Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini 9780231884778

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ITALY from NAPOLEON, to MUSSOLINI

ITALY from KAPOLEON. to MUSSOLINI Rene Alhrecht-Carrie

gp COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y HEW YORK

PRESS

Τ ο the Memory

of My

Father

PREFACE A L I T T L E over four years ago we celebrated with relief the end J \ of the Second World War, first in Europe, shortly thereafter X in Japan. There was, in America especially, a widespread feeling that a job had been finished, and the understandable urge to resume the interrupted and "normal" (meaning pre-war) course of existence found expression in the precipitateness with which we brought the boys back home and dismantled our war machine. We are, at present, very exercised—departing, in some ways, with resentment born of frustration, from the canons of calm judgment—about what appears to many an attempt on the part of Soviet Russia comparable to that of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle to organize the world in accordance with its designs. The latter attempt has undoubtedly failed, but, in a sense, this failure, and our victory, represent an essentially negative accomplishment, for the following reason. On the level of power, Germany, Italy, and Japan were seeking certain definite and concrete acquisitions and advantages. But this is only part, in some respects not the major part, of the story. For, in connection with their attempt, cause as well as effect of it, there emerged the assertion of a wholly new set of values and view of life—new at least in the sense that they represented a departure from what we had come to regard as the established trend of social and political evolution since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Like all historical phenomena, this one is complex, and our proximity to it, even discounting the part of emotions, preconceptions, and established patterns of thought, makes it difficult to appraise the factors involved at their true value. There is one view which would consider the phenomenon of Fascism and Nazism as a mere extension of the past. Nazi Germany is shown to have its roots in Bismarck, Frederick, and Luther. Mussolini is but the logical heir of Machiavelli and Sorel. These roots undoubtedly exist and it is useful to trace them. But as a complete explanation, this is one that, because of its limitations, amounts to gross distortion. At the other extreme, Nazism and Fascism are

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Preface

viewed as novel and momentary aberrations, which, once defeated in their native habitats, can be forgotten as dead things. This is equally incomplete and misleading. Fascism-Nazism, and the war which they precipitated, were symptoms of a malady far more fundamental than the mere contest for power of rival nations or groups of nations. The social maladjustments of which the Axis phenomenon was a manifestation were not cured by the war, for, if the military force of the German and Italian nations has been broken, the social dislocations which gave Fascism and Nazism their appeal, and which the war itself served to accentuate, have not been resolved. Nazism and Fascism are responses to problems that cut across national boundaries. But our world is a world of nations. That is where the complexity and the confusion arise. We have to deal with social and economic problems that cut across national lines in the framework of national units. The framework cannot be ignored or suddenly discarded. That the successful conclusion of the war was by no means synonymous with effective organization of peace is hardly an original statement to make in 1949. The defeat of the triangle removed the force that had cemented the adventitious alliance of East and West. In the postwar task of reorganizing the world, of finding a practicable remedy for its political and economic ills, we and the Russians offer incompatible solutions. Our own task is to prove workable a solution that will reconcile the conflict between freedom and organization. In this attempt, rejecting the totalitarian solution of Russian Communism, we find that the forces and ideas which came to hold power in Germany and in Italy are still alive and in our very midst, however much disguised their presentation and parentage. Bearing the foregoing considerations in mind, the purpose of this book is not to offer yet another blueprint for world organization, nor again to be a history in the ordinary sense of the word. It is rather to present an analysis and interpretation of certain forces and developments, the understanding of which is a necessary prerequisite to the organization of the future. Analysis and interpretation will be applied to Italy, used as an illustration and case study of a wider phenomenon. In many ways, the case of Italy is a particularly interesting one. The

Preface

ix

rapidity with which Italy has been accepted by her enemies of yesterday, climaxed in her participation in the Atlantic Pact, is in itself remarkable. In this we must see two things: the degree of Italian power, and Italian diplomatic skill, both of which have roots in a long past. For reasons of relative power, popular attention was focused on G e r m a n y and developments in that country, while corresponding happenings in Italy were looked upon either as of little significance for the outside world or even with a certain condescending and sympathetic benevolence. This was the mistake—a mistake peculiarly, though by no means exclusively, British—of thinking in terms of power only. It is true that Italy alone, on the basis of her own resources, could never have been a serious threat to the rest of the world. But it is well to remember that, of Nazism and Fascism, the latter was the elder twin. T o a considerable extent, Fascism came to be what it was as the result of an opportunistic adaptation to circumstances and conditions which are the f u n d a m e n t a l realities, economic and political, of our time, as these appeared on the Italian scene. In the course of this process of adaptation, Fascism may be said to have come of age, evolving meanwhile a political philosophy, a technique of government, a whole Weltanschauung, which in turn became an active force in its o w n right. T h u s it was that, having secured control of the power of the Italian nation, Fascism, driven by its inner logic, became a prime mover in setting in motion the train of events that precipitated the final explosion and set off the second world conflagration within a quarter of a century. In any case, however, the episode of Fascism proper is evidently history—history which, though recent, we are beginning to see with a certain perspective—and what this essay proposes to d o is to give an interpretative survey of the development of Italy f r o m the beginning of the nineteenth century, leading to the climax of Fascism, with the question in m i n d : how and why did it happen? Not with any preconceived deterministic approach, uncongenial to the writer, but rather with the simple advantages of hindsight and perspective (is not the first task of the historian that of p e r f o r m i n g post m o r t e m s ? ) to account for the course of the past. T h e result is interpretive a n d selective use of the material of Italian history, rather than chronological recital, and the conclusion the undramatic one that, in

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view of background and circumstances, the phenomenon of Fascism was by no means inevitable, but that it was "logical," "natural," or "understandable"—and the caution that it is just as likely to arise wherever and whenever suitable conditions may obtain. There is a common temptation to look into the past for lessons for the future. Aside from the belief that the past is of sufficient interest to merit study for its own sake, on the issue of whether its study holds useful and applicable lessons for present and future conduct, the author is inclined to skepticism. The course of human events is too laden with complexities for the historian to venture on the path of the prophet. But of the value of understanding there can be little question ; and to the understanding of a past which bears upon our future this may perhaps hope to be some contribution. T h e author wishes to express his indebtedness to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the material assistance which made possible the writing of the present book. He wishes it clearly understood, however, that he assumes sole and full responsibility for any of the statements and opinions which appear in it. T o Dr. James T . Shotwell he is particularly grateful for the time given to a careful reading and criticism of the entire manuscript, to friendly debates on the nature of Fascism and on the history of Italy, and for numerous valuable suggestions. ALGONQUIN PARK, ONTARIO JUNE 2 1 , I 9 4 9

René Albrecht-Carrié

CONTENTS

Part 1. INTRODUCTION Chapter I. The Background of Modern Italy

3

THE TRADITIONS OF ITALY

3

THE STATE AS A WORK OF ART

9

SOJOURN IN LIMBO

1J

PART 11. UNITED

ITALY

Chapter II. Italy Becomes a National State

25

ITALY IN 1 8 1 5

25

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNIFICATION

28

THE ROLE OF IDEAS: MAZZINI, THE APOSTLE

3I

THE TRIUMPH OF REALITY: CAVOUR, THE WIELDER OF POWER

36

CONCLUSION

43

Chapter III. Italy as a National State, i8jo-igi¡ ITALY IN 1 8 7 0

48 48

DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIPS

53

ITALY AMONG THE POWERS

66

Chapter IV. The Transition of War NEW FORCES AT WORK

77 F]

LIBYA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

87

TO BE OR NOT TO BE

89

ITALY AT WAR

ΙΟΙ

THE "MUTILATED" VICTORY

110

CONCLUSION

121

XU

Contents

Part III. THE FASCIST

EPISODE 127

Chapter V. Was Fascism Inevitable? D'ANNUNZIO AGAIN

127

THE FIUME EPISODE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE, 1 2 7 ; THE CONSTITUTION OF FIUME,

I31

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

I35

CONCLUSION: THE " M A R C H ON R O M E "

144

Chapter VI. Opportunity

and

Opportunism: 148

Fascism Comes of Age THE CONSISTENCY OF MUSSOLINI

149

ADAPTATION TO CIRCUMSTANCES

164

THE CONQUEST OF THE STATE

L68

N E W TECHNIQUES OF POWER

I72

THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS

175

CONCLUSION: THE PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

180

Chapter VII.

Essays ir. Power

187

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FASCISM, TO I 9 3 5

187

THE INHERITANCE OF NATIONALISM, 1 8 7 ; THE ITALIAN DRANG NACH

OSTEN:

ITALY

IN

THE

MEDITERRANEAN,

193;

THE

ESPOUSAL OF REVISIONISM: THE FOUR-POWER PACT OF I 9 3 3 , 198; THE IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF POWER, 207 THE COLONIAL RECORD OF I T A L Y , TO I 9 3 5 SCRAPS OF EMPIRE:

ITALY

I N EAST AFRICA, 2 1 8 ; ITALY

2I4 IN

NORTH AFRICA: MORE DESERTS ACQUIRED, 2 2 3 ; ITALIAN COLONIAL POLICY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 2 2 7 ; LIQUIDATION AND CONSOLIDATION: I O I O TO 102