Ireland and the Death of Kindness: The Experience of Constructive Unionism, 1890-1905 0902561421, 9780902561427

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IRELAND AND THE DEATH OF KINDNESS The experience of constructive unionism 1890-1905

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IRELAND AND THE DEATH OF KINDNESS The experience of constructive unionism

1890-1905

Andrew Gailey

Cork University Press

First published in 1987 by Cork University Press, University College, Cork

Copyright © Cork University Press and The Irish Committee of Historical Sciences 1987

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Gailey, Andrew Ireland and the death of kindness. 1. Ulster Unionist Party — History 2. Irish unification question 1. Title 320.9415 JN1419

ISBN 0-902561-42-1

Printed in the Republic of Ireland by Tower Books, 86 South Main St., Cork

To Mary and Drew and Shizzy

EDITORIAL

A GOOD purpose volume credited

NOTE

BOOK NEEDS NO introduction, least of all from an editor, andthe ofthis note is to draw attention to the fact that this is the second of a new series of Studies in Irish History which is being acby the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences. Two series were

previously published; the first by Faber & Faber which included seven volumes and the second by Routledge & Kegan Paul which extended to eleven volumes. These earlier series included some of the most original work published on Irish history during the past thirty years and provided a first publication forum for such noted historians of Ireland as R.B. McDowell, J.C. Beckett, E.R.R. Green, J.G. Simms, Kevin B. Nowlan and James Donnelly, Jr. But while of the highest academic calibre, the books published in the earlier series were also produced to the highest standards on high quality paper, with notes at the foot of the page and a comprehensive bibliography and index to each volume. Rising production costs and slow returns on sales explain why commercial publishers retreated from these earlier ventures, and the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences is now reviving the series so that scholars of the rising generation who devote themselves to Irish history will have the same publication opportunities as their predecessors enjoyed. The editorial board, appointed by the I.C.H.S. to organize the new series, hope to maintain the high academic and production standards that characterized the earlier series. We hope that each contribution will, like the eighteen volumes that preceded it, add significantly to the corpus of detailed studies that are essential to the understanding both of Ireland’s social, economic and political problems and of Anglo-Irish relations. All the work involved in the preparation of manuscripts for the press is being offered on a voluntary basis, and the editorial board hopes that all who submit manuscripts for consideration will benefit from a critical appraisal of the text even when we cannot proceed to publish the manuscript as a book. Because the new series is dependent on voluntary labour and because

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Editorial Note

production costs remain extremely high we shall limit our output to one volume a year. Only manuscripts by younger scholars who have not previously published a book will be considered for publication, and then only when they are recommended by reputable academics. This series will also differ from its predecessors in that we hope to confine all manuscripts to a word-limit of 100,000 words and we expect authors to reduce appendices and supporting data to the absolute minimum. These restrictions should not deter younger scholars whose existing works do not meet these specifications from submitting them for our consideration, because we may be able to offer advice on how the manuscript should be re-cast to meet our requirements. Even with voluntary labour and rigid word-limits we could not have hoped to re-launch the series without substantial external support. We are particularly indebted to Cork University Press for providing the major portion of the capital that makes the production of this second volume possible. Our own organization, the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences, advanced a grant in aid of production from its slim resources, and a special grant was also made by the Institute for Irish Studies in Belfast to help keep the purchase price of this particular volume within the reach of the book-reading public. In offering thanks for this generous support we hope that our success in producing this volume will persuade generous donors or philanthropic bodies to come to our support so that a work well-begun can continue ona regular basis in the years ahead. But wear =

AREAL Www

ofessor Nicholas Canny, Series Editor, University College, Galway

Dr Dr Dr Dr

R.H. Buchanan, Queen’s University, Belfast Art Cosgrove, University College, Dublin Vincent Comerford, St Patrick’s College, Maynooth Tom Dunne, University College, Cork

— Members of the Editorial Board

CONTENTS

page

EDUEORIA ISNOT Beet eres eens

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AGING WILE DGEMENT Ssorescence edi fotcess ee osetia ABBREVIATIONS Sere © cores

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RENT RODUCTION See os Cet tite

vii xi

aoe oe aed sa: Xiv

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Part One

1 GERALD BALFOUR AND THE SPIRIT OF KINDNESS........... 25 11 POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION. .........-- 69 ill A QUESTION OF UNIONISM AND THE CONSEOUENGES OFTS86 0m ee ee 99 IV THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF IRISH UNIONISM........0000000ceee 136

Part Two

V RADICAL UNIONISM AND THE CREATION OF AN TRISHRPORICY eer ee ee ee, LON See 161 Bayi 904 IRISH UNIONISM IN REVOLT 0..c00..-cc2s-seesecereccaeaes 210

Part Three

Vil DUBLIN CASTLE AND THE EMERGENCE OF DEVOLUTION Seen ee eer tint

eee

ee 235

Xs

Contents

Vill

THE FALL OF GEORGE WYNDHAM AND THE GRISIS2OEF ‘GABINE TBA ND» CAS TIRES esse celeste eeel ett

Part Four IX THE KILLING OF KINDNESS AND WHAT KINDNESS KIE LED co oasccehesraseaitanantaiecoedseicets sesewamse acts mecrectacete sececete stern

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IF ANYTHING IS inevitable, nothing was less inevitable than the completion of this book. After nine years such an achievement, if it be that, Owes as much to its friends as to the author. Whether they encouraged my work or mockingly doubted its existence, all served to prod me towards the conclusion and I am very grateful to them. Some deserve special mention. For developing my initial enthusiasm for history I will always be indebted to John Young’s inspirational teaching when I was at Campbell. At St Andrews, Geoffrey Parker and Keith Wrightson were both highly stimulating tutors who, along with Dermot Fenlon, first took an interest in my research plans. Edward Norman showed immense tolerance as a medievalist-turned-early-modernist struggled to master for the first time the contradictions of modern Irish history. Equal patience was required by Henry Pelling who supervised my thesis without complaint despite the scarcity of written material let alone ‘draft’ chapters. He above all others ensured that I left Cambridge with an understanding of the art and the discipline of the professional historian for which I will always be grateful. One of my greatest debts is to Roy Foster. His encouragement ofthis book never failed and his suggestions were always constructive. Despite his own heavy commitments he found time to read parts of the manuscript, as did Richard Jay, Peter Clarke, David Johnston and Paul Bew. Needless to say, their contributions saved me from many blunders and did much to sharpen up the text. Ihave also benefitted hugely from discussions over the years with Chris Andrew, Hew Strachan, Bill Speck, Ewan Green, David Harkness, Brian Walker, R.B. McDowell, Liam Kennedy, Trevor West, Carla Keating, Owen Dudley Edwards, Charles Townshend, Anthony Malcomson, Gerry Slater, Andrew Harrison and Bill Crawford. I would also like to express my thanks to the directors, librarians, keepers and staffs of the following record offices and archives for responding efficiently and courteously to my no doubt tedious requests for access to their collections: Public Record Office, London; Public

xi

XU

Acknowledgements

Record Office of Northern Ireland; Public Record Office of Ireland; The Scottish Record Office; The British Library; The House of Lords Record Office; The Bodleian Library, Oxford; The Times Archives; The Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge; The Kent Record Office; Dover Museum; Birmingham University Library; National Library ofIreland; India Office Library; Trinity College, Dublin; Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; The Pierpoint Morgan Library, New York; Wiltshire Record Office; West Sussex County Hall; Cambridge University Library; University College, Cork; The Plunkett Foundation, Oxford; Gloucestershire Record Office; Hatfield House; Trinity College, Cambridge; Churchill College, Cambridge. I am deeply indebted to the following copyright owners for permission to quote from documents in their possession: the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, the Master, Fellows and Scholars of Churchill College, Cambridge, Capt. Peter Montgomery, G.H. Boyle esq., the Duke of Westminster, the Marquess of Salisbury, News International plc, Lady Pentland, Sir William Gladstone, Lord Monteagle, the Chatsworth Settlement Trustees, The Earl of Balfour, The Earl of Cadogan, the Clerk of the Records (House of Lords), Mrs A. Opie, The Board of Trinity College, Dublin, Viscount Scarsdale, the India Office Library and Records, The Plunkett Foundation, The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, the Syndics of Cambridge University Library, the Syndics of the Fitzwilliam Museum and Lord Lytton. Every effort has been made to get in touch with the holders of copyright material; if any oversights have occurred, I apologize and hope this general acknowledgement will be taken as sufficient. Part of chapter I originally appeared as ‘Unionist rhetoric and Irish local government reform, 1895-8’ in Jrish Historical Studies, xxiv, no 93 (May 1984), pp 52-68. I am also extremely grateful to the Department of Education in Northern Ireland for funding most of my research in Cambridge; to the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences for financing this publication; to

Professor Ronnie Buchanan and the Institute of Irish Studies at Queens not only for awarding mea research fellowship in order to start my book but also for a generous grant towards its completion. Just as important for sustaining the precarious funds of the research student are the friends whose hospitality remained endless during my usually unheralded, seemingly interminable visits. In particular I would like to thank Aisling Foster, Joe and Trisha Nash, Sir John and Lady McFarland, Norrie Fife and Robert Scott Moncrieff. That my

Acknowledgements

xii

manuscript ever saw the light of day was in the end due to the secretarial skills and business-like tyranny of Miss Pearl Chambers and Mrs June Wells. Indeed it was to make one of the deadlines set by the former that I crashed my car — as it turned out into the steel barrier ‘protecting’ Purdysburn Mental Asylum! Donal J. Counihan and his staff at Cork University Press have not been the beneficiaries of such urgency but nonetheless they have always been more than understanding. I would also like to thank Professor Nicholas Canny for accepting this work and for all his advice, freely given. To Dr Eric Anderson I will always be grateful for keeping my place secure after I had gone to Queens. I would also like to thank Paddy Croker for proof reading some of the text and _ John Clark for aspiring to; and to my friends at Eton generally who provided much genial distraction. My most profound debt is to my parents who were the only people never to doubt the value of the task or its fruition. Such support also came from my wife who four years ago discovered that she had married not me but a book. To her love and calm forbearance towards what she regarded with amused disbelief, I owe everything. Hence the dedication. Andrew L.H. Gailey, Corner House, Eton College, 28 November 1986

ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations follow the rules of Irish Historical Studies except for those listed below.

A.B.P.

Arthur Balfour papers

G:BEPs

Gerald Balfour papers

Gop

Cadogan papers

C-B.P.

Campbell-Bannerman papers

ECM 2

Austen Chamberlain papers

IRC.Ps

Joseph Chamberlain papers

BEAN AEM,

Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction

D.A.P.

.

E.H. diaries/papers

Marquess of Dufferin and Ava papers

Edward Hamilton papers

I.A.O.S.

Irish Agricultural Organisation Society

IP...

Irish Parliamentary Party

A.M.P.

Anthony MacDonnell papers

H.C.P. diaries/papers

Horace Plunkett papers

(Ula

United Irish League

WIP LS Te

T.P. Gill papers

Birmingham U.L.

Birmingham University Library

Fitzwilliam Mus. Camb.

Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge

Hee Reo}

House of Lords Record Office

TWA

Irish Unionist Alliance Pierpoint Morgan Library, New York

Paine P.F.O.

Plunkett Foundation, Oxford

Whitt.

Whittingehame

W.R.O.

Wiltshire Record Office

ULE-E

University College, Cork

XIV

INTRODUCTION

‘I agree with Buller, as you cannot govern the Irish or anybody else, by severity alone; but I think he’s fundamentally wrong in believing that conciliation and severity must go together. The severity must come first. They must ‘‘take a licking’’ before conciliation will do them any good.’ Salisbury to Beach, 28 February 1887 The government

party ‘is not a conservative party but a unionist party: — a unionist party in which no doubt that conservative element greatly predominates, but one nevertheless of which the liberal element forms an essential and more important part. Now such a party can act heartily together only by the exercise of a certain amount of mutual forbearance’. Arthur Balfour to Col. Milward, March 1892

‘I shall be as relentless as Cromwell in enforcing obedience to the law, but, at the same time, I shall be as radical as any reformer in redressing grievances . . . It is on the twofold

aspect of my policy that I rely for success. Hitherto English governments. . . have either been all for repression or all for reform. I am for both: repression as stern as Cromwell; reform as thorough as Mr Parnell or anyone else can desire’. Arthur Balfour, 1887

THIS BOOK IS PRIMARILY concerned with the evolution of the unionist party’s policy towards Ireland. That this was unintended is only to say that it fell victim to the hazards and opportunities of research. For while originally setting out to investigate the impact of the unionists’ attempt to ‘kill home rule by kindness’, this work found little need to go beyond the preliminary task of assessing the Irish objectives of the unionist government (1895-1905). Despite the formal declarations of party

1

Ay

Introduction

orthodoxy, governmental action — except fora rhetorical gloss —bore little relation to the unionists’ avowed strategy. Therefore the only deductions that could be made were that unionist policy failed not simply because Irish nationalism was_immuneto.British—‘kindness’ but because such_a policy was either never planned in the-first place-or had proved impossible to introduce. By 1905, nearly twenty years after Arthur Balfour had launched his

party’s alternative to Gladstonian home rule, the unionists seemingly conceded the case when the-Irish._ government under George Wyndham

became associated with a scheme for devolution. Not that any of the party acknowledged this, and indeed virtually all remained staunch defenders of the act of union to the last ditch and beyond. As result a historians have generally assumed that ‘devolution’ was a political acci-

dent (which it was) and that, apart from demonstrating the limitations of unionist conciliation,! this pathetic, rather squalid affair had relevance to the unionist position on Ireland. Indeed Wyndham’s cessor as chief secretary, Walter Long, made just this point when, the electoral catastrophe of January 1906, he thundered to the Unionist Alliance:

little sucafter Irish

I believe. . . . that there is abundant reason for many Irish unionists to ask in tones of bitter indignation, why were these things done in the name of the unionist cause? Why were they done by men sent over to govern Ireland according to unionist ideas? Why,-when the unionist-flag was flying, were principles

adopted which were not-consonant with unionist policy? 2 This book attempts to answer these questions by showing that what Long saw as the degeneration of unionism into quasi-home rule had its roots in the origins of unionism itself. When

the December

election

of 1885

dramatically

left Parnell

holding the balance of power in the house of commons, it was inevitable that British party politics should come to pivot around the question of home rule for Ireland. Until then despite his party’s instinctive preference for coercing the Irish land agitation (which was interpreted in strictly British terms as another manifestation of the socialist challenge

1 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the famine (2nd ed., London, 1973), p. 222.

2 Quoted in Wyndham

947/126/15).

to Long,

30 Aug

1906 (W.R.O.,

Walter

Long

papers,

Introduction

3

to property held to be so evident in the 1880s),3 the conservatives’ leader, Lord Salisbury, had made discreet if rather hesitant overtures through Carnarvon and Lord Randolph Churchill for some accommodation with Parnell. However when the Gladstonian camp flew the Hawarden kite, and so committed the liberal party to home rule,.agreatly relieved Salisbury.sought to-rally conservative ranks-around an uncompromising defence of the act of union in the interests of property and the empire. Having successfully created a party of government, the conservative — or unionist party as it later became — had, now they were in power, to develop an Irish policy that was not only a distinct —

‘alternative to Gladstonian home rule but would also strengthen their

Hi ( > alliance with the liberal unionists, who had defected from the liberal party on this issue. This responsibility was left mainly to Arthur Balfour;—Salisbury’s nephew and from 1887 to se Irish chief

secretary.

What emerged was an integrated doctrine of stronggovernment and social amelioration that was to remain party orthodoxy until the great Va war.‘ Balfour argued that the Irish question was not one but at least fou questions and that the problems of constitutional reform, landholding, : long-standing poverty and political agitators were essentially aH in- } dependent of each other-{Fhe strength of Irish nationalism 5— so vivid |

J in the 1880s with the land war and Parnell — was due to the exploitation bya minorityof-political-extremists-of wide-spread and deeply felt ee

Social_and socia -economic. grievances.) Deal with these grievances and the

Balfour combined’ a stern enforcement of the law with “ae purchase acts, light railway schemes and the creation of the Congested Districts Board to alleviate poverty and rejuvenate the rural economy in the west of Ireland. By 1891 he had proved remarkably successful in defeating the land agitation and not surprisingly his policy was continued and 3 ‘T have long been impressed by the fact that at least half the force behind home rule is socialistic, and the more this is understood the better for us’. A.J. Balfour to W.H. Hurlbert, 1 Apr 1889, cited in L.P. Curtis, Jnr, Coercion and conciliation in Ireland, 1880-1892: a study in conservative unionism (Princeton, 1963), p. 407. 4 Ibid., p. 416. 5 A.J. Balfour, Nationality and home rule (London, 1913). 6 ‘Conciliation, in short, was supposed to cure an essentially ‘‘bread and butter’’ question’, Curtis, Coercion and conciliation, p. 332.

7 Ibid., pp viii, 332-3.

4

Introduction

expanded by his successors when the-unionists returned to power in 1895. His brother, Gerald (chief secretary 1895-1900), introduced a radical reform of local government and created a Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction to modernise Ireland’s primary industry. To this George Wyndham (chief secretary 1900-1905) added a land act (1903) which effectively ensured the rapid establishment of a peasant proprietary. Thus Arthur Balfour laid ‘the foundation for what came to be known as ‘‘constructive unionism’’ ’;* a positive, imaginative, progressive and yet respectable approach in which Balfour, under ‘the guise of a modern ‘‘physiocrat’’ operating on Peelite principles’,? sought to demonstrate that the union remained the best guardian of Irish interests. This thesis was first advanced by L.P. Curtis in his book.Coercion and conciliation in Ireland, 1880-1892 (1963) and until recently its inter-

prétations have been widely accepted. The concept of ‘killing home rule by kindness’, although a crudely mechanical approach which never showed any sign of undermining the electoral hold of home rule, is eas~ jly recognisable as of a piece with the rhetoric, the style and the political perspective of late nineteenth century conservatism. However while the attentions of,historians have tended to be attracted to the ‘kindness’, the focal point of the strategy was obviously homerule, And yet in reducing twenty years of unionist_policy-to.this- rather static formula they have ignored much of the variety in what precisely constituted the home.rule threat, Was it popular nationalism in Ireland or the Irish parliamentary party; was it socialism or the threat of the liberal party;.or was it the cement that bound the unionist alliance? In reality the ‘threat of home

rule’ was all of these but it was never constant in intensity or consistent in character. Indeed it would seem inconceivable that an Irish policy designed to meet the challenge of Gladstone, Parnell and the plan of | scampaign should remain unchanged when facing a peaceful Ireland and _ bitterly divided Irish and liberal parties. If nothing else the balance between ‘simultaneous’ coercion and conciliation was clearly bound to alter when there was no disorder to coerce. However logical the economic development of Ireland was in terms of Balfourian orthodoxy, it was nevertheless a policy which by 1900 few ofthe unionist party recognised as the one they had espoused in the political crisis of 8 Curis, Coercion and conciliation, p. 332. 9 Ibid., p. 374.

Introduction

1885-7. By concentrating on unionist policy as a lems, most historians have failed to appreciate British objectives of Irish policy. Certainly most kindness would kill home rule but that does not

when_ they did in the way they_did over

5

response to Irish probthe fluctuations in the unionists believed that explain why they acted

Ireland.-That can only be

understood through a more discriminating analysis of policy which focuses on the fluid interaction of ideals and prejudices with the immediate preoccupations and ambitions of the policy makers. In complete contrast to Curtis, A.B. Cooke and John Vincent in their book The governing passion (1974) argue for a more sophisticated concept of policy. Restricting their gaze to the political world of Westminster, they portray a closed-society,-largely_unaffected-by_outsideOpinion; in which the main preoccupation of politicians was the

manipulation of issues in order to create powerful parliamentary combinations.!° Quoting Evelyn Waugh’s Mr Pinfold, they assert that ‘ina democracy men do not seek authority so that they may impose a policy. \ - They seek a policy so that they may achieve authority’.!! Thus the realignment of the parties over home rule reflected no concern over the > Irish situation but was an arrangement which enabled Gladstone to reassert his authority over the radicals in his party and Salisbury to organise a majority political alliance in the defence of the conservative interest. Thereafter the purpose for both parties of an Irish policy-was ‘to embarrass_their political opponents, gain the support-of English opinion and ease the Irish situation (in that order)’.12 However it is with the ‘thereafter’ that the difficulties arise. The crucial question is whether an analysis founded on crises can throw any direct light-on-pohey- decisions taken-after-the-controversy had died _ down... It would seem perfectly justifiable that when an upheaval of the party structure appeared imminent, historians should ‘attempt to 10 A.B. Cooke and John Vincent, The governing passion: cabinet government and party politics in Britain, 1885-6 (Brighton, 1974), p. 17. 11 [bid., p. 1. 12 A.B. Cooke, ‘Lord Ashbourne’s political career’ in The calendar of the Ashbourne papers (H.M.S.O., Belfast, 1974). For what it is worth, Balfour held that the most accurate portrayal of the Irish situation was George Bernard Shaw’s John Bull’s other island which he saw five times taking (on different occasions) the liberal leaders, CampbellBannerman and Asquith. Whether the intention in this was to educate or embarrass them remains unknown. Norman and Jeanne Mackenzie, The First Fabians (London, 1977), p. 307.

6

Introduction

explain the actions of politicians by relating them to the actions of other politicians’ .13 But such preoccupations, although to some extent ever present, can hardly have been so pressing (save among ‘fringe’ politicians) when the crisis had been resolved and the new arrangement of political groupings relatively secured. How then can one relate the particular significance of a policy held in the midst of a political crisis with its later implementation in the calm after the storm? In the case of Ireland it would seem that the answer was hardly at all. Undoubtedly provincial opinion working through the conservative back-benches retained a firm doctrinal hold on the party. Nevertheless, except on issues of principle, the effect of this was to sustain an ethos and an identity, rather than to determine specific policy. '!4 Inevitably by the 1890s with the strucure of party politics firmly stabilised around Ireland, interest waned and major questions.of Irish policy.(excluding home rule)-came to_be left to the Irish administration. Any assessment of constructive unionism as a policy for Ireland must

focus.on the unionist government of 1895-1905. Not only was it in this period that the bulk of the ameliorative reforms — Balfour’s ‘kindness’ — were introduced. But it was also only in the relative calm of the 1890s that the dichotomy.between policy.as.aninstrument.of party manoeuvre and policy as a guideline for administrative action came ominously into view. This conflict within unionism is crucial to. any understanding of why constructive. unionism failed to make any positive impact on Irish political opinion: that it never got beyond what Balfour dubbed ‘political mechanics’ was the legacy of 1886. ~

The context of Irish unionism in 1890s Just as important for the prospects.of constructive.unionism was the state of Irish politics. With nationalist politics neutralised by the postParnellite feud, '5 Irish policy became noticeably less political in a party sense and much more open to popular influences within Ireland. While 13 Andrew Jones, The politics of reform, 1884. (Cambridge, 1972), p. 11.

14 Michael Bentley, ‘Party, doctrine and thought’ in Michael Bentley (ed), High and low politics in modern Britain (Oxford, 1983), pp 123-153. On the role of ideology see Peter Clarke, ‘Political history in the 1980s: ideas and interests’ in T.K. Rabb and R.I. Rotberg (ed), The new history. the 1980s and beyond (Princeton, 1982), pp 45-47. ‘8 On the nationalist divisions see F.S.L. Lyons, The Irish parliamentary party,

1890-1910 (London,

1951), pp 38-67.

Introduction

i

British ministers in Dublin sought to view these with an air of colonial detachment they did so nevertheless in a social environment that was thoroughly unionist. As aconsequence, the policy ‘process’ entailed not simply the interaction of party, doctrine and thought within an established British political structure but also involved the interplay be-

tween two contrasting unionist contexts in Britain and Ireland: In time thiswas to]prove highly significant as the re-orientation of British policy under Gerald Balfour and George Wyndham exposed the limited Irish perspective of their Balfourian inheritance and brought the government into a confrontation with unionist opinion in Ireland.

I The society that greeted the Irish government-on their arrivalin Ireland

was essentially that of southern unionism.1° At its head were the grandees — peers such as Lansdowne, Devonshire and the future Earl of Midleton, St John Brodrick — who, despite owning large holdings in Ireland, were for the most part absentee and primarily men of substantial political influence in England. More resident in Ireland were major landlords like earls Mayo, Meath and Dunraven, viscounts Powerscourt and de Vesci and lords De Freyne, Castletown and Clonbrock; and it was men of this stamp who headed the ascendancy in the south. However the predominant image is not of the great but of the provincial world of The Real Charlotte (1894): a small, strictly if not immutable hierarchical community in which the ‘Big House’ reigned supreme over the land agents, retired military and lesser county gentry.17 Although never detached from town life it was a world that spiritually was as much rural as it was officially anglican. '* And if protestantism remained an assumption, wealth and gentility were the chief topics of concern at a time when so many of the landed estates were 16 Patrick Buckland, /rish unionism I; the Anglo-Irish and the new Ireland, 1885-1922 (Dublin, 1972), pp xiii-xxvii. 17 Edith Somerville and Martin Ross, The real Charlotte(London, 1894); land’ Alton, ‘Southern Irish unionism: a study of Cork unionists, 1884-1914’ in R. Hist. Soc. Trans., xxiii, no 3 (Jan 1973), pp 71-88. 18 LP. Curtis, Jnr., ‘The Anglo-Irish predicament’ in Twentieth century studies (Nov

1970), pp 42-3. N.B. Thére was always a small number of prominent Roman Catholics who supported the unionist cause — men such as The O’Conor Don and Sir John Ross of Bladensburg.

8

Introduction

heavily insolvent.!9 Above all it was a strangely isolated existence cut off, except through the economic tie of rent and an increasingly perfunctory deference, from the native population by religion, education and ultimately by class.2° And yet paradoxically for all their fiercely exclusive concept of Irishness, there was a passionate sense of belonging both with regard to place and, in a distinctly paternalistic way, to the local community they so dimly appreciated.?! From time to time the constraints of parochial society were relaxed as the focus switched to Dublin and the vice-regal season. George Moore in A drama in muslin (1886) captured with crushing precision the stifling hypocrisy of Dublin ‘society’ at play; where balls at the Castle swiftly degenerated amid the feathers and the champagne as mothers on behalf of timid daughters pursued the eligible with a formal savagery that the market and honour demanded.?? But the season and horse show week were not simply occasions of maternal triumph but were deeply important gatherings of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy: reasserting its presence, reinforcing its beliefs and values and renewing its confidence in the

sumed greater sway.?? Supreme among these was Trinity College, still regarded by English academia as ‘the only really successful institution in Ireland’ and a worthy outpost of Oxbridge in the west;24 equally influential was the legal profession it spawned that fed off the landlord’s difficulties and swarmed around the Four Courts in search of a brilliant career at the Bar. Also groomed at Trinity were the anglican clergy and although closely entwined with the landed interest the church’s affairs

* 19 Ibid., pp 42, 44; L.P. Curtis, ‘Incumbered wealth: landed indebtedness in post famine Ireland’ in A.H.R., (xxxv, 2, 1980), pp 332-68.

20 Curtis, ‘Anglo-Irish predicament’, p. 44; George Birmingham, An Irishman looks at his world (London, 1919), p. 294. 21 ‘Candidly I may tell you I wish to live and die in the old place where my ancestors and father lived. I am now and always have been on the best of terms with my tenantry; I do not wish to sever that relationship’. A speech by Lord Clonbrock on the question of a conference to arrange for the transfer of land ownership to the tenantry, 18 Oct 1902 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MSS 19668). 22 George Moore, A drama in muslin (London, 1886), pp 166-183, 191-204. 23 George Birmingham, Benedict Kavanagh (London, 1907), pp 119-120. 24 A.V. Dicey to W.E.H. Lecky, 11 Dec 1895 (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS

1830/1121).

Introduction

9

lay in the hands of the representative church body meeting in Dublin.25 On the other hand just as much a party of the city’s unionism was the extensive protestant business community where huge wealth and large workforces brought considerable influence to the Guinness concern of lords Ardilaun and Iveagh, to the distiller Andrew Jameson and to Thomas Pim and Sons.?¢ Finally there were the leader writers and the editors of the Dublin press sustaining as much as moulding unionist opinion in the provinces. Not surprisingly, because these people resided in the Irish capital for most of the year they tended to predominate in traditional unionist watering holes such as the Kildare Street Club, the Royal Dublin Society and high table at Trinity; where Mahaffy and Traill sparred and Salmon presided as provost with a quiet if unmistakeable authority.2? Simply by being there, it was they who swelled the dinner parties at the lodges of the viceroy and the chief secretary and fed on the political gossip and scraps of information that fell from the governmental table. And for the same reason-Dublin came to have a greater say in the councils of Irish unonism, be they the executive committee of the Landowners’ Convention, the Irish Unionist Alliance or the editorial boards of the Irish Times and Dublin Daily Express. One

landowner’s indignant assertion that ‘Dublin University . . . bothasa corporation and as a collection of individual M.A.s is largely dependent on landlords’ ,28 simply proved the point that not infrequently the metropolitan tail could and did wag the provincial beast. Nonetheless the overriding impression of southern unionism was one of, if not social homogeneity, certainly social coherence founded on the widespread interests of the landed estates. It was above all a society confident in its assumptions of place and yet subconsciously plagued by. contradictions of loyalty: to their tenancy who a few idolised but most could not appreciate beyond the prism of duty; to English governments on whom they depended but whom as Irishmen and from experience they often distrusted. Thus it is that Somerville and Ross can only

25 R.B. McDowell,

The church of Ireland (London,

1975); Birmingham, Benedict

Kavanagh, p. 117. 26 Buckland, /rish unionism, pp xviii-xix, 18. 27 R.B. McDowell and D.A. Webb, Trinity College Dublin, 1592-1952; an academic

history (Cambridge, 1982), pp 279-283, 285-313. 28 Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery

Montgomery papers, D627/428/244).

to A.J. Balfour,

19 Apr 1894, (P.R.O.N.I.,

10

portray greatest Shute.29 tions of

Introduction

the native peasantry in terms of stereotypes and yet save their scorn for English interlopers like Leigh Kelway and Bernard But if the land war heightened this ambiguity, the presumpthe ascendancy remained intact into the 1890s.

II In terms of environment, character, attitude and approach the contrast with unionism in Ulster could not be more stark.3° Predictably ina province where protestants and unionists were in the majority unionism was much more self assured and aggressive in the defence of its ‘rights’. There was still a marked emphasis on landed authority among its leaders, headed by the Duke of Abercorn and lords Londonderry and Dufferin and Ava; ably assisted by lesser men of substance such as Colonel Saunderson, who led the Ulster M.P.s at Westminster, and the Clogher landlord, Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery; and powerfully reinforced by the long standing traditions of landed families like the O’Neills, McCalmonts and Archdales. Yet if outwardly the seat of power remained within the great estates of Baronscourt and Mount Stewart, in reality the structure of leadership was never so monolithic. In the first place the tremendous economic dominance of Belfast over the hinterland ensured that the industrialists and business interests carried great weight. Not only did they add a peculiarly Belfast dynamism to Ulster unionism but they were also far less deferential towards the landed élite and were always quick to assert their importance. In any case with the presbyterian tenant farmers of Antrim and the south west3!__ and the protestant working classes in Belfast’s shipyards and

factories, Ulster unionism was always destined to be less élitist and more of a popular movement;_and especiallyso since from the 1860s and 1870s as an electoral force it had come to depend on these groups. Consequently the latter imposed their own characteristics on the Ulster

29 Edith Somerville and Martin Ross, The Irish R.M. (Sphere ed., London 1970), pp 93-110, 130-148, 168-183. 30 On unionism in Ulster, see Patrick Buckland, Jrish unionism II: Ulster unionism and the origins of Northern Ireland, 1886-1922 (Dublin, 1973); J.F. Harbinson, The

Ulster unionist party, 1882-1973; its development and organisation (Belfast, 1973). 31 J.R.B. McMinn, ‘The Reverend James Brown Armour and liberal politics in north Antrim, 1869-1914’ (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Queen’s University of Belfast, 1979).

Introduction

Il

movement and in particular an acutely developed sectarianism, mobilised by the lodges of the Orange Order.3? If southern unionism, although far from immune to bigotry, had no place for such aboriginal politics, over religion the differences went further. Much of the ferocity and commitment of their northern allies came from the different complexion of protestantism in Ulster.33 With anonconformist (mainly presbyterian) majority over the Church.of Ireland, protestantism as George Birmingham wittily perceived was always going to be spelt with a ‘d’ in Ulster.34 Evenif this often proved a source of division, the conflict between and within the faiths gave protestantism both a vigorousintensity and externally a rigidity which enabled religion , to._provide the uncompromising-backbone- of-Ulsterunionism. Another source of unity was an innate.sense.of superiority. — self evident to all Ulster unionists — over the backward, poor, rural south which was almost racial in tone, even if religion tended to be the medium of this social Darwinism. Politically this gave rise to resentment at the domination of the I.U.A. by southern unionism when all the party’s seats were in Ulster, except for Trinity and Michael Morris’s heroic efforts in Galway; ‘alone’, as he modestly put it ‘in the midst of the capital of the enemy’s country in west Ireland’.35 Suspicions of southern resolve, always a constant theme, were given form with specifically Ulster organisations such as the Ulster Defence Union and the Unionist Clubs Council but real steps were> not taken until 1905 and the formation of the

Ulster Unionist Council. Till then British politicians had continually to remind each other that ‘the Abercorns think more of Derry than Cork’ — aneat juxtaposition of Mrs Knox’s famous retort on being offered a ticket to York, ‘no thank God, Cork’.3¢ Thus when in 1885-6 the disparate forces within protestant Ulster were brought together bya variety of economic and sectarian reasons in-

to an alliance to resist home rule and Bu the cultural demise it was believed 32 On urban unionism, see Henry Patterson, Class conflict and sectarianism (Belfast, 1980 ae W. Miller, ‘Presbyferianism and ‘‘modernization’”’ in Ulster’ in Past and Present, xxx (1978), pp 66-90. J.R.B. McMinn ‘Presbyterianism and politics in Ulster,

1871-1906’ in Studia Hib., xxi (1981), pp 127-146. 34 George Birmingham, \Pleasant places (London, 1934), p. 5S. 35 Lord KillanintoA.J. Balfour, 6 Aug 1902 (Bodl., Sandars papers, MSS Eng. hist. c

997. '. 37). 36 Cadogan to poset 22 Apr 1900 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). j } | } ,

12

Introduction

to threaten, the arrangement_proved.cemarkably.effective. There were few unofficial candidates at elections and thorough, determined organisation maximised the unionist vote and stagemanaged the Ulster convention and Balfour’s triumphant ‘north west passage’ in 1892.37 On the surface the unionist achievement was very impressive, but success posed its own problem after 1893. Very simply would the combina-

tion hold without the spectreofhome rule? | At first glance the fact that Ulster unionism should, in the 1890s, be

disrupted by internal revolts appeared unavoidable from its very inception. The alliance of 1885-6 was very much a coalition of opposites, enticing under the anti home-rule banner numerous mutually antagonistic groups. In the countryside where the land war of the 1880s ravaged the properties and deflated the overriding confidence of the ascendancy, many Ulster landlords were horrified to find that in the early stages their protestant tenants were sympathetic to the ‘communistic’ demands of the nationalist Land League.38 So also, to a degree, was the presbyterian church. Keen to support the interests of its flock, it was also extremely jealous of the numerically smaller Church of Ireland which had retained not only an air of pre-eminence but also its influence over appointments, long after its disestablishment in 1869.39 Furthermore there was also the growing antagonism of landed society towards the increasing intrusions, political as well as economic, of industrial Belfast upon their ‘natural authority’.4° When Lord Cadogan, the new viceroy in 1895, prepared to make his first official visit to Belfast he was sharply warned by Lord Londonderry ‘not to be put upon by the people for three days! Itis absolutely ridiculous. . . andit will make you far too common.’ 4!

37 B.M. Walker, ‘Party organisation in Ulster, 1885-1892: registration agents and their activities’ in Peter Roebuck (ed.), Plantation to partition (Belfast, 1981), pp 191-209. See also Harbinson, The Ulster unionist party; Patterson, Class conflict, pp

22-3. 38 R.W.

Kirpatrick,

‘Origins

and development

of the land war

in mid-Ulster,

1879-85’, in F.S.L. Lyons and R.A.J. Hawkins (ed), /reland under the union: varieties of

tension (Oxford, 1980), pp 201-236. 39 W.S.

Armour, Armour of Ballymoney (London, 1934), pp 146-154; A.J. Megahey,

‘The Irish protestant churches and social and political issues, 1870-1914’ (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Queen’s University, Belfast, 1969). 40 W.E. Macartney to Schomberg ‘Pom’ MacDonnell [Salisbury’s private secretary], 14 and 23 Apr 1890 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). 41 Londonderry to Cadogan, 14 Dec 1895 (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/774).

Introduction

M33

Conversely popular orangeism was swift to denounce any of the hierarchy who, especially in matters of education, so much as hinted at concessions to popery — frequently cloaking their suspicions in the language of class hostility and renewing demands for working class representation in the councils of power.42 However at an overtly political level, the point where most unionists feared a split was a return to the longstanding and traditionally bitter rivalry between the former conservatives and liberals. To conservatives many liberal unionists still retained radical ideas on reforming landholding, university education and local government, while the latter were deeply aggrieved over the selection of predominantly conservative parliamentary candidates.43 The affair which encapsulated all these potential controversies was T.W. Russell’s compulsory land purchase campaign of 1893-5.44 Russell, a leading propagandist for the I.U.A. in the 1880s, soon had landed toryism howling with his own brand of ‘class warfare’, stirring up disputes between landlord and tenant and anglicans and presbyterians.*5 Nevertheless under pressure from British unionism the party hierarchy quickly sought to absorb the movement into the tory phalanx in much the same way as they had done with a similar movement in the 1880s.46 Concessions were made, a number of unionist MPs endorsed Russell’s call for compulsory purchase, and Russell fought on the party platform. Such loyalty from their traditional rivals surprised many conservatives and Abercorn admitted to Lord Salisbury, the new British prime minister that ‘during the last few years the presbyterians have behaved very well to us. As arule they are a nasty radical lot but the home rule question has altered their former political opinion to a great degree’.47 In some respects the Russell affair demonstrated the 42 Patterson, Class Conflict, pp 19-41.

43 W.S. Armour,

Armour of Ballymoney,

p. 92; McMinn,

‘Armour and liberal

politics’. 44 Desmond Murphy, Derry, Donegal and modern Ulster, 1790-1921, (Londonderry, 1981), pp 201-2. 45 Col. Saunderson to Salisbury, 28 and 29 Oct 1894 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). 46 Joseph Chamberlain to Montgomery, 9 Oct 1894 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, T1089/261); H.O. Arnold-Forster to Montgomery, 7 Sept 1894 (P.R.O.N.L., Montgomery papers, D627/428/266); Leo Maxse to Montgomery, 28 Apr 1894, (P.R.O.N.1I., Montgomery papers, D627/428/245); Kirkpatrick, ‘The land war in mid Ulster’, pp 232-5; J.W. Good, Ulster and Ireland (London, 1919), p. 76. 47 Abercorn to Salisbury, 29 Feb 1896 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers).

14

Introduction

instinctive bonds of unity within Ulster unionism. But there was no escaping the fact that it required a general election and the traditional foe to bring the rebels to heel.

Ill Such episodes reflected a significant crisis of purpose for Irish unionism; namely, with home rule successfully defied in parliamentary terms, should unionism now adopt a different tack and seal the union’s defence through a strategy of conciliatory reforms. This debate after 1893 brought into contention an element of unionism that had slipped from view during the confrontation years of 1885-1893 when all were

resolved on implacable resistance to the nationalist threat, the disciples

ofprogressive-conservatism. In the first instance this meant the landed supporters of Isaac Butt’s Home Government Association.48 However if they advocated federalism and government responsive to Irish needs, their objective was not merely the securing of the union but also the protection of their ascendancy from Gladstone in search of a mission. The

ballot act and the 1874 election revealed the true issues at stake in Irish politics.49 For the progressives the pivot of action was now the question of democracy or, more specifically, how to reconcile the (relatively small) catholic middle class electorate, poorly educated and ripe for demagogery, to their natural leaders. Inevitably as Butt found himself outflanked by nationalist home rulers and eventually Parnell, the landed conservatives in the H.G.A. began to appreciate that their interests lay elsewhere than in a movement which was quickly leaving them embarrassingly declassé. By the late 1870s the challenge was taken up by the ‘haute ecole of intelligent toryism’, the Howth set.5° This was a group of Dublin 48 D.A. Thornley, Issac Butt and home rule (London, 1964); ‘The Irish conservatives and home rule, 1869-73’ in /.H.S., xino 43 (Mar 1959), pp 200-22; L.J. McCaffrey, ‘Irish federalism in the 1870s: a study of conservative nationalism’ in Trans. Amer. Phil. Soc., new series, lii, 6 (1962). 49 L.J. McCaffrey, ‘Home rule and the general election of 1874’, inJ.H.S., ix, no 34

(1954), pp 190-212. 50 For this and much of what follows see R.F. Foster, ‘To the Northern Counties station: Lord Randolph Churchill and the prelude to the orange card’ in F.S.L. Lyons and R.A.J. Hawkins, Ireland under the union: varieties of tension (Oxford, 1980), pp 237-287.

Introduction

15

lawyers, academics and politicians whose friendship stretched back to the days when as one of Trinity’s most brilliant generations they dominated the College Historical Society (the ‘Hist’). They were men like David Plunket (later Lord Rathmore) and Edward Gibson (later Lord Ashbourne) both careerist lawyers pursuing political ambitions; if the latter succeeded to the extent of becoming a unionist cabinet minister, the one lawyer who failed to make the political breakthrough but remained the driving force of this élite was Gerald FitzGibbon; others included Michael Morris, and Trinity academics Ben Williamson and J.P. Mahaffy. What gave this—intellectual_fringe of Dublin unionism political weight was their skilful cultivation of the

Marlborough government through the viceroy’s son, Lord Randolph

Churchill. A frequent visitor to the informal gatherings at FitzGibbon’s Howth retreat, he won the viceroy and the chief secretary, Hicks Beach, over to their schemes for educational reform. These included state intermediate schools for the catholic middle classes, a rationalisation of exclusive (primarily protestant) educational trusts and above all an acceptance of the principle of denominatronal-education:5! Politically the strategy was clearly to rally the forces of conservatism within Ireland through an alliance with the Roman Catholic church. Beach did produce a bill in 1878 and a commission of enquiry. Moreover there was substantial evidence that the bishops looked favourably on such plans. But it all came to nought as Ireland was overwhelmed by a political maelstorm. For a start denominational education was shelved with the return Of Gladstone and the nonconformist conscience after the election of 1880. Much more ominous was the land war which grew out of the agricultural depression and which in turn stimulated an alliance between Parnell’s parliamentary party and the outwardly socialistic Land League. In response to this ‘new departure’ the catholic-church under-archbishops Croke and_ Walsh moved swiftly towards an accommodation_with | _ popular nationalism-to-ensure that at least it remained catholics? The threat of a sectarian demos preaching class warfare led to retaliation by

the ascendancy and the emergence of a primarily protestant unionist 51 R.F. Foster, ‘To the Northern Counties station: Lord Randolph Churchill and the prelude to the orange card’ in F.S.L. Lyons and R.A.J. Hawkins, freland under the union: varieties of tension (Oxford, 1980), pp 246-7. 52 Ibid., pp 259-60.

16

\\

Introduction

movement, defiant and intransigent, that was dominated by those at the

frontline — the landlords. On top of this, developments in Westminster party politics during 1885-6 necessitated on Salisbury’s return to power a policy both of implacable resistance to home rule and the coercion of _ agrarian disorder. In this context conciliation was primarily the bribe to ~ soothe the anxieties-of those in exile from Gladstonian liberalism.*3 For the Howth clique there was no alternative but to file in behind. Not that they c did so with any real heartsearching. They were to a man natural and committed unionists and looked askance at Churchill’s wavering over home rule in December 1885.54 FitzGibbon for one was

quite willing to tolerate the barbarisms of Ulster unionism on the practical grounds that ‘the orange flag’ was the only source of popular support in Ireland ‘who would not cut all your Britishers adrift tomorrow if they could and cut all our throats the day after’ .55 Yet noble pragmatism just as easily brought its disillusions, especially with the constructive unionism of Beach and Arthur Balfour. To begin with there was the lawyer’s disdain for coercive policies that only served to bring the law into disrepute.5° The Times commission did little to improve matters and left the impression that Balfourism for all its rhetoric was little more than cheap wheeling and dealing.‘’ In keeping with this their treasured hopes that education would be the key were defiled as Balfour through his catholic emmissary, Sir John Ross of Bladensburg, used university reform as a pawn in the game of Anglo-Vatican politics.5% Resentful that unionism had effectively been equated with reactionary landlordism, they criticised the land acts as a waste of money and labour in the

face of the ‘inevitable operation ofthe economic laws which are crushing _[landlordism].?s2— While—gestures—such- -as—the- -Congested Districts Board made better-economic-sense, -the-economic strategy of. 53 P.T. Marsh, The discipline of popular government (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978), pp 120-4, 215. 54 Foster, ‘Northern Counties’, p. 264. 55 FitzGibbon to Churchill, 11 Oct 1883 (Churchill College, Lord Randolph Churchill

papers, 1/ii/181), quoted in Foster, ‘Northern Counties’, p. 269. 56 Foster, ‘Northern Counties’, pp 243-4. 57 Ibid., p. 283. 58 Curtis, Coercion and conciliation, pp 270-5. See also Ross’s memoranda, May 1888 to Dec 1890 (P.R.O.N.I., Ross of Bladensburg papers, D2004/4/33-53). 59 Morris to Lecky, N.D. [1880s] (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1836/2536); Foster, ‘Northern Counties’, pp 242, 251, 255, 284).

Introduction

17

‘kindness’ was limited, clumsy and poorly thought out by a chief secretary seemingly preoccupied with the political front at Westminster. Whatever the truth in these charges, such griping reflected primarily the exclusion of Howth and particularly FitzGibbon from the councils of

government. Churchill’s dramatic resignation left his Irish ally tainted by association with the ‘archfiend’ and consigned by the triumph of the Cecils to the political wilderness. As it was he had little to offer, pondering by 1889 over notions of devolution and the encouragement of Irish initiative but quailing in front of the same stern bulwark of Ulster that he had persuaded Churchill to endorse in 1886.°°

IV It was left to others and especially Horace.Plunkett, Anglo-Irish agriculturist and regenerator of the co-operative movement-in Ireland, to develop fully a coherent conservative approach, Like the Howth circle and the pro-catholic ministers,°! he rejected.direct.economic.con-

ciliation as mere appeasement and instead, like them, his objective was the encouragement of moral courage and instinctual conservatism through education: ‘the coup of the century’ he once prophesied, ‘will be the establishment of modern relations between the government and the people’ .©? However this was to be achieved not through a rapprochement with the bishops over schooling but by social engineering through economic organisation so releasing individualism from the repressive ethos of the catholic church.*? Fundamentally he sought to take the debate beyond the sterile unionist-nationalist controversy and penetrate, in the graphic phrase of his ‘poet organiser’ George Russell (‘A.E.’), the ‘deeps below the constitution where national wisdom or national folly are generated among the people’.*4 If the instrument was to be his co-operative movement, the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, theaim-was nolessthanthe creation ofthe SEEN 60 Foster, ‘Northern Counties’, p. 285. 61 Ross’s memoranda, 6 June 1902 and N.D. (P.R.O.N.I., Ross of Bladensburg,

D2004/4/63, 65). 62 Plunkett to Betty Balfour, 23 Aug 1896 (P.F.O., H.C.P. papers, BAL/3). 63 Horace Plunkett, Ireland in the new century (London, 1904), pp 94-121, 319-325.

64 G_R. (‘A.E.’) Russell, Cooperation and nationality (Dublin, 1912), pp 80-1. 65 ‘The true significance of the movement promoted by Sir Horace Plunkett is that it is an attempt to build up a new social order in Ireland’, ibid., p. 33; see also chap. XII, ‘Ideals of the new rural society’.

18

Introduction

This theme constantly recurs in the writings of Plunkett and Russell. For them the instability of Irish politics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the outcome of the electoral reforms of 1872 and especially of 1884-5 which by more than trebling the electorate had effectively unleashed the prospect of mass democracy. Given the shortage of governmental experience in the localities; the widespread and willing dependence on doles; and the lack of cooperation among Irish farmers,

the coming of democracy had seen personality politics prevail, resulting in a reign of demagogues instead of the emergence of a ‘new governing class’.67 Thus the threat of home rule to Plunkett was not so much devolution or even nationalism but populism. Clearly there was no going back on the franchise. Equally plain was the fact that the future of Irish statesmanship depended on the ‘evolution of a social order which willensure. . . that the democracy will put forward its best thinkers, its wisest men of affairs, and that it will develop a respect for the man of special and expert knowledge’ .®8 The keyto this process of re-education

were the agricultural co-operatives. These not only fostered vital economic skills-but also, by the experience of ‘self help through helping others’, encouraged attitudes.of practicality, public-spirited awareness of the communal good.and_a_ respect for good leadership. As the cooperatives spread, so would this—constructive approach; ®? first permeating local government and then in turn extending into national life ‘creating a public opinion and forming a national character which will be proof against the tyranny of the agitators’.7° Political stability would therefore rest on the sure foundations of rural prosperity.and public conservatism.7! Indeed, for all its progressive air, Plunkettism was a highly conser-. vative social creed. againstthe modern evils of democracy and socialism. By establishing a ‘rural civilisation in Ireland’, Plunkett was both conjuring up images of a past (and probably imaginary) harmony and 66 Brian Walker, ‘The Irish electorate, 1868-1915’, in J.H.S., xvi, no 61 (1968), pp

64-90. On the significance of electoral reform see K.T. Hoppen, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland, 1832-1885 (Oxford, 1984).

67 Plunkett to Gill, 10 Mar 1899 (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494). 68 Russell, Cooperation, p. 56. 69 Gill to G.W. Balfour, 14 Jan and 6 Mar 1897 (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509(7), 13509(8) ). 70 Plunkett to Betty Balfour, 2 Jan 1901 (P.F.O., H.C.P. papers, BAL/64).

71 Russell, Cooperation, pp 56-7.

Introduction

19

resurrecting the Smilesian doctrines of individualism — that mixture of mid-Victorian philosophy and late-Victorian myth. Yet if he was decidedly a nineteenth century figure his conception of a native ruling class grafted onto the ascendancy, now based on education and talent rather than land, was distinctly that of the radical right who were to flourish in Edwardian England.?? In this form such ideas gave the unionist economic strategy a pertinence and a creative force that it had previously lacked. Indeed in post-Parnell Ireland it stood as the only

real.alternative to endless resistance. | CY

ic

V That a meritocracy was the only possible rapprochement between educated society (whether nationalist or unionist) and naked democracy was an argument that had few advocates among the Anglo-Irish. Nonetheless these ideas gained respectability with the historian W.E.H. Lecky’s victory over a clique of ‘jealous lawyers and narrow parsons’ in

the 1895 contest for the vacant Trinity seat.73 With Morris in full support and Mahaffy, trapped by the chores of invigilation, sending notes of encouragement on the back of exam papers, the Howth connection seemed back in action; 74 although in truth the initiative lay elsewhere. Lecky’s whiggish past was rapidly being erased with each revision of his Leaders of public opinion in Ireland (1861, 1871, 1903) and his impending Democracy and Liberty (1896) was a trenchant statement on how Gladstonian liberalism undermined the rights of property and paved the way for socialism; but he nonetheless won the votes of the landed and clerical graduates for a programme of Irish conciliation and industrial development.75 However if the mood was one of opportunity, the debate that raged only concerned an educated few and was conducted mainly through 72 cf G.R. Searle, ‘Critics of Edwardian society: the case of the radical right’ in Alan O’ Day, The Edwardian age (London, 1979), pp 79-96. 73 Mahaffy to Lecky, ‘Tuesday’ [1895] (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1836/2521). 74 Ibid., 17 Oct 1895 (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1836/2517); Morris to Lecky, 28 Oct 1895 (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1829/895). 75 Lecky’s electoral address, 19 Oct 1895 (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1829/881); W.E.H. Lecky, A history of Ireland in the eighteenth century, ed L.P. Curtis, Jnr (London, 1972), pp xix-xxxvii; Donal McCartney, ‘Lecky’s leaders of public opinion in

Ireland’ in J.H.S., xiv (1964-5), pp 119-41.

20

Introduction

private memoranda, letters to the press and serious articles in high-brow political journals. To all intents and purposes this controversy passed the majority of Irish unionists by. At best there was the Earl of Caledon’s pious hope ‘that the jawbone will succeed’ but at heart he was sufficiently pessimistic to believe that ‘the backbone is the only salvation for this land of troubles, and that is the orangemen and the military’.7° More typical of unionist opinion was the steward at Castle Saunderson: in a letter of thanks to his employer for Christmas presents he digressed onto home rule and concluded with some relish, ‘thank goodness. some.of.us.can.look straight along arifle.....and if the worst comes we will havesome sport beforewe.die’.77 So it came as no surprise that Plunkett failed to persuade the I.U.A. to undertake a propaganda

campaign to popularise unionism in the three southern provinces78 or that his pleas for ‘a progressive policy on home rule’ when ‘Ulsterism is exploded’ fell on deaf ears.79 Significantly Plunkett broadened his attack and in the-aftermath.of.the. unionist-landslide-in the 1895. general election he attempted _to_capitalise_on the mood_of reconciliation, prevalent in the press, by calling for an allparty committee to meet during the parliamentary recess which would discuss acommon strategy on the development of material prosperity.in Ireland. The fact that John Redmond, leader of the Parnellite faction of the Irish party, sat down with an assortment of southern landlords, liberal unionists from Ulster, farmers and businessmen guaranteed that the eventual report — a full endorsement of Plunkett’s ideas — would steal the limelight.8° However the refusal of Colonel Saunderson, the spokesman of embattled unionism, to attend prompted one Dublin unionist paper to ask whether ‘the creed ofthe unionist party begins and ends in saying ‘‘no”’ to home rule’.8! But all knew that in the summer of 1895 the question did not stop 76 Caledon to Montgomery, D627/428/276).

‘Friday’

77 M.J. McCaulay to Saunderson,

[1890s] (P.R.O.N.I.,

23 Dec 1896 (P.R.O.N.I.,

Montgomery

papers,

Saunderson

papers,

T2996/3/28). 78 Margaret Digby, Horace Plunkett: an Anglo-American Irishman (Oxford, p. 76.

1949),

79 Plunkett to Gill, 26 May 1895 (N.L.1.$T.P.G.P., MSS 13497 (5) ); Plunkett, New century, p. 65.

80 Ibid., chap. viii; Digby, Plunkett, pp 76-9. 81 Daily Express, 21 Aug 1895.

Introduction

21

there. To a degree, largely unrecognised by modern historians, the focal

point of Irish politics was now the new unionist administration in Dublin. For a start, all political groups in Ireland were to.some-extent in a minority_position-as a result of the British unionist majority in the house of commons. Nevertheless if no one group could automatically dictate the party line, what that line was to be remained uncertain throughout 1893-5. Save for mandatory declarations of Balfourian orthodoxy, the British leadership were persistently ambiguous on future Irish policy. Certainly the opportunity for a major initiative was there,

with the nationalist party hopelessly split and the catholic hierarchy dropping hints of arenewed interest in university reform.82 A constructive policy also had definite party advantages, appealing as it did to the English electorate while shutting all doors against a Rosebery inspired desertion of home rule. On the other hand a_ passive, essentially unimaginative administration would have the backing..of. the Irish unionist establishment and an uncontroversial Ireland had undoubted parliamentary attractions. But all this lay in the balance. With the two party structures in Ireland extremely volatile and unstable on account of mutual internal tensions, the spotlight came to rest on the government of Lord Cadogan and Gerald Balfour who arrived to take up their posts in August 1895.

82 Lyons, /.P.P., pp 38-67.

»

*

Part I

The Balfourian millenium

In spite of everything, I go with aheavy heart. . . For one thing it is not pleasant to depart in a storm of obloquy and misrepresentation . . . But I really had at bottom, even if not at every moment of the day, that feeling for poor Ireland which I suppose nurses acquire for a peculiarly fractious child, and perhaps I had the foolish idea that I could manage it at least as well as anybody else. Gerald Balfour to Lord Monteagle, 14 November 1900

The Balfourian millenium or hitting the honest nail on the head “The Balfourian millenium’’ was invented to establish peace, justice and con-

tentment with the inconciliable [sic] nationalists. This noble policy has been

worked with vigour, energy anddetermination. Its origin was ‘‘tokill home rule by kindness’’. Proprietary interests were confiscated whole — complish “‘that the end justifies the means’.

some to ac-

‘‘Rob Peter to pay Paul’’. Vic-

timize the unionist, bleed the loyalist, bribe the tenant; enrich chancellors, land judges, commissioners, lawyers attornies, valuators (et hoc genus omne) actsof parliament; to conciliate the disloyal-and-rebellious-had-been the-essence of the “Balfourian.millenium’’.

Anonymous letter sent to the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, 13 October 1899

GERALD BALFOUR AND THE SPIRIT OF KINDNESS

‘The government would, of course, be very glad if they were able by kindness to kill home rule. . .’ Gerald Balfour, Leeds, 17 October 1895

GERALD BALFOUR’S APPOINTMENT as Irish chief secretary in July 1895 was as unexpected as it was intriguing. Recording the event in his diary Sir Edward Hamilton, Gladstone’s former private secretary and now assistant financial secretary to the Treasury, described it as ‘quite a surprise and a considerable experiment’, ! and the Carlton club, noted more for its relentless suspicion of Irish chief secretaries than its welcoming of surprises and experiments, grumbled ominously. After all Gerald Balfour had followed an uneventful academic life at Cambridge with a back-bench career that had proved neither prominent nor promising and he clearly owed his new position to the support of his illustrious brother, Arthur, and the unbridled nepotism of hisuncle, Lord Salisbury,-the-prime-minister:2- Like his avuncular patron, he soon developed a weakness for ‘blazing indiscretions’ and in his first major policy speech to his Leeds’ constituents after his election he spoke of

1 Sir Edward Hamilton diaries [henceforth E.H. diaries], 5 July 1895 (B.L., Add MSS 48677). Annual register, 1895, p. 213. 2 D.N.B. 1941-50 (Oxford, 1959) pp 51-2; Max Egremont, Balfour: a life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980), pp 17, 46, 50; Kenneth Young, Balfour (London, 1963) p. ilk.

ras)

26

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

‘killing home rule with kindness’.3 This rather glib phrase provoked a furore amoné the Irish nationalists and aroused the scepticism of many Irish unionists, though, as Balfour subsequently protested, he was merely echoing the strategy his brother had pursued with full unionist support in the 1880s.* Gerald Balfour had always publicly supported his brother’s Irish policy5 and on entering office in 1895 he not-only-substantially aided and encouraged the

Congested Districts Board and the development of light railways but also introduced novel departures.of his. own. These included a land act (1896), an extremely democratic local government-scheme-(1898)-and the establishment of a department of agriculture and-technical instruction (1899), To contemporaries, with three major acts within four years, Balfour’s legislative achievement was only comprehensible as part of a long-term strategy to kill home rule by kindness; and the Irish chief secretary did-Jittle to. disabuse tham of.this.impression. Speaking to his constituents before the general election of 1900 he claimed that the unionists and his policy were responsible for the ‘diminution of home rule’, and explained that, while retaining a firm hand upon the reins of government, it had been their endeavour to get.at the very root from which home rule was supported and sustained by remedying all legitimate grievances and doing all that was in their power to promote the material prosperity of Ireland.°®

Such succinct expositions of constructive unionism have convinced ce

ithe undercutting of the home rule movement, and that the Irish sete of Gerald Balfour and George Wyndham were simplyacontinuation of Arthur Balfour’s policies of the 1880s.” However, at the very least sucha 3 Leeds Mercury, 17 Oct 1895. 4 Indeed Arthur Balfour had reiterated his philosophy during the recent election when he proclaimed to loud cheers that, ‘land purchase . . . is the key of the land question in Ireland and if the land question in Ireland were once settled there would be no other Irish question at all’. The Times, 11 July 1895; Leeds Mercury, 5 July 1895; Hansard 4 (commons), Xxxvi, 134 (Gerald Balfour, 15 Aug 1895). 5 Hansard 3 (commons), cccx, 86-94 (Gerald Balfour, 27 Jan 1887); Hansard 4 (commons), Xxxvi, 134-6 (Gerald Balfour, 15 Aug 1895). 6 The Times, 25 Sept 1900. 7 Curtis, Coercion and conciliation, p. 416; F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the famine (2nd ed., London, 1973), pp 203-04, 211-12, 217; Patrick O’Farrell Ireland’s English question (New York, 1971), pp 208-9.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

as.

thesis exaggerates the control that politicians had over policy and its formulation, for whatever the continuity of personnel and rhetoric, the circumstances.on-which_unonist_policy was based, changed dramatically

between Arthur Balfour’s departure from the Irish Office in 1891 and his brother’s assumption of responsibility in 1895. There was no Parnell, no serious land agitation, no active homerule movementinthe

country and no united Irish parliamentary party to pester and obstruct the government in parliament. Perhaps the most significant difference was notin Ireland but in Britain; for whereas. Arthur- Balfour developed his policies in the - shadow_of an imminent liberal and home rule victory at the polls, Gerald formulated his priorities inthe aftermath of Gladstone’s retirement from politics and an electoral triumph which saw the unionists trounce the home rule cause; winning a massive majority of 152 seats.8 As a consequence the Irish government of Gerald Balfour was, in fact, ° far less preoccupied with the question of home rule than his brother’s had been in the 1880s. This did not necessarily involve an abnegation of principle but merely a change of emphasis in the face of changing circumstances.

Nothing

illustrates.this-more~clearly-than~their

respective Tocal

en . Arthur Balfour’s scheme of 1892, introduced with the election pending, wasso loaded with restrictive franchises-and-central controls as to be practically unworkable. Indeed it can even be questioned whether it was ever meant to pass.? What is certain is that it stood in stark contrast to his brother’s bill which only six years later introduced an unfettered democratic franchise and devolved extensive local

powers to the new county councils. Such a bill was bound to diminish the local authority of the unionists’ Irish supporters in the three southern provinces. At the same time it offered a dispirited and divided Irish party the opportunity to strengthen its hold over local opinion and regain some of the credibility it had lost since the fall of Parnell.1° Gerald Balfour can hardly have been surprised when nationalists \ took nearly 75% of the county council seats. In Ulster, the rock of the 8 Chris Cook and Brian Keith, (ed), British historical facts, 1830-1900 (London,

1975), p. 142. 9 Curtis, Conciliation and coercion, pp 381-7; Piers Brendon, Eminent Edwardians (London, 1979), p. 93. 10 F,S.L. Lyons, John Dillon (London, 1968), pp 187-8.

/

28

Xe

|

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

unionist cause, they were only 6% short of the unionist total and in the board of guardian elections more nationalists were returned than unionists in the northern province.!! Even more galling was the near absence in these local elections of.a. middle ground or any-evidence that constructive unionism was having-.any.effect.ontrish-politrcal opinion. Councils were soon passing home rule resolutions and in one case raising nationalist flags.12 Furthermore, as many unionists recognised, there was the tactical question that if the new councils proved efficient, one of the most powerful and widely-held elements in the unionist case

against home rule would have been destroyed.

And’yet such considerations never figured:in-the-policy discussions of the Irish Office. Indeed the head of the Local Government Board, Sir Henry Robinson, was soon reporting to Balfour that after ‘the nightmare of the past two years. . . allisrunning smoothly and that our doubts and anxieties for the result are cleared up’. * The impression that comes across.is not-one of Balfour’s naiveté but thatthe question of home rule was_not.of primary concern..Consequently to view Gerald Balfour’s policy-.as-simply-a direct-continuation of the Balfourian strategy of ‘killing home rule with kindness’ is only to confuse the questidn. Gerald Balfour’s reputation has always lain in the shadow of his famous brother. However, it is clear that for an understanding of the true Irish objectives of constructive unionism in this period,his-policy

must be studied in its own right and in its own context.

|

I

The origins of a phrase On the eve of the general election of 1895, Joseph Chamberlain confided to Henry Chaplin that he ignored the recent attacks on him from right wing conservative circles because ‘atleast Ihave helped to smash home rule and Idon’t care for much else’.!4 The Oxford academic and 11 Even more sinister were police findings that 114 (or 10%) of county councillors and 468 (or 5%) of district councillors had I.R.B. links. ‘Returns of the local government elec-

tions, Ireland 1899’ (P.R.O., C0904/184/1). 12 Annual register, 1899, pp 241-2. 13 Robinson to Gerald Balfour, 14 Mar 1900 (Whitt., G.B.P.). 14 Joseph Chamberlain to Chaplin, 19 Apr 1895 (Birmingham U.L., Joseph Chamberlain papers [henceforth J.C.P.], JC 5/13/13). See also Barry O’Brien, Life of Charles Stewart Parnell (London, 1898).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

29

guardian of unionist orthodoxy, A.V. Dicey, was not so convinced. Nevertheless, after the immense unionist victory of July, he did concede

to Chamberlain that while he was not ‘sanguine enough to hope that home rule agitation is entirely disposed of . . . I do hold that the immediate danger of a home rule success has passed away and that the unionists now hold in their hands the means for making the union absolutely secure’.!5 What he feared, however, was not so much that the government should do anything matter, but I dread their, in effect, doing nothing questions, such as the land question, which they seem opportunity, that will never recur, of finally setting

specially wrong in the Irish and thus leaving unsettled to me to have an unrivalled at rest. . .16

Paradoxical though it may seem of a government that was to produce three major Irish reforms, there is no evidence to suggest-thatin1895the unionist leadership had seriously considered—introducing..any-sub-

stantiallégistation for.Treland» When in May 1895 Horace Plunkett, the leading exponent of agricultural co-operation in Ireland and a unionist, put forward his scheme for ‘a vigorous propaganda [campaign] in the three southern provinces’, he found Balfour unenthusiastic: ‘he evidently feels scared about the Ulster farmers’ land views and can attach little importance to the nationalist parts of Ireland’. A month later Balfour admitted privately to Plunkett that the government ‘did not contemplate Irish legislation in the next parliament. . . ‘‘at least, not much” ’,17 With agrarian crime practically non-existent and the Irish nationalists in a stateof seemingly permanent disarray, popular opinion in Britain sought to concentrate again on England’s-needs.!8 Indeed,.it.was this decline in the immediacy of the Irish question that allowed Salisbury to relegate the chief secretaryship-to-the status. of ‘inferior appointments’ outside the cabinet and award it with an air of desperation to his third

1S Dicey to Chamberlain, 29 Aug 1895 (Birmingham U.L., J.C.P., JC 5/23/2). 16 Dicey to W.E.H. 17 H.C.P. diaries,

Lecky, 19 Oct 1895 (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS

1831/1416).

2 May & 19 June 1895 (P.F.O.).

18 The Times, 23 Aug 1895. When Gerald Balfour first spoke to his constituents as chief secretary, he was frequently heckled with ‘give us a little of England and never mind Ireland’. Leeds Mercury, 5 July 1895. See also E.H. diary, 18 July 1895 (B.L., Add. MSS 48667).

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Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

choice candidate.1° This demotion was not lost on the previous liberal chief secretary, John Morley, who mocked ‘this delightfully simple plan for keeping Ireland out of politics’.2° As with most political jibes it was not without its ounce of truth and throughout the election campaign and opening session of parliament Arthur Balfour and Salisbury refused to be drawn on their policy and left Gerald Balfour to reiterate orthodox unionist principles. That done, Salisbury and his government_ turned to more pressing needs, leaving Irish affairs to the Irish Office and the sympathetic oversight of Arthur Balfour. If this did not augur well for a sustained programme of Irish amelioration, at least the isolation of Irish policy in the Irish office ensured that it would be more Irish orientated than it had been under Arthur Balfour. Inevitably, if rather ironically, Gerald Balfour’s only experience of Irish affairs had been the great parliamentary debates on Gladstonian home rule, out of which he emerged a unionist of principle but without any real understanding of the complexities of Irish society. As strong as his unionism was his genuine pride in the British empire and a powerful conviction of the civilising mission of British imperialism.?! These two faiths, in the union and in the empire, led to a rather contradictory attitude toIreland. On one handit was an integral part of the

empire at its core? and yet on ‘he other hand Ireland with its crippling poverty, its land leagues and its superstitious faith appeared backward and uncivilised in comparison to England.? In his memoirs, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt recalled an argument over Ireland with Gerald Balfour in August 1892 when Balfour, on the basis of Darwin’s ‘law’ of the survival of the fittest, declared that ‘ ‘‘they [the Irish] ought to have been exterminated long ago. . . but it is too late now’’ ’. However, noted Blunt, Balfour was now, ‘confident of defeating..home~rule by 19 Salisbury to A.J. Balfour, 22 & 28 Aug 1895, (Whitt., A.B.P.). Walter Long was Salisbury’s first choice but J.W. Lowther, Gorst and Stuart Wortley were also considered. 20 M.J.F. McCarthy, Five years in Ireland (London, 1901) p. 32. Leeds Mercury, 9 July 1895. Lord Cadogan, the lord lieutenant, was in the cabinet but as his position as the Queen’s representative denied him a parliamentary role and as the chief secretary headed the Irish administration at Dublin Castle, Cadogan’s function was restricted to that of an

overseer. 21 The Times, 21 Dec 1898. 22 W.S. Blunt, My diaries, (London, 1919) i, pp 69-70.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

3]

constitutional means’. Two years after taking office Gerald Balfour still felt it necessary to insist to his constituents that, ‘we should disabuse

ourselves of the notion that the principles of government which are good for this country were good for Ireland as well’.23 Like most of the Cecil family, Gerald Balfour nourished a deep suspicion of democracy. While recognising the value of popular participation in councils of agriculture and local government, he consistently warned against ‘ill-conceived concessions to the demos’, whether it was the Irish or the trade unions.?4 Behind these prejudices lay an instinctive trust in the hierarchical values of rural Britain and he reacted sharply to what he saw as the undermining of that society and its creed by political subversives — be they Irish nationalists or Mr. Gladstone — for their own ends. He denounced the spirit of Gladstonian legislation, because he felt that such state intrusion eroded the fundamental relationships of landlord and tenant, employer and employee and led to the demoralisa-

tion of society.25 By nature he remained a ‘laissez-faire tory?.and when transferred to the Board of Trade in 1900, he ‘devoted his advice in cabinet and debating power in the commons to protecting the economy from state intervention’ .26 However, he was far from being a crude reactionary; rather he sought, if needs be through the state, to protect what he held to be the essential humanity in economic relations as governments began for the first time to wrestle seriously with the critical question of the ‘social condition’. What,like many other conservatives, he _ abhorred in radical legislation was its pandering to the whims of | materialism and class-feeling. Consequently he believed that, inthe face ,

of the moral vacuum that beckoned {the obj ective of the:state should. not. ' be the direct alleviation of social hardship through legislation but the reestablishment of: economic..conditions..which_ would encourage. individual self- helps. With hindsight such attempts to shore up the 23 The Ties 8ne 1897.

24 Roger Davidson, ‘The Board of Trade and industrial relations’ in Hist. jn., xxi, 3 (1978), p. 584. An American visitor to Cambridgein the 1880s, though admiring his good looks, wrote in amazement: ‘he is really the most conservative man that I have yet met. Believes the higher set of people, the lords etc., set a good example to the lower set of people — and ever so much more stuff that I had read of but never met anyone that believed it’. Gwen Raverat, Period piece (London, 1954) pp 7-8. 25 Hansard 3 (commons), cccx, 94 (Gerald Balfour, 27 Jan 1887). 26 St John Brodrick to Gerald Balfour, 29 Jan 1906, (Whitt., G.B.P.). Cited in Davidson, ‘Board of Trade’, p. 578.

32

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

Smilesian doctrine appear futile, but in the 1890s the issue was ostensibly still in the balance and for Gerald Balfour any question of social reconstruction centred on the revival of individual responsibility. nretrospect it is difficult to reconcile these principles and beliefs with a policy ofconciliating Irish nationalists through generous land bills and

devolution of powers to democratic councils. Moreover such radical legislation appears out of character for aman who by nature revelled in the intricacies of detail and not in the broad sweep of policy.?7 This inconsistency is only explicable in terms of Balfour’s experience in Ireland. A dry, serious, rather academic man with a withering disdain for the illogical Balfour nevertheless worked with great determination, if little outward sympathy, for the best interests of Ireland.As to what they were he was never dogmatic but preferred to seek the advice of all representatives of Irish opinion. As one close friend later reminisced ‘Gerald did not give his heart to Ireland. He gave his brain instead and he left her, for his service more I believe, than any other chief secretary. . . Gerald would always take and back another man’s idea. With Horace Plunkett it had to be Ais Ireland, but Gerald could take any man’s Ireland so long as he found it good. . . Like all the Balfours, he saw round corners and the other side of the question and could even work with his opponents’ .28 This was not simply a courting of the line of least resistance but a recognition that as Irish policy became, virtually for the first time since the 1870s, the concern almost solely of Ireland, Irish ideas and the state of Irish politics would prove central to ruling Ireland. Unquestionably the most striking feature about Irish politics in the aftermath of the general election was the apparent disintegration of the home rule movement. The violent divisions within the Irish parliamentary party were, of course, common knowledge in Westminster; indeed Gerald Balfour’s first ministerial speech in the house was followed by a

27 In the opinion of one official, Gerald Balfour was ‘cleverer’ than his brother: ‘I do not mean in diplomacy, for far sightedness, or power of leading men; but in the grasp of his mind over the most complicated problems’. Henry Robinson, Memories wise or otherwise (London,

1924), p. 110.

28 Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, Seventy years young (London, 1937), pp 231-2. On Balfour’s seriousness see Blunt diaries, 28 May 1906 (Fitzwilliam Mus. Camb., MSS 7 — 1975). On Gerald Balfour’s sincerity and lack of political ambition, see Winston Churchill’s gruff comment to Plunkett in Digby, Horace Plunkett, p. 116.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

33

bitter squabble between the Parnellites and the anti-Parnellites and the ejection of the nationalist MP, Dr Tanner.22 Much more significant and unexpected was the extent of popular disillusionment.with.home.rule politicians inIreland. Despite the fact that the nationalists continued to dominate the Irish representation in parliament, Irish popular opinion had accepted the postponement.of home-rule long -before the unionist victory of 1895.39 When one of the leading nationalist organs declared that it ‘declined to regard the conservative party as the bitterest enemies of Ireland’ and all the nationalist press spoke out in favour of conservative remedial legislation, the government could hardly fail to detect a new political climate,.3! Similarly when Gerald Balfour to his astonish: ment was ;received with bonfires at Swinford in John Dillon’s constituency, he could not help but reflect that home rule was ‘sleeping very soundly’ and would continue to do so ‘for the next five or six years at any rate’ (presumably only to be revived by the liberals rather than the Irish Cnationalists).32 With the traditional focal point of unionist policy now left to ‘the dim future’, Cadogan reported back to Salisbury on the unique opportunity for the Irish government. The feature of the situation appears to me to be that the people will no longer allow their leaders to spurn ‘Saxon gold’ and ‘our dirty money’ and it is clear from their speeches and newspapers articles that they dare not oppose.

There was, as both Cadogan and Balfour realised, ‘a strong flavour of expectation of boon to come in all this’, but the chief secretary, especially after his own trip to the congested districts, was convinced that these were ‘the signs of a very real change of feeling’, and it was to this ‘change

29 Hansard 4 (commons), xxxvi, 141-2 (Gerald Balfour, 15 Aug 1895). On the divisions within the IPP, see Lyons, The I.P.P., pp 38-67. 30 Freeman’s Journal, 13 Feb 1895; Daily Independent, 30 June & 7 Oct 1895. See also Hansard 4 (commons), xxxvii, 202 (Gerald Balfour, 12 Feb 1896).

31 Daily Independent, 26-7 June 1895. Freeman’s Journal, 24 Sept 1895S. The latter was also highly conservative and catholic, and consequently deeply distrusted the liberals,

especially in matters of social and educational reform. 32 G.W. Balfour to Salisbury, 23 Sept 1895 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). Hansard 4, (commons), xxxvii, 202 (Gerald Balfour, 12 Feb 1896). 33 Cadogan to Salisbury, 30 Sept 1895, (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). Cadogan to Queen Victoria, [31 Aug ?] 1895, (H.L.R.O., Cadogan papers {henceforth C.P.],

CAD/725).

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Gerald Balfour & the Spirit ofKindness

in the spirit of the people’ 34 away from the tyranny of the agitators and towards the communal pursuit of material prosperity that Gerald Balfour directed his policy.(Unionist ‘kindness’ was in the first instance a response-to-a-popular demand and not’a thinly veiled conspiracy to

-kil?-home rule:} Nevertheless, to many Irish politicians — unionist and nationalist — the home rule movement lay ripe for the killing. Horace Plunkett-was jaghast when he learnt from Arthur Balfour that the government plan* ned little or no legislation for Ireland.35 ‘They will make a great blunder ‘if they don’t take the great — perhapsthe last— opportunity they will haveof making a unionist settlement/of the Irish question’. In fact the debate over whether the amelioration of social and economic grievances would satiate the popular desire for home rule had been going onin Irish political circles since the failure of the second home rule bill and Rosebery’s ‘predominant partner’ speech. Matters came to a head with the return of the conservatives in 1895 and in the autumn the National Review produced a symposium on a ‘unionist policy for Ireland’ in which both nationalist and unionist contributors frankly discussed the possibilities of ‘killing home rule by kindness’. Similarly when Plunkett ‘launched his scheme for a recess committee of all political persuasions to work out acommon programme for Irish redevelopment, he was told by the anti-Parnellites, that ‘the nationalist objection was that he was ‘killing home rule by kindness’’ ’.36 The question remained whether the government would seize their opportunity and take up the challenge issued by the Parnellites under John Redmond to put the matter to the test.37

What was certain was that this controversy could not be ignored. Nevertheless, in his first major policy statement, Balfour cautiously left this matter to the end and began instead by outlining prospective reforms in landholding, light railways and Irish agriculture. Then, after describing to his constituents the strong feeling of goodwill he experienced in Ireland, he emphasised that, / ¢ SNS

34 G.W. Balfour to Salisbury, 30 Sept 1895, (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). G.W. Balfour to Cadogan, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/729). 35 H.C.P. diaries, 19 June 1895, (P.F.O.).

36 Ibid. 23 Sept 1895, (P.F.O.). National Review, xxvi, no. 153 (Nov 1895), pp 306-338. 37 The Times, 16 Aug 1895.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

35

I do not wish to build too much upon that. I do not for a moment suggest that that implies that the majority of the Irish people have lost their desire for home rule. On the contrary, I have not the slightest doubt that, if they had to vote again on the subject tomorrow, they would again vote for home rule as they voted for it at the last election.

And he concluded, atesshould be glad enough, no doubt, to kill home rule with kindness if we could ’ but, whatever may be the result of our efforts, our intention is to do our utmost to introduce and pass such measures as will really promote the interests of the material| prosperity 0of Ireland. 38

Not surprisingly, if unfortunately, his qualifications were quickly forgotten amid the associations of this penetrating expression. Two years later Balfour tried to reassert his true position, stating in parliament that however desirous killing home rule was, his policy stood independent of this.39 But it was too| late for his. _administration was

already stamped inthepublic eye with|‘that notorious phrase’ .4° What Plunkett dubbed ‘the economic and social truth’ undoubtedly attracted Balfour but it was never his primary objective. Essentially

Balfour was sentto Ireland to tidy up after the liberals, govern efficiently and, above all, keep the country quiet; and even the| ‘most ‘cursory analysis of his legislation 1reveals that tl thiswas all he tried to do. Se

ml

REET

II he land act The unionists, long committed .to.state-funded land purchase, were vir-

tually compelled tointroduce a land bill on entering office. Land sales were dwindling and John Morley’ss bill to revive purchase had just been lost with the fall of the liberal Government. Furthermore the matter had become particularly pressing with the first fifteen year revision of rents (necessary under Gladstone’s act of 1881) due in September 1896.41

38 39 40 41

The Times, 17 Oct 1895. Hansard 4 (commons), lii, 132-9 (Gerald Balfour, 2 Aug 1897). Robinson, Memories, p. 114. Land Law (Ireland), Act, 1896 (59 + 60 Vict., c.47) was passed on 14 Aug 1896.

36

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

Nevertheless, as late as October 1894 Salisbury had in a memorandum to the conservative, St. John Brodrick, criticised ‘a mood in the party’ which sought to make concessions to the tenants in return for an admission by the nationalists that this was ‘a final solution’. Unanimity was impossible, argued the unionist leader, because of the virulent infighting within the Irish party; and, since the nationalists ‘could not be trusted’, any concession by the unionists would be interpreted as a preliminary to the final ‘surrender’ of the landed classes in Ireland.4?

Consequently few in the party expected the ‘tenant land bill’ that emerged, with its effective protection of tenants’ right and improvements. The Irish_unionists.were.incensed at what theysaw_as.a political bid to conciliate nationalist opinion at the expense of the government’s traditional-supporters;-and, in retaliation, the landed interest in the house of lords.rebelled-and-managed-to-defeat.the government on six amendments. Others interpreted the bill as the inevitable outcome of the inclusion.in government.at-Chamberlain’s.insistance of

T.W.._Russell:-The

latter, a_liberal unionist and spokesman

for a

presbyterian tenant movement, had threatened to split the unionist party in Ulster and on his appointment had been quick to declare the unionist government’s commitment _to further land legislation. Even Salisbury had heard of these rumours but he was more surprised at the early signs of landlord discontent; writing to Cadogan after he had seen the first draft of the bill: You speak of difficulties with the land bill in the house of lords. I hope you take too gloomy a view. I do not think that the land bill treads on any of the special

corns ofthe Irish landlords. I earnestly hope that it may not recall 1887 to minds. That was a bill containing some very bad provisions but they were the price for obtaining the votes of the lib. uns., and of the left wing of our party, for the crimes act. We have no such favour to purchase now: and I trust we shall pay no such price.43

The Balfour brothers fully concurred with this and they deeply resented Edward Carson’s taunt that inside a year they had abandoned their principles and betrayed their friends for the ‘sweets of office’. In 1894 Carson had been the main unionist spokesman on Irish land reform and on Balfour’s advice had withdrawn from Morley’s committee 42 Salisbury to Brodrick, 24 Oct 1894, (P.R.O., Midleton papers, 30/67/27). 43 Sal sbury to Cadogan, 22 Nov 1895 (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/756).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

37

investigating dual ownership. Hence he was greatly offended on discovering that Gerald Balfour’s bill was largely based on Morley’s committee’s report. But Balfour, wounded by the slight on his integrity, fervently denied that ‘he regarded the rights of Irish landlords as mere ‘pawns’ in the English political game’.44 In fact, despite the impending tension of the rent-revision due in 1896, he had been extremely reluctant to promote any further Irish land legislation. Nevertheless, by the eve of the election he had become convinced that the question could not be safely ignored. Undoubtedly thisdecision had-as much to do with the election as it did with Ireland. Balfour had been highly perturbed by the division within Ulsterunionism and, with J oseph Chamberlain powerfully in support of Russell, he felt that some gesture had to be made: ‘would it be possible’, he asked Salisbury, ‘to pass a machinery bill in August (if we get a majority!) and defer the other questions until a more convenient session?’ 45 What neither Balfour-nor -his-uncle-predicted-was-the-seale-of-a

unionist victory that left the conservatives with a majority independent of the liberal unionists. Russell was still given a post at the local government board,p partly to keep him quiet and partly to soothe Chamberlain; but Balfour now began to question whether circumstances in Ireland in their own right deserved the attention of the new government. And if they did, he sought only to implement his earlier strategy for disposing with such an explosive subject quickly and quietly. Soon after his brother’s appointment to Ireland he wrote to suggest that, if a land bill -was necessary, then they should introduce immediately a measure, ‘strictly confined to. . . the ‘‘uncontroversial parts’’ of Morley’s bill’. Such a limited proposal could be justified on the grounds that, as Morley’s bill had passed through the commons, ‘it could hardly be resisted in any quarter of the house’. When the bill passed, the govern‘ment would then have ‘a perfectly free hand’ to postpone any major land legislation. However to leave the matter unresolved to 1896 would make it, much more difficult to avoid at once bringing in, as our very first measure, a bill

which no doubt would be equally unacceptable to the landlords (as going too far) and to the nationalists (as not going far enough).4¢ 44 E. Majoribanks, Carson (1932-6) 1, pp 261-70. A.J. Balfour to Lady Gosforth, 26 Jan 1896. (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49853). 45 A.J. Balfour to Salisbury, 29 June 1895 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). 46 A.J. Balfour to G.W. Balfour, 21 July 1895, (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49821).

38

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

In the end Balfour’s scheme was overwhelmed by the bewildering intricacies of Irish land law and_his uncle’s reluctance for controversial legislation so soon after assuming power. But while Gerald Balfour did sised, a4 secondary bill after Ne faiog education bill.47 Moreover it was quickly shelved and was only revived when the education bill, in the face of endless amendments, had to be dropped.** Thus, though the land bill became law, the intention of the unionist government was clearly to find the quickest-way.of doing very little. Obliged to act, Gerald Balfour,-not surprisingly, adopted the principles that had been unionist orthodoxy-since-the Ashbourne.act (1885). These held that, while Gladstone’s compromise of dual ownership was abhorrent (as an interference with property) and class-divisive, it effectively denied any return to unfettered landlordism in Ireland. At the same time, though unionist legislators made frequent attempts to improve the land system, they were convinced that:it was unworkable and would only prove to bea preamble to the expropriation of the landlords by a liberal government in need of Irish votes: With the spectre of compulsory purchase in front of them, the unionists sought to establish a peasant proprietary through voluntary sales, aided by imperial funds.

With the fall of landstock and the imminence of the rent revision, land purchase had come to a halt by 1896 amid a morass of litigation. To make land purchase more attractive to the tenant, Balfour tried to ensure a ‘complete protection’ of tenant improvements and also introduced a system of decadal reductions in the annuity the purchasing tenant would have to pay. For the landlords he abolished the deposit — the landlord’s fifth — that was withheld by the exchequer on every sale and the purchaser’s insurance fund. He also attempted to-simplify, in the interests of efficiency and economy, the procedure and the administration of land purchase in order to avert the incessant resort to the courts; these were already overwhelmed with business, which was costly to the litigants and often poisoned the relations between a potential seller and his tenants; Thus the precise definition of the tenant’s legal position in Balfour’s ‘bill was not, as landlords saw it, a threat to their rights of ownership, but an effort to prevent the wheels of purchase 47 A.J. Balfour to G.W. Balfour, 6 Dec 1895, (Whitt., G.B.P.). 48 Lansdowne to Dufferin, 16 Aug 1896 (P.R.O.N.1., Marquess of Dufferin and Ava papers henceforth D.A.P.)

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

39

from being bogged down in litigation to the benefit of none — save the legal profession.*9 In effect it was the ‘machinery bill’ that Arthur Balfour had argued for the year before. What the unionists were not determined to do was take up the tenants’ case against the landlords.*° It is quite misleading to view the land act _withi tsp protection of tenant rights.as a sign of anew conciliatory or sympathetic‘unionism. Gladstone’s acts had destroyed the market for Irish land and most unionists recognised that voluntary purchase offered the only hope of landlords recovering at least some of their investment. But voluntary purchase presumed negotiation and this would be futile until the rights of all parties were ascertained and recognised. Much of this land act’s ‘liberal’ reputation arose out of the adoption of the ‘uncontroversial’ elements of Morley’s bill and this was only done to save parliamentary time. Thus Lord Lansdowne reassured the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava that ‘Gerald Balfour means well, but there are innumerable pitfalls, and there is always a risk of our being sacrificed to parliamentary exigencies’. Ultimately many of the procedural reforms (which would have benefitted the landlords) were dropped to save parliamentary time and so safeguard the bill’s passage, but in so doing, this gave the bill a character.that-was-never.intended.5! Even so, Cadogan had originally feared that the nationalists would dismiss the measure as a landlords’ bill and many observers were surprised that the Irish party accepted such a meagre proposal.5? Indeed with Lords.Cadogan.andAshbourne-in.the-Irish.government joining Lords Lansdowne,-Salisbury.and Devonshire in the cabinet, a unionist landact could be no other but.a landlord TREERISTIG Lord Cadogan, in quest he‘passed : a tithes act and aiken they complained at the partiality shown by the Land Commission, he appointed the Fry Commission to investigate. If these gestures failed to satisfy the Landowners Convention it was not because the government was unsympathetic but

49 Undated memorandum (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/810). Cabinet memorandum, 4 Nov 1895 (P.R.O., CAB 37/40/56). J.E. Pomfret, The struggle for land in Ireland,

1800-1923 (Princeton, 1930), pp 206, 271-5. 50 For Gerald Balfour’s lack of sympathy towards the evicted tenants, Hansard 4, (commons), xxxvii, 1188-1205 (Gerald Balfour, Feb 1896). 51 Lansdowne to Dufferin and Ava, | Dec 1895, (P.R.O.N.I., D.A.P.).

52 Cadogan to Salisbury, 23 Feb 1896, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/839).

40

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

because, as Lansdowne admitted in exasperation to Lord Dufferin, “the whole thing is wrong ‘‘lock stock and barrel’’ and nothing can make it

right’.53 But to Irish landlords often in debt and facing large rent reduc“tions, the reality of “Balfourism’ seemed to threaten not only poverty but-the destruction of the ascéndancy.tradition. It.was the reaction of these men, in defence of their raison da’ etre which gave Gerald Balfour’ S land act its radical hue. Land Lords Mad ; Tf the conservative sentiments that underpinned this lepislation were lost from view, so also was its political objective.’Inno way was this a pre-emptive strike against a revival of nationalist politics.54 Essentially / the introduction of the land act had yery little to do with Ireland and everything to do with the disposing.of_a potentially dangerous obligation.

Ill Local government reform ‘Perhaps nothing-has.been traditionally held to symbolise conciliatory unionism more than the democratisation.of Irish local government in 1898.55 Like the Wyndham land act of 1903, it ranks as one of the few pieces of British legislation that profoundly shaped the Irish nation which was to emerge after 1921; together they laid the economic and political framework for an instinctive parochialism that continues to envelop Irish society to this day. Moreover,-unlike-most—British_in-

itiatives in Ireland, this was-not-a-concession-to-popular démand, for there.was-nene; *° instead it appeared to contemporaries as ‘a great surprise upon the country. It had not been heralded in by any series of promises or by any flourish of trumpets whatsoever’ .57

»y Even more unexpected were the bill’s contents. Gone at one stroke 53 Lansdowne to Dufferin and Ava, 27 Mar 1897, (P.R.O.N.I., D.A.P.). 54 Gerald Balfour himself described the bill as ‘more like a collection of small bills than a comprehensive measure framed in order to carry out a single well defined principle’. Hansard 4 (commons), xxxix, 779 (Gerald Balfour, 13 Apr 1896). 55 The Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898 (61 + 62 Vict., c. 37) became law on 18

Aug 1898. 56 Except from the Ulster liberal unionists. See Catherine B. Shannon, ‘The Ulster liberal unionists and local government reform, 1885-98’ in J. H.S., xviii, no 71 (Mar 1973), pp 407-23. 57 McCarthy, Five years in Ireland, p. 364.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

4]

were the grand juries which, after the land legislation, had been the last bastion of Anglo-Irish.ascendancy.In their place was now instituted aa “structure of urban, rural and county councils, all completely elected on a broad franchise — indeed one that exceeded the parliamentary franchise. The £50 property qualification was abolished and every occupier was given the vote irrespective of wealth, religion or sex. However complicated the measure was, its consequences were clearly nothing short of a revolution in local power.’ That it was the-unionists-who destroyed their own supporters’ authority.in the localities was perhaps not as surprising as the fact that they should adopt such a sweeping and radical measure to achieve this. After_all.it-was-just-this-kind of legislation that they.had cometo-powerto prevent: It1s only-by-resolving this contradic_tion-that-the unionist policy can-be- understood. ; ! The first point to stress in any explanation of Balfour’s motives is that the local government act wasnoracalculated attempt to undercut home rule and reconcile the politically concerned in Ireland to the Union. This is especially important because paradoxically many of Balfour’s*own party thought that it was. Local government reform had always been the classic unionist alternative to home rule.and, indeed, the only other time such a bill was introduced by unionists (1892), the measure was so patently unworkable as to be explicable only in terms of Gladstone’ s imminent return and a second home rule bill.59 D.H. Coghill, the unionist M.P. for Stoke-on-Trent, spoke for all his party’s British backbenchers when he described the elections since 1886 as ‘a battle of local government against home rule’ ,®° and in the debate the unionist hierarchy, no doubt because they shared such sentiments as well as desiring a quick passage for the bill, respected these views. However those responsible for Irish policy argued rather differently. ‘Home rule’, Gerald Balfour insisted to the house ‘was something totally and entirely different, not

merely in degree but in kind1 from. . . local government’. He then emphatically asserted that ‘we, on our side of the house, have never said, and never professed that by passing a local government billwe should 58 The tenants’ had already challenged with some success the landlords’ monopoly of appointment to the poor law boards. W.L. Feingold, ‘The tenants movement to capture the Irish poor law boards, 1877-86’ in A/bion, vii, no 3, (Fall 1975), pp 216-31). 59 As such it was also a gesture to keep the liberal unionists in the fold. Marsh, Discipline of popular government, p. 215; cf. Curtis, Conciliation and coercion, pp 381-6. 60 Hansard 4 (commons), liv, 478 (D.H. Coghill, 21 May 1898).

42

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

satisfy the desire for home rule’.*! Nor can this be dismissed as mere rhetoric from an Irish chief secretary seeking to ensure a favourable reception for his bill in nationalist Ireland. Never once during the formulation of what was readily admitted to be a new policy nor during the ~ drawing up of the bill is there any evidence that the government ever ¥\0.yo. 2 seriously considered the political impact of the act on Ireland or on the

“home rule movement. From the first a nationalist landslide was widely presumed and while some of the cabinet felt uneasy over this, it remained a consequence and never an issue Rather more rhetorical was Gerald Balfour’s espousal of the

democratic faith in his speech of introduction. Ifthe ‘antiquated’ grand_ juries were ‘no longer in harmony with the spirit of the age’ ©? nor was the chief secretary. In a discussion on whether the compulsory purchase powers formerly held by the grand juries should be transferred to the new councils Balfour declared bluntly that ‘it is clear that powers so far reaching and so little subject to check as these, though they might be harmless in the hands of ajury of country gentlemen, would be extremely dangerous to entrust to a popularly elected body’ .©3 More serious was his hope that the local government might release some of the tension ina society polarized by the conflicting interests of landlord and tenant. He rejected minority representation specifically because ‘if you establish minority representation, you can only do so by admitting that thereisa minority that requires protection, and I am anxious, as far as possible, to obliterate and do away with all class distinctions’.°4 At the same time he urged the local gentry, ‘the natural leaders of the people. . . to play the more manly part’.and seek election to positions which only they were truly qualified to fill. In an emotional plea that was almost Biblical in tone he assured them ‘they may meet with rebuffs at first, but let them persevere, and their reward is certain’; if this ‘class’ rallied, democratic local government ‘willcarry. . .ahealing power rich in blessings for the future of Ireland’.®5 It was a moot point whether Gerald Balfour saw his reform dissolving class antagonisms or disguising them. Few Irish unionists had any 61 Tbid., col. 510 (Gerald Balfour, 21 May 1898). 62 Ibid., lili, 1227 (Gerald Balfour, 21 Feb 1898). 63 Cabinet memorandum (P.R.O., CAB 37/45/51). 64 Hansard 4, (commons), lii, 516 (Gerald Balfour, 21 May 1898).

65 Ibid., liii, 1227 (Gerald Balfour, 21 Feb 1898).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

43

illusions and while a surprising number did respond to the chief secretary’s call, outside the north-east most were humiliated. Undoubtedly Balfour, like all unionists, sought the reconciliation of the old landed order with the new popular movements but the question remains whether he introduced local government-reform-with this—in mind. His brother Arthur, who was primarily responsible for the rejuvenation of unionist interest in local government reform,® had never held out much hope for this. Writing to Lord Dufferin some months after the first elections he expressed his pleasure on hearing of the success of the county councils in the north and only wished that same could be said of the rest of Ireland: ‘but’, he added rather apologetically, ‘this of course was not to be expected’ .®” Was the rehabilitation of the gentry even privately considered? Again, there is no record. If it had been a major concern, one would have expected some allusion, or even concession, to the united campaign of unionists and nationalists in Ireland for the implementation of the financial relations report.°8 Significantly all the indications were that instead of encouraging this rapprochement, the government did all in its power to break it up. _

As it was,

Gerald: Balfour denied that local government reform in-

volved any consideration of policy at all. Since the whole issue was ‘res judicator [sic]’ after the 1888-reforms-in- England and Scotland it had‘long been felt that-its.extension.totreland was only.a.question.of time’; — it was simply a matter of accomplishing ‘an inevitable change in a way

that will do most good and least harm’.®® Ostensibly the unionists had been long pledged to this and indeed, when he rejected an earlier scheme proposed by Tim Healy, Gerald Balfour had unequivocally renewed his party’s commitment.7° Yet their ardour was always lukewarm on this issue and after the unhappy episode of 1892 any plans the unionists had seemed firmly shelved in the deepest recesses.of Dublin Castle. Only the most naive attributed the revival of local government reform to a desire to fulfil political promises: not only had the bill been announced three years after taking office but it had not even been mentioned in the Queen’s speech of January 1897. Thus its adoption only four months 66 E.H. diaries, 26 May 1897, (B.L., Add. MSS 48671). 67 A.J. Balfour to Dufferin and Ava, 3 May 1899, (P.R.O.N.I., D.A.P.).

68 This had found that Ireland was being over taxed by £2*%4 million p.a. 69 Hansard 4, (commons), liii, 1227 (Gerald Balfour, 21 Feb 1898). 70 Ibid., xxxix, 987 (Gerald Balfour, 15 Apr 1896).

44

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

, _later can only be seen as a hurried decision in a political crisis, andnotas _

_deliberate.policy._

When Arthur Balfour announced the ‘alternative policy’ in May he did so not because of a renewal of interest inlocal government or evenin Ireland, but because it offered a way out of a parliamentary impasse that was holding up the government’s legislative plans. His brother had introduced the main element in his policy to rejuvenate the Irish economy — a board of agriculture bill — but this was being obstructed in parliament by English apathy and a combination of Irish M.P.s who ‘were infuriated at the government’s disregard-of the Financial Relations Commission’s report. On top of this there was great ill feeling about the failure of the Treasury to extend the agricultural rating grant to Ireland which particularly hurt the landlords, who were already seething at the passing of the ‘confiscatory’ land act of the year before.7! Finally the Irish government had been working on an extensive reorganisation of poor law administration but soon found this endangered by the furore in parliament, and also because it would unavoidably thrust too much responsibility on the already overworked boards of guardians.72 _ What ‘inextricably intertwined’ these apparently unconnected ques-

Treasury to subsidise agricultural r te as they had done in Britain on the unionists’ return to office when there was no machinery of local government to work with.73 So instead an equivalent sum was given over

to the Irish government to be spent on Irish purposes as they saw fit. It was out of this source that Gerald Balfour hoped to finance his new board and the overhaul of the poor law. To the Irish landlords, funds that parliament passed to alleviate agricultural distress were being spent on government. legislation. which should have been financed out of government funds. Moreover they claimed that under the traditional arrangements that governed such equivalent grants, Ireland should have received an annual grant of £750,000 and not the £150,000 that the Treasury offered to finance the new board of agriculture.” Coming as 7 Annual Register, 1897, pp 107, 126-8. 72 G.W. Balfour to ‘Secretary to the Treasury’,

17 June 1896, (P.R.O., Treasury

papers, T’/9059 A/9486/1896). 73 Memorandum written by Sir Edward Hamilton, 6 Jan 1897, (P:R.O., E.H. Papers, T168/37). 74 Lecky to H. de F. Montgomery,

T1089/298).

3 Dec 1900 (P.R.O.N.1I., Montgomery

papers,

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

45

this did at a time when all Irish politicians were convinced that Ireland was being overtaxed by two and three-quarter million pounds year; the

government’s pledge to remove all the just grievances that the Irish experienced under the Union lost much credibility. As the debate wore on it became clear that many of the government’s rank and file remained unmoved by the ministerial arguments and a revolt, similar to that of the peers over the land act of 1896, seemed inevitable. By the beginning of May the government’s bid to sit out the storm had failed and Edward Hamilton at the Treasury was predicting a surrender.’ Their fate was sealed when on 18 May the Irish unionist M.P.s sent a formal letter to the chief secretary to announce that they would vote against the board of agriculture bill unless the agricultural rating grant was extended to Ireland;7¢ three days later the first lord of the Treasury revealed that the agriculture and poor law bills were to be dropped and a local government bill would be promoted in the next session. In fact the government had thought of capitulating, as early as the end of March. Rumours circulated in the lobby of the house and Plunkett, whose Recess Committee had inspired the board of agriculture bill, was warned by the Irish attorney general to ‘look out for a surprise’.”77 At a private dinner on 9 May Cadogan sounded Edward Hamilton on ‘the latest Irish ideas’. With the extension of local government poor law reform could be based on respected and powerful institutions in the regions. More important, the Irish opposition in the house of commons would be conciliated by the unfettered grant of democratic county government, and the landlords by a massive subsidy of the rates by the government. With the gilding of such a ‘liberal’ concession, no Irish party could refuse. This, Hamilton thought, was ‘ingenious’ and bound to ‘break up a combination of unionists with nationalists in Ireland [that] was becoming too strong even for a ministry with a majority of 150!’ It was, he felt, more than an escape: it could prove ‘maybe a coup for the government’.78 When the next day Gerald Balfour broke the news of the probable 75 B.H. diaries,

5 May 1897, (B.L., Add. MSS 48671).

76 Irish unionist MPs to G.W.

Balfour, 18 May 1897, (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS

1832/1535). 77 Plunkett to Gill, 28 Apr 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13493(13) ). 78 E.H. diaries, 9 May 1897, (B.L., Add. MSS 48671).

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Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

failure of his agricultural bill to Plunkett, the latter found him very depressed: ‘he does not know why or whether. He is collared. He feels that he has no friends in Ireland, that none of the unionist press back him up and that all looks hopeless. I think you will see a new move ina few days — a big local govt. scheme as the govt. evidently feel [they

have] blundered’.79 But Arthur Balfour was more pragmatic and making a virtue out of necessity described his plan to the cabinet as ‘a unique opportunity for attempting at one stroke to remove the grievance Over agricultural rates and introduce a decent system of local government ac-

ceptable to both landlords-and-oeeupiers’; 8° within ten days the cabinet hadaccepted his scheme. Nothing illustrates the rapidity of this upheaval in policy more plainly than the fact that the official in charge of Irish local government first learnt of the government’s intentions only days before the announcement. Sir Henry Robinson was on a sailing holiday off the west of Scotland when he received a copy of the English local government act and a letter of explanation from Gerald Balfour, asking Robinson to send by return a statement on how far the former could be adapted to Irish conditions.®! That such questions were raised for the first time only a week before the government’s declaration of policy demonstrated the true priorities of the unionist government. It was a supreme display of parliamentary opportunism and, in its essentially English terms, one that proved highly successful. If it did not finally allay the discontent over financial relations, it did end a parliamentary blockade and so offered the agricultural bill a second chance without having to concede financial principles which the Treasury were loth to and certainly could not afford to give up. It was, as Horace Plunkett bitterly acknowledged, ‘a masterstroke of statecraft’-where Irish local government was ‘a purely English necessity’ §? for an English crisis. Surprisingly, as the parliamentary controversy subsided, English considerations retained their paramountcy in the drawing up of the bill. In one respect this was simply a question of parliamenary time. After all this measure, itself unintended, had only been introduced to overcome 79 Plunkett to Gill, 10 May 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13493(13) ). 80 Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, 11 May 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1094).

81 Robinson, Memories, pp 124-5. 82 Plunkett to Cadogan, 23 May 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1094). Plunkett to Gill, 12 Sept 1899, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494).

See also

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

47

the paralysis of the legislative process created by Irish legislation: so naturally the government were keen to prevent British legislation being baulked in turn by this bill. Therefore, as far as possible the provisions of the English local government act (1888) were adopted in toto because the Lord Lieutenant had powers to make Orders in Council to apply English legislation, which had already passed through parliament, to Ireland. Thus much of the bill did not have to be debated in the commons. Although this caused much resentment, the government always knew that the Irish M.P.s would not jeopardise the bill, which could not have been passed in one session without this shortcut.83 As aresult the Irish local government bill assumed a distinctly English character. Intriguingly this was precisely what the government desired. To the more academic of the cabinet like Arthur Balfour it was fundamental to unionist principles that both Ireland and England should be governed under the same system and that the rare political opportunity that now existed to establish this should not be missed, virtually ir-

respective of the practical consequences for Ireland. The Duke of Abercorn, the figurehead of the Irish Unionist Alliance, was shocked to

discover in a discussion over the need for ‘safe-guards’ that ‘Arthur views the matter from an academic point of view — I think — and notso much froma practical point’ .84For the non-purist it was also a chance to strengthen the unionist cause by removing-what many English people

felt to be the lastJegitimate grievance of Ireland. ‘As one unionist put it, there [must] not be the least semblance of any difference between the treatment of Ireland and England in this matter. We have preached so often equality of treatment to our fellow subjects in Ireland; let us now do all that we can to carry out our views, so that when this bill is passed there may be no legitimate grievance against us.§5

Unionist ministers were not deaf to such pleas and when Gerald Balfour produced his draft of the bill nearly all the amendments proposed by the cabinet attempted to secure uniformity in local

83 Robinson, Memories, pp 126-7. 84 Abercorn to Cadogan,

12 Dec 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1261).

85 Hansard 4, (commons), liv, 479, (D.H. Coghill, 21 Mar 1898). See also Thomas Sinclair to Cadogan, 19 Jan 1898, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1293). Even Lecky recognised

this. Mrs W.E.H. Lecky, (London, 1909), p. 319.

A memoir of the Right Hon William Edward Hartpole Lecky

48

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

government.‘ Ironically this.occasionally—involved~resorting to arguments decidedly foreign to unionists: Thus-after-twelve years of denouncing home rule for Ireland on the grounds of the Irishman’s instinctive corruption and extravagance, the cabinet rejected the chief secretary’s proposed restrictions on road expenditure as ‘savouring of distrust’. Furthermore when Gerald Balfour argued forcefully for the exclusion of clergy from office on account of the catholic priests’ unique spiritual hold over their flock, the cabinet abandoned-traditional unionist prejudices and insisted on their inclusion.Itwas only when it became abundantly clear that both the Irish unionists and the nationalists were in favour of disqualification that the cabinet gave way.®°® Yet to A.V. Dicey, a fervent unionist and renowned constitutional authority, these tortuous arguments sought to defend a bogus unionism. As he pointed out to W.E.H. Lecky, ‘the condition of the two countries is essentially different and the whole of our legislation since 1870 has been supposed to rest upon the recognition of this difference’ . The Irish historian fully sympathised but felt it useless to resist the ‘common doctrine’ or what he preferred to dismiss as ‘the common craze’. For in the months after the government’s adoption of local government reform, backbench opinion in both parties became convinced that any deviations from 1888 would be seen to be a denial of justice. Analysing the attitude of English unionists, Dicey felt that it arose partly ‘under the influence of a superstitous belief in anything which is called local < government’, and partly out of a widespread ‘delusion that Irish home ~ rulers will accept local government in the place of home rule instead of using it as a means for obtaining home rule’.87 Undoubtedly such sen\G a ‘timents prevailed butit was support for home rule inthe English constit/uencies. rather than Ireland that-really-concerned-the M.P.s. As one put—

gy Se: ,

\

I feelthat, so far as Englandi is concerned, agreat deal of the Svmpathy’ which was

'

_been given to the Irish people as it ought to have been 12 years.ago.88 86 Cabinet memorandum,

(P.R.O.,

CAB

37/45/51).

See also, G.W.

Balfour to

(Cadogan, 10, 16 Dec 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1259, CAD/1265). Sir George Errington to Sir Patrick Coll, 6 Feb 1898, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49850). 87 Dicey to Lecky, n.d., (T.C.D., Lecky papers, MSS 1835/2417). Hansard 4, (commons), liv, 455-6 (W.E.H. Lecky, 21 Mar 1898).

88 Hansard4 (commons), liv, 478 (D.H. Coghill, 21 Mar 1898); ibid., xlix, 1051 (Sir John Luttock, 21 May 1897); ibid., xlix, 1056 (Sir Penrose Fitzgerald, 21 May 1897); Plunkett to Betty Balfour, 19 Oct 1897 (P.F.O., Plunkett papers, BAL/17).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

49

|It was to such convictions — what Colonel Saunderson derisively dub-

‘bed ‘the-conscience-of.the British-people’®” — that the government ‘pandered.in-the debates of 1898: Yet they were rarely the motivating force behind an Irish policy that lacked precision, if not substance, and which had within two years been reduced to a shambles that threatened to hold up the government’s domestic programme. Notwithstanding the gloss of statesmanship that the local government bill later acquired, it remained first and foremost the minimum compromise to resolve a particular political confron-

tation. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the Irish government were lumbered with a policy they did not want. However unintended popular local government was, senior officials at Dublin Castle gratefully adopted what had been presumed impossible after the debacle of 1892. As the state began to assume responsibilities for what had previously been left to a variety of exclusive parochial bodies, its effectiveness came increasingly to depend on local co-operation. This was particularly true of the Irish administration of the 1890s as it faced up to the immense problems of poverty and of agricultural production. What the 1898 act gave the administrators was a streamlined and integrated system of local administration that was not only representative but also widely ac-

cepted. Naturally there were fears that the nationalists would exploit the new institutions for their own political ends and Gerald Balfour was for atime extremely anxious over Thomas Esmonde’s campaign to turn the central consultative council (drawn up from representatives of the elected county councils) into a ‘people’s parliament’, meeting annually in Dublin.9° Yet within a year it was clear that under the tight supervision of the Local Government Board, under Sir Henry Robinson, such fears seemed ungrounded. Thus, while the nationalist and pro-Boer resolutions were always embarrassing, to the officials in Dublin Castle the experiment was undoubtedly‘an-adminisirative Success.9! Furthermore efficiency, it was hoped, would breed economy, and in an administration that was widely regarded as extravagant the reduction 89 Hansard 4, (commons), liv, 492 (Col Saunderson, 2] Mar 1898).

90 Plunkett to Gill, 17 Apr 1899, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494(1) ); A.J. Balfourto C.M. Doyne, 18 Apr 1899, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49853). 91 Robinson to G.W. Balfour, 26 Dec 1899, 19 Mar 1900, (Whitt.,G.B.P.); Robinson, Memories, p. 132. Catherine Shannon, ‘The Irish local government act of 1898’ (unprinted M.A. thesis, U.C.D., 1963).

50

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness f ¢f LU

of government expenditure was a major concern. This was not simply a case of the surpluses from administrative rationalisation, because for certain officials the popularisation of local government had another, and a distinctly moral, purpose. On hearing of the government’s new plans Sir David Harrel, the under-secretary, sent Gerald Balfour a memorandum which he had originally written for Arthur Balfour in 1889. In it he proposed the partial democratisation of county government and the creation of a representative central council which would have a powerful influence in the allocation of Irish funds. What particularly concerned him was ‘the policy ruling applications for imperial grants for Ireland’ which was ‘to ask for everything and to take as gain all that can be got without thought for the future or regard for the pressing necessities of the objects to which the grants were to be applied’. This, he suggested, could only be changed by giving Irishmen large responsibilities for the discharge of their own taxes. ‘From.tthis _experience those seemingly unfitted to hold such authority would al Oe : amore mature-and_co- -operative attitude towards the state. 92

4 It.was these

IML eves

principles of efficiency, :economy andresponsibility that

determined theFinalTore STA though thé’government’s advisers in Dublin Castle were pushed further over the franchise than perhaps they would naturally have gone, for the most part the practical reality of the government’s Irish policy was determined more by the demands of the ‘official mind’ than by political strategy. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the government’s main preoccupation — the’ development of material prosperity in Ireland.

IV Poverty, prosperity and politics Like his brother before him, Gerald Balfour, on taking up office, embarked ona tour of the west of Ireland to witness first-hand the crippling and unrelenting poverty that, according to unionist orthodoxy, lay at

the heart of the Irish problem. There among the small and uneconomic holdings, where employment was spasmodic and emigration the continuing fate of the young, he found ‘a kind of hero-worship for Arthur 92 Sir David Harrel, ‘Recollections and reflections’, 1926 (T.C.D., Harrel papers,

MSS 3918b, pp 132-9).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

5S]

[Balfour] wherever a light railway had been made’.93 Enthusiastically the new chief secretary adopted his ameliorative policy towards these depressed areas with further grants for light railways and the Congested Districts.Board:-His period in office also saw drainage schemes, labourers acts and, above all, the establishment of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (D.A.T.I.). Yet this programme was not simply the extension of ‘Balfourism’ that its protagonists initially presumed; for at the same time it raised important questions about the social and moral role of the state in Ireland. In particular these involved a revision of the original unionist interpretation of Irish poverty away from a simplistic and narrowly economic approach to one in which the central problem was not a lack of resources but the erosion of individualism by a traditionally interventionist state.°* For it was the moral rather than the political _objective.that-marked..the unionist response to the twin problems of poverty and the creation of prosperity. ‘The harvest’, Cadogan confidently assured the prime minister, ‘is the all important factor’ in Ireland.95 Hardly an inspired judgement, it nevertheless illustrated the imprint of land war on the British perception of Irish society: a bountiful harvest meant prosperity and peace, but a poor crop led to poverty and hardship, lawlessness and Parnell. And yet, while harvest failures were periodic, poverty seemed permanent and ever-increasing. The attitude of the government towards this long-term demoralisation was founded primarily in the belief that there was little the state could do: baited once by Tim Healy in the house, an enraged Balfour once retorted that, much as he wished to, he could not send the poor ‘to the south of France and feed them on champagne’.* There was the poor law with boards of guardians dispensing occasional poor relief, but there was no escaping the fact that late-Victorian governments had not the means, the money or the philosophy to tackle such an immense problem. Nor was it felt that they should. Instead, the problem of the poor in the government’s eyes became not one of poverty but the poor

93 G.W. Balfour to Salisbury, 23 Sept 1895, (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers). 94 See Lyons, Jreland since the famine, chap. 3.

95 Cadogan to Salisbury, 30 Sept 1895, (H.L.R.O., Salisbury papers). 96 Hansard 4, (commons), lvii, 451-2, (Gerald Balfour,

5 May 1898).

52

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

law.97 Governmental attempts to allay genuine deprivation through expensive ameliorative gestures such as doles and relief works had transformed the problem into one where government grants and work schemes were being corruptly exploited while the poverty of the west remained undiminished. In an extraordinarily vehement memorandum to the cabinet, Gerald Balfour described the real challenge to the government and its system of relief. It takes the whole responsibility for dealing with distress off the shoulders of local people and shifts it onto the government. It is the government which has to determine the necessity for relief works, to measure the extent of that necessity, and to pay the cost incurred. The locality has nothing to do except take all it can get, and it finds the experience so pleasant that the appetite grows with each renewal of it. A ‘“‘famine’’ is a god-send to every class in a poor district — to landlords, to shopkeepers, to priests, to the ratepayers generally, to the labourers employed on the works, even to the police who are paid as timekeepers. The result is what might have been expected. It isto everybody’s interest to raise the cry of distress, and it is accordingly raised with ever less and less pretext, and ever increasing exaggeration even when real ground for it exists. This tendency is fast growing to be a serious embarrassment to the government. It is also most demoralising to the population ofthe districts concerned, who are being taught to imagine that they have a right to dip their hands in the public purse every time the harvest is a little worse than the average, and whose motive for exerting themselves is proportionately weakened.98

Matters came to a head after the partial destruction of the harvest in the dreadfully wet summer of 1897. Although the resulting hardship would not be felt until the middle of the next year, the Irish party were quickly (and vainly) demanding the recall of parliament. Soon the propaganda campaign was in full cry with vivid descriptions in the press of starvation and even a melodramatic telegram to Dublin Castle calling on the government to send corn or coffins. The government’s predicament 97 One castle official once explained to Arthur Balfour that the enormous rise in outdoor relief was due ‘to the fact that the mode of living of the poorer classes has gradually become more extravagant and their means have not increased proportionately. The result is that they can no longer support their old relatives who when no longer able to work fall upon the rates; and of recent years the educated classes on the board of guardians have been replaced by shopkeepers who profit indirectly by giving relief outside, and by farmers who are firmly persuaded that outdoor relief is cheaper than relief in the house’. Robinson to A.J. Balfour, 10 Mar 1892, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49850). 98 Cabinet memorandum

(P.R.O., CAB 37/45/41).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

oS

became acute when 7he Observer carried an article which condemned the recent royal visit by the Duke and Duchess of York as a ‘pleasure trip’ to Ireland by people who had little interest in peasants ‘on the verge of semi-famine’. Stung by this, the Yorks determined to set up an appeal fund for the relief of the west which could only have reflected badly on the Irish government.°? And yet government reports could find ‘nothing to be alarmed about’. The under-secretary, fresh from a personal investigation of the troubled areas, came away convinced that the board of guardians could cope with the distress: ‘at the same time’ he told Balfour ‘the exaggerations in the newspapers are most mischievous and have had a bad effect upon both the priests and people’. Later Harrel reported that in the newspapers, ‘ ‘‘distress’’ is being run in the west on political lines for all its worth’; and with appeal funds being set up in Manchester and London, the government stood in grave danger of being stampeded ignominously into unnecessary action. 19° Gerald Balfour shared fully his under-secretary’s views and fears. Nationalist press reports were always felt to be grossly exaggerated and he suspected that much of it was intended to influence the Fry commission: Ireland, he asserted condescendingly, was always ‘a great country for arriére pensée’.'°' Nevertheless, he was determined that British opinion, notwithstanding the claims of Irish poverty, must be firmly resisted. The state had got into ‘a bad groove’ and could only be extricated by placing the responsibility, where Balfour always felt it belonged, back on the individual. To achieve this he proposed firstly to prevent any recurrence of distress by loans to the boards of guardians for spraying and seed potatoes. The alleviation of distress was also left to the guardians who could institute relief works only with the sanction of the Local Government Board. However, these would not be subsidised by the government, though there was a secret proviso that financially embarrassed unions would receive a proportion (never more than seventy-five per cent) of their expenditure. !°? Not surprisingly, this apparently cold-blooded response fanned the

99 The Observer, 12, 19 Sept 1897; G.W. Balfourto Harrel, 14 Mar 1898, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1322). Robinson, Memories, p. 112. 100 Harrel to G.W. Balfour, 24 Sept 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1202). Harrel to G.W.

Balfour, 7 Dec 1897, (Whitt. G.B.P.).

101 G.W. Balfour to Cadogan, 13 Oct 1897, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1209). 102 Cabinet memorandum

(P.R.O., CAB 37/45/41).

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flames of agitation and with the reopening of parliament Sir Henry Robinson at the Local Government Board soon found himself the target of ‘wilful misrepresentation’ in ‘absurd shrieking sensational articles’. Assailed from all sides, the resolve of Dublin Castle began to wilt. Harrel and Cadogan both pressed Balfour to counter allegations of government indifference by announcing ‘that we had our minds made up and our plans cut and dried before winter set in’. They even suggested ‘casually’ assuring guardians that they would, if necessary, be bailed out, 193

But to reveal this would be to abandon all that Balfour was fighting for. He did not seek credit for his government so much as the establishment of responsible attitudes towards economy and the state. What made his stand even more remarkable was that it came just after the financial relations scandal when the government had rescued its early popularity with the concession of local government. This fragile recovery could have been strengthened by a gesture to finance relief works; after all neither his brother nor John Morley had had any qualms over such extravagances in the past. But Balfour stuck firm and with the good harvest of 1898 the crisis passed. Moreover, with the local govern-

ment act, local responsibility for the relief of distress was increased and the new councils proved on the whole reasonably economical.1% In many ways this episode revealed far more about Gerald Balfour’s intentions in Ireland than the more spectacular legislation for which he was remembered. The economic and social decay was undeniable but to Balfour its significance went far beyond the political vultures who fed upon it. What preoccupied his government now was not whether but how the state should act without encouraging the irresponsibility it so deplored. If Dublin Castle were too ready to dismiss the needs of the poor as ‘wholesale jobbery and demoralisation’ , !°5 it was no doubt as much out of inclination as experience; but also it was because the real solution lay not in the amelioration of hardship but in the creation of prosperity. Agriculture, which was by far the largest Irish industry, was crippled by 103 Robinson to G.W.

Balfour, 6 Feb 1898; Harrel to G.W. Balfour, 7 Dec 1897,

(Whitt, G.B.P.). 104 Robinson, Memories, p. 112. See also Shannon, ‘The Irish local government act’, passim. 105 Robinson to G.W. Balfour, 24 Apr 1898, (Whitt, G.B.P.).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

5S.

archaic methods of production, poor quality products and inefficient systems of distribution; consequently Irish farmers found it difficult to compete abroad. The state had been interfering in Irish agriculture since at least 1870 with the land legislation; but while the establishment of a peasant proprietary was politically acceptable, it was hardly conducive to economic efficiency. On the other hand the Congested Districts Board did attempt to improve and amalgamate the wretched, small holdings in the west, and to supplement incomes with aid to the (uneconomic) cottage industries upon which many poor householders depended. However, its operations were confined to the western seaboard and were fraught with restrictions and lack of funds. By the time Balfour came to Ireland there had long existed a mood in favour of setting up a new state department to stimulate and co-ordinate agriculture. Indeed Harrel had already drawn up a proposal, though this was later overtaken by Horace Plunkett’s Recess committee report. Both schemes sought to ‘promote Irish agriculture’ by enlisting local cooperation in the task of re-educating Irish farmers. ‘What they had to aim at’, Balfour told a Belfast audience, ‘was not so much a change of external conditions as a change in men’s habits and attitude of mind .. .” Essentially it was the co-operative philosophy writ large with the agricultural committees, drawn from the county councils, working with the central administration to realise Plunkett’s dream of ‘better farming, better business, better living’. 1% The achievement of the new Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, !°” like that of most educational experiments, has remained uncertain.1°8 This was inevitable when like most educational experiments D.A.T.I. became from the outset embroiled in political controversy. Whatever unionists thought of the appointment of a former Land Leaguer as secretary, nationalists and expecially John Dillon held a deep distrust of anything associated with Plunkett. Consequently, 106 Harrel ‘Recollections’ (T.C.D., Harrel papers, MSS 3918b, pp 122-8). Digby, Plunkett, pp 78-9. The Times, 20 Jan 1900. 107 Established under the Agricultural and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act, 1899 (62+ 63 Vict., c. 50) on 9 Aug 1896. 108 For a sympathetic approach see Digby, Plunkett, pp 84-116 and R.A. Anderson, With Horace Plunkett in Ireland (London, 1935). Two recent critiques: C. Ehrlich, ‘Sir Horace Plunkett and agricultural reform’ in J. Goldstorm, and L.A. Clarkson, (ed.), Irish population, economy and society (Oxford 1981); Liam Kennedy, ‘Adoption of a group innovation in Irish agriculture, 1890-1914’ in Oxford agrarian studies, 1977.

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D.A.T.1. was viewed with the same suspicion as the 1.A.O.S., and when the former began financing the latter out of departmental funds, the

reality of the unionist attempt to erode nationalist aspirations with economical reforms appeared irrefutable. If Gerald Balfour shared Plunkett’s enthusiasm for rural development even to the extent of describing the Irish question as essentially ‘a farmers’ question’ he nevertheless consistently rejected the nationalist accusations. ‘Improvement in the social and economic condition of the people’, he wrote later, ‘must be our first object. It is an end to be pursued for its own sake, whatever the indirect consequences may be. But these need cause us no anxiety. Increased material prosperity, and the contentment which inevitably accompanies it ... are not likely to strengthen the demand for constitutional changes’.!°? Elsewhere he argued that these indirect consequences could take generations and as such remained only a distant hope and not a realistic object.11° For Plunkett on the other hand the distinction was never so explicit. Indeed at times it seemed barely to exist. In August 1896 he wrote of John Dillon’s opposition to the recess committee: ‘he sees in it the greatest danger home rule has yet to face. So do I’. Certainly Plunkett talked the language of ‘kindness’. He never missed an opportunity to persuade British politicians that the Irish question was ‘mainly economic’ and that if they wished to change political sentiment in Ireland, the government should adopt the policies of the recess committee.!!! Indeed he held that it was the duty of the unionist government to seize the opportunity of the 1890s to transform Ireland ‘politically speaking’ and was horrified to discover that little or no legislation was planned for Ireland.'12 Ina similar vein he once described the 1.A.0.S. to Lord Cadogan, the lord lieutenant, as a ‘most valuable agent of the government’ against the agitators;!!3 and on another occasion argued that a bill to establish a department of agriculture ‘without popularising the central government either by home rule or paternalism, . . . will be

109 S. Rosenbaum (ed), Against home rule (London, 110 The Times, 8 Apr 1897. 111 Plunkett’s

memorandum,

(H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1094-7); Add. MSS 49792).

1912), pp 247-8.

‘The Irish policy of the government’,

12 May

1897,

Plunkett to A.J. Balfour, 9 Feb 1900, (B.L., A.B.P.,

12 H.C.P. diaries, 19 June 1895, (P.F.O.).

"13 Plunkett to Cadogan, 23 Nov 1897, (H.L..R.O., C.P., CAD/1251).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

Di

used to force the said popularisation’.114 And

yet, while Plunkett

was always convinced

of this ‘economic

truth’, there is an unmistakable element of special pleading — an impression that Plunkett was to some extent selling his agricultural schemes to the government in terms he thought they would like to hear. Since, on Plunkett’s own estimate, nearly seventy-five per cent of the 1.A.0.S. membership were home rulers, it was most unlikely that his movement could be an instrument of unionist policy.!15 Plunkett, for one, never underestimated the emotional appeal of Irish nationalism. In October 1896 after watching the Parnell anniversary march he recorded the inescapable conclusion in his diary: ‘nothing could be more complete than the proof of the survival of the national sentiment as a forcein politics than the persistence of this great function in spite of the disintegrating factionalism in nationalist politics’.116 Consequently he had nothing but contempt for the English unionist view of democratic local government as a substitute for home rule; for Plunkett, ‘the national spirit only sleeps’.!!7 In fact Plunkett, while never appreciating the artistic objectives of the Gaelic League and the Irish literary revival, was extremely sympathetic to any movement that sought to encourage a sense of national identity and self-respect. !18 Rather than seeking to undermine Irish nationality, Plunkett sought to _ harness it to sound, lasting economic foundations.

~~ The attempt to fuse Irish nationality with unionist ‘economics’ held a great attraction for those unionists who were aware that, with the land acts and the democratisation of local government and the poor law boards, the erosion of their paternal role in the locality was irreversible. After the agrarian agitation of the 1880s with its overtones of class warfare, here was a chance in the lull before the storm to find a niche for a redundant caste. Certainly T.P. Gill sold the co-operative movement in these terms to the traditionally unionist readers of the Daily Express. Moreover both Plunkett and Gill continually stressed the importance of ‘being in touch with the democracy’ and pointed proudly to the |

114 Plunkett to Gill, 25 Mar 1898, (N.L.1., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494 (1) ). 115 [bid., 27 July 1895 (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13493 (6) ). 116 H.C.P. diaries, 11 Oct 1896, (P.F.O.).

17 [bid., 21 Feb 1898. 18 Tbid., 10 Sept 1897; Plunkett, New Century, p. 148.

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democratic constitution of D.A.T.I.119 The newly democratised county councils were to elect two thirds of the Council of Agriculture which in turn elected the majority of the Board of Agriculture and this body hada power of veto over departmental expenditure. Was this to be the path out of the abyss for the ascendancy? However Plunkett adopted the ‘elective element’ for two less cataclysmic and more practical reasons. Firstly, with the grim example of Dublin Castle to be avoided, Plunkett was determined to ensure the effectiveness of his department through popular participation at the local level. As Plunkett informed the council, ‘the principle involves local initiation, local contribution, local administration, with central supervision and control’.12° At the same time it offered the means, in A.E.’s phrase, ‘to keep the experts on tap and not on top’. !2! The second reason for Plunkett’s courting of the democracy was that he had no alternative. For a start, because of the reluctance of English MPs to allow parliamentary time to be wasted on non-essential and often controversial Irish measures, it was vital for Plunkett to demonstrate to the party whips that the bill to establish the department had unanimous support among the Irish MPs, 12? and socould be passed speedily. It was not home rule but the home rule party that Plunkett had to conciliate and hence Gill urged the chief secretary, Gerald Balfour, to emphasise the consultative council: not simply because ‘it is really a great innovation’ but also because it is ‘quite enough. . . to win for the scheme the approval of the representatives of the popular spirit’. 123 But this concession paled in comparison with the offer of democratically elected local government and the board of agriculture bill was dropped. As aconsequence of this the stakes were raised when Plunkett attempted to revive the bill. The popular element in the proposed councils was increased and elected by the local county councils; the board, which originally was to be wholly nominated, was now elected in the main by the council and so — at least in theory — this could result in the financial brake that the board held over D.A.T.I. being in the hands of local 119 Gill to G.W. Balfour, 6 Mar 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509 (8) ). 120 Pat Bolger, The Irish co-operative movement (Dublin, 1977), pp 85-6. 121 George (‘A.E.’) Russell, Co-operation and nationality (Dublin, 1912), pp 80-1. 122“. _ . who after all are direct representatives of Irish agriculture’. Plunkett to Gill,

25 Jan 1896, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13493 (8) ). 123 Gill to G.W. Balfour, 6 Mar 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509 (8) ).

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politicians.'24 Given this, what was remarkable was that the politicisation of the consultative councils took so long to materialise. The point is that despite the credit that was given to Plunkett for this imaginative effort to popularise Irish government, he had been pushed much further than he had intended to go. In fact like many of his colleagues in the upper echelons of the I.A.O.S., Plunkett was staunchly opposed to the extension of the democratic principles 125 in Ireland. He was firmly convinced of the need of ‘a strong central executive’ 126 and dismissed the government’s attempts to decentralise authority in the ‘new department’ as ‘sheer folly’.127 If Cadogan felt it was ‘ludicrous’ to have a board whose advice need not be taken, Plunkett’s retort was to condemn ‘the fatuity of trying to combine a democratic constitution with administrative efficiency, at any rate in the initiatory stages, in an Irish department’ .!28 In this crucial dispute the new local government ‘franchise [was] a real danger’; 129 and when in June 1899 the government were thinking of sending the bill before a grand committee of the house of commons, Plunkett was horrified lest the nationalist MPs would use their majority to amend the bill ‘in the direction of democratic administration — the worst danger we have had to fight against from the first days of the recess committee till now’ .13° Such sentiments hardly reflect a spirit of compromise and instead reveal that Plunkett aimed higher than simply the reconciliation of the ‘old order’ with a post-Parnellite fait accompli. If he did not share the blind and arrogant presumptions with which most of his class regard their future, he did view the quiescent facade of Irish politics after Parnell with un-

doubted confidence. In stark contrast to the isolation of 1908 and the plaintive cry of Noblesse Oblige, Plunkett unionist rule (1895-1905) was not fighting a ascendancy. As his biographer recognised ‘he foresee the future as to make it’. 131 In comparison, Gerald Balfour’s ambitions 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131

during the ten years of rear guard action for the was not so much trying to

for D.A.T.I. seems paltry

Plunkett to Gill, 10 Feb 1899, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494 (1) ). Monteagle to Plunkett, 19 Apr 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509 (9) ). Plunkett to Gill, 6 July 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13493 (15) ). H.C.P. diaries, 11 Jan 1899, (P.F.O.). Plunkett to Gill, 12 Jan 1898, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13494 (1) ). Ibid., 16 Mar 1898. Tbid., 29 June 1899. Digby, Plunkett, p. 109.

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indeed; and yet in another sense D.A.T.I. had a distinctly political aim for him too. Looking back on the conservatives’ Irish legislation since 1886 and the creation of the new

department

in particular,

Gerald

Balfour claimed that this ‘veritable new departure’ represented nothing less than the abandonment of /aissez faire. While this may be historically questionable, he certainly intended to convey the impression that it was the result of lengthy consideration by the Irish executive and the ‘insight and devoted persistence of a single individual’,'!3? Horace Plunkett. But this was written in 1912 when the conservatives had formally committed themselves to protection, from which the revenues would go to finance the impending social responsibilities of the state. Prior to 1903 and Joseph Chamberlain’s launching of his tariff campaign, Gerald Balfour, like his brother, held a strong dislike for state intervention in the economy; and despite pragmatic attempts to accept retaliatory tariffs, his time at the Board of Trade (1900-1905) showed that his instinctive trust in the ultimate benevolence of the free market had barely diminished. In Ireland the demoralisation that had arisen out of the poor law and the land legislation had only confirmed his worst fears. Yet, at the same time, he recognised that there could be no retreat. It was because of this that Balfour was so attracted to the Recess Report for, in its author’s words, ‘it pointed out. . . the true limits of state aid in what, for some time at any rate, must bea free trade country’ .!33 The act that emerged out of the report closely reflected these limits and attempted to set a precedent for future state involvement in social reform. By working through voluntary bodies, county committees and the national Consultative Councils of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (made up of representatives from the elected county councils), the department would not only gain local understanding and acceptance of its schemes but would also engender a greater appreciation of the limitations and responsibilities of government. Only by working indirectly through popular participation could the state achieve both reform and economy and thus efficiency. Balfour himself summed up the principles of his legislation as, ‘state aid, encouraging and supplementing cooperation and self-help; co-operation and self-help providing suitable 132 Rosenbaum, Against home rule, pp 227-8. 133 Plunkett to Sir Josselyn Gore-Booth, 12 July 1897, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13497

(1) ).

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

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opportunities for the fruitful application of state aid’ .134 Thus, far from abandoning /aissez-faire, Balfour tried through D.A.T.I. to confine and ultimately lessen the role of the state. The consultative councils of agriculture, technical instruction and social government were not radical ventures into democracy but a highly conservative attempt to reconcile Irishmen to the responsibilities of government.!35 He was, as he once admitted,

preaching an ‘old lesson’, a

rearguard action in defence of a passing world. If he sought to change peoples’ minds it was not simply to sway them from constitutional change; rather it was to resurrect the creed of ‘individual initiative’ 13°in a country long ‘demoralised’ by the periodic and unimaginative distribution of state doles.

V

aS

The essence of Balfourism Many years later, Gerald Balfour recalled his infamous ‘killing home rule with kindness’ speech at Leeds: This phrase has been repeatedly quoted since, as if it had been a formal declaration on the part of the incoming Irish government that to “‘kill home rule’’ was the alpha and the omega of their policy. What I really said was that we intended to promote measures having for their object an increase in the material prosperity of the country; that ifwe could thereby kill home rule with kindness, so much the better; but that the policy stood on its own merits irrespective of any ulterior consequences. !37

While the Irish government never doubted the strength of popular sentiment, the home rule threat to the unionist cause came not so much from Ireland as from Westminster and the liberals. Indeed thepolitical 134 Rosenbaum, Against home rule, p. 240. 135 The consultative council for agriculture was elected from the new county councils and met once a year to advise the department and elect a board of agriculture. This body met more frequently and actually had a power of veto over expenditure from the agricultural endowment fund. However, one third of both the council and the board was made up of members nominated by the department, expressly to insure the representation of ‘voluntary organisations’ like the 1.A.O.S. Ibid., pp 236-8. Plunkett, New Century, chap. ix. 136 The Times, 20 Jan 1900. 137 Rosenbaum, Against home rule, p. 240.

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Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

impact in Ireland of the government’s ameliorative reforms was essentially a nationalist question, and one of some tradition. For it is none other but the old dilemma introduced by Fintan Lalor, sustained by the Land League and Parnell, and allowed to continue festering into the 1890s by the politics of ‘the split’: namely did the nationalist movement depend for its popular support on the crisis of poverty among the peasantry? The issue was not simply whether the party would be dissolved by prosperity but also what kind of nationalist would the well-fed man make? What was feared was that economic reform could well transform the social and political nature of the Ireland that would emerge after home rule. In contrast, as the 1890s progressed, the home rule danger receded and ceased to be a pressing concern for the Irish government. Occasionally, as during the anniversary of the 1798 rising, the numerous schisms within the movement were closely monitored but normally the bitter divisions within the Irish party were not of political interest but merely a source of light-hearted jest: ‘if only they would proceed to the extremity of the Kilkenny cats!’ remarked Cadogan jovially to Betty Balfour; ‘but’, he lamented, ‘I feel they will fall short of that ideal!’ The reunification of the Irish Parliamentary Party in no way dampened the government’s confidence and ‘real unity’ 138 was contemptuously dismissed as an impossibility. Yet these private convictions contrasted sharply with the government’s public utterances. Whatever Gerald Balfour felt in the seclusion of the chief secretary’s lodge, on the platform he constantly stressed the imminent and ever-present threat of home rule. Moreover, as he fulfilled the annual chore of addressing his constituents, he frequently described his Irish policy of remedial reforms as ‘spiking the nationalists’ guns’: 139 that their sole raison d’etre was to undermine home rule. Undoubtedly, as the debate on the local government act

demonstrated, the belief that kindness could kill home rule was strong in the constituencies. While this formula was too simplistic to a politician heavily involved in the Irish administration, it was essential for the unionists to put the Irish question in English terms; for, as Balfour insisted, ‘the battle for home rule would be fought, not in Ireland, 138 Gerald Balfour to Cadogan, 8 Feb 1899, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/1481). Cadogan to Betty Balfour, 21 Feb 1900, (Whitt, G.B.P.).

139 The Times, 5 Feb 1898; 10 Oct 1898; 18 Nov 1898; 4 Feb 1899.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

63

but in this country’. 14° Although the general election of 1895 had vindicated the union, few unionists doubted that there was general resentment at the continued preoccupation of English political parties with Ireland.141 Moreover, the very magnitude of the unionist victory threatened to resolve the whole debate. To the liberals home rule was clearly proving a liability and by 1896 Rosebery and other liberals were trying discreetly to ditch their Gladstonian inheritance and so open the way for the return of the liberal unionists to the fold.!4? For reasons of party as well as for the union, the unionists could not afford to stand idly by while the liberals tried ‘to run away from home rule as fast as decency would permit them’. 143 To counter this," unionist propaganda portrayed the government’s Irish policy as a moderate, responsible and planned programme that )would appeal to an essentially ‘liberal’ electorate} thus ensuring that the liberals would remain the prisoners of home rule and the Irish party. To < capitalise on the presumed unpopularity of home rule, government “ ministers depicted their Irish legislation primarily in terms of defending the union against the future duplicity of ‘the English home rule party’. Even the removal of all Ireland’s grievances, Gerald Balfour once argued, would not remove the demand for home rule. Nevertheless, the achievement of his chief secretaryship was, he declared, not the reconciling of the Irish people to ‘their necessary connexion, but in convincing this country that the imperial parliament was able to grant to Ireland all that Ireland could legitimately ask’.144 Thus the consequence of this approach for both contemporaries and historians was to merge the private intentions of the Irish chief secretary with the public propaganda of his party, so giving a deceptive coherence to Balfour’s policy. This impression was reinforced by the nationalists’ perspective, published by the anti-Parnellite wing of the IPP and the bitter, narrow rhetoric of John Dillon. Regardless of what events suggested, there was no programme, no blue-print ‘to kill home rule with

140 The Times, 4 Feb 1899. 141 T.eeds Mercury, 5 July 1895.

142 I. W. Gutzke, ‘Rosebery and Ireland, 1898-1903: a reappraisal’ in J. H.R. Bull, liii (1980), pp 88-98.

143 The Times, 4 Feb 1899. 144 Ibid., 21 Dec 1898; 25 Sept 1900 (my italics).

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Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

kindness’. A phrase that was too striking to be forgotten only ensured that a rather limited policy of economic reconstruction was lost and confused amid the glamour of a rhetorical myth,) ” If there is a connection between Irish savetwent and English propaganda it lies in viewing Balfour’s Irish policy as an extension of the unionists’ domestic response to the menace of socialism in an Irish context. As such, Balfourism mirrored the contortions of the Victorian state as it sought to wrestle with the moral challenge of the ‘discovered’ poor. Irish home rule, as propagated by the I.P.P. and the Land League, along with Harcourt’s ‘confiscatory’ taxation and the Newcastle programme was, in the eyes of many conservative contemporaries, symptomatic of a reckless drift towards class-divisive ‘collectivism’ at the cost of abandoning the tried principles of responsible government that had underpinned Victorian stability. Consequently, the unionists had been elected, it was felt, as a distinct alternative which would reassert the primacy of good administration over the uncertainty of radical legislative surgery. However, unionist politicians, despite the contradictions with unionist principles, often sought refuge in pointing out that Ireland was fundamentally different, economically and socially, from Britain, and that the extensive role of the state in Irish society was part of the ‘exceptional treatment’ allowed for under the act of union.145 Gerald Balfour fully recognised this party shibboleth and yet his own period in the Irish Office and his legislation displayed a profound concern with the central issue of late- Victorian government — the inter-relationship between the state and the individual. Thus while Irish conditions aroused his interest in and determined the practical form of his reforms, the philosophy behind them was more closely concerned with the individualist preoccupations of bodies like the Liberty and Property Defence League. 146 145 “Such measures on the land purchase acts, the Congested Districts Board, the light railways, the agricultural and technical instruction . . . have no parallel in legislation for England, and are justified only by an anxiety to give exceptional aid to the sister kingdom’. A.J. Balfour to W.P. Jackson, 20 Mar 1900, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS

49853). 146 N. Soldon, ‘Laissez-faire as dogma: the Liberty and Property Defence League, 1882-1914’ in K.D. Brown, Essays in anti-labour history (London,

1974); E. Bristow,

“The Liberty and Property Defence League and individualism’ in Hist. Jn. xviii, 4 (1975), pp 761-89. John W. Mason, ‘Political economy and the response to socialism in Britain,

1870-1914’ in Hist. Jn., xxiii, 3 (1980), pp 565-87.

Gerald Balfour & the Spirit of Kindness

65

Moreover, Balfour’s reform of the poor law simply reflected prevailing attitudes amongst the influential Charity Organisation Society

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I have often myself tried to discover the genesis of W.’s apostasy .. . My diagnosis is this. At first when he came over he was a unionist but a Wyndhamite before all things. You remember [that] land reform was not thought of in the election of 1900. T.W. Russell . . . went on the rampage . . . and Wyndham . thought he would by his bill of 1902 checkmate him. This bill. . . failed... Wyndham was baulked. About this time MacDonnell turned up. Wyndham’s mind was at this time wavering. He said to me once, ‘Do you think homerule will come?’. I replied, ‘Possibly but we are not the party to bring it about’. He then shut up. I believe it then occurred to him that he might with MacD.’s aid square the nationalists, settle the land and education questions. Pose as the pacificator of Ireland and immensely raise himself in popular estimation. He then began to intrigue.

John Atkinson to Walter Long 3 October 1911

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VII

DUBLIN CASTLE AND THE EMERGENCE OF DEVOLUTION

When, if ever, the inner history of this unfortunate imbroglio comes to be written, perhaps it will be made clear how the late chief secretary, as well as the under-secretary, and, it may be added, the lord lieutenant, stood throughout in their dealing with the concocters of ‘devolution’. At present we can only infer that there were painful vacillations, grotesque contradictions and a secrecy which was most unfair to the nation.

J. Mackay Wilson (National Review, November 1905)

I LATE IN 1902, Wyndham was relating his latest schemes to Wilfrid Blunt when the latter questioned whether these reforms would lead to home rule or closer union. It was a constant preoccupation of Blunt’s who never missed an opportunity to persuade his unionist cousin that he was in practice a home ruler. The chief secretary’s reply was suitably both uncommitted and flattering: ‘he admitted that it would probably lead to home rule, but said it was not his business to look so far ahead’. ! On another occasion Blunt’s relentless persecution produced a 1 Blunt diaries, 22 Nov 1902, (Fitzwilliam Mus. Camb., MSS 6 - 1975).

23)

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Dublin Castle & the Emergence of Devolution

confession to being ‘theoretically a home ruler’, although — not being practical politics — ‘the less said about it just now the better’.?Consequently when the devolution crisis broke amid rumours of government complicity with the publication of Dunraven’s manifesto, Blunt traced its origins to 1903 and Wyndham’s ‘sudden’ recognition of the probable outcome of his constructive reforms.3 To others, particularly former colleagues like Atkinson who had been appalled by such ‘treachery’, ‘the overmastering passion which worked his downfall was self love’.4 But since then historians have been more indulgent, arguing that whatever Wyndham’s sentiments devolution emerged from a simple misunderstanding between the chief secretary and MacDonnell.® However, the issues raised by devolution went far beyond questions of personal character and struck directly on the complete failure of the unionist government to legislate for Ireland. Apart from the 1903 land act (and even this had broken down through a lack of money), they had only managed to pass rather sterile legislation on railways, Belfast harbour, liquor sales and the registration of clubs. Important bills on town tenants and labourers had to be dropped and the central issues of overtaxation, evicted tenants, education and land still remained unsolved after ten years of unionist rule. Devolution was a despairing attempt to pinpoint the causes of the unionist paralysis. It is only in this light that one can begin to appreciate how the Irish administration came to be so deeply associated with the ultra-sensitive issue of constitutional reform at such an inopportune moment for a unionist government struggling to survive amid the storm over tariffs.

II When MacDonnell and Lord Dunraven produced their scheme they were not instigating anovel departure in unionist policy. The Balfourian strategy of coercion and conciliation involved under his brother Gerald, the large-scale devolution of administrative powers with the introduction of democratic local government (1898). Furthermore, Gerald Balfour in his D.A.T.I. act (1899) instituted a series of popularly-elected 2 Ibid., 31 Mar 1903, (Fitzwilliam Mus. Camb., MSS 376 - 1975).

3 Ibid., 28 Feb 1904 (Fitzwilliam Mus. Camb., MSS 7 - 1975). 4 Atkinson to Long, 3 Oct 1911, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/31). 5 Mackail, Wyndham; Biggs-Davison, Wyndham; Egremont, The cousins.

Dublin Castle & the Emergence of Devolution

Pash

councils to oversee and even at the highest level veto if necessary departmental expenditure. When the viceroy, Lord Dudley, in 1902 proclaimed his faith in ‘ruling Ireland through Irish ideas’ he was only paying lip-service to an established tradition: a tradition moreover that Wyndham had fully espoused, although in the wider imperial context, in his rectorial lecture on The development of the state. The parallels with Dunraven’s arguments for devolution were striking to say the least. Both saw the survival of the British Empire as the ultimate objective and viewed the social and economic crisis in Ireland as part of ‘the disease gnawing at its core’.” Both also recognised that it was ‘only by admitting and encouraging the sense of her own nationality that a feeling of a larger nationality and true imperial sentiment in Ireland can be created’;8 or as Wyndham put it more succinctly, ‘the perfected empirestate of the future, to evoke universal allegiance, must appeal to particular sentiment’.? Finally both accepted that it was only through involvement in their own affairs that Irishmen would develop the self respect and self control that the modern state demanded. '° This in turn echoed fully the debate in 1897 within Dublin Castle over local government reform.'!! Whether one consulted the county councils or Dunraven’s financial council, the logic remained the same. From its uncertain beginnings constructive unionism had ended up with Dunravenism: ideologically this was perfectly rational, politically it was perfectly impossible. In any case, as Dunraven insisted, it was the ‘experience’ of ruling Ireland that convinced the majority of under-secretaries and many of their political chiefs of the necessity of administrative devolution and later of popular involvement in the governmental system.12 Few could be more unionist and conservative in the Castle than Sir David Harrel and yet in 1889 as inspector general of the Royal Irish Constabulary he proposed a wide-ranging democratisation of local government and even the establishment of a representative general council with sufficient

6 7 8 9

Plunkett to Betty Balfour, 22 Sept 1906, (P.F.O., H.C.P. papers, BAL/74). Dunraven, Outlook, pp 137-8. Ibid., p. 9; Crisis6p. 53. Wyndham, Development, p. 59.

10 Dunraven, Outlook, p. 36; Crisis, p. 12.

11 Harrel, ‘Recollections’, (T.C.D., Harrel papers, MSS 3918b, pp 129-131). 12 Dunraven, Crisis, pp 30-6.

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of Devolution

powers to review Irish expenditure. With an eye on the instability of the party system at Westminster, Arthur Balfour rejected Harrel’s plan as smacking too much of Gladstonian home rule. And yet when ten years later the Liberal threat over Ireland had apparently disintegrated, Harrel, now under-secretary, resubmitted his memorandum, much of which was adopted (including the general council) by Gerald Balfour in his sweeping reform of local government. !3 What had been a contradiction to unionism in 1889 had become the corner-stone of unionist policy by 1898. Similarly Wyndham’s attempt to set up the development grant as an independent fund reflected Gerald Balfour’s suggestion to resolve the financial relations dispute by creating a fund (made up of economies in Irish civil expenditure) for exclusively Irish purposes. While this was dismissed as being an impossible and rather myopic view of the crisis, it did illustrate where the Castle felt its problem lay. '4 Still Gerald Balfour did establish the precedent when the ‘new department’ was given complete freedom in the allocation of its funds, save ultimately for parliamentary review. Finally, and most telling, because of the preoccupations and priorities of the British parliamentary party, unionist legislation for Ireland came ironically to depend on the opinion of the 105 Irish M.P.s — a dependence that was occasionally broken by resorts to conferences such as Dunraven’s or the Recess Committee. 5 Thus administratively, financially and even legislatively, the implementation of ‘official’ unionist policy appeared necessarily to involve a conflict with the strict political principle of the union. This was intensified by the political paralysis which had constantly menaced the Irish government and had finally struck in the early months of 1904. It was precisely because the dependence of Irish government on the needs of Westminster and Whitehall gave opportunities for the damag-

ing forces of apathy and obstruction that theories of devolution were mooted in the privacy of certain Castle circles. After the collapse of the catholic university plans, Moreton Frewen, the federalist and occasional confidant of George Wyndham, reported to the nationalist leader, John Redmond, that the chief secretary and the lord lieutenant 13 Harrel, ‘Recollections’, (T.C.D., Harrel papers, MSS 3918b, pp 129-131). 14 G.W. Balfour to Cadogan, 8 Nov 1896, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/939). Salisbury to Cadogan, 22 Dec 1896, (H.L.R.O., C.P., CAD/971). 15 Plunkett to Gill, 27 June 1896, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509(2) ).

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were ‘in some distress about the Irish situation’; more specifically, ‘a

party within the cabinet (as you will readily believe) still exists which views with real concern any rapprochement between the classes in Ireland. With that party ‘‘divide et impera’’ will always be the legend’. Then in a passage heavily underlined he continued that Dudley asked me to tell you (with a frankness & indiscretion which does him credit) that once assured of the safety of the ‘‘loyal minority’’ (he did not use the word ‘‘loyal’’) he had hoped to see Ireland commence some sort of autonomous legislation with a council with representatives from each of the four provinces. 16

Whether or not frank indiscretions are ever creditable (let alone credible), it is clear that certain Irish administrators had become aware of the growing necessity for a reorganising of Irish government as it became less and less able to govern in what even the Irish executive felt were the best interests in Ireland. As early as March 1903, before the land bill had been made law, the land conference committee, headed by Lord Dunraven, had produced a memorandum on devolution but this had been quickly suppressed.” Later in the autumn, Wyndham and MacDonnell discussed the possibilities of ‘financial decentralisation’ 18 and early in 1904 the latter arranged a secret meeting between himself, Lord Dunraven and other ‘prominent unionists’, who might be induced to form a moderate centre party to counterbalance the influence in parliament and Ireland of the extreme wings in both the nationalist and unionist parties; however, at the last moment nerves failed and the meeting never took place, apparently because MacDonnell feared that Wyndham might be ‘compromised’. !9 Yet such a direct action was rare and ‘devolution’ or ‘decentralisation’ never got beyond the realm of private discussion between intimates. No doubt because of this they were all the more wide-ranging, often exploring beyond the boundaries of the politically possible. Wyndham had great faith in debate, always participating himself and

16 Moreton Frewen to John Redmond. The letter is not dated but from the Frewen papers in Washington it seems probable that Dudley saw Frewen in November 1903, (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MSS 15188). See also Dudley to Frewen, 16 Oct 1903, (Lib. Congress, Frewen papers). 17 Dunraven, Past times, ii, p. 25. 18 [bid., appendix III, p. 189. 19 Tbid., p. 190. See also Crisis, pp 35-6.

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encouraging his advisors to talk freely. ‘G.W. frank, excited, brilliant, epigrammatic, sanguine, visionary’ reported Plunkett in his diary after dining at the chief secretary’s lodge.2° More specifically Dunraven remarked on numerous casual discussions on how to ‘articulate’ moderate opinion and also on ‘the possibility of a moderate centre party’.21 Certainly MacDonnell felt strongly that moderate opinion was hidden by the two party machines and if these could be broken up consensus politics would then emerge.2? This would also make sense of Wyndham’s remarks to Balfour on splitting the I.P.P. in late 1902.23 And of his justification to Austen Chamberlain for the financial structure to enact a continuous policy in order to repress the agitators and give ‘the moderates — i.e. at least 70% of the population — something to think of and work for’.24 But whether Wyndham seriously envisaged the establishment of a new governing party — with an organisation, leader and programme — was unlikely if only because it would be unnecessary.?5

For while Wyndham agreed with Dunraven and MacDonnell that the act of union need not be revoked but modernised, he always recognised ultimately the realities of politics. Highly ambitious and instilled with a deep instinct for survival, Wyndham was not going to tinker with the sacred ark of a party in which he stood, along with Austen Chamberlain, as a potential leader. Nevertheless his open confession of his private views simply inspired those around him to move in a direction which he could not publicly condone. Whether intentionally or not Wyndham effectively cultivated a mood of reform which, when frustrated, left his confidants bitter over their ‘betrayal’. Such feelings were to give the devolution affair its destructive edge, for the débacle of February 1905 arose as much from the offended pride of sensitive politicians as it did from revolutionary ideas.

Il How these ideas emerged from the private consultations after dinner into the forum of politics was due fo a stylé of government evolved during 20 H.C.P. diaries, 10 Jan 1905, (P.F.O.). 21 Dunraven, Crisis, pp 35-6.

22 A.C. Hepburn ‘The Irish council bill and the fall of Sir Anthony MacDonnell, 1906-7’ in J.H.S., xvii, (Sept 1971), pp 478-9. 23 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 8 Nov 1902, (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49804). 24 Wyndham

to Austen Chamberlain,

14 Oct 1903, (Birmingham

U.L., A.C.P.,

AC/16/3/6). 25 Wyndham to Wilfrid Ward, 26 Aug 1905, Mackail, Wyndham, ii, p. 513.

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Wyndham’s regime to overcome the entrenched position of his opponents in parliament and the cabinet. On MacDonnell’s arrival in 1902, the chief secretary adopted a more detached position within the administration, concentrating to a greater degree on decisions of policy rather than bureaucracy. Consequently the under-secretary took over the responsibility for co-ordinating the Irish government, inevitably assuming a large measure of personal initiative in administrative matters. When the 1903 land bill was threatened by serious dissensions amongst the nationalists, the scope of MacDonnell’s private initiative widened considerably; and indeed Wyndham attributed the successful passage of his act to the under-secretary’s unofficial discussion with and concessions to the nationalist leadership.2° This role became of crucial importance as Wyndham strove throughout the winter of 1903-4 to maintain the ‘dialogue’ with Redmond; and MacDonnell again proved his effectiveness in prising out of the bishops concessions over university reform and so establishing a reasonable consensus among the various church leaders for governmental action. In the end it was all to no avail. But what was significant about the university debacle was firstly the extent to which the Irish executive was acting independently of central government and secondly how far MacDonnell had become the cutting edge of the Wyndham initiative. However, this style of government was not only naive and rather superficial27 but also extremely dangerous. As was shown when suspicious Ulster unionists rose in fury after Redmond made an oblique reference to the secret meetings, forcing the chief secretary to make rapid and strenuous denials in the commons.?8 Fortunately the affair never reached the cabinet. Nevertheless the risks of a breakdown in secrecy were clearly great, particularly with the renowned conservative sentiments that predominated in Dublin Castle. So much so that a major political scandal was always a strong possibility and when the issue at stake was the union itself, these risks verged close on certainty.

26 Wyndham to William O’Brien, 21 Dec 1904, (N.L.I., Macdonagh papers, MSS

11439(2) ). 27 In the sense that it relied totally on Irish leaders to control and persuade their followers. Given the controversial issues involved, their authority was not always assured. 28 Wyndham to MacDonnell, 20 Feb 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 321, ff

147-50).

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IV At least Sir A. is no revolutionist, whatever else he may be;

nor is he a nationalist in the proper acceptation of the word. He is rather an Indian official than a nationalist. True he does desire some form of home rule, or shall I call it emancipation from London control; my belief is he would not tolerate an Irish parliament; and the devolution scheme (impracticable and dangerous as it was) seems to me to show this. It indicates that the bend of his mind is to try and give Ireland some show of autonomy (which would be safe in his opinion), under the imperial parliament, without introducing the proletariat of Ireland into the government of the country. I can almost imagine a moment in the dark days of future radical ascendency, when all moderate men would be glad to see him back. Sir John Ross to Duke of Norfolk 14 April 1905

And yet the devolution affair was the product not only of style but also of circumstance. As the summer recess neared in August 1904, depression hung heavy over Wyndham’s office. The tariff controversy and the relentless and unbending criticisms from the Ulster unionists in parliament blocked all opportunities for reforming initiatives and left him in despair.29 Overworked and verging on a nervous breakdown, Wyndham left for his first long holiday since he came to Ireland. MacDonnell had felt likewise, although he had been to France in Juneto rest, and as the hostility of ‘the Orange party’ towards him degenerated into character-assassination, he began to regret bitterly that he did not leave after the successful passage of the 1903 land act.3° But before MacDonnell could return to Contrexeville came Lord Dunraven’s appeal for help. ¢ While Wyndham’s secretary, Hornibrook, had the impression that MacDonnell was reluctant to get involved, in fact the latter was greatly interested in Dunraven’s committee. In the first place he did not want to see a group of moderates break up while Irish politics was embroiled in 29 ‘It grieves me’, he told his wife, ‘to see good work for the happiness of Ireland picked to pieces. The pettiness and malice and ignorance are wearing’. Wyndham to his wife, 19 July 1904, (P.R.O.N.I., Grosvenor papers [copies], T. 3221/1/328).

30 MacDonnell to A.S. Green, 20 Mar and 7 July 1904, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089 (3, 4) ).

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one of its periodic fits of bloody-minded irrationality. Also the suggestions of Dunraven and the ideas expressed in the press by federalists like Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie and T.A. Brassey echoed schemes for administrative devolution which he had been nurturing since his arrival at Dublin Castle. MacDonnell was never a home ruler, as popularly suspected, but a liberal and an imperialist whose experience in India as much as in Ireland convinced him that at the very least some form of ‘financial decentralisation’ was essential, preferably on Indian lines with an elected advisory council. Despite the complete rejection of these reforms by the Treasury he did not waver in his opinion and on 14 August wrote to Wyndham: I wish Dunraven would take up the subject of our Treasury servitude and work out ascheme of decentralised finance, in which lies in my opinion the only practicable immediate hope of salvation for Ireland. I would help him with all my heart.3!

But just as devolution was necessary, so it was impossible with a unionist government in power. On the other hand MacDonnell, like most political commentators, reckoned that the government, while it had struggled through the last parliamentary sessions, would not last long in the next when it opened in February 1905. In contrast the liberals would, he felt, be more responsive to his views, especially as that party was deeply divided over Irish policy with many doubting the political viability of Gladstonian home rule and even questioning the benefits of maintaining an alliance with the I.P.P. Thus in August 1904 he saw an opportunity to set up devolution as a practicable and popular alternative which the liberals could adopt and put into practice immediately on their return to power. As he confided to the Irish historian Alice Stopford Green, with the formation of ‘a moderate but progressive party’ of unionists and nationalists advocating a comprehensive pro-

gramme the liberal party would then be able to take up a policy which was the policy ofa respectable party, with representation in the house of lords. This was the kernel 31 This is just what Harrel argued for in his 1889 scheme. Hornibrook’s note, July 1924, Mackail, Wyndham, appendix A, p. 794. Intriguingly MacDonnell attempted later to suppress the publication of this letter on the grounds of being ‘strictly administrative business’ and not related to devolution. MacDonnell to Guy Wyndham, 13 July 1924, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 354, ff 164-5); ibid., 13 July 1924, (c 395, f. 67); Guy Wyndham

to MacDonnell,

14 July 1924, (ibid., c 351, f. 167).

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of my reason for starting the business. Lord Dunraven was quite willing to accept it.32

The report issued by Dunraven’s Irish Reform Association on 31 August struck Hornibrook as a vague collection of ‘pious hopes’, clearly stamped with MacDonnell’s views but politically innocuous. The initial response of the press was encouraging even if it remained unconvinced. Inevitably Ulster criticisms led to demands for a more detailed programme but most sinister of all were the growing assertions of The Times about Castle collusion with the heretical.34 This unnerved MacDonnell, who immediately wrote on 10 September to square his position with the chief secretary. However, he was steeled by a pugnacious Dunraven who argued that ‘the alarm note of the press, especially the hysterical outbreak of The Times, had rendered a more detailed statement necéssary if we are to obtain support, financial and other’ .35 In any case MacDonnell recognised that with the first report he had ‘launched my post’ and consequently agreed to help Dunraven prepare the second report.3¢ After three meetings, two on board Dunraven’s yacht anchored in Kenmare Bay, and a final one actually inside the chief secretary’s office, Dunraven and MacDonnell drew up what the latter desribed as “a very big scheme’, which was accepted by the Irish Reform Association and published on 26 September.37 Significantly, at least compared to the profusion of memoranda and letters which MacDonnell poured out after November to justify his 32 MacDonnell to A.S. Green, | Sept 1904, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089(4) ). 33 Hornibrook’s note in Mackail, Wyndham, appendix A, p. 794. For MacDonnell, however, the report ‘enables us to go just as far or as little as circumstances suggest; and it works from below upwards which is safe’. With time, the details would be decided upon and the funds raised for the waging of ‘a journalistic battle of great dimensions’. MacDonnell to A.S. Green, 1 Sept 1904, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089(4) ). 34 The Times, 5 and 15 Sept 1904. 35 Dunraven pointed out that as The Times had commented on the programme before it was released, ‘we have evidently a traitor inthe camp’. Dunraven to MacDonnell, 8 and

11 Sept 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 350, ff 143-50). 36 * “With you is the ebbing, with us is the flowing tide’’ as Gladstone said on a memorable occasion. Hitherto Irishmen have been vague and extravagant in their demands for reform. We shall now see what comes of precision and moderation: but such moderation as shall not limit legitimate growth in the future’. MacDonnell to A.S. Green, 12 Sept 1904, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089(4) ). 37 Dunraven, Past Times, ii, p. 26. MacDonnell to his wife, 23 Sept 1904, (Bodl.,

A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 57-8).

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action, there appears to have been little sign at the time that the undersecretary felt any real need to reconcile this activity with his position as a civil servant of a unionist administration. While his later plea that devolution was clearly distinct, in intention and form, from nationalist home rule was undoubtedly correct, it plainly was not in accord with unionist doctrine as expounded by the party and he obviously appreciated this by his direction of the manifesto at the liberal and not the unionist party. He did attempt to reduce the scope of the programme by cutting out some of its more detailed information and reducing its political offensiveness to ‘Ulster’, but these were all firmly rejected by Dunraven who acknowledged rather unhelpfully, ‘I daresay we have embarrassed the govt. That does not concern me.’38 MacDonnell’s problem was that his powerlessness was also his defence — he was not a member of the association — and so did not have complete control over the public expression of what were mainly his ideas.39 In any case, as Wyndham was on holiday, he had frequently kept Lord Dudley, the viceroy, informed on both the August report and the September programme. Yet what for MacDonnell and Dudley resolved all their doubts was the belief that fundamentally ‘the whole business was no more than a project of reform put forward by a body of unionist gentlemen for public discussion, and pretended to no official inspiration’. Thus while Dudley and MacDonnell criticised the concept of a legislative council for anything more than private bills, Dunraven included it in the manifesto in order ‘to throw it out for discussion’ .4° Nevertheless it was remarkable how uninformed the chief secretary was kept. He was never told about the August report and MacDonnell’s letter of 10 September made only a rather ambiguous reference to ‘the

38 Dunraven, Past Times, appendix III, ii, p. 187. Dunraven to MacDonnell, ‘Tuesday’ [September 1904] and 6 Oct 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 350, ff

104-7, 112-114). 39 Tbid. Originally he had intended to resign his post and join the association but Dunraven persuaded him that he was more useful where he was and so he planned to ‘keep in the background’. MacDonnell to A.S. Green, 12 Sept 1904, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089(4) ). 40 Dunraven, Past Times, appendix III p. 191. Dudley never saw the final draft of the manifesto. Dudley to A.J. Balfour, 21 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., MSS 49802); MacDonnell to Lord Ripon, 27 Feb 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542). Dunraven noted how MacDonnell disapproved to ‘my democratic decentralising views’, Crisis, p. 36. See also Hepburn, ‘The Irish council bill’ in /.H.S., xvii, (Sept 1971), pp 470-98.

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Irish Reform Association manifesto’ in which ‘I fancy you have recognised the trace of conversations we have had. I have helped and am helping Dunraven in the business, which for many a day seemed to me to offer the best hope of an unravelling of the tangled skein of English and Irish relations’.41 This hardly constituted a warning of an impending manifesto that was to contain innovations like a powerful financial council which had never figured in conversations between the two, and which only came up for the first time at the meeting in Kerry on 18 September when Wyndham was in Germany.4? Yet when the latter returned and immediately adopted the course — unusual for a minister — of repudiating the scheme in the first instance with a letter to The Times, MacDonnell and Dunraven both seemed genuinely surprised: not only that Wyndham should take the allegations of governmental involvement so seriously but that he should reject utterly the sentiments of the manifesto. From the numerous discussions of the previous two years on ‘Indian finance’ and ‘councils’ both were convinced that he was sympathetic to their ideals. More specifically, MacDonnell thought Wyndham had known from the beginning, later claiming that the chief secretary had answered his 14 August letter three days later with, ‘I have seen Lord Dunraven and hope to see him again’.43 While at first uncertain, he eventually gave way under Dunraven’s persistent assurances that Wyndham was in accord with his plans, and only realised after Wyndham’s repudiation that, as he bitterly noted to his wife, ‘it is clear that he [Dunraven] had no understanding with Wyndham. He says W([yndham] more than once expressed sympathy with the views and Dunraven is surprised at his attitude’ .44 If the devolution crisis was the product of a simple misunderstanding, this occurred in mid-August and not in September; but, if MacDonnell had been so unsure, he would have required greater sanction than this and there can be little doubt that MacDonnell was in the mood for action. However, with the amending of the land act and the dropping of the university reform, his freedom of movement was hampered by 41 Mackail, Wyndham, ii, pp 764-5.

42 MacDonnell to Ripon, 16 Feb and 9 May 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542). 43 Dunraven, Past Times, appendix III, p. 190. Dudley saw this letter. Dudley to A.J. Balfour, 21 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49802). 44 MacDonnell to his wife, 30 Sept 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 149-50).

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political realities that had been too distant to affect him in the NorthWest Province. He deeply resented the block that Wyndham continually had to impose on his schemes as they neared fruition and was extremely depressed at the prospect of spending another eight months concentrating solely on the sterile business of administering Ireland until the fall of Balfour’s government. It was in his character to take the lead in his chief’s absence and force the pace.45

V Indeed, notwithstanding his natural inclination, MacDonnell seems to have assumed a more prominent role out of necessity as the chief secretary’s mental and physical health began to crack from as early as October 1903. As a result relations became so fraught at the Castle that when the devolution crisis broke, many important figures within the Irish administration were quite prepared to believe in rumours of conspiracies and cabals centering on the under-secretary. Those that could do so hastily denied in public any knowledge of the affair but made no effort to allay the fears of the unionists. Indeed quite the opposite. When a man as respected as John Atkinson — a law officer, unionist M.P. for Londonderry and generally presumed to be a leading adviser to the government — suggested on a platform that devolution might have been part of a deal with the nationalists to get the land bill passed the year before, he completely undermined the credibility of Wyndham’s forceful denial of complicity and only fortified the campaign of the unionist press. That he was totally wrong only added to the irony.46 If such ‘betrayals’ were the price of Wyndham’s detachment, it also brought him little relief. Even the under-secretary could be extremely frank about some of Wyndham’s most cherished schemes, while he so persistently pressed his own ideas that Wyndham often became ‘quite sulky and morose’.47 Worn down by dissensions within and a continual

45 Indeed there is evidence to suggest that MacDonnell tried to revive negotiations on university reform after Wyndham’s decision to break off talks following Londonderry’s and later his own public denials. Rev T. Hamilton to MacDonnell, 13 Apr 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 351, ff 19-20). Captain Shawe-Taylor to John Redmond, 13 Mar 1904, (N.L.I., Redmond papers, MSS 15226). 46 Trish Times, 13 Oct 1904. 47 Robinson, Memories, p. 143.

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barrage of criticism without, Wyndham gradually began to suffer more frequent bouts of deep melancholy; when in October 1903 Mark Sykes came to Dublin as a secretary to Wyndham, he found his prospective chief almost deranged. By the following August his growing dependence on artificial stimulants and violent exercise had only left him dangerously ‘whirling rather than walking through his days’.48 Any assessment of George Wyndham’s role in the emergence of devolution usually reduces itself to the question of his mental state in August 1904. How could a man who was so exhausted and disturbed, and who for the crucial month of September 1904 was on holiday with his son in Germany, take in the little he was told? As a result, MacDonnell is traditionally seen as a man exploiting the temporary incapacity of his chief, while Wyndham remains, as he would dearly have loved to have been, the tragic figure cut down before his prime. Yet such an interpretation exaggerates and misunderstands the nature of Wyndham’ illness. After all, periodic fits of depressed inertia were followed by periodic recoveries and all the evidence suggests that by nature Wyndham recovered very quickly indeed. Seemingly unstable in October 1903 after the failure to establish a conference to settle the university question, Wyndham had revived by December as another opportunity appeared in the offing. By February not only was he working hard on Irish matters but he was also heavily involved in the cabinet committee on Arnold-Forster’s projected army reforms, and spent most evenings powerfully defending the government in the house of commons in Balfour’s absence.49 For Wyndham such hectic demands of government were exacting but also exhilarating: ‘I feel very well for I delight in a hurricane’, he assured his wife. ‘My spirits are bounded up to meet the battle and the breeze’ .5° These responsibilities gave Wyndham a new lease of life away from the stagnation-of Irish politics and left him where he always yearned to be, at the centre of the political stage. He thrived on the theatre of the commons and being, in the eyes of the press and the public, at the fore-front of the parliamentary struggle; whether it was an 48 “The whole sub-melody which runs through everything is melancholy, humour, false hilarity, elemental passions, elemental thought, nobility of soul, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, blending into a wailing dirge’. R. Adelson, Mark Sykes, (London, 1975) p. 97. 49 “The only man who seems capable of rising to the occasion — and it is an occasion for the young men — is George Wyndham [who] sees his opportunity and takes full advantage of it’, E.H. diaries,

5 Feb 1904, (B.L., Add. MSS 48681). 50 Wyndham to his wife, 29 June 1904, cited in Egremont, The cousins, p. 243.

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all-out offensive or a valiant rearguard action in pursuit of grand principles and strategies. What deflated him quickest was helpless resignation to marking time — an endless defence, devoid of any great design, against pointless and petty criticism. By July the Irish M.P.s had once again placed him under siege and Wyndham’s spirits sank. At dinner on the 13th, his close friend, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, found Wyndham ‘dying to be out of office, and live an irresponsible life away from politics, which he declares to be an abomination’.5! Nevertheless, with the release of the summer recess, Wyndham’s recovery was again swift. By 1 September he had regained sufficient enthusiasm to remark jovially to his wife: ‘The Andersonites are howling away and have a grand anonymous attack on me in the National Review’.52 Moreover, there can be little doubt that Wyndham did read of Dunraven’s August report in the press and that, when he was in Germany, he saw MacDonnell’s letter of 10 September.53 Therefore the question remains: why did Wyndham not stop MacDonnell? In the first instance the report’s desire ‘to promote a union of all moderates and progressive opinion, irrespective of creed and class’, could be thought to reflect what Wyndham had ‘preached in season and out of season’; namely ‘that all, no matter to what parties they belonged or what extreme views they may hold, should endeavour to agree on practical proposals of a moderate character’.54 Writing to the prime minister on the eve of his resignation, Wyndham recounted how the vagueness of the first report of Dunraven’s ‘reform association creation’ convinced him that the affair was ‘not serious’ and could wait until he returned to Dublin when he ‘meant to do what I eventually did, i.e. stop MacDonnell from telling me the extent of the assistance he had given and point out that there must be no encouragement, not only of things to which I objected, but to any large projects, however unexceptionable’; to him there was ‘nothing which occurred in September [that]

led me to expect any manifesto at all; still less its contents’.55 He 51 Blunt, My diaries, ii, p. 107. 52 Wyndham to his wife, 1 Sept

1904, (P.R.O.N.I., Grosvenor papers [copy], T.3321/1/337). 53 Wyndham denied this at first but later acknowledged otherwise. Wyndham toA.J. Balfour, 5 Mar 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 54 Jrish Times, 31 Aug 1904. Wyndham to Wilfrid Ward, 26 Aug 1905, Mackail Wyndham, ii, p. 513. 55 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 5 Mar 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805).

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presumed that MacDonnell would appreciate the political situation facing the government and would consult the chief secretary before embarking on a new initiative. As for Dunraven he had gone ‘beyond his book’.5* That the Irish peer had a mission is interesting enough, although it was officially confined to exploring possible reforms of secondary education. Nevertheless, Wyndham knew that MacDonnell was keen to expand Dunraven’s brief to include financial decentralisation and later saw little to disturb himin the woolly platitudes ofthe first report, despite the fact that most of the press and even acabinet minister recognised that ‘it is most dangerous and might mean anything up to home rule inclusive’.’? Wyndham, notwithstanding his vehement denials in public, was essentially far from hostile towards notions of decentralisation but felt that devolution was not ‘practicable or wise until we have had the pluck, or the luck, or both, necessary to settle the last

stage in catholic emancipation [a catholic university]’.5° What he really objected to was the public pronouncement on questions he had yet to decide on and, as he agitatedly informed Gerald Balfour, ‘privately to his [MacDonnell’s] having assisted the publication of ANYTHING’.*? Prior to the September manifesto, Wyndham simply viewed the Dunraven negotiations as just another of MacDonnell’s ‘sky signs’ and in the past these discreet initiatives had, in respect of the land and university questions, prised out openings for political action from the most static of situations.6° While he never contemplated taking any ‘action’ in the autumn of 1904, Wyndham was always the supreme opportunist and was grateful for anything that sustained the political dialogue and furthered the impression of the government being the one creative and dynamic force in Irish politics. Lionel Earle, Lord Dudley’s secretary, saw Wyndham’s position clearly: George Wyndham’s policy . . . was to find some middle term which would render the Irish government no longer the shuttlecock of extreme factions, but he had thought out no settled plan of operations by which this might be effected

56 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 5 Mar 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 57 Gerald Balfour to Monteagle, 4 Sept 1904, (N.L.1., Monteagle papers, MSS 14141). 58 Wyndham to Mary Drew, 30 Oct 1904, Mackail, Wyndham, ii, p. 484. 59 Wyndham to Gerald Balfour, 19 Feb 1905, (Whitt., G.B.P., 109). 6° Robinson, Memories, p. 162.

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and had merely utilised the extraordinary suppleness and dexterity of his mood to try experiments in this and that direction, and was ready to substitute one for another as each in turn failed.®!

This flexibility was only attained by allowing MacDonnell to operate covertly beyond the front line and it was as a consequence of this political method that the scheme for devolution evolved and developed, almost unnoticed, to such a dangerous extent.

VI After the publication of the September manifesto Wyndham appreciated at once that this experiment had gone too far and immediately shut it down with an unmistakably blunt repudiation in The Times. © The strategy of using private agencies to seek out the middle ground in Irish politics also allowed him to disown them when confronted by popular discontent and, just as he had ditched Dunraven over the catholic university, Dudley over the ‘ruling Ireland by Irish ideas’ speech 3 and Horace Plunkett over the Galway election of 1901,°4 so Wyndham felt few qualms about his outright rejection of the arguments of the Irish Reform Association. Before returning to Dublin, he also wrote a long letter to Arthur Balfour on the whole range of conservative policies which ended with a rather low-key demand that, in the premier’s forthcoming policy speech, ‘as a subsidiary derivative I would, in passing, condemn ‘‘home rule’’ i.e. national legislatures within the United Kingdom. . .’.65 MacDonnell had in fact been on the same crossing and they met on disembarking at Kingstown, where the under-secretary found his chief ‘not unfriendly: but not in his usual empressé way’. Nevertheless at an interview later that day (1 October), MacDonnell found Wyndham very sympathetic: he did not wish to know any details of MacDonnell’s dealings with Dunraven and, without attaching any blame, pointed out the embarrassment to the government unless the under-secretary dissociated himself from the Irish

61 Sir Almeric Fitzroy’s diary, 11 Mar 1905, (B.L., Add. MSS 48374). 62 The Times, 27 Sept 1904.

63 Sir Almeric Fitzroy’s diary, 11 Mar 1905, (B.L., Add. MSS 48374). 64 Plunkett to Betty Balfour, 2 Jan 1902, (P.F.O., H.C.P. papers, Bal./64).

65 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 28 Sept 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49804).

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Reform Association.®® Wyndham’s calm, almost nonchalant, composure starkly contrasted with the unabated fury of The Times and the nervousness of some of the party chiefs.°” After four years in Ireland, it was difficult not to become disdainful of the incessant assaults of the unionist press; crudely, often violently, critical, the frequent admonitions ofthe Irish unionist M.P.s, upon which the papers fed, were tedious, tiring and rarely as significant as they sounded. ‘My contact with the Ulster members’, Wyndham noted caustically in August 1904, ‘is like catching the ‘‘itch’’ from park pests. It is very unpleasant — not your fault — but still degrading. . . I

must get washed of my Ulster itch’ .6 Moreover their very extremism implied ignorance. He could also feel confident since he had no direct connection with the scheme and, if the journalistic attack on MacDonnell did not relent, the under-secretary could be returned to the India Office. Although there was to be much controversy over this, Wyndham firmly believed that MacDonnell was on temporary loan from the India Council and it was his argument that this offered a ‘line of retreat’ that finally persuaded Arthur Balfour to allow the move.®? However this was a last resort that he was reluctant to employ, for the removal of MacDonnell under Irish pressure could raise a whole host of embarrassing questions concerning his role in the government and his involvement in schemes for a catholic university and devolution without the sanction of the cabinet. Inevitably such enquiries would reflect harshly on the very nature of Wyndham’s administration and so he continually played down the crisis to his government colleagues, insisting that he must be allowed to settle, in his own way, what he held to bea departmental matter. Thus in October Wyndham, at least initially, did not wish to throw over MacDonnell.7° Confident that there would be no need, he 66 MacDonnell to his wife, 1 Oct 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e216, ff 66-7). See also Mackail, Wyndham, ii, p. 706. 67 The Times, 28 and 30 Sept 1904; J.S. Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 16 Sept 1904, (B.L.,

A.B.P., Add. MSS 49762). 68 Wyndham

to his wife,

13 Aug

MeS22W/17332)s

1904, (P.R.O.N.I.,

Grosvenor

papers

[copy],

69 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 22 Sept 1902; A.J. Balfour to Wyndham, 24 Sept 1902,

(B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49803).

70 MacDonnell believed that in debate, should the matter ever reach and asserting that he saw no reason secretary. MacDonnell to Ripon, 26

September 1904 Wyndham proposed to forestall parliament, by denying any official aid to Dunraven to enquire in the private relationships of his underFeb 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542).

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prepared to weather out the storm.7! Thus, devolution emerged out of as well as despite unionist philosophy. In the experience of those who had genuinely sought to put into practice the principles of unionism, and indeed in the wider context of the contemporary debate on imperial organisation, reform was clearly unavoidable; as T.P. Gill pithily (but hardly dispassionately) pointed out, ‘the best unionist policy is home rule’.72 Since that had been stolen by the Irish separatists and sold to Gladstone and the liberals, the conservatives as unionists had to accept a highly logical political position (equality of treatment within a United Kingdom) but one that was at odds with the practical demands of the union. In so doing they had to undertake a political commitment to Irish reforms which never appealed to a primarily English party, and in this sense, the Dunraven manifesto could serve as an epitaph of constructive unionism. Nevertheless, while it highlighted the paralysis of the union and the inherent futility of Balfourism, it is misleading to view devolution as the final denouement of enlightened unionism. The experiment in constructive government had been suspended in the spring of 1904 with the break-up of Wyndham’s understanding with Redmond, and it is more accurate to see the Irish Reform Association’s manifesto as a blueprint for the future liberal government, who now sought, after the failure of the conservaties, another alternative to the reckless home rule schemes of Irish nationalism. However, if devolution was not to be part of unionist policy it was part of unionist politics. Since the return to power in 1895 unionism had been bitterly divided between the conciliationists who aspired to the creation of a consensus at the centre of the political spectrum and the neo-unionists who insisted on the traditional defence of their prejudices, privileges and way of life. In launching devolution, Dunraven deliberately attempted to recreate the spirit of his land conference and so wrestle back the initiative for the moderates. Concern with initiatives, with keeping at the forefront, also preoccupied the government. Hampered by conditions within parliament, the Treasury and the 71 On

15 Oct 1904, Plunkett noted: ‘Wyndham

is determined

—

or rather has not

risk[ed] his responsibilities or his opportunities. He is a politician not a statesman. Nothing interests him except in as far as he can serve in the game of his conditions’.

H.C.P. diaries, 15 Oct 1904 (P.F.O.). 72 T.P. Gill to W.E. Gladstone, 25 Aug 1896, (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509(5) ).

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cabinet, the Irish government under Wyndham and MacDonnell maintained its credibility through a series of private meetings and secret assurances. It was a system that not only required dexterity and care but also a perfect understanding and self-control. Not surprisingly with two strong characters, both idealistic and ambitious in their differing ways, it broke down and the impolitic came out. This, in itself, was no disaster and certainly not the catastrophe it became. If progressive politices were temporarily in abeyance, the political struggle against reactionary unionism was far from lost. Professor Dowden’s confident assertion, in October 1905,73 that the confrontation of unionism and nationalism would tolerate no distractions, while rational, was undoubtedly premature. Indeed, quite the opposite: it was the very instability of traditional political divisions that gave viability to Dunravenism supported by aconciliatory Irish government, and provoked the fierce hostility of the Ulstermen. Against the vociferous outbursts of the weak and the uninformed, Wyndham knew he was safe. Nothing illustrated his confidence more strikingly than his omission to investigate his under-secretary’s activities. Concealed behind an impregnable wall of secrecy, the chief secretary had no need for such details. What shattered this defence, what in the end ensured that the conciliationists would lose the battle for power within the unionist party, had little to do with Wyndham’s opponents and everything to do with his colleagues. If devolution was an Irish affray, the controversy was essentially an English affair.

73 Edward Dowden, ‘Irish unionists and the present administration’ Review, xliv, (Oct 1904), p. 364.

in National

Vill

THE FALL OF GEORGE WYNDHAM AND THE CRISIS OF CABINET AND CASTLE

Fate has emptied a quiver at me 31 March 1905 From a distance the proceedings at Westminster look confused and diminutive as the bustle of a shaken ant-heap. . . The ‘‘machinery’’ of politics — cabinet, whips’-room, bought press — has developed so rapidly at the expense of ideas and independence. . 20 April 1905 George Wyndham to Wilfrid Scawen Blunt

I IN MARCH 1905, only a month after the opening of the new session of parliament, George Wyndham resigned the chief secretaryship of Ireland and left to recuperate in Germany. A promising political career in ruins, he was now struggling to retain his sanity after being the helpless victim in a series of extremely vicious and bitter debates on the address. It was as if all the tension that had been building up relentlessly over the question of fiscal reform was suddenly unleashed only to break over the head of the unfortunate chief secretary. The uproar was sparked off by the publication in Ireland of the Irish Reform Association’s

2)

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manifesto during the summer recess of 1904. But what really generated the controversy that followed was the growing suspicion that the British government had been involved; more specifically, that the undersecretary and head of the Irish civil service, Sir Anthony MacDonnell, had assisted Lord Dunraven in the formulation and drawing up of the devolution proposals. In the insecure world of the Irish unionist such apprehensions were soon firm convictions. ! To the British government on the other hand the whole affair was the consequence of an unfortunate misunderstanding by which MacDonnell thought that the chief secretary (then on holiday) knew and, by his silence, approved of his actions. Such a simple breakdown of communications was to have catastrophic results. The Irish unionists came to the new session of parliament in February 1905 after a massive press campaign had aroused the home rule scare. To confront the passionate sincerity of the ill-informed with admissions of guilt and protestations of loyalty on the single article of faith upon which the party was founded was to court disaster. For such a controversy had not dominated parliamentary debate since 1893 and the emotions aroused by the twenty Ulster M.P.s took the commons by surprise. To many, within three weeks the government had been brought to its knees, sacrificing its minister and its conciliatory Irish policy to gain peace from the Orange Order Wyndham also regarded the storm over devolution as a triumph for the Ulster unionists and the culmination of their long opposition to his policies. Indeed, days after his resignation he confided to his chief, ‘recent events — if we look as history will look, dispassionately — have only accentuated a situation which threatened me with defeat last July’. History has, in fact, fulfilled Wyndham’s expectation and the devolution episode has been seen as ‘one of fundamental importance, for it demonstrated conclusively the limits of constructive unionism at both the official and unofficial levels’.4 What had set those restraints was, in the words of a leading protagonist of Irish unionism, the inescapable ‘logic of the situation [that] two ideas, essentially ! The standard work on this questionis F.S.L. Lyons, ‘The Irish unionist party and the devolution crisis of 1904-05’, vi (Mar 1948), pp 1-21. See also Dunraven, Past Times, ii, pp 1-38. 2 Daily News, 7 Mar 1905. The Times, 8 Mar 1905. 3 George Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 7 Mar 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 4 Lyons, Ireland since the famine, p. 222.

Fall of Wyndham & the Crisis of Cabinet & Castle

di]

antagonistic, will confront each other — now as in 1886 — until one or other has obtained the mastery’ .5 But this presumes much of the Ulster unionists’ importance and explains little about Wyndham’s resignation; why he survived so easily in July 1904 and fell so completely seven months later; and indeed how the devolution crisis became a crisis. In the first place, partly because of their own bravado on the platform and ferocity in debate and partly because of the support of such illustrious guardians of the truth as The Times, the importance of the Irish unionists to the February parliamentary crisis has been overrated. Despite having six members of the government in their ranks, they exerted very little effective pressure and were too dependent on the British unionist government for the latter to bow to a revolt of the Irish backbenchers. This impotence undoubtedly riled the Irish unionists especially because it left intact a British policy towards Ireland which was proving extremely disruptive to unionist interests in Ireland. Nothing demonstrated the weakness of the party more clearly than its attempt to counter Dunraven by forming the Ulster Unionist Council in March 1905. Always in Ulster eyes asymbol of strength after its efficient mobilisation of popular unionism in the Ulster crisis of 1912-14, it was in 1905 little more than a desperate attempt by the party hierarchy to reassert their authority at the core of Ulster politics. Until this was achieved the parliamentary leadership could not afford to contemplate a general election. Herein lay the key to an understanding of the political manoeuvres of the Ulster unionist M.P.s during the February crisis. To turn out the government would only risk further political disintegration but to do nothing on an issue that so incensed unionist opinion in Ulster threatened to undermine their campaign to restore their control within the party. In the circumstances the Irish unionists privately did all they could to prevent a major confrontation with the government, while maintaining their political credibility with intimidating utterances in public. A week

before the debate opened their leaders * met in Londonderry house with the secretary of state for war, H.O. Arnold-Forster, who noted in his diary that ‘all [were] very angry about MacDonnell and I am sure I do 5 Dowden, National Review, (Oct 1904) p. 364.

6 These included Londonderry, Carson, Campbell, Moore, Lonsdale and C.C. Craig. H.O. Arnold-Forster’s diary, 10 Feb 1905 (B.L., Arnold-Forster papers, Add. MSS 50344).

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not wonder. I confess that his retention in his present post seems to me an outrage’.”? No doubt encouraged by such a friendly response from a senior cabinet minister, they hoped the government would ‘remove’ MacDonnell. However when Arthur Balfour arrived to meet them at lunch, he was unrelenting. And yet, while the Irish unionists resented the seemingly callous indifference to their situation by the party chiefs in London, they continued to seek a compromise. Writing to Balfour on the day after Wyndham’s first statement in the commons, in which he admitted MacDonnell’s involvement, Saunderson asserted that the relations between the Irish unionists and the government were ‘strained almost to breaking point’. Nevertheless his party’s support would not be withdrawn if MacDonnell were to be removed ‘in the immediate future’ or at the very least if the government would give an assurance, which need not be public, that the under-secretary would leave the Irish office as soon as politically convenient.’ By 20 February the terms of the Irish unionists had diminished even further and Edward Carson wrote to the prime minister that the Ulster M.P., William Moore, had told him that if MacDonnell was to have ‘no exceptional position’ and be subjected to the normal restrictions on civil servants, ‘they will be satisfied and vote with us. I think this is fair’, added Carson ‘. . . and I don’t see how McD. can be allowed to go on any other terms’.? Despite the hostility they showed towards the government on the floor of the house, the Irish unionists had made great efforts to offer Balfour a way out from the impending crisis. But the prime minister, preferring to weather the parliamentary storm, conceded nothing. Ten days later the position was hopeless and he had to accept the greater loss of his cousin and chief secretary, while MacDonnell remained to hold his post long after Balfour himself had fallen. Thus to attribute Wyndham’s departure to a political vendetta led by Irish unionists, aghast at the disruptive consequences of his policies, only ignores the remarkable flexibility the Ulster M.P.’s demonstrated

7 H.O. Arnold-Forster’s diary, 10 Feb 1905 (B.L., Arnold-Forster papers, Add. MSS

_ 50344). 8 Saunderson to Balfour, 17 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49857).

9 Carson to Balfour, 20 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49709). This was con-

firmed the next day by the Irish solicitor general, J.H. Campbell. Campbell to A.J. Balfour, 21 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P. Add. MSS 49857).

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in their attempt to prevent a catastrophe. In contrast, that the devolution debate came to have such disastrous consequences for constructive unionism seems to have resulted from the ineptitude of the government and not from the relentless pressure of their opponents. Fundamentally the symbolic expulsion of the conciliatory Wyndham was inextricably bound up with the mysterious reluctance of the government to remove MacDonnell. In another sense too the crisis was entirely of the government’s making. It was not until Wyndham replied to a question in parliament on 16 February 1905, nearly six months after Dunraven ‘launched devolu-

tion’, that the Irish unionists had any proof that MacDonnell had been involved. Prior to that the fury of Irish unionism, which had been fomented by the Irish press, had been based on nothing more conclusive than innuendo and rumour. Indeed, just as the Ulster members were trying to defuse the crisis, government spokesmen kept making statements that appeared to incriminate the government further than anyone had ever suspected. Two days after Wyndham had proclaimed his own innocence but admitted his under-secretary’s misguided involvement,!® Lord Dunraven gave an account to the house of lords on the origins of his scheme which virtually implicated the chief secretary.!! In reply Lord Lansdowne, the foreign secretary, announced that MacDonnell, unlike any other permanent civil servant, had been appointed on.the condition that he should exercise a large degree of personal initiative in matters of administration and policy, subject ultimately to the chief secretary; moreover, he continued, the under-secretary had, in the absence of the chief secretary, kept the lord lieutenant, Lord Dudley, in-

formed throughout his negotiations with Dunraven.!? Little wonder that when Lansdowne sat down, Lord Ashbourne, muttered ‘My boy, I have never heard so much fat put on the fire in a few minutes!’ !3 The attack then moved in the commons to those who had granted MacDonnell such extraordinary latitude. Wyndham attempted to play down the significance of the terms but did let out that he viewed MacDonnell as more of a ‘colleague’ than a subordinate. Worse was to 10 Hansard 4 (commons), cxli, 326 (George Wyndham,

16 Feb 1905).

1t Hansard 4 (lords), cxli, 433-43 (Lord Dunraven, 18 Feb 1905). 12 Ibid., cxli, 461, 466 (Lord Lansdowne, 18 Feb 1905). It was Lansdowne who had

been sufficiently impressed with MacDonnell in India and who persuaded him in 1902 to accept the under-secretaryship. 13 Fitzroy, Memoirs, i, p. 237.

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follow when Balfour sought to deny the existence of any ‘special conditions’ and the government’s defence became chaotic when, under pressure, Wyndham produced his original correspondence with MacDonnell, which clearly illustrated the unprecedented freedom and influence that the under-secretary had been given without any consultation of parliament. As ministers contradicted each other and unionist tempers rose with each revelation, government majorities in the house fell dangerously low. From the public gallery, what most struck Joseph Chamberlain’s wife was ‘the general impression of incredible muddle’.'4 After nearly five months to prepare their parliamentary defence such governmental disorganisation was extraordinary, particularly because Balfour placed great value and justified his retention of office on the size of the unionist majority in the house of commons. Indeed in its protection, the prime minister had displayed the greatest dexterity in debate and throughout the tariff reform controversy he had resolutely managed to keep his party intact and stave off political defeat. In comparison to this, the disarray of February 1905 appears to be almost out ° of character. Therefore it would appear more likely that the devolution affair became critical not because of the revolt of the Ulster unionists but because some internal difficulty hampered the government’s response. What is certain is that at the end of September 1904, Wilfrid Blunt, when dining with the Wyndhams in Belgrave Square, found his host ina buoyant mood and entirely unperturbed by the outcry over devolution. His letter to The Times had been well received and he was optimistic that political controversy had been averted because, as Blunt blandly noted in his diary, while ‘I know this kind of home rule to be in accordance with his views, . . . he gets out of the difficulty by declaring that it is absolutely contrary to those of the unionist party, a distinction which has so far escaped the criticism of his opponents’. '5 Yet ina matter of weeks, Wyndham’s position lay in peril — not from the criticism of his Ulster opponents, but rather from the aftermath of a British invasion of Tibet in the winter of 1903.

14 Amery, Joseph Chamberlain, vi, p. 672 (1 Mar 1905). 18 Blunt, My diaries, ii, p. 110.

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II Ever fearful of the growing Russian menace beyond the Himalayas, the viceroy, Lord Curzon, had despatched Colonel Younghusband with a military force to sustain British influence in Tibet. But the mission had got out of hand, many Tibetans were massacred and the capital, Lhasa, taken; on 7 September 1904 a treaty was signed, which amongst other things allowed for the establishment of a British agent in Tibet. The cabinet in London had throughout been sceptical of Curzon’s arguments and, although they had reluctantly agreed to an expedition, they had expressly forbidden the annexation of the country or even the imposition of a British agent. Consequently they immediately dissociated themselves from the treaty and reprimanded Younghusband. The latter together with Curzon took great offence at this. He claimed that the cabinet had been informed and clearly implied that, while going beyond the orders of the cabinet, he was acting fully in accord with the intentions of hisimmediate superior, Lord Curzon (who at the time of the treaty was on leave in England). 1° The publication of the Dunraven report came for Brodrick, the secretary of state for India, after a year of trying desperately to restrain his illustrious viceroy from such acts of arrogant irresponsibility. Thus he was only too aware that, once again, he would have to acknowledge his accountability for the follies of others. An ambitious AngloIrishman and extremely proud of his political achievement and reputation, Brodrick was sensitive to parliamentary opinion and felt deeply its disapproval. When he saw in the devolution controversy the powerful accusations against MacDonnell (who was still technically the secretary of state’s responsibility having only been seconded temporarily to Ireland from the India council), Brodrick recognised instantly the similarity with the Younghusband case and also the consequences. Only a month before he had had to repel the aggressive questioning of the Ulster M.P.s and refuse, at Wyndham’s request, their demand for the recall of the under-secretary;!7 and from the press he realised immediately that this campaign would reappear at the opening of the new session (February 1905), stronger and more belligerent than ever. No longer relishing the task of defending MacDonnell again, Brodrick 16 On the Tibetan expedition see James Morris, Farewell the trumpets (London, 1979 ed.), pp 125-44. David Dilks, Curzon in India, (London, 1969-70). 17 Wyndham to Brodrick, 11 Aug 1904, (P.R.O., Midleton papers, 30/67/21/1057).

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moved quickly to stifle the controversy before it reached parliament. He wrote to Wyndham demanding the return of MacDonnell, ostensibly for Indian purposes but, as he privately admitted, primarily to prevent a political crisis.!8 Brodrick’s plan caught the chief secretary completely unprepared and, while recognising Brodrick’s right, he was reduced to the utterly vacuous argument that having ‘persuaded him [MacDonnell] to come here, how can I persuade him to go?’ But Wyndham, understanding his colleague’s true anxiety, assured him that, whatever the state of party opinion, ‘they will ease their feelings by damning me [and] I will cheerfully stand the racket’.19 Brodrick, however, insisted and four days after first contacting the chief secretary he wrote to MacDonnell, emphasising at Wyndham’s suggestion solely the Indian reasons.?° These MacDonnell perceived at once to be entirely spurious and, as the undersecretary began to make sinister reference to conspiracies and consultations with ‘his friends’,24 Wyndham’s grasp on the situation began to slip. To let MacDonnell leave Ireland would only confirm the suspicions of the press; but if he was to resign from the India council, his appointment as under-secretary would become permanent and further affront an enraged Ulster. More immediately, the failure of Brodrick and Wyndham to resolve their differences would lead to a cabinet debate where the chief secretary would face close interrogation from unionists like

18 ‘Speaking as a member of the government I really think that my difficulty here gives you a golden bridge in what may be a serious trouble to us. I do not for a moment suggest that all or a hundredth part of what is attributed to MacDonnell is true. But you know Ireland so well that the fact that it is believed by all unionists certainly invalidates the authority of the government and the acceptability of a great many decisions’. Brodrick to

Wyndham, 24 Oct 1904, (Ibid., 30/67/21/1087-90). 19 Wyndham to Brodrick, 25 Oct 1904, (Ibid., 30/67/21/1097 J-K). 20 Cabinet memoranda, (P.R.O., CAB 37/13/157).

21 MacDonnell to Wyndham, 25 Nov 1904, (W.R.O. Long papers, 947/68). Annie MacDonnell to her mother, 6 Nov 1904: ‘Wyndham implores my father three times to consult no friends’, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 354, f. 88). MacDonnell did in fact send all his correspondence to Lord Dudley, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Ripon, a liberal peer, Knollys, the King’s secretary and W.T. Bailey of the land commission. Consequently when Knollys asked Balfour for further information, a startled premier could only suggest, a non-committal reply. Sandars to Knollys, 8 Nov 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS

49684).

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Londonderry, Walter Long, and Arnold-Forster,22 who were all extremely hostile to MacDonnell. Hence throughout November Wyndham sought desperately to placate both Brodrick and MacDonnell and eagerly took up the latter’s suggestion that he should remain officially on the India council but should not leave the Irish office to take his seat until September 1905, thus avoiding the ‘odium’ of dismissal.23 Wyndham pressed the compromise on Brodrick, stressing that while it would inconvenience the secretary of state for ten months ‘it would put me to much more than inconvenience if Sir A.M. left now’.24 But Brodrick was unmoved and obstinately called for a quick decision, protesting to Balfour that the under-secretary was just as guilty as Younghusband.?5 Nevertheless it had been Wyndham who had insisted on referring the matter to the prime minister, looking to his friend to force the September compromise.?© And should Balfour have been in any doubt he plainly restated the possible consequences: ‘I have never denied’, wrote Wyndham, ‘that political expediency and party interests are important and in no way sordid. But even on that score, inferior as it is to the question of justice, MacDonnell’s departure would hardly moderate Ulster criticism.’ Furthermore, he felt that the removal of MacDonnell ‘would so injure me in my own eyes to such a point that I should almost cease to be useful as a minister’. But these opaque allusions to resignation sprang also from the realization that if he spoke in a debate on MacDonnell, ‘I could not say that he had ever disobeyed my instructions or acted disloyally to me.’ 27 Yet Balfour did not particularly relish the prospect of a major party rebellion on the question of the union. The, strenuous testimonies of Lansdowne and Wyndham failed to convince him of the good faith of MacDonnell, whom Balfour had always mistrusted, but unsure of the

22 During the Anderson controversy Arnold-Forster described MacDonnell as ‘the disloyal papist who, in concert with the priests, is engaged in demoralising the Irish constabulary and hunting the protestants out of the force’. Arnold-Forster diaries, 3 Aug

1904, (B.L., Add. MSS 580339). 23, MacDonnell to his wife, 8 Nov 1904, (B.L., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, f. 96).

24 Wyndham to Brodrick, 20 Nov 1904, (ibid., 30/67/21/1106-7. 25 Brodrick to A.J. Balfour, 24 Nov 1904, (ibid., 30/67/21/1108-1112). 26 Wyndham to MacDonnell, 23 Nov 1904, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/68)

27 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 24 Nov 1904, (B.L., A.B.P. Add. MSS 49804).

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facts28 he let matters slide until MacDonnell chose between India or Ireland — a choice, irrespective of the decision, that was to weaken fundamentally Wyndham’s position.

Ul Although forewarned by the chief secretary, MacDonnell was extremely upset by Brodrick’s letter, which he angrily described to his wife as ‘a letter of recall, practically’.29 Yet if appalled, he was not surprised for in the outcry over devolution Wyndham’s repudiation in The Times had left the under-secretary very aware of how isolated and exposed he now was to the vengeance of his numerous enemies in the Castle and the unionist party. Despite reassurances from Lord Lansdowne and Wyndham, his fears of betrayal became an obsession.2° Consequently Brodrick’s letter and Wyndham’s weak rejoinder 3! confirmed his worst suspicions of an ‘underhand’ dismissal which would wreck his career and leave him in relative poverty and disgrace. Helpless and embittered, he assured his wife he had ‘no intention of yielding . . . I owe it to my post, to my religion and to my country not to bedriven out. . . by these conspirators’ .32 So certain was he of the existence of such a plot that he began writing to his family in code and arranged for them to inform his ‘friends’ of his plight. By 8 November when he next met the chief secretary, he had determined to ‘join the liberal party openly’ on his removal from the Irish office and reveal everything to parliament.34 The meeting began apprehensively and it was not until MacDonnell 28 Jack Sandars interrupted a ‘long conversation’ between Lansdowne, Wyndham and Balfour that was ‘beset with difficulties’ on the question of MacDonnell ‘on whom the most contradictory opinions were held’. Sandars to Knollys, 8 Nov 1904, (ibid., Add. MSS 49684). 29 MacDonnell to wife, 2 Nov 1904, (B.L., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 76-77). 30 “Notes for an autobiography’, p. 56, (Bodl., MSS Eng. hist. c 321). 31 Cabinet memoranda, Wyndham to Brodrick, 25 Oct 1904, (P.R.O., CAB SM NST). 32 MacDonnell to wife, 7 Nov 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 91-2).

33 Later his daughter wrote of the code that though ‘seemingly theatrical [it] was unfortunately necessary and when in use these unfortunate practices ceased’ [by which she meant the apparent tampering of their mail], Annie MacDonnell’s note, 9 Dec 1953, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, f. 109). 34 Annie MacDonnell to mother, 7 Nov 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. c 354, ff 98-105). MacDonnell to wife, 7 Nov 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 91-2).

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proposed a return to the India council in September 1905 that the chief secretary became enthusiastic, giving ‘clear understanding’ that MacDonnell could not leave Ireland ‘without forceable removal which he said was impossible’ .35 The confrontation with an agitated and plainly nervous chief secretary left MacDonnell in greater heart. Telephoning his daughter from the Castle, he confided that he thought the affair was ‘practically over’. Brodrick could of course reject the September compromise; yet if that happened, he argued, it would be a ‘put-up job’ by the two ministers, and in any case unlikely as Wyndham lay ‘in holy dread from an outcry from [MacDonnell’s] friends and so timing the election’ .36 Yet hopes that the September compromise would prove the ‘trump card’ were dashed by Brodrick. At first, MacDonnell was tempted to take up his seat on the council, which offered financial security and a return to Indian affairs, but such opportunities were nothing compared to his abhorrence of ‘the idea of being expelled or withdrawn at the dictum of bigots’.37 Years of ruthless vilification in the unionist press had scarred his self-respect and left him as intransigent as his Ulster critics;

like them, nothing less than a complete vindication would do and for this he was quite willing to risk dismissal. Such a fate would nevertheless leave him relatively impoverished.38 On the other hand, if he resigned his Seat on the India council and became as a result a permanent member of the home civil service, his pension would be increased by £450 per annum.39 Moreover, as Sir Peter Coll pointed out, if he did not resign his council seat, the government could recall him at any time and in no sense could

he

claim

to

have

been

dismissed;

but

were

he

solely

35 MacDonnell to wife, 8 Nov 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, f. 96).

36 ‘Wyndham and co. could not stand the music of Morley and co. were the rock [MacDonnell] to go: and they would hasten the end by breaking up the Orange party, Wyndham and co. badly’, Annie MacDonnell to mother, 8 Nov. 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e

216, ff 101-8). 37 MacDonnell to wife, 2 Nov 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 76-7). 38 Lady MacDonnell to Lansdowne, 16 Aug 1903, (ibid., MSS Eng. Hist. c 395). In July 1903 MacDonnell had turned down, at the insistence of Wyndham and the King, the extremely lucrative post of governor of Bombay. As a result in August 1903 his wife had asked Lansdowne to persuade the Treasury to raise her husband’s salary. Indeed when MacDonnell contemplated joining the liberals in parliament in early November 1904 his income out of office would have been a mere £500 per annum. 39 MacDonnell to wife, 4 Nov 1904, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 80-83). See also MacDonnell to Wyndham, 8 Dec 1904, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/68).

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under-secretary for Ireland, he could not be forcibly removed except on breach of contract (which in MacDonnell’s case was extremely wide and ill-defined) and so could hope, if unfairly dismissed, for compensation of, at least, £2,000 per annum.?° Encouraged by his family and the need to secure both his future and his feputation, and driven on, above all, by a gut-hatred of his unionist detractors, MacDonnell resigned his seat on the India council at the end of November.

IV Having promptly acknowledged MacDonnell’s resignation, Brodrick turned:the screw on Wyndham still tighter by insisting that not only should this decision be ratified by the full cabinet but a memorandum containing all the official correspondence together with a covering minute on the affair, should be circulated to the cabinet.4! Yet this was the one outcome that Wyndham had sought to avoid since the scandal came to light in September. If he could barely convince Arthur Balfour, there could be little hope of assuaging the hostility of the Irish unionists in the cabinet, who had effectively hindered his proposed reforms of spring 1904 and whose party had launched a ferocious campaign to bring down MacDonnell. After formally suggesting to Brodrick that his minute was ‘somewhat unusual’ and would only lead to ‘misconception of my position’,42 Wyndham complained angrily to Balfour of Brodrick’s aggressive attitude and derided the uproar as ‘journalism and nothing else’.43 The prime minister however had already given his approval and all Wyndham achieved was a rather futile concession involving the exclusion from the covering minute of any reference to Irish considerations.44 Nevertheless he was sufficiently confident on the eve of the meeting of 40 Relating this to her mother, Annie MacDonnell asserted that, should the government produce a ‘trumped-up’ charge, her father could ‘prove by letter and official means everything . . . [and] this would mean power for Spencer’s and Morley’s party whereas MacDonnell would be alright’, Annie MacDonnell to mother, 6 Nov 1904, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 354, ff 90-2). 41 Cabinet memoranda, 3 Dec 1904, (P.R.O., CAB 37/73/157). 42 Wyndham to Brodrick, 7 Dec 1904, (P.R.O., Midleton papers, 30/67/21).

43 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 7 and 8 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49804). 44 Sandars to Brodrick, 5 Dec 1904, (B.L., Midleton papers, Add. MSS $0072).

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the cabinet to reassure his restless under-secretary by stating boldly that ‘I do not think there is any question of your resigning [the undersecretaryship]. It would entail my resignation’; only to conclude rather ominously: ‘a// are much exercised over Dunraven and the attitude to be assumed in debate’.45 Even so, few suspected the strength of feeling in the cabinet. ‘The-whole ofa very long cabinet’, reported Balfour wearily to the King, was devoted to MacDonnell’s position ‘and the awkward questions that it raises’. While most of the cabinet felt that it would be impossible to defend in the house of commons ‘so violent a breach of constitutional usage’, some agreed with Wyndham and Lansdowne that ‘the unjust attacks which from time to time have been made upon him by the extreme Orange party’ deserve ’extreme consideration’ .*¢ Yet it was hardly conceivable that Londonderry and Long showed any such ‘consideration’ if even mild men like Gerald Balfour were ready to ‘believe almost anything of Sir A. McD.’.47 For a government with such a divided party in the house to undertake the defence of an action, unanimously recognised to be indefensible, was plainly ludicrous. In the face of such powerful opinion, the prime minister was fortunate to evade a decision by promising to interview MacDonnell personally.48 Such a serious demonstration of discontent within the government compelled Lansdowne, Wyndham and Balfour to think again. Obviously MacDonnell could not escape unscathed if the unity of the government was to be preserved and, as the chief secretary refused to dismiss him, all that remained was to censure him strongly. But this reprimand, argued Wyndham, should be ‘couched in terms unmistakable but not harsh’ and qualified by a ‘positive and explicit statement of our absolute confidence in his loyalty’. At the same time he maintained that MacDonnell would still respect ‘the ‘‘honourable agreement’’ that his Irish appointment was temporary’.49 Lord 45 Wyndham to MacDonnell, 9 Dec 1904, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/68). 46 A.J. Balfour to the King, 11 Dec 1904, (P.R.O., cabinet letters, CAB 41/29/42). 47 Gerald Balfour to Lord Monteagle, 4 Sept 1904, (N.L.I., Monteagle papers, MSS

14141). 48 A.J. Balfour to the King, 11 Dec 1904, (P.R.O., cabinet letters, CAB 41/29/42). This interview never took place. 49 Wyndham to Lansdowne, 11 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. was in fact no mention of MacDonnell’s conditions of appointment but, since Lansdowne was to admit them freely in parliament, he have been completely surprised at the stir these conditions were to

MSS. 49857). There in the cabinet censure and Wyndham must cause.

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Lansdowne, a close friend of the MacDonnells, fully supported this compromise and wrote to Balfour that, while ‘care should be taken to avoid suggestions that there has been a ¢ransaction under which MacDonnell would undertake not to remain in Dublin, in consideration of a promise of the next vacancy at the I[ndia] O/ffice]’, he was sure that MacDonnell ‘will not outstay his welcome a day longer than he thinks necessary’. He advised the prime minister against interviewing MacDonnell, since ’for the moment it is with the cabinet rather than with him you have to deal’ and confidently declared that they would be ‘satisfied’ with Wyndham’s solution; consequently he did ‘not see why the whole story should be rediscussed’.5° Balfour however remained dubious and the cabinet meeting of December 10 had only increased his doubts.51 But just as he relented in September 1902 to MacDonnell’s appointment, so in December 1904 he gave way under pressure from Lansdowne and Wyndham, whose friendship he greatly valued and whose judgement he liked to trust. Having decided, he then resolutely carried Wyndham’s compromise through the next cabinet.52 Yet, while impressive, this display of authority had produced in the end a parliamentary case that was barely logical and hardly convincing. Balfour, who, after all, had been leader of the house for ten years, must have appreciated that to censure and not dismiss MacDonnell for this ‘insidious attack’ on the union would imply to many M.P.s some degree of ministerial support.53 However, he allowed himself to be persuaded by the bland assurances of Lansdowne and Wyndham and acceded to the censure of MacDonnell without ever hearing the latter’s case except

50 Lansdowne to Arthur Balfour, 12 Dec 1904, (ibid., Add. MSS 49729). There was no specific deal between Wyndham and MacDonnell but the latter was made well aware that, should he wish, he would be seriously considered when the next vacancy appeared in

September 1905. Even Brodrick acknowledged this. Brodrick to MacDonnell, 31 Dec 1904, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/68). 51 Wyndham to Lansdowne, 11 Dec 1904, (ibid., Add. MSS 49857). 52 A.J. Balfour to the King, 16 Dec 1904, (P.R.O., cabinet letters, CAB 41/29/43). 53 During the debates of February 1905 Balfour privately admitted to Carson that ‘George has been very indiscreet’ and pleaded with his friend, ’now, do help me, I am in great difficulty. Besides, can make a very good logical defence of George’. ‘What would be the use’, Carson mockingly retorted, ‘of my saying to one of my juries: ‘‘My client comes before you, gentlemen, with a very good logical defence?’’ What I must know is whether you have a real defence for him. What are the realities of the matter?’ H.M. Hyde, Carson (London, 1953), p. 209.

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through the chief secretary. This was no doubt loyal and correct but Wyndham himself had made no attempt to find out the details until November and did not discover until after the censure decision that MacDonnell had not only kept copies of all correspondence but had also informed Lord Dudley throughout the Dunraven negotiations.54 By failing to press his doubts and succumbing instead to, in the words of One minister, ‘an innate antipathy to unpleasant interviews with colleagues and subordinates’,

Balfour allowed the matter to drift into a

confrontation with a vociferous section of his cabinet.55 The situation was exacerbated by Balfour’s poor relations with some

of the less favoured of his colleagues. What had really rankled with Brodrick was that while he was being ‘sledgehammered’ 5 over the Tibetan escapade and Younghusband censured publicly, MacDonnell remained untouched and Wyndham, with the backing of the prime minister, was denying the existence of any malpractice whatsoever: ‘the cabinet’, he declared indignantly, ‘have as much right to decline to have him [MacDonnell] supported under their authority for a mistake which was really grave as they have to decide whether Y[ounghusband] should be dismissed, censured or rewarded’.57 Such outbursts took Balfour by surprise. But there can be little doubt that he did hide behind a circle of intimate friends and advisers, among whom were Lansdowne, Wyndham, Gerald Balfour, Jack Sandars (his private secretary), Akers-Douglas and Acland-Hood (the parliamentary whip), and that it was in this company that Balfour first discussed the political questions of the day. Even Austen Chamberlain, for all his importance as representing his maverick father, was rarely involved in this initial conversations and others, whether related to Balfour (like Selbourne) or not (like Long, Arnold-Forster, Brodrick and Londonderry), were often only consulted in questions concerning their department. Though cabinet ministers, they were outside what ArnoldForster called ‘ ‘‘the family’’ who have such immense influence with A.J.B.’58 and at whose heart lay the energetic, astute and 54 Mackail, Wyndham, ii, pp 775-81. Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 31 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 55 Lord George Hamilton, Parliamentary reminiscences (London, 1922), ii, pp 253-4. 56 Brodrick to Curzon, 2 Dec 1904, (India office library, Curzon papers, MSS. Eur. F.

111/164). 57 Brodrick to A.J. 30/67/21/1108-1112).

Balfour,

24

Nov

1904,

(P.R.O.,

Midleton

58 Arnold-Forster diaries, 31 Oct 1904, (B.L., Add. MSS. 50340).

papers,

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ever-protective Sandars. Clearly this caused much resentment, particularly when under Balfour cabinet meetings sometimes ‘degenerated into cliquey conversations between ‘‘Arthur’’ and ‘‘Bob’’ and ‘“‘George’’ — sometimes almost unintelligible in their intimate allusions to the outer circles of the cabinet’.5? The closeness of the favoured few inevitably bred amongst those excluded from ‘the ring’ the suspicion that information was occasionally withheld and that the cabinet were simply ratifying decisions taken elsewhere. Over devolution this was to some extent justified. Throughout November, discussions on the government’s general policy were restricted to a triumvirate of Lansdowne, Wyndham and Balfour and when before the cabinet of 16 December Wyndham wrote a detailed report to Lansdowne on his conversations~ with MacDonnell, the foreign secretary advised the prime minister that it should not go before the cabinet.©° More dramatically, the first intimation the cabinet had of Dudley’s involvement was the announcement to the house of lords®! in February 1905! However in this case Wyndham had informed Balfour immediately he knew and it was the latter who declined to tell his cabinet. Despite this there was never any formal conspiracy to conceal and such conjectures were purely the consequences of the distance at which Balfour held most of his colleagues. Virtually every member of Balfour’s government recognised a personal loyalty to the prime minister if only because the survival of his ad-

ministration depended upon such loyalty and trust. Yet there were occasionally outbursts of discontent when the cabinet, agitated by the presumptions of the Balfourian clique, sought to demonstrate their importance. Devolution was one of these. Sensing that all had not been disclosed or properly discussed on what was the central plank of the party’s platform, they forced Balfour and Wyndham to compromise. But in so doing the cabinet utterly undermined the chief secretary’s position. After the censure he could no longer adopt the strategy of persistent denial, which had rendered impotent the Ulster unionists’ allegations over acatholic university. While the cabinet did not treat these rumours seriously, those surrounding devolution proved harder to ignore. The publication of such a detailed and informative report, the insinuations 59 Lord George Hamilton cited in Beatrice Webb, Our partnership, p. 357. 60 Lansdowne to A.J. Balfour, 12 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49729).

6! Walter Long to A.J. Balfour, 21 Feb 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49776).

Fall of Wyndham & the Crisis of Cabinet & Castle

PRIA

of respected Castle figures like John Atkinson and Brodrick’s pertinent comparisons with the Younghusband affair, led most of the cabinet to suspect that something had gone badly awry. Faced with dissension of his cabinet, Balfour was strangely unassertive and his mishandling of this volatile situation only ensured that ‘dear George’ was left with a parliamentary case that was stronger in semantics than politics.®?

Vv No-one was more aware of this than the chief secretary himself. The cabinet censure would hardly abate the storm that waited for him at Westminster and MacDonnell’s departure from the India council left Wyndham with little room in which to manoeuvre. Characteristically though, it was the party’s and not his personal inconvenience which he emphasised to the prime minister: ‘his [i.e. MacDonnell’s] indefinite continuance in Ireland is a party difficulty; great while we remain in office, perhaps greater if we go out’.®3 Such sentiments had been far from Wyndham’s thoughts only two weeks previously when confronting the cabinet. Yet it was not a change of heart but an imaginative resurrection of his original defence that he had in mind. If MacDonnell could not be dismissed, it was becoming clear to Wyndham that, given the state of party feeling, the under-secretary might not be allowed to stay. Moreover, with the latter’s concern over his reputation, ‘a ‘‘deal’’ with MacDonnell’, as Wyndham glibly remarked, ‘was not a possible move on the board’. Therefore he proposed to tempt him out by promoting the governor of Madras, Ampthill, to the under-secretaryship for India, and transferring MacDonnell into his place. The Irish under-secretary was, he argued, ‘dying to be out of it’ and the political lull over New Year offered an excellent opportunity to take the initiative.®4 62 This analysis should be compared with the assessment of Lord Ashbourne. ‘A.J. Balfour presided over the cabinet with more directness and authority than Lord Salisbury, i.e. he kept the members more closely to what he wished discussed’, ‘March 1912’ (H.L.R.O., Ashbourne papers, Al/1).

63 ‘Not that he will manoeuvre for home rule or catholic ascendancy: that is all nonsense. . . But, if he stays on after us, every Orange and Irish unionist disappointment over the liberal administration in Ireland will be ‘‘marked up’’ against us, instead of against them’, Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 31 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 64 “As The Times of today makes little of the Dunraven episode, we have calm water . . . [and] you could squash the Irish difficulty’ (ibid.).

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Fall of Wyndham & the Crisis of Cabinet & Castle

Balfour thought the scheme ‘ingenious’ and together with Sandars began to plan a much larger reshuffle; at the Admiralty Wyndham would replace Selborne, who was due to take over from Milner as high commissioner in South Africa, and Walter Long would go to Ireland, which would, Balfour noted, ‘give great satisfaction to the Orangemen’.*5 However within a week this strategy was in ruins when Brodrick relayed to Sandars that Ampthill had refused because, as under-secretary, he would have to defend the Government’s policy on Tibet of which, as acting viceroy in 1904, he had not wholly approved. ‘It is a pity’, remarked Balfour regretfully, for it could have ‘saved us the whole MacDonnell row’ .® Indeed by the end of January, regardless of all Wyndham’s efforts, MacDonnell’s position in Ireland was becoming if anything even more permanent. The chief secretary reacted sharply to Brodrick ‘ostentatiously’ filling MacDonnell’s seat on the India council. But much more serious was Brodrick’s latest admission that ‘the party might not wish to see Sir A.M. employed after the debates that are probable’. To be able to announce or even just hint at MacDonnell’s imminent departure was essential if Wyndham was to diffuse the animosity within unionist ranks: ‘I cannot possibly win’, he protested strenuously, ‘if the India office breaks the understanding under which Sir A.M. went to Ireland’.®”7 Nothing illustrated the necessity of such a course and the significance of Brodrick’s obstruction more than the Irish unionist rebels’ promise of support in return for precisely this concession. But by the opening of the new parliamentary session there was nowhere that MacDonnell could go. Brodrick, having agreed to consider MacDonnell for the next vacancy, within a week appointed Sir Hugh Barnes to the India council as a direct consequence of discovering that MacDonnell had sent all their correspondence to the King. This fit of pique however gave way at the beginning of February to embarrassment as MacDonnell’s successor could not take up his new post until May — ironically nearly two months after Wyndham had been forced to resign.®8 65 A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 4 Jan 1905; Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 6 Jan 1905, (Ibid.,

Add. MSS 49760). 66 Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 12 Jan 1905; A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 22 Jan 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49760).

67 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 28 Jan 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49805). 68 Brodrick to Curzon, 6 Jan 1905; Sir Arthur Godley to Curzon, 10 Feb 1905, (India office library, Curzon papers, MSS Eur. F. 111/164).

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Gradually Wyndham came to realise that his position was virtually ‘untenable’ and that he was as much ‘an element of weakness in the government’ °° as his under-secretary. A painful denigration in the editorial columns of The Times7° and the distressing lack of cooperation from his colleagues led to the first of many despairing offers to resign. To Arthur Balfour, Wyndham’s depression threatened to unhinge his sanity.7! Yet while he recommended that Wyndham should see a physician, he had no intention of letting him go only three weeks before the opening of parliament where he already faced controversy over Tibet, army reform, the police, unemployment and the Taff Vale decision. Despite receiving ominous warnings from Sandars of disrup-

tion over devolution and even a possible alliance between the more extreme tariff reformers and Ulstermen, the prime minister sought to give heart to his apprehensive friend and allay his fears: ‘This government’, he declared, ‘must stand or fall together’.72 As it was, his government had great experience in such tight situations. With defeat ever imminent and constantly predicted, Balfour’s regime by its resilience and determination had always rebounded from crises intact, if not unscathed. While few escaped the occasional depression, for most of the cabinet survival created and fed a belief in survival itself and reinforced a strong if rather blind faith in their leader’s ability to stave off the crash. However doubts had lingered since the December cabinets and as parliament reconvened the rumblings of discontent were unmistakable. On 6 February Edward Carson, the solicitor general, an influential member of the government outside the cabinet and a close friend of Balfour, made a speech ferociously attacking MacDonnell and was firmly supported by the leading Irish unionist in the cabinet, the 69 Wyndham to Balfour, 28 Jan 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 70 The Times, 28 Jan 1905. 71 Balfour told Wyndham’s wife that her husband ‘is really hardly sane, and has worked himself into such a state of mind that he actually believes that his colleagues doubt his honour!’ Cited in Egremont, The cousins, pp 249-50. During December and early January Wyndham had also been involved in a wearing battle with the Treasury to prevent the restriction of his land act’s funds. Austen Chamberlain to Wyndham, 21 Dec 1904 (Birmingham U.L., Austen Chamberlain papers, AC/16/3/60); Wyndham to Chamberlain, 27 Dec 1904, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805).

72 ‘Do not be distressed about Sir A. MacDonnell and the controversies centreing around him. We may possibly have a tightish time in the house over it; but I do not think you need worry yourself’, A.J. Balfour to Wyndham, 28 Jan 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805)

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Marquess of Londonderry.7? Lansdowne pleaded with Balfour to placate Londonderry: ‘he could stay away if he likes but I am afraid of him making ascandal. . . once C[harles] gets on his legs heaven knows what will happen’.74 Balfour quickly contacted the Irish peer and stressed the government’s intention to disapprove absolutely of not only devolution as being ‘inconsistent with unionist principles’, but also of MacDonnell’s conduct as a civil servant. By this he hoped to smooth the way for MacDonnell’s departure to ‘another sphere of activity where he can do better service to the state. Gfeorge] W[yndham] is most anxious that he should go and so am I’. To achieve this and avoid scandal, he advised Londonderry to approach the question from ‘a general or British point of view, and not from an exclusively Irish one’; and concluded stiffly: ‘that he would deprecate speeches from our own front bench which differed violently in tone and colour — even though in substance there was no important discrepancy between them’.75 After nearly five months of preparation the government were clearly as divided as ever and hopelessly dependent on the naive belief that they could bulldoze their way through an Irish controversy by theoretical disquisitions on empire. However it was not Londonderry who set the affair ablaze. Paradoxically, while he remained grudgingly in line, Lansdowne made two announcements that shattered the government’s strategy and started a witch-hunt that ended with Wyndham. Such a catastrophe was not simply the consequence of governmental confusion and disunity but was also the remarkable achievement of an embittered man — Sir Anthony MacDonnell.

IV On hearing of his censure, MacDonnell, as Wyndham reported to Balfour, ‘ ‘‘kicked’’ a good deal at the cabinet decision’.76 This can 73 Even as late as the morning of the first major debate on the devolution business Londonderry was insisting that ‘Carson has a right to expect to be defended by the government. . . youcannot be surprised [at him] in view ofthe cabinet’s opinion. With regard to Sir A.M. they are astounded and furious (as indeed I am) that he was not summarily dismissed’. If Lansdowne, as government spokesman in the house of lords, failed to take this line, Londonderry threatened to do so himself. Londonderry to A.J. Balfour, 17 Feb

1905 (ibid., Add. MSS 49802). 74 Lansdowne to A.J. Balfour, 17 Feb 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49729). 75 A.J. Balfour to Londonderry, 17 Feb 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49802). 76 Wyndham to A.J. Balfour, 31 Dec 1904, (ibid., Add. MSS 49805).

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have been no surprise since the chief secretary had hardly kept him informed and had presented the under-secretary with what was virtually a fait accompli. To MacDonnell, constantly in fear of dismissal, the censure must have appeared as the clearing of the ground before the government sacrificed him to soothe the Orangemen. After all, Wyndham had always insisted that the cabinet were vexed over their parliamentary case and not his loyalty; but since this entailed declaring that the undersecretary’s actions were ‘indefensible’, it was plain to MacDonnell that not only would his reputation and policies be in ruins but that he was to be made as well the scapegoat of unionism. However mistaken this view was, believing that Wyndham was at best too weak and that others inthe government were plotting against him, he began to plot against them.77 Soon after reluctantly acceding to the censure, MacDonnell began to mobilise ‘his friends’. At the end of January he met with Dunraven to discuss tactics for the address and two weeks later he confidentially showed Horace Plunkett his correspondence with Wyndham.78 However, in the house of commons he was dependent on the liberals to defend him and in many ways they held the key to his uncertain future. MacDonnell felt, as did many others, that ‘the portents points to an early appeal to the country’ 7? — an appeal that would be won by the liberals — and, though as a civil servant he was not affected by the result, he sought to clarify his position. Even as early as December 1904 Dudley, the unionist viceroy in Ireland, called privately on H.H. Asquith to ask for an ‘assurance’ from the liberals that MacDonnell would not be immediately dismissed on their return. Although later he claimed that this extraordinary initiative was ‘purely spontaneous’, hedid havea copy of all the correspondence between Wyndham, Brodrick and MacDonnell which could only have been supplied by the latter. Presumably the under-secretary (then in consultation with Dudley over his resignation from the India council) must have heard the favourable reply. After 77 MacDonnell

to Alice Stopford Green,

16 Feb 1905, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS

15089(5) ). Godley’s note on his meeting of 19 Feb 1905 with MacDonnell (India office library, Kilbracken collection, MSS Eur. F. 102/62). 78 ‘He is going to force W[yndham] to publish this’, Plunkett recorded in his diary, ‘which will prove that he was the author of the Dunraven devolution scheme with W’s sanction and that he came with a distinct understanding that he was to have a free hand with administrative reform’. (H.C.P. diaries, 11 Feb 1905, (P.F.O.) ).

79 MacDonnell to Alice Stopford Green, 31 Jan 1905, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS

15089(5) ).

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consulting Spencer and Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith wrote that a pledge was impossible but on the return of his party there would be ‘a strong predisposition to retain’ MacDonnell and, if this became ‘unworkable’, his claims to a seat on the India Council ‘could hardly be overlooked’ .8° Confident of liberal support, MacDonnell wrote to the former liberal chief secretary, John Morley, hinting that the government ‘will have to be very delicate in their way of throwing him over’ and warning him of a possible amendment to the address from the Ulster unionists.8! A week before the start of the debate, MacDonnell also informed Lord Ripon of the ‘violent attacks’ he expected from ‘the Ulster protestant section’, but by now his orchestration of his defence was well advanced. He gave Ripon a detailed memorandum to circulate confidentially among the liberal hierarchy emphasising firstly that helping Dunraven was fully in accord with his contract on appointment and his work in Ireland, and secondly that he had been loyal to the government and throughout had hidden nothing from his superiors. Such action was blatantly improper and.even MacDonnell admitted to ‘a kind of feeling that I ought not to “‘brief’’ the opponents of the government. . . But’, he argued, ‘thisisa matter of honour or dishonour for me’.82 Convinced that Wyndham would not defend him ‘properly’ 83 MacDonnell extended his rebellion still further..He was, as he explained to Ripon, ‘steering’ to have a matter first raised’in the house of lords by Lord Dunraven; to this his friend, Lord Lansdowne, as the leading spokesman for the government, would be bound to respond and he had promised to stress the flexibility of MacDonnell’s contract; when Lord Dudley announced that the under-secretary had kept him and Wyndham informed from the beginning, MacDonnell’s case would be 80 H.H. Asquith to Campbell-Bannerman, | Dec 1904, (B.L., Campbell-Bannerman {henceforth C-B.] papers, Add. MSS 41210). Dudley undertook this mission because he was ‘seriously perturbed’ lest MacDonnell departed, for ‘he is an invaluable link between the Castle and the people outside’ (ibid.). As a consequence the liberals saw this material ten days before the unionist cabinet! See also Dudley to MacDonnell, 20 Dec 1906, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 395, f. 16). 81 MacDonnell to wife, 5 Jan 1905, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 321, ff 73-8). Morley to Campbell-Bannerman, 24 Jan 1905, (B.L., C-B.P., Add. MSS 41223). 82 MacDonnell to Ripon, 9 Feb 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542). It is. clear from the memorandum that Dudley had seen it and sanctioned it. 83 “He will pretend to defend me: but he cannot make a real defence without compromising himself’, (ibid.).

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Ph

complete and the attack in the commons forestalled.84 Four days later he crossed to England (in the rather incongruous company of John Dillon and J.H. Campbell, the Irish solicitor general) to put his plan into operation. On arrival he went to Lansdowne who he found ‘had evidently been primed by Wyndham’.85 MacDonnell, however, was inno mood to endure vacillation and forcefully persuaded the foreign secretary to state MacDonnell’s case fully in the forthcoming debate. Afterwards he saw Ripon, who with Campbell-Bannerman had arranged for Sir Robert Reid to watch over MacDonnell’s interests in the commons; and then heard from Knollys, the King’s secretary, that his memorandum had been forwarded, as requested, to Edward VII. At the end of the day he could confidently write to his wife: ‘no doubt I shall come out of the business well. If it is afterwards raised in the commons there need be no fear’.8¢ However on 16 February, only a day before Dunraven was to raise the matter in the lords, MacDonnell’s scheme went awry. After his conversation with J.H. Campbell aboard the mail-boat, he had been convinced that ‘the Ulster members may strive to force the pace’ 8? and presumed that this implied an amendment to the address. Instead the Ulster unionists placed a question for the chief secretary and this Wyndham answered by stressing the censure and the temporary nature of MacDonnell’s appointment.8® This immediately compromised Lansdowne who could hardly defend what the cabinet had publicly declared indefensible; and on the day of the Dunraven debate he attempted to revive the idea of announcing MacDonnell’s return to the India council in the autumn.8? Again MacDonnell was tempted; but ultimately he would have none of it, feeling that the lords debate would overcome what he saw as a pre-emptive strike by Wyndham in collusion with the Ulster M.P.s, the Orange Order and The Globe. Such grandiose delusions were 84 MacDonnell to Ripon, 9 Feb 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542). 85 ‘He thinks it will be difficult to do what I want and safeguard Wyndham at the same time’, MacDonnell to wife, 13 Feb 1905, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 321, ff 77-8).

86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Wyndham did not use the world ‘censure’ but announced instead that the cabinet deemed MacDonnell’s actions to have been indefensible but not disloyal. Hansard 4 (commons), cxli, 324-6, (George Wyndham, 16 Feb 1905). 89 Annie MacDonnell to mother, 17 Feb 1905, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216,

ity UTES)

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symptomatic of renewed despair. Morley’s refusal to answer his pleas for help, Dudley’s inability to get over from Ireland and the widespread opinion that the government would now hold on even until 1907 did little to raise his spirits.9° On 17 February, Arthur Godley, the under-secretary for India, wrote areport for the viceroy, Lord Curzon, onthe new session of parliament: ‘the government seem to be in a great hole about MacDonnell; a debate is going on about him at this moment in the house of lords, the results of which may be an explosion’.®! This explosion heralded MacDonnell’s triumph, for his strategy had worked perfectly. Lord Dunraven had opened the debate with a long discourse on the origins of his devolution scheme which implicated Wyndham as a devolutionist who sought to set up a moderate third party. When Lansdowne spoke, he kept his word and emphasised MacDonnell’s loyalty and the unique breadth of the conditions of his appointment. Furthermore under pressure from the liberal peers, Ripon and Spencer, and obviously with great reluctance, he read out a letter from Dudley confirming that the under-secretary had kept him informed. For MacDonnell, this ‘clinched the defence’

and he telegraphed his wife of his ‘complete vindication’. The fury of the commons consequently moved away from MacDonnell to the government and Wyndham faced a barrage of questions on MacDonnell’s appointment and censure. At the same time MacDonnell continued to send the liberals detailed memoranda and, as a result, the questioning was incisive and extremely destructive; 93 one of Redmond’s questions was ‘so pertinent’ that MacDonnell felt he could not have written it better himself. 4 Inevitably government majorities began to fall away. After a motion of censure on the government had only been defeated 90 MacDonnell to wife, 16 and 17 Feb 1905, (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. c 321, ff 83-6). MacDonnell to Alice Stopford Green, 16 Feb 1905, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS 15089(5) ). 91 Godley to Curzon, 17 Feb 1905, (India office library, Curzon papers, MSS Eur. F

111/164). 92 MacDonnell to wife, 17 and 18 Feb 1905, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. c 321, ff

88-92). So complete was MacDonnell’s control of the situation that Dunraven allowed the under-secretary to check over his speech before it was delivered to the lords (ibid., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, ff 147-8). 93 MacDonnell to Ripon, 17, 26 and 27 Feb and 3 Mar 1905, (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43542). 94 MacDonnell to Ripon, 3 Mar 1905; Ripon claimed the next day that he had only shown the papers to Spencer, (ibid., Add. MSS 43542).

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by forty-two votes, MacDonnell reviewed his achievement. While Wyndham had been ‘greatly compromised’ and the causes of the liberal party and administrative reforms advanced, he felt the most significant result was that ‘reluctantly I now represent the principle that a catholic Irishman ought pace the Rathmores to be allowed to serve the King in Ireland without being worried by Orange bigots’ .95 Behind this inflated view of his self-importance lay an insecurity that drove him relentlessly to destroy the administration of which he was an official. Obsessed by conspiracies around him, he was in fact the arch, if not the only, conspirator. His assault in defence of his honour through that bastion of unionism, the house of lords, was commendably audacious as well as subversive, but it was only successful because there had never been a counterplot. Such apprehensions grew out of his own isolation within the Castle. He was fully aware that most of the department heads were offended by his aggressive and interfering manner and were highly suspicious of autocratic intentions, but such criticisms were dismissed from his reckoning because (like the condemnations of the Irish unionists and their press), though obstructive, they were politically powerless while he retained the support of the government. As a result any opposition came to be viewed as part of aco-ordinated campaign of criticism involving all his enemies. When, however, the govenment wavered in December 1904, his position became so precarious that. he sought new masters. Yet MacDonnell’s desertion was not as calmly calculated as it seemed. His frequent correspondence with his family reveals a man dominated by his vulnerability in the face of incessant persecution. Convinced of his innocence and desperate to save his reputation, MacDonnell’s mood, just like Wyndham’s, fluctuated between moments of great determination and bleak despair. Two years at the Castle, by leaving

him certain only of whom he could not trust, had groomed him for the autumn betrayal. The censure of the cabinet dispelled any lingering doubts and in the early months of 1905 he acted with characteristic positiveness. With all the melodramatic overtones of the amateur spy, the spirit of MacDonnell’s triumph was captured best by one of the many coded telegrams he sent to his wife during the hectic days of the devolution debates: ‘Charles [Wyndham] condition dangerous Mary 95 MacDonnell

15089(5) ).

to Alice Stopford Green, | Mar 1905, (N.L.I., Green papers, MSS

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[Cabinet] very sick consultation being held tell John [Dudley]’.°° Yet that the illness so nearly proved to be fatal was not due solely to the intrigues of the under-secretary for Ireland. For MacDonnell’s manipulation of the devolution debates created an opportunity for a backbench rebellion that had been threatening since 1903.

VII Shortly before his retirement from parliament in 1902, the Trinity academic, W.E.H. Lecky, observed to Edward Carson, it is curious how through the influence of all this [Irish obstruction] our house of commons is losing its old character — how the private member is being turned into a mere voting machine — how the power of the cabinet is growing.”

But while the historian lamented, the demise of the private member became even more pronounced when the controversy over tariff reform split the cabinet and threatened to destroy the government’s majority. Thereafter the unionist whips kept the party on a tight rein. Many unionists found this extremely frustrating particularly as they saw their party being ripped to shreds by extremists on both sides because their leaders, whom they were loyally sustaining in office night after night, hesitated to impose a firm party line. They despaired at Balfour’s pedantic search for acompromise while the strong electoral positions of 1895 and 1900 evaporated. An exasperated Acland-Hood, then chief whip, reported to Sandars in October 1904 that ‘the most discontented say, ‘‘whois our leader? If itis Balfour why doesn’t helead?’’ The better disposed wish he would come forward now’ .98 But to no avail, and eighteen months of internecine feuding had left the party demoralised and disillusioned. Early in 1905 Sandars relayed the fears of the whips to his ‘chief’, even claiming that many conservatives were not applying for reelection ‘out of disgust’.9? To some unionists, what one commentator described as ‘the philosophic indifference of the prime minister to constitutional forms and the way this is utilised by his private secretary 96 MacDonnell to wife, 21 Feb 1905, (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng. hist. e 216, f. 127). 97 Hyde,. Carson, p. 185. 98 Acland-Hood to Sandars, 4 Oct 1904 (BodI., Sandars papers, MSS Eng. hist. c 748,

ff 207-10). 99 Fitzroy, Memoirs, i, p. 232, (31 Jan 1905).

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to treat the art of government as a cheap-jacks exhibition of hand to mouth adroitness’!°° was deeply humiliating. On top of these grievances the revelations over devolution came as the ultimate blow. Sandars warned the prime minister that feeling within the party was ‘very acute’ and concluded ominously that ‘you may think that the Irish could not oppose this, but we could suffer almost as much from the disinclination of our friends’.!%1 What made devolution the final straw however was that for the first time the rank and file could pose a sufficient threat. Whereas they had been divided over tariff reform, they were united on the issue of the union. Moreover, with the retention of MacDonnell it appeared that their government was preparing to defend his tampering with the fundamental principle of the party. Here seemed a clear display of Cecilian disregard for the plight of their supporters in the protection of one of their more favoured sons [Wyndham], whose popularity was in any case in rapid decline. '° In the first division a majority was only obtained by much cajoling and pleading from the whips. Indeed, many M.P.s felt that the government would be compelled to call an election and there were dramtic rumours that the extreme sought to exploit the discontent over devolution to achieve this end.1°3 As more divisions followed, the powerful ties of loyalty began to weaken under the pent-up rage of the unionist backbenches. On 3 March, although commanding a potential majority of eighty, the govenment survived five successive divisions by majorities that never exceeded thirty-one and twice fell to twentyone.!°4 However, after the resignation of Wyndham, tempers cooled 100 Fitzroy diaries, 9 Mar 1905, (B.L., Add. MSS 48380). 101 Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 21 Jan 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49760).

>

102 At the end of January, Sandars admitted to Fitzroy that ‘the airy web of his [i.e. Wyndham’s] brilliant rhetoric no longer dazzles the house of commons and the persistence with which he defends MacDonnell is believed to justify discontent’. Fitzroy, Memoirs, i, p. 232. Edward Hamilton noted in his diary that, in the opinion of Eddie Stanley, Wyndham ‘was much too unpopular ever to be leader. He was moreover too fond of the glass’. E.H. diaries, 18 Nov 1904, (B.L., Add. MSS 48682). 103 Fitzroy, Memoirs, i, p. 239 (25 Feb 1905). Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 21 Jan 1905; A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 22 Jan 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49760). 104 ‘Old-fashioned tories, who, in the whole course of their parliamentary lives, had

never entertained the thought of voting against their party, now left the house swearing that nothing would induce them to stay and vote. They swept past the whips at the doors, ignoring their presence or rudely repelling their efforts to detain them, till the whips themselves deserted their posts in despair, and defeat was only averted by putting up stalwarts to talk against time’. Fitzroy, Memoirs, i, p. 241. The government’s potential majority is calculated from D.E. Butler and A. Sloman, British political facts 1900-1975 (London, 1975 ed.), pp 190, 196.

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and the government emerged from a major debate of tariffs with an increased majority. Although they were defeated over the Irish estimates in July, many unionists had been absent and this decision was quickly reversed. Yet as Arnold-Forster noted, the defeat ‘was certainly most discreditable to our people, taking place as it did within one day of our party meeting, and with all the professions of devotion and self-sacrifice still in the air’.1°° Unionist anger had given way to unionist apathy. After the devolution debates, the conciliationist Horace Plunkett acknowledged bitterly that ‘the Ulster bigots and a landlord clique led by Westmeath have defeated us. . . They wouldn’t matter, but the ordinary English tory member, not without reason, objected to the secret agreement and will back up the Ulstermen in their continuing onslaught’. 19° In a sense he was right, for it was far more an English than an Ulster protest. Moreover it was not simply a dispute over devolution but was also the occasion for the release of much of the seething tension within unionist ranks and gave an outlet for the expression of their dissatisfaction with leaders who seemed to be leading the party towards electoral catastrophe. It was these sentiments of despair that almost forced Balfour out of office on the question of devolution.

Vill Perhaps more decisive was the rebellion that confronted the prime minister in the cabinet, where the strained loyalty of the junior members

broke down as they found themselves associated with decisions on which they had never been consulted; Walter Long complained indignantly to Balfour at Wyndham’s ‘attempt to qualify the word cen-

sure’ and was incensed by his failure to inform the cabinet of Dudley’s involvement.!°7 But what appalled them most was the discovery of Wyndham’s private attempt to solve the university.question in a manner

to which some of the cabinet and the majority of the party had beenlong opposed. Ministers like Arnold-Forster, who had won a by-election in

1903 pledged to the prevention of a catholic university, were aghast by 105 Arnold-Forster diaries, 20 July 1905, (B.L., Add. MSS 50349). 106 H.C.P. diaries, 12 Mar 1905, (P.R.O.). 107 Longto A.J. Balfour, 21 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49776). Brodrick to Curzon, 24 Feb 1905, (India office library, Curzon papers, MSS Eur. F. 111/164).

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such irresponsibility: ‘a week ago I had no idea that the government had commissioned an important public servant to intrigue for the establishment of aRoman Catholic university’, he grumbled to Arthur Lyttelton as they leftthe:commons after another torrid evening. The latter (who sporting achievements were always more renowned than his ministerial talents), retorted that ‘ ‘‘it was not cricket’’. A thing that in the eyes ofa Lyttelton is not cricket, must be dark indeed’. 198 If Arnold-Forster could still manage a smile, Walter Long most certainly could not and he fumed at ‘the deliberate betrayal’. Aware that he had been ‘absolutely tricked’, he vehemently pronounced that ‘he would ‘‘fight upon his stumps’’ against the institution of an R.C. _university’. Convinced that Wyndham must resign, Long informed Arnold-Forster ‘all of them (by which I suppose he means himself and several of the others) told the P.M. what they thought’. Arnold-Forster at first advised restraint but within hours of pacifying Long he was fulminating over ‘extraordinary rumours, which are so unsatisfactory that they are likely to be true’; Wyndham ‘having sold the party and got us into a horrible mess’ was to be promoted to the Admiralty, while the under-secretary ‘is to be flattered and cajoled into accepting some bribe in the form of a highly remunerated office, for condescending to go out of Dublin Castle’.1°° These were just the schemes that Wyndham, Balfour and Sandars had toyed with in early January, but the heavy sarcasm demonstrated the extreme anger that smouldered among the less influential members of the cabinet at the leniency shown by Balfour to his ‘intimates’. Some even feared that the prime minister would lose sight of his duty to the party behind his friendship for Wyndham. 11° Balfour initially staved off this criticism by preventing the matter being raised in the cabinet.!!! As it was, he was greatly pressed not only by 108 Arnold-Forster diaries, 27 Feb 1905, (Bodl., Add. MSS 50344). Lyttelton had played cricket for England. 109 [bid., | Mar 1905. Furthermore from 22 Feb 1905 Arnold-Forster had heard that MacDonnell ‘like a true Irish Roman Catholic and nationalist’ was blackmailing the government with documents of which Wyndham had no copy. The source ofthis was Sir Arthur Godley, under-secretary at the India office, who had relayed to Lord Lansdowne a conversation with MacDonnell in which the latter confided that he had documents which could wreck the government. However, Godley felt that this was more of an admission to a former colleague and not a threat to the cabinet. Note of 19 Feb 1905, (India office library, Kilbracken collection, MSS Eur. F. 102/62). 110 Arnold-Forster diaries, 10 Feb and 1 Mar 1905, (B.L., Add. MSS 50344-S).

111 Tbid., 28 Feb 1905.

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the defence of the chief secretary but also by the need to restrain the inexperienced Dudley, who, horrified at embarrassing the government, intended to resign in order to defend his actions. !!2 But it was over Wyndham that he came under the greatest pressure. Even before the crisis had broken, Sandars and the whips were appealing for Wyndham’s departure. '13 Yet if Balfour remained adamant, it was partly because he had never fully grasped the details of the affair.114 Only the day before announcing Wyndham’s resignation, he was still asking in the cabinet, ‘but what was MacD[onnell]’s position? Was hea Sir A[rthur] Godley, or was he something more? Because, if he was anything more than ¢hat, it was clearly wrong. . .” Nevertheless his faith in Wyndham’s sincerity remained constant !!5 and he was utterly determined that his government would not bow before ‘the wildest and most idiotic rumours’ that were circulating in the lobby.1!16 These included speculations that Wyndham had promoted the Irish Reform Association’s manifesto as a ballon d’essai''7 and was now engaged in a major cover-up. Balfour found these allegations contemptible, later comparing ‘this wretched and, in itself, trumpery incident’ to being suspected of forging a cheque. !18 Yet such accusations could not be ignored and he found it ‘excessively difficult to know how to neutralise this poison, which eats into the party’.119 Nevertheless when Wyndham on 2 March again appealed to be 112 Balfour was under great pressure firstly from Carson and Esher to let Dudley resign but also from the King to avoid such a scandal. Carson to Balfour, 18 Feb 1905,

(B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49709). Knollys to Sandars, 21 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49684). Knowing that Dudley would have to leave his office in August out of penury, Balfour persuaded the viceroy that his intentions would only intensify the controversy, assuring him in arather avuncular tone that ‘when the house once gets suspicious, it is [as] difficult to deal with as a jealous husband. Mere innocence supplies a quite insufficient justification’. A.J. Balfour to Dudley, 23 Feb 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49802). 113 A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 26 Apr 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49760). 114 Note of 5 Mar 1905, (India office library, Kilbracken collection, MSS Eur. F

102/62. 115 H.C.P. diaries, 24 Mar 1905, (P.F.O.). 16 A.J. Balfour to Wyndham, 3 Mar 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49805). 117 These rumours, Balfour suspected, emanated from Dudley’s and Dunraven’s supporters. A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 26 Apr 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49760). 118 “It is beneath your dignity even to take the trouble to repudiate the charge — still less to explain to him that you think forgery wrong!’ Balfour to Cawdor, 7 Jan 1909,

(ibid., Add. MSS 49709). 119 A.J. Balfour to Wyndham,

3 Mar 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49805).

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released on grounds of health and in order to safeguard the conciliatory approach to Ireland, Balfour disregarded the advice of his whips and cabinet and refused. Resignation, he told his friend would be interpreted ‘by the malevolent (who at this moment abound) as a practical admission that you encouraged a home rule or quasi-home rule agitation’ and thus would only encourage further defamations. However, he held on to his sick and broken colleague for a far more fundamental reason. To Balfour it was ‘utterly repulsive. . . to allow a colleague to go under anything in the nature of pressure from outside. . . if the prime minister is to permit these gusts of feeling to modify the constitution of his cabinet, it appears to me that all cabinet solidarity is in danger of dissolution’.!2° Unable to assuage political opinion by argument, a unified government must reassert its authority over a party with a long tradition of loyalty. Long after Wyndham’s resignation, Balfour continued to belittle the discontent among his supporters and insist that his firm stand was only defeated by Wyndham’s collapse: ‘had his health been good’, he assured a doubtful Sandars; ‘had Walter Long. . . or I found ourselves in the same difficulty which he found himself on the address, I do not believe the debate would have presented serious difficulties . . .?!2! In believing this Balfour was deluding himself, and within thirty-six hours of rejecting Wyndham’s resignation he was compelled to rescind his decision. What had transformed the situation was not Wyndham’s instability but a rough confrontation with political reality. On the evening of 3 March (i.e. after Balfour’s reply to Wyndham), the government majority had dropped by almost three-quarters and defeat had become a strong possibility. The next day the threat of resignation from the six Irish unionists in the government was echoed by other ministers, and Horace Plunkett, staying with the Gerald Balfours at Fisher Hill, learned that ‘at the cabinet end W[yndham] must resign or the government

must go. That’s the situation’.!22 Faced with the disintegration of his government and his party, indeed with the mantle of Peel, Balfour had no choice.122¢ With the cabinet the crisis over devolution had soon risen above the 120 A.J. Balfour to Wyndham, 3 Mar 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 49805). 121 A.J. Balfour to Sandars, 26 Apr 1904, (ibid., Add. MSS 49760). 122 H.C.P. diaries, 4 Mar 1905, (P.F.O.). 1224 Blanche Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London, 1936), ii, pp 74-7.

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particular consequences for Ireland. For the ministers their association with such schemes pointedly emphasised their lack of consultation and their relative impotence as members of the cabinet. Moreover, to have to defend what they despised not only implied weakness but also endangered their careers by casting doubts on the political sincerity of themselves and their party. However, to Balfour, nobody could seriously queston his commitment to unionism; and when Ulster did, he dismissed it as ‘a most insolent and unworthy suspicion but extremely characteristic of the Irish mind’ .!23 What was really at stake was not his integrity as a unionist but his credibility as aleader. At the beginning of a session that promised to be a bitter and close fight for survival, Balfour, around whom the government revolved, could not afford any blow to his authority. However it was illustrative of his detachment that, on his determining the way, he seriously expected his party to follow. Blinded by the personal loyalties that undoubtedly existed and shielded behind the ring of his advisers, he had never developed the instinctive understanding of, or even the respect shown by his great predecessor towards, his rank and file. Consequently he became too dependent on others to contrive the majority which he demanded. However, when his intimates and his colleagues rebelled, his personal authority had to give way to the interests of his party and, while professions of loyalty were still echoed, his prestige was badly dented.

IX Perhaps, given the intensity of political feeling, what was most remarkable was that the government did not fall. In the end, for all the rebels, there were still enough tories whose loyalty remained undiminished. Undoubtedly Wyndham’s resignation had eased much of the tension. Moreover, Sandars’ fears of the extreme tariff reform wing exploiting the controversy to force an early election proved unfounded. '?4 Just as important to the survival of the government was the attitude of the opposition. At first the liberals viewed the affair with amused anticipation.!25 Yet the opportunity was not without its 123 A.J. Balfour to Cawdor, 7 Jan 1909, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49709). 124 Joseph Chamberlain to H. Maxwell, 25 Feb 1905, cited in Amery, Chamberlain, vi, p. 665.

Joseph

125 Asquith to Campbell-Bannerman, | Dec 1904, (B.L., C-B.P., Add. MSS 41210); Herbert Gladstone to Campbell-Bannerman, 18 Feb 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 41217).

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dangers, since the liberal party was as divided over Ireland as the unionists. After the debacle of 1893 many liberals sought to shelve home rule in favour of a less controversial, gradualist approach and saw in devolution a progressive platform on which to resolve the liberal dissensions over Ireland. Moreover, it was a compromise which not only appealed to certain liberal unionists uneasy at their party’s growing rejection of the free trade shibboleth, but it also appeared to have Irish support; on the eve of the devolution debates the nationalist leader, John Redmond, in a private interview with Herbert Gladstone, recognised the difficulties of the liberals and admitted that home rule could only come ‘by degrees’. 126 But while Herbert Gladstone, together with Asquith and Bryce, sought to overcome positively the divisive question of Ireland, his revered father’s old lieutenants strongly resisted any diminution of Gladstonian home rule. John Morley in particular warned firmly against any new declaration of policy and in any case, to defeat the government over Ireland when the question of fiscal controls offered such rich electoral possibilities was clearly foolish. !27 At the same time, few of the liberals who knew were enamoured with the disloyal activities of the under-secretary for Ireland that they stood to inherit and Morley gruffly assured Gladstone that, were he to return to Dublin Castle, MacDonnell ‘would be off his stool in one minute’.!28 The liberal indecision, heightened by the prolonged absence of Campbell-Bannerman who was recuperating from illness at Dover, hampered an all-out bid to topple Balfour’s regime. So while they ‘trampled’ on the government, revelling in the numerous ministerial contradictions, the liberals could not force the pace without an alternative Irish policy. Indeed throughout the debates the liberal leadership tried to restrain the Irish members and control their amendments to ensure that however damaging the affair was it did not prove decisive. 126 Two days later T.W. Russell confided to the liberal chief whip that, provided the liberals did not commit themselves to an Irish parliament, they could win six or seven of the nine Ulster seats at the next election. Entries in notebook, 13 and 15 Feb 1905, (B.L., Herbert Gladstone papers, Add. MSS 46485). 127 Spencer to Campbell-Bannerman, 23 Jan 1905, (B.L., C-B.P., Add. MSS 41229). Morley to John Dillon, 26 Jan 1905; Morley to Campbell-Bannerman, 19 Feb 1905,

(B.L., C-B.P., Add. MSS 41223). 128 Morley to Gladstone, 11 Apr 1905, (ibid., Add. MSS 41217). Reid to Ripon (B.L., Ripon papers, Add. MSS 43543).

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Consequently the controversy petered out over March and April. Balfour, enraged on hearing of MacDonnell’s disloyalty, attempted to remove him within six weeks but failed for much the same reasons as he had in January. As it was, not only did Brodrick deny a return to the India Council, but also Walter Long was so incensed at what he deemed to

be Wyndham’s treachery that he rather perversely defended MacDonnell to the hilt.129 When Wyndham eventually made his resignation speech he was duly pulverised in debate, but by then the heat of the matter had long dissipated. The Ulster protest in the commons was as unrelenting as it was unattended since, with the resignation of Wyndham, the government had won back the decidedly apathetic support of its followers and in the end staggered successfully through the session. Ultimately the insignificance of the Ulster M.P.s, suddenly returned to the positon of helplessness of a year before, and the remarkable restraint of the liberal opposition illustrate just how much the devolution controversy was fundamentally an internal affair. With the departure of Wyndham the crisis that had racked the cabinet and the Castle had been resolved.

x At the end of October 1904 Wyndham wrote a characteristically vivid description of the political climate in Britain: At present there is a darkness that can be felt in front of us all — a general tendency in home politics and world politics to mistake fishing craft for torpedo boats. “*Shoot first’’ is the Bismarckian message to mankind. To me it seems hysterical and carries the incidental disadvantage of reconstructing Christendom on the model of a mining-camp bar saloon. 13°

That he should be the first to fall in the impending brawl was as unexpected as it was unfortunate. Yet, while he was the victim of stirring times, it is hard to escape the impression that his departure was both 129 Lansdowne to Arthur Balfour, 13 and 16 Mar 1905, (B.L., A.B.P., Add. MSS 49729). Godley’s memoranda of 19 and 25 Mar, and 2 Apr 1905, (India office library, Kilbracken collection, MSS Eur. F 102/62). Cabinet memoranda of 1 and 3 Mar 1905, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/71). 130 Wyndham to Mary Drew, 30 Oct 1904, Mackail, Wyndham, ii, p. 484. Wyndham was specifically alluding to the sinking of British trawlers by the Russian navy on Dogger Bank.

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unnecessary and until as late as January avoidable. In particular the failure of the government to settle its own differences proved disastrous. During the parliamentary debates one observer noted that ‘it is not so much the transaction itself, as the way it has been explained and defended, that causes most injury’.!3! It was the sight of the government floundering amid contradiction and confusion that sparked off a series of crises which had long been festering within the cabinet and amongst the bewildered supporters of the party, concerning not just Ireland but the nature and effectiveness of the unionist leadership in general. The unionists were enraged at a government which to quote the Irish renegade T.W. Russell, ‘in this matter did not mean the Londonderrys, the Arnold-Forsters, and ministers of that stamp. It did not even mean Mr Long. The government meant the inner circle — the prime minister, the foreign secretary and Mr Wyndham’ .!32 It was this autocratic exclusiveness, which had destroyed confidence and engendered suspicions and which, with the retention of MacDonnell, had implicated the party in something few had suspected and still less would condone, that gave the devolution controversy its destructive edge. Reviewing the affair in the Manchester Guardian, Russell concluded that ‘there was no reason why the Wyndham-MacDonnell compact should not have succeeded, save one — its secrecy. . . It was its secrecy that did the damage’.!33 To a certain extent this was irrefutable, for clearly Balfour would have been in a stronger position if he had been able openly to co-ordinate this government’s defence in February 1905. Instead he was severely hindered by his complete dependence for information on a chief secretary who was naturally reluctant to uncover incriminating decisions of years past. The outcome was a brief so lacking in plausibility that it provoked an uproar which brought the government perilously close to defeat. But methods of secrecy did not only compromise the government. Indeed, there can be no more striking a condemnation of the act of union than the necessary adoption of such dubious means to implement much-needed social reforms. From the first the act of union presumed heavily on the sympathetic attention of both partners, British as well as Irish, and it was precisely the apathetic disregard by nearly all British politicians for all predominantly Irish 131 Fitzroy, Memoirs, 21 Feb 1905, i, p. 237. 132 The Independent, 6 Sept 1906. 133 Manchester Guardian, 9 Mar 1905.

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matters that allowed the reactionaries in both the nationalist and Irish unionist parties to wreck any attempt at acoherent policy for Ireland. In this sense the devolution crisis was a classic example of the Irish members exploiting the inherent Anglo-centricism of the unionist party for their own ends. Yet if secrecy was so destructive, why was it necessary to resort again to such means after Wyndham had (temporarily) closed down the experiment in constructive unionism in spring 1904? Recalling the controversy some years later, John Atkinson suggested that ‘the whole manufacturing of lies and trickery and intrigue was self-going’ , !34 that, once the constitutional bounds had been breached, the constraint of responsibility was correspondingly weakened. At the same time both Wyndham and MacDonnell enjoyed power and believed in its use. With the arrogance of a proconsul in what he clearly treated as acolony, MacDonnell saw the state as the primary agent-of civilisation. Having diagnosed the needs of the ruled he determined to implement the necessary, irrespective of and, on occasion, in spite of the politicians. If this undoubtedly worried Wyndham, he nevertheless was tremendously excited by his dynamic under-secretary and the opportunity he opened up for creative initiatives in Irish legislation. These could only enhance his standing in the party and, as Atkinson caustically noted, the chief secretary was ‘a Wyndhamite before all things’ .135 Together they were a formidable combination; in opposition their commitment to their ambitions was so great that the confrontation could not be anything but bloody. But, if the controversy was primarily a conflict of internal loyalties and prejudices, it was the Irish consequences that were the greatest. Nine years of unionist rule had amply illustrated the fragility of the union as an instrument of conciliatory government; but the party’s adherence to constructive unionism still remained intact if unenthusiastic. However with the rejection of devolution and Wyndham’s replacement by the strictly orthodox Walter Long, the conciliationists had been finally ousted from control. Suddenly, inside a year, the ideological struggle over Ireland which had divided the unionist party since 1896 had been lost by the progressives; now discredited, they slid quickly though not quietly towards political irrelevance. The ‘golden 134 John Atkinson to Long, 3 Oct 1911, (W.R.O., Long papers, 947/31).

135 Tbid.

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opportunity’ that had opened up before Gerald Balfour and Lord Cadogan in 1895 and which seemed to promise so much to unionism, had finally passed away.

Part

IV

The demise of constructive unionism

IX

THE KILLING OF KINDNESS AND WHAT KINDNESS KILLED

So far as I am concerned I have always been in favour of a policy of conciliation; but I have always thought that this isin harmony, not in antagonism, to true unionism and that it is in no way inconsistent with the firm application of even the severest clauses of the crimes act in any part of the country which rendered such application necessary with the interests of law and order. Arthur Balfour to Lord Dudley, 16 March 1905 What stands in the way? Politics alone. Lord Dunraven, Crisis in Ireland

. . us Irish unionists whose troubles may be an annoyance to you but whose troubles have kept you in office for the last twenty years... John Atkinson to Gerald Balfour, 26 November 1905 . . of the two evils it is better, perhaps, that our ship shall go nowhere than that it should go wrong, that it should stand still than that it should run upon rocks. Arthur Balfour, May 1885

TO THAT MOST ACUTE of Irish observers, the novelist George Birmingham, ‘the most striking feature of Irish politics is the stability of

295

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The Killing of Kindness & What Kindness Killed

parties ... The nationalist remains steadfastly nationalist. The unionists steadfastly unionist. No one imagines that the opinions of the voter can be altered by any means’, let alone by rational discussions on policy. Significantly he traced the death of debate to the 1880s and the arrival of genuine democracy which released onto the political stage the central, seemingly timeless social conflict within Ireland — that ‘battle of civilisations’ of which D.P. Moran wrote so confidently and Edward Dowden anticipated so eagerly in October 1904.2 Thus stated the framework of Irish politics was culturally determined and would remain so until the struggle was over and ‘mastery’ won; an interpretation echoed recently with greater sophistication and much eloquence by another eminent Trinity professor, the late F.S.L. Lyons. However the latter was writing during the present ‘troubles’ when the ‘roots of difference’ in Ulster must have stood out more grotesquely than ever. Similarly George Birmingham, writing in 1919, had with understandable sensitivity forgotten the great aspirations that he, as Canon J.O. Hannay of Westport, had held out for national reconciliation through the Gaelic League in the early years of the twentieth century. As for Dowden, his pronouncement was one of hope rather than fact for at that time the unionist party was more divided than it had ever been since 1885. Thus his article was part of the Irish unionist riposte to the divisive preoccupations with social and tariff reform by exploiting Dunraven’s ‘going off at half cock’. As such it was a useful weapon in a critical propaganda war and so much appreciated by Leo Maxse of the conservative National Review.‘ In fact despite the temptations of historical continuity, party politics in the decade after Parnell were in a state of extreme fluidity. Not only were both the main parties riven by bitter schisms but they also were confronted by the ‘new’ cultural and economic politics of organisations as diverse as the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association, Sinn Fein, the I.A.O.S. and even the 1.0.0. Undoubtedly if ! George Birmingham, An Irishman looks at his world (London, 1919), pp 2 Edward Dowden, ‘Irish unionists and the present administration’ in Review, xliv (Oct 1904), p. 364; D.P. Moran, The philosophy of Irish Ireland 1905) p. 114; F.S.L. Lyons, Culture and anarchy in Ireland, 1890-1939(Oxford, 58-61.

9-13. National (Dublin, 1979), pp

3 Lyons, Culture, pp 51-5, 70-75. This is supported by the recent political analysis of Paul Bew and Frank Wright, ‘The agrarian opposition in Ulster politics, 1848-1887’ and Brian Walker, ‘The land question and elections in Ulster, 1868-1886’ in Samuel Clark and James S. Donnelly, Jnr., /rish Peasants: violence and political unrest, 1780-1914. See also the editors’ review of the issues, p. 271-283. 4 Leo Maxse to Dowden, 28 Oct 1904 (T.C.D., Dowden papers, MSS 3154/1155).

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the home rule debate a la 1885-93 could be revived, the traditional battle lines would be renewed — as indeed they were after 1907. But, to informed contemporary analysts there was no logical reason why the home rule controversy should inevitably return to such a traditional form: the issues may have been inescapable, the grand alliances of the 1880s were certainly not. Therefore the failure of the centre to emerge as a serious force in Irish politics was not a failure to do the impossible, but was as much the responsibility of the centrists (and ultimately of the British unionist government) as it was of the conflict itself.

I In search of the centre: elusive or an illusion? Perhaps it is never possible to form a political party. Parties come into existence far down at the depths of a nation, as water begins to boil at the bottom of alarge pot. Leaders, like bubbles, emerge from the depths, are caught by the swirlings of popular emotion, and carried, glistening, to the surface. No party begins with leaders or witha policy. Both come into being out of the vague, inchoate movements of a spirit somewhere unseen. To form a party with a ready-made leader and a policy nearly summarised on a sheet of paper seems of all forms of political activity the most futile. George Birmingham, An Jrishman looks at his world

The most obvious cause of the failure of conciliation lies with the moderates themselves; for the term implies a collective unity that is flattering but historically false. Essentially they comprised of a small number of idiosyncratic groups and minor political movements, some faddists anda few enthusiastic but part-time politicians from among the Anglo-Irish ascendancy. For the most part they all acted independently of each other and were only of significance because of the extensive influence they periodically held over British policy in Ireland. It was this that gave the disciples of conciliation their collective impact on Irish politics, which was in sharp contrast to the lack of co-operation between them. Castletown was furious when his land bank scheme was shelved by the government in favour of Plunkett’s plan for the I.A.O.S., who ‘make more noise and know less — two necessities in Ireland’.’ 5 Castletown to Montgomery, n.d. (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery papers, T1089/355-6).

298 Similarly

The Killing of Kindness Lord

Monteagle

& What Kindness Killed

(Plunkett’s

‘dear,

right thinking,

weak

creature’ at the I.A.O.S.)® never forgave Dunraven for excluding him from the land conference and subsequently lost no time in undermining the credibility of Dunraven and Shawe-Taylor in the eyes of the government.7 Plunkett had his own reasons for exulting in Dunraven’s eventual demise; ® but such disputes paled in comparison with the set-to between his two creations, the I.A.O.S. and D.A.T.I., which only came to an end when Plunkett resigned from the latter.? Often this disunity was little more than personal competitiveness laced with petty jealousy; but there were crucial differences. Not sur-

prisingly among people whose political heritage had traditionally been fairly conservative, while there was a general acceptance for the need for reform, the level of commitment to progressive change varied widely. Many moderates for instance, having praised the extension of the democratic principle to local government in 1898 were shocked and appalled after the first elections by what they witnessed to be the violent reality of the ‘Irish demos’.!° Others like Lord Castletown held back from joining organisations such as the Irish Reform Association in the belief that one could do ‘morereal work. . . inlocal minor tasks’; an attitude that reflected his recognition by 1904 that he was ‘nothing but a plodding Irishman loving my country and doing my daily round and common task as best I can’.!! The retreat to the demesne was on. For the Dunravenites who sought to stand their ground, their position was plagued by half-baked ideas and unresolved contradictions. In part this was the product of a leadership *handicapped’ by their lack of technical knowledge in the practices of government and parliament.2 More serious was the fact that the September manifesto raised more issues than it solved, all of which were difficult to answer ‘for the © H.C.P. diaries, 14 Sept 1900 (P.F.O.).

7 Monteagle to G.W. Balfour, 6 Dec [1902?] (Whitt., G.B.P.); Thomas Spring Rice to Monteagle, 21 Sept 1917 (typescript at P.R.O.N.I., Monteagle papers, B/9); Thomas Spring Rice to Mary Spring Rice, 31 Aug 1917 (P.R.O.N.1., Monteagle papers, D/9). 8 H.C.P. diaries, 19 Oct 1896; 28 Oct 1904 (P.F.O.). 9 Bolger, Co-op movement, pp 100-101.

10 Moreton Frewen to Redmond, 11 Apr 1899 (N.L.I., John Redmond papers, MSS 15187).

1 Castletown to O’Brien, 15 Sept 1904 (U.C.C., William O’ Brien papers, A N. 219); Dunraven to O’Brien, 16 Oct 1905 (N.L.I., William O’ Brien papers, MSS 8554(4) ). '2 Dunraven 116-121).

to MacDonnell,

21 Jan 1905 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist. c 350, ff

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association’, as Dunraven admitted to MacDonnell, ‘have never thrash-

ed the matter out’.!3 Indeed the first full treatment of their position, Dunraven’s Crisis in Ireland, did not appear until almost a year after the first report launched the cause. Pre-eminent among these difficulties was the question of how a centre party preaching devolution could still remain a unionist party; for, as T.P. O’Connor once quipped, to all appearances devolution was simply the Latin for home rule.!4 Thus Hutchenson-Poe argued for the manifesto to demonstrate the compatibility of unionism and devolution and Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie claimed ‘the bold pronouncement on self government’ was ‘a great step in advance for a body of unionists’.15 But there were a few like Dunraven who were confessing to nationalists who would listen that they had always been home rulers at heart — ‘that is’, to use Castletown’s definition, ‘an Irishman who believes Ireland can be best governed by the Irish’; which congenially circumvents the fundamental distinction of which Irishmen would do the governing.16 To these problems must be added an appreciation of political tactics that was in every sense inept. Originally they had planned merely to provoke a debate with the August report out of which hopefully aconsensus would emerge which would draw up definite proposals. However stung by disparaging references in press to the social standing of the association’s membership, and especially by Bagwell’s ‘hysterical outbreak in The Times’ ,'7 they rushed into the manifesto. As everyone was on holiday consultation was reduced to a correspondence between Dunraven, gout-ridden in Kerry, and an increasingly shifty MacDonnell in Dublin Castle. Indeed the manifesto which committed the association in detail to legislative and financial councils was virtually presented as a fait ac-

compli to the fifteen members 13 Dunraven

to MacDonnell,

who attended the hastily convened

29 Jan 1905 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist. c 350, ff

122-5). 14 Cited in Boyce, D.G., Nationalism in Ireland (London & Dublin, 1982) p. 279. 15 Poe to MacDonnell, 16 Sept 1904 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist c 351, ff 102-3); Talbot-Crosbie to O’Brien, 13, 28 Aug 1904(U.C.C., William O’Brien papers, A N. 208,

212). 16 Dunraven to O’ Brien, 26 Oct 1903 (N.L.I., William O’Brien papers, MSS 8554(2) ); Castletown to Redmond, 14 Nov 1909 (N.L.1., John Redmond papers, MSS 15175). 17 Dunraven to MacDonnell, 11 Sept 1904 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist c 350, ff

147-150); Poe to MacDonnell, 102-3).

16 Sept 1904 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist c 251, ff

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The Killing of Kindness & What Kindness Killed

meeting.'!8 Never was so much rope given so needlessly to hang so few. Not that rope was actually necessary for the Dunravenites were in no position, however striking their programme, to launch which was in effect a new party. They had no organisation, no secretary and most important, no funds: Hutchenson-Poe had promised to find financial assistance but had gone shooting in Antrim instead.'9 So had most of their support, not that there was ever much of it: twenty-two had assembled to ratify the August report and only fifteen the September manifesto; at most the association could call on a membership of thirty.2° To make matters worse the preponderance oflandlords left the association open to charges of being ‘men on the lookout for a job now their true métier is passing away’.?! In a political sense, this had been true for Dunraven (very much seen as the figurehead of the movement) since 1886 when he had resigned with Churchill. For those of the British political establishment who deemed this merely folly, Dunraven remained the amateur of little talent, chiefly remembered in clubland jests as the gentleman-sailor who should have known better than to bother accusing the Americans of cheating him out of the America’s Cup. The unseemly wrangles and the journalistic ‘splash’ tainted Dunraven’s reputation for life and indirectly effected the credibility of his creation.?2 Nonetheless if, as he admitted to MacDonnell in January 1905, ‘devolution does not go’?3 the reason was not his past but that Dunravenism had no idea where it wanted to go. Although not a member Castletown recognised the essential dilemma and indeed had retired from public life precisely because he was ‘too advanced for the party of unionists and not sufficiently so for the other side’.24 To some, like Talbot-Crosbie, the nettle had to be grasped and the objective 18 Dunraven, Crisis, p. 34.

19 Dunraven to MacDonnell, ‘Tuesday’ [1904]; 8 Sept 1904 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng

hist c 350, ff 139, 143-4). 20 Dunraven, Crisis, p. 34.

21 MacDonnell to Alice Stopford Green, 1 Sept 1904 (N.L.I., A.S. Green papers, MSS

15089(3) ).

22 Dunraven to A.J. Balfour, 28 June 1895 (Bodl., Sandars papers, MSS Eng hist, c 726, ff 122-7). On the Americas Cup episode see Dunraven’s file (P.R.O.N.I., Dunraven

papers, D3196/G/18-20).

23 Dunraven to MacDonnell, 21 Jan 1905 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist, c 350, ff

116-21). 24 Castletown to O’Brien, 15 Sept 1904 (U.C.C., William O’ Brien papers, A N. 219).

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became one of converting unionism,25 With hindsight the campaign to convince the ascendancy of their impending doom was destined to fail. As it was the nineteenth century had been one of near permanent crisis for landed society. But the challenges of agrarianism, clericalism, popular nationalism, British politicians and imminent financial collapse bred a resilience which would need more than Dunraven’s warnings to shake. More to the point with Ireland at its most peaceful since the land war, what crisis? The unionist alliance and the Landowners Convention were tried bulwarks against any revival of Parnellism and the Land League. While the land act of 1903 offered both the prospect of financial security and an opportunity to get out of the crossfire of the class war. Undoubtedly the morale of the ascendancy had taken some serious blows but if the mood was more circumspect there were few signs of doubt or despair.?¢ In any case the very nature of caste experience, together with the embarrassments of 1899, meant that Anglo-Ireland was not geared to co-operating with those they had previously despised. What they were not to know was that the house of lords would compromise its powers and thus let in home rule or that the first world war would create the issues and the openings for the young Turks to sweep out the old constitutional leadership and transform the political reality of Irish nationalism. But then neither did Dunraven. Nevertheless it was striking how little effort was put into converting unionist society. If the Dunravenites listened less to unionist than nationalist opinion that was because as unionists themselves they felt that they appreciated the needs of unionism. Intriguingly more attention was paid to Ulster. In December 1904 Shawe-Taylor madea ‘reconnaissance’ of Belfast but at a large 1.0.0. rally came into conflict with Sloan and Lindsay Crawford on the question of a catholic university.27 This was the same problem that Plunkett had addressed to the luckless Dunbar Buller in 1902: confronted with the sectarianism of the ‘northern democracy’, ‘how would you meet the man who honestly thinks that if a ‘‘comma in the King’s oath were changed, the foundation of our religious and civil liberties are undermined”’ ’?28 To such questions 25 Talbot-Crosbie to O’Brien, 13 Aug 1904 (U.C.C., William O’Brien papers, A N. 208). 26 Curtis, ‘Anglo-Irish predicament’, p. 46; d’ Alton, ‘Cork unionists’, pp 71-88. 27 Boyle, ‘Belfast Protestant Association’, p. 131. 28 Plunkett to Dunbar

D664/D/355B).

Buller,

2 Aug

1902 (P.R.O.N.I.,

Dunbar

Buller papers,

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Dunravenism had few answers. Yet in comparison Dunraven’s caution to Moreton Frewen after the floating of devolution was all the more revealing: ‘go slow, be moderate, and don’t scare the unionists — I mean the moderate ones — the gnats that buzz about Kildare Street don’t signify’; 29 that such insignificants were to sink his scheme within six months presumably did. The only alternative therefore was an accommodation of moderate nationalism as supposedly represented by Redmond and O’Brien. However such a strategy was by 1904 riddled with incompatibles, notwithstanding the obvious embarrassment of unionist coquetting with the enemy. For a start devolution was not a genuine concession to home rule but a scheme that would sustain the political influence of moderate unionism. Furthermore not only had they failed to consult the nationalist leaders but the timing of such a blunt initiative, with controversy over theland act stillin full swing, plumbed the depths ofinsensitivity.3° With the liberal return to office widely predicted and with the I.P.P. predominantly Dillonite in outlook after O’ Brien’s fall, there was little chance of a nationalist response; even with Redmond privately accepting as early as March 1904 that ‘gradual devolution’ was the only

realistic prospect.3! On top of this Dunraven was too élitist to appreciate sympathetically the internal demands of the Irish party. A ParnelliteDunravenite alliance in co-ordination with O’Brien’s rebel party in Cork would only re-open the painful wounds of ‘the split’ and run against all that Dillon and Redmond had worked for, despite O’Brien, since 1900.32 Moreover such a realignment would involve official nationalism detaching itself from the more dynamic elements in the movement — cultural nationalism, the revival of physical force and the emergence of Sinn Fein. Lord Mayo for one recognised the position if only to miss the point when he reported to Salisbury that the Irish party were ‘doomed’ because they had ‘no new blood’.33 Consequently, regardless of Shawe-Taylor’s assurances of no thoughts of competition,

29 Dunraven to Frewen, 7 Sept 1904 (Lib. Congress, Moreton Frewen papers).

3° O’Brien to Talbot-Crosbie, | Sept 1904 (U.C.C., William O’Brien, A N. 214); Dunraven to Redmond, | Dec 1904 (N.L.I., John Redmond papers, MSS 15187); Redmond to Dunraven, n.d. [Dec 1904?] (N.L.1., John Redmond papers, MSS 15187). 31 H.C.P. diaries, 15 Mar 1904 (P.F.O.). 32, F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon, (London, 1968), p. 236. 33 Mayo to Salisbury, 22 Feb 1902 (Hatfield House, Salisbury papers).

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the loose talk of ‘platforms’, of ‘fighting elections’, indeed the existence of a separate organisation with apparent government backing and directed at the middle ground — very much the soft underbelly of Irish politics — all ensured that Dunravenism was looked uponas a challenge and not an ally. Thus the Buttite tradition was condemned to the age of Butt.34 Ultimately what killed off the moderates was their complete dependence on the conservatives’ Irish government. With such powerful backing and the gradual implementation of their ideas, numerical support in Ireland became less relevant in comparison to the prestige to be gained through influence. However Wyndham’s rebuttal in The Times dashed Dunraven’s hopes and effectively ‘snuffed out’ his cause.35 By the time the general election came in December 1905 the Irish Reform Association was in no position to fight it. A rally in Belfast produced fine speeches but ‘no one present to hear them’; to cap it all from an attendance of twenty, one shouted out that ‘the Belfast people could run the whole show’.2¢ Although Shawe-Taylor roused them in Derry, the response in Dublin was ‘entirely apathetic’ and in Limerick, where Dunraven’s influence produced a sympathetic crowd, they were in the main ‘definitely nationalist home rulers, not devolutionists’.37 The polls brought crushing defeat and the gradual recognition that ‘Redmondite home rule was now the only possible compromise’ .38 Thereafter Dunraven created new organisations and peddled schemes of imperial federation for all their worth until ‘the year of shame’, 1921, brought these harmless exercises to an end. Left only to write his memoirs, he pondered bitterly on the achievement that might have been his if Wyndham had ‘stuck to his guns’.39 It is ironic that in the long run Dunraven probably encouraged the intransigent fundamentalism in Irish politics which he abhorred and had set out to undermine. Doubtless Dunraven and his friends missed the paradox. But ina group where opposite opinions were avidly tolerated 34 Shawe-TaylortoO’Brien, | Aug 1904(U.C.C., William O’ Brien papers, AN. 197); Talbot-Crosbie to O’Brien, 13 Aug 1904 (U.C.C., William O’Brien papers, A N. 208). 35 The Times, 27 Sept 1904. O’ Brien to Dunraven, 18 Nov 1904, 4 Dec 1904; Dunraven to O’Brien, 30 Nov 1904 (N.L.I., William O’ Brien papers, MSS 8554(4) ).

36 Berkley, ‘Notes for an autobiography’, p. 40. 37 Ibid., p. 46. 38 [bid., p. 33. 39 Dunraven, Past times, ii, p. 38.

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but rarely heeded; where if there was a viable centre in Irish politics one never heard what it thought but merely what it was told to think; and in which everyone maintained that numbers paled in significance when confronted by the influence of ‘a few important men’, it was their lack of importance that was so glaringly apparent by 1905. Ten years after the dawning of the ‘golden opportunity’ the forces of moderation had so isolated themselves in the political spectrum as to be impotent and immaterial — their ideals now simply the preoccupation of, in George Bernard Shaw’s wicked phrase, ‘gentleman whose pastime it is to settle the Irish question in the correspondence column of The Times’ .4° But with Dunraven went devolution, the only plausible unionist alternative to prolonged resistance.

II The legacy of the Balfourian myth It may perhaps appears strange to some who have watched the course of the unionist policy in Ireland, that after all the concessions which have been made and the reforms inaugurated during the past ten years, so little real progress should have been made towards the conciliation of the Irish people. . . The Irish question, on the contrary is still with us . it might perhaps be shown that to some extent [these reforms] were responsible for a part at least of the failure. . . this is not an unusual consequence of a policy formulated with the sole design of killing popular discontent by kindness, especially when the discontent is widespread and real Sir John Ross c. 1905

The last months of the unionist regime passed away amid petty squabbles and bitter recriminations. Walter Long — ‘personally I belong to the ‘‘stupid’”’ party’4' — was not so much reactionary4? as 40 George Bernard Shaw, The matter with Ireland: collected writings on Ireland, ed

Rupert Hart-Davis (London, 1962). 41 Long to A.J. Balfour, 27 Nov 1898 (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49776). 42 J. Brown, ‘The appointment of the 1905 Poor Law Commission’ in J. H.R. Bull, xlii (1969), pp 239-42.

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unimaginative, seeking only to provide ‘steady, quiet but firm administration’ in stark contrast to the ‘quack medicine’ of late.43 To him unionist policy was to be limited to ‘law and order and the development of national resources’ 44 — a view that few could take umbrage at until it became clear that by it he meant to cave in to Treasury pressure and cut back on development (i.e. land purchase, drainage schemes etc) in return for an increase in the police establishment.45 A spectacular row with Dudley ensued and with Curzon kicking up in India, Arthur Balfour became more than a little tired of his viceroys, particularly since he had no alternative but to support Long. In the aftermath of the devolution crisis and with an election beckoning, fence-mending was bound to be the order of the day, even if it meant the Kildare Street Club being ‘in office’. The years after 1905 saw a protracted debate among its protagonists on the failure of constructive unionism. Despite official denials, that it had failed was unquestioned: the only time that Horace Plunkett perceived loyalty to be on the increase was on the occasion of the Duke of York’s visit to the Dublin horse show! 4¢ For some, policies of conciliation led by chief secretaries, ‘unversed in Irish affairs’ and reluctant to break their dependence on ‘the mere individual opinions of persons . . . [of] no position or influence in the country’ for the state of public opinion, was short-sighted at the very least.47 Harrel, who was one of these ‘persons’, concurred with this and added the Westminster dimension which resulted in haphazard reformist policies that were invariably too little, too late.48 But this only prompted standard excuses from Balfour that all the policy lacked was time.*? Far more telling was the condemnation of British unionism’s inability to conceive of Irish nationalism as an entity in itself. In particular Arthur Balfour’s frequent 43 Long to Sandars, 15 Mar 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49776). 44 Long to Wyndham, 2 Sept 1906 (W.R.O., Walter Long papers, 947/126). 45 Walter Long, Memories (London 1923), pp 140-174; Long to MacDonnell, 1 June 1905 (W.R.O., Walter Long papers, 947/106); for his negotiations with the Treasury see W.R.O., 947/101. 46 H.C.P. diaries, 25 Aug 1897, (P.F.O.). 47 Ross’s

draft

memorandum,

n.d.

[1905]

(P.R.O.N.I.,

Ross

of Bladensburg,

D2004/4/65). 48 Sir David Harrel, ‘Recollections and reflections’, 1926 (T.C.D., Harrel papers, MSS 3918b, p. 178). 49 Curtis, Coercion and conciliation, p. 434.

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analogy with Scottish patriotism was tenuous in the extreme.°° Scotland remained unionist in 1707 (and 1979) not because of the alleviation of grievances but because of the existence of long established, powerful and socially widespread ties with England. Most obvious was lowland Scotland’s integration industrially and commercially with Great Britain. More significant surely was the matter of religion. By the final Jacobite defeat at the very latest the protestant faith was largely accepted throughout Scottish society and certainly by the nineteenth century there was no significant dissident minority — let alone a 74% majority as in catholic Ireland. Furthermore for all Scotland’s European associations during the enlightenment, by the late nineteenth century there had developed, especially in the Highlands and the Borders, strong traditions of service in the British Empire.5! The comparison could not be more inappropriate. The task of creating such economic and social links while the political union was under attack was bound to prove immensely difficult. Even Plunkett realised in his first unsolicited memorandum to Walter Long that the unionist economic strategy must fail unless it attempted to create a tie beyond that of advantage.5? With this of course John Ross of Bladensburg was in complete agreement. Nevertheless for him the. moral vacuum had a decidedly religious hue. With the Irish party at the beck and call of its extremists and the formation of a moderate centre party ‘hardly at any time possible’, the only ‘corporation’ sufficiently representative of Irish opinion and with whom the government could have worked, he argued, was the Roman Catholic Church.53 Given the government’s policy of enlarging popular participation, the church’s control over the popular mind and its natural conservativism should have proved essential to the ‘safe’ transfer of power. But in the formation of such an alliance ‘the university question . . . formed the key to the situation and the pivot on which all else was to turn’.54 Thus the 50 Blanche Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London, 1936), ii, p. 98. 51 Christopher Harvie, Scotland and nationalism (London, 1977), pp 29-32, 41, 97, 139-40; Bruce Lenman, /nfegration, enlightenment and industrialisation: Scotland,

1746-1832 (London, 1981), pp 1-2, 17-19. 52 Andrew Gailey, ‘Horace Plunkett’s new Irish policy of 1905’ in Keeting (ed.), Plunkett and co-operatives, pp 83-5.

53 Ross to Duke of Norfolk (draft), 24 Feb 1905 (P.R.O.N.I., Ross of Bladensburg

papers, D2004/4/67). 54 Ibid., 14 Apr 1905, (P.R.O.N.I., Ross of Bladensburg papers, D2004/4/69).

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initial refusal to respond to the Robertson report in early 1903; followed by the sudden adoption in the autumn of a scheme that nobody had asked for only to abandon it equally abruptlyin 1904; while throughout, Dublin Castle continued its efforts to centralise control of primary education, all served to disillusion the bishops and provoke a new rapport with political nationalism. As it was this reversal coincided with a revival of the catholic revanche of the 1880s in the form of the Dublin Catholic Association. Although this body did not survive Archbishop’s Walsh’s censure, it reflected a new mood of intolerance that went beyond the irritations of a disappointed catholic unionist. Similarly, although there were many who sympathised with Ross’s fears of government-engendered secularism, they were not reading his memoranda but the distinctly alien novels of the catholic priest, Canon Sheehan: whose books were deeply moralistic, virulently anti-British and highly popular. In this atmosphere there was no need for Cardinal Logue to read Jreland in the new century before denouncing it out of hand.§5 Intriguingly it was the revival of strident catholicism that encouraged certain moderates to take up enthusiastically the Gaelic League whose cultural nationalism in theory rejected both the sectarianism of nationalist politics and the cynical manipulation of unionist policies. In their place it offered a sense of Irishness which was modern, spiritually vital, imaginative and crucially all-embracing.5* This position was perfectly embodied in a correspondence early in 1905 between T.W. Rolleston and Canon Hannay and which for all its idealism conveyed the overwhelming impression of driftwood left high and dry by a tide that had rolled out to sea and the gathering storm beyond. Unquestionably residual, it nonetheless pinpointed the cultural restraints that were closing in around progressive politics. Flushed by the reception that his first political novel, The seething pot,’’ had received from Irish political society, Hannay began concocting a scheme for a radical alliance between Sinn Fein and the 1.0.0. (which he interpreted as a revival of northern presbyterian radicalism of the 1790s) against the domination of the narrow priest and the political boss.58 He quickly 55 Plunkett to O’ Brien, 12 Mar 1904 (U.C.C., William O’ Brien papers, A N. 187-90). 56 Rolleston to Hannay, 12 Mar 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 3454/180). 57 Hannay’s diary, 4 July 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 9234). 58 Hannay to Lindsay Crawford, 26, 29 May 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 3454/194a, 195a).

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gained Rolleston’s support for an attempt to put Arthur Griffith in touch with Lindsay Crawford, leading propagandist of the I.0.0.59 Not surprisingly when the latter produced the Maghermore Manifesto in July 1905 Hannay was ecstatic.6° Here were Orangemen declaring unionism to be ‘a discredited creed’ and calling on ‘protestant and Roman Catholic’ to ‘in their common trials unite on a true basis of nationality’.©! Thus the combination of the ‘brave and honest men in [the] northern protestant democracy’ ,®? the economic programmes of Sinn Fein and the resurrection of Irish pride and ‘character’ through the Gaelic League offered the possibility of strong moral public opinionina rejuvenated Ireland.®? With this would come the opportunity to restore a revitalised Irish gentry to their rightful position in Irish society — a goal that Hannay pursued endlessly both in his novels and in real life: ‘why not discard the hopeless negations of Londonderry and Ardilaun, cut yourself adrift from the little coterie of place hunting Dublin lawyers and come out as a real national leader’ ,°*he urged Hugh Montgomery; who not surprisingly held none of Hannay’s hopes and aspired only to replace Plunkett as head of the I.A.0.S.°5 As it was, Rolleston had little of Hannay’s trust in Griffith and Sinn Fein: a ‘venemous little clique’ whose ‘puerile ideas of nationality are as great a danger to [the Gaelic League] as the bigotry and Billingsgate of the Leader’ .** In the end both the 1.0.0. and the league proved to be vehicles for narrow sectarianism, as Hannay found to his cost when priests of a very different nature from Father O’Meara in Benedict Kavanagh hounded him out of the organisation, out of his parish in Westport, and eventually out of Ireland altogether.*® 59 Rolleston to Hannay, 14 Mar 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 3454/183). 60 Hannay to Crawford, 15 July 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 3454/208a). 61 J.W. Boyle, ‘The Belfast Protestant Association’, pp 133-5; for a critique of the Maghermore Manifesto see Henry Patterson, ‘Independent Orangeism and class conflict in Edwardian Belfast: a reinterpretation’ in Proc. R. Ir. Acad., 80c (1980), pp 1-27. 62 Birmingham, Benedict Kavanagh, p. 204.

63 Ibid., p. 216. 64 Hannay to Montgomery, papers, T1089/324, 326).

24 May 1907, 11 June 1907 (P.R.O.N.I., Montgomery

65 R.A. Anderson, With Horace Plunkett in Ireland (London, 1935), pp 125-9. 66 Rolleston to Hannay, 10 Apr 1905 (T.C.D., Hannay papers, MSS 3454/189).

67 R.B.D. French, ‘J.O. Hannay and the Gaelic League’ in Hermathena, cii (Spring, 1966), pp 26-52; R.B. McDowell, The Church of Ireland, 1869-1969 (London, 1969), pp

100-101.

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It is easy to dismiss such episodes as the politics of fantasy. But to do so would be to miss the point. For Hannay and Rolleston were concerned, as indeed were Plunkett and Ross, with a crisis within Irish society which was created and then largely ignored by the government in which they had held such high hopes. But undermining the traditional forces of authority in the localities without establishing ‘a new social order’ inits place was plainly an abdication of responsibility. To men of this stamp any unionist solution to the Irish question had to revolve around the re-establishment of the gentry’s leadership on a surer social foundation. Instead Irish society was left exposed to the evils of secularism (Ross), popularism (Plunkett) and priestly tyranny (Hannay) — left, as Moore had always said that it would be, with the ox and the priest. Yet for all their perception their analysis was singularly myopic. Plunkett wrote Noblesse oblige (1907) presumably because ‘the nobility’ did not feel so inclined. For the reason why one need look no further than Hannay’s novels: The seething pot (1905) and Hyacinth (1906) both describe the travails of a young man who tried to cross the class divide and reconcile the two traditions only to meet nationalist rebuff. Both stories end symbolically with hero retreating defeated from the fray to the comfortable anonymity of Anglo-Ireland; a social theme echoed by George Moore in both The wild goose (1903) and The lake (1905), although in each case the retreat was from Ireland, as Moore himself was to experience when he returned in 1911 to an England whose jingoism had hardly lessened.¢®8 What they (excepting Moore who rarely viewed the issues in such a narrowly political sense) ignored were the immense party and doctrinal restraints that prevented the government from acting as they desired. More seriously they did not perceive the real objectives of British unionism. What was most striking in the aftermath of the devolution crisis was the ease with which Arthur Balfour accepted the (officially de facto) demise of constructive unionism. There is no evidence of the depression with which Cadogan®? and Wyndham viewed the 68 F.S.L. Lyons, ‘George Moore and Edward Martyn’ in Hermathena, xcviii (Spring,

1964), p. 204. 69 Cadogan holidaying in Cannes ‘grieved to read of the triumph of the Ulstermen which will I believe do much to destroy our work in Ireland, where you and I tried so much to hold the balances. . .” Cadogan to G. W. Balfour, 6 Mar 1905 (Whitt., G.B.P.); Wyn-

dham to A.J. Balfour, 4 Dec 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., MSS 49805).

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future; 7° nor any of the despair of Plunkett and Dunraven as they made desperate attempts to restore the policies of reconstruction. This equanimity was, of course, totally in character; but it also emerged because to Balfour nothing had really changed.7! With Wyndham ditched, Balfour’s position and that of his party remained intact. This spoke volumes for the prime minister’s commitment to constructive unionism as a policy for Irish government and to appreciate this fully one has to return to the origins of the Balfourian myth. For a start constructive unionism was not simply a unionist policy but a body of ideas that had evolved within protestant society in Ireland during the 1870s and sprang from dissatisfaction with Gladstone and the insensitivity — symbolised by disestablishment — and inefficiency of government under the union. Although never more than a minor strain in protestant politics, these reformist ideas on administration, education, land-holding and (to a lesser extent) federalism won favour with British conservative politicians stranded in Ireland, such as Hicks Beach and Lord Randolph Churchill.72 These were the ideas that Balfour effectively hi-jacked in 1887. Despite Curtis’ work, ‘Bloody’ Balfour went to Ireland as firm a coercionist as he had been in Scotland.72« The primary, though by no means the sole, purpose of radical Irish reforms such as the C.D.B. was not a Wyndhamite dream of social reconstruction or even the long term strengthening of the union, but simply to keep Ireland quiet.73 Conversely conciliation was not intended ‘to solve the Irish question’ by undermining the home rule movement in Ireland for that would only destroy the raison d’étre of his party; and Balfour was above all a party man.73¢ The unionists’ Irish policy was a British policy for a British electorate

70 ‘If Irishmen come to understand how little English politicians — conservatives, liberals, free traders, protectionists and labour men — know or care about Irish interests, they will discover that they cannot afford to imitate the worst features in our party system’. Wyndham to Bertram Windle, 1 Nov 1905, in Guy Wyndham, Letters. 71 A.J. Balfour to Dudley, 16 Mar 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., MSS 49802). 72 McCafferty, ‘Federalism’, pp 7-58; Thornley, ‘Irish conservatives’, pp 200-220; R.F. Foster, ‘Parnell and his people: the ascendancy and home rule’ in the Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, June 1980, pp 105-134. 72a Charles Townshend, Political violence in Ireland (Oxford, 1984), pp 207-12. 73 Wyndham clearly admitted this to Austen Chamberlain, Wyndham to Austen Chamberlain, 26 Jan 1904 (Birmingham U.L., A.C.P., AC/16/3/45). 73a Dugdale, Balfour, ii, pp 74-77.

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and intended to keep the Irish question as the foundation of party structure and of British politics. Conciliation was aimed not at the irreconcilable Irish nationalists but the conservatives’ political allies, the liberal unionists: the land act of 1887 was the price for the crimes act and the embarrassing local government bill of 1892 was a gesture, with an election looming, towards Chamberlain’s A unionist policy for Ireland.74 As such Balfour’s Irish reforms added substance to the rhetorical myth of his fusion of coercion and conciliation and gave a pleasing parliamentary gloss to a parliamentary alliance. It was question time and not Mitchelstown or even the C.D.B. that made Balfour. By keeping Chamberlain in the fold and by leading the defence of the union with such panache and verve Balfour ensured that his ‘catch-all’ policy would cement the parliamentary forces of unionism. This was the real achievement of his chief secretaryship. But the Irish consequences were enormous. 1886 and the unionists’ assumption of a fundamentalist position on the act of union effectively determined that any reformist schemes that Balfour or his disciples might espouse would ultimately have to be tempered to the party’s narrow perception of unionism. Given that the two party system was now structured around the division within Irish politics, any unionist attempt to achieve reconciliation in Ireland was bound to be compromised at Westminster. Thus British unionism denied unionist governments any ultimate objective in their Irish policy, as was painfully demonstrated by frustration of Wyndham’s visionary schemes. Indeed it could be argued that Wyndham failed because he took the party’s rhetoric too seriously. In any case, in relation to Irish government, Arthur Balfour’s chief secretaryship had proved nothing. The Plan of Campaign had been defeated as much by the harvest as the crimes act,75 and by leaving Ireland so soon after introducing novel institutions of conciliation, he avoided the necessity of resolving the dilemma when conciliation verged too close to appeasement. Furthermore his claim to have fused coercion and conciliation, while it caught the eye of English public opinion, was a delusion which allowed the development of two interpretations of Balfourian policy. Despite Balfour’s nonchalant 74 Marsh, The discipline of popular government, pp 120-4, 215. 75 Joseph Lee, The modernisation of Irish society, 1848-1918 (Dublin, 1973), pp 122-3. For a recent account that emphasises the effectiveness of coercion see Charles Townshend, Political violence, pp 212-221.

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air after the devolution crisis this was not simply a question of balance. For Balfour’s triumphant return in 1891 did not herald the establishment of a strong, single unionist policy towards Ireland but simply legitimised two essentially conflicting philosophies within the party. As became increasingly obvious after Rosebery’s ‘predominant partner’ speech and the liberals’ efforts to shelve Gladstonian home rule, the political debate among unionists on Irish affairs declined into a fierce dispute between those who had not budged over Ireland since 1886 and presumed themselves to be orthodox; and those who in the wake of more pressing and just as revolutionary questions (particularly about the economy) preferred to be more flexible (or less concerned) over Ireland.’ The conflict rarely came out into the open and was certainly never formalised a la the tariff controversy because most unionists assumed that, despite appearances, on Ireland, (by which most meant home rule) they all did (and had to) agree. But between 1895-1905 Ireland was not homerule and consequently Irish policy became the victim of doctrinal contradictions. To attempt to resolve these would be to risk the very existence of the party; but to do nothing only condemned the Irish government ‘to go nowhere’. However, by 1905 for constructive unionism there was nowhere to go. The violent uproar over devolution was just the final culmination of what Dunraven called ‘the revolt of neo-unionism’. For him the question that beckoned was ‘whether the new unionism — the unionism of mere negation — will absorb all unionist sentiment?’ 77 In a very real sense however the struggle to maintain a progressive unionist policy in Ireland had already been lost, not simply because of a lack of support in Ireland — the recess committee and the land conference had illustrated definite possibilities — but because it had too few active proponents in Westminster and Whitehall. And from 1906 onwards Walter Long made sure that any who felt tempted were tarred with the brush of devolution.78 When in 1912 the Irish question resumed its traditional form, the unionists met the challenge of Erskine Childers’ The

76 Dunraven to MacDonnell,

12 Sept 1906 (Bodl., A.M.P., MSS Eng hist, c 350, ff

136-7). 77 Tbid. 78 J.R. Fanning, ‘The unionist party and Ireland, 1906-10’ in J.H.S., xv, no 57 (1966-7), pp 147-171.

The Killing of Kindness & What Kindness Killed

SHES

framework for home rule (1911) with a collection of essays entitled Againsthome rule. After a meandering discourse from Arthur Balfour on Ireland’s racial diversity, the criticisms of home rule rained in thick and fast. The array of argument and evidence was undoubtedly impressive but lest any remained unconvinced the book concluded with a ‘constructive’ section in which George Wyndham extolled his land act and Gerald Balfour lauded Horace Plunkett. In what was clearly intended as a propagandist work nothing could be more symbolic ofthe fate of constructive unionism than its embalming in the final third of this supremely negative work; isolated, almost an irrelevant afterthought and written in the glow of retrospection, there was nothing which suggested that unionism could or would overcome the contradictions that plagued its policies between 1895 and 1905. In its own way, Against home rule served as the ultimate critique of unionism as a political philosophy of Irish government.

Ul Constructive unionism and the polarization of Irish politics I see a seething pot, and the face of it is towards the north. Jeremiah I, viii

You should read ‘A seething pot’ — a good novel about Ireland . . . [with] types of all who, at this moment, lead mutually destructive and abortive movements in that land of apparently endless regurgitations.

Wyndham to Blunt, 20 April 1905.

Perhaps the greatest legacy of Balfourism was its failure in Ireland. In terms of developing Irish prosperity this was highly predictable given that policies of peasant proprietorship and the shoring up of unprofitable cottage industries were hardly conducive to economic efficiency.7° As for its political legacy, nationalist history has always presumed it to be irrelevant, notwithstanding the keen debates of the 79 Lee, Modernisation, pp 124-6; Mary E. Daly, Social and economic history of Ireland since 1800 (Dublin, 1981), p. 76; L.M. Cullen, An economic history of Ireland

since 1660 (London,

1972), pp 150-4.

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& What Kindness Killed

contra-factual enthusiasts on whether killing home rule by kindness would have ‘worked’ with time. Predictably they have achieved little. Perhaps their interest has led them to ignore the valid question of how far Ireland’s subsequent political development was affected by the experiment in constructive unionism because modern Ireland was shaped as much by failure as by Irish nationalism. While one can doubt that the unionists intended their ameliorative measures to kill home rule, there

can be little question that ‘kindness’ had a pronounced impact on Irish politics. If in the wider sense unionist kindness was designed to deal not with nationalism as such but the threat of socialism, in Ireland such

strategies were spectacularly successful. The land legislation and the C.D.B. sustained the rural economy®® and determined a fiercely parochial and conservative society which would have little interest in social revolution, as the years after 1916 demonstrated. Moreover this ethos was in turn maintained by the Free State in the form of the Land Commission and the Gaeltacht policies. Intriguingly to Arthur Balfour in his declining years this remained one of his proudest achievements.8! Although there has been very little research on the political impact of amelioration in rural society, it appears likely that the intrusions of the state, such as the reform of local government or the grants of the C.D.B., while gratefully received, simply institutionalised and strengthened existing power and patronage structures, and were quickly absorbed into the local political culture where adherence to home rule was a basic assumption.®2 However at the national level many of the party leadership did fear that an increase in prosperity could kill popular enthusiasm for an Irish parliament precisely because the local allegiance to home rule was only one of a whole complex of social, economic and communal relations and essentially was more a part of parochial culture than of a national political movement. Furthermore when the national party split into three or four competing organisations, who were all virtually insolvent and equally ineffective in defending the interests of the ruled against the 89 Daly, Social and economic history of Ireland, pp 51, 54-7, 136; W.J.P. Logan, ‘Co Donegal

and the Congested

Districts

Board,

1891-1909’

(unpublished

M.A.

thesis,

Queen’s University Belfast, 1976); W.L. Micks, History of the Congested Districts Board (Dublin, 1925). For the contribution of Plunkett’s co-operative movement, Carla Keating (ed), Plunkett and co-operatives, pp 61-5. 81 Dugdale, Balfour, ii, p. 95. 82 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life, 1913-21 (Dublin, 1977), pp 87, 97.

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state, the relationship between parliamentary and popular nationalism became steadily, weaker. The defeat of Gladstone’s second home rule bill in 1893 and the unionist landslide in the general election two years later provoked a widespread disillusionment over the opportunities for home rule and a growing concentration on the development of Ireland’s material resources and economic needs. Consequently the unionists’ remedial legislation only served to accelerate the decline in influence of the Irish parliamentary party and left the leadership in a tortuous dilemma of either rejecting these much needed social reforms and risking further unpopularity or supporting them and acquiescing in their own isolation: a choice which invariably ended in bitter recriminations as the Parnellites under John Redmond, seemingly in an effort to outflank John Dillon, were determined to support conciliation.83 At the local level this conflict was reflected in the bitter feud between the shopkeepers (who were deeply involved in the nationalist organisation) and the equally nationalist farmers over Plunkett’s co-operatives.83¢ By 1898, with party funds at an all-time low, Dillon admitted to O’ Brien that an appeal to the country could shatter the parliamentary wing. O’Brien also recognised the need of what he called ‘an outside public opinion’ and suggested that the politicians should align with the United Irish League over the emotive and therefore popular issue of the grazing lands: Here, . . . ready to your hands is what we have been pining for for the last eight years — a public opinion live, real and resolute, not depending on the priests on the one hand nor the toleration of the Independent on the other for its existence or growth.84

In the end O’Brien’s movement, aided by raw imperialism in southern Africa, proved a highly effective base for a reunified nationalist movement, but even its influence began to wane when the unionists produced the land act of 1903. Thereafter, if not before, the unity of rural nationalism evaporated amid the ranch war (1906-09) against the graziers.84¢ 83 O’Brien to his wife, 14 Apr 1896(U.C.C., William O’Brien papers, BE. 16); Lyons, I.P.P., pp 68, 229-33. 83a | jam Kennedy, ‘Farmers, traders and agricultural politics in pre-independence Ireland’ in Clark and Donnelly, Jrish Peasants, pp 339-373. 84 O’Brien to Dillon, 26 Dec 1898, cited in F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon (London, 1968), pp 178, 197. 84a David S. Jones, ‘The cleavage between graziers and peasants in the land struggle, 1890-1910’ in Clark and Donnelly, /rish Peasants, pp 374-418 [esp. p. 387].

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Perhaps the greatest threat from the government came from its indirect encouragement of moderates, who ostensibly sought to break away from the arid debate over the union and to reconcile through cooperation both unionists and nationalists. Such friendships could produce dramatic results. Horace Plunkett’s recess report and his work with the I.A.O.S. led to the establishment of D.A.T.I.; and Lord Dunraven’s land conference of 1902 was taken so seriously primarily because everyone knew the government would implement its findings. This was just the kind of influence that the Irish party no longer held and the ability of Plunkett, Dunraven and T.W. Russell to arouse widespread support from the centre of Irish politics on specific issues persuaded John Redmond and William O’Brien that perhaps the nationalists’ future lay with co-operation and not all-out confrontation. But, for Dillon, the strategy of ‘conference plus business’ threatened to destroy the party. It was not just that-the amelioration of social grievances would weaken popular nationalism — Dillon once admitted to Wilfred Blunt ‘that the land trouble is a weapon in nationalist hands’, and that to settle it finally would be to risk home rule, ‘which otherwise must come’ 85 — but that it was impossible to co-operate with unionists without ultimately compromising on home rule and losing the young nationalists to the Irish Republican Brotherhood.8* He could not comprehend how nationalists like T.P. Gill could believe that Ireland was ‘approaching a turning point when unionism and nationalism will cease to be antagonistic’.87 But what horrified him even more was that ‘by allowing the initiative on, and the direction of, large Irish questions to be taken out of the hands of the Irish party and handed over to the conferences summoned by outsiders’ ,88 the Irish party were abandoning their position as the sole representatives of the Irish people and giving credibility to a central position in Irish politics. And this could leave the traditional home rulers in the periphery. Indeed Michael Davitt firmly believed that ‘the constitutional movement . . . [was] dead . . . poisoned by O’Brien with a big dose of Dunravenism’ .89 Hence Dillon’s pursuit of O’ Brien in 1903, the success of which closed down the strategy of 85 Blunt, Diaries, i, p. 468 (5 May 1903). 86 Lyons, Dillon, p. 240.

87 Gill to W.E. Gladstone, 25 Aug 1896 (N.L.I., T.P.G.P., MSS 13509(5) ): 88 Dillon to Redmond, 2 Oct 1903 (T.C.D., Dillon papers, 6747/48). 89 Lyons, Dillon, p. 239.

The Killing of Kindness & What Kindness Killed

oL7

conciliation and co-operation. So that when Dunraven did make a bid for the centre with his Irish Reform Association and their policy of devolution in September 1904, it won little Irish support as Dillon vehemently proclaimed that ‘any vote of confidence in Lord Dunraven . . could tear the ranks of the nationalists in Ireland to pieces’.9° Such an uncompromising stance can only be understood in reference to the fragility of a party structure that had emerged out of the bitter hositlities in the 1880s and which, without such clear cut issues as home rule, was in danger of breaking up into its constituent parts. Thus Balfourism simply strengthened those forces which sought to overturn this structure by simulating a new synthesis between unionism and nationalism. It is not a question of whether there could have been a viable centre party in Irish politics or not, but that, in a decade of weakness and insecurity, nobody could confidently deny the possibility; Dillon for one was utterly convinced of the existence of ‘a deep laid plot to capture Ireland out of the hands of the national party’ .91 Consequently by 1905 conciliation had paradoxically compelled the Irish party to adopt an extremely narrow, inflexible but consolidating policy of absolute concentration on home rule. As has been seen an unstable party system without the binding force of the constitutional controversy had affected the Irish unionist party as traumatically as it did its nationalist counterpart. Inevitably the failure to gain McDonnell’s scalp ensured that 1905 would bring little relief and indeed this reverse was quickly followed by two others. Firstly in July, they almost lost a by-election in west Down, which had not been contested since Gladstone first espoused home rule, and then had their majority in north Belfast cut by 80% in a contest with a labour candidate. Just as perturbing was the publication of the Magheramorne manifesto by Lindsay Crawford of the I.O.O. calling for a patriotic class alliance. It was hardly surprising therefore that, facing these threats and a major assault from the Russellites, the Irish unionist leadership pleaded with Balfour to delay the general election.9? Equally predictable was Sandars’ response when Long relayed to Balfour the request not to ‘hand [the Irish unionists] over to the enemy this year’: ‘I can’t think what he means by this’ except that ‘Walter as chief secretary 90 William O’Brien, An olive branch in Ireland (London, 1910), p. 326. 91 John Dillon’s diaries, 15 May 1903, cited in Lyons, Dillon, p. 234.

92 Saunderson to A.J. Balfour, 18 Nov 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49817).

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means to hunt this winter in Meath!!!’ 93 When it came in January 1906 the sense of imminent catastrophe was heightened when at a large unionist rally, clearly intended to imitate the great Ulster convention of 1892, Abercorn and Saunderson were shouted down and only T.H. Sloan of the 1.0.0. was allowed to speak.®4 In the end, despite the pleas by the establishment for party unity, in the thirteen contested unionist seats, eleven were fought between unionists, one was against labour and only one was against a nationalist. The independents succeeded in defeating three official candidates, including William Moore, and the labour candidate, William Walker, continued to reduce the unionist majority in north Belfast. At the same time the nationalist Joseph Devlin capitalized on a unionist split to win west Belfast by sixteen votes. In the capital of Ulster unionism, only east Belfast remained a safe official seat.95 Yet despite ‘the crash’, neo-unionism survived and gradually began to exert its authority and that of the Ulster Unionist Council over protestant politics in the north. As it was the 1906 election was not the disaster the returns implied for in defeat the official unionists had won a number of important victories. Official candidates defeated two of the independent M.P.s and during the election campaign they managed to split the 1.0.0. by forcing T.H. Sloan to rescind his support for the Magheramore manifesto ‘for the sake of unity in the ranks of the unionists’.9° The manifesto had in any case been far too radical for most of the breakaway movement, who really wanted the revival of protestant unionism and not a non-sectarian class alliance to assert the interests of the Belfast democracy. Indeed the very extremism of

Crawford’s arguments reflected the successful reassertion ofthe official party as the spokesman for sectarian unionism.” After the collapse of the Belfast strike of 1907 and the growing hostility of Joseph Devlin’s Ancient Order of Hibernians, such an alliance was totally out of the question.?® However the striking feature of the demise of the forces which appeared so powerful before 1906 was just how insignificant they 93 Sandars to A.J. Balfour, 16 Aug 1905 (B.L., A.B.P., Add MSS 49760). 94 Belfast Newsletter, 3 Jan 1906. 95 Walker, Election results.

96 Belfast Newsletter, 1 Jan 1906. 97 Patterson, ‘Independent Orangeism’, pp 12-27. 98 Eamonn McCann, War in an Irish town (London, James Larkin (London, 1965), pp 25-40.

1974), pp 140-5; Emmet Larkin,

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319

became under a liberal government, associated since the days of Gladstone with the transgression of homerule. Nothing saved the Ulster unionist party more than the fall of the conservative government. The revival of devolution in 1907 by the liberals stiffened loyalist ranks and the introduction of compulsory purchase eased the tension over the land question. All this, together with Russell’s return to the liberal party and to office, effectively ensured the collapse of the tenant movement in Ulster. Most important however was the fact that the liberals’ return to power ended ten years of ‘enlightened’ constructive legislation which had continually divided Ulster unionists and powerfully reinforced minor elements in the party. No longer would the official leadership find itself paralysed by association with policies that infuriated their popular support and which privately they abhorred. Moreover George Wyndham, by attempting to establish a moderate consensus in Ireland, had merely determined by his failure that only the more extreme were left to fill the vacuum. Instead of ‘killing home rule by kindness’ the Balfourian government had threatened to kill Irish unionism but ultimately only secured the death of ‘kindness’ itself. When Carson came to lead Ulster against the third home rule bill in 1912 he was not simply stirring up the passions of the seventeenth century or the hysteria of the 1880s. Undoubtedly they continued to haunt unionist sentiments but the Ulster unionist party which stood resolutely in defiance of parliament differed significantly from its predecessors. After the traumas of 1895-1905, Ulster unionism knew its limitations and its weaknesses and, guarding itself against these, stuck rigidly to what was essential — the defence of the union; ‘it is home rule first and home rule last’, insisted the Belfast Newsletter, ‘and nothing else but home rule’. 19° It was the inherent divisions within unionism, together with the bitter experience of that divisive decade, that compelled and permanently established the political intransigence for which Ulster unionism became infamous. In 1886 and 1893 there was only one issue in Ulster politics; after 1905 there could only be one issue. The apparent evaporation of the divisive elements in unionist Ulster after 1906 has led some historians to question the notion of unionism in 99 McMinn, ‘Armour and liberal politics’, p. 363; McMinn, ‘Liberalism in north Antrim’, pp 26-9. 100 Belfast Newsletter, 31 Oct 1903.

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crisis.1°! Certainly there was little sign of any abatement in the popular commitment to the union — as Dunraven discovered to his cost. But it cannot be said that the survival of the Irish unionist party as united party behind a mainly tory and landed leadership was inevitable. Indeed it was in doubt right up to 1910. Political gossip always claimed that Lord Londonderry’s opposition to tariff reform sprang from ‘the fact that its author [had] never bowed the knee to Baal in the shape of Lady Londonderry.’ 192 Even so Londonderry had recognised that from 1905 an increasing number of unionist tariff reformers were willing to consider a compromise with the nationalists over home rule in return for their support for protection.!°3 To what was largely a protectionist parliamentary party home rule could easily seem curiously dated now that the fundamental issue of financing social welfare was in the open.'!°4 Not only would this have left the Irish unionists high and dry but needless to say on this crucial question they were split right down the middle. ArnoldForster had almost lost west Belfast in September 1903 through his initial espousal of tariff reform and by 1906 a whips’ analysis found that of the sixteen Irish unionist M.P.s five could be denoted protectionists. Significantly the issue divided the most influential M.P.s with Saunderson, McCalmont, Sloan and Lonsdale confronting Carson, Craig, Campbell and Long.!°5 For all Long and Londonderry’s efforts to expose the Chamberlainite heresy, it was Balfour’s prevarication over tariffs and the challenge of Lloyd George’s budget to the house of lords which ensured the return of the old, straightforward struggle. The party which in office had imperilled the Irish unionist movement by its policies, saved it when in opposition by default. Such was the flux of Irish politics in the years after the fall of Parnell.

101 Patterson, ‘Independent Orangeism’, p. 27.

102 Sir Almeric Fitzroy’s diaries, 16 Nov 1905 (B.L., Fitzroy papers, Add MSS 48380,

p. 131). 103 Fanning, ‘The unionist party and Ireland’, pp 149-151, 160-1. 104 Ibid.; Sykes, Tariff Reform, pp 228-232. 105 Acland Hood to Sandars, 9, 10, 18 Sept 1903 (Bodl., Sandars papers, MSS Eng hist. c 741, ff 66, 115, 234); Iwan Muller, 24 Sept 1903 (Bodl., Sandars papers, MSS Eng hist. c 742, f. 151); unsigned memorandum, n.d. [1906?](Bodl., Sandars papers, c 744, f.

196).

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& What Kindness Killed

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IV There is one thing that is more necessary in Irish affairs thana policy and that is the discovery of aman to carry the policy into effect. He must be an Irishman — for we stupid Englishmen are not fitted for the delicate work of administering the affairs of a quick witted race like the Irish. He must not be identified with either of the two parties in Ireland to such an extent as to prejudice his work with the party to which he does not belong. He must be a man of genius and have ideas — he must bea man of business and be able to give practical shape to his ideas. Where is this paragon to be found? Find him and you have solved the Irish question. Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Londonderry 25 February 1898 196

Not even Parnell at the height of his influence fitted this bill. Nevertheless in the void that he left there were many who pursued what Chamberlain plainly felt to beimpossible. If there was a single theme to Irish politics of this period, it was the pursuit of public opinion by all who were politically committed in a search for a consensus of popular support to replace the jaded and overstrained party machines that had dominated politics in the 1880s. O’Brien and Russell tried to create a popular base with their tenant movements, as did Plunkett with his coopertives and Dunraven through conferences and the Irish Reform Association. George Wyndham was convinced that, following his land act, the Irish government was ‘the only popular force in Ireland’; but there were other challenges of a different nature from organisations like th G.A.A., the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein, while throughout the decade Dillon and the Duke of Abercorn sought to reassert loyalties to the traditional political parties. The impact of the government was not to introduce this potential anarchy but, with its resources, it acted asa catalyst on the progressive elements within Irish society, though often this intrusion was spasmodic and unpredictable in its results. In retrospect the unionists had gone to Ireland with a position but not a plan and theschemes that did follow were hastily drawn up, inadequately 106 Joseph Chamberlain to Londonderry, donderry papers, D2846/3/10/9).

25 Feb

1898 (P.R.O.N.I.,

Lady

Lon-

gag

The Killing of Kindness & What Kindness Killed

financed and rarely appreciated or supported by the ‘predominant partner’. Writing with uncanny foresight, the ageing Stephen de Vere grieved in 1896 that he had lived to see the feebleness with which the present unionist government have deserted promise after promise, and principle after principle. The day will come when they willrun, having abandoned the liberal unionist gentlemen of Ireland. The worst sting is that of the dead wasp. We are ruined, and repeal will be the consequence of the first great war.1°7

Yet the real failure of constructive unionism was not home rule or even independence for the experience of the previous decade had demonstrated that any ambitious unionist strategy would necessitate some form of devolution. Rather it lay with a government which threatened to change the very character of Irish politics, without the means, the method or any great motivation, and subsequently only left two extremely suspicious and insecure parties to become utterly inflexible, and so drastically reduce the openings for reconciliation and cooperation within Ireland. This was conciliation’s greatest impact and partition was its saddest epitaph.

107 Stephen de Vere to Lord Monteagle, 27 July [1896?] (P.R.O.N.I., Monteagle papers, A/30).

SELECTED

A

MANUSCRIPT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

COLLECTIONS

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323

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INDEX

Abercorn, duke of, 10, 11, 13, 47,74, 75, 117-119, 124, 138, 140, 146, 148, ISO=3e 1555 Si 2185225-695 leo Admiralty, the, 82, 90, 272, 283 Against home rule, 313 agriculture, 34, 54-5; and board of agriculture bill, 44-6, 58, 79, 115, 117, 124-5, 148; and Department of

Agriculture and Technical Instruction, see D.A.T.I. Americas Cup, 300 Akers-Douglas, A., 269 Ampthill, lord, 271-2 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 318 Anderson, R.A., 74 Anderson case, the, 229, 249 Andrews, Thomas, 74, 146, 147 Archdale, Edward, 10, 145 Ardilaun, lord, 153, 155-8, 308 Arnold-Forster, H.O., 163, 248, 2578, 263, 269, 282-3, 289, 320 Arran, earl of, 139 Ashbourne, lord, 15, 38-9, 72, 75-7, 90, 94, 176, 180, 201, 259 Asquith, H.H., 275-6, 287

Asquith, Margot, 148 Atkinson, John, 72-3, 76-7, 178, 208, 236, 247, 290 Bagwell, Richard,

151, 299 Balfour, Betty, 62, 67, 75, 79, 133, 214 Balfour, Arthur, 2, 12, 16, 50-1, 54, 119, 124, 148-152, 156-7, 163, 174,

337,

LS3ye 19720782205 229 e482 320; and Irish policy, 3-4, 16, 25-8, 29-30, 77, 88-93, 122, 162, 182-3, 209, 227, 236, 251, 253, 305-6, 30913,317 andland reform, (1896) 3640, 87, 93-4, 123, (1901-2) 177, (1903) 183, 187, 189, 190, 192-3; and local government, 27-8, 43-50, 139, 238; and financial relations, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114; and university reform, 65-6, 125-31, 143; and devolution crisis, 240, 247, 258-60, 263, 266-74, 280-9 Balfour, Frances, 95 Balfour, Gerald, 6, 7, 21, 70, 89-93, 101-2, 114-17, 121-4, 141, 148, 157, 170, 197, 209, 250, 267, 269, 285, 291, 313; and Irish policy, 25-8. 32-5, 41-2, 61-5, 67-8, 74-5, 120, 131-5, 161-2; and political beliefs, 30-2; and 1896land act, 36-40, 93-6, 123; andlocal government, 4, 27-8, 40-50, 115, 236; and poor relief, 50-54) 1115; and’ DIA. T.I., 4, 55-6, 59-61, 79, 125, 236, 238; and Irish opinion, 70-9, 150; and the Treas- . ury, 79-83, 85-8, 140, 174, 238; and the role of the state, 31-2, 50-4, 6061, 64-5 Balfour of Burleigh, lord, 119 Ball, Erlington, 156 Barbour, Sir David, 106 Barnes, Sir Hugh, 272 Barrymore, lord, 218

338

Index

Belfast city council, 143 Belfast Newsletter, 319 Belfast Protestant Association, 227-8 Bell, Moberly, 121 Benedict Kavanagh, 308 Birmingham, George, see Hannay, YO, Blake, Edward, 152, 194 Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, 30-1, 171, 182, 195, 209, 235-6, 249, 260, 316 Board of Works, 70, 80, 203-4 Boer war, 119, 131-3, 139, 162, 165, il, a Sis Brassey, T.A., 218, 221, 243 Brodrick, St John, 7, 36, 176, 261-6, 269, 271-2, 275, 288 Bryce, James, 287 Buckle, G. E., 181 Butt, Isaac, 14, 303 cabinet, the unionist, 129, 175, 182, 197, 201, 204; and policy mation, 88-93, 157, 183, 196, and financial relations, 111, and Irish legislation, 93-98,

179, for199; 113; 115-

116, 188; and 1902 land bill, 174-7; and 1903 land act, 190, 192-3; and devolution affair, 252, 254, 266-71, 273-4, 282-6; and Irish unionists,

148-50 Cadogan, earl of, 12, 21, 33, 45, 50,54,

56, 62, 67, 70-9, 82, 86, 93, 115, 132-3, 140, 148, 157, 184, 291, 309; influence on policy, 72, 75-9, 90; and landreform, 36, 39, 75-6, 94-5, 118-19, 144, 176, 217; and D.A.T.L., 59, 79; and landlords, 116, 118-19; and a catholic university, 126-7, 129-30, 143; and financial relations, 101-103, 105-6, 113-14; and Wyndham, 173-4, 180-1, 183; and coercion, 180-1.

Caledon, earl of, 20 Campbell, J.H., 277, 320 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 276We, asl Carlton Club, 25, 113 Carnarvon, earl of, 3 Carson, Edward, 36-7, 95-6, 123, 143, 149-50, 153, 158, 258, 273, 280, 319, 320 Castletown, lord, 7, 74, 103, 151, 217, 297-300 catholic university question, the, 65-6, 72, 125-31, 141-3, 146, 152, 188, 19820292055 211212922722295 24 1n 2465 250, 282-3, 301 Chamberlain, Austen, 171, 199,204-7, 240, 269 Chamberlain, Joseph, 28-9, 36-7, 89, 917,93, 95, 1d IIS 1325 143 AaGs 155; IS7 168) 176 7S OS eos. 97a? 5 200es ins 20eS2i Chaplin, Henry, 28, 91 Charity Organisation Society, 65 Childers, Erskine, 312 Childers, H.C.E., 106, 110 Church ofIreland, 8-9, 11, 12, 72, 87, 140-1 Churchill, Lord Randolph, 3, 15-16, 135, 216, 300, 310 Clonbrock, lord, 7, 151, 154 Coercion and conciliation, 4-5 Coghill, D.H., 41, 47-8, 193 Coll, Sir Peter, 265 Congested Districts Board, 3, 16, 26, 51, 55, 105, 140, 204, 310-11, 314 Conservative and Unionist Party, see unionists, Cooke, A.B., 5 Corbett, Thomas, 155 Craig, Charles C., 224-5, 229-30, 320 Craig, James, 225 Cranbrook, lord, 103

Index Crawford, Lindsay, 301, 308, 317-18 Crisis in Ireland, 299 Croke, archbishop, 15 Gurtise Pe 5S 10 Curzon, lord, 163, 171, 184, 261, 278, 305

Daily Telegraph, Daly, John,

111

103

D.A.T.I., 4, 26, 51, 55-61, 65, 68, 70-1, 79, 84, 124-5, 133, 157, 186, 203-4, 213, 214, 236-7, 298, 315 Davitt, Michael, 170, 194 de Freyne, lord, 7, 179, 182 Democracy and liberty, 19 Development of the state, the, 167,

W223i) de Vere, Stephen, 321-2 de Vesci, viscount, 7 Devlin, Joseph, 318 devolution, 2, 147,184; the Dunraven scheme, -221-3, 230; and unionist government, 235-54; and political crisis, 255-291 Devonshire, duke of, 7, 39, 91, 119, 130, 157, 176, 192 Dicey, A.V., 29, 48, 111-13, 134, 178 Dicey, professor, 130 Dillon, John, 33, 55-6, 75, 124-5,152, 199, 219-20, 277, 302, 315-17, 321 Dowden, Edward, 158, 254, 296 Drama in muslin, a, 8 Dublin Castle, 8, 43, 49-54, 68, 82, 85, 89, 150, 158, 180, 307; and policy, 70-9; inefficiency of, 58, 70-1; and Gerald Balfour, 71-2; and Wyndham, 173; and MacDonnell, 184, 186-7, 204, 208, 241, 264-5, 279, 283, 287, 299; and coordination, 188-9, 203-5, 213; and devolution, 236-44, 247, 280 Dublin Catholic Association, 307

spp

Dublin Daily Express, 9, 57 Dudley, earl of, 184, 196, 199-200, 220, 237, 239, 245, 251, 259, 269, 275-8, 280, 282, 284, 305 Dufferin and Ava, marquess of, 10, 39-40, 43, 150, 152, 154 Dunbar-Buller, C.W., 228, 301 Dunraven, earl of, 7, 102, 200-1, 224, 236-40, 242-6, 249-51, 253-4, 257, 259, 267, 269, 275-8, 310, 312, 321; his political background, 216-18; and land conference, 191-5, 214, 218, 315-16; and formation of Irish Reform Association, 219-21, 244; and September manifesto, 222-3, 244-5, 256, 261, 298-9; and failure of Irish Reform Association, 254, 296 - 304, 319 Earle, Lionel, 250-1 education, 65, 81-2, 197, 203; and intermediate schools, 15, 250; and

universities, 65-6, 125-131, 141-3, 146, 202, 211-12, 241, 250. 232-3, see alsocatholic university question; and Roman Catholic church, 15, 306-7; and Tories, 16 Educational Endowment Commission, 141 elections, 18, 179, 217; general: (1874) 14; (1895) 20; (1900) 153-5; (1906) 318; by-elections, 145, 176, 192, 317 Eliot, T.S., 163 Erasmus Smith controversy, 140-1, 146 Esmonde, Sir Thomas, 49, 139 Eton College, 166 Farrar, lord,

106 Fingall, lady, 67, 216-17 financial relations controversy, 98, 99-114, 188, 217

44,

340

Index

Finlay, Rev. T.A., 74, 147 FitzGibbon, Gerald, 15-17

Framework for home rule, the, 312 Franks, W., 72, 150, 173 Frewen, Moreton, 199, 238-9, 302 Fry Commission, 39,53, 117, 119,124 Gaelic Athletic Association,

66, 296,

home rule, 3-5, 27, 61-4, 147, 149-50, 187, 243, 245, 253, 296-7, 310-18 Howth set, 14-17, 19 Hornibrook, M., 208, 242, 244 Hutchinson-Pée, Col. W.H., 216-17,

299-300 Hyacinth, 309 Hyde, Douglas,

164

321 Gaelic League,

57, 66, 296, 307-8, 321

Giffen, Sir Robert, 109-10, 112 Gill, T.P., 57-8, 74, 113, 140, 147, 1569 2139220525398 16 Gladstone, Herbert, 287 Godley, Sir Arthur, 278, 284 Goschen, George J., 91, 115

Governing passion, the, 5-6 grand juries, abolition of, see local government reform Green, Alice Stopford, 243 Griffith, Arthur, 308 Haldane, R.B., 127-30 Halsbury, earl of, 91 Hamilton, Sir Edward, 25, 45, 84-7, 96, 122, 175, 192; and financial relations, 106-112 Hamilton, lord George, 91, 138 Hannay, J.O., 65, 295-7, 304, 307-9 Hanson, Philip, 180, 208 Harcourt, Sir William, 64 Harrel, Sir David, 50, 53-5, 70, 72, 76, 80, 82, 89, 104, 173, 180, 184, 237-8, 305 Healy, Tim, 43, 51, 124-5, 127, 141 Henley, W.E., 165 Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, 15, 16, 90-1, 119, 127, 135, 183, 310; and Irish expenditure, 79, 81-8, 174-5, 177; and financial relations, 102, 106, 108, 110 Home Government Association, 14

Independent

Orange Order, 227-9, 296, 307-8, 317-18 Ireland and empire, Treland in the new century, 213-15, 307 Irish Agricultural Organisation Socieine, J, SORE, SOL IES, 1, Ws, Te). 214, 296, 298, 308, 315 Irish Landowners’ Convention, 9, 39, (214 ldGe TAO a4 elon cOle hes WT, SOM Irish literary revival, 57, 66-7 Irish nationalism, 3, 4, 132, 174, 296; and Scottish nationalism, 66, 305-6 Irish Parliamentary Party, 27, 52, 589, 64, 83, 106, 123-8, 187, 196, 202-3, 238, 243, 311; and the ‘split’, 6, 32-3, 133; and local government reform, 47; and parliamentary obstruction, 177-9; and 1903 land act, 189, 1945, 198-9, 202; and Dunravenites, 218-220, 302-3; and government policy, 33-4, 56, 62, 63, 124-5, 313-17 Irish Reform Association, 246, 251-3, 256, 284, 321; origins of, 219-21; objectives of, 222-3, 244-5, 299; failure of, 297-304, 316 Irish Republican Brotherhood, 316 Trish Times, 9 Irish Unionist Alliance, 2, 9, 11, 20, 72, 154, 156-8, 181, 210 Iveagh, earl of, 9

Index Jameson, Andrew,

9 Johnston of Ballykilbeg, William, 145, 228 judgeships, abolition of, 82-3, 86 Kelly, Conor, Kensit, John,

139 125, 227 Kildare Street Club, 9, 73, 133, 138, 213, 302, 305 Knollys, lord, 277

Lake, the, 309 Lalor, Fintan, 62 land agitation, 27, 179, 188; Land League, 12, 15, 62, 64, 137, 301; ranch war (1906-9), 315; and Ulster tenant farmers, 12, 13, 29, 143-5, 154-5, 176-7, 224-7, 317-19 Land Commission, 72, 116-17, 169, 173, 193, 314 land conference (1902-3), 189-91, 195, 201, 239, 253, 312 land reform, 34, 65, 174-7, 181, 185, 188, 314; and land acts: (1881) 96, 137, 144; (1885) 38; (1887) 311; (1896) 26, 35-40, 81, 93-6, 122-3, 137-8, 147, 150-1; (1903) 169, 189196, 197-9, 202, 205, 208, 213, 220, 227, 239, 241-2, 246, 315; and compulsory purchase, 13, 143-5, 154-5, 171-2, 224-7 landlords, 12, 38-40, 44, 81, 94-6, 116-19, 132, 137-8, 143-5, 147, 1746, 189-91, 216-17, 220, 224-7, 300-1 Lansdowne, lord, 7, 39-40, 91, 94, 96, 176, 259, 263-4, 267-70, 274, 276-8 law and order, 176-82 Leader, The, 308 Leaders of public opinion in Ireland, 19 Lecky, W.E.H., 19, 48, 112, 142-4, 152, 154, 156, 158, 280

34]

liberal party, 35, 238, 275-6, 319; and home rule, 63, 243, 312, 318; and devolution crisis, 243, 253, 264,

286-7 Liberal and Property Defence League. The, 64 light railways, 3, 26, 34, 51, 81, 88 Literary history of Ireland, A, 164 Lloyd George, David, 320 local government, 186, 193, 202, 217; reform of, 26, 27-8, 40-50, 80, 90, DS 32 S-9 el 42 4 oe oe 236-8, 311 Local Government Board, 28, 53-4, 71, 76, 103, 203-4, 225 Logue, cardinal, 127, 131, 307 Londonderry, lord, 10, 12, 137, 148, 176, 181, 201, 263, 267, 269, 274, 289, 308, 319-20 Long, Walter, 2, 91, 157, 263, 267, 269, 272, 282-3, 285, 288-90, 304, 306, 312, 317, 320 Lonsdale, J.B., 320 Lyons, F.S.L., 296 Lyttleton, Arthur, 283 McCarthy, M.J.F., 227-8 Macartney, W.E., 154 MacDonnell, SirAnthony, 193-5, 199202; Indian experience of, 184-5; conditions of appointment, 185, 252, 259-60; and Ireland, 185-6;

and home rule, 187; and administrative coordination, 188, 203-5; and role in government, 208, 220, 241; and devolution, 221, 223, 233, 236, 239-54, 256, 299-300; and Irish unionist criticism of, 227, 229, 231, 242, 244-5, 257-9, 263, 265, 273-7, 279, 317 Mackail, J.W., 170 MacNeill, Swift, 153

342

Index

Magheramore manifesto,

308, 317-18 Mahaffy, J.P., 9, 15, 19, 201-2 Manchester Guardian, 289 Mayo, earl of, 7, 139, 218, 302 Maxse, Leo, 134, 296

Meath, earl of, 7 Micks, W.L., 140 Middleton, capt. R., 145 Milner, Sir Alfred, 272 Mitchell, Edward, 225 Monteagle, lord, 74, 82, 143, 147, 298 Montgomery, Hugh de F., 10, 143, ISOS 154 a 1S 6nlS8. 2255 508 Moore, George, 8, 309 Moore, William, 228-230, 258, 318 Moran, D.P., 166, 296 Morley, John, 30, 35-7, 39, 54, 136, 276, 278, 287 Morning Post, 129, 180 Morris, Michael, 11, 15, 19, 212 Murphy, constable, 80 Murray, Sir George, 206-7 National Education Board, 71 National Review, 34, 134, 249, 296 National University, 126 Newcastle programme, 64 Noblesse oblige, 59, 309 Northern Whig, The, 154

O’Brien, William, 132-3, 139, 176, 190, 199, 202, 215, 218-23, 315-16, 321 Observer, The, 53 O’Connor, T.P., 299 O’Conor Don, 218 Orange Order, The, 11, 73, 125, 201, 224, 227-8, 231, 256, 267, DUS: Ps OLS) Outlook, The, 168

142, 302,

143, 272,

Parnell C357,02,.5, 4.115, 1902057, 120, 1335 15651775226, 30153320-1

patronage, 74, 116, 139-40 Pim, Thomas, 9 Plan of Campaign, 82, 120, 311 Plunkett, Sir Horace, 20, 29, 32, 34, 45-6, 68, 70-2, 89, 132-3, 138, 143, 151, 153, 170, 180, 184, 226, 240, pil, WIS, Pwr, Ase SVAIG joxoliincell philosophy of, 17-19, 142-8, 186, 215-16; and recess committee, 20, BAN 4555) ll Sean DeAMielees S-9 76, 19) 124-5, 133, U5i7, 1186,92042 influence on government, 60, 68, 74-5, 76, 78, 147-8; and 1900 election, 154-8; and Wyndham, 208, 212-13; and New century, 213-15; and ‘killing home rule by kindness’, 34-5, 56-7, 297-9, 301, 305-10, 313, 315-16 poverty and poor relief, 44-5, 50-4, 76, 80, 115 Powerscourt, viscount, 7, 101, 103 presbyterianism in Ulster, 11-13, 72, 125-6, 130, 143, 157, 174, 176; and PLURVeAn 4 oeulis5 Piessythe ad 2n 2 ION O0R2 09m Sa. 259, 266 Punch, 121-2 Queen’s College, Belfast, 126 Queen’s College, Galway, 116, 140

Rathmore, lord, 15, 279 Real Charlotte, the, 7 recess committee, 20, 34, 56, 76, 78, Sl ISe 1245 A723 Sas Redmond, John, 20, 34, 124-5, 152, 179, 189-90, 194-5, 198-200, 202, 207, 218-2055 2225238982419 2535 278, 287, 302-3, 315-16 Reid, Sir Robert, 277 Ridley, Sir M.W., 92 Ripon, lord,. 276-9

343

Index Ritchie, C.T., 183 Robertson Commission, 201,214,307 Robinson, Sir Henry, 28, 46, 54, 70-2, T6nd Te 3204 Rolleston, T.W., 67, 307-9 Roman Catholic church, 15-16, 66, 125-6, 129, 141-2, 164, 189, 198-202, 211, 241, 306-7 Rosebery, earl of, 21, 312 Ross of Bladensburg, Sir John, 16, 170, 211-12, 306-7, 309 Rossmore, lord, 140 Royal Dublin Society, The, 9 Russell, George (‘A.E.’), 17-18, 58, 95, 170 Russell, T.W., 13, 36-7, 103-4, 111, 133, 143-5, 150, 154-5, 171-2, 176-7, 224-7, 289, 316, 317-19, 321 Salisbury, marquess of, 3, 13, 16, 25,

29-30, 33, 67, 73, 83, 86, 88, 91-3, 120, 136, 146, 155, 157, 175-6, 183, 209, 217, 302; his unionism, 5, 89; and Irish unionists, 105-6, 116-19, 148-51, 157, 181, 225-6; and 1896 land act, 36-7, 39, 93-6, 98; and financial relations, 99-100, 102, 104 6, 113; and Irish landlords, 94-5, 104, 116-19, 144 Salmon, Rev. George, 9, 140-2 Samuels, A.W., 82-3 Sandars, Jack, 174, 199, 269-70, 2723, 280-1, 283-6, 317 Saunderson, Col. E.J., 10,20, 49, 95, 136, 143, 149-55, 218, 228, 258, 317, 320 Seething pot, the, 307, 309 Selbourne, earl of, 269, 272 Sexton, Thomas, 194, 219 Shaw, George Bernard, 304 Shawe-Taylor, Capt. John, 189-91, 199, 216-20, 222, 228, 298, 301-3

Sheehan, canon,

307 Sidgwick, Henry, 112-13 Sinclair, Thomas, 74, 146-7, 155-7 Sinn Fein, 296, 302, 307-8, 321 Sloan, T.H., 228, 301, 317-18, 320

Spectator, The, 178 Spencer, earl of, 276, 278 Spring-Rice, S.E., 85, 87 Stanley, constable, 80 Starkie, William, 116, 140, 201 Strachey, St Loe, 178 Sykes, Mark, 248 Talbot-Crosbie,

Lindsay, 221, 223, 243, 299-300 Tanner, Dr, 33 tariff reform, 108-11, 162, 175, 197, 199, 201, 210, 214, 220, 236, 242, 273, 279-80, 286, 312, 320 Templetown, viscount, 142 Tenniel, Sir John, 121 Tibet, invasion of, 260-2, 269, 273 Times, The, 111, 121-2, 176, 180-1, DAG 246, 2511-24252 0s 204.9273, 299, 303, 304 Traill, Anthony, 9, 202 Treasury, 44, 68, 70, 115, 118-19, 132, 182-3, 221, 243, 253, 305; and Ireland, 80-88; and financial relations, 106-11; and 1902 land bill, 174-7; and ‘coordination’, 188, 203-5;and development grant, 188, 205-7; and 1903 land act, 190-2, 195-6, 220

Trinity College, Dublin, 8, 9, 11, 15, 19, 65, 72, 116, 125-7, 140-2, 143, 154, 158, 200-2 Tynan, Patrick, 92

Ulster Defence Union, Ulster Unionist Council,

318

11 11,231,257,

344

Index

unionism, 16, 91, 97-8, 107-8, 111, 113-14, 131, 181-2, 192, 195-6, 209, 253, 289-90; constructive unionism, 3-6, 61-8, 89, 111, 119-20, 134-5, 137, 142, 144-5, 147, 157, 161-2, 169, 182-3, 207-9, 211, 220, 236-40, 2534, 290, 304-22; reactionary unionism, 131-4, 230, 254, 304-5, 312-13; and socialism, 2-4, 31-2, 64-7; and imperialism, 30, 162, 237; and anglo-centrism, 105, 253, 290 unionism in Ireland, commercial, 9-10, 12, 20, 101 unionism in Ireland, landed, 8, 10, 101, 132; and 1896 land act, 94-6, 151-8; andlocal government, 138-9; and compulsory purchase, 12-13, 143-5, 176-7 unionism in Ireland, populist, 10-11, 13, 142-3; and ‘Ulster revolt’, 227-8, 230-1, 317 unionism in southern Ireland, 7-10, Wl, ADS 7283, SKS, PaO unionism in Ulster, 10-14, 116-17, NAN) 5 EN IIS Ae oh 319; and southern unionists, 11, 158, 230-1; and liberal unionists, 13; and Russellites, 13-14, 143-6, 154-8, 176-7, 224-7; and Orange Order, 145, 227-9, 231, 317-18; and government policy, 74, 210, 227, 229-30, 317-20; and devolution, 230-1, 254, 256-60, 282, 300-1; and 1906 election, 210, 318; and tariff reform, 273, 319-20; and MacDonmellie 22/229 23leeA2 e446 26la36 265, 273-7, 2719 unionism, British: and conservative party, 89, 209, 300, 305, 309-12; and liberal unionists, 3, 311, see also Joseph Chamberlain; and Irish local government, 41, 45-9, 122;

and Irish legislation, 29, 58, 64, 97, 120-25, 176-8; and Irish unionists, 148-51; and university for catholics, 125, 130-1, 201; and 1903 land act, 191-4; and devolution, 258, 280-2 unionism, Irish, 7-14, 20, 83, 103,

112, 132, 136-7, 156-8, 179-80, 210-31, 256, 295-7, 300-2; and financial relations, 102, 152-3; and 1896 land act, 94-6, 122-3, 137-8; and

local government, 42-3, 45, 138-9; and patronage, 139-40; and Erasmus Smith controversy, 140-41; and a catholic university, 141-3, 152, 211-12. 228: and) Plunkett 78, 146-8; influence on British government, 72-5, 116-19, 148-53, 252, 317-20; and 1900 election, 153-8; and T.W. Russell’s campaign, 143-5 Unionist Clubs council, 11 United Irish League, 65, 132, 142, 166, 169, 171, 174, 176-9, 182, 189, PANG). SiI5) Vincent, John,

5

Walker, William, 227, 318 Wallace, Col. R.H., 224

Walsh, Archbishop William, 129-30, 200-1, 307 Waugh, Evelyn, 5 Wild goose, the, 309 Williamson, Ben, 15 Willis, G. de L., 140 Wood, James, 224 Wrench, F., 150, 173

15, 126,

Wyndham, George, 4, 7, 26, 157, 212 309-11, 313, 321; and Gerald Balfour, 161-2, 170; his character, 1613; and literary revival, 164; and religion, 164; and imperialism, 165,

>

345

Index Wyndham, George (cont.), 169; and socialism, 165-70; and rectorial address, 167, 172; and tariff reform, 168, 193; and university education, 169, 198-202, 211; and political ambition, 170-2, 197-8; and Dublin Castle, 173, 183-4, 208; and Lord Cadogan, 173-4, 180-1, 183; and the Treasury, 174-5, 177, 188, 191-2, 195-6; and Ulster unionists, 174, 176-7, 210, 252, 254, 319; and 1902 land bill, 171, 176; and law and order, 176-82; and administrative co-ordination, 187-9, 197,

203-5; and development grant, 1889, 196-7, 201-3, 205-7, 238; and1903 land act, 40, 189-96, 198-9, 214; and devolution, 2, 183, 188, 235-54, 303; his mental health, 247-9; and MacDonnell’s involvement in ‘devolution’, 249-53; and the devolution crisis, 255-91 Wyndham,

Guy,

170

York, duke and duchess of, 53, 305 Younghusband, colonel, 261, 263,

269

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