Introducing Global Issues 9781685853525

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Introducing Global Issues

Introducing Global Issues THIRD

EDITION

edited by Michael T. Snarr D. Neil Snarr

l y n n e R I E N N E R PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Introducing global issues / edited by Michael T. Snarr, D. Neil Snarr.— 3rd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-330-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. World politics—1989- 2. International economic relations. 3. Social history—1970- 4. Ecology. I. Snarr, Michael T. II. Snarr, Neil. 1933D860.I62 2005 909.82'9—dc22 2005000410 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America

(oS

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

2

1

For Elise, whose loving spirit and sense of wonder have brought us great joy

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface

1

Introducing Globalization and Global Issues Michael T. Snarr

• 2

Part I: Conflict and Security Weapons Proliferation and Conflict Jeffrey S. Lands

3

Nationalism Lina M. Kassem, Anthony N. Talbott, and Michael T. Snarr

4

Globalization and Human Rights D. Neil Snarr

5

Global Security and Insecurity: Responses to Terrorism and Other Threats Jack Patterson,

• 6

Eliza Kretzmann,

and Tom Smith

Part 2:The Global Economy Free Trade vs. Protectionism: Values and Controversies Bruce E. Moon

7

International Capital Flows and Institutions Chris W. Scholl

8

Poverty in a Global Economy Don

Reeves

vii

viii

• 9 10 11 12

• 13 14 15

g 16

Contents

Part 3: Development Population and Migration Ellen Percy Kraly

155

Women and Development Elise Boulding and Heather Parker

179

Children George Kent

195

Health Marjorie E. Nelson

215

Part 4:The

Environment

Sustainable Development Pam S. Chasek and Marian A. L. Miller

231

Protection of the Atmospheric Mark Seis

257

Commons

Conflict and Cooperation over Natural Resources Deborah S. Davenport and Karrin Scapple

277

Part 5: Conclusion Future Prospects Michael T. Snarr

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

301

311 315 329 335 349

Tables and Figures

I Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 5.1 7.1 7.2 7.3

8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 11.1 12.1 12.2 12.3 13.1

Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization World and Regional Military Expenditures Countries Suspected to Possess Chemical or Biological Weapons Capabilities Comparison of Causes of Death Global Currency Flows on a Daily Average Historical Trends in Official Development Assistance Net Development Assistance from Development Assistance Committee Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Organizations, 2003 Poverty Impact of Income Distribution, Selected Countries, 2002 United Nations Millennium Development Goals World Population by Geographic Region and for More and Less Developed Countries, 1950-2003 Projections of World Population by Geographic Region and for More and Less Developed Countries, 2000 and 2050 Refugees and Other Types of Persons of Concern to the UNHCR, by Geographic Regions, December 2003 Representation of Women in National Parliaments by Region, 1987, 1995, 1999, and 2004 Annual Child Deaths, 1960-2002 Desirable Height and Weight for Adults Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics and Features, 2003 Per Capita GDP and Selected Health Indicators, Selected Countries Global Priorities in Spending, 1998 ix

6 16 24 77 120 121

122 137 149 161 168 172 189 203 219 222 232 242

Tables and Figures

X

14.1 14.2 14.3

•

World Carbon Emissions from Fossil Fuel Burning, 1950-2003 Largest Producers of Carbon Emissions Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Selected Countries

259 261 261

Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 11.1 13.1 13.2 15.1 15.2 15.3

Internet Users Around the World, 1998 and 2000 The Proliferation Matrix Nuclear Weapon Status, 2004 Arab-Israeli Wars The Expansion of Israel Israeli-Palestinian Peace Attempts First Generation of Human Rights, UDHR Articles 2-21 Second Generation of Human Rights, UDHR Articles 22-26 Third Generation of Human Rights, UDHR Articles 27-28 UDHR Articles 29-30 The Importance of Looking at the Root Causes of Terrorism Timeline of the U.S. Preemptive Strike on Iraq and Its Aftermath Number and Percentage of Poor People in Developing Countries, 1981-2001 Distribution of Global Income Number of Undernourished People by Region, 2000-2002 A Virtuous Circle Ages of Males and Females as Percentage of Population, Spain and Tanzania, 2000 World Population for Development, 1950-2003 World Fertility Rates, 1995-2000 Projected World Population Under-Five Mortality Rate, 1990 and 2000 Agenda 21 The Millennium Round of World Conferences Natural Resource Matrix Species Composition of Commercial Harvests in Pacific Salmon Treaty Region, 1990-1994 Jordan River Basin

5 14 22 45 46 49 56 58 59 60 76 82 132 136 139 144 158 160 163 166 204 243 249 280 285 291

Preface

I

n this new edition of Introducing Global Issues, every chapter has been thoroughly updated to cover the most recent developments. We have dramatically changed the chapter on peace and conflict to reflect the increasing significance of terrorism to global security. New case studies have been added to the chapters on human rights, women, and natural resources. Additionally, the environmental section now more thoroughly examines the history of global environmental conferences and the concept of the global commons. Other ideas for improvement and general comments are welcome at [email protected]. *

*

*

We would like to express our appreciation to those who made this book possible. First and foremost, we express deep regret that Marian Miller passed away on November 2, 2003. We are greatly appreciative of her contribution to the field of international environmental politics. Marian will be sincerely missed. Part of the joy of a project like this is working with scholars and practitioners who share a concern for the future of humanity. Many thanks for the efforts of all of our contributors! We thank our global issues students at Wilmington College, especially the fall 2004 honors class (April Bentley, David Bowers, Wendy Cooper, Rosalyn Craig, Kaitlyn Donohoe, Cynthia Drerup, Seth Fair, Emily Holden, Samantha Hutcheson, Sarah Jordan, Jennifer Kerschner, Kristin Kramer, Tabitha Moss, Jennifer Pequignot, Wade Rethmel, Lisa Robinson, Danielle Sollars, Christopher E. Sprowl, and Dana Workman). Each student read and commented on multiple draft chapters for this edition. Other students who contributed research and suggestions include Brittany Hensley, Mark Lundsford, Heather Parker, Robert Trumpy, and Angeline Burrall. xi

xii

Preface

The following also read parts of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions: Jeffrey Lantis, Ruth Snarr, Sarah Chayes, John Cox, Diana Quick, Jeffrey Blick, Richard Bourland, Nathan Busch, Andrew Clem, Sharon Murphy, Rodney North, and Pamela Zeiser. Thanks go to Wilmington College for Michael's sabbatical support, and to our global issues colleagues at the college for their helpful input along the way. We also greatly appreciate the patience and support of Lynne Rienner, Lesli Athanasoulis, and Lisa Tulchin at Lynne Rienner Publishers. Once again, loving gratitude goes to our eternally supportive family— Melissa, Ruth, Madison, Ty, Isaiah, and Elise. —Michael T. Snarr —D. Neil Snarr

Introducing Global Issues

I Introducing Globalization and Global Issues Michael T. Snarr

•

M o r e than 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e are added to the w o r l d ' s population every day. • People in more than 2 0 0 countries and territories have access to Cable News Network (CNN). • During the 1990s, the number of undernourished people declined by approximately 40 million ( U N D P 2001). • During the 1990s the share of people suffering from extreme poverty fell from 30 percent to 23 percent ( U N D P 2003). • An infant living in Africa is thirteen times more likely to die than one living in Europe or North America (PRB 2004). • More civilians died in the twentieth century as a result of war than in the four previous centuries combined. • Dramatic numbers of species are becoming extinct worldwide. • More than 1.1 billion people live on less than one U.S. dollar per day. • During the past thirty years, life expectancy in the developing world has increased by eight years and illiteracy has been reduced by nearly 50 percent ( U N D P 2003). • At least 38 million people are HIV-infected, including more than 38 percent of Swaziland's population ( U N A I D S 2004). • Approximately 27,000 children die every day from preventable diseases. • In the 1990s, more children died f r o m diarrhea than all the people who died due to armed conflict since World War II ( U N D P 2003). » In the poor countries, more than 80 percent of children are enrolled in primary school ( U N D P 2003)

I

2

Introducing Global Issues

E a c h of the items above is related to a global issue discussed in this b o o k , and m a n y of them affect the reader. But what is a global issue? T h e term is used here to refer to t w o types of p h e n o m e n a . First, there are those issues that are transnational, that is, they cross political boundaries (country borders). T h e s e issues a f f e c t i n d i v i d u a l s in m o r e than o n e country. A c l e a r e x a m p l e is air p o l l u t i o n p r o d u c e d by a f a c t o r y in the U n i t e d States a n d b l o w n into C a n a d a . S e c o n d , there are p r o b l e m s and issues that d o not necessarily cross borders but affect a large n u m b e r of individuals throughout the world. Ethnic rivalries and h u m a n rights violations, for e x a m p l e , m a y o c c u r within a single c o u n t r y but h a v e a far wider i m p a c t . T h u s , global issues cross country borders and/or affect a vast n u m b e r of people. For the c o n t r i b u t o r s to this v o l u m e , the primary goal is to introduce several of the most pressing global issues and d e m o n s t r a t e h o w strongly they are interconnected. Since these issues affect each and every one of us, we also hope to motivate the reader to learn more about t h e m .

Is the World Shrinking? T h e r e has been a great deal of discussion in recent years about globalization, which can be d e f i n e d as "the intensification of e c o n o m i c , political, social, and cultural relations across b o r d e r s " (Holm and S0rensen 1995: 1). E v i d e n c e of globalization is seen regularly in our daily lives. In the United States, grocery stores and s h o p s at the local mall are stocked with items p r o d u c e d a b r o a d . L i k e w i s e , N i k e , L o s A n g e l e s L a k e r s , and N e w York Yankees hats and T-shirts are easily f o u n d outside of the United States. In m a n y countries outside of the United States, Britney Spears and other U.S. m u s i c g r o u p s d o m i n a t e the a i r w a v e s ; C N N a n d M T V are on t e l e v i s i o n screens; and Shrek is at the m o v i e s . Are we m o v i n g toward a single global culture? In the w o r d s of B e n j a m i n Barber, we are being influenced by "the onrush of e c o n o m i c and ecological forces that d e m a n d integration and unif o r m i t y and that m e s m e r i z e the world with fast music, fast c o m p u t e r s , and f a s t f o o d — w i t h MTV, M a c i n t o s h , and M c D o n a l d ' s p r e s s i n g n a t i o n s into o n e commercially h o m o g e n e o u s global network: one M c W o r l d tied together by technology, ecology, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and c o m m e r c e " (Barber 1992: 53). For the editors of this b o o k , globalization took on a m o r e personal f a c e last year w h e n we took a g r o u p of students to M e x i c o . A s w e were on a bus b o u n d for the p y r a m i d s of Teotihuacan, just outside of M e x i c o City, w e met a C a n a d i a n n a m e d Jag. We learned on the bus ride that Jag is a H i n d u f r o m India w h o lives in M o n t r e a l . His j o b is to assist the n e w l y f o r m e d Inuit ( f o r m e r l y k n o w n as E s k i m o s ) g o v e r n m e n t of N u n a v e t , w h i c h is a n e w C a n a d i a n territory created through negotiations with the C a n a d i a n g o v e r n -

Introducing Global Issues

3

ment. Think about it. A Hindu Indian living in French-speaking Montreal, a s s i s t i n g t h e I n u i t g o v e r n m e n t , a n d v i s i t i n g a p y r a m i d b u i l t by the Teotihuacan peoples while vacationing in Mexico City—now that's globalization! Technology is perhaps the most visible aspect of globalization and in many ways its driving force. Communications technology has revolutionized our information systems. CNN reaches hundreds of millions of househ o l d s in o v e r 2 0 0 c o u n t r i e s a n d t e r r i t o r i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d . " C o m p u t e r , television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-optic, and m i c r o c h i p technologies [are] combining to create a vast interactive communications and information network that can potentially give every person on earth access to every other person, and make every datum, every byte, available to every set of e y e s " (Barber 1992: 58). Technology has also aided the increase in international trade and international capital flows and enhanced the spread of Western, primarily U.S., culture. Of course the earth is not literally shrinking, but in light of the rate at which travel and communication speeds have increased, the world has in a sense become smaller. Thus many scholars assert that we are living in a qualitatively different time, in which humans are interconnected more than ever before. "There is a distinction between the contemporary experience of change and that of earlier generations: never before has change come so rapidly . . . on such a global scale, and with such global visibility" (CGG 1995: 12). This seemingly uncritical acceptance of the concept of globalization and a shrinking world is not without its critics, who point out that labor, trade, and capital moved at least as freely, if not more so, during the second half of the nineteenth century than they do now. Take for example the following quote, which focuses on the dramatic changes that have taken place in the past thirty years to m a k e the world more economically interdependent: " T h e complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. This interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization . . . the instantaneous dissemination of financial and c o m m e r c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n . . . and generally the i n c r e d i b l e i n c r e a s e in the r a p i d i t y of c o m m u n i c a t i o n " ( A n g e l l 1909: 4 4 - 4 5 ) . If this statement were to a p p e a r in a n e w s p a p e r today, no one would give it a second thought. But it was written in 1909—illustrating the belief of some critics that globalization is not a new phenomenon. S o m e skeptics argue that while i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and technological advancement have increased in some parts of the world, this is not true in a vast m a j o r i t y of the South. (The terms "the S o u t h , " "the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d , " "the less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , " and "the third w o r l d " are used interchangeably throughout this book. They refer to the poorer countries,

4

Introducing

Global

Issues

in contrast to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which are referred to as "the North," "the more developed c o u n t r i e s , " and "the first w o r l d . " ) For e x a m p l e , H a m i d M o w l a n a argues that " g l o b a l " is not "universal" (1995: 42). Although a small number of people in the South may have access to much of the new technology and truly live in the "global village," the large majority of the population in these countries does not. Despite the rapid globalization of the Internet, as of 2002, only one in ten people worldwide have access to it ( U N D P 2004). Figure 1.1 further documents the lopsided nature of Internet use in the world. In most of the poorer countries of Africa and Asia, the number of cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people is in single digits. In contrast, in many of the developed countries, nearly half of all people use this technology ( U N D P 2004). A good example of this contrast can be seen in the recent war in Afghanistan. While ultramodern U.S. jets flew above Kabul, many Northern Alliance troops were entering the city on horses and bicycles. Similarly, one can argue that the increased flow of information, a characteristic of globalization, goes primarily in one direction. Even those in the South who have access to television or radio are at a disadvantage. The globalization of communication in the less developed countries typically is a one-way proposition: the people do not control any of the information; they only receive it. It is also true that, worldwide, the ability to control or generate broadcasts rests in the hands of a tiny minority. While lack of financial resources is an important impediment to globalization, there are other obstacles. Paradoxically, B e n j a m i n Barber, w h o argues that we are experiencing global integration via "McDonaldization," asserts we are at the same time experiencing global disintegration. T h e breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the great number of other ethnic and national conflicts (see Chapter 3), are cited as evidence of forces countering globalization. Many subnational groups (groups within nations) desire to govern themselves; others see threats to their religious values and identity and therefore reject the secular nature of globalization. As a result, for some, globalization has produced not uniformity, but a yearning for a return to non-secular values. Today, there is a rebirth of revitalized fundamentalism in all the world's major religions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Shintoism, or Confucianism. At the same time the global homogeneity has reached the airwaves, these religious tenets have reemerged as defining identities. (Mowlana 1995: 46)

None of these criticisms mean that our contemporary time period is not different in some important aspects. There is widespread agreement that

F i g u r e I. I I n t e r n e t U s e r s A r o u n d t h e W o r l d , 1998 a n d 2 0 0 0 Internet Users (as percentage of population) 1998 United States High-income O E C D (excluding U.S.) Latin America and the Caribbean East Asia and the Pacific Eastern Europe and CIS Arab states Sub-Sarahan Africa South Asia

2000

26.3 6.9 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.04 2.4

World

Note: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa

United States

High-income OECD, excluding U.S.

Arab states Eastern Europe and the CIS

Note: Pie chart represent« year 2000. The large circle represents world population; pie slices show regional shares of world population; dark wedges show Internet users.

East Asia and the Pacific

Latin America and the Caribbean

Internet Users (as percentage of national population) 2000

Sweden U n i t e d States Norway

Singapore

Malaysia Brazil South A f r i c a China

Source: Adapted from UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 200!), Feature 2.3, p. 40.

6

Introducing

Global

Issues

communications, trade, and capital are moving at unprecedented speeds and at volumes never before seen. However, these criticisms do provide an important caution against overstating or making broad generalizations about the process and effects of globalization.

•

Is Globalization Good or Bad?

There are some aspects of globalization that most will agree are good (for example, the spread of medical technology) or bad (for example, increased global trade in illegal drugs). Events during the war in Afghanistan in 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 2 revealed the dramatic contrast between friends and foes of globalization. Due to the Taliban's rejection of many aspects of Western culture, some Afghanis apparently buried their televisions and VCRs in their backyards. When Kabul was captured by the Northern Alliance, it was reported that one Afghani anxiously retrieved his TV and VCR in order to view his copy of Titanic (Filkins 2001). Judging whether or not globalization is good, however, is complex. Table 1.1 identifies three areas that are affected by globalization— political, economic, and cultural—and gives some examples of aspects considered positive and negative about globalization. A key aspect of political globalization is the weakened ability of the state to control both what crosses its borders and what goes on inside them. In other words, globalization can reduce the state's sovereignty (the state's ability to govern matters within its borders). This can be viewed as good, because undemocratic governments are finding it increasingly difficult to control the flow of information to and from prodemocracy groups. Satellite dishes, e-mail, and the World Wide Web are three examples of technology that have eroded state sovereignty. But decreased state sovereignty also means that the state has difficulty controlling the influx of illegal drugs and unwanted immigrants, including terrorists. In the realm of economics,

Table I . I

Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization

Effects of Globalization Political Economic Cultural

increased globalization has given con-

Advantages

Disadvantages

Weakens power of authoritarian governments Jobs, capital, more choices for consumers O f f e r s exposure to other cultures

Unwanted external influence difficult to keep out Exploitative; only benefits a few; gap between rich and poor Cultural imperialism

Introducing

Global

Issues

7

sumers more choices. Also, multinational corporations are creating jobs in poor areas where people never before had such opportunities. Some critics reject these points, arguing that increased foreign investment and trade benefit only a small group of wealthy individuals and that, as a result, the gap between rich and poor grows both within countries and between countries. These critics point out that the combined wealth of the fifteen richest people in the world is more than the gross domestic product (GDP) of subSaharan Africa (Parker 2002). Related to this is the argument that many well-paying, blue-collar jobs are moving from the North to the poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. At the cultural level, those who view increased cultural contact as positive say that it gives people more opportunities to learn about (and purchase goods from) other cultures. But critics of cultural globalization see things differently. Samuel Huntington has argued that the shrinking world will bring a "clash of civilization." In this scenario, clashes will occur a m o n g m a n y civilizations including the largely Christian West against Islam. Other critics of cultural globalization argue that the wealthy countries are guilty of cultural imperialism—that their multibillion-dollar advertising budgets are destroying the cultures of non-Western areas, as illustrated by Avon's aggressive sales strategy in the Amazon region. The fear of cultural imperialism is certainly a key component in the animosity of some Arabs toward the United States. Other critics are increasingly fearful that more and more national languages will b e c o m e extinct as foreign languages, especially English, penetrate borders. The degree to which cultural values can be "exported" is the subject of some debate. Huntington argues that "drinking Coca-Cola does not make R u s s i a n s think like A m e r i c a n s any m o r e than e a t i n g sushi m a k e s Americans think like Japanese. Throughout human history, fads and material g o o d s have spread f r o m one society to another without significantly altering the basic culture of the recipient society" (1996: 2 8 - 2 9 ) . Similarly, others argue that globalization brings only superficial change. " M c D o n a l d ' s may be in nearly every country, but in Japan, sushi is served alongside h a m b u r g e r s . In many countries, hamburgers are not even on the m e n u " (Mowlana 1995: 46). Thus the global product is often altered to take on a local flavor. The term "glocalization" has combined the words "global" and "local" to describe such hybrid products. It is left to the reader to determine whether globalization is having a positive or negative effect on the issues discussed in this book. Is globalization enhancing human capacity to deal with a particular issue? Or is it making it more difficult? Of course, each individual's perspective will be influenced by whether he or she evaluates these issues based on self-interest, national interest, a religious view, or a global humanitarian viewpoint. For example, when considering the issue of free trade (Chapter 6), readers must

8

Introducing Global Issues

decide h o w they evaluate a moral question such as, "Is f r e e trade g o o d or b a d ? " T h o s e c o n c e r n e d first and f o r e m o s t with self-interest will ask, " H o w d o e s f r e e trade a f f e c t m e ? " A national point of v i e w will c o n s i d e r o n e ' s country and the e f f e c t s of free trade on it. If readers identify with a religion, t h e y will ask h o w t h e i r r e l i g i o n w o u l d i n s t r u c t t h e m on t h i s q u e s t i o n . Finally, the global humanitarian view w o u l d ask, " W h a t is best f o r h u m a n i ty in g e n e r a l ? " T h e r e f o r e , readers m u s t ask themselves what is m o s t i m p o r tant to t h e m w h e n evaluating the issues discussed in this b o o k .

I

Interconnectedness A m o n g Issues

As m e n t i o n e d above, a primary purpose of this book is to e x p l o r e h o w the i s s u e s i n t r o d u c e d in t h e v a r i o u s c h a p t e r s are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . In o t h e r words, the chapter on poverty should not be considered separate f r o m the c h a p t e r on population, even though these t w o issues are treated separately. Here are several e x a m p l e s of h o w issues discussed in this b o o k are interconnected: • • •

•

T h e growth in the w o r l d ' s population (Chapter 9) h a s b e e n dramatically affected, especially in Africa, by the A I D S crisis (Chapter 12). M a n y of the value j u d g m e n t s concerning trade issues ( C h a p t e r 6) are intricately linked to human rights issues (Chapter 4). Ethnic conflict (Chapter 3) (as well as other types of c o n f l i c t ) o f t e n leads to internal migration as well as international population m o v e m e n t s (Chapter 9). O n e of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for reducing poverty ( C h a p t e r 8) is to e d u c a t e w o m e n and give t h e m m o r e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r o v e r their lives (Chapter 10).

T h e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s of these issues is even m o r e extensive than these e x a m p l e s demonstrate. For instance, while an increase in A I D S will a f f e c t population growth, the c o n n e c t i o n s do not end there. A I D S e p i d e m i c s also lead to i n c r e a s e d g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , w h i c h can lead to i n c r e a s e d indebtedness, w h i c h will likely lead to more poverty, and so on. T h u s , e a c h global issue discussed in this book has multiple c o n s e q u e n c e s , as well a s a ripple effect.

•

Key Players

B e f o r e diving into the important global issues, w e need to introduce the k e y p l a y e r s o r a c t o r s i n v o l v e d in t h e s e issues. T h e m o s t s a l i e n t p l a y e r s are

Introducing Global Issues

9

countries. In the following pages you will continually read about the countries of the world and their efforts to solve the various global issues. Often countries get together and form organizations called international governmental organizations (IGOs). The logic is that by cooperating through an 1GO like the United Nations, the World Bank, or the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), countries are better equipped to achieve a common goal, like preventing war or alleviating poverty, that they could not accomplish on their own. The reader will notice that IGOs are also mentioned throughout the book. Nongovernmental groups working on global issues are part of what is called civil society. For instance, in recent decades there has been a dramatic increase in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to make the world a better place (NGOs are sometimes referred to as international nongovernmental organizations [INGOs]). NGOs, as their name implies, work outside of the government and comprise individual citizens working together on one or more problems. There are many very well known NGOs working on global issues: the Red Cross, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, World Vision, and Doctors Without Borders are just a few of the thousands that exist. Because these NGOs are often made up of highly motivated people in the middle of a war or refugee camp, they can often achieve results that countries cannot. NGOs have become extremely active on all of the issues discussed in this book, and often cooperate with IGOs and individual countries. Other civil society actors include businesses (also called transnational corporations) and private individuals acting on their own. Businesses and individuals can have an impact on global issues as well, and are mentioned in the following pages.

•

Outline of the Book

This book has been organized into five parts. Part 1 focuses on conflict and security issues. More specifically, it considers some of the primary sources of conflict (weapons of mass destruction, nationalism, terrorism, human rights abuses, etc.) and some of the many approaches to establishing and maintaining peace. Part 2 concentrates on economic issues ranging from international trade and capital flows to one of the major concerns that confronts humanity—poverty. Related political and social issues are also examined. Part 3 deals with issues that, although not confined to them, tend to plague the poorer countries, such as population growth, health issues, and issues that affect women and children. Part 4 focuses on environmental issues (such as the global commons, sustainable development, global warming, ozone depletion, sustainable development, and others) and global

Introducing Global Issues

10

a t t e m p t s to s o l v e t h e m . Part 5 d i s c u s s e s p o s s i b l e f u t u r e w o r l d o r d e r s , s o u r c e s o f h o p e and c h a l l e n g e s in the c o m i n g d e c a d e s , and i n n o v a t i v e a c t i o n s that are b e i n g taken to m a k e a p o s i t i v e impact on global issues.

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Discussion Questions 1. What e x a m p l e s o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n can y o u identify in your life? 2. D o y o u think g l o b a l i z a t i o n will continue to increase? If so, in what areas? 3. D o y o u think g l o b a l i z a t i o n has m o r e p o s i t i v e attributes or m o r e n e g a t i v e attributes? 4. C a n y o u think o f additional e x a m p l e s of h o w the g l o b a l i s s u e s disc u s s e d in different chapters are interconnected?

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Suggested Readings

Barber, Benjamin R. (\996) Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books. F r i e d m a n , T h o m a s L. ( 2 0 0 0 ) The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Anchor Books. Iyer, Pico (2001) The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home. New York: Vintage Books. Jones, Ellis, et al. (2001) The Better World Handbook: From Good Intentions to Everyday Actions. Boulder: New Society. Kennedy, Paul, Dirk Messner, and Franz Nuscheler, eds. (2001) Global Trends and Global Governance. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. O ' M e a r a , P a t r i c k , H o w a r d D. M e h l i n g e r , and M a t t h e w K r a i n . e d s . ( 2 0 0 0 ) Globalization and the Challenges of the New Century: A Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. S i m m o n s , P. J., and Chantal de Jonge O u d r a a t , eds. ( 2 0 0 1 ) Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: Carnegie E n d o w m e n t for International Peace. U N D P (United Nations Development Programme) (annual) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. World at Risk: A Global Issues Sourcebook (2002) Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. World Bank (2004) World Development Indicators. New York: Oxford University Press.

PART I

Conflict and Security

2 Weapons Proliferation and Conflict Jeffrey S. Lantis

T

he proliferation of weapons and weapons technology is one of the most serious challenges to international security today. Recent events such as the Iraq War, increased tensions on the Korean peninsula, and terrorist efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are bitter reminders that proliferation threats are here to stay. These challenges also raise questions about the future of the nonproliferation regime and the strategy of deterrence. Proliferation is not simply a problem for politicians and military leaders. When governments choose to use weapons in conflict, they are exposing both soldiers and civilians to danger. In fact, the proliferation of weapons contributed to higher civilian casualties and greater destruction in the twentieth century than in the previous four centuries combined (Small and Singer 1982). When governments devote funds to build up large armies and WMD, they are also choosing to divert resources from other programs like education and health care. Whether or not there are imminent threats to national security, citizens of the world experience the effects of proliferation every day.

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Types of Proliferation

Proliferation is best understood as the rapid increase in the number and destructive capability of armaments. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there are two broad dimensions of proliferation to consider: vertical versus horizontal proliferation and conventional weapons versus weapons of mass destruction. Vertical proliferation is the development and stockpiling of 13

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Conflict and

Security

Figure 2.1 The Proliferation Matrix

Conventional weapons Weapons of mass destruction

Vertical

Horizontal

Proliferation

Proliferation

Type 1

Type II

Type III

Type IV

a r m a m e n t s in o n e c o u n t r y . H o r i z o n t a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n is t h e s p r e a d of w e a p o n s or w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y a c r o s s c o u n t r y b o r d e r s . C o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s are those systems that m a k e up the vast m a j o r i t y of all military a r s e n a l s — i n c l u d i n g guns, tanks, most artillery shells and bullets, planes, and ships. W e a p o n s of mass destruction are special w e a p o n s that have a d e v a s t a t i n g effect even when used in small n u m b e r s . Nuclear, c h e m i c a l , and biological systems can be used to kill more indiscriminately than can conventional w e a p o n s . Vertical Proliferation of Conventional Weapons T h e buildup of conventional w e a p o n s arsenals in many countries is the oldest form of proliferation in h u m a n civilization. At first glance, one might v i e w this c a t e g o r y as the least t h r e a t e n i n g or most b e n i g n of all f o r m s . Vertical conventional proliferation, however, can be a threat to international stability for at least t w o m a j o r reasons. First, a r m s s t o c k p i l i n g p r o v i d e s more weaponry for g o v e r n m e n t s and groups to e n g a g e in m o r e conflicts. C o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s have b e c o m e m o r e sophisticated ( f r o m a u t o m a t i c rifles to p r e c i s i o n - g u i d e d m u n i t i o n s ) and m o r e d e s t r u c t i v e ( f r o m m o r t a r shells to multiple-launch rocket systems). Vertical c o n v e n t i o n a l proliferation in an unregulated world m a r k e t m a y provide d e t e r m i n e d leaders with enough incentive to spark conflicts. A second danger of conventional arms b u i l d u p s in one c o u n t r y is the social cost, w h i c h o f t e n i n c l u d e s s e r i o u s reductions in social welfare spending by g o v e r n m e n t s for citizens w h o can ill afford such deprivations. More weapons mean more conflicts. G o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s to build up conventional a r m a m e n t s ensure that there are m o r e w e a p o n s available for c o u n t r i e s to e n g a g e in m o r e c o n f l i c t s . S o m e e x p e r t s b e l i e v e that the simple availability of w e a p o n s s y s t e m s and the d e v e l o p m e n t of military strategies increase the c h a n c e s that a country will g o to war. T h e y h a v e a r g u e d that a d v a n c e s in c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n r y a n d o f f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y strategies were contributing factors to the outbreaks of n u m e r o u s conflicts, i n c l u d i n g both w o r l d w a r s a n d t h e V i e t n a m War. In this c o n t e x t , a r m s

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

15

buildups are seen as one potential cause of war in the international system (Sagan 1986; Sivard 1991). Traditionally, conventional arms buildups focus on weapons systems that are considered to be most effective for the times. In the period leading up to World War I, Germany and Great Britain engaged in a race to build the most powerful and awesome warships. Adolf Hitler ordered research and development of surface-to-surface missiles and jet aircraft as a way to gain military advantage during World War II. During the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan called for the creation of a 600-ship naval force, with an emphasis on strong aircraft carrier battle groups and advanced submarines. More recently, attention has turned to the latest technology of warfare, including stealth planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), antisatellite weapons, and computer technology to give mobility and advantage to fighting forces in the twenty-first century. The relationship between arms buildups arid the likelihood of conflict is multiplied by the fact that conventional weapons have become more sophisticated and destructive over the years. "Smart" bombs and precisionguided munitions enable the delivery of explosive ordinance directly to a target, however remote. Shoulder-launched missiles may give a person the ability to shoot down large aircraft. Finally, it is important to remember that conventional arms have been used repeatedly in conflict since the end of World War II. From landmines to fighter jets, conventional weapons have been blamed for roughly 50 million deaths around the globe since 1945. Individuals, groups, and governments have all assembled and used conventional weapons to achieve their goals. The social costs of arms buildups. Many governments have sizable conventional arsenals. U.S. military expenditures have topped $250 billion annually over the past two decades, with the majority of these funds going to support troops and conventional weapons. In 2003 the Bush administration authorized a total defense budget of $396 billion to support an activeduty military strength of 1,370,000 soldiers and a force structure comprising ten army divisions, twelve navy aircraft carrier groups, three marine divisions, five army special forces groups, and thirteen air force combat wings. More than 250,000 of these U.S. soldiers were stationed abroad (with large deployments in Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and Asia). Critics point out that in relative terms, 2001 defense expenditures by the United States were more than six times larger than those of its nearest potential competitor, and more than twenty-three times larger than the combined spending of the seven "rogue states," or countries traditionally identified as the most likely adversaries of the United States: Cuba, Iran, Iraq,

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Conflict and Security

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (CDI 2001). Table 2.1 illustrates the broader context of changing levels of global and regional defense expenditures in the post-Cold War era. Though Table 2.1 shows a slight decline in global defense spending in the mid-1990s, levels are once again on the rise. In 2000, global military expenditures reached $798 billion, or $130 for every person on the planet. African countries saw the sharpest increase in defense spending, more than 37 percent, between 1998 and 2000 (SIPRI 2001). Countries continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars every year on the military. Critics charge that there are dangerous social costs of military spending. In 1996, for example, world military expenditures per soldier equaled $31,480, while government expenditures on education were just $899 per student. Health expenditures per person were only $231 around the world and just $22 in developing countries (Sivard 1996: 44-49). The United States, which ranked first in the world in military spending in 2003, placed thirtieth on infant mortality rates (behind countries such as Canada, Belgium, Greece, Slovenia, and Cyprus) (UNDP 2003). And when military expenditures rise in developing countries, studies have shown that the rate of economic growth declines and government debt increases (Nincic 1982). This has led some to conclude the sad truth that many countries are more concerned with defending their citizens from foreign attack than they are with protecting them from social, educational, and health insecurities at home.

Table 2.1

W o r l d and Regional Military Expenditures (in U.S.$ billions at constant 2000 values)

Selected Regions 3

1994

1999

2003

Africa Asia Central America Europe Middle East North America South America World

9.2 120 3.5 200 47.1 244 17.6 742

9.9 128 3.4 188 50.3 299 20.1 699

11.4 151 3.3 195 70 426 21.8 879

% Change 1994-2003 +24 +25 -5 -2 +48 +24 +24 + 18

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (London: Oxford University Press, 2004). Note: Figures may not always add up to totals because of conventions of rounding and estimates of expenditures. a. Data for some countries have been excluded because of lack of information. Africa figures do not include expenditures of Angola, Benin, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia; Asia excludes Afghanistan; and Middle East excludes Iraq.

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

17

Horizontal Proliferation of Conventional W e a p o n s A second category of proliferation is the horizontal spread of conventional weapons and related technology across country borders. The main route of the spread of conventional weaponry is through legitimate arms sales. The conventional arms trade has become quite lucrative, though, and many experts are concerned that corporate greed may be driving the world more rapidly toward the brink of major conflict. A r m s dealers. The conventional arms trade is a very big business. Seven powerful countries—the United States, France, Russia, Great Britain, China, Germany, and Israel—are responsible for more than 90 percent of global sales. Patterns in the arms trade have changed over the past two decades, however. In 1987 the Soviet Union was at the top of the arms trade, dominating the market with 46 percent of all sales. But as Soviet and (later) Russian sales levels plummeted, the United States quickly emerged as the new leader. In 2003, U.S. companies exported $14.5 billion worth of conventional arms, or 57 percent of the global market share. Their nearest competitor, Russia, exported $4.3 billion in arms (17 percent of the global market); Germany was the third largest arms merchant, completing deals worth $1.4 billion (Shanker 2004). A r m s customers. Who are the main customers for all of these weapons? U.S. defense contractors have sold most weapons to allied countries. In Europe, countries like Germany and Greece are major consumers of U.S. armaments. In the Middle East, U.S. defense contractors have sold arms to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Bahrain, Turkey, and other countries. In Asia, allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have purchased large numbers of U.S. conventional weapons systems. Arms are not always sold to countries considered traditional allies, however. From 1984 to 1989, the People's Republic of China spent some $424 million on U.S. weapons, and these arms deals were stopped only after the Tiananmen Square massacre of prodemocracy activists in the summer of 1989. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein purchased a massive conventional arsenal on the international arms market in the 1980s. Arms sales to Iraq by friends and allies came back to haunt the United States, however, during the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003). Indeed, the sale of conventional weapons raises real concern about the potential for "deadly returns" on U.S. investments (Laurance 1992). Legal and illegal arms transfers also have contributed to civil wars around the world in the past decade, including conflicts in Mozambique, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Congo, and other developing countries. Sadly, most of the casualties have been civilians. Landmines and unexploded ordnance produce

18

Conflict and Security

some 15,000-20,000 casualties a year. Children are especially at risk. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than 2 million children were killed and another 4.5 million disabled in civil wars and conflicts between 1987 and 1997 (Klare 1999). Vertical Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction The vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another serious threat to international security. There are several important dimensions of this problem, including the types of WMD systems, incentives for states to build nuclear weapons, and the patterns of vertical WMD proliferation. Types of W M D . There are three categories of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, biological, and chemical. These are often examined as a group, but it is important to note that their effects and their potential military applications are quite different. Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938, and scientists like Albert Einstein called on governments to sponsor an exploration of its potential. The U.S. government, through the five-year, $2 billion secret research program known as the Manhattan Project, first developed atomic weapons. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a 12.5-kiloton atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. This weapon produced an explosive blast equal to that of 12,500 tons of TNT and caused high-pressure waves, flying debris, extreme heat, fires, and radioactive fallout. Approximately 135,000 people were killed instantly or died within six months from injuries sustained in the blast. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, killing 65,000 people. The Japanese government surrendered one day later. The use of atomic bombs to end World War II was actually the beginning of a very dangerous period of spiraling arms races between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime immediately stepped up its atomic research and development program. In 1949 it detonated its first atomic test device and joined the nuclear club. By the 1980s the Soviet Union had accumulated an estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. Both superpowers also put an emphasis on diversification of their weapons systems. Land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were the symbolic centerpiece of the arsenal. But the superpowers also deployed nuclear weapons on submarines, in long-range bombers, and even in artillery shells and landmines. Chemical weapons and biological weapons. Chemical weapons work by spreading poisons that can incapacitate, injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the body. Chemical agents can be lethal when vaporized and

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

19

inhaled in very small amounts or when absorbed into the bloodstream through skin contact. Examples of chemical weapons range from mustard gas used during World War I to nerve agents such as Sarin (employed by a radical religious cult in Japan against civilians in Tokyo in 1995). Nerve agents are invisible and odorless, and they can produce a loss of muscle control and death for untreated victims within minutes. Many governments and independent groups have funded chemical weapons research and development programs. In fact, chemical weapons are relatively simple and cheap to produce compared with other classes of WMD. Any group with some level of expertise could develop variants of commonly used, household chemicals to create dangerous weapons of mass destruction. The first recorded use of chemical weapons in warfare occurred in the fifth century B.C.E. when Athenian soldiers poisoned their enemy's water supply with a chemical to make them sick. During World War I, more than 120,000 tons of chemical weapons were used by both sides on the western front. In 1917 alone, mustard gas attacks killed 91,000 soldiers and injured 1 million more. The last wide-scale use occurred during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), during which an estimated 13,000 soldiers were killed by chemical agents (McNaugher 1990). As dangerous as chemical weapons can be, biological agents are actually much more lethal and destructive. Biological agents are diseasecausing microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi that cause illness or kill the intended target after an incubation period (if left untreated). An example is anthrax, a disease-causing bacteria that contains as many as 10 million lethal doses per gram, which was used in terrorist attacks in the United States in fall 2001. The key to the lethality of biological agents lies in the effectiveness of delivery systems and also, of course, in the ineffectiveness of medical treatment for infected victims. Like chemical agents, biological and toxic weapons are relatively easy to construct and have a high potential lethality rate. Any government or group with access to pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities or biological research facilities can develop biological weapons. And like the other classes of WMD systems, information about the construction of such systems is available in the open scientific literature and on the Internet. W h y build W M D systems? There are two primary reasons why countries build weapons of mass destruction: security and prestige. First, many government leaders genuinely believe that the security of their countries is at risk without such systems. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union established large nuclear weapons stockpiles—but they also developed sizable arsenals of chemical and biological weapons. U.S.

20

Confici and Security

policy on b i o w e a p o n s d e v e l o p m e n t was finally r e v e r s e d by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s, while clandestine Soviet research and development continued for another decade. In the Middle East, Israel is suspected of having more than 100 nuclear devices for potential use in its own defense. Recently revealed diplomatic cables suggest that the Israeli government secretly threatened to use these systems against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War if Israel were to come under chemical or biological weapons attack. The standoff between India and Pakistan is another prime example of the s e c u r i t y i m p e r a t i v e . A f t e r years of rivalry a n d b o r d e r s k i r m i s h e s between the countries, India began a secret program to construct an atomic device that might swing the balance of regional power in its favor. In 1974 the Indian government detonated what it termed a "peaceful nuclear explos i o n " — s i g n a l i n g its capabilities to the world and threatening Pakistani security. For the next twenty-five years, both Pakistan and India secretly developed nuclear weapons in a regional arms race. In May 1998 the Indian government detonated five more underground nuclear explosions, and the Pakistani government responded to the perceived threat with six nuclear explosions of its own. The two governments acknowledged their nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s to the w o r l d , and r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e n e i g h b o r s h a v e remained quite tense. Second, some governments have undertaken W M D research and development programs for reasons of prestige, national pride, or a desire for influence. It became clear to some during the Cold War that the possession of W M D systems—or a spirited drive to attain t h e m — w o u l d gain attention for a country or leader. North Korea's drive to build a nuclear device based on an a d v a n c e d u r a n i u m e n r i c h m e n t process d r e w the attention of the United States and other Western powers in the early 1990s. After extensive n e g o t i a t i o n s , North Korea was o f f e r e d new n u c l e a r e n e r g y reactors in exchange for a promise not to divert nuclear material for a b o m b program. When North Korea renounced the deal in 2002, world leaders scrambled to head off its program to develop more weapons. Other government leaders pursue the development of W M D arsenals because they believe that it will help them gain political dominance in their region. To illustrate this dynamic, Gerald Steinberg (1994), an expert on proliferation, relates the story of clandestine Iraqi government efforts to develop a W M D arsenal. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered the creation of a secret W M D research and development program and began to acquire nuclear technology and materials from France, Germany, the United States, and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in the late 1970s. S a d d a m H u s s e i n also s o u g h t to strengthen his political profile in the region by improving relations with key A r a b states. M e a n w h i l e , the Israeli g o v e r n m e n t tried to stop Iraq's W M D program by launching an air strike against Iraq's nuclear research

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

21

reactor at Osiraq in 1981. But the determined Iraqi drive for regional influence appears to have ended only with the Gulf War and the dispatch of a United Nations special commission to investigate and dismantle the Iraqi WMD program. Broadly speaking, Iraqi proliferation efforts were part of a larger scheme to gain prestige, power, and influence in the Middle East. H o r i z o n t a l Proliferation of W e a p o n s of Mass Destruction The horizontal proliferation of WMD systems represents the final dimension of this challenge to international peace and stability. In fact, the spread of these weapons and vital technology across state borders is often viewed as the most serious of all proliferation threats. President George W. Bush warned in 2002 that the gravest danger we face is that "the world's most dangerous people" will get their hands on "the world's most dangerous weapons" (Zakaria 2004). N u c l e a r arsenals. The massive buildup of nuclear arsenals by the superpowers was not the only game in town during the Cold War. In fact, while the Soviet Union and United States were stockpiling their weapons, other countries were working to join the nuclear club through both open and clandestine routes. Today, the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, China, India, and Pakistan all openly acknowledge possessing stocks of nuclear weapons (see Figure 2.2). At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union supported key allies by secretly authorizing the transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to other research and development programs. In 1952, Great Britain successfully tested an atomic device and eventually built a nuclear arsenal of about 200 weapons. France officially joined the nuclear club in 1960 and built a somewhat larger nuclear arsenal of an estimated 420 weapons. The People's Republic of China detonated its first atomic device in 1964 and built an arsenal of about 300 nuclear weapons during the Cold War (McGwire 1994). The controlled spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology from the superpowers to key allies is not the only route by which countries might obtain valuable information and materials. Several less developed countries began secret atomic weapons research and development projects after World War II. As noted earlier, states like India, Pakistan, and Israel pursued clandestine WMD programs because of concerns about security and prestige. These efforts were facilitated in some cases by covert shipments of material and technology from the great powers, but research and development of WMD systems was also aided by the availability of information in the open scientific literature (and by the resourcefulness of their scientists and engineers).

Figure 2.2 Nuclear W e a p o n Status, 2004

I

NPT nuclear-weapon slates (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S.)

I I

Non-NPT nuclear-weapon states (India. Israel, Pakistan) Suspected programs (Iran, North Korea)

Abstaining Countries

The following industrialized countries have the techologicat base, but thus far not the desire, to develop nuclear weapons. Some have installations that can produce weapons-grade material under international inspection: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Renunciations

Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa had active nuclear weapon programs during the 1980s, but renounced such activities by opening all of their nuclear facilities to international inspection and by joining the nonproliferation regime. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and cooperated in the removal of all remaining nuclear weapons to Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

W o r l d w i d e Nuclear Stockpiles

Country China France India Israel Pakistan Russia United Kingdom United States Maximum Total

Total Nuclear Warheads 410 350 50-903 ~100 b 30-50c -17,000 185

-10,000 28,185

Notes: a. I n d i a is t h o u g h t to h a v e p r o d u c e d e n o u g h w e a p o n s - g r a d e p l u t o n i u m to p r o d u c e between 5 0 and 9 0 nuclear weapons. The number of actual weapons assembled or c a p a b l e of b e i n g a s s e m b l e d is u n k n o w n . N o w e a p o n s are known to be deployed among active military units or on missiles. b. Israel is thought to possess enough nuclear material for b e t w e e n 9 8 a n d 172 n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . T h e n u m b e r of w e a p o n s a s s e m b l e d or c a p a b l e of b e i n g a s s e m b l e d is unknown, but likely to be on the lower end of this range. c. Pakistan may have produced enough w e a p o n s - g r a d e uranium to produce up to 50 nuclear weapons. The number of actual weapons assembled or capable of being assembled is unknown. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are reportedly stored in component form, with the fissile core separated from the nonnuclear explosives.

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/images/npp/nuke.jpg.

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict

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When the Indian government detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974, it symbolically ended the monopoly on nuclear systems held by the great powers. India actually obtained nuclear material f o r its b o m b by diverting it from a Canadian-supplied nuclear energy reactor that had key components originally made in the United States. Most experts believe that India now p o s s e s s e s a significant stockpile of about f i f t y u n a s s e m b l e d nuclear weapons. The 1974 Indian detonation was, of course, a catalyst for the Pakistani government to step up its research and development program. Pakistani research scientist A. Q. Khan actually stole uranium enrichment technology f r o m a European consortium in the late 1970s and became a national hero for leading Pakistan's weapons program. Today, most experts believe that Pakistan has dozens of weapons that could be assembled quickly for use. The test explosions sponsored by both governments in 1998 put the world on notice regarding their capabilities. Finally, the Israeli nuclear p r o g r a m was a d e r i v a t i v e of research and d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s in the United Stales and, ironically, the Soviet Union. Like India, the Israeli government proved to be quite resourceful in adapting existing technologies to construct its arsenal (Cirincione, Wolfstahl, and Rajkumar 2002). According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, several other countries are considered " h i g h - r i s k " proliferants. Iran, Libya, and North Korea have all attempted to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan has admitted that he had supplied agents for these governments with the designs and technology to produce enriched uranium. But these countries are limited by international supply controls and sanctions. While the government of North Korea signed a framework agreement in 1994 in which it pledged not to develop nuclear w e a p o n s , e x p e r t s n o w b e l i e v e that the c o u n t r y a l r e a d y h a s s u f f i c i e n t w e a p o n s m a t e r i a l f o r up to e i g h t n u c l e a r d e v i c e s . World l e a d e r s are extremely c o n c e r n e d about the Iranian g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to develop nuclear weapons. It started a pilot nuclear facility and construction of a large uranium enrichment plant in 2004. Finally, s o m e states have m a d e political d e c i s i o n s to give up their W M D research and development efforts. Included in this group are South A f r i c a , Brazil, A r g e n t i n a , and three f o r m e r Soviet r e p u b l i c s : B e l a r u s , Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Libya recently joined this group as well. T h e South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t admitted that it had constructed six nuclear devices for self-defense in the 1970s and 1980s, for example. But the government decided to destroy these weapons in 1990—unilaterally removing itself f r o m the nuclear club. Argentina and Brazil r e n o u n c e d their past efforts to develop nuclear arsenals and have developed a new antinuclear profile for the region. The three former Soviet republics had about 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons stationed on their soil after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Soon after gaining their independence, however, the three

24

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Security

republics agreed to become non-nuclear weapons states under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]). They agreed to transfer all their nuclear warheads back to Russia in exchange for economic assistance from the United States (McGwire 1994). In December 2003 the Libyan government announced that it would give up its WMD research and development programs. Some experts suggested that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi changed course just days before the Iraq War because of the international community's new resolve to fight proliferation. T h e spread of chemical and biological weapons. At least twenty countries are suspected to possess chemical and biological weapons, and many have chosen to develop these weapons through clandestine routes. Table 2.2 illustrates the range of actors involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. W M D terrorism. The horizontal spread of WMD systems raises another concern about international security at the dawn of the twenty-first century: the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons systems in terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, this fear was realized in 2001 with a wave of "toxic terrorism" in the United States. These attacks caused panic in many industrialized countries and increased public concerns about other potential threats, such as the use of smallpox or plague as a terrorist weapon. Osama

Table 2.2

C o u n t r i e s S u s p e c t e d to Possess C h e m i c a l or Biological W e a p o n s Capabilities Chemical Weapons China Egypt India Iran Israel Libya North Korea Pakistan Sudan Syria Taiwan

Biological Weapons China Egypt India Israel Libya North Korea Pakistan Russia Sudan Syria

Sources: E. J. Hogendoom, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (September-October 1997); "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Arms Control Today (October 1992); Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfstahl, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly ArsenalsTracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

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25

bin Laden has called it a " d u t y " for the Al-Qaida terrorist network to acquire a nuclear bomb to use against the West. A recent study of documented terrorist incidents involving chemical and biological agents r e v e a l s that there were 101 attacks w o r l d w i d e between 1900 and 1999. A c c o r d i n g to the d a t a b a s e c o m p i l e d by the Monterey Institute's Center for N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Studies, chemical or biological attacks have accounted for a total of 103 fatalities and 5,554 injuries in the past century. Although two-thirds of all documented incidents occurred outside the United States, some of the more i n f a m o u s attacks were c l o s e r to h o m e . In 1984, for e x a m p l e , f o l l o w e r s of the R a j n e e s h e e cult c o n t a m i n a t e d r e s t a u r a n t s a l a d b a r s in T h e D a l l e s , Oregon, with salmonella bacteria, sickening 750 people for several days. Oddly, the attack was intended not to kill innocent victims but rather to keep voters at home in order to influence the outcome of a local election (Tucker 2000). Many experts believe that the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, material, and know-how has increased the likelihood that a group or state will attempt an act of nuclear terrorism in the future. This is of particular concern given the chaos and instability surrounding the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, and there have been numerous reports of attempts to buy or steal nuclear warheads in that region. In January 1991, armed Azeri rebels in Azerbaijan penetrated a Soviet base on which tactical nuclear weapons were stored and gained control of a nuclear warhead for a short period before being ejected by Soviet troops. Later that year, a nuclear expert from Greenpeace conducted a secret investigation to see how easily one might buy a Soviet nuclear device on the black market. With very little effort he found a group of disgruntled Russian soldiers willing to sell a nuclear warhead for $250,000. He quickly reneged on the deal and reported the incident to international regulatory authorities (Hersh 1994). Finally, experts are concerned about the possibility that terrorists will combine radioactive materials with conventional explosives to create deadly radiological devices (also known as "dirty bombs"). All of these factors suggest that the threat of W M D terrorism has increased in the modern era.

•

G l o b a l Solutions?

T h e Nonproliferation Regime Proliferation is a very complex and multilayered challenge to international security. Many world leaders have recognized this threat and addressed the proliferation challenge through a series of regional and global initiatives. The scope of these nonproliferation initiatives has steadily increased over

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the past few decades, but it should be noted that many skeptics question the effectiveness of these efforts in the twenty-first century. In some ways, the global nuclear nonproliferation movement began even before the first use of atomic weapons in 1945. Americans involved in the Manhattan Project recognized from the outset that such weapons were special and more dangerous than other systems. President Harry Truman, who had ordered the use of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, authorized his ambassador to the United Nations, Bernard Baruch, to propose that all nuclear materials and technology in the world be placed under UN oversight. While the plan did not receive w i d e s p r e a d support, it demonstrated a first step toward global consideration of proliferation problems and set the stage for later progress on the issue. In the 1960s, world leaders agreed to new initiatives, including the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This agreement outlawed nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It was originally signed by leaders from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, and later gained support from much of the world. In 1967 the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America created a large nuclearfree zone. Signatories to this treaty pledged to use nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes. Most important, the treaty outlawed the testing or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the region (Davis 1991). T h e N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty. The NPT represented one of the most significant advances in the development of the global nonproliferation r e g i m e . The treaty was an a g r e e m e n t to halt the s p r e a d o f n u c l e a r weapons beyond the five declared nuclear powers. Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty had ambitious goals for both vertical and horizontal proliferation. Article 1 of the treaty dictated that no nuclear weapons state (defined by the treaty as a state that detonated a nuclear explosive prior to 1967) would transfer "directly or indirectly" nuclear weapons, explosive devices, or control over these weapons to another party. Article 2 stipulated that no non-nuclear weapons state could receive, manufacture, obtain assistance for manufacturing, or otherwise try to acquire nuclear weaponry. Another significant element of the treaty was Article 6, which obligated all nuclear states to pursue the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and completing a treaty on general disarmament under strict and effective international control. In many ways, the N P T represented the crowning achievement of global nonproliferation efforts during the Cold War. Related nonproliferation initiatives. Several other significant agreements have followed in the spirit of the NPT. The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 was the first formal effort to gain some control over

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the w o r l d ' s d e a d l y b i o l o g i c a l a r s e n a l . M o r e than 1 4 0 c o u n t r i e s a g r e e d to ban " t h e d e v e l o p m e n t , production and s t o c k p i l i n g o f m i c r o b i a l or other b i o l o g i c a l a g e n t s . " T h e c o n v e n t i o n , h o w e v e r , did n o t s a n c t i o n n o n s i g n a t o ries and did not p r e c l u d e r e s e a r c h on b i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s ( D a v i s 1 9 9 1 ) . In the s a m e spirit, w o r l d l e a d e r s e n g a g e d in y e a r s o f n e g o t i a t i o n to draft a C h e m i c a l W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n ( C W C ) , w h i c h w a s o p e n e d f o r s i g n a t u r e in January

1 9 9 3 . T h i s treaty c o m m i t t e d all s i g n a t o r i e s to e l i m i n a t e

their

s t o c k p i l e s o f c h e m i c a l w e a p o n r y and halt all d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s . In a d d i t i o n , it i n c l u d e d a set o f v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s s o m e w h a t m o r e s t r i n g e n t than t h o s e u n d e r the N P T . T h e s e p r o c e d u r e s s u p p o r t e d the r i g h t s o f a n e w C W C i n s p e c t o r a t e to c o n d u c t r i g o r o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and s u r p r i s e " c h a l l e n g e i n s p e c t i o n s " o f s u s p e c t e d c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s p r o g r a m s in s i g n a t o r y states. In 1 9 7 2 the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t U n i o n n e g o t i a t e d their first t w o m a j o r a r m s c o n t r o l t r e a t i e s , the b e g i n n i n g o f an i m p o r t a n t p e r i o d o f i m p r o v e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t w o s u p e r p o w e r s o n c e l o c k e d in a bitter c o l d war. T h e S t r a t e g i c A r m s L i m i t a t i o n T r e a t y ( S A L T I) c a l l e d f o r limits on the n u m b e r o f n u c l e a r launch p l a t f o r m s , i n c l u d i n g m i s s i l e s and s t r a t e g i c bombers. T h e A n t i - B a l l i s t i c Missile ( A B M ) Treaty limited each superpower to the d e p l o y m e n t o f d e f e n s i v e , g r o u n d - b a s e d a n t i m i s s i l e s y s t e m s at o n l y t w o sites (later r e d u c e d to o n e ) . A c c o r d i n g to A r t i c l e 5 o f the treaty, e a c h party p l e d g e d " n o t to d e v e l o p , test, o r d e p l o y A B M s y s t e m s o r c o m p o n e n t s w h i c h are s e a - b a s e d , s p a c e - b a s e d , o r m o b i l e l a n d - b a s e d " b e y o n d a l l o w e d l i m i t s . O t h e r b i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t s led to c a p s on the n u m b e r o f s t r a t e g i c w a r h e a d s (the S t r a t e g i c A r m s R e d u c t i o n T r e a t i e s ) a n d e v e n the e l i m i n a t i o n o f an e n t i r e c l a s s o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s ( t h e 1 9 8 7

Intermediate-Range

N u c l e a r F o r c e s T r e a t y ) . In the past d e c a d e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s and R u s s i a h a v e p l e d g e d to r e d u c e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s s t o c k p i l e s to r o u g h l y 2 , 0 0 0 warheads each. In 1 9 9 6 the C o m p r e h e n s i v e N u c l e a r T e s t B a n T r e a t y ( C T B T ) , a n o t h e r nonproliferation initiative, was opened for signature. M a n y U N

member

s t a t e s v o t e d to support the treaty and b a n all n u c l e a r t e s t i n g , but to b e c o m e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w t h e t r e a t y r e q u i r e d the s i g n a t u r e a n d r a t i f i c a t i o n o f all f o r t y - f o u r c o u n t r i e s k n o w n to p o s s e s s n u c l e a r r e a c t o r s . A s e r i e s o f p r o b l e m s b l o c k e d f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s on the treaty, h o w e v e r . T h e g o v e r n m e n t s o f b o t h India and P a k i s t a n h a v e r e f u s e d to sign the treaty. India has c l a i m e d that it w a n t s the C T B T to b e s t r o n g e r in o r d e r to f o r c e n u c l e a r s t a t e s ' c o m p l i a n c e with A r t i c l e 6 o f the N P T , and the P a k i s t a n i g o v e r n m e n t h a s stated t h a t it w i l l not s i g n the C T B T w i t h o u t I n d i a n c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e i r n u c l e a r t e s t s o f M a y 1 9 9 8 u n d e r s c o r e d t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e to t h e r e g i m e . O t h e r states, i n c l u d i n g C u b a and S y r i a , a l s o r e m a i n r e l u c t a n t to sign the treaty. F i n a l l y , t h e U . S . S e n a t e e n g a g e d in h e a t e d d e b a t e s o v e r t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e C T B T , f o c u s e d o n v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , p r o b l e m s with n o n s i g n a t o r i e s ,

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a n d the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s of the a g r e e m e n t . In a m o v e that stunned the world, the Senate rejected the treaty in October 1999. At this writing, the B u s h administration s h o w s n o inclination to renew c o n s i d e r a tion of the C T B T .

Controlling Weapons at the Point of Supply G i v e n serious c o n c e r n s about the implications of the spread of W M D technology around the world, g o v e r n m e n t s have also devoted attention to c o n trolling w e a p o n s transfers at the point of supply. The NPT, for e x a m p l e , did not prevent states f r o m exporting " p e a c e f u l " nuclear energy reactors and o t h e r types of m a t e r i a l s that c o u l d potentially be a d a p t e d f o r use in the d e v e l o p m e n t of W M D programs. To address such concerns, m a j o r supplier s t a t e s — i n c l u d i n g the Soviet Union, Japan, France, the United States, Great Britain, West G e r m a n y , and C a n a d a — a g r e e d in 1976 to establish a " t r i g g e r list" of items that could be sold to other countries only under stringent safeg u a r d s . In the 1980s, supplier states established the M i s s i l e T e c h n o l o g y Control R e g i m e , w h i c h prohibited the transfer of essential technology f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t of ballistic missile systems. Like the NPT, however, supply control efforts have had only m a r g i n a l success. T h e y helped to limit missile development projects under way in South A m e r i c a and the Middle East, but some twenty countries still h a v e j o i n e d the ballistic missile club. T h e s e supply controls did not prevent Iraq f r o m m a k i n g s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s t o w a r d the d e v e l o p m e n t of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s through the m o d i f i c a t i o n of civilian scientific technology that w a s adapted for military use. A n d they did not prevent Iraq f r o m m a n u f a c t u r i n g and m o d i f y i n g the S c u d - B missiles that were used against Israel and Saudi A r a b i a d u r i n g the 1991 G u l f W a r — a n d that w e r e c a p a b l e of c a r r y i n g chemical warheads. M e a n w h i l e , Pakistan developed its o w n ballistic missile, the H a t f , a n d a c q u i r e d a b o u t thirty n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e m e d i u m - r a n g e M - l l missiles f r o m C h i n a ( M c N a u g h e r 1990). The North Korean g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e s to d e v e l o p a l o n g - r a n g e T a e p o D o n g m i s s i l e t h a t m a y s o m e d a y have the potential to reach the continental United States. On the conventional w e a p o n s front, there is growing recognition that a r m s t r a n s f e r s — e v e n "small a r m s " like guns and antitank w e a p o n s — r e p r e sent a f u n d a m e n t a l threat to i n t e r n a t i o n a l security. Security e x p e r t s a n d g o v e r n m e n t leaders h a v e been discussing w a y s to increase the transparency of the c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s trade by m a k i n g more i n f o r m a t i o n available on a r m s transfer policies and data. In 2001 the United Nations estimated that there were m o r e than 5 0 0 million small arms in the world, 4 0 - 6 0 percent of which h a v e been acquired illegally through black markets (Crossette 2001). T h e small a r m s trade f u e l s civil wars in developing countries, e m p o w e r s organized crime, and enables terrible h u m a n rights violations.

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T h e Future of Proliferation and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century National Missile Defense and the End of Deterrence? U.S. g o v e r n m e n t leaders have expressed concerns about w e a p o n s proliferation for decades, but presidents have developed very different a p p r o a c h e s to the problem over time. President T r u m a n supported the Baruch Plan for the t r a n s f e r of n u c l e a r t e c h n o l o g y to U N c o n t r o l . P r e s i d e n t J o h n F. K e n n e d y n e g o t i a t e d the Partial N u c l e a r Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union soon a f t e r the C u b a n missile crisis. P r e s i d e n t R i c h a r d N i x o n led U.S. n e g o t i a t i o n s with the Soviet U n i o n that e s t a b l i s h e d the first m a j o r a r m s c o n t r o l t r e a t i e s b e t w e e n the s u p e r p o w e r s , S A L T I a n d the A B M Treaty. In 1977, President J i m m y Carter proclaimed that one of his administration's goals would be the c o m p l e t e elimination of nuclear weapons. O t h e r p r e s i d e n t s h a v e p l a c e d less faith in a r m s control a g r e e m e n t s , however. Ronald Reagan was c o n c e r n e d by the fragility of nuclear deterrence with the Soviet Union (which he termed the "Evil E m p i r e " ) . Reagan a n n o u n c e d in M a r c h 1983 that he w a s o r d e r i n g an intensive p r o g r a m to d e v e l o p a s p a c e - b a s e d m i s s i l e d e f e n s e s h i e l d , k n o w n as the S t r a t e g i c D e f e n s e Initiative (SDI, or as it c o m m o n l y b e c a m e k n o w n , "Star Wars"). Critics argued that this would u n d e r m i n e the nuclear deterrent relationship with the Soviet Union, nullify the A B M Treaty, and lead to the militarization of space. Attention to SDI research was soon diverted, however, by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. President G e o r g e W. Bush resurrected the plan as a national missile d e f e n s e ( N M D ) system, which w o u l d be a centerpiece of his national security policy. T h e Bush administration believed that the United States faced n e w t h r e a t s of m i s s i l e a t t a c k — n o t f r o m R u s s i a or o t h e r f o r m e r S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s — b u t more likely f r o m the actions of a terrorist group, a " r o g u e state" like North Korea, or an accidental launch. In this sense, N M D was cast as a response to c o n t e m p o r a r y proliferation challenges. But U.S. plans to d e v e l o p N M D drew heated opposition at h o m e and abroad. Critics questioned the scientific feasibility of the program and worried about the abrog a t i o n of the A B M T r e a t y . T h e y c h a r g e d that the U . S . p r o g r a m w o u l d destabilize relations with other m a j o r nuclear p o w e r s , such as Russia and China, and threatened an arms race in space. T h e S e p t e m b e r 11, 2001, terrorist attacks r e i n f o r c e d the p r e s i d e n t ' s belief in the need for N M D and quieted m a n y critics. But they also p r o m p t ed a b r o a d e r review of nuclear strategy for the twenty-first century and led the B u s h administration to equate missile d e f e n s e with h o m e l a n d security. Bush a n n o u n c e d in D e c e m b e r 2001 that the United States would unilaterally w i t h d r a w f r o m the A B M Treaty within six m o n t h s . A n d he launched a f o u r - y e a r , $ 8 . 3 billion r e s e a r c h initiative f o r t h e s y s t e m . T h e p r e s i d e n t

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argued: "Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations— means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to d e f e n d . . . . H o m e l a n d d e f e n s e and missile d e f e n s e are part of s t r o n g e r security, and t h e y ' r e essential priorities f o r A m e r i c a " ( W h i t e House 2002b). N M D represents only one dimension of the conversion in U.S. nuclear strategy. Top Bush administration officials have argued that a deterrence policy resting on mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a relic of the Cold War that should be jettisoned as a guiding principle for preserving U.S. security. In the wake of a government study of W M D security (the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review), the Bush administration a n n o u n c e d that the U n i t e d States should e n h a n c e its ability to launch p r e e m p t i v e strikes (nuclear and nonnuclear) against hostile states. Related initiatives bolster the c h a r g e that the Bush administration has f u n d a m e n t a l l y changed its strategy on W M D security. In the past four years, the Bush administration has f u n d e d development of N M D sites, supported research and developm e n t of " m i n i - n u k e s " (or the A d v a n c e d W e a p o n s C o n c e p t Initiative), "bunker-busters" (or the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator), and a revitalization program for nuclear weapons development.

Proliferation, P r e e m p t i o n , and Conflict: T h e Iraq W a r The Iraq War may be an example of the evolution of nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century; it certainly illustrates the linkage between proliferation and international security. Plans for a war on Iraq were hatched just days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. In a meeting of President Bush's principal national security advisers at Camp David, Maryland, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued that S a d d a m H u s s e i n w a s a tyrant w h o r e p r e s e n t e d a direct threat to U.S. national security. He charged that Iraq had continued to develop W M D after the 1991 Gulf War and threatened their use against U.S. allies such as Israel. Wolfowitz added that Iraq supported international terrorism, and he believed there was a strong chance that Saddam Hussein had actually been involved in the September 11 attacks. While President Bush chose to delay consideration of a war with Iraq in lieu of an invasion of Afghanistan, he did authorize the Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency to begin secret planning to topple Saddam Hussein. T h e p r e s i d e n t a n d h i s t o p a d v i s e r s a r t i c u l a t e d t h e t h r e a t t o the A m e r i c a n public in 2002. In a speech to graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president argued: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear

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weapons, along with ballistic missile t e c h n o l o g y — w h e n that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic p o w e r to strike great nations. Our e n e m i e s have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power. (White House 2 0 0 2 )

While Iraq agreed to a new round of international inspections of suspected W M D sites in October 2002, the Bush administration proceeded with plans for war. In the winter of 2002-2003, the United States prepositioned over 100,000 troops in the Persian Gulf and began calling up National Guard and Reserve forces to augment coalition strength. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a high-profile address at the UN Security Council outlining Iraqi suspected WMD activity and the purported links between Saddam and Al-Qaida terrorists (Dobbs 2003). The Iraq War began on March 19, 2003, with a coalition assault on targets throughout the country. U.S. and coalition forces advanced very rapidly into Iraq. Allied soldiers faced challenges such as bad weather, long and insecure supply lines, and hit-and-run enemy attacks, but the takeover of Iraq was by no means a major struggle. In early April, U.S. and coalition forces rushed into Baghdad and forced a general surrender of Iraqi forces. Iraqis and Americans celebrated the successful conclusion of the war, and there was general optimism about the future. On May 1, 2003, President Bush stood under a "Mission Accomplished" banner aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declared the "end of major combat operations" in Iraq. But the Iraq War was not yet over. In the summer of 2003, a major insurgency operation claimed the lives of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and foreign workers in Iraq. Some of the worst strikes came when suicide bombers, possibly sponsored by the Saddam fedayeen (men of sacrifice) and foreign terrorist groups, attacked soft targets such as the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, police stations, and even civilian job fairs. Back in Washington, the Bush administration was forced to reconsider its declaration of victory in Iraq. Facing the reality of the costs of a postwar occupation of Iraq, U.S. public opinion eroded substantially in 2004. The number of Americans who believed that the United States had "done the right thing" in Iraq dropped by 16 percent in the first six months of 2004. One year after the president's announcements of the end of major combat operations, his public approval rating stood at 46 percent—down from a high of 89 percent just after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Stevenson and Elder 2004). The Bush administration faced another surprising twist in the Iraq

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story. Soldiers and weapons inspectors who entered the country in 2003 f o u n d no e v i d e n c e of an active p r o g r a m to d e v e l o p w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction. Intelligence reports that had prompted the Bush administration to consider immediate action against Saddam Hussein proved false, and critics of the war jumped on this to claim the war was waged for illegitimate reasons. Close observers of the debate that preceded the war suggested that conservative Bush advisers had "cooked the books" in favor of the war e f f o r t . In particular, they charged that the Defense Department had manipulated the intelligence it was receiving in order to shape American public opinion and policies toward Iraq. Concerned citizens in the United States and around the world questioned the effectiveness of a strategy of preemption for dealing with proliferation threats.

Conclusion: Prospects for the Future? The proliferation of weapons is truly a major challenge to global security. One of the most important catalysts of global proliferation was the Cold War arms race between the superpowers. But with the Cold War a distant memory, many scholars and politicians are taking a new look at incentives for proliferation in the twenty-first century. Optimists say that we may be headed toward a nuclear-free world. They argue that a global build-down in tensions—a reverse proliferation—has occurred since the late 1980s. They cite the completion of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), between the United States and the Soviet Union in January 1991; the START II agreement, to reduce nuclear arsenals to 3,500 warheads each; and surprising recent agreements between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin as evidence of progress toward a minimal nuclear deterrent relationship. P e s s i m i s t s w a r n , h o w e v e r , that m a n y a r m s c o n t r o l i n i t i a t i v e s are d o o m e d to fail in a proliferating world. New and complex debates have emerged about whether defense and deterrence represent a more effective, pragmatic response to the spread of weapons technology. Strategists suggest that preparedness for a rogue-state nuclear launch at the United States or a concentrated toxic terrorist attack would be the best use of government resources. The September 11 attacks and subsequent international developments appear to have bolstered this pessimistic vision, and the current war on terrorism seems to be one definitive answer to the question of how to respond to proliferation threats. Furthermore, many American conservatives view international nonproliferation agreements with a jaded eye. U.S. government opposition to the C T B T and verification regime initiatives for the Biological Weapons Convention, combined with a doctrine of preemption and support f o r national missile defense, all suggest a new attitude toward proliferation.

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Discussion Questions 1. In y o u r o p i n i o n , w h i c h of the f o u r types of p r o l i f e r a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s the m o s t s e r i o u s threat to international security? 2. Is the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s a c h a l l e n g e that the g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y can e v e r fully m e e t ? W h y o r w h y not? 3. Is it p o s s i b l e that w e a p o n s p r o l i f e r a t i o n c o u l d a c t u a l l y m a k e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m m o r e stable in the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y ? H o w m i g h t this o c c u r ? 4. W h a t are s o m e of the e f f o r t s that individual c o u n t r i e s and international o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e m a d e to r e s p o n d to the p r o l i f e r a t i o n chall e n g e ? W h i c h are m o s t e f f e c t i v e , and w h y ? 5. W h a t are s o m e of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the trade-off b e t w e e n e x p e n ditures on d e f e n s e and social w e l f a r e p r o g r a m s ? 6. W h a t c a n g o v e r n m e n t s d o to c o n f r o n t t h r e a t s of t e r r o r i s m u s i n g w e a p o n s of m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n ? H o w h a v e recent international develo p m e n t s c h a n g e d the d e f i n i t i o n of the Type IV p r o l i f e r a t i o n threat? Why? 7. S h o u l d the United S t a t e s d e v e l o p a ballistic missile d e f e n s e s y s t e m ? In y o u r o p i n i o n , is d e t e r r e n c e still an e f f e c t i v e strategy f o r W M D security? 8. S h o u l d g o v e r n m e n t l e a d e r s use military force to stop w o u l d - b e proliférants f r o m t h r e a t e n i n g their security? W h y or w h y not?

Suggested Readings Bailey, Kathleen C. (1993) Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Boulder: Westview. C i r i n c i o n e , J o s e p h , Jon B. Wolfstahl, and Miriam R a j k u m a r (2002) Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Karp, Aaron (1994) "The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms." Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn). M e n d e l s o h n , Jack ( 2 0 0 1 ) " I s A r m s C o n t r o l D e a d ? " Issues in Science and Technology 17, no. 3 (Spring). Michalak, Stanley (2001) A Primer in Power Politics. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Moodie, Michael (1995) "Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Diffusion." Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring). P e r k o v i c h , G e o r g e ( 1 9 9 9 ) India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: W. W. Norton. Tucker, Jonathan B. (2000) Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Cambridge: MIT Press.

3 Nationalism Una M. Kassem, Anthony N.Talbott, and Michael T. Snarr

I

n late February 1986, as many as 1 million Filipinos left their homes in the middle of the night to form a human barricade around the Camp Crame military police base in Manila. The men, women, and children placed themselves in between the tanks of a vengeful dictator and a handful of coup leaders who had attempted to overthrow him. Catholic nuns, schoolchildren, dock workers, attorneys, farmers, business owners, and communist revolutionaries all joined together to stand in defiance of President Ferdinand Marcos. Why? What caused these wildly different people to unite? Was it some shared sense of purpose? Did a common destiny drive them? The answer is yes. The people of the Philippine People Power Revolution shared a common identity: Filipino. They saw themselves as belonging to a community, a community they imagined as encompassing all citizens of their country. They came together to rescue their country. They experienced a strong sense of nationalism.

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Nationalism

But what is nationalism? Nationalism is a shared sense of identity based on important social distinctions that has the purpose of gaining or keeping control of the group's own destiny. Nationalism arises from many different sources. Shared ethnicity, language, religion, culture, history, and geographical proximity all generate feelings of comradeship and belonging to a certain group. As a result, human beings organize themselves into groups or communities. We are social beings. These communities determine how we interact with others and with whom we interact. They affect our perception

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of ourselves and of others. We consider other people either to be part of our group or to be outside of our group. Although we may have several identities (daughter, mother or father, spouse, club member, student, etc.), our nationality is one of the most important. People unite into groups in pursuit of certain goals. Often this sense of shared identity becomes political. When the goal is self-determination for the g r o u p , the shared i d e n t i f i c a t i o n has b e c o m e n a t i o n a l i s m . In o t h e r words, when a group of sports fans identify with one another, but have no political aspirations, this does not constitute nationalism. But when a group of p e o p l e seek to have political control over a given territory, then it becomes nationalism. Thus national self-determination is the main purpose of nationalism. The shared identity of nationalism is often called an imagined community because, despite their strong feelings of fellowship, most citizens of a country will never actually meet—let alone get to know—one another. But the feeling of unity remains. To understand nationalism, we must look at the origins of the nation and the state, how they have evolved, and the different shapes that nationalism takes in the world today.

T h e Evolution of the State A state (also referred to as a country) is a political unit that has sovereignty over a geographical area. Sovereignty refers to the fact that the state is selfgoverning; that is, there is no external group or person that has authority over it. It is hard to imagine an alternative, but prior to the seventeenth century, states as we know them did not exist. Prior to the modern state, most people lived under political units referred to as empires. Empires usually included large swaths of land, encompassing many groups or nations. In Europe, between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the modern system of states, medieval feudalism was largely in place. Under feudalism, power was not as centralized as it was under the Roman Empire. Individual peasants had to a n s w e r to local nobles or kings, w h o in turn were loosely ruled by an empire, such as the Holy Roman Empire. Lines of control in medieval Europe were fuzzy at best. As Europe drew closer to the seventeenth century, the Catholic C h u r c h ' s p o w e r was increasingly called into question. The Protestant Reformation and secular authorities combined to challenge the P o p e ' s authority. One tragic outcome was the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), which pitted Protestants against Catholics and destroyed much of Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended this devastating war and recognized many independent, secular political units that would become modern states. One key distinguishing characteristic of these states was sover-

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eignty. Unlike the earlier empires, which did not respect the right of other empires to govern their own territory, the new states recognized each other's sovereignty. In short, states were to govern themselves without outside interference. There was no distant secular emperor, king, or religious leader to control them. As a result, states slowly began to develop international law as a way to coordinate or govern relations between them. The beginning of the modern state system did not happen overnight. It had begun to develop in Europe at least a century before the Treaty of Westphalia, and slowly spread throughout the world in a process that is arguably still continuing today. In fact, most of the countries or states of today are relatively new (as will be discussed later in the chapter).

T h e Evolution of N a t i o n a l i s m The creation of the modern state system paved the way for nationalism as we know it today. Prior to the spread of nationalism, most people were primarily concerned with local and personal affairs. People knew they were the subjects of powerful kings, queens, and emperors, but there were no serious attempts to foster a sense of common identity. Local rulers and feudal lords governed everyday matters. A vast gulf existed between rulers and ruled. Local people did not participate in government above the most basic levels. People only knew their family and others in the village. There was little sense of belonging to a larger, countrywide community. Slowly this began to change. Although the roots of nationalism began before the end of the eighteenth century, most scholars point to the French Revolution as the defining moment for nationalism. Influenced by the Enlightenment, writers like John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the people should govern themselves rather than being governed by kings or queens. Thus the concept of divine right of kings was gradually replaced with the notion of the will of the people ( k n o w n as popular sovereignty). The American (1776) and the French (1789) revolutions greatly strengthened the idea that the people had the right to participate in their own g o v e r n m e n t s . Napoleon and the leaders of the French Revolution used this new sense of c i t i z e n s h i p to create a p s y c h o l o g i c a l bond a m o n g the p e o p l e spread throughout France. For the first time, the varied people of France began to c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s as Frenchmen. T h i s new i d e n t i t y led to m a n y changes. People addressed one another as "citizen" rather than "sir" and a new flag was designed. France no longer had to pay mercenaries, but could now motivate an army of F r e n c h m e n to fight for their country. United and empowered by nationalism, they did not merely fight for a ruler, they fought for France. Soon after the French Revolution, national-

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ism began to spread throughout Europe and gradually to the rest of the world. Since the French Revolution, nationalism has been both a positive and a negative force in the world. It has united and divided peoples. It has brought peace and it has led to war. In one of its more negative forms, nationalism created a strong sense of superiority within Nazi Germany and led to the death of millions of innocent victims. Feelings of superiority and national pride within Europe also fueled the colonization of Africa and other parts of what we now call the South, or the developing world. In the case of Africa, colonization consisted of countries like Portugal, Great Britain, Germany, France, and others forcibly taking over and controlling the continent during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In what would become known as the "scramble for Africa," the European powers carved up the continent into colonies. These new political units ignored the existing tribal structure. In other words, very diverse groups, even enemies of one another, were forced together into colonies. The European colonial powers were able to take advantage of diverse groups living in Africa in a divide-and-conquer strategy that led to the subjugation of Africa. (Groups that identified with one another were sometimes split into separate units, as happened with the Somalis.) Conversely, nationalism can often be a very positive force. For certain, nationalism offers many people a sense of belonging and meaning. In addition, it has rallied oppressed people to demand freedom. More specifically, in places like Africa, nationalism led to ann'colonization. The colonized people of Africa and Asia (including the Middle East) eventually overcame their differences long enough to band together and overthrow their colonizers or persuade them to leave. The oppressive tactics of the colonizers ironically helped build a sense of shared identity among the diverse people within each colony, that enabled them to build successful anticolonial movements. Anticolonial nationalism had a dramatic effect on the world. As colonies rejected their colonizers, countries became independent, sovereign states. As a result, the decolonization of the twentieth century led to a dramatic increase in the number of states. To illustrate, consider the following statistics. In 1789 there were 23 countries. By 1900 there were 57 countries. Currently, however, there are approximately 192 countries. These new countries were primarily formed in Africa and Asia, but other countries disintegrated, namely the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The new states led to smaller units that more closely resemble nation-states (see the next section). In other words, Croats and Slovenes who used to live in a more multinational state (Yugoslavia) created more homogeneous countries named Croatia and Slovenia, respectively. It is also interesting to note that during the short history of nationalism

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many have predicted and called for its end or at least a reduction in its influence. After the death of millions in the two world wars, many argued that n a t i o n a l i s m was too d e s t r u c t i v e . To a great extent, the L e a g u e of Nations and the United Nations were designed to restrain the destructive tendencies of nationalism through international law. During the 1970s, as economic interdependence a m o n g countries increased, some argued that national allegiances would be reduced as the world's inhabitants interacted across country borders. At the core of this belief was the idea that as countries became economically dependent on one another and cultural boundaries were frequently crossed, the strength of people's allegiances to their country would erode. Needless to say, these predictions were premature— nationalism seems to be alive and well today. To confirm nationalism's current importance, one need only look at Iraq and its strong internal divisions b e t w e e n the K u r d s , Sunni M u s l i m s , and Shia M u s l i m s . As the United States attempts to build a single nation out of this divided country, it is gaining appreciation for the strength of nationalism. In sum, nationalism and the modern state system, although different phenomena, went hand in hand. As states began to f o r m with relatively defined borders, people living within these borders began to identify with one another. This process was aided by the concept of popular sovereignty, since people now had a stake in their government. The natural result was what is called the nation-state.

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T h e Nation-State

Although the term nation-state is generally used loosely to mean country, it is technically defined as a single nation within the boundaries of a single state. Not all modern countries are actually nation-states, but it is the ideal. For e x a m p l e , there exist nations that do not have a c o m m o n state. One example would be Koreans, w h o are divided into peoples of North and South Korea. Another example is the Kurds, a group of people who identify with one another but are spread out through northern Iraq, southern Turkey, and western Iran. Similarly, there are dozens of examples of multinational states, in other words, states that have multiple nations living in a single state. In many African countries, for instance, there are multiple tribes who historically had fought with one another but who now, since becoming united into sovereign countries in the last half of the twentieth century, live together within the same borders. C a n a d a is another e x a m p l e . Within p r e d o m i n a t e l y E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g C a n a d a sits the F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g province of Q u e b e c . Nationalism in Quebec is so strong that nearly half of its citizens have voted to break away from Canada and create their own country. Also within

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Canada are several indigenous (native) groups who have resisted considering themselves Canadians. This is not uncommon. Throughout the world thousands of indigenous groups are part of countries with which they d o not identify. As a result, many of the contemporary countries can not technically be considered nation-states.

Different Perspectives on Nationalism Nationalism is a very complex subject. Scholars disagree on when it first emerged and whether it is generally good or bad. There are also different types of nationalism. This section will introduce some of the complexity surrounding this concept.

Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism Many scholars divide nationalism itself into two categories: civic and ethnic. This is due to disagreement over the roles of ethnic and political components of nationalism. Civic nationalism is associated with the Western experience, and is based on citizenship rather than on ethnic linkages. The nation-state is seen as the core of civic nationalism. Its main role is to promote the principle that a society is united by territoriality, citizenship, and civic rights and legal codes transmitted to all members of the group. All members of this society, regardless of their ethnicity or race, are ideally equal citizens and equal before the law. By contrast, ethnic nationalism is based on ethnicity. Ethnic nationalism draws its ideological bonds from the people and their native history. It relies on elements that are considered purely unique to a group, such as collective memory, c o m m o n language, values, religion, myth, and symbolism. It is dependent on blood ties, bonds to the land, and native traditions. To understand nationalism, it is important to consider degrees of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. All nationalism is, by definition, exclusive. It excludes all people who are not members of that nation. In other words, how broadly defined is the nation? How many different subgroups make up the main group of people w h o compose the nation? History, culture, social class structure, and f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t are all important. All of these influence how community is imagined and how nationalism is constructed. Many scholars have treated these two types of nationalism as being diametrically o p p o s e d to e a c h other. Civic nationalism, which is more inclusive, is typically seen as the " g o o d " form of nationalism. For instance, in most democracies of the world, an individual is a citizen not because of bloodlines, but because they believe in the ideals and symbols of that country and pledge their allegiance to the country. Ethnic nationalism is viewed

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as having m o r e negative characteristics, such as being m o r e exclusive d u e to its e m p h a s i s on ethnic links b e t w e e n people. In other words, if you d o n ' t share the c o m m o n history, language, and other ethnic ties, you are not part of the nation. For example, it would be m u c h easier for a K u r d or S e r b to b e c o m e a citizen in a country that practices civic nationalism (such as the United States, E n g l a n d , or Canada), than to b e c o m e a m e m b e r of another national group. A l t h o u g h m a n y scholars present these two categories of nationalism as being opposites, this is not always the case in practice. For e x a m p l e , the Philippine People P o w e r Revolution, mentioned in the o p e n i n g paragraph of the c h a p t e r , d i s p l a y e d e l e m e n t s of both civic and ethnic n a t i o n a l i s m . Myth, race, religion, and citizenship all c o m b i n e d to unite and e m p o w e r the people. Other scholars reject these two categories altogether. T h e y see nationalism mainly in terms of whether it supports or attempts to overthrow an existing g o v e r n m e n t . At least since World War II, every s u c c e s s f u l w a r of i n d e p e n d e n c e and revolution has been driven by n a t i o n a l i s m . D u r i n g the s a m e period, every g o v e r n m e n t in p o w e r has used nationalism to gain the support of its people. Nationalism is a p o w e r f u l tool of politics that can liberate, oppress, or e m p o w e r people. Nationalism, Religion, and Violence N a t i o n a l i s m and violence often go hand in hand. "United we stand, divided w e f a l l " is the u l t i m a t e call to a r m s of the n a t i o n a l i s t . T h e " u s " v e r s u s " t h e m " mentality operates in all types and sizes of c o m m u n i t y — f r o m rival villages arguing over grazing rights to international coalitions involved in geopolitical disputes. Wars are f o u g h t for nationalist reasons. Nationalists o v e r t h r o w g o v e r n m e n t s . Terrorists attack in the n a m e of nationalism. T h e potential f o r violence often increases w h e n the causes of nationalism and religion overlap. This is because nationality and religion are two very p o w e r f u l f o r m s of identification in the world today. W h e n p e o p l e think about w h o they are, many, if not most, think of t h e m s e l v e s as A m e r i c a n s or T u r k s or Thais, and as Christians or M u s l i m s or Buddhists. A l t h o u g h violence o f t e n a c c o m p a n i e s n a t i o n a l i s m , this is not a l w a y s the case. G a n d h i ' s " Q u i t India" m o v e m e n t against the British was a r e m a r k a b l y n o n v i o l e n t e f f o r t that relied on anticolonial n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e P h i l i p p i n e P e o p l e P o w e r R e v o l u t i o n a l s o r e l i e d o n p e a c e f u l m e a n s to a c h i e v e its goals. M a n y other, lesser-known e x a m p l e s of nonviolent nationalism also exist. It should also be mentioned that while religion o f t e n intensifies nationalist f e e l i n g s , it can also be a p o w e r f u l motivator that transcends or even o p p o s e s nationalism. Take for e x a m p l e O s a m a bin L a d e n . If the traditional

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notion of nationalism were applied to him, one would expect bin Laden to be a patriotic Saudi Arabian nationalist. Yet this couldn't be further f r o m the truth. Bin Laden's allegiance is not to his country of origin, but rather to Islam. He feels a far greater allegiance to Pakistani, Algerian, Jordanian, and even U.S. Muslims (those who share his interpretation of Islam) than he does to Saudi Arabians who do not share his religious beliefs. Christianity in the United States is also an interesting case study. U.S. Christians such as Jerry Falwell and others see the United States as a country favored by God and founded on Christian beliefs. To them, Jesus, U.S. patriotism, and involvement in Iraq go hand in hand. Meanwhile, other Christians are horrified at the meshing of Jesus and U.S. militarism. They focus on the New Testament's commands to "love one's e n e m y " and "turn the other cheek." In fact, an increasingly vocal group of U.S. Christians argue that followers of Jesus in the United States should reconsider their n a t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e s , as they m a y h a v e more in c o m m o n with f e l l o w Christians outside the United States (including China and Iraq) than with non-Christians in the United States. Although these radical religious views do not immediately threaten nationalism as a whole, they have raised some interesting issues for people of faith. In sum, nationalism is a tremendously important political force of our time. From its origins in Europe, it has spread to every corner of the world. Nationalism is also a complicated concept that encompasses a wide range of expressions. It can be inclusive or exclusive, violent or nonviolent. It all depends on the environment in which it develops, on the will of the leaders shaping it, and on how all the people involved imagine it. We end the chapter with a case study of a nationalist struggle that demonstrates how nationalism works in the contemporary world.

C a s e Study: T h e Israeli-Palestinian Conflict This case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict illustrates many of the concepts discussed earlier in the chapter. Palestinians are united by a strong anticolonia! nationalism while Israel is also motivated by a strong sense of nationalism. Self-determination is the guiding principle for both groups. How each of these two communities imagines itself affects how inclusive or exclusive it is. Ethnic nationalism is present for both Palestinians and Israelis. Israel is essentially a Jewish state. In fact, it defines itself as such. Palestine is primarily composed of Arabs. With respect to religion, most Israelis are Jews, although a significant percentage are not practicing Jews. A small percentage of Muslim and Christian Arabs (most of whom consider themselves Palestinians) live in Israel, but do not enjoy all the rights of citizenship. Palestinians are Muslims and Christians. The conflict, which has

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n o w lasted nearly a century, has been expressed through both violent and nonviolent m e a n s . T h e terrorist tactics used by extremists on both sides are tragic e x a m p l e s of the violent potential of nationalism.

Historical Background By the b e g i n n i n g of the twentieth century, E u r o p e a n colonialists effectively controlled o v e r 85 percent of the w o r l d ' s natural r e s o u r c e s as well as its people. A r a b nationalism, which is at the center of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is a response to this E u r o p e a n and foreign intervention. It was an attempt to assert A r a b self-determination and i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m colonialism. In Palestine, A r a b nationalism developed in response to another f o r m of n a t i o n a l i s m , Z i o n i s m . Zionists desired to create a h o m e l a n d f o r J e w s . M o s t l y b o r n o u t of the E u r o p e a n J e w i s h e x p e r i e n c e , Z i o n i s m w a s a r e s p o n s e to the v i o l e n t p e r s e c u t i o n that J e w s s u f f e r e d at the h a n d s of E u r o p e a n s . R u s s i a n p e r s e c u t i o n of J e w s in the late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y resulted in the first wave of Jewish emigration to Palestine. In the late nineteenth century, T h e o d o r Herzl, widely regarded as the f a t h e r of Z i o n i s m , c a m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that the only solution f o r the plight of the J e w s would be the creation of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d . Herzl, a secular assimilated European Jew, considered several locations for a Jewish h o m e l a n d , including possible locations in East A f r i c a and South A m e r i c a . Other Zionists argued that the m o r e religious J e w s would join the Zionist project if the p r o p o s e d h o m e l a n d w a s the biblical land of Palestine. T h e i d e a of r e e s t a b l i s h i n g a J e w i s h s t a t e w o u l d a l s o g a i n t h e s u p p o r t of C h r i s t i a n Z i o n i s t s , w h o h a v e b e e n s u p p o r t i v e of the r e s t o r a t i o n of the J e w i s h h o m e l a n d b a s e d on t h e b e l i e f that the B i b l e p r o m i s e d it to the J e w i s h people. O n the other hand, the Palestinians have inhabited the land for generations and some even see themselves as the true d e s c e n d a n t s of the a n c i e n t H e b r e w s . T h e y saw the n e w J e w i s h i m m i g r a n t s as a threat, since the latter did not intend to assimilate but rather to establish a c o m p e t ing claim to the land. At the outbreak of World War I, the Arabs were under the control of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which was allied with the G e r m a n s . Britain, h o p i n g to w e a k e n the O t t o m a n s f r o m within, turned to the Arabs. In return f o r helping the British in the war effort, mostly by revolting against the O t t o m a n Turks, the A r a b s of the region, including Palestine, were p r o m i s e d indep e n d e n c e . T h e British were also very aware of the strategic importance of the region. Oil h a d already been discovered in areas of Iraq and Iran, and the M i d d l e East represented an important strategic point on the trade route to India. In Palestine at the beginning of the twentieth century, A r a b s o u t n u m b e r e d J e w s — b o t h native and r e c e n t a r r i v a l s — a b o u t ten to o n e . D e s p i t e

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this, the British decided, for economic and political reasons, to support a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The British issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917. The declaration stated: "His M a j e s t y ' s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this project, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g n o n - J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in Palestine or the rights and political status e n j o y e d by Jews in any other country." Many books have been written in an attempt to decipher the true intentions of this declaration; however, it is clear that the British decided that it would serve their interest to support a Jewish homeland in the midst of an Arab world. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, gave mandates to France and Britain to divide up the region into client states, under their domination. Palestine, during the mandate period (1919-1947), fell under the direct c o n t r o l of the B r i t i s h . T h i s o p e n e d the way f o r the J e w i s h National Fund (the Jewish land-purchasing agency of the Zionist m o v e ment) to start buying large amounts of land in Palestine. Jewish settlers began building homes on this land. These large land acquisitions by the Jewish National Fund, coupled with the Balfour Declaration and Zionist aspirations, became increasingly threatening to Palestinian landowners and farmers. Palestinians feared that they might lose their land rights and be turned into minorities in their h o m e l a n d . As a result, f i g h t i n g b e t w e e n Palestinians and Jewish settlers erupted. During World War II, the Allied nations, including the United States, refused to open their borders to Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust. At the end of the war, with the horrors and the magnitude of the Holocaust exposed, the Allies felt a great deal of sympathy for the Jewish people, along with a great deal of guilt. In late 1947 the U N decided to "partition" Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The UN partition plan gave 53 percent of the land to the Jews, who accounted for 30 percent of the population, and they gave the remaining 47 percent of the land to the Arabs, who accounted for 70 percent of the population and had owned 92 percent of the land. Immediately after the partition announcement, fighting broke out. Figure 3.1 briefly summarizes this war and three subsequent Arab-Israeli wars. In the 1947-1948 war and 1967 war, Israel acquired land beyond what the UN had given it (see Figure 3.2). These land acquisitions are especially important for understanding current land disputes. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed by exiled Palestinian nationalists who became disillusioned with the inability of other Arab leaders to liberate Palestine. Yasir Arafat emerged as its national leader, a role he a s s u m e d until his death in N o v e m b e r 2004. T h e P L O helped unite the

Nationalism

Figure 3.1

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Arab-Israeli W a r s

War of 1947-1948. T h e m i n u t e the U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n n o u n c e d the partition plan in N o v e m b e r 1947, f i g h t i n g b r o k e out. At that p o i n t J e w i s h u n d e r g r o u n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g s e v e r a l terrorists g r o u p s , being m u c h m o r e o r g a n i z e d than any P a l e s t i n i a n r e s i s t a n c e , a c h i e v e d several strategic victories. M o s t A r a b a r m i e s a r o u n d P a l e s t i n e w e r e reluctant to i n t e r v e n e . O n M a y 15, 1948, the state of Israel w a s d e c l a r e d . O v e r the next f e w d a y s , a r m i e s f r o m s e v e r a l A r a b c o u n t r i e s i n v a d e d I s r a e l . At t h e e n d of t h e w a r , I s r a e l h a d a c q u i r e d c l o s e to 8 0 p e r c e n t of the P a l e s t i n e m a n d a t e . J o r d a n a n n e x e d w h a t r e m a i n e d of P a l e s t i n e . West B a n k . E g y p t c o n t r o l l e d t h e G a z a Strip. O f the m o r e than 1 m i l l i o n P a l e s t i n i a n s , as m a n y as 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 w e r e f o r c e d to leave t h e i r h o m e s . F i v e h u n d r e d v i l l a g e s w e r e e i t h e r d e s t r o y e d or d e p o p u l a t e d . T h e s e P a l e s t i n i a n s w o u l d b e c o m e r e f u g e e s , m o s t l y in n e i g h b o r i n g A r a b states. War of 1956. In 1956 E g y p t i a n p r e s i d e n t A b d e l N a s s e r nationalized the S u e z C a n a l . Israel allied itself with Britain and F r a n c e and i n v a d e d E g y p t . T h e U n i t e d States a s k e d f o r and r e c e i v e d a c e a s e - f i r e , with U N p e a c e k e e p e r s m a i n t a i n i n g a b u f f e r z o n e b e t w e e n Israel and Egypt. War of 1967 (Si.x Day War). T h e U n i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c ( E g y p t a n d Syria u n i o n ) asked for the w i t h d r a w a l of the U N f o r c e s f r o m the c e a s e - f i r e lines. Israel, b e l i e v i n g an attack f r o m E g y p t w a s i m m i n e n t , l a u n c h e d a " p r e e m p t i v e " attack. Israel m o b i l i z e d a n d attacked J o r d a n , c a p t u r i n g the West B a n k and East J e r u s a l e m ( w h i c h had b e e n a n n e x e d b y J o r d a n in 1948). Israel also c a p t u r e d the G o l a n H e i g h t s ( w h i c h w a s part of S y r i a ) , the Sinai P e n i n s u l a ( w h i c h w a s part of E g y p t ) , a n d the G a z a Strip ( w h i c h had been a n n e x e d by E g y p t in 1 9 4 8 ) . F o l l o w i n g t h e w a r , t h e U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l p a s s e d R e s o l u t i o n 242, w h i c h r e q u i r e s Israel to w i t h d r a w f r o m the West B a n k . G a z a , and all o t h e r areas it o c c u p i e d as a result of the 1967 war. War of 1973 (Yorn Kippur War). E g y p t a n d Syria a t t a c k e d Israel in an a t t e m p t to r e c l a i m S y r i a n and E g y p t i a n t e r r i t o r i e s o c c u p i e d by Israel. A l t h o u g h the E g y p t i a n s w e r e able to m a k e strong a d v a n c e s earlier in the war. the Israelis rallied and p u s h e d back the a d v a n c i n g E g y p t i a n s . I n t e r v e n t i o n by the United States and S o v i e t U n i o n led to a c e a s e - f i r e . T h i s w a r signaled the e n d of e f f o r t s b y A r a b s t a t e s to liberate P a l e s t i n i a n territory. In 1979, U.S. p r e s i d e n t J i m m y C a r t e r b r o k e r e d a peace a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n E g y p t i a n president A n w a r Sadat and Israeli prime minister M e n a c h e m Begin, which r e t u r n e d the Sinai P e n i n s u l a to E g y p t . A s a result, E g y p t a g r e e d to r e c o g n i z e t h e state of Israel as well as establish full d i p l o m a t i c relations b e t w e e n the t w o states. T h e p e a c e p r o c e s s w a s b a s e d on the a c c e p t a n c e by both parties of U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 2 4 2 , which r e c o g n i z e d the l e g i t i m a c y of the state of Israel in its p r e - 1 9 6 7 b o r d e r s .

Palestinians both in exile and in the Occupied Territories and gave voice to their hopes for self-determination and national independence. The PLO has used a combination of diplomatic initiatives as well as armed struggle to gain international recognition for Palestinian national rights.

46

Conflict

and

Security

F i g u r e 3.2 T h e E x p a n s i o n o f I s r a e l

0

Extent of Israel as proposed under the UN partition plan for the establishment of a Jewish state, 1947.

Damascus *

Occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949 in excess of the UNrecommended partition plan.

SYRIA Heights

Territories occupied by Israel in lisüia June 1967. The Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt by 1982.

West B a n k

Tel Aviv

•

Amman

M E D I T E R R A N E A N SEA

Gaza Strip Jerusalem

JORDAN

• Cairo

o \

£

\

1 "Palestine" / claimed by World ' Zionist Organization 1919

SAUDI ARABIA

Source: R e p r i n t e d f r o m W a y n e C. M c W i l l i a m s and Harry P i o t r o w s k i , The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, 6th ed. ( B o u l d e r . C O : L y n n e R i e n n e r , 2 0 0 5 ) . © Copyright 2 0 0 5 Lynne Rienner Publishers.

An important recent development was the first intifada, or uprising (1987-1993). In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli occupation became increasingly marked with human rights violations, including administrative detentions, land confiscations, and the destruction of Palestinian homes.

Nationalism

47

Palestinians pointed to the fourth Geneva Convention's prohibition of these tactics. Israeli authorities argued that most of these actions were emergency measures to protect the security of Israeli citizens. Palestinians argued that these measures, such as home demolitions and land expropriations (acquisitions), were methods of acquiring more land for Israeli settlements. The first intifada began in December of 1987 following an incident in which Palestinians workers were killed in Gaza. As a result, Palestinians took to the streets in protest, which escalated into an all-out revolt. The intifada was symbolized by Palestinian youth throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers, who in turn retaliated with gunfire. The spontaneous uprising was a result of frustration for two decades of Israeli occupation. The demonstrations and the rock throwing were only a small part of it; the intifada would become a mass mobilization movement of resistance to the Israeli presence. The intifada and the Israeli response had a wide-ranging e f f e c t . For instance, when Israelis shut down Palestinian schools for three years, the latter organized underground alternative education. Palestinians also boycotted Israeli products. Extremist groups on both sides feared the creation of a lasting peace, which would of course require compromise on both sides. In a dramatic illustration of the determined opposition on the Israeli side, a Jewish member of an extremist group assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in Tel Aviv in 1995. Just as Jewish extremists were using violence in an attempt to stop the peace process, Palestinian extremists also stepped up violent opposition in an attempt to destroy whatever was left of IsraeliPalestinian peace talks, known as the Oslo Accords (discussed in Figure 3.3). Members of Palestinian extremist groups carried out suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Israelis blamed Arafat, who in 1996 was elected the president in the first ever Palestinian elections. They were frustrated by the inability of his Palestinian Authority to control violent extremist groups such as Hamas, which has been responsible for many terrorist attacks. In September 2000, a visit by Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount (the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque—the third holiest site in Islam) in East Jerusalem sparked widespread demonstrations, which resulted in the killing of six unarmed Palestinian demonstrators. This would become known as the Al-Aqsa intifada, or the second intifada, which has been marked by increased militarization. Whereas the first intifada was mostly a nonviolent resistance against the occupation, the second has been shaped by the excessive use of violence on both sides. Extremists have hijacked the conflict. The continued military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has facilitated the rise of extremist elements within Palestinian society. Groups such as Hamas have increasingly resorted to mass terror attacks against Israeli civilians. Suicide bombers have become their weapon of choice. Israelis have undertaken targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders and activists, which often involve the death of innocent

48

Conflict and

Security

Palestinians. They have continued to use other means of collective punishment such as house demolitions, curfews, and mass imprisonment. In 2002, Israel reoccupied all Palestinian areas it had withdrawn from as part of the Oslo process. Arafat, held responsible for failing to control Hamas and the other extremist groups, was placed under house arrest in his headquarters in Ramallah (in the West Bank). Israel began construction of what it referred to as a "security fence" within the West Bank. It argued that the fence (which more resembles a wall) was an attempt to protect its citizens from terrorists attacks. Palestinians argued that because it was built well into Palestinian territory, it was an attempt to confiscate additional Palestinian lands. Critics also point out that, in many cases, the fence has separated Palestinian communities from their hospitals, schools, and farms. Palestinians felt vindicated when in 2004 the International Court of Justice ruled that the wall violated international law. In November 2004, Arafat died. In January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected to replace him as president of the Palestian Authority. This move was heralded as a m a j o r b r e a k t h r o u g h for the peace p r o c e s s by most Western observers as well as Israeli officials who have always identified Arafat as an obstacle to peace. However, there are others who are more cautious in their assessment of the new developments and argue that for a lasting peaceful resolution to the conflict, both sides need to address head on the major issues that have hampered the establishment of a viable, independent Palestinian state. Despite all the conflict in the region, peace attempts have occurred throughout much of the twentieth century. In fact, attempts to bring both sides to a compromise predate the creation of Israel. Unfortunately, peace attempts have not been very successful (see Figure 3.3). A majority of Israelis favor returning land in the West Bank and Gaza if it would mean an end to the conflict. And the majority of Palestinians want an end to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. However, there are disagreements over how to attain these objectives. No Israeli leadership has ever offered complete withdrawal f r o m the Occupied Territories (based on UN Security Council Resolution 242) and Palestinians argue that they would not be able to establish a viable state on anything less. Several key issues are also important obstacles to peace. Major Obstacles to Peace Finding a lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been incredibly d i f f i c u l t . S o m e of the m a i n o b s t a c l e s have been Israeli s e t t l e m e n t s , Palestinian refugees, East Jerusalem, and terrorism.

Nationalism

Figure 3.3

49

Israeli-Palestinian Peace A t t e m p t s

1988. A key development occurred in 1988 when Arafat accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242. This resolution called for the withdrawal of Israel from territories seized in the 1967 war as a basis for any just and lasting Middle East peace. This resolution has become the cornerstone of most international efforts to negotiate peace. Also in 1988, Yasir Arafat condemned terrorism for the first time and accepted Israel's right to exist. 1993. The Oslo Peace Accords resulting from secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The basic principle of these negotiations was "land for peace," by which Israel would return land to the Palestinians, who in turn would halt attacks on Israel. As part of the accords, the Palestinian Authority was created and given limited home rule. Opposition emerged on both sides and key issues such as Jerusalem, settlements, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees were left for later negotiations. 2000. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak met with Arafat at Camp David, Maryland, and President Bill Clinton acted as the moderator. Although Barak was willing to return a larger part of the occupied territories (up to 80 percent of the Occupied Territories) than any of his predecessors, he insisted that it be divided into several sections. This solution would leave Palestinians with small, unconnected areas of land, making a Palestinian state impractical. The right of return for Palestinian refugees proved to be another major stumbling block. 2003. U.S. president George W. Bush, supporting separate states for Israelis and Palestinians, announced his "road map for peace." The road map pushed for a stop to the building of Jewish settlements and to Palestinian violence. However, increased violence on both sides led to heightened frustration for Jews and Palestinians, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq diverted U.S. attention away from the peace process. 2004. Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon announced plans to close some settlements in the West Bank and all of the settlements in Gaza. Although Israeli public opinion appears to support this dramatic move, it has drawn angry protests from within Israel. Palestinian critics argue that the targeted settlements represent only a fraction of Israel's settlements and that other key issues are being ignored.

I s r a e l i s e t t l e m e n t s . W h a t to d o with Israeli settlements in the disputed territory has been a m a j o r stumbling block in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. A p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 9 0 , 0 0 0 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank, controlling 4 2 percent of the area, and 7 , 5 0 0 Israeli settlers live in the G a z a Strip, controlling 3 0 percent of the area (Palestine Monitor 2004). T h e increasing size and quantity of the settlements has continued to shrink the area under Palestinian control. Palestinians point out that the fourth G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n prohibits any o c c u p y i n g p o w e r f r o m establishing settlements in

50

Conflict and Security

the Occupied Territories. Israel itself is divided on the issue of settlements—some favor moving settlers out of the territories, while others see such a move as betraying the Zionist cause. Even those in favor of moving the settlers acknowledge it would be extremely difficult politically for the Israeli government to force Jewish settlers from their homes in the Occupied Territories. Palestinian refugees' right of return. The right of Palestinians to return to their original homes has been a central issue to the larger ArabIsraeli conflict. Palestinians complain that Israel, despite international law, has consistently refused to allow Palestinians, who were forced to flee their homes in 1947-1948, to do so. To complicate matters, these Palestinian refugees are often not granted any rights in their host countries. In Lebanon, Palestinians are not allowed to own land or work unless through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees. Israel refuses to allow these refugees to return, arguing that it would be a demographic disaster for the Jewish state. If Palestinians were to return to their original homeland in Israel, they would outnumber Israelis. Israelis are already concerned with the high birthrates of Palestinians as compared to the much lower birthrate of Jewish populations. East Jerusalem. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism have in common the patriarch Abraham, and all three consider Jerusalem to be holy land. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians lay claim to Jerusalem as their capital. Access to religious sites is a central issue in the conflict over Jerusalem. The Israel occupation continues to restrict many Palestinians in the occupied West Bank from access to religious sites in occupied East Jerusalem. Security concerns have always been the rationale used by the Israelis for restricting access. Although international law rejects Israel's annexation of predominantly Arab East Jerusalem, approximately 250,000 Israeli settlers live in occupied East Jerusalem. Palestinians continue to demand that Arab East Jerusalem become the capital of a future Palestinian state, while the Israelis refuse to divide Jerusalem, claiming that it should forever be the capital of the state of Israel. T e r r o r i s m . Israeli officials argue that a major obstacle to peace is the continuous threat from terrorism that the state has to endure from extremists groups. Israel has blamed the Palestinian Authority for not prohibiting these groups, such as Hamas, from carrying out their suicide missions. The Palestinian Authority is therefore, Israelis argue, not a legitimate negotiation partner. Palestinians reject the terrorism label and argue that they are engaged in armed struggle for liberation, which is legitimate under international law. They maintain that the occupation of Palestinian lands is the

Nationalism

51

cause of these attacks, and if the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to end, then the attacks would end, or at least be greatly reduced. Palestinians also argue that the Israeli army e n g a g e s in state terrorism against Palestinians, which perpetuates the violence.

I

Nationalism and the F u t u r e

H i s t o r i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , the stale s y s t e m and n a t i o n a l i s m are relatively young. However, both have an extremely strong impact on our lives. As in the past few hundred years, nationalism will continue to play an important role in the world by bringing people together and shaping their identities. It will also play an important role where groups seek self-determination (e.g., Chechnya and French-speaking Quebec) and in areas ravaged by war (e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the conflict in Iraq). In light of the power of nationalism and state sovereignty, it will be interesting to see over the next few d e c a d e s how they fare against the forces of globalization. With a state system based on sovereignty, states will continue to seek control over their borders. Yet as the world continues to become more interconnected due to advances in technology, controlling their borders from external elements, such as illegal drugs, weapons, and immigrants, may become more difficult. Similarly, globalization may lead citizens to identify with groups in other countries (based on religion, pop culture, etc.) as much or more than those of the same nation. In both state sovereignty and nationalism, changes will likely be gradual.

•

Discussion Questions 1. What are your primary allegiances? In other words, how do you identify yourself? 2. Will the force of nationalism decline in the future? 3. Has state sovereignty eroded over the past few d e c a d e s ? Will it decline significantly in the future? 4. What do you think would be a fair solution to the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis?

'

Suggested Readings

Anderson, Benedict (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism. Second edition. London: Verso. Chatterjee, Partha (1993) The Nation and its Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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F i n k e l s t e i n , N o r m a n G . ( 1 9 9 5 ) Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Verso. Gellner, Earnest (1983) Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. H o b s b a w m , Eric (1992) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. New York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (1996) Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press. Khalidi, Rashid, L. Anderson, R. Simon, and M. Muslih, eds. (1991) The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Laqueur, Walter (1972) The History of Zionism. New York: Schocken. Morris, Benny (1999) Righteous Victims. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Simons, Lewis M. (1987) Worth Dying For. New York: William Morrow. Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge, MA: Smith, Anthony D. (2001) Nationalism: Polity Press. Z u n e s , S t e p h e n ( 2 0 0 3 ) Tinderho.x: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism. Monroe, ME: C o m m o n Courage Press.

4 Globalization and Human Rights D. Neil Snarr

O

n D e c e m b e r 10, 1 9 4 8 , the General A s s e m b l y o f the United Nations

approved the Universal D e c l a r a t i o n o f Human R i g h t s ( U D H R ) . T h e r e

were no votes against the d o c u m e n t , but eight c o u n t r i e s abstained while forty-eight voted in its favor, including the United States. S i n c e that time the U N has approved well o v e r 2 0 0 d o c u m e n t s that elaborate and expand these rights (such agreements are often referred to as c o n v e n t i o n s , treaties, or c o v e n a n t s ) . S i n c e t h e i r i n c e p t i o n , h u m a n rights i s s u e s h a v e r e c e i v e d tremendous attention. O n e student o f human rights declares, " T h e r e c o g n i tion o f human rights and the weaving o f a w e b o f globalization are probably the most important political d e v e l o p m e n t s o f our lifetimes. L i k e water

c a r v i n g a c a n y o n , the slow, quiet p o w e r o f h u m a n - r i g h t s p r e s s u r e s and aspirations helped bring down the S o v i e t e m p i r e , transform long-suffering Latin A m e r i c a , and construct unprecedented international institutions: T h e United Nations S y s t e m " ( B r y s k 2 0 0 3 : 2 1 ) . O n the o t h e r h a n d , it must b e r e c o g n i z e d that this f o c u s on h u m a n rights has not been universally s u c c e s s f u l : When the United Nations introduced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it was seen by many as a sign of optimism, of the possibilities of a better world. Yet, over 50 years later, observers recognize that we live in an age when human rights abuses are as prevalent as they ever have been—in some instances more prevalent. The world is littered with examples of violations of basic rights: censorship, discrimination, political imprisonment, torture, slavery, the death penalty, disappearances, genocide, poverty, refugees. The rights of women, children, and other groups in society continue to be ignored in atrocious ways. ( O ' B y r n e 2003: 5)

S3

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T h i s chapter looks at these rights, the controversies that surround them, the efforts to support them, the m a n y f o r c e s that inhibit their realization, and s o m e s p e c i f i c c a s e studies.

T h e O r i g i n of H u m a n Rights D e c l a r a t i o n s and a g r e e m e n t s that c o n t a i n historic steps toward the

1948

U D H R are numerous. T h e y c o m e from philosophers, politicians, and religious prophets. T h e y are contained in Scripture, s p e e c h e s , and treaties. T h e B r i t i s h M a g n a C a r t a ( 1 2 1 5 ) , the E n g l i s h B i l l o f R i g h t s ( 1 6 8 9 ) , the U . S . D e c l a r a t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e ( 1 7 7 6 ) , the U . S . C o n s t i t u t i o n ( 1 7 8 9 ) , the F r e n c h Declaration o f the R i g h t s o f Man and o f the Citizen ( 1 7 8 9 ) , and the U . S . Bill o f Rights ( 1 7 9 1 ) are j u s t a few o f the documents that contain refe r e n c e s to what we now call human rights. Late in the nineteenth century slave trade was outlawed and early in the twentieth century slavery itself w a s outlawed. Later, humanitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the c o n d u c t o f war w e r e a g r e e d upon, and the treatment o f workers, p r i s o n e r s , and w o m e n were the subjects o f international a g r e e m e n t s . B e c a u s e o f the indescribable horrors that occurred during World War 11, w ith the g c n o c i d e against J e w s , G y p s i e s , and other groups in E u r o p e , the world c o m m u n i t y founded the UN and approved the U D H R in the hopes o f avoiding such wars and violations o f human rights in the future.

w

W h a t A r e H u m a n Rights?

O n e UN d o c u m e n t refers to h u m a n rights as " i n a l i e n a b l e and i n v i o l a b l e rights o f all m e m b e r s o f the human f a m i l y " (UN 1 9 8 8 a : 4 ) . A c c o r d i n g to one scholar: T h e very term h u m a n rights i n d i c a t e s both their nature and their s o u r c e s : they are the rights that o n e has s i m p l y b e c a u s e o n e is h u m a n . T h e y are held b y all h u m a n b e i n g s , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f any rights or duties o n e m a y ( o r m a y n o t ) h a v e as c i t i z e n s , m e m b e r s o f f a m i l i e s , w o r k e r s , o r parts o f a n y p u b l i c o r private o r g a n i z a t i o n o r a s s o c i a t i o n . In the l a n g u a g e o f the 1 9 4 8 d e c l a r a t i o n , they are u n i v e r s a l rights. ( D o n n e l l y 1 9 9 3 : 1 9 )

H o w do human rights c o n v e n t i o n s c o m e into e x i s t e n c e ? D i s c u s s i o n s o f human rights generally start in the U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , where they are debated, given public scrutiny, and voted on. Passage o f human rights conventions in the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y is the easy part; it only takes a majority v o t e . A f t e r the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y a p p r o v e s these c o n v e n t i o n s , they are opened for signatures by m e m b e r states; and after a designated n u m b e r o f

Globalization and Human

Rights

55

countries have ratified them, they are said to "come into effect." It often takes many years for this to happen. After conventions come into effect, the agreeing countries are expected to pass laws, if they do not have such laws, that will ensure their observance and enforcement. Eventually, it is hoped, all countries will approve such human rights laws and they will become international law. I will discuss the problems of enforcing these rights later in this chapter.

•

T h e U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f H u m a n Rights

What rights have been identified as human rights? One way to approach this question is to divide the UDHR of 1948 into three generations, or classes. These three generations have different origins and represent different views of human rights. Since the 1948 covenant was approved, these rights have been expanded and elaborated, and the UDHR can still serve as a place to initiate a discussion. The UDHR includes thirty articles, the first of which declares: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood." The first generation of rights, often referred to as civil and political (or first-generation rights), are contained in Articles 2 through 21 of the U D H R . They focus on the rights of the individual and e m p h a s i z e the responsibility of governments to refrain from unjustly interfering in the lives of their citizens (see Figure 4.1). Originating in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Western ideas, these rights found expression in the revolutions of France, Britain, and the United States. The United States often views these as civil rights, which the U.S. government generally equates with human rights. These rights were supplemented by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which clarifies and expands them. This covenant was open for signatures in 1966, but it took until 1976 to acquire the thirty-five signatories required to implement the convention. Even with the strong support of U.S. president Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s, the covenant was not ratified by the United States until 1992. It is this first generation of human rights that has received the most attention and seen the most success. The second generation of human rights is referred to as social and economic rights. Contained in Articles 22 through 26 of the UDHR, they stem from the Western socialist tradition. To some degree they are seen as a way to balance what many consider to be the excessive individualism of the first generation of rights and the impact of Western capitalism and imperialism. They focus on social equality and the responsibility of the government to its citizens, rather than on protection of citizens from their government as

Figure 4.1

First Generation of Human Rights, UDHR Articles 2-21

2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation of social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal projection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed. 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. (continues)

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Figure 4.1

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continued

15. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to a nationality. (2) N o o n e shall be arbitrarily d e p r i v e d of his n a t i o n a l i t y n o r d e n i e d the right to c h a n g e his nationality. 16. (1) M e n and w o m e n of full a g e , w i t h o u t a n y limitation d u e to race, nationality or religion, h a v e the right to m a r r y a n d to f o u n d a f a m i l y . T h e y are entitled to e q u a l rights as to m a r r i a g e , d u r i n g m a r r i a g e and at its d i s s o l u tion. (2) M a r r i a g e shall b e e n t e r e d into only with the f r e e a n d full c o n s e n t of the i n t e n d i n g s p o u s e s . (3) T h e family is the natural and f u n d a m e n t a l g r o u p unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 17. (1) E v e r y o n e has t h e right to o w n p r o p e r t y alone as well as in association with o t h e r s . (2) N o o n e shall be arbitrarily d e p r i v e d of his property. 18. E v e r y o n e has the right to f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t , c o n s c i e n c e and religion; this r i g h t includes f r e e d o m to c h a n g e his religion or belief, a n d f r e e d o m , e i t h e r a l o n e or in c o m m u n i t y with o t h e r s a n d in p u b l i c or p r i v a t e , to m a n i f e s t his religion or belief in t e a c h i n g , practice, w o r s h i p and o b s e r v a n c e . 19. E v e r y o n e has the right to f r e e d o m of o p i n i o n a n d e x p r e s s i o n ; this right i n c l u d e s f r e e d o m to h o l d o p i n i o n s w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d to s e e k , r e c e i v e a n d impart i n f o r m a t i o n and ideas through a n y m e d i a and r e g a r d l e s s of frontiers. 20. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to f r e e d o m of p e a c e f u l a s s e m b l y and a s s o ciation. (2) N o o n e m a y be c o m p e l l e d to b e l o n g to an a s s o c i a t i o n . 21. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to take part in t h e g o v e r n m e n t of his c o u n try, d i r e c t l y or t h r o u g h f r e e l y c h o s e n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . (2) E v e r y o n e has the right of e q u a l a c c e s s to p u b l i c s e r v i c e in his country. ( 3 ) T h e will of the p e o p l e shall be the basis of the authority of g o v e r n m e n t ; this will shall be e x p r e s s e d in p e r i o d i c a n d g e n u i n e e l e c t i o n s w h i c h shall b e by u n i v e r s a l and e q u a l s u f f r a g e and shall b e held b y secret v o t e or by e q u i v a l e n t f r e e voting p r o c e d u r e s .

the first generation of rights does (see Figure 4.2). Second-generation rights necessitate a proactive government acting on behalf of its citizens. They establish an acceptable standard of living for all—that is, a minimal level of equality. The second generation of human rights is supported by another central UN convention, which, together with the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is referred to as the Universal Bill of Rights. This third document is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR). President Carter signed it on October 5, 1977, on behalf of the United States. To date, however, it has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. (Each convention must be signed by the head of

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Figure 4.2

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Second Generation of Human Rights, U D H R Articles 22-26

22. Everyone, as a m e m b e r of society, has the right to social security and is e n t i t l e d to r e a l i z a t i o n , t h r o u g h n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l coo p e r a t i o n and in a c c o r d a n c e with the o r g a n i z a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of e m p l o y m e n t , to j u s t and favorable conditions of work and to protection against u n e m p l o y ment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone w h o works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) E v e r y o n e has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of u n e m p l o y m e n t , sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall e n j o y the same social protection. 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be m a d e generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the h u m a n personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and f u n d a mental f r e e d o m s . It shall p r o m o t e understanding, tolerance and f r i e n d s h i p a m o n g all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

state and ratified by the appropriate political body. Consistently, the United States is more committed to the first generation of human rights than the second generation.) The third generation of rights is referred to as solidarity rights, since their realization requires the cooperation of all countries (see Figure 4.3). It claims rights for poorer countries of the South, or third world. Until

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Figure 4.3

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Third Generation of H u m a n Rights, U D H R Articles 27-28

27. (1) E v e r y o n e has t h e right f r e e l y to participate in the cultural life of the c o m m u n i t y , to e n j o y the arts and to s h a r e in scientific a d v a n c e m e n t and its benefits. (2) E v e r y o n e has the right to p r o t e c t i o n of the m o r a l and m a t e r i a l interests r e s u l t i n g f r o m any s c i e n t i f i c , literary or artistic p r o d u c t i o n of w h i c h he is t h e author. 28. E v e r y o n e is entitled to a social and international o r d e r in w h i c h the rights and f r e e d o m s set f o r t h in this D e c l a r a t i o n can be f u l l y r e a l i z e d .

a p p r o v a l of the U D H R , m a n y p e o p l e of the S o u t h lived u n d e r the b u r d e n of c o l o n i a l i s m a n d w e r e n o t r e p r e s e n t e d at t h e U N . T h e y c o n s t i t u t e 8 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n b u t r e c e i v e a v e r y s m a l l p o r t i o n o f its b e n e f i t s . T h e t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n o f r i g h t s is a h o p e o r e v e n a d e m a n d f o r t h e g l o b a l redistribution of opportunity and well-being. T h i s g e n e r a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e t h e s t a t u s of o t h e r r i g h t s a n d is in t h e process of being developed. L a w professor Burns W e s t o n says the f o l l o w ing about t h e m : [They] a p p e a r so f a r to e m b r a c e six c l a i m e d rights. . . . T h r e e of t h e s e r e f l e c t the e m e r g e n c e of T h i r d W o r l d n a t i o n a l i s m and its d e m a n d f o r a g l o b a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r , w e a l t h , and o t h e r i m p o r t a n t v a l u e s : the right to p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , social, a n d cultural s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; the right to e c o n o m i c and social d e v e l o p m e n t ; and the right to p a r t i c i p a t e in and b e n e f i t f r o m "the c o m m o n heritage of m a n k i n d " (shared e a r t h - s p a c e r e s o u r c e s ; scientific, t e c h n i c a l , and o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a n d p r o g r e s s ; and cultural traditions, sites, and m o n u m e n t s ) . The other three thirdg e n e r a t i o n r i g h t s — t h e right to p e a c e , the right to a h e a l t h y and b a l a n c e d e n v i r o n m e n t , and the r i g h t to h u m a n i t a r i a n d i s a s t e r r e l i e f — s u g g e s t the i m p o t e n c e or i n e f f i c i e n c y of the n a t i o n - s t a t e in c e r t a i n critical r e s p e c t s . (1992:19-20) A s an e x a m p l e of the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the third-generation solidarity r i g h t s , t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y a d o p t e d in D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 6 t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o n the Right to D e v e l o p m e n t . A s W i n s t o n Langley notes: T h e D e c l a r a t i o n c o n f i r m s the view of the international c o m m u n i t y that the right to d e v e l o p m e n t is an i n a l i e n a b l e h u m a n right " b y virtue of w h i c h e v e r y h u m a n p e r s o n and all p e o p l e s a r e entitled to p a r t i c i p a t e in, c o n tribute to and e n j o y e c o n o m i c , social, cultural and political d e v e l o p m e n t , in w h i c h all h u m a n r i g h t s a n d f u n d a m e n t a l f r e e d o m s c a n be f u l l y realized." (1996: 361)

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S o m e students of h u m a n rights m e r g e the second and third generation of rights; the U N has d o n e this in its Human Development Report 2000. T h i s v o l u m e , p u b l i s h e d a n n u a l l y by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) , argues that h u m a n rights cannot be realized without h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , and h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t cannot be realized w i t h o u t h u m a n rights. T h e final t w o articles of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n R i g h t s a f f i r m the u n i v e r s a l i t y of a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the rights d e s c r i b e d in Articles 1 - 2 8 (see Figure 4.4).

I

H u m a n Rights: Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism

T h e e m e r g e n c e of h u m a n rights on the w o r l d ' s political a g e n d a in recent d e c a d e s is clearly not without controversy. At every step since the signing of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, there have been delays and d e n o u n c e m e n t s . T h e r e is n o reason to believe that this will stop. In the sections that follow, I address a f e w of these controversies and the a r g u m e n t s that surround them. T h e UN Charter g u a r a n t e e s state sovereignty, or self-determination and nonintervention; it also states that all individuals, regardless of their citizenship and status, have h u m a n rights. T h e s e principles are o f t e n f o u n d to be contradictory. T h e idea that e v e r y o n e possesses these rights as f o u n d in the U D H R is referred to as universalism. On the other hand, s o m e countries and c u l t u r e s f o l l o w t r a d i t i o n s that are c o n s i d e r e d i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the U D H R , and they claim e x c e p t i o n for their traditions. T h e s e g o v e r n m e n t s say they are the final authority in d e t e r m i n i n g what is right for their citi-

Figure 4.4

U D H R Articles 29-30

29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing the recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

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zens: they plead state sovereignty, which has been a long-standing global principle for three centuries. According to these countries, appropriate expectations for human rights are judged against, or relative to, local culture. In other words, certain acts thought by some to violate human rights are considered legitimate cultural or religious practices by others. This view is referred to as relativism or cultural relativism. Two such acts or customs are child brides and female circumcision. In South Asia, young girls are often promised by their families to marry at an early age and without considering the desires of the child. This is generally considered a violation of the child's rights, but it is often defended as a cultural tradition, or relativism. For those who participate in this practice, the determining factor would be tradition, not an abstract rule that is considered to apply universally. Female circumcision is also practiced by millions of people throughout Africa and the Middle East and has been defended as a cultural practice that should not be subject to a universal human rights rule. Female circumcision (sometimes called female genital mutilation, or FGM) involves a procedure that may include the complete removal of the clitoris and occasionally the removal of some of the inner and outer labia. It is estimated that this procedure affects some 137 million women, mostly in Africa. The cultural reasons for supporting it are that it makes girls "marriageable" (because it ensures their virginity) and also diminishes their sex drives. UN agencies disagree with this relativist position and have begun to take steps to eliminate the practice. As the debate proceeds over what rights are universal, most decisions will fall s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n these two extremes of universalism and relativism. At the same time, however, there is general agreement that such acts as genocide (the killing of a people such as Jews, Gypsies, Hutus, or Tutsis), torture, and summary executions are violations of human rights.

•

T h e U N a n d H u m a n Rights I m p l e m e n t a t i o n

" F o r all its faults, the United Nations is probably the most important agency involved in the protection of human rights worldwide" (O'Byrne 2003: 85). Tom Farer observes that the UN operates at four levels in supporting human rights (1992). First, it formulates and defines international standards by approving conventions and making declarations. Second, it advances human rights by promoting knowledge and providing public support. At the third level, it supports human rights by protecting or implementing them. Although the task of directly enforcing human rights is primarily left to the states t h e m s e l v e s , the UN does b e c o m e involved in various means of implementation. During the 1990s and early part of the

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2000s, UN enforcement took on new meaning and controversy. The efforts by the UN, often under pressure from the United States and its allies, in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, R w a n d a , the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan are examples of this. They include the boycotts of aggressor states, military action, military support for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the protection of refugees. Some of these are controversial extensions of the UN mandate and will provide material for discussions about the role of the UN in the future (see Chapter 5). Fourth, the UN has taken additional steps at e n f o r c e m e n t that some consider to be structural and economic aspects of human rights issues. This refers to the support for the third generation of rights, including e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t for poorer countries as described earlier. Development has taken a great deal of UN resources but does not receive the public attention that more d r a m a t i c actions do. Beyond the positive actions that the UN takes in supporting human rights, there is a great deal of criticism that human rights are often not enforced in the world. Critics point out that some countries have signed UN human rights conventions but have made little progress toward instituting them. Why do countries sign these conventions with no apparent intention to enforce them? First, all countries of the world want to appear to other countries and persons as though they treat their citizens justly. Second, some countries, regardless of their human rights record, are reluctant to subject their country to the jurisdiction of such world bodies. The United States, which generally has a good human rights record, often fits into this category. In short, a country says that what happens within its own borders is its business and not the concern of other political bodies (an example of the principle of state sovereignty). Third, the UN is not an independent body or a world government; it is subject to the whims of its members and has no more power or resources than it is given by its members. For instance, many UN decisions on human rights violations are made in the Security Council with its five powerful p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s — B r i t a i n , C h i n a , F r a n c e , R u s s i a , and the U n i t e d States, any of which can veto an action. (The ten nonpermanent members do not have such veto power.) Thus, all f i v e permanent m e m b e r s must approve any action taken, a very difficult task. On the other hand, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Security Council has tended to take into consideration issues related to human rights. A final inhibiting factor is the availability of money for UN operations. Several countries are either unable or unwilling to pay their rightful share. For instance, the United States is behind in its payments for three categ o r i e s — U N budget, peacekeeping operations, and international tribunals. This debt, which is over $ 1 billion, makes up 35 percent of the total debt of UN m e m b e r states (GPO 2004). In this case it is not a lack of money but

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rather political opposition to UN actions and policies by some in the U.S. Congress.

•

State Sovereignty, the U N , and the International Criminal C o u r t

State sovereignty is a cornerstone of the present international system. But like so many things in our globalizing world, it is being challenged and slowly altered. For instance, at the close of the Gulf War in April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, which permitted the establishment of temporary havens for refugees inside Iraq, without Iraq's permission. The rationale was that the violent treatment of Kurds (a large ethnic group living in Iraq) by the government of Iraq threatened international peace and security. This clearly contradicts the traditional understanding of state sovereignty. A more recent example was the establishment of tribunals (or courts) to try within their own countries persons responsible for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Due to state sovereignty, some heads of states who have perpetuated massive human rights abuses have escaped responsibility. Those who have killed tens of thousands and even millions of their own citizens—such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Pol Pot in Cambodia, and Slobodan Milosevic in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a — h a v e rarely been held responsible for their crimes. They have not gone unnoticed, but because of the Cold War and the fact that indicting them would confront state sovereignty, they have received limited attention. Yet these kinds of violations have not always been overlooked. Crimes that were labeled crimes against humanity were dealt with after World War II in both Germany and Japan. Those who perpetrated these crimes were tried before tribunals and found guilty. After that, however, there was a long lull in much human rights work, lasting from 1946 to 1976, a period that Geoffrey Robertson refers to as "thirty inglorious years" (2000: 37). During that time, the United States supported many governments that were responsible for massive human rights violations (crimes against humanity) but justified its support on the basis of fighting communism. The Soviet Union did the same thing with different justification— fighting Western imperialism and capitalism. Thus, these men and those who supported them and carried out their grisly commands have generally been able to walk away from their crimes with little fear of being held responsible. Often, before leaving their posts as heads of state, they would see that legislation was passed that would absolve them and their cohorts of any guilt, and as a result they could leave with impunity.

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In early 1993 and again in late 1994, two international tribunals were established in Central A f r i c a by the UN Security Council to deal with crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In the former Yugoslavia, some 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 people were killed in what was called "ethnic cleansing" (separating ethnic groups by killing or forced migration), and in Rwanda, approximately 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 were massacred in tribal violence. The timing of these tribunals is especially important, since they were established before the end of the conflicts and thus constitute a form o f early intervention. Also, these tribunals were established based on international law, which supersedes state sovereignty, at least in principle. T h e establishment of the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda was an exceedingly important step in dealing with the impunity so pervasive until recent times. However, these are ad hoc tribunals—established for specific cases of crimes and for limited time periods. In 1998 the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established via the Rome Statute. " T h e International Criminal Court is the first ever permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to promote the rule o f law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished. The ICC will be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions" (ICC 2 0 0 4 ) . The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1, 2 0 0 2 , after sixty countries ratified it. T h e seat o f the Court is T h e Hague in the Netherlands and it is an independent international organization. B y the end o f 2 0 0 4 nearly 100 countries had ratified the agreement. President Bill Clinton signed the R o m e Statute on December 31, 2 0 0 0 , the last day it could be signed, but the U . S . Senate did not ratify it. Later, " T h e Bush Administration 'nullified' the U . S . signature by sending a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on May 6, 2 0 0 2 , expressing its intention not to be bound by the treaty" ( C G S 2 0 0 4 ) . Since that time the United States has made many efforts to keep the treaty from being an integral part of UN operations and is pressuring countries to sign bilateral agreements meant to ensure immunity for U . S . citizens. Why does the United States feel so threatened by the ICC? One argument is that it does not want its past or future actions to be subject to an international court. For instance, it is possible that the ICC could charge high-ranking U.S. officials with criminal behavior for crimes covered by the Court. However, since the ICC, like other treaties, allows countries to register reservations at the signing o f the treaty, the United States could prevent this from happening by ratifying the treaty with reservations. Since U.S. opposition has been so adamant, it appears the world's only superpower largely objects in principle to opening itself up to legal criticism by a foreign court.

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H u m a n Rights Implementation Outside the United Nations With all of its problems, o n e cannot speak of h u m a n rights without invoking the n a m e of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . It is here that h u m a n rights issues e m e r g e and m a j o r discussions take place. With all of its w e a k n e s s e s , e f f o r t s by the U N must be seen within the total context of h u m a n rights efforts. Because of the centrality of h u m a n rights issues in the world (greatly due to the w o r k of the U N ) , g o v e r n m e n t s and i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e f o u n d e d o t h e r institutions to s u p p l e m e n t this very i m p o r t a n t w o r k . T h e s e g r o u p s h a v e t a k e n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s , r e c e i v e d d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s of a p p r o v a l , and seen varying degrees of success. O n e n o n - U N f o r c e to e n t e r the h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n a c o m p r i s e s the regional h u m a n rights structures. The most advanced and effective of these is in E u r o p e a n d o p e r a t e s u n d e r the C o n v e n t i o n f o r the P r o t e c t i o n of H u m a n Rights and F u n d a m e n t a l F r e e d o m s . It was established in 1950 and f u n c t i o n s under the E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n of H u m a n Rights. Its m a n d a t e has been e x t e n d e d on several o c c a s i o n s and it is possible for citizens of E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s to r e g i s t e r c o m p l a i n t s d i r e c t l y to the c o m m i s s i o n . ( M a n y h u m a n rights agencies will only receive c o m p l a i n t s f r o m governments.) A c c o r d i n g to h u m a n r i g h t s a d v o c a t e s , this s o p h i s t i c a t e d , wellf u n d e d , a n d very s u c c e s s f u l r e g i o n a l structure is a m o d e l f o r the w h o l e world to emulate. A similar, but m u c h less s u c c e s s f u l structure exists in the Americas. It includes the s e v e n - m e m b e r Inter-American C o m m i s s i o n of H u m a n Rights and the I n t e r - A m e r i c a n Court of H u m a n Rights. Its decisions have o f t e n been resisted or ignored by countries of the Americas on the principle that state sovereignty p r e d o m i n a t e s . T h e c o m m i s s i o n and court are left with the p o w e r of publicity a n d m o r a l i n f l u e n c e , which h a v e b e e n q u i t e limited. T h e r e are signs, however, that this is beginning to c h a n g e and that these institutions are being taken m o r e seriously. Finally, in the 1980s, A f r i c a n states approved the A f r i c a n C h a r t e r on H u m a n and P e o p l e s ' Rights. It is an interesting d o c u m e n t in that, unlike o t h e r regional d o c u m e n t s , it includes the rights of " p e o p l e s , " that is, the third-generation, or solidarity, rights. Article 19 states, "All p e o p l e s shall be equal; they shall e n j o y the s a m e respect and shall h a v e the same rights. N o t h i n g shall j u s t i f y the d o m i n a t i o n of a people by a n o t h e r . " In J a n u a r y 2 0 0 4 an A f r i c a n h u m a n rights court c a m e into existence. A second and very p r o m i s i n g h u m a n rights d e v e l o p m e n t outside of the U N h a s b e e n the a c t i v i t i e s of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) . T h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e e m e r g e d to fill the g a p left by the U N and its m a n y agencies and the reluctance or inability of sovereign states to e n f o r c e

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human rights. As their names indicate, these groups are active on a variety of global issues and their impact is growing. There are hundreds of these organizations throughout the world with millions of members. Human rights N G O s take many f o r m s and operate in many different ways. By operating outside of g o v e r n m e n t they are able to monitor the actions of governments and bring pressure on governmental policies. They gather information, provide advocacy and expertise, lobby, educate, build solidarity, and provide services and access to the political system (Wiseberg 1992). Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International League for H u m a n Rights, Cultural Survival, the International C o m m i s s i o n of Jurists, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Physicians for Human Rights are just a few of the hundreds of such human rights NGOs. Provisions have been made for these organizations to have an official repr e s e n t a t i o n at t h e U N a n d at U N - s p o n s o r e d c o n f e r e n c e s . G e o f f r e y Robertson, a human rights scholar who has been quite critical of the UN, argues that experts from human rights N G O s should be eligible for appointment to U N c o m m i t t e e s and c o m m i s s i o n s : "The best way f o r w a r d is to bring n o n - g o v e r n m e n t organizations (which do most of the real human rights fact-finding) into the appointments process, thereby providing some g u a r a n t e e that m e m b e r s are true e x p e r t s in h u m a n rights, r a t h e r than experts in defending governments accused of violating t h e m " (2000: 47).

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Women's Rights

A domain of human rights that has received some official attention from the UN and its members, but that has had relatively little success in implementation is w o m e n ' s rights. From the initial UDHR document to many other agreements and specific c o n v e n t i o n s directed to w o m e n ' s issues, it still seems quite clear that "millions of women throughout the world live in conditions of abject d e p r i v a t i o n of, and attacks against their f u n d a m e n t a l human rights for no other reason than that they are w o m e n " (HRW 2004b). This statement by Human Rights Watch, an NGO, is reiterated by Amnesty International and many other N G O s throughout the world. Still, the UN is committed to this issue, as Chapter 10 indicates. The single most important UN document related to w o m e n is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Over 90 percent of UN member states are party to the convention; and President Carter signed it in 1980, but it has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. The plight of w o m e n in our world will rely heavily on the work of NGOs, which will provide support for bringing abuses to the attention of the UN, sovereign states, and the world community.

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W o m e n and W a r Rape is often an integral part of war; some would say it always is. Social norms are weakened and the enemy is demonized, thereby providing a climate in which rape and other forms of antisocial and illegal behavior often become the norm. It is estimated that f r o m 200,000 to 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 Bengali women were raped in 1971 by Pakistani soldiers. Many observers believe this was the worst instance of wartime rape, but reports from the genocide in Rwanda indicate that possibly half a million women were raped during a few months in 1994. During World War II in what came to be called the " R a p e of N a n k i n g , " b e t w e e n 2 0 , 0 0 0 and 8 0 , 0 0 0 C h i n e s e w o m e n were raped by Japanese soldiers. These events, however, are not things of the past. It is estimated that at least 20,000 w o m e n were raped in the mid1990s during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina. More recent than these cases is the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur region of the Sudan.

W o m e n , Rape, and H I V / A I D S Directly related to the issue of women, rape, and war is the fact that many women raped during recent wars contracted HIV/AIDS. This was especially true in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the genocide in Rwanda, but the spread of H I V / A I D S does not only result f r o m rapes during war. The "Virgin C u r e , " which is found in many countries where the rate of HIV/AIDS is high, also contributes to this abuse. This myth maintains that having intercourse with a virgin, often the younger the better, will cleanse a male of A I D S . Although stories of this myth are associated with South Africa, it has also been found in Asia and the Caribbean. It also has a long history with other v e n e r e a l diseases in m a n y other parts of the world, including the West.

Trafficking in W o m e n Trafficking in w o m e n can refer to a variety of illegal and profitable recruitments into forced labor such as prostitution and forced marriage. H u m a n Rights Watch estimates that "anywhere from 700,000 to four million persons are t r a f f i c k e d annually w o r l d w i d e , and that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 , 0 0 0 women and children are trafficked annually for sexual exploitation into the United States. Women are particularly vulnerable to this slavery-like practice, due largely to the persistent inequalities they face in status and opportunity worldwide. . . . In all cases, coercive tactics, including deception, f r a u d , i n t i m i d a t i o n , isolation, threat and use of physical f o r c e , or debt bondage, are used to control w o m e n " (HRW 2004a). Regions of the world that are consistently identified as problem areas are southern Asia and eastern Europe, where opportunities for women are limited and their rights are

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often unenforced. Their destination is the more affluent West and Japan. Many NGOs work on these issues, as do UN agencies and sovereign states. There have been related hearings in the U.S. House of Representatives, and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) sponsors a trafficking project in addition to many other UN efforts. W o m e n , M i g r a t i o n , and V i o l e n c e Much of the internal and international migration is becoming feminized due to the skills that women possess, their lack of opportunity, and their determination to assist their families. A case in point is the migration of Mexican women to their northern border to work in maquiladores (assembly plants) just below the U.S. border. At one time there were nearly a million w o r k e r s in these f a c t o r i e s and the o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s were women. One especially tragic series of murders has taken place in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, across the border from El Paso, Texas. Hundreds of bodies of young women have been found in the area and hundreds more women have disappeared. These murders and disappearances have happened in the past d e c a d e and Mexican state and federal agencies have made little progress in identifying the perpetrators. A recent report by a federal special prosecutor who has been analyzing the cases states that the public officials involved in them have often been inept if not complicit. To this list could be added such violent acts as honor killings (the most severe penalty for women who disgrace their family due to perceived sexual misconduct), treatment of women in state custody (several NGOs have been focusing on this in the United States), and the legal status of women (whether they are able to inherit property). Human rights abuses against women are an important global issue and will continue until education and other societal changes take place. As one scholar writes: "The history of the drive for women's human rights indicates that only when women are literate, when they can articulate their view of life in publications and before audiences, when they can organize and demand equality, when girls are educated and socialized to think of themselves as citizens as well as wives and mothers, and when men take more responsibility for care of children and the home, can women be full and equal citizens able to enjoy human rights" (Fraser 2001: 58).

•

Conclusion

Human rights have become an integral part of the international political landscape and, if present trends continue, will become even more important in the future. The post-September 11, 2001, period presents the possibility

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that g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n will take place on global issues such as h u m a n rights. With the assistance and influence of regional h u m a n rights institutions and n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations, there is good reason to be hopef u l . O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h i s t r e n d will not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t i n u e . A r i f t between the United States and its allies, and b e t w e e n the United States and much of the world, has f o l l o w e d its invasion of Iraq, and clashing v i e w s over the International Criminal Court have added to this frustration on both sides. This rift may quite possibly lead to diminished cooperation b e t w e e n the United States and its allies on issues such as h u m a n rights. T h e next few years will be crucial in determining whether progress is m a d e toward achieving greater respect for h u m a n rights throughout the world.

Discussion Questions 1. W h i c h generation of h u m a n rights d o you think is most important? 2. W h y a r e h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t t h e U N h a s a p p r o v e d o f t e n n o t enforced? 3. W h a t should be done by the international c o m m u n i t y to protect the rights of w o m e n ? 4. W h i c h is m o s t i m p o r t a n t : state s o v e r e i g n t y or u n i v e r s a l h u m a n rights? 5. W h y d o e s the United States r e f u s e to sign m a n y of the U N c o n v e n tions on h u m a n rights?

Suggested Readings A g o s i n , Marjorie, ed. ( 2 0 0 1 ) Women, Gender, and Human Rights: A Global Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Amnesty International (2004) It's in Our Hands: Stop Violence Against Women. New York: Amnesty International. Amnesty Internationa! Report (annual) London: Amnesty International. Claude, Richard Pierre, and Burns H. Weston, eds. (1992) Human Rights in the World Community. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Felice, William F. (1996) Taking Suffering Seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press. Gutman, Roy (1993) A Witness to Genocide. New York: Macmillan. Hayner, Priscilla B. (2001) Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York: Routledge. Human Rights Watch World Report (annual) New York: Human Rights Watch. Langley, Winston E. (1996) Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues Since 1945. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. O'Byrne, Darren J. (2003) Human Rights: An Introduction. London: Pearson Education.

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Pollis, Adamantia, and Peter Schwab, eds. (2000) Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Robertson, Geoffrey (2000) Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. New York: W. W. Norton.

5 Global Security and Insecurity: Responses to Terrorism and Other Threats Jack Patterson, Eliza Kretzmann, and Tom Smith

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he attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, changed the way many in the United States and to a lesser extent the rest of the world view the task of p r o v i d i n g security to the world's peoples. Many argue for different, if not new, approaches to security that seem to overturn conventional ways of addressing conflict. Few would argue that traditional approaches to security that prevailed through most of the twentieth century can be e f f e c t i v e today. This chapter will introduce current challenges to global security, review traditional approaches to global security, and then discuss three alternative methods to enhance it. The choices made in the next few years may well determine the course of the twenty-first century.

Current Security Challenges The global security environment has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. D e m o c r a c y and market e c o n o m i c s have spread unevenly across the former Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. Globalization has intensified political, economic, and cultural interconnectedness worldwide. Some have argued that globalization has weakened the role of nation-states in favor of unregulated e c o n o m i c forces. At the United Nations, Cold War polarization has receded as new impulses toward international cooperation have increased. This new spirit of cooperation has led to far fewer vetoes in the Security Council and greater consensus on the formation of UN peacekeeping missions in response to the growing number of ethnic and religious conflicts. This transformation of the international system means t o d a y ' s

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security context differs from that of the past. This section will look at the security challenges that have emerged within this new context during the past ten to fifteen years. This transformation was deeply affected by the changing nature of war itself in the post-Cold War period. First, it is widely recognized that conflict in the 1990s and 2000s has intensified a trend that began during the Cold War, namely a shift from wars between countries to wars within nation-states. While many wars in the early part of the twentieth century were clearly divided along national lines, conflicts during and after the Cold War were often between warring parties within national borders, such as the civil war in Rwanda. In addition, traditional cross-border wars have become quite rare. Second, the most visible actors are less often states and traditional armies; rather, nonstate actors such as guerrilla groups, terrorist networks, paramilitaries (unofficial armies), and similar militias are often organized around ethnic or religious lines. Often these actors have reach beyond their national borders. For example, now terrorist groups often attack people or groups outside the boundaries of their own country, whereas in the past most terrorist attacks occurred within states or sometimes in neighboring states. A third shift in the nature of war is the growing reality that civilians are now the primary victims and account for the majority of fatalities, while military deaths are on the decline. For example, in the recent conflict in Iraq, it is estimated that as of this writing 18,000 Iraqi civilians have died and about 1,500 U.S. soldiers have been killed (IBC 2005). One source has noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the ratio of military to civilian victims was about nine to one, whereas during World War II the ratio was about even. By the end of the century the ratio had been completely turned upside down as nine civilian deaths occurred for every one military death (Gutman and Rieff 1999). The rest of this section will review three of the most salient challenges to global security: global terrorism, genocide, and civil conflicts.

Terrorism While terrorism is certainly not a new phenomenon on the world scene, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in September 2001 brought it to the forefront of challenges in the United States and in many other countries. To a great extent terrorism is seen now as a global issue. While there was broad unity worldwide on the need to respond to terrorism in the wake of September 11, there has been no ready agreement on what constitutes terrorist acts. Definitions of terrorism are varied and highly contested. Even UN resolutions calling for action on terrorism fail to

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provide a definition, as many countries have acute sensitivities to use of definitions that would seem to include, for example, their own liberation movements. This has been particularly true in African states, where the term "terrorist" was used freely to describe the armed movements that gave rise to their independence from colonial rulers. Governments or "highpower" actors are more likely to see terrorism as attacks perpetrated by rogue nonstate actors on governments, while "low-power" actors who feel victimized by their own governments are likely to stress that government military attacks and repression are a form of terrorism as well. For the purpose of this chapter, while respecting the sensitivity of defining terrorism, we will use the following simple definition: terrorism is the use of violence against civilians in order to attain political aims. Historical examples of terrorism. Terrorism spans all geographical regions and ages, and has been used as a tactic by widely varying and diverse cultural, political, ethnic, and religious groups. Some of the most frequently cited examples of terrorist groups in the past include: •

•

• •

•

• •

The Stern Gang, a Jewish group in the 1940s, used terrorist violence to press for political independence in British-controlled Palestine. The Irish Republican Army, an Irish nationalist group operating in the latter part of the twentieth century, fought against British control of Northern Ireland. The Shining Path, a Maoist faction in Peru, began using terrorist tactics in the 1980s for revolutionary change. The Palestine Liberation Organization has used terrorism to press for the political independence of the Palestinian Arabs in the Middle East. The Red Army Faction, an extreme left-wing revolutionary movement in Germany, used terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s to try to overthrow capitalism. The Tamil Tigers, an ethnic-based militia in Sri Lanka, have used terrorism to press for representation and autonomy for the Tamils. Governments, too, are cited as in the recent experiences of government-sponsored "death squads" and even more formal repression in Argentina, in Chile, and in Iraq under Hussein's Baathist regime.

This list includes groups engaged in ideological struggles and struggles for self-determination, groups with religious, ethnic, and class grievances. T h e new terrorism. Contemporary terrorism exhibits several significant shifts from the terrorist acts of the past. First, the new terrorism has a glob-

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al reach. Most earlier terrorist groups tended to have a specific geographical focus for their grievances: the Stern Gang operated in Palestine, Shining Path in Peru, and the Irish Republican Army largely in the British Isles. Other groups widened the area of their operations, but still attacked targets that reflected their political goals rooted in a specific place. For example, Palestinian groups carried out operations all over the world, from the 1972 Munich Olympics siege to the hijacking of planes on international routes, but the targets tended to be Israeli interests and reflected the Palestinians' political cause. In contrast, the new terrorism makes use of new technology to attack targets anywhere in the world seen to conflict with their transb o u n d a r y g o a l s . T h e shift to a larger global stage may be seen as an inevitable consequence of globalization. Second, much of the current terrorism springs from new ideological commitments. Religion is not a new element in terrorism: the operations of Hezbollah in Lebanon during the 1980s, for example, had a radical Shia Muslim outlook, and the Kach movement in Israel during the 1990s had Jewish fundamentalist motivations. However, while the religious aspects of terrorism are not new, the shift to an apocalyptic, fanatical streak is one of the most salient features of the new terrorism. This shift in ideology sees terror, at least in part, as an end in itself rather than just a tactic to achieve a political end. Although today terrorism is often framed as a phenomenon linked to Islam, this is deceptive. While many of the current terrorist factions and the perpetrators of recent high-profile attacks identify themselves as Muslim, the current trend of the Western press and the U.S. government to focus on the link between Islam and terrorism is misleading. It paints a skewed picture that distorts the true diversity of past and present terrorist movements. It also may lead people to believe that Islam is an inherently violent religion, which is not supported by the text of the Quran and is hotly disputed by many Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Third, contemporary terrorism has a new range of targets. There is less concern about alienating possible supporters of the perpetrators' political m o v e m e n t s , and so the new terrorism is less discriminate than the old. Targets are often chosen to maximize destruction, and for the amount of press and global attention a target will attract, as illustrated by the attacks of September 11 and the activities of Al-Qaida. Fourth, there are new means available to terrorists. Globalization and the i n f o r m a t i o n t e c h n o l o g y revolution have allowed groups to use the Internet, satellite telephones, and other technology to c o m m u n i c a t e over large distances and with relative anonymity. In addition, there is a possibility of terrorist groups gaining greater access to weapons technology, such as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. The use of commercial aircraft

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in the attacks of September 11 demonstrated that even conventional features of modern societies can be turned into effective weapons. Last, terrorism now tends to adopt a less hierarchical and more networked form. There are fewer chains of command and fewer instructions given from a centralized leader. Old terrorism often had identifiable operational leaders, such as Baader and Meinhof for the Red Army Faction, or Abimael Guzman for the Shining Path. Contrary to common perceptions, cells now operate with much greater independence from the leadership, as was illustrated by the March 2003 Madrid bombings in Spain, which were perpetrated by a relatively autonomous Al-Qaida cell operating in Europe. Terrorism as a preeminent concern today. Examples of the new terrorism are more diverse than Al-Qaida and the terrorism perpetrated by Islamist groups. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult, perpetrated the first chemical attack by a terrorist group, on the Tokyo subway in 1995. In the United States, the Oklahoma City bombing provided an example of the use of messianic ideology to inflict mass civilian casualties. However, it took the massive scale of the World Trade Center attacks to galvanize world attention and shape the way much of the world thinks about security and insecurity in the twenty-first century. Despite the vast resources directed to fighting terrorism, little attention has been given to its root causes (see Figure 5.1). For many developing countries, the threat of terrorism and the resulting "war on terror," as promoted mostly by Western governments, have had the unfortunate effect of overshadowing other threats to world peace and security. S o m e critics argue the single focus on terrorism has actually increased the seriousness of other issues as more and more scarce resources and political energy are diverted to addressing terrorism. Global maladies such as g e n o c i d e , civil c o n f l i c t , the e p i d e m i c of t r a f f i c k i n g in small arms/light weapons, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and other humanitarian disasters also threaten global security and may worsen if neglected. Genocide and Civil Conflicts For the majority of the world's peoples, terrorism takes a back seat to the challenges they face from other threats to security and stability. Genocide and civil conflict are a far greater threats to them than terrorism. The twentieth century was the most violent in history. The costs of war in h u m a n lives have been catastrophic in m a n y regions of the world. According to Global Action: "Over 200 million people were killed in 250 wars and genocidal onslaughts, more people than were killed in warfare in the past two thousand years. (The Global Action definition of war comprehends interstate armed conflict, internal armed conflict, terrorism, and

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F i g u r e 5.1 T h e I m p o r t a n c e of L o o k i n g a t the R o o t C a u s e s o f T e r r o r i s m

It has b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t in the years a f t e r S e p t e m b e r 11, 2 0 0 1 , to d i s c u s s the root c a u s e s of terrorism and to e x a m i n e t h e context in w h i c h the attacks t o o k p l a c e . If o n e a t t e m p t s to d i s c u s s w h y t h e s e atrocities h a p p e n e d , o n e is likely to be a c c u s e d of trying to j u s t i f y the attacks, rationalize t h e v i o l e n c e , and s y m p a t h i z e with the perpetrators. In fact, trying to u n d e r s t a n d the r o o t causes of the c u r r e n t crisis is a very i m p o r t a n t part of p r e v e n t i n g it f r o m h a p p e n i n g again. D e s p i t e the continual c l a i m that the t e r r o r i s t s w e r e m o t i v a t e d by p u r e " h a t r e d of o u r f r e e d o m s , " O s a m a bin L a d e n a n d his g r o u p h a v e relatively clear political a i m s , including the r e p l a c e m e n t of c o r r u p t g o v e r n m e n t s in the M i d d l e E a s t with theocratic I s l a m i c r e g i m e s , the e n d of all U . S . military presence in t h e r e g i o n — e s p e c i a l ly f r o m t h e " h o l y s o i l " of t h e A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a , and t h e e n d of " Z i o n i s t o c c u p a t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n l a n d s . " A f t e r b e i n g a c c u s e d of j u s t i f y i n g the actions of A l - Q a i d a , activist a n d intellectual M i c h a e l A l b e r t m a d e the f o l l o w i n g c o m p a r i s o n : " S u p p o s e s o m e o n e s a y s that h u g e stress in a p o s t a l w o r k p l a c e contributed to the m i n d s e t of a w o r k e r w h o c a m e in a n d shot his w o r k m a t e s . Would that c o r r e s p o n d to saying the killer w a s j u s t i f i e d in s h o o t i n g his w o r k m a t e s ? O f c o u r s e not. Would it be an i m p o r t a n t t h i n g to n o t i c e ? O f c o u r s e it w o u l d , a s s u m i n g , that is, that o n e c a r e s a b o u t d i m i n i s h i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d of p e o p l e ' g o i n g p o s t a l ' in t h e future."3 Like all terrorism b e f o r e it, the violence of A l - Q a i d a exists in a certain historical c o n t e x t , r e f l e c t s a set of g r i e v a n c e s , and a i m s at i d e n t i f i a b l e political g o a l s . E x a m i n i n g this c o n t e x t is i m p o r t a n t . Note: a. "Replying to H i t c h e n s , " available online at w w w . e p s i l o n p r e s s . s e / ncnyterror/albe rthitchens.htm.

g e n o c i d e . ) M o r e t h a n s i x m i l l i o n p e o p l e h a v e d i e d in w a r s i n c e the e n d o f t h e C o l d War, w h e n t h e l e v e l o f v i o l e n c e s h o u l d h a v e g o n e d o w n " ( 2 0 0 3 : 5 ) . L i t t l e h a s c h a n g e d t o g i v e p r o m i s e t o a d i f f e r e n t s c e n a r i o in t h e t w e n t y first c e n t u r y . A s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , t h e r e h a s b e e n a d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e in c i v i l c o n f l i c t s d u r i n g r e c e n t d e c a d e s . In f a c t , n e a r l y all o f the w a r s in t h e 1 9 9 0 s w e r e c i v i l c o n f l i c t s , that is, w a r s within

a c o u n t r y rather t h a n between

countries.

A n o t h e r h u m a n i t a r i a n t r a g e d y c o n f r o n t e d t h e w o r l d d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 0 s , in the f o r m o f g e n o c i d e . T h e w o r l d largely stood back and w a t c h e d as g e n o c i d e t o o k p l a c e in R w a n d a a n d B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a ( " B o s n i a " f o r s h o r t ) . T h e s e e v e n t s alerted the world to a tragic r e a l i t y — a s a global c o m m u n i t y , w e h a v e n o t y e t l e a r n e d h o w t o s t o p m a s s m u r d e r . In t h e R w a n d a g e n o c i d e t h e r e w e r e 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 d e a t h s in 1 9 9 4 a l o n e — m o s t o f t h e m w i t h i n a s p a n o f f o u r m o n t h s ( s e e c a s e s t u d y later in t h e c h a p t e r ) .

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W h e n the former Yugoslavia disintegrated in the early 1990s, ethnic fighting broke out among several groups. In Bosnia, Serbs were a minority but sought to align themselves with neighboring Serbia. In an effort to rid Bosnia of non-Serbs, Serbs killed hundreds of thousands of non-Serbs. The s t r a t e g y b e c a m e k n o w n as " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . " T h e s t a g g e r i n g loss of human lives due to genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia points to an immense global security issue. The increase in civil wars and genocidal situations has coincided with the spread and use of smail arms and light weapons. Violence perpetrated by guns and small weapons is felt around the world. These weapons, often referred to as "small arms/light weapons" (SALWs), are easily transferred and obtained, and are operable by one person or a few people. Every year, more than 500,000 people are killed by such weapons, at least 300,000 during armed, often civil conflict, with the other 200,000 being victims of homicide and suicide (UNIS 2003). Despite the immense number of deaths and level of human suffering caused by SALWs, the issue does not receive the level of international attention that terrorism does. Resources to address the i m m e n s e problem of S A L W s may instead be used f o r antiterrorism activities, although more people are dying due to the proliferation and use of S A L W s (see Table 5.1). By not a d d r e s s i n g the p r o b l e m s caused by SALWs, the world can only be less secure.

R e s p o n s e s to C h a n g i n g T h r e a t s How has the international c o m m u n i t y responded to terrorism and other security t h r e a t s ? In this section we will review s o m e of the historical approaches to global security and then discuss the pros and cons of three approaches that have arisen in the past decade. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international relations have been based on two principles, now enshrined in the UN Charter. The first is state sovereignty, or the political self-determination of states. This principle is r e f l e c t e d in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter, which reads: " T h e [UN] organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its

Table 5.1

C o m p a r i s o n of C a u s e s of D e a t h

Cause International terrorism Small arms/light weapons R w a n d a n genocide

Deaths 1,032 500,000 800,000

Year(s) 2002-2003 In an average year 1994

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members." The second principle is nonintervention. This is discussed in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, which reads: "Nothing in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters that are the domestic jurisdiction of any state." There are only two circumstances in which the charter authorizes the use of force by one state against another: (1) collective or individual self-defense, usually understood as the right of a state to defend itself when threatened by imminent attack over its borders; and (2) the authorization of force by the UN Security Council to "maintain or restore international peace and security" (these are contained in Article 51 and Article 42 of the UN Charter, respectively). In other words, when states go beyond self-defense in the face of imminent attack, they require specific authorization from the UN Security Council. Legally, there is no other existing basis for the legitimate use of force in international affairs. New challenges to this proposition have arisen from several quarters. A growing number of states have argued that the changing nature of the threats faced today, including global terrorism, requires revisiting the principle of nonintervention. Some have come to believe that principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention are increasingly insufficient to address these new challenges, as well as irresponsible and even immoral. For a growing number of states, the option of standing aside in the face of genocide for the sake of nonintervention is unacceptable. Simply put, should state sovereignty still be respected when the lives of thousands are threatened? Since the end of the Cold War, at least three distinct approaches to achieving peace and security have arisen. These approaches emphasize: human security, preemptive military action, and prevention of armed conflict. The main question throughout is: To what extent do new threats justify revising or overturning the two principles of nonintervention and state sovereignty, which have sustained world order during the past half century? Moving from State Security to H u m a n Security The traditional emphasis on state security, which focuses solely on states protecting their own borders from outside threats, began to shift in the mid1990s. In the face of the humanitarian disasters in Rwanda and Srebrenica, Bosnia, state security began to give way to a focus on human security. The disasters of Rwanda and Srebrenica laid bare the inadequacy of traditional methods of dealing with security. Nonintervention, whereby countries reject intervention in another country's affairs, was revealed as being insufficient for responding to threats requiring a more robust and even interventionist response. The case for intervention: Rwanda. From April through July 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda. The genocide was perpetrated primarily by Hutu citizens against the Tutsi population. Postcolonial

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Rwanda was never able to recover from a colonial history of "divide and rule." After an increasing animosity between the two groups in the early 1990s, Rwanda finally exploded. Although there were UN peacekeepers in the country at the time of the genocide, they did not have a mandate to intervene to stop the killing. The entire UN force was withdrawn after ten peacekeepers were killed in the first weeks of the genocide. A lack of political will in the UN Security Council and an unwillingness of any country to commit more troops to Rwanda meant that no further action was taken. In addition, the reluctance of the United States and other key countries to name the event "genocide" meant that action was delayed. The use of this term is significant because, according to the 1948 Convention on Genocide, once a conflict is ruled genocide, it places an obligation on all states to act and prevent it. Part of the fallout of the genocide in Rwanda was the realization that the key principles of the past, state sovereignty and nonintervention, were failing to adequately protect the interests of individuals all over the world. In 1999 the UN published a report on the circumstances leading to the failure of the international community to prevent the Rwanda genocide (as well as a report on the UN's failure in Srebrenica in July 1995, when outnumbered and outgunned Dutch peacekeepers sent to protect Muslims in the presumably safe zone stood aside as the whole population was herded out of the city and thousands of men and boys ended up in mass graves in the countryside). The UN reports revealed how the established principles of nonintervention and state sovereignty were more concerned with protecting the interests of states than vulnerable and threatened populations. State security with its concern for nonintervention was seen to trump the protection of innocent civilians from massive human rights abuses brought upon them by governments—often their own governments. For a growing number of states, particularly in Europe and including the United States and Canada, this was an intolerable situation that had to be remedied. The example of Rwanda illustrates the case for humanitarian intervention and the shift from state security to human security. It is argued that if intervention had occurred, and human security had taken precedence over state security, many lives could have been saved. Human security: conclusions. The shift to human security has a distinct advantage. Human security places an emphasis on the life and worth of humans, whereas previous principles of international relations have treated states as paramount. Allowing for international intervention in situations such as genocide could drastically decrease mortalities. Despite the clear advantage of a shift to human security, some concerns exist. The primary concern is that a focus on human security may be misused by great powers. There is deep suspicion among many smaller states

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that a right to intervene for humanitarian reasons may simply cloak other motives to a d v a n c e a c o u n t r y ' s self-interest. For small states the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention are the only line of d e f e n s e f r o m intervention by bigger and more p o w e r f u l neighbors.

Moving from Nonintervention to Preemptive Military Action A second approach to peace and security in the twenty-first century is the shift toward preemptive military action. This approach b e c a m e official U.S. p o l i c y in S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 2 a n d is e m b o d i e d in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House 2002a) for that year. Preemption can be defined as military action that is undertaken in response to i m m i n e n t d a n g e r f r o m an a d v e r s a r y , but undertaken b e f o r e an a r m e d attack by that adversary has actually occurred. The most cited e x a m p l e in recent history is the use of force by Israel against Egypt in the 1967 war. Israel's p r e e m p t i v e attack on E g y p t was undertaken on the g r o u n d s that E g y p t w a s p r e p a r i n g to attack, since it had restricted the f l o w of Israeli shipping and redeployed its troops on Israel's border. Preemptive military action is hotly debated because the t w o traditional principles of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s — s t a t e sovereignty and n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n — a r e largely e l b o w e d aside. Under the principles of the U N Charter, the use of force is prohibited except in self-defense, which is traditionally defined as a response after an armed attack has begun or when an attack is too i m m i n e n t for collective deliberation. Supporters of p r e e m p t i o n claim that waiting until a f t e r an armed attack is to wait too long, especially in the f a c e of new security threats f r o m terrorists who may intend to use w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction ( W M D ) . In this view, the two traditional principles of international relations are no longer sufficient in the face of new security challenges. O n e of the key p r o b l e m s with p r e e m p t i v e military action is p r o v i n g that an armed attack is actually imminent. In the case of the 1967 w a r it is debatable w h e t h e r E g y p t really was intending to attack Israel, since Egypt was scheduled to participate in U.S.-sponsored peace talks during the week of Israel's p r e e m p t i v e strike, and if Egypt were to attack Israel it was c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e that it would be d e f e a t e d by the far superior strength of the Israeli army. In the case of the National Security Strategy this is an even m o r e pertinent question, since the U.S. government expressed its support for launching p r e e m p t i v e strikes not just in the face of i m m i n e n t attacks, but also in order to prevent threats f r o m materializing in the first place. T h e principle of p r e e m p t i o n today has therefore m o v e d b e y o n d a r e s p o n s e to i m m i n e n t a r m e d attack; it has n o w b e c o m e the response to a possible threat of an i m m i n e n t a r m e d attack.

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A related problem with preemption is the issue of setting a precedent. The traditional principles of nonintervention and state sovereignty were designed to be hard and fast rules that applied to all states, in order to protect them from outside interference. If these traditional principles are displaced by the idea of preemption, there is nothing to stop any country from claiming that any other country is planning to develop a threat against it, and then launching a preemptive strike in response. If countries were to justify use of aggression by claiming that their adversaries are preparing to attack them first, this could cause chaos in international affairs and grave human suffering. A third problem with preemption is that it is a "quick fix" that may simply postpone problems rather than resolve them. In other words, it may eliminate a single future threat, but it does not address the root causes of that threat. Nor does it address the root causes of any other threats or conflicts or take into account the unintended effects of the preemptive act. Arguably, the strategy of preemption may actually increase the probability of violence on a global scale, by setting a dangerous precedent in international affairs that others may be led to utilize. C a s e study: Iraq. The best illustration of the pros and cons of a preemptive strategy is the Iraq War. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a highly publicized and visible example of a preemptive strike, one that was undertaken on the basis of three main lines of argument. The first argument in favor of war was that Iraq needed to be disarmed. According to this argument, Iraq possessed WMD in violation of UN resolutions. Proponents of the war argued that Iraq would use these weapons to threaten the West, either through a direct attack or by making these weapons available to other groups. (See Figure 5.2 for a timeline of events in Iraq.) The second argument in support of war was that Iraq had links with terrorists. According to this argument, Iraq and Al-Qaida had a common enemy, the United States, and Iraq had established links with Al-Qaida in order to attack the United States. This second argument was used in conjunction with the first to summon the specter of Al-Qaida gaining access to Iraq's WMD and launching a devastating nuclear attack. The third argument in favor of war was that Iraq was a totalitarian state with an appalling human rights record. According to this argument, overthrowing Saddam Hussein would lead to a free and democratic Iraq, resulting in a spread of democracy throughout the Middle East and making the region more stable. All three of these arguments focused on issues of peace and security. Proponents of war claimed that Iraq was a serious threat, and that the consequences of this threat were so great that a preemptive strike was justified to eliminate it. In short, it was claimed that invading Iraq would make the

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Figure 5.2 Timeline of the U.S. Preemptive Strike on Iraq and Its A f t e r m a t h

January 2002. President George W. Bush identifies Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. He vows that the United States "will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." June 2002. President Bush publicly introduces the new doctrine of preemption in a speech at West Point. The president asserts that the United States must strike first against another state to prevent a potential threat from growing into an actual one: "Our security will require all Americans . . . [to] be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." September 2002. President Bush addresses the UN, challenging the organization to swiftly enforce its own resolutions against Iraq. If not. Bush contends, the United States will have no choice but to act on its own against Iraq. October 2002. Congress authorizes an attack on Iraq. February 2003. Massive peace protests across the world. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivers a presentation to the UN concerning Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction and its ties to the Al-Qaida terrorist network. March 2003. The United States invades Iraq without UN Security Council authorization and in the face of widespread global protest. May 2003. The United States declares an end to major combat operations. August 2003. A suicide bombing destroys UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24, including top envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, and wounding more than 100. The UN withdraws its entire staff from Iraq. September 2003. Continued violence and slow progress in Iraq lead to President Bush's announcement that $87 billion is needed to cover additional military and reconstruction costs. December 2003. Saddam Hussein is captured by U.S. forces. January 2004. David Kay. the former head of the U.S. weapons inspection teams in Iraq, informs a Senate committee that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq and that prewar intelligence was "almost all wrong"about Saddam Hussein's arsenal. His report sets off a firestorm of allegations. April 2004. The appalling physical and sexual abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad comes to light when photographs are released by the U.S. media.

world a safer place. A s the New York Times (2003) wrote on February 23, 2003: "It is not surprising that in the wake of September 11 the president would want to make the world safer, and that one of his top priorities would be eliminating Iraq's ability to create b i o l o g i c a l , chemical, and nuclear weapons."

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However, no solid evidence for the supposed threats in Iraq was found. After a year of searching, the chief weapons inspector for the United States, David Kay, admitted that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction did not exist and said that it would be "delusional" to think they would be found (BBC News 2004). Several UN weapons inspectors, for example, Scott Ritter, who had overseen the dismantling of Iraq's WMD program in the 1990s, had warned of this before the war began. The link between Iraq and Al-Qaida also turned out to be false. Again, most Middle East experts had pointed out before the war that there was no evidence to suggest a link, noting instead that the secular dictatorship of Saddam Hussein actually had an extensive history of brutally crushing religious groups like Al-Qaida. When the 9/11 Commission finally declared that there was no relationship between the two, and that Hussein had no involvement in the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration continued to claim that ties existed. Finally, the humanitarian argument for war in Iraq has also been called into question. The war itself has caused immense human suffering and loss of lives and the everyday insecurity of Iraqis has increased. Towns lack a regular supply of power and clean water. The scandal of abuse by U.S. soldiers of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in May 2004 added to the impression that the U.S. troops were occupying the country and not benefiting the inhabitants. In a poll conducted by the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2004, 92 percent of Iraqis saw the United States as "occupiers," 3 percent saw them as "peacekeepers," and only 2 percent viewed them as "liberators." The war in Iraq has illustrated a number of serious drawbacks arising from the strategy of preemptive war. Most vivid are the failure of the U.S.led coalition to demonstrate that an imminent threat existed and the failure to find WMD. In the face of intelligence of dubious quality and with the suspicion abroad that evidence had been doctored for political reasons, it is likely that many states will require a higher standard of evidence before committing themselves to preemptive interventions in the future. In addition, the Iraq War illustrates the likelihood of preemption being misused by states as an excuse to attack their enemies, as a precedent may already have been set. The Los Angeles Times (2003: B14) summarized these problems with preemption neatly in the run up to the war, writing: "An Iraq invasion without U.N. sanction would be a pre-emptive attack by the world's only superpower. It would probably be successful in the initial military phase— but at what cost? A pre-emptive strike can be justified if the threat is imminent and unavoidable. With neither of those conditions proven, a preemptive attack yields the moral high ground. The United States would be cast as the global buliy, seeking to arrogate the installation of governments in other lands."

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The Bush administration and its supporters have largely fallen back on the argument that the world is safer now that the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is over. There is no doubt that Hussein committed horrendous atrocities. However, in terms of global security, many are concerned with the precedent set by the United States in its preemptive strike. Moving from Reaction to Prevention Another approach to peace and security that has been gaining momentum since the early 1990s is the prevention of violent or armed conflict. This is quite different from the previous two approaches, as it shifts the primary focus from the reaction to violence to the prevention of violence before it occurs, or in the case of postconflict situations, a shift to preventing violence from recurring. The carnage of the past century makes it apparent that the existing mechanisms for preventing war are inadequate. There are often clear w a r n i n g s of i m m i n e n t violent conflicts, but e f f e c t i v e and timely action is needed to addresses the problems before a conflict becomes violent. Typically, warnings are ignored or underaddressed until they become violent and unavoidable. The UN has no official definition for prevention, but it begins with the premise that "the prevention of violent conflict is far better and more costeffective" than responding after conflicts arise (Annan 2002). Most conflicts do not materialize overnight. They build up over a long period and, in most cases, there is time for diplomats, mediators, and communities to attempt to prevent them from becoming violent crises. The prevention of violent conflict requires a set of policies and techniques that build national and global security by looking at the root causes of conflict and terrorism and responding to early warnings. Prevention techniques can be used at several different levels of society, from the state level, where government mediators may intervene to help prevent an escalating crisis, to the community level, where people may work to maintain peace in a volatile area. Two types of prevention frequently referred to are operational and structural. Operational prevention refers to measures applicable in the face of i m m e d i a t e crisis, and structural prevention consists of m e a s u r e s to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place (or if they do, that they do not recur) by focusing on root causes. An example of operational prevention is the a d d i t i o n of p e a c e b u i l d i n g c o m p o n e n t s to existing and n e w peacekeeping operations to strengthen efforts to break the cycle of violence that leads to r e c u r r i n g c o n f l i c t . In the case of R w a n d a , it would have involved sending in a large peacekeeping contingent prior to the conflict, when warning signs were evident, in this case months before the genocide. S t r u c t u r a l p r e v e n t i o n seeks to strengthen c o u n t r i e s through e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , democracy, h u m a n rights, and education. It seeks to take

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away the reasons for war by building a peaceful society. Structural prevention tends to be more long-term and proactive rather than short-term and reactive. The focus on prevention of violent conflict emerged around the same time as the debates on human security and humanitarian intervention. All were efforts to respond to the apparent failures by the international community to adequately respond to the g e n o c i d e s in R w a n d a and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. Those who advocate prevention usually emphasize addressing the root causes of impending conflict. Prevention activities such as diplomacy, community efforts, and state diplomacy are not new, of course, but the framing of prevention activities and prevention as a discipline or practice are new, as is the increased attention on prevention in international security issues. Over the past decade, the study and advocacy of prevention of violent conflict has gained momentum. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2002 report on the prevention of armed conflict calls for a shift from "the culture of reaction to a culture of prevention" (Annan 2002). This echoes the opening of the UN Charter: "We the peoples of the UN, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Governments and civil society (the latter u s u a l l y i n c l u d i n g n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s but sometimes the business or private sector as well) are also involved in this shift. Several governments, such as Sweden, have developed policies for the prevention of violent conflict. The United Kingdom has created conflict prevention "pools" to bring together the knowledge and resources of different government entities. The UN Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) , the World Bank, and other development agencies are exploring m e t h o d s of integrating conflict prevention into their program work. Civil society is forming networks to improve its role in conflict prevention, seeking to connect with governments and the UN. There are a number of opportunities and advantages to prevention as a paradigm for dealing with security challenges today. First, prevention is one of the few approaches that examines the root causes of violence, rather than simply responding to it. In this way, prevention has the advantage of being more sustainable than other approaches, which often just lead to a temporary cessation in the cycle of violent conflict. Second, a shift from reaction to prevention may mean that many lives can be saved and that m a n y v a l u a b l e r e s o u r c e s can be r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d h u m a n n e e d s . K o f i A n n a n ' s report on the prevention of armed conflict estimated that the international community spent about $200 billion on the major interventions in the 1990s (including B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a , Somalia, R w a n d a , Haiti, the P e r s i a n G u l f , C a m b o d i a , and El S a l v a d o r ; e x c l u d i n g East T i m o r and Kosovo). By calculating the cost differentials between these conflict management activities and potential preventive action, the report concluded that

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the preventive approach would have saved the international community almost $130 billion (Annan 2002: 1-2). Third, prevention as a paradigm relates to small local conflicts as well as large international ones. This is a strength because in a globalized world, local conflicts almost always have important regional ramifications. Local turmoil, even in far corners of the world, affects not just the immediate area in which it occurs, but the interests of the major powers as well. Fourth, prevention looks at the role not only of the UN and national governments, but also of civil society, and strives for greater collaboration between them in responding to global security threats. T h e most f r e q u e n t l y cited challenge for prevention is not a lack of early warning or ways of effectively responding so much as it is a lack of political will on the part of nation-states. It is difficult to get all the relevant actors to support prevention initiatives, especially in an international system where the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention are so deeply engrained. Many smaller countries, particularly in the developing world, guard these principles closely, fearing that any downgrading of state sovereignty will place them in a vulnerable position that opens them further to the interference of major powers. As a paradigm that requires early intervention to stop violent conflict from breaking out, prevention is interventionist and therefore difficult for all states to support. A second c h a l l e n g e for prevention is financial. While we live in a world where military spending worldwide is immense, finding the money to support initiatives for preventing violent conflict is difficult. A third and related challenge for prevention is that success is very hard to measure. Proving a "negative" is difficult, and donors are often unwilling to release m o n e y for e f f o r t s that are so intangible. Former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated (in reference to the UN headquarters in New York City): " N o one will ever know how many conflicts have been prevented or limited through contacts which have taken place in the famous glass mansion, which can become fairly opaque when necessary" (UN 1988b: 7-8). A fourth c h a l l e n g e for prevention lies in providing evidence that a violent conflict is imminent when making a case for nonmilitary intervention. A r g u m e n t s f o r p r e v e n t i o n as well as a r g u m e n t s f o r p r e e m p t i v e attacks require credible early warning through good intelligence gathering. The failure to find W M D in Iraq raised the bar for all types of future intervention, and may m a k e the international community reluctant to support them. In s u m , the c h a l l e n g e of p r e v e n t i o n today lies in its a p p l i c a t i o n . Predicting where violent conflicts will erupt is relatively easy. What is lacking, and what m a n y are working to find, is a concerted approach to quell these conflicts before they begin, and to keep the cycle of violence in

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conflict areas from repeating itself. Taking prevention of violent conflict from belief to action is the challenge, and the UN, many governments, and civil society organizations are working to overcome this challenge. While the obstacles to prevention are real, it offers the opportunity for an integrated approach that can decrease the human and economic costs of conflict and increase global security. Bruce Jentleson, director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University, calls preventive action a "pay now or pay later" proposition, like changing the oil in your car before the engine seizes up. "Prevention is possible, difficult, and necessary" (USIP 2003).

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Conclusion

Current security threats differ from those of the past. Terrorism, though not new, is appearing in different and more dangerous forms. While it is a global security issue that demands a response, the increased focus on terrorism brought on by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the war on terror may dangerously shift focus away from security threats such as genocide, civil wars, and SALWs. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, in the wake of the Cold War and the first Gulf War, it was possible to argue that the use of unilateral, unauthorized warfare had become illegitimate. This view was soon challenged by the traumas of Bosnia, Rwanda, and East Timor, where genocidal war crimes were seen to be committed with impunity. The international community was challenged to intervene earlier, militarily if necessary, unilaterally if need be, to prevent abuses f r o m occurring. A growing number of states began to argue the necessity of humanitarian intervention in situations where national governments were unable or unwilling to protect their own people and where massive abuses of human rights were occurring. While proponents of such intervention argued for the legal and moral right of countries, critics were concerned that long-established views on the rights to sovereignty and nonintervention enshrined in the UN Charter could be overridden.

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Discussion Questions 1. 2. 3. 4.

What is the best way for countries to deal with global terrorism? Is global terrorism likely to become more pervasive in the future? Should terrorism be the highest priority for global security? Do you support the move from state security to human security? Why or why not?

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5. S h o u l d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y f o c u s its a t t e n t i o n a n d resources o n c o n f l i c t prevention? 6. D o y o u think the shift toward human security, preemptive military strikes, and c o n f l i c t prevention will continue?

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Suggested Readings

Annan, Kofi (2002) Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2002 Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. New York: United Nations. Boulden, Jane, and Thomas George Weiss (2004) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. B o u t r o s - G h a l i , B o u t r o s ( 1 9 9 5 ) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy. Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping. Second edition. New York: United Nations. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1998) Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. New York: Carnegie Corporation. G l o b a l A c t i o n ( 2 0 0 3 ) Global Action to Prevent War. A v a i l a b l e o n l i n e at http://www.globalactionpw.org (November 22). Hamburg, David A. (2002) No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield. Quaker United Nations Office website, http://www.quno.org. Sriram, Chandra Lekha, and Karin Wermester (2003) From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Bculder: Lynne Rienner. White House (2002) National Security Strategy of the United States. Available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

PART 2 .

The Global Economy

6 Free Trade vs. Protectionism: Values and Controversies Bruce E. Moon

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nternational trade is often treated purely as an economic matter that can and should be divorced from politics. This is a mistake, because trade not only shapes our economy but also determines the kind of world in which we live. The far-reaching consequences of trade pose fundamental choices for all of us. Citizens must understand those consequences before judging the inherently controversial issues that arise over trade policy. More than that, we cannot even make sound consumer decisions without weighing carefully the consequences of our own behavior.

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T h e Case for Trade

T h e i n d i v i d u a l m o t i v e s that generate international trade are f a m i l i a r . Consumers seek to buy foreign products that are better or cheaper than d o m e s t i c o n e s in o r d e r to i m p r o v e their m a t e r i a l standard of l i v i n g . Producers sell their products abroad to increase their profit and wealth. M o s t p o l i c y m a k e r s b e l i e v e that governments should also w e l c o m e trade because it provides benefits for the nation and the global economy as well as for the individual. Exports produce jobs for workers, profits for corporations, and r e v e n u e s that can be used to purchase imports. Imports increase the welfare (well-being) of citizens because they can acquire more f o r their m o n e y as w e l l as obtain products that are not a v a i l a b l e f r o m domestic sources. The stronger economy that f o l l o w s can fuel increasing power and prestige for the nation as a whole. Further, the resultant interdependence and shared prosperity among countries may strengthen global cooperation and maintain international peace.

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Considerable historical evidence supports the view that trade improves productivity, consumption, and therefore material standard of living (Moon 1998). Trade successes have generated spurts of national growth, most notably in East Asia. The global economy has grown most rapidly during periods of trade expansion, especially after World War II, and has slowed when trade levels have fallen, especially during the Great Depression of the 1930s. P e r i o d s of international p e a c e have also c o i n c i d e d with tradeinduced growth, while war has followed declines in trade and prosperity. However, recent evidence casts doubt on whether trade has had such positive effects, especially among poor countries, during the era of globalization, when trade levels exploded. A World Bank report that the median per capita growth of developing countries has been 0.0 percent since 1980 suggests that trade expansion may be considerably more beneficial for developed nations than for poorer ones (Easterly 1999). Another report establishes that inequality has grown both within and between societies, estimating that since 1980 the number of people living on an income of less than $2 a day has grown from 2.4 billion to 2.7 billion, a figure that represents more than 45 percent of humankind (Chen and Ravallion 2004). Still, the private benefits of trade have led individual consumers and producers to embrace it with zeal for the past half century. As a result, trade has assumed a much greater role in almost all nations, with exports now constituting about a quarter of the economy in most countries and over half in many (World Bank 2002). Even in the United States, which is less reliant on trade than virtually any other economy in the world because of its size and diversity, the export sector is now about 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), defined as the total of goods and services produced in a given year. Since World War II, most governments have encouraged and promoted this growth in trade levels, though they have also restrained and regulated it in a variety of ways. All but a handful of nations now rely so heavily on jobs in the export sector and on foreign products to meet domestic needs that discontinuing trade is no longer an option. To attempt it would require a vast restructuring that would entail huge economic losses and massive social change. Furthermore, according to the "liberal" trade theory accepted by most economists, governments have no compelling reason to interfere with the private markets that achieve such benefits. The reader is cautioned that the term liberalism, as used throughout this chapter, refers to liberal e c o n o m i c theory that o p p o s e s government interference with the market and is not to be confused with the ambiguous way the term liberal is applied in U.S. politics, where it often means the opposite. From its roots in the work of Scottish political economist Adam Smith ( 1 7 2 3 - 1 7 9 0 ) and English economist David Ricardo (1772-1823), this liberal perspective has e m p h a s i z e d that international trade can b e n e f i t all

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nations simultaneously, without requiring governmental involvement ( S m i t h 1910). A c c o r d i n g to R i c a r d o ' s t h e o r y of comparative advantage ( 1 9 8 1 ) , n o n a t i o n n e e d lose in o r d e r f o r a n o t h e r to w i n , b e c a u s e t r a d e allows total global production to rise. T h e key to creating these gains f r o m trade is the efficient allocation of resources, w h e r e b y each nation specializes in the production of g o o d s in which it has a c o m p a r a t i v e advantage. For e x a m p l e , a nation with especially fertile f a r m l a n d and a f a v o r a b l e climate can p r o d u c e food much m o r e cheaply than a country that lacks this c o m p a r a t i v e advantage. If it were to trade its e x c e s s food production to a nation with efficient m a n u f a c t u r i n g facilities for clothing production, both nations w o u l d be better off, b e c a u s e trade allows e a c h to apply its resources to their most efficient use. No action by g o v e r n m e n t s is required to bring about this trade, however, since profit-motivated investors will see to it that producers specialize in the g o o d s in which they h a v e a c o m p a r a t i v e advantage, and c o n s u m e r s will naturally purchase the best or cheapest products. T h u s , liberal theory concludes that international trade c o n d u c t e d by private actors free of g o v e r n m e n t control will m a x i m i z e global welfare.

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Challenges t o the Liberal Faith in Trade

T h o u g h trade levels have grown massively in the t w o centuries since A d a m Smith, n o g o v e r n m e n t has f o l l o w e d the advice of liberal e c o n o m i c theorists to r e f r a i n f r o m interfering with trade altogether. T h a t is b e c a u s e g o v e r n m e n t s also have been influenced by a dissenting b o d y of thought k n o w n as mercantilism, which originated with the trade policy of E u r o p e a n nations, especially E n g l a n d , f r o m the sixteenth century to the m i d d l e of the nineteenth. W h i l e mercantilists do not o p p o s e trade, they do hold that g o v e r n m e n t s must regulate it in order for trade to a d v a n c e various aspects of the national interest. T h e a s p i r a t i o n s of m e r c a n t i l i s t s g o b e y o n d the i m m e d i a t e c o n s u m p t i o n g a i n s e m p h a s i z e d b y l i b e r a l s , to i n c l u d e l o n g - t e r m g r o w t h , national self-sufficiency, the vitality of key industries, and a p o w e r f u l state in f o r e i g n policy. B e c a u s e m o s t states accept the m e r c a n t i l i s t c o n v i c t i o n that trade has negative as well as positive c o n s e q u e n c e s , they try to m a n a g e it in a fashion that will m i n i m i z e its most severe costs yet also capture the b e n e f i t s claimed f o r it by liberal theory. It is a fine line to walk. In particular, m e r c a n t i l i s t s o b s e r v e that the rosy e v a l u a t i o n of trade a d v a n c e d by S m i t h and R i c a r d o was predicated on their e x p e c t a t i o n that a n y g i v e n n a t i o n ' s i m p o r t s w o u l d m o r e o r l e s s b a l a n c e its e x p o r t s . H o w e v e r , w h e n a nation's imports are greater than its e x p o r t s — m e a n i n g that it b u y s m o r e f r o m other n a t i o n s than it sells to t h e m — m e r c a n t i l i s t s warn that this "trade deficit" carries with it potential dangers that m a y not

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be readily apparent. On its face, a trade deficit appears as the proverbial free lunch: if a nation's imports are greater than its exports, it follows that national consumption must exceed its production. One might ask how anyone could object to an arrangement that allows a nation to consume more than it produces. The answer lies in recognizing that such a situation has negative consequences in the present and, especially, dangerously adverse repercussions in the future. For example, the United States has run a substantial trade deficit for three d e c a d e s , with imports surpassing exports by over $665 billion in 2004. That trade deficit allowed U.S. citizens to enjoy a standard of living more than $2,300 per person higher than would otherwise be possible. But mercantilists observe that these excess imports permit foreigners to obtain employment and profits from production that might otherwise benefit U.S. citizens. For example, since the U.S. trade deficit began to bloom in the 1970s, the massive sales of Japanese cars in the United States have transferred millions of jobs out of the U.S. economy, accounting for high levels of unemployment in Detroit and low levels of unemployment in Tokyo. Corporate profits and government tax revenues also accrue abroad rather than at home. H o w e v e r , the l o n g e r - t e r m impact of t r a d e d e f i c i t s p r o d u c e s e v e n greater anxiety. Simply put, trade deficits generate a form of indebtedness. Just as individuals cannot continue to spend more than they earn without eventually suffering detrimental consequences, the liabilities created by trade deficits threaten a nation's future. Unfortunately, the consequences of trade imbalances cannot be evaluated easily because they trigger complex and unpredictable flows of money, including some that occur years after the trade deficit itself. To understand this point, consider that the trade deficit of the United States means that more money flows out of the U.S. economy in the form of d o l l a r s to pay f o r i m p o r t s than f l o w s b a c k into the U.S. e c o n o m y through p a y m e n t s f o r U.S. g o o d s p u r c h a s e d by foreigners. T h e consequences of the trade deficit depend in large part on what happens to those excess dollars, which would appear to be piling up abroad. In fact, some of these dollars are, literally, piling up abroad. Of the $450 billion of U.S. currency in circulation, about $300 billion is held outside the United States. However, this cash held abroad is a mere drop in the bucket, a little over 10 percent of the $2.5 trillion that has flowed out of the U.S. to pay for the excess of imports over exports since 1985. That year— the last time that A m e r i c a n s o w n e d more assets abroad than f o r e i g n e r s owned of U.S. assets—marked the transformation of the United States from a net creditor nation to a debtor nation. Almost 90 percent of that $2.5 trillion has already found its way back into the U.S. economy, as loans to Americans and purchases of U.S. financial assets. For example, the U.S.

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Treasury has borrowed $ 5 5 0 billion from foreigners by selling them U.S. Treasury bonds. Not only must this debt be repaid someday, but foreigners now receive more than $ 7 0 billion in interest payments annually from the U.S. federal government. U.S. businesses owe foreigners another $1.9 trillion as the result of the sale o f corporate bonds. About $ 1 . 5 trillion in stocks—about 10 percent of outstanding U.S. equities—are owned by foreigners. Such capital flows can offset a trade deficit temporarily and render it harmless in the short run, but they create future liabilities that only postpone the inevitable need to balance production and consumption. T h e United States is being sold to foreigners piece by piece to finance a trade deficit that continues to grow. Economists disagree about whether these developments ought to raise alarm. After all, the willingness of foreigners to invest in the United States and to lend money to Americans surely is an indication o f confidence in the strength of the U.S. economy. More generally, as Chapter 7 shows, capital flows can be beneficial to the economy and its future. Indeed, foreign capital is an essential ingredient to development in many third world countries. Whether capital inflows produce effects that are, on balance, positive or negative, depends heavily on the source of the capital, the terms on which it is acquired, the uses to which it is put, and the unpredictable future behavior of foreign lenders and investors. For example, should foreigners decide to use their $ 3 0 0 billion holdings in U . S . currency to purchase U.S. goods, the result could be catastrophic: the increased demand for U.S. products would bid up prices and unleash massive inflation. Alternatively, should they try to exchange those dollars for other currencies, the increased volume of dollars available in currency markets would constitute excess supply that could trigger a violent collapse of the external value of the dollar. If owners of U.S. treasury certificates sell their dollar-denominated holdings and invest in euro- or yen-denominated assets, U.S. interest rates would rise and the dollar would plummet. It is unlikely that any of these scenarios will occur suddenly—as they did in Mexico, Argentina, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea in recent years—but over time the excess supply of dollars is bound to erode the value of the dollar more gradually. No one can predict the timing or severity of this decline, but it has been long under way already: the dollar was once equivalent to 3 6 0 Japanese yen, but traded at just over 100 yen in early 2 0 0 5 . The dollar declined by more than a third in just four years, from 1.18 euros in 2 0 0 0 to under 0 . 7 5 euros by the beginning of 2 0 0 5 . As the purchasing power of the dollar continues to decline, the prices paid by Americans for foreign products, services, and investment assets increase. The net worth o f Americans declines. Thus, a trade deficit provides immediate benefits but also risks reducing the standard o f living for future generations. A m e r i c a n s who have

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g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d to c o n s u m i n g far m o r e than they p r o d u c e will be forced to c o n s u m e f a r less. B e c a u s e t h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s are u n c e r t a i n , n a t i o n s vary s o m e w h a t in their tolerance for trade deficits, but most try to minimize or avoid t h e m altogether, as counseled by mercantilists.

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Options in Trade Policy

To achieve their desired trade balance, nations o f t e n c o m b i n e t w o m e r c a n tilist a p p r o a c h e s . T h e y m a y e m p h a s i z e the e x p a n s i o n of e x p o r t s through a strategy k n o w n as industrial policy. M o r e c o m m o n l y , they e m p h a s i z e minim i z i n g i m p o r t s , a s t a n c e k n o w n g e n e r a l l y as protectionism (Fallows 1993). P r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e m a n y f o r m s of i m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n designed to limit the purchase of g o o d s f r o m abroad. All allow domestic i m p o r t - c o m p e t i n g industries to capture a larger share of the market and, in the process, to earn higher profits and to e m p l o y m o r e w o r k e r s at higher wages. T h e most traditional barriers are taxes on imports called tariffs or i m p o r t d u t i e s , but they are n o longer the m a i n f o r m of p r o t e c t i o n i s m in most countries. In fact, declining f r o m their peak in the 1930s, tariff levels throughout the world are n o w generally very low. In the United States, the average tariff rate reached a m o d e r n high of 59 percent in 1932 under what has been c a l l e d " a r e m a r k a b l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e tariff l a w , " the S m o o t - H a w l e y A c t , which has been widely credited with triggering a spiral of restrictions by o t h e r n a t i o n s t h a t h e l p e d p l u n g e the g l o b a l e c o n o m y i n t o t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n of the 1930s. T h e average rate in the United States was reduced to 25 percent after World War II and declined to about 2 percent a f t e r the U r u g u a y R o u n d of trade negotiations (discussed in greater detail later in the chapter) c o n c l u d e d in 1994. Most other countries h a v e f o l l o w e d s u i t — a n d s o m e h a v e reduced rates even m o r e — s o that a v e r a g e rates a b o v e 10 percent are n o w quite rare. H o w e v e r , in place of tariffs, g o v e r n m e n t s have r e s p o n d e d to the pleas of industries threatened by f o r e i g n competition with a variety of nontariff barriers ( N T B s ) , especially voluntary export restraints ( V E R s ) . In the most f a m o u s c a s e of V E R s , J a p a n e s e a u t o m a k e r s " v o l u n t a r i l y " a g r e e d to limit e x p o r t s t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s in 1981. ( H a d J a p a n r e f u s e d , a q u o t a that would h a v e been m o r e d a m a g i n g to J a p a n e s e a u t o m a k e r s w o u l d have been imposed.) A f a v o r a b l e trade balance also can be sought through an industrial policy that p r o m o t e s exports. T h e simplest technique is a direct export subsidy, in which the g o v e r n m e n t pays a d o m e s t i c f i r m for each good exported, so

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that it can compete with foreign firms that otherwise would have a cost advantage. Such a policy has at least three motivations. First, by increasing production in the chosen industry, it reduces the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate. Second, by enabling firms to gain a greater share of foreign markets, it gives them greater leverage to increase prices (and profits) in the future. Third, increasing exports will improve the balance of trade and avoid the problems of trade deficits. Liberals are by no means indifferent to the dangers of trade deficits, but they argue that most mercantilist cures are worse than the disease. When mercantilist policies affect prices, they automatically create winners and losers and in the process engender political controversies. For example, to raise the revenue to pay for a subsidy, the domestic consumer has to pay higher taxes. As noted above, protectionism also harms the consumer by raising prices even while it benefits domestic firms that compete against imports.

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T h e Multiple Consequences ofTrade

As nations choose among policy options, they must acknowledge liberal theory's contention that free trade allows the market to efficiently allocate r e s o u r c e s and t h u s to m a x i m i z e g l o b a l and n a t i o n a l c o n s u m p t i o n . Nonetheless, governments almost universally restrict trade, at least to some degree. That is because governments seek many other outcomes from trade as well—full employment, long-term growth, economic stability, social harmony, power, security, and friendly foreign relations—yet discover that these desirable outcomes are frequently incompatible with one another. Because free trade may achieve some goals but undermine others, governments that fail to heed the advice of economic theory need not be judged ignorant or corrupt. Instead, they recognize a governmental responsibility to cope with all of trade's consequences, not only those addressed by liberal trade theory. For example, while trade affects the prices of individual products, global markets also influence which individuals and nations accumulate wealth and political power. Trade determines who will be employed and at what wage. It determines what natural resources will be used and at what environmental cost. It shapes opportunities and constraints in foreign policy. Because trade affects such a broad range of social outcomes, conflict among alternative goals and values is inevitable. As a result, both individuals and governments must face dilemmas that involve the multiple consequences of trade, the multiple goals of national policy, and the multiple values that compete for dominance in shaping behavior (Moon 2000).

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T h e Distributional Effects of Trade, or W h o W i n s , W h o Loses? Many of these d i l e m m a s stem f r o m the sizable e f f e c t that international trade has on the distribution of i n c o m e and wealth a m o n g individuals, groups, and nations. Simply put, some gain material benefits f r o m trade while others lose. T h u s , to c h o o s e one trade policy and reject others is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a choice of one i n c o m e distribution over another. As a result, trade is inevitably politicized: each group pressures its government to adopt a trade policy from which it expects to benefit. The most visible distributional effects occur because trade policy often protects or promotes one industry or sector of the economy at the expense of others. For example, in response to pleas from the U.S. steel industry, President George W. Bush imposed a temporary 30 percent tariff on various types of imported steel in March 2002. Because the import tax effectively added 30 percent to the price of steel imports, the U.S. steel industry could benefit from this protection against foreign competition by increasing its share of the market, by raising its own prices, or by some combination of the two. A larger market share and/or higher prices would certainly increase the profits of U.S. steel firms, which would benefit steel executives and stockholders, and perhaps permit higher levels of e m p l o y m e n t and wage rates, which would benefit steel workers. Steel producers argued that the respite from foreign competition brought idled mills back on line and kept teetering plants f r o m shutting down, resurrecting 16,000 steel jobs. Distributional effects are often regional as well as sectoral. The entire economy of steel-producing areas would be boosted by the tariff because steel companies would purchase more goods from their suppliers, executives and workers would purchase more products, and the multiplier effect w o u l d s p r e a d t h e g a i n s in j o b s a n d p r o f i t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e r e g i o n a l economies where the steel industry is concentrated—Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. In fact, critics contended (and White House officials only halfheartedly denied) that the main purpose of the tariffs was to boost the president's reelection prospects in those key electoral states. H o w e v e r , these gains represent only one side of the distributional effect, because there are losers as well as winners. For example, by making f o r e i g n - p r o d u c e d steel more e x p e n s i v e , the tariffs also h a r m d o m e s t i c automakers, w h o must pay higher prices for the steel they use. Indeed, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a u t o - p r o d u c i n g states like M i c h i g a n and T e n n e s s e e d e n o u n c e d the t a r i f f s . T h e p r e s i d e n t ' s o w n e c o n o m i c a d v i s e r s , led by Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, also opposed the tariffs, bolstered by liberal theory's contention that the total losses would outweigh the total benefits. A report by the International Trade Commission estimated the cost to industries that consume steel at more than $680 million per year. A study backed by steel-using companies concluded that higher steel prices had

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cost the country about 200,000 manufacturing jobs, many of which went to China, where Chinese steel remained cheap. This episode illustrates that most barriers to trade harm consumers because of higher prices, a point always emphasized by proponents of free trade. Trade policy also benefits some classes at the expense of others, a point more often emphasized by those who favor greater governmental control. For example, the elimination of trade barriers between the United States and Mexico under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) forces some U.S. manufacturing workers into direct competition with Mexican workers, who earn a markedly lower wage. Since NAFTA guarantees that imports can enter the United States without tariffs, some U.S. businesses move to Mexico, where production costs are lower, and U.S. workers lose their jobs in the process. Facing the threat of such production shifts, many more U.S. workers will accept a decline in wages, benefits, or working conditions. The losses from such wage competition will be greatest for unskilled workers in high-wage countries employed in industries that can move either their products or their production facilities most easily across national boundaries. But they also affect skilled workers in industries like steel and autos. Others, particularly more affluent professionals who face less direct competition from abroad (such as doctors, lawyers, and university professors), stand to gain from trade because it lowers prices on the goods they consume. Of course, the greatest beneficiaries are the owners of businesses that profit from lower wage rates and expanded markets. Proponents of free trade tend to de-emphasize these distributional effects and instead focus on the impact of trade on the economy as a whole. That is partly because liberal theory contends that free trade does not decrease employment but only shifts it from an inefficient sector to one in which a nation has a comparative advantage. For example, U.S. workers losing their jobs to Mexican imports should eventually find employment in industries that export to Mexico. Proponents of free trade insist that it is far better to tolerate these "transition costs"—the short-term dislocations and distributional effects—than to protect an inefficient industry. Workers are not so sure, especially because "short-term" effects seem to last a lot longer to those who actually live through them, and because future prospects rarely compensate for present losses when security, stability, and peace of mind are factored in. Because these distributional consequences have such obvious political implications, the state is also much more attentive to them than are economic theorists. That is one reason why all governments control trade to one degree or another. Of course, that does not mean that they do so wisely or fairly, in part because their decisions are shaped by patterns of representation among the constituencies whose material interests are affected by

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trade policy. In general, w o r k e r s tend to be underrepresented, which is why trade policies so o f t e n e n c o u r a g e trade built on low wages that enrich business o w n e r s but constrain the opportunities for workers. M o r e o v e r , as the discussion of trade deficits has indicated, the e c o n o m i c activities shaped by trade policies tend to affect current generations very differently f r o m f u t u r e o n e s — a n d the latter are seldom represented at all.

T h e Values D i l e m m a T h e s e distributional e f f e c t s pose c h a l l e n g i n g trade-offs a m o n g c o m p e t i n g values. For e x a m p l e , the e f f e c t s of N A F T A were predicted to include somewhat lower prices for U.S. c o n s u m e r s but also j o b loss or w a g e reduction for s o m e unskilled U.S. workers. T h e positions taken on this issue by most individuals, h o w e v e r , did not hinge on their own material interests; f e w could confidently f o r e s e e any personal impact of N A F T A , since the gains were estimated at well under 1 percent of GDP, and j o b losses were not expected to exceed a f e w hundred thousand in a labor force of more than 100 m i l l i o n . H o w e v e r , the c h o i c e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g values w a s p l a i n : N A F T A meant gains in wealth but also greater inequality and insecurity for workers. S o m e citizens acceded to the j u d g m e n t of liberal theory that the country as a whole would be better off with freer trade, while others identified with the plight of workers, w h o were more skeptical of liberal theory simply because for them the stakes were so m u c h higher. A f t e r all, it is easy for a theorist to postulate that j o b losses in an import-competing industry would be matched by j o b gains in an exporting firm, but it is far harder for a worker w h o has devoted his life to one career to pack up and m o v e to a strange town, h o p e f u l that he might find a j o b that requires skills he m a y not possess in an u n f a m i l i a r industry. In the final analysis, N A F T A b e c a m e a r e f e r e n d u m on what kind of society people wished to live in. T h e decision w a s q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y A m e r i c a n : o n e of g r e a t e r w e a l t h but a l s o g r e a t e r inequality and insecurity. Other nations, which assess the trade-off b e t w e e n values differently, might have c h o s e n an alternative policy toward trade. Of c o u r s e , d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e f f e c t s g a v e rise to other v a l u e c h o i c e s as well. Since the gains f r o m N A F T A were expected to be greater for M e x i c o t h a n f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the c o n s c i e n t i o u s citizen w o u l d a l s o w e i g h w h e t h e r it is better to help M e x i c a n workers because they are poorer or to protect U.S. workers because they are U.S. citizens. As C h a p t e r 8 implies, such issues of inequality in poor societies can translate directly into questions of life or death. A s a result, the importance of trade policy, which has such a p o w e r f u l impact on the distribution of gains and losses, is heightened in poor, d e p e n d e n t nations w h e r e half of the e c o n o m y is related to trade. Perhaps the m o s t c h a l l e n g i n g value trade-offs concern the trade poli-

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cies that shift gains and losses f r o m one time period to another. Such "intergenerational" effects arise from a variety of trade issues. For example, as discussed earlier, the U.S. trade deficit, like any form of debt, represents an immediate increase in consumption but a postponement of its costs. The Japanese industrial policy of export promotion fosters a trade surplus, which produces the opposite effect in Japan. The subsidies the Japanese government pays to Japanese exporters require Japanese citizens to pay both higher prices and higher taxes. However, the sacrifices of Japan's current generation may benefit future ones if this subsidy eventually transforms an "infant industry" into a powerful enterprise that can repay the subsidies through cheaper prices or greater employment. The values dilemma encompasses much more than just an alternative angle on distributional effects, however (Polanyi 1944). The debate over "competitiveness," which began with the efforts by U.S. businesses to lower their production costs in order to compete with foreign firms, illustrates how trade considerations may imply a compromise of other societal values. Companies could lower their costs if the abolition of seniority systems or age and gender discrimination laws allowed them to terminate employees at will. But that would leave workers vulnerable to the whim of a boss. Labor costs would be reduced if the minimum wage and workplace safety regulations were cut, if collective bargaining and labor unions were outlawed, and if pensions, health care, paid vacations and holidays, sick leave, and workers' compensation for accidents were eliminated. But such actions entail a compromise with fundamental values about the kind of society in which people want to live. Government regulations that protect the environment, promote equality and social harmony, and achieve justice and security may add to production costs, but surely achieving economic interests is not worth abandoning all other values. Choosing between them is always difficult for a society, because reasonable people can differ in the priority they ascribe to alternative values. Still, agreements on such matters can usually be forged within societies, in part because values tend to be broadly, if not universally, shared. Unfortunately, trade forces firms burdened by these value choices to compete with firms operating in countries that may not share them. This situation creates a dilemma for consumers, forcing them to balance economic interests against other values. For example, continuing to trade with nations that permit shabby treatment of workers—or even outright human rights abuses—poses a painful moral choice, not least because goods from such countries are often cheaper. As Chapter 4 documents, foreign governments have often declared their opposition to human rights abuses but have seldom supported their rhetoric with actions that effectively curtailed the practice. In fact, maintaining normative standards has fallen to consumers, who must unwittingly answer key questions daily: Should we purchase

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cheap foreign goods like clothing and textiles even though they may have been made with child labor—or even slave labor? Of course, we seldom know the conditions under which these products were produced—or even where they were produced—so we ask government to adopt policies to support principles we cannot personally defend with our own consumer behavior. Where values are concerned, of course, we cannot expect everyone to agree with the choices we might make. As Chapter 11 describes, child labor remains a key source of comparative advantage for many countries in several industries prominent in international trade. We cannot expect them to give up easily a practice that is a major component of their domestic economy and that is more offensive to us than to them. Unfortunately, if trade competitors do not share our values, it may prove difficult to maintain these values ourselves—unless we restrict trade, accept trade deficits, or design state policies to alleviate the most dire consequences. After all, it is hard to see how U.S. textile producers can compete with the sweatshops of Asia without creating sweatshops in New York. That point inevitably animates a complex debate over whether eliminating sweatshops would really benefit the poor, a dilemma of international trade that cannot be avoided merely by refusing to think about it. Foreign Policy Considerations: Power and Peace Some of the most challenging value choices concern the effect of trade on the foreign policy goals pursued by states, especially power, peace, and national autonomy. Policymakers have long been aware that trade has two deep, if contradictory, effects on national security. On the one hand, trade contributes to national prosperity, which increases national p o w e r and enhances security. On the other hand, it has the same effect on a nation's trade partner, which could become a political or even military rival. The resulting ambivalent attitude is torn between the vision of states cooperating for economic gain and the recognition that they also use trade to compete for political power. While a market perspective sees neighboring nations as potential customers, the state must also see them as potential enemies. As a result, the state not only must consider the absolute gains it receives from trade but also must weigh those gains in relative terms, perhaps even avoiding trade that would be more advantageous to its potential enemies than to itself. For this reason, states are attentive to the distribution of the gains from trade and selective about their trade partners, frequently encouraging trade with some nations and banning it with others. While understandable, such policies sometimes lead to open conflict. In fact, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull,

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contended that bitter trade rivalries were the chief cause of World War I and a substantial contributor to the outbreak of World War II. Both were precipitated by discriminatory trade policies in which different quotas or duties were imposed on the products of different nations. Hull, who believed that free multilateral trade would build bridges rather than create chasms between peoples and nations, thus championed the nondiscrimination principle and urged the creation of international institutions that would govern trade in accordance with it. Moreover, the Great Depression of the 1930s made it plain that international institutions are required to establish the rules of trade and create the international law that embodies them. In response, the United States sponsored the Bretton Woods trade and monetary regime centered on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since 1946, GATT, which evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, has convened eight major negotiating sessions (referred to as "rounds") in which nations exchange reductions in trade barriers. This bargaining is necessary to overcome the inclination of most nations to retain their own trade barriers while hoping other countries will lower theirs. The World Bank supports the effort by lending money to nations that might otherwise seek trade-limiting solutions to their financial problems. The IMF facilitates trade by providing a stable monetary system that permits the easy exchange of national currencies and the adjustment of trade imbalances. The result has been a dramatic increase in global trade. In between negotiating rounds, the GATT/WTO dispute resolution mechanism has provided a forum for diverting the inevitable skirmishes over trade into the legal arena rather than the military realm. Such was the case with the controversial steel tariffs introduced by President Bush in March 2002. This episode demonstrated that if mercantilist policies are controversial in the nations that enact them, they are met with even greater hostility by the nations with which they trade. Immediately after the steel tariffs were announced, the European Union (EU) lodged a complaint with the WTO. It pointed out that the White House based its tariffs on the "safeguard" provision of GATT, which allows governments to provide temporary protection to industries that are overwhelmed by sudden surges of imports. The principle is that such industries must be given time to adjust to new competition. However, steel imports actually crested in 1998, and had already fallen by about 25 percent over the following four years—even before the tariffs were imposed. The EU, contending that the tariffs were unnecessary and therefore illegal, sought compensation for the damage done to its economies. Not only did the tariffs prevent European steel producers from selling in the U.S. market, but they also blocked entry into the United States by big producers in China and South Korea. These firms would naturally seek to instead dump

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their p r o d u c t s on the E u r o p e a n m a r k e t , thus d o i n g d o u b l e d a m a g e to European producers. The EU thus imposed steel tariffs similar to the U.S. ones, which spread the chaos and enlisted international support f o r the W T O case against the United States. In addition to protecting its home market, the EU initiated W T O proceedings to secure compensation in the form of reduced U.S. tariffs on other EU products, as required by GATT. In the event that no agreement on compensation could be reached, the EU asked the W T O to instead authorize retaliatory duties on selected U.S. products. Since it saw the steel tariffs as motivated by President Bush's desire to impress voters in swing states like Pennsylvania and Ohio, the EU proposed that the retaliation be directed at U.S. goods that would inflict political pain on the White House. The EU chose citrus fruit and clothing because they were produced in battleground states such as Florida and the Carolinas. In March 2003 the W T O ruled against the United States and in December President Bush removed the tariffs, though in defiance he declared that the WTO had nothing to do with the decision. At the regional level, a similar belief in the efficacy of free trade as a guarantor of peace was an important motivation for the initiative that eventually led to the creation of the E u r o p e a n U n i o n . In both the EU and Bretton Woods, policymakers saw several ways that an open and institutionalized trading system could promote peace among nations. The institutions themselves could weaken the hold of nationalism and mediate conflict b e t w e e n nations. Trade-induced contact could break d o w n nationalistic hostility among societies. Multilateralism (nondiscrimination) would tend to p r e v e n t g r i e v a n c e s f r o m d e v e l o p i n g a m o n g states. I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e could constrain armed conflict, and foster stability, while the e c o n o m i c growth generated by trade could remove the desperation that leads nations to aggression. European integration was launched in 1951 with the f o u n d i n g of the European Coal and Steel C o m m u n i t y (ECSC), which internationalized an i n d u s t r y that w a s key not only f o r t h e e c o n o m i e s of t h e six n a t i o n s involved but also for their war-making potential. With production facilities scattered a m o n g different countries, each became dependent on the others to provide both demand for the final product and part of the supply capacity. This arrangement fulfilled the liberal dream of an interdependence that would prevent war by making it economically suicidal. In fact, the E C S C was an innovative form of peace treaty, designed, in the words of Robert Schuman, to " m a k e it plain that any war between France and G e r m a n y b e c o m e s , not merely unthinkable, but materially i m p o s s i b l e " ( P o m f r e t 1988: 75). The most recent step to encourage E u r o p e a n trade was the creation of a new regional currency, the euro, to replace national currencies in 2001.

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Institutional efforts to secure global peace require the exercise of power. According to hegemonic stability theory, one dominant nation—a hegemon—will usually have to subsidize the organizational costs and frequently offer side benefits in exchange for cooperation, such as the massive infusion of foreign aid provided to Europe by the United States under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. Maintaining the capability to handle these leadership requirements entails substantial costs. For example, U.S. expenditures for defense, which have been many times higher than those of nations with whom it has competed since World War II, erode the competitiveness of U.S. business by requiring higher tax levels; they constrain the funds available to spend on other items that could enhance competitiveness; and they divert a substantial share of U.S. scientific and technological expertise into military innovation and away from commercial areas. The trade-off between competitiveness and defense may be judged differently by different individuals, but it can be ignored by none. International C o o p e r a t i o n and National A u t o n o m y International institutions may be necessary to facilitate trade and to alleviate the conflict that inevitably surrounds it, but they can also create conflict. Institutions require hegemonic leadership, but many critics complain that the United States benefits so much from its capacity to dictate the rules under which institutions operate that they have become extensions of U.S. imperialism. Institutions seek to maintain fair competition among firms in different countries—which is essential to the international trading system— but they must also do so without undermining the national sovereignty and autonomy that are central to the modern state system. Trade disputes test the capacity of institutions to balance these imperatives, because one nation will often defend its policy as a rightful exercise of national sovereignty, while another challenges it as an unfair barrier to trade. Since governments have many compelling motives for enacting policies that affect trade, clashes of values often appear as struggles over the rightful boundaries of sovereignty. Such disagreements can be settled by appeal to GATT or, more recently, to the WTO, but not even the WTO's chief sponsor, the United States, accepts the dominion of the WTO without serious reservations about its intrusion into affairs historically reserved for national governments. Indeed, even though the U.S. administration strongly supported the creation of the WTO to prevent trade violations by other nations, a surprising variety of U.S. groups opposed its ratification because it might encroach on U.S. sovereignty. Environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club were joined not only by con-

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sumer advocates like Ralph Nader but also by conservatives such as Ross Perot, Pat B u c h a n a n , and Jesse H e l m s , w h o feared that a W T O panel could rule that various U.S. government policies constituted unfair trade practices, even though they were designed to pursue values utterly unrelated to trade. For e x a m p l e , EU automakers have challenged the U.S. law that establishes standards for auto emissions and fuel economy. Buchanan said, " W T O m e a n s putting A m e r i c a ' s trade under f o r e i g n b u r e a u c r a t s who will meet in secret to d e m a n d changes in United States laws. . . . W T O tramples all over American sovereignty and states' rights" (Dodge 1994: ID). Because the W T O could not force a change in U.S. law, GATT director-general Peter Sutherland called this position "errant n o n s e n s e " (Tumulty 1994), but the W T O could i m p o s e sanctions or a u t h o r i z e an o f f e n d e d nation to withdraw trade concessions as c o m p e n s a t i o n for the injury. T h e m o s t d r a m a t i c e x a m p l e o c c u r r e d in the 1994 c a s e k n o w n as "GATTzilla versus Flipper," in which a GATT tribunal ruled in favor of a complaint brought by the EU on behalf of European processors who buy tuna from countries that use purse seine nets. The United States boycotts tuna caught in that manner because the procedure also kills large numbers of dolphins; but this value is not universally shared by other nations. In fact, the GATT tribunal ruled that the U.S. law was an illegal barrier to trade because it discriminates against the fishing fleets of nations that use this technique. The United States saw this as an unwarranted intrusion into its domestic affairs and an affront to U.S. values. Soon thereafter the United States found itself on the other side of the clash between fair competition and national sovereignty when it appealed to the W T O to rule that the E U ' s prohibition of beef containing growth h o r m o n e s v i o l a t e d t h e " n a t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t " p r i n c i p l e c o n t a i n e d in G A T T ' s Article 3. Since almost all cattle raised in the United States are fed growth h o r m o n e s and very few European cattle are, the United States c o n t e n d e d that the E U rule w a s s i m p l y d i s g u i s e d p r o t e c t i o n i s m that unfairly discriminated against U.S. products. The EU contended that such beef was a cancer risk and that as a sovereign power it had the right to establish whatever health regulations it chose to protect its citizens. The W T O ruled in f a v o r of the United States, incurring the wrath of those who saw this as an example of national democratic processes being overruled by undemocratic global ones. Can it be long before C o l o m b i a challenges U.S. drug laws as discriminating against marijuana while favoring Canadian whiskey? Neither can regional agreements avoid this clash between fair competition in trade and national autonomy. The first trade dispute under NAFTA involved a challenge by the United States to regulations under C a n a d a ' s Fisheries Act, established to promote conservation of herring and salmon

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stocks in C a n a d a ' s P a c i f i c Coast waters. Soon thereafter the C a n a d i a n government challenged U.S. E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection A g e n c y regulations that require the phasing out of asbestos, a carcinogen no longer permitted as a building material in the United States ( C a v a n a u g h et al. 1992). Similarly, critics of the E U worry that its leveling of the playing field f o r trade c o m p e t i t i o n also threatens to level cultural and political d i f f e r ences a m o n g nations. D e n m a r k , for e x a m p l e , f o u n d that f r e e trade m a d e it impossible to maintain a sales tax rate higher than n e i g h b o r i n g G e r m a n y ' s , because Danish citizens could simply e v a d e the tax by purchasing g o o d s in G e r m a n y and bringing t h e m across the border duty free. C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s pressures also m a k e it difficult for a nation to adopt policies that impose costs on business when low trade barriers force f i r m s to c o m p e t e with those in other countries that d o not bear such burdens. For e x a m p l e , French f i r m s d e m a n d a level playing field in c o m p e t i n g with Spanish f i r m s w h e n e v e r the French g o v e r n m e n t m a n d a t e s e m p l o y e e benefits, health and safety rules, or e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n s m o r e costly than those in Spain. In fact, f r e e trade tends to h a r m o n i z e m a n y national policies. S o m e trade barriers are d e s i g n e d to protect u n i q u e a s p e c t s of the e c o n o m i c , social, and political life of nations, e s p e c i a l l y w h e n trade a f f e c t s cultural m a t t e r s of s y m b o l i c i m p o r t a n c e . For e x a m p l e , F r a n c e i m p o s e s limits on the p e r c e n t a g e of t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m m i n g that c a n o r i g i n a t e a b r o a d , allegedly in d e f e n s e of F r e n c h l a n g u a g e and c u s t o m . T h e o b v i o u s targets of these restrictions, U.S. p r o d u c e r s of m o v i e s and y o u t h - o r i e n t e d music, c o n t e n d that the F r e n c h are simply protecting their o w n i n e f f i c i e n t e n t e r t a i n m e n t industry. T h e y argue that p r o g r a m m i n g d e s e r v e s the s a m e legal protection a b r o a d that the f o r e i g n television sets and D V D p l a y e r s that display these i m a g e s r e c e i v e in the U n i t e d States. But if w e restrict trade b e c a u s e w e o p p o s e child labor or rain forest d e s t r u c t i o n , h o w can w e o b j e c t w h e n other c o u n t r i e s ban the sale of U.S. p r o d u c t s b e c a u s e they violate their v a l u e s — s u c h as rock m u s i c and H o l l y w o o d f i l m s that celebrate sex, v i o l e n c e , a n d f r e e e x p r e s s i o n of c o n t r o v e r s i a l ideas or e v e n blue j e a n s , M c D o n a l d ' s h a m b u r g e r s , and o t h e r s y m b o l s of U.S. cultural domination?

Conclusion: Choices for Nations and Individuals F e w would deny the contention of liberal theory that trade permits a higher level of aggregate c o n s u m p t i o n than would be possible if c o n s u m e r s were prevented f r o m purchasing foreign products. It is hard to i m a g i n e m o d e r n life without the benefits of trade. Of course, it does not f o l l o w that trade must be utterly unrestricted, b e c a u s e the a g g r e g a t e e c o n o m i c e f f e c t tells only part of the story. A s mercantilists remind us, trade also carries with it

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important social and political implications. Trade shapes the distribution of income and wealth among individuals, affects the power of states and the relations among them, and constrains or enhances the ability of both individuals and nations to achieve goals built on other values. Thus, trade presents a dilemma for nations: no policy can avoid some of trade's negative consequences without also sacrificing some of its benefits. That is why most governments have sought to encompass elements of both liberalism and mercantilism in fashioning their trade policies. The same is true for individuals, because every day each individual must—explicitly or implicitly—assume a stance on the dilemmas identified in this chapter. In turn, trade forces individuals to consider some of the following discussion questions, questions that require normative judgments as well as a keen understanding of the empirical consequences of trade. We must always remember to ask not only what trade policy will best achieve our goals but also what our goals should be.

I

Discussion Questions 1. Are your views closer to those of a liberal or a mercantilist? 2. Is it patriotic to purchase domestic products? Why or why not? 3. Does one owe a greater obligation to domestic workers and corporations than to foreign ones? 4. Should one purchase a product that is cheap even though it was made with slave labor or by workers deprived of human rights? 5. Should a country surrender some of its sovereignty in order to receive the benefits of joining the WTO? 6. Should one lobby the U.S. government to restrict the sales of U.S. forestry products abroad because these products compromise the environment?

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Suggested Readings

Chen, Shaohua, and Martin Ravallion ( 2 0 0 4 ) "How Have the World's Poorest Fared S i n c e the E a r l y 1 9 8 0 s ? " W o r l d B a n k P o l i c y R e s e a r c h W o r k i n g Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. Easterly, William ( 1 9 9 9 ) "The Lost D e c a d e s : Explaining D e v e l o p i n g Countries' S t a g n a t i o n , 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 8 . " W o r l d B a n k P o l i c y R e s e a r c h W o r k i n g Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. Fallows, James ( 1 9 9 3 ) "How the World Works." Atlantic Monthly, December. M o o n , Bruce E. ( 1 9 9 8 ) "Exports, Outward-Oriented D e v e l o p m e n t , and E c o n o m i c Growth." Political Research Quarterly, March. ( 2 0 0 0 ) Dilemmas Westview.

of International

Trade.

Second edition. Boulder:

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Polanyi, Karl (1944) The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Reinhart. Ricardo, David (1981) Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo: Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Adam (1910) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: J. M. Dutton. World Bank (2002) World Development Indicators 2002. Washington, DC: World Bank.

7 International Capital Flows and Institutions Chris W. Scholl

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e live in a world of great diversity and increasing interconnectedness. One aspect of this diversity is the disparity between a handful of wealthy, economically developed states and the vast majority of states, where most of the world's population resides. These states are relatively impoverished and consequently characterized by limited economic development, weak educational systems, inefficient security, ineffectual courts, and a declining natural environment. Together these problems have led to a degree of political instability. At a basic level, what these states do not have is capital (money) to invest in the construction of a better place. We live in a world where the available capital inordinately resides in the economically developed states of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, while the poor countries, most in need of capital to invest and build their futures, have little.

Poverty in the developing world emerged as a critical concern for the global community shortly after the end of World War II. Termination of the war was quickly followed by the reality of decolonization as the devastated European powers began to shed their empires. This process led to the creation of many new states, but importantly, these were states with minimal development and extremely limited financial resources. To help these countries survive, maintain reasonable order, and provide a decent life for their citizens, it was necessary to provide financial resources for them. This chapter will look at the construction of the global financial architecture after World War II, discuss the significance of exchange rates and how their management has changed in the past sixty years, examine the importance of capital flows, then look at some significant problems with global finance (in particular the debt crisis, conditional lending and the International

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Monetary Fund [IMF], and the Asian financial crisis). The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the important global financial issues confronting states in the new millennium.

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Constructing the Global Financial Architecture of the Postwar W o r l d

As World War II was winding down, leaders of the world were already working on ways to avoid a repeat of such grand devastation. For many, it was not only the memory of the near total destruction of World War II but also the realization of how quickly it had followed the "war to end all wars," World War I. There were numerous views on the causes of the war and means to avoid them in the future. In particular, economic liberals held that the creation of international institutions would enable disparate parts of the world to communicate and better work with one another, while creating international norms of behavior that states would follow. They explicitly rejected mercantilist policies, which were followed in the 1930s, as detrimental to all. Mercantilist policies were concerned only with the advancement of their countries; it was argued that if another country increased its wealth, this threatened one's own country. Economic liberals argue that mercantilist policies are harmful for all in the long run, as witnessed by the widespread economic disaster of the Great Depression. As economies around the world weakened in the 1920s and 1930s, governments began to raise barriers to imports, with the belief that this would raise domestic production and jobs. Increasingly, countries pinched off international trade, which helped further deflate economies and accelerate the downward economic spiral. Barriers to trade inhibited corporations from exporting products; they also raised the price of imported goods. The net effect was a decline in production and an increase in the cost and variety of goods. Mercantilist policies were a clear movement away from a global economy based on rules and norms to one based on power and individual self-interest. Though often popular in economically struggling times, this kind of policy has been shown to actually cause more harm than good. Liberal economic philosophy focuses more on the benefits of trade and creating an open global market. The belief is that a lack of government intervention and elimination of barriers to trade and capital flows will lead to a growing global economy that will benefit all, not just one state. This line of reasoning led to the creation of two significant international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to help integrate, develop, and manage this global economy. There were at least four core reasons for the creation of an integrated global economy maintained and nourished by these two institutions: a belief that war and

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e c o n o m i c s w e r e interrelated, a necessity for capital f o r d e v e l o p m e n t , the importance of creating a global e c o n o m y , and a requirement f o r stable currencies to rebuild a global e c o n o m y .

W a r and Economics Poor p e o p l e with deplorable living c o n d i t i o n s and little hope f o r the f u t u r e are o f t e n s u s c e p t i b l e to d e s p e r a t e acts, e i t h e r by t h e m s e l v e s or by their leaders. A c c o r d i n g to this line of thought, the radical foreign policy m e a s ures taken by the G e r m a n s , Italians, and J a p a n e s e in the 1930s and 1940s were a result of the poverty thrust upon t h e m by war reparations, depression, and a d e c l i n e in international trade and restrictions f r o m importing vital goods. A corollary to this reasoning is that even in d e m o c r a c i e s people often turn to radical leaders w h e n times are tough. T h u s a cornerstone to creating a m o r e peaceful world entailed creating a wealthier world, and a world in which that wealth was more evenly distributed. This w a s certainly not a n e w idea. F o r n e a r l y 2 0 0 y e a r s , i n d i v i d u a l s f r o m A d a m S m i t h to David Mitrany have been a d v o c a t i n g the importance of international develo p m e n t and trade for reasons of both peace and e c o n o m i c prosperity. W h a t m a d e 1944 different was that world leaders were working together to create a financial structure that would p r o m o t e and e n a b l e this vision to b e c o m e a reality. As noted above, t w o important international organizations were created to serve as the conduits through which capital and technical assistance would f l o w to the needy corners of the world: the World Bank G r o u p (consisting of five associated agencies, one of which, the International Bank for R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and D e v e l o p m e n t [IBRD], w a s the original institution, and is usually r e f e r r e d to as simply the "World B a n k " ) and the International M o n e t a r y Fund.

Necessity of Capital F o r a n y k i n d of d e v e l o p m e n t to t a k e p l a c e in a n y c o u n t r y , c a p i t a l is r e q u i r e d . To build the factories, s c h o o l s , roads, ports, p o w e r plants, and o t h e r f o u n d a t i o n s of a h e a l t h y e c o n o m y , large q u a n t i t i e s of c a p i t a l are n e e d e d . A f t e r W o r l d War II m a n y c o u n t r i e s w e r e e i t h e r b a n k r u p t f r o m f i g h t i n g the war, had b e e n e c o n o m i c a l l y d e s t r o y e d by the war, or w e r e recently independent f o r m e r colonies; all lacked capital. To help the world o v e r c o m e this capital shortage, the World B a n k would f u n n e l capital to the n e e d y regions of the world. T h e m o n e y was not given a w a y but loaned at b e l o w - m a r k e t interest rates. T h e f i n a n c i a l b u r d e n w a s then shared by all states in the world (all for o n e and o n e for all). This d i f f e r s greatly f r o m an o l d e r world v i e w of mercantilism policies (or b e g g a r - t h y - n e i g h b o r policies) that e m p h a s i z e s self-interest and c o n c e r n only f o r the e c o n o m y of o n e ' s o w n state. Again, the postwar period s h o w e d a c o n s e n s u s in the West on the

The Global Economy basic p r e m i s e of liberal e c o n o m i c s : All will do better if e v e r y o n e is participating. Consequently, w e should help those without capital, not necessarily for s o m e humanitarian or moral reason, but for o n e ' s own e c o n o m i c wellbeing. This necessity for capital w a s especially acute in the f o r m e r colonies. T h e y were brought to i n d e p e n d e n c e after World War II but o f t e n had very little e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ; their easily accessible r e s o u r c e s had b e e n stripped away by the f o r m e r colonial power, and they were just relearning h o w to govern t h e m s e l v e s . This region b e c a m e known as the South, or the developing world, referring to the poor states spread across Latin A m e r i c a , A f r i c a , and Asia. T h e w e a l t h y c o u n t r i e s of North A m e r i c a , E u r o p e , a n d Japan h a v e been referred to as the North, or the developed world, thus creating a N o r t h - S o u t h global divide. T h e Southern c o u n t r i e s are g e n e r a l l y states that are extremely poor; h a v e limited economies, m o s t l y p r o d u c i n g primary products (e.g., f o o d s t u f f s and raw materials) for sale in the North; and have large population growth. Per capita gross domestic product ( G D P ) in the North is $ 2 9 , 2 7 0 while in the South it is $1,101; rates of literacy in the South are half as high as those in the North (World Bank 2004).

Benefits of a Global Economy A global e c o n o m y is one w h e r e corporations and individuals can buy and sell goods to or f r o m a n y w h e r e in the world. Such an e c o n o m y was d e e m e d i m p o r t a n t f o r a c o u p l e of r e a s o n s . F r o m a m o r e e t h i c a l v i e w p o i n t , the thinking was that as w e interact with other countries and cultures, we build a greater tolerance for d i f f e r e n c e s and increasingly view o u r s e l v e s as part of the s a m e g r o u p . T h u s , w h e n d i f f e r e n c e s arise w e are m o r e willing to negotiate rather than g o to war. Trade binds us together and w a r m a y economically hurt us m o r e than it helps us. At a more practical level, a global e c o n o m y binds us together through markets. For instance, it does not pay to g o to w a r a n d b o m b the f a c t o r i e s that s u p p l y y o u r c o m p u t e r m o n i t o r s . Additionally, c o r p o r a t i o n s can increase profits as they sell g o o d s not only to their o w n n a t i o n a l s but also to p e o p l e f r o m all o v e r the w o r l d . T h u s peace and prosperity w e r e seen as benefits created by a global e c o n o m y . L o a n s and d e v e l o p m e n t projects of the World Bank were m a d e to e n h a n c e the ability of p o o r states to participate in the market place (a m a r k e t is any place w h e r e b u y e r s and sellers of g o o d s can meet, in t o d a y ' s world this can be m o s t anyplace on earth), while loans f r o m the I M F are intended to stabilize markets and currencies and thus foster trust and trade.

Stable Currencies Not only is capital necessary to create e c o n o m i c growth and a global e c o n omy, but stable currencies are also. E a c h state has its own c u r r e n c y (with

International Capital Flows and Institutions

the recent exception of the European Union, in which all member states have adopted the euro) and these are valued differently against other currencies in the world. Currencies can be bought and sold and their values fluctuate according to the rules of supply and demand, which affect the prices of other goods like gasoline. Extreme volatility in currencies hinders trade, since businesses are less willing to risk buying and selling goods in another state where the exchange rate could change overnight. Such a situation would lead to great uncertainty and tremendous economic losses. The initial plan after World War II was to create an international standard whereby all currencies were valued according to the U.S. dollar; and the U.S. dollar was valued at $35 to an ounce of gold. The act of "tying" the U.S. dollar to gold made it a "hard" currency, truly as good as gold. Anyone holding dollars knew exactly what their value was and could exchange them for gold, which brings confidence and stability to a paper currency. This system of stable exchange rates was known as the Bretton Woods system. Such a system is called a fixed exchange rate system since the value of currencies does not change and is fixed to a particular value, in this case the U.S. dollar and gold. The U.S. dollar was chosen because after the war the United States was the only country in the world relatively untouched and consequently had a healthy, vibrant economy and relatively huge financial resources. Most of the rest of the world was poor and had their economies devastated by years of intense warfare. Tying all currencies to the dollar and ultimately to gold was a means of creating trust in the monetary system, which would hopefully encourage trade and global economic interactions.

S

Exchange Rates:The Bretton W o o d s System to Fluctuating C u r r e n c i e s

As explained above, free-flowing capital was seen as a central component to building a global economy by the planners at Bretton Woods. This system was devised so currencies would be fully convertible, meaning they could be changed into any other currency. This was important so people and businesses from one state could easily buy or sell goods from another. Fixed rates between these currencies were also considered vital to limit volatility and to build confidence. If countries became too indebted, they could borrow from a fund composed of "dues" paid by all member states of the IMF. By 1947 it became clear that the economic devastation of World War II was greater than anticipated and the only really convertible currency in the world was the U.S. dollar. The trouble with using the dollar as an international currency was that there were too few dollars in the world. After the war the United States was the leading manufacturing country.

The Global

Economy

Consequently, the rest of the world was buying U.S. goods. This meant capital flowed into the United States, but little capital flowed out to other parts of the world. If this structure was not changed, eventually other states would not have the financial resources to buy U.S. goods, let alone invest in their own reconstruction. To improve the international financial system, the United States worked to move dollars out of the country and into the global market through enacting aid programs like the Marshall Plan, joining international organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and establishing military bases around the world. All these activities increased the flow of capital back out into the global economy. What resulted f r o m these c h a n g e s was a financial system managed more by the United States than the IMF, due to the confidence in and power of the U.S. dollar. H o w e v e r , by 1960 this all began to c h a n g e , as the European and J a p a n e s e e c o n o m i e s had been rebuilt and were g r o w i n g . Also, foreign holdings of dollars surpassed U.S. gold reserves for the first time in 1960. In essence, this meant that if everyone wanted to exchange their dollars for gold, there would not be enough gold to go around. From this time on the United States was still a major player but needed the cooperation of other large economies to help regulate the global financial system. By the late 1960s, global financial integration was growing faster than any form of management of the system. National banks were starting to establish international branches. More and more currencies were traded overseas, and multinational corporations were moving vast quantities of capital a r o u n d the w o r l d . T h e s e activities were generally taking place beyond the area of g o v e r n a n c e by states or international organizations. Finally, in 1971 the United States experienced its first trade deficit since World War II and President Richard Nixon removed the United States from the gold standard. Temporary chaos ensued in the global currency markets. Resulting f r o m this c h a o s was the end of fixed exchange rates and the beginning of floating exchange rates. In this kind of system, each currency's value changes daily according to the real and perceived strength of its economies, relative to other currencies. For instance, in January 1995 it took 5.6 Mexican pesos to buy 1 U.S. dollar; in October 2004, it took 11.4 Mexican pesos to buy 1 U.S. dollar. In practical terms, this means that any imports from the United States have essentially doubled in price for people in Mexico. T h e f r e e floating of currencies, deregulation of markets around the world, and an increase in technology began to create an international financial system that was larger than any one state could control. The role of the I M F once again came into prominence in helping states maintain financial stability in this fast-moving global market. The institution began to play more of the role originally envisioned for it in the 1940s. Today, the finan-

International

Capital Flows and Institutions

cial flows are thirty times greater than global trade flows. The changing global financial system has had an enormous impact on the poor, developing states. By the 1980s, developing states had accrued extremely high levels of debt. With currencies fluctuating, it was easy for a state to develop a negative balance of payments (balance of payments is simply the total capital f l o w s into and out of a c o u n t r y ) . If a currency d e v a l u e s and trade remains the same, the country will be spending more on imports and earning less on exports. To make matters worse, most imports need to be purchased with a hard currency (money that can be easily converted throughout the w o r l d ) , and w h e n a state r u n s out of this hard c u r r e n c y it is essentially b a n k r u p t and u n a b l e to i m p o r t any g o o d s . T h i s n e g a t i v e l y impacts both the b a n k r u p t country and the others that were selling its goods. This is where the IMF steps in, to assist states from entering this severe situation or to help them out if they do (see discussion of the Asian financial crisis below).

Creating Capital Flows As n o t e d a b o v e , a g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m w h e r e c u r r e n c i e s c a n be e x c h a n g e d is a v i t a l s t e p t o w a r d c r e a t i n g a s t a b l e , v i t a l e c o n o m y . Developing states face obstacles here because they have what is known as "soft currency." The reality of currency exchange is not as simple for poor states as with states of the North, because there is a significant difference between hard and soft currencies. Hard currencies are easily convertible most anywhere in the world because they are backed by strong economies. Typically these include the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the euro, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen. Most currencies from the states of the South are considered to be soft. Their values are volatile and the prospect of them losing value is high. Consequently, most businesses and states will not accept soft currency. In general, states of the South need to acquire hard currency so they can pay for their imports and also pay off their debt to Northern banks. Therefore, the dilemma for developing states is twofold: it is not only that the states of the South need to acquire capital, but also that this capital must be in the form of hard currency. There are four basic ways for states to acquire capital: trade, foreign investment, foreign aid, and loans. To create a global economic system that all can participate in and benefit from requires the construction of a system where money flows around the world, lubricating the economic engines of all and allowing investments where they are most needed. A developed economy generally relies on the first two of these methods for acquiring c a p i t a l : t r a d e and f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t . To v a r y i n g d e g r e e s , t h e s e f o u r options are available to the South; however, each has inherent obstacles.

The Global Economy

Trade Issues concerning trade are discussed in Chapter 6 and thus will not be extensively covered here. However, there are a few points that are very applicable to capital flows. First, often the states of the South are producing only basic commodities like sugar, bananas, or cocoa, and these are often commodities that have multiple suppliers; thus the financial gains are usually minimal since the prices for primary products in the world market are generally low. Second, many states of the South have not been actively engaged in the global trading network. This is not to say that they are isolated from the global economy, but more generally that their trading relationships are undeveloped and deal primarily with their former colonial power and exist in those items they traditionally produced in colonial times. To branch out into new customers and different goods is important. Consequently, they have to expend resources to enter the global market, including building a transportation infrastructure, engaging in marketing, and making business contacts. Unfortunately, diversifying away from primary products into manufactured goods and improving infrastructure require the very capital that they do not have. Furthermore, they are unable to build up capital because the manufactured goods they need to buy from other states always cost more than the raw materials they sell (negative terms of trade).

Foreign Investment There are two forms that foreign investment usually takes, foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign portfolio investment (FPI). FDI is the more traditional of the two and has a long history, stretching back to at least the 1800s. FDI entails private corporations or individuals building a company in another country. Businesses that have operations in several different countries are usually referred to as multinational corporations (MNCs), or transnational corporations. These large businesses, employing hundreds of thousands of workers and often headquartered in the North, possess vast economic and technological resources, and their investment decisions can drastically influence the economic environment of a small country. MNCs like Exxon Mobil, General Motors, British Petroleum, and Ford have more wealth than most countries in the world. It is important to note that these important economic players are privately owned and thus their decisions are not controlled by states. M N C s invest heavily in the North. W e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e s are the Japanese Honda Corporation building an assembly plant in Ohio or the Dell Computer Corporation manufacturing computers in Ireland. This brings investment and jobs into these countries. Foreign direct investment in the South has grown tremendously in the past several decades, from around $3.5 billion in 1970 to $8.4 billion in 1980, $36.9 billion in 1990, and $246 billion in 2000 (UNCTAD 2004b).

International

Capital Flows and

Institutions

FDI has since dropped, to around $162 billion in 2002. This is generally a positive development, but must be tempered by several crucial points. M N C s have been extensively criticized, especially for their role in the South. They are sometimes viewed as exploiting developing countries, their citizens, and the environment. Workers are often paid extremely low wages and forced to work long hours in deplorable conditions. Meanwhile, environmental regulations are often nonexistent or not enforced, so heavy pollution of the air and water ensues. M N C s will often transfer the most labor intensive and pollution-producing aspects of their business to these countries. The benefit of new jobs and investment must be weighed against the physical, social, and environmental costs that are paid by the South. Despite these drawbacks, the South is eager to obtain FDI. However, the South must compete with the North as a "host" for FDI, and the North is very attractive. Countries of the South usually lack the educated and specifically trained work force needed for manufacturing. Remember, until recently much of the population was undereducated and making a living through manual labor. The transition to new skills takes time and money to train and educate the work force. Additionally, as mentioned above, many underdeveloped countries lack the sufficient infrastructure to support manufacturing facilities. This could include advanced sea ports, airports, highways, or rail lines to bring in the raw materials and export the finished goods. There is also a need for power, housing, a stable banking system, and a system to provide security for the investment. In many developing states, all or some of these elements are missing. Consequently, as a percentage of global FDI, the proportion going to the South has remained around 20 percent for the past couple of decades, which means 80 percent of FDI is invested in the North. Nearly 73 percent of the F D I in d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s g o e s to only ten c o u n t r i e s : M e x i c o , Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Poland, India, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Gilpin 2000). In fact, the fifty poorest countries received only 1.4 percent of FDI in 1990 and 1.4 percent in 2000 ( U N C T A D 2004b). In sum, there is significant investment in developing states, but this investment is limited to a small number of states and is still nothing close to the tremendous flows that occur annually in the North. Foreign portfolio investment is a newer p h e n o m e n o n and represents investments in stocks, bonds, and currency markets. This has only occurred since states began to lift investment controls that hindered or prevented foreigners f r o m investing in these areas. Indeed, FPI is a characteristic of increasing globalization. One measure of this growth is the daily movement of currencies globally. Investors seeking to purchase securities in foreign markets require foreign currency. Table 7.1 shows the tremendous growth in the daily transactions of currencies. By contrast, the value of global trade in 2002 was about $8 billion for the entire year.

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Table 7.1

Economy

G l o b a l C u r r e n c y Flows o n a Daily A v e r a g e Year 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004

U.S.$ billions 590 820 1190 1490 1200 1880

Source: BIS ( B a n k f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e t t l e m e n t s ) , Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in April 2004, 2004, available online at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx04.pdf.

Once again, the vast m a j o r i t y of this type of financial f l o w occurs among developed states. When developing states receive FPI, it can also sometimes cause turmoil in their markets (such as the Asian financial crisis). The difficulties mentioned above regarding trade and FDI have historically left the developing states of the South with only two significantly viable options in acquiring capital: aid and borrowing.

Foreign Aid Foreign aid usually refers to official development assistance ( O D A ) and can take the form of bilateral O D A (from one country to another) or multilateral O D A (from a group of countries or from an international organization to a developing country). Table 7.2 shows the trends in aid f r o m the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1960. The O E C D comprises the wealthiest countries in the world and represent the majority of O D A . The organization has grown over time to represent the current twenty-two states. The United States is the single largest provider of O D A in absolute terms, but is the smallest in terms of percentage of G N P given. Table 7.3 shows a comparison of total O D A against O D A as a percentage of GNP. Even with these levels of aid, several obstacles to development arise. Foreign aid often comes with strings attached. For instance, the majority of assistance f r o m the United States and other aid-providing states is called "tied aid." This type of aid comes with restrictions on how it can be spent. In particular, tied aid restricts the recipient to using the money only for purchases f r o m the lending state. In other words, the majority of the capital flows back into the lending state through purchases of technology, materials, or machinery. The developing state then does not receive the benefits of capital staying within its borders or the benefits of being able to purchase the best product for the project, and yet the state must pay back the aid

International

Table 7.2

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H i s t o r i c a l T r e n d s in Official D e v e l o p m e n t A s s i s t a n c e ( U . S . $ m i l l i o n s )

Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands N e w Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

1960

1970

1980

1990 a

2000

59 0 101 65 5 823 224

212 11 120 337 59 7 735 599

667 178 595 1,075 481 111 2,889 3,567

995 168 889 2,470 1,171 846 7,163 6,320

—

—

—

—

77 105

147 458

987 440 820 1,744 1,664 371 4,105 5,030 226 234 1,376 1,350 123 3,135 113 1,264 271 1,195 1,799 890 4,501 9,955

—

—

—

35 —

5 — —

7 4 407 2,760

196 14 37 — —

117 30 482 3.153

—

30 683 3,353 5 1,630 72 486 4 162 962 253 1,854 7,138

—

57 3,395 9,069 25 2,538 95 1,205 142 965 2,007 750 2,638 11,394

Source: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Development Statistics, 2004, available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385.xls. Notes: — indicates that the state was not a member of the O E C D at the time, a. 1990 is an exceptional year because these numbers include debt forgiveness (see section on the debt crisis).

since most of it is offered in the form of loans and not grants. The critical point is that development cannot occur without capital. If capital is flowing immediately back to the North, the utility of the aid is minimized significantly. Bilateral ODA also can take on a political dimension. Aid is not always provided to the states most in need, but instead often to those states where the lender has some interest. For instance, Israel and Egypt are typically the largest recipients of U.S. bilateral ODA. These two states alone received almost $2 billion of U.S. aid in 2002 while all of sub-Saharan Africa received about $1 billion. Clearly there is more than need, and the effort to help provide capital for development, dictating these decisions. Loans Another traditional means of acquiring capital is borrowing. As a family may borrow money from a bank to make a large investment such as buying a house, countries also borrow money from private banks. This became a

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Table 7.3

N e t Development Assistance from Development Assistance C o m m i t t e e ( D A C ) Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Organizations, 2003

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

ODA, U.S.S Millions

ODA, as a Percentage of GNP

1,237 503 1,887 2,209 1.747 556 7,337 6,694 356 510 2,393 8.911 189 4,059 169 2,043 298 2,030 2.100 1.297 6.166 15.791

0.25 0.20 0.61 0.26 0.84 0.34 0.41 0.28 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.20 0.80 0.81 0.23 0.92 0.21 0.25 0.70 0.38 0.34 0.14

Source: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Development Statistics, 2004, available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385.xls.

very popular way to bring capital into developing countries in the 1970s and is discussed in the next section, on the debt crisis. In addition to private banks, multilateral loans are provided by a variety of international financial institutions, including regional development banks and the O E C D . However, by far the largest lenders in this arena are the IMF and the World Bank. Both of these institutions have been deeply involved in creating the economic world we have lived in for nearly sixty years. They have loaned billions of dollars to most of the nations of the world for reasons ranging f r o m keeping currencies afloat, to p r o v i d i n g technical assistance, to building roads and establishing schools in poor rural communities. Both of these institutions have tremendous economic power, reach, and intellectual capital. The World Bank is the single largest source of development aid and is an important supporter of projects designed to attract other forms of development f u n d s f r o m other multilateral lending agencies, states, or private

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123

sources. As a result of its size and expertise, many development agencies, countries, and private banks and corporations wait to invest until the Bank has provided its approval for a project. Consequently, it is a critical actor in international economics and international development. In 2003 the World Bank loaned $18.5 billion to ninety-two countries, which was spread out over 240 different projects ranging from improving secondary education in Tanzania, to enabling greater access to the health system in Brazil, to a highway construction grant for China. Similarly, the I M F provides a "stamp of approval" for many states' e c o n o m i c policy by e x a m i n i n g their e c o n o m i c situation and publishing reports accordingly. If the I M F withholds funds or observes improper economic management, then most other sources of lending, whether private c o r p o r a t i o n s , states, or multilateral institutions, will w i t h h o l d or limit loans. The IMF currently has loans of over $107 billion outstanding in the world. The goals of each organization is to create financial stability within the m e m b e r states of the institution, which currently number 184. Together, these two institutions are vital to the maintenance of the global economy because they have tremendous financial resources—greater than any individual state—provide technical assistance on financial and development issues, provide a plethora of data on global economic and social issues, and s e r v e as i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u r v e y o r s of f i s c a l and d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s throughout the world. Regardless of these important functions, both institutions also have a significant list of critics due to some controversial policies (see the section below on conditional lending). Now we turn to the debt crisis, which illustrates some of the d r a w b a c k s of gaining capital through loans.

•

Debt Crisis

Before the 1970s, developing states had little private debt, since they were not seen as d e s i r a b l e i n v e s t m e n t l o c a t i o n s by the b a n k s in the N o r t h . However, everything changed as financial regulations opened up, modest e c o n o m i c g r o w t h o c c u r r e d in d e v e l o p i n g states, and m e m b e r s of the O r g a n i z a t i o n of P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s ( O P E C ) d r a m a t i c a l l y raised oil prices in what is known as the first oil crisis. The oil-rich countries then placed a significant amount of their newfound wealth in private Western banks. These banks, flush with capital, invested in the developing countries, which were desperate for capital. As a result, private financial institution lending grew to $6.5 billion in 1973 and rose to $19.5 billion by 1978 and $35.7 billion by 1981 (IMF 1983). Trouble occurred between 1979 and 1981 as the seismic shifts in the

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global economic landscape heavily impacted developing states. The second oil crisis, in 1979, dramatically increased the cost of oil, which hurt developed economies due to their heavy oil-dependence. Developing states (that did not produce oil) were hit even harder, since they were less able to handle the increased cost of imported oil. The increases in price also precipitated a recession in the developed states, which meant consumers purchased fewer and fewer goods from the South. As demand dwindled, the price of primary products dropped. Finally, interest rates increased as the United States tried to lower its inflation rate. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the interest rates the South was paying on its debt. The impact of these events was dramatic. The trade deficit of developing countries increased from $22.2 billion in 1979 to $91.6 billion in 1981, and interest payments on debt increased from $24.3 billion to $41.8 billion over the same period (Spero and Hart 2002). Total debt from private financial institutions reached $293 billion by 1981. By 1982, interest payments exceeded new lending, which meant the South was becoming an exporter of capital instead of an importer. Countries like Mexico and Brazil were approaching $100 billion in debt. By 1982 they were increasingly unable to make interest payments on the debt, and their governments began to speak of the possibility of defaulting on their payments. The level of lending from private U.S. banks was also so high that there was a fear that these institutions would collapse if the Latin American states defaulted on their debt payments. To resolve this situation a combination of writing off some of the debt and providing new loans with more favorable interest rates was negotiated. This plan was known as the Baker Plan. The belief was that at least some of the debt could then be repaid, as opposed to none. Though briefly slowing down the level of indebtedness in the South, by the 1990s debt levels were once again increasing. Currently, the South is over $2 trillion in debt, and this amount keeps growing larger every year. Interest payments alone on this debt were over $92 billion in 2003 (IMF 2004). Some supporters of the South question the legitimacy of this debt. One argument for debt forgiveness maintains that nondemocratic governments, which did not always invest wisely in development projects, did much of the initial borrowing. Sometimes these leaders used the money to accrue vast personal wealth while, as in Zaire and the Philippines, the United States looked the other way. Cold War interests trumped everything else. Today people in these states are economically crippled by actions that had nothing to do with them. Resulting from these high levels of debt, lenders, in particular the IMF, began to place "conditions" on additional loans to these heavily indebted countries.

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Conditional Lending M a s s i v e developing-country debts are a concern to the South as well as to the North. In the North, if the b a n k s are not paid back, this can have a negative e f f e c t on the entire e c o n o m y . T h e r e f o r e , the N o r t h has an inherent interest in h e l p i n g the S o u t h recover. ( A d d i t i o n a l l y , a f i n a n c i a l l y s o u n d South can purchase m o r e exports f r o m the North.) In an effort to help the S o u t h , n e w loans h a v e been g i v e n , m o s t of w h i c h c o m e f r o m the IMF. H o w e v e r , the new l o a n s — o f t e n referred to as structural a d j u s t m e n t loans ( S A L s ) , or the broader structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s ( S A P s ) — h a v e certain conditions attached in order to increase the S o u t h ' s c h a n c e s of paying them back. T h e conditions placed on b o r r o w i n g states primarily revolve around structurally adjusting their e c o n o m i c policies to m i m i c those practiced in the North. Typically these conditions include cuts in g o v e r n m e n t spending, including support for education, health, housing, and water; removal of import controls; devaluation of currencies; and privatization of industry and services. T h e s e m e a s u r e s stem f r o m what is k n o w n as the " W a s h i n g t o n C o n s e n s u s " — t h e idea that f r e e - m a r k e t capitalism based on the U.S. model is the best way to achieve d e v e l o p m e n t . C r i t i c s c h a r g e that the e c o n o m i c a n d social p r o b l e m s in the S o u t h o f t e n vary greatly f r o m t h o s e of the d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , and t h e r e f o r e the s a m e a d j u s t m e n t p o l i c i e s s h o u l d not be a p p l i e d to the S o u t h . O t h e r critics point to the practical e f f e c t s of S A P s , w h i c h lead to rising prices and increased poverty. As a result, the S A P s create a h e a v y b u r d e n on the poor, w h o did not create the f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s in the first place. By privatizing b u s i n e s s e s and o p e n i n g up the f i n a n c i a l sectors of these states, the h o p e was that g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d spend less, e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p w o u l d rise, and the c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t p l a c e would lead the e c o n o m y to a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e . H o w e v e r , this w o r k e d better in t h e o r y than in p r a c t i c e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y what o f t e n h a p p e n s , at least in the short t e r m , is that political instability o f t e n e n s u e s , as those most a f f e c t e d (usually the p o o r ) turn to protest or violence. O n e of the first states to u n d e r t a k e such a S A P w a s M o r o c c o in the early 1980s. As g o v e r n m e n t s u b s i d i e s w e r e cut in M a y 1981, the price of f l o u r increased 86 percent, s u g a r 97 p e r c e n t , and milk 100 p e r c e n t ( G e o r g e 1988). With vast s e g m e n t s of society existing at the level of basic survival, i n c r e a s e s in the prices of these c o m m o d i t i e s were d i s a s t r o u s . T h e p o o r and h u n g r y rioted and h u n d r e d s w e r e killed by g o v e r n m e n t security f o r c e s . A n o t h e r instance of S A P s d e s t a b i l i z i n g a c o u n t r y o c c u r r e d in 1989, w h e n V e n e z u e l a f o l l o w e d an I M F S A P r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and a l m o s t o v e r n i g h t the costs of public transportation and f o o d prices s k y r o c k e t e d ; for e x a m p l e , the price of bread increased 2 0 0 percent. T h i s led to protests and r i o t s in w h i c h 6 0 0 p e o p l e w e r e killed and 1,000 w o u n d e d . S i m i l a r

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problems were experienced in Bolivia in 1985, Zambia in 1986, Jordan in 1989, and many other developing countries. These programs are also seen as being an infringement on the sovereignty of the states. O p p o n e n t s argue that i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s should not have the right to dictate how a particular state structures its economy, tax system, food subsidies, and the like. This is part of the sovereign d o m a i n , e s p e c i a l l y b e c a u s e the c o n d i t i o n s can have such a great impact on the developing state's politics. However, these states are so poor and desperate for capital that they have no other choice than to go along with the dictates. If they do not, they will jeopardize not only loans from these institutions but most other a v e n u e s of lending as well, since the World Bank and I M F provide the "seal of approval" on a states' economic policies.

T h e I M F and the Asian Financial Crisis Free-flowing capital and high levels of debt can also lead to financial meltdowns in developing economies, which can spread like a disease in the global economy. The speed at which economic problems can be transmitted around the globe was revealed during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The IMF works to limit these negative effects by lending to countries in times of financial distress. The IMF and the World Bank are often referred to as the "lenders of last resort," meaning that countries go to them when they are unable to pay their bills. A significant aspect of the I M F strategy is that its lending assistance is provided to the central government of the m e m b e r states. In essence, the underlying objective is to create stable, well-managed economies in countries throughout the world. Stability and efficiency in all economies helps the global economy grow. The I M F also assists countries in avoiding a balance of payments crisis. As mentioned earlier, the balance of payments is simply the total capital flows into and out of a country. This includes such things as profits from exports and payments for imports, services, aid, and money f r o m foreign visitors, whether tourists, business representatives, students, or others. A state can either have a surplus or a deficit in its balance of payments. If it has a significant deficit, investors may become nervous about their investments. If such a balance of payments crisis materializes, and i n v e s t o r s begin pulling out their i n v e s t m e n t s , it can h a v e a ripple effect, inflicting e c o n o m i c hardship on n e i g h b o r i n g and interconnected economies. Living in an increasingly globalized world means that economic problems in one country can impact any other country in the world. The Asian financial crisis is a prime example of economic interdependence and the ability of economic problems in one state to spread rapidly to

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others. The problem began in Thailand in 1997 as the country became increasingly unable to support the value of its currency (baht), that is, it lacked sufficient capital reserves. As the currency dropped in value, investors pulled their money out of Thailand, which further exacerbated the situation. Not only did this hurt the Thai economy, but without trust in the value of its currency, the baht plummeted further in value, which made imports more expensive. This had a dramatic impact on the poor, who now had to pay higher prices for the necessities of life, such as food and fuel, which were imported, while their wages remained the same. The uncertainty and fear spread to other nearby markets, including Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan. This fear led to several economically negative actions. First, foreign capital in the form of FPI and future FDI was quickly pulled out of these economies (due to lack of confidence), which devastated their ability to maintain a reasonable amount of hard currency. Second, as the value of one country's currency plummeted because of the economic turmoil, it meant that its goods became cheaper to the rest of the world. To continue to compete, other states in the region were forced to lower the value of their currencies. It became a race to the bottom. Loans that were made to these states, many by private Japanese banks, were unable to be repaid, resulting in a weakening of Japan's banking system and consequently its entire economy. What made this dramatic collapse of these economies even more unanticipated was that for the previous couple of decades they had recorded some of the highest economic growth rates in the world. They were viewed by many as examples of how poor developing countries could rise and produce vibrant growing economies. The most devastating impact was felt in Indonesia, where the local currency (rupiah) fell by 80 percent of its value against the dollar in only a few months' time. In practical terms this meant that the price of most imports, and Indonesia's debt, both increased by 80 percent. This placed tremendous pressure on an already poor developing country. Indonesia also witnessed a political impact—growing protests on the streets that ultimately led to the resignation of President Suharto, who had ruled since 1968. As uncertainty spread in the financial markets, the Brazilian real and the Russian ruble also came under pressure. Both of these economies are much larger than their Asian counterparts, and the potential consequences of economic collapse in them are severe. By October 1998, with no other solution in sight to stop the contagion, the IMF stepped in with a huge lending package to help support these economies. It lent over $37 billion to the Asian states to help them buy back their currencies, pay off bad loans, purchase imports, and make the necessary changes to their economic structure so that they could avoid a similar crisis in the future (Gilpin 2000). Part of the impetus for action was the fear that the collapse could spread and would impact the financial sta-

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bility of the United States and its allies. The devastation took less than two years and started in relatively unknown Thailand, not often thought of as a global economic power. Indeed, in today's world, with economies so interlinked, trouble in one can spread like a virus to others, even if they had previously been relatively healthy economically. This type of macro-lending to central governments to stop the contagion of financial instability is a primary role of the IMF in the contemporary world. Similar loans have been made to other states since the Asian crisis. In 1998, there was fear of collapse in Russia and a n o t h e r multibillion-dollar assistance program was implemented. T h e f o l l o w i n g year, the focus moved to Brazil, and its weakening economy received a $40 billion assistance package to support and transform its economy. No single state has the financial muscle or economic expertise to attack these problems at a global level, and the inherent dangers still exist.

Conclusion As we move into a new century, the problems of an uneven distribution of capital in the global economy that were confronted by leaders constructing a post-World War II world still face us today. There have certainly been changes and progress made in some areas. However, the large debt and lack of capital in some of the poorest states of the world is a significant concern. Responding in part to a sustained campaign called Jubilee 2000—led by a variety of nongovernmental organizations and including the involvement of celebrities such as U2's Bono and actor Martin Sheen—the British government, the U.S. government, and the World Bank have held serious discussions about forgiving substantial portions of debt held by the poorest states in the world. The belief is that this debt is so high that it is hindering development in these states and having negative c o n s e q u e n c e s for the entire global community, in terms of both economics and morality. Additionally, many of these states have now become democracies, and the leaders who put them in this unenviable financial situation are out of office. Bolivia and Ethiopia are two examples of states that have received debt relief. In 1999 they had outstanding debts of $6.16 billion and $6.85 billion respectively. After relief they now have debts of $2.87 billion and $3.25 billion respectively (Jubilee2000uk 2004). Another concern is f r e e - f l o w i n g capital that can s w a m p developing states and lead to an overheating of the economy. This occurs when new money pours into an economy in which there may not be enough investments to contain it. Consequently, individuals and firms start investing in real estate and other ventures. Prices rise higher and higher due to this excess capital and can eventually lead to inflation. When there is no longer

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trust in the future growth of such an economy, investors begin to look elsewhere. This same capital can also be pulled out seemingly overnight, leading to a crash of the economy and devastation of peoples' lives, as in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Perhaps one of the most significant results of the Asian crisis is the realization that the impact of a collapse is not limited to the states or the region where it occurs. Because many people have pension f u n d s and other monies invested in countries around the world, we see that all have an interest in promoting stability. What is clear is that the only way to manage such complex financial issues is through cooperation of states. Certainly, the wealthy states of the North need to work to maintain an open global economy, but all states need to be involved in this decisionmaking process. International organizations like the I M F and the World Bank are critical in maintaining global economic stability. They also play a role in creating an economic forum to discuss and address these issues in a concerted manner.

Discussion Questions 1. Since World War II, what have the countries of the world done to try to integrate the world economy? 2. What role do international organizations and M N C s play in international financial flows? 3. H o w has the international financial system changed since the end of World War II? Are these changes positive or negative for the states of the South? 4. Should foreign aid be "tied"? Should it be increased? 5. Should developing countries have to pay their past debts if the loans were used to enrich a former dictator's personal wealth?

Suggested Readings Eichengreen, Barry (2004) Capital Flows and Crises. Cambridge: MIT Press. George, Susan (1988) A Fate Worse Than Debt. New York: Grove Press. Gilpin, Robert (2000) The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mittleman, James (2000) The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton. World Bank (2004) World Bank Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank.

8 Poverty in a Global Economy Don Reeves

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Poverty is a mother's milk drying up for lack of food, or kids too hungry to pay attention in school. Poverty is to live crowded under a piece of plastic in Calcutta, huddled in a cardboard house during a rainstorm in Sào Paulo, or homeless in Washington. D.C. Poverty is watching your child die for lack of a vaccination that would cost a few pennies or never having seen a doctor. Poverty is a job application you can't read, a poor teacher in a rundown school, or no school at all. Poverty is hawking cigarettes one at a time on jeepneys in Manila, or being locked for long hours inside a garment factory near Dhaka or in Los Angeles, or working long hours, but only when needed, on someone else's farm. Poverty is to feel powerless—without dignity or hope.

D i m e n s i o n s of Poverty

Poverty has many dimensions. Religious ascetics may choose to be poor as part of their spiritual discipline. Persons with great wealth may ignore the needs of those around them or may miss the richness and beauty of nature or great art and remain poor in spirit. But this chapter is about poverty as the involuntary lack of sufficient resources to provide or exchange for basic necessities—food, shelter, health care, clothing, education, opportunities to work and to develop the human spirit. Globally, poor people disproportionately live in Africa. The largest 131

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n u m b e r live in A s i a . A s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r are in L a t i n A m e r i c a n a n d C a r i b b e a n countries. T h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the people in several c o u n t r i e s of sub-Saharan A f r i c a and in Haiti are poor and, depending on the threshold chosen, at least one in five and perhaps as many as one-half of all p e o p l e in d e v e l o p i n g countries t o g e t h e r are poor. Figure 8.1 s h o w s the w o r l d w i d e poverty situation. But n o place on the globe is i m m u n e to poverty. T h e United States, s o m e E u r o p e a n countries, and Australia also have large blocs of p o o r people. With f e w exceptions, the incidence of poverty is higher in rural than in urban areas but is shifting toward the latter. Nearly e v e r y w h e r e , w o m e n and girls s u f f e r f r o m poverty more than men and boys; infants, y o u n g children, and elderly people are particularly vulnerable. Cultural and discriminatory causes of hunger are i m m e n s e ; the difficulties in changing long habits and practices should not be underestimated. In this chapter, I look first at w a y s in which poverty is m e a s u r e d . T h e n I look at approaches to reducing poverty in the context of a global economy, especially the relationship b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c growth and inequality. Finally, I e x a m i n e a series of policy choices developing country societies might consider as they attempt to reduce poverty.

Figure 8.1 Number and Percentage of Poor People in Developing Countries, 1981-2001

flffffMll 1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

I Number below $ l / d a y

1

- Percent below $ l / d a y

—•— Percent below $2/day

Source: World Bank, World Development

Indicators

2001

I Number below $2/day

2004 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).

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Measuring Poverty and Inequality

Poverty is not the same in the United States or Poland or Zimbabwe. It will often be described differently by supporters or critics of a particular regime. Poverty does not lend itself to an exact or universal definition. Deciding who is poor depends on who is measuring, where, and why. Poverty Thresholds Poverty is usually measured by income or consumption. The World Bank estimates poverty using two thresholds. Worldwide, about 1.1 billion people live on incomes equivalent to less than U.S.$1 per day; about 2.7 billion live on less than $2 per day (World Bank 2004). All the first group and the majority of the latter chronically lack some or all basic necessities. The rest live so close to the edge that any e m e r g e n c y — i l l n e s s , work layoff, drought—pushes them from just getting by into desperation. In the United States, poverty is defined as three times the value of a thrifty food plan devised by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, adjusted for family size—$18,660 for a family of four in 2003. Some critics say the threshold is higher than necessary, partly because certain government program benefits—such as Medicare, housing subsidies, and school meals— are not counted. But poor people themselves feel hard pressed. The thrifty food plan was worked out in the early 1960s to address short-term emergencies. Although it is adjusted annually for changes in food prices, other costs, particularly housing, have grown faster than food costs since the plan's base year (1955); so the threshold has represented a gradually declining standard of living. The selection of the poverty threshold often makes a dramatic difference in the observed poverty rate. The World Bank, based on its cutoff of $1 per person per day, estimates that in 2001, 212 million (16.6 percent) of China's total 1.3 billion people were poor. The Chinese government, using a lower cutoff point, claims that only about 50 million (4.5 percent) of its people were poor (World Bank 2004). Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product Two other widely used income measures are per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP). GDP is the value of all goods and services produced within an economy; GNP equals GDP plus or minus transfers in and out of the economy, such as profit paid to foreign investors or money sent home by citizens working abroad. (The World Bank now uses the term gross national income (GNI) instead of GNP, since transfers from abroad are not "produced" within a country's boundaries. In this chapter I use the more familiar term, GNP.)

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Among the world's economies, large and small, the World Bank counts sixty-four l o w - i n c o m e e c o n o m i e s with an annual per capita G N P f r o m $100 to $735 (2002). At the other end are fifty-six high-income economies with per capita G N P from $9,076 to $38,730. In between are eighty-nine m i d d l e - i n c o m e e c o n o m i e s with per capita i n c o m e s b e t w e e n $ 7 3 6 and $9,075 (World Bank 2004). G N P (or G D P ) provides a quick measure of the capacity of an economy overall to meet people's needs. It also represents the pool from which savings and public expenditures can be drawn. But G N P is seriously flawed as a measure of poverty or well-being, because it gives no information about the quality of the production or the distribution of income within the country. First, G N P and G D P fail to distinguish among types of economic activity. M a n u f a c t u r i n g cigarettes, m a k i n g b o m b s , and running prisons are scored as contributing to G N P or G D P the same as making autos, teaching school, building homes, or conducting scientific research. Second, many goods and services generate costs that are not reflected in their prices—polluted air from manufacturing or illness from overconsumption, for example. Third, many nurturing and creative activities—parenting, homemaking, gardening, and home food preparation—are not included because they are not bought and sold. At best, G N P and G D P figures include only estimates for food or other goods consumed by producers, unpaid family labor, and a wide range of other economic activities lumped together as the informal sector. Illegal or criminal activities, such as drug-dealing or prostitution, are generally not included in estimates but nonetheless contribute to some people's livelihood. Purchasing Power Parity G N P and G D P figures for various countries are usually compared on a currency exchange basis. In 2002 the per capita G N P in Bangladesh, at 22,000 taka, could be exchanged for U.S.$380. But 22,000 taka will buy more in Bangladesh than $380 will buy in the United States, primarily because wages there are m u c h lower. T h u s the World Bank and the United N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) have adopted a measure—purchasing power parity (PPP)—that estimates the number of dollars required to purchase comparable goods in different countries. Bangladeshi PPP is estimated at $1,848 rather than $380 (World Bank 2004). P P P estimates m a k e country-to-country c o m p a r i s o n s more accurate and realistic and somewhat narrow the apparent gap between wealthy and p o o r c o u n t r i e s . E v e n so, vast d i s p a r i t i e s r e m a i n . P P P s of $ 2 8 , 9 0 0 to $36,100 per capita, as in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, are

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forty to sixty times those of Tanzania and Ethiopia, at $580 and $780 (World Bank 2004). inequality Estimates of poverty and well-being based on estimated GDP are at best crude measures. GNP, GDP, and PPP are all measured as country averages. But because poverty is experienced at the household and individual level, the distribution of national incomes is crucial. Detailed and accurate information is necessary for targeting antipoverty efforts and particularly for assessing the consequences of policy decisions in a timely fashion. But census data as comprehensive as those for the United States are a distant dream for most poor countries. Many of them do not keep such basic records as birth registrations and may have only a guess as to the number of their citizens, let alone details about their conditions. Representative household surveys are the only viable tool for most countries for the foreseeable future. Household surveys, to be useful—especially for comparison purposes—need to be carefully designed, accurately interpreted, and usable for measuring comparable factors in different times, places, and circumstances. Private agencies, many governments, and even some international agencies are tempted to shape or interpret surveys to put themselves in the best light. Users of survey results need to be keenly aware of who conducted each survey and for what reasons. Global inequality. Globally, we accept gross income inequality. The most used measure of inequality compares the income of the richest onefifth, or quintile, of each population with that of the poorest quintile. Measured in currency exchange value, the wealthiest one-fifth of the world's people control more than 85 percent of global income. The remaining 80 percent of people share less than 15 percent of the world's income. The poorest one-fifth, about 1.2 billion people, receive barely 1 percent. The ratio between the average incomes of the top fifth and the bottom fifth of humanity is 70 to 1 (see Figure 8.2). Using purchasing power parity as a measure, the poverty gap narrows, but it is still extreme. The first-ever global survey in 2001, based on household surveys and using PPP, estimated that during the 1990s the poorest 20 percent could purchase on average about one-twelfth as much as the top 20 percent, and the ratio increased during this period. A more recent survey of 454 household studies covering nearly all the developing countries since 1975 concludes that there is no clear overall trend in comparisons based on purchasing power from 1981 to 2001 (Milanovic 2001). Review again the trend lines on Figure 8.1. The number

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Figure 8.2 D i s t r i b u t i o n of G l o b a l I n c o m e

Poorest 20%, Middle 60%, 14% o '

1 1 1

"

1 % of g l o b a l '

ine

Richcst 2 0 % , 8 5 % of global income

Source: W C S D G (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization). A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All (Geneva: 1LO. 2004).

of people living on less than $1 per day (PPP) has dropped moderately over this period, and their proportion has dropped from 39.5 percent to 21 percent. But the n u m b e r living on less than $2 per day has actually risen, although the proportion has dropped because of increasing population. Two f u r t h e r caveats are necessary. First, nearly all the gains have occurred in China throughout the period, and in India in the latter years. Without China and India, the number of extremely poor has risen, especially in Africa, but elsewhere as well. Second, the people below the $1 per day threshold are on average much worse off, again especially in Africa, but even in China and India. Meanwhile, the incomes of a very small proportion of nearly every nation's population have skyrocketed. In the study mentioned just above, Branko Milanovic (2001) estimated that the ratio between the top 5 percent and the bottom 5 percent was 114 to 1 in 1993, up from 78 to 1 in 1988 (see also U N D P 2003). Some other stunning c o m p a r i s o n s emerged from the Milanovic survey: • •

T h e r i c h e s t 1 p e r c e n t of p e o p l e in the w o r l d r e c e i v e as m u c h income as the bottom 57 percent. A U.S. citizen having the average income of the bottom U.S. decile (tenth of the population) is better off than two-thirds of the world population.

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The top 10 percent of the U.S. population has an aggregate income equal to the income of the poorest 43 percent of people in the world (25 million people compared to nearly 2 billion).

Remarking on these comparisons in 2003, the UNDP noted that since 1993, "stagnation in the poorest countries and robust growth in many of the richest imply that the [ratios] are unlikely to have improved." Inequality in the United States. Using U.S. census data, in 1980 the richest one-fifth of U.S. households received 43.7 percent of the total income, while the poorest one-fifth had 4.3 percent—a ratio of 10.2 to 1. By 2001 the ratio had widened to 14.3 to 1: the top one-fifth had 50.1 percent, the bottom one-fifth only 3.5 percent. Tax changes made between 2000 and 2004 will exacerbate this trend. Parallel to worldwide estimates, the poverty gap is widening even faster between the very top and bottom. The poorest are growing even poorer. The rich are getting much richer. The World Bank uses per capita income instead of household income to compare income shares. It found the ratio between the rich and poor quintiles' incomes in the United States to be 8.5 in 2000, the highest among industrial nations. Among other wealthy nations, the ratio ranged from 3.8 and 4.3 in Finland and Denmark up to 7.0 and 7.2 for Australia and the United Kingdom (compare with the ratios in Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Poverty I m p a c t of I n c o m e Distribution, Selected Countries, 2002 Income Ratio of Highest 20% to Lowest 20% Republic of Korea Chile Malaysia Brazil Thailand Colombia China Philippines Egypt Indonesia India Bangladesh Nigeria

16,960 9,420 8,500 7,450 6,890 6,150 4,520 4,450 3,810 3,070 2,650 1,770

800

6,699 1,554 1,870 745 2,101 830 1,062 1,202 1,638 1,289 1,179 797 176

Source: World Bank, World Development 2004).

Indicators

31,800 29,296 23,078 23,989 17,225 19,034 11,300 11,637 8,306 6,647 5,512 3,655 2,228

4.7 18.8 12.3 32.2 8.2 22.9 10.6 9.7 5.1 5.2 4.7 4.6 12.7

2004 (Washington, DC: World Bank,

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Inequality w i t h i n developing countries. A m o n g the l o w - i n c o m e countries with estimates available, the ratios between the top and bottom quintiles ranged from 4.6 for Bangladesh and 4.7 for India up to 32.2 for Brazil (World Bank 2004). Differences in income distribution make a big difference to poor people. Measured in PPP$, Brazil's per capita G D P is nearly three times India's, but the poorest 20 percent of the population in India have half again as much purchasing power. Egypt's G D P is 40 percent of Chile's, but Egypt's poor people have slightly greater purchasing power. Thailand's per capita GDP is only slightly greater than Colombia's, but Thai poor have two and a half times the purchasing power (see Table 8.1).

Direct Measures ofWeil-Being Other indicators measure well-being even more directly than income or poverty r a t e s — f o r e x a m p l e , infant or u n d e r - f i v e mortality rates, life expectancy, educational achievement, and food intake. Hunger. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates shortfalls in food consumption. The FAO has estimated that the absolute number of people in developing countries who consume too little food declined slightly over a period of two decades—from about 900 million in 1969-1971 to about 800 million in 1990-1992. For the next several years the declines stalled. Because population increased rapidly over the period, however, the proportion of hungry people in developing countries declined from about 35 percent to about 17 percent. In its most recent report, State of Food Insecurity in the World 2004, the FAO (2004) reported that the number of hungry people has actually risen slightly since 2000, to about 815 million, as increases in India and China more than offset slight gains in several other regions. The most dramatic gains in reducing hunger over the whole period were in East and Southeast Asia, most notably China, where the percentage of hungry people dropped from 41 to 12 percent and the number by two thirds—from 476 million to 152 million. Less dramatic gains by both measures were recorded in the Middle East and North Africa. The proportion declined, but the absolute number increased slightly over the period in South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. In Africa, the percentage of hungry people increased, with the number soaring from 103 to 204 million (FAO 2004) (see Figure 8.3). H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Index. The United Nations Development Programme has developed a Human Development Index (HDI), which gives equal weight to three factors: life expectancy at birth, educational

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Figure 8.3 Number of Undernourished People (millions) by Region, 2000-2002

Industrial

Latin A m e r i c a

Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), The Slate of Food Insecurity World 2004 (Rome: FAO, 2004), available online at http://www.fao.org/docrep.

in the

attainment (based on the adult literacy rate and mean years of schooling), and per capita purchasing power (UNDP 2 0 0 3 ) . People's lives can be improved if even limited resources are focused on nutritional programs, public health, and basic education. Both China and Sri Lanka, for example, have invested relatively heavily in education and health care since independence. They rank with many industrial countries in life expectancy and educational attainment. Most of the formerly communist countries invested heavily in education and health care. Some former colonies continue to build on the educational systems established during the colonial era: Vietnam, L a o s , and Madagascar (colonized by France); Tanzania, Uganda, and Burma (colonized by Britain); and the Philippines (colonized by Spain and the United States). Several Latin American countries have emphasized education more recently: Chile, Cuba, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Each of these countries rank higher on the HDI scale than other nations with a comparable per capita GDP. But sustaining such improvements requires steady or improving economic performance. Many of these same nations have suffered recent economic downturns or are in the midst o f drastic political and e c o n o m i c

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change. In the short term, at least, they are hard pressed to maintain their education and health programs. Other nations rank much lower on the HDI scale than on a per capita G D P scale. The Middle Eastern oil-rich nations rank low in both longevity and educational attainment, particularly because of the status of women in these societies. Several A f r i c a n nations have extremely low educational attainment and longevity indicators, for varied reasons. Angola and Namibia have been engulfed in long independence struggles and civil war. Botswana and Gabon, although relatively rich in natural resource income, have not devoted proportional resources to education and health care services.

E c o n o m i c G r o w t h and Poverty Reduction in a G l o b a l , K n o w l e d g e - B a s e d , M a r k e t E c o n o m y Individual, community, and national efforts to reduce poverty must be set in the context of a threefold revolution that has taken place during the past generation, transforming national markets into a truly global economy: • • •

the e v o l u t i o n of a s i n g l e w o r l d w i d e s y s t e m of p r o d u c i n g and exchanging money, goods, and services; the shift f r o m a r e s o u r c e - b a s e d e c o n o m y to a k n o w l e d g e - b a s e d economy; and the acceptance of market-based economics as conventional wisdom by most political leaders throughout the world.

The first t w o aspects of the global revolution are inextricably linked. New information, communication, and transportation technologies have dramatically changed the way many older businesses are managed (on-time delivery of manufacturing components and inventory, digital voice transcription, and automatic business-to-business transmission of orders and billing, for example). These same technologies have also spawned whole new industries (distance learning and online marketplaces). Their immense capacity to process information has enabled new scientific advances (mapping the human genome, medical and space research, cross-species bioengineering). The knowledge factor outweighs the resource factor in an increasing number of endeavors. At their peak in 1970, about 40 percent of the world lived in countries with centrally planned economies. By the turn of the twenty-first century, with a c o u p l e of m i n o r e x c e p t i o n s , these c o u n t r i e s had all i n t r o d u c e d m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d r e f o r m s . S o m e , such as C h i n a , are i n t r o d u c i n g such r e f o r m s gradually. Others, such as the Soviet Union, held on until their economies collapsed. Despite rhetoric, no nation is attempting a true freem a r k e t e c o n o m y . D e b a t e s about political e c o n o m i e s are usually about

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deciding which functions can be left to markets and which cannot, or shaping the context or rules under which markets function. A central question is how market-oriented political economies might contribute more to reducing poverty, especially in the poorest countries. The Global W o r k Force: Need for 2 Billion Jobs The route out of poverty for most people is through new economic opportunities—jobs or business ventures. As the world's population grows by onethird, from about 6.3 billion to over 8.0 billion in the next generation, the global labor force will grow even faster, by about half, from 2.8 billion to more than 4 billion w o r k e r s . In a d d i t i o n , the I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r Organization (ILO) estimates that more than a billion workers are unemployed or underemployed (ILO 1996). Half of the new workers have already been born, and the number of unemployed is still growing. The pressing need, therefore, is to create nearly 2 billion new economic opportunities during the next twenty-five years. Most of the new jobs or businesses will be needed in developing countries, where more than 95 percent of the increase in population and labor force is taking place. Virtually all of the a d d e d j o b s will need to be n o n f a r m j o b s . Governments in developing countries, or developing markets, may increase incentives for food production, but farmers are likely to adopt technologies that increase their productivity and reduce farm employment even faster. More and more farmers, or their children, will seek nonfarm employment. Whether such nonfarm employment is urban or rural will depend on policy choices. Improvements in education, health care, and public infrastructure can provide some public service jobs. But most new income-earning opportunities, if they come to pass, will be in the private sector. Every job or new opportunity, whether public or private, for employee or self-employment, requires savings and investment—in human resources and in physical capital (buildings and tools). The rates of savings and their allocation are crucial factors in determining whether enough decent income-earning opportunities can be created; these factors are determined in large measure by public policies. Globalization and Poverty Globalization has had mixed effects on employment, poverty, and income distribution. Hundreds of thousands of new jobs have been created in poor countries as standardized manufacturing and, more recently, information technology jobs have been moved, especially to Asia. By the standards of the developed nations and human rights advocates, many of the manufacturing jobs, especially, are not very desirable. But for most of the workers, they are an improvement over any alternative. Still, low-wage jobs, by themselves, will not be enough to build thriving economies. Will poor nations be

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able to emulate Korea and Taiwan from a generation ago, with increasingly sophisticated products and services for themselves as well as for export? One effect of globalization in the United States is what has been called "the disappearing middle." Growing incomes and reduced inequality in the United States during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s reflected a growing middle class—most prominently, well-paid union workers in manufacturing. With labor-reducing technologies and increasing imports of standardized m a n u f a c t u r e s , half of U.S. m a n u f a c t u r i n g jobs have disappeared since 1980. Most workers have found new jobs. About half of the new jobs are "tech up" jobs, with comparable or higher wages; the other half are "dumb down" jobs, some still in manufacturing, but primarily in the service sector, with lower wages and benefits, partly from competition with immigrants. This trend has contributed to the widening income gap described above, and to the growing number of working poor in the United States. Some observers have noted a parallel phenomenon at the nation-state level. The poorest nations are actually gaining ground from a very low base with low-wage manufacturing. A few other nations are or will increasingly become competitive in more sophisticated goods and services, as have Korea and Japan. But a number of middle-income countries, especially those without highly skilled workers or valuable natural resources, seem to be stagnating. Refer once again to Figure 8.1. E c o n o m i c G r o w t h and Poverty Reduction As poor nations think about developing their economies, economic growth is often held up as the primary goal for economic development and as the means to increased employment opportunities. Some analysts, bankers, and political leaders equate development with economic growth. Most of these people expect poverty and other social problems to shrink as economies grow. Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing poverty. The distribution of the added income is also critical. Poverty has fallen rapidly in some f a s t - g r o w i n g economies (Korea, Indonesia, China), while not changing much or rising in others (Brazil, South Africa, Oman). What lessons can be learned from the varied experiences? Because poverty is experienced in households and by individuals, detailed and accurate information at that level is critical. Both recent and earlier World Bank studies, covering nearly a hundred developing countries, find the following consistent relationships (Chen and Ravallion 2004; Ravallion 2001; and Ravallion and Chen 1997): • •

Poverty rates have consistently fallen as average incomes have risen, and risen as average incomes have fallen. Poverty rates have not declined anywhere in the absence of economic growth.

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In d e v e l o p i n g countries, inequality i n c r e a s e d about as o f t e n as it d e c r e a s e d as average i n c o m e s rose. In transition e c o n o m i e s ( f o r m e r c o m m u n i s t states in Eastern E u r o p e and C e n t r a l A s i a ) , i n e q u a l i t y c o n s i s t e n t l y i n c r e a s e d at the s a m e time as a v e r a g e incomes fell, at least through a several-year period of a d j u s t m e n t .

Other studies of eight East and Southeast Asian countries show that it is possible to h a v e both economic growth and decreasing inequality if the right policies are in place. In South Korea, f o r e x a m p l e , where per capita i n c o m e has g r o w n rapidly, the richest fifth of the population has about five times as m u c h i n c o m e as the poorest fifth. T h e ratio has n a r r o w e d over the past three d e c a d e s ; poor people have shared in the rapid growth. That is, their i n c o m e s h a v e increased m o r e than a v e r a g e o n a p e r c e n t a g e basis, although the absolute increase in income has been greater f o r wealthier persons. In sharp contrast, Brazil's per capita G N P was twice K o r e a ' s in 1970. Since then, its e c o n o m y has g r o w n about half as fast; by 2002, K o r e a ' s per capita G N P was m o r e than twice Brazil's, as m e a s u r e d by PPP. M e a n w h i l e , the i n c o m e r a t i o b e t w e e n B r a z i l ' s p o o r e s t a n d richest f i f t h h a s w i d e n e d even further, to 32-fold. Poor Brazilians have not b e n e f i t e d f r o m g r o w t h and remain m i r e d in deep poverty (see Table 8.1). T h e Asian countries have reduced, or at least have not increased, econ o m i c i n e q u a l i t y by giving p o o r p e o p l e the i n c e n t i v e a n d the m e a n s to i m p r o v e their o w n earning power. E x a m p l e s are land r e f o r m and support for small f a r m e r s in Korea and Taiwan; high school education, especially f o r w o m e n , in Singapore; and m a n u f a c t u r i n g for export, which has raised the d e m a n d f o r unskilled factory workers, plus a m a s s i v e a f f i r m a t i v e action p r o g r a m for the p o o r e r ethnic groups, in Malaysia.

T h e Virtuous Circle D e c l i n i n g i n e q u a l i t y and e c o n o m i c g r o w t h s u p p o r t e a c h o t h e r in t h r e e w a y s , in an a s c e n d i n g , or virtuous, cycle (see F i g u r e 8.4): •

•

•

A s p o o r f a m i l i e s ' incomes increase, they invest m o r e in human capital—more education and better health care for their o w n (usually f e w e r ) children. I m p r o v e d health and better e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h usually a c c o m p a n y d e c r e a s e d inequality, increase the p r o d u c t i v i t y of p o o r e r w o r k e r s and their c o m m u n i t i e s and nations. T h i s in turn f u r t h e r increases their i n c o m e . G r e a t e r equality contributes to political stability, which is essential for c o n t i n u e d e c o n o m i c progress.

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Figure 8.4

Economy

A Virtuous Circle

Source: Adapted f r o m Bread for the World ( B F W ) Institute, Hunger 1995: Causes of Hunger (Washington. DC: B F W Institute. 1994). Used with permission of the B F W Institute.

Relative equality in distribution of national incomes also increases the likelihood that economic growth can be sustained. Widespread participation in political as well as economic activity reduces the likelihood of enacting bad policies and permits their earlier correction (Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot 1996).

Sustainable Development Economic growth that is relatively equally distributed is not enough; more is needed to achieve long-term poverty reduction. The growth and distribution must be sustainable. The concept of sustainable development emerged in the 1970s to help ensure that development would not ruin the environment, which would sooner or later slow or reverse development (sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t is discussed in detail in C h a p t e r 13). The UN World Commission on Environment and Development ( W C E D ) has defined sustainable development as "development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" ( W C E D 1987). More recently, and as used here, the term has evolved to incorporate other aspects of development in addition to economic growth. A d v o c a t e s of international justice, environmental protection, peace, sustainable population growth, democracy, and human rights have increasingly come to see that their goals are interlinked. For example: • •

There is no way to save the rain forests of Brazil without dealing with the need for land of poor Brazilians. There is no way to reduce rapid population growth in developing

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c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t i m p r o v i n g living s t a n d a r d s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r girls (see Chapters 9 and 10). T h e r e are no durable solutions to poverty and h u n g e r in the United States without social peace, broader d e m o c r a t i c participation, and a shift to e c o n o m i c patterns that will be e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y sustainable.

Bread for the World is a n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organization ( N G O ) f o c u s e d on policy decisions that can reduce h u n g e r and poverty. It d e f i n e s sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t in t e r m s of f o u r i n t e r c o n n e c t e d o b j e c t i v e s : p r o v i d i n g e c o n o m i c opportunity for poor people, meeting basic h u m a n needs, ensuring e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection, and enabling d e m o c r a t i c participation ( B F W Institute 1995). T h e s e concepts, and those f r o m other chapters in this book, are reflected in the policy suggestions of the next section.

Antipoverty Policies in a Global Economy Public policies aimed at r e d u c i n g poverty fall into t w o broad categories: creating appropriate, e f f e c t i v e guidelines f o r markets; and collecting and allocating public resources, especially for investment in h u m a n resources and in social safety nets. T h e reality of a c h i e v i n g e f f e c t i v e a n t i p o v e r t y p o l i c i e s is, of c o u r s e , m u c h m o r e difficult than the assertion. Just as s o m e actors in the marketplace can take advantage of their e c o n o m i c power, they and other p o w e r f u l political actors can sway policies to their o w n self-interest, w h e t h e r at the local, national, or international level. M e a n w h i l e , p o o r people, w h o s e wellbeing is the strongest e v i d e n c e of whether policies are effective, o f t e n lack political access or clout. In addition, they and their allies are often unclear or divided on issues of national and international e c o n o m i c policy. But as the global, k n o w l e d g e - b a s e d , market e c o n o m y reaches into the far c o r n e r s of our planet, people of goodwill h a v e only one option: to help create a n d i m p l e m e n t policies that will direct a sizable portion of this econo m y t o w a r d creating i n c o m e - e a r n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p o o r p e o p l e . T h e m o s t important areas f o r policies to help reduce poverty include investing in people, sustaining agriculture and f o o d production, creating a f r a m e w o r k f o r s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t , and targeting international f i n a n c i n g ( B F W Institute 1997; World B a n k 2001c).

Investing in People Without question, if nations are to avoid the low-skills, l o w - w a g e trap, their p e o p l e m u s t be healthy and well-educated. I n v e s t m e n t s in h u m a n capital (people) are foundational.

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H e a l t h c a r e a n d n u t r i t i o n . I n v e s t m e n t s in b a s i c h e a l t h c a r e a n d i m p r o v e d n u t r i t i o n yield h u g e d i v i d e n d s . H e a l t h y c h i l d r e n learn better. Healthy adults work better. I m p r o v e d health care begins with greater attention to basic public health m e a s u r e s : nutrition education, clean water and adequate sanitation, vaccination against infectious diseases, prevention of A I D S , distribution of iodine and Vitamin A capsules, and simple techniques of h o m e health care. Delivery of these services can be relatively inexpensive, especially in d e v e l o p i n g countries, where village w o m e n with minimal training can be e m p l o y e d . T h e s e basic services should have priority over urban hospitals and specialized medical training. In some instances, public health training can be delivered in c o n j u n c tion with supplemental feeding p r o g r a m s such as the Special Supplemental Food Program for W o m e n . Infants, and Children in the United States or the Integrated Child D e v e l o p m e n t Services in India. The United Nations Children's Fund ( U N I C E F ) provides another instance of the payoff f r o m direct interventions that include education of m o t h e r s . In 1980 U N I C E F e s t i m a t e d that 4 0 , 0 0 0 children died each day f r o m preventable causes, about half related to hunger. By 2 0 0 3 the estimate has been reduced to about 2 7 , 4 0 0 per day, thanks in part to U N I C E F ' s fourf o l d p r o g r a m of g r o w t h m o n i t o r i n g , oral r e h y d r a t i o n t h e r a p y , b r e a s t feeding, and i m m u n i z a t i o n . E d u c a t i o n . I n v e s t m e n t s in basic e d u c a t i o n c o m p l e m e n t those in health care and improved nutrition and yield huge p a y o f f s in both developing and industrialized nations. Better education for youth, especially girls, leads to i m p r o v e d health a w a r e n e s s and practices for their f a m i l i e s on a lifelong basis. Cognitive and other skills improve productivity, enable better m a n a g e m e n t of r e s o u r c e s , and p e r m i t a c c e s s to new t e c h n o l o g i e s . T h e y also e n h a n c e participation in d e m o c r a c y . One study of ninety-eight countries showed G D P gains up to 20 percent resulting f r o m increases in elementary school e n r o l l m e n t and up to 4 0 percent resulting f r o m increases in secondary enrollment. In allocating educational resources, the highest payoff is for e l e m e n t a r y education, because it reaches the most children (Fiske 1993). In the United States, dramatic i m p r o v e m e n t has f o l l o w e d investments in H e a d Start, w h i c h p r o v i d e s p r e s c h o o l e d u c a t i o n a n d m e a l s f o r lowincome children, and J o b C o r p s , which provides remedial and vocational training for d i s a d v a n t a g e d youth (see Figure 8.4).

Sustaining Agriculture and Food Production A c c e s s t o l a n d . W i d e s p r e a d l a n d o w n e r s h i p by small f a r m e r s usually contributes directly to f o o d security and i m p r o v e d e n v i r o n m e n t a l practices,

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as well as to increased incomes. The more successful land reform programs, as in South Korea and Taiwan, have provided at least minimum compensation to existing landlords. Equitable prices for farm produce. Thriving agriculture is basic to successful development in most of the poorest nations. Much of new savings must be accumulated within agriculture, since it is such a large share of the economy. Such savings are important for increasing agricultural productivity and for helping to finance rural, nonfarm businesses. Also, as their incomes rise, farmers expand their purchases of consumer goods, providing an important source of nonfarm employment. In many developing countries, state-run marketing boards have taxed agriculture by setting farm prices very low and retaining for the government a large share of the value from farm exports. Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union have supported their own farmers in ways that generate surplus crops. They also subsidize exports of these crops, driving down prices around the world. Developing country farmers, who usually are not subsidized, cannot match the low prices. Agriculture falters and with it the whole process of development. Both rich-country export subsidies and developing-country discrimination against agriculture should be phased out as quickly as possible. Creating a Framework for Sustainable Development Access to credit. Equitable access to credit for small farmers and small businesses is probably the highest priority for the allocation of domestic savings or outside investment. Training in resource and business management is often part of successful credit programs. Most informal economic activity results from the efforts of small entrepreneurs who cannot find a place in the formal economy. If they have access to good roads, markets, and credit, small farmers and small-business people can create their own new income-earning opportunities in market economies. Adequate physical infrastructure. Creating and maintaining an adequate physical infrastructure is essential to a viable, expanding economy. Important for rural areas are farm-to-market roads and food storage, both oriented to d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n and, if a p p r o p r i a t e , e x p o r t s . For all areas, safe water, sanitation, electricity, and communications networks are needed. Stable legal and institutional framework. Sustainable development requires a stable legal framework. This includes assured property titles,

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enforceable contracts, equitable access to courts and administrative bodies, and accessible information networks. Stable currency and fiscal policies. Neither domestic nor international investors, including small farmers and microentrepreneurs, are likely to invest in countries in which the political or economic environment is unsettled. High inflation or continuing trade deficits, which often go together, discourage needed investments and may even drive out domestic savings. Effective, progressive tax s y s t e m s . Effective, progressive tax structures are key to sustainable financing for investments in human resources and infrastructure. Taxes based on ability to pay are also key to stabilizing or reducing wide disparities in income distribution in both rich and poor countries. Such tax systems are usually difficult to enact where wealth and political power are controlled by a small minority. Incentives for job-creating i n v e s t m e n t s . The Asian countries that have grown so rapidly have all placed emphasis on labor-intensive exports—some in joint ventures with overseas partners, some with investments solicited from abroad, but many with subsidies from within their own economies. This is a distinct departure from their more general commitment to follow market signals. A primary target for job-intensive investments will be processing operations for primary products—whether for domestic consumption or for crops and minerals now being exported. The success of these efforts will depend in considerable measure on further development of trade among poor nations and, especially, whether rich nations are willing to reduce higher tariffs on manufactured goods. D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance The poorest countries will never catch up, or even escape extreme poverty, if they depend solely on their own resources. Their economic base, often primarily agricultural, is too tiny to permit the savings necessary for investing in human and other capital. Under the right conditions, private businesses will invest in factories, equipment, some kinds of infrastructure, and specialized training. But they cannot be expected to fund basic human development and much of the necessary social infrastructure. For economic and security reasons, as well as humanitarian motives, wealthy nations must greatly increase the resources they provide through development assistance. At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, for the first time ever, all 198 nations a t t e n d i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e m s e l v e s to s p e c i f i c

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Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015. The first commitment is to cut poverty and hunger in half. Other goals include universal education for children, reducing child mortality, and promoting gender equality (see Table 8.2). At the U N Financing for D e v e l o p m e n t Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, nations endorsed a program to reach these goals, and made initial pledges of resources. By the standard of military spending, for example, the resources are not huge—on the order of two to three times the $55 billion currently directed to development assistance. In early 2004 the World Bank concluded that "it is too early to conclude that the world as a whole is on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals—or that it is not. What is clear is that the goals remain a great challenge and that hard work lies ahead" (World Bank 2004: 1).

U

Conclusion

Extreme poverty—the lack of resources or income to command basic necessities—is the condition of about one-sixth of the world's population, or more than one-fifth of the people in developing countries. The absolute

Table 8.2

United Nations Millennium D e v e l o p m e n t Goals, Unanimously A d o p t e d by the United N a t i o n s Millennium S u m m i t S e p t e m b e r 2000

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Achieve universal primary education Promote gender equality Reduce child mortality Improve maternal health Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases Ensure environmental sustainability Develop a global partnership for development

Reduce by half the proportion of people who live on less than a dollar a day and who suffer from hunger. Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education. Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under five. Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio. Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other major diseases. Integrate principles of sustainable development; reverse loss of environmental resources. Halve the proportion of people without safe drinking water. Develop international trading and finance systems that meet needs of developing nations: nondiscriminatory trade and access for their exports; debt relief; more development assistance; more productive work for youth; access to affordable essential drugs; access to new technologies, especially information and communications.

Source: U N D P (United Nations Development Programme), "Millennium Development Goals," 2000, available online at http://www.undp.org/mdg/millennium%20development% 20goals.pdf.

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number of poor people has remained fairly steady in recent years, while their proportion has declined slightly, with considerable regional variation. Countries need economic growth to overcome poverty, but other conditions are also critical. Relatively egalitarian distribution of national income among and within households matters greatly. Gains must be sustainable. Decisionmaking must be broadly shared. Creating 2 billion good jobs or business opportunities is the biggest single challenge for this generation. The economic and policy tools to generate relatively equitable growth have been successfully demonstrated in recent years, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, some of the worst effects of poverty have been, and should continue to be, offset by public and private interventions: infant mortality and overall hunger have declined, and literacy and longevity have increased in many instances, even in the face of continued poverty Adapting these tools and programs to particular circumstances, especially in Africa, is of utmost concern to everyone. In an increasingly global e c o n o m y , the well-being and security of each person or c o m m u n i t y or nation is inescapably linked to that of every other. All the world's nations have adopted bold Millennium Development Goals. Reaching these goals will require a large measure of the one ingredient that seems in shortest supply: the political will to do so.

•

Discussion Questions 1. Are you more inclined to measure poverty in terms of absolute income, income distribution, or the capacity to reach more f u n d a m e n t a l g o a l s ? If the third c h o i c e , what w o u l d be y o u r list of goals? 2. Which of the antipoverty policies do you think are the most beneficial? 3. What would you consider a reasonable goal for the ratio between the top and bottom income groups within an e c o n o m y ? Within a business firm? What policies would be necessary to move toward these goals? 4. S h o u l d g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s e n c o u r a g e t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income? If so, to what extent? 5. Are you as optimistic as the author that poverty can be overcome? 6. D o you c o n c u r that the w e l l - b e i n g of e v e r y o n e is i n e s c a p a b l y linked? 7. Do you agree with the author that the principal missing ingredient in overcoming hunger is political will?

Poverty in a Global

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Note

T h i s chapter is a d a p t e d f r o m an e a r l i e r w o r k o f m i n e in Hunger Causes

of Hunger

1995:

( B F W Institute 1 9 9 4 ) and is u s e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f

Bread for the World Institute.

•

Suggested Readings

American Friends Service Committee Working Party on Global Economics (2004) Putting Dignity and Rights at the Heart of the Global Economy. Holly Sklar, ed. Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee. Birdsall, Nancy, Thomas Pinckney, and Richard Sabot (1996) "Why Low Inequality S p u r s G r o w t h : S a v i n g s and I n v e s t m e n t by t h e P o o r . " I n t e r - A m e r i c a n Development Bank (IDB) Working Paper no. 327. Washington. DC: IDB. Birdsall, Nancy, David Ross, and Richard Sabot (1995) "Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia." World Bank Economic Review 9, no. 3. Bread for the World ( B F W ) Institute (annual) Annual Report on the State of World Hunger. Washington, DC: BFW Institute. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (annual) The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Rome: FAO. Fiske, Edward B. (1993) Basic Education: Building Block for Global Development. Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development. Garrett, Geoffrey (2004) "Globalization's Missing Middle." Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6. Landes, David S. (1999) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York: W. W. Norton. Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme (annual) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. U.S. C e n s u s Bureau websites: poverty statistics, h t t p : / / w w w . c e n s u s . g o v / h h e s / poverty; income statistics, http://www.census.gov/income/histpov. W o r l d B a n k ( b i e n n i a l ) World Development Indicators. New York: O x f o r d University Press. (annual) World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

PART 3

Development

9 Population and Migration Ellen Percy Kraly

C

oming to grips with the implications of current population trends is an extremely important dimension of global studies. The process is neither easy nor comforting, because a significant population increase is an inevitable characteristic of the global landscape in the first fifty years of the twenty-first century. It is critical that students interested in global issues should appreciate both the causes of population growth and the consequences of population change for society and the environment. Such an a p p r e c i a t i o n will s e r v e in d e v e l o p i n g a p p r o p r i a t e a n d e f f e c t i v e responses to population-related problems emerging globally, regionally, and locally. This chapter seeks to contribute to the understanding of the interconnections among population change, environmental issues, and social, economic, and political change in both developing and developed regions of the world. Because population growth has m o m e n t u m that cannot be quickly changed, it is important to begin by considering fundamental principles of p o p u l a t i o n or d e m o g r a p h i c a n a l y s i s and to place recent global and regional population trends in historical perspective. This chapter examines the widely divergent philosophical and scientific perspectives on the relationships among population, society, and environment that have pervaded visions of the future. Debates on the implications of current growth have also influenced discussions about routes for population policy. The chapter discusses the global effects of population redistribution, urbanization, and international migration, and concludes by considering global dimensions of population policies that target growth and international population movements.

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•

Principles and Trends

D e m o g r a p h i c C o n c e p t s and Analysis D e m o g r a p h y is the study o f population c h a n g e and characteristics. A population can c h a n g e in size and c o m p o s i t i o n as a result o f the interplay o f three d e m o g r a p h i c p r o c e s s e s : f e r t i l i t y , m o r t a l i t y , and m i g r a t i o n . T h e s e c o m p o n e n t s o f c h a n g e constitute the f o l l o w i n g population equation: P = ( + ) births ( - ) deaths ( + ) in-migration ( - ) out-migration; where P is population c h a n g e between t w o points in time On the global level, the world's population grows as the result o f the relative b a l a n c e b e t w e e n births and deaths, often c a l l e d natural i n c r e a s e . T h e U . S . population is currently increasing at about 1.0 percent per year; natural increase a c c o u n t s for about two-thirds, and net international m i g r a tion constitutes about one-third o f this relatively low level o f population growth. M a n y p e o p l e s e e k i n g routes to s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t a d v o c a t e a cessation o f population growth often referred to as zero population growth ( Z P G ) . W h e n viewed from a short-run perspective, Z P G m e a n s simply balancing the c o m p o n e n t s o f the population equation to yield no (zero) c h a n g e in population size during a period o f time. Population scientists, however, usually c o n s i d e r Z P G in a long-term perspective by considering a particular form o f a zero-growth population: a stationary population is o n e in which constant patterns o f childbearing interact with constant mortality and migration to yield a population changing by zero percent per year. In such a case, fertility is considered replacement fertility, b e c a u s e one generation o f parents is j u s t replacing itself in the next generation. In low-mortality c o u n tries, r e p l a c e m e n t - l e v e l fertility can be measured by the total fertility rate and is approximately 2.1 births per w o m a n to a c h i e v e a stationary population over the long run. It takes a relatively long time, perhaps three generations after replacement fertility has been a c h i e v e d , f o r a population to c e a s e growing on a yearly basis. Large groups o f persons o f childbearing age, reflecting earlier eras o f high fertility, result in large numbers o f births even with r e p l a c e m e n t - l e v e l fertility. H e n c e , an e x c e s s o f births o v e r d e a t h s o c c u r s until these " a g e structure" e f f e c t s work t h e m s e l v e s out o f the population. T h i s is k n o w n as the m o m e n t u m o f p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h . S e v e r a l y e a r s a g o , W o l f g a n g Lutz estimated that i f the world's populations a c h i e v e d r e p l a c e m e n t - l e v e l fertility instantaneously, g l o b a l population w o u l d c o n t i n u e to grow from 5 . 3 billion in 1 9 9 0 to 7 . 4 billion in 2 0 5 0 , a whopping increase o f 4 0 percent despite the immediate (and unrealistic) fertility decline ( 1 9 9 4 : 57).

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Age structure is an important social demographic characteristic of a population. Both the very young and the very old in a population must be supported by persons in the working-age groups. The proportions of persons in different age groups in a population are depicted in a population pyramid. Figure 9.1 shows population pyramids for two countries, Tanzania and Spain. The pyramid for Tanzania reveals a youthful population, with nearly one-third under ten years of age. This reflects high fertility. In Spain, a low-fertility country, only 9 percent of the population is under ten years of age. At the other end of the age spectrum, less than 5 percent of the Tanzanian population is over the age of sixty years, compared to over onefifth, 21 percent, of the Spanish population. The immigration of male workers into Spain is also evident in the large proportion of males aged thirty to thirty-four. These two age pyramids illustrate the history of past levels in fertility and migration as well as the different demands on society for support for the young and the old. Historical and C o n t e m p o r a r y Trends in Population Growth The world's population was estimated to be 6.3 billion at the beginning of 2003 and increasing at approximately 1.2 percent per year (UNPD 2003). These data represent a cross-sectional perspective on population characteristics—a snapshot that fails to capture the varying pace of population change worldwide and regionally. Over most of human history, populations have increased insignificantly or at very low annual rates of growth, with local populations being checked by disease, war, and unstable food supplies. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, population growth appeared to become more sustained as a result of changes in the social and economic environment: improved sanitation, more consistent food distribution, improved personal hygiene and clothing, political stability, and the like. The world's population probably did not reach its first billion until just past 1800. But accelerating population growth during the nineteenth century dramatically reduced the length of time by which the next billion was added. According to the United Nations (UNDESIPA 1994; UNPD 2001b), world population reached 1 billion in 2 billion in 3 billion in 4 billion in 5 billion in 6 billion in

1804 1927 (123 years later) 1960 (33 years later) 1974 (14 years later) 1987 (13 years later) 1999 (12 years later)

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Rapid population growth occurred on a global scale during the second half of the twentieth century. Population data for years since 1950 are shown in Figure 9.2. Between 1950 and 2003, the world's total population more than doubled, increasing from 2.6 billion to 6.3 billion. The difference in height of the bars in Figure 9.2 reveals the momentum of population growth that results in continued additions to the world's population, albeit in decreasing numbers: between 1985 and 1990, approximately 85 million persons were added to the world's population each year; in the late 1990s, the annual increase is estimated at 77 million (UNPD 2003). It is important to note, however, that despite these large additions to the world's population, the rate of population growth is decreasing. The average annual rate of global population growth reached an all-time high of about 2.2 percent between 1962 and 1964. Since that time, the pace of growth of the world's population has decreased to the current rate of approximately 1.2 percent per year. Patterns of population growth differ significantly between more and less developed regions of the world. Table 9.1 provides greater geographic detail and summarizes population size and distribution for major regions of the world for selected years since 1950. Dramatic shifts in the geography of world population have occurred during the past five decades and, as discussed below, are expected to continue well into the future. In 1950, just over two-thirds of the world's popu-

Figure 9.2 World Population for Development, 1950-2003 (thousands)

• More-developed countries

• Less-developed countries

Source: United Nations Development Programme ( U N D P ) , Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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Population and

Table 9.1

Migration

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W o r l d Population by G e o g r a p h i c R e g i o n and for M o r e a n d Less Developed Countries, I9S0-2003 1950

Population in millions World More developed countries Less developed countries Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Europe Northern America Oceania Percentage World More developed countries Less developed countries Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Europe Northern America Oceania

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2003

2,519 3,021 3,692 4,435 5,264 6,071 6,301 813 915 1,007 1,083 1,149 1,194 1,203 1,706 2,106 2,685 3,352 4,115 4,877 5.098 622 851 221 277 357 470 796 1,398 1,701 2,143 2,632 3,168 3,680 3,823 442 520 543 167 218 285 361 604 722 728 726 547 656 692 284 326 172 204 232 256 316 32 16 19 23 27 31 13 100.0 32.3 67.7 8.8 55.5 6.6 21.7 6.8 0.5

100.0 30.3 69.7 9.2 56.3 7.2 20.0 6.8 0.5

100.0 27.3 72.7 9.7 58.0 7.7 17.8 6.3 0.5

100.0 24.4 75.6 10.6 59.3 8.1 15.6 5.8 0.5

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

100.0 21.8 78.2 11.8 60.2 8.4 13.7 5.4 0.5

100.0 19.7 80.3 13.1 60.6 8.6 12.0 5.2 0.5

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100.0 19.1 80.9 13.5 60.7 8.6 11.5 5.2 0.5 Report

lation was located in less developed countries; by 2003, this proportion had increased to four-fifths. Asian countries make up three-fifths of the world's population; over one-fifth, 21 percent, of the global village live in China; and another 17 percent live in India (data not shown in Table 9.1). Africa's share has increased from just under 10 percent in 1950 to almost 14 percent of the world's current population. European populations constituted 11.5 percent of the w o r l d ' s population in 2003, a decline f r o m 22 percent in 1950. Western Hemisphere regions—North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean—include approximately 14 percent of the world's population. Population growth is f u e l e d by levels of fertility, mortality, and net migration. T h e rapid population growth that occurred in the p o s t - W o r l d War II era reflected significant declines in mortality resulting in large part from public health advances and the transfer of medical technology from more to less developed countries. T h e total f e r t i l i t y rate m e a s u r e s the a v e r a g e n u m b e r of b i r t h s per woman of childbearing age and is a strong indicator of overall population g r o w t h . In the period 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0 , based on the most recently available national measures, the total fertility rate for the world as a whole was 2.8

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births per w o m a n , r e p r e s e n t i n g a significant decline f r o m 4 . 2 in about 1985. Fertility in more developed countries has been below replacement for some time and is estimated at 1.6 births per woman. In developing countries, the rate dropped from 4.7 in 1985 to 3.1 in 1995-2000. Much of this decline is weighted by the aggressive fertility control campaign in China and significant declines in fertility throughout Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Total fertility in India has also declined, but less dramatically, from 4.3 in 1985 to 3.3 based on the most recently available national data ( U N P D 2004a). Fertility in least-developed countries including many in sub-Saharan Africa, while declining somewhat in the past decade, remains strikingly high: 5.3 births per woman. Figure 9.3 provides a cartographic view of recent levels of fertility for countries of the world.

Perspectives on the Causes and Consequences of Population Change R e f l e c t i o n s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n population and society can be found in the early history of many cultures. In early Greece, Plato wrote about the need for balance between the size of the city and its resource base; C o n f u c i a n i s m e m p h a s i z e d the social and e c o n o m i c advantages of large families. Concern about the implications of population growth for social progress became a focus of social theory in the nineteenth century and continues in contemporary debates on the global effects of current levels of population growth.

Debates on Population Growth Certainly the most influential statement concerning the sources and implications of population growth was that of Thomas Malthus in his Essay on the Principle of Population; the first edition, published in 1798, was followed by several revisions (Malthus 1826). In his essay, Malthus was reacting to mercantilist philosophy that pervaded eighteenth-century European thought and emphasized the value of large and increasing populations for economic growth and prosperity. Malthus offered a negative perspective on the consequences of population growth, arguing that increases in population will outpace increases in food supply, resulting in starvation, poverty, and human misery. Because of the instinct of humans to reproduce, population growth can only be halted through the so-called positive checks—rising mortality as a result of famine, war, and epidemics. Malthus, a clergyman, opposed contraception and advocated delayed marriage and abstinence, which he called "preventive" checks. Neo-Malthusians, in contrast, recognize the importance of birth control as a means to limit family size and hence reduce population growth. A m o n g the early critics of Malthusian thought was Karl Marx, w h o

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argued that there exists no universal law of population like the one M a l t h u s h a d g e n e r a t e d ; rather, M a r x a r g u e d , c o n s e q u e n c e s of p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h derive f r o m the particular f o r m of e c o n o m i c organization within a society. A c c o r d i n g to Marx, rather than population g r o w t h , it is capitalism and the m o t i v a t i o n to m i n i m i z e l a b o r c o s t s a n d m a i n t a i n a r e s e r v e of un- a n d u n d e r e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s that r e s u l t s in h i g h l e v e l s of p o v e r t y . In t u r n , poverty m a y result in the need for additional family labor and hence large families. T h e s e historical perspectives on population hold a true vitality f o r c o n t e m p o r a r y debates c o n c e r n i n g population issues and policies. T w o lines of thought have d o m i n a t e d the population debate in the past three decades and might be crudely labeled neo-Mcilthusian and cornucopia n . T h e n e o - M a l t h u s i a n perspective continues to emphasize the p r o b l e m of population growth as the primary obstacle to sustaining the ecological balance of Planet Earth by leading to natural resource depletion, pollution, and loss of biodiversity. C o r n u c o p i a n perspectives, on the other hand, e m p h a size the role of technological innovation and market forces, which through pricing e f f e c t s will m a n a g e the use of natural resources. From this vantage point, population growth holds potential for solving global problems t h r o u g h increased e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i v i t y and capacity for t e c h n o l o g i c a l progress. B e c a u s e of the d r a m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t v i s i o n s of society and n a t u r e inherent in these t w o p e r s p e c t i v e s , the d e b a t e b e t w e e n the negative and positive c o n s e q u e n c e s of population g r o w t h has always been energetic, anim a t e d , and often contentious. It is therefore helpful to many c o n c e r n e d students of population studies that a third perspective on population, society, and e n v i r o n m e n t linkages has e m e r g e d in the past few decades. This perspective has been labeled by s o m e as structuralist (Harper 1995). Structuralist perspectives, which borrow f r o m Marxist theory, consider population characteristics, including population growth, poverty, food supplies, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l problems, as o u t c o m e s of broader social structural p r o c e s s e s and institutions. T h u s , population g r o w t h , specifically high fertility, is more a c o n s e q u e n c e than a cause of slow e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and r e s t r i c t e d social a n d e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s . B a r r y C o m m o n e r ( 1 9 9 2 ) v i e w s poverty and the low status of w o m e n as factors contributing to high fertility in d e v e l o p i n g societies; m o r e significant for the quality of the global e n v i r o n m e n t overall are the high levels of energy c o n s u m p t i o n and waste in rich Northern countries. F r o m t h e s e d i s p a r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e s , C h a r l e s H a r p e r ( 1 9 9 5 ) s e e s an " e m e r g i n g c o n s e n s u s " c o n c e r n i n g the c o n s e q u e n c e s of population growth. T h i s perspective conceptualizes population growth as both cause (like the n e o - M a l t h u s i a n s ) a n d c o n s e q u e n c e (like the structuralists) of social, econ o m i c , and e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s c o n f r o n t i n g the world, nations, a n d local c o m m u n i t i e s . H e n c e the reduction of poverty, the i m p r o v e m e n t of life

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chances and of the status of women, the increasing sustainability in food production, the improvement in water quality, and the like, all become important strategies for reducing population growth. Also recognized is the advantage of slowing and ultimately ceasing world and regional population growih in order to more effectively improve standards of living, stabilize food supplies, and halt environmental degradation (UNPD 2001a; National Research Council 1986). Helping to chart the progress toward low population growth in societies is the model of the demographic transition that was developed initially as a description of p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h p a t t e r n s in E u r o p e and North America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The model became linked to theories of m o d e r n i z a t i o n to predict how population growth would proceed throughout the developing world. As societies underwent industrialization and urbanization, with all the concomitant social changes, death rates would fall as they had in the Western societies, followed with a lag by declines in fertility. During the lag, population growth would occur until norms and values concerning the need for large families were replaced by small-family ideals. The demographic transition model has been widely criticized, retested, and revised. A major limitation of the theory is the view that the experiences of non-Western societies will mirror or converge with those of Europe and North America. Revisions of the demographic transition model present a clearer understanding of how family size is influenced by cultural beliefs and by gender, particularly educational opportunities for girls. Moreover, studies in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have shown the importance of understanding the contributions of children to the well-being of the family and its kin. Young children in developing societies may be a source of wealth as household labor and family prestige, and older children may p r o v i d e o l d - a g e s u p p o r t and c o n t i n u a t i o n of the f a m i l y lineage (Caldwell 1982).

•

Expectations A b o u t F u t u r e Population G r o w t h

Theories of population change guide analyses of future population growth, usually in the form of population projections. Most demographers are quick to state that population projections are not predictions but rather represent a calculation of future population size based on a set of assumptions or variants. Shown in Figure 9.4 are population estimates and projections prepared by the United Nations Population Division in its most recent projection series for the years 1950-2050 (UNPD 2003). The world totals reflect the sum of projections conducted separately for 228 countries; the " f a n " of population figures represents the four projection variants for the projection

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Figure 9.4 Projected W o r l d Population (thousands)

14.000

12.000

10,000

o

8,000

£

6,000 4.(XX)

2,000

0

Medium

—High

ï —Low

—•—Constant fertility

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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period 2000-2050. These variants reflect different assumptions about the pace and pattern of fertility change. The projections prepared by the UN in 2002 represent revised assumptions about both the pace and level of fertility decline and the severity and geographic extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The medium variant projects the fertility of individual countries to follow the pattern of fertility decline of currently low-fertility countries. The ultimate target is a total fertility rate of 1.85, which is below a level of fertility that ensures population replacement (2.11 births per woman) at existing levels of mortality. In some cases, fertility of very low fertility countries will actually have to increase to hit this target by the end of the projection period. In the high variant, fertility follows a path of 0.5 children above that projected for each country in the medium variant; in the low variant, fertility is projected at a level of 0.5 children below that in the medium variant. The constant fertility variant represents the status quo by assuming that fertility levels for 1995-2000 are maintained throughout the projection period. This variant provides a useful point of comparison. In all four projections, mortality levels decline, although at a slower pace in those countries where mortality is already low. In those countries in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic is severe, a slower pace of mortality decline is assumed. The projection series as a whole assumes convergence among

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countries and thus generally embodies a demographic transition model, although greater variation among countries in pattern and pace of change in demographic rates is present in these most recent UN projections, and significantly, fertility settles at below replacement. The high-fertility variant results in growth in world population from 6.1 to 10.6 billion between 2000 and 2050, an increase of nearly 4.5 billion. The low variant projects an increase to 7.4 billion in 2050, an increase of 20 percent. Thus, even with a declining trajectory of fertility to well below replacement, the world's population will continue to grow as a result of the m o m e n t u m of population growth. The medium variant results in an increase to 8.9 billion in 2050, an increase of 46 percent over the 2000 population. The projections also reveal the future impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the 2002 revised projections, fifty-three countries are identified as being most severely affected by the disease, an increase over the forty-five countries considered in the projections prepared just two years earlier (UNPD 2001b). In the fifty-three countries most affected by the disease, it is estimated that 46 million excess deaths due to HIV/AIDS will occur between 2000 and 2010, and between 2000 and 2050 this number is projected to be 278 million in these same countries. Because of high levels of fertility in many of these countries, however, overall population growth will continue to be positive. But in regions where HIV/AIDS is exceedingly acute, even high levels of fertility will not counter the effects of the epidemic. According to the UN, "for the seven most affected countries in Southern Africa, where current HIV prevalence is above 20 percent, the population is projected to increase only slightly, from 74 million in 2000 to 78 million in 2050, and outright reductions in population are projected for Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland" (UNPD 2003). Shifts in the geographic distribution of the world's population are evident in all of the projections, as seen in Table 9.2. The results for the medium variant help make the point. The population in African countries, primarily in sub-Saharan regions, will increase from 13 percent to 20 percent of the world's population, and the population of Europe is expected to decline from 12 percent to 7 percent of the world's population. Countries in North America and Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to hold about 14 percent of the world's population. Asian countries will continue to hold the largest share of the world's population, although decreasing from 61 percent to approximately 58 percent. It is important to consider two Asian countries in particular, China and India, whose population policies are considered later in this chapter. The population of China is projected to increase from 1.3 billion in 2000 to 1.4 billion in 2050; India's population is projected to grow from 1 billion in 2000 to 1.5 billion in 2050, thus overtaking China as the largest national population in the world. Thus we can

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Table 9.2

Projections of W o r l d Population by Geographic Region and for M o r e and Less Developed Countries, 2000 and 2050

Population in thousands World More developed countries Less developed countries Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Europe Northern America Oceania Percentage World More developed countries Less developed countries Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Europe Northern America Oceania

2000

Low 2050

Medium 2050

High 2050

Constant Fertility 2050

6,071 1,194 4,877 796 3,680 520 728 316 31

7,406 1,084 6,325 1,516 4,274 623 565 391 40

8,919 1,220 7,699 1,803 5,222 768 632 448 46

10,633 1,370 9,263 2,122 6,318 924 705 512 52

12,754 1,185 11,568 3,279 7,333 1,032 597 453 58

100.0 19.7 80.3 13.1 60.6 8.6 12.0 5.2 0.5

100.0 14.6 85.4 20.5 57.7 8.4 7.6 5.3 0.5

100.0 13.7 86.3 20.2 58.5 8.6 7.1 5.0 0.5

100.0 12.9 87.1 20.0 59.4 8.7 6.6 4.8 0.5

100.0 9.3 90.7 25.7 57.5 8.1 4.7 3.6 0.5

Source: United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) , Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press. 2003).

Report

expect significant shifts in world geography of population based on these projections.

•

Social and E n v i r o n m e n t a l D i m e n s i o n s of Population R e d i s t r i b u t i o n and M i g r a t i o n

As well as influencing population change, the movement of persons within and among countries is both a cause and a consequence of social, economic, political, and environmental factors. Geographic mobility is the general concept covering all types of human population movements. Migration is generally considered to refer to moves that are permanent or longer-term; internal migration within a country is distinguished from international population movements; international migration to a country is immigration, and international migration from a country is emigration. Reasons for moving are often included in migration c o n c e p t s , such as labor migration, r e f u g e e migration, and s e a s o n a l migration. Internal and international

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migration are processes that are increasingly linked through the geographic and social dimensions of global economic development. Internal Migration and Urbanization A corollary of the demographic transition model is growth in the size of cities as well as increasing proportions of populations living in cities and metropolitan areas, that is, urbanization. The UN estimates that 48 percent of the world's population was living in urban areas in 2003; the difference between more and less developed countries, 74 percent and 42 percent respectively, is dramatic (UNPD 2004c). Thus, while some of the largest metropolitan areas in the world are found in developing countries—for example, Mexico City and Bombay each with 18.1 million in 2000, Sao Paulo with 17.8 million, and Calcutta and Shanghai each with 12.9 million, over half of populations in these societies currently live in rural areas. Demographers are anticipating a shift in this rural/urban balance in the very near future. Cities will grow as a result of population growth and rural-to-urban migration throughout regions of the world. By 2030, for example, the level of urbanization in more developed countries is expected to increase to 82 percent and in less developed countries even more steeply to 57 percent, a dramatic shift in patterns of residence and economic activity (UNPD 2004c). The causes of urban growth have varied among regions and during different historical periods. In Western societies, urbanization was fueled in large part by technological change in both agricultural and industrial sectors, resulting in both a push from rural communities and a pull to emerging industrial centers (Harper 1995). In developing societies, rural-to-urban migration is driven by many factors, including increasing population density (caused by high fertility rates) in rural areas, environmental degradation from practices such as overgrazing, and the hope for gainful employment in urban areas. The pull of cities in many developed countries exists in the form of hope for employment and higher wages rather than prearranged jobs. As a result, levels of unemployment in cities in developing countries are very high. Evidence of underemployment is shown in the large numbers of persons, including many children, attempting to earn livelihoods in what has been called by some the informal economy—for example, street vendors, curbside entertainers, and newspaper boys and girls.

International Population M o v e m e n t s One of the most visible manifestations of globalization is the increasing scale of international population movements throughout all regions of the world. According to scholars Stephen Castles and Mark Miller:

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Development Millions of people are seeking work, a new h o m e or simply a safe place to live outside their countries of birth. For m a n y less developed countries, emigration is one aspect of the social crisis which accompanies integration into the world market and modernization. . . . Migrations are not an isolated p h e n o m e n o n : m o v e m e n t s of c o m m o d i t i e s and c a p i t a l a l m o s t a l w a y s give rise to m o v e m e n t s of people. Global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media, also leads to migration. . . . Migration seems likely to go on g r o w i n g into the new millennium, and may be one of the most important factors in global change. (1998: 3^4-)

The consequences of international population movements for both sending and receiving nations and communities will have significant implications for emerging global issues. Countries in both Western and Eastern Europe have been faced with large n u m b e r s of persons seeking political asylum f r o m both European regions as well as f r o m g e o g r a p h i c a l l y distant sources, including East Africa and Southeast Asia. Significant labor migration flows have emerged between South and Southeast Asia and oil-producing regions of the Middle East and throughout the Asia Pacific region. The United States has grappled with issues concerning large numbers of undocumented migrants drawing from Mexico and many other source countries. Refugee migration is recurringly characteristic of political and e n v i r o n m e n t a l c h a n g e t h r o u g h o u t Africa. Castles and Miller (1998: 8 - 9 ) identify five "general tendencies" of contemporary international population movements that they expect to continue well into the t w e n t y - f i r s t century. First, international population movements will involve an increasingly large number of countries, both as s e n d i n g and r e c e i v i n g r e g i o n s , h e n c e the globalization of migration. Second, the volume of international migration can be expected to increase in volume. Third, international migration will continue to become differentiated by including a w i d e r variety of migrants, for e x a m p l e , seasonal migrants as well as migrants seeking permanent resettlement. Fourth, as women throughout the world become increasingly involved in the global work f o r c e , international migration will b e c o m e more feminized. Fifth, international migration is likely to b e c o m e a more significant political issue, both on the international stage as well as in the politics of individual nations. The significance of the scale of refugee migration and displaced populations in global population issues cannot be overstated. R e f u g e e s seek safety f r o m war and oppression but can also be a source of political and e c o n o m i c i n s t a b i l i t y in b o r d e r r e g i o n s and c o u n t r i e s of a s y l u m . F o r instance, Afghanis seeking refuge following the U.S. military response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks faced resistance in neighboring Pakistan.

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The international definition of a refugee is a person who o w i n g to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, m e m b e r s h i p of particular social group(s) or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or o w i n g to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or unwilling to return to it. ( U N H C R

1995: 256) At the beginning of 2003, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identified more than 20.6 million persons throughout the world who were of concern to the organization. Of this extraordinary number, 10.4 million are recognized as refugees living in asylum in other countries; the remainder are persons who are internally displaced within their own countries for complex political, economic, and environmental reasons and persons outside their home country in refugee-like situations. Table 9.3 shows refugees and other persons of concern by broad category and geographic region. Many refugee settlements or camps have existed for many years. Some refugees have been repatriated to their homelands, for example, Guatemalans who had sought refuge in Mexico and Muslims who had fled Myanmar (formerly Burma); others, including many Vietnamese during the 1970s and 1980s, have been permanently resettled in other countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States. The majority of the world's refugees are women and children, whose voices are often not heard in discussions about programs to aid and resettle refugees (UNHCR 2003).

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P o p u l a t i o n Policies

A population policy may be defined as deliberately constructed or modified institutional arrangements and/or specific programs through which governments influence, directly or indirectly, demographic change (Demeny and McNicoll 2003). According to the 2003 UN survey of government policies, seventy-five less developed countries have policies or programs to reduce population growth; in contrast, eighteen more developed countries have goals to increase growth (UNPD 2004b). Many more countries have indirect population policies that, while not targeting population growth, have clear implications for either mortality, fertility, or migration. The United States, for example, has not yet adopted a formal statement of goals concerning national population growth but does have a long-standing policy for the permanent resettlement of immigrants and refugees (see discussion below), which in turn results in net additions to the population through international migration.

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Table 9.3

Refugees and O t h e r Types of Persons of C o n c e r n to the U N H C R , by Geographic Regions, D e c e m b e r 2003

Population World Africa CASWANAME b Asia Pacific The Americas Europe Percentage World Africa CASWANAME b Asia Pacific The Americas Europe

Asylum Seekers

Total

Refugees

17,093,361 3,977,489 4,064,295 1,404,675 2,278,425 5,368,405

9,671,831 2,863,418 2,914,704 816,364 623,941 2,453,404

995,042 160,363 23,513 17,973 383,626 409,567

100.0 23.3 23.8 8.2 13.3 31.4

100.0 29.6 30.1 8.4 6.5 25.4

100.0 16.1 2.4 1.8 38.6 41.2

Returned Refugees

Internally Displaced and Others of Concern

1,094,698 a 5,331,790 608,649 345,059 420,770 705,308 8,254 562,084 1,270,565 293 35,712 2,469,722 100.0 31.5 64.4 0.8 0.0 3.3

100.0 11.4 7.9 10.5 23.8 46.3

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Population Data Unit, 2002 UNHCR Population Statistics (Provisional), 2003, available online at http://www. unhcr.ch. Notes: a. Includes seventy-two returning refugees with unknown region, b. Central Asia, Southwest Asia, North Africa, Middle East.

International Efforts to Reduce Population Growth International population conferences bring government delegations and representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) together to discuss goals concerning population and to develop strategies for achieving those goals. The most recent conference was held in Cairo in 1994. In each of these gatherings, there has been a general recognition, though not universal agreement, that (1) rapid population growth fueled by high fertility poses a challenge to economic development in less developed countries; (2) mortality should be reduced regardless of the effect on population growth; and (3) international migration is an appropriate arena of national policy and control (Weeks 1996). Over the past three decades, however, important shifts in thinking about population growth have occurred that have had implications for the agenda of population policies and programs within countries. These are discussed in the next section. The 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest produced the f i r s t f o r m a l e x p r e s s i o n of a w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n p o l i c y . T h e " W o r l d Population Plan of Action," however, embodied a wide range of perspectives on the ways to reduce population growth within developing societies. Some countries, notably the United States, advocated fertility cpntrol,

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(Kentucky) Herald Leader, J u l y - A u g u s t 1995.

specifically family planning programs, to reach population growth targets. Other countries, primarily in the developing world, emphasized the role of development in leading to fertility decline (hence, " d e v e l o p m e n t as the best contraceptive")- The 1984 International Population C o n f e r e n c e in Mexico City found the United States reducing its support for family planning (which was linked in turn to the Reagan administration's views on abortion) and identifying population growth as having little hindrance on e c o n o m i c and social d e v e l o p m e n t . M a n y d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s by this time, h o w e v e r , had instituted family planning p r o g r a m s in an e f f o r t to slow the retarding effects of rapid population growth on improving stand a r d s of living a n d e d u c a t i o n a l levels and r e d u c i n g m o r t a l i t y (Weeks 1996). The 1994 International C o n f e r e n c e on Population and Development recognized the global dimensions of population change. T h e conference report, " P r o g r a m m e of Action," identifies the connections among population processes, economic and social development, human rights and opportunities, and the environment, thus shifting attention away f r o m targets concerning population growth to goals concerning sustained development, r e d u c t i o n of p o v e r t y , and e n v i r o n m e n t a l b a l a n c e . T h e c e n t r a l role of w o m e n in the goals and programs to achieve sustainable development is underscored in the final report: "The key to this new approach is empower-

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ing w o m e n and providing them with more choices through e x p a n d e d access to education and health services, skill development and e m p l o y m e n t , and through their full i n v o l v e m e n t in policy- and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g processes at all levels" ( U N D E S I P A 1995: 1). O v e r many decades, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t has i m p l e m e n t e d p r o g r a m s abroad c o n c e r n i n g population, d e v e l o p m e n t , and h u m a n w e l f a r e . As m e n tioned earlier, U.S. support for international family planning p r o g r a m s has w a v e r e d d e p e n d i n g on the particular president's political lens. U n d e r President Ronald R e a g a n , support for fertility control p r o g r a m s was barred f r o m those countries that permitted w o m e n access to legal abortion. This restriction on U.S. foreign aid was lifted in the early days of the Clinton administration, only to be reinstated under President G e o r g e W. Bush. O n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c a l e , the e m p h a s i s on c o n n e c t i n g p o p u l a t i o n issues to the status of w o m e n has represented a significant forward step in e m b e d d i n g p o p u l a t i o n analysis into broader discussions of the quality of h u m a n l i f e a n d the b a l a n c e b e t w e e n society and e n v i r o n m e n t at l o c a l , national, and global levels. Given the demographic trends and patterns discussed above, three additional population issues are likely to b e c o m e m a j o r policy concerns in the near future: population aging, excess deaths d u e to H I V / A I D S , and rapid population growth in already large metropolitan areas. National Population Policies Most countries that have f o r m a l population policies seek to reduce population growth by reducing fertility. Beginning in the 1950s, providing contraception through f a m i l y planning p r o g r a m s was initiated in m a n y developing c o u n t r i e s — o f t e n with s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m d e v e l o p e d countries, N G O s and f o u n d a t i o n s , and in subsequent decades, international o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the U N F u n d f o r P o p u l a t i o n A c t i v i t i e s ( U N F P A ) . Increasingly, policies a i m e d at fertility reduction have e n c o m p a s s e d b r o a d er perspectives on population d y n a m i c s , incorporating goals to increase the status of w o m e n through better health, enhanced educational and e m p l o y ment opportunities, greater access to credit, and so on. T h e record of f a m i l y planning programs has been variable t h r o u g h o u t the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d . I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l f a m i l y p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m , m a i n t a i n e d s i n c e 1952, h a s m e t w i t h f e r t i l i t y t r e n d s that vary s i g n i f i c a n t l y throughout regions within the country and between rural and urban areas. In 1973, M e x i c o instituted a national policy to reduce population g r o w t h , with a f o c u s on the reduction of fertility through maternal and child health p r o g r a m s , f a m i l y p l a n n i n g services, sex education, and population i n f o r m a tion programs. C h i n a ' s fertility control policy began in 1971 as a set of policy goals (wan xi shao) c o n c e r n i n g later m a r r i a g e (wan), l o n g e r intervals b e t w e e n births (xi), and f e w e r children (shao), with the one-child policy i m p l e m e n t -

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ed in 1979. During the 1970s the Chinese birthrate declined significantly, reflecting the provision of contraception in combination with social and economic incentives to delay and reduce fertility. The birth control program also coincided with a general decline in fertility, which had been evident since the early 1960s. The Chinese fertility policy has been criticized harshly, however, for being coercive and for leading to selective abortion, abandonment, and infanticide of girl infants. The current level of fertility in China is estimated to be 1.8 births per woman. The demographic implications of rapid fertility decline in China can be anticipated using population projections. Despite below-replacement fertility, the Chinese population is projected to increase from 1.275 billion in 2000 to 1.395 in 2050 (medium-fertility variant). This nearly 10 percent increase in population size is accompanied by significant shifts in age composition: in 2000, 10 percent of the Chinese population was over sixty years of age; by 2050, this proportion is expected to triple, to 30 percent. (By way of contrast, the proportion of the U.S. population over sixty years old in 2000 was 16 percent.) This dramatic aging of Chinese society in the near future will require changes in Chinese social and economic arrangements to support and care for an increasingly elderly population (UNPD 2003). International Migration and Refugee Policies The UN Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the basic right of people to leave their homelands. The converse of this right to emigrate, however, is not recognized—that is, nation-states have the sovereign right to control the entry of nonnationals into their territory. Nearly all countries have clear policies concerning international migration and travel. The very few countries that continue to allow international migration for permanent resettlement include the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, often considered the traditional immigrant-receiving countries. A much larger range of countries provide humanitarian assistance to refugees in the form of programs admitting refugees for permanent resettlement, response to requests for political asylum, land for r e f u g e e camps, and provision of financial and other resources for international organizations seeking to respond to refugee situations. The demand for international migration, temporary labor migration, refugee resettlement, and temporary asylum can be expected to continue to grow in the next decade, with those seeking to move drawing overwhelmingly from developing regions. Emerging and persistent patterns of undocumented migration throughout both the developed and the developing world are symptoms of the motivation of people to seek better opportunities through international migration. Matched with this demand are national doors that are gradually closing to international migrants. In the traditional receiving countries, concerns over the social, economic, political, and secu-

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rity effects of immigration have moved high up the political agenda at both the national and state or provincial levels, o f t e n , but not always, with efforts to tighten migration controls, reduce immigration levels, and constrain access of immigrants to national and local social programs. The United States accepts the largest number of immigrants for permanent resettlement in the world. Since the mid-1990s, immigration for permanent residence to the United States has averaged approximately 800,000 p e r s o n s per year. In 2 0 0 2 , M e x i c o , India, C h i n a , the P h i l i p p i n e s , and Vietnam provided the largest numbers of immigrants to the United States (USDHS 2003). U.S. immigration policy is organized around several principles. First, the policy gives priority to close relatives of U.S. citizens and, to a lesser extent, to relatives of immigrants already in the country. Second, the policy gives priority to persons with occupations, skills, and capital that will benefit the U.S. economy. This dimension of U.S. immigration policy may contribute to the loss of highly skilled and professionally trained persons from developing countries (referred to as "brain drain"). Third, immigrants to the United States must be admissible on the basis of a long list of personal characteristics (for example, good health, lack of criminal background, and sufficient economic resources). Fourth, there are annual numerical limits on the major categories of immigration to the United States. Refugees are resettled in the United States if they meet the criteria of the international definition provided above. The numbers of persons admitted as refugees reflects international need as identified by the U.S. State Department in consultation with Congress. In the mid-1990s, an average of 80,000 refugees were admitted annually, largely from Bosnia-Herzegovina, countries in the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam (USDHS 2003). Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, refugee admissions to the United States have been sharply curtailed. The United States also issues hundreds of thousands of " n o n i m m i grant" visas each year to persons visiting the country for specific purposes such as tourism and business, university study, consulting, and temporary employment. One likely effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks will be more restriction of temporary visas and a generally greater scrutiny of all visa applications. T h e relationship between international migration and homeland security has become a significant dimension of the U.S. immigration debate.

•

Conclusion

Population trends and patterns within countries and regions hold fundamental and inescapable i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the full spectrum of global issues

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addressed in this book. W h i l e the annual rate of world population growth has been declining in recent d e c a d e s , s i g n i f i c a n t increases in p o p u l a t i o n size, particularly in countries in the d e v e l o p i n g world, will continue into the near future. Understanding the sources of population c h a n g e , specifically declines in fertility and patterns of migration, is a critical d i m e n s i o n of e f f o r t s to attain s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t and r e d u c e p o v e r t y in r e g i o n s throughout the world and to protect the global e n v i r o n m e n t . Population scientists are directing world attention to the spectre of H I V / A I D S and infectious disease and also to rapid urbanization throughout m a n y regions of the developing world. To contribute to these important discussions, this chapter has sought to introduce readers to the international and national p o p u l a t i o n issues that exist and are e m e r g i n g within the global arena. T h e d i s c u s s i o n has been built on a foundation of basic tools for the study of population, important trends in population growth and its c o m p o n e n t d e m o g r a p h i c processes, and d o m i n a n t perspectives c o n c e r n i n g the causes and c o n s e q u e n c e s of population growth. Threaded throughout the discussion has been consideration of perspectives on population, society, and environment. Present trends in fertility, mortality, and m i g r a t i o n h o l d the key f o r the f u t u r e t r a j e c t o r y of world population growth. Population policy decisions m a d e today—locally, nationally, and internationally—will influence that trajectory and ultimately the size and distribution of global population.

Discussion Questions 1. Is population growth a m a j o r global p r o b l e m ? 2. D o you agree more with the views of the c o r n u c o p i a n s or the neoMalthusians with r e f e r e n c e to population g r o w t h ? 3. W h a t population p r o b l e m s arise f r o m rapidly g r o w i n g cities? 4. S h o u l d c o u n t r i e s o p e n their b o r d e r s to r e f u g e e s f l e e i n g political persecution and those seeking e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t y ? 5. Was the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t ' s one-child policy j u s t i f i e d ? Should g o v e r n m e n t s be involved in population policy? 6. Should the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t give foreign aid to reduce world population g r o w t h ? Should the aid be conditional? 7 To what groups of i m m i g r a n t s should countries give p r e f e r e n c e ?

•

Suggested Readings

Arizpe, Lourdes M., Priscilia Stone, and David C. Major, eds. (1994) Population and Environment:

Rethinking the Debate. Boulder: Westview.

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Ashford, Lori S . ( 1 9 9 5 ) " N e w Perspectives on Population: L e s s o n s from C a i r o . " Population Bulletin 5 0 , no. 2. Washington, D C : Population Reference Bureau. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J . Miller ( 1 9 9 8 ) The Age of Migration: International Population in the Modern World. Second edition. New York: Guilford Press. Commoner, Barry ( 1 9 9 2 ) Making Peace with the Planet. New York: New Press. Demeny, Paul, and Geoffrey M c N i c o l l ( 2 0 0 3 ) Encyclopedia of Population. Volumes 1 - 2 . New York: Macmillan Reference U S A . Harper, C h a r l e s L . ( 1 9 9 5 ) Environment and Society: Human Perspectives on Environmental Issues. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. M c F a l l s , J o s e p h , Jr. ( 1 9 9 5 ) " P o p u l a t i o n : A L i v e l y I n t r o d u c t i o n . " Population Bulletin 4 6 , no. 2. Washington, D C : Population Reference Bureau. Moffett, George D. ( 1 9 9 4 ) Critical Masses: The Global Population Challenge. New York: Penguin. A Debate on Myers, Norman, and Julian L. Simon ( 1 9 9 2 ) Scarcity or Abundance: the Environment. New York: W. W. Norton. U N H C R (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Population Data Unit ( 2 0 0 3 ) 2002 UNCHR Population Statistics (Provisional). Available online at http://www.unhcr.ch. U N P D (United Nations Population Division) ( 2 0 0 3 ) World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision—Highlights. New York: United Nations. ( 2 0 0 4 a ) World Fertility Report. New York: United Nations. ( 2 0 0 4 b ) World Population Policies 2003. New York: United Nations. ( 2 0 0 4 c ) World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision—Data Tables and Highlights. New York: United Nations. U S D H S ( U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D C : U . S . Government Printing Office.

IO Women and Development Elise Boulding and Heather Parker

T

his chapter uses the term development to refer to social, economic, and political structures and processes that enable all members of a society to share in opportunities for education, employment, civic participation, and social and cultural fulfillment as human beings, in the context of a fair distribution of the society's resources among all its citizenry. The United Nations bound itself in its Charter "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character." In other words, the more industrialized countries of the North agreed to help the less industrialized countries of the South to reach the higher economic and social level already achieved in the North. The first thing to note about this development planning is that it has been done almost entirely by men, for men, with women and children as a residual category. How could half the human race be invisible to development planners despite Mao Tse-tung's well-known saying that "women hold up half the sky"? This chapter will review how this situation evolved, how it has hampered "real development," and what women—and men—are doing about it.

•

From Partnership to Patriarchy

In the early days of the human species, men, women, and children moved about in small hunting and gathering bands, sharing the same terrain and exploring the same spaces. Role differentiation was minimal, though childbearing restricted women's movements somewhat, and men ranged farther in hunting prey. Even so, it is estimated that women, as roving gatherers,

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supplied up to 8 0 percent o f a band's diet by weight and therefore carried an important part o f society's ecological knowledge in their heads. B a s e d on observation o f small hunting-gathering tribes found in Africa, Australia, and South America today, it would seem that old women as well as old men took the role o f tribal elders and carried out rituals important to the social life o f the band. About 1 2 , 0 0 0 B.C.E. a combination o f events brought about a m a j o r c h a n g e in the human c o n d i t i o n : improved hunting t e c h n i q u e s resulted in a dwindling supply o f animals, and women discovered from their plant-gathering activities that seeds spilled by c h a n c e near the previous year's campsite would sprout into wheat the following year, creating a convenient, nearby source o f food. This resulted in the deliberate planting o f s e e d s to grow f o o d , and agriculture c a m e into b e i n g . T h i s c h a n g e d everything. S i n c e working with seeds was w o m e n ' s work, women b e c a m e the farmers, and men went farther and farther afield in search o f scarce g a m e , thus d i s c o v e r i n g e x c i t i n g new terrain that w o m e n knew nothing about. T h e shared-experience worlds o f women and men were now differentiated. Women knew about everything that was close to home, and men were exploring the world "out t h e r e . " W h i l e a lot has happened to humankind since 1 2 , 0 0 0 B.C.E.. bearing children, growing and processing food, and feeding families (also creating shelters and c l o t h i n g ) have continued to be w o m e n ' s work for most o f the world's population. M o v i n g from the earliest farming settlements to villages to towns to c i t i e s and civilizations took another 8 , 0 0 0 to 1 0 , 0 0 0 years, but cities never returned to women that freedom o f movement they had e n j o y e d as gatherers. Rather, cities heralded the rise o f the rule o f men, or patriarchy, to replace an earlier partnership. W h a t cities and c i v i lization brought were c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f wealth and p o w e r — a n d houses that e n c l o s e d women and shut them o f f from the outside world. Only poor w o m e n were free to scurry about the streets to provide services for the r i c h . W i t h i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , and m a j o r p o p u l a t i o n m o v e m e n t s to the c i t i e s , w h e r e the f a c t o r i e s w e r e l o c a t e d , t h e r e w e r e f e w e r and f e w e r w o m e n e n j o y i n g the relative freedom o f farming and craft work, which f a m i l i e s often carried out as a f a m i l y team in the period known as the Middle A g e s . Now they were either shut up in the h o m e or shut up in f a c tories. W h i l e we have been describing m a j o r trends for women, the reality for individual women was much more c o m p l e x , and in every age women found ways to be creative and to improve the circumstances in which they l i v e d . W h i l e m o s t o f w o m e n ' s c r e a t i v i t y w a s i n v i s i b l e , we do f i n d w o m e n — q u e e n s and saints and philosophers and p o e t s — i n the history books. We also find precursors o f the contemporary w o m e n ' s movement from the 1 5 0 0 s through the 1 7 0 0 s . However, by the nineteenth century, the p r e s s u r e s o f u r b a n i z a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n in E u r o p e and N o r t h

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America gave rise to a new social sector of educated middle-class women with free time and a growing awareness of the world around them, including awareness of women migrants from rural areas, chained with their children to factory and slum. This produced a small group of women radicals and revolutionaries and a larger group of liberal reformers and concerned traditionalists who translated their sense of family responsibility into responsibility for the community. These women quickly discovered, when they intruded into the political arena, that as women they had no civic or legal identity, no political rights, and no economic power. The realization that they needed civic rights to get on with reform led to an exciting century and a half of mobilization of women in the public arena. Their concerns about economic conditions for the poor soon spilled over to concern about the frequent wars that rolled over Europe, which they saw as directly related to poverty and suffering. The suffrage movement came into being because women realized that they needed political power in order to fight the social evils they saw. Everywhere, women came up against the rule of men and sought partnership with them rather than domination by them. The patriarchal model pervades society but begins in the family with the rule of the male head of household over wife or wives and children; it has served as a template for all other social institutions, including education, economic life, civic and cultural life, and governance and defense of the state. Because so many generations of humans have been socialized into the patriarchal model, the struggle to replace it with partnership between women and men will be a long one, and it has barely begun. Now, however, the survival of the planet is at stake. Women's knowledge of their social and physical environment, of human needs, of how children learn, of how conflicts can be managed without violence and values protected without war—as well as their skill in managing households with scarce resources— are urgently needed wherever planning takes place and policies are made. Yet these are precisely the places where women are absent.

•

T h e U n i t e d Nations:The Development Decades

As Western colonial empires began to dissolve in the UN's first decade in the 1950s, it became clear that the ever more numerous new, poor nations that came to be called the "third world" were going to need a lot of assistance from the founding states of the UN in order to work their way out of poverty. The popular "trickle-down" theory, which asserts that financial benefits given to big business and upper-class sectors will in turn pass down to smaller businesses, consumers, and lower-class sectors, led to the encouragement of capital-intensive heavy industry in poor countries. This

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type of industry requires large expenditures of capital. The result is a loss o f l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e light industries that require labor and might have employed the unemployed and the unschooled. The only aid given to agriculture was in the form of capital-intensive equipment that required large acreage and pushed subsistence farmers onto ever more marginal lands with rapidly deteriorating soils. This approach, labeled economic dualism, leaves the bulk of a country's population without the skills and tools needed to be more productive. B y the end of the 1950s, it was evident that "international cooperation" was not helping poorer countries at all. Then the UN General Assembly declared the 1960s a "Development Decade," a time of catching up for all the societies left behind in the tw entieth-century march of progress. Yet the policies based on economic dualism remained unchanged, despite valiant efforts by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), established in 1965, to undertake a more diversified approach. B y the end of that decade, gross national product ( G N P ) growth rates were negative in a number o f third world countries, even in some that had " g o o d " development prospects. A second Development Decade was launched in 1 9 7 0 to try to do what the first had failed to accomplish, but by then it had become clear to many third world countries that the development strategies recommended by "first w o r l d " countries were not working. T h e y formed their own body, the Group of 77 (eventually including 118 states), to promote a program of action for the establishment o f a new international e c o n o m i c order. This called for more aid from countries of the North, debt moratoriums, and other strategies to halt the continuing increase in economic gap between North and South. A monitoring system for the conduct o f multinational corporations was also demanded. The North had no serious interest in acting on these proposals, and the poor nations kept getting poorer. In 1980 the UN launched yet another Development Decade, still following failed policies. One problem faced was the World B a n k ' s structural adjustment program, which compelled countries of the South to focus on producing cash crops for the international market to reduce their indebtedness, and to spend less money on human services. This intensified the dualism between a low-productivity agricultural sector and a high-productivity agribusiness and industrial sector. People in the South went hungry and without s c h o o l i n g while food was e x p o r t e d to the North (since more money could be made), and countries sank still deeper into poverty. The goal of all of this Development Decade activity, planned and carried out by men, was to increase the productivity of the male worker. But one quiet day in the late 1960s, a Danish woman economist, Ester Boserup ( 1 9 7 0 ) , decided to study what was actually going on in that intractable subsistence sector of agriculture. She was able to point out that the majority of

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the food producers were women, not men, but all agricultural aid, including credit and tools, was given to men. This aid not only failed to reach the women but also encouraged men to grow cash crops (which needed irrigation) for export. This added to the women's work load, as the men demanded that their wives tend the new fields in addition to the family plot that fed the family and provided a modest surplus for the local market. Now an entirely new picture began to emerge. Boserup focused her studies on Africa, which was bearing the cruelest load of suffering in the food supply crisis. She found that roughly 75 percent of food producers were women, often either sole heads of households or with migrant husbands living and working elsewhere. Their working time was on the average fifteen hours a day. They worked with babies on their backs, and their only helpers were the children they bore. These women farmers never received advice on improved methods of growing food, tools to replace their digging sticks, wells to make water more available, credit to aid them during the years of bad crops, or aid in marketing. Long hours of walking to procure water and to get to market (with their produce carried on their heads), in addition to the hard work in the fields, made their lives a heavy struggle. Yet emphasizing the hardship women experience should not obscure the importance of women's special knowledge stock, which is basic to community survival in any country, in both rural and urban settings. In a future world with more balanced partnering between women and men, knowledge will not be so gender linked; for now, it is imperative that it be recorded, assessed, and used. Women's special knowledge stock relates particularly to six areas: (1) life-span health maintenance, including care of children and the elderly; (2) food production, storage, and short- and longterm processing; (3) maintenance and use of water and fuel resources; (4) production of household equipment, often including housing construction; (5) maintenance of interhousehold barter systems; and (6) maintenance of kin networks and ceremonials for handling regularly recurring major family events as well as crisis situations. While only the second area relates directly to food, all six factors contribute to the adequate nutrition of a community; the sixth area is particularly important in ensuring food sharing over great distances in times of food shortages and famine. Unfortunately, the extended-kin and ceremonial complex is one of the first resources to be destroyed with modernization. The story of the UN's third Development Decade could have been different if policy planners had had this information at their fingertips. But now there was a women's movement ready to hear what Ester Boserup and a growing group of women development professionals had to say about women's roles in the development process. The UN came to play an important part in giving them a platform.

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•

T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s : T h e W o m e n ' s Decades

In 1 9 6 3 t h e U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y p r o c l a i m e d

1965

"International

Cooperation Y e a r " ( I C Y ) . Just two years before, the W o m e n ' s Strike for P e a c e m o v e m e n t had spread from the United States to other continents, so when word o f the U N ' s proclamation got out, an international w o m e n ' s network quickly sprang into being to organize projects for 1965 in many countries. B e t w e e n the w o m e n ' s inexperience and the international b u r e a u c r a c y ' s inertia, the I C Y fell short o f its s p o n s o r s ' ambitious hopes; but for the international c o m m u n i t y o f w o m e n , it proved to be the start o f a still unfolding chain o f events. W o m e n formed traveling teams to e x p l o r e every continent and began seeing with their own eyes in the rural areas o f A f r i c a , Asia, and Latin A m e r i c a what E s t e r B o s e r u p was documenting as an e c o n o m i s t . T h e y began to see w o m e n as the workers o f the world, though invisible to census e n u m e r a t o r s b e c a u s e m u c h o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e l a b o r t a k e s p l a c e in the w o r l d o f the h o m e : the k i t c h e n , t h e k i t c h e n g a r d e n , and the n u r s e r y . " E m p l o y e d p e r s o n s " were supposed to have identifiable outside j o b s and wages. U n w a g e d labor (such as child care, h o u s e w o r k , e t c . ) and labor in what is called the informal e c o n o m y (which is not reported in the e c o n o m y ' s record b o o k s , such as street vending, prostitution, and illegal drug sales) were c o n c e p t s not taken seriously by e c o n o m i s t s and statisticians. T h i s did not stop the women who traveled together in the I C Y teams. A s they b e g a n to see h o m e m a k e r s as w o r k e r s , they r e d e f i n e d their own role. T h e y liked to be called " h o u s e k e e p e r s o f the w o r l d . " In 1 9 7 2 , "international h o u s e k e e p i n g " brought them to the UN C o n f e r e n c e on the Human Environment

in S t o c k h o l m

a n d in

1 9 7 4 to the World

Population

C o n f e r e n c e in B u c h a r e s t and the World F o o d C o n f e r e n c e in R o m e . E a c h time, they c a m e in larger numbers and with better d o c u m e n t a t i o n on how the c o n f e r e n c e s u b j e c t was relevant to w o m e n . T h e y a l s o b e c a m e increasingly aware o f how blind most o f their m a l e c o l l e a g u e s were to the importance o f w o m e n ' s roles in e c o n o m i c production and social welfare. S i n c e g o v e r n m e n t s a p p o i n t e d f e w w o m e n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s , the knowledge and w i s d o m o f this growing group o f observers went unheard. T h e y were outsiders, petitioners, protesters. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the U N had actually e s t a b l i s h e d , in its E c o n o m i c and S o c i a l C o u n c i l , its C o m m i s s i o n on the Status o f W o m e n as early as 1 9 4 6 , and by 1 9 4 8 its D e c l a r a t i o n on Human R i g h t s included gender as a category. In fact, over the d e c a d e s the U N adopted twenty-one c o n v e n t i o n s on the rights o f w o m e n , although they remained largely paper rights because m e m b e r states did not provide f o r their implementation. It was still a m a n ' s w o r l d . B u t w o m e n w e r e l e a r n i n g s t r a t e g i e s f o r w o r k i n g in it. T h e C o m m i s s i o n on the Status o f W o m e n in particular was building up experie n c e in working within the U N system and began to assert itself. Its m e m bers saw to it that the phrase "integrating w o m e n into d e v e l o p m e n t " was

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included in the development program for the second Development Decade. While ignored by decisionmakers, the phrase immediately reverberated in the growing international women's movement. Furthermore, in 1972, Helvi Sipila of Finland was appointed the first woman UN assistant secretarygeneral, for humanitarian and social affairs. Empowered by Sipila's support, the Commission on the Status of Women worked closely with the older women's organizations and the newer networks to create a women's agenda for the UN. The first real breakthrough came when the UN General Assembly declared that 1975 would be "International Women's Year." A worldwide plan of action (UN 1976), drafted for the 1975 assembly of women in Mexico City, defined status in terms of the degree of control women had over their conditions of life. This became a key theme that continues to this day in the women's movement. The International Women's Year became the UN International Decade for Women (or Women's Decade), with follow-up meetings in 1980 in Copenhagen, in 1985 in Nairobi, and in 1995 in Beijing. These UN-sponsored world women's conferences have represented a growing voice for women as participants and coshapers of the world in which they live. The trio of themes for each of these gatherings, which swelled from 6,000 women in Mexico City to 14,000 women in Nairobi to 50,000 in Beijing, has been equality, development, and peace. The interrelationship of these three concepts in the lives of women, and in the life of every society, represents an important breakthrough in the conceptualization of development. The guidelines for national action laid down for the Women's Decade are as relevant today as they were twenty years ago: •

• • • •

• •

involving women in the strengthening of international security and peace through participation at all relevant levels in national, intergovernmental, and UN bodies; furthering the political participation of women in national societies at every level; strengthening educational and training programs for women; integrating women workers into the labor force of every country at every level, according to accepted international standards; distributing health and nutrition services more equitably, to take account of the responsibilities of women everywhere for the health and feeding of their families; increasing governmental assistance for the family unit; involving women directly, as the primary producers of population, in the development of population programs and other programs affecting the quality of life of individuals of all ages, in family groups and outside them, including housing and social services of every kind.

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Immediate o u t c o m e s o f the 1 9 7 5 c o n f e r e n c e included the establishment o f the UN I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h and T r a i n i n g Institute f o r the A d v a n c e m e n t o f W o m e n ( I N S T R A W ) , the UN D e v e l o p m e n t Fund f o r Women (a voluntary fund), and a modest working relationship with the UN D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e . With few resources and very small staffs, the two new UN bodies have nevertheless played an important part in the gradual recognition o f women as actors, not only as subjects needing protection. S i n c e the UN declared the international W o m e n ' s Decade, some promising steps have been taken within the international c o m m u n i t y toward progress for women in development. One o f the most notable and betterknown events is the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in B e i j i n g . S i n c e this conference the United Nations has also called a special session, the B e i j i n g + 5 , designed to review and assess past and current progress as well as future actions and initiatives. In addition, in 1997 the U N ' s Division for the Advancement o f Women ( D A W ) , the UN D e v e l o p m e n t Fund for Women ( U N I F E M ) , and I N S T R A W founded W o m e n W a t c h . WomenWatch was created to monitor the results o f the 1995 B e i j i n g C o n f e r e n c e as well as to create Internet space on global w o m e n ' s issues. In short, women were no longer to be treated as invisible or as subject to patriarchal rule, but as persons, citizens, and actors on the local and global scene. T h e importance o f the role o f the UN in providing an international platform for women to be seen, heard, and listened to with respect cannot be underestimated—even though the UN itself still has a long way to g o in making senior posts available to women. Now the concepts are there, in public international discourse, and the UN and its m e m b e r states c a n n o t c o m p l e t e l y ignore t h e m , h o w e v e r much they drag their feet in applying them. This change in visibility could not have happened without a strong involvement o f women from every continent. How did the invisible b e c o m e visible so quickly?

•

W o m e n ' s N e t w o r k s Redefine t h e Meaning o f D e v e l o p m e n t

A s mentioned earlier, women were already active internationally on behalf o f the oppressed poor by the middle o f the nineteenth century. T h e y c a m e to k n o w e a c h o t h e r a c r o s s c o n t i n e n t s by m e e t i n g at the great w o r l d ' s f a i r s — L o n d o n in 1 8 5 1 , Paris in 1 8 5 5 and 1 8 6 7 , and C h i c a g o in 1 8 9 3 . T h e s e were women o f the upper middle classes who could travel, o f course. Many innovations in education and welfare services and h o m e services for working women and children, prisoners, and migrants emerged from those m e e t i n g s . B y 1 9 3 0 there were thirty-one international nongovernmental w o m e n ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( I N G O s ) and m o r e o f them had w o r k i n g - c l a s s

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m e m b e r s . However, it was not until the United Nations brought grassroots w o m e n f r o m each continent in touch with each other that there e m e r g e d a d e e p e r understanding of the p r o b l e m s that w o m e n f a c e d in countries form e r l y c o l o n i z e d by the West. W h i l e e v e r y c o u n t r y e x p e r i e n c e d g e n d e r based dualism ( w o m e n ' s - o n l y and m e n ' s - o n l y j o b s ) , only in the third world w a s g e n d e r - b a s e d d u a l i s m l i n k e d to an e c o n o m i c d u a l i s m that t r a p p e d w o m e n in the subsistence sector. In other words, w o m e n were left without the skills or opportunity for e c o n o m i c i m p r o v e m e n t . W h i l e the cultural specifics of the situation of w o m e n differed a m o n g countries and continents, they all had a c o m m o n base of experience linked to the fact of bearing and rearing children and having responsibility for the n o u r i s h m e n t , health, and well-being of f a m i l y m e m b e r s . T h u s , while m e n m e a s u r e d d e v e l o p m e n t in e c o n o m i c terms of rates of growth of the gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t , w o m e n ' s t h i n k i n g w a s in t e r m s of h u m a n a n d s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t . W h a t m a d e life better for individual h u m a n beings, and what m a d e societies m o r e h u m a n e and j o y f u l to live in? T h e s e were the questions w o m e n were asking as they f o r m e d new w o m e n ' s I N G O s c o m m i t t e d to h u m a n rights, d e v e l o p m e n t , and an end to violence. T h e same questions were being asked by the new w o m e n ' s n e t w o r k s that began f o r m i n g during preparations for the first International W o m e n ' s Year. T h e first of the new n e t w o r k s was f o r m e d at the International Tribunal on C r i m e s Against W o m e n , w h i c h met in Brussels in 1974. F r o m that tribunal w e get the first m a j o r international statement about patriarchal p o w e r as v i o l e n c e against w o m e n per se, apart f r o m s p e c i f i c a b u s i v e acts. Participants joined to establish the International Feminist Network after list e n i n g to a h o r r i f y i n g array of v i o l e n c e e x p e r i e n c e d by w o m e n f r o m all classes on all continents at the h a n d s of men in their families, c o m m u n i t i e s , and places of work. Today we are a w a r e that this violence extends to the h o r r o r of w a r t i m e r a p e , an old but i n c r e a s i n g l y v i s i b l e c r i m e a g a i n s t w o m e n w h e r e v e r the violence of w a r takes place. As awareness of the obstacles to achieving the good life not only for w o m e n but also for society as a w h o l e increased, new transitional n e t w o r k s d e v e l o p e d and multiplied f r o m the time of the tribunal to the present. Thus, internationally, w o m e n are strongly aware that obstacles persist to their full partnership in the d e v e l o p m e n t process and that violence and other h u m a n rights abuses and w a r itself constitute a significant part of those obstacles. S i n c e b e i n g a b l e to w o r k w i t h m e n as e q u a l s is a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r w o m e n ' s v o i c e s to be h e a r d , e q u a l i t y h a s b e e n a g o a l at least since the b e g i n n i n g of the s u f f r a g e m o v e m e n t . But gaining the vote, with s o m e associated legal and property rights, did not improve w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c situat i o n , n o r did it b r i n g s e x u a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n to an e n d or m o v e w o m e n t o w a r d p o l i c y m a k i n g positions in society. T h e r e f o r e , o n e part of the equal rights m o v e m e n t has dealt in painstaking detail with legal rights in the area

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of family, employment, rights to education and training, and equal access to opportunity in general. This is important for women everywhere but especially in the poorest countries, where m e n ' s literacy rate is barely at 40 percent and w o m e n ' s literacy rate is only a third or half of that. As opportunities for advanced study become more available to women, the increase in women graduating with degrees in law, engineering, and the sciences, both physical and social, means that the sisterhood for social change on each continent can draw on a high level of competence and expertise in its work for equality. Another part of the equal rights m o v e m e n t has taken a more direct p o l i t i c a l track: w o m e n have s o u g h t to be i n v o l v e d in the l a w m a k i n g process as elected officials. Women's representation in politics can be broken down into parliamentary and executive branches of government. Since 1987, w o m e n ' s representation in single and lower chambers of parliaments around the world has increased by 7 percent, starting at 9 percent in 1987, remaining at 9 percent in 1995, growing to 11 percent in 1999, and growing to 16 percent in 2004. Women are still greatly underrepresented in national parliaments throughout the world. However, in certain regions, w o m e n ' s representation has made great strides, specifically in the Caribbean, Latin America, and eastern and southeastern Asia (see Table 10.1) ( U N S D 2001; U N D P 2004). In addition, women are underrepresented in executive branches of government (including the following positions: president or head of state and prime minister and ministry positions and cabinet) around the world. Since 1974, women have held the post of head of state in only thirty countries, and since 1960, women have served as prime minister in only thirty-three countries. Yet around the world there is evidence that w o m e n ' s representation is slowly increasing. In 2001, fifty-eight countries had women in 15 percent of ministerial positions, versus twenty-eight countries in 1998 that had women in 15 percent of these posts ( U N D P 2004). Women's political participation may be thought of as a pyramid, with the bulk of w o m e n found at the bottom, at the local level, and the fewest at the top, at the d i p l o m a t i c level. In g e n e r a l , t h e r e is a t i p p i n g - p o i n t p h e n o m e n o n f o r women in elected or appointed office. When there are a very few, " t o k e n " women, they tend to confine themselves to what are thought of as traditional w o m e n ' s issues, notably the well-being of families and children. As women grow in numbers and self-confidence, however, they are e m p o w ered to address broader systemic issues that affect all sectors of society. As professional skills are bringing women into the legislative process, their k n o w - h o w is also b e c o m i n g available to d e v e l o p m e n t specialists, including the language of development alternatives and what is t e r m e d another development. Instead of high-tech industrial enclaves and agribusinesses that rob the poor of their intensive hand labor, alternative develop-

Women and Development

Table 10.1

Region

189

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of W o m e n in N a t i o n a l P a r l i a m e n t s by R e g i o n , 19B7, 1995, 1999, and 2004 1987

World average Africa 9.0 Northern A f r i c a 3.0 Sub-Saharan Africa 7.0 Latin America and the Caribbean Caribbean 9.0 Central America 8.0 South America 7.0 Asia Eastern Asia 18.0 Southeastern Asia 10.0 Southern Asia 5.0 Central Asia 0.0 Western Asia 4.0 Oceania 2.0 Developed regions Eastern Europe 26.0 Western Europe 14.0 Other developed regions 7.0

1995

1999

2004

9.0 4.0 9.0

11.0 3.0 10.0

14.0 8.0 14.0

11.0 10.0 9.0

13.0 13.0 13.0

20.0 16.0 15.0

12.0 9.0 5.0 8.0 4.0 2.0

13.0 12.0 5.0 8.0 5.0 3.0

15.0 17.0 8.0 11.0 5.0 2.0

9.0 18.0 12.0

10.0 21.0 18.0

14.0 24.0 20.0

Sources/ U N S D (United Nations Statistical Division), The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics (New York: United Nations, 2001); IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union), "Women in P a r l i a m e n t : W o r l d C l a s s i f i c a t i o n , " 2 0 0 4 , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e at h t t p : / / w w w . i p u . o r g / wmn-e/classif.htm (Octobcr 26).

ment means investing in tools and water supplies for farmers and craft workers; making credit available for small improvements, including equipment for small local factories; and building local roads, schools, and community centers that can serve many needs, including day care for small children and health services. While women have been leaders in all of these efforts to achieve human and social development, not simply economic development, they have certainly not been alone. Ever since E. F. Schumacher (1993) wrote about "economics as if peopled mattered," there have been creative and humanistically oriented male development professionals who have worked both alone and together with women to further these broader goals. They too have helped to strengthen the women's networks. Protecting the environment from multinationals that are logging whole forests and leaving fragile soils to erode, that are undertaking mining operations destructive of local farmland and waterways, that are building dams that destroy huge acreage and cause an increase in homelessness and unemployment—these activities also become an important agenda for women's networks. They are proud to bear the label ecofeminists. (It was a woman, Ellen Swallow, who coined the term ecology in 1892, and it was a woman,

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Rachel Carson, who is credited with initiating the birth of the modern environmental movement with her book Silent Spring, appearing in 1962.)

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F r o m Patriarchy to Partnership

We are midstream in a long, slow process of transformation. As described more fully at the end of The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time (Boulding 1992), in one sense the institutions of society continue to be stacked against women. There are strong expectations of subservient behavior on the part of women, reinforced by upbringing, teachi n g s of c h u r c h and s c h o o l , c o n t i n u i n g i n e q u a l i t y u n d e r the law, underrepresentation in government, and media portrayal of women as consumer queens. However, we must not underestimate the fact that there has always been a women's culture inside the patriarchal culture, one that modifies and changes the patriarchal institutions. We can therefore think of women as shapers, not only victims, of society. However, individual initiative alone can be weak and ineffective. The support system for women found in women's organizations and networks acts as a great multiplier of individual effort.

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Some C o u n t r y Examples of the W o m e n - D e v e l o p m e n t Relationship

Kenya The Green Belt movement for reforestation is responding to the environmental crisis of deforestation. The trees of the Rift Valley in Kenya are already gone, and the land is undergoing soil erosion and desertification on a large scale. The Green Belt movement brings the women of local villages into tree-planting activities in order to rebuild seriously degraded soils and also to provide the foods and fuelwood that a well-cared-for forest can provide. The plan is very simple. The women of each village plant a community woodland of at least 1,000 trees, a green belt. They prepare the ground, dig holes, provide manure, and then help take care of the young trees. The inspiration for this movement came from a Kenyan woman biologist, Wangari Maathai, who saw that the natural ecosystems of her country were being destroyed. As she has pointed out, the resulting poverty was something men could run away from, into the cities, but the women and children remain behind in the rural areas, hard put to provide food and water for hungry families. Working with the National Council of Women of Kenya, Maathai went from village to village to persuade women to join the Green Belt movement. Green Belt by now has involved more than 80,000

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women and half a million schoolchildren in establishing over 6,000 local tree nurseries and planting more than 30 million trees in community woodlands, with a tree survival rate of 70 to 80 percent. This revival of local ecosystems has made fuel available, and family kitchen gardens are once more viable. Furthermore, women have been empowered to develop more ways of processing and storing foodstuffs that were formerly vulnerable to spoilage. The movement's success has encouraged its spread to fifteen other African nations. In Kenya, educated urban women were in close enough touch with their village sisters to be aware of their needs. The basic development issue at stake, says Maathai, is food security, without which no country can have any meaningful development. Women helped to introduce the food security concept to development professionals. As a result of her work, Maathai was award the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004. She became the first African woman to receive the prestigious award. Bangladesh Long before the days of colonialism, the traditional practice of forming local credit associations had tided many women over hard times. The new situation of a growing cash economy in both rural and urban areas greatly increased the need for credit, but credit is rarely available to women through local banks. In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank was started specifically for the poorest sector of the population and now has thousands of borrowers' groups throughout the country, most of which are women. A network of thousands of "bankers on bicycles," each trained by the Grameen organization, covers many areas of Bangladesh, and the Grameen principle has now spread to other Asian countries, to Africa, and to Latin America. Further loans to a borrowers' group depend on repayment of previous loans, and repayment rates average 98 percent of all loans, with women having consistently higher repayment rates than men. Once a women's group has successfully completed its first round of loans for land for farming, for livestock, or for tools, they often expand their activities to building schools, clinics, and needed local production facilities. Studies of Grameen find that the incomes of borrowers' groups in Grameen Bank villages are 43 percent higher than those of borrowers in non-Grameen villages. This is a tribute both to the Grameen method and to the business acumen of women borrower groups. Afghanistan Believing that economic empowerment could be key to positive change in the lives of Afghan women, Afghans for Civil Society (ACS) launched the successful Income Generation Project in Kandahar in 2002. The project

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provides a market for traditional embroidery and beadwork. S i n c e m o s t women in conservative southern Afghanistan are still prevented from being seen outside, A C S provides the poor with work in their homes, which they can complete on their own time, as they j u g g l e their often arduous household chores. T h e women use silk threads and beads to create intricate, delicate designs (a trademark o f Kandahar), while A C S tailors the dimensions o f the finished products to the Western market. B y working with women in their homes, in a culturally sensitive way that does not directly challenge local norms, the project's goal is to positively impact women's lives while p r e v e n t i n g a b a c k l a s h that m i g h t e n d a n g e r their rights. W o r k i n g with women in their homes has also permitted the organization to develop other projects, such as the W o m e n ' s Mobile S e r v i c e s Project, that bring health care and literacy training for women into their homes. During its brief e x i s tence, the Income Generation Project has grown to employ more than 3 0 0 women in thirty centers in and around the city.

Assessing W h e r e W e A r e We have followed the development decades from the perspective of women and noted the absence o f women from the planning process. Male planners' lack o f knowledge o f the importance o f w o m e n ' s agricultural labor, and o f their e c o n o m i c and social contributions to a national standard o f living, led development professionals and the UN development institutions, including the World Bank, to concentrate on a capital-intensive type o f development. This included agricultural development that remained in special enclaves. Nothing "trickled d o w n " to poor farmers, mostly women, and the countries o f the South grew poorer as r e s o u r c e s were diverted from the areas o f greatest need. We have also d e s c r i b e d how the international w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , with support from the UN, has set about addressing the ignorance o f male planners about w o m e n ' s work. At the same time, women's efforts to promote equality o f participation in development, starting with the W o m e n ' s D e c a d e , has led to a g r o w i n g a w a r e n e s s that o v e r c o m i n g poverty and i m p r o v i n g the q u a l i t y o f l i f e f o r all r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between women and men, moving from patriarchy to partnership. W h e n women and men can share their experience, resources o f the World B a n k and m e m b e r states will be better used at local levels. This is already happening. T h e World B a n k has started modifying its structural adjustment programs. In the spring o f 1997, a noteworthy global campaign was launched by I N G O s and private sector antipoverty groups, with the b a c k i n g o f the World B a n k , the UN D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , national leaders, international aid agencies, foundations, and corporations,

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to m a k e small loans to nearly 100 million p o o r p e o p l e to f i n a n c e smallscale f a r m i n g and trade, with a special f o c u s on w o r k i n g with local w o m e n f a r m e r s and entrepreneurs. W o m e n ' s World B a n k i n g has been one of the leading promoters of this c a m p a i g n , which will result in a t r e m e n d o u s multiplication of G r a m e e n B a n k - t y p e projects. T h i s r e p r e s e n t s an important step toward understanding d e v e l o p m e n t as h u m a n and social d e v e l o p m e n t , o p e n i n g u p m o r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r d i v e r s e a p p r o a c h e s to h u m a n b e t t e r m e n t — r e c o g n i z i n g , as S c h u m a c h e r said a l o n g t i m e a g o , that " s m a l l is b e a u t i f u l . " M o s t of all, it p o i n t s to a g r o w i n g p a r t n e r s h i p b e t w e e n the w o m e n and men w h o will be w o r k i n g for that m o r e diversified, m o r e earthloving, m o r e local, and yet m o r e c o n n e c t e d world of the f u t u r e .

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Discussion Questions 1. A f t e r reading this chapter, what does d e v e l o p m e n t m e a n to y o u ? 2. W h y h a v e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l w o m e n ' s c o n f e r e n c e s f r o m 1975 to 1995 continued with the same three t h e m e s : equality, d e v e l o p m e n t , and peace? D o you agree that these t h e m e s belong together? 3. T h e a u t h o r s f o c u s p r i m a r i l y o n p r o b l e m s of d e v e l o p m e n t in the South. Do you think the United States has d e v e l o p m e n t problems? 4. W h a t does the phrase from patriarchy to partnership mean? What would it m e a n for U.S. society? 5. W h a t skills h a v e the w o m e n d i s c u s s e d in the t h r e e c a s e s t u d i e s demonstrated in resolving current and f u t u r e e c o n o m i c and environmental p r o b l e m s ? H o w h a v e they i m p l e m e n t e d the resolutions to these problems?

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Suggested Readings

Boserup, Ester (1970) Women's Role in Economic Development. New York: St. Martin's Press. Boulding, Elise (1992) The Underside of History: A View of Women Through Time. Revised edition. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. (See vol. 1, chap. 4, "From Gatherers to Planters"; and vol. 2, chap. 5, "The Journey from the Underside: Women's Movements Enter Public Spaces.") Caldecott, Leonia, and Stephanie Leland, eds. (1983) Reclaim the Earth: Women Speak Out for Life on Earth. London: Women's Press. Fisher, Julie (1993) The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World. Westport, CT: Praeger. Masini, Eleanora, and Susan Stratigos, eds. (1991) Women, Households, and Change. Tokyo: UN University Press. Rehn, Elisabeth, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2003) Progress of the World's Women,

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2002. New York: U N I F E M . Shiva, Vandana (1989) Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development. London: Zed Books. Turpin, Jennifer, and Lois Ann Lorentzen (1996) The Gendered New World Order: New York: Routledge. Militarism, Development, and the Environment. UN (United Nations) (1995) Fourth World Conference on Women. A/CONF. 177/20. October 17. New York: United Nations. U N S D ( U n i t e d N a t i o n s Statistical D i v i s i o n ) ( 2 0 0 1 ) The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics. New York: United Nations. W a r i n g , M a r i l y n ( 1 9 8 8 ) If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

11 Children George Kent

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orldwide, many children live in wretched conditions, suffering from malnutrition and disease, laboring in abusive work situations, and suffering exploitation of the most grotesque forms. The gravest problems of children are found in poorer countries, but many children are severely disadvantaged even in the richer countries. In the United States, for example, fully one-fifth of the nation's children live below the official poverty line. My purpose here is to show that the situation of children should be understood not merely as a series of unconnected localized and private problems, but as a series of systemic problems of public policy requiring attention at the highest levels of national and international governance. Increasing attention by policymakers to the problems of children has resulted in some real progress in improving the quality of children's lives. The advances are documented every year in reports of the United Nations C h i l d r e n ' s Fund ( U N I C E F ) : The State of the World's Children and The Progress of Nations. In 1993, for example, The Progress of Nations reported: In little more than one generation, average real incomes have more than doubled; child death rates have been more than halved; malnutrition rates have been reduced by about 30%; life expectancy has increased by about a third; the proportion of children enrolled in primary school has risen from less than half to more than three quarters; and the percentage of rural families with access to safe water has risen from less than 10% to more than 60%. (UNICEF 1993a: 4) However, satisfaction with such successes must be tempered with appreciation of the great distance still to be traveled if all children are to live a life

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of decency. Perhaps the clearest lesson learned in recent years is that significant gains in children's well-being do not result from economic growth alone. They also require progressive social policy based on a sustained commitment to improvements in the well-being of the poor in general and children in particular. The following four sections provide an overview of the situation of children with regard to child labor, child prostitution, armed conflict, and malnutrition. A section on child mortality then shows that such pressures on children result in massive mortality, making even armed conflict look relatively unimportant by comparison. While many different kinds of programs have been developed over the years to address the concerns of children, most have been inadequate to the task. There is now new hope in the rapidly advancing recognition of children's rights, based on the acknowledgment that every single child has the right to live in dignity. The legal obligation for the fulfillment of children's rights falls primarily on national governments, but for large-scale global issues these obligations need to be clarified. The last section of this chapter focuses on these obligations.

Child Labor Children work all over the world, in rich as well as poor countries. They do chores for their families, and many go out to fields and factories to earn modest amounts of money. Children's work can be an important part of their education, and it can make an important contribution to their own and their families' sustenance. There can be no quarrel with that. The concern here, however, is with child labor. Child labor can be defined as children working in conditions that are excessively abusive and exploitative. It is not clear where exactly the boundary between acceptable children's work and unacceptable child labor should be located, but there are many situations in which there can be no d o u b t that the line has been crossed. Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, in a study on child labor, offered many illustrations: Thousands of girls between the ages of 12 and 15 work in the small industrial enterprises at Kao-hsiung in southern Taiwan. . . . Some children [in Colombia] are employed 280 metres underground in mines at the bottom of shafts and in tunnels excavated in the rock. . . . Most carpet-makers [in Morocco] employ children between the ages of 8 and 12, who often work as many as 72 hours a w e e k . . . . [In Pakistan] slave traffickers buy children for 1,600 rupees from abductors. They cripple or blind the weakest, whom they sell to beggar masters. . . . One million Mexican children are employed as seasonal workers in the United States. (Bouhdiba 1982: 2-3, 11, 20)

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Young brick carriers in Madagascar

Many children are caught up in the bonded labor system, especially in South Asia and Latin America. In the succinct explanation provided by the International Labour Organization's World Labour Report 1993: The e m p l o y e r typically entraps a " b o n d e d " labourer by o f f e r i n g an advance which she or he has to pay off from future earnings. But since the employer generally pays very low wages, may charge the worker for tools or accommodation, and will often levy fines for unsatisfactory work, the debt can never be repaid; indeed it commonly increases. Even the death of the original debtor offers no escape; the employer may insist that the debt be passed from parent to child, or grandchild. Cases have been found of people slaving to pay off debts eight generations old. (ILO 1993: 11)

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In Pakistan, an estimated 2 0 million people work as b o n d e d laborers, 7.5 million of them children. T h e carpet industry alone has perhaps 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 bonded child workers. A f g h a n r e f u g e e s in Pakistan, and their children, are n o w included in P a k i s t a n ' s pool of bonded laborers. Children work in rich countries as well. In the United States, for e x a m ple, in 1988 about 28 percent of all f i f t e e n - y e a r - o l d s were w o r k i n g . T h e U . S . G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e ( U S G A O 1991) f o u n d that of the e m p l o y e d fifteen-year-olds, about 18 percent worked in violation of federal child labor r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g m a x i m u m h o u r s or m i n i m u m a g e s f o r e m p l o y m e n t in certain occupations. Many working teenagers are injured on the j o b . E n f o r c e m e n t of child labor laws has been w e a k in m a n y states, a p p a r e n t l y d u e to t h e g r e a t e r c o n c e r n w i t h p r o t e c t i n g the i n t e r e s t s of employers. Paradoxically, the acceptance of child labor tends to be higher w h e r e there are higher s u r p l u s e s of adult labor. T h e addition of children to the labor force helps to bring d o w n wage rates, which in turn m a k e s it m o r e necessary to have all f a m i l y m e m b e r s e m p l o y e d . T h e widespread e m p l o y ment of children keeps them out of school and thus prevents the buildup of h u m a n capital that is required if poor nations are to d e v e l o p . T h e U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l h a s r e p o r t e d g o o d p r o g r e s s in r e d u c i n g child labor but a c k n o w l e d g e s that there is m u c h m o r e work to be d o n e : W h i l e m o s t international attention during the 1990s w a s f o c u s e d on the formal and export sectors, o n l y 5 per cent o f child labour is found there, and an estimated 7 0 per cent of children in d e v e l o p i n g countries work far from public scrutiny in agriculture and the informal sectors. T h e invisibility o f the bulk o f child l a b o u r — i n c l u d i n g work in the informal sector or in the family, represents a serious c h a l l e n g e and is c o m p o u n d e d by the clandestine nature of such practices as trafficking. ( U N G A 2 0 0 1 : 9 7 )

T h u s , despite e x t e n s i v e e f f o r t s to control the practice, there are still millions of children w h o work, m a n y under grossly exploitative conditions.

Child Prostitution Child prostitution refers to situations in which children e n g a g e in regularized sexual activity for material benefits for t h e m s e l v e s or others. T h e s e are institutionalized a r r a n g e m e n t s — s u s t a i n e d , patterned social s t r u c t u r e s — i n which children are used sexually for profit. Child prostitution is an e x t r e m e f o r m of sexual abuse of children and an especially intense f o r m of exploitative child labor. M o s t prostitution is exploitative, but for m a t u r e m e n and w o m e n there m a y be s o m e element of volition, s o m e consent. T h e a s s u m p -

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tion here is that young children do not have the capacity to give valid, informed consent on such matters. In some places, such as India and T h a i l a n d , child prostitution was d e e p l y ingrained as part of the culture well b e f o r e f o r e i g n soldiers or tourists appeared in large numbers. There are many local customers. Some Japanese and other tourists may use the child prostitutes in the "tea houses" in the Yaowarat district of Bangkok, but traditionally most of their customers have been locals, especially local Chinese. Similarly, in the sex trade near the U.S. military bases in the Philippines b e f o r e they closed down, more than half the customers were local people. There is big money associated with the foreign trade, but there are bigger numbers in the local trade. Child prostitution is widespread. It has been estimated that about 5,000 boys and 3,000 girls below the age of eighteen are involved in prostitution in P a r i s . T h e M i n i s t r y of S o c i a l S e r v i c e s a n d D e v e l o p m e n t in t h e Philippines has acknowledged that child prostitution rivals begging as the major occupation of the 50,000 to 75,000 street children who roam metropolitan Manila. The number of underage prostitutes in Bangkok numbers at least in the tens of thousands. In India the number is surely over 100,000. It has been estimated that there are about 600,000 child prostitutes in Brazil. The U N Secretary-General's report on the status of children says: S e x u a l a b u s e o c c u r s in the h o m e , in c o m m u n i t i e s and a c r o s s s o c i e t i e s . It is c o m p o u n d e d w h e n a b u s e takes p l a c e in a c o m m e r c i a l s e t t i n g . T h e w o r s t f o r m s o f e x p l o i t a t i o n i n c l u d e c o m m e r c i a l p r o s t i t u t i o n and c h i l d s l a v e r y , q u i t e o f t e n in the g u i s e o f h o u s e h o l d d o m e s t i c w o r k . T h e t r a f f i c k i n g o f c h i l d r e n , as w e l l as w o m e n , f o r s e x u a l e x p l o i t a t i o n , h a s r e a c h e d a l a r m i n g l e v e l s . A n e s t i m a t e d 3 0 m i l l i o n c h i l d r e n are n o w v i c t i m i z e d b y t r a f f i c k e r s , s o far largely w i t h i m p u n i t y . ( U N G A 2 0 0 1 : 2 2 )

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A r m e d Conflict

Armed conflicts hurt children in many ways. Wars kill and maim children through their direct violence. Children are killed in attacks on civilian populations, as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Nicaragua, many children were maimed or killed by mines. The wars in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Bosnia in 1993 were especially lethal to children. In 2004, many children were brutally killed in the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. In September 2004, a siege by Chechnyan rebels at a school in Beslan, Russia, led to the killing of several hundred children. Wars now kill more civilians than soldiers, and many of these civilians are children. Children have been counted among the casualties of w a r f a r e at a steadily increasing rate over the past century.

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Historically, conflicts involving set-piece battles in war zones away from major population centers killed very few children. However, wars are changing form, moving out of the classic theaters of combat and into residential areas, where civilians are more exposed. There is also a great deal of violence against children in repressive conditions short of active warfare. Death squads in Latin American countries have killed thousands of street children with impunity. Children are frequently hurt in the aftermath of warfare by leftover mines. The International Committee of the Red Cross has estimated that "using current mine-clearing techniques, it would take 4,300 years to render only twenty per cent of Afghan territory safe" (ICRC 1993: 471). Often children are pressed to participate in armed combat as child soldiers, harming them both physically and psychologically. Children can be the agents as well as the victims of violence. Increasingly, older children (ten to eighteen years old) are engaged not simply as innocent bystanders but as active participants in warfare. Dorothea Woods, associated with the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, has dedicated herself to chronicling the plight of child soldiers in a monthly survey of the world's press titled Children Bearing Military Arms. In the January and February 1997 editions, for example, she cites these cases:

Small Boys Unit at a checkpoint near Lunsar, Sierra Leone

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Afghanistan: "Hundreds of thousands of youth . . . were being raised to hate and fight a 'holy war.'. . . Many of those children are now with the Taliban army." Burma/Myanmar: "A Shan boy . . . had been a porter-slave to carry heavy things to the place of fighting. . . . He fell down and was kicked by a Burmese soldier . . . until his leg broke like a stick in three places." Chechnya: "Government security forces have often detained young males between the ages of 14 and 18 as potential combatants in order to prevent them from joining the rebel forces." Guatemala: "Forcing the under 18's from the indigenous communities to enroll in the army practically severs and destroys the future of these communities." Liberia: "Because of the socio-economic crisis a part of the youth population is inclined to join one of the factions. The possession of a Kalachnikov gives the means to live by pillage and racketeering if necessary. . . . Various estimates have put the total number of Liberian soldiers below the age of 15 at around 6,000." Mozambique: "For the 10,000 children who took part in the civil war, the war is not over; it has been replaced by a multitude of small wars in their heads." Sierra Leone: "After the outbreak of the civil war in 1991 some five thousand youngsters joined either the governmental army or the rebel Revolutionary United Front." Uganda: "Some 3,000 children have been kidnapped in the northern part of Uganda in the last four years according to UNICEF. The guerrillas who took these children have enrolled the boys in their army and have forced the girls to 'marry' the soldiers."

Wars sometimes harm children indirectly, through their interference with normal patterns of food supply and health care. Many children died of starvation during the wars under the Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes in K a m p u c h e a ( C a m b o d i a ) in the 1970s. In 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 6 in Angola and Mozambique, about half a million more children under five died than would have died in the absence of warfare. In 1986 alone, 84,000 child deaths in Mozambique were attributed to the war and destabilization. The high mortality rates in Angola and Mozambique were due not only to South Africa's destabilization efforts but also to their civil wars. The famines in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s and again later in that decade would not have been so devastating had it not been for the civil wars involving Tigre, Eritrea, and other provinces of Ethiopia. Civil war has also helped to create and sustain famine in Sudan. The interference with food supplies and health services is often an

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unintended by-product of warfare, but in many cases it has been very deliberate. In some cases, the disruption of the infrastructure can have deadly effects well beyond the conclusion of the war. One example is the trade sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. More deaths resulting from the Gulf War occurred after the war than during it. On the basis of careful surveys in Iraq, in July 2 0 0 0 UNICEF estimated that if trends of the 1980s had not been interrupted by the war and the subsequent sanctions, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under five in the 1990s. Despite all these horrors, only a small portion of the malnutrition in the world occurs in the context of armed conflict.

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Malnutrition

There are many different kinds of malnutrition. One of the most important, protein-energy malnutrition, is usually indicated in children by growth retardation. It is widely accepted that if a child's weight is more than two standard deviations below the normal reference weight for his or her age (about 80 percent of the reference weight), that child should be described as malnourished. An enormous number of the world's children are malnourished. The number is decreasing, but much too slowly, and progress has been uneven: In 1990, 177 million children under five years o f age in developing countries were malnourished, as indicated by low weight-for-age. Estimates suggest that 149 million children were malnourished in 2 0 0 0 . T h e preval e n c e o f u n d e r - f i v e m a l n u t r i t i o n in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s as a w h o l e decreased from 3 2 per cent to 2 7 per cent. . . . T h e most r e m a r k a b l e progress has been in South America, which registered a decrease in child malnutrition rates from 8 to 3 per cent. Progress was more modest in Asia, where rates decreased from 3 6 to 2 9 per cent and the number o f underweight children under five years o f age fell by some 33 million. Even this relatively limited achievement probably had a significant positive i m p a c t on c h i l d survival and d e v e l o p m e n t . S t i l l , m o r e than two thirds o f the world's malnourished c h i l d r e n — s o m e 108 m i l l i o n — n o w live in Asia. . . . In sub-Saharan Africa, the absolute number o f malnourished children has increased despite progress achieved in a few countries. (UNGA 2001: 37)

Contrary to the common belief that the problem is most widespread in Africa, there are far more malnourished children in Asia than in Africa. More than half the developing world's underweight children are in South Asia (UNACC/SCN 1997). Almost a third of all children under the age of five in developing countries are malnourished, and malnutrition contributes to half the deaths of young children in these countries ( U N I C E F 1996a).

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Child M o r t a l i t y

Nothing conveys the plight of children worldwide as clearly as their massive mortality rates. Estimates of the n u m b e r of u n d e r - f i v e deaths for selected years are shown in Table 11.1. Children's deaths account for about one-third of all deaths worldwide. In northern Europe or the United States, children account for only 2 to 3 percent of all deaths. In many less developed countries, more than half the deaths are deaths of children, which means there are more deaths of young people than of old people. The median age at death in 1990 was five or u n d e r in A n g o l a , B u r k i n a F a s o , E t h i o p i a , G u i n e a , M a l a w i , M a l i , M o z a m b i q u e , N i g e r , R w a n d a , Sierra L e o n e , S o m a l i a , T a n z a n i a , and Uganda. This means that in these thirteen countries, at least half the deaths were of children under five. In the United States, the median age at death in 1990 was seventy-six, and in the best cases—Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—it was seventy-eight (Kent 1995) (see Figure 11.3). The child mortality rate for any given region is the number of children who die before their fifth birthdays for every thousand born. As indicated in Figure 11.1, the rate at which children are dying each year has been declining. However, the numbers are still enormous. The number of children who die each year can be made more meaningful by comparing it with mortality due to warfare. There were about 100

Table 11.1

Annual Child Deaths, 1960-2002

Year

N u m b e r of Deaths ( 0 - 5 years old)

1960 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

18,900,000 17,400,000 14,700,000 12,700,000 12,821,000 13,191,000 13,272,000 12,588,000 12,465,000 11,694,000 11,574,000 11,140,000 10,630,000 10,929,000 10,803,000 10,889,000

Source: United Nations C h i l d r e n ' s Fund, The State of the World's Children U N I C E F / O x f o r d University Press, annual).

(New York:

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Figure I I . I

U n d e r - F i v e M o r t a l i t y Rate, 1990 a n d 2000

Source: Report of the UN Secretary-General, "We the Children: End-decade Review of the Follow-up to the World Summit for Children." A/S-27/1 (New York, United Nations, May 4, 2001).

million fatalities in wars between the years 1700 and 1987. That yields a long-term average of about 350,000 fatalities per year. The yearly average between 1986 and 1991 has been estimated at about 427,800. These figures can be compared to the more than 12 million deaths of children under five years of age in each of these years (Kent 1995). The most lethal war in all of human history was World War II, during which there were about 15 million battle deaths. If civilian deaths are added in, including g e n o c i d e and other f o r m s of m a s s murder, the n u m b e r of deaths in and around World War II was around 51,358,000. Annualized for the six-year period, the rate comes to about 8.6 million deaths a y e a r — when children's deaths (under five years of age) were running at well over 20 million per year. This most intense war in history resulted in a lower death rate, over a very limited period, than results from children's mortality year in and year out. Counting late additions, at the end of 1987 there were 58,156 names on the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, D.C. That is less than the number of children under the age of five who die every two days through-

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out the w o r l d . A m e m o r i a l f o r t h o s e c h i l d r e n w h o d i e w o r l d w i d e e a c h y e a r w o u l d be m o r e t h a n 2 5 0 t i m e s as long as t h e V i e t n a m V e t e r a n s ' M e m o r i a l , and a n e w o n e w o u l d be n e e d e d e v e r y year. C h i l d r e n d i e f o r m a n y d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s . T h e i m m e d i a t e c a u s e of d e a t h f o r m o s t c h i l d r e n is not m u r d e r , direct p h y s i c a l a b u s e , or i n c u r a b l e d i s e a s e s such as A I D S , b u t a c o m b i n a t i o n of m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d q u i t e ordinary, m a n a g e a b l e d i s e a s e s such as diarrhea, m a l a r i a , a n d m e a s l e s .

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C h i l d r e n in t h e U n i t e d States

O n the w h o l e , c h i l d r e n in the U n i t e d States are f a r better off than m o s t children in the rest of the w o r l d . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is a d a r k side that m a n y of us n e v e r e x p e r i e n c e directly, o n e that is rarely r e p o r t e d to us b y the g o v e r n m e n t or the m e d i a . A l t h o u g h C h i n a m a y n o t be any m o r e o b j e c t i v e a b o u t this t h a n A m e r i c a n s t h e m s e l v e s , its v i e w s m a y p r o v i d e a h e l p f u l c o r r e c t i v e to o u r usual c o m p l a c e n t v i e w s . T h e f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t f r o m a report b y the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t is b a s e d entirely on d a t a f r o m U . S . s o u r c e s . Child poverty was a serious problem. The Chicago Tribune reported on Aug. 27, 2004, that the number of children in poverty climbed from 12.1 million in 2002 to 12.9 million in 2003, a year-on-year increase of 0.9 percent. About 20 million children lived in "low-income working families"—with barely enough money to cover basic needs (AP Washington, Oct. 12, 2004). In California, one in every six children did not have medical insurance. The Los Angeles Times said on May 6, 2004 that in the metropolitan area the number of homeless children found wondering on the streets at nights numbered 8,000, which had stretched the 2,500-bed government-run emergency shelter system well beyond capacity. Poverty deprived many children the opportunity to obtain higher education. In the 146 renowned institutions of higher learning, only 3 percent of the students came from the low-income class, while 74 percent of them were from the high-income class. Children were victims of sex crimes. Every year about 400,000 children in the US were forced to engage in prostitution or other sexual dealings on the streets. Home-deserting or homeless children were the most likely to fall victims of sexual abuse. Reports on children sexually exploited, which were received by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, soared from 4,573 cases in 1998 to 81,987 cases in 2003 (The USA Today, Feb. 27, 2004). . . . Violent crimes occurred frequently. Studies show nearly 20 percent of US juveniles lived in families that possessed guns. In Washington, D.C., 24 people younger than 18 were killed in 2004, twice as many as in 2003 (The Washington Post, Jan. 1, 2005). In Baltimore, 29 juveniles were killed from Jan. 1 to Sept. 27 in 2004. In 2003 35 were killed (The Washington Post, Sept. 28, 2004). A report released by the US Justice Department on November 29, 2004 said about 9 percent of school kids aged 9 to 12 admitted being

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threatened with injury or having suffered an injury from a weapon while at school in 2003. Every year, 1.98 out of every 100,000 American children were killed by their parents or guardians. In Maryland, the rate was as high as 2.4 per 100,000. (Md Child Abuse Deaths Exceed National Average, The Sun, May 18, 2004). The Houston Chronicle newspaper reported on Oct. 2, 2004 that in Texas, each staff of local government departments responsible for protecting children's rights handled 50 child abuse cases every month. Two thirds of juvenile detention facilities in the United States lock up mentally ill youth; every day, about 2,000 youth were incarcerated simply because community mental health services were unavailable. In 33 states, juvenile detention centers held youth with mental illness without any specific charges against them (http://demonstrats.reform.house.gov/ Documents/200408171941 -41051 .pdf). The USA Today reported on July 8, 2004 that between Jan. 1 and June 30 of 2003, 15,000 youth detained in US youth detention centers were awaiting mental health services, while children at the age of 10 or younger were locked up in 117 youth detention centers. The detention centers totally ignored human rights and personal safety with excessive use of drugs and force, and failed to take care of inmates with mental problems in a proper way. They even locked up prisoners in cages. There w e r e r e p o r t s a b o u t s c a n d a l s i n v o l v i n g c o r r e c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s in California, where two juvenile inmates hanged themselves after they were badly beaten by jail police (San Jose Mercury News and Singtao Daily, March 18. 2004). (CIOSC 2005)

Children's Rights M a n y different kinds o f s e r v i c e programs are o f f e r e d by both g o v e r n m e n t a l and n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s to address children's c o n c e r n s , and m a n y o f them have b e e n very e f f e c t i v e . H o w e v e r , the c o v e r a g e is u n e v e n , largely a matter o f charity and c h a n c e . There is n o w an e v o l v i n g understanding that if children e v e r y w h e r e are to be treated w e l l , it must be r e c o g n i z e d that they h a v e s p e c i f i c rights to g o o d treatment. Thus, there is n o w a v i g o r o u s m o v e m e n t to r e c o g n i z e and ensure the realization o f children's rights. Children's rights h a v e been addressed in m a n y different international instruments. O n February 2 3 , 1923, the General C o u n c i l o f the U n i o n for C h i l d W e l f a r e a d o p t e d the D e c l a r a t i o n o f G e n e v a o n the R i g h t s o f the Child. On S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1924, it w a s adopted by the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s as the G e n e v a Declaration on the R i g h t s o f the Child. It w a s then r e v i s e d and b e c a m e the b a s i s o f the D e c l a r a t i o n o f the R i g h t s o f the Child, a d o p t e d without dissent by the U N General A s s e m b l y in 1959. T h e declaration e n u merates ten principles regarding the rights o f the child. A s a n o n b i n d i n g declaration, it d o e s not provide any basis for i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h o s e principles.

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T h e Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights was approved without opposition by the U N General Assembly in 1948. It was given effect in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on E c o n o m i c , Social, and Cultural Rights. The two covenants were adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. The covenants include specific references to children's rights. A f t e r ten years of hard negotiations in a w o r k i n g group of the UN Commission on Human Rights, on N o v e m b e r 20, 1989, the UN General Assembly by consensus adopted the new Convention on the Rights of the Child. It came into force on September 2, 1990, when it was ratified by the twentieth nation. Weaving together the scattered threads of earlier international statements of the rights of children, the convention's articles cover civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. It includes not only basic survival requirements such as food, clean water, and health care but also rights of protection against abuse, neglect, and exploitation and the right to education and to participation in social, religious, political, and economic activities. The convention is a comprehensive legal instrument, legally binding on all nations that accept it. The articles specify what states are obligated to do under different conditions. National governments that agree to be bound by the convention have the major responsibility for its implementation. To provide added international pressure for responsible implementation, Article 43 calls for the creation of a Committee on the Rights of the Child. It consists of ten experts whose main functions are to receive and transmit reports on the status of children's rights. Article 44 requires states parties to submit "reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress m a d e on the e n j o y m e n t of those rights." Article 46 entitles U N I C E F and other agencies to work with the committee within the scope of their mandates. By the middle of 1997, all countries except Somalia and the United States had ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Somalia has not ratified because it does not have a functional government. The reasons for the U.S. failure to ratify are not so clear. Both Bill and H i l l a r y C l i n t o n w e r e k n o w n as strong c h i l d a d v o c a t e s w h e n Clinton first took office in 1993, so it was a serious disappointment to children's advocates when the Convention on the Rights of the Child was not quickly signed and ratified. The United States finally did sign the convention in February 1995. That signing, handled very quietly, apparently was done to fulfill a deathbed promise to James Grant, who had been executive director of UNICEF. However, the convention does not become binding on the United States until it is ratified through the advice and consent of the Senate. T h e convention still has not been forwarded to the Senate for its action.

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The U.S. government has never offered any official explanation for its reluctance to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the major objections that have been voiced unofficially are described below. States Rights The historical struggle to find an appropriate balance between the powers of the states and the power of the national government has not been fully resolved. There is a fear that through its power to make international agreements, the U.S. government might federalize issues that previously had been addressed only in state law. C a p i t a l Punishment Article 37 of the convention states that "neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age." Until recently, the United States (along with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Bangladesh) was one of the few remaining countries that execute people for crimes committed before their eighteenth birthday. This argument was tied in with the argument that capital punishment should be a matter of state rather than federal policy. However, in March 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this practice unconstitutional. Abortion The preamble of the convention says that "as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 'the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth."' The last six words conform to the prolife, antiabortion position. However, because of the divisiveness of the abortion issue, the drafters of the convention chose not to elaborate the theme. For prolife activists, the convention is not explicit enough regarding safeguards before birth and thus is not acceptable. It would be possible for the United States to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child despite these objections. It could be ratified with a reservation regarding the capital punishment provision, thus reserving U.S. freedom on that issue. There is nothing in the convention that would constrain the United States on the abortion question. Thus, despite these objections, the United States could ratify the convention in order to support the many other provisions that it favors. Perhaps the most serious obstacle to U.S. ratification is ideological. The United States tends to support civil and political rights but not eco-

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nomic and social rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child asserts economic rights such as the human right to adequate food. Article 24, for example, says: 1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services. 2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures: a. To diminish infant and child mortality; b. To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care; c. To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the frame work of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious f o o d s and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution.

Economic rights of this sort trouble many people in the U.S. government. The government is willing to provide a broad array of nutrition and other social service programs, but it balks at the idea that people have a right, an entitlement, to these services (Kent 2005). Conservative elements in the United States have organized systematic campaigns of opposition to the convention based on false charges that ratification would undermine the family and take away parents' rights to raise their own children as they see fit. These unfounded arguments are advanced by people who apparently have not read the convention.

I

International Obligations

Children have the human rights enumerated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These rights were further clarified with Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, which entered into force on January 18, 2002, and by the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which entered into force on February 12, 2002. With few exceptions, children also have all other human rights. In some cases, other agreements give explicit attention to children. For example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-

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tion Against Women makes frequent references to children. Several of the agreements developed through the International Labour Organization refer to children and particularly to the need to limit child labor. On June 17, 1999, the International Labour Organization adopted the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, which came into force in November 2000. The articulation of these human rights in international instruments represents an important advance, but there is still much more to be done to ensure that all these rights are fully realized. Although technically binding on the states that ratify these international agreements, the human rights claims are not precisely specified. Latitude for interpretation is provided deliberately because it is left to the national governments, representing the states that are parties to the agreements, to concretize them in ways appropriate to their particular local circumstances. Much more needs to be done by national governments to ensure that human rights within their jurisdictions are realized. However, the question remains: What are the obligations of the international community, especially where national governments are unwilling or unable to do what needs to be done to ensure that children's human rights are fully realized? There are programs of international humanitarian assistance and many international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental, that work to alleviate suffering. Development and foreign aid programs do a good deal to improve the quality of life. But it is now largely a matter of politics and charity. There may be a sense of moral responsibility, but there is no sense of legal obligation, no sense that those who receive assistance are entitled to it and that those who provide it owe it. Historically, the idea of a duty to provide social services and to look after the weakest elements in society has been understood as something undertaken at the national and local levels, not as something that ought to be undertaken globally. Indeed, the only major market economy in which there is no clearly acknowledged responsibility of the strong with respect to the weak is the global economy. Within nations, citizens may grumble when they are taxed to pay for food stamps for their poor, but they pay. Globally, there is nothing like a regular tax obligation through which the rich provide sustenance to the poor in other nations. The humanitarian instinct and sense of responsibility is extending worldwide, but there is still little clarity as to where duties lie. There is no firm sense of sustained obligation at the global level. Most c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n s of g l o b a l g o v e r n a n c e f o c u s on s e c u r i t y issues, the major preoccupation of the powerful, and give too little attention to the need to ensure the well-being of ordinary people. Just as there should be clear legal obligations to assist the weak in society at the local and national levels, those sorts of obligations should be recognized at the global level as well. Discussion of that idea has begun in the United Nations, but just barely.

Children

There is much discussion of international protection of human rights, but what does that mean? If one party has a right to something, some other party must have the duty to provide it. Children's rights would really be international only if, upon failure of a national government to do what was necessary to fulfill those rights, the international community was obligated to step in to do what needed to be done—with no excuses. There is now no mechanism and no commitment to do that. The international community provides humanitarian assistance in many different circumstances, but it is not required to do so. International law does not now require any nation to respond to requests for assistance. There should be clear global obligations, codified in explicit law, to sustain and protect those who are the worst off. The exact nature of those obligations and their magnitude and form will have to be debated, but the debate must begin with the question of principle. The principle advocated here is that international humanitarian assistance should be regularized through the systematic articulation of international rights and obligations regarding assistance. Regularization can begin with the formulation of guidelines and basic principles and then perhaps of agreed codes of conduct. These can be viewed as possible precursors of law. The nations of the world could collectively agree that certain kinds of international assistance programs must be provided, say, to children in nations in which children's mortality rates exceed a certain level. This international obligation to provide assistance should stand unconditionally where national governments or, more generally, those in power, consent to receiving the assistance. The obligation must be mitigated, however, where those in power refuse the assistance or where delivering the assistance would require facing extraordinary risks. Part of the effort could focus on helping nations ensure that their children's nutrition rights are realized. The most prominent international governmental organizations (IGOs) concerned with nutrition are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Children's Fund. They are governed by boards composed of member states. Responsibility for coordinating nutrition activities among these and other IGOs in the UN system rests with the Administrative C o m m i t t e e on Coordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN). Representatives of bilateral donor agencies such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the U.S. Agency for International D e v e l o p m e n t (USAID) also participate in ACC/SCN activities. There are also numerous international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) concerned with nutrition. Some INGOs participate in ACC/SCN activities. The main role of the IGOs is not to feed people directly but to help

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nations use their own resources m o r e effectively. A new r e g i m e of international nutrition rights would not involve m a s s i v e international transfers of f o o d . Its main f u n c t i o n would be to press and help national g o v e r n m e n t s a d d r e s s the p r o b l e m of m a l n u t r i t i o n a m o n g their o w n p e o p l e , u s i n g the food, care, and health resources within their own nations. There m a y always be a need for a global e m e r g e n c y food facility to help in e m e r g e n c y situations that are b e y o n d the capacity of individual nations, but a different kind of design is needed for dealing with chronic malnutrition. Moreover, as c h r o n i c m a l n u t r i t i o n is a d d r e s s e d m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y , n a t i o n s w o u l d increase their capacity for dealing with e m e r g e n c y situations on their o w n . O v e r t i m e the n e e d f o r e m e r g e n c y a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the o u t s i d e w o u l d decline. T h e I G O s could be especially generous in providing assistance to those nations that create e f f e c t i v e national laws and national agencies devoted to i m p l e m e n t i n g nutrition rights. P o o r nations that are relieved of s o m e of the b u r d e n of p r o v i d i n g material r e s o u r c e s w o u l d be m o r e willing to create p r o g r a m s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g nutrition rights. S u c h p l e d g e s by international agencies could be viewed as a precursor to recognition of a genuine international duty to r e c o g n i z e and e f f e c t i v e l y i m p l e m e n t rights to a d e q u a t e nutrition. Of course, the o b j e c t i v e of ending c h i l d r e n ' s malnutrition in the world by establishing a r e g i m e of hard international nutrition rights is idealistic. Nevertheless, the idea can be useful in setting the direction of action. We can think of the I G O s as having specific duties with regard to the fulfillment of nutrition rights. We can m o v e progressively toward the ideal by inviting I G O s to establish clear rules and procedures they would f o l l o w as if they were firm duties.

I

Conclusion

Within nations, through d e m o c r a t i c processes m a n a g e d by the state, s o m e moral responsibilities b e c o m e legal obligations. A similar process is needed at the global level. Internationally recognized and i m p l e m e n t e d rights and obligations should not and, realistically, cannot be imposed. T h e y should be established democratically, through a g r e e m e n t of the nations of the world. R e a c h i n g s u c h a g r e e m e n t w o u l d be a c t i o n not a g a i n s t s o v e r e i g n t y b u t against global anarchy. It is important to m o v e toward a global rule of law. Regularized assistance to the needy under the law is a mark of civilization within nations. If we are to civilize relations among nations, international humanitarian assistance also should be g o v e r n e d by the rule of law. L o o k i n g after our children internationally could b e c o m e the leading e d g e of the project of civilizing the world order.

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In 1990, a World Summit for Children p r o d u c e d ringing declarations and a promising plan of action to improve the c o n d i t i o n s of children worldw i d e . In M a y 2 0 0 2 a S p e c i a l S e s s i o n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y was held to review the progress that had been m a d e in the intervening decade and to m a k e new plans and new c o m m i t m e n t s for the future. T h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s review, prepared for the Special Session, s h o w e d that substantial progress had been m a d e on m a n y of the issues of concern ( U N G A 2001). It also showed that there was m u c h m o r e that r e m a i n e d to be done. Like the 1990 s u m m i t , the Special S e s s i o n of M a y 2 0 0 2 c o n c l u d e d with impressive declarations and plans of action. S o m e will say that we can only wait and see if these c o m m i t m e n t s will be taken seriously. T h e y are m i s t a k e n . It is i m p o r t a n t for p e o p l e e v e r y w h e r e , in all w a l k s of life, to actively and persistently insist that g o v e r n m e n t s and international agencies at every level h o n o r their c o m m i t m e n t s to the children of the world.

•

Discussion Q u e s t i o n s 1. Should countries be concerned with the treatment of children within other countries? Should the United N a t i o n s be c o n c e r n e d ? Explain. 2. Should c o r p o r a t i o n s be allowed to b e n e f i t f r o m exploitative child labor in other countries? Explain. 3. Should the United States ratify the C o n v e n t i o n on the Rights of the Child? W h y or why not? 4. D o you agree with the concept of international obligations for child r e n ' s rights?

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Suggested Readings

CIOSC (China Information Office of the State Council) U.S. Human Rights Record in 2000. Beijing. Available online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/paper/us2000.html (February 27). Freeman, Michael, and Philip Veerman, eds. (1992) The Ideologies of Children's Rights. Drodrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. International Journal of Children's Rights (quarterly). Kent, George (1991) The Politics of Children's Survival. New York: Praeger. ( 1 9 9 5 ) Children in the International Political Economy. London: Macmillan. ( 2 0 0 5 ) Freedom from Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. LeBlanc, Lawrence J. (1995) The Convention on the Rights of the Child: United Nations Lav:making on Human Rights. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Sawyer, Roger (1988) Children Enslaved. London: Routledge.

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UN (United Nations) ( 1 9 9 2 ) Child Mortality Since the 1960s: A Database for Developing Countries. New York: United Nations. UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) (2001) We the Children: End-Decade Review of the Follow-Up to the World Summit for Children: Report of the Secretary General. New York: United Nations. A/S-27/3. Available online at http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/documentation/index.html. UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) (annual) The Progress of Nations. New York: UNICEF. (annual) The State of the World's Children. New York: Oxford University Press/UNICEF. (1993) Food, Health, and Care: The UNICEF Vision and Strategy for a World Free from Hunger and Malnutrition. New York: UNICEF. Veerman, Philip E. (1992) The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

12 Health Marjorie E. Nelson

T

he World Health Organization ( W H O ) defines health as a "state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." It is the result of a person's interactions with the e n v i r o n m e n t . G e n e s , resources, past e x p e r i e n c e s , and choices determine some of the interactions humans have with their environment. The makeup of the natural environment is also a determinant. The complex interplay of all these factors results in a unique experience of health and disease throughout an individual's life. I examine some of these factors in this chapter. First, I look at nutritional status; second, I review examples of environmental factors; third, I examine some h u m a n behavioral factors; and finally, I consider some specific societal responses to protect health. Throughout the chapter I urge the reader to consider the disparity between health status in the North and the South.

g

Nutrition and Health

"Phuong caught measles last week. He's much thinner than usual. His mother says he has no appetite and she thinks he's going to die," M a d a m e Xuan Lan told me. It was 1968.1 was making my weekly visit to the day care center. Phuong, his mother, and three sisters were recent arrivals in one of the refugee camps around Quang Ngai City, where the American Friends Service Committee had set up this center during the Vietnam War. Phuong's mother supported her family by gathering wild greens to sell each day. She left Phuong in the care of his eight-year-old sister while she went to market.

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While Xuan Lan went for Phuong, I examined other sick children. When Phuong arrived he was too weak to stand. I could hear pneumonia in his lungs and he already had a pressure ulcer on his lower back. His mother was right: lying without food or medicine on a damp floor in a refugee camp, Phuong would soon be dead. We bandaged the ulcer and I left medicines for the pneumonia. "Bring him to school every day. Feed him chao thit ga three times a day and just let him rest." Chao thit ga is a Vietnamese chicken rice soup. It would give him the calories, protein, and fluids he needed to fight the infection, heal his ulcer, and regain weight. Sure enough, soon his pneumonia and ulcer were gone, and he was the bright-eyed four-year-old we had known before measles struck. In North America, we do not think of measles as a killer. However, in developing countries, about one out of every four children who gets measles will die. The main reason is malnutrition.

Interaction of People, Land, and Food Nutrition depends on what we eat. The interaction of people with the land at their disposal affects food availability and hence nutrition. When a people outgrows its food supply, one of four things will happen: agricultural change will be introduced to produce more calories and protein per acre of arable land (land that can be cultivated); more land will be acquired—by migration or conquest; food will be imported; or people will starve. In a traditional diet (a diet eaten by a people o v e r a period o f 5 0 0 - 1 , 0 0 0 years), the main source of calories is from grains and starchy foods: for example, wheat, potatoes, rice, beans, corn, plantains, and cassava. The highest-quality protein comes from animal sources: meat, milk, eggs, and seafood. However, other substantial protein sources for much of the world are soybeans, peas, beans, wheat, corn, rice, oats, rye, nuts, and especially peanuts. In traditional diets, fat is valued for its calories and taste but is a minor part of the diet. To provide the yearly protein supply for a moderately active man by beef alone would require about 4.75 acres of land. To meet his yearly needs with poultry alone would require just under 2 acres. About 0.7 acre of wheat, 0.5 acre of rice, or 0.2 acre of soybeans would also meet his requirements. As the amount of arable land per person decreases, the usual diet in that region will shift toward food that has a higher protein content per acre. Japan, a densely populated island nation, has a traditional diet that depends heavily on rice, soybeans, and seafood—which, coming from the sea, does not depend on arable land. Why? At the end of World War II, Japan had about 0.15 acre of arable land per person; this was not enough to meet Japanese protein needs, even if it were all in soybeans. Today it is

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about 0.12 acre per person. Japan, one of the richest and most developed countries, will always have to import food as long as its population remains as large as it is now. But the traditional Japanese diet tells us the country has had this problem for much longer than fifty years. Rice was grown in Japan but was not significant in the Japanese diet until the seventeenth century. From 1600 to 1868, Japan underwent great economic development, and its population rose to 30 million. "Progress on this scale was possible only because of a constant rise in the agricultural production which supported these 30 million people on a surface area which could only have supported five or ten million people in Europe." Rice, a concentrated source of calories and protein, was the key (Braudel 1981: 156). The typical U.S. diet is often described as "bread, meat, and potatoes." This could be a hamburger patty, bun, and fries; or fried chicken with mashed potatoes, gravy, and roll. At the end of World War II, the United States had 2.9 acres of arable land per person. Today it is about 2.1 acres per person. We are a nation of immigrants who have come over a period of 350 years to a place with abundant arable land. Our diet reflects this, as well as the diet patterns of our countries of origin. However, as population grows and water for agricultural use as well as land remain finite, we too will see our diet patterns change. Undernutrition Adequate nutrition is crucial for a child's health. A good diet must include energy (calories), protein, and key micronutrients. Without adequate calories, a child's growth is stunted and weight is reduced. In case of infection, or in a time of food scarcity, a child like Phuong has no reserves on which to draw. The body needs protein for cell growth and repair. While calories are the fuel, proteins are the building blocks of the body: enzymes, hormones, cell walls, and antibodies to fight infections. Micronutrients such as iron, iodine, and vitamins are also important. In 1995, according to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 165 million children under age five were malnourished—half of them in just three c o u n t r i e s : B a n g l a d e s h , India, and Pakistan (1996b: 12). Malnourished children, if they survive, grow into stunted adults with increased risk of disease, lowered capacity for physical and mental work, and for women, reduced ability to nourish a developing fetus during pregnancy. Many of these effects cannot be totally reversed, even if nutrition improves later. Now consider an example of migration and starvation. Food, as well as people, can migrate. The potato is a Western Hemisphere food. Grown in the high Andes since at least 2000 b.c.e., Spaniards brought it to Europe in the mid-1500s, where it joined wheat (bread) as a major food. Soon it was

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widely grown in Ireland, and by the 1700s it was almost the entire diet of Irish peasants, a u g m e n t e d only by a little milk and cheese. By 1843 it was the single food sustaining the population of Ireland. T h e n disaster struck. A new potato blight a p p e a r e d and wiped out the potato c r o p for t w o successive years. For m a n y reasons, adequate food was not brought into Ireland. T h o u s a n d s died of starvation, while Irish i m m i g r a t i o n to North A m e r i c a increased greatly.

Overnutrition In the face of limited or sporadic f o o d supply, Homo sapiens developed the ability to store calories as fat when there is a t e m p o r a r y excess of f o o d . Dietary fat and c a r b o h y d r a t e s can be c o n v e r t e d to b o d y fat and s t o r e d . G r a m for gram, fat contains twice as m a n y calories as carbohydrates, so it is an efficient energy storage system. In our distant past, persons with a preference for calorie-rich f o o d s and an efficient system for storing extra calories as fat were more likely to survive, nourish o f f s p r i n g , and pass on both d i e t a r y p r e f e r e n c e s and g e n e t i c traits. Today in s o m e areas of the world, food surpluses, high incomes, and technology for the mass processing and distribution of f o o d m a k e excess f o o d available to m a n y people. T h e s e f o o d s are often high in fat and simple sugars and low in fiber c o m pared to traditional unprocessed f o o d s such as fresh fruits, vegetables, and grains. As a result, obesity is a g r o w i n g problem in most developed c o u n tries. Obesity is d e f i n e d as 120 percent or more of ideal body weight (see Table 12.1). Today in the United States, about 64 percent of adults and 15 percent of children are overweight or obese. Weight gain usually begins in childhood or early adulthood and continues gradually throughout life. In recent years, lack of exercise has added to the risks f r o m an unhealthy diet. Obesity and the diet that leads to it cause serious health problems: high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and hardening of the arteries. This results in heart attacks and strokes, the first and third leading causes of death in the United States. Diabetes, the sixth cause of death in the United States, is m o r e c o m m o n in obese people. High-fat, highcalorie diets are also often low in dietary fiber. Dietary fiber, found in whole grains, fruits, and vegetables, slows the absorption of fat and sugar f r o m the digestive system. This helps counteract a high-fat, high-calorie intake. Fiber a f f e c t s b a c t e r i a l m e t a b o l i s m in the d i g e s t i v e s y s t e m , t h u s r e d u c i n g the absorption of toxins. It also has a laxative effect. All these actions of fiber reduce the risk of s o m e cancers, especially colon cancer. Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States, and colon cancer is o n e of the top three along with breast and lung cancer. With obesity, like undernutrition, it is very hard to reverse the effects. T h e best strategy is to f o r m good diet and exercise habits early and maintain them throughout life.

Health Table 12.1

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Desirable Height and Weight for Adults Small Frame

Medium Frame

Large Frame

Men 5 ft. 2 in. 5 3 4 5 5 5 6 5 7 5 8 5 9 5 10 5 11 5 0 6 1 6 2 6 3 6 4 6

128-134 130-136 132-138 134-140 136-142 138-145 140-148 142-151 144-154 146-157 149-160 152-164 155-168 158-172 162-176

131-141 133-143 135-145 137-148 139-151 142-154 145-157 148-160 151-163 154-166 157-170 160-174 164-178 167-182 171-187

138-150 140-153 142-156 144-160 146-164 149-168 152-172 155-176 158-180 161-184 164-188 168-192 172-197 176-202 181-207

Women 4 ft. 10 in. 11 4 0 5 1 5 2 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 7 5 8 9 5 10 5 5 11 0 6

102-111 103-113 104-115 106-118 108-121 111-124 114-127 117-130 120-133 123-136 126-139 129-142 132-145 135-148 138-151

109-121 111-123 113-126 115-129 118-132 121-135 124-138 127-141 130-144 133-147 136-150 139-153 142-156 145-159 148-162

118-131 120-134 122-137 125-140 128-143 131-147 134-151 137-155 140-159 143-163 146-167 149-170 152-173 155-176 158-179

Height

Source: Adapted from MetLife Insurance Company, www.metlife.com/lifeadvice/tools/ heightnweight/docs/men.html. Reprinted with permission of MetLife. This information is not intended to be a substitute for professional medical advice and should not be regarded as an endorsement or approval of any product or service. Noie : Weights at ages 25-29 based on lowest mortality. Weight in pounds according to frame (in indoor clothing weighing 5 lbs. for men and 3 lbs. for women; shoes with 1 -in. heels).

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Health and the Natural Environment: N e w and R e e m e r g i n g Diseases

What we know as the AIDS pandemic began inconspicuously over fortyfive years ago.

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In 1959, two sailors died of a rare disease: Pneumocystis pneumonia. One was in England; the other, a Haitian, was in New York. In 1966, a Norwegian sailor died of multiple infections and a strange immune system collapse. Later, his wife and one child also died f r o m results of severe immune deficiency. During the 1970s, Dr. Margrethe Rask, a Danish surgeon working in Zaire, developed swollen lymph nodes and deep fatigue. Gaetan, an Air Canada steward who flew often between France, the United States, and Canada, became sexually active as a homosexual. A young Greek fisherman moved to Zaire, where he worked on Lake Tanganyika, while each year several thousand men from Haiti went to Zaire as short-term laborers before returning home. On July 4, 1976, New York harbor was host to sailing ships from fifty-five nations and their sailors who had gathered to help the United States celebrate its 200th birthday. It was a glorious party. Later that year, Dr. Rask collapsed with her strange illness and returned to Denmark. The Greek fisherman was not feeling so well either. In late 1977, Dr. Rask died at the age of forty-seven with overwhelming Pneumocystis pneumonia. In 1978, Dr. Peter Piot, a tropical disease specialist in Belgium, saw a new patient, the Greek fisherman from Zaire. The man died of widespread infection with an odd mycobacterium—one not recognized as a disease agent. In 1979, Gaetan experienced a "flulike" illness that left him with swollen lymph nodes all over. He continued to fly between Paris, New York, and San Francisco, where he had many sexual contacts. In 1980, his doctor told him he had a rare cancer: Kaposi sarcoma. In Belgium, Dr. Piot continued to see patients from Zaire with severely damaged immune systems and strange infections: some women, some men, and some married couples. On April 28, 1981, Sandra Ford, a technician at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, wrote her boss about a puzzling pattern. Part of her j o b was to fill orders for pentamidine, a drug used so rarely it was stocked only at the CDC. It was used to treat a rare pneumonia, Pneumocystis, which typically occurred when a disease knocked out a patient's immune system, such as a child with leukemia or a patient with an organ transplant. Usually she got a dozen or so requests a year, but this year she already had nine, and the doctors did not seem to know why their patients had Pneumocystis. Several were in New York City. Three weeks later, a doctor from Los Angeles called the C D C because he and his colleagues had a group of cases of Pneumocystis pneumonia in gay men. The June 5, 1981, issue of the C D C ' s weekly bulletin, MMWR, carried a report titled "Pneumocystis P n e u m o n i a — L o s Angeles." This was the first published report of a group of cases in the worldwide epidemic we have come to know as AIDS (based on Shilts 1987 and Garrett 1994).

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Technically an epidemic is "the unusual occurrence of a disease in the light of past experience." Sandra Ford knew that even nine cases of unexplained Pneumocystis pneumonia was a possible epidemic. When epidemiologists investigate a possible epidemic, they look for "Patient Z e r o . " If they can find the first patient in the epidemic and learn about his or her interactions with other cases, they may find out how it spreads. If it is a new disease, it may help explain what causes it. When C D C epidemiologists first began investigating what we now call human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the underlying cause of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), they did not know it was a virus, nor did they know how people became infected. They did know that it destroys part of the human immune system, allowing normally harmless microbes to invade and kill people. W h e n they first found evidence that it was an infectious agent passed through sexual contact, they did not know how long a person could be infected before symptoms would occur. The first estimate was months. We now know a person may carry the virus and be infectious for ten to fifteen years before symptoms of AIDS appear. In the early investigations, the C D C team found that Gaetan had been a s e x u a l p a r t n e r of s e v e r a l of the e a r l i e s t c a s e s in both N e w York a n d California. As they still thought the asymptomatic infectious period was m o n t h s , he was tentatively labeled Patient Zero. He c o n t i n u e d h a v i n g unprotected sex even after being warned by several doctors that he was probably infectious. He certainly contributed to the spread of the AIDS epidemic, but he was not Patient Zero. Many of the earliest cases of A I D S detected in gay men in both New York and California were in a small group of men who lived and partied together in New York during the 1976 bicentennial celebration. Perhaps HIV was introduced to that group then, three years before Gaetan presumably got his infection. Slowly we have put together the pieces of this A I D S puzzle. W h e n HIV tests became available, doctors went back and tested samples f r o m m o s t of the early u n i d e n t i f i e d cases. T h e y were HIV positive. R e c e n t molecular biology research indicates that the HIV virus originated somewhere in Central Africa. Clearly some cases occurred as early as 1959. However, the e p i d e m i c took off in the 1970s. Look at the cases b e f o r e 1975: three sailors, the wife and child of one of them, a missionary doctor, and a Greek fisherman working abroad. This is not the pattern we associate with AIDS today. But if someone had had all those cases collected then, that person could have warned us that an epidemic was coming. Because air travel was uncommon before the 1970s, most of the early cases identified in the United States and Europe were travelers by sea, and their trips lasted days or weeks. Today we can fly f r o m Miami to Managua in three hours, f r o m Palo Alto to Beijing in thirteen, and f r o m New York to Nairobi in fifteen. Almost half the world's people live in urban areas, and

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more than 10 percent live in cities of more than one million ( W C E D 1987). W h a t h a p p e n s in one " n e i g h b o r h o o d " of our global c o m m u n i t y can affect us rapidly, even though w e live in another. In the countries of the developed world, A I D S began as a "big c i t y " p r o b l e m , leapfrogging o v e r small t o w n s and rural areas to other big cities. Attention focused on gay m e n and intrav e n o u s drug users. In A f r i c a the pattern was different (see Table 12.2). In 1985, after over a year of trying to c o n v i n c e their colleagues and officials in Tanzania that they had A I D S in their small rural hospital on the U g a n d a n border, Drs. Kidenya, T k i m a l e n k a , and N y a m u r y e k u n g e appealed to the C D C for help. T h e y sent s a m p l e s d r a w n f r o m their patients to the C D C , w h i c h quickly c o n f i r m e d the diagnosis of A I D S . Travelers were involved but here it was traders, truck drivers, or migrant laborers w h o had sex with prostitutes and then carried the disease back to their w i v e s in rural areas (Garrett 1994). W h e n I visited western K e n y a in 1992, church elders told m e of entire villages on the U g a n d a n border that were inhabited only by elderly grandparents and young c h i l d r e n — o r p h a n s of parents who had died of AIDS. N o w we see this pattern throughout sub-Saharan Africa. A I D S is primarily transmitted heterosexually and f r o m m o t h e r to unborn child, wiping out entire families and devastating c o m m u n i t i e s . Sub-Saharan A f r i c a is h o m e to 25 m i l l i o n p e o p l e i n f e c t e d with A I D S , a b o u t 7 0 percent of the total w o r l d

Table 12.2

Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics and Features, 2003

Sub-Saharan Africa North Africa and Middle East South and Southeast Asia East Asia Latin America Caribbean Eastern Europe and Central Asia Western Europe North America Oceania Total

Adults and Children Living with HIV/AIDS

Adult Prevalence Rate 3 (%)

Adults and Children Newly Infected

25,000,000

7.50

3,000,000

480,000

0.20

75,000

6,500,000 900,000 1,600,000 420,000

0.60 0.10 0.60 2.30

850,000 200,000 200,000 52,000

1,300,000 580,000 1,000,000 320,000 37,800,000

0.60 0.30 0.60 0.20 1.10

360,000 20,000 44,000 5,000 4,800,000

Source: UNAIDS, " A I D S Epidemic Update—December 2003," available online at http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/epidemiology.asp. Note: a. The proportion of adults (15-49 years of age) living with HIV/AIDS in 2003, using 2003 population numbers.

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cases. Africa has buried 75 percent o f the world's A I D S victims. However, Asia now has the fastest-growing epidemic o f A I D S ( U N A I D S 2 0 0 4 ) . U n l i k e the A I D S epidemic, it took public health o f f i c i a l s only four months to alert the world to the appearance o f another new epidemic threat: severe acute respiratory syndrome ( S A R S ) . In C h i n a on N o v e m b e r 16, 2 0 0 2 , a forty-five-year-old village administrator from Foshan municipality west o f Guang-zhou (Canton) was hospitalized with a severe respiratory illness. His wife and three relatives who visited him in hospital soon c a m e down with the same illness. In the next two months, other cases o f this mysterious illness appeared throughout G u a n g - d o n g p r o v i n c e , which is adjacent to Hong Kong. One o f these patients had visited Hong K o n g the day before he was hospitalized. B y early March, people who had traveled to Hong Kong and southern China had carried this new illness to Toronto, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Singapore. On M a r c h 12, 2 0 0 3 , the World Health Organization issued a global alert about these cases o f what would soon be named S A R S . B y m i d - 2 0 0 4 it had been established that S A R S is caused by a corona virus never previously described and that it likely c a m e from one or more kinds o f live wild animals sold for meat in markets in South China. This virus is transmitted from person to person through the air and most who contract it b e c o m e quite ill. This means they seek medical care soon after onset of symptoms. If they are then isolated, community spread can be halted quickly. Health care workers were disproportionately affected, as they were the first responders, treating these patients before the diagnosis was recognized. T h e initial S A R S epidemic was contained in a few short months, with only about 8 , 0 0 0 c a s e s , unlike the millions in the ongoing H I V / A I D S epidemic. As the world tries to cope with these new diseases o f A I D S and S A R S , it also has to face the reemergence o f diseases o n c e thought under control. Humans are not the only ones interacting with the environment in our global neighborhoods; each neighborhood is home to many other living organisms: animals, plants, and microbes. S o m e t i m e s , as in the case o f the H I V virus, what one m i c r o b e does improves the c l i m a t e f o r other m i c r o b e s . W h e n the H I V virus has destroyed e n o u g h T - c e l l s in a p e r s o n ' s body, microbes, which are usually killed by our T-cells, can grow. M y c o b a c t e r i a such as tuberculosis and parasites such as Pneumocystis are two examples. Viruses and bacteria not only m u t a t e — t h a t is, c h a n g e their genetic structure—but also exchange " t o o l s " with other microbes. M a n y o f these changes are useless or harmful to the m i c r o b e , but sometimes they help. O n e tool a bacteria might have is resistance to an antibiotic. S o m e bacteria carry the information on how to do this in " t o o l b o x e s " called plasmids, which they exchange with other bacteria. B e f o r e we discovered and started using antibiotics, this set o f tools was not so useful, but in the past fifty years, bacteria that have them survive better.

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Consider interaction o f cholera bacteria with their environment. W h e n we ingest water or food contaminated by cholera, the bacteria attach to the intestinal lining and reproduce. Unfortunately for us, they release a protein that causes severe diarrhea, which can lead to death in days or even hours. Cholera has been present in South Asia for centuries. Periodically it would erupt as an epidemic across many countries, often carried by pilg r i m s traveling to M e c c a . In the 1 8 0 0 s , there were m a n y outbreaks in European cities due to inadequate sewage systems and unprotected water supplies. T h i s virulent o r g a n i s m killed 7 0 - 8 0 percent o f the people it infected, but it could not survive long outside the human body. Dr. J o h n Snow, an early epidemiologist, stopped one outbreak in London by removing the handle from the pump at the Broad Street w e l l — a cholera-contaminated water supply. S l o w l y , public health measures such as safe water, good sewage disposal, and use o f quarantine reduced cholera epidemics. Then, in 1961, a new strain o f cholera, El Tor, appeared in Indonesia. It produced a milder disease; fewer ill people died, and s o m e people were asymptomatic carriers. However, this strain was resistant to antibiotics. One substrain in Thailand was resistant to eight drugs. T h i s cholera bacteria had picked up a powerful set o f tools in a toolbox trade somewhere. It had also developed a way to survive longer in saltwater between stays in human hosts. T h e s e cholera organisms can hibernate for weeks inside plankton that grow with algae. T h e y can drift inside their hosts on the ocean currents or be drawn into a ship's bilgewater and pumped out in the next port o f call a continent away. Both international shipping and increased algal blooms in the past three decades have helped the spread o f cholera. A fiercer strain, Bengal, which appeared in the 1990s, combined some o f the advantages o f the El Tor with the more virulent disease-causing strength o f the c l a s s i c cholera. During the past fifty years, we have lived through the golden age o f antibiotics. Now we are seeing new diseases like A I D S and reemergent old diseases with new defenses, like Bengal cholera, against which our antibiotics are no longer effective. In the next century, we must find new ways to deal with them and their toolboxes o f tricks. This will require worldwide cooperation, as well as respect for changes that may arise in the environment as a result o f our actions or other interactions.

I

Health and Human Behavior

A b o v e we saw that past experiences and personal c h o i c e s determine some o f the interactions humans have with their environment and that the social characteristics o f that environment determine some o f those interactions. Both affect health.

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Rapid air transportation was not the only human behavior factor that helped the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. T h e development of reliable birth control and of antibiotics that cured many of the recognized sexually transmitted diseases contributed to a sexual revolution among both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Most AIDS cases in the world today result from heterosexual sexual activity. In contrast, the first cluster of AIDS cases identified in the United States was among gay men. It occurred during the tenure of a politically conservative administration in Washington that was not sympathetic to this g r o u p of c i t i z e n s , nor to p u b l i c h e a l t h e x p e r t s w h o tried to get more resources allocated to the emerging epidemic. The history of AIDS control efforts might have been very different if the first cluster had been detected in recipients of blood transfusions, for example. Both individual actions and social structures or attitudes affect patterns of disease. These are not limited by national borders. Decisions in an Asian or Colombian neighborhood of our global community affect people in distant countries. During the Vietnam War, many soldiers were introduced to cheap heroin in Southeast Asia. The flow of heroin from there on both military and commercial flights rose dramatically. The 1970s saw the beginning of our current epidemic of intravenous drug use. In Latin America, a more p o w e r f u l f o r m u l a t i o n of c o c a i n e , " c r a c k , " was i n v e n t e d and b e g a n to spread among drug users. Intravenous drug and crack cocaine users also have high rates of AIDS. Not all drug traffic f l o w s f r o m d e v e l o p i n g to d e v e l o p e d countries. S o m e is h o m e g r o w n and some f l o w s the other way. In fact, the United States might be called o n e of the largest d r u g - p u s h i n g countries in the world if we consider the case of tobacco. Lucy was a coworker and a patient of mine. We had known each other for years. Now she sat in my office with bad bronchitis. "Lucy, have you ever thought about giving up the cigarettes?" I asked. She had smoked two packs a day since she was a teenager. She swung one foot to and fro. " I ' v e tried lots of times." "Stop-smoking classes or nicotine gum have helped a lot of people quit," I suggested. Her shoulders drooped. "I know, but I just can't quit. I guess I'll just have to die early." I gave her a prescription for her bronchitis. I felt sad as I watched her walk down the hall. Her last words seemed ominous. A couple of years later, Lucy had a heart attack and fell, breaking her hip. She died suddenly in the hospital from complications of the two events. She was fifty-two. Her words in my office that day had been prophetic: dying at fifty-two is quite early for a North American woman.

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We are in the middle of an epidemic of disease and death caused by tobacco. It is a slow-growing epidemic compared to a cholera epidemic, which develops in days, or even to the AIDS epidemic. It takes thirty to thirty-five years for the damage caused by tobacco to show up as illness or death. Cigarette smoking causes lung cancer as well as heart attacks and thinning of the bones. The epidemic began to show up in men in the 1940s but not in women until the late 1960s. Why? Smoking was not widespread in the United States before World War I (1914-1918). However, one of the standard items given to soldiers in World War I, along with equipment and food rations, was cigarettes. Every soldier got them. Many men came back with "the habit" and continued smoking. But it was a man's habit. It was not socially acceptable for women to smoke until World War II (1939-1945). So we see a twenty-five-year lag between the lung cancer epidemics in U.S. men and women. This same pattern is emerging around the world, due largely to U.S. and European tobacco companies. While tobacco is widely grown, in traditional societies it was the older men who used it. They grew it locally, cured it themselves, and "rolled their own" one at a time. If a man did not start smoking until he was a mature adult, he might live out his expected life span before he developed a cancer or died of other complications of smoking. Today tobacco is the world's most widely grown nonfood crop and a s i g n i f i c a n t item in i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. A c c o r d i n g to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, since 2000 the United States has ranked fourth in tobacco production. According to the International Tobacco Growers Association, the United States heads the list of tobacco export countries, exporting 48 percent of its crop in 2000 (ITGA). Asian countries, due to their rapid economic growth, are prime targets for U.S. cigarettes. Both the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, for example, used the threat of trade sanctions to help open markets in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea for U.S. tobacco companies. In the United States, despite vigorous antismoking programs, we still have a problem. Like Lucy, most adult smokers acquire their habit in their teens. In 2003, 21.9 percent of high school students reported they had smoked one or more days in the past month and 9.7 percent smoked frequently. In China and Vietnam, where Western tobacco companies and their advertising are not yet well established, the traditional pattern predominates. Old men smoke and younger men are starting, but it is still uncommon among women, especially adolescent females. In Vietnam, only 4 percent of women smoke (Jenkins et al. 1997), and in Beijing, only 3 percent of school-age girls smoke (Zhu et al. 1996). In countries where Western

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tobacco companies have introduced advertising and promotion campaigns, smoking patterns become more like those of the United States and Europe. The health effects of this increase in tobacco use are enormous. In addition to lung cancer, tobacco use also causes many deaths from emphysema of the lungs. However, the greatest number of deaths due to tobacco use are cardiovascular: heart attack and stroke. Many of these deaths are premature. Like Lucy, adults who smoke die 13-14 years earlier than nonsmokers. During this decade, China will have 2 million smoking-related deaths each year; 900,000 of them will stem from lung cancer alone (Zhu et al. 1996). Tobacco use is a good example of how both individual choice and social environment affect disease in our global community. International trade, advertising, social values in a "neighborhood," government policies, and the like, as well as an individual's decision, influence the magnitude and pattern of disease.

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Providing and P r o t e c t i n g H e a l t h : C o m m u n i t y A c t i o n s

Finally, let's consider how our global village responds to health challenges. What do we as a community do to protect our health? M a t e r n a l and C h i l d H e a l t h The nurses at Van Dinh District hospital were excited. Tuyet, a young woman from a small hamlet, had come to the hospital to have her first baby. Instead, she had given birth to three girls. Triplets are even more rare among Vietnamese than in the West. Everyone in the hospital wanted to see these three miracle babies. Although healthy, they were small so they would be in the hospital for several weeks. Dr. Thuat, the medical director, was pleased, not only because Tuyet and her daughters were healthy, but also because he saw an opportunity. When Tuyet went home, everyone would want to visit with her and the babies. She would be admired and respected because of these healthy triplets. Other young women would listen and take advice from her. So he went over to the obstetrics wing and invited Tuyet to enroll in their community health worker course. She could stay here with her babies while she studied. To his delight, Tuyet agreed. Every community values its children, for they are the future. If children do not survive and grow into strong healthy adults, the community grows weak and risks extinction. So every community has developed activities to protect the health of children and their mothers. As we have seen, nutrition is crucial to health. Adequate nutrition must

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These healthy eight-month-old triplets prove to be an attraction that helps their mother, a community health worker, deliver health education messages to her village in Van Dinh District,Vietnam.

begin before a baby is born. If a m o t h e r is poorly nourished, the developing fetus will not get all the nutrients it needs. T h e baby may be born underweight, or even with birth defects. If a pregnant w o m a n s m o k e s , she m a y have a premature infant. If she drinks heavily, the baby may be retarded. W o m e n need to k n o w these things b e f o r e they b e c o m e pregnant, and they need access to good nutrition during pregnancy. In m a n y countries, c o m m u n i t y health w o r k e r s , like T u y e t , are trained to share this i n f o r m a t i o n with w o m e n in their n e i g h b o r h o o d . T h e s e health w o r k e r s e n c o u r a g e w o m e n to b r e a s t - f e e d their infants. Breast milk is the best f o o d for infants in their first f o u r to six m o n t h s of life f o r three reasons. First, it contains all the essential nutrients the g r o w ing b a b y n e e d s e x c e p t iron. Second, it contains antibodies to fight infect i o n s . A b a b y ' s i m m u n e s y s t e m is not f u l l y d e v e l o p e d until a b o u t six m o n t h s of age. Until then, it must depend on antibodies in m o t h e r ' s milk. Third, breast milk is best b e c a u s e it is sterile and inexpensive. If a b a b y is fed with f o r m u l a or other f o o d s , there is a higher c h a n c e of illness, b e c a u s e poor families o f t e n stretch f o r m u l a or other f o o d s with contaminated water. S o m e t i m e s c o m m u n i t y p r o g r a m s provide f o o d s u p p l e m e n t s for pregnant and nursing w o m e n and y o u n g children. In the 1980s the g o v e r n m e n t of Tamil N a d u in s o u t h e r n India b e g a n a p r o g r a m of w e i g h i n g c h i l d r e n

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every month from six months to three years of age. Any child who was malnourished received extra food for ninety days. At the same time, their mothers received nutrition education and were also offered extra food. When the program began, 4 5 - 5 0 percent of the children needed extra food. Eight years later that had dropped to 24 percent. "[This program] worked in Tamil Nadu because the community nutrition workers were well trained and highly motivated, and because mothers came to understand the importance of feeding for healthy growth" (World Bank 1993: 80). In the United States, this kind of community education work is often found in local health departments or community prenatal programs. At a county level, the Women, Infants, and Children Program, funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, provides supplemental food to eligible women and children. Some programs improve the nutrition and health of the whole population. Goiter and impaired thyroid function due to lack of iodine in the diet used to be quite common in the United States. They have disappeared, thanks to iodized salt. In the early 1900s, rickets caused by Vitamin D deficiency was very common in the northern United States and Europe. Now it is rarely seen because Vitamin D is added to milk. Vaccines and Immunization P r o g r a m s Vaccination, or immunization, causes the body to produce antibodies against a specific bacteria or virus. This gives a person the ability to fight off an infection when exposed. Despite his malnutrition, if Phuong had been immunized against measles, he would not have become sick and almost died. In 1965, I heard a team of infectious disease specialists at the CDC present a plan to eradicate smallpox in ten years. The roomful of doctors from all over the world were skeptical. Never in history had humanity wiped out an infectious disease. Surely it could not be done in just ten years. In fact, it took them eleven. On October 26, 1977, a Somali cook, Ali Maow Maalin, became the last case of wild smallpox in the world. This took a worldwide team effort. The United States contributed $ 3 0 million to the smallpox eradication campaign. Each year it saves about $ 3 6 0 million because it no longer has to vaccinate against, watch for, or treat any cases of smallpox in the United States. Barring a bioterrorist attack, smallpox will remain a distant memory. The global community, through WHO and UNICEF, is now waging another ambitious campaign: the Expanded Program of Immunization, later renamed Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. When this program was begun in 1980, only 25 percent of the world's children were immunized against the six common vaccine-preventable diseases. By 1999, this had increased to 74 percent (http://www.vaccinealliance.org). One of

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these diseases, poliomyelitis, is slated for complete eradication by 2005. In 2003, only 724 confirmed cases of polio occurred worldwide and only six countries were polio-endemic. However, following suspension of vaccination in northern Nigeria, a new outbreak of polio began in late 2003. With renewed efforts, perhaps polio will soon also be just a memory. Influencing H u m a n Behavior There is no AIDS vaccine. Combined treatment with two or more medicines prolongs the life of AIDS patients, but it is not a cure. Even with the advent of new generic drugs at much reduced cost, most of the estimated 38 million people infected with HIV are not receiving them, so they will die early and without any substantial treatment. This is a great tragedy. However, an even greater tragedy will occur if we as a global community let the epidemic continue to spread. We now know how to prevent transmission of the HIV virus. The World Bank noted in its 1993 World Development Report that a comprehensive AIDS prevention program could check the growth of the disease. . . . Crucial elements in these strategies are providing information on how to avoid infection, promoting condom use, treating other sexually transmitted diseases, and reducing blood-borne transmission. . . . Young people, both in and out of school, need comprehensive education on reproduction and reproductive health issues. . . . All potential behavioral choices, including abstinence and condom use, should be presented. (1993: 100)

In 1993 the global community spent about $1.5 billion on AIDS prevention. Schools, religious groups, voluntary agencies, and governments have all been involved in prevention programs. Unfortunately, sufficient resources have not been contributed to keep ahead of the ballooning epidemic. No medical technology exists to undo the damage caused by tobacco use. By 2020, tobacco will kill more people than any single disease, even AIDS (Murray and Lopez 1996). However, it is another epidemic we know how to stop. Prevention can help both smokers and those who do not smoke. Smokers who quit cut their risk of heart attack to the same level as nonsmokers in one year and their added lung cancer risk in fifteen years. Lung destruction by emphysema stops when smoking stops. Of course, for those who never start, all these risks are avoided. Stop-smoking programs are offered by many hospitals, clinics, and health departments. Voluntary agencies, such as the American Heart Association and the American Lung Association, sponsor such programs, as well as programs to prevent young people from starting to smoke or using smokeless tobacco. Government policy also influences decisions to start or continue smoking. Actions that have helped reduce tobacco use include raising taxes on

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tobacco products, b a n n i n g or limiting advertising, requiring warning labels on cigarette p a c k a g e s , prohibiting sales to m i n o r s , banning cigarette vending machines accessible to minors, and f o r b i d d i n g the sale of single cigarettes or distribution of f r e e s a m p l e s . S i n g a p o r e has b a n n e d t o b a c c o ads since 1971, and currently about eighteen countries have a total or partial ban on such ads. By the early 1990s, m o r e than eighty countries required w a r n i n g labels on cigarette p a c k a g e s . T o b a c c o taxes are fairly c o m m o n . W h e n Papua N e w G u i n e a raised the tobacco tax 10 percent, c o n s u m p t i o n dropped by 7 percent (World Bank 1993). T h e s e taxes can be used to support prevention p r o g r a m s .

Poverty and Health S o far I have e x a m i n e d s o m e e x a m p l e s of specific activities designed to improve directly the health of people. A n o t h e r factor mentioned earlier w a s the resources a p e r s o n possesses. Poor people have more disease and poorer health than rich people. Studies show that this is true all over the world. With m o r e m o n e y , p e o p l e can buy m o r e f o o d , live in a place with s a f e r water and s e w a g e disposal, and get m o r e education and medical care. A p o o r c o u n t r y will u s u a l l y h a v e h i g h e r d i s e a s e rates, h i g h e r d e a t h rates, and l o w e r life e x p e c t a n c y than richer c o u n t r i e s . Table 12.3 s h o w s that, in general, as a c o u n t r y ' s per capita g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t ( G D P ) falls, life e x p e c t a n c y falls, a n d d e a t h rates a m o n g i n f a n t s and p r e g n a n t w o m e n and rates of tuberculosis rise. In a p o o r country, both individuals a n d t h e c o m m u n i t y at l a r g e l a c k r e s o u r c e s t o r e d u c e d e a t h r a t e s a n d improve the health status of p e o p l e . "In 1984 f e w countries a c h i e v e d an average life e x p e c t a n c y at birth of 7 0 years or more until gross national product per head a p p r o a c h e d $ 5 0 0 0 per y e a r " (Wilkinson 1992: 168). O n c e a c o u n t r y reaches a certain level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t (about $ 5 , 0 0 0 p e r capita G N P in 1984), the gap b e t w e e n its richest and poorest p e o p l e is a m o r e i m p o r t a n t i n f l u e n c e o n the health of the nation than p e r c a p i t a G N P . A s t h e g a p b e t w e e n t h e r i c h e s t a n d p o o r e s t g e t s s m a l l e r , l i f e e x p e c t a n c y at b i r t h i n c r e a s e s . If t h e g a p g e t s l a r g e r , l i f e e x p e c t a n c y d r o p s . T h i s is based on studies in t w e l v e countries of Western E u r o p e and in the United States, C a n a d a , Australia, and J a p a n . O n e m i g h t say, " a s the rich get richer, the c o u n t r y gets sicker." C o n s i d e r G r e a t Britain and J a p a n : In 1970, income distribution and life expectancy were similar in these two countries. . . . Since then they have diverged. Japan has the most [equal] income distribution of any country on record [and] has the highest life expectancy in the world. In Britain, on the other hand, income distribution has widened . . . and deaths among men and women aged 15-44 have increased. (Wilkinson 1992: 168)

232 Table 12.3

Country

Development

Per C a p i t a G D P a n d S e l e c t e d H e a l t h Indicators, S e l e c t e d C o u n t r i e s

Per Capita GDP (PPP 2002 U.S.Î)

Sub-Saharan AfricaL Nigeria 860 Kenya 1,020 Zambia 840 Niger 800 Middle East and North Africa Israel 19.530 Egypt 3,810 870 Yemen Asia and PacificJapan 26.940 China 4.580 India 2.670 Nepal 1.370 The Americas 35.750 United States Brazil 7,770 Venezuela 5.380 Honduras 2,600 Europe Norway 36,600 Portugal 18,280 Russian Federation 8,230

Life Expectancy at Birth (2002)

Infant Mortality Rate (2002) (per 1.000 live births)

Tuberculosis Maternal Mortality Cases Rate 1 ' (2002) (per 100.000 (per 100,000 live births) people)

51.6 45.2 32.7 46.0

110 78 108 156

800 1000 750 1600

565 579 588 386

79.1 68.6 59.8

6 35 79

17 84 570

9 38 145

81.5 70.9 63.7 59.6

3 31 67 66

10 56 540 740

44 272 344 271

77.0 68.0 73.6 68.8

7 30 19 32

17 260 96 110

4 94 54 98

78.9 76.1

4 5

16 5

5 37

66.7

18

67

181

Source: United Nations Development Programme ( U N D P ) . Human (New York: Oxford University Press. 2004).

Development

Report

The United States has the widest gap between poorest and richest families of any developed country. Government policies in terms of tax relief and other transfers can alter this gap. In the 1990s, without government intervention, France and the United States both had about 25 percent of children living in poverty. After transfers and taxes, France's child poverty rate went to 6.5 percent, while the U.S. rate fell to 21.5 percent. A m o n g the t h i r t y c o u n t r i e s of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n and Development ( O E C D ) , only M e x i c o has a higher percentage of children living in poverty than the United States. Twenty-five of these thirty countries have lower early childhood mortality rates than the United States; only Hungary, Poland, Mexico, and Turkey have higher rates ( U N I C E F 2004). Health is one of the most precious possessions of any person. This chapter has considered some of the determinants of health, such as nutri-

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tion, poverty, the natural e n v i r o n m e n t , the society in w h i c h w e live, and the decisions we m a k e individually or collectively, and e x a m p l e s of local prog r a m s that address these factors, such as f e e d i n g p r o g r a m s , immunizations, a n d s t o p - s m o k i n g c l a s s e s . B o t h g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s ( s u c h as h e a l t h d e p a r t m e n t s ) and private v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s m a y d e l i v e r t h e s e services. Other factors can be operating in a n o t h e r n e i g h b o r h o o d of our global c o m munity: e m e r g e n c e of a n e w virus, increased travel, t o b a c c o trade, cocaine smuggling, g o v e r n m e n t policies, and so on. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s and cooperation b e t w e e n national and international agencies, such as the C D C , W H O , and U N I C E F , play an increasingly important role in protecting our health w h e n such factors are involved. N o one nation could eradicate smallpox or monitor A I D S . Yet a successful response to these challenges benefits us all.

•

Discussion Q u e s t i o n s and Suggested A c t i v i t i e s 1. H o w m a n y e x a m p l e s of A I D S prevention p r o g r a m s can you identify in your own c o m m u n i t y ? 2. H o w does the m o v i e Outbreak d e m o n s t r a t e the i n f l u e n c e of environment and h u m a n behavior on disease? 3. Should health care be a right of all people? 4. S h o u l d g o v e r n m e n t s r e g u l a t e the sale a n d p u r c h a s e of t o b a c c o products? 5. H o w d o h e a l t h p r o b l e m s d i f f e r in the N o r t h a n d S o u t h ? W h i c h p r o b l e m s are more serious? W h i c h should receive the greatest attention? 6. Visit your local health d e p a r t m e n t or voluntary agencies. Find out about their p r o g r a m s . H o w are they a d d r e s s i n g any of the issues discussed in this chapter? D o they need volunteers? 7. Using G o o g l e or s o m e other search engine, see what you can find on the World W i d e W e b about f o o d and calories, the t o b a c c o epidemic, or e m e r g i n g infectious diseases.

•

Suggested Readings

Braudel, Fernand (1981) The Structures of Everyday Life: Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-]8th Centuries. New York: Harper & Row. Brown, Lester (2003) Plan B: Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble. New York: W. W. Norton. Crosby, A l f r e d (1972) The Colombian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Garrett, Laurie (1994) The Coming Plague. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

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Hobhouse, Henry (1987) Seeds of Change: Five Plants That Transformed Mankind. New York: Harper & Row. McNeill, William H. (1987) Plagues and Peoples. New York: Anchor Books. Shilts, Randy (1987) And the Band Played On. New York: St. Martin's Press. Tannahill, Reay (1988) Food in History. New York: Crown. ( 2 0 0 4 ) UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. Available online at http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/report.html. W C E D (World C o m m i s s i o n on E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PART

4

The Environment

13 Sustainable Development Pam S. Chasek and Marion A. L Miller

D

evelopment strategies in the early part of the twenty-first century have been shaped by the increasing tensions between economic health and ecological health. Capitalism, the predominant economic system, depends on repetitive e x p a n s i o n . This process of e x p a n s i o n needs and supports industrial processes with insatiable appetites for resources such as oil, coal, wood, and water, and it depends on increasing use of land, sea, and atmosphere as sinks for the deposit of wastes. Clearly, there is a conflict between the economic s y s t e m ' s relentless demand and our limited and shrinking supplies. Although there is concern that the ravenous economy will gobble up and despoil the natural environment, some scholars and policymakers suggest that this catastrophe can be avoided: with sustainable development, we can have economic growth while protecting the environment ( W C E D 1987; UN 1992). This chapter will look at the evolution of the concept of sustainable development and the contribution of three decades of United Nations global conferences toward understanding and implementing development that is economically, socially, and environmentally sound.

I

Sustainable Development

Concepts of sustainability and sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t appeal to many people because they hold out the promise of reconciling these divergent views about the relationship between economic development and environm e n t a l h e a l t h . Yet, w h i l e o n e c a n a r g u e that r e c o n c i l i n g t h e t e n s i o n between ecology and economy is the central goal of sustainable development, there is little agreement on what sustainable development actually

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means. As a result, sustainable development has a multiplicity of definitions. Generally, it implies that it is possible to achieve sound environmental planning without sacrificing economic and social improvement (Redclift 1987: 33). Some definitions emphasize sustainability, and therefore the f o c u s is on t h e p r o t e c t i o n and c o n s e r v a t i o n of l i v i n g and n o n l i v i n g resources. Other definitions focus on development, targeting changes in technology as a way to enhance growth and development. Still others insist that sustainable development is a contradiction in terms, since development as it is now practiced is essentially unsustainable. The Brundtland Commission underlined concern for future generations by asserting that sustainable development is development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" ( W C E D 1987: 8). The commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development, known by the name of its chair, N o r w a y ' s Gro Harlem Brundtland, was convened by the United Nations to formulate a long-term agenda for action on environment and development. Definitions of sustainable development tend to focus on the well-being of h u m a n s , with little explicit attention to the well-being of n a t u r e . H o w e v e r , the World C o n s e r v a t i o n U n i o n ( I U C N ) . the U n i t e d Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Wide Fund for Nature ( W W F ) have proposed a definition that includes nature and highlights the constraints of the biosphere: sustainable development is "improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems" (IUCN, UNEP, and W W F 1991: 10). Although this d e f i n i t i o n o b s e r v e s the traditional hierarchy that places h u m a n b e i n g s above the natural world, it does emphasize our dependence on the biospheric envelope in which we live. Over time the concept of sustainable development has evolved and it was recognized that efforts to build a truly sustainable way of life require the integration of action in three key areas: economic growth, conserving natural resources and the environment, and social development. If development is to be genuinely sustainable, policymakers will have to make substantial modifications to their strategies and their assumptions. However, the difficulties of actually delivering on the hopes that many people around the w o r l d have a t t a c h e d to the idea of s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t h a v e b e c o m e increasingly evident. In part, these d i f f i c u l t i e s reflect political problems, grounded in questions of financial resources, equity (justice or fairness), and the competition of other issues, such as terrorism, war, and weapons of mass destruction, for the attention of decisionmakers. In part, they reflect differing views about what should be developed, what should be sustained, and over what period. Additionally, the political impetus that carried the idea of sustainable development so far since the 1980s in public forums has also increasingly distanced it from the scientific and technological base necessary to m a k e some headway.

Sustainable

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Evolution of International Environmental Governance: T h e Environmental Pillar

The threat to the global environment has been salient enough to make the environment an item on the international agenda. In the period between 1900 and 1968 there were a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements and conferences on environmental issues, many of them focusing on particular species or regions. For the most part, they had an optimistic tone, taking the p e r s p e c t i v e that the existing p r o b l e m s c o u l d be f i x e d by the employment of financial and technological resources. But by the time of the Biosphere Conference (the Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere) in 1968, that optimism had dimmed, and conference participants were emphasizing that environmental deterioration had reached a critical threshold (Caldwell 1990: 27). As the international community became more concerned about the state of the environment and the relationship with economic development, this sense of crisis came to be reflected in the global conferences held in 1972, 1992, and 2002.

T h e 1972 Stockholm Conference The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) was not the first environmental conference to draw representatives from many of the world's nations. But it was the first large-scale environmental conference to look beyond scientific issues to broader political, social, and economic issues. The 1972 conference put the environment squarely on the official international agenda. Delegates came from 113 nations, 21 United Nations agencies, and 16 intergovernmental organizations (UN 1972). In addition, more than 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sent observers. Since the conference took place at a time when issues of global equity were becoming more prominent in international fora, it is not surprising that this was reflected in preconference discussions and at the conference. Developed countries and developing countries clashed over global economic relations and environmental politics. Before the conference, developed countries had identified a particular set of issues to be addressed—issues such as pollution, population explosion, conservation of resources, and limits to growth. But the developing countries wanted to enlarge the agenda to include issues such as shelter, food, and water. They were able to use their voting power in the United Nations General Assembly to press developed countries to adopt a more inclusive agenda (McCormick 1989: 92-105). T h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l o u t c o m e of t h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e w a s t h e c r e a t i o n of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t Programme. In the decades since Stockholm, U N E P has played a signifi-

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cant role in shaping the e n v i r o n m e n t a l policy a g e n d a and in coordinating e n v i r o n m e n t a l policy within the United N a t i o n s s y s t e m . T h e c o n f e r e n c e o u t p u t a l s o i n c l u d e d the D e c l a r a t i o n on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t , the D e c l a r a t i o n of Principles, a n d R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r A c t i o n . O n e of the m i n o r resolutions addressed plans for a second United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t . T h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e put the e n v i r o n m e n t f i r m l y on the international political agenda and thereby paved the way for intensified multilateral environmental cooperation and treaty-making. By stressing that environmental issues inherently are political and need to be s u b j e c t to political negotiations and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , the S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e rejected the earlier notion that e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues were primarily relevant only to scie n t i s t s and o t h e r e x p e r t s . T h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e a l s o i d e n t i f i e d a t h e m e that has been at the center of international e n v i r o n m e n t a l discourse e v e r since: that the s i m u l t a n e o u s a c h i e v e m e n t of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and environmental m a n a g e m e n t is possible.

T h e Brundtland C o m m i s s i o n In the w a k e of S t o c k h o l m , the United Nations a s s u m e d a direct and coordin a t i n g r o l e in e f f o r t s to r a i s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l a w a r e n e s s t h r o u g h its n e t w o r k of a s s o c i a t i o n s with g o v e r n m e n t s , N G O s , and the w o r l d ' s business and scientific c o m m u n i t i e s . H o w e v e r , e n v i r o n m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t issues were o f t e n addressed separately and in a f r a g m e n t e d fashion. S t o c k h o l m s u c c e s s f u l l y brought international attention to the environmental crisis, but did not resolve any of the inherent tensions in linking e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection with social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . To b r i n g back the f o c u s o n the b r o a d e r i s s u e s of e n v i r o n m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t that had been d i s c u s s e d at the S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e , the U N General A s s e m b l y d e c i d e d in 1983 to establish an i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m i s s i o n to f o r m u l a t e a l o n g - t e r m a g e n d a for action. O v e r the next three years, the World C o m m i s s i o n on E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t held public hearings and studied the p r o b l e m . Its report Our Common Futurea published in 1987, stressed the need f o r d e v e l o p m e n t strategies in all countries that r e c o g n i z e d the limits of the e c o s y t e m ' s ability to r e g e n e r a t e itself and a b s o r b waste p r o d u c t s ( W C E D 1987: 43). R e c o g n i z i n g "an accelerating ecological i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a m o n g n a t i o n s , " the c o m m i s s i o n e m p h a sized the link b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues, and identified poverty e r a d i c a t i o n as a necessary and f u n d a m e n t a l requirem e n t f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t ( W C E D 1987: 3 - 5 ) . In addition to c o n t r i b u t i n g to the d e b a t e on d e v e l o p m e n t and e n v i r o n m e n t , the B r u n d t l a n d C o m m i s s i o n p o p u l a r i z e d the term " s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t , " describing it as " a p r o c e s s of c h a n g e in w h i c h the exploitation of r e s o u r c e s , the d i r e c t i o n of i n v e s t m e n t s , the o r i e n t a t i o n of t e c h n o l o g i c a l

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development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspiration" ( W C E D 1987: 46). T h e 1992 E a r t h S u m m i t On the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, governments gathered again, this time in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to m o v e the sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n d a f o r w a r d . O f f i c i a l l y designated the United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on Environment and D e v e l o p m e n t ( U N C E D ) , the popularly termed "Rio Conference" or "Earth Summit" attracted greater official and u n o f f i c i a l interest than had the S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e . M o r e than 170 nations sent delegates, and 108 of these nations were represented by their heads of state or government. Thousands of N G O s sent representatives, and there were nearly 10,000 m e m b e r s of the media in attendance ( U N D P I 1997). The conference and the preparatory work that preceded it showed that there were still s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the d e v e l o p e d and the developing world. Consequently, each group provided different inputs to the agenda-setting process: developed countries wanted to focus on ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain, and deforestation, while developing countries also wanted to explore the relationship between the economic policies of the developed countries and the sluggish economic growth of developing countries. The concern was that an "environmentally healthy planet was impossible in a world that contained significant inequities" (Miller 1995: 9). One of the issues that delegates focused on was changing unsustainable patterns of consumption. Poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated. While poverty results in environmental stress, the major cause of global environmental deterioration is an unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in the industrialized countries, which aggravates poverty and imbalances. Inequalities in consumption are stark. Globally, the 20 percent of the world's people in the highest-income c o u n t r i e s account f o r 86 percent of total private c o n s u m p t i o n expenditures—the poorest 20 percent account for a minuscule 1.3 percent of consumption expenditures. More specifically, the richest fifth: • • • • •

consume 45 percent of all meat and fish, the poorest fifth 5 percent; consume 58 percent of total energy, the poorest f i f t h less than 4 percent; have 74 percent of all telephone lines, the poorest fifth 1.5 percent; consume 84 percent of all paper, the poorest fifth 1.1 percent; own 87 percent of the world's vehicle fleet, the poorest fifth less than 1 percent.

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R u n a w a y growth in c o n s u m p t i o n in the past fifty years is putting strains on the e n v i r o n m e n t n e v e r b e f o r e seen ( U N D P 1998). T h e world's s p e n d i n g priorities also show the effect that c o n s u m p t i o n patterns have on sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t priorities (see Table 13.1). T h e m a j o r o u t p u t of U N C E D w a s a n o n b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t c a l l e d " A g e n d a 2 1 " (referring to the twenty-first century), which sets out a global plan of action for sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . A g e n d a 21 e n c o m p a s s e s every s e c t o r a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues as well as international policies a f f e c t i n g both e n v i r o n m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t , and the full range of domestic social and e c o n o m i c policies. W h e n printed, A g e n d a 21 ran to 294 pages, including 4 0 chapters covering 115 separate topics. A g e n d a 21 demonstrated the e m e r g e n c e of a clear international consensus on the range of issues affecting the long-term sustainability of h u m a n society, including domestic social and e c o n o m i c policies, international e c o n o m i c relations, and cooperation on global c o m m o n s issues (see Figure 13.1). T h e c o n f e r e n c e also p r o d u c e d two nonbinding sets of principles—the R i o D e c l a r a t i o n of E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t and the S t a t e m e n t of Forest Principles—that helped create n o r m s and expectations. T h e United Nations F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n on Climate C h a n g e and the C o n v e n t i o n on Biological Diversity, which were negotiated independently of the U N C E D process on parallel tracks, were opened for signature at the Earth S u m m i t and are often m e n t i o n e d as U N C E D agreements. U N C E D also m a r k e d a watershed in a d v a n c i n g the concept of sustaina b l e d e v e l o p m e n t . A s T o m m y K o h , the d i p l o m a t f r o m S i n g a p o r e w h o chaired the U N C E D Preparatory C o m m i t t e e , stated:

Table 13.1

Global Priorities in Spending, 1998

Global Priority Basic education for everyone in the world Cosmetics in the United States Water and sanitation for everyone in the world Ice cream in Europe Reproductive health for all women in the world Perfumes in Europe and the United States Basic health and nutrition for everyone in the world Pet foods in Europe and the United States Business entertainment in Japan Cigarettes in Europe Alcoholic drinks in Europe Narcotics drugs in the world Military spending in the world

U.S.$ Billions 6 8 9 11 12 12 13 17 35 50 105 400 780

Source: Barbara Crossette, "Kofi Annan's Astonishing Facts," New York Times, September 27, 1998.

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Figure 13.1

Agenda 21

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Section I: Social and Economic Dimensions. International cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in developing countries; combating poverty; changing consumption patterns; demographic dynamics and sustainability; protecting and promoting human health conditions; promoting sustainable human settlement development; integrating environment and development in decisionmaking. Section II: Conservation and Management of Resources for Development. Protection of the atmosphere; integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources; combating deforestation; managing fragile ecosystems: combating desertification and drought; managing fragile ecosystems: sustainable mountain development; promoting sustainable agriculture and rural development; conservation of biological diversity; environmentally sound management of biotechnology; protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use, and development of their living resources; protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources; environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals; environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes; environmentally sound management of solid wastes and sewage-related issues; safe and environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes. Section HI: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups. Women; children and youth; indigenous people; nongovernmental organizations; local authorities: workers and trade unions; business and industry; scientific and technological community; farmers. Section IV: Means of Implementation. Financial resources and mechanisms; transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation, and capacity building; science for sustainable development; promoting education, public a w a r e n e s s , and t r a i n i n g ; national m e c h a n i s m s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation for capacity building in developing countries; international institutional arrangements; international legal instruments and mechanism; information for decisionmaking.

It used to be fashionable to argue in the developing countries that their priority should be economic development and that, if necessary, the environment should be sacrificed in order to achieve high economic growth. The sentiment was to get rich first and to clean up the environment later. . . . Today, developing countries understand the need to integrate environment into their development policies. At the same time, developed countries have become increasingly aware of the need to cut down on their wasteful consumption patterns. The new wisdom is that we want economic progress but we also want to live in harmony with nature. (Koh 1997: 242) T h e R i o Summit set out a v i s i o n of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t , and established goals and principles for achieving it. The agreement was hard fought and historic. The next step—trying to turn goals into action—proved to be even more challenging.

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The 1997 Earth Summit+5 Conference T h e Earth S u m m i t + 5 C o n f e r e n c e (formally k n o w n as the Special Session of the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y to R e v i e w and A p p r a i s e the I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of A g e n d a 21) was held in June 1997, five years after the Earth S u m m i t . It a f f o r d e d d e l e g a t e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to a s s e s s the p r o g r e s s that had b e e n m a d e since the 1992 c o n f e r e n c e and to plan for c o n t i n u e d implementation of the Earth S u m m i t strategies. Earth S u m m i t + 5 presented delegates with a sobering reminder of the lack of p r o g r e s s m a d e in i m p l e m e n t i n g the g o a l s set out in A g e n d a 21. G o v e r n m e n t s a c k n o w l e d g e d that the global e n v i r o n m e n t had continued to deteriorate in the five years since Rio, with rising levels of g r e e n h o u s e gas e m i s s i o n s , toxic pollution, and solid waste. R e n e w a b l e resources, notably f r e s h w a t e r , forests, topsoil, and marine fish stocks, continued to be used at rates that were clearly u n s u s t a i n a b l e . On the positive side, g o v e r n m e n t s r e c o g n i z e d that world population growth was slowing, f o o d production was rising, local air and water quality were improving in m a n y developed c o u n tries, and the majority of people were living longer and healthier lives. But the n u m b e r of people living in poverty had increased and gaps between rich and p o o r had g r o w n , both within and between countries. G o v e r n m e n t officials m a d e the usual grand speeches and f u l s o m e promises, but analysts and N G O s were critical of the progress m a d e at the 1997 c o n f e r e n c e and in the p r e c e d i n g f i v e - y e a r period. G o r d o n S h e p h e r d , the W W F ' s director for international policy, criticized the c o n f e r e n c e for spending too m u c h time on speeches and not enough time on agreeing on the targets and timetables necessary to implement c o m m i t m e n t s m a d e in 1992. He criticized the lack of progress on issues such as forests, climate, and toxic chemicals. He noted that the conference should have taken the initiative in ensuring that international e c o n o m i c agreements were supportive of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . S h e p h e r d did identify one area in w h i c h progress had been m a d e : A g e n d a 21 w a s b e i n g i m p l e m e n t e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i t y and local action groups, small enterprises, and s o m e g o v e r n m e n t s ( W W F 1997). Martin Khor, director of the Third World N e t w o r k , expressed similar o p i n i o n s . H e was disappointed at the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the "Spirit of R i o , " d e m o n s t r a t e d by the fall in aid to developing countries, the continued drain of resources f r o m d e v e l o p i n g countries, and the new intellectual property r i g h t s a g r e e m e n t of the World T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W T O ) . At the s a m e t i m e , he was e n c o u r a g e d by the actions of local c o m m u n i t y leaders and millions of ordinary people around the world ( K h o r 1997).

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Concern About Trade: The Economic Pillar

T h e c h a l l e n g e s f a c e d in i m p l e m e n t i n g A g e n d a 21 w e r e c o m p o u n d e d by c h a n g e s in the global e c o n o m y . T h e years f o l l o w i n g the Earth S u m m i t saw

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the rise of globalization as a dominant concern, as rapidly increasing trade and capital flows, coupled with the revolution in information and communication technologies (such as the Internet), made the world more independent and interconnected than ever before. Since 1990 the value of world trade has tripled, and the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI; companies investing in other countries) have increased fourteenfold (Gallagher 2003). Absolute priority has been given to expanding the scope for trade and investment in line with neoliberal economics (a political-economic movement, increasingly prominent since 1980, that de-emphasizes or rejects government intervention in the economy, focusing instead on achieving progress and even social justice by more free-market methods, especially an emphasis on economic growth). For example, neoliberals argue that the best way to protect the environment is by overcoming poverty via increasing privatization, foreign direct investment, and free trade. As a result, the institutions governing the global economy have grown stronger while those promoting social equity, poverty alleviation, and environmental cooperation remain weak. When globalization arrived on the scene, the barriers to trade and investment began to fall, and the belief that poor countries could grow themselves out of poverty by boarding the liberalization express train took on an almost religious force—at least in the rich countries (Halle 2002). In other words, if poorer countries supported trade liberalization, many of their economic development problems would be solved. The trend toward globalization—the rapid growth and integration of markets, institutions, and cultures—is viewed by some as a threat, by others as an opportunity. Many policymakers and industrialists in the developed world were positive about the phenomenon. However, a majority of those living in developing countries or engaged in a variety of different NGOs worried that it was a "race to the bottom" in terms of environmental and labor standards, and was exacerbating social and economic disparities. Many NGOs were concerned that to attract foreign direct investment, developing countries would eliminate or ignore environmental and labor standards. There was a fear that if a host country demonstrated that it did not have strict pollution standards and did not condemn child labor or support an eight-hour work day, it would attract more corporate investment. The establishment of the World Trade Organization at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, was widely applauded at the time, but some feared it would give rise to a new type of "all powerful" international organization and worried that United Nations treaties and agreements on environment, development, human rights, labor, women, and children would be relegated far down the list of priorities. Without the necessary political commitment, these pressing issues would not receive the attention they deserved. The goal of the WTO is the harmonization of international standards

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for trade in g o o d s and services, as well as for intellectual property rights. T h i s includes similar product testing requirements, health and safety stand a r d s , p r o d u c t liability standards, p a p e r w o r k r e q u i r e m e n t s , and so f o r t h . S u c h h a r m o n i z a t i o n m e a n s that c o r p o r a t i o n s will f i n d f e w e r r e g u l a t o r y obstacles to their operations in host countries. G o v e r n m e n t regulations that require that imported products meet certain s t a n d a r d s — i n c l u d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t a n d a r d s — w i t h regard to content or process, are subject to c h a l lenge. For e x a m p l e , a country might impose m e a s u r e s to restrict the e x p o r t s of forestry resources or fish f o r c o n s e r v a t i o n p u r p o s e s , but this could be ruled an unfair trade practice. If a local corporation can buy the resource, t h e n t h a t r i g h t a l s o h a s to be e x t e n d e d to f o r e i g n - b a s e d c o r p o r a t i o n s . Preferential treatment cannot be given to local interests. If the W T O panel rules against a country, it has to m a k e the r e c o m m e n d e d c h a n g e within a prescribed time or face financial penalties or trade sanctions. T h e s e c h a n g e s in trade rules have clear implications for sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t especially as local jurisdictions lose access to s o m e of the regulatory tools that might be used to shape d e v e l o p m e n t . For m a n y e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s , trade liberalization raises questions a b o u t the potential impact on the earth's e c o s y s t e m s and on g o v e r n m e n t s ' d e v e l o p m e n t choices. T h e y see liberalization as driving the d e m a n d for greater c o n s u m p t i o n of natural r e s o u r c e s and as creating p r e s s u r e s to d i s m a n t l e e n v i r o n m e n t a l regulations (Gallagher 2003). Trade liberalization has both direct and indirect e f f e c t s on sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . An e x a m p l e of the f o r m e r is that a recent study of the increasing levels of transportation d u e to the North A m e r i c a n Free T r a d e A g r e e m e n t ( N A F T A ) f o u n d that N A F T A trade has increased air pollution in five key t r a n s p o r t a t i o n corridors that link North American commerce (NACEC 2001), including V a n c o u v e r - S e a t t l e , W i n n i p e g - F a r g o , T o r o n t o - D e t r o i t , San A n t o n i o Monterrey, and T u c s o n - H e r m o s i l l o . A second direct e f f e c t is the introduction of alien invasive s p e c i e s — s p e c i e s that are not native to a particular country, region, or e c o s y t e m . T h e trade-based global e c o n o m y stimulates the s p r e a d of e c o n o m i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t s p e c i e s , o f t e n w i t h f u n d i n g f r o m d e v e l o p m e n t agencies to establish plantations of rubber, oil palm, pineapples, and c o f f e e , and fields of soybeans, cassava, m a i z e , sugarcane, w h e a t , and o t h e r species in c o u n t r i e s f a r f r o m their place of origin. But it a l s o stimulates the accidental spread of species through a variety of p a t h w a y s . W h i l e it is difficult with present information to d e t e r m i n e precisely h o w m u c h of the invasives p r o b l e m globally is due to c o n s c i o u s intent and h o w m u c h to inadvertence, s o m e hints are available. A n o t h e r p r o b l e m is the discharge of ballast water. Ballast water is carried in e m p t y ships to p r o v i d e stability. It is t a k e n o n board at the port b e f o r e the voyage b e g i n s and tiny s t o w a w a y s , in the f o r m of marine organisms, are taken on board with it. T h e discharge of ballast water, w h e n the

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ship is loaded again, introduces harmful aquatic o r g a n i s m s , including dise a s e s , bacteria, and v i r u s e s , to both marine a n d f r e s h w a t e r e c o s y s t e m s , thereby degrading c o m m e r c i a l l y important fisheries and recreational opportunities. For e x a m p l e , the World Wide F u n d for Nature reports that more than sixty invasive species have been found in the Baltic S e a , with many species apparently having arrived via ballast water f r o m ships. For e x a m p l e , the zebra m u s s e l w a s introduced into the Great L a k e s via ship ballast water and the A s i a n tiger m o s q u i t o w a s introduced via used tire imports. The rapid decline in f r o g populations in Q u e e n s l a n d is attributed to a virus that is exotic to A u s t r a l i a and that m a y have been introduced through the thriving international trade in ornamental fish for h o m e aquarium use ( M c N e e l y 2 0 0 1 ) . There are a l s o indirect e f f e c t s . K e v i n G a l l a g h e r ( 2 0 0 3 ) outlines four m e c h a n i s m s whereby trade and investment liberalization indirectly affect s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t : s c a l e , c o m p o s i t i o n , t e c h n i q u e , and r e g u l a t o r y effects. First, scale e f f e c t s occur when there is an e x p a n s i o n of e c o n o m i c activity. An e x a m p l e w o u l d be e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s o f c a r b o n d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s due to the e x p a n s i o n of the world e c o n o m y in the 1990s. S e c o n d , composition e f f e c t s occur when increased trade leads nations to specialize in the sectors where they enjoy a comparative advantage. When c o m p a r a tive a d v a n t a g e is derived from differences in the strictness o f regulations, then the composition e f f e c t will exacerbate environmental and social problems in countries with lax regulations as " d i r t y " or " s o c i a l l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e " industries concentrate in these countries. Third, technique e f f e c t s , or c h a n g e s in resource extraction and production technologies, can potentially lead to a decline in pollution. Trade and investment liberalization could e n c o u r a g e the transfer of environmentally sound cleaner technologies to developing countries. However, o f all foreign direct investment f l o w s of $ 5 5 9 . 6 billion in 2 0 0 3 , only $ 1 7 2 billion went to d e v e l o p i n g countries, of which 6 2 percent went to A s i a alone, with China being the largest d e v e l o p i n g country recipient ( U N C T A D 2 0 0 4 a ) . T h e s e f i g u r e s s u g g e s t that m a n y o f the w o r l d ' s poorer nations will not benefit f r o m the p o s s i b l e transfer of cleaner technologies through F D I , especially since there is no guarantee that the technologies will not be outdated and environmentally harmful. T h e fourth m e c h a n i s m outlined by G a l l a g h e r is the regulatory effect. For d e v e l o p i n g countries, e c o n o m i c integration can crowd out the creation of development-friendly policies and institutions. T h e World B a n k estimated that the cost to implement j u s t three of the W T O agreements that involve restructuring or reforming d o m e s t i c l a w s and regulations, c o m e s to $ 1 3 0 million. This is more than the annual development budget for the w o r l d ' s poorest nations (Finger and Schuler 1999). T h i s can seriously harm develo p i n g countries' social and environmental policies.

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C i v i l s o c i e t y g r o u p s and N G O s , i n c l u d i n g O x f a m , the W o r l d Development Movement, the World Wide Fund for Nature, and the Third World Network, are increasingly calling for a balance of rights and responsibilities in trade liberalization. They argue regulations that protect the health and safety of a country's citizens as well as the natural environment are necessary complements to liberalization. Developing countries will only see the benefits from trade when economic, environmental, and social development policies work in concert.

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The Millennium Conferences: The Social Development Pillar

C o n c e r n s o v e r g l o b a l i z a t i o n and o t h e r e m e r g i n g i s s u e s such as the H I V / A I D S epidemic added a new dimension to the sustainable development debate as the millennium approached. There was a growing recognition that the world was failing to achieve most of the goals for a more sustainable society set out in Agenda 21 and elsewhere. Between 1992 and 2 0 0 0 , official development assistance from the industrialized countries plunged, while H I V / A I D S rolled back life expectancies in some countries to p r e - 1 9 8 0 l e v e l s as the n u m b e r o f p e o p l e l i v i n g with the d i s e a s e approached the 4 0 million mark. The world's population climbed above 6.1 billion in 2 0 0 0 , up from 5.5 billion in 1 9 9 2 — a significant increase in just eight years. The total number of people living in poverty dropped slightly—from 1.3 to 1.2 billion—but most of the gains were in Southeast Asia and virtually no progress was made in sub-Saharan Africa, where almost half the population lives in poverty. There remained at least 1.1 billion people lacking access to safe drinking water and 2.4 billion who lacked adequate sanitation (UNDPI 2 0 0 2 ) . To help prepare the United Nations to meet these c h a l l e n g e s , the General Assembly designated its fifty-fifth session, in September 2 0 0 0 , as the "Millennium Assembly," where world leaders agreed on a far-reaching plan to support global development objectives for the new century. The world's leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work toward a world of peace and security for all and a world in which sustainable development and poverty eradication would have the highest priority. The Millennium Declaration, which was adopted by all UN member states, set out key challenges f a c i n g humanity and identified eight overarching development goals. The first seven goals are directed toward eradicating poverty in all its forms: halving extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education and gender equity, reducing the mortality of children under five by two-thirds, reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters, reversing the

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spread of HIV/AIDS, halving the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water, and ensuring environmental sustainability. The final goal, that of building a global partnership for development, is viewed by some as developing the sort of North-South pact first envisaged in Rio in 1992 (see Table 8.2). The m o m e n t u m a c h i e v e d with the a d o p t i o n of the M i l l e n n i u m Development Goals was reinforced over the next two years by other major international m e e t i n g s (see Figure 13.2). In Brussels, g o v e r n m e n t s addressed the needs of the least-developed countries, while in Doha they expressed the need to link sustainable development and trade. Meanwhile, Monterrey supported the mobilization of resources to finance development, Rome confirmed the global commitment to eradicate hunger, and a series of UN special sessions promoted issues relating to women, social development, human settlements, and children. As delegates turned their attention toward the ten-year review of Agenda 21, there was great concern about the global situation, the emerging trends, and globalization. It was recognized that rather than providing a place to negotiate or renegotiate another set of principles, the World Summit on Sustainable Development would have to be a forum where various partners from different sectors of society could set out clear programs for future action and agree on projects and initiatives with specific targets and timetables.

Figure 13.2

T h e Millennium R o u n d of W o r l d Conferences

Women 2000. New York. June 5 - 1 0 , 2000; gender equality, development, and peace for the twenty-first century. World Summit for Social Development and Beyond. Geneva, Switzerland. June 26-July 1, 2000; achieving social development for all in a globalizing world. Millennium Assembly. New York, September 2000. Third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries. Brussels, Belgium, May 1 4 - 2 0 . 2 0 0 1 . Review of the Implementation of the UN Conference on Human Settlements. New York, June 6 - 8 , 2001. Fourth World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference. Doha, Qatar, November 9 - 1 4 , 2001. International Conference on Financing for Development. Monterrey, Mexico, March 18-22, 2002. Review of the implementation of the World Summit for Children. New York, May 8 - 1 0 , 2002. World Food Summit: Five Years Later. Rome, Italy, June 10-13, 2002.

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E v o l u t i o n o f a C o n c e p t : T h e 2002 W o r l d S u m m i t on Sustainable D e v e l o p m e n t

Ten years after Rio, the United Nations convened a World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, to map out a detailed course of action for implementation of Agenda 21. The W S S D sought to overcome the obstacles to achieving sustainable development and to generate initiatives that would deliver results and improve people's lives while protecting the environment. The Johannesburg Summit did not aim to renegotiate Agenda 21, but it did attempt to fill some key gaps that have impeded its implementation and the shift to sustainable development. The Johannesburg Summit opened on Monday, August 26, 2002, and brought together g o v e r n m e n t representatives f r o m over 190 countries, including 100 world leaders. An estimated 37,000 people attended either the summit or one of the many other gatherings held alongside the main event (UN 2002). The difficult negotiations that followed focused on an ambitious plan of implementation that would address eradicating poverty, changing unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, and protecting and managing natural resources. As in Stockholm and Rio before it, there were divergent views among governments on how to tackle issues ranging from water and sanitation to desertification, climate change, biodiversity, oceans, health, e d u c a t i o n , science and technology, trade, and finance. Indeed, there were moments when negotiations came to a standstill and when skeptics questioned the negotiators' commitment to multilateralism and sustainable development. The North continued to argue that development in the South needed to be environmentally sound, while the South continued to argue that development had to come first and it was the responsibility of the North to help the South in this regard. After all, the North got rich while destroying its environment and now was asking the South not to do the same. This was seen by some as condemning the South to poverty. As Indira Gandhi said at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, "poverty is the worst form of pollution." To put it simply, the idea in Rio was that the North should act first, shoulder most of the adjustment burden, offer access to environmental technology, and finally engage in some financial redistribution—then the South would come on board and eventually share in commitments. Ten years later in Johannesburg, the South argued that the North had not fulfilled its part of the bargain and, therefore, the South did not have to fulfill its commitments toward environmentally sound development. After ten days of hard work in Johannesburg, the negotiations conclude d . T h e s u m m i t p r o d u c e d t h r e e key o u t c o m e s . T h e f i r s t w a s the Johannesburg Declaration, a pledge by world leaders to commit themselves

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fully to the goal of sustainable development. The second was the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which sets out a comprehensive program of action for sustainable development and includes quantifiable goals and targets with fixed deadlines. Finally, the summit produced nearly 300 voluntary partnerships and other initiat i v e s to s u p p o r t s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t . U n l i k e t h e J o h a n n e s b u r g Declaration and the Plan of Implementation, this major outcome was not the result of multilateral negotiations involving the entire community of nations. Instead, it involved numerous smaller partnerships composed of private sector and civil society groups, as well as governments, who committed themselves to a wide range of projects and activities. Many of the commitments and partnerships agreed to in Johannesburg echoed the Millennium Development Goals. For example, countries agreed to commit themselves to halve the proportion of people who lack clean water and proper sanitation by 2015. These commitments were backed up by an announcement by the United States of a $970 million investment in water p r o j e c t s o v e r the next three years, and an a n n o u n c e m e n t by the European Union (EU) to engage in partnerships to meet the new goals, primarily in Africa and Central Asia. The UN received twenty-one other partnership initiatives in this area with at least $20 million in extra resources ( U N D E S A 2002). On energy issues, countries committed themselves to expanding access to modern energy services for the 2 billion people that do not have them. In addition, while countries did not agree on a target for phasing in renewable energy (e.g., a target of 15 percent of the global energy supply from renewable energy by 2010), which many observers said was a major shortcoming of the summit, they did commit to green energy and the phase-out of subsidies for types of energy that are not consistent with sustainable development. And to bolster these c o m m i t m e n t s , a group of nine m a j o r electric companies signed agreements to undertake sustainable energy projects in developing countries. In addition, the EU announced a $700 million partnership initiative on energy and the United States announced investments of up to $43 million for energy in 2003 ( U N D E S A 2002). On health issues, in addition to actions to fight HIV/AIDS and reduce waterborne diseases, and the health risks due to pollution, countries agreed to p h a s e out, by 2 0 2 0 , the use and p r o d u c t i o n of c h e m i c a l s that h a r m human health and the environment. There were also many c o m m i t m e n t s made to protect biodiversity and improve ecosystem management, including commitments to reduce biodiversity loss by 2010, to restore fisheries to their m a x i m u m sustainable yields by 2015, to establish a representative network of marine protected areas by 2012, and to improve developing countries' access to environmentally sound alternatives to ozone-depleting chemicals by 2010. These commitments are supported by thirty-two part-

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nership initiatives s u b m i t t e d to the U N , with $ 1 0 0 m i l l i o n in additional resources, and a U.S. a n n o u n c e m e n t of $53 million f o r forest m a n a g e m e n t in 2 0 0 2 - 2 0 0 5 ( U N D E S A 2002). Yet a m o n g all the targets, timetables, c o m m i t m e n t s , and partnerships that were agreed u p o n at J o h a n n e s b u r g , there were n o silver-bullet solutions to aid the fight against poverty and a continually deteriorating natural environment. In fact, as an i m p l e m e n t a t i o n - f o c u s e d s u m m i t , J o h a n n e s b u r g did not p r o d u c e a p a r t i c u l a r l y d r a m a t i c o u t c o m e — t h e r e w e r e n o a g r e e m e n t s that will lead to new treaties, and m a n y of the a g r e e d targets h a d already been agreed at other meetings, including the M i l l e n n i u m S u m m i t . As UN Secretary-General Kofi A n n a n told the press on the last day of the summit. "I think we have to be c a r e f u l not to expect c o n f e r e n c e s like this to produce miracles. But we d o expect c o n f e r e n c e s like this to generate political c o m m i t m e n t , m o m e n t u m and energy for the a t t a i n m e n t of the g o a l s " ( U N D E S A 2002). A m o n g the s u m m i t ' s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s was the creation of a balance of the three pillars of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t : social d e v e l o p m e n t , e c o n o m i c growth, and protection of the e n v i r o n m e n t . This was a decisive shift f r o m the view over the previous d e c a d e that sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t equaled the protection of the e n v i r o n m e n t . T h i s was the first true s u m m i t on sustainable development in the sense that the advocates of all three pillars of sustaina b l e d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e u n d e r o n e roof a r g u i n g their c a s e s , raising real issues, and c o n f r o n t i n g those with different interests and perspectives. It w a s not a social s u m m i t dealing only with poverty, exclusion, and h u m a n rights. It was not an e c o n o m i c and globalization s u m m i t addressing only trade and investment, finance for d e v e l o p m e n t , and transfer of technology. And it w a s not an e n v i r o n m e n t a l s u m m i t focusing only on natural resources degradation, biodiversity loss, climate change, and pollution. J o h a n n e s b u r g was instead a s u m m i t about the intersections of all of these issues (Speth 2003). However, not e v e r y o n e was pleased with the o u t c o m e of J o h a n n e s b u r g . To many, the W S S D fell short of expectations and thus was a lost o p p o r t u nity, because g o v e r n m e n t s failed to take the sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n da forward. S o m e N G O s felt that the summit did not g o far e n o u g h in setting targets f o r increasing the use of r e n e w a b l e energies. J o n a t h a n L a s h , p r e s i d e n t of the W o r l d R e s o u r c e s I n s t i t u t e , s a i d , " W e h a v e m i s s e d a n opportunity to increase energy production f r o m non-polluting sources like solar, biomass, and wind, and to provide the m a n y c o m p a n i e s taking action to reduce emissions with a secure f r a m e w o r k for their actions." H o w e v e r , as Lash added, " T h i s S u m m i t will be r e m e m b e r e d not for the treaties, the c o m m i t m e n t s , or the declarations it produced, but f o r the first stirrings of a new way of g o v e r n i n g the global c o m m o n s — t h e b e g i n n i n g s of a shift f r o m t h e stiff f o r m a l w a l t z of t r a d i t i o n a l d i p l o m a c y to t h e j a z z i e r d a n c e of

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improvisational solution-oriented partnerships that may include nongovernment organizations, willing governments and other stakeholders" (UNDESA 2002). WWF director-general Claude Martin was also critical in his assessment: N e g o t i a t i o n s . . . m o r e o f t e n r e s e m b l e d a ' r a c e to t h e b o t t o m ' than any real attempt to m o v e f o r w a r d . W h i l e in their s p e e c h e s w o r l d l e a d e r s e m p h a sized the i m p o r t a n c e of s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t , in the n e g o t i a t i n g r o o m s m a n y c o u n t r i e s w o r k e d to p r o t e c t their o w n interests b y p r e v e n t i n g the S u m m i t f r o m r e a c h i n g n e w targets and t i m e t a b l e s . T h e c o m p r o m i s e s and w e a k e n i n g of l a n g u a g e in the p l a n of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w e r e to s u c h an extent that in s o m e c a s e s it actually went b a c k on p r e v i o u s c o m m i t m e n t s . (Martin 2 0 0 2 )

Some took their criticisms one step further. Sunita Narain, from India's Center for Science and the Environment, wrote: It n o w s e e m s to m e that t h i s c o n f e r e n c e w a s d e s i g n e d to f a i l a n d t h e i n c o m p e t e n c e of its o r g a n i z e r s w a s not a c c i d e n t a l . W h y ? S i m p l y b e c a u s e the multilateral s y s t e m is n o w an " u n n e c e s s a r y r e s t r a i n t " f o r the w o r l d ' s most p o w e r f u l nation, the U S . W e a k e n i n g this s y s t e m is a key o b j e c t i v e of U S f o r e i g n policy. T h e g a m e plan is to shift f o c u s f r o m global responsibility on i s s u e s s u c h as c l i m a t e c h a n g e , o n t o n a t i o n a l g o v e r n a n c e , b y arguing that p o v e r t y and e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n h a v e little to d o with global trade or f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m s , but are c a u s e d by c o r r u p t and irresponsible g o v e r n m e n t s of the S o u t h . T h i s also b e c o m e s a c o n v e n i e n t a r g u m e n t against aid, w h i c h they c l a i m d o e s not w o r k b e c a u s e of c o r r u p t national g o v e r n m e n t s . Instead, t h e y p r o m o t e f u n d s f r o m the p r i v a t e sector. In this p r o c e s s , U N a g e n c i e s a r e e m a s c u l a t e d , e i t h e r by d r i v i n g t h e m to b a n k ruptcy or by d e s t r o y i n g their credibility with f a i l u r e s s u c h as the W S S D . (Narain 2002: 5)

In short, Narain believes that the rich countries, like the United States, control international conferences and the entire U N and Bretton Woods systems and want to use their control to pursue their own domestic agendas of increased greenhouse gas emissions and consumption of natural resources. Was the World Summit on Sustainable Development a success or a failure? This question will most likely be debated long into the future, but the answer depends on what one's goals and expectations were. For the most part, the success of the W S S D can only be evaluated in the future, when the results of the negotiations and other events will be visible. Many people left Rio in 1992 with a great sense of disappointment only to state ten years later that Rio was a high point for the sustainable development agenda. What precedents the W S S D will set remain to be seen. Like the Earth Summit before it, the W S S D marked the beginning of a new era of international cooperation on sustainable development—not just environmental

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protection, not j u s t e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , not j u s t social d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e W S S D updated and e x p a n d e d the activities called for in A g e n d a 21 to recognize the realities of the first few years of the twenty-first century that had not even been e n v i s a g e d in 1992. The J o h a n n e s b u r g S u m m i t recognized that the c h a l l e n g e s of the day were g l o b a l in nature and required international solutions. What its legacy will be is largely in the hands of the governments and nonstate actors who have the responsibility to carry the sustainable a g e n d a forward.

Conclusion T h e global e c o n o m i c system depends on endless growth, and many believe that this is clearly unsustainable. The governments o f industrialized countries support this e c o n o m i c system because with growing e c o n o m i e s they can pacify the less affluent m e m b e r s of their societies with a slice of a larger p i e , i n s t e a d o f h a v i n g to s h a r e the e x i s t i n g p i e m o r e e q u i t a b l y . Developing-country governments a l s o want their countries' e c o n o m i e s to grow; to that end, many have e m b r a c e d the Western model of development. However, the planet cannot support everyone in such a resource-intensive lifestyle. Despite the apparent tension between e c o n o m i c health and ecological health, in the long run e c o n o m i c health is dependent on ecological health. T h e economy cannot thrive in the f a c e of the total devastation of our biospheric e n v e l o p e . If we accept this fact, then there are only two w a y s to resolve that tension between e c o n o m y and e c o l o g y : we can let the tension continue until the integrity of the e c o l o g y and the e c o n o m y deteriorate and snap like old rubber bands, releasing all tension; or we can make the economic, social, and cultural c h a n g e s that will be supportive of sustainable development at the community, national, and global levels. It is c o m p a r a tively easy to agree that the shift to sustainable development is necessary. T h e challenge is for g o v e r n m e n t s to have the political will to m a k e this shift happen and for the people o f the world to d e m a n d change.

Discussion Questions 1. Which definition of sustainable development d o you prefer? W h y ? 2. How has the concept of sustainable development e v o l v e d since the 1980s? 3. Why are environmentalists concerned about trade liberalization? 4. What are s o m e of the tensions between the three pillars of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t ?

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5. Do you think sustainable development is possible? Should it be a priority? Why or why not?

Suggested Readings Chasek, Pamela, ed. (2000) The Global Environment in the Twenty-First CenturyProspects for International Cooperation. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. C h a s e k , P a m e l a , and Richard S h e r m a n ( 2 0 0 4 ) Ten Days in Johannesburg: A Negotiation of Hope. Cape Town: Struik. Conca, Ken, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko (2004) Green Planet Blues: Environmental Politics from Stockholm to Johannesburg. Third edition. Boulder: Westview. Miller, Marian A. L. (1995) The Third World in Global Environmental Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. (2001) "Tragedy for the Commons: The Enclosure and Commodification of Knowledge." In Dimitris Stevis and Valerie J. Assetto, eds., The International Political Economy of the Environment. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Redclift, Michael (1987) Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions. New York: Methuen. Speth, James Gustave (2004) Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment. New Haven: Yale University Press.

14 Protection of the Atmospheric Commons Mark Seis

I

n Garrett H a r d i n ' s article " T h e Tragedy of the C o m m o n s " (1968), he argued that common property will be destroyed by human greed and over exploitation. Hardin used the hypothetical example of cattle herders on a pasture (not owned by any one particular individual). He argued that if an unsustainable number of cattle were added in an effort to maximize profits, then the pasture would eventually be overgrazed and thus destroyed. The problem is that as the herders attempt to maximize their profits and add more cattle, then collectively, the herders will work against each other's ability to m a x i m i z e profit. Individual restraint is unlikely because each herder knows that if they reduce the number of cattle they have, they will lose profits, at least in the short term, while other herders continue to make short-term profits from unsustainable grazing practices. The end result is that when grazers are free to exploit a pasture with no community control, driven strictly by the ethic of profit maximization, the result is what Hardin called the "tragedy of the c o m m o n s . " This example can be applied to other global commons, such as the atmosphere, outer space, and the oceans. Two current approaches to addressing the destruction of the commons by the ethic of profit maximization are complete privatization and government regulation. In the former, a private actor controls the pasture that has been privatized. So, for example, in the case of a pasture that has been transformed from a commons to private property owned by a single herder family with the intention of owning the land forever, the owner would want to ensure that they could continue to graze cattle on the land. Therefore, theoretically, the family would use it sustainably. If the government took control of the previously community controlled pasture, then it would need to establish laws to regulate its use and to ensure that it is developed sustainably.

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Hardin's concept of the commons, however, has been seriously criticized for mistaking what were actually community regulated public lands for '"open access' regimes in which anything goes" (Athanasiou and Baer 2002: 145). Historically, socially regulated commons have been maintained by a subsistence-based economics guided by cultural practices and a spiritual sense of belonging to the land that "stabilize people's relationships with their ecosystems" (Cronon 1983: 12). Food production, work, recreation, and spiritual fulfillment form a cultural context that affirms and ensures the health of the land and therefore the community. For instance, Aborigines, many Native Americans, and other indigenous peoples around the world have had such cultural practices that affirm their relationship to their ecosystem. Many people feel that the only way to preserve the atmospheric commons is "to convert it from an open-access resource into a commons, a limited socially regulated global c o m m o n s in which access is apportioned to us each in equal measure, by virtue of . . . our common humanity" (Athanasiou and Baer 2002: 145). Maintaining air quality and atmospheric stability as essential components to all life on this planet is an example of a socially regulated commons that affirms our relationship with our biosphere. Conversely, some support the idea of converting the commons into private property. Treating air as private property assumes that rationing air through markets is superior to cultural practices that ensure quality air for all. An example of this privatization approach is the creation of C 0 2 trading regimes—discussed later in the chapter. I examine specific atmospheric environmental issues in this chapter that relate to the degradation of the global atmospheric commons. Because the atmosphere belongs to all as common property by virtue of our need for a healthy atmosphere to live, it is the assumed responsibility of nationstates to provide all people equal access and equal shares to a healthy atmosphere. The majority of the atmospheric treaties explored in this chapter are attempts by nation-states to assert their responsibility to preserve the atmospheric commons. In particular, this chapter explores global warming, ozone depletion, and acid rain. I examine each topic separately, looking at the cause of the problem, the major nation-state contributors, and the various international polices that have been proposed and implemented for reducing the potentially damaging effects each poses for the future of humanity.

•

T h e T h r e a t of Global W a r m i n g

Since Charles Keeling set up laboratories in 1958 at the South Pole and Hawaii, he has shown that carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 ) levels have been rising (Bates 1990; Leggett 1990; McKibben 1989). Current concentrations of

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C 0 2 are still increasing. In fact, C 0 2 levels are, " a c c o r d i n g to s a m p l i n g s of air bubbles trapped in the w o r l d ' s deepest ice core in Vostok, Antarctica . . . ' u n p r e c e d e n t e d ' in relation to the last 4 2 0 , 0 0 0 y e a r s " ( D u n n 2 0 0 1 b : 85). T h e r e is w i d e s p r e a d c o n c e r n that increased C 0 2 levels are leading to an increase in the e a r t h ' s temperature, k n o w n as global w a r m i n g . C r i t i c s ( K e r r 1989; Ray a n d G u z z o 1992; M i c h a e l s 1992; L i n d z e n 1993), however, question the actual a m o u n t of w a r m i n g that will occur and the a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g c o m p u t e r m o d e l projections. Skeptics suggest that the e a r t h ' s natural a t m o s p h e r i c process (for e x a m p l e , oceans, forests, sulfate aerosols) will be able to mitigate the g r e e n h o u s e e f f e c t (described below). O t h e r skeptics argue that the c u r r e n t w a r m i n g trend is a natural fluctuation in global t e m p e r a t u r e s rather than a result of h u m a n activities. Despite the critics, the m a j o r i t y of scientific literature on the subject is m o u n t i n g a very strong case that w a r m i n g ( f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d to as climate c h a n g e ) is o c c u r r i n g . T h e twentieth century w a s already 0 . 6 d e g r e e s Celsius (1.08 d e g r e e s F a h r e n h e i t ) w a r m e r than the n i n e t e e n t h century, and according to " g l o b a l c l i m a t e records . . . the 10 w a r m e s t years in the past century have all o c c u r r e d since 1 9 8 0 " (Flavin 1996: 22). T h e most conv i n c i n g e v i d e n c e f o r g l o b a l w a r m i n g is t h e l o s s of ice s h e e t s in t h e Northern H e m i s p h e r e . T h e thickness of arctic ice " h a s d e c l i n e d by 4 2 percent since the 1950s, and N o r w e g i a n researchers e s t i m a t e that Arctic s u m m e r s m a y be ice-free by 2 0 5 0 " ( D u n n 2 0 0 1 b : 87). T h e accelerated rate of w a r m i n g h a s b e e n a t t r i b u t e d m o s t l y to t h e a c t i v i t i e s of h u m a n b e i n g s (Bates 1990; Flavin 1996; D u n n 2 0 0 1 b ; A t h a n a s i o u and Baer 2002) (see Table 14.1).

C a u s e s a n d C o n s e q u e n c e s of G l o b a l W a r m i n g T h e earth is c o n s t a n t l y b o m b a r d e d by solar r a d i a t i o n , s o m e of w h i c h is a b s o r b e d and s o m e of which is reflected back into space. This process is

Table 14.1

World Carbon Emissions from Fossil Fuel Burning, 1950-2003

Emissions (million tons of carbon) Carbon dioxide (parts per million)

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

1,612.0

2,535.0

3,997.0

5,155.0

5,931.0

n.a.

316.7

325.5

338.5

354.0

2000

6,315

369.4

2003

6,443

372.9

Source: Michael Renner and Molly O. Sheehan, eds., "Carbon Emissions and Temperature Climb." in Vital Signs 2003 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

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known as the greenhouse effect. When the natural carbon cycle is altered by fossil fuel burning (automobiles, power plants, industry, and heating being the most c o m m o n fossil fuel-burning activities), large amounts of C 0 2 are released into the atmosphere. The result is that more solar radiation is trapped in the earth's atmosphere and less is reflected, and therefore, the earth begins to warm. G a s e s like carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons ( C F C s ) , methane, tropospheric ozone, and nitrogen o x i d e s trap solar radiation and c a u s e the atmosphere to warm. Carbon dioxide accounts for roughly 5 0 percent of total greenhouse g a s e s , chlorofluorocarbons 20 percent, methane 16 percent, tropospheric ozone 8 percent, and nitrogen o x i d e s 6 percent ( M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). A s the atmosphere warms, it retains more water vapor due to evaporation. Water vapor is also a powerful greenhouse g a s , because it traps long-waved solar radiation. This phenomenon has been recently demonstrated by satellite measurements from the Earth Radiation Budget Experiments, which showed that as ocean and surface temperatures increase, more infrared radiation is trapped in the atmosphere (Leggett 1990). Increasing temperatures set into motion various f e e d b a c k l o o p s that escalate the problem of global warming. A warming earth m e a n s that there is less ice and snow in mountain and polar regions to reflect back solar radiation. In addition, as the earth w a r m s , large amounts of methane are r e l e a s e d f r o m i c e , t u n d r a , and m u d in the c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l v e s . M o r e methane m e a n s more greenhouse g a s e s to trap solar radiation, which in turn m e a n s hotter temperatures, and hotter temperatures mean more thawing, which means more methane g a s — c r e a t i n g a vicious cycle of warming. With global warming c o m e s increased precipitation in s o m e areas and drought in other areas b e c a u s e of increased evaporation due to the heat and c h a n g i n g wind patterns. R i s i n g s e a levels, longer and w a r m e r s u m m e r s , more severe storms, and m o r e frequent forest fires are all likely o u t c o m e s of increased warming ( B a t e s 1990; M c K i n n e y and S c h o c h 1996). B a s e d on a plethora of g l o b a l c l i m a t e data, T o m A t h a n s i o u and Paul B a e r ( 2 0 0 2 ) report that sea levels are rising, s u m m e r s are b e c o m i n g longer and warmer, serious storms are b e c o m i n g more frequent and severe, and water shortages have b e c o m e a chronic problem for eighty countries, constituting 4 0 percent of the world's population. Increased global w a r m i n g will bring to extinction many more species b e f o r e their natural time b e c a u s e o f rapidly c h a n g i n g habitats ( L e g g e t t 1990; Weber 1993; Bright 2 0 0 0 ) . The resulting storm and drought d a m a g e may also lead to p o s s i b l e f o o d shortages, especially when one considers the expected increase in human population (Athansiou and B a e r 2 0 0 2 ) .

W h o Are the Major Contributors to Global Warming? Since the Industrial Revolution, human activity has added 271 billion tons of carbon to the atmosphere (Dunn 2 0 0 1 b ) . Annual global carbon e m i s s i o n s

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are 6.4 billion tons ( S h e e h a n 2003). Since 1990, Western industrial nations h a v e i n c r e a s e d t h e i r c a r b o n e m i s s i o n s by 9 . 2 p e r c e n t , a n d d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n s h a v e i n c r e a s e d t h e i r c a r b o n e m i s s i o n s by 2 2 . 8 p e r c e n t ( D u n n 2001a). S o m e countries are guilty of emitting m u c h m o r e c a r b o n than othe r s , w h i c h h a s c r e a t e d p r o b l e m s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y w i t h respect to formulating binding international strategies for regulating greenh o u s e g a s e m i s s i o n s . T a b l e 14.2 r e v e a l s the m a j o r C 0 2 c o n t r i b u t o r s . A n o t h e r way to view C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s is the amount p r o d u c e d per person in a g i v e n c o u n t r y . T a b l e 14.3 s h o w s the d r a m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s in the North v e r s u s the South. T h r e e of the r e a s o n s stated for such high carbon e m i s s i o n s in the United States (and other wealthy countries like Australia and C a n a d a ) are " l o w energy prices, large houses and heavy use of a u t o m o b i l e s " (Flavin 1996: 31).

Table 14.2

Largest Producers of Carbon Emissions (thousands of metric tons) Country United States China Russian Federation Japan India Germany United Kingdom Canada Italy South Korea

Carbon Emissions 1.528 761 391 323 292 214 154 118 116 116

Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Center, "Global, Regional, and National Fossil Fuel C O i Emissions." 2003. available online at http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/home.html.

Table 14.3

Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Selected Countries Country

C 0 2 Emissions per Capita

United States Germany Japan Poland China Brazil India Ethiopia

19.7 9.7 9.1 8.1 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.1

Source: Janet L. Sawin, "Making Better Energy Choices," in Brian Halweil et al., eds., Slate of the World 2004 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).

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T h e fact that the United States has failed to take m a n d a t o r y and legally binding steps to reduce its c a r b o n e m i s s i o n s makes it difficult to persuade industrializing nations to slow their rate of carbon e m i s s i o n s and look to alternative technologies. Most U.S. m e a s u r e s to r e d u c e the threat of global w a r m i n g , as p r o m u l g a t e d in President Bill C l i n t o n ' s climate action plan, were voluntarily based. T h e Natural Resources D e f e n s e C o u n c i l claims that even a g g r e s s i v e e n f o r c e m e n t of C l i n t o n ' s strategies w o u l d not have m e t target reductions, because "in 1994 C o n g r e s s a p p r o v e d only half the f u n d s called for; the 1995 C o n g r e s s m a d e even more drastic cuts, and w e a k e n e d a p p l i a n c e and lighting s t a n d a r d s that had been e n a c t e d by the 1992 C o n g r e s s " (Flavin 1996: 32). To date, President G e o r g e W. Bush has s h o w n little concern in reducing carbon emissions in particular and global w a r m ing in general. Authors Peter Schwartz and D o u g Randall in a report for the Central I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y s u g g e s t e d that " c l i m a t e c h a n g e s h o u l d be e l e v a t e d beyond a scientific debate to a U S National Security c o n c e r n " ( T o w n s e n d and Harris 2004). The Bush administration suppressed the report for f o u r months. Given the threat to world security suggested by this report, s o m e scientists and foreign leaders believe that this might be the catalyst to get President Bush m o v i n g on the issue of global w a r m i n g and climate change. Hope is offered also by the fact that some industrialized nations, such as G e r m a n y , France, the United K i n g d o m , and Russia, have lowered their c a r b o n e m i s s i o n s , and D e n m a r k , S w i t z e r l a n d , and the N e t h e r l a n d s h a v e implemented a variety of carbon e m i s s i o n - r e d u c i n g strategies (Flavin and Dunn 1997).

International Climate Control Policies In 1972, the United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t , or the S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e , was held. This c o n f e r e n c e consisted of 114 governments and was attended by m a n y n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations ( N G O s ) . It was the first time in history that nations of the world c a m e together to d i s c u s s issues s u r r o u n d i n g the d e s t r u c t i o n of the e n v i r o n m e n t ( S w i t z e r 1994; Valente and Valente 1995). T h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e did not create any binding obligations but served more as a catalyst to generate an international discourse on global e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues. It was not until the 1992 Earth S u m m i t (also k n o w n as the R i o S u m m i t or the United N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on the E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t [ U N C E D ] ) that serious d i s c u s s i o n on r e d u c i n g C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s to curtail global w a r m i n g was u n d e r t a k e n . T h e R i o S u m m i t was a t t e n d e d by 178 countries and 110 heads of state (Switzer 1994). O n e of the f i v e m a j o r d o c u m e n t s p r o d u c e d at the Earth S u m m i t was the F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n on C l i m a t e C h a n g e . Its purpose w a s "stabilization of g r e e n h o u s e gas c o n c e n -

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trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences in the climate system" (Flavin 1996: 36). Although the United States, headed by the first Bush administration, was a m a j o r actor at the Rio S u m m i t , it f o u g h t the binding of targeted reductions in C 0 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Despite U.S. reluctance to sign on to targeted C 0 2 reductions, many industrialized European nations "did sign a separate declaration reaffirming their c o m m i t m e n t to r e d u c i n g their o w n C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s to 1990 l e v e l s " ( G o r e 1992: xiv). Germany and Japan provided most of the leadership in getting the other industrial n a t i o n s to m a k e a c o m m i t m e n t to t a r g e t e d C 0 2 r e d u c t i o n s . President Bill Clinton in 1993 reversed the Bush administration's position, announcing that the United States would reduce C 0 2 to 1990 levels by 2000. But as noted earlier, many of the appliance and lighting efficiency initiatives enacted by the 1992 Congress were weakened by Congress in 1994 and 1995 and were also severely strained in that they received only half the funding needed to implement many of the voluntary programs recommended by the Clinton plan (Flavin 1996). Getting the industrialized nations to make serious c o m m i t m e n t s has become a major concern of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and worldwide insurance companies. AOSIS is a small coalition of island nations that are extremely threatened by rising seas. A rise of one meter in sea level could threaten to wipe out the sustainable land and economy of many of the small island nations. Given this threat, AOSIS proposed that industrial nations reduce their C 0 2 emissions by 20 percent. This proposal was also endorsed by seventy-seven other nations participating in the 1995 Berlin Conference (which was a follow-up to the Rio Summit and focused on climate change), but was resisted by a majority of the oil-producing nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and by the larger carbon-consuming countries like the United States and Australia (Brown 1996; Flavin 1996). Other major non-nation players are some of the world's largest insurance companies, which obviously have a stake in any losses that may occur due to global warming. With sea levels projected to rise and temperatures projected to increase, insurance companies are reporting that "economic losses related to climate change could top $304 billion a year in the future" (Abramovitz 2001: 117). The primary objective of the Berlin Conference was to design measures that would reduce global carbon emissions and to create a series of trial projects aimed at exchanging alternative low-carbon-intensive technologies among nations (Flavin 1996). Despite the fact that there were no legally binding carbon reduction targets established, the Berlin Conference did provide a sense of renewed hope in formulating a global policy for mitigating climate change. T h e agreement reached at Berlin, known as the Berlin Mandate, instructs governments to negotiate a treaty protocol "to

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elaborate policies and measures, as well as to set quantified limitations and reduction objectives within specified time-frames such as 2 0 0 5 , 2 0 1 0 , and 2 0 2 0 " (Flavin 1996: 35). The meeting to establish this treaty took place at the end of 1997 in Japan and generated the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted on December 11, 1997, and opened for signatures on March 16, 1998. The protocol contains legally binding emission targets for key greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. The agreement requires ratification by fifty-five countries; these fifty-five must include developed countries representing at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions of the ratifiers. According to the UN: " T h e overall commitment adopted by developed countries in Kyoto was to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by some 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by a budget period of 2 0 0 8 to 2 0 1 2 . While that percentage did not seem significant, it represented emissions levels that were about 29 percent below what they would have been in the absence of the Protocol" ( 1 9 9 8 a ) . One of the problems with Kyoto was that negotiators were vague concerning the ways in which countries could achieve reductions through emissions trading (mentioned in the introduction as an alternative to socially regulated commons) and carbon sinks. In the former, countries would be assigned a total amount of carbon they were allowed to emit per year. These assigned levels vary for each country based on past emissions. If countries reduce their emissions below their allotted level, they can "trade" these unused emissions to countries having less success lowering carbon emissions. Kyoto was also vague on the degree to which carbon sinks should count toward a country's effort to reduce global warming. Carbon sinks include forests, rangelands, and croplands that absorb carbon. At the Hague Conference the question of how carbon emission reductions could be counted remained the major obstacle to achieving an agreement. The United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia favored using flexible and c r e a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s such as c a r b o n sinks and m a r k e t - b a s e d mechanisms (for example, emissions trading). Other European countries, however, interpreted the U.S. advocacy of flexible methods as an attempt to avoid reducing emissions from cars, factories, and power plants. Many E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s want actual r e d u c t i o n s in g r e e n h o u s e e m i s s i o n s through the development of non-fossil fuel technology. However, according to one study of five European nations, only the United Kingdom and possibly Germany will meet the target emission reductions of Kyoto (Kerr 2 0 0 0 ) . It is unlikely that the United States will reach the emissions goals of Kyoto, since according to one study it would have to reduce its emissions by 3 0 percent (Kerr 2 0 0 0 : 9 2 1 ) . In contrast to Europe, the United States wants to achieve the K y o t o goals without reducing greenhouse gases, because such cuts would likely involve increased coal and oil prices.

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Negotiations at the Hague Conference ended in deadlock over agreement on how emission reductions could be measured. In November 2001, negotiators from 160 countries met in Marrakesh, Morocco, and agreed on the details of the Kyoto Protocol begun four years ago. In the treaty, industrialized countries (with the glaring exception of the United States) agreed to reduce C 0 2 by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels. Countries have until 2012 to accomplish this task. Early in 2001, the industrialized countries decided to continue with negotiations even though the United States, under President George W. Bush, withdrew from negotiations, claiming that it was "not in the United States economic best interest" (Athanasiou and Baer 2002: 117). Until the end of 2004, without the United States, negotiators had not been able to get the required support of countries responsible for generating 55 percent of carbon dioxide emissions. However, at the end of 2004, Russia, which had been reluctant to sign the agreement, announced its support for the protocol and the Russian parliament ratified it. The protocol officially went into effect early in 2005. The new agreement combines emissions trading and carbon sinks as well as required emissions cuts. Critics highlight that developing nations are exempt from this agreement (due to their economic situation and lack of contribution to the current C 0 2 levels). They also question the significance of the treaty given the absence of the United States.

•

T h e T h r e a t of O z o n e Depletion

Record-low ozone levels were recorded throughout the 1990s, however scientists have recently reported that the rate of ozone depletion has markedly slowed. Atmospheric chemist Michael Newchurch reported in a recent study that " w e ' r e not gaining ozone, w e ' r e just losing it less q u i c k l y " (Perlman 2003). Newchurch notes that "it has been declining at about 8% per decade for a couple of decades, and now it's only about 4% per decade" (Black 2003). International policies are reducing the sources of ozone depletion, but the damaging effects of a thinning ozone layer have yet to be fully realized, and it may take 50 to 100 years for ozone levels to return to concentrations prior to the creation of CFCs.

Causes and Consequences of O z o n e Depletion There are two types of ozone we often hear about. Ozone in the stratosphere is what protects us f r o m h a r m f u l ultraviolet radiation. If compressed, the ozone layer would be about a tenth of an inch thick (3 millimeters). Ozone in the troposphere, on the other hand, is extremely poisonous

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to most life forms. A large portion of the o z o n e found in our troposphere is g e n e r a t e d by h u m a n s o u r c e s of a t m o s p h e r i c pollution that interact with solar radiation to create a pale blue gas with a strong p u n g e n t odor, which can s o m e t i m e s be smelled a f t e r it rains (Gribbin 1988). T h e issue highlighted in this chapter, in contrast, is the depletion of protective, stratospheric o z o n e resulting f r o m the h u m a n production of chemicals like C F C s , halons, and other halon c a r b o n s . This stratospheric ozone layer protects us f r o m excessive a m o u n t s of ultraviolet radiation. T h e ozone layer is created f r o m oxygen that escapes f r o m the troposphere. O x y g e n is created f r o m living organisms that process carbon dioxide and exhale o x y g e n . Just as o x y g e n is vital for the creation of the ozone layer, so is the o z o n e layer vital for the creation of oxygen by protecting the living organisms that produce it. C F C s and halon m o l e c u l e s , w h i c h have relatively long a t m o s p h e r i c lives, contain chlorine and b r o m i n e atoms. O n c e these m o l e c u l e s float their way up into the a t m o s p h e r e , they interact with sunlight, w h i c h breaks apart their m o l e c u l a r structure, r e l e a s i n g the chlorine and b r o m i n e a t o m s that destroy ozone. It is k n o w n that " a single chlorine atom can scavenge and d e s t r o y m a n y t h o u s a n d s of o z o n e m o l e c u l e s " (Gribbin 1988: 4 8 ) . J o h n Gribbin explains: " A t an altitude of about 11 miles above the ground, more than half of the o z o n e a b o v e A n t a r c t i c a was d e s t r o y e d in the s p r i n g of 1987. And changes in the a m o u n t of chlorine oxide present m a r c h e d precisely in step with c h a n g e s in the amount of ozone. W h e r e chlorine oxide went up, ozone went d o w n , s h o w i n g clearly that chlorine was destroying the o z o n e " (1988: xi). C F C s are solely products of human industry and are most often used for propellants in aerosol spray cans. They are also used in air conditioners, refrigerators, c o m p u t e r chips, and S t y r o f o a m . Halons are e m p l o y e d mostly in e q u i p m e n t used to suppress fires. There are no natural processes in the troposphere that react with C F C s and halons to break their m o l e c u l a r structure d o w n ( M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). Another m a j o r destroyer of o z o n e is nitrous oxide ( N 2 0 ) . Like C F C s and halons, N 2 0 is not a friend to the stratosphere. It reacts chemically with high-energy solar radiation to break up into N O (nitric oxide), which reacts with ozone. Nitrous oxide is emitted into the atmosphere by plants, c o m bustion of coal and oil, and spray cans. Plants naturally emit N 2 0 , which h e l p s m a i n t a i n o z o n e levels so as to strike a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t o o little o z o n e — a certain a m o u n t is needed to protect the earth f r o m h a r m f u l radiat i o n — a n d too m u c h ozone, which would inhibit life as w e k n o w it (Gribbin 1988; M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). While the release of N 2 0 by plants is a natural process, the use of chemical fertilizer to increase f o o d production has increased the a m o u n t of N 2 0 in the troposphere (Gribbin 1988). E f f e c t s of o z o n e d e p l e t i o n on h u m a n b e i n g s are s e v e r a l . T h e m o s t

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obvious is that o z o n e depletion c a u s e s an increase in ultraviolet B (UV-B) radiation, which is k n o w n to increase our chances of getting skin cancer, especially m a l i g n a n t m e l a n o m a ( M e a d o w s , M e a d o w s , and R a n d e r 1992). Increases in UV-B radiation have been most p r o n o u n c e d in countries located in the Southern H e m i s p h e r e , such as Australia, N e w Zealand, and South A f r i c a . A u s t r a l i a h a s the h i g h e s t rate of skin c a n c e r in t h e w o r l d , and r e s e a r c h e r s s u g g e s t that t w o out of t h r e e p e o p l e g r o w i n g u p t h e r e will d e v e l o p skin cancer during their lifetimes, "and 1 in 6 0 will d e v e l o p the most deadly type, malignant m e l a n o m a " ( M e a d o w s , M e a d o w s , and R a n d e r 1992: 145). In the S o u t h e r n H e m i s p h e r e , skin c a n c e r a n d c a t a r a c t s are i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m m o n . In f a c t , A1 G o r e r e p o r t s that " i n Q u e e n s l a n d , in northeastern Australia, for e x a m p l e , m o r e than 75 percent of all its citizens w h o have reached the age of sixty-five n o w have s o m e f o r m of skin cancer, and children are required by law to wear large hats and neck scarves to and f r o m school to protect against ultraviolet r a d i a t i o n " (1992: 85). In addition to increased rates of skin cancer, UV-B radiation also suppresses the h u m a n i m m u n e system, m a k i n g us m u c h m o r e vulnerable to disease and viruses ( G o r e 1992; G r i b b i n 1988; M e a d o w s , M e a d o w s , and R a n d e r 1992; M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). I n c r e a s e d U V - B radiation on p l a n t s such as s o y b e a n s , b e a n s , s u g a r beets, potatoes, lettuce, tomatoes, sorghum, peas, and wheat has been s h o w n to inhibit growth, photosynthesis, and m e t a b o l i s m ( M c K i n n e y and S c h o c h 1996). High levels of U V - B radiation also a f f e c t f r e s h w a t e r and m a r i n e e c o s y s t e m s , especially ocean plankton, the base of the o c e a n ' s food chain ( M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). T h e r e have been reports f r o m Chile that s h e e p are going blind and that rabbits are d e v e l o p i n g m y o p i a so severe that one can walk into a field and pick t h e m up by the ears ( L a m a r 1991). Cattle are also k n o w n to get eye cancer and pinkeye w h e n e x p o s e d to high levels of UV-B radiation (Gribbin 1988).

Major Producers and Users of Ozone-Depleting Substances C h l o r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s , like m a n y o t h e r c h e m i c a l s , really b e c a m e p o p u l a r a f t e r World War II. T h e production of the t w o most c o m m o n types of C F C s increased f r o m 5 5 , 0 0 0 tons in 1950 to 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons in 1976: From 1950 to 1975 world production of CFCs grew at 7% to 10% per year—doubling every 10 years or less. By the 1980s the world was manufacturing a million tonnes of CFCs annually. In the United States alone CFC coolants were at work in 100 million refrigerators, 30 million freezers, 45 million home air conditioners, 90 million car air conditioners, and hundreds of thousands of coolers in restaurants, supermarkets, and refrigerated trucks. (Meadows, Meadows, and Rander 1992: 142)

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A p p r o x i m a t e l y 9 0 p e r c e n t of the C F C s used were i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e a s e d i n t o the a t m o s p h e r e d u r i n g t h e i r use, w i t h the o t h e r 10 p e r c e n t b e i n g released after the product was discarded (for example, refrigerators and air c o n d i t i o n e r s ) . E s t i m a t e s a r e t h a t 2 2 m i l l i o n t o n s of C F C s h a v e b e e n released into the atmosphere since their initial production ( M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). Like most pollution caused by m o d e r n technology, there is an i m m e n s e disparity b e t w e e n the a m o u n t of ecological destruction caused by industrialized and industrializing countries. T h e countries of the North, such as the United States, the European C o m m u n i t y ( n o w the European Union), Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, have used m u c h more C F C s than industrializing countries like China and India ( U S C C & A N 1991). W h e n broken d o w n by per capita use, North A m e r i c a n s and E u r o p e a n s were using on average 2 p o u n d s (0.85 kilogram) of C F C s a year per person, and d e v e l o p i n g c o u n tries like C h i n a and India were using less than an ounce (0.03 kilogram) a year per person ( M e a d o w s , M e a d o w s , and R a n d e r 1992). In 1985 there was no longer any d o u b t that C F C s w e r e c a u s i n g the destruction of the ozone layer. W h e n British scientists m e a s u r e d a 4 0 percent decrease in ozone over Halley Bay in Antarctica, it w a s perceived as an error. A f t e r c h e c k i n g their m e a s u r e m e n t and other m o n i t o r i n g sites, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that o z o n e d e p l e t i o n w a s h a p p e n i n g . N A S A c o n f i r m e d with readings m a d e by the Nimbus 7 satellite that a hole in the o z o n e layer was indeed open over Antarctica. This discovery prompted a series of international m e e t i n g s that led to a m a j o r c o n f e r e n c e designed to create target reductions and phase-outs of o z o n e - d e p l e t i n g substances.

International Policies on O z o n e Depletion S h e r w o o d Roland and Mario M o l i n a ' s 1974 paper d o c u m e n t i n g the depletion of ozone led to policies both in the European C o m m u n i t y and in the United States requiring the phase-out of spray cans that used C F C s as propellants. In 1978 the United States b a n n e d the use of C F C propellants in spray cans, and the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y reached a voluntary a g r e e m e n t r e q u i r i n g a 3 0 p e r c e n t r e d u c t i o n in C F C p r o p e l l a n t spray c a n s ( G r i b b i n 1988; U S S C E P W 1993). Despite the fact there were no international agreem e n t s at that time, there was a decrease in C F C propellants b e t w e e n 1974 and 1982 in most of the d e v e l o p e d world e x c e p t the Soviet Union (Gribbin 1988). T h e decrease in C F C propellants f o r spray cans, however, did not include a decrease in other uses and types of C F C s . In 1985, the same year the o z o n e hole o v e r Antarctica was discovered, an international agreement titled the Vienna C o n v e n t i o n for the Protection of the O z o n e L a y e r was signed by twenty nation producers of halocarbons. T h e a g r e e m e n t , however, did not entail any binding phase-out or reduction

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of ozone-depleting substances. Instead, the agreement focused on international research efforts aimed at documenting the ozone-depleting potential of halocarbons and other C F C and n o n - C F C ozone-depleting substances (Gribbin 1988; U S S C E P W 1993). After NASA's confirmation of the Antarctic ozone hole in 1987, it took only nine months of negotiations before twenty-seven countries signed the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol is by far the strongest piece of international environmental policy to date. T h e a g r e e m e n t b e c a m e e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1989 and required a "freeze in worldwide production of C F C s and halons (at 1986 levels, for CFCs in 1989 and halons in 1992) and a 50 percent reduction in the production and consumption of CFCs by mid-1988" ( U S S C E P W 1993: 108). The twenty-seven nations signing this document accounted for 99 percent of the producers and 90 percent of the consumers of ozone-depleting substances. Declining to sign, however, were m a n y industrializing nations like India and China, because the original agreement made no stipulation for providing technical and financial assistance for d e v e l o p i n g nations ( U S S C E P W 1993). Due to record-low ozone levels over the Northern Hemisphere reported by the s c i e n t i f i c c o m m u n i t y in 1989 and again in 1992, the M o n t r e a l Protocol has b e e n a m e n d e d t w i c e since its o r i g i n a l s i g n i n g . T h e first amendment took place in June 1990 in London. The amendment included an agreement by all the parties "to a complete phaseout of CFCs, halons and carbon tetrachloride by the year 2000" ( U S S C E P W 1993: 110). Further agreements included a ban in 2005 on the production of methyl chloroform. The London amendment also generated an agreement between the original Montreal Protocol signers to create a fund to provide assistance to developing nations for converting to the use of ozone-friendly substances (USSC E P W 1993). The second amendment was signed in November 1992 in Copenhagen by 126 countries. The amendment established more rapid phase-out dates for the major ozone-depleting substances. In addition to the phase-out of CFCs, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), the substance used to replace CFCs, are also targeted for phase-outs, which began in 2004. While HCFCs are much less devastating to the ozone layer, they are known to reach the stratosphere with 2 to 5 percent of the ozone-destroying potential of CFCs ( M c K i n n e y and Schoch 1996). T h e full r a m i f i c a t i o n s of H C F C s to the a t m o s p h e r e and h u m a n health are not yet k n o w n , but the fact that the Copenhagen agreements call for a total ban on H C F C s by 2020 ensures that their overall impact on the environment will be mitigated. It appears that most countries are meeting their obligations, because as of 1997, " g l o b a l C F C p r o d u c t i o n was d o w n 85 p e r c e n t f r o m its 1986 level." Also, "a recent U N E P analysis found that at least two thirds of the

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developing countries surveyed were well on track to meeting their commitments" (French and Mastny 2001: 181, 182). Unfortunately, the only impediment to this treaty has been the illegal trafficking of CFCs. Chlorofluorocarbons legally produced in developing countries have been making their way back into industrialized countries' black markets both in the United States and in Europe, where CFCs are still sought for use in r e f r i g e r a t o r s and a u t o m o b i l e air c o n d i t i o n e r s . Hilary French and Lisa Mastny note: By 1995, C F C s were considered the most valuable contraband entering Miami after c o c a i n e . F o l l o w i n g a subsequent crackdown on large consignments throughout East Coast ports, much of the illegal trade shifted to the Canadian and Mexican borders. B e t w e e n April 1998 and March 1999, the U.S. C u s t o m s O f f i c e in H o u s t o n , Texas, reported 6 1 9 s e i z u r e s o f Freon. totaling nearly 2 0 tons. (2001: 182)

The good news, however, is that the illegal trade of C F C s in the United States seems to be on the decline (French and Mastny 2001). The Montreal Protocol and its amendments are testimony to the positive environmental policy that can be promulgated a m o n g nations when environmental degradation is taken seriously. It shows us that serious environmental degradation has a way of smoothing over ideological differences among nations. The Montreal Protocol and its a m e n d m e n t s were passed because a diverse group of international scientists, politicians, and corporations agreed that preservation of the ozone layer—a necessity for life as we know it—outweighed the subtle political and economic d i f f e r e n c e s that most often keep nations from making international agreements. The Montreal Protocol and its amendments are the most successful international environmental policy to date.

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T h e Acid Rain Problem

Acid rain (often referred to as transboundary air pollution or simply air pollution) has become a major problem throughout the world, but it is most publicized in the United States, Canada, and Europe. In early May 2001, a c o n f e r e n c e in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , titled " A c i d R a i n : A r e the P r o b l e m s Solved?" was convened to confront some of the failures in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. Acid deposition is now recognized both in the United States and in Europe as more chemically diverse than other environmental p r o b l e m s , such as c l i m a t e c h a n g e , m e r c u r y a c c u m u l a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a t e matter buildup, ground-level ozone formation, and overfertilization of the environment. Acid rain kills lakes and rivers, seriously damages the soil, and endan-

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gers the health of animals and humans. Like most pollution, acid rain does not stop at the political border of one country and ask permission to enter another. Acid rain has become a source of conflict between the United States and Canada and among many European nations. Causes and Consequences of Acid Rain Acid rain is created almost immediately after sulfur dioxide has been emitted into the atmosphere. Almost all fossil fuels contain sulfur, and sulfur content is extremely high in coal. In the United States, coal-fueled utility power plants account for roughly two-thirds of the U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions (Switzer 1994). When fossil fuels burn, sulfur combines with oxygen to create sulfur dioxide (S0 2 ), which is an odorless and colorless gas. Sulfur dioxide is a known lung irritant that can, in low concentrations, bring about asthmatic attacks and make those with respiratory problems quite uncomfortable. In the United States, sulfur dioxide by itself has not been a major problem, but the transformation of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere into sulfuric acid ( H 2 S 0 4 ) is a major environmental health problem (Seis 1996). In the atmosphere, S 0 2 combines with oxygen to form sulfate (S0 4 ). Sulfate is a small particle that floats in the air or settles on leaves, buildings, and the ground. When sulfate interacts with mist, fog, or rain, it becomes acid rain (USCC&AN 1991). Sulfate, when inhaled into the moist lungs, is also transformed into sulfuric acid. The disappearance of fish in the northern United States and in Canada has been on the increase since the early 1970s. According to one 1984 report, "In the Adirondack mountains, at least 180 former brook trout ponds will no longer support populations" (USCC&AN 1991: 3652). In 1975, another study, which surveyed 214 Adirondack lakes, showed that "90 percent of these lakes were entirely devoid of fish life" (USCC&AN 1991: 3652). The Office of Technology Assessment estimated that "in the Eastern United States approximately 3,000 lakes and 23,000 miles of streams have already become acidified or have virtually no acid neutralizing capacity left" (USCC&AN 1991: 3655). In Europe, "fish have disappeared from lakes in Sweden and Norway, as well as Scotland and England" (Switzer 1994: 258). Fish populations in lakes have been declining and in some cases dying out altogether in countries like Russia and Romania (Switzer 1994). Acid rain has also been linked to forest declines in various parts of the United States. For example, in Appalachia, "the death rate of oaks appear to have doubled and that of hickories to have nearly tripled from 1960 to 1990," and acidity in forest soil from Illinois to Ohio has led to "a decline of soil organisms—earth worms, beetles, and so on" (Bright 2000: 34). In eastern Europe forests are dying rapidly, and in southwestern Poland, the

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army was used in 1990 to fell large tracts of dead forest due to acid rain. Military f a c t o r i e s p u m p i n g out large doses of s u l f u r dioxide along the Russia-Finland border are responsible for ravaging forests within a 300mile radius of the factories and are responsible for damage to "an additional fifty thousand square miles, with an estimated 30 percent of the firs in Finnish Lapland in danger of dying" (Switzer 1994:262). The most serious acid rain problem in the world currently is in China. Seventy-three percent of China's energy comes from burning coal, and over a quarter of the country's land mass is now affected by sulfur dioxide (Bright 2000: 34). The effects of acid rain on human health are beginning to make an appearance in populations throughout the world. In Santa Catarina, Brazil, for example, "the environmental secretary estimates that 80 percent of the local hospital patients have respiratory ailments caused by acidic pollutants" (Switzer 1994: 265). High acid levels have been correlated with increased colds, bronchial infections, asthma attacks, and death. Harvard public health researchers suggest that an approximately 5 percent annual excess of mortality in the United States is due to sulfate and fine particles ( U S C C & A N 1991).

Major Acid Rain Producers As in the cases of ozone depletion and global warming, it is the largest industrialized nations that are the major generators of acid r a i n - c a u s i n g pollutants. Coal-fueled power plants and factories account for the highest emissions of sulfur dioxide leading to acid rain worldwide. Thirty-nine percent of worldwide electricity is generated from coal (Flavin and Lenssen 1991). In the United States alone, 75 percent of total sulfur emissions come f r o m power plants and large factories, which also emit large amounts of nitrogen o x i d e s (Switzer 1994). While s u l f u r dioxide e m i s s i o n s in the United States have been reduced by 35 percent since 1973, acid rain due to nitrogen oxides have neutralized the reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions (Middleton 2001: 225). The biggest problem with the countries producing the most sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions is that their pollution becomes the problem of other countries. Air pollution goes where the wind blows. Most of C a n a d a ' s acid rain problems have been attributed to coal-fueled p o w e r plants operating in the Ohio Valley. Likewise, coal-fueled power plants and factories in eastern Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic destroy forests to the east. S u l f u r emissions from Russia have been implicated in an acid rain problem for Finland and Sweden, and emiss i o n s f r o m G r e a t B r i t a i n h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to acid rain p r o b l e m s f o r Norway. Sulfur emissions f r o m China create acid rain problems for Japan and South Korea.

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The acid rain problem is severe in Europe, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has estimated that "75 percent of Europe's forests are now experiencing damaging levels of sulfur deposition" (Brown 1993: 6). The monetary damage assessment for Europe is estimated to be at $30.4 billion per year, which does not take into consideration the other ecological functions forests serve with respect to regulating climate, flooding, and erosion ( B r o w n 1993). A c c o r d i n g to the E u r o p e a n E n v i r o n m e n t a l Agency, although there has been a substantial emissions drop due to desulphurization systems and a m o v e away from coal, acidification still remains a major environmental problem in Europe (EEA 2004). Given the fact that coal-powered electricity is the major culprit in acid rain generation, reducing our reliance on coal to generate electricity seems to be the obvious answer. No solutions between nations, however, are easy. Coal is a cheap and widely available fossil fuel when compared with more expensive energy sources (for example, hydroelectric power, natural gas, and oil) and in some cases m o r e d a n g e r o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s (for e x a m p l e , n u c l e a r p o w e r ) . T h u s , s o l v i n g what we k n o w to be a s i m p l e p r o b l e m becomes extremely complicated when we figure domestic and international politics and economics into the solution. International Policies o n A c i d Rain T h e r e have been no s p o n s o r e d United N a t i o n s multilateral a g r e e m e n t s regarding the abatement of acid rain. Unlike global warming and ozone depletion, which cause w o r l d w i d e problems, acid rain is more regional. Accordingly, most acid rain agreements tend to be signed between bordering nations. Probably the most extensive acid rain discussions have been between the United States and Canada. Canadian environmentalists contend that sulfur dioxide emissions f r o m the United States are responsible for damaging as many as 16,000 Canadian lakes (Switzer 1994). Serious talks between Canada and the United States began in 1978 and culminated in a nonbinding treaty titled the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The treaty stipulated m e a s u r e s that r e q u i r e d e m i s s i o n r e d u c t i o n s on the part of b o t h nations. The progress made in 1978 was negated in 1980 when President Jimmy Carter, acting on the Middle East oil crisis, decided to convert 100 oil-fired utility plants to coal (Switzer 1994). F r o m 1980 to 1990, acid rain talks b e t w e e n the United States and Canada did not make much progress. It was not until 1990, when President G e o r g e H. W. Bush signed the 1990 Clean Air Act ( C A A ) , that serious efforts were initiated to reduce U.S. sulfur dioxide and nitrogen emissions. The United States and Canada have each significantly reduced sulfur dioxide, but nitrogen emissions remain a problem for both countries.

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With respect to sulfur dioxide e m i s s i o n s , the C A A promulgates a marketable allowance program. The allowance p r o g r a m grants each electrical utility a set level of e m i s s i o n s , which is roughly half of their e m i s s i o n output prior to the 1990 enactment of the C A A . Coal-fired utility c o m p a n i e s can reduce their e m i s s i o n s b e l o w the E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection A g e n c y allowance and m a k e money by selling their e x c e s s allowances to other utilities. L i k e w i s e , utilities can e x c e e d their a l l o w a n c e by b u y i n g e x c e s s allowances from other utilities that have e x c e s s allowances to sell. Utility c o m p a n i e s can profit by reducing sulfur d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s or pay for not reducing sulfur dioxide e m i s s i o n s ( S e i s 1996). Europe has also been struggling with international strategies to curtail acid rain. T h e European Union ( E U ) and the U N E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for E u r o p e ( E C E ) have been instrumental in at least initiating e f f o r t s to abate acid rain. The E U consists of fifteen m e m b e r nations, and the E C E consists of all the nations of E u r o p e . In an effort to m a k e e c o n o m i c and environmental laws uniform, the E U has experienced difficulty in attempting to p r o m u l g a t e u n i f o r m s u l f u r d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n r e d u c t i o n s a c r o s s nations, but progress is being m a d e . The E C E has m a d e more progress, beginning in 1979 with the enactment of the Convention on L o n g - R a n g e Transboundary Air Pollution. This agreement of intent obliged each nation to d e v e l o p technology to abate acid rain and, where appropriate, to share the technology. The agreement, however, established no e m i s s i o n s reduction standards nor did it require any uniformity in implementation of acid rain reduction technology. It w a s not until 1985 in Helsinki that thirty European nations agreed to a 30 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide e m i s s i o n s by 1993. T h o s e that signed the protocol are known as m e m b e r s of the " 3 0 percent c l u b . " While m o s t European nations signed on, Great Britain, Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal did not. Unfortunately, the 30 percent reduction is a politically derived target, not a scientifically based one, which means that there are no guarantees that a 30 percent reduction will abate the e f f e c t s o f acid deposition throughout Europe (Switzer 1994). Countries like Norway, S w e d e n , Finland, and J a p a n have been m a k i n g m a j o r inroads into g e n e r a t i n g s u l f u r d i o x i d e - r e d u c t i o n t e c h n o l o g y and abating their own sulfur d i o x i d e e m i s s i o n s . D u e to the e f f e c t s of acid rain on their own forests, Norway, S w e d e n , and Finland m a d e R u s s i a a $1 billion l o a n to utilize F i n n i s h d e s u l f u r i z a t i o n t e c h n o l o g y ( S w i t z e r 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e s e s a m e countries have been extremely influential in convincing most of E u r o p e of the s e r i o u s n e s s of acid rain. J a p a n has also been instrumental in helping the Chinese d e v e l o p desulfurization technology. Unfortunately, many environmentalists contend that g o o d desulfurization technology may not be enough for China, which has huge coal reserves and is j u s t begin-

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ning to accelerate toward industrialized development (Brown 1993, 1996; Leggett 1990; Postel 1994; Bright 2000). Many nations are recognizing the damaging effects of acid rain and are beginning to act by establishing sulfur dioxide emission reductions. The acid rain problem, however, is complicated for many reasons. Coal is the cheapest and most abundant fossil fuel remaining, and for developing nations it is at this time the only economically viable option for pursuing development. Even many of the more developed nations are reluctant to abandon coal as a major fuel. Although some reduction strategies are being implemented, it seems apparent that acid rain is not going to diminish as a major environmental problem anytime soon.

•

Conclusion

Of the first two problems discussed in this chapter, global warming appears on the international level to rank as less serious than ozone depletion. The major reason global warming appears to be a subordinate concern is probably due to the uncertainty that surrounds the possible outcomes of a warming planet. Furthermore, the causes of global warming are inextricably intertwined with politics, economics, growth, and development. Because global warming is taken less seriously, as judged by the commitment and legal teeth of international agreements, it could prove to be the world's most serious future problem. Radical climate unpredictability could create worldwide food and housing shortages. On a more optimistic note, however, current international efforts toward reducing greenhouse gases are much more serious than they were at the Rio Summit. International policy regarding ozone depletion is ecologically sound and moving toward a complete worldwide phase-out of major ozonedepleting substances. Unfortunately, it will be decades before international agreements produce major reductions in ozone depletion and a few decades more before ozone restoration becomes discernible. Nevertheless, the Montreal Protocol and its two amendments epitomize the type of international environmental agreements that can be achieved when nation-states recognize how they are interconnected ecologically. Acid rain is also forcing nation-states to see beyond their political boundaries. Some countries are making major efforts to reduce emissions responsible for acid rain, but many nations are not because they are rich in low-grade coal and poor in desulfurization technology. Unfortunately, from an ecological standpoint, low-grade coal is the most available fossil fuel reserve for many countries, which means that acid rain will most likely continue to cause bioregional and geopolitical problems. The best hope for

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a c i d r a i n r e d u c t i o n w o r l d w i d e lies in e m i s s i o n r e d u c t i o n s of l o w - s u l f u r c o a l f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s a n d t h e e a s y a v a i l a b i l i t y of h i g h - t e c h d e s u l f u r i z a tion e q u i p m e n t f o r all i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g n a t i o n s . As this c h a p t e r has s h o w n , a t m o s p h e r i c pollution i n f l u e n c e s the clim a t e , a n d c h a n g i n g c l i m a t e a f f e c t s t h e f e r t i l i t y a n d i n t e g r i t y of t h e l a n d . T h e n e x t c h a p t e r e x a m i n e s w a y s in w h i c h a t m o s p h e r i c p o l l u t i o n is d i r e c t l y l i n k e d to l a n d r e s o u r c e s .

Discussion Questions 1. W h a t a r e s o m e o f t h e w a y s t h e l a r g e s t

greenhouse-contributor

nations could reduce their emissions? 2. W h a t a r e s o m e of t h e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e o z o n e p r o b l e m a n d t h e g l o b a l w a r m i n g p r o b l e m ? W h y is it s o d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e w o r l d c o m m u n i t y to r e a c h a v i a b l e s o l u t i o n r e g a r d i n g g l o b a l w a r m ing, like t h e y d i d w i t h o z o n e d e p l e t i o n ? 3. In w h a t w a y s is a c i d rain an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m ? D e s c r i b e s o m e s o l u t i o n s to t h e a c i d rain p r o b l e m if n a t i o n s w e r e to w o r k t o g e t h e r . 4. D o e s t h e N o r t h h a v e an o b l i g a t i o n to h e l p t h e S o u t h d e v e l o p in a m o r e e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y s a f e w a y ? D o e s it h a v e an i n t e r e s t in h e l p ing? 5. S h o u l d t h e S o u t h b e e x p e c t e d to r a t i f y t h e K y o t o P r o t o c o l ?

Suggested Readings Brown, Lester R., Christopher Flavin, and Hilary French, eds. (2000) State of the World 2000. New York: W. W. Norton. (2002) State of the World 2001. New York: W. W. Norton. Commoner, Barry (1990) Making Peace with the Planet. New York: Pantheon Books. Dunn, Seth (2001) "Atmospheric Trends." In The Worldwatch Institute Vital Signs 2001. New York: W. W. Norton. Leggett, Jeremy K. (2001) The Carbon War: Global Warming and the End of the Oil Era. London: Routledge. M e a d o w s D. H., D. L. M e a d o w s , and J. Rander ( 1 9 9 2 ) Beyond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse, Envisioning a Sustainable Future. Mills, VT: Chelsea Green. Schnaiberg, A., and K. A. Gould (1994) Environment and Society: The Enduring Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press.

15 Conflict and Cooperation over Natural Resources Deborah S. Davenport and Karrin Scapple

N

atural resources are the foundation of the world economy. No wealth can be created without relying on the resources provided by nature. Although some marine resources are found in the global ocean commons, which were discussed in Chapter 14, most natural resources are found within the territorial boundaries of states. Thus it is not surprising that wars have been fought over natural resources. Since few states (countries) are self-sufficient, they often cooperate with other countries to obtain natural resources that they need. However, if cooperation is not possible, violent conflict often becomes a viable alternative. The dilemma for a leader is to determine how to meet the state's needs with as little conflict as possible and without relinquishing too much state sovereignty over its own territory. The resolution to this dilemma often depends on the characteristics of the particular resource involved.

W h a t A r e Natural Resources? There are many types of natural resources and they have different impacts on global politics. Natural r e s o u r c e s m a y be c a t e g o r i z e d a c c o r d i n g to whether they are renewable or nonrenewable and whether they are located within the borders of one state or are transboundary. Such differences can play a role in whether conflict over the resources will take place.

Renewable vs. Nonrenewable Resources Renewable resources are those that regenerate themselves, such as trees, fish, and animals. Conversely, a nonrenewable resource is one that does not

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regenerate. Once it is used, it cannot be re-created. In many respects nonrenewable resource is a misnomer, however. Most resources are in fact renewable. The issue becomes whether the resource can be renewed over a reasonable period of time in human terms. For instance, oil is a renewable resource and can regenerate over time; however, we would need to measure the regeneration time in centuries rather than months. So for policymaking purposes, it is more accurate to consider oil and other fossil fuels as nonrenewable resources. Renewable and nonrenewable resources may have different impacts on the international system. Theoretically, because renewable resources do regenerate, states should not have to fight over them. If states are unable to meet their own needs for a particular renewable resource, they can frequently cooperate to meet those needs through trade agreements and economic integration. Conflict results, however, if the needed renewable resource is overconsumed so that full regeneration, or sustainable growth, is no longer possible. This "mining" of renewable resources at an unsustainable rate makes the difference between renewable and nonrenewable resources less meaningful. Fishing and whaling conflicts have thus become key issues over the past several decades. Conflict and violence more often result over nonrenewable resources. If a resource is needed but there is only a finite amount available, states will s o m e t i m e s fight very hard to obtain that resource. The Gulf War (1990-1991) is an example of a highly visible clash over nonrenewable resources. While cooperation is possible, it becomes less likely if the nonrenewable resource is, like oil, critically needed and if the disputants have unresolved conflicts from the past. Boundary vs.Transboundary Resources The question of whether a resource is boundary or transboundary refers to whether it stays in one place or moves around. A forest is an example of a "boundary" resource: most are located within one state's borders and ownership is clear. Conflict is less likely with a boundary resource because of the international principle of sovereignty. However, conflict over boundary resources can occur when their harvesting creates second-order consequences for other states. For instance, clear-cutting a forest may harm a river upon which other states also rely. The loss of trees leads to soil erosion and subsequent increase in sediment flow. As sediment collects on the bottom of the riverbed, the carrying capacity of the river is reduced, which can lead to flooding. In the longer run, clear-cutting can lead to localized climate changes that result in less rainfall and drought conditions, which can decrease river flow to d o w n s t r e a m countries. Other s e c o n d - o r d e r effects of clear-cutting include potentially serious implications for the sta-

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bility of the global climate due to the loss of the forest's ability to absorb carbon. A transboundary resource is more likely to cause open conflict. A river is an example of a transboundary resource. It may define a border between two countries or it may travel from one country to another; in either case, the river must be shared by two or more states. The possibility of conflict in a transboundary resource hinges on whether the two or more states that share it can cooperate with each other over how to do so. The issue of sovereignty becomes critical when one looks at natural resources in boundary and transboundary terms. International law protects a state's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. International law asserts that the resources found within a state's borders are that state's property to do with as it chooses. For example, although countries have concerns over Nigeria's human rights abuses involved in oil development, no country disputes Nigeria's right to develop its oil fields. The oil fields are in Nigerian territory and are under Nigerian sovereignty. Yet this sense of sovereignty becomes controversial with transboundary resources. If a river's head exists in one state, does that state have the right to do whatever it wants with the water, even though downstream states may be dependent on that resource too? A state leader's perspective on this will probably depend on whether the country is "upstream" or "downstream." Upstream states tend to rely heavily on the principle of absolute sovereignty; downstream states tend to promote the idea of equity and cooperation. Cooperation may be relatively easy over some resources, but conflict becomes more likely if the resources are critical to survival.

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Case Studies

Figure 15.1 shows issues that fit into four categories based on renewability and location. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the case studies in each of the cells of this matrix in order to highlight some natural resource issues. These cases provide examples of how some natural resource issues can be dealt with through cooperative action while in other cases they can generate or exacerbate conflicts between states dependent upon them.

Renewable Boundary Resource: Forests The use of a boundary resource such as a forest sits clearly within the domain of the sovereign state in which the forest is found, because the resource does not travel outside its borders. Nevertheless, given the existence of second-order consequences, there are debates at the international level about who should have jurisdiction over such boundary resources.

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Figure 15.1

Boundary Transboundary

Environment

Natural Resource Matrix Renewable

Nonrenewable

Forests

Oil

Fish

Water

The North advocates that the needs of the international community are critical. In other words, issues such as global climate change and species extinctions should play a key role in policy decisions. The South is primarily concerned about its own development opportunities. Boundary resources may provide a good source o f export income and thereby fund internal development needs. To some extent Southern states believe that Northern environmental concerns are simply a cover for Northern desire to prevent the South from developing and fully competing with the industrialized North. Development practices sometimes make a great contribution to habitat destruction, particularly in tropical forests, which house the greatest diversity of species found in the world. Ironically, this in itself can hamper development, because the nutrients in most tropical forests are found in the vegetation, not in the soil; thus a forest that is clear-cut for agricultural conversion can be productive for only three to five years. But the North has some culpability. For instance, the desire for inexpensive beef has created a trade e n v i r o n m e n t that e n c o u r a g e s d e f o r e s t a t i o n for c a t t l e r a i s i n g . According to a recent report published by the Center for International Forestry Research, Brazilian beef exports more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2 0 0 2 (Kaimowitz et al. 2 0 0 3 ) , with exports to the United Slates alone increasing almost threefold. The report explicitly links a "frightening increase in deforestation" in Brazil to rapid growth in international demand for Brazilian beef, including the demand for hamburgers from fast food c h a i n s in the United S t a t e s ( K a i m o w i t z et al. 2 0 0 3 : 1). T h u s , when Northern countries such as the United States suggest that the South should protect the environment, they must also recognize that Northern lifestyles also need to change to lessen their destructive environmental impact—such as by eating fewer fast food hamburgers. With regard to forests, the dilemma is to determine how they can contribute to development while at the same time continuing to perform their critical role in providing environmental and ecosystem services.

Certification and labeling of timber and timber products. One potential solution to some of the deforestation currently occurring may be found in the proliferation o f nonstate forest certification and labeling

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s c h e m e s that b e g a n in the 1990s. Forest c e r t i f i c a t i o n s c h e m e s r e v o l v e around the d e v e l o p m e n t of practices f o r sustainably m a n a g i n g timberproducing forests. They typically involve the development of criteria for achieving sustainable forest m a n a g e m e n t (SFM), an independent thirdparty certifier, and a higher accreditation body. The certifier's role is to verify compliance with the agreed-upon rules for SFM under that scheme periodically and certify that a forest is sustainably managed. The accreditation body's role is to endorse the certifier as adhering to the accepted rules for that scheme. Product "ecolabeling" is used to trace forest products through the supply chain from forest all the way to consumers of wood products ( G u l b r a n d s e n 2 0 0 4 ) , in m u c h t h e s a m e way that o r g a n i c a p p l e s , f o r instance, carry labels certifying them as organic. How do certification schemes help protect forests? Researchers theorize that once a certification scheme is established, with a set of standards for SFM, forest managers may become interested in modifying their practices to b e c o m e eligible to participate in the scheme. If the certification body approves the m a n a g e m e n t practices, the forest will be certified as conforming to the required standards and, in most cases, the applicant for certification will have an opportunity to label its products. The label would distinguish products coming f r o m sustainably m a n a g e d forest resources from those that do not. This would permit purchasers to choose sustainably produced wood products by looking for labeled instead of unlabeled products. Practicing S F M costs producers more, at least in the short run, than other timber production methods, but if consumers are willing to pay more for products that c o m e f r o m sustainably managed forests, this will give producers an incentive to join the scheme (Gulbrandsen 2004). Certification is an outgrowth of concern on the part of Northern environmentalists over deforestation, tropical deforestation in particular. In the past, e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s h a v e f r e q u e n t l y used b o y c o t t c a m p a i g n s in an attempt to influence the market, and boycotts of tropical timber were organized as a weapon against tropical deforestation in the late 1980s. Private v o l u n t a r y f o r e s t c e r t i f i c a t i o n was d e v e l o p e d as an a l t e r n a t i v e " c a r r o t " a p p r o a c h — i n other words, the promise of a r e w a r d — t o these traditional "sticks"—or threats of punishment (Cashore 2002). Certification programs in effect manipulate the international timber market by responding to customer preferences for "environmentally friendly" wood. They are thus seen as a way to encourage S F M in timber-producing forests and at the same time p r o v i d e e c o n o m i c incentives f o r forest o w n e r s to maintain forests rather than converting them for other economic uses such as agriculture or cattle ranching or otherwise harvesting them at an unsustainable rate. Forest certification programs have evolved at the national, regional, and even global levels and constitute perhaps the most d y n a m i c case of nonstate-driven rule making for any global environmental issue. Forest cer-

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tification thus r e p r e s e n t s a case where c o o p e r a t i o n has prevailed over potential conflict. Nevertheless, the question remains whether such programs will achieve the t w o goals of maintaining forests' environmental benefits while also allowing forests to be used as a resource for development. So far, forest certification schemes are still too new to be judged on their environmental effectiveness. However, it is believed that the development of certification standards will raise awareness and boost knowledge about what is needed in order to manage a forest sustainably. Certification s c h e m e s vary along several dimensions, including the number of different stakeholders—or people with various interests in the f o r e s t — i n v o l v e d in d e v e l o p i n g s t a n d a r d s f o r SFM, the strength of the schemes' environmental and social standards, the quality of auditing (iuch as whether companies are evaluated according to set environmental standards or simply according to management practices), and the level of participation in the scheme by producers and consumers. The first scheme, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), was set up in 1993 by the World Wide Fund for Nature and other environmental organizations, along with social and indigenous peoples' groups, timber traders, forest owners, community forest groups, and other stakeholders. More recently, and in reaction to the FSC, schemes have been established by forest industry associations themselves, such as the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), which was set up in 1994 by the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), a national trade association for the forest, paper, and wood products industry in the United States, along with professional foresters, conservationists, and scientists chosen by the AF&PA (Gulbrandsen 2004). Programs initiated by industry tend to be more flexible and give more dominance to industry actors; the others tend to give environmental and social g r o u p s a greater role in their p o l i c y m a k i n g (Cashore, Auld. and Newsom 2003). However, differences between "industry-owned" certification schemes and those advanced by environmental organizations are becoming gradually less significant in some cases (Sasser et al. 2004). For instance, the AF&PA set up an independent Sustainable Forestry Board in 2000 to oversee the development of standards, and the SFI's standards were strengthened substantially in 2002. Now, firms participating in SFI must meet more stringent requirements and AF&PA members are required to participate in order to maintain membership. Meanwhile, monitoring of compliance was also strengthened when the option of third-party certification was introduced. Participants in this program can choose either SFI-based or FSC-based thirdparty certification and some in fact choose FSC certification, perhaps due to pressures f r o m environmental organizations (Sasser et al. 2004). There are some potential limitations on the effectiveness of any certific a t i o n s c h e m e . First, f o r e s t c e r t i f i c a t i o n is a voluntary m a r k e t - d r i v e n instrument. This means that it depends on encouraging consumers to incur

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the price p r e m i u m that they may have to pay f o r sustainably produced wood products. Producers can only be expected to participate in certification schemes if they feel participation produces a net benefit or avoids a net cost. This will depend on the development of a market for certified wood as opposed to u n c e r t i f i e d wood, thus g i v i n g p r o d u c e r s of c e r t i f i e d wood greater market access, or on the willingness of enough consumers to pay higher prices for ecolabeled wood products. Another question revolves around the limited authority of certification bodies to ensure participation and compliance, given that they are private entities rather than governmental ones. Regular audits by third-party certifiers are intended to promote compliance with standards and continuous improvements on performance, but certifiers have no authority to enforce compliance, apart f r o m suspending a forest m a n a g e r ' s certificate, nor to stimulate participation by producers who do not feel able to afford the costs of certification. Although there is a market for certified timber products in Europe and, increasingly, in North America, the overwhelming share of timber traded worldwide is not certified. However, the market for certified forest products is increasing and will likely continue to encourage the proliferation of forest certification, at least in developed countries. On the other hand, the multitude of schemes in existence, and the differences between them, may confuse customers and ultimately weaken the credibility of all certification programs. Furthermore, for tropical countries the existence of certification schemes has thus far produced little pressure to certify tropical timber; indeed, a large portion of the tropical timber on the world market comes from illegal sources (Gulbrandsen 2004). Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that forest certification will have a significant impact on sustainable use and conservation of natural tropical forests. In addition to the costs of certification, there is a general lack of awareness of certification programs in developing countries. In any case, a large part of tropical forest that is certified is made up of plantations, in other words, planted monocultures rather than natural forest. This in itself is part of the problem, because natural tropical forest contains numerous different tree species, which together form habitat for perhaps thousands of species, while monoculture plantations only contain the planted, commercially valuable tree species. Finally, the pressures on tropical forests result from a combination of the fact that there are still few financial incentives to practice SFM, the possibility that there is quick money to be made from harvesting and selling existing timber resources, and the problem that there are external factors that m a k e c o n v e r t i n g land to other uses f r e q u e n t l y appear more economically attractive (Gulbrandsen 2004). It appears that saving natural tropical forest may need stronger measures than marketdriven certification, but it is at least a step in the right direction.

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Renewable,Transboundary Resource: Fish Any child who has owned a couplc of guppies can tell you that fish are a renewable resource. In fact, fish renew at a very fast rate. Yet fish stocks are depleting throughout the world, thanks in part to technologies developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that increased catch size and processing capabilities. This decrease in fish stocks particularly affects over 1 billion people in the world who rely on fish as their main source of protein (Ghazi, Smith, and Trevena 1995). What's more, as the world population increases, there will likely be increasing demands for inexpensive food sources such as fish. Many of the fish that are most in demand in the world either live in the ocean, a global commons—a part of the earth that does not belong to anyone and that contains resources that all want to benefit from—or cross state boundaries at some point in their lives. This means that conservation of this precious resource depends on cooperation between two or more states. The 1982 Law of the Sea (LOS) Treaty was intended to help resolve fishing conflicts by establishing a state's rights over the resources found in waters up to 200 miles off its coast. This area is not part of the state, but the state has the exclusive right to control ocean resources, including fish, in the area. This means that the state can use all of the resources found within that "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) or sell rights to others to use them. People thought that the LOS Treaty would prevent most conflicts over fishing rights, as worldwide recognition of 200-mile EEZs brought more than 90 percent of the world's commercially fished stocks under the jurisdiction of individual states with coastline (Alcock 2002). Unfortunately, the LOS Treaty has been inadequate in resolving a number of fishing disputes and stocks the world over continue to be overfished. T h e U . S . - C a n a d a salmon dispute. A timely example of a transboundary dispute over fishing rights is the "salmon war" that has been going on in the Pacific Northwest since the nineteenth century. Technology fueled this dispute, with the development of the salmon canning industry and, in the early 1900s, butchering machines and automatic can-making machinery. With technological developments, salmon became a viable export industry and a rush to exploit these riches began (Ralston and Stacey 1997-1998). Figure 15.2 shows the area of transboundary conflict over salmon. The expansion of fisheries within the Pacific Northwest's major river systems precipitated a long decline in the salmon population of the region. The situation has become critical during the past twenty-five years, with a sharp fall in salmon populations in the region, particularly in the U.S. states of Washington and Oregon (Knight 2000). Salmon are anadromous, meaning that they spawn in freshwater, migrate to the sea, where they feed and grow for two to four years, and then

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Figure 15.2 Species Composition of Commercial Harvests in Pacific Salmon Treaty Region, 1990-1994

Source: Daniel D. Huppert, "Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Has Not Brought Peace," School of Marine Affairs, University of Washington, 1995.

return to their stream of origin. This makes it necessary to conserve the salmon spawning habitat (upstream), which takes place within national jurisdictions, even though the (downstream) salmon fishing industry is located in the open sea, and also to ensure that harvesting of mature salmon is limited so that enough salmon can return to spawning rivers and lakes to ensure sustainable populations. Harvests are managed through catch quotas (or ceilings), open and closed fishing seasons, minimum size limits, and limits on the numbers of licensed commercial fishers (Huppert 1995).

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The LOS Treaty changed the international norm of ownership of highseas resources from one that applied solely to caught fish to one based on the "state of origin" of the fish. In other words, the state in whose freshwater river the salmon spawn is now considered the owner of that resource. However, because salmon cross political boundaries during their migrations, it is impossible to separate them by country of origin. Hence, fishers from both the United States and Canada catch some of the salmon that originate in each o t h e r ' s rivers, a p h e n o m e n o n labeled "interception." This means that the fishing industries of both countries are mutually dependent, to greater or lesser degrees, on the conservation of habitat within each (Huppert 1995; Knight 2000). U.S.-Canadian efforts to cooperate over Pacific salmon began with the Fraser River Convention of 1930. This agreement created an international commission to restore the Fraser River, which had been damaged, as the s p a w n i n g habitat of the s o c k e y e s a l m o n and d i v i d e d annual h a r v e s t s equally between the two states. Even this limited agreement took seventeen years to achieve, and it only covered one particular species and one habitat. While the a g r e e m e n t achieved its limited aims, it did not adequately address issues of how to allocate the costs of maintaining the spawning habitat of sockeye salmon fairly between Canada and the United S t a t e s . Nor, of c o u r s e , c o u l d it a d d r e s s the s e v e r e d e p l e t i o n of o t h e r s a l m o n stocks in the U.S. N o r t h w e s t , which began in the early 1980s (Knight 2000). In 1985, a f t e r a further f o u r t e e n - y e a r e f f o r t , the United States and Canada signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). This changed allocation of harvests to one based on equitable distribution of salmon according to state of origin. In other words, the salmon harvest is divided between the two countries' fishing industries based on the percentage of the "run," or natural grouping of salmon, that originate in the spawning habitat of each country. If one country intercepts more than their fair share, this is offset by allocating an increased p e r c e n t a g e of another stock to the other country. For example, if Washington fishers intercept a larger number of Fraser River sockeye than what is allocated under the treaty, then Canadian fishers to the north can intercept more Columbia River (Alaska) chinook salmon to offset this (Knight 2000). The obligation to conserve salmon stocks is solely the responsibility of each country under the 1985 PST, and the United States gives authority for this implementation primarily to local g o v e r n m e n t s , states, and Native American tribes, which are supposed to arrive at decisions on implementation through consensus (Yanagida 1987). Throughout the region, salmon are caught by competing fleets for competing purposes. Native American tribes harvest salmon for ceremonial and commercial purposes, and recre-

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ational catches also compete with commercial fisheries (Huppert 1995). The requirement for multistakeholder consensus eventually led to gridlock because the stakeholders could not agree on policy. By 1991, salmon stocks, which had formerly seemed inexhaustible, were in poor condition in all but 6 percent of their range within the continental United States and extinct in 38 percent of it. This meant that, while Canadian and Alaskan stocks remained relatively strong, the salmon stocks in Washington and Oregon were no longer viable (Knight 2000). It is not only the United States that is affected by this loss. Canadian fishers depend on stocks from Washington and Oregon to offset interceptions by U.S. fishing boats of Canadian salmon when they migrate to Alaskan waters. However, implementation of the PST's obligations to conserve salmon stocks is solely the responsibility of each country, and the United States gives authority for this implementation primarily to local governments, states, and Native American tribes, which are supposed to arrive at decisions through consensus. Because stakeholders come from a geography that covers Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, this weak decisionmaking framework is unable to correct any unfair allocations that result from differences in the health of the salmon runs in these regions (Knight 2000). The decline in health of salmon stocks in Washington led to legal restrictions on their harvesting, which dramatically reduced the number of i n t e r c e p t i o n s of W a s h i n g t o n - o r i g i n s a l m o n by C a n a d i a n f i s h e r s . Meanwhile, however, Washington and Alaskan fishers were still able to intercept salmon of Canadian origin. Washington fishers were willing to reduce their own catch of C a n a d i a n fish to address this inequity, but Alaskan fishers were not. Their harvests remained large while the rest of the Pacific salmon fishing industry was severely limited. Canada responded by increasing its fishing off the coast of Vancouver to try to balance Alaskan interceptions of Canadian fish. Cooperation eventually broke down in 1994, when Canada instituted the requirement that U.S. fishing vessels passing through Canadian waters obtain a permit. Then in 1997 the dispute turned into a real "fish war," as newspapers labeled it, when Canada blockaded an Alaskan ferry and held it for several days to protest Alaskan interceptions (Nickerson 1997). Clearly, a new agreement had to be negotiated. Negotiations were started in 1995 and took four years to complete. The 1999 agreement replaces one of the annexes, or side agreements, of the 1985 treaty. It contains commitments on a new body to oversee salmon originating in the transboundary rivers of Canada and southeastern Alaska, funding to improve resource management and habitat restoration, and scientific cooperation. The agreement was almost killed, however, by a holdup in the U.S. Senate over the

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f u n d i n g needed to implement it. It happened that an A l a s k a n senator w a s the chair of the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e and A l a s k a felt unfairly b u r dened by the new agreement, as it would m a k e both A l a s k a n fish and fish m i g r a t i n g i n t o A l a s k a n w a t e r s s u b j e c t to p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e U . S . E n d a n g e r e d Species Act and thus reduce the n u m b e r of fish Alaskan f i s h e r s could harvest. A l a s k a n s felt that they were being asked to pay the price, b y r e d u c i n g their catch, for m i s m a n a g e m e n t of habitats by W a s h i n g t o n a n d Oregon ( M c R a e 2001). T h e p r o b l e m was eventually ironed out: C o n g r e s s agreed to require several procedural steps before e n f o r c i n g the E n d a n g e r e d Species Act against Alaska, and the full a m o u n t of f u n d i n g required w a s appropriated (Knight 2000). T h e 1999 agreement brought conservation into the allocation process for determining the a m o u n t of fish to be harvested, but it did not address the c o n s e n s u s - b a s e d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a m o n g all stakeholders that had led to the failure of c o o p e r a t i o n in the 1990s. H o w e v e r , f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s h a v e t a k e n p l a c e . T h e Y u k o n R i v e r S a l m o n A g r e e m e n t w a s s i g n e d in D e c e m b e r 2002 to form another annex to the 1985 treaty. This a g r e e m e n t focuses on conservation of salmon stocks originating in the Yukon River in C a n a d a ( U S D S 2002). M e a n w h i l e , s u b n a t i o n a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n m e t h o d s have evolved to include proposals to cut fishing fleets in Alaska ("Report R e c o m m e n d s " 2 0 0 4 ) and the rise of s a l m o n f a r m i n g . C o n t r o v e r s y still exists, however, over w h e t h e r h a t c h e r y - s p a w n e d s a l m o n pose a threat to wild s a l m o n — s u c h as by infecting them with lice (Froehlich 2 0 0 4 ) — o r are viable for release into the wild and inclusion in p o p u l a t i o n n u m b e r s for allocation purposes ( " C o h o S a l m o n " 2004). P o p u l a t i o n s of wild s a l m o n c o n t i n u e to d e c l i n e , both in the U n i t e d States and C a n a d a , due to water pollution, loss of habitat, overfishing, d a m construction and operation, water use for irrigation and other purposes, predation by other species, d i s e a s e s and parasites, and climatic and o c e a n i c shifts, as well as genetic and ecological risks posed by h a t c h e r y - p r o d u c e d s a l m o n d u e to t h e i r d i f f e r e n t f o r a g i n g , s o c i a l , a n d p r e d a t o r - a v o i d a n c e behavior. H u m a n p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h c o m p o u n d s all of these other p r o b lems. In addition, n o one has yet c o m e up with a realistic technical solution to r e v e r s e the d e c l i n e of w i l d P a c i f i c s a l m o n a n d e n s u r e their s u r v i v a l b e y o n d 2 1 0 0 ("Experts E m b a r k on Salmon P r o j e c t " 2004). It remains to be seen whether the political a g r e e m e n t s that have been reached h a v e established a regime that can survive and be built upon to lead to full c o o p e r a tion and recovery of wild s a l m o n in the future.

Nonrenewable Transboundary Resource: W a t e r T h e Quran states that water is the source of all life, but water is the primary l i m i t i n g r e s o u r c e in an arid r e g i o n . W a t e r is u s u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t o be

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renewable, but in fact, more than three-fourths of underground water is nonrenewable, in that it takes centuries to replenish it. Other water may be considered nonrenewable when chemical spills make it polluted for a lifetime. In addition, freshwater may be used up when no rain falls, a situation that can last for years at a time in some arid regions. The water situation around the world is so serious that the United Nations refers to " w a t e r refugees"—those 25 million people who have faced social and economic devastation as a result of the critical shortages of water—and declared 2003 the "International Year of Freshwater." Indeed, water r e f u g e e s now outnumber war refugees ("Nor Any Drop to Drink" 2001). Nowhere is the water situation more dire, nor its potential to contribute to conflict greater, than in the Middle East. While the 2003 Iraq War has disconfirmed some experts' predictions that the next protracted war in the Middle East would be fought over water (Gleick 1994; Postel 1993), that region remains one of the most arid in the world and a rarely acknowledged factor in the continuing conflict between Israel and its neighbors is the scarcity of water for the growing population of that area. States in the Middle East depend almost entirely on river systems for their water supply. T h e problem is that none of the rivers in the region exist solely within one state's borders; 90 percent of all potable (drinkable) water sources are transboundary (Peterson 2000). Generally, countries that are in control of the water supply are in the most powerful position, since they can control both the quantity of water (through dams) and the quality of water (by their industrial and agricultural actions). One glaring result of this i m b a l a n c e in the M i d d l e East is that Palestinian and Jordanian areas lack appropriate drinking water while Israel has a regular w a t e r s u p p l y a n d a f r e e f l o w of t a p w a t e r . T h i s i m b a l a n c e b e t w e e n u p s t r e a m a n d d o w n s t r e a m states c a n n o t help but h e i g h t e n f e e l i n g s of anger and frustration. Yet problems such as water pollution and scarcity affect all of these areas, and this mutual vulnerability can also lead to cooperation ( F O E M E 2003). One debate concerns the issue of sovereignty. A guiding principle in international law states that a government has jurisdiction over domestic issues, including natural resources. However, the world is becoming more interdependent each day. The boundary between domestic and international issues is rarely clear, as has been noted in m a n y chapters in this book. Proponents of absolute sovereignty rely on the H a r m o n doctrine, which asserts that a state has the right to make all decisions about the resources that lie within that state's territory. Growing awareness of transboundary resource problems has led to the development of an alternative doctrine— "equitable u t i l i z a t i o n " — w h i c h is promoted by the United Nations. This doctrine asserts that states have the obligation to ensure that their use of

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those r e s o u r c e s will not adversely affect other states. T h e r e is still great debate as to which principle should prevail in resource issues. T h i s is particularly true in a region such as the Middle East, which is highly dependent on a transboundary resource for its very survival. T h e J o r d a n R i v e r b a s i n . T h e water p r o b l e m s that exist in the Jordan River basin are a good e x a m p l e of tangled upstream and d o w n s t r e a m relat i o n s h i p s . T h e J o r d a n R i v e r basin is s h a r e d by S y r i a , L e b a n o n , Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, and c o m p r i s e s the Jordan River as well as its four tributaries, three of which arise in Syria or L e b a n o n , as can be seen in Figure 15.3. It is modest in terms of length as well as flow. Yet it is the focus of intense attention, given the acute political tension in the area. Of all the water systems in the Middle East, it is cited as the one most likely to erupt into a water war (Dolatyar and G r a y 2000). Historically, the Jordan River was able to supply the d e m a n d for water put upon it until the twentieth century. In 1878 the population of what was then Palestine was 3 4 0 . 0 0 0 ( A m e r y and Wolf 2000). An influx of both Arab and Jewish i m m i g r a n t s raised the population to 7 2 2 , 0 0 0 in 1915, 80,000 of w h o m were Jewish. T h e Jewish population eventually grew to over 4 million (Dolyatar and G r a y 2000), while Jordan already has a population of roughly 5.2 million ( D O S 2003) and the Palestinian population is expected to reach 4.2 million by 2 0 1 0 (Yaghi 2004). Fortunately, the upstream states, Syria and L e b a n o n , only obtain 5 percent of their water f r o m the Jordan River basin. Jordan, however, has a serious water deficit and relies heavily on the Jordan River and its tributary, the Yarmouk River, to satisfy its major water n e e d s . Israel o b t a i n s about one-third of its w a t e r supply f r o m the U p p e r Jordan, and has severely restricted Palestinian use of water from the Jordan River and aquifers (underground geological structures that can store water) underlying the West Bank of the Jordan (Dolyatar and Gray 2000; D e c o n i n c k 2 0 0 4 ) . N e i t h e r Israel nor J o r d a n n o r P a l e s t i n e h a v e a large e n o u g h supply of water to meet the World Health O r g a n i z a t i o n ' s m i n i m u m s t a n d a r d of 5 0 0 c u b i c m e t e r s p e r c a p i t a d a i l y p o t a b l e w a t e r s u p p l y (Deconinck 2004). In the M i d d l e East, water p r o b l e m s are e n m e s h e d with unresolved border issues, massive population increases, diminishing agricultural resources, increasing industrialization, and c h a n g i n g living standards, in addition to the geographic reality and issues of religion, culture, and tradition. The legacy of British and French control of the region until 1948, and the division of territory after the 1948 war, left the Jordan River divided in such a convoluted way that unilateral d e v e l o p m e n t of water resources was b o u n d to lead to conflict (Wolf 2000). Unfortunately, due to the political hostilities b e t w e e n them, such unilateral action was the only strategy avail-

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Figure 15.3 Jordan River Basin

able. Each of the riparian (riverside) states along the Jordan River system thus moved to utilize as much water as it needed for itself, without regard to the others' needs. The only viable means to access or secure water rights was frequently seen as military force. After Israel gained independence, it devised development plans that relied heavily on water from the Jordan, as local aquifers were insufficient to meet its needs. Jordan, for its part, announced a plan to irrigate its Ghor region by constructing a canal from the Yarmouk River, one of the tributaries of the Jordan, in 1951. Between 1953 and 1955, U.S. envoy Eric Johnston attempted to broker an agreement to share the waters of the

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Yarmouk. The proposed project included the construction of two dams on the Yarmouk, two irrigation canals—the East and West Ghor Canals—and other dams to utilize seasonal flows, and drainage facilities. Johnston's proposal was agreed upon by all the technical experts involved, but it was rejected at a meeting of the Arab League because the government of Syria objected for political reasons (Johnston 1958). In the absence of an intergovernmental agreement, Israel and Jordan both moved ahead with their development plans unilaterally. While Jordan carried on construction of the East Ghor Canal, Israel carried on with its All Israel Plan, which included construction of its National Water Carrier system—a network of pipes, canals, and pumping stations that were intended to bring water from the northern and central regions of Israel to southern agricultural settlements, thereby "greening" the Negev desert in the south (Wolf 2000; Morris 1996). In 1964 Israel dammed the southern outlet of the Sea of Galilee and began extending the National Water Carrier to the south. In response, the Arab League met and agreed on a joint water strategy to divert the northern Jordan River's two tributaries in Lebanon and Syria and impound the water f o r use by J o r d a n and Syria with a d a m on the Y a r m o u k . Israel then launched a series of aircraft and artillery attacks which halted the diversion project and set off a chain of events that led to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Morris 1996; Wolf 2000). The Israeli victory in that war and resulting occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased Israel's effective riparian rights (rights of riverside landholders to water from that river) over upstream tributaries to the Jordan by almost 50 percent. It interrupted the work that had begun on the East Ghor Canal as well, due to Israel's takeover of half the length of the Yarmouk River. Israel then attacked the extant portion of the East Ghor Canal in 1969 in an effort to p e r s u a d e King Hussein of Jordan to take action against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been chartered in 1964. King Hussein did expel the P L O f r o m Jordan and the canal was rebuilt, but Johnston's master plan was never implemented and no further development of the East and West Ghor Canals has been possible. Full utilization of the extant portion of the canal has been hampered by the presence of silt and debris, but past efforts to remove the debris have been halted by Israel for fear that the level of the Jordan River would be affected (Morris 1996). The disputes over waters of the Jordan River basin are just one aspect of the overall conflict over water in the Middle East, a result of the aridity of the region, the growing population, and the desire on the part of all countries to develop and industrialize. Water disputes involving Israel also extend to the aquifers that Israel shares with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and now controls under its military occupation of

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those areas. Middle Eastern water disputes also divide Islamic countries themselves. For instance, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq share the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers; this upstream-downstream relationship constitutes another significant source of political tension and potential conflict. Whether water is at the base of the political conflict in the Middle East or is more a mask for other underlying tensions, it is clear that the Middle Eastern political situation is worsened by the growing conflict over water and that water continues to be used as a weapon (Morris 1996). On the other hand, states' mutual vulnerability to water scarcity could be the source of future cooperation rather than war (Dolatyar and Gray 2000; Coles 2004). The Jordan River is a vital resource for Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, making all three mutually dependent on one another in its administration. The 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan contains promising language on ownership and use of mutually shared water resources (Morris 1996; Izenberg 1997). Despite the upsurge in IsraeliPalestinian conflict in 2000, the governments of Israel and Jordan have generally managed to adhere to the treaty's language on water. In 2002 this cooperative effort was furthered by an agreement between Israel and Jordan to collaborate on a plan to bring water from the Red Sea to replace water that has been diverted from the Jordan River to other uses over the past half century and replenish the receding Dead Sea (Stephens 2002). In the longer term, some scholars predict that such collaborative efforts over water resources in the region could have a positive effect in increasing the chances for peace and cooperation more generally (Dolatyar and Gray 2000). Nonrenewable B o u n d a r y Resource: Oil Technically, oil is a renewable resource; it is created when dead marine microorganisms accumulate on the ocean floor and eventually become released as hydrocarbon molecules. The key word is eventually; fossil fuels are called such simply because it takes thousands of years for supplies to become abundant. In fact, some experts have estimated that human extraction of fossil fuels each year equals what it took nature 1 million years to create (Pickering and Owen 1994). This is the problem: oil reserves are a limited and finite resource, and industrialized states use more of this resource than they can produce themselves. Thus, even though it is a boundary resource, oil is the subject of conflict due to interstate competition. The United States is the largest user of petroleum, using about 25 percent of global production (NRDC 2001) or approximately 19.4 million barrels each day (MacKenzie 2001). However, the largest oil fields in the United States contain only 3 to 4 percent of the global reserves (NRDC 2001), so the United States imports a significant amount of oil from the Middle East.

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T w o i s s u e s m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d w h e n d i s c u s s i n g the g l o b a l oil s i t u a tion: consumption requirements and domestic availability. Oil consumption is d i r e c t l y tied to d e v e l o p m e n t and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . M o s t m a j o r f a c t o r i e s a n d industries rely on oil, as d o e s a g r i b u s i n e s s , w h i c h r e l i e s on m e c h a n i z e d f a r m e q u i p m e n t . A s t a t e ' s d e s i r e to m a i n t a i n a s t r o n g and r o b u s t m i l i t a r y a l s o i n c r e a s e s the n e e d f o r o i l , as d o c i t i z e n s ' d e s i r e s f o r c o n v e n i e n t transp o r t a t i o n . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t n e e d s h a v e i n c r e a s e d at a p h e n o m e n a l rate f o r m a n y d e c a d e s . In f a c t , prior to W o r l d W a r II, the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s the p r i m a r y p r o d u c e r o f oil ( V o

1994); however, U.S. needs soon outpaced

p r o d u c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y and U . S . r e s e r v e s . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 5 - 7 6 p e r c e n t o f t h e g l o b a l o i l r e s e r v e s a r e in t h e M i d d l e E a s t ( U S D O E 2 0 0 1 ) . T h u s the M i d d l e E a s t h a s b e c o m e the site o f an i m p o r t a n t c o m m e r c i a l e n t e r p r i s e that a f f e c t s b o t h e c o n o m i c

develop-

m e n t and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has b e c o m e quite reliant o n M i d d l e E a s t e r n o i l ; d e s p i t e its a t t e m p t to limit oil i m p o r t s d u r i n g the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s ( O P E C ) c r i s i s in the 1 9 7 0 s , o v e r a l l oil c o n s u m p t i o n in the U n i t e d S t a t e s has risen by 12 p e r c e n t s i n c e 1 9 7 3 , and it has risen 4 2 p e r c e n t in the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e c t o r ( M a c K e n z i e 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n o w i m p o r t s m o r e M i d d l e E a s t e r n oil than it did b e f o r e the c r i s i s . O t h e r d e v e l o p e d states a l s o depend on i m p o r t e d oil. J a p a n h a s e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d r e s e r v e s o f f o s s i l fuels and m u s t rely a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y on i m p o r t s , m o s t f r o m the M i d d l e E a s t ( P i c k e r i n g and O w e n

1994).

T h e E u r o p e a n s are l e s s reliant on oil than A m e r i c a n s , but their r e s e r v e s are a l s o m u c h s m a l l e r and m o r e e x p e n s i v e to e x p l o i t ( F l a v i n 1 9 9 1 ) . T h e y a l s o c o n s u m e m o r e than they p r o d u c e , and are h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t on the M i d d l e E a s t f o r t h e i r supply. A s the s i t u a t i o n stands, t h e r e are m a n y p o w e r f u l s t a t e s in the N o r t h that d e p e n d h e a v i l y on this r e s o u r c e f o r industrial d e v e l o p m e n t , p e r s o n a l c o n s u m p t i o n , and m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e m i l i t a r y . O n e c o u l d m a k e an a r g u m e n t that p o w e r in t h e s e states is d e t e r m i n e d in large part b y o i l . B u t that r e s o u r c e is v e r y l i m i t e d and is p r e d o m i n a n t l y f o u n d in a n o t h e r r e g i o n o f the w o r l d . T h e r e f o r e , e v e n t h o u g h the i m p o r t e r s and e x p o r t e r s h a v e a l o n g history o f c o o p e r a t i o n in oil p r o d u c t i o n and trade during the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , c o m p e t i t i o n f o r oil a l s o g i v e s r i s e to the potential f o r c o n f l i c t . T h e 1 9 9 1 G u l f W a r . O n A u g u s t 2 , 1 9 9 0 , Iraqi m i l i t a r y f o r c e s c r o s s e d the b o r d e r and i n v a d e d the s o v e r e i g n state o f K u w a i t . W h i l e the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t m a d e m a n y c l a i m s to j u s t i f y the a c t i o n , o n e o f the m a j o r i s s u e s w a s o i l . T h e R u m a i l l a oil fields are o n the b o r d e r b e t w e e n the t w o states. Iraq c l a i m e d that b e c a u s e K u w a i t w a s u s i n g t o o m u c h o f that oil r e s e r v e and w a s s t e a l i n g oil f r o m the Iraqi side o f the border, Iraq s h o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d ( F r e e d m a n and K a r s h 1 9 9 3 ) .

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295

This dispute has historical roots. The territories that later became the sovereign states of Iraq and Kuwait were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire until Kuwait became a British protectorate in 1899 and Iraq came under British m a n d a t e in 1918. Iraq gained i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1958 and Kuwait followed three years later. It was later discovered that some of the r i c h e s t oil r e s e r v e s in t h e w o r l d w e r e w i t h i n K u w a i t i t e r r i t o r y . Development in Kuwait grew tremendously throughout the 1960s, so that by the 1970s Kuwait had one of the highest per capita gross domestic products in the world (Vo 1994). Although the Kuwaiti economy slipped during the 1980s due to inflationary problems, Kuwait was clearly a state that was very well off economically. While Kuwait was growing at unbelievable rates, Iraq faced its own internal problems. The growth of the Kuwaiti economy was a sore point to Iraq. Iraq believed that it had historical rights to the territory and had threatened to fight Britain during its protectorate period (Freedman and Karsh 1993). In the 1980s the Iraqi economy faced an even greater strain due to its war with Iran. The eight-year war left an enormous drain on the Iraqi economy, which was made worse by the fact that Kuwait supported and lent money to Iran. The economic strain, coupled with disputes over Iraqi rights to Kuwaiti territory, paved the way for the Iraqi invasion in 1990. The invasion of another sovereign state was a clear violation of international law, and the United Nations responded. Yet many other clear violations have been ignored by the international community. What made this so different? Many experts suggest that the only reason the United States and the rest of the North took such swift and decisive military action was their interest in protecting the oil supply (V5 1994; Pickering and O w e n 1994). The North, especially the United States, had many concerns. It was worried not only that the Kuwaiti oil reserve was in Iraqi hands but that Iraq might destroy the oil fields (Warner 1991). Further, there was great apprehension that Iraq would not stop with Kuwait but would attempt to claim the abundant oil reserves in Saudi Arabian territory as well. N o matter what the goal of the Iraqis, the North felt that its supply of petroleum was in danger. What followed was an example of collective security, as provided in the Charter of the United Nations. The UN Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq retreat f r o m the borders of Kuwait. W h e n Iraq refused, sanctions were imposed and a multinational military force was created. A short but violent war ensured, with the final result being the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Although Iraq did destroy some of the oil fields and set as many as 500 oil wells on fire (Warner 1991), the violence produced the desired result: protection of the oil reserves. However, the story did not end in 1991. In 2003 the United States led

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a "coalition of the willing" into Iraq and removed its president, Saddam Hussein, who was seen as a remaining threat, from power. Although the United States had p u s h e d f o r a resolution a u t h o r i z i n g such a m o v e to enforce Security Council resolutions against Iraq during the 1990s, it was unable to persuade the Security Council or the vast majority of the world's states to contribute to the effort. As a result, the United States bore the brunt of the coalition's costs during the invasion and the occupation that followed, in terms of both financial costs as well as military casualties. Yet despite these costs. Americans continue to pay upward of $2.00 per gallon of gasoline, and consumption continues to grow: between 2002 and 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, U.S. imports of crude oil grew f r o m 9 , 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 b a r r e l s per d a y to 9 , 6 6 5 , 0 0 0 b a r r e l s p e r d a y ( E I A 2004). Environmental economists suggest that if U.S. products cost their true price—including the cost of government subsidies and support, environmental impact, and human lives—Americans would recognize the need to conserve. Instead, most of these costs get absorbed in the general budget and become seemingly lost to the general public. As the cartoon below suggests, Americans would probably be more willing to conserve if they had to pay the true cost of recovering a scarce natural resource.

Source: Ed Stein, Rocky Mountain News, 1990. Used by permission of Ed Stein.

Conflict and Cooperation

•

oyer Natural

Resources

297

Conclusion: The Need for Sustainability

O n e of the things that can be learned from the case studies presented in this chapter is that the potential for both cooperation and conflict exists in all natural resource issues. Cooperation is more likely to occur over renewable, b o u n d a r y resources—in other words, resources that do not cross boundaries and do not run out. Otherwise, the potential for conflict is much greater. But cooperation also depends on whether the parties involved are on f r i e n d l y terms and w h e t h e r the r e s o u r c e s are critically important. Conflict, particularly violence, is more likely when the parties distrust each other and the resources are both limited and crucially important. Both renewable as well as nonrenewable resources can lead to conflict when overuse leads to depletion and ever-greater competition over what is left. Perhaps the lesson to learn, therefore, is that there is a great need to alter our use of natural resources to a more sustainable level so that cooperation can be encouraged and conflict avoided. The concept of "sustainable development," discussed in Chapter 13, captures this need to ensure that while basic human needs are met now, we do not jeopardize the ability of future generations to meet their needs. For the South, sustainable development means finding alternatives to m a n y of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t t e c h n i q u e s that are c u r r e n t l y d e p l e t i n g resources. This might result in finding inherent value in standing forests r a t h e r than d e f o r e s t e d land, or d e v e l o p i n g new w a y s to share w a t e r resources to meet basic human needs. For the North, sustainable development means reducing consumption in general, to create the "ecological s p a c e " for people in the rest of the world to increase their own consumption to at least the minimum standards necessary to live healthy, safe lives. This will require developing plans for more efficient use of current resources as well as exploring more fully solar, wind, and thermal energy. Both North and South need to cooperate to develop policies that are more efficient and that ensure the provision of basic human needs around the world. While natural resource issues have been perceived by many policymakers as "low politics," it is clear that natural-resource issues can become "high politics" if the stakes are high enough and the needs critical enough; t h e y then b e c o m e issues of " e n v i r o n m e n t a l s e c u r i t y " ( S o r o o s 1994). Desperation due to depletion of resources necessary to meet basic human n e e d s , and possibly fueled by resentment of what is seen as profligate waste of resources in the North, cannot be dismissed as a source of open conflict. One solution to avoid conflict and encourage cooperation in natural resource issues is to live more sustainably. This may be, in fact, the primary challenge for the twenty-first century.

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Discussion Q u e s t i o n s 1. Are m a r k e t - b a s e d s o l u t i o n s such as c e r t i f i c a t i o n a d e q u a t e to address tropical rain forest decline? 2. Are forests a "critically important" resource? 3. What is the role of technological development in the exploitation and/or conservation of natural resources? 4. Should water shortages in the Middle East be the subject of marketbased solutions? Why or why not? 5. Do you think that water will be the cause of the next Middle Eastern war? 6. Should the price of gasoline accurately reflect its cost? 7. If you were president of the United States and faced a threat to Middle Eastern oil reserves, what would you do? 8. The United States contains only 5 percent of the global population but uses 2 5 - 4 0 percent of global resources. Does the United States have a responsibility to try to reduce its national consumption levels? What could it do to accomplish this? 9. Should countries' security policies address environmental security?

S u g g e s t e d Readings Allan, Tony (2002) The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy. London: I. B. Tauris. A m e r y , Hussein A., and Aaron T. Wolf ( 2 0 0 0 ) Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom (2003) Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2004) "Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest R e g i m e ? " Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 2. Knight, Sunny (2000) "Salmon Recovery and the Pacific Salmon Treaty." Ecology Law Quarterly 27. Petiere, Stephen C. (2004) America's Oil Wars. Westport, CT: Praeger.

PART

5

Conclusion

16 Future Prospects Michael T. Snarr

O

ne question of interest to people studying global issues is, given the critical nature of these issues, what will the future look like? Will conditions get better or worse? Will humans organize themselves in a way that is more effective for dealing with global issues? Four possible scenarios of what the w o r l d m i g h t look like several d e c a d e s into the f u t u r e involve world g o v e r n m e n t , regionalism, decentralization, and the status quo.

•

World Government

S o m e scholars argue that a world government, consisting of a p o w e r f u l central actor with a significant amount of authority, is the method by which we will organize ourselves in the future. The World Trade Organization's increasing degree of consensus on economic issues, and the emergence of a multitude of free trade agreements, are often cited as evidence that some sort of world government is not out of the realm of possibilities. Similarly, for those arguing that the world is moving toward a single global culture (that is, McWorld), a world government might not seem beyond reach. This possibility is not likely to occur overnight. In contrast to a slow, evolutionary movement toward consensus on issues like economics, it is conceivable that a world government might be created after a catastrophe. An exchange of nuclear attacks or a worldwide economic crisis more destabilizing than the Asian shock (discussed in Chapter 7) might force governments into calling for a central authority that would avoid long, drawn-out negotiations among over 190 or more sovereign states.

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Conclusion

An obvious problem with the world government scenario, and the reason it will not be realized anytime soon, is the unlikeliness that the countries of the world would voluntarily give up their sovereignty. Furthermore, a world government would f a c e m a n y practical problems, such as w h o would be responsible for enforcing laws. Would a world government have a powerful military? If so, the fear of tyranny would be realistic. If not, its enforcement capabilities would be questionable. There are other possibilities in addition to a true world government. A federation would establish a relatively weaker world government, similar to the model of the United States, where the federal g o v e r n m e n t shares power with the states. Even weaker would be a confederation, in which states would be the dominant actors but would give the world government some jurisdiction. Both federate and c o n f e d e r a t e systems would give a world government more power than the United Nations currently possesses.

Regionalism In the regionalism scenario, countries are organized into groups based on geographic proximity, perhaps following the pattern of current economic groupings like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. As with a world government, countries would not completely relinquish their sovereignty, but that sovereignty would likely be significantly reduced. The European Union is the leader in the movement toward economic and political cooperation. Not only has the EU drastically reduced barriers to economic integration and to the movement of people within its borders, it has also adopted a single economic currency and made progress toward a common foreign policy. Although NAFTA and A P E C are relatively young in comparison to the EU, their formation represents the current popularity of regional arrangements. Of course, the regionalism scenario also must deal with the reluctance of countries to relinquish their sovereignty, the fear of concentrating too much power in the hands of a central government, and so on. However, these issues may be easier to resolve in smaller groupings of states than in a world government context. On the positive side, regionalism would facilitate the coordination of regional policymaking on global issues such as the environment, h u m a n rights, and trade. Still, the enhanced ability of countries to coordinate policies within their respective regions would not necessarily translate into cooperation between regions. It could be argued that regionalism would simply transform a world in which countries compete into one in which regions compete, without solving pressing global problems.

Future

•

Prospects

303

Decentralization

At the same time that free trade and environmental agreements are being enacted, there is significant evidence of decentralization or disintegration. One example is the strong separatist m o v e m e n t mounted by C a n a d a ' s French-speaking province of Quebec. The former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia are additional examples of disintegration. Although the various separatist movements have differing motives, many of them do have in common a desire for self-determination—that is, the desire to break away from the dominant culture and govern themselves. If many of these groups succeed, instead of "one world" or a few regions, hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of new countries could emerge. Each new country would of course be smaller and more culturally homogeneous than today's countries, which ideally would alleviate some of the tensions discussed in Chapter 3. However, it also would make achieving international consensus on issues like the environment, human rights, and nuclear proliferation more difficult. There is, however, another type of locally oriented movement, commonly referred to as civil society, which has gained momentum in recent years. Civil society comprises nongovernmental, nonprofit groups such as social service providers, foundations, neighborhood watch groups, and religion-based organizations. Afghans for Civil Society, Kenya's Green Belt m o v e m e n t , the G r a m e e n Bank (all discussed in Chapter 10), and Jubilee 2000 (Chapter 7) are examples of civil society, or grassroots movements. Later in this chapter, two more examples of civil society will be discussed. In recent decades, more and more people have turned to civil society, rather than government, to solve their problems. Reading this book, you may have noticed the many global nongovernm e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) m e n t i o n e d . T h e n u m b e r of N G O s has increased dramatically, from about 200 in the early 1900s to nearly 5,000 at the end of the twentieth century. Their ranks include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, C A R E , the Mennonite Central Committee, and the World Wildlife Federation. Composed of private citizens in more than one country, they focus on such global issues as the environment, poverty, human rights, and peace. Those frustrated with government's inability to solve global problems insist that centralized governments are not the most effective way to deal with them. Governments, they argue, are simply too far removed from local communities to understand completely the nature of a particular problem and to offer effective solutions. Advocates of civil society are encouraged by the dramatic increase in NGOs. Critics, however, believe local grassroots efforts will be insufficient to solve global problems like nuclear proliferation, ozone depletion, and global warming. They argue that govern-

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Conclusion

ments are the only actors with sufficient resources to effectively confront these large-scale issues.

•

Status Q u o

Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which no dramatic changes occur over the next several decades. This is not to say that change will be absent, but that it will be only a gradual continuation of current trends toward globalization in the areas of economic integration, information flow among countries, the importance of nongovernmental actors (including multinational corporations), and cooperation among countries on environmental and other issues. Citizens will continue to pledge their allegiance to countries, not economic blocs; states, not groups of private citizens, will remain the dominant political actors; and short-term domestic interests will prevent states from surrendering their sovereignty. Does this scenario allow an effective response on the part of the global community to the issues discussed in this book? Critics view the status quo with suspicion because it has made disappointing progress thus far in such areas as global warming, peacemaking, and poverty.

•

T h e Future: Sources of H o p e and Concern

As many of the chapters in this book point out, there are positive signs in the world's attempts to deal with the multitude of global issues. Smallpox appears to have been eliminated. There is a cooperative effort to deal with ozone depletion. Women have been increasingly successful in forming effective grassroots m o v e m e n t s and making their voices heard. In the developing world, the World Bank (2004) reports: • • •

The n u m b e r of people living on less than a dollar per day has declined over the past two decades. In most regions of the world, the number of undernourished people has declined. Most regions of the world "are on the path to cut extreme poverty by half by 2015" (UNDP 2004).

In addition, some progress has been made in health, environmental ability, and democracy (UNDP 2001: 11). Despite these successes, still a long way to go on a number of issues—many challenges still the creation of a better world. Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles we face is created by the

sustainthere is exist to North's

Future Prospects

305

o v e r c o n s u m p t i o n and the S o u t h ' s d e s i r e to e m u l a t e the l i f e s t y l e of the North. A s the writers in this book have s h o w n , the North, which constitutes approximately 2 0 percent of the w o r l d ' s population, is responsible for creating the vast m a j o r i t y of our e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s (acid rain, o z o n e d e p l e t i o n , g r e e n h o u s e g a s e s , r e s o u r c e d e p l e t i o n , etc.). M e a n w h i l e , the South, w h i c h m a k e s u p 80 or so percent of the w o r l d ' s population, is trying to imitate the North. If the South industrializes in the same fashion as the North, what will the environmental c o n s e q u e n c e s be? T h e prospect of hundreds of millions of individuals in the South driving a u t o m o b i l e s with leaded gas and n o catalytic converters is disturbing f r o m an e n v i r o n m e n t a l perspective. At the h e a r t of this issue is sustainable development—the idea that development today should not negatively affect the lives of f u t u r e generations. E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s h a v e s t r e s s e d that l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t s m u s t be given higher priority; for e x a m p l e , forests should not be clear-cut in order to obtain short-term profit, since the indiscriminate clearing of forests is e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y h a r m f u l and will inhibit f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e North has largely accepted sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t in principle but has received criticism f r o m the countries of the South. T h e latter argue that the North, which is r e s p o n s i b l e for the vast m a j o r i t y of the w o r l d ' s e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , h a s n o m o r a l right to tell the S o u t h that it c a n n o t f o l l o w the N o r t h ' s d e v e l o p m e n t path. T h e s e s a m e c r i t i c s a r g u e that in m a n y p o o r countries survival is often at stake, so that e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s must be tied to the issue of current d e v e l o p m e n t . Based on this premise, the South insisted that the 1992 Earth S u m m i t f o c u s not only on the e n v i r o n m e n t but also on d e v e l o p m e n t , and as a result the c o n f e r e n c e was officially called the U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on E n v i r o n m e n t a n d D e v e l o p m e n t . T h e South also points out that the North is doing little to adopt a m o r e sustainable lifestyle. O n e p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h t o t h i s c o m p l e x i s s u e is t h e t r a n s f e r of a d v a n c e d , " e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y f r i e n d l y " t e c h n o l o g y f r o m the N o r t h to the South. This might allow the South to avoid the adverse affects that a c c o m panied N o r t h e r n d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e South, h o w e v e r , is not in a position to purchase this technology, and the North has balked at significant transfers. Currently, there is n o easy solution to this contentious problem. A related issue is widespread poverty, another e n o r m o u s obstacle to a b e t t e r w o r l d . S e v e r a l c h a p t e r s in t h i s b o o k h i g h l i g h t t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p o v e r t y a n d o t h e r i s s u e s . C h a p t e r 12 p o i n t s out that h e a l t h is directly related to p o v e r t y — t h a t the poorer you are, the m o r e likely you are to s u f f e r f r o m disease or malnutrition. C h a p t e r s 9 and 10 discuss h o w the n u m b e r of children a w o m a n bears will d e c r e a s e as poverty is alleviated and w o m e n gain m o r e control over their lives. C h a p t e r s 13, 14, and 15 on the e n v i r o n m e n t s h o w that f o r those w h o are d e s p e r a t e l y poor, issues of

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immediate survival must take precedence over concerns about the environment. Chapter 2 underscores the vast amounts of money spent on military budgets at the expense of social programs such as health and education. Central to the issue of poverty is the unequal distribution of wealth, which appears to be getting worse. Chapter 8 highlights this problem. At the same time, as those who live in the North know, poverty is not simply a question of North-South relations: there are many pockets of poverty within the wealthy countries, and evidence suggests that the gap between the rich and poor is increasing within countries as well as between them. And d e s p i t e t h e s o u r c e s of h o p e m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , t h e U N ' s Human Development Report notes, as does Chapter 8, little has been done to alleviate inequality. Finding a solution to this problem will be difficult. At the domestic level, a country must have economic growth before income can be redistributed; but economic growth does not guarantee better income distribution. Chapters 8 and 11 demonstrate that focusing on taxation, education, health care, and other such issues is necessary to foster a more favorable distribution of wealth; however, such an approach typically has little support among those whose wealth would be transferred. The issue becomes e v e n m o r e c o m p l e x if we c o n f r o n t the g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e a l t h . Within a single country, the wealthy are often taxed at higher rates to support social programs. To attempt to tax the wealthy countries in order to pay for social programs in poorer countries would meet a great deal of opposition, not only f r o m the wealthy in the North, but also from the middle- and lower-income populations in the North. Historically, voluntary aid f r o m North to South has helped somewhat, but has been insufficient to seriously address the poverty gap; also, as suggested in Chapter 7, traditional aid may not be the most effective approach to fostering development. As is the case with sustainable development, poverty is a daunting problem.

•

W h a t Can I Do?

It is important to recognize that the future has not yet been written. The choices that governments, N G O s , and individuals make will have a critical effect on the issues discussed here. Assuming the reader agrees that these issues deserve serious attention, whether on the grounds of self-interest, a sense of patriotism, a religious view, or a sense of humanitarianism (see Chapter 1 for an elaboration of these perspectives), the practical question remains: What can I do to make a positive difference? C o m m o n suggestions include: write to your government representatives, vote, buy recycled products, and so on. An increasingly widespread

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option is to f o r m , join, or support an N G O like those m e n t i o n e d t h r o u g h o u t this book. B e l o w are t w o brief case studies of N G O s , organized by a small g r o u p of people, that have tried to relieve the suffering of many. Both cases are related to the p o v e r t y and inequality d i s c u s s e d a b o v e . T h e first case f o c u s e s on c o f f e e and the N G O E q u a l E x c h a n g e , a n d the s e c o n d c a s e describes the work of E d u c a t i n g for Justice and the m a n u f a c t u r i n g of tennis shoes.

N G O C a s e Study: Equal Exchange T h r o u g h o u t the world millions of people are e n g a g e d in g r o w i n g , harvesting, and processing c o f f e e . Most of the c o f f e e g r o w e r s are individuals w h o own small plots of land and sell their c o f f e e to m i d d l e m e n w h o export the c o f f e e to markets in the North. As a result of the March 2 0 0 0 c o f f e e price c o l l a p s e , the p r i c e p a i d to c o f f e e f a r m e r s d r o p p e d as l o w as $ . 0 4 2 per p o u n d in O c t o b e r 2001, the lowest price in a century. As a result, m a n y c o f fee farmers w e r e forced out of business. Although prices have r e b o u n d e d to nearly $ 1 . 0 0 per pound, profits are still m e a g e r for c o f f e e f a r m e r s . Equal E x c h a n g e is one of a f e w unique c o m p a n i e s w o r k i n g to improve the lives of c o f f e e f a r m e r s t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . S i n c e 1991 they h a v e helped small c o f f e e f a r m s by creating a m a r k e t f o r c e r t i f i e d " f a i r t r a d e " c o f f e e . F a i r l y t r a d e d f o o d a n d b e v e r a g e p r o d u c t s are c e r t i f i e d by the TransFair organization and bear its logo. T h e TransFair designation m e a n s , a m o n g other things, that f a r m e r s will receive a " f a i r " price f o r their c o f f e e . Currently, the m i n i m u m price paid to f a r m e r s for fair trade c o f f e e is $1.26 per p o u n d . T h i s is a s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t t e r p r i c e t h a n t h e y w o u l d r e c e i v e otherwise. Participating f a r m e r s generally have to be organized into a cooperative (a g r o u p of m a n y f a r m e r s ) and m a k e decisions democratically. In addition, cooperatives are expected to pursue sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t and reinvest m u c h of the p r o f i t s into i m p r o v i n g living c o n d i tions in their c o m m u n i t y (for e x a m p l e , health care, h o u s i n g , e d u c a t i o n ) . C o f f e e f a r m s are m o n i t o r e d by outside g r o u p s to ensure these practices are foll o w e d . C o m p a n i e s d e d i c a t e d to f a i r t r a d e w o r k with a b u s i n e s s m o d e l that accepts small profits, w h i c h e n a b l e s t h e m to f r e e up m o r e resources for paying the higher c o f f e e prices to f a r m e r s . D u e to c o n s u m e r interest, s o m e of the c o f f e e b o u g h t by S t a r b u c k s and D u n k i n ' D o n u t s is fairly t r a d e d . D e s p i t e the r a p i d g r o w t h of f a i r - t r a d e c o f f e e o v e r the p a s t f e w years, and interest a m o n g large c o m p a n i e s like Starbucks, fair trade c o f f e e represents less than 1 percent of U.S. c o f f e e sales. For this g r o w t h to con-

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tinue, c o n s u m e r s will have to m a k e a conscious decision to buy fair trade c o f f e e . F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n , s e e t h e E q u a l E x c h a n g e w e b s i t e at http://www.equalexchange.com.

N G O Case Study: Educating for Justice This case also deals with fair w a g e s and individuals in the North seeking solidarity with w o r k e r s in the S o u t h . T h e story of E d u c a t i n g for Justice ( E F J ) b e g a n w i t h J i m R e a d y , an a s s i s t a n t s o c c e r c o a c h at St. J o h n ' s U n i v e r s i t y s e e k i n g his m a s t e r ' s d e g r e e in theology. W h i l e r e s e a r c h i n g a paper on Nike labor practices in 1998, Keady discovered that Nike was violating several tenets of Catholic social teaching. G i v e n St. J o h n ' s Catholic identity, Keady saw a troubling contradiction in the process of the universit y ' s n e g o t i a t i n g a m u l t i m i l l i o n - d o l l a r e n d o r s e m e n t c o n t r a c t with N i k e . A f t e r m o n t h s of trying to seek c h a n g e through the s c h o o l ' s administration, he w a s essentially f o r c e d to resign his position b e c a u s e he could not, in good conscience, follow his b o s s ' s order to wear Nike and d r o p the issue or resign. He charged that because he was forced to be "a walking billboard" for Nike (evidence indicated he w a s not given the choice of wearing a unif o r m without the Nike logo), his f r e e d o m of speech was being violated. Although to date his suit has been u n s u c c e s s f u l , Keady has continued with the issue and turned his attention to increasing a w a r e n e s s to what he feels is an exploitative w a g e paid to Nike workers in Southeast Asia. Nike has responded that no one is forcing these people to work in the factories and that Nike does in fact pay a reasonable wage, since it pays better than many other Indonesian j o b s . In reaction to N i k e ' s claims, Keady and Leslie Kretzu ( c o f o u n d e r of EFJ) o f f e r e d to work in a factory m a n u f a c t u r i n g Nike s h o e s in order to j u d g e the f a i r n e s s of N i k e ' s w a g e s . A f t e r being turned d o w n , Keady and Kretzu set off for Indonesia to try to live on $1.25 per day, the average w a g e for those w o r k i n g in Indonesian shoe factories. A f t e r s p e n d i n g f o u r w e e k s living with Indonesian w o r k e r s , K e a d y and Kretzu have traveled across the United States telling the story of Indonesian workers and the poor conditions in w h i c h they live. T h e s e t w o activists have targeted Nike because of its high profile and because it is the industry leader. T h e y point out that Nike board c h a i r m a n Phil Knight h a s a net worth of nearly $7 billion but r e f u s e s to pay third world workers a living wage. O t h e r activists criticize Nike for closing its factories in the United States and sending the j o b s overseas. In addition to E F J ' s public education program, the organization is also trying an innovative strategy to c h a n g e N i k e ' s policies. It is raising m o n e y in order to buy Nike stock. O n the surface this s e e m s like a contradictory policy. H o w e v e r , N i k e s h a r e h o l d e r s are allowed to attend the c o m p a n y ' s annual shareholders m e e t i n g . T h e hope is that by bringing Indonesian factory workers to attend the shareholders meeting, they can influence other,

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more traditional shareholders to enact policies more favorable to those producing the shoes. It appears that the EFJ is making some progress in its crusade to win better working conditions for workers in Asia. Nike has recently admitted some mistakes and has made some minor changes to its policies. To learn m o r e , see the f o l l o w i n g w e b s i t e s : h t t p : / / w w w . n i k e w a g e s . o r g and http://www.nikebiz.

It needs to be made clear that these are just two of thousands of examples of small groups, usually NGOs, working to make the world a better place. In fact, dozens, if not hundreds, of NGOs are organized around each issue discussed in this book. For instance, fair trade coffee is sold by several other g r o u p s , including Pura Vida C o f f e e , Just C o f f e e , and G r e e n M o u n t a i n C o f f e e . Fair trade e x t e n d s b e y o n d c o f f e e to food and clothing as well. S i m i l a r l y , there are m a n y N G O s , like E d u c a t i n g f o r J u s t i c e , that are involved in ensuring that laborers throughout the world work in decent conditions. Social Accountability International (SAI) is just one example. SAI is a human rights organization that is "dedicated to improving workplaces and communities by developing and implementing socially responsible standards." Among other things, SAI educates businesses on workplace standards and accredits organizations whose j o b it is to verify that companies are in compliance with agreed standards (see http://www.sa-intl.org for further information). There is a seemingly endless list of groups such as these.

Conclusion Although national and local (and perhaps regional) governments will continue to play important roles, we cannot depend solely on them to solve all of the problems discussed in this book. It is up to each individual to work to create the world he or she prefers. Dramatic results at the global level can be realized if the world's citizens act. After all, if "citizens 'leave it to the e x p e r t s , ' they s i m p l y e n s u r e that the e x p e r t ' s v a l u e s and interests become policy" (Thompson 2003: 2). We hope readers will seek to learn more about the issues in this book and educate others, as well as become active members for positive change in their community and the world.

Discussion Questions 1. Which of the f u t u r e world orders do you think is most likely to emerge? Which do you think is most desirable?

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2.

Would a strengthened United N a t i o n s be desirable?

3. Can y o u think o f another p o s s i b l e world order? 4. What s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e s , in addition to p o v e r t y and the n e e d for sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t , do y o u think confront humanity? 5. What i t e m s w o u l d y o u add to the list o f things y o u can d o as an individual to m a k e the world a more l i v a b l e place? 6. What d o y o u think of the efforts of Equal E x c h a n g e and Educating for Justice?

S u g g e s t e d Readings Brown, Lester, et al. (2003) Vital Signs 2003: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future. New York: W. W. Norton. Cohen, David, Rosa de la Vega, and Gabrielle Watson (2001) Advocacy for Social Justice: A Global Action and Reflection Guide. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighborhood. New York: Oxford University Press. D i e h l , Paul F. ( 2 0 0 1 ) The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Karnes, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst (2004) International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Kennedy. Paul, Dirk Messner, and Franz Nuscheler, eds. (2001) Global Trends and Global Governance. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. Naidoo, Kumi (1999) Civil Society at the Millennium. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. State of the World (annual) New York: W. W. Norton. U N D P (United Nations Development Programme) (annual) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

Acronyms

A B M Treaty ACC/SCN ACS AF&PA AFSC AIDS AOSIS APEC B.c.E. BFW BIS CAA CDC CEDAW CESCR CFC CGG CGS CIOSC CIS CNN CTBT CWC

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Administrative Committee on Coordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition (United Nations) Afghans for Civil Society American Forest and Paper Association American Friends Service Committee acquired immunodeficiency syndrome Alliance of Small Island States Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation before the c o m m o n era Bread for the World Bank for International Settlements Clean Air Act Centers for Disease Control Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights chlorofluorocarbon Commission on Global Governance Citizens for Global Solutions China Information Office of the State Council Commonwealth of Independent States Cable News Network Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention 311

312 DAC

DAW ECE ECOSOC ECSC EEA EEZ EFJ EIA EPA EU FAO FDI FGM FOEME FPI FSC GATT GDP GNI GNP GPO HCFC HDI HIV HRW IBC IBRD ICBM ICC ICRC ICY IFAD IGO ILO IMF INGO INSTRAW IPU ITGA IUCN LOS Treaty

Acronyms

Development Assistance Committee Division for the Advancement of Women (United Nations) Economic Commission for Europe Economic and Social Council European Coal and Steel Community European Environment Agency exclusive economic zone Educating for Justice Environmental Information Administration Environmental Protection Agency European Union Food and Agriculture Organization foreign direct investment female genital mutilation Friends of the Earth Middle East foreign portfolio investment Forest Stewardship Council General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product gross national income gross national product Global Policy Forum hydrochlorofluorocarbon Human Development Index human immunodeficiency virus Human Rights Watch Iraqbodycount.net International Bank for Reconstruction and Development intercontinental ballistic missile International Criminal Court International Committee of the Red Cross International Cooperation Year International Fund for Agricultural Development international governmental organization International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund international nongovernmental organization I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h and T r a i n i n g I n s t i t u t e f o r the Advancement of Women Inter-Parliamentary Union International Tobacco Growers Association World Conservation Union Law of the Sea Treaty

Acronyms

MAD MNC NACEC NAFTA NATO NGO NMD NPT NRDC NTB ODA OECD OPEC PLO PPP PRB PST QUNO SAI SAL SALT SALWs SAP SARS SDI SFI SFM SIDA SIPRI START UAV UDHR UN UNACC/SCN UNAIDS UNCED UNCTAD UNDESA UNDESIPA

313

mutual assured destruction multinational corporation North A m e r i c a n C o m m i s s i o n for E n v i r o n m e n t a l Cooperation North A m e r i c a n Free Trade A g r e e m e n t North Atlantic Treaty Organization n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organization national missile d e f e n s e N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty Natural R e s o u r c e D e f e n s e Council nontariff barrier official d e v e l o p m e n t assistance Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Palestine Liberation Organization purchasing p o w e r parity Population R e f e r e n c e Bureau Pacific S a l m o n Treaty Q u a k e r United Nations O f f i c e Social Accountability International structural a d j u s t m e n t loan Strategic A r m s Limitations Treaty small arms/light w e a p o n s structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m severe acute respiratory s y n d r o m e Strategic D e f e n s e Initiative Sustainable Forest Initiative sustainable forest m a n a g e m e n t S w e d i s h International D e v e l o p m e n t A g e n c y S t o c k h o l m International P e a c e Research Institute Strategic A r m s R e d u c t i o n Treaty u n m a n n e d aerial vehicle Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights United N a t i o n s U N Administrative C o m m i t t e e C o o r d i n a t i o n / S u b c o m m i t t e e on Nutrition Joint U N P r o g r a m m e on H I V / A I D S U N C o n f e r e n c e on the E n v i r o n m e n t and D e v e l o p m e n t U N C o n f e r e n c e on T r a d e and D e v e l o p m e n t U N D e p a r t m e n t of E c o n o m i c and Social A f f a i r s U N D e p a r t m e n t f o r E c o n o m i c and Social Information and Policy Analysis

314 UNDP UNDPI UNEP UNFPA UNGA UNHCR UNICEF UNIFEM UNIS UNPD UNSD USAID USCC&AN USDHS USDOE USDS USGAO USSCEPW UV-B VER WCED WCSDG WFP WHO WIC WMD WSSD WTO WWF ZPG

Acronyms

UN Development Programme UN Department of Public Information UN Environment Programme UN Fund for Population Activities UN General Assembly UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Children's Fund UN Development Fund for Women UN Information Service UN Population Division UN Statistical Division U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of State U.S. General Accounting Office U.S. Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works ultraviolet B voluntary export restraint World Commission on Environment and Development World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization World Food Programme World Health Organization women, infants, and children weapons of mass destruction World Summit on Sustainable Development World Trade Organization World Wide Fund for Nature, or World Wildlife Fund zero population growth

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The Contributors

Elise Boulding is professor emerita of sociology at Dartmouth College and former secretary-general of the International Peace Research Association. She has undertaken numerous transnational and comparative cross-national studies on conflict and peace, development, and women in society. A scholaractivist, she was international chair of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in the late 1960s. Among her many publications are Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society (ed.) (1994); The Future: ¡mages and Processes, with Kenneth Boulding (1995); Women in the Twentieth Century World (1997); and Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History (2000). Pam S. Chasek is an assistant professor of government and director of international studies at Manhattan College in New York City. She is also c o f o u n d e r and e d i t o r of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S u s t a i n a b l e Development's Earth Negotiations Bulletin, a reporting service on United Nations environment and development negotiations. She has been a consultant to the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , and the U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e p a r t m e n t f o r Economic and Social Affairs. She is the author of numerous articles and publications on international environmental politics and negotiation, including Earth Negotiations: Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy (2001); Global Environmental Politics, third edition, with Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown (2002); and The Global Environment in the 21st Century: Prospects for International Cooperation (2000). D e b o r a h S. D a v e n p o r t is assistant p r o f e s s o r of political science at

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The

Contributors

Mississippi State University and writer/editor for the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. She is the author of a number of papers and articles on international e n v i r o n m e n t a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , a p p e a r i n g in s u c h j o u r n a l s as Global Environmental Politics. During her former tenure directing the environmental work of the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, she served on the U.S. delegation to the International Tropical Timber Organization. She is currently working on a book on global environmental negotiations and U.S. interests. Lina M. Kassem has recently finished her Ph.D. in political science at the University of Cincinnati. Her primary research interests are U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, international law, and Middle East politics, with a special focus on issues of subnational identities. She teaches courses on global issues and global politics at Wilmington College. G e o r g e Kent is p r o f e s s o r in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawai'i. His approach centers on finding remedies for social problems, especially finding ways to strengthen the weak in the face of the strong. He works on human rights, international relations, peace, development, and environmental issues, with a special focus on nutrition and children. His books include The Political Economy of Hunger: The Silent Holocaust (1984); Fish, Food, and Hunger: The Potential of Fisheries for Alleviating Malnutrition (1987); Children in the International Political Economy (1991); and Freedom from Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food (2005). He is co-convener of the Commission on International Human Rights of the International Peace Research Association. He has worked as a consultant with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Children's Fund, and several civil society organizations. He is part of the Working Group on Nutrition, Ethics, and Human Rights of the United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition. Ellen Percy Kraly is William R. Kenan Jr. Professor in the Department of Geography at Colgate University. She is author of numerous articles on international migration to and from the United States, U.S. immigration policy and environmental issues, trends in socioeconomic mobility among immigrant groups, and ethical dimensions of population data systems. She has conducted research for the United Nations Statistical Commission, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the National A c a d e m y of Sciences, and the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. She has been president of the Population Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers. Eliza Kretzmann works with the N G O - U N Conflict Prevention Working Group, a group of nongovernmental organizations seeking improved mech-

The Contributors

331

anisms to address international conflict, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Since 1990 she has volunteered and worked with the American Friends Service Committee, and has a background in community planning. Jeffrey S. Lantis is associate professor of political science/international relations and chair of the Department of Political Science at the College of Wooster. His teaching and research interests include foreign policy decisionmaking in democratic states, international cooperation and conflict, and E u r o p e a n p o l i t i c s . He is a u t h o r of Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements (1997), coeditor of The New International Studies Classroom: Active Teaching, Active Learning (2000), and coeditor of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior (2002). (The late) Marian A. L. Miller was associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Akron. Her major areas of research interest were environmental politics and the politics of development. Her Politics received the book The Third World in Global Environmental International Studies Association's 1996 Sprout Award for its contribution to international environmental politics. She also authored numerous papers on various aspects of environmental politics. Bruce E. Moon is professor in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University. He is author of The Political Economy of Basic Human Needs (1991) and Dilemmas of International Trade, second edition (2000). His articles have appeared in International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Political Research Quarterly, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. His research in international political economy and foreign policy has also appeared in several edited volumes. Marjorie E. Nelson is an associate professor emerita of the Department of Social Medicine at the Ohio University College of Osteopathic Medicine. After residency training in Philadelphia, she was staff physician with the American Friends Service Committee Rehabilitation Project at Quang Ngai Hospital in Vietnam from 1967 to 1969. She has been a local health officer and medical director of a Planned Parenthood affiliate, and she has worked with the Hospital Ship HOPE in Guinea, West Africa. Heather Parker is currently studying at the University of Cincinnati in the College of Law and the w o m e n ' s studies graduate program. She is the Amnesty International Student Area Coordinator for Southwest Ohio and

332

The Contributors

the State Campaign Coordinator for the Stop Violence Against Women Campaign in Ohio. Her main area of interest is women's rights. Jack Patterson is the director of the Quaker United Nations O f f i c e (QUNO) in New York. He has been a Quaker Representative to the United Nations since October 1998, representing Friends worldwide in their concern for developing and strengthening international institutions of peace. Prior to QUNO, he headed the Expatriate Dialogues Program in the New York Office of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). He has worked for the AFSC since 1969, actively organizing educational activities and civil action on conflicts in Vietnam, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Afghanistan, as well as work on disarmament issues, world hunger, and the needs of immigrants. Don Reeves, now in semiretirement on his Nebraska farm, is president of the Center for Rural Affairs, an organization that focuses on practical and policy needs of small rural communities and small and moderate-sized family farms. He served as interim general secretary for the American Friends Service Committee during most of 2000. He served as economic policy analyst on Bread for the World (BFW) Institute staff from 1987 to 1998, and continues to consult concerned citizens on hunger- and poverty-related issues. During the early 1990s, he directed a church- and farm-sponsored educational effort on issues of U.S. agriculture, trade, and development. From 1977 to 1980, he was legislative secretary for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Quaker lobby group in Washington, D.C. In 1983, he was f o u n d i n g chair of the Nebraska Farm Crisis Response P r o g r a m under I n t e r c h u r c h M i n i s t r i e s of N e b r a s k a and, earlier, of Nebraskans for Peace. Karrin Scapple was formerly a faculty m e m b e r at Ozark Technical Community College. Her research interests include international environmental politics and policy, the United Nations, and international law. She has published in the Journal of Environment & Development, the Journal of Environment & Security, International Studies Notes, the American Society of International Law Antarctic Interest Group Newsletter, and several edited volumes. Chris W. Scholl is assistant professor of political science and director of international studies at Wheeling Jesuit University. His teaching and research interests include global political economy, international organizations, and development issues, with a particular emphasis on the Caribbean basin. He has published recently in International Politics and International Studies Review.

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Contributors

333

Mark Seis is assistant professor of sociology at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado. His primary research interests are environmental crime, law, and policy. He has published on various topics ranging from economic globalization and the environment to Native American perspectives of environmental crime to ecological problems with the Clean Air Act. He is also coauthor of A Primer in the Psychology of Crime (1993). Tom Smith has a m a s t e r ' s degree in politics from the University of Edinburgh, specializing in political theory and the politics of the modern Middle East. He has worked for a number of different nongovernmental organizations: managing educational projects in the Palestinian refugee camps of southern Lebanon, supporting disadvantaged children in UK housing schemes, and working on the Emerging Conflicts and Crises program at the Quaker United Nations Office in New York. He is currently managing an exchange scheme to build the capacities of nongovernmental organizations in Wales and Kazakhstan. D. Neil Snarr is professor of social and political studies at Wilmington College in Ohio. He teaches both freshman and senior courses in global issues. This book was partially developed to provide course material for the freshman global issues course. He has published in several sociology and disaster-oriented journals and edited several books on a variety of topics. Michael T. Snarr is associate professor of social and political studies at W i l m i n g t o n C o l l e g e in O h i o . He is c o e d i t o r of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior (2002). His recent chapter "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches" (coauthored with Jacqueline Anne BraveboyWagner) appears in The Foreign Policies of the Global South (2002). His research focuses on Latin American foreign policy, and he teaches courses on global issues, global politics, U.S.-Mexican relations, and nonviolence. Anthony N. Talbott is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Arizona State University. He teaches courses on global issues and Southeast Asia studies at Wilmington College, Ohio. His research and publications focus on popular religion and politics in the Philippines. A ten-year veteran of the U.S. Navy, he has traveled extensively in Asia, Australia, Africa, and elsewhere. In 2000-2001 he conducted political and ethnographic research in the Philippines as a Fulbright Research Fellow.

Index

Abbas, Mahmoud, 4 8 Aborigines, 258 Abortion, 208 Abu Ghraib, 83 Acid rain: causes of, 271; consequences of, 271-272; international policies on, 273-275; producers of, 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): history of, 219-222, 225; life expectancy with, 248; population growth and, 166-167, 177; poverty and, 146; prevention of, 230; ripple effect of, 8; statistics for, 1, 222tab; women with, 67 Administrative Committee on Coordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN), 211 Advanced Weapons Concept Initiative, 30 Advertising bans, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 Afghanistan: children as soldiers in, 201; refugees of, 170, 198; transportation in, 4; war in, 6, 199; women in, 191-192 Afghans for Civil Society (ACS), 191-192, 303 Africa: AIDS in, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 ; colonization of, 38; defense spending in, 16; foreign aid to, 121; Grameen principles in, 191; human rights in, 61; hunger in, 138; infants in, 1; malnutrition in,

202; populations of, 161, 167; poverty in, 131-132, 136, 248; refugees of, 170; terrorists in, 73; w o m e n in, 183 Age, 157 Agenda 21, 242, 2 4 3 f i g , 244, 248, 250, 254 Agriculture: in Japan, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ; land reforms within, 143, 146-147; nutrition and, 216; sustaining, 146-147; w o m e n in, 180, 183 Air pollution, 244, 246, 272 Alien invasive species, 246 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 263 Al-Qaida, 2 4 - 2 5 , 31, 75, 76ft?, 81, 83 American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), 282 American Friends Service Committee, 215 Amin, Idi, 63 Amnesty International, 66, 303 Angola, 140, 201, 203 Annan, Kofi, 64, 85, 252 Antarctica, 266, 268 Anthrax, 19 Anti-Ballistic Missile ( A B M ) Treaty, 27, 29 Antibiotic resistance, 224 Anticolonization, 38 Arab-Israeli wars, 4 4 - 4 5 , 4 5 f i g Arafat, Yasir, 44, 4 8

335

336

Index

Argentina, 23, 95, 119 Arms race, 18 Arms trade, 17-18, 28 Asbestos, 107 Asia: AIDS in, 223; defense spending in, 16; economic growth in, 143; FDI in, 247; financial crisis in, 126-128; Grameen principle in, 191; human rights in, 61, 6 7 - 6 8 ; jobs in, 141; malnutrition in, 202; political women in, 188; populations of, 161, 167; poverty in, 131-132 Athansiou, Tom, 260 Atmospheric commons, 258 Aum Shinrikyo, 75 Australia: carbon emissions and, 264; C F C use by, 268: immigration to, 175; poverty in, 132; UV-B radiation in, 267; Vietnamese refugees in, 171 Autonomy. See Sovereignty Azerbaijan, 25 Baer, Tom, 260 Bahrain, 17 Baker Plan, 124 Balfour Declaration, 44 Ballast water, 2 4 6 - 2 4 7 Bangladesh: capital punishment in, 208; Grameen principle in, 191; malnourishment in, 217; poverty in, 134, 138 Barber, Benjamin, 2, 3, 4 Baruch, Bernard, 26 Beef, 106, 280 Belarus, 23 Bin Laden, Osama, 2 4 - 2 5 , 42, 7 6 f i g Biodiversity, 251 Biological weapons, 19, 2 4 - 2 5 . 24tab Biological Weapons Convention (1972), 2 6 - 2 7 , 32 Biosphere Conference, 239 Birth control, 172-173, 225 Black market, 25, 270 Bolivia, 125-126, 128 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 37 Bonded labor, 197-198 Boserup, Ester, 182-183, 184 Bosnia, 7 6 - 7 7 , 78, 176, 199 Botswana, 140, 167 Bouhdiba, Abdelwahab, 196 Boundary resources, 2 7 8 - 2 7 9 Boycotts, 106

Brain drains, 176 Brazil: acid rain in, 272; child prostitution in, 199; debts of, 124; Earth Summit in, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 ; economic growth in, 143; FDI in, 119, 123; I M F aids, 128; poverty in, 138; renunciation of nuclear weapons by, 23 Bread for the World, 145 Breast-feeding, 228 Bretton Woods system, 103, 104, 115-117 Britain, 4 3 ^ 1 4 Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 238 Brundtland Commission, 238, 2 4 0 241 Buchanan, Pat, 105-106 Burkina Faso, 203 Burma, 139, 171, 201 Bush, George W„ 98, 103, 174, 262, 265; Iraq War and, 3 0 - 3 1 ; national security policy of, 2 9 - 3 0 ; nuclear weapons development revitalized by, 30; UN negotiation's by, 64 Cable News Network (CNN), 1 Cambodia, 63, 201 Canada: acid rain in, 2 7 1 - 2 7 3 ; carbon emissions in, 264; Fisheries Act of, 106-107; immigration to, 175; nationalism in, 3 9 - 4 0 ; purchasing power of, 134—135; U.S. salmon war with, 2 8 4 - 2 8 8 ; Vietnamese refugees in, 171 Cancer, 218, 227, 230, 267 Capital flows: concerns regarding, 128-129; creation of, 117-123; North and South, 114, 118-119, 124-125; in United States, 95 Capital punishment, 208 Capitalism, 55, 237 Carbon dioxide, 247, 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 , 259tab Carbon emissions, 2 6 0 - 2 6 5 , 261 tab Carbon sinks, 264, 265 Caribbean region, 161, 167, 188 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 Carson, Rachel, 1 8 9 - 1 9 0 Carter, Jimmy, 29, 55, 66, 273 Castles, Stephen, 169-170 Catholic Church, 36

Index Center for International Forestry Research, 280 Center for Science and the Environment, 253 Centers for Disease Control (CDC),

220-222

Central America, 16 Chechnya, 201 Chemical weapons, 18-19, 24-25, 24tab Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 27 Children: capital punishment of, 208; global obligations to, 210-211; health of, 227-229; labor laws for, 198; as laborers, 101-102, 196-198; malnutrition of, 202, 205, 217; mortality of, 203-205, 203tab, 204fig; population growth and, 165; poverty and, 146, 205, 232; as prostitutes, 198-199; quality of life for, 195-196; as refugees, 171; rights of, 61, 195-196, 206-212; urban, 169; war and, 17, 199-202, 200fig Chile, 63, 119, 138, 139, 267 China: ABM treaty, 29; acid rain in, 272, 274—275; arms sales in, 17; carbon emissions from, 261; CFC use by, 268; emigrants from, 176; FDI in, 119, 123, 247; fertility control in, 174—175; human rights in, 67; market reforms in, 140; measures of well-being in, 139; nuclear weapons development in, 21; population of, 162, 167, 175; poverty in, 133, 136; report on U.S. children by, 205-206; SARS in, 223; steel production in, 103; tobacco use in, 226, 227 Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 260, 266, 267-270 Cholera, 224 Cigarettes, 226 Civil society, 9, 85, 86, 303 Civil wars, 17-18, 7 6 - 7 7 , 2 0 1 Classes, 99 Clean Air Act (CAA), 273-274 Clear-cutting, 278-279, 280 Climate change, 244. See also Global warming Climate control policies, 262-265 Clinton, Bill, 64, 174, 207, 262 Clinton, Hillary, 207

337

Cocaine, 225 Coffee, 307-308 Cold War, 15, 20, 72 Colombia, 196 Colonialism, 38, 58-59, 114, 181 Commission on the Status of Women, 184-185 Commoner, Barry, 164 Commons, 257-258 Communications, 3^4 Comparative advantage, 93, 247 Competitiveness, 101 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 27-28, 32 Confucianism, 162 Consumption, 241-242, 242tab, 293-294, 296fig, 304-305 Contraception, 172-173, 174, 175,225 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 65 Convention on Biological Diversity, 242 Convention on Genocide, 79 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 274 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 66, 209-210 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 207-209 Cooperation, international, 105-107 Cornucopian perspective, 164 Corporations, 246 Costa Rica, 139 Crack cocaine, 225 Credit, 147, 191 Croatia, 38 Cuba, 15-16, 27, 139 Cultural relativism, 61 Cultural survival, 66 Culture: globalization's effect on, 6tab, 1 Currency, 114-117, 120tab, 127, 134 Czech Republic, 272 Death squads, 73, 200 Debt, international, 94, 123-124, 182 Decentralization, 303-304 Declaration of Principles, 240 Declaration on the Human Environment, 240

338

Index

Declaration on the Right to D e v e l o p m e n t , 59 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 206-209 Decolonization, 111 D e f e n s e , 15-16, 16tab, 2 9 - 3 0 , 105 Deforestation. 190, 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 D e m o g r a p h y , 156, 165. See also Population g r o w t h D e n m a r k , 107, 220, 262 D e v e l o p i n g countries. See Less developed countries D e v e l o p m e n t : definition of, 179; U N role in, 1 8 1 - 1 8 6 ; w o m e n ' s networks and, 1 8 6 - 1 9 0 Diarrhea, 1, 205, 224 Diet, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 Direct export subsidy, 9 6 - 9 7 Diseases, 1, 2 1 9 - 2 2 4 Earth Radiation Budget Experiments,

260 Earth S u m m i t (1992). 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 . 262 Earth S u m m i t + 5 C o n f e r e n c e (1997). 244 East Asia, 92, 143, 188 Ecofeminists, 1 8 9 - 1 9 0 E c o n o m i c dualism, 182 E c o n o m i e s : global, 91, 114; globalizations effect on, 6 - 7 , 6lab', growth of, 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 ; informal, 184 E c o s y s t e m , 251, 258 Educating for Justice (EFJ), 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 Education: as h u m a n right, 58; poverty and, 146 E g y p t , 17. 80, 121, 138 Einstein, Albert, 18 Emigration, 168, 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 Emphysema, 230 Empires, 3 6 - 3 7 , 4 3 Energy, 251 Enlightenment, 37 E n v i r o n m e n t : c o n s u m p t i o n strain on, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 , 242tab\ deterioration of, 239, 252; e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and, 240; politics of, 240; poverty and, 241; protection of, 2 4 5 Environmental Protection A g e n c y (EPA), 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 , 2 7 4 Environmental regulations, 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , 119 E q u a l E x c h a n g e , 3 0 7 - 3 0 8 , 307//,?

Eritrea, 201 Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus), 162 Ethiopia, 1 2 8 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 3 Ethnic cleansing, 64, 77 Ethnicity, 4 0 - 4 1 Europe: acid rain in, 273, 274; child mortality in, 203; colonists f r o m , 43; and decolonization, 111; d e f e n s e spending in, 16; e c o n o m y of, 116; Marshall Plan aids, 105; oil consumption in, 294; populations of, 167; poverty in, 132; tobacco industry in, 226. See also European Union European Coal and Steel C o m m u n i t y ( E C S C ) , 104 European C o m m i s s i o n of H u m a n Rights, 65 European Union: agriculture in, 147; C F C use by, 268; currency of, 114-115; free trade in, 107; as regional g o v e r n m e n t , 302; steel tariffs in. 104—105; sustainable d e v e l o p ment supported by, 251; W T O c o m plaints by, 106 Exports, 92, 9 3 - 9 4 , 112 Extinctions, I F a m i n e , 201 Farer, T o m , 61 Fat, 216, 218 F e m a l e genital mutilation ( F G M ) , 61 Fertility, 156, 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 1 6 3 f i g , 165-166, 166fig, 174-175 Fiber, 2 1 8 Financial capital: necessity of, 113-114; North-South f l o w s of, 114, 118-119, 124-125 Finland, 272, 2 7 4 Fish, 2 7 1 , 2 8 4 - 2 8 8 Fisheries Act ( C a n a d a ) , 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 F o o d and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1 3 8 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 6 Ford, Sandra, 220, 221 Foreign aid: for children, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 ; by country, 122tab; f o r m s of, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 ; historical trends in, 121 tab\ obstacles to, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 118-119, 245, 2 4 7

Index

Foreign exchange rates, 111-112, 115-117 Foreign portfolio investment (FPI), 118, 119-120 Forest certification schemes, 2 8 0 - 2 8 3 Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), 282 Forests, 244, 2 7 9 - 2 8 3 Fossil fuel, 260, 293 France: arms sales in, 17; carbon emissions in, 262; E C S C in, 104; nationalism in, 3 7 - 3 8 ; nuclear weapons development in, 21; poverty in, 232; T V restrictions in, 107 Fraser River Convention, 286 Free trade, 7 - 8 , 97, 99, 107, 245 French Revolution, 3 7 - 3 8 Friends of the Earth, 105-106 Fundamentalism, 4 Gabon, 140 Gallagher, Kevin, 247 Gandhi, Indira, 250 Gasoline, 296 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 103-104, 105-106, 245 Genocide, 54, 67, 75, 76, 7 8 - 7 9 Germany: acid rain in, 272; arms sales in, 17; carbon emissions in, 261, 262, 264; E C S C in, 104; foreign policies of, 113; terrorist groups in, 73; trade in, 107; war crimes by, 63 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), 229 Global issues: children's well-being as, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 ; definition of, 2; interconnectedness of, 3, 8, 71, 111; wealth's distribution as, 306 Global security: approaches to, 7 7 - 8 7 ; challenges of, 7 1 - 7 7 Global warming: causes of, 2 5 8 - 2 6 0 ; consequences of, 260; contributors to, 2 6 0 - 2 6 2 ; critics of, 259 Globalization: advantages/disadvantages of, 6 - 8 , 6tab\ criticisms of, 3 - 4 , 6; definition of, 2; FDI characteristic of, 119; fundamentalism and, 4; human rights and, 53; nationalism and, 51; population movements and, 169-171; poverty and, 135-137, 1 3 6 f i g , 141-142; state sovereignty and, 4, 6; sustainable development and,

339

2 4 4 - 2 4 5 ; technological aspects of, 3^4, 7 4 - 7 5 ; terrorism and, 7 3 - 7 4 Gold, 115 Gore, Al, 267 Government regulations, 257 Grameen Bank, 191, 193, 303 Grant, James, 207 Grassroots movements, 303 Great Britain, 17, 21, 231, 272 Great Depression, 92, 96, 103, 112 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, 273 Greece, 17 Green Belt movement, 190-191, 303 Greenhouse effect, 2 5 9 - 2 6 0 Greenhouse gas emissions, 244, 264 Greenpeace, 25, 105-106, 303 Gribbin, John, 266 Gross domestic product (GDP), 92, 114, 133-134, 231 Gross national product (GNP), 120, 122 tab, 133-134, 182 Group of 77. 182 Growth hormones, 106 Guatemala, 171, 201 Guinea, 203 Gulf War, 17, 63, 202, 278, 2 9 4 - 2 9 6 Guzman, Abimael, 75 Haiti, 132 Halons, 266, 269 Hamas, 4 7 ^ 1 8 Hardin, Garrett, 257 Harper, Charles, 164-165 Head Start, 146 Health: acid rains effect on, 272; definition of, 215; diseases effecting, 2 1 9 - 2 2 4 ; human behavior and, 2 2 4 - 2 2 7 , 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 ; immunization programs for, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 ; indicators of, 2i2tab\ maternal and childs, 2 2 7 - 2 2 9 , 228//,?; nutrition and, 2 1 5 - 2 1 8 ; poverty and, 146, 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 ; sustainable development and, 251; undernutrition and, 138, 1 3 9 f i g , 202, 205,217-218 Hegemonic stability theory, 105 Helms, Jesse, 105-106 Heroin, 225 Herzl, Theodor, 4 3 Hitler, Adolf, 15

340

Index

HIV. See Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Homeland security, 29-30, 176 Hong Kong, 127 Hull, Cordell, 102-103 Human and Peoples' Rights, 65 Human capitol, 145 Human Development Index (HDI), 138-140 Human rights: of children, 61, 195-196, 206-212; civil and political, 55, 56-57'fig; controversies surrounding, 60-68; defined, 54; emigration as, 175; enforcement of, 61-63; globalization and, 53; institutions supporting, 65-66; origins of, 54; social and economic, 55, 57—58'fig; solidarity, 5 8 - 6 0 , 59fig; state sovereignty and, 6 0 - 6 1 , 63-65; UN's support of, 54-64; violations of, 46-47, 53, 101-102; for women, 61, 6 6 - 6 8 Human Rights Watch, 66 Hungary, 232 Hunger, 138, 139//g Huntington, Samuel, 7 Hussein, Saddam: arms purchased by, 17; nuclear weapons development by, 20-21; overthrowing of, 81, 295-296; U.S. threatened by, 30 Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), 269 Ideology, 74 Immigration, 168, 171, 175-176,217, 218

Immunization, 229-230 Imperialism, 55, 105 Imports, 9 3 - 9 4 , 112, 246; quotas, 96, 103 Income distribution, 99-100, 135-138, 136fig, 121 tab, 231 Income Generation Project, 191-192 India: arms control in, 27; carbon emissions in, 261; CFC use by, 268; child prostitution in, 199; CTBT supported by, 27; emigrants from, 176; family planning in, 174; FDI in, 119; health care in, 228-229; malnourishment in, 217; nuclear weapons development by, 2 0 - 2 2 , 23; population in, 162, 167, 174; poverty in, 136, 138

Indonesia: cholera in, 224; FDI aid to, 95, financial crisis in, 119, 127; Nike workers in, 308 Industrial policy, 96 Industrialization, 165, 180-181 Inflation, 148 Informal economy, 184 Integrated Child Development Services, 146 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 65 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 65 Interconnectedness, 3, 8, 71, 111 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 18 Intergenerational, 100-101 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 27 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 113 International Commission of Jurists, 66 International Committee of the Red Cross, 66, 200 International Conference on Population and Development, 173 International Cooperation Year, 184 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 55, 57, 207 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 57-58, 207 International Criminal Court (ICC), 63-64 International Feminist Network, 187 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 211 International governmental organizations (IGOs), 9 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 International Labour Organization, 210 International law, 37, 279, 289 International League for Human Rights,

66 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 103, 111-113, 115-117, 122-123, 126-128 International nongovernmental women's organizations (INGOs), 186-187, 211 International Population Conference, 173

Index

International Tobacco Growers Association, 226 International trade: barriers to, 112; capital flows within, 117, 118; case for, 9 1 - 9 3 ; competitiveness, 101-102; consequences of, 9 7 - 1 0 2 ; distributional effects of, 9 8 - 1 0 2 ; foreign policy and, 102-105; governmental responsibilities in, 97, 9 9 - 1 0 0 ; intergenerational effect, 100-101; liberal theory of, 9 2 - 9 3 , 246, 247; protectionist policies of, 9 6 - 9 7 ; rules of, 246; trade deficits in, 93-96 International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, 187 International W o m e n ' s Year, 185 International Year of Fresh Water, 289 Internet, 4. 5'fig, 245 Inuits, 2 - 3 Iran, 15-16, 23, 208 Iran-Iraq War, 19 Iraq: arms sales in, 17; capital punishment in, 208; casualties in, 72, 83; defense expenditures in, 15-16; insurgency operations in, 31; nationalism in, 39; nuclear weapons development by, 2 0 - 2 1 , 30; refugees within, 63; Scud-B missiles f r o m , 28; trade sanctions on, 202; W M D in, 2 0 - 2 1 , 30, 81, 83 Iraq War, 17, 3 0 - 3 2 , 69, 8 1 - 8 4 , 82fig. 289 Ireland, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 Irish Republican Army, 73, 74 Islam, 74 Israel: arms sales in, 17; Egypt's attack on, 80; ethnic nationalism in, 42; expansion of, 46/i'g; extremists from, 47, 74; Land acquisitions by, 44; nuclear weapons development in, 21, 22, 23; people of, 42; U.S. aid to, 121 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 4 2 - 5 1 , 45fig, 46fig, 49fig. See also Israel; Palestine Italy, 113, 261 Japan: acid rain in, 272, 274; arms sales in, 17; carbon emissions in, 261, 264; C F C use by, 268; diet in, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ; e c o n o m y of, 116, 217; financial crisis

341

in, 127; foreign policies of, 113; life expectancy in, 203, 231; nontariff barriers in, 96; nuclear bombing of, 18; Sarin attack in, 19; terrorism in, 75; trade in, 101; U.S. tobacco sales in, 226; war crimes of, 63 Jentleson, Bruce, 87 Jerusalem, 50 Jewish National Fund, 44 Job Corps, 146 Job creation, 141-142, 148, 150, 169 Johannesburg Declaration, 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 Jordan, 125-126 Jordan River Basin, 2 9 0 - 2 9 3 , 291/;;? Jubilee 2000, 128, 308 Kaposi sarcoma, 220 Kay, David, 83 Kazakhstan, 23 Keady, Jim. 308 Keeling, Charles, 258 Kennedy, John F., 29 Kenya, 1 9 0 - 1 9 1 , 2 2 2 Khor, Martin, 244 Knight, Phil, 308 Koh, Tommy, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 Korea, 95, 141-142, 143 Kretzu, Leslie, 308 Kurds, 39, 63 Kuwait, 2 9 4 - 2 9 5 Kyoto Protocol, 264 Labor: bonded, 197-198; child, 101-102, 196-198; poverty and, 141-142, 148, 150; unwaged, 184. See also Work Land, arable, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 Land mines, 199 Land reforms, 143, 146-147 Langley, Winston, 59 Laos, 139 Lash, Jonathan, 252 Latin America: bonded labor in, 197; death squads in, 200; Grameen principle in, 191; poverty in, 132; women in public office in, 188 Law of the Sea (LOS), 284, 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 League of Nations, 39, 206 Lebanon, 74 Legal institutions, 147-148 Lesotho, 167

342

Index

Less developed countries (LDCs): agriculture in, 147; carbon emissions from, 261; CFCs used by, 268; child mortality in, 203; colonialism's end in, 114; debts of, 117, 182; economic dualism in, 182; exploitation of, 119; FDI in, 118-119, 247; fertility in, 162; globalization in, 245; hunger in, 138, 139/z'j?; jobs in, 169; malnutrition in. 202; populations of, 160//,?, 161 tab, 168tab. 170, 171; poverty in, 111. 132fig, 138; sustainable development for, 239, 241, 243, 250; sweatshops in, 102; trade deficits of. 124; urbanization of, 169 Liberalism, 92, 108 Liberals, economic. 112, 113-114 Liberia, 201 Libya. 15-16, 23 Life expectancy. 1, 138-139, 203, 248 Literacy, 188 Loans, 121-123, 147, 191 Locke, John, 37 Lon Nol, 201 Lutz, Wolfgang, 156 Maathai, Wangari, 190-191 Madagascar, 139 Malaria, 205 Malawi, 203 Malaysia, 95, 119, 127, 143 Mali, 203 Malnutrition, 202, 205, 212, 216, 217. See also Undernutrition Malthus, Thomas, 162, 164 Manhattan Project, 18, 26 Mao Tse-tung, 179 Marcos, Ferdinand, 35 Market reforms, 140 Marshall Plan, 105, 116 Martin, Claude, 253 Marx, Karl, 162, 164 Measles, 205, 215 Mennonite Central Committee, 303 Mercantilism, 9 3 - 9 6 , 108, 112, 113 Mexico: child labor in, 196; debts of, 124; emigrants from, 176; FDI in, 119; Guatemalan refugees in, 171; migration in, 68; monetary values in, 95; mortality rates in, 232; NAFTA and, 99, 100; population policies of,

174; poverty in, 232; undocumented workers from, 170 Middle East: defense spending in, 16; measures of well-being in, 140; oil reserves in, 294—295; strategic importance of, 43; terrorist groups in, 73; water disputes in, 289-293 Migration, 68, 168-171, 217. See also Population growth Milanovec, Branko, 136-137 Millennium Conferences, 248-249, 249fig Millennium Declaration, 248-249 Miller, Mark, 169-170 Milosevic, Slobodan, 63 Missile Technology Control Regime, 28 Mitrany, David, 113 Molina, Mario, 268 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 269 More developed countries (MDCs): capitol flows in, 117; carbon emissions from, 261; CFCs used by, 268; definition of, 114; fertility in, 162; foreign investments by, 118; globalization in, 245; obesity in, 218; overconsumption by, 304—305; population policies of, 171; populations in, 160/i£, 161 tab, 168tab; sustainable development for, 239, 241, 243, 250; urbanization of, 169 Morocco, 125, 265 Mortality, 162, 203-205, 203tab, 20Afig, 232 Mowlana, Hamid, 4 Mozambique, 201, 203 Multilateralism, 104 Multinational corporations: criticisms of, 119; foreign investments by, 118; monitoring system for, 182 Muslims, 39, 42, 74 Mutual assured destruction (MAD), 30 Nader, Ralph, 105-106 Namibia, 140 Narain, Sunita, 253 National Council of Women of Kenya, 190 National missile defense (NMD) system, 29 Nationalism: Arab, 43; in Canada,

Index

39-40; definition of, 35; degrees of, 40; destructive tendencies of, 39; ethnic, 40-41; evolution of, 37-39; forms of, 38; future of, 51; global institutions and, 104; globalism and, 51; imagined community forming, 36; in Iraq, 39; nonviolent, 41; political, 36; religion and, 41-42; terrorism in name of, 41—42; in United States, 42; as war's cause, 41; Zionism, 43 Nation-states, 39-40, 72, 86, 142 Native Americans, 258, 286, 287 Natural resources: boundary vs. transboundary, 278-279, 280fig\ fish as, 284-288; forests as, 279-283; oil as, 293-296; renewable vs. nonrenewable, 277-278, 280fig\ sovereignty and, 279; sustainable development and, 297; water as, 289-293 Neoliberal economics, 245 Neo-Malthusian perspective, 164 Netherlands, 64, 262 New Zealand, 175, 267, 268 Newchurch, Michael, 265 Nicaragua, 199 Niger, 203 Nigeria, 230, 279 Nike Co., 308 Nitrogen oxides, 260 Nitrous oxide, 266 Nixon, Richard, 19-20, 29, 116 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): defined, 9; human rights implementation by, 65-66; increase of, 303; Jubilee 2000 supported by, 128; nutrition provided by, 211; population policies and, 172; poverty and, 145; sustainable development and, 252; women's, 186-187 Nonproliferation of weapons, 25-28 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 23-24, 26 Nonrenewable resources, 277-278 Nontariff barriers (NTBs), 96 North. See More developed countries North America: defense spending by, 15-16, 16tab, 105; immigration to, 218; population in, 161, 167 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 99, 100, 246, 302

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 116 North Korea, 15-16, 20, 23 Northern Alliance, 6 Northern Ireland, 73 Norway, 203, 238, 272, 274 Nuclear fission, 18 Nuclear weapons: black market in, 25; development of, 18, 21-24; nonproliferation initiatives for, 25-28; renunciation of, 23-24; status by country, 22fig Nunavut, 2 - 3 Nutrition, 183, 209, 212, 215-218, 227-228 Obesity, 218 Official development assistance (ODA), 120, 121 tab, 122 tab Oil, 123-124, 278, 293-296 O'Neill, Paul, 98 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 120, 12 Mab, 232 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 123, 294 Osiraq reactor, 20-21 Oslo Accords, 47 Overnutrition, 218, 2\9tab Oxfam, 248 Ozone depletion: causes of, 265-266; consequences of, 266-267; international policies on, 268-270; sources of, 267-268 Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST), 286 Pakistan: Afghan refugees in, 171, 198; arms control in, 27; bonded labor in, 198; capital punishment in, 208; child labor in, 186; extremists in, 47; malnourishment in, 217; nuclear weapons development in, 20-21, 22, 28 Palestine: British control of, 44; ethnic nationalism in, 42; Israeli settlements in, 49-50; Jewish homeland in, 43-44; land rights in, 44; partitioning of, 44; people of, 42; refugees of, 50; terrorist groups in, 73; uprisings in, 46-48 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 44—45, 73, 292

344

Index

Papua New Guinea, 231 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 26, 29 Patriarchy: nationalism as, 38; to partnership, 190. 193; replacement of, 181; rise of, 180 Peace: approaches to, 7 8 - 8 7 , 102-105; obstacles to, 4 8 - 5 1 , 4 9 f i g ; UN strives for, 7 1 , 7 9 , 84 Pentagon, 71, 72 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 86 Perot, Ross, 105-106 Persian Gulf, 31 Peru, 73 Philippine People Power Revolution, 35, 41 Philippines, 124, 139, 176. 199 Physicians for Human Rights, 66 Pinochet, Augusto, 63 Piot, Peter. 220 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2 5 0 - 2 5 4 , 251 Plato, 162 Pneumocystis pneumonia, 220-221 Pol Pot regime, 63, 201 Poland, 119, 232, 272 Polio, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 Political asylum, 170, 171, 175 Political instability, 111 Population growth: AIDS and, 166-167; future of, 165-168, \66fig, 168tab, 177; perspectives on, 162, 164—165; principles and trends of, 155-165; rapid, 157, 1 6 0 f i g , 248; w o m e n ' s status and, 164—165, 173-174 Population movements, 169-171 Population policies: conferences for, 172-174; definition of, 171; international, 175-176; national, 174-175 Population pyramid, 157, 1 5 8 f i g , 159'fig Potatoes, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 Poverty: among women, 146; of children, 146, 205, 232; defined, 131; dimensions of, 131-132; education and, 146; environment and, 241; fight against, 252; global reduction of, 140-145, 248; globalization and, 141-142; health and, 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 , 232tab; measuring, 1, 133-139; public policies aimed at, 145-149; sus-

tainable development and, 144—145, 240; taxation and, 210; virtuous cycle of, 143-144, 144fig; wealth distribution and, 306 Powell, Colin, 31 Preemptive military action. 8 0 - 8 1 Privatization, 245, 257 Property rights, 57 Prostitution, 198-199 Protectionism, 96 Public lands, 258 Purchasing power parity (PPP), 134-135, 137tab Putin, Vladimir, 32 Qaddafi, Muammar, 24 Rabin, Yitzhak, 47 Radiological weapons, 25 Rajneeshee cult, 25 Randall, Doug, 262 Rape, 67, 187 Rask, Margrethe, 220 Reagan, Ronald, 15, 29, 174 Red Army Faction, 73, 75 Refugees, 50, 63, 170-171, 172tab, 175-176, 198 Regionalism, 302 Religion, 41. 42, 57, 74 Renewable energy, 251 Renewable resources, 244. 2 7 7 - 2 7 8 Replacement fertility, 156. 166, 167 Ricardo, David, 9 2 - 9 3 Rickets, 229 Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, 242 Ritter, Scott, 83 Robertson, Geoffrey, 63, 66 Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, 30 Roland, Sherwood, 268 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 37 Russia: acid rain in, 272; arms sales in, 17; carbon emissions in, 261, 262; children killed in, 199; I M F aids, 128; monetary values in, 95; small arms control in, 28 Rwanda: child mortality in, 203; civil war in, 72, 76; genocide in, 63, 64, 7 8 - 7 9 ; operational prevention in, 84-85; rape in, 67

Index

S a l m o n war, 2 8 4 - 2 8 8 , 2 8 5 f i g Salmonella, 25 Sanitation, 248, 251 Sarin, 19 Saudi Arabia, 17 S c h u m a c h e r , E. F., 189 S c h u m a n , Robert, 104 S c h w a r t z , Peter, 2 6 2 Sea levels, 260, 2 6 3 Seasonal migrants, 170, 175 Security, 7 8 - 8 0 , 102, 176 S e p t e m b e r 11 attacks: a r m s control and, 2 9 - 3 0 ; global security after, 71; r e f u g e e a d m i s s i o n s after, 170, 176; temporary visas after, 176; w a r on terrorism result of, 32. See also Terrorism S e v e r e acute respiratory s y n d r o m e (SARS), 223 Sexual abuse, 1 9 8 - 1 9 9 Sharon, Ariel, 4 7 Shepherd, G o r d o n , 2 4 4 Shining Path, 73, 74, 75 Sierra Club, 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 Sierra L e o n e , 201, 2 0 3 Silent Spring (Carson), 1 8 9 - 1 9 0 Singapore, 143, 231 Sipila, Helvi, 185 Slavery, 54, 102 Slovenia, 38 Small arms/light w e a p o n s ( S A L W s ) , 28, 77 Smallpox, 229 Smart b o m b s , 15 Smith, A d a m , 92, 113 Smoking, 226-227, 230-231 S m o o t H a w l e y Act, 9 6 Snow, J o h n , 2 2 4 Solid waste, 2 4 4 S o m a l i a , 203, 2 0 7 South. See Less d e v e l o p e d countries S o u t h A f r i c a , 23, 167, 267 S o u t h A m e r i c a , 16, 2 0 2 S o u t h Asia, 61, 1 9 7 , 2 2 4 , 308 S o u t h K o r e a : acid rain in, 272; a r m s sales in, 17; carbon e m i s s i o n s f r o m , 261; e c o n o m i c g r o w t h in, 143; f i n a n cial crisis in, 127; steel production in, 103; U.S. t o b a c c o sales in, 2 2 6 Southeast Asia, 162, 188, 2 4 8 Sovereignty: f r e e trade vs., 6 0 - 6 1 ,

345

6 3 - 6 5 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 7 ; globalization and, 4, 6; natural resources and, 279; S A P s i n f r i n g e m e n t on, 126; world g o v e r n m e n t and, 3 0 2 Soviet U n i o n : a r m s control treaties in, 27, 2 9 - 3 0 ; a r m s sales in, 17; b r e a k u p of, 4; C F C use in, 268; m a r k e t r e f o r m s in, 140; nuclear a r m s develo p m e n t by, 18; r e f u g e e s of, 176; s m u g g l i n g of nuclear materials by, 25 Spain: b o m b i n g s in, 75; population p y r a m i d for, 157, 158//?; trade in, 107 Special S u p p l e m e n t a l F o o d P r o g r a m for W o m e n , Infants, and Children, 146, 229 S p e e c h , f r e e d o m of, 57 Sri L a n k a . 73, 139 Standard of living, 9 1 , 9 2 , 133, 192 Star Wars. See Strategic D e f e n s e Initiative S t a r b u c k s C o r p . , 307 Starvation, 201, 2 1 7 State sovereignty, 4, 6, 3 6 - 3 7 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 63-65,77-81 Statement of Forest Principles, 2 4 2 States: and capital flow, 111; and currencies, 114-115; multinational, 3 9 - 4 0 ; rights of, 2 0 8 Status q u o , 304 Steel, 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 Steinberg, G e r a l d , 2 0 Stern G a n g , 73, 74 S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r e n c e (1972), 184, 239-240, 262 Strategic A r m s Limitation Treaty ( S A L T I), 2 7 Strategic A r m s R e d u c t i o n Treaty ( S T A R T I), 27, 32 Strategic D e f e n s e Initiative (SDI), 2 9 Structural a d j u s t m e n t , 182 Structural a d j u s t m e n t loans ( S A L s ) , 125 Structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s (SAPs), 125-126 Structural perspective, 164 Structural prevention, 84—85 S u d a n , 1 5 - 1 6 , 199, 201 S u f f r a g e m o v e m e n t , 181 Suicide b o m b e r s , 31, 4 7 S u l f u r dioxide, 271, 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 Surveys, household, 135-136

346

Index

Sustainable development: creating framework for, 147-149; defined, 144, 237-238; evolution of, 238; global future and, 305; globalization and, 244-245; government regulations and, 257; health and, 251; impact of trade on, 246, 247; natural resources and, 297; partnerships for, 251; poverty and, 144-145, 240; three pillars of, 252; women's role in, 173-174; zero population growth for, 156 Sustainable forest management (SFM), 281

Sustainable forestry Initiative (SFI), 282 Sutherland, Peter, 106 Swallow, Ellen, 189-190 Swaziland, 1, 167 Sweatshops, 102 Sweden, 85, 203, 272, 274 Switzerland, 203, 262 Syria, 15-16, 27 Taiwan: arms sales in, 17; child labor in, 196; jobs in, 141-142; land reforms in, 143; U.S. tobacco sales in, 226 Taliban, 6, 201 Tamil Tigers, 73 Tanzania: child mortality in, 203; education in, 123, 139; population pyramid for, 157, 159//S Tariffs, 96, 103-104, 105-106 Taxes, 137, 148, 210, 230-231 Technology, 3-4, 74-75, 140, 169, 245, 247, 305 Terrorism: definition of, 72-73; global reach of, 73-74; historical examples of, 73, 75, lltab\ ideological commitments behind, 74; international response to, 77-87; in IsraeliPalestinian conflict, 50-51; nationalism and, 41-42; root causes of, 76/ig; targets for, 74; war on, 32, 75; with weapons of mass destruction, 24—25, 80. See also September 11 attacks Terrorists: Al-Qaida, 24-25, 31, 75, 76/ig, 81, 83; attacks by, 72 Thailand, 95, 127, 138, 199 Third World Network, 244, 248 Thirty Years' War, 36 Tigre, 201

Tobacco, 225-227, 230-231 Toxic chemicals, 244 Toxic pollution, 244 Trade. See International trade Trade deficit, 93-94, 148 Trade liberalization, 245 Trafficking, 67-68, 199 "The Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin), 257 Transboundary resources, 278-279 TransFair organization, 307 Treasury bonds, 94-95 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 26 Treaty of Westphalia, 77 Trickle-down theory, 181-182, 192 Tropospheric ozone, 260 Truman, Harry S., 26, 29 Tuberculosis, 223 Turkey, 17, 232 Uganda: AIDS in, 222; child mortality in, 203; children kidnapped in, 201; human rights violations in, 63; measures of well-being in, 139 Ukraine, 23 Ultraviolet B (UV-B) radiation, 266-267 Undernutrition, 138, 139//,?, 202, 205, 212, 217-218. See also Nutrition The Underside of History : A View of Women Through Time (Boulding), 190 Union for Child Welfare, 206 United Kingdom: carbon emissions in, 262, 264; conflict prevention by, 85 United Nations: environmental awareness by, 240; human rights conventions and, 54-63; international laws of, 39; nuclear materials oversight by, 26; Palestine partitioned by, 44; peacekeeping by, 71, 79, 84; small arms estimations by, 28; UDHR approval by, 53, 54; women's involvement in, 181-186 United Nations Charter, 77-78, 80, 85, 179, 295 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): children's rights supported by, 207, 211; immunization programs of, 229; malnourishment addressed by, 217; mortality reports

Index

by, 202; quality of life improved by, 195 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 207 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 241-242 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 184, 239-240, 262 United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 186 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): casualties reported by, 18; conflict prevention by, 85; Human Development Index of, 138-140; human rights and, 60; purchasing power parity of, 134-135; women's involvement in, 186 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 28, 68, 184 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 238, 239-240 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 242, 262-263 United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), 174 United Nations General Assembly, 182, 185,206, 2 0 7 , 2 1 3 , 2 3 9 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 171 United Nations International Decade for Women, 185 United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), 186 United Nations Millennium Summit, 148-149, 149tab United Nations Security Council, 62, 64, 71,78, 295,296 United States; acid rain in, 271-273; agriculture in, 147; arms control in, 27; arms sales in, 17; capital punishment in, 208; carbon emissions in, 262, 264; CFC use by, 268; child labor in, 198; children in, 205-206; Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 207-209; debts of, 62-63; defense expenditures by, 15-16, 16tab, 105; diet in, 217; economic

347

dominance of, 115-116; exports of, 92; and globalization, 142; immigration to, 175, 176; mortality in, 203; NAFTA and, 99, 100; nationalism in, 42; nuclear arms development by, 18; obesity in, 218; oil consumption in, 293-294, 296/ig; population in, 156; population policies of, 171; poverty in, 132, 133, 137, 232; refugees in, 171, 176; salmon war with Canada, 284-288; security in, 71, 80; sovereignty of, 106; steel industry in, 98-99, 103-104; sustainable development supported by, 251, 252; tariff levels in, 96; terrorist attacks on, 24-25, 72, 75; tobacco industry in, 226; trade deficits in, 94-95, 116; treaties by, 27-28, 64; war on Iraq, 17, 30-32, 69, 75 Universal Bill of Rights, 57-58 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 53, 54, 55-60, 56-57/ig, 58/ig, 59/ig, 60fig, 175, 184, 207 Universalism, 60 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 15 Urbanization, 165. 170, 180-181 Uruguay, 139 Uruguay Round, 96, 245 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 211 U.S. Endangered Species Act, 288 U.S. General Accounting Office, 198 U.S. International Trade Commission, 98 Vaccination, 229-230 Venezuela, 119, 125 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 268 Vietnam, 139, 171, 176, 226 Vietnam Veterans' Memorial, 204—205 Vietnam War, 215, 225 Visas, 176 Vitamins, 217 Voluntary export restraints (VERs), 96 Voting rights, 57, 187 Wages, 9 8 - 1 0 0 War crimes, 63 Water, 244, 248, 251, 260, 2 8 9 - 2 9 3 Weapons, conventional: horizontal pro-

348

Index

liferation of, 17-18; sales of, 17-18; small arms, 28; vertical proliferation of, 14-16 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): biological, 14, 19, 24-25, 24tab; chemical, 18-19, 24-25, 24tab; clandestine programs for, 21; control of transfers of, 28; horizontal proliferation of, 21-25; inspections for, 31-32, 81, 83; nuclear, 18; radiological, 25; reasons for building, 19-21; social costs of arming with, 14, 15-16; terrorism with, 24-25, 80; vertical proliferation of, 18-21 Weapons proliferation: conflicts increased by, 15; examples of, 13-14; horizontal, 17-18, 21-25; incentives for, 32; national missile defense system and, 29-30; nonproliferation initiatives for, 25-28; social costs of, 14, 15-16; vertical, 14-15, 18-21 Weston, Bums, 59 Wolfowitz, Paul, 30 Women: environmental work by, 189-190; as farmers, 180, 183; health care for, 227-229; human rights of, 61, 66-68; as huntergatherers, 179-180; national action guidelines for, 185; networks by, 186-190; as partners, 181, 190, 193; political involvement by, 188, 189tab; poverty among, 146; as refugees, 171; special knowledge of, 183; status of, 164-165, 173-174; United Nations involvement by, 181-186; voting rights for, 187; as workers, 184. See also Patriarchy Women's Mobile Services Project, 192 Women's Strike for Peace, 184 Women's World Banking, 193 WomenWatch, 186 Woods, Dorothea, 200-201 Work: GNP/GDP and, 133; poverty and, 141-142, 148, 150; unwaged, 184. See also Labor World Bank: AIDS prevention, 230;

capital provided by, 113, 114, 122-123; creation of, 112-113; international trade and, 103; poverty measured by, 133; structural adjustment program of, 182, 192-193 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 144, 240 World Conservation Union (IUCN), 238 World Development Movement, 248 World Food Conference, 184 World Food Programme (WFP), 211 World government, 301-302 World Health Organization (WHO), 211, 215, 223, 229 World Population Conference, 172-173, 184 World Resources Institute, 252 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 250-254 World Trade Center, 71,72 World Trade Organization (WTO): creation of, 103, 245; dispute resolution by, 104; environmental regulations of, 105-106; goal of, 245-246; property rights agreement of, 244 World War I: cause of, 102-103; cigarette rations during, 226; weapons used in, 15, 19 World War II: cause of, 102-103; deaths during, 204; global finances after, 111, 112-114; Jewish refugees of. 44; trade expansion after, 92; weapons of, 15 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 238, 247, 248 World Wildlife Federation, 303 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 210 Yugoslavia: breakup of, 4, 38, 77; human rights in, 63, 64 Yukon River Salmon Agreement, 288 Zaire, 124, 220 Zambia, 125-126 Zero population growth (ZPG), 156 Zionism, 43

About the Book

F

ully revised and updated, this new edition of Introducing

Global

Issues

explores the challenging contemporary issues of conflict and security, the global economy, development, and the environment. Notable features of the new edition include: • • • • •

a discussion of the war in Iraq a stronger focus on global security and terrorism an expanded discussion of concepts of identity an engagement with the debate over free trade thorough coverage of current environmental concerns

The material has been successfully designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the topics covered. Each chapter provides an analytical overview of the issues addressed, identifies the central actors and perspectives, and outlines past progress and future prospects. Discussion quest i o n s are posed to e n h a n c e s t u d e n t s ' a p p r e c i a t i o n of the c o m p l e x i t i e s involved, and suggestions for further reading additionally enrich the text. Michael T. Snarr is associate professor of social and political studies at W i l m i n g t o n C o l l e g e . D. N e i l S n a r r is p r o f e s s o r of s o c i o l o g y at Wilmington College.

349