Ivan the Great of Moscow

Citation preview

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

IVAN III from A . There?s ‘Cosmographie U n iv e r s e lle 1555

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW BY

J. L. I. FENNELL

LONDON

M A C M ILLA N & CO LTD NEW YORK • ST MARTIN’S PRESS

1961

Copyright © J . L. I. Fenneil 1961

MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED

London Bombay Calcutta Madras Melbourne THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED

Toronto ST MARTIN’S PRESS INC

New York

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE No monograph has yet been written in English on Ivan III. The purpose of this book is to give historians who know no Russian or have no access to Russian sources an insight into the growth and expansion of the state of Muscovy during the reign of Ivan III. It is an attempt to show the methods whereby perhaps the most intelligent and certainly the most successful of all the Muscovite princes increased his dominions and secured his control over them. As a study of the expansion of the grand principality of Moscow, this book is primarily concerned with foreign policy and diplo­ matic methods. No attempt has been made to study the culture of the period; nor have I discussed in detail the internal policy of Ivan III or the economic and social structure of the country during his reign. It is hoped, however, that the final section, which deals with the opposition to the government and the means used by the government to rid itself of its opponents, will shed some light on the aims and methods of Ivan's internal policy. The only work on Ivan III of similar scope and dimensions known to me is the late Professor К. V. Bazilevich's great mono­ graph, VneshnyayapolitikaRusskogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva (1952). Unfortunately I was unable to consult Professor L. V. Cherepnin's Obrazovanie Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva na Rusi v X IV -X V vekakh (i960) before completing this work. As for the question of transliteration, I have used the so-called “ British" system of latinization advocated by the Slavonic and East European Review (see W. K. Matthews, “The Latinisation of Cyrillic Characters", Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXX, No. 75, June 1952, pp. 531-49); I have, however, made one or two minor exceptions to this system: (a) e and ë are always transliterated e (thus, Elena, and not Yelena). (b) The endings -ый and -ий are always rendered by -y (Ostrozhsky, Vasily, etc.).

v

VI

PREFACE

(c) Both the so-called “soft sign”, the letter ь, and the “hard sign” ъ (when it occurs in the middle of a word) are rendered by an apostrophe (Kazan*, Tver*, ot’ezd). (id) In the spelling of feminine names ending in -iya, the ending -ia has been used throughout (Maria, Sofia, etc.). In the writing of place names I have called all places which are today within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. by the names given them by the Russians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus LVov, not Lw6w or Lemberg; Novgorodok, and not Nowogrôdek or Novogrudok. I have retained the Polish spelling of places in present-day Poland (Sandomierz, Belz, etc.). Obvious exceptions to the above rules are Moscow, Warsaw, Cracow and the Vistula. I would like to thank Dr. G. L. Lewis of Oxford University for his advice on the spelling of Tatar names, Miss Phyllis Hartnoll for her careful scrutiny of the text and her invaluable suggestions, and my wife for her help in reading the proofs and compiling the index.

CONTENTS СНЛРТЖЕ

PAGE

Preface I ntroduction I. M uscovy at the beginning of I van’s reign II. T he K azan* Campaigns of the S ixties

III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.

T

he

F all

of

N

v

ix i

19

29

o v g o ro d

T he Southern F lank 66 T he P eripheral Allies 106 W ar with L ithuania. T he first phase 132 T he F inal P reparations for the L ithuanian W ar 164 T he R usso-L ithuanian W ar (1500-1503) 211 IX. I nternal Conflicts 287 E pilogue 353 Appendices:

A. The views of Soviet Historians on the conspiracy of 1497 B. The views of Soviet Historians on the events of 1499 C. The Descendants of Ivan I D. The Descendants of Jagiello E. The Descendants of the Daughters of Vasily I G lo ssa ry L is t

of

I ndex

W

orks

C it e d

and

A b b r e v ia t io n s

355 358 362 363 364 365 367 373

L IS T OF MAPS PACE

The Russo-Lithuanian frontier area, showing lands ceded to Moscow in 1494.

142

The North-Western frontiers between Livonia, Pskov and Novgorod.

243

Western Muscovy, Lithuania and Eastern Poland, show­ ing lands ceded to Moscow in 1503.

271

Muscovy and Lithuania in 1462.

end of book

INTRODUCTION O n 22 January 1440 in a monastery near Novgorod a monk, renowned for his prophetic powers, proclaimed the birth of the future sovereign of Moscow and destroyer of the city state of Novgorod. “Today,” he exclaimed to the archbishop of Novgorod, “there is joy for the grand prince in Moscow. A son Timothy is bom, and he has been given the name of Ioann. He will be the heir of his father and he will destroy the customs of our city. To many lands he will be an object of fear.” Indeed, on that day, the festival of St Timothy, Maria Yaroslavna had borne her husband, Grand Prince Vasily II of Moscow, his first son. According to tradition, the infant was first given the name of the saint on whose day he was bom, and later, at his baptism, that of the choice of his parents — Ioann (Ivan). The great unifier of the Russian lands was bom into a principality racked by disunity and civil war. His father, Vasily II, since the earliest days of his reign had had to contend with rival claims to his right to bear the title of grand prince of Moscow. Yury, prince of Zvenigorod and Galich, the second eldest son of Dmitry Donskoy, had from the first contested the right of his nephew Vasily to rule. He claimed precedence over Vasily according to the ancient, and by now obsolete, law of succession by genealogical seniority. The conflict which followed the accession of the ten-year-old Vasily in 1425 was bitter and long drawn out. In 1433 Yury defeated his nephew in the field and assumed the title of grand prince. Seldom in Russian history had a prince sat more insecurely upon the throne. Abandoned by his sons and alarmed at the steady stream of Muscovite boyars deserting to Kolomna, which he had imprudently bestowed upon Vasily, the usurper soon invited his nephew to resume his rule, and himself departed to Galich in the north. Once re-established upon the throne, the eighteen-year-old Vasily felt that he could afford to be generous. He made peace with his uncle on the condition that the latter should not aid his three rebellious sons, who were busy stirring up trouble in the north. But Yury, who saw in an alliance with his sons his only hope of regaining the IX

X

IN T R O D U C T IO N

throne, had no intention of honouring his treaty with Vasily. Together with his three sons, Vasily Kosoy, Dmitry Shemyaka and Dmitry the Fair (Krasny), he collected a formidable force in the north. In the spring of 1434 he soundly defeated his nephew in the Rostov area, and once more occupied Moscow. But again his stay in the capital was of short duration, for in June of the same year he died. Vasily II lost little time in regaining his throne at the expense of Yury’s son, Vasily Kosoy, who had proclaimed himself grand prince at his father’s death. For his presumption and his efforts to prolong the internecine war Vasily Kosoy was eventually blinded at the orders of the grand prince — a deed which his family was never to forget. The first stage of the civil war was over. But Vasily II had still to reckon with his cousin, Dmitry Shemyaka.1 After die disastrous battle of Suzdal’ (1445), at which Vasily was captured by the Tatars, Dmitry urged the victorious khan, Ulug-Mahmed, not to release his prisoner. But Ulug-Mahmed, greedy for the vast ransom promised by the grand prince and distrusting the intentions of Dmitry, set Vasily free. Thereupon Dmitry began to plot in earnest. By spreading the rumour that Vasily had promised the khan to hand over Moscow to the Tatars and to retire to Tver*, he enticed to his side not only a considerable number of Muscovite boyars, merchants and even clergy, but also the grand prince of Tver’, Boris, and Ivan, prince of Mozhaysk. Little suspecting the treachery of his cousin, Vasily set off in February 1446 with his two sons Ivan and Yury on a pilgrimage to the Trinity monastery of St Sergius north-east of Moscow. No sooner had they left the city than Dmitry, informed by his fellow-conspirators of the grand prince’s every movement, entered from the west, seized Vasily’s mother and wife, plundered his treasury and set himself up as ruler. His faithful henchman, Ivan of Mozhaysk, was immediately despatched to the Trinity monastery, where on Sunday, 13 February, he arrested Vasily. Three days later in Moscow the grand prince was blinded at the command of the brother of the man whose eyes he had himself put out ten years previously. Together with his pregnant wife he was led off to a sorry exile in Uglich. Having blinded his cousin and, temporarily at least, denied him any possibility of interference in affairs of state, Dmitry now 1 Dmitry the Fair died in 1440.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

XI

bethought himself of the two princes, Ivan and Yury. The prince of Mozhaysk and his men, when arresting the grand prince, had shown no interest in the whereabouts of the children, who were hiding in the monastery. Either Dmitry had neglected to include their seizure in his orders, or, more likely, the conspirators, flushed with the importance of their captive, had forgotten their instructions. On the night of the coup d'état the boys fled from the monastery together with the few faithful retainers who had remained with them. They found refuge with the staunchest of Vasily’s supporters, the Ryapolovskys, who moved them to a place of hiding in the comparative safety of Murom on the lower Oka. Some two months later Dmitry learned of their whereabouts from his agents. By now the usurper felt himself as insecure upon the throne as his father had thirteen years before. He dared not incur further the indignation of the people by openly arresting the princes. Instead he decided on guile. Summoning Iona, bishop of Ryazan’ and future metropolitan of Moscow, Dmitry requested him to take the children under his protection, whereupon their father would be released and the family granted estates sufficient for their needs. For his efforts the bishop was promised elevation to the dignity of metropolitan. After hearing Iona’s words, the Ryapolovskys agreed to let the princes depart with him. Shemyaka’s perfidy soon became manifest. On the third day after their arrival at Peryaslavl*, Ivan and Yury were despatched to Uglich, where they joined their parents in exile and imprisonment. Within the principality of Moscow the forces of discontent grew daily. If the crime of blinding the grand prince in retaliation could be overlooked, Shemyaka’s violation of his promise to Iona incensed the loyal followers of the rightful grand prince. Faced with the possibility of an armed attempt to free Vasily and daily admonished by Iona, Shemyaka eventually agreed to release his captives. A dramatic scene of reconciliation took place in Uglich in the autumn of 1446. In an outburst of self-abasement Vasily admitted responsibility for the parlous state of affairs in Muscovy, declared himself worthy of death and expressed his gratitude to his cousin for allowing him to live and to atone for his sins. Shemyaka, after extracting an oath from Vasily to recognize him as grand prince, allowed him and his family to go to Vologda. His action was premature. Released from his oath by the abbot of

Xll

IN T R O D U C T IO N

the White Lake monastery of St Cyril, Vasily proceded to Tver*, where he was joined by many of his previous supporters. A treaty of friendship was drawn up with Boris Alexandrovich, grand prince of Tver’, and cemented by the betrothal of the six-year-old Prince Ivan to Boris’s daughter Maria. Shemyaka could no longer withstand the superior forces of his rival. Moscow fell without a struggle. On 17 February 1447, one year and one day after being blinded there, Vasily entered die city in triumph. The civil war was virtually at an end. The supremacy of Vasily had been vindicated. For the remaining fifteen years of Vasily’s reign Ivan was to learn the art of ruling at his father’s side and to acquaint himself with the problems of warfare conducted against both internal and external enemies. We first hear of him participating in the final punitive campaign against the fugitive Dmitry Shemyaka early in 1452. At the age of twelve he was placed — nominally, one can only presume — in command of an expedition to those regions in the extreme north where Shemyaka was operating. The pretender, on hearing the news of the approach of the Muscovite forces, hurriedly left the besieged city of Ustyug at the confluence of the Yug and Sukhona rivers, and fled to the northern stretches of the Dvina. While a combined force under Prince Vasily Yaroslavovich of Serpukhov was sent to Ustyug, Ivan moved north from his headquarters at Galich, along the river Sukhona, to the area of the river Kokshenga, evidently a strong­ hold of Shemyaka’s supporters. Again Shemyaka fled, this time to Novgorod, where in the following year he was poisoned. Reinforced by troops under command of Ulug-Mahmed’s son, the vassal Tatar tsarevich Yakub, Ivan’s forces conducted successful moppingup operations in the Kokshenga area and returned south via Vologda with much booty and many prisoners of war. His advance units, evidently in pursuit of Shemyaka, reached as far north as the junction of the rivers Vaga and Dvina.1 During the final ten years of Vasily’s reign the chronicles record few of Ivan’s activities. At the age of twelve he was married to Princess Maria of Tver* (4 July 1452). Six years later his first son, Ivan, was bom. His only recorded independent military exploit was undertaken at the end of 1458 or in the beginning of 1459 when the Tatars of Seyyid Ahmed’s Dnepr horde attempted an incursion from the south. Ivan was sent with a large force to the 1 See PSRL VIII/125; XXV/272; l/L/82-3.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

xiii

Oka river, where the Tatars were prevented from crossing and forced to withdraw. The victory was evidently a considerable one, for the metropolitan Iona founded a stone church in Moscow to celebrate the occasion.1

Vasily II died on 27 March 1462. His last illness was short and painful. Suffering from tabes, he ordered smouldering tinder to be applied to various parts of his body, a treatment which in no way alleviated his suffering. Covered with festering sores as a result of this crude therapy, he was refused his last request — to take the tonsure and die, as all his predecessors had died, a monk. His will, written probably during the last weeks of his life,2 from a territorial, fiscal and political point of view established the predominance of Ivan over his younger brothers. Apart from the grand principality — in other words, the sovereign lordship over the state of Moscow — Ivan was granted one-third of all revenues from the city of Moscow, fifteen major towns and the land of Vyatka, which, though virtually subjugated in 1459 by Vasily II, still in fact remained a free and independent city state. The remaining two-thirds of the Moscow revenues and the rest of the territory of Muscovy were split up between Ivan’s brothers and his mother. Yury, the eldest brother, was given the important appanage of Dmitrov to the north of Moscow and, to the west and south-west, the lands of Serpukhov, Khotun’, Medyn’ and Mozhaysk. Andrey the Elder received the northern districts of Uglich and Bezhetsky Verkh and also the town of Zvenigorod, due west of Moscow on the river Moskva. To Boris’s lot fell the lands bordering Lithuania in the west — Volokolamsk (Volok Lamsky) and Rzhev, as well as the town of Ruza (north-east of Mozhaysk), while Andrey the Younger was granted the territories of Vologda in the extreme north of the grand principality and the lands beyond the Kubensky Lake (the Kubena district) and the White Lake (Zaozer’e). Vasily’s widow, the Grand Princess Maria Yaroslavna, whose authority her sons were adjured to respect, was liberally endowed with scattered districts and villages; in addition she was granted, according to the traditional practice, 1 See P S R L VIII/147; XXV/275-6. . 8 For the question of the dating of Vasily’s will, see L. V. Cherepnin, RFA, Vol. I , pp. 158—9. ТЪе will itself is printed in DDG, No. 61, pp. i93"~9-

XIV

IN T R O D U C T IO N

a number of districts within the appanages of each of her sons. These districts, however, she held on a basis of life tenure only — on her death they were to revert to her sons. Furthermore she was granted life-long control over the still independent principality of Rostov, whose princes were to enjoy the same rights they had enjoyed under Vasily II. As to the escheats of the appanage princes, no mention was made of them in the will; the question of what was to happen to the lands of a prince who died childless or intestate was left open. This omission on the part of Vasily, whether intentional or unintentional, was later to lead to grave differences of opinion between the appanage princes and their sovereign brother. Politically the authority of the grand prince was stressed in Vasily’s exhortation to his younger sons to “respect and obey [their] elder brother in place of their father”. Ivan was to treat his brothers “ in brotherly fashion, without offence”. In a final clause, intended perhaps to maintain friendly relations between Moscow and Lithuania, Vasily entrusted his widow and sons to the care of “his brother the king of Poland and grand prince of Lithuania, Casimir”, according to the terms of the treaty of friendship and non-aggression signed in 1449. Both Ivan and Casimir paid little heed to this hopeful and somewhat naïve gesture. Indeed, Ivan’s reign marked the beginning of a long and bitter struggle between the two great powers of Eastern Europe. The balance of power which Vasily had hoped for at the end of his reign was soon to be disrupted.

CHAPTER I ★

MUSCOVY AT TH E B E G I N N I N G OF IVAN’S R EI GN

hen Ivan succeeded his father in 1462 the unification of the Muscovite state, though by now a foregone con­ clusion, was by no means complete. By the end of Vasily’s reign the hegemony of Moscow over the other G Russian principalities and states had been confirmed. But the principalities of Tver*, Ryazan’, Rostov and Yaroslavl’, as well as the free cities of Novgorod, Pskov and Khlynov (Vyatka), techni­ cally owed no allegiance to the grand prince. Furthermore, the Russian lands in the south-west along the Dnepr and the upper reaches of the Oka were politically outside the sphere of Moscow’s influence. A brief survey of the various Russian principalities and states as well as their external neighbours will perhaps help to clarify the political situation at the beginning of Ivan’s reign and put into true perspective the internal and external problems which faced the grand prince on his accession. A glance at the map will show the territorial extent of the grand principality of Moscow in 1462 — that is, of the lands under the direct control of the grand prince and the appanages of his brothers. Apart from the lands bounded by the Volga in the north and the Oka in the south (excluding the wedge formed by the principalities of Tver’, Yaroslavl’ and Rostov) the territory of the grand prince extended far to the north in the old principa­ lities of Beloozero, Kostroma and Galich, and north-east along the Sukhona river as far as the junction of the Northern Dvina and the Vychegda rivers, and including the city of Ustyug. In the east his lands stretched on both sides of the Volga as far as the rivers Vetluga and Sura in the old principality of Suzdal’ — Nizhny Novgorod. In the south the boundary was more or less the Oka

W

I

2

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

westwards to Kaluga and thence the Ugra as far as its most northern bend. Only the southernmost bulge of the Oka was in the hands of the grand prince of Ryazan’; but on either side of this bulge Muscovite territory extended south of the Oka — in the east, in the confines of the old principality of Murom, and in the west, in the district of Tula. In the west the district of Rzhev, including the upper waters of the Volga, formed a wedge between the lands of Tver* and Lithuania. Torzhok and its district on the northern tributary of the Volga, the Tvertsa, was held conjointly by Moscow and Novgorod. Of the four independent Great Russian principalities neighbour­ ing the grand principality of Moscow, Tver* was both politically and territorially the most important and possessed at the beginning of Ivan’s reign a greater degree of independence than the others. Situated on the upper reaches of the Volga between Zubtsov in the west and Kashin (on the river Kashinka, a few miles from its confluence with the Volga) in the east, the state of Tver’ had since the end of the thirteenth century formed a buffer between its three great neighbours — Novgorod in the north, Moscow in the south and Lithuania in the west. Economically its importance was due mainly to its geographical position, situated as it was on the principal trade route between Novgorod and the eastern Russian lands. The political and economic role Tver’ played, however, in the two centuries preceeding Ivan’s accession was by no means passive. By the beginning of the fourteenth century the prince of Tver’, which only little over half a century earlier had become a principality and an episcopal see, was strong enough to set himself up as candidate for — and win — the grand princely throne of Vladimir. It was the beginning of a long rivalry with Moscow for political hegemony among the Russian principalities and for suzerainty over Novgorod. The first phase ended disastrously for Tver’ in 1327, when, after a bloody anti-Tatar uprising, in which most of the Tatars in Tver’ were butchered, Ivan I of Moscow led a mixed force of Russians and Tatars against the principality. The main towns were sacked, thousands were taken prisoner and the grand prince was forced to flee. Not until the end of the sixties did Tver’ sufficiently recover to oppose Moscow again; but no longer could she oppose Moscow on her own. After a series of internecine clashes between the various members of the Tverite princely family, there emerged a prince strong and popular enough

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

3

to attempt to repeat the exploits of his father and grandfather. But the efforts of Mikhail Alexandrovich were in vain, for his ally and brother-in-law, Olgerd of Lithuania, looked upon the campaigns undertaken with Tver* against Moscow (1368-72) more as diversionary raids than as full-scale invasions. And in 1375, when Dmitry of Moscow together with the majority of the Russian princes besieged Tver*, no help came from Olgerd. Mikhail was obliged to surrender, to acknowledge himself as *‘younger brother* *of Dmitry and to renounce his friendship with Lithuania. Alone he retained the hollow title of grand prince of Tver*. Yet this crushing defeat at the hands of Moscow, which seemingly reduced Mikhail to the level of Dmitry’s vassal, did not in fact lead to the end of Tver* ’s independence. Indeed, for a whole cen­ tury she retained her autonomy. By careful diplomacy, by skilful manoeuvring between Lithuania and Moscow and by avoiding embroilment in the conflicts of her neighbours when this was unfavourable to her policy, she managed to remain compact and unified. The greatest of her princes, Boris Alexandrovich (142561), great-grandson of Mikhail Alexandrovich, sided now with Lithuania, now with Moscow. In 1427 and 1449 he concluded treaties with Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania and King Casimir of Poland respectively, whereby Tver* was recognized to lie within the Lithuanian sphere of influence. In the mid fifties, when Vasily IPs authority had been finally consolidated, he concluded a treaty with Moscow, agreeing to a common foreign policy and thus breaking finally his political ties with Lithuania. Henceforth Boris would act in unison with Vasily against all external enemies, be they Tatars, Lithuanians, Poles or Germans. Boris died the year before Ivan’s accession, leaving to his son Mikhail (1461-85) his small but compact state, an independent and individualistic principality with a flourishing culture and tradition of its own. The old antagonism towards Moscow had disappeared. Only once more did a prince of Tver* appeal to Lithuania for help, and then it was too late. From the beginning of Ivan’s reign Tver’ was the friend and ally of Moscow, even during the latter’s conflict with Novgorod. It was only a question of time before the thin strip of territory between the lands of Moscow and the empire of Novgorod was annexed by the gatherer of the Russian lands. To the south of Muscovite territory lay the lands of the grand principality of Ryazan’, the northernmost tip of which extended

4

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

beyond the Oka bulge on either side of Pereyaslavl'-Ryazansky. On the east and the west the territory of Ryazan' was bounded roughly by the upper reaches of the rivers Tsna and Don. After the Tatar depredations of the thirteenth century Ryazan' was no match for Moscow at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Furthermore, the grand principality was weakened by an almost permanent internal feud between the two centres of Pereyaslavl' (which had succeeded old Ryazan’ as capital after the latter's destruction by the Tatars in 1237) and Pronsk, a conflict in which Moscow was always ready to interfere. By the reign of Ivan I, Ryazan' had not only lost to Moscow valuable territory on the Oka (Kolomna was annexed by Moscow in 1301) but had virtually fallen under Muscovite control and had little claim for independ­ ence. Only under Grand Prince Oleg Ivanovich (1351-1402) did the fortunes of Ryazan' revive and the principality acquire a measure of independence; indeed, Oleg even succeeded in attracting to his service the princes of Kozel’sk, Pronsk, Murom and Elets, thus temporarily extending his frontiers. But the struggle with Moscow continued, ever more increasingly to the detriment of Ryazan’. The descendants of Oleg were unable to prevent the gradual transition from independence to submission. His grandson, Ivan Fedorovich (1427-56), pursued a policy of tacking between Lithuania and whosoever held the throne of Moscow, a policy similar to that of Boris Alexandrovich of Tver'. In 1427 he and the grand prince of Pronsk entered into an agree­ ment with Vitovt of Lithuania, which not only bound them to the service of Vitovt, thus depriving them of any possibility of independent foreign policy, but also obliged them to side with Lithuania in the eventuality of a conflict with Moscow.1 Vitovt, indeed, could order his vassals in Ryazan' to attack Moscow when he pleased. The treaty appears, however, to have lapsed, for after Vitovt's death in 1430 there is no evidence of any ties between Ryazan’ and Lithuania. From now on the allegiance of the grand prince of Ryazan' lay towards the ruler of Moscow alone. In the initial stages of the civil war Ivan Fedorovich swore allegiance to Vasily II. In 1437 this allegiance was transferred to Yury. Ten years later the triumphant Vasily signed a treaty with Ivan, who 1 See A E, Vol. I, Nos. 25 and 26 and DDG, pp. 67-9, where the date is given as “around 1430м* See, however, К . V. Bazilevich, VP, p. 39, note 3. Cf. also Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, p. 296, note 122, who puts the date at 1429.

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

5

agreed to hold Vasily as his “elder brother” and to enter into no negotiations with Lithuania unless Moscow be at peace with Lithuania. Should Lithuania wish to conclude a pact of friendship with Ryazan’, then Ryazan* might agree only after consultation with Vasily II. The treaty of 1447, indeed, marked the end of Ryazan’*s vacillation. Henceforward her economic and political links with Moscow were too strong to break. At his death in 1456 Ivan Fedorovich entrusted his principality and his eight-year-old son Vasily to the care of Vasily II of Moscow, who sent his governors to rule in Ryazan’. Vasily Ivanovich, however, was permitted to return to Ryazan’ at the end of 1463. His loyalty to the new grand prince of Moscow was cemented in January 1464 when he was married to Ivan I l l ’s sister. From now on he ruled his state as the vassal of Ivan III although Ryazan* was not form­ ally annexed until 1521. The two remaining independent principalities of Rostov and Yaroslavl* were independent in name only. Situated on either side of the Volga at its northernmost bend and surrounding Lake Nero in the south, the two adjacent principalities were all but encircled by Muscovite possessions. Through their lands ran the shortest and most convenient route connecting Moscow with the districts north of the Volga and with the northern possessions of Novgorod. Together they represented a mere fragment of the old and powerful principality of Rostov, which had been carved up into minor states (including Yaroslavl’) at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Throughout the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth century both principalities lost land to Moscow and at the same time the last vestiges of political independ­ ence; indeed, from the reign of Dmitry Donskoy the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl’ were little more than the vassals of the grand prince. Their territories, however, were only formally annexed at the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign. In 1463 Alexandr Fedorovich of Yaroslavl’ was forced to yield his lands to Ivan III; in 1474 Ivan Ivanovich of Rostov sold to Moscow what remained of his principality. To the north-west, north and north-east of the grand principality of Moscow lay the independent republic of Novgorod and her vast northern empire. The hub of the Novgorodian state was the city of Novgorod, situated on both banks of the river Volkhov just north of Lake Il’men*. The territory of the Novgorodian

6

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

state proper was centred around Lake Il'men*, in the basin of the four rivers running into it (Volkhov, Msta, Lovat’ and Shelon*), and also in the basin of the rivers Luga and Neva. To the north and east of Lakes Ladoga and Onega stretched the great colonies of Novgorod, reaching from the eastern borders of Finland in the west to the Urals in the east. The wealthiest of these colonies was the Zavoloch’e in the basin of the Northern Dvina, north of Vologda and Ustyug; further east were the districts of Perm’, Pechora and Yugra, which lay on both slopes of the Northern Urals. In the extreme north-west was the district of Tre on the northern shores of the White Sea, already in the first half of the twelfth century mentioned as part of the lands of Novgorod.1 Novgorod’s territory was flanked in the west by the lands of her sister state, the republic of Pskov. The city of Pskov itself, on the Velikaya river, lay roughly in the centre of the long strip of Pskovite territory, and was linked by waterways with all the neighbouring countries — and above all with the Baltic. The lands belonging to the republic ran north and south in the basins of the rivers Plyusa and Velikaya and of Lake Chudskoe, a strip of territory some three hundred versts long and a hundred versts wide. Owing to her position between her aggressive neighbours in the west — the Livonian knights along the whole of her western border and the Lithuanians on the south-west — and Novgorod in the east, Pskov had suffered repeatedly throughout her history, for her land formed a natural arena for the struggles between Novgorod and the west. Yet this small city state, for all its unfortunate geographical position, managed not only to achieve independence but also to keep out the Germans and Lithuanians, whose forces were so often numerically superior to those at its disposal. In the earliest days Pskov was merely a province (prigorod) of Novgorod, governed by Novgorodian officials, in the election of whom Pskov had no say. Gradually, however, the Pskovites learned to rely on themselves alone in their constant clashes with their western neighbours, for although Novgorod was usually ready to carry the war into German territory, she could not always be relied upon to assist in repelling the reprisal raids which invariably followed. The assumption of autonomy was gradual. Only in 1348 did Novgorod finally renounce all authority over Pskov. Henceforth the Pskovites had the right to elect as governor 1 The early history of Novgorod-Moscow relations is dealt with in Chapter III.

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

J

a prince of their own choice, who was usually little more than a hired military commander, and to appoint locally their own chief civic officials. Only in ecclesiastical matters did Pskov remain dependent on Novgorod; for in spite of the frequent demands of her citizens, no separate bishopric was created in Pskov; and although certain concessions concerning the rights of the Pskovite clergy were made in 1348, the church of Pskov remained within the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Novgorod. During the fourteenth century Pskov had accepted princes both from Lithuania and from Moscow. But from the beginning of the fifteenth century, when Vitovt of Lithuania began to show an active interest in the two Russian republics, the majority of the princes of Pskov were sent, or at any rate confirmed in their appointment, by the grand prince of Moscow. Gradually the power of the prince-governor increased at the expense of the veche, and by the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign, Pskov, though still nominally independent, was finally under the control of the grand prince, who guided the internal and external affairs of the republic. Somewhat similar in its political structure to Pskov and Novgorod, in that it retained a veche (but had no prince), was the “free city” of Vyatka, or Khlynov as it was known until the end of the eighteenth century,1 which at the beginning of Ivan’s reign retained a semblance of autonomy. The lands of Vyatka lay to the east of the river Vetluga along the upper reaches of the river Vyatka, and were of vital importance to the Muscovites for carrying out invasions into Kazan’ territory in the south. Founded by the Novgorodians in the last quarter of the twelfth century, Vyatka was conquered by the Tatars at the end of the fourteenth century. From then on the people of Vyatka became tributaries of the Tatars and a source of anxiety for the eastern border lands of Muscovy and their north-western neighbours in Ustyug and along the Northern Dvina, against whom they carried out predatory raids. Both Vasily I and Vasily II sent expeditions to subjugate Vyatka, but only in 1459 did Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev succeed in forcing the men of Vyatka to “bow submission to the grand prince according to his entire will, as is fitting to a sovereign”.2 However, this act of submission appears to have been 1 It was rechristened Kirov by the Soviets. * See UL{84. Vernadsky considers the expedition to have been in the nature of a reprisal for the aid given Shemyaka by Vyatka. (Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, pp. 328-9.)

8

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

quickly forgotten, for in later years we read of obstruction and unco-operativeness on the part of Vyatka in a Muscovite expedi­ tion against Kazan’; and in the second half of the eighties raids against Ustyug were resumed. It was not until 1489 that Vyatka was finally subdued and annexed. The largest and by far the most powerful of all Muscovy’s neighbours was the grand principality of Lithuania in the west. Early in the thirteenth century the aggressive and virile pagan Lithuanian tribes, inhabiting the basins of the lower Neman (Nemunas), Shventoy and Viliya rivers, emerged as a single state under a powerful ruler, Mendovg (Mindaugas in Lithuanian). Harassed in the west and the north by the German knights of the Teutonic and Livonian Orders, the Lithuanians began to spread southwards and eastwards. By the forties of the thirteenth century Mendovg had established his authority in so-called Black Russia in the basin of the upper Neman. But it was in the fourteenth century and the early years of the fifteenth century that the extraordinary growth of the Lithuanian state took place. Under three outstanding rulers, Gedymin (Gediminas), Olgerd (Algirdas) and Vitovt (Vitautas), Lithuanian influence spread all over the West Russian lands including modem White Russia and the Ukraine — from the district of Polotsk in the north to eastern Podolia and even the Black Sea steppes between the Dnepr and the Dnestr in the south; from the lands of Smolensk and Kiev in the east to Volhynia and the land of Berest’e (Brest-Litovsk) on the Western Bug. Of all the former West Russian lands only Galicia and the southern tip of Volhynia were incorporated into Poland. The incorporation of the West Russian lands into the state of Lithuania was achieved on the whole by peaceful means. The rulers of Lithuania, in establishing their princes or governors in newly annexed territories, saw to it that the old order was as little disturbed as possible. And indeed the inhabitants of the West Russian lands, particularly in the south, welcomed the efficient and beneficial protection of Gedymin and his large family. After the disastrous Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century — which, let it be noted, had not touched the territory of Lithuania proper — the West Russian principalities, particularly the districts of Chemigov-Seversky, Pereyaslavl’, Kiev and Podolia, had suffered economically and politically. The Tatar yoke retarded their

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN*S REIGN

9

economic development and put an end to their independence. Many of the larger districts were split up into a number of petty principalities, often entirely isolated from one another politically. There was no one dynasty powerful or fortunate enough to play the same role as Moscow or Tver* played in North-East Russia. It was small wonder that these lands had neither the strength nor the desire to resist the penetration and protection of the Lithuanians. And when in later days the Muscovites overtly wooed the support of the West Russian princelings in an effort to cause large-scale defections, it says much for the wisdom of Lithuanian “colonialism” that so few were willing to exchange Vilna for Moscow. As far as can be seen from available sources, the West Russian lands under Lithuanian dominion were given remarkable freedom and were bound to their suzerain by the slenderest of ties. This did not so much apply to the Russian lands adjoining Aukstaitia (Upper Lithuania), such as Black Russia, Podlyash’e and Poles’e, which were closely bound, administratively and politically, to the seat of government in Vilna. It was most evident in the “outer” districts — Podolia and Volhynia and the lands of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Chemigov-Seversky and Kiev. Here all the previous social and political institutions were left intact. Neither language nor faith was tampered with; indeed the Lithuanian rule was remarkable for the spread of Russian culture into Lithuania. Far from forcing their own institutions upon the Russians, the Lithuanians wisely assimilated those of their more civilised subjects. Governmental control was in most cases implemented by the simple process of removing the local Ryurikovich prince and replacing him with a member of the reigning Lithuanian dynasty or a deputy governor. The new ruler, together with the old boyars, was responsible for finance, justice and administration; the landowners were obliged to do military service for the grand prince; certain taxes were levied on the population and certain portions within the Russian lands were transferred to the ownership of the grand prince. In other words conditions remained much the same as they had been before Lithuanian control. Even Vitovt’s efforts at the end of the fourteenth century to centralise and strengthen his power as grand prince by replacing most of the Gedyminovich princes in the “outer” districts with his own representatives made little

IO

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

noticeable difference to the political and cultural life of the Russian lands. Most indicative of the shrewdness — or looseness — of Lithuanian control was the almost complete absence of evidence of Russian opposition to domination by the grand princes of Lithuania. There had been, it is true, some signs of an anti-Lithuanian movement in Smolensk at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and again in 1440 when the populace rose up to remove the governor. There were also signs of unrest in Volhynia and Kiev after the murder of Grand Prince Sigismund in 1440. But these were symptomatic of a desire rather for a greater degree of independence from the central authority of the grand prince than for complete autonomy or separatism. Certainly throughout the one and a half centuries before Ivan I l l ’s reign there is little or no evidence of any pro-Muscovite movement among the Russian subjects of the grand prince of Lithuania. Still looser was Lithuanian control over the so-called Verkhovsky principalities on the upper reaches of the Oka river, a district in which Moscow was later to show a lively interest and which was to become one of the main pawns in the struggle between Moscow and Lithuania at the end of the fifteenth century. After the Mongol invasion the area, at that time the eastern portion of the principality of Chernigov, was split into a number of minor principalities between the descendants of the three younger sons of Prince Mikhail of Chernigov. Some of the southern towns came under Lithuanian influence during the mid-fourteenth century, but the position of the Upper Oka princes in general vis-à-vis the grand prince appears only to have been regularized during the rule of Vitovt. There was no question of formal annexion by Lithuania. The Verkhovsky princes were bound by no ties of vassalage to the grand prince of Lithuania. They merely agreed to pay dues to and render military service to him, in return for a pledge of armed protection against all aggressors. In other words the border princes were not, properly speaking, subjects of the Lithuanian grand prince, although they recognized that their lands lay within his sphere of influence. Perhaps the tolerant policy of the Lithuanian grand princes towards their Russian subjects is best illustrated by the official State attitude towards the Greek Orthodox Church, to which the vast majority of the Russian population belonged. Before the Union of Poland and Lithuania of 1386, when Jagiello, grand

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

II

prince of Lithuania, was accepted into the Catholic Church and crowned king of Poland, the Greek Orthodox faith was not tampered with by the heathen Lithuanians, and the proselytizing efforts of Rome met with little succcess in Lithuania. As a direct result of the Union the Catholic Church gained ground at the expense of the Orthodox, particularly on purely Lithuanian territory. All Lithuanians were to be converted to Catholicism; they were even forbidden to marry Russians unless the latter accepted their new faith. The growth of Russian Orthodoxy was checked by limiting the building of churches. The political power of the bishops was curtailed by their exclusion from the Council of the grand prince, of which the Catholic bishops were ex officio members. Yet for all these measures, designed to limit the expan­ sion of the Russian Church, there is no evidence of anything but the most benevolent attitude of the grand princes towards the faith of the majority of their subjects, particularly of those in purely Russian territory. There is no evidence of State interference in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Orthodox bishops; nor is there any indication of attempts to secularize or even limit the landed possessions of the Orthodox clergy. The rulers of Lithuania saw clearly that persecution of the Russian Church in their territory would cause as much, if not more, discontent as would unnecessary meddling in the social and political institutions of their Russian subjects; furthermore it would provide their watchful neighbours in the east with the opportunity of proclaiming a holy war in the name of Orthodoxy. Whatever the relationship of the grand prince of Lithuania to the Orthodox Church, he could scarcely view with favour the recognition by the West Russian clergy of the metropolitan of Moscow as metropolitan of all Russia — i.e. of Muscovite and Lithuanian Russia; and from the beginning of the fourteenth century, when the metropolitan of Kiev moved his seat to NorthEast Russia, attempts were made to establish an independent see in Kiev for the Lithuanian Orthodox Church. In 1458 the question was finally settled when Grigory “the Bulgarian”, a pupil of the Uniate metropolitan of Moscow, Isidor, was con­ secrated “metropolita Chieuensis et Lithuaniensis et totius Russie inferioris”. Whatever Grigory’s attitude to Rome — and there can be no doubt that as a pupil of Isidor and a creature of the pope he was a staunch supporter of Union with the Roman Church —

12

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

he clearly refrained from Uniate activities and propaganda during his tenure of the metropolitanate of Kiev. In spite of the efforts of Metropolitan Iona of Moscow to persuade the Orthodox in Lithuania not to recognize Grigory’s authority, all the bishops, with one exception, appear to have supported their own metro­ politan and to have shown no desire to transfer their allegiance to the “metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia”. Before we leave Lithuania a word must be said about her relations with her western neighbour, Poland. Before the Union of 1386, whereby Jagiello became king of Poland, the grand princes of Lithuania had enjoyed complete independence. The terms of the treaty of Krevo (1385) implied the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland; but Lithuania appears to have retained de facto complete independence and King Jagiello, or Ladislas II as he was known after his conversion and coronation, was forced to recognize his cousin Vitovt as ruler of Lithuania. In 1413 a new treaty of Union was drawn up in Gorodlo (Horodto). It was agreed that, while the principle of Lithuania’s incorporation into Poland was reaffirmed, Lithuania should have a separate ruler after Vitovt’s death. Vitovt died in 1430 and his death was followed by a long period of civil war between the two rival claimants for the grand princely throne, Svidrigaylo (Jagiello’s brother) and Sigismund (Vitovt’s brother). Sigismund, who emerged victorious in the struggle, was murdered by his Lithuanian subjects in 1440 and a new phase in Lithuanian-Polish relations began. A section of the Lithuanian nobility managed to appoint their own candidate, Casimir, the son of Jagiello (died 1434) and brother of the new king of Poland, Ladislas III, as grand prince, in spite of the opposition of the Poles who merely wanted him to be the king’s representative in Vilna. After the death of Ladislas III (1444) Casimir was elected king by the Polish parliament. In 1447 he was crowned king of Poland. Once again Poland and Lithuania were united under a single crown and so remained until Casimir’s death in 1492. In the east and in the south Moscow was faced with neighbours and problems of an entirely different kind. The Tatars of the Golden Horde, based on their capital of Saray on the lower reaches of the Volga, had by 1462 long ceased to be a power capable of imposing its will either on Moscow or on Lithuania. Yet the khanate of the Golden Horde and the two splinter khanate

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

13

of Kazan’ and the Crimea were able throughout much of Ivan I l l ’s reign to harass or embarrass their Russian neighbours sufficiently to cost the latter considerable military or diplomatic efforts. Indeed, in view of these efforts the Tatar danger facing Muscovy in the second half of the fifteenth century must not be under­ estimated. The Golden Horde — or, as it was frequently called by the Russian chroniclers, the Great Horde — had, owing to the feudal wars of the fourteenth century and the intervention of Tamerlane, lost most traces of its former power by the early fifteenth century and had been reduced to little more than a nomadic kingdom based on the lower Volga basin. Yet the Horde was still capable of being a nuisance to its neighbours; during the two decades before Ivan I l l ’s reign the chronicles record frequent Tatar incursions from the Golden Horde and its eastern neighbours, the Nogay Horde, from the area of the river Yaik north of the Caspian Sea. And whether or not tribute was regularly paid to the khan of the Golden Horde, the prince of Moscow was still, in name at least, a vassal of the Tatar “tsar”. But Moscow was to have greater powers to contend with in the east and in the south than the relics of the Golden Horde. The first half of the fifteenth century saw the formation of two separate and independent hordes — the khanates of the Crimea and of Kazan’. The Crimean Tatars, who appear to have achieved a certain degree of independence from die Golden Horde as early as the third decade of the fifteenth century under the first khan of the Girey dynasty, Hajji, were by the middle of the century an entirely autonomous state. Flanked on their northern border along the lower Dnepr by the Ukrainian possessions of Lithuania, the Crimean Tatars looked at first to Lithuania and Poland for support. The Lithuanians, anxious to maintain a foothold on the mouth of the Dnepr and to secure their southern frontiers against unexpected raids, must have welcomed their Tatar neighbours as a valuable ally, doubtless intending to use them against Moscow, should the need arise. Indeed, at the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign the westernmost Tatar horde presented a potential, though dormant, threat to Muscovy of considerable gravity — a threat which could only be removed by skilful diplomatic manoeuvring. Of greater immediate danger to the Muscovite principality was the khanate of Kazan’. Situated in the area of the old Bulgar State on the middle reaches of the Volga, the khanate constituted a

4

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

greater strategic threat to the lands of Muscovy than either the Crimean or the Great Horde; for the raiding grounds of the Suzdal’-Nizhny Novgorod territory were in far easier striking distance from Kazan* than were the lands of Ryazan*, say, from the Crimea or the lower Volga. While historians disagree as to the date of the origin and even the name of the founder of the khanate, it seems indisputable that by 1445 there already existed an independent Tatar Horde in Kazan*. In that same year the future khan, Mahmudek, Ulug-Mahmed*s son, had inflicted a serious defeat on Vasily II near Suzdal* and had succeeded in capturing the grand prince himself, who was only released after payment of an enormous ransom. Encouraged by this resounding and totally unexpected victory, the khan, it appears, determined to restore Russia to her former state of vassaldom by demanding regular payment of tribute. Nor did he hesitate to meddle in Russia’s internal affairs. By treating privately with Dmitry Shemyaka he was clearly attempting the old Tatar game of playing off one Russian prince against another. But Vasily was able to play at the same game. In 1446 he willingly accepted into his service two Tatar tsarevichiy Kasim and Yakub, who had fled, presumably together with their armies, from their brother Mahmudek. That they served the grand prince faithfully, and that their service was of the utmost value to Moscow, there can be no doubt. We find them participating in campaigns against Dmitry Shemyaka in the north and against the Tatars of the Golden Horde in the south. As a reward for his efforts Kasim was granted the town of Gorodets on the Oka (later called Kasimov in his memory) in the Meshchera district of Ryazan’ — probably in 1452. From a strategical point of view the foundation of this first “ Russian appanage khanate”, as one historian has called it,1was of supreme importance. It meant that the grand prince of Moscow had in his vassal ruler of Kasimov not only a defender of Moscow’s natural boundary, the Oka, against Tatar incursions from the south and the east, but also a highly competent adviser on Tatar affairs. Furthermore Kasimov proved later to be useful as a nursery for Muscovite puppet khans; a Kasimov-bred tsarevich was usually — from the Muscovite point of view — the best candidate for the throne of Kazan* whenever it was vacated as a result of Russian intrigue or Russian arms. 1See P. B. Struve, Sotsid 'naya i ekonomicheskaya istoriya Rossii, p. 212.

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN*S REIGN

15

Perhaps the desertion of Kasim and Yakub and the formation of a pro-Muscovite khanate on Russian soil (a tempting bait for would-be Tatar deserters in the future) served as a warning to Mahmudek. At any rate there is no evidence of serious clashes between Kazan’ and Moscow during the fifties of the fifteenth century. During the last year but one of his reign, however, Vasily II mounted an expedition against Kazan’, which was called off at an early stage when the Tatars for unknown reasons sued for peace.1 This was the first of a series of aggressive eastward moves on the part of the Russian princes which culminated some ninety years later in the capture of Kazan’ by Ivan IV. Of course, the extraordinary attention paid by Moscow to Kazan’, particularly during the early years of Ivan I l l ’s reign, cannot be explained by strategical considerations alone. Kazan* was of vital importance to Moscow’s eastern commerce, especially at a time when trade with Turkey (via the Crimea) was not yet on an organized basis and Astrakhan* (yet another independent khanate, which had formed at the end of the i45o*s) was separated from Moscow by the Tatars of the Great Horde. Before leaving Muscovy’s neighbours, mention must be made of the eastern Baltic provinces. Only the thin strip of land that was the district of Pskov and the western portion of Novgorod’s possessions separated Muscovy from the Livonian knights of the Teutonic Order, who were in virtual occupation of what is now known as the Soviet Republics of Esthonia and Latvia but what was then called Livonia. Ever since the thirteenth century, when the German knights had been repelled in their Drang nach Osten by Alexandr Nevsky, Novgorod and, in particular, Pskov had been under intermittent pressure from their western neigh­ bours. Russo-German clashes followed a monotonous pattern. The Livonian Order — sometimes egged on by the Lithuanians — would attack the lands of Pskov, seldom getting beyond her eastern frontiers; the Pskovites, and often the Novgorodians as well, would retaliate by penetrating as far as was practical into Livonian territory. Neither side appeared to be capable of inflicting more serious damage or of realizing more ambitious plans. The Livonian Order, weakened by internal political decentralization and a highly complex sharing of power and land between the Order, the archbishop of Riga and the four bishops of Derpt, 1 See P S R L VIII/149.

l6

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Oesel, Revel* (Tallin) and Courland, was unable to undertake more than somewhat ineffective raids on Pskov; its dreams of conquering Novgorod and Pskov for Rome proved time and time again unrealizable without the assistance of more powerful allies. Novgorod and Pskov, on the other hand, with a military system designed only to defend their territory against aggression, had no thought of carrying the war permanently into Livonia or of occupy­ ing die important ports of Revel* and Riga. A more effective outlet to the Baltic than the Neva and the strip of coast between Finland and the Narova would doubtless have greatly increased the western trade of Novgorod and Pskov. But neither Ivan III nor Vasily III — let alone Novgorod and Pskov in the days of their independence — could seriously consider expansion in this direction. And rightly so — for, as Ivan IV was to find to his cost, a full-scale Russian invasion of the north-eastern Baltic lands could only arouse the indignation and cause the intervention of other powers who felt they had just as strong a claim on Livonia — Denmark, Sweden and Lithuania-Poland. Since the early fifteenth century the Livonian Order had caused the Russians little trouble. It was only towards the middle of the century, during the height of the civil war in Muscovy, that the Germans became aggressive and made what appears to have been their last attempt to annex Novgorod. From the end of 1444 to 1448 a state of undeclared war between the Livonian Order and the north-west Russian lands existed. Militarily it was confined to sallies on either side of the dividing Narova river. But there can be little doubt that a war of larger dimensions was envisaged by the Germans; for not only did the grand master of the Teutonic Order attempt to push the king of Denmark into the war (1445), but also a serious attempt at an economic blockade of Novgorod was made. The grand master tried to stop the import of grain into Novgorod and in general to hamper Novgorod’s trade with the Hanseatic and Livonian towns (1446). Neither of these measures was effective; the Danes gave no assistance and the Livonian towns suffered more from the blockade than did Novgorod. A fifteen-year peace was eventually concluded in 1448 between Novgorod and Pskov on the one hand, and on the other the master of the Livonian Order and the bishop of Derpt. The old frontiers were confirmed and free trade across them was guaranteed.

MUSCOVY AT THE BEGINNING OF IVAN’S REIGN

17

Thus by the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign the extreme north­ western frontiers were safe, all the more so as from 1454 to 1466 the Livonian Order was too occupied with a war with Poland to worry Novgorod, Pskov or the grand prince of Moscow. Indeed, only once during Ivan’s reign was the Order, for all its military ineffectiveness, able to cause the grand prince serious difficulty and that was when it chose to harass Pskov throughout the critical year of 1480, when all available troops were needed by the Russians for action against the Tatars.

None of the descendants of Ryurik ever set themselves so immense and ambitious a task, and came so close to achieving that task, as did Ivan III. His goal was the union of all Russia — of Great, Little and White Russia — under the independent leadership of the grand prince of Moscow, and the creation of a centralized State to replace the archaic and intolerably inefficient confederation of princes that since the Mongol invasions had achieved unity only in moments of supreme crisis and under inspired leadership. Rarely is the historian of mediaeval Russia justified in hazarding the aims and motives of a ruler, in attempt­ ing to ascribe what might be called a conscious policy to this or that of the princes or tsars, for few of them left any personal record — memoirs, correspondence, instructions, testaments — whereby motive or policy might be deduced. Nor do the chronicles — that source of so much information on mediaeval Russia — help the historian to find his way and decide who amongst the princes was the statesman and who the puppet. Wars are declared, embassies are despatched abroad, prince marches against prince; but rarely are motives put into the mouths of the leading actors or explanations vouchsafed by the chroniclers. We are left with the laconic narration of events, dry, often dramatic and sometimes objective. In the case of Ivan III and his reign there is little or nothing to help the historian elaborate policies, except for the astonishingly logical sequence of events. Campaigns, annexations, marriages, embassies, executions, reforms — all occur as if by some pre­ conceived plan. The purpose of each event becomes clear when viewed in perspective from the end of the reign. Nothing seems to have been accidental, carelessly planned or even mistimed. And

18

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

all events appear to point in one direction. The numerous minor campaigns, the countless attempts to form friendships in the east and in the west, the disgraces at home, the intrusions in Church affairs — all these were by no means haphazard occurrences caused by the whim of a despot. They were rather steps in the path of a statesman of vision and above all of astounding singlemindedness. For Ivan III, more clearly than any of his pre­ decessors or followers on the grand princely throne of Moscow, knew precisely where he was going. He knew his goal, the means at his disposal, the obstacles to be encountered. He never over­ estimated his own strength or under-estimated that of his enemies. His cold reasoning told him just how far he could abuse the freedom of his subjects and tamper with the sanctity of religious institutions. He never fought a war for the sake of fighting, sought a friendship from altruism or disgraced a subject through spite. All the deeds of this dedicated, hard-headed ruler and most shrewd diplomat were directed towards one goal only. Looking back on Ivan’s reign and seeing how close he came to achieving his aim one can only be amazed at the thoroughness of his method, at the meticulousness with which every step in the progress towards his ultimate objective seems to have been planned. Though he was an uninspiring general (he fought his wars sitting at home, said the great ruler of Moldavia, Stephen) and a cautious rather than bold diplomat, it was nevertheless the results of his generalship and diplomacy which made him the most successful of all pre-Petrine rulers and Russia the leading nation of eastern Europe. Inevitably the success of his campaigns and his embassies deflect the historian’s attention from his home policy. Yet there can be no doubt that this policy, however sketchily adumbrated by Ivan, was equally logical and in keeping with his great aim. His land reforms, his Church policy, his attitude towards his Council and the close circle of his family and relatives, all were motivated by his over-riding purpose. Indeed, many of the actions of Ivan affecting his subjects alone can be understood only if studied in conjunction with his foreign policy.

CHAPTER II ★

T H E KAZAN* CAM PAIGNS OF T H E S IX T IE S

t is a sign of Ivan’s meticulousness and caution that he was only prepared to attempt his ultimate military operation — the reconquest of the West Russian lands from Lithuania — at the very end of his reign after all possible steps to ensure the success of this his last venture had been taken. Before a major war in the west could be undertaken, a whole series of tasks had to be completed. Firstly the eastern and southern frontiers had to be secured: Kazan’ had to be neutralized, the troublesome remnants of the Golden Horde to be scattered and a sound ally in the Crimea (and later in the Porte) to be established. At the same time concerted Russian action in the west was unthinkable without the annexation of the republic of Novgorod. For not only was the city a permanent danger-spot to Moscow in international relations, capable of transferring its affections from Moscow to Vilna in an instant, but also no war could be effectively waged by Moscow in the basins of the Western Dvina and the Upper Dnepr unless the northern Russo-Lithuanian frontier was manned by reliable cadres of faithful Muscovites and not by fickle Novgorodians. Finally there was the question of allies. Who would be prepared to help Ivan in his war with Poland-Lithuania and whom could Ivan expect as additional enemies? Every possibility had to be explored, allies to be sought, possible enemies to be bribed or neutralized. Hence the sudden burst of Russian diplomatic energy in the eighties and the nineties of the fifteenth century. Only when Ivan was satisfied that all possible precautionary steps had been taken did he enter upon the last phase of his plan. He began his reign with caution. There was nothing to be gained by tackling the problem of Novgorod or of Tver’ pre­ maturely; there was no point in seeking allies in the west before

I

c

l9

20

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

he was ready to exploit them. His first problem was to secure the eastern (and most vulnerable) border by quelling or frightening into temporary submission the Tatars of Kazan’. Since the humiliating defeat of Vasily II at the battle of Suzdal’ in 1445 the Russians had been able to take few steps to show Kazan’ their true military strength. But the advantages and the initiative were now all on Ivan’s side. For had not the Kazanites sued for peace the year before his father’s death, when they learned of the dimensions of the Russian expeditionary force gathering to march east? And had he not in Kasim an expert in Tatar warfare, a possible candidate for the khanate and an alluring bait for would-be Tatar deserters? Ivan’s first recorded act on ascending his father’s throne was to despatch what appears to have been a large reconnoitring force into the northern and eastern districts of the khanate (the land of the Cheremisians). In the summer of 1462 two of his generals, Boris Kozhanov and Boris the Blind (Boris Slepets, Slepoy), collected a force from the northern towns of Ustyug, Vologda and Galich and set off south from Ustyug.1 The route taken became later one of the main routes used by Ivan’s armies for raiding or reconnoitring Kazan’ territory — i.e. south along the rivers Yug and Molozha to Kotel’nich on the Vyatka river in the semi-autonomous district of Vyatka (Khlynov), and thence into the khanate along the Vyatka river as far as its juncture with the Kama. The expedition then moved east up the Kama and north into the land of Great Perm’, outside the control of the Tatars. What the Russians set out to achieve and what they in fact achieved on this expedition has not been recorded. But in the same year Kazan’ retaliated. A force of native Cheremisians and Kazan’ Tatars carried out a raid on the district of Ustyug. On their return journey south they were chased and caught by the men of Ustyug, who succeeded in forcing them to release all their many prisoners. For five years Ivan was content to let events in Kazan’ develop and to wait for a favourable opportunity of employing his Tatar vassal, Kasim. In 1467 it looked as though the time had come. The old khan, Mahmudek, had died in the beginning of the 1 “ They went past [or via] Ustyug** according to the chronicle. The generals presumably started from Moscow and collected forces en route at Galich, Vologda and Ustyug, in that order. For the only description of the campaign and of the retaliatory T atar expedi­ tion of the same year, see C/L/85. None of the other chronicles mention it.

THE KAZAN* CAMPAIGNS OF THE SIXTIES

21

sixties1 and his throne was now occupied by Kasim’s younger brother, Ibrahim (Mahmudek’s third son). Dissention and dis­ satisfaction, or so it seemed to Ivan, were rife in Kazan’. At any rate Kasim was secretly invited by several of the “princes” of Kazan’, headed by one Abdul Mamon, to come and take his rightful place upon the throne. Whether or not this was nothing more than a scheme to lure Kasim and the Russians into a trap, as most of the chroniclers would have us believe, Ivan III was sufficiently impressed to provide Kasim with a large army of infantry and cavalry and three of his most distinguished generals, Ivan Vasil’evich Obolensky-Striga, Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmsky and Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev.123The expedition, however, was a complete failure. Leaving Kasim’s headquarters on 14 September 1467, the army marched overland and reached the right bank of the Volga at Zvenich Bor, near Kazan’. There to their dismay they found Ibrahim’s forces waiting for them on the other bank.8 Either Abdul Mamon had tricked Kasim, or his schemes to betray the khan had leaked out. Robbed of the element of surprise and already exhausted by the rigours of the march, the cold and rainy autumn and the lack of food and fodder, the Russian army had no alternative but to turn back and abandon the whole venture. No sooner had they retreated than Ibrahim sent a punitory force to carry out a surprise raid on Galich. As a result of this Ivan was obliged to strengthen his eastern and north-eastern districts by sending detachments to garrison the towns of Murom, Nizhny Novgorod, Kostroma and Galich.4* In spite of the failure of Ivan’s attempt to place Kasim on the throne of Kazan’, he was determined to continue operations in Tatar territory. Less than three months later a highly successful surprise campaign was launched. A large army under command of Prince Semen Romanovich Yaroslavsky gathered in Galich and set off east on 6 December 1467. After a month’s secret march they reached the land of the Cheremisians and proceeded to overrun the area north of Kazan’, “sacking, killing, capturing and 1 See Bazilevich, VP, p. 64. * Obolensky-Striga is mentioned by all the chronicles; Kholmsky only by P S R L V, and Patrikeev only by P S R L V III. 3 According to UL and P S R L V the Tatars attacked the Russians in boats and fought them on the right bank of the Volga. No mention is made of casualties or of the gravity of the battle. 4 For the campaign of 1467 and the ensuing events, see P S R L V/274; VIII/152; XXV/279; C/L/86-7; Ä/SS-

22

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

burning,” and getting to within a day’s march of Kazan’ itself. At the same time, or shortly afterwards, detachments from Murom and Nizhny Novgorod penetrated the khanate from a different direction, advancing due east along the Volga.1 Satisfied, perhaps, with the success of these two co-ordinated exploratory raids, Ivan decided to mount a major operation. In early spring (1468) he moved his headquarters to Vladimir on the Klyaz’ma, whence he could control operations in the east more satisfactorily than from Moscow, summoning two of his brothers (Yury and Boris), his son, Ivan, and his cousin, Prince Vasily Mikhaylovich of Vereya “together with all their princes, boyars and generals”. His two remaining brothers were ordered to remain in Moscow, presumably in order to protect the city against any possible attacks from the west or the south. As a measure of security Ivan even took the trouble to prevent a Lithuanian ambassador, who had arrived in Moscow, from seeing what was going on in Vladimir by deflecting him to Pereyaslavl’ in the north and receiving him there.2 But these elaborate preparations came to nothing. The great expedition had, for one reason or another, to be postponed until the following year and instead Ivan contented himself with minor operations which closely followed previous patterns. Directly after a successful Tatar raid on Kichmenga (south of Ustyug) in the spring, Ivan ordered a large army from the north to proceed along the Vyatka and Kama rivers. Again this was clearly little more than a reconnaissance in force, a dress rehearsal along one of the axes of attack planned for the great expedition of 1469. It will be noted that the route followed was close to that taken in 1462; only this time the task was more ambitious. The commander-in-chief was one Ivan Dmitrievich Runo. Setting off from Moscow after Easter he proceeded to Galich and Vologda, collecting forces en route, and thence by river to Ustyug where he arrived on 9 May. The army, reinforced by detachments from Ustyug and Kichmenga, gathered at the main rendezvous at Kotel’nich on the Vyatka river, where they were joined by a further group from Vyatka. All but 300 of the latter, however, hastened back to Vyatka on receiving the news that the Tatars had invaded their territory. In fact, the inhabitants of Vyatka, 1 See P SR L XXV/279-80. * This incident is only mentioned in P S R L VIII/153, XII/119 and JL/56. Ivan took his son with him to PereyaslavT “and having dismissed the ambassador, returned to Vladimir” . The gathering of the army is recorded in XXV/280.

THE KAZAN’ CAMPAIGNS OF THE SIXTIES

23

weakened by the detachment which had joined Runo, were unable to hold out against the Tatars and “they surrendered to the tsar of Kazan’, Ibrahim” — a fact which was to cause grave embarrass­ ment to the Muscovites in the following year. The expeditionary force moved south along the Vyatka river into Tatar territory, fighting the autochthonous Cheremisians en route. On reaching the Kama river they turned west, and con­ tinued, fighting and pillaging, to within a short distance of the Volga. They then turned about and proceeded to lay waste the country on either side of the Kama as far as the Belaya Volozhka river, a southern tributary of the Kama, now called the Belaya. There they were met by a force of 200 Tatars, who had left their horses with the Cheremisians and had embarked on river boats. The Tatars were chased up the Belaya Volozhka by a detachment under Runo himself, who, having caught them, soundly defeated them in a pitched battle. All the Tatars were killed except for two who were taken prisoner. Russian losses amounted to two killed and sixty wounded. On rejoining the main army, Runo withdrew north along the Kama to the district of Great Perm* and from there to Ustyug, where presumably the various detachments dispersed. The Tatars were given no rest during the summer of 1468, nor were they allowed to guess at Ivan’s intentions; for while Runo and his northern army were devastating the Vyatka and Kama river districts, Prince Fedor Semenovich RyapolovskyKhripun with a force consisting of the Nizhny Novgorod garrison and troops from Moscow attacked Kazan’ territory from the west. The expedition left Nizhny Novgorod on 4 June and its move­ ments were clearly timed to coincide with Runo’s operations. There are no details of the fighting; the chronicles merely state that many Tatars “of the tsar’s court” (i.e. of the khan’s army) were killed and name a “prince” whom Ryapolovsky led back to Moscow in captivity.1 By the beginning of 1469 preparations for a full-scale campaign against Kazan’ were complete. The two main axes of attack — from the west and from the north — had been fully reconnoitred and Ivan had in his armies men and commanders who knew both the terrain and the enemy. Yet for all the careful preparation and 1 For the details of the summer campaigns of 1468 see P S R L XXV/280-1. Ryapolovsky’s campaign is mentioned a second time in /L/60 and P S R L V III/157 towards the end of the description of the summer campaign of 1469. It is mentioned only once, and in the wrong place, in P S R L V/275 and U L/Sj.

24

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

vast mobilization of forces the great campaign of the summer of 1469 was a failure. Perhaps this was due to poor communications between the two armies themselves and between them and Ivan’s headquarters in Vladimir; or perhaps Ivan felt unwilling to risk both his armies when the element of surprise had been lost and when the northern force ran up against unforeseen difficulties in Vyatka. Whatever the cause Ivan was quick to cancel his original plans and restrict operations once more to a raid. General mobilization took place in spring. Two armies were formed. The first (river-borne) army — by far the larger — con­ centrated in Nizhny Novgorod under command of Konstantin Alexandrovich Bezzubtsov. All the towns belonging to the grand prince and all the districts belonging to his brothers sent their detachments. The chroniclers note in detail the various approach routes to the main rendezvous: the Moscow contingent, under command of Prince Petr Vasil’evich Obolensky-Nagoy, proceeded by the rivers Moskva and Oka to Nizhny Novgorod. Detachments from Kolomna and all cities west of Kolomna on the Oka went by the Oka. The men of Vladimir and Suzdal’ set off along the IGyaz’ma; Dmitrov, Mozhaysk, Uglich, Yaroslavl’, Rostov, Kostroma and other towns on the Volga sent their troops by the Volga.1 The second army, which was to operate from the north, came under command of Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Yaroslavsky.2 It consisted mainly of detachments from Vologda (under command of Semen Peshek-Saburov, the voevoda, or general, of Prince Andrey the Younger, whose patrimony included Vologda), Galich8 and Ustyug — it was, in fact, probably much the same army as had taken part in Runo’s campaign of 1468. From Ustyug the second army sailed by river to Vyatka, where the commander-in-chief, in the name of the grand prince, told the Vyatchane to join the expedition against Kazan’. The men of Vyatka, however, in spite of their act of submission to Moscow in 1459, felt themselves bound by the pact of neutrality which had been forced upon them by Ibrahim in the previous year. The risk was too great. 1 The Ustyug Chronicle (U LI87), which tends to be confused on matters not directly concerning Ustyug and the north, states that Ivan sent his brothers, Yury and Andrey the Elder, to Kazan' with this expedition. This is not m en­ tioned by any other source and is in fact contradicted by more reliable sources. * Daniil Alexandrovich Penko-Yaroslavsky, according to the Ustyug Chronicle (UL/87). * Galich is not mentioned in the chronicles, but two of the commanders taking part, Gleb and Vasily Semenovich Filimonov, are known to have come from Galich. See P S R L XXV/280, 281.

THE KAZAN’ CAMPAIGNS OF THE SIXTIES

25

Yaroslavsky’s army was too small, in their opinion, to justify so hazardous a venture. With the Tatar invasion of 1468 still fresh in their memories, they refused to move. Furthermore, any chances of success that a surprise attack might have had were soon destroyed, for the khan’s ambassador in Vyatka sent back word to Kazan* that a small Muscovite army was about to sail south along the Vyatka river. Weakened by the refusal of Vyatka to join him and bereft of the essential element of surprise, Yaroslavsky was unable to play his part in the campaign —namely, to divert the Tatars’ attention from the main attack. It seems probable that the breakdown of the northern army’s plans caused Ivan to cancel the main thrust from the west. Bezzubtsov, while waiting in Nizhny Novgorod to begin his advance on Kazan’, received a message from Ivan III telling him to remain where he was; only volunteers were to be sent to “wage war on the districts of Kazan’”. They were not to approach the city itself. In other words no attempt was to be made to capture Kazan’. If Ivan had hoped by his instructions to limit the force to a mere handful of venturous spirits he had underestimated the morale of his army. For, according to the most reliable chroniclers, the whole force volunteered, leaving Bezzubtsov behind in Nizhny Novgorod to await further orders from his sovereign in Vladimir. In his place the “volunteers”, after much deliberation, elected Ivan Runo, who at least had had experience of fighting the Tatars of Kazan’, albeit in a different sector. In spite of Ivan’s instructions, Runo made straight for Kazan’. After sailing down the Volga for three days, stopping only for the first two nights, the army arrived at the outskirts of Kazan’ at daybreak on 22 May. Runo’s arrival caught the enemy completely unawares. Arousing the sleeping Tatars with the sound of the trumpet, the Russians attacked the posady (the fortifications outside the Kremlin) and set about “killing, plundering and capturing”. After releasing all the “ Christian prisoners, from Moscow, Ryazan’, Lithuania, Vyatka, Ustyug, Perm’ and other towns”, they set fire to all the posady and withdrew by ship to the nearby island of Korovnich, where they rested for seven days.1 1A somewhat different picture is painted in the less reliable Ustyug Chronicle. Runo, according to it, was only appointed as a compromise after squabbles over precedence amongst the various commanders. Runo’s men arrived at daybreak and would have been able to capture the whole city, had not Runo betrayed them. Bribed, perhaps, by the Tatars, he *'withdrew his army from the gates of the town". See U Lj87.

26

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Meanwhile Khan Ibrahim was gathering a large army and was planning to attack the Russians by land and by river. Runo, however, forewarned of the impending attack by an escaped Russian prisoner, split his force into two. The troops in the larger ships, which he had sent off ahead of the main force, were attacked by Tatar cavalry, but managed to shoot their way out and to arrive safely at their main rendezvous on the island of Irykhov. The remainder were attacked by a numerically superior Tatar force in ships. After a long and bitter battle the Russians succeeded in forcing the Tatars back to the walls of Kazan*. They then sailed to Irykhov, where they were rejoined by the original commander-in-chief, Bezzubtsov. The campaign was by no means over, and Ivan, it seems, in spite of the early setback of the northern army, was now determined not to let his carefully-laid plans fall through entirely. On his arrival at Irykhov, Bezzubtsov immediately sent off messengers to the commander of the northern army and to the men of Vyatka, ordering the latter to march on Kazan*. The men of Vyatka, however, were still unwilling to risk a breach of their treaty with Kazan’. What they had seen of Ivan’s available forces was not enough to assure them of success. “ If the brothers of the grand prince march against Kazan*,** they answered, “then we will go too.** As for the northern army, Bezzubtsov received no word as to their whereabouts or plans. After seven weeks of fruitless waiting he decided to withdraw his army. There was no hope of linking up with Yaroslavsky, and, besides, supplies were running short. The army set sail for Nizhny Novgorod. On the following day they passed a party consisting of Mahmudek’s widow, who had previously been living with Kasim in Russia, and her suite. She was sailing to Kazan* to her other son Ibrahim, she informed Bezzubtsov, as the grand prince had told her that “there would be no more enmity between them [Ivan and Ibrahim], and all would be well*’. Ivan, evidently, had finally decided to call off the whole campaign. But Bezzubtsov’s troubles were not at an end. Before reaching Nizhny Novgorod he was unexpectedly attacked by an army of Tatars in boats and on horseback — probably the same force that had attacked the Russians at Korovnich. The battle raged from midday till nightfall, when both sides withdrew. Unfortunately there is no further mention of the fighting in the chronicles or indeed of the return of Bezzubtsov’s army to Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow.

THE KAZAN’ CAMPAIGNS OF THE SIXTIES

27

Information on the movements of the northern army is scant and contradictory. According to the chronicler of Ustyug, who is apt to be somewhat less unreliable where his own town and its troops are concerned, Yaroslavsky’s army sailed south along the Vyatka river, presumably having given up hope of urging the men of Vyatka to join them.1 On arriving at the Kama river, Yaroslavsky was informed by a Tatar that the Russian army from Nizhny Novgorod had already been at the walls of Kazan’ but had withdrawn after concluding a truce with the khan.2 There was nothing to be done but to hasten back into Muscovite territory. Yaroslavsky decided to sail down the Kama and up the Volga to Nizhny Novgorod, but at some point in his journey3 he found the river blocked by a Tatar naval force. The ensuing battle was “great and bloody” (boy velik i secha zla), but the Russians, in spite of losing 430 men killed — including Prince Yaroslavsky — managed to break through and reach Nizhny Novgorod.4 Undaunted by the complete failure of the great summer campaign of 1469, Ivan was determined at all costs to achieve his ends. In the late summer of the same year yet another expedition­ ary force stood at the walls of Kazan’. Unfortunately the same chronicles, which had described Bezzubtsov’s expedition in such detail, barely mention the campaign and little is known of the organization, fighting or results. But if we can judge from the names of those who were in command, the army was the largest yet sent to Kazan* and undoubtedly the most ably commanded. It was a mixed force of cavalry and river-borne infantry and was led by Ivan’s eldest brother, Yury, who had with him another brother, Audrey the Elder, and a cousin, Prince Vasily Mikhaylo­ vich of Vereya. Having picked up the remnants of Prince Yaroslavsky’s northern army at Nizhny Novgorod, the whole army arrived at Kazan* on 1 September. After a preliminary skirmish the Tatars withdrew into the city. The siege lasted only five days as the Russians were fortunate enough to cut off the town’s water supply. Ibrahim sued for peace. He “bowed 1 No mention is made in the Ustyug Chronicle of Vyatka’s refusal to march on Kazan’. * This, perhaps, refers to the mission of Ibrahim’s mother (see above, p. 26). The Ustyug Chronicle, anticipating the autumn campaign of 1469, mentions a truce between the khan and Prince Yury, Ivan’s brother. See C/L/87. * According to P S R L X II and the Ioasaf Chronicle — “at the mouth of the Kama” . See P S R L XII/123; /L/60. 4 For details of the summer campaign of 1469» see P S R L V/274“ 5» VIII/157» X II/122-3; XXV/281-3; СЛ./87-8; Щ 57-60.

28

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

submission according to the entire will of the grand prince* *— in other words he accepted all Prince Yury’s conditions — and agreed to release all prisoners captured by the Tatars during the past forty years. Unfortunately there is no information as to what Yury’s conditions were. But it seems likely that the Russians demanded a period of non-aggression and possibly the cession of Vyatka.1 Whatever were the conditions of the truce concluded between Ibrahim and Yury, it was clear that Ivan had by the end of the sixties achieved at least part of his immediate objective. He had failed, it is true, to secure Kazan’ by placing his own vassal upon the throne. The time had not yet come when a Moscowtrained khan would be acceptable to the Tatars of Kazan’. But by showing his true military strength he had at last forced the Tatars to respect his power. For nine valuable years his eastern frontiers were safe from Tatar incursions and he could con­ centrate on problems in the west. 1 P S R L V/275; VIII/158; XII/123; C7L/88; /L/60-1.

CHAPTER III ★

T H E FA LL OF NOVGOROD

he great city state of Novgorod in the north-west had achieved independence in an early period of her history. During most of the eleventh century and the first quarter of the twelfth she had been dependent on Kiev, whose gran prince was free to appoint and remove her princes at will. But after the death of Vladimir Monomakh in 1125, when the political and economic power of Kiev began to decline as a result of constant internecine wars, invasions from the steppes and the loss of Byzantine trade, Novgorod freed herself from this remote and, it seems, often somewhat contemptuous control, and began to work out the basic pattern of her freedom. It was indeed a favour­ able period for Novgorod, for Suzdal’ in the north-east was not yet strong enough to interfere in the process of her emancipation and Kiev was already too weak. By the end of the twelfth century all the outward signs of Novgorod’s autonomy were visible. The existence of the veche or Popular Assembly, in which every citizen in theory had the right to cast his vote on most affairs concerning the republic but whose powers in practice were restricted by the Senate, or Council of Boyars, meant that no arbitrary decisions could be taken by the prince or any outsider without the approval of the people of Novgorod. Still more important is the fact that the senior administrative, ecclesiastical and military officials were all elected by and from the Novgorodians. The posadnik, or annually elected mayor, had been chosen by the veche since early in the twelfth century. The tysyatsky, who fulfilled the functions of commander of the local forces and judge, was also elected by the people. Even the archbishop, whose role in state affairs was frequently decisive, was chosen from candidates

T

29

30

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

put forward to the veche. But perhaps the most significant manifestation of Novgorod’s independence was her attitude to the prince. By the end of the twelfth century the Novgorodians had been formally granted the right by Vsevolod III to choose a prince from any of the princely families in Russia. Whoever was invited to Novgorod found his powers strictly limited: he was forbidden to own estates within the lands of Novgorod; he was not allowed to interfere with the election of city officials, nor was he allowed to dismiss them without a decision of the veche or a trial. In other words all his activities within the republic were restricted. He could only rule, command and judge with the approval and co-operation of the citizens themselves. Gradually he developed into little more than a mercenary, hired to carry out the tiresome job of protecting Novgorod from her aggressive neighbours. But for all Novgorod’s freedom-loving aspirations she was never able to achieve complete and lasting autonomy; for all her riches and vast colonial empire in the north she was never able to be self-sufficient and do without the help and protection of her neighbours. There were two reasons for this. Firstly — an economic reason. In spite of the fact that Novgorod was by far the greatest centre in Russia for trade between east and west — particularly during the barren period of Mongol occupation when there were few if any outlets to western Europe — she was economically not self-supporting, as was the neighbouring republic of Pskov. For grain she was dependent mainly on her eastern neighbours, the mesopotamian districts of Suzdal’, Vladimir, and later, Moscow, and to a lesser extent on imports from the west. Indeed it frequently proved only too easy for Novgorod’s neighbours to carry out an economic blockade of the city — by preventing the import of grain along the Volga, Tvertsa or Msta rivers in the east, or in the west by closing the frontier town of Narva and holding up Novgorod-bound shipping in the Gulf of Finland. The second reason for Novgorod’s dependence on her neighbours was purely military. Novgorod was never able to create an efficient army capable of defending the city against the Swedes, Germans and Lithuanians in the west or against the Russian principalities in the east. One has only to refer to the overwhelming defeats inflicted by comparatively small Muscovite contingents on numerically superior Novgorod armies to be

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

31

convinced of this.1 From the earliest days of her independence, therefore, Novgorod had always been obliged to seek military protection from her more powerful neighbours. It might be distasteful to hire a descendant of Gedymin or Ryurik to protect the city and wage the republic’s wars, but it was essential. The problem was, of course, whom to ask to defend the republic. It arose early in the thirteenth century when Novgorod was faced with the growing danger of invasion by the Teutonic Order, slowly moving eastwards along the Baltic, by marauding Lithua­ nian tribes in the west and by the Swedes from across the sea in the north. The obvious — and most frequently sought — ally was the grand principality of Suzdal’-Vladimir with which the merchants of Novgorod, whose trade caravans plied along the Volga, had constant contact. But there were those in Novgorod who objected to the growing hegemony of Suzdal’ and wished to protect the independence of Novgorod by inviting princes from southern principalities, such as Kiev and Galicia, princes who would interfere less in the affairs of the city and would prove to be less intransigeant and autocratic in their behaviour owing to the large distance from their base. With the rise of the power of the grand principalities of Moscow and Lithuania, Novgorod, sandwiched between them, was forced to decide between the two. In many cases, of course, the question was solved by force or by threat of force, but nevertheless it appears that the ruling classes in the republic were sharply divided — particularly during the fifteenth century — into what might be called pro-Muscovite and pro-Lithuanian factions, and that the choice of a prince frequently depended on what faction was in power at the time. Again, the pro-Lithuanian group was composed primarily of those who sought the prolongation of Novgorod’s independence, who saw in the grand prince of Lithuania a milder and less autocratic and interfering suzerain than the ruler of Moscow and who feared, not without justification, that annexation by Moscow would spell the end of their political influence and the curtailment of their wealth. These were for the most part the land-owning boyars, who were, however, not lacking in support from the lower classes. Indeed, it is interesting to note that when matters came to a head 1 In the battle of Staraya Rusa (1456) less than 200 Muscovites are said to have routed 5,000 Novgorodians. On the river Shelon’ (1471) the proportion was 5,000 to 40,000. Even allowing for Muscovite exaggeration, the numerical superiority was clearly large.

32

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

in 1477 it was the populace (chem\ narod) who are reported by one of the few unbiased sources as being bitterly opposed to the sovereignty of the grand prince of Moscow.1 The pro-Muscovite faction, on the other hand, supported union with Moscow mainly on economic grounds. Although Novgorod was, before the annexation of Smolensk early in the sixteenth century, the main clearing house for trade between Europe and East Russia, and contained an office of the Hanseatic League, nevertheless she faced east as far as her economy, culture and religion were con­ cerned. In her western trade Novgorod was merely a middleman: the goods she received from the west were exchanged for com­ modities fetched from her colonial possessions, from the VolgaOka principalities and from the east; she had no fleet to export her wares by sea to the west. Culturally and spiritually, too, Novgorod faced east. Apart from isolated manifestations of western ideology penetrating into Muscovy via Novgorod, her literature, her architecture and her art bore the same unmistakable stamp as those of Moscow. Her clergy faced east simply because since the beginning of the fourteenth century the metropolitan had resided in Vladimir or Moscow; attempts were made, it is true, by the grand princes of Lithuania to establish an independent metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia — a necessity if Novgorod was to be brought into the Lithuanian fold. But until Ivan I l l ’s reign these efforts were spasmodic and ineffectual, and the clergy of Novgorod, who showed no visible symptoms of a desire for Union with Rome, had little alternative but to send their candidates for the archiépiscopal see to Vladimir or Moscow for consecration. Support by the clergy for pro-Lithuanian policy in Novgorod meant political approval of the anti-Moscow faction rather than a desire to embrace the grand prince of Lithuania’s ecclesiastical policy or to deny the primacy of the metropolitan of Moscow. Throughout die first three-quarters of the fifteenth century Novgorod was one of the main bones of contention between Lithuania and Moscow. When Lithuania was at the height of her power her main expansionist tendencies were directed towards Novgorod. During the first three decades of the century Vitovt of Lithuania made repeated attempts to annex not only Novgorod and Pskov but also Tver* and Ryazan’, attempts which were cut short only by his death in 1430. From then on Novgorod 1 See ULI92.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

33

ceased to be the object of Lithuanian aggression and was instead peacefully wooed by the grand princes of Lithuania, who had enough difficulties to cope with inside their own country without having to wage a border war in the east. Soon after his election Svidrigaylo hastened to conclude a “perpetual peace** (vechny mir) with Novgorod, in which the questions of mutual free trade between the two countries, frontiers, and tribute owing to Lithuania, were settled. The treaty was virtually ratified some thirteen years later by a similar pact signed by Casimir IV and the representatives of Novgorod. Meanwhile Novgorod attempted to make the best of Moscow’s internal troubles as well. Whoever was in possession of the throne of Moscow was recognized as grand prince by Novgorod. But at the same time the republic reserved the right to give refuge to whoever had been deprived of the throne. The latter policy led inevitably to trouble. In 1441 Vasily II declared war on Novgorod and was only mollified by payment of 8,000 roubles.1Three years later, under pressure from the Livonian knights and the troops of Tver*, and doubtless threatened by Vasily II for harbouring his enemy, Dmitry Shemyaka, Novgorod accepted a prince, one Ivan Vladimirovich, from Lithuania, but refused more concrete — and more binding — offers of help and affiance from Casimir. Ivan Vladimirovich remained a year in Novgorod. He was replaced in 1445 by yet another Lithuanian prince, Yury Lugvenevich-Semenovich, a grandson of Olgerd and a son of a former prince of Novgorod. Such actions could not fail to rouse the anger of Vasily II. In the final phase of the Muscovite civil war Novgorod was to compromise herself still further and to flaunt her traditional freedoms still more boldly in the eyes of Vasily. During his last shaky reign (Feb. 1446Feb. 1447) Dmitry Shemyaka concluded a solemn pact of friend­ ship with Novogorod; when Vasily marched on Moscow in the beginning of 1447 he (Vasily) had no support from Novgorod; and when Shemyaka fled die capital he found refuge in the republic. For the last six years of his life he remained in, or based on, Novgorod. For all the metropolitan’s pleadings, Archbishop Evfimy refused to break the traditional hospitality of St Sofia and hand over the “unblessed and excommunicated” Dmitry. It was as though Shemyaka was in a foreign country. 1 For details and a plausible explanation of the campaign of 1441, see Solov’ev, Istoriya Rossit, Book I, col. 1086-7.

34

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

In 1456, three years after Shemyaka’s death, Novgorod got what she must long have expected — punishment for her “improbity” (neispravlenie). With a large army Vasily II marched on Novgorod. After a small advance detachment had soundly defeated the main Novgorod army at Staraya Rusa, south of Lake Il'men’, Archbishop Evfimy was sent to treat with the grand prince in Yazhelbitsy, some 120 versts east of Novgorod. The terms of the treaty were humiliating for Novgorod but they by no means meant the end of her independence. Apart from paying a fine of 10,000 roubles, Novgorod agreed to limit the powers of her popular assembly, which henceforth was to issue no documents without the seal of the grand prince, and to desist from her traditional hospitality where enemies of the grand prince of Moscow were concerned. In other words Novgorod forfeited the right to carry on independent foreign relations and agreed not to accept political defectors who had fled from Moscow to Lithuania. No mention was made of Muscovite governorship or any form of internal control over the republic. Novgorod, it seems, was free to continue accepting princes from the west provided this did not imply the independent conclusion of treaties with Casimir. The events of 1456 had evidently taught Novgorod a lesson. For two years the republic, held back perhaps by Archbishop Evfimy, refrained from any action likely to arouse the anger of the grand prince. But the anti-Moscow faction was clearly not prepared to sacrifice Novgorod’s freedom without a struggle. In 1458, after the death of Archbishop Evfimy (10 March) and before the consecration of Iona (1 February 1459), a delegation was sent to Lithuania to ask Casimir for a prince “na prigorode”, i.e. a prince to whom would be allotted certain towns outside the capital (prigorody) for his sustenance (kormlenie) and who in exchange would agree to protect the republic from its enemies. Casimir hastened to comply with their wishes and on 1 November 1458 Prince Yury Lugvenevich-Semenovich once more arrived to resume what must by now have been considered the family occupation of this particular branch of Olgerd’s descendants. He was welcomed and honoured and given the five towns of Staraya Rusa, Ladoga, Oreshek, Korela and Yam and half the town of Kopor’e in exchange for his services. But his stay was short. Sensing, perhaps, trouble from the east, he returned in August

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

35

1459 to Lithuania. No explanations for his departure are offered by the chronicler.1 If indeed he left through fear of Vasily II, his premonitions were soon realized; for in January 1460 the grand prince, together with two of his sons (Yury and Andrey the Elder2), arrived in Novgorod to pay his respects to St Sofia and other holy places in the republic. Such at any rate were his ostensible (and only reported) intentions. But, as the Novgorodians were later to find out, such “peaceful” (s mirom) visits from Moscow entailed more than the mere observance of religious formalities. Vasily, no doubt, wished to investigate the political atmosphere of his “patrimony”, as he now evidently regarded Novgorod, and perhaps by his presence and gestures to avert further manifestations of treachery and pro-Lithuanian tendencies. That the situation in Novgorod was tense on his arrival there can be little doubt. According to one source a veche was summoned, at which it was resolved to murder the grand prince and his two sons. Only the good sense and the persuasive powers of the new archbishop, Iona, saved the Novgorodians from what would have been for them indeed a tragic error. “ If you kill the grand prince,” he pleaded, “what will you achieve? You will only increase Nov­ gorod’s trouble (yazva — lit. “sore”), for his eldest son, Prince Ivan, will hear of your evil deed and straightway will ask for an army from the khan and will march against you.” 3 Having spent three weeks in Novgorod and received the homage of all her citizens, Vasily and his suite departed for Moscow. Novgorod had been granted a reprieve; but few of her citizens could have hoped for more than a temporary prolongation of their freedom. During the first eight years of Ivan I l l ’s reign relations between Novgorod and Moscow steadily worsened. Vasily II, in the first months of 1462, had been about to vent his displeasure once more on his erring patrimony; only his death had saved the city. Soon after Ivan’s accession Archbishop Iona headed a delegation to Moscow to persuade the new grand prince to give some guarantee of his peaceful intentions; but his mission failed, so 1 See P S R L XV I/198-200. * Which Andrey is not stated. Andrey the Younger, however, was only seven at the time. * P S R L V I/182. T he same source mentions a further plot to murder Vasily’s general, Fedor Basenok, one of the victors of the battle of Staraya Rusa; but no further details are given. D

36

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

the chronicler tells us, and he returned to Novgorod emptyhanded. Throughout the sixties tension grew. The split in Novgorod between the pro-Muscovite faction and the proLithuanian party headed by the widow and sons of the ex-posadnik, Isaak Boretsky, became more sharply defined and led to disorders within the city. Although few people could have foreseen any other fate for Novgorod than her ultimate annexation by Moscow, the pro-Lithuanian faction grew in strength and boldness. It was as though they were attempting to provoke Ivan into a final act of reprisal. The grand prince’s representatives and officials at his court in Gorodishche outside the city walls were publicly insulted; his territories bordering on the lands of Novgorod were violated; Novgorod districts formerly ceded to Moscow by treaty were forcibly re-annexed by Novgorod and their inhabitants were compelled to swear allegiance to the city; taxes due to the grand prince were held back. In vain Ivan sent his ambassadors to reason with his insubordinate patrimony; Novgorod refused to listen to his complaints. Had Novgorod confined her activities to acts of insubordination directed against Moscow, her independence might well have continued throughout the rest of the century. Mere insolence and minor boundary conflicts could hardly be used as a pretext for a major expedition to crush what was after all a Russian and an Orthodox state. But the anti-Moscow elements in the city went further, and shortly after Ivan’s assumption of the throne entered once more into negotiations with Lithuania. In 1463, probably towards the end of the summer, a message was sent to the king of Poland-Lithuania informing him of the grand prince’s “ disgust with Novgorod”, and at the same time, in defiance of the terms of the treaty of Yazhelbitsy, an ambassador was despatched to the two rebel princes exiled in Lithuania, Ivan Andreevich of Mozhaysk, one of those responsible for the blinding of Vasily II, and Ivan Dmitrievich, son of Dmitry Shemyaka, asking them to defend Novgorod against the grand prince. Apart from the fact that the two princes agreed to help Novgorod, nothing is known of the results of Novgorod’s efforts to find help in the west. Casimir appears to have remained unmoved, or at any rate unwilling to embark on a war with Moscow.1 1 For Novgorod-Moscow relations during the fourteen-sixties, see P S R L VI/3-4; XVI/206-7, 211, 214.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

37

The appeal to Casimir evoked no immediate reaction from the grand prince, although he can hardly have been unaware of it. His hands were tied in the east, and the best he could do was to fulminate against Novgorod and warn the archbishop to have no truck with the “ Latin” metropolitan of Kiev, Grigory. What­ ever may have been Grigory’s connections with Rome and however much he may have attempted to spread propaganda for the Union, there is no evidence, except indirect evidence, of any attempts to interfere with the see of Novgorod during the archbishopric of Iona. Yet the danger must have seemed only too real to Ivan, who towards the end of the sixties enjoined the archbishop to remember his oaths to the metropolitans of Moscow and to beware of the guiles of Grigory. By issuing this solemn injunction, he was in fact warning Novgorod of his intentions should the republic commit the double sin of political and religious treachery. To ask for a Lithuanian prince for protection was bad enough; but to submit the church to the jurisdiction of a creature of the pope could lead only to Muscovite armed intervention. At all costs the grand prince of Moscow must protect his patrimony from the accursed heresy.1 The momentous events which took place between November 1470 and August of the following year, and which led to the downfall of the republic, are not always easy to disentangle from the welter of facts presented by the chroniclers, who were at best confused and uninformed and at worst grossly biased. But from all the accounts one general picture emerges — of a Novgorod, a section of whose leading citizens had decided to throw in their lot irrevocably with the west and had persuaded the people of the city that in Casimir lay their only hope of salvation; and of a grand prince waiting patiently for his opponents in Novgorod to compromise themselves sufficiently both with the king of Poland and with the metropolitan of Kiev for him to mobilize his greatly superior forces and crush the treacherous republic with complete justification. No one would be able to say that the grand prince of Moscow had not acted in defence of the faith and in the interests of his patrimony — except, of course, the new subjects of Moscow, who had once prided themselves on their free spirit and independence. 1 For Ivan’s message to Archbishop Iona, see R IB , vol. VI, col. 7°7” I2i Solov’ev, op. d t., vol. I, col. 1353; № I/80.

38

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

The death of Archbishop Iona (November 1470), who had clearly exercised a restraining influence in Novgorod, served as a signal for revolt and disorder. Bereft of the one man who was capable of maintaining a semblance of unity and thus saving the republic, the people of Novgorod split into two mutually hostile factions, those who supported union with Moscow or who at any rate realized the inevitability of such action, and those who sought to ward off the evil day by allying themselves with the west. Owing to the confused and varied accounts of the events of the winter of 1470 given by the available sources it is impossible to reconstruct the chronology of events with any degree of accuracy. But one fact emerges clearly: the question of where the new archbishop-elect, Feofil, should be consecrated — in Moscow or in Kiev — was as much at the root of the conflict as was the question of whose sovereignty the city should recognize. According to the most detailed — but also, unfortunately, most prejudiced — account of events in Novgorod the pro-Lithuanian party, headed by Marfa Boretsky, the widow of an ex-posadnik, and her children, and on the ecclesiastical side, by Pimen, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the archbishopric, began to stir up the populace as soon as Ivan III had announced his approval of the archbishop-elect. In spite of appeals to reason and sombre warnings issued by the pro-Muscovite elements (headed probably at this stage by Feofil himself), the veche appears to have voted in favour of entering into negotiations with Poland-Lithuania. The decision was reached after uproar and in the face of bitter opposi­ tion. Even if credence is not given to the biased Muscovite accounts, according to which gangs of thugs were hired by Marfa to bully the veche into submission, it is clear that the victory of the pro-Lithuanian party was by no means unanimous or decisive. At any rate an embassy was despatched to Casimir asking him to be *'‘sovereign and master” of Novgorod the Great, to order the consecration of the archbishop by Metropolitan Grigory of Kiev, and to send a prince.1 Whether or not Mikhail Olerkovich, the prince who in fact is reported to have arrived in Novgorod from Lithuania on 8 November — three days after Iona’s death and a week before the election of Feofil — came as a result of this embassy cannot be 1 See P S R L VIII/160; XXV/Z85. Cf. VI/5-6. Marfa, according to the latter source, was even planning to marry the king’s governor and thus jointly “in die king's name rule all the land of Novgorod".

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

39

stated for certain. The pro-Muscovite sources emphatically assert that this was the case. But from the detailed dating which is given in several other sources, and which it would be unreasonable to doubt, it appears either that he arrived before the trouble in the veche started or that the Boretskys’ embassy to King Casimir left considerably earlier than even the death of Archbishop Iona. The important fact for us is that he came, that he was probably asked for by the pro-Lithuanian faction in Novgorod and that he was almost certainly sent by Casimir to govern the city.1 His presence in the city can hardly have inspired the Boretskys and their followers with confidence; there is no mention of an army accompanying the prince; nor is there any evidence of Casimir moving east to support his ally or indeed of showing the slightest interest in Novgorod. At the best Mikhail’s presence was merely symbolical, a gesture of defiance, calculated perhaps to test the grand prince. It was, however, enough to rouse Ivan to action. Even if the archbishop-elect had managed to restrain the populace and resist the demand that he be consecrated by Grigory of Kiev, nevertheless the arrival of a Lithuanian prince, Orthodox though he might be, in the patrimony of the grand prince of Moscow gave the latter sufficient pretext to mobilize his forces. During the Christmas Fast of 1470, i.e. between 15 November and 24 December, an ambassador of the grand prince of Moscow arrived in Pskov “ in order to raise the Pskovites against Novgorod 1 T he Soviet historian Bazilevich considered that Mikhail Olel’kovich in fact came to Novgorod without asking Casimir’s permission and against Casimir’s will. He bases his theory on the following assumptions: (a) Vladimir Olgerdovich of Kiev, Mikhail's grandfather, had had strong links with Moscow owing to his hostility with Vitovt, and consequently Casimir viewed his two grandsons, Semen and Mikhail, with consider­ able suspicion. This suspicion was probably increased by the fact that their mother, Anastasia, was Vasily II's sister. (1b) As members of one of the senior branches of Olgerd’s descendants, Semen and Mikhail Olel’kovich probably had a strong claim to the grand princely throne of Lithuania. (c) W hen Semen Olel’kovich died in the autumn of 1470, Casimir did not nominate his brother Mikhail, then in Novgorod, as prince of Kiev, but appointed instead the Catholic Martin Gasztold as voevoda. Bazilevich might have added that Mikhail Olel’kovich took part in the plot of 1481 against Casimir. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 94—6; Backus, О. P., Motives of West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania far Moscow, 1377-1514, p. 99Bazilevich's arguments are not altogether convincing; the Polish historian, Dhigosz, writing probably at the time, calls Mikhail Olel'kovich Casimir's “Praefectus” in Novgorod (“tunc apud Novogrodenses Praefectus Regius erat". See Dhigosz, Historia Polomca, Vol. 13, col. 462). As has been mentioned, the Muscovite sources (See P S R L V III and XXV) state that he was sent by the king. So also do the Pskov chronicles (See P S R L IV/235; PL II/172).

40

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

the Great”.1 Although this was little more than a preliminary warning order to Pskov — at least two further embassies were sent from Moscow before Pskov mobilized in July 1471 — it can hardly have reassured the new governor of Novgorod. The Novgorod troops, which would have come under his command in the event of war, had anything but a reputation for efficiency and valour. To make matters worse their own commander-inchief, Prince Vasily Vasilevich Gorbaty-Shuysky, a scion of the Suzdal’-Nizhny Novgorod dynasty of Ryurikovichi and “service prince” (sluzhily knyaz’) of Novgorod since 1455, had been sent north to defend Novgorod’s colonial possessions along the Northern Dvina river as soon as the new prince had arrived.123* To rule a state racked with internal dissension, threatened with destruction from the east, and totally incapable of defending itself, was scarcely an attractive proposition. And besides, in the autumn of 1470 Mikhail’s brother Semen, prince of Kiev, had died, and the Kievans, alarmed at the prospect of a Catholic pan upon their traditionally Orthodox throne, were clamouring — in vain, as it turned out — for the appointment of Mikhail as their prince. Anything was better than Novgorod, and on 15 March 1471 Mikhail Olel’kovich set off to try his luck in Kiev. On his way south he repayed the Novgorodians for their four months’ hospitality by pillaging the countryside like a conquering hero. The people of Novgorod can hardly have been sad to see him outside their boundaries or to learn that Casimir had insisted on his exclusion from the throne of Kiev. But now they were faced with the grim threat of reprisals from Moscow without even a figurehead to protect them. It may well have been immediately after Mikhail’s departure that Marfa Boretsky and her party drew up the ill-starred treaty with Casimir, a copy of which was allegedly captured by the Muscovites later in the summer after the battle on the Shelon’.8 1 P L I I / 173. Pskov sent two ambassadors to Novgorod informing their sister state of the grand prince's embassy. T he Novgorodians replied by asking the Pskovites to join them in their struggle against Moscow. * See P S R L XXV/285; JL/64; C7L/88. 3 See P S R L V I/n -1 2 . The text of what is perhaps only a draft of the treaty is printed in G V N iP , pp. 129-32. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 96-8. As for the dating of the treaty, it can only have been drawn up after 15 November 1470, as Archbishop-elect Feofil (who was elected on that day) is mentioned as heading the Novgorod delegation. It cannot therefore have been drawn up before, and resulted in, the arrival of Olel’kovich. For a detailed analysis of the treaty, see L. V. Cherepnin, R F A , vol. 1, pp. 363-9.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

41

According to this treaty, of which only the Novgorod draft copy has survived, the king was to send his governor “of our Greek faith, of the Orthodox Christianity* * to Novgorod, to afford Novgorod military protection in case of aggression by Ivan III, to agree not to build “ Roman churches” on Novgorod territory or to tamper with the Orthodox faith, to allow the people of Novgorod to elect their own archbishop and to have him con­ secrated where they wished, and, finally to settle — in Novgorod’s favour — the question of certain disputed territories lying on the border of Lithuania and Novgorod. All that Novgorod agreed to do in return was to transfer certain dues from Moscow to Lithuania and to recognize the sovereignty of the king. In the military clauses there is no mention of any obligation whatsoever on Novgorod’s side to aid the king; in the clauses concerning justice, administration, finance and trade, formulae of previous treaties are repeated, but so worded as to favour Novgorod; throughout, the limitation of the privileges of the king in Novgorod territory is stressed; for the first time in international treaties the expression “free men of Novgorod” is used. Such a treaty can scarcely have appeared attractive to King Casimir, formulated as it was almost exclusively in the interests of the republic. There is, not surpris­ ingly, no copy of it in the Lithuanian archives. Casimir, it would appear, had neither the inclination nor indeed the time to ratify it. The position in Novgorod was desperate. Even the most optimistic members of the pro-Lithuanian faction must have realized how near the end was, for Ivan made little attempt to conceal his intentions. The metropolitan of Moscow, Philipp, wrote warning the people of Novgorod against allying themselves with the king and submitting to the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kiev, and advising them not to resist the grand prince of Moscow. When his exhortations remained unheeded, Ivan despatched an ambassador, one Ivan Fedorovich Tovarkov, to Novgorod to reason with his rebellious “subjects” for the last time, urging them to “bow allegiance” (bit’ chelom) to Moscow and not to betray the faith. When even Tovarkov’s mission failed, Ivan sent off his formal declaration of war against Novgorod — probably in early June 1471— having previously detailed two of his generals to prepare for war in the north against the possessions of Novgorod in the basin of the Northern Dvina.1 1See P S R L VI/8.

42

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Realizing that little help could be expected from Casimir and none from Pskov, about whose intentions in the forth­ coming struggle they can have had little doubt, the Novgorodians even approached their traditional enemies in the west — the Livonian knights. But here again they drew a blank. For even before the master of the Livonian Order had written to the grand master in Prussia warning him of the possible consequences of the fall of Novgorod, the campaign was over, the peace signed and Novgorod duly annexed.1 According to the most detailed account, the campaign was planned with care, conceived on a scale far larger than proved to be necessary and executed with extreme ease. Reckoning, no doubt on the possibility of Lithuanian intervention, Ivan summoned a vast conference — “his brothers, all the bishops of his land, his princes, boyars, generals and troops**2 — to discuss the forthcoming campaign. The grand prince of Tver* and the republic of Pskov were invited to participate in the great crusade against the treacherous and faithless patrimony of the grand prince of Moscow. In June three armies left Moscow at intervals of one week. The first, under command of Princes Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmsky and Fedor Davidovich Starodubsky-Pestry, set out for Staraya Rusa; the second, under Prince Vasily Ivanovich Obolensky-Striga, including a detachment of Tatar troops, moved to Vyshny Volochek at the source of the Tvertsa river, and thence down the Msta towards Lake Il*men*; the third, under the grand prince himself, proceeded to Torzhok, where they were joined by detachments from Tver*. At the same time three of the grand prince’s brothers (Yury, Andrey the Elder and Boris) and Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya all set out with their armies from their estates and converged on Novgorod from different directions. On 10 July Pskov mobilized her forces and invaded Novgorod territory. The heir to the throne, Ivan Ivanovich, and his uncle Andrey the Younger remained in Moscow to protect the capital. Accounts of the campaign differ in various chronicles. But all agree that the decisive battle was fought on the river Shelon* south-west of Novgorod on 14 July 1471. The Novgorod army, calculated at 40,000 strong, was routed by a force greatly inferior in numbers; 12,000 were killed and some 2,000 were taken prisoner. 1 See Solov’ev, op. cit., col. 1361.

1 P S R L XXV/286.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

43

The elaborately planned campaign had come to a spectacular and sudden end.1 The causes of the collapse of Novgorod are not hard to find. First and foremost there was the dichotomy within the city; the antagonism of the two hostile parties was hardly conducive to the prosecution of a major war. The government — or rather the pro-Lithuanian faction — had to contend with the growing discontent of the populace, unwilling to fight a hopeless war and disgruntled at the ensuing famine and soaring prices. The standing army was unable to cope with the all-round invasion; tradesmen, merchants, “ carpenters, coopers and others, who from birth had not sat upon a horse,” 2 were press-ganged into service. Those who had no desire to fight were robbed, beaten up or thrown into the river Volkhov. Small wonder that a detachment ten times smaller could rout them. Matters were not helped by the inefficiency and confusion of the high command; the cavalry failed to join the infantry at one critical moment; the troops were not sure whom they were supposed to be fighting, as the archbishop had given express orders that only the troops of Pskov were to be attacked, and not those of the grand prince.3 Even weather conditions favoured the Muscovites. No rain fell in that year in the battle area from May to September, and the ensuing drought made the numerous marshes and lakes easily negotiable for the Muscovite cavalry.4 But the greatest single factor contributing to the fall of Novgorod was, of course, the unwillingness of King Casimir to help his prospective ally. Wholly absorbed by Bohemian and Hungarian affairs, he had neither the time nor the inclination to become involved in a war with his powerful and efficient neighbour in the east. After the battle on the river Shelon* Novgorod sent one final embassy to beg the king for aid. But the careful master of the Livonian Order, not yet committed in the struggle, refused even to allow the ambassador to pass through his territory on the way to Vilna:6 Novgorod fell without a friend. Meanwhile, ten days after the disaster on the river Shelon*, when Ivan was preparing to meet the peace delegation from Novgorod at the village of Korostyn* on Lake Il*men*, a battle equally disastrous for Novgorod was raging in the far north. Two 1 For a detailed description of the campaign, see P S R L V III/i59-67; XXV/286-91; /L/65-73. Cf. P S R L IV/127-8; VI/8-15. * P S R L XXV/289. 8 See P R S L IV/128. 4 See P S R L VI/9. * See P S R L IV/128.

44

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

months previously Ivan had sent Boris Slepets, an experienced northern campaigner, to Vyatka to raise an army. At the same time the governor of Ustyug, Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets, was ordered to prepare the men of Ustyug for a campaign on the Northern Dvina. In July a small combined force, 3,970 strong, from Ustyug, Vyatka and Vologda sailed north down the Dvina river into Novgorod territory. They were met by a large army, 12,000 strong, consisting mainly of local troops from the Dvina and Pechora districts and commanded by Novgorod’s professional commander-in-chief, Prince Vasily Vasilevich Gorbaty-Shuysky, who had been sent north in the previous autumn to forestall just such a situation.1 The battle took place on the river Shilenga, a tributary of the Dvina, on 27 July 1471, and ended in a com­ plete defeat for the Novgorodians.2 Shuysky and the local area commander, one Vasily Nikiforovich, fled north to Kholmogory with the remnants of their army, and thence managed to make their way back to Novgorod.3 The campaign was over, and part of the richest of all Novgorod’s colonial possessions had fallen to Moscow. In the subsequent peace negotiations between Ivan III and Novgorod much of the land of the Dvina, particularly the northern portion along the basins of the rivers Dvina, Pinega and Mezen’, was ceded to Moscow.4 The colonial empire had begun to crumble. Three days after Ivan had summarily executed four of the leading members of the pro-Lithuanian faction who had been captured in the Shelon’ battle (including Marfa Boretsky’s son Dmitry), a delegation from Novgorod headed by the archbishopelect approached Ivan in the village of Korostyn’ near the mouth of the river Shelon*. The Novgorod delegation was in no position to bargain. Even though the news of the Dvina disaster had not yet reached Ivan’s headquarters, they could do little but hope for the grand prince’s magnanimity. Indeed the whole proceedings, 1 See above, p. 40. 8 Slepets’s losses amounted only to 55 men, according to the most reliable sources (C/L/89; P S R L XXV/290). # For accounts of the Northern Dvina campaign, see P S R L IV/128; VI/14; VIII/166; XXV/286, 290; JL/66, 71; ULjSg. 4 See G VNiP, p. 154, No. 98. It is interesting to note that in the list of districts mentioned in the Korostyn* peace treaty as still belonging to Novgorod there is no mention of “the portage and all its districts’*(volok so vserni volost'mi), which in previous treaties always heads the list of Novgorodian volosti; whereas the “ area beyond the portage'* (Zavoloch'e) is still included under Novgorod. (Ibid., pp. 46-7.)

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

45

as reported by the chroniclers, sounds more like the act of a vassal doing homage to his sovereign than a peace conference between two powers. Even the wording of the treaty itself, as one Soviet historian has pointed out, runs more like that of a deed of privilege granted by a sovereign than that of a bilateral agreement.1 At first sight the treaty, both the Novgorod and Moscow copies of which have survived, appears to be little more than a repetition of previous Moscow-Novgorod treaties, notably of the Yazhelbitsy treaty of 1456. The same formulae are repeated in many of the clauses; the wording is often identical. But a closer examination shows significant differences. The first of these is, as has been mentioned above, the general tone of the treaty; the indulgent recognition of certain of Novgorod’s ancient and traditional freedoms (stariny) by the grand prince and the use of certain expressions in the Novgorod copy, which one would expect to find rather in a humble petition than in a peace treaty, give the text a flavour wholly different to that of the Yazhelbitsy treaty. The second main difference lies in the clauses dealing with Novgorod’s foreign relations. Whereas in 1456 Novgorod had merely agreed not to receive the enemies of Moscow and to limit the rights of her popular assembly by affixing the grand prince’s seal to its decrees, now the people of Novgorod expressly bound themselves not to depart from Moscow (“byti nam ot vas . . . neotstupnym”), not to seek alliance with whoever might be king of Poland or grand prince of Lithuania, and not to ask for or to receive a prince from Lithuania. In other words, all independent relations with Lithuania and Poland were to be severed. Ecclesi­ astically, too, the bonds between Novgorod and Moscow were tightened. While the people of Novgorod retained the right to elect their own candidate for the archiépiscopal see, they now agreed to send him only to Moscow for consecration. The treaty says little about the authority of the grand prince or his lieutenants in the republic, but certain small changes and additions, notably concerning legal affairs, subtly increased their influence; indeed, the legal codex of Novgorod was, as a result of the treaty of 1471, remodelled by the Muscovite government, reissued in the name of the grand prince, and authenticated with his seal.2 1 See Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. i, p. 369. * See Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. I, pp. 37* and 373 sq- Both copies of the treaty are printed in G V N iP , pp. 45-51.

46

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

It was in many ways an extraordinary treaty. Novgorod had been soundly beaten in the field, both at home and in her colonies; she had been accused of planning to accept the suzerainty of the king of Poland and damning evidence had proved her only too guilty; she had been suspected of anti-Orthodox and pro-Catholic tendencies. And yet Ivan showed remarkable clemency. True, he saw to it that all possibility of independent diplomatic relations and military alliances with the west was removed and that the archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov should in future be only under the jurisdiction of Orthodox Moscow — but then these were indeed the avowed aims of his crusade. All his other measures were mildness itself. Novgorod could well afford the fine of 15,000 roubles1 imposed upon her. Only a small part of her northern empire had been annexed. Only four of her leading citizens had been executed, and many of those imprisoned by Ivan for “treachery” had been later released.2 Nothing was done further to limit the powers of Novgorod’s greatest guarantee of her liberties — the veche. And most striking of all, the rare expression “ Free men [of Novgorod]” (muzhi voVnye)3 is used in the treaty cheek by jowl with the term: “we, your patrimony” (nom, vashey otchine) * In other words this was a compromise. Novgorod, as it were, was being given the chance painlessly to fit in with the Muscovite régime. She remained a republic in name, with most of her freedoms guaranteed, and yet a republic within the sphere of influence of the grand prince. “You are free to do as you please,” Ivan warned the people of his patrimony, “provided you do as I please.” As the “free men” of Novgorod were soon to find out, this freedom was illusory. It may well be asked why Ivan chose leniency at this stage, why he decided to postpone the coup de grâce which at first sight it would appear to have been so simple to inflict in 1471. Why should the anomaly of an independent freedom-loving republic within the confines of what was becoming a centralized totalitarian state be tolerated for another seven years? The answer is that Ivan himself was not ready for the final subjugation of Novgorod. He needed a period of observation in which to watch the republic 1 Or 15,500, 16,000, 17,000 or 18,000, according to various chronicles. * See P S R L VI/15. 8 The expression was first used in Novgorod's draft treaty with King Casimir. See above, p. 41, and GVNiP. p. 130. 8 Ibid., p. 46.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

47

through the eyes of his own officials and to decide upon the best methods of dealing with her and incorporating her and her colonies into his own empire. And, of course, harsh methods at this stage would not make the task of governing the city any easier; his undoubted unpopularity amongst certain members of the community would be increased; leaders of the opposition would become martyrs in the eyes of the public; the merchants, whose support Ivan was only too anxious to court and maintain, might well become antagonistic to the cause of Moscow and thus disrupt its economic programme. Again, strategic problems had to be considered in detail. In the event of war with Lithuania the vital frontier areas of Novgorod territory could hardly be left in their present condition, inhabited by people of perhaps doubtful political allegiance; all this would have to be changed, but changed slowly, for the forced resettlement of large portions of the population needed time and careful preparation. Local conditions had to be studied at close quarters and the most elaborate plans laid before the actual steps to realize them could be taken. There was, as well, the question of church land. Ivan undoubtedly had his eyes on the vast possessions of the Novgorod monasteries and of the archbishop; to secularize any of these would not only have shocked the clergy of Novgorod but would have struck fear into the hearts of the metropolitan and many a Muscovite abbot. Ecclesiastical and secular opinion would have to be more deeply outraged by the so-called treacheries of Ivan’s patrimony before the sovereign could lay his hands on what by the tradition of centuries was unalienable. It was indeed with reason that Ivan refrained from destroying in a day the freedom of four centuries. And by biding his time and by planning with care he managed to achieve his aim at little cost to himself and none to his reputation — except within the republic, where the people were to weep for the loss of their freedom. For four years an uneasy peace reigned in Novgorod. The city was turbulent, the boyars split among themselves, the populace restless and dissatisfied. It was clear that those whom Ivan had left to manage his new patrimony were unable to cope with the situation. At length he decided to visit Novgorod personally in order to sort out the conflicts and to dispense justice where necessary. Here was a splendid opportunity to study the situation at first hand, to remove any particularly dangerous elements from

48

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

the scene and at the same time to present himself to the citizens of his patrimony as the protector of the oppressed and the upholder of justice. According to the account of the chronicler, who must have been an eye-witness, so detailed are his facts,1 Ivan spent the winter of 1475/6 like an eastern potentate. One after another the terrified citizens of Novgorod stumbled over themselves in their haste to do homage to their master, to load him with gifts and to regale him with food and drink. Even before he had arrived in the republic he was met by delegation after delegation, all hurrying to get in first with their complaints or their offerings. Many came to grumble to the grand prince of the excesses of this or that boyar or posadnik — of extortionism, violence, miscarriage of justice. Plaintiffs and defendants pleaded their cases before him as he sat in state in Gorodishche. Several of the leading citizens, accused of arbitrary behaviour, were arrested, among them Fedor Isaakovich Boretsky, one of Marfa’s sons, and Vasily Anan’in, both of whom were members of the pro-Lithuanian faction. Two, Ivan Afanas’ev and his son Elevfery, were arrested for “plotting to hand over Novgorod to the king”. The arrests led to delegations from the archbishop and the boyars, who begged the grand prince to exercise mercy. Eventually on I December 1475 the grand prince decided to be magnanimous. All were released, doubtless on substantial bail, except for six (including Boretsky, Anan’in and the two Afanas’evs) who were safely locked away in the dungeons of Murom and Kolomna. These six clearly represented the most dangerous elements from the purely political point of view. They were also among the richest landowners in the republic and their arrest meant a valuable confiscation of territory. Ivan, not surprisingly, firmly resisted all pleas for their release. After their removal the festivities began. From 14 December to 19 January Ivan attended banquet after banquet given by the archbishop and the richest and most influential of the nobles and merchants. At each feast lavish gifts of money, gold and silver vessels, falcons, horses, walrus-tusks, Flanders cloth, wine, old mead and furs were pressed upon the grand prince, who showed no reluctance in accepting them. All those who were unable to fit a banquet into this crowded pro­ gramme merely presented themselves before him with their gifts and bowed allegiance. At last, on 26 January 1476, the grand 1 See P S R L VI/200-5; XXV/304-8.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

49

prince left the city. He was seen off by a delegation consisting of the archbishop and the leading citizens. They were, no doubt, heartily pleased to see him go.1 For a year Novgorod, impressed by the grand prince’s visit, remained, outwardly at least, calm. Archbishop Feofil attempted once more to persuade Ivan to release the six imprisoned Novgorodians, undertaking the journey to Moscow in person — but in vain. Ivan remained adamant.8 The chronicles record no other events connected with the city during the rest of 1476. But Novgorod’s calm was deceptive. Quarrels soon flared up again within the republic, quarrels which the local judges were unable to settle. In February 1477 delegations of Novgorodians seeking justice began to arrive in the capital. Plaintiffs and defendants in large numbers brought their cases before the grand prince. “Never,” remarked the chronicler in astonishment, “since the days of Ryurik . . . had such a thing happened.” 3 It was not merely personal squabbles, however, that rent the city. The great political conflict between the two main parties was once more coming to a head. In spite of the removal of some of its leading members the anti-Moscow party was still powerful and influential enough to sway the citizens. The match to the powder was a decision of the veche in March 1477 to accept the full sovereignty of the grand prince. Evidently the pro-Moscow party had temporary control. Archbishop Feofil, in the name of the republic, sent one Nazar, a senior legal official, or usher (podvoysky pristav), and the secretary of the veche, Zakhariya, to Moscow where they did homage to the grand prince and called him “sovereign of Novgorod” (gosudar*). As the chronicler pointed out, it was an unprecedented act. Throughout the history of the land of Novgorod the republic had never called a grand prince “sovereign”, but had always used the courtesy title of “master” or “lord” (gospodin).4 This was clearly tantamount to accepting Ivan’s full sovereignty over the republic and giving him political carte blanche. He hastened to send two experts on Novgorod affairs, Prince Fedor Davidovich Starodubsky-Pestry and Ivan Borisovich Morozov, to enquire what kind of sovereignty he was 1 There is evidence that Ivan, during his "peaceful” visit to Novgorod in 1475-6, confiscated, or attempted to confiscate, church land. See Kazakova and Lurie, AED , p. 102, note 46. * M arch-April 1476. See P S R L XXV/308. » P S R L XXV/309. * See P S R L VI/205; VII/183; XXV/309; Щ ф .

SO

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

to enjoy in Novgorod. But when the Muscovite delegation arrived in Novgorod at the end of April the popular assembly was under control of the opposition. Feofirs ambassadors had exceeded their instructions, the delegation was informed; the veche had never passed a decree naming Ivan “sovereign” ; it was all a lie.1 The opposition party was now clearly in power. Throughout May they controlled the popular assembly, whipping up public indignation against the pro-Muscovite “traitors”. They had no difficulty in finding, accusing and executing collaborators. Vasily Nikiforovich Penkov, one of the earliest of the boyars to pay his respects to Ivan on the occasion of the latter’s visit in 1475, was brought before the veche, accused of swearing allegiance to the grand prince and put to death. So too were three members of the unfortunate Ovin family, who had also been conspicuous for their zeal in welcoming Ivan to Novgorod. Not content with murdering the grand prince’s loyal supporters, the opposition once again began to clamour for alliance with the king. Every meeting of the veche was duly reported to Ivan by his agents and representatives. There was now little danger of opposition or intervention from Poland-Lithuania; by now the list of traitors and unreliable elements within the republic must have been complete. There was no point in waiting any longer. The patrimony of the grand prince had so compromised itself that Ivan need have no scruples in removing the last traces of freedom from Novgorod and even in laying his hands on her much-desired estates. Throughout the summer of 1477 full-scale mobilization took place once again, but this time on a scale even larger than in 1471. On 30 September an official declaration of war was sent to the republic.2 It was a strange campaign. There was no resistance from Novgorod — Ivan can hardly have expected any — no fighting. And yet the elaborate plans which were drawn up and executed and the seemingly immense army commanded by the flower of the Russian aristocracy would lead one to believe that this was a 1 Ibid. Cf. also C/L/92, where some interesting details are given. According to this source, the common folk (chem’) answered the Muscovite ambassadors saying that Nazar’s mission was all the doing of the boyars and that the people (narod) knew of none of this. The chronicler adds that this was the beginning of the anger felt by the common folk for the boyars. From this account it would appear that the populace was on the side of the pro-Lithuanian, or at any rate anti-Moscow, party. 1 For the events of the summer of 1477, see P S R L VIII/184-5; XXV/310; ULI92.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

Si

major war against a major enemy. Perhaps Ivan treated the military side as one vast manoeuvre; mass mobilization, after all, was a difficult operation in those days and demanded considerable rehearsal. Or perhaps this array of strength was really needed to impress the Novgorodians with the deadly seriousness of Ivan’s intentions and to serve as a warning to any of Casimir’s agents who were observing the spectacle. No less striking was the display of conventional diplomacy. On reading the detailed account of the campaign given in most of the chronicles one is struck by the extreme formality of the negotiations between the parties. In the diplomatic bargaining which went on from 23 November 1477 to 7 January 1478 it is as though both sides were observing the elaborate rules and etiquette of an eastern bazaar. One marvels at the patience with which Ivan conducted this conventional exchange. But not only was this the accepted diplomatic practice of the Muscovites, as can be seen from the Moscow-Lithuanian peace negotiations at the turn of the century; it also gave Ivan an opportunity of displaying before his subjects what he no doubt hoped would pass for magnanimity. The hard blows of the final declaration of his aims were perhaps slightly softened, or at least prepared for, by the protracted verbal quibbling which proceeded them. As the grand prince’s great army moved westwards in the autumn of 1477 certain of the leading citizens of Novgorod hastened to forestall events by doing him homage and entering his “service” . But their numbers were surprisingly few; there was no rush this time to appease him. Yet few of the guilty “traitors”, on hearing of the advancing horde, can have hoped for merciful treatment from the angry ruler. No military engagements took place. By 23 November Ivan had set up his headquarters in the village of Sytino on the east bank of Lake Il’men’ and on that day he was approached for the first time by the delegation from Novgorod which was to conduct peace negotiations. The delega­ tion consisted of Archbishop Feofil, five posadrdki, four “well-todo folk” (zhit'i lyudi), one merchant and, at a later stage, five members of the commonalty (ehern*), every stratum of Novgorod society being thus represented. They were not, however, pleni­ potentiaries. Every proposal made by the Muscovites had to be discussed in the city itself, presumably at a meeting of the Senate. The Muscovite delegation consisted of senior boyars, headed by

5*

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev, and including F. D. StarodubskyPestry, I. V. Obolensky-Striga and the two brothers Morozov, Ivan and Vasily, all of whom had participated in the 1471 campaign. At first the Novgorod delegation merely begged the grand prince to cast off his wrath and to release the boyars arrested in 1475. This was a pure formality, a plea unlikely to be listened to by Ivan, and on 24 November, at what might be called the first official session of the peace conference, the archbishop’s delegation put before the Moscow boyars the following proposals. Ivan, they suggested, should visit his patrimony every four years and on each occasion levy a tax of 1,000 roubles; the governor and current posadnik should be responsible for justice in the city — all cases too serious for their jurisdiction to await the sovereign’s quad­ rennial visit; there should be no legal summonses to Moscow; the governor should not interfere in those legal matters which were the prerogative of the archbishop and the posadnik. This was clearly not at all the sort of talk that Ivan was expecting from the representatives of his guilty patrimony, and on the same day as the preliminary discussions were going on he gave orders for his troops to occupy Ryurikovo Gorodishche, the governor’s citadel, just outside the city walls, and all the suburban monasteries around the city. Any hope of resistance the population of Novgorod may have had was now destroyed. The city was completely surrounded and at the mercy of Ivan; it was only a question of time before the archbishop would be reduced to an abject plea for mercy and an unconditional acceptance of the grand prince’s conditions. Little by little the Novgorodians were made aware of the grand prince’s intentions. On 4 December he informed them through his representatives that it was all a question of sovereignty. The campaign, he said, had been undertaken solely because the veche had denied him the title of sovereign (gosudar’), a title which the republic’s ambassadors had used earlier in the year. Let them now consider how to do homage. After discussing the question within the city the archbishop’s delegation admitted Novgorod’s guilt in this matter, and asked Ivan what degree of sovereignty he intended to exercise. The reply was ominous. “We, the grand prince, desire our sovereign rule; just as we are [sovereign] in Moscow, so will we be in our patrimony, Novgorod the Great.” As though there were still doubt in their minds, the delegation

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

53

withdrew once more and returned again on 7 December to place fresh proposals before the grand prince. But there was little difference. The only significant addition was the plea that none of the republic’s citizens should be drafted for frontier service along the Oka and Ugra rivers (bereg[ovaya\ sluzhba). At first sight it would appear that these requests were unrealistic and that the Senate, which presumably drafted them, was out of touch with the current situation. Yet they represented merely the statement of the concessions the delegation hoped to wheedle out of the grand prince; they took no account of, and, of course, made no attempts to anticipate, the probable proposals of Ivan. In fact they appear to have achieved much by their bargaining. Ivan agreed that there would be no interference in the boyars* estates, no deportations, no summonses in Moscow and no military service in the “lower” lands. These were mere palliatives to the harsh reality of his positive demands. “This shall be our sovereignty,” stated Patrikeev, the chief of the Muscovite delegation. “There shall be no bell of the veche in our patrimony Novgorod, there shall be no posadnik, we shall prosecute our sovereign rule . . . as in the lower lands.” The most cherished symbols of Novgorod’s freedom, the veche bell and the posadnik, were to be abolished. Without the popular assembly and locallyelected mayor Novgorod would no longer be an independent republic. The Novgorod delegation had barely time to recover from this blow before Ivan made his territorial claims. He had agreed, it is true, not to interfere with the boyars’ estates; there was no question of tampering with ecclesiastical property; he had promised that there would be no deportations. All this meant that none of Novgorod’s territory could be appropriated by the government, and that two of the ultimate aims of the operation — die strengthening of the vulnerable frontier districts and the acquisition of land for distribution in fiefs — would be frustrated. The subjugation and annexation of Novgorod would be little more than a symbolical victory for Ivan’s generals and diplomatists if Moscow were to gain no land for all her efforts. As the Muscovite delegation explained to the archbishop, “our patrimony, Novgorod the Great, [should] give us districts (volosti) and villages, for we, the grand princes, cannot maintain our sovereign lordship in . . . Novgorod without that.” Ivan indeed had no intention of returning

54

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

to Moscow without some fresh land which would be entirely at his disposal. Again the diplomatic haggling began. On New Year’s Day 1478 Novgorod offered Ivan the towns and districts (volosti) of Velikie Luki and Pustaya Rzheva. When this was refused they offered ten districts, four of which were part of the archbishop’s estates, and all the land of Torzhok. Again Ivan refused and the delegation was forced to ask him to state his demands. At first Ivan produced his maximum demands which virtually amounted to secularizing half the church’s immovable property in Novgorod. Not only did he ask for all the land of Torzhok, the full possession of which by Moscow would effectively seal off the grand principality of Tver’ in the north, but also he demanded half the possessions of the archbishop and the monasteries. After a short consultation the delegation from Novgorod agreed to the first two demands but begged Ivan to content himself with half the territory of six of the richest monasteries — the others, they claimed, were too poor to put up with such a loss. Ivan at last agreed, but at the last minute decided to limit his secularizing activities to half the possessions of the six monasteries, amounting to a total of approximately 27,000 hectares, and only ten volosti belonging to the archbishop (some 13,500 hectares).1 All the lands of Torzhok, to whomsoever they had belonged formerly, were transferred to Ivan. Only the sad final formalities remained. The question of taxation and tribute was settled. All the former possessions of Novgorod in the north renounced their allegiance to the republic and became colonies of the grand prince.2 The citizens of Novgorod solemnly kissed the cross in allegiance to their new sovereign. Marfa Boretsky and six of her party (including her grandson) were arrested and deported to Moscow, their possessions having been confiscated. Four lieutenant-governors were appointed to rule the city. Amid general lamentations the great bell of the popular assembly was removed and transported to Moscow. There it was hung with the other bells of the Kremlin. The great republic of Novgorod had ceased to exist and had become yet another 1 See S. B. Veselovsky, Féodal'nee zemlevladenie v severo-vostochnoy Rust, p. 285. 1 According to the Pskov chronicle (PL II/217) Ivan’s troops actually con­ ducted operations in the Zavoloch'e district during the winter of 1477/8. The Muscovite chronicles make no mention of any fighting.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

55

satellite of the grand prince of Moscow. The last spark of freedom in the Great Russian lands had been extinguished. Ivan, as he stated in an exultant message to his mother, his son and the metropolitan, had “subjected his patrimony Novgorod the Great to his entire will and had become sovereign there just as in Moscow”.1 There still remained, however, a glimmer of independence in the defeated state. For a decade the survivors of the proLithuanian party still dreamed of help from the west and indeed continued to maintain relations with the king of Poland. But they were unable to conceal their “treacherous” activities from the agents of the grand prince, and the discovery of each fresh plot led to immediate reprisals. Little more than eighteen months after the removal of the bell of the veche Ivan was once again on the move against Novgorod. The chroniclers give only a blurred account of this his third campaign, reluctant, perhaps, to admit that punitory measures were needed so soon after the events of 1478. They merely state that on 26 October 1479 Ivan went to Novgorod “with peace”, leaving the heir to the throne in Moscow. But the eighteenth-century historian Tatishchev, using, alas, unspecified sources, gives a far fuller picture of what appears to have been a serious military expedition, designed to crush a dangerous revolt. According to Tatishchev, Ivan was informed in secret of treachery brewing in Novgorod. The discontented elements were again in touch with the king of Poland, asking him to aid his former ally. This time the results threatened to be dangerous, for the king not only promised military intervention but also agreed to canvass the help of the pope and the khan of the Great Horde. Whether or not these reports were genuine — as is so often the case, there is no additional information to support or refute them — Ivan acted with speed and decision. With a small force he moved west, having informed Novgorod that he was preparing to fight the Germans. But while he waited a fortnight en route for reinforcements from his brothers, the true purpose of his campaign became known to the Novgorodians. They locked themselves up in the city. Ivan at once hastened to Novgorod, surrounded the city and after a prolonged bombardment forced 1 For the long and highly detailed account of the campaign of 1477/8 and the subjugation of Novgorod — again, evidently written by an eye-witness — see P S R L VI/207-21; VIII/185-99; XXV/310-23; /L/97-117, all of which are m ore or less die same.

56

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

the men of Novgorod to open the gates. Fifty of the leading “traitors” (kramoVniki), with whose names Ivan’s agents had provided him beforehand, were immediately arrested. Under torture they divulged the full extent of the plot and admitted that Archbishop Feofil himself was in sympathy with the rebels. Over a hundred “major traitors” (boVshie kramoVniki) were executed. Feofil was arrested, despatched to Moscow and, bereft of the dignity of his rank, confined in the Chudov monastery. All his moveable possessions were confiscated. Although the chroniclers neither confirm nor deny the siege of Novgorod and the punish­ ment of the rebels, they all mention Feofil’s arrest which took place on 19 January 1480. The Voskresensky Chronicle even explains the cause of his treachery: “that bishop did not wish Novgorod to be under the grand prince, but under the king [of Poland] or any other sovereign; for when the grand prince captured Novgorod the first time, he took from the [arch]bishop of Novgorod [and] from all the monasteries half the districts (volosti) and villages” .1 While the details of the grand prince’s secularization are wrong — they in fact represent part of Ivan’s first demands to the Novgorod dele­ gation— they nevertheless give the clearest and most obvious explanation of Feofil’s treachery. The archbishop, formerly the conciliator between the two parties, if not the supporter of Ivan, had become the advocate of secession to Lithuania owing to the unpardonable liberties the Muscovite government had taken with what was considered almost sacred, and certainly inalienable, church property. The rebellion had clearly been well and truly suppressed. The ring-leaders had been executed; the arch­ bishop had been ignominiously removed and was not to be replaced for a considerable time. Ivan was able to face the Tatar invasion of 1480 with less fear of defection on his north­ western boundaries.* For nearly four years there was calm on the surface; at any rate there is no extant record of clashes or discontent on either side. In the summer of 1483, however, Ivan decided to end the deadlock caused by Feofil’s imprisonment and appoint a creature of his 1P SR L VIII/204. The words “captured Novgorod for the first time (vpervye)“ , i.e. in 1477-8, are interesting, as they imply that the second visit, described by all the chroniclers as “peaceful“ , was after all an aggressive one, as Tatishchev says. 1A full account of Tatishchev's description of the 1479 campaign is given by Bazilevich, VP, pp. 125-7. Cf. Solov'ev, op. cit., cols. 1377-8.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

57

own as archbishop. Not only would this break the immemorially traditional right of the Novgorodians to elect their own prelate, but it would extend the grand prince’s influence over the church. Ever since the election of Iona as metropolitan of Moscow in 1448 the nomination of metropolitan had virtually depended on the grand prince’s personal choice; nor could any bishop, it seems, be appointed without his approval. It was, therefore, absurd that the Novgorodians should continue their practice of electing their archbishop independently of the grand prince’s wishes. In what must well have appeared as a mocking imitation of the traditional practice of Saint Sofia, the grand prince and his council of ecclesiastical advisers had lots cast for the three (Muscovite) candidates on the altar of the Uspensky Cathedral in the Kremlin. The lot fell on one Sergy, an elder (starets) of the Trinity Monastery. On 4 September he was consecrated and despatched to his diocese. After nine months he was forced, through illness according to one chronicler,1 to retire to his original monastery. His appointment, and particularly the method of it, was little short of a calculated insult to the Novgorodians, particularly to those who resented the uncanonical removal of Feofil. To make matters worse, Feofil was still alive* and one of the unsuccessful candidates, later to succeed him as archbishop, was in fact his jailor, Gennady, archimandrite of the Chudov monastery. The dissatisfaction of the people of Novgorod is reflected in the number of legends which grew up around him. According to one version, originating in Pskov, all the past bishops of Novgorod buried in the cathedral of St Sofia appeared to Sergy in a dream and punished him with sickness for ascending the throne while the legitimate bishop was still alive. Another source describes how Sergy went mad because he failed to honour correctly the relics of a former archbishop, Moisey; a third describes his punishment at the hands of the twelfth-century archbishop, Ioann. According to a Moscow legend the Novgorodians drove Sergy mad by magic for not following their policy.8 In fact it was probably sheer unpopularity and lack of co-operation on the part of the local clergy that drove Sergy back to the confines of the Trinity monastery. 1 “Because he began to sicken." See P S R L XXV/330. 1 According to I L f 119 he died years after his imprisonment. •S e e V. O. Klyuchevsky, DrevnerusskU zkitiya svyatykh kak istorichesky istochnik, pp. 151-г.

58

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

If Ivan by appointing Sergy had hoped to acquire greater influence in Novgorod amongst either the clergy or the lay population, he was soon disillusioned. It was an act of almost deliberate tactlessness and it only served to start up fresh trouble. 1484 was a year of discontent, denunciations and reprisals for the Novgorodians; it also saw the second deportation of the population from Novgorod territory to the interior. That the trouble was connected with the appointment of Sergy there can be little doubt. One of the chroniclers of Pskov notes that in the Spring of 1484 Ivan sent a “large army of Muscovites with full battle equipment* * (s vseyu ratnoyu pripravoyu) to the city. They stayed for seventeen weeks and left at the same time as Archbishop Sergy, on 23 July.1 The army may well have been sent to protect Sergy, amongst other things, but its main task was clearly to deal with the political situation and to maintain order while the grand prince’s agents carried out their business of arresting and punish­ ing political offenders. The pretext for reprisals was again treacherous dealings with Lithuania, although this time the informers appear to have come from among the Novgorodians themselves.2 Probably in mid-summer — one chronicler gives the date as 15 July3 — the arrests took place. These appear to have affected primarily the upper layers of Novgorod society — “ the great Novgorod boyars and their wives” as well as the “well-to-do folk” (zhit'i lyudi), that rich section of the population which occupied a position in the social scale roughly between the boyars and die merchants. All had their goods and lands confiscated; some were resettled in estates adjoining the capital which were granted them on feudal tenure (pomest'ya); others after prolonged torture were pardoned at the gallows and imprisoned, their wives and children being banished. While it is impossible to assess the number of those arrested — one source mentions “about thirty”,4 but that is probably a very conservative estimate — it is clear that Ivan by this operation greatly increased the amount of territory in the Novgorod district at his entire disposal. “ He took,” in the words of one chronicler, “an immeasurably large amount of property.” 6 On 12 December Gennady, ex-abbot of the Chudov monastery, a man of a very different stamp from Sergy, was appointed archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov. It seemed as though Novgorod’s cup was full. 1 See P L II/64. * See P S R L VI/235. * See ULI95. 4 P S R L VI/236. • Ibid. For the events of 1484, see P S R L VI/236; VIII/215; XII/215-6; XXV/330; P L II/64; ULl 9S; Я./124.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

59

But the large-scale mass deportations were yet to come. Novgorod was still to feel the full force of the power of Moscow. The frontier war with Lithuania began in 1487. Although the fighting tended to be local, it was enough to make Ivan take even more stringent precautions on his north-western borders. In that same year fifty of the richest merchant families were transferred from Novgorod to Vladimir, east of Moscow.1 In the winter of 1487/8 more than 7,000 “well-to-do folk” (zhit'i lytidi) were moved to Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod; the somewhat implaus­ ible excuse was proffered by the Muscovite government that they were all involved in a vast plot to murder the governor, Yakov Zakhar’evich Koshkin-Zakhar’in. A certain number, presumably those most concerned in the “plot” — “conspirators” (dumtsy), as they were called by the chronicler — were executed in Nov­ gorod and in Moscow. What happened to the 7,000 odd is not known; evidently they were settled in fiefs in the Moscow and Nizny Novgorod districts. Their estates in Novgorod were occupied by “Muscovites and people from other towns”.2 A year later, at the end of 1488, or more likely in early 1489, a further party of “over 1,000 boyars, well-to-do folk and merchants” was deported from Novgorod. They were resettled in fiefs (pomesf y a) in the areas of Moscow, Vladimir on the Klyaz’ma, Murom, Nizhny Novgorod, Pereyaslavl’, Yur’ev, Rostov, Kostroma and other towns. To their lands in Novgorod were sent “many of the best people (luchshie lytidi), merchants and boyar children from Moscow, and from other cities of [the grand prince’s] Muscovite patrimony many boyar children and merchants”.8 Altogether, as a result of these mass deportations, Ivan acquired something like a million hectares of territory for distribution in fiefs among some 2000 “service men” from the “lower lands”, the districts of Moscow and her neighbouring territories. The patrimonial system of land tenure in Novgorod was broken; the leading elements of opposition to rule from Moscow were liquidated; the north-western and western boundaries of the Muscovite state were now manned with efficient reliable cadres of service men from Moscow who owed their position and their land entirely to their sovereign (and exclusively on the condition 1 This vyvod is only mentioned in P S R L XII/219 and JLJ126. * For an account of the vyvod of 1487/8, see P S R L VI/238—9; VIII/218; XII/220. » P S R L VIII/218; XII/220; IL l 127.

6o

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

that they rendered him service), who had no local ties and traditions and from whom the grand prince could expect nothing but devotion. Even more ruthlessly than in 1479 did the deporta­ tions and executions at the end of the eighties deprive Novgorod of any hope of freedom and independence. There was to be no more resistance, no more plots. And when five years later Ivan closed the offices of the Hanseatic League in Novgorod, there was to be no more contact with the west. As for the remaining Great Russian lands still technically outside the control of the grand prince of Moscow at the beginning of Ivan’s reign, the principalities of Yaroslavl* and Rostov were formally annexed by treaty in 1463 and 1474 respectively, as has already been mentioned above. Pskov and Ryazan* managed to avoid annexation, not by any effort or resistance, but simply because it was not in Ivan’s interest to change their system of government, which virtually amounted to vassaldom. With Moscow’s old rival, Tver’, however, it was a different story. Political independence after the pattern of Ryazan* might have been a possibility, even after the fall of Novgorod, had not the local grand prince chosen to maintain friendlier relations with Lithuania than with Moscow — in other words, had he not attempted to defend an island of freedom in the sea of Muscovite possessions. The history of the decline and fall of Tver’ is a simple and a sad one. From the first, Mikhail Borisovich, the grand prince, was fighting a losing battle against overwhelming odds. After the fall of Novgorod in 1478 the territory of Tver* was entirely surrounded by Muscovite lands; there was no exit to the west, no passage for ambassadors through neutral country to Lithuania or Livonia. The fall of Tver* seemed inevitable. Yet long before 1478 even there were signs that Tver* was preparing to accept Moscow’s hegemony without a struggle. During Ivan’s two campaigns against Novgorod in 1471 and 1477 Mikhail had not hesitated to send military assistance to the grand prince of Moscow. Already in 1476 a considerable number of boyars and service people (“boyar children”) decided to transfer their affections to Moscow and to enter the service of the grand prince, influenced perhaps by reports of Ivan’s “peaceful” visit to Novgorod in the winter of

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

6l

1475/6, from which he had just returned.1 It is not without significance, too, that in 1478, just after the final conquest of Novgorod, Vassian, the son of Prince Ivan Vasil’evich ObolenskyStriga, one of the first of Ivan’s governors in his new province, was appointed bishop of Tver*,2 and Bishop Vassian was to play a leading role in future negotiations between Tver’ and Moscow. The events leading up to the final capitulation of Tver’ in the mid eighties are reported with what at first sight appears to be a welter of confusing and contradictory detail by a variety of sources. But in fact there is little contradiction, and by piecing together the scraps of information one receives a coherent and logical picture. The first signs of Mikhail Borisovich’s active Lithuanian orientation can be seen in 1483. In February of that year his first wife, Sofia, died and Mikhail decided to seek as her successor a close relative of the king of Poland. Negotiations clearly began in the spring or summer of 1483, and while evidently they failed to link the king and Mikhail by marriage, they resulted in the signing of a treaty between them. This treaty, in fact, was little more than a reaffirmation of the treaties of Mikhail’s father with Vitovt and Casimir, whereby both sides agreed on mutual aid against all enemies; but it was completely opposed in spirit to the subsequent treaties concluded between Boris Alexandrovich and Vasily II and between Mikhail and Ivan III (1462-4), and amounted virtually to a challenge to Moscow. So too did Mikhail’s provocative behaviour in the autumn of 1483. Towards the end of October an envoy from Moscow, Vladimir Elizarevich Gusev, arrived in Tver’ with the news of the birth of Ivan’s first grandson, Dmitry, the son of the heir, Ivan Ivanovich, and of Elena, daughter of Stephen IV of Moldavia. Mikhail refused to receive him, had him dismissed from the reception hall and forbade him to convey the good news even to his (Nikhail) mother.8 1 T he chroniclers name six who “came to the grand prince to serve” and add “with many others” . See P S R L VIII/182; XXV/308; iL/95. * See P S R L XXV/323. * It is interesting to compare this incident with Mikhail’s friendly reception of another envoy, Petr Grigor’evich Zabolotsky, who brought the news of Ivan Ivanovich’s wedding to Elena in mid-January 1483 (the wedding took place on 12 January). Both he and his mother Anastasia received Zabolotsky and accepted the gifts he brought. Both these missions, Zabolotsky’s and Gusev’s, are reported in the T ver’ Chronicle under 6991 (1483). See P S R L XV/498-9. Mikhail's wife, Sofia, died on 7 February 1483 (ibid., 498). It seems therefore reasonable to date Mikhail’s attempts to marry a relative (vnuka) of Casimir (mentioned in the Pskov 2nd Chronicle, P L II/65, and in P S R L VI/236, under the year 1485) and the conclusion of the treaty with Lithuania (A Z R , I, No. 79,

62

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Such deliberately provocative behaviour could scarcely fail to annoy the grand prince of Moscow, who must have known that any attempts on his part to annex Tver* would meet with little or no resistance from the majority of the Tverites. Yet Ivan could do nothing for a whole year. The explanation of his inactivity is clear. As we have seen, throughout 1484 Ivan’s hands were tied in Novgorod — it was the time of reprisals and deportations; there was no possibility of dealing with Tver’ until the disturbances in Novgorod had been settled, and the unrest caused by the appoint­ ment of Archbishop Sergy and by the policy of resettlement had blown over. In the winter of 1484/5 Ivan invaded Tver*. Laconically the chroniclers describe the causes of the campaign: “because [Mikhail] began to have friendship with the king of Lithuania . . . and to hold council with him on all things and had asked the king for his granddaughter in marriage”.1 It was a swift and easy campaign. Ivan had only to send his frontier troops (rat1poriibezhnaya) over the border. After two towns had been burned the fighting was over. Bishop Vassian was sent with a delegation of boyars to “bow submission” to the grand prince and to negotiate terms. The resultant treaty, while it still left Tver* technically autonomous in that no mention was made of the limitation of the local grand prince’s power or the appointment of Muscovite officials in Tver’, nevertheless seriously limited the independence of the principality and paved the way— just as the treaty of Korostyn* in 1471 had done in the case of Novgorod — for its where it is dated 1483 by the editors) some time between Zabolotsky’s and Gusev’s visits — i.e. in the spring or summer of 1483. N. B. : Gusev was later involved in the dynastic crisis of 1497-9. See below, p. 336. Cherepnin advances the theory that the Gusev incident was introduced into the Tver* Chronicle, which was edited about 1498 in Muscovite circles closely linked to Dmitry Ivanovich and his party, solely in order to discredit Gusev. Gusev, who was executed for his part in the plot of 1497 against Dmitry, he describes as a “seditious representative of the boyar party” . See Cherepnin, R FA , Vol. 2, pp. 299-301. Cherepnin makes no mention of the fact that Gusev was sent with die news of Dm itry’s birth to Tver*. Although it is not actually stated in the Tver’ Chronicle that he was sent with this purpose, it is quite clear from the context that he was: “in that autumn . . . a son was bom to Elena, the Grand (1) Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, in Moscow. Volodimir Elizarevich came to T ver’ with a greeting (s poklonom) . . . .” T hat Zabolotsky brought the news of the wedding is specifically stated in the chronicle. Ya. S. L ur’e considers that Gusev was “the representative of a feudal bloc which was attempting to attract T ver’ to its side” in the struggle against Ivan III. See Ya. S. L ur’e, “ Iz istorii politicheskoy bor’by pri Ivane I I I ” , p. 92. 1 P L 11/66. Cf. P S R L VI/236. The campaign is described only in these two chronicles.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

63

ultimate subjugation. It was highly one-sided, as was to be expected, and greatly different in tone and contents from the previous treaty concluded between Mikhail and Ivan at the beginning of their reigns. Mikhail was no longer to consider himself the equal in status of Ivan III, even though he might retain his title of grand prince. From now on he was to consider Ivan and his son and heir, Ivan Ivanovich, as “ elder brothers”; he was to be the equal, or “brother”, of Andrey the Elder, Ivan’s eldest surviving brother; Boris Vasil’evich and Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya were to be considered to be his inferiors, “younger brothers”. From the level of independent grand prince, the equal in status of the grand prince of Moscow, Mikhail was lowered to the position of senior appanage prince. More humiliating, and of far greater import, were the clauses dealing with the foreign relations of Tver’. Mikhail Borisovich was immediately to break off his alliance with Casimir and to conduct affairs with Lithuania only with the full knowledge and consent of Ivan III. He was to have no truck with the enemies of the grand prince who were in exile in Lithuania, or with the Tatars of the Great Horde. He was to participate in all Ivan’s wars as his ally and Ivan was to defend him in case of attack by the Polish king. Both sides agreed not to encroach upon each other’s territories and not to receive “service princes together with their patrimonies” who were transferring their allegiance from one side to the other — a clause which Ivan was shortly to interpret as binding solely for the grand prince of Tver’.1 The treaty was a pure formality. It was clear that neither side intended rigorously to respect its conditions. Had Ivan wished he could undoubtedly have annexed Tver’ then and there. But he preferred, as was so often the case, to give his opponent sufficient rope to hang himself with; he preferred that the final act should appear as a movement of voluntary submission on the part of the people of Tver*. He had not long to wait. In the spring or summer of 1485 two of the leading Tver* princes, Andrey Mikulinsky and Osip (Joseph) Dorogobuzhsky, wisely decided to transfer their allegiance and service to Ivan. In spite of the recently-signed treaty term expressly forbidding such behaviour, Ivan not only 1 The text of the treaty is printed in DDG, No. 79, pp. 295-301. It is analysed and compared with the treaty of 1462-4 in Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 1, pp. 202-5. T hat the treaty was drawn up and signed immediately after the winter cam­ paign of 1484/5 is clear from the wording of P L II/67.

64

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

received the two princes, but richly endowed them with Dmitrov, part of Yury Vasil’evich’s escheat, and Yaroslavl* respectively. They were followed by a number of boyars, who according to the chronicler left Tver* owing to land disputes with the grand prince’s agents, but who in all probability were shrewd enough to see which way the political wind was blowing.1 Mikhail Borisovich now clearly realized that his days as grand prince of Tver* were numbered. His only hope lay in King Casimir, with whom he reopened negotiations in the summer. Whatever aid Casimir may have planned to give his ex-ally, Ivan once again moved too quickly and forestalled him. At the end of June a courier bearing despatches from Tver* to Lithuania was intercepted by Muscovite agents. This was the excuse Ivan had been waiting for. Mikhail attempted to mollify him by sending an embassy consisting of Bishop Vassian, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Kholmsky and other leading citizens of Tver*.2 But Ivan refused even to admit the Tverite ambassadors to his presence. Instead he mobilized his forces and invaded his neighbour’s territory. The campaign was swift and bloodless. Although he must have known that resistance would be negligible, Ivan took the trouble to invade with impressive strength, taking with him his eldest son Ivan, his two remaining brothers, Andrey the Elder and Boris, and all the Muscovite artillery under the great architect, founder and gunmaker, Aristotel Fioraventi. The army set off on 21 August. By 8 September, joined by a detachment from Novgorod under the governor (namestnik), Yakov Zakhar’evich KoshkinZakhar’in, they had surrounded the city of Tver’. Two days later the suburbs were burned and on 11 September “princes and boyars of Tver’ ” voluntarily left the citadel to do homage to Ivan III. That same night Mikhail Borisovich left his ancestral throne for ever and fled to Lithuania. “He did not dare to resist,” states the chronicler of Ustyug, “for all his princes and boyars had left him to serve the grand prince.” 8 The garrison had no alternative but to surrender. On Monday 12 September Bishop Vassian and the leading citizens opened the gates to the Muscovites. It was all over. Ivan immediately sent in a group of experts to take over the 1 See P S R L VI/237, the only source to report on the event. ■According to the Tver’ Chronicle (P S R L XV/499), the embassy was in Moscow at the time of the death of Ivan I l l ’s mother, Maria (4 July 1485). Cf. P S R L VI/237; PL II/67.

a ULI9S.

THE FALL OF NOVGOROD

65

administration of the city, to maintain order and to arrange for all the citizens to swear allegiance to their new sovereign. By 15 September the preliminary formalities were concluded. Ivan entered Tver* and solemnly handed the old grand principality to his son and heir as a “full patrimony** (na vsey votchine). After appointing one of the victors of the 1471 Dvina campaign, Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets-Dobrynsky, as governor (namestnik), Ivan returned to Moscow. The fourth Great Russian territory had been added to the Muscovite empire.1 1 For the sources mentioning the fall of Tver*, see P S R L VI/237; VIII/216-7; X II/217-8; XV/500; XXV/330-1; JL/125-6; C/L/95; P L 11/67-8.

CHAPTER IV ★

T H E SO U TH ER N FLA N K

y the beginning of Ivan’s reign the main bulk of the Tatars on Moscow’s southern and south-eastern borders had ceased to be a constant menace. The Great, or Golden, Horde was but a shadow of its former self. Yet during much of Ivan’s reign it was ruled by a crafty and able khan and it remained a potential danger to Moscow in that it was still able to carry out surprise raids and with little difficulty approach the Oka, Moscow’s great natural frontier in the south. More irksome was the fact that Ivan was still, in name at least, a tributary of the khan of the Golden Horde; to the khan alone was given the title of tsar, so long as the grand prince of Moscow remained his subject. If these considerations were not enough to make Ivan direct his energies toward the eventual “liberation” of the Russian lands from the Tatar yoke, the possible danger of a Polish-Lithuanian-Tatar confederation along the whole of his western and southern flanks was. In 1472 the significance of such an alliance became all too clear. But there was yet another power in the south — the Tatar khanate of the Crimea, situated on the southern border of Lithuania’s Ukrainian possessions. A close alliance between the Crimean Tatars, the Great Horde and Lithuania could well have proved disastrous to Moscow’s western plans. Any Muscovite attack on Lithuania could have been answered by concerted raids from the south. Only one possible course lay open to the govern­ ment of Moscow: the Crimean Horde must be won over by diplomacy and bribery — perhaps even by the argument that the Ukraine, so accessible to Tatar raiding parties from the Crimea, so rich and so undefended, was still in Lithuanian hands; and the Great Horde must be defeated militarily, or at any rate isolated politically and weakened economically.

B

66

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

67

For most of the first decade of Ivan’s reign there was relative quiet on the southern border. In 1465, however, Ahmed, khan of the Great Horde, decided to mount an invasion into Russian territory. His armies collected on the river Don. There they were attacked and routed by Tatars from the Crimea under Khan Hajji Girey, founder of the great Girey dynasty. From this time on, the chronicler notes, “the two hordes began to war among themselves and thus God saved the Russian land from the heathens.” 1 It would perhaps be far-fetched to read into Hajji Girey’s timely intervention the beginnings of Muscovite diplomacy in the Crimea; there is indeed no evidence of any mission sent by Ivan to Hajji Girey. Yet the pattern of future events was beginning to emerge. Hostility between the two great Tatar hordes in the south was one of the pivots of Muscovite foreign policy. At the beginning of the seventies the pattern began to emerge still more clearly. In the early autumn of 1470, just before the crisis in Novgorod broke, Casimir despatched an envoy to the Great Horde to urge Ahmed to invade Muscovite territory. The ambassador, a certain Kirey (Girey?), himself a Tatar who had previously deserted the service of Ivan III and fled to Lithuania, suggested to Ahmed and his court that both he and Casimir attack Moscow simultaneously and in full force. The plan appealed to the nobles, notably to Prince Temir, a former collector of tribute in the district of Ryazan’, who urged the khan to comply with the king’s request. But Ahmed hesitated. Perhaps the memory of Hajji Girey’s intervention restrained him. In any case he kept Kirey at his court for a whole year. Amongst other things, he said, he had no gifts suitable to send to King Casimir. In July 1471, however, his capital of Saray was attacked by a force from Vyatka under one Kostya Yur’ev. Sailing down the Volga they had found the Tatar capital empty. Ahmed and his army were a day’s march off. Saray was sacked and the expedition set off up-stream, laden with booty and prisoners. The Tatar army, which rushed to intercept them, was unsuccessful and the party slipped through the barricade on the Volga. Alarmed, perhaps, at his vulnerability, Ahmed lost little time in sending back Kirey to Casimir together with hie own ambassador, who doubtless was instructed to inform the king of his plans. By that time, however, 1P S R L VIII/151; X II/116-7 — the only two sources to mention the event. T he date, 6973, could be either late 1464 or 1465.

68

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

it was too late for concerted action. If Casimir had indeed ever seriously intended to invade Muscovy himself he now had the excuse that he was elsewhere occupied. As the chroniclers remarked: “the king at that time had already begun to war with the king of Hungary.” 1 Another year passed before Ahmed finally decided to invade. It was a fruitless and aimless campaign. If the purpose of the expedition was to deflect Ivan’s attention and troops from Novgorod, then it came a whole year too late; the peace of Korostyn’ had been signed almost exactly twelve months before the Tatars were first reported approaching the Oka. Yet there can be no doubt that the invasion was inspired, if not actually sponsored, by King Casimir: of the two accounts of the event one describes Ahmed as “moving against the Russian land . . . urged on by the king”; the other gives his approach route to the Oka as running through Lithuanian territory. Indeed the point at which he chose to attack, the town of Aleksin, was considerably further west, and closer to the Lithuanian frontier, than the traditional invasion zone between Kolomna and Serpukhov. At the end of June 1472 Ivan received the first news of Ahmed’s approach. As there was no clear information as to the exact direction the attack would take, Ivan appears to have distributed his armies along the entire vulnerable front of the Oka from Kolomna westwards. Never one to underestimate his enemies, he mobilized the armies of all his brothers, of Prince Vasily Mikhaylovich of Vereya, of the Tatar tsarevicki in his service. Some of his most distinguished generals — Ivan Vasil’evich Obolensky-Striga, Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmsky, Fedor David­ ovich Starodubsky-Pestry, Petr Fedorovich Chelyadnin — were despatched south to defend the river line. His fourteen-year-old son, Ivan, was sent to Rostislavl’, south-west of Kolomna.2 All in all the Russian forces numbered 180,000 and stretched along some 150 versts of the river. The attack took place on 30 July at Aleksin on the right (east) bank of the Oka, and clearly took the weak garrison completely by surprise. Yet they managed to beat 1 For Kirey's embassy, see P S R L VIII/158, 168; XII/124, 142; XVIII/235; XXV/395, 292; JL/61-2, 73. For the attack on Saray, see ULIS q: P S R L VIII/168. * Most of the chroniclers say “Rostov” . This seems unlikely as Ivan “ordered his son to follow him . . P S R L VIII/174, however, has: “ordered his son to follow his grandmother to Rostov.” Ivan had previously sent Grand Princess Maria to Rostov, presumably for safety's sake.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

69

off the first wave, and it was only after the second attack on the following day that the town was burned and abandoned to the enemy. By the time the Tatars had crossed the river and joined battle with a small force of Russians under the garrison commander, Semen Beklemishev, reinforcements of such large dimensions arrived that Ahmed had no alternative but to withdraw. There was no possibility of continuing the campaign. Impressed by the vast Russian forces on the other side of the river and fearing lest the Tatar vassals of the grand prince be sent to plunder his capital, Ahmed retreated back to the steppes whence he had come. The discomfiture of his army was increased by the onset of an epidemic. By 23 August Ivan was back in Moscow. At small loss to himself he had averted the danger of a major invasion; it had required little more than an impressive show of strength. But Ahmed’s incursion and the sack of Aleksin had shown just how dangerous a military alliance between Poland-Lithuania and the Great Horde could be. A firm ally in the south must be secured at all costs.1 For eight years Ivan strove to achieve his ends in the south by diplomatic means. It must not be imagined that Ivan’s primary aim at this juncture was the military destruction of the Great Horde. This might well have proved a long and difficult under­ taking. His aim, as ever, was war with Lithuania, and all his diplomatic manoeuvring was directed towards stabilizing the situation on his southern border. Basically, he sought an aggressive alliance with the Crimea and a passive alliance with the Great Horde. Had he been able to wring from the khan of the Crimea a promise to aid him militarily in operations against Casimir and from Ahmed a promise to stay neutral, he would have been satisfied. But matters were complicated by an even bitterer enmity than that which existed between Ivan and the king of Poland — the enmity between the two hordes themselves. It must be assumed that Ivan started negotiations with Mengli Girey, Hajji Girey’s second son and khan of the Crimea since 1469, shortly after Ahmed’s invasion of 1472. The inter­ mediary in the talks was a rich Jewish merchant from Kaffa, Khoja Kokos, who enjoyed the confidence both of Ivan and of Mengli. The initiative came from Moscow. Ivan was anxious to get Mengli to agree to terms for an aggressive alliance. But 1 For an account of Ahmed’s invasion of 1472, see P S R L V II I / 173-5; XII/148-50; XXV/297-8; /L/80-2; PL II/188. For a slightly different account, see P S R L VI/195; XX/297Î ULI90-1.

70

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Mengli was cautious. He had no wish to include the name of Casimir among the “common enemies** listed on the treaty draft. His father had been friendly with the king, and Mengli, who had only acceded to the khanate by driving out his elder brother, cannot have felt himself entirely secure upon the throne. At the same time Ivan was chary of including Ahmed among the common enemies — he did not wish to involve the Great Horde in his struggle with Lithuania. Indeed, while the preliminary exchange of views between Moscow and the Crimea was going on, Ivan had begun negotiations with Ahmed himself. In 1473 or early 1474 Ivan sent his first embassy to Saray, the aim of which was clearly to keep Ahmed neutral in the event of war with Lithuania. It was answered in the summer of 1474 by a vast Tatar embassy to Moscow. When this in its turn went back to Saray, Ivan sent with it a d'yak, Dmitry Lazarev, to negotiate with Ahmed. More important still, he despatched at the same time the envoy of the Venetian Senate, Gian-Battista Trevisan. Three years before Trevisan had been sent by the Doge to Moscow, whence he was to travel to Saray in order to sound the ground for a TatarVenetian league against the Turks. In Moscow, owing to a mis­ understanding, he had been arrested for spying and had only been saved from execution by the intervention of Cardinal Bonumbre, the papal legate who accompanied Ivan III*s second wife from Rome to Moscow. Ivan wrote to the Senate, who confirmed their original intention of sending Trevisan to Saray in order to deflect the Tatars from Russia to the Black Sea and Wallachia, and thus involve them in a war with the common enemies of Christianity. Now, in letting Trevisan carry out his mission to the Horde, Ivan was approving of the plan of Venice. If Ahmed were to become involved in a war with Turkey, so much the better. It would effectively neutralize him in the event of a Russo-Lithuanian struggle. The mission, however, was only successful in so far as it led to further diplomatic exchanges between Saray and Venice.1 As for Lazarev, there is no information as to the results of his efforts. Meanwhile, in March 1474, Ivan had despatched the first of his official ambassadors to the Crimea, Nikita Vasil*evich Beklemishev. The instructions given him well illustrate the importance which 1 For details of Trevisan’s mission, see P. Pierling, La Russie et le SaintSiège, pp. 176-83.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

71

Ivan attached to the projected alliance and the exact intentions of the Muscovite government. Beklemishev was to defend Ivan’s right to maintain diplomatic relations with the Great Horde and was, if possible, to exclude Ahmed’s name from the list of common enemies in the draft of the treaty. Only if Mengli refused pointblank to agree to this and only if Mengli agreed to nominate the king of Poland as common enemy, was Beklemishev to include Ahmed. But deadlock was reached. Mengli stubbornly refused to include Casimir’s name in the treaty. In his eagerness to con­ clude some sort of written agreement with the khan, Ivan was even prepared to compromise. In 1475 one Aleksey Starkov was sent to Mengli to conduct further bargaining. Let the khan promise not to help Casimir in the event of a Russo-Lithuanian war; should Mengli agree to help Ivan against Casimir, then he, Ivan, was prepared to ally himself with Mengli against Ahmed. The results of Starkov’s embassy are not known; they clearly met with no success — indeed, it is not even certain that Starkov found Mengli still on the throne. The history of the Crimea during the second half of the seventies is obscure and confused, to say the least of it. Mengli’s attention was diverted from Moscow. He was faced with far graver problems than had hitherto beset him and he had little time — or opportunity — for negotiating with Ivan. In 1475 the Ottoman fleet seized Kaffa, the principal city of the Crimea. By the end of the year the whole of the southern seaboard, from Kerch to Khersones, was in the hands of the Turks. Southern Crimea had become an Ottoman province, governed and garrisoned by Turks in Kaffa. The khan, who had been imprisoned earlier in the year, was released and permitted to continue his rule in the northern part of the peninsula, but as vassal of the sultan. His precarious rule did not last for long. In 1476 he was again overthrown, this time by his old enemy Ahmed, who, acting with the approval of the sultan, sent his son to invade the Crimea. Mehemmed II made no effort to support his newest subject — for him, no doubt, one Tatar khan, provided he was willing to co-operate, was as good as another — and Mengli Girey spent the next few years in Turkish captivity while one Jani Beg, perhaps a relation, certainly a creature, of Ahmed, ruled in his place. It was only towards the end of 1478 or the beginning of 1479 that he was restored to his khanate, in what circumstances we do not know.

72

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Once reinstated, Mengli was obliged himself to seek an ally amongst the Christians; it was unrealistic to expect reliable support from his Turkish overlord. Nor was the choice between Casimir and Ivan a difficult one for him to make. Indeed every­ thing now favoured the speedy settlement of a treaty between Moscow and the Crimea. Not only had Casimir afforded Mengli no help in the past, but his friendship with Ahmed was un­ concealed. Furthermore Mengli’s two brothers, Nur Devlet (whom Mengli had driven from the throne in 1468) and Haydar, were now in Lithuania, enjoying, no doubt, the protection of the king. Ivan on the other hand had now no objection to including Ahmed’s name in the list of common enemies. Gone were all pretences of an alliance with the Great Horde. In 1476, taking advantage of Ahmed’s preoccupation with Turkish and Crimean affairs, Ivan had discontinued the humiliating formality of paying tribute to the khan and had been summoned to the Horde to explain his behaviour (July 1476). This was the end of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Saray. An ambassador was sent back to the Horde, bearing, no doubt, Ivan’s haughty refusal to do homage to the khan, and then there was silence. The declaration of war was only a matter of time.1 The final arrangements for concluding the alliance between Ivan and Mengli went smoothly and quickly. At the end of 1478 or the beginning of 1479 Mengli informed Ivan of his restitution to the khanate and of his desire to conclude a treaty on the terms suggested by Ivan four years previously. The exchange of ambassadors began anew. Each side showed remarkable willing­ ness to fall in with the other’s desires; Ivan indeed went so far as to lure Mengli’s two brothers from Kiev to Moscow and there to keep them under supervision — a circumstance which caused Mengli considerable relief8 and gave Ivan another trump card in his hand. In April 1480 Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets was sent to the Crimea with the final version of the treaty. Both sides were to agree on a defensive alliance against Ahmed and an offensive affiance against Casimir. Should one side be attacked by Ahmed, 1 T he assumption that Ivan ceased to pay tribute in 1476 is based on the remark put into the mouth of Ahmed in 1480 by the Vologda-Perm’ chronicler: “ This is the fifth year that he (Ivan) has not paid me tribute’'. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 118-9. For Ahmed's embassy to Moscow and Ivan’s answering embassy to the Horde, see P S R L VIII/183; XXV/308-9. * They arrived in Moscow in the autumn of 1479. There is no evidence to show how Ivan’s agents persuaded them to move. See Bazilevich, VP, p. 117.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

73

the other was to go to his aid. Should one side attack Casimir, the other was to join in the attack. It was precisely what Ivan wanted. He had no intention of invading Ahmed’s amorphous realm; it was still all too evident that Ahmed would shortly invade Muscovite territory. The only aggressive war Ivan envisaged was against the king of Poland. It had taken nearly ten years to conclude the treaty. But Ivan achieved what he wanted in the end, and it was worth it.1 In 1480 the expected invasion by Ahmed took place. The king of Poland, it will be remembered, had promised the discontented elements in Novgorod to canvass the aid of the Great Horde and the pope.* Whether or not as a result of Casimir’s efforts, the Livonian Order did in fact enter the fray and cause Ivan consider­ able trouble on his western border. Two of Ivan’s brothers, Andrey the Elder and Boris, chose this year of all years to revolt. Ivan, having just crushed what appears to have been a dangerous rebellion in Novgorod, was faced with invasion in the south, harassing war in the west and grave dissension in the centre. It was no wonder that in April, by which time the danger of the situation was evident, Ivan instructed his ambassador to the Crimea to secure the friendship of Mengli at all costs. Trouble in the north-west had, it is true, been brewing for some time; there had been incidents liable to start off a war in the spring and autumn of 1478, in which Pskovite merchants in Livonia had been involved. But the master of the Order restrained his hand until 1480. On New Year’s Day troops of the master and the archbishop of Riga carried out a lightning raid across the frontier on the little town of Vyshgorod to the south of Pskov.8 The town was sacked, and the Germans withdrew before the Pskovite forces could retaliate. On 20 January a more serious attack was carried out by two armies. This time the objective was Gdov, north of Pskov, on the eastern shores of Lake Peipus (Chudskoe Ozero). While one army surrounded the town the other laid waste the countryside. It was clear by now to the Pskovites that this was to be no mere frontier skirmish, but a full-scale war with the aim of capturing Pskov, and perhaps even Novgorod itself. 1 For an excellent description of Russo-Tatar relations during the sixties and the seventies of the fifteenth century, see Bazilevich, V P t pp. 102-23. Details of most of the diplomatic missions mentioned above are to be found in S R IO , Vol. 41. 8 See above, p. 55. 8 See map, p. 243.

74

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Indeed the German sources indicate the massive scale of the troops collected by the master, Bernhard von der Borch.1 In desperation the Pskovites turned to Ivan, who at this time was in Novgorod dealing with the disturbances there. An army under Prince Andrey Nikitich Obolensky-Nogot’ was sent. It arrived in the republic on n February and proceeded to carry out a success­ ful raid into German territory, getting as far as Derpt (Dorpat, Tartu), west of Lake Peipus, and meeting little opposition. Such military assistance from the grand prince was precisely what the Pskovites needed for the defence of their territory and the maintenance of their morale. But on returning to Pskov, Obolensky left as abruptly as he had come. Messengers were sent to beg him to come back, but to no avail. The Germans were quick to appreciate the situation and to take advantage of this weakening in the defence of Pskov. No sooner had the Muscovite contingent left than the Germans invaded again, attacking Izborsk, between Pskov and the Livonian border. The attack failed. On i March fighting took place on the ice of Lake Peipus. Three days later the Livonians attacked and sacked the town of КоЬуГе on the east bank of the narrow neck of Lake Peipus. The town was burned and 3,985 people died in the process, notes the chronicler.2 It was the end of the winter campaign. The reason given by the parochial Pskov chroniclers for the hasty removal of the Muscovite army from Pskov territory is that Obolensky “grew angry with the Pskovites” . The real reason for his recall, however, is not hard to find. Just after Ivan had sent Obolensky off to Pskov he had been informed of the rebellion of his brothers, and had set off post haste to Moscow in order to cope with the situation there. The valuable army which had been lent to the Pskovites was now wanted to deal, if needs be, with the dangerous situation within the state. The rebellion began on 1 February when the grand prince was conveniently away from the capital dealing with the troublesome Novgorodians. Boris of Volokolamsk was the first to move. After despatching his wife and children to Rzhev, he went with his court and army to the patrimony of his brother Andrey at Uglich. Dissatisfied with their elder brother’s arbitrary behaviour and ungenerous attitude to 1 See Balthasar Rüssow, Chronica der Provintz Lyfflandt, p. 31. * See P L II/22I) where the date is given in a marginal note as 5 August. In the Pskov 2nd Chronicle, however, the date is given correctly as 4-5 M arch (PL II/59)* For the winter campaigns of 1480, see P L II/58—9, 218-21.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

75

them when it came to apportioning land, Andrey and Boris decided to defect.1 On 13 February, the day Ivan arrived back in Moscow, the two princes with their courts and their vast armies set off west along the Volga. After travelling without incident through the territory of Tver*, they reached Rzhev. Here they were met by an emissary of the grand prince, asking them to return. Unheeding, they proceeded north-west into what had previously been Novgorod territory. On their way to the city of Novgorod they were caught up by Ivan’s second emissary, Vassian, arch­ bishop of Rostov, who had been sent to plead with them. His mission was in vain; by the end of March he was back in Moscow, accompanied by two boyars from the courts of Andrey and Boris, Vasily and Petr Nikitich Obolensky, whose unpleasant duty it was, no doubt, to explain to the grand prince the reasons for his brothers* actions and the terms on which they were prepared to call off the rebellion. Meanwhile Andrey and Boris, realizing that the Novgorodians were in no mood to harbour such dangerous guests within their walls, struck off south, plundering and ravaging all the way, to the city of Velikie Luki, hard by the borders of Pskov and Lithuania. It was an ideal situation, close enough to Lithuania to parley with Casimir and remote enough from Moscow to render them safe from attacks. Here the two princes made their headquarters for the next six months. While the rebellious princes settled in Velikie Luki, much to the distress of the local inhabitants, who suffered direly from the depredations of their troops, an extraordinary three-sided bargaining match between them, Casimir and Ivan, took place. Before discussing details, perhaps it would be worth while seeing just what the two princes had to offer both sides and what exactly the rebellion meant to Ivan. First and foremost it must be borne in mind that both the princes set off west together with their armies, the size of which, according to one source,2 was 20,000 men — a force which Ivan could ill do without. For Casimir the defection of the two senior princes of the Muscovite realm could be of immense propaganda value, particularly amongst those of his Orthodox Russian subjects who might in their turn be con­ templating desertion eastwards. Apart from the loss of 20,000 trained soldiers, Ivan clearly feared the renewal of civil war within 1 T heir reasons for defecting are analysed in Chapter IX. 1 Pskov and Chronicle. See P L II/60.

76

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

his borders or, indeed, the triumph that would have been Casimir’s had he succeeded in winning over the brothers on his own terms. Furthermore there was the nuisance value of the rebellion. All the chroniclers report on the general public reaction, which was one of alarm and terror. Neither Andrey nor Boris had much control over their soldiery, who, once away from their masters’ estates, began to pillage, bum and rape. “All the people”, states a chronicler, “were in great terror of the brothers; all the towns were in a state of siege. Many people fled through the forests and died of cold.” 1 On 24 April Ivan sent off Archbishop Vassian once more, this time accompanied by two distinguished boyars, Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets and Vasily Borisovich Tuchko-Morozov. Owing to the difficulties of travel in Russia during the thaw, their journey took nearly four weeks. They arrived in Velikie Luki on 21 May. This time they brought with them more concrete proposals from the grand prince. If they returned to their patrimonies, he was willing “to meet all their demands” (vo vsem . . . zhalavati). What is more, he was prepared to give Andrey the two Oka towns of Kaluga and Aleksin.2 The offers were rejected and the arch­ bishop returned for the second time empty-handed. Andrey and Boris were not ready to negotiate with their brother until they had thoroughly investigated the possibilities on the other side of the border. Here, however, they met with less favourable conditions than they had expected. No sooner had they arrived in Velikie Luki than they despatched ambassadors to the king, asking him to help them in their conflict with the grand prince. But Casimir was not willing to co-operate — the rebellion, perhaps, had come too soon for his purposes, for Ahmed had not yet appeared in force on the Russian frontiers. He refused them the help they asked for, merely offering their wives the town of Vitebsk for life. Disillusioned in their attempts to arouse the sympathy of Casimir, the brothers had no alternative but to reopen negotiations with Ivan. Perhaps after all they had been foolish to reject his previous offers. At any rate, in the early summer they sent emissaries to bow allegiance to their elder brother. But it was a different Ivan to the one that had sent off Archbishop Vassian to beg the princes to return. This time the grand prince refused to listen to his brothers’ d’y aki, in spite of the intercession of his 1P S R L VIII/204. Cf. P L II/60.

* See P S R L VIII/204.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

77

mother for her favourite son Andrey. Ivan remained adamant. He declined their offer of submission. Indeed he had reason to change his attitude. By now he must have heard of Casimir’s refusal to help the rebels; the treaty with Mengli Girey had been safely concluded; and the summer invasion of Ahmed had been limited to a reconnaissance in strength. Sheer inactivity and boredom would probably drive the brothers back to their comfortable patrimonies before long. In the meantime there was no point in sending further embassies to plead with them or armies to drive them back. As the summer advanced and the rebel brothers remained in enforced idleness on the Russo-Lithuanian frontier, suddenly the Germans attacked again in the north-west. On 18 August Bernhard von der Borch with an army of 100,0001 men fell upon Izborsk. Two days later, realizing that the fortress was impreg­ nable, they moved east to their main objective, Pskov. After attacking on the outskirts, they laid siege to the city itself. The Pskovites were in despair. In vain they appealed for help to Novgorod and to the grand prince. So desperate was the situation that even Ivan’s namestnik, Prince Vasily VasiTevich Shuysky, attempted to flee. As a last resort they sent messengers to Andrey and Boris, asking them to aid them. Before they could arrive, however, the Germans, miraculously, so the Pskovites believed, abandoned the siege and departed. Little did the men of Pskov realize what they were in for when they asked the two princes for help. They arrived on 3 September. The Pskovites begged them to avenge them by attacking the Germans, or at least to defend them. But Andrey and Boris were only prepared to help on the condition that Pskov gave adequate provision and accommodation to their wives and families. As this would have been tantamount to harbouring the grand prince’s enemies, the prudent Pskovites demurred. Eventually, preferring discretion to their own security, they quoted, somewhat tactlessly, the words of the Gospel about serving two masters. The two princes left in a huff and proceeded to terrorize the land of Pskov. With a retinue 10,000 strong “they laid waste many districts like infidels, and they plundered the houses of God and killed much cattle. They defiled women and virgins and many they led off in captivity. Of all the animals they left not a chicken alive. . . 1 See Rüssow, op. cit., p. 31.

e P L II/61-2. Cf. P L II/22a.

78

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

It was only after the republic had bribed them with 215 roubles that they agreed to move back into what had been formerly Novgorod territory. There they remained until at the height of the invasion crisis in October the grand prince, persuaded by his mother and the senior clergy, relented. The wayward princes, after their long and futile attempt at defection, returned to the fold and were welcomed with open arms by their elder brother, who was temporarily willing to forget their treachery. Those who were left alive of the inhabitants of Velikie Luki could begin to live their lives again, mercifully released from the troops of Uglich and Volotsk, who were little better than wild animals.1 The events of the autumn and early winter of 1480, culminating in the hasty withdrawal and eventual murder of the khan of the Great Horde, made a profound impression on public opinion. The result is that there survived a variety of accounts; some of these were official, some unofficial; a few more or less ten­ dentious, most were heavily biased. It is not proposed here to investigate the reliability of the various sources. This has been done admirably by the Soviet historian Bazilevich.® It is intended to set out the most probable course of events and to examine the motives of the chief protagonists. Perhaps then we can come to a conclusion different from that proffered by many of the chroniclers (and some nineteenth-century historians), namely that the socalled “stand on the Ugra” was a somewhat shameful page in Russian history, that Ivan behaved in a craven and undignified manner and that Russia’s liberation from the Tatar yoke was due to divine intervention. Bazilevich has convincingly shown that the most diffuse, inaccurate and prejudiced account, in which Ivan is portrayed as an inefficient panicky coward and his wife is shown in the most unsympathetic light,3 was probably little more than a political pamphlet written towards the end of the century with the purpose of discrediting Sofia Palaeologa. A synthesis of the more sober accounts of 1480 throws a very different light on events. The northward move of the Great Horde in the summer or spring of 1480 was undoubtedly planned as a vast and crushing invasion of Muscovy. With an arrogance and self-confidence that 1 For details of the story of the princes* rebellion, see P S R L V I/222-3; VIII/204-6; XII/197-201; XXV/326-7; I L f119-21; C/L/92-3; P L II/S9-62, 222. 8 See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 134-47. Cf. Ya. S. L ur’ye, “ Iz istorii . . .**, pp. 78 sq. 8 The 2nd Sofiysky Chronicle. P S R L VI.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

79

were hopelessly anachronous, Ahmed aspired to the glories of Baty, who had humbled the Russians just two and a half centuries before. But he was not acting independently of his allies. Nor clearly was the decision to invade prompted solely by Ivan’s refusal to pay tribute or by the humiliating treatment of Tatar envoys at the hands of the Russians. It was to be a joint attack, planned with, if not by, King Casimir. All the chroniclers are in agreement on this. “The king led him against the grand prince,” “ The king called him with all his Horde . . . . ” Indeed before the invasion Ahmed’s ambassadors had discussed the campaign with Casimir.1 Ahmed marched north with the conviction that Casimir would close in from the west at the appointed time. One of the sources even suggests that the defection of the grand prince’s two brothers was part of this vast scheme to overwhelm Ivan, and that the brothers themselves advised Ahmed to invade when he did2 — an accusation which may not seem so far-fetched when one realizes that Ivan eventually imprisoned Andrey the Elder for, inter alia, “sending messages to Tsar Ahmed of the Great Horde and leading him on to attack the grand prince and the Russian land.” 8 But all the carefully-laid schemes for a joint invasion of Ivan’s lands fell through. The brothers’ rebellion fizzled out and Casimir failed to move at the appointed time. Had Ahmed remembered the lesson of Mamay, who exactly a hundred years previously had been frustrated in his designs on Moscow by the non-co-operation of his ally Jagiello of Poland-Lithuania, he would not have risked and lost his whole Horde on this venture. Although the first intelligence of the northward move of the Great Horde had probably been received in Moscow during the spring, the first appearance of the Tatars on Russian soil appears to have been in the beginning of June, when their advance parties seized the town of Besputa in the Tula district south of the Oka, and withdrew. Aware of the gravity of the impending invasion, Ivan hastened to defend the traditional river front along the Oka.4 Andrey the Younger was sent to Tarusa, half-way between Serpukhov and Aleksin, and Ivan Ivanovich, the heir to the 1 ". . . King Casimir of Poland united with Tsar Ahmed, and the ambassadors of the tsar (khan) were with the king, and they agreed to march against the grand prince, the tsar from his base over the steppes and the king from his. . . (P SR L XXV/327.) * See P S R L XXV/327. . * P S R L X II/231. 4 For the places mentioned in the following pages, see map, p. 142 and map at the end of the book.

8o

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

throne, to Serpukhov. Ivan himself took up his main head­ quarters in Kolomna on 23 June.1 Cautiously and slowly Ahmed moved north; as the chroniclers point out, there was no point in hurrying before he heard that Casimir had mobilized. On learning, however, that the Oka was held in strength from Kolomna to Aleksin, Ahmed changed his plans. He decided to move west, cross the Oka in Lithuanian territory, attack over the upper stretches of the Ugra and thus outflank the Russians holding the Oka line. His change of plan was countered by Ivan, who switched the main concentration of his defence westwards.2 Ivan Ivanovich and Andrey the Younger took up their headquarters in Kaluga, close to the junction of the Oka and the Ugra rivers; most of their troops were stationed along the Ugra, guarding the fords and likely crossing-places. Autumn was now under way. By the end of October it would be winter and the rivers would be frozen over; the Oka and the Ugra would no longer afford a serious obstacle to the invaders. Ivan was faced with a grave problem. The troops at present at his disposal were capable of defending the river line before the frosts came. But would he be able to cover the entire southern front when crossing presented no difficulty to the enemy? And how could Moscow be defended if Casimir chose to strike at the same time? There was only one possible solution to his problem — the 20,000 men under Andrey the Elder and Boris must be persuaded to return to the defence of the country at all costs. It was probably this last consideration, and the fact that envoys from the two princes were waiting in Moscow, that made Ivan return from the front to the capital on 30 September. Further­ more, he needed to attend to details of the defence of Moscow, which was already, say the chronicles, “in a state of siege“ . He stayed only three days in Moscow (30 September — 3 October), according to the majority of accounts. His first action was to summon a Council of State to discuss the conduct of the coming war. The council consisted of the senior clergy, represented by Metropolitan Geronty and Ivan’s father-confessor, Archbishop Vassian, the grand prince’s mother, Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya and “all the boyars’’. First and foremost it was decided 1 23 July, according to some accounts. * Ivan probably realized Ahmed’s change of plans when the Tatar advance troops were shown the fords across the Ugra by the local inhabitants. See P S R L VIII/206.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

8l

that the war must be prosecuted at all costs, the Tatars must be resisted and the country saved. “They begged him with great entreaties to stand firm for Orthodox Christianity against heathendom.” Then came the question of getting back the two rebellious princes. In the moment of crisis Ivan had no alternative but to accede to their demands and the insistence of his Council. His mother was instructed to send for the brothers and their armies at all speed, and messengers were sent off to Velikie Luki. After seeing that the defences of the city were strengthened under the garrison commander, Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev, and having performed the religious rites expected of a ruler in time of crisis, Ivan left his capital and returned towards the front. Moscow, swollen with refugees from less defended towns, settled down uneasily to wait. All minds were occupied with one thought: would the brothers arrive in time to save the country from the Tatars and possibly too from the Lithuanians? Instead of returning to the front line at the Ugra river, Ivan took up his headquarters at the village of Kremenets on the river Luzha, upstream from Maly Yaroslavets. Situated some 25-30 miles from the Ugra, yet far enough north to be able to cope with an attack from the west, Kremenets was the best position not only for main headquarters, but also for the reserve force. If a second front was opened by Casimir, Ivan would be in greater control of the situation than if he had retained his headquarters in Kaluga. For the moment, however, the main danger came from the Tatars and Ivan sent off all available troops south to bolster up the defences on the left bank of the Ugra. If and when the rebel brothers came, their armies could be used to form the reserve force. On 3 October Ivan was in Kremenets. Five days later the main body of Ahmed’s army arrived at the confluence of the rivers Oka and Ugra.1 Impatient, no doubt, at Casimir’s delay, Ahmed decided to cross the river with all despatch. The defence on the left bank, however, conducted by Ivan Ivanovich and Andrey the Younger, was effective. For four days the Russians held off the Tatars with arrows, arquebuses and guns (tyufyaki). The Tatars were unable to cross. On 12 October Ahmed withdrew a little way from the river — perhaps to Vorotynsk, the last town he had stopped at before attempting 1 T he date, 8 October, as well as much of the subsequent information is given in the hitherto unpublished Vologda-Perm’ Chronicle. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 147» sq-

82

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

the river crossing. There was little he could do. The Ugra could not be crossed without serious losses until the hard frosts started. Casimir still showed no signs of life. Both sides were faced with a fortnight’s inactivity at the front. Rather than wait passively for the river to freeze and the king to move, Ahmed decided to allow his troops their traditional form of relaxation — the pillaging and sacking of the neighbourhood. “He scattered his troops throughout all the Lithuanian land.” At first sight this would appear to have been a singularly foolish act on Ahmed’s part in view of the anticipated co-operation of Casimir. The king would hardly feel more inclined to help his ally while his possessions were being sacked by him. But the list of towns affected by Ahmed’s depredations show that these activities were carefully confined to the principalities on the Upper Oka, whose ties of vassaldom to the grand prince of Lithuania were slender, to say the least of it. This was clearly no act of wanton revenge for Casimir’s “treachery”.1 Had Ahmed despaired of the king’s help he would have abandoned his venture after his unsuccessful attempt to cross the Ugra. As it was, he patiently waited, confident of his ally’s support. The reasons for this act of savagery can only be guessed at. Perhaps the minor princelings had refused co-operation as Ahmed marched north towards the Ugra — many of them, it is known, were well disposed towards Moscow and ready to defect; perhaps they had even conducted guerilla tactics in his rear as he fought the Russians across the Ugra. While the Tatars pillaged the districts of the Upper Oka, Ivan opened negotiations with the khan. The initiative came from the grand prince, who sent Ivan Fedorovich Tovarkov laden with gifts to the khan and his nobles. His task was to persuade the Tatars to withdraw and leave the lands of Muscovy in peace. In answer, Ahmed demanded the presence of the grand prince or, failing that, his son or brother.2 How the parleys ended is not known; they were clearly nothing but conventional exchanges. On the face of the evidence, this was an act of excessive caution and even cowardice on the part of Ivan — and as such, indeed, it 1 Most sources describe how he withdrew eventually “warring on the king's land for his treachery". This episode in the campaign, which took place immedi­ ately after 12 October, is only described in the Vologda-Perm' Chronicle. * The two main versions of the parleys are contained in the Vologda-Perm' Chronicle on the one hand, and in the Sofiysky 2nd Chronicle and in the L'vov Chronicle on the other hand. See P S R L VI/231; XX/346.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK

S3

was interpreted by most of his enemies and some of his wellwishers. A more rational interpretation would be that Ivan was trying to gain time by conventional parleying rather than seriously attempting to buy the enemy off. His brothers, after all, had not yet arrived from Velikie Luki, and it was not known whether they would arrive in time. Whatever his motives in negotiating with the enemy, they were construed by his confessor, Archbishop Vassian, as a sign of vaccilation and weakness. In an impassioned address Vassian urged his sovereign not to lend an ear to those corrupt advisers who counselled pacification and non-resistance to the enemy, but to stand firm, to fight the pagans and to defend the Christian faith.1 On 20 October, shortly after Ivan had received his spiritual father’s weighty exhortation, Andrey the Elder and Boris arrived with their armies at Kremenets. The extraordinary events which concluded Ahmed’s campaign seem hardly credible as reported by the majority of contemporary chroniclers, who in their naivety would have us believe that both sides retreated through fear of each other. Ivan, we are told, withdrew his commanders and their forces to Kremenets, and then still further back to Borovsk. Not only was he afraid that the Tatars would cross the Ugra; he had also been hearkening to evil counsellors, two of whom are even mentioned by name in one account. The Tatars, seeing the opposite bank evacuated, thought that the Russians were luring them into a trap and retreated south. Little credence, of course, can be given to such a naive account of affairs; the motives of Ivan and Ahmed can hardly be ascribed to fear alone, although it is reasonable to assume that neither side was willing to risk a pitched battle. Ivan’s behaviour is the hardest to explain, and one can only doubt the timing and the motives of his actions as reported in the chronicles. His longawaited reinforcements had arrived; neither Ahmed nor Casimir showed the slightest signs of bellicosity, even though the rivers had frozen by the end of October and there were no natural obstacles in the path of the Tatars. The most reasonable explana­ tion of his actions is that he ordered a general withdrawal to Kremenets and then to Borovsk — probably the dispersal point for his armies — after he had assured himself that the Tatars had fled. Such is certainly the most satisfactory solution. 1 T he “ Epistle to the Ugra” (Postante na Ugru), as it is known, is included in most of the chronicles. See P S R L V I/225-30; V III/207-13; XII/203-12.

84

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

For an explanation of Ahmed’s behaviour, however, one must look further afield. Winter and the hard frosts had set in on 26 October. The rivers, presumably, had frozen hard enough for safe crossing shortly after this. Ahmed retreated on 11 November after some two weeks of inactivity, during which time he may still have been waiting for a sign from Casimir. The king’s refusal to co-operate, coupled with the knowledge that the rebellious brothers had rejoined the grand prince, must clearly be con­ sidered as one of the main reasons for Ahmed’s withdrawal. Single-handed he could not face the entire might of the Russians. But the Kazan’ Chronicle gives yet another reason — and a more cogent one still. While Ahmed was waiting on the Ugra, Ivan, so the chronicle alleges, sent one of his “service khans”, Urdovlet (Nur Devlet?) Oblyaz of Gorodets, together with Prince Vasily Nozdrovaty, down the Volga to Saray, which they found un­ defended. As soon as Ahmed heard the news, he abandoned his Russian campaign and retreated south. Although the Kazan* Chronicle is not always the most reliable of sources, there is no reason to doubt this incident. Nothing could have been better calculated to draw off the Tatars from the Russian front than a surprise raid on their base. It had been done before, in 1471, by the men of Vyatka, and fear of just such a raid by Ivan’s service “tsarevichi” had in fact been one of the reasons why Ahmed had abandoned his campaign in 1472.1 While it is idle to speculate as to what would have been the fate of Moscow had Casimir fulfilled his obligations towards Ahmed, it is none the less important to inquire into the reasons for the Polish king’s immobility. The chroniclers have no hesitation in explaining away Casimir’s reticence, but unfortunately their explanations are couched in the vaguest of terms and are annoyingly laconic. “The king himself did not join him [Ahmed], nor did he send his forces, since he had his own internal troubles (usobitsy). For at that time (togda bo) Mengli Girey, the Crimean tsar, waged war on the king’s land of Podolia, serving the grand prince.” 2 The 1 See above, p. 69. For the attack on the Horde, see P S R L XIX/202-3. Who exactly Urdovlet Oblyaz was it is hard to say. It is tempting to see in him N u t Devlet, Mengli's brother, who had just entered Ivan’s service. One of Ivan’s T atar interpreters in 1490 was called Oblyaz bakshey. (S R IO Vol. 41, pp. 87, 100.) * Such is the version of P SR L VIII/206; XII/201; XXV/328; JL /ai. VI/224, XVIII/268 and XX/338 omit the second sentence about Mengli Girey. In some versions the word "serving” (duxha) is replaced by "in friendship with” ( Vol. 1, No. 162, pp. 183-5. The document is undated, but presumably refers to the early years of the war. * See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 333. At the same time Kubensky passed on to Ivan a rumour to the effect that Stephen and Jan Olbracht were at war.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

233

was to be expected, Kachka’s mission turned out to be entirely fruitless. Mengli sent him back with a junior official (cheloveka plokhogo) and promptly set off to fight the Lithuanians.1 Once again Stephen’s efforts to maintain the peace between his ally Alexander and the latter’s enemies had failed. Neither Ivan nor Mengli had the slightest intention of cancelling what promised to be a highly profitable war for both of them. Ivan in particular was unlikely to pay attention to an appeal that smacked of a crusade and represented the Turks and the Tatars as the enemies of Christianity. Stephen’s attempt at mediation on behalf of Alexander was not the only one. The second year of the war began with a concerted effort by the two brothers of Alexander, Wladislaw of Hungary and Bohemia and Jan Olbracht of Poland, to stop the war. Unwilling and unable to help their brother with force of arms, they cajoled and threatened the grand prince of Moscow in turn. But it was all to no effect; for Ivan was well enough aware of the situation in eastern Europe to realize just how empty were the threats and how incapable were the two Jagiellon kings of lending more than nominal aid to Lithuania. During the first two and a half months of 1501, while military operations were at a standstill, the ambassadors of the Jagiellons argued with Ivan and his ministers in Moscow. The first to arrive was Matyas Csezeliczky, the emissary of Wladislaw, who was received in audience by Ivan on 14 January 1501.2 He came quickly to the point and used no subterfuge to convey his master’s intentions. Wladislaw had heard of the war between Ivan and Alexander, a war which could only result in great losses for Christianity and rejoicing “for the pagans”. He begged Ivan to make up the quarrel with Alexander and offered his services as mediator. Only towards the end of Matyas’s speech could a note of warning be heard: should Ivan not make peace, then Wladislaw intended “to counsel and help his brother as best he could”. The threat was scarcely veiled and Ivan countered it with just as explicit a declaration of his own intentions. After laboriously recounting all the old Muscovite grudges against Alexander and the latter’s repeated breaches of the treaty of 1494, Ivan’s spokesman 1 See ibid., pp. 355-6. 1 His credentials were signed in Buda on the “Wednesday after the Elevation of the Holy Cross (14 September), 1500” . For his mission, see S R IO , Vol. 35, No. 65, pp. 300-^7.

234

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

concluded with an affirmation of Muscovite rectitude and Lithuanian guilt and an outspoken answer to Wladislaw’s threats: “we will resist1 our enemy as much as God helps us; for God is our helper and justice is ours.” Should, however, Alexander send his ambassadors to discuss an armistice, Ivan was ready to make peace — only under what conditions, he was not yet prepared to say. One final request was made by the Hungarian ambassador. He asked Ivan to release all prisoners captured during the first year of the war “on oath or on surety”. He was met with a curt refusal. Such was not the custom of Muscovy, he was told. In any case the king need have no anxiety for their treatment; they were receiving a sufficient amount of clothing and food and were suffering no hardship. On 22 January Matyas left Moscow having achieved nothing. He could only report to his master on Ivan’s confidence and determination to prosecute the war. While Matyas was still in the middle of his attempts to reconcile the warring parties, a messenger arrived in Moscow announcing the impending arrival of the ambassadors of the other two Jagiellons, Jan Olbracht and Alexander. Clearly the east European triumvirate was anxious to put a speedy end to hostilities. Their almost indecent haste and the clumsiness of their tactics can only have convinced the Muscovite government of the weakness of their position and of their inability to carry out their threats. On 21 February Pan Olekhno and Stanislav Narbut, representing Jan Olbracht and Alexander respectively, presented themselves in Moscow. Their arguments differed little from those of the Hungarian ambassador. The king of Poland was anxious to investigate the Russo-Lithuanian quarrel, to ascertain who the guilty party was and to arbitrate between the two sides. Such willingness to assist the cause of peace in a neutral capacity well befitted his role as mediator, but his representative Olekhno soon showed that the purpose of his visit was quite different. He pointed out that Ivan III had illegally seized the lands of his son-in-law. These must be handed back. This time the threat was even less veiled than before. To enforce the restitution of Alexander’s “patrimonies”, the king of Poland was prepared to intervene militarily and even to ally himself for this purpose to unspecified “pagans”. As for Narbut, he merely recapitulated the habitual Lithuanian arguments in justification of the grand prince. 1The words used are stoyati protiv — lit. “to stand (firm) against. . .” .

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (15O O -1503)

235

Alexander, he alleged, had not started the war; his ambassadors had only gone to the Great Horde to discuss frontier problems and never to incite the children of Ahmed against Moscow; no religious pressure had been brought to bear on Elena; it was true that no chapel had been built in her quarters at the palace and that her suite was not exclusively Orthodox — but then this had never been part of the written agreement between Ivan and Alexander. If Jan Olbracht could hint at reprisals, so could Ivan hint at the demands he would ultimately make at the peace table. Con­ fident that only he could emerge victorious from the war, he treated the suggestions of Olekhno with the contempt he thought they deserved. The lands which Ivan had been accused of wrong­ fully occupying had been from time immemorial his own patrimony (istariny ego otchina). In spite of the fact that Alexander had violated the treaty — and here followed the customary catalogue of accusations — Ivan was anxious for peace, but only under conditions, as Ivan’s representative unambiguously put it, “that will suit us”. Narbut was given an answer almost word for word the same as that given to the Lithuanian ambassadors in April 1500, on the eve of the war. He can hardly have expected better. There can be no doubt that Alexander was extremely desirous of achieving even a temporary cessation of hostilities. As well as bringing his two brothers into play in the role of mediators, he adopted the device which had proved so successful nine years previously and gave his blessing to a private correspondence between representatives of the Lithuanian and Muscovite nobilities.1 The correspondents, strangely enough, were the same as before — Yan Zaberezinsky, now voevoda of Troki, and Yakov Zakhar’in, now voevoda of Kolomna. But this time, although it continued till December 1501, the exchange of letters led to nothing. Both writers merely voiced the official views of their governments and contributed little to the cause of peace.2 Indeed, only Ivan seems to have benefited, for he instructed the messenger sent to deliver Zakhar’in’s first reply to Zaberezinsky to try to collect as much information of strategical importance as he could.3 1 T he correspondence may, of course, have started on the initiative of the Lithuanian nobles themselves, as it had in 1492; but it seems likely that in any case Alexander encouraged the exchange. * For the correspondence, see S R IO , Vol. 35, Nos. 67, 68 and 69. 3 He was told to find out about casualties, reinforcements (especially from Poland and Hungary) and any Turkish or Crimean operations in Lithuania or Poland. See ibid., pp. 326-7.

2 36

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

The only crumb of comfort which fell to Alexander as a result of the negotiations in early 1501 was a temporary truce on all fronts. In a final effort to achieve some results, Olekhno and Narbut suggested that the “great ambassadors** of Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania should come to Moscow to discuss a treaty. Sensing the possibility of gaining his ends by diplomatic rather than warlike means, Ivan agreed. What is more surprising, he agreed to instruct all local commanders to stop attacking the frontiers of Lithuania until the ambassadors arrived, and in fact even issued orders to this effect to Mozhaysky and Shemyachich.1 In spite of these orders, however, he wrote to Mengli Girey at the same time, announcing that he had rejected all Alexander’s offers of peace and that he intended to mount a new expedition against Lithuania forthwith. The ambassadors never came. No doubt the three envoys persuaded the Jagiellons that there was little purpose in dealing at the present time with anyone so intractable as Ivan, a view which was confirmed by the inconclusive correspondence between Zaberezinsky and Zakhar’in and by Ivan’s conduct in the months following the talks. At the same time Alexander’s decision not to send his ambassadors to Moscow can be explained by the sudden change in the political situation in eastern Europe: On 17 June 1501 Jan Olbracht died. Alexander became joint ruler of Poland and Lithuania. The diplomatic negotiations of January-March 1501 and the promises of a temporary truce on the Russo-Lithuanian borders were soon forgotten in the intensive preparations for a summer campaign. A three-sided attack on Lithuania — probably in the direction of Smolensk — was planned from the north, the east and the south; while the khan of the Crimean Tatars, it was hoped, would penetrate deep into Alexander’s rear, west of the Dnepr.2 While Mozhaysky and Shemyachich, in spite of recent orders to the contrary, were now being told to attack Lithuania from the south,8 the main Muscovite forces were mustering in the north. Three armies were involved. The first was sent from Moscow 1 The orders were given on 11 March 1501. See S R IO , Vol. 41, pp. 345-6. 1 On 11 March Prince Fedor Romodanovsky was sent to Mengli to inform him that the Russian offensive would soon be under way and to urge him (a) to attack either Kiev, or Slutsk, or Turov, Pinsk and Minsk, and (6) not to wage war on the districts east of the Dnepr which were now in Muscovite hands. See ibid., pp. 340, 343. * This information comes from despatches to Mengli and Mamonov in May 1501. See ibid., No. 71.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

237

westwards in April 1501. To judge from the list of relatively insignificant commanders, it was probably the weakest.1 The second army was under an old and experienced commander, Prince Semen Romanovich Yaroslavsky,2 and was ordered to move south from Novgorod. The third, and main, army was grouped in reserve in Tver*, whither Ivan had sent his eldest son Vasily as supreme commander. It contained a galaxy of dis­ tinguished generals, including Prince Daniil VasiPevich Shchenya, the victor of the Vedrosha, two princes of Rostov, Dmitry and Alexandr Vladimirovich, Vladimir Andreevich Mikulinsky and Dmitry Andreevich Shein.8 However carefully planned the summer operations of 1501 may have been, they were suddenly called off. Yaroslavsky and the second army, if they ever left Novgorod at all, were back at their base in mid May; should hostilities with Lithuania begin, part of them were ordered to join the main army in Tver’; should there be trouble on the Livonian front, one of the namestniki of Novgorod, Ivan Andre­ evich Kolychev-Loban, was to be in command.4 On the activities of the first army from Moscow or of Mozhaysky and Shemyachich in the south the chronicles are silent. There is likewise no informa­ tion as to the reasons for the cancellation of the campaign of the early summer of 1501. It may be that Ivan foresaw Mengli’s inability to carry out his diversionary invasion west of the Dnepr and suspected that both Russian and Crimean operations might be hampered by the Great Horde.5 He may have been disturbed by the news of an attempt by the men of Narva to sieze Ivangorod in the spring of 1501, and feared that further operations on the north-west frontier would keep him engaged there and prevent him from concentrating his main forces on Smolensk. The news from Kazan’, so recently subjected to a siege by the Nogays, may 1 T he commanders of the Great Corps were Princes Daniil Alexandrovich Penkov, a former governor of Novgorod, and Mikhail Kurbsky-Karamysh; the Leading Corps was under Prince Vasily VasiTevich Shuysky-Nemoy; the two brothers Borozdin, Ivan and Petr Borisovich, commanded the Right and Left Hands respectively. See D R K , p. 28. * See ibid., p. 28. * See ibid., p. 28. 4 Prince S. R. Yaroslavsky, together with Prince Ivan Tulup and Mikhail Andreevich Kolychev, was instructed to join Vasily in Tver’. I. A. Kolychev was, if necessary, to bring in the namestniki of Oreshek and Korela to help fight the Livonians. A third Kolychev brother, Andrey, was to stay behind with the archbishop in case of emergency. See ibid., pp. 28-9. 6 It must be pointed out that Ivan first heard officially from his ambassador that Mengli had had to put off his Lithuanian expedition on 23 July 1501. See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 356.

238

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

have worried him. Perhaps even intelligence as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions in the Smolensk area were a contributory factor. In any case, the major invasion of Lithuania which was planned for the early summer of 1501 was cancelled before it even got under way. Ivan’s armies were not idle for long. In the autumn of 1501 they went into action almost simultaneously, on the southern front against the Lithuanians, and in the north-west against the Livonian Order. The operations in the south were carried out with speed and skill. On 24 September considerable reinforce­ ments were sent from the north — probably from Tver’ — to Starodub, the headquarters of Mozhaysky and Shemyachich.1 Clearly the two defector-princes needed extra troops; for in late August they had sent part of their army to defend Ryl’sk against the Tatars of the Great Horde, who after Mengli’s withdrawal from the Tikhaya Sosna area in July had moved west with the purpose of carrying out Alexander’s request and harassing the new Russian acquisitions in the Ukraine.2 The reinforced army, led by Mozhaysky and Shemyachich, marched north. On 4 November, near Mstislavl’, some sixty miles south of Smolensk, they were met by the main Lithuanian army commanded by Astafy Dashkovich and Prince Mikhail Zheslavsky (Izheslavsky). The battle resulted in a complete victory for the Muscovite forces. Some 7,000 Lithuanians were killed, many prisoners were taken and standards captured. Zheslavsky just managed to escape. No attempt was made by Mozhaysky and Shemyachich to take Mstislavl’. Having laid waste the land around the city, they withdrew. Most of the commanders were ordered to return to Moscow; only Princes Ivan Mikhaylovich Vorotynsky and Petr Semenovich Ryapolovsky were told to go back with Mozhaysky and Shemyachich to their headquarters at Starodub.8 One must again speculate as to the reasons for the campaign of Mozhaysky and Shemyachich in the early autumn of 1501. It was clearly not a thrust directed against Smolensk; for there were 1 Two of the commanders sent to Starodub, Prince Alexandr Vladimirovich Rostovsky and Grigory Fedorovich Davydov, are mentioned as being at Vasily's headquarters in T ver’ in April 1501 (D R K , p. 28). T he third, Semen Ivanovich Vorontsov, may have come from Moscow. See D R K , pp. 20-30; P S R L VI11/240. 8 See below, p. 245. 8 For the Russian order of battle, see D R K , pp. 29-30. A detailed description of the battle is given in the chronicles. See P S R L VIII/240-1.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (15O O -1503)

239

no simultaneous movements from the north or the east, and'autumn was hardly the time to launch a major invasion. Furthermore, the behaviour of the army after the battle of Mstislavl’ — their complete unwillingness even to assault the town and their swift withdrawal and failure to follow up what was after all a resounding victory — all points to the deduction that neither Smolensk nor even Mstislavl’ were the objectives. Mozhaysky’s task was to destroy the Lithuanian army. Its location was well known to the supreme command in Moscow and to the commanders of the southern army, detachments of which had been operating in the area just south of Mstislavl* during the summer of 1501.1 Unless the army was destroyed, future operations against Smolensk might be seriously held up. An even graver consideration may have activated Ivan and his princes. It is not impossible that the Lithuanian army gathered in Mstislavl’ was planning an invasion of the Seversk lands in co-operation with the Tatars of the Great Horde, who in August had moved against Ryl’sk. Whatever were the plans of the Lithuanian High Command, they were shattered by Ivan. The battle of Mstislavl’ was decisive: after it the Lithuanian forces could not hope to offer much resistance to a Russian invasion from the south, let alone mount a counter­ offensive and win back the lands so recently lost. Even before Ivan had despatched his reinforcements to Starodub, Pskovite and Muscovite forces were engaged on the Livonian front in the north-west. The aggressive Von Plettenberg, Master of the Livonian Order, had concluded a treaty with Alexander early in 1501. The Order and some of the Baltic towns, it was planned, were to attack Russian possessions in conjunction with Lithuania.* But as was so often the case in anti-Muscovite activities, the Lithuanians let their allies sadly down. No help came from Alexander, and Von Plettenberg was obliged to carry out his campaign alone. The first sign of activity was an abortive attack on Ivangorod by the inhabitants of Narva in March or April of 1501.8 But the raid was on a small scale and was never even mentioned by the chroniclers of Pskov. During the early months of summer there were no further signs of Livonian 1 On 6 August Ivan informed his envoy to Mengli, Mamonov, that Russian troops had captured, inter alia, Krichev on the Sozh, some 25 miles due south of Mstislavl’. See SR IO , Vol. 41, No. 73. 1 See Bazilevich, VP, p. 473. a See ibid., p. 473. For places mentioned below see map on p. 243.

240

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

hostility. The Muscovite government, however, was fully aware of the possibility of a German invasion of Pskovite territory; not for nothing were the namestrdki of Novgorod warned in May to stand by in case of an emergency in the west and if needs be to bring in troops from Oreshek and Korela — forces normally used in the defence of the Russo-Finnish frontier — to protect the republic of Pskov.1 The fears of the Muscovite government were soon justified. During the summer of 1501 came the first indications of the aggressive intentions of the Order. Pskovite merchants were arrested on Livonian territory. As had so often been the case in the past, it was a sure prelude to war, and as such Ivan rightly interpreted it. After the traditional, and quite fruitless, complaints and counter-complaints had been exchanged across the frontier, a messenger was sent to Moscow to report on the situation. Ivan acted quickly. There could be no doubt that a serious frontier clash was imminent. Without delay he sent what appears to have been the whole of the first army, which he had sent off westwards from Moscow “against Lithuania” in April and which he had suddenly recalled in early May.2 On 1 August the army, commanded as before by Prince Daniil Alexandrovich Penkov, entered Pskov. For three weeks Penkov’s army was stationed in Pskov, seemingly without orders from Moscow, while the border lands of the republic were being ravaged by the Livonians. Aggrieved at what seemed to them the irresponsibility of the Muscovite commanders, and enraged at the sight of an idle army consuming vast quantities of food at the expense of the republic, the Pskovites sent messengers to the grand prince asking him to send his generals into batde. Ivan immediately gave orders to invade the “ German land”, and on 22 August and 24 August both the Muscovite and the Pskovite armies — the latter commanded by the “prince” of Pskov, Ivan Ivanovich Gorbaty-Suzdal’sky — set out to meet the forces of Von Plettenberg. The clash took place on the Seritsa river, some seven miles south of Izborsk, on 27 August. After the Pskovites had gained an initial advantage in the battle, the Germans brought their artillery to bear on the Pskovite and Muscovite forces. The result was disastrous for the Russians, who 1 See D R K , pp. 28-9. • See PL I/84-5. The commanders sent by Ivan to Pskov, with the exception of Kurbsky, were the same as those of the first army — i.e. Penkov, V. V. Shuysky and the two brothers Borozdin. See above, p. 237, note 1.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

241

fled back to Pskov as best they could, abandoning on the way their baggage train. How grave was the defeat of the Russians it is hard to gauge, so conflicting are the sources. Balthasar Rüssow, in his Chronicle of Livonia, describes the battle, somewhat vaguely and exaggeratedly, as a great victory for the master: “on Thursday after St Bartholomew’s day [24 August] with 4,000 knights he met 40,000 Russians, of whom many were killed and the rest put to flight” .1 One of the Russian sources, equally vaguely, estimated that only “a few” were killed on their side.* But victory in any case it was for the Germans. On the following day, 28 August, they were already laying siege to Izborsk, twenty miles south-west of Pskov. In spite of their artillery they failed to take the town and moved south-east towards the Velikaya river. For eight days they ravaged the countryside west of the river and attempted to force the fords and crossings, which were stoutly contested by a hastily mustered army from Pskov on the east bank of the river. Their only success was the capture of Ostrov on the Velikaya, thirty miles south of Pskov. While the Pskovite army was being kept at a safe distance, the town was burned. 4,000 of the inhabi­ tants were put to the sword; the rest were led off in captivity. On 8 September the master returned to Livonia after his highly successful invasion of the republic of Pskov. An epidemic of dysentry which had broken out in the army forced him to withdraw, says Rüssow. Had he been able to continue his campaign he would probably have joined up with the Lithuanian army which at the time of the sack of Ostrov was at Opochka, some fifty miles further south. It was the nearest the Lithuanians got to joining forces with their ally.8 Just how successful was Von Plettenberg’s campaign and how dangerous was the situation in the north-west can be judged from the reaction of the Muscovite authorities. A vast expeditionary force was mounted. The most experienced and most successful of all the Muscovite voevodas, Prince Daniil VasiTevich Shchenya, 1 See Rüssow, op. cit., p. 33. * See P S R L VIII/241, where it is also stated that one of the Borozdin brothers, Ivan, was killed. T he unreliable Pskov 3rd Chronicle, which twice mentions the battle, states that on one occasion nine posadrdki were killed, and on the other — that only го Pskovites fell in battle. (PL II/252.) * For descriptions of Von Plettenberg’s campaign, see PL 1/85-6; P L II/252; P S R L VIII/241; Rüssow, op. cit., p. 33. After giving an excellently objective account of the operations in August-September 1501, Bazilevich for some reason comes to the conclusion that the Germans’ success was only moderate. See Bazilevich, VP, p. 479.

242

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

was appointed commander-in-chief. Subordinate to him were numerous distinguished Muscovite generals — Penkov, the com­ mander of the Muscovite forces in the previous operations, two Shuysky princes, Ivan and Vasily Vasil’evich, Prince Alexandr Vasil’evich Obolensky, Prince Petr Semenovich RyapolovskyLoban, to name a few.1 According to a Pskov source, even a Tatar “tsar” — perhaps Mehemmed Emin — together with Tatar troops was attached to the Russian force.2 The huge army consisting of troops from Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov and Tver* set out on its punitive campaign in November 1501.8 The main body of the enemy was located at the fortress of Helmed near Derpt (Dorpat, Tartu). In the early hours of 24 November battle was joined. Although Obolensky was killed at an early stage and although the Germans again employed all their artillery, the Russians won a great victory. The Russian chronicles state that the German army was annihilated. Not even a messenger survived to bring back the news to Von Plettenberg. There was nothing to stop the Russians after the battle of Helmed. They swarmed over the eastern half of Livonia, meeting with little or no resistance from the enemy. The Muscovite army swept north towards Revel’ (Tallin) and then east to Ivangorod; here they were joined by the troops from Pskov, who had laid waste the land between Lakes Peipus and Vorts. Altogether, so Rüssow tells us, 40,000 inhabitants of Livonia were killed or taken prisoner.4 The cam­ paign had been swift and successful. Russian losses were negligible. The defeat on the Seritsa was fully avenged. Even though no Livonian territory was occupied and annexed, the military losses inflicted on the Order and the damage caused in eastern Livonia were enough to dissuade the master from attempting any further diversionary raids on the lands of Pskov for the time being. More successful than Alexander’s northern alliance with Von Plettenberg — in other words, more troublesome for Moscow — was the co-operation he received from the Great Horde in the south. It will be remembered that in November 1500, after the districts of Seversk had fallen into Ivan’s hands, Alexander had 1 See D R K , p. 30; P S R L VIII/241Ï P L 1/86. * See P L 1/86. * According to PL 1/86, the “reinforcements” from Novgorod arrived in Pskov on 18 October and fought the Germans on 24 October. However, Ryapolovsky, who was in the peredovoy polk, had in fact fought in the battle of Mstislavl* and had been ordered to return to Starodub after 4 November. According to P S R L V III, the battle of Helmed was fought on 24 November. 4 See PL I/86-7; P SR L VIII/241; RUssow, op. cit., p. 33.

R

24 З

244

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

sent an emissary to the Horde to conclude a treaty and to urge the khan to attack the southern frontiers of Muscovy while the Nogays harassed Kazan’ in the east. His plan was partly successful. Although the Nogays were unable or unwilling to inflict any noticeable damage on Kazan’, the Great Horde was able, in the last months of its existence, to prove an undeniable nuisance to Ivan III, to contain his ally Mengli and to deflect his armies in Seversk. In the early spring of 1501 the Horde began to move westwards from its winter quarters in the Volga basin. At the junction of the Medveditsa river and the Don two of the sons of Ahmed, Sheykh Ahmed and Seyyid Ahmed, united forces.1 They were planning, so Mengli Girey heard, to join up with Alexander in the west. 20,000 strong and accompanied by both Polish and Lithuanian ambassadors, they moved up the Don to the Virgin Hills (Devich’i Gory), at the mouth of the river Tikhaya Sosna.8 Here, in June 1501, they built a fortress. The rumours of the westward move of the Great Horde, soon confirmed by prisoners’ reports, caused Mengli Girey alarm. In the last days of April 1501, having set off on a campaign against the Lithuanians, he heard the news of Sheykh Ahmed’s approach to the Don and interpreted it — wrongly, so it turned out — as a move against the Crimea.3 He decided to change the direction of his campaign. Instead of complying with his allies’ repeated requests and invading Lithuania west of the Dnepr, he led his army north to meet the menace of the Great Horde. Before he reached the assembly area of the enemy, however, he realized that he had been mistaken and that Sheykh Ahmed’s operations were directed not against him but against his ally. On arriving at the Donets he heard that Seyyid Ahmed had quarrelled with his brother and had returned towards Astrakhan’, and, more important, that the army was accompanied by ambassadors from Poland and Lithuania. There could be no doubt now of Sheykh Ahmed’s intentions. Mengli decided to leave the fighting to Ivan. He despatched a messenger to Moscow asking Ivan to send 1,000 troops by boat along the Don; these, he requested, should be followed by 10,000 cavalry; a few boats laden with cannon and arquebus, it was suggested, would impress the Tatars. 1 See SR JO , Vol. 41, p. 361. 1 See ibid., pp. 356, 367-8; see also map on p. 271.

1 See ibid., p. 356.

THE RUSSO-LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1500-

1503)

245

In July Mengli arrived at the Tikhaya Sosna river. A fortress was erected by the Crimeans on the east bank, opposite to that of the enemy, thus cutting off any hope of withdrawal eastwards. Mengli had no intention of staying longer than was necessary. After a brief skirmish he led his army of 25,000 men back to the Crimea. His excuses, which he sent to Ivan together with another request for Muscovite troops, were lame and totally unconvincing. His army was exhausted, there was no fodder for the horses and, what is more, he had heard that Musa was on his way to help Sheykh Ahmed with Nogay reinforcements.1 A week before Ivan received the disgraceful news of Mengli’s withdrawal he wrote to the khan informing him that he had complied with his request. In the hope that a combined Russo-Crimean force would be able to liquidate the tiresome “children of Ahmed” once and for all, after which Mengli would be able to concentrate on the real enemy, Ivan despatched an army south to join his ally. It was commanded by the ex-khan of Kazan’, Mehemmed Emin, and by Prince Vasily Nozdrovaty and contained troops of Ivan’s faithful vassal, Nur Devlet, the brother of Mengli. To it were attached forces from the grand principality of Ryazan*. They sailed south along the Don. On arrival at the mouth of the Tikhaya Sosna they found both fortresses empty. Mengli’s army had faded into the steppes; Sheykh Ahmed’s had moved west, and, guided by Alexander’s envoy, was heading for Ryl’sk. By mid August 1501 Sheykh Ahmed was at last complying with the instructions Alexander had given him nine months earlier and was harassing the southern boundaries of the Muscovite state. When the news that the Horde was approaching the middle reaches of the Seym river reached Moscow, both Mozhaysky and Shemyachich were sent south-east from Starodub to deal with them. It was no easy task to cope with a steppe enemy who knew the district well, and fighting was still going on in the first week of October. On 30 August Ivan wrote to his ambassador in the Crimea telling him to persuade the khan to take to the field again. Nothing happened. On 7 October he sent an envoy who was to insist in no uncertain terms that Mengli should attack Sheykh Ahmed.1 Again there was no response. Mengli Girey remained in a state of strange, and, to the Muscovite government, inexplicable, inertia. It was as if he had decided to leave all the 1 See ibid., pp. 368-9.

* See ibid., Nos. 75, 76.

246

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

work to Ivan’s troops while the Great Horde was so far from his base in the Crimea. The troops from Starodub, however, were able to master what was left of the Great Horde sufficiently to prevent them from doing extensive damage in the Seym area and to drive them off — probably before the end of October — to their winter quarters. At any rate, by the beginning of November we find Mozhaysky and Shemyachich fully engaged on the southern Smolensk front. The danger to the lands of Seversk had passed. The end of the Great Horde was drawing near. Sheykh Ahmed was virtually a beaten man. He could hope for little help from Lithuania. Musa and the Nogay Tatars had not after all come to his aid. The soldiers of his battered army, many of them accom­ panied by their wives, withdrew to the upper reaches of the Donets where they hoped to winter in peace. Their morale was wretched. There was a grave shortage of horses, food and fodder. Deserters were beginning to seek refuge with the Crimean Horde in order to escape the final disaster which they felt to be imminent.1 In December Sheykh Ahmed sued for peace — not with Mengli Girey, from whom he could expect no quarter, but with Ivan, who might prove a more profitable and co-operative ally than Alexander. That some sort of an agreement was reached there can be no doubt. Ivan kept the Tatar envoy until March when he sent him back to rejoin the Horde together with David Likhorev. But there are no available details of the transactions. Probably Ivan extracted a promise from the khan that he would no longer approach the frontiers of Muscovy, in exchange for which Ivan would refrain from assisting Mengli Girey. Indeed the Great Horde during the last weeks of its existence kept its distance from the lands of Seversk and caused the Muscovite forces no further trouble, while Ivan refused to send his troops to help Mengli finish off Sheykh Ahmed. At the same time as the khan was negotiating with Moscow, his brother Seyyid Ahmed asked for asylum. Ivan had no hesitation in accepting him.2 The final blow tö Alexander’s anti-Muscovite Tatar alliance was struck when in the same month, December 1501, envoys arrived in Moscow from the two Nogay mirzas, Musa and Yamgurchu, asking for peace. 1 See ibid., No. 78, pp. 376-82, which consists of despatches from Mengli and Ivan’s two ambassadors, Mamonov and Fedor Mikhaylovich Kiselev, received in Moscow on 2Ô January 1502. * For the peace overtures of Sheykh Ahmed and the surrender of Seyyid Ahmed, see ibid., pp. 384-5; P S R L VIII/241.

THE RUSSO-LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1500-

1503)

247

They promised henceforward to do no harm to Kazan* and to leave the eastern frontiers of Muscovy alone.1 Ivan had nothing more to fear from Alexander’s eastern allies. The task of annihilating the Great Horde was left strictly to Mengli Girey. At the end of November 1501 he wrote to Ivan apologizing, as well he might, for his inactivity since the fiasco of the Tikhaya Sosna. But he hastened to inform his ally of his good intentions and of his plans for dealing with Sheykh Ahmed. When he had ascertained the location of the Great Horde’s winter quarters he intended to burn the surrounding steppe land. He promised to march against the “children of Ahmed” in the beginning of February 1502. As soon as the Horde had been disposed of he would attack Kiev in conjunction with Muscovite forces. He asked Ivan to send messengers to meet him in the early spring at the junction of the Dnepr and the Orel’ or Samara rivers. Mengli would then provide them with guides who would direct the main Russian army to the assembly point of the Crimean Tatars.2 Needless to say, these proposals were not taken seriously by Ivan. On 3 March 1502, five weeks after receiving Mengli’s message, he sent Alexey Grigor’evich Zabolotsky to the Crimea. Mengli was curtly informed that Ivan had no intention of sending an army to his aid and that the grand prince expected him to attack Sheykh Ahmed immediately — a month had elapsed since the promised date of Mengli’s campaign. Only if the Great Horde should attack the Crimea would Ivan instruct Mehemmed Emin, two months previously reinstated on the throne of Kazan’, to help his step-father.3 In the early spring of 1502 Sheykh Ahmed’s sorry Horde left its winter quarters on the Donets and moved west to the junction of the Desna and the Dnepr, just north of Kiev.4 The sultan, in an attempt to stop the conflict between the two Hordes, had ordered him to cross the Dnepr. But Sheykh Ahmed refused to obey him.6 Perhaps he feared that he would find as little safety 1 See S R IO , Vol. 41, pp. 376, 386; P S R L VIII/241. * See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 378. 8 See ibid., No. 79, pp. 382-90. If Zabolotsky was asked how Mehemmed Emin could leave Kazan* in view of the hostility of the Nogays he was instructed to say that Musa and Yamgurchu had asked for peace and had promised to do no harm to Kazan*. For Mehemmed Emin*s reinstatement as khan in January 1502, see above, p. 184. 4 On 3 May Ivan received a message from Mengli to this effect. See S R IO t

248

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

and security west of the Dnepr as he had done east of it. His fears would have been justified. Were he to cross the Dnepr, Mengli intended to cross too at Tavan*, near the mouth; and even Stephen of Moldavia, so Mengli assured Ivan, was prepared in such an eventuality to join forces with the Crimean Tatars and help them despatch the relics of the Great Horde.1 Having murdered the sultan’s envoy and quarrelled with the Lithuanians, the friendless khan moved down the Dnepr to the mouth of the Sula.8 Mengli set off at the end of May. He had received instructions earlier in the year from his suzerain the sultan to make peace with Sheykh Ahmed. But when the news of the murder of his envoy to the Great Horde reached Bayezid, these instructions were cancelled. Mengli was even offered Turkish aid, which he refused.8 At the beginning of June he crossed the Samara river. By 6 June it was all over. The relics of the Great Horde were utterly routed by the Crimean Tatars. Only Sheykh Ahmed and a handful of men managed to escape.4 There was no longer any barrier between the Crimea and Lithuania. Although the final defeat of the Great Horde only took place in mid 1502, Sheykh Ahmed and his Tatars ceased to be a nuisance to Ivan the moment they withdrew from the Ryl’sk area in the autumn of 1501. It cannot be said that even when harassing Seversk they constituted anything like a serious threat to the military machine of Moscow. Nevertheless they played their role in the over-all strategic plan which seems to have been evolved by Alexander in 1501. Viewed from afar and extracted from the tangle of events, the military activities of Alexander and his allies during the second year of the war fall into a definite pattern. It is perhaps not beyond the bounds of probability that Alexander planned to take the initiative in 1501 and to recover, by a threefold attack, the lands which he had lost in 1500. While Von Plettenberg contained the cream of Ivan’s armies in the area of Pskov, Alexander may well have hoped to close in on the lands of Seversk from Mstislavl* in the north-west and from Ryl’ek in the south. Doubtless, too, he relied on the Nogays to play their part, either by worrying Kazan’ or by reinforcing the 1 See ibid, pp. 414, 417. ' See ibid., p. 418. The information on Sheykh Ahmed's movements, his relations with the sultan and his breach with Lithuania is contained in a despatch from Zabolotsky to Ivan, written after г June 1502. * See ibid., p. 418. 4 See ibid., p. 419.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

249

Great Horde. Whatever his plans and however badly they may have failed, one thing remains certain: throughout 1501 the initiative passed into Alexander’s hands and Ivan was forced on to the defensive. The Muscovite armies were tied down by well-timed, if ill-executed, operations on the part of the enemy. The only consolation, apart from victories in the field, that Ivan could gain from what must have appeared to him a wasted year was the fact that he refrained from committing his major forces in the summer of 1501 in an all-out attempt to conquer Smolensk. Subsequent events in the late summer and autumn of that year fully justified his caution. In the third year of the war the initiative swung once again to Ivan. Yet in spite of this, 1502 was a year of disappointment and failure for the Russians. As before, the key to Moscow’s strategy was Smolensk, and on its capture Ivan concentrated all his efforts. Polotsk on the Western Dvina, at the mouth of which lay the Baltic port of Riga, and Kiev, the largest city of the Ukraine, were ignored by the Russian armies; all further conquests had to wait until Smolensk and its district had been annexed. Ivan was certain that the summer operations against Lithuania would succeed — so certain that he promised to send reinforcements to his troops only if Alexander himself went to the help of the besieged city. He failed to capture Smolensk. It was the greatest military set-back of the war. In order to appreciate the exceptional importance attached by Ivan to the campaign on the central front in 1502, it is necessary to study the Russian Order of Battle. Nominally in command of the whole expedition was Ivan’s third eldest son, the twenty-oneyear-old Dmitry. The real commanders were Prince Vasily Danilovich Kholmsky and Yakov Zakhar’in, both men of great experience and reputation. Among the other commanders were thirteen princes, including Mozhaysky, Shemyachich and Bel’sky, and the princes of Ryazan’ and Rostov.1 Unfortunately there is no 1 See D R K , pp. 31-2. The Order of Battle was as follows: Commander-inc h ie f — Prince Dm itry Ivanovich; Great Corps (bol'shoy polk) — Kholmsky and Ya. Zakhar’in; Leading Corps (peredovoy polk) — Princes S. I. Starodubsky (Mozhaysky), V. I. Shemyachich, Vasily Mnikh Ryapolovsky and Ivan Mikhaylovich Repnya; Right Hand ( pravaya ruka) — Princes Fedor Borisovich Polotsky and Fedor Ivanovich Bel’sky, and Dmitry Vasil’evich Shein; Left Hand, (levaya ruka) — Princes Fedor Ivanovich Ryazansky, Alexandr Vladimirovich Rostovsky and Mikhail Fedorovich Kurbsky-Karamysh; Guard Corps (storozhevoy polk) — Princes Ivan Borisovich (?), Mikhail Fedorovich Telyatevsky, Fedor Vasil’evich Telepen’ and Konstantin Yaroslavovich) (?),

2SO

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

information as to the numbers involved or the course of events. We merely know that the campaign started on 14 July1 and lasted three months, and that fierce fighting went on around the besieged city. By the beginning of August things were clearly going well for the Muscovites, for on the third of the month the pans of the Council of Lithuania sent a message to the Duma of the grand prince of Moscow begging the boyars to urge their sovereign to cease hostilities immediately and to send safe conducts. In a message sent to his son Dmitry on 27 August Ivan told him to hand over the safe conduct to the messenger of the bishop of Vilna, who was waiting outside Smolensk to convey it back to the Council at Minsk; on no account was he to let the news that Ivan was prepared to listen to peace talks filter through to the citizens of Smolensk. Dmitry was to go ahead and take the city without further delay. Should he hear that Alexander was going to the aid of Smolensk or sending reinforcements, then the grand prince would immediately send his son Vasily, the vassal Tatar tsarevichi in his service and the whole army of Kazan’ to assist him.2 But try as he might, Dmitry was unable to break the resistance of the citizens of Smolensk and enter the town. The Muscovite forces had to content themselves with raids into the neighbouring districts. Orsha, seventy miles west of Smolensk on the Dnepr, was sacked; in the north raiding parties burned the outskirts of Vitebsk and detachments even reached Polotsk; in the west they penetrated as far as the Berezina.3 But nothing was gained by these raids. On 23 October 1502 Dmitry was back in Moscow, having failed in his mission. The failure to take Smolensk, so Ivan’s envoy to the Crimea was instructed to say, was due to supply difficulties. The army was too large for the fodder available in the surrounds of the city; it was impossible to maintain a long siege.4 The chronicler merely stated that Dmitry was unsuccessful because Smolensk was too strongly held.5 Obviously both these reasons were valid. A three 1 See P S R L VIII/242. 1 The message from the Lithuanian Council was written in Minsk on 3 August and delivered in Moscow on 23 August. T he safe conduct, signed by V. D. Kholmsky, D. V. Shchenya and Ya. Zakhar'in, was sent to Dm itry for further transmission on 27 August. See S R IO , Vol. 35, Nos. 70, 71, pp. ЗЗ2-9.

8 Or so Ivan Nikitich Beklemishev, Ivan's envoy to Mengli, was told to say if he asked about Russian activities in Lithuania in 1502. See S R IO , Vol. 41, pp. 439,461. 4 See ibid., p. 439. e See P S R L VIII/243.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

251

months’ siege by a large army in hostile territory was bound to cause a grave shortage in supplies; and Smolensk was extremely strongly held — Alexander, after all, realized its strategical importance just as much as Ivan did. But there were other factors, not mentioned by Ivan or the chroniclers, which must be taken into account. In order to succeed on the central front it was essential to carry out simultaneous diversionary attacks on the enemy from other directions: an attack on the district of Smolensk from the west would effectively blockade the entire area and prevent the approach of enemy reinforcements; an attack from the north would draw off Lithuanian reserves or at least reinforce the besieging army. One such thrust, we know, was planned but only partially carried out. The second, from the north, where large forces were available in the area of Novgorod and Pskov, if it was ever in fact planned, was baulked at the critical moment by the intervention of Alexander’s sole remaining ally capable of harassing Muscovy — Von Plettenberg. For the first of these two diversionary thrusts Ivan pinned all his hopes on Mengli Girey. Already on 15 July 1502, the day after Dmitry and his army had set off from Moscow for the central front, Ivan was sending urgent messages to the khan and to Zabolotsky, the Muscovite ambassador in the Crimea. In the first of his despatches he congratulated Mengli on his victory over the Great Horde, entrusted him with his own plans and begged him to co-operate and send off his armies with all speed. The direction suggested was the same as before—Kiev, Slutsk, Turov, Pinsk and Minsk — but this time there was a significant change. While carrying out this vast sweep west of the Dnepr, the khan was urged to find contact with Dmitry’s armies at Smolensk; in other words, to wheel east at Minsk and join forces with the Muscovites. In the second despatch Zabolotsky was told to insist on Mengli taking immediate action and to put all possible pressure on the khan and all his relatives.1 As usual the khan needed no pressing to invade Lithuania. Indeed his armies had actually set off on 28 July, three days before the messenger from Moscow arrived. It was not Mengli himself who led the expedition nor his eldest sons, but his two youngest, Feti Girey and Bumash Girey. But what the army lost in leader­ ship it made up in numbers. According to Mengli, it consisted of 1 See S R IO , Vol. 41, No. 84, pp. 423-7.

252

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

90,000 men.1 As soon as he received Ivan’s request, the khan sent a message to his sons telling them that they were to march on Kiev and Lutsk and to penetrate as far as Vilna and Troki; they were also to get in touch with Dmitry at Smolensk. In spite of Zabolotsky’s request to accompany the expedition he was held back in the Crimea. Feti and Bumash had probably been given carte blanche, and Mengli had little desire to let Ivan’s representa­ tive meddle with the command of the army or see that the tsarevichi had no intention of carrying out the wishes of the grand prince. Even though the route which Mengli allegedly gave his sons differed from that suggested by Ivan, they would have considerably facilitated the Russians’ task at Smolensk had they followed it. Instead, it seems, they followed their own inclinations and led their vast marauding hordes into districts far removed from the Smolensk theatre or the Turov-Slutsk-Minsk axis of advance which Ivan had advocated. After setting out from the Crimea the two tsarevichi crossed the Dnepr, probably at Tavan’. During the whole of August they remained inactive, encamped in the steppes near the mouth of the Dnepr. In the beginning of September news reached the Crimea that once again Sheykh Ahmed was on the war-path. He had gathered around him, so the rumour went, those of his relations who had not been with the Great Horde at the time of its dissolution, had attracted some Nogay Tatars to his cause and had even persuaded Abdul Kerim of Astrakhan* to join him. He was planning, Mengli heard, to attack the Crimea. It was a false alarm; but the news had the customary effect on Mengli. In a moment of quite unjustifiable panic he ordered his two sons to return and defend the peninsula. His messenger never reached them. On 3 September they had set off to plunder Lithuania and Poland.2 The Crimean expedition of September-October 1502 was one of the largest and most wide-spread ever undertaken by Mengli’s Horde. The main area of depredation was Volhynia and Galicia, 1 See ibid., pp. 430-1. Zabolotsky, who confirmed most of what Mengli said, unfortunately makes no mention of the size of the army. T he despatches of Mengli and Zabolotsky were received in Moscow on 12 September. * See ibid., p. 451. In February 1503 Ivan warned Mengli to beware of Alexander, as Sheykh Ahmed's man, one Bumash, had been in Kiev at the time of the destruction of the Horde, and had afterwards been sent by Alexander to urge Sheykh Ahmed to carry on the struggle against Moscow and the Crimea. See ibid., p. 455.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR ( 1500-

1503)

253

the border lands of Poland and Lithuania which had suffered so severely from the great Crimean raids of 1500. Many of the same towns which had earlier been ravaged by the Tatars were again attacked — Lutsk, L ’vov, Lublin, Belz, Bratslav, Turov. This time the two tsarevichi penetrated still further west, their advance guards reaching even beyond Cracow. One detachment, which operated independently and remained behind after the main body had returned in the beginning of November, concentrated on die area just west of Kiev. Feti and Bumash arrived home in the Crimea on 8 November 1502 with a large number of prisoners.1 Clearly the tsarevichi made no attempt to follow Ivan’s proposed line of advance. Their main thrust was too westerly and southerly to be of any direct aid to Dmitry at Smolensk. Even though Kiev and Turov received their attentions, they had no intention of carrying out the plan suggested by their ally and joining forces with the Russians. The reasons given for this divergence sound naïve, but were probably quite genuine: the entire terrain over which Ivan asked Mengli to operate was “too wooded and close” for so huge an army;2 the Tatars preferred open steppe land over which they could move with speed, enjoying the advantage of complete surprise and avoiding ambushes and fixed battles. Besides, the area of Volhynia, particularly the “patrimony of Ostrozhsky” — the Styr’ and Goryn’ basins — and Galicia were districts in which they had recently operated with success and which had proved highly fruitful. If the Tatar invasion of Poland and Lithuania was of no immediate help to Dmitry, it nevertheless saved the Russians from having to commit their reserves on the central front. Ivan, it will be remembered, had promised to send to Dmitry’s aid his son Vasily, his Tatar princes and the army of Kazan’ should Alexander go to the help of the besieged city. This was precisely what Alexander intended to do when the news of the Russian attack on Smolensk was brought to him at his headquarters in Novgorodok on the Neman. It was only when he heard that Mengli’s sons had set off from the Crimea that he changed his plans. Whether in fact Alexander himself went to direct operations against the Tatars in Volhynia and Galicia is not known. We know, 1 T he clearest account of the expedition is given by Zabolotsky in a despatch to Ivan written in February 1503. See ibid., pp. 468-9. 1 T his was the official argument relayed by Zabolotsky to Ivan in February 1503. See ibid., p. 469.

2 54

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

however, that Feti Girey and Bumash Girey reported a concentra­ tion of 30,000 Lithuanian troops in Lutsk — presumably the army which Alexander had originally intended to send to the relief of the defenders of Smolensk.1 Thus the great Tatar expedition of 1502 was only successful from a Muscovite point of view in that it deflected Alexander’s armies from Smolensk. It may perhaps, too, have tied down Polish troops in the Lublin-Cracow area and prevented Alexander from using them in the war with Moscow.2 But it was not what Ivan had wanted or what he had planned. The losses inflicted by the Tatars on the civilian population of Poland and Lithuania were little more than pin-pricks in the enemy’s rear. There were no clashes with the main enemy forces; Alexander’s armies were never defeated by the Tatars — indeed it seems unlikely that they even met in open conflict. Worst of all, no attempt was made at concerted action with the Russians. As far as Ivan was concerned, it was just another vast unco-ordinated raid into the heart of Poland and Lithuania. The large forces which Ivan held in the north — in the area of Novgorod and Pskov — were able to contribute to the Russian war effort in 1502 still less than those on the central front. None could be spared to carry out a thrust from the north through Velikie Luki into the district of Smolensk. In spite of Shchenya’s successful campaign in the autumn of 1501 and the annihilation of the German army at Helmed, Von Plettenberg showed that he was still capable of causing damage to Russian territory and even of mounting another expedition against Pskov. In the beginning of March 1502 troops of the Livonian Order launched a small attack on Ivangorod;3 like a similar raid a year previously, it was the first sign of activity on the Livonian front in 1502. Ivan strengthened the garrison with northerners from Ustyug and the Northern Dvina.4 The attack on Ivangorod was followed a few days later by a swift and inconclusive raid on the southern tip of the land of Pskov. The Germans attacked the town of Krasny, but withdrew at the approach of an army from Pskov, taking with them many prisoners.6 Although both these attacks 1 See again Zabolotsky's message to Ivan. (Ibid., pp. 451-2.) * Such is the opinion of Bazilevich. See Bazilevich, VPt p. 493. 8 See P S R L V III/241. The raid took place on 9 March. Losses on the Russian side were slight: one of the Kolychev-Lobans and 20 men were killed. 8 See U LI102. » See P L I/87.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR ( 1500-

1503)

255

were on a small scale, they served to remind the Russians of Von Plettenberg’s activities during the previous summer. A large army was kept close at hand during the summer months, ready to move to any trouble-spot on the north-western front. The expected attack came on 2 September, at the very time when the Russian armies were besieging Smolensk and their allies were beginning their invasion of Poland and Lithuania. The Germans appeared at Izborsk, about half-way between the frontier and Pskov. After besieging the town for one night they marched on Pskov. The siege of Pskov began on 6 September. For several days the Pskovites managed to keep the enemy at bay by burning the suburbs and venturing out on sorties. After a few days Von Plettenberg withdrew from Pskov as hastily as he had arrived. News had reached him of the approach of the Muscovite army from Novgorod.1 The Muscovite army, which, according to a list of the com­ manders given in the chronicles, was almost identical with that which had so decisively beaten the Livonians in the autumn of 1501,* had been waiting in Novgorod in a state of complete readi­ ness. This is shown by the remarkable speed with which Shchenya moved to the front. Within eleven days of Von Plettenberg’s appearance on Pskovite territory, the grand prince’s army had joined forces with the Pskovites and had caught up the retreating Germans at Lake Smolino.3 The ensuing battle, which resulted in the withdrawal of both contendents, was the last in the cam­ paign. According to the Russian sources, the Pskovite and Muscovite armies appear to have been lured into a trap. In the fighting which followed, the Russians suffered only moderate losses, in spite of what appears to have been inept leadership on the part of certain commanders who allowed their battle organiza­ tion to be disrupted. Von Plettenberg’s great apologist, Rüssow, on the other hand, describes the battle of Lake Smolino as an outstanding victory for the Order, at which the Russians lost thousands and were routed. From all the available evidence it 1 See ibid., p. 87. * See P S R L VIII/242; the list is identical with that given in DRK, p. 30, with the exception of Prince Fedor Andreevich Prozorovsky, who in 1501 is listed as 2 i/c the Left Hand. * In view of the distances covered by the Muscovite army it seems likely that they in fact left Novgorod before news of Von Plettenberg's attack on Izborek reached them. This is bom out by a remark in the Ustyug Chronicle to the effect that the grand prince received information “ahead” . See ULf 102.

256

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

would seem that the Germans got the upper hand and that the victory — if victory it can be called — was theirs. When the fighting stopped, Von Plettenberg and Shchenya withdrew their forces; clearly both sides had lost heavily, for neither was in a position to pursue the other. The great army of Shchenya with­ drew to Novgorod to heal its wounds and refit. Von Plettenberg retired with the remnants of his knights to the interior of Livonia.1 Even if the damage which the Livonian Order inflicted upon Pskov and its outskirts was insignificant, nevertheless Von Plettenberg had done all that Alexander could possibly have expected of him. With a small force and totally unaided by the Lithuanians or the Poles, he had tied down a large Muscovite army from the spring to the late autumn of 1502. Had the permanent threat of invasion not hung over the western borders of Pskov during the summer months of 1502, Ivan would have had at his disposal a large striking force capable of turning the scales in the battle for Smolensk. As it was, the northern army of Shchenya could only take part in the Lithuanian campaign in December. By then the army of Dmitry had been withdrawn and the struggle for Smolensk had been abandoned. Having failed in his attempt to capture Smolensk in 1502 Ivan nevertheless persevered with the war right up to the end of the year. Already in October, before even Dmitry had returned from the front, he was planning to send his second eldest son, Yury, on a campaign against Lithuania.3 But nothing came of this scheme. It was only by December that his troops had had sufficient time to refit after the fighting on the central and northern fronts and were ready for further action. Three separate armies were sent against Lithuania. The first, from the Seversk district, was commanded by Mozhaysky and Shemyachich, assisted by Prince Alexandr Vladimirovich Rostovsky, and contained troops from Ryazan*, from the Upper Oka district and from Bryansk, to judge from the list of commanders.8 The second army, from Novgorod, had almost the same generals as those who had fought Von 1 For details of the battle, see P S R L V I11/242-3; P L I/87-8; Rilssow, op. cit., pp. 33-4. An objective description of the battle is given by Bazilevich, though his conclusions seem a little biased. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 496-9. 1 See SR IO , Vol. 41, p. 434. * These included Princes Ivan Semenovich and Vasily Semenovich Odoevsky and Ivan Mikhaylovich Vorotynsky, the namestnik of Bryansk, Ivan Vasil’evich Zhuk, voevoda of the grand princess of Ryazan’, Chavka Vasü’evich Dumovo, and Princes Ivan Mikhaylovich Repnya and Vasily Vasil’evich Romodanovsky. See D R K , p. 32.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

257

Plettenberg in September and was again commanded by Shchenya.1 A third army, with a less distinguished company of voevodaSy and therefore probably the weakest, was sent from Rzhev.* What these three armies did or where they operated is completely unknown. The chroniclers are all silent on the Lithuanian campaign of December 1502. From this official silence it would seem that the operations were not on a large scale and that the objective was no longer Smolensk, the capture of which was anyhow unthinkable in mid-winter. If indeed the voevodas of the three armies were not recalled before they even set out, they may merely have confined their activities to small raids across the border, to the softening-up process, perhaps, in the Smolensk area in preparation for yet another attempt to capture the city in 1503. Even if these military activities in Lithuania in December 1502 were successful — and there is nothing to indicate that they were — it was a disappointing year for Ivan. He had gained no fresh ground on any front and in spite of all his carefully laid plans had failed in his major objective, the capture of Smolensk. All he and his allies can be said to have done is to have harassed Poland and Lithuania and to have inflicted a series of pin-pricks on the enemy. But they were no more than pin-pricks, no more than a minor discomfiture to be tolerated when warring against the Muscovites and their barbarian allies. The new king of Poland and grand prince of Lithuania had reason to be pleased with the results of 1502, to congratulate himself that no more territory had slipped from his hands into Ivan’s, that no major military or political defeats had been suffered. Ironically enough, the only person to cause him serious territorial loss in 1502 was his newlyfound ally, Stephen of Moldavia. Stephen’s invasion of south-east Poland in the summer or autumn of 1502 was entirely unexpected; if it were not for the thoroughness with which it was carried out, one might almost say that it was unpremeditated. In spite of the treaty Stephen had concluded with the Jagiellons in 1499» and in spite of the ill-will and distrust he felt towards Ivan as a result of the latter’s treatment of his daughter and grandson, he nevertheless chose a moment 1 Apart from I. V. Shuyaky, В. T . Ulanov, O. Dorogobuzhsky and S. Karpovich, who do not figure in the December campaign, the list of com­ manders is the same. See ibid., pp. 32-3. * See ibid., p. 33.

258

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

highly embarrassing for Alexander in which to seize and occupy the province of Pokut’e (Pokucie) as far as Galich on the Dnestr.1 There is no explanation for his action, except that ever since the act of homage to Casimir in 1485, when Stephen renounced all claims to Pokut’e, he had been waiting for a favourable moment to retrieve what he considered to belong to him by right. He could hardly have chosen a better time. Alexander was fully occupied both with the Tatar invasion of Volhynia and northern Galicia and with the Muscovite attack on Smolensk. In vain the king remonstrated with Stephen. On returning to his capital in Suceava after the Pokut’e campaign, Stephen received a message from Alexander. “Why do you wage war on Poland,” he was asked, “at a time when my enemy has attacked me?” Alexander went on to point out that Ivan of Moscow was as much the enemy of Stephen as he was the enemy of the king of Poland. Had not Ivan, he asked, disgraced Elena, stripped Dmitry of his titles and arrested them both?2 Alexander’s appeal, though it had not the slightest effect on Stephen’s attitude to Poland and Lithuania, nevertheless gave the voivode food for reflection. Already news of the final disgrace of Elena and Dmitry, which took place on 11 April 1502,3 had begun to filter through to Suceava. Twice during the summer Stephen wrote to Mengli for information. The first time he asked: “ are my daughter and grandson alive?” When he was informed by Mengli that they were “in good health” (for so the Muscovite ambassador had told the khan), he asked if the title of grand prince had been taken from Dmitry and if Vasily had been made grand prince of Moscow. Again Zabolotsky provided a soothing, if inaccurate, answer: Vasily had merely been given the title of grand prince of Novgorod.4 But now after the Pokut’e campaign the doubts which Mengli had dispelled in the summer returned. Again 1 See Zabolotsky’s message to Ivan from the Crimea (5 February 1503), in which he stated that Stephen had taken and occupied Kolomyya, Galich, Pokut’e, Snyatin, Krasnoe and Beloe. See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 470. Zabolotsky had previously written to Ivan in September 1502 saying that Stephen had congratulated Mengli on his victory over the Great Horde and had informed him that he was planning to invade Lithuania. See ibid., p. 451. 8 See ibid., pp. 466, 470. This information of the king’s appeal to Stephen was transmitted to Ivan by Mengli Girey and Zabolotsky. * See below, p. 342. 4 In fact on 14 April he was made “grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow and autocrat of all Russia’’. (.P SR L V I11/242). Stephen’s queries and Mengli’s answers are given in Zabolotsky’s despatch to Ivan, dated 18 August 1502. See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 432.

THE RUSSO-LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1500-

1503)

259

Stephen wrote to Mengli asking for confirmation or denial of the rumours. Mengli questioned Zabolotsky with care. The Muscovite ambassador, who may well have been ignorant of the true plight of Elena and Dmitry, having left Moscow a month before their disgrace, assured the khan that there was no truth in Alexander’s accusations: “it is all lies, untruth,” he said in the presence of the Moldavian envoy, “a fabrication of the king. What accusations would not an enemy bring against an enemy?” 1Once more Stephen was reassured by Mengli Girey that his daughter and grandson were safe and in possession of their former rights. Deprived of communications with Moscow owing to the Russo-Lithuanian war,2 he was unable to verify the khan’s assertions. He even released Dmitry Ralev and Mitrofan Fedorovich Karachev, the two Russian ambassadors who were returning from Rome with a party of artisans and technicians and whom he had been holding until his suspicions were allayed.3 Ironically enough, Ivan, even before hearing of Stephen’s invasion of Pokut’e, had decided that there was no point in concealing the fate of Elena and her son from the outside world. Twice he told his envoy Beklemishev to explain the circumstances of their fall from favour: “they erred before their sovereign and acted unbefittingly; for this their misdemeanour the sovereign took the grand principality from his grandson and bestowed all the principality upon his son, Grand Prince Vasily” .4 But each time Beklemishev set off for the Crimea he was turned back in the steppes. Stephen remained in ignorance of the sad fate of his daughter and his grandson.

In spite of King Alexander’s successes in the Russo-Lithuanian war during 1502 he was ready for peace at the end of the year. Now that Sheykh Ahmed, his only ally in the south, had lost his army, there was no hope of containing the predatory Tatars from the Crimea. Urged on by Moscow, Mengli Girey would be only 1 See ibid., p. 470. * There may, however, have been some exchange of envoys with Moldavia via the Crimea in 1502, as there is mention of despatches to Moldavia in a letter written by Ivan to the governor of Kaffa in July 1502: “and those despatches are written in the Moldavian records (v voloshskikh tetratekh)”. See ibid., p. 429. 3 They arrived in the Crimea in June 1503. See ibid., p. 473. 4 See ibid., p. 440. This was contained in the instructions issued to Beklemi­ shev on 16 October 1502. On 23 February 1503 Beklemishev was told to explain that the reason for Dm itry's fall from favour was his “insolence" (. . . uchal grvbiti). See ibid., pp. 463, 492. s

260

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

too pleased to repeat annually the vast marauding expeditions which he had sent so successfully against Poland and Lithuania in the summer of 1502. Nor was there any sign that Ivan intended to abandon his attempts on Smolensk. Alexander could perhaps have continued the struggle for a year or two, but at the risk of losing Smolensk, Kiev and eventually all the districts which in pre-Mongol days had been part of the land of Rus'. It was better to begin negotiations as soon as possible, even if it meant the eventual renunciation of the territory which Ivan had already seized, than to lose half a kingdom. At least there was no likelihood that Ivan would refuse to negotiate. However strong his strategical position, the grand prince of Moscow was certain to prefer oriental haggling over peace terms to physical fighting in the field. Indeed, if anything gave Alexander hope that the enemy would be prepared to discuss an armistice, it was the excessive caution — one might almost say timidity — that Ivan had shown in his conduct of the war in 1502. Already in the summer of 1502 Alexander had twice made overtures, firstly to the Crimean khan, and secondly to the Boyar Council of Moscow. The first attempt was fruitless — even humiliating — for Mengli had merely forwarded Alexander’s letter on to Ivan, just as he had done two years previously. Alexander wrote on 14 July, ostensibly to congratulate the khan on his victory over the Great Horde, but in fact to suggest the initiation of peace talks. It was absurd for the two countries to be at war, especially as Mengli was labouring under the illusion that Alexander had set the Great Horde against him. He had, of course, set Sheykh Ahmed against Ivan. In order to appeal to the khan's greed, he hinted that he was prepared to pay large yearly tribute, not only to the khan, but also to his sons, relatives, oghlans and princes. He proposed sending the same messenger as before to work out the finer details of the peace terms — the voevoda of Kiev, Dmitry Putyatich.1 This time Mengli Girey did not even bother to comment on the king’s behaviour; he merely sent the letter to Ivan with the next courier. By the time he him­ self had received the letter in the first place, his sons were already plundering Alexander’s lands. He had no intention of stopping them. 1 See ibid., pp. 448-9; A Z R , Vol. I, No. 196, pp. 344-5. Ivan received the letter in November 1502.

THE RUSSO -LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 3 )

261

Alexander’s second attempt to stop the war in 1502 was some­ what less fruitless. On 23 August a document from the “pans of the Rada (Council) of the grand principality of Lithuania to the Rada of the grand principality of Moscow” was delivered in Moscow. Instead of individual magnates writing to their opposite numbers over the border and asking them to influence their sovereign, it was thought that an appeal from the whole Lithuanian Council to the Boyar Duma would have more effect. The nobility of Lithuania, so the document read, were highly desirous of peace; they had only delayed sending their representatives before because of the death of Jan Olbracht and the election of Alexander. But now it was time for both sides to lay down arms. The boyars were asked to send safe conducts so that plenipotentiaries might cross the frontier and begin negotiations in Moscow.1 In spite of the fact that the message was received at a time when Ivan was fully confident of the successful outcome of the current military operations — Dmitry had just begun the siege of Smolensk, Mengli had set off from the Crimea and all was still quiet on the north-western front — he nevertheless complied with the request of the Lithuanian pans and sent off a safe conduct signed by the three leading generals of the state, V. D. Kholmsky, Shchenya and Yakov Zakhar’in.2Although in fact the safe conduct was incorrectly worded — it was not addressed to the king of Poland, so the pans informed the boyars8 — and had to be replaced, it showed that Ivan was willing to open negotiations and would not refuse access to the ambassadors of Poland and Lithuania. The preliminary probing was left to the ambassador of the king of Hungary and Bohemia. Uninvited, poorly briefed and sadly lacking in the stamina required of an ambassador at the court of the grand prince, Sigismund Santay arrived in Moscow on 29 December 1502. It was almost exactly two years to the day that the last Hungarian emissary had turned up in Moscow to urge Ivan to stop the war. On that unfortunate occasion threats had been used; an attempt had been made to bully and brow-beat the Russians into peace. This time it was different. By now Wladislaw 1 See S R IO , Vol. 35, No. 70, pp. 332-4. The document was written in Minsk on 3 August. 8 See ibid., No. 71. Kholmsky signed himself as “voevoda of Moscow” , Shchenya — “voevoda of Novgorod” and Zakhar’in — “voevoda of Kolomna” . 8 See ibid., No. 72. W ritten in Vilna on 13 November, the parts' letter complaining that the safe conduct was incorrectly addressed was delivered in Moscow on 27 December 1502.

262

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

realized that threats were of no avail. Instead he instructed Santay to appeal to Ivan’s conscience and to persuade him that it was his duty as a Christian ruler to pool his resources with the leaders of Christendom in the west, to stop fighting his neighbour and relative, and to concentrate his attention on war against the real enemies of civilization — the Turks. Santay was received in audience by Ivan on 1 January 1503. His first act was to hand over a letter from Pope Alexander VI, written on 15 November 1500 in Rome. In this somewhat belated document the pope drew Ivan’s attention to the danger of the Turks, the need for concerted action against them and the fact that one Cardinal Regnus, who was being sent to Budapest, would see to the details of the grand prince’s enrolment in the grand crusade. There was little in this to please Ivan; few things appealed to him less than suggestions that he should join the Latin west against his allies in the east, especially when such suggestions came from the pope of Rome. As the audience wore on, the real aim of the mission became evident. Regnus, the pontifical legate in Hungary, in a message to Ivan begged him to lay down arms and stop fighting his son-in-law.1 The same theme was developed in a speech from the pope, who also suggested that Moscow should join with the Jagiellon empire — Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and Lithuania — and the Prussian and Livonian Orders in a coalition against the Turks. Santay, however, was spared the unpleasant task of relaying to the grand prince his master’s more concrete and still more unacceptable proposals. For on the same evening of his first audience, at the traditional drinking bout which followed the banquet at the table of the grand prince, he was made so drunk that he fell down and incapacitated himself. On the next morning he sent his interpreter in his place to deliver Wladislaw’s message to Ivan. He begged the grand prince to excuse him. He had fallen, he said, on arriving back at his lodging and had hurt himself. Wladislaw’s speech to Ivan, delivered by the interpreter on 2 January 1503, contained no more talk of an anti-Turkish league; it merely laid down what the terms of the peace between Ivan and Alexander should be. The grand prince should stop fighting at once, pay back the king for the damage done to Lithuania, and 1 See ibid., pp. 342-4. The document read out by Santay was dated 11 July 1502, Buda.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR

(1500-1503)

263

return all lands and prisoners which had been captured during the war. Ivan and his advisers took eleven days to compose a suitable reply to this piece of impertinence — for such it must have appeared to them. The answer began with a lengthy and tedious reiteration of all the old complaints against Alexander. It was entirely the latter’s fault that the war had begun; by his treatment of Elena, his persecution of the Orthodox faith in Lithuania, his refusal to acknowledge Ivan’s title, his treacherous dealing with the Horde, his infringement of Muscovite territory — by these and many other wicked deeds he had forced Ivan to defend himself. After this drawn-out preamble, much of which Ivan’s diplomatic d'yaki must have known by heart, came the meat of the reply: “ King Wladislaw and King Alexander have been hereditary owners of the kingdom of Poland and the land of Lithuania since the days of their ancestors; but the Russian land, since the days of our ancestors, since the times of old, has been our patrimony”. There was nothing ambiguous about this. Ivan was laying claim to all the Russian lands of Lithuania. Whereas before he had merely claimed those lands he had captured from the enemy as his patrimony,1 now he was showing the full extent of his demands. The limit of his territorial ambitions was the border of Poland and Lithuania proper. Should the king wish to fight with him over this, then he was prepared to carry on the struggle with God on his side. Should, however, Alexander desire peace, then he, Ivan, was also desirous of peace and was prepared to discuss terms — not those, needless to say, proposed by Wladislaw. Santay realized that nothing more could be gained from prolonging the discussions. His mission had been partially achieved. T aking Ivan’s desire for peace as an invitation to Alexander to send his ambassadors to Moscow, he requested safe conducts for them as well as for the envoys of the Livonian master. His request was granted. On 17 January safe conducts for the Lithuanian and Livonian ambassadors were signed and handed over.2 Sigismund Santay, well pleased no doubt with the results of his “ diplomacy”, decided to stay on in Moscow and to attend the peace talks. In fact, his mission had achieved nothing for the Jagiellons; it had merely given Ivan the possibility of formally expressing his willingness to negotiate with the enemy, 1 See above, e.g., p. 235. * For Santay’s mission to Moscow, see S R IO t Vol. 35, pp. 341-61.

264

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

and had demonstrated the weakness of his enemy’s position. This time the Hungarian king had not even attempted to threaten Ivan. On 4 March 1503 the ambassadors of Poland and Lithuania, led by Petr Myshkovsky and Stanislav Glebovich, arrived in Moscow. They were accompanied by one Ivan Gildorp, the representative of the Livonian master. Their initial proposals, made at the first audience, were hardly constructive. It was the traditional opening gambit. All responsibility for the war was laid on Ivan; it was he who had brought “fire and strife” to the land of Lithuania, had seized the districts of the king’s traitors and had sent his son to take Smolensk. There was only one thing to do: Ivan must hand back to Alexander all the lands he had wrongfully occupied across the border, and both sides must return prisonersof-war. If these proposals, which amounted to little more than a repetition of the king of Hungary’s request, were unlikely to move Ivan or his ministers, then the document which was subsequently delivered to the grand prince by his daughter’s “chancellor”, Ivan Sapega, was clearly calculated to stir his paternal emotions. It was a touching plea by Queen £lena to stop the war. While there is no direct evidence to prove that in fact Elena wrote her celebrated letter under pressure from, or dictated by, the PolishLithuanian authorities, it seems not improbable that she was being used once again as a pawn in the conflict between her husband and her father. At any rate we know that her brother-inlaw, Cardinal Frederyk Jagiellon, and the Catholic bishops of Poland requested her to intervene in the dispute, and that her husband approved of, and perhaps suggested, the method she adopted.1 Her letter was moving, eloquent, full of unforced pathos and yet at the same time dignified. In spite of the humiliations we know she had been subjected to at the hands of the Polish nobility and clergy as a result of her refusal to abandon the Orthodox faith,* Elena nevertheless loyally defended her husband, protesting that he was innocent of all the charges brought by Ivan against him and virtually laying the blame for the war on her father. Alexander, she protested, had always been the perfect husband, kind, tolerant and generous. “He allows me to maintain my faith 1 See E. Tsereteli, Elena Ioannovna, Velikaya Knyaginya Litovskaya, Russkaya, Koroleva PoVskaya, pp. 230 sq.; Bazilevich, VP, pp. 510-11. a See above, p. 163.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

265

according to the Greek custom, to go from one holy church to another, and to have at my court priests, deacons and choristers.” There was no question of oppression, she wrote. He allowed the liturgy to be sung in her presence according to the Greek rite both in Lithuania and throughout Poland. In all things Alexander had acted in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1494. Her arrival in Lithuania, so all people had hoped, presaged an era of peace between the two countries; but now it was clear to everyone that it had merely led to war and bloodshed. She placed all her hope in Ivan. He must stop the war, turn a deaf ear to such traitors as that Judas Bel’sky, revert to the terms of the treaty of 1494 and restore all the damage he had done in the last three years. At the same time she addressed letters to her mother, Sofia Palaeologa, and her two brothers, Vasily and Yury, begging them to intercede with the grand prince.1 Elena’s letter to her father had a noble ring about it. Yet for all its nobility it totally failed to convince the practical and hardheaded Ivan, who refused to believe that his daughter was not being persecuted. The fact that Elena categorically denied Alexander’s guilt merely hurt his paternal pride. At the same time it upset him from the point of view of diplomatic technique; for it deprived him of one of the most impressive, if by now hackneyed, sections in the list of Alexander’s black deeds which his ministers had learned to recite every time a justification for Muscovite aggression was called for. But these were merely pin-pricks. Ivan remained unmoved by her eloquence. Only at the end of the peace conference, indeed after the delegates had departed, did he see fit to administer a stiff rebuke and a grave warning to his daughter. In her letter she had denied that Alexander was applying any pressure; yet Ivan, so he instructed Sapega to tell his daughter, was perfectly aware of the proselytizing efforts of the bishops of Vilna and Smolensk, to say nothing of the Bemadine monks. He urged her to suffer for the faith, if needs be even to death. Should, however, she submit and betray both her faith and country, then she would perish spiritually. Worse than this, her father was not prepared to overlook the matter. Between him and her husband “there would be incessant war”.2 1 Elena's letters are contained in the account of the Polish-Lithuanian peace embassy of March-April 1503. See SR IO , Vol. 35, pp. 367-76. * Ivan’s answer to Elena was given both verbally and in writing. See ibid., p p .409-12.

266

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Ivan’s answer to the original speech of the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors was delivered on io March. It was as uncompromising and unconstructive as their proposals had been. It gave no opening for further discussion. Its tone was harsh and all too familiar. Following the traditional preamble, in which the events of recent years and complaints of Lithuanian behaviour were recapitulated with tiresome thoroughness, Ivan summarily answered the suggestion that both sides revert to the terms of the 1494 treaty by reiterating the answer he had given earlier in the year to the Hungarian ambassador. This time the wording was still more forceful and unambiguous. Not only were all ths towns and districts seized by the Russians his patrimony, but so were all the ethnically Russian lands still in Lithuanian possession. There could be no question of returning to the old treaty — “all that had long since passed”. But should Alexander desire love and brotherhood with Moscow, then he must “yield to our sovereign his patrimony of all the Russian land”. There was no possible answer to this. The ambassadors had no competence or authority to discuss such matters; their brief, so they said, only allowed them to discuss peace according to the terms of the treaty of 1494. Both sides had put forward their maximum claims and so far neither had shown any signs of yielding. It was still too early for either party to take the first step towards the inevitable compromise which would eventually result in some sort of peace. Too great a willingness to listen to or accept the proposals of the other side at this stage would have meant a lowering of national dignity, apart from a tactical error of the first magnitude. In order to protract the proceedings before making the first concession, which they as the militarily inferior side would have eventually to make, the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors tried another open­ ing. Two days after Ivan’s answer to their first proposals they presented the Russian delegates with documents addressed by the Polish Senate and the Lithuanian Rada (Council) to the Boyar Duma of Moscow. In these documents it was suggested that the three councils persuade their sovereigns to stop fighting and ally themselves in the common struggle against the “pagans”. Such proposals were as unconstructive and useless as even the pope’s outdated appeal. When the Muscovite delegates began to discuss the Senate’s and the Rada’s suggestion, it soon became evident that neither side had anything new to add at this stage.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

267

The Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors merely reiterated the request to revert to the terms of the treaty of 1494; the boyars doggedly demanded the surrender of all towns belonging to Ivan’s “patri­ mony”. The arguments became long and heated, degenerating eventually into a squabble over the grand prince’s title and the extent of his patrimony in Lithuania. In order to put an end to such fruitless bickering, the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors announced that they could go no further without discussing matters with the Hungarian envoy, who was waiting patiently in the background. For two days the ambassadors conferred with Sigismund Santay. On 14 March he requested an audience with the grand prince. He was granted one on the following day. This time some slight flexibility was shown, even though the discussions ended once again in a deadlock. For the first time since his arrival in Moscow Santay began to use veiled threats. Л Turkish ambassador, he stated, was at the moment in Vilna asking the king to make peace with him. Should the ambassadors return empty-handed from Moscow, then Alexander would have no alternative but to enter into an alliance with the Porte. Santay’s speech ended with a passionate appeal to Ivan to lay down arms and to unite with Alexander against the “heathens”. Once again he made no concrete proposals as to how an agreement between the two antagonists might be reached. If he had hoped by his threats of a TurkoPolish alliance to scare the Muscovites, he was sadly mistaken. Ivan had no fear of the Turks and was indeed convinced of the improbability of such an alliance. His ministers answered Santay with the usual demand for all the Russian lands, vouchsafing this time an entirely specious explanation as to why he had not demanded his heritage when the previous treaty had been signed. He had refrained from claiming the Russian lands of Lithuania when he decided to give his daughter in marriage to Alexander. “We yielded the Russian lands to him for the sake of kinship.” Now, however, that the king had broken virtually every clause of the treaty, why should the grand prince of Moscow yield his patrimony to him? And why should he not desire to get back his ancestral possessions? It was at this stage that Santay made the first con­ cession of the conference. He suggested that Ivan give back to Alexander half the territory he had seized in the war. This was to be a temporary measure until the fate of all the so-called

268

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Russian lands could be once and for all decided by such neutral arbiters as the pope and the king of Hungary. As was to be expected such an improper suggestion was indignantly scouted by Ivan. Knowing that further concessions would have to be put forward by the other side, he remained as adamant as before. There could be no question of handing over anything to Alexander. If Alexander wanted peace, then he must do the handing over. By now Ivan had made it abundantly clear to the envoys of Alexander and Wladislaw that he had no intention of giving way to their persuasive powers. Only a compromise could rescue them from the impasse. They had no authority to conclude a treaty which was not in fact a restatement of the treaty of 1494 and did not imply the surrender by Ivan of all his conquered territory. Yet they had been instructed to bring about an end to hostilities at all costs. The only way out was a temporary truce between the two countries. This meant a fixed period of armistice during which the two governments would attempt to find a solution to the problem and conclude a permanent peace. It also meant that both sides would retain what lands they actually held at the time of the signing of the truce. On 17 March 1503 the Polish, Lithuanian and Hungarian ambassadors took the first steps towards reaching such an agree­ ment. Pointing out to the grand prince that no progress could be made while both parties rigidly adhered to their original demands and that a compromise would have to be worked out so as to satisfy both Lithuania and Moscow, they suggested that a truce be signed. It was a solution which suited Ivan admirably. Alexander’s envoys would clearly never agree to his demands, which amounted to the cession of more than half the grand principality of Lithuania; and it would be difficult to step down from these demands without losing dignity. Condescendingly and almost grudgingly, the Russians agreed to a six-year truce. With remarkably little delay they handed the envoys a list of districts which had been seized during the war and which, once the truce was signed, would come legally under Muscovite control. The Polish and Lithuanian ambassadors put up a show of resistance and disputed the accuracy of the document presented by the representatives of the grand prince. It was an essential step for them to take, if only to save face; an immediate acceptance of the enemy’s terms would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

2 69

might make things harder for them in future negotiations. But more important, the list contained certain glaring — and probably quite deliberately inserted — inaccuracies. Other arguments arose as well. Should those Russian districts which still remained in Alexander’s hands be called the king’s “patrimony” or his “lands” ? The Russians objected to the former on the grounds that it implied a renunciation by them of their claims to the “ Kievan heritage” , and insisted on the latter. Eventually, however, all matters of contention were settled to the mutual satisfaction of both sides and it became possible to draw up the terms of the truce. The truce was to last for six years, from 25 March 1503 to 25 March 1509, during which time King Alexander was to send his “great ambassadors” to Moscow in order to conclude a permanent peace. Until such a treaty was signed Alexander and Ivan were not to attack each other’s lands and were to keep within the boundaries imposed by the terms of the armistice. Alexander was not to interfere with the so-called “border-lands” of Moscow — the districts of Novgorod, Pskov, Tver’, Ryazan’ and Pronsk — as well as with his latest acquisitions, which included the lands of Shemyachich, Mozhaysky, Bel’sky and the princes of Trubchevsk and Mosal’sk. There followed in the truce document a long list of formerly Lithuanian-held districts, towns, fortresses and villages which were to be recognized as Muscovite territory until the peace was finally signed.1 Ivan, on the other hand, agreed not to touch Kiev, Kanev and Cherkasy on the Dnepr, Zhitomir and Vruchy to the west of Kiev, Mstislavl* and the neighbouring town of Krichev on the Sozh, Smolensk, Vitebsk and Polotsk. From the list of places which both sides agreed not to attack during the armistice it is possible to deduce fairly accurately where the temporary line of demarcation lay. In the south the new frontier ran roughly between the lower reaches of the Dnepr and the Seym, Ryl’sk and Putivl* becoming the southernmost outposts of the Muscovite state. The frontier crossed the Desna just south-west of Chernigov and ran north, looping across the Dnepr at Lyubech, the only town on the Dnepr below Smolensk 1T he most important places listed are: Chernigov, Starodub, Putivl’, Ryl’sk, Novgorod Seversky, Gomel*, Lyubech, Pochep, Trubchevsk, Radogoshch, Bryansk, Karachev, Khotiml’, Popova Gora, Mglin, Drokov, Mtsensk, Lyubutsk, Serpeysk, Mosal’sk, Dorogobuzh, Bely, Toropets and Ostrey. See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 398 seq.

270

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

to be included in the Russian area. From Lyubech it continued north along the eastern bank of the Dnepr as far as the district of Gomel*, which in its entirety now came under Moscow. Just north of the junction of the Berezina and the Dnepr the frontier moved north-east to Khotiml* on the Besed, thus slicing off the southern portion of the district of Mstislavl* for Moscow.1 From Khotiml* the boundary went north-east and north, leaving the upper reaches of the Desna, except for the first few miles from the source, in Russian hands. It crossed the Dnepr again near the influx of the Vop*, approximately halfway between Dorogobuzh and Smolensk, and ran north along the Vop*, leaving most of the river in Russian possession.2 Just north of Velitsa on the Vop*, which was retained by the Lithuanians, the frontier turned and ran due west along the southern boundary of the old princi­ pality of the Bel’skys. Near Velizh on the Western Dvina it moved north and then west again to include the district of Toropets on the Russian side and also the north-eastern fringe of the district of Vitebsk. Before rejoining the old frontier line between Pskov and Polotsk, the new boundary made two loops into Lithuanian territory to add to the acquisition of Moscow the towns of Ostrey and Nevel*. The truce more or less confirmed what Moscow had won during the war, for where Muscovite officials and troops were in control, there they remained. It meant that a huge slice of eastern Lithuania, comprising most of the lands east of the Dnepr, now came under Muscovite authority and was to stay there until such time as an official treaty between the two countries be signed. In the east Moscow finally rounded off her annexation of the so-called Upper Oka principalities. All the lands along the rivers Oka, Zhizdra and Ugra now came under her control; there was no longer any Lithuanian-held territory between the former Vyaz’ma and Oka salients, which had been yielded to Moscow in 1494. In the south the basins of the Seym, with the towns of Ryl*sk and Putivl* on it, and the Desna, which watered the districts of Bryansk, Trubchevsk, Novgorod Seversky and Chernigov, were now recognized as Muscovite, as were the territories of Starodub 1 This consisted of the towns of Popova Gora, Khotiml*, Drokov, and Mglin. a The villages of Velitsa and Novoe Selo on the Vop* remained in Lithuanian hands. They had originally been claimed along with many other volosti in the Smolensk area by the Muscovites, who yielded them after the Lithuanian ambassadors had protested. See ibid., pp. 393-6.

272

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

and Gomel* and the southern half of the principality of Mstislavl*. In the north Moscow acquired the districts watered by the Western Dvina and Mezha rivers — the old Lithuanian salient of Toropets and Bely. It needed only the cities of Smolensk and Kiev to complete the picture; but Ivan had little reason to complain. Smolensk was under forty miles from the Muscovite frontier; Kiev was within easy reach both of Chernigov and of Lyubech on the Dnepr; and with Velizh on the Western Dvina and the Nevel* salient in the north in their possession the Muscovites were even closer than before to Vitebsk and Polotsk. The rest of the truce was of little importance; the clauses which followed those dealing with the readjustment of the frontier were nothing more than a repetition of previous treaties. They dealt with purely formal matters, such as the passage of ambassa­ dors between the two countries, the rights of merchants to trade abroad, the methods to be adopted in disputes arising on the border. Before the final formalities of seal-appending and crosskissing the Polish-Lithuanian and Hungarian ambassadors made an attempt to include the Livonian Order in the truce. Hitherto the German envoys had received scant attention at the court of Ivan; indeed, they had been studiously ignored. Now that the conditions of the truce had been agreed upon, Ivan had no intention of protracting matters by dealing with the representatives of the Livonian master, who in any case was merely asking for peace with Moscow at the request of Alexander. They were permitted, however, to put their case to the diplomatic officials of the grand prince. They wished, it transpired, to conclude a truce with the grand prince himself and not, as had been the practice hitherto, with his representatives in Novgorod and Pskov. But they expressed themselves “in an unbefitting manner**, so Ivan*s treasurer, Ivan Volodimirovich, reported. Ivan refused to comply with their wishes. The joint ambassadors of the Jagiellons were told that a truce between the master and Moscow could only be concluded in Novgorod. There was no mistaking Ivan’s tone. Humiliated, the Livonian envoys had to agree with Ivan’s demands.1 On 2 April the representatives of Ivan and Alexander met once again to give official sanction to the truce. Seals were affixed 1 See ibid., pp. 403-5. Ivan's ambassadors to Alexander, who were sent from Moscow on 7 May 1503, were instructed to say that the Livonian envoys had arrived in Novgorod, where they were negotiating a truce between Novgorod and Pskov on the one hand and the Order on the other. See ibid., p. 435.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

273

to both copies of the truce; a solemn oath on the cross was taken by both parties. As was the custom on such occasions, Ivan rounded off the proceedings with a speech. He returned to the old, and by now well-worn, theme of the preservation of the purity of his daughter’s faith. It was a speech dictated not by the feelings of a loving father or a zealous churchman, but by the caution of a shrewd diplomat. If, as was probably the case, Ivan had little or no intention of abiding by the truce — it is hard to imagine him renouncing his plans for the capture of Smolensk and Kiev for six long years1 — then some loophole must be found, some excuse which would enable him to begin a new war with as few scruples and as much self-justification as he had had when he began the old war three years previously. Once again the ambassadors were told to warn their master not to tamper with his wife’s faith and to exhort him to build her an Orthodox church and supply her with an Orthodox retinue. Should he in any way bring pressure to bear on Elena in order to convert her to his own religious beliefs, it would not this time be overlooked by Ivan. The grand prince of Moscow had no intention of permitting his son-in-law to break his oath so shamelessly in the future. The spokesman for the king, hoping to pour oil on troubled waters, replied saying that the pope, who had twice communicated with Alexander about his wife, had no wish that she should abandon the Greek faith and be rebaptized a Catholic; he merely requested that she should “bear him obedience”, frequent Catholic churches and “be in union with Rome accord­ ing to the eighth Council of Florence”. The ambassador’s words were clearly intended as a palliative: they had exactly the opposite effect on Ivan. He was incensed by the suggestion that his daughter should become a Uniate and by the implication that such a step would be as acceptable to him as it was to Alexander. He answered with unusual bitterness, ridiculing the idea of obedience to the pope and scarcely bothering to veil his threats. Two days later the ambassadors were formally dismissed, with the exception of Sapega, who was retained to receive still further injunctions regarding Elena and her faith.2 They set off west bearing with them the copy of a temporary treaty which gave 1 It is interesting to note that in August 1503 Ivan wrote to Mengli Girey saying that he was sending three of his sons to invade Lithuania. See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 481. 1 See above, p. 265.

274

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Alexander nothing more to console himself with than the tenuous promise of six years of peace on his eastern frontiers. They had come to Moscow full of hope and confidence. They had been instructed by their king to yield no Lithuanian territory and to demand back all that Ivan had seized;1 they had hoped that both the authority of the king of Hungary and of the pope would awe the grand prince, and even frighten him into making a peace which would suit the Jagiellons. They had sadly miscalculated the temper of Ivan, who looked upon them as representatives of a vanquished nation and who considered that only he had the right to dictate the terms of the treaty.2 Neither side believed in the truce; neither side felt that it would last or that peace would be made before March 1509. Alexander and his government can only have been shocked and alarmed by the extent of the concessions made by their ambassadors in Moscow; the king’s subsequent action shows that in spite of his military inferiority he had no intention of letting the terms of the truce be converted into a permanent peace and resigning himself to the loss of so large a portion of his realm. Ivan made little attempt to hide his feelings. Indeed, in a message to the khan of the Crimean Tatars he admitted that he had only agreed to a truce in order to consolidate his gains and allow his armies to rest.8 To appreciate the instability of the truce of 1503 one has only to examine the attitude of both sides to the Crimean Tatars, as well as the diplomatic relations between Poland-Lithuania and Moscow during the last two years of Ivan’s reign. Relations between Ivan III and Mengli Girey during 1503 were marred by the inability of the Muscovite envoys and messengers to pass through the steppes. Owing to the activity of roving bands of Nogay Tatars it proved impossible for the ambassadors sent by Ivan to get much further south than the Russian borders — Ivan Beklemishev’s party, which set off in February 1503, was dispersed at the Tikhaya Sosna river and forced to return; Ivan Ivanovich Oshcherin, who set off on 22 September, was held up 1 For the instructions given to the ambassadors in January 1503, see A Z R , Vol. I, No. 200, pp. 347-50. * For the details of the visit of the Polish-Lithuanian and Livonian ambassadors, see SR IO , Vol. 35, No. 75, pp. 363-412. Cf. P S R L VIII/243. * See S R IO , Vol. 41, p. 493.

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN WAR (1 5 0 0 -1 5 0 3 )

275

for about a year in Putivl’; even the couriers carrying despatches from Moscow to the Crimea in August 1503 were unable to get through the dangerous steppe land.1 Nevertheless, from the instructions given to the diplomats and the messengers it is possible accurately to gauge Ivan’s Crimean policy at the time of the negotiation of the truce with Alexander and during the months following the signing of the agreement. As before, the aim of Ivan’s policy was to stimulate amongst the Crimean Tatars an aggressive attitude towards Lithuania and Poland. Whatever the outcome of Russo-Lithuanian relations, it was essential for Ivan to retain in Mengli Girey a strong ally who in case of war would repeat his attacks on Lithuania and Poland, and in the event of a peaceful settlement between the two antagonists would refrain from raiding Muscovite possessions and concentrate his predatory activities on the lands further west. Indeed there were already signs that the Crimean Tatars were not bothering to ascertain whether their raiding areas were under Lithuanian or Muscovite control: Prince Semen Mozhaysky complained in 1503 that one “Tsarevich Mamyshek” had attacked the district of Chernigov and had refused to return the prisoners he had taken, even after apologizing to Mozhaysky; shortly afterwards Mengli’s son Bumash attacked Chernigov and caused considerable damage.2 With all his persuasive abilities Ivan urged Mengli to continue the war against Lithuania. In February 1503, while Ivan was waiting for the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors to arrive in Moscow and begin the peace talks, he sent off Beklemishev to the Horde to persuade the khan to invade Lithuania and to attack along the familiar Kiev-Turov-SlutskMinsk axis.8 He even announced his intention of mounting a spring expedition against Lithuania under his sons Yury and Dmitry. It might be argued that there was some moral justification in persuading Mengli to attack Lithuania on the eve of the peace talks. But on 22 August 1503, four and a half months after he had solemnly promised to keep the peace with Alexander for six 1 See ibid., Nos. 88, 92, 91. The only messengers who appear to have arrived were those sent from Moscow on 19 October. See ibid., No. 93. * These two incidents are reported in a message sent by Ivan to Mengli Girey via Oshcherin in September 1503. See ibid., pp. 487-8. * Beklemishev was sent off on 23 February, a week before the arrival of the Lithuanian-Polish ambassadors in Moscow. See ibid., No. 88, pp. 453-65* Ivan was perfectly aware of their impending arrival, as he had issued them with safe conducts on 17 January. See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 360-1. T

276

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

years, Ivan sent off a courier to the Crimea informing Mengli that this time three of his sons, Vasily, Yury and Dmitry, were about to be sent against Lithuania, and once again begging him to carry out an attack west of the Dnepr.1 At the same time as he was urging Mengli to attack Lithuania and informing him of his own aggressive intentions, Ivan was faced with the problem of letting him know that he had concluded a truce with Alexander. With the courier whom he despatched on 22 August to tell Mengli that his three sons were about to invade Lithuania he sent a message to the khan informing him of the peace talks in Moscow. He had, so the message ran, attempted to tell him about the arrival and proposals of the ambassadors of Wladislaw and Alexander in February, when he sent off Beklemishev on his abortive trip to the Crimea. This attempt to explain away some four months’ silence was in fact founded on a lie, for Beklemishev had left Moscow before the arrival of the Lithuanian ambassadors.2 It was followed by another lie. Ivan’s reaction to the proposals of the Jagiellons, so he said, had been to send his envoys to Vilna with instructions to conclude a treaty with Alexander only on the condition that Alexander made peace with Mengli. “ If you will not make peace with my brother Mengli,” his ambassadors had been allegedly instructed to say, “then I will not have peace with you.” 8 In fact the Muscovite envoys, who had gone to Vilna to witness the king’s oath, took with them no such instructions concerning Mengli Girey. By 22 August, it is true, they had not yet returned with the king’s ratification of the truce. There had been no answer to his counter-proposals concerning the Crimea, Ivan told Mengli, and therefore both Moscow and the Crimea were justified in attacking Lithuania. It was impossible, however, for Ivan to keep up this chicanery for long. Sooner or later he would have to let the khan know the true nature of his relations with Alexander. A month later, on 22 September 1503, he sent off Oshcherin to the Crimea. He was given the delicate task of breaking the news of the truce to the khan and of urging him to maintain as aggressive an attitude as 1 See S R IO t Vol. 41, p. 481. In Ivan’s justification it must be said that Alex­ ander had not yet signed his copy of the truce; he signed on 27 August. * In the despatch given to Beklemishev, however, Ivan did mention the proposals of the Hungarian ambassador as well as his own reply to the effect that he was only prepared to accept peace on condition that all the Russian lands in Lithuania be handed over to Moscow. See ibid., p. 457. • See ibid., p. 481.

THE RUSSO-LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1500 -

1503 )

277

possible towards Lithuania. At the same time he was to remon­ strate with Mengli for the Tatar attack on the new Muscovite acquisitions east of the Dnepr.1 Oshcherin, no doubt, was only too pleased that his enforced stay at Putivl’ prevented him from reaching the Crimea before the autumn of 1504.* Having delivered in an open speech to the khan his complaint about Mamyshek’s attack on Chernigov, he was to ask for a private audience. He was then to tell the khan that the Muscovite ambassadors had at last returned from Vilna — they arrived in fact five days after Oshcherin’s despatch8 — and that they had agreed to a five-year truce with Alexander. This, of course, he was to add, had only been consented to by the Muscovites on the condition that Alexander concluded a truce with Mengli Girey. Alexander, indeed, had expressed a desire to send his envoys to the Crimea to negotiate with Mengli. When they arrived Mengli was urged to conclude a truce for five years only, no more. Oshcherin was to finish his private speech with a reiteration of Ivan’s lasting friendship with the Crimean Horde against all common enemies, against the king of Poland and the “children of Ahmed”. In his secret instructions, so conveniently recorded, as always, in the state archives, Oshcherin was told to prevent at all costs the initiation of diplomatic relations between Alexander and Mengli. Only a truce must be considered; on no account must the khan sign a peace with Lithuania; nor must he send his ambassadors to Vilna. Again Oshcherin was to point out that Ivan had only agreed to a truce with Alexander on the condition that one was made between Alexander and Mengli, and, if pressed for a more cogent reason, he was to say that Ivan looked upon the truce merely as a period of rest between two wars — a period in which he could strengthen the cities he had taken and give his armies time to recover and refit. In order to dissuade Mengli from enter­ taining thoughts of friendship with Alexander, Oshcherin was told to stress the untrustworthiness and duplicity of the Polish king. He was to recount how Alexander had hesitated to sign the truce 1 See above, p. 275. Details of Oshcherin’s mission are given in SR IO . Vol. 41, No. 92, pp. 486-97. . . . 1 On 2 July 1504 Mengli wrote to Ivan saying that he was sending an expedi­ tion to Putivl* to fetch Oshcherin. See ibid., p. 515. Oshcherin left Putivl’ for the Crimea probably in August 1504. See ibid., p. 535. 3 Bazilevich therefore assumes that Ivan received information (not recorded) of Alexander’s ratification of the truce before the return of the Muscovite ambassadors. See Bazilevich, VP, p. 525.

278

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

with Moscow in the summer of 1503 because he had heard that Sheykh Ahmed was about to attack the Crimea. It was only when the news came that Sheykh Ahmed had been abandoned by his mirzas that he had consented “in grief” to sign the truce and let the Russian ambassadors return to Moscow. This was the man who would be sending his envoys to the Crimea with overtures of peace! Should Mengli show a desire to attack Lithuania rather than conclude a truce, then, of course, he must not be dissuaded. There was no mistaking the tone of the speeches which Oshcherin was to deliver to Mengli or of his instructions. They showed that Ivan was only interested in the khan as an aggressive ally who would be prepared to co-operate with him again in the struggle with Alexander; he was not interested in him as a partner in the Russo-Lithuanian truce. They showed, too, beyond all doubt that Ivan’s attitude to the recently-signed truce was entirely cynical. He did not believe that the peace would be kept between the two countries; nor had he any intention of keeping it longer than suited his plans. That Alexander also had few illusions about the truce can be seen from his dealings with the Crimea. The ambassadors, who, Oshcherin had been told to say, would be sent from Vilna, arrived at the end of 1503 or the beginning of 1504. This time they came to threaten rather than to plead. The reason for this change of attitude — recent Lithuanian overtures to the Crimea, it will be remembered, had been con­ ciliatory, if not servile — was that Alexander had now in his hands what he hoped would prove a valuable pawn in his negotiations with the khan: Sheykh Ahmed, former ruler of the Great Horde and still the bitter enemy of Mengli Girey, was now a prisoner of the king. After the final defeat of the Horde in June 1502 Sheykh Ahmed had sought support among the Nogay Tatars in the area of the lower Volga. In the summer of 1503 he sent a messenger to Ivan III asking him for peace and suggesting that the grand prince help him win for himself the khanate of Astrakhan*. It was an attractive proposition for Ivan. As khan of Astrakhan’, Sheykh Ahmed would be far removed from Poland and Lithuania and would be able to exercise some influence over the Nogay Tatars. Ivan agreed to assist him provided that he promised to break off all relations with Alexander.1 Sheykh Ahmed, however, changed his mind. Thinking, perhaps, that he would be accepted 1 See S R IO , Vol. 41, pp. 482, 489; cf, S R IO , Vol. 35, p. 432.

THE RUSSO -LITH UANIAN WAR

(1500-1503)

279

as khan without a struggle and preferring to win the khanate without Muscovite aid, he went to Astrakhan’ alone. On 8 July 1503 he arrived at the city; on the following day he was told to leave. With two of his brothers, Khozyak and Khalek, he set off west from the Volga delta. In the autumn he reached Kiev. Thence he moved to Cetatea Alba on the Black Sea, intending to seek refuge in Constantinople. But the Turks refused him asylum owing to his enmity with the Crimea, so Mengli told Ivan. Driven out of Cetatea Alba, he wandered north into Lithuanian territory. By early winter a raiding party from the Crimea learned of his presence in Novgorodok, west of Minsk. They drove him out of the district. With only eight in his party he made his way back to Kiev. Here at last he was arrested by the voevoda. His days of freedom were over.1 Alexander immediately made use of his captive. He sent an ambassador to the Crimea asking Mengli to make peace with him. The conditions should be the same as those that had existed between Hajji Girey and Casimir. Should Mengli Girey refuse, then Alexander had no alternative but to set up Sheykh Ahmed and his brothers against Mengli. It was an open threat. If the Crimean Tatars did not refrain from their attacks on Lithuania and Poland, which were still going on,2 Alexander would retaliate by helping Sheykh Ahmed to build up an army and re-equipping him for the struggle against the Crimea. When the Lithuanian ambassador was arrested by Mengli still more messengers and ambassadors came to the Crimea, “one after the other . . . with the same speeches.” At length Alexander announced that he was prepared to send Dmitry Putyatich, the voevoda of Kiev, as his “ great ambassador”, i.e. his plenipotentiary, to discuss terms — a proposition which aroused the interest of the “ oghlans and princes”, but which was rejected by the khan.8 Alexander miscalculated the effectiveness of his captive as a means of intimidation. Ivan, it is true, made efforts to entice Sheykh Ahmed to Moscow lest Alexander should make use of him against the Crimea; his envoy to Elena in the spring of 1504 was instructed to get in touch with the prisoner and persuade 1 For Sheykh Ahmed's adventures after leaving Astrakhan', see the account given in July 1504 by Mengli in a despatch to Moscow. See ibid., p. 516. * T hat the Crimeans were still keeping up their raids on Lithuania can be seen from Mengli's message of July 1504, in which he states that a party of Crimean Tatars were operating in the area of Novgorodok during the winter of 1503-4. See ibid., p. 516.

28o

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

him to escape to Moscow.1 But the possibility of the rehabilitation of Sheykh Ahmed did not frighten Mengli Girey. He preferred the profitable friendship of Ivan to Alexander’s doubtful promises mixed with threats. No truce was concluded between Lithuania and the Crimea. If anything, Alexander’s blustering attempts to pacify Mengli increased the latter’s hostility, as well as his determination to share with Ivan in the spoils of a defeated Lithuania. In September 1504 Mengli was already writing to Ivan confirming his friendship with Moscow and his hostile intentions towards Lithuania. “ It is time,” he wrote, “that we took Kiev.” He planned once more to build a fortress near Tavan’ on the Dnepr with the help of a thousand men sent by Sultan Bayezid. “After this Lithuania will be in the hands of us both.” 2 Ivan was unable to exploit Mengli’s eagerness to wage war on Lithuania. During the last months of his life, from June to September 1505, he was wholly occupied with the rebellion of Mehemmed Emin in Kazan’ and the combined Kazan’-Nogay Tatar assault on Nizhny Novgorod.8 Nevertheless the aims of his Crimean diplomacy had been achieved. He had successfully hampered a rapprochement between Alexander and Mengli Girey; and once again he had succeeded in getting the khan into a state of readiness and willingness to attack Lithuanian territory.

That the truce of 1503 was unstable and that neither side was prepared to convert it into a lasting peace is also shown by RussoLithuanian diplomatic relations. From the signing of the armistice in Moscow in April 1503 to Ivan’s death in October 1505 neither side made the slightest effort to lessen the tension or to contribute in any way to the creation of a true peace. For the most part the diplomats plied between Vilna and Moscow to discuss routine matters, usually complaints of border infringements and petty irregularities. And when the promised “great ambassadors” from Poland-Lithuania arrived, both sides showed themselves as inflexible as ever. The first ambassadors to be sent from Moscow to Lithuania after the war, Petr Mikhaylovich Pleshcheev and Konstantin Grigor’evich Zabolotsky, left Moscow on 7 May 1503. They went 1 See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 464-5. 1 See SR IO , Vol. 41, No. 100, pp. 538-44. * See above, p. 184, note 3. Bazilevich considers it likely that the Nogay Tatars played a considerable role in the rebellion and that they were encouraged to stir up trouble by Alexander. See Bazilevich, VP, pp. 537-9.

THE RUSSO -LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 3 )

281

ostensibly to conduct the formal business of witnessing the king's oath on the truce. They were, however, given other tasks as well, the most important of which was to get Alexander to sign a “ confirmatory document" (utverzhennaya gramota) safeguarding Elena's Orthodoxy. In their first formal address to the king the old injunctions to respect Elena’s religious beliefs were repeated. At the same time they requested Alexander to sign a document containing three simple clauses. (1) Elena was not to be pressed to join the Roman Catholic Church; (2) she was to maintain her Greek Orthodox faith in all matters; and (3) even if she herself desired to become a Catholic she was to be prevented from doing so. The king was asked to append his great seal to the document and to request his brother Frederyk, archbishop of Cracow, and Bishop Wojciech of Vilna to add their seals as well. Apart from the third clause, it was identical with the agreement which Ivan had insisted on Alexander signing after the treaty of 1494.1 Once again the aim of the agreement was not so much to insure the preservation of Elena's faith as to provide Alexander with every possible oppor­ tunity of breaking his word and thus providing Ivan with an excuse for breaking his. Presumably Alexander signed the document.There is no direct evidence that he did; but there were no complaints from the Muscovite government to the effect that he had refused to do so. Apart from witnessing the king’s official acceptance of the truce and negotiating the “ confirmatory document" on Elena's religious beliefs, the ambassadors were given numerous other tasks to perform in Vilna. They were to address the usual long tirades to Elena, both in public and in private, about the advisability of maintaining the purity of her faith; they were to collect informa­ tion on the foreign relations of Alexander; they were to question Elena on suitable brides for her brothers, Vasily, Yury and Dmitry — did she know of any foreign rulers, Orthodox or Catholic, with marriageable daughters?2 They were to complain 1 See above, p. 154. * The ambassadors were told, more specifically, to find out about the children of George, son of Stephen, Despot of Serbia. Was George still alive and in Hungary? Had he any marriageable daughters? In February 1504 Ivan received an answer from Elena. She had not been able to find out anything about George or his children. T he Margrave of Brandenburg, however, had five daughters, the eldest of whom was lame and ugly, the second eldest 14 years old and allegedly “pretty in her person*’. The princes of Bavaria and Stettin both had daughters. The king of France had a sister, once engaged to Jan Olbracht of Poland and now in a monastery. The king of Denmark had a daughter. See SR IO , Vol. 35, pp. 453- 3•

282

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

about Lithuanian infringements of the frontiers — Popova Gora and several villages in the Starodub area had been raided from across the border, so Mozhaysky had reported. In all their deal­ ings they were to behave themselves in a manner becoming the ambassadors of a great sovereign.1 The Ambassadors were an unconscionably long time returning to Moscow. The delay was not due to difficulties of travel but to the fact that Alexander was in no hurry to confirm the truce. In fact he only performed the ceremony of appending his seal to the documents and kissing the cross on 27 August, at least three months after Pleshcheev’s party had arrived in Vilna. The official excuse for the delay was that the king had been waiting for the results of inquiries into border incidents. No sooner had the envoys arrived, so Alexander informed Ivan in a despatch dated 12 August,2 than he received complaints from “the princes and boyars of Smolensk”, whose districts near the frontier were being taken over by the Muscovites. He had of course sent an official to investigate and had held up the Muscovite envoys until the return of that official so that he might be able to inform them of all that was going on at the frontier. It was hardly a valid reason for delaying the ratification of the treaty for three whole months, as Ivan himself hastened to point out to the king. He had never heard, he said, of ambassadors on truce business being held up because of complaints: “even if our people have done your people any wrong, there was no purpose in holding up our ambassadors.”3 Furthermore, Alexander’s messenger had not even brought with him a list of the complaints from the Smolensk region. This made it still harder for Ivan to believe in Alexander’s reasons for holding up Pleshcheev and his party. It must be assumed that Alexander had serious misgivings about the nature of the truce and the extent of the territorial concessions which had been made by his ambassadors in Moscow. The three months during which Pleshcheev waited in Vilna or Troki may well have 1 They were advised not to quarrel amongst themselves, but to obey in all matters the head of the party, Pleshcheev. They must beware of excessive drinking at banquets; above all, they must "not behave with domineering arrogance like Prince Semen Ryapolovsky and Prince Vasily Ivanovich (Patnkeev)” — a reference to two of the boyars punished in 1499. See SR IO , Vol. 35, p. 428. 2 See ibid., pp. 435-7. On 20 July a note had been received from S. I. Bel’sky to the effect that Alexander had "seized" Pleshcheev’s party and sent them to Troki. See ibid., p. 433. 8 See ibid., p. 438. Ivan replied to Alexander's message on 31 August.

THE RUSSO -LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 3 )

283

been spent by the king in consultation with his advisers and with his brother Wladislaw. When he eventually agreed to ratify the truce, he did it with bad grace. “ Tell my brother and father-inlaw from me,” he said to Pleshcheev and Zabolotsky, “that he should give back to us those of our lands which he has seized from us, and return those of our people whom he has captured, so that brotherhood and love between us be not broken.” 1 Alexander’s parting remark to the Russian ambassador left Ivan in no doubt as to the conditions on which the king was prepared to make a lasting peace. On 2 December 1503 Ivan was informed by a messenger that the “great ambassadors” were on their way to Moscow.2 They arrived at length on 26 February 1504, four months after their credentials had been issued in Mel’nik. The cause of their delay is not known. It seems improbable that the king spent the time deliberating with his advisers as to what line he should take at the peace talks and what claims he should put forward — he had already given clear enough indication of his demands at the end of August. A more likely explanation is that the capture of Sheykh Ahmed and the negotiations with the Crimean and Nogay Tatars3 caused Alexander to hesitate before sending off his ambassadors. Had all his Tatar schemes fallen through, he would not perhaps have been willing to take so rigid a stand in the diplomatic conflict with Ivan. At their first audience with Ivan the ambassadors wasted no time in presenting the claims of the king. Alexander, they said, desired peace. His terms were simple. Ivan must hand back all those districts “seized from us without reason”, make full compensation for the damage caused by the war and return all prisoners. In other words, Ivan was once more being presented with a demand to return to the terms of the treaty of 1494. Once more, too, the ambassadors denied Lithuanian responsibility for starting the war: the Lithuanians had never broken the treaty, they said; they had never encroached upon Muscovite land, they had “many a time” observed Ivan’s correct title in their diplomatic correspondence and they had exerted no pressure whatsoever on Elena. The ambassador’s speech amounted to nothing more than a repetition of the demands made by the Polish-Lithuanian peace delegation on their arrival in Moscow almost exactly a year before. 1 See ibid., p. 439. * See ibid., p. 444* See above, pp. 279-80. On 21 October 1503 Nogay ambassadors were in Lithuania. See A Z R t Vol. I, No. 206.

284

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

After four days’ deliberation Ivan replied to the ambassadors through his ministers. Point by point he refuted their arguments, denied their allegations and ridiculed their claims. How, he asked, could Alexander assert that he was honouring his agree­ ment as far as the grand princely title was concerned? Only a few weeks before he (Alexander) had sent a safe-conduct to Moscow to enable a Danish envoy to return to Denmark via Lithuania and Poland. The pass for Lithuania, which was written in Russian, was correctly worded: Ivan was named “sovereign of all Russia”. But the pass for Poland, written in Latin, omitted the vital clause in the tide. “Is this what our brother and son-in-law calls keeping to the treaty,” Ivan’s spokesman petulantly asked, “ doing us such dishonour?” It was a petty point to make. Alexander had no intention of insulting Ivan by omitting “sovereign of all Russia” in the Latin document; as he explained shortly afterwards, the error was merely due to the ignorance of a scribe who was unacquainted with the terms of Alexander’s treaties with Moscow.1 As for Elena and the ever-recurring question of her faith, the grand prince’s point of view had been put time and time again to the ambassadors of the king, as well as to those of his brothers Wladislaw and Jan Olbracht. He could only repeat what he had said before: the bishops of Smolensk and Vilna and Bemadine monks had been used to persuade her to change her faith; no Orthodox chapel had been built in her quarters; she had only one Orthodox woman left in her suite — all the rest were Roman Catholics. Finally Ivan turned to the most important section of the speech of the Polish-Lithuanian envoys, in which Alexander’s conditions for peace were laid down. The king had demanded that the Russians hand back the towns and districts which they had seized since 1494 and which, he claimed, were the “patrimony” of the king of Poland and grand prince of Lithuania. There was only one answer to this. Ivan’s representatives once more laboriously outlined for the benefit of the king the Muscovite theories of the ownership of the “ Russian” lands. “ It is known to King Alexander . . . that all the Russian land is by God’s will our patrimony, and has been since olden times, since our 1 Ivan had originally requested a safe-conduct for “Magister David**, the king of Denmark’s envoy, in November 1503 (see S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 440-1). The passes were brought to Moscow in February 1504. (Ibid., p. 450.) Alexander sent Matvey Kuntsevich to explain the error in the Latin pass in April 1504. (Ibid., pp. 466-7.)

THE RUSSO -LITH UANIAN WAR ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 3 )

285

forefathers. . . . Their [i.e. the king’s] patrimony is the Polish and Lithuanian lands. Why therefore should we yield to him those cities and districts — our patrimony — which God gave us?” Ivan went on to point out that his patrimony did not only consist of those lands which he already held, but of “all the Russian land, Kiev and Smolensk and other towns which he [the king] now holds in the Lithuanian land.” Should Alexander want peace, then he must hand over to Ivan the whole of the Russian patrimony.1 Both sides were back to where they started. Neither was prepared to negotiate a peace based on uti possidetis. Alexander was demanding what he had persistently demanded since the beginning of the war — a return to the treaty of 1494, in other words the cession of all the lands annexed or conquered by Ivan since 1499. There was now no question of his ambassadors giving way on any point. The damage caused by the truce of 1503 could only be undone by refusing to agree to a peace on any but the terms of the old treaty. Ivan for his part, not to be outdone by what must have seemed to him the unwarranted arrogance and boldness of the Polish king, once more unconditionally laid his maximum claims before Alexander. He was ready to make a permanent peace only if the king relinquished “all the Russian lands” still in his possession. It is hard to say what exactly was the extent of this demand, which, it is interesting to note, had first been adumbrated only a year previously in answer to the king of Hungary’s tentative suggestions of peace. Presumably it embraced all the principalities that had been part of the old Kievan state — Kiev, Smolensk, Turov-Pinsk, Polotsk, Volhynia and Galicia; Ivan rather vaguely left it at “ Kiev, Smolensk and other towns” . But whatever the size of the territory claimed, Ivan’s demand was just as unrealistic and unrealizable as Alex­ ander’s insistence on a return to 1494. By their intransigence and inflexibility both parties were merely acknowledging their incompatibility, their complete inability to live in peace as neighbours; both were now virtually admitting the inevitability of war. No further attempts were made to break the deadlock. After listening to various complaints concerning violation of the 1 For the peace mission of February-M arch 1504, see ibid., No. 78, pp. 454-63. The ambassadors were Stanislav Glebovich, Yury Zinov’ev and Bogdan Sapega.

286

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

frontiers — designed no doubt to counter those they themselves had made earlier — the ambassadors of the king left Moscow on 7 March 1504. For the remainder of Ivan’s reign there was no more mention of peace. Ivan forebore to comment on the fruitless exchange of views with Alexander’s peace delegation. Alexander made no move towards sending another. Any further discussion between the two rulers was pointless; it was a waste of time to equip and despatch embassies merely to state conflicting view­ points and argue opposing ideologies when neither side was prepared to shift from the positions they had taken up. The envoys who moved between the courts of Alexander and Ivan during the last winter and spring of Ivan’s reign were concerned almost exclusively with the lodging of complaints and counter­ complaints about minor violations of the frontier.1 Their argu­ ments were as barren as had been those of the diplomats who had discussed the possibilities of peace at the beginning of 1504; the likelihood of an agreement was equally remote. Both sides complained and neither took the slightest notice of the other’s complaints. Meanwhile, as the diplomats hurried to and fro, arguing, complaining, threatening, there existed a state of un­ declared war along the Russo-Lithuanian frontier. In spite of the truce fighting had not stopped. But it was a local war, or rather a series of little local wars, not a national conflict. Individual princes and landowners were deciding themselves just how the boundaries should run and were working out in practice what the diplomats had decided in theory. It was only a question of time before a full-scale war started again, before the unresolved and unsatisfactorily concluded war of 1500-2 was resuscitated. But before war was ever declared, the two antagonists, Ivan and Alexander, had both died. 1 See ibid., Nos. 81-3, pp. 471-8. Apart from these only two other embassies are recorded between the peace mission of Feb.-M arch 1504 and Ivan’s death: (a) On 8 March 1504 Ivan sent Konstantin Zamytsky to Elena with a consign­ ment of falcons and furs. He was also told to get in touch with Sheykh Ahmed if possible (see above, p. 280, note 1) and to pick up what information he could as to Polish-Lithuanian foreign relations. See ibid., No. 79, pp. 463-6. (b) Alexander’s mission to Ivan to apologize for the incorrect use of Ivan’s title. See above, p. 284, note 1.

CHAPTER IX ★

IN T E R N A L C O N F L IC T S

he comparative ease with which Ivan appears to have waged his wars on several fronts and conducted his complex diplomacy might lead one to believe that the machinery of state ran smoothly and efficiently, and that ther were no internal difficulties to distract the grand prince from his task of reuniting “all Russia” . It is easy to picture Ivan as a despot who brooked no opposition, at whose command armies marched and rulers were dethroned, whose word was unquestioningly obeyed by his subjects. It is easy to see in him merely a man of stronger character and personality than his father; a man who ruled what had been left him with a firmer hand than his pre­ decessors, made no changes in the structure of the state and suffered no organized opposition: a man who merely took over the apparatus of government and tightened his control over it. Such a picture is false and misleading. Throughout Ivan’s long reign an elaborate and carefully-planned policy of reform was carried out — reform of the administration, of the system of land tenure, of the economy — in the attempt to build a centralized state out of the ruins of the old so-called appanage system. At the same time the grand prince’s programme, both of home and foreign policies, met with considerable resistance among those with whose personal or class interests his schemes clashed. While it is not proposed in this work to study in detail the economic and political reforms of Ivan III, it is hoped that an enquiry into the opposition, and into the methods used by the government in dealing with the opposition, will show what Ivan was attempting to achieve in his home policy and to what extent he was successful. Any investigator of the internal conflicts which Ivan solved or tried to solve comes up against two difficulties. Firstly, he is faced

T

287

28 8

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

with the problems presented by the paucity or the reticence of the sources. In many cases the only indication of a crisis or a clash is the brief statement in the chronicles of an execution, a flight or a banishment. Sometimes the evidence is only indirect, as for instance in the case of the enfeoffment of the former servants of persons whose courts or estates had presumably been dissolved or confiscated in punishment for some crime against the state. Only rarely do the sources vouchsafe an explanation for a particular case, and then such explanations must often be discredited owing to the tendentiousness of the source itself. Indeed, as far as the grave “dynastic” crisis of 1497-9 is concerned, the facts are so thin and the actions reported so apparently unmotivated that the historian is tempted to try to find a solution which will fit in with his theories. The second difficulty is that the opposition was far from homogeneous. The opponents of the grand prince and of his close circle of advisers, as well as those who fell foul of him for one reason or another, were not confined to one class, one profession, one stratum of society: they included members of the grand prince’s family and of his court, his advisers, the clergy, the titled and untitled land-owning aristocracy, the minor service gentry, the civil service. They represented, as far as we can tell, a multiplicity of views. They opposed the sovereign or his policy for a wide variety of reasons, from purely personal feelings of jealousy or spite to a firm and sincere conviction that the grand prince’s policy was morally or politically wrong in one way or another. Some, the supporters of separatism, were opposed to his policy of unification and centralization; some objected to his aggressive foreign policy, to his hostility towards the rulers of Poland and Lithuania; some protested against his high-handed attitude towards the sacred possessions of the Church, against his unwillingness to take upon himself the duties of a Christian sovereign in fighting heresy; some rebelled against the innovations concomitant with the reform of the state; some objected to the curtailment of their personal liberty and the threat to their economy. But none of them appear to have belonged to what might be called an opposition party. There was clearly little or no organized opposition with a plan for concerted action and a programme to put forward, or if there was, there is no evidence of it in the available sources. On rare occasions we hear of a small group being punished for an offence against the state, its members

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

289

being clearly involved in conspiracy; but usually it is only the imprisonment or execution of isolated individuals that is reported. It is therefore impossible to talk of the existence of an opposition group or class, just as one cannot assume that all the so-called boyar class, the land-owning “feudal” aristocracy, the titled and untitled descendants of the former independent princes and their boyars, formed a solid bloc which resisted the “progressive” policy of the grand prince, or that the minor service gentry, the dvoryanstvo, and the rising class of government officials and civil servants, the d'yaki, or even the popular masses, were necessarily the firm supporters of autocracy. The best one can say is that a great variety of people objected to Ivan’s policy for a great variety of reasons; and only one thing linked the opponents of the government together — the treatment they received. Swiftly, efficiently, quietly, they were removed from the political scene. There were no trials. If they were given the opportunity to plead their case, no record of such proceedings has survived. Of those who escaped to the safety of the west none was sufficiently gifted or articulate to leave an account of his experiences or to put his case to the world as did Prince Kurbsky a century afterwards.

Ivan and his brothers The most serious opposition to the grand prince came, as might be expected, from his own brothers. The principle of autocracy within the grand principality of Moscow, of the suprem­ acy of the prince of Moscow, may have been vindicated by Vasily II; by the end of his reign he was master of the entire grand principality of Moscow, with the exception of the only remaining appanage principality of Vereya. Yet the defeat of Yury of Galich, of his family and of his supporters did not mean the end of “separatist” aspirations within the grand prince’s family. The extinction or suppression of Vasily I I ’s two uncles and their descendants and supporters had left Vasily in supreme control. But by dividing up his realm between his five sons and his wife, he created new appanages — on much the same basis as the old appanages which had been formed by Dmitry Donskoy and Vasily I. And by this very act he created fresh potential danger within the state, the possibility of renewed internal wars and

29О

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

strife. It is true, the authority of the grand prince had been legally established by the will of Vasily II: the proportion of land and wealth left to Ivan made his position as senior prince un­ assailable. But his brothers held considerable territories and money and enjoyed, it would appear, complete power within their appanages. Had their elder brother been prepared to rule the state as primus inter pares, to regard them as his advisers and fellow-rulers, to share with them any accretions of land or wealth and to respect those political rights and freedoms which they held sacred — then no doubt they would have accepted the position established by the will of Vasily and would have been prepared to co-operate with Ivan in his rule. But Ivan had no intention of remaining merely the senior member of the family. In his concept of the ideal state he envisaged the ultimate sub­ mission of the appanage princes to the grand prince. He was certainly not prepared to see his brothers increase their power and wealth as the Muscovite state itself grew in territory. Indeed, he was determined to whittle down their authority, to render them politically impotent and to secure for himself as much as he could, if not all, of their lands. What exactly was the position of the four brothers of the grand prince at the beginning of Ivan’s reign? What authority had they in and over their estates? To answer these questions it is necessary once again to look at the will of Vasily II. Each of the four younger brothers received as his udel, or appanage, a number of large towns together with the districts administratively and fiscally dependent on them, as well as scattered villages, towns and areas of less political, but perhaps equal financial, importance. The udely were held on a basis of full ownership. They were, indeed, called otchiny, or patrimonies, in the will. The princes were able to do what they liked with their estates — to sell, mortgage or be­ queath them as they pleased. Only one person had the right to interfere with the distribution within the udely, and that was the grand princess Maria, the wife of Vasily II; but this interference was strictly limited to the unlikely case of one of the sons losing his udel — in war, it must be understood. In any case, the formula was traditional: “should any of my sons have his patrimony taken from him, then my princess shall take [land] from the udely of her sons and fill the patrimony of that one.” 1 As for the relation 1DDG, p. 197.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

291

of the appanage princes to their elder brother, the will, like all previous grand princely wills, was vague; it merely stated that they should “respect and obey your elder brother Ivan in my [i.e. Vasily’s] place”, whereas Ivan was to “hold his brother Yury and his younger brothers in brotherhood, without offence”.1 The word “obey”, in fact, gave Ivan control over his brothers’ activities outside the boundaries of their estates. It meant that they must raise their own armies and go to war when called on by the grand prince to do so — and only then — and must conduct no in­ dependent diplomatic business with states or principalities outside the grand principality of Moscow. Should they desire to have dealings with foreign countries, then this could only be done through the grand prince. The udely, in other words, were states within a state; what the princes did with their own subjects within their own boundaries was their own business. They had no fiscal ties with Moscow except for the raising of Tatar tribute — as long as the Great Horde existed the princes were obliged to hand over the annual levy (vykhod) to Ivan. But “should God change [i.e. remove] the Horde, then my princess and my children shall take the tribute from the udely for themselves, and my son Ivan shall not interfere in this”.8 In return for their relative lack of freedom as far as foreign relations were concerned, they could expect a share in the management of state affairs, consultation on questions of international relations and protection in case of invasion. But it was a loose and in many ways unsatisfactory form of agreement: many of the terms could be interpreted to suit either the grand prince or his brothers. In order to define the exact relationship between Ivan and the appanage princes, it was necessary to draw up treaties, especially when either side looked like taking too untraditional a view of this or that clause in the will. During the first ten years of Ivan’s reign there do not appear to have been any clashes or differences of opinion between the grand prince and his brothers.8 There is no evidence to show either that Ivan had cause to be dissatisfied with his brothers or that they objected to his behaviour during these years. They did not hesitate to send troops to join in the Kazan’ campaigns of 1468 and 1469 or the expedition against Novgorod in 1471. 1 Ibid., p. 198. * Ibid., p. 197. * Unless one accepts the chronicler's later charge against Audrey the Elder that "he plotted against the grand prince together with Princes Yury, Boris and Audrey (the Younger)". See below, p. 304.

292

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

There was no need for treaties so long as the appanage princes and their brother were prepared scrupulously to observe the conditions of their father’s wül. Vasily, however, had made no provision for one eventuality: there was no word in his will as to what was to happen to the estate of any of his sons should they die heirless and intestate. On the last occasion when a grand prince of Moscow had divided his realm amongst his sons he had left specific instructions in his will as to what was to happen should one of the sons die. This is what Dmitry Donskoy said in his will of 1389: “should God take away any of my sons, then my princess shall share up his appanage between my [remaining] sons; to whom she grants anything, that shall be his.” 1 There was nothing like this in Vasily IFs will. And when Yury, the eldest of Ivan’s four brothers, died unexpectedly and childless on 12 September 1472, his appanage was taken over by the grand prince. Yury had, it is true, drawn up a draft will before his death, but it contained merely a list of villages, goods and monies to be dis­ tributed on his death to his mother, his brothers, various individuals and monasteries; there was no mention of the con­ veyance of his estates — the lands of Dmitrov, Serpukhov, Khotun*, Medyn’ and Mozhaysk. This omission on Yury’s part may perhaps be explained by the fact that the will was only in draft form and that discussions were going on between Ivan and his brothers at the time of Yury’s death. No agreement as to the fate of Yury’s appanages in the case of his death can have been reached.2 Whatever the reason for Yury’s unwillingness to commit himself before his death, the annexation of his udel by Ivan III caused sharp dissatisfaction among the other brothers. Unfor­ tunately, this, the first major clash between Ivan and his brothers, is barely mentioned in the sources. Only the Voskresensky Chronicle touches laconically on the matter: “the brothers became angry with the grand prince for not giving them a share in the ùdel of their brother Prince Yury.” They were reconciled, so the chronicler goes on, by their mother. In order to pacify the three angry brothers, Ivan and his mother, the grand princess Maria, 1 See DDG, p. 35. 2 See Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 1, pp. 195-6; DDG, No. 68, pp. 221-4. Cherepnin's view is that Yury submitted his will in draft to Ivan in 1472 and that as no mention was made of the appanage being left to the grand prince, the latter refused to ratify it.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

293

gave them additional estates. Boris of Volotsk was given the town of Vyshgorod, ten versts from Vereya on the Protva, which had previously belonged to Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya and which had been handed over by him to Ivan III. Andrey the Younger received the border town of Tarusa, north-east of Aleksin on the Oka, part of the grand prince’s estate. Andrey the Elder got nothing from Ivan; he had to be satisfied with the small town of Romanov on the Volga which his mother gave him.1 It was clearly time to regularize the relations between the grand prince and his brothers. Not only had the latter expressed their dissatisfaction with Ivan’s policy and obliged him to recompense them, albeit meagrely, for receiving no share in Yury’s escheat, but lands had changed hands. It was essential to draw up treaties and define the exact status of the appanage princes and their obligations towards their elder brother. Two such treaties have survived — between Ivan and Boris in February 1473, and between Ivan and Andrey the Elder in September of the same year. Andrey the Younger was evidently the least captious of the three brothers. Satisfied, perhaps, with Tarusa, or unwilling to offer any resistance to Ivan’s plans, he faithfully served the grand prince for the remainder of his life and obligingly bequeathed his entire estate to him before dying in 1481. With such a com­ plaisant brother there was no point in drawing up a treaty. The agreements with Andrey the Elder and Boris followed the traditional pattern. Both princes were to hold Ivan III and his son Ivan as “elder brothers” ; they were to carry on no relations, diplomatic or military, with outside powers except with the knowledge and, although this was not explicitly stated, the approval of Ivan III; alliances could only be made with friends of the grand prince of Moscow and wars could only be fought against his enemies; at the summons of the grand prince the two brothers must send him what help was required. For his part Ivan agreed to keep his brothers informed of all dealings with foreign countries, and to protect them and their estates. Both parties obliged them­ selves to respect the other’s “patrimony”, “to protect, not to offend and not to invade”, an obligation which held both for the covenanters and for their children. Now included in the grand 1 See PSRI* VIII/181, where the episode is wrongly dated 1474. In February 1473 Vyshgorod is mentioned in Ivan's treaty with Boris as part of the latter’s estate; in September 1473 Romanov is mentioned as belonging to Andrey the Elder in Ivan’s treaty with him.

294

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

prince’s patrimony was the old udel of Yury, “the towns of Dmitrov, Rostov, Mozhaysk, Serpukhov and Khotun’.” 1 These were not to be interfered with by Andrey and Boris. As for the third of the Moscow revenues which Andrey had formerly shared with Yury, he would now share them with Ivan III. Andrey’s udel was increased by Romanov and Boris’s by Vyshgorod; in other words, the concessions made by Ivan and his mother were now ratified. The remaining clauses of the two treaties were traditional: should either of the contracting parties die, then neither would Ivan interfere with the patrimonies of his brothers which would be under the control of their widows and children, nor would Andrey and Boris touch Ivan’s estates or Yury’s. Tribute to the Horde was to be administered by Ivan; Andrey and Boris were merely to make their contributions to the central treasury. The “ Tsarevich Daniar”, or any other Tatar tsarevich in Ivan’s service, was to be held by the brothers as Ivan’s equal. Andrey and Boris were to join Ivan or his son on all campaigns; they were to go wherever the grand prince might send them and to send their voevodas and soldiers to fight in Ivan’s wars. As for the right of “departure” (ot'ezd), “service princes with patrimonies” were not to be received by the appanage princes should they wish to quit the service of the grand prince. “Boyars, boyar children and free servants,” however, had full right of movement between the various principalities; they were free to serve whom they wished.2 There was nothing new in the formulation of these treaties. They followed closely the pattern of compacts drawn up between 1 This list of towns occurs in Ivan’s treaty with Andrey. (See DDG, p. 233). In the original copy of the treaty with Boris the patrimony of Yury is merely described as “the udel of my brother . . . according to his father’s will*’. (Ibid., pp. 225-6.) In a second copy of the treaty with Boris, made evidently while preparing fresh treaties in 1481, the list of towns is given. In the list there are two discrepancies with Vasily I I ’s will and Yury’s draft will (which mentions the towns of his udelf without saying to whom he left them): the two wills both include Medyn’ but omit Rostov. M edyn’ was later included in the list of towns in Yury’s escheat in the revised treaty of Ivan III with Andrey the Elder in 1481. (See ibid., p. 252). Rostov was originally left by Vasily II to his wife, the grand princess Maria Yaroslavna “for life” (do zhivota): after her death it was to pass to Yury; the princes of Rostov, however, were to retain certain control over their principality. Maria died in 1485, having taken the veil in 1478. As Yury makes no mention of Rostov in his will, it may be assumed that Ivan persuaded his mother to hand it over between 1472 and September 1473. It is interesting to note that Maria Yaroslavna was ill in Rostov in the late summer of 1472; she was visited there by Ivan and Andrey the Elder in September. 8 See DDG, Nos. 69 and 70. See also No. 66, which is a copy of a draft treaty between Andrey and Ivan drawn up by the former before September 1472, but not ratified by the grand prince.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

295

Ivan’s father and grandfather and the udeVny princes within the grand principality of Moscow. In most cases even the phraseology was the same. No new principles, no factors limiting in any way the rights of the two brothers, had been introduced; their relations with their elder brother were precisely the same as had been the relations of the appanage with the grand princes during the previous two reigns. All in fact that had altered since the accession of Ivan was the extent of the estates of the princes. The grand prince had vastly increased the size of the lands at his disposal by annexing in its entirety the escheat of Yury; the three surviving brothers had had to be content with trifling additions to their estates, parsimoniously meted out to them out of the domains of the grand prince and his mother. Yet they appear, temporarily at least, to have been appeased by the grants and the treaties con­ firming the grants. There were no signs of disobedience or rebellion in the six years following the signing of the treaties. They fulfilled their military obligations by taking part in the campaign against Novgorod in 1477-8, just as they had done in 1471. Twice Ivan, on his way to Novgorod, in October 1475 and October 1477, stopped at Volok Lamsky, Boris’s capital, to pay what appears in each case to have been an entirely amicable visit; on the second of these occasions, indeed, it is probable that he examined and approved the will of Boris which was drawn up at the time and in which the entire estate was bequeathed to Boris’s family.1 The calm, however, was illusory. Early in 1480 Andrey and Boris openly rebelled against their elder brother. The majority of the sources which describe the rebellion are unusually reticent. They merely state that the grand prince, who was at the time in Novgorod, was informed by his son in Moscow that his two eldest brothers were about to defect; they then describe the brothers’ move west to Velikie Luki, Casimir’s refusal to support them, the efforts of the grand prince to persuade them to return and the final reconciliation.2 Only in one chronicle account of the incident — an account coloured by its author’s evident sympathy for the brothers and antagonism towards the grand prince8 — is an explanation given for the rebellion. 1 See Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 1, pp. 182-3. The will is printed in DDG, pp. 249-51. Boris wrote the will “going on the business of my master . . . to Novgorod the Great** — in other words on the expedition of 1477. For Ivan's visits to Volok, see P S R L XXV/304, 311. 2 See above, pp. 74 seq. • P S R L VI/222; XX/336. Cf. Ya. S. L ur’ye, “Bor'ba tserkvi. . .*', p. 224.

2 96

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

According to this source there were two main grievances. The first sprang from Ivan’s territorial niggardliness and greed/Trince Yury died,” the brothers are reported to have said, “ and all his patri­ mony fell to the grand prince; he gave us no share. Great Novgorod we captured with him, but all fell to him and he gave us no share of it.” The second grievance concerned what the princes considered to be a gross breach of privilege. In the late summer or early autumn of 1479 Ivan dismissed his namestnik from Velikie Luki. The man in question, Prince Ivan Vladimir­ ovich Obolensky-Lyko, had presumably been appointed governor of Velikie Luki early in the previous year, after the annexation of Novgorod, of whose territory Velikie Luki had formerly been a part. He was dismissed for abusing his authority as governor and illegally extorting money from the inhabitants of the district. The latter complained to the grand prince. Obolensky-Lyko, so the chronicler narrates, “being unable to bear this, departed [ofekhal] from the grand prince to his brother Prince Boris in Volok Lamsky.” As a “free servant” of the grand prince he was thus exercising the immemorial right of all “boyars, boyar children and free servants” to change allegiance from one prince to another. This much had been confirmed six years earlier in Ivan’s treaties with Andrey and Boris. Ivan, however, had little intention of abiding by his treaty obligations when the ot’ezd of his own servants was concerned, particularly of the titled aristocracy. He sent an emissary to seize Obolensky “in the midst of Prince Boris’s court in Volok”, but Boris forcibly prevented him from carrying out the arrest. A second attempt to arrest him, this time by Andrey Mikhaylovich Pleshcheev, was equally unsuccessful; Boris refused to listen to the demands of the grand prince and continued to shield Obolensky. Eventually, however, Ivan heard that Obolensky had taken refuge in a village belonging to him in the district of Borovsk, outside the jurisdiction of Boris. From Novgorod the grand prince sent instructions to the governor of Borovsk, Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets, telling him to seize the fugitive prince by stealth. Obolensky was arrested by Obrazets, put in chains and sent off to Moscow. There are many contradictions and omissions in the story of Obolensky’s flight and arrest. Clearly much is left unsaid. There is no explanation as to why he fled from the safety of Volok, where Boris was evidently prepared to protect him, to the grand prince’s

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

297

territory of Borovsk;1 there is no indication as to his exact status before his flight — did he, for instance, come under the category of “service princes with patrimonies” whose departure was forbidden by treaty? We do not know on what legal grounds Ivan sought to arrest him or Boris to retain him. It is, however, unlikely that the incident was a mere invention on the part of the chronicler. For all its vagueness the story rings true and certain of the details can be verified.2 Whatever the true facts of the Obolensky affair, Boris, according to the same source, complained bitterly of the grand prince’s breach of tradition. No one had any longer the right to “depart” from the grand prince to his brothers, who were obliged in silence to watch their rights being trampled on. “ Should anyone depart from him to us, he [the grand prince] seizes him without justice. He considers his own brothers lower than the boyars; he has forgotten the will of his father . . . and the treaties he concluded [with us] after his father’s death.” The story of the rebellion has already been dealt with in an earlier chapter8 and there is no need to repeat the details. It will be remembered how three times the brothers refused to listen to the grand prince’s envoys and to return to Moscow and how they rejected his offers to meet their demands. After their failure to arouse King Casimir’s interest in their cause, they themselves attempted to reopen negotiations with Ivan, but met with no response. Only at the height of the invasion crisis, in October 1480, was a reconciliation reached. The brothers returned to join Ivan in his defence of Muscovy against the Tatars. There is little to show what agreement was reached between the three brothers. According to one account of the event, Ivan was reluctant to compromise and had to be persuaded by his mother, the senior 1 It is interesting to note that in 1479 Joseph of Volokolamsk, owing to a quarrel with Ivan III, left the monastery of Borovsk, of which he had been abbot since 1477, and moved to Volok, where he was immediately offered protection by Boris. Boris appears to have helped him found his new monastery eight miles from Volok. There is nothing to show any link between the Obolensky incident and Joseph’s removal to Volok, but it seems within the bounds of possibility that there was some connection. See L ur’e “Bor’ba tserkvi . . .” , p. 227; Poslaniya Iosifa Volotskogo, p. 144. Cf. L ur’e, “ Poslanie vel’mozhe . . .” . 1 See, for instance, the description of Lyko’e behaviour in the district of Rzhev, which appears to have been similar to that which aroused the anger of the inhabitants of Velikie Luki. See A Z R , Vol. 1, No. 71, pp. 87-92. That V. F. Obrazets was namestnik of Borovek is shown by the mention of his parti­ cipation in the Novgorod campaign of 1477-8 “a bcrovicki”. See P S R L VIII/191; IL f 101, 107. • See above, Ch. IV.

298

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

clergy and old Prince Mikhail of Vereya to treat with the rebels;1 according to another, the brothers agreed to return provided no reprisals were taken against them and provided the grand prince promised to “hold them as his brothers“.8 At an earlier stage in the proceedings, when Ivan, fearing the possibility of a civil war and anxious lest Casimir support the rebels, had been trying to persuade the princes to return, Andrey was promised the towns of Kaluga and Aleksin on the Oka. It seems probable that in the negotiations of September and October 1480, which resulted in the return of the brothers, concessions were made by both sides. It was unlikely that Ivan could easily overlook or forget the enormity of the crimes committed by Andrey and Boris. They had attempted a civil war; they had treated with the enemy — or at any rate with the recognized ally of the enemy — and had, so one chronicler believed,3 even advised Ahmed to invade Muscovy. Yet however much Ivan may have wished to remove his brothers and their associates from the political scene, he was unable to do more than conclude written agreements with them. The grand prince of Moscow was not yet the absolute autocrat who could deal arbitrarily with the appanage princes. He was unwilling to alienate a large and influential section of the public by banishing or executing his brothers; nor could he risk losing the support of his mother and the senior clergy. He preferred to act circumspectly, to allow his brothers to remain in their patrimonies and little by little to whittle down their rights. And so, instead of taking drastic action to remove the possible danger of another uprising, he set about his task with tact and diplomacy. As soon as the Tatar danger had passed he had the two treaties of 1473 copied out so that the texts might be amended during the preparatory stages of discussion. The final versions of the new treaties, which were agreed to and signed by the parties concerned in February 1481, contained in both cases two important changes: to the estates of the grand prince were added — as well, of course, as Yury’s escheat — the “patrimony of Novgorod the Great“ and “all the districts of Novgorod“. The brothers agreed “not to invade, to protect and not to offend“ this, the latest addition to 1 See P S R L X II/200; XXV/327; IL f 120. This is not mentioned in the account given in V III (p. 206), where it is merely stated that Andrey and Boris returned and were “ received with love” . * See P S R L XX/346. * See P S R L XXV/327.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

299

the Muscovite empire, either during Ivan’s rule or during the reign of his successors. Secondly, adjustments had to be made to the estates of Andrey and Boris. Andrey, who at the last territorial reshuffle eight years previously had merely been given Romanov on the Volga — and that by his mother — now received the important town and district of Mozhaysk, formerly part of Yury’s appanage.1 Boris, who in 1473 had been granted Vyshgorod by the grand prince, had to content himself with certain small concessions concerning some of the villages which had been left him long ago by Maria Fedorovna Goltyaeva, the mother of the prince of Serpukhov, Vasily Yaroslavich: according to the treaty of 1473 Ivan retained his juridical and fiscal rights over these villages; according to the final version of the treaty of 1481, all those villages not in the immediate vicinity of Moscow came under full control of Boris. These were the only clauses in the treaties which altered in any way the relationship between Ivan and his brothers. All it meant was that in exchange for certain territorial concessions the brothers agreed to recognize the transference to Ivan not only of Yury’s escheat, less Mozhaysk, but also of the whole of Novgorod and her great empire.2 In spite of Ivan’s success in getting Andrey the Elder and Boris to recognize his claims on Yury’s escheat and on Novgorod, there was nothing more he could do at this stage to lessen the authority of his brothers, short of radically revising the political clauses of his treaties with them or taking drastic steps to remove them physically. However, at the same time as he was negotiating the treaties of 1481, Ivan won yet another territorial victory over his brothers. He not only persuaded Andrey the Younger to bequeath virtually his entire estate to him but evidently forced Andrey the Elder and Boris to acquiesce in this. Probably at the time of the signing of the two above mentioned treaties in February 1481, 1There was clearly considerable discussion in 1481 as to what district Andrey should get. Both Kaluga and Medyn’ were mentioned, and the former was even entered into the draft treaties as transferred to Andrey. See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 172. According to the unpublished chronicle of the KirilloBelozersky monastery, Ivan III in 1480 intended to reward Andrey the Younger with Serpukhov. See ibid., p. 187. Note that the official chronicles mention that Ivan offered Andrey Aleksin and Kaluga. See above, p. 76. 1For the texts of the treaties, see DDG, Nos. 72,73, pp. 252-75. See Cherepnin, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 162-75. It is interesting to note that at the time of the negotiations Ivan requested Andrey and Boris to hand over to the Muscovite chancellery their copies of the old treaties. Andrey, who stood to gain most from the new treaty complied. Boris declined, saying that his copy was tom and burned.

3OO

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

and certainly not later than March of that year, Andrey the Younger drew up his will.1 Apart from minor bequests of land to Andrey the Elder, Boris and Ivan’s second eldest son, Vasily, the whole of the patrimony was left to the grand prince; to his eldest nephew, Ivan Ivanovich, the heir apparent, he left no immovable property — merely gifts of sentimental value, such as a gold cross and chain.2 Five months later, on 5 July 1481, Andrey the Younger died childless, and the large northern districts of Vologda, Kubena and Zaozer’e became part of the grand prince’s estate. Neither of Ivan’s two surviving brothers protested or complained. By now they had become reconciled to the principle whereby all family escheats and conquered territories automatically became the property of their elder brother. In the middle of the eighties of the fifteenth century the grand prince added still further to his estates, without, it appears, even considering the demands of his brothers. In 1485 the entire grand principality of Tver*, which he had captured, albeit bloodlessly, with the aid of Andrey and Boris, was handed over to his son and heir, Ivan Ivanovich, as a “full patrimony”. In the spring of i486 the last surviving cousin of Ivan III to own an appanage principality within the Muscovite state, Mikhail Andreevich, died, not before bequeathing his estate of Beloozero in the north and Vereya on the Protva to Ivan III.8 Once again Andrey and Boris had been forced to watch in complete helplessness the steady expansion of their brother’s estates. They could make no com­ plaint with any justification. Ivan had every right to dispose of his own territory as he wished, and the lands of the last prince of Vereya had been made over to the grand prince in a manner to which the brothers could raise no legal objections. But their anger at Ivan and their sense of frustration were not likely to be lessened by such considerations, nor, indeed, by the galling spectacle of two Tverite princes, who had had the good sense to 1 The will was witnessed by Archbishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov, who died on 23 March 1481 (P S R L VIII/213), Paisy Yaroslavov, abbot of die Trinity monastery, and Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev. Cherepnin considers that the will might have been drafted in 1479 when Andrey was ill, but considers that February 1481 is a more likely date. See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 180. T he will is printed in DDG, No. 74, pp. 275-7. ■Andrey the Elder was given die volost* of Rameneytso near Moscow, Boris — the village of Yasenevo near Moscow, and Vasily — the village of Tanino. He also left 40 small villages (derevm) in the Vologda area to the Trinity monastery. • See below, p. 314.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

3O I

defect in time to Moscow, being rewarded with such plums as Dmitrov and Yaroslavl*.1 Yet there is no record of any protest on their part. Instead we find them both submitting to still another revision of their treaties with the grand prince. In August i486 Boris’s treaty was reviewed; in November that of Andrey. Both princes agreed to recognize Ivan’s latest acquisitions — Andrey the Younger’s lands, the patrimony of Mikhail Andreevich and the former grand principality of Tver’ — and not to interfere in them. Thus the earlier treaties were brought up to date. But although the texts of the new treaties were for the most part repetitions of those of 1473 and 1481, they contained nevertheless certain significant differences. Whereas previously the brothers had addressed Ivan merely as “elder brother”, now the term “master” or “ lord” (gospodin) was used, and to his title of “grand prince” was added “ of all Russia” (vseya Rusi).1 As usual both treaties contained the traditional clause restricting independent foreign relations: “you shall not treat with, or exchange ambassa­ dors with, anyone without our knowledge” . But Boris’s treaty contained two additional clauses which expressly forbade him to have any relations whatsoever, “either by messenger, or by document, or by any manner, or by any cunning means” with King Casimir, ex-Grand Prince Mikhail of Tver’ or any other Muscovite traitors in Lithuania. Furthermore he was to have no dealings with Novgorod or Pskov — or rather with dissentient elements within the two cities — and was to report immediately to Ivan any attempts made by such elements to contact him.3 These clauses, for some reason or other, were not included in Andrey’s treaty. In fact they made little difference to the status of Boris, for any relations detrimental to the grand prince were forbidden in other clauses found in all treaties emanating from Moscow. Yet Boris, by agreeing to their inclusion in his treaty, seems to have reconciled himself to his subordinate position vis-à-vis the grand prince. For the rest of his life he offered his elder brother no resistance; Ivan, in his turn, left him in peace. And when he died in 1495, his estates passed into the hands of his sons according to his will: no attempt was made to persuade him to make over his lands to the grand prince. Andrey, on the other 1 See above, pp. 63-4. * T he same tide was used by Mikhail of Tver* when addressing Ivan in the treaty of 1484-5. See DDG, p. 295. • For the two treaties of i486, see DDG, Nos. 81, 8a, pp. 315-28.

302

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

hand, may well have jibbed at the inclusion of such clauses in his agreement1— this, indeed, could explain why his treaty was concluded three months after Boris’s. If the omission of the offending clauses was a concession on the part of Ivan III, it was the last he was to make. However well Ivan concealed his true feelings for his brothers, Andrey appears to have been well aware of the distaste and disfavour with which the grand prince regarded him and to have had no illusions as to what would befall him if and when Ivan decided to dissolve his appanage. Less than two years after the signing of the treaty Andrey was contemplating flight, presumably to Lithuania. One of his boyars, Obrazets by name,2 informed him that the grand prince was about to arrest him. He planned to defect — “to run in secret from Moscow” — but changed his mind and sent word to the senior boyar of the Muscovite court, Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev, requesting him to find out what the grand prince intended to do. Patrikeev declined to carry out this mission. Thereupon Andrey himself went to the grand prince and told him of the rumour. Ivan indignantly denied the allega­ tions, swearing “by heaven and earth and by almighty God . . . that this had never been in his thoughts” . He ordered an investiga­ tion. It transpired that a servant of the grand prince, one Munt Tatishchev, had started the rumour as a joke. The joke, however, had been taken seriously by Obrazets, who, wishing to curry favour with his master Andrey, had told him that Ivan was planning to arrest him. For his ill-timed sense of humour Tatishchev was publicly flogged. He would have had his tongue cut out had it not been for the intercession of Metropolitan Geronty. All this is told us in a succinct chronicle account, which, as usual, leaves a great deal to the imagination.8 There is no explanation, for instance, of Patrikeev’s strange refusal to act as an inter­ mediary between Andrey and Ivan;4 nor do we know why Andrey 1 Bazilevich considers that the inclusion of the clauses concerning Novgorod and Pskov in Boris's, and not Andrews, treaty might be explained by the fact that Ivan suspected some sort of illicit relationship between Boris and the two towns and by the fact that Boris's patrimony contained “such important border lands as Rzhev and Vyshgorod on the Protva". See Bazilevich, VP, PP. 233—4. 1 Not to be confused with the distinguished Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets who arrested Obolensky-Lyko in 1479, see above, p. 296. 8 See P S R L VI/238; V III/2I7-8; X II/2 19—20; XX/353. The account is the same in all the chronicles. 4 Cherepnin attributes his refusal to his “hostile attitude to the appanage princes". See Cherepnin, op. d t., Vol. 2, p. 307. See also below, Appx. B.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ЗОЗ

suddenly changed his mind and decided to investigate the rumour rather than defect. And why should the metropolitan have interceded for the hapless Tatishchev? Through want of supplementary information one can only speculate on the incident. The chronicle version, though described by a Soviet historian as “undoubtedly tendentious”,1 rings strangely true. There may, of course, have been a grain of truth in Tatishchev’s story. But Ivan had two good reasons for not arresting his brother at the moment. During the preliminary phases of the Lithuanian war Andrey was conducting successful harassing operations across the western border of the district of Mozhaysk. From 1487 to 1489 we hear of “Andrey’s men” frequently raiding the Lithuanian-held territory of Vyaz’ma.8 Andrey, of course, could have been replaced in Mozhaysk, by an efficient and reliable namestnik, but — and here was the second reason for Ivan's unwillingness to remove his brother — there was no valid pretext at the time for arresting him: he had not committed treason, nor had he disobeyed the grand prince. Had he been seized, there might well have been a general protest throughout the state, not only in Uglich. And it would not have been attractive propaganda for the Russian princes in Lithuania, whom at that very moment Ivan was so ardently wooing. It seems, therefore, unlikely that Ivan was in fact planning Andrey’s arrest in 1488. On the other hand, the rumour may well have been spread deliberately to test Andrey’s reactions, to provoke him. Had he defected, as he intended to do at first, then there need have been no hesitation on Ivan’s part: there was nothing contrary to the accepted norm of Muscovite political behaviour in arresting a traitor, even though he be the brother of the grand prince, and annexing his estate. Nobody could have objected and nobody could have blamed Ivan. Whether the rumour of Ivan’s intention to arrest his brother was a deliberate snare on the part of the government or merely the result of poor taste and judgment on the part of Tatishchev, Andrey kept his head and acted wisely. Ivan, however, had not long to wait. Three years later, in the summer of 1491, Andrey’s “treachery” was once again brought to light. The khan of the Crimean Tatars told Ivan that the Great Horde together with Nogays from the Astrakhan’ area were about to attack the Crimea 1 See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 181.

1 See above, p. 136.

ЗО4

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

and would probably turn on Russia; he begged him to send an army. Ivan complied and in June 1491 ordered his armies to move south. His two brothers were told to send troops under their commanders. Boris obeyed, but Andrey refused. “ He sent neither voevoda nor army,“ says the chronicler.1 It was precisely the sort of action Ivan was waiting for; it involved little or no danger to the state and was quite sufficient, so Ivan thought, to warrant Andrey’s arrest. On 19 September 1491 Andrey arrived in Moscow. He was received with great honour by his brother. On the following day he was summoned to the grand prince’s palace “to eat bread“. Ivan met him in one of the ante-chambers, sat with him and talked for a short while. He then went out, bidding him wait and ordering his boyars, who had accompanied him to Moscow, to go into the banqueting hall. There they were all arrested. One of the senior boyars of Ivan’s court, Prince Semen Ivanovich Ryapolovsky, was then told to go and arrest Andrey. Accompanied by a large number of princes and boyars, he entered the room where Andrey was sitting. In tears he in­ formed him that he was under arrest. The response was dignified: “ It is the will of God and of my eldest brother. With him I shall be judged before God; he seizes me, innocent though I am.“ After a long wait he was led off to the Treasury building, where he was kept under strict surveillance. At the same time the two sons of Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev, Vasily and Ivan, were sent to Uglich to arrest Andrey’s sons. Expecting resistance from Andrey’s adherents, they were accompanied by a force of 500 boyar children. The two sons of Andrey, Ivan and Dmitry, were locked up in Pereyaslavl’.2 One of the chroniclers, in order to justify what must have appeared to many as an appalling breach of faith on the part of the sovereign, gives us a list of Andrey’s “treacheries”, some of which, the first in particular, may have been thought up for the occasion. “ Contrary to his oath on the cross he plotted against the grand prince . . . together with Princes Yury, Boris and Andrey, and made them swear an oath to stand united against their elder brother; and he sent messages to King Casimir in Lithuania, uniting with him against the enemy; and together with his brother Prince Boris he departed 1P S R L VIII/223. 1 This account of Andrey’s arrest is only found in the Ustyug Chronicle. It shows considerable sympathy for Andrey and therefore was probably rejected by the other, more tendentious, official chronicles. See UL/98-9.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Зоб

from the grand prince; and he sent messages to Tsar Ahmed of the Great Horde leading him on to attack the grand prince and the Russian land; and he did not send his voevoda and army together with the grand prince’s army against the tsar of the Horde.” 1 Two years after Ivan had thus perfidiously abjured his treaty and absolved himself of his oath not to harm his brother, Andrey died in prison.2 Ivan had reason to be pleased with himself. Yet another appanage principality had been dissolved. Yet another battle in the war against separatism had been won. The estates of Uglich, Bezhetsky Verkh, Zvenigorod and Mozhaysk were now at the entire disposal of the grand prince. But, more important still, Ivan’s most dangerous opponent had been removed; for Andrey was indeed the only member of his family capable of caus­ ing serious trouble within the state and becoming a rallying point for dissentient elements. Happily for Ivan, his arrest and death, shameful and perfidious though the method of carrying out the former was, caused no public outcry. No voices were raised in protest; if they were, their owners were probably quietly and efficiently removed from the scene. Indeed, Ivan had been careful to get rid of Andrey after the death of the latter’s two most influential supporters — his mother Maria, who died in 1485, and the metropolitan of Moscow, Geronty, who died in 1489.

Boris, as has been said above, caused Ivan no trouble for the rest of his life. He was clearly not of the same calibre as a political opponent and trouble-maker as had been Andrey; he was a man of “unsubtle nature” , as a chronicler remarked when explaining why Ivan removed Andrey and his children but left Boris in peace.8 He died in 1494, leaving his estate divided between his two sons Fedor and Ivan; the former received Volokolamsk and one half of Rzhev; the latter Ruza and the other half of Rzhev. Vyshgorod, with which Ivan in i486 had promised not to meddle before or after Boris’s death,4 was evidently returned to the grand prince either in 1494 or within the next ten years; for in 1504 we 1P S R L XII/231; XXV/338; /L/182-3. 1 6 November 1493. See P S R L VIII/227. There is little to show that his death was not from natural causes. The chronicle of Ustyug states that he died “in imprisonment and in irons” . (UL/99.) In the Tipografsky Chronicle, however, Ivan is shown as repenting to the metropolitan for having been responsible for Andrey’s death. See P S R L XXIV/214 — under the year 1498. • See P S R L X II/231-2 — “neukhrishchennago nrava” . Cf., however, Ya. S. L ur’e, “ Poslanie vePmozhe . . .” . 4 See DDG, p. 318.

306

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

already find Ivan disposing of it in his will as though it had long been part of the grand princely patrimony.1 Fedor and Ivan Borisovich proved as inoffensive as their father. During Ivan I ll's lifetime they caused their uncle no embarrassment, and Ivan left them alone to run their estates. But the central government was by no means disinterested in the diminished, yet strategically important, appanages of the two princes. And when an opportunity arose quietly to annex part of Boris's old estates, Ivan was quick to take it. In 1503 Ivan Borisovich, still unmarried, fell ill. He expressed a desire to be taken to his god-father, Joseph, abbot of the neighbouring monastery of Volokolamsk and former protégé of Boris himself. His boyars objected, fearing that an attempt would be made to influence the young prince in the disposal of his worldly goods. And well might they fear; for Joseph, it appears, was now only too ready to act in the interests of the grand prince. The boyars' objections were over-ruled by Ivan III, who personally intervened in the conflict and ordered the boyars to respect the wishes of their sick prince.2 Ivan Borisovich was taken to the Volokolamsk monastery. The abbot sent away his boyars and proceeded to help him draw up his will. Instead of keeping his patrimony within the family and leaving it to his brother Fedor, as doubtless his boyars had wished, Ivan bequeathed Ruza and half Rzhev — the bulk of his estate — to his “sovereign the grand prince". The only witness of the will was Joseph himself.8 The grand prince and his son Vasily were named executors. Significantly enough, as Cherepnin points out, the formulae used in the will can only have originated in the grand prince's chancellery.4 By the end of Ivan's reign all the appanages granted by Vasily II to his younger sons had been annexed by the central govern­ ment, with the exception of half of Boris's estate, and the traditional power of the independent appanages had been broken, it seemed, once and for all. The task of destroying the so-called appanage system, of dissolving the family estates and of combating 1 He left it, together with Vereya, to his son Andrey. DDG, p. 360. 1 He forbade him to accept the tonsure “because he was young'*, says Joseph's biographer. The probable reason was that Ivan III had no wish to see Ivan Borisovich’s estates pass into the abbot's hands. * His monastery, needless to say, became richer by a village as a result of Ivan’s will. 4 See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 217-9. T he will of Ivan Borisovich is printed in DDG, No. 88, pp. 351-3.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ЗО7

any separatist tendencies within the state was prosecuted with thoroughness and efficiency and with a minimum of unnecessary violence. Andrey the Younger was talked into leaving all his land to the grand prince; the same can be said of Boris’s younger son Ivan. There are signs that shortly before he died Yury was being persuaded to bequeath his estate to Ivan. Andrey the Elder’s lands were automatically confiscated at the time of his arrest and imprisonment. Only two of the four brothers made any show of protest at the untraditional manner of ruling practised by Ivan. Their rebellion was formidable, it is true. But whether by luck or by shrewd tactics, Ivan managed to avert the disaster with which their attempted defection threatened the state. And after the rebellion only Andrey kept alive the spirit of independence; as far as we know, he was the only one of Ivan’s brothers who had to be physically eliminated. ★ **

The Dissolution of the Appanage of Vereya Apart from the patrimonies of the four younger sons of Vasily II, there was yet another appanage principality within the Muscovite state at the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign — Vereya. It belonged to Prince Mikhail Andreevich, first cousin of Vasily II. Both he and his lands suffered much the same fate as the brothers of Ivan III and their estates. Precisely the same methods of intimidation and persuasion were used by the government, and with precisely the same aim — the extinction of that particular branch of the family within the Muscovite state and the annexation of its lands by the grand prince of Moscow. An examination of the relations between Ivan III and the family of Mikhail of Vereya will show just how similar were the technique and aims of the grand prince and how important a part of his policy Ivan considered the elimina­ tion of such “opposition” as the appanage principalities to be. Mikhail was the son of Andrey of Mozhaysk and grandson of Dmitry Donskoy. Together with his elder brother, Ivan of Mozhaysk, he formed the youngest of the three branches of the descendants of Dmitry Donskoy involved in the civil war of Vasily II ’s reign. But whereas in the conflict, which had con­ cerned mainly the two senior branches, Ivan had sided exclusively with the rebellious sons of Yury of Galich, Mikhail had remained true to Vasily II. He was indeed the only one of the appanage x

308

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

princes to behave impeccably towards Vasily II and never to compromise himself.1 In 1454 Ivan Andreevich fled to Lithuania and his appanage of Mozhaysk was confiscated by Vasily II. Mikhail remained in favour for the rest of Vasily’s reign. For his loyal services he was given in 1450 the district of Vyshgorod, near Vereya, formerly part of the patrimony of the princes of Galich, as well as certain lands in the district of Zvenigorod.2 His main estates, which had been left him by his father Andrey, consisted of Vereya on the Protva, just south of Mozhaysk, and the large northern principality of Beloozero, which consisted of the White Lake itself and most of the basins of the Suda and upper Sheksna rivers to the south of the White Lake.8 As for his political status at the beginning of Ivan I l l ’s reign, it was exactly the same as that of the brothers of the grand prince. In other words, he held his estates on a basis of full ownership and he was assured of the grand prince’s non-interference in them; he was unable to carry on independent relationships with other princes or with foreign powers without the knowledge and approval of the grand prince; he was the ally of the grand prince’s allies and the enemy of his enemies; he was bound to provide the grand prince with military assistance if asked to, and, in return, would be protected when necessary by the latter’s armies. In other words, he was a semi-independent ruler of a semi-independent state within a state. Whereas he could do more or less what he liked with the lives of his own subjects, he could only do what the supreme sovereign liked with his principality. By his background, then, Mikhail of Vereya was ideally suited to become a complaisant appanage prince, willing to serve the grand prince as he had served his father, to comply with his schemes and to lend him military aid. But Ivan III had no need of faithful service from so insignificant a member of his family, and he had no intention of treating him as a co-ruler or of letting him govern Vereya in peace. He objected to the principle of private ownership on so large a scale — ownership which virtually 1 Only Vasily Yaroslavich, great great grandson of Ivan I, and last of the appanage princes of Serpukhov, appears to have supported Vasily II as faith­ fully as Mikhail of Vereya. Yet he was arrested in 1456 “for certain treachery” (za nekuyu kramolu). He died in prison. Only his elder son Ivan managed to escape to Lithuania. * For the treaty of 1450 between Vasily II and Mikhail of Vereya, see DDG No. ss, pp. 164-8. • The district north of the lake, Zaozer’e, had been part of Mikhail's estate from 1447 to 1450; in 1450 he was given Vyshgorod instead of Zaozer’e. See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 150.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ЗО9

amounted to political control over a considerable part of the Muscovite state. The appanage system might be a necessary evil, tolerable only as far as his brothers were concerned and provided they behaved themselves. But when extended to other branches of the family, the system became anachronistic, it had no place in the new system of things and ran counter to the idea of a centralized government; indeed, it might well prove dangerous, particularly if Mikhail were to join the opposition and harbour discontented elements within the state. Furthermore, Vereya and Beloozero were needed by the grand prince — Vereya because of its strategic position, sandwiched between Mozhaysk and Borovsk, and Beloozero because of its size and usefulness to Ivan as land for distribution in fiefs. Well might Ivan jib at the survival of so old-fashioned an element in his modem state. The prince of Vereya and his family could not be tolerated within the grand principality of Moscow. And so with typical thoroughness Ivan set about removing them. He methodically whittled down their estates; he decreased their political power; and he drove them into the arms of the opposition. For all their faithful and meticulous service, for all their distinguished family record, they compromised themselves willy nilly in the end. The process of breaking up Vereya began early in Ivan I l l ’s reign. From a series of treaties between Mikhail and the grand prince we can trace the gradual diminution of the authority and the estates of the former. During the first two years of Ivan’s reign a treaty was drawn up which merely confirmed Mikhail’s hereditary ownership of Vereya and Beloozero, as well as Vasily I I ’s grant of Vyshgorod and a number of districts in the Zvenigorod region. At the same time Mikhail’s political position within the family hierarchy was established: he was junior to Ivan III and Yury, equal to Andrey the Elder, and senior to Boris and Andrey the Younger. The remaining clauses of the treaty are much die same as those found in the agreements concluded between Ivan and his brothers in the early seventies; in other words, they confirmed his status as an appanage prince.1 Not long after this, perhaps even still in the sixties, Mikhail agreed to hand over to Ivan the estate of Vyshgorod and the Zvenigorod districts 1 See DDG, No. 64, pp. 207-12; Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 162-3. T he dating given by Cherepnin is between 27 March 1462 (accession of Ivan III) and 13 September 1464 (retirement of M etropolitan Feodosy who is mentioned in the treaty).

31O

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

which Vasily II had given him as a reward for faithful service. How he was persuaded to relinquish part of his lawful patrimony, whether he committed an offence and was thus being punished for it, or even whether he was compensated in any way, we do not know. There is merely the bald statement in the treaty: “As for my father and me, the grand prince, granting you Vyshgorod, our patrimony . . . as your patrimony and appanage, you yourself, my cousin, have yielded (otstupilsya) this my patrimony to me. . . ,ni Not only did Mikhail suffer loss of land for no known cause in the first ten years of Ivan’s reign; he was also humiliated politically. Yet another treaty was drawn up, probably towards the end of the sixties or the beginning of the seventies. This time Mikhail, the sole surviving grandson of Dmitry Donskoy in the grand principality of Moscow, was degraded to a position below all the brothers of Ivan. Whereas before he had been the equal of Andrey the Elder, now he was to consider himself junior even to Andrey the Younger.12 Once again there is no known explanation for Ivan’s action. In spite of Ivan’s high-handed and contemptuous attitude to the old prince of Vereya, we can find no evidence of disaffection or disobedience in the behaviour of Mikhail or his son Vasily during the first fifteen years of Ivan’s reign. Both complied with Ivan’s wishes in 1471 and took part with their troops in the campaign against Novgorod. Vasily helped to defend the Oka line at the time of Ahmed’s invasion in 1472. And in the autumn of 1477 we find Vasily marching on Novgorod again and participating in the siege of the city together with Ivan’s brother Boris. But in 1478 there occurred an incident which involved not only the senior clergy and Ivan III but also Prince Mikhail. For the first time Mikhail acted in a manner which, while it could hardly be described as deliberately hostile to the grand prince’s interests, undoubtedly struck Ivan as such and as worthy of punishment. According to one version of the incident, heavily biased in favour of Archbishop Vassian of Rostov, a conflict between the archbishop and Metropolitan Geronty arose because 1 See DDG, No. 65, pp. 212-4; Cherepnin, op. tit., Vol. 1, p. 163. There is no date, but the treaty must have been concluded after и November 1464 (accession of Metropolitan Philipp, mentioned in treaty) and before 12 September 1472 (death of Yury, mentioned as living). 2 See DDGt No. 67, pp. 217-21; Cherepnin, op. tit., Vol. 1, pp. 163 sq. This treaty was written after the previous one and, again, before 12 September 1472.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

3”

of the White Lake monastery of St. Cyril, which lay in Mikhail’s district of Beloozero and also in the diocese of Vassian. Certain of the monks, headed by their abbot Nifont, decided that they no longer wished “to be under the laws of the bishops of Rostov nor to obey the archbishop of Rostov”. In other words they wanted to remove themselves from the legal and fiscal jurisdiction of the archbishop. They approached Prince Mikhail, who in his turn approached the metropolitan, Geronty. “The metropolitan listened to Prince Mikhail and gave him a document to the effect that the prince should manage \yedati\ the monastery and the archbishop of Rostov should not interfere in it.” Vassian immediately appealed to Geronty not to break traditions and not to meddle in his see; but Geronty refused to listen to him. There­ upon Vassian took his case to the grand prince. Ivan immediately sided with Vassian against Geronty, Nifont and Prince Mikhail. He remonstrated with the metropolitan, but to no avail. He then ordered that the metropolitan’s “document”, which entitled Mikhail to full administrative control over the monastery, be taken from the appanage prince, and at the same time ordered that a church council be set up in Moscow to decide the dispute between Geronty and Vassian. At this the metropolitan gave in; he had no wish for the conflict to be brought before the assembled bishops and abbots. He allowed the grand prince to “ reconcile” him with Vassian. The “document” was torn up and St. Cyril’s monastery was ordered to submit to the authority of the archbishop of Rostov “in everything”.1 According to another source,® diametrically opposed to the tendentious chronicle account, the quarrel began in quite a different way. It was all the fault of the archbishop, who had interfered in the legal and administrative rights of the prince of Beloozero and had thus broken the old traditions according to which the monastery had always been under the civil jurisdiction of the local appanage prince.8 1 T he chronicle version originated in the Tipografsky Chronicle of Rostov, highly favourable in most accounts to Vassian and the grand prince. See P S R L XXIV/197. It is repeated in P S R L VIII/200 and XII/189-90. 1 This was the “deed of rights” (pravaya gramota) on the White Lake mon­ astery issued by Geronty to Mikhail Andreevich. See N. K. Nikol’sky, Pravaya Gramota Mitropolita Gerontiya (SPb, 1895). For a commentary on this source, as well as on the incident in general, see Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 191-4; L ur’e, “Bor’ba tserkvi . . L ur’e, “ Iz is to rii. . .” . 8 According to the deed the abbot had the right to judge his monks, but himself was under the jurisdiction of the prince of Beloozero. In spiritual matters, however, he came under the archbishop of Rostov. See Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 193.

312

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

The nicer points of the squabble — the boundary between civil and ecclesiastical law — do not matter very much to us. What is important is the fact that Mikhail for the first time entered into political conflict with the grand prince. According to the first version, the responsibility for the row was partially Mikhail’s, partially Nifont’s. According to the second, it was a case of deliberate provocation on the part of Vassian; it looked as though the grand prince’s staunchest supporter among the clergy was trying — at Ivan’s instigation — to involve Mikhail in a quarrel, the outcome of which could only be to the discomfort of the local prince. Wherever the truth lies — whether Mikhail was responsible for the incident or whether, as seems more likely, Vassian started the conflict on behalf of the grand prince — Ivan III was at last presented with a pretext for dealing with Mikhail. The grand prince, however, was unable to take action until 1482. He had no wish to antagonize Mikhail unduly during the rebellion of his brothers and the invasion of Ahmed;1 and in 1481 his chancellery was busy dealing with the estates of the two Andreys and Boris. But in 1482 the political crisis was over and the question of the two surviving brothers of the grand prince had been settled for the time being. Now Ivan could turn his attention to Beloozero, its prince and its greatest monastery. Nifont was removed from the abbacy of St. Cyril’s and was replaced by one Serapion.2 An attempt was made to secularize the estates of the monastery.8 Most important of all, Mikhail was persuaded to give up his hereditary rights to the district of Beloozero. On 4 April 1482 he signed yet another treaty with Ivan III. In it he agreed that Beloozero should pass to the grand prince on his death. All that he and his son now retained as hereditary possessions were the districts of Vereya and Yaroslavets.4 1 In June 1480, when Ahmed first arrived in Muscovite territory, Mikhail's son Vasily was sent with Ivan I l l's son Ivan and Audrey the Younger to defend the Oka line (P S R L VI/223; X X /337). When Ivan arrived in Moscow on 30 September 1480, Mikhail was a member of the State Council which discussed the conduct of war with the grand prince. See above, p. 80. 8 See Lur'e, “Bor’ba tserkvi. . p. 222. In 1483 fifteen of the senior monks (startsy) of the monastery protested against Serapion and left the monastery. They returned when Mikhail Andreevich personally intervened and removed Serapion from the abbacy. See ibid. 8 See A. I. Kopanev, Istoriya zemlevlademya Belozerskogo kray a X V - X V I w ., p. 104, note 3. 4 For the treaty of 1482, see DDG, No. 75, pp. 277-83. Cf. Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. I , p. 165. It is interesting to note that Archbishop Vassian died before the treaty was signed — in March 1481. Maly Yaroslavets, south-east of

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З1З

But even now Ivan was not satisfied. He had evidently decided that the death of Mikhail Andreevich, when it came, should mean the end of the whole appanage and not of just the northern portion of it. He did not have long to wait before another crisis, involving this time Mikhail’s son, gave him a pretext to whittle down the appanage of Vereya still further, and to convert Vereya and Yaroslavets to the same state of precarious tenure as Beloozero.The incident is related laconically by the chroniclers with the usual absence of explanatory details. When Ivan’s grandson Dmitry was bom on 10 October 1483, the grand prince decided to present his daughter-in-law, Elena Stepanovna, with a setting or cluster of jewels (sazhenie), which was part of the dowry of his first wife, Maria of Tver*. He asked his wife, Sofia Palaeologa, to whose care the dowry had been entrusted, to hand over the jewels. But Sofia was in an embarrassing position. According to the chronicle, “she had squandered much of the grand prince’s treasure”. Some of the dowry she had given to her impecunious brother Andrew; some she had given as dowry to her niece Maria (Andrew’s daughter) on the occasion of her wedding to Vasily Mikhaylovich of Vereya. She could only confess to her husband that the jewels were in Vereya. Ivan was furious. But he turned his fury to good purpose. Instead of venting his anger on his wife, he decided to punish Vasily Mikhaylovich, whose only guilt was the fact that he accepted the present in the first place. Agents were sent to Vereya to seize not only the ill-fated dowry, but also Vasily and his wife. Vasily, however, had no confidence in the influence of his wife’s aunt, who at the time was clearly out of favour at court.1 However much she might sympathize with the appanage principality of Vereya and all it stood for, Sofia could do little to protect Vasily and her niece once Ivan had decided to arrest them. The jewels were confiscated, but Ivan’s agents arrived too late to seize Vasily and Maria. They had already fled to Lithuania.8 Borovsk, is first mentioned as the patrimony of Mikhail in the treaty of 1482. In the treaty of 1483 and in Mikhail's will it is not mentioned as having been left Mikhail by his father. It may therefore have been given Mikhail by Ivan in compensation for Beloozero. The town appears to have been originally part of the appanage of the princes of Serpukhov. 1 In 1480, during the invasion of Ahmed, Sofia “fled" to Beloozero, then still part of Mikhail Andreevich’s appanage. In the same year her brother Andrew visited Moscow. a The incident is reported in P S R L VI/235; XXIV/202-3; XX/350. Prince Boris Mikhaylovich Obolensky-Turena was sent after Vasily "and all but caught him ” .

3 4

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Ivan had succeeded in making Vasily Mikhaylovich a traitor. Of course, there was more tp the incident than is related in the chronicle narrative: it would be naïve to imagine that Vasily and Maria fled to Lithuania and thus disinherited themselves simply because Ivan was angry with Sofia for misappropriating his first wife’s dowry. The charge of being in possession of certain jewels which Ivan wanted to give to his daughter-in-law was so trivial that one must assume that both Sofia and Vasily had incurred the grand prince’s anger on more serious grounds.1 In any case Ivan’s aim was achieved. He could now deal with the father of the “traitor” as he wished. And on 12 December 1483 yet another treaty was drawn up. The old prince of Vereya promised to have no relations with his son: any messengers from Vasily in Lithuania were to be sent immediately to Moscow. Furthermore, Mikhail agreed that from now on his last two remaining patrimonial possessions, Vereya and Yaroslavets, would be held by him on a basis of life tenure only. On his death they would pass, together with Beloozero, into the hands of Ivan II I.1 It only remained to get Mikhail to draw up a will ratifying these clauses. This he did shortly before his death. He was, however, subjected to one final humiliation. The copy of his will which was sent to Moscow was not approved by the grand prince’s chancellery. Although it made over virtually all his immovable possessions to the grand prince, Ivan was not satisfied with the wording. A new version was sent back in which, amongst other things, the voluntary handing over of Beloozero during Mikhail’s lifetime was stressed,8 and a modest legacy to his daughter of two villages was changed to one of 300 roubles. 1 It is significant that Sofia later got permission from her husband for Vasily to return to Muscovy. In January 1493 D. D. Zagryazhsky, Ivan’s ambassador to Alexander, was instructed to take a message to Vasily from Vasily, Ivan’s eldest son, and Sofia. Vasily Mikhaylovich had got in touch with Beklemishev, the Muscovite ambassador to Casimir in 1492, before he turned back on hearing of Casimir’s death (see above, p. 140) and had asked him to intercede for him. Sofia and her son then appealed to Ivan, who was willing to accept him as a “service” but not an appanage prince (S R IO , Vol. 35, p. 82). Vasily Mikhayl­ ovich, however, refused to return on such conditions and wrote asking, no doubt, for a territorial grant and promising to return all items of the grand prince’s “treasure” which he and his wife had taken to Lithuania. His letter has not survived, but a message was sent to him by diplomatic channels in August 1495 asking him for a list of all his valuables (ibid., p. 211). There are no records of any further dealings with Vasily Mikhaylovich. * See DDGt No. 78, pp. 293-5; Cherepnin, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 175. * See Cherepnin, ibid., pp. 175-9. The various copies of the will are printed, in DDG, No. 80, pp. 301-15,

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

SIS

The old man died in i486, and at his death the last remnants of those estates which Andrey Dmitrievich had left his second son were absorbed in the patrimony of the grand prince. It was the end of the appanage of Vereya. For the last twenty years Ivan had been slowly but deliberately forcing his father’s last loyal supporter into a position from which there was no escape. We do not know if in fact either Mikhail or his son deserved the treatment they received. We do not know if they openly opposed the grand prince, encouraged his enemies, participated in conspiracies or even sympathized with such obvious opponents of autocracy and centralization as Andrey the Elder and Boris. If they did, then the chroniclers, many of whom had no scruples in reporting treason among the relatives of the sovereign, maintained a strange silence about their treacherous activities. However they may have behaved, it was not their attitude to the sovereign but the sovereign’s attitude to them which led to the steady diminution of their estates and their eventual downfall. In Ivan’s picture of the ideal state there was no room for such anachronisms as appa­ nage principalities. Therefore the family of Mikhail Andreevich had to be extinguished and the appanage absorbed in the grand principality. For this no means short of physical violence were considered unadmissable. With his customary boundless patience Ivan set about obliterating the family and estate of Mikhail of Vereya. As with his brothers, he got his own way in the end.

The Dynastic Crisis From all available evidence it would appear that the rebellion of 1480 was the gravest internal crisis which faced Ivan during his reign. In any case, it was the only oppositional move which enjoyed some sort of success and which consequently could not be passed over in silence by the contemporary annalists. At the turn of the century, however, events occurred in Moscow, which, only because of the paucity of evidence and because the con­ spiracies (if such they were) were nipped in the bud, seem to have been of less moment than the attempt at independence and civil war on the part of Andrey and Boris. The sources, for the most part strictly censored during the following reigns, only hint obscurely at what happened. Annoying though this is, it is hardly

3 16

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

surprising when one considers that Vasily III was himself deeply concerned in the dynastic crisis. We are left to piece the fragments together and to find an explanation for what seems to be a jumble of disconnected facts. At first glance it appears to have been little more than a dynastic crisis, a question of who was to succeed Ivan, his son Vasily or his grandson Dmitry. The question, however, arose not because there were two candidates who, it might seem, had something like equal rights to be nominated Ivan’s successor. Had that been the case, Ivan could merely have made a personal choice and pensioned off the unsuccessful candidate with an appanage. It arose because of the persons connected with, and supporting, the two candidates, and in particular the two mothers concerned. For Vasily and Dmitry attracted to themselves adherents of dia­ metrically opposed political tendencies. Both boys became symbols, as it were, of different aspects of political thought. Before examining the events themselves, and before trying to determine what exactly were the aspirations and ideals of the two parties, it would perhaps be useful to consider two of the main protagonists, Sofia Palaeologa and Elena Stepanovna, the mothers of Vasily and Dmitry respectively, and to look into their backgrounds and their political connections. Sofia, or Zoe as she was called before she arrived in Moscow, was the niece of Constantine XI, the last emperor of Constanti­ nople, who died without issue in 1453. After Morea, the despotate of her father Thomas, had fallen to the Turks, Zoe and her brothers were brought to Rome. Their education was supervised, at the pope’s request, by Cardinal Bessarion, a Greek who had accepted Roman Catholicism and who twenty-five years previously had worked ardently for the union of the churches at Florence. There can be little doubt that Zoe was brought up, if not a Roman Catholic, then at least a Uniate, owing allegiance to the pope. Bessarion saw to it that two Catholic priests were attached to the retinue of his wards.1 Ivan first heard of Zoe in 1469. His wife, Maria of Tver’, had died two years before, leaving him with one son only, Ivan. It was a precarious position — his son might predecease him — and a second wife had to be found. In February 1469 one of two 1 For Sofia’s background and the history of her life before she came to Russia, see Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège, pp. 108 sq.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З17

agents of Gian-Battista della Volpe, Ivan’s Italian Master of the Mint, arrived back in Moscow from Rome with a letter to the grand prince from Bessarion. In it the cardinal informed Ivan that there was in Rome “an Orthodox Christian, Sofia, daughter of Thomas Palaeologus, Despot of Morea, from the kingdom of Constantinople”. “ If you wish to take her in marriage,” Bessarion went on, “ I will arrange it in your kingdom. She has already been proposed to by the king of France and the duke of Milan — but she does not wish to join the Latin faith.” 1 The message, as given in the chronicle, contains gross exaggerations and inaccuracies. Zoe could hardly be described as Orthodox, and it was unlikely in any case that Bessarion would stress her apostasy from the Roman church by calling her such. Nor had the king of France or the duke of Milan ever sought her hand.* However, it seems probable that some sort of communication, altered perhaps by the messengers themselves in order to impress the grand prince, was sent from Rome to Moscow in the first place and that the initiative in the royal match-making came from the pope and not from Ivan. It is true that Volpe’s two agents first appeared in Rome from Moscow in 1468, and this has led historians to believe that the grand prince was the initiator of the marriage talks. But the chronicler, for all his inaccuracy, was probably right; for the pope stood to gain far more than Ivan from such a match. All Ivan could hope for in Zoe was a producer of heirs and an exotic embellishment for his somewhat crude court — she was, after all, the closest marriageable female relative of the last emperor of Byzantium. Bessarion and the pope, on the other hand, saw in the projected marriage the possibility of winning over a military ally of unknown potentialities to the cause of the holy war against the Turks; perhaps they even hoped that Zoe’s presence in Moscow would somehow strengthen the cause of the Union and increase the prestige of the Roman church in the east. Ivan was sufficiently impressed by the message from Rome to take action. After consulting his Council he sent off Volpe himself to inspect Zoe and to make further inquiries. Zoe, the chronicler tells us, consented to the proposed match. Her portrait was 1P S R L VIII/154. * See Pierling, op. cit. T he fact that she is here named Sofia, by which she was called only after her arrival in Russia, also leads one to doubt the authenticity of the message.

З18

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

brought back to Moscow together with the necessary safe-conducts for the ambassadors who would come to Rome to fetch Zoe. Once again Ivan consulted his Council. The marriage was agreed upon. And once again Volpe was sent off to Rome to bring back the bride. On 1 June 1472 a solemn betrothal ceremony took place in Rome. Three weeks later Zoe began her long journey to Moscow. In her suite were Russians, who had been sent from Moscow with Volpe, and numerous Greeks and Italians, whom the pope saw fit to attach to her. The spiritual head of this strange cortège was a papal legate, Antonio Bonumbre, bishop of Ajaccio. No expense was spared by the pope to make the journey a memor­ able and impressive one; Zoe and the bishop were given the large sum of 6,000 ducats from the Vatican funds. On i i October the party reached Pskov where the legate astounded the local dignitaries by his strange garb and his western manners. “ Sofia”, narrates the Pskov chronicler, “entered the church of the Holy Trinity with her escort; and with her was her bishop, who, contrary to our custom, was entirely robed in a purple habit, with a purple cowl on his head; he wore gloves, so that no one could see his hands, and thus did he give the blessing. . . . ” His behaviour in the cathedral was hardly tactful. Preceded by a Latin crucifix, he not only omitted to cross himself, but even refused to venerate the ikons. Only Sofia’s intervention averted a scandal; at her request he bowed down before the image of the Mother of God. In the beginning of November the cortège, headed by the legate who insisted that the Latin cross precede him, arrived in the environments of Moscow. After a hurried consultation with Metropolitan Philipp, who threatened to leave the city should Bonumbre enter it with his Roman crucifix, a delegation was sent to reason with the bishop and a scandal was again averted. Almost immediately after her arrival in the capital Sofia was formally wedded to the grand prince according to the Orthodox rites.1 Sofia remained in Muscovy until her death in 1503. No person connected with Ivan III has ever received such variegated treatment at the hands of historians. One of the leading Soviet specialists on the period sees in her a convinced supporter of the 1 See P S R L VIII/154-5, 169, 173, 175-6; P L II/190. Cf. Pierling, op. cit. pp. 140 eq.; G. Vernadsky, Russia at the dawn of the modem age, pp. 17—22; Bazilevich, VP, pp. 72 sq.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З19

boyar opposition to Ivan II I.1Many nineteenth-century historians, on the other hand, portray her as the haughty Byzantine princess who inspired and urged the grand prince to throw off the shameful Tatar yoke in 1480,2 whose marriage led to the opening of cultural and diplomatic relations with the west, who introduced Byzantine pomp and ceremony into the crude court of Moscow and who strengthened in her husband the conception of monarchism and absolutism. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this appraisal of Sofia given by so many Russian historians.8 Far from inspiring Ivan to noble deeds at the time of the Tatar invasion, she fled ignominiously to the north. Although the first of a series of parties of craftsmen from Italy came to Moscow with her in 1472, and although it may have been at her instigation that further missions were sent to Italy to hire artisans, masons, architects, painters and even doctors and bring them back to Russia, nevertheless diplomatic and, to a certain extent, cultural relations with the west only began after 1480, the date of Russia’s independence from the Tatars. It was not the marriage to a Byzantine princess, but the end of the vassalage to the Mongols and the annexation of Novgorod which gave Ivan the necessary self-confidence to treat with the western powers on an equal footing. There are no signs of Sofia’s influence in the creation of a new court ceremonial or of new court ranks and functions. Indeed, many of the changes, such as the adoption of the Byzantine emblem of the two-headed eagle on the grand prince’s seal and the institution of certain offices of high court dignitaries, did not take place until about a quarter of a century after her arrival. Some of the innovations, it is true, bear a faint resemblance to the previous court ceremonial of Constantinople; but it cannot be said that it was Sofia’s arrival in Moscow or her marriage to the 1 See L ur’e, “ Iz istorii . . .” and “Pervye ideologi . . .” . Cf. L ur’e, “ O vozniknovenii teorii ‘Moskva — trety Rim* ” . Cf. Bazilevich, VP, pp. 83—8. * This view clearly has its origins in the eighteenth-century historian Tatishchev, who describes how Sofia on the eve of the Tatar invasion persuaded her husband to refuse to pay tribute to the khan; it was also based on the tendentious account of Herberstein. Herberstein writes: “he (Ivan) was com­ pelled to acknowledge the sway of the Tatars; for when the Tatar ambassadors were approaching he would go forth from the city to meet them, and make them be seated while he stood to receive their addresses, a circumstance which so annoyed his Greek wife, that she would daily tell him that she had married the slave of the Tatars. . . .” (Herberstein, op. cit., p. 25.) 8 A notable exception among pre-revolutionary Russian historians is V. I. Savva, who in 1901 refuted the opinions of many of his predecessors. See V. I. Savva, Moskovskie tsari i Vizantiyskie vasilevsy.

320

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

grand prince which engendered the need for a more impressive court and a more elaborate ritual. It was rather the beginning of diplomatic exchanges with the west after 1480 — the fact that foreign diplomats were coming to Moscow for the first time and Muscovite diplomats were getting to know the courts of western Europe — which made it necessary to attempt to raise the level of the Muscovite court to that of the western capitals. Least of all can one find in her behaviour any evidence to show that Sofia was responsible for implanting the idea of absolute autocracy in the mind of her husband. It is true that the Austrian ambassador, Sigismund von Herberstein, was told during one of his visits to the court of Vasily III that Sofia was “a very artful woman” and that she had “considerable influence over the Grand Duke”; and at a later date a disgruntled boyar, Ivan Вersen ’- Beklemishev, ascribed all the woes of the Russian land to her arrival: “when the mother of the grand prince, the grand princess Sofia,” he is alleged to have said to Maxim the Greek, “came here with your Greeks, then did our land fall into confusion and there came to pass great disorders.” 1 It must not, however, be forgotten that Herberstein was writing from hearsay and long after Sofia’s death; and the main object of Beklemishev’s complaint was the intolerant attitude to the boyars adopted by Vasily III rather than Ivan III himself (whose benign treatment of his subjects he even praised) or Sofia Palaeologa. Indeed his words on Sofia might be construed as meaning merely that her arrival coincided with the “confusion of the Russian land”.8 There is unfortunately very little information on Sofia’s activities during her life in Russia. Her numerous confinements are, of course, faithfully recorded. But apart from them we have only scant references to her behaviour. There seems to be insufficient evidence to show that Sofia was actively connected with the religious opposition to the grand prince, attractive 1 See A E, Vol. 1, No. 172. Prince A. M. Kurbsky, writing nearly a century later, calls her a sorceress and describes how she exerted an evil influence over her husband. See A. M. Kurbsky, Istoriya о velikom knyaze Moskovskom, cols. 271-2, 326. * This is L ur’e’s view (see “ Iz isto rii. . .” , pp. 86-7). It must, however, be pointed out that L ur’e quotes Bersen’ out of context and interprets his words “whatever she may have been like, her arrival resulted in our disorder” as meaning whatever may have been her personal views or her origin. In fact the remark was only in answer to Maxim's remonstration: “the mother of the grand prince . . . came of great stock on both sides” .

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

321

though this theory may be.1 True, the Greek brothers Trakhaniot, the family servants of the Palaeologi, who came with Sofia from Rome to Moscow and may well have been, like Sofia, Uniates by upbringing, participated in combating the nationalistic heresy of the Judaisers:2 they supplied Archbishop Gennady with information from Catholic sources and helped him with transla­ tions and references. But this does not make Sofia an active combatant of the heresy; nor does it allow us to see in her the defender of the Greek patriarchal church, or the upholder of the Union, or the opponent of the chauvinistic religious policy of the grand prince and certain elements of the Russian church. The few references we have, however, to her behaviour tend to show her in sympathy with the political opposition to the grand prince or at any rate with those who objected to the grand prince’s management of affairs. But we must guard against seeing in her the leader of an opposition party, the rallying point for discontented elements or the champion of separatism. All these things she may have been. But there is nothing to prove it. Any unfavourable references to compromising activities on her part would have been carefully expunged by the chroniclers of her son’s reign. Only on two occasions before the events of 1497-9 do we find Sofia Palaeologa shown in an unfavourable light or involved in any sort of activity which might be described as connected with the opposition. The first of these occasions was in 1480. Owing to the discrepancies between the various accounts of Ahmed’s invasion and the biased nature of several of them,3 it is hard to find out what exactly Sofia did in the autumn of that year. That she fled to the north — and, significantly enough, to the district of Beloozero which still belonged to the appanage prince of Vereya — there can be no doubt. All the chronicle accounts confirm this. But whether she was sent by her husband in a moment of panic,4 or whether she chose herself to desert the capital (where, it is 1 According to L ur’e, the violent separation from the Greek church in the m id fifteenth century was looked upon by many elements within the Russian church with disapproval. The bishop of T ver’, for instance, refused to recognize Metropolitan Iona who had been appointed without the blessing of the patriarch of Constantinople. Pafnuty, abbot of Borovsk and teacher of Joseph of Volokolamsk, also forbade people to “call Iona metropolitan” . I van’s own anti-Catholic and anti-Byzantine tendencies were shared, according to L ur’e, mainly by the Judaisers themselves. See “Pervye ideologi . . .” * See ibid. For the heresy of the Judaisers, see below, pp. 324 sq. * See above, p. 78. 4 “He sent his grand princess, the Roman, and his treasury with her to Beloozero.” (P SR L VI/224.)

322

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

stressed, the mother of the grand prince chose to remain, “having disdained flight“) it is hard to say. In some versions of the chronicle narrative Sofia is roundly censured for unnecessary cowardice and for causing distress to the districts through which her suite passed. “ In the winter [of 1480/1] the grand princess arrived [in Moscow] from her flight, for she had fled from the Tatars to beyond Beloozero together with the [her?] boyars’ wives, although she was chased by no one. And through whatever districts they passed it was worse than had the Tatars been there because of [the depredations] of the [her?] boyars’ serfs, those who drink the blood of Christians. Reward them, О God, according to their merits!’’1 There follows a eulogy of the “good and brave** men who fought the Tatars and an appeal to the “courageous sons of Russia’’ not to let the country suffer the same fate as the countries overrun by the Turks, “ . . . such as the Bulgarians and the Serbs and the Greeks . . . and [the people of] many other lands, who did not fight courageously, but fled and destroyed and ruined their land and kingdom, and who wander about the countries of others, poor indeed and exiled, and — what is deserving of much lamentation and tears — reproached and abused and spat upon, as cowards who have run away with much possessions and with their wives and children. Thus God has granted me to see with my sinful eyes great sovereigns who have fled from the Turks with their possessions and who wander about like exiles. . . .” 2 Whether or not Sofia actually committed any political indiscretion during the critical autumn months of 1480, one thing is clear from the reaction of the majority of the chroniclers to her and her family: in their minds, and presumably in the minds of all those who advocated a vigorous and aggressive foreign policy for the grand prince, Sofia was connected with some sort of opposition, with those “evil lovers of silver, the rich and the fat-bellied, the destroyers of Christianity and the allies of the Musulman’*,8 who advised Ivan not to give battle to the Tatars, but himself to flee. 1 P S R L IV/154; VI/21, 232; XX/347; XXIV/201. *P SR L VI/232; VIII/207; XX/347; XXIV/201-2. The sourness of this reference to the Palaelogi may well be due to the impression made by Sofia’s importunate brother Andrew, who first visited Moscow earlier in 1480. 8 P S R L VIII/207. In certain versions (P S R L VI/230; XX/345) two of the cowardly boyars are mentioned by name: Ivan Vasil’evich Oshchera and Grigory Andreevich Mamona. Archbishop Vassian in his address to Ivan III talks of the “corrupt advisers’* who do not cease “to whisper in your -ear deceitful words and advise you not to resist the enemy . . See above, p. 83.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З23

The second incident which sheds some light on Sofia’s political leanings was the Vereya affair of 1483. Sofia, it will be remembered, had given her niece Maria on the occasion of her wedding to Prince Vasily Mikhaylovich of Vereya some jewels which had originally belonged to Ivan’s first wife. When Ivan’s daughter-inlaw, Elena Stepanovna, gave birth to her son Dmitry in October 1483, the grand prince decided to show his gratitude and his favour by giving her the jewels he had entrusted to Sofia. When the truth came out and Ivan learned how his wife had disposed of his “treasure” he confiscated the jewels and attempted to arrest Vasily Mikhaylovich. As far as Sofia is concerned the incident is important, not as an example of her tactlessness or stupidity, but because it shows the beginning of the rivalry between her and Elena, the ascendancy of the latter and, most important of all, the link between Sofia and the last of the independent appanages. That this link existed is further shown by the fact that Sofia chose one of the estates of the prince of Vereya to flee to in 14801 and that she vigorously interceded for Vasily Mikhaylovich when in 1492 the latter contemplated returning to Moscow from his self-imposed exile in Lithuania.2 If by these two incidents Sofia is not actually shown as an active supporter of a pro-boyar or pro-separatist movement in opposition to the grand prince, then at least she does not appear in the role of the irreconcilable enemy of the boyars and the staunch advocate of autocracy, a role ascribed to her by so many historians in the past. As will be seen later, it is almost impossible, in view of recent scholarship, any longer to accept the traditional view of the nineteenth-century historians on Sofia Palaeologa. Her behaviour during the crisis of 1497-9, the social and political connections of those associated with her and her son, and the grand prince’s attitude towards her are convincing, if not con­ clusive, evidence that her sympathies lay with the opposition. Still less, unfortunately, is known about the background and career of Elena Stepanovna. Daughter of Stephen IV of Moldavia, she was, on her mother’s and grandmother’s side, the great granddaughter of Vasily I and thus a cousin of Ivan II I.8 All we 1 Note that in 1497 Sofia’s son was suspected of plotting to seize the reserves of the grand prince’s treasury in Vologda and Beloozero. It would appear that Sofia and Vasily could count on supporters in Beloozero, though by then it belonged to the grand prince. * See above, p. 314. * See genealogical table, Appx. E. Y

3 4

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

know of her early life is that at the beginning of the eighties of the fifteenth century a marriage was arranged between her and the heir apparent to the grand principality of Moscow, Ivan Ivanovich, that she was conducted from Suceava to Moscow in 1482 and that her wedding to Ivan Ivanovich took place in January 1483.1 On 10 October she produced a son, Dmitry. Ivan III was delighted. It was as though a long-awaited heir had been bom. He not only sent a special messenger to Tver* to inform Grand Prince Mikhail of the event but, as we have seen, demonstratively presented Elena with part of his first wife’s dowry. Nothing like this had been done when Sofia had produced her first three sons,2 and it would not be surprising to find that Sofia resented the treatment which the newcomer at court was receiving. The rivalry between the two women undoubtedly dated from the birth of Dmitry, Whether or not the rivalry between Sofia and Elena was manifested in any way at this early date we cannot say; for almost nothing is known of the conduct of either protagonist in the following years. The first signs of hostility between the two militant mothers occurred only at the end of the century. One fact, however, of the greatest importance is known about Elena. At some time or other — probably in the second half of the eighties or the first half of the nineties — Elena joined the heretical sect of the “Judaisers” or Zhidovstvuynshckie, as they were called. To what extent she practised their rites, shared their views, joined in their proselytizing activities, cannot be said. All we know is that at a later date Ivan III, in a private conversation with the bitterest enemy of the heretics, Joseph, abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, admitted knowing that his daughter-in-law had been converted to Judaism by one Ivan Maksimovich.8 In order to understand the full significance of Ivan’s admission, it is necessary to consider briefly the history and nature of the heresy. Unfortunately, as is so often the case with movements of an ideological or religious nature, the sources describing the heresy tend to be biased, inaccurate and unreliable. It has recently been shown, for instance, that Joseph of Volokolamsk’s vast 1 See above, pp. 108 sq. 8 Or at any rate there is no record of Ivan having shown his satisfaction in any way. The sons were: Vasily (March 1479), Georgy (Yury) (March 1480) and Dmitry (October 1481). She had also produced three daughters: Elena (April 1474); Elena (April 1476) and Avdot’ya (February 1483). 8 See Joseph of Volokolamsk, Epistle to Mitrofan, p. 176.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З25

and erudite anti-heretic work, the ProsvetiteV1 (“Enlightener”), which contains much information on the history of the heresy, is not only highly tendentious but also questionable as far as accuracy is concerned.2 Certain general deductions, however, can be made as regards the heresy by collating all the available information — works written by die heretics and works written specifically against them, records of the proceedings against them and occasional chronicles entries. It appears that the heresy originated in Novgorod in the seventies of the fifteenth century. According to both Archbishop Gennady of Novgorod — after Joseph, the most zealous persecutor of the sect — and Joseph himself, the heresy began in 1470 with the arrival of the Lithuanian prince Mikhail 01el*kovich, who had been summoned by the pro-Lithuanian faction in the republic to defend its rights against the partisans of Moscow. Both agree that it was started by a Jew,3 evidently a member of 01el*kovich’s retinue. What the beliefs of this heresiarch were cannot be said for certain. Joseph, trying no doubt to stress the enormity of the heretics* offence, describes their teaching simply as Judaism: he tells how the Jew, Skharia by name, “first of all seduced the priest Denis and converted him to Judaism; and Denis brought to him the archpriest Aleksey, and he also was an apostate from the unsullied, true and Christian faith.** After the conversion of Denis and Aleksey still more Jews arrived from Lithuania to aid the two apostates convert others — “many of the priests and the deacons and the common people (prostykh lyudey)”.4 He goes on to accuse them of what he considers to be their most heinous offences — denial of the divinity of Christ, rejection of the doctrine of the 1 T he title ProsvetiteV was probably given to the work in the seventeenth century. W hat it was called originally is not known. See Kazakova and L ur’e, A E D , p. 438. * See ibid., p. 119, note 51, pp. 211 sq. •S ee Gennady, Epistle to Zosima (October 1490), p. 375; and Joseph of Volokolamsk, Skazanie о novoyavivsheysya eresi, pp. 468-9. L ur’e considers that there is little truth in either statement. Gennady, he thinks, ascribes the beginning of the heresy to Olel’kovich’s arrival in Novgorod merely to show that it was the heretics who had links with Lithuania and not he himself; for he had been implicitly accused of relations with Lithuania by Zosima, who had demanded a new confession of faith from him. See A E D t pp. 113-4. This, L ur'e thinks, was the beginning of the Skharia legend, taken up later by Joseph, who in his ProsvetiteV stressed the Jewish nature of the heresy in order to impress on the authorities the need to eradicate the sect (ibid., pp. 215-6). There can, however, be little doubt that even if the heresy was not pure Judaism, then at least most contemporaries thought it was. 4 See Joseph of Volokolamsk, Skazanie, p. 469.

326

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Trinity, attacks on monasticism, reviling of the ikons and so forth. They adopted certain Jewish practices, but were warned by the Jews themselves not to be circumcised, for “should the Christians find out and wish to see, then you will be caught”. “ Keep the Jewish faith in secret,” they were advised, “but openly profess Christianity!” A close examination of earlier and more reliable sources than Joseph’s ProsvetiteV — in particular documents connected with, or prior to, the first council against the heretics in 1490 — show that their main tenets were anti-trinitarianism and iconoclasm. As well as this rationalistic tendency to reject certain Christian beliefs there is also evidence of a critical attitude to the hierarchy on the grounds that the Russian prelates practised simony — a recrudescence, as Gennady was quick to realize, of the earlier heresy of the Strigol'niki.1 It would seem, then, that the heresy began as a form of rationalistic protest against many of the accepted dogmas of the Orthodox Church and that it was probably intro­ duced from, and fostered initially by, the west. What the precise nature of the heresy was to start with cannot, of course, be determined. Nor is it of great importance to us. For heretical beliefs founded on purely doctrinal divergences of opinion were unlikely to attract or disturb the untheologically-minded mass of the clergy in fifteenth-century Novgorod or Moscow. What is of interest is the fact that the heresy evidently soon began to assume overtones of a social and political nature; it soon became an outlet for dissatisfaction, a means of protesting not only against the senior clergy but also against monasticism and certain principles of contemporary monasticism. As such it attracted elements both within the church and within the state. Above all it attracted the grand prince himself, who saw in the movement possibilities of support within the church itself for his plans for secularizing ecclesiastical possessions. If he hesitated to lay his hands on church property, which he needed above all for the enfeoffing of the new class of service gentry, it was because he could not yet afford to risk the wrath of the bishops and the abbots as a whole. But a vociferous, though small, group within and without the church, particularly if headed by men of exceptional intelligence, 1 See Kazakova and L ur’e, op. cit., pp. 116-26. Evidence of the heretics’ critical attitude to the church hierarchy is only found in Gennady's Epistles to Zosima (1490) and to the Council of Bishops (1490). For a detailed account of the Strigol'niki, see ibid., Part I.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З27

could cause great damage to the church by insinuating itself into public opinion and could weaken the clergy’s resistance to the grand prince’s incursions on their property. Furthermore, it may have seemed likely to Ivan that a free-thinking rationalistic sect, whose members at first were largely drawn from the lower orders — “priests, deacons and common people”, so Joseph said — would not be unwilling to afford precisely that sort of support for autocracy which he was unable to expect from the conservative aristocracy and church hierarchy. Not much is known about the early stages of the heresy — the period when it was confined to Novgorod. According to Joseph, Ivan III, after his visit to Novgorod in the late autumn of 1479,1 took back with him to Moscow the two priests who had first been converted to the heresy, Aleksey and Denis. There is no evidence to show that Ivan was in fact at the time aware that the two priests were heretics or that he even knew of the existence of the heresy.2Yet it seems not unlikely that he took them back with him to Moscow because he saw in them active supporters of his policy concerning the church lands of Novgorod and perhaps even likely champions of his political cause. It must be remembered why Ivan went to Novgorod in 1479. The purpose of his visit was firstly, according to the eighteenth-century historian Tatishchev, to quell a nascent rebellion among those of the population who opposed the domination of Moscow, and secondly, as is clear from the chronicles, to deal with protests at the largescale secularization of Novgorod church property in 1478.8 As a result of the expedition some hundred leading citizens were executed and Archbishop Feofil, who resented Muscovite rule owing to Ivan’s confiscation of church territory, was arrested. Aleksey and Denis were brought to Moscow where they were appointed archpriest of the Uspensky cathedral and priest of the Arkhangel’sky cathedral respectively.4 Even without their leaders the heretics in Novgorod continued to practise their activities unmolested by the church. The unfortunate Archbishop Sergy, who succeeded Feofil in 1483, 1 Joseph merely gives the date as 6988, i.e. between 1 September 1479 and September 1480. See Joseph, Skazafde, p. 471. * He knew, of course, at a later date “what heresy the archpriest Aleksey adhered to” , as he admitted to Joseph. See Joseph of Volokolamsk, Epistle to Mitrofant p. 176. * See above, pp. 55 sq. 4 See Joseph of Volokolamsk, Skazame, p. 471• I

328

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

took no steps to check them — indeed they may well have been among his few supporters in the midst of the hostile Novgorodians, who allegedly drove him mad as a result of his anti-Novgorod policy.1 But on 12 December 1484 a new archbishop was appointed who was to take a very different attitude to the heretics. Paradoxically, Gennady was, if not a nominee of the grand prince, then at least a firm supporter of him in his quarrels with Metro­ politan Geronty. Two years previously he had, in the face of almost universal opposition, supported Ivan in a minor theological squabble with Geronty, as a result of which the latter retired to his old monastery in high dudgeon and refused to resume his duties as head of die church until Ivan in person asked his forgive­ ness. And when later in the same year (1482) Geronty in a moment of warrantable pique saw fit to arrest Gennady for a petty offence the grand prince did what he could to save Gennady.8 The omens looked bad for Novgorod. The new archbishop was hardly likely to continue the policy of the good Feofil, whose jailer Gennady, as archimandrite of the Chudov monastery, had been before his appointment. Nor could the heretics have expected that one so close to the sovereign would take such an uncompromising view of their activities or defend his see and his land with such vigour. Once in Novgorod, Gennady appears to have changed. Far from supporting the grand prince’s interests in Novgorod, he became, as one historian has put it, “the tenacious guardian of the interests of his diocese and the active representative of the church militant”.8 A man of rare intelligence and enlightenment for his time, he made his palace a centre of literary activity and culture unrivalled in north-eastern Russia. He shared none of Ivan’s hatred and fear of the “ Latins”;4 he even employed a Dominican monk to aid him in his theological research, and showed no aversion to using Latin texts and sources when it suited his literary or polemical purposes. Indeed, by comparison with any other cultural centre in Muscovite Russia of the time, the archiépiscopal palace of Novgorod during Gennady’s primacy 1 See P S R L VI/236; XX/351. See above, p. 57. * For both incidents, see P S R L VI/233, 234; X X /348, 349. 9Ya. S. L ur’e. See Kazakova and Lur*e, op. cit., p. 113. 4 In 1471 Ivan for the first time raised the banner of anti-Catholicism in his campaign against Novgorod. He accused the patriarch of Constantinople, the metropolitan of Lithuania and those Novgorodians who had been in contact with the latter of “Latinism” (latynstvo). See ibid., p. 114.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З 29

was outstanding for its open-mindedness and its refusal to reject the culture and learning of the west.1 Small wonder, then, that Gennady soon disassociated himself from his sovereign's bigoted views. He began not only to defend the interests of his see by resisting further encroachments by the state on Novgorod church property,12*but also to persecute the heretics. In the early stages of his struggle with the Novgorod heretics Gennady met with considerable difficulties. One of the leading heretics, a recent convert by the name of Zakhar, started a campaign against the archbishop, accusing him of heresy — “he sent letters throughout all the towns calling me a heretic," Gennady complained later.8 And Gennady received little assistance from either the metropolitan or the grand prince; indeed the latter even intervened on behalf of Zakhar and requested the archbishop merely to punish him “spiritually" and to let him go back to his monastery.4*Only in 1487 did Gennady find it possible to take positive action against the heretics. The metropolitan and the grand prince gave their consent for Gennady to start investigations. But only four were arrested, and they managed to escape to Moscow,6*where they were tried by Ivan and Geronty; three were publicly flogged, and all four were sent back to Gennady, who was to try them again and, should they remain unrepentant, to hand them over to the civil authorities, the grand prince's two namestniki in Novgorod. Furthermore, Gennady was to continue his investi­ gations against the heretics.® 1 See ibid., p. 114; L u r’e, “Pervye ideologi . . pp. 81-92; Istoriya russkoy literatury, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 382-3. * See Kazakova and L ur’e, op. cit., p. 113; A. S. Pavlov, Istorichesky ocherk sekulyarizatsii tserkovnykh zemeV v Rossii, Ch. II. 8 Gennady, Epistle to the Council of Bishops (1490), p. 380. 4 See ibid. Zakhar’s case is interesting, though confusing. He was a m em ber— perhaps abbot — of the monastery of die Assumption at Nemchinov (south of Kholm on the Lovat’ river) in the south of Novgorod’s old territory. The monks of the monastery complained to Gennady that they had been refused communion for three years by Zakhar. Before, they had been “boyar children” of Prince Fedor Bel’sky, but had been forced to take the tonsure by Zakhar. Bel’sky had been linked with Olel’kovich in the plot against Casimir (1481) and had deserted to Moscow in the same year. Ivan gave him Moreva and Deman (Dem’yansk) — both close to Nemchinov. Zakhar’s main protest appears to have been directed against the simoniacal practices of the higher clergy. * According to the chronicles they were sent by Gennady to Moscow. Cf., however, Gennady’s Epistle to Zosima, p. 375. * See P S R L VI/238; X X /353; Gennady, Epistle to Zosima; Gramoty of Ivan III and Geronty to Gennady, (Kazakova and L ur’e, AED , Appx. Nos. 18, 14, 15.)

33 °

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

However much success Gennady may have had in combating the heresy in his own see, he was not satisfied. For Ivan and Geronty showed themselves disinclined to take decisive steps to eradicate the evil and quite unconcerned at the spread of the sect in Moscow. There was, as Gennady remarked in one of his letters, a vast difference in the attitude of the authorities in Novgorod and in Moscow to the heresy: “ Novgorod and Moscow“ , he complained, “are not one single orthodoxy“ .1 Indeed, by the mid eighties of the fifteenth century a small but influential circle of heretics existed in the capital. Their leader appears to have been Fedor Kuritsyn, one of the most powerful and trusted d'yaki in Ivan’s foreign service.12*Not unsympathetic to the heretics — perhaps even a heretic himself, for such was Joseph’s accusation — was Zosima, archimandrite of the Simonov monastery.8 Their cause was strengthened in 1490 when Zosima, who, whether a heretic himself or not, was undoubtedly hostile to the main prosecutors of the heresy, was appointed metropolitan in place of Geronty (d. 1489). Yet even after Zosima’s appointment Gennady’s influence continued to make itself felt. As a result of his persistence Denis was expelled from his post at the Arkhangel’sky cathedral. More important, Gennady managed to win the support of the majority of the bishops in 1490 and Ivan was obliged to convoke a council against the heretics. The Council of 1490, however, did not have the effect that Gennady had hoped for. The number of heretics who were put on trial was not great, nor were their punishments as severe as Gennady would have liked.4* Some were excommunicated and banished; others were imprisoned, and yet others were sent for action to Gennady, who dealt with them in a peculiar manner, calculated to strike 1 See Gennady, Epistle to Ioasaf, p. 317. 8 Fedor Kuritsyn was sent to Hungary on a diplomatic mission in 1482; he returned to Moscow (via Moldavia, where he saw Elena’s father Stephen IV) some time before the summer of 1485. See above, pp. 112-14. In his Episüe to Zosima (1490), Gennady writes that “the trouble began from the time Kuritsyn arrived from the Hungarian land; from then on the heretics ran to Moscow” . He goes on to mention that Kuritsyn became their “protector” (pechalnik). See p. 377. 8 On the question as to whether Zosima was in fact a heretic or not, see Kazakova and L ur’e, A E D , pp. 150 sq.; J. L. I. Fennell, “The attitude of the Josephians and the Trans-Volga Elders to the Heresy of the Judaisers” , p. 493, note 29. 4 Gennady had asked for them to be burned or hanged. L ur’e considers that the results of the council of 1490 were satisfactory from Gennady’s point of view. See L ur’e, “ K voprosu ob ideologii Nila Sorskogo”, pp. 182 sq.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ЗЗ1

fear into the hearts of the Novgorodians. According to Joseph, Gennady had them “mounted on horse-back on pack saddles and their clothes turned back to front, and he bade them turn their backs to the horses’ heads . . . and on their heads he ordered to be put birch-bark hats, pointed like devils’ hats, with bast cockscombs and crowns made of straw mixed with hay and with labels written in ink on the hats: ‘behold the army of Satan!’ And he ordered them to be led through the town . . . then he had the hats which were upon their heads burned. This that good shepherd did, wishing to terrify the wicked and godless heretics”.1 The Council of 1490 and Gennady’s strange treatment of the heretics who were sent back to him probably impressed the Novgorodians and prevented any recrudescence of the heresy there, at least for the time being. But the sect in Moscow seems to have been singularly little affected by the events of 1490 or to have been worried by the fulminations of the archbishop of Novgorod. Kuritsyn, their leader, had not after all, been brought to trial in spite of the fact that Gennady had informed Zosima and the bishops of his heresy just before the Council. He remained in Moscow throughout the nineties of the fifteenth century and the first years of the sixteenth century, playing an important role in external affairs, appearing often as Ivan’s spokesman in negotiations with foreign diplomats and twice being sent on missions abroad. At court he seems to have enjoyed the grand prince’s confidence and to have exercised a certain influence over him: “the autocrat”, said Joseph, “hearkened to him in all things” .2 So great indeed was his authority that together with his brother Ivan Volk (“the Wolf”) he succeeded in getting a recent convert to the heresy, one Kassian, appointed archimandrite of the Yur’ev monastery in the heart of Gennady’s diocese. Kassian, according to Joseph, had no fear of Gennady, “for he had Fedor Kuritsyn as his helper”.8 It must not be imagined, however, that the opponents of the heresy were entirely powerless during this period. Joseph of Volokolamsk and his followers, it is true, were clearly at a dis­ advantage; even taking into account Joseph’s dramatization of the events of the early nineties — he talks of “many woes, and bonds, and prison, and plundering of property” as the lot of the 1 Joseph of Volokolamsk, Skazanie, p. 472. 1 Kazakova and Lur'e, A E D , p. 155.

3 See ibid.

ЗЗ2

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

anti-heretics1 — it is evident that Ivan III was more willing to listen to the advice of the Judaisers than to consider the accusa­ tions of their opponents. But nevertheless they voiced their complaints. Joseph himself campaigned against the metropolitan, of whose heretical views he was convinced. Writing to Nifont, bishop of Suzdal*,a he described Zosima as “a foul, evil wolf clothed in pastoral garments . . . who befouled the great throne of the bishops, teaching some Judaism and defiling others with sodomitic abuses . . .”.8 They even met with some degree of success. For in May 1494, while, be it noted, Kuritsyn was temporally absent from the country, Zosima was removed from the metropolitanate. Only the chronicler of Novgorod mentions the cause of his dismissal. In order, perhaps, to distract attention from the scandalous facts, Gennady’s spokesman attributed his removal merely to drunkenness and indifference: “ Metropolitan Zosima left the metropolitanate not of his own will, but because he was addicted to excessive drinking and had no care for the Church of God”.4 But if indeed the dismissal of Zosima can be ascribed to the efforts of Joseph and his adherents, it was their only success. The heretics remained, as before, undaunted by the attacks of their opponents. Whether the Moscow heretics still held to the beliefs of the founders of the heresy or whether their outlook had changed with their surroundings and circumstances, it is hard to say. There were, it would seem, certain differences in beliefs and aims — and in social status — between the heretics of Novgorod and those of Moscow. Ivan III himself admitted to knowing “which heresy the archpriest Aleksey held and which Fedor Kuritsyn”.5 But there is insufficient evidence to show what these differences were. Certainly anti-monasticism was one of the main features of the Moscow heresy; and anti-monasticism had never been levelled 1 Joseph of Volokolamsk, Skazame, p. 474. * It is interesting to note that this Nifont, whom Joseph addresses as “head of all” , was formerly abbot of the monastery of St Cyril with whom Prince Mikhail of Vereya had sided in his clash with Archbishop Vassian and Ivan III. See above, pp. 311 sq. * See Joseph of Volokolamsk, Epistle to Nifont (long redaction), pp. 160-1. For the dating and question of which redaction of the epistle came first, see Kazakova and Lur'e, AED , pp. 420-4; Poslamya Iosif a Volotskogo. p. 252. * P SR L , IV/164, 268. 6 So Joseph reported his conversation with Ivan III (1503) in his Epistle to Mitrofan (p. 176). It is clear from the beginning of the reported conversa­ tion that Joseph and Ivan looked upon the “Novgorod” heresy and the “present” heresy (i.e. 1503) as separate.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

333

against the heretics of Novgorod by Gennady. But further than this one cannot go without wandering into the realms of specula­ tion. Suffice it to say that whatever the programme of the Moscow heretics, it clearly contained features attractive enough to the autocrat to secure his support for the movement during the last twenty years of the fifteenth century. It would not be rash to surmise that these features were the negative attitude of the heretics to ecclesiastical, and in particular monastic, landownership, and their support for supreme autocracy; indeed, hints of the latter can be found in the writings of Zosima himself.1 Such then was the sect of which Elena became a member during the eighties or the first half of the nineties of the fifteenth century. The knowledge that she was a heretic makes it easier for us to understand certain aspects of the dynastic crisis. For it meant that she was assured of support from her fellow-heretic, Kuritsyn. It was an added incentive to Ivan — in so far as he was sympathetic to certain of the views of the heretics — to lend his support to her rather than to her enemies, even though her “heretical* * views were not, of course, the prime cause of this support. At the same time the fact that Ivan was prepared — mainly for reasons of foreign policy — to champion Elena and her son may well have increased his benevolent attitude towards the heresy and hardened him in his refusal to listen to its prosecutors. Her heretical connections increased the hostility, if not of Sofia Palaeologa, then certainly of most members of the church hierarchy and probably of many of the boyars as well. Above all, the fact that she was a member of the sect helps to explain more clearly the political and idealistic inclinations of those who supported her and her son, as well as of her opponents. The crisis can be said to have started in 1490 when Ivan IIFs eldest son, the husband of Elena Stepanovna, died. Bom in 1458 of Ivan’s first wife, Ivan Ivanovich had from an early age been treated by his father as heir-apparent to the throne and co-ruler. Already in 1471 the chronicle refers to him as “ Grand Prince Ivan Ivanovich**, a title probably granted him by decree of his 1 See Zosima*8 introduction to the new Paschal tables, 1492. R IB , Vol. VI, cols. 795-802.

334

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

father, for there is no record of an official coronation. Apart from a vague report by the Italian traveller Contarini, who visited Moscow in 1476-7, to the effect that Ivan Ivanovich at that time “was not in great favour on account of his bad conduct”,1 there is nothing to show that the relationship between father and son was at any time strained. Indeed, Ivan the Young, as he was known to contemporaries, occupied precisely the position in military and administrative affairs which one would have expected from the heir, remaining behind in the capital while his father busied himself with Novgorod, actively defending the Oka in 1480 and being rewarded for his services in 1485 with the former grand principality of Tver’. On 7 March 1490 he died of gout, having been ineptly treated by one Magister Leon, a Jewish doctor from Venice, who was later executed for his error. It would be tempting to believe that Sofia Palaeologa was in some way responsible for her stepson’s death; but there is nothing but the most circumstantial of evidence to show that she was in any way implicated.2 There can be little doubt, however, that she was glad to see him out of the way, for only by his death would one of her sons stand a chance of acceding to the throne. The problem arose as to who would now be nominated heir. There were no more sons by Ivan’s first marriage. Sofia, however, had already produced five (the eldest of whom, Vasily, was nearly eleven) and was four months pregnant with her sixth son. Ivan Ivanovich, on the other hand, had left a six-and-a-half year old son, Dmitry. According to the practice and tradition of the house of Daniel, the princes of Moscow left their thrones to their eldest sons. But never yet had an eldest son with male issue predeceased his father and there was therefore no precedent for choosing between the son of the deceased heir and the eldest surviving son of the reigning prince. The choice between Dmitry and Vasily rested entirely with Ivan III himself. No move was made by Ivan or by either of the two mothers for seven years. Evidently some sort of modus vivendi was agreed upon pending the ultimate decision of the grand prince; or, at any 1 Ambrogio Contarini, Travels to Tana and Persia, p. 163. 1 Viz. the remark made some eighty years later by Kurbsky, highly prejudiced against Sofia, that she and Ivan I I I (!) “had destroyed . . . with death-bringing poison . . . Ioann”. (Kurbsky, Istoriya о velikom knyaze Moskovskom, cols. 272-3.) Such a rumour may have been started because Leon had been brought to Moscow in the winter of 1489/90 by Sofia's brother Andrew.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

335

rate, if there was dissension within the family, the outer world was not allowed to hear of it. Sofia and her children, Elena and her son continued to live together in the palace of the grand prince.1 No hint was dropped as to Ivan’s choice of successor. The chroniclers refer to all his progeny alike merely as “princes”. In diplomatic exchanges with Lithuania every effort was made to keep the Lithuanian Foreign Office in the dark as to who had precedence, Vasily or Dmitry. No possible conclusions could be drawn from the order in which the greetings of the various members of the grand prince’s family were transmitted to Alexander and, later, to his wife.2 Even if Sofia had been in dis­ favour during the nineties it is most unlikely that Ivan would have advertised the fact by omitting her name in despatches sent to Vilna; for at that time he had every reason to present to West Russian eyes a picture of harmony and concord within the Kremlin. Alexander’s Ruthenian subjects would not be attracted to serve a sovereign whose closest relations were in disgrace or disfavour, especially if one of those relations happened to be Sofia; for her presence in Moscow could only be an attraction to would-be defectors who perhaps sympathized with, if not were members of, the Uniate Church. In any case there is evidence that Sofia was not in disfavour, at any rate in the early part of the nineties; for her son Vasily, then eleven years old, appears to have been given nominal control of Tver’ after Ivan Ivanovich’s death.8 The crisis broke in 1497. Most of the chronicle accounts of the incidents of the winter of 1497-8 are bare and disappointing: 1 In 1492 Sofia and her children, Elena and Dmitry all moved with the grand prince to Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev’s palace while his own wooden palace was being replaced by a stone one. See P S R L VIII/224. * The normal order was: Ivan III; Sofia; Elena Stepanovna; Sofia's first three sons — Vasily, Yury and Dmitiy; Elena’s son — Dmitry. The practice was, however, as follows: first the senior member of the Muscovite delegation conveyed the greetings of the grand prince; then the second in seniority conveyed the greetings of Sofia’s three sons; finally the senior member conveyed the greetings of Elena's son Dmitry. See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 138, 164, 205. Sofia and Elena Stepanovna were either mentioned by the second in seniority before Sofia's sons (ibid., pp. 138, 164) or by the senior member immediately after the grand prince (p. 205). Note that Elena Stepanovna is not mentioned before 1495 in the lists of poklony. 3 On the back of a zhalovannaya gramota issued by Ivan Ivanovich in i486 granting the White Lake monastery of St Cyril free right of passage for a ship and three carts across Tver' territory, there is a confirmatory note added in “the year [69] 99” (i.e. between 1 September 1490 and 1 September 1491) and authoritatively issued in the name of “Prince Vasily Ivanovich’’. See A S E l, Vol. 2, No. 271.

ЗЗ6

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

clearly they were pruned by careful censorship during Vasily I l l ’s reign, all details unfavourable to Vasily being removed. In one chronicle fragment, however, which was written at the end of Ivan I IPs life and which evidently escaped official notice during subsequent reigns, we find an unbiased and reasonably detailed account of what happened.1 It in no way contradicts the other accounts — it merely fills in the details and gives the motives underlying many of the events. The facts, as far as can be judged by piecing together all available information, are as follows: some time before the end of 1497, probably in the late summer, a certain d’yak by the name of Fedor Stromilov informed Vasily — and no doubt his mother too — that the grand prince was about to appoint his grand son Dmitry “grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow”. Around Vasily a conspiracy was formed. The chief conspirator, according to the chronicle fragment, was “that second forerunner of Satan, Afanasy Ropchenok”, who together with Stromilov, “Poyarok the brother of Runo” and “other boyar children” urged Vasily to “ depart” from his father. To assist in this act of treachery yet more boyar children were admitted to the conspiracy and “led in secret to take the oath”. It was planned that Vasily should “plunder the grand prince’s treasury in Vologda and Beloozero” and “commit treason against Prince Dmitry the grandson”. In other words, Vasily was to disassociate himself from the central authority of Ivan III and his new heir, to seize all official funds deposited in the northern provinces of Vologda and Beloozero and there to set up an independent centre of rebellion and resistance. The plot was discovered by the grand prince before the conspirators could do anything. Vasily was placed under house arrest. On 27 December 1497 six of the conspirators2 were beheaded on the ice of the Moskva river; others were imprisoned. At the same time Sofia was put in opala or disgrace; according to the uncensored account, it was discovered that “women were coming to her with [poisonous] herbs” — presumably they were to have murdered Dmitry. After interrogation Ivan had “these evil women executed, drowned by night in the Moskva river”. “ From that time on,” 1 See P S R L VI/279; XII/263; Kazakova and Lur'e, A E D f p. 165; Lur'e, “Pervye ideologi. . p. 96. * Afanasy Rcpchenok, Poyarok “the brother of Runo**, Fedor Stromilov, Vladimir Elizarovich Gusev, Prince Ivan Ivanovich KhruT Paletsky, Shchavey Skryabin-Travin.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

337

the chronicler concludes, “he began to live with her in great vigilance“.1 At some time or other between the discovery of the plot and the execution of the plotters Ivan consulted Metro­ politan Simon, summoned a Church Council and evidently referred to it the case against the conspirators — possibly, too against his wife and son.2 Just over a month after the execution of the chief conspirators Ivan demonstratively showed his subjects — and, more especially, the outside world — where his sympathies lay. Dmitry, his grand­ son, was crowned grand prince of Vladimir, Moscow and All Russia on 4 February 1498. The ceremony was performed by the metropolitan in the cathedral of the Assumption. All the bishops, with the conspicuous exception of Gennady of Novgorod and Filofey of Perm*, were present; so were the sons of the grand prince — all, that is, except the disgraced Vasily: his place was taken by the second eldest son Yury, who at the conclusion of the service thrice sprinkled his nephew with gold and silver coins in front of each of the three great cathedrals of the Kremlin. Ivan in his opening address to the metropolitan said that it was the custom of the grand princes of Moscow to bestow the grand principality on the eldest of their sons; this he had done to his eldest son. “ But now by God’s will,” he went on, “my son Ivan has departed this life; his first son Dmitry has remained alive, and now, for my lifetime and for after my life, I bless him with the grand principality of Vladimir, Moscow and Novgorod”. After blessing the regalia — the cap of Monomakh and the great collar (barmy) — the metropolitan handed them to Ivan who put them on Dmitry.3 Elena’s son, it seemed, was assured of his grand­ father’s throne. For Elena Stepanovna it was her greatest moment of triumph: her enemy Sofia was in disgrace; her son’s only rival was under house arrest. The first phase of the dynastic crisis could hardly have ended more satisfactorily for her. For a year all appears to have been calm on the surface. The sources, intentionally perhaps, avoid all mention of the main 1 P SR L , VI/279; XII/263. Cf. VI/43; VIII/243; XII/246. * This evidence is only found in P S R L XXII/513. Cf. Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, pp. 302-3; S. B. Veselovsky, “ Vladimir Gusev — sostavitel* sudebnika 1497 goda,“ pp. 46-7. It seems not improbable that the Church Council, the majority of whose members m ust have sympathized rather with Sofia than with the heretical Elena, strongly advocated leniency in the grand prince’s treatment of his wife and son. * See P S R L V III/234-6. The same account is found in all the chronicles.

ЗЗ8

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

protagonists in the conflict at court. If Vasily and Sofia still remained in disgrace in Moscow, Ivan was determined that the outside world should not hear of it; the three ambassadors despatched to Vilna in 1498 were each instructed to convey Sofia’s greetings to Alexander, and on the one occasion when all the grand prince’s sons were mentioned, Vasily’s name figured with the rest, albeit after those of Dmitry, Sofia and Elena.1 In the beginning of 1499, however, the crisis took a new turn. In January Ivan arrested his first cousin, Prince Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev, foremost boyar and statesman, governor (namestnik) of Moscow, close adviser of the grand prince and president of the Boyar Council. With him were arrested two of his sons, Vasily (nicknamed Kosoy, the squinter) and Ivan Mynin Patrikeev, as well as his son-in-law Prince Semen Ivanovich Ryapolovsky.2 Only one source mentions their crime directly — “treason”.8 The remainder merely report the arrest without comment. All four princes were sentenced to death. Ryapolovsky was beheaded on the Moskva river on 5 February. The Patrikeevs, however, were saved from death by the intervention of the senior clergy: “thanks to the intercession of Metropolitan Simon, the archbishop [Gennady of Novgorod or Tikhon of Rostov?] and the bishops, he [Ivan III] bestowed his favour upon Prince Ivan Yur’evich [Patrikeev] and did not commit him to execution, but had him and his son Vasily take the tonsure”.4 Ivan Yur’evich was made to join the brethren of the Trinity monastery; Vasily was sent to the White Lake monastery of St Cyril (Beloozero);6 the third son, Ivan Mynin, was placed under house arrest.6 On 21 March Ivan publicly forgave his son Vasily (vina emu otdal),7 gave him the 1 See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 244, 250, 261. * See P S R L VIII/236 and all other chronicles under 1499 for news of the arrest. 8 T he chronicle of Ustyug. See ULj 100. 4 See the chronicle fragment mentioned above, P S R L XII/264. See also the Vladimirsky Letopisets under 1499, the only other source to mention the inter­ vention of the clergy. Tikhomirov, “ Iz *Vladimirskogo Letopistsa’ ” , p. 291. 6 See P S R L VIII/236. •See P S R L XII/264. Bazilevich and Cherepnin consider that Afanasy Patrikeev, whose lands were at some time confiscated, was also arrested with the other Patrikeevs. It is not known what his relationship with Ivan Yur’evich was. See Bazilevich, VP, p. 370, note 2; “Novgorodskie pomeshchiki iz posluzhiPtsev v kontse XV v.” , p. 70; Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, p. 307. 7 P S R L XII/264. Only in this chronicle fragment is the forgiveness of Vasily’s “guilt” mentioned. All the other official chronicles, censored during the reign of Vasily himself, merely state that Ivan called Vasily grand prince and sovereign, and made him grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

339

tide of “sovereign grand prince” and appointed him grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov, an appointment which, though it apparently deprived Dmitry of one of his “grand principalities”, in no way lessened the latter’s authority as “grand prince of All Russia”, co-ruler and heir to the throne. The arrests went on. In April of the same year Prince Vasily VasiTevich Romodanovsky, a relative of Ryapolovsky and a diplomat of some standing, was arrested together with a certain Andrey Korobov of Tver’.1 Their fate is unknown.12 Others too were probably rounded up at the same time — we know that at some time before the end of the century several Muscovite boyars, some of whom were connected in one way or an other with those arrested in 1497 and 1499, had their estates confiscated.3 The arrests of the boyars in 1499 may or may not have been connected with the dynastic conflict — only the unreliable and tendentious Stepennaya Kniga links the two events.4 In any case it would appear that there were no publicly manifested reactions to the punishments either in Lithuania, where the Patrikeevs, Ryapolovsky and Romodanovsky were well known, or in Moscow; if there were, they were carefully concealed by the chroniclers. The strange appointment of Vasily, however, caused some resentment in Pskov. The Pskovites, still technically independent of the grand prince of Moscow, yet none the less his most obsequious of servants, were alarmed at the news. Realizing that the appointment would be to their detriment, they despatched a delegation to Moscow requesting that whoever was grand prince in Moscow should be sovereign of Pskov. To their surprise they were soundly rebuked by Ivan III, furious that the servile Pskovites should question his political decisions. “Am I not free to choose between my grandson and my children?” he asked them. “To whomsoever I please will I grant the right to rule”. For their pains the Pskovites were obliged to return home, leaving behind two members of their delegation in a Moscow 1 See N. M. Karamzin, Istoriya gosudarstva rossiyskogo, Vol. 6, note 451. * Romodanovsky appears to have been pardoned. In December 1502 we find him attached to an army from the Seversk district. See above, p. 256, note 3. * See Bazilevich, “ Novgorodskie pom eshchiki. . . ” , pp. 70-2; VP, pp. 358 sq. 4 In the Stepennaya Kniga, written at a much later date and after the second disgrace of Vasily (or Vassian, as he was known after his tonsure) Patrikeev (1531), the execution of Ryapolovsky is linked directly with the dynastic events of 1497-99. After the arrests Ivan began “to have no care for his grandson'*. See PSRL XXI/57*.

z

З40

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

jail. At the same time Archbishop Gennady, delighted no doubt at the pardon granted to Vasily and Sofia, arrived in Pskov, which it must be remembered was part of his see, and proposed to officiate at a thanksgiving service. The Pskovites, however forbade him to “pray God for the grand prince Vasily”.1 The men of Pskov, who wanted no other prince but Dmitry or his grand­ father as suzerain, were in no mood to put up with their arch­ bishop’s political leanings or to witness any manifestation of his sympathy for the “ Roman” and her son. Vasily’s position was, to say the least, equivocal. Dmitry was in no way worse off than before, in spite of the fact that he now appeared to share the title of grand prince of Novgorod with his uncle. Even if we accept the doubtful evidence of the Stepennaya Kttiga to the effect that Ivan “ceased to care” for his grandson after the events of the early spring of 1499, there is nothing to show that Dmitry’s authority was to any degree lessened. The only ones who can have been — and clearly were — disconcerted by the events of the last three years of the century were Sofia and Vasily. The granting of the title of grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov meant very little in terms of power and nothing in terms of the future. Even if the liquidation of the senior boyars was closely connected with the “pardon” of Vasily, there is, as will be seen later, no evidence to show that the boyars in question were any more on the side of Elena and Dmitry than on the side of Sofia and Vasily. Indeed, their political elimination may have been looked upon by Sofia and her son as a severe political set-back, a loss of valuable support in high places. Perhaps the most eloquent indication of Vasily’s dissatisfaction with the political situation in 1499 and with the sop offered him by his father is the fact that he once again planned “departure”, and not only planned it, but executed it, albeit partially. Unfortunately this, the most daring and treasonable of all Vasily’s actions, is only mentioned laconically and confusingly in an entry in an unpublished chronicle first brought to light in 1948. This entry, taken from a short chronicle dating from the beginning of the sixteenth century, describes Vasily’s flight under the year 7008 (i.e. between 1 September 1499 and 1 September 1500): “Prince Vasily, the son of the grand prince Ivan, desiring the grand principality . . . fled himself to Vyaz’ma with his advisers. l PL, 1/83-4.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З41

And the grand prince began to take council with Princess Sofia and brought him back. . . -” 1 The chronology is confused by the fact that the words “brought him back” are followed by . . and gave him the grand principality and seized Prince Dmitry and his mother Princess Elena”; for we know that Dmitry and Elena were not arrested until April 1502. Even the year “7008” is too vague a date to be of much use, for so many momentous events occurred between September 1499 and September 1500 — the defection of the West Russian princes, the secularization of Novgorod church property, the declaration of war on Lithuania and the attempts of Stephen of Moldavia to keep the peace — that it is impossible to gauge the true significance of Vasily’s flight unless we know exactly when it took place. Was it connected with the reverse defection of Bel’sky, Mozhaysky and Shemyachich? Did these princes only agree to enter Muscovite service after Vasily had been “brought back” from Vyaz’ma and fully restored to favour? Did Vasily decide to desert on the eve of the declaration of war on Lithuania, just as Ivan’s brothers had “departed” on the eve of Ahmed’s invasion, choosing the most embarrassing moment for the grand prince? All these and many other questions cannot, unfortunately, be answered for lack of precise information. Judging from the known facts and from the wording of the chronicle entry, we can only say that the defection of Vasily, whenever it may have taken place, was planned to embarrass Ivan, was envisaged as a serious rebellion (Vasily, it will be remembered, fled “with his advisers” to Vyaz’ma, until recently Lithuanian territory and now on the border between the two states) and was caused by Vasily’s grave dissatisfaction with the political situation in the Kremlin. Vasily’s treason marked the turning point in the struggle between the two factions at court. After his return to Moscow Vasily was not only fully pardoned but also liberally rewarded for his efforts, just as twenty years earlier his uncle Andrey had been after his rebellion. In March 1501 he had already assumed the title of grand prince and had evidently been granted Beloozero 1 See L ur’e, “Pervye ideologi . . pp. 99-100; Kazakova and L ur’e, op. cit., pp. 204-5. Between the words “grand principality . . .” and “ . . . fled himself’* is an incomprehensible clause: “wishing to lay it waste (? istraviti) on Svinskoye field near Samsov Wood” . Samsov Wood may be connected with “ Samsonov Meadow” in the Moscow district, a place often mentioned in the wills of the grand princes.

З42

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

as his estate or as part of his estate; for in that month we find “ Grand Prince Vasily Ivanovich” writing “to our patrimony of Beloozero”.1 Yet his triumph was not yet complete, for Dmitry still remained, in name at least, grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow. He did not remain so for long. On 11 April 1502, just over four years after his coronation, Dmitry was arrested together with his mother. On that day, the chronicler narrates, “ Grand Prince Ivan placed opala [disgrace] upon his grandson Grand Prince Dmitry and upon his [Dmitry’s] mother Elena; and from that day onwards he forbade their names to be mentioned in prayers and litanies and forbade him to be called grand prince; and he placed them behind guards”. Three days later Vasily was officially blessed by his father, given the title of “autocrat of All Russia”, and, with the sanction of Metropolitan Simon, “placed upon the throne of Vladimir and Moscow”.12*The dynastic crisis was over. There were now no obstacles in Vasily’s way. Two years later Elena died — according to one source she was murdered.8 Dmitry died in prison in 1509; his death, too, it seems, was a violent one.4 Such are the facts relating to the dynastic crisis as far as we know them. On the face of it it would seem that their interpretation is quite simple. Indeed, until recently historians have found no difficulty in making the facts fit straight-forward and satisfying theories. Assuming, on the evidence of Herberstein, Beklemishev and Kurbsky, all three, be it noted, either prejudiced or unreliable or both, that Sofia Palaeologa was the enemy of the boyars and thus, by implication, the supporter of the new service nobility, most pre-revolutionary, and some Soviet, historians automatically placed Elena and Dmitry in the opposite camp. Supporting their theories with the irresponsible dicta of Kurbsky, they made Elena and Dmitry figureheads of the boyar opposition to the grand prince, the royal representatives of a party headed by such 1 A S E I, Vol. 2, No. 305, pp. 260-1. Vasily was possibly given the title even earlier. In February 1501 the Lithuanian ambassadors to Moscow conveyed Alexander’s greetings to “Grand Prince Vasily” , Princes Yury, Dmitry and Semen, and to the grandson of Ivan, “Grand Prince Dm itry” . As the ambassa­ dors’ credentials were issued in Vilna in December 1500, it may be that Vasily was already grand prince then. See S R IO , Vol. 35, pp. 310, 325. T he Ustyug Chronicle dates the granting of Vasily’s title 1500; but then it also states that in that year Dmitry was imprisoned and Elena died. See t/L /io i. 2 See P S R L t VIII/242 for both events. 8 See P S R L XXIV/21 4 See P S R L VIII/250.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

343

distinguished aristocrats as the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky. Thus the conspiracy of 1497 was represented as an essentially anti-boyar, pro-dvoryanstvo plot (it was pointed out that the conspirators were mostly of humble origin); the execution of Ryapolovsky and the banishment of the Patrikeevs in 1499 was looked upon as a triumph for the anti-boyar party headed by Sofia and her son; and the eventual disgrace of Elena and Dmitry was held to be the ultimate defeat of the aristocratic opposition to the autocratic sovereign.1 The discovery of fresh material (notably the information on Vasily’s flight to Vyaz’ma) has made it possible to appraise the events of 1497-1502 afresh. It must of course be stressed that, given the present paucity of sources, there is no complete and satisfying solution to the problem of the dynastic crisis and that all theories must necessarily remain conjectural. It is nevertheless possible to offer an interpretation of certain events, to suggest certain solutions to certain aspects of the problem, which, while they may not always corroborate pre-conceived theories, will at least not conflict with such facts as can be reasonably established.8 The first task in assessing the events of 1497 must surely be to try to establish the initial incident, the prime causal force which set other actions in motion. In this connection most important is the information that Stromilov told Vasily about Ivan’s plans to make Dmitry grand prince. It may, of course, be argued that this was simply the chronicler’s own naïve motivation for the story which he wished to narrate or that the incident was related in order to throw the blame on the d'yaki and lessen the guilt of the future grand prince. But a careful reading of the text, con­ vincingly factual and detailed, makes this seem unlikely, as well as the knowledge that the fragment in question, dating from before Vasily’s accession, is certainly less biased and more objective than the other abridged accounts of the affair. It would appear, then, that the first move came from Ivan III, who decided to appoint his grandson heir. Now if we forget for a moment the supposition that Elena’s own political convictions were probably more congenial to Ivan than those of Sofia — a supposition based solely on the view that the Judaisers, or at any rate the Muscovite section 1 Such, broadly speaking, were the views of Karamzin, Solov’ev and Klyuchevsky. 8 For a résumé of the views of Soviet historians on the conspiracy of 1497, see Appx. A.

344

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

of the sect, were themselves the champions of autocracy — we must look for another reason for this his momentous decision. 1497 was a year of singular tension in south-east Europe. In June Ivan was informed by Alexander of Lithuania that a joint Turkish-Tatar attack on Poland and Lithuania was imminent. When, however, it became clear in Moscow that the vast Polish and Lithuanian armies massing to the north of the Mol­ davian frontier were not there to protect their own lands but to invade Moldavia on their way to the Black Sea coast, Ivan did all he could to avert what might well have turned out to be a disaster for his ally Stephen. In August P. G. Zabolotsky, one of Ivan’s ablest diplomats, accompanied significantly enough by the brother of Elena’s chief supporter in Moscow, Ivan Volk Kuritsyn, set off for Alexander’s headquarters in Lutsk with instructions at all costs to stop the Lithuanians warring on Stephen.1 He need have had no anxiety, for in October 1497 Stephen decisively defeated the Poles and the Lithuanians as their armies withdrew north; and Moldavia was saved from becoming a Jagiellonian province. The fate of Moldavia was of the greatest importance to Ivan. The presence of an active ally on the banks of the Dnestr, able to tie down large forces in Podolia, would considerably strengthen his own strategic position. It was essential, in view of the coming war with Lithuania, to ensure the friendship of Stephen. During the period preceding the Polish “ Black Sea” expedition of 1497 both the Poles and the Lithuanians on the one hand and the Muscovites on the other pressed Stephen to support their cause. Just before the expedition set out, Alexander of Lithuania sent two ambassadors to Suceava to conclude a treaty with Stephen and to urge him to join the Jagiellons in their crusade against the Turks.2 Ivan, who at this time was busy trying to form an alliance with the Turks, was also engaged in diplomatic exchanges with Stephen. Although we know nothing of the nature of these exchanges, we must assume that the grand prince was attempting to dissuade Stephen from joining Jan Olbracht and Alexander in any venture directed against the Turks or the Tatars. We know that some time before November, in all probability in August 1497, Ivan Oshcherin, whom a year previously Ivan had sent to Moldavia, arrived back in Moscow together with a Moldavian 1 See above, p. 204.

1 See above, p. 202, note 3.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

345

envoy.1 It seems not improbable that Oshcherin brought back with him the welcome information that Stephen, in the event of Polish-Lithuanian troops marching through his country, had decided to declare himself a vassal of the sultan and to resist the Jagiellons. A condition may well have been that Ivan, in recom­ pense for such behaviour on the part of his ally, should reward him by proclaiming their mutual grandson heir to the throne. There was little else he could do to show his appreciation of Stephen’s decision, short of attacking Lithuania; and the time had not yet come for that. Ivan, then, it may be argued, had ample reason for appointing Dmitry grand prince of Vladimir and Moscow; it was a blatant demonstration of the grand prince’s approval of the attitude of his ally Stephen to the Jagiellons. It may well, too, have been intended at home as a demonstration of his disapproval of Sofia’s boyar sympathies and connections. The confidential information concerning Ivan’s plans which was passed to Vasily by Stromilov sparked off the rebellion. Such a sacrifice of her son, who after his appointment to Tver’ in the early nineties must have seemed assured of the title, could scarcely have failed to enrage Sofia. Revolt was the only form of protest and action open to her. By acquiescing in Dmitry’s appointment she would have ruined the chances of her eldest son, and, as her ecclesiastical advisers no doubt warned her, imperilled Orthodoxy itself. Thanks to her connections with the former appanage principality of Vereya — perhaps too with the courts of Ivan’s brothers before their liquidation — Sofia was assured of support from cer­ tain elements of the population. She could presumably count on local support in Beloozero, chosen by the conspirators as one of the centres of rebellion; her past links with this district, formerly part of the appanage of the princes of Vereya, date from as far back as 1480 when she fled there in so disgraceful a manner. And indeed if we consider the background and family connections of the conspirators themselves, it will be seen that many of them 1 See SRJO , Vol. 41, p. 240. The dating is hard to establish. On 2 November 1497 Ivan sent off a party to the Crimea with a message complaining that his ambassador Oshcherin, “who has now arrived in Moscow,” had been plundered on his journey. T he chronicler states that Oshcherin was sent off to Moldavia in June 1496 and returned “in August” with the Moldavian ambassador Ivan Pitar, having been plundered on the way back. Although this is not actually stated, it m ust have been August of 1497. Three months were barely sufficient for the journey from Moscow to Suceava and back. See P S R L VIII/232-3.

З46

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

were closely linked with the courts of the former appanage princes or themselves had aristocratic family connections. Vladimir Gusev, for example, one of the leading conspirators, was a member of the distinguished boyar family of Dobrynsky. His father Elizar Vasilevich Gusev had served in the courts of two appanage princes — Ivan Andreevich of Mozhaysk (brother of Mikhail of Vereya and enemy of Vasily II) and Ivan I l l ’s brother, Andrey the Younger, the bulk of whose patrimony consisted of the plotters* second centre of rebellion — Vologda.1 Afanasy Eropkin (Ropchenok), “the second forerunner of Satan,** was the descendant of a family of minor Smolensk princelings, who had emigrated to Moscow in the beginning of the fifteenth century and who had had since then links with various appanage princes within the Muscovite state, including those of Volotsk.2 Stromilov*s grandfather had betrayed Vasily II during the civil war and, like Gusev’s father, had entered the service of Prince Ivan Andreevich of Mozhaysk. Like Eropkin, Shchavey Skryabin-Travin was the descendant of petty Smolensk princes. As for Prince Ivan Ivanovich Khrul* Paletsky, the only member of the conspiracy to have retained his title, he belonged to the aristocratic and distinguished family of the princes of Starodub (on the Klyaz’ma), two more of whose members, Ryapolovsky and Romodanovsky, were themselves shortly to fall foul of the grand prince.3 Even if such investigations into the antecedents of the plotters do not prove conclusively that Gusev and his party were the active partisans of separatism and the opponents of the grand prince’s policy of centralization, at least they show that these 1 See Veselovsky, “Vladimir Gusev . . .", pp. 33-43; Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, pp. 293-4; Bazilevich, VP, p. 363. On the slenderest of evidence Cherepnin puts forward the view that Vladimir Gusev was connected with Andrey the Elder of Uglich. He also claims that Vladimir's brother Yushko, who fled to Lithuania in 1492, was connected with Andrey’s court; he argues that his flight “was evidently (1) linked with the arrest of Andrey", but he gives no evidence to support his claim. Bazilevich thinks that Yushko’s flight was linked with the arrival in Moscow of the Lithuanian ambassadors Stanislav Glebovich and Ivan Vladychko (November 1492). See Bazilevich, VP, p. 393, note 2. A more likely explanation is that Yushko was involved in the conspiracy of Lukom&ky, who, at the same time, was executed for plotting to m urder Ivan III. See above, p. 146. 2See Veselovsky, “Vladimir Gusev . . .", p. 43; Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, p. 295; Bazilevich, VP, p. 362. • See Veselovsky, “Vladimir Gusev . . .", p. 44. Nothing is known of Poyarok. His brother, Ivan Runo, had a fairly distinguished career as voevoda and for some reason or other was disgraced about 1483. (Ibid., pp. 44-5.)

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

347

men were in no way typical of what I. I. Smirnov calls “the untitled middle stratum of the feudal class“ which supported a centralized state, typical boyar children bitterly opposed to “appanage princely circles“ . There is nothing apart from Stromilov’s title of d'yak wedenny, which implied membership of the State Council, and the general appellation “ boyar children“ to show that the conspirators belonged to the new social class of the minor service nobility, which, at a later date, was to prove the mainstay of autocracy. If anything, it is easier to envisage these men as the opponents of a system which had virtually destroyed the old political way of life enjoyed and fought for by their fathers. If it is true that Sofia herself sympathized with the separatist views held by her brothers-in-law and the princes of Vereya, then these were precisely the sort of men to support her in her conflict with the grand prince. To recapitulate, the most likely chain of events in 1497 appears to have been as follows: the crisis was started by Ivan’s decision to appoint Dmitry grand prince. This was primarily a political move designed to please Stephen of Moldavia and perhaps even to reward him in the most adequate and demonstrative way possible for the vital part he was playing in the affairs of south­ east Europe. This act led to Sofia’s extreme displeasure and forced her hand. Her previous connections with Vereya and Beloozero led her to seek the support of men whose sympathies lay with the fast-crumbling appanage system and who opposed the grand prince’s policy of combating separatism. A rebellion was planned as the only means of resisting the grand prince or, at the worst, of forcing him to reconsider his decision. There may, of course, have been other reasons, apart from internal politics and the dynastic question, which broadened the breach between the grand prince and Sofia — such as the question of the forth­ coming war with Lithuania. Was Sofia prepared to play her part in what promised to be a conflict for the purity of the Orthodox faith, a crusade against the Roman church? Did she approve of the function Ivan requested their daughter to fulfil in Vilna? Such questions unfortunately must remain hypothetical. All we can assume from the available evidence is that Sofia was sufficiently goaded by Stromilov’s secret information to plan rebellion with others wThose views she shared. There is no reason to suppose that Sofia “made use of” the rebels in order to achieve her ends

З48

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

or that the rebels made use of Sofia and her son as figureheads for their insurrection. Such a view is straining probability too far. Whereas it is relatively easy to find a reasonable explanation for the first phase of the crisis, it is extremely difficult satisfactorily to interpret the events of 1499. As has been mentioned above, the nineteenth century historians saw in the removal of Ryapolovsky and the Patrikeevs a blow for the boyars who were represented at court by Elena and Dmitry and a gratification of the “anti-boyar” group headed by Vasily and Sofia. In the eyes of Solov’ev, the “treachery” of the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky “consisted of their actions against Sofia and her son and in favour of Elena and Dmitry”.1 The Soviet historians, who consider that Sofia’s sympathies lay with the aristocracy, are at pains to dis­ associate the elimination of the boyars as far as possible from the dynastic question: the only way of explaining away the coin­ cidence of the events of January and March 1499 was either to show that the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky were not entirely representative of the boyarstvo in general and were therefore not to be identified with Sofia and Vasily, whose triumph, or partial triumph, followed closely upon their removal; or to suggest that the boyars concerned were removed for reasons in no way connected with the Sofia-Elena conflict.2 It is impossible to come to any definite conclusion about the events of 1499. The best one can do is to examine the arguments for and against the victims’ allegiance to this or that particular “party” and attempt to decide whether or not the purge had any connection with either the dynastic question, or foreign affairs, or internal policy. At first sight the evidence would appear to be overwhelmingly in favour of the thesis that the boyars in question were the supporters of Elena and Dmitry and belonged to their faction. Firstly there is the chronological order and the close proximity in which the events of 1498-9 are related in the chronicles; this would lead us to believe that die arrests, sandwiched between the coronation of Dmitry and the “pardoning” of Vasily, were connected with both events, and that Ivan’s displeasure with his grandson was first manifested in January 1499 when the boyars 1 See S. M. Solov’ev, Istoriya Rosit, Vol. 5, Ch. 2, col. 1410. Cf. V. O. Klyuchevsky, Kurs russkoy istorii, Vol. II, p. 159. 1 For a résumé of the views of Soviet historians on the events of 1499, see Appx. B.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

349

were arrested. Secondly, there is the evidence of the Stepennaya Kniga, whose author was at pains to have his readers believe that the “ treacherous” boyars (their guilt is described as “kramola” — dissension, rebellion, or treason) were closely connected with Dmitry and that their fate and his fate were closely linked. And finally there are the ties between the punished boyars and Elena’s fellow-heretic and supporter, Fedor Kuritsyn.1 In dealing with Russo-Lithuanian affairs, I. Yu. Patrikeev, as senior member of the State Council, and Kuritsyn, as one of Ivan’s most experienced specialists on foreign affairs, worked closely together, as can be seen from the records of the diplomatic exchanges between Moscow and Vilna.2 In the spring of 1494 Fedor Kuritsyn was attached to the mission headed by V. I. Patrikeev and S. I. Ryapolovsky which went to Vilna to complete the formalities of the peace treaty and to negotiate certain details of the marriage between Alexander and Elena Ivanovna.3 Whatever his personal relationship with them, it cannot be denied that Kuritsyn was closely connected professionally with both Patrikeevs and with Ryapolovsky. None of these points, however, can be called irrefutable proof that Ryapolovsky and the Patrikeevs supported Elena and Dmitry in the dynastic conflict. It would be dangerous to argue that because one incident preceded another it necessarily led to or was connected with that second incident. The worthlessness of the Stepennaya Kniga as a source for the events of Ivan I l l ’s reign has already been pointed out. And the fact that Kuritsyn and the boyars happened to be professional colleagues does not necessarily make them political partners; indeed, it might be pointed out that Gusev, one of the ringleaders of the 1497 conspiracy, was himself a member of Elena Ivanovna’s escort to Vilna in 1495 and that the party was under S. I. Ryapolovsky.4 If it could be shown that 1 Cherepnin considers that he may have had a part in preparing the text of the Sudebmk in 1497 together with the Patrikeevs. See Cherepnin, RFA, Vol. 2, p p .308-14. * Both, for instance, were concerned with the reception and handling of the Lithuanian envoys in June-July 1493. See SRIO, Vol. 35, No. 22. In January 1494 V. I. Patrikeev, S. I. Ryapolovsky and F. Kuritsyn were instructed to hand the Lithuanian envoys Ivan’s reply to them. Ibid., No. 24. It is interesting to note that in July 1497 both Patrikeevs and Fedor Kuritsyn witnessed a deed of exchange (menovnaya gramota) issued by Ivan III to his nephews Ivan and Fedor Borisovich of Volotsk, the last surviving appanage princes in the Muscovite state. See DDG, p. 344. » See SRIO, Vol. 35, No. 25. 4 See ibid., No. 31.

3 SO

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Elena and Dmitry represented the “progressive” party at court, the party which supported autocracy and opposed separatism, then, in so far as the Patrikeevs can be called “anti-separatists”, they might well be considered their allies. It is true, as Cherepnin has convincingly shown, the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky worked closely with the grand princely authority in its dealings with the appanage princes, not only under Ivan III but also during Vasily IPs reign.1 But it is hard to say whether the fact that they, as the senior advisers of the grand prince, co-operated with him in the struggle against the remnants of the appanage system makes them necessarily the ideological upholders of the principles of undivided autocratic rule and the opponents of “feudal separatism”. On the face of it the evidence seems to show that, if anything, the punished boyars were in sympathy with the opposition headed by Sofia and Vasily. In the first place there is the irrefutable fact that Vasily Ivanovich, when he became grand prince, not only forgave Vassian (as Vasily Patrikeev was known after his pro­ fession) but allowed him to live in Moscow, where he exercised an extraordinary influence over the sovereign.2 Secondly it must be remembered that Metropolitan Simon supported the Patrikeevs: thanks to his intercession in 1499 they were saved from execution. Simon himself, later to appear as the staunch supporter of Joseph of Volokolamsk and the opponent of the heretics, can only have been on the side of Vasily and Sofia in the dynastic conflict. Indeed, it may well be that the church council under Simon, which was consulted by Ivan in 1497, saved their lives at the time. It looks, too, as if the metropolitan’s sympathies lay with the “separatists”. At any rate we know that he disapproved 1 See Cherepnin, RFA, Vol. 2, pp. 307-8, 314-5. O f most interest is the part played by the boyars in Ivan I l l ’s dealings with his brothers. In 1481 I. Yu. Patrikeev witnessed Andrey the Younger’s will, in which all the latter’s estates were transferred to Ivan III. See DDG, p. 277. In 1491 I. Yu. Patrikeev’s two sons, Vasily and Ivan Mynin, were sent to arrest the children of Andrey the Elder. See UL/gg. Ryapolovsky himself was entrusted with the arrest of Andrey. T he chronicler of Ustyug, the only one to report the incident in detail, describes how Ryapolovsky wept when he told Andrey the news. How­ ever, it must be borne in mind that the whole passage shows considerable sympathy for Andrey; Ryapolovsky’s tears were probably invented to heighten the pathos. The Ustyug version of the incident, as too prejudiced in favour of Andrey, must have been rejected by the other, more “official” , chronicles. * One of Vassian’s associates later described him as “a great favourite (velikoy vremennoy chelovek), close to the grand prince” . See Preniya Daniila . . . so inokom Maksimom Svyatogortsem, Chtemya, 1847, 7.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

З51

sufficiently strongly of Ivan I l l ’s treatment of his brother, Andrey of Uglich, demonstratively to rebuke him in public. According to the Tipografsky Chronicle, he imposed penance on the grand prince for his responsibility for Audrey’s death.1 Lastly, there is the question of the arrest of Vasily Vasil’evich Romodanovsky, which took place in April 1499. It may, of course, have had no connection with the arrest of the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky three months earlier; but this seems unlikely, both in view of the fact that in his diplomatic activity he was their close colleague2 and in view of his family connections; for Romodanovsky was a member of the same branch of the Ryurikovichi as Ryapolovsky: the latter’s father, Ivan Andreevich Starodubsky-Ryapolovsky, was the brother of Romodanovsky’s grandfather, Fedor Andre­ evich Starodubsky. Assuming, then, that Romodanovsky was arrested for the same reason as the other boyars, we can point to still closer connections between the “boyar group” as a whole and the party, if such it was, headed by Vasily and Sofia. For before engaging on his diplomatic activities V. V. Romodanovsky was senior boyar at the appanage court of Prince Mikhail Andre­ evich of Vereya, a fact attested by several mentions of him in the latter’s will.3 This does not, of course, prove that the “boyar group” had pro-appanage, pro-separatist tendencies — Cherepnin has produced evidence to show that the opposite was true4 — but at least it shows some link between Sofia, who we know was closely associated with Vereya, and one of the boyars involved in the events of 1499. After examining all the available evidence, we must reluctantly come to the conclusion that there is nothing to prove that the arrest of the boyars was directly connected with the dynastic crisis. Still less can we say that questions of foreign policy were involved — that the Patrikeevs or Ryapolovsky were opposed to Ivan’s plans for waging war on Lithuania or that they objected to the government’s attitude to would-be defectors.6 All we can say is that most of the available evidence indicates that the political inclinations of the boyars coincided with those of Sofia and Vasily. 1 See P S R L XXIV/214; Kazakova and L ur’e, op. cit., p. 201. * In February 1495 he was sent with his wife to Vilna to replace S. I. Ryapolovsky, who had accompanied Elena from Moscow, and to assist Elena in her secret correspondence with Ivan. See SR IO , Vol. 35, No. 32. In 1498 he was sent off again on a mission to Alexander and Elena. See ibid., No. 53. 8 See DDGt No. 80. 4 See Appx. B. • See Appx. B,

352

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

The removal of S. I. Ryapolovsky, the three Patrikeevs, Romodanovsky, and probably others as well, was a blow to the faction headed by Sofia and her son, a blow which the grand prince attempted to soften by “pardoning” Vasily and granting him the grand principality of Novgorod and Pskov. Sofia and Vasily were not satisfied with this concession. Nor can they have been gratified by the news that Ivan later in the same year “seized for himself in Novgorod the Great lands belonging to the archbishop and the monasteries and distributed them as fiefs to his boyar children”;1 although this was done “with the blessing of Metro­ politan Simon”, it must have been interpreted if not as a triumph for the heretical party, then at least as a defeat for Archbishop Gennady and Joseph of Volokolamsk, and, indirectly, for Sofia and Vasily. The result of all these events was, as has been shown above, Vasily’s flight in 1500. Dissatisfied with the treatment he and his mother and their adherents were receiving from the grand prince, he decided to force Ivan’s hand in the most drastic manner possible. His flight had the desired effect. Unable to risk another rebellion like that of his brothers in 1480 and fearful of the consequences should Vasily fall among the still uncommitted West Russian princes, Ivan recalled his son. The return of Vasily meant the downfall of Elena and Dmitry. We need seek no further explanation of Ivan’s decision to withdraw his support from his daughter-in-law and grandson and, with them, the heretical faction: he was forced by circumstances and by the uncompromising behaviour of his son. The decision he took cannot have been an easy one. Yet for Ivan there was one crumb of comfort: he could now abandon Elena without fear of disrupting the carefully-planned alliance with her father, Stephen of Moldavia. For the alliance was virtually dead. During the whole of the first year of the Russo-Lithuanian war Stephen, instead of acting as Ivan had hoped he would act and attacking Poland or Lithuania, spent his time vainly attempting to stop both Ivan III and Mengli Girey of the Crimea from fighting his newly-found ally, Alexander of Lithuania. Ironically enough, it was not until after Ivan finally decided to arrest Elena and Dmitry that Stephen changed his tactics, invaded south-east Poland and seized the province of Pokut’e to the great embarrassment of King Alexander. 1P S R L X II/249.

EPILOGUE

n 27 October 1505, at one o’clock in the morning, Ivan III died. He was sixty-six years old and he had reigned for forty-three years and seven months. He survived his wife by two and a half years; his son-in-law and great ri in eastern Europe, King Alexander, survived him by just under a year. His last years were years of disappointment and frustration. In the cause of expediency he had been forced to sacrifice his daughter-in-law and his grandson and to witness the triumph of his wife and his eldest son, whose political views he did not share. At the Council of 1504 the heretics, perhaps the staunchest supporters of his autocratic principles, had been outlawed, and he had been obliged to pass the death sentence on Ivan Kuritsyn, the brother of one of his most trusted advisers, and Ivan Maksim­ ovich, the close associate of his daughter-in-law. His hopes of acquiring some of the Church’s vast landed estates had been broken when at the end of the Council of 1503 the assembled representatives of the upper clergy upheld the principle of the inviolability of ecclesiastical land-ownership. In the east the carefully-planned policy of controlling the khanate of Kazan’ by means of Moscow-trained puppet-rulers was proving a disastrous failure; the lecherous and unreliable Mehemmed Emin not only demonstratively revolted against Ivan’s authority in Kazan’, but even invaded his lands. But the bitterest of disappointments must have been the situation in the west. The Russo-Lithuanian war, the culminating venture of his entire reign, had ended inconclusively and unsatisfactorily. And although he had suc­ ceeded in reconquering large areas of the West Russian lands, Smolensk and Kiev still remained in the hands of the enemy, and of an enemy strangely buoyant and even undaunted by the military might of Moscow. He died unmoumed and, it would appear, unloved. The chroniclers, so swift to laud the qualities of a popular or a heroic

O

353

354

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

ruler, are silent on the greatest of all their princes. They make no mention of his virtues or of his achievements. We do not even know what he died of. Seldom can a man have reigned for so long and achieved so much, and left so little impression on his con­ temporaries. Almost nothing is known of his personal qualities or of his private life. He was tall, thin and slightly stooping. His features were awe-inspiring, and women are said to have fainted at the mere sight of him. The only pleasures he indulged in, as far as we know, were those of the table. At banquets he would drink himself into a stupor. Only three rulers of Russia have ever won from posterity the appellation of “the Great“ — Ivan III, Peter I and Catherine II. That Ivan’s achievements warranted such a name, no less than Peter’s or Catherine’s, there can be little doubt. He “gathered together”, as his contemporaries put it, the Russian lands by annexing most of the Great Russian states which had been independent at his accession. By undermining the authority of the appanage princes, or simply by taking over their lands, he put an end to separatism and began the process of centralized rule. And by his shrewd diplomacy and his subtle aggressiveness he began the great reconquest of the Ukraine from Lithuania. These may indeed be called the works of a great ruler. Yet it should never be forgotten that militarily glorious and economically sound though his reign may have been, it was also a period of cultural depression and spiritual barrenness. Freedom was stamped out within the Russian lands. By his bigoted anti-Catholicism Ivan brought down the curtain between Russia and the west. For the sake of territorial aggrandizement he deprived his country of the fruits of Western learning and civilization.

APPENDIX A The views of Soviet Historians on the conspiracy of 1497 The conspiracy of 1497 has received variegated treatment at the hands of Soviet historians. In most cases attention has been riveted on the conspirators themselves. S. B. Veselovsky was the first Soviet critic to point out that one of the main conspirators, V. E. Gusev, was not a d'yak> as had been almost generally assumed before, but a member of a distinguished and rich boyar family, and that he and two others of the remaining five con­ spirators named had been connected either personally or through their close relatives with the courts of former appanage princes (see S. B. Veselovsky, “Vladimir Gusev . . .”, pp. 31-47). Vese­ lovsky’s conclusions, however, are feeble: “the affair of V. Gusev and his fellow-conspirators was distorted by the court party hostile to them . . . they were involved in the affair and executed because, owing to carelessness or careerism, they interfered in the family concern of the grand prince.” (ibid., p. 47). Cherepnin took up the theme, which had been barely developed by Veselovsky. In view of the links of the plotters and their families with the former udeVny princes, he came to the con­ clusion that the conspiracy of 1497 was a scheme “to defend the interests of the feudal centres” — “a recrudescence of the feudal war of Vasily II.” As for Vasily himself, Cherepnin somewhat lamely concludes that “it is hardly possible to admit any real community of interest between Vasily Ivanovich and Gusev’s party”. The figure of Vasily “was necessary to the plotters only to enable them to contest Ivan I l l ’s policy of crushing the indepen­ dence of a number of feudal centres”. Sofia and Vasily, on their side, found the plotters “useful for their struggle against Dmitry Ivanovich”. In other words, Sofia and Vasily were only interested in the narrow issue of the dynastic question; the broader political issues were the concern of Gusev and his party (see Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, pp. 289-303). Bazilevich develops Cherepnin’s ideas still further. The plotters were connected with “the appanage courts and their 2Л 355

З56

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

feudalistic separatist tendencies” (Bazilevich, VP, p. 361); they were not representatives of the minor service nobility, but for the most part “belonged by origin to princely-boyar families”; (ibid., p. 364); and amongst them were “people in some degree connected with the Muscovite émigrés in Lithuania”. (Ibid., p. 370.) The conspiracy was the result of dissatisfaction amongst the “feudal aristocracy” and arose independently of the dynastic crisis. As for the differences of opinion between Sofia and Ivan III, Bazilevich casts further afield than Cherepnin. The conflict did not arise because of the dynastic problem, but because of a difference in attitude to Lithuanian questions between Ivan and his wife. Basing his views on the slenderest of evidence — the “unpolitical” tone of a letter written by Sofia to her daughter Elena in Lithuania — Bazilevich assumes that Ivan and Sofia failed to see eye to eye on the question of Russo-Lithuanian relations. In 1497 Sofia wrote to Elena, the wife of Alexander of Lithuania, a motherly letter enquiring after her husband’s health and her pregnancy. At the same time Ivan III wrote his usual injunctions to maintain the Orthodox faith, to request Alexander to build her a church and attach Orthodox courtiers to her suite (SRIO, Vol. 35, No. 49, pp. 239-42). “This absence of interest in the religious and political conditions of her daughter’s life — so vastly important in Ivan’s eyes — cannot [?] be explained by the intimate nature of a mother’s letter which left the husband to deal with all official affairs” (Bazilevich, VP, p. 366). However, Bazilevich quite rightly points out that Elena Stepanovna was “the natural opponent of Alexander, who himself was the enemy of her father Stephen”, and that the renewal of hostilities between Alexander and Stephen and Ivan’s intense interest in Moldavian affairs coincided with his breach with Sofia (see ibid., pp. 368-9). Lur’e, whose views are much the same as Cherepnin’s and Bazilevich’s in so far as he considers Gusev’s plot “a reactionary movement linked with the boyar-princely opposition” (see Kazakova and Lur’e, AED, p. 165), is primarily concerned with associating Sofia’s name with the interests of the “feudal” aristocracy and demonstrating the proximity of the views of Elena Stepanovna (and, of course, the Judaisers) and those of the autocrat. Gusev — that “representative of the new feudal oppositional bloc” (see “ Iz istorii politicheskoy bor’by . . .”, p. 92) — and his friends were the enemies of autocracy; there is

APPENDIX A

357

no question of Elena and Dmitry ever having enjoyed boyar support (ibid, and “Pervye ideologi. . .”.). In contrast to these views only two Soviet historians seem to have managed to keep the flag of Solov’ev and the “bourgeois” historians flying by maintaining that Gusev and his party were enemies of the boyars and supporters of autocracy, whereas Dmitry and Elena were backed by the aristocratic nobility, notably the Ryapolovsky-Patrikeev group. I. I. Smirnov, in his review of Bazilevich’s book on Ivan I l l ’s foreign policy, criticizes the standpoint both of Bazilevich and of Veselovsky, and attempts to show that Gusev’s group were all typical of “ the untitled middle stratum of the feudal class” which supported a growing centralized government. The plot of 1497 was an attempt by the “boyar children” and the d*yaki to alter the course of events, to remove Dmitry whom “feudal princely circles” were hoping to use in their nefarious climb to power, and to hand over authority to Vasily (see I. I. Smirnov, Voprosy Istorii, 1952, No. 11, pp. 139-44). A. A. Zimin’s views are close to those of Smirnov: associating Ryapolovsky and the Patrikeevs with the ElenaDmitry faction, he considers that the heretical court party was purely reactionary and that Dmitry was the “protégé of the boyar heretical circle” (see A. A. Zimin, “O politicheskoy doktrine Iosifa Volotskogo,” p. 165).

APPENDIX В The views of Soviet Historians on the events of 1499 Bazilevich considers that the arrest of the boyars in early 1499 had nothing to do with the dynastic conflict. It was a question of disagreement on foreign policy. Ryapolovsky and the two Patrikeevs, he points out, were intimately connected with RussoLithuanian relations, in particular with the conclusion of the peace of 1494 and the marriage of Elena and Alexander in 1495; Romodanovsky, arrested in April 1499, was also connected with the royal wedding. Most important, Ivan Yur’evich Patrikeev was a man who enjoyed the confidence of the Lithuanians — a fact demonstrated, in Bazilevich’s opinion, by his correspondence with Jan Zaberezinsky (Zabrzezinski) and Nicholas Radziwill in 1492 (see above, pp. 145 sq.). In view of this evidence and in view of the warning Ivan gave his ambassadors to Vilna in 1503 ‘‘not to act with domineering arrogance (vysokoumnicha?) like Prince Semen Ryapolovsky and Prince Vasily Ivanovich [Patri­ keev]” (SR IO , Vol. 35, p. 428), Bazilevich comes to the con­ clusion that the punished princes were ‘‘convinced partisans of reconciliation and friendship with Lithuania” and that “in them Ivan met opposition to his plans for the armed conflict with the Lithuanian sovereign” (Bazilevich, VP, p. 374). It is an attractive theory, but unfortunately somewhat hard to corroborate. The boyars concerned were, it is true, closely connected with RussoLithuanian affairs. But surely no conclusion concerning I. Yu. Patrikeev’s “conciliatory tendencies” can be drawn from the fact that Zaberezinsky and Radziwill chose him to correspond with in 1492: he was selected by the Lithuanians, after all, because he was senior boyar of Moscow and as such most likely to influence his master; his written answer to Zaberezinsky was obviously dictated by Ivan III — indeed, much of the wording of his note of 15 November 1492 to Zaberezinsky is identical with the message Zakhar’in was told by Ivan to transmit to Zaberezinsky earlier in the year (SRIO, Vol. 35, pp. 78-9, 70); and his colleague, Yakov Zakhar’in, to whom Zaberezinsky and Radziwill also

З58

APPENDIX В

359

addressed themselves, not only survived the purge of 1499, but lived to carry on an identical correspondence — and again with Zaberezinsky — in 1501 (see ibid., pp. 313-4). As for Ivan’s references in 1503 to the behaviour of Ryapolovsky and V. I. Patrikeev, this has clearly nothing to do with their “treachery” or the reason for their punishment. Immediately before the words quoted by Bazilevich, Ivan instructed his envoys not to drink too much and not to dishonour their sovereign. The “arrogance” mentioned by Ivan is more likely to refer to their behaviour on some particular occasion than to “a serious divergence of views on policy” . Besides, no mention is made of Patrikeev senior, whose guilt was presumably the same as his son’s; and it is hardly likely that V. I. Patrikeev, had he committed some grave political indiscretion during his last recorded mission to Lithuania in 1494 would have been put in command of the second expeditionary force to Finland in the winter of 1495-6 (see above, p. 172; note also that Ryapolovsky led an expedition to Kazan’ in 1496 — P SR L VIII/231 ). As for Vasily’s appointment as grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov in March 1499, Bazilevich considers this to have been the result of Sofia’s willingness to fall in with Ivan’s plans as regards Russo-Lithuanian relations: “evidently Sofia’s reconciliation with the grand prince was achieved at the cost of her full submission to her husband in questions of Muscovite-Lithuanian relations” (Bazilevich, op. cit., p. 375). At the same time the appointment, Bazilevich thinks, was a gesture intended to prevent the Lithuanians interpreting Ivan’s quarrels with his wife and son as a sign of internal weakness (see ibid., p. 375). Cherepnin also considers that the execution of Ryapolovsky and the disgrace of the Patrikeevs was closely linked with the beginning of the war with Lithuania, and that Patrikeev senior was an “advocate of Russo-Lithuanian rapprochement”. To substanti­ ate his arguments Cherepnin mentions the correspondence with Zaberezinsky. He also attempts to link up the events of 1499 with Russo-Moldavian relations: “the disgrace of Dmitry and Elena Stepanovna”, he argues, “was caused by the unwillingness of Elena’s father to enter the war on the side of Ivan III against Lithuania. Thus [1] the Patrikeevs belonged to the party of Elena Stepanovna which had declared against war with Lithuania” (Cherepnin, R F A , Vol. 2, pp. 315-6). As, however, there could

360

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

have been no indication of Stephen’s “unwillingness to enter the war” as early as January 1499 (Ivan first heard of Alexander’s treaty with Stephen in August 1499 — before that he had no reason to suspect Stephen’s friendship), and as the news of Vasily’s appointment, misinterpreted perhaps, may well have contributed to the reason for Stephen’s strange volte face, little attention should be paid to Cherepnin’s somewhat extravagant arguments. Indeed, there is no evidence and no justification whatsoever for his claims that the Elena-Dmitry faction was opposed to the war. Cherepnin, however, goes still further and advances yet another, still more anachronistic, explanation for the purge. Both the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky, he points out, were closely connected with the courts of Vasily II and Ivan III; in all their activities they had always shown themselves close adherents of the anti-separatist policy of the grand prince; they belonged to “that section of the . . . Muscovite boyarstvo which . . . fought on the side of the grand princely power against the opposition coming from individual feudal centres” (ibid., p. 314). As the opponents of “feudal separatism” they objected, so Cherepnin argues, to the support given by the grand prince to “Russian émigré princes who came from the milieu of the enemies of the Muscovite grand princely power” (ibid., p. 315). Ryapo­ lovsky and the Patrikeevs may well have sympathized with Ivan in his struggle against the old appanage system. But surely it is going a little too far to assume that the punishment of the boyars was “in some way conditioned by the defection to Moscow of the descendants of those appanage princes who had waged feudal war against the Muscovite princes [?] in the days of Vasily II ”. In other words, the Patrikeevs and Ryapolovsky were removed because they objected to the Muscovite government’s willingness to accept the service of Vasily Ivanovich Shemyachich and Semen Ivanovich Mozhaysky, the only two defectors who fit Cherepnin’s description. The absurdity of this theory becomes evident when we consider that Shemyachich and Mozhaysky transferred their allegiance to Moscow fifteen months after the arrest of the boyars (see above, pp. 214 sq.). It is also hard to accept Cherepnin’s explanation of Vasily’s appointment as grand prince of Novgorod and Pskov as a step “to strengthen the western frontiers of the Russian state in the event of the impending war with Lithuania” (ibid., p. 315).

APPENDIX В

361

Lur’e has so far written little about the removal of the boyars. Without committing himself, he states that “the disgrace of Ryapolovsky and the Patrikeevs . . . was linked with questions of foreign policy” (Kazakova and Lur’e, AED, p. 168), and rejects the view that the boyars were connected with the Elena-Dmitry faction. Kuritsyn’s links with Ryapolovsky and the Patrikeevs he considers “doubtful and unproved” . At the same time he points out that there is no evidence to show that the boyars concerned were in any way hostile to Vasily. As for A. A. Zimin and I. I. Smirnov, both consider that the boyars, “the very top of the feudal aristocracy,” supported Elena and Dmitry (see I. I. Smirnov, VI, No. 11, p. 143; A. A. Zimin, “O politicheskoy doktrine Iosifa . . .”); their views are based mainly on the un­ reliable evidence of the Stepennaya Kniga, which links the punisment of the boyars with the beginning of Ivan’s “disregard” for his grandson.

APPENDIX С The Descendants of Ivan I Ivan I

Andrey of Serpukhov

I

Л еяII

Vladimir

Pomftoy

D m itry

Maria Goltyaeva = Yaroslav

Vasily

Maria = Vasily I I

Maria of Tver* - I v a n I I I — Sofia

Elena Stepanovna = Ivan

D m itry

Vastly I I I

Yury

Vasily I

Yury I Patnkeevich= Maria

Yury

Yury

Andrey the Elder

Dmitry

Boris

Vasily Kosoy

Andrey the Younger Semen

Andrey of Mozhaysk

Dmitry Krasny

Ivan

Andrey

Elena = Alexander

Ivan of Mozhaysk

Mikhail of Vereya

Semen

Vasily

A PPENDIX D

The Descendants of Jagiello

Jagiello (Wladyslaw Jagiello)

Wladislaw I I I

Wladislaw (Ladislas) King of Bohemia and Hungary

Casimir IV

Jan Olbracht

AlexanderSigismun

363

APPENDIX E The Descendants of the Daughters of Vasily I Vasily I

Yury I Patrikeevich= Maria

Alexander | Olel’ko = Anastasia of Kiev CO

P4

Stephen IV 1 of Moldavia = Evdokia

E lena= Ivan

Dmitry

Mikhail (Olerkovich)

0

=Y ury of Pro nek

Ivan of Pronek

Fedosia = Semen Yur*evich[?]

Semen Ryapoloveky =

Ivan Mynin

Vasily (Vassian)

Daniil Shchenya

GLOSSARY altyn: coin, value of 3 copecks or 6 den*gas. boyar: nobleman, member of gentry. boyar children: lesser gentry, minor landowners, minor nobility. boyarstvo: nobility, gentry. chelobit'e: petition. darugi: Tatar tax inspectors. danshchiki: tax agents. deriga: coin, value of half a copeck. duma: council. dvoryane, dvoryanstvo: minor service nobility, members of prince’s “court” or army. d'yak: secretary, civil servant. d'yak wedenny: d'yak with membership of State Council. gospodin: lord, master. gosudar': sovereign. gramota: document. Kaluzhane: men of Kaluga. kika: married woman’s headdress. kormlenie: lit. “feeding” — system of provincial administration whereby governor is “fed” at the expense of those governed. menovnaya gramota: deed of exchange. mirza: Tatar prince. namestnik: lieutenant, governor. oghlan: member of Tatar princely family. opala: disgrace. otchina: patrimony, hereditary estate. ot'ezd: right of departure, right to leave one’s master, or sovereign. pan: lord (West Russia). podvoysky pristav: usher, senior legal or police official. poklon: greeting. pomest'e: land granted on precarious tenure in reward for service. posad: outskirts of town (outside city fortifications). posadnik: mayor. prigorod: borough or town administratively dependent on larger town. 365

366

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

rada: council (West Russia). razryady : list of military appointments, order of battle. sluzhily knyaz' : service prince. starets: elder, senior monk. Toropchane : men of Toropets. tsarevich: son of Tatar khan. tysyatsky: commander of a thousand men. udel («adj. udeVny): appanage. veche: popular assembly. verst: 3,500 feet — about two-thirds of a mile. voevoda: military commander, general, governor of town or province. voivode: local ruler (south-east Europe). volost': district. vykhod: annual Tatar tax. vyvod: deportation. yasak: Tatar tribute. zhalovannaya gramota: deed of grant.

L IS T OF W ORKS C IT E D AND ABBREVIATIONS AE See Akty Arkheograficheskoy ekspeditsii. AED See Kazakova and Lur’e. Akty arkheograficheskoy ekspeditsii (AE), 4 vols. (SPb, 1836). Akty otnosyashchiesya k istorii zapadnoy Rusi (.AZR), 5 vols. (SPb, 1 8 4 6 - 5 3 ).

Akty sotsiaTno-ekonomicheskoy istorii severo-vostochnoy Rusi kontsa X IV — nachala X V I v (ASEI), eds. B. D. Grekov and L. V. Cherepnin, 2 vols. (A.N. SSSR, Moscow, 1952-8). Alderson, A. D., The structure of the Ottoman dynasty (Oxford, 1956). A.N. SSSR — Akademiya Nauk S.S.S.R. A SE I See Akty sotsiaTno-ekonomicheskoy istorii. . . . AZR See Akty otnosyashchiesya k istorii zapadnoy Rusi. Backus, О. P., Motives of West Russian Nobles in deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377-1514 (University of Kansas Press, 1957). Bazilevich, К. V., “Novgorodskie pomeshchiki iz posluzhil’tsev v kontse XV v.” IZ , No. 14, 1945, pp. 62-80. ----- Vneshnyaya politika Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. Vtoraya polovina X V veka (VP) (Moscow, 1952). Cambridge History of Poland (CHP), Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1950). Cherepnin, L. V., Russkie feodaVnye arkhivy X IV -X V vekov (RFA), 2 vols. (A.N. SSSR, 1948-51). CHP See Cambridge History of Poland. Chteniya v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti (Chteniya) (Moscow). Contarini, Ambrogio, Travels to Tana and Persia by Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini (London, Hakluyt Society, 1873). Cromer, Martin, De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum (Basel, 1554). DDG See Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty velikikh i udeVnykh knyazey X IV -X V vekov. Dhigosz, Historia Polonica (Leipzig, 1712). Drevneyshaya Razryadnaya Kniga (DRK), Chteniya (Moscow, 1902, Book 1). DRK See Drevneyshaya Razryadnaya Kniga. Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty velikikh i udeVnykh knyazey X IV -X V vekov (DDG), eds. S. V. Bakhrushin and L. V. Cherepnin (A.N. SSSR, 1950). 367

368

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Fennell, J. L. I., “The attitude of the Josephians and the TransVolga Elders to the Heresy of the Judaisers,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 73, June 1951, pp. 486-509. Forsten, G. V., Bor'ba iz-za gospodstva na Baltiyskom more v X V i X V I stoletiyakh (SPb, 1884). Fraknoi, W., Mathias Corvinus, König von Ungarn (Freiburg, 1891). Gennady, Archbishop, Epistle to the Council of Bishops, Kazakova and Lur’e, AED, Appx. No. 19, pp. 379-82. ----- Epistle to Ioasafy Kazakova and Lur’e, AEDt Appx. No. 16, p p . 3 1 6 -2 0 .

----- Epistle to Zosima> Kazakova and Lur’e, AEDt Appx. No. 18, PP- 374- 9Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova (GVNiP), ed. S. N. Valk (A.N. SSSR, 1949). GVNiP See Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova. Hammer, J. von, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Pest, 1828). Herberstein, Baron Sigismund von, Rerum Moscoviticarum Comentariiy translated into English by E. H. Major (London, Hakluyt Society, 1851). IL See Ioasafovskaya Letopis*. Ioasafovskaya Letopis'y ed. A. A. Zimin (A.N. SSSR, 1957). Iorga, N., Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale (Akademia Românâ, Bucarest, 1937). Istoricheskie Zapiski (IZ) (Moscow). Istoriya russkoy literatury (A.N. SSSR). IZ See Istoricheskie Zapiski. Jablonowski, Horst, Westrussland zwischen Wilna und Moskau, Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas (Leiden, 1955). Joseph of Volokolamsk, Epistle to Mitrofan, Poslaniya Iosifa Volotskogot pp. 175-8 (also: AEDt Appx. No. 27, pp. 436-8). ----- Epistle to Nifont, Poslaniya Iosifa Volotskogo, pp. 160-72 (also: AEDy Appx. No. 25, pp. 424-33). ----- Skazanie 0 novoyavivsheysya eresi {Skazanie), AEDt Appx. No. 28, pp. 466-86. Karamzin, N. M., Istoriya gosudarstva rossiyskogo. Karge, P., “Kaiser Friedrich’s III. und Maximilian’s I Ungarische Politik und ihre Beziehungen zu Moskau, 1486-1506”. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschafty Band 9, Heft 1 (Freiburg and Leipzig, 1893).

LIST OF WORKS CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS

369

Kazakova, N. A. and Lurie, Ya. S., Antifeodal'nye ereticheskie dvizherdya na Rusi X IV — nachala X V I veka (AED) (A.N. SSSR, 1955). Klyuchevsky, V. O., Drevnerusskie zhitiya svyatykh kak iüorichesky istochnik (Moscow, 1871). Kurs russkoy istorii (Sochineniya, 8 vols., Moscow, 1956-9). Kopanev, A. I., Istoriya zemlevladerdya Belozerskogo kraya (A.N. SSSR, 1951). Kurbsky, Prince A. M., Istoriya о velikom knyaze Moskovskom, RIB, Vol. 31. Lurie, Ya. S., “Boriba tserkvi s velikoknyazheskoy vlast’yu v kontse 70-kh— pervoy poloviny 80-kh godov XV v.” {abbr. “Boriba tserkvi . . .”), TODRL, Vol. XIV, 1958, pp. 219-28. ----- “Iz istorii politicheskoy boriby pri Ivane III” {abbr. “Iz istorii . . .”), Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, No. 80, 1941, pp. 75-92. ----- “ K voprosu ob ideologii Nila Sorskogo”, TODRL, Vol. XIII, 1957, pp. 182-213. ----- “O vozniknovenii teorii ‘Moskva — trety Rim* ”, TODRL, Vol. XVI. i960, pp. 626-33. ----- “Pervye ideologi Moskovskogo samoderzhaviya (S. Paleolog i ее protivniki)” {abbr. “Pervye ideologi . . .”), Leningradsky Gosudarstvenny Pedagogichesky Institut imeni A. I. Gertsena, uchenye zapiski, Vol. 78, 1948, pp. 86-101. ----- “Poslanie vePmozhe Ioannu о smerti knyazya” {abbr. “Poslanie vel’mozhe . . .”), Slavia, Casopis pro slovanskou filologii (Praha, 1958, Se§it 2, pp. 216-25). NL See Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis\ Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis* starshego i mladshego izvodov {NL) (A.N. SSSR, 1950). Ocherki istorii SS S R , perioda feodalizma IX -X V v.v.. Part 2, (A.N. SSSR, 1953). Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheny Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi {PDS), 10 vols. (SPb, 1951-71). Pavlov, A. S., Istorichesky ocherk sekulyarizatsii tserkovnykh zemel* v Rossii (Odessa, 1871). PDS See Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheny. Pierling, P., La Russie et le Saint-Siège (Paris, 1896). PL See Pskovskie letopisi. Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey {PSRL). Poslaniya Iosifa Volotskogo, eds. A. A. Zimin and Ya. S. Lurie (A.N. SSSR, 1959).

370

IVAN THE GREAT OF MOSCOW

Pskovskie letopisi (PL), ed. A. Nasonov, Vols, i and 2 (A.N. SSSR, 1947- 55)PSRL See Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey. RFA See Cherepnin, L. V., Russkie feodaVnye arkhivy. RIB See Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka. Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka (RIB), 39 vols. (SPb, 1872-1927). Riissow, Balthasar, Chronica der Provintz Lyffland, Scriptores Rerum Livoniearum, Vol. 2 (Riga and Leipzig, 1848). Sarnicius, Stanislaus, Annales Poloniae (Leipzig, 1712). Sawa, V. I., Moskovskie tsari i Vizantiyskie vasilevsy, (Kharkov, 1901). Sbomik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (SRIO) 148 vols. (SPb, 1867-1916). Semenov, P., Geografichesko-statistichesky slovar’ Rossiyskoy Imperii (SPb, 1862). Seton-Watson, R. W., A history of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1934). Smirnov, I. I., Review of Bazilevich’s VP, Voprosy Istorii, 1952, No. ii, pp. 139-44. Smirnov, N. A., Rossiya i Turtsiya v X V I-X V II w . (Uchenye Zapiski MGU, vyp. 94, Moscow, 1946). Solov’ev, S. M., Istoriya Rossiis drevneyshikh vremen, ed. “Obshchestvennaya Pol’za”, (SPb). SRIO See Sbomik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva. Stora Rimchronika (Scriptores rerum Sveciciarum medii aevi, Upsala, 1818). Struve, P. B., SotsiaVnaya i ekonomicheskaya istoria Rossii, (Paris, 1952). Tikhomirov, M. N., ‘Tz ‘Vladimirskogo Letopistsa’ ”, IZ, No. 15,1945. TODRL See Trudy Otdela Drevnerusskoy Literatury. Trudy Otdela Drevnerusskoy Literatury (TODRL) (A.N. SSSR, Institut Russkoy literatury). Tsereteli, E., Elena Ioannovna, Velikaya Knyaginya Litovskaya, Russkaya, Koroleva PoVskaya. (SPb, 1898). Übersberger, H., Österreich und Russland seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts (Vienna and Leipzig, 1906). UL See Ustyuzhsky Letopisny Svod. Ustyuzhsky Letopisny Svod (UL), ed. K. N. Serbina (A.N. SSSR, x950)Vernadsky, G. The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953). ----- Russia at the dawn of the modem age (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959).

LIST OF WORKS CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS

371

Veselovsky, S. B. Féodal'noe zemlevladenie v severovostochnoy Rust (A.N. SSSR, 1947). “Vladimir Gusev — sostavitel* sudebnika 1497 goda,” JZ,

No. s, 1939, pp. 31-47. VP See Bazilevich, Vneshnyaya Politika. Zimin, A. A., “ O politicheskoy doktrine Iosifa Volotskogo,” TODRL, Vol. IX, 1953, pp. 159-77-

IN D EX Abash Ulan, 104 Abd-al-Latif, 181,182-5, 206, 223 Abdul Kerim, Khan of Astrakhan', 103, 104,252 Abo (Turku), 166, 172,173,174 Afanas’ev, Elevfery Ivanovich, 48 Afanas’ev, Ivan, 48 Agalak, Khan, 183-4 Agish, Kazan' Beg, 179-81,182 Ahmed, Khan of the Great Horde, 67-88, 92, 298, 305, 310, 312, 313,

42, 63, 64, 73-8, 79, 80, 81, 83, 104, 135, 136, 146, 291, 292-305, 307, ж З09, 3 io , 314, 341 346, 350, 35i

Andrey Vasirevich the Younger, Prince, brother of Ivan III, xiii, 24, 35,42, 79-80, 81,291, 293,299-300, З01, 304, 307, 309, 310, 312, 346,

350

Anne of Brittany, 124 Arkhangel’sky Cathedral, 327, 330 Arsky Gorodok, 181 Assumption Cathedral, see Uspensky Cathedral Astrakhan', town and khanate, 15,103, 104,179,244,278-9, 303 Aukstaitia, 9 Avdot’ya Ivanovna, daughter of Ivan H I, 324 Ayeeha, daughter of Mengli Girey, 188 Äyräpää, 170,171 Azi-Baba, Tatar envoy, 89 Azov, 104,187-8,191

З41

Ahmed Girey, 200 Akkerman, see Cetatea Alba Aland, island, 172 Alderson, A. D., 188 Alegam, see Ali Khan Aleksey, heretic, 325, 327, 332 Aleksin, 68-9, 76, 79, 80,293, 298, 299 Alexander, son of Stephen IV, 111 Alexander, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania, 130, 131, 140, 141, 143, 144-5, 146, 147-53, 154163, 169, 173, 189, 194, 196, 197, 198-9, 201, 202-7, 208, 212-20, 221-2, 224-5, 228-36, 238, 239, 242-4, 248-9, 250, 251, 252, 253254, 256, 257-61, 262-9, 272, 273274, 276, 277-80, 281-6, 314, 335, ЗЗ8, 342, 344, 349, 351, З52, 353, 354, З56, 358, 360

Alexander VI, Pope, 163, 262, 268, 273, 274 Alexander Fedorovich, Prince of Yaroslavl’, 5 Alexander Nevsky, 15,165 Ali Khan, Khan of Kazan’, 93-6, 179, 184 Anan’in, Vasily, 48 Anastasia, mother of Mikhail Boriso­ vich of T ver’, 61 Anastasia Vasil’evna, Princess, sister of Vasily II, 39, 85 Andersen, secretary of John of Den­ mark, 177 Andrew Palaeologus, brother of Sofia Palaeologa, 313, 322, 334 Andrey Dmitrievich, Prince of Mozhaysk, 307, 308, 315 Andrey Ivanovich, Prince, son of Ivan Ш ,з ° 6 Andrey Vasil'evich the Elder, Prince, brother of Ivan III, xiii, 24, 27, 35,

Babich, Yury, Prince, 175 Backus, О. P., 39 Baden, Margrave of, 120,122 Bali Bey, 207, 208, 209 Baltic Sea, 6, 16, 31 Baltic Provinces, 15-6, 167 sq. Bartashevich, Stanislav, 221 Basenok, Fedor, 35 Baty, Khan, 79 Bavaria, 281 Bayezid II, Sultan, 101-4, 109-10, i n , 113, 185, 186-95, 200, 231, 247-8, 280 Bazilevich, К. V., v, 4, 21, 39, 40, 56, 72, 73, 78, 81, 85, 86, 92, 94, 97, 117, 127, 130, 131, 134, 140, 148, 182, 198, 239, 241, 254, 256, 264, 277, 280, 302, 318, 319, 338, 339, 346, 355-6, 357, 358-9 Beatrix of Aragon, Queen qf Hungary, 123, 128 Beklemishev, Nikita Vasil’evich, 70 Beklemishev, Semen, 69 Beklemishev, see also Bersen’Beklemishev Belaya Volozhka (Belaya), river, 23 Belev, 133, 134, 140, 144, 152 Belevsky, Andrey Vasil’evich, Prince,

373

139,144

374

INDEX

Belevsky, Ivan Vasil’evich, Prince,

138, 139,144

Belevsky, Vasily Vasil’evich, Prince,

139,144

Belgorod, see Cetatea Alba Beloe, 258 Beloozero, town and district, 1, 184, 300, 308, 309, 3U -3, 314, 321-2, 323, ЗЗ6, 340-1, 345, 347 Bely, 86,134,136, 269, 272 Bel’sky, Fedor Ivanovich, Prince, 85-6, 90, 13З, 135, 136, 139, 146, 184, 214,249, 329 Bel’sky, Semen Ivanovich, Prince, 214-5, 217-8, 219, 221, 225, 265, 269,282, 341 Belz, 226.253 Berest’e (Brest-Litovsk), 8, 226 Berezina, river, tributary of Dnepr, 86, 270 Berezina, Western, river, 86, 216, 227, 250 Bemadine Order, 214, 215, 219, 265, 284 Bersen’-Beklemishev, Ivan Nikitich, 140, 250, 259, 274, 275, 276, 314, 320,342 Besed, river, 270 Besputa, 79 Bessarion, Cardinal, 316-7 Bezhetsky Verkh, xiii, 305 Bezzubtsov, Konstantin Alexan­ drovich, 24-7 Bezzubtsov, Mikhail Konstantino­ vich, 184 Black Russia, 8, 9 Black Sea, 70, 107, n o , 113, 187, 194, 199,206 Black Sea Expedition (1497), 195, 202-7, 344 Bogush, Lithuanian envoy, 232 Boguslaw, Duke of Pomerania, 126 Bohemia, 43,118,262 Boltin, Vasily Ivanovich, 131 Bonumbre, Antonio, Cardinal, Bishop of Ajaccio, 70, 318 Borch, von der, Bernhard, 74,77 Boretsky, Dmitry Isaakovich, 44 Boretsky, Fedor Isaakovich, 48 Boretsky, Isaak, 36 Boretsky, Marfa, 36, 38-41,44,48, 54 Boris Alexandrovich. Grand Prince of T ver’, x, xii, 3,4,61 Boris Semenovich, Namestnik of Lyubutsk and Mtsensk, 141 Boris Vasil’evich, Prince, brother of Ivan III, xiii, 22, 42, 03, 64, 73-8, 79, 80, 81, 83, 104, 291, 292-306,

309,314

Borovsk, 83, 296-7, 309,313

Borovsk monastery, 321 Borozdin, Ivan Borisovich, 237, 240, 241 Borozdin, Petr Borisovich, 237, 240 Bosnia, 107 Bothnia, Gulf of, 172. 173 Boyar Children, 59, 60, 294, 347, 352, 357 Brandenburg, Margrave of, 281 Bratslav (Bradaw) 196, 202, 203, 204205, 207, 226, 253 Breslau, 119, 128, 130 Brest, see Berest’e Brittany, 126, 129 Brunkenburg, 167 Bryansk, 140, 220-1, 223, 256, 269, 270 Bryukho, Ivan, Prince, 175 Buda, 112, 115, 116, 123, 125, 128, 233, 262 Bug, Southern, river, 196, 198, 199, 201, 209 Bug, Western, river, 8 Bukovina, 206, 207 Bulgaria, 107, 203, 322 Burash Seyyid, T atar general, 104 Bumash, Sheykh Ahmed’s envoy, 252 Bumash Girey, son of Mengli Girey,

251-4,257

Byshkovichi, 139 Byvaletsky-Vyazemsky, Vasily, Prince,

135

Byzantium, 186, 316, 319-20 Carpathian Mountains, 209 Casimir, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania, xiv, 3, 12, 33, 34, 36^7, 38-42, 43, 51, 55, 61, 63, 64, 67-8, 69, 70-1, 72-3, 75-^7, 79, 80, 81—2, 83, 84—6, 87, 88—92, 97, 99, 100-1, 104, 107, 109, 110—11, 112, 114-5, 116-7, 118, 119, 124, 125, 126, 130, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139,140, 141, 144, 146, 149, 151, 197,224, 258, 279, 295, 297, 298, 301,304,314,329 Caspian Sea, 13 Catherine II, Empress, 354 Catlebuga, n o Caves, Monastery of, (Kiev), 91 Cetatea Alba, 103, 109-10, 113, 186, 194,199, 200, 203, 207, 209, 279 Charles V III, King of France, 126, 129,188 Chelishchev, Boris Fedorovich, 206 Chelyadnin, Andrey Fedorovich, 172, 223 Chelyadnin, Petr Fedorovich, 68 Chelm, 226 Cheremisians, 20, 23

INDEX Cheremisians, land of, 20, 21 Cherepnin, L. V., v, xiii, 40, 45, 62, 63, 146, 292, 29s, 299, 300, 302, 303, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, ЭН, 337, ЗЗ8, 346, 349, 350, 351,

,

,

355 356 359-60

Cherkassky Gorodok (Cherkasy), 217, 269 Chernigov, town and district, 8, 9, 10, 149, 150, 198, 200, 220, 223, 224, 227, 269, 270, 272, 275, 277 Chilia, 109-10, 113, 209 Christian of Oldenburg, King of Denmark, 167-8 Christopher, King of Denmark, 166-7 Chronik vom Pfqffenkriege, 85 Chudov Monastery, 56, 57, 58, 328 Chudskoe, Lake, see Peipus, Lake Colmar, 129,130 Conrad III, Prince of Mazovia, 148 Constantine X I, Emperor, 316 Constantinople, 103, 160, 186, 187, 189,190-1,192,193, 207, 279, 319 Contarim, Ambrogio, 334 Copenhagen, 168, 169 Courland, 16 Cracow, 198, 208, 253, 254 Crimea, 14, 15, 71, 85, 99, 102, 103, 108-9, n o -1 1 , 113, 116, 189, 206, 226, 244,252, 303 Crimean Horde, 13, 19, 66-7, 69-73, 88-92, 96, 97-9, 101-5, 106, 126, 140, 161, 194, 195, 196, 197-202, 203-4, 205, 206-7, 208-10, 21I, 213, 224-30, 235, 246, 247-8, 251254, 258, 259-60,274-80,283 Croatia, 188 Cromer, Martin, 216, 226, 231 Csezeliczky, Maty as, 233-4 Cyril, Saint, see W hite Lake Monastery Dalecarlia, 167 Dalmatov, Vasily T ret’yak, 135, 177178 Daniar, Tsarevich, 294 Danube, riven 109,199, 202, 203, 207 Danzig, 85, 86, 127, 173, 176 Darugi, 217 Dashkovich, Astafy, 238 David, Danish envoy, 168, 284 Davydov, Grigory Fedorovich, 238 Delator, Della Torre, see T h u m Deman (Dem’yansk), 136, 329 Denis, heretic, 325, 327, 330 Denmark, 16, 126, 148, 166-71, 176178,211, 281, 284 D erpt (Dorpat, Tartu), 15, 16, 74, 242 Desna, river, 200, 220, 221, 223, 247, 269, 270

375

Devich’i Gory, 244 Dhigosz, 39 Dmitrov (north of Moscow), xiii, 24, 64,292,294, 301 Dmitrov (on the Ugra), 136,151,152 Dmitry Andreevich, Prince, son of Andrey VasiPevich the Elder, 304 Dmitry Donskoy, Grand Prince of Moscow, ix, 3, 5, 214, 289, 292,

307, ЭЮ

Dm itry Ivanovich, Grand Prince, grandson of Ivan III, 61-2, 172, 231, 232, 258-9, 313, 316, 323, 324, 334-43, 345, 347, 348-52, 353, 355, 359, 361 Dmitry Ivanovich, Prince, son of Ivan III, 249-50, 253, 256, 261, 275, 276, 281,324,335, З42 Dmitry Yur’evich Krasny, Prince, x Dmitry Yur’evich Shemyaka, Prince, x-xii, 7, 14,33-4, 36 Dnepr, river, 1, 8, 13, 19, 99, 101, 102, 198, I99, 200, 202, 209-IO, 214, 220, 221, 224, 236, 244, 247-8, 251, 252, 269, 270, 271, 276, 280 Dnestr, river, 8, 103, 199, 203, 204, 206, 207, 209, 344 Dobrynsky family, 346 Don, river, 4,67, 86,191,244,245 Donets, Seversky, river, 99, 244, 246, 247 Dorogobuzh, 220, 221, 222-3, 269, 270 Dorogobuzhsky, Osip Andreevich, Prince, 63-4, 257 Drokov, 223, 269,270 Dubno, 135 Dumovo, Chavka Vasil’evich, 256 Dvina, Northern, river, xii, 1, 6, 7, 40, 41,44,165, 17З, 254 Dvina, Western, river, 19, 153, 224, 249,270, 272 Elena Ivanovna, eldest daughter of Ivan III and wife of Alexander, King of Poland, 154-63» *97» 201» 212-4, 216, 217, 219, 235, 263, 264265, 267, 273, 280, 281, 283-4, 286, 324, 335, 347, 349, 35L 356, 358 Elena Ivanovna, second daughter of Ivan III, 324 Elena Stepanovna, daughter-in-law of Ivan III, 61-2, 108-9, 155, 196, 231, 232, 258-9, 313, З16, 323-4, 333-5, 337-8, 340-3, 348-52, 353, 356-7, 359, 361 Elets, 4 Elizarov, Yury, 135 El’nya, 222 Engelbrecht, 166

З76

INDEX

Epancha, “son of the Crimean tsar”,

80, 302-3, 305, 310-11, 328, 329,

Eropkin, Fedor Stepanovich, 110 Eropkin, see also Klyapik-Eropkin Esthonia, 15 Evdokia, wife of Stephen IV of Moldavia, 108 Evfimy, Archbishop of Novgorod, 33-4

Gesgaylov, Stanislav Yanovich, 150-

201

Fedor Borisovich, Prince, nephew of Ivan III, 223, 305, 306, 349 Fedor Grigor’evich, Lithuanian envoy, 219 Fedor Vasil’evich, Prince of Ryazan’,

141, ИЗ

Fennell, J. L. I., 330 Feodosia Alexandrovna, Princess, sister-in-law of Stephen IV of Moldavia, 108 Feodosy, Metropolitan of Moscow,

309

Feofil, Archbishop of Novgorod, 38-9, 40, 44, 48-9, 50, 51, 52-4, 56-7, 327, 328 Feti Girey, son of Mengli Girey, 251254 Filimonov, Gleb Semenovich. 24 Filimonov, Vasily Semenovich, 24 Filofey, Bishop of Perm’, 337 Finland, 6, 16, 165, 167, 169, 170-1, 172-4,176-8,180,189, 359 Finland, Gulf of, 30,164,172 Fioraventi, Aristotel, 64,94 Flanders, 124 Foma, priest, 157-8 Forsten, G. V., 165, 166, 167, 169, 170,171,173, 176,177 Fraknoi, W., 124 France, 126, 129,130,281 Frankfurt, 122,125 Frederick, Emperor, 117, 118-23 Frederyk Jagiellon, Cardinal, 264, 281 Galich (northern), ix, xii, 1, 20, 21, 22, ^ 24, 146 Galich (on the Dnestr), 258 Galicia, 8, 31,201,252-4, 258, 285 Gartinger, 131 Gasztold, Martin, 39 Gavrilov, Fedko, 202 Gdov, 73 Gedymin (Gediminas), Grand Prince of Lithuania, 8, 31,139 Gennady, Archbishop of Novgorod, 57, 58, 321, 325, 326, 328-33, 337, ЗЗ8, 340, 352 George, son of Stephen of Serbia, 281 Geronty, Metropolitan of Moscow,

ЗЗО

154

Gildorp, Ivan, 264 Glebovich, Stanislav, 146, 217, 264274,283-6, 346 Glebovich, Yury, 141 Glinsky, Bogdan, Prince, 223 Glinsky, Ivan, Prince, 89, 198-9 Glinsky, Princes, 135, 136 Golden Horde, see Great Horde Golokhvastov, Alexandr Yakovlevich, 192-3 Goltyaeva, Maria Fedorovna, 299 Gol’shansky, Ivan Yur’evich, Prince, 85-6 Gomel*, 220, 269, 270, 272 Gomza, Mitya, Moldavian envoy, 111 Gorbaty-Shuysky, see ShuyskyGorbaty Gorbaty-Suzdal’sky, see Suzdal’skyGorbaty Gorodets, see Kasimov Gorodishche Ryurikovo, 36, 48, 52 Gorodlo, Union of, 12 Goryn’, river, 225, 253 Gotland, 168 Great Horde, 12-3, 14, 15, 19, 55, 63, 66-88, 89, 90, 96, 97-105, i n , 179, 204, 206, 211, 225, 228, 229-30, 235, 237, 238, 239, 242-9, 251, 252, 258, 260, 263, 291, 294, 303, 305 Grigory, Metropolitan of Kiev, 11-2, 37, 38, 39 Gundorov, Ivan, Prince, 175 Gusev, Elizar Vasil’evich, 346 Gusev, Vladimir Elizarevich, 61-2, ЗЗ6, 346, 349, 355, З56-7 Gusev, Yushko Elizarevich, 135, 146,

147, З46

Gustinskaya Letopis\ 216 Hajji Girey, Khan, 13, 67, 69, 224, 279 Hammer, Joseph von, 207, 209 Hanseatic League, 16, 32,60,167, 170 Hapsburgs, ii7 s q . Haydar, brother of Mengli Girey, 72 Helmed, 242, 254 Herberstein, Sigismund von, Baron, 221,222, 319, 320, 342 Holy Roman Empire, 106,117-31 Horodlo, see Gorodlo Hungary, 43, 91, 106, 107, n o , h i , 112-7, 118, 123-4, 125, 126-7, 128130, 131, 188, 206, 213, 262, 330 Ibrahim, Khan, 21, 23, 24, 26-8, 92-3 Iglau, 118 Il’men’, Lake, 5-6, 34,42,43, 51

INDEX

Ingulets, river, 198 Innocent V III, Pope, 166 Ioann, Archbishop of Novgorod, 57 Iona, Archbishop of Novgorod, 34, 35-6, 37, 38,39 Iona, Bishop of Ryazan* and Metro­ politan of Moscow, xi, xiii, 12, 58, 321 Iorga, N., n o Iosif Bolgarinovich, Bishop of Smolensk and Metropolitan of Kiev, 212, 214,218,219 Irykhov, island, 26 Isaev, Fedor, Moldavian envoy, 232 Isidor, Metropolitan of Moscow, 11 Istoma, Andrey, 135 Ivak (Ibrahim-Ibak), Khan, 86-7, 96, 178-9 Ivan, d'yak, Hungarian envoy, 115, 116 Ivan, German sent to Pechora district,

131

Ivan I, Grand Prince of Moscow, 2,308 Ivan II, Grand Prince of Moscow, 151 Ivan IV, Grand Prince of Moscow and Tsar of Russia, 15,16,121 Ivan Andreevich, Prince of Mozhaysk, x-xi, 36,152, 307-8, 346 Ivan Andreevich, Prince, son of Andrey the Elder, 304 Ivan Borisovich, Prince, nephew of Ivan III, 223,105, 306, 307, 349 Ivan Borisovich (?), Prince, 249 Ivan Dmitrievich, Prince, son of Dmitry Yur’evich Shemyaka, 36 Ivan Fedorovich, Grand Prince of Ryazan*, 4, 5 Ivan Ivanovich, Prince of Rostov, 5 Ivan Ivanovich, Prince, son of Ivan III, xii, 22, 35, 42, 55, 61, 63, 64-5, 68, 79-80, 81, 108, 109, n o , 135, 136, 293, 300, 312, 316, 324, 333-4, 335, 337 “ Ivan Magister” , Danish envoy, 168 Ivan Maksimovich, heretic, 324, 353 Ivan Vasil’evich, Prince, son of Prince Vasily of Serpukhov, 308 Ivan Vladimirovich, Lithuanian Prince, 33 Ivan Volodimirovich, treasurer of Ivan III, 272 Ivan Yaroslavich, Prince, 152 Ivan Yur’evich, Prince of Pronsk, 108 Ivan Zinov’evich, Muscovite envoy to Moldavia, 109 Ivangorod, 174-5, 237, 239,242, 254 Izborsk, 74,77, 240,241,255 Jääski, 170,171,174 Jablonowski, H ., 86,138

377

Jagiello, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania, 10-11,12,79 James III, King of Scotland, 167 Jan Olbracht, King of Poland, 100-1, 103, u i , 117, 127, 130, 161, 194, 198, 203, 204, 206, 231, 232, 233, 234,236, 261, 284, 344 Jam Beg, Khan, 71 Jem, brother of Sultan Mehemmed. 188 Johann, Kurfürst of Saxony, 121 Johanna, sister of Queen Beatrix, 123 John (Hans), King of Denmark, 148, 166, 167-71,176-8 John Corvinus, son of Matthias Corvinus, 117,123 John (V III) Palaeologus, 122 Joseph, Abbot of Volokolamsk, 297, 306, 321, 324-7, 331-2, 350, 352 Judaisers, 321, 324-ЗЗ, 343“4, 353,

356

Kachka, Moldavian envoy, 232-3 Kaffa, 69,71, 97, 187-8, 189, 190,191, 192-3, 207 Kalimet, Kazan* Beg, 179-81, 182, 183 Kalmar, 171,177 Kaluga, 2, 76, 80, 81, 134, 137, 138, 140,227, 228,229,298, 299 Kama, river, 20,22-3, 27,93 Kamenets, 203 Kamlak, Crimean envoy, 207 Kanev, 269 Karachev, 269 Karachev, Mitrofan Fedorovich, 259 Karamyshev, Vasily, n o Karamzin, N. M., 339, 343 Karelia, 165, 169, 170-1, 172-3,178 Karge, P., 11 8 ,119,124 Kargopol*, 95 Karpovich, Semen, 257 Kashin, 2 Kashinka, river, 2 Kashira, 182 Kasim, Tsarevich, 14-5,20-1,26 Kasimov, 14, 34,96 Kassian, Archimandrite of Yur’ev Monastery, 331 Kazakova, N. A., 49, 325, 327, 328, 3*9» ЗЗО, ЗЗ1, 33*, ЗЗ6, 341, З51,

356,361

Kazan’, town, khanate and district, 7, 8, 13-5, 19-28, 88, 92-7, 103-4, 105,166, 176, 178-85, 206, 211,223, 237, *44, *47, 250, 253, 280, 291, 353, 359 „ , Kazimir, envoy of Mengli Girey, h i Kemi, river, 173 Kerch, 71

З78

IN DEX

Korostyn’, 43,44,62, 68 Khalek, son of Ahmed, 279 Korobov, Andrey, 339 Khersones, 71 Korovnichi, island, 25, 26 Khlepen’, 135, 140,149,150 Koshkin-Zakhar’in, see Zakhar'in Khlynov, see Vyatka Kostroma, town and district, 1, 21, 24, Khodkevich, Ivan, 91 Khoja Kokos, 69 59 Kotel’nich, 20,22 Kholm (on river Lovat’), 140,152, 329 Kozel’sk, 4,134,149,150,152 Kholmogory, 44 Kozhanov, Boris, 20 Kholmsky, Daniil Dmitrievich, Krasnoe, 258 Prince, 21,42,68, 95 Krasny, 254 Kholmsky, Mikhail Dmitrievich, Krasnystaw, 226 Prince, 64 Kraénik, 226 Kholmsky, Semen Danilovich, Prince, Kremenets, 81,83 182 Krevo, Treaty of, 12 Kholmsky, Vasily Danilovich, Krichev, 239, 269 Prince, 184,249, 250,261 Kroehinesk, 135 Khotetovo, 138,214,219 Kubena, district, xiii, 300 KhotimT, 269, 270 Kubensky, Ivan Semenovich, Prince, Khotun’, xiii, 183, 292,294 224-5, 226, 232 Khozyak, son of Ahmed, 279 Kubensky, Lake, xiii Khrebtovich, Yan Lyutavor, 155 Kuchyukovich, Voytekh, 202 Kichmenga, 22 Kiev, town and district, 8, 9, 10, 11, Kulm, 86 Kuntsevich, Matvey, Polish envoy, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 40, 72, 86, 91-2, 284 109, 125, 160, 189,190,197,198, Andrey Mikhaylovich, 199, 200, 212, 217,226,227,228, Kurbsky, 229, 236, 247, 249,251,253,260, Prince, 289, 320, 334, 342 269, 272, 273, 275,279,280,285, Kurbsky-Karamysh, Mikhail Fedoro­ vich, Prince, 223, 237, 240,249 353 Kuritsyn, Fedor, n o , 112-5,120,128, Kika, 157 Kirey, Polish envoy, 67 154,186,194,212,219,330-2, 333, Kirov, see Vyatka 349, 361 Kuritsyn, Ivan Volk, 128, 204, 331, Kishka, Stanislav Petryashkovich, 205, 208, 214,218-20 344,353 Kutuzov, Andrey Semenovich, 213 Kliment, Hungarian envoy, 114 Kutuzov, Boris, 159 Klyapik-Eropkin, Mikhail, 128-9,131, Kutuzov, Mikhail Vasil'evich, 90,196 154,160-1,184 Klyaz’ma, river, 22,24 Kuzminsky, Fedor, 114-5 Klyuchevsky, V- O., 57, 343, 348 Ladislas II, see Jagiello Knutsson, Karl, 166-7 Ladislas III, King of Poland, 12 Kobyl’e, 74 Ladoga, Lake, 6,164,165,173 Kokshenga, river, xii Kola Peninsula, 173 Ladoga, town, 34 Kolomna, ix, 4 ,24,48,68, 80,235 Latvia, 15 Lazarev, Dmitry, d’yak, 70 Kolomyya, n o , 196, 230,258 Kolychev, Andrey Andreevich, 237 Leon, Magister, 334 Kolychev, Mikhail Andreevich, 237 Lezajsk, 226 Kolychev-Loban, Ivan Andreevich, Likhorev, David, 246 Likhorev, Ivan Dmitrievich, n o 198, 237 Königsberg, 127, 128 Liminka, river, 174 Konstantin, d’yak, Moldavian envoy, Linz, 123-4 Livonia, 15-6, 60,73-4,115,119,149232 Konstantin Yaroslavov(ich), Prince, 150,242,256 voevoda, 249 Livonian Order, 6, 8, 15-7, 33, 42, 43, Kopanev, A. I., 312 73-4, 77, 120, 126, 127, 128, 173, Kopor’e, 34 174, 175, 211, 237, 238, 239-42, Kopyl’, 86 254-6, 262, 263, 264,272 Kopystrin, 100 Lobanov-Kolychev, see KolychevKorela, 34,165,173, 237, 240 Loban Kormlente, 34 Lorikhove, Johann, Freitag von, 120

IN DEX

Lovât*, river, 6, 329 Lübeck, 116, 122, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 .1 3 1 .1 7 0

Lublin, 101, 226, 253, 254 Luchshie lyudi, 59 “ Luke the Wallachian**, 197 Lukomsky, Ivan, Prince, 146-7, 346 Luga, river, 6 Lugvenevich- Semenovich, Yury, Prince, 33, 3 4 -s L u re , Ya. S., 49, 62, 78, 295, 297, З05, 311, 312, 319, 320, 321, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 336, , 34 i , 3S i , 356- 7, 36 i Lutsk, 203, 204, 226, 252, 253, 254,

344 Luzha, river, 81 Lychino, 139 Lyubech, 220,269,270,272 Lyubutsk, 133, 137, 141, 151, 152, 269 Lyudimsk, 152 L ’vov, h i , 226, 253 L a n cut, 226

Magnus Ericsson, King of Norway and Sweden, 165 Mahmed Girey, son of Mengli Girey, 200,207 M ahmud, son of Ahmed, 98 Mahmudek, Khan, 14-5,20,21,26 Makary, Archimandrite of the Vilna T rinity Monastery, 157-8 Malechkin, Konstantin, 197, 201 Maly Yaroslavets, 81, 312, 313, 314 Mamay, Khan, 79 Mamon, Abdul, 21 Mamona, Grigory Andreevich, 322 Mamonov, Ivan Grigor’evich, 213, 217, 227-9,232,236 Mamuk, Khan, 179Г-81, 182,183, 185 Mamyshek, Tsarevich, 275, 277 Maria, wife of Vasily Mikaylovich of Vereya, 313-4,3*3 „ Maria Borisovna, first wife of Ivan III, xii, 313, 316 Maria Yaroslavna, wife of Vasily II and m other of Ivan III, ix, xiii-xiv, 64, 68, 77, 80-1, 108, 290, 292-3, 294, 297, 298, 299, 305, 322 “ Mathias the Pole**, 146 Matthews, W. K., v Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, 107, n o , 112-7, 118, 123-4, 125, 131,188 Maxim the Greek, 320 Maximilian, King of the Romans and Emperor, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123131 .166.170 Mayko, Andrey, 219

379

Mazovia, 148 Mecklenburg, 167 Medveditsa, river, 244 Medyn*, xiii, 134, 136, 137, 292, 294, 299 Mehemmed, son of Bayezid, 188-9, 190,192 Mehemmed II, Sultan, 71,107,186,187 Mehemmed Emin, Khan, 93-7, 100, 102, 104, 178-85, 242, 245, 247, 280, 353 Mel’nik, 283 Mendovg (Mindaugas), Grand Prince of Lithuania, 8 Mengli Girey, Khan, 69-73, 77» 84-5, 88-92, 94, 95, 97-9, 100, 101-4,

109, 110, h i , 112, 114, 115, 140, 179, 183, 184,185, 186, 187-8, 189, 190-1, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197-202, 203, 206-7, 208-10, 217, 219, 221, 223, 224-30, 232-3, 236, 237, 238, 244-8, 251-4, 258-9, 260, 261, 273, 274-80, 303-4, 352 Merl*, river, 99 Meshchera, 14 Meshchovek (Mezetsk, Mezchesk), 134, 136, 137, 141-З, 144, 146, 149, 150,1 5 1 ,1 5 2 ,1 5 5 ,2 1 4

Meshchovsky, Ivan Andreevich, Prince, 137 Meshchovsky, Mikhail Romanovich, Prince, 143 Meshchovsky, Petr Romanovich, Prince, 143,152 Meshchovsky, Semen Romanovich, Prince, 143,152 Mezen*, river, 44 Mezha, river, 272 Mglin, 223, 269,270 Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov, 10,134 Mikhail Alexandrovich, Grand Prince of Tver*, 3 Mikhail Andreevich, Prince of Vereya, 42, 63, 80, 293, 298, 300, 301, З07315 332 346,351 Mikhail Borisovich, Grand Prince of T ver’, 3,42, 60-4,152, 301, 324 Mikhaylo Yur’evich, Prince, 137 Mikulinsky, Andrey Borisovich, Prince, 63-4 Mikulinsky, Vladimir Andreevich, Prince, 237 Minsk, 227, 228, 236, 250, 251, 252, 261,275,279 Moisey, Archbishop of Novgorod, 57 Moklokov, Guba, 232 Moldavia, 18, 100, 106-12, 113, 116,

, ,

126, 128, 161, 195-7, 202-7, 208, 209, 213, 224, 230-3, 259, ЗЗО,

334-5

380

IN D E X

Molozha, river, 20 Morea, 316, 317 Moreva, 136, 329 Morozov, Ivan Borisovich, 49-50, 52, *35 Morozov, Vasily Borisovich, 52, 76 Mosal’sk, 133, 134,136, 137, 139, 141, 150,151,152, 214,215, 219, 269 Moskva, river, xiii, 24, 336, 338 Mozhaysk, xiii, 24, 134, 136, 292, 294, 299, 303, З05, 308, 309 Mozhaysky, Semen Ivanovich, Prince, 141, 214, 219, 220, 221, 222, 236, 237, 238-9, 245-6, 249, 256, 269, 275, 282, 341, 360 Mozyr’, 226 Msta, river, 6, 30,42 Mstislavl’, 238-9, 242, 248, 269, 270, 272 Mtsensk, 137, 141, 151, 152, 155, 214, 215,219,223,269 Murom, town and district, xi, 2, 4, 21, 22,48, 59,180,184 Murtaza, son of Ahmed, 97-104 Musa, Nogay Mirza, 86, 96-7, 178-80, 183, 223, 245, 246-7 Mushat, Moldavian envoy, 110 Myshkovsky, Petr, 264-74 Narbut, Stanislav, 234-5, 236 Narova, river, 16,174 Narva, 30, 122, 165, 170, 174, 237, 239 Nazar, Novgorod usher, 49, 50 Nedokhodov, 137, 139 Negomir, 135 Neman (Nemunas), river, 8, 86, 253 Nemchinov, Monastery of the Assumption, 329 Nero, Lake, 5 Neva, river, 6, 16, 165 Nevel*, 270, 272 Nifont, Abbot of the White Lake Monastery, later Bishop of Suzdal', 311-2, 332 Nikol’sky, N. K.,311 Nilsson, Svante, 169 Nizhny Novgorod, town and district, I , 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 40, 59,180,184,280 Nogay Horde, 13, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96-7, 98, 99, 103, 105, 178-80, 183, 184185, 211, 223, 230, 237, 244, 245, 246, 248, 252, 274, 278, 280, 283,

303

Norway, 165,166, 167, 168, 178 Novgorod, town, district and republic, ix, xii, I , 2. 3, 5-7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 29-60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 73, 74, 75, 77, 85, 90, 93, 125 133, 134, 135, 140,

145, 149, 151, *52, 155, 164, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 189, 222, 237, 242, 251, 254, 255, 256, 269, 272, 291, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 301-2, 310, 318, 325“ 33, 334, 34L352 Novgorod Seversky, town and district, 220, 224, 227, 269,270 Novgorodok, 253, 279 Novoe Selo, 270 NovosiT, 152 Nozdrovaty, Vasily, Prince, 84, n o , 245 N ut Devlet, brother of Mengli Girey, 72, 84, 99,100,101,103, 245 N ut Sultan, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99“ *oo, 182, 183, 185 Nürnberg, 119, 126 Nyslott (Savonlinna), 173, 174 Oblyaz bakshey, 84 Obolensky, Alexandr Vasil’evich, Prince, 95,182, 242 Obolensky, Petr Mikhaylovich, Prince, 103 Obolensky, Petr Nikitich, Prince, 75 Obolensky, Vasily Nikitich, Prince, 75 Obolensky-Lyko, Ivan Vladimirovich, Prince, 296, 302 Obolensky-Nagoy, Petr Vasil’evich, Prince, 24 Obolensky-Nogot', Andrey Nikitich, Prince, 74 Obolensky-Repnya, Ivan Mikhaylo­ vich, Prince, 103 Obolensky-Striga, Ivan Vasil'evich, Prince, 21, 52,61,68 Obolensky-Striga, Vasily Ivanovich, Prince, 42 Obolensky-Telepnya, Fedor Vasil’e­ vich, Prince, 141 Obolensky-Tulupa, Vasily, Prince, 135 Obolensky-Turena, Boris Mikhaylo­ vich, Prince, 212, 313 Obrazets, boyar of Andrey the Elder, 302 Obrazets-Dobrynsky, Vasily Fedoro­ vich, 44,64,76, 93, 296-7, 302 Obsha, river, 134 O b’, river, 131 Ochakov, 198, 201, 203, 207 Oder, river, 126 Odinets, Andrey, 115 Odoev, 137, 139 Odoevsky, Fedor Ivanovich, Prince,

139

Odoevsky, Ivan Semenovich, Prince, *37, *39,256 Odoevsky, Petr Semenovich, Prince, *37, *39

IN DEX

Odoevsky, Semen, Prince, 133, 137 Odoevsky, Vasily Semenovich, Prince,

137,139,256

Oesel, 16 Oka, river, xi, xiii, 1, z, 4, 10, 14, 24, S3, 66, 68, 79-80, 81-2, 104, 133-

134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 144, 15З,

220, 224,256,270, 293, 310, 334 Old Krym, 102 Oleg Ivanovich, Grand Prince of Ryazan', 4 Olekhno, Polish envoy, 234—5, 236 Olel’kovich, Mikhail, Prince, 38-40, 85-6, 108, 325, 329 Olel'kovich, Semen, Prince, 39, 40, 86 Olgerd (Algirdas), Grand Prince of Lithuania, 3, 8, 33, 39, 85, 151 Olofsborg (Olavinlinna), 174 Ol'shanka, 86 Onega, Lake, 6 Onega, river, 173 Opakov, 138,143, 144,146, 151, 152 Opatöw, 226 Opochka, 241 Orekhovets, see Oreshek Orekhovna, 135 Orel', river, 247 Oreshek (Schlüsselburg), 34, 165, 166, 237, 240 Orsha, 250 Oshchera, Ivan Vasil'evich, 322 Oshcherin, Ivan Ivanovich, 197, 201, 274-5, 276-8,344-s Oskol, river, 99 Ostrey, 269,270 Ostrog, 225 Ostrov, 241 Ostrozhsky, Konstantin Ivanovich, Prince, 207, 222-3, 226,253 Ot'ezd, 294,296-7 Ovin family, 50 Pafnuty, Abbot of Borovsk Monastery, 321 Paisy Yaroslavov, 300 Palaeologus, Dmitry Ralev, 96, 168, 259 Palaeologus, Manuel Ralev, 96 Paletsky, Fedor Ivanovich, 182 Paletsky, Ivan Ivanovich K hrul’, Prince, 336, 346 Patrikeev, Afanasy, 338 Patrikeev, Ivan Ivanovich Mynin, Prince, 304, 338, 348, 350, 352, 357 Patnkeev, Ivan Yur'evich, Prince, 7-8, 21, 52-3, 81, 145, 148, 300, 302, 335, ЗЗ8, 343, 348-52, 357, 358361

381

Patrikeev, Vasily Ivanovich, Prince, x43, 151, *54, 172, 182, 282, 304, ЗЗ8, 339, 348-52, 357, 358-61 Pavlov, A. S., 329 Pechora, river, 6,44,131 Peipus, Lake, 6, 73-4,242 Penkov, Daniil Alexandrovich, Prince, 237, 240,242 Penkov, Vasily Nikiforovich, 50 Perekop, 104,198, 225,227 Peremyshl', 140,152 Peremyshl’sky, see VorotynskyPeremyshl’sky Pereyaslavl’ (Southern), 8 Pereyaslavl* (Zalessky), xi, 22, 59, 304 Pereyaslavl'-Ryazansky, 4 Perm ', district, 6, 20, 23, 25, 155 Peshek-Saburov, Semen, 24 Pestry, Vasily Davidovich, 136, 137 Peter I, Emperor, 354 Petrov, Andrey, 131 Philipp, Metropolitan of Moscow, 41, 310, 318 Philipp, son of Maximilian, 127, 129 Pierling, P., 70,96, 316, 317, 318 Pimen, candidate for archbishopric of Novgorod, 38 Pinega, river, 44 Pinsk, 227, 228, 236, 251, 285 Pitar, Ivan, Moldavian envoy, 197, Pleshcheev, Andrey Mikhaylovich, 109,296 Pleshcheev, Ivan Andreevich, n o Pleshcheev, Mikhail Andreevich, 189191,192 Pleshcheev, Petr Mikhaylovich, 109, 280-3 Plettenberg, von, 239-42, 248, 251, *54- 6 , *57 Plyusa, river, 6 Pochep, 269 Podlyash’e, 9 Podolia, 8, 9, 84-5, 91, 92, 100-1, 104, h i , 198, 200,202, 210, 229, 344 Podul Inalt, 107, 108 Podvoysky pristav, 49 Pogozhev, Mikhail, 160 Pokut'e, n o , 258-9, 352 Poles’e, 9 Polotsk, town and district, 8, 9, 145, 215, 219, 249, 250, 269, 270, 272, 285 Polotsky, Fedor Borisovich, Prince, 249 Pomerania, 167 Popova Gora, 223, 269, 270,282 Poppel, Nikolaus, 118-22, 123, 127 Posadnik, 29, 51, 52, 53, 241 Posady, 25

3 S2

IN DEX

Posse, Knut, 175 Poyarok, “ brother of Runo” , 336, 346 Pressburg, 123, 128,129 Prigorod, 6, 34 Pripyat*, river, 226, 227 Pronsk, 4, 269 Protva, river, 293 Prozorovsky, Fedor Andreevich, Prince, 255 Prussia, 42, и 9f 126, 127,128 Pskov, town, district and republic, 1, 6-7, is , 16, 17, 30, 32, 39-40,42,43, 57, 60, 73-s, 77, « о , 140, 149, 151» 152, 155, 172, 175, 223, 239-42, 248, 251, 254-6, 269, 270, 272, 301-2, 318, 339-40 Pustaya Rzheva, 54 Putivl’, 92, 217, 223, 227, 269, 270, 275, 277 Putyatich, Dmitry, Prince, 229, 260, 279 Pyhä, river, 173

Ruza, xiii, 305, 306 Ryapolovsky family, xi Ryapolovsky, Princess, wife of S. I. Ryapolovsky, 158 Ryapolovsky, Semen Ivanovich, Prince, 95, 151, 154, 156, 158, 180, 182, 184, 282, 304, ЗЗ8, 339, 343, 346, 348-52, 357, 358-61

Ryapolovsky, Vasily Mnikh, Pnnce, Ryapolovsky-Khripun, Fedor Semen­ ovich, Prince, 23 Ryapolovsky-Loban, Petr Semen­ ovich, Prince, 223, 238, 242 Ryazansky, Fedor Ivanovich, Prince, Ryazan’, Grand Principality, 1, 3-5, 14, 25, 32, 60, 67, 141, 149, 150, 152,245, 256,269 Ryazan*, old, 4 Ryl’sk, 220, 223, 227, 238, 239, 245, 248, 269, 270

Rzhev, xiii, 2, 74, 75, 115, 133, 134, Radogoshch, 269 Radom, 207 Radziwül, Nicholas, 145-6, 358-9 Ragozin, Ivashko, 97 Ralev, see Palaeologus Rameneytso, 300 Regnus, Cardinal, 262 Repnya (Obolensky?), Ivan Mikhay­ lovich, Prince, 249,256 Revel* (Tallin), 16, 116, 122, 126, 129, 242 Riga, 15,16,249 Rimnlc, 107 Romanov, 293, 294, 299 Rome, 16, 37, 96, 259, 316-8 Romodanovsky, Fedor, Prince, 236 Romodanovsky, Semen Vasil’evich, Prince, 191, 208 Romodanovsky, Vasily Vasil’evich, Prince, 103, 158, 160, 256, 339, 346,

351-2, 358 346

Ropchenok (Eropkin), Afanasy, 336, Roslavl*, 222 Rostock, 176 Rostislavl*, 68 Rostov, town and principality, x, xiv, 1,5,24,59,60,68,294,311 . Rostovsky, Alexandr Vladimirovich, Prince, 237, 238, 249, 256 Rostovsky, Dmitry Vladimirovich, Prince, 237 Runo, Ivan Dmitrievich, 22-3, 24, 25-6, 346 Rusalka, Mikhail Yakovlevich, 156,158 Riissow, Balthasar, 74, 77, 241, 242, 255, 256

140, 149, 150, 152, 257, 297, З02,

305, З06 Sadyr’, Kazan’ Beg, 179-81,182 St. Sofia (Kiev), 91 St. Sofia (Novgorod), 33, 35, 57 St. Stanislas (Vilna), 157-8 Sakovich, Bogdan Andreevich, 90,

91, 1ЗЗ

Samara, river, 247, 248 Samsonov meadow, 341 Samsov wood, 341 Sandomierz, 207 Santay, Sigismund, 261-3, 266, 267, 268 Sapega, Bogdan, 283-6 Sapega, Ivan, 208, 212, 217, 264, 265,

273

Saray, 12,67, 70, 72, 84 Satilghan, Tsarevich, son of N ur Devlet, 101,103, 184,206 Savolax, 170,171,174 Savva, V.I., 319 Scotland, 167 Selevin, Bogdan, 146-7 Selevin, Olekhno, 146-7 Selim I, Sultan, 188 Semen, Grand Prince of Moscow, 151 Semen Ivanovich, Prince, son of Ivan III, 342 Semen Karpovich, voevoda, 257 Semen Y ur’evich, brother-in-law of Stephen of Moldavia, 108 Semenov, P., 182 Serapion, Abbot of the W hite Lake Monastery, 312 Serbia, 107, 322

IN D E X

Serena, river, 144,153 Serensk, 139,15a Sergius, St., see Trinity Monastery Sergy, Archbishop of Novgorod, 57-8,62, 327-8 Seritsa, river, 240, 242 Serpeysk, 134, 141-3, 144, 146, 151, 152, 2x4,215, 219,223, 269 Serpukhov, xiii, 68, 79, 80, 182, 292, 294, 299, 308, 313 Seton-Watson, R. W., 111 Seversk district, 92, 220, 221, 227, 239,242, 244,246, 248, 256, 339 Seym, river, 223, 224, 245-6, 269, 270 Seyyid Ahmed, son of Ahmed, 97104,244,246 Seyyid Ahmed, Khan, xii, 217 Shandr, Moldavian envoy, n o , 231-2 Shatel’sha, 136 Shchenya, Daniil Vasil’evich, Prince, 143, 172, 175, 222-3, 237, 241-2, 250, 254,255-6, 257,261 Sheenok, Afanasy, 220 Shein, Dmitry Andreevich, 237 Shein, Dm itry Vasil’evich, 115, 184,172 223, 249 Sheksna, river, 308 Shelon’, river, 6, 31,40,42,43,44,222 Shemyachich, Vasily Ivanovich, Prince, 214, 219, 220, 221, 222, 236, 237, 238-9, 245-6, 249, 256, 269,

З41, 360

Shemyaka, Ivan Dmitrievich, Prince, 152 Shemyaka, see also Dmitry Yur’evich Shestak, Yury Ivanovich, 90, 94 Shestakov, Fedor, 212-3, 217 Sheykh Ahmed, son of Ahmed, ю г, 104, 230, 244-8, 252, 259, 260, 278280,283, 286 Shilenga river 44 Shtibor, Muscovite envoy, 114,116 Shuysky, Ivan Vasil’evich, Prince, 242, 257 Shuysky, Vasily Fedorovich, Prince, 172 Shuysky,Vasily Vasil’eyich, Prince, 77 Shuysky-Gorbaty, Vasily Vasil’evich, Prince, 40,44 Shuysky-Nemoy, Vasily Vasil’evich, Prince, 237, 240,242 Shventoy, river, 8 Siberian Khanate, 86, 96-7, 178-81, 183, 185 Sigismund, Count of the Tyrol, 131 Sigismund, Grand Prince of Lithuania, 10,12,149, 151 Sigismund, Margrave of Branden­ burg, 121

З83

Sigismund, son of Casimir IV, h i , 160-1 Silistria, 207 Simon, Metropolitan of Moscow, 337, ЗЗ 8 ,

342,

3SO -L352

Simonov Monastery, 330 Skharia, heresiarch, 325 Skryaba, Timofey Ignat’evich, 8990 Skryabin-Travin, Shchavey, 336, 346 Skurat, Prokofy Zinov’evich, n o Slepets, Boris, 20,44,93 Slonim, 155 Slutsk, 86, 227, 228, 236, 251,275 Smirnov, 1.1., 347, 357, 361 Smirnov, N. A., 194 Smolensk, town and district, 8, 9, 10, 32, 91, 141-З, 144, 151» 152, 153, 220, 22X-3, 224, 227, 228, 236, 237, 238, 239, 246, 249-51, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 269, 270, 272,273, 282, 285, 353 Smolino, Lake, 255-6 Snups, Michael, 131 Snyatin, 258 Sochovki, 135 Sofia, wife of Mikhail Borisovich of Tver*, 61 Sofia Palaeologa, second wife of Ivan III, 70, 78, 122, 154, 155, X59, 162, 231, 265,313-4,316-23, 324, 333, 334-8, 340-3, 345, 347-8, 350-2, 353, 355, 356, 359 Sokolinsky, Semen Fedorovich, Prince, 138 Solkhat, see Old Krym Solov’ev, S. M., 33, 37, 42, 56, 94, 98, 343, 348, 357 “ Sovereign of All Russia”, 147, 148, 152,153,155,216-7, 218,284 Sozh, river, 239, 269 Stanislaus Samicius, 200, 209, 226 Staraya Rusa, 31, 34, 35,42 Starkov, Aleksey, 71 Starodub (Chernigov district), 220, 238,242,245, 246, 269, 270,282 Starodub (on the Klyaz’ma), 346 Starodubsky, Fedor Andreevich, Prince, 35x Starodubsky-Pestry, Fedor Davido­ vich, Prince, 42,49-50,52,68, 135 Starodubsky-Ryapolovsky, Ivan And­ reevich, Prince, 351 Stephen IV, Voivode of Moldavia, 18, 61, 107-12, 195, 196-7, 202-10, 2 I X , 216, 230-3, 248, 257-9, 323, ЗЗО, 341, 344-5, 347, 352, 356, 359-60 Steteko, Moldavian envoy, 110 Stettin, 281

IN DEX З84 Stockholm, 167, 170, 172, 175, 176, Toropets, 133, 134, 135-6, 138, 150,

177, 178 , , Stora Rimchràntka, 172, 173, 174, *75 Stralsund, 176 Stret, Lithuanian envoy, 97 Strigol’niki, heresy, 326 Stri2ewski, Polish envoy, 203 Stromilov, Fedor, 336, 343, 345, 347 Struve, P. В., 14 Sture, Eric, 169 Sture, Sten, 165-6, 167-77,178 Sture, Svante, 175 Styr’, river, 226, 253 Suceava, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 196, 206, 230, 231, 232, 258, 324, 344, 345 Suda, river, 308 Sudilov, 136 Sukhona, river, xii, 1 Sula, river, 248 Sura, river, I Suzdal', town and district, x, 1, 14, 20, 24,29,30,31,40 Suzdal’sky, Ivan Alexandrovich, Prince, 184 Suzdal'sky-Gorbaty, Ivan Ivanovich, Prince, 240 Svidrigaylo, Grand Prince of Lithuania, 12, 33 Svinskoe field, 341 Sweden, 16, 30, 31, 126, 127, 128, 148,165-78,211 Sytino, 51 Székesfehérvâr, 126 Tallin, see Revel' Tamerlane, 13 Tanino, 300 Tarusa, 79,134, *93 Tatishchev, historian, 55, 56, 319, 327 Tatishchev, M unt, 302-3 Tavan', 198, 248,252,280 Telepen', Fedor Vasil'evich, Prince, 249 Teleshov, Ivan, 220 Telyatevsky, Mikhail Fedorovich, Prince, 249 Ternir, Tatar Prince, 67, 97, 99 Terebovl’ (Trembowla), 201 Teutonic Order, 15, 16, 31, 42, 101, 126,127, 128,262 Thomas Palaelogus, 316, 317 T hom , 127 T hum , Jörg von, 122-9,166 Tikhaya Sosna, river, 238, 244-5, 247, 274 Tikhomirov, M. N., 156, 338 Tikhon, Archbishop of Rostov, 338 Timothy, Saint, ix T om Alv, 173

220,223, 269,270, 272 Torzhok, 2,42, 54 Tovarkov, Ivan Fedorovich, 41, 82,

13З

Trakhaniot, Dmitry, 321 Trakhaniot, Yury, 122-31, 177-8, 321 Tre, district, 6 Trevisan, Gian-Battista, 70 Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius, x, 57,300,338 Troki, 150, 220,235, 252, 282 Trubchevsk, 214,220, 221, 269, 270 Trubetskoy, Ivan Yur’evich, Prince, 137 Tsarevichi, Tatar, 14, 68, 84, 96, 98, 250, 294 Tsereteli, E., 264 Tsil’ma, river, 131 Tsna, river, 4 Tuchko-Morozov, see Morozov Tula, district, 2,79 Tulup, Ivan, Prince, 237 Turkey, Ottoman Empire, 15, 19, 70, 71, 97-8, 99, 100-4, 106, 107, 109n o , h i , 113-4, 116, 129, 130, 131, 160, 185-95, 196, 199, 200, 202-3, 205, 206, 207-9, 210, 211, 213, 216, 230-1, 233, 235, 262, 267, 279, 316, 317, 344 Turobin, 226 Turov, 226, 227, 228, 236, 251, 252, 25З, 27s, 285 Tur'ya, 135,136 Tvertsa, river, 2, 30,42 T ver', town and Grand Principality, x , x ii, I , 2-3, 9, 19, 32, 33, 42, 54, 60-5, 75, 114, 115, 135, 136, 140, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 222, 237, 238, 242, 269, 300-1, 324, 334, 335, 345 Tyaginka, 198-201,203, 207 Tysyatsky, 29 Tyumen' (Chinga-Tura), 86-7, 179, 183 Übersberger, H., 119,127,130 Uglich, x, xi, xiii, 24, 74, 303, 304, 305 Ugra, river, 2, 53, 78, 80, 81-3, 87, 136, 137, 138, 143, 15З, 224, 270 Ulanov, Boris Tebet, Prince, 257 Ulm, 119 Ulug-Mahmed, Khan, x, xii, 14 Uniate Church, 11-2, 37, 212, 216, 273, 316, 317, 321,335 Urak, Kazan' Beg, 179-81, 182, 183184 Ural mountains, 6 Urdovlet Oblyaz, 84 Ushaty, Ivan Fedorovich, 173-4

IN DEX

Ushaty, Petr Fedorovich, 173-4 Uspensky Cathedral, 57, 327, 337 Ustyug, xii, I , 6, 7, 8, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25,27,44,93,173, 254 Vaga, river, xii, 173 Valla Alba, 107 Vasily I, Grand Prince of Moscow, 7, 144,289, 323 Vasily II, Grand Prince of Moscow, ix-xiv, 3, 4, 5, 7, 14, is , 20, 33-5, 39, 61, 122, 149, 214, 289, 290-1, 292, 294, 306, 307, 308, 309-Ю, 346, 350, 355, 360

Vasily Davidovich, namestmk of Vselug, 135 Vasily Ivanovich, Grand Prince of Ryazan*, 5 Vasüy Ivanovich, son of Ivan III, later Grand Prince of Moscow, 16, 129, 169, 177, 221, 231, 237, 238, 250, 253, 259-60, 265, 276, 281, 300, 306, 314, 316, 320, 323, 324, 334-43, 345, З48, 350-2, 353, 355, 357, 359-61 Vasily Mikhaylovich, Prince of Vereya, 22, 27, 68, 310, 312, 313-

314,323

Vasily Mikhaylovich, son of Mikhail Borisovich of Tver*, 152 Vasily Nikiforovich, 44 Vasily Yaroslavich, Prince of Ser­ pukhov, xii, 299, 308 Vasily Yur’evich Kosoy, Prince, x Vassian Rylo, Archbishop of Rostov, 75,76, 80,83, 300,310-2,322,332 Vassian, Bishop of Tver*, 61-3, 64 Vazuza, river, 134 Veche, 7, 29-30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 45, 46, 49-50, 52-3, 54 Vedrosha, 219, 222-3, 224, 237 Velikaya, river, 6, 241 Velikie Luki, 54, 75, 76, 81, 90, 115, 133, 134, 140, 149, 150, 152, 254, 295, 296-7 Velitsa, 270 Velizh, 270,272 Venice, 70,96, 193, 334 Vereya, town and principality, 289, 293, 300, 306, 307-15, 323, 345, 347,351 Verkhovsky principalities, 10, 82, 133 sq., 214 Vernadsky, G., 4,7, 318 Veselovsky, S. B., 54, 337, 346, 355, 357 Vetluga, river, 1, 7 Vienna, 118, 124,125, 126 Viktor, German sent to Pechora district, 131

38S

Viliya, river, 8 Vilna, 9, 12, 19, 43, 88-9, 97, 143, 144, 148, 150, 154, 156, 157-9, 160, 162, 198, 208, 212, 213, 216, 217, 220, 224, 228, 232, 252, 261, 267, 276, 277, 278, 281, 282, 335, 338, 342,347, 349,351,358 Vinnitsa, 207 Vishnevets (Wiéniowiec), 200 Vistula, river, 127, 226 Vitebsk, town and district, 9, 76, 250, 269,270, 272 Vitovt (Vitautas), Grand Prince of Lithuania, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 32, 39,61,144,149,151,221 Vlad IV of Wallachia, 107 Vladimir, Grand Princely throne of, 2, 155,258,337, З42 Vladimir (on the Klyaz’ma), 22, 24, 25, 30,31,32, 59,94 Vladimir Monomakh, Grand Prince of Kiev, 29 Vladimir Olgerdovich, Prince of Kiev, Vladychko, Ivan, 146, 346 Volga, river, 1, 2, 5, 12, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 67, 75, 84, 86, 99, 103, 126, 135, 179, 181, 182, 223, 244,278, 279 Volga Bulgars, 155 Volhynia, 8, 9, 10, 101, 200, 203, 226, 229,252-4,258,285 Volkhov, river, 5-6,43 Vologda, xi, xii, xiii, 6, 20, 22, 24, 44, 95, 300, 323, 336, 346 Volok Lamsky, Volotsk, see Voloko­ lamsk Volokolamsk, xiii, 295, 305, 306, 346 Volpe, Gian-Battista della, 317-8 Vop’, river, 270 Vorontsov, Semen Ivanovich, 328 Vorotynsk, 81,134,135,136,140,152 Vorotynsky, Dmitry Fedorovich, Prince, 137, 138,139,141 Vorotynsky, Ivan Yur’evich, Prince, 138 Vorotynsky, Semen Fedorovich, Prince, 137, 139,141 Vorotynsky, Vasily Ivanovich Krivoy, Prince, 138 Vorotynsky-Peremyshl’sky, Ivan Mikhaylovich, Prince, 133, 137, 138,141,175, 238,256 Vorskla, river, 99 Vorts, Lake, 242 Vorya, river, 136 Vruchy, 269 Vselug, Lake, 135,223 Vsevolod III, Grand Prince of Vladi­ mir, 30

386

IN D E X

Vyatka, town and district, xiii, 1, 7-8, 20, 22-3, 24-5, 26-7, 28, 44, 67, 84, 93, 95 Vyatka, river, 7, 20,22-3, 25, 27 Vyazemsky, Andrey Yur’evich, Prince, 143-4 Vyaz’ma, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143-4, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 212, 220,270, 303, 340-1, 343 Vyaz’ma, river, 134 Vyborg (Viipuri), 165, 172, 173, 174,

175,177

Vychegda, river, 1 Vyshgorod (on the Protva), 293, 294, 299, 302, 305-6, 308, 309-10 Vyshgorod (Pskov district), 73 Vyshny Volochek, 42 Wallachia, 70,107 Warsaw, 207 Wendish Towns, 167,173 White Lake, xiii, 308 White Lake, Monastery of St. Cyril, xii, 311-2,332, 335, 338 W hite Russia, 8,17, 228 White Sea, 6,173 Wismar, 176 Wladislaw, King of Bohemia and Hungary, i n , 116-7, 118, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 203, 206, 210, 231, 233-4, 261-4, 268, 274, 276, 283, 284, 285 Wojciech, Tabor, Bishop of Vilna, 158,281 Yaik, river, 13 Yakub, Tatar Tsarevich, xii, 14-5 Yakubovich, Adam, 155 Yam, 34 Yamgurchu, brother of Mengli Girey, 103,104 Yamgurchu, Nogay Mirza, 86, 87, 96-7, 178-80,183, 223, 246-7 Yanovich, Petr, 150-4 Yaroslavets, see Maly Yaroslavets Yaroslavl’, town and principality, 1, 5, 24,60,64,143, 182, 301 Yaroslavsky, Daniil Vasil’evich, Prince, 24-7 Yaroslavsky, Semen Romanovich, Prince, 21, 95,184, 223, 237 Yaroslavsky-Penko, Daniil Alexan­ drovich, Prince, 24 Yasak, 217 Yasenevo, 300 Yazhelbitsy, 34, 36, 45 Yug, river, xii, 20 Yugra, district, 6, 155 Yury, Grand Prince of Moscow, 165, 170

Yury Dmitrievich, Prince of Zvenigorod and Galich, ix-x, 4, 289, 307 Yury Ivanovich, Prince, son of Ivan III, 172, 256, 265, 275, 276, 281, 324, 335, 337, З42 Yury Vasil’evich, Prince brother of Ivan III, x-xi, xiii, 22, 24, 27-8, 35, 42, 64, 136, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298,299, 304, 307, 309, 310 Yur’ev, 59 Y ur’ev, Kostya, 67 Yur’ev Monastery, 331 Zaberezinsky (Zabrzezinski, Zaberezhsky), Yan Yur’evich, 133, 145-6, 147, 155, 220 235-6, 358359 Zabolotsky, Alexey Grigor’evich, 247, 248, 251-2,253, 254, 258-9 Zabolotsky, Konstantin Grigor’evich, h i , 197, 200,280-3 Zabolotsky, Petr Grigor’evich, 61-2, 204-5, 344 Zagryazhsky, Dmitry Davidovich, 147, 218,314 Zakhar, heretic, 329 Zakhariya, Secretary of the Novgorod Veche, 49 Zakhar’in, Yakov Zakhar’evich, 59, 64, 145, 147, 172, 176, 220, 221, 222, 223, 235-6, 249, 250, 261,

358

Zakhar’in, Yury Zakhar’evich, 184, 221,222 Zamytsky, Konstantin, 286 Zamytsky, Timofey Petrovich, 197 Zaozer’e, district, xiii, 300, 308 Zaslavl’, 101, 103 Zavoloch’e, district, 6, 44, 54 Zawichost, 226 Zaytsev, Dmitry, 168 Zheslavsky (Izheslavsky), Mikhail, Prince, 238 Zhitomir, 269 Zhit'i Lyudi, 51, 58, 59 Zhizdra, river, 144,153, 270 Zhuk, Ivan Vasil’evich, 256 Zimin, A. A., 357, 361 Zinov’ev, Yury, 283-6 Zoe Palaeologa, see Sofia Palaeologa Zosima, Metropolitan of Moscow, 325, 330-3 Zubtsov, 2 Zvenets, Ivan Ivanovich, Prince, 72, 108, 109, 189-90,194 Zvenich Bor, 21 Zvenigorod, xiii, 305, 308, 309-10 Zmudz, 150,155

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, GLASGOW