Islam and identity politics among British-Bangladeshis: A leap of faith 9781526111333

Citation preview

Islam and

identity politics among

British-Bangladeshis A leap of faith

Ali Riaz

Islam and identity politics among British-Bangladeshis

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Islam and identity politics among British-Bangladeshis A leap of faith ali riaz

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Ali Riaz 2013 The right of Ali Riaz to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed exclusively in Canada by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for isbn  978 0 7190 8955 8  hardback First published 2013 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or any third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or ­appropriate.

Typeset in Sabon with Trade Gothic display by Koinonia, Manchester

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Dedicated to Altab Ali Murdered in Whitechapel, in London’s East End on 4 May 1978 by a group of white supremacists. His death changed the British-Bangladeshi community forever. His memory will never die.

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Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements Abbreviations and acronyms Introduction

page viii ix xi 1

1 The Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK

18

2 A tale of two long summers

46

3 Identity, Islamism and politics: the internal factors

71

4 Identity, Islamism and politics: the state as actor

141

5 Beyond the present

173

Bibliography 195 Index 218

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Tables

1.1 South Asian population in Britain, 1951–2001

27

1.2 British-Bangladeshi population in the regions of the UK

28

1.3 Bangladeshis living in metropolitan areas (in thousands)

28

3.1 Ethnic minority candidates in general elections, 1970–2005

114

3.2 Ethnic minority parliament members, 1987–2010

115

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Acknowledgements

I have received enormous help from individuals, organizations and various public and private offices during the course of gathering data and writing this book. It is impossible to properly acknowledge the debts I owe to them. I am thankful to everyone who shared their opinion and information, formally and informally, and spent hours discussing the issues addressed in the book. In many instances these conversations were not designed as interviews, yet they shaped my thoughts and opinions profoundly. Some of these conversations took place long before I planned to engage in this project. In some measure, this book can be traced back to these exchanges and my observations of gradual change of the Bangladeshi diaspora community during my stay in England between 1995 and 2001. I wish I could thank all of them individually. However, I must express my deep gratitude to a few friends and research associates. My friend Ahmed Faruque Ratan not only gathered information, set up interviews and pointed to the right sources during my research trips to England, but he and his wife Lucky also opened the door of their home for me during my stay. Ratan’s constant enquiry about the project was both a source of inspiration and a reminder that it needed to be completed. Ansar Ahmed Ullah’s help in digging out information and contextualizing various perspectives made my research easier. A number of research assistants worked with me throughout the project; of them Tim Glaza played a crucial role, preparing the manuscript according to the publisher’s guidelines. My friend Dr Marina Carter read and corrected various versions of each chapter. Her insights, both theoretical and empirical, enriched the contents. I thank Tony Mason of Manchester University Press for taking inter­­­est in this project and bearing with my demands. I appreciate his patience. Comments of anonymous reviewers of the manuscript were extremely helpful in revising some arguments. I am sure these revisions have brought clarity and strengthened my arguments. Parts of the book

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x

acknowledgements

were presented at two conferences, at the University of Western Sydney in Australia, and the Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Toronto, Canada. Discussants and participants of the panels, particularly Hanifa Deen and Professor Zaheer Baber, drew my attention to works which benefited me significantly. Thanks to Fiona Thornton for doing the most tedious job in the process of publishing a book – copy editing the manuscript. Her eagerness to bring clarity, and her patience, have been enormously helpful. I am also deeply thankful to Julie Derden for her painstaking work in preparing the index. The book would not have seen the light of day without the careful efforts of the production unit of MUP, particularly of Lianne Slavin, the production editor. I am grateful to them for their attention to detail. Finally, my deepest gratitude to my family; without the support of my wife Shagufta Jabeen and our daughter Ila Sruti, this and my other works would have remained dreams. Despite the support and help of so many individuals, there may be shortcomings in this book. The faults and limitations are entirely mine.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AL Awami League AYM Asian Youth Movement British Broadcasting Corporation BBC BFP British Freedom Party BKM Bangladesh Khilafat Majlis BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party BNP British National Party BWA Bangladesh Welfare Association BYA Bangladesh Youth Approach BYA Bangladesh Youth Association CPB Communist Party of Bangladesh CRC Community Relations Council CRE Commission for Racial Equality DTI Department of Trade and Industry EDL English Defence League ELM East London Mosque FBYO Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organizations FCCC Faith Communities Consultative Council FOSIS Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies HT Hizb ut-Tahrir ICM Islamic Constitution Movement ICRC Inner Cities Religious Council Islamic Forum Europe IFE IJOF Islamic Jatiyo Oikya Front (Islamic National United Front) IOJ Islamic Oikya Jote (Islamic United Alliance) JI Jamaat-i-Islami LMC London Muslim Centre MAB Muslim Association of Britain MCB Muslim Council of Britain PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SDP Social Democratic Party SYM Southall Youth Movement YMO Young Muslim Organization

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Introduction

7

May 2010 marked a significant milestone in the history of the BritishBangladeshi community, as Rushanara Ali, the first politician of Bangladeshi descent, was elected to the British House of Commons by the Bethnal Green and Bow constituency of London. The results of the general elections, held on 6 May, began to be announced the previous evening, but British-Bangladeshis of London’s East End had to wait until the next morning because of the overwhelming number of votes cast. Although the Labour Party lost the general election, Labour candidate Ms Ali secured a comfortable victory – a swing of 14 per cent in favour of the party.1 Interestingly, the parliamentary seat was a gain for the Labour Party at a time when it lost a staggering 91 seats throughout the country; the incumbent MP George Galloway of the Respect Party stood in another constituency and thus it was an open seat. Ms Rushanara Ali, an Oxford graduate, was born in Bangladesh and immigrated with her parents in 1982 at the age of seven. Her election is historic on many counts, not only because the community had long been waiting for a politician of Bangladeshi descent to represent them; but also because of its symbolic significance. Her election represented the stemming of a trend, evident from voting patterns in 2005, which indicated that a religion-infused identity as opposed to an ethnicity-informed identity was on the rise among the British-Bangladeshi community. While the result was a reversal of the previous election, it is too early to conclude that it represents a turnaround of the recent tendency within the BritishBangladeshi community to privilege a religious over an ethnic identity. In the summer of 2006 two events riveted the British-Bangladeshi community; beginning as local issues in London, both captured national and international media attention within a short span of time. These two apparently unrelated events revealed a disturbing trend within a small minority community who otherwise receive little attention and have been on the margin of British society for decades. Barring a few exceptions British-Bangladeshis remained invisible in the mainstream

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media and political discourses.2 The two events of summer 2006 that captivated the Bangladeshi community were the protests against the filming of Brick Lane in the East End of London, and the visit from Bangladesh of Delwar Hossain Saidee, an Islamist leader. These two events came a year after the surprise and highly publicized victory of George Galloway, leader of the Respect Party, representing a constituency in East London inhabited by a large British-Bangladeshi population. Brick Lane is an adaptation of a best-selling novel by an author of Bangladeshi origin and is about the life of migrant Bangladeshis. As soon as the film production company announced their plan to film in the East End, a group of local residents voiced their opposition and threatened to stop the filming at any cost. Many wondered why the residents of the East End, where almost a quarter of the population of Bangladeshi origin in the UK live, opposed the filming. Was it a sign of intolerance on the part of the Bangladeshi community? Delwar Hossain Saidee, a leader of the largest Islamist party in Bangladesh – the Jamaat-i-Islami – and a well-known preacher, visited the UK regularly from 1978. Saidee not only opposed the Bangladesh movement in 1971, but also actively supported the Pakistani occupation forces. During his previous visits, Saidee spoke at gatherings described as religious congregations and raised funds for unspecified activities. These congregations, called waz mahfils were attended by hundreds of Bengalis. Although many expressed concern that his messages were provocative, there was no public outcry to bar him from public speaking in Britain until the summer of 2006. As the protest from within the Bangladeshi community grew louder, the question was raised as to who exactly approved of the messages of Saidee and the Islamists. While the primary focus remained on the individual, the question of the appeal of Islamists to the British-Bangladeshi community loomed large. A further significant event for the community was the decision of George Galloway to stand as a parliamentary candidate in Bethnal Green and Bow. George Galloway, first elected from Glasgow as a Labour Party candidate in 1987, was known for his vocal opposition to the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the first Gulf War (1991). An ardent supporter of the Palestinian cause since his youth, Galloway had defended Hezbollah and Hamas on many occasions. He led War On Want, a British charity that campaigns against poverty worldwide, between 1983 and 1987 and became the Vice President of the Stop the War Coalition in 2001. He opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq and alleged that Prime Minister Tony Blair lied to lead the country into war. His controversial comments, such as calling on British troops ‘to refuse

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to obey illegal orders’3 led to his expulsion from the party in October 2003. In early 2004, Galloway announced his intention to form a coalition called Respect – the Unity Coalition (referred to as Respect) with members of the Socialist Alliance. Some of the Socialist Alliance objected to forming a coalition with Galloway. However, Respect came into existence in January 2004. Galloway stood as the Respect candidate in London in the 2004 European Parliament elections, but failed to win a seat. In 2005, he declared that he would run for parliament, not from his constituency in Glasgow, but from Bethnal Green and Bow, a safe Labour Party seat with a large Bangladeshi-British population. The incumbent MP, Oona King, a mixed-race British woman, had been a vocal supporter of the Iraq War. On declaring his candidacy, Galloway highlighted not only his anti-war credentials but also his insistence that Islam and Muslims had been unfairly targeted by Western countries. Galloway organized his election campaign around this platform and secured support from the Islamists. Galloway won the seat in the election held on 5 May 2005. At one level these three events were unrelated as they involved three different issues and (perhaps) three different sets of people of the same community. But at another level, I argue, they are closely linked as they demonstrate two different facets of the same phenomenon: a rapidly growing, or already-present schism within the British-Bangladeshi community based on their perceived identity and their relationship with British society at large. These events reveal that new socio-political forces are making headway within the British-Bangladeshi community the appeal of which is based on exclusivity and religion. As these events were unfolding, larger questions, such as the genesis and trajectories of these newly defined identities, implications for the future, and socio-political dynamics within the Bangladeshi community, were coming to the fore. One dimension of these questions was directly related to government policy. The issue of the visit of Saidee brought the British government into the arena. The immediate concern was how the government should deal with the individual in question, but the central question was: what role was the British government playing in addressing these issues, particularly in stemming the appeal of the Islamists to younger British-born Bangladeshis? Or conversely, should the government play any role? Did state policies have any bearing on the growing appeal of Islamists for the British-Bangladeshis? At this critical moment of the debate a wealth of Foreign Office documents in regard to British policy towards the Islamists at home and abroad became available to the public.4 These documents addressed wider issues, but provided enough food for thought to those who had been following the

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slow but steady changes within the British-Bangladeshi community and the growing appeal of the Islamists to them. The debate on Brick Lane and Delwar Hossain Saidee, we must note, emerged exactly a year after the transport bombing in London which killed 52 people and injured hundreds. The well-orchestrated attacks by four youths (three of British-born Pakistani descent and another Jamaican born but long settled in Britain) of Muslim faith on 7 July 2005 sent a shockwave through British society. The incidents also provided enough excuses to the right-wing anti-immigration lobbies to launch verbal assaults on the Muslim community at large. In the environment of legitimate heightened security, a state of shock and incredulity that these bombers came from within the country and the fear among Britons of all persuasions and classes of further terrorist attacks, some groups attempted to tint all events, including those involving BritishBangladeshis, as matters of security concern. Those who refused to see the above-mentioned three events as disparate and unrelated identified a common thread among them: the growing salience of religion as a marker of identity within a community which previously took pride in its secular ethnic heritage. Additionally, the change within the community was linked to high-profile Islamist organizations connected to the international Islamist movement and religiopolitical parties in Bangladesh. Against this backdrop this study attempts to examine the causes of and conditions for the appeal of Islam as a marker of identity, and the influence of Islamists, among the Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK. The central questions are: Are we witnessing a decisive shift in the BritishBangladeshi identity? Why is the Bangladeshi diaspora embracing the vision of religio-political forces? How do the British-Bangladeshis relate and contribute to Islamist politics? What are the future trajectories? These issues are far more complex than they appear at first sight, and therefore it would be impossible to provide definitive answers to these questions in a single study. Neither do I intend to provide a decisive answer. However, raising these questions helps to identify issues deserving our attention, opens a debate on various aspects of an emerging ­phenomenon and furthers our understanding of the complexities of the phenomenon due to the admixture of the socio-economic environment of the Bangladeshi community in Britain, politics in Bangladesh, and British domestic and foreign policies, to name but a few. These developments within the British-Bangladeshi community must also be situated alongside the ongoing debate on the interactions of Islam and Europe, globalization and the identity politics of diaspora. They constitute pieces of the puzzle of an intriguing picture that has

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been emerging over recent decades. The British-Bangladeshi community is not an island unto itself; hence there should be no doubt that the mindset and actions of its members are influenced by the world around them – both local and global. I must also caution against searching for primacy. A combination of both these local and global worlds and their interplay which creates different dynamics must be identified and appreciated. The primary objective of this book, therefore, is two-fold: first to underscore the fact that identity politics among the British-Bangladeshi community has undergone a dramatic shift in the past decade, to map these changes, identify the actors and events, and explore the challenges, opportunities and dilemmas for members of the community and the British state; second, to address a lacuna in the extant literature. It is my contention that the extant literature on the interplay of Islam and Europe, which has grown in volume and has attained significant sophistication in recent years, has not paid due attention to the intricate and complex dynamics at the micro-level. The actors and events that have shaped and continue to shape the identities of members of the community are not simply general trends and tendencies, but also particular to the community itself. Comprehension of the phenomenon demands that the general and the particular be seen as part of a whole; that they be appreciated and analysed simultaneously. Therefore, this study is on the one hand about the British-Bangladeshi community, while on the other hand it is about the interplay of identity and Islam in Europe in the era of globalization and the future of multiculturalism in Britain. I hope that it will serve to improve our understanding of the issues at hand; and contribute to a meaningful, mature and nuanced debate on identity politics among ethnic minorities in Britain. Conceptual issues One of the key concepts employed in this study is that of ‘diaspora’. The term has gained currency in recent decades and has been utilized by a number of academic disciplines with a variety of meanings attached to it. Thus, it is important to lay out the meaning implied in this study. As the term has attracted the attention of various disciplines, a plethora of studies have been conducted; at times these studies have presented conflicting conceptual frameworks. In its most rudimentary understanding the term refers to a community which is located outside its home; there is an implicit assertion that the members of the community have been displaced. The element of displacement is ingrained in the understanding because of the epistemology of the term (i.e., its

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common dictionary meaning: ‘The dispersion of Jews outside of Israel from the sixth century B.C., when they were exiled to Babylonia, until the present time.’) Thus some argue that ‘the notion of diaspora rests on three co-ordinates: homeland, displacement and settlement. In other words, a diaspora is constituted when communities of settlers articulate themselves in terms of displacement from a homeland.’5 The connotative meaning of the displacement includes ‘forced displacement, victimization, alienation and loss’.6 But as migration has increasingly becoming a norm, for a variety of reasons including voluntary movement, displacement cannot any longer be considered an essential element of the construction of a diaspora, although for some migrant communities it could still be true. The forces of globalization, including global market forces, have created a web of movement and various forms of migration. Thus, it is justifiable to raise the question: ‘Must these migratory communities be called “diaspora”?’7 Migration, therefore, doesn’t necessarily create a diaspora community. It is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to call a community a diaspora. My point here is that the formation of diaspora should not be conceived as a natural/ incontrovertible consequence of migration; instead, for a diaspora to emerge, specific processes of mobilization have to take place. Deterritorialization remains the indispensable condition for the construction of diaspora in the common understanding of the concept. Both physical space and the psychological state of the community are vital elements in understanding the concept of diaspora. The extant conceptualizations have underscored these twin elements. Take, for example, definitions provided by Robert Cohen and William Safran. Robert Cohen suggests the following criteria for diasporas: (1) a forced or voluntary movement from an original homeland to a new region or regions; (2) a shared memory about the original homeland, a commitment to its preservation and belief in the possibility of eventual return; (3) a strong ethnic identity sustained over time and distance; (4) a sense of solidarity with members of the same ethnic group also living in areas of Diaspora; (5) a degree of tension in relation to the host societies; (6) the potential for valuable and creative contributions to pluralistic host societies.8

Safran, in very similar language, identifies the following as the defining characteristics: 1) They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘centre’ to two or more ‘peripheral’, or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and

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therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship.9

It is also notable that in typical definitions and standard discussions on diaspora, settlement or the eventual return to the ‘homeland’ features prominently. But increasingly this element has become problematic because for many migrant communities, the return to their homeland in the physical sense is neither a practical option nor even a dream. This is due partly to the expansion of families, but partly also to the realization that the homeland has changed. A key factor in this regard is connected with one aspect of globalization: communication. Thanks to new communication technologies such as the internet and satellite television, the homeland has arrived to those who live away from it. Inherent in these definitions is the primacy of space and reified notions of belonging and the ‘roots’ of migrants in places of origin. The relationship between these two (homeland and diaspora) are projected and understood as inseparable and simplistic. Levy has criticized this uncomplicated pairing calling it the ‘solar system model’: By this term I refer to the literature that depicts diasporic communities as constructing and cultivating longings for their symbolic centre, which is often perceived as the cradle of their innermost being … These communities thus perceive themselves as structured symbolically like satellites circulating around their cherished ‘mother/father-sun’ throughout history.10

In this study my conceptualization of diaspora is cognizant of this inadequacy of the accepted way of thinking about diaspora. When I have spoken about the Bengali/Bangladeshi community in Britain, in no way do I intend to imply that they are engaged in such a simplistic unidirectional relationship with the ‘homeland’. Instead, I employ Stuart Hall’s framework that, ‘Diaspora does not refer to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must return at all costs.’11 In my understanding the Bangladeshi diaspora is in the making as they continuously negotiate their current location (space) and their relationship with the host society and their ‘homeland’. As the community no longer subscribes to ‘the myth of return’/an ideology of return, the homeland has now taken on a new meaning, akin to what Levy and Weingrod described as ‘centre’:

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‘[Centers] are places where immigrants and their descendents formerly lived, or a purported place of identification … and towards which they develop positive memories and a personal attachment … What mainly differentiates between [Homelands and Centers] is the moral requirement to Return: Centers are places where one might visit and enjoy, but they are not conceived of as the Ancient Home where one should Return and where one truly belongs.’12 This process allows migrants, in the words of Hall, to constantly produce and reproduce themselves anew through transformation and differences. Cognizant of the debates on identity politics, particularly of the diaspora community, I have throughout the study considered identity formation as a dynamic process and that ‘the fully, unified, completed, secure, and coherent identity is a fantasy’.13 In agreement with Amartya Sen, I am also of the opinion that in our daily lives we live with multiple identities. Sen argues: In our normal lives we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them. The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal [etc.] Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category. Given our inescapably plural identities, we have to decide on the relative importance of our different associations and affiliations in any particular context.14

Thus in discussions about identity and group, we must be forthright about the context. In this study of the British-Bangladeshis the particular context I am concerned with is their engagement with the society at large, privileging one identity in determining their mode of interactions and engagements with other members of the society and community, specifically their behaviour in regard to political activism. A note of caution must be sounded here. The presentation of the Bangladeshi community as a single, cohesive entity is problematic. This is equally true for representation of any other group, whether we speak of black, Hispanic, Afro-Caribbean etc. Thus we must be mindful of the internal differentiation; for example in terms of gender and class, although they are not completely free from similar shortcomings either. Identities are socially constructed. It is well to bear in mind that construction and reconstruction of social identities are influenced, if not entirely shaped, by the material and social constraints imposed on the communities in question. Therefore, any expression of social identity is historically contingent and influenced by the continuous interplay of history, culture and power. We are well aware that none of them are

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static; history is always open to new interpretation and continuously shaped by contemporary global and local events. Particular reference to the ‘global’ must be made here. In the era of globalization, however we define globalization, one can hardly remain oblivious to events around the globe. Identities are responses of individuals and groups to these changes. This means that the individual/group has the agency; they are not passive recipients of all that is happening around them. Having said that, I would like to go back to the point of social construction. The act of construction is carried out through various means, and through formal and informal institutions such as family, school, associations, etc. The identity, however defined, is bound to be contested within and outside the community. Both material life circumstances and intangible cultural traits are essential elements of the identity of a group. Group identity is not only about defining one’s own group but also defining the ‘other’; thus it is not only who they are, but also how they are different from others. In some measure, this binary division is intrinsic to the group identity and any group identity sets boundaries and parameters of affiliation. The group identity is not entirely a voluntary process; a group does not decide exclusively of its own volition how it (and its members) wants to be identified. In this regard Mandeville’s point is worth emphasizing: ‘the construction of group identity is inherently a sociopolitical process, involving as it does dialogue, negotiation and debate as to “who we are” and, moreover, what it means to be “who we are”’.15 The latter point is important, because the meanings are constructed in two ways – how ‘we’ want be seen and how others perceive ‘us’. Therefore, identity is always an expression of the struggle for the meaning. It is worth recalling that the spatial dimension of the diaspora, their locations of lived life, and their relationships with the host community, add multiple layers of complexity to the issue of identity. For the diaspora community, the lived and imagined lives both shape their identity as much as their media consumption and appropriations of communication technologies. The individuals are open to re-imagine themselves, and to adopt multiple affiliations along with altering existing ones. This also allows individuals to identify with those who fall within the same boundaries at the same time as they identify with those who are located outside of their borders. This dynamic process continues without an end point. Throughout the book, I have used the term British-Bangladeshis to identify individuals of Bangladeshi origin living in the UK. I am aware that the use of this term is problematic at both empirical and ideological levels, particularly given that this study is addressing the very question

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of why and how the members of the community describe their affiliation with a group. At the empirical level, the use of the term to identify all Bangladeshis living in the UK irrespective of their immigration status can be questioned. While all of them are people of Bangladeshi heritage, many have yet to embrace British citizenship. Yet I have used it in its most expansive meaning: their physical location in Britain. The question of how to label the ‘immigrant’ Asian community has never been resolved. Popular discourse and public policy documents have referred to it in various ways. For people of Bangladeshi heritage, the census documents have opted for ‘Bangladeshi’ (similarly, people of Pakistani heritage are called Pakistani and people of Indian heritage are labelled Indian). The community is referred to as part of the Black and Ethnic Minority Community and placed vis-à-vis the white population in a comparative data set. Identification of the community as ‘Bangladeshi’ creates a category which may not be acceptable to a new generation which has little or no contact with the country, its language and culture. In similar vein they may object to my use of the term British-Bangladeshi as an identifier. I have used the term Bangladeshis and Bengalis interchangeably to identify the same community, particularly when the ethnic dimensions of their identities and/or their spatial origins are emphasized. At the ideological level, one critical question is whether the use of British as a prefix or a suffix implies the existence of an identifiable British identity; and similarly, one can ask: can ‘British’ be a simple civic constitutional identity devoid of any race, colour and history of colonial experience? Answers to questions like these call for a debate about the defining characteristics of Britishness. But some have also argued that a fixed notion of Britishness and British values is counterproductive. The British government in 2002 set the parameters of British citizenship through the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. Perhaps this addresses the civic-constitutional element of Britishness. The act requires UK residents seeking British citizenship to be tested to show ‘a sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic’, to have ‘a sufficient knowledge about life in the UK’ and to take a citizenship oath and a pledge at a civic ceremony. These can be seen both as rituals and substantive at once. Many European countries, and the United States, have been making use of rituals like citizenship ceremonies for a considerable time, but the British language test underscores the primacy of the languages and cultures of the UK over the cultures of the individuals. In fact, the report on the 2001 riots which led to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 had linked the notion of ‘citizenship’ with the need for ‘a clear primary loyalty to this Nation’.16 Thus an

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essential characteristic of citizenship is already defined: acceptance of and loyalty to the nation as delineated by the state discourse. Whether that is an acceptable proposition in a multicultural society is debatable. We must also note that there is recognition among the policy-makers that a shared future, which I will call the basis of citizenship, can only be built on the basis of key principles including upholding ‘rights and responsibilities [and] visible social justice.’17 These issues loom large in our discussion throughout the book, even when they are not addressed directly. (I return to these issues in the final chapter of the book.) In the discussion of identity of the British-Bangladeshis I have referred to the salience of a ‘Muslim’ identity in recent years. Numerically a substantial majority of British-Bangladeshis are Muslims. This feature remained unchanged from the very beginning of the migration of the members of the community and for most constitutes ethno-historical roots. They can be categorized as cultural Muslims, who often describe themselves as ‘non-practising believers’. ‘Many such believers, who do not really practise, do not reject the ethnic Islam inherited from their parents, which provides them with a festive and traditional relationship to Islam.’18 Many, perhaps the majority of British-Bangladeshis, would probably consider themselves as ‘good’, i.e. observant, Muslims (as opposed to cultural Muslims who are presumably non-practising). This implies that for them (i.e. both cultural Muslims and observant Muslims) the Muslim identity remained a component of multiple identities without according any primacy to the religious identity. By salience, on the other hand, I mean the increase in the number of ‘individuals whose self-descriptions and identities do involve Islam (however defined) as a key (and often primary) component’19 and that their actions at a socio-political level are guided by certain precepts of Islam (as they understand and interpret them). This group is defined … by a strict demand for the respect of Islamic prescriptions. Religion in this case is invested as orthopraxis – that is, as concern for respecting religious prescriptions to the letter and embodying them in one’s daily life. Identification with Islam offers the individual direct access to daily reality and provides a framework so that he or she can structure the life; the world can be sectioned off into ‘pure’ and ‘impure’; all acts can be categorized according to the degree to which they are lawful or unlawful. All available evidence describes this behavioural conformity as a function of Islamic prescriptions (whether on the topic of food, clothing or ritual acts).20

Simply stated, the key difference between these two groups (cultural and observant Muslims on the one hand and the Islamicist on the other) is the primacy of human will and divine will. The former subscribes to the

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idea of primacy of human will without violating and/or detracting from the basic tenets of Islam, while the latter not only believe in the fixed nature of the holy texts and Prophetic traditions but view them as the determinants of their identity and actions irrespective of their location and situations.21 Structure of the book The book comprises five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a profile of the British-Bangladeshi community. Drawing on various sources of data, particularly the 2001 census, the chapter locates the British-Bangladeshi community within British society. It compares the state of the community with the white majority population and other minority communities using a range of critical indices such as education, housing and composition of households. The statistical profile, developed on the basis of the recent census and in comparison to earlier census data, is supplemented with historical narratives and information as to how the community formation process has taken place since the beginning of the arrival of Bengali seamen in the early twentieth century. The chapter maps the process of how the community responded to the challenges it faced in previous decades. The data presented in this chapter reveals that the community has remained on the margin of the society both economically and spatially. A significant proportion of the community, 54 per cent of the total British-Bangladeshi population, lives in the Greater London area and 23 per cent of the population live in a single London borough – Tower Hamlets. This raises the question of whether one should consider the term ‘ghettoization’ to describe the residential location of the Bangladeshi community. The segregation index and other indicators may not support the validity of such a claim in the strict sense of the term; but the perception is widespread among members of the community. The Labour Force Surveys of 2002 and 2003, quoted in the chapter, show that poverty is endemic within the Bangladeshi community. A combination of poverty, deprivation, lack of opportunity and spatial segregation has made the community socially excluded and encapsulated. These data help us to comprehend the mindset and the worldview of members of the community, particularly the younger generation who comprise more than half of the total community. The three events that I have referred to at the beginning of the introduction, the election of George Galloway, the controversy over the filming of Brick Lane and the visit of Delwar Hossain Saidee are elaborated in Chapter 2. The details identify significant commonalities in these three events as all of them reflect how religious identity is being brought to

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the forefront and how much strength the Islamists have gained both discursively and organizationally. The campaign against the filming of Monica Ali’s novel entitled Brick Lane incorporated other elements too; a sub-ethnic identity within the British-Bangladeshi community, particularly incessant tensions between the Sylhetis and people from other parts of the country, was one such element. I argue, in this chapter, that it is through the gender dimension of the debate that the Islamists made their mark. Debate on the visit of controversial Islamist leader Saidee offers a revealing glimpse of the struggle within the community to create a dominant discourse on the issue of identity. In addition to the analysis of these events, I examine the debate in the Bengali newspapers published in London. The discussions and letters published in these newspapers show the modus operandi of creating a narrative of political identity and how this is transformed into a hegemonic discourse with a corresponding negation of dissenting voices. The causes of the salience of the Muslim identity among the BritishBangladeshis, and the process of the transformation, can be divided into two broad categories: internal and external factors. By internal factors, I mean those which were unique to the community. These are the impact of Bangladeshi politics, the rise of Islamist youth groups in the 1980s and the 1990s, the failures of the secular leadership and the sources of funding. These factors are examined in detail in Chapter 3. I demonstrate that the intimate relationship between the diaspora community and Bangladeshi politics influenced the community at two levels. At the first level, changes within Bangladeshi politics over the past three decades, especially the rise of Islamist parties and the Islamization of politics and society, privileged the Muslim identity and thus provided the impression that it is an integral part of their place of origin. At the second level, the youths felt that ‘extended Bangladeshi politics’ is futile as they are incapable of mobilizing the Bangladeshi community in the UK to promote any advancement for them. The Bangladeshi political parties in UK were seen to replicate the acrimonious relationship of the parties in Bangladesh. The local social organizations, wrecked by battles for leadership and jockeying for power, did not present an appealing image to the younger population. The Bangladeshi youths’ community activism began with their involvement in the anti-racism movement in the late 1970s, but as the secular anti-racism movement dissipated in the late 1980s the younger generation had very little organized form to express their discontent and despair. The Rushdie affair in 198922 and the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated the strengths of the Islamists and the British state’s unwillingness to listen to public opinion. In the face of continued institutional racism, marginalization and lack of oppor-

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tunities, gang and drug culture stealthily gained ground in the community. This paved the way for the rise of Islamist youth organizations as vehicles of opposition to the establishment, both within and outside the community. The Islamist youth organizations provided a social service and became a refuge for the disaffected youth. The secular leaders and the organizations who led the community in the 1970s and 1980s started to falter in the late 1980s. The decline in their influence was a result of a combination of factors: for example, the community activists gradually moved to mainstream politics by joining Labour or the Conservatives or the Liberal Democratic Party (and the Social Democratic Party during its brief existence), and vied for elected local council positions. With an eye on popular support and votes, the new party activists did not want to antagonize any segment of society, including Islamists. There was also a generational shift. The community organization leaders did not create a process of succession and thus, as they stepped down or moved away, there was a leadership vacuum. The younger generation had by then begun attending universities where community-based organizations had no presence, and little or no relevance; Islamist student organizations, on the other hand, were very much present on the campuses and made community-based leadership less appealing. These organizations became more appealing and/or the only choice open to the younger generation because of societal pressure. The stereotypes or sheer ignorance of members of British society ascribed them an identity that these youths embraced – reluctantly or reactively. The resources available to both pietist and Islamist organizations have grown phenomenally in recent decades. In the 1980s, the resources allegedly came from external sources, particularly petroleum-rich Middle Eastern countries; but the scene has changed with the availability of Bengali television channels in the UK. These organizations have made use of these media to raise funds for a number of projects. There is no accountability regarding the use of the funds, making many suspicious as to whether they are properly used. In Chapter 4, I focus on external factors, specifically the role of the British state, in paving the way for the Islamist political organizations to gain a foothold in the community. The policies towards the minority communities in the past century are examined to show that they have undergone four stages: the era of hostility, the era of assimilation, the era of multiculturalism and the era of faith. It is my contention that state policies to support faith-based organizations since the beginning of 1980s have created the groundwork and helped develop the organizations which strengthened the influence of the Islamists and fostered the salience of religious identity among the younger generation. Many analysts tend to claim that the encouragement of faith-based

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organizations was an integral part of the multiculturalist policies of the government. In disagreement with this line of argument, I show in this chapter that a distinct policy shift took place during the last years of the Conservative government which was further accelerated by the Labour government after 1997. The social cohesion policy of the government was not a departure from their faith-based policy; rather it can be viewed as an extension of the government’s reliance on religious groups to address issues related to minorities. The debate on the success and failure of multiculturalism is discussed in this context. The second issue discussed in this chapter is the foreign policy of the UK and its implications for local communities, especially those with large numbers of Muslims. I show that both the Iraq War and other foreign policy issues have broadened the appeal of the Islamists. The final chapter presents future possible trajectories of the identity of the British-Bangladeshi community. I argue that two sets of questions/ challenges have emerged and will have to be confronted by the BritishBangladeshi community on the one hand and the British state on the other. The first set of questions involves the choice of the community: do the majority members of the community favour a fusion of religion and political activism? Should religion be the marker of their identity? The second set of questions is about the broader issues related to the policies of the state: Does the British state continue to pursue policies that weaken secular forces? What is the future of multiculturalism in Britain? How will the issue of citizenship and the multiple identities of the minority communities be addressed? For analysts and policy-makers in Britain, the immediate question is whether the salience of Muslim identity will lead to radicalization and thus pose a challenge to British society. While there are merits to the question, it is my contention in this chapter that securitizing the identity issue will not be helpful in the long term. Notes   1 For election results see, ‘Election 2010’, BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ shared/election2010/results/ (accessed 6 June 2010). The historic nature of the 2010 election cannot be overstated. The overall result produced a hung parliament where no party commands a majority leading to a Conservative Party–Liberal Democratic coalition government, the only example of powersharing in the last sixty years. The number of ethnic parliament members doubled – from 14 to 27; six minority women won seats (Afus Hirsch, ‘UK election results: number of minority ethnic MPs almost doubles’, Guardian (7 May 2010): www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/07/black-minorityethnic-mps-2010 (accessed 6 June 2010).

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  2 These exceptional circumstances include the bungled police raid on 3 June 2006 at Forest Gate in London. During the raid two Britons of Bangladeshi origin were arrested and one of them received a bullet injury. The security sources claimed that they had received intelligence of a ‘viable’ chemical device in the house. Both were later released without any charge.   3 ‘Galloway: I’ll fight expulsion’, BBC News (7 April 2003): http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2923849.stm (accessed 10 February 2010).   4 Martin Bright, When Progressives Treat With Reactionaries (London: Policy Exchange, 2006).   5 S. Sayyid, ‘Beyond Westphalia: nations and diaspora – the case of the Muslim Umma’, in Barnor Hesse (ed.), Un/Settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions (London/New York: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 37–8.   6 Steven Vertovec, ‘Three meanings of “Diaspora”, exemplified among South Asian religions’, Diaspora, 7:2 (1997), 277–99.   7 Maryse Conde and Jill Cairns, ‘Globalization and diaspora’, Diogenes, 46:4 (1998), 32.   8 Quoted in Anthony Giddens, Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), p. 263.  9 William Safran, ‘Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 1:1 (1991), 83–4. 10 André Levy, ‘A community that is both a centre and a diaspora: Jews in late twentieth century Morocco’, in André Levy and Alex Weingrod (eds), Homelands and Diasporas: Holy Lands and Other Places (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 69. 11 Stuart Hall, ‘Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities’, in Anthony King (ed.), Culture, Globalisation and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 52. 12 André Levy and Alex Weingrod, ‘Paradoxes of homecoming: the Jews and their diasporas’, Anthropological Quarterly, 79:4 (2006), 711. 13 Stuart Hall, ‘The question of cultural identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tom McGrew (eds), Modernity and Its Future (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 277. 14 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Penguin, 2006), pp. xii–xiii. 15 Peter Mandaville, ‘Reimagining Islam in diaspora’, Gazette, 63:2–3 (2001), 170. 16 Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (London: Home Office, 2001), p. 20 17 Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Our Shared Future (London: Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007). 18 Jocelyne Cesari,‘Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11: Local and global components of the integration process’, in Gabriel Motzkin and Yochi Fischer (eds), Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2008), p. 163. 19 Mandaville, ‘Reimagining Islam in Diaspora’, 173.

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20 Cesari, ‘Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11’, p. 163. 21 Samina Yasmeen, ‘Understanding Muslim identities: from perceived relative exclusion to inclusion’, Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia (2008): www.cmss.uwa.edu.au/welcome/whats_new/ understanding_muslim_identities (accessed 14 January 2010). 22 The ‘Rushdie affair’ refers to the events following the publication of the novel The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie in 1988. In early 1989, Iran­­ ian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a religious edict calling on Muslims to kill Rushdie for blasphemy. Islamist activists in England set off a global protest against the book, burning copies and demanding it be banned. While some countries proscribed the book, the British government declined to do so. Rushdie went into hiding for safety.

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The Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK

A

lthough migration of South Asians to Britain is intrinsically linked to the colonial history of the British Empire in India, it long predates the Raj. The first contact between South Asia and Britain can be traced back to the arrival of the East India Company (EIC) in India in 1612 when they established a trading post in the western coastal town of Surat. Throughout the seventeenth century, the company expanded its presence in the eastern part of the Mughal Empire, especially in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, secured permission from the Emperor to establish trading posts, founded forts and engaged in a number of military expeditions against their trading rivals (notably the Portuguese, Dutch and later the French East India Companies) and local rulers. The Battle of Plassey in 1757, between the East India Company and the Nawab of Bengal and his French allies, not only established Company rule in South Asia for the next hundred years but inaugurated colonial rule in India. The transfer of power from the Company to the British Queen in 1858 formalized state control over what would be considered the ‘jewel’ of the Empire.1 Trade and commerce between India and Britain necessarily included a flow of migrants between the two territories, although for a long time it was primarily one way – more British making their way to South Asia than South Asians travelling to the faraway islands called Great Britain. South Asians arriving in Britain in the early colonial period were likely to be merchants undertaking business trips, or Indian Nawabs and Rajas and their emissaries travelling for pleasure or seeking to draw the attention of the Imperial authority to legal matters. Some scholars came to Britain to teach Persian and Hindustani languages and, as the elaborate colonial bureaucracy developed and English became the language of the administration, students came to study law and to take the Indian Civil Service examination to secure jobs in the expanding civil administration. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indian politicians began to make their presence felt, especially when they arrived to

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make arguments for Indian independence. These were the elites of South Asia, whose visits were voluntary and with definite objectives. But there were others who did not come entirely of their own free will and certainly not under their own means. Ayahs (nannies) employed by the officials of the East India Company and the British colonial administration in India were often brought to England. Many later found themselves in a destitute condition having been abandoned.2 According to one account, ‘There is evidence in art and literature of the arrival of Bengali children as servants in London in the mid-17th century.’3 If these two groups of people, elites and virtually indentured Ayahs,4 are situated at two ends of a continuum, the Indian seamen (known as Lascars) are located in the middle. Large-scale employment of Indian seamen on British ships began in the eighteenth century. The East India Company’s crew lists and agreement documents from the eighteenth century suggest that initially it employed Indo-Portuguese seamen from Bengal and Madras. These seamen had been called ‘Lascarim’ by the Portuguese. The British initially described these men as ‘Black Portuguese’, but later adopted the Portuguese name, changing it to ‘Lascar’. They called all Asian seamen Lascars. One shipping document from 1746 lists 21 Indians from Calcutta on an East India Company ship. All of them had Portuguese names.5

While the number of Lascars may be of significance, the phenomenon is not. Indian seamen began travelling to England as early as the seventeenth century. For example, EIC records of 1614 show that three Indian seamen in London were negotiating their terms of employment for the return voyage home.6 A number of factors prompted the employment of Indian seamen: one interesting and little-explored aspect of the need for these seamen as crew on British merchant ships is that it was necessitated by the illegal acts of ‘jumping ship’ by the European, particularly English and Scottish sailors, in India during the early days of East India Company trade. If eighteenth-century India, particularly Bengal, drew merchants and traders from England due to its abundant resources, after 1857, the colonial administration attracted members of the upper echelons of British society to be a part of the local administration. Soon entire British families were being raised in India and the volume of shipping rose as contacts between home and colony increased. The high rate of death of European seamen from both the harsh conditions aboard ship and tropical diseases on arrival, has been noted by historian Michael Fish, who adds, ‘The Royal Navy (whose own ships also lost seamen in the Indian Ocean) also conscripted prime European seamen from merchant ships there, at rates occasionally into one-third of the entire

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crew.’7 On their return journey these ships therefore needed more sailors. This opened up job opportunities for local people.8 Indian seamen were employed both on East India Company and private ships, and were often left for months at a time in the UK, possibly awaiting a return passage, or recovering from sickness. With few resources, a number abandoned their employment and settled in London. As a result, a mixed community of temporary and more permanent Lascars of Indian origin grew up around the London docks from the eighteenth century onwards. For many Lascars the early experiences of life in Britain were distressing, to say the least. They were not treated well at sea or when they arrived. ‘On the ships they lived in cramped, overcrowded conditions, without exercise, fresh air or fresh food and without suitable clothing or bedding for cold climates.’9 In short, ‘Life on board these relatively tiny and fragile vessels was hellish.’10 Many died during their journey, due to sickness and overwork. When they arrived in England, often ending up in East London, not far from where their ships docked, they faced an ‘even worse’ situation: many died uncared for on the streets. Their plight, especially of being cheated, robbed and made destitute by unscrupulous individuals, drew some attention in the 1840s and some initiatives were taken to provide shelter. But overall they were neglected by the community at large and the merchants who were making fortunes on the backs of their toil.11 Migration of Muslims, especially South Asians, has been subject to academic inquiry for quite some time. Most studies have attempted to trace a timeline and distinctive features of various phases of migration. Lewis argues that the migration has taken place in four phases: pioneers, unskilled male workers, family and the emergence of the British-born generation.12 Brah has identified four phases of migration since the decolonization of South Asia: the 1950s and early 1960s (‘Coming to Vilayat’), the 1960s and early 1970s (‘A home away from home’), the mid-1970s and early 1980s (‘Here to stay’), and the 1990s onwards (‘1990s – the new millennium’).13 Ansari, whose study primarily focuses on South Asian migration, describes large-scale Muslim settlement in Britain as occurring in two broad phases: firstly 1945 to the early 1970s; and then the second phase from 1973 to the present.14 Amongst South Asians, Sylhetis, from the north-eastern region of Bangladesh, were the first to establish a significant presence in Britain. The connection between Britain and Sylhet began as soon as the British East India Company started trading in the Bengal region. Sylhet, then known as Srihatta (Sanskrit word, meaning a prosperous centre of trading), officially came under the control of the EIC in 1765 but it

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took almost two decades for them to establish their dominance. By the late eighteenth century, there was a significant presence of British merchants in what is now known as Sylhet. The autobiography of Robert Lindsay, who served as an administrator (‘resident collector’) of Sylhet between 1778 and 1790, elaborately documents this connection.15 Lindsay, a trader and an administrator, was deeply involved in commercial activities and made a personal fortune in a short span of time before retiring. One of the sources of his personal gain was building boats: ‘We became also in great repute as elegant boat-builders; in this department we particularly excelled, and it had the effect of leading me to the building ships of burthen.’16 Boatbuilding had a long tradition in Sylhet, because of its geographical location (surrounded by waterways, particularly during the monsoon season), due to its close proximity to the trade route (between Assam and Calcutta, and between the seaports of the Bengal delta) and due to the need to transport the most precious commodity of the region (limestone locally known as chunam). However, Lindsay oversaw significant improvements in the processes and materials used for building the boats. The familiarity with and to a great extent expertise of boatbuilding among local people has been passed on for generations. This long historical connection played a role in attracting people from Sylhet to England, but the employment of Sylhetis on British ships made the journey possible. Among the array of factors that prompted Sylhetis to be employed by the British ships in large numbers, three deserve highlighting: firstly, their involvement with trade via rivers for centuries and concomitant expertise in navigation and boatbuilding. As Hossain remarks, Until the introduction of the railway in the last decade of nineteenth century and its expansion in the early twentieth, Sylhet had waterway communications with Calcutta and the rest of Bengal that were cheap and easy. So a short-cut waterway from Assam to Bengal ran through the heart of Sylhet … Training as a boat-builder was a pre-requisite for becoming a boatman so most of the crew on the boats trading up and down the Surma valley river system were drawn from Sylhet.17

The second factor was the introduction of new modes of transport. By the early nineteenth century, dramatic changes were taking place in the transport sector due to the introduction of steamships and the railway. Many out-of-work boatmen moved to Calcutta port in search of jobs. With their expertise in boatbuilding and experience of waterway trading, Sylhetis easily found jobs as seamen on British ships docked in Calcutta port, particularly after 1842 when Calcutta became the Indian terminus of the P&O line. The process further accelerated when

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Calcutta became the headquarters of the British India Steam Navigation Company (BISNC) in1856.18 The third factor was related to political-economic developments in the Sylhet region. The annexation of Sylhet was not an easy task for the EIC. Although initial resistance was quelled over two decades, discontent continued to simmer. The famine in 1781 resulting from a devastating flood paved the way for an uprising. The death of almost one-third of the population was blamed on the policies of the EIC, particularly the local administrator Lindsay, although his request to Fort William (the EIC headquarters) for a tax exemption was declined. The 1782 uprising was led by two brothers, Syed Hadi and Syed Mahdi. Both were killed and local myth insists that they were killed by Lindsay.19 This and other similar local resistance movements stimulated further migration. The commercialization of tea plantations under Company rule, especially after 1834 when the EIC lost its monopoly over the tea trade from China, was another factor. Many locals refused to work in the plantations and thus explored other avenues of employment. It is difficult to point to a definite time when people from what is now known as Bangladesh began to settle in England, but some records indicate that in the early years of the seventeenth century, ‘East Indian(s) from the Bay of Bengal’ were being baptized in churches in London.20 A report in 1760 of the burial of a Portuguese Lascar from Bengal shows that there were Bengalis in England at that time.21 The presence of Bengali-speaking seamen was noticed by visitors from India in 1765, as one wrote: ‘The English were not unacquainted with [men from] Chatgaon (present-day Chittagong) and Juhangeernuggur (Jahangir Nagar – present-day Dhaka).’22 In the following century the settled Bengali population grew, but not in great numbers. By the early 1920s, many of the Bangladeshis who arrived in London as Lascars decided to stay on in expectation of higher wages.23 The number of immigrants was small in the early phases, but grew steadily in the post-colonial period24 and surged in the 1980s. Two features shaped the composition of the post-Second World War Bangladeshi migrant community in the UK; firstly, the vast majority came from one district; and secondly, community formation took place over three decades. ‘During the 1970s the first generation of Bangladeshi Muslims was joined by a second generation and wives and dependents arrived in the 1980s to complete community formation.’25 The firstgeneration Bangladeshi migrants found work in industry, but deindustrialization and the rise of the service sector forced them towards other labour-intensive and low-skill jobs. In the 1980s, the growing catering industry, especially ‘Indian’ restaurants, provided job opportunities to

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this new workforce.26 Gradually they began to own ‘Indian’ restaurants. Entrepreneurship opened further the possibility of chain migration, but the pattern (confined to one geographical area and familial connection) remained the same. The experience of Abdus Sami, narrated below, who arrived in London in 1962, is common to most of the Bengali population of the first generation:27 When I came to this country, there were no [close] relatives of mine here. We came here by ship. In those days people used to have restaurants and take away shops. There was an abundant number of mills and factories, so we had no shortage of jobs. I came here and lodged at 24 Great Windmill Street [Soho]. I had a [distant] relative of mine who had come before me by … ship and he used to run a restaurant here. He provided me with a job [and I] used to get £7 as salary and £1 or £1 and half as overtime payment. He used to take £4.50–£5 from me [for] rent and … food. I borrowed some money in Bangladesh … From my brother … I was [under] pressure [to refund] the loan and also had to save some money. So I used to work hard. One of my nephews, Ahad, … used to work in a restaurant … offered me a job with higher wages with free accommodation and food. It was [a] good offer for me and I would easily save some money in this process. I agreed with him and worked in the restaurant for 5 to 7 years. Working in the restaurant, I was able to pay [off] all my debt. I then came to Aldgate … and rented a room from one of my friends. The rent was three and a half pounds, I took one partner and brought two single beds [to] the room and we two were living there … Then someone advised me [to get a] tailoring job because tailoring had more money.28

The spartan bachelor life of single males was the defining characteristic of the early arrivals.29 For them the stay in an alien land was supposed to be short, with a goal to earn a decent amount of money to be sent back home to take care of their families, either the immediate or the extended ones, pay off the debt they had incurred to make the journey and build up some savings for the future.30 It took a long time for a community to form among the Bengali migrants. The slow process of community formation is due to the absence of women among the immigrants. The pace of arrival of women was slow, and in this first period of settlement, a small number of Bangladeshis also married local white women. One account of marriages between Bengali men and the English women states: Many Bengali Lascars and destitute servants found it difficult to gain employment in England and became musicians playing Indian drums, tambourines and sitars in the streets of the East End. Some eventually entered into relationships with local English women and a generation of Bengali-British children was born.31

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Adams explains that ‘It was very common among the seamen to marry their English (or Irish) girlfriends, some of whom became Muslim. Some of these marriages were short-lived, but others retained the romance of their beginnings for lifetime.’32 Of the early sojourners, those who were married usually left their wives and children at home while those who were young went back to marry and often returned alone with a promise to make trips whenever they could. According to one social historian of the Sylheti community in Britain, in 1957 only three women from Sylhet were identified as having migrated with their husbands. Yousuf Choudhury further notes that the first Bangladeshi woman migrated to Birmingham in early 1957. Between 1957 and 1958, five women arrived in Birmingham to join their families, and none of them had any children.33 The number of migrants picked up in the 1960s, after the ­enactment of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and at that time the composition of the migrants also began to change. Instead of the majority of migrants being Lascars and seamen, students and other professionals, some with no educational or professional background also started to migrate for better opportunities. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act spurred the migration of families and kin; the male migrants were apprehensive of the government’s move and were worried that if they did not bring their families straight away they might not be able to bring them ever, and therefore made efforts to secure the ‘voucher’ (a document from an employer stating that the individual had a secure job in Britain) that would allow their kin to join them. The migration of Bengali women, mostly wives began slowly in the late 1960s. The arrival of women, or in other words family reunions, had a number of consequences for the community, some immediate, some gradual. ‘Almost immediately, the all-male households which had been so prominent in the earlier period broke up, as settlers [moved to] separate houses to accommodate their families.’34 The most important change, however, was the perceptual shift among male migrants that the place they lived in was no longer an alien land but a home, a ­temporary one and not the home, yet a home nevertheless. Although in their minds there still remained an image of the home, where they lived before and that they longed for and where they would ‘eventually’ return, the migrants soon began to recognize that until that moment arrived, they were ‘here’. This perceptual shift on the part of the male members of the community brought about an underlying alteration in their relationships with their fellow migrants and the society at large. The second important consequence of the arrival of the family was that it necessitated building networks – ‘a range of social networks which

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enable comfortable individual and family life’.35 Building these social networks required investments both in material and emotional terms. Judith Brown identifies three types of networks that emerged and played key roles: supportive networks of neighbourhood, marriage networks and religious and cultural networks.36 The neighbourhood network, as I will show later, gave rise to a segregated group formation in the East End of London and over time contributed to the social exclusion of the community. The marriage network reproduced through intra-ethnic marriages continued the gender relations and patriarchal hierarchy that the Bangladeshi families brought with them from home and contributed to the maintaining of ‘firm sexual and social boundaries’ for women.37 The religious and cultural networks allowed life-cycle rituals (such as weddings and births) to be celebrated at home and in the neighbourhoods where the migrants settled. These rituals brought new members to the network, but also spawned competition among members of the community for prestige. An intriguing development was the construction of religious networks and institutions. According to one study, early Bangladeshi migrants experienced complete cessation of religious activities upon arrival in Britain and relied on their families at home who ‘prayed for them’. ‘But when the family came, so did the religion.’ 38 Nielsen argues that the steady growth of mosques in Britain after 1966 can be linked to the arrival of Muslim families from South Asia.39 The establishment of mosques as a visible sign of an emerging religious network is not unique to South Asian Muslims in Britain; adherents of other faiths (e.g. Hindus) also followed a similar trajectory. Indeed it is a common pattern among South Asians who migrated to other parts of the world, whether as indentured labour to Africa and the Caribbean or as more recent migrants to Europe and North America. The mosques are one aspect of the networks; other aspects include religious traditions, practices and leadership. While these mosques (especially in the early days of their establishment, for example in the 1970s and 1980s) were shared by various ethnic/national groups from South Asia and became symbols of one single community to outsiders, internally they diverged in traditions, practices and leadership. As the majority of the migrants from Bangladesh came from Sylhet, they shared the ethos and practices embedded in their society (such as traditions of sufis, saints and shrines), which in many ways differed from those of Muslims from other parts of the subcontinent.40 The genealogy of social networks among Bangladeshi seamen can be traced back to the establishment of the Indian Seamen’s Welfare League (ISWL). Ayub Ali, a seaman from Sylhet, settled in London in the 1920s

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and started a café which soon became the primary contact point of the Bengali seamen. Ayub Ali not only provided food but also shelter at his lodging house. Most importantly he helped compatriots to gain papers to work in England, and provided other services such as writing letters to their families and arranging ways to remit their monies back home. These services gained him respect among the seamen, and set up a conduit between the seamen and the authorities. He, along with Shah Abdul Majid Querishi, established the ISWL in 1943. The lodging house of Ali and some others like him were the places to meet fellow seamen and created the backbone of social networks. This network, however, was primarily based on their profession. The Pakistan Welfare Association, founded in 1952, was the second major organization which reflected the presence of a network among the migrant Bengalis and contributed to the strengthening of connections among community members. A number of other cafés were opened by former seamen in the late 1930s, followed by the opening of the first full-scale restaurant by Shah Abdul Majid Querishi in 1938 (and similar business ventures by Mosharraf Ali and Shirajul Islam soon afterward) and became the centres of Bengali gatherings and social interactions. However, until the 1970s, these places were, in large measure, exclusively male spaces. Thus throughout the 1970s and 1980s a slow process of chain migration (marriage and kinship), arrival of new migrants (for education, employment and business), and expansion of catering businesses (creating job opportunities) paved the way for the formation and consolidation of the diaspora Bangladeshi community in Britain. The community became more diverse and increased in size as people from other parts of Bangladesh arrived and families grew. The total number of Bangladeshis (including persons of Bangladeshi origin) residing in Britain in 1981 was 65,000, and by 1991 had risen to 163,000. In 1996 the number was estimated at 183,000.41 Figures provided by local authorities put the number of Bangladeshis in 1998 at 240,000.42 According to the 2001 census, the total number of Bangladeshis in the UK in that year stood at 282,000 (Table 1.1). They constitute 0.5 per cent of the total population and 6.1 per cent of the non-white population of the country. Taking undocumented migrants into account, Bangladeshi community leaders claimed in 2001 that the number is higher – more than 300,000. A Bangladeshi media report stated that the number had reached 500,000 by 2008.43 By faith, the British-Bangladeshi population is largely Muslim. They comprise 17 per cent of the total 1.3 million Muslims in Britain.44 The age-wise disaggregation of the population shows that the Bangladeshi community is relatively young, according to the General House-

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Table 1.1  South Asian population in Britain, 1951–2001 Year

Indian

Pakistani

Bangladeshi

Total South Asian

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991

31,000 81,000 375,000 676,000 840,000

10,000 25,000 119,000 296,000 477,000

2,000 6,000 22,000 65,000 163,000

43,000 112,000 516,000 1,037,000 1,480,000

2001

1,051,831

746,000

282,000

2,081,251

Source: Ceri Peach, ‘Demographics of BrAsian Settlement, 1951–2001’, in N. Ali, V.S. Kalra and S. Sayyid (eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 168.

hold Surveys of 2004–6, 38 per cent are under the age of 16, 18 per cent between 16 and 24, 31 per cent between 25 and 44, 9 per cent between 45 and 65, and only 5 per cent above 65. According to the 2001 census 38 per cent were under the age of 16 and an equal per centage were between 16 and 34 years. The population between 35 and 64 was 20 per cent and only 3 per cent were above the age of 65. These data are consistent with the earlier census conducted in 1991. The 1991 census revealed that about 18 per cent of Bangladeshis were between the ages of 16 and 24, and almost 50 per cent between 5 and 24. Among the older generation (age 65 and above) men outnumber women: only one-third (34 per cent) are women. This is distinctly different from other ethnic groups. Within the Pakistani community, for example, the percentage of women is higher: 45 per cent. Non-white ethnic groups in the UK mostly live in England and are concentrated in urban centres. Bangladeshis follow the same pattern. More than 70 per cent of Bangladeshis are to be found in four areas in Britain: London, Oldham (4.5 per cent of the city’s population), Birmingham (2 per cent of the city’s population) and Luton (4 per cent of the city’s population). About 5,000 Bangladeshis live in Bradford (1 per cent of the city’s population). According to the 2001 census, ‘54% of the Bangladeshi population lived in the Greater London area and a high proportion of these London inhabitants were located within the inner boroughs. Indeed, the “heartland” of the London Bangladeshi community is to be found in Tower Hamlets, which contained 65,553 Bangladeshi residents’45 (Table 1.2 and Table 1.3). It is very important to note that the concentration of the Bangladeshi population in Tower Hamlets, as a per centage of the total Bangladeshi population in Britain, has remained at the same level between 1991 and 2001 despite the

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Table 1.2  British-Bangladeshi population in the regions of the UK Region

Total population

London

Main concentrations Bangla- Percentage Percentage of total of Banglawith percentage of deshi Bangladeshi population popula- population deshi tion population

7,512,400 170,500

West Midlands 5,366,700 East Midlands 4,364,200 South-east 8,237,800 North-west 6,853,200

2.3

54.37

Tower Hamlets – 33 Newham – 10 Camden – 6

38,300

0.7

11.09

Birmingham – 2

11,000 23,800 33,100

0.3 0.3 0.5

2.45 5.43 9.19

East Yorkshire and Humberside South-west Scotland North-east

5,606,600

27,500

0.5

6.54

5,142,400 5,124,100 5,094,800 2,549,700

17,500 8,300 1,980 8,300

0.3 0.2 0.039 0.3

4.36 1.70 0.70 2.18

Wales Northern Ireland

2,903,085

5,436

0.19

1.92

1,685,267

255

0.02

0.09

Oldham – 5 Burnley – 1.6 Rochdale – 1.5 Manchester – 1.0 Rossendale – 1.4 Luton – 4

Bradford – 1

Newcastle upon Tyne – 1.1 Cardiff – 0.83

Sources: Data for various regions are drawn from Office of National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics, www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/

Table 1.3  Bangladeshis living in metropolitan areas (in thousands) Year Greater London

Greater Manchester

West West Midlands Yorkshire

Other metropolitan areas

Total Bangladeshis

Percentage living in metropolitan areas

2001

154

20

29

8

8

283

78

1991

86

11

18

6

5

163

77

Source: Peach, ‘Demographics of BrAsian Settlement, 1951–2001’, p. 178.

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increase in the total number of Bangladeshis during this period. Both the 1991 and 2001 censuses show that about 23 per cent of Bangladeshis reside in Tower Hamlets. Bangladeshis live in areas with low concentrations of white people and, barring certain wards of Tower Hamlets (for example Spitalfields), they constitute a minority among the Asians. It is important to note that, ‘It is not simply that Bangladeshis are highly segregated from the white population … they also show high rates against other minority ethnic groups.’46 In simple terms, ‘at the intra-urban level in 1991, the Bangladeshi population was the most segregated of all minority ethnic populations in Britain’.47 Households headed by Bangladeshis are the largest in the UK. The average size of the Bangladeshi-headed household is 4.9 people, according to the combined results of General Lifestyle Surveys of 2008, 2009 and 2010. The number is not only higher than the national average, but also significantly higher than other South Asian groups. Almost threequarters of Bangladeshi households have at least one dependent child. According to the 2001 census data, 54 per cent of Bangladeshi households have a married couple, and 17 per cent of Bangladeshi households have more than one family (compared to 2 per cent of all households in the UK). Living alone in a household is rare within the Bangladeshi community; only 9 per cent fall within this category. Home ownership among the Bangladeshis is almost half (37 per cent) that of the white British population (70 per cent), and lowest among all ethnic minority groups (the rate among Pakistanis, for example, is 67 per cent and among Indians, 76 per cent). In 2001, around half of Bangladeshi households (48 per cent) lived in socially rented accommodation. The Survey of English Housing conducted by the Department for Communities and Local Government in 2006–7 reports that 38 per cent of Bangladeshis live in owner-occupied housing, 49 per cent are social renters, and 14 per cent are private renters.48 In explaining the 2001 census data, the National Statistics Office commented that, ‘Overcrowding may also be related to factors such as the availability of adequate housing in different parts of the country.’ At times, non-availability of housing is a result of policies of local-level authorities. For example, in Tower Hamlets, the Borough Council passed legislation in the 1990s that stipulated that newly arrived (i.e. late 1980s and 1990s) Bangladeshis would not qualify for local authority housing as they had made themselves ‘intentionally homeless.’ Statistics pertaining to education reveal that ‘more than 40 per cent of Bangladeshi and Pakistani men and of Pakistani women, and more than half of Bangladeshi women have no qualifications above Level  1’.49

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Among women of all ethnic communities in Britain, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are least likely to have degrees (7 per cent). The lack of formal education explains the high rate of unemployment among Bangladeshis (18 per cent) in the October–December quarter of 2011, the highest within any ethnic community. According to the 2010 Labour Force Survey, 65.6 per cent of women of Bangladeshi origin were considered as economically ‘inactive’. The situation is improving as younger BritishBangladeshis are attending schools and striving to attain higher levels of education. ‘In 2003, 45.5 percent of Bangladeshi students achieved 5+ A*–C grades compared to 51.0 percent of white British students. By 2008 these figures had increased to 62.3 percent of Bangladeshi students while the results for British white students were 63.8 percent.50 However two serious weak spots remain: (a) that the reading level of Bangladeshi students is less than the national average at age seven;51 and (b) that at the higher education level (i.e. enrollment at age-specific appropriate levels of education between seventeen and thirty years of age), students from Bangladeshi backgrounds had the lowest participation rates among minority ethnic groups (35 per cent) in 2001/2. The latter is particularly important because black and ethnic minorities students have a higher level of initial participation (described in policy documents as the Higher Education Initial Participation Rate - HEIPR).52 Poverty is endemic among the Bangladeshis. This is partly due to their time of arrival: ‘The bulk of Bangladeshi immigration occurred at a time of severe economic recession in Britain. Thus, although they settled in the more prosperous South East region, Bangladeshis did not benefit from that prosperity because of the changed structure of industry and the operation of the British economy as a whole.’53 The Labour Force Survey of 2010 reveals that the proportion of Bangladeshi working-age households who are without work is, at 24.5 per cent, significantly higher than the proportion for white British households. Among those in working families, around 65 per cent of Bangladeshis are in low-income groups. This is greater than Pakistanis (48 per cent) and Indians (21 per cent), and much higher than for white British (11 per cent).54 A report on economic inequality in English published in 2010 states that ‘those from Bangladeshi and Pakistani households have a median equivalent net income of only £238 per week, compared to the national median of £393. Nearly half are below the official poverty line.55 Bangladeshi men and women were overwhelmingly employed in the distribution (transport of goods), and hotel and restaurant industries: according to the Labour Force Survey of 2003, 39.6 per cent are employed in hotels and restaurants and 19.7 per cent in the distribution industry.

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The proportion of Bangladeshis employed in the distribution and catering sector has remained static for decades. In 1993, 75.6 per cent of Bangladeshis in the UK aged between 18 and 29 were employed in these two sectors.56 A decade and a half later, Thandi finds the same pattern of employment: ‘around 70 per cent of the Bangladeshi working population is in the catering industry, where most workers are not able to progress above the cook or waiter status’.57 Carrey and Shukur noted in 1985 that, ‘unless there is a strategy to allow the majority of members of the Bangladeshi community to break out of existing employment in clothing, restaurant and ethnic service sectors, they will become more marginalized than at present’.58 The prediction has not only come true, but it has now become even more difficult for the community to break out due to prevalent stereotypes and prejudices. The impact of this employment pattern has been devastating on the community. The low-skilled, labour-intensive jobs in which Bangladeshis usually work long hours have a serious impact on their health: 14 per cent of men and 15 per cent of women reported poor health. Nazroo, drawing on the data on health issues in the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (NSEM) conducted in 1994, concluded that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups were 50 per cent more likely than whites to report fair, poor or very poor health, while Indians and AfricanAsians had a similar rate to whites; additionally, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis aged over 40 years were at a higher risk of having a diagnosis or symptoms suggestive of heart disease than whites.59 Further research has revealed a more disconcerting picture regarding the health situation of Bangladeshis. Salway has disaggregated the data on Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and showed that the health disadvantage of Bangladeshis is greater. According to Salway, ill-health was a pervasive force in the lives of Bangladeshis in the UK.60 The above profile shows that the Bangladeshi community is poor and disadvantaged. A combination of these two factors points to a larger problem that can be described as social exclusion. While the term has multiple meanings, here I am referring to both the cognitive and material aspect of the phenomenon: a situation where the community is materially deprived and is perceived, or perceive themselves, to be marginalized: a condition where individuals or communities are geographically part of a society but feel that they cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens because, in their perception, a) conditions and institutions exist that actively limit or deny such participation, and b) where societal and/ or governmental agencies portray them as ‘outsiders’.61

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It can be objected that perceptions of exclusion may not reflect the reality. In this context, however, the reality itself lends credence to the existence of exclusion. An even narrower definition used by the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) of the British government provides further validity for the use of this term in the context of the Bangladeshis in Britain.62 According to the SEU, social exclusion is a ‘shorthand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown’.63 As a result of social exclusion, the Bangladeshi community has remained an ‘encapsulated’ population (i.e. interdependent on the community network and segregated from the host population); 64 or in other words the community is ‘cohesive yet confined’.65 The confinement, in this instance refers to the spatial dimension of living: that is living close to one another. As mentioned earlier, 33 per cent of Bangladeshis in Britain live in the Tower Hamlets borough of London. Statistics like these along with ethnographic studies of the life of ethnic minorities in general and particularly Bangladeshis have brought the issue of spatial segregation to the forefront. In discussing segregation we must recognize at the outset that residential segregation cannot be reduced to one factor, be it class, race or ethnic origin; instead, as Blalock insisted more than four decades ago, it is a multifaceted issue.66 Similar arguments have been made by other researchers who note that ethnic segregation arises from a ‘complex interplay of many different social and economic processes’.67 It is equally important to note that a variety of processes contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of residential segregation. It can result from imposition of policies on a group, due to discriminatory practices in labour and housing markets causing substantial segregation, or can be the result of self-segregation due to choices made by the group. As for the causes of self-segregation, cultural familiarity and familial and social support networks have been cited by many as primary reasons. Although selfsegregation of minorities could be a conscious choice made to sustain their cultures or reduce insecurity, it could also be a result of ‘constrained choice’ in the housing market (i.e. only relatively cheap and undesirable housing is available).68 Thus what causes the segregation is a matter of debate, and consequently, the impact of segregation has been debated by social scientists for decades. Those who insist that ethnic segregation is often a choice of the communities themselves highlight the positive results: the retention of heritage, language and cultural identity.69 Others argue that it can have both positive and negative impacts, depending on the contexts.70 But Sylvia Novak has aptly questioned, ‘By turning to

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cultural or ethno-racial homogeneity, are immigrants simply choosing a supportive affiliation, or are they making the best of segregation imposed by a dominant social group with its many messages of exclusion and social distance?’71 Some have unequivocally stated that the negative impact outweighs any positive impact segregation may have, because residential segregation is believed to promote segregation in other social institutions, leading to various forms of discrimination. Residential segregation can affect linguistic assimilation, educational facilities, and occupational mobility. Because residential segregation increases the visibility of a racial or ethnic group, it can sharpen prejudices and discrimination by the dominant groups.72

The available literature also discusses the methods of measuring segregation. In general the extant literature has dealt with the issue in the context of urban areas. Massey and Denton distinguish five dimensions of residential segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization and clustering.73 The latter three dimensions, concentration, centralization and clustering, are spatial in nature, while evenness deals with the differential distribution of two social groups in a city and exposure refers to the degree of potential contact between members of different social groups. An uneven distribution of a minority group across urban units results in segregation of that group. The most widely used measure of evenness is the index of dissimilarity. Exposure, on the other hand, refers to the degree of potential contact between members of different social groups within an area. The most widely used measure of exposure is the isolation index. In Britain, although almost all researchers agree that race relations and housing policies played a critical part in the early days of immigration and housing in the East End,74 some argue that the spatial segregation of the existing Bangladeshi community is for the most part by choice of the members of the community.75 Iza Aftab, quoting Peach,76 noted, ‘today most of the immigrant Bangladeshi population shows a preference for settling into council housing or purchasing a council housing flat in the East End’.77 Ouseley noted this trend within the South Asian community in a report regarding Bradford, saying that there is a ‘very worrying drift to self-segregation’.78 The report on the Oldham riots in 2001 comments on ‘the preferences both within the indigenous and Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities of people “to live with their own kind”’.79 The high concentration of Bengalis in the East End of London has also been described as ‘ghettoization’.80 The use of the term is contentious.

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Some researchers, for example Ceri Peach,81 have questioned whether the use of ghettoization is a valid characterization of a high concentration of an ethnic minority in one local area. However, the same study has also demonstrated that based on the most commonly used index to measure segregation, the dissimilarity index (ID),82 the mean score for Bangladeshis is high, meaning that they live among themselves more than any other ethnic group and in greatest isolation from the white British population. The issue of segregation and ghettoization featured in the public discourse in Britain after a speech by Trevor Phillips, then Director of the Government Commission for Racial Equality, in September 2005, in which he warned that Britain was sleepwalking into American-style ghettoization. The most forceful argument against the existence of ghettos in Britain is presented by Nissa Finney and Ludi Simpson who referred to ghettos as myths.83 Whatever term academics prefer, the segregated spaces of the Bangladeshis in several highly visible clusters look very much like ‘ghettos’ to the layperson. Whether the clustering and ghettoization of Bengalis has taken shape because of the fear of racial attack and harassment,84 a product of political actions of the community itself or a result of the immigration legislation and housing policies of the government is a matter of debate,85 but what is beyond controversy is that it has outlived its necessity, and had and is currently having a deleterious effect on the community. It is also worth remembering in this context the geographical location of the Bengali ‘ghetto’. As one writer has aptly put it: ‘visions of unattainable wealth paradigmatically encircle Tower Hamlets as the City of London and the Docklands with Canary Wharf surrounding it. The area offers few prospects for well-paid and satisfying work or decent ­accommodation.’86 Whatever may be the cause of the preference for living with members of the same ethnic community, space has an important role in shaping the lifestyle of the community members and their interactions between themselves and others. The influence of space (i.e. the geographical area where the community initially settled or is living) in shaping the mindset of the community and the outcomes of the second generation is crucial, and deserves special attention in the case of the British-Bangladeshi community. The relationship between people and their residential environment is vital to shaping their social life and psychological state, and therefore provides a clue to the understanding of their life and society. Drawing on the work of Carlinde Adriaanse, I argue that space contributes to the creation of a social climate which influences three types of behaviours of the residents: attachment, performance and citizenship. An adverse

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social climate is bound to have negative effects on all three dimensions. Specific characteristics of the architecture in general and facilities that are available (for example, schools, shops, playgrounds) are indicative of the social climate. As Adriaanse has noted, ‘visible expressions of social climate can be found in indicators of liveability (e.g., unsafe passageways, graffiti, litter, feelings of insecurity, damaged garbage cans). In other words, liveability is the “product” or “outcome” of the social climate.’87 Iza Aftab’s micro-level study of housing estates in Tower Hamlets demonstrated that the ‘spatial structure of the estate tends to separate different groups of people: adults-children, men-women, and residentsstrangers’.88 Such differentiation results in an exclusive co-presence and very little interaction with people from outside of their own community. Brick Lane, which serves both as a social meeting place and commercial centre, is a case in point. Aftab observed that (predominantly male) ‘people tend to mingle and stand and chat more on Brick Lane’. But ‘no social mixing between strangers (whites and blacks) and the Bangladeshi ethnic minority group living there was observed, suggesting a high degree of social segregation’.89 This exclusive co-presence helps maintain the kinship network and reproduce localized village social structures. ‘Living in such close proximity intensifies local gossip networks which act as a means of social control, particularly of gender relations.’90 Therefore, the spatial aspect and consequently the social network of the Bangladeshis in the East End have bred rules of social behaviour, peer pressure to conform to the accepted norms and a system of censure for ‘deviant’ actions. These have adversely impacted on women as they have to live under more ‘peer’ pressure than their male counterparts and are expected to uphold the norms of the society. The issue of ‘segregation’, especially residential segregation, received significant attention from analysts and policy-makers in Britain after the riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in the summer of 2001. Official reports on the riots opined that spatial segregation leads to a situation where white and minority ethnic communities live ‘parallel lives’ that do not intersect at any point.91 The East London Bangladeshi community is perhaps the most glaring example of this. The impact of geography, especially economic conditions, is significant. The available literature suggests that minorities in England are heavily concentrated in deprived areas. As a matter of fact, over half of the Bangladeshis and Pakistanis live in the ten per cent of neighbour­hoods defined as the most deprived in the UK and one-third of Bangladeshi and Pakistani homes are deemed unfit to live in. The area effect, often described as postcode discrimination, is found to be a crucial element

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with regard to work and other economic opportunities. Atkinson and Kintera have demonstrated that living in deprived areas in Britain not only creates immediate problems for residents but also entrenches their disadvantages. They argue that the importance of area reputation has a determining effect on opportunity.92 The Social Exclusion Unit estimated in 2004 that Pakistanis are almost seven times more likely to live in areas with high concentrations of worklessness; and Bangladeshis are nine times more likely to do so than to live in areas with the lowest proportions of worklessness.93 Undoubtedly these conditions affect their life chances and possibility of upward mobility. Lucinda Platt demonstrated that second-­generation Bangladeshis (and Pakistanis) are lagging behind: ‘they are not achieving upward mobility on a par with other migrant groups or with the white majority’.94 While space alone cannot explain this phenomenon, its role is significant in perpetuating deprivation and consequently the negative impact on upward mobility. The relationship between segregated living conditions and the lack of opportunity to succeed in life is well documented in discussions of the African-American population. Khattab et al. have concluded that, ‘in relation to the occupational returns to education, living in ethnically-segregated residential areas tends to have a negative impact upon the employment prospects and occupational returns to education among Bangladeshis in the UK’.95 These factors have impacted upon the social fabric of the Bangladeshis, their worldview and their political activism. Furthermore, these features, particularly the spatial aspect, have a serious bearing on the self-perception of Bangladeshis and outsiders’ view of the community. The profile of the Bangladeshi community, presented above, is not exhaustive in the sense that it does not discuss many aspects of social life. Despite an adverse and restrictive environment, the community has thrived in the past four decades. Many members of the community have attained successes in various fields and have been recognized for their contributions by the community and the British establishment; the election of Rushanara Ali to the British parliament is a case in point. The vibrancy of the community can be understood from the presence of a number of local media and regular cultural activities. A compilation of the Who’s Who of British-Bangladeshis, as a publication with thousands of entries which is still considered by many as incomplete, is voluminous.96 These successes, however, do not negate the structural problems faced by the community at large.

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Notes  1 The history of British colonialism is well documented. Available studies include: Peter Robb, A History of India (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011); Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (London/New York: Routledge, 2006).   2 According to one historical account, ‘Nannies or ayahs lived with the British families that brought them to England. An institution known as the Ayahs’ Home was established in 1897 in Aldgate (London) to accommodate ayahs who were waiting for a return passage to India … In the 19th century individual cases of destitute South Asians requesting repatriation back to India appear sporadically in the records of the British Library’ (Moving Here, Migration Histories: South Asian: www.movinghere.org.uk/­galleries/ histories/asian/settling/settling.htm, (accessed 20 February 2010). The Moving Here partnership, led by the National Archives, is a consortium of 30 archives, libraries and museums who contributed material to the catalogue of 200,000 items on the website. The creator of this particular page is Shompa Lahiri.  3 ‘Bengali-speaking community in the Port of London’ PortCities London: www portcities.org.uk/london/server/show/ConNarrative.126/chapterId/2599/ Bengalispeaking-community-in-the-Port-of-London.html (accessed 14 May 2012).   4 There are very few studies to date exclusively on the ayahs or nannies who were brought to England from India by independent merchants and East Indian Company officials. However, many have referred to or discussed ayahs as part of the interactions between India and Britain. The Children of Edward Holden Cruttenden with an Indian Ayah, a painting by Joshua Reynolds, provides a picture of the relationship between the ayahs and their masters. Court Minutes available at the British Library provide some of the earliest references to the presence of Indian servants and ayahs in Britain. For example, Court Minute Book, 25 April 1690–19 April 1695 states, ‘It is ordered that a black female servant belonging to Mr Alford the Companies Warehouse Keeper at Fort St George have leave to take her passage on the ship Princess of Denmark for Madras she paying the charge of her transportation according to a Report from the Committees of Shipping now read and approved’ (B/40, British Library, p. 180). The Public and Judicial Department Records have some reports on ‘destitute Indians in Britain and abroad’. A letter from Syed Abdoollah, former Professor of Oriental Languages, London University, written in January 1869 mentions ‘native servants’ abandoned and left destitute, begging in the streets of London. He suggested a re-introduction of the system of deposit to provide their return passage (IOR: L/P&J/2/49, f. 7/281, British Library). IOR: L/P&J/6/395, f.  608, dated 16 April 1895, is a minute on a stranded ayah in a workhouse in Manchester: ‘The Local Government Board forward a letter from the

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Manchester Guardians from which it appears that a Hindoo woman named McBarnett who came to this country as an Ayah in the service of an English family has been unable to obtain an engagement which would enable her to return to India.’ IOR: L/P&J/11 contains a few surviving passports of travelling ayahs. For discussions on the servants and ayahs see Michael H. Fisher, Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travelers and Settlers in Britain 1600–1857 (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), pp. 53–65 and Rozina Visram, Asians In Britain: 400 Years of History (London: Pluto Press, 2002).   5 ‘Bengali-speaking community in the Port of London’, PortCities London.   6 Michael H. Fisher, ‘Working across the seas: Indian maritime labourers in India, Britian, and in between, 1600–1857’, International Review of Social History, 51, supplement (2006), 26.  7 Fisher, ‘Working across the seas’, 26.   8 Ashfaque Hossain, ‘Historical globalization and its effects: a study of Sylhet and its people, 1874–1971’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of History, University of Nottingham, UK, December 2009), p. 132.   9 Caroline Adams (ed.), Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers: Life Stories of Pioneer Sylhetti Settlers in Britain (London: Tower Hamlets Arts Project, 1988), p. 16. 10 Fisher, ‘Working across the seas’, 28. 11 Caroline Adams, in her seminal work on migrant Bengalis, has also noted the role of the seamen who fought alongside the British Navy during the two world wars, particularly the Second World War, in which the Merchant Navy played a crucial part. 12 Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 13 Avtar Brah, ‘The “Asian” in Britain’, in N. Ali, V.S. Kalra and S. Sayyid (eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 35–61. 14 Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain Since 1800 (London: Hurst and Co., 2004). 15 Robert Lindsay, Anecdotes of an Indian Life, volume IV (Wigan 1840). The complete text of the book is available at http://archive.org/stream/livesof lindsayso04craw/livesoflindsayso04craw_djvu.txt. 16 Lindsay, Anecdotes of an Indian Life, p. 47. Lindsay’s autobiography also reveals his role in combating the uprisings against British colonialism. He writes, ‘But a circumstance soon occurred to give me additional occupation. Our military strength did not in general exceed one hundred effective men, being a detachment of brigade sepoys, commanded by an officer; the men were chiefly natives of the higher provinces, but the climate of the hills, and particularly the water, was so pernicious to their health that whole detachments were successively destroyed; the party was in consequence withdrawn. Owing to this untoward circumstance, I proposed to the board to undertake the defence of the province myself, at an expense far inferior to the former, with native troops formed into a militia corps. This was readily agreed to; the command remained with me, and this arrangement continued

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during my residence in the country. My corps I increased or reduced as occasion required. I accompanied them myself in every service of difficulty, and my business of course was well done’ (pp. 47–8). 17 Hossain, ‘Historical globalization and its effects’, p. 134. 18 ‘Bengali-speaking community in the Port of London’, PortCities London. 19 The local historical narrative goes as follows, ‘In the month of Muharram of 1782, two religious leaders, Syed Mohammad Hadi and his brother Syed Mohammad Mahdi along with their followers revolted against the British from this ground. Robert Lindsay, the then British Collector of Sylhet shot these brothers dead to foil the revolt against the British. This was even before the great revolt by Titumir. On that fated day in 1782, Syed Hadi and Syed Mahdi along with their followers gathered there with a Muharram procession. They planned to attack the British all on a sudden. But, things went wrong as the collector through his spies got the message ahead of the day. Lindsay reached the field along with a contingent and asked the people to surrender their arms. But the two brothers and the followers declined and revolted. At one stage of the long fight, Syed Hadi was shot dead by Lindsay. Hadi’s brother Mahdi also embraced martyrdom along with some others after a long fight. Robert Lindsay, who had served for about 12 years in Sylhet, also narrated the sad incident in his memoirs that he wrote on his return to England.’ Iqbal Siddiquee, ‘Shahi Eidgah – 300 year old historical structure’, Star Insight, 1:7 (30 September 2006): www.thedailystar.net/ starinsight/2006/09/03/journey.htm (accessed 23 June 2011). 20 British Library records quoted in John Eversley and Ansar Ahmed Ullah (eds), Bengalis in London’s East End (London: Swadhinata Trust, 2010), p.   10. 21 Clifford Pereira, The View from Shooters Hill – The Hidden Black and Asian History of Bexley, BACCA (Bexley: UK, 2008). 22 Visram, Asians In Britain. 23 John Eade, ‘The Brick Lane test’, Axess, Issue 2 (2006): www.axess.se/ english/2006/02/theme_eade.php (accessed 12 December 2006), 4. Also see Adams, Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers and Yusuf Choudhury, Sons of the Empire: Oral History from the Bangladeshi Seamen Who Served on British Ships During the 1939–45 War (Birmingham: Sylheti Social History Group, 1995). 24 The number of Bangladeshis in 1961 was estimated at 6,000 (John Eade, Tim Vamplew and Ceri Peach, ‘The Bangladeshis: the encapsulated com­munity’, in Ceri Peach (ed.), Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, 2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1996), p. 50. 25 Eade, ‘The Brick Lane test’, 3. 26 Yusuf Choudhury notes that Bangladeshis started to enter the catering business as early as 1938. But the large-scale involvement of Bangladeshis in catering is a phenomenon of the early 1970s. The economic recession and deindustrialization of the UK in the 1980s provided further impetus to Bangladeshis to venture into the catering sector (Yusuf Choudhury, The Roots and Tales of the Bangladeshi Settlers (Birmingham: Sylheti Social History Group, 1993)).

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27 Caroline Adams has collected and published the experience of the first generation of migrants who arrived at various times beginning in the 1930s in their own words in her aforementioned book. For the sake of space I refrain from quoting these experiences. Each of their life stories is valuable and a testimony to their resilience. The experience of Abdus Sami in the 1960s, quoted here, shows that the struggle continued well into the latter half of the century. 28 This account is drawn from the oral history project of the University of Surrey, School of Arts, Communication and Humanities Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM) and the Swadhinata Trust, a London-based non-partisan secular Bengali group. These interviews were conducted in 2006 and published as a book entitled, Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, ed. John Eade, Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Jamil Iqbal and Marissa Hey. Abdus Sami was interviewed on 12 June 2006. For the account of Bangladeshis in Gloucestershire, see BBC Gloucestershire Radio’s excellent series called ‘Voices: our untold stories’. These programmes were produced and broadcast in 2003. For summary transcripts of the profiles of Bangladeshis see: www.bbc. co.uk/gloucestershire/untold_stories/asian/bangladeshi_community.shtml (accessed 12 February 2010). 29 Judith Brown, Global South Asian: Introducing the Modern Diaspora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 43; and Katy Gardner and Abdus Shuker, ‘I’m Bengali, I’m Asian, and I’m living here’, in Roger Ballard (ed.), Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain (London: Hurst & Co., 1994), p. 150. 30 This phenomenon is often described as the ‘Myth of Return’: see Muhammad Anwar, The Myth of Return (London: Heinemann, 1979). 31 ‘Bengali-speaking community in the Port of London’, PortCities London. The narrative goes on: ‘Perhaps the most famous child of Bengali-British parentage was Albert Mahomet. He was born in 1858 at Sophia Street in Bow, East London, to an English mother and an ex-seaman from Calcutta. Mahomet grew up in a world of crime and poverty that claimed many of his siblings. Eventually, he moved to the city of Wells and became a respected Methodist preacher and photographer.’ 32 Adams, Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers, p. 48. 33 Choudhury, The Roots and Tales of the Bangladeshi Settlers. 34 Roger Ballard, ‘The emergence of Desh Pardesh’, in Roger Ballard (ed.), Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain (London: Hurst and Co., 1994), p. 16. 35 Brown, Global South Asian, pp. 74–5. 36 Brown, Global South Asian, pp. 81–93. 37 Brown, Global South Asian, p. 84. 38 Stephen Barton, ‘The Bengali Muslims of Bradford’, Research Papers: Muslims in Europe, 13 March 1982 quoted in Jorgen S. Nielsen, ‘Muslims in Britain: ethnic minorities, communities or Ummah’, in Harold Coward, John R. Hinnells and Raymond Brady Williams (eds), The South Asian

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Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada and the United States (Albany: State University of New York, 2000), p. 111. 39 Nielsen, ‘Muslims in Britain: ethnic minorities, communities or Ummah’, p.  111. According to Vertovec, in 1963 there were only 13 mosques registered in Britain. The number grew to 49 in 1970, to 99 in 1975, and to 203 in 1980, almost doubling to 338 in 1985 (Steven Vertovec, ‘Religion in migration, diasporas and transnationalism’, Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis, University of British Columbia, 2002, Working Paper (February 2007): www.riim.metropolis.net (accessed 21 February 2010). 40 The first mosque established by the Bengali migrants was in London in a small room at a house in Commercial Street in 1910. 41 Office for National Statistics, Key Data: UK Social and Economic Statistics, London, Office of National Statistics (1997/98), 13. 42 Jamil Ali, Changing Identity Constructions Among Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain (Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Department of Theology, University of Birmingham, 2000), p. 6. 43 Channel S, Overview (2008): http://chsuk.tv/overview.html (accessed 24 July 2008). 44 Alexandra Frean and Syal Rajeev, ‘Community divided on terrorism and security’, The Times, (2008): www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989–225 4738,00.html (accessed 15 January 2008). The Pakistani-origin Muslims are the largest ethnic community among the Muslims in Britain; they comprise 43 per cent, while Muslims of Indian origin comprise only 9 per cent. 6 per cent of Muslims are of other Asian origin. Among the Muslim population in Britain 84 per cent are of South Asian origin; 46 per cent were born in Britain while 54 per cent have migrated from other countries. Among the British-Bangladeshis living in London, the per centage of migrants is almost equal to the per centage of British-born (Greater London Authority (GLA), Muslims in London (2006), p. 29. 45 David Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK: socio-cultural dynamics, religious trends and transnational politics’, Paper presented at the European Human Rights Conference on Bangladesh – Extremism, Intolerance & Violence (London: School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, 17 June 2005). It is also worth noting that according to a 2006 account 36.4 per cent of population of the Tower Hamlet Borough is Muslim, ‘making Tower Hamlets the authority with the highest proportion of Muslim residents in the UK’ (GLA, Muslims in London, p. 18). In London, Muslims of Bangladeshi origin comprise the largest Muslim population: 23.54 per cent of Muslims are of Bangladeshi origin (GLA, Muslims in London, Table 2, p. 21). 46 Ceri Peach and D. Rossiter, ‘Level and nature of spatial concentration and segregation of minority ethnic populations in Great Britain, 1991’, Ethni­ city in the 1991 Census, 3 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1996), p. 123. 47 Ceri Peach, ‘Demographics of BrAsian Settlement, 1951–2001’, in N. Ali, V.S. Kalra and S. Sayyid (eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in

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Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 177. 48 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Survey of English Housing Provisional Results 2006–7 (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). 49 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, ‘An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK, report of the National Equality Panel’, CASE report 60 (London: London School of Economics, 2010), p. 100. (‘Level 1’ refers to fundamental inability and does not refer to any specific qualification.) 50 Steve Strand et al., ‘Drivers and challenges in raising the achievement of pupils from Bangladeshi, Somali and Turkish backgrounds’, Research Report DCSF-RR226 (London: Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2010), p. 17. 51 Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), National Curriculum Assessment, GCSE & Equivalent Attainment & Post-16 Attainment, by Pupil Characteristics in England 2006/7, SFR 38/2007 (London: DCSF, 2007). 52 Helen Connor, Claire Tyers, Tariq Modood and Jim Hilage, Why the Difference? A Closer Look at Higher Education Minority Ethnic Students and Graduates (London: DfES Research Report RR552, 2004), p. 43. 53 Nii Djan Tackey et al., ‘Barriers to employment for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain’, Research Report no. 360 (Leeds: Department for Work and Pensions, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006), p. 2. 54 The Poverty Site, ‘Low income and ethnicity’: www.poverty.org.uk/06/ index.shtml?2. Data is for 2008/09, updated in August 2010 (accessed 16 May 2012). 55 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, ‘An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK, report of the National Equality Panel’, Summary (London: London School of Economics, 2010), p. 19. 56 Ali, Changing Identity Constructions among Bangladeshi Muslims, p. 7. 57 Shinder S. Thandi, ‘Brown economy: enterprise and employment’, in N. Ali, V.S. Kalra and S. Sayyid (eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 218. 58 Sian Carey and Abdus Shukur, ‘A profile of the Bangladeshi community in East London’, Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 12: 3 (1985), 405–17. 59 James Y. Nazroo, Ethnicity, Class and Health (London: Policy Studies Institute, 2001). 60 Sarah Salway, ‘Limiting illness as a barrier to livelihood improvement among UK Bangladeshis’, Paper presented at the British Society for Population Studies annual conference, 2004. 61 Tania Burchardt, Julian Le Grand and David Piachaud, ‘Social exclusion in Britain 1991–1995’, Social Policy and Administration, 33:3 (1999), 227–44; emphasis in original. 62 The Social Exclusion Unit was established in December 1997 and was in existence for nine years. In 2006, the Unit was shut down and its work transferred to a smaller taskforce called the Social Exclusion Task Force.

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63 Social Exclusion Unit, Preventing Social Exclusion (London: Cabinet Office, 2001), p. 11. For a more nuanced and probing discussion see Amartya Sen, ‘Social exclusion: concept, application, and scrutiny’, Social Development Papers No. 1, Office of Environmental and Social Development, Asian Development Bank (June 2000). 64 Ceri Peach, Vaughan Robinson and Susan Smith (eds), Ethnic Segregation in Cities (London: Croom Helm Limited, 1998). 65 Stephen W. Barton, The Bengali Muslims of Bradford (Community Relations Project, Bradford: University of Bradford, 1986). 66 H.M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1967). 67 D.S. Massey and N.A. Denton, ‘The dimensions of residential segregation’, Social Forces, 67:2 (1988), 281–315. 68 Ron Johnston, James Forrest and Michael Poulsen, ‘The geography of an ethniCity: residential segregation of birthplace and language groups in Sydney, 1996’, Housing Studies, 16:5 (2001), 569–94. 69 Stanley Lieberson, Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970); Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972). 70 David Cutler and Edward Glaeser, ‘Are ghettos good or bad?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997), 826–72. 71 Sylvia Novak, ‘Immigrant enclaves and residential segregation: voices of racialized refugee and immigrant women’, Housing New Canadians, Research Working Group, Toronto 2002: www.hnc.utoronto.ca/publish/ women.pdf (accessed 6 February 2010). 72 T.R. Balakrishnan, Paul Maxim and Rozzet Jurdi, ‘Social class versus cultural identity as factors in the residential segregation of ethnic groups in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver for 2001’, Canadian Studies in Population, 32:2 (2005), 203–27. 73 Massey and Denton, ‘The dimensions of residential segregation’, 281–315. 74 For a succinct history of housing issues in the East End, particularly related to the Bengalis, see: Sarah Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card: Politics and Ghettoisation in London’s East End, Institute of Geography Online Paper Series: GEO 018 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2006). 75 Iza Aftab, ‘The spatial form of Bangladeshi community in London’s East End’, in A. van Nes (ed.), Proceedings of the 5th International Space Syntax Symposium Volume III (Delft: Delft University, 2005), pp. 129–44. 76 Ceri Peach, ‘South Asian and Caribbean ethnic minority housing choice in Britain’, Urban Studies, 35:10 (1998), 1657–80. 77 Aftab, ‘The spatial form of Bangladeshi community in London’s East End’, p. 32. 78 Herman Ouseley, Community Pride, Not Prejudice: Making Diversity Work at Bradford (Bradford: Vision Bradford, 2001). 79 David Ritchie, Oldham Independent Review: One Oldham, One Future (London: Government Office for the North West, 2001), p. 9. 80 Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card.

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81 Ceri Peach, ‘Sleepwalking into ghettoization? The British debate over segregation’, in Karen Schönwälder (ed.), Residential Segregation and the Integration of Immigrants: Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, ­Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2007–602 (Berlin: Social Science Research Center Berlin, 2007), pp. 7–40. 82 The dissimilarity index (ID) compares the residential distribution of pairs of population groups in cities. The index gives the per centage of either of the two groups which would have to move to replicate the d ­ istribution of the other. Values below 39 are taken as ‘low’; 40–9 are taken as’ ­moderate’, 50–9 as ‘moderately high’, 60–9 as ‘high’ and 70 and over as ‘very high’. The study of Peach shows that the Caribbean population has a ‘low’ average level of segregation (35) while the Indian mean is ‘moderate’ (43), the Pakistani mean is ‘moderately high’ and the Bangladeshi mean is ‘high’. The IDs for the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations in selected urban areas with substantial numbers show a similar result. The index is scaled from ‘0: no segregation’ to ‘100: total segregation’. The unweighted average for the Caribbean population (35) is in the ‘low’ category. The Indian (43) is ‘moderate’, the Pakistani (56) ‘moderately high’ and the Bangladeshi (60) ‘high’. 83 Nissa Finney and Ludi Simpson, Sleepwalking to Segregation? Challenging Myths of Race and Migration (Bristol: Polity Press, 2009). 84 Ritchie, Oldham Independent Review, p. 20. 85 The debate on housing and its impact on community relations has always been a part of British social policy discourse, but it was pushed to the back burner in the 1990s. The riots of summer 2001 reignited the debate, particularly because of official reports which pointed to housing segregation as one of the primary causes of the riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham. 86 Delwar Hussain, ‘Globalization, God and Galloway: the Islamisization of Bangladeshi communities in London’, Journal of Creative Communications, 2:1–2 (2007), 198. Hilary Clarke painted a similar picture in her report published in 1998, a decade before Hussain’s piece: ‘As they speed on the Docklands Light Railway through Tower Hamlets towards their gleaming offices in Canary Wharf, commuters can glimpse the desperate poverty in the borough. The dilapidated, overcrowded council blocks of Shadwell are nearly all occupied by Bangladeshis. Their flats sit side by side with the luxury warehouse apartments of Wapping. It’s the kind of juxtaposition of extreme poverty and wealth that you associate more usually with New York than London.’ (Helen Clarke, ‘Life on the Lane’, Independent (2 May 1998): http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_19980524/ai_n14158397 (accessed 6 August 2008)). 87 Carlinde Adriaanse, ‘The utility of the “social climate” concept in understanding urban neighbourhood-life: a theoretical approach and initial empirical evidence’: www.otb.tudelft.nl/live/binaries/2e2a5b07–3f77–4d71– b1d1–33a897e794aa/doc/Conference%20paper%20Adriaanse.pdf (acces­­sed 15 February 2010).

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88 Aftab, ‘The spatial form of Bangladeshi community in London’s East End’, p. 142. 89 Aftab, ‘The spatial form of Bangladeshi community in London’s East End’, p. 139. 90 Marie Gillespie, Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 37. 91 Official reports published on the riots are: Burnley Task Force, Burnley Speaks, Who Listens? Burnley Task Force Report (London: Burnley Council, 2001); Home Office, Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Groups on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London: Home Office, 2001); Ritchie, Oldham Independent Review. 92 R. Atkinson and K. Kintrea, ‘Disentangling area effects: evidence from deprived and non-deprived neighbourhoods’, Urban Studies, 38:12 (2001), 2277–98. 93 Tackey et al., ‘Barriers to employment for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain’, p. 36. 94 Lucinda Platt, ‘Moving up? Intergeneration social class mobility in England and Wales and the impact of ethnicity, migration and religious affiliation’, Conference on Immigration: Impacts, Integration and Intergenerational Issues (London: University College London, March 2006), pp. 29–31. 95 Nabbil Khattab, Ron Johnston, Ibrahim Sirkeci and Tariq Modood, ‘The impact of spatial segregation on the employment outcomes amongst Bangladeshi men and women in England and Wales’, Sociological Research Online 15(1)3: www.socresonline.org.uk/15/1/3.html (accessed 15 May 2012). 96 British Bangla Media Group, British-Bangladeshis: Who’s Who (London: British Bangla Media Group, 2009): www.bbwhoswho.co.uk/home.html (accessed 20 February 2010).

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A tale of two long summers

I

n the introduction to the book I have referred to three events as indications of a dramatic transformation of identity among the British-Bangladeshi population: the victory of George Galloway in parliamentary elections held in 2005, demonstrations in the East End against the filming of a book entitled Brick Lane, and the controversy over the visit of Bangladeshi Islamist leader Delwar Hossain Saidee in 2006. In this chapter I will explore these events in detail to illustrate the commonalities between them and their significance for understanding the nature of the transformation. The victory of Galloway From the outset it was clear to political analysts and media commentators that the British parliamentary elections of 2005 would be comparatively dull, because the result of the election was a foregone conclusion: the Labour Party would be re-elected. It was also clear that the victory would be less spectacular than in the 1997 and 2001 elections. Although everyone knew that it would be a historic event, because the Labour Party had never before been returned to power for a third successive term and no Labour leader before Tony Blair had been thrice elected Prime Minister, there was very little enthusiasm among voters. The only issue that kept the media busy was the extent of losses the party would bear; in other words, everyone was waiting to see how bruised the party and Tony Blair would emerge from the election. The stable economy provided the impetus for voting in favour of the incumbent but the Iraq War had become the Achilles heels of Labour. As the campaigns progressed, one constituency began to draw attention and provide excitement. This was in East London – the Bethnal Green and Bow constituency. The incumbent Labour candidate Oona King was being challenged by former Labour MP George Galloway, who by then had formed his own party called Respect. The media noted that

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Galloway was increasingly gaining ground and appealing to the local population, particularly to the British-Bangladeshis. George Galloway was not a local, but chose to contest Bethnal Green after his former Glasgow constituency was divided. The media hinted that his choice of constituency was perhaps guided by two considerations: first, ‘with close on 45,000 Muslim residents – and Muslims at the forefront of those opposed to the Iraq War – it was Galloway’s best chance to bloody Tony Blair’s nose’;1 second, Muslim organizations with a local support base had offered to back him. Although Respect and Galloway initially framed his candidacy as an anti-war protest, soon the discourse shifted to a religious overtone: Galloway accused the government of being part of a ‘war on Muslims’. As the election approached, the slogan of Respect became: ‘For British Muslims facing the fear of losing their identity, RESPECT is THE only party’. The election campaign, as I will show later, became a showcase of the strengths of the Islamists. Galloway won with a margin of less than 1,000 votes.2 Galloway’s victory was consistent with one national trend: ‘In all ten seats with the highest proportion of Muslims, Labour suffered aboveaverage falls in its vote share and in six of these seats its vote fell by over 15 per cent.’3 But this statistic shows that the trend is consistent only when a significant number of voters are identified by their religious affiliation. In previous elections the voters of the Bethnal Green and Bow constituency had never voted along religious lines; the victory of Oona King for two terms bears this out. This was indeed a shift from that stance. The Brick Lane furore The furore began in mid-July when a film production company planned to film in Brick Lane – an east London street, and part of the home turf of the largest agglomeration of Bangladeshis living in the UK. The filming was part of the screen adaptation of the best-selling novel Brick Lane by Monica Ali which had been published in 2003. A group named Campaign Against Monica Ali’s Film Brick Lane vowed not to allow filming and began to mobilize. Described in the media as a ‘community action group’, led by the leaders of the local traders’ association, the group accused the novel of reinforcing ‘pro-racist, anti-social stereotypes’ and of containing ‘a most explicit, politically calculated violation of the human rights of the community’. Along with the initial petition drive, the group threatened mass protests, and the key organizer Abdus Salique4 told the media that ‘young people are getting very involved with this campaign. They will blockade the area and guard our streets.

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Of course, they will not do anything unless we tell them to, but I warn you they are not as peaceful as me.’5 These threats seem to have worked. By the end of July, the production company announced that they were moving to another location.6 Nevertheless, the campaign continued for a while, including a demonstration on 30 July, attended by about 120 men and two women, which insisted that the book ‘greatly offended the hard-working, industrious Bangladeshi community’.7 The uproar against the book, however, was nothing new. Soon after its publication in 2003, the author and the book came under criticism from some British-Bangladeshis, particularly the Sylhetis. The allegations were that the book cast Sylhetis in a bad light and that it failed to ‘represent’ the culture of the Bangladeshi migrant community and their neighbourhood. Despite disapproval, the book received rave reviews and became a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic. Brick Lane is the story of an immigrant Bangladeshi woman, Nazneen, told from her vantage point. At the age of 18, Nazneen, a young girl from a poor family in a small village in Bangladesh, consents to an arranged marriage after her younger sister Hasina has eloped. Nazneen’s husband, Chanu, twenty years older than her, brings Nazneen to London where she finds a ‘home’ within the Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets, a public housing project in London’s East End with a long history of lodging immigrants. The place is truly an enclave of marginalized Bangladeshis. Nazneen speaks no English, and her husband sees no need for her to try. Chanu is a kind and warm-hearted, but overbearing and somewhat hopeless, under-performing individual. He has never considered England home: his dream was to become successful and return to Bangladesh a wealthy man, but success never came. For the first-generation Bangladeshi immigrants and British-Bangladeshis living in the East End making a living is difficult at best, and most heads of household are forced to take demeaning jobs, regardless of their education. Chanu, who has a bachelor’s degree in English, epitomizes this lack of opportunity. Nazneen, with her two daughters, lives in total submission, though she struggles with loneliness and poverty, and loses her son in infancy. Curiosity, friendship and parenting, among other things, keep her going. The ‘homeland’, a place that she left behind and never goes back to after her marriage, comes through the letters of her sister Hasina. The letters tell little of her parents, but of Hasina’s eventful life and unending tribulations as well as conditions in Bangladesh. Hasina, we come to know, fled her violent husband, found work in a garment factory, was being kept by a wealthy factory owner, and ultimately upon her rejection by him, has little choice but to become a prostitute.

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Life in the enclave of the East End is governed by strict Bengali and supposedly Muslim traditions. ‘In public, eyes are watching and tongues wagging with gossip as the women shun those who become Westernized. Still, there is a profound cultural disturbance beneath the placid surface of the Bengalis’ world.’8 It is in this world that Nazneen meets Karim, a sweatshop-owner’s nephew, in 2001. Until then Razia was Nazneen’s only friend and her window on the world. Economic hardship, which forces Chanu to accept employment working nights as a taxi driver and allows Nazneen to do piecework for a local garment factory, brings Nazneen and Karim together. Karim, a young man with dreams, yearns to direct the local Muslim population away from secularization and back to strict religious traditions. Nazneen, who is otherwise ‘trapped inside this body, inside this room, inside this flat, inside this concrete slab of entombed humanity’ comes alive with Karim –‘her life had become bloated with meaning and each small movement electrified’. Karim ‘challenges Nazneen in a way that causes her to redefine her personal priorities and unquestioning acceptance of fate’s directives. For the first time, through his eyes, Nazneen views herself, not as mother and wife, but as a woman.’9 In some ways Brick Lane is a classic story of adultery, but it is also a story of a young immigrant Bangladeshi woman’s isolation, her passivity, and at last her gradual exploration of the outside world. Most importantly, it tries to take us beyond the yellowing net curtains of [Bangladeshi women’s] cramped tower-block flats, and into their living-rooms and bed­­­ rooms. It aims, for the most part successfully, to articulate their fears and desires, and offers a rich and finely textured corrective to those accounts which portray them as elective mutes, unthinking purveyors of Third World tradition.10

The book has some serious weaknesses; language, length and poor research being the prominent ones. Some of the details and narrative structure in parts of the book were drab, to say the least. Some critics complained that the book is full of clichés, lacks narrative punch and is occupied by ‘one-dimensional people taken straight from a textbook of Indo-Anglian Lit’.11 One critic has demonstrated that the novel has uncanny similarities with Zadie Smith’s White Elephant, published in 2000.12 Some felt that ‘Brick Lane is not a literary achievement, its style and language are not endearing … the concept and storyline were unoriginal.’13 Some critics, on the other hand, praised the work as a major contribution to postcolonial contemporary literature. Alistair Cormack insists that the novel ‘is particularly of interest as an examination of the double bind that female migrants face, treated as alien by

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their host nation and as commodities by the men in their own communities’.14 James Wood commented that, ‘Brick Lane is a great achievement of the subtlest storytelling – the kind that proceeds illuminatingly, in units of characters rather than in wattage of “style”.’15 But the protests in the summer of 2006 by some of the residents of Brick Lane were not about the literary quality or the supposed inaccuracies of the book, but about the representation of the local people and their culture, which they found offensive. Abdus Salique, the organizer of the protests, argued that such works ‘sully the identity of those Bengalis from Sylhet region in Bangladesh’.16 Indeed sub-ethnic identity within the British-Bangladeshis, particularly incessant tensions between the Sylhetis, who constitute the majority of the Bangladeshi migrants, and those from other parts of Bangladesh, has played an important part in the hostility evinced towards the author and the novel. The Sylheti community often feel that they are treated with disrespect by the Bengalis, and saw Monica Ali’s book as the latest proof of this disdain. This sub-text of the messages of the protestors was clearly articulated. After the publication of the book the Greater Sylhet Development and Welfare Council sent an 18–page complaint to the publisher on 23 September 2003 alleging that the book was ‘shameful’ and ‘a despicable insult’.17 The letter, addressed to Monica Ali, and sent also to the ‘Managing Director of Booker Prize Award’ and ‘Literary Editor’ of the Guardian among others, stated, with profound regrets and utter disappointment we are constrained to say that, having gone through this 413–page work we find it thematically an anti-Sylheti venomous volume, written by an author inherently ingrained with malicious prejudice against and acrimonious attitude towards Sylhetis at home and abroad, stemming out of sheer ignorance about the Sylheti community in Britain, particularly in and around Brick Lane, which has been historically the hub of immigrants from the days of Huguenots of the 17th Century.18

In a similar vein, Abdus Salique commented to the press, ‘she targeted our particular community’ of people from Sylhet, ‘for some reason, she said we were uneducated, illiterate, not clean’.19 Salique, in an interview with the author of this book, said: Monica Ali has commented about us, but she knows nothing about our community. She is not even one of us.20 She never shared [our lives], and she has no experience [of our lives]. They argue that it is a fiction, but fictions cannot be like this, because this is reality – we are here. She used the name of this locality. Whether you show the bad side or the good side [of a community], you got to tell the complete story. You cannot tell

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only the bad side. New generations are growing up; they will only know the awful things [about their predecessors]. Wouldn’t you say [anything] against these?21

Religion, especially the portrayal of Karim, played a part too. The pro­­­test organizers consciously downplayed this aspect, saying ‘this is not about Islam’.22 Salique insisted that he had been misunderstood. ‘I consider myself a progressive individual. I had many progressive friends. Many of my progressive friends alleged that I have behaved like a communal and fanatic person. I did not agree with them that if the book is not good readers will reject it.’23He never intended to behave like a ‘fanatic’, Salique maintained.24 But many residents of Brick Lane confirmed in private that the issue of religion came up in discussions during the 2003 protest against the book and the 2006 protest against the filming.25 One of the headline-grabbing comments of the organizers, particularly of Abdus Salique, was that the book would be burned.26 This comment was reproduced in the national and international media ad nauseum thanks to the internet, blogs and news websites. Was such a threat ever made? Salique insisted that he never made a threat to burn the book: ‘I never said that book will be burned, I said that people may burn it because they are upset.’27 Whether or not an explicit threat was made, an intimidating environment was created, according to some residents of Brick Lane.28 One can trace a veiled threat in the 2003 letter; the letter narrated the predicament of an author who previously tried to ‘malign’ the Sylhetis: It [i.e. Brick Lane] reminds us of the mischievous attempt of Dr. F.M. Bhatti, a Pakistani immigrant in this country to malign Sylhetis in Britain, he identified us in his draft book ‘Bangladesh: An Introduction’. He identified Sylhetis in Britain as ‘servants of the British tea plantation owners and workers, some of whom while returning home brought their Sylheti servants with them’. The book project was funded by the Inner London Education Authority and Bhatti worked with a team of twenty others under the name of a spurious organization called ‘Centre for Asian Studies’ he produced the draft book circulating some three hundred copies. The reaction to such a downright lie was serious, even violent by Sylhetis in Britain. As a result, the Inner London Education Authority was compelled to withdraw the draft book and scrap the project. Bhatti was banished from East London and never seen again in the locality.29

The furore over Brick Lane brought forth issues that are, in my judgement, important in understanding British-Bangladeshi society. Two issues deserve special attention: the treatment of gender, and the pre-eminence of the ‘vocal minority’. Contrary to the contention of some

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critics, I argue that Brick Lane has challenged the gender stereotype at various levels; not only because it is a story of Nazneen (and Hasina), and that it is told from a woman’s point of view, but also because it is written by a woman. Monica Ali challenged ‘the supremacy of Bengali men by articulating the secret experiences of Bengali women’. While the challenge was not unprecedented, it was never so public within a community which takes pride in its exclusivity, as Bangladeshi and as Sylheti, and occasionally under the religious garb. ‘A woman – a woman! – had dared to take the rest of us on an intimate tour of the Bengali community. She had even tried, in her subtle, tender way, to incite a rebellion of Muslim women, to encourage them to become Nazneens.’30 The gender dimension has received less than deserved attention in the debate. One of the participants on the Guardian internet discussion board highlighted the gender dimension quite eloquently: The point being missed here is that what the local campaigners find objectionable is that it portrays a woman from their community having sex with someone other than her husband and defying her husband by refusing to return to the homeland. Johann Hari interviewed locals for the Evening Standard and after some half-baked rhetoric one of the locals exploded ‘Our women are not fucking around’. This is the crux of this entire campaign. I’m sure many men would recognise themselves in the hideous husband, with his ineffectual bullying and low-level abuse, but what the real problem is is that both the mother and, especially, the eldest daughter in the book are rebellious in different ways, and the novel ends with a very feisty and opinionated daughter and a newly emancipated mother living happily without the awful husband/father. This is where the threat to the men of Brick Lane lies.31

It is well to bear in mind that the demonstrators were mostly middleaged men, and represented a trait of social conservatism within the community.32 The Bengali/Sylheti community, despite its exclusivity, is not isolated from an emerging trend in Europe, particularly within the immigrant community. That, in the words of Hari, is ‘to silence women from their own neighbourhoods calling for change’. In the context of the British-Bangladeshis, this exclusivity of the com­­­ munity and marginalization of women is ingrained in social, cultural and even in spatial milieu, and naturalized through cultural practices and a particular interpretation of religion.33 All these factors create an environment within which intolerance breeds, and which allows religiopolitical activism to take root. This is why the uproar over a book, particularly the mode of expression of the discontent, is important in understanding the political atmosphere within the community, especially

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the appeal of the Islamists to the British-Bangladeshi community. The second important issue pertaining to the Brick Lane protest is the number of protestors. Press reports and discussions with the local inhabitants reveal that the number was very small. This is not to suggest that a small number of people cannot be right, but to draw attention to the fact that their claim of ‘community representation’ is tenuous at best. This also shows that some voices were excluded; ‘the media have followed the barking of certain voices to the exclusion of other voices of the community’.34 Conspicuously absent in the discussions were the voices of women, despite the fact that the novel is about the life of a woman. These voices would not necessarily have been supportive of the novel and its portrayal of women in the East End Bangladeshi society, but they could have initiated a debate on the status of women in general and particularly their experiences in regard to the tensions between the two cultures they have to live in. Also excluded were those who may have supported the filming. Indeed the point was made by some, for example Lisa Appignanesi (Deputy President, English PEN) et al. in their letter to the Guardian.35 But ironically, their claim is equally questionable, for their right of ‘representing the community’ is equally unconvincing.36 The results of the protests show that the minority voices prevailed as the production company retreated and the filming moved elsewhere.37 The silence of the British-Bangladeshis who disagreed with the protests, whether they liked the book or not, indicates an important feature of British-Bangladeshi society:38 the predominance of a vocal minority. The implication of this has far-reaching consequences, particularly in shaping the political landscape and determining the relationship of this minority with the society at large. A combination of exclusivity and predominance of the vocal minority, whose vested interests lie with exclusionary practices, does not bode well for a community that is lagging behind mainstream society in almost all sectors. The Saidee Saga Delwar Hossain Saidee is no stranger to the British-Bangladeshi community. He has been visiting England regularly for almost two decades. The concerns voiced about his visit in 2006 were on two grounds: his personal track record and statements he made over previous years in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Understanding these concerns necessitates looking at three related matters: the party Saidee belongs to, the statements he made and the forum he uses; because while Saidee was at the centre of the debate, its implication was far beyond the individual in

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question and more about the messages and the organization behind these messages. Saidee is a leader of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) Bangladesh, the party which opposed the Bengali nationalist movement throughout the 1960s, and collaborated with the Pakistani Army during the genocidal war against the Bengalis: JI-supported armed groups provided logistical and intelligence support to the Pakistani army. It is widely known that JI’s armed cadres, notably the al Badr, the al-Shams and the Razakars brutally murdered a number of distinguished Bengali intellectuals on the eve of the surrender of the Pakistani army on 16 December 1971.39 The purpose of the party, as stated in various party documents, is: ‘to give a clear exposition of the Islamic system and to organize a party whose indoctrinated leadership and cadres would work to bring about an Islamic revolution’.40 The JIs final aim is, as stated in the election manifesto in 2001, an Islamic state in Bangladesh: ‘Bangladesh shall be declared an Islamic Republic on the basis of Sovereignty of Almighty Allah. The Holy Quran and Sunnah [the teachings and practice of Prophet Muhammad] will be the only source of all laws in the Republic.’41 JI further states, ‘Each and every Muslim citizen shall be orientated in unquestioned faith in Islamic fundamentals, injunctions and moral values so that Muslim men and women could acquire knowledge about the fundamental teachings of Islam easily. All possible steps shall be taken to establish “Salat” [prayers].’42 The organization of JI in Bangladesh is similar to its Pakistani counterpart and follows a pattern characterized by many as ‘cadre-based’.43 According to Banu, ‘the Jamaat [is] built upon the pattern of revolutionary totalitarian parties working through concentric circles of spreading out their influences’.44 The organization is hierarchically organized, but ‘well disciplined and cohesive’.45 Twice elected to the Bangladeshi parliament,46 Saidee introduced a bill in 1993 to pass the Blasphemy Law and has since then called for a clamp-down on secularist writers. His tirade against the Ahamadiyaa community is well known as he literally demonized the Ahamadiyaas when he called them ‘Satanic’ in 2003,47 and insisted that ‘Ahmadiyas don’t have any right to introduce themselves as Muslims. They are a minority community here, just like the Hindus and Christians.’48 Saidee’s dislike for independent journalists is also well documented. In its 2003 annual report, Reporters without Frontiers noted that ‘at a public meeting on 23 March, Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, a member of parliament for Jamaat-e-Islami (a junior member of the ruling alliance), criticised journalists who “confuse Muslims and Islamists” and called for blood tests for journalists “to see if they are Muslims or not”.’49 On 4 January 2002, Saidee declared that all statues in Bangladesh except

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those worshipped by non-Muslims would be demolished as constituting an affront to the sentiments of Muslims in Bangladesh.50 Saidee reportedly commented that ‘England and America deserve all that is coming to them for turning a poor Muslim country [Afghanistan] upside down’.51 On 25 February 2005, in a public meeting in Dhaka, Saidee declared that the ‘Taleban Flag must fly in the sky of Bangladesh’. He went on to say that the ‘US wants to propagate atheism and secularism in the minds of our Muslims. However, we wouldn’t let it happen.’52 Delwar Hossain Saidee speaks at a limited number of political gatherings during his visits to the UK and other countries. Most of his political meetings are restricted to party activists and therefore do not reach the public at large. To reach the public he addresses gatherings called waz (and/or Tafsir) mahfils. Waz mahfils (public performances of scriptural commentaries) are a traditional means of preaching Islam among believers, organized in both urban and rural areas in Bengal for centuries. Although traditionally this has been an expression of piety in eastern Bengal, particularly in the rural areas, it has taken a different form since the 1980s. These gatherings have become a forum of commentary on current affairs and thus centred on ideology rather than on theology. The people who attend these mahfils are stimulated by the cultural construct of the religion. In Bangladesh, with few exceptions, maulanas (religious scholars) who conduct these mahfils have very little knowledge of Islamic theology, and thus provide interpretations based on a very narrow and often inaccurate understanding of religious texts. Yet, for a large number of people, these mahfils have emerged as the most authoritative sources of the interpretation of Islam and its relevance in daily lives. The waz mahfil has also become the most effective and popular medium of communication with a population who are either unable to access the original religious texts or are too busy to read them, or share the same worldview. The enormous influence of these mahfils is due both to the oratory of these speakers, and the uniformity of their messages with popular culture. Taj-ul Islam Hashmi noted this aspect: ‘They [speakers of these mahfils] cast a magical spell on their audiences, mostly arousing a fear of hell, in conformity with the popular culture which glorifies death and the hereafter.’53 Organizing waz mahfils in England is a relatively recent development and has been primarily an effort of the Islamists. The tradition of the publicly organized waz mahfil among the British-Bangladeshi community was absent until the late 1980s. Delawar Hossain Saidee is perhaps the best-known of these mahfil speakers. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Delwar

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Hossain Saidee almost single-handedly transformed the scope and nature of the waz mahfil over the 1980s and 1990s, both in Bangladesh and outside the country. He uses a distinctly different style of rhetoric and a belligerent style of presentation, and loads his speeches with overt political content. His presentations are meant to assail the secularists, and provide an ideology-driven, politically motivated interpretation of Islam. The content of a large number of audio cassettes of Saidee’s speeches at various waz mahfils bear out these points. For example, ‘[Speech at the] Gathering of Learned Men in Qatar in 2002’, ‘Coalition Government and Secularist Ideology’, ‘Historical Speech Against the Apostates’, ‘Discussion On Babri Mosques’, ‘Mass Media: What the Muslim Ummah [community] Should Do’, ‘Khatme Nabuat’, ‘Jihad in the Name of Allah’, ‘Educational Stories’, ‘Speech of Allama Saidee in London 1999’, and ‘The Ways to Become Successful in Life’ are particularly significant in this regard.54 Taj Hashmi, who considers Saidee ‘basically an itinerant mulla [cleric]’ pointed out the misogynistic content of Saidee’s waz: ‘From his numerous recorded speeches on audio and video tapes with catchy and misleading titles like ‘Liberation of Women’, ‘Purdah [veil] and Women’s Rights in Islam’, ‘Rights of Husbands and Wives’, ‘Women and Non-Muslims in Islam’, proceed vulgar and misogynous expositions, which not only undermine modern civilization but also degrade women to the level of animals, objects, fruits or eatables.’55 Hashmi, however, is not alone in noting the misogynistic messages of the waz mahfils. Maleka Begum, a prominent women’s rights activist in Bangladesh, has also noted that waz mahfils have unleashed tirades against women, particularly concerning their roles outside the home and in the workplace.56 The transformation of this traditional institution came to the attention of many in the early 1990s when the Islamists began a campaign against the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh on the grounds that that they were spreading Christianity. During this campaign waz became the most convenient means to assault the secularists, and vilify the schools established by the NGOs. These waz mahfils not only condoned violence but also, in many instances, provoked the attendees. Numerous incidents have occurred in Bangladesh where NGO offices and schools have come under attack after speakers at waz mahfils called upon villagers to resist the local NGOs.57 Delwar Hossain Saidee, whose speeches are available as audio and video tapes, within and outside Bangladesh, sends a clear signal to the audience that these messages are sanctioned by JI Bangladesh. These messages provide legitimacy to hate, anger and violence, and contribute to an atmosphere supporting militant Islam. On many occasions the

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police have found cassettes of Saidee’s waz mahfil speeches in militant hideouts in Bangladesh. Some of the militants, notably Jabed Iqbal (alias Aman Ullah alias Mohammad alias Abu Hurrab), the chief of the militant organization Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Chittagong region, confessed to the law-enforcing agencies that ‘he was imbued with the sprit of jihad to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh after listening [to] the speech of Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee [sic] at Tafsir Mahafil held at the parade ground in Chittagong.’58 Notably, these recordings are easily available in the shops in Brick Lane.59 Although many of Saidee’s previous visits went smoothly, some of these visits had stirred heated debate and violence within the commun­ity. For example, the Stoke on Trent Sentinel reported on 6 October 1995 that about 45 people demonstrated outside a meeting where Saidee spoke in the town. According to the newspaper, ‘some Muslims in the town denounce him as a political activist who incited young Muslims to join a “radical fundamentalist organization”’.60 On 27 July 1999, in a ‘religious gathering’ in Oldham Saidee made derogatory comments about the local Sylheti community.61 Saidee issued a denial despite the availability of audio recordings of his speech. Members of the local com­­­­­munity continued their protests. In May 2000, followers of Saidee attacked a journalist of the weekly Potrika in Oldham for his reporting of the previous year’s speech. In 2001, another journalist, the local correspondent of the weekly Surma, was attacked by Saidee followers in Oldham. The victim of the attack described the incident in the following way: I wrote one article about Delwar Saydee [sic], few years ago. He came to Oldham. It was in a religious speech, it was during a wa’z. In Queen Elizabeth Hall. Many people were there. Thousands. I was there as a reporter. He said that youth, young girls in our community have got boyfriends. And this is not true. Because if you said anything you should do survey. As a politician, as a Maulvi, as a priest you don’t say that. You can say ‘don’t do that, don’t have boyfriend before marriage’, that’s one thing. But if you say that 95% of girls have boyfriends, that is another thing! Another thing he said, is that if Sylheti people didn’t come to Great Britain they would have become rikshaw wallahs. This is demolishing our status … So they attacked me. Five youths attacked me. Came to me. They said ‘look you wrote something about my leader, I will kill you today’. I was injured. They banged my head. Kids from Westwood, they were from Jamaat, from the Young Muslim Organisation.62

A protest gathering called in the East End by a coalition of various organizations on 18 June 2001 came under attack from Saidee supporters, with some spectators alleging that the attackers came from the nearby

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East London Mosque.63 One of the protestors described the incident: When Saydee [sic] came here, we had a big demonstration in Altab Ali Park, and they launched an attack on our elders. And it was YMO [Young Muslim Organization] kids. They mobilised them. It was 2 or 3 years ago. There has been violence in this countr … It’s not with guns or bombs, it’s been physical violence. Mainly physical or verbal violence more than anything else.64

With information regarding JI, Saidee and the speeches available, and supposedly a ‘zero-tolerance policy’ in place, the question became urgent for the British administration in late 2005 as to whether Saidee should be allowed to visit and speak in the UK. Thanks to Martin Bright the documents are now available, and show that the British government failed to act at that time. Thus the issue returned in the summer of 2006 when Saidee planned a visit to Britain: the primary reason for the visit was to speak at a two-day waz mahfil in London. The programme, organized by Da’watul Islam, UK and Eire, was scheduled on the evenings of 15 and 16 July. Saidee was the chief guest while Maulana Abdul Matin Shabagi of Sylhet and Maulana Abu Sayeed, the chairman of the Islamic Shariah Council of the UK were special guests. Saidee was also scheduled to attend the inauguration of a housing fair organized at the London Muslim Centre on 15 July. The fair was organized by a Sylhet-based business association of real estate developers. According to the invitation letter for the fair, 28 developers were to attend the threeday fair and the inauguration ceremony was to be attended by a number of then cabinet ministers from Bangladesh. The list of guests included Matiur Rahman Nizami (then Minister of Industries and head of the JI Bangladesh), Mirza Abbas (then Public Works minister and a prominent leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party), Ehsanul Huq Milan (then State Minister for Education) and Badruddin Ahmed Kamran (then Mayor of Sylhet City Corporation).65 As the visit of Saidee approached, many British-Bangladeshis voiced their discontent, condemning the British government’s decision not to revoke Saidee’s visa, and the mainstream media soon began highlighting these concerns.66 Ultimately, Saidee did visit the UK in the summer of 2006, but cut short his trip and cancelled all of his public engagements.67 Local journalists could not reach him for comments, but the East London Mosque (ELM) and the London Muslim Centre (LMC) issued a statement on 17 July in support of Saidee’s visit. The press release insisted that Saidee is a ‘noted religious speaker and [a] Bangladeshi MP’. Additionally, ‘He has been a frequent visitor for 30 years, and is very popular with a large section of the Bangladeshi community.’ The statement expressed

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satisfaction that the ‘Foreign Office has approved his most recent visit, though this was not at the request of the Mosque or its Chairman.’68 The opposition to his visit within the Bangladeshi community was more vocal and far more widespread than in any previous years,69 but it was not unanimous by any measure. The Bengali press in London reflected this difference of opinion. The weekly Potrika, in its 17 July issue, reported that Saidee might have gone into hiding after the criticisms of him in the British media. The report said, ‘Maulana Delwar Hossain Saidee, the MP of the Jammat-i-Islami, has suddenly disappeared during his London trip.’ The weekly referred to Martin Bright’s documentary, ‘Who Speaks for Islam?’ and other press reports. It remarked that in some circles it was being discussed that the British government might ban Saidee. The headline of the report on the Saidee controversy in the weekly Surma’s 21–27 July issue was, ‘Saidee to be banned in Britain!’ The weekly Jonomat in its 21 July issue reported, ‘Stormy Debate in British Media about Saidee’. The weekly contacted the Foreign Office on this matter, but Foreign Office officials declined to comment in regard to the visa of any individual. An official also told the weekly that the Foreign Office recognized the concerns in regard to Saidee’s visit. However, ‘Saidee is not visiting at the invitation of the government and the government has no intention to contact him’, the official contended. The weekly Notun Din, in its 21–27 July issue, published an editorial entitled, ‘Why the London Muslim Centre has become the Safe Haven of the War Criminals of Bangladesh.’ Narrating the role of the JI in 1971, the editorial called upon the LMC to make their position clear on this issue. Reza Ahmed Faisal Chowdhury Shoaib, in his column in the same issue of Notun Din raised the question of whether Saidee represents the British Muslims.70 Reza Shoaib writes, If Saidee becomes a problem each time he visits [Britain] why is he being [invited] frequently? What is the interest [in bringing him here]? Does Saidee represent the British Muslims? How can he represent us? He is an MP of Bangladesh; he will represent his constituency in Bangladesh parliament, not here. Here a British Bengali politician will represent the British Muslims. Here Baroness Paul Uddin, Murad Quareshi, Shafi Chowdhury and others who are engaged in politics will represent [the Muslims]. There is no question of Saidee representing [the Muslims]. Those who intend to make Saidee the representative of the British Muslims, undoubtedly they have other intentions, and other business interests. Saidee’s visit to Britain cause[s] damage to British Muslims.71

In contrast to the above-mentioned reports and articles some news­­­ papers published reports revealing their tacit and explicit support for Saidee. The weekly Bangla Post in its report mentioned a fax statement

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of Saidee sent to the weekly Euro Bangla in which he denied the allegations against him and described these reports as biased, baseless and politically motivated. Saidee maintained that Channel 4 should have given him the opportunity to defend himself: ‘Channel 4 has interviewed my political opponents to talk about me; they should have given me the opportunity.’72 Saidee complained that he had been deprived of his democratic rights. He described the report as undemocratic, unjust and contrary to the principles of journalism. Interestingly, the Bangla Post is the only newspaper which quoted the statement. The report also claimed that the reaction to the press reports of Saidee’s hiding had been mixed within the community and a reporter of a local newspaper faced the wrath of Saidee followers at the housing fair at the LMC where Saidee was supposed to be present. The editorial of the weekly Euro Bangla of 24 July was entitled ‘What is your agenda?’. Although Saidee was only obliquely referred to in this editorial, it is evident that the events surrounding Saidee were the primary reason behind the comments. The central point of the editorial was that a section of the Bangladeshi community was embroiled in a grand conspiracy against Muslims in general and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in particular. The newspaper maintained that the MCB had become a ‘strong voice of 2 million Muslims’ in Britain, bringing 400 organizations together. In the view of the newspaper, millions gathered to protest against wars in Lebanon and Iraq, and demonstrate against the cartoon of the Prophet and the author of The Satanic Verses, responding to the call of the MCB. For some time, a conspiracy had been hatched to weaken the Muslims by disintegrating this organized group, the editorial insisted. ‘This is not an isolated event about a Bangladeshi; they have shown the audacity to call Dr Qaradawi [a theologian] evil.’ ‘Why do you echo them without probing the whole issue deeply?’ the newspaper questioned.73 The weekly Bangla Post, in its 27 July issue, reported that ulama (Islamic legal scholars) from Bangladesh had become cautious after the Saidee incident. The newspaper reported that the ulama were worried whether they would be able to visit Britain in future and speak at waz mahfils. The report quoted an alim (scholar) who described Saidee as ‘a learned man’ who may became ‘emotional’ in protesting the killings of Muslims.74 On 28 August 2006, a reader of the Euro Bangla, M.A. Rahim from Birmingham, wrote that Muslims are victims of a global conspiracy and claimed that the Zionists and secularists are now joined by a vested interest group in this ‘maddening conspiracy’. The conspiracy and hostile publicity of Saidee is a part of that conspiracy, the reader insisted. ‘In the context of Bangladesh, Allama Delwar Hossain Saidee is the most popular personality not only compared to other ulama but

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also compared to other political leaders.’ M.A. Rahim reminded readers that despite being the third largest party, the JI decided the destiny of two major political parties in Bangladesh; this was due, he claimed, to the honest and popular leadership of Nizami and Saidee and the popular support for the JI. He requested that journalists be cautious regarding what they print about Saidee: ‘Millions of people attend his mahfil, but you don’t bring that picture to the nation.’75 Not only did newspapers that reported the Saidee case sympathetically receive letters of this kind, but others that were critical of Saidee also received letters supporting him. Muqtadir Ali, from Twickenham, wrote a long letter to Notun Din in September 2006 asking why the Bengali media was singing to the tune of the mainstream media, which was trying to undermine Saidee and Makbul Ali, the Islamic issues adviser at the UK Foreign Office.76 The reader felt that the Bengali media should instead have protested against these character assassinations. ‘We have to understand why the media has begun a campaign against reputed Muslim thinkers and representative Muslim organizations. Actually they [i.e. the mainstream media] are trying to destroy our strength by whipping up the division among us.’77 The Saidee controversy did not remain within the newspapers and public discussions, it also spawned demonstrations: ‘young, third generation, British-born Bengalis demonstrated in support of Sayedee’s [sic] presence’.78 The demonstrations in support of Saidee were far from mammoth gatherings, but they did reveal a considerable support base for Saidee. The strategy adopted by the Saidee supporters was not to engage in street battles with the detractors. The violent clash of 2001 did very little for their cause, but had rather drawn the attention of the police and created adverse responses from the community. Instead, Saidee supporters adopted the strategy of painting these developments as part of a conspiracy against the Muslims in general. With the backing of the MCB and the LMC, they launched a concerted campaign to question the legitimacy of those who opposed Saidee’s trip. The responses in Martin Bright’s blog after his documentary entitled ‘Who Speaks for Islam?’ broadcast on Channel 4 are cases in point. Two samples suffice:79 As for Delawar Hossain Sayeedi [sic], he is the most popular religious speaker in Bangladesh. He attracts more than 500,000 people in his 5 day programme in Chittagong, Bangladesh. He has some political enemies in Britain, particularly those who are members of the opposition party in Bangladesh, the Awami League. For example, Mr Murad Qureshi, GLA [Greater London Authority] member, who called Sayedee a bigot and an extremist in the programme, is the son of Mr Mustaq Qureshi who is a die hard member of Awami League.

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Those who call him [Saidee] a bigot and think he is extreme – do so for their allergy of Islam and [to cover their] political inadequacy.

When Saidee’s trip was over, the question that it raised lingered: why do various sections of the community, particularly the younger Britishborn Bangladeshis, identify with the messages spread by Saidee and his ilk? One must acknowledge that the attraction to Saidee and his messages is symptomatic of a trend within the community which can no longer be brushed aside as fringe; neither can it be suspended for a future time.80 The appeal of these messages, in particular to the younger population, demands closer scrutiny, because according to the 2001 census, nearly 40 per cent of British-Bangladeshis are under the age of 16. These three events, which took place over a period of two summers, are reflective of an underlying change within the British-Bangladeshi community. It was not an overnight catastrophe but is enormously significant. A slow but steady change over preceding decades resulted in these events. The gradual prominence of religion as a marker of identity, and the deep divisions within the Bangladeshi community that came to the fore, demand closer examination and analysis. The questions as to why and how the change took place, what factors played a key role, and which actors facilitated the transformation will be addressed in the following chapters. Notes   1 ‘Galloway’s East End street fight’, BBC News (6 May 2005): http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4519575.stm (accessed 5 June 2007).   2 The overall result of the election was no surprise: ‘Turnout was only slightly up on the 2001 all-time low, indicating no great interest this time. The Conservative share of the vote hardly changed, whereas Labour lost about 13 per cent of its 2001 share and the Liberal Democrats increased theirs by 20 per cent – largely at Labour’s expense. The decline in Labour’s vote share meant that it lost 47 seats net in the House of Commons: the Conservatives’ number of seats increased by 32, even though they won few extra votes, and the Liberal Democrats had a net gain of 10’ (Ron Johnston, ‘Another UK general election: more books!’, Political Science Review, 4:3 (2008), 298.   3 Thomas Quinn, ‘Elections in context, choosing the least-worst government: the British general election of 2005’, West European Politics, 29:1 (2006), 175.   4 Abdus Salique is a businessman with several business establishments in the Brick Lane area. He hails from the Sylhet region. He is a Labour Party activist (personal interview, London, 19 July 2007). Mr Salique was the chairman of Brick Lane Traders’ Association at the time of the interview. He is the founder chairman of Banglatown Restaurants Association and owner

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of Bonoful Sweets and Salique’s Restaurant. He migrated to London from Bangladesh in 1970 at the age of 19.   5 Lea Richard and Paul Lewis, ‘Local protests over Brick Lane film’, Guardian (17 July 2006).  6 Paul Lewis, ‘Brick Lane protests force film company to beat retreat’, Guardian (27 July 2006): www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/27/film.books (accessed 29 July 2008).  7 Mario Cacciottolo, ‘Brick lane protesters hurt over lies’, BBC Online (2006): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5229872.stm (accessed 1 August 2006).   8 Luan Gaines, ‘Book review: Brick Lane’, Curledup (2005): www.curledup. com/briklane.htm (accessed 15 March 2005).   9 Gaines, ‘Book review: Brick Lane’. 10 Sukhdev Sandhu, ‘Come hungry, leave edgy’, London Review of Books, 25:19 (2003), 11. 11 Bobby Ghosh, ‘Flavor of the week’, Time (7 July 2003). 12 M.K. Chakrabarti, ‘Marketplace multiculturalism’, Boston Review (2004), December 2003–January 2004: http://bostonreview.net/BR28.6chakrabarti. html (accessed 3 March 2005). 13 Tazin Abdullah, ‘Reading Brick Lane’, Star Weekly Magazine, 1:140 (30 January 2004). 14 Alistair Cormack, ‘Migration and the politics of narrative form: realism and postcolonial subject in Brick Lane’, Contemporary Literature, 47:4 (2006), 700. 15 James Wood, ‘Making it new’, New Republic (8 September 2003), p. 34: www.tnr.com/article/making-it-new (accessed 10 May 2008). 16 Alan Cowell, ‘In London a new east-west skirmish’, New York Times (2006): www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/arts/05bric.html?ex=1312430400&en=b6d cf1eccd7d1ea3&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed 6 August 2006). 17 ‘Ali’s Brick Lane upsets community’, BBC Online (2006): http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3287413.stm (accessed 21 July 2006). 18 Greater Sylhet Development and Welfare Council in UK, letter dated 23 September 2003. (The author has a copy of the original letter.) The letter was written by K.M. Abu Taher Choudhury. For details of the arguments, see Choudhury’s interview, ‘Community leader defends his people’, Weekly Bangla Mirror, 19 December 2003, p. 7. Choudhury, in his column in Euro Bangla newspaper called upon Monica Ali to publicly apologize to the Sylheti community and withdraw her book from the market (‘The audacity of Monica Ali: ban the Brick Lane novel’, Euro Bangla, December 2003). 19 Abdus Salique quoted in Alan Cowell, ‘In London a new east-west skirmish’. 20 Monica Ali’s upbringing has been raised by her detractors on many occa­­ sions. The English pamphlet calling for the demonstration on 30 July 2006 mentioned that she has ‘hybrid parenthood’ – a Bangladeshi father and an English mother. Her father was a non-Sylheti, the pamphlet notes. Additionally, ‘she does not speak any Bengali, not to speak of Sylheti dialect, and is married to a white Englishman’.

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21 Abdus Salique, personal interview, London, 21 July 2007. Similar points were made by other organizers of the protest. For example, Dr Hasnat Husain, formerly an education official of the Tower Hamlets Council, said in a demonstration: ‘A book has been written, that has greatly offended the hard-working, industrious Bangladeshi community. This hard-working community has been offended by lies, slander and cynicism. There should be a limit to what you can write or say. You can write fiction, but you cannot use names that are reality. The reality is Brick Lane’ (‘Brick Lane protesters hurt over lies’ BBC News (31 July 2006): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ uk_news/5229872.stm (accessed 27 July 2008)). 22 Abdus Salique quoted in Cowell, ‘In London a new east-west skirmish’. 23 Salique, personal interview. 24 ‘I believed that the film will misrepresent us; that is why I protested. I may be wrong, but I believed it then and I still believe it’ (Salique, personal ­interview). 25 The debate on the filming and the book spilled over to internet and mainstream media, and was joined by literary stalwarts like Salman Rushdie and Germaine Greer in the pages of the Guardian. Greer insisted that ‘the community has the right to keep the filmmakers out’, while Rushdie opined, ‘people do not have the ‘moral right’ to prevent the making of a film simply because they have decided in advance that they will not like it’. The debate in and of itself was interesting, but I avoid narrating their arguments as this will divert us from the central issues of this chapter. 26 Lewis, ‘Brick Lane protests force film company to beat retreat’. Nathalie Rothschild, ‘The battle of Brick Lane’, Spiked (1 August 2006): http:// spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/1317/ (accessed 29 July 2008). 27 Salique, personal interview. 28 The events in Brick Lane should also be contextualized in the light of increasing intolerance within other communities in Britain. A number of events took place in the months prior to the Brick Lane protest. In December 2004, an enraged Christian toppled wax statues of soccer star David Beckham and his wife Victoria as Joseph and Mary at Madam Tussaud’s. In the same month, nearly 300 members of the Sikh community attacked the Birmingham Repertory Theatre, forcing the cancellation of the play Behzti (dishonour), written by Gurpreet Bhatti. In the play, set in a Sikh temple, a holy man rapes a devotee’s daughter. In early 2006, a Hindu group attacked a leading London gallery for holding an exhibition of paintings of Maqbool Fida Hussain, the most prominent contemporary artist of India. His paintings included Hindu goddesses in the nude. 29 Greater Sylhet Development and Welfare Council in UK, letter dated 23 September 2003. (The author has a copy of the original letter.) The activists also reminded me during my fieldtrip in summer 2007 that similar reactions were displayed against Azam Faruque, a reporter, when he referred to Syl­­­ hetis as tea plantation labourers in an article in a weekly newspaper called Jagoron couple of years ago. ‘Angry Sylhetis threw the copies [in] the garbage and the author had to go [into] hiding’, commented some activists. They attributed the demise of the newspaper to this event.

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30 Johann Hari, ‘What’s at stake in the battle of Brick Lane’, Independent (31 July 2006): http://comment.independent.co.uk/columnists_a_l/johann_hari/ article1205985.ece (accessed 4 August 2006). 31 Letigre, Guardian (1 August 2006): http://books.guardian.co.uk/comment/ story/0,,1834544,00.html (accessed 2 August 2006). 32 Rothschild, ‘The battle of Brick Lane’. 33 These observations are based on my visits to the Tower Hamlets borough and extensive interactions with the community between 1995 and 2000 when I lived and worked in London, and in the following year when I frequently visited friends in the area. 34 Natasha Walter, ‘The book burners do not speak for all of Brick Lane’, ­Guardian (2006): http://books.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1834544 ,00.html (ac­­­cessed 2 August 2006). 35 ‘Not all Bangladeshis oppose the filming of Brick Lane’, Guardian (2006). http://books.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1824456,00.html (accessed 21 July 2006). PEN is an international writers’ organization promoting free expression: it has often supported authors, publishers and editors who are under threat of persecution. 36 This is not to suggest that they cannot be engaged in the debate but to emphasize that they too do not represent the Bangladeshis of the East End. Their support to ‘stand squarely behind the film, its author and the right to free imaginative expression’ is praiseworthy. 37 The movie, directed by Sarah Gavron, was released in 2007. 38 Some of those who decided to remain silent throughout the series of events, particularly the demonstrations, described them as ‘village politics’ at best. Proponents of this argument maintain that opponents of the film and the book felt that they have been marginalized; outsiders were intruding into their territory without having any discussions with them. Ayub Korom Ali, a local councillor, insisted that had the film company discussed this with these self-styled community leaders prior to the filming, the problem could have been avoided. Ayub Korom Ali feels that the detractors were looking for recognition from the community. Despite recent achievements of the community, it is still small and inward-looking. Recognition of individuals comes only from the community and therefore all members fight to make their voices heard within the community, he insisted. The Brick Lane events were illustrative of this syndrome (Ayub Korom Ali, personal interview, London, 18 July 2007). 39 The role of the JI during 1971 has been discussed in most of the available accounts of Bangladesh history. For a succinct description see, Razia Akter Banu, ‘Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: challenges and prospect’, in Hussin Mutalib and Taj Ul-Islam Hashmi (eds), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 80–99. 40 Banu, ‘Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh’, p. 83. 41 Jamaat-i-Islami, ‘Preamble: election manifesto’, (2001): www.bangla2000. com/Election_2001/Manifesto_Jamaat-e-Islami.shtm (accessed 19 September 2006). For an exposition of Jamaat’s idea of an Islamic state see: Ishtiaq

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Hossain and Noore Alam Siddiquee, ‘Islam in Bangladesh politics: the role of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-i-Islami’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 5:3 (2006), 388–9. 42 Jamaat-i-Islami, ‘Social reforms and religious life’, Election Manifesto (2001): www.bangla2000.com/Election_2001/Manifesto_Jamaat-e-Islami. shtm (accessed 19 September 2006). 43 Husain Haqqani, ‘The ideologies of South Asian jihadi groups’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 1 (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005). 44 Banu, ‘Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh’, p. 84. 45 Hossain and Siddiquee, ‘Islam in Bangladesh politics’, 395. 46 It should be stated here for the record that the last three years of his second tenure as member of the parliament (2003–6) was disputed and subjected to legal proceedings. The High Court (HC), on 14 September 2003, stripped Saidee of his membership for submitting a false statement on his poll expenses and for violating other election rules. It declared Saidee’s election null and void for corruption, illegal practices and violation of the Representation of People’s Order 1972, setting the first ever example of unseating a lawmaker by the HC in an election dispute case. This verdict came in a case filed by his opponent Shudangsu Shekhar Halder. After the 2001 election, Halder filed the petition with the HC on 14 November against the chief election commissioner (CEC), Saidee and nine others with a plea to declare himself as the elected representative by cancelling his rival’s membership of the parliament. The court in its judgment found Saidee guilty on several counts of concealling the sources of his election fund, spending more money than the ceiling set by the election laws and failure to send an affidavit along with his poll expenses to the Election Commission (EC). The HC directed the authorities to send its order to the EC by a special messenger for necessary action. On receipt of the order, the EC was supposed to announce the seat vacant and hold by-polls within 90 days. Saidee filed a petition with the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court on 15 September 2003 requesting permission to appeal against the HC judgment. Two days later the vacation bench of the Appellate Division stayed the HC judgment until 22 October of the same year and instructed Saidee to submit a regular petition by that time. The regular petition filed by Saidee remained pending for the following three years allowing him to continue as an MP. In the meantime Haldar died in September 2004 following an illness. Saidee was arrested on 29 June 2010 for hurting religious sentiments. The International Criminal Court, established in March 2010 to try those who allegedly committed crimes against humanity during the Bangladesh war in 1971, indicted him on 3 September 2011. The trial is ongoing as of November 2012. 47 Human Rights Watch, ‘Breach of faith: persecution of the Ahamadiyya community in Bangladesh’, Human Rights Watch, 17:6C (2005). 48 Delwar Hossain Saidee, in Bhorer Kagoj, quoted in Women Living Under Muslim Law, ‘UK: Bangladeshi Jamaat-i Islami hate monger now touring UK’: www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5b157%5d=x-157– 295495 (accessed 5 August 2006).

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49 Reporters Without Borders, ‘Bangladesh – 2003 Annual Report’: www.rsf. org/article.php3?id_article=6372, (accessed 25 March 2005). 50 ‘Now Delwar Hossain Saidee’s fatwa’, Janakantha (5 January 2002), 1. This call recalled the actions of the Taliban in March 2001 when on the instruction of their leader Mullah Omar they destroyed two towering sandstone statues of Buddha considered world archaeological treasures. 51 Recorded speech in a DVD produced by Spondon Goshti, Dhaka, quoted in Women Living Under Muslim Law: www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt. shtml?cmd%5b157%5d=x-157–295495 (accessed 5 August 2006). 52 Mohammad Arafat and Rubel Ahsan, ‘Delwar Hossain Saidee of Jamaat calls for a Taliban state’, Bangladesh Web (2005): www.bangladeshweb.com/view. php?hidDate=20050302&hidType=OPT&hidRecord=0000000000000000 036053 (accessed 3 October 2005). 53 Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, ‘Popular Islam and misogyny: a case study of Bangladesh’, Muktomona (2006): www.muktomona.com/Articles/taj_hashmi/ Popular_Islam_and_Misogyn2.pdf (accessed 25 May 2006). 54 For comparison with other speakers I have relied on my recollections of the content of speeches of waz mahfils I attended in the 1980s, during field research on Bangladeshi politics, particularly for my dissertation in the early 1990s (Ali Riaz, ‘State, Class and Military Rule in Bangladesh’ (PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, 1993)) and my book on Islamist politics in the late 1990s. 55 Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection and Tyranny (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 87–8. 56 Maleka Begum, Nari Andolan: Samasya O Bhabiswat (Women’s Movement: Problems and Prospects, in Bengali) (Dhaka: Gyan Prakashani, 1989). 57 Examples abound, but one suffices to describe the nature of these attacks: on 9 February 1994, in a waz mahfil in the village of Nimaidighi in northern Bogra district, speakers issued a fatwa (religious edict) decreeing that the schools in the area run by BRAC (a development NGO) were proselytizing and should be closed immediately. On the same night, a BRAC primary school in the adjoining village of Batdighi was set on fire ‘by some unidentified people’, according to the local authorities. In subsequent days, twentyfive schools run by BRAC were attacked by arsonists (Masud Hasan Khan, ‘Fabricated propaganda endangers development efforts’, Daily Star, Dhaka (26 February 1994), p. 1). 58 Nazimuddin Shymal, ‘Modus operandi of JMB in CTG: law enforcers now more knowledgeable about outfit militant’, Independent, Dhaka (15 December 2005), p. 6. 59 Both commercial and ideological considerations are behind selling these cassettes according to a number of store managers in Brick Lane (conversation with bookstore staff and managers, July 2007). Those who are more ideologically inclined to sell these cassettes insisted that they provide moral lessons to the members of the community from a ‘respected alim’. They insisted that there is no specific importer of these cassettes and printed materials with similar views. But this claim could not be verified i­ndependently.

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60 British Muslims Monthly Survey, ‘Concern over Bangladeshi visitor’, 3:10 (1995): http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/bmms/1995/10October95.html (accessed 14 July 2006). 61 Saidee reportedly said, ‘What would you be doing if you were living in Sylhet? At most you would be pulling a rickshaw or driving a bus’ (in the Bangladeshi context, these comments are meant to demonstrate the low intellect of the Sylhetis). He also said, ‘You are so illiterate that you would break three pens to sign your name.’ In the same speech he said that 90 per cent of the Muslim girls in Britain have boyfriends, which is forbidden: ‘The young girls wear see-through clothing to show off their bodies.’ 62 Quoted in John Eade and David Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora: community dynamics, transnational politics and Islamic activities (with a focus on Tower Hamlets, Oldham and Birmingham)’, Report for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003): www. roehampton.ac.uk/researchcentres/cronem/clients-and-projects/Bangladeshi _Diaspora_2003.pdf (accessed 20 October 2003). 63 Information about these incidents has been gathered from a number of sources including the pamphlets of the Probashi Action Forum (published in August 2001), and Public Informer (Issue 13 September 1999). Some of the incidents are also mentioned by David Garbin (‘Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK: socio-cultural dynamics, religious trends and transnational politics’, Paper presented at the European Human Rights Conference on Bangladesh – Extremism, Intolerance & Violence (London: School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, 17 June 2005)). 64 Quoted in Eade and Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora: community dynamics, transnational politics and Islamic activities’. 65 None of these guests, however, was present at the fair. The organizers insisted that the ministers cancelled their trip due to the political situation in Bangladesh. Nizami had scheduled a meeting with the British Chamber of Commerce on 16 July . The meeting was cancelled. 66 For example, ‘The Foreign Office ought to be serving Britain, not radical Islam’, Observer (9 July 2006); ‘Extremist linked cleric given green light to enter Britain’, Daily Mail (13 July 2006); ‘Comment: indulging the enemy’, Daily Mail (14 July 2006); ‘Islamist hardliner heads for Britain’, Time Online (14 July 2006); ‘“Kill Brits” hate cleric let into UK’, Sun (15 July 2006). Meanwhile, Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh refuted the allegations brought by the British media saying they were ‘politically motivated’ and ‘untrue’. Senior Assistant Secretary General of the Jamaat Mohammad Kamaruzzaman told the Daily Star of Dhaka, ‘We had a talk with the British deputy high commissioner in Dhaka and we expressed our concern about the reports and the film against our leader’ (‘Preaching hatred, Jamaat MP Saidee in UK hot soup’, Daily Star (27 July 2006)). Mohammad Kamaruzzaman also stated that Saidee arrived in London on 5 July and returned to Dhaka on 14 July. 67 Organizers and sympathizers of Saidee provided various explanations for his absence in the scheduled programmes. One account was that he had to

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cut back on his engagements due to a fever. One of the local Bengali newspapers reported that Saidee left Britain on 14 July (‘British press debates on Maulana Saidee’ (in Bengali) Bangla Post (20 July 2006), p. 1) On 15 July 2006, as Saidee did not show up for the opening of the housing fair, the air was thick with rumour that he had not been allowed to enter the country (Nahas Pasha, ‘Saidee’s Waz business in London under threat’ (in Bengali) Daily Janakantha (17 July 2006), p. 1). Evidently the organizers of the housing fair were trying to distance themselves from Saidee and the ongoing debate. 68 East London Mosque and London Muslim Centre, ‘Press Release, re: Who Speaks for British Muslims? Not Martin Bright’ (17 July 2006). 69 In drawing the comparison I relied on my own experience and recollections of a number of community members. Between July 1995 and June 2001, I lived in England and had access to first-hand information about the incidents of 1995, 1999 and 2001. Despite coverage of these events in the Bengali press in England, the mainstream media paid no attention to them and the public discourse was very limited. Similarly, the media in Bangladesh did not take note of these events. Members of the community, for example, Urmi Rahman, Ayub Korom Ali, Masud Rana, and Nahas Pasha (personal interviews, between 17 July and 21 July 2007), pointed out that the opposition to Saidee’s 2006 visit received more coverage in the mainstream media than on any previous occasions. Ayub Korom Ali credits the media, particularly the Bengali television channels, for the vocal opposition to Saidee’s visit. He also insists this is an indication that the secular community organizations are gaining ground within the community after almost a decade in retreat. 70 R.A.F.C. Shoaib, ‘Does Saidee represent the British Muslim?’, Notun Din (21–27 July 2006), p. 14. 71 Shoaib, ‘Does Saidee represent the British Muslims?’, p. 14. 72 ‘British press debates on Maulana Saidee’ (in Bengali), Bangla Post (20 July 2006), p. 1. 73 ‘What is your agenda?’, editorial, Euro Bangla (24 July 2006). The representative nature of the MCB has been highlighted in various documents of the British government. Former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone has been an ardent supporter of the MCB. In 2005, leading up to the broadcast of a documentary programme, Panorama, on the BBC, Livingstone described the MCB as a mainstream representative body and criticisms of the MCB as a ‘witch hunt’. He said that painting the MCB as extremist would hurt community relations. 74 ‘Alims are cautious after Saidee incident’, Bangla Post (27 July 2006), p. 1. 75 M.A. Rahim, ‘Behind the conspiracy against Islam’, Euro Bangla (28 August 2006), p. 6. 76 Martin Bright’s report and various other media reports published in summer 2006 revealed that during the debate within the Foreign Office on whether to allow Saidee to enter the UK, Makbul Ali defended Saidee and argued that his exclusion could jeopardize support from mainstream Muslims for

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the government’s anti-terrorism agenda. He accused Saidee’s detractors of being politically biased. 77 M. Ali, ‘Some thoughts about the documentary of Channel Four, news and editorial in other newspapers, and the Bangladeshi community’, Notun Din (15 September 2006), p. 24. 78 Delwar Hussain, ‘Bangladeshis in East London: from secular politics to Islam’, Open Democracy (7 July 2006): www.opendemocracy.net/­ democracy-protest/bangladeshi_3715.jsp (accessed 12 July 2006). 79 Comments are drawn from posts made between 14 and 19 July 2006: www. newstatesman.com/200607131006 (accessed 4 August 2008). The first one is anonymous and the second is posted by ‘Habib’. 80 Although a number of social scientists have been observing this trend within the Bangladeshi community for more than a decade, British policy-makers remained oblivious until recently. Earlier studies on the Islamization of the Bangladeshi community include John Eade, ‘Nationalism and the quest for authenticity: the Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets’, New Community, 16:4 (1990).

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Identity, Islamism and politics: the internal factors

A

nalytical and ethnographic studies about the British-Bangladeshi community conducted around the turn of the twentieth century1 and the events described in Chapter 2 demonstrate that a Muslim identity has gained salience among a section of British-Bangladeshis, especially the younger generation. ‘More and more young Bengalis now identify themselves first and foremost as Muslims rather than as Bengali or Bangladeshi,’ concluded Gardner and Shukur in 1994.2 Until the late 1980s, the Bengali ethnic identity preceded any other identification – whether Bangladeshi or British. But the priority seems to begin to change in the early 1990s. John Eade’s study in 1994, based on interviews with twenty Bengali-speaking youths either born in Bangladesh or in Britain with Bengali ancestry showed them wrestling with multiple identities, but also revealed the growing inclination towards a Muslim identity.3 A female respondent stated in that study, ‘If you had to go on a one to ten scale of who you are, what you are, it [goes] Muslim, Bengali and then British and then whatever the things that make me up. If you take the top two away that wouldn’t be me. If you take the British bit away, I think that would still be me.’ Prioritizing Islam over other markers of identity was a key response of a number of respondents. For example, one respondent said, ‘If I was to describe myself I would say I am British Bengali Muslim, if you like, but my religion is more important to me than my culture at the end of the day.’ Another respondent explained if somebody comes up to me and said ‘What are you?’, first I would say ‘A Muslim’. Then I would say my national identity because I personally believe: ‘Yes, we are British. I am British’ … I haven’t been born in this country [and am] not necessarily going to stay the rest of my life in this country, but I believe that I am British. Yet I believe in my own identity as Muslim and as a Bengali because once a person has their own identity, their own history, their own family history and everything, they can be a firm person. And their old culture or background, as long as it doesn’t contradict Islam, they can become [a strong person].

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While each of these youths, in some form or other, acknowledges the existence of a number of different aspects of his/her identity involving ancestry, location and faith; each underscored his/her religious identity as the core element. I received similar responses in my interactions with youngsters in the summer of 2007 during fieldwork on the identity politics of the British-Bangladeshi community. Many young people attending various colleges and universities insisted that Islam is an integral part of their lives, although some admitted that they are not devout Muslims and do not practise Islam. ‘I may not be practicing but how can I deny that I am a Muslim? Islam is my culture,’ commented a young male participant in an informal group discussion. Often they described Bengali as a language they do not speak, although that is their parents’ preferred language of communication. The multiplicity of identity featured in our discussion, as reflected in a comment by a participant who migrated as a child: ‘I don’t think I can say I am a Bengali … [definitely] I am not Bangladeshi, I can describe myself as British, but then my parents are from Bangladesh, perhaps I am Bengali by birth … but I surely am a Muslim.’ Another participant, born and raised in Britain, commented, ‘you see, you can be a Bengali and a Muslim; you can be a Bangladeshi and a Muslim; you can be a British and a Muslim; you can be here or there – but you can be Muslim anywhere. That is why you should be Muslim first. That is [the] only thing that stays with you all the time.’ Justin Gest, in a recent study, found similar sentiments among a group of Bangladeshi youth in the East End. ‘“Without Islam, I have no identity,” Ebrahim, a student at Queen Mary University, says. “My practice is weak, yeah. I have little time in life for Islam. But it’s still my base. When I have nothing else, it’ll always be there.”’ Gest quotes another youth who insists, ‘I am a Muslim. Not a Barelwi, Tablighi Jamaat, Salafi, Hanafi or whatever. I’m a Muslim. I’m not British or Bengali. I’m Muslim.’ 4 The statement demonstrates that the respondent is making a deliberate choice of Islam over other potential identities. Ismail, a high school student, says to Gest, ‘I don’t feel an identity crisis, because I feel like I have a relationship with God and so I don’t have any problem saying that I am a Muslim.’ Kabir, in her study entitled Young British Muslims, quoted a comment of a 22–year-old British-born Imam of Bangladeshi background: ‘If they ask me I’ll say I’m British because I was born here ... that’s what I am, yeah British Muslim. If someone asked me what’s my root then I’d say Bangladesh.’5 A young female graduate who works for a local government agency discussed the duality of her identity in the following way:

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On my trip to Bangladesh I realized how not Bengali I am. In England I realize how not fully English I am either. Bengalish sounds just right. A cocktail of Bengali, English and Muslim. Vast majority of your education, music, films, entertainment is in English growing up you can’t call yourself Bengali if you grow up in the UK, you have so little trace of it. My parents could. I like to think I’ve kept the best bit of my Bengali culture but I think and communicate in English as it’s the dominant culture. Parents are lucky if they can ensure [that even a small number] of us are still [bearing some elements of] Bengali [culture]! I loved my parents’ values and wish people kept more of the modest Bengali values and culture but it’s like fighting against a tide. I’d rather keep the best of my parents’ heritage with the majority.

In the past decade and a half the trend has gained further ground, and it is not an exaggeration to say that now a sizeable proportion of BritishBangladeshis identify themselves as Muslims as opposed to stressing their ethnic identity, which they used to do until the early 1990s. This new identity, for the younger generation, is significantly different from their parents’/earlier migrants’ generation, and is related to a new version of Islam propagated by Islamists all over the world. This new religiosity among Muslims, especially among the younger population, has been variously conceptualized and described. Some describe this as ‘New Islam’,6 some call it a ‘search for true Islam’7 and others prefer the term ‘global Islam’.8 It is also described as imaginary Islam’.9 However named, it provides a new discourse on Islam, which is ‘political in nature,’ and ‘one of its chief concerns is explicitly to rethink Islamic conceptions of politics and political community’.10 Three features characterize this new interpretation of Islam: first, it underscores the fact that Islam is a global religion, therefore spatial location is not an obstacle to becoming part of a global community (ummah); second, this interpretation of Islam is completely divorced from the ethnic identity of the adherents and their culture-specific interpretations of Islamic ideals, values and practices; thirdly, it seriously questions the traditional religious institutions and authorities, many of which have travelled from other parts of the world along with the migrant community. Migrant Muslim communities in Europe and the United States, irrespective of their origin and race, are experiencing the growing identification of the younger generation with Islam. Cesari insists that it is palpable in European countries: Although they still represent a small minority, a growing number of young people have become stricter in their respect of Islamic rules. As they grow acquainted with the texts and practices of orthodox Islam, they often distance themselves from the religious habits of their parents, which they

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perceive as superstitious. They distinguish these customs from what they call ‘the real Islam.’11

Scantlebury echoes the finding: ‘[a] significant number of young [European] Muslims are rejecting a religio-ethnic identity in favour of a search for “True Islam.”’12 In the words of Franz: ‘This new interest in faith is especially keen among Muslims born in Europe, who are mostly the children and grandchildren of the immigrants who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s.’13 In Britain, a similar tendency has been noticed among the youth of Pakistani origin.14 The trend, therefore, is not unique to the Bangladeshi community; rather, it has become an overarching issue for Muslim youth in general. In the context of Britain this is particularly relevant to the South Asian communities as they constitute a majority of the Muslim population in the country. The salience of the Muslim identity among the British-Bangladeshis went hand in hand with the pre-eminence of the Islamists within the community. What I intend to underscore here is that the emphasis on the Muslim identity vis-à-vis the ethnic/national identity has not taken place independent of the Islamist organizations. In large measure this quest for a new identity has been engendered by the Islamist organizations. The question is, therefore, why and how has the new identity gained prominence? Some analysts frame the question more starkly: what drove the younger generation to the Islamists? The answer is not too complex to some commentators. Kenan Malik, for example, provides a very straightforward answer: ‘It was not just disenchantment with the left that drove young Asians into the hands of the radical Islamists. It was also the multicultural policies pursued by local authorities and national government.’ Malik insists that radical groups, for example the Asian Youth Movements (AYM), challenged the traditional values and the racist policies of the British state simultaneously (discussion on the AYM is presented later). Thus both the traditional leaders of the Asian community and the political elites attached to the British state had an interest in taming radicalism. Malik argues that the multicultural policies pursued in the 1980s by the British state and implemented through local government ‘dispensed millions of pounds’ to organizations which enabled the traditional authorities, including mosques and religious leaders, to reassert their power. ‘As the secular tradition was squeezed out, the only place offering shelter for disaffected youth was militant Islam.’15 Explanations like this abound and often dominate debates but they are also devoid of the nuances which shape any social phenomenon. On the other end of the spectrum is the argument that if one is by faith Muslim, it is inevitable that religious identity will be prioritized over any other possible choices.

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My argument is that the salience of the Muslim identity of BritishBangladeshis and the pre-eminence of Islamists within the community in recent years is a result of both the internal and external life of the community. Indeed, the separation of internal and external factors is in one sense arbitrary and artificial; because they do not operate in isolation. What seems at first glance an internal issue often emerges as a result of events, actions and policies outside the community. As in any social context, for the British-Bangladeshi community, these two sets of factors influenced each other and their interactions created a dynamic that is not inherent to any of these factors. Nevertheless to facilitate an understanding of this emerging phenomenon, I will try to identify and discuss them separately. What I mean by internal life is the socio-political dynamic within the Bangladeshi community that paved the way for a transformation of identity-privileging religious elements, and the forces that shaped this transformation. Four important elements – the impact of Bangladeshi politics, the rise of Islamist youth groups in the 1980s and the 1990s, the failures of the secular leadership and the sources of funding – are examined in detail in this chapter. In the next chapter I deal with the external factors, specifically government policies towards the ethnic community and the foreign policies of the government. My choice of these two issues is guided by my understanding that the state is a critical factor in understanding ethnic identity politics. In any circumstance, the modern state plays a crucial role in the shaping of social groups; but this is far truer in case of a welfare state like Britain. The state, through its policies of representation and resource allocation can and does contribute to the construction or reconstruction of ethnic ­identities. It is also necessary to locate the internal dynamics of the Bangladeshi community within the wider context for two obvious reasons; firstly, to concentrate solely on the internal dynamics provides an inaccurate impression that the community is insulated from state and government policies and changes within the host society. Secondly, concentrating exclusively on the internal dynamics creates the trappings of racializing and pathologizing a community, i.e. constructing the community as a ‘problem’ rather than examining the factors that contributed to the problems. I do not intend to suggest that these are the only factors that engendered a new identity among the British-Bangladeshi community; there are other factors. I am highlighting these four to demonstrate that this change is not abrupt, but is instead the result of a long process; that external factors, however important they are, cannot be exclusively responsible for these changes; and that issues and events of a mundane nature do influence the bigger picture.

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islam and identity among british-bangladeshis An intimate relationship: Bangladeshi politics and the Bangladeshi diaspora

Maintaining strong ties with the country of origin is very common to migrant communities, particularly to first-generation migrants. South Asian communities in the UK have followed a similar pattern and the Bangladeshis are no exception. Generally the close connection between the community and the country of origin provides cultural comfort and a kinship tie which is expected to ease the process of migration and, therefore, integration with the host country/culture. The connection also provides the community with a distinct identity and influences their mode of representation and activism. In the case of the Bangladeshi community, the connection has proved to be very influential, and I argue that it is key to understanding the movement from a secular nationalist ethnic Bengali identity to a religion-based Muslim identity. The changes that have occurred within the British-Bangladeshi community in many ways reflect the transformation of Bangladeshi politics. Since the 1970s Bangladesh has seen a phenomenal rise of political parties and organizations with an Islamist agenda. The exact number of Islamist parties is difficult to discern; but Election Commission records provide some estimates. Islamist parties participating in elections show a steady growth since 1979, the year when Islamists were first allowed to participate in elections in Bangladesh. This came after the constitutional provision prohibiting religion-based parties was rescinded by the then military ruler Ziaur Rahman. In 1979, only two Islamist political parties contested the election and the number stayed the same in the 1986 election, but it increased to seventeen in 1991 and to eighteen in 1996. The number declined slightly in 2001, to eleven.16 Election Commission records show that at least thirty-five political parties bearing names suggestive of an Islamist agenda participated in elections between 1979 and 2001. In 2008, as the new law requiring registration with the EC for participating in elections was enacted, ten Islamist parties were registered. Apart from JI, the electoral strengths of these parties have remained insignificant. Most of the Islamist parties have failed to secure any seats in the parliament. These electoral defeats are also reflective of their organizational strength. In most instances, these parties have pockets of support in one or two constituencies. Seven of the Islamist parties founded an alliance called the Islamic Oikya Jote (IOJ, Islamic United Alliance) in 1990 but this alliance has experienced several splits since then. It did, however, become a member of the BNP-led four-party ruling coalition between 2001 and 2006. The IOJ secured one seat in 1991, one seat in 1996 and two seats in 2001. Their share of the popular vote

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was 0.79 per cent in 1991, 1.09 per cent in 1996 and 0.68 per cent in 2001.17 The rise of Islamism as a prominent political ideology and the Islamists as a formidable political force in Bangladeshi politics is due to a combination of factors – both domestic and international. But the domestic factors, particularly the crisis of hegemony of the ruling class and the politics of expediency of the secularists, have played the most critical role in the transformation of Bangladeshi politics. Notwithstanding the impact of authoritarian rule, both civilian and military, the origins of the Islamist resurgence lie in a crisis that can be described as the crisis of hegemony of the rulers – that is, their inability to provide moral leadership and earn spontaneous consent from the masses.18 Bangladeshi political elites, irrespective of political parties, have failed to construct an ideology that on the one hand universalizes their corporate interests while apparently representing the interests of the masses on the other. Although at independence Bangladesh declared secularism to be one of its founding principles and the constitution banned all religious political parties19 the state soon embarked on an Islamization process. The party which played a pivotal role in the struggle for national independence and became the first ruling party of the country, soon began to undercut the spirit of secularism. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (or Mujib), the leader of the nation and the founding president of the country, for example, declared that he was proud to be a Muslim and that his nation was the second biggest Muslim state in the world. He not only frequently made use of Islamic expressions in his speeches but repeatedly insisted that his vision of ‘secularism does not mean the absence of religion’. Additionally, Mujib joined the Islamic Summit held in Lahore in February 1974. Two months later Bangladesh took the lead at the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference held in Jeddah, in establishing the Islamic Development Bank. The most revealing step came in late 1973 when most of the imprisoned JI leaders were released under a general amnesty.20 It is well to bear in mind that ‘secularism’ as envisioned in the constitution of the country and as practised by the regime was somewhat different from the Western notion of the term. The separation between state and religion, the hallmark of the Western notion of secularism, was not intended, nor was it attempted. In the context of Bangladesh, the common perception of secularism was the prevention of minority faith persecution and freedom to practise one’s religion. What role religion, parti­­­cularly Islam, would play in public life was never discussed or debated. The experience of Pakistani rule, when Islam was used to justify discrimination and political suppression, created a desire that

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religion should remain outside the public arena. It was also generally expected that religious rhetoric would not dominate the political discourse. But soon after independence, the leaders of the ruling party began using religious rhetoric. Many thought that the rhetoric inferred cultural expressions with little religious importance and therefore had no religious implications. The regime’s growing tilt toward religious rhetoric can be attributed to the rupture of its ideological hegemony over the masses established during the struggle against Pakistani colonial rule. The relevance of nationalism as the hegemonic ideology was lost and attempts to fill the void with a new ideology (i.e. Mujibism) failed. The crisis accelerated after the demise of the Awami League (AL) regime following a coup d’état in 1975. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, most of the members of his family, and his close associates were brutally murdered in the coup. Two of Mujib’s daughters, on a trip outside the country, survived. This was followed by a spiral of coups until the middle of November 1975 and the advent of General Ziaur Rahman (‘Zia’) as the strongman. Over the next fifteen years, succeeding military regimes faced a crisis of legitimacy in addition to a lack of moral leadership. The military regimes, which usurped power through coups in 1975 and 1982 and ruled the country until 1990, pursued policies of Islamization as a means to gain much-needed political legitimacy. This provided the previously banned religion-based parties with the opportunity to resurface in the political arena. For example, General Ziaur Rahman’s regime (1975–81) created a new ideological terrain with religion, territoriality of identity, and national security at its centre. The pseudo-civilian cabinet and the newly established ruling party were not only composed of defectors from various political parties and people who had collabourated with the Pakistani regime in 1971, but also, perhaps more importantly, they made those who had close ties with religious organizations more visible. The new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), formed under the leadership of Ziaur Rahman in 1978, emphasized the role of Islam both in daily life and as a guiding political ideology. In April 1977 soon after his assumption of the office of president,21 Zia made some constitutional amendments through a proclamation (Second Proclamation Order no. 1, 23 April 1977). The amendment brought changes to Article 6 of the original constitution, which stipulated that the identity of the citizens of Bangladesh would be designated as ‘Bangalee’. Instead the amendment proclaimed, the citizens would be known as ‘Bangladeshi’. Thus the identity of the nation was linked with the territorial limits in order to isolate it from the so-called ‘Bangalee

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sub-culture’ of India. Indeed the other objective of the change was to eliminate the secular element of the identity of the population of Bangladesh. The Bangalee identity, as it had emerged over the centuries and highlighted during the course of the nationalist movement in the 1960s, was inclusive of all faiths. The new ‘nationalist ideology’, on the other hand, intended to highlight the Islamic aspect of identity. The word ‘secularism’ – appearing in the Preamble and Article 8 as one of the four fundamental principles – was substituted with ‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’; and a new clause (1A) was inserted to emphasize that ‘absolute trust and faith in almighty Allah’ should be ‘the basis of all actions’. Article 12 which defined ‘secularism’ was omitted and above the Preamble the words ‘Bismillah-ar-Rahman-ar-Rahim’ (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) were inserted to give the Constitution an Islamic colour. The principle of socialism was given a new meaning – ‘economic and social justice’ (Preamble and Article 8). A new ideological terrain was in this way created by the regime to legitimize its rule. These steps, in conjunction with others, marked a decisive move away from a secular nationhood and accorded religious rhetoric a pivotal role in the political discourse. The executive orders, issued between 1976 and 1979, removed the ban on forming political parties based on religious ideology and allowed the individuals who collabourated with the Pakistani army in 1971 to participate in politics. The JI became the most significant beneficiary of this step. This also allowed Golam Azam, the supreme leader of the JI, who had left Bangladesh before independence and campaigned against the country, to return to Bangladesh. Zia died in an abortive coup d’etat in May 1981. But the Islamization process was taken further by the regime of General Ershad during his military rule, which spanned the period from 1982 to 1990. In the face of strong opposition from political parties and periodic popular uprisings, Ershad utilized Islam as a tool to its fullest extent. In June 1988, the constitution was amended to declare Islam the state religion.22 The secularist political parties, at the same time, pursued a policy of expediency and befriended those religio-political forces that had accorded them recognition as legitimate political actors. Between 1982 and 1990, the year the Ershad regime was toppled in a popular urban uprising, opposition political parties, including secularists, worked closely with the Islamists, thus providing the latter with political legitimacy while idioms and icons of religion became central to the political discourse of Bangladesh. For example, the Awami League, which had once taken pride in its secular identity, made a remarkable change in its approach toward religion and religion-based political parties. By the

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early 1990s, it preferred to be portrayed as a party that valued Islam as an integral part of the culture of Bangladesh. Beginning in 1991, the statements of party leaders and party publicity materials showed that the AL was eager to present itself as a suitable custodian of Islam in Bangladesh. Symbolic expressions of this change were the carrying of prayer beads and wearing of scarves by AL chief Sheikh Hasina. In addition to making pilgrimages to Mecca, Hasina began using Islamic phrases in her public speeches. Party political posters also carried these phrases to assuage the devout among the electorate. Prior to the elections of 1991, BNP leader Khaleda Zia alleged that if the AL was elected to office, they would remove ‘Bismillah-arahmir Rahim’ from the constitution. Sheikh Hasina dismissed this as a smear campaign against the AL and declared that she had ‘no quarrel with Bismillah’. In the democratic era of Bangladeshi history (1991–2006), the two main political parties sought the support of Islamists, particularly the JI, either to achieve power or to topple a democratically elected regime. The BNP, for example, courted the JI in 1991 to form a cabinet when it lacked the necessary votes in the parliament.23 This ‘marriage of conven­ience’ was over within two and a half years, after which the AL succeeded in wooing the JI into the fold to unseat the BNP regime through popular agitation. The JI went back to the BNP camp again in 1998 and became a partner of the coalition that came to power in 2001. Among two other members of the alliance was the combine of small Islamist parties, the IOJ. The IOJ is known for its radical views including its support for the Taliban regime and challenging the civil court’s verdict on banning fatwa (religious edicts). Thus Islam as a political ideology has become an integral part of the Bangladesh polity. Over preceding years, the Islamist forces in general and the JI in particular had not only gained recognition as legitimate political actors but had also emerged as kingmakers both in the electoral equation and on the ideological terrain. In electoral politics, the Islamists had succeeded in fortifying a small but loyal base and in drawing the attention of the larger population, chiefly because two major claimants on power (the BNP and the AL) lacked a clear and convincing ideological perspective and largely relied on issue-based differentiation. Pursuing the politics of expediency is not the sole preserve of the two major political parties; the political somersault of the Jatiya Party led by General Ershad during 1997–2001 demonstrates that others have proved themselves to be equally apt in this exercise. But what is significant for our purpose is the end product, that these shifts have ultimately benefited the Islamist parties. In 2001, when Ershad left the opposition

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alliance under pressure and tacit threats from the ruling AL, he went shopping for an Islamist alliance in the hope that this would reduce the votes of the BNP-led alliance. He was joined by a radical Islamist party called the Islami Shashontontro Andolon (Islamic Constitution Movement, renamed Bangladesh Islamic Movement in 2008). Along with three other small parties, they formed the Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IJOF, or Islamic National United Front). The pir of Charmonai,24 Syed Fazlul Karim, leader of the Islamic Constitution Movement (ICM) declared that the IJOF would establish an Islamic government in the country if voted to power. The religious conservatism of the party can be understood from its stance on women. The pir is opposed to female leadership, and insisted that Ershad’s wife, Raushan Ershad, a former member of parliament and a senior leader of the Jatiya Party, wear a veil if she attended any of the alliance’s meetings.25 The Jatiya Party’s election manifesto, especially on issues pertaining to religion, also inferred that the ICM was dictating terms. The JP election manifesto stated that if the party was voted to power, ‘existing laws would be brought in line with the principles of the Quran and Sunnah … laws contrary [to the] Quran and Sunnah shall be amended … Shariah laws would be followed as far as possible … special laws would be made for punishing those making derogatory remarks against the Prophet (sm) and the Shariah … religious education would be made compulsory at all levels.’ In terms of the election manifestos of 2001 there seemed to be no differences among the major political parties. The BNP’s election manifesto proclaimed that the party, if voted to power, ‘will not enact any law contrary to Islam’. The JI, for understandable reasons, announced in unambiguous terms that the party, if voted to power, ‘will convert the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh into an Islamic Republic’. The AL, in an apparent race with the others, declared in its manifesto, ‘no law will be enacted, which will be inconsistent with the dictates of the Qur’an and Hadith’.26 The AL’s decision to sign a controversial ‘memorandum of understanding’ (MOU) with the radical Islamist party, the Bangladesh Khilafat Majlis (BKM), in December 2006 in the wake of the parliamentary election27 is the most glaring example of the political bankruptcy of the ‘secularists’. According to the MOU the AL agreed that if voted to power the right to issue fatwa would be conferred upon certified Islamic scholars; criticism or maligning of the prophet and his sahaba (companions) would be made a punishable offence; no law repugnant to the Qur’an and sunnah would be passed by the parliament; qawmi madrassahs (privately operated Islamic seminaries, most of which follow an orthodox tradition) would be recognized; and those who failed to recog-

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nize Muhammad as the last and best prophet would not be able to call themselves Muslims.28 This MOU demonstrated how far the ‘secularist’ parties were ready to go to gain the support of the Islamists. The BKM had not only expressed support for the Taliban regime but some of its leaders were allegedly connected to the Islamist militants who exploded more than 450 bombs on 17 August 2005 and were involved with suicide attacks that followed the bombings.29 The above description shows that post-1975 Islamists began to emerge as a formidable political force. Over the subsequent decade, ‘Islam’ became a prominent political ideology, and religious rhetoric occupied a central position in political discourse. The Islamists benefited from and indeed exploited a number of domestic factors including deep ideological divisions among the Bangladeshi people, the pervasive partisanship of civil society, a mindset of continuous denial of facts that do not fit the interests of the ruling party, the acrimonious relationship between the two major political parties (i.e. the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League), their proclivity towards a ‘politics of expediency’, personalized politics coupled with weak institution-building and the dynastic element of party politics. Although individually some of these features are not unique to Bangladesh, their effects have been far-reaching for Bangladeshi politics, especially in weakening the appeal of secularist ideologies. Furthermore, the vacuum created by the absence of a social democratic party and/or moderate left parties as a viable alternative have further enhanced the rise of Islamism. These circumstances taken together have allowed the Islamists, the JI in parti­cular, to project themselves as a clean, legitimate, viable and emerging political force. Two further damaging elements of the Bangladeshi political culture have created an opportunity for the rise of the Islamist parties: the issue of emotional attachment to historical figures, and their pathological hatred for each other. Frequent eulogy and evocation of the achievements of the late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by his daughter Sheikh Hasina and of the late Ziaur Rahman by his widow Khaleda Zia serve as a reminder of their relationships to these leaders, but also serve to attach their followers to a ‘cause’ greater than the present party leaders’ endeavours to rise to power – to protect Mujib and Zia’s iconic stature. It is not a rhetorical gloss over a fight for power, nor mere symbolism; instead it is the ultimate test of loyalty to the party and its politics. Those who decline to subscribe to the emotional attachment to these leaders are then left with the options of subscribing to the ‘mundane’ material ideals of daily lives, or to a divine authority. The left and social democratic parties profess the former, while the Islamists advance the idea of the latter. The left and social democratic parties have faced the

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wrath of successive governments,30 and also failed to appeal to the electorate in previous elections due to their organizational weaknesses. Islamists, particularly the JI, cannot emotionally adhere to either of these figures, for reasons that are both ideological (as they do not believe in the sovereignty of human beings over God’s will) and political (as this undercuts the raison d’être of their existence). Hence their emphasis on ‘God’s Law’. The support the Islamists and the JI have received from the military regimes has given them an edge over the social democrats, and made them a formidable force in the political arena. The acrimonious relationship between the two main parties, especially between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, is well known and bitterly criticized. This behaviour is accompanied by verbal attacks on the part of both leaders. At times these comments are highly slanderous and incendiary in nature. One example is the threat of the then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia at a public meeting that sedition charges would be brought against the leader of the opposition,31 which was immediately countered by the opposition leader’s response that she would file a case against the Prime Minister for grenade attacks on her public meeting. Hasina continued, ‘You talk of sedition charges, but you are a traitor yourself.’32 While such behaviour has now sadly been accepted as ‘normal’ it demonstrates that these two leaders, and by extension these two parties, intend to question the legitimacy of each other’s existence. This is often described as a ‘zero-sum game’ culture. The exchanges of harsh words undermine the legitimacy of the democratic political system, and thereby pave the way for political parties who oppose it. In this context the Islamists advance their argument that man-made democracy is flawed and therefore, ‘the rule of God’s law and the rule of honest men’ is the only solution. The political process has aided as well as benefited from the emergence of a wide variety of socio-religious and cultural organizations. This includes the Islamic Foundation, the Bangladesh Masjid Mission, Islam Prachar Samity, the Koranic School Society, the Bangladesh Islamic Centre, the World Islam Mission (Koran and Sunnah), Ittehadul Ummah and the Council for Islamic Socio-Cultural Organization, to name but a few. The Bangladesh Masjid Mission, for example, has been working since the mid-1980s and has developed an extensive network. Their objectives include making the mosques of the country into ‘centres of socio-religious activities’. The Islam Prachar Samity has been engaged in preaching Islam through an array of welfare delivery projects. The Koranic School Society aims at making Muslim children more Islamoriented through what it describes as ‘character building’ programmes.

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These developments reflect an Islamization process – a process of ideological shift of the state with the acquiescence of the secularists. Concomitant to these political changes there has been a gradual shift at societal level, especially in attitudes towards the possible fusion of religious ideology and social practices. Despite some resistance from civil society, there is a growing trend within Bangladesh of tolerating and accepting a particular interpretation of Islam that is being continually redefined by the state and the socio-religious organizations linked to the Islamists. The increasing presence of religion in everyday life can be recognized by looking closely at the dress codes, the extent of silent censure, the sensibility about acceptable female behaviour, and the efforts to curtail particular modes of comportment.33 A particular reading of the religious texts is being naturalized to the extent that everyone must conform to avoid social denunciation. While the domestic political events described above played key roles in bringing the Islamists to the forefront of politics, two factors accelerated the process: the emergence of political Islam on the global scene, and Bangladesh’s connection with the Middle Eastern and Gulf countries. Throughout the 1980s, Islamists not only gained global prominence but also acquired power and achieved legitimacy, thanks to two events in 1979 – the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed by the emergence of the Mujahideen (Holy Warriors). The Iranian revolution demonstrated that Islam can be seen as a political ideology rather than merely a religious or theological construct. This line of argument had earlier been advanced by Hasan al-Banna (1906– 49), the Egyptian Islamist and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (est. 1928), and Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–79), the South Asian Islamist and the founder of the JI (est. 1941). Their ideas had been debated within activist circles, but the Iranian revolution proved that they could be translated into a reality. The Afghan example was even more compelling, especially due to the involvement of the United States. Mahmood Mamdani noted that the Afghan War was important on two counts: First, the Reagan administration ideologized the war as a religious war against the evil empire, rather than styling it a war of national liberation such as it claimed the Contras were fighting in Nicaragua … Second, the Reagan administration privatized war in the course of recruiting, training and organizing a global network of Islamic fighters against the Soviet Union … Before the Afghan jihad, right-wing political Islam was an ideological tendency with little organization and muscle on the ground. The Afghan jihad gave it numbers, organization, skills, reach, confidence and a coherent objective. America created an infrastructure of terror but heralded it as an infrastructure of liberation.34

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The war in Afghanistan against Soviet intervention received significant coverage in the right-wing media in Bangladesh, but had very little impact on mainstream politics or public discourse. The pro-Moscow Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) which expressed its satisfaction and support for the April Revolution in 1978 (the communistled military coup in Afghanistan) did not make any substantial effort to raise awareness about the Soviet intervention or the adverse effects of the US-backed insurgency. In some measure it was also due to the turbulent domestic situation in Bangladesh. The military regime of Ziaur Rahman was facing intense opposition from the political parties, and was being shaken by periodic abortive military coups.35 However, in the mid-1980s, a group of Islamists began to take special note of the situation. In 1984, a group of ‘volunteers’ travelled to Afghanistan and joined the war. This was followed up with a trip by several Bangladeshi ulama to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bangladesh’s interaction with countries in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East has been mediated through its migrant workers. Since 1976, exporting unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour to these countries has become one of the main sources of Bangladesh’s foreign revenue. Studies have shown that the contribution of migrant worker remittances to Bangladesh’s GDP rose from 1 per cent in 1977–78 to 5 per cent in 1982–83. In the 1990s, the rate continued at the level of 4 per cent.36 Data from the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), a government agency in Bangladesh, show that between 1976 and January 2002 the number of Bangladeshis who migrated on shortterm employment contracts was about three million. Although Bangladesh also exports migrant workers to some Southeast Asian countries, seven Middle Eastern and North African countries have been the main destinations. They account for more than 82 per cent of migrant workers from Bangladesh. These countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Libya, Bahrain and Oman. Saudi Arabia alone accounts for half of the workers who migrated from Bangladesh during this period. These workers are mostly male and young, overwhelmingly unskilled with little education, and are drawn from rural areas. Usually the length of their stay abroad is about four years. Labour migration has impacted positively on the nation’s economy in at least two ways: firstly, it has kept the unemployment rate low, and secondly, it has brought a flow of remittances, often in the face of dwindling exports. The social cost, however, has been high. The migrant workers have been exposed to a set of retrogressive social values, and a less tolerant version of ‘Islam’ in the host countries. This has nurtured the idea that Islam practised in its birthplace is more authentic than that

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practised anywhere else. Thus upon returning home the migrants try to emulate the lifestyle and values they have been exposed to and share them with their communities. In poorer rural communities, the returnees also assume a social status that allows them to become authority figures. This has contributed to the deepening of social conservatism in the name of Islam and played a crucial role in the Islamization process. To maintain the newly earned social status of the returnee migrants these values and norms needed to be reproduced in the society. This has led to the use of traditional social institutions and practices as tools of political Islam in Bangladesh. The dramatic rise of fatwa, abuse of salish (village arbitration), and proliferation of madrassahs, especially qwami madrassahs in the 1980s and 1990s, show that their roles have been redefined by the Islamists and their beneficiaries. These institutions have been recast as guardians of orthodoxy and propagators of a certain version of Islam akin to the Wahabbism of Saudi Arabia. A recent study on the impact of migration in a Bangladeshi village found that 80 per cent of the Gulf migrants returnees are more involved in religious activities compared to before their migration. The study also found that Gulf migrants brought back ‘religious artifacts’ such as burqa (veil), tashbi (prayer beads), zainamaz (prayer mats), atar (aromatics/perfume) and toopi (caps).37 The intricate details of Bangladeshi politics discussed above may seem remote from the British political scene, particularly from mainstream political undertakings; but they have a serious bearing on the sociopolitical dynamics of the British-Bangladeshi community. These developments have informed and shaped the identity and outlook of the community at two levels. At the first level, ‘Bangladeshi’ identity has now become synonymous with ‘Muslim’ identity because of the growing strength of the Islamists within Bangladesh and the (Bangladeshi) state-sponsored reconstruction of the history of the nation. The secular struggle for nationhood in the 1960s has been obliterated from, or at least undermined in, the official narratives of Bangladeshi history.38 This was done with the domestic political agenda in mind, but did not remain within the borders of Bangladesh for understandable reasons. The acquiescence of the secularist political parties in Bangladesh provided legitimacy to this project. This process has been accentuated due to the presence of chapters of the Bangladeshi political parties within the Bangladeshi community in the UK. Almost all Bangladeshi political parties have their chapters in the UK (and other countries). This intimate relationship between the diaspora and the political par­­ ties in Bangladesh goes back to the 1970s, particularly to the

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independence movement in 1971. The Bengali population from the then East Pakistan, although small in number, played an important role in drawing the attention of the international community to the genocide of the Pakistani army and the resistance movement.39 The tradition of the secular nationalist movement in the then East Pakistan became an integral part of Bengali activism in England and forged a direct relationship with the political parties, particularly the AL, which represented this strand. This does not mean that the support was unanimous. A small group opposed this strand and insisted on a Muslim Pakistani identity. This strand of thought was represented by a handful of supporters of the Muslim League. Thus the divide, referred to as a secular–religious divide in the public discourse, was part of the community from the outset. In the 1990s this divide gained prominence due, among other reasons, to the generation gap and ‘the competition for resources’.40 This is where the second level of Bangladeshi politics played its part in the construction of the new identity for the second- and third-generation Bangladeshis who are ‘born and bred’ in Britain. The new generation felt disconnected with their parents’ ideologies not because of the transformation of the Bangladeshi polity that had privileged the Muslim identity, but most importantly because they considered those political parties inefficient and incapable of mobilizing the Bangladeshi community in the UK to promote any advancement for them.41 My conversations with younger members of the community in summer 2007 revealed a complex and interesting picture. The BritishBangladeshi youth argued that the chapters of Bangladeshi secular political parties such as the AL, the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), the CPB, and Gonoforum are ‘obsessed’ with the politics of Bangladesh. Leaders of these parties, they pointed out, speak about the issues that involve Bangladesh with little relevance to British society and politics. The ‘inability’ of the leadership to address issues of local import makes them ‘parochial’, the youth argued. In similar vein, the parties which advocate a Muslim identity within Bangladesh, for example the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jatiya Party, have not demonstrated any capacity to transcend parochialism. ‘If [these parties] insist, in the context of Bangladesh, that we are Muslims first; then why should it be different here? Why can’t they come up with a Muslim agenda for us?’ asked a youth. Despite scathing criticisms of the community leaders and the representatives of the Bangladeshi political parties in Britain, they were not willing to completely forgo their ‘Bangladeshi’ identity, neither did they want to see the community identity dissipated altogether. These young British-Bangladeshis underscore the point that both race and poverty remain central to their relationship with British society

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and the ‘community’ is a potent force to counter these elements. Some argue that having connections with Bangladeshi political parties adds to the community’s clout over the British government. Thus they feel the need to have a politically connected community but are dismayed by the overemphasis on ‘home politics’ at the expense of ‘our politics’.42 There is scepticism among a large section of British-Bangladeshis about the intentions of those involved with Bangladeshi politics while resident in Britain. Many, both younger and elder, feel that such involvement is largely for personal gain, despite the claims of those involved that their purpose is to represent the community at home. One of the interviewees of a study articulated this sentiment eloquently: By entering a political party here, a Bangladeshi political party here, you are entering a circle of some sort of power. Now when you are recognised as say a leader of [the] Awami League in Aston, when you go back to Bangladesh, you will be recognised as one of the leader[s] of the Awami League abroad. And you gain [a] certain respect among the party. Now it’s not easy for them to be associated with mainstream politics in this country. And also being a labour party member in this country wouldn’t give you as much power as being a member of a Bangladeshi political party. And people need that, people have business interest[s] in Bangladesh. People need some sort of protection. These are the clever ones and they do it for power.43

There are those who are yet to subscribe to such scepticism, but forcefully argue against the involvement of British-Bangladeshis in Bangladeshi politics. Rajonuddin Jalal, a former Labour Party member who was elected to the Tower Hamlets council several times and has been at the forefront of community activism for decades, insists that Bangladeshi political parties ‘have an adverse influence’ on the community. He feels that being involved with the activities of the Bangladeshi parties detracts from being involved in ‘the political process of this country’.44 The continuous squabbles within various groups of elders to gain party leadership and ‘represent the community’ also isolate the younger generation from the ‘politics of home’. But that does not mean that the younger generation was (or is) trying to keep away from politics. Their experience of racial discrimination and economic marginalization has taught them that politics is an integral part of their existence. What they sought to distance themselves from were the traditional politics of secular (and not-so-secular) parties with roots in Bangladesh. The youth were alienated from the ideology of their parents, not necessarily from political activism. At this juncture they opted for new organizations based in the UK with a distinct agenda of promoting community interests. The rise of youth

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groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a testimony to this trend. These youth organizations and a new generation of organizers placed themselves within the British political system with their close connections with the Labour Party. This paved the way for further fragmentation of the community and accelerated the process of challenging the ‘obsolete’ community leadership. This gap between the Bangladesh-based secular parties and the Bangladeshi-British youth community made the younger population susceptible to the growing Islamist outlook, both in Bangladesh and Britain. Islamists were quick to seize this opportunity through establishing new youth organizations affiliated with pan-European Muslim confederates and focused on local issues from a non-ethnic approach. Youth mobilization and the new identity of British-Bangladeshis The involvement of Bangladeshi youth in community activities is largely a product of the anti-racism movement of the late 1970s. The murder of Ishaq Ali and Altab Ali in 1978 galvanized the community and became the main impetus for an organized proactive youth movement in defence of the Bengali community in London’s East End.45 The process of bringing the Bengali youth together under some form of organization, however, began sporadically in the mid-1970s as the community faced heightened racist attacks. Some efforts to unify the community and the youth were planned, but most grew spontaneously as the need to stay together became more of a necessity to remain alive. Throughout the mid-1970s, members of the Asian community, including the Bengali population, in Britain faced spatial segregation, racial discrimination and rampant racist attacks and harassment from various strata of society. The emerging National Front, a white supremacist organization, orchestrated attacks on members of the Asian community almost on a daily basis. The deepening economic recession was the immediate impetus for the growing intolerance, but deep-seated racism within the society at large laid the groundwork for the racist groups to build their organizational structures and propagate their ideology. Undoubtedly, ‘these groups capitalise[d] on the frustrated energies and hopes of the white working class, especially those of the youth’, but as Brah has aptly identified, the mainstream politicians, particularly the Conservative Party, provided them with legitimacy by situating race and immigration at the centre of British politics.46 Margaret Thatcher’s radio interview in January 1978 where she promised that if voted to power she would seek an end to immigration and protect the British way of life from people of different cultures, is a case in point.47 The climate of fear was further accentuated by the media, both national and

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local. Anandi Ramamurthy, in an exploratory essay on the Asian Youth Movement, noted: During the 1970s, the media also played their part in fuelling racism. A racist backlash was encouraged by highlighting individual cases of black families being supported by the social security system. What before had been a trickle burst into a flood of newspaper articles after 4 May 1976, when the Sun broke a story entitled, ‘Scandal of £600 a week immigrants’. The rest of the media followed with headlines such as ‘More on the Way’, ‘Asian Flood’ and ‘Asian Invasion’ to publicise the arrival of Asians who had been expelled from Malawi in 1976.48

The local media, for example the East End Advertiser, a newspaper which is supposed to represent all the local residents, played a provocative role. John Newbigin, who worked with Avenues Unlimited as a youth and community worker in the mid-1970s, recalled: East End Advertiser (a local newspaper) never chose to really present the Bengali community as anything other than a problem, what was 1970s [sic]. That was partly reflected in their letters’ pages, where they would say, they were simply reflecting the concerns of their readers, but they ran all kind of letters which really was horrific [in] which people complained about the strange people with the strange smells in their cooking and strange language and strange habits and their strange children and so on and so on … I don’t think the East End Advertiser was a responsible newspaper, it didn’t challenge the behaviour of the police or the local authority; it made very little attempt to explain to its readers what were the problems of the community, what was the recent history of Bangladesh, what people were doing here or anything like that at all. I wouldn’t like to comment on what the advertiser right now [sic], but in the 1970s, it was certainly part of the problem not part of the solution.49

The extent of racist attacks faced by the Bengali community can be understood from the four accounts below. 50 These accounts are representative of the situation and treatment faced by the Bengali community, but are by no means exhaustive. Many members of the Bengali community faced harassment in their everyday lives yet never discussed these events, not even with fellow members of the community. The victims had very little choice but to accept these as ‘normal’ reactions of the ‘host’ culture and ‘local people’. Often the nature of the humiliation made them ashamed and, considering their experiences demeaning to their own status in society, they were unwilling to discuss them. For many, silence was the only way to avoid shame. These four accounts also reveal that the Bengali community was not the only victim; the Asian community in general was targeted as much as the black AfroCaribbean community.

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Asian people were being attacked by the racist element of British society – in the early ’70s – in the name of ‘Paki bashing’. That was the first time that the term was coined and every single Asian [person] was seen as Paki, irrespective of their country of origin. The people were … beaten up and they were attacked in the middle of the night. Their homes were attacked and people coming from work after ten o’clock at night were attacked and killed.51 Sundays was the worst day for racial violence; because that was when the National Front used to turn out in force and take a whole park or pavement, and they would abuse verbally and sometimes physically, not just Black people, not just Bengali people but anybody who looked different, who didn’t look as if they were National Front supporters. Because; the stereotype of what a good patriotic British citizen should look like: it was White, short hair, and large boots. And if you didn’t fit that stereotype, then you will be abused, whoever you are. So people who looked like students would be abused, White people with long hair would be abused, people who looked as if they might be gay, how the people looked gay I don’t know, but they thought might be gay, people wearing Anti-Nazi League badges, or almost any badges apart [from] the Union Jack badges – all were abused. So it wasn’t just Bengali people but it was mainly the Bengali people. There was certainly an increase in attack[s], increase in the climate in which attack was seen as more acceptable in that period. During the 1970s and particularly towards the end of the 1970s, areas with a physical danger, were the area north of the railway bridge in Brick Lane, the old borough of Bethnal Green and the area in Bethnal Green itself and going up into Shoreditch that has been a dangerous area for Jews in the 1930s but much earlier the turn of the 20th century. There was a markedly sharp divide, and you can hardly see any Bengali people north of the railway bridge and north of the Truman Brewery and Brick Lane. So you were in a very multi racial area, and you are in an area with lots of Bengali people and increasingly lot of Bengali restaurants, that developed much later. Once you cross the railway bridge and Bethnal Green, you are in an area [where] the racist[s] are organising; and you hardly ever saw Bengalis except in groups of about 10 or 12 going to English classes of the Bethnal Green Institute. Because that’s where the English classes are. So I don’t feel most Bengalis would have wanted to go to Bethnal Green at all, they have to go there for English classes, but they went in groups. They regarded [it] as alien territory, unsafe territory, as the Jews have done in the earlier period. So there was very much a geographical connection and I think that has remained although the geography has changed. The areas [that] were going to be more dangerous for Bengali people were the Isle of Dogs that was later in the 90s.52 At that time … if you walk in the street, or something like this [white people] are not very much aware of your culture. They would say to us, ‘Look at this, look at this,’ sniffing with the fingers on their nose.

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Obviously we couldn’t speak very good English [at] that time; obviously we just take [these] things as abuse at that time. But later we did understand, there were lots of people [who] hated us all the time, because they can see another community coming into Tower Hamlets, and they feel that [this community was ] taking their homes … You can see this from the school, when they children used to say ‘Paki! Paki!’ – that’s [the] sort of word they used, obviously they learned from their parents. Since we were kids, when they say ‘Paki’ which was the bad one, we said something [back] so there was a fight. It started from there. Even probably in 1974 or 75 there was a student who was killed round in this area. They were Chinese, they were coming out from the takeaway, they were attacked by the local white[s], and I think that was a racial attack. So obviously there was a problem [at] that time.53 Bengali people used to avoid the Wapping area because of fear. Most people were afraid of Bethnal Green. Today I live in Ingram House, this was an area marked for enmity to Bengalis. People were unable to go to Wapping even for work. Some parts of Ingram House were marked as no go area[s] to the Bengali people.54

In the face of relentless racist abuse, harassment and physical attacks by the supporters of the National Front and others combined with the inaction of the law-enforcement agencies, the Bangladeshi community felt the need to build a resistance.55 Within the Bengali community, several youth organizations emerged spontaneously as a result of the realization among the community, especially the younger generation, that the extant organization, the Bangladesh Welfare Association, was not ‘the right organization to respond to the changing demands of the Bangladeshi community’.56 These organizations include the Bangladesh Youth League (BYL), the Bangladesh Youth Movement (BYM), the Bangladesh Youth Association (BYA), Bangladesh Youth Front (BYF), Bangladesh Youth Approach (BYA) and Progressive Youth Organization (PYO), to name but a few.57 Among these organizations, perhaps only the BYM predates the murder of Altab Ali. Following the death of Altab Ali and in an effort to create a common platform to organize protests, the Bengali Youth Movement Against Racist Attacks emerged. The alliance was short-lived, but it paved the way for the coming together of youth groups and the creation of an umbrella organization. This was named the Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organizations (FBYO). The brutal murder of Altab Ali and Ishaq Ali is often described as the ‘wake-up call, not just for Bangladeshis in the East End but for Asians all over Britain’.58 Caroline Adams, who worked closely with the Bengali community from the early 1970s until her death in 2001 and had helped establish many Bengali youth organizations, described this as a ‘part

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of the coming of age of Bangladeshi people who refused any longer to accept the role of passive victim and realized that they have to become involved in the politics of Britain if anything was to change’.59 In the words of Suroth Ahmed (Faruk), a key youth organizer of that time: The killing of Altab Ali gave the voice to the Bengali people that we are here to stay and to live. We can no longer tolerate racism and such kind of brutal activity. It was the beginning of the progression of the community. The (Bangladesh) Youth Movement and youth centre was formed and all the members of the community were fully and actively supporting the activities. Many people had a mind set, that we are here to earn and go back to Bangladesh but the mind set was changed after Altab Ali’s killing. We decided to establish ourselves in Britain. Many of the young people went to learn the Kung Fu for self defence, many were not successful, but many were successful to learn the art.60

These reactions, particularly building organizations to counter the growing intolerance and racism, were not unique to the Bengali community. Rather, the Bengali community was making these moves parallel to initiatives within the Pakistani and the Indian communities. The emergence of the Asian Youth Movement (AYM) is a testimony to the larger youth movement sweeping across the South Asian communities at that time. The emergence of the AYM in 1978, in fact, was the culmination of a series of events beginning with the racist murder of an Indian youth two years before the killings of Altab Ali and Ishaq Ali. On 4 June 1976 Gurdip Singh Chaggar was killed in a racist attack in the centre of Southall, the southern part of London with a significant number of Indian residents. The attack prompted an effort from the Indian community, especially the youth, to found the Southall Youth Movement (SYM). The murder of Chaggar came exactly a month after the Sun began a media campaign against the immigrant community. This provided a clear message to the communities, if that was necessary at all, that these attacks were far from isolated events; therefore, a concerted response was imperative. The events of the night before the SYM was founded were indicative of the forthcoming changes in community activism, not only within the Indian community but all South Asian communities. After the death of Chagger: A meeting was held and the elders went about in the time-honoured way, passing resolutions, making statements. The youth took over – marched to the police station, demanding redress, stoning a police van en route. The police arrested two of them. They sat down before the police station and refused to move – until their fellows were released. They were released. The following day the Southall Youth Movement was born.61

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Interestingly, similar reactions from the established community leaders occurred within the Bangladeshi community after the death of Altab Ali. The leadership of the Bangladesh Welfare Association (BWA), the established community organization, split into two on how to protest against the killing, and decided to organize two separate demonstrations. Another smaller group, described as a Muslim group, planned a separate demonstration. The youth were frustrated to see that the protest was being fragmented and consequently mounted enormous pressure on the elders to come together to stage one demonstration. Finally, these three factions came together to organize the historic demonstration of 17 May 1978. The demonstration, participated in by more than 7,000 people, was the largest demonstration by South Asians that had been seen in Britain. Jamal Hasan, a young community leader, acted as the emissary between the youth and the elders and was elected the secretary to the coalition that called for the demonstration. The founding of the SYM was a watershed event in the sense that it was soon replicated elsewhere in England. In Bradford, the Indian Progressive Youth Association, later renamed Bradford Asian Youth Movement, was formed in 1977, followed by smaller organizations in Luton, Nottingham, Leicester, Manchester, Sheffield and Birmingham, not to mention East London, Burnley and Pendle, Luton and Watford along these lines.62 The connections between these emerging organizations within the Indian community and the Bangladeshi youth was not only ideational but was also organizational as the Indian youth were encouraging the Bangladeshi youth to form their own platform. According to one account, Bradford AYM ‘sent delegates to London in 1978 to consolidate and support the organization of Bangladeshi youth after the racist murder of Altab Ali in east London’.63 By 1978, some of the key Bangladeshi youth organizers were already working with the SYM. According to Suroth Ahmed (Faruk) the first time he participated in any demonstration in London was against the killing of Chagger. Initiated as a response to the rising far-right racist attacks on the community, the movement gradually incorporated broader issues such as police brutality, housing discrimination and immigration laws. In subsequent years, organizations with a broad socio-political agenda emerged within other Asian communities. The agenda of these youth organizations, which grew as a result of youth activism under the broad umbrella of the AYM, was fundamentally different from the existing organizations. There were two key characteristics of these organizations and the youth movement in general: these groups were secular in nature and primarily identified with their ethnic identities – ‘they chose to focus on problems relating to their particular

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communities in the UK, rather than their homelands’.64 Ramamurthy summarized these characteristics: the Asian Youth Movements (AYMs) of the 1970s and 1980s were powerful examples of political movements that were influenced by black politics and a version of secularism that became a unifying force between different religious communities. For the AYMs, the term ‘black’ denoted a political allegiance between those of African and Asian origin, without denying the specific cultural differences of each group, and the term ‘secular’ implied a unity-in-diversity between those of different religious backgrounds, without suppressing their particular religious identities.65

The FBYO and its member organizations followed the same pattern. The FBYO, like its counterparts within the Indian community, not only challenged the racist groups and the British state but the traditional leadership and thinking within their own community and powerful social institutions. In the words of Kenan Malik: ‘they challenged not just racism but also many traditional values too, particularly within the Muslim community, helping establish an alternative leadership that confronted traditionalists on issues such as the role of women and the dominance of the mosque’.66 Their approach to dealing with problems was markedly different from that of their predecessors as these youth organizations became assertive and insisted on their rights as members of British society. This approach brought them closer to other socio-political groups – formed on the basis of ethnic identity and/or based on a political ideology such as class. Cross-cultural issues received importance and were highlighted by these organizations. The secular nature of the youth organizations within various South Asian communities was not a default option, but an informed choice of the participants, because there was already a well-established pan-Islamic student organization called the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (FOSIS). The organization, established in 1962, was closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the JI of Pakistan.67 Although Bangladeshi youth were engaging in activism, they did not choose to be involved with the FOSIS. In the early 1970s, another youth organization named the Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) was founded in Bradford for Pakistani youth under the leadership of Ahmed Jamal. Although the UK Islamic Mission was the sponsor of the organization, it was founded by the JI with a goal to expand its influence over Muslim youth in the UK.68 Thus, these organizations and their ideological underpinnings were available to the Bangladeshi activists, yet they founded organizations which highlighted their national origin and joined a national movement with a secular agenda and clear anti-racist programmes.

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The anti-racism movement and subsequent events not only created formal youth organizations but also gave rise to ‘informal groupings’ and in some cases, unfortunately, created gangs. The genesis of many of these gangs can be traced back to the defensive actions of the Bangladeshi youths in East London in the face of intimidation by the racists.69 Keith noted in the mid-1990s that in the case of young Bengali men a long-standing threat of racial danger makes the practice of moving through streets in groups at times as much a defensive necessity as a sociable presence. So it is significant that demographic factors matched with welfare cuts created a marked increase in the visibility of groups of young Bengalis, in particular young Bengali men, in the public spaces of the East End.70

The prevalence of gang culture among the Bangladeshi youth was reported widely in the Bengali and mainstream press. For example, on 21 August 1994, the Sunday Times reported: The gangs, predominantly youngsters from Bangladeshi families, take their inspiration from Afro-American culture. Mimicking gangs in L.A., they wear hooded jackets and baggy jeans and listens to rap and [reggae] music. An increase in drug taking and dealing among young Asians has happened in tandem.71

The Evening Standard on 13 November 1996 noted that Bangladeshi youth were ‘turning violently against each other’. Rajonuddin Jalal, then a local councillor and social activist, commented in 1998 to Hilary Clarke of the Independent that, ‘You no longer have passive old men who don’t fight back. If anything, it has gone the other way and you have the old gangster culture of the East End penetrating the Bengali community.’ Clarke quoted one local youth who stated, ‘Now it’s more likely to be Bangladeshi youths from Whitechapel fighting other Bangladeshi kids from the Commercial Road.’72 In any community, when gang culture evolves, this is followed by drug abuse and clashes between the gangs. There were no reasons for the Bangladeshi community to be different. ‘Gang membership brings with it the sense of power as well as belonging, and as youth workers in drug projects observe, fights and drugs bring an excitement, which can only be bettered by using more violent weapons or stronger drugs.’73 The rising problem with drug abuse in Bangladeshi communities in England was conspicuous in the 1990s. The economic deprivation of the community made it easier for the youth to fall victim to the lure of easy money. Drug peddlers found the Bangladeshi youth easy prey. Patel et al. claimed in 2001 that in the previous five years there had been a dramatic surge in drug abuse among Bangladeshi youth. The share of

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Bangladeshi youth of the client base for drugs was over 40 per cent in the late 1990s while it was about 10 per cent in the mid 1990s.74 Yahya Birt, in 2001, quoted a police report for the Borough of Tower Hamlets which revealed that 50 per cent of drug offenders referred to drug agencies were young Bangladeshi men. Of these, 90 per cent were under 25 and more than 60 per cent had never received any help to get off drugs.75 Whether drug abuse among the Bangladeshi youth has been higher than in other communities is a matter of empirical study, but the impact was far greater because of the initial denial of the community leaders of the existence of such problems. Additionally, there was very little counselling or community support. The culture of denial still prevails within the Bangladeshi community. The extent of the denial can be understood from a recent study on drug abuse among British-Bangladeshi females. The study conducted by Cottew and Oyefeso on young Bangladeshi females reveals that ‘Bengali female drug users constitute a hidden population who are engaging in high-risk behaviours but the cultural constructs in which their drug use is rooted prevent their effective utilization of drug treatment services. Bengali female drug use, therefore, remains shrouded in secrecy due to a strong cultural imperative.’76 The authors go on to say, ‘A sense of shame and the need for concealment of their drug use and associated behaviours dominated every aspect of the lives of the women interviewed in this study. As a result the true extent of drug use by Bengali women is unknown. What is known is that, when it does occur, it takes place largely behind “closed doors”.’77 Many family members prefer to conceal the problem and thus do not seek support from the existing counselling and medical facilities. As late as 2005, press reports suggested that poor Bangladeshi families were taking out private loans to pay for private treatment for relatives with drug problems. Addiction Today reported that many Bangladeshi families send their children to Bangladesh for treatment: ‘In the past few years, 10–15 detoxification and rehabilitation centres have emerged in Bangladesh, with no health and safety records, horror stories of UK citizens being subjected to draconian and coerced treatment, and others being sedated for weeks until withdrawal symptoms cease.’78 Some Bangladeshi youth elevated themselves to the rank of dealers because the drug mafias found this a convenient means of overcoming cultural boundaries. A 1998 press report provides a bleak picture: Although heroin use is a widespread problem in Britain, it is hitting the Bangladeshi population harder than most. Because of their large families and overcrowded living conditions, Bangladeshi children spend a great

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deal of time on the street where they are more likely to come into contact with heroin. Youth workers say children as young as 11 are already addicted, chipping in their pocket money to buy the drug – £2 is enough to get four 11–year-olds high. ‘Before, they’d try a bit of cannabis, maybe have a drink, but now they go straight onto heroin (which they burn in silver foil in order to smoke the fumes). It has become the first drug many of them try,’ says Monza Ahmed, 25, a member of the Tower Hamlets Community Drugs Team. ‘Before, older dealers had principles. If a 14– year-old came up to them, they wouldn’t serve them. The problem now is that it’s kids selling the drug to other kids.’ A third of the young drugusers who attend the Drugs Team’s facilities are Bangladeshi boys, often brought there by their concerned sisters.79

In 2000, it was further reported that heroin had became the drug of choice amongst Bangladeshi youth in Tower Hamlets Borough.80 Frustrations growing from the lack of opportunity, the lack of upward mobility and isolation from the community increased drug abuse and the number of addicts within the community. It is worth remembering, as Lucinda Platt demonstrated in her study, that Bangladeshis seriously lag behind in intergenerational upward social mobility.81 It is important to note that even education was not sufficient to remove the barriers they face. The situation revealed prevalent ‘structural racism’ and thus rationalized the alienation from the community and society at large. It is in this context that ‘more strident Islamist groups emerged and started to exert an influence on the younger generation’.82 The appeal of Islamists to the youth population in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Britain is both a general trend and specifically affects the Bangladeshi community. Among the Bangladeshis, the organization that gained remarkable influence was the Young Muslim Organization (YMO). Tariq Modood’s study of the Asian population, published in 1992, documented the general trend.83 The particularity of the Bangladeshi community needs be contextualized within developments since the mid-1970s. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh in 1971 vindicated the secularists within the Bangladeshi community and marginalized those who supported the Pakistani rulers, particularly the supporters of the military crackdown. The small group of Muslim League supporters faded away within a short time, but with the arrival of Golam Azam in London in 1974 attempts were made to breathe new life into antiBangladesh activities. ‘The East Pakistan Recover Committee’, founded in Lahore in 1972 under the leadership of Azam, shifted its headquarters to London and began the publication of a weekly newspaper called the Sangram. The committee made little headway but continued its existence. Thereby a network of Islamists remained in place.

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The political changes after the coup of 1975 in Bangladesh were welcomed by the Islamists. They reorganized under the banner of the Dawat-ul Islam in the late 1970s. The leadership included Chowdury Muinuddin, Abu Sayeed and Lutfur Rahman, all of whom were members of the JI Pakistan until 1971. According to press reports, they were actively engaged with the paramilitary forces supporting the Pakistani Army and participated in the genocide perpetrated against ethnic Bengalis throughout the nine months of war in 1971. The establishment of the Dawata-ul Islam, its youth front the YMO,84 the Young Muslim Sisters organization and a number of charity organizations over the years in the late 1970s created a more visible and strong network within the Bangladeshi community. The ‘changing political landscape at home’, i.e. the rise of the Islamists, particularly the JI, was far more than a source of moral encouragement for the Islamists, as material support began to arrive. The Dawat-ul Islam gradually established its influence over the East London Mosque. One of the key developments was the establishment of Muslim Aid in 1985. The organization soon became a global network. In 1989, a group of Dawat-ul Islam members left the organization and established the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE) under the leadership of Muinuddin. The YMO followed his leadership and switched their allegiance to the IFE.85 Both the Dawat-ul Islam and the IFE continued to maintain contact with the JI of Bangladesh. By the late 1980s, a number of Islamist organizations had gained a foothold within the Bangladeshi community, and the YMO began attracting the younger population. The growing appeal of the YMO and similar organizations from the mid-1980s was due to a combination of factors. The success can be attributed, on the one hand, to the Islamists’ strategic moves, and on the other hand to the abject failure of secular community leaders. In addition, the British state played a significant role in tilting the playing field in favour of the Islamists, as global events lent a helping hand. I will address the role of the British state in another chapter of the book; here I highlight three factors involving the Bangladeshi community and global events. These three factors are: first, successful presentation of the Islamic brotherhood as an antidote to drug culture and social alienation; second, the establishment of the East London Mosque (ELM) as a centre of various social activities;86 and third, the ability to ‘channel [the] frustrations stemming from exclusion from the wider society and also from inaction by elder Muslims with regard to community affairs’.87 Social alienation of a community as a whole or a group of people within a community can result from a number of factors. Bangladeshi youths, particularly in the 1980s living in the East End where they were

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spatially, socially, and economically marginalized, were caught between various conflicting demands and trends, for example past and future, Bangladesh and England, ethnicity and religion. These various issues gave rise to a hybridity. The hybridity, which made them ‘strangers’ within their own community and unaccepted within the new community, bred social alienation. The Bangladeshi community, particularly the community leadership, was unable to address this issue. This was at the heart of the problems faced by Bangladeshi youths, and, in combination with the lack of opportunities described earlier, contributed to the drug abuse of the 1990s. But the secular community organizations, either due to the prevalent denial culture or lack of resources, were slow in dealing with this issue while the Islamists came forward to offer the comfort and certainty of religion and explained this as ‘a grand design of the establishment’ to keep the immigrant Muslims down. Interestingly, by the late 1990s, the Islamists had resources to offer services, such as counselling and medication, to deal with this problem. When the gang culture proliferated, Islamist youth organizations such as the YMO came forward to be the neutral arbitrator to bring peace. It is well known within the Bangladeshi community that in 1998 leaders from the warring street gangs successfully negotiated a truce on the ‘neutral territory’ of the East London Mosque. The strategy of the YMO was distinctly different from the other religious organizations/movements working within the Bangladeshi community. One of the YMO activists explained this vis-à-vis the pietistic movement of Tabligh Jamaat: There are not many groups reaching out to the youth. Basically it’s us and the Tabligh Jamaat. But the methodology they have is not adapted to change the society. They don’t include the women, it’s not a wide way of doing dawah [calling to faith]. For example, if you want to reach the youth, you need to include certain activities, like football. Any sports, it’s not their field. But there are Tablighis who are more reformed, they are into sports and everything, mostly Pakistanis. But unfortunately most Bangladeshi ones they’re not, they have very negative views about the work that we are doing. Some of them, who are very extreme in their practice, you can say that they’re still living in the cave. They need to come out and see how the society is changing. 88

The East London Mosque, established in 1985,89 ‘offers many activities including providing Islamic literature, study groups, conferences, and social support to the local Bangladeshi and also Somali Muslim community’.90 The mosque offers among other activities, counselling, welfare and funeral services and addresses other needs of Spitalfields’ deprived populations in a variety of ways. The success of the mosque in building a large following and securing support from the govern-

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ment led to the establishment of the London Muslim Centre (LMC) in 2004.91 The LMC offers a wide array of social services and its facilities include spaces for ‘conferences, wedding receptions, exhibitions, banqueting, presentations, seminars, training courses, product / press launches, conventions’.92 These make the centre attractive to a number of people within the community, particularly at a time when there are very few other alternatives available. The ascendance of the ELM in the 1980s as a centre of activism was a stark contrast to the London Jami Mosque, popularly known as the Brick Lane mosque, due to its location in the street of that name. The building, where the mosque has been situated since 1976, has a long history of being the place of worship of immigrant communities in East London. It was originally established as the Huguenot Church in 1742. The building became the London Society for Promoting Christianity among Jews (commonly known as the Jewish Chapel) in 1809 and a Methodist chapel in 1819. In 1897, the building was consecrated as the Machzikei HaDath, or Spitalfields Great Synagogue. The synagogue was no longer in use in the 1970s as most of the Jews of Polish and Russian descent had moved from the area, and a group of Bangladeshi businessman bought the building and established the mosque in 1976. The architectural and structural aspects of the building remained intact, because of its historical significance, but it became the most prominent mosque among the Bangladeshi community living in the vicinity from the time of its establishment. The mosque never attempted to become the centre of social activism, although for quite some time it was one of the main social institutions of the Bengali community. The approach to religious issues was, in some measure, as humble as its appearance. The ulama and mullahs attached to the mosque represented a pietistic reformist tradition called the Barelvis (Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jamaat). The Barelvis always upheld the syncretistic element of South Asian religion, and concentrated on personal salvation rather than engaging in organized social action. This eighteenth-century social movement has always, unlike the JI, been a supporter of mystical sufi practices and veneration of saints. As opposed to the JI, the Barelvis supported the Pakistan movement in 1947. The mosque easily attracted the first generation of Bengali immigrants as it reproduced the rituals and practices of home. For the immigrants, the mosque was another ethnic institution which kept them insulated from the broader society. One can easily relate this to the mindset of the first-generation immigrants who thought that they would eventually return to their homeland. The nostalgic significance aside, the mosque’s approach to social issues was traditional and conservative, something that the immigrants who were primarily from

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rural Bangladesh could identify with. The Bangladesh government and the High Commission provided support to the mosque: for example, General Ershad visited the mosque while president of the country and made a donation in the 1980s. This gave an impression to many that the mosque was tied to the establishment, rather than opposing the repressive regime. As for social activities, the mosque never ventured into any event that had no direct religious significance. It has always been just a place of worship, nothing less and nothing more. Thus, there was very little discussion of contemporary issues. The sermons were about the teachings of Islam regarding how to live a good life, but without any reference to the social context. The mosque left contemporary social issues to the social organizations and thus deliberately maintained a separation. Even when social issues were dealt with, they were the issues the community faced within the enclave rather than as a member of the broader society. Over time, these defining characteristics of the mosque became unattractive to the younger population, because with education and interaction with the mainstream society and exposure to the world via various media, they were seeking answers to broader issues. To many youth this was an obvious sign of the inability of the elders to deal with community issues. This inadequacy of the mosque created a void into which the radical Islamist youth groups stepped. Ansari has rightly pointed out: ‘the attraction of radical Islamist organizations rather than the mosque for young Muslims therefore lies in the way they have articulated issues which others have tried to avoid, in language comprehensible to many Muslims growing up in Britain’s highly urbanised and pluralistic society’.93 This was matched by another factor, the prevalence of sectarianism within the community. Although the Brick Lane mosque and its patrons never intended to present themselves as the representative of one denomination or sect of Islam, in the eyes of the younger Bangladeshis they appeared nothing less. Although the issue of sectarianism within the Bangladeshi community was not as serious as within the Pakistani community, the youth did not have the appetite. The radical Islamist organization, on the other hand, presented a rhetoric of unity: ‘these organizations provide them with a set of ready-made solutions to complex political issues as well as to questions of their personal identity’.94 While the above three factors are distinctively local, the discourse of these organizations did not remain within local boundaries. Sarah Glynn quotes a message of the YMO to its members in 2001 that advised members to speak out ‘for peace and justice in the world’.95 The radical Islamist organizations framed their messages touching universal issues such as oppression, discrimination and marginalization. By univer-

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salizing their messages they have connected the marginalized Bengali Muslims to the Muslim world. In these discourses the entire Muslim world was enduring the problems inflicted by the West as much as the Bangladeshis in Britain were. Thus, the war in Bosnia, or the first Gulf War (1991) were part of their struggle. The community is no longer defined by geography but is identified with a global ummah defined by religion. Islam, therefore, is presented as an emancipatory meta-narrative – of resistance and empowerment. This line of argument often draws on academic works on diaspora and transnational networks which insist that these networks and associated processes have the potential to undermine oppressive global structures. But as the experience of the Bangladeshi community has demonstrated, the liberating potential is not intrinsic but depends on the actors and their agenda.96 The most important impact of these organizations was the shift in the self-perception of Bangladeshis and their relationship with the society at large. The YMO and similar organizations have emphasized a monolithic Islamic identity as opposed to multi-layered identities within which religion is one identity, primarily within the domain of private life. The de-privatization of religion placed it at the heart of the identity of the Bengali Muslims in the UK. Within this framework there is an ‘authentic’ Islam and the other syncretistic traditions are deviations and therefore need to be either purified or altogether rejected. Delwar Hossain Saidee’s messages neatly fit into this scheme pointing to these deviations at the micro-level and suggesting the ways and means of purification. Emphasis on affiliation with the ummah disconnects them from their ethnic identities and rituals and particularly those which have secular elements. Criticisms of the Baishakhi Mela (fair to celebrate the Bengali New Year on Brick Lane) as ‘un-Islamic’, of ‘shirk’ (polytheism) and commemoration of Language Day (the day to mark the martyrdom of protestors who died demanding the Bengali language be officially recognized in Pakistan) as acts of ‘atheists’, and the building of the Shaheed Minar (Martyrs’ Memorial to commemorate the language movement in Bangladesh) as a ‘waste of money’ demonstrate that the objective is to disassociate from the cultural rootedness to the ethnic Bengali culture. This mindset also indicates a certain amount of intolerance and hostility towards the ‘other’, however that other is construed. Such intolerance grows from moral absolutism, disconnect with the local community, and an absence of belonging to the society. One can identify such traits of intolerance within the protest against the Brick Lane filming in the summer of 2006. The universalization of the message of oppression, and its transcendence from a culturally defined and spatially limited community to a

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global community was accelerated by the protest against the Satanic Verses of Salman Rushdie. The most significant effect of the Rushdie affair was that it transcended national boundaries and introduced the concept of the ummah to the British Muslim lexicon. This also created a national network of Islamists, initially the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) and later the MCB, both led by the followers of JI ideologue Abul Ala Mawdudi. According to an Islamist website, salam.co.uk, ‘the most positive outcome of the Rushdie Affair was that it prompted the formation of UKACIA, that was to be a precursor of a more ambitious initiative to unite British Muslims in a movement that began in 1994 and culminated in the formation of the Muslim Council of Britain in 1997’.97 Undoubtedly, ‘no trajectory of Islam in Britain can be recounted without noting this defining moment [i.e. the Rushdie affair], which shattered the conceptions of the Asian community as a passive and homogenous group and precipitated fears of a fundamentalist Muslim community’.98 The events, especially the communication among activists from other countries and the use of an extant network of the JI in England, showed that the JI is no longer just a ‘national’ organization but is capable of leading a transnational movement. Giles Kepel, documenting the organization of the protest both in South Asia and Britain, concluded that, ‘the speed of the operation showed the efficiency and perfect coordination of the “Islamist International” created by Mawdudi’s disciples, which was able to run parallel campaign[s] in India and Britain’.99 The members of the British-Bangladeshi community had very limited involvement with the movement. The narrative of the movement mentions the marginal role the Bangladeshi community played: Among other unsung heroes of the era was Maulana Abdal Miah, imam of a mosque in Tower Hamlets: working on his own and with only two telephones at his disposal, he mobilised the community across Britain for a march in London. A prominent former activist in the Bangladesh Workers Association, Rumman Ahmed, was later to provide him invaluable support in its organisation.100

Some accounts of the events indicate that JI Bangladesh leaders such as Muinuddin were members of the group who encouraged the movement. By 1991, large numbers of British-Bangladeshi youth began to be attracted to Islamist organizations. Community activists Ayub Korom Ali, Ahmed Ansar Ullah, author Urmi Rahman,101 and Nahas Pasha, currently the editor of the weekly Jonomot – all point to 1991 as the watershed year; some call it the turning point.102 Ali contends that the consciousness of religious identity among the young Bangladeshis began to take root as a result of the success of the movement against Rushdie,

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but the ground was ready due to the policies pursued by the Conser­ vative government, especially the Home Office. Nahas Pasha also attributes this transformation to the first Gulf War (1991). Masud Rana, a school teacher and a political activist, argues that this is connected to the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the only global hegemonic power. With the appeal of socialism waning, Islamism has become an ideology of resistance. The deepening sense of insecurity has engendered this attraction, Rana insists.103 Haras Rafiq, co-founder and Executive Director of the Sufi Muslim Council, is of the opinion that the change within the Bangladeshi community is identical to some other Muslim diaspora communities. ‘The Pakistani youths had undergone the changes before others, perhaps by the late 1980s, but others caught up in the early-1990s,’ Haras Rafiq said.104 There is no single moment that can be identified as the juncture, neither can one event be defined as the tipping point; but discussions with a number of Bangladeshis who were in their twenties in 1991, provided some clues as to how that transformation took place.105 Identification with their Muslim identity was a result both of pro-active effort and reactive response to societal pressure, they claim. Some youth were approached by, came in contact with or sought out the Islamist organizations who insisted that the Rushdie Affair demonstrated how the British state tacitly accepted the denigration of Islam; hence it is a moral obligation of any Muslim to stand up and fight back in an organized manner. This process commenced soon after the Rushdie issue ebbed and has continued since then. These efforts convinced some youths. Others were reacting to the societal pressure of being portrayed by media and acquaintances as Muslims first. A respondent of another study described the situation these youth faced in 1989: During the Rushdie affair, both me and my friend Dev [a Hindu of Indian origin] were constantly asked by other people at work to defend the Islamic fundamentalist position. This was only because both of us are brown. It didn’t matter what religions we held, whether or not we were fundamentalists, or even if we were Muslims at all.106

The fundamental change in the societal perception the Rushdie Affair brought about was aptly summarized in 1992 by Yuval-Davis: ‘groups previously known by national or regional origin – Pakistani, Mirpuri, Bengali, and Punjabi, for example – are now all seen [as] part of a single Muslim community’.107 The growing affiliation with Islamist organizations and increased emphasis on the Muslim identity produced a chain of effects and changes in socio-cultural arenas and personal behaviour. There are subtle but

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significant signs of cultural shift within the Bangladeshi community. Perhaps the most obvious is the dress worn by some Bangladeshi young men and women. Wearing the veil is nothing new or uncommon among Bangladeshi women in the UK. A small number of women always used to wear the veil but not only has the number increased substantially since the 1990s, but also the style of these veils changed dramatically. Apparently the new veils are more ‘modern’ and ‘fashionable’, which is viewed by some as a development, a sign of adapting to change. But, interestingly, the styles of these new veils are imported from Saudi Arabia. The popularity of jilbab (a long, loose-fitting garment) and niqab (face covering) among young Bangladeshi women is more than a fashion statement; it is an indication of Saudi cultural influence. Similar trends can be noticed on the part of the young men. (It is not too difficult to identify a parallel development in Bangladesh. The rise of Islamists in Bangladesh in recent decades also brought changes in the dress worn by men and women and advertisements for these styles of clothing are now found in newspapers and magazines.) Notwithstanding the growing influence of the Islamists linked to the JI in South Asia, other Islamist organizations have made their presence felt within the BritishBangladeshi community in the past decade. The most important among them is the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).108 The organization warrants our attention for three reasons. Firstly, because of the influence and impact of this organization among Muslim youth in Britain. Secondly, because of ­information and insights available due to some high-level defections from the HT in Britain. These defectors are: Ed Husain, Shiraz Maher and Maajid Nawaz. Ed Hussain is a young activist of Bangladeshi origin, and penned his experience in a book entitled The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left.109 And thirdly, because the HT in Britain not only inspired the youth at home to join the organization, but was the source of the Bangladesh chapter founded in 2001. The HT stirred debate in the 1990s when it was alleged that it was propagating a hateful message to the youth at various campuses and again after the London transport bombing in 2005 when the then Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the intention of government to proscribe the organization. The idea was later shelved because it was suggested by law-enforcement agencies that banning the organization would be counter-productive.110 One of the key appeals of the group to the younger population has been its ability to introduce controversial issues to public discourse. Mandaville, writing in 2001, underscored this: ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir has undoubtedly forced young Muslims to deal with questions and issues which they might have otherwise avoided, its noisy tactics

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effectively allowing it to define the political agenda for the younger generation.’111 The emblematic status of the HT is due to its success in driving home one key feature of the new interpretation of Islam: that Islamic identity is beyond national and ethnic boundaries. Even the critics of the organization acknowledge this aspect of the HT: ‘after decades of stressing the existence and unity of a global Islamic community (ummah), HT can take pride in the growing feeling among Muslims that their primary identity stems from, and their primary loyalty is owed to, their religion rather than their race, ethnicity, or nationality’.112 The HT has not only provided a different interpretation to the role of Islam in politics, but also influenced other organizations to re-evaluate their strategies and tactics to reach out to the younger generation. The HT began to expand its reach in Britain in the early 1990s, as more young British-Bangladeshis were attracted to Islamism due to international and domestic political changes. Some of these youths started with youth organizations either connected to the IFE or the Dawat-ul Islam, but were disappointed with the stance on various social issues. One particular point of dissension was integration with mainstream society. The HT favoured a more vocal opposition to Western foreign policy and developing an international network to propagate their ideology. Participation in elections appeared to be a matter of difference as well: the HT is against it. In general, the HT offered a stricter and a more ‘globalized’ version of Islam by calling for the establishment of Khilafat (a divinely ordained Islamic system of governance). Taking a more intellectual stance, the HT regularly arranges seminars and symposiums. Additionally, members work through youth organizations such as the East London Youth Forum which organizes social events. Shiraz Maher, a member of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in Leeds until he left the group in early 2005, said that the organization is engaged in ‘social welfare projects, to tackle issues like Muslim underachievement in schools, and to be seen as providing for people the way Western, godless governments cannot’.113 Maher describes these efforts as a way to gain a foothold, and legitimacy, within the community. The organization insists that it is opposed to violence and terrorism. Ed Hussain agrees that the organization has not been involved in violence in Britain, but he states, ‘From my involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir I know it to be a sophisticated organisation: it rarely ever pulls the trigger. It raises the temperature and allows others to do the deed. That is how the murder of an innocent young man, Ayotunde Obonobi, took place in Newham in 1995.’114 According to the HT’s website, ‘The work of Hizb ut-Tahrir is to ... change the situation of the corrupt society so that it is transformed into

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an Islamic society.’ The organization ‘aims to bring back the Islamic guidance for mankind and to lead the Ummah into a struggle with Kufr (non-believing), its systems and its thoughts so that Islam encapsulates the world’. The organization believes that the democratic system is ‘a system of kufr [non-believing], based on the creed of separating religion from life’. It is argued that the organization has a three-step strategy: ‘The first involves educating Muslims about its philosophies and goals. In the second step, the Muslims would then spread these views among others in their countries, especially members of government, the military and other power centres. In the third and final step, Hizb ut-Tahrir believes its faithful will cause secular governments to crumble because loyalties will then lie solely with Islam – not nationalities, politics or ethnic identifications.’115 The HT had a prominent presence in the university campuses in Britain until the mid-1990s. In 1995, the HT was banned from university campuses for alleged anti-Semitism. In 1996, Omar Bakri and his followers left the HT to establish the Al-Muhajiroun. Supporters and sympathizers of the HT insist that the organization has changed since then. Inayat Bunglawala, media secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, writes, ‘I suspect many Muslims would agree that the Omar Bakri-led HT (up until 1996) was a deeply unpleasant organisation whose members often behaved like street thugs. I can recall meeting after meeting of different organisations being disrupted by HT followers at the time.’116 Abdul Wahid, an HT member, acknowledges their past behaviour but claims that their members have matured now: ‘some of our members, in their first flush of political activism around a decade ago, were over-enthusiastic in their work; they are more mature now, but old impressions have stuck’.117 The organization has made attempts to reappear on campuses after 2001 under different names; often the HT supporters have organized demonstrations on specific issues. Within the British-Bangladeshi community, the organization remained quite visible until 2003, but has lost some ground in recent years.118 The profile of members of the HT within the Bangladeshi community is identical to the profile of other HT activists in general: educated professional and well aware of global politics. The strict opposition of the HT to participation in elections led to the vehement opposition to George Galloway’s candidacy in the 2005 election. According to press reports, Galloway was attacked during a campaign meeting at Bethnal Green by HT activists.119 After the attack Galloway told a reporter, ‘I was meeting people who live in the flats. Hizb ut-Tahrir suddenly filled the room and blocked the door. I tried

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speaking calmly. They then said I was parading as a false prophet and served a sentence of death on me. They were claiming I was representing myself as a false deity and for this apostasy I would be sentenced to the gallows.’120 The Hizb ut-Tahrir’s position on the election and the democratic system, particularly in Britain, was not new or unique to them. The Muslim Parliament, established by Kalim Siddiqui in 1992, opposed Muslim participation in mainstream politics. The organization called upon British Muslims not to vote in 1997. Siddiqui and his followers suggested that the Muslims should create a separate political system.121 ­ articipation Al-Muhajiroun and its off-shoots have always opposed p in elections. In 2005, like the HT activists who attacked Galloway’s campaign rally, another group with a direct connection to the Al-Muhajiroun attacked a press conference by the MCB, where the MCB was supposed to call Muslims to vote in upcoming elections. In both instances, the groups comprised apparently well-educated youths. The founding of the Bangladesh chapter of the HT is an important testimony to the influence of the HT on British university campuses in the early 1990s. Syed Golam Mowla, the founder of the Bangladesh chapter of the HT, came to know about the HT while a student at university in London. Mowla, a lecturer at Dhaka University, came to England to pursue his doctoral studies in 1992: In 1993 Mowla first heard of Hizbut Tahrir from two MBA students studying at the same university. After a few days Hizbut Tahrir’s London Imperial College of Science and Technology chapter organized a seminar at the college auditorium. Mowla took part in the seminar. ‘I was greatly attracted to the organisation’s ideology and expressed my interest to join their next seminars. Since then I have attended many seminars,’ Mowla reminisces. On his return, Mowla shared his newly acquired knowledge with others and discussed about Hizbut Tahrir. Since 1996 Mowla’s home at Dhanmondi turned into a favourite haunt for many civil society members who came there and discussed Hizbut Tahrir’s aims and objectives, its potential, etc. ‘Then in 2001 I organized a seminar titled “Clash of Civilization” at Dhanmondi’s BETS Centre and through that Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh chapter formally emerged,’ Mowla says.122

Mowla, who is an adviser to the HT, is also the author of The Election of Caliph/Khalifa and World Peace. The total number of members of the Bangladesh chapter was claimed by the coordinator Professor Mohiuddin Ahmed at 10,000, of which 50 per cent are activists. The organization has thrived since its founding. They have a student wing called the Chattra Mukti and founded the Muslim Professional, a wing to work with professionals, in 2008. The organization actively

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­ articipated in demonstrations against publication of a cartoon in a p Bangladeshi newspaper in September 2007: the HT leadership described the cartoon as blasphemous and insisted that the publication of the cartoon was a ‘deliberate attempt’ to ridicule the Prophet Muhammad. The HT activists in London expressed solidarity with the movement in Bangladesh and organized a demonstration in front of the Bangladesh High Commission in late September 2007. George Galloway’s victory in 2005 in the Bethnal Green and Bow area, dominated by Bengalis, became an international event as it was a slap in the face for the Labour Party’s foreign policy, particularly the Iraq War policy. But it also demonstrated the strength of Islamist youth groups within the community and the dramatic shift in British politics when it comes to securing the support of Muslim voters. The election, held in 2005, brought the issue to light, but was not as surprising as the mainstream media had portrayed it. Instead, it had been in the making since 2003. There is no doubt that the victory of Galloway is in part a result of the anti-war movement that reached its zenith on 15 February 2003 when millions gathered at Hyde Park to protest the Iraq invasion. Interestingly, the organizers of the march made decisions which in the long run helped the Islamists gain strength within the Muslim community in general and the Bangladeshis in particular. The broad coalition which led the campaign called ‘Stop the War’ brought together an array of people and organizations. It is understandable that an issue like the invasion of Iraq was bound to bring people of different ideological orientations onto the street. But one can easily question whether forming a coalition with the Islamists was the right decision. At the height of the anti-war movement, a partnership between Stop the War and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) was founded. This was later joined by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The decision to choose a religion-based organization instead of drawing support from smaller secular organizations had a serious adverse affect on the Bangladeshi community. Some community activists argue that it helped the schism within the community, and the Islamists gained further ground – both ideologically and organizationally. At the local level, in the East End, some secular social organizations objected to the local anti-war activists, but in vain. Some refrained from joining the movement, despite their outright opposition to the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain. While the foreign policy of the Blair government was a key issue in the general election throughout the country, one can ask: why did the Respect Party in one constituency do so well? To find an answer to this question we must closely examine the election result of the Respect

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Party. If the anti-war issue had singularly favoured the Respect Party this would have been reflected in all areas in which it filed candidates. The party contested 26 seats, and in 12 constituencies their candidates received less than 2 per cent of votes. The party did best in five seats, but when votes from these five seats are deducted the average vote for Respect falls from 6.97 per cent to 2.7 per cent. The Respect Party’s highest votes came from the East End of London and Birmingham. In both areas Muslims are the dominant voters.123 The anti-war sentiment within the British-Bangladeshi community was high, we must admit.124 But the election result reaffirmed the point that global issues are prioritized in the Islamists’ agenda and may be placed in the driving seat. This is not to say that the Respect Party of Galloway did not highlight local issues, particularly the failure of local politicians to address ‘bread and butter’ issues. But when it came to appeal to the Bengali voters, the ‘Muslim’ content was the primary focus. It needs no explanation to understand who the intended audiences were when Galloway made the statement that ‘if you make war against Muslims abroad, you are going to end up making war against Muslims at home’.125 It is no secret that the ELM, the IFE and the LMC extended their support and that their members worked for Galloway to secure the victory. The BBC reported that Muslim volunteers affiliated with the MAB were at the forefront of Galloway’s campaign.126 A passionate plea on the IFE website called upon East End voters to support Galloway: ‘George Galloway is unlikely to establish khilafah in East London, but voting for him will elect a man who speaks up and has sacrificed more for the Muslims than they speak up and have sacrificed for themselves … It will be a disgrace if Bethnal Green and Bow wakes up on Friday 06 May 2005 to find that George Galloway has not been elected as their MP.’127 Galloway and Respect have reportedly acknowledged the contribution of the Islamists in securing his victory. The party from the beginning of the campaign insisted that, ‘For British Muslims facing the fear of losing their identity, RESPECT is THE only party.’128 The long-term impact of the election of Galloway cannot be overstated. The comments of Abdal Ullah, an independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority for Tower Hamlets, on the night of the election, are worth recalling. Insisting that the election had caused long-term divisions within the community, Ullah said to a reporter: ‘Many youngsters in Tower Hamlets have been politicised by this election; it has been a learning curve for them. The area is not going to be the same for a number of years. But I hope it will encourage young people to become involved and to take a deeper interest in mainstream politics, rather than single issues.’129 The opinion was echoed by many, even almost two

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years later, in the summer of 2007 when I visited London. A shopkeeper at Brick Lane insisted, ‘the East End is different from what you saw before 2005’. What is also significant is that the use of religion was not an exclusive preserve of Respect and Galloway: ‘in the course of a bitter campaign, both [mainstream] parties [i.e. Labour and the Conservatives] accused the other, with some justifications, of stirring racial tensions; and both attempted to appeal to Bengali voters through their Muslim identity’.130 This observation is supported by almost all the individuals, including hardcore supporters of both parties, to whom I talked. A Bengali journalist working for a weekly newspaper published from the East End commented that it reminded him of the Bangladeshi election campaign where both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League emphasize their Islamic credentials at times at the expense of other important issues and concerns. This was, in some ways, no surprise, because it was consistent with recent government policy regarding race and ethnic minorities. Where were the community leaders? The success of the Islamist organizations, both the YMO and the HT, in the late 1980s and early 1990s to reach out to the younger population, also raises the question as to why the previously influential community organizations failed to maintain their sway. This can be attributed to the dismal failure of the secular community leaders as much as to the credit of the Islamists. Murad Querishi, a member of the London Assembly, however has a different take. He argues that the ‘Islamists are not as sophisticated as they are made out’.131 Implicit in his assertion is a need for introspection of the community leaders. The secular community leaders, in general, acknowledge this failing, with some caveats, for example the role of the British government. Ayoob Korom Ali insists that the secular community organizations did not fail, their influence ‘declined’. Ramamurthy argues that the decline of the secular organizations and leadership took place across the board within all Asian communities: Why did these organisations and the ideas they represented lose political influence so rapidly during the 1980s? Firstly, it is important to note that key members of the AYMs [Asian Youth Movements] and the UBYL [United Black Youth League], in developing their political perspectives and attitudes as they grew up, began to change their central political commitments. For some members, a developing anti-imperialist perspective posed a contradiction to organizations that campaigned predominantly on anti-

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racist issues and they chose to join or establish organisations in which their concern with their ‘home’ countries could be more clearly developed. Other members defected from grassroots black organising and joined the Labour Party.132

In essence, the argument is that the community activists changed their positions as they moved into mainstream politics. This argument demands an examination of the involvement of South Asians in British politics. I will primarily focus on the participation of Bangladeshis, keeping the wider South Asian communities in mind. One of the key measures of political participation is its nature and scope in electoral processes. Available literature on the participation of the South Asian communities in British electoral politics reveals that until the 1990s members of the community had been reluctant to register to vote. A 1974 study showed that 27 per cent of Asians did not register to vote. The share of non-registration among the South Asian communities was significantly higher than the white population (6 per cent), but lower than the Afro-Caribbean population (37 per cent).133 Surveys conducted in the 1980s revealed that the level of non-­registration remained high among South Asians, but was declining.134 By the early 1990s the rate of non-registration declined significantly, and only 15 per cent of Asians were reported to be left off the voter roll.135 Thus, over a period of two decades the Asian communities have gradually begun to be involved in electoral processes. Although the rate of non-registration remained high among Bangladeshis compared to Indians and Pakistanis, registration has experienced a steady rise since the 1980s. According to one study, in 1997, 91.3 per cent of Bangladeshis claimed to have registered to vote.136 Interestingly, despite low registration rates, the turnout among the South Asian registered voters has always been very high. Those who registered have diligently exercised their rights since the 1970s.137 Overall, Ed Fieldhouse and David Cutts conclude, ‘South Asian adults are less likely to be registered to vote than the rest of the population’, but ‘registered South Asian electors are more likely to vote than non-South Asians’.138 Among the South Asians, Bangladeshis recorded the highest turnout rate in the 2005 general election. Muhammad Anwar’s study showed that the turn-out rate among Bangladeshis was 76 per cent, almost 15 per cent higher than the national average (61.4 per cent) and significantly higher than other South Asian communities (Pakistanis 70 per cent and Indians 67 per cent).139 Despite their enthusiasm for the electoral process, South Asians received a very lukewarm reception from the main political parties, as did other ethnic minority groups. This is, in large measure, because British

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political parties try to keep the ethnic issue on the back burner when it comes to party competition and ‘for [the] most part, political parties have worked fully within the understanding that ethnic minority voters are both attitudinally and geographically amongst the safest constituencies of the Labour Party’.140 These two considerations have engendered an institutional culture within all major political parties which is detrimental to the prominence of ethnic minority issues within parties and the selection of minority candidates for elected public office. Geddes has rightly noted that this institutional culture is then reproduced through institutional inflexibility and by giving undue prominence to events that show minorities in a bad light or discourage them from participating.141 Thus, while the ethnic minorities indicated their willingness to be active and productive participants of the process, political parties have either missed the indications or deliberately kept the minorities at bay. Some have argued that the attitude of the Labour Party towards the minority has been arrogant or neglectful.142 In any case, the result of this institutional culture was that few black and ethnic minority candidates were nominated by mainstream parties for parliament until the late 1980s. After the Second World War, the first ethnic minority candidate to run for a parliamentary seat was in 1950, nominated by the Liberal Party; this was followed by Labour in 1959. Table 3.1  Ethnic minority candidates in general elections, 1970–2005 Year

Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

0 0 0 2 4 6 8 9 16 41

1 1 0 1 6 14 9 13 21 32

3 1 1 2 8 9 5 17 29 40

1970 1974, Feb 1974, Oct 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

Total 4 2 1 5 18 29 22 39 66 113

Source: 1970 and 1974 data are from Omar Khan, Table 2, BME Candidates by Political Party and the Total 1970–97, ‘How representatives are MPs?’, Runnymede’s Quarterly Bulletin, 325 (London: Runnymede Trust, March 2001), pp. 2–11. 1997 to 2005 data are from Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher (compiled and edited), Table 7.07, British Electoral Facts (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 134.

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In both instances each party nominated only one candidate. In the 1964 and 1966 elections, no minority candidates were nominated. In 1970 four candidates were nominated by two parties – one by Labour and three by the Liberal Democrats. The number of ethnic minority candidates in elections between 1970 and 2005 presented in the table below shows that it reached double digits in 1983 and increased afterwards: The increase in the number of candidates, however, masks the fact the parties were not hospitable to the minority candidates. These candidates were nominated mostly in unwinnable seats: before 1983 this was true in almost all cases; since then there has not been any significant change in this trend.143 In 2005, for example, of the total 41 ethnic minority candidates nominated by the Conservative Pary, only two candidates were nominated in safe seats; three were nominated in ‘Labour marginals’ (where Labour’s previous margin was between 9 and 12 per cent), and the reminder – 36 – were in unwinnable seats. It was so obvious that an analyst commented well before the election that, ‘The 36 other minority Tory candidates are gaining valuable experience by standing for election, which may well help their political careers in future contests.’144 The track record of the Labour Party was only slightly better. In 1997, when the party won a landslide victory, out of 183 new MPs only four were non-white. In 2005, 11 incumbent ethnic members were nominated (of these, two were in Labour marginal seats), five additional ethnic candidates were nominated in safe seats to replace retiring MPs, and the remaining 17 ethnic minority Labour candidates faced ‘contests that look unwinnable’.145 The Liberal Democrats’ 35 ethnic minority candidates were all destined to lose as the seats were either Labour or Conservative safe seats. Table 3.2  Ethnic minority parliament members, 1987–2010

Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat Total

1987

1992

1997

2001

2005

2010

4 0 0 4

5 1 0 6

9 0 0 9

12  0  0 12

13  2  0 15

16 11  0 27

Source: Richard Cracknell, ‘Ethnic Minorities in Politics, Government and Public Life’, Standard Note: SN/SG/1156, Social and General Statistics Section (London: House of Commons Library, January 2012). Note: Liberal Democrat includes SDP in 1987; Liberal Democrat’s nominee Parmjit Singh Gill won Leicester South in a 2004 by-election but lost the seat to Labour in 2005.

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As for the success of these candidates, four non-white candidates – Bernie Grant, Diane Abbott, Paul Boateng and Keith Vaz – from the Labour Party were elected in the 1987 elections. One of these new members Keith Vaz was the first South Asian in post-war Britain to win a seat in parliament.146 The number grew slightly in the election of 1992: altogether five members of non-white ethnic background were elected, of whom two were of South Asian background. These numbers, of course, did not reflect the share of South Asians and/or of the ethnic minorities in the British population. These communities remained marginalized in the political arena. In such circumstances, in the 1980s, for South Asians the locallevel borough councils became their point of entry to elected office. Local-level representation is often described as ‘local ladder’, that is, ‘it provides training for future MPs’;147 and the South Asians were hoping that the ladder would take them to the top. Although there was sporadic success in the 1930s and 1940s – for example in St Pancras Council of London an Asian councillor was elected several times between 1934 and 1947 and an Asian Mayor took office in 1938 – the Asian presence in local council leadership was not visible until the late 1970s. As for the Bangladeshis, there were two sporadic instances of successful runs in local elections, both outside the East End. The first instance was in 1972, when Monwar Hossain was elected to Bradford Council and West Yorkshire County Council as a Labour Party representative. Mr Hossain migrated to England in 1954 and founded the Pakistan People’s Association in 1958. In 1971, he was one of the five-member steering committee in support of the Bangladesh war of independence. These experiences provided him with the organizational skills and necessary connections to secure the nomination. The second instance was in 1978. Abdus Samad was elected as Councillor for Waltham Forest Council.148 However, growing frustration with the local-level administration, the need to make their voice heard after the murder of Altab Ali and the opportunity to work with various left-wing platforms including the Anti-Nazi League and labour unions during the anti-racism struggle in the late 1970s, provided impetus to the Bengali community to engage in the local electoral process. Between 1978 and 1982 a significant number of community workers joined the political parties, especially the local Labour Party. Yet securing a nomination for the local council in Tower Hamlets Borough, where the community already demonstrated their networks and capacity to organize and run campaigns, remained a distant dream. The breakthrough came in 1982, somewhat ironically. Mohammad

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Nurul Huq, a community leader, sought nomination from the Labour Party in Tower Hamlets Borough Council from Spitalfields ward, but he was denied. The denial by the Labour Party galvanized the local Bangladeshi community organizations who formed an alliance called the ‘People’s Democratic Alliance’ (PDA) and nominated Huq as an independent candidate. While the community was united in nominating a candidate against the established political parties, differences emerged as to who should represent the community. Eventually five Bangladeshis contested the seat. Huq defeated the Labour nominees and secured the highest number of votes and Syed Nurul Islam came fourth, only 26 votes short of winning a seat in the council. Altogether ten Bangladeshis contested the borough council election in various wards – seven as Independents, two as SDP (Social Democratic Party) representatives, and one as a Labour Party candidate.149 The Labour Party nominee, Mohammad Asik Ali, won St Katherine’s Ward. ‘The defeat of a white Labour Party candidate in Spitalfields ward by a Bengali Independent appeared to indicate the power of the Bangladeshi electorate in particular wards to affect the party’s electoral fortunes.’150 This led the local Labour Party leadership to re-evaluate their strategy towards the Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets: When the veteran Labour councillor for Spitalfields, Annie Elboz, died in 1985 the ward party activists selected Spitalfields’ first Bangladeshi Labour candidate from the ranks of the second-generation activists who had played a prominent part in the formation of Bengali youth groups and the communication of Bangladeshi grievances to local state agencies.151

During the following year the community leaders made their mark on the Tower Hamlets Borough Council electoral politics: 12 Bangladeshis were nominated by different parties and two independent candidates joined the race in four wards of the borough in the election of 1986. The Labour Party won 23 seats, five of which were won by Bangladeshis. In the same year, Syed Nasrullah M. Syed became the first Bangladeshi councillor elected to Hackney Borough Council.152 Elections in Tower Hamlets Borough between 1982 and 1998 show that within a decade the community achieved remarkable success in securing nominations. These successes were not unique to the Bangladeshi community, although they were well ahead of other minority communities in terms of entering into electoral politics. Surveys have shown that in 1974 there were four ethnic minority councillors in London boroughs, the number increased to 35 in 1978, to 79 by 1982, to 179 in 1990 and to 213 in 1994. In 1978, 21 of them were Asian. The number rose to 35 in 1982, to 69 in 1990 and to 194 in 1994.153

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Throughout this period, the trend of an increase of ethnic minority local councillors was observed nationwide: it was 170 in 1985, around 600 in 1996 (about 3 per cent of a total of 25,000 councillors) and a similar number in 2001.154 Throughout the 1990s, Bangladeshis in other boroughs and cities began to venture into local politics while the Bengalis in the East End strengthened their position by assuming the Leader of the Council position (Helal Uddin Abbas was the first) and that of Mayor (Ghulum Mortuza in 1996). Among other elected councillors, Shafi Khan was elected to Croydon Council in 1994 and appointed Mayor in 1999–2000. Thus, beginning in the late 1980s, the leaders of the British-Bangladeshi community became immersed in local-level electoral politics. They joined the mainstream parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats)155 and were successful in securing nomination for local public offices, especially the borough councils. Some became candidates as independents. It was in some measure a graduation from community politics to national politics. This, in view of some members of the community, also brought a shift in the ideological orientations of the community activists; they were no longer trying to represent a position they subscribed to as individuals but that of the political party they were members of. Within these parties they were not sufficiently influential to decide the policy agenda; therefore, they were primarily instrumental in implementation. We must acknowledge that the decision of the community leaders and activists to enter into mainstream politics/parties was a strategy of resistance to ‘power’ – which was, in their view, discriminatory and oppressive. But by being a part of the institutions they were also participating in power relations and contributed to the reproduction of that relationship. The representation of ethnic groups in local elections is a controversial issue; not only for the Bengali community. Often community members are suspicious of their ‘representative’, for the representatives are seen as ‘middlemen’, only an extended tool of the state. Werbner argued that the ethnic representatives faced this suspicion because ‘the majority of ethnic leaders at the local level deal with the state within the parameters defined by the state. Their intercalary position is necessarily the focus of both conflict and cooperation.’156 Furthermore, the increase of ethnic minorities in local-level councils was taking place at a time when the central government initiated a policy of weakening the local government.157 This meant that the councillors had limited resources and very little influence on policy-making. Murad Querishi does not accept that there was an ideological shift of the activists or that joining the mainstream parties should be blamed.

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For him the primary reason behind the decline in community leadership was the generation gap: there was no new leadership. ‘In the late 1980s and early 1990s the leadership of the secular community organizations was in the hands of the first or second generations. Those who led these organizations either migrated as adults or spent their childhood in Bangladesh.’158 Ayub Korom Ali emphasizes that at that time higher education flourished within the community and Bangladeshis were enrolling at universities in large numbers. ‘We could not connect with them. On the other hand, they were reached by the Islamist organizations such as YMO and the Hizb ut-Tahrir at the campuses. These contacts brought them to other social activities within the neighbourhood and the relationship solidified.’159 Nahas Pasha echoed the absence of younger leadership in the community organizations as a key factor of the decline, but he feels that the younger generation was less interested in this kind of organization as it did not provide any benefit – material or otherwise. The older leadership was ‘retiring’ from their responsibilities, he added. In the view of Nahas Pasha, an ‘equally important factor was the nature of these organizations’. These organizations used to provide services related to immigration, and unemployment benefits, or help write letters to government agencies on behalf of individuals. By the early 1990s, almost all families had someone educated enough to deal with these issues at home, thus there was no need to go to an association. Pasha highlights, for example, the Bangladesh Welfare Association which had two welfare officers to provide these kinds of services. Nahas Pasha’s view echoed Ayub Korom Ali’s point : ‘There was very limited need of the community for these kinds of services. Besides, the government agencies adopted new technologies which required fewer intermediaries. These organizations were not adapting to these changing circumstances.’160 Some community activists, however, argue along the line of Ramamurthy’s argument that joining mainstream parties is a major factor. They contend that political expediency on the part of aspiring leaders has had a role in rendering the secular organizations ineffective in confronting the Islamists’ influence. The community activists argued that, as the community leaders began to participate in mainstream politics in large numbers, electoral considerations took priority over everything else. With their eye on the upcoming elections, these aspiring leaders did not want to antagonize voters in any way, and tried to prove their acceptability within the community to the party leadership. The electoral equation had clouded their judgement. As these parties and individuals fought to gain support of the community they identified issues

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that would give them an edge over others and therefore ensure their victory. In so doing, some of the community leaders had at times underscored issues that brought religion into the public space. They did not foresee how issues with religious significance might shape the political landscape in the long term and how other political forces might reap the benefit. Short-term gain and rivalry with other groups influenced their decision on selecting issues to be highlighted. For example, in the 1986 election, parties vied to attract Bengali community leaders which not only exacerbated the internal fighting, but also brought issues like religion to the forefront. A number of community leaders who left the Labour Party in 1985 due to their differences about selection of the 1985 by-election candidate, joined the SDP and ran on their platform. During the election, these leaders highlighted the issue of a proposed mosque in St Dunstan’s ward. They alleged that local Labour leaders – both white and Bangladeshi – were failing to serve the interests of the Bangladeshis and Muslims because they were ‘obstructing an attempt in St Dunstan’s ward to set up a mosque on a council estate which contained a large number of Bangladeshis’.161 In the 1990s, on similar issues, the leadership ceded ground to the Islamists. Perhaps these leaders underestimated the influence of the Islamists, and hoped that it would be a temporary phase. These developments bear strong similarities with the political situation in Bangladesh in the 1980s when the secularists gradually adopted Islamic rhetoric and subscribed to the Islamists’ agenda. Joining mainstream parties also contributed to the weakening of community unity, as community leaders were pitted one against another. The differences within the community already existed and appeared on various issues prior to the pre-eminence of electoral politics; no community can be homogenous and free of contestation. Social organizations, such as the Bangladesh Welfare Association (BWA), Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organizations (FBYO), the Bangladeshi Education Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH) and the cultural centre established in 1982, all witnessed in-fighting. But political affiliations intensified the power struggle. The experiences of 1986 and 1997 within the Labour Party in regard to the nomination to the local parliamentary seat illustrate the point. In 1986, a group of Bengali community leaders tried to secure the party nomination for a British-Bangladeshi and Rajonuddin Jalal presented himself as one of the contestants. The party leadership was unwilling to deselect Peter Shore, a successful MP and a high-ranking party leader. One group of community leaders sided with the party leadership. Jalal and his backers still are of the opinion that their opponents acted in their ‘personal interests’.162 In 1997, there were allegations of ‘ethnic entryism’ (i.e. a sudden rise of

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party membership of one ethnic group with an intention to sway the party nomination in favour of a candidate) which led to the cancellation of membership of hundreds of Bangladeshis. The unfortunate result of the community’s internal quarrel was the denial of a Bengali-speaking candidate in Bethnal Green and Bow constituency. Until the dispute erupted Pola Monjila Uddin was expected to be nominated by the party. But as supporters of another Bengali candidate were allegedly recruiting new members and thus potentially influenced the nomination process, the party hierarchy decided to nominate Oona King.163 By then other parties had begun to nominate leaders of the Bengali community, as both Conservative and Liberal Democrats were well aware that this was an ‘unwinnable’ seat for their candidates. In any case, these intense conflicts within the party and the community created space for other political forces, even those who were not participants of the electoral politics, to gain ground. At times, the community leaders turned a blind eye to this development and befriended Islamists, hoping that it would be beneficial in the short term. Those who were not eyeing party tickets were constrained by the reality on the ground. The extant social injustices, discrimination and unfair treatment by social and political institutions gave credence to the Islamists’ rhetoric. The failure of mainstream politicians to deliver on jobs, decent homes and countering the root causes of racism made it difficult for community leaders to defend the existing political system. The certainties embedded in the Islamists’ rhetoric, however utopian, sounded better compared to the double-talk of politicians, one community leader confided. The discussion on the community leaders’ decision to join the mainstream parties and actively pursue political careers is not intended to imply that they should not have joined, neither is it intended to discourage future leaders to tread this path, but to draw attention to the unintended consequences it has on the political landscape and ideational transformation of the community. As these community leaders moved from the smaller arena of community activism to the larger political arena, they left a void behind which was soon filled by a new kind of political activism propagated by the Islamists. The sources of funding: look no further The sources of funding of the Islamist organizations have been widely discussed in the British media in recent years. Participants of these discussions have often argued that the Islamist organizations, particularly those with a global agenda, receive funding from outside sources.

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Generally speaking, fingers have been pointed at the oil-rich Gulf nations for supporting Islamist groups and individuals. On the other hand, it is also argued that a number of Islamist organizations, either directly or through registered charity organizations, raise funds in Britain for Islamist groups, including militant groups in other countries. The former arguments gained credence because it is well known that in the 1980s a number of charities based in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries provided funds to ‘Islamic’ organizations in many parts of the world, some which had been involved in questionable activities.164 The newly found wealth of the Middle Eastern countries in the late 1970s was used not only for pietistic endeavours in Muslim majority countries, but also in countries where substantial Muslim minorities lack the resources to build their own institutions. While many of these efforts were intended to provide the Muslim communities with religious institutions such as mosques, Islamic centres and religious schools, especially in the early stages, some were connected to political objectives. In the 1980s, there were efforts from Saudi Arabia and countries in the Gulf region to propagate their interpretations of Islam through funding social and religious organizations. These efforts primarily came after the Iranian revolution as a containment policy of the Shi’a theology and the potential destabilizing political influence of the Iranian revolution. Saudi Arabia became the key source of funding. Regent’s Park Mosque and the Islamic Centre in London are cases in point. The mosque, established in the 1940s, was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim scholars until Saudi funding was used to complete the new building in the 1970s. The institutional leadership then shifted to ulama with links to Saudi Arabia. Similarly, al-Mutanda al-Islami centre in south-west London, founded with Saudi support in 1986, has become a centre for the teaching of Saudi-inspired interpretations of Islam.165 The leadership of these institutions has not spoken against the Saudi political establishment. There have been high-profile gifts from Saudi princes and charity organizations for mosques, and educational and social institutions, for the Muslims in Britain in past decades. Many of these gifts and donations are well publicized and received wide coverage in the media, especially those provided for the establishment of mosques and Islamic institutions in various parts of the country including London and Manchester. Yet it is very difficult to estimate the total amount of these gifts and donations. Whether any of these gifts have had any unintended use is a matter of meticulous investigation. Besides, one can argue that these institutions have created an environment and provided an infrastructure for Islamists to flourish. However, these high-profile public contributions are not the only channels of funds from Saudi Arabia. As one analyst has noted,

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‘Donations for less prestigious organizations tend to be covert, as they pass through personal networks and connections which people [are] reluctant to disclose.’166 Availability of these funds, from Saudi Arabia and other countries of the region, is a matter of concern to many British Muslim activists and scholars. For example, Irfan Chishti, an Imam and religious education teacher in Greater Manchester commented in 2005: ‘Some mosques and organisations have clearly been in receipt of foreign funds. In the name of religious dawah (invitation to the religion) certain countries have endeavoured to infiltrate British Islam with their ideologies and theological understandings by giving funds.’167 Salma Yaqoob, a Respect Party leader, agreed that ‘Funding is always an issue and it has been tempting for groups to take up offers of foreign sponsorship. Invariably, money which comes from foreign governments, for example despotic regimes like Saudi Arabia, comes with strings attached (e.g. not to engage in criticism or politics).’168 Overall, the point is made by researchers that in recent decades Muslims in Europe have become more visible in public spheres and there has been an emergence of various organizations and mobilization of Muslims. Silvestri argues that external sources of funding were an important element in this process and refers to ‘Muslim states trying to help (“interfere with” would perhaps be a more accurate term) their own diasporas by providing moral guidance and economic support through the funding of mosques and cultural centres or by appointing imams and teachers of Arabic.’169 There is no doubt that these external funds were pivotal in building networks and infrastructures in the 1980s, but whether these organizations still are exclusively dependent on these sources is doubtful. Over time these institutions and the Islamist organizations have become less dependent on external support; instead they have cultivated local sources to sustain and expand their outreach. Interestingly, one of the key sources for these organizations has been the British state. In the 1980s, the British government not only made drastic cuts in public spending and thus reduced welfare services but also pursued a policy of supporting ‘faith-based’ organizations as a conduit for delivering social services (discussion on the policies of encouraging faith-based groups is presented in Chapter 4). Until then the ethnicity-based local secular organizations received support from the local government to reach out to the communities and acted as a liaison between the state and the community. The most important impact of state support for the Islamist organizations was that they gained legitimacy and acceptability within the society, especially the minority communities.

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In the case of the Bangladeshi community, the legitimacy provided by the state and the funds provided by the local authority helped Islamists, particularly those who had a closer relationship with the MCB, to garner resources to continue their activities. Of late, the cloud of suspicion about their resources no longer hangs over their heads as almost everyone is aware that they are provided for from taxpayers’ money. It is assumed that all of the activities of these organizations are supported from public funds, although that may not be true. These organizations have become a part of the social welfare network on which, unfortunately, a large segment of the Bangladeshi community depends. When Michael Keith, the leader of Tower Hamlets Council, points out that to end the funding of such organizations would result in ‘the disappearance of crucial safety-nets of the kind which once [were] provided (but no longer) by the state’170 he not only states a fact but also reveals how deeply rooted these organizations have become. State funding for social and organizational programmes of the Islamist organizations has undoubtedly helped them; but they have developed a system which allows them to raise funds from the community. Nahas Pasha, the editor of Jonomot, points out that almost half of the £10 million needed for the construction of the LMC came from the Bengali community. The massive fund-raising campaign for the Centre through Ramadan Radio made this possible. The contributions from individuals were small: £100 or £200. ‘The ELM authorities promised that the money will be used for the prayer room etc. Now they have a centre, parts of which are used as commercial property and thus generate revenue. Many are now asking how the money has been utilized.’ Additionally, the LMC has received funds from the European Union: ‘Not necessarily only as part of faith-based initiatives, but through [a] competitive process.’171 Nahas Pasha argues that people involved with the ELM are organized; this enables them to gather funds from various sources including the European Union. Raising funds from the community through radio and television programmes has become a major source of funding for many Bangladeshi Islamic organizations. Not that all Islamic organizations are engaged in political or social activities which privileges the scripturalist interpretation akin to the Islamist, but the presence of these organizations and their activities allow the members of the community to subscribe to religious identity. In 2007, during the month of Ramadan, through two London-based Bangladeshi community television channels – Channel S and Bangla TV – Bangladeshi as well as UK-based Islamic educational, social and cultural organizations collected a substantial amount of money.This was not

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an isolated one-time fund-raising event, neither was it a simple replication of the success of the LMC; these organizations had been collecting funds for quite some time. In the preceding years, funds amounting to £5 million had been raised.172 Of course, not everyone who donates to these organizations subscribes to the ideals of these organizations or does so with intent to support their political agenda. The huge sum of money raised over the year demonstrates that despite abject poverty, the community has been generous in its philanthropic endeavour. In 2007, the television channels charged organizations £6,000 for each night of programming. During Ramadan, the channels charged an exorbitant £10,000 for airtime. This did not deter these organizations: all 30 days of airtime between 8pm and 4am were sold.173 In 2006 each channel aired as many as 27 separate fund-raising programmes for different Bangladeshi Islamist organizations. This is estimated to have helped individual organizations raise as much as £700,000. Approximately, £2 million was grossed through these fundraising programmes. According to the weekly Jonomot, the Bangladeshi community in Britain has been annually contributing £5 million to charity.174 Channel S claims that between 2006 and 2008, it raised up to £7.5 million for 65 mosques, 17 madrassahs and 35 other charity events. There is very little, if any, accountability regarding the use of the funds. To date, these fund-raising programmes have been organized by registered charitable organizations. But television authorities suspect that in future such minimal regulation might be inadequate in controlling the number of organizations raising funds in the UK. The authorities of the television channels, however, are not very eager to reduce the number of these kinds of fund-raising programmes. Capitalizing on the recent trend of selling airtime as fund-raising slots to both UK- and Bangladesh-based Islamic organizations, the television channels have individually grossed a substantial profit. For example, in 2006, Channel S was able to raise £42,000 through these promotional programmes. The Charity Department of Channel S works closely with the Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and Hefazothe Islam UK. Following the lead of the Moulvibazaar-based Baruna Madrassah, which was able to collect nearly £386,000 during its first year of fund -raising, other organizations such as the Portsmouth Central Mosque, Jamiaat-ul-Ulum, Needy Care, iQra International, the Dar-ul Hadith Latifa, Muslim Aid, the Bromley Mosque and Islamic Help have joined the fund-raising fray. It is believed that a specific goal-oriented appeal has enabled organizations to raise large sums of money in recent years. The Baruna Madrassah,

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for example, explains to the audience that they can contribute to help particular kinds of students. A donation of £500 ensures the teaching of a student to become Hafez (able to memorize the Qur’an). Similarly, £200 reserves a prayer space for a madrassah student. An amount of £150 provides food and lodging to a poor madrassah student. The madrassah is located in Maulvi Bazar in Bangladesh, but it is connected to a UK-based organization named Hefazothe Islam UK. The organization bought a house in Plaistow in London at the cost of £450,000 to build a mosque and Islamic Centre. Another Islamic charity organization, iQra International, has been able to collect £14,000. A donation of £60 to the organization provides a wheelchair to a physically disabled person, a donation of £110 provides a sewing machine to a woman, a heavy quilt for the destitute is £15 and a cataract operation £50.175 The UK-based Islamic educational organization, Jamiaat-ul-Ummah, has been able to collect a sizeable amount through their fund-raising programme. The madrassah was founded in 1997. In 2005, the organization raised £130,000, of which £65,000 was collected through a television appeal. In 2006 they aimed to collect £150,000 through the same means. Expenditure incurred by the organization, for each of its students, amounts to £3,300 annually, of which £2,500 comes from the student’s family as tuition fees and donations. The additional amount of £800 is raised through the programme on various television channels. A spokesperson of the madrassah pointed out that over the years their success in terms of their students’ performance has been encouraging.176 In this chapter I have sought to discuss some factors internal to the British-Bangladeshi community which engendered an environment of privileging an identity with religion as its core value. I highlighted four factors – the impact of Bangladeshi politics, the rise of Islamist youth groups in the 1980s and the 1990s, the failures of the secular leadership and the sources of funding for the Islamists – and through the examination of these factors I have shown how they shaped not only the identity of the individual at the social level but also at the community level, especially within the political realm. It is not that the community had made deliberate choices in every instance to go down a certain path, but in some instances choices of the members of the community had paved the way, whether or not they were intended to do so. These factors were not mutually exclusive; in fact, different circumstances offered different choices and some have had greater impact than others. Events and choices are not independent of actors; thus as these factors were played out, there were actors who tried to sway policy in one direction or the other. Those who intended the community’s identity to be

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informed by its religious identity, the Islamists, have achieved significant success. They have contributed to the creation of some circumstances and indeed, made the most out of the circumstances, even if not of their making. These internal factors were matched by some external factors, which I discuss in the next chapter, that have helped the Islamists gain further ground. Notes   1 Examples of such studies include John Eade, ‘Nationalism and the quest

for authenticity: the Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets’, New Community, 16:4 (1990), 493–503; John Eade and David Garbin, ‘Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance: Bangladeshis and the competition for resources in the global city’, Oxford Development Studies, 30:2 (2002), 137–49; David Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora in the UK: socio-cultural dynamics, religious trends and transnational politics’, Paper presented at the European Human Rights Conference on Bangladesh – Extremism, Intolerance & Violence (London: School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, 17 June 2005); Sarah Glynn, ‘Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25:6 (2002), 969–88; Delwar Hussain, ‘Globalization, God and Galloway: the Islamisization of Bangladeshi communities in London’, Journal of Creative Communications, 2:1–2 (2007), 189–217; John Eade and David Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora: community dynamics, transnational politics and Islamic activities (with a focus on Tower Hamlets, Oldham and Birmingham)’, Report for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003): www.roehampton.ac.uk/researchcentres/cronem/clients-andprojects/Bangladeshi_Diaspora_2003.pdf (accessed 20 October 2005); Katy Gardner and Abdus Shuker, ‘I’m Bengali, I’m Asian, and I’m living here’, in Roger Ballard (ed.), Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain (London: Hurst & Co., 1994), pp. 142–64.   2 Gardner and Shuker, ‘I’m Bengali, I’m Asian, and I’m living here’, p. 163.   3 John Eade, ‘Identity, nation and religion: educated young Bangladeshi Mus­­­ lims in London’s “East End”’, International Sociology, 9:3 (1994), 377–94.   4 Justin Gest, ‘Reluctant pluralists: European Muslims and essentialist identity structures’, Paper presented at Political Studies Association Conference 2010, available at the PSA Conference Proceedings 2010: www.psa.ac.uk/ journals/pdf/5/2010/306_1270.pdf (accessed 15 July 2010).   5 Nahid Afrose Kabir, Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 95.   6 Nazli Kibria, ‘The “New Islam” and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31:2 (2007), 243–66.   7 Elizabeth Scantlebury, ‘Muslims in Manchester: the depiction of a religious community’, New Community, 21:3 (1995), 425–35.   8 Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma

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(London and New York: Routledge, 2001) and Global Political Islam (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).  9 Remey Leveau, ‘The Islamic presence in France’, in Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg Lithman (eds), The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe (London and New York: Mansell Publishing, 1988), pp. 107–22. 10 Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics, p. 136. 11 Jocelyne Cesari, ‘Muslim minorities in Europe: the silent revolution’, in John Esposito and François Burgat (eds), Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 251–69. 12 Scantlebury, ‘Muslims in Manchester’, 427. 13 Barbara Franz, ‘Europe’s Muslim youth: an inquiry into the politics of discrimination, relative deprivation, and identity formation’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 18:1 (2007), 110. 14 Jessica Jacobson, Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity Among British Pakistani Youth (London/New York: Routledge, 1998). 15 Kenan Malik, ‘UK: Rise in the market for fatwas and book burning and decline of secular space’, South Asia Citizens Web (2009): www.sacw.net/ article587.html (accessed 24 May 2008). Malik developed his arguments further in his book, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy (London: Atlantic, 2009). 16 Shawkat Liton, ‘Islamic parties boom after 1976 ban lifting’, Daily Star (29 August 2006), p. 1. 17 For extensive discussion on various Islamist parties, and their electoral and organizational strengths, see Ali Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 29–43. 18 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (New York: International General, 1971). 19 Article 12 of the Bangladesh constitution reflected these secular aspirations when it stated that, ‘in order to achieve the ideals of secularism, a) all kinds of communalism, b) patronization by the state of any particular religion, c) exploitation (misuse) of religion for political purposes, and d) discrimination against, and persecution of, anyone following a particular religion will be ended’ (Bangladesh Constitution, Article 12). The constitution further stipulates, ‘No persons shall have the right to form or be a member or otherwise take part in the activities of, any communal or other association or union which in the name of or on the basis of any religion has for its object, or pursues a political purpose’ (Bangladesh Constitution, Article 38, paragraph 2). 20 After the promulgation of the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972, widely known as the collabourators order, on 24 January 1972, the government set up 73 special tribunals, to try Razakar, Al-Badr and Al-Shams forces, defined as collabourators in the order. However, these trials came to a halt after the government granted a general amnesty on 30 November 1973. Under the general amnesty, about 26,000 out of the 35,000 people held or convicted under the act were released. While the

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amnesty did not apply to those charged with murder, rape or arson, most of the collabouration cases, especially those of the leadership stature, involved abduction and other general collabouration charges. A large number of persons charged with murder, rape or arson, including prominent collabourators, were also released (Shahiduzzaman, ‘Cases buried, laws revoked’, New Age (December 2005): www.newagebd.com/2005/dec/15/murdered/ murdered03.html (accessed 15 January 2006). 21 Between November 1975 and April 1977, although Zia held the real power, A.S.M. Sayem held the post of president. Sayem was asked to resign from the position in April 1977. 22 The State Religion Amendment Bill, commonly referred to as the ‘Eighth Amendment of the Constitution’, was introduced in parliament on 11 May 1988, and passed on 7 June . 23 Out of three hundred seats in the parliament, the BNP won 140, the Awami League 88, Allies of the Awami League 11, the Jatiya Party of General Ershad 35, and the JI 18. A total of 151 seats were necessary to claim a stake in power. 24 Pirs, literally translated saints, are very common figures in Bangladesh. The tradition grew out of a specific mode of preaching Islam in the subcontinent. Some of these early preachers drew the attention of the local people irrespective of their religious beliefs through their spiritual power, morality and principles of tolerance. These pirs, ideally, represent mystic Islam and represent one or more mystic orders. Following their deaths, their graves are turned into mazars (shrines) and are visited by their muridan (disciples). But over the years, the practice has degenerated to a great extent and cult-like organizations have been created, especially by those who lack high morals. These pirs often exert inappropriate influence on their disciples, and their residential-cum-worship compounds have become headquarters of complex social networks and places where patronages are exchanged between highranking people 25 Haroon Habib, ‘On neutral ground’, Frontline,18:6 (2001): www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1816/18160570.htm (accessed 4 September 2001). 26 The only exception was the 11–party alliance, a conglomeration of the left and liberal democratic parties and groups. They pledged that if voted to power, they would work towards restoration of secular ideals. 27 The election scheduled to be held on 22 January 2007 was later cancelled after a State of Emergency was declared on 11 January and a militarybacked technocratic government took power. 28 ‘AL-bigots electoral deal stuns all’, Daily Star (25 December 2002), p. 1. 29 ‘2 “militants” get AL tickets’, Daily Star (27 December 2006), p. 1. 30 Ali Riaz, Unfolding State: The Transformation of Bangladesh (Ontario: de Sitters Publications, 2005). 31 ‘PM warns against anarchy’, Daily Star (22 December 2005), p. 1. 32 ‘Hasina hits out at PM over sedition threat’, Daily Star (23 December 2005), p. 1. Hasina was referring to the grenade attack on the AL public meeting on 21 August 2004. At least 22 people, including a central AL leader, were

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killed. The target of the attack was Hasina who was slightly hurt (see Ali Riaz, ‘Bangladesh in 2004: the politics of vengeance and erosion of democracy’, Asian Survey, 45:1 (2005), 112–18.). 33 Shelley Feldman, ‘Gender and Islam in Bangladesh: metaphor and myth’, in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretative Essays (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 231. 34 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Inventing political violence’, Global Agenda (2005): www.globalagendamagazine.com/2005/mahmoodmamdani.asp (accessed 20 October 2005). 35 For details of the tumultuous events between 1975 and 1982, see Riaz, Unfolding State. 36 Tasneem Siddiqui, Migration as a Livelihood Strategy of the Poor: The Bangladesh Case (London: Department of International Development, 2003), p. 3. 37 Md. Abdus Sabur and Hasan Mahmud, ‘Political impacts of remittances: a micro-level study of migrants’ remittances in a village in Bangladesh’, Asian Social Science, 4:12 (2008), 128–34. 38 Detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this book. For details see: Muntasir Mamoon, Patthya Pustak: Itihash Dokholer Itihash (The Text Book: The History of Capturing the History, in Bengali) (Dhaka: Dana Publishers, 2002) and Momtazuddin Patawri, Patthypustake Muktijuddher Tithash Bikriti (Distortion of Facts in the Text Books on Liberation War of Bangladesh, in Bengali) (Dhaka: Jatiya Granth Prakashan, 2004). For an incisive discussion on the controversy related to history writing see: Yvette Claire Rosser, Indoctrinating Minds: A Case Study of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2004). 39 Historical narratives of the role of the Bengalis and memoirs of some of the key organizers are available in Bengali. For example, Tajul Muhammad, Muktujuddho O Banglaee Probashi Samaj (Freedom Struggle and the Bengali Diaspora, in Bengali) (Dhaka: Shahitya Prakash, 2001); Y. Chowdhury, Ekatore Belet Proboshai (Diaspora in England During 1971, in Bengali) (Sylhet: Ishan Publishers, 1988); Syed Abdul Mannan, Muktijudhey Juktorajyer Banglaeer Obodan (The Contribution of the Bengalis in the UK in the Freedom Struggle, in Bengali) (London: Radical Asia Publications, 1998); Abu Sayeed Chawdhury, Proboashe Muktijudhyer Deenguli (The Days of Freedom Struggle in Overseas, in Bengali) (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1990); Khonodoker Mosharraf Hossain, Ekattorer Smriti: Muktijudhey Belet Proboasheeder Obodan (The Memories of 1971: The Contribution of the Bengali Diaspora in England, in Bengali) (Dhaka: Ahmed Publishing House, 1998). For a brief English narrative, see: Sarah Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card: Politics and Ghettoisation in London’s East End, Institute of Geography Online Paper Series: GEO 018 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2006). 40 Eade and Garbin, ‘Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance’, 140. 41 Eade and Garbin, ‘Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance’,

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140; see also Hussain, ‘Globalization, God and Galloway’, 202. 42 Personal interview of a group of youths in East London, 20 July 2007. The participants wanted to remain anonymous. Aged between 18 and 24, the composition of the group, however, was all male. Some are attending colleges, while some are already in jobs. Note the differentiation of Bangladeshi politics and British politics as expressed by these youth. Speaking of Bangladeshi politics as practised by the elders they described it as ‘home politics’ while British politics is referred to as ‘our politics’. 43 Quoted in Eade and Garbin, ‘Bangladeshi diaspora’. 44 Rajonuddin Jalal, interview, 11 March 2006 in John Eade, Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Jamil Iqbal and Marissa Hey (eds), Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain (Surrey: Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism, University of Surrey, 2006), p. 98. The book is a result of an oral history project of the University of Surrey, School of Arts, Communication and Humanities Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM) and the Swadhinata Trust, a London-based non-partisan secular Bengali group. The interviews of the project were conducted in 2006 . The date of interview and page number of the book is mentioned for each interview and will be referred to ­accordingly. 45 Altab Ali, a 25–year old mechanic, who had recently arrived in the country from Bangladesh, was murdered in Whitechapel, in London’s East End on 4 May 1978. He was returning home from his job at a sweatshop in nearby Brick Lane when he was fatally stabbed by three local youths – two white, one black. ‘It was not just any night. It happened on local election night in May 1978, when the National Front politically … hardly existed but they were agitating and organizing’ (Dan Jones, 6 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 65). 46 Avtar Brah, ‘The “Asian” in Britain’, in N. Ali, V.S. Kalra and S. Sayyid (eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 49. 47 Quoted in Brah, ‘The “Asian” in Britain’. 48 Anandi Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, Race & Class, 48:2 (2006), 42. 49 John Newbigin, interview, 21 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 79. 50 These accounts are drawn from Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain. 51 Rev. Aloke Biswas, interview, 19 May 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 80. Reverend Biswas was a community activist and a social worker in the borough of Hackney in the 1970s. 52 Rev. Kenneth Leech, interview, 9 March 2006, in Eadeet al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 82. Reverend Leech was the former director of the Runnymede Trust, a leading think-tank promoting ethnicity and cultural diversity. He was involved with the progressive youth movement from the 1960s. 53 Akikur Rahman, interview, 5 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three

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Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 79. Rahman was a political ­activist in the late 1970s. He was one of the organizers of the Black Solidarity Day in reprisal for the murder of Altab Ali. At the time of the interview Rahman was a Liberal Democrat councillor for the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. 54 Suroth Ahmed (Faruk), interview, 30 April 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 81. Ahmed was one of the founding members of Bangladesh Youth Approach (BYA). 55 The feeling and actions in regard to building resistance to the attacks is vividly described by Rajonuddin Jalal: ‘There were many occasions when the thugs belonging to the National Front [would] be rampaging through places like Brick Lane and Cannon Street Road, and we would organise groups of young people to go and physically fight with them. There have been many battle[s] that involved physical assaults between the National Front and us, and eventually we did drive them out of the area. It was a battle for survival’ (Rajonuddin Jalal, interview, 11 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 79. Jalal was one of the key organizers of the Bangladesh Youth Movement (BYM). 56 Nooruddin Ahmed, interview, 10 April 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 59. Nooruddin Ahmed was a community activist in the 1970s. Sunahwar Ali states, ‘we were the young people [and] we realized that we needed to form some kind of organization. The Bangladesh Welfare Association was there but they were not taking any active part in the anti-racist activity’ (Sunahwar Ali, interview, 21 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 63). 57 See interviews of Dan Jones, Kenneth Leach, Rajonuddin Jalal, John Eversley, Derek Cox, John Newbigin, Mohammad Abdus Salam, Sunahwar Ali, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, pp. 59–63. 58 Helen Clarke, ‘Life on the Lane’, Independent (2 May 1998), p. 24. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_19980524/ai_n14158397 (accessed 6 August 2008). 59 Quoted by Kenneth Leech, interview, 9 March 2006, in Eade et al., Tales of Three Generations of Bengalis in Britain, p. 66. 60 Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, 38–60. 61 A. Sivanandam, From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1986), p. 142. 62 Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, 44. 63 Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, 44. 64 Munira Mirza, Abi Snethikumaran and Zein Ja’Far, ‘Living apart together, British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism’, Policy Exchange (2007), 22. 65 Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, 39. 66 Kenan Malik, Speech at Community Relations Council (CRC) Policy Con­ ference, London (27 April 2006): www.community-relations.org.uk about-the-council/background-info/brandon-hamber-speech/malikpolicy (accessed 4 August 2008).

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67 Ziauddin Sardar, now a prominent author, described this connection clearly in an article published in 2004. Sardar writes, ‘I developed an aversion to secularism in my early 20s. During my university days, in the early 70s, I became the General Secretary of the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (FOSIS). Like most members of FOSIS, I was strongly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and JI of Pakistan. These organisations preached a simple message: Islam Good; Secularism Bad’ (‘Searching for secular Islam’, New Humanist, 119:5 (2004): http://newhumanist.org. uk/798/searching-for-secular-islam (accessed 20 February 2010)). 68 Sophie Gilliat, ‘Muslim youth organizations in Britain: a descriptive analysis’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 14:1 (1997), 99–110. 69 R. Okley and S. Carey, ‘Street life, youth and ethnicity in inner city areas’, New Community, 13:2 (1985), 214–23. 70 Michael Keith, ‘Making the street visible: placing racial violence in context’, New Community, 21:4 (1995), 552. 71 Quoted in Claire Alexander, ‘(Dis)Entangling the ‘Asian gang’: ethnicity, identity, masculinity’, in Bannor Hesse (ed.), Un/Settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions (London/New York: Zed Books, 2000), p. 127. 72 Clarke, ‘Life on the Lane’. 73 Glynn, ‘Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals?’, 975. 74 K. Patel, I. Wardley, J. Bashford and M. Winters, The Evolution of Nafas: A Bangladeshi Drug Service (Preston: Ethnicity and Health Unit, Faculty of Health, University of Central Lancashire, 2001), p. 16. 75 Yahya Birt, ‘Being a real man in Islam: drugs, criminality and the problem of masculinity’, Islam for Today (2001): www.islamfortoday.com/birt01. htm (accessed 20 February 2010). 76 Gillian Cottew and Adenekan Oyefeso, ‘Illicit drug use among Bangladeshi women living in the UK: an exploratory qualitative study of a hidden population in East London’, Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 12:3 (2005), 183. 77 Cottew and Oyefeso, ‘Illicit drug use among Bangladeshi women’, 184. 78 Addictiontoday.org, ‘Abstinence can be a cultural requirement: why settle for inappropriate treatment?’ Policy, Nafas (2006): www.nafas.org/ Basharat%20Addiction%20Today%20Article.pdf (accessed 8 May 2008). 79 Clarke, ‘Life on the Lane’. 80 S.F. Carey, ‘Looking for the buzz: heroin – the drug of choice. Drug use amongst Bangladeshi youth on the ocean estate’ (Final report, London: Community Partnership, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 2000). 81 Lucinda Platt, ‘Moving up? Intergeneration social class mobility in England and Wales and the impact of ethnicity, migration and religious affiliation’, Conference on Immigration: Impacts, Integration and Intergenerational Issues (London: University College London, March 2006). 82 Mirza et al., ‘Living apart together, British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism’, 23. 83 Tariq Modood, Not Easy Being British: Colour, Culture and Citizenship

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(London: Runnymede Trust/Trentham Books, 1992). 84 The official narrative of the founding of the organization is as follows: ‘In October 1978 young Muslim men gathered in a house in London to bring together a dynamic band of youth who would respond to the challenges faced by their community with deep faith, true commitment and a positive and comprehensive work plan. They believed that this was the way to success, to preserve and strengthen Muslim identity in Britain, and contribute to the global Islamic Movement whose aim is to direct the Islamic process of social change. Thus was the Young Muslim Organisation UK (YMO UK) born!’ (Young Muslim Organisation UK, Islamic Forum Europe: www.islamic forumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=ymo (accessed 21 February 2010)). But this was a reincarnation of the Islamic Youth Movement founded in the early 1970s. The IYM, after its initial success, disappeared at the end of the decade. Its demise has been attributed to three factors: first, ‘to most young Muslims the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Britain was far-fetched’; second, ‘its dismissive attitude towards the traditional values of the parents’ g­ eneration’; and third, ‘growing unease over the unimpeachable status accorded to the Jamaat-i-Islami founder Maududi’ (Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain Since 1800 (London: Hurst and Co., 2004), p. 371). 85 By then another Islamist youth organization, the Young Muslims UK (YMUK) had emerged. The organization was founded in 1984. The Islamic Society of Britain is the parent organization of the youth body. 86 Activities of the ELM have been extensively discussed by a number of authors; see Eade and Garbin, ‘Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance’; ‘Bangladeshi diaspora’; Glynn, ‘Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals?’ and Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card. 87 Jamil Ali, Changing Identity Constructions Among Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain (Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Department of Theology, University of Birmingham, 2000), p. 27. 88 Quoted in John Eade and David Garbin, ‘Competing visions of identity and space: Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain’, Contemporary South Asia, 15:2 (2006), 181–93. 89 The mosque has a long history. It was originally established in 1940 at Commercial Road. In 1975 it was moved to White Chapel Road after the Greater London Council purchased the previous location. The construction of the current structure of the mosque began in 1982 and was completed in 1985. This is the phase when Islamists, especially followers of the Dawat-ul Islam, established their control over the mosque management. The followers of the Dawat-ul Islam left the management in 1988 after differences of opinion among the organizers. This led to the founding of the IFE and its control over the mosque. Adjoining land was acquired in 1999. 90 Eade and Garbin, ‘Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance’. 91 The London Muslim Centre (LMC) is located adjacent to the ELM. According to the ELM authority, ‘HRH Prince Charles and HRH Prince Mohamed al-Faisal launched the project to build the London Muslim Centre in a ceremony on 2001. Building work commenced a year later, and the new

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London Muslim Centre opened in June 2004.’ 92 East London Mosque, Facilties (2008): www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/? page=facilities (accessed 5 August 2008). 93 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 374. 94 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 374. 95 Glynn, ‘Bengali Muslims: the new East End Radicals?’, 976. 96 Hussain, ‘Globalization, God and Galloway’, 202. 97 salam.co.uk, ‘Muslims in UK, defining events: the Rushdie affairs 1988–91’, n.d: www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/september03_index. php?l=1 (ac- cessed 25 May 2007). 98 Rayen Salgado-Pottier, ‘A modern moral panic: the representation of BritishBangladeshi and Pakistani youth in relation to violence and religion’, Anthro­­­ pology Matters, 10:1 (2008): www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/ 2008 –1/salgado-pottier_2008_modern.pdf (accessed 30 July 2008). 99 Giles Kepel, Allah in the West, Islamic Movements in America and Europe, trans. Susan Milner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 131. 100 salam.co.uk, ‘Muslims in UK, defining events’. 101 Urmi Rahman is a renowned Bangladeshi author and a journalist who migrated to Britain two decades ago. She previously worked for the BBC World Service Radio. At the time of the interview, she was a staff member of Newham Borough. Ms Rahman regularly contributes to Bangladeshi newspapers on the British-Bangladeshi community. Urmi Rahman, per­­­sonal interview, 19 July 2007, London. 102 Ayub Korom Ali, personal interview, 17 July 2007; Ahmed Ansar Ullah, personal interview, 21 July 2007, and Nahas Pasha, personal interview, 20 July 2007, London. 103 Masud Rana, personal interview, 20 July 2007, London. 104 Haras Rafiq, personal interview, 16 July 2007, London. 105 These comments are drawn from discussions with a number of Bangladeshis. Most of them were in their 30s when interviewed in the summer of 2006 and summer of 2007. They are quite successful at their careers, including business. They have sought anonymity and their comments are paraphrased rather than quoted verbatim. 106 Quoted in Gardner and Shuker, ‘I’m Bengali, I’m Asian, and I’m living here’, p. 162. 107 Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Fundamentalism, multiculturalism and women in Britain’, in James Donald and Ali Rattansi (eds), Race, Culture and Difference (London: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 284. 108 Extensive discussion on the HT can be found in Frank Schneider, ‘Hizb Ut-Tahrir: A Threat Behind A Legal Façade?’ (Unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006). 109 Ed Hussain, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left (London: Penguin Books, 2007). The book narrates the life journey of a young political activist in England in the 1990s. Hussain joined the YMO at the age of 15. Three years later he

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left the YMO after he became disillusioned. He then joined the Hizb ut-Tahrir led by Omar Bakri. After working with the HT for several years, he decided to leave the organization and joined the Islamic Society of Britain. Finally, he renounced all of these and joined the sufi movement. While Hussain has received kudos for being candid and brave, the book has many flaws. His experience helps readers understand Islamist activism, but also demonstrates his naivety, especially on foreign policy and Islamophobia. On the other hand, he has faced threats and intimidation from radical Islamists. Hussain and Nawaz established the Quilliam Foundation, ‘a counter extremism think tank foundation’. 110 Nigel Morris, ‘PM forced to shelve Islamist group ban’, Independent (18 July 2006), p. 1. 111 Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics, p. 129. 112 Zeyno Baran, ‘Fighting the war of ideas’, Foreign Affairs, 84:6 (2005), 69. 113 ‘For Britain’s young Muslims, forks in the road’, International Herald Tribune (30 August 2006): www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/29/news/britain. php?page=1 (accessed 2 August 2008). 114 Ed Hussain, ‘They threatened my life. But I will still speak out’, Observer (9 June 2007): www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/10/religion.british identity (accessed 28 September 2012). 115 Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’: www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/ def (accessed 28 September 2012). 116 Inayat Bunglawala, ‘Review of “The Islamist”’, Muslim Council of Britain (2007): www.mcb.org.uk/library/article_24–05–07.php (accessed 23 June 2007). 117 Abdul Wahid, ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s Distinction’, Open Democracy (15 August 2005): www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/criticism_2755.jsp (accessed 19 June 2007). 118 Nahas Pasha, personal interview, 20 July 2007, London. 119 ‘Hate mob attacks Galloway’, Evening Standard (20 April 2005): www. thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-18034715–details/Hate+mob+attacks+ Galloway/article.do (accessed 3 May 2008). 120 ‘Hate mob attacks Galloway’, Evening Standard. 121 The organization has experienced a split since and reorganized under the leadership of Ghayasuddin Siddiqui (no relation to Kalim Siddqi, but a close associate). The website of the Muslim Parliament in Great Britain claims that the organization’s new leader has ‘introduce[d] reforms into how the Muslim Parliament was to operate and engage with its social and political environment. Out went the ideologically-driven thinking and in came a more consensual, pragmatic modus operandi. Predictably this led to disaffection in the ranks of Dr Kalim Siddiqui’s more ideological followers, some of whom seceded to form separate groups’ (The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, ‘The Muslim Parliament – a historical background’: www.muslimparliament.org.uk/history.htm (accessed 27 February 2010)). 122 Shafiq Rahman, ‘Call for Khilafa’, Probe News Magazine (2005): www. probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=827 (accessed  15

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March 2008). 123 Three constituencies where Respect candidates did well are worth mentioning: in West Ham Lindsay German won 20.7%, coming second to Labour; in East Ham Abdul Khaliq Mian won 19.5%, also coming second; and Oliur Rahman won 17.2% in Poplar and Canning Town, coming third. 124 As reported by the BBC: ‘In a further sign of the impact of the Iraq War, there was a significant swing from Labour to Lib Dem in most of the 40 seats with a large Muslim population’ (‘Blair secures historic third term’, BBC News (6 May 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/ vote_2005/frontpage/4519863.stm, accessed 5 June 2007). 125 George Galloway made the statement at the meeting of the East London Community Organization – TELCO – on 20 April 2005. Quoted in Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card, p. 18. 126 ‘Galloway’s East End street fight’, BBC News (6 May 2005): http://news. bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4519575.stm (accessed 5 June 2007). 127 The article, written by Babar Ahmed, was also posted on the Muslim Association of Britain website. The MAB provided a list of candidates Muslims should vote for. The article suggested that younger voters should take ‘a day off work or studies’. A copy of the article is available at IslamicAwakening.com (Babar Ahmed, ‘Why British Muslims must vote’, Islamic Awakening (2005): www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php? articleID=1220 (accessed 7 July 2007)). 128 Quoted by J.M. Thorn, ‘Respect victory – a new dawn for the left?’, Emancipation and Liberation, 10 (2005).: http://republicancommunist. org/articles/EL010/EL010Thorn.html (accessed 28 October 2007). 129 T. Kirby, ‘Election 2005: police on alert in tense Bethnal Green’, Inde­­ pendent (6 May 2005): http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_ 20050506/ai_n14615306 (accessed 3 August 2008). 130 Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card, p. 18. 131 Murad Querishi, personal interview, 17 July 2007, London. 132 Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, 55. 133 Muhammad Anwar and David Kohler, Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the General Election, October 1974 (London: Community Relations Commission, 1975). 134 In a 1981 survey among Asians living in inner London areas the rate was recorded at 27 per cent (J. Todd and B. Butcher, Electoral Registration in 1981 (London: Office of the Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981)), and the 1983 survey at 21 per cent (Muhammad Anwar, Ethnic Minorities and the 1983 General Election, London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1984). 135 S. Smith, Electoral Registration in 1991 (London: Office of the Population Censuses and Surveys, 1993). 136 Shamit Saggar, Race and Representation: Electoral Politics and Ethnic Pluralism in Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 137 Muhammad Anwar, ‘The politics of brAsian electorate’, in N. Ali et al.

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(eds), A Postcolonial People, South Asians in Britain (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006), pp. 193–5. 138 Ed Fieldhouse and David Cutts, Electoral Participation of South Asian Communities in England and Wales (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2007). 139 Muhammad Anwar, Ethnic Minorities and Politics: The British Electoral System (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). 140 Shamit Saggar, ‘Analyzing race and elections in British politics: some con­­­ ceptual and theoretical concerns’, in Shamit Saggar (ed.), Race and British Electoral Politics (London: University College London Press, 1998), p. 26. See also Anthony M. Messina, ‘Ethnic minorities and the British party system in the 1990s and beyond’, in Shamit Saggar (ed.), Race and British Electoral Politics (London: University College London Press, 1998), pp. 47–69. 141 Andrew Geddes, ‘Explaining ethnic minority representation: contemporary trends in the shadow of the past’, in Jonathan Tonge, Lynn Bennie, David Denver and Lisa Harrison (eds), British Elections & Parties Review: Volume 11 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 127–32. 142 Marian Fitzgerald, ‘There is no alternative … Black people and the Labour Party’, Social Studies Review, 4:1 (1988), 20–3. 143 Omar Khan, ‘How representative are MPs?’, Runnymede’s Quarterly Bulletin, 325 (London: Runnymede Trust, March 2001), 2. 144 Pippa Norris, ‘Parties back ethnic minority candidates in the race for seats’, Financial Times (21 April 2005): www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/ Acrobat/FT%20columns/FT%20Column%203%20draft%20version.pdf (accessed 9 June 2010). 145 Norris, ‘Parties back ethnic minority candidates in the race for seats’. 146 Between 1892 and 1929, three South Asians were elected to parliament; they were: Dadabhai Naoroji (1892–95), Mancherjee Bhownagree (1895– 1906) and Shapurji Saklatvala (1922–23, 1924–29). 147 Geddes, ‘Explaining ethnic minority representation’, p. 123. 148 Dr Mozammel Haque, ‘Political participation of British-Bangladeshi in the UK politics: a historical perspective’, Euro Bangla (31 May–6 June 2010), p. 22; Faruque Ahmed, ‘Bengali-British MP, through the history’ (in Bengali), Weekly Potrika (London), Election 2010, Special Issue (26 April 2010), pp. 14–16. 149 John Eade, ‘The political representation of South Asian minority in a working-class area: the Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets, East London’, South Asia Research, 7:1 (1987), 56–7. 150 Eade, ‘The political representation of South Asian minority in a workingclass area’, 57. 151 Eade, ‘The political representation of South Asian minority in a workingclass area’, 61. 152 These changes were not only due to pressure from the Bengali community – inter-party ideological battles within the Labour Party played a key role too. Sections of the party commonly referred to as the left and

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the right fought on many issues, including the participation of minorities. The ­activists on the ‘left’ alleged that the central and regional leadership were part of the ‘right’ and thus they were trying to create a grassroots movement. In so doing, they were trying to enlist support of the minorities at local levels. This ideological battle opened the door to the Bengali and other ethnic minorities. 153 See Michel Le Lohe, ‘Ethnic minority participation and representation in the British electoral system’, in Shamit Saggar (ed.), Race and British Electoral Politics (London: University College London Press, 1998), p.  94, Messina, ‘Ethnic minorities and the British party system in the 1990s and beyond’ and Jessica R. Adolino, ‘Integration within the British political parties: perception of ethnic minority councillors’, in S. Saggar (ed.), Race and British Electoral Politics (London: University College London Press, 1998), pp. 175–201. Le Lohe further argued that in the late 1990s, Labour’s Asian candidates were more successful compared to Labour’s overall performance in local elections. He reported that 72.6 per cent of Asian Labour candidates succeeded while the overall success rate was 54.5 per cent. Conservative and Liberal Democrat Asian candidates did not do so well: 11.8 per cent of Conservative Asian candidates succeeded (overall 29.1 per cent) and 7 per cent of Liberal Democrat Asians succeeded (overall 20 per cent). 154 Roman Garbaye, Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 7. 155 In the late 1980s, the Labour, Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic parties were the mainstream parties. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) existed between 1981 and 1988. The party was founded by so-called moderate Labour leaders who alleged that Labour became too left-wing in its policy orientation. The SDP joined an alliance with the Liberal Party in 1983 and 1987 general elections, and finally merged with the Liberal party to form the Liberal Democrat party in 1988. 156 Prina Werbner, ‘Black and ethnic leaderships in Britain: a theoretical overview’, in Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar (eds), Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 17; emphasis in original. 157 Glenn Loury, Tariq Modood and Steven Teles, ‘Introduction’, in Glenn Loury, Tariq Modood and Steven Teles (eds), Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1–18. 158 Murad Querishi, personal interview, 17 July 2007, London. 159 Ayub Korom Ali, personal interview, 18 July 2007, London. 160 Nahas Pasha, personal interview, 20 July 2007, London. 161 Eade, ‘The political representation of South Asian minority in a workingclass area’, 64. 162 Rajonuddin Jalal, ‘Struggle for a Bengali MP: from the pages of memory’, Weekly Potrika (London), Election 2010, Special Issue (26 April 2010),

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p.  28. 163 Pola Uddin was appointed to the House of the Lords in 1998. 164 Some of these organizations active in Bangladesh in the 1980s include the Kuwait-based Restoration of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS, Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami) and Dawlatul Kuwait, Saudi-based Al-Haramian Foundation and Hayatul Igachha, Emirates-based al-Fujira, the Dubaibased al-Ansar al-Khairiah, the Bahrain-based Dawlatul Bahrain, and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). For their roles, especially connections with militant groups, see Riaz, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. 165 Madawi Al-Rasheed, ‘Saudi religious transnationalism in London’, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.), Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 157. 166 Al-Rasheed, ‘Saudi religious transnationalism in London’, p. 154. 167 ‘Sponsoring British Islam’, BBC News (August 2005): http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/4172000.stm (accessed 15 June 2010). 168 ‘Sponsoring British Islam’, BBC News. 169 Sara Silvestri, ‘Muslim institutions and political mobilisation’, in A. Boubekeur, S. Amghar and M. Emerson (eds), European Islam: The Challenges for Society and Public Policy (Brussels/Budapest: Centre For European Policy Studies/Open Society Institute, 2007), p. 177. 170 Quoted in Delwar Hussain, ‘Bangladeshis in East London: from secular politics to Islam’, Open Democracy (7 July 2006): www.opendemocracy. net/democracy-protest/bangladeshi_3715.jsp (accessed12 July 2006). 171 Nahas Pasha, personal interview, 20 July 2007, London. 172 S. Chowdhury, ‘Prabasi Bangalira bachare 5 million pound daan karen’ (Migrant Bengalis donate 5 million pounds annually, in Bengali), Jonomat (27 October–2 November 2006), p. 1. 173 Nahas Pasha, personal communication via e-mail on fund-raising in London, 4 September 2007. 174 Chowdhury, ‘Prabasi Bangalira bachare 5 million pound daan Karen’, p. 1. 175 ‘Follow up: TV te jamjamat fund raising’ (follow up: impressive fundraising on television, in Bengali) Jonomat (13–19 October 2006), p. 1. 176 ‘T.V te Jamiaatul Ummah’s fund raising anusthan: target 150 hajaar pound’ (Jamiaatul Ummah’s fund-raising programme on television: target 150,000 pounds, in Bengali) Jonomat (29 September–5 October 2006), p.  54.

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4

Identity, Islamism and politics: the state as actor

T

he state plays a pivotal, perhaps the central role, in ethnic identity politics, and this is truer for welfare states like Britain. Whilst the members of the ethnic community, especially their leaders, define the parameters of the group identity, instrumentalize these features through various means and claim the representation, the state provides the legitimacy to these identities within the social and political realms. Werbner has aptly described the actions of community members and actions of the state as two ways of invention/imagination of a community.1 The state’s direct role can be discerned at two levels; at the national level the state provides recognition and incentives through policies of race and immigration as well as law and order; at the local level, the state is the principal source of resources. In Britain, the local authorities allocate resources which have a significant effect on how social groups are defined and vie for representation. These two levels within the state are inseparable; the former provides the broad policy framework which the local authorities translate into actions. Globalization has inserted another dimension to this complex interplay between state and communities: foreign policy. The external relations of a state, until the late twentieth century, had very little direct impact on domestic minority politics. In conventional international relations, domestic and foreign policy are distinguished as two separate concepts occupying different terrains, although there is no denying that the values and ideas of the society shape the foreign policy of a country.2 However, it is no longer the case that these two domains remain distinguishably separate; on the contrary, the divide between external and domestic policies is now blurred. Foreign policy is no longer an obscure issue to the community leadership. Of course, globalization is an enabling force in removing the separation line as policies are now more accessible to members of the community, thanks to the media. But the most important element is that the foreign policy of the government does influence the state’s approach towards social groups within the country.

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The merger between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ in regard to the treatment of the minority Muslim community became more pronounced after 9/11 throughout the world, particularly in Western countries. Foreign policies can also bring about a perceptual shift within a community who can now link, whether correctly or not, the state’s approach toward the group at home and their country of origin. In such cases, the community leadership plays an important role in shaping the nature of identity politics and modes of activism of the community. With this in mind, I address the impact of the policies of the British government in recent decades on identity politics within the BritishBangladeshi community. The previous chapter has demonstrated that events, issues, forces and factors internal to the community helped the salience of Muslim identity; here I look outside the community. In this chapter I examine the role of the British state in facilitating the rise to prominence of Islamists within the community. The empirical data are organized around two topics: race and immigration policy, and foreign policy. From hostility to community cohesion via faith: policies toward race and ethnicity During the twentieth century, British policy towards minority communities underwent four phases: the era of hostility, the era of assimilationism, the era of multiculturalism, and the era of faith and social cohesion.3 The phases represent both continuity and change in policies and have left indelible marks on race relations in the country. These changes over a period of a century have considerable continuity, particularly in defining the expectations of the British state as regards the immigrant community and the state’s approaches towards engaging with minority communities. The policies, their successes and failures, have changed the social landscape of Britain and the role of migrant communities, including the British-Bangladeshis. It is my contention that recent policy initiatives to emphasize faith as a marker of community and the defining feature of identity have facilitated the rise of Islamists within the Bangladeshi community. The familiar history of race relations in the UK takes 1948, particularly the arrival of the Empire Windrush, the SS Orbita and the SS Georgia with Afro-Caribbean immigrants, as the point of departure, and policies formulated since then as the official approaches towards the ethnic minority groups. Until recently, both academic and popular discourses had uncritically accepted this narrative and recognized 1948 as a watershed in the history of multicultural Britain. The BBC website,

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for example, states: ‘On 22 June 1948, the Empire Windrush docked at Tilbury in London, delivering hundreds of men from the West Indies. Many had returned to rejoin the RAF [Royal Air Force]. Others had been encouraged by adverts for work. The day marked what would become a massive change to British society – the start of mass immigration to the UK and the arrival of different cultures.’4 This historical construction, especially the reference to ‘arrival of different cultures’, is highly problematic at various levels. First, it presents a completely inaccurate picture of British history, as if there had been one single homogenized British nation/culture from time immemorial, whereas in fact the nationstate itself emerged only in the eighteenth century and the imagined British culture has always remained fragmented with the presence of Scots, Welsh and Irish. Secondly, as I discuss below, it simply obliterates the fact that the black population has been present in England since the sixteenth century and Asians since the eighteenth century. From this perspective, the first specific policy dealing with immigration was the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and the Race Relations Act of 1965 was the first policy in regard to race and ethnicity. Concomitant to this narrative is the claim that the 1958 Nottingham/Notting Hill riots were the first ever race riots in Britain. This narrative has come under fire in recent years, as it has been unveiled by researchers that race and immigration had been issues of concern for policy-makers before 1948, while policies under different guises had been formulated to address these issues, and some of the policies codified later were already being practised. The picture that emerges from the acceptance of the 1948 watershed perspective is that the country was wholly white or that the white majority population had warmly accepted a small non-white minority. Both are far from the truth. The presence of a non-Caucasian population in England since the sixteenth century is well documented. Throughout the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries, there were a number of black settlements in various parts of London. Before the slave trade between Europe, Africa and the Americas was proscribed in 1807, members of the higher echelons of society such as former colonial officers, military personnel and traders regularly brought slaves to England. Records of burial registration show that black people were buried in a number of graveyards in London.5 In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, many African and Caribbean men participated in the Napoleonic Wars on behalf of the British Empire and later settled in London. In similar vein, there is ample evidence indicating an antiimmigration sentiment in society. One can go back to the letter of Queen Elizabeth I to Mayors of major cities in 1596 where she wrote: ‘of late

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divers blackmoores brought into this realm, of which kind of people there are already here to manie ...’. She ordered that ‘those kinde of people should be sente forth of the land’.6 The discriminatory treatment of Indian seamen vis-à-vis white seamen under various navigation laws passed from 1660 onwards also reveals anti-immigrant attitudes and in the late nineteeth century the anti-immigrant sentiment was widespread. For example, a section of the British press took an anti-immigration stance in 1886, two inquiry commissions were appointed by parliament in 1888 to examine immigration issues, the first anti-immigration society was founded in 1892, and two separate bills to restrict immigration were introduced in 1892 and 1898.7 In 1905 the Aliens Act, the first peacetime act to limit immigration, was passed as a direct outcome of the reaction to the Eastern European Jewish immigrant presence. The passing of the act was preceded by the founding of the British Brothers League, a radical anti-immigrant group, in 1902 in East London. The group was supported by a number of MPs, including Major EvansGordon and Howard Vincent. The group described the immigrants as ‘destitute foreigners’ and organized a number of demonstrations to push for a stricter policy. Race riots and racial tensions on the ground pre-dated 1948. Two weeks prior to the docking of the Windrush, there was a race riot in Liverpool.8 The country had witnessed major riots long before the ‘arrival’ of the Afro-Caribbean population: the 1919 race riots are now well documented. Although their genesis can be traced back to the government’s decision regarding demobilization of servicemen after the First World War, the riots were essentially racial in nature and were directed against the migrant community. ‘From January to August race riots occurred in no less than nine British port towns. Thousands of people were involved, three white and two black men were killed, dozens injured, over 200 arrested, and thousands of pounds sterling worth of property was destroyed.’9 Liverpool was one of the major towns where the riots were extremely violent, but other towns were not far behind. On 13 June 1919, the New York Times reported that ‘At Cardiff and Barry, in South Wales, race riots of almost equal magnitude took place last night. … In London there have been repeated race riots of a minor character in the last few weeks.’10 More than a hundred years before the widespread race riots examples of inter-group fighting between non-white migrants was reported in the East End of London: ‘on October 12 1806 … there [was] a riot between 300 Chinese and a group of Lascars and Irishmen that numbered around 150.’11 Thus, race relations in Britain were strained from the beginning of the twentieth century (and perhaps even before) and the government dealt with these

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through existing policies. The New York Times reported that during the 1919 riots, the local authority of Liverpool in consultation with the Ministry of Labour ‘decided to intern negros brought from Africa and other countries, to serve as labour battalions, pending their r­ epatriation’. The aforementioned description shows that internment and deportation were the primary policies of the government in dealing with immigrants who were considered ‘undesirable’. These actions were taken under the Aliens Act of 1905,12 the first piece of legislation in regard to migration in the twentieth century.13 During the First World War, the government rushed through two pieces of legislation, the Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919. Although both were aimed at controlling foreign ‘enemy’ aliens already settled in Britain, particularly Germans, they reflected the prevalent attitude and approaches toward immigrants in general. The Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 required foreign nationals to register with the police and allowed for their deportation. The 1919 Act extended the wartime emergency powers of the 1914 Act and added further restrictions, particularly concerning the employment of alien seamen in British merchant ships. The riots of 1919 accelerated the processes of imposing further restrictions on immigrants. The Aliens Order of 1920 and the 1925 Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order14 made it mandatory for immigrants to register with the police and thereby created an environment of fear of deportation for immigrants if they broke the law. Under this act, many non-white seamen with British nationality were arbitrarily registered as aliens. ‘The principle enshrined in the 1920 Order became a cornerstone in the regulation of immigration for decades to come.’15 I call this phase an ‘era of hostility’, because the implicit and explicit arguments in making the policies, the texts of the policies and the implementations of them were premised on the view that the migrants were undesirable, and that it was the responsibility of the policy-makers to protect the country from being ‘flooded with the whole of the alien refuse from every country of the world’.16 This phase came to an end in the early 1960s through the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962. The second phase began with the 1962 Act, the primary goal of which was immigration control: to ensure that a smaller number of people would finally be allowed to enter and stay in the UK. In essence the act was intended to limit the number of non-white immigrants, because after 1949 the government had clearly demonstrated its preference for immigration of whites from Europe.17 A Colonial Office report of 1955 states, ‘a large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life would weaken ... the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached’.18 It was

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also expected that those who would be allowed to remain within the country would gradually become a part of the society, though not as an equal partner. The dominant thought was that the immigrant community must accept the lifestyle offered and try to assimilate with the broader society. This policy of assimilation did not necessarily mean equal rights or protection; nor did it promise any special treatment. It was an era of assimilationism. ‘Assimilationism utopianized the prospect of a British national identity preserved through the eventual cultural acceptance of the migrants into the putative British way of life, in exchange for the generational dissipation of ethnically marked cultural differences.’19 Throughout the 1960s, the British government on the one hand enacted legislation such as the Race Relations Act 1965 and the Race Relations Act 1968 which provided an impression that the state was serious in addressing deteriorating race relations, while on the other hand it passed the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1968 and the Immigration Act 1971. The former specifically restricted the entry of East African Asians with British nationality and created a ‘two-tier British citizenship’.20 The history of policies devised under Labour and Conservative governments in regard to race relations in the following three decades shows that there was a bi-partisan consensus that was closely tied to immigration policy based on the shared belief that ‘firm immigration control is [a] pre requisite for good race relations’.21 In the 1970s and 1980s the assimilationist mindset steered the policies of the government. The challenges of race relations became obvious and juridico-legal changes were designed to attain the principal objective of assimilation. While the British establishment was either failing to comprehend the nature of the issue or pursuing wrong policies, the immigrant community faced intimidation, harassment, attacks and social and political obstacles. The rise of the National Front, a party with an avowed anti-immigration stance, in the 1970s, preceded by Enoch Powell’s infamous speech of 1968, marks the high point of this antiimmigration sentiment. This sentiment was, however, reflective only of certain sections of society: one can hardly argue that when Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher made immigration a major issue of her election platform in 1978 she was responding to sections of the population who were in favour of ‘compulsory repatriation of immigrants’.22 The electoral victory of the Conservative Party was perhaps due to the poor electoral strategy of the Labour Party, but it also bears out the point that British society was looking for an answer to the immigrant question and that the Conservatives provided a clear answer to it. For those who wanted a solution to the immigration issue, the answer was that the migrants must shed all their cultural baggage, adopt the norms

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of British society, and ‘become like us’ or else they must find another home. From the policy vantage point this was an era of assimilationism, while on the ground it was an era of tension between ethnic minorities and a section of white supremacists. The essence of assimilationism is cultural uniformity; it presupposes that there is a dominant, single, unchanging culture to which others must assimilate. Although occasionally the assimilationist discourse attempted to conflate assimilation and integration, the policies did not. ‘The term integration implies a process of give and take on both sides. Assimilation suggests that the immigrants must do the adjusting.’23 At no point did state policies indicate the encouragement of an exchange between the migrant communities and the society at large. Some authors argue that the assimilationist mindset of the policy-makers was not a post-1960s phenomenon, but had begun as early as 1945. Ian Spencer, for example, writes, ‘“Assimilation” and “racial conflict” are two terms which frequently recur in official writings on the subject of “coloured” immigration in this period [1945–55].’24 This observation is worth keeping in mind. The insistence of the state on changing the way immigrants perceive their identity alienated the ethnic minority community, and they came up with various strategies of resistance. Resistance does not necessarily imply engaging in planned and organized violence, overt opposition, or posing an outright challenge to the state or its policies. We can divide resistance into two broad categories: individual everyday resistance,25 and organized collective resistance. The dynamics, mechanisms, and techniques of everyday forms of resistance are different from collective resistance. The former may create the groundwork for the latter. But members of subaltern and marginalized groups create their own ways of resistance in their everyday lives. In many ways the insularity of various ethnic communities during the era of assimilation was a mode of resistance. The Bangladeshi community, in its infancy, responded with withdrawal from the wider society, building cohesion within the small community, reliance on close networks and finally resistance against racial attacks through organized efforts. The adoption of the first three techniques was easier because most of them came from one particular geographical region of Bangladesh and arrived through a chain migration which relied upon kinship networks. Many members of the community had endured an adverse political environment in their homeland prior to their departure, and this prepared them to distance themselves from the state and the ‘other’ community. But the Bengali nationalist movement in the then East Pakistan was also a source of inspiration which helped them to organize

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collective resistance against racial attacks. In 1971, some members of the community participated in activism in the UK in support of the Bangladesh movement and learnt how to reach out to other anti-establishment organizations such as the labour unions, the left political parties, and the Anti-Nazi League. Those who arrived after the emergence of Bangladesh were filled with nationalist feelings and were ready to take on any system. To them, there was no system that could not be challenged. In his study of Muslims in Britain, Ansari argues that the first-­ generation post-Second World War Muslim migrants were ‘content to remain detached from the wider British society’ due to their ‘personal priorities, aspirations, and social and religious pressures’.26 This generalization can be applied to the Bengali migrants who arrived alone and led spartan bachelor lives. But with the arrival of their families in the late 1960s, the situation changed and there were expectations to be part of the British society. But the response of the host society and the state was unwelcoming and hostile. This was what compelled the Bengali community to retreat to an insular environment. Ansari further argues that the South Asian Muslim community adopted ‘accommodation’ as their main strategy.27 He explains ‘accommodation’: ‘Those who accommodate may be content with a minimum modus vivendi between themselves and the host society while remaining largely encapsulated within their own group, and adapting only slowly to the social environment.’28 Within the British-Bangladeshi community accommodation comprising insularity and encapsulation was both an imposition by the society (for example the spatial dimension) and a form of everyday resistance. The turning point in regard to race relations policy came in 1976 with the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).While there had been various Race Relations Acts in the 1960s, the establishment of the CRE represented a clear signal of a change in the British approach towards race relations and ethnic minorities. The acknowledgement that race and ethnicity had become major issues and that the situation demanded clearly articulated policies and an institutional framework to implement equality was a marked improvement from earlier eras. This heralded the era of multiculturalism. The issue of multiculturalism can be addressed from two perspectives: first, descriptively (that is as a description of a reality or a statement of fact) and second, as a policy-response of the state towards the minority populations. The advancement in communication, expansion of economic activities, growing inequality among nations, availability of opportunities, war, persecution and many other factors have prompted migrations and movements of people in larger numbers in the past

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century than ever before. It is a truism to say that the world is a diverse place; it has always been full of people of various cultures, races and ethnicities. The discourse of multiculturalism is not about this reality on a grand global scale, but rather about the ground reality of certain countries and continents. Places such as Europe, North America, and Australia have become diverse in terms of demographic composition and hence have become multicultural. This is equally true of other parts of the world, in various degrees. But it should be pointed out that the presence of people of other cultures in the society, especially in Europe and North America, is not a new phenomenon; for centuries these societies have been home to people of other cultures, either by choice or due to forced migration. In many places, the situation is far more complex than at first sight. For example, in North America and Australia, the people representing the ‘other’ culture became the dominant group and thus the ‘statement of fact’ itself can be problematic, unless one locates the ‘fact’ in larger historical perspective. Thus, to speak about multiculturalism as a statement of fact must be prefaced with the acknowledgment that there was (and still is) an explicit hierarchy of cultures in these societies; that a binary frame of outsider/insider, dominant/subordinate, majority/ minority was (and still is) used to view the society, uncritically accepted and naturalized through state policies and societal norms; and that the ‘outsider’ and/or ‘other’ has been defined incoherently.29 Additionally, once this frame was naturalized, there was a structured silence about the presence of the people who were considered outsider/other. But societal needs expressed through various forms, for example – in the case of Britain – the violence of the 1980s, necessitated that ‘the ground reality’ be accepted and the need for multiculturalism as a state policy considered. Stuart Hall has drawn a distinction between these two describing social formations with diverse population as ‘multicultural’ whereas multiculturalism is ‘the strategies and policies adopted to govern or manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity which multi-cultural societies throw up’.30 In so far as the state policies are considered, a usual historical narrative starts in 1971: Inaugurated in Canada by the Trudeau government in 1971, and adopted in modified form by Australia a few years later, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the multicultural policies introduced in many countries, including Britain, the Netherlands and Germany. As in Britain, such policies did not always issue from a state commitment to multiculturalism. In the US, where it is not an official government policy at any level, multiculturalism arose as a protest movement from ‘below’ among African Americans and

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other assorted identity groups, who felt that the ‘difference-blind’ policies flowing from the 1964 Civil Rights Act were not working for them, and henceforth their difference should be a matter of emphasis and pride.31

While this narrative is correct as a history of juridico-legal steps and changes in the ‘normative attitude’ of the policy-makers within these countries, it misses the point that these measures are primarily the ‘vehicle for redressing [the] legacy of ethnic exclusion and racial subordination’32 at home and abroad. Therefore it is necessary to locate these developments within the global political imperatives and the embedded objective. Mills highlights these two dimensions: multiculturalism is basically a post-Second World war phenomenon, a result of the confluence of several major historical developments: the (partial) discrediting of racism and the concept of race itself by the Holocaust, the global anti-colonial struggle and eventual success of decolonization, the civil rights movements of black Americans and indigenous peoples in the former white settler states, and the mass labour migrations of the last few decades from ‘South’ to ‘North.’ Multiculturalism in this context can thus be seen as a backhanded, belated, and oblique (too oblique for some) acknowledgement that the modern world has in certain respects been a global polity shaped by the fact of transnational white European domination – invasion, expropriation, settlement, slavery, colonization, the color bar, segregation, restricted immigration, and citizenship – and that a political correction for this history of general Euro-hegemony is called for.33

Stuart Hall also underscores the need of such contextualization within global historical developments saying that ‘this is the result of a series of decisive shifts, a strategic reconfiguration of social forces and relations across the globe’.34 The policy of multiculturalism implemented in these countries, whether or not explicitly acknowledging the history and contexts, recognized the existence of minorities and paved the way for their voices to be heard. In Britain the reports on the riots of the 1980s, especially the Scarman Report on the Brixton Riots in 1981,35 ‘called for a multi-racial, multicultural approach, which would recognise the different needs and ethnic communities in society’.36 This resulted in a series of policy interventions and a culture shift within the establishment and the society including the passing of the British Nationality Act 1984 which opened the door for the entry of new Commonwealth citizens to Britain. While the old assimilationist ideas didn’t die suddenly, neither did the extreme racist forces vanish overnight; rather, a process of change ensued. Multiculturalism provided an opportunity to the ethnic minorities to be a part of the larger whole without being submerged by the ‘dominant’ culture, and allowed many voices to be heard and diversity celebrated.

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Within the Bangladeshi community this meant the emergence of various local secular organizations – cultural, social and sub-regional. Associations of various kinds mushroomed. Avenues of cultural expression, including media, opened up to the community. These organizations became the vehicle of reaching out to the local authorities, to convey the demands and discontents of the community. Similarly, for the government and local authorities, these organizations became the means to mobilize local communities. The Bangladesh Welfare Association is a case in point. This organization represented the community, serving as a bridge with the administration through which the local government disbursed funds for community health, education, social welfare and economic development. Often these organizations were at the forefront of the struggle against racism, inequality, and injustice. Importantly they were participating through the existing democratic structure.37 One of the most obvious effects of multicultural policy on the Bangladeshi community was the participation of British-Bangladeshis in local government and mainstream political parties. To some critics, this allowed the establishment to co-opt the Bangladeshis. The policy of multiculturalism came under fire in the mid-1980s from all shades of political persuasions and gathered force over time. The central element of the criticisms of the conservative right was that multiculturalism disunites society and undermines national identity; the liberals on the other hand argued that it provides lip-service to diversity in society without making substantive changes in power relations. The liberals also argued that in the process of according legitimacy to group identity and group rights, individual rights were being trampled. The policy was not embraced by some of those who were actively engaged with the Asian Youth Movements, although the activists of these movements were at the forefront of challenging assimilationist policies and paved the way for change. In their view, the multiculturalist policy created a rift within the broad-based ideological unity of the disenfranchised segments of the population shaped in the late 1970s. Ramamurthy made this point eloquently: ‘Through funding criteria, the state split the communities into Asian and black and the broad-based concept of a political black identity that had been embraced by the youth movements struggled to maintain influence. Within the context of state funding, an identity based on black resistance gave way to new identities focused on the cultural domain.’38 The criticisms of multiculturalism can be divided into two broad cate­­­ gories: theoretical and practical, or to borrow from Kaloianov, categorical and functional.39 In short, the categorical/theoretical arguments are

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that multiculturalism essentializes culture, views it as a fixed entity and thus reifies group-based identities; that multiculturalism only recognizes the differences and therefore encourages the ‘politics of recognition’40 but as it fails to challenge the system of domination and subordination it does not provide an emancipatory politics; and that multiculturalism provides an illusion of a change in power relations between dominant and subordinate.41 This is not to say that there were no challenges to these positions. Tariq Modood42 and Bhikhu Parekh43 in the case of Britain, for example, argued that these criticisms are often premised on wrong theoretical assumptions. As for the practical/functional criticism, the central element remained the effectiveness of the policies; across the spectrum of political persuasions the loud and clear message was that multiculturalism has not worked. While the critics varied as to what exactly the policies should have achieved, there seems to have been an underlying agreement that the actions taken under the broad rubric of multiculturalism have not created a bridge between the minority communities and the majority white population. Instead, as Ruth Kelly, then Secretary for Communities and Local Government insisted in 2006, they created ‘separateness’.44 In the view of Francis Fukuyama, ‘the old multicultural model was based on group recognition and group rights. Out of a misplaced sense of respect for cultural differences – and in some cases out of imperial guilt – it ceded too much authority to cultural communities to define rules of behaviour for their own members.’45 In some respects multiculturalism and identity politics has enforced group conformity and thus undercut the spirit of celebrating difference. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, in her book entitled After Multiculturalism published in 2000, not only ignited a heated debate in the media but challenged the extant view that it has not helped minorities gain their due position in British society. The most scathing critique came from the enquiry reports on the riots of 2001, particularly the report by Ted Cantle of the Community Cohesion Review Team, which insisted that minorities are living parallel lives. Amartya Sen introduced the term ‘plural monoculture’ to describe the shortcomings of multiculturalism practised in Britain.46 Plural monoculturalism, Sen argues, is a condition wherein various cultures exist alongside but distinct, separate and isolated from each other with no real interchange or dialogue, absent of sharing of life and learning. Sen’s interjection came in the middle of the 2000s, after the transport bombings in July 2005 in London which essentially securitized the debate, but the road to the transformation of the debate from a civic endeavour to understand the meaning of citizenship to a debate on the ‘enemy within’ was being laid throughout the mid-1990s. The ­criticisms

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against multiculturalism grew louder to the extent that political leaders were happy to declare the demise of multiculturalism.47 Between 2000 and 2005, the issue became whether multiculturalism was a failed experiment. Functional criticisms included arguments that it has led to at least three serious problems, as Alibhai-Brown had noted: first, the state remained unchanged and continued keeping the minorities at bay; second, the policies have deliberately failed to give the people their entitlements which led to the fragmentation of groups and bred in-fighting; ‘The third problem that is emerging, the only real challenge, is how we are, each of us individually or as states or nations or localities, going to embrace, relate to, empathise with, understand people who are utterly unlike ourselves and to whom we owe nothing.’48 One other argument was that multiculturalism has allowed ‘interest groups’ to masquerade as ‘cultural groups’.49 Kenan Malik, a fervent critic of multiculturalism, argues that the policy has been detrimental not only to the state and the people of Britain, but to the minority communities as well. I quote his arguments at length below: Multiculturalism gave an institutional form to what we now call identity politics. Policy makers came to treat people less as British citizens than as members of particular racial, ethnic, cultural or faith groups, and to define policy largely in terms of the perceived needs and desires of those groups. And people came to see themselves in that way too – not as British citizens but as Muslims, or African Caribbeans, or Scottish.   Two consequences flowed from these developments. First, there has been increasing conflict between identity groups. Britain today is less defined by confrontation between the state and minority groups, than by conflict between those groups. Because Britain is seen as a community of communities, so each group seeks to maximise its interests at the expense of others, creating animosity.   Second, there is a greater disengagement between individuals and the political process. Because individuals are often treated not as citizens but as members of particular groups, so they feel less inclined to think of themselves as citizens or to see to political process as being of great value. This is particularly so because elected politicians have effectively abandoned their responsibility for engaging directly with Britain’s communities. Instead they have subcontracted their responsibilities out to so-called community leaders who act as intermediaries.50

One of the critics of multiculturalism stated, ‘in Britain, multi­ culturalism became a career opportunity and a source of political patronage. So-called experts on cultural sensitivity and equal opportunity – generally people whose ambitions far exceeded their talent, except for bureaucratic intrigue – built little empires, whose continued

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existence depended on the permanence of racial and other divisions in society.’51 One can hardly contest the fact that the policy of multiculturalism had its downside. Occasionally, voices of less powerful minority groups may have been lost in the loud voices of many groups. Mainstream political parties began using the ‘ethnic card’, some abused the ­ system, and some abominable practices were hidden behind culturalist arguments. Yet in the end, as Ayub Korom Ali, a Labour Councillor in the London Borough of Newham who has been engaged in community activities for almost three decades, forcefully argues, multiculturalism created ‘a vibrant community sector’ and ‘opportunities for communities to do things for themselves’.52 The onslaught on the multiculturalism policy was one of the hallmarks of Margaret Thatcher’s administration. Not only did the administration move away from the policy, but it restricted funding of local government to community organizations which eventually stifled their activities and led to their eventual demise. The debate on the pitfalls of multiculturalism accelerated after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. In Britain, as I have noted, the 2001 riots constituted a watershed moment and the reports that followed called for a new policy measure – social cohesion. But the 2005 transport bombings in London (referred to as 7/7) turned the theoretical debate entirely into a public policy issue. The debate was followed in France, Denmark and Australia where official discourses shied away from the use of the word multiculturalism.53 Remarkably, what was once an issue of liberal democratic egalitarianism soon became an issue of integration of Muslims within Western demo­cracies. However, as the debate was raging in the 1990s, British policy took a new turn: it brought religion or faith, as it was referred to, to the front and centre of community relations. This policy shift, marking the fourth phase, delivered a huge blow to secular ethnic organizations. Bangladeshi community activists believe that it has had disastrous consequences for the community, and the damage is ­irreparable. Religion had occupied a visible position within public life in Britain for centuries, especially because of the unique position of the Church of England. However, the role of the church as a conduit of the state’s social welfare services took centre stage after the publication of the Anglican Church’s report Faith in the City in 1985. The Church became ‘a key player’ in the regeneration process and a number of projects of the Church were funded by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The DTI’s Inner Cities Unit adopted a policy that, ‘in order to

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have dialogue with these ethnic communities, by far the best instrument for communicating with them … and enabling them to represent their needs to government, was through their faith linkages’.54 This line of action was furthered in 1992 when the government founded the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC).55 Although the primary objective of the ICRC was urban regeneration, this initiative founded a forum where religious identity came to the fore. By the mid-1990s religion assumed the central place in policy towards ethnic minorities. The government policy to reduce funding for community-based organizations from the mid-1980s had already weakened the secular ethnicity-based community organizations and palpably fragmented them, thus leaving only the religious organizations and religious groups intact. Within the Muslim communities, ‘bodies with a distinct Muslim identity … emerged with an enhanced profile in the eyes of the authorities. Those who wished to emphasise Islamic needs found their positions strengthened in schools and in mosques, prayer halls and madrassas.’56 Ayub Korom Ali explained the consequence in terms of the identity of the members of the community: ‘We were no longer Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, or Indians; we are now part of a faith community, religion has become the most important factor in defining and describing our communities’. The most telling indicator of the government’s preference for religious groups as opposed to ethnic community organizations was the comment of the Home Secretary Michael Howard in 1994. He told a Muslim delegation that they should come back when they had established a unified Muslim organization to speak with one voice.57 This comment and the government’s insistence on a single voice for the Muslim community led to the founding of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. But this is just about representation. There was no ban on community-wide organizations. Kenan Malik places blame squarely on multiculturalist policies for the prominence and influence of religious groups and institutions and insists that this prominence can be traced back to the Bradford Council’s decision to fund the Bradford Council of Mosques in 1981. In his opinion moves like this squeezed out the secular tradition: ‘the only place offering shelter for disaffected youth was militant Islam. Hence the rise in the late 80s of fundamentalist Islamic organisations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.’58 There are voices which do not completely agree with this analysis. Haras Rafiq feels that ascribing faith-based initiatives as a cause for the rise of Islamist forces within the Bangladeshi community or radical forces within the Hindu community is an exaggeration. The support for faith-based groups ‘is not a cause, but an enabler’, he insists.59

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The policy of the Conservative government to prefer faith-based organizations vis-à-vis the secular ethnic community-based organization was further expanded under the Labour Party government which came to power in 1997. From its very first year, the government made it clear that faith would be the key determinant in its engagement with the minority communities. One of the key proofs of Labour’s adherence to and belief in religion as a critical factor in addressing ethnic issues is its approach towards the ICRC. The 1998 review of the ICRC concluded that ‘there is an increasing tendency for the members of ethnic minority communities to identify themselves in the first instance by their religious beliefs rather than by their nationality’.60 The government’s reliance on religious groups to further its contacts with the community was also reflected in the adoption and implementation of ‘Compacts’ announced in November 1998. The Compact, according to a government document, ‘provides a framework that sets out the principles and undertaking that should underpin the relationship between the sector and government. It is aimed at creating a new approach to partnership.’61 The document further stipulates: ‘Local authorities will ensure that faith communities, as social partners, are fully included in the compact process and feel that their voice has been both heard and reflected in the partnership statement that results in the form of a local compact.’ 62 By the time the Labour Party was re-elected in 2001, the policy of working intimately with faith-based groups had taken firm root within almost all departments of government. In 2004, the government produced the report entitled ‘Working Together: Cooperation between Government and Faith Communities’ which laid down elaborate plans of action and specific steps to enhance the capacities of faith-based organizations.63 Beginning in 2005, the Home Office initiated the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund to provide financial support to faith-based groups. Two rounds of the funding between 2005 and 2008 provided support to a total of 140 Muslim organizations.64 Despite severe criticisms from various sectors of society, particularly secular social activists, the Labour government did not make any serious effort to re-evaluate its position; instead it further strengthened its efforts in this direction. In 2008, the Department of Communities and Local Government announced a plan which includes new local ‘Faiths in Action’ funds, a programme of investment over three years in Regional Faith Forums to support and build their capacity and in particular their interaction with local inter-faith activity, and supporting the ­ development of regional Faith Links (regional hubs for Local Authority Faith Leads) within each of the English regions by 2011, to name but a few.65

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The policy of privileging faith was not devised for the Muslim community alone. But in the context of Muslims, this new policy constructed a Muslim community as if Muslims constituted an undifferentiated whole. Ignoring the wisdom of scholars that to speak of Islam without the cultural variation is nothing but refusing to see the reality, the British establishment opted for an essentialized concept of Islam and a Muslim community. Needless to say, Islam should be understood as a ‘discursive tradition’,66 which assumes different meanings in different sociocultural milieu and is open to contestation. Islam in Europe, therefore, would have a different dimension to that in Asia or in Africa. But this was completely ignored in the policy discourses and subsequent government actions. It is important to note that by subscribing to this essentialization, the British government had already delivered a victory to the Islamists because within their frame of reference Islam has only one meaning and all Muslims belonged to a universal brotherhood of believers – ummah. This policy shift not only made the religious organizations partners of the state in delivering social services to the community and therefore provided them with representation and legitimacy, but also weakened the effectiveness and appeal of the secular social organizations. For the Bangladeshi community, it could not have come at a worse time, because the secular organizations were losing ground among the youth, thanks to the rise of youth organizations (discussed earlier). Within the Bangladeshi community in London, this resulted in the prominence of the East London Mosque and other Islamic organizations that ‘began to engage much more actively and directly with [the] local council’.67 The choice of an institution which is directly connected to an Islamist party operating in South Asia sends a message to the community that the British government had no problem engaging the Islamists, despite the controversial role of the party in question. Since 1997, the policy of supporting faith-based organizations has been extended to education. To date, there is state funding for four Muslim schools, among them: Al Furqan School in Birmingham, Islamia School in London and Feversham College in Bradford.68 The most important impact of the policy shift is the combination of legitimacy and the availability of legitimate resources to those organizations which have a distinct Islamist agenda. The connection between the East London Mosque (ELM) and the JI, and between the ELM and Delwar Hossain Saidee are cases in point. This in many ways resembles the developments in Bangladesh throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s when the Islamists, particularly the JI, gained a foothold within Bangladeshi politics. As I discussed earlier in the book, the military

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rulers looked for support from the Islamists and thus provided them with the protection of the state; this was followed up by secularist parties which provided legitimacy by allowing the JI to be a partner in the pro-democracy movement. Subsequently, the Islamist parties have dominated the political landscape. The strategy adopted by the Islamists is to Islamicize the society – in terms of social practices and rituals, introduce and sustain religious rhetoric in political discourse thus compelling the liberal secular parties (and the state) to engage in debates on religion – either endorsing it or registering their differences rather than rejecting the role of religion. This weakens the so-called secularists’ position on secularism, particularly in regard to the separation of religion and state. In the long run the idea of secularism becomes irrelevant as a political ideology. The campaign of George Galloway is sufficient to demonstrate how availability of resources and gaining legitimacy may influence domestic politics beyond the confines of the Bangladeshi community. The discourses of these organizations are now being reproduced by the local and central government machinery and legitimated by recognition. A worrying development is the British establishment’s unwillingness to acknowledge these connections. Members of the British administration that I talked to in the summer of 2007 insisted that the connection between the JI and the local Islamists is overrated. Despite their knowledge of the JI’s past and current involvement in violence in Bangladesh, and the palpable connection between the JI Bangladesh and some Islamists in Britain, the authorities are not yet ready to address this issue. The British authorities have insisted that the actions of the JI’s parent organizations in South Asia will not be a criterion in determining government policy towards JI supporters in Britain. Some have argued that youths connected to the East London Mosque (and by extension the JI) have been instrumental in reducing the influence of the now proscribed radical organization Al-Muhajiroun led by Omar Bakri and Anjem Choudary.69 British foreign policy: perceptions and more The growing identification with a Muslim identity and the rise of Islamists within the British-Bangladeshi community is not a post-9/11 or a post-7/7 phenomenon. As our discussion thus far has shown, the process began in earnest in the 1990s. Therefore one can argue that drawing a relationship between British foreign policy, particularly the Iraq War, and Islamization within British Muslim communities including Bangladeshis is inaccurate. Two issues are missing in this argument; first that the Iraq War has indeed made a difference in terms of broadening the

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appeal of the Islamists – as a matter of fact this has contributed to the radicalization of the British Muslim youth; the second point is that British foreign policy is not only about the Iraq War, but about a wide array of policies pursued over a long period, most importantly the government’s approach to the issues perceived as important by the Muslim community. The war in Iraq is an important issue to any observer of global politics. For activists on both sides, the issue generates passionate debates. But for the vast majority of Muslims around the globe, the issue is more than an unjust war launched without proper international consent; it is an issue of Muslim victimhood and is viewed as consistent with the record of the West. It is now well documented that since the beginning of the war the resolve of the Muslim community to integrate with the mainstream has been weakened, thus contributing to further isolation.70 The connections between the Iraq War and growing radicalism and terrorism within Britain have been acknowledged by the Foreign Office and MI5, in two different internal documents in 2004. The Foreign Office permanent under-secretary Michael Jay, in a letter to the cabinet secretary Sir Andrew Turnbull on 18 May 2004, stated that British foreign policy was a ‘recurring theme’ in the Muslim community, ‘especially in the context of the Middle East peace process and Iraq’. The letter identified some crucial and potential underlying causes of extremism that can affect the Muslim community; these included discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion. The letter unequivocally stated, ‘British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence among especially the younger generation of British Muslims.’71 Similarly, in 2006, the head of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, said: My service needs to understand the motivations behind terrorism to succeed in countering it. The video wills of British suicide bombers make it clear they are motivated by perceived worldwide and long-standing injustices against Muslims; an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam promoted by some preachers and people of influence; and their interpretation as anti-Muslim of UK foreign policy, in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan. Killing oneself and others in response is an attractive option for some citizens of this country and others around the world.72

Despite clear indications in internal documents of various security agencies that there was a close link between the Iraq War and ‘homegrown’ radicalism, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and members of his cabinet continued their policy of denial. Prime Minister Blair described this line of argument as ‘twisted logic’73 and as a ‘completely false sense of grievance against government foreign policy’.74

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Indeed the most incontrovertible evidence for the connection between British foreign policy and radicalism are the video statements of the London suicide bombers referred to by Eliza Manningham-Buller. The statement of one of these bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, is instructive: To the non-Muslims of Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this. You are those who have voted in your government, who in turn have, and still continue to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters, from the east to the west, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah … You have offered financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, in the massacre of our children in Palestine. You are directly responsible for the problems in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq to this day. You have openly declared war on Islam, and are the forerunners in the crusade against the Muslims … What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks, which, inshallah [God willing], will intensify and continue, until you pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until you stop all financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, and until you release all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh, and your other concentration camps. And know that if you fail to comply with this, then know that this war will never stop, and that we are ready to give our lives, one hundred times over, for the cause of Islam. You will never experience peace, until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.75

Notwithstanding the connection between foreign policy and radicalism, it is important to emphasize that opposition to foreign policy by itself is not sufficient to create a radical; radicalization requires more than opposition to a set of policies. Haris Rafiq contends that, ‘it is theology and ideology which encourage one to blow himself up’.76 How the domestic and the international merge together in the minds of the youth and become enabling factors has been discussed at length in many studies. But a succinct description is available in a leader of the British newspaper the Guardian, well before the tragic events of 7 July 2005 in London. While one may not agree with the recommendations of the newspaper, it is hard to differ with the Guardian’s analysis of the connections between disaffected youth and the possibility of adopting extremism. It writes: The crucial ingredient which radicalises this kind of community disaffection into some individuals undertaking acts of extreme violence is the international context. It began with the slow international response in Bosnia, but now spans the globe from Chechnya and Palestine to France where the sisters cannot wear the hijab. The perception everywhere is that the proud, expansionary faith of Islam is under attack. That makes a

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faith in which the ummah (international community of believers) is central and, when combined with modern mass communications, quite literally explosive. Worryingly, this international context – in particular the war on Iraq – is now sapping the will of the British Muslim community to integrate, as a recent Guardian-ICM poll found.77

In this day and age of globalization images transmitted instantaneously, thanks to the international media, have become the conduit of what Jamal Nassar has described as ‘the migration of dreams and nightmares’.78 These images, particularly those which reinforce the perception that Islam is under attack, that Muslim communities throughout the world are subject to some repression and that the United States and Britain support the perpetrators, make the situation worse. Fair and Haqqani have rightly noted that ‘perceived threats to Islam create support for terrorism’: There is tremendous hesitance to admit that Muslim populations, on whose behalf terrorists claim to operate, have grievances or concerns that need to be addressed as a means to minimizing public support for terrorism. For some, this is the moral equivalent of negotiating with terrorism. This is unfortunate, because these grievances matter. In some countries, including Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan […] more than 70 per cent of the population believes that Islam is under threat. Support for terrorism feeds on the belief that large segments of the Muslim world are victims of ongoing injustice. Some experts argue, with justification, that the perception of threats to Islam is deliberately cultivated by Islamist political groups and authoritarian Muslim governments to generate support for their agenda. But support for terrorism is unlikely to decline without addressing that perception, whether the perception is the product of propaganda or the result of legitimate political grievance.79

In an atmosphere where Muslim identity is being fostered domestically and political Islam is gaining ground internationally, these images are understood as vindicating Muslim victimhood. It is a cliché to say that ‘perceptions matter’80 but we need to remind ourselves that perceptions are not abstract constructions; instead they are rooted in the realities around the individuals who perceive in certain ways. At the root of the perception that Britain and its close ally the United States have an utter disregard for the plight of the Muslims lies the policy towards the Middle East. Former US President Bill Clinton noted this aspect in December 2004, in a speech at a conference in Doha which brought American and Muslim leaders and thinkers together, saying ‘sometimes I feel that our country is judged by many Muslims based on how they think the Mideast peace process is going, and whether they think we are doing enough to try and give the Palestinians a state and a decent future’.

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Clinton insisted ‘that it is not the only standard’.81 In an ideal situation, perhaps it should not be. But reality is often not the ideal situation. Martin Marty, co-editor of The Fundamentalism Project, notes that ‘continuing U.S. support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip confirms many Muslims’ belief that the United States is hostile to their interests and hypocritical in its support for democracy. American policy toward Israel fuels Islamist sentiment. As long as we’re uncritical, as long as we side with them, as long as we let the peace process die, it shows that we’re out to do the Palestinians in.’82 Mearsheimer and Walt argue that ‘undue amounts of American support for Israel [have] poisoned our once high standing in the Islamic world’.83 James Zogby, the President of the Arab American Institute, commented in February 2002 that ‘Arabs are troubled by the U.S. attitude toward the Arab world, toward Palestinians, and toward Islam’.84 It is not only the Arabs who are troubled but similar sentiments are expressed in other Muslim majority countries and by Muslims living in various parts of the world. Whether the perception is the product of propaganda or the result of legitimate political grievance is a somewhat moot point; because the perception of victimhood results in a state of constant fear and insecurity leading to a siege mentality and desperation. Needless to say, this helps the Islamists to gain further ground. It is exacerbated by the fact that after 9/11 leaders of some countries with pernicious records joined ‘the war on terror bandwagon’ and intensified the repression of their own people, while the British government showed little interest in criticizing them. It is generally understood that the guiding principle of the foreign policy of the United States and Britain post-9/11 was the so-called ‘global war on terror.’ The war was waged abroad in (at least) two theatres – Afghanistan and Iraq – and at home through the introduction of a number of domestic security measures. In Britain, the anti-terrorism legislation which used the ‘control order’ as a means to combat terror threats and attempted to include deportation (of suspected terrorists) as a way to deal with the threats, made the minority community, especially communities with larger Muslim populations, suspicious of the government. Members of the community were deeply concerned over whether the clauses within new laws for removal of foreign nationals engaging in unacceptable behaviour would be used to target immigrant communities who have little clout and influence over the administration. The concerns regarding the potential abuse of the anti-terrorism laws have been borne out. The new British Home Secretary, Theresa May, acknowledged in June 2010 soon after coming to power that ‘under the last ­government, counter-terrorism stop and search powers were used unlawfully in many

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cases. It has been clear for a decade that the last government held our civil liberties cheap. They introduced the powers that have been abused 10 years ago, and then sat back as they were used more and more frequently.’85 These abuses did not help in the fight against violent extremism; neither has the legislation made the country safe. Similarly the government’s ‘action plan to step-up work with Muslim communities to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism’ – named Preventing Violent Extremism (commonly referred to as Prevent) initiated in 2007 has not only isolated Muslims but made them a ‘suspect community’.86 These domestic initiatives of the government have grown out of their strategies to fight violence, extremism and terrorism at home. These threats are real and need to be confronted. But one can see that the conflation between foreign policy and misdirected domestic policies has not served the country, including its minority communities, well. Two other elements of British foreign policy also demand some attention. The first is the policy of engagement. Undoubtedly realist foreign policy calls for an engagement and dialogue. But the questions that have become important are: should Western governments engage in a dialogue with the Islamists? If they do, who should be the partners in the dialogue? It is generally understood that the primary objectives of any engagement are to ensure a dynamic stability, guaranteeing adherence to international norms, and strengthening democracy. The goals include reducing the possibility of radicalization of Islamist movements, and giving Islamists a stake in the system. Western governments including that of the UK seem to have adopted this as a guiding key principle, especially after 9/11.87 But what has become problematic is that in pursuing this policy the British government (and perhaps some other European countries) are strengthening the Islamists within their respective countries. This has raised concerns because when it comes to engagement with religiopolitical forces the track record of the British and the US governments has been questionable. In the past the British and the US governments had extended support to the religious right as a countervailing force to secular progressive democratic forces. Tariq Ali has discussed the West’s proclivity towards the religious right in great detail and demonstrated that it is a pattern of both British and US policies.88 Steve Coll argues that the British government supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt against the Nasser regime, and hints that Israelis with the tacit support of the US covertly supported Hamas as a rival movement within the Palestinian community against the PLO.89 While it is necessary to be cognizant of the Islamists’ presence in the political arena, the policies of Western nations should not ­undermine

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the secularist forces representing the majority of the population. But, according to those familiar with British foreign policy, the ‘British government has chosen to privilege those forces over secular leftist forces and nationalist forces in South Asia’.90 British policy places enormous importance on participation in elections as a means of deciding which Islamists to be engaged with; that is to say, those who have participated in elections are considered as ‘democratic’ and therefore a partner in this dialogue. But participation in elections does not necessarily produce democratic Islamists. Islamists in Bangladesh often express their disdain for democracy and declare their intent to use elections as a means to power. The Bangladesh JI is a case in point. Such engagements have helped them gain a foothold not only within Bangladesh but also within the British-Bangladeshi community. The debate within the Foreign Office in September 2005 in regard to the visit of JI leader Delwar Hossain Saidee, documented in various e-mails, show influences on the policy-making process. The principal argument for allowing Saidee to visit the UK was, ‘Sayeedi [sic] is a mainstream figure from a mainstream party.’91 At no point was concern expressed that Bangladeshi Islamists, under favourable conditions, might seek to institute legal and constitutional changes so sweeping as to practically unmake democracy. The second element of British foreign policy that is relevant to our discussion is the cookie-cutter approach to understanding Bangladesh. Indeed, Bangladesh looks small and unimportant from geo-political perspectives. But the historical connections with the country and the presence of the large and growing number of Bangladeshis in Britain require a different approach. Martin Bright has rightly noted that there is a deplorable ignorance about Bangladesh in the British media, and that Britain ‘ought to develop its own specific country-based policy towards Bangladesh rather than relying on any kind of Cold War or pro-American, or indeed actually, anti-American perspective to deal with Bangladesh’.92 This has become urgent because of the intimate relationship between the domestic politics of Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi diaspora. The intricacies of Bangladeshi politics and the conflict between various political forces in Bangladesh have found ways to reach the UK; remaining oblivious to these will not help the British government. In conclusion, I would like to underscore the point I made at the beginning of the chapter: the state has a pivotal role in shaping the contours of the identity politics of minority communities. This power cannot be underestimated; neither should it be used unwisely. Cognizant of the possible long-term impacts, policies should be framed to strengthen the involvement of citizens in public institutions without creating a schism.

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The two issues around which I have built my arguments above reveal that the British state, irrespective of the party in power, has pursued policies in past decades which resulted in the salience of religious identity and the strengthening of the Islamists within the Bangladeshi community. Notes   1 Pnina Werbner, ‘Black and ethnic leaderships in Britain: a theoretical over­­ view’, in Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar (eds), Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 21.  2 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 222.   3 Understandably this is a broad generalization. Although I believe that the issue demands a detailed critique of British social policies, that is beyond the scope of the study and space constraints do not allow me to go into further detail.   4 ‘Short history of immigration’, BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ static/in_depth/uk/2002/race/short_history_of_immigration.stm (accessed 24 February 2010).   5 Folarin Shyllon, ‘The black presence and experience in Britian: an analytical overview’, in Jagdish S. Gundara and Ian Duffield (eds), Essays on the History of Blacks in Britain (Avebury: Aldershot, 1992); and Nigel File and Chris Power, Black Settlers in Britain, 1555–1958 (London: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1995).  6 Emily C. Bartels, ‘Too many blackamoors: deportation, discrimination, and Elizabeth I’, Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900, 46:2 (2006), 305–22.  7 David Cesarani, ‘An alien concept? The continuity of anti-alienism in British society before 1940’, in David Cesarani and Tony Kushner (eds), The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 29.  8 Jacqueline Nassy Brown, Dropping Anchor, Setting Sail: Geographies of Race in Black Liverpool (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and John Warwick, ‘The Windrush myth’, in Professor John Warwick blog (2007): http://john-warwick.blogspot.com/2007/10/windrush-myth.html (accessed 19 February 2010).   9 Carlton Wilson, ‘Britain’s red summer: the 1919 race riots in Liverpool’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 15:2 (1995), 25. 10 ‘Race riots break out in British cities’, New York Times (13 June 1919), p.  6: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A05E4D81F39E13A BC4B52D FB0668382609EDE (accessed 18 January 2010). 11 Warwick, ‘The Windrush myth’. 12 This act replaced the 1836 Act and set up a new system of immigration

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control and registration and gave responsibility to the Home Secretary for all matters of immigration and nationality. 13 ‘The 1905 Act was passed because of fears of degenerating health and housing conditions in London’s East End. The cause of the degeneration was seen as the large number of Russian and Polish Jews who had arrived in the East End after fleeing persecution in Tsarist Russia’ (‘Aliens Acts 1905 and 1919’, Exploring 20th Century London: www.20thcenturylondon.org.uk/ server.php?show=conInformationRecord.35 (accessed 24 February 2010). 14 This order was revoked in 1943 in the wake of another war when Britain faced an acute shortage of labour. 15 David Cesarani, ‘An alien concept?’, p. 39. 16 David Cesarani, ‘The anti-Jewish career of Sir William Joynson-Hicks, cabinet minister’, Journal of Contemporary History, 24:3 (1989), 472. 17 John Warwick, quoting Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), p. 174 and Ian R.G. Spencer, British Immigration Policy Since 1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain (London/New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 40 showed that the policy was to allow those who were ‘not prevented by their race or religion from intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged in it’ (John Warwick, ‘Race and the development of immigration policy during the 20th century’, in Professor John Warwick blog (2007): http://john-warwick.blogspot.com/2007/09/ race-and-development-of-immigration.html, accessed 19 February 2010). 18 Kenan Malik, ‘Why immigration is a social problem’, Lecture delivered at the seminar on ‘The political and cultural debates surrounding migrant workers in the UK’, University of Oxford (8 November 2007): www.kenan malik.com/lectures/immigration_oxford.html (accessed 21 January 2009). 19 Barnor Hesse, ‘Introduction: un/settled multiculturalisms’, in Barnor Hesse (ed.), Un/Settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions (London/New York: Zed Books, 2000), p. 6. 20 Muhammad Anwar, Between Cultures: Continuity and Change in the Lives of Young Asians (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 11. 21 Sarah Spencer, ‘The impact of immigration policy on race relations’, in Tessa Blackstone, Bhikhu Parekh and Peter Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 74. 22 In the 1970s, according to the opinion polls, a quarter of Britons were in favour of forced repatriation (Roger Eatwell, ‘Community cohesion and cumulative extremism in contemporary Britain’, Political Quarterly, 77:2 (2006), 206). 23 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 10. 24 Spencer, British Immigration Policy Since 1939, p. 42. 25 The idea of everyday resistance, now common to various disciplines, was introduced by James C. Scott in his seminal work entitled Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).

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26 Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain Since 1800 (London: Hurst and Co., 2004), p. 209. 27 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 211. 28 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 208. 29 The ‘nation-state’ formation processes all around the world have been premised on the erasure of differences between communities. The primary objective of the nation-state is to create a homogeneous polity and a common identity. In doing so nation-states have pursued a variety of policies, ranging from oppression to coerced assimilation to physical elimination through ‘ethnic cleansing’ or genocide. 30 Stuart Hall, ‘Conclusion: the multi-cultural question’, in Hesse, Un/Settled Multiculturalisms, p. 209. 31 Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ‘What is living and what is dead in multiculturalism’, Ethnicities, 9:1 (2009), 75. However, Floya Anthias and Nira YuvalDavis provide a somewhat different account: ‘Multiculturalism emerged as a result of the realization originally in the USA, and then Britain, that the melting pot doesn’t melt, and ethnic and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generation’ (Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, Racialized Boundaries (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 158). 32 Charles W. Mills, ‘Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism?’, in Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (eds), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 90. 33 Mills, ‘Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism?’, p. 90. 34 Hall, ‘Conclusion: The multi-cultural question’, p. 212. 35 The riots erupted between 10 and 12 April 1981 in Brixton, South London at the end of the first week of an operation called ‘Swamp 81’ which was marked by high-handed policing in the area. The operation included repeated incidents of disproportionate use of ‘stop and search’ powers by the police against blacks, arbitrary roadblocks and mass detention. According to press reports and eyewitness accounts, hundreds of mostly black youths participated in the riots. The police were attacked with stones, bricks, iron bars and petrol bombs and they retaliated forcefully. On the evening of 11 April clashes between police and youths resulted in the injury of 279 policemen and at least 45 members of the public. Looting was reportedly widespread during the riots and 28 buildings were damaged or destroyed by fire as well as police cars and other vehicles. The government appointed an enquiry committee headed by Lord Scarman. The committee published its report on 25 November 1981. 36 Munira Mirza, Abi Snethikumaran and Zein Ja’Far, ‘Living apart together, British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism’, Policy Exchange (2007), 23. 37 Ayub Korom Ali, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront. ­Conference on the rise of political Islam in Bangladesh: what’s at stake in the 2007 Elections?’, organized by the Policy Exchange, Hudson Institute, New Statesman and the International Bangladesh Foundation, London (14 November 2006).

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38 Anandi Ramamurthy, ‘The politics of Britain’s Asian youth movements’, Race & Class, 48:2 (2006), 56. 39 Radostin Kaloianov, ‘Multiculturalism and diversity: a reply to Kenan Malik’, Eurozine (2009): www.eurozine.com/articles/2009–02–20–kaloianov-en. html (accessed 25 June 2009). 40 The term gained currency after the publication of Charles Taylor’s classic essay in 1992. The essay and extensive commentaries on the essay can be found in Charles Taylor et al., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 41 For the last point see Philip Cohen, ‘The perversion of inheritance: studies in the making of multi-racist Britain’, in Philip Cohen and Harwant Bains (eds), Multi-Racist Britain: New Directions in Theory and Practice (London: Macmillan, 1988). 42 Tariq Modood has written extensively on the issue of multiculturalism in the past two decades and has been deeply engaged in this debate. Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) brings most of his arguments together. 43 Bhikhu Parekh is the author of the oft-quoted report entitled, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books, 2000) (commonly referred to as The Parekh Report). One of his important contributions is entitled Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 44 Ruth Kelly, speech at the launch of Commission on Integration and Com­­­­­ munity Cohesion, London (24 August 2006). 45 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Identity and migration’, Prospect, 131 (2007): www. prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/02/identityandmigration/ (accessed 27 August 2007). 46 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Penguin, 2006). 47 For example, the speech of Lord Tebbit to the Conservative Party conference in October 1997; see Peter Jackson, ‘Cultures of difference’, in Vince Gardiner and Hugh Matthews (eds), The Changing Geography of the UK (London and New York: Routledge, third edition, 1999), p. 277. 48 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Candace Allen, Ted Cantle and Dreda Say Mitchell, ‘Multiculturalism: a failed experiment?’, Index on Censorship, 35:2 (2006), 93–4. 49 Jens-Martin Eriksen and Frederik Stjernfelt, ‘Culturalism: culture as political ideology’, Eurozine (2009): www.eurozine.com/articles/2009–01–09– eriksenstjernfelt-en.html (accessed 15 November 2009). 50 Malik, ‘Why immigration is a social problem’. 51 Theodore Dalrymple, ‘A confusion of tongues’, City Journal, 18:2 (2008): www.city-journal.org/2008/18_2_otbie-immigrant_assimilation.html (accessed 23 February 2010). 52 Ali, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront’. 53 For a synopsis of the events in France and Denmark, see Levey, ‘What is living and what is dead in multiculturalism’, 75–93.

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54 J. Taylor, ‘After secularism: inner city governance and the new religious discourse: a case study’ (PhD dissertation, London: The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002) quoted in John Zavos, ‘Negotiating multiculturalism: religion and organisation of Hindu identity in contemporary Britain’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35:6 (2009), 890. 55 The Inner Cities Religious Council and the Working Together Steering Group was replaced with the Faith Communities Consultative Council (FCCC) in April 2006. 56 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 353. 57 Sean McLoughlin, ‘The state, new Muslim leaderships, and Islam as a resource for public engagement in Britain’, in Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims And the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 60. 58 Kenan Malik, Speech at CRC Policy Conference, London (27 April 2006): www.community-relations.org.uk/about-the-council/background-info/ brandon-hamber-speech/malikpolicy/ (accessed 4 August 2008). 59 Haris Rafiq, personal interview, 15 July 2007, London. 60 J. Austin, R. Taylor and K. Dixon, Review of the Inner Cities Religious Council (London: Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 1998), pp.  6, 20. 61 Local Government Association (LGA), Faith and Community (London: Local Government Association, 2002), p. 16. 62 LGA, Faith and Community, p. 16. 63 For the actions and their progress in the first year, see ‘Working Together’: Cooperation between Government and Faith Communities – Progress Report August 2005: www.edf.org.uk/news/working_together_followup_ a1.pdf (accessed 19 June 2010). 64 Baroness Andrews, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, in response to a question in the House of Lords (16 July 2008): www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/80716w0001.htm#80716w0001.htm_spnew26 (accessed 15 March 2010). Two rounds of funding were provided under this initiative. A total funding of £7.5 million was distributed between January 2006 and March 2007 to 582 organizations which included organizations of other faiths. In the second round beginning August 2007, another £4.5 million was made available to faith groups. 65 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Face to Face and Side by Side (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008). 66 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Center for Contemporary Arab Studies: Washington D.C.,1985). 67 Munira Mirza, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront. Conference on the rise of political Islam in Bangladesh: what’s at stake in the 2007 elections(?)’, organised by the Policy Exchange, Hudson Institute, New Statesman and the International Bangladesh Foundation (London, 14 November 2006). See also John Eade and David Grabin ‘Changing ­narratives

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of violence, struggle and resistance: Bangladeshis and the competition for resources in the global city’, Oxford Development Studies, 30:2 (2002), 140; Delwar Hussain, ‘Bangladeshis in East London: from secular politics to Islam’, Open Democracy (7 July 2006): www.opendemocracy.net/demo cracy-protest/bangladeshi_3715.jsp (accessed 12 July 2006); Sarah Glynn, Playing the Ethnic Card: Politics and Ghettoisation in London’s East End, Institute of Geography Online Paper Series: GEO 018 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 15–17. 68 In addition to the state-supported faith schools, there are now at least 22 madrassahs (Islamic seminaries) in the UK. ‘The first was established in the 1970s, three in the 1980s, seventeen in the 1990s, and one in the new century. All are Sunni: sixteen Deobandi seminaries, three Barelwi, one Azhari, one Nadwi, and one Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood)’ (Philip Lewis, ‘Beyond victimhood – from the global to local: a British case-study’, European Muslims and the Secular State in a Comparative Perspective, Final Symposi­um Report (European Commission DG Research, 2003): www.arabphilosophers. com/English/discourse/east-west/Secularism/Final_ICDEI_Symposium.pdf (accessed 15 July 2006)). 69 Al-Muhajiroun was founded in Saudi Arabia in 1983 as an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir. After being thrown out of Saudi Arabia Omar Bakri moved to Britain in 1986 and continued to propagate his political ideology as a leader of the HT. In 1996 he was expelled from the HT and revived Al-Muhajiroun. Omar Bakri dissolved the organization in 2004 after severe criticisms following the 9/11 attacks, particularly his statements in support of the 19 hijackers. The organization was active until the British government banned it in 2006. (For a detailed study of the organization, see Quintan ­Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). A succinct historical background is provided on pp. 6–11. 70 Alan Travis, ‘Desire to integrate on the wane as Muslims resent war on Islam’, Guardian (16 March 2004): www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/ mar/16/race.polls (accessed 17 July 2005). The report is based on the ICM-Guardian poll conducted earlier in March 2004. 71 Martin Bright, ‘Leak shows Blair told of Iraq War terror link’, Observer (28 August 2005): www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/28/uk.iraq (accessed 18 March 2007). 72 Kim Sengupta and Jason Bennetto, ‘MI5 chief says Iraq War is driving British Muslims into terrorism’, Independent (11 November 2006), p. 1. 73 Tony Blair quoted in Mark Oliver, ‘Blair calls for task force to combat “evil ideology”’, Guardian (19 July 2005): www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/19/ politics.july72 (accessed 21 June 2010). 74 ‘Muslims must root out the extremism’, BBC News (4 July 2006): http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5144438.stm (accessed 21 June 2010). 75 ‘Al-Qaeda film on the first anniversary of the London bombings features messages by bomber Shehzad Tanweer, American Al-Qaeda member Adam Gadan and Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri’, Middle East Media

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Research Institute (8 July 2006): www.memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=1186 (accessed 15 January 2006). 76 Haris Rafiq, personal interview, 16 July 2007, London. 77 ‘Towards a British Islam’, Guardian (1 April 2004): www.guardian.co.uk/ uk/2004/apr/01/britishidentity.terrorism (accessed 22 May 2008). 78 Jamal Nassar, Globalization and Terrorism: The Migration of Dreams and Nightmares (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). 79 Christine Fair and Husain Haqqani, ‘Think again: Islamist terrorism’, Foreign Policy (2006): www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id= 3359 (accessed 4 September 2006). 80 Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan, A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), p. 5. 81 Fiona MacDonald, ‘Clinton urges Muslims not to misjudge US’, MiddleEast-Online (1 December 2004): www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id= 8471=8471&format=0 (accessed 1 September 2006). 82 ‘Islamic fundamentalism feared, misunderstood’, National ­Catholic Repor­­ ter (8 October 2004): http://ncronline.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2004d /100804/100804a.php (accessed 6 September 2006). 83 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, Harvard Working Paper, RWP06–011 (13 March 2006), quoted in P.W. Singer, The 9–11 War Plus 5: Looking Back and Looking Forward at U.S.-Islamic World Relations, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper, no. 10 (September 2006), p. 5. 84 James Zogby, discussion on ‘The U.S. Image in the Islamic World’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (19 February 2002). A transcript of the discussion is available at: http://isd.georgetown.edu/files/ IW_Summary_Feb19.pdf (accessed 4 September 2006). 85 Theresa May, ‘Stop and search policy will be robustly reviewed’, Guardian (10 June 2010). www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/ jun/10/stop-and-search-powers-abuse (accessed on 21 June 2010). 86 Arun Kundani, Spooked! How Not To Prevent Violent Extremism (London: Institute of Race Relations, 2009). 87 Ali Riaz, ‘Bangladesh’, in Toby Archer and Heidi Huuhtanen (eds), Islamist Opposition Parties Around the World and the Potential for EU Engagement (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2007), pp. 25–34. 88 Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2003). 89 Interview with Amy Goodman, Democracy Now (10 June 2004). A transcript of the programme is available at: www.democracynow.org/ article.pl?sid=04/06/10/1425222 (accessed 1 September 2006). 90 Martin Bright, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront’. ­Conference on the rise of political Islam in Bangladesh: what’s at stake in the 2007 elections?, organized by the Policy Exchange, Hudson Institute, New S­ tatesman and the International Bangladesh Foundation, London (14 November 2006).

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91 Martin Bright, When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries (London: Policy Exchange, 2006). 92 Bright, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront.’

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5

Beyond the present

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ne point that emerges clearly from the preceding discussion on the identity politics of the British-Bangladeshis is the complexity of the subject. The tendency among ethnic minority Muslim immigrant communities in Europe towards identification with Islam as a marker of identity is discussed in an array of studies, but seldom have they explained coherently how the change took place. This study of the preference of the members of the British-Bangladeshi community for a religion-based identity vis-à-vis ethnicity-based identity is an attempt to address this lacuna. We examine the micro-level dynamics, the internal and external factors and the role of the state and locate these within the broad framework to demonstrate that this change takes place incrementally. The process, our discussion shows, ranges from mundane daily actions to historic events; it involves actors from individuals to the state; and is influenced by the social ecosystem within and outside the community. Transformation of the identity of a diasporic community is neither unusual nor unexpected; because diaspora is no longer a simple dislocation from home, nor is it a temporary belonging to a space with a dream of returning to the ‘homeland’ but rather a process of continuous negotiation between the migrant’s current location (space) and his/her relationship with the host society. The ‘homeland’ (in the conventionally understood sense) remains present as a backdrop but no longer looms as a larger-than-life entity. Globalization and generational differences bring newer meanings to the concepts of space as well as ‘homeland’. The notion of belonging and homeland as two static points has become obsolete for any migrant community. In such circumstances, the individual and the community attempt to reconfigure their positions; occasionally this is a conscious political effort but often the reconfiguration takes place through routinized activities, as a response to societal demands and as a coping mechanism. This reconfiguration leads to the redefinition of identities of the community and individuals. Common

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language, heritage, rituals, practices and solidarity grouping, in short the culture, usually serve as the context of and give rise to the identity of an ethnic minority community. But migration and generational variation bring changes to the culture. This paves the way for identities to diverge from the cultural contexts which gave rise to the identity in the first place. In the case of diasporic identity the transformation does not imply that one identity is to be replaced with another with complete disavowal/ denial/rejection of the previous one; it is not a complete erasure of one and then the inscription of another. Instead, the process of transformation produces fluidity and layered identities. In one sense the changes mean that individuals move away from ‘an ideal construct’ to ‘a pragmatic acculturation’. Members of a diasporic community, in the words of Stuart Hall, ‘must learn to inhabit two identities, to speak two cultural languages, to translate and negotiate between them’.1 We can go further, saying that they have to inhabit multiple identities and speak multiple cultural languages. These identities are on the one hand the choice of the individual while on the other hand are socially constructed, because it is not entirely dependent upon the individual and/or a community how he/ she/it wants to be identified – it is also how others view the individual/ community. Material constraints influence their choices as well. In the case of community, the identity can be doubly imagined/constructed – by those who claim to represent it, through creation of associations with specific goals, to establish its claim on the available resources; and by the state ‘which must reify ethnic segments as perpetual communities in order to control conflict or allocate resources in an “equitable” manner’.2 Important in this transformation is what becomes the preferred marker of identity by the community or a group within the community and the source of their activism – political and otherwise. The multiplicity of identity is a fact of life of the diasporic but important questions are: Can one identity demand a complete delinking of the individual from other identities? Does one negate the other? Which is at the centre of the social interaction? How does the preferred marker shape the relationship between the society and the individual? As our discussion throughout the book has shown, since the 1990s, a substantial proportion of the British-Bangladeshi community, especially the youths, are subscribing to a form of religiosity propagated by the Islamists which disapproves of traditional Bengali cultural practices, supporting leaders who are opposed to Bengali ethnic identity and secular Bengali nationalism, and preferring to emphasize religious iden­­ tity as the determining element in their activism. In simple terms, this

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is not about being merely Muslim but instead about being a part of ‘a community of faith’.3 This community transcends the boundary of the nation-state, and offers a closed and scripturalist version of Islam which calls for Islamization of the society and which has served as a source of radicalization for a small minority of youths in Europe. The disavowal of the secular Bengali identity indicates that religion is at the centre of their interactions with the society at large. A pertinent question here is why religion is embraced by the community, especially the younger generation, as the pivotal source of their new identity. I argue that it is related to dislocation – both cognitively and spatio-temporally. For new immigrants, the latter is more important while for the second and third generations it is the cognitive dislocations. Despite being born in the ‘host’ country, marginalization, perceived deprivation and alienation give the youth a sense of ‘perpetual exile’,4 or in other words they feel that that they are ‘dislocated’ – away from where they are supposed to be. This perception is generated by the continuous reproduction of three discourses related to the ‘immigrant’ youth population – ‘the discourse of “enemy within” has shaped policies of policing, immigration, formal and informal education. The discourse of separatist ghettos has shaped policies of social cohesion and urban planning. The discourse of “between two cultures” has shaped social services, police domestic violence units, refuges, youth services, advice and counselling services.’5 These approaches, in combin­ ation with globalization, destabilize the sense of certainty and security that individuals usually enjoy or have enjoyed for decades, or expect to enjoy. This adds another element to the already perplexed sense of identity of individuals and the community and creates the potential for the pre-eminence of religion. Anthony Giddens’s explanation of modernity and its impacts are helpful in understanding the situation. In his sociological analysis of high modernity, Giddens insisted that modernity brings a fundamental change: it breaks down the protective framework offered by the community and tradition. In a situation like this, Giddens argues, ‘The individual feels bereft and alone in a world in which she or he lacks the psychological support and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings.’6 Giddens has explained this situation with two key theoretical formulations, ‘ontological security’ and ‘existential anxiety’. Ontological security, according to Giddens, is the basic need of individuals for ‘a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual’.7 It refers to a ‘person’s fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other people’.8 ‘To be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness,

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‘“answers” to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses’.9 The absence of these answers accentuates existential anxiety. Giddens further argued that the doubt and insecurity inherent in our time favours a resurgence of religion.10 As we have discussed earlier, the new identity among the diaspora is a result of continuous renegotiations and remains in flux as it never reaches an end point. But it is also important to note that it is not only an individual journey, but is equally true for the community. On the one hand, the community as a unit tries to create a new identity that provides a semblance of stability; while on the other hand individuals who feel vulnerable and experience existential insecurity are drawn to a collective identity that reaffirms self-identity. Catarina Kinnvall argues that facing ontological insecurity, an individual seeks affirmation of his/ her self-identity by drawing closer to any collective that is perceived as being able to reduce insecurity and existential anxiety.11 This collective could be religion, nationalism or ethnicity. She adds that, ‘Religion, like nationalism, supplies existential answers to individuals’ quests for security by essentializing the product and providing a picture of totality, unity and wholeness. The fact that God has set the rules and made them difficult to contest relieves the individual psychologically from the responsibility of having to choose.’12 It is not imperative for a community or individual to choose religion as a collective identity – it could be ethnicity and nationalism as Kinnvall suggested – yet they chose religion. Thus we must explore further why at the juncture of self-identification, religious identity, particularly Islam in the case of the British-Bangladeshis, comes to the fore. Here the notion of everyday resistance should be of some help. The identification with a Muslim community is seen by the marginalized as a form of resistance to the dominant narratives. The resistance is not only meant to be an opposition to existing paradigms, but is a means to assert a new path, a new identity which transcends the divisiveness of the community and invents symbols of pride and unity. It is in this context that religion, especially Islam, and the Muslim identity served the purpose and became a choice. If for some it is exercising the power of agency, or in other words making the choice by themselves, for others embracing religion is a reactive identification. The negligence/hostility towards Islam and the Muslim community intensifies their personal attachment to religion and make this the reference point of their own identity. The British-Bangladeshi community is by no means alone in its predicament; studies have shown similar trends among Muslim youth in other countries in Europe and the United States, especially after 9/11.

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Foregrounding Islam as an identity does not necessarily mean that the community in general and particularly the members of the younger population will act similarly. As Nielsen has argued, European Muslims ‘are constructing their sense of self and community, their relations to the wider society both locally and nationally, and imagining the directions they want to mark out for the future’ in various ways.13 Among these various paths personal religiosity is one which increases observance of religious rituals and efforts to participate in various community religious activities. As for their interactions with the wider community, we are witnessing among the youth population ‘collective isolation’ (‘quiet retrenchment within the family and clan network’), ‘limited participation’ (‘taking an active part in the wider economy but keeping this strictly separate from their home and community lives’), and ‘high profile separation’ (‘activism within the community for space within national politics but little effort to adapt to the surrounding’).14 The most disturbing trend is ‘aggressive action’ which encourages the group to adopt a radical Islamist agenda. There is a growing trend of religiosity among various diaspora communities; British-Bangladeshis are no exception. But personal religiosity aside, there is a growing tendency within the British-Bangladeshi community to subscribe to an interpretation of Islam where religion is secondary and politics is primary. This is an ideology propagated by Islamists which underscores a homogenized notion of religion, emphasizes political activism more than personal piety, and stresses the need to pursue a single vision and goal. This development is facilitated by state policies and community politics, but most importantly because of the efforts of the Islamist organizations. * * * Recent developments in regard to identity politics among BritishBangladeshis presents two sets of questions/challenges for the community and the British state. One set of questions involves the choice of the community: Do the majority of members of the community favour a fusion of religion and political activism? Should religion be the marker of their identity? The other set of questions is about issues related to the policies of the state: Does the British state continue to pursue the policies that facilitated the rise of the Islamists? Importantly, what is the future of multiculturalism in Britain? How will the issue of religion, citizenship and the multiple identities of the minority communities be addressed in future? The electoral victory of the Conservative Party in Britain in 2010 and the developments in other countries in Europe in recent years have thrust the issue to the forefront. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron and former

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French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s pronouncements have all suggested an unceremonious demise of multiculturalism in Europe echoed by a host of academics from the right, and can no longer be seen as skewed analyses of the situation on the ground, but a clear policy of discarding an approach without offering an alternative. What is to come is, therefore, an open question and should be a topic of robust debate. Addressing the issue of the growing appeal of the Islamists to the British-Bangladeshis requires recognition that it is intrinsically related to the identity issue and cannot be seen as an internal community matter. Inseparable from larger debates, this issue cannot be left to the community to deal with on its own. Therefore, stakeholders of all shades – the British-Bangladeshi community, the British government, British society, and the popular media – all must bear their fair share. The conversation must start with an examination of the place of religion in the social public sphere. Here a distinction must be made between the relationship between the state and religious institutions (commonly referred to as the Church) and the secularization of society. Olivier Roy’s comment is telling in this regard: ‘situations differ considerably depending on variations in two parameters: the separation of church and state (yes or no) and the position of religion in the society (strong or weak)’.15 Although most countries in Europe have embraced secularism and made the separation between state and church the cornerstone of the liberal state, their success is limited at best: ‘separation of state and religions and religious neutrality of public institutions are nowhere to be found in history or in existing political bodies as a perfectly fulfilled and accomplished reality’.16 However, it does not mean that a basic framework of separation between state and the religion has not been established, or has not worked, although it has not attained the ideal level. Religion has not ‘disappeared in Europe’,17 but instead Since its relegation from the public to the private sphere, religion has operated at a different cultural and social level. Europeans are distinctly uncomfortable with public displays and revelations of religious faith. But Europe’s secularist identity shrouds the reality of strong and persistent cultural-religious identities, a condition Grace Davie has termed ‘believing without belonging,’ – i.e., no longer participating in public religious practices while retaining a strong private religious identity.18

Despite a strong presence of religion in public spheres for decades in Europe and the role of religion in identity formation, it has become a matter of discontent in recent decades as part of the immigration debate and particularly in the context of the Muslim community’s efforts to incorporate religion into its identity. There is no denying that ‘the intersection of religion and identity is complex and raises important

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questions both in public spheres presumed to be secular and in contexts where religion is thought to play a significant role in defining the public sphere’,19 but that should not encourage the debate to be suspended for ever or focus on a specific community as a problematic. The absence of an open conversation has created an opportunity for the extremists to shape the perception of the community. The debate can help stem the rise of Islamists within the British-Bangladeshi community and perhaps among other communities with a Muslim majority. But it is also important to underscore that it is not a debate in which the community can take a back seat and wait to see how it is played out, but instead needs to be an active participant and delve into its own tradition of institutional neutrality and equality for all irrespective of their faith. The debate over the Muslims’ position within Europe is not only a matter of conversation about how they should be integrated into European culture, but what the identity of Europe is. The­conversation cannot ignore the contribution of Islamic thought and Muslims in the making of Europe. In similar vein, it cannot be a one-way traffic; the Muslims, migrants and second generation alike, have to re-examine their positions as well. Tariq Ramadan’s point in this regard is worth recalling: The selective memory that so easily forgets the decisive contributions of rationalist Muslim thinkers like al-Farabi (10th century), Avicenna (11th century), Averroes (12th century), al-Ghazali (12th century), Ash- Shatibi (13th century) and Ibn Khaldun (14th century) is reconstructing a Europe that practices self-deception about its own past. If they are to reappropriate their heritage, Muslims must demonstrate, in a manner that is both reasonable and free of emotional reactions, that they share the core values upon which Europe and the West are founded.

The questions of multiculturalism and citizenship are also pertinent here. How can we find a common ground between the unspecified yet hegemonic idea of a homogenous national identity called ‘Britishness’ and members of the heterogeneous British society who subscribe to a plethora of identities? Is there a way to reconcile the differences between the two ideas? The key argument of the protagonists of ‘social cohesion’ or the ‘big society’ is that a set of common and shared goals is necessary for a country to move forward and create an inclusive society. There can be no argument against this proposition, nor against the idea that social processes are necessary to instill in individuals a sense of belonging to the same community, but the challenge is how to build that bridge. Bhikhu Parekh’s suggestion is worth considering: What we can, and should, do is to find ways of reconciling the demands of social cohesion and cultural identity. This requires a broad a­ greement on common values which all British people share, and within the ­framework

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of which they can express their identities and conduct a dialogue. Dialogical multiculturalism needs to be separated from segregationist multiculturalism, which leads to ghettoization, and also from hegemonic multiculturalism, which assigns minorities a fixed space. In this view of multiculturalism, Britishness is seen as a language, which we all speak, but in different accents.20

How far British society, particularly the British government, is willing to subscribe to this idea of an inclusive, open, expansive and new mode of multiculturalism is an important question. But equally important is the participation of ethnic minorities and their leaders. Those who profess exclusivity and purity of identity, either in the name of religion or in the name of race, will be opposed to any recognition of plurality. But the future of diasporic communities, including British-Bangladeshis, cannot be left to a small minority within the majority population or within the minority communities. These discussions, debates and necessary adjustments to the institutions at both European and national levels will not guarantee that extremism within the community will wither away. Instead, as a community activist stated, the battle against ‘extremism within the community’ is essentially the task of community members.21 But it is well to bear in mind that this is primarily an ideological struggle. A group within a society can only be hegemonic when it establishes its moral leadership. The ‘secularists’ or those who want to keep religion-infused identity as the driver of political activism at bay cannot claim the support of the community unless they can demonstrate that they are better equipped to deal with the problems the community, particularly the younger generation, are facing in their daily lives. A broader alliance with forces outside the community like that built during the anti-racism movements in the 1970s and 1980s is essential. It would not be erroneous to say that the appeal of the Islamists is partly linked to their success in delivering. Faith-based organizations provided important public services when local funding cuts were taking place and now command resources to continue those services without state support. This has made faith-based organizations an integral part of the ‘crucial safety-net’ for the vulnerable segment of the community. It is worth remembering that when the state retreats from any area, whether it be in terms of geography or service provision (such as welfare), it creates the opportunity for an alternative authority to grow. The failure of the state’s welfare policy is surely to blame but secularists must also take responsibility. It is time for the secularists to do some soul searching, identifying their shortcomings and strategizing future steps. What alternatives they can offer is something which must be considered.

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For the members of the British-Bangladeshi community, poverty, i­njustice and exclusion remain the central issues; these contribute to alienation, anger and frustration which are often exploited by religiopolitical forces. Indeed the focus on religion is not going to solve the problem of unemployment or poor education. But reiterating the obvious is not enough to appeal to those who are experiencing economic and social inequality. Politicized religion, which provides ardent certainties, can only be confronted with specific plans and a vision of a just society. The civil society organizations of the community should come together to draw up an agenda for change. The absence of a ‘secularist’ voice vis-à-vis the ‘Muslim’ voice demonstrates the fragmented nature and inherent weakness of the ‘secularists’ within the Bangladeshi ­community. Ultimately this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the younger generation, the second and third generation, and perhaps the fourth generation, British-Bangladeshis. Reaching out to this younger population will be harder if the world is not seen from their vantage point. It is imperative that the issues that matter most to them are addressed and that the younger generation can identify with them. Increasing awareness of Bengali culture and history among the British-Bangladeshis is important, but the static idea of an ethnic identity may not be appealing to them. How these two can be reconciled and infused into the minds of the younger generation is a challenging task. The Bangladeshi diaspora needs to be engaged in soul-searching to find answers. This is not a unique problem, and therefore lessons can be learned from other diasporic communities. The members of the community alone will not be able to change its course; the British government has a pivotal role to play. Government interventions need not be exclusively for the Bangladeshi community. Understanding Bangladeshi politics and culture and developing a country-specific approach, which I have suggested in the preceding section, is as far as a specific policy need go. Other suggested interventions are part of the wider social policies of the government. The Bangladeshi community has never received special treatment and they should not be treated differently from other ethnic minorities. It is necessary to revisit the policy of emphasizing faith groups as partners in delivering social services. The impact of this policy, not only within the Bangladeshi and the wider Muslim community but also among other communities, deserves serious examination. This policy has brought religion into public life, and has created the environment for religio-political forces to be at the forefront of politics. Confusing race and ethnicity with religion is a folly the British government embraced a decade ago. This has changed the social landscape and vitiated the issue

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of minority representation. With the growing number of state-supported faith schools, the compartmentalization of society based on religion will be difficult to undo. The issue is neither a Bangladeshi nor a Muslim one; it is a British issue and British society can no longer look the other way. The issue of faith schools cannot be debated only when Islamic schools seek permission and/or receive state funding; the issue of state funding for other religious schools should be addressed at the same time. The move of the Con-Lib coalition government in mid-2010 to allow religious schools to become academies and to have ‘freedoms over the curriculum’ is about opening the door for a wholesale revamping of state-funded education and increased numbers of religious educational institutions.22 It needs no new commission to tell the government that despite some positive changes in the last decade, British society has a long way to go to achieve equality. Black and Ethnic Minority Communities are bearing a disproportionate share of poverty and exclusion. These issues must be addressed in earnest. But that should be part of a wider antipoverty programme, not a piecemeal solution for any community or region. There is no magic bullet to end poverty, but that does not mean that the poor should be left to fend for themselves. British foreign policy needs to be subject to a robust debate. If a policy breeds discontent at home and threatens the social fabric, it is more than necessary to open a debate, and change course if needed. The debate should be open and inclusive of all opinions. The debate should not be only about British policy towards Iraq or Afghanistan, but the basic principles of the policy: justice and equality. The double standard of the policy towards Middle Eastern countries and utter disregard of popular opinion in shaping policy are legitimate concerns and go beyond faith issues. These concerns warrant attention and should be addressed without further delay. Although it is a cliché to say that extremism breeds extremism, it is relevant to see how it contributes to the issues at hand and exacerbates the problem. This is where the role of society and the media come into play. Throughout Europe and Scandinavian countries as of August 2011 there is a growing sympathy and support for anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim groups: The far-right Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkerpartis) has 25 seats in parliament; the Sweden Democrats Party won 5.7% of the vote in the 2010 election. In Finland, the True Finns party made a dramatic breakthrough in April’s elections, gaining more than 1 in 5 votes. Beyond Scandinavia, France’s National Front won 15% of votes in the first round of regional elections in March 2010, even though it was not on the ballot in the entire country. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party only managed 2% better.

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In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders … has successfully stirred up hatred against Islam and the establishment; his Party for Freedom has become the country’s third largest, with 24 seats in the Dutch parliament.23

Amnesty International, in a report published in April 2012, criticizes European leaders for tolerating prejudices against Muslims and insists that political leaders, rather than combating fears of Islamic extremism and the equating of the devout with the radical, have been pandering to prejudice against Muslims in a quest for votes.24 Similarly, in recent decades British society has allowed far right groups to thrive. The electoral success of the British National Party (BNP) in local elections in 2006 and 2008 is a testimony to this sympathy. The BNP secured a London-wide seat in the London Assembly and 58 councillors in England. It finished fifth in the London Mayoral election with 5.23 per cent of the popular vote. In the 2007 Welsh Assembly Election, the BNP came fifth in terms of votes for the regional lists with 4.3 per cent of the vote. In 2009 the BNP won 2 seats in the European Parliament. The BNP, founded in 1982 by John Tyndall, has been at the forefront of stirring racial violence in the country. Antiimmigration and anti-Semitism were the main thrusts of the party under Tyndall’s leadership. Since Nick Griffin assumed the leadership, the BNP has focused on criticism of Islam, and worked closely with extremist Sikh and Hindu groups to intensify its attacks on Muslims.25 In 2001, the BNP distributed pamphlets with titles such as Looting, Arson, and Molestation: It’s All in the Koran! The party also published a contemptuous poster: ISLAM: intolerance, slaughter, looting, arson, molestation of women. Nick Griffin, in 2006, publicly stated that, ‘the British National Party is positioned very firmly to benefit politically from ever growing popular concern about the rise of Islam’.26 The presence and the growing support of organizations and political parties like the BNP, make Muslim communities worried and allow extremist groups to operate within other communities. The BNP suffered losses in the 2010 and 2012 local elections. In the elections of 2012, the BNP lost its only seat in the London Assembly, and its mayoral candidate finished in seventh position. The party has lost all six of the seats it was defending in the English local elections. Some analysts, for example Matthew Goodwin, are proclaiming that the BNP ‘is finished as an electoral force’.27 Perhaps it is too early to write the obituary of the BNP. Besides, since 2010 far-right groups have become engaged in stirring up racial violence under the guise of the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL, in the summer of 2010, orchestrated riots in Dudley, Luton and Stoke, and threatened to march in East London in June. Protests from local activists, including members

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of the Bengali community, succeeded in stopping the march, but the belligerent posturing of the EDL continues. Another ominous development is the emergence of the British Freedom Party (BFP). A breakaway faction of the BNP formed the BFP in 2010 and registered as a political party in October of the same year. It also formed an alliance with the EDL, and the head of the EDL was named the Deputy Leader of the BFP in April 2012. The BFP has adopted ‘virulent anti-Islamic policies as its central strategy’.28 Strong criticism of the BNP and its ilk by mainstream parties, civil society and the media is necessary to reassure the minorities, especially the Bangladeshi community who have suffered at the hands of the BNP, that British society does not tolerate any extremism. These words should also be backed up with the government’s action of providing security to the minority communities. One can hardly ignore the fact that government and society’s tolerance of extremist organizations creates a favourable environment within which neo-Nazis, white supremacists and Christian fundamentalists find new recruits. Perhaps no event can be more telling than the incidents in Norway on 22 July 2011. Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old far-right extremist killed 77 people, including 69 youths attending a summer camp, in twin attacks. The self-confessed perpetrator, in a 1500–page manifesto entitled ‘2083: A European Declaration of Independence’ posted on the web, criticized multiculturalism and insisted that Europe is being Islamicized. Breivik mentioned in his manifesto that he had been in contact with members of EDL – he attended an EDL march in 2010 and openly admired their tactics; he wanted to set up a Norwegian Defence League.29 The British media, particularly the tabloids, have exacerbated the problem of disconnectedness of the Muslim community through the reproduction of stereotypes and misrepresentations of the ­community. Exaggeration of events, melodramatic descriptions and sensational head­­­­ lines have inflamed the situation and hardened the position of many individuals. Unfortunately the broadsheets have not been far behind. A report in the Guardian on 9 July 2007 is a case in point.30 The report’s headline, ‘More Britons travelling to Bangladesh to train in terror’ was not supported with any details. The opening sentence of the report, ‘significant numbers of Britons are travelling to Bangladesh to train in terrorist techniques’, was not backed up by any specifics; instead it asserted, ‘[British counter-terrorist officials] say the number of Britons of Bangladeshi descent apparently prepared to consider carrying out terrorist acts marks a new and worrying development’ (emphasis added). The report refers to other countries (Pakistan, South Africa) and

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other regions (Middle East, Southeast Asia), yet the headline highlighted Bangladesh for no apparent reason. The crucial role of the media in influencing minds and shaping events needs no elabouration. The Cantle Report on the Bradford Riots of 2001 emphasized the point and discussed this in detail. The British media need to play their role as much as the community, the government and civil society will have to play theirs. * * * Throughout Europe analysts and policy-makers have raised questions about whether the new religiosity among the younger Muslim population in combination with the presence of Islamist movements amongst them will lead to radicalization. A number of incidents in Europe since March 2004 (for example, the Madrid train bombing on 11 March 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, the London transport bombing on 7 July 2005, failed attacks in London on 21 July 2005 and the Glasgow Airport attack on 30 June 2007) have given credence to the argument that European countries are faced with a challenge of Islamist militancy. The debate has been particularly pertinent to Britain and many have asked whether such a threat can come from members of the British-Bangladeshi community, however tiny the radical group may be. This question has gained urgency among certain quarters of the British establishment, and security analysts after the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 and the London and Glasgow bombing plots in July 2007. In both instances, a number of the perpetrators came from the Pakistani community. The profiles of the 7/7 attackers reveal that they were active members of British mainstream society and their ethnic communities, and were either born and brought up in Britain or grew up there. Rohan Gunaratna argues, ‘Every major terrorist act in the West in the past decade, with the exception of Oklahoma City, utilized immigrants or immigrant communities.’31 In similar vein, Claude Moniquet, the Director General of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre, stated in 2005, ‘Recruits [of the new generation of terrorism] come from the “Third Generation” of immigration, who we know has identity problems and feels itself the victim of imperfect integration. These problems can push many young people towards violence.’32 As the demographic composition of the Muslim community in Britain demonstrated, the largest segment comprises those of South Asian origin, Pakistanis being the largest number. Hence, the question: is the second largest section of the Muslim community of South Asian origin, the Bangladeshis, experiencing the same phenomenon? The question has a larger context as well. The appeal to radicalism within the diaspora community is nothing new, nor has it been limited

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to Muslims. Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation has aptly argued that diasporas have been powerful agents in the United States for quite some time. Their connections to radical politics and terrorism are well documented. Hoffman writes, The Jewish Diaspora in the United States was extremely successful in lobbying Congress to pass resolutions denouncing the British in Palestine; Irish American support of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was so great that upwards of 70 per cent of the weapons found by British forces in Ireland were American; and the LTTE established a global network arms procurement, support, and finance operations abroad for its cause. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used cultural events and political events to instill a common cause among the Tamil Diaspora and to ensure their radicalization and support.33

Similarly, many diaspora communities in Britain have been associated with radical movements. Exiles and dissidents have always found Britain, particularly London, a useful base for international campaigns. As I mentioned earlier, the Bangladesh movement in 1971 received the support of the community in Britain and Professor Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, the then Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University who was on a trip to Britain when the war began in March, became the unofficial international spokesperson of the Bangladesh Government in Exile in India. Professor Chowdhury’s profile provided him easy access to the British government. He participated not only in raising awareness about the war and the genocide perpetrated by the Pakistani Army, but also in raising funds for the refugees living in India and the freedom fighters. Until recently, in most instances, the common cause that the diaspora community would fight for had been the national movement. What makes the current involvement of the diaspora different from previous efforts, according to Hoffman, is ‘Diaspora communities turning against their adopted homelands, targeting the government and its people.’34 A note of caution should be sounded here: in no instance has a community as a whole turned their back on the host country; neither is there any example that the majority of any diaspora community has become ‘the enemy within’. There cannot be any inherent traits within a community that engender radicalization. To date, available examples demonstrate that individuals have been engaged in violence, radicalism and terrorism against their adopted homeland; occasionally individuals who are citizens by birth but with immigrant backgrounds (for example, parents who migrated from other countries) had become threats to their own country. It is well to bear in mind that people of mainstream ethnic backgrounds have also perpetrated pernicious terrorist attacks on their communities.

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In the specific context of the British-Bangladeshi community, ques­­ tions can be asked: Can members of the community become prone to radicalization in future? Are the youth becoming more susceptible to radical ideology? The questions are important particularly because of the slow and steady trend of Islamization as a response to the identity dilemma, and the sense of social exclusion within the younger population. Add two other important factors: the growing strength of the Islamist organizations that have a dubious past, and the proliferation of militant groups, some of which are results of global interactions (for example, Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh) in Bangladesh. With close connections between the migrant community and Bangladeshi society, this kind of support may not be sporadic but an indication of things to come. Evidently this was in the mind of the British Home Secretary Jacqui Smith when she commented that there are links between British and Bangladeshi terror networks.35 The British government has not identified the organizations, but the Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HUJIB) remains the prime suspect as some of the members of its affiliate organization called the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have confessed to law-enforcement agencies that they received funds from British nationals of Bangladeshi origin. Jacqui Smith commented that her government feels that HUJIB is a threat to Britain and did not dismiss the notion that there could be a link between Al-Qaeda and Bangladeshi militant groups: ‘the global terror network does have the ability to work in a wide range of countries,’ she said. As for the involvement of the British-Bangladeshis in terror activities in Britain, save few instances, there is a very little evidence to suggest that there is a pattern. In 2002, a 27-year-old man of Bangladeshi origin, Mainul Abedin of Sparkbrook, Birmingham, who had moved to England as a child, was convicted by Birmingham Crown Court of planning to cause an explosion. He was jailed for 20 years.36 Another man, 29-yearold Nurur Rahman, arrested in November 2005, was convicted for nine years for being involved with a plot to shoot down a transatlantic airliner.37 Roshonara Choudhry, a 21-year-old student of Bangladeshi origin, was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2010 for attempting to kill Stephen Timms, a former government minister, for supporting the Iraq War.38 In December 2010, nine men of Bangladeshi origin were among twelve arrested in various parts of England in an anti-terror raid.39 Rajib Karim, an employee of British Airways and an IT expert, was convicted on 28 February 2011 and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment after being arrested in early 2011 for providing sensitive information data to the terrorist group and offering to help the group to

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launch an attack in the UK.40 Interestingly, both Choudhry and Karim confided that were inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born preacher and key figure in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. There are British-Bangladeshis who have close connections with mili­­ tant groups operating in Bangladesh. One of them was arrested several times while another is claimed to have founded HUJI’s unit in Britain. Dr Faisal Mustafa of Stockport, Greater Manchester, an accomplice of Abedin, was arrested three times in England before being arrested in Bangladesh in 2009. Mustafa studied chemistry in England and earned his PhD in metal corrosion. He was first arrested in 1996. He was acquitted of plotting to cause explosions after a trial at Manchester Crown Court, but was found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm and sentenced to four years in prison. In 2000, Dr Faisal Mostafa was arrested and charged with planning to cause explosions after police discovered a large cache of explosives at a house in Birmingham. Two years later he was arrested for conspiring to build home-made explosive devices allegedly using a manual detailing bomb-making techniques. He was again acquitted due to lack of conclusive evidence. Faisal Mostafa was arrested a third time in the UK in July 2008 for possession of dangerous weapons and making a false statement about baggage cargo at Manchester airport. He was reportedly trying to board a plane with weapons. Faisal Mostafa was found guilty by a court in Manchester in November and was given a two-year suspended sentence and ordered to do 100 hours’ unpaid community work. In March 2009, Bangladeshi police arrested Mostafa after a large cache of weapons and explosives was discovered at a madrassah in the southern town of Bhola, established by the charity Green Crescent, founded and headed by Mustafa. The charity is based in Britain and reportedly received funding from a charity based in the Middle East. Mustafa was released on bail in early 2010 and at the prodding of the British government allowed to return to Britain.41 Sylhet-born Gulam Mustafa of Birmingham had his bank account frozen on 23 April 2007 on suspicion of terrorist financing. Gulam Mustafa was reportedly interrogated by the London police several times in the early 2000s, but was never charged. He moved to Bangladesh and worked closely with Faisla Mostafa. Ghulam Mustafa was arrested in late 2007 in Bangladesh and was sentenced to 17 years by a local court. Bangladeshi police described him as the chief of the HUJI in England. In February 2009 he secured bail from the High Court as he appealed against the local court verdict. He, however, became involved in reorganizing the HUJIB in Bangladesh and was arrested in April 2010.42 These incidents, one can argue, are few and far between. Also, the small number shows that an insignificant number of individuals of

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British-Bangladeshi origin have been engaged in terrorism in Britain. A study published in 2008 on the background of 48 persons charged with or convicted for participating in violent attacks in the UK since 2001 revealed that, 18 persons (39%) were of Pakistani descent. The proportion roughly corresponds to the proportion of British Muslims of Pakistani origin (43% according to 2001 Census). Bangladeshis represent the second highest proportion of British Muslims (16%), yet there have been no persons of Bangladeshi origin among the 48 suspected British-based Jihadists. 43

Most of the community activists that I spoke to are optimistic that the trend will hold, and in the long run radicalism in the name of pan-Islamism will not be the defining characteristic of the community. Murad Querishi cites three factors as obstacles to possible radicalization of the British-Bangladeshi youth. These are: the absence of any political conflict in Bangladesh; the presence of legitimate means within British mainstream politics to vent grievances; and the syncretistic Islamic ­tradition in Bangladesh, particularly among families from Sylhet. Querishi argues that the conflict in Kashmir and the connections with the conflict via their extended families have been a major source of radicalization of the Pakistani community in Britain. Remarking that a significant proportion of Pakistani migrants in Britain are from the Mirpur area of Kashmir, Querishi insists that the conflict had an effect. In the case of the Bangladeshis, no such conflict with long-lasting effect exists, Querishi opines. The level of integration of Bangladeshis into mainstream society can be debated; but it is true that at the local level they are involved with mainstream parties. Thus, these youths can express their discontent, particularly on British foreign policy, and do not need to resort to violence. Querishi feels that, ‘In a way, the rise of Respect [within East London] was a welcome development. It allowed them to vent their anger.’ There is more than one tradition of Islam within the community. The larger segment of the community is from Sylhet where saints have been an integral part of the religious tradition. This tradition does not approve of extremism and radicalism; and the tradition is still alive within the community.44 Querishi is not alone in insisting that the syncretistic tradition is an antidote to radicalism; Urmi Rahman and Nahas Pasha also highlighted this aspect. Brendan O’Duffy makes similar arguments: Why have there been few or no violent jihadis among this [Bangladeshi] population? Several factors seem relevant: first, the form of (Sunni) Islam practiced in Bangladesh has been influenced by Sufism, which places more emphasis on inward personal spirituality, rather than outward ritualistic

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form emphasized by Salafist doctrine. As a result Bangladeshi Muslims may be less predisposed to violent jihadist ideology.45

Urmi Rahman is of the opinion that despite recent digression, the secular ethos within the community and the younger generation is stronger than the pull towards a religiously informed identity. She insists that while a section of the youth remains rooted to religious mores, another section has an outward outlook and is integrating with British society.46 ‘Let us not forget that the primary reason for emphasizing the Muslim identity is to be a part of a larger community’ insists Masud Rana.47 ‘Radicalization does not address the need for the Bangladeshis to belong to a bigger community or in uplifting the self esteem.’ Therefore, in Masud Rana’s view, radicalization is not an option for Bangladeshi youth. Nahas Pasha feels that religiosity within the family will always counteract the external influence of extremism.48 The thrust of the arguments of other activists that radicalism is not the emerging trend is shared by Ahmed Ansar Ullah; but he is less optimistic compared to others that youths cannot be diverted towards radicalism in the future. He argues that as British-Bangladeshi youths are being isolated from the mainstream society, this isolation may make them vulnerable to ‘Jihadi culture’ in future.49 The community should not be complacent that the number is minuscule now. Ahmed Ansar Ullah strongly insists that numbers should not be the only index of influence. In regard to radicalization, the point cannot be overstated. Ansar Ullah is not alone; some other community leaders have similar concerns. One of the key factors in radicalization, and attraction to extremism, is the network; in other words, who you know matters when it comes to being radicalized. Qintan Wiktorowicz’s finding that ‘social networks are often critical for recruitment’ is instructive in this regard.50 He goes on to say: ‘exposure to radicals typically results from movement outreach and social networks that tie [religious] seekers to the movement through personal relationships (both prior relationships as well as newly constructed social ties that result from movement activism)’.51 Wiktorowicz further insists: ‘attitudinal affinity may predispose an individual to join a movement, but social ties are critical for transforming interest and availability into actual activism’.52 The case of 25-year-old Waheed Ali of Bangladeshi origin, accused of helping the 7 July bombers plan their attacks, illustrates the point. The death of his parents when he was 4, and within a year of moving to England, a rough childhood in an abusive foster home, and growing up in a secluded neighbourhood where his choice of career was limited, did not by itself lead him to the radical path. The acquaintance of Shehzad Tanweer and Sadeer Salim were critical. He came into contact with

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Sidique Khan through these two individuals. These connections resulted in two trips to Pakistan and spending time in militant training camps. Ali and two others charged with him were cleared by a court in 2008 and a retrial in 2009 also found them not guilty of conspiring with the 2005 bombers by organizing a reconnaissance mission to London. Ali and another accused were found guilty of a second charge of plotting to attend a terrorism training camp in Pakistan.53 In conclusion, let me reiterate some of the points I made in this chapter: that complexity of identity politics among diaspora community in a globalized world cannot be overstated and a fixed simplistic generalization in regard to a community and a rigid framework to understand the phenomenon are unhelpful to the community, which is by definition heterogeneous, and bound to be inaccurate as the process remains in flux; that salience of religious identity among a section of the community does not indicate a single trajectory, or in other words, it is not path dependent, instead internal and external factors and the social ecosystem shapes them; that the growing salience of religious identity among British-Bangladeshi community has brought some uncomfortable questions to the fore for the Bangladeshi community, secularists and Islamists alike, as well as for the British state and society; discussions on these questions cannot remain suspended any longer. This study, in its entirety, is an effort to expedite this discussion and participate in this conversation. Notes   1 Stuart Hall, ‘The question of cultural identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tom McGrew (eds), Modernity and Its Future (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 310.   2 Pnina Werbner, ‘Black and ethnic leaderships in Britain: a theoretical over­­ view’, in Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar (eds), Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 21.   3 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 201.   4 David Marcus, To Next Year in Jerusalem (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. 140.  5 Gill Cressey, ‘Our streets of England: some translocal British Pakistani young people’s relationship with their Birmingham’, Global Built Environment Review, 6:2 (2007), 50.   6 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and the Society in the Late-Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 33.  7 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 243.

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 8 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 38.  9 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 47. 10 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, p. 185. 11 Catarina Kinnvall, Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India, The Search for Ontological Security (London: Routledge, 2006). 12 Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and religious nationalism: self, identity, and the search for ontological security’, Political Psychology, 25:5 (2004), 759. 13 Jorgen Nielsen, ‘The question of Euro-Islam: restriction or opportunity?’, in Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds), Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 42. 14 Nielsen, ‘The question of Euro-Islam’, p. 43. 15 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, trans. George Holoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 13–14. 16 Giulio Ercolessi and Ingemund Hägg, ‘Towards religious neutrality of public institutions in Europe: introduction’, in Fleur de Beaufort, Ingemund Hägg and Patrick van Schie (eds), Separation of Church and State in Europe, with Views on Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Greece (Brussels : European Liberal Forum, 2008), p. 12. 17 Karin L. Johnston, ‘Religion and politics: the European debate’, issue brief 15 (May 2007) (Washington D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2007), p. 2. 18 Johnston, ‘Religion and politics’, p. 2. 19 Salwa Ismail, ‘Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and identity politics’, Government and Opposition, 39:4 (2004), 614–31. 20 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘We’re all British, but we speak in different accents’, Inde­­­ pendent (11 June 2004): www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/ bhikhu-parekh-were-all-british-but-we-speak-in-different-accents-731756. html (accessed 11 March 2010). 21 Ahmed Ansar Ullah, ‘UK policy towards Bangladesh – homefront. Conference on the rise of political Islam in Bangladesh: what’s at stake in the 2007 elections?’, organized by the Policy Exchange, Hudson Institute, New Statesman and the International Bangladesh Foundation, London (14 November 2006). 22 For Academies Bill, see Queen’s Speech to the House of Commons (25 May 2010). www.number10.gov.uk/queens-speech/2010/05/queens-speechacademies-bill-50658 (accessed 10 July 2010). 23 Tim Lister, ‘Europe’s resurgent far right focuses on immigration, multiculturalism’ CNN (25 July 2011): http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/ 2011/07/25/europes-resurgent-far-right-focuses-on-immigration-multiculturalism/ (accessed 1 August 2011). 24 Amnesty International, Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination Against Muslims in Europe (London: Amnesty International, 2012). 25 ‘Hindu and Sikh extremists in link with BNP’, Observer (23 December 2001), p. 10. 26 Nick Griffin, quoted in Enemies Not Allies: The Far-Right (London: One

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Law for All, 2011): www.onelawforall.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Enemiesnot-Allies-web-version1.pdf (accessed 5 May 2012). 27 Matthew Goodwin, ‘The BNP is finished as an electoral force’, Guardian (4 May 2012): www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/04/bnp-localelections-electoral-force-finished (accessed 28 May 2012). 28 Mark Townsend, ‘Britian’s far right to focus on anti-Islamic policy’, Guardian (28 April 2012): www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/28/britain-far-rightanti-islamic (accessed 28 May 2012). 29 For a coverage of the events and related issues, see the Guardian: www. ­guardian.co.uk/world/norway (accessed 1 August 2011). 30 ‘More Britons travelling to Bangladesh to train in terror’, Guardian (2 July 2007), p. 4. 31 Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Al Qaeda: status and future prospects’, presentation at the Nixon Center Immigration and National Security Forum, Washington D.C., 1 December 2004. Overview available at www.nixoncentre.org/ index.cfm?action=showpage&page=immigratNatlSecur.html (accessed 1 June 2007). 32 Claude Moniquet, Director General of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, Testimony to the Committee on International Relations, Subcomittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, United States House of Representative, April 27, 2005. 33 Bruce Hoffman, The Radicalization of Diaspora and Terrorism, Proceedings of a Joint Conference by the Rand Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), p. 1. 34 Hoffman, The Radicalization of Diaspora and Terrorism, p. 1. 35 ‘Bangladesh, British terrors have links says UK Home Secy’, Daily Star (10 April 2008), p. 1. 36 ‘Bomb maker jailed for 20 years’, BBC News (27 February 2002): http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1845218.stm (accessed 8 August 2008); ‘Abe­­­­din team may go abroad’, BBC News (27 February 2002): http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1845534.stm (accessed 8 August 2008). 37 ‘Missile plot Briton sent to jail’, BBC News (30 April 2007): http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6206886.stm (accessed 7 August 2008). 38 ‘Roshonara Choudhry jailed for life over MP attack’, Guardian (3 November 2010): www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudry-jailedfor-life-attack?intcmp=239. 39 ‘Anti-terror police arrest 12 in UK raids’, Guardian (20 December 2010): www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/dec/20/anti-terror-police-arrests-uk (accessed 1 August 2011). 40 ‘Terror plot BA man Rajib Karim gets 30 years’, BBC News (18 March 2011): www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12788224 (accessed 1 August 2011). 41 Mustafa and his lawyers in both Bangladesh and in Britain alleged that he was tortured by the Bangladeshi police. ‘Fresh torture allegations raised over third British man held in Bangladesh’, Guardian (1 June 2010): www. guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/bangladesh-british-terror-torture-allegations (accessed 1 July 2010).

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Index

Notes are indicated with ‘n’ between page and note numerals. Tables are indicated with a ‘t’ between page and table numerals. Abbas, Helal Uddin 118 Adams, Caroline 38n9, 38n11, 40n27, 92–3 Afghanistan 84–5, 159–60, 162,182 Afro-Caribbean community 90 arrival in Britain of 142–3 After Multiculturalism (Alibhai-Brown) 152 Ahamadiyaas 54 Ahmed, Mohiuddin 109–10 Ahmed, Nooruddin 132n56 Ahmed, Suroth (Faruk) 93, 94, 132n54 al-Awlaki, Anwar 188 al-Banna, Hasan 84 Ali, Altab 89, 92, 93, 94, 116, 131n45, 132n53 demonstrations in response to murder of 94 Ali, Ayub Korom 65n39, 69n69, 104, 112, 119, 135n102, 139n159, 154, 155, 169n37 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin 152, 153 Aliens Act (1905) 144, 145, 165n12, 166n13 Aliens Order of 1920 145 Aliens Restrictions Acts of 1914 145 Aliens Restrictions Acts of 1919 145 Ali, Ishaq 89, 92, 93 alim (scholar) 60, 67n59 Ali, Makbul 61, 69n76 Ali, Monica 13, 47, 50, 52, 63n20, 63n20 Ali, Rushanara 1, 36 Ali, Waheed 190–1 see also London transport bombings Al-Muhajiroun 108, 109, 158, 170n69

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al-Mutanda al-Islami centre 122 Al-Qaeda 187, 188 Anglican Church see Church of England anti-Muslim groups in Europe/Scandinavia 182–3 Anti-Nazi League 91, 116, 148 Arab American Institute 162 Asian community in Britain, racial discrimination of 89, 90–1 see also Bengali(s), racial discrimination in Britain Asian Youth Movement (AYM) 74, 90, 93,151 secular movement of 94–5 assimilationism 146–7, 150 and cultural uniformity 147 youth challenge to 151 see also ethnic minorities, and resistance to identity perception changes by state Awami League (AL) 61, 79–80, 81, 82, 87, 88 coup d’etat (1975) 78 and Islam as guiding political ideology 112 and lack of ideological perspective 80 and signing memorandums of understanding (2006) with BKM 81 ayahs (nannies) 19, 37n2, 37n4 Azam, Golam 79, 98 Baishakhi Mela (Bengali New Year Brick Lane fair) 103 Bakri, Omar 108, 135n109, 158, 170n69, 170n89 Bangladesh

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Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET) in 85 constitution 77, 78–9, 128n19 cultural organizations 83–4 diaspora in United Kingdom 4 domestic factors and politics 77 domestic situation (1978) in 85 Eighth Amendment to the Constitution 129n22 Government in Exile in India (1971) 186 gross domestic product (GDP) statistics of 85 High Commission 102, 110 High Court (HC) in 66n46 history, democratic era of (1991– 2006) 80, 129n23 identity as Muslim identity 86 independence movement (1971) 86–7 International Criminal Court in 66n46 international factors and politics 77 Islam as state religion (1988) 79 Islamization process in 84, 86 labour migration from 85–6 military regimes and Islamization policies 78 nationalist ideology (1977) and Islam 78–9 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 56 north-eastern region of 20 see also Sylhet region  (Bangladesh) and Persian Gulf relationships 85 political culture elements 82 political elites of 77 political identity of 77 political party acrimony 83 religio-political parties 4 rise of Islamism as political ideology 77 secularism of 77, 86, 130n38 secular-religious divide 86–7 social democrats in 82–3 socio-religious organizations 83–4 statehood (1971) 98 syncretistic Islamic tradition in 189–90 volunteers for Afghan war 85 Bangladeshi Education Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH) 120 Bangladesh Islamic Movement 81 Bangladesh Khilafat Majlis (BKM)

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conditions of (2006), with AL 81–2 and Taliban regime support 82 Bangladeshi movement (1971) 2 Pakistani opposition to 2 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 80, 81, 82, 87 election manifesto (2001) of 81, 129n26 and Islam as guiding political ideology 78, 112 and lack of ideological perspective 80 Bangladesh Welfare Association 92, 120, 132n56, 151 declining need of services of 119 split within 94 Bangladesh Workers Association 104 Bangladesh Youth Approach (BYA) 92, 132n54 Bangladesh Youth Association (BYA) 92 Bangladesh Youth Front (BYF) 92 Bangladesh Youth League (BYL) 92 Bangladesh Youth Movement (BYM) 92, 132n55 Bangla Post 59–60 Bangla TV 124–5 Barelvis (Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jamaat) 101 Baruna Madrasah 125–6 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 111 Begum, Maleka 56 Bengal 18, 19 Bengali(s) activism in UK 130n39 and early settlement in England 22 ethnic identity 71 language 72 migration to UK 22–3 nationalist movement in East Pakistan 147–8 post-WWII migration of 22 racial discrimination in Britain 89–92 see also Asian community in   Britain, racial discrimination of response to murder of Altab Ali 116 youth identity 71–4 Bengali-Sylheti community 52 Bengali Youth Movement Against Racist Attacks 92 Bethnal Green and Bow constituency (London) 1, 2, 3, 46, 47, 91, 92, 108, 111 Galloway victory in 110 MP candidacy (1997) in 121

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Black and Ethnic Minority Community 10, 182 Blair, Tony (Prime Minister) 2–3, 46, 47, 106 foreign policy of 110–11, 159 Blasphemy Law 54 Boateng, Paul 116 Borough Council , legislation on newlyarrived Bangladeshis 29 Bosnian War 103 BRAC (developmental NGO) 67n57 Bradford (England) 94, 95 riots (2001) 35, 44n85 Bradford Asian Youth Movement, 94, 151 Bradford Council 116, 155 Bradford Council of Mosques 155 Breikik, Anders Behring 184 Brick Lane see Tower Hamlets Borough (London), Brick Lane Brick Lane (Ali) 46, 47, 51, 52 debate on 4, 65n35 filming of 2, 12–13, 47–53, 65n37, 65n38, 103 issue of religion in 51 opposition of locals to filming of 48, 50, 53 plot line of 48–50 Brick Lane Mosque 101 Bright, Martin 58, 59, 61, 69n76 Britain anti-immigrant sentiment 144 anti-poverty programme 182 Asian population in 143–5, 185 Bangladeshi voter registration (1997) 113 Bangladeshi voter turnout (2005) 113 black population in 143–5 borough-level as South Asian entry level to politics 116 and colonialism 37n1, 38n16 and ethnic minority MPs 115, 115t3.2, 116 and ethnic minority political candidates 114–15, 114t3.1, 139n153 faith/religion as basis for public policy 154–8 foreign policy of 182 identity politics of ethnic minorities 57 Indian community in 93 multiculturalism in 142–58, 177–8, 179–90 Pakistani community in 93, 185, 189

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parliamentary elections (2005) 46–7, 62n2 preference for European (white) immigrants 145–6 race relations (twentieth century) 144–5 repatriation of immigrants 146, 166n22 role in social group identity shaping 75 South Asian/Bangladeshi political participation in 113, 119–21, 137n134 South Asian population in 26–7, 27t1.1 welfare policy 180 British-Bangladeshi community ‘accommodation’ to host society 148 anti-Iraq War sentiment 111 anti-racism struggle of 116 and assimilation era 147–8 and census populations 12, 26–7, 28t1.2 chapters of political parties relevant to Bangladesh 86–7 children of Bengali-British parentage 23, 40n31 consequences of women arrivals to 24–5 debate on rise of Islamists within 179 diaspora 86–7, 173–4 diasporic identity of 173–4 drug abuse statistics 96–8 drug rehabilitation measures 97 economic deprivation of 96 education 29–30 election (2010) of politician of Bangladeshi descent 1, 15n1 employment sources for 30–1, 39n26 and ethnic identity 1 ethnic segregation 2 ethnic suppression in British politics 113 female youth drug abuse in 96 future paths of, 15 generations of 87, 119 and global event factors 99 home ownership, 29 and host country connection 76 household size of 29 identity politics of 5, 72, 173, 177–8 identity transformation of 46, 75 Islamist pre-eminence in 75

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index see also Islamist(s) movement   and factors in British  Bangladeshi community and Islamization and identity dilemma 187 and lack of terror activity evidence 187, 188–9 lack of upward mobility of 36 life of early male migrants to UK 23 London population 27, 28, 29 Muslim identity 11, 13, 71 and nation-state transcendence 175 networks of 25–6 and new mode of multiculturalism 180 population in Bethnal Bow and Green 3 and poverty 30–1 relationship with British society 3, 23–4 religious identity of 1, 26, 76, 176 residential segregation of 32–3 Saudi cultural influence on 106, 122–3 secular nationalist identity 76, 77–8 segregation of population 29, 32 self perception of 36 social climate in, 34–5 social exclusion 31–2 social segregation, 35 social settings 26 societal issues 51–3 socio-economic environment of, 4 socio-political forces within 3, 75 spatial segregation of 32, 33, 34–5, 36 sub-ethnic identity of 13, 50 and tension with Sylhetis 50 and terror network links to 187–8 and Tower Hamlets Council candidate nomination (1982) 117–18 unemployment rate 30 urban population concentration 27, 28t1.3 use of term for this study 9–12 view of outsiders on 36 as vocal minority 53 weakening of secular social organization in 157 weakening of unity in 120 women migrants to UK 23, 24 youth 87, 181 youth activism in 13 youth and dislocation discourse 175 youth and Islamic views 89, 174

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youth drug abuse 96–8 youth gang culture 96 youth and appeal by Islamist organizations 99–100, 102, 104–12 youth and Muslim identity ‘tipping point’ 105 youth and obstacles to radicalization 189–90 youth organizations’ emergence (1980s-early 1990s) 92, 98 youth secular outreach failure 112, 174–5 youth social alienation 99–100 youth view of community politics 88–9 youth view of home state politics 87–8, 131n42 see also Bengalis, migration to UK British Broadcasting Corporation see BBC British Brothers League 144 British government and faith-based organization support 123–4 and foreign policy identification with Muslim identity 158–9 foreign policy implications for local communities 15, 112 and Home Office 105, 156 multicultural policies of 15 and Muslim school funding 157, 182 and policy toward Islamists 3–4, 105 and policy toward minorities (twentieth century), four phases 142, 165n3 rise of Bangladeshis as elected local officials in 117–18 and role in response to Islamist appeal 3 social cohesion policy 15 social policies and ethnic minorities 181 British Indian Steam Navigation Company (BISNC) 22 British merchant ships, death rate of European seamen 19–20 British Nationality Act 1984 150 British National Party (BNP) 183–4 Brixton Riots (1981) 167n35 Bunglawala, Inayat 108 Burnley (England), riots (2001) 35, 44n85 burqa (veil) 86

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Calcutta (West Bengal) 21–2 Campaign Against Monica Ali’s Film Brick Lane 47 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 110 Canary Wharf see Tower Hamlets Borough (London), Canary Wharf Cantle Report on the Bradford Riots of 2001 185 Cantle, Ted 152 Chaggar, Gurdip Singh 93, 94 Channel 4 60 Channel S 124–5 Chittagong (region in Bangladesh) 22, 57, 61 Choudary, Anjem 158 Choudhry, Roshonara 187 Church of England 154–5 Civil Rights Act (1964) 150 Clinton, Bill (US President) 161–2 collective identity 176 Coloured Alien Seamen see Special Restriction Order (1925) Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (1976) 34, 148 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 24, 143, 145–6, 166n17 and impact on migrants, 24, 145 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 146 Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) 85, 87 Communities and Local Government 152 Community Cohesion Review Team 152 ‘The Compact’ (1998) 156 see also British government, and faithbased organization support Con-Lib coalition government (Britain) 182 Conservative Party 62n2, 89, 112, 115, 121, 139n155, 177 British-Bengladeshis as local candidates in 118 and immigration policies 146 dawah (calling to faith) 100 Dawat-ul Islam 58, 99, 107, 134n89 Department for Communities and Local Government 29, 156 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 154–5 deterritorialization 6

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Dhaka University 109, 186 diaspora and appeal to radicalism 186–5 community 9 conditions for 6 criteria 6 defined for this study 5–8 see also Bangladesh, diaspora   in United Kingdom framework of 7–8 and individuals against host country 186 Irish-American 186 Jewish 186 Tamil 186 East End Advertiser 90 East End (London) 1, 2, 25, 46, 99–100 Bangladeshis 35, 92 Bengali political strength in 118 Bengalis 33–4 Bengali youth movement in (1970s) 89 ‘ghettoization’ of 33–4 housing issues in 43n74, 165n13 in MP election (2005) 111 post-2005 election 112 protest gathering (2001) 57–8 race riots in (nineteenth century) 144–5 secular social organizations in 110 Shoreditch 91 youth study in 72 East India Company (EIC) 18, 22 East London Mosque (ELM) 58, 99, 100, 111, 124, 134n89, 134n90, 157 and connection to JI 158 history of 101–2 East London Youth Forum 107 Elboz, Annie 117 The Election of Caliph/Khalifa and World Peace (Mowla) 109 Empire Windrush 142–3 English Defence League (EDL) 183–4 Ershad, General Hussain Muhammad 80–1, 102 regime of (1982–1990) 79 Ershad, Raushan 81 ethnic minorities 147 and demise of secular organizations 154–5 and resistance to identity perception changes by state 147

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and tension during assimilation era 147 Euro Bangla, 63n18 European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre 185 Evans-Gordon, Major 144 Evening Standard 96 extremism 180 faith-based organizations and public service delivery 180, 181–2 Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund 156, 169n64 Faith in the City (1985 Church of England report) 154–5 Faith Links 156 see also Local Authority Faith Leads fatwa (religious edict) 67n57, 80, 81, 86 Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organizations (FBYO) 92, 95, 120 Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (FOSIS) 95, 132n67 Foreign Office (UK) 68n66, 164 foreign policy and globalization effect 141–2 Forest Gate (London) police raid (2006) 16n2 The Fundamentalism Project 162 Galloway, George (MP) 1, 2, 12–13, 46–7 campaign of (2005) 158 HT opposition to candidacy of 108–9 MAB support for campaign of 111 MP election campaign 112 and support of Islamists in election (2005) 3 and use of religion in election 111–12 and victory in parliamentary election (2005) 46 Garbin, David 68n63 General Lifestyles Surveys 29 ghettoization 180 Glasgow (Scotland) Airport attack (2007) 185 globalization 9, 141–2 ‘global war on terror’ 162 Government Commission for Racial Equality 34 Great Britain see Britain Greater London Authority (GLA) 61 Greater Sylhet Development and Welfare Council in UK 50, 63n18, 64n29

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223

Green Crescent 188 Greer, Germaine 64n25 Griffin, Nick 183 group identity 9 Guardian 52, 53, 64n25, 160–1, 184 Gulf War (1991) 2, 13, 103, 105 Hackney Borough Council 117 Hadi, Syed Mohammad 22, 39n19 Hadith 81 Hamas 2, 163 Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HUJI) 188 Bangladesh (HUJIB) 187, 188 Hashmi, Taj-ul Islam 55, 56 Hasina, Sheikh 80, 82, 83, 129n32 Hefazothe Islam UK 125, 126 hefez (ability to memorize the Qur’an) 126 hegemonic identity 77–8 Hezbollah 2 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) 135n109, 155, 170n69 Bangladesh chapter of 109–10 emphasis on religion as identity 107 Galloway campaign rally attack 108–9 impact on Muslim youth in Britain 106–10 London Imperial College of Science and Technology chapter 109 membership profile 108 mission description of 107–8 opposition to election participation 108–9 on university campuses (1990s) 108, 119 youth appeal 112 host community 9 Howard, Michael (Home Secretary) 155 human will 82–3 Huq, Mohammad Nurul 116–17 Hurrab, Abu see Iqbal, Jabed Husain, Ed 106, 135n109 identity formation 8 identity politics 8, 141, 153 Immigration Act 1971 146 Independent 96 Independents 117 India ‘Bangalee sub-culture’ of 78–9 colonial history of 18–19 Indian Civil Service examination 18

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Indian Progressive Youth Movement see Bradford Asian Youth Movement Indian Seamen’s Welfare League (ISWL) 25–6 Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC) 155, 156 Inner London Education Authority 51 Iqbal, Jabed 57 iQra International 125 Iranian Revolution 84 Iraq War 2, 3, 47, 110, 137n124, 158–9, 187 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 186 Islam authoritarian rule and impact on 77 and divine will primacy 11–12, 83–4 in Europe 5 global 73 interactions with Europe 177 new version of 73 political interpretation 177 religious interpretation 177 state policies and rise of 17–18 Sunni 189–90 and youth appeal 74, 155, 176 as youth identity marker 71–2 youth population trends 177 Islamic Centre in London 122 Islamic Constitution Movement (ICM) 81 Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference (1974) 77 Islamic Forum Europe (IFE) 99, 107, 111, 134n89 Islamic Oikya Jote (IOJ, Islamic United Alliance) 76–7 and support of Taliban 80 Islamic Shariah Council of the UK, 5 Islamic Society of Britain 134n85, 136n109 see also Young Muslims UK Islamic Summit (1974) 77 Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) 95, 134n84 Islamic youth organizations 100 Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IJOF or Islamic National United Front) 81 Islami Shashontontro Andolon (Islamic Constitution Move­­ment) 81 see also Bangladesh Islamic Movement Islamist(s) 2, 83 appeal to British-Bangladeshis 3, 178 appeal to younger British-Bangladeshis 3

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in Bangladesh 164 and Galloway support (2005) 111 global issues agenda 111 influence of 4 international movement of 4 militant groups 187 movement and factors in BritishBangladeshi community 75 organizations and external funding 121–6, 140n164 in parliamentary elections (2005) 47 perceptions of threats to Islam 161 political organizations and role of British state 14–15 political party growth 76 rise of faith initiatives of 142 role of British government in response to 3 secular ineffectiveness in religious influence of 119–20 strategy to ‘Islamicize’ society 158 use of religion in election (2005) 111–12 views and British-Bangladeshi youth see British-Bangladeshi community, youth and Islamic views youth appeal 112 youth organizations 14, 110 Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (Riaz) 128n17 The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left (Husain) 106, 135n109 Islamization process 84–86 Islam, Shirajul, 26 Jagoron 64n29 Jalal, Rajonuddin 88, 96, 120–1, 132n55 Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) 2, 58, 59, 61, 65n39, 83, 101, 104, 157, 158 Bangladesh 56, 68n66, 81, 104, 158, 164 as beneficiary of religious identity ban in Bangladesh constitution 79 cadres 54 congregations of 2, 54 courting support of Islamists 80 election manifesto (2001) 54 electoral leaders as ideological ‘kingmakers’ 80 electoral strength of 76 founding of 84, 134n84 imprisoned leaders released (1973) 77

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Pakistan 95, 99, 133n67 transnational movement transformation 104 Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 57, 187 Jamaat-ul-Ulum 125 Jamaat-ul-Ummah 126 Jamal, Ahmed 95 Jatiya Party 80, 81, 87 Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) 87 Jay, Michael 159 jilbab (long, loose-fitting garment) 106 Jonomat 59, 104, 124, 125 Karim, Rajib 187–8 Karim, Syed Fazlul 81 Keith, Michael 124 Kelly, Ruth 152 Khan, Sidique 191 see also London transport bombings Khilafat (divinely ordained Islamic governance) 107 King, Oona (MP) 3, 46, 47, 121 Kufr (non-believers) 108 Labour Force Survey 12, 30 Labour Party 1, 2, 3, 46, 47, 62n2, 88, 89, 110, 112, 114–15, 116, 117, 139n155 British-Bangladeshis as local candidates 118 defection of community leaders 120 denial of Huq nomination 117 and faith-based groups 156 and immigration policies 146 Lascars (Indian seamen) 19, 20 in East London 20, 22, 23 Liberal Democrats 115, 121 British-Bengladeshis as local candidates 118 Liberal Party 114–5, 139n155 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 186 Lindsay, Robert 21, 22, 39n19 Liverpool race riot (1919) 144 Livingston, Ken 69n73 Local Authority Faith Leads 156 London Bethnal Green and Bow constituency see Bethnal Green and Bow constituency (London) Borough of Newton 154 East End see East End (London)

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failed attacks in (21 July 2005) 185 as locus of radical movements 186 London Jami Mosque see Brick Lane Mosque London Muslim Centre (LMC) 58, 59, 60, 61, 111, 124, 134n91 London transport bombings (2005) (‘7/7’) 4, 106, 152, 185, 190–1 madrassahs (Islamic religious education institutions) 81, 86, 135, 170n68 Madrid (Spain) train bombing (2004) 185 Mahdi, Syed Mohammad 22, 39n19 Maher, Shiraz 106, 107 mahfils. see waz mahfils Malick, Kenan 153, 155 Manningham-Butler, Eliza 159, 160 Marty, Martin 162 maulanas(religious scholars) 55 Maulvi Bazar (Bangladesh) 126 Mawdudi, Abul Ala 84, 104 May, Theresa 162–3 mazars (shrines) 129n24 Mecca 80 MI5 159 migration 6 Britons to South Asia 18 phases of Muslim 20 South Asians to Britain 18–27, 27t1.1 Ministry of Labour 145 modernity 175–6 Modood, Tariq 152, 168n42 Mowla, Syed Golam 109 Mughal Empire East India Company presence in 18 Muhammad (prophet) 82 Muinuddin, Chowdury 99, 104 Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) 84 mulla (cleric) 56, 101 multiculturalism 167n31 categories of 151–2 critics of 153–6 demise of 153 dialogical 180 era of 148–54 see also Britain, multi  culturalism in hegemonic 180 in other countries (post-WWII) 149–50 and policies of recognition 152, 168n40, 168n41, 168n42, 168n43 segregationist 180

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as source of political patronage 153–4 muridan (disciples) 129n24 Muslim(s) in Britain 41n39, 41n44 and British media misrepresentations of 184–5 diaspora of 105 establishment of British mosques 25 perception of U.S. policy toward Palestine and Israel 162 post-9/11 treatment of 142 role in European history 179 schools in Britain 157 youth radicalization 59–61, 74 youth and identity problems of 185–6 Muslim Aid 99, 125 Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) 110, 111, 137n127 Muslim Brotherhood 84 of Egypt 95, 132n67, 163 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 60, 61, 69n73, 104, 108, 109, 124, 155 Muslim identity ‘belonging’ as part of resistance 176 cultural 11 and divine will primacy 11–12 and human will primacy 11–12 in religion 178–9 Muslim League 87, 98 Muslim Parliament (1992) in Great Britain 109, 136n121 Mustafa, Dr Faisal 188, 193n41 Mustafa, Gulam 188 National Front 89, 91, 92, 146 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) 10–11 nation-state formation process 167n29 National Statistics Office 29 National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (NSEM) (1994) 31 Nawaz, Maajid 106, 135n109 New York Times 144, 145 niqab (face covering) 106 Norway murders (2011) 184, 193n29 Nottingham/Notting Hill riots (1958) 143 Notun Din 59, 61 Obonobi, Ayotunde 107 Oldham (England) 57 riots (2001) 33, 35, 44n85

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Pakistan and Bangladeshi movement 186 and colonial rule 77–8 East and Bengali population in 87 resistance movement in 87 Pakistani(s) anti-Bangladeshi activities of 98, 99 army 87 in Britain and effect of Kashmir conflict 189 community in London 33 health 31 lack of upward mobility 36 youth religiosity 74 Pakistan People’s Association 116 Pakistani Welfare Association 26 Parekh, Bhikhu, 152, 168n43 Pasha, Nahas 104, 105, 119, 124, 189–90 PEN 53, 65n33 People’s Democratic Alliance (PDA) 117 People’s Republic of Bangladesh 81 Phillips, Trevor 34 pirs (saints) 129n24 ‘plural monoculture’ 152 postcode discrimination 35–6 Potrika 57, 59 Powell, Enoch 146 Preventing Violent Extremism (Prevent) 163 Progressive Youth Organization (PYA) 92 qawmi madrassahs (orthodox privatelyoperated Islamic seminaries) 81, 86 Querishi, Shah Abdul Majid, 26 Querishi, Murad 112, 118–19, 137n131, 139n158, 189, 194n44 Quilliam Foundation 135n109 Qur’an 81, 126 race and immigration policies 142 Race Relations Act of 1965 143, 146, 148 Race Relations Act of 1968 146, 148 radicalization and key factors 190 Rafiq, Haras 105, 155 Rahim, M.A. 60–1 Rahman, Lutfur 99 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) 77, 78, 82 Rahman, Urmi 69n69, 104, 135n101, 189–90, 194n46

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index Rahman, General Ziaur (‘Zia’) 76, 78, 82 death of 79 regime (1975–1981) 78–9, 85 Regent’s Park Mosque 122 religion European presence of 178–9 in identity formation 178 in social public sphere 178–9 religio-political forces 181–2 religious right, British and U.S. support to 163 Reporters without Frontiers 54 Respect Party 1, 2, 3, 46–7, 110–11, 123 and election of candidates (2005) 137n123 and Muslim voter dominance (2005) 111 use of religion in elections (2005) 111–12 as voice to British-Bangladeshi youth 189 Runnymede Trust 131n52 Rushdie affair (1989) 13, 104, 105, 128n15 Rushdie, Salman 13, 17n22, 64n27, 104–5, 128n15 sahaba (companions) 81 Saidee, Delwar Hossain 2, 53–62, 68n61, 157 anti-journalist stance 54 as Bangladeshi parliament member 54, 66n46 impact on British-Bangladeshi identity discourse 13 misogynistic view of 56 popularity with British-Bangladeshi youth 62, 70n80 recordings of 57, 67n59 supporters of UK visit 61 visit to London (2006) 2, 12–13, 46, 59–62, 68n67, 69n69, 164 waz mafils of 55–7, 58 St Dunstan’s Ward 120 St Katherine’s Ward 117 St Pancras Council of London 116 Salafist doctrine 190 Salim, Sadeer 190–1 see also London transport bombings Salique, Abdus 47–8, 50–1, 62n4, 63n19, 64n21 salish (village arbitration) 86

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Sangram 98 Sarkozy, Nicolas 178 The Satanic Verses (Rushdie) 60, 104 Sayeed, Abu 58, 99 Scarman Report on the Brixton Riots (1981) 150, 167n35 secularism in Bangladeshi constitution 79 defined 77–8, 79 secularists political bankruptcy of 81 secularization 178 segregation dissimilarity index (ID) as measure 34, 44n82 Sen, Amartya 152 Shaheed Minar (Martyrs’ Memorial) 103 Shariah laws 81 Shore, Peter 120 Siddiqui, Ghayasuddin 136n121 Siddiqui, Kalim 109, 136n121 Smith, Jacqui 187 social cohesion 179–80 social construction 9 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 117, 120, 139n155 social exclusion, defined 31–3 see also British-Bangladeshi community, social exclusion Social Exclusion Task Force 42n62 Social Exclusion Unit 42n62, 43n63 worklessness estimate (2004) 36 Southall Youth Movement (SYM) 93, 94 South Asian population in Britain see Britain, South Asian population South Wales race riots (1919) 144 Special Restriction Order (1925) 145 Stoke on Trent Sentinel 57 Stop the War Coalition 2 structural racism 98 Sufi Muslim Council 105 Sufism 189–90 Sun 90, 93 Sunday Times 96 Surma 57, 59 Survey of English Housing (2006–7) 29 Syed, Syed Nasrullah M. 117 Sylheti(s) Bangladesh migrant majority from 25 as boat builders 21 and Brick Lane criticism 48 British-Bangladeshi tensions with 13 community in Britain 24

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factors in migration to Britain 21–2 as first British migrants 20 Sylhet region (Bangladesh), history of 22 Tabligh Jamaat 100 Tafsir mahfils see waz mahfils Tanweer, Shehzaf 160, 190–1 see also London transport bombings terror networks 187–8 Thatcher, Margaret 89 and immigration platform (1978) 146–7 on multiculturalism 154 toopi (caps) 86 Tower Hamlets Borough (London) 27, 28t1.2, 34, 65n33, 92, 116 Brick Lane 35, 47, 64n21, 64n28, 91, 112 British-Bangladeshis in 29, 32 Canary Wharf 34 Docklands 34 drug abuse problems in 97, 98 elections in 117–18 housing estates study 35 Metropolitan Police Authority for 111–12 Muslim residents in 41n45 Shadwell 44n86 Spitalfields 100, 117 Tower Hamlets Borough Council 64n21, 88, 117, 124, 138n152 Tower Hamlets Community Drugs Team 98 Uddin, Pola Monjil 121 UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) 104 UK Foreign Office 61, 159 UK Islamic Mission 95 ulama (Islamic legal scholars) 60, 85, 101

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Ullah, Ahmed Ansar 104, 190 ummah (global community) 73, 103, 107, 108, 157, 161 United Black Youth League (UBYL) 112–13 United Kingdom, election in 2010 1, 15n1 Unity Coalition see Respect Party urban regeneration 155 van Gogh, Theo 185 Vaz, Keith 116 Vincent, Howard 144 Wahabbism (conservative branch of Sunni Islam) 86 Wahid, Abdul 108 Waltham Forest Council 116 War on Want 2 waz mahfils 2, 55–7, 58, 60, 67n54, 67n57 see also Jamaat-i-Islami, congregations of West Yorkshire County Council 116 Who’s Who of British-Bangladeshis, 36 Windrush 144 Yaqoob, Salma 123 Young British Muslims (Kabir) 72 Young Muslim Organization (YMO) 57, 58, 98, 99, 100, 102–3, 112–13, 119, 135n109 and monolithic Islamic identity 103 Young Muslim Sisters 99 Young Muslims UK (YMUK) 134n85 see also Islamic Society of Britain zainamaz (prayer mats) 86 Zia, Khaleda [Prime Minister] 80, 82, 83, 129n21

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