Introducing Global Issues 9781685850357

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INTRODUCING

GLOBAL ISSUES

SECOND

EDITION

INTRODUCING

GLOBAL ISSUES EDITED BY MICHAEL T. SNARR D. NEIL SNARR

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

For Ty and Ruth Shaban, and Don and Mabel Snarr, thanks for your love, guidance, and encouragement

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Introducing global issues / edited by Michael T. Snarr and D. Neil Snarr. — 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-011-9 (alk. paper) 1. World politics—1989- 2. International economic relations. 3. Social history—1970. 4. Ecology. I. Snarr, Michael T. II. Snarr, Neil. 1933- . D860.189 2002 909.82—dc21 2002069819 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures Preface

vii ix

1

Introducing Globalization and Global Issues Michael T. Snarr

•

PARTI CONFLICT AND SECURITY

2

Weapons Proliferation and Conflict Jeffrey S. Lantis

11

Nationalism John K. Cox

35

The Changing Face of Global H u m a n Rights D. Neil Snarr

53

Peacekeeping and P e a c e m a k i n g Carolyn M. Stephenson

71

3 4 5

•

PART 2 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

6

Controversies in International Trade Bruce E. Moon

7

International Capital Flows Gerald W. Sazama

89 107

v

vi

CONTENTS

8 Poverty in a Global Economy Don Reeves

• PART 3

131

DEVELOPMENT

9 Population and Migration Ellen Percy Kraly

155

10 Women and Development Elise Boulding with Jennifer Dye

179

11 Children George Kent

195

12 Health Marjorie E. Nelson

215

• PART 4 THE ENVIRONMENT 13 Protection of the Atmosphere Mark Seis

239

14 Cooperation and Conflict over Natural Resources Karrin Scapple

257

15 Protecting the Global Commons: Sustainable Development in the Twenty-First Century Marian A. L. Miller

275

• PART 5

CONCLUSION

16 Future Prospects Michael T. Snarr

295

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

305 309 323 327 341

TABLES AND FIGURES

• 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 5.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2

TABLES Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization The Proliferation Matrix World and Regional Military Expenditures, 1991, 1995, and 2000 The Social Costs of U.S. Military Expenditure During the Cold War, 1990 Countries Suspected to Possess Chemical or Biological Weapons Capabilities Current UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2002 Net Financial Flows to All Developing Countries, 1990-2000 Net Financial Flows to Developing Countries, by Region, 2000 Official Development Assistance, by Principal Donor Countries, 1999 Comparative Measures of Official Development Assistance, Private Flows, and Debt Repayments, by Region, 1999 Income Inequality Between the World's Richest and Poorest, 1970 and 1997 Worldwide Real Per Capita Income by Percentile of Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993 Poverty Impact of Income Distribution, Selected Countries, 1999 World Population by Geographic Region and for More and Less Developed Countries, 1950-2000 Projections of World Population by Geographic Region and for More and Less Developed Countries, 2000 and 2050 vii

6 12 14 15 23 81 115 116 120 121 137 137 138 160

168

TABLES AND FIGURES

viii

9.3 Refugees and Other Types of Persons of Concern to the U N H C R , by Geographic Region, 2000 10.1 Representation of Women in National Parliaments, by Region, 1987, 1995, and 1999 11.1 Annual Child Deaths, 1 9 6 0 - 2 0 0 0 12.1 Desirable Height and Weight for Adults 12.2 Regional H I V / A I D S Statistics and Features, 2001 12.3 Per Capita G D P and Selected Health Indicators, Selected Countries 13.1 World Carbon Emissions from Fossil Fuel Burning, 1950-2000 14.1 Natural Resource Matrix

•

172 189 203 219 223 233 240 259

FIGURES

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 5.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 11.1 12.1

Internet Users Around the World, 1998 and 2000 Nuclear Status Around the World, 1998 Yugoslavia and Its Successor States The Expansion of Israel UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1948-2001 Comparing Corporate Revenue and Country GDP, 1999 Number and Percentage of Poor People Worldwide, 1990 and 1999 Distribution of World Income and Purchasing Power, 1993 Distribution of Undernourished People, by Developing Region, 1969-1971 and 1990-1992 Number of Undernourished People, by Region, 1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 8 A Virtuous Circle Ages of Males and Females as Percentage of Population, Spain and Tanzania, 2000 World Population for More and Less Developed Countries, 1 9 5 0 - 2 0 0 0 World Fertility Rates, 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0 Projected World Population to 2050 Under-Five Mortality Rate, 1990 and 2000 Cancer Death Rates in U.S. Males and Females, 1930-1998

4 21 46 48 80 113 132 136 140 141 145 158 161 163 167 204 226

PREFACE

In the second edition of Introducing Global Issues, we have updated and expanded our coverage of some of the world's most pressing problems. All of the chapters reflect significant changes in the world, including those resulting f r o m the events of September 11, 2001; additionally, a new chapter on the global environment addresses issues of biodiversity and the global commons. In response to student suggestions, we have included a list of acronyms, along with many new tables and figures. Other ideas for improvement and general comments are welcome at [email protected]. *

*

*

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to those who made this book possible. We are first and foremost indebted to our contributors for their perseverance and hard work. Getting to know them better has been a gratifying outcome of this project. Special thanks go to the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers—and especially to Lynne Rienner, Bridget Julian, and Lesli Brooks Athanasoulis—for their outstanding encouragement and support. We thank our global issues students at Wilmington College for asking insightful questions and demanding a readable book, along with our colleagues, who offered many useful suggestions. Joan Skidmore and her staff provided secretarial help at every step, and Jennifer Dye and Emily Herring assisted us with research and artwork. Rodney North and Colin Frake contributed their good advice to the earlier comments of Steven L. Lamy and Jeffrey Lantis. We owe a special debt of gratitude to our f a m i l y — M e l i s s a , Ruth, Madison, Ty, and Isaiah. Your support, love, and friendship are invaluable. —Michael T. Snarr —D. Neil Snarr

ix

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION A N D G L O B A L ISSUES Michael T. Snarr

• • • • • • • • • •

Approximately 210,000 people are added to the world's population every day; that is the equivalent of 76 million people per year. People in more than 200 countries and territories have access to Cable News Network (CNN). During the 1990s, the number of undernourished people declined by approximately 40 million ( U N D P 2001). An area of rainforest larger than a U.S. football field is destroyed every second worldwide. Infant mortality rate was reduced during the 1990s by over 10 percent worldwide ( U N D P 2001). More civilians died in the twentieth century as a result of war than in the four previous centuries combined. Dramatic numbers of species are becoming extinct worldwide. More than 1 billion people live on less than one U.S. dollar per day. 40 million people are HIV-infected ( U N A I D S 2001); approximately 11 people are infected every minute. A p p r o x i m a t e l y 30,000 children die every day f r o m preventable diseases.

Each of the items above is related to a global issue discussed in this book and many of them affect the reader. But what is a global issue? The term is used in the book to refer to two types of phenomena. First, there are those issues that are transnational, that is, they cross political boundaries (country borders). These issues affect individuals in more than one country. A clear example is air pollution produced by a factory in the United States and blown into Canada. Second, there are problems and issues that do not

I

2

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL ISSUES

necessarily cross borders but affect a large number of individuals throughout the world. Ethnic rivalries and human rights violations, for e x a m p l e , may occur within a single country but have a far wider impact. Thus, global issues either cross country borders or affect a vast number of people. For the contributors to this volume, the primary goal is to introduce several of the most pressing global issues and demonstrate how strongly they are interconnected. Since these issues affect each and every one of us, we also hope to motivate the reader to learn more about these global issues.

•

IS T H E W O R L D SHRINKING?

There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years about globalization, which can be defined as "the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders" (Holm and S0rensen 1995: 1). Evidence of globalization is seen regularly in our daily lives. In the United States, grocery stores and shops at the local mall are stocked with items produced abroad. Likewise, Nike, Los Angeles Lakers, and New York Yankees hats and T-shirts are easily found outside of the United States. In many countries outside of the United States, Britney Spears, ' N Sync, and other U.S. music groups dominate the airwaves; CNN and M T V are on television screens; and Harry Potter is at the movies. Are we moving toward a single global culture? In the words of B e n j a m i n Barber, we are being influenced by "the onrush of economic and ecological forces that d e m a n d integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast f o o d — w i t h MTV, Macintosh, and M c D o n a l d ' s , pressing nations into one commercially h o m o g e n e o u s global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communication, and c o m m e r c e " (Barber 1992: 53). Technology is perhaps the most visible aspect of globalization and in many ways its driving force. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s technology has revolutionized our information systems. C N N reaches hundreds of millions of households in over 200 countries and territories throughout the world. "Computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-optic, and m i c r o c h i p technologies [are] combining to create a vast interactive communications and i n f o r m a tion network that can potentially give every person on earth access to every other person, and m a k e every datum, every byte, available to every set of e y e s " (Barber 1992: 58). Technology has also aided the increase in international trade and international capital f l o w s and enhanced the spread of Western, primarily U.S., culture. Of course the earth is not literally shrinking, but in light of the rate at which travel and c o m m u n i c a t i o n speeds have increased, the world has in a sense become smaller. Thus, many scholars assert that we are living in a

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL ISSUES

3

qualitatively different time, in w h i c h h u m a n s are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d m o r e than e v e r before. " T h e r e is a distinction b e t w e e n the c o n t e m p o r a r y experience of c h a n g e and that of e a r l i e r g e n e r a t i o n s : n e v e r b e f o r e has c h a n g e c o m e so r a p i d l y . . . on such a global scale, and with such global v i s i b i l i t y " ( C G G 1995: 12). T h i s s e e m i n g l y uncritical a c c e p t a n c e of the c o n c e p t of g l o b a l i z a t i o n a n d a s h r i n k i n g world is not w i t h o u t its critics. T h e s e critics point out that labor, trade, and capital m o v e d at least as freely, if not m o r e so, during the s e c o n d half of the nineteenth century than it d o e s now. S e c o n d , s o m e skeptics argue that while i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and technological a d v a n c e m e n t have increased in s o m e parts of the world, this is not true in a vast m a j o r i t y of the South. (The t e r m s the South, the developing world, the less developed countries, and the third world are used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y t h r o u g h o u t this book. T h e y r e f e r to the p o o r e r countries, in contrast to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and N e w Zealand, w h i c h are r e f e r r e d to as the North, the more developed countries, and the first world.) For example, H a m i d M o w l a n a argues that " ' G l o b a l ' is not 'univ e r s a l ' " ( 1 9 9 5 : 42). A l t h o u g h a small n u m b e r of p e o p l e in the South m a y h a v e access to much of the new technology and truly live in the "global village," the large m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n in these countries does not. Despite the rapid globalization of the Internet, it is estimated that by 2005, only one billion (or one in six people) will h a v e access to it ( U N D P 2001). Figure 1.1 f u r t h e r d o c u m e n t s the lopsided nature of Internet use in the world. In most of the poorer countries of A f r i c a and Asia, the n u m b e r of cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 p e o p l e is in single digits. In contrast, f o r many of the developed countries, nearly half of all people use this technology ( U N D P 2001). A good e x a m p l e of this contrast can be seen in the current war in Afghanistan. While ultramodern U.S. jets flew a b o v e Kabul, m a n y Northern Alliance troops were entering the city on horses and bicycles. Similarly, one can a r g u e that i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w s , a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of g l o b a l i z a t i o n , g o primarily in o n e direction. E v e n those in the South w h o h a v e access to television or radio are at a d i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e globalization of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in the less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s t y p i c a l l y is a o n e - w a y proposition: T h e people d o not control any of the i n f o r m a t i o n ; they only rec e i v e it. It is also true that w o r l d w i d e the ability to c o n t r o l or g e n e r a t e broadcasts rests in the h a n d s of a tiny minority. W h i l e lack of financial r e s o u r c e s is an important i m p e d i m e n t to globalization, t h e r e are o t h e r o b s t a c l e s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , B e n j a m i n B a r b e r , w h o argues that w e are e x p e r i e n c i n g global integration via " M c D o n a l d i z a t i o n , " asserts w e are at the s a m e t i m e e x p e r i e n c i n g g l o b a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . T h e b r e a k u p of the Soviet U n i o n and Yugoslavia, as well as the great n u m b e r of other ethnic a n d national c o n f l i c t s (see C h a p t e r 3), are cited as e v i d e n c e of forces countering globalization. Many subnational groups (groups within

Figure l . l

Internet Users Around the W o r l d , 1998 and 2000

Internet Users (as percentage of population) 1998 United States 26.3 High-income OECD (excluding U.S.) f.,9 Latin America and the Caribbean 0.8 East Asia and the Pacific 0.5 Eastern Europe and CIS 0.8 Arab states 0.2 Sub-Sarahan Africa 0.1 South Asia 0.04 World

2.4

2000 54.3 28.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 0.6 0.4 0.4 6.7

Note: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Commonwealth of Independent Stales (CIS).

South Asia High-income OECD, excluding U.S.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Arab states

Eastern Europe and the CIS

Latin America and the Caribbean

East Asia and the Pacific

Note: Pie chart represents year 2000. The large circle represents world population; pie slices show regional shares of world population; dark wedges show Internet users.

Internet Users (as percentage of national population) 1998

2000

60

50 /

/

/

/

Singapore

„

Japan

,

Ireland

///

40

.30

Sweden United States Norway

/ / / /

/ / / / //

20

10 —' 0

Source:

Adapted from UN Development P r o g r a m m e , Human

O x f o r d University Press, 2001), Feature 2.3, p. 40.

Development

Report

Malaysia Brazil South Africa Phina

2001 ( N e w York:

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL ISSUES

5

n a t i o n s ) desire to g o v e r n t h e m s e l v e s ; o t h e r s see t h r e a t s to their r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s and identity and t h e r e f o r e reject the secular nature of globalization. As a result, for some, globalization has produced not uniformity, but a y e a r n i n g for a return to n o n - s e c u l a r v a l u e s . Today, there is a rebirth o f r e v i t a l i z e d f u n d a m e n t a l i s m in all the world's major religions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism, S h i n t o i s m , or C o n f u c i a n i s m . At the s a m e t i m e the g l o b a l h o m o g e n e i t y has r e a c h e d the airwaves, these religious tenets h a v e r e e m e r g e d as d e f i n i n g identities. ( M o w l a n a 1995)

N o n e of these criticisms m e a n that our c o n t e m p o r a r y time period is not d i f f e r e n t in s o m e i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s . T h e r e is w i d e s p r e a d a g r e e m e n t that c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , trade, and capital are m o v i n g at u n p r e c e d e n t e d speeds and at v o l u m e s never b e f o r e seen. T h e s e criticisms do, however, p r o v i d e an important caution against o v e r s t a t i n g or m a k i n g broad g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about the process and e f f e c t s of globalization.

•

IS G L O B A L I Z A T I O N G O O D O R BAD?

T h e r e are s o m e aspects of globalization that most will agree are good (for e x a m p l e , the spread of medical t e c h n o l o g y ) or bad (for e x a m p l e , increased global trade in illegal d r u g s ) . E v e n t s d u r i n g the w a r in A f g h a n i s t a n in 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 2 revealed the dramatic contrast b e t w e e n f r i e n d s and f o e s of globalization. D u e to the Taliban's rejection of m a n y aspects of Western culture, s o m e A f g h a n i s apparently buried their televisions and V C R s in their b a c k yard. W h e n Kabul was c a p t u r e d by the N o r t h e r n A l l i a n c e it w a s r e p o r t e d that one A f g h a n i anxiously retrieved his T V and V C R in order to view his copy of Titanic (Filkins 2001). J u d g i n g w h e t h e r or not globalization is g o o d is, however, c o m p l e x . T h e first c o l u m n of Table 1.1 identifies three areas that are a f f e c t e d by globalization—political, e c o n o m i c , and c u l t u r a l — a n d gives s o m e e x a m p l e s of aspects c o n s i d e r e d positive and n e g a t i v e about globalization. A key aspect of political globalization is the w e a k e n e d ability of the state to control both what crosses its borders and what goes on inside t h e m . In other w o r d s , globalization can reduce the state's sovereignty (the state's ability to g o v e r n matters within its borders). T h i s can be v i e w e d as g o o d , b e c a u s e u n d e m o cratic g o v e r n m e n t s are f i n d i n g it i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to control the f l o w of i n f o r m a t i o n to and f r o m p r o d e m o c r a c y g r o u p s . Satellite dishes, e - m a i l , and the World Wide Web are three e x a m p l e s of t e c h n o l o g y that h a v e e r o d e d state sovereignty. But d e c r e a s e d state sovereignty also m e a n s that the state has d i f f i c u l t y c o n t r o l l i n g the i n f l u x of illegal d r u g s and u n w a n t e d i m m i grants. including terrorists.

6

I N T R O D U C I N G G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D G L O B A L ISSUES

Table I. I

Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization

Effects of Globalization Political Economic Cultural

Advantages

Disadvantages

Weakens power of authoritarian governments Jobs, capital, more choices for consumers

Unwanted external influence difficult to keep out Exploitative; only benefits a few; gap between rich and poor

Offers exposure to other cultures

Cultural imperialism

In the realm of economics, increased globalization has given consumers more choices. Also, multinational corporations are creating jobs in poor areas where people never before had such opportunities. Some critics reject these points, arguing that increased foreign investment and trade benefit only a small group of wealthy individuals and that, as a result, the gap between rich and poor grows both within countries and between countries. Related to this is the argument that many well-paying, blue-collar jobs are moving from the North to the poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. At the cultural level, those who view increased cultural contact as positive say that it gives people more opportunities to learn about (and purchase goods f r o m ) other cultures. But critics of cultural globalization argue that the wealthy countries are guilty of cultural i m p e r i a l i s m — t h a t their multibillion-dollar advertising budgets are destroying the cultures of nonWestern areas, as illustrated by Avon's aggressive sales strategy in the Amazon region (Byrd 1994). The fear of cultural imperialism is certainly a key component in the animosity of some Arabs toward the United States. Other critics are increasingly fearful that more and more national languages will become extinct as foreign languages, especially English, penetrate borders. The degree to which cultural values can be "exported" is the subject of some debate. Samuel Huntington argues that drinking C o c a - C o l a d o e s not m a k e R u s s i a n s think like A m e r i c a n s any m o r e than e a t i n g s u s h i m a k e s A m e r i c a n s think like J a p a n e s e . T h r o u g h o u t h u m a n h i s t o r y , f a d s and m a t e r i a l g o o d s h a v e s p r e a d f r o m o n e s o c i e t y to a n o t h e r w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n t l y altering the b a s i c c u l t u r e o f the r e c i p i e n t s o ciety. ( H u n t i n g t o n 1 9 9 6 : 2 8 - 2 9 )

Similarly, others argue that globalization brings only superficial change. " M c D o n a l d ' s may be in nearly every country, but in Japan, sushi is served alongside hamburgers. In many countries, hamburgers are not even on the m e n u " (Mowlana 1995: 46). It is left to the reader to determine whether globalization is having a positive or negative effect on the issues discussed in this book. Is globalization

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL ISSUES

7

e n h a n c i n g h u m a n capacity to deal with a particular issue? O r is it m a k i n g it m o r e difficult? Of course, each i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s p e c t i v e will be i n f l u e n c e d by w h e t h e r he or she evaluates these issues based on self-interest, national interest, a religious view, or f r o m a global h u m a n i t a r i a n v i e w p o i n t . F o r exa m p l e , w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g the issue of f r e e trade ( C h a p t e r 6), r e a d e r s m u s t d e c i d e h o w they e v a l u a t e a m o r a l q u e s t i o n such as, "Is f r e e trade g o o d or b a d ? " T h o s e c o n c e r n e d first and f o r e m o s t with self-interest will ask, H o w d o e s f r e e trade a f f e c t m e ? A n a t i o n a l p o i n t of v i e w will c o n s i d e r o n e ' s country and the effects of f r e e trade on it. If readers identify with a religion, they will ask h o w their religion w o u l d instruct t h e m on this q u e s t i o n . Finally, the global h u m a n i t a r i a n v i e w w o u l d ask what is best f o r h u m a n i t y in g e n e r a l . T h e r e f o r e , r e a d e r s m u s t ask t h e m s e l v e s w h a t is m o s t i m p o r t a n t w h e n evaluating the issues d i s c u s s e d in this book.

•

I N T E R C O N N E C T E D N E S S A M O N G ISSUES

A s m e n t i o n e d above, a primary p u r p o s e of this book is to e x p l o r e h o w the issues introduced in the various chapters are interconnected. In other words, the poverty chapter should not be c o n s i d e r e d separate f r o m the c h a p t e r on p o p u l a t i o n , even though these t w o issues are treated separately. B e l o w are several e x a m p l e s of h o w issues discussed in this book are interconnected. •

•

•

•

T h e growth in the w o r l d ' s population ( C h a p t e r 9) h a s been d r a m a t ically affected, especially in A f r i c a , by the A I D S crisis, which is disc u s s e d in the chapter on health ( C h a p t e r 12). M a n y of the value j u d g m e n t s that the trade c h a p t e r ( C h a p t e r 6) u r g e s r e a d e r s to c o n s i d e r are intricately linked to h u m a n rights issues (Chapter 4). Ethnic conflict discussed in C h a p t e r 3 (as well as other types of conflict) often leads to internal migration as well as international p o p u lation m o v e m e n t s ( C h a p t e r 9). O n e of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for r e d u c i n g poverty ( C h a p t e r 8) is to e d u c a t e w o m e n and g i v e t h e m m o r e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p o w e r o v e r their lives (Chapter 11).

T h e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s of t h e s e issues is e v e n m o r e e x t e n s i v e than these e x a m p l e s d e m o n s t r a t e . For instance, w h i l e an increase in A I D S will affect population growth, the c o n n e c t i o n s do not end there. A I D S e p i d e m i c s also lead to increased g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s , w h i c h c a n lead to increased i n d e b t e d n e s s , w h i c h will likely lead to m o r e p o v e r t y , and so on. Thus, each global issue discussed in this book has m u l t i p l e c o n s e q u e n c e s .

8 •

INTRODUCING GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL ISSUES

OUTLINE OF THE B O O K

This book has been organized into five parts. Part 1, which focuses on conflict and security issues, considers some of the primary sources of conflict and some of the many approaches to establishing and maintaining peace. Part 2 concentrates on economic issues ranging from international trade and capital flows to one of the major concerns that confronts humanity—poverty. Part 3 deals with issues that, although not confined to, tend to plague the poorer countries, such as population growth, health issues, and issues that affect women and children. And Part 4 focuses on environmental issues (such as global warming, ozone depletion, biodiversity, and others) and global attempts to solve them. Part 5 discusses possible future world orders, sources of hope and challenges that face us in the coming decades, and innovative actions that are being taken to make a positive impact on global issues.

•

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. What examples of globalization can you identify in your life? 2. Do you think globalization will continue to increase? If so, in what areas? 3. Do you think globalization has more positive attributes or more negative attributes? 4. Can you think of additional examples of how the global issues discussed in different chapters are interconnected?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Barber, Benjamin R. (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books. Friedman, Thomas L. (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Anchor Books. Hauchler, Ingomar, and Paul M. Kennedy, eds. (1994) Global Trends: The World Almanac of Development and Peace. New York: Continuum. Huntington, Samuel P. (1998) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone Books. Jones, Ellis, et al. (2001) The Better World Handbook: From Good intentions to Everyday Actions. Boulder, CO: New Society Publishers. Kaplan, Robert D. (2000) The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War. New York: Random House. Iyer, Pico (2001) The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home. New York: Vintage Books. O'Meara, Patrick, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain, eds. (2000) Globalization and the Challenges of the New Century: A Reader. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. United Nations Development Programme (annual) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part I C O N F L I C T A N D SECURITY

2 WEAPONS AND

PROLIFERATION CONFLICT

Jeffrey S. Lantis

The proliferation of weapons is one of the most serious challenges to international security today. Arms races, regional competition, and the spread of w e a p o n s technology to new countries or groups are all important dimensions of the proliferation challenge that could contribute to long-term global instability. The events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, and subsequent international developments, are a bitter reminder that the proliferation challenge is here to stay. Proliferation is best understood as the rapid increase in the n u m b e r and destructive capability of armaments. Evidence of the impact of proliferation on world affairs can be seen in the arms race between Germany and Great Britain that helped to spark World War I; the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that brought us to the brink of a World War III; the clandestine arms buildup in Iraq that helped it fight the Gulf War; the nuclear race between India and Pakistan that culminated in a series of underground test explosions in both countries in May 1998; and the anthrax attacks in the United States in the fall of 2001. It is important to remember, however, that proliferation is not simply a problem for politicians and military leaders. W h e n governments choose to use weapons in conflict, they are exposing both soldiers and civilians to danger. In fact, the proliferation of weapons contributed to higher civilian casualties and greater destruction in the twentieth century than in the previous four centuries combined (Small and Singer 1982). When governments devote f u n d s to build up large armies and w e a p o n s of mass destruction ( W M D ) , they are also choosing to divert f u n d s f r o m other p r o g r a m s like education and health care. Clearly, citizens of the world experience direct and indirect effects of proliferation every day.

11

12

C O N F L I C T A N D SECURITY TYPES O F P R O L I F E R A T I O N

T h i s chapter e x a m i n e s f o u r d i f f e r e n t types of w e a p o n s proliferation. As illustrated in Table 2.1, there are t w o broad d i m e n s i o n s to consider: vertical v e r s u s horizontal p r o l i f e r a t i o n and c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s v e r s u s w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction. Vertical proliferation is the d e v e l o p m e n t and stockpiling of a r m a m e n t s in o n e country. Horizontal p r o l i f e r a t i o n is d e f i n e d as the spread of w e a p o n s or w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y across c o u n t r y borders. C o n v e n tional w e a p o n s are those s y s t e m s that m a k e up the vast m a j o r i t y of all military a r s e n a l s — i n c l u d i n g g u n s , t a n k s , m o s t artillery shells and bullets, planes, and ships. W e a p o n s of m a s s destruction are those special w e a p o n s that h a v e a d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t e v e n w h e n used in small n u m b e r s a n d that kill more indiscriminately than conventional w e a p o n s ; they include nuclear, c h e m i c a l , and biological systems.

Table 2.1 The Proliferation Matrix

Conventional weapons W e a p o n s of m a s s destruction

Vertical

Horizontal

Proliferation

Proliferation

Type I

T y p e 11

Type III

T y p e IV

Type I: Vertical Proliferation of Conventional

Weapons

T h e buildup of conventional w e a p o n s arsenals in m a n y countries is the oldest form of proliferation in h u m a n civilization and represents the core of the proliferation threat. At first glance, one might view this category of prolife r a t i o n as the least t h r e a t e n i n g or m o s t b e n i g n of all f o r m s . Vertical c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , can be a threat to i n t e r n a t i o n a l stability f o r at least two m a j o r reasons. First, arms b u i l d u p s p r o v i d e m o r e w e a p o n r y for g o v e r n m e n t s and g r o u p s to e n g a g e in more conflicts. At the same time, conventional weapons have b e c o m e more sophisticated ( f r o m breech-loading r i f l e s to p r e c i s i o n - g u i d e d m u n i t i o n s ) and m o r e d e s t r u c t i v e ( f r o m m o r t a r shells to m u l t i p l e - l a u n c h rocket s y s t e m s ) . Vertical c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o l i f e r a tion in an u n r e g u l a t e d world m a r k e t m a y p r o v i d e d e t e r m i n e d leaders with e n o u g h incentive to order a g g r e s s i v e action and to actually spark c o n f l i c t s . A s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t d a n g e r of c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s b u i l d u p s in o n e c o u n t r y is the social cost, w h i c h often includes serious r e d u c t i o n s in social w e l f a r e spending by g o v e r n m e n t s for citizens w h o can ill a f f o r d such d e p r i v a t i o n s . More weapons mean more conflicts. G o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s to build up c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m a m e n t s e n s u r e that there are m o r e w e a p o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

13

countries to engage in more conflict. Some experts believe that the simple availability of weapons systems and the development of military strategies increase the chances that a country will e n g a g e in conflict. They have argued that advances in conventional w e a p o n r y and o f f e n s i v e military strategies were contributing factors to the outbreaks of numerous conflicts, including both world wars and the Vietnam War. In this context, arms buildups are seen as one potential cause of war in the international system (Sagan 1986; Sivard 1991). In traditional forms, conventional arms buildups focus on weapons syst e m s that are considered to be most e f f e c t i v e for the times. In the period leading up to World War I, G e r m a n y and Great Britain engaged in a race to build the most powerful and a w e s o m e warships. In the period leading up to World War II, Adolf Hitler ordered research and development of rudimentary surface-to-surface missiles and jet aircraft as a way to gain military advantage. During the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan called f o r the creation of a 600-ship U.S. naval fleet, with an emphasis on strong aircraft carrier battle groups and advanced submarines. More recently, attention has turned to the latest technology of warfare, including stealth planes and ships, remote-controlled aircraft, antisatellite weapons, and computer technology to give mobility and advantage to the fighting forces of the twentyfirst century. The relationship between arms buildups and the likelihood of conflict is multiplied by the fact that conventional weapons have become more sophisticated and destructive over the years. " S m a r t " conventional bombs and precision-guided munitions have improved in terms of both accuracy and destructive capability. Shoulder-launched missiles e m p o w e r one person with the ability to shoot down large aircraft. The modernization of conventional weapons such as fuel-air explosives and the faster and more accurate M1A1 tank also poses a great threat to soldiers and civilians. Finally, it is important to remember that conventional arms have been used repeatedly in conflict since the end of World War II. From landmines to fighter jets, conventional weapons have been blamed for roughly 50 million deaths around the globe since 1945. Individuals, groups, and governments have all built and used conventional weapons to achieve their goals. The social costs

of arms

buildups.

At the b e g i n n i n g of the twenty-first c e n -

tury, many governments have sizeable conventional arsenals. U.S. military expenditures have topped $250 billion annually in the past two decades, with the m a j o r i t y of these f u n d s going to support high levels of c o n v e n tional weaponry and troops. In 2001, the Bush administration sought a total defense budget of $305 billion to support an active-duty military strength of 1,370,000 soldiers and a force structure composed of ten army divisions, twelve navy aircraft carrier task groups, three Marine Corps divisions, five army special forces groups, and thirteen air force c o m b a t wings (Cohen

14

C O N F L I C T A N D SECURITY

2001). M o r e than 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 of these U.S. soldiers were stationed abroad (with large deployments in Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and Asia). Critics point out that in relative terms, U.S. defense expenditures in 2001 were more than six times larger than that of its nearest potential competitor, and more than twenty-three times larger than the c o m b i n e d spending of the seven "rogue states," or countries traditionally identified as the most likely adversaries of the United States: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Center for D e f e n s e Information 2001). Table 2.2 illustrates the broader context of changing levels of global and regional defense expenditures in the p o s t - C o l d War era. Though Table 2.2 shows a slight decline in global defense spending in the early to m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , levels are once again on the rise. In 2000, global military expenditures reached $798 billion, or $130 for every person on the planet. Military expenditures rose in all parts of the world between 1998 and 2000, but African countries saw the sharpest increase of defense spending, 37 percent in that two-year period (SIPRI 2001). It is clear that countries continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars every year on the military. This has led many critics to charge that there are dangerous social costs in the trade-off between " g u n s and butter," and the end of the Cold War drew new attention to this difficult balance between military and social spending. In 1990, the United States ranked first in the world in terms of military spending but compared rather poorly with other countries on various social indicators. To some degree this was a function of priorities in government spending during the Cold War. Table 2.3 shows how the United

Table 2.2 W o r l d and Regional Military Expenditures, 1991, 1995, and 2000 (in U.S.$ billions at constant 1998 values)

Selected Regions

1991

1995

2000

Percentage of Change, 1991-2000

Africa Asia Central America Europe Middle East North America South America World

11.6 97.9 2.2 302 70.7 345 16.5 860

10.1 112 2.7 239 47.9 307 22.9 742

13.8 123 3.0 240 60.9 288 26.3 756

+20 +26 +29 -19 -14 -16 +59 -12

Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001). Notes: Figures may not always add up to totals because of conventions of rounding and estimates of expenditures. Data for some countries have been excluded because of lack of information. Africa figures do not include expenditures of Congo, Libya, and Somalia; Asia excludes Afghanistan; Europe excludes Yugoslavia; and Middle East excludes Iraq.

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

15

Table 2.3 The Social Costs of U.S. Military Expenditure During the Cold War, 1990 Military expenditure L i t e r a c y rate G r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t p e r capita Per c a p i t a e x p e n d i t u r e f o r e d u c a t i o n Life expectancy A v e r a g e scores of s t u d e n t s on science and m a t h tests I n f a n t mortality rate P o p u l a t i o n per p h y s i c i a n Source: R u t h L e g e r Sivard, World Military and Social D C : W o r l d Priorities, 1993). Note: R a n k c o m p a r e d with 140 other c o u n t r i e s .

1 4 6 9 10 13 21 22 Expenditures

1993

(Washington,

States c o m p a r e d with other countries in t e r m s of social w e l f a r e standards, literacy rates, sanitation, e d u c a t i o n , and health care d u r i n g the C o l d War. A r e l a t e d study f o u n d that w h e n m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s r o s e in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , the rate of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h d e c l i n e d and g o v e r n m e n t d e b t inc r e a s e d ( N i n c i c 1982). T h i s has led s o m e to c o n c l u d e the sad truth that m a n y countries b e c a m e m o r e c o n c e r n e d with d e f e n d i n g their citizens f r o m f o r e i g n attack in the twentieth century than they w e r e with protecting t h e m f r o m social, educational, and health insecurities at h o m e .

•

Type II: Horizontal

Proliferation

of Conventional

Weapons

A s e c o n d c a t e g o r y of proliferation is the horizontal spread of c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s and related technology across country borders. T h e m a i n route of the spread of c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n r y is through legitimate arms sales. But the c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s trade has b e c o m e quite lucrative, and m a n y e x p e r t s are c o n c e r n e d that the i m p e r a t i v e of the b o t t o m d o l l a r is d r i v i n g us m o r e rapidly t o w a r d global instability. Arms dealers. T h e conventional a r m s trade has b e c o m e a very big b u s i n e s s , and s e v e n p o w e r f u l c o u n t r i e s — t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , F r a n c e , R u s s i a , G r e a t Britain, C h i n a , G e r m a n y , and I s r a e l — a r e r e s p o n s i b l e for m o r e than 9 0 percent of g l o b a l sales. P a t t e r n s in the a r m s t r a d e h a v e c h a n g e d o v e r t i m e , however. In 1987, the Soviet U n i o n w a s at the top of the arms trade, d o m inating the m a r k e t with 4 6 p e r c e n t of all sales. But as S o v i e t and (later) R u s s i a n sales levels p l u m m e t e d , the U n i t e d States quickly e m e r g e d as the new leader. In 2 0 0 0 , U.S. c o m p a n i e s e x p o r t e d at least $ 2 6 . 5 billion worth of c o n v e n t i o n a l arms, or 4 9 percent of the global m a r k e t share. T h e i r nearest c o m p e t i t o r , F r a n c e , e x p o r t e d $ 9 . 8 billion in a r m s ( 1 8 p e r c e n t of the global m a r k e t ) ; G r e a t Britain e x p o r t e d $8.9 billion in a r m s (16 p e r c e n t ) . Other m a j o r e x p o r t e r s controlled a s i g n i f i c a n t l y s m a l l e r p e r c e n t a g e of the

16

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

global trade, including Russia with $2.8 billion in sales, Israel with $1.3 billion, Germany at $0.8 billion, and China at $0.5 billion in global arms sales (IISS 2000). Arms customers. Who are the primary buyers of all of these weapons? Generally speaking, U.S. defense contractors have sold most hardware to allied countries. For example, in 1998, traditional allies like Germany purchased $259 million in armaments from U.S. defense contractors; the government of Greece bought $531 million in U.S. arms. In the Middle East, U.S. defense contractors sold $2.3 billion worth of armaments to Saudi Arabia, $1 billion to Egypt, and $628 million to Israel (which included armored combat vehicles and advanced fighter jets). Bahrain purchased $286 million in U.S. military hardware, and Turkey spent $241 million. In Asia, allies purchased large numbers of U.S. conventional weapons systems in 1998. This included sales to Taiwan ($441 million), Japan ($348 million), and South Korea ($267 million). Arms sales are not always made to countries considered traditional allies, however. From 1984 to 1989, the People's Republic of China spent some $424 million on U.S. weapons, and these arms deals were stopped only after the Tiananmen Square massacre of prodemocracy activists in the summer of 1989. Through legitimate means, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein purchased a massive conventional arsenal on the international arms market. In 1990, estimates of the arsenal included a total of 5,500 tanks; 4,000 pieces of heavy artillery; 7,500 armored personnel carriers; and 700 planes. Arms sales to Iraq by friends and allies came back to haunt the United States, however, during the Gulf War. Indeed, the sale of conventional weapons raises real concern about the potential for "deadly returns" on U.S. investments (Laurance 1992). Concerned world citizens have devoted new attention in the post-Cold War era to the role of conventional arms trades in fueling civil wars and violence in developing countries. Legal and illegal arms transfers have contributed to civil wars around the world in the past decade, including conflicts in Mozambique, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Congo, and other developing countries. Sadly, most of the casualties in these conflicts have been civilians, and children have been especially victimized. According to the United Nations Development Programme, more than 2 million children were killed and another 4.5 million disabled in civil wars and conflicts between 1987 and 1997 (Klare 1999). Type III: Vertical Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction The vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another serious threat to international security. There are several important dimensions of this problem, including the range and variety of modern W M D systems.

W E A P O N S PROLIFERATION

17

incentives for states to build nuclear weapons, and the patterns of vertical W M D proliferation. Types of weapons of mass destruction. There are three different types of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, biological, and chemical. These are often examined as a group, but it is important to note that their effects and their potential military applications are quite different. Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938, and scientists like Albert Einstein soon called on governments to sponsor an exploration of its potential. Atomic weapons were first developed by the U.S. government through the five-year, $2 billion secret research program during World War II known as the Manhattan Project. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a 12.5-kiloton atomic b o m b on Hiroshima, Japan. This weapon produced an explosive blast equal to that of 12,500 tons of conventional high explosives (such as T N T ) and caused high-pressure waves, flying debris, extreme heat, and radioactive fallout. A second b o m b was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, and the Japanese g o v e r n m e n t surrendered one day later (Schlesinger 1993). The use of atomic bombs to end World War II in 1945 was actually the beginning of a very dangerous period of spiraling arms races between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime immediately stepped up its atomic research and development program. In 1949, it detonated its first atomic test device and joined the nuclear club. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had accumulated an estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. Both superpowers also put an emphasis on diversification of their weapons systems. The symbolic centerpiece of each side's nuclear arsenals was their land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable of accurate attacks when launched thousands of miles to their targets. But each side had also deployed nuclear weapons on submarines; in longrange bombers; as warheads on short-range, battlefield missile systems; and even in artillery shells and landmines. Chemical weapons and biological weapons. Chemical weapons, another class of weapons of mass destruction, work by spreading poisons that can incapacitate, injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the body. T h e s e antipersonnel w e a p o n s can be lethal when vaporized and inhaled in very small amounts or when absorbed into the bloodstream through skin contact. Examples of chemical weapons range from mustard gas used during World War I to nerve agents such as Sarin (employed by a radical religious cult in Japan to kill, injure, and terrorize civilians in Tokyo in 1995). Nerve agents are invisible and odorless, and they can produce a loss of m u s c l e control and death within minutes for untreated victims. Many g o v e r n m e n t s and independent groups have f u n d e d chemical weapons research and development programs. In fact, chemical w e a p o n s

18

CONFLICT A N D SECURITY

are relatively simple and cheap to produce compared with other classes of W M D s . Any group with access to chemical manufacturing plants can develop variants of commonly used, safe chemicals to create dangerous weapons of mass destruction. The first recorded use of chemical weapons in warfare occurred in the fifth century B.C.E. when Athenian soldiers poisoned their enemy's water supply with a chemical to make them sick. During World War I, more than 120,000 tons of chemical weapons were used by both sides on the western front. In 1917 alone, mustard gas attacks killed 91,000 soldiers and injured more than one million. The last known widescale use occurred during the Iran-Iraq War ( 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 8 ) , where an estimated 13,000 soldiers were killed by chemical agents (McNaugher 1990). As dangerous as chemical weapons can be, biological agents are much more lethal and destructive. Biological agents are basically disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi that cause illness or kill the intended target after an incubation period (if left untreated). A more lethal derivative of biological weapons—toxins—can cause incapacitation or death within minutes or hours. Examples include anthrax, which was used in terrorist attacks in the United States in fall 2001. Anthrax is a disease-causing bacteria that contains as many as 10 million lethal doses per gram, but the key to its lethality lies in the effectiveness of delivery systems and also, of course, in medical treatment of infected victims. Like chemical agents, biological and toxic weapons are relatively easy to construct and have a high potential lethality rate. Any government or group with access to pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities or biological research facilities can develop biological weapons. And, like the other classes of W M D systems, information about the construction of such systems is available in the open scientific literature and on the Internet. Why build WMD systems? There are two basic reasons why countries build weapons of mass destruction: security and prestige. First, many government leaders genuinely believe that their state security is at risk without such systems. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union established large nuclear weapons stockpiles—but they also developed sizeable arsenals of chemical and biological weapons. U.S. policy on bioweapons development was finally reversed by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s, while clandestine Soviet research and development continued to the end of the Cold War. The standoff between India and Pakistan is another prime example of the drive for W M D security. After years of rivalry and border skirmishes between the countries, India began a secret program to construct an atomic device that might swing the balance of regional power in its favor. In 1974, the Indian government detonated what it termed a "peaceful nuclear explosion"—

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

19

signaling its capabilities to the world and threatening Pakistani security. For the next twenty-five years, both Pakistan and India secretly developed nuclear weapons in a regional arms race. In May 1998, the Indian government detonated five m o r e underground nuclear explosions, and the Pakistani government responded to the perceived threat with six nuclear explosions of its own. The two governments acknowledged their nuclear capabilities to the world, and relations between the neighbors have been quite tense. Another example c o m e s f r o m the M i d d l e East, where Israel is suspected of having developed d o z e n s of nuclear devices for potential use in its o w n defense. Recently revealed diplomatic cables suggest that the Israeli government secretly threatened to use these systems against Iraq during the Gulf War if Israel c a m e under chemical or biological w e a p o n s attack (Schlesinger 1993). Second, some g o v e r n m e n t s have undertaken W M D research and development programs for reasons of prestige, national pride, or influence. It b e c a m e clear to some during the Cold War that the possession of W M D systems lent a certain level of prestige, power, and even influence to state affairs. At a m i n i m u m , the possession of W M D systems—or a spirited drive to attain t h e m — w o u l d gain attention for a country or leader. North Korea's drive to build a nuclear device based on an advanced uranium enrichment process drew the attention of the United States and other Western powers in the early 1990s. After extensive negotiations, North Korea was offered new nuclear energy reactors in exchange for a promise not to divert nuclear material for a b o m b program. Other g o v e r n m e n t leaders pursue the development of W M D arsenals because they believe that it will help them gain political dominance in their region. To illustrate this dynamic, Gerald Steinberg (1994), an expert on proliferation, relates the story of clandestine Iraqi government efforts to develop a W M D arsenal. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered the creation of a secret W M D research and development program and began to acquire nuclear technology and materials f r o m France, Germany, the United States, and other countries in the late 1970s. While research scientists in the program worked on uranium enrichment, Saddam Hussein worked to strengthen his political profile in the region and to improve relations with key Arab states. Meanwhile, the Israeli government tried to stop the clandestine nuclear program by carrying out a devastating air strike against Iraq's nuclear research reactor at Osiraq in 1981. But the determined Iraqi drive for regional influence was really only stopped by the efforts of the U.S.-led international coalition in the Gulf War and the dispatch of a United Nations (UN) special commission to investigate and dismantle the Iraqi W M D development program. Broadly speaking, Iraqi proliferation efforts were part of a larger scheme to gain prestige, power, and influence in the Middle East.

20

CONFLICT A N D SECURITY Type IV: Horizontal of Weapons

Proliferation

of M a s s

Destruction

The horizontal proliferation of W M D systems represents the final dimension of this challenge to international peace and stability. In fact, the spread of these weapons and vital technology across state borders is often viewed as the most serious of all proliferation threats. Nuclear arsenals. T h e massive buildup of nuclear arsenals by the superpowers was not the only game in town during the Cold War. In fact, while the Soviet Union and United States were stockpiling their weapons, other countries were working to join the nuclear club through both open and clandestine routes. Today, the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, China, India, and Pakistan all openly acknowledge possessing stocks of nuclear weapons (Figure 2.1). At the height of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union supported key allies by secretly authorizing the transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to other research and development programs. In 1952, Great Britain successfully tested an atomic device and eventually built a nuclear arsenal that today numbers about 200 weapons. France officially joined the nuclear club in 1960 and built a somewhat larger nuclear arsenal of an estimated 4 2 0 weapons. The People's Republic of China detonated its first atomic device in 1964 and built an arsenal of about 300 nuclear weapons during the Cold War (McGwire 1994). The controlled spread of nuclear w e a p o n s and w e a p o n s technology f r o m the superpowers to key allies is not the only route by which countries might obtain valuable information and materials. Several less d e v e l o p e d countries began secret atomic weapons research and development projects after World War II. As noted earlier, states like India, Pakistan, and Israel pursued clandestine W M D programs because of concerns about security and prestige. In some cases, these efforts were facilitated by covert shipments of material and technology from the great powers, but research and development of W M D systems was also aided by the availability of information in the open scientific literature (and by the resourcefulness of scientists and engineers). W h e n the Indian g o v e r n m e n t detonated its first nuclear e x p l o s i o n in 1974, it symbolically ended the monopoly on nuclear systems held by the great powers. India actually obtained nuclear material for its b o m b by diverting it f r o m a Canadian-supplied nuclear energy reactor that had key components originally m a d e in the United States. Most experts believe that India now possesses a significant stockpile of about fifty unassembled nuclear weapons. The 1974 Indian detonation was, of course, a catalyst for the Pakistani government to step up its research and development program, and

22

CONFLICT A N D SECURITY

today most experts believe that Pakistan has an arsenal of dozens of weapons that could be quickly assembled for use. The test explosions sponsored by both governments in 1998 put the world on notice regarding their capabilities. Finally, Israel may possess as many as 100 nuclear weapons. The Israeli nuclear program was a derivative of research and development projects in the United States and, ironically, the Soviet Union. Like India, the Israeli government proved to be quite resourceful in adapting existing technologies to construct its arsenal (Forsberg, Driscoll, Webb, and Dean 1995). According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, several other countries are considered "high-risk" proliferants. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea have all attempted to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, but they are limited by international supply controls and sanctions. While the government of North Korea signed a framework agreement in 1994 in which it pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, experts believe that North Korea may already have sufficient weapons material for one or more nuclear devices. The governments of Iran and Libya have attempted to develop nuclear weapons, but experts believe that their research and development facilities are quite limited to date. Finally, Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime was well on the way to the development of nuclear weapons prior to the Gulf War. From 1991 to 1998, Iraq's research and development program was dismantled and monitored by the United Nations Special Commission (Jones, McDonough, Dalton, and Koblentz 1998), but Western governments remain concerned about the status of clandestine weapons programs in Iraq today. Finally, there are f o r m e r nuclear states that have m a d e political decisions to give up their w e a p o n s and end research and development efforts. Included in this group are South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and three former Soviet republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. T h e South A f r i c a n government admitted that it had constructed six nuclear devices for self-defense in the 1970s and 1980s. But the government decided to destroy these weapons in 1990—unilaterally removing themselves f r o m the nuclear club. Argentina and Brazil renounced their past efforts to develop nuclear arsenals and have developed a new antinuclear profile for the region. The three f o r m e r Soviet republics had about 3,000 strategic nuclear w e a p o n s stationed on their territory after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Soon after gaining their independence, however, the three republics agreed to become n o n - n u c l e a r w e a p o n s states under the Treaty on the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n of Nuclear Weapons (or Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). In 1992, they signed on to the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), agreeing to transfer all the nuclear warheads on their territory to Russia in exchange for economic assistance f r o m the United States (McGwire 1994). The spread of chemical

and biological weapons.

At least t w e n t y

countries

are suspected to possess chemical and biological weapons, and m a n y have

W E A P O N S PROLIFERATION

23

c h o s e n to d e v e l o p these w e a p o n s t h r o u g h c l a n d e s t i n e routes. Table 2.4 ill u s t r a t e s the r a n g e of actors i n v o l v e d in the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction. WMD terrorism. T h e h o r i z o n t a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n of W M D s y s t e m s raises ano t h e r c o n c e r n a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y at the d a w n of the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y : the use of nuclear, c h e m i c a l , or biological w e a p o n s s y s t e m s in terrorist attacks. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this f e a r w a s realized in 2 0 0 1 with a w a v e of " t o x i c t e r r o r i s m " in the U n i t e d States. T h e s e attacks c a u s e d panic in m a n y industrialized countries and increased public c o n c e r n s about other, potential t h r e a t s such as the use of smallpox or the p l a g u e as a terrorist w e a p o n . A r e c e n t study of d o c u m e n t e d terrorist i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g c h e m i c a l a n d b i o l o g i c a l a g e n t s r e v e a l s that there w e r e 101 cases of s u c h a t t a c k s w o r l d w i d e b e t w e e n 1900 and 1999. A c c o r d i n g to the d a t a b a s e c o m p i l e d by

Table 2.4

C o u n t r i e s Suspected t o Possess C h e m i c a l o r Biological W e a p o n s Capabilities C h e m i c a l Weapons

Biological Weapons

Bulgaria China Egypt France India Iran Iraq 3 Israel Libya M y a n m a r (Burma) North Korea Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia South Korea Syria Taiwan United K i n g d o m United States Vietnam

China Iran Iraq" Israel Libya North Korea Syria Taiwan

Sources/ E. J. Hogendoorn, " A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1997): 3 5 - 3 9 ; "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Arms Control Today (October 1992): 4 4 ^ 5 ; Randall Forsberg, William Driscoll, Gregory Webb, and Jonathan Dean, The Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, M A : Institute for D e f e n s e and D i s a r m a m e n t Studies, 1995). Note: a. Since the end of the Gulf War, the United Nations Special C o m m i s s i o n ( U N S C O M ) has destroyed more than 4.8 million liters of Iraqi chemical agents and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals.

24

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, chemical or biological attacks have accounted for a total of 103 Natalities and 5 , 5 5 4 injuries in the past century. Although two-thirds of all documented incidents occurred outside the United States, some of the more infamous attacks were closer to home. In 1984, for example, followers of the Rajneeshee cult contaminated restaurant salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, with salmonella bacteria, sickening 7 5 0 people for several days. Somewhat surprisingly, the attack was intended not to kill innocent victims but rather to keep voters at home in order to influence the outcome of a local election (Tucker 2 0 0 0 ) . Many experts believe that the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, material, and know-how has increased the likelihood that a group or state will attempt an act of nuclear terrorism in the future. This is of particular concern given the chaos and instability surrounding the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, and there have been numerous reports of attempts to buy or steal nuclear warheads in that region. In January 1991, armed Azeri rebels in Azerbaijan penetrated a Soviet base on which tactical nuclear weapons were stored and gained physical access to a nuclear warhead for a short period before being ejected by Soviet troops. Later that year, a nuclear expert from Greenpeace conducted a secret investigation to see how easily one might buy a Soviet nuclear device on the black market. With very little effort he found a group of disgruntled Russian soldiers willing to sell a Soviet nuclear warhead for $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , but he quickly reneged on the deal and revealed this news to international regulatory authorities (Hersh 1994). The emergence of fifteen newly independent states in the region with very porous borders also increased the likelihood that nuclear materials and know-how would be smuggled out of the country. In Germany, for example, hundreds of arrests were made in connection with attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In October 1992, two containers of radioactive material were discovered by the police in Frankfurt containing amounts of cesium and strontium misappropriated from scientific or medical establishments in the former Soviet Union. While these materials would not be sufficient to construct a traditional nuclear device, experts highlight such cases to show that the construction of "radiological devices" (smaller quantities of radioactive material used with conventional explosives) would be much more plausible. Even low-grade radioactive material such as cesium-137, commonly used in hospital x-rays, would be useful as a basis for a radiological terrorist device. Meanwhile, nuclear scientists in the former Soviet republics (who earn an average monthly salary of $ 3 0 in defunct research facilities) may have been lured to less developed states like Iran to work in budding nuclear research programs by the promise of high wages and social status. All of these factors suggest that the threat of W M D terrorism has indeed increased in the post-Cold War era, although experts are quick to add that

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

25

there have been only a few, isolated cases in which attempts to s m u g g l e sign i f i c a n t w e a p o n s - g r a d e material h a v e been identified ( F o r s b e r g , Driscoll, W e b b , and Dean 1995).

• GLOBAL SOLUTIONS? The Nonproliferation

Regime

Proliferation is a very c o m p l e x and multilayered c h a l l e n g e to international security. M a n y world leaders and e x p e r t s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d this threat and h a v e addressed the proliferation c h a l l e n g e through a series of regional and global initiatives. T h e scope, n u m b e r , and m o m e n t u m of these n o n p r o l i f e r ation initiatives h a v e steadily increased o v e r the past f e w d e c a d e s , but it should be noted that m a n y skeptics question the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of these e f forts in the p o s t - C o l d War era. In s o m e ways, the g l o b a l n u c l e a r n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t b e g a n even b e f o r e the first use of a t o m i c w e a p o n s in 1945. P o l i t i c i a n s , m i l i t a r y leaders, and scientists involved in the M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t r e c o g n i z e d f r o m the outset that such w e a p o n s w e r e special and m o r e d a n g e r o u s than other s y s t e m s . President H a r r y T r u m a n , w h o had o r d e r e d the u s e of a t o m i c b o m b s o v e r H i r o s h i m a and N a g a s a k i , a u t h o r i z e d his a m b a s s a d o r to the United N a t i o n s , B e r n a r d B a r u c h , to deliver a p r o p o s a l to the o r g a n i z a t i o n calling f o r all n u c l e a r m a t e r i a l s and t e c h n o l o g y to be p l a c e d u n d e r U N o v e r s i g h t . W h i l e the plan did not r e c e i v e w i d e s p r e a d s u p p o r t , it d e m o n strated a first step t o w a r d g l o b a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r o l i f e r a t i o n p r o b l e m s and set the stage for later progress on the issue. In the 1960s, world leaders agreed to new initiatives, including the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. T h i s a g r e e m e n t b a n n e d n u c l e a r tests in the atm o s p h e r e , in outer space, and under water, and it was originally signed by leaders f r o m the Soviet U n i o n , Great Britain, and the U n i t e d States. In 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of N u c l e a r W e a p o n s in Latin A m e r i c a created a large n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e . S i g n a t o r i e s to this treaty p l e d g e d to use nuclear facilities only for p e a c e f u l purposes. Most important, the treaty outlawed the testing or acquisition of nuclear w e a p o n s in the region and even precluded third parties f r o m bringing w e a p o n s to the region (Davis 1991). The Non-Proliferation Treaty. T h e N P T represented one of the most significant advances in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the global n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n r e g i m e . T h e N P T was an a g r e e m e n t to halt the spread of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s b e y o n d the five declared nuclear p o w e r s . First o p e n e d for signature in 1968, the treaty had ambitious goals for both vertical and horizontal proliferation. Article I of the treaty dictated that n o nuclear w e a p o n s state (defined by the treaty as

26

C O N F L I C T A N D SECURITY

a state that detonated a n u c l e a r explosive prior to 1967) would transfer "directly or indirectly" nuclear w e a p o n s , explosive devices, or control over these w e a p o n s to another party. Article II stipulated that no n o n - n u c l e a r weapons state could receive, m a n u f a c t u r e , obtain assistance for manufacturing, or othe r w i s e try to a c q u i r e n u c l e a r w e a p o n r y . A n o t h e r significant e l e m e n t of the treaty was Article VI, which obligated all nuclear states to pursue the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear w e a p o n s and completing a treaty on general disa r m a m e n t under strict and effective international control. In m a n y ways, the N P T represented the crowning achievement of global nonproliferation efforts during the Cold War. Related nonproliferation initiatives. Several other significant a g r e e m e n t s have f o l l o w e d in the spirit of the N P T . T h e B i o l o g i c a l W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n of 1972 w a s the f i r s t f o r m a l e f f o r t to g a i n s o m e control o v e r the w o r l d ' s deadly biological arsenal. M o r e than 140 countries have agreed to ban "the d e v e l o p m e n t , p r o d u c t i o n and s t o c k p i l i n g of m i c r o b i a l or o t h e r b i o l o g i c a l a g e n t s . " T h e c o n v e n t i o n , h o w e v e r , did not sanction nonsignatories and did not p r e c l u d e r e s e a r c h on b i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s ( D a v i s 1991). In the s a m e spirit, w o r l d l e a d e r s e n g a g e d in years of n e g o t i a t i o n to d r a f t a C h e m i c a l W e a p o n s C o n v e n t i o n ( C W C ) , w h i c h w a s o p e n e d for signature in J a n u a r y 1993. This treaty c o m m i t t e d all signatories to eliminate their stockpiles of c h e m i c a l w e a p o n r y and to halt all d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s . In a d d i t i o n , it inc l u d e d a set of verification p r o c e d u r e s s o m e w h a t m o r e stringent than those u n d e r the NPT. T h e s e p r o c e d u r e s s u p p o r t e d the rights of a n e w C W C inspectorate to c o n d u c t r i g o r o u s investigations and surprise " c h a l l e n g e ins p e c t i o n s " of s u s p e c t e d c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s p r o g r a m s in s i g n a t o r y states. Ratification by the legislatures of sixty-five countries in the system was required f o r the C W C to c o m e into f o r c e . A f t e r a great deal of d e b a t e about the implications of the treaty f o r U.S. national security and sovereignty, the U.S. C o n g r e s s finally ratified the a g r e e m e n t in 1997. In 1972, the U n i t e d States and the Soviet U n i o n n e g o t i a t e d their first t w o m a j o r arms control treaties, the b e g i n n i n g of an important period of improved relations b e t w e e n the s u p e r p o w e r s once locked in a bitter Cold War. T h e Strategic A r m s Limitation Treaty (SALT I) called for limits on the n u m ber of n u c l e a r l a u n c h p l a t f o r m s i n c l u d i n g missiles and strategic b o m b e r s . T h e Anti-Ballistic Missile ( A B M ) Treaty limited each s u p e r p o w e r to the dep l o y m e n t of d e f e n s i v e , g r o u n d - b a s e d antimissile systems at only t w o sites (later r e d u c e d to one). A c c o r d i n g to Article 5 of the treaty, each party pledged "not to d e v e l o p , test, or deploy A B M systems or c o m p o n e n t s which are s e a - b a s e d , s p a c e - b a s e d , o r m o b i l e l a n d - b a s e d " b e y o n d a l l o w e d limits. A l t h o u g h the A B M T r e a t y w a s of u n l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n , either side had the right to w i t h d r a w f r o m the a g r e e m e n t by giving six-months notice. Both the S A L T and A B M treaties p a v e d the way f o r f u r t h e r bilateral a g r e e m e n t s to control and reduce the n u m b e r s of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s in the 1970s and 1980s.

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

27

In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), another nonproliferation initiative, was opened for signature. A large majority of UN member states voted to support the CTBT (a treaty that would eliminate all actual nuclear testing), but to become international law the treaty required the signature of all forty-four countries known to possess nuclear reactors. By early 1998, representatives of the five declared nuclear powers had all signed the CTBT and delivered the treaty for ratification by their legislatures. A series of problems has blocked further progress on the CTBT, however. The governments of both India and Pakistan have refused to sign the treaty. India has claimed that it wants the CTBT to be stronger in order to force nuclear states' compliance with Article VI of the NPT, and the Pakistani government has stated that it would not sign the CTBT without Indian cooperation. Their nuclear tests of May 1998 underscored their resistance to this latest initiative of the nonproliferation regime. Several other states also remain reluctant to sign the treaty, including Libya, Cuba, and Syria. In October 1999, the U.S. Senate engaged in heated debates over the ratification of the CTBT, verification procedures, problems with nonsignatories, and the national security implications of the agreement. In a move that stunned the world, the Senate rejected the treaty, and the Bush administration has shown no inclination to renew consideration of the CTBT. » Controlling Weapons at the Point of Supply Given serious concerns about the implications of the spread of WMD technology around the world, governments have also devoted attention to controlling weapons transfers at the point of supply. The NPT, for example, did not prevent states from exporting "peaceful" nuclear energy reactors and other types of materials that could potentially be adapted for use in the development of WMD programs. To address such concerns, major supplier states—including the Soviet Union, Japan, France, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and Canada—agreed in 1976 to establish a "trigger list" of items that could be sold to other countries only under stringent safeguards. Representatives of these states met in London, and this "London Club" established and coordinated a supply control group. In the 1980s, supplier states established the Missile Technology Control Regime, which prohibited the transfer of essential technology for the development of ballistic missile systems. Like the NPT, however, supply control efforts have had only a mixed rate of success. They helped limit missile development projects under way in South America and the Middle East but allowed some twenty countries to join the ballistic missile club. These supply controls did not prevent Iraq from making significant progress toward the development of nuclear weapons through the modification of civilian scientific technology that was

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

28

adapted for military use. And they did not prevent Iraq from manufacturing and modifying the Scud-B missiles that were used against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War—and that were capable of carrying chemical warheads. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed its own ballistic missile, the Hatf, and acquired about thirty nuclear-capable medium-range M - l l missiles from China (McNaugher 1990). In 2002 the North Korean government continues to develop a long-range Taepo Dong missile that may someday have the potential to reach the continental United States. On the conventional weapons front, there is growing recognition that arms transfers—even "small arms" like guns and antitank weapons—represent a fundamental threat to international security. Security experts and government leaders have been discussing ways to increase the transparency of the conventional arms trade by making more information available on arms transfer policies and data. In 2001, the United Nations estimated that there were more than 500 million small arms in the world, 4 0 - 6 0 percent of which have been acquired illegally through black markets (Crossette 2001; Klare 1999). The small arms trade fuels civil wars in developing countries, empowers organized crime, and enables terrible human rights violations. Taliban control of Afghanistan, for example, was maintained largely by a combination of the force of will, fundamentalist religious beliefs, and small arms. In summer 2001, the United Nations sponsored its first conference on the small arms trade, with the expressed intention of controlling weapons at the point of supply. Diplomats at the conference spoke of heartfelt concern about the weapons trade and its impact on the lives of civilians in war-torn developing countries. Representatives from 170 nations reached consensus on a treaty to combat illegal small arms trafficking on July 21, 2001, but many returned home from the summit with mixed feelings about the final agreement. During the deliberations the United States had threatened to block international consensus on the treaty if language to restrict civilian gun ownership and limit U.S. government efforts to supply small arms to nonstate actors had been left in the deal. The governments of China, India, and Russia also expressed serious reservations about limitations on arms transfers. After eleventh-hour negotiations, diplomats agreed to a watereddown version of the small arms trade treaty that would make some important statements about this area of proliferation.

The Missile Defense

Controversy

U.S. government leaders have expressed concerns about weapons proliferation for decades, but presidents have developed markedly different approaches to the problem over time. President Truman, troubled by the implications of the decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan at the end of

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

29

World War II, s u p p o r t e d the B a r u c h Plan f o r the t r a n s f e r of n u c l e a r techn o l o g y to U N control. P r e s i d e n t J o h n F. K e n n e d y h e l p e d d r a f t the Partial N u c l e a r Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet U n i o n soon a f t e r the C u b a n Missile Crisis. P r e s i d e n t R i c h a r d N i x o n led U.S. n e g o t i a t i o n s with the Soviet U n i o n that established the first m a j o r a r m s control treaties b e t w e e n the sup e r p o w e r s , S A L T I and the A B M Treaty. In 1977, President J i m m y Carter p r o c l a i m e d that o n e of his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s goals w o u l d be the elimination of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s f r o m the f a c e of the earth. R o n a l d R e a g a n , elected p r e s i d e n t in 1980, b r o u g h t a new p e r s p e c t i v e to the c h a l l e n g e of p r o l i f e r a t i o n . H e w a s quite c o n c e r n e d by the f r a g i l i t y of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e with the S o v i e t U n i o n ( w h i c h he t e r m e d the " E v i l E m p i r e " ) and consulted with advisers about alternative strategies. D r a w i n g on scientific and military advice, R e a g a n a n n o u n c e d in M a r c h 1983 that he w a s o r d e r i n g "a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and intensive e f f o r t to d e f i n e a l o n g - t e r m research and d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear m i s s i l e s " ( M i c h a l a k 2001). Specifically, the g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d f u n d an intensive p r o g r a m to d e v e l o p a s p a c e - b a s e d missile d e f e n s e shield, k n o w n as the Strategic D e f e n s e Initiative (SDI, or as it c o m m o n l y b e c a m e k n o w n , " S t a r Wars"). W h i l e there was c o n s i d e r a b l e debate about the scientific feasibility of SDI, critics were m o s t vocal a b o u t the legal i m p l i c a t i o n s of c h a l l e n g i n g the A B M Treaty with the Soviet Union. Attention to SDI research w a s diverted, however, by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet U n i o n . In the 1990s, the Clinton administration devoted f e w resources and little enthusiasm to research and d e v e l o p m e n t of such a system. Yet the issue was not dead. During the 2 0 0 0 presidential election c a m paign, R e p u b l i c a n candidate G e o r g e W. Bush p r o c l a i m e d that the d e v e l o p ment of a h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y national missile d e f e n s e ( N M D ) system w o u l d be a c e n t e r p i e c e of his national security policy p l a t f o r m . T h i s quickly bec a m e a controversial new dimension of the proliferation challenge in 2001. T h o s e w h o supported a r e n e w e d U.S. effort to d e v e l o p an N M D system believed that the United States f a c e d new threats of missile a t t a c k — n o t f r o m Russia or other f o r m e r Soviet r e p u b l i c s — b u t more likely f r o m the actions of a terrorist group, a " r o g u e state" like North Korea, or an accidental launch by larger n u c l e a r p o w e r s . In this sense, N M D w a s a r e s p o n s e to the c o n temporary proliferation challenge. Supporters argued that a missile d e f e n s e shield would provide protection as well as deterrence against the possibility of attack. T h e plan to d e v e l o p land-, sea-, and s p a c e - b a s e d s y s t e m s w o u l d have significant implications f o r U.S. security in the twenty-first century. F u r t h e r m o r e , P r e s i d e n t G e o r g e W. B u s h and key a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i cials c o n t e n d e d that the A B M T r e a t y w o u l d not, and s h o u l d not, restrict U.S. research and d e v e l o p m e n t initiatives. T h e y argued that the 1972 treaty

30

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

was o u t m o d e d b e c a u s e the Soviet U n i o n and the Cold War had p a s s e d into history and were supplanted by m o r e diverse and unpredictable threats f r o m terrorist g r o u p s and r o g u e n a t i o n s . N M D w o u l d be d e s i g n e d p u r e l y as a d e f e n s i v e shield, they c l a i m e d , a n d s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e not c o n c e r n f o r e i g n governments. H o w e v e r , U.S. plans to d e v e l o p N M D d r e w heated o p p o s i t i o n both at h o m e and abroad. Critics launched a series of challenges to the initiative including q u e s t i o n s about the scientific feasibility of the p r o g r a m , the threat of violation of the A B M Treaty, and destabilization of relations b e t w e e n the United States and other m a j o r nuclear p o w e r s Russia and C h i n a ( N e w h o u s e 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e U.S. m i l i t a r y c o n d u c t e d several f a i l e d tests of an i n t e r c e p t o r r o c k e t s y s t e m d e s i g n e d to s h o o t d o w n a d u m m y m i s s i l e in f l i g h t , raising q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the s c i e n t i f i c p l a u s i b i l i t y of e v e n the m o s t b a s i c c o m p o n e n t s of N M D . S e c o n d , o p p o n e n t s w a r n e d that if the U n i t e d States proc e e d e d with d e v e l o p m e n t and field testing of N M D systems, it w o u l d violate the A B M T r e a t y and u n d e r m i n e the g l o b a l n o r m of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n . E v e n f o r m e r president J i m m y Carter s p o k e publicly against B u s h a d m i n i s tration plans to a b r o g a t e the treaty. S o m e of the m o s t v o c a l o p p o n e n t s of the U.S. p r o g r a m w e r e f o r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t s , w h o g r e w c o n c e r n e d about the militarization of space and the instability N M D m i g h t c a u s e in the international order. E u r o p e a n allies exp r e s s e d s k e p t i c i s m a b o u t B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a n s in 2 0 0 1 and s o u g h t r e a s s u r a n c e f r o m the new p r e s i d e n t r e g a r d i n g the U.S. c o m m i t m e n t to cooperative security a r r a n g e m e n t s . M e a n w h i l e , the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t chara c t e r i z e d the A B M T r e a t y as the " c o r n e r s t o n e of n u c l e a r a r m s c o n t r o l . " President V l a d i m i r Putin publicly w a r n e d that if the United States unilaterally a b a n d o n e d the treaty, R u s s i a w o u l d c o n s i d e r three d e c a d e s of a r m s control treaties null and void and w o u l d build a new generation of multiplew a r h e a d m i s s i l e s . C h i n a t o o k a s i m i l a r stand on the matter. O n July 16, 2 0 0 1 , P r e s i d e n t Putin a n d J i a n g Z e m i n , the p r e s i d e n t of C h i n a , s i g n e d a f r i e n d s h i p and c o o p e r a t i o n treaty that included joint s t a t e m e n t s of o p p o s i tion to U.S. d e f e n s e policy initiatives including missile d e f e n s e . In the w a k e of the events of S e p t e m b e r 11, 2001, however, the d y n a m ics of this controversy a p p e a r e d to change. President Bush has signaled his intention to m o v e f o r w a r d with N M D by proposing a four-year, $8.3 billion research budget for the system. O n D e c e m b e r 13, 2001, Bush announced that the United States w o u l d unilaterally w i t h d r a w f r o m the 1972 A B M Treaty within six m o n t h s . A l t h o u g h President Putin called the decision to a b a n d o n the treaty a mistake, he did pledge to maintain relations and to negotiate f u r ther reductions of nuclear arsenals. On M a y 24, 2002, Bush and Putin signed a treaty to r e d u c e the n u m b e r of strategic n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s held by e a c h country to between 1,700 and 2,200 in ten years, and they hailed this achievement as the beginning of a n e w strategic partnership. On a parallel track, the

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Pentagon began construction of ground-based facilities in Alaska for a missile defense shield in the spring of 2002 (including a command center, radar stations, and silos for the new interceptor rockets). The U.S. military also conducted another successful test of an interceptor designed to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles and planned more tests of elements of the original SDI program that might be incorporated into the new NMD. Plans for testing these systems run from 2002 to 2012.

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CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?

The proliferation of weapons is truly a major challenge to global security, but significant initiatives have been undertaken to respond to the challenge. One of the most important catalysts of global proliferation was the Cold War arms race between the superpowers. As a new decade unfolds, many scholars and politicians are taking a new look at incentives for proliferation in the post-Cold War era, and optimists say that we may be headed toward a nuclear-free twenty-first century. They argue that a global build-down in tensions—a reverse proliferation—has occurred with the end of the Cold War standoff. They cite the completion of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) between the United States and the Soviet Union in January 1991, the START II agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals to 3,500 warheads each, and surprising recent agreements between Bush and Putin as evidence of progress toward a minimal nuclear deterrent relationship. Pessimists warn, however, that many arms control initiatives are doomed to failure in the realities of a proliferating world. New and complex debates have emerged about whether defense and deterrence represent a more effective, pragmatic response to the spread of weapons technology. Strategists suggest that preparedness for a rogue state nuclear launch at the United States or a concentrated toxic terrorist attack would be the best use of government resources. The September 11 attacks and subsequent international developments appear to have bolstered this pessimistic vision, and the current war on terrorism seems to be one definitive answer to the question of how to respond to proliferation threats. Furthermore, many key officials in the Bush administration view international nonproliferation agreements with a jaded eye. U.S. government opposition to the C T B T and verification regime initiatives for the Biological Weapons Convention, combined with support for ballistic missile defense, all suggest a new attitude toward proliferation. Regardless of one's stand in this debate, it is clear that new solutions to the proliferation challenge might be found in the twenty-first century. Citizens of the world could agree to build on the momentum of past progress by making moral and principled stands against proliferation. For instance,

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Oscar Arias, the 1987 recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, has called for a global agreement to stop arms sales to countries that have violated human rights. Others call for strengthening the small arms trade control agreement and ratification of the CTBT. These certainly would be important steps in a global effort to address ethical and moral concerns about weapons proliferation. Furthermore, moral stands against proliferation in favor of economic development, health care, and education may pave the way toward increasing peace and justice for many regions of the world in the twentyfirst century.

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. In your opinion, which of the four types of proliferation represents the most serious threat to international security? 2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons a challenge that the global community can ever fully meet? Why or why not? 3. Is it possible that weapons proliferation could actually make the international system more stable in the twenty-first century? How might this occur? 4. What are some of the efforts that individual countries and international organizations have made to respond to the proliferation challenge? Which are most effective, and why? 5. What are some of the implications of the trade-off between expenditures on defense and social welfare programs? Can countries afford to enjoy a "peace dividend" in the post-Cold War era by diverting large sums from defense expenditures to other needs? Can they afford not to? 6. What can governments do to confront threats of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction? How have recent international developments changed the definition of the Type IV proliferation threat? Why? 7. Should the United States develop a ballistic missile defense system? What are the scientific debates regarding the feasibility of such a system? 8. In your opinion, should government leaders offer to pursue complete W M D disarmament? Why or why not?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Bailey, Kathleen C. (1993) Strengthening Westview Press.

Nuclear

Non-Proliferation.

Boulder, C O :

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Jones, Rodney W., Mark G. McDonough, Toby F. Dalton, and Gregory D. Koblentz (1998) Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Karp, Aaron (1994) "The Arms Trade Revolution: The M a j o r Impact of Small Arms," Washington Quarterly 17 (autumn). Mendelsohn, Jack (2001) "Is Arms Control D e a d ? " Issues in Science and Technology 17, no. 3 (spring). Michalak, Stanley (2001) A Primer in Power Politics. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc. Moodie, Michael (1995) "Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Diffusion," Washington Quarterly 18 (spring). Perkovich, George (1999) India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: W. W. Norton. Tucker, Jonathan B. (2000) Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Cambridge, MA: M I T Press.

3 NATIONALISM John K. Cox

Nationalism is a complicated and widespread phenomenon in modern politics and cultures. At its most basic level, it is a sense of identity felt by individuals and groups. This sense of belonging links the individual to a group of people on the basis of certain shared characteristics. Most important among these are a common language, a common history, and common customs or cultural traditions (sometimes including religion). When this sense of identity becomes a political force, as it usually does, it generally justifies independence for the national group. This quest for political independence, often called "self-determination," is based on the perceived right of every nation, or people, to rule itself. Theoretically, this means that all the various countries, or states, of the world would become "nation-states" (independent countries composed of members of a single national group), once their populations have nationalist feelings. Making the borders of countries and nations congruent, however, is a very complicated procedure, since most empires and countries have historically contained many different ethnic or national groups and have been based on dynasties or religion or conquest or other factors instead of nationalism. Thus, only a small fraction of the world's countries today are true nation-states, although this process has moved further in Europe, where it began, than in other parts of the globe.

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TYPES OF NATIONALISM

It is helpful to categorize types of nationalism according to defining concepts: What is a nation? Who belongs to it? And who is an outsider? In general, nationalism is broken down into two types. 35

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Civic Nationalism The first, and oldest, type was initially associated with Western European or North American politics and with countries elsewhere that followed them. It is usually called " c i v i c , " or political, nationalism, and it is seen above all as a "legal-political c o n c e p t , " or as a "political c o n f i g u r a t i o n " (Bojtar 1988: 254). Although there are competing theories regarding the origin of civic nationalism, it is Napoleon Bonaparte, who ruled France after the French Revolution ( f r o m 1799 to 1815) who is usually credited with introducing this modern concept of nationalism. As the great French novelist Andre Malraux pointed out, Napoleon convinced the French that France existed as a coherent whole, that is, he brought the diverse people of this geographic region to identify with one another and the state. Playing on this c o m m o n identity b e c a m e the source of much of his popularity and power; and tapping into this modern identity became a political technique (as well as a cultural achievement) that was then much copied in the rest of Europe, at least after the massive wars unleashed by Napoleon had subsided. This new national feeling went far beyond simple patriotism, which is the love of o n e ' s h o m e l a n d or h o m e region. Patriotism has been a part of human behavior since the beginning of history. But it was a rather narrow idea compared to the more inclusive civic, or modern, nationalism. These revolutions are thus important milestones on the path to democracy, since they resulted in breaking the stranglehold on political power of the kings and aristocrats who had governed up to this time. Still, the muchheralded civic nationalism can also be exclusive. For instance, the U.S. Constitution was designed in the 1780s to deny women and slaves the right to vote. It was only after the Civil War that African American men were officially given the right to vote (the Fifteeth A m e n d m e n t ) , and in many states this right was not protected by meaningful enforcement of laws until the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, almost 100 years later. Women were denied the right to vote almost everywhere until the twentieth century; in the United States, this right was provided by the Nineteenth A m e n d m e n t in 1920. In theory, though, civic nationalism a s s u m e s that citizenship and nationality are identical (Liebich, Warner, and Dragovic 1995: 186). T h e nation is a political population, united in its ideas and habits. Most scholars w h o deal with nationalism—historians, political scientists, sociologists, and, increasingly, psychologists—believe that the growth of nationalism is a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of modernization. Generally m o d ernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy, and secularization. This was as true of European history in the nineteenth century as it was of the decolonizing w o r l d — m o s t l y Africa and A s i a — i n the twentieth. Therefore, the growth of nationalism involves two processes: its

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appearance in people's minds as a sense of identity, belonging, and loyalty; and its growth (or cultivation) into a political force, which ultimately works to create a sovereign state. One of the most modern aspects of nationalism is that differences in socioeconomic status (class) are minimized; often religion is de-emphasized, too, and sometimes so is race. This creates a bigger and more powerful body of subjects or citizens; in positive manifestations of nationalism, this " p e o p l e , " or nation, will e m b r a c e cultural diversity and try to rule itself by increasing civil liberties and democratic voting procedures. Ethnic

Nationalism

The other type of nationalism, "ethnic" nationalism, was originally associated with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. This nationalism is based on "ancestral association" (Bojtar 1988: 254) as c o m p a r e d to civic nationalism, which can embrace diverse people who live within shared borders. Ethnic nationalism requires a c o m m o n culture, way of life, and above all a perceived sense of genetic links (as in a greatly extended family) among the members of the ethnic community. The word ethnic comes from the Greek word ethnos meaning a group of people united by their c o m m o n birth or descent. It should be noted that all types of nationalism are in some way exclusionary. If nothing else, this is true because of the presence of borders and frontiers. But ethnic nationalism, due to its e m p h a s i s on the "blood line" or racial connections among citizens, is far more exclusionary than civic nationalism and pays less attention to political boundaries. The historical differences between these types of nationalism are great and remain relevant to this day. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be better understood by remembering that many Serbs and Croats adhere to the exclusive nationalism of the second category (see the case study on Yugoslavia on p. 44). W h y ? Because the more inclusive civic nationalism of Western Europe developed in the spirit of certain key turning points in European civilization, such as the Enlightenment and the growth of middleclass democracy. Western European nationalism arose in societies that were already modernizing, while the peoples of Eastern Europe were neither independent nor economically modern. In short, Eastern Europe became nationally conscious before it had experienced e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , representative g o v e r n m e n t , and political unity (or in m a n y cases even independence f r o m foreign rule). A central result was the desire to alter the political boundaries to coincide with national or cultural boundaries (Sugar and Lederer 1994: 10; Kohn 1965: 2 9 - 3 0 ) ; another result was to embrace a greater sense of exclusivity in determining w h o was " i n " and w h o was "out" of the nation.

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CONFLICT AND SECURITY THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Despite the differences between civic and ethnic nationalism, both concepts have much in common. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, both lead to a sense of belonging and eventually the desire for political independence. Both have tended to foster "popular sovereignty," or democracy; and both have been used by leaders to galvanize support for the state (as opposed to a monarchy, in which the people were merely "subjects" instead of "citizens"). During the nineteenth century, more and more European political leaders were starting to make use of the great political power of nationalism. Nationalism appealed to many with its symbolism of national unity and mission. Skeptics and detractors of the movement, however, had strong arguments against it. Leaders of Europe's many multinational states (the United Kingdom, Russia, the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires), the nobility, many leaders of the Roman Catholic church, and Marxists, all for different reasons, opposed nationalism. Despite this diverse and often intense opposition, the twentieth century began with what most people regard as the triumph—or, as some would say, the running amok—of the national idea. The great powers of Europe, such as Britain, Germany, Russia, and France, became imperialistic and sought to ratchet up their power considerably, both in Europe and abroad. The result was World War I (1914-1918), in which massive armies and new military technology combined with the propaganda of national glory and the vilification of the enemy to create a new level of battlefield fury and destructiveness. The Great War, as it is also called, was the first total war involving horrific new violence using poison gas, tank assaults, long-range and high-powered artillery, submarine warfare, the use of flamethrowers and machine guns, and the bombardment of civilian population centers. There is another important connection between the Great War and nationalism: The number of nation-states in Europe was greatly expanded as a result of the peace treaties at its conclusion. The old multinational empires of Europe collapsed (except for the United Kingdom). In their place arose a set of what diplomats endorsed at the time as nation-states, f r o m Finland in the north to Turkey in the south. These included Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Austria as well as two small confederations of related peoples—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The study of nationalism is growing increasingly sophisticated. Some scholars are now examining the role of territory and geography in creating psychological identity and loyalty to the state, while others view nationalism as a kind of expanded male-dominated hierarchy (also known as patriarchy),

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which extends men's control over women, especially in the areas of work and sexuality. A recent addition to the analytical concepts used to understand nationalism is "nested identities," a framework for studying the way individual people can maintain and prioritize various kinds of identities relating to various parts of their lives.

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FUNCTIONS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism functions in five ways. First, there is the matter of identification, whereby individuals consider themselves, especially since the advent of industrialization and its processes of urbanization and secularization, to be part of a nontraditional mass group, the "nation." Second, governments since the time of Napoleon have used nationalism as a means to mobilize military and economic power and to further their own legitimacy. Third, nationalism can function as a centrifugal force when it breaks up bigger countries (or empires) into smaller ones. This occurred in many European countries after World War I. It also took place in a massive way in the British Empire after World War II when India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, and other former colonies became independent. Then in the 1990s, it occurred again in the breakups of Czechoslovakia (into the separate Czech and Slovak republics) and Yugoslavia (into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro). Canada and Spain are two countries experiencing the centrifugal effects of separatist nationalism today: the Frenchspeaking Quebecois in Canada and the Catalonians and Basques in Spain. The recent civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) is another important example of different national groups competing for power and gradually crippling the power of the central government. Nationalism can also work in a fourth way, as a centripetal force, when it unites various people into new nation-states, such as occurred in the long and bloody unification struggles of the Germans and Italians in the nineteenth century or in the Vietnam War in the twentieth century. Fifth, nationalism can serve as a form of resistance, especially to colonial intruders. In Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, this has often been a kind of state-run, top-down nationalism that aims at organizing more meaningful resistance to actual or potential invaders. Sometimes this top-down nationalism is called "reform nationalism" (Breuilly 1993: 9). In Turkey after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk launched a highly successful plan of economic and political modernization based on this kind of government-led reform nationalism. Cuba under Fidel Castro fits this definition as well. Another kind of resistance to colonialism takes the form of wars of independence (sometimes called national liberation struggles). Important examples of this kind of national struggle include the Vietnam War and the

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Algerian war of independence (1954-1962). Peripheral nationalism is a related phrase used to describe the impetus given to national groups that are emerging from a centrally run empire that is collapsing; geopolitical concerns are important here, since local leaders must step into a power vacuum and create structures of governance that are both effective and recognized as legitimate by the population.

• NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM As discussed earlier, nationalism can be an individual's sense of identity, a political allegiance, and a force for military and political change. Arising from these different levels of meaning are various negative effects of nationalism. Many of the conflicts in the world today originate in national disputes. A quick glance over the headlines shows warfare, ethnic conflicts, or genocide in Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Indonesia, Canada, South Africa, Macedonia, Cyprus, Israel, and Ireland. One can discuss these negative, conflict-producing effects of nationalism in terms of the following categories: imperialism, the glorification of the state, the creation of enemies, the overlap with religion, discrimination against minorities, and competing rights.

Imperialism Self-confidence and group assertiveness, integral aspects of nationalism, can lead to arrogance or aggressiveness. Imperialism, which is the projection of a country's power beyond its borders to achieve the subjugation or exploitation of another country, is as old as history itself. But it takes on greater intensity when it meets with a sense of national unity and purpose. The "scramble for Africa" of the late nineteenth century, when many European states collaborated in literally carving up and occupying most of the continent, is a breathtaking example of arrogant imperialism imbued with a purported civilizing mission, or "white man's burden," which justified the exploitation of other races. Carried to a much greater extreme, nationalism can end in genocide, as it did in the wildly homicidal policies of Adolf Hitler in the Third Reich, who sought to rid the world of Jews in order to make it "safe" for Germans.

Glorification of the State Although many early nationalists, especially in the nineteenth century, believed that the nation-state was a vehicle of progress and liberty for all human beings, not all nationalist thought is connected with individual freedom. Indeed, nationalism often encourages antidemocratic practices. When

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a " p e o p l e , " or n a t i o n , f e e l s t h r e a t e n e d by n e i g h b o r s , o r w h e n it h a s a history o f u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t o r d i v i s i o n , p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s c a n m a k e the c a s e f o r an a u t h o r i t a r i a n ( a n t i d e m o c r a t i c ) g o v e r n m e n t . S o m e t i m e s , in the case of f a s c i s t g o v e r n m e n t s , w h i c h are e x t r e m e l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n a n d s t r e s s a n t i i n d i v i d u a l i s m , racial or national h o m o g e n e i t y , s c a p e g o a t i n g , and m i l i t a r i s m , the s t a t e or its l e a d e r c o m e s to be r e g a r d e d as t h e u l t i m a t e e x p r e s s i o n of the p e o p l e ' s c h a r a c t e r a n d a m b i t i o n s ( P a y n e 1995; W e b e r 1964). L o y a l t y to g o v e r n m e n t s like these is e x t r e m e l y d a n g e r o u s ; d e m o c r a c y is s h o r t c h a n g e d at h o m e and f o r e i g n policy is o f t e n a g g r e s s i v e .

Creation of Enemies A n o t h e r n e g a t i v e e f f e c t of n a t i o n a l i s m can take place at the m o s t basic level of s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . W h e n p e o p l e i d e n t i f y with o n e g r o u p , they o f t e n dev e l o p m i s t r u s t f u l or hostile f e e l i n g s a b o u t p e o p l e o u t s i d e that g r o u p . E v e n n e i g h b o r i n g states with a great deal in c o m m o n can c o m e to m i s t r u s t e a c h other, as in the c a s e of the recent f i s h i n g c o n t r o v e r s i e s b e t w e e n the U n i t e d States and C a n a d a . Similarly, c o u n t r i e s with c o m m o n political interests and s i m i l a r e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s — s u c h as the U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n — c a n d e v e l o p d e e p m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s b a s e d largely on national f e e l i n g .

Overlap with Religion In s o m e c o n f l i c t s , such as t h o s e in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , the M i d d l e East, and B o s n i a , n a t i o n a l i s m and r e l i g i o n c r o s s p a t h s in a d e s t r u c t i v e w a y . In t h e c u r r e n t t h r e e - w a y s t r u g g l e in B o s n i a , b e t w e e n m o s t l y O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n S e r b s , R o m a n C a t h o l i c Croats, and B o s n i a n M u s l i m s , religion f a c t o r s h e a v ily. A d d i n g a r e l i g i o u s d i m e n s i o n to n a t i o n a l i s m can i n t e n s i f y d i v i s i v e f e e l ings; f o r i n s t a n c e , it can s a n c t i o n k i l l i n g — o r d y i n g — f o r a c a u s e . T h u s , it can m a k e n a t i o n a l i s t s m o r e f a n a t i c a l and c o n f l i c t s b l o o d i e r ( L a n d r e s 1996).

Discrimination Against Minorities O t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s arise w h e n states or c o u n t r i e s a r e a c t u a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d on n a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . S u c h p r i n c i p l e s h o l d that o n l y m e m b e r s of a g i v e n national or e t h n i c g r o u p h a v e the right to live in the n e w n a t i o n a l state. O f t e n a related p r i n c i p l e t e n d s to hold a lot of w e i g h t a l s o — f o r e x a m p l e , the belief that o n l y m e m b e r s of a p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c g r o u p s h o u l d e n j o y t h e f u l l b e n e f i t s of c i t i z e n s h i p . T h i s c r e a t e s a p r o b l e m f o r m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . M a j o r e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e the H u n g a r i a n s in R o m a n i a a n d S l o v a k i a ; the R u s s i a n s in the f o r m e r S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s ( n o w i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s ) of E s t o n i a , L a t v i a , and L i t h u a n i a ; a n d , until the c r e a t i o n of the Irish R e p u b l i c , the Irish in the United Kingdom.

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CONFLICT AND SECURITY Competing Rights

A n o t h e r n e g a t i v e a s p e c t of n a t i o n a l i s m lies in the c o m p e t i n g rights and c l a i m s that states m a k e against o n e another. T h r e e k i n d s are d e r i v e d f r o m or h a v e a m a j o r impact on ethnic and minority questions. T h e first involves historic rights. T h e s e include c l a i m s by one national g r o u p to a certain p i e c e of territory b a s e d on historical p r e c e d e n t . In o t h e r w o r d s , w h o was t h e r e first? T h i s issue is hotly d e b a t e d in T r a n s y l v a n i a , a large portion of w e s t e r n R o m a n i a that has a substantial H u n g a r i a n p o p u l a t i o n . In B o s n i a , the c o m p e t i n g parties of Serbs, B o s n i a n M u s l i m s , and C r o a t s h a v e each tried to p r o v e that they c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e to the r e g i o n ' s cultural heritage and, h a v i n g set the t o n e for the r e g i o n ' s culture, d e s e r v e to m o l d the reg i o n ' s political f u t u r e now. Next are ethnic rights, w h i c h address the question of w h o is currently in the m a j o r i t y in a given region. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y setting—determined by p o p u l a t i o n c o u n t s , polls, and votes of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n (such as in the Austrian p r o v i n c e of Carinthia and in the P o l i s h - G e r m a n region of Silesia just after World War I)—is the decisive factor, not the c o m p l i c a t e d historical record of settlements, assimilation, i m m i g r a t i o n , and emigration. T h e final claim can be referred to as strategic rights. S o m e t i m e s a state will claim a piece of territory simply because it needs that territory in order to be viable. This usually m e a n s the land is necessary f o r the c o u n t r y ' s defense or basic e c o n o m i c well-being. For example, after World War I the victorious Allies g a v e the new state of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a the Sudetenland region, even though it was heavily populated with G e r m a n s . This was d o n e to provide the fledgling republic with a m o r e m o u n t a i n o u s , d e f e n s i b l e border. Unfortunately, the Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler would later attack Czechoslovakia both diplomatically and militarily to " l i b e r a t e " the G e r m a n s of that region, w h o , he claimed, were being denied their right to self-determination.

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CHALLENGES T O NATIONALISM

Historically n a t i o n a l i s m has been o p p o s e d by m a n y f o r c e s . In addition to the c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n in E u r o p e , E u r o p e a n i m p e r i a l i s t p o w e r s in A f r i c a — e s p e c i a l l y the United K i n g d o m , France, B e l g i u m , and P o r t u g a l — resisted the g r o w t h of n a t i o n a l i s m in their colonies. T h e y did this d e s p i t e b e i n g m o r e or less n a t i o n - s t a t e s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s is b e c a u s e n a t i o n a l i s m a m o n g c o l o n i z e d p e o p l e s p r e s e n t e d a direct c h a l l e n g e to E u r o p e a n d o m i nation and exploitation. I will n o w e x a m i n e the f o u r m a i n challenges to the nation-state. O n e of these c h a l l e n g e s is inherent in the ideal of n a t i o n a l i s m itself. This is the p r o b l e m of carrying the principle of self-determination through to its logical

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conclusions; if one national group deserves its own country and independ e n c e , then do not all groups deserve these things too? But countries are destabilized when every ethnic group within them agitates for its independence. And sometimes so-called microstates are created that are too small to be economically viable and that swell the m e m b e r s h i p of the United Nations and affect voting patterns there. For instance, the Pacific island country of Kiribati has about one-eighth as many people as the Canadian city of Toronto; likewise, the c o m b i n e d populations of thirty-eight microstates total only about a third of that of California (Rourke 1995: 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 ) . A related issue is devolution, or the decentralization of power in ethnically mixed countries. This usually does not result in the b r e a k u p of the country. The United K i n g d o m continues to experiment with this principle by giving more and more autonomy to its Welsh and Scottish regions. Belg i u m has also achieved a balance, based on this principle, between its Flemish and Walloon populations. Russia is faced with this issue early in the twenty-first century in many autonomous regions and districts. Second is the issue of supranational groupings of various kinds. At the height of the era of decolonization, some Arab and African countries tried to establish political leagues that cooperated on a wide variety of issues. In 2 0 0 2 there are regional political and e c o n o m i c groupings on every continent. But in Europe, the blossoming of the European Union seems to herald an age of ever greater integration of nations. The United Nations, of course, while generally respecting the sovereignty of all countries, is the best example of a global group above the national level. Other c o n t e m p o r a r y examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the C o m m o n Market of the South (Mercosur); both are regional free trade groups in the Western Hemisphere. Third, modern economic developments are also undermining the nationstate. The influence of multinational corporations, the obsession with free trade, and the appearance of a global, computer-driven, mass market economy are breaking down barriers among populations and eroding the sovereignty of smaller, less developed nations. This trend is analyzed in detail in Benjamin Barber's Jihad vs. McWorld (1996), where a grim picture is painted of an increasingly standardized, shallow world culture dominated by a few, nearly all-powerful, marketing agents and producers of consumer goods. In the 2000s the concept of national identity, and even to some degree the concept of nation-states, is in flux. The prevalence of computer-driven communication on the Internet and the World Wide Web affects society in many ways. From shopping to political discussions to dating networks, geography and distance are suddenly rendered virtually inconsequential by computers. The much-heralded "global village" of travel and c o m m u n i c a tion has to some extent arrived, although its effects will likely never be as graciously positive and progressive as the gurus of technology predicted a

44

CONFLICT AND SECURITY

few decades ago. Computer culture has developed rapidly along with the general economic shift in the world's most developed countries (such as Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Japan) into service-based economies (in contrast to economies based on the production of industrial goods). Many important changes in thought and attitudes go along with these technological and economic shifts. Service economies are oriented toward individual consumption, and the Internet means that individuals can have a maximum of self-fulfillment with a minimum of real contact with other citizens. This can reduce the sense of group loyalty so important in nationalism. Finally, the world is also witnessing a revival of conservative religious activity. This is most prominent in the Muslim world, but it is also present in other religions. Politically speaking, it is the new Islamism (sometimes called "Muslim fundamentalism") that most affects international politics, because it rejects capitalism and the decadence of Western culture as manifestations of a new imperialism. Since much, although by no means all, of the Muslim world consists of states that are ethnically and linguistically Arab, there is added potential for cooperation that transcends political boundaries. The supranational nature of the terrorism of Islamist extremists was evident in the deadly attacks on the United States in September 2001, in which terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries joined together—probably with the support of other governments such as the Taliban in Afghanistan—to strike a blow for an agenda involving issues in Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and many other countries both inside and outside the Middle East. The following two case studies illustrate current national conflicts in various parts of the world. They give us an idea of how national issues mix with other kinds of problems to create major crises.

•

CASE STUDY ONE: YUGOSLAVIA

The region of southeastern Europe known as the Balkans provides numerous intriguing case studies of nationalism at work. One of the characteristics of the region is the prevalence of ethnic, or cultural, nationalism rather than civic, or political, nationalism. Another is the highly diversified nature of its population. In many areas of the Balkans numerous ethnic or national groups live closely together; groups often intermingle and sometimes occupy the ancestral homelands of their neighbors. Two of the most mixed of these areas are Bosnia and Macedonia, both of which were part of the former Yugoslavia. A third major characteristic of Balkan societies is a long history of foreign rule. Various empires, from the Ottoman and Habsburg to the Russian

NATIONALISM

45

a n d S o v i e t , h a v e d o m i n a t e d the r e g i o n , p r e v e n t i n g the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of B a l k a n peoples. T h e t w o m a i n p e o p l e s within the multinational state of Y u g o s l a v i a w e r e the S e r b s and C r o a t s . It w a s their c o n f l i c t i n g national a s p i r a t i o n s — s t r e n g t h e n e d and m a d e p o i s o n o u s , m a n y w o u l d say, by their l e a d e r s — t h a t provided the i m p e t u s for the b r e a k u p of the country in 1 9 9 1 1992. T h e t e r m Yugoslavia m e a n s s i m p l y " l a n d of the S o u t h S l a v s . " T h e c o u n t r y w a s c r e a t e d in 1918 as a kind of c a t c h - a l l state f o r a n u m b e r of small nationalities, including several that had been part of e m p i r e s that collapsed in World War I. T h u s , the term Yugoslav did not c o r r e s p o n d to any g e n u i n e national or ethnic group; it was a matter of c i t i z e n s h i p only (civic n a t i o n a l i s m ) , e x c e p t for a small n u m b e r of idealists or p e o p l e w h o w e r e part of m i x e d families created by m a r r i a g e s b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l g r o u p s . T h e n u m b e r of Yugoslav c i t i z e n s w h o i d e n t i f i e d with Yugoslav n a t i o n a l i t y (as o p p o s e d to the o l d e r c a t e g o r i e s of S e r b , C r o a t , etc.) never surpassed 10 percent, although it was highest in Bosnia and Vojv o d i n a (a p r o v i n c e of northern Serbia), w h e r e old c o m m u n i t i e s of varying nationalities lived in the closest p r o x i m i t y to each other. D u r i n g its existence, the c o u n t r y — f i r s t u n d e r the authoritarian rule of the Serbian royal family and then a f t e r World War II under the f i r m hand of the C o m m u n i s t military leader J o s i p B r o z ( k n o w n as T i t o ) — w a s d i v i d e d into p r o v i n c e s or " r e p u b l i c s " that reflected its chief national groups: Serbs, Croats, B o s n i a n M u s l i m s , S l o v e n e s , and others. T h e r e were also large and important minority g r o u p s , especially A l b a n i a n s in the southern regions. Rivalries among the various South Slavic national groups have been comm o n , as they are a m o n g almost all neighboring peoples. But the frequently used journalistic phrases "ancient ethnic hatreds" and "long-smoldering ethnic f e u d s " are not accurate. W h i l e the M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n rivalry in the B a l k a n s h a d been a p r o b l e m since the M i d d l e A g e s in B o s n i a , the a n i m o s i t i e s bet w e e n Serbs and Croats b e c a m e acute only during World War II. A f t e r the N a z i s and their allies c a r v e d up Yugoslavia in 1941, p u p p e t states in both Croatia and Serbia e m e r g e d (see Figure 3.1). Both countries, but especially Croatia, sought to e x p a n d their territory and to h o m o g e n i z e their p o p u l a t i o n at the e x p e n s e of their n e i g h b o r s and m i n o r i t i e s . F u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i n g the situation w a s the n a t u r e of Yugoslav r e s i s t a n c e to the N a z i s , w h i c h w a s led by the C o m m u n i s t s u n d e r Tito but w h i c h i n c l u d e d o t h e r rival political groups. Tito's p o s t - W o r l d War II g o v e r n m e n t sought to stabilize the c o u n t r y ' s n a t i o n a l g r o u p s by o n e - p a r t y rule and by a d e c e n t r a l i z e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H o w e v e r , in the early 1990s Yugoslavia began to break apart w h e n Slovenia, Croatia, and B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a sought and won their i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h u s , the e f f o r t to create a single c o u n t r y ( b a s e d on civic n a t i o n a l i s m ) a m o n g d i s p a r a t e ethnic g r o u p s f a i l e d . U n r e s t in B o s n i a c o n t i n u e s , and in

46

CONFLICT A N D SECURITY

Figure 3.1 Yugoslavia and Its Successor States

Since Sonn e: R e p r i n t e d f r o m W a y n e C. M c W i l l i a m s a n d H a r r y P i o t r o w s k i , The World 1945: A History of International Relations. 5th e d . ( B o u l d e r , C O : L y n n e R i e n n e r , 2 0 0 1 ) . © Copyright 2001 Lynne Rienner Publishers. Note: S e r b i a , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d K o s o v o c o n s t i t u t e w h a t r e m a i n s of Y u g o s l a v i a as of 2 0 0 2 .

1999 the United States led its NATO allies into war with Serbia over Slobodan M i l o s e v i c ' s "ethnic c l e a n s i n g " of the Albanians in the province of Kosovo. In some ways, Tito may have made the national situation worse. Still, it is impossible to attribute the b r e a k u p of the country to any one cause. Nationalism played a part, as did economic problems, the ambitions of current leaders, and the failure of the Communists to allow or promote a pluralistic civil society that could have taught deeper loyalties to the central government and the Yugoslav ideal. Doubtless the map and distribution of population affected the way the country fell apart, too. The Serbs were always the dominant group, both numerically and politically, in Yugoslavia. But at 36 percent of the population, they did not form a majority in the 1980s. Other groups, especially the Croats, were numerically strong enough to challenge them; the smaller Slovene population wielded considerable economic power, and Tito favored

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47

other small groups such as the B o s n i a n M u s l i m s and M a c e d o n i a n s , whom he viewed as brakes on potential Serbian dominance. Furthermore, o f the country's 8 million Serbs, almost 25 percent o f them lived outside the borders o f S e r b i a , mostly in B o s n i a and Croatia. T h i s meant that when those two countries began to move away from the rest o f Yugoslavia in 1 9 9 1 , nationalists in Serbia were aroused to war to try to keep the country together. As imperfect as Serbs thought Tito's Yugoslavia had been, at least all their people had lived in one country for the first time since the fourteenth century and they did not need to fear a repeat o f Croatian violence as seen in the 1940s. T h e ethnic drama continues to unfold in the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a as troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) continue to o c cupy both K o s o v o and M a c e d o n i a in an effort to stop the killing. K o s o v o , the A l b a n i a n - d o m i n a t e d southern province o f S e r b i a , b e c a m e an international protectorate as did M a c e d o n i a , referred to as the Former Yugoslav P r o v i n c e o f M a c e d o n i a . T h e latter is threatened by its minority A l b a n i a n population and their f e l l o w A l b a n i a n s in K o s o v o . At the same time that these efforts are taking p l a c e , S l o b o d a n M i l o s e v i c , the recently defeated president o f Yugoslavia, has been extradited to T h e Hague, Netherlands, to stand trial for g e n o c i d e , c r i m e s against humanity, and war c r i m e s . S e e Chapter 4 on human rights for more about these charges.

•

CASE STUDY T W O : THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

T h e contemporary troubles between Arabs and Israelis form the main, but not only, crisis in the Middle East. T h i s c o n f l i c t centers on possession o f the territory known as Palestine, which is important in both a religious and a historical sense to both Arabs and J e w s . S i n c e the diaspora (forcible dispersion) o f R o m a n times, most J e w s have lived outside this ancestral homeland. Arabs were the majority, though not the only, population group in Palestine during the intervening centuries. During World War I, the British, who were also cooperating with the Arabs, issued the B a l f o u r Declaration in support o f a Jewish state there. In 1 9 4 8 , when Palestine was partitioned and the state o f Israel was created (see Figure 3 . 2 ) , hundreds o f thousands o f Arabs were displaced. As a result, many M u s l i m states have, at least until recently, refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. Wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out in 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 5 6 , 1 9 6 7 , and 1 9 7 3 . Although Israel won all the wars, the situation remained volatile in large part because o f the Cold War. T h e S o v i e t Union supported Arab states, while the United States aided the Israelis. In 1 9 6 4 , the P a l e s tine Liberation Organization ( P L O ) was formed. L e d by Yasir Arafat, the P L O has operated as a refugee organization, a g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e , and a

Figure 3.2 T h e E x p a n s i o n of Israel

Extent of Israel as proposed under the UN partition plan for the establishment of a Jewish state, 1947.

Beirut/ Damascus +

Occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949 in excess of the UN-recommended partition plan. mm [ill

SYRIA

Territories occupied by Israel in June 1967. The Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt by 1982.

Height*

i

West Bank

Tel Aviv

;*

•

Amman

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Gaza Strip Jerusalem

JORDAN

* Cairo

\ ; '

"Palestine" claimed by World Zionist Organization 1919

S A U D I ARABIA

Source: Reprinted from Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski. The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2001). © Copyright 2001 Lynne Rienner Publishers.

NATIONALISM

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terrorist group; today it has b e e n granted partial state p o w e r in several reg i o n s in and around Israel. In addition to the territorial, r e l i g i o u s , and l i n g u i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the A r a b s and the Israelis, o t h e r f a c t o r s have c o m b i n e d to m a k e the n a t i o n a l i s m o f the c o n f l i c t i n g parties m o r e i n t e n s e . S o m e J e w s b e g a n to t a k e an a c t i v e interest in returning to t h e i r traditional h o m e l a n d in the 1 8 9 0 s , due to increasing a n t i - S e m i t i s m in E u r o p e . T h e m o v e m e n t known as Z i o n i s m p r o c l a i m e d the J e w i s h p e o p l e a nation with territorial c l a i m s to P a l e s t i n e and not j u s t a religion. In the 1 9 4 0 s , the terrors o f the H o l o c a u s t g a v e added impetus to J e w i s h e m i g r a t i o n . O n the A r a b side, the issues i n v o l v e m o r e than j u s t the fate o f the P a l e s t i n i a n A r a b s ; m a n y A r a b s v i e w Israel as an outpost o f Western imper i a l i s m . L o n g dominated by foreign p o w e r s , the A r a b s have revealed " f r u s tration over past and present w e a k n e s s " (von L a u e 1 9 8 7 : 3 5 0 ) . S i n c e World W a r II. the A r a b countries have c o o p e r a t e d in various international b o d i e s d e s i g n e d to f o s t e r unity and c o m m o n p u r p o s e . T h e s e i n c l u d e the A r a b L e a g u e ( s i n c e 1 9 4 5 ) , the Organization o f A r a b Petroleum E x p o r t i n g C o u n tries, or O A P E C ( s i n c e 1 9 6 0 ) , and the short-lived U n i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c , a fusion o f E g y p t and S y r i a . In the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , the p e a c e p r o c e s s in the M i d d l e East began m a k i n g s i g n i f i c a n t progress. T h e Israeli g o v e r n m e n t was finally r e c o g n i z e d by the P L O , Egypt, Jordan, and other key M u s l i m states. And with this recognition o f I s r a e l ' s right to exist, the Israeli g o v e r n m e n t s o f Y i t z h a k R a b i n ( a s s a s s i nated in 1 9 9 5 ) and, later, Ehud B a r a k were able to push ahead with a " l a n d f o r - p e a c e " deal with Yasir Arafat o f the P L O . Yet tragedy struck in 2 0 0 0 . A s Israeli withdrawals from disputed territory in the West B a n k were starting and A r a f a t ' s Palestinian Authority was a s s u m i n g m o r e a u t o n o m o u s g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s , a s e c o n d intifada, or uprising (the first was in 1 9 8 7 ) , broke out. T h e v i o l e n c e — s u i c i d e b o m b i n g s and shootings carried out by radicals from the unofficial Palestinian groups I s l a m i c J i h a d and H a m a s — e s c a l a t e d as the Israeli military responded with increasing f o r c e . B y 2 0 0 2 , the level o f b l o o d s h e d was continuing to mount, and many outside o b s e r v e r s doubted w h e t h e r Arafat retained the ability to c o n t r o l radical f a c t i o n s a m o n g his p e o p l e . A r a f a t supporters say that the Israelis and their A m e r i c a n allies have d e m a n d e d t o o m u c h o f Arafat without giving him c o n c e s s i o n s to raise the P a l e s t i n i a n s ' c o n f i d e n c e in I s r a e l ' s g o o d intentions. T h e p e a c e p r o c e s s at the time o f this writing might, sadly, b e e f f e c t i v e l y sabotaged. L i k e the Y u g o s l a v c a s e , n a t i o n a l i s m has m i x e d with o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s such as p o p u l a t i o n and C o l d W a r rivalry. G i v e n the c o m p l e x i t y o f this situation, it is no wonder that the main actors, even with the a s s i s t a n c e o f the international c o m m u n i t y , have not b e e n able to s o l v e the Palestinian issue.

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CONCLUSION

As mentioned, nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces in the world over the past 200 years. It operates in various ways on individuals, social groups, and governments. Nationalism can build states or destroy them; it can provide individuals or organizations with identity, motivation, and justification for their actions. Although it is true that nationalism provides important links between people and can give them a common purpose (as in patriotism), nationalism also causes conflicts and can be used to justify aggression and feelings of superiority. Thus, it has a very mixed reputation in terms of its positive and negative effects. While most people regard nationalism as an inevitable companion to social modernization, there are some signs that the usefulness or relevance of nationalism may be on the wane.

•

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Which of the functions of nationalism do you think is the most important, and why? 2. What are some of the negative aspects of nationalism? Which do you think is the most dangerous or immoral? 3. Why do some countries have civic nationalism and others ethnic nationalism? 4. Which of the two types of nationalism is most prevalent in the United States? 5. Do you think nationalism will be replaced by other allegiances in the next few decades?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Breuilly, John (1993) Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Coté, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. (1997) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Eley, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. (1996) Becoming National: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. Geenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hechter, Michael (2000) Containing Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric (1992) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (1996) Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press. , eds. (2000) Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. New York: Routledge. Kecmanovic, Dusan (1996) The Mass Psychology of Ethnonationalism. New York: Plenum. Liebich, André, Daniel Warner, and Jasna Dragovic, eds. (1995) Citizenship East and West. London: Kegan Paul International. Sugar, Peter F., and Ivo John Lederer, eds. (1994) Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Teich, Mikulas, and Roy Porter, eds. (1993) The National Question in Europe in Historical Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles, ed. (1975) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

4 THE C H A N G I N G FACE OF GLOBAL H U M A N RIGHTS D. Neil Snarr

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). There were no votes against the document, but eight countries abstained while fortyeight voted in its favor. Since that time the UN has approved well over 200 documents that elaborate and expand these rights (such agreements are often referred to as conventions, treaties, or covenants). Since their inception human rights issues have received tremendous attention. As one member of the U.S. House of Representatives and student of human rights has put it, "The defense of internationally recognized human rights has become the most universally accepted moral standard in the world today. Across the ideological spectrum, from the far left to the far right, there is agreement that the one unifying spiritual ideal in modern society is the enhancement and enforcement of human rights" (Drinan 1987: vii). This chapter looks at these rights, the controversies that surround them, the efforts to support them, the many forces that inhibit their realization, and some specific case studies.

•

THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Declarations and agreements that contain historic steps toward the 1948 UDHR are numerous. Such documents as the British Magna Carta (1215), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791) are just a few of these contributions. Late in the nineteenth century slave trade was outlawed and early in the twentieth century slavery itself was outlawed. Later, humanitarian considerations in the conduct of war were agreed upon, and the treatment of workers, prisoners.

53

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C O N F L I C T A N D SECURITY

and women were the subject of international agreements. The events that immediately preceded the establishment of the UN and the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, were World War II and the genocide against Jews and other groups in Europe. Because of these indescribable horrors, the world community founded the UN in the hopes of avoiding such wars and violations of human rights in the future.

•

W H A T ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?

What are human rights? One UN document refers to them as "inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family" (UN 1988: 4). According to one scholar, The very term human rights indicates both their nature and their sources: they are the rights that o n e has simply b e c a u s e one is h u m a n . T h e y are held by all h u m a n beings, irrespective of any rights or duties one m a y (or may not) have as citizens, m e m b e r s of families, workers, or parts of any public or private organization or association. In the language of the 1948 declaration, they are universal rights. (Donnelly 1993: 19)

How do human rights come into existence? Discussions of human rights generally start in the UN General Assembly, where they are debated, given public scrutiny, and voted on. Passage of human rights conventions in the General Assembly is the easy part; it only takes a majority vote. After the General Assembly approves these conventions, they are opened for signatures by member states; and after a designated number of countries have ratified them, they are said to "come into effect." It often takes many years for this to happen. After conventions come into effect, the agreeing countries are expected to pass laws, if they do not have such laws, that will ensure their observance and enforcement. Eventually, it is hoped, all countries will approve such human rights laws and they will become international law. I will discuss the problems of enforcing these rights later in this chapter.

•

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

What rights have been identified as human rights? One way to approach this question is to divide the U D H R of 1948 into three generations, or classes. These three generations have different origins and represent different views of human rights. Since the 1948 covenant was approved these rights have been expanded and elaborated, but they still can serve as a place to initiate a discussion. The U D H R includes thirty articles and the first,

G L O B A L H U M A N RIGHTS

55

introductory, article d e c l a r e s that " A l l h u m a n b e i n g s are b o r n free and equal in d i g n i t y and rights. T h e y are e n d o w e d w i t h reason and c o n s c i e n c e and s h o u l d act t o w a r d o n e another in a spirit o f b r o t h e r h o o d . " F o l l o w i n g this s t a t e m e n t are the first g e n e r a t i o n o f rights, o f t e n referred to as civil

and political

(or f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n r i g h t s ) ; t h e y are c o n -

tained in A r t i c l e s 2 through 21 o f the U D H R . T h e y f o c u s o n the rights o f the i n d i v i d u a l and e m p h a s i z e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t s to refrain f r o m unjustly interfering in the l i v e s o f their c i t i z e n s . T h e y are as f o l l o w s : 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, nonself-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal projection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 8. E v e r y o n e has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. 10. E v e r y o n e is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal o f f e n c e has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed. 12. N o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 13. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t and residence within the borders of each state.

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CONFLICT A N D SECURITY (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. 16. (1) Men and w o m e n of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes f r e e d o m to change his religion or belief, and f r e e d o m , either alone or in c o m m u n i t y with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. . . . 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

O r i g i n a t i n g in s e v e n t e e n t h - a n d e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y W e s t e r n i d e a s , t h e s e r i g h t s f o u n d e x p r e s s i o n in t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of F r a n c e , B r i t a i n , a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f t e n v i e w s t h e s e as c i v i l r i g h t s , w h i c h t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t equates with h u m a n rights. T h e s e rights were s u p p l e m e n t e d by the International C o v e n a n t on Civil and Political Rights, which clarify and e x p a n d t h e m . T h e c o v e n a n t w a s o p e n f o r s i g n a t u r e s in 1 9 6 6 , b u t it t o o k u n t i l 1 9 7 6 to a c q u i r e t h e t h i r t y - f i v e s i g n a t o r i e s r e q u i r e d t o i m p l e m e n t t h e c o n v e n t i o n . E v e n w i t h t h e s t r o n g s u p p o r t of U . S . p r e s i d e n t J i m m y C a r t e r in t h e late 1 9 7 0 s , t h e c o v e n a n t w a s n o t r a t i f i e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s u n t i l

G L O B A L H U M A N RIGHTS

57

1 9 9 2 . It has b e e n this first g e n e r a t i o n o f h u m a n rights that h a s r e c e i v e d the m o s t a t t e n t i o n and s e e n the m o s t s u c c e s s ( e v e n t h o u g h d u r i n g the C o l d War there w a s v e r y little p r o g r e s s ) . T h e s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n o f h u m a n rights is referred to as social nomic

and

eco-

rights. C o n t a i n e d in A r t i c l e s 2 2 t h r o u g h 2 6 o f the U D H R , t h e y s t e m

f r o m the W e s t e r n s o c i a l i s t tradition. T o s o m e d e g r e e t h e y h a v e d e v e l o p e d in r e s p o n s e to w h a t are c o n s i d e r e d to b e the e x c e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f the first g e n e r a t i o n o f rights and the i m p a c t o f W e s t e r n c a p i t a l i s m and i m p e r i a l i s m . T h e y f o c u s o n s o c i a l e q u a l i t y and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the g o v e r n m e n t to its c i t i z e n s . T h e y are as f o l l o w s : 22. E v e r y o n e , as a m e m b e r of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national efforts and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free d e v e l o p m e n t of his personality. 23. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to work, to f r e e c h o i c e of e m p l o y ment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against u n e m p l o y m e n t . (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) E v e r y o n e who w o r k s has the right to just and f a v o r a b l e remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of h u m a n dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other m e a n s of social protection. (4) E v e r y o n e has the right to f o r m and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 24. E v e r y o n e has the right to rest and leisure, including r e a s o n a b l e limitation of w o r k i n g hours and periodic holidays with pay. 25. (1) E v e r y o n e has the right to a standard of living a d e q u a t e for the health and w e l l - b e i n g of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of u n e m p l o y m e n t , sickness, disability, w i d o w h o o d , old age and other lack of livelihood in c i r c u m s t a n c e s beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, w h e t h e r born in or out of w e d l o c k , shall e n j o y the s a m e social protection. 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be m a d e generally available and h i g h e r education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. (2) E d u c a t i o n shall be directed to the full d e v e l o p m e n t of the h u m a n personality and to the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of respect for h u m a n rights and f u n d a m e n t a l f r e e d o m s . It shall p r o m o t e und e r s t a n d i n g , tolerance and f r i e n d s h i p a m o n g all nations, racial or religious g r o u p s , and shall f u r t h e r the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

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CONFLICT AND SECURITY (3) Parents h a v e a prior right to c h o o s e the kind of education that shall be g i v e n to their children.

R a t h e r than protecting the citizen f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t as the first generation does, these rights necessitate a p r o a c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t acting on behalf of its citizens. T h e y establish an a c c e p t a b l e standard of living for all—that is, a m i n i m a l level of equality. T h e third g e n e r a t i o n of rights is r e f e r r e d to as solidarity rights since their r e a l i z a t i o n r e q u i r e s the c o o p e r a t i o n of all c o u n t r i e s . It c l a i m s rights f o r those that w e r e latecomers to the industrialization that swept the Weste r n c o u n t r i e s . T h e y are the p e o p l e of the S o u t h , or the third w o r l d , m a n y of w h o m until the past f o r t y y e a r s lived u n d e r the b u r d e n of c o l o n i a l i s m and were not r e p r e s e n t e d at the U N w h e n the U D H R was a p p r o v e d . T h e y constitute 80 percent of the w o r l d ' s population but receive a very small portion of its b e n e f i t s . T h e third g e n e r a t i o n of rights is a hope or even a d e m a n d f o r the g l o b a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t y and w e l l - b e i n g . T h e s e g e n e r a l rights are i m p l i e d in A r t i c l e 28: " E v e r y o n e is entitled to a social a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r in w h i c h the rights and f r e e d o m s set f o r t h in this Declaration can be fully realized." T h i s g e n e r a t i o n d o e s not h a v e the status of o t h e r rights and is in the process of being d e v e l o p e d . L a w p r o f e s s o r B u r n s Weston says the f o l l o w ing about t h e m : [ T h e y ] appear s o far to e m b r a c e six c l a i m e d rights. . . . Three of these ref l e c t the e m e r g e n c e o f Third World n a t i o n a l i s m and its d e m a n d for a g l o b a l redistribution of p o w e r , w e a l t h , and other important v a l u e s : the right to p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l , and cultural s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; the right to e c o n o m i c and social d e v e l o p m e n t ; and the right to participate in and b e n e f i t f r o m "the c o m m o n heritage of mankind" (shared earth-space resources; s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , and other i n f o r m a t i o n and progress; and cultural traditions, sites, and m o n u m e n t s ) . The other three third-generation r i g h t s — t h e right to p e a c e , the right to a h e a l t h y and b a l a n c e d e n v i r o n ment, and the right to humanitarian disaster r e l i e f — s u g g e s t the i m p o t e n c e or i n e f f i c i e n c y o f the nation-state in certain critical respects. ( W e s t o n 1992: 1 9 - 2 0 )

As an e x a m p l e of the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the third-generation solidarity rights, the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y a d o p t e d the D e c l a r a t i o n on the Right to D e v e l o p m e n t in D e c e m b e r 1986. A s W i n s t o n L a n g l e y notes, The Declaration c o n f i r m s the v i e w of the international c o m m u n i t y that the right to d e v e l o p m e n t is an i n a l i e n a b l e h u m a n right "by virtue o f w h i c h e v e r y h u m a n p e r s o n and all p e o p l e s are e n t i t l e d to participate in, c o n tribute to and e n j o y e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l , cultural and political d e v e l o p m e n t , in w h i c h all h u m a n rights and f u n d a m e n t a l f r e e d o m s can be f u l l y realized." ( L a n g l e y 1996: 3 6 1 )

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59

Some students of human rights merge the second and third generation of rights; the UN has done this in its Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development. This volume, published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), argues that human rights cannot be realized without human development, and human development cannot be realized without human rights. The final two articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirm the universality of and responsibility for the rights described in Articles 1 - 2 8 : 29. (1) E v e r y o n e has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing the recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

•

THE U N A N D HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION

Tom Farer observes that the UN operates at four levels in supporting human rights (Farer 1992: 232-235). First, it formulates and defines international standards by approving conventions and making declarations. Second, the UN advances human rights by promoting knowledge and providing public support. At the third level, the UN supports human rights by protecting or implementing them. Although the task of directly enforcing human rights is primarily left to the states themselves, the UN does become involved in various means of implementation. During the 1990s and early part of the 2000s, UN enforcement took on new meaning and controversy. The efforts by the UN, often under pressure from the United States and its allies, in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan are examples of this. They include the boycotts of aggressor states, military action, military support for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the protection of refugees. Some of these are controversial extensions of the UN mandate and will provide material for discussions about the role of the UN in the future. Finally, the UN has taken additional steps at enforcement that some consider to be structural

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and economic aspects of human rights issues. This refers to support for the third generation of rights, including economic development for poorer countries as described earlier. Development has taken a great deal of UN resources but does not receive the public attention that more dramatic actions do. Beyond the positive actions that the UN takes in supporting h u m a n rights, there is a great deal of criticism of their inability to do more. Following are some of these criticisms: First, some countries have signed conventions but have m a d e little progress toward instituting them. W h y do countries sign these conventions with no apparent intention to e n f o r c e them? All countries of the world want to appear to other countries and persons as though they treat their citizens justly. Additionally, this interest in being perceived as just and humane to one's citizens can work to encourage the observation of human rights by such governments. Second, some countries, regardless of their human rights record, are reluctant to subject their country to the jurisdiction of such world bodies. T h e United States, which generally has a good human rights record, often fits into this category. It seems that the United States refuses to ratify the Rights of the Child C o n v e n t i o n (see C h a p t e r 11), the f o u n d i n g of the International C r i m i n a l C o u r t , and several other c o n v e n t i o n s b e c a u s e it w a n t s to d e t e r m i n e its o w n law. This is part of the o n g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n about state s o v e r e i g n t y and the UN. In short, a country says that what h a p p e n s within its o w n borders is its business and not the c o n c e r n of other political bodies. A third reason for the failure of these approved human rights agreements is the structure of the UN itself. The UN agencies that are given the responsibilities for enforcement are not sufficiently independent and are not adequately funded. Fourth, and related to some of the above criticisms, the UN is not an independent body or a world government; it is subject to the whims of its members and has no more power or resources than it is given by its m e m bers. For instance, many UN decisions on human rights violations are m a d e in the Security Council with its five powerful permanent m e m b e r s — Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, any of which can veto an action. (The ten nonpermanent members do not have such power.) Thus, any action taken must be approved by all five m e m b e r s , a very d i f f i c u l t task. Another inhibiting factor is the availability of money for UN operations. Several countries are either unable or unwilling to pay their rightful share. Again, the United States comes to mind as it has been behind on its payments by some one billion dollars in recent years. In this case it is not a lack of money but rather political differences in the U.S. Congress o v e r support for UN actions and policies that explains the unpaid bill.

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS •

61

HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS

With all of its problems one cannot speak of human rights without invoking the name of the UN. It is here that human rights issues emerge and major discussions take place. With all of its weaknesses, UN efforts must be seen within the total context of human rights efforts. Because of the centrality of human rights issues in the world (greatly due to the work of the UN), governments and individuals have founded other institutions to supplement this very important work. These groups have taken different forms, received different degrees of approval, and seen varying degrees of success. One non-UN force to enter the human rights arena is the regional human rights structure. The most advanced and effective of these is in Europe and operates under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It was established in 1950 and functions under the European Commission of Human Rights. The commission receives complaints from approximately 4,000 individuals per year. (Many human rights agencies will only receive complaints from governments.) After analysis, this large number is reduced to some forty cases per year. The commission "pursues [these] vigorously, and a majority end with a decision against the state" (Donnelly 1993: 82). Thus, "individual human rights" are realized, even though they may be opposed by the laws of sovereign states. According to human rights advocates, this sophisticated, well-funded, and very successful regional structure is a model for the whole world to emulate. A similar, but much less successful structure exists in the Americas. It includes the seven-member Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Its decisions have often been resisted or ignored by countries of the Americas on the principle that state sovereignty predominates. The commission and court are left with the power of publicity and moral influence, which have been quite limited. Finally, in the 1980s, African states approved the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. It is an interesting document in that, unlike other regional documents, it includes the rights of "peoples," that is, the third-generation, or solidarity, rights. Article 19 states, "All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another." The document does not provide for a human rights court but emphasizes mediation, conciliation, and consensus. A second and very promising human rights development outside of the UN has been the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Since many countries seem to have limited commitment to human rights, NGOs have come to serve the purpose of monitoring human rights violations

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throughout the world. Hundreds of these organizations exist, but again they are m o r e active and successful in areas where general support for human rights already exists. In several countries where human rights have m a d e little headway, the very presence of NGOs is often unsupported, if not prohibited, and their advocates and employees prosecuted. In many parts of the world it is dangerous to work for human rights groups. N G O s take many forms and operate in many different ways. By operating outside of government they are able to monitor the actions of governments and bring pressure on governmental policies. Laurie Wiseberg lists nine areas in which human rights N G O s provide services: (1) information gathering, evaluation, and dissemination; (2) advocacy to stop abuses and secure redress; (3) legal aid, scientific expertise, and humanitarian assistance; (4) national and international lobbying; (5) legislation to incorporate or develop human rights standards; (6) education, conscientization (raising the consciousness of citizens), or empowerment; (7) solidarity building; (8) delivery of services; and, (9) access to the political system (Wiseberg 1992: 73-77). Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International League for Human Rights, Cultural Survival, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Physicians for Human Rights, and many other N G O s provide a variety of human rights services. Although they are somewhat limited in what they can do, they represent one of the most promising avenues for human rights support. The UN has made provisions for these organizations to have an official representation at the UN and at UN-sponsored conferences. G e o f f r e y Robinson, a scholar who has been quite critical of the UN, argues that experts from human rights NGOs should be eligible for appointment to UN committees and commissions: T h e best way forward is to bring non-government organizations (which do most of the real human rights fact-finding) into the appointments process, thereby providing some guarantee that m e m b e r s are true experts in h u m a n rights, rather than experts in d e f e n d i n g governments accused of violating them. (Robinson 2000: 47)

• CURRENT ISSUES RELATED T O HUMAN RIGHTS T h e e m e r g e n c e of human rights on the world's political agenda in recent decades is clearly not without controversy. At every step since the signing of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, there have been delays and denouncements. There is no reason to believe that this will stop. In the sections that follow, I address a few of these controversies and the arguments that surround them.

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The UN Charter guarantees state sovereignty or self-determination and nonintervention; it also states that all individuals, regardless of their citizenship and status, have human rights. These principles are often found to be contradictory. The idea that everyone possesses these rights as found in the UDHR is referred to as universalism. On the other hand, some countries and cultures follow traditions that are considered inconsistent with the UDHR, and they claim exception for their traditions. These governments say they are the final authority in determining what is right for their citizens: they plead state sovereignty, which has been a long-standing global principle for some three centuries. According to these countries, appropriate expectations for human rights are judged against, or relative to, local culture. In other words, certain acts thought by some to violate human rights might be upheld as legitimate cultural or religious practices by others. This view is referred to as relativism or cultural relativism. Two such acts or customs are child brides and female circumcision (see following section). In South Asia young girls are often promised by their families to marry at an early age and without considering the desires of the child. This is generally considered a violation of the child's rights, but it is often defended as a cultural tradition, or relativism. For those who participate in this practice the determining factor would be tradition, not an abstract rule that is considered to apply universally. As the debate proceeds over what rights are universal, most decisions will fall somewhere between these two extremes of universalism, which states that everyone has certain rights regardless of the circumstances, and relativism, which holds to the idea that local customs and culture determine what rights people have. At the same time, however, there is general agreement that such acts as genocide (the killing of a people such as Jews, Gypsies, Hutus, or Tutsis), torture, and summary executions are violations of human rights.

•

Female

Circumcision

Female circumcision (sometimes called female genital mutilation, or F G M ) is a cultural practice that has become a high-profile issue and is defended as a tradition by some and condemned by others as a violation of human rights. This procedure may involve the complete removal of the clitoris and occasionally the removal of some of the inner and outer labia. In its most extreme form—infibulation—almost all of the external genitalia are cut away, the remaining flesh from the outer labia is sewn together, or infibulated, and the girl's legs are bound from ankle to waist for several weeks while scar tissue closes up the vagina almost completely. A small hole, typically about the diameter of a pencil, is left for urination and menstruation (McCarthy 1996: 32).

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Sonn e: Jim Borgman, Cinc innati Enquirer. 19%. Reprinled with special permission of King Features Syndicate. © Copyright King Features Syndicate.

It is e s t i m a t e d that this p r o c e d u r e a f f e c t s s o m e 137 m i l l i o n w o m e n , m o s t l y in A f r i c a . T h e c u l t u r a l r e a s o n s f o r s u p p o r t i n g it are that it m a k e s girls " m a r r i a g e a b l e " ( b e c a u s e it e n s u r e s their virginity) and also d i m i n i s h e s their sex d r i v e s . It is v i e w e d by its p r o p o n e n t s as a cultural p r a c t i c e that is a p e r s o n a l and local m a t t e r that should not be c o n s i d e r e d a h u m a n rights vio l a t i o n . Yet a m a j o r i t y of t h e UN m e m b e r s s a w t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y a n d in 1993, in the D e c l a r a t i o n on t h e E l i m i n a t i o n of V i o l e n c e A g a i n s t W o m e n , Article 2a, c o n d e m n e d p h y s i c a l , s e x u a l , a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l v i o l e n c e o c c u r r i n g in t h e f a m i l y , inc l u d i n g b a t t e r i n g , s e x u a l a b u s e of f e m a l e c h i l d r e n in t h e h o u s e h o l d , dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation, and other traditional p r a c t i c e s h a r m f u l to w o m e n . ( L a n g l e y 1996: 1606)

If it w e r e not f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n of F G M , it is d o u b t f u l that F a u z i y a K a s i n g a , a n a t i v e of Togo, w o u l d h a v e r e c e i v e d a s y l u m in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a f t e r a y e a r in a U . S . p r i s o n . A f t e r c o m i n g to the U n i t e d S t a t e s and a d m i t t i n g to i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s that she did not h a v e a valid p a s s p o r t , it t o o k a y e a r of i n t e n s e legal e f f o r t b e f o r e the U.S. B o a r d of I m m i g r a t i o n A p p e a l s g r a n t e d political a s y l u m to K a s i n g a , r e c o g n i z i n g f e m a l e c i r c u m c i s i o n as a f o r m of p e r s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t w o m e n . T h e r u l i n g s e t s a b i n d i n g p r e c e d e n t f o r all U . S . i m m i g r a t i o n j u d g e s . It also l e a v e s o p e n the

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possibility that w o m e n threatened with this practice may seek asylum in the future (Burstyn 1995: 16). State Sovereignty

and the Question

of

Impunity

State sovereignty is a cornerstone of the present international system. But like so m a n y things in our globalizing world it is being challenged and slowly altered. For instance, at the close of the Gulf War in April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, which permitted the establishment of temporary havens for refugees inside Iraq and without the permission of Iraq. The rationale was that the violent treatment of Kurds (a large ethnic group living in Iraq) by the g o v e r n m e n t of Iraq threatened international peace and security. This clearly contradicts the traditional understanding of state sovereignty. A more recent example was the establishment of tribunals (or courts) to try persons responsible for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. State sovereignty seems to have its corollary in the impunity extended to the heads of state, even those w h o perpetuate massive human rights abuses. Those that have killed tens of thousands and even millions of their own citizens—such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Pol Pot in Cambodia, and Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia—have rarely been held responsible for their crimes. They have not gone unnoticed, but because of the Cold War and the fact that indicting them would confront state sovereignty, they have received limited attention. Yet these kinds of violations have not always been overlooked. Crimes that were labeled crimes against humanity were dealt with after World War II in both Germany and Japan. Those war criminals were tried before tribunals and found guilty. Since then, however, there has been a long lull in much human rights work that lasted f r o m 1946 to 1976, a period that Robinson refers to as "thirty inglorious y e a r s " (Robinson 2000: 37). During that time, the United States supported many governments that were responsible for massive h u m a n rights violations (crimes against humanity) but justified them on the basis of fighting c o m m u n i s m . The USSR did the same thing with different justification—fighting Western imperialism and capitalism. Thus, these men and those w h o supported them and carried out their grisly c o m m a n d s have generally been able to walk away f r o m their crimes with little fear of being held responsible. Often, before leaving their posts as heads of state they would see that legislation was passed that would absolve them and their cohorts of any guilt—they could leave with impunity. A crack in the armor of impunity (exemptions f r o m responsibility for these acts) began to occur with the establishment of "truth commissions" in

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the mid-1970s to investigate some of these massive crimes against humanity. The first one was commissioned in Uganda in 1974 but was disbanded before it was completed. This was followed by twenty additional commissions that had varying degrees of success in exposing crimes. The aims of these truth commissions were fivefold: to discover, clarify, and formally ack n o w l e d g e past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past (Hayner 2001: 2 4 - 3 1 ) . T h e s e reports helped to rekindle the interest in dealing with crimes against humanity as was done in the Nuremberg Trials after World War II. Finally, as mentioned previously, in early 1993 and again in late 1994, two international tribunals were established by the UN Security Council to deal with crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in Central A f r i c a . In the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, some 200,000 people were killed in what was called ethnic cleansing (separating ethnic groups by killing or forced migration), and in R w a n d a , approximately 800,000 were massacred in what appeared to be tribal violence. The timing of these tribunals is especially important since they were established b e f o r e the end of the conflicts and thus constitute a form of early intervention. Also, these tribunals were established based on international law, which supersedes state sovereignty, at least in principle. Observer David Scheffer argues that the UN Security Council establishment of these two tribunals under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter set an important precedent. International humanitarian law can subsequently override domestic jurisdiction (that is, state sovereignty in such matters is challenged). Challenges to state sovereignty have continued. On May 11, 1997, Dusto Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, was found guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal for the F o r m e r Yugoslavia (1CTY) of eleven counts of crimes against humanity. As Robinson notes, "This man will go down in history as the person whose case settled the principles and scope of international criminal law at the end of the twentieth century" (Robinson 2000: 310). But this is not the end; Tadic was an underling, one of thousands who willingly and j o y f u l l y tortured, raped, starved, and killed w h o m e v e r they chose. What will c o m e of those w h o mandated and oversaw these crimes? The case of one leader began to unfold in the late 1990s, that of A u gusto Pinochet, the military dictator w h o had overthrown the democratically elected government of Chile in 1973 and is presumed responsible f o r the disappearance and death of t h o u s a n d s of Chileans. Pinochet granted himself self-amnesty and w a s m a d e senator for life; both circumstances gave him immunity f r o m prosecution in Chile and presumably elsewhere in the world.

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When Pinochet traveled to London for medical treatment in 1998, however, the Spanish government asked that he be extradited to Spain where he would be tried. After Pinochet made several court appearances in London, it was decided that he could be extradited to Spain to face charges. According to Robinson, "The Pinochet Case was momentous because—for the first time—sovereign immunity was not allowed to become sovereign impunity. The great play of sovereignty, with all its pomp and panoply, can now be seen for what it hides: a posturing troupe of human actors, who when off-stage are sometimes prone to rape the chorus" (2000: 374). Ultimately, because of Pinochet's age and health (he is said to have suffered a heart attack), he was permitted to return to Chile, but another door had opened to world justice. The dramatic developments in the Tadic and Pinochet cases are outdone by the more recent case of Slobodan Milosevic, who was defeated as president of Yugoslavia in a national election there in 2000. To the surprise of many, the new Yugoslav government extradited him to stand trial at the ICTY, where he was indicted in 1999 but not arrested. Then in November 2001 he was indicted on charges of crimes against humanity in Croatia in 1991-1992 and Kosovo in 1999 as well as for genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (New York Times 2001). This is a dramatic change on the human rights scene. It is a clear warning to heads of state that just because they occupy a premier position they are not immune from international prosecution if they commit crimes against their own people.

W Human Rights: Western Imperialism? Does the growing influence of human rights on the world scene constitute a form of cultural imperialism? This accusation is heard from several East Asian countries—China, Indonesia, and Singapore among them—who view human rights as a product of Western civilization and not fully applicable to their societies. Although they do not refer to what are considered the more serious violations of human rights—such as murder, slavery, torture, and genocide—as controversial, they do take issue with first-generation rights such as freedom of the press, speech, association, and expression. They argue that they had little input into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that it expresses values they do not necessarily support (Bell 1996). One argument these poorer Asian countries give to support their position is that economic development necessitates at least the temporary suspension of some rights. They say that suspending certain rights will result in a greater good for more persons in the long run, when economic growth is realized. Western supporters of human rights respond that there is little evidence that human rights inhibit economic growth. Some argue that quite

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the opposite is true—that social and political rights may help ensure such economic growth. East Asian countries also argue that Western human rights advocates overlook the negative consequences that the Western emphasis on individual freedom brings. They point to the many social problems that the West, especially the United States, is experiencing. Such problems as drug abuse, crime, declining commitment to the family, homelessness, racism, and general alienation feed this skepticism. These countries feel that the focus on first-generation rights as opposed to second-generation rights is at least partially responsible for Western moral decline. Further, they argue that the unjustifiable U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and close U.S. relationships with and support for many Asian governments that have massively violated human rights are more reasons to be skeptical of Western promotion of human rights (Faison 1997). The recent controversy over human rights in China is directly related to the issue of trade. China has long sought greater access to global markets. For China this opening could come through membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), yet this had been held up for some fifteen years because of China's human rights record. In 1989, the Chinese government broke up a prodemocracy student movement in Tiananmen Square with ruthless disregard for life and was broadly condemned by the West. This was added to the charges that in China arbitrary arrests are common and that the Chinese government disregards several other first-generation rights. Add to these the fact that China is not a democracy and reportedly sells body parts of recently executed prisoners. Should a country with such a human rights record be permitted to benefit from membership in the WTO? For several years, the United States has cosponsored a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva to call for an investigation of China's human rights record. On all occasions China vetoed the resolution. In the late 1990s things began to change. China made some human rights concessions and in 1996 the United States established some conditions under which the resolution would not be reintroduced. China has released many political prisoners and incorporated additional civil and political human rights concepts into its laws. In November 2000 China and the UN did sign a human rights pact. Mary Robinson, the UN high commissioner for human rights, and Chinese vice foreign minister Wang Guangya "signed a memorandum committing China to comply with rights treaties it has already signed and to review some current rights abuses, including its use of labor camps" (New York Times 2000). Whether or not significant human rights changes are taking place in China is still debatable. The question seems to focus on whether human rights changes in China would come about if China were permitted to become a full partner in the global economy or whether the chance of changes

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w o u l d b e g r e a t e r if t h e y w e r e k e p t o u t . A f t e r y e a r s of d e b a t e t h e U n i t e d States and the E u r o p e a n U n i o n agreed that p e r m i t t i n g C h i n a to join the W T O w a s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t h i n g t o d o , a n d in l a t e 2 0 0 1 that h a p p e n e d . O n l y t i m e w i l l tell h o w this d e c i s i o n will p l a y o u t .

•

CONCLUSION

H u m a n r i g h t s h a v e b e c o m e an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l l a n d s c a p e a n d , if p r e s e n t t r e n d s c o n t i n u e , will b e c o m e e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e f u t u r e . T h i s t r e n d , h o w e v e r , w i l l n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t i n u e . T h e t e r r o r i s m t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e x p e r i e n c e d in S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 c o u l d a l t e r t h i s t r a j e c t o r y as c o u l d t h e r e s p o n s e to that t e r r o r i s m . If t h e t e r r o r i s m c o n t i n u e s , it c o u l d d i s r u p t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n e s s e n t i a l to i n c r e a s e d h u m a n r i g h t s . S i m i l a r l y , if in its r e s p o n s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i s r e g a r d s t h e l e g a l p r o c e s s e s e s s e n t i a l to t h e r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h i s w o u l d a l s o i m p e d e h u m a n r i g h t s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e p o s t - S e p t e m b e r 11 p e r i o d p r e s e n t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l t a k e p l a c e o n g l o b a l issues, such as h u m a n rights. M a i n t a i n i n g w o r l d o r d e r is a d e l i c a t e b a l a n c i n g a c t w i t h

uncertain

o u t c o m e s . I n s t i t u t i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g h u m a n r i g h t s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y h a s c o m e to b e s e e n as o n e w a y of i n c o r p o r a t i n g r e g u l a r i t y a n d p r e d i c t a b i l i t y in o u r d a i l y l i v e s . T h e n e x t f e w y e a r s w i l l b e c r u c i a l in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e h u m a n r i g h t s c a u s e c a n c o n t i n u e to p l a y that r o l e .

•

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. W h i c h g e n e r a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s d o y o u t h i n k is m o s t i m p o r t a n t ? 2. W h y d o e s t h e U N n o t e n f o r c e t h e h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t t h e G e n e r a l A s sembly has already approved? 3. S h o u l d s u c h p r a c t i c e s as f e m a l e c i r c u m c i s i o n be s e e n in u n i v e r s a l o r relative terms? 4. W h i c h is m o s t i m p o r t a n t : state s o v e r e i g n t y o r u n i v e r s a l h u m a n r i g h t s ? 5. S h o u l d C h i n a h a v e b e e n p e r m i t t e d to b e n e f i t f r o m j o i n i n g t h e W o r l d T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n in light of t h e i r h u m a n r i g h t s r e c o r d ?

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SUGGESTED READING

Amnesty International Report (annual) London: Amnesty International Publications. Claude, Richard Pierre, and Burns H. Weston, eds. (1992) Human Rights in the World Community. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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Donnelly, Jack (1993) Internationa! Human Rights. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Felice, William F. (1996) Taking Suffering Seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press. Forsythe, David P. (1991) The Internationalization of Human Rights. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Gutman, Roy (1993) A Witness to Genocide. New York: Macmillan. Hayner, Priscilla B. (2001) Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York and London: Routledge. Human Rights Watch World Report (annual) New York: Human Rights Watch. Langley, Winston E. (1996) Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues Since ¡945. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press. New York Times (2000) "United Nations, China Sign Human-Rights Pact." November 20. Robinson, Geoffrey (2000) Crimes Against Humanity : The Struggle for Global Justice. New York: W. W. Norton. Staub, Ervin (1989) The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5 PEACEKEEPING AND

PEACEMAKING

Carolyn M. Stephenson

Conflict now routinely crosses international boundaries, blurring the distinction between domestic and international conflict. In response, new methods of providing for international peace and security have evolved, especially in the p o s t - C o l d War world since the early 1990s. Peacekeeping and peacemaking have taken new forms, and the role of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations (UN), has b e c o m e much more significant. What was initially optimism for a more peaceful world in the wake of the Cold War, however, has hardened into a recognition that we still face conflicts as intractable as the Cold War between the Soviet and Western blocs appeared to be from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. In the late 1980s, the world was full of hope for a new, more gentle order that would provide for more peace and security. There were hopes for a renewed UN, f o r new f o r m s of mediation and other third-party conflict resolution, for a new relationship between the superpowers, for the signing of arms control and disarmament treaties, and for the increasing recognition of individual h u m a n rights and needs. Nonviolent revolutions had overturned authoritarian regimes in the Philippines in 1986 and in Eastern Europe in 1989. T h e UN had received the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping missions in 1988. We were beginning to develop solid international agreements to protect and restore our environment. We were less hopeful and more sober by the early 1990s. We had begun to take seriously both new dimensions of conflict and new approaches to peacemaking, yet disagreed about what constituted the g r o u n d s for successful peacemaking. For some, success consisted of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the renewed ability of the United Nations to function as originally intended as maker and keeper of the peace, under the leadership 71

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of the United States. Many saw U.S. military, economic, and political power as having been responsible for the end of the Cold War. For them, the restoration of the UN capability for enforcement, under U.S. leadership, was central. For others, what constituted success was the restoration of a different United Nations, a United Nations that would run by one-nation, one-vote, countering the dominant influence of both superpowers. This UN would function cooperatively to further individual and group rights, security, development, and the state of the global environment. For these people, U.S. leadership was not so important as that of decentralized political movements of individual human beings. For them, the changes of the 1980s had come about not so much because of U.S. military, economic, and political power but because of the committed organizing power of social movements all over the world. The two approaches, and other variants of them, rely on different conceptions of security and peace and on different conceptions of power. Because they emphasize different methods of and approaches to peacemaking, it is important that we examine the conceptions of security, peace, and power that underlie these approaches. Otherwise, we risk shifting from notions of world government to arbitration, to nuclear deterrence, to rapid deployment forces, to UN peacekeeping, to nonviolent revolution, to arms control, to mediation, or to humanitarian intervention, with no sense of why we have shifted from one approach to another, let alone what the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are in particular situations.

• CHANGES IN THE C O N C E P T OF SECURITY Where national security was once virtually the only way to talk about security, the world has come to acknowledge the relationship between national security and both international and individual security. We have moved from reliance on a balance-of-power system, to collective security, collective defense, and then common security, with the present international security system representing some mixture of all of these. The classical balance-of-power system, the primary system for maintaining security in nineteenth-century Europe, was retained well into the twentieth century. With a goal of ensuring that no nation-state became so strong as to be able to overpower others, rough equality was maintained by two camps of states in the system, with one or several states (usually Britain) changing alliances in order to maintain the balance. This system began to break down in the twentieth century, when it failed to avert war and maintain stability. Under collective security, which began with the League of Nations in 1919 and was strengthened with the establishment of the United Nations

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in 1945, states agreed on certain rough rules of international law, including national sovereignty and freedom from outside aggression; they also agreed that if any state violated these rules, all of the others would band together against that state. Sanctions for violating the prohibition against international aggression could be either military or nonmilitary. The UN Security Council is the primary site of collective security, with Chapter VII of the UN Charter governing this. Collective defense, which was a step back in the direction of the balance-of-power system, became the dominant security system by the late 1940s and throughout the Cold War. Under this system, each set of nationstates, West and East, gathered together in military alliances to defend against the other set. The West embraced capitalism and democracy, while the East promoted c o m m u n i s m , each hoping to establish its systems throughout the rest of the world. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by Western states in 1949 was followed by the formation of the Warsaw Pact by Soviet-bloc states in 1955. Each side bolstered its conventional military defenses with the nuclear umbrella of its respective superpower. Although collective defense has not entirely ended, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, together with the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, left NATO with questions about its remaining purpose. Deterrence, including but not limited to nuclear deterrence, was the primary underlying power dynamic of collective defense. In contrast, the concept of common security arose, primarily within the UN framework. There are two distinct aspects of c o m m o n security, one of which arose in the context of North-South conflict, one in the East-West context. With respect to the first, the Report of the Independent C o m m i s sion on International Development Issues in 1980, better known as the Brandt Report, raised notions of economic security (ICIDI 1980). For the South, the failure of economic development was perceived as a much greater threat to security than nuclear war. In 1982 the Independent C o m mission on Disarmament and Security Issues, or the Palme C o m m i s s i o n , made two more explicit linkages: first, there could be no victory in nuclear w a r — t h e r e f o r e we could only survive together; second, the costs of militaries everywhere were contributing to economic insecurity—therefore the reduction of military costs could contribute to development (ICDSI 1982). The East-West aspect of c o m m o n security is embodied in the Helsinki Agreement and is the best k n o w n e x a m p l e of c o m m o n security. This agreement (today called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was formed in 1975 by the states of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and contains three "baskets": a security basket, which includes agreements on post-World War II borders in Europe; an economic basket, which opens up trade between East and West; and a human rights basket, which provides for certain human rights guarantees and procedures in both East and West.

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The Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future, in 1987 added the concept of environmental security to that of common security, strengthening the idea that sustainable development requires sustaining the environment that supports development and promoting the notion that military expenditures and war are harmful to the environment. Environmental security encompasses both the protection of the environment for its own sake and the protection of the environment for the sake of humankind. Thus, common security now includes political-military aspects, economic aspects, and environmental aspects and seems to be recognizing their interdependence; however, it is even more explicit in acknowledging the interdependence of states with regard to security. Security today is thus conceived of in a much more comprehensive way than ever before, even when that security applies still to the nationstate rather than global society. The concept comprises not only negative security (the ability to defend against or shut off relationships one views as harmful) but also positive security (the ability to maintain relationships one views as essential to one's survival, such as access to food, oil, and credit). Such a reconceptualization of security means that reliance on traditional approaches to security are less likely to be adequate. This is one of the reasons new approaches to peacemaking are being taken ever more seriously.

•

CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF PEACE

The concept of peace has also broadened in much the same way as security, expanding from the concept of negative peace alone—or peace as the absence of war or direct violence—to include positive peace—or peace as the absence of exploitation and the presence of social justice. While the earliest mention of positive and negative peace appears to be in the writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., the terms were expanded upon and more fully analyzed and operationalized by Johan Galtung (1969). The debate that ensued over which concept of peace was to be accepted has yet to be resolved. For some, the absence of direct violence seems more important; for others, the absence of exploitation is key. But until we are more in agreement about the kind of peace we are interested in making, there will continue to be major differences among approaches to peacemaking. At one end of the spectrum, those who believe that peace is simply order or the absence of violence may argue that peace can or should be enforced with military action. At the other end of the spectrum, those who believe that peace must include justice may argue that peace cannot be enforced and can only be brought about by negotiations that take into account justice and the underlying needs of the parties. The international system has mechanisms that span the full range of these points of view.

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For a long time, distinctions h a v e been m a d e in the U N b e t w e e n peacem a k i n g , p e a c e k e e p i n g , and p e a c e - b u i l d i n g ( B o u t r o s - G h a l i 1992). Without getting into an a r g u m e n t over technical d e f i n i t i o n s , let it s u f f i c e to say that p e a c e - b u i l d i n g g e n e r a l l y includes b u i l d i n g the c o n d i t i o n s of society so that t h e r e will be p e a c e . In this area w e m i g h t i n c l u d e such m e t h o d s as h u m a n rights education, d e v e l o p m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t aid, and reconciliation and the restoration of c o m m u n i t y f o l l o w i n g a violent conflict. P e a c e k e e p i n g , in t h e b r o a d e r s e n s e , i n v o l v e s k e e p i n g parties f r o m f i g h t i n g or o t h e r w i s e d o i n g h a r m to e a c h other. In the n a r r o w e r s e n s e , it h a s b e e n used to d e scribe the particular multinational operations e m p l o y e d to restore and maint a i n p e a c e b e t w e e n hostile parties. P e a c e m a k i n g is u s u a l l y taken to m e a n h e l p i n g to b r i n g h o s t i l e p a r t i e s to a g r e e m e n t . I will e x p l o r e all three of t h e s e , with an e m p h a s i s on p e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e m a k i n g and with the r e c o g n i t i o n that they o v e r l a p s o m e w h a t .

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P E A C E M A K I N G A N D THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S C H A R T E R

T h e U N C h a r t e r includes t w o p r i m a r y w a y s of p r o v i d i n g for p e a c e m a k i n g and for international p e a c e and security. C h a p t e r VI of the C h a r t e r f o c u s e s o n P e a c e f u l S e t t l e m e n t of D i s p u t e s , w h i l e C h a p t e r VII relates to A c t i o n w i t h R e s p e c t to T h r e a t s to the P e a c e , B r e a c h e s of the P e a c e , and A c t s of A g g r e s s i o n . Article 33, the first article of C h a p t e r VI, p r o v i d e s that the parties to any dispute, the c o n t i n u a n c e of w h i c h is likely to e n d a n g e r the m a i n t e n a n c e of international p e a c e and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, m e d i a t i o n , c o n c i l i a t i o n , arbitration, judicial s e t t l e m e n t , resort to r e g i o n a l a g e n c i e s or a r r a n g e m e n t s , or other p e a c e f u l m e a n s of their o w n c h o i c e .

W h e n parties are u n a b l e to n e g o t i a t e their way t h r o u g h a d i s p u t e on their o w n , the Security C o u n c i l m a y call u p o n t h e m to settle their d i s p u t e by any of these m e a n s , and it, or o t h e r parts of the United N a t i o n s , m a y assist them by p r o v i d i n g a third party to help t h e m d o so. Enquiry and factfinding are m e t h o d s by w h i c h a third party attempts simply to find out the f a c t s of the situation. In mediation and conciliation, a third party, s o m e t i m e s in the f o r m of a special r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , s o m e t i m e s in the f o r m of a c o m m i s s i o n , helps the c o n f l i c t i n g parties c o m m u n i c a t e and c o m e to a g r e e m e n t w h e n they are u n a b l e to d o so. U n d e r arbitration, the third party m a k e s a d e c i s i o n about the c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s of the parties; s o m e t i m e s the parties can c h o o s e w h e t h e r to a c c e p t this decision, but u n d e r b i n d i n g arbitration, the parties are b o u n d to accept the decision of the arbitrator. U n d e r judicial settlement, the C h a r t e r p r o v i d e s f o r submitting certain types of legal disputes b e t w e e n states to the International

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Court of Justice in T h e H a g u e , Netherlands, w h e r e the court will rule on the legitimacy of the case u n d e r international law. M e d i a t i o n has b e c o m e increasingly important in resolving international disputes. T h e "quiet d i p l o m a c y " of the U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l or his representatives h a s b e e n used in a long series of crises in the M i d d l e East, beg i n n i n g in the late 1940s and c o n t i n u i n g t h r o u g h to the Iran-Iraq War, as well as in o t h e r r e g i o n a l areas. M e d i a t i o n has also been used by international regional o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the O r g a n i z a t i o n for A f r i c a n Unity, as well as by p o w e r f u l states such as the United S t a t e s — f o r e x a m p l e , when it m e d i a t e d the p e a c e b e t w e e n Israel and E g y p t during the C a m p David neg o t i a t i o n s — a n d by less p o w e r f u l states such as Algeria, which mediated the release of the U.S. h o s t a g e s held by Iran. M e d i a t i o n is also practiced in the f o r m of what is called s e c o n d - t r a c k d i p l o m a c y , w h e r e individuals such as a c a d e m i c specialists in c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the International C o m m i t t e e of the Red C r o s s or of religious organizations, such as the M e n n o n i t e C o n c i l i a t i o n S e r v i c e or the F r i e n d s World C o m m i t t e e for C o n s u l t a t i o n ( Q u a k e r s ) , h e l p to f a c i l i t a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n or to run w o r k shops a i m e d at solving the p r o b l e m s u n d e r l y i n g the conflict. UN enforcement action c o n s t i t u t e s a n o t h e r a p p r o a c h to p e a c e m a k i n g that has b e c o m e m o r e available to the international system since the end of the C o l d War. E n f o r c e m e n t action is c o v e r e d u n d e r the collective security p r o v i s i o n s of C h a p t e r VII of the U N C h a r t e r , e s p e c i a l l y the nonmilitary sanctions p r o v i d e d in Article 41 and the military sanctions provided in Article 4 2 . W h i l e s o m e point out that the C h a r t e r c o n d i t i o n s for military enf o r c e m e n t have never been met, due to the failure to set up UN forces under a M i l i t a r y Staff C o m m i t t e e ( A r t i c l e s 4 3 - 4 7 ) , m o s t w o u l d agree that U N authorized operations in K o r e a in 1950 and in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 constitute the primary e x a m p l e s of UN military e n f o r c e m e n t . E n f o r c e m e n t action is g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d w h e n a state has clearly violated the t e r m s of the C h a r t e r and c a r r i e d out a g g r e s s i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l action. Military enf o r c e m e n t actions have tended to be led and s t a f f e d by one or several of the great p o w e r s . T h e r e are clear d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion as to whether military e n f o r c e m e n t action constitutes an approach to p e a c e m a k i n g or is better considered simply as war. N o n m i l i t a r y sanctions are another a p p r o a c h to p e a c e m a k i n g . Article 41 of the U N C h a r t e r says that " t h e Security C o u n c i l m a y decide what m e a s ures not involving the use of a r m e d f o r c e are to be e m p l o y e d to give e f f e c t to its d e c i s i o n s , " i n c l u d i n g " c o m p l e t e or partial interruption of e c o n o m i c relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and the s e v e r a n c e of d i p l o m a t i c relations." T h e old d e b a t e o v e r w h e t h e r s a n c t i o n s are a p p r o p r i a t e and e f f e c t i v e was r e n e w e d a f t e r I r a q ' s invasion of K u w a i t . P e a c e organizations generally s u p p o r t e d s a n c t i o n s as an a l t e r n a t i v e to w a r b e f o r e the war, but o p p o s e d

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sanctions as harmful to the Iraqi people after the war. If the purpose was to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, there were early indications that sanctions might have worked. If the purpose, on the other hand, was to get Saddam Hussein out of Iraq, sanctions were not likely to be effective. The ambiguity between those two goals in messages from the United States may be one of the reasons sanctions did not succeed within the time period they were used. In the 1930s, sanctions were seen as a primary guarantor, within the system of collective security, for preventing wars. However, after the failure of the League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1936 with respect to Ethiopia, sentiment turned against sanctions. Most observers today have concluded that sanctions are not especially useful on major foreign policy goals but carefully focused sanctions may be useful in limited goals. The definition of sanctions has changed over time. By the time of the League of Nations, sanctions meant actions taken by international bodies to enforce international law. Since then, the term has come to include unilateral acts and even the use of economic policies for ordinary diplomatic influence. Evaluation of the success of sanctions may be very different if one separates out the unilateral from the more consensually based actions of international organizations.

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PEACEKEEPING

On October 10, 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the 10,500 members of UN peacekeeping forces. He paid tribute to the half-million young men and women from fifty-eight countries who served in UN peacekeeping operations, especially to the 733 who had lost their lives. Both he and Norway's prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, expressed their concern for the financial status of peacekeeping, particularly the fact that major powers are in considerable arrears. At that time, the annual cost of peacekeeping activities was about $300 million. Annual UN peacekeeping expenditures peaked at $3.6 billion in 1993, while the number of missions peaked at twenty-one in 1999. Peacekeeping had come of age but was endangered by the massive costs that accompany certain of its activities. There is no official UN definition of peacekeeping. However, the definition adopted by the International Peace Academy (IPA), a nongovernmental organization (NGO) closely related to the UN that has undertaken much of the training for UN peacekeeping forces, has been seen as close to official. Under that definition, peacekeeping is the p r e v e n t i o n , c o n t a i n m e n t , m o d e r a t i o n and termination o f h o s t i l i t i e s b e t w e e n or within states, through the m e d i u m o f a p e a c e f u l third party

78

CONFLICT A N D SECURITY i n t e r v e n t i o n o r g a n i z e d and d i r e c t e d internationally, u s i n g multinational forces of soldiers, p o l i c e , and c i v i l i a n s to restore and maintain peace. (IPA 1984: 2 2 )

A wide range of interpretations are still possible under that definition. UN publications distinguish between two kinds of peacekeeping operations: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. Observers are not armed; soldiers in peacekeeping forces have weapons but generally are authorized to use them only in self-defense. By 1990 there had been ten observer missions and eight peacekeeping forces. By June 1996 there had been forty-one peacekeeping operations (UNDPI 1990: 3; UNDPI 1996), by 2001 fifty-four. Peacekeeping is not based on sending a fighting force to stop a violent conflict. Rather, the premise of peacekeeping is that inserting an impartial presence in the region will allow the parties to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. There are differences in emphasis between the military and civilian role in peacekeeping operations—and different proportions of military and civilians in each operation—to achieve the double objective of reducing the violence and helping to move toward peaceful settlement. P e a c e k e e p i n g is clearly d i f f e r e n t f r o m e n f o r c e m e n t action or action based on collective security. The separation of peacekeeping from enforcement is critical as both p e a c e k e e p i n g and e n f o r c e m e n t are made increasingly possible by the condominium of the great powers in the aftermath of the Cold War. The fact that p e a c e k e e p i n g missions are deployed in countries with their consent, that they are unarmed or lightly armed and use force only in self-defense, and that they are composed largely of middlelevel powers whose degree of neutrality in the conflict is likely to be perceived as higher than that of the great powers, are significant factors that may well be important to their success. The changing world situation in the late 1980s led not only to an increase in peacekeeping but also to the first UN Security Council summit meeting. In the concluding statement of the summit on January 31, 1992, the heads of state invited the Secretary-General to prepare "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 117-118). Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his resulting report, spoke of the increasing demands for peacekeeping: Thirteen p e a c e - k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n the years 1945 and 1987; 13 others s i n c e then. A n e s t i m a t e d 5 2 8 , 0 0 0 military, p o lice and c i v i l i a n personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January 1992. . . . T h e c o s t s o f t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s h a v e a g g r e g a t e d s o m e $ 8 . 3 b i l l i o n till 1 9 9 2 . . . . P e a c e - k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s approved at

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present are estimated to cost close to $3 billion in the current 12-month period. (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 57-58) A m e c h a n i s m not originally provided in the UN Charter had evolved over time to b e c o m e the major item in the UN budget, with the exception of the specialized agencies.

• PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING AFTER THE COLD WAR At the end of the Cold War, when the f o c u s of conflict turned f r o m the threat of nuclear war to ethnic conflict in the developing world and elsewhere, there was an enormous rise in peacekeeping operations. Figure 5.1 indicates the geographic spread of both completed and ongoing UN peacekeeping operations f r o m 1948 to 2001. Table 5.1 shows that the fifteen current operations vary greatly in start date, size, budget, and purpose, as is revealed to some degree in the title of each mission. While a few of the current operations are almost as old as the U N itself, most began in the 1990s. Many described these conflicts as a new type, although in reality they were not significantly different from the hundreds of intrastate ethnic, religious, racial, tribal, and national conflicts that had been occurring with regularity throughout the Cold War. T h e d i f f e r e n c e was that throughout the Cold War period the two sides had interpreted these conflicts as involving competition between c o m m u n i s m and capitalism, while now they were seen simply as intrastate conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, consisting of fifteen of the 189 members of the UN, votes by a 9-of-15 majority vote. The vote must not include a veto of any of the permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). At the end of the Cold War and its pattern of Cold War vetoes, the Security Council found that it could make decisions and take action it could not have taken before. This led not only to a tremendous rise in the number of peacekeeping operations but also to a blending of traditional peacekeeping with enforcement in some cases and with peace-building measures such as election monitoring, h u m a n rights monitoring, and education, among other techniques, in others. These new types of operations s o m e t i m e s came to be called " s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n " peacekeeping. Missions such as those in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Mozambique are widely regarded as successes; they helped oversee elections and rebuild societies where there was agreement to do so. On the other hand, in places suffering a breakdown of society, including rioting

Figure 5.1 U N Peacekeeping Missions, 1948-2001

Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, Peace and Security Section, in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacekeeping Financing Division, Office of P r o g r a m m i n g Planning, Budget and Accounts. D P I / l 6 3 4 / R e v . 2 la, S e p t e m b e r 15, 2001. Used by permission of the United Nations. Notes: Peacekeeping operations 1 9 4 8 - S e p t e m b e r 15, 2001 total 54. Operations under way on S e p t e m b e r 15, 2001 total 15. Personnel as of A u g u s t 31, 2001: Military personnel and civilian police serving total 47,151; countries contributing military personnel and civilian police total 88; international civilian personnel total 4,253; local civilian personnel total 8,489; total n u m b e r of fatalities in peacekeeping operations 1 9 4 8 - S e p t e m b e r 15, 2001 total 1,680. The term military personnel refers to military observers and/or troops, as applicable. Fatality figures include military, civilian police, and civilian international and local personnel. Financial aspects: Projection of costs f r o m July 1. 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 30, 2 0 0 2 total about $ 3 - 3 . 5 billion; approved budget for period f r o m July 1, 2 0 0 0 - J u n e 30, 2001 total about $2.63 billion; estimated total cost of operations f r o m 1 9 4 8 - J u n e 30, 2001 total about $23.3 billion; outstanding contributions to peacekeeping on August 31, 2001 total about $3.4 billion.

Table 5.1

C u r r e n t U N Peacekeeping Operations, 2002

UNTSO

MINURSO

U N Truce Supervision Organization Since June 1948

U N M i s s i o n f o r t h e R e f e r e n d u m in W e s t e r n Sahara S i n c e A p r i l 1991

S t r e n g t h : m i l i t a r y 153; i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n 102; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 109 Fatalities: 38 Appropriation for 2001: $22.8 million

UNMOGIP U N M i l i t a r y O b s e r v e r G r o u p in I n d i a a n d Pakistan Since January 1949 Strength: military 45; international civilian 24; local civilian 4 2 Fatalities: 9 Appropriation for 2001: $7.3 million

UNFICYP U N P e a c e k e e p i n g F o r c e in C y p r u s Since March 1964 Strength: military 1,251; international civilian 41; civilian police 35; local civilian 104 Fatalities: 170 Appropriation for July 2001-June 2002: $42.4 million (gross), including voluntary c o n t r i b u t i o n s of $ 1 3 . 6 million from C y p r u s and $6.5 million from Greece

UNDOF

Strength: military 229; international civilian 2 2 3 ; c i v i l i a n p o l i c e 3 4 ; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 126 F a t a l i t i e s : 10 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $50.5 million (gross)

UNOMIG U N O b e r s e r v e r M i s s i o n in G e o r g i a Since A u g u s t 1993 S t r e n g t h : m i l i t a r y 106; i n t e r n a t i o n a l civilian 9 3 ; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 169 Fatalities: 3 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $27.9 million (gross)

UNMIBH U N M i s s i o n in B o s n i a a n d H e r z e g o v i n a Since D e c e m b e r 1995 S t r e n g t h : m i l i t a r y 4; i n t e r n a t i o n a l civilian 339; civilian police 1,680; local civilian 1,508 Fatalities: 8 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $144.7 million (gross); budget figures include U N M I B H , U N M O P , and the U N l i a i s o n o f f i c e s in B e l g r a d e a n d Z a g r e b

IJNMOP

UN Disengagement Observer Force Since June 1974 Strength: military 1,039; international civilian 33; local civilian 88 Fatalities: 4 0 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $35.7 million (gross)

U N M i s s i o n o f O b s e r v e r s in P r e v l a k a Since January 1996 Strength: military 27; international civilian 3; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 6 Fatalities: 0

UNIFIL

UNMIK

U N I n t e r i m F o r c e in L e b a n o n Since M a r c h 1978 Strength: military 4,486; international c i v i l i a n 131; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 3 4 0 Fatalities: 2 4 4 C o m m i t m e n t authority for July 2 0 0 1 - D e c e m b e r 2001 (six m o n t h s ) : $106.2 million (gross)a

U N I n t e r i m A d m i n i s t r a t i o n M i s s i o n in K o s o v o Since June 1999 Strength: military 38; international civilian 1,228: civilian police 4 . 3 3 2 ; local civilian 3,176 F a t a l i t i e s : 13 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $413.4 million (gross)

UNIKOM

UNAMSIL

UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission S i n c e A p r i l 1991

U N M i s s i o n in S i e r r a L e o n e Since October 1999 Strength: military 16,654; international civilian 297; civilian police 49; local civilian 4 6 4 Fatalities: 4 6

Strength: military 1,099; international c i v i l i a n 5 7 ; l o c a l c i v i l i a n 165 F a t a l i t i e s : 14 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 2002: $52.8 million (gross), including voluntary c o n t r i b u t i o n s of $ 3 3 . 7 million f r o m Kuwait

A p p r o p r i a t i o n i n c l u d e d in U N M I B H

C o m m i t m e n t authority for July 2 0 0 1 - D e c e m b e r 2001 (six m o n t h s ) : $293.4 million (gross)3

(continues)

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Table 5.1 continued UNTAET U N Transitional Authority in East Timor Since O c t o b e r 1999 Strength: military 8,125; international civilian 972; civilian police 1,489; local civilian 1,859 Fatalities: 16 C o m m i t m e n t authority for July 2 0 0 1 - D e c e m b e r 2001 (six months): $300.8 million (gross) 3 MONUC U N Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of C o n g o Since D e c e m b e r 1999 Authorized strength: military 5,537

Strength on August 31, 2001: military 2,398; international civilian 475; local civilian 170 Fatalities: 2 Appropriation for July 2 0 0 1 - D e c e m b e r 2001 (six months): $209.1 million (gross) 3 UNMEE U N Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Since July 2000 Strength: military 3,866; international civilian 235; local civilian 163 Fatalities: 2 C o m m i t m e n t authority for July 2 0 0 1 - D e c e m b e r 2001 (six months): $96.0 million (gross) 3

Source: Adapted f r o m www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm. Notes: U N T S O and U N M O G I P are f u n d e d f r o m the United Nations regular budget. Costs to the United Nations of the thirteen other current operations are financed f r o m their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all m e m b e r states. For these missions, budget figures are for one year (July 1, 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 30, 2002) or for six months (beginning on July 1, 2001) and include the prorated share of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logisitics Base in Brindisi, Italy, a. Revised budget for the period July 1, 2 0 0 1 - J u n e 30, 2002 in preparation.

and looting and a continuing struggle for power between factions—such as in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia—action by the UN, other groups, the United States alone, or NATO has not been regarded as entirely successful. It has become increasingly clear that there must be a peace to keep before peacekeeping can be useful. Today's peacekeeping is described as "the power of persuasion backed by force" (UNDPI 1998: 4). A U N mission may include military, civilian police, and civilians. It may include such varied activities as truce supervision, cease-fire monitoring, military observation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance, education on human rights, mine clearance, and cooperation with regional organizations (UNDPI 1998: 15-16). Following the tremendous rise in peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the UN entered a period of reassessment and began to step back from its enormous investment and to draw conclusions on the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations. Among these was that it is essential to have the size and nature of the force fit the situation. The UN also began to realize that peace could not be enforced from the outside and that there was no substitute for political negotiations. In August 2 0 0 0 the Special Panel on UN Peace Operations produced a review and recommendations for reform

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(commonly known as the "Brahimi Report"), and Secretary-General Kofi Annan followed with an implementation report (A/52/502), which will be considered by the Security Council and General Assembly.

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CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING

The chief conditions of success in peacekeeping, whether for restraining violence or for resolving conflict, are more likely to be political than military. A clear mandate adopted with the greatest degree of consensus possible and the consent of the parties to the conflict may be among the most important conditions. But there are other conditions that have developed out of the experience of UN peacekeeping. The set of operating conditions that the UN Secretary-General attached to the deployment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1973 has come to be regarded as prerequisites for success. Deployment must be done only (1) with the full confidence and backing of the Security Council and (2) with the full cooperation and consent of the host countries. The force must (3) be under UN command through the Secretary-General; (4) have complete freedom of movement in the countries; (5) be international in composition, with national contingents acceptable to the parties in conflict; (6) act impartially; (7) use force only in self-defense; and (8) be supplied and administered under UN arrangements (UN 1973). Perhaps the most important conditions here are the nonuse of force except in self-defense and the consent of the parties to station a force. UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) and MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) have become classic examples of missions where several of the basic conditions were not met and where success was at best questionable. It has been argued that it is not the use of force per se that is the problem but the unsuccessful use of force where the intervention does not receive the support of the majority of the population. A guideline for success may be that force can only be effectively used to restrain a very small minority of the population when that minority is violating agreed-upon norms, as is the case with the domestic use of police in participatory democratic societies. Probably the most important factor in success, then, is not the mission on the ground but whether it is accompanied by sufficient efforts to facilitate the resolution of the underlying conflict that led to the violence. While participants in the actual peacekeeping operation may do harm, if they are unskilled, partial, badly commanded, or without sufficient resources or information, they cannot resolve the underlying conflict on their own. Reducing violence and helping resolve conflict are both important criteria for success, but the cost factor must also be considered. Conflict is costly in terms of time, money, and opportunities forgone; violent conflict is

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even more costly, because it takes lives as well. Where conflicts remain unresolved, there is the constant potential for the resumption of violence. The cost of simply maintaining order without resolving underlying conflicts may not be worth it, either to the local or the international community. Perhaps a peacekeeping force, to provide real security, must always have both elements: the restraint of violence and assistance in the resolution of conflicts. Other factors, such as leadership, organization, and communication, are also important. Adequate logistical support is critical. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1995) made particular note of this in An Agenda for Peace. Adequate and timely financing is also crucial to the success of peacekeeping or any organizational mission. Where peacekeeping forces are in considerable arrears, as many are, this constrains their effectiveness both logistically and politically.

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NONVIOLENT PEACEKEEPING

It is not certain that military personnel are the best peacekeepers. Brigadier General Michael Harbottle made the point that one of the lessons of UNEF, MONUC, and UNF1CYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) was that the professional soldier was no better as a peacekeeper than a volunteer. Volunteers are more likely to want to be there, and because they come from all walks of life, they may be more likely to have a common bond with those in the communities in which they are deployed (Harbottle 1971). Among the factors critical to the success of an operation are the attitudes of the members of the force, their ability to be sensitive to cultural differences, and their ability to solve problems and to facilitate the resolution of conflicts. Increasingly, the composition of peacekeeping missions is more and more diverse, including not only military personnel and civilian police, but administrators, observers, and other civilian personnel. Civilians trained in the nonviolent resolution of conflict may have an increasingly important role to play in international peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building, especially in the context of community-wide conflict. Nongovernmental nonviolent peacekeeping forces organized on the Gandhian shanti sena (peace army) model have sent volunteers into situations of violence to monitor human rights or border crossings (see Desai 1972). Peace Brigades International is one of these, with an international board from all continents. Originally called the World Peace Brigade, it was founded in Beirut, Lebanon, on January 1, 1962, and has sent transnational teams of observers to conflicts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. The conflict between the goals of reconciliation through mediation (which

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stresses impartiality) and c o n f r o n t a t i o n in the n a m e of justice (which tends to stress partisan s u p p o r t of one side of the s t r u g g l e ) has been an issue of d e b a t e within P e a c e B r i g a d e s International. More and more unarmed nongovernmental peacekeeping groups have b e g u n to play roles in c o n f l i c t areas. W i t n e s s f o r P e a c e h a s o p e r a t e d both as a n o n v i o l e n t w i t n e s s and as a t r i p w i r e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s d e v i c e to k e e p U.S. c i t i z e n s a w a r e of what the U n i t e d States and o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s are d o i n g or p l a n n i n g in Central A m e r i c a . It h a s sent o b s e r v e r s as s u p p o r t f o r local c o m m u n i t i e s that are w o r k i n g f o r d e v e l o p m e n t and h u m a n rights in t h e f a c e of r e p r e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e C y p r u s R e s e t t l e m e n t P r o j e c t h a s w o r k e d o n r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , the B a l k a n P e a c e T e a m has w o r k e d in C r o a t i a , Cry for J u s t i c e in Haiti, and C h r i s t i a n P e a c e m a k e r T e a m s in a variety of settings. A s n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e d in d a y - t o - d a y p o l i c y m a k i n g a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , p e r h a p s there is a role that t r a i n e d , u n a r m e d c i v i l i a n s s k i l l e d in n o n v i o l e n t a c t i o n and c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n c a n play to i m p r o v e the U N ' s p e a c e m a k i n g and p e a c e k e e p i n g c a p a c i t y on the g r o u n d .

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CONCLUSION

P e r h a p s the d i l e m m a s the U N f a c e s w o u l d not be so d i f f i c u l t if the international system were not so biased t o w a r d the utility of violent force. T h e e f f i c a c y of v i o l e n c e is a myth: at best, only s o m e w i n — a n d at the great exp e n s e of others. B e c a u s e violent f o r c e d o e s not m a k e p e a c e or j u s t i c e , its use by the U N w o u l d not seem to be the most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e use of its limited resources. It may well be that the situation the U N is in with respect to f u n d i n g and general s u p p o r t m a y , in c o n t r a s t to p o p u l a r t h i n k i n g , be d u e to the o v e r u s e and m i s u s e of violent f o r c e r a t h e r than to its inability to b r i n g about international (and subnational) p e a c e and security. T h e Nobel P e a c e Prize was a w a r d e d a f t e r a period of m a n y small, less violent p e a c e k e e p i n g m i s s i o n s . C r i t i c i s m h a s c o m e f o l l o w i n g the U N m i s s i o n s in S o m a l i a and the f o r m e r Yugoslavia. Perhaps it is t i m e to have a m o r e pointed d e b a t e on the merits of long- v e r s u s short-term, and m o r e violent v e r s u s less violent, a p p r o a c h e s to international peace, security, and j u s t i c e . If the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m is r e a d y to m o v e in the d i r e c t i o n of international peace, security, and justice, it m u s t o v e r c o m e the m y t h of the e f f i cacy of violence and take on the m o r e difficult task of creating security cooperatively. L e s s v i o l e n t , l o n g e r - t e r m m e a n s f o r p r o v i d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e and security, such as p e a c e m a k i n g and p e a c e - b u i l d i n g , m a y h o l d m u c h more p r o m i s e than traditional e n f o r c e m e n t — o r even p e a c e k e e p i n g .

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. H o w h a v e the c o n c e p t s of p e a c e and security e v o l v e d ? 2. D o y o u think p e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e m a k i n g will be m o r e attainable n o w that the C o l d War is over? 3. Is it in the interest o f the United States to cooperate with the United N a t i o n s in its p e a c e k e e p i n g and p e a c e m a k i n g efforts? 4. S h o u l d the U n i t e d N a t i o n s have its o w n military f o r c e ? H o w might this raise c o n c e r n s o v e r state s o v e r e i g n t y ? 5. C o u l d n o n v i o l e n t approaches be u s e f u l as a m e a n s of bringing about peace?

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SUGGESTED READINGS

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995) An Agenda for Peace. Second edition. New York: United Nations. Harbottle, Michael (1971) The Blue Berels. London: Leo Cooper. Higgins, Rosalyn (1996) United Nations Peacekeeping. 4 vols. London: Oxford University Press. International Peace Academy (1984) Peacekeeper's Handbook. New York: Pergamon Press. Mahony, Liam, and Luis Enrique Eguren (1997) Unarmed Bodyguards. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. M o s e r - P u a n g s u w a n , Yeshua, and Thomas Weber (2000) Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Ramsbottom, Oliver, and Tom Woodhouse (1999) Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc. UN Department of Public Information (UNDPI) (1996) The Blue Helmets: 4 Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. Third edition. New York: UNDPI. (1998) Peacekeeping: 50 Years 1948-1998. New York: UNDPI (Pamphlet DPI/2004, 88 pages). UN Panel on UN Peace Operations (August 21, 2000) Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations. UN Resolutions A/55/305-S/2000/809 (the "Brahimi Report"). Weiss, T h o m a s G., ed. (1993) Collective Security in a Changing World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. White, N. D. (1990) The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. New York: Manchester University Press. Wiseman, Henry (1983) "United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview." In Henry Wiseman, ed., Peacekeeping. Appraisals and Proposals. New York: Pergamon Press.

Part 2 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

6 CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE Bruce £. Moon

International trade is often treated purely as an economic matter that can and should be divorced from politics. That is a mistake, because trade not only shapes our economy but also determines the kind of world in which we live. The far-reaching consequences of trade pose fundamental choices for all of us. Certainly citizens must understand those consequences before judging the inherently controversial issues that arise over trade policy. More than that, we cannot even make sound consumer decisions without weighing carefully the consequences of our own behavior.

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THE CASE FOR TRADE

The individual motives that generate international trade are familiar. Consumers seek to buy foreign products that are better or cheaper than domestic ones in order to improve their material standard of living. Producers sell their products abroad to increase their profit and wealth. Most policymakers believe that governments should also welcome trade because it provides benefits for the nation and the global economy as well as for the individual. Exports produce jobs for workers, profits for corporations, and revenues that can be used to purchase imports. Imports increase the welfare (well-being) of citizens because they can acquire more for their money as well as obtain products that are not available from domestic sources. The stronger economy that follows can fuel increasing power and prestige for the nation as a whole. Further, the resultant interdependence and shared prosperity among countries may strengthen global cooperation and maintain international peace.

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C o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e supports the v i e w that trade i m p r o v e s p r o d u c tivity, c o n s u m p t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e material standard of living ( M o o n 1998). T r a d e s u c c e s s e s h a v e g e n e r a t e d spurts of national g r o w t h , most notably in East Asia. T h e g l o b a l e c o n o m y has g r o w n m o s t rapidly d u r i n g p e r i o d s of trade e x p a n s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y after World War II, and has s l o w e d w h e n trade levels have fallen, especially during the Great D e p r e s s i o n of the 1930s. Periods of international p e a c e have also coincided with t r a d e - i n d u c e d g r o w t h , w h i l e w a r has f o l l o w e d d e c l i n e s in trade and prosperity. M o r e recent evid e n c e s u g g e s t s that trade e x p a n s i o n m a y be c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e b e n e f i c i a l f o r d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s than for poorer ones, h o w e v e r . I n d e e d , a 1999 World B a n k study reported that the m e d i a n per capita g r o w t h of d e v e l o p i n g c o u n tries was 0 . 0 p e r c e n t since 1980, that is, d u r i n g the era of globalization in w h i c h trade levels e x p l o d e d (Easterly 1999). Still, the p r i v a t e b e n e f i t s of trade h a v e led i n d i v i d u a l c o n s u m e r s a n d p r o d u c e r s to e m b r a c e it with zeal for the last half-century. A s a result, trade h a s a s s u m e d a m u c h g r e a t e r role in a l m o s t all n a t i o n s , with e x p o r t s n o w constituting about a q u a r t e r of the e c o n o m y in most countries and over half in the developing world (World Bank 1999: 222). E v e n in the United States, w h i c h is less reliant on trade than virtually any other e c o n o m y in the world b e c a u s e of its size and diversity, the export sector is now about 10 percent of gross d o m e s t i c product ( G D P ) , defined as the total of g o o d s and services p r o d u c e d in a g i v e n year. S m a l l e r nations m u s t e n g a g e in m o r e trade bec a u s e they can neither supply all their o w n n e e d s nor p r o v i d e a market sizable e n o u g h for their own industries to operate efficiently. Since World War II, m o s t g o v e r n m e n t s have e n c o u r a g e d and p r o m o t e d this g r o w t h in trade levels. All but a h a n d f u l of nations n o w rely so h e a v ily on j o b s in the e x p o r t sector and on f o r e i g n p r o d u c t s to m e e t d o m e s t i c n e e d s that d i s c o n t i n u i n g trade is no longer an option. To a t t e m p t it w o u l d r e q u i r e a vast r e s t r u c t u r i n g that w o u l d entail h u g e e c o n o m i c losses a n d m a s s i v e social c h a n g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , a c c o r d i n g to the " l i b e r a l " trade t h e ory accepted by m o s t e c o n o m i s t s , g o v e r n m e n t s have no c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n to interfere with the private markets that achieve such b e n e f i t s . T h e r e a d e r is cautioned that liberalism, as used throughout this chapter, refers to liberal e c o n o m i c theory that o p p o s e s g o v e r n m e n t interference with the market a n d is not to be c o n f u s e d with the a m b i g u o u s way the term liberal is applied in U.S. politics, w h e r e it o f t e n m e a n s the opposite. F r o m its roots in the w o r k of Scottish political e c o n o m i s t A d a m S m i t h ( 1 7 2 3 - 1 7 9 0 ) and E n g l i s h e c o n o m i s t D a v i d R i c a r d o ( 1 7 7 2 - 1 8 2 3 ) , this liberal perspective h a s e m p h a s i z e d that international trade can benefit all n a tions s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , w i t h o u t requiring g o v e r n m e n t a l i n v o l v e m e n t ( S m i t h 1910). A c c o r d i n g to R i c a r d o ' s theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo 1981), n o nation n e e d lose in order for a n o t h e r to win, b e c a u s e trade a l l o w s total global p r o d u c t i o n to rise. T h e key to creating these gains f r o m trade is

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the efficient allocation of resources, whereby each nation specializes in the production of goods in which it has a comparative advantage. For example, a nation with especially fertile farmland and a favorable climate can produce food much more cheaply than a country that lacks this comparative advantage. If it were to trade its excess food production to a nation with efficient manufacturing facilities for clothing production, both nations would be better off, because trade allows each to apply its resources to their most efficient use. No action by governments is required to bring about this trade, however, since profit-motivated investors will see to it that producers specialize in the goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and consumers will naturally purchase the best or cheapest products. Thus, liberal theory concludes that international trade conducted by private actors free of government control will maximize global welfare.

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CHALLENGES TO THE LIBERAL FAITH IN TRADE

Though trade levels have grown massively in the two centuries since Adam Smith, no government has followed the advice of liberal economic theorists to refrain from interfering with trade altogether. That is because governments also have been influenced by a dissenting body of thought known as mercantilism, which originated with the trade policy of European nations, especially England, from the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. While mercantilists do not oppose trade, they do hold that governments must regulate it in order for trade to advance various aspects of the national interest. The aspirations of mercantilists go beyond the immediate consumption gains emphasized by liberals to include long-term growth, national self-sufficiency, the vitality of key industries, and a powerful state in foreign policy. Because most states accept the mercantilist conviction that trade has negative as well as positive consequences, they try to manage it in a fashion that will minimize its most severe costs yet also capture the benefits claimed for it by liberal theory. In particular, mercantilists observe that the rosy evaluation of trade advanced by Smith and Ricardo was predicated on their expectation that any given nation's imports would more or less balance its exports. However, when a nation's imports are greater than its exports—meaning that its residents buy more from other nations than it sells to them—mercantilists warn that this "trade deficit" carries with it potential dangers that may not be readily apparent. On its face a trade deficit appears as the proverbial free lunch: If a nation's imports are greater than its exports, it follows that national consumption must exceed its production. One might ask how anyone could object to an arrangement that allows a nation to consume more than it produces. The answer lies in recognizing that such a situation has

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a d v e r s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s (especially in the f u t u r e ) , just as individuals c a n n o t c o n t i n u e to s p e n d m o r e than they earn w i t h o u t e v e n t u a l l y s u f f e r i n g detrimental c o n s e q u e n c e s . For e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d States has run a substantial trade d e f i c i t f o r three d e c a d e s , with imports s u r p a s s i n g e x p o r t s by about $1 billion per day in 2 0 0 0 , a trade d e f i c i t that a n n u a l l y a l l o w s U.S. citizens to e n j o y a standard of living m o r e than $ 1 , 0 0 0 per person higher than would o t h e r w i s e be possible. But mercantilists f e a r that e x c e s s i v e imports permit f o r e i g n e r s to e n j o y e m p l o y m e n t and profits f r o m production that might o t h e r w i s e benefit citizens of the h o m e country. For e x a m p l e , since the U.S. t r a d e deficit b e g a n to b l o o m in the 1970s, the m a s s i v e sales of J a p a n e s e c a r s in the United States have transferred millions of j o b s out of the U.S. e c o n o m y , acc o u n t i n g f o r high levels of u n e m p l o y m e n t in Detroit and low levels of une m p l o y m e n t in Tokyo. H o w e v e r , the greater anxiety o v e r trade deficits concerns their longerterm impact, b e c a u s e they generate f u t u r e liabilities just as any o t h e r f o r m of indebtedness. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the c o n s e q u e n c e s of trade i m b a l a n c e s cannot be e v a l u a t e d easily b e c a u s e they trigger c o m p l e x f l o w s of m o n e y that are also u n b a l a n c e d and u n p r e d i c t a b l e . To u n d e r s t a n d this point, c o n s i d e r that the trade deficit of the United States m e a n s that m o r e m o n e y f l o w s out of the U.S. e c o n o m y in the f o r m of d o l l a r s to pay f o r imports t h a n f l o w s back into the U.S. e c o n o m y through p a y m e n t s for U.S. goods p u r c h a s e d by f o r e i g n e r s . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the trade d e f i c i t d e p e n d in large part o n what h a p p e n s to those e x c e s s dollars, w h i c h w o u l d appear to be piling u p abroad. Eventually, o n e a s s u m e s , f o r e i g n e r s will want to use those d o l l a r s to purchase U.S. g o o d s , and w h e n they do, the result could be catastrophic. Suddenly, A m e r i c a n s w h o h a v e g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d to c o n s u m i n g f a r m o r e than they p r o d u c e will be f o r c e d to c o n s u m e far less. In practice, m a n y of t h o s e d o l l a r s have already f o u n d their w a y b a c k into the U.S. e c o n o m y , b e c a u s e f o r e i g n e r s have used them to p u r c h a s e U.S. T r e a s u r y b o n d s a n d real estate a n d to f i n a n c e the t a k e o v e r of U . S . b u s i nesses as well as to m a k e new i n v e s t m e n t s in the United States. S u c h c a p ital f l o w s can o f f s e t a trade deficit temporarily and render it h a r m l e s s in the short run, but they create f u t u r e liabilities that only postpone the inevitable n e e d to b a l a n c e p r o d u c t i o n and c o n s u m p t i o n . For e x a m p l e , d u r i n g t h e 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. T r e a s u r y b o r r o w e d h u n d r e d s of billions of d o l lars f r o m f o r e i g n e r s by selling t h e m U.S. T r e a s u r y b o n d s , a f o r m of d e b t that must s o m e d a y be r e p a i d . In the m e a n t i m e , f o r e i g n e r s n o w r e c e i v e about $70 billion in interest p a y m e n t s annually f r o m the U.S. federal g o v e r n m e n t (Forsyth 1996). M o r e o v e r , the other investments m a d e by f o r e i g n ers out of the p r o c e e d s of their past trade s u r p l u s e s with the U n i t e d States also represent f u t u r e liabilities, even though they d o not constitute " d e b t " in the s a m e f o r m a l a c c o u n t i n g sense. For e x a m p l e , H o n d a auto plants l o c a t e d

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in the U n i t e d S t a t e s can be e x p e c t e d to return m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s to their o w n e r s in J a p a n every year far into the f u t u r e . This constant o u t f l o w of dollars r e s u l t i n g f r o m past trade d e f i c i t s only adds to the o u t f l o w a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the c u r r e n t o n e . O v e r a l l , the net liability of U.S. p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e debt to f o r e i g n e r s n o w a m o u n t s to well o v e r $2 trillion, and it c o n t i n u e s to m o u n t at a rate e q u i v a l e n t to the annual trade deficit, m o r e than $ 3 0 0 billion per year recently. E c o n o m i s t s d i s a g r e e about w h e t h e r these d e v e l o p m e n t s ought to raise a l a r m . A f t e r all, the willingness of f o r e i g n e r s to invest in the United States surely is an indication of c o n f i d e n c e in the strength of the U.S. e c o n o m y . M o r e generally, as C h a p t e r 7 s h o w s , capital f l o w s can be beneficial to the e c o n o m y and its f u t u r e . Indeed, foreign capital is an essential ingredient to d e v e l o p m e n t in m a n y third w o r l d c o u n t r i e s . W h e t h e r capital i n f l o w s prod u c e e f f e c t s that are, on b a l a n c e , p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e d e p e n d s heavily on the s o u r c e of the capital, the t e r m s on w h i c h it is a c q u i r e d , and especially on the uses to w h i c h it is put. In the c a s e of the U n i t e d States, international c u r r e n c y m a r k e t s h a v e sent a cautionary signal that the persistent trade deficit is eroding the c o n f i d e n c e of f o r e i g n investors. E v e n with m a s s i v e i n f l o w s of i n v e s t m e n t f r o m abroad, the d e m a n d for dollars by f o r e i g n e r s to purchase products or investm e n t s f r o m the U n i t e d States has been s m a l l e r than the supply of d o l l a r s created by A m e r i c a n s purchasing foreign products and investments. As a result, the value of the dollar, once equivalent to 360 J a p a n e s e yen (¥360), declined to under ¥ 8 0 in early 1995 (before recovering to ¥ 1 2 5 in early 2002). T h e s e fluctuations in the purchasing p o w e r of the dollar mean, for e x a m p l e , that the ¥ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 cost of a J a p a n e s e automobile would translate into a dollar price of about U . S . $ 5 , 6 0 0 at the e x c h a n g e rate of ¥ 3 6 0 per dollar, but w o u l d require m o r e than U . S . $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 when the dollar fell below ¥ 1 0 0 . B a l a n c e - o f - t r a d e deficits tend to lead to such c u r r e n c y declines and to both f u t u r e price increases and s n o w b a l l i n g debt. T h u s , a trade deficit provides i m m e d i a t e b e n e f i t s but also implies that f u t u r e c o n s u m p t i o n m a y be r e d u c e d so that the standard of living for f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s will fall. Because these c o n s e q u e n c e s are uncertain, nations vary s o m e w h a t in their tolerance for trade deficits, but most try to m i n i m i z e or avoid t h e m altogether, as c o u n s e l e d by mercantilists.

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O P T I O N S IN T R A D E P O L I C Y

To achieve their desired trade b a l a n c e , nations o f t e n c o m b i n e t w o m e r c a n tilist a p p r o a c h e s . T h e y m a y e m p h a s i z e the e x p a n s i o n of e x p o r t s t h r o u g h a strategy k n o w n as industrial policy. M o r e c o m m o n l y , they e m p h a s i z e minimizing imports, a stance k n o w n generally as protectionism (Fallows 1993).

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P r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e m a n y f o r m s of i m p o r t restriction designed to limit the p u r c h a s e of g o o d s f r o m abroad. All allow d o m e s t i c imp o r t - c o m p e t i n g industries to c a p t u r e a larger share of the m a r k e t and, in the p r o c e s s , to earn h i g h e r p r o f i t s and to e m p l o y m o r e w o r k e r s at h i g h e r w a g e s . T h e s i m p l e s t i m p o r t b a r r i e r s are quotas, g o v e r n m e n t restrictions that p l a c e a f i x e d limit on the q u a n t i t y or v a l u e of g o o d s that can be imp o r t e d . T h e m o s t traditional b a r r i e r s are taxes on i m p o r t s called tariffs or i m p o r t duties, but they are n o l o n g e r the m a i n f o r m of p r o t e c t i o n i s m in m o s t countries. In fact, declining f r o m their p e a k in the 1930s, tariff levels t h r o u g h o u t the world are n o w generally very low. In the United States, the a v e r a g e tariff rate r e a c h e d a m o d e r n high of 5 9 p e r c e n t in 1932 under w h a t h a s been c a l l e d " a r e m a r k a b l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e tariff l a w , " the S m o o t - H a w l e y Act, w h i c h has been w i d e l y c r e d i t e d w i t h t r i g g e r i n g a spiral of r e s t r i c t i o n s by other n a t i o n s that h e l p e d p l u n g e the global e c o n o m y into the Great D e p r e s sion of the 1930s. T h e average rate in the United States was reduced to 25 p e r c e n t a f t e r W o r l d War II a n d d e c l i n e d to about 2 p e r c e n t a f t e r the U r u g u a y R o u n d of trade negotiations (discussed in greater detail later in the c h a p t e r ) c o n c l u d e d in 1994. M o s t other countries have f o l l o w e d s u i t — a n d s o m e h a v e reduced even m o r e — s o that a v e r a g e rates a b o v e 10 percent are n o w very rare. H o w e v e r , in place of tariffs, g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e r e s p o n d e d to the pleas of industries t h r e a t e n e d by f o r e i g n c o m p e t i t i o n with a variety of nontariff barriers ( N T B s ) , especially voluntary export restraints ( V E R s ) . In the most f a m o u s c a s e of V E R s , J a p a n e s e a u t o m a k e r s " v o l u n t a r i l y " a g r e e d to limit e x p o r t s to the U n i t e d States in 1981. ( H a d J a p a n r e f u s e d , a q u o t a that w o u l d have been m o r e d a m a g i n g to J a p a n e s e a u t o m a k e r s would have been i m p o s e d . ) T h e F e d e r a l T r a d e C o m m i s s i o n ( F T C ) has e s t i m a t e d that the h i g h e r prices f o r autos that r e s u l t e d cost U.S. c o n s u m e r s about $1 billion per year. Not only d o e s the restricted supply of J a p a n e s e autos cause their prices to rise because of the artificial shortage, but it also enables U.S. m a n u f a c t u r e r s to m a i n t a i n higher prices in the a b s e n c e of this c o m p e t i t i o n . A f a v o r a b l e t r a d e b a l a n c e (or the e l i m i n a t i o n of an u n f a v o r a b l e o n e ) also can be s o u g h t t h r o u g h an industrial policy that p r o m o t e s exports. T h e simplest t e c h n i q u e is a direct export subsidy, in w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t p a y s a d o m e s t i c f i r m for each good e x p o r t e d , so that it can c o m p e t e with f o r e i g n f i r m s that o t h e r w i s e w o u l d have a cost advantage. Such a policy has at least three m o t i v a t i o n s . First, by increasing p r o d u c t i o n in the chosen industry, it r e d u c e s the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate. S e c o n d , by enabling f i r m s to gain a greater share of f o r e i g n m a r k e t s , it gives t h e m greater leverage to increase p r i c e s (and p r o f i t s ) in the f u t u r e . T h i r d , i n c r e a s i n g e x p o r t s will i m p r o v e the balance of trade and avoid the p r o b l e m s of trade deficits. L i b e r a l s are by n o m e a n s i n d i f f e r e n t to the d a n g e r s of t r a d e d e f i c i t s , but t h e y a r g u e that m o s t m e r c a n t i l i s t c u r e s are w o r s e than the d i s e a s e .

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When mercantilist policies affect prices, they automatically create winners and losers and in the process engender political controversies. For example, to raise the revenue to pay for a subsidy, the domestic consumer has to pay higher taxes. As noted above, protectionism also harms the consumer by raising prices even while it benefits domestic firms that compete against imports. If mercantilist policies are controversial in the nations that enact them, they are met with even greater hostility by the nations with which they trade. For example, U.S. firms complain that Japanese protectionism prevents them from competing for the lucrative Japanese market, while the export promotion policies of many countries place U.S. firms at a disadvantage even in the U.S. market. The U.S. steel industry has been particularly outspoken in its denunciation of steel imported f r o m foreign firms, especially those that are heavily subsidized by their governments. They contend that U.S. jobs and U.S. profits are being undercut unfairly and, in December 2001, the U.S. International Trade Commission recommended a tariff to protect the U.S. steel industry from foreign competition. The United States has generally preferred to maintain a desirable volume and balance of trade by inducing other nations to lower their trade barriers rather than by erecting its own. The United States has undertaken direct bilateral negotiations to change the policies of other nations, especially Japan, and has spearheaded efforts to create and maintain global institutions that facilitate trade, as discussed below.

•

THE MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE

As nations choose among policy options, they must acknowledge liberal theory's contention that free trade allows the market to efficiently allocate resources and thus to maximize global and national consumption. Neither can the desire of individual consumers and producers to participate in trade be ignored. As my brief survey of the consequences of a trade deficit illustrates, however, the simplicity of individual motives conceals the complexity of the effects that trade has on others. As I will illustrate, the dangers of trade deficits are only a small part of why governments almost universally restrict trade, at least to some degree. In fact, governments seek many outcomes from trade—full employment, long-term growth, economic stability, social harmony, power, security, and friendly foreign relations—yet discover that these desirable outcomes are frequently incompatible with one another. Because free trade may achieve some goals but undermine others, governments that fail to heed the advice of economic theory need not be judged ignorant or corrupt. Instead, they recognize a governmental responsibility to cope with all of trade's consequences, not only those addressed by liberal trade theory. For example, while trade affects the prices of individual products, global markets

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also influence which individuals and nations accumulate wealth and political power. Trade determines who will be employed and at what wage. It determines what natural resources will be used and at what environmental cost. It shapes opportunities and constraints in foreign policy. Because trade affects such a broad range of social outcomes, conflict among alternative goals and values is inevitable. As a result, both individuals and governments must face dilemmas that involve the multiple consequences of trade, the multiple goals of national policy, and the multiple values that compete for dominance in shaping behavior (Moon 2000).

The Distributional Effects of Trade, or Who Wins, Who Loses? Many of these dilemmas stem from the sizable effect that international trade has on the distribution of income and wealth among individuals, groups, and nations. Simply put, some gain material benefits from trade while others lose. Thus, to choose one trade policy and reject others is simultaneously a choice of one income distribution over another. As a result, trade is inevitably politicized: Each group pressures its government to adopt a trade policy from which it expects to benefit. The most visible distributional effects occur because trade policy often protects or promotes one industry or sector of the economy at the expense of others. For example, tariffs on imported steel protect the domestic steel industry by making foreign-produced steel more expensive, but they also harm domestic automakers who must pay higher prices for the steel they use. As in this case—where car buyers face higher prices as a result—most barriers to trade benefit some sector of the economy at the expense of consumers, a point always emphasized by proponents of free trade. Trade policy also benefits some classes and regions at the expense of others, a point more often emphasized by those who favor greater governmental control. For example, the elimination of trade barriers between the United States and Mexico under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) forces some U.S. manufacturing workers into direct competition with Mexican workers, who earn a markedly lower wage. Since NAFTA guarantees that imports can enter the United States without tariffs, some U.S. businesses move to Mexico where production costs are lower, and U.S. workers lose their jobs in the process. Facing the threat of such production shifts, many more U.S. workers will accept a decline in wages, benefits, or working conditions. The losses from such wage competition will be greatest for unskilled workers in high-wage countries employed in industries that can move either their products or their production facilities most easily across national boundaries. Others, particularly more affluent professionals who face less direct competition from abroad (such as doctors, lawyers, and university professors), stand to gain from trade because

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it lowers prices on the goods they consume. Of course, the greatest beneficiaries are the owners of businesses that profit f r o m lower wage rates and expanded markets. Proponents of free trade tend to de-emphasize these distributional effects and instead focus on the impact of trade on the economy as a whole. That is partly because liberal theory contends that f r e e trade does not decrease e m p l o y m e n t but only shifts it f r o m an inefficient sector to one in which a nation has a comparative advantage. For e x a m p l e , U.S. workers losing their jobs to Mexican imports should eventually find employment in industries that export to Mexico. Proponents of free trade insist that it is far better to tolerate these "transition c o s t s " — t h e short-term dislocations and distributional effects—than to protect an inefficient industry. Because these distributional consequences have such obvious political implications, however, the state is much more attentive to them than economic theorists are. That is one reason all governments control trade to one degree or another. Of course, that does not mean that they do so wisely or fairly, in part because their decisions are shaped by patterns of representation among the constituencies whose material interests are affected by trade policy. In general, workers tend to be underrepresented, which is why trade policies so often encourage trade built on low wages that enrich business owners but constrain the opportunities for workers. Similarly, the economic structures created by trade patterns can produce just as great a distributional inequity between genders as between classes, sectors, or regions. As Chapter 10 describes, political representation of w o m e n in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is very poor. Finally, as the discussion of trade deficits indicated, the economic activities shaped by trade policies tend to affect current generations very differently f r o m future ones—and the latter are seldom represented at all.

The Values

Dilemma

These distributional effects pose challenging trade-offs among competing values. For example, the effects of NAFTA were predicted to include somewhat lower prices for U.S. consumers but also j o b loss or wage reduction for some unskilled U.S. workers. The positions taken on this issue by most individuals, however, did not hinge on their own material interests; few could confidently foresee any personal impact of N A F T A since the gains were estimated at well under 1 percent of GDP, and j o b losses were not expected to exceed a few hundred thousand in a labor force of more than 100 million. However, the choice among competing values was plain: NAFTA meant gains in wealth but also greater inequality and insecurity for workers. Some citizens acceded to the j u d g m e n t of liberal theory that the country as a whole would be better off with freer trade, while others identified with the plight of workers, who were more skeptical of liberal theory simply

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b e c a u s e for t h e m the stakes w e r e so m u c h higher. A f t e r all, it is easy f o r a theorist to postulate that j o b losses in an i m p o r t - c o m p e t i n g industry w o u l d be m a t c h e d by j o b g a i n s in an e x p o r t i n g f i r m but far h a r d e r f o r a w o r k e r w h o h a s d e v o t e d his life to o n e c a r e e r to p a c k up and m o v e to a s t r a n g e town, h o p e f u l that he might f i n d a j o b that requires skills he m a y not possess in an u n f a m i l i a r industry. In the final analysis, N A F T A b e c a m e a r e f e r e n d u m on what kind of society people wished to live in. T h e decision w a s quintessentially A m e r i c a n : o n e of g r e a t e r w e a l t h but also greater i n e q u a l ity and insecurity. Of course, other distributional effects gave rise to other value c h o i c e s as well. Since the gains f r o m N A F T A were expected to be greater f o r M e x i c o than f o r the U n i t e d States, the c o n s c i e n t i o u s citizen w o u l d also w e i g h w h e t h e r it is better to h e l p M e x i c a n w o r k e r s b e c a u s e they are p o o r e r or to protect U.S. w o r k e r s b e c a u s e they are U.S. citizens. As C h a p t e r 8 implies, such issues of inequality in p o o r societies can translate directly into q u e s tions of life or death. As a result, the i m p o r t a n c e of trade policy, w h i c h h a s such a p o w e r f u l impact on the distribution of gains and losses, is h e i g h t e n e d in poor, d e p e n d e n t nations w h e r e half of the e c o n o m y is related to trade. P e r h a p s the m o s t c h a l l e n g i n g value t r a d e - o f f s c o n c e r n the t r a d e policies that shift gains and losses f r o m one time period to another. S u c h " i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l " e f f e c t s arise f r o m a variety of trade issues. For e x a m p l e , as discussed earlier, the U.S. trade deficit, like any f o r m of debt, r e p r e s e n t s a n i m m e d i a t e i n c r e a s e in c o n s u m p t i o n but a p o s t p o n e m e n t of its c o s t s . T h e J a p a n e s e industrial p o l i c y of e x p o r t p r o m o t i o n f o s t e r s a t r a d e s u r p l u s , w h i c h p r o d u c e s the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t in J a p a n . T h e s u b s i d i e s the J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t p a y s to J a p a n e s e e x p o r t e r s r e q u i r e J a p a n e s e c i t i z e n s to p a y both higher prices and higher taxes. H o w e v e r , the sacrifices of J a p a n ' s c u r rent g e n e r a t i o n m a y b e n e f i t f u t u r e o n e s if this subsidy e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s f o r m s an " i n f a n t i n d u s t r y " into a p o w e r f u l enterprise that can repay the s u b sidies t h r o u g h c h e a p e r prices or g r e a t e r e m p l o y m e n t . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h o s e subsidies m a k e J a p a n e s e p r o d u c t s c h e a p e r a b r o a d , so c o n s u m e r s in c o u n tries like the United States b e n e f i t , r e i n f o r c i n g the U.S. p r e f e r e n c e for i m m e d i a t e g r a t i f i c a t i o n . Of c o u r s e , if the s u b s i d i e s drive U.S. f i r m s out o f business, f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s of U.S. citizens m a y s u f f e r losses of e m p l o y ment opportunities and higher prices. It is interesting to speculate w h y U . S . policies so f r e q u e n t l y d i f f e r f r o m J a p a n e s e ones when distributional e f f e c t s pose the d i l e m m a of w h e t h e r it is better to sacrifice now for the f u t u r e or t o leave f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s to solve their o w n p r o b l e m s . T h e v a l u e s d i l e m m a e n c o m p a s s e s m u c h m o r e than just an a l t e r n a t i v e angle on d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e f f e c t s , h o w e v e r ( P o l a n y i 1944). T h e d e b a t e o v e r " c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , " which began with the efforts by U.S. businesses to l o w e r their production costs in order to c o m p e t e with foreign firms, illustrates h o w trade m a y i m p l y a c o m p r o m i s e of o t h e r societal values. C o m p a n i e s o f t e n

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find that g o v e r n m e n t policies m a k e it d i f f i c u l t for t h e m to lower their labor costs. L o w e r w a g e s c o u l d be paid if the m i n i m u m w a g e w e r e e l i m i n a t e d and collective b a r g a i n i n g and labor unions w e r e o u t l a w e d . T h e abolition of seniority s y s t e m s a n d age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l a w s w o u l d e n a b l e c o m p a n i e s to terminate w o r k e r s w h e n their e f f i c i e n c y declined (or at the w h i m of a boss). E l i m i n a t i n g p e n s i o n s , health care, sick leave, w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r a c c i d e n t s , w o r k p l a c e s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s , and p a i d v a c a t i o n s and h o l i d a y s w o u l d also l o w e r c o m p a n y labor costs. But such a c t i o n s entail a c o m p r o m i s e with f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e s a b o u t the kind of s o c i e t y in w h i c h p e o p l e want to live. G o v e r n m e n t regulations that h a n d i c a p b u s i n e s s were d e s i g n e d to meet other legitimate national goals, addressing such issues as equality, security, social h a r m o n y , and ecological sustainability. E n v i r o n m e n t a l regulations, f o r e x a m p l e , m a y add to p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s , but surely a c h i e v i n g e c o n o m i c interests is not worth a b a n d o n i n g all other values. C h o o s i n g between alternative v a l u e s is a l w a y s difficult for a society, because reasonable p e o p l e can d i f f e r in the priority they a s c r i b e to e a c h . Still, a g r e e m e n t s o n such matters can usually be f o r g e d within societies, in part b e c a u s e values tend to be broadly, if not universally, shared. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , f r e e trade f o r c e s f i r m s b u r d e n e d by these value choices in one c o u n t r y to c o m p e t e with f i r m s o p e r a t i n g in c o u n t r i e s that m a y not share them. This situation creates a d i l e m m a for c o n s u m e r s , f o r c i n g them to balance e c o n o m i c interests against other values. For e x a m p l e , continuing to trade with n a t i o n s that p e r m i t s h a b b y t r e a t m e n t of w o r k e r s — o r even outright h u m a n rights a b u s e s — p o s e s a p a i n f u l moral choice, not least b e c a u s e g o o d s f r o m such c o u n t r i e s are o f t e n cheaper. As C h a p t e r 4 d o c u m e n t s , foreign g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e o f t e n d e c l a r e d their o p p o s i t i o n to h u m a n rights a b u s e s but h a v e s e l d o m s u p p o r t e d their r h e t o r i c with a c t i o n s that e f f e c tively c u r t a i l e d the p r a c t i c e . In fact, the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the policy to pressure foreign g o v e r n m e n t s on behalf of a n o r m a t i v e stance has been left to c o n s u m e r s , w h o h a v e unwittingly a n s w e r e d key q u e s t i o n s daily: S h o u l d w e p u r c h a s e c h e a p f o r e i g n g o o d s like c l o t h i n g a n d textiles e v e n t h o u g h they m a y have been m a d e with child l a b o r — o r even slave labor? Of course, w e s e l d o m k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e p r o d u c t s w e r e p r o d u c e d — o r e v e n where they w e r e p r o d u c e d — s o w e p r e s s u r e o u r g o v e r n ment to adopt policies on behalf of principles w e c a n n o t personally d e f e n d . W h e r e v a l u e s are c o n c e r n e d , of course, w e c a n n o t e x p e c t e v e r y o n e to agree with the c h o i c e s we might m a k e . As C h a p t e r 11 describes, child labor remains a key s o u r c e of c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e f o r m a n y countries in several industries p r o m i n e n t in international trade. We c a n n o t e x p e c t t h e m to give u p easily a p r a c t i c e that is a m a j o r c o m p o n e n t of their d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y and that is m o r e o f f e n s i v e to us than to t h e m . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , if trade competitors d o not share our values, it m a y prove difficult to maintain t h e m o u r s e l v e s — u n l e s s w e restrict t r a d e , accept t r a d e d e f i c i t s , or d e s i g n state

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policies to alleviate the most dire consequences. After all, it is hard to see how U.S. textile producers can compete with the sweatshops of Asia without creating sweatshops in New York. That point inevitably animates a complex debate over whether eliminating sweatshops would really benefit the poor, a dilemma of international trade that cannot be avoided merely by refusing to think about it. Foreign Policy Considerations:

Power and

Peace

Some of the most challenging value choices concern the effect of trade on the foreign policy goals pursued by states, especially power, peace, and national autonomy. For example, policymakers have long been aware that trade has two deep, if contradictory, effects on national security. On the one hand, trade contributes to national prosperity, which increases national power and enhances security. On the other hand, it has the same effect on a nation's trade partner, which could become a political or even military rival. The resulting ambivalent attitude is torn between the vision of states cooperating for economic gain and the recognition that they also use trade to compete for political power. While a market perspective sees neighboring nations as potential customers, the state must also see them as potential enemies. As a result, the state not only must consider the absolute gains it receives from trade but also must weigh those gains in relative terms, perhaps even avoiding trade that would be more advantageous to its potential enemies than to itself. For this reason, states have always been attentive to the distribution of the gains from trade and selective about their trade partners, frequently encouraging trade with some nations and discouraging or even banning it with others. While understandable, such policies create competitive struggles for markets, raw materials, and investment outlets, which sometimes can lead to open conflict. In fact, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of state Cordell Hull even went so far as to contend that bitter trade rivalries were the chief cause of World War I and a substantial contributor to the outbreak of World War II. Both were precipitated by discriminatory trade policies in which different quotas or duties were imposed on the products of different nations. Hull, who believed that free multilateral trade would build bridges rather than create chasms between peoples and nations, thus championed the nondiscrimination principle and urged the creation of international institutions that would govern international trade in accordance with it. In fact, international institutions are absolutely essential to maintaining any kind of international trading system, let alone one that reduces the conflict potential among nations. The need for such institutions at the global level is illustrated by the Bretton Woods trade and monetary regime created

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under the leadership of the United States at the end of World War II. It is centered on the institutions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Institutions are necessary to overcome the inclination of most nations to retain their own trade barriers while inducing other countries to lower theirs. Since 1946, the GATT has convened eight m a j o r negotiating sessions (referred to as rounds) in which nations exchange reductions in trade barriers, with the result that global trade has increased dramatically. Institutions are also necessary to provide a stable monetary system that facilitates trade by permitting the easy exchange of national currencies and the adjustment of trade imbalances, a role taken up at the global level by the IMF. The World Bank lends money to nations that might otherwise seek trade-limiting solutions to their financial problems. At the regional level the European Union (EU) has struggled with monetary issues for years, finally fashioning a new regional currency, the euro, to replace national currencies beginning in 2001. Finally, international institutions are necessary to establish the rules of trade, create the international law that embodies them, and provide a forum for resolving the disputes that inevitably arise. Thus, the Uruguay Round of GATT, completed in 1994, created the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide a global setting to resolve trade disputes among its 143 members peacefully. Regionally, a similar belief in the efficacy of free trade as a guarantor of peace was an important motivation for the initiative that eventually led to the European Union. This process was launched in 1951 with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which internationalized an industry that was key not only for the economies of the six nations involved but also for their war-making potential. With production facilities scattered among different countries, each became dependent on the others to provide both demand for the final product and part of the supply capacity. This arrangement fulfilled the liberal dream of an interdependence that would prevent war by making it economically suicidal. In fact, the ECSC was an innovative form of peace treaty, designed, in the words of Robert Schuman, to "make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible" (Pomfret 1988: 75). In both the EU and Bretton Woods, policymakers saw several ways that an institutionalized liberal trading system could promote peace among nations. The growth of global institutions could weaken the hold of nationalism and mediate conflict b e t w e e n nations. Trade-induced contact could break d o w n nationalistic hostility a m o n g societies. Multilateralism (nondiscrimination) would tend to prevent grievances f r o m developing among states. Interdependence could constrain armed conflict, and foster stability, while the economic growth generated by trade could remove the desperation that leads nations to aggression.

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Such peaceful pursuits require the exercise of power. According to hegemonic stability theory, one dominant nation—a hegemon—will usually have to subsidize the organizational costs and frequently offer side benefits in exchange for cooperation, such as the massive infusion of foreign aid provided to Europe by the United States under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. Maintaining the capability to handle these leadership requirements entails substantial costs. For example, U.S. expenditures for defense, which have been many times higher than those of nations with whom it competes since World War II, erode the competitiveness of U.S. business by requiring higher tax levels; they constrain the funds available to spend on other items that could enhance competitiveness; and they divert a substantial share of U.S. scientific and technological expertise into military innovation and away from commercial areas. (Ironically, much of that money has been spent directly on protecting the very nations against whom U.S. competitiveness has slipped, especially Germany, Japan, and Korea.) The trade-off between competitiveness and defense may be judged differently by different individuals, but it can be ignored by none. Neither can we neglect the complex relationship between peace and power raised by trade issues. The United States certainly sacrifices some power to maintain these organizations, but it also achieves considerable benefits from its capacity to strongly influence—and sometimes dictate— the rules under which they operate. Indeed, many of the critics who have protested at recent meetings of these institutions see them as extensions of U.S. imperialism. International

Cooperation

and National

Autonomy

International institutions may be necessary to facilitate trade and to alleviate the conflict that inevitably surrounds it, but they also create conflict of their own. At issue is the tension between maintaining fair competition among firms in different countries—which is essential to sustaining the international trading system—and maintaining the cultural and political differences among nations—which is central to the national sovereignty and autonomy of the modern state system. Fair competition in trade requires at least implicit cooperation between governments, because no nation can export unless some other nation imports. However, while nations usually encourage the exports on which they rely for jobs, for profits, and for the limitation of balance-of-trade deficits, they are usually less enthusiastic about welcoming imports. Fortunately, almost all nations acknowledge, in principle, the obligation to permit the sale of foreign products within their borders, if only because they fear that excessive protectionism of their own market will encourage other nations to protect theirs.

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Still, disputes over trade barriers are common, because, in practice, governments have many compelling motives for enacting policies that affect trade. Often one nation defends its policy as a rightful exercise of national sovereignty, while another challenges it as an unfair barrier to trade. Ideally, such disagreements have been settled by appeal to the GATT or, more recently, to the WTO, whose new dispute resolution panel hears trade disputes and determines whether national behavior is consistent with international rules. But not even the W T O ' s chief sponsor, the United States, accepts the dominion of the W T O without serious reservations about its intrusion into affairs historically reserved for national governments. Since trade touches so many other areas of governmental responsibility, it seems unavoidable that this conflict would arise from time to time. While the U.S. administration strongly supported the creation of the W T O to prevent trade violations by other nations, a surprising variety of U.S. groups opposed its ratification because it might encroach on national sovereignty. Environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club were joined not only by consumer advocates like Ralph Nader but also by conservatives such as Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, and Jesse Helms, who feared that a W T O panel (a small panel of judges who hear disputes) could rule that various U.S. government policies constituted unfair trade practices, even though they were designed to pursue values utterly unrelated to trade. For example, EU automakers have challenged the U.S. law that establishes standards for auto emissions and fuel economy. Buchanan said, " W T O means putting America's trade under foreign bureaucrats who will meet in secret to demand changes in United States laws. . . . W T O tramples all over American sovereignty and states' rights" (Dodge 1994). Because the WTO could not force a change in U.S. law, GATT director-general Peter Sutherland called this position "errant nonsense" (Tumulty 1994), but the W T O could impose sanctions or authorize an offended nation to withdraw trade concessions as compensation for the injury. The most dramatic example occurred in the 1994 case known as "GATTzilla versus Flipper," in which a GATT tribunal ruled in favor of a complaint brought by the EU on behalf of European tuna processors who buy tuna f r o m Mexico and other countries that use purse seine nets. The United States boycotts tuna caught in that way because the procedure also kills large numbers of dolphins; but this value is not universally shared by other nations. In fact, the GATT ruled that the U.S. law was an illegal barrier to trade because it discriminates against the fishing fleets of nations that use this technique. The United States saw this as an unwarranted intrusion into its domestic affairs and an affront to U.S. values. Soon thereafter the United States found itself on the other side of the clash between fair competition and national sovereignty when it appealed

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to the W T O to rule that the E U ' s prohibition of beef containing g r o w t h horm o n e s violated the " n a t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t " principle contained in G A T T ' s Article 3. S i n c e a l m o s t all c a t t l e raised in the U n i t e d States are f e d g r o w t h h o r m o n e s a n d very f e w E u r o p e a n cattle are, the United States c o n t e n d e d that the EU rule was simply disguised protectionism that unfairly discriminated against U.S. p r o d u c t s . T h e EU c o n t e n d e d that such beef w a s a cancer risk and that as a s o v e r e i g n p o w e r it had the right to establish w h a t e v e r health regulations it c h o s e to protect its citizens. T h e W T O ruled in f a v o r of the United States, incurring the wrath of those w h o saw this as an e x a m p l e of national d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s b e i n g o v e r r u l e d by u n d e m o c r a t i c global ones. C a n it be long b e f o r e C o l o m b i a c h a l l e n g e s U.S. d r u g laws as discriminating against m a r i j u a n a while f a v o r i n g C a n a d i a n w h i s k e y ? N e i t h e r can regional a g r e e m e n t s avoid this clash b e t w e e n fair c o m p e tition in trade and national a u t o n o m y . T h e first trade dispute under N A F T A involved a c h a l l e n g e by the U n i t e d States to r e g u l a t i o n s u n d e r C a n a d a ' s F i s h e r i e s Act e s t a b l i s h e d to p r o m o t e c o n s e r v a t i o n of h e r r i n g and s a l m o n stocks in C a n a d a ' s P a c i f i c Coast waters. S o o n t h e r e a f t e r the C a n a d i a n gove r n m e n t c h a l l e n g e d U.S. E n v i r o n m e n t a l Protection A g e n c y (EPA) r e g u l a tions that r e q u i r e the p h a s i n g out of asbestos, a c a r c i n o g e n no longer permitted as a b u i l d i n g material in the United States ( C a v a n a u g h et al. 1992). Similarly, critics of the EU worry that its leveling of the playing field for t r a d e c o m p e t i t i o n also t h r e a t e n s to level cultural and political d i f f e r ences a m o n g nations. D e n m a r k , for e x a m p l e , f o u n d that free trade m a d e it impossible to maintain a sales tax rate higher than n e i g h b o r i n g G e r m a n y ' s , b e c a u s e Danish citizens could simply e v a d e the tax by p u r c h a s i n g g o o d s in G e r m a n y and b r i n g i n g t h e m a c r o s s the b o r d e r duty free. C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s p r e s s u r e s a l s o m a k e it d i f f i c u l t f o r a n a t i o n to adopt policies that i m p o s e costs on business w h e n low trade barriers force f i r m s to c o m p e t e with those in other countries that d o not bear such b u r d e n s . For e x a m p l e , French f i r m s d e m a n d a level playing field in c o m p e t i n g with Spanish f i r m s w h e n e v e r the French g o v e r n m e n t m a n d a t e s e m p l o y e e benefits, health and safety rules, or e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n s m o r e costly than t h o s e in S p a i n . In f a c t , f r e e trade tends to h a r m o n i z e m a n y national policies. S o m e trade barriers are d e s i g n e d to protect unique aspects of the e c o n o m i c , social, and political life of n a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n trade a f f e c t s cultural m a t t e r s of s y m b o l i c i m p o r t a n c e . For e x a m p l e , F r a n c e i m p o s e s limits on the p e r c e n t a g e of television p r o g r a m m i n g that can originate a b r o a d , allegedly in d e f e n s e of French l a n g u a g e and c u s t o m . T h e o b v i o u s target of these restrictions, U.S. p r o d u c e r s of m o v i e s and youth-oriented m u s i c , c o n tend that the F r e n c h are s i m p l y p r o t e c t i n g their own i n e f f i c i e n t e n t e r t a i n ment industry. Indeed, H o l l y w o o d sees Baywatch as a valuable export c o m m o d i t y that d e s e r v e s the s a m e legal p r o t e c t i o n a b r o a d that the f o r e i g n television sets and C D p l a y e r s that d i s p l a y t h e s e i m a g e s r e c e i v e in t h e

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United States. But if we restrict trade because we oppose child labor or rain forest destruction, how can we object when other countries ban the sale of U.S. products because they violate their values—such as rock music and Hollywood films that celebrate sex, violence, and free expression of controversial ideas or even blue jeans, McDonald's hamburgers, and other symbols of U.S. cultural domination?

•

CONCLUSION: CHOICES FOR NATIONS A N D INDIVIDUALS

Few would deny the contention of liberal theory that trade permits a higher level of aggregate consumption than would be possible if consumers were prevented from purchasing foreign products. It is hard to imagine modern life without the benefits of trade. Of course, it does not follow that trade must be utterly unrestricted because the aggregate economic effect tells only part of the story. As mercantilists remind us, trade also carries with it important social and political implications. Trade shapes the distribution of income and wealth among individuals, affects the power of states and the relations among them, and constrains or enhances the ability of both individuals and nations to achieve goals built on other values. Thus, trade presents a dilemma for nations: No policy can avoid some of trade's negative consequences without also sacrificing some of its benefits. That is why most governments have sought to encompass elements of both liberalism and mercantilism in fashioning their trade policies. The same is true for individuals, because every day each individual must—explicitly or implicitly—assume a stance on the dilemmas identified in this chapter. In turn, trade forces individuals to consider some of the following discussion questions, questions that require normative judgments as well as a keen understanding of the empirical consequences of trade. We must always remember to ask not only what trade policy will best achieve our goals but also what our goals should be.

•

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Are your views closer to those of a liberal or a mercantilist? 2. Is it patriotic to purchase domestic products? Why or why not? 3. Does one owe a greater obligation to domestic workers and corporations than to foreign ones? 4. Should one purchase a product that is cheap even though it was made with slave labor or by workers deprived of human rights? 5. Should a country surrender some of its sovereignty in order to receive the benefits of joining the WTO?

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THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 6. Should one lobby the U.S. government to restrict the sales of U.S. forestry products abroad because these products c o m p r o m i s e the environment?

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

Easterly, William (1999) "The Lost Decades: Explaining Developing Countries' Stagnation 1980-1998." Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Fallows, James (1993) "How the World Works," Atlantic Monthly, December. Moon, Bruce E. (1998) "Exports, Outward-Oriented Development, and Economic Growth," Political Research Quarterly (March). (2000) Dilemmas of International Trade. Second edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Polanyi, Karl (1944) The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Reinhart. Ricardo, David (1981) Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo: Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Adam (1910) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: J. M. Dutton. World Bank (1999) World Development Indicators 1999. Washington, DC: World Bank.

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS Gerald W. Sazama

As humans have developed technology, our race has simultaneously developed economic systems. Primitive economic exchange occurred through the barter of handmade goods within a clan or between neighboring tribes. Modern economic exchange involves the transfer of simple products made with complex machinery, such as wheat, or of the complex machinery itself. These modern exchanges are financed by money and other sophisticated financial instruments. In finance, our race has moved from simple forms of money like wampum beads and gold coins to paper money and checks, and then to international markets for investment funds and national currencies transferred via the Internet. Like the growth in humans' ability to develop technology, the increasing sophistication of economic systems and financial instruments is wonderful. This sophistication makes possible the complex movement of products and resources first within single countries and now around the globe. Like the development of technology, however, the growth of international capital flows can also be used in horrible ways: for example, for selfish accumulation or for capital flight that dries up a nation's savings base, pushing it into a depression. Topics discussed in this chapter are (1) a basic vocabulary for international finance; (2) capital flows between industrialized or more developed countries (MDCs), such as the Japanese building a Honda plant in Ohio and the United States having a Chase branch bank in London; (3) capital flows between the MDCs and the less developed countries (LDCs); and (4) an exploration of the question "To regulate or not to regulate the international financial system?" 107

108 •

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY A BASIC VOCABULARY FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Financial capital takes many forms such as stocks, bonds, loans, and money. During a financial crisis, there is a rapid decrease in the value of financial capital, for example a stock market crash. Financial capital has little or no value if it represents ownership of a broken machine or a dysfunctional corporate organization or if investors lose trust in the health of markets. But financial capital is necessary because it facilitates exchange and movement of real resources like machinery, labor, and technology. International finance involves financing exports and imports and the movement of financial capital around the globe. To facilitate these flows, we have foreign exchange markets in which we exchange the money of one country for that of another. The price at which one country's money exchanges for another's is called the foreign exchange rate. An example of a foreign exchange rate would be the number of pesos (the money of Mexico) that can be purchased (exchanged) for one U.S. dollar. International financial capital flows occur because banks make international loans; multinational corporations (MNCs) and others invest in foreign countries; immigrants send labor earnings to relatives in their home countries; nongovernmental organizations, for example Save the Children Federation, transfer donations; multilateral organizations, for example the World Bank, have loans or grants; and governments build overseas military bases or give foreign aid.

•

NORTH-NORTH CAPITAL FLOWS

While only 15 percent of the world's population live in MDCs, over 80 percent of the world's capital flows among these countries. This is because about 80 percent of the world's production of goods and services is produced in the MDCs (World Bank 2001b). The history and contemporary situation of these North-North capital flows (among the MDCs) are discussed in this section. In the following sections, I will examine capital flows between the MDCs and LDCs, which are much poorer and contain the vast majority of the world's population. Historical Stages of the Growth of International Finance During the nineteenth century, international finance was based on the gold standard, in which all countries agreed to exchange their national currencies for gold. The European nations sent capital to finance the development of emerging MDCs, such as the United States, or to their colonies to build the facilities necessary to extract mineral and agricultural products, which were then sent back to the colonizing country.

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109

E c o n o m i c competition a m o n g the M D C s was an important cause of World Wars I and II. A f t e r World War I, Russia became communist. Also, England and France d e m a n d e d large war reparation payments f r o m Germany, which depressed the German economy and contributed to the rise of Adolf Hitler. In the early 1930s, countries also began to competitively devalue their currency in relation to gold in order to m a k e their exports to other countries cheaper and imports from other countries more expensive. These "beggar-thy-neighbor policies" made an international system of fixed e x c h a n g e rates with gold unsustainable. T h e international e c o n o m y collapsed and with it the use of the gold standard. These factors contributed to the worldwide Great Depression and to World War II. The United States emerged f r o m World War II as the world's dominant economic power. In the early 1950s, the total gross domestic product (GDP, or the value of a country's output of goods and services) of all the M D C s outside the United States was equal to only 4 0 percent of U.S. GDP. Because of this, the United States had a very strong influence over the terms of international trade and finance during the early postwar period. Other countries used government regulation to fix the value of their currency to the U.S. dollar. This means that these g o v e r n m e n t s guaranteed for a long period that a specific n u m b e r of units of their currency would equal the value of one dollar. This was done to bring stability to the prices of their goods in international trade. By the late 1960s, many c h a n g e s had occurred in the international economy. T h e European countries and Japan had rebuilt their economies. Most of the L D C s were no longer political colonies. The newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil were emerging on their own. Also, an economically p o w e r f u l Union of Soviet Socialist R e p u b l i c s ( U S S R ) was supporting the third world liberation movements for its own political-economic reasons. All of these factors challenged the economic supremacy of the dollar. B e f o r e this time, the United States had a more favorable ratio of exports versus imports. This permitted the United States to fix the redemption of $35 for an ounce of gold. But with the increased international competition, the United States was no longer able to maintain this fixed exchange rate. In 1973, the United States allowed the value of the dollar to fluctuate (or float) in its relation to other c o u n t r i e s ' currencies. The forces of d e m a n d and supply in world markets now determined the relative value of the dollar to foreign currencies and to gold. In response, most other countries also allowed their e x c h a n g e rates to fluctuate. A d j u s t m e n t p r o b l e m s to these changes created the first post-World War II international financial crises. In the 1980s, national g o v e r n m e n t s accelerated the deregulation of banks and international finance. Although this deregulation contributed to a rapid increase in growth of international capital flows, many fear it also led to instability in the system (Blecker 1999; Korten 2001).

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY T h e first p o s t - 1 9 8 0 crisis was the third world debt crisis in 1982. This is discussed in the N o r t h - S o u t h section below. T h e second p o s t - 1 9 8 0 crisis resulted f r o m the U.S. stock market crash in 1987, which caused a flight of f o r e i g n capital f r o m the United States and thereby destabilized o t h e r m a r kets. This destabilization w a s s t e m m e d only with coordinated action by important central b a n k s a r o u n d the globe. In 1995, there were t w o additional crises, w h e n the v a l u e of the M e x i c a n p e s o c o l l a p s e d a n d w h e n J a p a n e s e land v a l u e s a n d its stock m a r k e t c r a s h e d . Both again c r e a t e d s e r i o u s adj u s t m e n t p r o b l e m s f o r the international f i n a n c i a l s y s t e m . T h e s e p r o b l e m s w e r e m i n i m i z e d only by a series of e m e r g e n c y ad hoc a g r e e m e n t s a m o n g key national g o v e r n m e n t f i n a n c e ministers and by the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t ' s willingness to lend billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer m o n e y to support the p e s o in o r d e r to p r o t e c t the i n v e s t m e n t s of U.S. c o r p o r a t i o n s in M e x i c o . T h e f o u r t h p o s t - 1 9 8 0 crisis, called the A s i a n crisis, o c c u r r e d in 1997 and 1998. T h e r e was a dramatic sell-off of s t o c k — f i r s t in the Thailand stock exc h a n g e and then in the H o n g K o n g stock e x c h a n g e . B o t h of t h e s e led to d r o p s in stock values in the m a j o r international financial m a r k e t s . T h e contagion spread, and it resulted in recessions or d e p r e s s i o n s in several of the Asian countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and T h a i l a n d . This in turn spooked international markets, and the c o n t a g i o n s p r e a d as f a r as c a u s i n g capital flight f r o m R u s s i a and B r a z i l . U n f o r t u nately, these local r e c e s s i o n s resulted in increased u n e m p l o y m e n t and red u c e d g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e s . With lower g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e , and international p r e s s u r e s to r e d u c e inflation, g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s w e r e r e d u c e d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m a n y of these r e d u c t i o n s were for social services. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e part of the burden of these r e c e s s i o n s fell onto the s h o u l d e r s of l o w - i n c o m e families. At the time of this writing, the effect on international f i n a n c e of the terrorist a t t a c k s on the World T r a d e C e n t e r and the P e n t a g o n r e m a i n to be seen. H o w e v e r , these attacks should not be thought of as isolated f r o m issues of international f i n a n c e . Citizens f r o m m a n y Middle Eastern countries are f r u s t r a t e d with U.S. s u p p o r t of n o n d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e s in the r e g i o n . T h e s e r e g i m e s are seen as assuring the United States ready a c c e s s to the resources of these countries.

Contemporary Flows Among the MDCs Types of flows. Currently there are four broad types of private capital f l o w s a m o n g countries: (1) Multinational corporations carry out foreign direct investment (FDI). A multinational corporation is a business with at least o n e subsidiary or j o i n t - o w n e r s h i p c o m p a n y located in a f o r e i g n country. B a s i cally, F D I occurs w h e n a multinational o w n s part of or m a k e s a loan to its f o r e i g n affiliate. For e x a m p l e , w h e n H o n d a builds a plant in O h i o , this is

I N T E R N A T I O N A L CAPITAL F L O W S

F D I . (2) International loans are m o n e y lent by c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s and o t h e r s t o p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s o r g o v e r n m e n t s in a n o t h e r c o u n t r y . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n t h e C h a s e B a n k of N e w York l e n d s m o n e y to e n a b l e British A i r w a y s to e x p a n d its s e r v i c e to R u s s i a , this is a f o r e i g n loan. (3) Foreign portfolio investment o c c u r s w h e n i n v e s t o r s b u y s t o c k in a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n on t h e s t o c k e x c h a n g e of t h a t c o u n t r y . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n a F r e n c h m u t u a l investm e n t f u n d p u r c h a s e s V o l k s w a g e n s t o c k on t h e G e r m a n stock e x c h a n g e , this is f o r e i g n p o r t f o l i o i n v e s t m e n t . (4) Finally, t h e r e are international currency f l o w s . T h e s e f l o w s p a y f o r e x p o r t s a n d i m p o r t s of g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s a n d s u p p o r t the o t h e r t y p e s of capital f l o w s . Size of flows. T h e r e w a s a p h e n o m e n a l g r o w t h in total net g l o b a l c a p i t a l f l o w s in the 1 9 9 0 s . T h e y w e r e $ 7 9 4 b i l l i o n in 1991 a n d $ 2 , 2 9 2 b i l l i o n in 1 9 9 7 ; b y 2 0 0 0 t h e y h a d i n c r e a s e d to $ 4 , 3 2 4 b i l l i o n . D u r i n g 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 7 , a b o u t 9 0 p e r c e n t of t h e s e capital f l o w s w e r e to the M D C s , and in 2 0 0 0 this p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e d to 9 4 ( W o r l d B a n k 2 0 0 1 a : 37). T h e 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 f i n a n cial c r i s e s in s o m e L D C s c o n t r i b u t e d to this p o s t - 1 9 9 7 r e l a t i v e i n c r e a s e of f l o w s to the M D C s . A l t h o u g h t h e s e g l o b a l c a p i t a l f l o w s are large, the vast m a j o r i t y of inv e s t m e n t r e m a i n s in t h e h o m e c o u n t r y . M D C s h o l d o n l y 3.3 p e r c e n t of t h e total v a l u e of all of their assets in f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s , and only 11 p e r c e n t of t h e total v a l u e of t h e i r l o a n s are to f o r e i g n e r s ( D o b s o n a n d H u f b a u e r

2001: 6). S u r p r i s i n g l y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h is the largest e c o n o m y in t h e w o r l d , has r e c e i v e d s i n c e 1983 m o r e capital f r o m f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s t h a n it sent a b r o a d . F o r e x a m p l e , in the y e a r 2 0 0 0 , the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e c e i v e d $ 9 5 2 billion f r o m f o r e i g n e r s , and it sent a b r o a d $ 5 5 3 billion, f o r a net receipt of $ 3 9 9 billion ( U S C E A 2 0 0 1 : 27). In 2 0 0 0 , the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e c e i v e d a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s of g l o b a l c a p i t a l f l o w s a m o n g the b i g - t h r e e e c o n o m i e s ( U n i t e d States, J a p a n , and G e r m a n y ) , c o m p a r e d to a b o u t o n e - f i f t h in 1992. In 2 0 0 0 , net total c a p i t a l f l o w s into the U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e f o r t y t i m e s g r e a t e r t h a n U . S . f o r e i g n aid to L D C s . T h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s d i s c u s s t h e s i z e of t h e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l f l o w s listed earlier. G l o b a l F D I i n c r e a s e d f r o m 160 billion in 1991 to 1,118 billion in 2 0 0 0 . D u r i n g the first t w o - t h i r d s of the d e c a d e , the p e r c e n t a g e g o i n g to M D C s dec r e a s e d f r o m 78 to 6 3 . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e of the f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s d i s c u s s e d earlier, the p e r c e n t a g e of F D I to M D C s i n c r e a s e d to 8 4 f o r the y e a r 2 0 0 0 ( W o r l d B a n k 2 0 0 1 a : 3 7 ) . In e s s e n c e , t h e f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s m a d e c o m p a n i e s leery of i n v e s t i n g in t h e L D C s . W h i l e U . S . e x p o r t s t o t a l e d $ 9 3 3 billion in 1998, sales by o v e r s e a s a f f i l i a t e s of U . S . - b a s e d m u l t i n a t i o n a l s w e r e m o r e t h a n $ 2 . 4 trillion. O n e c o n c e r n a b o u t F D I is the r e l a t i v e p o w e r of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . In 1999, o n l y t w e n t y - t h r e e of t h e 162 c o u n t r i e s o n t h e g l o b e h a d a

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY gross d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t larger than the value of c o r p o r a t e r e v e n u e of the largest global c o r p o r a t i o n , G e n e r a l M o t o r s . T h e total r e v e n u e of G e n e r a l M o t o r s w a s larger than the c o m b i n e d G D P of the f o r t y least d e v e l o p e d countries. Only seven M D C s had a G D P greater than the c o m b i n e d r e v e n u e of the f i v e largest g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . ( U N D P 2 0 0 1 ; K a h n 2 0 0 0 ) . F i g u r e 7.1 c o m p a r e s the c o r p o r a t e r e v e n u e of the largest m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a tions with the G D P of selected countries. T h e n u m b e r in p a r e n t h e s e s gives the M N C ' s rank a c c o r d i n g to c o r p o r a t e r e v e n u e . T h e n u m b e r in b r a c k e t s gives the c o u n t r y ' s rank according to GDP. G l o b a l data on foreign loans is hard to find, but according to the International M o n e t a r y F u n d , the total v a l u e of f o r e i g n loans o u t s t a n d i n g in 1989 w a s $ 9 1 7 billion ( I M F 1991). S e v e n t y p e r c e n t of these loans w e r e a m o n g the M D C s . T h e total value of f o r e i g n loans increased 4 6 0 p e r c e n t b e t w e e n 1983 and 1989; correcting for inflation, it tripled in just six years. I n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y f l o w s in 1998 are e s t i m a t e d to be $1.5 trillion per day ( B l e c k e r 1999: 2). T h e s e c u r r e n c i e s f l o w back and forth b e t w e e n countries over a year, so the annual net f l o w s are much less than these daily f i g u r e s times 3 6 5 . To put the v a l u e of c u r r e n c y f l o w s in p e r s p e c t i v e , the daily value of i m p o r t s and e x p o r t s in 1998 was $ 3 3 billion ( U N D P 2 0 0 1 : 18). T h e most i m p o r t a n t c a u s e of these c u r r e n c y f l o w s is s p e c u l a t i o n to earn financial profits on the m i n i s c u l e d i f f e r e n c e s in e x c h a n g e rates in d i f ferent countries. Ordinarily, this helps keep the various markets in step with each other. H o w e v e r , f i n a n c i a l p a n i c s can cause a s p e c u l a t i v e run on a c o u n t r y ' s currency (in which investors rush to withdraw their assets), as o c curred for s o m e c o u n t r i e s during the Asian crisis discussed previously.

•

NORTH-SOUTH CAPITAL FLOWS

H a v i n g e x a m i n e d N o r t h - N o r t h capital f l o w s , that is, f l o w s a m o n g t h e M D C s , I now turn to N o r t h - S o u t h capital f l o w s b e t w e e n the 15 percent of the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n in the M D C s and the 85 percent of the w o r l d ' s p o p ulation in the L D C s . T h e most important areas of controversy f o r the L D C capital f l o w s are (1) f o r e i g n direct i n v e s t m e n t , (2) the third w o r l d d e b t p r o b l e m ( L D C p r o b l e m s in r e p a y i n g p r e v i o u s f o r e i g n loans), and (3) f o r eign aid. Foreign Direct Investment T h e r e is a long-standing debate a m o n g economists as to whether foreign d i rect investments f r o m M D C s to L D C s are a cause of d e v e l o p m e n t , s i m p l y one i n g r e d i e n t of it, or an e l e m e n t that retards d e v e l o p m e n t . B e f o r e t h e 1980s, m a n y L D C s held that f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t r e t a r d s a n d d i s t o r t s

THE GLOBAL E C O N O M Y

e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . Multinational corporations were accused of extracting raw materials and profits f r o m their host countries, bribing g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s f o r special p r i v i l e g e s , and e n g a g i n g in cutthroat c o m p e t i t i o n that harms or destroys nationally o w n e d c o m p a n i e s . To counter these p r o b l e m s , L D C g o v e r n m e n t s restricted the ability of multinationals to export, import, repatriate capital, set prices, and negotiate with labor unions. In s o m e i n s t a n c e s , d i s t r u s t of M N C s i n t e n s i f i e d w h e n M D C g o v e r n m e n t s i n t e r v e n e d to p r o t e c t M N C s f r o m their c o u n t r i e s . In 1954, f o r e x a m p l e , the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t g a v e m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t to G u a t e m a l a n rightist f o r c e s that o v e r t h r e w the r e f o r m i s t p r e s i d e n t , J a c o b o A r b e n z . A s a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , w h e n S a l v a d o r A l l e n d e w a s e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t of C h i l e in 1970, U.S. m u l t i n a t i o n a l s f e a r e d that his g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d e x p r o p r i a t e their inv e s t m e n t s in C h i l e . In 1972, A l l e n d e w a s m u r d e r e d , and the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t q u i c k l y e n d o r s e d the n e w g o v e r n m e n t , a m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p . T h i s d i c t a t o r s h i p w a s f r i e n d l y to f o r e i g n b u s i n e s s , and the U n i t e d States s u p ported it for a l m o s t t w e n t y years. O t h e r c o n c e r n s a b o u t F D I will b e d i s c u s s e d in the last section of this chapter on w h e t h e r or not to r e g u l a t e the international financial system. P r o p o n e n t s of F D I a r g u e that f l o w s f r o m M D C s into L D C s are the m i s s i n g e l e m e n t in L D C d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e y b e l i e v e that i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i nancial institutions, such as the W o r l d B a n k and r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t banks, are set u p to p r o v i d e L D C s with capital w h e n and w h e r e private inv e s t o r s fail to d o so. F D I a d v o c a t e s also argue that m o s t M N C s pay their w o r k e r s well, n e g o t i a t e f a i r l y with u n i o n s , d o not c h e a t on t a x e s , and r e frain f r o m bribery. T h e r e is e v e n s o m e e v i d e n c e that M N C s pay w a g e s , o n a v e r a g e , t w i c e as h i g h as local b u s i n e s s e s a n d o f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e f r i n g e benefits: housing, e d u c a t i o n , hospitalization, and health services. B e g i n n i n g in the 1970s, c o u n t r i e s such as the " f o u r d r a g o n s " of E a s t A s i a ( S o u t h K o r e a , T a i w a n , H o n g K o n g , and S i n g a p o r e ) s o u g h t to m a k e their i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e attractive. T h e s e i n v e s t m e n t policies h e l p e d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t surge in these countries into the 1990s. D u e to a variety of f a c t o r s , by the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , m o s t o t h e r L D C s b e g a n d e v e l o p i n g a more f a v o r a b l e climate for F D I as well. O n e factor in this shift was the failing Soviet U n i o n that had a d v o c a t e d very strict controls on f o r e i g n investm e n t . In addition, m a n y L D C s w e r e d e e p l y in debt and c o r r u p t i o n - r i d d e n and had state industries u n a b l e to f a c e world c o m p e t i t i o n . Size of the flows. In the early 1990s, private capital f l o w s f r o m M D C s into L D C s s u d d e n l y surged. Table 7.1 s h o w s the a g g r e g a t e net long-term f l o w s of investment capital into L D C s f r o m 1990 to 2000. O f f i c i a l capital d e n o t e s capital f r o m g o v e r n m e n t s a n d international agencies. N o t e that, while o f f i cial capital f l o w s r e m a i n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same during the d e c a d e , priv a t e i n v e s t m e n t i n c r e a s e d m o r e t h a n t h r e e f o l d b e t w e e n 1990 and 1 9 9 7 . This increase is spread a m o n g all the types of financial f l o w s .

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL

Table 7.1

FLOWS

N e t Financial F l o w s t o A l l D e v e l o p i n g C o u n t r i e s , 1990-2000 (in U . S . $ billions) 1990

1997

1999

2000

28.5 27.2 55.7

24.7 15.8 40.5

29.2 16.5 45.7

29.1 8.5 37.6

15.6 24.3 3.7 43.6 99.3

97.0 172.6 30.2 299.8 340.3

-0.6 185.4 34.4 219.2 264.9

31.3 178.0 47.9 257.2 294.8

Other f l o w s Interest o n l o n g - t e r m debt -54.6 Profit remittances o n direct i n v e s t m e n t - 1 7 . 6 Total other f l o w s -72.2

-87.2 -31.8 -119.0

-100.3 -40.0 -140.3

-108.2 -50.2 -158.4

221.3

124.6

136.4

N e t capital f l o w s Official Grants L o a n s (net) Total o f f i c a l Private D e b t (net) Direct i n v e s t m e n t P o r t f o l i o equity Total private Total net capital f l o w s

N e t financial f l o w s Source: 2001).

World B a n k , Global

27.1 Development

Finance

( W a s h i n g t o n DC: World Bank,

And yet the contagion effects of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis caused private capital flows to LDCs to drop by more than 25 percent between 1997 and 1999. In 2000, there was some increase beyond the 1999 level. Private capital flows have been concentrated in about ten countries, most of which are middle-income countries in East Asia and Latin America and also in two large low-income countries, China and India. The top ten of the 112 developing countries received 74 percent of the FDI to developing countries in the year 2000. In that same year the fifty-eight lowest per capita income developing countries received only 7 percent of FDI to developing countries (World Bank 2001a: 38). Also, there was increased competition for these funds from the former communist countries in Europe. Table 7.2 contains data on the regional disbursement of capital flows to LDCs for the year 2000. While financial flows from the MDCs to the LDCs help the economic development of the LDCs, these flows also cause flows out of the LDCs back to the MDCs. Multinational corporations remit profits back to their home country, and interest needs to be paid on past debts. As can be seen in the "Other flows" rows in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, these flows back to MDCs are sizeable. For example, Table 7.1 shows that in the year 2000 net private and official flows to the LDCs were $294.8 billion, while flows from the LDCs were $158.4 billion. Consequently, the net flow to the LDCs was $136.4 billion.

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