Islam in the Anglosphere: Perspectives of Young Muslims in Australia, the UK and the USA 9819937795, 9789819937790

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Islam in the Anglosphere Perspectives of Young Muslims in Australia, the UK and the USA Ihsan Yilmaz

Islam in the Anglosphere

Ihsan Yilmaz

Islam in the Anglosphere Perspectives of Young Muslims in Australia, the UK and the USA

Ihsan Yilmaz Alfred Deakin Institute Deakin University Burwood, VIC, Australia

ISBN 978-981-99-3779-0 ISBN 978-981-99-3780-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

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Transcending Orientalism, Islamophobia, and Victimhood 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Going Beyond the Limitations of Orientalism, Islamophobia, and Victimhood 1.3 Research Method 1.4 Structure of the Book References Young Muslims and Living with Discrimination in the Anglosphere 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Lived Reality—A Part of Life 2.3 Micro Acts of Discrimination and ‘Othering’ as Part of Daily Life 2.4 The Impact of Changing and Far-Right Politics on the Treatment of Muslims 2.5 The Impacts of Islamophobic Policies on Society’s Attitudes Toward Muslims 2.6 Role of Media, Islamophobia, and the Roots of Misconception 2.7 A Desire for Alternative Media and Narratives About Muslims 2.8 The Possibility to Enact Change on Social Media 2.9 Discrimination at School and University

1 1 2 8 13 16 23 23 28 29 31 34 38 44 47 49 v

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2.10 Discrimination at Workplace 2.11 Discrimination in Public Spaces 2.12 Gender 2.13 Justifications for, or Downplaying of, Discrimination 2.14 Super “Normal” 2.15 Ambassadors of Islam 2.16 Defiance 2.17 Social Distancing 2.18 Conclusion References 3

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54 58 62 68 71 75 78 79 86 90

Multilayered Identity of Young Muslims in the Anglosphere 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Existing Literature of Muslim Identity in the West 3.3 Multiple Identities: Fluidity and Harmony 3.4 Multiple Identities: Clashes 3.5 Western Home and Identity 3.6 Human Rights and Liberal Freedoms 3.7 Greater Freedoms for Women 3.8 Disconnection with Western Country 3.9 Maintaining Connection with Countries of Origin 3.10 Identity Through Entertainment Media 3.11 Conclusion References

95 95 96 101 106 107 110 112 114 117 118 121 123

Young Muslims in the Anglosphere and Expression of Faith 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Muslims’ Relationship with Islam 4.3 Participant’s Relationship with Religion 4.4 Religion as Identity 4.5 Consultations with Imams 4.6 Going Online to Engage with Faith 4.7 Interfaith Engagement 4.8 Conclusion References

129 129 130 134 139 142 146 152 155 157

CONTENTS

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Sharia and Young Muslims in the Anglosphere 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Literature on Sharia in the West 5.3 Advocating for Sharia in the West 5.4 Sharia Laws Are not Culturally Relevant in Modern Society 5.5 Sharia Was Designed Solely for Muslim Majority Societies 5.6 Conclusion References

163 163 164 167

Engagement Inside Home (Australia/UK/USA) Country 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Muslims and Engagement with Society 6.3 Local Community Volunteering and Associations 6.4 Volunteer Work via Mosque 6.5 Socializing Within Mosque and Faith Associations 6.6 Participation and Volunteering Outside of Faith Community 6.7 Generational Gaps: Distancing from the ‘Community’ 6.8 Religious and Ethnic Communities Are Too Insular 6.9 Widening Gaps Between New and Older Generations of Muslims in the West 6.10 Problematic Gender Perceptions and Attitudes Within the Community 6.11 Discriminatory Attitudes Within the Community 6.12 Conclusion References

189 189 190 195 197 198

Transnational Engagement of Young Muslims: The Global Citizen 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Country of Origin 7.3 Identifying and Connecting with Issues in the Muslim World 7.4 Keeping Up-To-Date and Connected with Muslim World Politics 7.5 Global Citizen and Keeping Informed of International News 7.6 Forming Connections with Others Around the World

173 178 182 185

200 204 205 208 210 212 214 218 221 221 223 228 233 236 239

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The Ability and Desire for Young Muslims to Create Change 7.8 Taking Action 7.9 Transnational Charity Work 7.10 Conclusion References 8

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National, Transnational, and Global Political Participation of Young Muslims 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Muslims and Political Participation 8.3 Democracy 8.4 Democracy Beyond Borders 8.5 Voting and Running for Office 8.6 A Belief or Feeling of Duty in Voting 8.7 Disinterest or Disenchantment in Voting 8.8 Running for Office and Muslim Representation in Politics 8.9 Concerns that Politics Threatens Islamic Values 8.10 Participating in Protests 8.11 Conclusion References

241 246 248 249 251 255 255 256 263 267 272 273 278 281 287 288 290 291

Intersectionality, Complexity, Agency, and Resilience of Young Muslims in the Anglosphere Reference

297 309

Appendix A—Table of Demographical Details of the Sample

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Appendix B—Table of Pseudonyms, Gender, Place of Origin/Ethnicity

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Index

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CHAPTER 1

Transcending Orientalism, Islamophobia, and Victimhood

1.1

Introduction

Muslims are the second largest religious group in the world, and within the West, Islam is one of the fastest-growing religions. Despite the large number of adherents and the existence of Muslims in the West, Muslims remain largely misunderstood and misrepresented. Politicians and media have both played a negative role in Muslims’ lives by using them as scapegoats and molding them into physical threats and a source of ontological insecurity for the West. While contrary to this approach, other politicians, some scholars, and more sympathetic media have increasingly portrayed Muslims as helpless victims without any agency or attempted to comprehend their behavior within the migrant identity framework. The key aspect of this book is to transcend this binary by exploring what Muslims actually think and say rather than intellectual articulations on them. Thus, instead of deeply engaging with the rich and arguably over-saturated literature on Muslims in the Anglophone West, the book aims to present the lived reality of young Muslims from their own perspectives. Using semi-structured interviews with 122 young Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds, various age groups, and possessing various interests, this book is able to explore their ideas of key Islamic and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6_1

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secular concepts, their struggles, world views, triumphs, how the stigmatized group negotiates their identity in three English-speaking Western countries 20 years after 9/11. I am hoping that the interviews conducted in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) will aid scholarly understanding of young Muslims by viewing the group beyond the binary of either demonization or passive victims usually and alternatively employed in such studies.

1.2 Going Beyond the Limitations of Orientalism, Islamophobia, and Victimhood Muslims have largely been misunderstood in contemporary discourse; a discourse primarily produced by an Orientalized ‘gaze.’ While Arab culture was previously romanticized, with Bedouins riding camels in the middle of a golden desert, today this image is replaced by a single dimensioned view of Islam and Muslims as dogmatic and dangerous, and which defines them as unidimensional ‘terrorists’ (Abdulla 2007a) or potential terrorists. As early as the 1980s there was clear evidence that American television had espoused and embraced this Orientalized idea of Islam and Arabs, linking them with themes of “‘terrorism, hijack, intractability, sullenous, perverseness, cruelty, oil, sand, embargo, boycott, greed, bungling, comedic disunity, primitive torture, family feuds, and white slavery’,” all of which were key themes in Hollywood depictions of Muslims. This pre-9/11 conception of Muslims crucially failed to acknowledge the diversity of Muslims (Yilmaz 2016a). For instance, Abdulla (2007b) notes, popular American television shows and movies often appeared to forget that most Muslims are not Arabs, but come from diverse regions such as “India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all of which are non-Arab countries.” September 11 (9/11) marked the beginning of one of the most critical events of the twenty-first century. The terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, by a group of jihadists, manifested the clash between the West and the East that Samuel P. Huntington had notoriously described in his book The Clash of Civilizations. In this book, he argued that “Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power”

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(Huntington 2016). Huntington promotes a neo-Orientalist perspective of Islam and Muslims, in which he sees the faith as a ‘problem’ to be ‘dealt with,’ thus repeating and reshaping the ‘white man’s burden’ at the closing of the twentieth century in an evolved idea of orientalism (Mohadi and Akhmetova 2020; Kerboua 2016; Amin-Khan 2012; Yilmaz and Morieson 2023). With a pre-existing caricature of ‘the Muslim’ oriental already in place, it was not difficult for the American government to involve the USA in a clash of ‘civilizations’ by triggering multiple conflicts in the Middle East. While there were legitimate security concerns in the region, exactly what this now two decades old ‘clash’—involving long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—has achieved remains contested (Sheridan 2021; Cordesman 2020; Khan 2020; Malkasian 2020). Today the USA and its allies appear to be struggling with the ramifications of an inherently orientalist and Islamophobic war. The circular nature of the problems these wars have caused cannot be understated. The resources and lives lost in war have become less of a pressing issue than the flow of refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, which has sparked ontological insecurity across a European continent whose citizens often look at Muslims with the same ‘gaze’ of suspicion, fear, and caution of the early Orientalists (Dalakoglou 2016; Nougayrède 2016; Yilmaz 2016b; Postelnicescu 2016). It is important to note that the subjects of Islamophobia and orientalism are not merely passive receivers. Muslims throughout the world have negotiated their identity by embracing the notion of victimhood which first surfaced in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in the First World War and the Empire’s subsequent dismemberment (Aydin 2017). Since this time, Muslims increasingly gravitated toward “the discourse of victimhood, discrimination, and betrayal by European empires” (Aydin 2017: 149). While these claims can also take the form of conspiracies there is some truth in these feelings of alienation and radicalisation in the global political arena (Yilmaz 2009, 2012). In the midst of a social and political climate where media and foreign policy are shaped by antiMuslim and anti-Islam attitudes, the figurehead-less Muslim community has faced an ontological crisis that has taken the shape of a victimhood narrative. Using the case study of Turkey, I explain this victimhood is based on the trauma of feeling that it is constantly under ‘siege,’ thus requiring constant self-defense, and resulting in the glorification of jihadism (Yilmaz 2021a: 31, 221).

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This multigenerational trauma has repeatedly been exploited by Islamists, including both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ jihadist actors including terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaida and elected members of parliaments such as Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan in Turkey and Imran Khan who are trying to assume the mental of the Muslim ‘struggle’ (Yilmaz 2021b; Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz and Shakil 2021a, b). This trauma is not only a result of the Muslim world’s political engagement with the West, but also the adoption of a ‘victim’ role and mentality. Thus, since the triumph of the West over the Ottomans “Islamists present themselves as religious, pure and virtuous rulers who qualify to rule because instead of self-interest, they pursue a morally superior purpose” which is anti-Western and evokes anxieties drawn on orientalist lines (Yilmaz 2021a: 105). Ironically, a portion of Muslims who have embraced the Islamist narrative have conformed to the stereotypes of orientalism and increasingly Islamophobia, leading to a self-fulling prophecy in terms of their socio-psychological and political outlook and actions. In the post-9/11 context media plays a crucial role in perpetuating stereotypes of Muslims, thus fueling an Islamophobia which deeply impacts domestic and global policies and politics. Western news stories frequently “show a mosque, a minaret, or a veiled woman regardless of the nature of the story, even when the story is about terrorism” (Abdullah 2007a: 1064). The paring of Muslim cultural practices and imagery with terrorism/terrorists has subliminally and outwardly made ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslims’ synonymous with terrorism and violent extremism in mass audiences (Utych 2018; Amin-Khan 2012; Naderi 2016; Khan et al. 2012; Zaal 2012; Dar 2010). In Smith’s (2016: 416) terms, this is making Muslims a “less-than-human creature to them.” Dehumanizing a group legitimizes sanctions, individual and group acts of violence, as well as discriminatory government policies toward ‘the otherized’ (Yilmaz 2021a; Smith 2016; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). Stereotypes created from prejudice essentially characterize the ‘out-group’ as not only being less human but also less competent, leading to a sharp decline in empathy or ‘warmth’ shown by observers (Utych 2018; Harris and Fiske 2006). Islamophobia and the mediums by which it is spread have led to the collective dehumanization of the subject, chiefly by attributing the violent and ruthless identity of a terrorist to all Muslims (Acim 2019; Samiei 2010; Zebiri 2008). In response, many Muslim and Islamist leaders have indulged in a self-induced PTSD that reinvigorates the legacy of victimhood and legitimizes hostility toward the West. In effect, both the Muslim

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world and the West seem to be stuck in a cycle is distrust based on ‘in’ and ‘out-group’ identities that provide little opportunity to find common ground and embrace each other. A transitional link between orientalism and Islamophobia undoubtedly exists. Amin-Khan (2012: 1595) points out that the Islamophobia phenomenon has found, “expression in the media in the form of raced and gendered portrayals and demonized cultural representations of Muslims and Islam.” It also retains its orientalist roots “with the accompanying assumption of the superiority of Western culture” and what is referred to as “incendiary racism” which “underpins the simultaneous vilification of Muslims and Islam” (Amin-Khan 2012: 1595). For two decades Islamophobia has become the predominate narrative in Western media and has also spread out to other regions. For example, regions such as India and Myanmar have hosted a Muslim population for centuries, but in recent years a wave of Islamophobia transmitted from media coverage has translated into anti-Muslim policies. Although India has historical tensions between its Hindu and Muslim populations, the events of 9/11 and a period of worsening ties with Muslim majority neighbor Pakistan have given India’s media and political landscape fertile ground to sow the seeds of Islamophobia and resulted in the demonization, oppression, deportation, and killing of Muslims in the country (Apoorvanand 2021; Human Rights Watch 2020a, b; Sumra 2020; Drabu 2018). Myanmar is an extreme case study, culminating in the Rohingya genocide of 2017 (Bakali 2021; Justice for all 2020; Crouch 2016). Beech (2017) disturbingly notes that the negative stereotyping of Muslims and their dehumanization has led many residents of Myanmar to perceive the mass murder and displacement of Muslims as unproblematic. In the Western context the vilification of Muslims has become normalized (Colic-Peisker et al. 2016) Islamophobia is ‘the fear of Muslims’ and is very similar to what the West has previously experienced in the form of racism against ethnic African citizens and anti-Semitism against the Jewish communities settled across Europe. Sinophobia is also a variation of such discriminatory views which surfaced at large in the 1990s and has taken new heights after the spread of COVID-19 which originated in Wuhan China turning into a pandemic (Albader 2019). The African and Sinophobia-based prejudices and stereotypes are racial in nature, and can be called ‘biological racism,’ while anti-Semitism is more culturally based discriminatory behavioral responses and attitudes toward Jewish people.

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Islamophobia displays a blend of both because it mixes anti-Arabism, feelings of hostility and suspicion toward those from the orient, and culturally fear-driven stereotypes and prejudices against those who identify with the faith of Islam (Grossman et al. 2016: 5, 25–33). For Muslims living in the West, Islamophobia has shaped the way they engage with society and the way they conduct their lives. For instance, a study of Muslim youth in Australia revealed that stereotyping forces many of the participants to react in four different ways “performing ordinary Australianness; social distancing; being a ‘supernormal’ hero of adjustment; and defiance” (Harris and Karimshah 2019). ‘Performing ordinary Australianness’ refers to the engagement of the group with national traditions and norms to show their “Australian-ness.” Fears seem to haunt young Australian Muslims who feel that they are not viewed as Australian, and thus try to engage with festivities and cultural activities with a significant ‘Aussie’-ness to them. “Social distancing” was also practiced by those who simply avoided engagement with Anglo-Australians because issues such as dietary habits, gender roles, and sexuality were points of contention that made the Muslim youth feel they would not ‘fit in.’ To compensate for the ‘Muslims are terrorists’ stereotype, a number took it upon themselves to be ‘supernormal’ and ‘heroes of adjustment,’ where they took up social work, community engagement programs, and other philanthropic activities to ‘prove’ their innocence or dispel negative images of Muslims. Lastly, Harris and Karimshah (2019) saw that some young interviewees showed a form of ‘defiance’ which challenged stereotypes. This defiance may take the form of a scarfed woman smoking or working full-time to defy the ‘Muslim women are oppressed’ narrative. At a state level former American President Donald Trump’s ban on travel from a number of Muslim countries, coupled with incessant Islamophobia in the media led to the significant oppression of American Muslims (Khan et al. 2021; Alsultany 2020). In France, a right-wing government has used violent terrorist incidents carried out by jihadist to justify various actions such as policing of women’s clothing by implementing niqab, burka, headscarf, and burkini bans by generalizing that all Muslims are extremists terrorists; while the ultra-right is in opposition, Islamophobia is so common in France that liberal President Emmanuel Macron has turned his policies in a far-right direction with new laws targeting French Muslims and their liberal freedoms (AlJazeera 2021a, b; Muhammad 2021). Government and media-led discrimination over the

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past two decades has led to a plethora of studies exploring Islamophobia in the West (Acim 2019). All in all, the book aims to go beyond the oversimplified binaries of ‘Muslim victims’ versus ‘Muslim terrorists’ and provides a fuller spectrum of the ideas, thoughts, and narratives of young Muslims in the Anglosphere. Through interviewing these young Muslims, I have started my investigation by exploring their reactions to Islamophobic conditions (Chapter 2), but then moved beyond it to investigate their important yet often overlooked perspectives on issues of identity, belonging, faith, sharia (Yilmaz 2023), social engagement (Yilmaz et al. 2021), politics, participation, and local/national/transnational/global affairs. The book does not limit itself to the impacts and experiences of Islamophobia on Muslims in the West by going beyond and highlighting key discussions concerning identity, faith, role in society, views on global events, transnational engagements, and political agency. The book furthermore contributes to the literature on the heterogeneity of the Muslim diaspora. For instance, it analyzes the voices of women, minority sects, newly converted Muslims, and non-religious cultural Muslims to emerge as a part of the wider Muslim discourse. Also, most of the extant scholarship on Muslims in the West offers an issue-specific analysis of different cultural, civic, economic, socio-political, religious, and identityrelated factors. This book’s main aim is to help bring these different strands together and to make an empirical contribution by providing a more holistic perspective on the lives of young Muslims in Australia, the UK, and the USA and by exploring whether these young Muslims wish to break free of the multigenerational trauma of victimhood, and determining how they perceive the discriminatory attitudes and behaviors they have encountered throughout their lives. Through interviews with 122 young Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds, age groups, and possessing different interests, the book explores how the often-stigmatized group negotiate their identity, interact in society, and manage their connection with faith. At the same time, the book goes beyond this and shows—or rather allows young Muslims to show—the core concerns of young Muslims in the Anglophone West, including their political beliefs, their knowledge and understanding of sharia law, their interest and participation in local and transnational political activism, their positive and negative feelings about their own communities, and indeed how they define their community.

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Most of all, the book allows young Muslims to describe themselves, and demonstrate themselves to be active citizens who care about their societies, yet also take an interest in global events, participate formally and informally in politics, and attempt to hold onto the traditions given to them by their parents that they consider positive and beneficial, while at the same time disregarding the those they consider deleterious for themselves and wider society. The interviews, while not fully representative of all young Muslims living in Western countries, shed light on the plural nature of what it means to identify with Islam in the twenty-first century. The chapters simultaneously discuss the differences of opinion, in experiences, and of ideas among the participants, showing the heterogeneous nature of perspectives present in Muslims living in the English-speaking West. The book also provides a close insight into the absorptive capacity of these young individuals to ‘balance’ their ideas and personalities and find several ways to engage with society and ward off Islamophobic hostility. What is clear that all these young Muslim individuals felt the West was ‘home’ and chose to look past or accept the challenge of Islamophobia or general prejudice. Young Muslims’ perspectives are refreshing, and especially helpful in an environment where the idea of Muslims or Islam is heavily stereotyped and misunderstood. In a sense, the subject of this work is a small contribution to the continuation of an academic discourse that provides insight into the misunderstood ‘oriental subject’ of the rational Western gaze.

1.3

Research Method

The primary data for this book was generated from semi-structured interviews and online surveys with 122 participants in Australia, the UK, and the USA. A close-ended survey was also filled out by the participants before the interview. This aided in the collection of data with rich insights into demographical variables and indicative attitudes. Thus, a mixed methodology approach was used to gain data and insights from young Muslims residing in America, Australia, and the UK. The purposive sampling of the 122 interviews was carried out through Muslim community organizations, leading personalities in the communities, young Muslim research assistants, Mosques, university Islamic societies, shopping centers and markets in the Muslim populated neighborhoods, word of mouth, and social media posts. Care was taken to

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ensure that the sample was representative of factors such as gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, and other variables that might have had an impact of the perspectives of the participants. This sample is not of course a probabilistic representative sample of all young Muslims living in these three countries. However, I have tried to have a sample as representative as possible in terms of gender, ethnicity, and sect. For every single ethnic community more than a few individuals and ‘entry points’ to the ethnic community were approached so that we were not limited to an identical group of people in the ethnic community with very similar views. Thus, while my findings cannot be generalized to all young Muslims living in these three countries, it offers significant insights about what many of these young Muslims could be living every day, thinking, and behaving. A time of convenience for a meeting was set between the interviewer and interviewee for an interview that lasted between thirty minutes and an hour. In some cases, the discussion went over the period of an hour although this was only due to the participant’s willingness to engage for longer. These detailed in-depth discussions were possible because both the interviewer and interviewee entered the interview agreement with a degree of flexibility (Edwards and Holland 2013: 29; Elliott and Timulak 2005: 150). A survey was also filled out by the participants prior to the interviews to gain a range of demographical insights. All these interviews were conducted in English language and recorded. A transcriber later used the audio recordings to convert them into text. Some of these interviews were carried out in person whereas others, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, were conducted online. The time and place, in the case of in-person interviews, were of the choosing of the participants to ensure that they were not inconvenienced. In terms of the sequence of empirical research, after the initial introduction, a consent form was shared with the participants. Later and after consultation of the consent form, the participants shared a written agreement to participate in the study and an acknowledgment of their rights. Following this initial stage, the closed-ended survey was sent to the participants who filled it in and returned it to the researcher prior to the scheduled interviews. As the interviews were carried out between late 2018 and late 2022. To maintain the anonymity of the participants various Muslim names have been allocated to the participants as pseudo names. Keeping the participant’s ethnic background and gender in perspective, the names have been kept close to these two variables to ensure that they capture the essence of the context of the quotation used from the sample.

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For the semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire was used by the interviewer to ask close to fifty-five questions from the participants. This guided the interviewee through the discussion process. At times if there was a need felt by the interviewer, the participant was kindly asked to explain or elaborate their response, and few additional questions were asked. The questions were open-ended. Some examples from the questionnaire include ‘How do you prefer to describe your identity?’, ‘What do think about the media coverage in about Muslims?’, ‘Do you have Anglo colleagues in your workplace? Or friends in your school? Are they friendly? Do you socialize with them outside of work/school?’, ‘Are you excited or curious about voting?’, ‘Have you discussed any political issue with an imam or an Islamic scholar?’, and ‘Have you ever taken part in a public demonstration or online protest?’ These questions began by exploring the idea of identity for the participants, their feelings about their ancestor’s country of origin, and their attachment to and life in the Western country. The structure of the questionnaire was designed to bring forth the association of the interviews with faith, community, country, and the world. Another segment also tries to gain insight into the participants’ habits and views regarding voting, social media, use of news platforms, preference for entertainment shows, etc. There were also specific questions to understand how young Muslims look at faith as a matter of personal belief system and also its relevance in the larger society. The interviews were structured as an attempt to capture the experiences of young Muslims as well as their thoughts and feelings about the world around them. The survey used in all three countries covers similar themes as the semistructured questionnaire but because the questions were closed-ended it yields quantitative information. Some examples of questions included those inquiring about the gender, age, voting habits, and participants’ use of social media. These questionnaires provide qualitative data that compliments the semi-structured interviews and provides key demographical information about the participants. The geographical location of the ‘Western’ and ‘Anglosphere’ countries includes Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). In Australia, the recent census shows that 2.6% of the population identifies as Muslim (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). In the UK 7% of the population consider themselves Muslim (Office of National Statistics 2019). While in the USA, the percentage of the faith group was 1.1% of citizens (Population and Housing Census 2020).

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While all 122 participants in the study identified as Muslims, they came from diverse ethnic backgrounds. A total of sixty-four participants from Australia took part in the study, in addition to thirty from the USA and a total of twenty-eight participants from the UK. Most respondents were born in their Western country of residence, while a small number were not (in some cases, yet) citizens of the countries. Table 1.1 indicates the latest census poll results, and the respective sample of the interview participants. The transcription of these interviews was carried out simultaneously. To ensure the reliability of this work, they were verified by a second researcher following the initial transcription. The transcription process for the 122 interviews was verbatim. After the text of the interviews was prepared, we used an established process of coding. Using both inductive and deductive coding, I explored the themes of identity and belonging among young Muslims in the sample regions, in addition to their interactions within society. Other key themes include the participants’ relationship with faith and the legal doctrines (sharia) of Islam; political participation, civic activities, and acting as a global citizen; and determination of the nature of intergroup dynamics, friendships, and discrimination experienced in a multicultural society. Through these subthemes, the author is able to present the various levels of engagement of Muslim youth have in their respective countries and their understanding of the socio-psychological and political realities that surround them. To reiterate, given the sample size and non-probabilistic sampling, I am fully aware that the book does not cover the perspectives and outlooks of all young Muslim living in Australia, the UK, and the USA, nor is this the intended outcome of this work. Secondly, the interviews on average lasted for an hour making it challenging for an in-depth investigation of all aspects of Muslim life and opinions. Thus, I am not attempting to create an analysis that depicts the views of a ‘prototype young Muslim.’ In fact, I have tried to be throughout the book, and supported by the interview findings, that there is no prototype Muslim or monolithic Muslim ‘community.’ Rather, given the diverse nature of the Muslim communities residing in these countries and the limitation of the current data’s generalizability, through successive chapters I demonstrate the similarities or at times differences in the respondents’ views and circumstances by discussing the major themes of the chapter and the subthemes within them.

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Table 1.1 Ethnicity of Australian, British, and American Muslims

Self-identified ethnicity Australian sample Ethnicity Iraqi Pakistani Turkish Lebanese Indian Afghan Indonesian Bosnian Palestinian Iranian Bangladeshi Malay-Singaporean Indian-Singaporean Indian-South African Pakistani-Fijian Palestinian-Lebanese Arab-Afghan Uighur Kurdish Sri Lankan Kenyan Turkish-Macedonian Albanian Anglo-Australian American sample Ethnicity Albanian Albanian + White Turkish Turkish + Azeri Tajik/Kyrgyz Bulgarian African African American American Black + Puerto Rican American + Caucasian/White Arab Moroccan

No.

8 7 7 6 6 5 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

(continued)

1

Table 1.1 (continued)

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Self-identified ethnicity

No.

Iraqi-Kurdish Arab + American + Latin American South Asian Bengali Pakistani Pakistani + Indian South Asian Pakistani Pakistani-American British sample Ethnicity British-Pakistani British-Bangladeshi Kurdish-Irish British-Turkish White British Asian British-Libyan Mauritian Mixed Race Turkish-Syrian Turkish-Yemeni Not identified

1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 13 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

Structure of the Book

The book uses nine chapters to explore the various aspects of the life, experiences, and belief systems of the young interviewees. Each chapter and its subcomponents explore the core thematic areas of concern, shedding light on the various aspects of the Muslim experience in the West. The present chapter of the book serves as an introductory chapter to existing literature, theoretical framework, methodology, significance, and layout of the book. Chapter 2 seeks to understand young Muslims’ lives as a targeted minority in the Anglophone West and the challenges they face due to the prevalence of Islamophobic and hostile attitudes and behaviors toward Muslims. The chapter finds that discrimination, in varying intensities and forms, is part of the everyday lives of all Muslims, and that they overwhelmingly believe media and politics have a key role in shaping and disseminating Islamophobic narratives. Women, due to their visibility, and those who look “Arab,” are most likely—interviews show—to receive racial/religious attacks. Data produced through interviews with

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young Muslims and related to the discrimination they face is thematically analyzed, which provides in-depth insight into the role discrimination plays in the day-to-day lives and social and political behavior of young Muslims. This includes not only young Muslims’ experiences of discrimination, but also the rationales and coping mechanisms they have employed to mitigate the impacts of Islamophobia. Chapter 3 explores young Muslims’ expression of multiple identities, with various indicators of identity studied. The chapter’s thematic analysis revealed a complex expression of identity among young Muslims including a strong sense of individuality in each respondent. Interview responses brought forward subthemes of multiple expressions of identities. Instead of belonging to one temporal space or social category, it was evident that most, if not all, had dynamic ‘layers’ of identity. Through analysis of each of the subthemes found in interviews, the chapter finds that not only are migrant identities plural, and display elements of connection with homeland, country of origin, faith, and gender, but there is also a clear difference in their expression of identity depending on the experiences they have had with feeling welcomed and included in their Western home. Chapter 4 examines how young Muslims understand and relate to their faith and the role it plays in their day-to-day lives and the Muslim community. The findings reveal the surprising diversity of Muslims’ relationship with Islam, and the variety of ways in which they connect with faith, ranging from Islam being a cultural element in their lives to religion holding vital importance and helping them make everyday decisions. The interviews also reveal the diverse ways and discerning manner in which participants sought information about their religion, from consulting Imams to online research. The varying relationship between Islam and the personal identities of young Muslims in the Anglosphere is also identified, including how Muslim identities are expressed and perceived, and how this has been impacted by negative stereotyping in broader society. Yet ultimately this chapter finds various expressions of pride and acceptance; most interviewees freely connect with their religious identity, and this has resulted in them being curious and accepting of other religious identities. Chapter 5 focuses on providing a new perspective to one of the most misunderstood and feared parts of Islam and Muslim identity in the West: sharia law. The word sharia itself is so heavily loaded with negative connotations that little effort is made to understand its meaning

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and its relevance for Muslims. To address this gap, the interviews with young Muslims explore their conceptualization of sharia; its relevance in their lives; if they believe it should be implemented in Muslim majority countries and/or the West; and issues and concerns they have about sharia and the way it has been represented in society. The chapter illuminates how young Muslims in the Anglophone West do not conform to typical media-driven ideas of Muslims as either secular ‘good’ Muslims or pro-sharia ‘bad’ Muslims, but rather that Muslims have a diverse set of opinions about sharia, and very often have little understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. Chapter 6 investigates how young Muslims engage within their home country. The interviews conducted for this chapter reveal how young Muslims’ engagement with the world around them takes shape via social interactions such as volunteering for religious and secular causes, joining special interest or professional groups, and perusing hobbies. The themes recorded in interviews reveal that defining the community is a challenging task for the participants, since for each person the community can represent different things. Interview responses repeatedly indicated frustration felt by some young Muslims toward their ethnic and/or religious communities for the conservative, insular, or judgmental views they encounter from older generations. The author ultimately finds that young Muslims have found numerous ways of defining and engaging with what they perceive as their community in their home in the West. Chapter 7 explores young Muslims’ understanding of socio-political realities beyond their country of residence, allowing interviewees to express several ways in which they connect with global debates and issues faced by humanity pertaining to issues such as human rights, climate change, peace, and conflict. The thematic analysis consequently allows for an examination of young Muslims as global citizens. It also finds that for most interviewed, their Muslim identity permitted them insight into events in Muslim majority countries and, in particular, their “country of origin.” Cumulatively, the responses also demonstrate that social media, much more than traditional media, plays a vital role in creating and maintaining engagement at various levels as global citizens. The chapter is essential insofar as it ventures beyond the common idea that young Muslims’ engagement with the world takes the form of transnational jihadism and provides a fresh view of young Muslims as global citizens, and moreover as normal people who take a keen interest in global and transnational Muslim affairs. Taken together, Chapters 5, 6, and 7

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demonstrate the ‘active citizenry’ of young Muslim in the anglosphere West, providing evidence of individuals who are politically, socially, and globally engaged. Chapter 8, the final thematic chapter of the book, analyzes the diverse ways in which young Muslims participate in political activities nationally, transnationally, and globally. The chapter finds that participants as active citizens engage in a variety of conventional (e.g., voting) and nonconventional (e.g., political activism) means to make their voice heard and create change in the Western societies in which they live. Although some participants felt disenchanted or disinterested in political participation, the majority saw it is an opportunity or civic duty. The interviews also found that most young Muslims felt a need for greater representation of Muslims in politics. This is related to giving a voice to Muslims, but also to providing a positive representation of ‘good role models’ and ‘good Muslims.’ These interview discussions raised interesting and differing points of view about the compatibility of Islam and Islamic morals with political participation, finding that for many young Muslims in the West, their religious and civic duties co-contribute to their decision to actively participate in politics. The last chapter of the book serves as its conclusion. It begins with an analysis of contemporary changing attitudes toward Muslims. The discourse presented in the above-mentioned chapters is key in debunking many stigma-inducing perspectives and prejudices. At the same time the conclusion discusses the multi-fold nature of young Muslims lives and identity. In essence, chapter thirteen presents the triumphs and struggles of the group in the West, and as a part of society who are misunderstood and at times misjudged. The author also notes that this research, despite its innovative nature, lacks in some regards. The chapter ends by highlighting the contribution of this book within the parameters of existing research and encourages further research based on the multifaceted perspectives brought forth by the 122 interviews.

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Postelnicescu, Claudia. (2016). “Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism.” European Journal of Psychology 12(2), 203–209. Accessed 12 May 2021. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v12i2.1191. Samiei, Mohammad. (2010). “Neo-Orientalism? The Relationship Between the West and Islam in Our Globalised World.” Third World Quarterly 31(7), 1145–1160. Accessed 9 May 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/27896605. Sheridan, Greg. (17 April 2021). “How 20 Years of Conflict Let China Catch Up.” The Australian. Accessed 10 May 2021. https://www.theaustralian. com.au/inquirer/war-in-afghanistan-a-forever-and-fateful-failure/newsstory/ 685d93564565787fb49d631dcde5473c. Smith, David Livingstone. (2016). “Paradoxes of Dehumanization.” Social Theory and Practice 42(2), 416–443. Accessed 10 May 2021. www.jstor.org/ stable/24871350. Sumra, Azhar ul Hassan. (2020). “Muslims and Islam in Indian English Press: Exploring the Islamophobic Discourse.” Islamophobia Studies Journal 5(2), 226–237. Accessed 12 May 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/islastudj. 5.2.0226. Utych, Stephen M. (2018). “How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” Political Research Quarterly 71(2), 440–452. Accessed 10 May 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/26600483. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (April 2009). “Socio-Economic, Political and Theological Deprivations’ Role in the Radicalization of the British Muslim Youth: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir.” European Journal of Economic and Political Sciences (EJEPS) 2(1), 89–101. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2012). “An Analysis of the Factors That Pave the Way for the Radicalization of the British Youth.” In Mohammed Siddique Seddon, Fauzia Ahmad, and Shiraz Khan (Eds.), Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations (pp. 32–53). London and New York: Continuum.. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016a). Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan. London and New York: Routledge. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016b). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Switzerland: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2021a). Creating the Desired Citizens: State, Islam and Ideology in Turkey. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (14 February 2021b). “Erdogan’s Political Journey: From Victimised Muslim Democrat to Authoritarian, Islamist Populist.” European Center for Populism Studies. Accessed 12 May 2021. https://www.populisms tudies.org/erdogans-political-journey-from-victimised-muslim-democrat-toauthoritarian-islamist-populist/.

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CHAPTER 2

Young Muslims and Living with Discrimination in the Anglosphere

2.1

Introduction

The oriental gaze has undergone a major shift since the turn of the century. While the underlining misunderstandings remain embedded in the narratives about people of the orient, new ideas and perceptions have become prominent. For instance, intrigue has been largely replaced by fear (Yilmaz 2016), and the subjects have become increasingly misunderstood. The post-September 11 rhetoric that surfaced, has been coupled with widespread anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric around the world (Cervi 2020; Haddad and Harb 2014; Awan 2010; Zine 2009; Allen 2014). ‘Trigger events’ such as terrorist attacks and ISIS violence are found to intensify online and offline hostilities toward Muslim communities in the West (Wiedlitzka et al. 2021; Zempi and Awan 2016). This is partly due to the biased and inflammatory media reporting of these incidents which has further demonized these communities in mainstream discourse (Zempi and Awan 2016). Both digital and physical spaces have seen a sharp spike in xenophobic rhetoric which questions the presence of racially and religiously diverse groups in the West. Muslims, chiefly due to the global wave of jihadism, are often at the forefront of this socio-political debate (Ellefsen and Sandberg 2021; Moufakkir 2020; Wang et al. 2020; Sadeghi 2019; Yilmaz 2009, 2012). The merging of Islamophobia in society with the pre-existing “oriental gaze” discussed in Chapter 1 has made Muslim © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6_2

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communities susceptible to widespread prejudice and stereotyping. From seeking employment to choosing a neighborhood to live in (Ahmed and Gorey 2021; Di Stasio et al. 2021; Shavit 2021; Colic-Peisker et al. 2019; Miaari et al. 2019) the lives of Muslims have too often been defined by shielding themselves against the resentment they face in Western society. Ranging from verbal attacks to more subtle forms of racism, the instances of religiously motivated acts of hatred are globally rising (Bravo and Castelló 2021). This chapter describes the lived experiences of young Muslims who face various forms of hostility and the adjustments they have had to make, consciously and unconsciously, to cope and adjust in their respective countries. The events of September 11, 2001, shaped the lives of Muslims around the globe. Muslims living in the West have been profoundly impacted by this event and the global events and discourse it triggered. It is not surprising that in their study of young Muslims living in Melbourne, Australia, Johns et al. (2015) found that over half of participants described September 11 as their “formative experience.” This means that discrimination and stereotyping redefined many aspects of their lives on a large scale. For some, it meant finding new ways to engage with religion and to express their citizenship. The “formative” nature of 9/11 might have driven some young Muslims toward more ontological questions, and many had to struggle with growing up as a whole spectrum of discrimination was directed toward them (Pratt and Woodlock 2016; Hopkins 2004). Numerous studies that go beyond Islamophobia as just statistics have been carried out in the West to understand lingering anxiety about Muslims, and its impact on Muslim victims. Authors such as Elkassem et al. (2018) found that as early as school Muslim children face all forms of discrimination, varying from mild arguments to physical incidents of violence (Elkassem et al. 2018). It is not only fellow students that partake in Islamophobia, but also teachers and faculty members that at times, perpetuate stereotypes about Muslim pupils (Elkassem et al. 2018). This makes Islamophobia a fixture in the lives of many from very early on. The West’s prolonged fear of Muslims and its increasing intensity also means that it has evolved over time and in correspondence with changing socio-political conditions. Peucker (2018) challenges the far-right Islamophobic rhetoric, which aggressively presents Islam as a cultural threat to Western societies. He also challenges the ‘liberal’ anti-Islam agenda which is based on an opposition to beliefs about Islam’s strict “conservatism”

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on issues including the role of women, homosexuality, or abortion. In one study, Sunar (2017) finds that “the otherization” of Muslims has been further catalyzed by events such as the election of Donald Trump. The author believes that radical right-wing narratives that hinge on antiminority narratives have a trickle-down impact on the lives of the minority. As a result, the study finds that Islamophobic sentiments and anti-Muslim behaviors have rapidly increased, despite nearly two decades have passed since 9/11. In addition to political discourse, the role of both traditional and digital media is crucial in shaping the narrative around Muslims and has been responsible for the transnational dissemination of Islamophobic messaging (Anderson et al. 2021; Awan and Khan-Williams 2020; Saeed 2007). In such an environment, Muslims have found various outlets for coping with and adjusting to discrimination. In their study of young Muslims living in the West, Harris and Roose (2014) found that 80% of the participants talked to their family or friends ‘very often’ about issues including racism, discrimination, religion, and climate change. The study also identified a reliance these subjects had on others beyond their kin and noted the important role of their network of friends. These networks aid in cushioning the negativity spread by the media and provide a safe space for discussion and healing. Harris and Roose’s (2014) data shows Muslims have constructed a ‘citizen communication network,’ through which people can discuss contradictory ideas and try to understand the others’ points of view. This network helps to break down social barriers and develops mutual understanding with others. One-to-one interaction and discussion yield positive results and help move past negative mainstream media representation. Hopkins (2004) reached a similar conclusion when looking at how social media networks are used by Muslims to find a safe space for discussing their unique struggles. Hopkins finds that online forums, where people could connect with each other and every voice felt heard, provided Muslims with an opportunity to let people around the world know that they disagree with extremist ideologies. These forums gave minorities and majorities alike a chance to assert their arguments and views. In another study, Harris and Hussein (2020) explored how young Australian Muslims defend themselves against Islamophobic propaganda disseminated by the media and the public. The research claimed that the participants of the study reported that they consistently feel the need to

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explain and defend themselves, predominantly in response to the negativity that is spread about Muslims in Western societies. For Muslims, their position as ambassadors of Islam also makes them engage in various civic activities (Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2022). Harris and Karimshah (2019) also find various defenses utilized by young Australian Muslims to mitigate the unjust scrutiny they faced from Western media. The researchers find that in an atmosphere where Muslims are racially profiled and criminalized, they display distrust not only toward the media but also toward various state institutions. Four strategies are identified that young Muslims adopt in response to this atmosphere: “Performing ordinary Australianness; social distancing; being a ‘supernormal’ hero of adjustment; and lastly, defiance” (Harris and Karimshah 2019). In the first strategy, ‘performing ordinary Australianness,’ the subjects of the study reported that they see their ‘Muslimness’ as a source of difference between themselves and fellow Australians. In other words, Australians are perceived to look at them differently purely predicated on the idea that if a person is Muslim, then he is different. To overcome this perception, the participants reported that they tend to do things that any “normal” Australian does (see also Yilmaz et al. 2021). They involved themselves in mainstream Australian cultural activities, such as engaging in recreation and sports activities. Secondly, ‘social distancing’ is a strategy which involves deliberately and publicly distancing oneself from violent or extremist ideas. Australian Muslims who seek approval from local Australians tend to portray themselves as having nothing to do with the ideas of violent groups. For example, one of the participants in the study reported that when a violent incident happens in which a Muslim group is involved, he explained to his fellow Australians that such groups are only ruining the name of Islam and have nothing to do with Muslims or Islam. Thus, by distancing themselves from extremist groups, Australian Muslims seek to portray themselves as ‘normal.’ In the third strategy, ‘being a ‘supernormal’ hero of adjustment,’ the participants of the study reported that when stigma is attached to a person, they tend to overdo efforts to construct their image as a ‘normal’ person. They named this response as being ‘on’; in this state, defending their image against proclaimed stigma, they tend to behave not only as ‘good,’ but as ‘better’ than others. As a result, in overcoming the stigma of being ‘abnormal,’ they tend to become ‘supernormal.’ Lastly, in the ‘defiance’ strategy, the participants claimed that they tend to defy the image that Australians have generally constructed of them. For

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example, a woman reported that when she smokes wearing a scarf, she defies the image of a traditional Muslim woman who is forbidden to do such things. Similarly, another female participant said that she dresses up, takes her hair out, and even dances to show that she is as normal as any other Australian. Through their work with young Muslims, Jakubowicz et al. (2012) discovered that no matter how integrationist the Australian environment may seem, these young Muslims suffer in wider society as Muslim culture is not accepted completely by the national culture (Jakubowicz et al. 2012). Therefore, in order to ‘legitimize’ their cultural capital, these young Muslims are always trying very hard in order to prove that they are as ‘Australian’ as others. In this effort, they try to adapt to Australian culture as much as they can and bridge the gap existing between these different cultures and values. Thus, the young Australian Muslims are likely to face the dilemma and extensive effort of adapting to Australian culture while keeping their Muslim identity intact. At the end of the day, Muslims face the burden of having to “prove” themselves as well as dispelling myths about people ‘like them.’ Literature also finds that societal backlash has been particularly harsh for Muslim women who dress ‘visibly’ Muslim in the West. Choices such as covering their body make women easy targets for Islamophobic attacks due to their visibility in public. Iner et al. (2023) found that 78% of offline incidents reported to the Islamophobia Register Australia between 2014 and 2021 were directed against Muslim women, the majority of whom were ‘visibly’ Muslim. Muslim women’s choices are constantly second guessed by a mainstream society which labels them as oppressed (Gaouas et al. 2021; Khokar 2021; Iner and Korbatieh 2021; Terman 2017; Allen 2014; Carland 2011; Zebiri 2011). Duderja (2018) finds that with the rising number of Muslim migrants in Western countries, identity conflicts are originating, and Muslims are consequently trying to construct a new identity as a means to assimilate into Western culture. The author finds that the veil or Hijab is perceived as a symbol of Muslim ‘otherness,’ and that as a result Muslim women are considered outsiders in Western culture. Similarly, the role of women in Islam has raised a plethora of discussions and debates. These debates have often portrayed Islam as confining women and preventing them from roles of leadership or power in all arenas. Gaouas et al. (2021) and Allen (2014) also note that in the UK, the political atmosphere and mainstream media target Muslim

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women quite frequently and increased their vulnerability to discrimination. Terman (2017), using content analysis of media converge in the USA regarding Muslim women, finds American media to be riddled with highly negative stereotypes of Muslim women. However, studies also demonstrate that Muslim women have found their own coping mechanisms, and many still chose to be visibly Muslim. For instance, Johns et al. (2015) found that a female participant (Samina) decided to wear a hijab in response to hostilities and discrimination that she had faced in school. Even though she initially started wearing a hijab as a political decision, her decision to continue wearing it was based on her religiosity. Samina critiqued the liberal feminist position on hijab, and her choice to wear it, which she conceptualizes as ‘feminism within.’ This example demonstrates one way in which discrimination shapes young Muslim women and has resulted in their own assessment of religion and the perception of society. Iner and Korbatieh (2021) also find that Muslim women constantly display agency in challenging this narrative and redefining themselves. However, the authors lack the exploration of the added burden of “proving” to society that they are independent women with freedom of choice. Women face an added layer of burden to be activists for their faith, to carry out extra activities to connect with the larger society, and to create a counterimage of Muslim women collectively (Khokar 2021). Ultimately, this review of literature demonstrates that Muslims in the West, particularly women, face extensive and varied forms of discrimination. There are a multitude of responses by the victims and their efforts to mitigate the situation. This chapter presents interview responses that illuminate not only the various types of discriminations and impacts faced by young Muslims in the West, but also individual perceptions, coping strategies, and examples of resilience. These findings offer a cumulative understanding of this challenging and highly prevalent aspect of young Muslim’s lives.

2.2

Lived Reality---A Part of Life

Unfortunately, the interviews confirm the prevalence of discrimination in the daily lives of young Muslims, which can take the form of blatant attacks or more subtle comments and prejudices in the workplace. Many felt the media and political climate promoted such practices and most accepted it as part of their day-to-day life. No matter what form this discrimination took, all the respondents acknowledged its presence. Every

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participant had a personal story or account of someone close to them who had faced racial or religious discrimination. Most felt quite hurt by these occurrences while others chose to ignore them. Despite most ‘coping’ with the experiences of discrimination, its presence was omnipresent in their lives. It is important to remember that most of the interviewees grew up in a post-9/11 scenario where school, work, and other spheres of their lives were shaped by Islamophobic attitudes and the intense skepticism around Muslims in the West. For most then, this behavior is simply a lived reality, and the majority have learned to negotiate this negative side of life in the West and see it as an exchange for the opportunities offered to them. When asked in the interviews what they liked most about their Western homeland, most listed favorable reasons such as freedoms (especially for women), education, work opportunities, political stability, and quality of life. When the next question asked them to list down unfavorable or disliked things, the issue noted most was discrimination in one form or another. This thematic analysis aims to explore the role this discrimination has played in the lives of these youth. It contributes empirical evidence of the regular occurrence of discrimination, the emotions that arise in response, and a crucial insight into how interviewees understand, respond to, and contextualize these unpleasant experiences.

2.3 Micro Acts of Discrimination and ‘Othering’ as Part of Daily Life The presence of microaggressions toward these individuals arose on many occasions in the interviews. Aanadi explained, People have made comments that could be considered like micro aggressions or, you know, things [that] are culturally insensitive.

Ajmal claims discriminatory statements are part of day-to-day life for Muslims living in the West, “When you meet new people and they are like, ‘oh where are you from?’”. And she added how having a non-traditional name that is not “English” also adds to it, “also like the name, like it is not the traditional English name so, it can be hard to get across”.

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As Rizwan explained in his discussion, being asked “where are you from” can feel like an attack or an insinuation that he does not belong, I think that is attacking my identity a bit, they feel like I don’t belong in Australia. Then, so even like other ethnic Australians ask me, ‘where you are from?’ and I feel attacked by them. Because it is showing that somehow, I do not belong here. I am not sure [… if it is] from the way I speak, from the way I look, the way I dress.

Even forms of questioning that are quite subtle can have a significant impact on those who receive them. As Khadija recalled from her high school years, I would have been in what grade ten or eleven probably […] and I remember there was this much younger student walking past and I still remember he asked, ‘do you speak English?’ And I don’t know what context that was in, but he just came past me, and I was like, ‘are you serious right now?’

Aanadi regularly came into a comment with these types of comments and was clear in her opinion that this would not be the case if she were a “White man.” Qaiser, while discussing workplace racism and prejudice, blamed a lack of “awareness” or “ignorance” for such occurrences. The participant explained matter-of-factly, With my work colleagues or socially, I would not say that I [have] personally experienced any ill-feeling. I feel that I am popular amongst them, but I notice that they have prejudices against people of my background and religion, because of the nature of the questions they ask and sometimes the tone and the nature of their conversations.

This is an interesting comment because it highlights that stereotyping is often directed toward groups or whole segments of society. When in closer proximity, or when people ‘get to know’ the stereotyped subject, like Qaiser’s workmates know him, they do not see him as part of the ‘other’ or stereotyped group. Aarish’s comment supports a prevalent viewpoint that discrimination has become the “norm” among many of the interviewees across the three regions,

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So, in the UK it’s very, very subtle. So, you won’t have people on the street calling you terrorists but the privilege – for example the White privilege – would be embedded in people’s mind, and they won’t even realize it.

2.4

The Impact of Changing and Far-Right Politics on the Treatment of Muslims

Interviewees felt that politics and the government played an important role in promoting diversity in society, although had failed to do so in many cases. Various opinions surfaced on the issue in the three countries; some were satisfied with state and political efforts, however others felt disappointed with immigration policies and with the rise of right-wing and divisive politics that perpetuated discriminatory attitudes toward Muslims in the West. Hasan noted that the Australian government has recently been making questionable legal proposals, which have the ability to limit the future of multiculturalism. He commented on the new bill relating to citizenship, I mean, let us say that with the new citizenship proposal that they put, they want someone to speak English fluently at a university level, they wanted someone who would do all that but then at the same time you can’t really expect someone to know English fluently when they have only been in this country for a limited amount of time […] So, the current government I think they could do better. In term[s] of better communicating our message to others and in terms of you know giving everyone an equal go, no matter what their religion is or what their background is.

Fatimah felt that Australian politicians made “migration” a “Muslim issue” which has resulted in anti-Muslim attitudes in Australian society. She explained, I think that the government has allowed Muslims and other ethnic minorities to be sort of separated from Australians due to the fact like when they say, ‘no migrants’, their view is always like the Muslim migrants coming into Australia. Even though like we have more immigration from Europe and stuff then we do like from Muslim countries. But because the government makes it look like a Muslim issue it leads to contention between Anglo-Australians and […] ethnic [Muslim] minorities.

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The growing relevance of far-right voices in parliament and across social media unsettled participants. Although Noriyah enjoys her life in Australia, she has felt the growing presence of political figures like Pauline Hanson and worries about the impact on Muslims. She explained further, I think in a way, they have become a very culturally diverse country, you know, Australia. But at the same time, they have polices like operations on borders, and apparently, they wanna implement the burka ban and that sort of a thing, which is discouraging.

In the USA the rise of former President Donald Trump was seen as a key vehicle of hostile politics intensifying the already problematic issue of Islamophobia. Kiza shared a story of verbal abuse at her hijabi friend in connection to the 2016 elections. She narrated, It [discrimination] escalated in recent years, I would say around 2015, 2016. The last presidential election. And after that, it escalated a lot, and I felt a lot less like I belonged in this society. […] I did have a friend who was walking on the street once and had someone shout at her when I was with her, because she was wearing a headscarf. So, yeah, they’re shouting about the election and telling her to go back to where she came from. […] I just find it a bit ridiculous because almost everyone in this country came from somewhere else. So, I don’t really take it personally. It doesn’t hurt me just because I’ve always felt like I came from somewhere else, and I knew that I didn’t have a problem with that. But it is it is frustrating for other people that I know that were born and raised here and have had to fight to belong.

Salomon simply stated, “I mean, look, the President [Trump] … there’s not a lot to say about that.” Zia perceptively explained how he was thankful that the election of Trump had made it clear that still large amounts of racism still exist in American society, and this provided an opportunity for growth, I was very proud to be American my whole life. Really proud. Up until, you know, President Trump came into office. It’s actually interesting because I didn’t realize how racist and how prejudiced people could be if it wasn’t for the present. So, you know, I thank him for that, there’s no question I think it was the best thing that could have ever come out of it. I think we needed a president like Trump to come into office to just show was some of the colors of the country that we assumed were gone [are still present].

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And this now opens up lots of avenues for dialogue. This opens up ways to communicate with various different communities that may have seen us in a different light.

Most participants who commented on the rising tide of right-wing politics were clear in their view that the repercussions went beyond the Muslim community and affected all ethnicities. Yezda referred to Trump in his comment that, I mean that, like look at […] the comments that he has made over the years, like us Muslims, like just negative. Honestly about anyone that is not White I feel like.

Nadia, who lived in the USA and worked at a diner, shared that there were many people during and after the 2016 election who wore “Trump T-Shirts” and made negative comments about religious and ethnic minorities. Her story reinforces the trickle-down impact of politics on the communicates targeted by them. In the UK issues such as Brexit also triggered a fresh wave of discrimination in the views of many. Nargis felt that this wave was targeted not only at Eastern Europeans but also at other religious minorities, including Muslims, in the UK. Zubeida believed the rise of the far right was more than just Brexit and had serious and ongoing implications for British Muslims, Like the far-right’s power is becoming increasingly prominent and that is reflected within the everyday interactions between people. It is becomingI would say - quite frightening.

Saad also felt that the Tory government and several members of parliament had said hurtful things about Muslims recently and in the past, I think there are plenty of anti-Muslim sentiments in MPs, Ministers or even the PM himself, so yeah that is definitely a big thing.

The problematization of Islam does not only originate from right-wing political and media organizations. Many also expressed their frustration with the political left for its inaccurate presentation of Muslims and Islam, which often took the form of the political left “victimizing” Muslims. As Arben stated,

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I would say that there is a spilt for sure, so people who stand more on the left side of the spectrum just see Muslims just as an oppressed minority community and people who stand more on the right side of spectrum they see Muslims more differently. I would say both of them are somewhat accurate. None see [Muslims…] just as individuals who are part of this society, you know, everyone sees as a cause to change or cause to get rid of.

Sumayya expressed her disappointment with politicians, who pushed agendas about respect and diversity around election time, but then never follow up or support Muslim communities, They don’t do anything, but to claim that they are doing something. So, they have that slogan ‘respect now and always’ but they haven’t had any I guess seminars or any talks about that, they don’t have the events that promote respect […] Although they claim to be a very multicultural and ethnic community, they don’t really do much to support those communities.

2.5 The Impacts of Islamophobic Policies on Society’s Attitudes Toward Muslims Jameelah felt that the widescale profiling of Muslims post-9/11 had created distrust between the state and Muslim citizens. She noted, I feel like they [Muslims] are still very much afraid and it is kind of like, I feel like most Muslims feel like they are being watched and the government doesn’t trust them, yeah. So, I don’t think they have done a good job.

Sohrab who lived in the USA also felt the events of the last two decades had left the Muslim community with a bitter taste in its mouth due to extensive profiling, “In terms of religious, I think that there are issues with religious freedom in the United States in the sense that sometimes there’s that surveillance of Muslims […] That’s a problem, like countering violent extremism programs is a problem, because they criminalize Muslims before they’re convicted of anything.” He added “I think that those kinds of policies should be changed”.

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Zohaib felt that overall, the root of discrimination was politicians feeding hostile ideas into their voter base about immigration and immigrants. He noted, Some working-class White people are very racist but that is also because of the media and because of what they are told about their problems, like ‘immigrants cause your problems, Muslims cause your problems’. And that is because of politicians and what they are allowed to say about Muslims and people of color in general. But then you also have working class White people who have worked and lived alongside […] Muslims, so then in that situation there is more understanding and not as much tension and actually more similarity.

This comment also brings home the point made earlier in this chapter, that a closer proximity to Muslim individuals often reverses the stereotyping and prejudiced view of them. Concerns about mass surveillance and breaches of the privacy of Muslim in the UK were repeatedly raised in the interview discussions. Zohaib noted, When it comes to the government’s counter extremism tactics and programs, the way that it sees a Muslim community, and the way that it covertly takes information on them without consulting them. And yeah, it is not exactly a way to- I don’t know, it makes Muslims trust the government less, that is one example.

Yasir, also from the USA, felt that criminal justice and the state did not work for “people like him.” He did not feel the legal intuitions provided protection, commenting that “if I was arrested and put in jail, I mean, like the fact that some kid can be thrown in jail and go to Rikers Island for like two plus years without ever going to trial.” The participant also explained that lobbies and politicians did not have their best interests at heart, “No, I do not trust them to do what’s good for the people. I trust them to do what’s good for themselves.” Ajmal felt that social and political attitudes regarding different races and religions also skew the legal system. He provided examples of harsher sentences given to ethnic and Muslim members of society compared to White perpetrators. Anas felt that in the Australian context, the problem was rooted in a much deeper construct of the modern nation state of Australia, where

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discrimination and Whiteness are the norm. He elaborated in his account of “thing that I dislike about Australia’,” I think I dislike the fact that there are certain systems in Australia which are still built of racism. The fact that we haven’t recognized or properly apologized for the Indigenous human rights volitions and authorities that we committed, for the Indigenous people. I don’t like the fact that we are sometimes very conservative in our political kind of objectives; so, for example a lot of the asylum seeker policies I don’t agree with. I don’t agree with the Australian foreign policy issues that when it comes to issues of conflict and war. And also, I dislike the fact that we […] still make the White mainstream narrative sometimes the norm, so we don’t really have an inclusive community. Sometimes we just expect people to become White rather than Australian and for me I find that an issue, and also the low levels of racism we see in Australia.

Khalifah, who lived in the USA, perceived similar problems in the USA; he noted while at the community level things were certainly better at the Federal government level a bias against diversity has been maintained over the years. Aanadi who also lived in America thought that the problem lies with the Federal government, I think local governments are good at this because local governments take in mind what their constituents want. But like as the government gets bigger and broader, it matters, or they care about it, less because then they’re catering to bigger and bigger populations, not just smaller communities that want these types of things [diversity and equality].

Ameer also commented that changing discriminatory attitudes was more likely to be achieved at the state than the federal level. The respondent felt hopelessness in his own agency to change the status quo of broader society, telling the interviewer, “I wanna give you all your answers, but I feel like no matter what we do, we are not being heard.” He believed the only way to enact change is by starting “at the state [and] local community, I think we need to look at those areas first before tackling Australia.” Anas felt that he was always going to face challenges when it comes to being accepted by society because of the political climate. He commented,

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I think I can go around and do [my] thing, but I think overall my full potential will be halted because of the different privileges that other people have - especially White-Australian compared to me as a Brown-MuslimAustralian. So, until that changes, I feel that there is always going to be a challenge of being fully accepted.

Although problems were noted, some participants felt the West offered relative protection to minorities compared to other countries around the world. Behlul for instance noted, Comparatively, yes, compared to many countries. Yes, but definitely there are things to be improved.

Liaqat noted that the USA’s constitution protected its citizens by ensuring various human rights, And to speak on a larger scale like the US and the government does a great job in protecting religious diversity and rights. Like just for the freedom that you have in the US […] You can speak against the government in majority and demand as people who don’t agree with how the government grants religious freedoms and certain ethnicities the rights that they have.

Najibah felt that publicly embracing Muslim cultural elements by political figures aids in normalizing diversity. She liked that some politicians publicly wished Muslims Ramadan or Eid Mubarak. She explained, Yeah, so on Eid and stuff like politicians would come on TV and say, ‘Eid Mubarak’ and we have Muslims celebrating this stuff today and they would give a short speech and that is nice.

Amal felt that the inclusion of diversity as part of the school curriculum has helped with integration. She supported the government’s efforts in this regard, Like now we are like taught in schools that Australia is a multicultural place.

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Research into Islamophobia and the experiences of Muslims in the West, discussed earlier in this chapter, found that both the political atmosphere and mainstream media are responsible for creating and disseminating Islamophobic attitudes which spill over into societal attitudes and behaviors and contribute to acts of discrimination. The interview responses provided above exemplify how the political climate, which has often been hostile toward Muslims, directly and indirectly influences the experiences of discrimination witnessed and experienced by young Muslims. The following section will explore how young Muslims view and understand the role of the mainstream media in intensifying Islamophobia.

2.6 Role of Media, Islamophobia, and the Roots of Misconception There was a general agreement among the interviewees that Western media plays a crucial role in creating, maintaining, and distributing Islamophobia, and that media outlets have created major issues in the lives of Muslims in the West. Referring to the mainstream media, Ebrar summarizes the general sentiment that, 9/11 was big and ever since then the world has changed. Ever since 9/11 the world media associated Muslims- they associated Islam with terrorism.

Tasneem expressed her frustration about the media’s tendency to blame all Muslims for a single person’s crime, particularly since other religious communities are not targeted in the same way. She said, The annoying part is that just because one person is doing [a terrible act] but the whole - like all Muslims get a bad name, it is very stereotypical. Whereas another person from another religion or another individual does it, they don’t all get blamed for it, they all don’t get mentioned; whereas if a Muslim does a certain thing, then suddenly all Muslim people are like that. That is what I find annoying about it.

Fayrooz who grew up facing the backlash of negative media coverage of Muslims explained its impact, and the distrust it has inspired in her,

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I mean media in general, I think is mostly negative because they are pushing their negative agenda, so I don’t really trust media, yeah. Yeah, there is usually an issue of judgment face, where people just judge you.

In Eileen’s opinion, media holds a lot of sway when it comes to the formation of public opinion. She spoke of the impact of the relentless portrayal of Muslims on mainstream media in a negative light, Yeah, everyday media, not every single day but I could say every second there is something there about Muslims […] But like at the end of the day what can you do? Like there are just so many Muslims around the world. Ah, yes, media is a very strong- a persuasive object kind of thing- that in can kind of manipulate a lot of people.

Saad observed that it is widely acknowledged that the portrayal of Muslims in mainstream publications is negative, I think, every balanced study always comes to that conclusion that it is very clear to see that whenever you pick up the newspaper, I am almost certain that I am going to find a negative story about a Muslim in there. And this might be a newspaper you get from the shop, the metro, the tube or the stand there is going to be something in there, almost always a negative article or something related to Islam.

Noor also spoke about the stress and tension associated with seeing inflammatory headlines that profiled Muslims as collectively dangerous and threatening, So, yes, I do read a lot of these things waking up every morning or if a crime has been done somewhere, if it is just any other ethnic group he is just mentioned by the name, it is just said that it someone who is not mentally ill or not psychologically fit you know did such and such a crime but you know if it is Muslim, the first headline you see is like, ‘okay Muslim Asian person’ or like, ‘Muslim Middle Eastern person did such and such a thing’. So, profiling happens, and it is not very fair.

Noor raised the case of ‘punish a Muslim day,’ describing the potential it has to radicalize others or encourage them to direct their hatred toward Muslims,

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I saw-it was on social media- it was something that said, ‘punish a Muslim Day’ or something similar, fourth of April I think, it was in UK, where they had a list or table with points where is said, ‘okay if you take a hijab off a Muslim this is how much you score, if you slapped a Muslim this is how much you score, you know if you vandalized Kabah this is how much you are going to score.’ So, you know a lot of measures had to be taken in the UK for it not to happen and you know a lot of Muslims stayed home that day, you know waking up to these things is not a good thing you know, it could be encouraging to people somewhere else because social media is a really powerful platform. Because something that is happening in UK […] and what if someone is a racist and would be looking at it in Australia, and we never know, it [they] might be influenced.

Amal was also frustrated with the power the media has in labeling Muslims as “terrorist,” compared to when non-ethnic individuals perform acts of violent extremism. She stated her concern, Yeah, we see a lot of terrorism news and in that they highlight any Muslim names, and they keep telling [the public] that their passport was found, that they are from this Muslim majority country, or […] the names would suggest that the person was explicitly Muslim or comes from an Islamic background. But other terrorism stuff that happens, which you see in social media, so we are just trying to say that ‘look non-Muslims also try to do these things’, and this is not showed in the media, in the news channels and stuff. I think the news channels mostly highlight the people who use Muslim names and do terrorist acts.

Majeed, and many others like him, conversely felt that when Muslims did something good, their efforts received no media coverage since the “Muslims are terrorists” narrative was better for ratings. Like Amal, he was also frustrated because it was only Muslims who gained hyper-attention for acts of terrorism and violence, and the impact this has on how the public perceive them. In his words, Oh yeah, that is like, there is a lot of media coverage about Muslims in a negative light, more so than if we are seen doing anything good, we do not get any media coverage on that, And that is what annoys me, there are all these people from other races who are doing such horrible things and they are not getting as much attention as we are. And I think that shows in the way people perceive the way we are.

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Aanandi’s comment also shows her awareness of the relentless connections the media make between terrorist incidents and Muslim perpetrators, and like other participants, notes that White people are not subjected to the same prejudice and bias, And it’s kind of like a virus moving forward, too, right. So, every time any Muslim steps out of line or does something that’s actually a pretty reprehensible action, the media will jump on that. ‘Look at this Muslim person doing this’, even though that’s not the case for most criminals who do pretty heinous things like, you know, when White men do things, they’re not like, oh, look at this Christian or this Catholic guy, you know, bombing up a school. But when it’s a Muslim identity, that’s really emphasized.

Sheeba, who lived in the UK, pointed out that during the crisis of the global pandemic, the Muslim community began being blamed for spreading the COVID-19 virus by media outlets. She substantiated her opinion with an example, I think a lot of them [Anglo Saxons] are brainwashed with what is shown on the media. So, if you are a British Muslim, you’re indifferent to what is shown on the media. Because it’s private to them. They just associate Islam with radicalization and terrorism. So, and especially now that Covid’s happening, on newspaper articles and screens you see Pakistani aunties with headscarves […] immediately there would be an association between Muslims and the rise of covid. Things like that affects the way they think about Muslims.

Growing up around such narratives has naturally left many feeling targeted, vulnerable, and isolated. Nadia’s memory paints a powerful picture of what it is like for young people to first encounter such negative portrayals of their faith community, I remember even when I was like fourteen, I remember, randomly the news was on one time it was like so crazy. It was like ‘Muslims are terrorists, and this is what their religion tells them to do’. And it was- I really felt like the news was showing Muslims in a really negative way to make people think that people doing bad things has something to do with Islam.

Safdr felt that these portrayals hindered the sense of belonging felt by Muslims in America, since the media continually challenged the idea of

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Muslims being “good” or integrated citizens of America. She also speculated on the reason this negative image benefited the organizations that perpetuated them, They [media outlets] want the overall American public to think that Muslims cannot assimilate, and that Muslims cannot be a part of the American structure or American people - no matter how many generations we have been here. I think the reason for this would be so that they can continuously invade countries and wage war on Islam, as they call it, without getting backlash in their home country.

Similarly, and in conjunction with other responses across the three countries, Affan noted how the media is a ‘tool’ to demonize Muslims. Furthermore, the participant acknowledges the danger of these anti-Islam narratives in inciting hatred and propping up the right-wing agenda, I would say that Islam right now is […] demonized. I feel like the community is demonized and I feel like everywhere it is slandered. I feel like media is used as a tool, especially for these Westernized states to just keep making people with Islam seem as [if they are] the bad people. I feel like there is clear lack [of truth], misquotations and mis-recitations and I feel like essentially all the media is doing is fueling up hatred [for] groups like EDL, you know, Britain First.

Most agreed that given Muslims were a small minority in Western countries, the average non-ethnic person did not personally have any relationship with Muslims. Consequently, most Anglo-Saxon or Caucasians formed opinions about Muslims based on mass media coverage. Therefore, given the mainstream biased portrayal of Muslims discussed in this chapter, the participants noted that the media is responsible for furthering prejudices and perpetuating stereotypes about Muslims in Western countries. For instance, Latifah recalled how her current friends, who had previously not met Muslims in person, had inhibitions which faded away over time. She explained, Yeah, because all social media and stuff, the way they show Islam, or Muslims. Like I felt like from my own friend, when I was first trying to be friends with them, I feel like they didn’t have any Muslim friends. So, they think Muslims are really, really different compared to other human beings

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and I say to be more open up and try to be more friendly. What they see is only from the media.

Anas also noted the power of media in shaping discrimination against Muslims in the West. Sharing his personal observations and experiences he said, I think because of the role that the media can play and the importance of the media, I think that Muslims being such a small number in society, the perception through the media has a massive impact. So, I would meet a lot of people who thought they knew what Islam or Muslims were but when they were questioned about it or you asked them to discuss it in bit more detail, they were pretty much relating what they heard in the media. And it was that impact that I have seen - stuff from the media or the hysteria or the fear from the media - play out in numerous ways, whether it [is] people’s perceptions or people trying to change certain laws, or general discrimination that happens in the street; I think a lot of it has come from the perception or the news stories from the media.

Aqil’s narrative demonstrates the power of media in the opinion formation of general citizens of any country. He shared a story, It is actually horrible, it is bad. Because I have an experience- one day I was with my friend- like he is a good Christian friend like, but I didn’t believe what he told me, and he was like ‘wait a minute are you guys terrorist and all of that?’ And I was like, ‘no we are not’.

Aqil explained that his friend had just relied on what he heard in the media. He also shared that after this incident, others in his friendship group questioned the inclusion of a Muslim and made fun of the atrocities that had taken place against Muslims in the Christchurch terrorist attack. He added that the media “just ruin[s] stuff for everybody.” It is also noteworthy that while young Muslims felt that most outlets had a bias against Muslims, they acknowledged that the bias was rooted in several horrific terrorist attacks which had gained global prominence. However, it was common for participants to note that they felt the intense focus and disproportionate space given to these attacks in the media gave rise to Islamophobia. Zohaib articulated that “the media does not exist by itself” and provided the following example to show how the media, politics, and terrorism feed Islamophobia,

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There are stories that come up you know and especially when it comes to what happens to Shamia Bakon, like the young girl who joined the ISIS and wanted to come back and then her citizenship- discussions about the citizenship being revoked. Yeah, that was the media, and the way it was reporting the issue, but also that was politics and [the] political system of the UK. So, it was Islamophobia is growing and so is terrorism as well.

The criminalization and vilification of Muslims in mainstream narratives have unfortunately lowered public sympathy and care for Muslims living in Western societies. Tooba, who lived in the UK contrasted the empathy his colleagues and friends had for victims of a terrorist attack tied to a supposed Muslim, and the lack of it when it came to the Muslim victims of the Christchurch terrorist attack, Because it was a shooting that happened in the mosque, and then Muslim [people] died but it was quite interesting to see the difference when the Manchester thing happened. A lot of my friends for example on social media put loads of pictures of remembrance of it and when it happened to Muslims a lot of them did not, so that is quite upsetting at time. When I am also work and we have these conservations about mosques and Muslims getting killed in mosques, it is interesting because I did not really feel that level of empathy as when it is non-Muslims from my colleagues.

2.7

A Desire for Alternative Media and Narratives About Muslims

Another prominent finding that arose from the interview discussions about discrimination was young Muslims’ need for better representation. This was not always necessarily believed to be possible in traditional and mainstream media outlets, but rather in the form of alternative and online media sources. However, positive changes that had occurred in media representation, for example advertisements featuring Muslims and Muslims hosting mainstream television series, were viewed with enthusiasm by the respondents. Jameelah explained that the type of media a person engages with has an impact on the ideas and opinions they form about Muslims. Others also felt that alternative news and different types and formats of information on social media have meant that younger White people are more open to diversity. Older generations remain more reliant on the more biased

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reporting of Muslims typical of mainstream media. Jameelah analyzed this difference in her response, “I think it depends on the age group and the discrimination as well because I feel like my generation really doesn’t really watch the news and we are more social media reliant and so it is different. So, the news there you absorb is very different, it really depends on what you are watching and what are [the] links you are watching. So, I guess it is all like a pattern but the older generation […] the conflict there is from the news and the media that they are consuming. So, I think like again it definitely depends on what age group”, adding that “it is definitely a negative impact.”

Pop culture was also seen as responsible for perpetuating harmful perceptions of Muslims. For instance, Noriya noted that entertainment media needs to review its characterization of Muslims. She noted, Yes, the Australian news and movies - lot of them portrays Muslims as evil and I would like to see that stop.

The young Muslims interviewed also recognized that the representation of Muslims in the media was dependent on the objectives of the media organization, and whether they were affiliated with the social and political left or right. Khalifah, a first-generation migrant to the USA noted, “When I first came, most of the media coverage was sort of against the backdrop of September 11 and it’s sort of changed [over time] into Muslims bringing I mean, again, dependency on one side of the political spectrum. They talk about Muslims living in Shariah law and forcing Americans to abide by Sharia law, which is more of a conspiracy theory.” The respondent noted that on the other political spectrum, the left, the media representation shows a “more positive” portrayal that defends Muslims.

Alternatives to mainstream media narratives were repeatedly encouraged by young Muslims in the interviews and particularly by the female participants who noted that women are typically shown as being oppressed in mainstream depictions. As Zubeida noted, It is often the sort of typical narrative of Muslims women being oppressed, and the White main [character] being the savior. I mean it is […] far from

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reality, I can’t watch it. I mean as a Muslim I cannot relate to the way women are portrayed in media.

With some excitement evident in her response, Shirin shared how seeing a Muslim woman in a cooking show meant a lot for her in terms of positive representation, Yeah, it’s an awesome thing… It is like the best feeling.

Zainab also welcomed advertisements acknowledging Muslim holidays, because this helped in creating awareness and having them accepted in the mainstream. She noted, I have even seen ads outside […] for example Coles and Safeway. They put up a Ramadan ad and they put it up like ‘Eid Mubarak’ like ‘Ramadan Mubarak’, have you seen?

Zareen referred to a popular Netflix show hosted by a Muslim, and one in which provides a better representation of a Muslim on a mainstream platform, Do you know Hassan Minhaj? He has this show on Netflix called the Patriot Act and although like a lot of episodes are vocalized around America, but he just speaks about political issues in a way that they are very interesting.

The participant also shared their view that television shows have the power to dispel misconceptions regarding Muslims. Kinza was also glad to see changes in the representation of Muslims in the USA, however still felt there was still a long way to come in finding balance and an accurate portrayal. She explained, But I do believe it’s improving in recent times by portraying diverse Muslim perspectives. But I do think there is a long way to go because the media always seems to sell one image or the other and it doesn’t really capture the middle ground.

Representation in advertising was noted positively by interviewees. Nargis for example felt that some companies using headscarves in their marketing campaigns is helping,

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The companies are kind of starting to take a stand, like GAP had headscarves […] even on one of the adverts. Like I saw SnapChat this morning and there was a bus with two headscarf girls playing football, so those stereotypes are - I think are being broken by other types of stereotypes, but I don’t see it so much in mainstream newspaper.

In another example, Saima referred to a sports advertisement aired in Australia, For example, I like Nike’s advertisement […] the hijabi women with the Nike- the brand on her hijab. That is beautiful, I love that.

Saad, and many other young Muslims, also felt that alternative content and positive portrayals in the media were facilitated by the inclusion of Muslims in the production of content. Saad explained the value in the following way, I think we need more Muslims in the media and in writing articles and sort of addressing the imbalance of anti-Muslim work or articles. Basically, I think that is the key, because wherever you look or most places look in the media - especially the mainstream newspapers which are most widely read, they are sort of anti-Muslim sentiments in those and, so you know it is basically about addressing that. So that is a big issue. And of course, I am not denying the importance of Islam and terrorism, there is no doubt about that, there is a clear link there, it is very important to Muslims that it is addressed correctly. And it is about denouncing it, of course we are going to denounce it, but it is also about making sure that we elaborate on that and that we really try to root it out of our communities.

2.8 The Possibility to Enact Change on Social Media Although Yezda and other participants witnessed plenty of prejudice against Muslims online, she felt that social media provided a space for young Muslims to create their own content and change the narrative this way. While discussing Instagram, Yezda remarked, I think it is really good for the Muslim community like in terms of fashion, there were not a lot of Muslim influencers before, like they kind of […] have their own fashion that you could relate to. But now there are so many

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like even YouTubers and Instagramers that are like Muslim and attract a lot of people and a lot of people connect with them […] I have connected with like a lot of kids that live in Texas and Tennessee and Washington and California and with some like I have become friends with them. It is nice because we get to connect, and we are able to speak out against injustices on social media and that has been very important and powerful.

Shiza also noted that Instagram provided a platform for “Muslim fashion” that aided in the destigmatizing of Muslim clothing, especially the hijab, One thing I like about social media, recently people have really started to look into Muslim fashion. So, there is a lot of Muslim influencers in Instagram especially, like girls who are starting [to] portray things that you can wear with hijab and how you can [dress] fashionably and modestly, and people have quite gotten into it, and they have started to understand it. Like Muslim fashion is not just one black burkah, it is a lot of things, which is nice because when you go out and you have seen stuff like that, and people don’t give you side eyes because now it is socially acceptable to dress as a Muslim.

Sana Ullah also felt social media had given rise to better and more accurate coverage of Muslims and their religion, I still think coverage is skewed a little but there is now more and more coverage because of social media and social media TV as well there is Instagram TV and Instagram Live and things like that. The coverage is becoming a bit more proper in terms of being Muslim and you are getting comedians who are not making fun of the Islamic religion, but they are shedding light on the difficulty around it, we have got Abbas Khan who have done- who are doing really good work in the media and comedy space.

Given the power of social media, many young Muslims felt it was their responsibility to use their platforms to dispel myths by sharing content that showcased Muslims in a positive light. The hunger for alternative media representation has in many cases been taken up as a form of activism by interviewees (this will be further discussed in the last segment of this chapter). Melek’s response demonstrates this sense of responsibility,

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I have noticed that a lot of people now, like something as small as Instagram sharing, something happens in another country and just sharing something on their story to let other people know what is going on that country. I think that is a good start and I think that is where I would start because I know I can’t just get out […] to government and tell him [them] about problems. I think just starting small and just letting people know what is actually happening. So, share even if it is hard to see, like let people sympathize with that country or religion.

Muneera also believed that social media, and the large amount of time people spent on it, offered an opportunity for educating the public to understand Muslims and Islam better, Well, a lot of stuff happens on social media. So, whatever we see is either on Instagram or Facebook or anything, so even showing Islam in a positive in those ways […could] change the minds of others. I don’t know statistics, but people use their phone a lot and if they are watching a lot of crappy things, they could actually watch educational things, maybe putup educational videos, or videos about like telling them common questions that people from other religions might have about Islam and stuff, so yeah.

2.9

Discrimination at School and University

Interviewees were able to recall incidents of discrimination occurring in the places they went to school, university, or in their places of employment. The types of incidents were diverse, ranging from microaggressions to more overt acts of discrimination and the responsible parties included peers, co-workers, teachers, and administrative staff. There were also discriminatory policies, for instance about school uniforms, that were built into the system and had caused participants discomfort or distress. The sample responses below highlight the occurrence of discrimination in an education setting, particularly during the respondents’ formative schooling years. Earlier works have similarly found that Muslim children first encounter discrimination from a young age; the interview responses and accounts of discrimination provided here build on this literature and strengthen these findings. The interviewees who shared these stories often associated them with a feeling of being different, out of place, misunderstood, or unsupported. There were some positive outcomes for some students who raised the issue, for instance with a member of staff.

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Ajmal recalled her school experience, which was mostly positive in Australia, when she saw the first traces of gendered religious discrimination in the form of dress codes imposed by the school. The school did not allow Muslim girls to observe their religious requirements and wear longer skirts. Najibah also shared how she struggled with the summer uniform for girls at her school that had short sleeves and a short skirt, which she did not feel comfortable wearing due to her religious beliefs. This resulted in ongoing conflict with the school administration about this issue. Khadijah shared a similar story, “Well, I remember my school, there was a huge controversy around a group of girls wanting to wear the long skirts- the ones that reach the floor. A teacher had justified this, saying ‘oh this is a safety hazard’.”

Fatimah felt that her school was quite considerate of the needs of Muslims as they were accommodating toward uniforms (especially for girls who chose to wear hijab), provided a prayer room, and served halal food in the cafeteria. However, this did not prevent other pupils from cruel or hostile behavior toward Muslim students. She narrated an incident from Arabic school, that took place on Sunday, which included non-Muslim Arab children as well, Probably the most significant one at school would have been when I was like at my Saturday Arabic school and the school was probably majority like Christian-Lebanese, and during Ramadan one of the boys came up to me […and] shoved a packet of chips in my nose, like to try and get me to eat it and just made like sly comments about me fasting.

Najeebah also retold an incident that her sister had shared with her about a school not respecting the religious needs of the predominantly Muslim classmates, She [her younger sister] was telling me that in Ramadan they were having the athletic week, so the running races and stuff-sports day, in Ramadan. So, the majority of the school is Muslim, and she did try and complain to them that we are fasting, and you can’t really do all these sports activities because one, we would get tired because we can’t drink water and give our best performance. And the house she belongs to, because she is the house leader, of course she wants her house to do the best and win but

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most of that house is Muslim and she tried telling them that, ‘we can’t do this’, but they wouldn’t understand, and they still went ahead with it.

Anas and many others felt that regulations and discussions about diversity schools were mostly formal procedures, with little impact on improving the overall situation, particularly on an ongoing basis, I think they maybe attempt to be inclusive in just name. Like they say that they are, but I don’t think that they invested enough or put enough time when I was in school to talk about these issues more often. It might be just a one-off kind of thing, but not constantly trying to talk about like issues to do with just different ethnic backgrounds or Muslim people, no.

Discrimination in school settings mainly stemmed from a lack of understanding about Islam or from the cultural and racial differences of the participants. For instance, Yusuf described feeling that he was the “odd” one out at school, which led to him being treated differently in a school dominated by Caucasians. Zia shared how cultural and religious differences had also made him the “odd” one at school and this was quite challenging. He recounted an instance where he was bullied, and the advice his father gave him, So, the first one was more religious assault, more cultural. I grew up in a house where we didn’t have much money, but my mom was always cooking, and I would go to school smelling like Pakistani or Indian food. So, there was always, you know, those jokes about how we smell like curry things, know things along those lines. But my dad earlier on explained to me, he’s like ‘the reason people make fun of you and the way you smell as far as food is concerned, [is] because most of the people that you’re around don’t get home cooked meals. They don’t have the mom sitting at home cooking for them all the time, making fresh breakfasts and lunches and dinners’.

Sometimes simple things such as not being picked for a school team were also rooted in bad attitudes to those who are ‘different.’ Nadimah recalled her time at school and the experience of discrimination she faced at school because she, was different looking and because of that there were always jokes about it - I wouldn’t be picked in teams or groups.

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In some cases, negative experiences gave rise to better, or unexpected outcomes. For instance, Latifah shared that during her time at school she was helped a member of staff when she raised the issue that there was nowhere she could pray, Yeah, because what happened during the school time I had to pray and there wasn’t any area to pray, and I went to the coordinator and asked her ‘I need to pray during the lunch time’ and she was really helpful. She told me I could come to her room, and she would leave the room and I can pray there.

Tasneem recounted when a schoolteacher was worried about the health impacts of fasting, and the unexpected outcome of their interaction, But I do remember fasting a couple of days in Ramadan and then, my teacher she really understood once I explained to her and then she fasted with me one day. She was like, ‘oh I am gonna fast with you’, and then she kinda told me about her experience as well like, ‘oh it is not as hard as I thought it would be’. Because she was so paranoid because I was so young fasting and everything. But she was actually okay with it, so yeah. In terms of that they were very respectful, but prayer room no, but I guess there wasn’t many Muslims - but I am pretty sure if a student asked, sure.

Noor, a first-generation immigrant, felt quite racially discriminated at school due to her inability to speak English during her first year at a school in Australia. However, over the years things improved and school staff were quite supportive, Whether it be with my language, with my looks and is in my skin, or be my religion, I was teased a lot. But with my teachers, because my teachers knew of my conditions, they were very understanding and they were very helpful, and they did accommodate to a lot of my needs, so that I could come up to speed. But during my second year, because I have already been there and I had learnt a little bit of English and I had made some friends, it was a less hard, a lot easier, I had actually learnt how to deal with these people, and I actually made a lot of friends.

A noteworthy finding from these interviews was the participants noting that the nature of discrimination has evolved over the years. Some of the participants who had parents growing up in Western countries felt that racial slurs and blatant incidents were quite common back in earlier

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times. Newer forms of discrimination are more closely linked to negative religious connotations, increased micro forms of aggression, and at times ignorance on the part of the perpetrators. Another finding was that racial dimensions of discrimination were more profoundly expressed by interviewees from the USA. This could be due to the higher incidence, or it could stem from better awareness and wider discussions about racism in their circles. Safdar, who had South Asian roots noted that at his American school he “had many issues or instances at school in being called racial slurs.” Saleema, who identified as an African American Muslim, recalled how her daughter lost a playmate at summer camp because of the racist attitude of another child, So, this was our second summer returning and the girls had made friends. And one of the girls, my eldest daughter and she was maybe five at the time […] her friend from the previous summer told her that she couldn’t play with her anymore because she was black.

Muslims who were Anglo-American converts or from regions of Central Asia or other ‘non-Arab’ parts shared that they felt immune to discrimination because of their skin color. Particularly for the women who passed as “White” and did not cover their head, they were spared discrimination. This underscores the intersection of racial and religious discrimination that Muslims face. Nadia who passed as “White” noted how she ‘avoided’ discrimination because people don’t know she is Muslim, I feel like I probably just have it easy because I am White, and I don’t wear a hijab and maybe most of the people don’t even know that I am Muslim. But like I have avoided some really weird stuff just by people [not knowing]. Like for example, at work people don’t know.

While cases of discrimination or prejudice in tertiary education were brought up less in comparison with school settings, they were not absent. Sumayya attended university in Australia and wore a hijab. She felt because of her hijab she was visibly Muslim in class, and this had led to one of her lecturers treating her differently and constantly reminding the class of September 11,

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Oh, I definitely have- I guess one of my lecturers especially, he would constantly in every single lecture bring up 9/11 and being the only hijabi in the course, I would take that personally.

Jameelah shared an incident from one of her previous university classes, in which a lecturer blatantly favored non-ethnic students, Like we had one lecturer, he wouldn’t like to let any of the ethnic people ask questions. Like if you asked him a question, he would just role his eyes and you could just tell that he didn’t in any ways want to associate with ethnic students.

Haya, an Anglo-American Muslim, said that because she is a convert, she has not experienced much discrimination, nor has her family. However, she did feel that since her conversion to Islam, her standing in academia was questioned at times, especially when she started wearing a headscarf. She elaborated, “When I worked in academia and when I converted, there was definitely a push back because many people I met in academia were atheists and not practicing. So, it wasn’t considered respectable to be really religious […] And then I started to wear the hijab. I would feel, you know, people were not as friendly in supermarkets”. Although she was hesitant to call it discrimination, Haya added, “so I did feel that there some people that, you know, it’s not overt, but people did treat me. Some people treated me differently when I started to covert and was obviously a [reaction to me being] Muslim.”

2.10

Discrimination at Workplace

Anti-discrimination laws mostly prevented the majority of participants from experiencing direct discrimination or overt hostility in the workplace. However, participants did feel the brunt of discrimination toward them at different times in their work life—for instance when applying for a job, and when attending professional social and networking events, which in many instances made them feel sidelined or “odd.” Less frequently, there were cases of outright discrimination within workplace settings; a small number are included in the sample interview responses below.

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Yusuf who was born and raised in Australia, still feels that companies discriminate against Muslim applicants; his response indicates a level of uncertainty in his prospects due to his Muslim name, Because whenever I apply for jobs and stuff, I still feel like I wouldn’t be accepted because of my name. I still feel like companies out there don’t want Muslims as well in their companies, so that is what I think when I apply for jobs.

Amal also felt her prospects were limited because of her ethnicity and religion. She explained her hesitation in pursuing the career she wants, Well, [if] I would do paramedicine and I feel like I would have a challenge. Because of like, I know the job is mostly like Australians and I am not Australian. Yes, I am but not my ethnicity isn’t and when I want to show that I am Muslim and stuff - that I fear that I might get judged or something like that.

Salam also noted that expanding business to wider markets, outside of London, to less multicultural locations might prove difficult due to prevailing sentiments in these societies about race and religion. Even though there were “more opportunities” and less competition outside of London, it is “less easy for ethnic minorities” in less diverse areas. Asifah, whose parents moved to Australia as adults, spoke to the interviewer about how they had trouble finding jobs because “they are brown skinned,” and even though they said they were “way more qualified, and they would communicate really well in interviews,” it would be the White/Anglo and less qualified people who were given the roles. She added, “that in a sense that is something that you call discrimination.” Uthman felt reluctant to use the “victim card” but felt that a job promotion in a previous role had been hindered because of his religious identity. He narrated his experience, For example, like [in relation to] job opportunities - like I had a job promotion that I was trying to get back when I was a lifeguard, and like I wanted to be a manager. I was like the best candidate several times, but people would choose other people over me. I mean I am not gonna say that I am victim of the system, but I do feel like that just because all the other- just everything – all the boxes were ticked for me belonging in that

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position, but I never got the upper hand until like three employees later. So, there was always like a bias and that is just an example obviously.

Majeed who worked in retail felt that the hostility came from customers and not his co-workers or supervisors. He shared that in situations where customers are being racist or prejudiced, his supervisors or co-workers protected him. Yet despite their protection, Majeed says he still faces discrimination because he is a Muslim, They [customers] know that I am brown, and I have a Muslim name, so they put two and two together.

Muslim participants also described how at work, they are sometimes expected to defend Islam or issues that arise in Muslim majority countries. Shiza shared a story of having to stand up for and justify her religion to her co-worker. The attitudes at this workplace eventually led to her leaving, “So, when I started with her, and she would get into a lot of debates with me that why things are happening in the Muslim community […] or if I had an explanation why Muslims were feeling so trapped. And then I used to say to her ‘that is not the case that all Muslim women feel trapped, and there are just as many problems in the Muslim community as there are in the British culture or community’. […] There was a lot of hostility there at the time because I was the only Muslims there, so there was a lot of hostility at the workplace and at the end I left the place.” She shared why she felt she had to leave, “I was not doing my best at the work, I did not wanna work there it was making [me] miserable, and answering the same question every single day and being told, ‘you know you are wrong you do not know anything about your own culture and your own people’, so I left and got another job.”

Fatimah shared her story of blatant religious discrimination she experienced at work, “So, he would often make fun of my name which is obviously like an Arab name” she also added that “he made comments about like my country of origin, he made comments like with regards to a dictator who ruled which is really quite offensive, things like that.”

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Corresponding with consistent findings throughout this book, intersectionality resulted in women feeling the greatest burden of prejudice. Zubeida’s experience of being a Muslim woman working in the UK resonated with the views of many women from the interviews, I would say that being visibly a Muslim woman, that is not White, has been a challenge in society. Especially in places of work but also in education and whatever, you are in a prestigious institution, or you just feel like maybe you are the odd one out.

Bither also felt that working or at university being “White” came with privileges and affordances not given to people of color, including being forgiven and accepted if you are late or not contributing enough. The participant explained that her ethnicity and religion had consequently made her work harder to prove herself. She added, “even in these small cases, you can see White prevailed, I feel.” Zulaikha’s comment also highlights the compounded discrimination against her because of intersections between race, religion, ethnicity, and gender, Obstacles I faced - for example job opportunities, sometimes because of my color obviously, almost all of the time I don’t get work there because of my ethnicity, or my religion or my gender but I do feel there is an impact and how high it is in different places.

Salemah who felt that people “second guessed” her due to her religious and racial identity, described overcoming this by “showing her skills.” This highlights how ethnic and religious minorities in the workplace may be pushed harder to demonstrate their skills or “prove themselves” to brush off any skepticism or stereotypes attached to them. This is a direct result of the normalization of discrimination in professional settings. As with educational institutions, several workplaces have made efforts to accommodate the spiritual needs of their employees. Nadeem who worked and lived in Australia shared his positive experience, So, I pray in my workplace very freely- they gave me a specific room for my prayer, and they have given me a specific time for my prayer, whenever I decide. So, I have got a good relationship with my colleagues being an Australian-Muslim.

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Among the stories of discrimination, there were also further cases in which Muslim individuals felt supported in the workplace, for instance by co-workers, mostly non-Muslims, taking over shifts to ensure that their Muslim colleague could perform their prayers.

2.11

Discrimination in Public Spaces

Public spaces such as markets and shops, car parks, and public transport are the most common places where cases of both subtle and overt Islamophobia surfaced from the interviews. Incidents ranged from getting “weird looks” to extreme cases of scarfs being pulled off the heads of victims. Most cases were limited to unpleasant comments or looks; however, all of the participants had either personally encountered this behavior or knew someone who had witnessed it. The most subtle incidents involved people avoiding sitting next to them or simply walking to the opposite side in an effort to avoid contact with the Muslim individual. Sumayya for instance shared how she felt people avoided her while using public transport, Oh, they definitely do, like even when you are travelling on public transport to and from university; if someone deliberately avoids sitting next to you, I guess that is a form of discrimination.

Zulaikha also felt that public spaces like transport were more likely to lead to situations with a racist encounter. She shared, You know a person swearing and say[ing] ‘it is all because of you’ and that sort of stuff- horrible experiences. But that usually happens in public spaces.

She followed this comment with a personal experience she had, “this guy was literally shouting and telling me, ‘Brexit is in a week!’, ‘You are an immigrant’ and ‘leave the country’ and ‘Islam is this’ and ‘Islam is that’, I mean that is one that I remember, but there have been countless occasions where I have been called a terrorist [on] the tube and people shooting at me.” Eileen’s statement also describes the hints of racism or prejudice she detects at times by the smallest of changes in tone and body language. She explained,

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It was more like having a sixth sense, that you know when someone does not like you. And it is just the way that their face mimics, their body language, and those kinds of things. Yeah, just minimal contact and like that kind of thing but at the end of the day when you talk to them it is just like, ‘oh they are just a normal person’.

Nadimah felt that discrimination subtly interfered with the living arrangements and holiday places of Muslims. She used her friends’ experiences to highlight this point, When you go on AirBnB to apply for a place to stay at, or when you are wanting a place to rent, they [my friends] actually get rejected as a roommate before they have even had the opportunity to talk, just based on the fact that they look Arab, or they look a different way. So, yeah, I do know that some of my friends have experienced that kind of discrimination before.

Although Ebrar was reluctant to label it discrimination, the participant spoke of receiving uncomfortable reactions when people learned their name, No discrimination, but I did have people look at me differently because of my name. Because they think it is a scary name. Because it is all over the media and because people think my name is a bad name. But it is just a name. Because it is obviously a Muslim name and it is an Islamic name, so people assume that you have got bad intentions.

Nargis had faced incidents of verbal abuse and also described being spat on by a passer-by in the UK. She felt that these types of attacks were increasing but were not reflective of the ethos of British society; she told the interviewer that she refused to believe that the UK stood for such values. Like Ebrar, she was reluctant to associate the incidents with increasing Islamophobia. Others reported cases that were the result of more structural Islamophobia, including the impact of discriminatory government policies. Young Muslims from the UK and the USA in particular reported these, and responses included them getting stopped and searched at the airport or being treated differently by authorities. Ajola, who lived in the States, shared that she has experienced,

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Discrimination in airports. I always have. And I’ve filed multiple complaints to the airports about this. I think mostly when traveling inside the US, that’s where the problems come [from]. That’s where the problems I’ve faced have happened. I get randomly searched and my devices always get searched and it’s only me.

Safdar also shared that beyond attracting ‘weird looks,’ sometimes the color of his skin and clothing have attracted racial and religious slurs. Arben likewise shared how being stared at is “normal” although is associated with more “extreme” situations such as outright verbal abuse. He described how praying publicly is often treated suspiciously in American society, Praying in public you know, you get some weird stares here and there. One time we had someone approach us just asking why we were doing it outside and why we could not find a place inside.

Rahimah spoke of the many friends she had in Australia who had faced varying degrees of Islamophobic abuse over the years, A lot of friends have had like really terrible encounters. Like people have yelled horrible things at them on the train, one of my friends had her hijab pulled, people don’t wanna sit next to them in the train or the bus, but I actually never had an encounter like that.

Some of the incidents were quite serious in nature. Raheel, who lived in the UK, shared an incident he faced while on his way to a mosque, I was going towards the mosque on a Friday from my work during lunch break and it was jummah time, Friday prayer time, I was going towards the mosque and there is [a] person there and he started abusing me, ‘hey, where are you going?’ And I just kind of ignored him because he was looking kinda drunk and he says, ‘where are you going?’ and I am like ‘what is with you where I am going’ and then he asks me again, ‘where are you going?’ and I am like, ‘it is Friday I am going to mosque to pray’. And he goes like, ‘you are all gonna freaking pray’, and just like saying some really, really bad and nasty things, and he had a dog with him. And he was like, ‘come here, come here, talk to me!’, and ‘I will shoot my dog on you’, so he said he will free his dog on me, and I just kept my head down and kept walking.

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Maya shared a deep anxiety provoking memory of when her mother, who she was accompanying, was threatened by an Anglo-Saxon woman in the park that she would “call the police” on Maya’s mother if she didn’t leave the park, I just remember it being very horrible. But I do remember her saying, ‘if you don’t leave now then I’ll call the police’. Which was very scary. And I remember just begging my mum to please just let’s go, because I didn’t want to be there and be scared. And I remember that night going to bed I was really scared that the police was going to come to our house. Even though, it’s very illogical. But I do remember her saying ‘if you don’t leave now, I’ll call the police.’ And it made us feel very excluded and alienated. Even though it was an accident. And I remember I wouldn’t even like walking past that park because I was scared that that woman would be there.

Nila, who lived in Australia, shared a disturbing story of derogatory verbal abuse she faced on the train, And then another time we were eating churros in [a] train and someone asked me, because churros have icing sugar and some sugar feel on my top… and someone was making like a really bad comment like, ‘oh is Allah is going to be happy that you have semen all over you?’ And she was laughing and giggling and saying things about Allah and things like that. And I was like [I thought to myself], you know so much about him wow. Yeah. She was Anglo. And I did not say anything, and she walked out of the train a few stations late[r and] like the whole time, she was talking about Allah.

Although Zahid said that overall, he did not feel he had encountered a lot of direct discrimination, he shared one story, Yeah sure, so I was sitting in the bus with a friend of mine who is from India and so we were able to communicate in our mother tongue and we were doing that, discussing holiday plans, and then a middle-aged white male, who was dressed as a tradesman was sitting one row away from us. And he told us to, and he was quite annoyed, and he says, ‘hey you are in Australia now, start speaking Australian’. So, that is it.

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2.12

Gender

The interview responses presented throughout this book support studies that find there is a gendered dimension to Islamophobia. The visibility of being Muslim is strongly attached to wearing a headscarf or niqab, resulting in women facing a greater risk of discrimination. This section explores the impacts of this specifically gendered discrimination on Muslim women, through the stories and thoughts of both male and female participants. Zulaikha was direct in her response that there was a clear relationship between the headcover and being attacked due to Islamophobia, Yes, like I said visibility is a huge thing. Being a visible Muslim woman makes you more subject to harassment and racism and all that stuff than those who are not.

Fayrooz was also well aware that Muslim women are more visible targets for Islamophobic attacks, commenting, I have got family members who wear scarfs and sometimes they get look[ed] at in specific ways or they are treated in specific ways.

Other male participants also shared stories of female relatives or friends who faced physical or verbal abuse for wearing a scarf. For example, Riaz described an incident against his sister, when they were out together and she first started wearing the hijab in public, “I was just taking a walk down the lane and hit me hard when I was walking down there and they are wearing the hijabs and they practice wearing hijabs and two young- well a group of young men yelled at them and called them terrorists, and they just walked by and said those types of things. Like, especially being a woman in America is especially hurtful,” he added “it is deeply affecting because it is your sisters it is someone you really care about”.

Ben had heard various stories of Muslim women being targeted because of their religious appearance, and recounted a specific instance, They [the perpetrators] go for the typical, predominantly [Muslim] women with the hijabs with a darker pigment in their skin. They can see they

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are from another culture, and they wear[ing] the head scarf, and they know they are Muslim and so. You know I have heard experiences of these women, these mums, of people yelling at them and they are in this country, they are refugees and they do not understand that is going on. They do not understand why or even what the other person is saying. You know a mum and son in a car, and they were pulled up by the traffic light, and some guy next to [them] in a car shouted […] you know, ‘take your scarf off you ISIS’, just made a reference. So, just really uneducated, quick split decision of, you know.

Yusuf’s sister and mother wore hijabs and had also repeatedly experienced racial abuse. He illustrated this with a specific instance that his sister had experienced vilification outside a shopping center in Australia, She was at a shopping center with her daughter, and she was just wearing a scarf and it was a long one and someone Australian- because she was just trying to walk to get to the shop- and some Australians were driving in the parking area and then they started swearing at her.

Bushra also acknowledged the backlash women faced. He shared an encounter his younger hijabi sister had in the city, And my sister has been to the city in a head scarf, and someone called [her] the terrorist, and you know it exists.

Ameer also noted the additional difficulties faced by Muslim women in all walks of life, I know female Muslims have it a bit harder to get into foreign areas and different walks to society. For me it was okay.

Zainab and her sister who went to school in post-9/11 Australia faced immense hostility due to their visibility as Muslims. She explained, When I used to go to school people, when I told them that I was Muslim, and when they used to see my sister wearing scarf, or they used to see me going to the masjid wearing my traditional clothes, and some of the boys sort of called like, ‘you are a terrorist’, ‘Osama bin Landen is your uncle’ and something like that.

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Arooba contrasts the different treatment she receives as someone who does not wear the hijab, with her mother who does wear a hijab and has been verbally abused many times, I notice it very subtly. Visually, if you see me, I don’t wear hijab. I have fair skin. I could pass off as a non-Muslim so in that respect, I’ve never actually noticed extreme versions of discrimination towards me and myself. But for example, with my mother, she wears a hijab. Because she wears a hijab, we’ve been in a lot of situations where she’s been racially abused. Not racially, sorry, but because of her religion. Wearing a headscarf, she’s been verbally abused on the street and in certain circumstances.

Sofia also acknowledged that females wearing the headscarf were more prone to racist attacks. She shared an incident in which her covered friend was targeted following a terrorist attack, This was in 2012 when the attacks happened 7/11. They were literally shouting at her [her friend], saying that it was her fault that the attacks happened. And it was like, how can you say that. I was with her, but I don’t cover, but she wears the hijab. So, I guess it almost became as if she could be targeted. We literally ended up having to leave the carriage, because we thought that it’s not worth it. These people are drunk, they don’t know what they’re saying so let’s just get out. So, I see it a lot.

Alimah noted that the discrimination against female Muslims in hijab was even more difficult for first-generation migrants or women who don’t speak English, Especially like the older women with kids, especially if they have a hijab on and stuff, and you can just tell that they have just recently arrived here by the way they dress and seem. So, I have seen this one guy once, outside the bus stop outside the shops, who was just shouting at these two women who were just dressed up; I couldn’t really hear what he was saying but it sounded like they were talking about their head scarfs and stuff.

Arifa, who had recently started wearing the headscarf noted that people definitely viewed her through a “Muslim” lens, and she felt that this does increase the judgment and discrimination she faces, “I just started wearing a headscarf a year ago […] and sometimes I have to constantly remind myself that I am wearing my headscarf, that I have

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to keep in mind that after all the headscarf, that when someone looks at me, they will associate me with Islam, so I have to make sure that what I am doing does not represent a bad image for Islam.” She added that even though she doesn’t know, she “just felt like, if anything was when I was looking for work, job opportunities I felt that maybe there was a slight chance of discrimination, especially when I went in to hand my resume, that some people may have judged me for my headscarf and some people may have declined me a job for that.”

Kinza who had stopped wearing the scarf in the USA, also contrasted the difference between she wears a headscarf and when she doesn’t, I wore the hijab for the past three years and I haven’t been wearing it for a few months now. But when I wore the hijab every single day, I truly felt like I did not belong in that society just due to how people treated me differently. So that was the biggest obstacle I faced. And once I fully belong, as well as, for example, going out with my family in public, sometimes at their wearing traditional clothes and seeing people’s, you know, judgmental expressions or behaving differently towards people representing their culture. That’s another obstacle that I [have been] faced with.

Habibah had also stopped wearing the headscarf, and like Kinza, noted the difference in people’s attitudes toward her when she was covered, “I used to wear the headscarf, I think it was a little bit harder because a lot of people conceptualize Americanness and Muslimness, and like a binary”. She also provided an example of when she was covered, “I wear the headscarf, some lady came up to me and asked me if, like my husband let me drive, which was like kind of problematic”.

For young Muslim women at school, there was an added burden of explaining and justifying their choice in attire. Latifah for instance spoke of the difficulty she faced having to explain this choice to her non-Muslim friends when she first attended a school with non-Muslims, It was pretty hard because it was my first time that I came in such an environment where not everyone is covered, and you have to explain yourself for every single thing. That was really hard, and back in the day my English wasn’t that great too. It was really hard for me.

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Noriya thought that right-wing politicians targeting Muslim women’s attire make it very hard for Muslim women to live in Western societies. She described this issue within the context of Australian politics, So, the burka ban, that was just so bad what Pauline Hanson wanted to do. Look it is also influencing other politicians and offering soft borders that is for the refugees and asylum seekers, not letting them come to Australia. Which again is, kind of discriminating.

Jasmine who lived in the UK echoed a similar concern about politicians choosing to govern women’s right to choose their clothing and its impact on the community. She explained, Yet there is this kind of criticism around women wearing the niqab and the way that the government handles that. The way the government handles it, doesn’t make it any better. I think that’s one thing I would say. I think they claim to be diverse and to love and respect everyone but there are just some things that they say to you that aren’t (loving or respectful).

Nargis added that wearing the headscarf also meant that sometimes people perceived her to be less competent. She has had to work harder to prove herself and make an extra effort to engage with other members of society. In Nargis’ words, I think because I have the headscarf and that is like an extra barrier […] So, for instance if I am in class or anything, I have to put in extra effort to be able to talk to [the] person sitting next to me. But in like Eastern culture that is not really the case.

She added that there is always a barrier when engaging with people from any other group or secular population, because of the headscarf. Zohaib reinforced Nargis’s perspective, explaining that his female friends and acquaintances also had to work harder to prove themselves. He also shared an experience a female friend had told him that further highlighted the multiple layers of discrimination Muslim women faced when trying to find work, I do have a friend who was trying very hard to find a job for a very long time, and she was a brown woman, and she was originally from Bangladesh. She was finding it really difficult to apply for job. I mean she would speak

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with the people who got the job, often people who are not as experienced at her, and at times much younger, but they were white, and they were you know, figures to back. I mean people [of] color with certain names, and Muslim tending names find it hard to get jobs in the UK.

Salemah’s narrative also demonstrates the insecurity some Muslim women feel when wearing a headscarf because of prevalent pre-existing notions and judgments in society, Really just wearing a head scarf, I do not really see it as a huge obstacle but sometimes I feel like I can’t fit in when I go to like job interviews and things like that […] I feel a bit insecure about that but I think I like have to adjust myself whenever I am in a work environment compared to just me being like a student or living my life.

Taslimah also spoke of the initial discomfort she faces when participating in university discussions because wearing a headscarf made her stand out, however felt that these barriers were overcome and respect was developed, It does make me stand out a bit and usually when I speak in the class, people look at me like, ‘oh she can talk as well’. But at first you know I felt a bit weird but then people really value and respect, I think because we are all students as well that we really respect each other.

The responses provided in the sections above indicate that young Muslims are aware of the discrimination they, or their friends, peers, and family members, face because of their religion, race, ethnicity, and/or religious dress. An intersectionality between these identity markers is often at play and increases the level of discrimination some Muslims face in public settings. This makes “Arab looking” women who wear a hijab more likely to receive discrimination compared to those who look more “Western.” In the following sections, the mechanisms employed by young Muslims as a response to this discrimination will be explored, and sample responses provided, giving an insight into the ways they navigate, mitigate, ignore, and/or accept hostile behaviors.

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2.13 Justifications for, or Downplaying of, Discrimination Because of the subtle nature of many of the forms of discrimination experienced by the participants (or their friends and family), they had no option in most cases but to accept or ignore it. Participants like Noor agreed that because it was “nothing big” they were unable to complain about it to the police or report it. Some participant responses revealed that they felt it was “just in their head” or they were “overthinking” the situation when faced with microaggression. Others felt that reporting was too tedious, or they lacked evidence, or the case was not serious enough, and therefore they took no action against the perpetrator or their actions. Because of the uncertainty around reporting incidents such as a person in a car or on the street hurling abuse, these cases often went unreported, or many made the conscious decision to “ignore it.” However, the discussion’s most pertinent finding was that most interviewees felt that the benefits and freedoms of the Western lifestyle outweighed the negative impacts of cases of discrimination. It is beneficial to keep in mind that both first-generation migrants and those born in their Western homes tended to be aware of the issues in their country of origin, or their family’s country of origin. Political and economic instability and complex social issues made many participants interviewed feel “fortunate” and “grateful” for escaping the precarious conditions of these countries. Overall, it was clear that many felt that they were much better off in the West. This often makes racism the “lesser evil” compared to issues such as war, the regressive state of women’s rights, sectarian violence, poor economic conditions, inadequate education and employment opportunities, lack of personal freedoms, political instability, and religious extremism. In this context, it was not surprising many felt that their hardships were trivial in comparison with people facing difficulties and abuses in other parts of the world. However, this did not mean they were oblivious or unimpacted by instances of racism or Islamophobia. Eileen shared that while she was aware of the acts of discrimination aimed at her, she had learned to live her life and make the best of it. She explained, “Yeah, to be honest personally I don’t care if you are going to discriminate [against] me, I have got better goals in life and I have got [bigger] things

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to achieve than dwell on you not liking me.” She added that at the end of the day, she is “going to achieve those goals and become someone that is, you know, higher-rank and be open minded about everything.” She also explains that looking at the bigger picture means she would not only be excelling as a person, but also “career-wise” and “character-wise”.

Ebrar relied on his humor to cope and change the attitudes of those around him, I just laugh it off because I like to have fun and I try to change that thought that my name is [a] bad name.

Ameer had faced discrimination at various points of his life, however, was careful to react in a way aligned with his own values. He described how he reacted to these incidents, Patience. As a person I don’t take people’s words to heart, because it is the way I take that -whatever they say, so you can call me whatever, you can say whatever it is coming out of our mouth, not mine, and I decide how to absorb it.

Others like Adeelah accepted the situation and made concessions for discriminatory behavior. This evaluation and attitude seemingly provide a degree of emotional protection from such negative events. She explained her logic, I am [a] minority here, I need to blend in, I need to understand the culture. Also, I need to be open minded, open hearted to [them even if] they sometimes [do] not really accept me.

Despite the presence of a positive outlook among some participants, many still experienced the discomfort and psychological strain belonging to various forms of discrimination. The most profound incidents recalled were mainly from memories of during school years, or when discrimination occurred in public settings. Noor, who faced racial and religious discrimination shared her story, And most of the time my reaction was really no reaction at all, so I really just walked away from people who conducted that [behavior…] I just behaved as if I never saw them. But I did go back home, and it did

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affect [me], and I had a lot of nights where I cried […] it did affect my self-confidence a lot, so I tried harder to be like those people who tried to tease me and mock me.

Hasan also expressed the sadness he felt when cases of discrimination led to him questioning his place in Australian society. The hurt and despair were evident in his response, I felt a bit sad in a way. I mean we are part of Australia, everyone in the country plays an important role to build-up Australia; we do as much as we can to help it out. And in that way, I felt a bit sad, like I mean we do everything we can, and we try and integrate into society, but we still have people who are doing this to us.

Muneera also shared the negative emotions that arose when she was recently targeted by discriminatory behavior, Yeah, it does not make me feel like I one hundred percent belong in society in Australia, yeah. Upset and kind [of] angry [or feeling] that, ‘why would they do that?’, makes me confused. So, yeah.

Anas and many others also shared feelings of being “hurt,” “shocked,” and “angered” after an Islamophobic attack (verbal or indirect), which took them quite a while to process. Despite many choosing to ignore the incidents or not allowing them to bother them outwardly, these events are deeply distressing. Most have had to develop coping strategies, to deal with these attacks in the long term. There was another reason for interviewees downplaying acts of overt or covert aggression. In the above responses showcased from the interviews, there is a recurring theme of respondents describing instances of discrimination as not reflecting the “real values” of those who commit them. Instead, the blame was shifted from individual perpetrators to factors such as the political climate, media bias, right-wing attitudes, and lack of exposure to Muslims. It can be speculated that each of these justifications helps the victims hold on to belief in the multicultural values of their Western home—the only home most of the participants have. The need to downplay these behaviors therefore is also tied to the heterogenous social fabric of the West and the freedoms they appreciate and acknowledge. This may create a situation where participants do not feel they should push back against the very real hardships they face in Western society. Furthermore,

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if they were to do so it would also present an ontological threat to their sense of identity and place, since racism and Islamophobia challenge their very existence in their home. It is thus understandable that many in the interviews perceived these incidents as isolated, rare, and the result of peripheral factors. The responses and discussions presented in this chapter showcase how young Muslims constantly downplay the extent of discrimination they, and the Muslims around them face. In doing so, they not only downplay the distress caused by these incidents, but also to a degree, accept them as part of their normal life. The trade-off of living in the West compared to the conditions offered to them in theirs or their family’s country of origin is a means of easing the emotional distress that stems from these incidents. This coping mechanism can be categorized as a passive response to discriminatory incidents. In the following subsections B to E, there is a more active approach taken by these young Muslims in their responses to incidents of Islamophobia.

2.14

Super “Normal”

The sense and pride of citizenship shared by the participants which indicate their clear devotion to the Western countries they call home. However, a real burden was also noted among the majority interviewed to “fix” Islamophobia or change the underlying assumptions and anxieties behind it. As the recipients of aggression toward them or their religious community, many feel a sense of responsibility to neutralize or correct the situation (Yilmaz et al. 2021); one common way they achieved this was through perpetuating an image of being “super normal.” As the above sections illustrated, many young Muslims felt that a lack of correct information or understanding led to a misconstrued image of Muslims rooted in fear, and misunderstanding. Interviewees in this subcategory thought it was their duty to overcome this image. Further, the feeling of being under the microscope led many to consciously demonstrate they were “normal” and not unlike other members of society. In this way, a sense of control was internalized by those who organized themselves around this view and way of behaving around non-Muslims. Adeelah provided an account of being blatantly stared at on public transport for wearing a hijab. She described the discomfort and feeling of

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being a minority, despite the knowledge that she was a good person and representing the Muslim community well, “I can sense that one tram full of people is just star[ing] at me because I am using hijab. There is a lot of people, you see that. I am trying to smile, I am trying to be a good Muslim as a good Muslim representative, but you know as a human, I feel I am okay.” She adds that despite knowing she is a good person, and good Muslim representative “I can sense they just can’t stop staring at me, so I am just trying to live or just something, that is what makes me feel like most uncomfortable and I feel like I minority here, if you know what I mean. But [in] my home country, I am a majority, eighty percent of us is Islam, so there is no problem with us using hijab. But in here, I can sense, I can understand my minority [status], so yeah.”

Tasneem also shared that being “nice” was important for building confidence in Muslims to non-Muslims. It made Muslims seem “normal” and negated the stereotypes about them, Because reputation-wise - I reckon reputation is very important. It always makes me feel like that I need to be more cautious, like the way I speak and the way that I interact with other people, just so they don’t get a negative impact about Muslims or Afghans.

Ebrar also felt that in uncomfortable encounters with non-Muslims, it was best to stay polite and make them feel at ease. He explained how being a “good and normal person” helps, I don’t feel uncomfortable, but I would rather laugh, so they feel comfortable too. If they see a friendly person in front of them, they will feel good.

Hasan described how after facing an incidence of discrimination, wanted to “talk” to the aggressors to dispel their ideas about Muslims, and present Muslims as “normal”—thereby taking on the onus of responsibility to represent Muslims in a good light. He explained, I wanted to be friendly to them, I wanted to go up to them and talk, and ask what they were doing and why they were doing it, but unfortunately they left before even I got up to go there, so I did not get a chance to talk to them […] It starts from, you know, connections you make through people and [they] share the information with everyone. You know it is

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all about respect, you respect their beliefs, and you respect your beliefs and the same way they should respect your beliefs. So, like if you respect everyone and if you become united, that is how you are going to fix it.

Amal also strongly felt that acting in a “good” manner helped to dispel myths about Muslims in the general public. She articulated, So, like if I see a person, or whoever I come in contact with, I would present in a good way. I would [not] show like a bad side.

It was also interesting to hear interviewees who faced regular discrimination in jobs such as retail and hospitality still felt that being “extra nice” was important to diffuse any negativity toward Muslims. For instance, Hasnah, who wore a hijab and worked in retail, shared how it was common for her to face discrimination from customers, however she always felt she needed to be nice in return no matter what. She explained this decision in the following manner, “I guess I am just nice to people […] Yeah, it is funny [ …] I do try, but yeah like I don’t really do much with my religion apart from wearing the hijab.” She went on to say that what she does follow from the religion is to “be friendly and nice. But yeah, because I have got a scarf on my head, I think that makes me a little extra nice because I am like an example.” She added, “I am just always extra nice to people, because I don’t want to them took at me and say, ‘because she is Muslim, she is hates us, they hate us because they think we are the enemy’, you know what I mean?”.

For Yasir being nice and open in responding to questions relating to Islam was “doing his part.” Nadeem who was quite active in local politics also believed that it is his responsibility to make a good impression, so that people saw the Muslim community in a positive light, “At the end of the day, I would always say that if you could be the best version of yourself, that version would influence the perception of other people around the community, about your grander culture, about your nationality”. He added, “I think from my side, I think I have tried my best, regardless of size, to change the perception of other people […] towards my community and my background. […] They know that ‘look that this guy and this group of people are a good example of good AfghanAustralian-Muslim people’ in Australia”.

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The need to display “niceness” and go the extra mile in public settings went beyond just the individual level. In all three countries, participants shared accounts of joining a mosque group or a Muslim association to hold interfaith events, run charities, or organize meetups to familiarize their communities with “real” Muslims and Islam. Muntazair, who resides in the USA, shared how he felt the need for such activities and what his local religious community did, I worked for a little while with an organization here in Connecticut. It’s called the Muslim Coalition of Connecticut. And they have this program. It’s called something like friendly talks with your Muslim neighbors, something like that. And we go kind of go around to different community centers and churches and things of that sort, and just kind of answer people’s questions and talk about misconceptions.

Women, as discussed before, felt an increased need to be “nice” due to their heightened visibility as Muslims. For example, Fiza, who worked and lived in the UK, summarized what many of the female participants believed, I wear a hijab to work, so I am visibly Muslim on day-to-day basis, so I just try and maintain decorum and politeness and respect for everyone, so people are aware that as a Muslim ‘she is a nice person, she is definitely not a terrorist, she has got a good sense of humor, just generally be a nice person.’ And I think that is a way to tackling these sorts of issues, like perceptions should be humanized to see another person who looks different, and they are different - but they are very much the same.

Aarish, another young woman who covered her head, shared how it has become her “duty” as a Muslims to be a positive model of Islam. She elaborated, So, I believe that God placed me in this position for a reason and I think that there’s really a reason. Me growing up as a Muslim in the West, I have a duty in my faith to give back in the best way possible. It doesn’t mean that I go out on the streets and start shouting and promote Islam like that. But I believe that me, in addition to society, I believe that everything I hold and believe as a Muslim I can keep, and I should stick to my morals and principles. If that is liked by the people or not. So, for example I’m visibly a Muslim right, because I wear a hijab and I wear an abaya

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and I wear it everywhere I go without exception. And I believe that we shouldn’t have to compromise our religion in order to compete with the West. Because the country that I live in is so accepting, it allows me to do that. So, my duty as a Muslim is to showcase my religion in the best way possible through my character, through the way I dress and through the way I speak. And everything else, my knowledge and skills - to sort of enhance that as well.

Behlul explained that although he “would prefer not to call it an attempt to change their view,” the reason behind his interfaith and voluntary work in the USA is to give people “a realistic perspective” through “firsthand experience.” Like Aarish, Behlul feels an obligation for people to see Islam and Muslims positively through his modeling it for them. The young Muslims interviewed also used their social media accounts to be ambassadors of Islam and promote a positive view of Muslims, and this often involved conducting themselves in a certain way online. Akbar for instance explained, I post as much as I can on social media. I have a lot of non-Muslims followers on Instagram, SnapChat […] and I actually post as much as I can about Islam and charity work etc., and I try to get a good name as much as I can. I mean it does work! Because non-Muslims also say that, ‘I wanna come to the next charity events with you, can you let me know?’ Yeah, I personally see it having a very good effect.

Raheel explained how he used his WhatsApp in a similar fashion, So, I post quite strongly about these kind of things – like Muslims cannot go ahead and bomb up a theatre and call that to be Islam, and I post these posts up on Facebook or Instagram and you know, even put it up as a status on WhatsApp. So, on Facebook I have got a lot of my White colleagues or my White friends who are from different backgrounds. It is the same with Instagram, so it is kinda trying to make [the effort] to change the perception and about equality.

2.15

Ambassadors of Islam

The self-imposed pressure to be “extra” or “super” nice is linked to the over-scrutinization that young Muslims both feel and perceive in society. They are aware that at times others see them simply as a representation of

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their religion, not as individuals. Becoming public “ambassadors of Islam” is a coping mechanism that many participants have taken on in response. This enables young individuals to feel a sense of agency in improving their situation by becoming agents of change. Jameelah’s response highlights how they feel they are responsible for creating awareness about Muslims and Islam, We should go to events and try to mix, and we would go and try to I guess make the social spaces bigger and just try to include more people. Like that is the only way -because if you have never spoken to a Muslim before you wouldn’t understand who we are and how we are, I guess.

Amal explained that, So, like if I see a person or whoever I come in contact with, I would present [myself] in a good way.

Amal’s statement, which overlaps with the idea of being “good” or “super normal,” resonates with the idea that young Muslims feel they must always behave like representatives of their faith. This by design results in the self-governance of their behavior around non-Muslims. Khadija further explains how she needs to demonstrate that nature of Muslims to non-Muslims, They [non-Muslims Westerners] have never met Muslims […] so I am like, ‘hey this is me, like I am very similar to you, you know, not a lot of differences’.

Their minority status often led the young Muslims interviewed to believe it was their responsibility to clarify ambiguities about Muslims and prove how normal those who adhere to Islam are in the West. This was evident in Hakeem’s response, Look, I think information, just giving out information to people, like you know [about] having different beliefs, [just] be around each other. You know if somebody who is White would actually meet a Muslim like myself [… They would] see that, ‘hey they are not as violent as they seem on the media’, then that alone will start to change opinion. So yeah, I think first step is really sort of bring[ing] the wide range of communities together, and sort of start to build this trust with one another and understanding.

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Kinza, being the only Muslim friend in her group, felt a “responsibility” to be a good Muslim and educate non-Muslims about Islam. She noted, I’m the only Muslim in my course. So, I took that responsibility very seriously to kind of represent myself. I [am] the best face of Muslims for people who may not know any other Muslims. And I guess what I’m trying to educate, anyone who’s interested in, or provide them with resources about learning more about Islam from different perspectives.

Similar to other respondents, Aanadi also believed that presenting herself in a positive way to others was her religious duty, although this was not through any specific effort—it was a case of people seeing exactly who she is. She explained, I feel like, you know, hopefully me as a person interacting with other White people. They get a positive impression of Muslims just from my own ego [self]. I always think of, you know, how like our prophet said, that the best way of teaching people about Islam is through your own character. So, I hope that I embody that to the people around me. But I haven’t done anything systemic.

Ajola’s response was similar, explaining that her behavior, informed by religion, will help people associate Muslims with goodness. She said that even if she was not “trying to do much,” she believed that if she practiced her religion “in a good way” then “my behavior will reflect that ‘this is the religion of peace’.” Latifah noted that she had unintentionally become an ambassador of Islam at school because there were too many questions that needed answering about Muslims. She recalled, I had to explain everything for them because in here, in Australia now, people they are used to Muslims they know. The people wearing scarfs they are Muslims, or they have Ramadan, these sorts of things they are familiar with. But during that time the students they did not know, for example, ‘why are you wearing scarf’, or ‘do you wear it all the time’ or ‘how do you pray?’

Noriya was clearly frustrated and believed people outside her faith need to “open your eyes” in how they see Islam, because they do not really try to understand Muslims beyond news and media sources, “there are people

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out there who are real people” she stated. Yet even though she was more unwilling than the other participants, she still became an ambassador of Islam and was forced to dispel stereotypes in certain situations. Even Rahima, who admitted that “I just kind of ignore them [ignorant comments by Anglo-Australians] because there is no point really,” had once engaged in interfaith activities to help normalize depictions of “true” Muslim versus the one portrayed on television. Equally, in Shirin’s testimony the pressure to being “nice” to displace the dominant stereotypes is clearly expressed, I always try. I try to be like more involving. I am trying to be a nice person [so] that everyone can understand that not all Muslims are bad people.

2.16

Defiance

The next distinct category relates to a small minority of young Muslim interviewees making the conscious choice not to defend Islam and Muslims or counteract negative views of their community and religion. Zohaib for instance was clear in his decision to disengage with the “responsibility” of being “super nice” or the ambassadors of Islam, and explained the reason why ambassadorship was a negative role. He explained, I think Muslims have a lot of problems in the way the way they perceive themselves and their self-esteem because there is that pressure. And especially in Muslim communities where there is a huge focus on integration, and you know displeasing misconceptions of Islam, that actually affects the self-perception and self-esteem of young Muslims, who are constantly trying to prove themselves. So, you know when I was younger, I used to take part in more interfaith things which focused on telling non-Muslims about Islam and ridding their minds of misconceptions. But you know as I learned more about the problems that comes with this prevention strategy - with the terrorism and counter terrorism doctrine and how it is centered around Islamophobia -now I refuse to give in to this idea that Muslims have to constantly prove themselves that they are super nice.

Zulaikha was similarly firm in her position that she was not going to be an ambassador, or educator on Islam for the non-Muslims around her. However, like participants in the previous section, she did think that her

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behavior and self-presentation is naturally representative of Muslims. She explained, No, I don’t think of it as a debate, and I don’t see it as my responsibility to change their attitudes and opinion. I mean if they want to be racist, they can be racist, and I cannot change that. The only thing I can change is my own behavior and the way I present myself in society and doing the best I can, that is what I can do, and apart from that I don’t feel like going to people and telling them this is what Islam is all about. It is 2020 and people can go online, and it is whether or not they chose to do that […] I have contributed in the way I have behaved and my accomplishments in life.

Only a few in the sample shared this attitude of ‘defying’ the normal narrative of being “super nice” or “ambassadors” of Islam; the much larger majority communicated a sense of responsibility to challenge these narratives.

2.17

Social Distancing

While most participants learned or had no choice but to live with discrimination, social distance strategies were also employed in many cases as a mechanism of self-protection. There was some irony to be found in these responses; the same people who felt the need to keep to their respective religious and ethnic communities were at times the same people who expressed the need for interfaith dialogue and a strong belief in multiculturalism. One way to interpret this is to understand that these individuals insulate themselves from possible situations where discrimination is expected, based on their prior experiences or simply from their awareness of the prevalence of Islamophobia in Western societies. Others were protected from Islamophobia by not being exposed to it in their network or community. For instance, many young Muslims who attended Muslim schools or schools with Muslim majority students felt their childhood was free of prejudice. This sense of safety and belonging led many to stay inside a particular friendship group which tends to be restricted to migrant and Muslim communities. Although this insulation is often the product of coincidence, context, and unconscious choices, it still results in a protection against coming into contact with Islamophobia. Most of the choices are initially instigated by the participant’s parents such

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as sending them to all Muslim schools and living in a Muslim majority area or neighborhood with a higher proportion of immigrants. A form of distancing that Muslim youth engage in is their choice of friends and the level of closeness they maintain with them. It must be clear that most in the interview displayed no reluctance in talking to or working with Anglo-Saxon friends or workmates, however they usually kept their meaningful and close friendships within their ethnic and religious community. For many, this was due to a perceived lack of connection that arose from a lack of common ground or a lack of shared interests. Several of the respondents additionally felt they had to search and expend effort to find White people who were non-judgmental, open to multiculturalism, or shared similar values, which made it more convenient to stick with their religious and/or ethnic groups. Alyah’s statement highlights the preference for the comfort and familiarity of friends within her ethnic community, Well to be honest, very few [White friends] because I tend to hang out with the people from my ethnic background. Because I feel like I can relate to them more, we have got more of a conversation to talk about, you know.

Anas also noted the shared understanding and similarities that drew him to friendships within his cultural community, I would say our sense of social capital, so we have this similar experience of what it is like be a person of color in Australia. So, we know how it is sometimes difficult to just fit in, or the issues that come in with having a different culture, different foods. So, we understand the experiences of each other, but also, we are able to connect on things like family and things like [what] we like to do with just certain cultural aspects that we understand, [but] that is harder for my White friends to understand.

Aisha also commented how the similarities in how they were raised and having shared interests brought her closer to her friends with the same ethnic background, “I tend to make friends with more desi people because we kind of have similar humor, I guess about being raised a certain way and you know having a similar parents and parenting strategies. So, kind of you know, [we] relate in that sense.” She added, “and you know, if you go towards

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different groups, I guess it is just a matter of different extra-curricular activities as well, you could say. Yeah, I just tend to have more similarities in hobbies and things with those students than others.”

Conversely, Ajmal’s rationale for not being close to Anglo-Australian friends exemplifies how social distancing can also be rooted in the fear of being judged by White peers, or simply seeing them as irrevocably different than one another. Ajmal talked about his lack of White friends in the following statement, They have a different lifestyle as well, not really the one that I am into […] so like just they go out a lot and just about drinking and what not, and I don’t know they just kind of group together as well. Like it is more like the White kids and then the rest of us.

Sumayya also shared the lack of personal connection she felt to classmates outside her religious and ethnic community circle, We are very different people I guess; we only relate at for example at uni, we only relate over the subjects. I don’t really have the needs to be friends with them on a personal level. If I am in the university environment, I will be very friendly, I will be very nice, we will be very social, but outside of that I don’t feel the need to socialize with them.

Aarish had a couple of strong friendships with non-Muslims who she could trust, however she shared that generally, shared value systems meant she had more trusting friendships with other Muslims, Just because we [Muslims friends] share the same faith and the same principles in Islam that teach us to be trustworthy and honest and reliable. Not just that; for example, if I see a non-Muslim that I can trust, and I would trust the non-Muslim as well. I have a couple close non-Muslim friends as well that I can rely on and trust. So, I think it depends more on my relationship with them than their background. But generally speaking, I’ll trust Muslims more.

Kinza’s struggle to form and maintain friendships outside her faith and ethnic group provides a deeper understanding of the gap many young Muslims felt in their relationships with White friends or acquaintances. She explains this in the following way,

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There are certain things in my life that I feel like I cannot communicate with these friends, because they might not be able to relate. So, for example, imposter syndrome -feeling like I only got a position or some achievement because I’m a minority, things like that. I feel like they wouldn’t really be able to understand. I don’t communicate that or even, you know, having low - having bad mental health days. I feel like they wouldn’t be able to relate to that experience if it’s related to, you know, my religion or something going on at home. Which is a cultural aspect. So, I my first choice would be to talk to my non-Anglo-American friends.

Needing to explain their religious obligations and rituals—the way interviewees dress, their choice not to drink, and fasting rituals for instance— can make friendships with non-Muslims more burdensome. Habibah explained the difficulty she faced in explaining her decision not to drink while socializing with her White friends in America, Usually, we go out to eat. I have gone out to like bars with them, but it’s always like a weird conversation. I’ll explain. Like I don’t drink in all of these things.

Amjad also spoke of how socializing was very different with non-Muslim friends, who drank and took drugs, I think the main area that distinguishes [us] is that we used to go to parties and stuff like that, and their actions - I wouldn’t do that with my Muslim friends. I wouldn’t go to a party where there would be drinking. I would have parties, but I wouldn’t be drinking, there wouldn’t be cigarettes, and drugs and stuff like that. So, yeah, probably that is the main distinguishing area.

Likewise, Rahimah also felt that the drinking culture among non-Muslims limited the time she chose to spend with these connections. Tooba spoke of feeling excluded from the after-hours socialization that took place in her organization, in addition to not feeling comfortable with the prevalent pub culture in the UK. Sofia echoed this view in her comment that, They bond over going to the bar, drinking, and I don’t do any of that stuff. So, it was quite difficult for me to have friends who were White.

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Different lifestyles and values ultimately led many participants to selfisolate from what they call “White culture.” These actions and choices are a result of social convenience, ease, and comfort. A second way participants avoided discomfort and alienation was through their enrolment in all Muslim schools as children. In many cases, participants who attended these schools reported feeling safe from prejudice, although at the same time this environment created its own set of challenges. Alimah attended a very diverse school and explained how it sheltered her from discrimination during these years, Not in school, because it was very diverse and there was a lot of Muslims as well. So, like no I haven’t had any experience with that. School was very accommodating.

Alimah’s response was reflective of numerous other participants who had attended exclusively Muslim schools and noted feeling cushioned against larger discrimination in society. Other interviewees also spoke of the bonds they were able to form with others in these school environments because of shared religion, values, and life experiences such as immigration or being raised by immigrant parents. Ebrar was thankful that his school was predominantly Muslim, because he believed this had protected him from any experiences of bullying or discrimination, Yeah, I can say that because the majority was Muslim ethnicity school, the kids basically knew what was right and what was wrong, and they didn’t do things like discrimination or bullying was not right and it just never happened.

Hakeem also felt that sharing a similar background to his fellow classmates helped create an environment where everyone got along, Yeah, you know I think because it was, we were all sort of from the same background and […] from the same environment, and you know we are all Muslims. Well, the majority of us were Muslims, so we kind of sort of all got along I guess.

Similarly, Tasneem liked the intimacy her Muslim high school provided to her. She had attended a public primary school where she was one of the only Muslims and shared that she had felt “on the outside.” However,

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in her secondary education among the majority Muslim students, she described starting and finishing high school with the same people and spoke with fondness about the more personal education setting. Various interview responses indicated that these majority or exclusively Muslim schools offered a significant layer of protection against external discriminatory attitudes for those who attended them. Yet once they left the confines of this school and attended university or gained employment, they were exposed to discrimination or an increased awareness of differences between groups of people. Aftab’s statement showcases this, The thing is that because I was brought up in a diaspora, in [a] closed school environment, you do not really feel that you do not belong until you reach university. In university, that is when you realize that there are differences.

Asifah also noticed a shift in attitudes once she started university, and that attention was drawn to her simply because she was a Muslim, Yeah, at school it was just very comfortable. At uni, at work, I don’t face much [discrimination] because majority of the people there are Muslim and a lot of the people there, they are from school. But at uni - like they haven’t said anything particular, but sometimes they just bring out the fact that I am Muslim for like unnecessary reasons like, ‘you don’t need to bring it up like I am here to have a conversation with you’. Yeah, like they would just be like, ‘oh she is Muslim’. Okay so that is something.

Shiza went to an all-girls school where most students came from similar cultural backgrounds. This means that she felt really accepted by others during her school years, who not only shared the same upbringing but also understood the gendered dimensions of the faith, I actually felt that I fit in most with people because it was all the same cultural identity. We [are] used to all the same things, and everyone understood each other, and I went to an all-girls school too, so it was good like that. Like why can’t you dress certain ways and do certain things or why you can’t eat or drink certain things, and why we don’t make friends with males and stuff, and it was understood, and I thought I used to fit really well in my school days.

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Maya also spoke of school feeling like “home” and a haven, because the other students were from similar backgrounds, I think then moving on to secondary school after primary school, going to a place where there were lots of people like me - it really felt like home. It really felt like a place where I kind of belonged because everyone looked the same, everyone spoke the same. A lot of people wore hijab, a lot of people were Muslims. And it felt more comfortable.

Fayrooz attended a Muslim school and felt that while it had protected him from discrimination, it also meant that many of his lifelong friendships ended up being quite homogeneous. He commented, Yes, it was good. There were pros and cons of it. The pros would be that there would be a lot more understanding because our backgrounds were similar, but the cons would be that we weren’t really subject to a more diverse friend base.

The sense of comfort and ease during school because of sharing the same background with other students resulted in participants feeling quite jarred when they went to university and lost this sense of ease. As Bushra explained, In high school it was pretty good because of the fact, that I think, we were all we were all kind of the same form the same sect, the same ethnic background, and cultural background and it made it easier to make friendships. But in university - it is not as good as high school.

Participant responses highlighted that attending majority ethnic/religious schools was quite a unique experience for Muslim participants living in the West. Many pupils were saved from being bulled or feeling different or like the “other” at school, yet this also seemed to lead them to experience a specific “cultural shock” after graduating from high school, when their status as a Muslim is made more prominent in their daily engagements. Additionally, some testimonies show that while escaping negative stereotyping is undoubtedly a positive, there is also an undeniably negative trade-off in that their social network can become limited. At times, this also meant that when these young Muslims moved into broader society, there was a period (which was ongoing in some cases) where they felt

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suddenly exposed to the attention, discrimination, or sense of difference that can come from being a Muslim living in the West.

2.18

Conclusion

The bombardment of information presented in the traditional media, via political debates, and on social media, has placed Muslims under the shadow of narratives of difference, being the “other,” in addition to being associated with jihad, extremism, and terrorism. The unraveling of peace in the Middle East and waves of transnational violent extremism have increased the challenges faced by young Muslims living in the West. The selected responses presented in this chapter have demonstrated that Muslims must defend not only their religious choices, but also their presence in the West. Time and again, ignorance seems to be a central cause of the false ideas fueling Islamophobia. The impact of Islamophobia is not uniform; Islamophobia affects some more than others, but regardless of the direct impact recalled, it did seem to leave an impression among the interviewees that they do not always “fully belong” in their Western home. Given that most were born or primarily raised in the Western countries they live in, and as expressed in earlier chapters feel these countries are their home, this feeling of non-belonging is a serious challenge for young Muslims. Some participants who were born elsewhere came from a legacy of war, hardship, and violence to the West with a hope for a better life. At times, this means that young Muslims (possibly all Muslim migrants) internalize or accept difficulties resulting from Islamophobia simply because it is the “lesser” of the two evils. Despite discrimination often being a lived reality, the interview responses suggested that those interviewed had a tendency to adjust their perceptions, contextualize their experiences, or learn various coping mechanisms. Examining how these participants rationalize discriminatory attitudes and behaviors they encounter provides an important insight into understanding their perspectives. At the same time, discussing their rationalizations moves beyond just treating them as passive victims, and gives a chance to explore how they perceive the issues they face in the broader context of Islamophobia, racism, and challenges for Muslims living in the West. Young Muslims feel politically isolated due to the mainstreaming and rise in popularity of right-wing politics. Events such as the 2016 American Presidential Elections, Brexit, and various Islamophobic statements and

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policies made by parliamentarians in the West have left Muslims feeling negatively politicized. This politicization naturally leaves many participants uneasy, and at times with some distrust toward the government. This is a representation of how the divisional politics of the twenty-first century is working against the well-being of minorities. Most were also aware of how politics and media combined to lead to increased episodes of attacks against Muslims on the streets and various forms of aggression toward them in other parts of life. The interviewees were very aware that the mainstream media has played an instrumental role in shaping broader attitudes about Muslims in the West. The vast majority of participants recollected growing up in the post-9/11 climate in the West; for them, the hostility from media has been deeply and personally felt. In many cases, interviews with these individuals revealed their belief that incidents of prejudice or discrimination they had faced stemmed from misinformation regarding Islam and Muslims communicated via mainstream media. Naturally, their distrust toward mainstream outlets left many young Muslims eager for alternative narratives, and participants appreciated seeing these narratives on television or online platforms. Most felt that social media offered hope in creating changes in perceptions of Muslims, because of its ability to empower individuals and represent different views and voices. Participants engaged with these views and shared them on their own platforms to support this shifting of narrative. This again shows that while the young Muslims have compromised with the current conditions, they are actively trying to change the situation and hold hope for the future. The stories shared by the participants showcase not only the various forms of discrimination that result from Islamophobia and racism, but its emotional toll as well. The power of description of these events gives an insight into the sentiments of the victims of Islamophobic attacks, as well as bringing to light the varying degrees young Muslims are impacted by discriminatory acts and behaviors. The lesser emotional maturity and understanding of the world around them mean that school-age children can be particularly challenged when discrimination occurs during these formative years. This chapter found stories of interviewees who had faced Islamophobia and racism in their early life and recalled it quite vividly. However, the latter part of the chapter also highlights that a significant number of participants had also attended exclusively or majority

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Muslim schools—and although this had come with its own set of challenges, it had protected them during their school years from encountering discrimination. Often, discrimination took on different forms in tertiary education where from being hired to being judged for their academic abilities can be tarnished by stereotypes. Incidents recorded in the interviews clearly show that public settings such as buses, rail stations, malls, and retail jobs are spaces where opportunistic discrimination often occurs. This has the consequence of supporting the logic of ‘distancing’ where Muslims and other minorities avoid less diverse areas and those people that may cause them harm. There are secondary harms that arise from distancing behaviors, with discrimination against these groups being reinforced and isolation imposed on the communities that feel unsafe outside their religious-ethnic groups. Discussions about incidents experienced as adults also brought to light that microaggressions against Muslims are quite widespread and arise in various points of social and professional contact in their lives. An unwillingness to or uncertainty in reporting these types of incidents was revealed in interviews, with most who responded saying the incident was too minor or would simply be impossible to report. To really understand the prevalence, nature, and impact of Islamophobia on the lives of young Muslims, both overt (such as acts of street aggression) and covert (such as microaggressions during the hiring process) behaviors must be considered. Although they manifest in different ways, we see how these behaviors are experienced from a young age and continue throughout adulthood. As with other forms of discrimination, certain attributes make some within the group more prone to discrimination. The discussions highlighted that gender, followed by race were clear determinants of the risk of discrimination that young Muslims encountered. The most extreme and frequent forms of racism were reported by, or reported about women who covered their heads, with incidents ranging from workplace discrimination to physical attacks. This makes Muslim women in a headscarf or covering more susceptible to discrimination compared to those without; many respondents had noticed this from their own experience, or from those around them. Another layer of bias highlighted related to how physical appearance, namely facial features and skin color, influenced the way young Muslims were treated in the West. Muslim converts who are “White” and Muslims with fairer skin complexions felt that because they passed as non-Muslims, they were less prone to attacks or had escaped

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discrimination altogether. This showcases the additional racial dimensions of Islamophobia which is targeted at “Arab looking” individuals. Being visibly Muslim consequently invites more frequent and intense forms of negative attitudes and behaviors. A further layer of analysis of the data indicated four clear patterns in defense mechanisms adopted by young Muslims to adjust into society, or cope with hostilities or misinformed attitudes. The first involves a process of justifying, downplaying, or accepting Islamophobic behaviors. Another common pattern is to ‘strive for change’ to the status quo. This relates to young Muslims’ involvement in interfaith programs, being super or extra “nice” and being “good” ambassadors of Islam and Muslims. This was not always a conscious choice, but often a reactionary role to how they were being treated or a perceived need to stand up for their faith and fellow Muslims. Many felt that they had to explain themselves and Islam to non-Muslims, which was fine, but often felt it demarcated ignorance on their counterpart’s part. This feeling leads us to understand another pattern that surfaced in the interviews, which indicated a very small number of participants taking an approach where they consciously chose to refrain from being “extra nice” or acting as “ambassadors” of the faith. This arose from feeling overly pressured by society to defend their choices and advocate for the faith; essentially, they chose not to offer any explanations, and believed it was not their responsibility, nor would it be fruitful, to inform and educate the public. The final mechanism used by participants is what the author calls “social distancing.” This behavior minimizes the chances of facing discrimination simply by distancing oneself from non-Muslim majority areas or activities. These involve both instances of willful distancing—for instance choosing only to interact with others who have similar religious and/or ethnic backgrounds, and circumstantial distancing—for instance from their parents deciding to send their children to an exclusively Muslim school. In any case, this distancing can have consequences including a lack of interaction with the larger society, or the experience of “culture shock” when the person is confronted by non-Muslims later in their life. This chapter is a continuation of literature that maps the lived experiences of Muslims in the rapidly shifting atmosphere of the West. Through the selected interview responses, the reader is presented with a gaze into the experiences of the participants. Key themes explored included various forms of discrimination, their impact on the lives of the participants, their coping mechanisms and efforts to rationalize discriminatory incidents.

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In addition, sensitive to intersectionality, the themes clearly bring forth evidence that women who are visibly Muslim (who wear modest clothing such as scarfs, shawls, body covers, abaya, niqab, and the burkha) and Muslims in public spaces are the most common and serious targets of Islamophobic abuse. While the chapter brings a highly emotive aspect of the lives of the participants, it also illuminates certain positives; there is a sense of belonging to the Western home within the participants. Despite discrimination, there were participants motivated to improve public opinions of Muslims. These obligations were at times imposed on the participants, but others embraced them more openly. There is no uniform way of understanding discrimination and coping with it among young Muslims in the West. However, its impact is undeniably deep and shapes the life trajectories of these young individuals.

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Walter de Gruyter GmbH. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20. 500.12657/50215/9783110671964.pdf?sequence=1#page=296. Sunar, L. (2017). “The Long History of Islam as a Collective ‘Other’ of the West and the Rise of Islamophobia in the U.S. After Trump.” Insight Turkey 19(3), 35–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26300529. Terman, Rochelle. (2017). “Islamophobia and Media Portrayals of Muslim Women: A Computational Text Analysis of US News Coverage.” International Studies Quarterly 61(3), 489–502. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/ sqx051. Wang, S. C., Raja, A. H., and Azhar, S. (2020). “‘A Lot of Us Have a Very Difficult Time Reconciling What Being Muslim Is’: A Phenomenological Study on the Meaning of Being Muslim American.” Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 26(3), 338–346. https://doi.org/10.1037/cdp0000297. Wiedlitzka, Susann, Prati, Gabriele, Brown, Rupert, Smith, Josh, and Walters, Mark A. (2021). “Hate in Word and Deed: The Temporal Association Between Online and Offline Islamophobia.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 39, 75–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-021-09530-9. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (April 2009). “Socio-Economic, Political and Theological Deprivations’ Role in the Radicalization of the British Muslim Youth: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir.” European Journal of Economic and Political Sciences (EJEPS) 2(1), 89–101. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2012). “An Analysis of the Factors That Pave the Way for the Radicalization of the British Youth.” In Mohammed Siddique Seddon, Fauzia Ahmad and Shiraz Khan (Eds.), Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations (pp. 32–53). London and New York: Continuum.. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Switzerland: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Bashirov, G. (2022). “Religious Homophily and Friendship: Socialisation Between Muslim Minority and Anglo Majority Youth in Australia.” Journal of Youth Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261. 2022.2046257. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Bliuc, Ana-Maria, Mansouri, Fethi, and Bashirov, Galib. (2021). “Young Muslim Australians’ Experiences of Intergroup Contact and its Implications for Intercultural relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44(15), 2772–2793. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1850823. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Bliuc, A. M., Mansouri, F., and Bashirov, G. (2021a). “Young Muslim Australians’ Experiences of Intergroup Contact and Its Implications for Intercultural Relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44(15), 2772–2793. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1850823.

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CHAPTER 3

Multilayered Identity of Young Muslims in the Anglosphere

3.1

Introduction

One of the earliest signs of social development in human infants is marked by their realization and recognition of various identities. Prominent sociologist George Herbert Mead and his contemporaries argue that this connection with others and self is critical in human social development. Eventually this becomes the grounds upon which one sees the world and constructs ideas about themselves (Deegan 2008). The development of identity is therefore highly influenced by socialization with others and forms a fundamental part of human existence. Grouping or categorizing individuals according to classifications increases their vulnerability to being stereotyped (Schmader 2012; King and Ahmed 2010; Chung-Herrera and Lankau 2006; Sheridan 2006). Muslims residing in the West have not been immune to this, especially since the upsurge and normalization of Islamophobia after September 11 (Sheridan 2006; Yilmaz 2016). In many cases the lack of interaction between Western people and Muslims when combined with Islamophobic mainstream media narratives proved to be a recipe for a broad misunderstanding of Muslim identities (Adida, Laitin 2017; Gest 2010). Such attitudes and misconceptions are successful in creating the Muslim ‘other’ which lead to a very poor understanding of the rich layers of Muslim identity (von Eberstein 2020).

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Grouping the Muslim identity together in a singular fashion also overlooks the rich and varied diversity of Muslim communities. Islam is the second most widespread religion across the world and is followed by people from various ethnic and geographical backgrounds. Several layers of identity are also added to their relationship with the country they live in, their gender, social class, and other factors. These layers are usually ignored when Muslim identity is discussed in mainstream narratives. Consequently, there is a dire need for better understanding and representing the diversity within the Muslim communities living in the West. This chapter aims to explore this rather untapped aspect of young Muslims’ lives and in three different Anglosphere nations, to help comprehend their multilayered identities. Using direct narratives of the participants provides an opportunity to observe these individuals not only as Muslims, but also in relation to their plural identities.

3.2 Existing Literature of Muslim Identity in the West There is a significant increase in literature that focuses on the study of migrants and their identities. This has been made possible due to the rapidity of migrations that took place in the twentieth century because of economic processes, conflict, and designed programs between states. One of the most common ways of understanding group identity is through their social attitudes and patterns. One of the key elements of migrant identity is a connection with their country of origin for the migrants or their ancestors. The most popular way to evaluate this link is by exploring the individual’s connection, in a cross-border fashion, to the homeland (Olwig 2007; Sørensen and Guarnizo 2007; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). This connection often takes the shape of what migrants consider to be their origin nation or notion of home (Olwig 2007). Another way of understanding the connection with homeland among migrants is to examine how migrant families experience their homelife. Some migrants live in transnational households (Grillo and Gardner 2002), for example as a caregiver or mothers living away from their child due to work commitments in a foreign nation, or vice versa. This creates the experience of ‘transnational motherhood or childhood’ (Anderson 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). Within the family life of migrant communities there are also ‘transnational marriages,’ which

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impact how kinship ties are established and sustained given the physical barriers (Rytter 2013; Charsley 2006; Charsley and Shaw 2006; Charsley and Lankau 2005; Constable 2004; Shaw 2001; Ballard 1990; Werbner 1990). Previous studies have addressed the sometimes-widespread nature of the idea of home, and migrants’ experience of transnational connections (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Olwig 2003). There are also works that acknowledge a multicultural socio-legal identity among migrants, who often feel that the connection they have with the ‘homeland’ ‘clashes’ with their connection with their ‘host’ country (Yilmaz 1999; Carruthers 2013; Yilmaz 2009, 2012, 2021; Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz 2022; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2022; Yilmaz 2023). Two significant gaps exist in this literature. Firstly, most of these studies do not extensively investigate how information and in particular social media play a role in building a transitional link between the migrants and their ‘homeland’ to form their identity. Secondly, most approaches are rooted in the idea of nationalism, which is defined by state boundaries (Maleševi´c 2019: 7; Wimmer and Schiller 2003). This approach risks understanding identity in a limited sense that is linked exclusively to space. This can be highly limiting when studying migrants and their descendants because of the plural connections they often have with both their countries of origin and home countries. Consequently, national identity is measured in terms of the level of ‘integration’ the migrants display such as disassociating with their ‘former’ country’s cultural bonds and behaviors. With such an outlook, the migrants are denied an understanding of their identity beyond these nationalist terms. For instance, identity markers and influences such as race, gender, religion, ethnicity, and the temporal as well as social relationship with the country of residence are ignored. This is noted by Pnina Werbner (2002) in her study of the Pakistani diaspora community settled in Manchester in theUK. The author finds that identity is rooted not merely in nationalism, but also in social and political factors, a trend also observed by Rytter (2010) in a study of the Muslim diaspora community in Denmark. In an Australian study, Roose and Harris (2015) point out that multicultural civic spaces, and navigating between liberal citizenship and Muslim identities can prove challenging. However, after conducting many interviews, the authors note that Islam contributes significantly to the development of civic mindedness that thrives in the secular multicultural context, which was evident from participants’ engagement in and outside of community networks and other voluntary work. This is also evident in the works

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of Kabir (2015) who finds biculturalism to be a blending of majority and minority cultures that permits the retaining of one’s religion and language, while also absorbing (in this case) the English language and other elements of the mainstream culture. It is worth noting that, in the Australian context, the often-expressed belief that ‘too many migrants are not adopting Australian values’ also remains a public concern, as a recent survey from Victoria, Australia indicates, but this assertion is also decreasing in recent years (60% in 2020, whereas it was 67% obtained in 2019) (Markus 2021). The idea of ‘integration’ needs to be reviewed in literature as migrant identities are plural and complex. Finn and Momani (2016) also explore this aspect of connection with Muslims (not diasporas) to understand transnational engagement with the ‘homeland’ or country of origin, not as a measure of lacking ‘integration’ but a way of freely expressing and exploring their plural identities. Focusing on Arab activists living overseas, the study indicated that most of these transnational individuals possess dual citizenship because they wish to live in a migrating state but don’t want to disassociate with their native land. Finn and Momani use the theoretical framework of ‘political subjectivities’ to understand the transnational activists who “constantly disturbs the state” by challenging it with respect to citizenship. The activists invoke the “post-national, deterritorialized model of citizenship” so that they can be considered as “citizens of the world.” Int this context, the Arab revolution is an even more important event because it “reawaken[ed] the self-identity” of being Arab and reconstructed the inclusive identity toward their respective states after the revolts. “The Arab uprisings awakened within Arab transnationals a profound desire for their citizenship rights and to break open citizenship spaces vis-à-vis their country of origin” (Finn and Momani 2016: 37). Fozdar’s (2011) work also challenges general stereotypical perceptions that suggest Muslim migrants cannot integrate into the Western ‘way of life.’ In direct opposition to this stereotype, 73% of refugee respondents felt that they do not experience any difficulty in living a Western life. Even Muslims who regularly practice religion and celebrate important days “rarely or never had problems understanding the Australian way of life compared to those who were not religious” (Fozdar 2011: 178). Nevertheless, the idea of diversity and multiculturalism has been recently understood in narrow terms with the rise of political conservatism. In a survey of British Muslims, O’Toole and colleagues (2013)

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found that the discourse in British society clearly sought to ‘integrate’ the Muslims. This is interesting to note because although Muslims are protected by extensive legal safeguarding, everyday society and social interactions have worsened for Muslims in the UK. Naturally this impacts the way Muslims feel about themselves and the society they live in. A similar impact of anti-Muslim right-wing politics was also felt by German and Australian Muslims with Turkish descent in a study conducted by Boz and Bouma (2012), who explored the phenomenon of identity construction. Australian Muslims referred to the Cronulla riot in 2005 in which significant violence was directed against the “asylum seekers from Muslim/Middle Eastern backgrounds who were perceived to the be ‘enemy’.” Whereas the Turks living in Germany spoke of ‘The Koln Issue’ in which a right-wing organization opposed the building of a mosque. They also quoted a Berlin minister who had remarked that Turkish and Arab communities “have low IQ and no productive function other than fruit and vegetable trade.” Both groups reported violence they suffered as a result of anti-immigrant attitudes in their respective countries. In Germany in particular, this was found to curtail their interactions with broader German society, and resulted in them feeling excluded, despite being born and brought up in that country. In addition, the general migration policies of the countries such as the German “guest worker status” compared to the Australian “permanent residents” also impacts the level of connectedness Muslims felt to the respective countries (Boz and Bouma 2012). In discussions about Muslim identity in Western countries, religion is usually seen as a hurdle to ‘integration.’ However, there is a newer scholarship that challenges the idea of viewing religion as a barrier to engagement. These words instead view the role of religion in young Muslims as a key factor in their engagement with their community/s, which in turn forms their ideas of identity. One important example is Johns et al. (2015) study, which analyzes the presence of religiosity in the formation of ‘active citizenship’ among young Muslims in Australia. The study is undertaken in the understanding of the social and political consequences of September 11, 2001, which led to widespread questioning about the status of citizenship among Muslims in Western societies. Not only have Muslims been subjected to ongoing marginalization within society, but they have also had their civil and political rights curtailed by the state. Johns et al. therefore consider the implication of such policies and their impact on young Australian Muslims, how Muslims have

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constructed their own identities in response to such encounters, and how they have engaged with society to reclaim their citizenship. The authors chose Muslim youth of 18–24 years old to study because during 9/11 and its direct aftermath, this age group was in the social environment of school, during particularly formative years, and were “suddenly framed [..] as a suspect citizen” (2015: 171). The traumatic experiences resulting from this hostile political and social environment shaped their identity. This study found more than half of the participants described 9/ 11 as their main “formative experience,” one that resulted in them engaging more with their religion and claiming their citizenship rights. For example, one participant decided to wear a hijab in response to the hostilities and discrimination which she faced in school. Although her initial choice to wear the hijab was a political one, she subsequently embraced it ongoing as a duty to her religion. The participant actively critiqued the liberal feminist position on hijab and described her choice to wear it as ‘feminism within.’ This example shows how religiosity can act as a critical instrument in reclaiming citizenship space. Johns et al. also asked two important questions to unpack how young Muslims understand the concept of citizenship and their position in society. Firstly, they asked: “What is it about being a Muslim that makes you a better citizen?” (Johns et al. 2015: 184). Some participants highlighted principles of equality and respect of diversity, while others mentioned welfare principles which require their civic engagement. Most of them mentioned doing ‘good deeds’ for others by protecting and respecting the rights of others including family, neighbors, and animals. The second question was: “Are there particular religious beliefs or practices that encourage good citizenship?” (Johns et al. 2015: 185). Most participants highlighted the moral and ethical training rooted within the five pillars of Islam. Importantly, responses demonstrated how morality, generosity, and responsibility are fostered by religiosity which in turn produces an active citizen. Fozdar’s aforementioned study presents similar findings in its attempts to uncover the relationship between religion and Australian Muslim’s lives in the country. Firstly, religion appears to be a “positive source of social capital” for migrants (Fozdar 2011: 176). Looking at migrants in Perth, the study also finds that migrants without religion appear to be significantly less happy with their social capital or network, in comparison with most Muslims who displayed higher levels of happiness with their social engagement.

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The literature on migrant identities also points out that the experiences of first-generation migrants are quite different to those of second or thirdgeneration migrants. For instance, Salih Yucel (2015) found that in 2010, the Australian Muslim community did not display high levels of religiosity. Even those born outside the country only indicated moderate religious affinity. This is significant because Muslims in the West are usually stereotyped by media as deeply religious (a perceived barrier to ‘integration’) and at times fanatical or extremist (Wigger 2019; van Es 2019, 2016). Both Kabir (2015) and Yucel (2015) also found that Muslim residents of Australia perceive the country to be their home, not merely a ‘host land’ (Ramadan 2005). Some respondents even chose two countries as ‘home’ which challenges the conventional nationalism framework in which peoples are supposed to identify with only one homeland. This trend was found to be more common among second and third-generation migrants, and Abbas et al. (2018) note that older Australian Muslims, who are mostly first generation or grew up in a different political climate, prioritized ethnicity as a marker of identity. Kabir (2008) interviewed Muslims from different age groups in Australia and also considered the number of years they had been living in the country. Survey results from this study found that not only did the generation to which they belonged to impact their life and identity, but factors including whether they were born overseas, and where they drew their idea of heritage from were also important. Equally, cultural influences, economic and social status in society, and their experiences with terrorism/narratives around terrorism all impacted their perceptions of life in Australia. This only proves to illustrate the dynamic nature of Muslim experiences. Thus, while exploring Muslim diaspora communities in the West, it is important to keep in mind the diverse range of factors that impact their identity.

3.3

Multiple Identities: Fluidity and Harmony

A multilayered identity was most commonly described by the participants, or in the analogy of one respondent, they are “layered like an onion.” Most felt comfortable in the acknowledgment they had layered identities. Turkish female Ajmal expressed this confidence, I do say I am Australian, but I do say I am a Cyprus-ian (Cypriot + Australian) in that sense, so I never really felt a split between the two. Like not really, even in like primary school—it was like an ethnicity diverse area

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and school, so everyone was like not Australian, everyone has their own separate background.

It is the multiculturalism she experienced growing up in Australian society that led her to believe that this plurality defines the country, Well, what is Australian anyway? Like how you classify it, that is the question. Everyone is Australian but they can also be something else … which [the] majority of people are.

Jameelah, an Arab-Afghan Australian, also felt that there are multiple elements to what makes her who she is, My identity is more defined by religion, more than my culture I would say and also by my environment I guess because I am a very liberal Muslim who was brought up here. So, I would say that my identity is very multifaceted.

Alimah called this blending of identities as being a “hybrid.” Others such as Salomon also expressed a sense of pride and joy in their efforts at “balancing.” In many other cases, respondents noted a preference for selecting or identifying with one identity before the other. Fatimah for instance felt a similar level of connection with Australia compared to her other identities because of their familial bond with the place. There were also those who culturally felt closest to their ethnic-national identity. As Sohrab explained, “Culturally, though, I identify mostly with being Albanian.” Majeed who is ethnically Indian-Malay, born in Singapore and now an Australian citizen felt that while his identity is dependent on the context, there is a stronger attachment to parts of his identity, So, if I am in Singapore I will be considered as an Australian and will be treated as a foreigner, I am closer to the culture here and I do consider myself Australian-Muslim.

Rahima’s comments also illustrate the judgments sometimes passed by others in relation to her heritage, Yes, I have always made it clear, you know people who might not acknowledge the background, but I acknowledge it everywhere. I say this is me,

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this is who I am, well there is good and bad things currently happening in Afghanistan which will impact the image of other people living in Australia. But if someone judges you, they will judge you, but I would respect you if someone judges you on a personal basis not on a community basis.

While most agreed that region was an influential part of their identity, and a significant number of responses addressed faith and religion, a noteworthy number felt that it was more of a cultural identity marker. For instance, Hakeem who has a Lebanese background referred to himself as a “cultural Muslim.” Rizwan from the UK felt that the religious layer of his identity was the strongest and most permanent, whereas the most interchangeable or flexible layers would be, Either be my ethnicity or nationality. The thing that would actually remain the same over time and would be first is my religion. I think the main thing to identify myself would be my religion actually.

Affan from the UK also identified religion as the strongest facet of his identity, Religion I uphold more than anything else. I believe religion is what creates an identify before anything anyways and then [I am] proud of like my origins, like where I come from and then I would add basic nationalities in them,” adding that he upholds his Turkish identity “more than a British [identity].

Muntazir who came from an ethnically Moroccan household said, I tend to choose like two races or more or something like that. Obviously, I am Muslim. That’s my religion. And my nationality as of right now is American. And that’s pretty much it.

Omar felt that his identity was derived from both his Lebanese heritage and home in Australia: “I would say I am Australian and Lebanese. My parents are Lebanese, I was born here but I did live about eleven years of my life in Lebanon, so I do identify as Lebanese as well and Australian.” Bashir also felt his ethnicity was the most important part of his identity, commenting “I am white, black and Latino or Afro Latina and then like,

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I guess Muslim, depending on the context.” Behlul similarly shared he was primarily “ethnically Turkish and American.” Nadia said, I am Bulgarian-American. I mean I was born here that is why I am American but not actually American […] you know what I mean. And then I am Muslim, so I think I kind of [see myself] definitely as a Balkan Muslim.

Sadfar’s comments resonate with Nadia’s, “I do identify myself as an American, but I understand that I am a minority considering that my parents are from Pakistan, South Asia, and also because of my religion and my ethnicity. I do consider myself a minority.” Noryia’s expression of identity also showed that for many participants, gender also played a role in how they viewed themselves. She explained, First, I would call myself Australian because I was born in Australia, and I was raised to be an Australian. And I then would describe myself as Iraqi follow[ed] by Muslim female.

It is interesting to note that predominantly women felt the need to express gender as part of their multilayered identity. Aanadi, an American Bengali shared with the interviewer that, “I tend to first identify myself as a person of Bangladeshi origin and as a Muslim woman.” Like several interviewees from the USA and Australia, Fiza from the UK also expressed her gender as a part of their identity, describing herself as, “British-mixed-race-female of Pakistani and English origin.” The interviews uncovered a sense of pride among most of the participants when discussing their multiple identities. Many were confident, willing, and open to discuss their varying ethnic or religious markers, and an overwhelming number of respondents from across the three national contexts felt at ease navigating their different identities. Many interviewees indicated they were comfortable and felt ease in maintaining and expressing their different identities. They provided interesting insights into the way these identities are managed, balanced, and brought to the fore depending on the environment they were inhabiting. Turkish female Ajmal statement illustrates the impact of context and environment on her expression of identity, Identity does change depending on the environment we are in. Obviously, I hold my values and my beliefs true to myself but depending on who

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I am with, I will I guess conceal certain aspects of my identity. When it is with my university friends who are mainly Australian […] my cultural identity wouldn’t be as dominant as for example my personal identity, my intellectual identity—so, I guess it really depends on who I am with and what I am doing.

Eileen also felt that she moved about fluidly from one identity to another depending on the situation, Well, it depends on the situation, like sometimes I even go around saying I am Macedonian; I don’t even put in the Turkish identity. It depends on what I am trying to do or what I am trying to get access to, so whatever works.

Bushra also felt that she was navigating multiple identities without major issues, “there is like an ethnic identity definitely and there is a religious identity and I guess there is an Australian identity as well [as an identity] from my country of origin.” Anas who has a Pakistani background felt that growing up close to the Pakistani community in his childhood made him feel like a “Pakistani,” yet over the years exposure to the larger Australian community also made him “Australian-Muslim.” He added that he did not feel a clash in this regard. Yasir, a young American Muslim with a Middle Eastern background also learned to balance his multiple identities, but prioritize those that are complementary to his religiosity, I identify myself mostly as Muslim. And I don’t think nationality makes a big difference in that, although I speak American English. I have an Egyptian sense of humor. And so, I think Muslim first and then nationalities and cultures come afterwards because whatever doesn’t clash with my religion. I try to make room for it. I try not to make room for things that do clash with it.

Riaz who came from South Asia and grew up in the USA described the different parts of his identity, and did not see them as clashing with each other, I would have more of an American identity, more so them a Pakistani one. Definitely I consider myself equally part-Muslim and equally part-American and they do not conflict with each other.

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Others attributed this fluidity in their identity to the way in which society saw them. Zulaikha, a young British woman explained, “So, in the private sphere I am not Arab—perhaps then I am British and then in the public sphere it all changes.” Further discussion with Jameelah uncovered that having multiple identities has meant that these identities are also context dependent. The identity linked to her ethnic community is more evident at social events from her ethnic or national community, as opposed to her identity as a Muslim that becomes more dominant at a religious event or at the mosque. Tasneem, who was born and raised in Australia with an Afghan background similarly expressed that her identity and its expression were dependent on contextual factors. As was the case with Jameelah, this was not presented as being problematic or a hardship, although Tasneem addressed the navigation required, So, like I have attributes of being like Afghan, so like the whole family culture and like being like a [bit] cultural […] Then like I have my Australian mentality, like things like people in my Afghan community might think it is right but whereas by me I think, ‘no it is wrong’. And then I also have my religious side of things like I know that I have to pray five times a day and there are so many things that are not accepted in our religion that I try to refrain from, so like culturally in Australia it is okay but religiously it is not. So, I guess all three of them, they are mixed together, I just have to judge the situation.

3.4

Multiple Identities: Clashes

A smaller number of those interviewed do struggle with their constantly fluctuating and transitioning identities, and a degree of anxiety was noted among these respondents. While Summayah a Turkish youth felt connected to all her identities, she also admitted to the exitance of a cultural clash, At times I feel like on certain topics they can be clashing. For example, like gender issues like gender roles—like I would not relate to anything that cultural norms dictated about gender.

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Turkish youth Ammer felt that it was the way his parents had raised him close to Turkish culture, and the subsequent exposure to the wider Australian culture had led to some feeling there was a clash of culture. He described this awareness and having to address differences in culture and ways of thinking, The identity I had, a Turkish growing up in a Turkish community and I feel like that is my identity, I am a Turkish individual living in Australia, but I guess my parents they did not even think [of] that, so yeah. So, they probably think what is different than what I think is right. And I think that is what is the killer because you grow up in a certain way, thinking that certain things are right, doing a certain thing, thinking [it] is the right way to do it. And when you have someone else who grew up in a totally different environment in a different way, there is a barrier there that you are either gonna learn of, or you are just gonna reject [their different way of thinking] and accept your own way of thinking. But yeah, that I what I think.

Some saw this process as being particularly difficult, such as Jameelah who felt that despite embracing her multifaceted identity, herself and others were plunged into an “identity crisis” when exposed to the larger community. She described this as a drawback, “yeah we [migrant Muslims are] definitely disadvantaged in some ways.”

3.5

Western Home and Identity

Maintaining a connection to the country of origin of the respondent, or the respondent’s family was important to many interviewed. Yet there was a majority view that the young individuals interviewed were happy with the life they have in the West and show a preference for the country they call home. Fayrooz described Australia as home because, “I mean home is where you find sanctuary and I find sanctuary in Australia.” Although Ebrar called Turkey his “homeland,” he did not feel “at home” there, explaining that his idea of home is more tied to Australia now. He stated, Because I do go to my home country a lot and it is something else there, I mean when I come back here, I certainly miss home, my country, but I am used to Australia as my second home.

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This feeling of “being home” was also felt among first-generation migrants in the interviews. Khalifa who lived in the UK said, I’ve been living here for the past nine years. I feel a connection to the country. Feel comfortable when I’m here. It’s somewhere, I can always feel like I can come back [to], and when I travel or when I go somewhere abroad and come back, I feel like this is … a place where I belong.

In Khadijah’s opinion, the fact that she has spent such a long time in the country, and the major events of her life have taken place in the country, make it home. In her words, I was seven when I came here and I am twenty now, I mean it is a lot of time. You can’t live somewhere for so long and then not call it home, I don’t think.

The presence of family, work, community, and friends made many feel a part of, and belonged to, their wider community. Bashir explained how this made him feel at home, So, I think that wherever one works and has relations and friends and can be considered home.

Behlul had origins in Turkey and was in tune and connected with his ethnic community. However, he strongly felt that America was where he wanted to be, and where he wanted to raise a family, I feel home is usually more in my origin country than in America. But I’m happy to be in America. I’m planning to live here. And I would like to raise my children here so far.

Yezda also described America as her home and expressed her contentment with this home, Well, I could consider Iraq to be my homeland, but […] In American I have my friends, my immediate family, I went to school here and I work here, so this is my home, and I would not want it any other way.

Alimah echoed this same fondness, and felt it is the “only home” she knew, which makes her feel part of the society. She explained a key

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benefit to living in the country, “Now that I have grown up here, I guess the freedom offered [to me]. Like you have it in your hand like literally anything you wanna do you can do.” Fatimah similarly notes that Australia is what she knows and where she fits in, I fit in quite well in Australia, my friends are Australian, my career path is something typical in Australia, it is just everything I have ever known.

For those who lived in a Western country for generations, it must be noted that it was unlikely they had relatives or connections to go back to. In essence, this made their connection to their ‘country of origin’ a cultural one which did not involve actually visiting or meeting family there. Saleem, an African American Muslim explained during her discussion, I do consider the United States to be my home because I was born here. My parents were born here. My ancestry dates back to whenever our enslaved ancestors arrived from sub-Saharan Africa. So, I definitely consider myself an American.

Although Yusuf had ancestral roots in Lebanon, he remained close to Muslim and Arab culture, and had no real feelings of nationalism or belonging toward Lebanon as he explained, I have never been to my country, so I wouldn’t know much about it.

Hasnah simply stated, “this is home, like, this is my home.” Hasan and his family have made a home in Australia and in his interview, Hasan reflected on their preference for celebrating Australian national holidays now, rather than Pakistani holidays. Like we did used to celebrate in Pakistan, but it is not a big deal with us anymore. I mean it is a different country, we are living here now, and I think we should support this land.

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3.6

Human Rights and Liberal Freedoms

Many respondents have experienced firsthand or have parents who came from war-torn countries or societies that limited or stripped freedoms for different cultures, ethnicities, and religions. This naturally contributes to an appreciation of the freedoms they experience in the West. Riaz’s family for example fled Pakistan due to religious persecution. He shared his story, I think it is necessary for me to point out that I also I also identify as an Ahmadi and Ahmadi is a sect of Islam that—it is a progressive sect that [began] in the 1800s, and in a lot of Muslim countries our sect is prosecuted because of our faith. That also has had a massive influence on how I view America, because very few countries in the Muslim world would accept me as a Muslim but America does. And even though there is a lot of animosity towards Muslims and things that I have faced in my life, no doubt I really feel that at its core America has had an emphasis on having individual liberties which protect especially the freedom of religion. And that is not something that is available in the rest of the world.

Not all had the freedom to live life the way they wanted to in their country of origin. Young Muslims who represented a religious or ethnic minority expressed a different and complex connection with these countries. For a number of these Muslim youth, they also hold a victimhood status, or the status of those persecuted by the majority, extremist elements, or at times the state apparatus itself. Noor, who has roots in India, noted this issue in her comment that, I think the major problem in the country of my origin is that they don’t have tolerance towards other people, other religions, and other ethnic backgrounds. [Actually] I wouldn’t say ethnic backgrounds—it is the same country but religious backgrounds.

Hasan who followed the Shia faith also noted that his religious community in Pakistan is very vulnerable to sectarian violence and terrorism, Pakistan, I think is a bit different like because I come from a Shia background. We are a minority in Pakistan, and you know terrorism is [one of] the top difficulties that we go through, and that is basically what the other Pakistani also go through.

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Samira lives in Australia and identifies as Kurdish. She expressed with fondness and happiness how Australia allowed her community to celebrate freely, which was not the case where her parents came from, So, Kurdish New Year consists of going to a massive park like Curvework park, and basically there is a lot of food and dancing and that kind of stuff. There are […] speeches about the nation and independence and all that kind of stuff.

The multiculturism and freedom and opportunities they were granted in the Western countries they lived in made it their preferred home in many cases. As Saad, a British Muslim, explained, I would say that there is a good balance of like good life balance and plenty of freedoms in practicing your faith and multiculturalism and yeah […] all of my friends are here, so yeah lots of personal relationships, and my family as well and things like that.

Noor from Australia sheds further light on this in her explanation of how liberal democracy and freedoms have allowed her to be fully herself, I feel like being myself more than any, more than where I could [in] any part of the world. Being in Australia I can freely practice my religion, I can freely express my views, I can be pretty much myself as much as I want to be. I am respected, I am treated the way I want to be treated. I have got rights towards things that I would like to have rights upon.

Kinza who lived in America reverberated a similar reason for calling the country her home, explaining how people from all backgrounds can coexist within one nation, The thing I most like about America is the diversity and people from all over the world, all different backgrounds. And in one country, being able to meet people from different countries and different languages, different ethnicities, that’s not found in any country.

Najibah who had lived around the world and was now settled in Australia, was quite content calling Australia home because it granted great freedoms and acceptance to her, in comparison with other countries she had lived. In the interview she mentioned,

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Because I have lived here for five years and the previous country that I lived in did not accept me as their own. And Australia, even though I have not been here for so long compared to [the] other country, they still have made me one of their own and given me the title of the citizen and that is really nice.

3.7

Greater Freedoms for Women

The Muslim women interviewed were more expressive about the level of inequality they felt in their countries of origin. Many of them were particularly thankful for having the opportunity to freely move about, gain an education and have their basic rights in the Western countries they live in. Tasneem, who has family in Afghanistan pointed out, Like equality between men and women, I feel like they are not equal. You know like I feel like everyone has the right to education, women should be able to work, women should be treated equally to men […] in every aspect.

Many women from conservative Muslim countries noted that their lives were much more actualized due to the freedoms they experienced in their Western homes compared to their country of origin. Fiza explained the benefit of living in the UK because of “the freedom and accessibility I have as a woman. Like there is no issue for me, so I would not freely travel and there is no issue with me driving or working and wearing what I want and speaking what I want publicly.” Aliyah shared a similar experience of her experience as a woman and the feeling of belonging she had in Australia. She contrasted the freedom and rights afforded to her in the country with other parts of the world, Well, I like the freedom that we have and [this is] something not seen in other places actually, especially [not in] the Middle East. So being able to—for a female Muslim, being able to go out, get an education, you know the health care services, the social care services—these are all granted to us and not a lot of people have this.

Yezda’s family was originally from Iraq and also felt that the West offered her a better life as a female. This offered her an opportunity to live life to the fullest, as she shared with the interviewer,

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Because it [the West] gives me as a female more freedom than it does in Iraq. And I really appreciate that and the lifestyle here is definitely nicer and I like how I do not have be in constant worry and if a bomb is gonna get struck near my house or something like that as if I would live there, I would be in constant fear.

The participant also contrasted the freedoms she could access growing up in the West, compared to her relatives in Iraq, My mom’s family is a little bit more strict—the girls cannot go out, walk alone, if they do, they should have like a brother or older sister or things like that. They do go out with friends, and it is with females. With me here I can go to the gym at like 10pm and come back and I will be like fine, but with them it is just different environment, and it hurts my heart.

The interviews also revealed that some participants felt some culture shock, or lack of belonging when they visited the countries, to which they had familial, ethnic, and cultural ties. For example, Nargis grew up in Australia and described not feeling like the country she was born in, where her family still are, was home when she visited, I just did not identify myself over there, and I would never go for just like a tourist perspective, like I was never a tourist there, you have family there, you have obligations there when you go, like after a week there it was too much for me.

This lack of belonging often serves to reinforce these individuals’ sense of home in the West. For example, Anandi was born and lives in America and shared, You know, often when I do go back to visit, my cousins will remark on things like, oh, my gosh, you’re so outspoken, and just say whatever comes to your mind and you don’t hold back. It’s like those types of things where I would get me in trouble. I mean, that’s a small thing. I mean, for the most part, I think it would be fine. Whenever I go to visit, it’s fine and it’s not a big deal. But they’re all small, small, small cultural things. That would probably be more difficult if I had to actually build a career there or go to school there.

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Muneera also felt that Australia had become her home and discussed the difficulties of assimilation into her country of birth after being in Australia for so long, I don’t wanna go back and live there. I don’t think I can assimilate back to the style because I came here when I was so young, and I was exposed to what it is like to live here. I don’t think I will be able to cope.

Most respondents strongly felt that the UK, the USA, and Australia were their homes, even when they identified with another country as their home, or in a smaller number of cases had a preferred home that was not these countries. Many had ‘two homes’ which further reflects on their rich construction of identity. Rizwan, a Pakistani British Muslim, similarly spoke of balancing the idea of having two homes, I think it is good to have the understating of both, it is important to me. Of course, I respect the country I live in, [I am] really grateful for it, and I do feel like the part of the society as well and at the same time I do remember my roots, like where my parents came from, and their parents came from and that would be Pakistan in my case.

The comments by Muntazir also demonstrated a duel feeling of belonging to two homes, I do think that America has become my home and [it] has not been that way in the past. Since I moved here and went to college and now, I live here and work here, I do call it home. But at the same time, I do call Morocco my home too, because that’s where I grew up in and that’s where my family is still. And so, from now on, then I would go and visit my family and friends and what not […] But America is definitely part of my home, too.

3.8

Disconnection with Western Country

A smaller portion of respondents across the three regions spoke of a disconnection they felt to the country they were living in. This stemmed from the perception of an atmosphere of hostility, a cultural disconnect or lack of kinship and community networks. Some felt they could overcome these challenges while a few were not so optimistic.

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Sohrab, a Muslim American struggled to fully belong. Sharing memories from school he recalled feeling a little outcasted, a feeling which has lingered throughout his education, I tried to relate to my school, which was majority middle class, upper middle-class, white in northern Virginia. And I had a lot of difficulties relating to that. I kind of didn’t understand. And then when I got to college, I kind of realized that I was kind of trying to push myself into these cultural groups that I kind of did not have that much similarity to. And for example, at George Mason, there’s a lot of students from Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent, as well as a lot from like East Africa and some Arab countries as well. And while I do sometimes feel comfortable with those students, I also feel that they don’t understand me as well. So, it’s kind of like, never really fully belonging.

Affan explained why he felt that the UK is no longer his “homeland.” As he narrated his experiences, it was evident that growing intolerances and right-wing politics have led some with diverse backgrounds to feel alienated in their own countries, I would think of it as my homeland. I do, I do consider Britain as my home also, I just feel like I would hesitate to say that because the initial British values were tolerance and acceptance or what not, but I feel like today you don’t see a lot of that, so I can’t really see Britain as my home.

Maya who lived in the UK described a similar sense of alienation, I do link Britain to home. For example, if I was to go back to where my parents were from, which is Bangladesh, it would feel different because it’s not where I grew up. But I’d still make do because my parents would be there, my family would be there. I can adapt, but the reason that I kind of stop to think that maybe Britain isn’t my home is because Britain hasn’t always accommodated … us to let us call it home. There have been many occasions where it wouldn’t feel like home because of certain things.

For some, their countries of origin or heritage represented a place where religion could be more freely practiced and expressed with ease, in comparison with their Western home. Ebrar lives in Australia, although described Turkey as ‘his country.’ Ebrar’s parents migrated to Australia before he was born, although constant visits to the ‘homeland’ and the

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religious freedom he enjoyed there have led to him feeling more ‘at home’ in Turkey in comparison with Australia. In his words, I would say that because I have got more family in Turkey, I feel as if I belong there, and I have come here for study or just for work. Because my heart is with my country, next to my family there, and when I do complete my degree, I am planning to move to my country. […] Well at my country [Turkey] you could walk to mosque, here you can’t. There are mosques basically at the end of every street, you will see a mosque and you will see a religious place and that […] makes it accessible. […] And because in my home country you can hear the religious times changing, so you can hear the call for prayer five times a day and that [is] what makes a big difference too.

However, there were those like Sohrab who felt truly “at home” in their country of origin despite being called “American” on his visits to Albania, Just because I say Kosovo, I feel a little bit like home because I have relatives there and because I do share more of the cultural similarities, I guess.

Hiranoor considered integration and feeling at home from another angle. She shared “yes, there are some obstacles and challenges because it also depends on when you integrate into society.” She felt it was easier for younger people to integrate into society, whereas it was harder for those who came to the West later in life to feel fully at home. Bither, who was born and raised in the UK, said she did not feel “English” and struggled with a lack of connection with her home. However, she also admitted that she possessed a sense of Britishness, in conjunction with her Turkish identity. She added, I think being English is an ethnicity and being British is a nationality that you inherit later on, or you are born into.

Although very few, some respondents like Amal, who were born and raised in the West, felt unsure about the notion of belonging. Amal explained,

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I just feel like I do wanna get to know my own culture and go there because I do feel like I belong there. Over here, I am like neutral here, do I belong? I don’t belong here?

Malik was more optimistic in his assessment; although he admitted to certain barriers, he felt that with time he could fully feel part of Australian society. He explained how he felt like he was fitting in with a greater knowledge of Australian culture, I felt like that my accent, and just not knowing Australian culture and other slang and stuff. So, once I got a hang of it, once I got to know like the norms of society, I felt that I became, you know, part of it.

3.9 Maintaining Connection with Countries of Origin Many also mentioned speaking both English and the language from their country of origin to maintain a connection with both countries. Haleemah from Iraq read fiction “in Arabic as well” to maintain a connection with the language. Noriyah could not speak the language but used films as a medium to learn about her language and heritage. Zakaria who had a Palestinian background identified with his country of origin by “passionately” staying connected with events that took place in the Gaza belt and actively taking part in protests. Afria remains connected to her homeland by following celebrities and sport figures, I like to follow, for example with athletes, I am following the Bosnian national soccer team members, I like to see what they are up to and with celebrities I will follow [them] if I am watching their series or [a] movie to see what they are like.

Salimah went online to express and sustain a connection with her Pakistani origins. She explained how on national days of significance she used online posts and clothing to express her link to her parent’s country of origin, “Usually, I just post something on social media because my friends here. there are not a lot of Pakistanis, so I kind of remind them you know this is my background. And I just post something about it, but I wouldn’t have a

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full or party or anything.” Although clothing also helps her to participate “I wear white and green every Pakistan day that is something I do.”

3.10

Identity Through Entertainment Media

Feelings of familiarity and engagement with entertainment and media content is also a part of understanding how the respondents construct and express their identity. For example, Aanandi shared her preference for American entertainment, I don’t watch very many movies or films or TV shows that come out of Bangladesh because they’re all generally the same. It’s not that I don’t like them, it’s just that they are very predictable and become boring after a while. I do tend to watch more American shows like a I really use Netflix and Hulu for my TV purposes. And so, I do prefer watching American shows.

Ajola also felt that growing up in the USA it was easier for her to feel connected to American content due to the sheer exposure to it, I only watch American […] or sometimes international short movies from YouTube. […] I’m comfortable with English.

Safdar who lives in the USA shared that although his mum watches the Turkish dramas, he prefers to watch only the American shows. For others it was because of their parents’ interest in this form of entertainment, or wanting to bond with their parents, that drew them to watching shows from Muslim countries. Liaqat shared, “I feel like most [of] what I watch from Pakistan is drama related. I do not usually watch that much, but just because my family watches it I will watch it.” Rahima considered viewing non-Western content not only as means of connecting with her family, but also a learning experience to explore society beyond her Western environment, My mum is watching the show for example and sometimes I watch it with her, and I just think it puts the Pakistani culture into perspective. I think it is interesting to see their social structure and their social problems and how different they are to the West.

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Kinza was able to connect with the themes and sense of humor from her country of origin and Muslim majority countries. Like Rahima, it is also a way for connecting with her Muslim identity by exploring things she has not necessarily been exposed to her in the West. Kinza explained, I do watch from my country of origin. I do watch both TV series and movies and films. […] I have seen a few TV series from Turkey that were dubbed.” She elaborated, “I watch them because […] I think they’re funny or enjoyable to watch or I think they have unique ideas or perspectives that I may not understand, or I can learn something from them.

Zia, who was open to watching all forms of entertainment media, admitted that content from Muslim majority counties has a certain appeal for him due to the cultural values embodied in these shows. He explained, I think the large Muslim majority countries like Turkey, Pakistan, India and whatnot. I like their homely feeling. You’ll get it. You get a sense of the culture. Right. Family values. It’s not the same really anymore. The stuff that I watch is a little bit older […] they have a real sense of the family values and the culture.

Aliah, who came from an Iraqi family, also felt that films from Muslim majority countries are more in line with her values and this made them more appealing. She explained, I feel like you know, Western movies rely on sex appeal for people to watch their films but Iranian movies obviously because of the law not allowing that, it kind of focuses on the storyline and the acting more than anything else. And that is something that I appreciate when I watch them.

Habiba, also born and raised in the USA watched both American and Turkish television series, and explained the difference in how Islam and Muslims were depicted between the two, I watch a ton of TV series from America. Part of it is just a matter of language and that’s my primary language. So, I like to watch entertainment in that language. […] I have watched the series from Turkey. That was interesting. And it was interesting because in American media, Muslimness and Islam are seen as kind of this novel […] I don’t know this different thing, this exotic thing. But in like Turkish series, it’s like normal. So,

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it’s not like a big deal [… it] depicts Muslims as kind of normal people, whereas I feel like American shows are really kind of Oriental oriented.

Riaz felt strongly about the need for positive Muslim heroes and role models in television series and movies. He used Netflix to watch the popular Turkish telenovela “Resurrection: Ertugrul,” and explained the appeal and importance of the show not only for him, but the broader Pakistani community, We took pride that these actions or this hero was something that stemmed from this Muslim belief, right […] like there [are] these values of honor that we like, and there are these values that we take form American and Western culture but in this series, they made it our own, they made it Muslim culture […] I mean I really liked the series and I thought it was a good thing. […] a lot of people in the Muslim world have had [exposure] to the series I think, [which] shows to the fact that there is a desire for people to have these good, kind of like inherently Muslim values, instead of like borrowing from Western types of values.

This particular television series was raised by many of the Turkish participants, who felt favorably toward its representation of Muslim characters, as well as associating with the cultural and religious themes in the show. For Asifah, watching South Asian shows is entertaining or “novel,” and she explained how they were a lot more “innocent” than American storylines in her comment that, I like the drama and sometimes the story lines are good. I like the storylines and sometimes they are a lot more innocent […] Like Bengali family ones are like innocent, American ones are just really just right there—a lot of like lying, deception and all of that stuff, drugs—but the Turkish one, that is like in the middle of innocence and drugs and lying.

Nadimah explained that South Asian television shows relive a nostalgic element of her childhood, Turkish shows are really, I don’t know, they have a lot of family values in them, and they have a lot of elements of romanticism and idealism. Like people really want to live like the gorgeous Turkish protagonist of the TV shows; the ones that are wealthy and they have really dramatic problems appear in their lives that they fix very quickly. So, they are very idealistic and Turkish dramas were a very big part of me growing up, and

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every Ramadan we would watch one and even if we did not understand the language, it would always be dubbed in Arabic, so yeah that is what I think.

3.11

Conclusion

The interview responses presented in this chapter give an insight into the complexity and diversity of the participant’s experiences, backgrounds, and ideas of self. In doing so, it is a reminder of the futility of attempting to categorize all Muslims together as a single entity, and then seek their ‘integration’ into Western society. Unfortunately, this has often been the outcome of the Western lens through which Muslims have been viewed and understood. Instead, the interviews show how individuals can hold multiple and overlapping identities and through these identities construct their relationships with the world around them. They do not, the interviews show, need to choose one identity (or aspect of their identity) over another. Rather, depending on the circumstances they can choose to associate with whichever of their identities that best fits the social setting. Furthermore, rather than viewing this as a weakness or lack of love for their Western home, it should be viewed as adding value and diversity to society. An overwhelming majority of respondents interviewed felt a closeness to their Western home, the home where they lived their social and professional lives. However, at the same time, many of the people interviewed came from, or had ancestors who migrated from, countries with social, political, and economic instability. These factors made them highly appreciative of the life they were able to lead in the three countries. Western society is highly cherished due to the freedoms and opportunities on offer compared to the country of their (or their parents) origins. The relative safety and ability to express their culture was, for ethnic and religious minorities, greatly appreciated and led them to feel not only safe but closer to their Western home. Female participants were particularly grateful for the freedoms they had in the West compared to Muslim majority countries. On the other hand, a small number of interviewees felt alienated by Western society and felt culturally more ‘at home’ in their country of origin. This mainly occurred in cases where interviewees had noticed or

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experienced discrimination in their Western home. The increasingly rightwing political atmosphere concerned some interviewees and enhanced feelings of discrimination and non-belonging. In these cases, those who were born and raised in the West still felt ‘different’ compared to conventional ideas of what being American, British, or Australian meant. Nonetheless, the majority felt most at home living in the West. Many shared how going back to their country of origin was enjoyable but in the long term it was not home. For some, such as African American participants, it was the only home they had and felt connected with, and indeed many had little knowledge of their ancestry. It is also worth noting that having plural identities does not threaten their connection with other aspects of life. For instance, the chapter indicates that although a few of these young Muslim struggle due to cultural differences, the majority felt quite comfortable in finding a balance between these personas. Essentially this negates the idea of ‘assimilation’ or those transnational connections threaten the bond between the individual and the nation (Western home). While the majority felt at ease with their current home, many freely and willingly explored their cultural heritage via learning the language, visiting the country/s, engaging with cultural events or conversations, and watching shows and following related media. For a smaller number of individuals this constant state of flux between religious, national, cultural, and ethnic identities proved difficult, and they felt a ‘clash’ between these. Most interviewees stated a preference for Western entertainment. This was firstly because of their preference for them being in English, most interviewees’ native language. The plots were also found to be more appealing and seen as being more nuanced compared to the telenovelastyled shows of the Middle East, South Asia, and Turkey. For those who watched shows from their country of origin, the reasons behind their decision to watch these programs varied. Some connected with the humor, others bonded with their parents through those shows, and some used it as a means to explore their parents’ or grandparents’ culture. There was however a small yet significant number of viewers from all three countries that felt drawn to shows with Muslim protagonists. As most of the participants lived through the 9/11 attacks or experienced the ramifications of it, there was a clear sense of affinity felt toward shows that refreshingly portrayed Muslims in a positive light. In this regard, the show Dirilis: Ertugrul, a Turkish historical fiction, was hugely popular among Turkish interviewees. For those who watched it, not only was the positive

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portrayal of Muslims attractive, but so was also the overall familiar nature of the culture, values, and themes expressed in the program. Identity is a complex subject. Its expression, and to a great extent its construction, is dependent on a variety of factors including the environment which surrounds young Muslims, and which greatly impacts how they build their connections to their or their parents’ culture and country of origin, and to the country in which they now reside. Despite the differences between the interviewees, in each case we found that in all three countries young Muslims have largely become adept to, and in many cases skilled in, possessing layers of identity through which they navigate their national and transnational activities.

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Adida, Claire L., Laitin, David D., and Valfort, Marie-Anne. (2017). “Jennifer Fredette. ‘Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies’.” Sociology of Religion 78(1), 100–101. https://doi.org/10.1093/soc rel/srx002. Constable, Nicole. (2004). Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Deegan, M. J. (2008). Self, War, & Society: George Herbert Mead’s Macrosociology (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315129136. Finn, M., and Momani, B. (2016). “Established and Emergent Political Subjectivities in Circular Human Geographies: Transnational Arab Activists.” Citizenship Studies 21(1), 22–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016. 1252713. Fozdar, F. (2011). “Social Cohesion and Skilled Muslim Refugees in Australia.” Journal of Sociology 48(2), 167–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/144078331 1413482. Gardner, K., and Grillo, R. (2002). “Transnational Households and Ritual: An Overview.” Global Networks 2, 179–190. https://doi.org/10.1111/14710374.00035. Gest, Justin. (2010). Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West. London, UK: Hurst & Co. ISBN: 9781849040761. Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., and Avila, E. (1997). “‘I’m Here, but I’m There’: The Meanings of Latina Transnational Motherhood.” Gender & Society 11(5), 548–571. https://doi.org/10.1177/089124397011005003. Johns, A., Mansouri, F., & Lobo, M. (2015). “Religiosity, Citizenship and Belonging: The Everyday Experiences of Young Australian Muslims”. Journal Of Muslim Minority Affairs 35(2), 171–190. https://doi.org/10.1080/136 02004.2015.1046262 Kabir, Nahid Afrose. (2008). “To Be or Not to Be an Australian: Focus on Muslim Youth.” National Identities 10(4), 399–419. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14608940802518997. Kabir, Nahid Afrose. (2015). “Muslim Youth’s Identity in Australia: Vigilant, Rational and Bicultural.” Journal of Applied Youth Studies 1, 82–96. https:/ /search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.138106027191375. King, E. B., and Ahmad, A. S. (2010). “An Experimental Field Study of Interpersonal Discrimination Toward Muslim Job Applicants.” Personnel Psychology 63, 881–906. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2010.01199.x. Levitt, P., and Schiller, N. G. (2004). “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society.” International Migration Review 38(3), 1002–1039. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00227.x. Maleševi´c, Siniša. (2019). Grounded Nationalisms. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108589451. Markus, A. (2021). Mapping Social Cohesion 2020. Victoria: Monash University.

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Marsh, David, O’Toole, Therese, and Jones, Su. (2007). Young People and Politics in the UK. Palgrave. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978023 0625631. O’Toole, T., DeHanas, D., Modood, T., Meer, N., and Jones, S. (2013). Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. Bristol: University of Bristol. Olwig, F. K. (2003). “‘Transnational’ Socio-Cultural Systems and Ethnographic Research: Views from an Extended Field Site.” International Migration Review 37(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00158.x. Olwig, F. K. (2007). “Islands as Places of Being and Belonging.” Geographical Review 97(2), 260–273. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2007. tb00402.x. Ramadan, Tariq. (2005). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roose, J. M., and Harris, A. (2015). “Muslim Citizenship in Everyday Australian Civic Spaces.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 36(4), 468–486. https://doi. org/10.1080/07256868.2015.1049984. Rytter, Mikkel. (2010). “In-laws and Outlaws: Black Magic Among Pakistani Migrants in Denmark.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16, 46– 63. Rytter, Mikkel. (2013). “Family Upheaval. Generation, Mobility and Relatedness Among Pakistani Migrants in Denmark.” Berghahn. https://www.berghahnb ooks.com/title/RytterFamily. Schmader, Toni. (2012). Stereotype Threat: Theory, Process, and Application. New York: Oxford University Press. Shaw, A. (2001). “Kinship, Cultural Preference and Immigration: Consanguineous Marriage Among British Pakistanis.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 7(2), 315–334. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655. 00065. Sheridan, L. P. (2006). “Islamophobia Pre- and Post-September 11th, 2001.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 21(3), 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0886260505282885. Sørensen, N. N., and Guarnizo, L. E. (2007). “Transnational Family Life Across the Atlantic: the Experience of Colombian and Dominican Migrants in Europe.” https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Transnational-family-lifeacross-the-Atlantic%3A-the-S%C3%B8rensen-Guarnizo/e819f298e29f198472 fae2af21fd84eeea7a8f. van Es, A. Margaretha. (2016). Stereotypes and Self-Representations of Women with a Muslim Background. Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/ book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-40676-3.

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van Es, A. Margaretha. (2019). “Muslim Women as ‘Ambassadors’ of Islam: Breaking Stereotypes in Everyday Life.” Identities 26(4), 375–392. https:// doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2017.1346985. von Eberstein, Alexandria. (2020). “Islamophobia and the Muslim Other.” Showcase of Undergraduate Research and Creative Endeavors (SOURCE). 193. https://digitalcommons.winthrop.edu/source/SOURCE_2020/allpre sentationsandperformances/193. Werbner, Pnina. (1990). The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts and Offerings Among British Pakistanis. Oxford: Berg. Werbner, Pnina. (2002). “The Place Which Is Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion and Gender in the Making of Chaordic Transnationalism.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(1), 119–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/136918 30120103967. Wigger, Iris. (2019). “Anti-Muslim Racism and the Racialisation of Sexual Violence: ‘Intersectional Stereotyping’ in Mass Media Representations of Male Muslim Migrants in Germany.” Culture and Religion 20(3), 248–271. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2019.1658609. Wimmer, Andreas, and Schiller, Nina Glick. (2003). “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology.” International Migration Review 37(3), 576–610. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00151.x. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (1999). Dynamic Muslim Legal Pluralism in England, Turkey and Pakistan and the Reconstruction of Unofficial Muslim Laws in England, Turkey and Pakistan. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3173987 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173987. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (April 2009). “Socio-Economic, Political and Theological Deprivations’ Role in the Radicalization of the British Muslim Youth: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir.” European Journal of Economic and Political Sciences (EJEPS) 2(1), 89–101. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2012). “An Analysis of the Factors That Pave the Way for the Radicalization of the British Youth.” In Mohammed Siddique Seddon, Fauzia Ahmad, and Shiraz Khan (Eds.), Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations (pp. 32–53). London and New York: Continuum.. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Switzerland: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizens: State, Islam and Ideology in Turkey. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2022). Authoritarianism, Informal Law, and Legal Hybridity: The Islamisation of the State in Turkey. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2023). “Muslim Secularism by Conduct: Attitudes of Young Australian Muslims to Legal Pluralism and Sharia.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 44(2), 274–288. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2022. 2104826. Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Bashirov, Galib. (2022). “Religious Homophily and Friendship: Socialisation Between Muslim Minority and Anglo Majority Youth in Australia.” Journal of Youth Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261. 2022.2046257. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Bliuc, Ana-Maria, Mansouri, Fethi, and Bashirov, Galib. (2021). “Young Muslim Australians’ Experiences of Intergroup Contact and its Implications for Intercultural relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44(15), 2772–2793. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1850823. Yucel, Salih. (2015). Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies. Derya Iner and Salih Yucel (Eds.). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publishing.

CHAPTER 4

Young Muslims in the Anglosphere and Expression of Faith

4.1

Introduction

The events of the first quarter of the twenty-first century have meant that being Muslim often carries negative connotations. Unfortunately, the global ‘war or terror’ escalated a cycle of violence between jihadists and the forces trying to counter them. Not only have civilian lives been lost on both sides, but there is also a clear stigma now attached to being a Muslim in the West. The 9/11 attacks created an unprecedented wave of Islamophobia (Yilmaz 2016) which continues to impact the lives of millions of Muslims both within and outside the West. The last two decades have seen mainstream media in the West readily labeling Muslim individuals involved in acts of violence as terrorists compared to other groups (Bleich et al. 2021; Lajevardi 2021; Rahman 2020; Schmuck et al. 2020; Samaie and Malmir 2017; Saleem et al. 2017; Jahedi et al. 2014). In addition, the growing conservatism in politics has seen political actors and groups using these sentiments and instrumentalizing the subsequent rifts in society to further stigmatize Muslims and push exclusionary agendas. One extreme manifestation was the US ban on Muslim migration during former President Trump’s time in office (Warnar 2021; Hafez 2020; Hodwitz and Tracy 2020; Rubin 2020). In addition, Hollywood and Western shows have picked up on these narratives and have presented Islam in a stereotypical manner with Muslim

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women portrayed as oppressed and Muslims broadly portrayed as religious hardliners if not dangerous terrorists (Senanayake 2021; Rezaei et al. 2020; Sayfo 2020; Yousaf 2020; Haider 2020). In such an environment there is a need for counter-narratives to dispel these stereotypes and move toward humanizing and understanding the diverse and important lives of Muslims living in the West. This chapter, first, provides a brief review of academic works published surveys on Muslims and religiosity in the West, before evaluating the various expressions of faith by the respondents to understand how young Muslims express their religion. This has been accomplished by not only investigating what Islam means to the respondents, but also delves into the means through which they express their faith, such as engaging in community work. The chapter provides not only a personalized view of how young Muslim individuals understand their faith, but also how it shapes their behavior in society at large.

4.2

Muslims’ Relationship with Islam

There are various approaches through which Muslims’ relationship with religion in the West is understood. Given the widespread nature of stereotypes associated with Muslims, a considerable portion of research to date focuses on how a small, yet intensely scrutinized, segment of young Muslims become (or are suspected to become) radicalized in the West (AlTarawneh 2021; Waldmann 2010; Lith and Savage 2006; Malik 2004; Yilmaz 2009, 2012, 2019a, b). Malik (2004) for instance argues that young individuals from Muslim backgrounds lack what he terms the will to ‘assimilate,’ which he argues leads to certain young individuals becoming drawn to radical ideas. He notes that this lack of ‘assimilation’ is a two-way process, and that since the 1970s immigrants from Muslim majority countries have faced rejection by certain political and social groups to theUK. The author notes that while overall the situation has improved, a stigma persists which alienates and in turn leads some young Muslims toward jihadism. Malik (2004) notes that faith thus becomes an identity for many Muslims, as society often sees them as ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘British Muslims.’ While Malik argues the failure to assimilate stems from a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy, Waldmann (2010) in his investigation of militant Islamists in the West claims radicalization within diaspora youth is a much more complex matter. He argues that both political and social events

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that take place within the country of origin and Western home shape the path to radicalization. Waldmann’s paper brings forth a model in which events such as ties to radical groups, or international terrorist organizations, increases the likelihood of violent behaviors developing. The paper also notes that domestic conflicts in the receiving country, such as pressure from radical groups or physical attacks by anti-immigration forces, also play an equally important part in radicalization of youth. The attraction of radical groups ultimately lies in their ability to provide utopian ideas which resonate with some young Muslims. However, jihadism does not attract most religiously inclined youth Muslims. In fact, Waldmann (2010, 16) notes, “A higher degree of religious consciousness does not automatically lead to religious radicalization and still less to an inclination to violence.” Al-Tarawneh (2021) takes a more critical look at the role of religion in the radicalization of Muslim youth. He argues that being exposed to various interpretations of the Quran has had a significant role in the radicalization of young people. Moreover, he finds that for radical groups, the use of a certain interpretation of the Quran is a key factor in their appeal and ability to recruit Muslim youth in Western countries. Given the focus on identity and personal world views in the radicalization of Muslims in the West, even psychological studies have tried to identify which youth are ‘suspectable’ to radicalization (Rahimullah et al. 2013; Kashyap and Lewis 2013; Lith and Savage 2006). Unfortunately, these investigations into determining which youth ‘could’ be radicalized have aligned all too well with the securitizing of Muslims as a group. This method of investigation has consequently come under scrutiny in the last decade due to its tendency to blame Muslim youth for their own radicalization or vulnerability to it, and for its myopic view of young Muslims’ worldview and beliefs (Abdel-Fattah 2020; Ali 2020; McDonald 2011). McDonald (2011), who focuses on the experience of young British Muslims, finds that the actions of a tiny minority involved in events such as national and international terror attacks lead the larger Muslim population to suffer stereotyping within wider society. She finds that in such circumstances, many young Muslims struggle to express their feelings of belonging, loyalty, and duty toward both their Western home and their personal faith. Despite these issues, McDonald observes Muslim youth involved in grassroots community work and finds that their activities become a way for resisting the binaries imposed on them as they seek to define their own plural expression of identity (religious, social and national). In his exploration of what identity means to post-9/11

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young Muslims in theUSA, Ali (2020) points out that religion forms a deeply complicated identity, and each individual has their own way of expressing it. Both Ali (2020) and Abdel-Fattah (2020), in the USA and Australia respectively, find that the government profiling of young Muslims is highly problematic due to its ability to not only stereotype but marginalize the demographic from a policy standpoint. Abdel-Fattah (2020), for instance finds that, the Australian government’s funding of programs and profiling of ‘at risk’ young Muslims is hinged on the racialization of Muslim youth. These studies underline that while faith plays an integral role in young Muslim’s lives, it can manifest in a variety of ways as well as hold different meanings. This has not been reflected in much of the literature to date; two main archetypes of Muslims, labeled in Duderija (2007) under the binaries of “Progressive Muslims” and “NeoTraditional Salafis” but can also be seen in progressive/conservative, good/bad Muslim narratives that were particularly prevalent in the first decade of this century. Although a direct result of the social attitudes and political climate relating to Islam and Muslims—this literature has served to reinforce stereotypes and flatten and eliminate diversity in the study of Muslim life in the West. Furthermore, these binaries prove far too narrow for exploring what religion stands for, or how young Muslims from various backgrounds interact with their faith in the West. The scholarship has been undergoing expansion, and since the late 2010s the focus has shifted and there is greater exploration of the various ways in which young Muslims engage with faith. A study exploring Australian Muslim youth found that Islamic religiosity is a precursor and predictor for active citizenship and civic engagement. The findings show that participation in organized religion can indeed be a strong predictor of civic engagement which runs counter to the argument that Islam is a source of radicalization and social disengagement (Vergani et al. 2017). The results found that most Muslims preferred civic engagement as their primary means of giving back to the Australian community, without comprising their core religious values (see also Yilmaz et al. 2021). Consequently, faith becomes a way to shape their civic identity and dispel some of the common perceptions regarding Muslims in Australia. The merging of religious beliefs and active citizenship co-contribute to a ‘striving for common good’ expressed among subjects in Melbourne. The article consequently demonstrates that organized Islamic groups and organizations, which are sometimes viewed as

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an incubator of religious extremism, are instead incubators of increased civic engagement. Kabir’s (2015) study of young Muslims in Australia sheds light on another important aspect of Muslim life: that religion is not always part, or is not always the most dominant part, of their identity. While Muslim youth are traditionally viewed through the lens of religion, the author’s interviews with young Muslims found them constructing an identity that was not monolithic or based entirely on religion. At times, national and ethnic identities were their primary identify markers, not their religious identity. The findings of the previous chapter in this book support this conclusion, with interview responses revealing plural and diverse identities among the respondents. A lack of connection with faith or distancing oneself from a Muslim identity can be attributed to the backlash faced by these young individuals due to the socio-political climate. For instance, Jakubowicz, Collins, and Chafic (2012) found that young Muslims in Australia, despite the overall inclusive environment, suffer in wider society as Muslim culture is not completely accepted by the national culture. Therefore, in order to ‘legitimize’ their cultural capital, these young Muslims are always making an effort to prove that they are as ‘Australian’ as others. In doing so they try to adapt to Australian culture as much as they can and attempt to bridge the gap between differences in values and behaviors. Thus, young Australian Muslims are likely to face the difficulty of adapting to Australian culture while keeping their Muslim identity intact. Diaspora Muslims groups, depending on the country’s politics, ultimately form their own relationship with faith. Schmidt (2004) who explored Muslim identities in Denmark, Sweden, and the USA noted that in these countries, “(1) visibility and aesthetics; (2) choice; (3) transnationalism; and (4) social ethics” are among the various factors that impact the role of religion in young Muslims’ lives in a ‘localized’ manner. Therefore, there is a clear sense that depoliticization is essential when exploring the lived experiences of young Muslims, especially in relation to their engagement with faith. The thematic analysis in this chapter makes an effort to look beyond these confined frameworks to explore how young Muslims interact with religion as part of their identity, culture, normative compass, rituals, and a mixture of these factors.

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4.3

Participant’s Relationship with Religion

When asked about their relationship with faith, there was great variation in participant responses. Answers ranged from faith being simply a part of the culture they grew up, to something personal, or seeing faith as providing a set of moral principles and a code of life. Aisha noted the spiritual connection, rather than attachment to organized religion she held, Yes, in terms of setting the foundations to the values that I uphold, yes, it is. […a] relationship with higher figures for instance, so I wouldn’t say it is organized religion per se, but it is the spirituality that I get from it that plays a big part in my role.

Fayrooz, similarly explained that “spiritually yes,” religion played a role in his life but “physically no not really” indicating that like Aisha his faith was not necessarily intertwined with formal religious organizations and spaces. Eileen described herself as religious, although admitted that she does not worry too much when she is not able to perform prayers, It is consistent [prayer], but I can’t say all the time and like there are sometimes that I have gotta go somewhere, and I get stuck on something or forget it, those kinds of things.

Hakeem felt that religion was more than just spirituality, and that it guided him in matters of morality as well, Like I said you know, religion has taught me a lot of values that I stand by. But in terms of how religious I am, I wouldn’t say I am very religious, and like I said I am not a practicing Muslim as well.

Saad felt that his moral compass was rooted in faith, and he can apply the teachings of the Quran to his modern life, The religion of Islam plays a very important role in my life. Because there is a lot of stuff that Islam teach[es] us like that to stay away from […] haram stuff, like drinking, go clubbing that kind of stuff. At the end of the day, it is bad for society as well.

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In another interview, Akbar described how faith is central to his life, Religion plays the most important role in my life, and I like to live my life accordingly to Islam. Everything revolves around the worship of God.

A similar sentiment was echoed by Khalifa who lived in theUSA, Yeah, pretty much everything I’ve been brought up [with] has been guided by religion.

Like many other respondents, Noor felt her faith acted as an anchor and a great source of comfort and direction, especially during testing times, My religion gives me strength, so it is that sanctuary to me that I go to when I feel like that the rest of life is collapsing. Islam has always benefited me in terms of, I feel like a much better person; my day-to-day life has become a lot easier; personally, my own mental health and mental wellbeing and even physically my habits have changed; and my temperament has changed towards good. So, it has never been more positive, and I am so ever grateful that I have found love in Islam.

For Liaqat, a South Asian American Muslim, faith was always present in his life, and something that has been passed on from one generation to another. He shared, Yes, I think religion plays a very important role in my life. I think it started off with my parents and grandparents kind of teaching me about religion, and introducing me to the mosque, and helping me learn the Quran and […] the faith and the five commandments. So yeah, I think religion has kind of like played a large part in my life.

Nadimah explained how her family’s role in teaching her Islam was critical to her learning of the faith, Islam has been a very important thing for me for my life. It was the one thing that I opened my eyes to […] From seeing your family praying together, to Ramadan, and to spending time with them, and my family to Muharram as well because we are part of the Shia faith […] Yes it has played a very big role in my life.

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There was also a desire shared by some to pass their faith on to their children. For instance, Sana, a British-Pakistani Muslim told the interviewer, Religion is a big part in my life. So, obviously, I have kids and I choose to bring them up with religion rather than culture. So yeah, religion is a big thing in our lives. I teach them Islamic things, like prayers, duas and things like that.

Habibah who converted to the faith explained, I was raised a Catholic and I became a Muslim when I was seventeen. Sixteen years old, actually. My family was somewhat religious. I think there were sometimes in my life where we went to church more than others. I consider myself quite religious. I try to pray five times a day. Don’t always do it. But religion is a really important part of my life. And I do fast.

For some who were raised in communist societies or did not have parents who practiced Islam, faith and spirituality were often explored by the participants as they grew older. For example, Bashir, who came from Albania explained this experience in the following way, But then to be honest, I didn’t know what religion was until I was maybe ten or twelve because it was not taught, and it was not very safe to talk about it. Parents avoided [discussing it] at all costs.

Sumayya and Ameer felt a deep connection with their faith and practiced via taking part in Ramadan prayers and by finding time to recite or understand the Quranic text. It was also revealed that during sacred months such as Ramadan, some became more involved with religious activities during these times. Tasneem who lived in Australia explained, Yes. During Ramadan I go more frequently for prayer and things. I usually just worship at home, pray at home, I usually don’t go to the mosque, just everything from home.

Noor, who closely identified with Islam and practiced it daily, also noted that she was more involved with religious activities during Ramadan,

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During Ramadan we practice night prayers we call taravee, so after we break our fast, [we] go pray, everything and I do participate in that. Apart from that when there is an event that is important, if there is a speech, or any such events I do participate in it. Being a Muslim and a girl, it is not very important to go to a place of worship, so I am very much allowed to do so in my house or anywhere else, so not often [do I got to the mosque] but when I am required to do so I go.

Hasan also explained that while he and his family were practicing Muslims who tried to follow all the five fundamental pillars of Islam, their involvement with the religion intensified during Ramadan, I do not get time during the whole day but during the month of Ramadan I mean I do go our religious community kind of center to celebrate shaebe-qadar and stuff like that.

Yusuf similarly spoke of his participation in religious activity, “Well I would say once a month [visiting the mosque] outside Ramadan, but during Ramadan it is more. Haleemah said that visiting holy shrines and destinations was a way she engaged with her faith, So, basically, I have done the ziyarat in Karbala where we visit the shrines, and I have done the like - it is a forty-day walk […] you basically walk all the way to Karbala […] I have also visited like other shrines, so there is like one in Baghdad, there is one in Najaf, like they are all from different states.

Although few participants had been able to undertake these sacred pilgrimages at the time of the interviews, it was a wish among many to have the opportunity. An interesting finding from the interviews was that religiosity was not necessarily a static, unchangeable variable in the participant’s lives. Faith and religious observance ebbed and flowed or changed in closeness during some participants’ lives. For instance, some grew closer to their religious belief or practice, while others became more distant with the passing of time. For instance, Jameelah, who lives in Australia, shared that as she has grown up and matured, she has found a balance between her daily activities and faith. Fatimah also spoke of her transitioning relationship with religion,

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So, religion was quite a big part of my life while I was growing up - like I considered myself to super religious […] I used to wear a scarf, fasted, I prayed like four or five times a day. It is not a big part of my life now. I think since I turned eighteen, I have gotten to be quite liberal in my views and I think Islam now to me is like what Christianity is to like everyday Australians. [It is] something I think about and celebrate but not something I actively participate in all the time.

In another example, Zakira also viewed religion as playing an important role as he grew up, but one that had lessened over the years, It was definitely part of my life. It was very important growing up, and that importance has slowly diminished as I have grown older.

Latifah also shared a need to understand and explore her faith. She explained that even though “I am a Muslim and born in a Muslim family” she doesn’t want that to mean that “I don’t need to know anything about my religion.” So, she chooses to “read books about what other scholars’ perspective about Islam or why there is reason behind every single thing. Ajola, an American Muslim, shared how her conversion to Islam did not hinder her from engaging with other religions. Her comments illustrate that her conversion was a carefully considered choice, Like I read the Bible as well because my family is mixed, like half Christian, half Muslim, but non-practicing Muslim. So, I went through a phase of soul searching and decided this is the religion that makes [the] most sense to me. After reading the books.

Zohaib’s narrative of conversion was interesting. Growing up as an AngloBritish he was intrigued by what mainstream media said about Islam and Muslims, leading him to probe further about the religion and this instigated his eventual conversion, And I remember asking one of the young boys like, “in the media, some people say that- well I refer it to as the people- that your Bible refers to blowing up people and women are like- like when you go to heaven there are seventy-two virgins waiting for you”, and so I actually wanted to know that if it was true. And so, I read it and so through that reading I- well that was the major part, through that reading I began to accept and sort of [think] ‘oh these are the beliefs that I already have and actually hold and

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now I have actually something that says, ‘you are doing the right thing’. So, that’s when the conversion started to happen.

The difference in genders in responses about attending places of worship, primarily the mosque, is also interesting to note. While the majority of male participants felt an obligation to visit the mosque, mostly for Friday prayers, the women interviewed did not feel the same obligation. This difference typically arose from cultural explanations, also evident in Muslim majority countries, in which women stay home for prayers. Amal who did not visit the mosque explained, Well in my family we would all just stay at home and pray, and the men would go to the mosque.

However, not all men attended the mosque. Majeed for example explained how he did not visit the mosque despite feeling close to Islam, I think I consider myself moderate Muslim, but I have not been anywhere, I would like to go, I think I am quite moderate. I pray.

Sohrab, who was also from Albania and now living in the USA, explained how most things related to Islamic rituals were alien to him, [The] first time I actually went inside a mosque was for my dad’s funeral, which was when I was thirteen. And I just I didn’t really even know what to do. Like, I saw people praying. I had no idea how to pray. I was never taught how to pray. One thing that kind of connected me to my religion was we had this plaque on the wall that had Quran’s verses.

These responses, in relation to questions about the respondent’s engagement with their faith and religion, provide an insight into the varied nature of this relationship. Different factors including spirituality, religious knowledge, family, later conversions, patterns in observance, and gender roles all facilitated different interactions with Islam.

4.4

Religion as Identity

Chapter two introduces the religious or Muslim identity as one (among others) of the identities held by young Muslims in the West. The interviews complement the findings of researchers like Kabir (2015), showing

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that religion is not necessarily the dominant identity in young Muslims. However, it is found to be an important, and in many cases permanent, fixture of the respondent’s perception of self and their feeling of belonging in the world. Equally, many in the interviews expressed the idea that being connected to a Muslim community could be compared to belonging to a national or ethnic group. This is important because it indicates how religion can facilitate social relationships between people. Yusuf’s statement highlights this connection, I feel like I belong with like a Muslim community […] because whenever I am around Muslims […] I feel like that is my home and stuff, so yeah, I would say that like in Muslim. […] being with people that are AustralianMuslim as well because I can connect more with them.

Young Muslims like Yusuf are often quite happy with, and open to multiculturalism. This is particularly the case within the Muslim community where forging friendships with people of different national and ethnic backgrounds is encouraged. In other examples, young Muslim individuals spoke of their names or certain personality traits contributing to and strengthening their Muslim identity within the public eye. For a number of female respondents, a hijab is quite a significant expression of their Muslim identity. Zulaikha, who wore the hijab, spoke of its contribution to her Muslim identity, Because for me my religion is my defining factor. My hijab is a defining factor, and people see me as a Muslim woman. Ethnicity [is also part of my identity, but] because I was born here and brought up here - and so I have a complex idea of identity. It is very complex I say and to keep it simple I say my religion [first] and ethnicity second.

Despite unfortunate backlash from larger society at the time, the participants interviewed who wore hijab only expressed pride in their choice. Asifah for instance explained, I do consider myself Muslim of course but I don’t like saying it out loud because of the scarf. It should be enough of a statement like, ‘okay she is a Muslim, and she is also proud of it’ because yeah. It is something that I do with pride.

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For others like Aqil, their name makes them visibly Muslim, and so being Muslim is inherently part of their social identity. The respondent commented, Basically the[y] already know that I am Muslim. So, like I am proud of that, I am proud to be Muslim.

Fiza, who lived in theUK, felt although Muslims living in the West were free to express their religion, religion became particularly important in the face of widespread Islamophobia in the West. She also shared, “I mean being raised in the West; you do really talk about religion. Like people from colored backgrounds are usually working-class backgrounds, so they are stuck in certain areas in London or whatever […] Sometimes like their national British identity is not that strong and that would be because of the[se] places.” She also suggested that religion becomes particularly important in diasporas in the West because their members have a central identity based on Islam.

For others, religion as an identity marker was most important out of personal choice. Maya, who lived in the UK, explained this as follows, I think at the top I’d definitely put that I’m a Muslim. And I think for me, personally, the fact that I’m a Muslim and my religion, that comes first among everything. And then, you know, my nationality and my gender. My religion for me, because I’m very attached to it. I don’t really see it as a part of my identity, I see it as my identity. And that’s what molds my life […] That’s what I am, first and foremost.

It is also important to remember that many of the participants did not drink alcohol or did not partake in certain Western social norms, which made their Muslim identity more pronounced in gatherings or engagements with those outside of the faith group. Sana, a young Muslim woman, elaborated on this aspect, The reason why I say British Muslim is because I understand that we have a religion that we adhere to. You know, growing up as a Muslims, you have certain stuff that you have to follow in Islam. So, I say British Muslim because you’re associating yourself with that religion. You’ve got your own group, basically.

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4.5

Consultations with Imams

Whether by their own preference or due to their upbringing, faith plays an important role in the lives of most young Muslims in this study. It is vital, then, to explore how they understand their faith. Given that the young Muslims interviewed grew up in societies with plural belief systems and values, some seek guidance on some religious issues. The interviews found the most common ways participants sought information was through directly consulting with an imam/religious scholar or searching for answers online. The majority of individuals, particularly in Australia and the UK, sought guidance on issues that were non-political in nature. In the USA the majority sought clarification on issues such as matters of daily life, however a small number were also interested in political topics such as protesting and Black Lives Matter activities that were at peak during the course of the interviews. When asked about seeking the aid of imams, Fayrooz’s explained how young Muslims used religious scholars, local imams and at times knowledgeable family members to gain guidance to navigate through life. He provided an example of consultation with an imam, I asked him about certain things, like how do you say what it bidat ? Things that are made-up by society to believe in and they think that it is actually Islamic law. […] I asked a few questions, I asked like the ruling on tattoos, the ruling on men wearing gold, the ruling on mean wearing silk, and a few other topics.

Zia, who was from theUSA, also explained how consulting imams was routine for him. He provided examples of guidance he sought regarding questions relating to a school environment, I would definitely go and seek opinions when it comes to areas that may somehow affect the way a Muslim might live in a community. Like the ability to have, you know, our Eid as a vacation day for public schools, for example, or, you know, changing our school menu to serve only kosher in halal meat, things along those lines. Yes, I generally don’t think most of that stuff is just common sense.

Haya also said she has “asked a lot of scholars” religious questions, such as if she was allowed to combine prayers.

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For some, they sought answers for the guidance of Islam regarding certain matters which might be different from the country’s legal stance. For instance, Samina expressed how she went to an imam to seek advice about the financial arrangements for women, So, one thing I remember is the, what happened was about women when she gets married, like how does she have or how is the money divided, or what happens when she gets divorced, the commission that she gets, some sort of thing.

It was also not necessary for everyone to directly contact an imam, nor were they always the first choice when a participant sought religious advice. Asking family or friends was also common, and if the matter was complicated the religious authority was approached. Sumayya explained during her interview that she did not speak with the imam directly, If I would have an issue or I would need clarification, I would do research on my own. If not [I was unable to find the answer…], I will use my parents as a means of getting to the imam to ask questions on behalf of me, but I personally wouldn’t talk with them myself.

Hasan also elaborated how his family sought an imam to seek clarification on bank loans and Islam’s directives on paying interest. Like Sumayya he did not directly consultant an imam; it was his father who asked, and the rest of the family benefited from the consultation, Yes, so take an example of the interest that you pay in Australia. I mean we; Islam does not allow us to take or pay interest but here in Australia it is something that you have to do. So, my father took a suggestion from this imam in Iran […] He asked if we are allowed to pay or take the interest, because it is what we have to do [in Australia], and the imam did say yes that we can pay the interest because it is the regulation of the land that you have to follow there. So, like I think we do go to imams if we need them.

There was no clear preference in terms of ethnicity or nationality when it came to consulting with imams. It was a matter of convenience in most cases, with most participants seeking out the imam nearest to them or seeking out the most educated imam available. Majeed, whose family came from South Asia, was at ease consulting an imam from Albania,

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Yeah, with Islamic law I do ask for clarification, with regards to alcohol and pork and that sort of thing. The dude’s Albanian. I go to the same mosque he works in, and I stop and ask him about rules and laws and to clarify.

However, it did emerge that sectarian associations within Islam were important when considering consulting with an imam, due to intellectual and cultural differences that exist between sects. For instance, Ashar who identified with the Ahmadiyya sect consulted an imam from his community, And of course, every imam I ask - it needs to be from my own community and usually the answer I get is [deduced from] that religion and politics.

Among Sunni participants, too, finding an Imam within their subsect sometimes mattered. Or as Shiza, a British-Pakistani, shared her experience, To be honest the one-woman Islamic scholar I came across, and she was from the Wahabi sector of Islam, and I am Sunni. And I know there is no point of me going to a Wahabi person because I knew that I was gonna disagree with everything that she says. How can I get any confirmation or clarification from someone who does not even pray the same as me you know, and that is the main foundation? So, for me there was not any point of going and seeking explanation with someone who I know was not going to agree with anyway.

Some of the participants did not wish to seek any advice from imams. This was mainly due to the lack of connection or trust with the religious authority or a preference for finding the answer online. Ameer’s comments resonate with these sentiments, No. Because I don’t see an imam in an area, and I don’t feel I connect with [any]. So, I would rather go online to see what [I am looking for].

Jameelah explained how an imam’s level of education and their level of nuanced understanding determined whether she would choose to trust them. It was common in the responses to find many young Muslims skeptical of imam’s statements and using their own knowledge to assess the

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fatwas and directives before accepting them. Jemelah also explained how she had enough religious knowledge to determine the answers for herself, I usually tend to educate myself; I don’t really rely on them. I mean it is good to listen to them because obviously that is why they are there, but oftentimes it is not what I want to hear. […] Well, it is generally because I have educated myself enough to know, like I know something is wrong, that is also why I can rely online [on online sources] - not because it is reliable, but I know […] enough background and context to be able to able to say that, ‘oh this is wrong’ and ‘oh, this makes sense’. So, I have to read it and then I have to make sure that I know, and I look at a few other sources.

Ajola, who resided in theUSA, also sought an imam who was ‘familiar with the culture’ and the context in which she lived when seeking advice. She gave an example of traveling as a female and how it was a tricky subject from some imams who lived outside America to understand, Like in certain countries, Muslim countries, women might not be allowed to travel without having a male, my harem companion, with them from their family. But in the West, I mean, that’s impossible to do because, you know, like all the male member family members, they’re working, and they don’t have time […] I need to travel somewhere and to see my parents […] They will give me advice based on that […] like certain rulings that are taken directly from text, but without the context of it.

Latifah’s statement provides further insight into this topic. Many young Muslims seek an imam they can trust; thus, they tend to thoroughly research the imam prior as the participant explained, I heard and someone recommends it [them], and their stuff really makes sense, or it is logical, what sort of perspectives they have got, like they are trust[worthy] people. And after [the imams meet the criteria], I have built the trust, then I keep reading their books.

Women in particular tended to express concern about how educated the imam was, and their beliefs. Najibah explained how her family’s imam was quite conservative regarding gender roles and guided her family to involve their daughters in ‘feminine’ professions. Because of this incident she was

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quite careful and distrustful toward imams in general. She narrated the incident as follows, So, when I was joining uni, I had to take a break because of visa issues. But when I was joining, he [her father] consulted the imam and the imam said that the girls should study seething that has to do with community service such as nursing. And I was like ‘are you serious?’ I felt that was a very sexist comment because you can’t tell what girls should study and what guys should study because we have the same brains.

Bashir was more vocal in the distrust he felt toward imams, and how he felt better in using his own logic to navigate the teachings of Islam, Generally, try to stay away from […] imams in general, because […] I like to have my own freedom to determine my own interpretations. And I just generally don’t really like to trust my religious practice in the hands of another human being.

Yet at the same time he was open to listening to the opinions of imams on political issues, Back when I was in college with this same imam that I mentioned earlier, he is actually having his own libertarian think tank. So, he really emphasizes, you know, libertarian things, which is kind of interesting because that’s not the first thing people think that Muslims are. I don’t necessarily agree with him politically, but in that sense that I might have come across some political discussions with him. But like I said, I don’t keep in contact with imams or anything, so I haven’t much.

4.6

Going Online to Engage with Faith

Aleem, who lived in Australia, talked about Google and its use as a means for religious clarification, and he jokingly referred to it as “Sheikh Google.” This statement demonstrates how many young Muslims felt about using online spaces for furthering their religious knowledge. Many watched videos, read blogs, and consulted trusted websites when confronted with faith-related questions. However, participants also took the information they received with a grain of salt, as they understood many sources were not authenticated and could be misleading. This led to a small number refraining from online searches on faith-related

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topics and stating their preference to receive advice from other authorities, including some of the participants discussed in the last section who consulted imams. For the vast majority, the internet offered an accessible avenue for connecting with and learning about religion and seeking clarification. Common ways participants interacted with religiosity online included finding the answers to simple questions, daily reminders about prayers, or following Islamic quote pages. As Noor explained, a number of young Muslims used the internet to expand their knowledge of faith or as part of their daily rituals, Just to keep updates and just to have reminders. Well, those religious pages and religious speakers that I follow do have a lot to say, for example, if Ramadan is coming you know, they give you updates on [up]coming Ramadan, they give you information about the holy month and what is something that is advised to do so, what is something that is not advised to do so, it keeps me updated.

Najibah admitted to the limitations of using the internet for seeking clarification on Islamic matters, but felt it was the most convenient way to go about it, Yeah, a lot! I think the internet is the best place to go to, well not the best place but most convenient place, like people have already asked questions before so you might find your answer there.

On the other hand, Fatimah felt more confident in her use of the internet compared to what she referred to as misleading quotes by some people around her, I think I like to use the internet to clarify things that I hear people say about Islam, because sometimes people claim a particular hadith that means this or a particular imam said this and they just say it because they have just heard it from other people […] I like to go on the internet to sort of see of exactly what was said or even to clarify bits of the Quran. Because I think it is really good, instead of just focusing on one scholar says -and then to look at what a couple of scholars say and then wanna take an average of that [take different opinions into consideration].

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Digital environments were consulted for questions that were often similar to those other participants had consulted imams for guidance, such as advice for daily living including dietary restrictions through to feminist thought in Islam, depending on the needs of the participants at the time. For instance, for Anandi the internet was the best place to search for “little things, I look up, look really, really small things. Yeah, I don’t think I’ve ever really looked up bigger questions like. It’s not like even if it’s not a bigger question, it might be even something related to your daily life. Daily – it can be a daily issue.

Nadimah’s comment also reflects the finding that among most respondents, online resources were used to seek Islamic clarifications in a timely fashion, Yeah, I have Googled a few things, ‘this is halal or is this not?’, ‘am I able to do this?’, ‘why does the Quran say this’, things like that.

Many of the respondents also followed online muftis; these individuals are mostly young, transnational, and quite popular on social media. As previously discussed, a number of respondents felt a sense of unease with imams who were seen as being unrelatable, and these online imams and social media influences were in many cases viable alternatives. During his interview, Yasir explained how he followed one of these personalities, Hamza Yusuf, I listen to quite a bit. He’s a convert, I think, from California. He’s the co-founder of I think […] a college in Berkeley.

The participant’s following of specific ‘celebrity muftis’ tended not to be based on sectarian or ethnic preferences. Rather, many felt their message resonated with them because they shared a similar background in relation to being Muslims living in the West. Behlul, who had ethnic roots in Turkey, followed a range of online scholars from across the world. He explained, I search online, but I can’t tell you for scholars that I take their perspectives […] arguably one of them would be Fethullah Gulen, yet another one could be on Hamza Yusuf, and other ones could be Nauman Ali Khan

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[…] But these are the first ones that comes to my mind. Also, some local figures.

Rizwan followed one of the imam celebrities because he found his content relatable, He is quite a young imam, a young Islamic scholar, I think in his late twenties or early thirties, so it is really [easy] to relate to. So, I think a lot of these young imams are trying to give knowledge back.

For Fiza, social media opened opportunities to connect with others on a religious basis, And also, I have been able to network with Muslim academics in different cities in the UK who I would have never known even existed if it wasn’t for social media.

Zubeida shared that she did not personally get in touch with scholars, but used the internet to seek credible information beyond Wikipedia and other basic sources, I would probably look at academic research, like what is out there, journals, and established Islamic scholars.

A small number described not only using the internet to seek clarification, but also to spread awareness about Islam and clarify any misconceptions they might come across on social media platforms. Although the majority of the participants were actively interacting with their religion online, there was a common understanding that the information they came across was not necessarily authentic, reliable, or free from biases and personal opinion. Sana Ullah shared how she used online sources to see what is generally said about certain topics, without necessarily trusting the answers or using it as a primary source of information, I use it to see the answers of other people before I question, not really to seek guidance, just to kind of see what others have said. I am always aware of the internet because it should never ever be the first source for gathering that type of information, but I still use it as a source.

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Many like Sheeba, recognized the convenience of seeking information online, yet felt an unease with using online spaces because the lack of authenticity is dangerous when dealing with important religious considerations, I think [it is] dangerous in terms of Islam. When you’re talking without studying something and you’re just giving your opinion, that becomes dangerous, and people might think that something’s allowed when it’s not. Purely based on someone’s opinion.

Ebrar also pointed out that the vastness of the internet meant that all sorts of opinions were present online, and that people should therefore proceed with caution, Because the internet is a big community basically, and you will see people with different beliefs, and they might conflict with my beliefs basically.

Eileen’s response provides an insight into how some have found their own system to authenticate information while searching online. She shared how she checked on Google, and if a couple of sources claimed the same thing, then it is likely they are reliable. She also checks with her friends because they come from the same background and same religion. If they don’t know the answer, they might know someone to contact who does. Tasneem used her circle of better-informed friends and elders to authenticate information that she found online, I usually read on the internet to get different views, or I either ask a friend like if they know or like, even ask an elder that knows religion.

Latifah also explained that when she comes across social media posts related to religion, she tries to authenticate what is being shared, Like people would make posts on social media, for instance, about women and their position and Islam and I wanna read about particularly [what] they were trying to understand or were referring to. So, yeah, I did do quite a bit of reading into that, interpretations of certain quotes of the Quran.

Sohrab also shared how looking at websites linked to different schools of thought provided different interpretations and rules,

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I would Google stuff. And the issue of the Google stuff is that usually the first search result is Islam Q&A, which is a website that has Salafi opinions. So, then you get a very strict opinion on this thing. And then I would get worried too […] I didn’t really know what the right thing was and [then] this website would give me these kinds of more strict opinions that usually make it very difficult for women to practice.

Hirnur was also particular about her searches. She trusted a secular Turkish platform for her online queries related to Islam. She explained why this was her preferred website, Because focus for secular Islam, and I know that this is trustable, and they also put a reference and it’s usually correct. I checked with people that know better than me, with some people that are doing research in this area. Advised me to look up. I also listen to his [religious authority on the platform] speeches. And it’s very trustable for us.

Gender again emerged as an additional consideration, with female participants in particular stating their dislike of certain videos and content available online. Yezda explained how she stopped watching Islamic videos online because, as she puts it, A lot of the videos were toxic, and they did not align with my way of thinking, and I feel like my way of thinking is definitely more liberal than others and […] yeah, they are debatable like amongst the Muslim community. So, sometimes when I hear these lectures and I am like ‘what are you saying!’ Especially in the rights of women and rights of men and women should [do] everything that their husband says, and I am like ‘I cannot listen to it right now! I am done with that’.

Connecting with others, seeking information and self-expression has witnessed a massive shift from physical to online platforms and methods on a global scale; the interviews with young Muslims confirmed that this shift is also evident in the religious habits and knowledge-seeking of this demographic.

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4.7

Interfaith Engagement

It is also essential to understand how young Muslims not only interact or relate with their personal faith, but with other faith groups as well. To understand this largely understudied question, a number of participants were asked if they had visited any non-Muslim places of worship and their experiences. Given that a majority grew up in a multicultural environment and most cherished this multiculturalism, it was unsurprising that this study found interfaith engagement was quite prevalent among the respondents. Young Muslims interviewed spoke of being curious and interested in exploring other places of worship. Taslimah, who wore a hijab, noted that she did not feel odd at a church when she visited and felt that she was welcomed. She conveyed a sense of tranquility and peace when sharing her account, I actually went to church just for the fun of it once in the city and I was surprised by how calm it was […] It is supposedly a non-Muslim area but then you know, they are people of the Book so we kind of share similar values. So, when I went in it [was] actually not that populated, you feel welcome there in churches. So, I am covered, and I go, and people [didn’t] ask me. And I felt like it was such a safe place, and it was […] just so nice, and I just wanted to stay there for a little longer. That is the reason why I went back, when it is time for their prayers, when they read, and they sing. So, obviously I can’t do that myself, but I just like to look at them practice their religion and it is really I don’t know, it is satisfying. And I compare that to mosques, and I wish mosques were just as welcoming and as beautiful as churches tend to be.

While Samira did feel a little out of place her overall experience of being at a church was also quite positive and she counted it as a valuable experience, At first it felt uncomfortable because […] you are different to everybody else so, you stand out. It is like wow. But everybody was very lovely, they are very open, very welcoming.

Salemah who had frequently attended mass when in high school expressed her wish to visit a temple,

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I wanna go to a temple to just like see it.

Ben who was well versed in Hebrew had also taught at a Sunday school attached to a Synagogue while he was in the UK. Saleema went to different places of worship when her friends invited her. She explained, And interestingly enough, we also visit each other’s places of worship. Then I’ll go to their church. If I’m doing you know, the gig at the birth of any of our children, then [they will visit]. So, we also go to each other’s social institutions. Our religious institutions will come together in moments of tragedy [such as] funerals.

Anas described why he was keen and open to visiting various places of worship. Like other respondents, he demonstrated a respect for other religious institutions, I have been to different churches. So, like I have been to a Mormon Church, and I have been to a Catholic Church. I have been to a synagogue, I have been to a gurdwara, I have been to a Hindu temple. It was enjoyable, it was a good experience and I like to learn [… In the] other religious places as well, there is an aspect of kind of comradery and different faiths- that people were praying and they felt a connection, even though I have a different belief but I could still feel the energy or the vibe in those places, that people were coming there to kind of reflect and introspect. So, I really liked going to those different religious places and seeing like people pray and how they welcomed me, and it was a good experience.

Social connections within their own family also led some participants to attend places of worship outside the mosque. Majeed attributed his trips to his family’s diversity that included non-Muslims and Hindu relatives within his own family, as well as their openness and tolerance, I have been to an Indian temple and a church before. My auntie had a family friend who was Hindu, and she was living with us, and she had to go on a Sunday, so I went with her. The art was pretty cool. Then we went inside and saw all the gods and idols and paintings depicting mythology. It was cool, and an experience you don’t really get very often. I think I was young, but the first time I was in a non-Muslim place of worship I was more focused on why they are doing it, or how they are doing their prayers, as an outsider I was interested. My parents are very tolerant, and

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my father had a lot of non-Muslim friends, so I had a lot of non-Muslim childhood friends and so that affected how I saw things personally.

A small number had visited other places of worship when overseas, including during trips to their/their family’s country of origin. Zakria, who had ancestors in Palestine, shared a story about a trip he took to the country, I went to a church in Palestine, and it was Jesus’s place of birth and there was a lot of history to it, and it was a bit of a surreal experience I guess looking at all those paintings and thinking about how the people who painted them felt, and [how] other people in those paintings felt stuff like that. I don’t know if spiritual is the right word to describe it though.

For most, it was simply ‘curiosity’ that led them to explore a different place of worship. Aleema explained why she visited a church, “The church one was just […] ‘we need to see what is inside of it’, like it is just a curiosity […] I just looked around and I did not do anything, it was actually a pretty cool experience […] we have our mosques and there are no chairs or anything, so like we pray standing up.” She contrasted this with churches having chairs and no open spaces, describing the difference as “pretty interesting.”

Those who visited these places did not always totally understand or agree with the ritual aspects but nonetheless were interested in and respected the practices. Noor’s comments highlight this feeling of respect for plural religious traditions, So, I have been to all kinds of religious places, so I have been to a church before, and I have been to a Hindu temple before, and I have been to a Jain temple before and a Buddhist temple as well. So, having seen multiple spiritual places and well people do observe a lot of their own rituals and lot of their own practices that I don’t necessarily incorporate into my own religion, but I do respect people for that they believe in.

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Conclusion

The thematic analysis of the interviews demonstrates that young Muslims’ relationship with religion is complex, and overall, the degree of attachment to religion varied widely between interviewees. Despite feeling stereotyped at times because of their faith, most felt confident in their expression of this religious identity, and through their responses, the participants were able to shed light on the multiplicities of expression of Muslim identity. Affiliation with religion and attachment to it clearly falls within a wide spectrum, and no dominant expression of faith was uncovered among the interviewees. Instead, discussions about faith uncovered that individual respondents have their own ways of relating with and expressing their faith. However, most did perceive religion to involve a personal connection with a higher power or spirituality. There were also those who strongly felt that religion provided them with moral guidelines in their daily lives in addition to its spiritual value. Another perspective expressed by interviewees was that religion has a cultural element in their lives. While most practiced faith in one way or another, there were also some who felt they believed in Islam predominantly because it was the religion passed down to them from their parents. For interviewees expressing this perspective, it was a ‘cultural Islam’ to which they belonged, and the spiritual aspects of the religion were unimportant to them. It is noteworthy that young Muslims who had embraced Islam after being born to other religions were more likely to stress the important place it held in their lives. The chapter not only described what religion means for the participants, but also explored the significance of this faith as a marker of identity. The chapter finds that although there is an element of identifying oneself with religion among participants, interviewees’ identities were also constructed in part by their experiences in society, and by the perception of others. The construction of Muslim identity by non-Muslim society was problematic, at times, due to the sometimes confining and discriminatory attitudes exhibited by non-Muslim anglophone societies, particularly following 9/11. Whatever their attachment with religion, most interviewees felt it played a significant part in their identity formation. For instance, feeling a part of the ‘Muslim community’ meant that most looked beyond shared ethnicity when forming friendships or

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engaging with other Muslims. However, at the same time this group identity prevented them from fully partaking in the typical ‘Western’ lifestyle, where eating Halal and avoiding the consumption of alcohol differentiate them from Western social norms. Aside from group identity, a significant number also felt that who they were was either heavily derived from, or somewhat inspired by their faith in terms of how they behaved, their outlook on the world, and in some cases their normative guidelines. As discussed in the review of literature, the post-9/11 environment was often a very hostile place for Muslims living in the West and one in which they were subject to stereotyping and being marked as potential threats. This was verified in the interviews. For many respondents, society involuntarily imposed ‘Muslimness’ on them. In interview discussions, the participants shared a range of reactions including ignoring the anti-Muslim bigotry to downplaying their Muslim identity. Despite the negative connotations surrounding Islam after 9/11, it is evident that most felt that religion is a pivotal part of their identity and expressed it with pride. This was highlighted especially in interviews with female participants who were proud of wearing the headscarf as a visible marker of their religion. The chapter also demonstrated that the young Muslims interviewed found various avenues to learn more about their faith and clarify any questions or concerns that arise. Some used imams, others relied on family connections, while many searched the internet or followed online religious figures or sources to seek clarification on matters pertaining to religion. Discussions with the young Muslims in this study revealed that what attracted them to a particular imam was the level of connection they shared, and if their views aligned, rather than the ethnicity or nationality of the imam. Because many stated they had not found an understanding or trusted imam in their immediate community, they sought guidance from personal networks or from the internet. While most were careful in relying solely on Google searches related to Islam, a significant number followed transnational digital imams. These individuals were highly relatable to the participants due to their young age, their liberal views, and the similar context of living in Western countries. The appeal of these digital imams shows how young Muslims in the anglophone West have complex and evolving identities and do not necessarily relate to the older generation of Muslims living in and outside the West. In addition to exploring their own faith, it was also interesting to confirm that a significant number of the participants were quite open

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and curious about interfaith engagement, which aligned with the passion for multiculturalism expressed by many young Muslims throughout the study. Participants who had converted to Islam had relatives and friends from other faith groups and maintained a connection with other faiths as a result. The majority, who were born to Muslim parents and followed the faith, also displayed a willingness to visit different places of worship or attend religious events such as weddings and baptisms of non-Muslim friends. While the visits ranged from personal curiosity to school trips, nearly all the participants described the experience as a positive one in terms of exploring various forms of spirituality and building respect for other belief systems. This is an important piece of evidence that counters the narrative of Muslims being a reclusive community unwilling to engage with non-Muslims. Overall, the chapter makes a few contributions. Firstly, there is no one type of ‘Muslim’ or a simple binary of ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ Muslims. The identities expressed by the young Muslims interviewed in this book vary significantly. Secondly, the chapter finds that there are many ways young Muslims connect with Islam, which means there are many ways in which Islam can be a source of spiritual guidance, set of moral guidelines, cultural identity, and group (social) identity. Thirdly, the interviewees spoke of the Muslim archetypes forced on them, which are usually stereotypical and prejudiced in nature. This resonates with the post-9/11 social-political environment in which Muslims have been narrowly categorized and constantly ‘otherized’ in the West. This brings us to our fourth finding, that despite the discrimination and stereotyping many interviewees experienced, most freely connect with their Muslim identity resulting in their choosing to dress a certain way, seek information about their faith, and connect with the larger Muslim community. The resilience of Muslim youth and willingness to engage inside and outside their faith group underlines their commitment to the larger society in which they reside.

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CHAPTER 5

Sharia and Young Muslims in the Anglosphere

5.1

Introduction

Sharia has been a highly stigmatized term, attracting significant misunderstanding and anxiety in the West. This stigmatization has occurred in response to mainstream media and political discourse about transnational neo-jihadists such as the Taliban or ISIS. These groups have justified their actions through reference to sharia, and their use of the term is intertwined with violence and intolerance. In Western media, sharia has consequently been linked with issues such as destroying women’s freedoms, barring men from shaving, polygamy, forcing individuals to pray, and killing non-Muslims. These narratives have instilled fear and the word sharia has become closely associated with the dystopic idea of an ‘Islamic state’ (Utych 2018; Naderi 2016; Khan et al. 2012; Zaal 2012). In reality, sharia is not well-defined and open to interpretation. In its essence, sharia means “the fundamental religious concept of Islam—namely, its law” (El Shamsy and Coulson 2021). As previously mentioned, these laws are highly temporal and context dependent. Factors such as the theological school of thought, historical-political dimension, sectarian association, and the context of the law itself lead to variations in what different Muslims perceive to be sharia. An example is the payment of zakat (annual alms giving), which is viewed differently by Sunnis and Shias. Similarly, the differing ideas of family law according to sharia is visible in the

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vastly different ways Muslim majority countries apply these laws (Poushter 2016; Korteweg and Selby 2012; Yilmaz 1999, 2014, 2016b). Despite the nuances and differences in understanding the term (Yilmaz 2020), mainstream ideas about sharia in the West have largely remained confined to the definitional parameters associated with terrorist outfits. The findings of this book clearly demonstrate that faith influences Muslims to take part in political activity, impacts their social networks, and equally shapes their worldviews and outlook on life. More research is warranted to explore what sharia means for young Muslims living in a country with secular laws and to attempt to understand their conception of the term and its (ir)relevance in their lives (see now Yilmaz 2023a). The chapter provides an alternative way of looking at sharia by focusing the lens on what it means to its followers, rather than to the hand-down definitions offered by jihadist groups and mainstream media.

5.2

Literature on Sharia in the West

The twenty-first century has seen Muslims increasingly being viewed as a ‘problem’ in the West. Western anxieties have been further stoked by an influx of refugees from war-torn Muslim countries, despite being a direct result of the Western-led ‘war on terror’ and its allied projects (Utych 2018; Naderi 2016; Khan et al. 2012; Zaal 2012). The notion of a ‘Muslim problem’ is deeply rooted in the Islamophobic (Yilmaz 2016a) narrative that democratic principles and sharia stand in sharp contrast to one another. Mayer (2013) closely examined the traditions of Islam to understand how they correspond with contemporary human rights. Through this attempt, Mayer (2013) was able to challenge prevalent ideas of Islam violating human rights and demonstrate that the foundational principles of Islam support human liberation and rights. Humphrey (2010) also notes that media outlets in the USA were largely responsible for instrumentalizing religion as a political tool in the West. This aided in what the author calls a ‘moral panic’ created in the West and which has been exploited both by the media and political groups. Khan (2012) argues that the idea of a ‘clash’ between the US constitution and ideas about sharia is a product of the mainstreaming and politicizing of Islamophobic rhetoric since September 11 (Khan 2012). Charfi (2005) has also attempted to dispel myths about sharia by arguing that Islam is a belief system whereas Islamism demands the implementation of sharia (traditional laws) and by providing a historical account of the misrepresentation

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of sharia. However, he relies heavily on using Islamic texts and sources to support its argument, rather than by showing how contemporary Muslims view or practice sharia. Few studies have surfaced asking Muslims, even less so young Muslims, what their idea of sharia might be, and the degree to which it is relevant and influential in their lives. Critiques of the sharia in academia often assert that the rules of sharia are in opposition to the modern and plural nature of Western democracies and deny the possibility of any form of legal pluralism. In these arguments, laws derived from traditions and rooted in cultural values have no space in the modern legal system which is rooted in the positivist school of thought (Tamanaha and Lehmann 2021; Fitzpatrick 1992; Sack 1986: 5; Kidder 1983: 185–208). However, Turner and Arslan (2014) provide a discussion about legal pluralism and critique the statecentered legal system and its refusal to acknowledge other belief systems. According to the authors, legal pluralism provides a voice for those who do not occupy the mainstream. Outside Western countries, many Muslim majority countries possess a measure of legal pluralism where colonial laws and European-inspired laws have been blended with Islamic laws to formulate constitutions (Yilmaz 2019a, b, 2016b; Aljunied 2016). Critics have claimed that sharia has not undergone a process of modernization and is incompatible with secularization because it fails to differentiate between religion and politics or ‘church’ and state. Sharia, however, is not state law, but rather, as Max Weber recognized, closer to common law. Sharia is constantly changing and evolving to suit new challenges that Muslims face, and for which tradition often has no answers (Alassiri 2020; An-Nacim 2012; Powell 2012; Hallaq 2004; Yilmaz 2014, 2016b, 2020, 2022, 2023a, 2023b). A number of critics have also argued there is a danger in legal pluralism in Western nations (Richardson and Springer 2013). Richardson and Springer (2013), for example, claim that permitting sharia laws to operate unofficially has the potential to cause cultural segregation and allow communities to create enclaves eroding wider social cohesion. Yet already, when the state legal system fails to cohere with their religious values, Muslims often turn to the internet or imams, or members of their community, and in an informal way construct a parallel legal system which reflects their values. Sparr (2014) argues that the subjective and normative nature of sharia makes it difficult to implement and that this subjectivity may lead to unknown consequences for Western societies. This argument suggests that sharia should not be adopted but, instead, governments

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should focus on welcoming Muslims into mainstream Western society. It is a sociological fact that “Muslims are not equally comfortable with all aspects of sharia” (Pew 2013). Therefore, it is possible that Muslims might embrace local Western laws as well as sharia and amalgamate them in a way that respects Muslim ethical commitments while embracing Western civil and political systems. Nevertheless, in primarily Western countries, the fear of sharia is rampant and viewed as a gross miscarriage of human rights and as a direct threat to the ideals of modern Western societies. There has been little input provided by Muslims living in the West about the issue. It is important to note that the idea of sharia among these individuals varies significantly from how it is presented in the mainstream. In their research addressing Muslim’s views of sharia, Possamai et al. (2016) found that only two people out of fifty-seven had actually sought a ‘sharia arbitration tribunal in the area of family law.’ Another study found a female Muslim supported sharia laws for women because, in her view, they offered more protection for women during a divorce (Moghissi and Ghorashi 2016, 64). The authors note that in these cases, sharia laws state that women are not liable to pay economic compensation to their ex-husbands after a talaq (divorce) and so Muslim women are offered financial safety and protection (Moghissi and Ghorashi 2016, 64). Berger (2006, 173) argues for the benefits of sharia law in governing the family life of Muslim migrants. The Canadian government in Ontario recognized the likely benefits of incorporating sharia into existing laws and permitted legal pluralism by giving Muslims the option of arbitration under sharia-guided principles for family law matters. One survey of British Muslims by ICM and Omnibus Research (2008) found that younger Muslims were more favorable toward sharia in Britain than the older generations of Muslims. The respondents strongly felt that family law pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance should be governed by law tribunals that take into consideration laws derived from the sharia. Nilan (2017, 59) describes how another 2013 UK study revealed that, compared to their parents, Muslim youth were more supportive of the legal pluralism of the sharia. Young Muslims in the UK desire for sharia and the strength of their Muslim identity might be attributed to post-9/11 politics, which have forced many young people growing up in the West to affirm their religious identity (Kashyap and Lewis 2013). For young Muslims in Western nations who engage with legal pluralism, and for those who demand the formalization of sharia,

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its laws represent the ‘proper way to live.’ For these Muslims, the sharia assists in determining a wide range of things for them, from choosing what to eat to choosing how to borrow money from a bank. However, these young people view sharia not in a ‘top-down, law-like fashion’ but as a flexible system that helps them in their daily lives (Nilan 2017: 60, 93). In a survey of young Muslims in Britain, Kashyap and Lewis (2013) found that their desire for a legal system with a religious basis is not exceptional, but also found among young people of other faiths. ‘[We] find that young Muslims attribute a greater salience to Islam for their personal identity, even though they pray and read scripture less, and support plural interpretations of Islam more than their elders. […] Muslim youth religiosity, although uniquely expressed, influences moral and social attitudes for Muslims similarly to that of Christian or other religious youth.’ Not all Muslim youth, however, wish to see sharia law implemented, nor do they see it as a legitimate source for defining laws. Korteweg and Selby (2012, 159), for example, found, when studying Canadian Muslims’ views on sharia, that there was great division between Muslims in Canada on this issue. In contrast, when asked what sharia means, almost 90 percent of Possamai et al.’s (2016) respondents referred to sharia as informing or guiding all aspects of Muslim life. Only four of the fifty-seven people surveyed were ‘unsure or had limited knowledge as to what it meant.’ The reluctance of the mainstream Western legal institution to embrace sharia or explore its directives in a practical and calm manner warrants a though academic investigation (see also Yilmaz 2023a). This chapter not only allows for reimagining of the idea of sharia but also allows Muslims from Anglophone democracies to discuss their ideas about sharia and its implications for their personal lives and their respective countries.

5.3

Advocating for Sharia in the West

The interviews presented and analyzed here display a more nuanced view of how young Muslims conceptualize and interact with sharia. The interviews revealed that among those who felt the need for sharia in their Western home, many lacked knowledge of the depth of Islamic jurisprudence. Many confused the moral principles of Islam with sharia and saw it as less of a legal system and more of a ‘way of life.’ For instance, Hasan discussed sharia’s ability to bring peace, yet was unable to describe how the implementation of sharia could achieve this when asked.

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Others believed that sharia could be implemented in the West and that it could complement the legal frameworks already in place and argued that there was a compatibility between Islamic law and Western society. A range of responses from the interviews illuminated how daily matters seen through the lens of sharia made it a valid legal/moral framework in the eyes of the participants. For instance, Muntazir explained his understanding of sharia and its applicability to Muslims in the West, “Sharia, from my understanding is, [it] is what Allah ordained for us. In this life, basically how we live our life and whatnot, and what are the guidelines, I guess if you want to call it that […] Sharia law is like a governing guideline system, which some countries might have, but sharia here is something that I think everyone should have.” He added that “it’s more like a moral compass.”

Khalifa, who resided in the USA, was initially hesitant about commenting on sharia, but eventually spoke about it in a favorable manner. He explained that because many Muslims were already going to imams for guidance, implementing sharia would only formalize this practice. He noted, It would be very dicey to bring up anything related to sharia, given the fact that sharia is associated with extreme Islamism is [and] extremist Islam. And so, what might be good is to have a reference point. Sort of reference guide for Muslims who are minorities in the West.

Respondents often reflected on the idea of basic moral guidelines and human rights codified in the sharia. Taslimah, for example, felt that sharia benefitted all humans due to its intrinsic pro-human rights orientation, “I think there are definitely some things [in the sharia] that would help”, although she reasoned that “sharia was made for a Muslim community in a Muslim setting, it was much different, but I think it can be applied, yeah.”

Hasnah, a young female participant, shared how in their view sharia supported and pioneered women’s rights. She noted, I wouldn’t know [about the various laws in the sharia] but when it comes to the rights of the women, I think they should take that page out of the sharia law book.

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She clarified that she wasn’t suggesting sharia law was just implemented fully in Australia, but that “I am saying there are some things that are some parts of the sharia law that is exactly what people are asking for, without actually realizing that it is sharia.” Those in favor of sharia felt that it was not simply bound to a certain time or to a certain group of people. Yasir, who lived in the USA, explained how sharia is fluid and adaptable, which allows different Muslims living around the world to abide by its rules: My understanding is adapting to the culture. So, for example, marriage is done in a certain ceremony, but you’re free to wear any clothes that you know, that fit the culture as long as they don’t contradict their religion. You know, women covering their heads, men not walking around half naked, things like that. I think sharia is very fluid. […] It’s a fluid - it’s a fluid thing where it responds to the culture, response of the people, response to the time. It’s not hard and fast and fixed. It is to a degree, to a degree. It also has to respond to what’s going on with people.

Zakaria’s position was that sharia laws could be integrated into Australia’s legal system. He explained, In my opinion, yeah, I don’t see a problem with democracy from an Islamic point of view. Well, it depends. If you are gonna put a bill that advocates for chopping people’s head off if they steal – then [it is] not compatible. But if you are talking about the nicer things, like, you know, compassion and embodying that in law, then yeah absolutely! Why not? In my opinion, it is okay, but again I am not a scholar, so it is hard to say. […] I don’t see a reason why you couldn’t draw inspiration from any positive aspects of Islamic laws and tweak it a bit and put it in the bill.

Zia felt that the interest-free principle of Islamic finance could really aid people and society if implemented in the West. Using the US context as an example, he said, So, I think in relation to sharia a specifically as far as funding and financing is concerned, I do think that that is a huge tool that the world itself can use and it can help shape and shift everything for the better. Just as far as the funding and financing part is concerned, I couldn’t speak on it in any other aspect.

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Nargis, who lived in the UK, explained that there were laws and policies in place that were similar to or were derived from the sharia. She noted that there were divorce laws in Scotland that operated in the same was as in Islamic law, and also that she had an Islamic bank account (which would use financial rules of the sharia). Aqil also discussed the benefits of sharia beyond just serving the Muslim community. For example, the participant noted the practical health benefits for everyone found in the sharia, “It is something that will lead you to go in a good place. If sharia says not to drink alcohol, there is a lot of opportunity for people to be smart and don’t get drunk and get involved in a crime and all that kind of stuff. So, if sharia says don’t get drunk, the government should focus on [it]. The youth is getting drunk a lot of the time so, if they follow sharia this kind of stuff won’t [happen, as] they are not allowed to drink. So, if they say, for example sharia says, as a Muslim you are not allowed to eat pork so even doctors in Australia say that pork in not good for you.” He also added that the sharia is not just for Muslims, “it can be for everyone.”

It was also raised by some participants that there are legal systems in place that look after different groups in society. Jameelah, for instance, claimed that Muslims should be able to access a parallel legal system, like Aboriginals can with a court of elders. In her words, I do think, like, there should be a different system for issues, or race and religion. Just because there is always, like, an Aboriginal court of elders. Like I think there should be something like that for Muslims as well, also like ethnic minorities. I feel like the courts are just very biased and, like, they are very old, uneducated people. Like, they don’t really know much about living day to day because they are so rich and that is why I think there should be something different. I mean, there is, like, the jury but I guess it is not the same. There should be a different body.

When asked what sorts of issues a Muslim court would cover legally, the interviewee responded, I think maybe marriage, issues like divorce and stuff. Looking at that kind of stuff, like, looking at grounds for divorce like I feel like there [are] boards of imams … but because it is not official, it is not the same. And

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I guess […] like family issues as well, like looking at family dynamics and stuff.

Others such as Amal were quite utopian and vague in their explanations, but nevertheless felt strongly about the benefits of sharia to society, I think if Islamic law was here, or it was used here, there won’t be any poor people. I don’t think so, because Islam says you should help everyone, someone in need, and you shouldn’t leave anyone out. So, I think Islam would be a good effect in Australia.

Although Affan was confused about how the sharia could be implemented in the West, he noted that the incorporation of religious thought, such as the sharia, within society would bring people “closer to religion.” He strongly believed the increasing trend toward “liberalism” was sidelining religion, which for him was a concerning issue. Despite often being uncertain about what the exact scripture on the subject said, many guessed and made common-sense assumptions to justify sharia. Due to the stigma attached to it, some tried to explain issues such as stoning and restricting women’s rights as ‘corruptions,’ introduced by culture or society over time. Some felt that this ‘human element’ is harmful to the real essence of sharia. Imran, for instance, stated “I think there is nothing wrong with sharia” and explained this point quite passionately, Isn’t sharia the law simply prescribed by Islam? Over time it has been mutated by people to think that it is totally disgusting but it should be just the words of law. There is probably much not wrong with it. A good example for exampling this would be that stoning is said in sharia law- I mean death, when I don’t think that stoning is ever even mentioned in the either hadith or Quran in general. It is more of a tradition rather than a religious value. So, while it has been convoluted, it has been changed.

The misrepresentation of sharia in Western societies was brought up in the interviews and seen as overlooking the fluid and disputed nature of sharia. Nilah felt that “if done the right way” sharia could be a highly beneficial addition to society. Although few in number, Shiza was one of the small number of participants who believed the harsher punishments in the sharia could work

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(for example, as a deterrent) in democratic countries, if they “completely believed in it.” She explained her stance, “This is my opinion and I believe that it is the right way, and what Islam says is right, and the treatments and the punishments for the consequences and the way of treating things. And I know most Muslims don’t believe that it is right. And some people may think it is too harsh you know, where like stealing or something like that, one of the punishment[s] is to cut off the hand from it [that] was stealing, so to make an example out of that. And people think it is medieval or barbaric and you can’t work with that in this day and age.” She also said that Muslim majority countries are even hesitant now to apply these types of punishments because they are “so washed by the Western laws and the Western way of life that we just think it is not appropriate.”

Yusuf felt that sharia works as a good deterrent against crime. Its implementation, he thought, would benefit the entire society. He remarked, “Yeah, I do think [sharia] should [be implemented in Australia] because it would teach people not to do that stuff, because people would be scared.” The participant spoke of the laxity of rules in the West, noting that criminals just get bail and then “just go out and do it again.”

Najibah was also strongly in favor of incorporating some aspects of the deterrent sharia rulings into Australian legislation, noting that there were some flaws in the current system of law, So, for example, in Islam if somebody is a rapist they would get hanged immediately […] So I think if we have that law here, there would be less of these situations. And for stealing as well, the punishment in Islamic laws is that cut off the hands. This might sound barbaric, but it is there to prevent this [crimes] from happening. So, if this was the law then thieves wouldn’t steal anything, but the law is here [so] that if the thief comes to your house and gets injured, then you can get sued. I mean he shouldn’t be in your house in the first place, but then if he gets injured it is our fault!

These examples demonstrate how the participants often discussed sharia not as a ‘personal endeavor,’ but as something that could or should be implemented across their nation. Some argued sharia rules should be adopted for all in a democracy, while others believed it could offer

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an alternative or supplementary legal framework for Muslims living in the West. Within this group most saw sharia as an added value to the legal system and not a replacement for current laws. It was conceived as a parallel system to the existing formal laws on issues such as Muslim marriage and family disputes. Some also thought that it could be usefully added to ensure merciful animal butchery and provide deterrents against crimes. A small number believed in the introduction of violent punishments such as cutting off the hands of thieves or the hanging of rapists. While the majority focused on the day-to-day or moral benefits of sharia, a few also felt that its inclusion into the legal systems of the country would bring about a positive change in the whole of society, while others thought it would be fair and just for Muslims to have sharia accessible in the legal system. The different perspectives on what sharia is and how it should be applied correspond with literature findings that note “Muslims are not equally comfortable with all aspects of sharia” (Pew 2013) and that there is high variability in terms of what sharia means and is highly dependent on the context.

5.4

Sharia Laws Are not Culturally Relevant in Modern Society

Although the UK-based surveys presented earlier in the chapter indicate that younger Muslims are more favorable toward sharia than the older generations, the interviews found a significant number of young Muslims were skeptical, if not opposed to the implementation of sharia in the West (and in Muslim majority countries in some instances). Two main rationales emerged in the interview discussions with those who lack enthusiasm about sharia and its implementation in the West. The first believes that due to their dated nature, sharia laws have little or no cultural relevance in modern society. The second key rationale reasoned that because Western countries are non-Muslim majorities, the population has no obligation to follow the sharia system or its directives. Among those who held this first view, interview responses revealed these participants think that sharia is overly conservative, intrudes too deeply into people’s lives, and is too old-fashioned. For instance, referring to one of the punishments associated with sharia, Noor commented,

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I don’t know why they cane people for doing that in public … It [is] juvenile, it is immature, it is completely unnecessary, and I don’t know it is just – and the fact that it happens in so many Muslim countries is insane, especially in the twenty-first century.

Uthman simply felt that there was a disconnect between contemporary society and the society that sharia laws were designed for originally. He justified this critique, “I don’t think the Sharia law, in the way that [it] is spoken of in modernday times, is suitable for the modern-day times.” Although he did concede that sharia could be contextualized and incorporated into contemporary society, “I mean if you look at the jurisprudence in a more sort of a modern way, you can probably fit them in more appropriate laws, so yeah I would say sharia can be acceptable to modern days’ time but I don’t think it is in the way that it is portrayed at the moment.”

Aisha strongly asserted that it was not a good idea to incorporate the sharia into the West and specifically Australia’s legal framework. She felt that secular legal governance was the best system, and religiosity was more of a private matter. She explained, No, no thank you! Honestly, if Australia itself was homogeneous and everyone else was Muslim - I would not be for that. Because even within Islam we have so many different beliefs going on. So, I reckon a secular body is better and just let everyone within the country do as they please in terms of their religious beliefs, again within their limits obviously. But like, believe in what you want and just have a government that is non-biased, is objective.

Omar simply proclaimed, “I think that it does not work for modern society.” Arben, who lived in the USA, called sharia ‘backward’ and explained his rationale in his response, It is an evolving, not all but in a lot of its aspects it is an evolving practice right, so I do not think it is a stagnant practice. And it makes a combination of you know, some divine guidance and intuitions, [and] laws. But also, it is not only you know the literal interpretation of divine guidance, in my opinion, as I said it is meant to evolve with other aspects of society as well.

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Holding a similar belief that the laws need to change with the time and context, Lailah shared her view, So, my thing [objection] is with the inheritance laws especially, like people say how it is set out between males and females – with the rule that it was created in a time where it was specifically for that time. Women didn’t work that much, and they get a small share of inheritance - but that does not necessarily work now […] in a world that is different from it [when then laws were created]”

Hakeem, who lived in Australia, was skeptical about the implementation of the sharia, although did recognize there were measures that could be taken to make it more suitable in the contemporary context, It just stands against a lot of views that we have especially about women, like more restrictions for women. And I just don’t think that the world could function using the typical sharia law. There are a lot of Muslims that advocate the idea of reforming. Yeah, yeah, I think it is important to modernize sharia law and sort of make it fair and work and probably eliminate anything to do with death.

Fayrooz was concerned that implementing sharia laws would create power imbalances, particularly with men holding the power of enforcing the laws, I would say yeah, power isn’t distributed evenly. […] It is more like who has more opportunities once sharia law happens. Men always have more opportunities in sharia law. I mean sharia says, ‘Here are my laws. Follow them’, so you don’t really make laws once there is sharia, you just follow sharia’s own laws. Well. They are not lawmakers; they are just enforcers.

Being a young woman in the UK, Sofia felt it hard to imagine a life under the rules of the sharia. She believed sharia law was biased against women, and brought up the example of divorce to support this view, noting not only the bias but the impracticality of these rules, It was regarding divorce [consultation with a religious scholar/imam]. I really didn’t know the procedure and the process of how it works and what the women rights are. Again, because culture blames the woman, and culture always believes the side of the man. And in Islam, you have an iddah period. When a woman gets divorced, culture says that she can’t

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leave the house. And for me it was a little difficult because it’s like - well I have to work. So, I can’t keep iddah for three months because I’m working.

Fatima argued that sharia was no longer relevant, and clearly asserted her position against its implementation, No, I don’t think sharia would exist, and I think sharia law was made for a very particular time and it was meant for like a world in which the entire ummah was Muslim. And that is not [the world] which we have, and it is divided and so, like it wouldn’t even work like in an Islamic country.

In contrast to the participants who were sympathetic or favorable toward the sharia, this group of participants felt that human rights, democracy, and other systems have evolved beyond the sharia and have created a set of universal moral standards which are superior to those derived from religious inspired texts. From Nadimah’s perspective, these rules were once useful however no longer hold relevance. She elaborated on this in her response, So, before Islam you had all these people doing disgusting things like murdering their daughter, and you know women had zero rights. And nobody could do anything, it was the aristocrats and people were just going around and doing horrible things. But I think when sharia came along with the advent of Islam, people were tamed, people became more civilized and that is what I think its greatest benefits were at the time. Now I don’t think it is applicable because we are such a globalized [society], and we live in different countries. and I think that law is arbitrary now I think that – well not arbitrary but values are arbitrary. Like we all have a common understanding about matters [universal values and rights].

In addition to her understanding that these rules were mostly irrelevant now, Nadimah also believed that important laws from sharia will already be incorporated, “I think as ideas they are great, but I am pretty sure they would have already been implemented, the ones that are beneficial.” Several of the participants who did not believe in the contemporary application of sharia did concede that there were certain positive elements of sharia. They also believed that if sharia jurisprudence underwent modernization, there was a possibility they could support its implementation. Aftab, for example, suggested that although the moral reasoning

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behind sharia was often sound, the laws themselves needed modernizing. After considering if this modernization was possible, he remained uncertain. This uncertainty was reflected in other participants’ responses. American participant Bashir felt that sharia was, in a sense, already part of US laws. He noted that the ideas that had paved the way to the American Constitution dated back to the times of the Enlightenment in which Muslim thought and the sharia were very influential. He explained, Islamic laws present in America because these principles are very much the same. And besides these, in many of these, what they call American system or American law or American justice and so on and so forth. It’s not the Americans invented them. They have been there [since the Enlightenment] […] It’s not that they sprouted out of nowhere.

Rania did not object to sharia in principle but felt a general confusion and lack of clarity around its meaning and application made it a difficult topic. She believed that having sharia in the UK would only make matters complicated and deepen rifts in society: Honestly, I don’t think it would be received well. For example, I don’t think us young Muslims have a complete understanding of the sharia law. So, if things were to be introduced, and I don’t have full understanding of it myself, there wouldn’t be a use to it. I would very much question it and I think generally White people and Black people would question it too.

The participants who held these views generally felt that the sharia had various morals and principles it could offer modern democracy and its legal infrastructure but were not ideal for adoption in their current shape. The views of these participants align with common critiques of sharia in the West, presented earlier in the chapter, that claim sharia has not undergone the process of secularization. This is an interesting finding, and it is possible that the participant’s ideas of sharia have been shaped by these debates.

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5.5 Sharia Was Designed Solely for Muslim Majority Societies A group of young Muslims with a secularist outlook argued that sharia law should not be implemented in a Western country, because its rules were designed solely for Muslim majority societies. Fayrooz, for instance, argued that “there is no use for sharia law in Australian politics, because sharia law is only used in Islamic states.” Kinza questioned if it was wise to implement Islamic law for not only Muslims but also non-Muslims in America. She thought that “following the law of the land” was linked to, or similar to following sharia. Nadeem similarly commented, I think what Islam says is that ‘you should follow the rule of the land’ [… It is] explicitly clear that sharia law does not apply to Australia because Australia is not an Islamic country and there is already a legal system in place. There is a legal constitution that you follow that other Australians do at the same time. So, I think there should not be any parallel system to the Australian legal system.

Majeed claimed that implementing sharia in Australia would ‘not be very useful.’ He continued, Why would you put sharia law here? You should put Australian law. I don’t think it will be a good idea to have Sharia law in a political context, it has already caused a lot of problems and I am not a big fan of it. And if you go to countries which have sharia law, like Malaysia and Indonesia, it is suited for those countries as they are majority-Muslim countries. In terms of Australia - we have a more relaxed and Westernized view, and it would be incompatible.

Ajmal also felt that following the laws in place in a Western country was sufficient for Muslims. When asked if the sharia should be implemented in Australia where he lives, the participant responded ‘No, not for Australia,’ adding that if someone lives in Australia, they ‘should abide by the Australian laws.’ Aanadi, who lived in the USA, felt that the sharia was not feasible in any contemporary society. She explained,

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“I don’t think that’s something that is feasible or fair in a society that are not a Muslim majority. Even in countries that are Muslim majority, I don’t think it’s quite fair to the people who aren’t Islam.” She continued, “Because I think Muslims can still operate in full Islam in a place where there is no sharia law. Don’t live in sharia law. I don’t think that invalidates our Islam.”

Liaqat commented ‘I do not think that sharia law is very useful for American politics,’ and that it is only applicable in cases of a Muslim majority country that is willing to accept the sharia law. Even though she did want to see some directives of the sharia used in America where she lived, she reasoned, America - a country that has like the legal history that is it has, the political history that is has, how would sharia help it?

Lailah did not believe in the application of sharia in a Western democracy because, I am not a big fan of religion being pushed on the people who don’t follow it.

Rizwan expressed a similar sentiment regarding the place of sharia in a modern non-Muslim country. He said, With all respect I would say no. Because we are living in the country, and that is [the] UK, and implementing sharia law is not necessary with all respect. Purely because we are not a Muslim majority country. If the UK was a Muslim majority country, then that would be a different scenario, but I think because we are in a Muslim minority country […] again the sharia law should not be applied.

There was a ‘strictness’ related to the sharia noted by some who felt it did not match the norms of contemporary Western societies. Saima put it in the following way, You know if you are to apply sharia law tomorrow, let us say if you are going to [do] that tomorrow in a country that has used democracy for hundreds of years - that will be really rude. I wouldn’t recommend that. I wouldn’t say it is a good idea. [sharia is] not useful, […] because I find

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it too strict for people nowadays. People today are very…not as before, as they might find sharia very harsh. […] The examples I can give is the gay marriage, which is or the latest one which is [related to legalizing] drugs, the law about the drugs. Like sharia wouldn’t be compatible to that.

Shiza used the example of gender and how modern Western liberal conceptions of gender clashed with interpretations of gender in the sharia. She explained her stance, “It has no place in the British political space to be honest. It cannot be integrated into the British politics, and that is because there are certain rules in Islam that cannot simply be applied to British society.” She further added, “The sharia covers sexuality so closely and England is now coming to the point that they are becoming so much more liberal towards homosexuality and transgenders and there is so much of a clash. Because this is a British country, I don’t know if I should it, this is a White man or a British man’s country, and there is no place for it here.”

Like many others in the group, Imran thought sharia was incompatible with the democratic or modern nation state. He was clear about his stance in his comment that, This is not an Islamic state. The definition of sharia is Islamic law. To apply an Islamic law in a non-Islamic country does not make any sense. If Muslims wanna follow Islamic laws then they are free to do so, they don’t need to force it upon other people living in the country.

Participants in this viewpoint group also argued that because Western societies are multicultural, allowing Muslims the privilege of sharia would be unfair to all other religious groups. Aliyah, an Australian, argued that sharia should not be implemented, Because Australia is a secular country and if we look at the religious backgrounds of the people you would see that the majority are Christian or Buddhist or Hindu or don’t ascribe to any religion.

Aleem also noted it was unfair to expect non-Muslims to follow an Islamic legal system in Muslim minority countries. She explained,

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Because we are not a Muslim country. Not everyone believes the same things as we believe therefore, we don’t have the right to impose those laws on them [non-Muslims]. That is up to Allah at the end of the day. How they live their life is how they live. We can’t force them to live their lives in a way that they do not believe in it.

Several participants also noted the impracticality or complexity of implementing sharia, mainly due to the fluid nature of sharia. Fayrooz clearly noted, I think it is very difficult given that there are so many standards and requirements to apply sharia law to a country. You can’t just pick and choose terms, it is a very strict governing system. So, a country like Australia, which is very loosely governed, it will be very difficult and almost impossible to apply sharia law.

Ajola was not as quick to dismiss the value of sharia, but she believed it was nearly impossible to establish sharia in a Western nation at present. She attributed this to lack of ‘honest’ people in modern societies, “I believe that the first generation of Muslims were the best generation. And then every generation that comes, it’s less than that, less good.” She added that in order to have the sharia system applied properly, “you need honest people and I’m not sure if there are many of them left.”

Nonetheless, most of the group felt it was: “illogical,” “absurd,” or “impractical,” to impose sharia in a Western context. Fayrooz, was pessimistic in his view, It is pointless [implementing sharia in Australia]. It is a joke. Well, some people are just dumb. You know the average human being is not very smart. I think that you just can’t mix oil and water sometimes. The two can’t exist at the same time. The Australian law and sharia law cannot exist at the same time. Is that how it is. It’s because the laws are there to govern people and if the people don’t want to be governed by certain laws you are not going to be able to enforce it, so there is just going to be pointless bloodshed.

These perspectives, which were often quite strongly opposed to the implementation of sharia, are quite different from discussions that consider the possibility of sharia existing in a plural legal framework. The respondents

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appeared to understand the sharia as more of an absolute set of laws that would overtake existing laws, rather than be used in a supplementary or complimentary manner. The possibility of the amalgamation of sharia and Western laws was not raised by many participants in the secularist groups.

5.6

Conclusion

To address some of the myths and to humanize the concept, the chapter investigated how young Muslims understand sharia and its relevance in their lives. The interviews with young Muslims revealed no singular idea of what sharia means for Muslims, and furthermore that sharia is also a misunderstood and at times feared concept among Muslims in the West. The chapter’s thematic analysis presents the varied attitudes toward sharia among young Muslims, who either believe that Islamic law is beneficial to society and ought to be implemented to a degree, or view sharia as an outdated system of law superseded by secular Western legal frameworks. These attitudes are very useful in challenging commonly held misconceptions regarding sharia. Interviewees did not bring up terms such as ‘Islamic state,’ ‘sharia state,’ or ‘khilafat,’ which are commonly attributed to Islamic law in media debates about ISIS or other jihadist groups. The interviews show how for some sharia simply guides the ‘the law of the land,’ while others believe sharia is the ‘guiding principles’ of Islam. The majority of participants indicated that religion belonged in the private domain, and consequently, when discussing Islam and Islamic law they believed that Islamic law is not necessary to govern public life in the West. However, for those in favor of sharia being implemented, they justified that it added value to the existing legal system for both the Muslim community and broader society. The reasoning behind these differing rationales demonstrates no uniform way the average young Muslims sees the sharia, which is a sharp contrast to what mainstream media represents for its audience. A curious finding presented in this chapter is the fact that sharia is not fully understood by most participants. While few were unfamiliar with the word, most did not comprehend it fully or were unaware of its exact legal implications. This is interesting given that many studies, referenced through the book, note that newer generation migrants have a closer association with religion compared to their parents. This suggests that religiosity has little to do with taking an interest in the jurisprudence of the faith. This finding can also be explained by considering the nature

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of sharia itself. Given that there is no one ‘standard’ understanding of sharia, it is difficult and complex to compile and communicate its message. Secondly, no successful model of sharia exists for young Muslims to imitate or from which they might borrow ideas. In the discussions, examples of how Muslim majority countries have failed implementing sharia commonly arose. In addition, many also noted that the lack of agreement on basic issues ranging from fixed times of prayer to the behavior of Islamic leaders, showing how sharia is a complex and often confusing subject. Thirdly, sharia is not only derived from Quran but also traditions and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions, which makes it a topic that requires expert knowledge to fully comprehend. Its context and time-bound nature requires a degree of legal training, which some felt modern jurists are lacking. All of these considerations render sharia difficult to understand, communicate, and apply. Some participants considered sharia a pre-medieval legal code, while for others it is the way of life prescribed for Muslims. Finally, the negative connotations surrounding sharia in the West may have acted as a discouraging factor for some to pursue an interest in Islamic jurisprudence. Despite the lack of concrete certainty about the sharia, the young Muslims interviewed did not hesitate in constructing opinions on the subject at hand, some of which were informed and some the product of guesswork. This led to the categorization of the perspectives into two key groups in the chapter. The first group consisted of young individuals who felt an attachment to the idea of sharia. Various explanations were provided by this group as to why they felt sharia was relevant in their lives in the West. The most popular belief was that sharia promoted better morals in society, from the best way to butcher an animal through to underlining the need for honesty in politics. A sub-group of participants firmly believed that sharia’s moral dimension would improve society, and consequently that it could or should be incorporated into the existing legal system. The other sub-group thought that Muslims, due to their religious beliefs, should be allowed some digression from mainstream courts or legal system. Interviewees supporting this view were essentially advocating for legal pluralism and referred to various examples to support their ideas. The examples included cases of success from countries where sharia was implemented, the life of Prophet Mohammed, finding examples where sharia was allowed in the West, and drawing comparisons and identifying similarities between sharia and modern ideas of democracy and human rights. While both groups were convinced of their opinions, there

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were unable to explain how sharia would be implemented and what the consequences of its implementation might be. The second major grouping of participants in this topic were the Muslims with a legal-secular outlook, who argued against implementing sharia in the West. Within this group, there were two very distinct subgroups. The first believed that sharia was irrelevant in the modern world, while the second believed that sharia was incompatible with Western legal and political traditions. In sharp contrast with the pro-sharia group, these participants felt modern liberal traditions were violated by sharia. The rights of women were a particular point of concern for both men and women alike in this group, and some even termed the implementation of sharia as ‘moving backwards.’ This group also noted that sharia was quite context specific and bound to a specific time in history. Adding to its retrograde nature, the risks and dangers associated with the misuse of sharia made it an unwelcome presence in modern societies for participants in this sub-group. The other sub-group that emerged within the thematic analysis was predominantly concerned with the primacy of the ‘law of the land.’ They felt that despite living in a Western country, Islam allowed and even encouraged them to follow the law of the lands providing they had religious freedoms. All participants in this sub-group believed they had full religious freedom; thus, sharia was rendered unnecessary. Secondly, given that Muslims were a minority in their respective countries, most felt that it was counterproductive to start a debate about, let alone begin implementing sharia. Despite the differences in opinions, Muslim seculars were aware of the negative connotations surrounding sharia. However, participants in this group still listed ‘good’ things about sharia but felt that these good things are universal morals already encoded in their country’s laws. Like the pro-sharia group, these participants were also not well-informed about sharia. Most made educated guesses and assumptions while carrying out the discussions. It is an ironic discovery that most interviewees, all of whom are Muslims, know very little about sharia and were often quite open in admitting their lack of clarity. Yet the Western non-Muslim media apparatus have regularly discussed and interpreted the term with confidence—undoubtedly overshadowing and distracting from more careful and thoughtful considerations of sharia, and its implications in the West and Muslim majority countries. The consultation of the literature and interview responses highlight that sharia, within and outside the Muslim community, remains a widely discussed yet little-understood concept.

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Furthermore, the events of September 11 have made it even more difficult to explore in an open, honest, and objective manner. The chapter allows for an opportunity to consider sharia away from mainstream understandings of the concepts to aid not only Muslims in the West but the West itself.

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Kashyap, Ridhi, and Lewis, Valerie A. (2013). “British Muslim Youth and Religious Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Investigation.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2117–2140. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870. 2012.672761. Khan, A. Saeed. (2012). “Sharia Law, Islamophobia and the U.S. Constitution: New Tectonic Plates of the Culture Wars.” 12 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 123. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle= hein.journals/margin12&div=6&id=&page=. Khan, Fazal Rahim, et al. (2012). “Global Media Image of Islam and Muslims and the Problematics of a Response Strategy.” Islamic Studies 51(1), 5–25. Accessed 10 May 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/23643922. Kidder, Robert L. (1983). Connecting Law and Society. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Korteweg, A. C., and Selby, J. A. (Eds.). (2012). Debating Sharia: Islam, Gender Politics, and Family Law Arbitration. University of Toronto Press. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2ttxc2. Mayer, A. E. (2013). Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (5th ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429495120. Moghissi, Haideh, and Ghorashi, Halleh. (2016). Muslim Diaspora in the West: Negotiating Gender, Home and Belonging. New York: Routledge. Naderi, P. S. Darius. (2016). “Gender, Martyrdom, and the Management of Stigmatized Identities Among Devout Muslims in the U.S.” PhD thesis submitted to Sociology and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas. Accessed 10 May 2021. https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/ 21879/Naderi_ku_0099D_14505_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Nilan, Pam. (2017). Muslim Youth in the Diaspora: Challenging Extremism Through Popular Culture. Oxon and New York: Routledge. Pew. (2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life. Possamai, Adam, Turner, Bryan S., Cheng, Jennifer E., Voyce, Malcolm, and Dagistanli, Selda. (2016). “Shari’a and Everyday Life in Sydney.” Australian Geographer 47(3), 341–354. Poushter, J. (27 April 2016). “The Divide Over Islam and National Laws in the Muslim World.” Pew Research. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/ 04/27/the-divide-over-islam-and-national-laws-in-the-muslim-world/. Powell, Russell. (2012). “Evolving Views of Islamic Law in Turkey.” Journal of Law and Religion 28(2), 467–487. www.jstor.org/stable/23645195. Richardson, J., and Springer, V. (2013). “Legal Pluralism and Shari’a in Western Societies: Theories and Hypotheses.” In L. Beaman and W. Sullivan (Eds.), Varieties of Religious Establishments (pp. 201–218). Burlington: Ashgate. Sack, Peter. (1986). “Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments.” In Peter Sack and Elizabeth Minchin (Eds.), Legal Pluralism. Proceedings of the Canberra

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Law Workshop VII (pp. 1–16). Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences (Australian National University). Schmidt, Garbi. (2004). “Islamic Identity Formation Among Young Muslims: The Case of Denmark, Sweden and the United States.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24(1), 31–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/136020004200 0212223. Shamsy, A. El, and Coulson, Noel James (24 January 2021). Shar¯ı.ah. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shariah. Tamanaha, Z. Brian, and Lehmann, S. Johan. (2021). Legal Pluralism Explained: History, Theory, Consequences. New York: Oxford University Press. Turner, B. S., and Arslan, B. Z. (2014). “Legal Pluralism and the Shari’a: A Comparison of Greece and Turkey.” The Sociological Review 62(3), 439–456. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12117. Utych, Stephen M. (2018). “How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” Political Research Quarterly 71(2), 440–452. Accessed 10 May 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/26600483. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (1999). Dynamic Muslim Legal Pluralism in England, Turkey and Pakistan and the Reconstruction of Unofficial Muslim Laws in England, Turkey and Pakistan. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3173987 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173987. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2014). “Semi-Official Turkish Muslim Legal Pluralism: Encounters Between Secular Official Law and Unofficial Shari’a.” In A. Possamai, Bryan S. Turner, and James T Richardson (Eds.), The Sociology of Shari’a: Case Studies from Around the World, Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion (pp. 51–65). Cham: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016a). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Cham: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016b). Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan. Reprint. London and New York: Routledge. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2019a). “Potential Impact of the AKP’s Unofficial Political Islamic Law on the Radicalisation of the Turkish Muslim Youth in the West.” In F. Mansouri and Z. Keskin (Eds.), Contesting the Theological Foundations of Islamism and Violent Extremism: Middle East Today (pp. 163–184). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2019b). “Nation Building, Islamic Law and Unofficial Legal Pluralism: The Cases of Turkey and Pakistan.” In Legal Pluralism in Muslim Contexts. Leiden and Boston: Brill. https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/ 9789004398269/BP000012.xml.

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CHAPTER 6

Engagement Inside Home (Australia/UK/ USA) Country

6.1

Introduction

The stereotyping of Muslim youth in the West becomes only too clear when considering their tropes in popular entertainment over the past two decades. Popular Western movies typically depict a studious individual with ‘tiger parents,’ a young woman oppressed or constrained by her faith and those around her, or a lost and radicalized youth causing harm in the name of religion. While there has been slow progress on the silver screen in the representation of Muslims, it is important that greater efforts are made to fully move beyond Hollywood’s stereotypical caricatures of young Muslims. This chapter is an effort to understand how these youth interact with predominately Anglophone Western society. It is noteworthy that some young Muslims might not choose religion or ethnicity as a preferred identifier; nonetheless, prevalent socio-political factors force this identity upon them or result in them being viewed primarily through this lens. This also makes it essential to understand how young Muslims construct their own sense of community in the West. To achieve this, the present chapter further explores how participants’ engagement with society also reflects what it means to be a young Muslim in the West. This investigation considers both the religious and non-religious activities of the interviewees and the ways in which these aid them in forming connections with their community.

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6.2

Muslims and Engagement with Society

The ways through which Muslims engage with society have been a topic of interest for scholars, particularly in recent years (Yilmaz 2012). For instance, Harris and Roose’s (2014) study examines the civic participation of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries. The authors find that interacting with others is particularly useful in creating a ‘citizen communication network’ through which individuals can discuss contradictory ideas and try to understand other points of view. This breaks down social barriers and develops a sense of mutual understanding. Consequently, engaging with society is impactful on young Muslims, and helps them express their identity, establish tolerance and respect, and participate as citizens of their respective nations (see also Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2022). Mosques are a means for many to not only explore their identity but also offer avenues for external civic engagement. Oskooii and Dana (2017) explore these avenues by focusing their work on the critical role of mosques in Great Britain, which enhance civil and political participation among their attendees. The purpose of their study is to challenge the essentialist discourses of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy; these common narratives conceptualize Islam as inherently radical, militant, and extremist. To refute these black and white ideas, Oskooii and Dana relied on social capital and social identity theories that provide a framework for understanding the institutional aspects of the mosque in the promotion of civil and political participation. Firstly, the mosque serves as a “common meeting place” which allows Muslims to discuss issues, and form leadership and community building among their respective communities. Secondly, mosque-goers are offered opportunities to participate in civil and political activities. This is important, because Muslims have faced many challenges including marginalization and bias in recent decades, and the mosque provides a space for Muslims to come together away from these challenges. In this way, social capital theory points to the mosque as a space where solidarity can flourish for the “stigmatized” groups. This empirical study produces two critical results: Attendance in mosque is substantially associated with firstly, greater electoral and nonelectoral political participation and active civic engagement; and secondly a reduction in politically motivated violence (PMV). The electoral participation refers to voting, whereas non-electoral indicates activities such as petition signing, voluntary community work, protest participation, and

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donations. Most importantly, the study reveals those British Muslims who often attend the mosque are more likely to participate in civil and political activities than those Muslims who do not go to the mosque. Oskooii and Dana (2017) also presented a comparative analysis between ethnic minority Muslims and ethnic minority Christians and found that both church and mosque are the “catalyst” in constructing a politically and civically active individual. Like Muslims, the churchgoers are also more engaged in political and civic participation than non-church goers. However, the study shows that “mosque-goers in the U.K. appear to be more engaged than churchgoers” because the former “may have more at stake” and may have to protect and promote their rights from various contemporary challenges (Oskooii & Dana, 2017: 1481). Karimshah et al. (2014) carried out a similar study in Brisbane, Australia. In this study, they explored the role of the mosque in Muslim life in Brisbane, and much like Oskooii and Dana, found that the mosque facilitated meaningful engagement opportunities within both the Muslim community and wider society. The mosque thus does not only provide opportunities for engagement with a religious identity but also offers meaningful opportunities for community engagement. Thus, the idea that terrorist sentimentalities are furthered or fostered at mosques is quite a gross—and inaccurate—generalization. Mosques are an important place of social networks for Muslims that help them engage with social causes, politics, and the wider community in the West. In the USA, a survey of over 1000 youth found that Muslim youth from an Arab background were often engaged in social work within their respective communities (Read 2015). The author found that this was quite contrary to popular beliefs, especially pertaining to Muslim women’s participation in society. The literature ultimately finds that mosques are a space for young Muslims to engage with society and express their identity. This is of course not ‘integration,’ but rather a space for young Muslims to express themselves fully, and live and engage in a multicultural society. Using a Norwegian case study of sporting activities organized by mosques, Walseth (2015) notes that activities organized by the mosque construct migrant networks that promote multiculturalism. Mosque-led activities therefore help many retain a sense of connection with their backgrounds while finding connections with their Western home. McLoughlin (2005) also used the case study of a mosque from Bradford, UK, that aided in community engagement of young Muslims, which

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at the time played a positive role in debunking some of the misconceptions around ethnoreligious tensions. While McLoughlin (2005) brings to the surface the idea of a “good mosque,” they also problematically shift the ‘burden’ of integration onto the Muslims and their religious institutions. When presented in this manner, Muslims and mosques are expected to conduct activities to present themselves as engaging or not ‘self-segregated’ individuals in their receiving Western country. ´ However, more recent works such as Ozalp and Cufurovi´ c (2021), who explore the lives of Australian Muslim youth, find that Muslim youth engagement needs to be understood beyond the mosque or their religious identities. They examine how active citizenship has led many young Muslims in Australia to engage with society in secular ways. Essentially, the authors argue that young Muslims are generally engaged and positive citizens of Australia. Their study provides a refreshing way to understand young Muslims in the West beyond the lens of religion and as individuals with various identities and interests. These findings are similar to those revealed in Lam and Mansouri’s work (2021), which discovers that while young Muslims in Australia have been misunderstood in the past two decades, this has not prevented them from finding ways to manage an identity that is compatible with both the Western and Islamic worlds, so to speak, and often amalgamates both. Thus, there is a growing focus on studying Muslim youth and even migrants from various backgrounds through a more expansive lens. Mansouri and Kirpitchenko (2015) conducted a meta-analytic study to find out about the practices of active citizenship among migrants’ youth. The researchers analyzed 258 surveys and 50 interviews of participants aged 14–25 years, in which genders and varying socio-economic statuses were significantly represented. The findings of the study suggested that while participants expressed a willingness to participate in active citizen activities, they did not like participation in structured, formal engagements. As most participants attended high school, they expressed a preference for participation in school-based groups in comparison with other groups. When questioned whether it is necessary to involve themselves in community service, the participants were found to be very interested in engaging themselves with community groups to address local problems. The only formal place of gathering for which participants expressed approval was the place of worship. Beyond this, the participants said that they do not join formal forums of community engagement except when their parents made them attend. Finally, the research found

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that not only did the participants express a willingness to participate in solving local community issues, but they also expressed a desire to assume leadership roles wherever needed. Thus, they were willing to take charge and lead toward solutions for the problems faced by their community. While the place of worship might be an important formal means of engaging with the community, it is quite clear that beyond that informal engagement points are more common. Self-driven involvement is explored by Roose and Harris (2015) who examine how Australian Muslims are enacting everyday citizenship through their active self-driven participation in multicultural civic spaces. The article, based on interviews with 80 young Australian Muslims from migrant backgrounds, explores the tensions between the ideals of multiculturalism, liberal citizenship, and Muslims. The study explored how young Muslims function as citizens through everyday informal engagement including workplace interactions which helped to break barriers among Muslims and other communities, and neighborly interactions which were guided by the Islamic emphasis on strong neighborly bonds. Thus, Islam contributes significantly to the development of civicmindedness that thrives in the secular multicultural context. These young Australian Muslims flourished in organic, unmanaged multicultural spaces such as volunteer networks, which create space for moving beyond securitizing frames into productive multicultural exchanges. In light of these findings, this book employs the idea of “active citizenship.” This concept considers the active presence and participation of the subjects in different segments of society, rather than the legal conceptualization of them being a citizen and having allied responsibilities (although this is also an important consideration that will be explored in chapter six). Active citizenship is rooted in “inter-subjective encounters and ‘acts’ that takes place in everyday life rather than in relation to abstract notion of ‘values’” (Johns et al. 2015: 173). Various other studies have employed this framework to successfully yield refreshing results in the exploration of migrant communities. When interviewing young Muslims in the West, Johns et al. (2015) found that more than half of the participants described 9/11 events as their primary “formative experience” that resulted in them engaging more with their religion and claiming citizenship rights. Most interviewees shared how the expression of their religiosity became a critical instrument in making a claim to their citizenship through active engagement within their communities. Most participants also highlighted how the moral and

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ethical training that they follow is rooted within the five pillars of Islam. So, these responses show how morality, generosity, and responsibility are fostered by a religiosity that produces an active citizen. Peucker’s (2018) work also looks at the relevance of “active citizenship” by Muslims in Western countries. Although there is no fixed definition of active citizenship, Peucker explains that the term generally constitutes “an understanding of citizenship that emphasizes the dynamic aspects of performative processes rather than the static aspect of holding equal legal rights” (Peucker 2018: 556–557). Peucker assesses the civic and political engagement of Muslims by focusing on two important questions: firstly, how do Muslim scholars respond to the compatibility of religiosity and citizenship in democratic societies? Secondly, how do Muslims themselves view their role as active citizen in the West? In asking these questions, he uncovers the growing trend of Islamic jurisprudence of fiqh al aqalliyyat al-Muslema, which relates to the citizenship of Muslims in democracies. This ruling denotes that “any land in which a Muslim can practice his religion freely becomes dar al-Islam” (Peucker 2018: 558), and therefore active citizenship in Western states is permissible under the Islamic principles. The next component of Peucker’s empirical analysis looks at the individual Muslims and their conceptualization of citizenship. Islamic law does not oblige Muslims to participate as an active citizen in the society they live in. However, Peucker argues Muslims tend to not just participate civically and politically in Western democracies but they also “decide to go one step further: describing their faith as an important driver for their active citizenship” (2018: 563). For Muslims in this study, faith was found to be a primary motivational force in three ways: (i) as a basis of empowerment and strength encouraging civic engagement, (ii) an inherent source for “serving humanity” by considering the principle of lived religiosity, and (iii) believing active citizenship as a religious duty (obligation) for which they will be rewarded by God. Hence, this study shows how religion can be a stronger driver for greater political and civic engagement. Using the framework of active citizenship, this chapter analyses the themes expressed by interviewees to understand how young Muslims engage with their respective societies.

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6.3 Local Community Volunteering and Associations The idea of what constitutes the respondent’s ‘community’ was not confined to religious or transnational alliances or even to a specific geographical location. For many, the community simply meant people who supported them such as close friendship networks and supportive kin. For others, the common denominator of being a migrant and feeling understood by those who had similar experiences helped them forge a sense of community. In some cases, participants felt close to people who shared a similar cultural background, even if they came from entirely different nations. At times, possession of a similar religion was the glue holding these relationships together. The interviews also revealed that for some young Muslims, the community can mean their immediate friends from the religious-ethnic community, but often specifically excludes ‘people who judge,’ such as the first generation of migrants or older individuals within the diaspora community. Like all the other aspects of young Muslims’ lives presented throughout this book, there is no singular interpretation or lived experience of ‘community.’ For many respondents, the community was tied to giving back and supporting those who needed it. One example is Zulikha and her peers, for whom giving back via helping women in their community was important. Together the friends volunteered for female empowerment projects in their community. The dedication the young women harbored for strengthening their community, taking on local issues, and promoting equality and inclusivity was evident. As the participant herself explained, I am involved in charity work, and it is not a big thing, but it is just some uni friends [and I], and we have been doing it [since] after we graduated. And most of us are women and we are trying to sort of better society, and we find areas, and we are doing events, and we are very cautious and wary of women’s issues […] And we are also giving opportunit[ies] for people to keep home and do what they want to do on their own beliefs, and the whole idea is to be as inclusive as possible in terms of gender and practices.

Nargis also provided extensive support to members of what she considered her community, I mean I mentor a lot of students, I mentor a lot of refugees, and students from, even from other ethnic backgrounds within the Muslim community.

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You know, trying to kind of help, you know, where they are stuck or where they have kind of stopped dreaming for themselves, you know to going to university and stuff. I help with you know university applications, probably close to thirty students I [have] help[ed] now in a year.

Aqil, who had grown up and lived in Australia, dedicates time to uplifting young individuals from migrant backgrounds via mentorship classes, I think acting as a mentor and helping with interviews with school students who come in to work […] I am involved quite heavily at work with these sort of things.

Arben who lived in the USA was a key organizer for cultural, religious, and sporting events, mainly for youth, I organize and I help my cultural community here, I organize a children’s festival every year, I also teach Albanian kids Albanian flock dance and sometimes Albanian language in the mosque. As I said I am [a] councillor, I try teaching kids some basic things about Islam and the faith. Soccer I also teach, I teach kids soccer as well. Yeah, it is mostly youth activities.

Hiranur, who was settled in the USA, explained her passion for supporting migrant communities because she felt close to the struggle many of them faced. She listed various ways she provided this support— from teaching language and culture weekly, to assisting the newly engaged, and helping families who have newly migrated to the country. Interview responses also revealed that it was common for many young Muslims to partake in various hobbies and clubs. For some respondents, the definition of community was a close kin network. Shiza explained that relaxing and being creative with her family and friends was her way of community engagement, I like to [… and] I do quite a bit of photography and this is something that I really enjoy […] taking pictures, editing them and seeing the final product, I love cooking and I especially love cooking with my mum. I do some henna art and I would do some henna work and stuff like that.

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Volunteer Work via Mosque

Participants also found opportunities to volunteer via the mosque. Supporting the findings of the literature review, the interview responses highlighted that the mosques were not only places of religious observance but also of community (religious and secular) outreach and involvement. Anandi was involved in volunteer work through the mosque, We used to do volunteer activities through our masjid where we would contribute to food drives, or we would like do things like walking for a cause in college. I did two volunteer activit[ies] as part of a group.

Ebrar explained his charity involvement via his local mosque, I attend my mosque on Fridays, they have a stand there and they sell food, and I volunteer to help them sell that food.

Majeed also expressed his interest in community work and social engagements surrounded by a faith group. Although his schedule does not permit such regular catchups at the moment, he shared, Before this we had a community gathering every week on a Saturday and we would read and eat food and all that. We would read the Quran, and they would teach the Quran and we had religious talks. And they would give information like this person is feeling sick and helps everyone come together.

Muntazir was also able to participate in community-related projects via his mosque in the USA. He explained, I used to volunteer [… the charity was] called the project downtown. They feed the homeless every week. I was part of that, and I was part of volunteering for the mosque for the youth group.

It is also worth noting that in many cases, although it was the mosques that led to volunteering within the local community, their charitable activities were not targeted at only Muslim beneficiaries. For instance, Liaqat explained how his mosque-led activities inspired his involvement with grassroots movements within the city in which he lived,

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I have done a lot of grassroots civilities - whether it is like going to areas that are like food shelters [… or] a neighborhood street clean up […] we have done actual physical activities but also just like community outreach […] my mosque is located in Silver Spring, so I have done like a lot of community outreach in that area.

6.5 Socializing Within Mosque and Faith Associations Noor’s comments illustrate how for some, the mosque is a key focal point in their social life, Well, we pray together, we read books together. There are a lot of fun activities as well, we go to dinner together, we have tea together and we do have discussions and then we have people who actually teach us about some of the concepts in the religion. We have speakers who speak about important aspects in religion, so we have all sorts of activities. Sometimes it is all games and some fun stuff as well.

Activities at cultural clubs or organized within the faith community gave many an opportunity for self-expression and provided another point of gathering beyond the mosque. Hasan discussed being involved in these community activities, Yes, I mean I do participate in gatherings as in like in the local Hazara gathering that we do, and just to dinners that we do we go to places.

Yasir, who was based in New York, explained how their community was a platform to enrich her understanding of her faith and its applications and to make more connections, I’ll be at the Islamic center at the NYU, which is kind of where my community is. And I will go for classes on Mondays to learn how to read the Quran, not necessarily what’s in the Quran, but more how to critically think about it while you read it. Wednesdays they have a female scholar, so I get that wonderful female scholar perspective. She’s a great storyteller too, so she really takes the point home. And then, you know, in those days I also see some friends and meet with some people. And on Fridays, weekends, I’ll probably hang out with the friends I’ve made in that community.

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In discussion with many young Muslims who went to university at the time of the interviews, it was common to find they had joined an Islamic society on campus. These societies involved activities like hosting interfaith events, advocating for Muslim students on campus, and meeting with people from similar backgrounds. Yusuf also found the Islamic society he participated in to be a valuable environment, The Islamic club because I was like to go to more Islamic events and to learn more about religion as well.

Najeebah attended university in Australia; she explained how she joined one such society to meet people with similar values and express her religion with like-minded people, I thought because we are similar people, I can find friends that way, we can have a network outside. So, for Islamic society, I like to help out, and I help out there because they have events and I was [in] the musalah - the prayer room - often, so the same people are part of the group, so it is nice to have events with them sometimes.

Arifa was also quite active in her university-related Islamic society, and attended various events, In my university I am a member of an Islamic society. When they have events, like during Ramadan, they have iftar and I attend that, and during the year I try to attend when I can.

Arooba spoke of her affiliation and passion for the Islamic society at her university, I’ve been involved in my Islamic society in my university for a very long time. And also, I [have] a community which was a volunteering initiative which was part of the Islamic society. [It was] for the Muslim students at university and it became very successful. A lot of non-Muslims used to sign up for it as well. There were volunteering opportunities as well, and it was an amazing way to kind of interact with non-Muslims and do things together. I’m involved in CIP which stands for community impact projects.

Fayrooz was among a small but significant number of youths who felt that their community (religious and ethnic) was too suffocating for

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them or not serving the right purposes. This led to this group avoiding volunteering in the community or attending events. Fayrooz elaborated, Because at first you get involved in that stuff because you wanna do some good and you wanna better yourself and improve yourself. But you come to a realization after you spend a certain amount of time with them that it is usually all superficial and just based on greed and ego.

Omar shared how he did not feel comfortable with his religious-ethnic community and consequently had more friends outside of this community. He explained the lack of belonging he felt, I mean this is a bit of a weird one because generally my community consists of Lebanese people and ethnic minorities, and it is actually within that ethnic minority that I feel that I did not belong. And generally, I get along with people outside of it as well. So, yeah.

In some cases, the decision to seek connections outside their religious communities stemmed from a desire to broaden their horizons and make connections with other people in society. This will be explored below.

6.6

Participation and Volunteering Outside of Faith Community

Many participants also shared the volunteer work they had done for global causes or causes outside their immediate community. Beyond giving back, some participants also spoke of following their interests and passions in a range of community settings. These findings confirm the results ´ c (2021), whose of Lam and Mansouri (2021) and Ozalp and Cufurovi´ researchers found that young Muslims in Australia engage with society in both religious and secular ways, showing a capacity to merge both ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ worlds. Ajmal’s volunteer work indicates he feels responsible not only for his own country and fellow humans but also responsibility in his role as a global citizen. He discussed his contribution to re-forestation efforts that he had been involved in recently,

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Like volunteering and just trying to get […] trees planted and stuff like that, but also like since I have the knowledge, I can share that knowledge with others as well and help make them see that the environment is finite.

Similarly, Hasan was part of the United Nations Youth Council as a way to address global issues. On a personal note, he also found support from the larger community in Australia when he chose to stop consuming animal products. He explained, Yes, in a way. You know I have recently gone vegetarian. So, I am part of the group called vegans in Australia, so we share the same beliefs and [are against] animal cruelty.

Ameer, who lived in Australia keenly took part in raising funds and food drives for a range of causes. When asked to explain in detail which communities he focused on, he was clear in his response that the race, religion, culture, nationality of the individual, and cause did not matter. His goal was to help those in need. Similarly, Sohrab also took part in charity efforts without focusing on the affiliations of the beneficiaries. He provided an example, We are family in Washington, D.C. Basically I helped out with food deliveries so they would take food to low-income seniors who are facing issues because of gentrification, like their rent was going up or whatever. They were elderly and had lived there for a long time.

Others took on volunteering at community centers that serviced a broad segment of the community, not just one particular religious or ethnic group. Yezda, for instance, shared how she would volunteer, So, I would go to soup kitchens and helping the homeless and things like that.

Going to university gave participants an opportunity to engage with various communities beyond their own. Sumayya, for example, was involved in tutoring at her campus. Nadimah also tutored and provided student support at her university, I have done things at different schools where we help students who are of like disadvantaged communities - we help them with like understanding

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the school material a bit more, so it is kinda like extra aid, it is kind of like tutoring. But we also give support [for] university applications and things like that and that is alongside my university.

Qaiser, from the UK, also shared a secular humanitarian outlook toward volunteering and charitable work, I work with local charities, doing fundraisers, maybe two or three or four times a year. The fundraisers are for generally non-faith denominational, so the beneficiaries are whoever – who[ever] needs the benefits of these charities. I attend homeless sort of breakfast and dinners and special occasions [throughout] the year to help out. We try to do it collectively. We try to raise awareness for minority communities and on various conflict issues around the world. So yeah, we try to do our best as a family and as an individual.

She also contributed her time and energy to activities that were political in nature. She told the interviewer about helping organize a Black Lives Matter event, and partaking in roles that served outside the Muslim community, My group, we helped organize the biggest peaceful rally for Black Lives Matter and we collaborated with two Black Lives Matters organizations […] that were started by youth. So, we […] are very involved with working with non-Muslims.

Nadeem and his social group in Australia were involved with a range of events and affiliations. They even traveled to other states to be involved, We do go to different events, political events […] we talk about the current affairs of the political systems [in] our life and how we can improve the other lives of you know, fellow Australian communities. We might go to a pub; we might go to a trip - road trip to some other interstate places in Australia where we have something concerning […] a specific issue.

Other participants gave back by contributing their professional skills, knowledge, and interests. For instance, Aisha volunteered with children at the hospital, an area of professional interest for her, I do volunteer at a hospital every Sunday. It is called Radio Lollypop and it is just working alongside children in hospitals […] we prepare activities

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for children in hospitals, and we go visit their rooms, so their wards and we talk to them, we play games. This is mainly because people respond to their medication if they are a lot happier, so the whole point is to make them happier and feel more comfortable.

Kinza also used her skills in the field of medicine in her volunteer role. She explained, I volunteer at a student run medical clinic at my campus. I volunteer about twice a month for four to five hours each time. And I also participate in service organizations at the hospital […] on my campus for one hour. I’d say once a month.

Jameelah joined intercultural clubs and attended and volunteered in a lot of workshops, such as documentary workshops which aligned with their personal interests. Yusuf spoke of his desire to volunteer at a club that is very closely aligned with his passion for the environment, I am trying to start volunteer [work] with the Wilderness Society. it is like a forest, like environmental group because I like that kind of stuff - like the environment and […] helping change like people’s views about forests.

Hakeem and Haleemah both spoke of their interest in joining sporting clubs because of their passion for sports. Uthman also shared his passion and involvement in his local sporting clubs, So, yeah, I do Brazilian Jiu Jitsu. Yeah, I teach that sometimes and I practice it pretty much every day. I play indoor soccer regularly with people from the same community as well.

Those who had children also used their recreation and volunteering as an opportunity to engage with society, or they found connections through their children’s activities. Zia, who lived in the USA, explained that while he was not directly involved, his children’s participation in various activities provided a connection with the community. In his words, I’ve got my son in, you know, soccer and Boy Scouts. I [have] my daughter […in] Girl Scouts. I get to go out and do local community clean-ups to get them involved with charitable giving […] I don’t find time for myself to do [charity, but…] I make sure I try and get my kids involved.

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Latifah shared her desire to join more clubs if she had more time, and to interact with a broad array of people, “The thing is I don’t like to limit myself to one community, I try to and like to participate in different communities, in different programs and stuff.” She added that she is busy though, and it is hard to find the time to participate in activities both inside and outside her community. However, she does “want to because I want to get to meet new people but if I was free, I would join.”

Collectively, these answers provide a valuable insight into the different interests, concerns for others, and passions of young Muslims across different Western settings. They also provide substantial evidence that the respondents are not only motivated by faith but are also influenced by their interests, ambitions, and global awareness (which will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter). A sense of openness to meeting and engaging with new people permeated through these discussions and is influential in the forms of social engagement participants chose to have.

6.7 Generational Gaps: Distancing from the ‘Community’ In some cases, interviewees spoke of a decision or need to distance themselves from the Muslim community. There was some concern noted that these communities in the West were divided or disunited. While discussing community relations, many young Muslims from across the sample were quick to note that being Muslim at times was not enough to bring the community a cohesive identity. A significant number felt that sectarian divides were quite common. Ashar, for instance, came from the Ahmadiyya sect and felt the divide quite deeply, I would say that the other religious communities within America, there is a lack of unity.

Shiza’s response further illustrates sectarian fissures prevent the Muslim community from coming together, and addressing important issues, I think the Muslim community does not sit together because we are so divided between Sunni and Shia and Wahabi and Ahmadi and they don’t

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see that our basis is Islam. And where they are busy calling a […] Shia a kafir and the Shia is the same doing that [calling Sunnis kafir]. And I think there are so many problems in the Western world, the Muslim communitywe need to stay together and actually do something.

Others were disheartened by the lack of unity in the community when it came to making important decisions, for instance, about important religious events. Sana Ullah, like a few other interviewees, noted the division of perspectives within the UK that led the Muslim communities to celebrate Eid on different days. He expressed concern that the communities could not even come together and agree on when Ramadan, a very important day in Islam, begins, That is a problem, yeah. It is a problem because you cannot unite, you cannot come to one [together]. There are disagreements when you can’t even have the same day of Eid and you can’t even agree on what is the first day that Ramadan starts on, that is a problem. Ramadan starts on the same day for everybody.

Rizwan also noted the discrepancy between different people when they start Ramadan, also finding this different problematic in the religion, We start Ramadan, and we start at different days and this time we started Ramadan on Saturday and then there was fasting I believe on Friday and that is a major, major things. This discrepancy I think we see every single year, where some people will follow Saudi Arabia, and our argument would be do not follow Saudi Arabia, you should follow the country we live in based on the hadith and there is a guidance about that, but then other people have different points of views.

6.8 Religious and Ethnic Communities Are Too Insular Other individuals were critical of the limitations or insularity of the ‘Muslim community,’ and consequently sought to engage with other communities. Others felt the burden of judgment or a lack of understanding from the older generations. The interviews revealed that some respondents believed it was necessary and healthy, and helped broaden

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horizons, to interact outside of the religious or ethnic community. Muntazir from the USA, for example, shared his opinion that, I think what we [American Muslims] are lacking is that we as Muslims try to stick to one another and stand within our own circles. We don’t go out of the circle much. I think we should get out more and try to be involved into seminars […] where there is more Anglo Americans to talk to, to mingle with, to understand, to converse and share shared thoughts.

This sentiment is echoed by several young participants, from all three countries, indicating the desire of the younger generation to form horizontal and vertical connections within the social ecosystems in which they reside. This once again reinforces the willingness of new generations of Muslims in the West to look beyond their respective religious-ethnic communities and engage with the wider society. Most were either born in or had spent their formative years in these Western countries which had made them feel part of the broader society. They do not wish to be limited to only one part of society, in accordance with only one of the various facets of their identity. Accordingly, participants also expressed concern or dislike for the closed-off attitudes of some of the older generations who do not interact outside their community. For instance, Adeelah pointed out that older immigrant communities or older generations in Australia tended to be more isolated within their communities. She explained, A lot of Muslims tend to just take part, or like being involved in the Muslim community. But I think it is really important to be involved in the wider community if you wanna really bridge the gaps. Gaps in the understanding and everything. I think not only working for my community, but the wider community. Because honestly like when I think of the older generation, people like my mom’s age and stuff they literally - they only work for the Muslim community.

Bither, who resided in the UK, was worried about the ‘pockets’ where ghettoization was preventing interaction between immigrants and the broader society. She noted that there is a need to address these challenges; however, the government tends not only to ignore the situation but at times reinforces the issue,

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Like there is literally - there is a little Bangladesh, because people are refusing to integrate, they have created these ghettos where people don’t even speak English in White Chapel, it is just Bengali. Because they don’t see the friendliness from the locals there, so they have decided to create their own little city.

This gulf between the first migrant, usually the parent or grandparent, and the child was also a result of living around the community. Saad noted that East London, a part of the city with more immigrant communities, allowed for many people from South Asia to live comfortably within the microcosm of the municipality while limiting their connections with the wider community. However, the children born to migrants clearly grew up in a different setting with their own expectations of life and values. According to Saad, this leads to the division he witnessed within the Muslim community around him in the UK. He summed up his concern in his interview response, [You] might go to parts of East London where there is very little integration or you know they are not outside their own race, so like there are places there are seventy to ninety percent plus people of their own race, so I think that is an issue. And often these people, their parents might not speak the language or whatever, and of course that is an issue too.

Other young Muslims interviewed shared this concern. Khalifa, who resided in the USA, noted that the communities he saw were divided along national lines (relating to the country of origin), From what I’ve noticed, there is a bit of separation. I mean, differentiation based on ethnicity or nationality […] Say, for example, you go to a mosque, and they say this is an Arab mosque. This is a Pakistani mosque. I think things like that. I would say [this] is the biggest issue. I mean, from my perspective, affecting the Muslim community in the US.

Rania who lived in Britain resonated with the comment above as she shared her thoughts on the issues, We see this in the older generation more who are not more aware, like if it’s a Pakistani mosque, it’s only for Pakistani [people]. Either it is only for Bengalis, or for Somalis. It’s very much divided and we don’t see

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much engagement between different cultures because a lot of them don’t understand it or they refuse to acknowledge it.

Ajola also acknowledged a separation between different ethnic communities in the USA; however, she also believed everyone came together for their religion, I mean, maybe in certain places in America, you have communities being detached from each other, like, I don’t know, the Turkish people have their own laws to the Arabs, their own malls and not interacting a lot. But there’s plenty of cities. You have everyone coming to the same mosque and being together.

The interview responses indicated that young Muslims acknowledge and understand some difficulties and barriers older generations face in interacting beyond their own ethnic or religious communities. Their responses, however, also show a desire to personally move beyond this type of insulation and engage outside of the ‘comfort zones’ of their ethnic and/or religious communities.

6.9

Widening Gaps Between New and Older Generations of Muslims in the West

In addition to the insularity noted above, another clear finding of the interviews was the dissatisfaction among young Muslims living in the West with the attitudes or cultural differences within the older generations of their religio-ethnic communities. Sumayya, who lived in Australia, found the community she belonged to was problematic because it only supported members who agreed with them and lived life according to their expectations, The community only wants to care and nurture those people that are supposedly in the right path, according to their views […] There is a very thin line; I feel like they will only support you depending on what you are doing. So, it is not unconditional support.

Eileen also addressed this and explained in greater detail the distancing taking place between the older and younger generations, and its impact on the idea of a wholistic community. She also explained the difference

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in perceptions and attitudes between the generations when someone does something outside the community norms, Just because of the way that people have [been] brought up- that you always have the two sides of the community […] you are the center of gossip for the older generation […] ‘oh look at what she is going, what she has done?’ and then you have got the ones that would be praising you, ‘she has made a difference in the community, she is not following the trend’ and that kind of thing. So, you do get both.

Yezda also noted the difficulties in appeasing the older generations when there was such a significant culture shift in the younger generation, I think one of the many issues that we deal with is the fact that our parents are most likely immigrants, and they are very traditional, and they want things a certain way. But [for] us being raised in America, we are obviously you know affected by the culture and the environment […] I think a lot of us [young American Muslims] have a hard time trying to balance both things.

Bashir recognized that this issue was felt not only within the Muslim community but also other religious communities. Younger generations are unable to connect with the last two generations, consequently creating a gulf within faith communities. He explained, I could say one thing is the fact that the new generation - the second, the third generation, they have difficulty relating to their parent’s religion, upbringing, and things like that, because […] They’re in [a] different, completely different environment.

Given this gulf and at times the struggles for acceptance from the larger society, it was evident that young Muslims believed their identity was misunderstood by other members at times, and this made it harder for them to feel connected with their community. Behlul highlighted this struggle in his comments that, The lack of understanding about the needs of the US [Muslims], second generation US [Muslims] or American-born youth. They have a lot of unique needs and unique challenges […] I feel like the community doesn’t

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have the proper resources to access [support] those needs, and these kids are left alone in terms of dealing with the stress of their […] problems.

6.10 Problematic Gender Perceptions and Attitudes Within the Community Across the three counties both men and women, but especially the latter, felt that the community’s cultural norms also disadvantaged women. Under these circumstances, many young women chose to move away or distance themselves from the Muslim community. Aanandi, who lived in the USA, explained, You know, even though Islam promotes equality among all men and women, Muslims themselves still have not figured out a way to play the game. Still a lot of abuse in Muslim communities, whether that’s parents abusing their kids or, you know, husbands abusing their wives […] That needs to be worked on. There are a lot of Muslim sheikhs who have, you know, recently been called out about, you know, abusing the people who they’re supposed to be helping.”

Sofia, who like Aanndi had parents from South Asia, echoed a similar struggle for her freedoms within the community. Her story about not being able to wear what she wanted and eventually breaking the cultural imposition showcases the struggles women face within the ‘community,’ So, my family believes that woman should wear Asian clothes, like shalwar kameez. When I was younger, I was made to wear shalwar kameez, I couldn’t wear English clothes or Western clothes. I was only allowed to wear Asian clothes. And as I grow older, where does it say in Islam that you must wear Asian clothes? It doesn’t. So, as long as you’re dressing modestly, there’s no harm in it. You can wear whatever you want. So, that was kind of a good example of how I started to learn and teach myself. I know that we look at Sahih Bukhari for our teachings, unless I can find the exact thing in the Quran itself. And I use those Hadith as well.

Maryam who resided in Australia also felt that her ideas would never be welcomed within the community due to the ‘culturally imposed’ ideas about sexuality and gender roles in the larger Arab community she identified with. She explained why she distanced herself from her community,

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Like in terms of how you present yourself - like if you are a girl, you should be well-behaved, disciplined, modest but somehow there is like that double standard where for a guy, you don’t see that [the same standards being set for Muslim men/boys]. You know they do whatever they want, they dress however they want. […] I believe [this] is dividing the community.

Sofia noted under the conventions of her Muslim community, things were far worse for women, although she is starting to see positive changes. She noted that growing up she felt obliged to follow the normative standards of the community that were less rooted in religion and more so in wider cultural norms. She provides the example of marriages to illustrate how these issues were rooted in cultural, rather than religious standards, I think we mix culture with religion so much. So, so much, and I think that causes problems with how Islam and Muslims are portrayed to everyone. And I’ve heard and seen so much, that Islam is like this and it’s oppressive, it treats women like this. And it’s like no, it really doesn’t. Don’t confuse it with culture.

Said noted that pursuing a career for many Muslim women was at times secondary due to community pressures. He quoted the example of this Palestinian-Australian co-worker to elaborate, I have this Palestinian woman that I work with as well. Her husband comes from a conservative background, and yeah, he is not really happy with the fact that she is working. And then there are some people in the community that kind of think that he has a valid reason to be that way and think needs more at home- taking care of the kids, taking care of the house- obeying all that stuff. And she is actually considering leaving work even though she has been registered- I think stuff like that […] a woman is not able to you know find a career and something just because of […] this expectation of what she has to do and what she is expected to be.

Noor has South Asian parents and also felt that being female limited her options when it came to gaining higher education. She explained how her gender meant that she was not allowed to go overseas to pursue her chosen education. She explained, So, for example I wanted to go overseas, study overseas and my parents said no but this would never happen with a son. I think I can accuse my parents of sexism as well because you know if somebody did go overseas,

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overseas for a bit for a semester or year you know and they will be like, ‘oh okay she went overseas hmmm’, you know, and that same kind of thing does not exist for guys.

Lailah felt that religious schools that young Muslims, especially girls, attended in Australia policed their behavior. She made an interesting argument that religious schools are not doing enough to empower young women, I think especially at the religious school it is always towards a, ‘you have to stop men looking at you’, it is not taught like that, ‘this is how [you can] feel comfortable dressing.’ I don’t want to see it as the biggest part of me and I don’t want you to see as something that I am forced [in]to, but I have actively chose[n] to do because I think it is right. Yeah, that is what my issue is. And I think that a lot of the girls that start wearing hijab early aren’t taught to see it as an empowerment or a choice, it is, ‘this is a thing that Muslim women do’, and this is the thing that we do, and it is not always taught correctly.

These sample responses show the young Muslims being able to demarcate the difference between cultural norms and religious rulings; in this case, the cultural norms toward women are seen as unsatisfactory and consequently some Muslim participants had the agency to distance themselves.

6.11

Discriminatory Attitudes Within the Community

Particularly in the American context, a unique concern of racism within the Muslim community was also raised by a handful of US participants. Kinza, for instance, explained, So, for example, racism in Muslim community is something that goes unspoken about as well as misogyny, sexual harassment, dealing [with] our internal problems that sometimes our communities cover up. And I think there are problems that affect everyone that need to be talked about more.

Habiba also felt a similar need to address gender and race issues for Muslims residing in the USA. However, she attributed a neglect of

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these issues due to the overshadowing of these concerns by Islamophobia (Yilmaz 2016). The mosque space was so frequently used to mitigate the latter that the former concerns were simply overshadowed or shelved. Sohrab also noted a similar plight of colored Muslims within their communities and from other ethnic communities in the USA. Although he did not identify as African American, he was aware of the issues they faced and desired to see change. He explained, So, one of the main things that I think is an issue is the internal discrimination and the internal racism. So, it’s very clear that African American Muslims are really disrespected. That [they] face a lot of racism coming from the various immigrant communities that come here and don’t want to recognize the history of America.

Safdar felt that racial, cultural, and religious forms of discrimination are an unfortunate result of the diversity within the Muslim community in the USA, I believe the internal struggles of Muslims in America, sadly I believe the struggle is discrimination and maybe some racism within our own communities. Considering that we do hold so many different cultures, races, and skin color[s] within the Muslims community; not everyone is from one country or race, and even within certain culture - even if you are from the same country and you are not from the right city that can be an issue […] or if you are not from the right sect of Islam, as we call, that can be an issue.

While this theme was most common in the USA, some concern was also located in discussions with young Muslims in the UK. Zohaib noticed racism in his community and noted, I think we have a lot of internal racism - you know we all tend to be racist to black people to be honest and I think that [is] how blackness plays out in our community.

Jasmine who lived in the UK pointed out another form of discrimination and racism within the Muslim community, which was affirmed by other respondents across the three countries. This was not based on skin color, but rather a bias toward a certain ethnicity, nationality (or country of

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origin) in regard to marriages between different communities. Jasmine explained, I know a lot of friends who’ve had a lot of marriage issues because they’re from a country where they can’t marry someone who’s from another country, even when they are Muslim. I think there’s racism in our community, unfortunately.

Maya agreed that this was an issue in the community, and used this example to express her view that cultural integration is important, I know a lot of cultures are encouraged to stick to their own cultures. So, Pakistani marrying a Pakistani, Somalian marrying a Somalian, White British Muslim marrying a White British Muslim. Personally, for me, I feel like one of the challenges we’re facing is waking up and realizing that integration of cultures is something that should be encouraged rather than denied or hidden.

These discussions highlight how young Muslims living in the West are critical of maintaining the status quo or restricting their interactions to only within the Muslim or ethnic communities. They are aware of the issues present within the communities of their parents and grandparents and demonstrate an openness in their worldviews and connections with others.

6.12

Conclusion

Like other facets of young Muslims’ lives, the idea of what constitutes a community is plural. The conception varies greatly among the respondents; for many, community is an idea confined to their ethnoreligious identifiers. Yet others see community as an opportunity and a means of connecting with people with similar background and experiences. Some interviewees expressed feeling disenfranchized by segments of their community, particularly the older generations. This often led them to seek their own external relationships with others who may or may not have shared similar ethnic or religious backgrounds. Community, therefore, goes beyond faith and represents the multicultural and diverse societies these young Muslims inhabit. The interviews also discovered that the way interviewees engaged with their community was widely

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varied. From volunteering and community service to pursuits of professional and personal hobbies, young Muslim participants revealed various ways through which they connected with the society around them in meaningful ways. This chapter also offered a positive counter-perspective to the widely misunderstood and feared role of the mosque in the lives of young people. In many Western settings, the mosque is portrayed as a site or incubator of ‘radicalization’; however, the author’s findings uncovered a contrary picture: Mosques do not simply fulfill a role as a place of spiritual and religious significance; this study finds that they play a vital role in community outreach, services, and socialization. They often function not only as a community center bringing together attendees but also provide voluntary activities to those who are seeking ways to give back to the community. Furthermore, not all activities coordinated by the mosque are solely for the Muslim community—there is a broader and more inclusive framework than many would expect, based on the prevalent conceptions of mosques in Western societies. These empirical findings support and further the prior studies, described earlier in the chapter, that suggest mosques are a site where civil and political participation is developed and fostered in Muslims. Discussions with the participants reveal that most charitable work and activities were open to all in the community, irrespective of religion. Therefore, although the non-secular institution organizes the event, its outreach and impact remain secular. Charity drives, interfaith events, and community services are all common ways in which Muslims engage with and contribute to their society. Furthermore, although the mosque often played a pivotal role in aiding engagement, many respondents did not use the mosque or relied on other platforms to engage with the community. Thus, secular institutions based on interests, humanitarian causes, and skills were common avenues for respondents to engage with others. Clear evidence also emerged that many young Muslims felt the need to engage beyond their prototype ‘community.’ Many perceived insularities in community as a shortcoming of first-generation immigrants, including their own kin, and wanted to make an active effort to be part of wider society. Crucially, these efforts were typically not attributed to pressures to “integrate” into society. Rather, discussions revealed participants generally feel at home and involved in the society around them. older generation

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migrants, most of the young individuals feel part of the Western countries they live in, rather than feeling like “foreigners,” because this is intrinsically their home and their society. Participants often expressed a sense of duty to help others who faced difficulties associated with a migrant background. It was quite common in the interviews for these young people to describe participating in volunteering roles that supported students; older residents with language skills; aiding new families in settling in; and volunteering for events. A desire to aid the migrant community in fully immersing and understanding the opportunities they could engage with in the West emerged in interview discussions. It can be speculated that participant’s own personal difficulties, or those of family members, gravitates them toward wanting to improve the quality of life for those who may face similar difficulties. Again, this is not in the pursuit of assimilation for anyone involved; it is a way in which they can engage in and better society and help others to do the same. Young Muslim participants across the three countries expressed their interest and passion in using their professional skills for charitable causes. Those who had medical training, credentials in mental health, and allied fields were active in volunteering their skills and knowledge in a range of medical settings. Others with business or skills in networking were active in local and transnational charities. These activities were also secular in nature and did not cater to specific religious or ethnic groups. For a small yet significant number, the community played a vital role in keeping their cultural traditions alive, particularly among the younger respondents. One important method was via creating awareness about and celebrating their ethnicity. Consequently, organizing cultural events, taking part in them, and classes such as dancing were important means through which the participants interacted with and expressed their plural identity. They were benefited from the freedom of expression offered in the countries they lived in and were clearly at ease participating in these activities. For those who came from a Muslim majority country where religious and ethnic markers led to discrimination and even physical assaults, this was particularly valuable. Recreation activities were also a multicultural engagement point for many young Muslims. Joining sports clubs, taking part in hobbies, and finding groups of interest on social media were among the activities listed by respondents. For those who had time, these were seen as a way to relax and link up with people who shared interests and were separate from the

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relationships they formed on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Exploring this theme in the interviews added a layer of normality in the portrayal of what being a young Muslim in the West is like. These young Muslims, like everyone else, have their own interests and skills which draw them to different activities. It is important to highlight the normal pursuits of life and social engagements among the participants as one way of moving beyond damaging and misinformed narratives about Muslim youth in the West. An interconnected theme was the respondent’s social engagements via professional networks at universities or work. At universities, this included co-curricular activities such as the Model United Nations club or joining their graduate club. For working professionals, it invited formal and informal means of finding ways to engage with people from their field via networking events and online groups. While the young Muslims interviewed were quite perceptive about the shortcomings and strengths of the previous generations, they are many other reasons for their need to create a hybrid identity built on religion, nationality, and ethnicity. This hybrid identity appeared to cultivate a pluralistic, inclusive, and open worldview. Thus, it was common for the participants to be quite vocal and passionate about issues including sectarianism, sexism, racism, colorism, and national divisions within their respective “communities.” Some chose to engage directly with the narratives, others saw it as a personal mission to combat bigotry within the community, and a few boycotted the community as a means of protesting against these issues. Regardless of the strategy chosen, there is a complexity in these views; there was resounding evidence that this cross-national sample of young Muslims was keen to let go of culturally driven biases and are open to the idea of universalism. The chapter has provided a valuable insight into the role of young Muslims in selected Western societies. Their world views both shapes how they chose to define what community means for them and how they engage with it. Essentially, there is no one way in which the idea of community was defined in the interviews, nor a singular means for forming meaningful networks. What this chapter contributes to, therefore, is an acknowledgment of the plurality of these individual’s outlook and connections, and their level of commitment to the societies in which they reside. The chapter further aids in providing an account of the ambitions of young Muslims, re-examining the role of the mosque, and recognizing the significant influence of non-religious motivations, in examining what constitutes the group’s engagements with wider society.

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References Harris, Anita, and Roose, Joshua. (2014). “DIY Citizenship Amongst Young Muslims: Experiences of the ‘Ordinary’.” Journal of Youth Studies 17(6), 794–813. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.844782. Johns, A., Mansouri, F., and Lobo, M. (2015). “Religiosity, Citizenship and Belonging: The Everyday Experiences of Young Australian Muslims.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35(2), 171–190. https://doi.org/10.1080/136 02004.2015.1046262. Karimshah, Ameera, Chiment, Melinda, and Skrbis, Zlatko. (2014). “The Mosque and Social Networks: The Case of Muslim Youth in Brisbane.” Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion 2(2), 1. https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v2i2.165. Lam, Kim, and Mansouri, Fethi. (2021). “Beyond (Mis)-Recognition: Muslim Youth and Religiosity in Australia.” Journal of Youth Studies 24(6), 765–780. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2020.1766667. Mansouri, F., and Kirpitchenko, L. (2015). “Practices of Active Citizenship Among Migrant Youth: Beyond Conventionalities.” Social Identities. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2015.1119680. McLoughlin, Seán. (2005). “Mosques and the Public Space: Conflict and Cooperation in Bradford.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(6), 1045–1066. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830500282832. Oskooii, K., and Dana, K. (2017). “Muslims in Great Britain: The Impact of Mosque Attendance on Political Behaviour and Civic Engagement.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(9), 1479–1505. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369183x.2017.1330652. ´ Ozalp, Mehmet, and Cufurovi´ c, Mirela. (2021). “Religion, Belonging, and Active Citizenship: A Systematic Review of Literature on Muslim Youth in Australia.” Religions 12(4), 237. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040237. Peucker, M. (2018). “On the (In)compatibility of Islamic Religiosity and Citizenship in Western Democracies: The Role of Religion for Muslims’ Civic and Political Engagement.” Politics and Religion 11(3), 553–575. https:// doi.org/10.1017/s1755048317000700. Read, Jen’nan Ghazal. (2015). “Gender, Religious Identity, and Civic Engagement Among Arab Muslims in the United States.” Sociology of Religion 76(1), 30–48. https://doi.org/10.1093/socrel/sru042. Roose, J. M., and Harris, A. (2015). “Muslim Citizenship in Everyday Australian Civic Spaces.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 36(4), 468–486. https://doi. org/10.1080/07256868.2015.1049984. Walseth, Kristin. (2015). “Muslim Girls’ Experiences in Physical Education in Norway: What Role Does Religiosity Play?” Sport, Education and Society 20(3), 304–322. https://doi.org/10.1080/13573322.2013.769946.

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Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2012). “An Analysis of the Factors That Pave the Way for the Radicalization of the British Youth.” In Mohammed Siddique Seddon, Fauzia Ahmad, and Shiraz Khan (Eds.), Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations (pp. 32–53). London and New York: Continuum. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Switzerland: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Bashirov, G. (2022). “Religious Homophily and Friendship: Socialisation Between Muslim Minority and Anglo Majority Youth in Australia.” Journal of Youth Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261. 2022.2046257. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Bliuc, A. M., Mansouri, F., and Bashirov, G. (2021). “Young Muslim Australians’ Experiences of Intergroup Contact and Its Implications for Intercultural Relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44(15), 2772–2793. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1850823.

CHAPTER 7

Transnational Engagement of Young Muslims: The Global Citizen

7.1

Introduction

Young Muslims not only demonstrate multiple points of engagement within their respective Western home countries (Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2022) but many also partake in transnational activities. These activities range from raising funds for children in war-torn countries to partaking in tree plantation activities to mitigate climate change. The present chapter builds on these findings and focuses on activities and explores participation in protests and connections they form with online political groups. The key purpose of the discussions is to understand how young Muslims engage with social and political issues beyond the geographical borders of their homes. This chapter investigates three layers of international engagement. Firstly, their engagement with the politics of the ‘country of origin,’ followed by interest taken in politics concerning the Muslim world, and lastly, global issues and causes. These three tiers were embedded in the questions to understand the level of connection young Muslims have with global events. Given participants’ strong connection with Muslim identity, the findings presented provide a useful insight into how these individuals view Muslim majority countries and their perception of global events and geopolitics. Keeping in mind that these young Muslims have either grown up entirely in Western societies or have spent significant time there, this is

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a valuable inquiry into non-religion-affiliated global issues such as migration, climate change, and poverty. Given the multicultural upbringing and orientation of the sample, both secular and religiously motivated interests are explored in the interviews, and young Muslims’ engagement with the world as ‘global citizens’ is explored. Global citizenship, a relatively new concept, can mean various things. However, in this context, it refers to the expansion of the idea of citizenship to a macro scale. Global citizens are no longer obliged to show interest or concern over issues that purely concern their local community but consider matters that impact humans globally such as climate change, poverty, and human rights (Reysen and Iva Katzarska-Miller 2013; Morais and Ogden 2011). “Social responsibility” can therefore be seen as an inherent component of global citizenship (Morais and Ogden 2011). This idea has been facilitated by multiculturalism and the widespread use of the internet. The former promotes the idea of universal human values and interests while the latter helps in connecting and disseminating information between global citizens (Orgad 2018; Rye 2016; Couldry 2007; Shearer 1996). The idea of a ‘citizen of the world’ is still a loosely built construct (Bowden 2003) and faces threats from nationalism and right-wing populism (Yilmaz et al. 2022). The necessity of global citizenship in addressing issues is thought to be directly related to the nature and scale of global crises (Schattle 2009). Considering the myriad of crises that the world is facing in this present age, and despite some backlash against the idea, global citizenship remains valid and purposeful. When Muslimness is attached to the concept of “global citizenship,” it is most often viewed through the prism of transitional jihadism or pan-Islamism. Most literature on this subject argues that an imagined community is created online, where Islamist radicals disseminate information and create a global force of jihadism (Mahzam 2017; Iqbal and Zulkifli 2016; Veilleux-Lepage 2016; Heickerö 2014; Khatib 2003). While the existence and operations of these networks are not denied, there is a need to look beyond this narrow focus and examine global citizenship outside the lens of jihadism. More recent works have shifted away from this myopic outlook and seek to understand how Muslims in various Western countries have found ways to express their citizenship, despite many Muslims’ living in the West being forced to prove their commitment to citizenship in response to widespread Islamophobia (Yilmaz 2012, 2016; Peucker 2018; Mustafa

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2016; Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). While the initial motivation may have been a response to the socio-political climate, in various Western countries Muslims have emerged as active citizens, participating in politics and community engagement (Mustafa 2016; Cato and Otterbeck 2014; Peucker et al. 2014). The previous chapters of this book have proved the active citizenry of Muslim youth in Australian society beyond stereotypes and religious affiliation. It is useful, then, to explore how young Muslims form global networks, and interact with global issues and concerns and in doing so, engage with the concept of global citizenship.

7.2

Country of Origin

The events that take place in the country of origin or heritage are a means through which young Muslims can direct their awareness of transnational issues, and the sample interview responses below show that these issues are viewed through the lens of humanitarianism and environmentalism. Anas, who lives in Australia, remarked that he followed news from Lebanon but at the same time discussed how his idea of a ‘Muslim world’ was quite Arab-centric. He also spoke of the regions and countries in which he followed news stories from demonstrating how participants’ country of origin can orient their interests in international events, I would say definitely […] more countries in the Middle East, in particular countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran and stuff to do with Turkey as well. Those are like the political regions but yeah, I am always conscious and aware of things happening if it is in Syria or Afghanistan or Palestine, so yeah. I would say [my knowledge is] mostly focused around Middle East and Asia. I don’t think I know too much about Muslim countries in Africa or East Asia. So, I wouldn’t know what is happing in countries like Mali or Indonesia.

Participants’ awareness of issues also came from family discussions and at times replication of trends in the Western countries they lived in. Like in the discussions in the previous chapters, the role of women in society was a concern among participants. Tasneem, who had roots in Afghanistan, explained how gender parity in Afghanistan bothered her and inspired her commitment to create change,

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“Oh! There are a lot of problems there. Like equality is one of the major issues there. Like equality between men and women, I feel like they are not equal. You know like I feel like everyone has the right to education, women should be able to work, women should be treated equally to men in like in every aspect.” Tasneem added that when she finishes her degree, she wants to use her achievement as a way to inspire other women to study and gain an education, and not to “choose the easy way out of life.”

Kinza also observed the diminished role of women in Pakistan society when she has been to visit cousins and relatives, In my personal opinion, [there are] regressive views on women and how they can contribute to society. There’s a lot of constraints placed on women. And […] whenever I have gone, I noticed that there are almost no women that you can see in the public sphere, which is strange because I live—my family lives in the big city.

For other participants, discrimination against minorities in their country of origin continued to trouble them, even when living far away. Yunis, for example, who had roots in Indonesia, noted that certain religious minorities faced persecution in Indonesia and found it quite concerning. However, he said he felt powerless to create change in Indonesia due to the deeply entrenched nature of this religious classification of the people in social and institutional structures. Najibah was aware of the deteriorating conditions of minorities and growing corruption in India. She also conveyed a sense of helplessness while discussing these issues, Corruption—so the politicians are selfish, and they want whatever they want and even though they are like the leaders of the country, they […] just do it for themselves to get the money, they live a nice lifestyle […] I think even though we have been independent for sixty plus years, there hasn’t been much of a change. Yeah.

Arben, who was born in Albania and moved to the USA, also noted a lot of issues in his country of origin, but saw no possible ways he could aid in their eradication, I could go on and on about that, but I think major problems are corruption, lack of citizen participation in the system, lack of civil society and lack

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of a proper justice system. So, the political system is creating a chokehold by all of these, you know it has not properly reformed since the collapse of communism, and you know the same people who were in the power then and their descendants are in power now, so we have not seen shift in much ideology even, I would say unfortunately.

Karima saw a variety of issues in her country of origin (Indonesia) that required attention, but felt these issues were too great to be solved by someone who lived in a distant country, “Politics, firstly politics, and then secondly again education, third is poverty because our economy is not stable yet and it is not spreading significantly all over Asia. And then tolerance to people and they are still judging each other and about the sustainability of the environment.” She added that there is a significant lack of knowledge about climate change and the population “knowing that the world is like, dying” and because of this there is too much wastage of precious resources and a lack of engagement in sustainable practices.

Asifah also observed many problems in Bangladesh, but felt uncertain of her capacity to address them, From here, especially as a Bengali living in Australia I really have no influence in that country, so I don’t think I can do anything.

Rizwan also reflected on social problems and believed inequality was a key issue for many nations. His statement demonstrates his depth of understanding of the problem and its ripple effect as he described the unequal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, I hate to say it, [but it is] ethnic minorities’ people who are suffering the most compared to people who are rich. So, this whole scenario with the lockdown and COVID-19 has shown the disparity, the massive, massive difference in equality as well between the super-rich and the super-poor, and I think not just in the UK but around the world like in the US or wherever you go.

Muneer, who had roots in China, was aware of the grave nature of persecution of Uighur people, yet she felt helpless in terms of being able to do anything about it. She shared that she would be unable to go back to

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China, and felt the pain of the oppression happening in China against the Uighur minority, Yeah, in my country that is what is happening, like I told you about the Chinese people and Muslim people […] So, what they do that is that they raid their own people’s homes and stuff, they just wanna repopulate everyone […] So, they like force women to sleep with Chinese men, and to basically wash away the religion and to kill that lady after she has had kids you know. It is that kind of thing—they just wanna get rid of any trace of Islam or any trace of like Uyghur ethnicity in that country, you know. So, yeah, I think that is what the main issue is in my country at the moment.

Zainab, who came from Iraq, noted that what was happening there was horrific, but due to the entanglement of world powers in the region it was hard to see any possible solution or resolution to the troubles, The country is like a battlefield for like USA and Iran. Yeah, they are being hurt by it, by other countries [that] fight each other, so that is what is going on right now.

Many respondents, like Najibah and Hasan, believed that changing the system was not an individual’s job. They felt grateful for their Western home, while at the same time feeling frustrated and sometimes saddened in their awareness of the gravity of the issues so prevalent in the countries they or their family originated from. These issues included poverty, lack of education, poor work conditions, unavailability of jobs, the impacts of climate change, corruption, war and conflict, and the deteriorating liberal freedoms suffered by people in these countries. Majeed sheds light on the issue of the limitations on freedom of speech and free journalism in [country] Freedom of speech is definitely one of the major problems; they restrict a lot of their journalists, and it goes through a lot of censorship. You can go to jail without a trial.

Salemah was passionate about the poor state of mental health and attitudes around it in her country of origin; her comments demonstrate a resolve to use her training to help correct these attitudes,

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One thing that bothers me about my country is like mental health awareness. So, people would treat depression, anxiety as a joke. That is one thing that I do think I can help with Insha’Allah. Like with my degree I plan to go back to Pakistan for a while and maybe like open clinics or generally increase more awareness […] People treat suicide as joke there—that is really one thing I hate. So, they would throw the word out and you know it gets treated as it is nothing and insha’Allah, I feel like that is something do able for me there.

Participants who had relatives in different countries or were firstgeneration migrants themselves also tended to feel quite strongly about the deteriorating conditions of peace in various regions, and the issues of poverty, security, and economy attached to them. Latifah, who came from an Afghan background, felt quite passionately about the unfortunate situation in Afghanistan and felt that her professional training as a psychologist might one day enable to aid with the post-war recovery of Afghanistan. She explained, We see [in] Afghanistan a lot of people die and people just pressing over like these sorts of comments and stuff [on social media], but nothing has changed. […] Well, I am thinking I always want to become a psychologist because I wanna help people.

Alimah also explained how she can not only use her network but also her education to protest societal norms in Afghanistan to better the lives of women. She shared her passionate ambitions, It is more of like—I am into women’s rights […] Especially where I am from, Afghanistan, women don’t have many rights, there is no equality over there. So that is where my hopefulness [to help] came from. After high school like I was like, ‘I wanna change that!.’ Like after I finished my studies here, I did not have a plan, but [in] general, like after I finished my studies and get a job, and like maybe go there and help women with health issues and stuff. Because that is still a big issue. From what I have heard from the news or generally talking to my relatives overseas.

While very few showed this resolve to address issues in their countries of origin, their responses are rational and realistic. Having often been victims of the system themselves, they expressed powerlessness in being able to create change in these countries. Additionally, the deeply entrenched

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social, economic, and political reasons that give rise to these problems mean that it is very difficult to create meaningful change as individuals. Yet participants’ sensitivity to these issues and their keen interest in these events mean that the young Muslims are well-informed and are proactively aware of the situation in the countries they hold ties to and beyond. This contributes to their profile as global citizens; they are aware and sympathetic and in rare cases willing to act to improve the troubled socio-political climates they are observing. Despite many of these individuals being born in a Western country and having limited connections with their parent’s or grandparent’s country of birth, they still feel a responsibility to be aware and understand. Thus, it can be assumed that seeing the lack of human rights, liberal values, and level of violations compared to their Western homeland makes them feel passionately about combating the problems in the country to which they have some form of familial or heritage connection. Having a Western upbringing allows them to see things that are clearly wrong, which they might have not experienced if they were born, where these issues become normalized.

7.3 Identifying and Connecting with Issues in the Muslim World Participants from the Western countries studied demonstrated a keen interest in the politics and issues that trouble the Muslim world and had established connections with others around the world to discuss and share information and ideas. Interviewees were aware of and passionate about Muslim world issues, although responses were quite varied in terms of perspectives on key issues. Some felt that the micro-environment of Muslim majority countries was the cause of a self-inflicted failure, whereas others were more inclined toward the idea of Muslims, or the ummah, being the victims of ill-treatment by world powers. Raheel’s stance on the issue reflects a Muslim victimhood, and while it leans more on shifting the onus outside the Muslim country/ummah, it is backed by a keen observation of global events. The participant reflected, Whether you look at the situation in Yemen or Syria, that or that situation in kind of Western Africa—the situation is quite bad. If you kind of move way from just war and genocide you have got all […] kind of stereotypes,

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prejudice that have issues with Muslims around the world. You know war is always a big, big issue but these kinds of low-level prejudice […] I have got these family friends in France, and they are educated from the best university in France, and your ideal student but he can’t find a job in France. He has to go and move countries to find a job.

Bushra felt that Muslim countries were targeted by non-Muslim countries, Like I said before, oppression is very real. And I think Muslim countries are belittled by other countries, yeah. They oppressed, yeah.

It was clear that some participants believed the root cause of many global issues was the oppression of Muslims. Aarish, from the UK, for instance, perceived the worst problems in the world as being those that involved the oppression of Muslims, Injustices of tyrannical rules, yeah so for example, all of the injustices happening in Syria, Palestine, Rohingya and the Uyghur Muslims […] anything like that are the major problems. You know, the crisis in Yemen.

The large tide of Islamophobia these young people have witnessed growing has also left some with the view that stereotyping of Muslims belongs to a conscious effort to discredit Islam and Muslims. Eileen, for instance, suggested that Western or non-Muslim powers are purposefully associating Muslims with groups like ISIS for their own benefit. On the other hand, there were also respondents who strongly felt that the problems of the Muslim world came from within, and some believed they were so entrenched that there was little that could be done to address them. Sumayya felt it was the lack of quality leadership in Muslim majority countries that gave birth to issues there. She reasoned in her response that, “when you give an uneducated person power it just causes corruption.” Qaiser suggested that most issues arise from a power vacuum in a country, which leads other powers to intervene in their domestic affairs. He explained simply, It is poor leadership and corruption. Then we have wars and conflict which is a result of poor leadership and corruption.

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Muntazir felt that a lack of democracy, and the influence of religious authorities over governments were the cause of many problems in the region, Political unrest in countries where you don’t know what’s gonna happen and how, because there is no actual proper source of governing or legit source of governing. When I say that, I mean democracy. Of course, there is an Islamic law and Islamic system. But at the same time, that in itself can be a democracy. But unfortunately, some places do tend to use it to their advantage to oppress their own people and oppress other countries in there and whatnot.

Anas also felt that it was the systems within these countries that led to failures but attributed a tarnished past with colonial powers as the ultimate cause of the Muslim world’s problems. He explained that in the Muslim world, the issue is, to do with the stress and trauma of the past, especially the post-colonial kind of era that the Muslim world came through. Because a lot of the Muslims world was colonized and so I think they are still reeling from that, and I think the lack of a proper social, political kind of system in the Muslim world which can integrate the issues and experiences with modernity.

Another commonly cited internal issue was the sectarian and divisional politics of many Muslim majority countries. Ameer explained how the internal conflicts in these societies results in divisions between Muslims, Conflict, it is more [a] conflict of what some Muslims believe but that has been going on for years, ‘I am right you are wrong,’ ‘you are wrong, and I am right.’ I hate that and I think that just divides [Muslim society] and it doesn’t really bring us together like it should or like it did during the prophet’s time, so that definitely is something big.

Others were more critical of how divisions or discord between Muslim countries negatively impacted the ummah. Ebrar was quite passionate in his response, The rich Muslims are the ones that do not help the poor Muslims. That is what I think, and I think that the people from Saudi are a bunch of

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pigs and that is about it. Because just a few days ago the Prince of Saudi, he made a press conference saying that the people from Palestine should either accept what America has said or they should be quiet, and it just shows that people from Saudi just don’t care about the Muslims who are struggling. Yeah, it is just bad, it is just heartbreaking.

Aanadi perceived the capitalist pursuits of some leaders of Muslim countries to be the most profound issue, even more so than religious divisions. She explained, And I think it’s starting to become an issue in the Muslim world as well. So, you have countries like Saudi Arabia, which people assume represent all Muslims, acting in heinous ways because they are also becoming this huge capitalistic place. They care about all the money that they can get. And they have […have become] extremely wealthy. Well, again, but people in that country suffer.

Hasan hoped for more “unity” among the ummah to address major issues faced by the Middle Eastern region and Muslim majority countries, In the Muslim world unity is like basically the most important thing. I mean Muslims should be untied and it does not matter in what they think and what group of Islam they belong to. As long as they are united, they can fight against anything.

Arben believed a united Muslim voice was missing, to speak out against the atrocities Muslims across the world faced. She attributed this to prioritizing economic over humanitarian interests in her comment, Putting economic interest before humanitarian interest […] with what is going on with the Uighurs in China or with the Rohingya in Myanmar, Kashmir, Palestine, there is no united Muslim voice condemning what is going on right, so they are putting the economic interests above their community and above their people.

Fatimah’s comments further indicated the confusion young Muslims feel at the immense lack of unity among the ummah, even between members of the same sect. As she explained, I think it is the lack of the connectedness. I think that the major issue is that, like if you are a Shia or Sunni, or you are an Iraqi Shia or

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an Irani Shia, and you feel like there are all these arguments and fights that happen in-between. And that means that the Muslim ummah is all separated instead of being together.

A small number of participants also blamed the lack of an Islamic moral compass for causing the most serious issues faced in the Muslim world. This explanation was rare but described a “deviation” from Islam as being the core issue among Muslim communities. Noor identified a lack of religious knowledge and piety among contemporary Muslims as posing a threat to the Muslim world, With the Muslim world—a lot of Muslims at present you see, you can see people being called […] cultural Muslims. So, what they are, are people coming from cultural Muslim backgrounds who are influenced by either Western culture or you know they just really aren’t that religious all in all. Which is nice but if people don’t have that kind of religious knowledge—I think not having that kind of knowledge is making those people you know, divert away from the religion and I think that is a big problem.

Sohrab felt that misinterpretation of the religion can have detrimental impacts, particularly concerning issues such as women’s rights, Muslims have an issue with interpreting their faith. I think there are a lot of problematic interpretations. For example, interpretations [that have] just advanced the patriarchy […] have been going on for a long time. And people kind of don’t want to question that, or the ones that question […] get in trouble or whatever. I think there’s people who might not dare to say.

Haya, like Sohrab, believed a departure from, or lack of understanding and connection with the core religious teachings of Islam has led to problems around the Muslim world, I think they’ve gone really astray, […they are] just so focused on the external. And they have, I think, fed into a lot of western, for lack of a better word, western ideas that have nothing to do with religion and who they are. I mean, I think Islam offers the world, if it’s practiced correctly, the answer to the problems. But our own ummah doesn’t even believe that a lot of them [can]. So, I say ‘but this is all predicted by the Hadith. So, the prophets about Islam, that Islam would come in as a stranger and leave us a stranger.’ So, what is happening in the world is not surprising

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at all. It was all predicted, but it’s a lack of connection. And Muslims, and ignorance of Muslims.

Yasir was similarly frustrated with the dominance of cultural Islam over true Islam. His response indicated that he attributes the problems of Muslim majority countries as not just being a result of Western intervention, but also the lack of critical thinking and knowledge of the religion, The Muslim world in particular, I think is dealing with a lot of hypocrisy. A lot of hypocrisy. That sort of cultural Islam is overtaking the real spirit of Islam […] which requires that you think critically. You can blame Western powers for getting involved, but you can also blame the people for not asking questions.

A small number felt so removed from Muslim majority countries that they did not feel they could comment on the issues in them, I don’t know. I can’t really speak for them because I don’t really identify [with] the population there.

Latifah, who cherished the freedom that her Australian home offered her, chose to distance herself from the politics and worldviews of Afghan politicians. She shared that she is not interested and is intentionally disconnected from the version of Islam that these politicians presented, Yeah, general about the Muslim world’s politics, but because I was never interested, so I don’t believe in their Islam, so I don’t listen to them.

7.4

Keeping Up-To-Date and Connected with Muslim World Politics

Conventional and social media are also a means for young Muslims to both explore their Muslim heritage and stay appraised of events in the Muslim world. Given the precarious and troubled situation in Muslim majority countries, young Muslim interviewees commonly expressed an interest in the affairs of these countries. Some indicated they wanted to help, some wanted to stay up to date, and a few wanted to know more so they could, in the future, create positive change. As Nadeem, who was

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born and raised in Australia, explained, being a Muslim meant that global events concerning Muslim majority countries have an impact on him. He explained his relationship with the news, Well because I am a Muslim, I have got a Muslim background so, the politics of Muslim countries contributes to the lives of other Muslims. So, yes, I follow the major news. I cannot go over everything, but I do see things that get my attention.

Zohaib was connected online with Muslim world concerns through a network of like-minded individuals who discussed deteriorating human rights and their impact on Muslims. The interviewee spoke of following the abuses of Muslims around the world in his response, If we are talking about Muslims, it is usually about the latest news concerning some sort of oppressions, like Uyghurs or Palestinian. [… Or] in the UK some new scandal concerning terrorism that actually takes place by the government here, or the secret spying or surveillance on the Muslim community here, it depends on what is going on. There is always something to talk about when it comes to Muslims suffering, there is always something going on. And I always talk about it with my friends.

Majeed used the internet for engaging with the transnational politics of Muslim majority countries. He sought information online to engage with his interest in Saudi politics and the impact these politics had on Muslims around the world, I am more interested in the wars that are going on, and how different political parties are supporting each other, and Trump coming in adds flavor and is funny. I am interested in the politics of other Muslim countries, like KSA, the Prince Mohammed bin Salman has taken over like forty percent of the place, and KSA is the holiest places for Muslims. I want to keep an eye out because it is really important for my faith and he is trying to modernize KSA, and I appreciate that. I like what he is doing, but it should be done in a better way.

Safdar was among the many participants that shared how they used the internet to explore their transnational Muslim identity and the issues that face Muslims. Social platforms provided an opportunity for people with

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similar concerns to connect and discuss different situations and issues occurring around the world. Safdar explained, [I] Have friends in Turkey, in Switzerland and in Pakistan and Denmark that I would say I have communication with, and we would occasionally talk about issues […] So I have these friends and we talk about certain issues, and the issues we do discuss would be I would say current events. Whatever is happening in the Muslim community at that time. So [we discuss] whenever there is you know a big [issue or event], whether or if it is something specific to their country or my country. So recently […] I would say when things were happening in Syria, we had a lot of talk about what was going on in Syria with some of my friends in Turkey.

Rahima similarly described the online connection she shares with fellow Muslims in different parts of the world. Her response highlights how she uses these connections to vent her frustrations about the disunity and conflict in the Muslim world, Yeah, I have a few friends in England who I discuss stuff with generally like when I am just complaining generally. Like, about our society and how we just have so many political problems going on in the Muslim world because we simply can’t get along and we just fight each other rather than dealing with bigger issues. But that is it really, that is what we talk about.

Participants like Aisha described using their friendship networks, online and offline, to express their political ideas. Mostly there pertained to political discussions surrounding Muslim world politics or Islam itself. The interviewee explained, Some people in my age group they are like, ‘something is happing there, but we don’t know what it is, and it is a bad thing’, and I would go up to them, particularly my friends and I would like [say], ‘look this is what is happening’.

Aarish shared that she was part of an online activist group that was responding to the plight of the Rohingya, Rohingya in Myanmar. So, I’m part of a Facebook group that is sort of like an activist Facebook group. There’s like posts on there, articles. I’m also a part of a Twitter group chat that is also the same group of people. But yeah, other than that, just in general I speak to people on social media

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who belong to different cultures and stuff. But that’s the only thing that I can think about.

Habiba, who lived in the UK, also spoke of the connections she held with Muslims from different parts of the world. They were mostly concerned with things or people they saw online, Most of the friends we talk to about these issues […] aren’t from the US, [they] are from Albania, Kosovo, Germany and the UK. And we talk about a lot […] things that sprout up online. Like there’s always some kind of controversy […] We talk a lot about Muslims who are involved in politics. Muslims who are kind of vocal and kind of think about how their impact is, what their impact is. So, things of that sort.

Zubeida’s explanation also indicated that shared concern and victimhood link young Muslims around the globe, I have a friend from India, and she speaks a lot of Kashmir, and I have got a friend from Yemen and there are issues there, so there is a lot of cross-cultural issues and dialogues we have, a lot of overlap and differences as well—but we often discuss. It comes up a lot, because I am friends with a lot of people who care about the world, politics, religion and I think that is part of why I am friends with these people, and I have purposefully made these friends.

The internet, with its expansive power to connect, provides ample opportunities for young people to connect and find ways to not only materialize their ideas but also find others who feel the same way about issues that affect young Muslims.

7.5 Global Citizen and Keeping Informed of International News Beyond a particular focus on Muslim world politics, some respondents were also more broadly interested and aware of global news, issues, and debates. They actively sought information from a range of sources and kept themselves informed, and this was an important way they demonstrated their connection with the globalized world. Many participants also described the relationships they had formed with people from around the

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world who shared similar interests, or in some cases collaborated to help enact change. The majority of participants did not need to actively seek out international news, because they often incidentally encountered it on social media such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Reddit. Maryam, who lived in Australia, told the interviewer that, Honestly, I don’t look at the news sites because I just go and Google, and it is like the first ones that come up. So, yeah; it depends on that issue.

The small group who regularly sought news from around the world generally relied on more than one source to stay engaged with multiple perspectives on a single issue. Saad explained how he accessed news from various sources to gain an insight into different political narratives, I tend to follow Sky News, maybe Al Jazeera and then I will also watch from time-to-time Russia Today, just to get an alternative [view], just to see a different perspective. That is just TV, and you know some on YouTube.

Qaiser, from the UK, similarly sought news from a range of sources, I use a variety of different sort of media platforms including traditional sort of Western TV channels, Sky News, BCC etc. and then a combination of Al Jazeera English, TRT World, and sometimes Russia today, so I try and get a complete spectrum of news.

Raheel similarly believed relying on only one source of the news was insufficient, and thus opted to access different narratives from multiple sources to form his own views, In French you have got Prospective Four and then in Pakistan you have got PTV, and you have got Geo TV, and then you have got ARY, so you have those kind outlets, I think it is like I said earlier about Russia Today, you know they have got you know those published in English and then yeah, there is others. And there is kind of different places—like I kind of try to stay away from CNN because I think it is kind of biased and it all American, just a bit too much for me. But you know you gave got [a] Turkish news provider, I think it is called Hurriyat, which I have started reading when I was in Turkey and you know when we were in Turkey at that time, Turkey was just, it was just getting back from this huge dispute

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and they tried to over throw the government, so there was Hurriyat, so I started seeing and getting access to that.

Aisha, who stated a particular interest in global hunger, explained that she followed crises such as the Yemen war to keep herself appraised of international crises and events. She was quite aware of the political dynamics of escalating conflicts, stating, Yemen, so I tend to have a more of a healthy interest, so if there are outbreaks or things like that, I do wanna be on top of what is happening. So, I was quite interested in Yemen, and you do have Saudi Arabia and what they do, that interests me because I am not pro-government of Saudi Arabia, so I do wanna know what they are doing.

While most young Muslims viewed news via their social media news feed or particular apps, some also watched television or read e-papers. Shiza, for instance, commented on her habit of viewing various sources to stay up to date with world affairs, Daily Mail, Times and stuff like that you know BBC, CNN […] they have news articles that come out on all these websites and that is where I usually read […] and stay up to date and see what is happening around the world.

Some interviewees felt the need to follow international affairs because they believed events, even if they occurred far away, impacted upon them. Fatimah, who called Australia home, follows global politics as she understands the flow-on impact these politics have on Australian society, Like, I don’t know the particulars of any given moment, I keep up to date with what is happening in Syria and what is happening in Saudi because it has [an] impact on what happens in Iraq, it has an impact on how people view Muslims in Australia. I think it is the same reason as why I keep up with US politics which is that [it] has a huge impact on the economy which impacts Australia.

Aliyah explained that although she follows and cares about what is happening in Australia, her main concerns lie in international events and crises,

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Well, I do care about what is happening in my country and if it affects me then I will read on about it and I will discuss it with people. But I think that my main concern, or what I read most about, is internationally based rather than domestic.

7.6 Forming Connections with Others Around the World For various interviewees, the internet was a tool that they used to create and maintain connections with like-minded people around the world. For others, it was a means to stay connected with the domestic situations of their countries of interest or country of origin. Abrar, who resided in Australia, had formed online connections with others from Turkey and Germany. Tasneem also had friends who lived in New Zeeland, London-England, Germany, and Dubai. For participants like these two, online relationships were based on a shared desire to remain connected with extended kin and people with similar interests in different countries around the world. Najibah, who had online friends in several countries, explained her relationship with one of her foreign friends, The one from Indonesia is interested in people from different countries, so she kind of added me and we discuss about her daily stuff, whatever she wants to talk about, saying ‘this is what happened today,’ and she wants to learn English as well, so if she talks to me her English would get better, so stuff like that, so just like a normal friend but just online.

While these connections were social in nature, they also helped young Muslims learn about the socio-economic and political environments in various other countries. Hasan’s explanation highlights how these connections provide them with a way to understand different experiences of fellow Muslims, Just about what they experience and what we experience here and [we] compare it. I mean if we compare it with from our friends from Iran, they basically live a life where everyone that they know is a Muslim because like, it is an Islamic country. Whereas, in let us say in the countries like the US and UK where Muslims are minority where they live, I think they go through the same as [what] we go through.

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Salam, who had a network of young Muslim friends from Europe and beyond, described how they connected and coordinated a project with this network to propose to the UN, I am on the board [of] members there and basically, we have people from around Europe, [and we also] have some guys from Kosovo, Belgium, Germany, France, England you know Manchester, Italy. So, we made a charter of rights, and we want to propose it to the UN, it is [about] Muslim Youth. So, it is basically a Muslim youth net project. So, we have these countries, and we have team leaders, and they have projects, and every country has their own problems, and we all come together with the projects, and we help push it in accordance with the charter.

Salam explained that although these are “Muslims issues” on the surface, at their core they are cases in which fundamental and universal human rights are being violated. The pull these respondents feel toward Muslim causes is not necessarily an overriding attachment they have to their pan-Islamic roots. Rather, as global citizens, they wish to see their own liberal freedoms extended to other Muslims across the world. Participants demonstrated an increased awareness about the similarities and differences between Muslim societies around the world based on their online connections. However, in some cases, respondents made it clear that transnational engagements were merely social and non-political in nature. Others simply used the ability to connect with people across the globe to explore themselves and their place in the world. Hakeem, for instance, remarked, I guess our own experiences [we share with each other], you know it is mainly personal stuff involving our future and just sort of improving our own self.

Kinza’s statement also sheds light on how, beyond political or religious affiliations, common interests or inclinations also attract young Muslims to engage with global trends. Her interest in fashion and art benefitted from being able to connect to global trends via social media, I really use [it] for creativity, artistic inspiration and just seeing different types of art, different photography, things like that.

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Australian participant Muneera shared how she had made an online friend with a Muslim girl in the USA via a K-Pop fan group, “We tend to discuss […] anything like related to a recent article that we have read about Muslims, and then why that makes us angry.” She also said they discuss racism and discrimination against Muslims that sometimes occurs in K-pop and how it should be changed.

The interview responses indicated online platforms were an important avenue for young Muslims to explore global connections and locate others with shared interests and concerns.

7.7 The Ability and Desire for Young Muslims to Create Change The interviews revealed that the sample of young Western Muslims have quite a rich understanding of world issues and an awareness of international debates of global importance. These range from climate issues to those of income inequality and world hunger. Most also had a plan or motivation to address these issues; for instance, some felt their career choices would allow them to create change, while others believed selfeducation and micro-actions in their community and family networks were a meaningful way to address global issues. Others participated in protests and petitioned against global and Muslim issues. A small number felt hopeless, but the overwhelming responses expressed not only an awareness but a willingness to bring about change. The young Muslims readily identified multiple major problems in the world that require solutions. Their awareness of these issues stemmed from their own experiences, in addition to their exposure to the problems at hand. For example, the global problems of sexism and discrimination against women were mostly brought up by the female participants because of their personal experiences. Jameelah, a young Muslim woman from Australia, exemplifies this in her discussion of global issues, I would say politics is the number one cause, but it is a really broad question. I think there are a lot of issues with gender equality. Again, politics is a big one. I think just waste and climate change, I mean that stuff is really bad as well and it is slowly getting- I think it is getting worse, and we are not aware of all the things that are happening.

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Issues pertaining to “third world” and the “Muslim world” were usually classified as global issues, and many believed they were also related to an anti-Muslim bias, although not everyone blamed the system or the West. Indeed, there was a clear consensus that corruption, lack of leadership, and poor levels of social development were key causes of the problems in developing countries. Connecting with ‘Muslim issues’ and causes therefore does not necessarily make them ‘religious causes’; they are also primarily issues concerning basic human rights. It is evident that being Muslim and understanding the experiences of being (or being related to) migrants does make young Muslims more prone to caring about Muslim oppression around the globe and the plight of refugees. Latifah, for example, believed that people shouldn’t limit themselves to thinking they should only help others with similar backgrounds, adding that, At the end of the day we are all human, we should be treating each other, helping each other.

Noor also recognized the myriad of problems that affect people from all types of countries, There are a lot of people in the underdeveloped nations and developing nations that are starving and struggling, have no food, sanitization issues, education, children not being able to get education, there is gender discrimination, mental health issues, drinking water issues, global warming on a large scale, and yeah.

The decline of democracy and human rights in many countries made many young Muslims anxious about the future. Arben, who resides in the USA, listed the range of threats he perceived across the world, Lack of political cohesiveness or the breakdown of the diplomacy is also a huge issue right now, a threatening issue, the rise of automatism you know and the inability of the world to combat these waves of populists and you know, totalitarianism emerging all around the world.

Safdar, who had roots in South Asia, explained, I also think that those smaller countries, less developed countries are not getting the support and are not getting the justice they deserve in what

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happens with them. I think that is a huge issue, especially in Africa where they are taking their resources and not correctly you know giving them what they deserve out of those for those resources.

Nargis, from the UK, resonated with the anxiety of most young Muslims as she listed the key global issues in her opinion, I think Islamophobia, climate change, white supremacy. So, I think these are again racial, economic, and environmental issues.

She also reaffirmed what a great number of Muslims living in the West in the study felt: threatened by the rise of right-wing politics, which was more profoundly felt by interviewees in the USA and the UK, due to events such as 2016 Presidential Elections and Brexit. Nargis voiced the collative concern of many young Muslims, I think there is racism, there is xenophobia, the rise of the right-wing politics and it is not necessarily right-wing politics in this sense of economics I mean, I feel like calling it populism rather than right-wing politics.

She astutely added that increases in populism result in a community being blamed for their religion and culture, while socio-economic factors are ignored or minimized. Political turmoil and lack of trust in politicians in developed countries was also a theme that emerged in the interviews. Latifa and many like her felt that right-wing politics were divisive and had a very negative impact on peace on a global scale, Politics gets in the way of everything, I feel like, with everything that is constantly happening, it is all about money and just no peace throughout the world, and it is chaotic, and it is a mess. The main thing would be the lack of peace.

Ashar identified the growing intolerance of societies not just in his home in the USA, but throughout the world, Apart from what is going on with George Floyd or whatnot, there is not really any world peace. Whichever nation you go, or any country at this point and you would see how much destruction and turmoil […] And everywhere we see there is hate, hatred between people, sects, between

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ethnicities—just because everyone always portrays themselves […as] being right, and of course everyone is entitled to their own opinions and freedom of speech but sometimes what we do not seem to understand [is] that it is okay […] sometimes to let the other person win.

The failures of capitalism and the norms it promoted were another systematic failure felt by many young Muslims interviewed. Most felt the world’s problems could not be overcome, although some believed individual actions and self-insight might aid. For instance, Yasir addressed the issue, The world in general—materialism is a huge one. Consumerism is huge.

Capitalism was also recognized to be deleterious on global societies and the environment, for instance, Salomon described capitalism and its problems through a global system approach, saying, Well, it all comes back to capitalism in the end. […] You know, and there’s quite a lot of problems […] from environmental stuff to climate change and pollution and so on, to the issues of war and conflict.

Salman, who resided in the UK, felt that at the roots of the current ethos, issues such as corruption and unchecked profitability led to the main issues of the contemporary world, I think corruption is the main thing. I think there is no point in money before anything, and the environment and the people are the ones suffering and we need to stop that.

Aleem also explained how the supremacy of individualism is trumping a society built on caring for each other, I feel like it is individualism […] People are becoming so out tune and so out of sync with reality that they don’t care about issues that are affecting others, or all they care about is this hedonistic lifestyle where they are perusing their own pleasures. And it is all about me, it is all about I, and we are forgetting. We continue to let oppression happen, we continue to let people starve, people get hurt, we are not cohesive as a society, and I feel like we need some [more] of that. I am not advocating for like a collectivist society, I am advocating for more care.

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Given the extensive list of issues acknowledged by the young Muslims interviewed, there was a level of frustration evident within the group. Due to the ‘voicelessness’ young people often have, especially on issues such as climate change, many felt disappointed with the inaction of governments. Others also pointed out the wrong issues and subjects are gaining the wrong attention. Saima, for instance, commented that society is, Not focusing on the real issues. And speaking a lot or discussing a lot about useless things. So, main issues would be climate change, would be religion, would be hungry kids around the world, and would be starvation as I said. Useless things would be Trump’s speeches are useless, so [are the] Kardashians, fashion like this to me- fashion is good but- useless fashions, lipsticks like makeups or fake faces as in plastic surgeries those things are useless […] We should really focus as a young generation on having an impact on climate change and such sort of major issues.

However, others like Bushra, while aware of the issues, felt at a loss when trying to think of a solution due to the scale of the world’s problems, Weaponry, I think it is pretty scary, like nuclear weaponry, world poverty, global poverty.

Noriya was similarly disheartened by the deep and extensive divisions in society, Poverty is still a big issue. So, there is millions and millions of starving children and families while there are millions of people who are living like in castles, or mansions, and I don’t think that is fair […] We need equality and access and all things equally. Racial discrimination—so that is also divisions of religions, so that could include Sunni and Shia and I find that there is a division between them, and you know, on the news they just talk about it and the things that they do to each other.

Noor suggested a universal basic income and social security to address economic issues from which she believed a lot of social problems stem. Some felt that basic human kindness toward each other was enough to create meaningful change. For instance, Tasneem suggested being kinder and nicer to those around was a great way to address major issues at hand.

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7.8

Taking Action

Some interviewees expressed a desire to take action to address global issues and injustices. While the majority of these responses described taking part in protests and campaigns and signing petitions, some respondents also spoke of enacting change through education and open discussion. For instance, Sumayya, who lived in Australia, described her approach to addressing all the major problems the world is facing, Power—there is an imbalance of power. There is greed, there is arrogance, and I guess those are the main issues that arise all other issues. […] I would try educating myself to begin with about political issues or with issues with my society, it would be a very big step. And then starting from my close friends and immediate family, sharing that information, making people aware, I guess using social media as a tool to spread information, knowledge.

Noor also felt that social networks and starting debates within them were an effective means to raise awareness about the issues she was passionate about. She added, Creating awareness amongst my friends and family or amongst my community, the people I am in touch with. Apart from this—on a large scale I think organizations should come together and should voice [important issues]. They’re on media and they should also work towards contributing to it.

Others like Imran did not feel like they were individually equipped to bring about change. She described not having the time or level of commitment required to be a positive role model in her comment, I can educate myself about spreading this information and I can just be a role model. For that I would have to dedicate a portion of my life to fixing these issues which obviously I am not willing to do, so I am not really good at this.

Interviewees’ political expression via protests ranged from protests in physical locations to opening discussions online about taboo or lesserknown issues. The issues participants protested most passionately about were related to human rights and climate change. Most possessed a sense

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of duty to take action and create awareness about these issues, particularly in response to humanitarian issues that were related to ‘Muslim’ crises such as the Uighur genocide, Palestinian oppression, and the Kashmir dispute. Jameelah participated in protests that were rooted in humanitarian issues. She shared that she often took part in protests in Melbourne held by the Armenian community demanding the genocide recognition. Discussing online petitions, she commented, Well, you know what I have signed so many I don’t even remember. But mainly about injustice, if there is someone in prison or something like that.

She added that she would ideally like to reach more people and help create political awareness, but “I am still you know a student in university trying to figure out my own path, so I can’t do much and I am hoping to.” Ebrar, who had roots in Turkey shared that he took part in the Syrian war demonstration, I was in a public rally for Syria, but this was back in 2015 maybe.

Majeed shared he had signed online petitions protesting the oppression of Muslims, Online protest—I think I signed up for a couple for the Rohingya and Uighur Muslims and a couple other[s] I cannot remember.

Fatimah also partakes in large protests, I get involved in protests for [the] Palestine issue in the city where large groups of us gather and that helps influence people in power just because of the numbers of people showing up.

In further discussion, she highlighted that her concerns primarily stemmed from humanitarian considerations, I have been to several protests for gay marriage before it was legalized thankfully last year, and now I mainly go to Palestine protests in Melbourne and in Brisbane.

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Zakria also attended diverse rallies, yet they all related to the universal need to protect the rights of humans, I have been to a few Palestinian rallies, I have been to a Syria rally, yeah. And Indigenous rallies […] But yeah there are refugee rallies, LGBT rallies as well.

The interview responses revealed that most participants can not only identify major global issues but also the effects these issues have on the communities around them and beyond. Their awareness of and interaction with these issues makes them involved and informed citizens of the world.

7.9

Transnational Charity Work

There were a few who participated in transnational charity work. This usually meant sending aid to their parents or their own country of origin. In some cases, the aid was sent to Muslim countries or less developed countries. Ameer explained how he carried out charity drives in Australia to provide some items to those in need in Turkey, Like this year, it was tied to providing clothes to homeless kids in Turkey. The second time was just trying to gather people that wouldn’t normally donate during Ramadan.

Raheel’s activities similarly sought to support those in need overseas, I was heavily involved in charity work for raising funds for orphans in Sub Sahara Africa, and I was also at a point very heavily involved in groups that are pro-Palestine. That was something that I felt quite strongly about for quite a bit.

Anisa also shared her prior involvement in a community charity effort, Like there was a lot of fundraising […] we actually raised like twelve thousand or fifteen thousand dollars for some to like to buy new furniture like buy new beds, and like toys for an orphanage in Cambodia or Thailand […] So, we did like charity stalls, gala nights and all these organizations and selling super doopers every day.

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Conclusion

The interviews in this chapter demonstrate young Muslims’ varying degrees of knowledge and interest in local, national, and global political and social issues. They benefit from the free flow of information facilitated on social media and the internet, and the connectivity they share with other young people around the world. In this way, young Muslims interviewed in this book share common online behavioral habits with the broader Millennial and Gen-Z demographic and inhabit shared online spaces. Many participants also shared their experiences of joining or being active users in special interest groups on social media; the connections they cultivate in these groups help inform their worldviews and interests. Their multifaceted identities and the sheer amount of information they encounter online have made them aware of events happening all over the world, and many participants have strong opinions on important global issues, with a few also wanting to address these issues. Ultimately, the interviews demonstrate that young Muslims are global citizens of the world, impacted by and aware of macro and micro socio-political events in the countries they are attached to or living in, and across the globe. Contributing to the young Muslims interviewed being global citizens is not only their awareness of major political and social problems in the world but the emotions they consequently attach to these problems. Some described feeling helpless when discussing economic systems in place and their cost to the environment. Others were proactive and focused on how they could help. For instance, one participant dreamed of setting up mental health clinics in her country of origin for post-conflict adjustment, signifying active citizenship on a global scale. Another participant felt that a stronger focus on kindness toward each other and tackling negativity across the world would create positive change, indicating a sense of responsibility toward humanity. The interview responses revealed a variety of reasons for individual participant’s interest in certain global issues, yet a defining feature shared by all was valuing the protection of human rights. Concerns about poverty leading to massive amounts of suffering, armed conflict damaging societies, extremism destroying the social fabric of a polity, and deteriorating or lack of democracy infringing on basic rights, were common responses among participants—no matter what particular political or social issue

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they were discussing. This shows that the participants are not only sensitive to “Muslim causes” but they also empathize with people around the world suffering from poverty, war, a lack of human rights, and a lack of democracy. It is also important to understand how the respondents shape their global identity in correspondence with their religious, ethnic, and cultural identity. The information they obtain and the culture in which they live, including the influence of visits to their/their family’s ‘country of origin,’ makes them naturally more aware of issues in Muslim majority countries. Having a Muslim identity results in concern and care for Muslims around the world who are facing struggles. It is not surprising then to find many young Muslims are keenly aware of social and political issues faced by Muslims, and that they prioritize these issues. The idea of a shared Muslim victimhood, or victimhood of the ummah, was apparent in some responses and this relates to a combination of everyday stereotyping and discrimination, paired with news of the oppression of various Muslim groups around the globe. While not all the interviewees exhibited this mentality, there was a significant number in all three countries that strongly felt Muslims were victims of outside forces who sought to cause them harm. This also led a smaller minority within this group to blame corruption or deviation from religion as the main cause of problems within the Muslim world. While they were not always clear in their ideas of what the “right path” was, this section of interviewees expressed feelings of victimhood and a belief that the ummah was under constant attack from non-Muslims. At the same time, a significantly larger proportion of young Muslims, while they cared deeply about issues facing Muslims, felt the root causes of these issues was systemic government failure in Muslim majority countries on issues such as education, along with poor leadership, rampant corruption, sectarianism, and religious extremism. In these scenarios, the plight of various groups such as Palestinians, Uighurs, Rohingya, and Ahmadis were seen through a humanitarian lens, rather than as examples of the ummah being “victims” of an anti-Muslim conspiracy. Although small in numbers, it is also noteworthy that some interviewees felt that substantial change could be made to address global issues. Rather than promoting the idea of “jihad,” young Muslims felt that by talking about issues, forming charities, and using their professional skills,

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they could have a positive impact on some of the major issues discussed. In these discussions and solution-driven responses, a high level of maturity was shown by these young individuals; they were realistic in terms of their capabilities, practical in their ideas, and also optimistic when looking for possible solutions. Equally, while their interest in and identification with a country of origin (theirs or their family) at times made them aware of a wide variety of global issues, it is also a clear source of distress among several interviewees—leading to these interviewees disclosing they avoided information from or about these countries. This also brings forth the conclusion that at times, possessing multiple identities creates an intersection of various stressors for these young Muslims. The politics of the countries they have ties with and the turmoil of the Muslim world are combined with global and domestic issues, including the growth of right-wing movements and the climate crisis. Anxieties resulting from the compounding stresses were clear in the interviews and the responses provided. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the makings and motivations of young global citizens who identify as Muslim. This chapter challenges the stereotype of all young Muslims being angry or radicalized jihadists and showcases young people who wish to create—despite their frequent feelings of hopelessness—a better and more democratic world.

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Khatib, L. (2003). “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as Global Citizenship.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 27(4), 389–409. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0196859903255776. Mahzam, R. (2017). “Jihadist Propaganda & Information Warfare in Cyberspace.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9(3), 8–14. http://www. jstor.org/stable/26351502. Morais, D. B., and Ogden, A. C. (2011). “Initial Development and Validation of the Global Citizenship Scale.” Journal of Studies in International Education 15(5), 445–466. https://doi.org/10.1177/1028315310375308. Mustafa, Anisa. (2016). “Active Citizenship, Dissent and Civic Consciousness: Young Muslims Redefining Citizenship on Their Own Terms.” Identities 23(4), 454–469. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2015.1024127. Orgad, Liav. (29 April 2018). “The Idea of Global Citizenship.” Conference Proceedings at Cloud Communities: The Dawn of Global Citizenship? By EUI Global Citizenship Observatory. https://globalcit.eu/cloud-commun ities-the-dawn-of-global-citizenship/. Peucker, M. (2018). “On the (In)compatibility of Islamic Religiosity and Citizenship in Western Democracies: The Role of Religion for Muslims’ Civic and Political Engagement.” Politics and Religion 11(3), 553–575. https:// doi.org/10.1017/s1755048317000700. Peucker, M., and Akbarzadeh, S. (2014). Muslim Active Citizenship in the West (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315870960. Peucker, M., Roose, M. J., and Akbarzadeh, S. (2014). “Muslim Active Citizenship in Australia: Socioeconomic Challenges and the Emergence of a Muslim Elite.” Australian Journal of Political Science 49(2), 282–299. https://doi. org/10.1080/10361146.2014.899967. Reysen, Stephen, and Katzarska-Miller, Iva. (2013). “A Model of Global Citizenship: Antecedents and Outcomes.” International Journal of Psychology 48(5), 858–870. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.701749. Rye, A. Ståle. (2016). “Young People’s Construction of Global Citizenship Through Internet Use.” In N. Ansell, N. Klocker, and T. Skelton (Eds.), Geographies of Global Issues: Change and Threat. Geographies of Children and Young People. Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-458554-5_30. Schattle, Hans. (2009). “Global Citizenship in Theory and Practice.” In Ross Lewin (Ed.), The Handbook of Practice and Research in Study Abroad. New York: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10. 4324/9780203876640-8/global-citizenship-theory-practice-hans-schattle.

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Shearer, Jenny. (1996). “One Net One World Global Citizenship and the Internet.” Journal of Universal Computer Science 2(12). https://www.jucs. org/jucs_2_12/one_net_one_world/Shearer_J.html. Veilleux-Lepage, Y. (2016). “Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy.” Journal of Terrorism Research 7(1), 36–51. https://doi.org/10. 15664/jtr.1183. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2012). “An Analysis of the Factors That Pave the Way for the Radicalization of the British Youth.” In Mohammed Siddique Seddon, Fauzia Ahmad, and Shiraz Khan (Eds.), Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations (pp. 32–53). London and New York: Continuum. Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2016). “The Nature of Islamophobia: Some Key Features.” In Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (Eds.), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives on Islamophobia. Boundaries of Religious Freedom: Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies (pp. 19–30). Switzerland: Springer. Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Bashirov, Galib. (2022). “Religious Homophily and Friendship: Socialisation Between Muslim Minority and Anglo Majority Youth in Australia.” Journal of Youth Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261. 2022.2046257. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Bliuc, Ana-Maria, Mansouri, Fethi, and Bashirov, Galib. (2021). “Young Muslim Australians’ Experiences of Intergroup Contact and its Implications for Intercultural relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44(15), 2772–2793. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1850823. Yilmaz, Ihsan, Saleem, A. M. Raja, Pargoo, Mahmood, Shukri, Syaza, Ismail, Idznnursham and Shakil, Kainat. (2022). “Religious Populism, Cyber Space and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia.” ECPS. https://www.populismstudies. org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Final-Rapor.pdf.

CHAPTER 8

National, Transnational, and Global Political Participation of Young Muslims

8.1

Introduction

This chapter describes the diverse ways in which young Muslims participate in political activities. The chapter finds that participants engage in a variety of conventional (e.g., voting) and non-conventional (e.g., political activism) means to make their voice heard and create change in the Western societies in which they live. Although some participants felt disenchanted or disinterested in political participation (Yilmaz 2012), the majority saw it as an opportunity or civic duty. The interviews also found that most young Muslims felt a need for greater representation of Muslims in politics. This is related to giving a voice to Muslims, but also to providing a positive representation of ‘good role models’ and ‘good Muslims.’ These interview discussions raised interesting and differing points of view about the compatibility of Islam and Islamic morals with political participation, finding that for many young Muslims in the West, their religious and civic duties co-contribute to their decision to actively participate in politics. The thematic analysis of this chapter provides an insight into not only the voting habits and preferences of young Muslims from the case studies but also tries to understand these individual’s ideas about core democratic behaviors such as voting, running for office, civil protests, and their perception of democracy in Muslim majority countries. This enables the chapter to present a more comprehensive view of young Muslims’ stances © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6_8

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on ideas surrounding democracy and their ways of engaging with the politics of their respective countries.

8.2

Muslims and Political Participation

Political participation is a crucial activity in the exercise of citizenship rights. The level of participation by migrant communities, particularly Muslim communities, has been a topic of interest in numerous studies. Ocampo et al. (2018), for instance, used a nationwide database of Muslims in the United States (US) to systemically analyze voting partners among this demographic. Their research found that religion was of central importance to Muslims when casting their votes and that most aligned with the Democratic party. The support for the party was attributed to the center-left outlook of the party, and its softer stance toward Muslims and migration in the USA, as opposed to the Republican party. Pietsch (2016) looks at voting patterns of migrants and ethnic minorities in Australian politics. Pietsch places both migrant and ethnic minorities into the same category because they both face common issues which are not faced by their White counterparts, such as marginalization and discrimination. The author also notes both communities tend to support similar state social welfare programs, like education, housing, and health, because they share common “class characteristics of electoral sub-groups” (Pietsch 2016: 2467). Their empirical study discovers that these groups show high support for the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Like in the American study, the authors found that support for left-leaning ALP is a result of its socio-economic views and policies which are more favorable to Muslim and ethnic communities in comparison with right-leaning opposition. Kranendonk et al. (2018), in an EU (European Union) based study, used interviews to explore voting behaviors among Muslims. They found that social identifiers including religion play a role in voting behaviors. The authors, however, assert that for European Muslims, the politics of their “country of origin” also plays a role in shaping preferences for the domestic politics of their Western home. There are also some consistencies identified in voting preferences between Muslims and other immigrant communities living in the West. De Rooij (2012) used an EUwide dataset to comprehend the voting patterns of immigrants in Western Europe. The author finds that immigrant status gives people unique experiences rooted in a socio-political experience, as argued by Pietsch above.

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It is unsurprising to find that Muslims in the West have different voting patterns and means of exercising citizenship than the mainstream. While the motivation behind voting or expression of civic engagement might differ, the average Muslim in the West has been found to be less likely to vote than the national average (Shah 2019; Al-Momani et al. 2010). Lower levels of political participation are often accounted for by three explanations: Priorities (culturally diverse voters either don’t understand the system or give it a low priority in contrast to other life objectives); cynicism (these voters believe the system is corrupt, the state is hostile to their community or their vote doesn’t matter); and religious objections, either because the system is considered un-Islamic or politics are perceived to be harmful and divisive (Al-Momani et al. 2010). It must be noted that blanket statements are unable to capture the diversity in Muslim voters, and their level of participation or preferences. Factors including gender, citizenship status, level of education, involvement in society (Yilmaz et al. 2021), and relationship with faith all have an impact on voting behaviors among Muslims. For example, a previous study has demonstrated that second-generation Muslims in the West tend to be more religious and more dissatisfied with politics compared to their parents, and more likely to attribute religion to their lack of political engagement (Just et al. 2014). Yet numerous studies in the USA have also found that Muslims are approximately as politically active as their compatriots, whereas this is not the case in Western Europe where lower voting participation has been identified. Variations in education may contribute to different levels of participation: Muslim Americans are more likely to hold a college degree than broader American society, while Muslim immigrants in Europe have much lower levels of education than those born in Europe (Angenendt et al. 2007). An association has been found between higher levels of education and being more politically active (Ayers and Hofstetter 2008). A study from the USA also found that highly educated members of society more readily embrace their American identity and tend to have higher confidence in American institutions (Angenendt et al. 2007). In contrast, less educated European Muslims are more isolated, less financially successful, and show less interest in participating in politics and civil society. They tend to have lower faith in European institutions and fewer resources to devote to community building. Furthermore, evidence suggests that Muslim men and women engage in politics in quite diverse ways, with women dominating in methods of informal participation, such as through signing petitions (Bullock

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and Nesbitt-Larking 2013). Studies also show that activism emerges from the individual’s personal understanding of social justice which is based on their lived experiences in the West (O’Toole and Gale 2010: 138). According to Peucker et al. (2014), it is difficult to quantitatively assess the extent of civic and political participation of Australian Muslims, but a general consensus exists that Australian Muslims have become more politically engaged over time. Through steadily accumulating human and social capital, the Muslim elite have gained access to lines of communication with political decision-makers. Yet this can create schisms and internal mistrust within the community, with the elites being viewed with suspicion due to their proximity to government and political institutions which are viewed as problematic. The challenge then remains, the authors argue, for the Muslim elite to navigate and placate the concerns of their community. However, this study is silent about Muslim youths’ political participation and various forms of civic engagement they partake in. Ataman et al. (2016) study does note a similar pattern of diverse factors impacting a range of civic activities in youth participants. The study is based on a comparative analysis examining political participation by young Turkish people in three countries: Germany, Belgium, and Turkey. Citizenship status, age, gender, and country as well as psychological factors were all identified as factors influencing different political behavior and civil engagement by Turkish youth in these countries. These findings also highlight that religion, or a personal identification with Islam often has little to do with Muslim voter preference. Furthermore, the socio-political environment proves to be more influential on voting outcomes. Rhetoric that targets Muslims often in turn mobilizes them to vote as a form of activism. For example, the current rise in right-wing populism likely mobilizes Muslim voters to vote against these politicians. Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) similarly found that Muslim voters were mobilized to vote in the wake of the post-9/11 political climate. The authors highlighted that the 2004 elections attracted higher participation of Muslim voters in America compared to any other group in America. They also found that although elevated levels of religion initially had a negative impact on the willingness to vote, this was offset by higher levels of participation in mosques and other religious events, which encouraged civic engagement in Muslims, including voting. Both the political atmosphere and level of engagement with community then are key factors in determining voting patterns among

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Muslims living in the West. Oskooii and Dana (2017) study produced similar findings: Mosque attendance is associated with (i) greater electoral and non-electoral political participation and active civic engagement and (ii) reduction in politically motivated violence (PMV). Moutselos’ (2020) study looks at Muslim voting patterns in the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. The author similarly found a sound correlation between mosque attendance and voting, although conversely, a study by Azabar et al. (2020) of Muslim votes in Belgium found no correlation between mosque attendance and voting, although the research did indicate that Muslim voters tended to favor Muslim candidates in the polls (Azabar et al. 2020). These findings collectively highlight the influence of the political atmosphere and the role of religious beliefs in vote casting behaviors of Muslim voters. Further, formal religion can only have a limited influence on political participation, since Muslims do not act with a single voice (any more than Christians, Jews, or members of any other religious group do). The political commonalities that emerge are likely to be precipitated by factors that are only secondarily religious, and which have more to do with shared experiences of discrimination or solidarity with Muslim communities overseas. The troubles of these communities are more commonly related to territorial and power struggles than those about religion per se (such as the Israel-Palestine conflict). Complicating matters further, identification with a religious category (such as Muslim) does not necessarily accord with religious practice or observance. According to research about young London-based Turks and Kurds, a majority of those who regularly fasted and prayed did not actually describe themselves using a religious identity marker, while a quarter of those who did not fast nevertheless describe themselves using a religious identity (Choudhury 2007: 7–9). It is therefore difficult to ascertain the relationship, if any, between religious identification and voting behaviors. A considerable amount of the literature on Muslim politics in the West is motivated by insecurities about, and a desire to prevent, Muslim radicalization. However, qualitative studies in several countries have found that Muslims in Western societies, including those adopting what are sometimes seen by outsiders as ‘extreme’ practices (such as wearing the niqab or burqa) overwhelmingly express their political aspirations and selfunderstanding in terms of liberal individualism (Klausen 2005; Liogier 2006; Yilmaz et al. 2021; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2022). The current literature does not facilitate an accurate assessment of the level or nature of

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Muslim political participation in Australia, the USA, and the UK. This is due to a number of reasons. First and foremost is the great diversity found among Muslims in these countries. Self-identified Muslims come from almost every geographical background, and their political participation is affected by many factors including age, education, employment, English fluency, socio-economic status, length of residence in a Western country, integration into a religious community, and levels of religious commitment. Harris and Roose (2014) discussed the issues surrounding the civic participation of Muslim youth living in non-Muslim majority countries. The researchers reported that Muslim youth are often perceived to be aloof and to not participate within civic institutions. To counter this view, Harris and Roose (2014) instead explore the civic participation of Muslim youth according to a wider definition of the concept, in which not only formal participation, i.e., political parties, unions, etc. is included but also informal participation. This informal participation is deinstitutionalized and occurs at individual levels. The authors find that young Muslims living in non-Muslim majority countries politically engage with their community in numerous ways including social and other media, speaking with others, community groups, letters to politicians, protests/rallies, and petitions (Harris and Roose 2014). This research follows Verba et al. (1995) in their view that political participation does not just consist of voting and formal political representation but also joining a local or issue-specific action group, volunteering to support a political campaign, writing to a member of parliament or raising funds for a political campaign. Muslim religious and community organizations have faced public pressure to perform the civic role of ‘bridging’ mainstream political and community organizations and have often shouldered the burden of facilitating social inclusion (Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011: 283). This means there is a serious need to explore Muslim civic participation and take into consideration the various avenues in which this occurs. Adler and Goggin (2005: 241), who provide an overview of several different avenues for political participation, suggest that it may prove most useful to describe civic engagement as ‘how an active citizen participates in the life of the community in order to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community’s future.’ From this point of view, civic engagement is about the activity (either individual or collective) that is oriented toward social change or the betterment of the

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lives of community members. Such action might be individual and serviceoriented or more formal, political, and collectivized, such as the active membership of a local organization. This is consistent with Vromen’s (2003: 82–83) definition of participation as ‘acts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in.’ Such a framing of civic engagement is particularly relevant in the lives of young people (Harris and Roose 2014: 795–796). The problem of a supposed civic duty deficit may lie more in the use of outdated definitions and indicators of civic engagement, which overlook activities ‘on the ground’ (Manning and Ryan 2004). While some attempts have been made to broaden definitions of participation to capture the ways in which young people are oriented toward action for the public good, conventional measures, and definitions are typically utilized, and an enduring depiction of civic deficit and at times panic regarding disengagement remains. Certain groups of minoritized young people, especially young Muslims, are particularly targeted by these depictions and anxieties (Harris and Roose 2014: 796). Much research on Muslim youth and civic participation, especially when it has been governmentcommissioned, has emphasized their concern in line with this depiction of civil inactivity. They highlight processes of exclusion from the mainstream or lack of engagement with the formal civic and political apparatus, such as voting, contacting politicians, volunteering, building leadership capacity, and participating in community organizations. Informed by conventional approaches to political and civic socialization, this research objective can fail to capture the emerging theories about the effects of the shifting landscape of civic life that are engendering new meanings and forms of engagement. Indeed, many argue that we are witnessing a refashioning of the political, with traditional forms of participation which are tied to representative democracy being eclipsed by a form of political participation that is increasingly focused on the terrain of culture (Nash 2001). New types of political subjectivity are evident, and different perspectives on the relationship between citizens and the state have developed. Considerable evidence exists that young people are turning away from traditional civic associations and institutions, including unions, community organizations, political parties, and youth clubs, and instead creating informal, short-term, and individualized forms of civic identification and participation (Martin 2012). Vinken (2005: 155) identifies a new chapter of

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citizenship among this generation, characterized by ‘dynamic identities, open, weak-tie relationships and more fluid, short-lived commitments in informal permeable institutions and associations.’ Bennett (2008) has described this as the emergence of the ‘selfactualizing citizen,’ whereby young people define their own citizenship paths through individual action and transient, issue-based engagements or forms of personalized, ad hoc, and ‘DIY’ activism (Bennett 2012: 20; Wieviorka 2005; McDonald 2006; Harris and Roose 2014). As Fahmy (2006: 105) also indicates, younger people tend to be more engaged in ‘relatively fluid and unstructured forms of participation.’ It is also suggested that it is within these fluid and changeable groups and activities that young people increasingly acquire the basics of citizenship participation (Roker and Eden 2002: 56; Harris and Roose 2014: 800–801). Bang (2004) agrees that we are witnessing a broader shift away from engagement with the state and other formal sites of traditional citizenship activity and moving toward network-building and issues-driven political or civic action. Consequently, he makes a case for focusing on ‘everyday makers’ (EMs), that is, civic actors, who use ordinary, everyday, practices, and individual activities to participate and create change in their local contexts. In the case of Muslims living in the West, we observe that new forms of engagement or informal civic participation rely on social and other media platforms for purposes of political engagement, petitioning, and other forms of social mobilization for a cause (Harris and Roose 2014). Taking these arguments into consideration, declining participation in key institutions of representative democracy is not necessarily evidence of political apathy. It is potentially indicative of wider social and political changes that have been occurring in the contemporary period, such as the emergence of ‘detraditionalization,’ ‘reflexive individualization,’ and ‘postmaterialist values’ (Giddens 1994; Beck 1997; Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2004). This context, it is suggested, has given rise to new political subjectivities or ‘grammars’ of action (McDonald 2006) that as discussed above, are characterized by a turn toward more reflexive, ‘DIY,’ everyday, fluid, and expressive forms of political engagement (Giddens 1994; Beck 1997; Bang 2004). It is often speculated that such shifts in grammars of action are particularly relevant to the young (Norris 2003), who are more likely to be politically engaged in activities outside mainstream electoral or party politics. It has also been suggested that ethnic minority groups are much more likely to be engaged in alternative forms of participation, often within social movements, as a consequence of exclusionary

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norms and practices within mainstream political arenas (Gilroy 1987; Black Public Sphere Collective 1995). To reiterate, lower levels of electoral engagement among these groups should not then be interpreted as evidence of political apathy (Marsh et al. 2007; Bousetta 2001).

8.3

Democracy

Most of the interviews revealed that young Muslims felt that having democracy in their country of residence was highly positive, and the majority reflected positively on the general idea of a liberal democracy. Most took the opportunity to elaborate on the freedoms and rights of citizens in a democratic system in their responses. For example, Muntazir, who resided in the USA, shared his conception of democracy and democratic freedoms, Democracy is a system where you’ll be able to live in a country. Or live in a system where you’re being offered services and opportunities to excel, as […a] member of society, and try to do best for your own system or your own country.

His ideas were resonant with most of the interviewees who frequently used words such as “freedoms,” “right to choose,” and “by the people” when explaining their understanding of the term democracy during discussion. Most felt that democracy ensured, or at least aspired toward, the power resting with the people. As Bashir, explained, “So, it says the power of and to the people.” Behlul’s definition of democracy showcases how the young participants conceptualize democracy beyond just being able to cast votes, [Voting] along with separation of powers. Freedom of speech. And the right to protest.

Liaqat also emphasized that beyond having an electoral system, another precondition of democracy featured “an open, civil society.” Being part of a minority in the Western context, most people from the interviews saw how democracy ensured protection of their rights. Another precondition recognized by many of the participants is democracy’s ability to allow freedom of expression without hurting others. Nadeem, who lived in Australia, explained this idea,

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It is a place where you can express ideas freely without the intention of hurting other people—and I can be okay, and where I can be accepted.

Zubeida, from the UK, also focused on the elements of human rights as a core constituent of democracy. She narrated, “My main idea for democracy is that it is for everyone, and no one should be excluded from having democratic right[s] and human rights,” adding that “I think of human rights a lot.”

Tooba’s statement lays out how democracy can bridge between different communities and give everyone an equal voice, I think it is really like—different communities and different cultures and religions should all have the opportunity to express their opinions, and there should be a collective and collaborate [method] to deciding the outcome of that, rather than it being in favor of one religion over another, or one culture over another. I think everyone’s views should be heard.

Zia believed that democracy, and the fairness and justness it promotes are crucial for the progression of society, “I’ve learned in my life [that it is important] to create an opportunity for the majority of Americans, immigrants and refugees, to get access to ethical funding and good quality business opportunities.” She added further that it is a matter of “educating our children and making sure they understand that these are the problems that we should be solving.”

Sofia provided another case for the benefits of a democratic society, I think it’s living in a society where what you say matters. I think in a democracy you can’t have scope for racism. Or colorism or sexism. Any of these things. For me, the biggest democracy is that your vote matters, your opinion matters. And it actually gets action to some level as well. And you can see that it gets action.

While the majority agreed in principle that democracy’s strength lies in its ability to dilute power to ‘the people,’ many remained critical of the current state of democracy in the West. Saleema described herself as a supporter of democracy and believes it offers a promise that other systems

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fail to provide; however, she said that it was unable to address all issues at hand. She shared her conceptualization of democracy and an interesting perspective about distinguishing democracy from equality, My personal definition of democracy is a culture and a government and systems where the people who reside in that society are consulted about how they are ruled, and the country or government or society of the people who are elected to rule the world. And the people who have the physical resources—the money, the power to engineer and control the society, and to design it where they do so in a way that provides opportunity to all people in the society. So not the same. Not equal. Everyone’s not going to be rich.

Yunis, who resided in Australia, was also aware of the limitations of democracy in practice but felt it was a worthwhile system. He added, Some people’s voice is valued and respected, even though it is not always implemented. And people who live in there, they also respect each other, yeah. Regardless [of if] they have different views and voice.

Affan also noted that “true” democracy could probably never exist, yet he was appreciative of what the system was able to offer, Power to the people. That is related to the social contract, democracy is holding the government and the whole state accountable to the fullest extent. I don’t feel like that can be achieved that at this point, even though people say that we are a democracy. If you say democracy, I would say that [we should be] holding our political leaders to the account of the fullest degree.

Many of the participants raised concerns about the weakening of democracy in their Western home. Sohrab who witnessed the 2016 Presidential Elections in America noted, Democracy for me is when the people can choose their own government, which calls into question a lot of countries that we consider to be democracies. Because are the people in the US necessarily free to choose their own government to an extent? Yes. But it could be better. So, I think democracy is a good ideal to have.

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Raheel was also critical of the recent tide of populist politics occurring in democracies around the world. He felt that some countries in the West were functioning as majoritarian rather than democratic governments. He used France as an example, So, it is working for the whole population and not just working for you know the upper-class and marginalizing the lower-class. Say France, they say it is democracy, I don’t think it is because some of the basic laws are not for the whole country. […] That is not democracy in my opinion and that would not be democracy. So, it is these kinds of things, for me democracy is a country where elected representatives are making decisions for the whole population regardless of gender, regardless of age, religion, and ethnicity.

Zia was more cynical about the current state of democracy, and saw little hope for improvement, stating, I think the way democracy is today, it’s a facade needed to keep control.

Aleem felt that the people (majority) are not always the “smartest” but democracy is the best system out there, I don’t agree with [it] one hundred percent of the time because people are dumb. But yeah, that is the best system we have right now.

While questions of whether democracy required fixing or whether existing democracies could be improved were discussed in the interviews, most of the participants were broadly supportive of democracy. Democracy was viewed as the ideal or best available system for a free and equitable society despite its shortcomings and recent democratic backsliding in some nations. These answers provide an additional layer to the literature consulted earlier in the chapter. While existing studies have considered the evolving role of how young Muslims participate, the interview discussions presented here reveal why they participate (in both conventional and newer, less structured forms of political activity). The young Muslims interviewed overwhelmingly believe that democracy is the best political system.

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Democracy Beyond Borders

To further expand on their ideas of democracy as a global concept, the participants were encouraged to share their ideas about democracy in Muslims majority countries. The majority were in agreeance that Muslim nations need to adopt democracy as the only means to progress socially and politically and address issues such as human rights. A consistent narrative emerged from those individuals who opposed the suitability of democracy within Muslim majority populations; most argued that either these countries need a political framework of their own or they need to adopt an Islam-based pathway toward democracy. Proponents of the latter felt that Islam itself is rooted in democratic tradition. Overall, most strongly felt there was a need for a form of governance that serves the people’s interests. While there was disagreement regarding whether democracy is suitable for Muslim countries, a sense of agreement emerged among young Muslims on the topic of Islam and democracy; most felt they were compatible systems of governance. Various participants cited instances from the life of the Prophet and his companions, or the succession of the first Caliph to prove how the democratic tradition is encouraged in Islam. Bashir, for instance, noted that the leaders after Prophet Muhammad were democratically elected, For example, the first leader […after] Prophet Muhammad died was, you know, it was [via] election. Basically, it was revolts. People voted the second to the third, the fourth. So, I think that if anyone knows just a tiny little bit of Islamic history, you can answer this question.

Riaz also made a reference to early Islamic history, using the example of Prophet Muhammad consulting with companions as a form of early and foundational democracy, I think in Islam you see and [are] reading about the life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) —when Islam was started there were delegation[s] of his companions and he took their advice, and that is democracy, and you have input from everyone. The Holy Prophet did not act as a monarch or act as one who rule[d] without justice. There was something so profound in his revelation of what the modern democracy [entails].

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Saleema selected a more contemporary explanation for discussing how Islam, in her view, shaped modern Western democracy. She noted not only how Thomas Jefferson sought inspiration from the Quran but also how European trade and cultural links with the Ottomans and Arabs led to a possible exchange of knowledge that has influenced political thought today. Maya also challenged the idea of democracy being a product of the West alone and strongly felt that Islam and democracy went hand in hand, and consequently that Muslim countries would be able to successfully adopt democratization measures. She explained, I don’t think democracy is a Western idea. I don’t think politics is a Western idea. I think doing things justly and kindly and fairly and freely is the backbone of Islam. And if people are twisting democracy to be something that’s riddled with scandals and unfairness, then that’s not what democracy is. It’s a twisted judgement. Democracy is something that’s fair and should be carried out fairly. That’s what Islam encourages. So, yes, it can be used in Islamic countries.

Ben, who had converted to Islam, spoke of how familiarizing himself with the Quran opened his eyes to the compatibility of Islam and democratic values—particularly tolerance for others. In his words, Well, when I was reading through the Quran for the first time, I came across the messages of freedom and equality but also tolerance. And so, I see that for a democracy to function you should tolerate what others say.

When asked about the need for democracy in Muslim majority countries, Akbar responded with concern for the future of those countries that use democracy, Definitely. I don’t think a Muslim country will be able to run without democracy -because if there was no democracy the people wouldn’t feel at ease, they would not feel comfortable and in this way, you will not be able to progress and go [towards the] future, and there would be no good coming out of there. People will be unhappy and what would we do when people are unhappy?

Others like Fiza felt that democracy was not tied to a geographical location or a particular religion. She remarked that Muslim countries

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can “benefit” from democracy, indicating an appreciation for democratic values which she shared with the large majority of those interviewed. Some participants thought entrenched attitudes and cultural biases in Muslim societies preclude democracy working in these political settings. Kinza discussed this concern, sharing her view that religion itself had no connection with the success or failure of the political system, it comes down to a matter of tolerance. She explored this idea in her response, I think democracy is suitable for Muslim countries because I don’t think it has as much to do with religion as it does with respecting differences […] Well, a lot of Muslims that I’ve met in my life don’t have issues with respecting differences. So, I do think that in Muslim majority countries, democracy is the only suitable [option] and the two are compatible.

Aleem provided an interesting perspective that dictatorship wasn’t inherently bad if the leader was trustworthy; however, he noted how rare this type of leader would be. The participant conceded that because of this, democracy and giving the people a voice is the best political option for society, In today’s society especially in contrast to other countries, I feel like democracy is the best way to go. But that being said—you should be a true democracy not just a sham. We don’t see a lot of good democracies in the Muslim world. It is difficult to get a good democracy. I am not sure why, but it is just that has been, I myself like I wouldn’t mind a dictatorship, but you know it depends on who the person in charge is and the policies in place. If it is a person, I can trust who can make the best decision for me and people, then yeah, I am all in for that. But how often do you get that? Very little probably. So, you have to leave it up to the people to scrutinize decisions here and there. So, it is for the best. So, yeah, I think democracy is for the best.

Sohrab also noted that Muslim countries have suffered periodic dictatorships and that democracy would be a better system for the Muslim people, There’s nothing against democracy in Islam. Islam does not inherently have to have authoritarian governments like many well-known Muslim countries have. In fact, I think democracy is better than authoritarian government for Muslims because it allows them the freedom.

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Conversely, other participants were skeptical or dismissive of the suitability or possibility of democracy in Muslim majority countries, although some in this group did think a transition was possible in the future. Amjad, who lives in Australia, felt that Western intervention in many Muslim majority countries does not allow for them to mature enough for democratization, because it is not in their interest to have these countries become powerful, So, ideally, I think that Muslims should eventually adopt democracy as the culture changes and the economy changes. But then I don’t think Western foreign policy will allow that economic change, because I think if once Muslim countries become strong democratically and become powers—I think they will threaten the Western hegemony, political hegemony in the globe.

Qaiser also desired the democratization of the Muslim majority world but felt Muslim countries needed a certain level of institutional stability for the process to succeed. He understood that necessary socio-political foundations were required for democracy to thrive, Democracy can be suitable for all people that are mature and educated and wise. So, you know it can be suitable for Muslim countries, it may not be suitable for certain young countries. [It] may not be suitable for places where there is no law and order in the first place—you may need more stricter measures. But as you[r] population evolves, and they become educated and as they become wise and cares for each other -then your system of democracy is not necessarily a bad system.

Nadia reasoned that democracy was not necessarily a catch-all solution for issues faced within these countries, I think a lot of countries have their own problems, but it is not democracy that is the problem, they just have their own issues. But democracy itself, I think it is supposed to be a good thing, but if people ruin their countries in other ways, I don’t think it is democracy’s fault.

Haya was more skeptical. She felt that the ways of the Prophet were the best and should be followed in Muslim countries. She did not believe that the ‘true’ democracy embodied in the early days of Islam could be found

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anywhere in the world, and the current manifestation of democracy is not a “good fit” for a Muslim country. Referring to the example of the failed democratization attempt in Turkey, Nargis noted that maybe Muslim majority countries could not be democratized. She observed that in principle democracy is needed; however, its ‘Western’ version was unsuitable for Muslim majority countries, I don’t think it is sensible to assume that democracy plus secularism for the Muslim world [would work] because there would be a popular uproar, so generally not anything like that, I think. Something like France as a Muslim country would not work.

Nadimah’s apologetically elaborated on her views in support of the second line of thought, I feel like that there are too many problems for us right now, for us to jump into democracy. I think that if there were to be- this is really ugly to say but- a monarchy or some sort of system like that which promoted cultural ties, and ties between people despite their religious or ethnic differences. Then maybe from there we could embrace democracy, because I think democracy over right [outright] isn’t gonna fix anything for the Middle East.

Aftab and a few others believed that the Muslim world should attempt to create its own version of democracy. Aftab advocated for a more locally suited model that included consultative practices, rather than a ‘Western’ style democracy or implementation of sharia law, Something similar to democracy. I think something like a meeting of people to decide something, the pros and cons being laid out, and eventually a decision being made on which one is better. Rather than the majority, if it does go against the majority.

In their interviews, Imran and Uthman both disagreed with the presence of democracy in the Middle East as they felt it was “not ready” for this type of politics, with recent track records of human rights abuses and lack of education in these countries. The interview responses raised an interesting contrast in opinions. On the one hand, the pro-democracy group feels that democratization would help solve these types of issues and

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refashion the socio-political climate. Conversely, the group that opposed the implementation of democracy in the Middle East, at least for the time being, believed that the socio-political climate needed to change, and the treatment and education of the citizens needed to improve before democracy can be the political system.

8.5

Voting and Running for Office

When the participants were asked questions about voting, and reasons for voting, young Muslims gave many different justifications for voting or not voting. For a country like Australia, where voting is compulsory for citizens, most interviewees voted but not necessarily out of a desire to see political change or because of a feeling of responsibility as a citizen. While there were those who were voting out of a perceived duty as a citizen, some young Australian Muslims felt forced to vote. In the UK and USA, a higher level of enthusiasm for voting was found among participants. This can be attributed to the 2016 Presidential elections and Brexit taking place in the respective countries around the time of the interviews, unfolding political situations which greatly impacted Muslims in these countries and beyond. Relatively speaking, Australian politics has not witnessed the huge shift toward the political right that has been observed in other Western democracies. Some interviewees from the three countries chose not to vote or felt no compulsion to vote. The reasons they provided usually stemmed from feeling disappointed by previous false political promises. There were interviewees who expressed they had no interest in politics, while others simply voted for whoever their family voted for. Despite these responses, the majority of young Muslims interviewed were quite passionate about the merits of voting—the main form of traditional political participation— to create change or as their civic duty. These findings were interesting considering the literature review at the outset of this chapter which included studies that suggested Muslims are less inclined to vote, and that young people in general are much more inclined toward new forms of civic participation. Even participants who commented on their vote only representing one voice often still conceded that it was an opportunity, a privilege, or an obligation. The young Muslims interviewed for this book do show an increasing engagement with different forms of political activism and

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participation, which corresponds with the literature findings. Yet the findings in this book also found that the participants do seek to create change by participating in traditional political structures—demonstrating the variety of ways and means in which young Muslims are willing to engage to better their situation, and that of others. Another dominant trend found in the interview data was respondents from all the case study countries being overwhelmingly inclined toward center-left parties including environmental parties such as the Greens. For these voters, these parties were best equipped to deal with their concerns around not only issues such as wages and welfare but also human rights, policies on migrants, the handling of refugees, environmental concerns, and in some cases LGBTQ+ rights. Even those who had no special interest in politics felt a pull toward the politically left-liberal parties, generally due to their family’s political orientation. The inclination of Muslims in the West toward left-leaning politics has been noted in previous studies.

8.6

A Belief or Feeling of Duty in Voting

Yasir, who lives in the USA, felt that voting was the core of a democratic system and a responsibility of all citizens. He explained how the system empowered all citizens by granting the right to vote, Democracy is so messy. Well, if you just want a definition of democracy, it’s everybody’s vote counts as one, regardless of who you are—politically, economically, socially. At the very top or at the very bottom of society, your vote counts for one and you have the right to use that vote.

Sumayyah strongly felt that voting was a way to bring about change in the society around her. Even though she admitted it was a small step she still felt the strong urge to play her ‘little’ part, I guess one vote is one vote and everything starts with that one vote you know. We shouldn’t underestimate the power of that and if there is a political party that supports my views then it is my responsibility to support them. I can’t expect the world to change without changing myself or contributing to that.

Jameelah explained that although she was not happy with the direction politics was taking in Australia, she nevertheless strongly felt the need to

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vote and to have her opinion counted. She was critical of those who chose not to vote. In her words, Some people are like, ‘ah I am just too lazy to vote’, but in reality, they just show that they don’t care if they are not voting at all, but they are willing to pay the fine. But for me, as long as I get to have an opinion that is all that matters. So, it is not necessarily that I care about the political- I do care, but if there is someone I am really against or someone who I am not going to vote [for], so in most situations there isn’t, so I just go on and vote because I want to have an opinion.

Noor was optimistic about the power of her vote, and the opportunity voting provides her to create meaningful change. She responded, Well, every vote counts, every vote needs to be heard. And if there is a survey, if there is a vote, if there is any kind of information that the government seeks from me, so that it can make my experience of living here a lot better and if it effects the whole outcome in the smallest way, I would like to contribute to that.

Zia was also confident in the need for voting and it being every citizen’s “duty.” He elaborated, I vote simply because it’s my duty as an American, to be frank with you. I can’t see anybody that’s taking advantage of this country’s opportunity and resources [that] should not be at the polls.

This sense of ‘duty’ was also something that was linked to values instilled in them by their parents. Habibah, for instance, explained this as a key reason for her decision to vote, I’m not particularly excited about voting, but I do vote. I vote in every election. I always try to go, although I don’t think electoral politics is the way to make the biggest change in society. I still think it’s very important to participate. My family has always been very big on voting. I used to go with my parents to vote when I was a kid. So, it’s something that was kind of instilled in me. So, I will always vote because at least I can say I did something.

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Rizwan also discussed the idea of this ‘duty’ in the following way, explaining that Islam provided guidance and advice to participate in the country’s social and political processes, Well yeah, I would say because it is your right. So, you are in the country and in the democracy, and you are part of the democracy, and as part of it you can participate. And I believe, based on Islam, you participate in a country’s social and political aspects. And one of those aspects is to vote. I would not say it is duty, it is option, but then you should if you have the opportunity and the right to vote then you should definitely do so.

Fiza also felt that voting was a privilege for her. So many women never get a chance to vote, she said, which makes it particularly important and empowering for her personally. She remarked, Firstly, I think that a lot [of] people who are similar to me, young women across the world, do not have the ability to vote; whether that they might not be [living in] a democracy, or they are young woman [and] they don’t know anything about politics and they are not involved in it. So, I am proud that I am a young woman in the UK, and I have the right and ability to influence who will run the country. And also, I think it is important because I want a say in who leads my nation.

Some participants were awaiting citizenship status yet reported looking forward to the opportunity to vote and to partake in this duty linked to their future citizenship. Hasan, who had roots in war-torn Afghanistan, viewed the electoral process positively and expressed his desire to partake, “I can’t vote because I am not a citizen yet, but yes after I am a citizen I would definitely vote.” He also justified his desire to vote, “as Australia is a democratic country where everyone gets to decide who the government would be; I think my reason to vote would be to choose my party that I support to be in the government.”

Arooba clearly articulated the importance of voting, Well, if you abstain from voting, it’s kind of like you’ve been given an opportunity through your government to choose the people who will be governing the country that you’ll be living in. So, if you abstain, you’re removing yourself of that opportunity. […] It’s not something that we should be abstaining from, or it’s not something that we should shy away

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from. This is the country that we live in and at some point, we have to realize that this is our home. Whether we like the people or not, this is our home. And sometimes we get a chance to choose the way that people will govern us. We should definitely vote.

Fatimah also championed for the power of voting to create political change, I think I vote because it gives me a chance to participate in the electoral process. And I feel if I do not vote, I do not have the right to complain about who gets voted in.

Discussing the issue further, she also considered the role voting and election had in influencing politicians to be accountable, adding, I think by voting, by getting involved. By voting it means that the politicians, when they get up to like encourage people to vote for [them], they have considered Muslim issues because of the Muslim votes- which can be very high in certain areas and if Muslims don’t vote, politicians have no reasons to make things better for Muslims.

Zeeshan, similarly felt that to secure the rights of Muslims as a minority in the West, it was essential to participate in the democratic process and make their voices heard. He commented, I feel like as a Muslim you should be involved in politics, and you should pick a political party that benefits you and your community. And if you don’t vote, you’re kind of accepting your fate. That bad thing[s] might come to your community.

Muntazir also shared his support for voting, and like other participants noted its power to enact change, I am excited about voting, I guess mainly because of what I do believe that, you know, the way to change things is just through voting.

Like other respondents, Muntazir also spoke of Islam guiding its followers to be active in their citizenship wherever they reside. Sohrab similarly felt that Islamic religion encourages Muslims to vote and be part of progressive societies. He explained,

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I think voting is important and I vote because I like to advance progressive causes. I think I mean, I don’t necessarily have direct Islamic justification for it, but, you know, because Islam encourages people to do the right thing and to be just that. I feel like progressive causes are a representation of that.

Raheel reinforced this point, explaining that Islam prompts its followers to take action to improve the situation of Muslims, and this is found in the religious texts. In his words, I mean we obviously trust in Allah and his decisions and Islam is a kind of religion that places a high belief of mukadar [fate] and trusting on Allah and all. But it also says you have gotta move and do something to actually improve your situation, and that is highlighted in several kind of Islamic articles, whether that is in the Quran or the Hadith. I would say that in a kind of modern situation that you go out and vote because […] you are living in a democracy.

Aarish did not personally feel constrained in voting by his faith, but tried to explain why some Muslims chose not to vote, There are some Muslims that believe that you can’t vote. You’re allowed to vote. Some people believe that you do [have permission]. There’s a lot of them that don’t. So, there’s a lot of division there. Personally, I don’t enforce my opinions on other people. It’s more about accepting different opinions. So, I think Islam is not black and white.

Aftab’s rationale for voting highlights the pressure located among many interviewees to protect their interests in an Islamophobic atmosphere, in which right-wing populist actors were becoming more prominent. He explained, So, we have to vote because if we do not vote then maybe a political party will come in, you know what I mean, be against Islamic morals and values or are not accepting of multiculturalism or something like that. And that becomes a problem, and conflict will arise, so use that vote to get someone in who is accepting of multiculturalism, so we have a better society.

Riaz’s statement reflects a sense of responsibility and citizenship he has as a Muslim but also as an American citizen in voting. He explained,

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I vote because I do value the ability to vote. Whether I think it will make a difference or not, I value it because of the conversations I have had with people that are not able to vote, and the countries that do not allow their citizens to vote, or restrict it, or it is corrupt. And I think that as a Muslim American it is my duty to vote; one, because of the right that we have, the people that have died for our ability to vote. I think it is disrespectful for not only American soldiers and military that have fought [for] that, and the people that have been killed as a result of our democracy and our ability to vote, I think it is respectful for me to do that [choose not to vote], not doing it makes me feel like I am just, I am making it is arbitrary when it is such an important thing.

Others like Aanadi felt that the electoral system in America was undemocratic. This lack of democracy, she explained, was the result of people not having the power to directly elect their leaders. She said, I think the way that America currently runs is not a democracy, because even if we all go out and vote, our individual votes really don’t matter. We still have an electoral college system where one person can still override a whole area vote and where often votes are not [present].

Despite feeling demotivated about the whole electoral process, Aanadi nevertheless still chooses to vote. Hakeem was also skeptical about how much his vote would change but still believed that it is an obligation and better than doing nothing, Mainly because it is me being able to express my opinion because I know one vote is not going to change much but yeah, I think this is something that you should do and regardless, more than anything just for you to know where you sit.

8.7

Disinterest or Disenchantment in Voting

Laylah had voted for the first time close to the period in which her interview took place. She described feeling felt disillusioned by the whole process and the lack of power she felt in the action of being just a single vote. However, as indicated in the responses of other participants, she saw this one vote as her civic duty,

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“I have voted for the first-time last year. I am a bit disillusioned with it because you know it is just one vote but at the end of the day, I think that voting being compulsory in Australia is a very good thing compared to other countries like where you don’t vote and where you are given the power at the end of the day to influence the election.” She added that despite it is just one voice, “it is important get out there and say or vote on what you have to say. Because at least something happens and you can say, ‘look I did go out there and say what I thought was important’, it is our civic duty and that kind of a thing. It is important. You are a person in that community, you do need to go out there and vote as much as you think it won’t do something, even then you have to go out and do it.”

Zakria also chose to vote and shared that she perceived no religious clash between voting and Islam, although felt a sense of disenchantment with politics, primarily due to the outcome of the US elections. He commented, In theory it is not bad. But then again Trump got elected, so it is probably very shitty. I don’t feel like it changes much to be honest.

In the UK, some like Akbar were disenchanted to the extent felt that it was silly to vote anymore, given the current political upheaval in the UK. When asked about the importance of voting to him he responded, Not heavily because I don’t believe in it. I mean if we have an election coming up in December, I don’t even know who to vote for. I mean, I don’t even agree with any of the parties, I think it is sort of a joke.

Ajmal explained how he was somewhat apathetic toward the whole electoral system in place in Australia and only voted due to it being compulsory. It is compulsory in Australia. But also, like at the moment I don’t have one specific party, but if there is one specific party that I want to win, I wouldn’t vote for them I would vote for someone that would rather win and probably be in power, just to, yeah.

Ajmal’s response indicated that he would strategically vote for a party that would have a better chance of being in power, rather than the actual

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party he wanted—demonstrating the unlikelihood he felt that the type of politics he believes in would come to power. Eileen also voted due to the activity being compulsory in Australia, although casually explained that she had no real faith in the nation’s political system, I have to vote, not because I want to vote for that ‘this country is gonna change’, there is nothing of a political system in this country.

Yusuf represented the voice of those who had no real interest in politics and just followed their kin and peers. He explained how he had always followed the lead of his parents in voting, and this has continued as an adult, Yeah, and I think I voted like two years ago. I don’t really think about voting much because my parents would tell me how to vote, so it did not give us the opportunity to look at our own things, that is what I feel when I am older. So, I just listen to them.

Yezda also described simply following the opinions of a family member in his voting preferences, Honestly this is horrible like I admit it like brother usually tells me who to vote for because he knows what is going on with every person and he tells me okay—do this. And I feel like that is something that I should probably work on, but like obviously trust him so that is right. Yeah, that is all I think about for right now.

Imran shared that they voted; however, it was less from a sense of obligation—he wanted to avoid the fine for non-voting. However, he also added that he wanted his vote to remove the political leadership that he opposed, Well, I did not want to get fined again. I have been getting fines like four years in a row. Yeah, the main reason was that I was fined, and the second reason was that I kinda cared that I actually didn’t want these fucks to win again, and they did. But yeah, you get the only two main reasons for voting.

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Although she was a citizen, Melek shared that she did not understand the political system in Australia, which led to a limited interest in politics. She explained, Yeah, I have voted this year for the first time. And because of my lack of knowledge, I do not generally have a big idea of who I want to vote for and who I shouldn’t vote for, but through research I know briefly like, who to vote for.

8.8

Running for Office and Muslim Representation in Politics

Another type of question explored in the interviews that related to voting asked interviewees about running for office. Most respondents did not engage with the question of whether they themselves wanted to run for office; however, they did respond affirmatively to the idea of seeing more Muslims in political roles. The majority in all three countries felt that Muslims need to partake in politics, not only to lobby for the interests of their community but also to “represent Muslims” as positive role models; more Muslims in office increased representation of Muslims, and this reflected positively on the whole community. A small number of respondents objected to Muslims holding political positions. This was rooted in the idea that politicians are inherently ‘corrupt’ and that any form of corruption goes against the Islamic code of life. However, the majority indicated support toward Muslims in office; for many, it was clear that Muslims need to run for office if they wanted to be heard and give the Muslim community a voice. Tasneem, for instance, reflected on the need for representation in her comment, “Well Muslims are a population of Australia, so obviously politicians and all that, they have to reflect the community. Well obviously, they can give their views like any other citizen or Australian.” But like other interviewees, she also felt Muslims should be careful in their behavior once in politics and ensure they “just don’t abuse power. Like I think that when someone is in power, you [they] should be fair and seek justice.”

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While Sumayya believed in Muslims participating in politics, she termed it as “challenging” in reference to some of the questionable moral dimensions associated with being a politician, e.g., dishonesty or lobbying with various questionable groups (things viewed by most Muslims as defying Islam). She expressed, We can be a part of Australian politics. We can have members in parliament that support us and that have the same views as us. Although it is very difficult and challenging, I do believe it is possible that we have members that represent us solely.

The idea that Muslim politicians need to be “good” people was quite deeply entrenched in the views of many of the participants. Hasan carefully considered the balance of being a politician and also a Muslim in his response, If you become a politician in Australia, that means you have to follow the Australian law and in a way you can be a good Muslim and a politician at the same time. I think Australia does give you the freedom to follow your religion and be a politician at the same time, I think it will work out.

Others like Fatima treated faith and politics as separate matters rather than intertwined, I think it is quite separate things and I think there are many successful Muslim politicians in Australia, and they are not great politicians because of their Islam, and they are not bad politicians because of that.

Fatima also acknowledged that atheist politicians have the capacity to lead well if they rely on their own morals. Amjad spoke of a need for more Muslims to study and involve themselves in politics, although this would require looking beyond seeking only traditional careers, First thing would be voting; they should definitely vote. And then also I think we need more Muslims to study politics and think [show an] interest in politics. I think in our Muslim communities there is stigma to being anything other than doctors, engineers. That I think is too much, and we should let go of that and more and more students should be going into

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arts and politics and taking more interest and actively participating in clubs and societies and youth organizations.

Hakeem also felt that having Muslim political figures would give younger Muslims growing up in the West role models to look up to. He firmly believed that electoral politics and participation in the process gave individuals and communities a sense of agency. He added, I think it is important for young Muslim kids to know that they can themselves also make a difference. And being involved in the government where they have the ability to you know, introduce bills to make changes and stuff like that.

Zakria, from Australia, shared that although he had little interest in politics, he saw a need for a greater Muslim presence in politics. He said that at present, he did not see any Muslim representation in Australian politics who would lobby for the interests of Muslims. Noriya believes that Muslim candidates should be working at all levels of Australian politics. Like some of the other participants, she made a clear distinction between politics and religion, Because politics is not based on religion. Politics is based on you know, how passionate you are about changing issues that people are facing. So not everything is about religion.

For many interviewees, having Muslim politicians in office also offered a chance to publicly highlight “good Muslims” and counter the negative narratives about both Muslims and Islam. Khalifah who lived in the US explained this, They can bring diversity of ideas. Representation, having a Muslim voice. And also changing the perception of Muslims” in those “people who have a negative perception of Muslims.

In comparison with Australia, the UK and the USA had a higher percentage of Muslims in office, and this seemingly had an impact on the outlook of the interviewees. Participants from these countries felt more positive about Muslim political role models as they reflected on real-life examples, whereas in Australia there were doubts that likely stemmed

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from a lack of reference points for the respondents at the time of the interviews. Kinza was pleased to witness the increased presence of Muslims in Congress, I’ve seen a lot of Muslims in recent times contributing by you know, running for office in different positions and trying to contribute in that way. Joining campaigns, lobbying. Yeah, I think just getting interested in politics from a younger age and in time to be active in that area.

Habibah was similarly appreciative of this presence, particularly seeing Ilham Omar, a Muslim woman representing a US politician, I think representation is really important, especially Ilham Omar. To see a woman with a job in Congress is pretty insane. I never thought that would happen before it did […] But I think it’s most important based on how they’re tackling issues. And I know there are Muslims across the political spectrum. There are Muslim Republicans.” She also considered how Muslim political presence is important for the future progress, “I think that we need more of that because it’s just been kind of cycling of the same rhetoric, the same ideas, the same values. And I think that our society is shifting with the younger generations. And I think that political parties and politics need to shift with that.

For Ajola, being heard and represented in the post-9/11 context was particularly important and a sign of progress, I think that now you see more Muslim candidates and Muslims being more involved in the politics and in public service, and I think that’s great because for a long time the Muslim voice[s] were not heard. And now people are getting more involved.

Rizwan was similarly excited to see Muslims in key roles in UK politics and explained that it has been “missed,” especially considering Islam promoted positive political engagement in its followers. He noted with enthusiasm, Yeah, of course! You have got Sadiq Khan who has become the Mayor of London and then you have got Sajid Javed who has become an MP and he was the Foreign Secretary at one stage […] yeah definitely I think because

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Islam encourages you to make a difference in the country that you live in, most important, it [is] something that gets missed.

While Fiza was happy to see a small number of diverse politicians in the UK, she felt that there was a need for more local politicians from ethnic communities to surface in British politics. She explained her reasoning, I think we should get more involved at a local level, and I think there is a lack of this and therefore people are less likely to be interested in policy and politics. So, once they get involved at a very basic level and they see change, and they might be encouraged to speak to the councilor or even run for a councilor if they are more in tuned to the issues that community is facing as a whole, as well as individual issues. So, once people are more in tune with what is going around and how people are feeling and things that people are waiting to change, they maybe [would be] more inclined to get involved in politics. At the same time as that they need to know how to get into politics. So, then there is local level and [then there is] actually getting involved in, becoming councilors and MPs.

In the USA, too, many participants felt political representation gave Muslims a chance to show that they are “good.” Hiranur, for instance, thought “it’s a good sign” that Congress now has Muslim American representatives. She saw this as a way to influence the “perceptions of Muslims there” and change views about Muslims, who are often only thought about in terms of human rights issues, the education rights of women, and early marriages. She added that Muslims leading and showing their knowledge and performance “could make a difference.” Asifah agreed the participation of Muslims in politics was good, although she did anticipate difficulty in ‘clearing’ the names of public Muslims which had been tarnished in the post-9/11 climate. Her comments indicate she thought this was possible through positive representation, Muslims should definitely become politicians, and if they do join politics, they should focus on issues that everyone faces in the country. Secondly, if they do a good job, if they give it their best—it would give a really good name to the Muslim identity, if they are doing a good job in politics.

Rahima also spoke of the ‘good image’ of Muslims working in Australian politics in her interview. She told the interviewer “I just think that more

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Muslims should go into work in the government,” adding that it would be a “positive” role and image. The respondent thought that “the more Muslims that we have in the parliament” the better for the Muslim community. For Riza, the religious foundations of Islam trained Muslims to be good and just officials. He approved of political participation and linked it with morals derived from religion, Islam …is a great foundation of beliefs, so if you are a well-equipped Muslim and you are capable of being elected, or becoming a politician, or capable of creating any sort of positive social change… They should act within the American political system.

Aftab reported feeling conflicted about the idea of Muslims in political positions. Ultimately, he felt that Muslims who are ‘proper’ Muslims with knowledge of Islam should run for office to truly represent Muslims, rather than overly Westernized Muslims or those who lack religious knowledge. As he explained, Encouraging Muslim leaders to become politically active, I think maybe, or Muslim leaders or maybe heads of masjids rather than random blokes off the streets. People that have proper knowledge of Islam and implementing it [should be] taking part in parliament and actually being proper representatives of Muslims in the country.

Fayrooz was unconcerned with the political representation of Muslims or other groups if the government was secular and presented itself in a secular manner. However, he did feel that right-wing governments were creating the need for more representation. He explained this in the following way, I mean it depends on how the government identifies itself. If it is secular, then no, it doesn’t really need to identify with religious topics. If it is secular, it is in general for everyone. But if it is not secular and they say, ‘oh yeah but we are a Christian state’, or this state or an Abrahamic country or whatnot- then you would obviously need to have input from all demographics.

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8.9 Concerns that Politics Threatens Islamic Values Unlike the participants represented above, there was also a significant number that held the opposing view that Muslims should not work in politics in the West due to the ‘lack of morals’ in politics. It was not a matter of lacking trust in the secular system or the state but rather doubts they had about the nature of politics itself, which they believed clashed with the ethics of Islam. This caused them to doubt whether Muslims should involve themselves in democratic politics. Yezda, for example, thought it must be hard for a Muslim politician to follow their religion if they immerse themselves in politics, but did not refute the possibility, So, for me I am like I find that personally if I became a politician, I would try to do things by like, the Islamic values. And I would stay away from things like that oppose Islamic values. But I think in politics you might not be able to do that, you sometimes will have to go with things that are against the values.

Tooba discussed the potential conflicts between Islam and morals that Muslim politicians in the West may face, saying, It could be [possible], but like there are little compromises in the position at time[s], so you need to be very independent and quite impartial. I think if you are a very strong-minded individual, I think you can do it. But you can’t be easily influenced, especially if it is in a Westernized country. You need to stand by your own cultural roots and your own religion and if you want to make an impact. Because sometimes you see there are some Muslim political leaders and they tend to be more modernized and their approach is quite moved away from religion, just to win more vote[s] or [are] trying to fit into society. So, I do think it can be done but the individual themselves have to be quite strong minded.

Raheel was quite firm in his view against Muslim participation in politics, perceiving a clash between Western values and systems and Islam. In the case of British politics, he spoke of a focus they had on monetary policies such as taxes and loans which were not permissible in Islam. Furthermore, on the issue of corruption in politics, he commented,

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What I am saying is that some of the fundamentals of politics in the UK, they just go against Islamic teachings, you cannot really get involved in them.

Sana also felt that elected officials from diverse backgrounds faced pressure to ‘assimilate,’ which made them change or deviate from their culture. She explained her worries about political participation by Muslims, Because it’s really hard to. Especially living in Britain, following Islam is very hard. Especially people understanding or accepting [Islam], so you have to adjust yourself to this way of life. Otherwise, you’re not going to be fully accepted.

8.10

Participating in Protests

Another way of expressing citizenship, and one which arose in most of the interviews, was participation in protests. Interviewees took part in both online and offline protests throughout their life, as an individual activity and at times with the involvement of kin and friends. Although many of the protests related to global crises and human rights abuses against Muslims, which will be explored in detail in chapter seven, non-Muslim issues such as ‘Black Lives Matter’ and local issues were also part of the protest activities of young Muslims. Irrespective of their feelings about politics and voting, nearly all participants had taken part in at least one form of protest related to the issues they were passionate about. Protesting took various forms, ranging from petition signing, running an online awareness campaign, sharing information via social media about the topic, through to going to the main town square to physically protest. Bushra, for instance, used different means of protesting, commenting that it took the form of “online, participate in rallies, discussions, whatever.” Although the Muslim participants were overall most concerned with issues facing Muslims in the international context, Bushra added that her protesting was “Not just Muslims countries. I have attended [protests] that concern Australia too,” supporting the notion that the Muslim interviewees were not limited to only international concerns. Tasneem recalled taking part in a student-led protest at her university,

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I think I have done like an on-campus protest; it was for the budget for education they were cutting down the money. That is the only one.

Noriya was also quite passionate about local politics and how her country responded to refugee and indigenous issues. She shared some of the protests she had attended about these issues, So, there is one on the ‘free the asylum seekers in Manus and Nauru.’ And also ‘Aboriginal Change the Date of Australia Day’.

Kinza also shared that she had attended a protest which had attracted quite a lot of publicity on campus at her university, which was regarding a Confederate statue on campus related to slavery. Hasan explained how his creative use of the media to express his political concerns to public representatives, It was just to participate in a show called Q&A where you are part of a group of [a] big audience and then you get the time to ask questions. It is mostly from government—I would say Senators and Federal parliamentarians that they get to like ask questions […] and see what they answer.

Muntazir, who lived in the USA spoke of his participation in local protests, One of the conflicts that happened between Israel and Gaza. And they had a protest […] And then another one that I was part of is for Black Lives Matter.

The responses above provide examples of how some young Muslims use protest as a way to stand up for issues that relate to the political environment in which they inhabit. Their Muslim and migrant identities do play a role in shaping the issues they engage with; however, most of the protesting discussed reflects an overall concern with humanitarian issues, including those that impact people in their Western societies.

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8.11

Conclusion

This chapter explored young Muslim’s relationship with politics and found that not only do most of the participants speak highly of democracy but they also believed in the participatory function of voting and wish to see greater Muslim representation in conventional politics. The interviews revealed that despite some participants doubting the efficacy of voting, the decision to vote was prominent among the participants. Many voted because they saw it as a duty, some felt it signified they were part of society, while others felt it was the way to pave the way for change or challenge the status quo. It is, however, worth noting just like other people of their age group a substantial number of the respondents described a disenchantment with politics or indicated a level of disconnect. This resulted in them either choosing not to vote, having no political opinions of their own, simply following their kin’s choice for voting, or stating that they only voted because it is compulsory (in Australia). Importantly, this does not make the group ‘less active’ citizens; instead, these findings show the participants being normally distributed, ranging from very active to quite inactive. This only makes the young Muslims normal in comparison with their non-Muslim peers and is unrelated to them being ‘integrated’ members of society. Literature on this subject establishes that young Western people in particular are moving away from conventional politics and are finding new, informal, and decentralized ways to engage with politics; therefore, this disenchantment and disinterest need only apply to understanding young Muslims feelings toward conventional politics. Some preferred to keep religion and politics separate, and a small minority felt Muslims should not participate in political activity. The majority though, felt they were linked, with many reasoning that Islam was favorable toward participation in political activities such as voting. While some participants believed voting or running for office contradicted Islamic principles, the majority disagreed with this view. Participants repeatedly spoke of a motivation to have Muslim representatives for reasons associated with their religion. Several also felt that Muslim politicians meant better representation and a chance to showcase ‘good’ Muslims to the West. Ultimately, voting for, or wanting to see increased Muslim representation in politics was a strong theme identified in the interviews in this chapter.

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The participants also talked about unconventional forms of political participation. These activities include staging protests, taking part in them, signing, or creating petitions, posting about political issues on forums and initiating political discussions with others. This corresponds with broader trends of young people choosing to voice their political ideals and concerns outside of solely voting booths and on the streets, online, or through direct engagement with stakeholders. Interview responses in this chapter showed some participants partaking in protests that relate to issues concerning the political environment they inhabit including Black Lives Matter and the rights of Indigenous Australians. This second form of participation, in which young Muslims increasingly turn toward informal, ‘everyday’ or ‘DIY’ political activity is further evidenced in the following two chapters; the first explores how young Muslims engage inside their communities such as volunteering, and the second how they engage with global communities and causes. Stereotypically seen as overly religious or unable to ‘integrate,’ the testimonies of these young individuals only go to show how they have carved out their own forms of political expression while also partaking in conventional methods such as voting.

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CHAPTER 9

Intersectionality, Complexity, Agency, and Resilience of Young Muslims in the Anglosphere

This book is an attempt to move past ideas of Islam and Muslims that have been constructed in the often reactionary, misinformed, and polarizing post-9/11 social and political climate as either villains or passive victims. The focus is directed instead toward the lived experiences of young Muslims, including how this climate has shaped their views and interactions in the world. The dominant ethnocentric manner of viewing Muslims in the West has created a huge gulf between the reality of Islam and Muslim life and how it is portrayed. Politicians and the media have taken advantage of and benefited from these negative portrayals; yet it is also evident that academia has not been immune to the oversimplifications, biases, and anxieties that are at the core of public discussions about Muslims in the West in recent decades. Influenced by ideas of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ Western Muslims are frequently “otherized” as a dangerous minority threatening the existence of Western civilization (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023). Despite being born in and in many cases calling the West their home, Muslims are frequently accused of being unable to ‘assimilate’ and have been more recently presented as a ‘security threat.’ The merging of the ‘oriental gaze’ and Islamophobia has created an outcast citizenry within the Western state—a class of ‘otherized’ Muslim people perceived as a cultural as well as physical threat. For example, wearing the hijab in public is increasingly seen as a symbol of Muslims’ lack of ‘assimilation’ while also being framed © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6_9

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as an issue related to women’s liberation. Contrary to this claim, the choice of freedom of association and right to self-determination are being robbed from the ‘subject’ Muslim women in the name of ‘liberation’ and protecting the European, liberal, or Anglo-Christian moral fabric of society. At the same time, the tide of jihadism in the Middle East that resulted from the rise of ISIS and affiliated terrorist networks, and their ability to attract extremists and support from the West and other regions, brought Muslims into the spotlight again and subjected them to extreme scrutiny. Since 9/11 Muslims have been racially profiled and highly securitized due to being perceived as potential ‘radicals.’ While there are Muslim radical groups in the West, overwhelming majority of Muslims despise them. Thus, the idea that every Arab-looking man with a beard or every woman with a head scarf is a ‘terrorist’ is absurd. Combined with the alleged cultural threat of Islam to the West, these ideas have opened a Pandora’s box which has helped grow both radicalism among some young Muslims and Islamophobia. Each chapter in this book has helped build knowledge about the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of young Muslims in the West. Chapter two shows how young Muslims in the Anglophone West have dealt with discrimination, and how it has affected their identity and expression of citizenship. The findings of this book have repeatedly demonstrated that contrary to mainstream depictions of Muslim youth, the sample interviewees are disinterested in radical violence and ideas and are generally active and invested members of their Western society. Yet this chapter shows that these inaccurate mainstream depictions have created a hostile environment for young Muslims in which discriminatory acts and behaviors are common, even ‘normal’ for interviewees. Indeed, the interviews demonstrate how young Muslims today have grown up with Islamophobia and are aware of being portrayed as the ‘other’ in mainstream society. Many feel that wider society singles them out as a group that does not truly ‘belong’ within the nation due to their religious identity and/or religion. It is important here to understand that young Muslims mostly seek to ‘belong’ in the country they live in. At the same time, as 9/11 begins to fade into history, the young people interviewed express hope that they will be perceived differently by society and are pleased when they see signs that this is (slowly) occurring. Thus, they feel enthused when Muslims appear on television in their country of residence, or when Muslim politicians gain prominence. Young Muslims

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also seek out alternative news and media in which Muslims are portrayed in a positive manner. Most young Muslims interviewed believed that ordinary people who felt hostility toward Muslims were unduly influenced by Islamophobic media and often uneducated. Thus, they blamed the media and politicians for Islamophobia in the Anglophone West, rather than society as a whole. The rise of right-wing populism in the West in recent years has undoubtedly made young Muslims feel anxious and fearful. Immigration debates and polarizing dichotomies are presented by right-wing political actors in a way often specifically targets Muslim minorities in the West. The discrimination young Muslims faced led to a variety of defense mechanisms. Some attempted to become ‘super normal’ and ‘super nice’ to effectively charm the majority non-Muslim population into liking them. This is sometimes an impossible task, although some respondents expressed the belief that the strategy worked for them. Others sought to engage directly as ambassadors of Islam with non-Muslims and with the white secular-Christian majority population. In doing so, they sought to improve the image of their community and by doing so combat Islamophobia. Others simply sought to avoid non-Muslims, though this of course proved impossible. Catching the bus, train, or other public transport made Islamophobic incidents at times unavoidable. Thus “social distancing” often ended in failure and exposure to people who hate and fear Muslims. The third chapter argued that Muslims cannot be categorized as a single group and showed how the young Muslims interviewed possess complex and multifaceted identities. Each of these identities is important. For some, religious, ethnic, or national identity may be the most important, or the identity they most closely associate with, yet this book also finds that young Muslims do not feel the need to identify with a single identity over all the others. They can thus feel and be ‘Western’ while also being Muslim or belonging to a particular ethnicity. Crucially, this is not inherently dangerous to cohesion and should be understood as adding extra cultural richness and layers to Western societies. Indeed, the young Muslims interviewed felt close to the Western country they lived in, which they felt—in most cases—was also their home. They articulated the advantages of Western life, particularly in cases where their parents or grandparents came from unstable and sometimes war-torn regions and migrated to seek a better life. Young Muslim women interviewed for this book in particular expressed gratefulness for the greater freedoms offered

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to them in the West compared to their parents’ country of origin. At the same time, some interviewees did experience feelings of alienation and claimed their receiving countries did not provide them with a sense of belonging. However, such expressions were rare and almost always appeared in cases in which the interviewee had experienced discrimination and suffered as a result. Others attributed blame toward the increasing influence of right-wing politicians and politics in the countries they lived in. In light of finding that young Muslims possess and successfully navigate plural identities, it is argued that simple notions of Muslims not assimilating or integrating require re-thinking. Muslims do, as interviews show, integrate into Western society, though not necessarily in the sense that the term, often conflated with assimilation, is typically understood. Indeed, young Muslims feel no need to assimilate when they can more easily possess a complex identity which is at once Western (and American, Canadian, Australian, British) and Muslim. Although a small number experienced some anxiety with this plurality, the fluidity and comfort demonstrated by most in managing their identities—ethnic, gender, race, religious, and national—is impressive and a sense of pride in this capacity was evident in interviews. The fourth chapter analyzed the complex nature of young Muslims’ relationship with religion. Earlier literature often fails to recognize this complexity and instead falls into the trap of categorizing Muslims in the West into binaries or typologies of ‘progressive’ vs ‘fundamentalist.’ The empirical evidence given in these interviews helps support a much more nuanced and holistic account of the Muslim identity. Faith is not necessarily a fixed, static component of the respondents’ lives, interview responses included accounts of faith ebbing and flowing, and various respondents spoke of its increasing intensity only during holy or religious holidays. For many participants, Islam was described as a personal matter connected with morality, yet for others, it was a set of rituals that their ancestors had practiced or part of their culture. Again, we find here that young Muslims are diverse and—for lack of a better term—rather normal. They do not share one single opinion on how religion should operate in a person’s life. For example, some participants chose to wear religious clothing including the hijab, but others found it unnecessary. A striking finding was young Muslims’ interest in interfaith relations. Most did not feel entirely comfortable with the ‘Western lifestyle’ or ‘white culture,’

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because certain elements of it—particularly consumption of alcohol— contradict Islamic teachings. Yet this did not preclude them from visiting churches and temples and finding the experience positive and enjoyable. Indeed, Islam played an important role in identity formation for almost all participants. Perhaps more than any other factor, interviews show, it was the hostility of the post-9/11 environment that made young Muslims feel a group apart from mainstream society. This sense of Muslimness, whether imposed or naturally occurring, led Muslims to seek out information about their religion and, moreover, how they ought to lead their lives as Muslims. Many young Muslims in the West feel understandably disconnected with their parents’ generation and their imams. Friends and some family members remained important sources of information, values, and traditions. Yet also, interviews showed, young Muslims in the West increasingly went online and used social media to seek advice, often from internet Imams who lived in multicultural countries and could therefore offer useful advice to young Western Muslims in Anglophone nations. A pertinent finding of the interviews was that young Muslims are discerning and critical in their search for religious knowledge and expertise and were cautious not to trust unreliable or unauthenticated sources of information, or imams without sufficient education or knowledge. Collectively, these findings offer a better understanding of young Muslims’ relationship with faith, and the discussions presented contribute to a more expansive view of individual faith and religiosity. Chapter five challenges Western myths around sharia and shows that young Muslims have a variety of opinions about Islamic Jurisprudence and its role in their lives. Two important findings came out of this section of the book. First, none of the young Muslims interviewed mentioned Islamic State or bringing back the Caliphate or thought the Western country they live in ought to become an Islamic theocracy. Young Muslims have a variety of opinions on sharia and varying degrees of knowledge about what it entails. Some interviewees expressed a belief that following sharia simply meant obeying the law of the land, i.e., the anglophone country in which they lived. Others believed that religion was a private affair and that sharia law was an outdated, pre-modern body of law that today held little relevance. Some participants, however, thought that Muslims ought to live under sharia law. Few were able to articulate what sharia law was, and how its implementation would affect their society. This is not surprising, of course, because sharia is a complex topic, and is a

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term used to describe a wide variety of opinions on Islamic jurisprudence. There is no one unified ‘sharia law,’ and the young Muslims reflected this in their answers. At the same time, it is also likely that the interviewees had grown up in an environment in which talking about sharia was taboo due to it being associated with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and later with Islamic State. This contributed to many knowing very little about sharia law beyond this negative association, and that many expressed negative views on sharia. Consideration must also be given to the simple fact that no successful examples of a sharia-based state exist in the contemporary world, and so it is understandable why none of the interviewees could explain what a sharia state would look like and how it would operate. Furthermore, having grown up in a secular environment, many participants were supportive of secularism’s separation of church and state, at least insofar as these arrangements allowed them to practice Islam in their own manner. From these interviews, it is possible to understand the nonuniform way in which young Muslims perceive sharia, including how it is largely a mystery to them, and something they are unable to fully explain or articulate. In chapter six, interview analysis showed how young Muslims define and engage with the community. In the previous chapter, the author stated a preference, supported by the literature, for describing “active citizens” which encapsulates both conventional and non-conventional political participation. In this chapter, the interviews provide many examples of young Muslims contributing to society by engaging and volunteering in their local communities. For the young Muslims interviewed, there was no monolithic ‘Muslim’ community to which all belonged; rather, they often belonged to more than one community. The chapter contributes empirical evidence that respondents are motivated to associate with different communities for a range of reasons. Religion and religious identity naturally played a role, however, other factors including ethnicity, personal interest, secular and humanitarian concerns, ambitions, and the desire to engage in political action, were also equally important in determining young Muslims’ engagement with a community or communities. These discussions again help create distance from mainstream narratives about Muslim youth, and instead highlight the normality of these young people, who have varying interests, concerns, and different levels of engagement with various communities in their respective polities.

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The chapter also supports important findings that the mosque does not appear to play a radicalizing role in young Muslims lives. Rather, in contrast to the popular media image of the mosque as a site of radicalization and intolerance, young Muslims interviewed found in the mosque a meeting place and a space that promoted engagement with wider society. Through the mosque, many young Muslims interviewed were able to become involved in social and charitable activities and give back to their respective communities. At times, these activities served not only Muslims but the broader community. Yet the discussions also found that many young Muslims supported their communities beyond the mosque. Interviewees volunteered and joined religious and secular organizations that gave back through avenues including language training, tutoring, coaching, mentoring, and providing advice to new migrants, youth, and disadvantaged members of society. A further contribution made by this chapter is capturing the dismay and dissatisfaction felt by some young Muslims at the sexism, racism, and level of judgment they encountered within their religious and ethnic community. They were also frustrated by the insularity of religio-ethnic communities, with the older generations being perceived as unable or unwilling to engage outside the familiarity of the community at times. These findings reaffirm how young Muslims have been shaped by, and advocate for, the values of the multicultural society they inhabit. Chapter seven discovered how young Muslims’ own experiences make them conscious of global issues, and further that many young Muslims are engaged with key problems facing the world, and not merely Muslim communities. The interviewees used the internet and social media to understand the world, but are understandably influenced by their parents and grandparents, and therefore take a keen interest in the political and social situation in their respective countries of origin. Once again, the chapter showed how young Muslims are much like other members of their generation: they are very active online, and even those who do not search out information about global issues have some understanding via coming across news and commentary via social media. For many young Muslims, who have family overseas and in places affected by economic problems, war, climate change, and bad governance, global issues are not distant and unimportant issues, but very real and important. Many feel helpless when confronted with these issues, particularly climate change, but others believe they must act to help. It is important to note that the empathy and desire to help others is not limited to only other Muslims,

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members of an ethnic group, or country of origin. Rather, the young Muslims interviewed were most often interested in helping all humanity, whether in the name of humanitarianism, environmentalism, or Islam. Furthermore, young Muslims also obtain information about global affairs from trips to their ‘country of origin‘ or through conversations with family in foreign nations. This is another reason why young Muslims will often prioritize Muslim issues, aside from the obvious fact that they are impacted by shared issues such as Islamophobia. Like any group of people, young Muslims are naturally concerned by what happens to other people in their identity group. Yet for young Muslims, who have been ‘otherized’ and had a ‘Muslim’ identity imposed on them, being conscious of ‘Muslim’ issues is necessary and a way of feeling protected or justified in a sometimes-hostile world. Indeed, some young Muslims expressed annoyance and anger at the state of the Muslim world yet directed all blame at colonialism and the West for its problems. Most, however, had a more balanced view and expressed anger toward governments in the Muslim majority world for failing to solve their respective nations’ many problems. Often, education was singled out as an issue which Muslim majority nations’ governments had failed to improve, leading to Muslim people often not being educated enough to succeed in a world in which education was a prerequisite for economic success. Young Muslims were also frequently dismayed by the lack of attention given—sometimes by Muslim nations—to the oppression of the Uighurs, Rohingya, and Muslim religious minorities such as the Ahmadis. Others were angered by the treatment of Palestinians by Israel. Yet almost all viewed these issues not through some conspiratorial lens, in which nonMuslim powers were attempting to hurt Muslims, but as examples of a failure of humanity to treat all people equally. Indeed, it is noteworthy how few young Muslims interviewed perceived the ummah as a simple victim group hated by non-Muslims. This suggests a global consciousness many imagined did not exist among young Muslims, and a rejection of radical jihadist explanations of world politics for a more realistic, humanistic conception. The findings of this chapter and interview analysis therefore significantly contribute to a better understanding of how young Muslims perceive and interact with the world around them. Chapter eight investigated the political participation of young Muslims. Open questions about democracy revealed that participants believed it to be the best political system and most viewed it through a very positive lens. While previous research has found that Muslims living in the

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West tend to have lower levels of political participation, this study found that many participants were in fact quite enthusiastic about their civic duty, right, and opportunity to vote. Although interviewees did express doubts about the purpose and/or usefulness of voting, this is not unexpected, and perhaps in line with the views of other young people in Western nations, who are often disillusioned with politics and have been found to be increasingly relying on unconventional methods of political engagement. While few felt interested in participating in politics by running for Congress or Parliament, most felt enthusiastic when presented with the opportunity to vote for a Muslim, believing that more Muslims in politics would both improve Islam’s reputation in the West and would ensure that Islamophobic legislation would be more difficult to enact. Some Muslims believed that Islam taught that people ought to engage in politics, while others believed that Islamic principles taught that Muslims should avoid the messy, often unethical world of democratic politics. At the same time, some young Muslims interviewed believed religion and politics ought to be separated, while others thought that Islam could play a role in politics and have a positive benefit not merely for Muslims but the entire community. Very few believed Islam and politics were deeply intertwined and that therefore Muslims were forbidden from entering non-Islam-based politics. The chapter discussed research findings that young Muslims more often participated in politics through unconventional means such as protesting, signing petitions, starting discussions, and engaging with people on social media. Indeed, these forms of political engagement were common, and show that young Muslims are behaving in a manner similar to non-Muslim young people, insofar as they use social media to participate in politics and in some cases have become disillusioned with formal participation. And while young Muslims participate in political protests related to ‘Muslim issues’ online and offline, many reported participating popular protests such as the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, and protests related to Australian Aboriginal people in the same period. Again, we find here that young Muslims are quite normal in their political behavior, and do not show troubling signs of deep alienation, anger, or radicalization. By interviewing these Muslim ‘subjects,’ this book strays far from mainstream narratives about young Muslims and presents them as normal, rounded, beings with complex identities, none of which preclude being

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both fully Muslim and an engaged citizen in an Anglophone Western nation. While not the first of its kind, the book studies Muslims on a wider scale—in three countries—and focuses on young people who grew up in the post-9/11 environment. This makes it an essential addition to the literature on Muslims in the West and helps us understand how Muslims experience and perceive their lives as a minority group in the West. In addition to providing a unique bird’s eye view of Muslim life in the West, the author has been able to demonstrate that Muslims are not a monolithic group, and it is unhelpful to speak or study them as such. The book’s thematic analysis also highlights the intersectionality that exists for Muslims in the West. Interviews with diverse groups which also included Muslims who had converted and were seemingly ‘White’ highlighted how skin color and ethnicity also play a role in anti-Muslim discrimination. Being brown, black, or ‘Arab’ makes the experience of Islamophobia more profound. In addition, being a woman is clearly linked to higher experiences of prejudice in society, particularly when ‘visibly’ Muslim. Wearing a headscarf, for instance, makes women not only prone to random acts of violence and abuse, but they also feel increased judgment at educational institutions for making simple choices such as wearing full sleeves. Thus, intersectionality at work, school, and university enhances the difficulties experienced by the already marginalized. While exploring Islamophobia, the book found that not all forms of Islamophobia are extreme. While physical attacks and verbal abuse were reported by many participants, the occurrence of microaggressions was more commonly raised. These incidents are more widespread, harder to report, and can penetrate safe environments. Their presence in educational institutions and workplaces shows the dangerous nature and widespread scale of Islamophobia. However, the interviews are also able to show a positive aspect when it comes to change in society. Stories of co-workers supporting Muslims in instances of prejudice, or office spaces being culturally sensitive demonstrate the capability of society to accept diversity and be more inclusive. Crucially, these interviews demonstrate not only the difficulties of being Muslim in the West but also Muslims’ resilience. The testimonies display a strong sense of agency present in the Muslim subjects. This agency led to them challenging many narratives around them; for instance, young Muslims’ rifts with older generations of Muslims, and their challenging of community traditions, demonstrate how young Muslims are keen to adapt to their Western home’s freedoms and liberal

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ideas. At the same time, they maintain the balance of the cultural aspects of their identity with their adherence to many Western norms. These young Muslims challenge the traditions of their respective communities, and the wrongs committed in their wider society or nation, while also combining their Muslim identity with a Western identity. Although this effort is commendable and is a strong indicator of their active citizenship, it also simultaneously adds pressure onto young Muslims. For instance, the interviews clearly demonstrate how actively assuming responsibility of countering Islamophobia by being ‘extra nice‘ or being ambassador of Islam adds a burden on those who practice this defense mechanism. Another contribution of this book is to explore the idea of nationalism and citizenship. While literature has focused on the idea of citizenship in a traditional sense by looking at vote casting trends and the legal status of individuals, this book provides an alternative view. Firstly, it provides a new way to look at citizenship that is not state defined. As the interviews display, most participants felt that they belonged to their Western home more than their ‘country of origin.’ Secondly, the interviews also highlight how Muslim individuals are capable of being citizens of not only their Western home but also of the global community. The interconnectedness of today’s world, which is further enabled by cyberspace, allows for transnational engagement with other individuals and causes at a global scale, giving the world a kind of fluidity in which one can be both a citizen of a single nation but also deeply invested in other nations, and indeed in all peoples throughout the world regardless of nationality. The interviews in this book collectively show how ideas of citizenship require re-examination given the increasingly plural and fluid nature of the twenty-first century. The book’s insight into the life of young Muslim women shows an empowered face of Muslim women, who are often presented as disempowered beings by media. Far from oppressed or silenced, this book provides examples of young Muslim women who are trailblazers in their communities. Most were not afraid to challenge convention, were invested in education, and took full advantage of the freedom Western life offered them. Many used their skills or hoped to help uplift other women from their communities. Equally, it was clear that wearing a scarf or not wearing it did not determine the path these women took. While young Muslims are doing their best to navigate their life in a highly turbulent world, the hostility they face has clear effects on them. The added burden of being ‘extra nice‘ or being ‘normal’ leads to choices

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that define the social life and political engagement of Muslims. Unconsciously, too, the participants were very often drawn toward people from similar backgrounds rather than Anglo or Caucasian individuals. Avoiding all White areas, avoiding events where drinking was common, lacking deep friendships with White individuals, sending children to Muslim/ ethic schools, were among the preventive measures they took, at an unconscious level, to reduce prejudice or feel more comfortable in society. While these actions do help protect Muslims from facing discrimination, they unintentionally limit social, educational, and employment options for young Muslims and can therefore act as barriers to social and economic advancement. While the eight preceding chapters of this book offer in-depth lived narratives of young Muslims they are still limited in important respects. A primary limitation is that the interviews are confined to a small group from the three countries and thus cannot be representative of the entire population. In addition, the exclusion of countries such as France and other non-English-speaking counties mean that the ‘West’ is not fully represented either. This book is more of a conversation starter on the issue that brings forth a range of aspects of the life of Muslims in the West that warrant further exploration. Moreover, it focuses on the Anglosphere and should be understood as an exploration, first and foremost, of Muslim life in these regions rather than in the broader West. Nonetheless, it is an important contribution to opening new discussions and perspectives on issues relating not only to Muslims in the West but also to concepts such as immigration, ideas of citizenship, and global/transnational citizenship. While Muslims are not the only ‘otherized’ ones in the West, they are one of the most discussed groups—perhaps the most discussed and debated—since the turn of the century. Despite all the media attention, the endless debates of politicians and academics over Muslim integration, immigration, and the efficacy of military intervention in Muslim majority countries by Western forces, the voices of Muslims themselves remain too seldom heard. Even in the supposedly inclusive world of the university, Muslim voices are too rarely acknowledged. Indeed, the majority of the authors of popular and academic books on Western Muslims have focused on exploring Muslims’ inability to integrate or Muslim youths’ radicalization. There have been few that examine the views of ‘normal Muslims.’ What is it like to be a Muslim in the West? This key question is addressed in this book with the help of interviews of people who help show us the plural face of Muslims living in the West. Beyond just a microscope that

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shows us a glimpse of the lives of ordinary young Muslims in three countries, the chapters display a group of diverse, sensitive, and well-connected young individuals who show resilience and commitment to their communities and countries. Despite the post-9/11 backlash they received from mainstream media and many politicians; most young Muslims interviewed for this book are confident in saying the West is their home. At the same time, their cultural heritage remains important to them and that they want to be able to add their unique culture and traditions to the societies they live in and contribute to their revered idea of a multicultural society.

Reference Yilmaz, Ihsan, and Morieson, N. (2023). Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Appendix A---Table of Demographical Details of the Sample

Participants: Australia Gender Ethnicity

Female Male Iraqi Pakistani Turkish Lebanese Indian Afghan Indonesian Bosnian Palestinian Iranian Bangladeshi Malay-Singaporean Indian Singaporean Indian-South-African Pakistani-Fijian Palestinian-Lebanese Arab-Afghan Uighur

38 26 8 7 7 6 6 5 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6

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APPENDIX A—TABLE OF DEMOGRAPHICAL DETAILS …

(continued)

Citizenship

Country of Birth

Primary Language

Kurdish Sri Lankan Kenyan Turkish-Macedonian Albanian Anglo-Australian Australian Permanent visa Indonesian with a temporary visa Pakistani with a temporary visa Albanian with a temporary visa Australia Indonesia Afghanistan Pakistan Iran England Germany Singapore Turkey, India, UAE, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Albania, New Zealand, China English English + Arabic English + Urdu English + Indonesian English + Tamil English + Turkish English + Hindi English + Persian English + Bangla English + Urdu + Hindi Persian Urdu Arabic Turkish Indonesian Bosnian Albanian Malay Pashtu

1 1 1 1 1 1 54 4 4 1 1 35 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 10

18 12 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1

(continued)

APPENDIX A—TABLE OF DEMOGRAPHICAL DETAILS …

313

(continued) Sect

Sunni Shia Islam (non-denominational)

46 12 6 64

Female Male Albanian Albanian + White Turkish Turkish + Azeri Tajik/Kyrgyz Bulgarian African African American American Black + Puerto Rican American + Caucasian/White Arab Moroccan Iraqi-Kurdish Arab + American + Latin American South Asian Bengali Pakistani Pakistani + Indian South Asian Pakistani Pakistani-American American Permanent Residents (USA) Temporary Visa (USA) American + Egyptian American + Iraqi American + Canadian Nigerian America Turkey Albania Azerbaijan

14 16 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

Total Participants: USA Gender Ethnicity

Citizenship

Country of Birth

2 1 1 1 1 1 19 4 2 1 1 1 2 18 3 3 1

(continued)

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APPENDIX A—TABLE OF DEMOGRAPHICAL DETAILS …

(continued) USSR, Tajikistan Nigeria Kurdistan, Iraq Not specified English English + Albanian English + Bulgarian English + Turkish English + Urdu English + Bengali Persian + Tajik + Russian Azerbaijani + Russian Albanian Turkish Kurdish Sunni Shi’a Islam (Jafri) Islam non-denominational Ahmadi Not specified

Primary Language

Sect

Total

1 2 1 1 16 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 19 1 6 2 2 30

Participants United Kingdom (UK) Gender Ethnicity

Citizenship

Country of Birth

Female Male British-Pakistani British-Bangladeshi Kurdish-Irish British-Turkish White British Asian British-Libyan Mauritian Mixed Race Turkish-Syrian Turkish-Yemeni Not identified British British-Libyan British-Mauritian United Kingdom Did not identify

17 11 13 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 26 1 1 23 2 (continued)

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315

(continued)

Primary Language

Sect Total Total interviews

Mauritius France Libya English English + English + English + English + English + Urdu Sunni

Urdu Turkish Turkish + Arabic Arabic Bengali

1 1 1 19 3 2 1 1 1 1 28 28 122

Appendix B---Table of Pseudonyms, Gender, Place of Origin/Ethnicity

Pseudonym

Gender

Place of origin/ethnicity

Aanadi Aarish Abdullah Abual Hassan Adeelah Affan Aftab Aisha Ajmal Ajola Akbar Aleem Ali Alimah Aliyah Amal Ameer Amjad Anas Anisa Anmol Aqil Arben Arifa

Female Female Male Male Female Male Male Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Male Male Female

American/Bengali British/Bengali Bosnian Nigerian Indian British/ (Ethnicity Not Specified) Indian Iraqi Turkish Albanian British/Pakistani Indian Iranian Afghan Iraqi Lebanese Australian Born Turkish Pakistani Pakistani Indonesian British/Bangladeshi Kenyan American/Albanian Bosnian Born in Germany (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6

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APPENDIX B—TABLE OF PSEUDONYMS, GENDER, PLACE …

(continued) Pseudonym

Gender

Place of origin/ethnicity

Arooba Arooj Ashar Asifah Azhar Aziz Bashir Behlul Ben Bihter Bushra Ebrar Eileen Fatimah Fayrooz Fiza Habiba Hakeem Haleemah Hasan Hasnah Haya Hiranur Imran Jameelah Jasmine Karima Khadijah Khalifa Kinza Lailah Latifah Liaqat Majeed Malik Maryam Maya Mehru Nisa Melek Muneera Muntazir Nadeem

Female Female Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Female Female Male Female Female Male Female Female Male Female Male Female Female Female Male Female Female Female Female Male Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Female Female Female Male Male

British/Pakistani British/Bengali American/South Asian Bangladeshi Albanian/American British/Turkish/Yemeni American/Albanian Turkish Anglo-Aust British/Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Macedonian (Mixed Race) Iraqi Australia Born Turkish British/Pakistani American/Life/Puerto Rican Lebanese Iraqi Hazara Afghan Shi’a Born in Afghanistan Iraqi American Azeri/Albanian/Turkish Pakistani Turkish British/Mauritian Indonesian Australian Born Afghan Nigerian American/Pakistani Indian-South African Arab, Born in Afghanistan American/South Asian Indian But Singapore Born Sri Lankan Palestinian-Lebanese British/Bengali Turkish Bosnian Uighur American/Moroccan Afghan (continued)

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(continued) Pseudonym

Gender

Place of origin/ethnicity

Nadia Nadimah Najibah Nargis Nilan Noor Noor Noriya Omar Qaiser Raheel Rahimah Rania Riaz Rihab Rizwan Ruth Saad Safdar Said Saima Saleema Salemah Salman Salomon Samira Sana Sana Ullah Sarmad Sheeba Shirin Shiza Sofia Sohrab Sumayya Taslimah Tasneem Tooba Uthman Yakub Yasir Yezda

Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Male Female Male Female Male Male Male Female Female Female Male Male Female Female Male Male Female Female Female Female Male Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Female

American/Bulgarian Iraqi Indian Background Born in the UAE British/Kurdish/Irish Malay-Singaporean Indian Born Indian Iraqi Lebanese British/Pakistani British/Pakistani Pakistani British/Pakistani American/Pakistani Arab/American British/Pakistani Caucasian American British/White/Asian American/South Asian/Pakistani Palestinian Albanian African/American Bangladeshi British (Ethnicity and Origin Not Identified) American/Canadian Kurdish British/Pakistani British/Pakistani Tajik British/Mixed Race Iranian British/Pakistani British/Pakistani American/Albanian Turkish Pakistani Afghan (Pashto) Australian Born British/Pakistani Lebanese Lebanese Egyptian/American/Latin American/Kurdish/Iraqi (continued)

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(continued) Pseudonym

Gender

Place of origin/ethnicity

Yunis Yusuf Zahid Zaibunnisa Zainab Zainab Zakaria Zareena Zeeshan Zehra Zia Zohaib Zubeida Zulaikha

Male Male Male Female Female Female Male Female Male Female Male Male Female Female

Indonesian Lebanese Pakistani Turkish/American Pakistani Iraqi Palestinian Pakistani-Fijian British/Turkish/Syrian Turkish American/Pakistani/Indian British/Pakistani British/Bangladeshi British/ Libyan Arab

Index

A Aboriginal, 305 active citizenship, 192–194 alternative media, 48 ambassadors of Islam, 26, 75, 76, 78, 89 Anglo-British, 138 Anglo-Christian, 298 Anglophone, 1, 7, 13, 15 anti-Semitism, 5 anxiety, 24, 61 Arab uprisings, 98 assimilation, 130 Australia, 2, 6–8, 10, 11

B bad Muslims, 132 Bible, 138 Black Lives Matter, 142, 305 Buddhist, 154

C Catholic Church, 153

Caucasians, 42, 51 civic engagement, 257–261 civilizations, 2, 3 clash of civilizations, 297 Climate change, 221, 222, 225, 226, 241, 243–246 community engagement, 191, 192, 196 coping, 25, 28, 29, 70, 90 coping mechanism, 28, 71, 76, 86, 89 country of origin, 300, 304, 307 COVID-19, 5, 9

D defiance, 26, 78 demonization, 2, 5 detraditionalization, 262 disenchanted, 255, 279 DIY activism, 262

E Eid, 37, 205 Eid Mubarak, 37, 46

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 I. Yilmaz, Islam in the Anglosphere, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3780-6

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322

INDEX

Environmentalism, 223 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 4 ethnocentric, 297 extra nice, 307 extremist ideologies, 25

F far-right, 24, 32, 33 feminine, 145 feminism, 100 fiqh al aqalliyyat , 194 First World War, 3 formative experience, 24 Freedom of speech, 226, 244

G ghettoization, 206 global affairs, 304 Global citizens, 222, 228, 240, 249, 251 good mosque, 192 good Muslims, 16, 72, 77, 132, 255, 282, 283

H Hindu temple, 153, 154 hobbies, 196, 215, 216 Hollywood, 129 Humanitarian, 231, 247, 250 Humanitarianism, 223 human rights, 110 Huntington, Samuel P., 2, 3

I Imam, 142–149, 156 Imran Khan, 4 incubator, 215 insularity, 205, 208 interfaith engagement, 152, 157

interfaith relations, 300 intersectionality, 306 Islamic scholar, 144, 149 Islamophobia, 3–8, 14, 23, 24, 32, 38, 43, 44, 58, 59, 62, 68, 71, 78, 79, 86–89

J Jain, 154 jihadism, 3, 130, 131

L legal pluralism, 165, 166, 183 legal positivism, 165 liberal freedoms, 110 libertarian, 146

M Macron, Emmanuel, 6 media, 23, 25–28, 33, 35, 38–48, 59, 70, 76, 77, 86, 87 Micro Acts, 29 microaggression, 306 Middle East, 3 mixed methodology, 8 modernization, 165, 176, 177 Mormon Church, 153 multilayered identity, 101, 104 multiple identities, 101, 104–106 Muslims in the West, 7, 16

N neo-jihadists, 163 non-conventional, 255

O ontological insecurity, 1, 3 oriental gaze, 23

INDEX

orientalism, 3–5 origin nation, 96 Ottoman, 3, 4

P political activism, 255, 272 political apathy, 262, 263 Pop culture, 45 purposive sampling, 8

R racial abuse, 63 racism, 24, 25, 30, 32, 36, 53, 58, 62, 68, 71, 86–88 Ramadan, 37, 46, 50, 52, 77 representation, 255, 260, 277, 281, 283–286, 290 Right-wing populism, 222 role models, 281, 283

S sectarian fissures, 204 secularization, 165, 177 self-actualizing citizen, 262 Sheikh Google, 146 siege, 3 social category, 14 social distancing, 26, 79, 81, 89, 299 social networks, 191 spirituality, 134, 136, 139, 155, 157 stereotypes/stereotyping, 4–6, 8, 24, 30, 35, 85, 189 super normal, 71, 76 Synagogue, 153

T temporal space, 14 terrorism, 2, 4

323

tiger parents, 189 transnational engagement, 98 transnational motherhood, 96 trauma, 3, 4, 7 Trump, Donald, 6 two homes, 114 U Ummah, 228, 230–232, 250, 304 United Kingdom (UK), 2, 8, 10 United States (US), 2, 3, 10 V victim, 1, 2, 4 Victimhood, 3, 4, 7, 110, 228, 236, 250 vilification, 5 volunteering, 195, 197, 199–203, 215, 216 voting, 255–261, 263, 272–277, 279–282, 288, 290, 291 W war or terror, 129 Western civilization, 297 Western home, 107, 112, 115, 121, 122 wholistic community, 208 X xenophobic, 23 Y young Muslims, 1, 2, 7–11, 13–16 Z zakat, 163