Internet in the Post-Soviet Area: Technological, Economic and Political Aspects (Societies and Political Orders in Transition) 3031325060, 9783031325069

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Societies and Political Orders in Transition

Sergey Davydov   Editor

Internet in the Post-Soviet Area Technological, Economic and Political Aspects

Societies and Political Orders in Transition Series Editors Alexander Chepurenko, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia Stein Ugelvik Larsen, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway William Reisinger, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA Managing Editors Ekim Arbatli, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia Dina Rosenberg, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia Aigul Mavletova, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

This book series presents scientific and scholarly studies focusing on societies and political orders in transition in Central and Eastern Europe but also elsewhere in the world, contemporary and historical. By comparing established societies, characterized by well-established market economies and well-functioning democracies, with post-socialist and other societies, often characterized by emerging markets and fragile political systems, the series identifies and analyzes factors influencing change and continuity in societies and political orders. These factors include state capacity to establish formal and informal rules, democratic institutions, forms of social structuration, political regimes, levels of corruption, specificity of political cultures, as well as types and orientation of political and economic elites. Societies and Political Orders in Transition welcomes monographs and edited volumes with diverse empirical and theoretical approaches from a variety of disciplines, including political science, economics and social sciences in general, as well as comparative politics, political history, political theory, comparative social research, and comparative economics in particular. Topics may include, but are not limited to, democratization, regime change, changing social norms, migration, etc. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. This book series is indexed in Scopus. For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consideration, please contact Johannes Glaeser (Senior Editor Economics and Political Science) [email protected].

Sergey Davydov Editor

Internet in the Post-Soviet Area Technological, Economic and Political Aspects

Editor Sergey Davydov HSE University Moscow, Russia

ISSN 2511-2201 ISSN 2511-221X (electronic) Societies and Political Orders in Transition ISBN 978-3-031-32506-9 ISBN 978-3-031-32507-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sergey Davydov

1

Characterizing the Post-Soviet Internet Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online Information Space in 2020–2021: Frequency of Mention, Media Dynamics, Mood Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander Sharikov

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Legal Regulation of the Internet Around Post-Soviet Space . . . . . . . . . . . . Svetlana Raspopova and Svetlana Simakova

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Cancel Culture and Novaya Etika in Russian Public Discourse . . . . . . . . . Sergei A. Samoilenko, Alina Eremina, and Anton Gumensky

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Online Coping Strategies During the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Case of Izoizolyacia Flash Mob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elena Pronkina

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Post-Soviet Countries: Special Focus Developing an Advanced Digital Society: An Estonian Case Study . . . . . 109 Marju Himma-Kadakas and Ragne Kõuts-Klemm Uanet Through Socio-Political Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Olena Goroshko and Nataliia Boiko Media Generations of the Russians in the Digital Media Environment: Opportunities for Intergenerational Communication . . . . 161 Anna Sumskaya, Greg Simons, and Valeria Solomeina

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Contents

Elite Students in Kazakhstan: Complexities of the Internet and the International Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Ellen Mickiewicz and Galiya Ibrayeva Measuring Media Literacy Level: A Case of Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Igor Zadorin, Anastasia Saponova, Valentina Reshetova, and Daria Chizhova

Introduction Sergey Davydov

The present book, being a separate publication, continues the topics of the “Internet in Russia: A Study of the Runet and Its Impact on Social Life”.1 The mentioned monograph, published by Springer in the “Societies and Political Orders in Transition” series, presents a comprehensive analysis of the Runet as a complex social phenomenon. One of the questions raised during the study of the Russian segment of the Internet is how it is developing in the post-Soviet area. By the post-Soviet area, we mean the territory of the former USSR and the countries located in it. Russia is the largest state in this region in terms of territory, population, a number of economic indicators, etc. The largest, but not the only one! The Soviet Union existed for 69 years, from December 1922 to December 1991. The history of its establishment is connected with the collapse of the Russian Empire, as a result of the revolutionary events of 1917, and against the background of the First World War. The double transition of power—from the Emperor to the Provisional Government, and then from the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks—led to the processes of disintegration, manifested both in the political and social spheres. During the civil war, which started in 1918, Soviet power was established in a significant part of the former empire. Thus, a new establishment emerged—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or the Soviet Union. Throughout its history, its borders and the administrative-territorial divisions have changed repeatedly. Our tasks do not include an analysis of these changes. We will only note that the Union Treaty was signed by 4 republics in 1922: the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the 1

Davydov, S. (Ed.). (2022). Internet in Russia: A study of the Runet and its impact on social life. Cham: Springer. S. Davydov (B) International Laboratory for Social Integration Research, HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_1

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Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic, and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. In the early 1990s, the USSR consisted of 15 union republics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they received the status of independent countries, namely: • • • •

the Baltic “states”—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; four countries of Eastern Europe—Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine; three Transcaucasian countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia; five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Despite certain changes that have occurred with the Soviet media system over the years of its existence, it has retained some characteristic features. According to the classic work, “Four Theories of the Press”, by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm,2 it was a version of the development of authoritarian theory, just as the theory of social responsibility of the press appeared as a result of the development of the libertarian media system. In brief, all mass media were owned by the State, controlled by the Communist Party, and used to maintain the existing system of power, mainly as tools of agitation and propaganda. It is obvious that the Soviet Communist media system ceased to exist—just at the time when Internet use had not yet become widespread, but the technological innovations associated with it could not but affect social relations in this sphere. Regardless of what researchers call the new Russian media system—neo-Soviet (S. Oates)3 or post-Soviet (S. Pasti et al.),4 two points seem important. Firstly, the current Russian media system has regained features from the Soviet past, but only partially. Secondly, the post-Soviet countries have gone through various paths of political and media development since 1991. That is why their media systems need individual research. The fact that the media systems of the post-Soviet countries are very different is confirmed by a group of annual rating studies of freedom of speech. For example, according to RSF’s World Press Freedom Index 2022, Estonia is among the four countries with the highest value of the integral indicator, while Turkmenistan is in 177th place out of 180. Such polarization, after a little more than 30 years, undoubtedly deserves research attention. The following book consists of two sections. The first contains chapters that consider the post-Soviet area as a whole. The chapter of Alexander Sharikov, which opens our publication, is devoted to the representation of the post-Soviet area in the global online information space, which is analyzed through the materials of the 2

Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1956). Four theories of the press: The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet Communist concepts of what the press should be and do. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 3 Oates, S. (2007). The Neo-Soviet model of the media. Europe-Asia Studies, 59(8), 1279–1297. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701655150. 4 Pasti, S., Logunova, O. S., & Davydov, S. G. (2022). Journalistic role performance in the Russian press: A post-Soviet model for the third decade, 2012–2022. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 30(2), 211–238.

Introduction

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Factiva database. Svetlana Raspopova and Svetlana Simakova consider the legal basis for the development of the Internet in the post-Soviet area. Sergei Samoylenko, Alina Eremina, and Anton Gumensky consider the cancel culture and the so-called new ethics. Finally, Elena Pronkina’s analysis focuses on the Izoizolyacia creative online group—a cultural phenomenon of the COVID-19 pandemic period—whose members, under conditions of social restrictions, created—and continue to create— their own versions of famous works of fine art. The second section includes studies that consider the development of the Internet, either in individual countries or in groups of countries. The first two chapters in this section are devoted to Estonia (Marju Himma-Kadakes and Ragne Cõuts-Klemm) and Ukraine (Olena Goroshko and Nataliia Boyko). Anna Shumskaya, Greg Simons, and Valeria Solomeina offer the author’s version of the theory of media generations of Russia. The chapter by Ellen Mickiewicz and Galiya Ibraeva is based on the results of a qualitative study of the elite student audience in Kazakhstan. Finally, Igor Zadorin, Anastasia Saponova, Valentina Reshetova, and Maria Chizhova offer a comparative analysis of media literacy in three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Speaking about the process of writing this book, it is important to mention the following. This work was prepared at a challenging time for many of its authors. It is hard to find a person whose everyday life has not been affected by the restrictions forced upon everyone as a result of the pandemic. For the academic community, obliged to research and teach in a seemingly constantly changing environment, this time has brought significant new challenges. In February 2022, when, as it seemed, life began to return to its usual course, the largest armed conflict in the entire post-Soviet history began, the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine. The post-Soviet area has repeatedly become a place of military conflicts, some of which have become protracted. Initially, we did not plan to consider this topic in the book, and our decision did not change after February 24th. We have deliberately left the new research agendas and tasks for further publications. I am immensely grateful to all the members of the team of authors for the fact that, despite the difficulties and doubts, we brought this work to a successful conclusion together. I would also like to express my gratitude for the support of my colleagues in the HSE University Sociology Department—Alexander Chepurenko, Scientific Director, and Elena Yarskaya-Smirnova, Head of the International Laboratory for Social Integration Research. Without your help, this work would hardly have been possible. Moscow, Russia Acknowledgements Support from the Basic Research Program of the HSE University is gratefully acknowledged.

Characterizing the Post-Soviet Internet

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online Information Space in 2020–2021: Frequency of Mention, Media Dynamics, Mood Characteristics Alexander Sharikov

The study of global information processes was preceded by research on international radio broadcasting in the shortwave range. This research began in 1939 in the United States with the establishment of the Princeton University Listening Center, which is often considered “a pioneer in the field of studying foreign shortwave radio broadcasting” (Panfilov, 1984, p. 39). In this center, the peculiarities of foreign policy propaganda were studied, primarily of the foreign policy propaganda of Nazi Germany, which was broadcast to the United States. At the same time, the doctrine of the free flow of information emerged (Bernstein, 1935) and became especially popular after the Second World War. Its essence is that laws should be adopted around the world to ensure the unhindered dissemination of information between countries. This idea was enshrined in fundamental international documents, in particular, in the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) signed in 1945, which states that the UNESCO will collaborate “through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image” (Constitution, 1945). This was later enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948: Every individual has the right to freedom of opinion and of expression, which entails the right to be free from harassment for his opinions and the right to seek out, to receive and to communicate, regardless of frontiers and ideas, by whatever means of expression he may choose.

Since 1951, UNESCO has been collecting and publishing information on mass media by country. The liberal–humanistic ideas of the UN, UNESCO, and other leading international organizations were declared against the background of the emergence and strengthening of ideological confrontation in the world, which manifested itself “along two A. Sharikov (B) HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_2

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axes” at that time: the West–East and the North–South. The West–East axis reflected the confrontation between the ideas of socialism, the carriers of which were the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the countries of the socialist camp, and the ideas of capitalism, which were preached by the leading Western countries led by the United States. This confrontation in the field of foreign broadcasting took on the character of an information war, which was also described as “psychological” (Linebarger, 1948). The ideological confrontation along the North–South axis reflected the gradual disintegration of the world colonial system to a system characterized as neocolonialism, which is the economic dependence of liberated countries on their former colonizing countries. The free flow of information actually turned out to be a flexible instrument of pressure of developed countries on developing ones. At the same time, the reverse flow of information from developing to developed countries turned out to be significantly smaller in volume. Therefore, in reality, the free flow of information was unidirectional: from economically strong countries to economically weak ones. These facts have led to criticism of the concept of free flow of information and to attempts to develop alternative approaches. The antithesis of the concept of free flow of information is the concept of the new world “information and communication order”, or NWICO, which arose within the framework of UNESCO. It emphasizes the need to reject the colonial and neocolonial principles of organizing the dissemination of information in the world (Hamelink, 1985). Schiller (1976) convincingly demonstrated how, based on the concept of free flow of information, the United States and other countries in fact implement the policy of information imperialism in the world with the help of mass communication. Thus, the concept of free flow of information has become an ideological doctrine that justifies the pressure of rich countries on poor ones. This contention greatly resonated both in academic circles and among government and other public figures. Discussions around the unfair use of broadcasting in the world at the UN and other international organizations led to the need to conduct a global empirical study on this problem. In 1977, UNESCO established the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. It included leading experts in the field of mass media from 15 countries, headed by Sean McBride, laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974. The Commission organized a continuous study of international information flows and presented the first results at the 20th UNESCO General Conference in Paris in 1978, which led to the adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War. An excerpt from the declaration states: “It is important that a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information be encouraged” (Declaration…, 1978). In 1980, the study was completed and published in the book “Many Voices—One World”. The research can be considered the starting point of the study of global information processes, as it showed a picture of the dissemination of information in the world as a whole and empirically identified some patterns thereof, such as the relationship of the economic development of countries to the prevalence of information about them at the global level.

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In the 1970s, the global era of the Internet began with the first experiments to establish international computer communication at a distance. Since the 1990s, after the emergence of the subsystem called the “World Wide Web” (WWW), the media have been actively developing the online environment for information exchange. The Internet has become a global information space. Scientists are trying to comprehend the new phenomenon at the theoretical level; there are a lot of studies, among which the fundamental work of Castells (2001), The Internet Galaxy, stands out. The Global News Flow Theory appeared under the influence of the described processes. In addition to studies on the mentioned problems and conceptual judgments, many empirical studies have been conducted in the area of news flows, which revealed three factors that cause uneven representation of different countries in the world picture formed in the media (Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Segev, 2015; Wu, 2000). The first factor is the level of economic development of the country. Publications about countries with a high level of economic development are more common. The observations of McBride and co-authors (Many Voices, One World, 1980) have been repeatedly confirmed. The second factor is the proximity of the described country to the country whose media publish the materials. This proximity is not only territorial but also linguistic, economic, ideological, and so on. The third factor is the events that attract the attention of the world press, especially disasters (natural and manmade) as well as social, political, economic, and military conflicts. Another important area of research concerning the news flow is media dynamics and one of its aspects, known as the News Dynamics Theory, within which the concept of media storm is considered (Boydstun et al., 2014; Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2008; Lowrence, 1996; Wien & Elmelund-Praesteker, 2009). The development of this area of research intensified after the creation, in the late 1990s, of systems for monitoring large numbers of text publications on the Internet (LexisNexis, Factiva, etc.). These facts have given projects a new impetus to study the global online information space (Segev, 2016). In Russia, research interest in this issue has begun to manifest in recent years and has led to the release of a number of publications (Bystritskii & Sharikov, 2021; Kazun, 2018; Kazun & Kazun, 2020; Sharikov, 2021a, 2021b). In the next section, I present the results of a 2020 empirical study on the representation, in the global online information space, of countries formed in the former USSR territory, hereinafter referred to as “post-Soviet countries”.

1 The Global Online Information Space: Key Notions and Research Details Let us start by defining the key concepts that will be used in this section: information, information space, online information space, and global online information space.

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1.1 Information In general, information is a universal notion, that is, a very broad concept that is used in all fields of science and in everyday life. In this article, we adhere to the journalistic interpretation of information as “facts about someone or something, and especially facts that are shared with other people” (Information, 2022). Thus, we will talk about the social information available to the general public and disseminated through the mass media.

1.2 Information Space The term information space in the social dimension originated at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s (Gould, 1975) and reflects the trends emerging at that times in cross-border dissemination of mass media information through international radio and satellite television (Intelsat 1, 2022), as well as the first experiences of communication via the computer network between countries (The origins…, 2022). Currently, some authors often use information space interchangeably with information cyberspace. However, this is inaccurate. The information cyberspace is merely a component of the information space, as the word information must be understood in a journalistic sense and not in an engineering or technical sense.

1.3 Online Information Space The word online is often used as a synonym for the word Internet. However, the Internet, strictly speaking, is a very complex system with many components that work at both the physical and social levels. The movement of information from the physical level to the social level is a very complex nonlinear process. Obviously, not all the information at the physical level could be represented at the social level. In this article, we are interested only in social information. At the same time, online is an antonym of the word offline. Offline describes multiple forms of social information, including information disseminated through traditional media, such as print, radio, and television, as well as non-automated forms of interpersonal, personal–group, and intergroup communication. At the same time, all the key traditional media have their own online versions, and many of them post texts of information materials on their websites, which opens up wide opportunities for analytics using computational linguistics tools.

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1.4 Global Online Information Space and the GLOPESTION Space Model The word global here indicates an extremely broad vision of the online information space. However, in the context of this article, it is necessary to narrow the boundaries of my analysis of the representation of post-Soviet countries on the Internet. The Internet segment that I will analyze should, first, contain textual content; second, be thematically limited to problems concerning politics, economics, and society (journalistic aspects); third, not represent literary, entertainment, and academic texts; and fourth, have a news and analytical orientation. Let me call this segment of the Internet global political, economic, and social textual information online space (GLOPESTION space). However, in this article, we will use GLOPESTION space interchangeably with global online information space.

1.5 Methods To study the representation of certain countries in the GLOPESTION, I used the Factiva monitoring resource of Dow Jones1 from January 1 to December 31, 2020. Some results of my analysis concerning Russia had been presented in Russian academic publications (Bystritskii & Sharikov, 2021; Sharikov, 2021a, 2021b). During January–November 2021, Factiva provided access to an expanded database of information sources, which included over 23 thousand of the world’s largest Internet resources (leading news agencies, websites of leading newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, specialized portals, etc.). It enabled analysis of information in 25 languages. According to W3 Techs, over 90% of Internet content as of January 1, 2021, was collectively represented on 25 languages monitored by Factiva (Historical…, 2022). Unfortunately, among the 25 languages used by the Factiva database, there are no languages of the peoples of post-Soviet countries, with the exception of Russian. The Factiva database sufficiently represents the GLOPESTION space linguistically. Thus, it corresponds well with our chosen GLOPESTION space model. A special analysis made it possible to determine that the statistical error of the language representation of the sources in the Factiva database is no more than 3.1% for each language. Factiva allows the conduct of a frequency analysis, which unit is a separate text where some meaningful categories are mentioned. Categories that are well developed in Factiva include:

1

The author is deeply grateful to Dow Jones for allowing the full-scale use of its Factiva system, and especially to Andrey Senuk, the official representative of the company in Russia, for making himself available for consultations during this project.

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• Geographical objects: parts of the world, groups of countries (e.g., the Commonwealth of Independent States—CIS), individual countries, regions within countries, and so on; • organizations: international, national, state, private, etc.; • topics in the classification set by Factiva itself; and • branches of the economy. The analysis can be carried out both for individual languages and for several languages at the same time, grouped in any manner. The analysis can also be performed for an arbitrary time period by setting its lower and upper bounds. In 2020, Factiva processed more than 106 million texts in 25 languages. For a number of widely spoken languages (i.e., Chinese, English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish), which account for more than 80% of the content on the Internet, Factiva can conduct sentiment analysis, determining the positive or negative tone of materials. However, it cannot conduct a sentiment analysis in several languages at once, as the tonality (positive or negative) is identified separately in each language. This type of analysis enabled identification of the key global publications in which post-Soviet countries appeared and the publication dynamics mentioning each country. We have introduced auxiliary concepts that allow us to expand the possibilities of sentiment analysis. In addition to determining the numbers of materials with positive and negative tonalities, the number of neutral materials was also determined—that is, the number of texts with both positive and negative tonalities was subtracted from the total number of texts. For convenient comparison, percentages were used relative to the total number of texts. We introduce the parameter tonality balance, defined as the difference between the percentage of positive and negative texts (Sharikov, 2021b).If the tonality balance has a positive value, the number of positive texts exceeds the number of negative ones. On the contrary, if the tonality balance has a negative value, there are more negative than positive texts. Considering the features of the tools used, we outline the scope of our analysis. We conducted a statistical analysis based on the corpus of texts from the Factiva database, which combined two methods: frequency analysis and sentiment analysis. Frequency analysis was conducted in a set of 25 languages. Sentiment analysis was conducted separately in 9 languages. Three main research questions are posed: • How often were post-Soviet countries mentioned on a global scale in 2020? • What were the dynamic characteristics of the representation of the post-Soviet countries in 2020 in the GLOPESTION space? • What are the tonal characteristics of the representation of the post-Soviet countries in the global dimension in 2020? In the next part, we will consider general trends in the existence of the global online information space in light of three aspects.

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2 The Global Online Information Space in 2020: General Features 2.1 Weight of Language Zones and Frequency of Country Representation Realizing that the Internet in general and the GLOPESTION space in particular are structured on many grounds, we will consider only two bases of this structuring: first, the language of the publications, and second, the geographical distribution of the publications by country. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the content (i.e., the number of online resources) by language according to W3 Tech (Historical yearly…, 2022). Figure 1 shows that as of January 1, 2021, English was the dominant language on the Internet (60.7% of the |Internet resources), followed by Russian (8.3%) and Turkish (3.9%). Let us now consider the 30 countries that were most often mentioned in the global online information space in 2020. Such information is presented in Table 1. In 2020, Russia was the most mentioned country in the global online information space: 16.934 million (15.93%) publications in the Factiva database mentioned it. The second place was taken by the United States: 10.166 million (9.57%). Germany was third: 7.58 million (7.13%). Among the post-Soviet countries, in addition to Russia, Ukraine entered the top 20 countries, landing in the 17th place, with approximately 753,000 (0.71%) publications mentioning it. The rest of the post-Soviet countries had lower exposures. Let us now correlate the information presented in Fig. 1 and in Table 1. It is natural to assume that a country where a particular language is its main language

Fig. 1 Languages with the highest percentage of content on the Internet (as of January 1, 2021). Source W3 Techs

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Table 1 Top 30 countries most frequently mentioned in the Factiva database in 2020 Number of publications that % of publications that mentioned the mentioned the country in the Factiva country in the Factiva database to the database, mln total number of publications in the database 1 Russia

16,934

2 USA

10,166

9.57

7,580

7.13

3 Germany

15.93

4 Chinaa

6,876

6.47

5 Spain

5,861

5.52

6 Japan

5,660

5.33

7 South Korea

5,607

5.28

8 Italy

5,563

5.23

9 UK

4,960

4.67

10 France

4,461

4.20

11 India

3,940

3.71

12 Australia

1,867

1.76

13 Brazil

1,712

1.61

14 Mexico

1,608

1.51

15 Canada

1,412

1.33

16 Switzerland

1,224

1.15

17 Ukraine

0,753

0.71

18 Pakistan

0,556

0.52

19 Poland

0,546

0.51

20 Turkey

0,523

0.49

21 Netherlands

0,516

0.49

22 Belgium

0,506

0.48

23 Indonesia

0,469

0.44

24 Portugal

0,455

0.43

25 Argentina

0,452

0.43

26 Iran

0,446

0.42

27 Nigeria

0,421

0.40

28 Austria

0,401

0.38

29 New Zealand

0,397

0.37

30 Egypt

0,364

0.34

a The

figures shown including those for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau

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15

should dominate in the pertinent language zone. In most cases, such is the case. In the Spanish-speaking zone, most of the materials mentioned Spain; in the Frenchspeaking zone, France; in the German-speaking zone, Germany; in the Russianspeaking zone, Russia; and so on. However, in the English-speaking zone in 2020, not the United States and the United Kingdom but Russia was the most mentioned, which gave it the top spot in mentions on a global scale. The data presented in Table 1 can be interpreted using the agenda-setting theory (Guo et al., 2012; Kosicki, 1993; McCombs & Show, 1972; Show & McCombs, 2008). According to the theory, the number of mentions of a certain object reflects its significance in the media space and therefore, in society as a whole. In this case, in the global online information space, the most significant country in 2020 was Russia, not, as many believe, the United States. Apart from this, Ukraine was comparatively significant among the post-Soviet countries. Are there deeper connections between the languages of publications and the number of publications that mention a particular country? To answer this question, a factor analysis was carried out on the matrix languages–countries with a dimension of 25 × 204. Both officially recognized states and unrecognized and partially recognized countries that were available in the Factiva database in 2020 were included. The matrix languages–countries was subjected to factor analysis on a linguistic basis. At a significant level, 12 factors stood out. Their total weight in the total variance was 96.47%. As expected, the English language was the strongest (52.53% of the total variance). It was followed by French (11.73%), Spanish (8.92%), Russian (6.69%), Arabic (5.05%), Portuguese (3.12%), German (2.60%), Chinese (2.07%), Italian (1.75%), Korean (0.95%), Japanese (0.59%), and Indonesian (0.49%). These are the languages of the Group of Twenty (G20) countries, with the exception of Turkey. The 13 other languages used by Factiva account for only 3.53% of the total variance. Figure 2 gives an idea of how different countries are located in the space of factors F1 (English) and F4 (Russian). Each country is depicted in the form of a circle, the diameter of which reflects the number of publications that mentioned that country. The larger the size of the circle is, the more publications were found in the Factiva database that mentioned the country in 2020. Figure 2 highlights two clusters—English and Russian—circled with dotted lines. The English-speaking cluster, which creates the basis for the F1 factor, includes about 100 countries, primarily Anglo-Saxon (United States, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as former British colonies (India, South Africa, etc.). The Russian-speaking cluster is formed by about two dozen countries, primarily post-Soviet countries, as well as unrecognized and partially recognized states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in its territory, including Abkhazia, NagornoKarabakh, South Ossetia, and Donbass. In addition to them, we also found Kosovo, Mongolia, and Montenegro. All of these countries were more often written about in Russian than in other languages used by Factiva, except for their official state languages. It is important to note, however, that Russian is used not only by Russia and not only by the media registered in Russia to write about these countries. Factiva has sources from 27 countries that publish materials in Russian, including Russianlanguage versions of major international news.

16

A. Sharikov 1.2

1

Ukraine South Ossetia Abkhazia

F4 - Russian Factor

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

Italy 0

-0.2

France

Russia

Belarus Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Armenia

Spain

Brazil 0 Japan -0.2

Donbass Tadjikistan Moldova

Kyrgyzstan Nagorno-Karabakh TurkmenistanGeorgia Azerbaijan Latvia Montenegro Kosovo Estonia Mongolia Lithuania

Mexico Germany Argentina 0.2

Indonesia South Korea

0.4

China

0.6

Saudi Arabia

-0.4

South Africa 0.8

1

USA

1.2

Canada UK India Australia

F1 - English Factor Fig. 2 Location of countries in the quotient space of the English and Russian languages. The calculation was based on Factiva data

2.2 Dynamic Characteristics Let us now turn to the dynamic characteristics of the global online information space. Our research on the Factiva database revealed the following points (Sharikov, 2021a). The global online information space is constantly expanding. There has been an increase in the number of websites, the number of materials posted, the number of languages in which texts are published, and the growth of the Internet audience. Figure 3 gives an idea of the nature of the growth in the number of websites and of the Internet audience in 2000–2020. From 2010 to 2020, the number of websites grew almost nine times—from 0.21 to 1.8 billion—and the number of Internet users increased 2.3 times—from 2.0 to 4.7 billion. A well-defined regularity of the production of new materials was found, which was most visible in weekly cycles, where two phases were identified: Monday afternoon to Thursday and Friday to Monday afternoon. In general, in the global online information space, there are more publications on weekdays than on weekends. The minimum falls on Sunday. This periodicity is explained by the fact that in any society, most work is done on weekdays. Figure 4 illustrates this regularity. Figure 4 clearly shows the numbers of publications in 25 languages that Factiva monitored per day in 2020—from 111,000 (on January 12) to 563,000 (on December 1). The lows fell on Sundays and on key Christian holidays. The highs happened on weekdays because of the decrease in journalistic activities on weekends. At the end of 2020, a noticeable increase in the number of publications was recorded, which

17

5.0

2.0

4.5

1.8

4.0

1.6

3.5

1.4

3.0

1.2

2.5

1.0

2.0

0.8

1.5

0.6

1.0

0.4

0.5

0.2

0.0

Number of websites, bln

Number of Internet users in the world, bln

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

0.0

2000

2005

2010

Number of Internet users, bln

2015

2020

Number of websites, bln

Fig. 3 Dynamics of growth in the number of Internet users and the number of websites in the world in 2000–2020. Sources: Internet World Stats and Internet Live Stats

Number of publications per day

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0

Fig. 4 Dynamics of the daily number of new publications on the Factiva database from January 1 to December 31, 2020. Source Factiva database

is explained by the planned expansion of the Factiva resource base. However, this expansion did not change the regularity of publications—the minimum number in December 2020 was still observed on Sundays and Christmas, and the highs, on working days.

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A. Sharikov

Our study examined the concepts of a global media surge (a significant increase in the number of produced materials in the global online information space within a few days) and a global media storm (a significant increase in the number of produced materials in the global online information space at monthly intervals or over an average of several weeks). Let us underline that previously, media bursts and media storms were considered at the level of individual publications or groups of publications, or at the national level (Boydstun et al., 2014; Hollanders & Vliegenthart, 2008; Lowrence, 1996; Wien & Elmelund-Praesteker, 2009). In 2020, the strongest global media surge was observed in connection with the assassination of Iranian General Suleimani on Friday, January 3. Such global media surge became a global media storm after several other events occurred around Iran, about which the world press wrote very actively (see Fig. 5). Among these events were the attack by Iranian air defense forces on a Ukrainian aircraft that was mistaken for a military facility and the attack by soldiers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on an American military base in Iraq. Thus, the strongest global media surge, which assumed the character of a double global “media explosion”, turned into a real global media storm that lasted more than a week. At the same time, a global media storm is not always associated with short-term sensational materials. The most powerful global media storm in 2020 was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, when, for several months, from January to April, there was a gradual increase in the number of materials devoted to various aspects of the

Number of publications that mentioned Iran

25000

Ukrainian plane shot down in Iran US Embassy in Iraq attacked

20000

15000

10000

Assassination of General Soleimani

5000

0

The number of publications in the FACTIVA database mentioning Iran

Average

Fig. 5 Number of publications that mentioned Iran by day in January 2020 in the 25 languages in the Factiva system

Number of publications that mentioned the COVID-19 pandemic per month, mln

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

19

2.7 2.5 2.2

1.7

0.9

1.6

0.9

0.8

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.5

Fig. 6 Number of publications that mentioned the COVID-19 pandemic per month in 2020 in 25 languages. Source Factiva database

pandemic and its consequences in the world. At the same time, there was no rapid growth in the number of publications in one day. Figure 6 shows this trend.

2.3 Mood Characteristics Let us now turn to the mood characteristics, that is, the tonality, of publications. According to the canons of highly professional journalism, the coverage of events should generally be balanced, and if something bad or negative is reported, these materials should be compensated for with something good or positive. Neutral messages should prevail. Factiva makes it possible to identify the tone of messages in nine languages. A special analysis has shown that neutral information materials generally absolutely dominate in such a nine-language zone. In 2020, there were 98.39% of them. At the same time, 0.73% of the materials had a positive orientation, and 0.89% had a negative orientation. If we subtract the percentage of negative materials from the percentage of positive materials, we get a new value that we call tonality balance. In 2020, the tonality balance was generally negative and equal to −0.16% of the entire array of materials monitored by the Factiva database in nine languages (Sharikov, 2021b). Consequently, the overall tonality of the allocated nine-language segment of the GLOPESTION space in 2020 was slightly negative—that is, negative messages were published more often than positive ones.

20

A. Sharikov Chinese

1.61%

Japanese

1.39%

Spanish

0.74%

English

0.59%

Portuguese

0.28%

Italian

-0.02%

German

-0.04%

French

-0.91%

Russian -5.54%

Fig. 7 Average tonality balance in 2020 for nine-language zones. The calculation was based on Factiva data

One of the trends observed is the difference in tonality balance in different language segments. Figure 7 shows the average tonality balance in 2020 for nine-language zones out of the set of all publications in every language. We see that the Italian and German tonality balances in 2020 look the most balanced, at −0.02% and −0.04%, respectively. The Chinese language had the most positive tonality balance: +1.61%, followed by the Japanese (+0.39%), Spanish (+0.74%), English (+0.59%), and Portuguese (+0.28%) languages. The Russian language had the most negative balance (−5.54%), followed by the French language (−0.91%). These trends probably reflect the specific sociocultural properties and journalistic traditions of the respective countries. They necessarily affect the tonal context in which certain countries are mentioned in each language zone. Which countries were mentioned more often in a positive and negative context in the global online information space in 2020? The answer can be stated in two ways: in absolute numbers and in relative terms. Table 2 shows the ranked list of countries in absolute terms, and Table 3 shows the list in relative values (Table 3). Table 2 shows that the top 25 countries with the largest number of publications with positive mentions of them in nine languages together include 15 countries from the G20. These are the largest economies in the world. In addition to them, we find Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Chile, Austria, and the Philippines. From the same table, it can be seen that the top 25 countries with the largest number of publications with negative mentions of them in nine languages together included 12 countries from the G20, 11 of which were also in the first list (This peculiarity is discussed in the next paragraph). In addition to them, in this list, 8 countries and regions are located in the territory of the former USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Donbass, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine), and the rest are Spain, Iran, Switzerland, Belgium, and Syria.

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

21

Table 2 Top 25 countries most frequently mentioned in positive and negative ways in 2020 in the Factiva database in nine leading languages of the world (in absolute terms) Number of publications that mentioned the country in a positive tone

Number of publications that mentioned the country in a negative tone

1 Chinaa

122,672

1 Russia

593,917

2 USA

108,277

2 Ukraine

73,771

3 Japan

76,383

3 USA

72,535

4 Spain

49,251

4 Chinaa

59,006

5 Russia

35,815

5 Germany

36,381

6 Germany

27,748

6 France

27,443

7 India

25,016

7 Italy

25,767

8 Italy

20,470

8 Armenia

19,404

9 UK

19,453

9 Azerbaijan

19,091

10 Brazil

12,426

10 Kazakhstan

17,595

11 Canada

10,061

11 Belarus

14,385

12 Mexico

8,999

12 UK

13,508

13 France

7,853

13 Spain

12,591

14 Australia

7,672

14 Brazil

12,108

15 South Korea

5,453

15 Nagorno-Karabakh

11,550

16 Switzerland

4,935

16 Japan

10,897

17 Portugal

4,223

17 Turkey

10,553

18 Singapore

3,777

18 Donbass

9,311

19 Vietnam

3,408

19 Iran

8,668

20 Thailand

2,846

20 India

7,575

21 Malaysia

2,543

21 Switzerland

7,040

22 Chile

2,322

22 Belgium

5,676

23 Argentina

2,312

23 Canada

5,283

24 Austria

1,991

24 Georgia

5,052

25 Philippines

1,930

25 Syria

5,050

a The

given figures include those for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau

We see that 11 countries—Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the United States—are included in both lists. How can this overlap be explained? The number of publications, both general and presented in one or another way, depends on many factors (Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Segev, 2015, 2016). Let us list some of them that seem to be the most important in our context. The first important factor is the size of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The richer the country is, the more often the global press writes about it. Therefore, in the list of leading countries, both in terms of the

22

A. Sharikov

Table 3 Top 25 countries most frequently mentioned in positive and negative tones in 2020 in the Factiva database (in equity terms, %) % of publications that mentioned the country in a positive tone

% of publications that mentioned the country in a negative tone

1

Vietnam

1.883

1

Donbass

20.491

2

Chinaa

1.834

2

South Ossetia

16.163

3

Thailand

1.799

3

Nagorno-Karabakh

13.826

4

Nauru

1.601

4

Armenia

11.238

5

Cambodia

1.382

5

Ukraine

9.980

6

Japan

1.371

6

Moldova

9.612

7

Angola

1.158

7

Abkhazia

9.335

8

Singapore

1.146

8

Azerbaijan

7.969

9

Costa Rica

1.138

9

Kazakhstan

7.703

10

USA

1.120

10

Georgia

6.315

11

Guyana

1.031

11

Belarus

5.760

12

Indonesia

1.027

12

Tajikistan

5.618

13

Eswatini

0.984

13

Kosovo

5.583

14

East Timor

0.954

14

Latvia

5.305

15

Cape Verde

0.924

15

Kyrgyzstan

4.688

16

Malaysia

0.916

16

Uzbekistan

4.547

17

Portugal

0.906

17

Russia

4.306

18

Myanmar

0.905

18

Western Sahara

4.247

19

Spain

0.877

19

Montenegro

4.168

20

Lesotho

0.868

20

Comoros

4.156

21

Zambia

0.853

21

Syria

4.069

22

Tanzania

0.817

22

Lithuania

3.942

23

Philippines

0.807

23

Mauritius

3.871

24

Saint Kitts and Nevis

0.798

24

Madagascar

3.712

25

Saudi Arabia

0.795

25

Estonia

3.608

a The

given figures include those of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau

total number of publications that mention them and the total number of publications that mention them in positive and negative contexts, we see the largest economies, including Russia. The second important factor is the country’s population. The more people live in a certain country, the more extensive the media sphere is there, the more media there are in it, and the more publications are produced in that country. However, there is a direct correlation between the size of the population and the

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

23

size of the GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2020,2 the Pearson coefficient between these two values was 0.57 (the GDP was expressed in US dollars). Thus, these two variables form a single cluster. Another group of factors is related to the traditions of countries, both sociocultural and sociopolitical. We have seen above on Fig. 7 that in different language zones, the entire corpus of publications has a different tonality balance. Unfortunately, among the Oriental languages, Factiva conducts sentiment analysis only in Chinese and Japanese. It is logical to assume that sociocultural traditions, which are largely associated with religious and philosophical views prevalent in East and Southeast Asia, orient the media to a more harmonious and less critical reflection of the world, and hence, to the predominance of a positively colored description of events. This explains the presence of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam in the first list of countries. In addition, these Asian countries are geographically located relatively close to China and Japan, which conducted the sentiment analysis, and as we know, the proximity of countries is also a factor in increasing the number of publications—countries write more actively about their neighbors. On the contrary, the traditions of Russian journalism are more focused on identifying the negative aspects of everyday life. Therefore, in the second list, we find a significant number of post-Soviet countries, and information on them is presented in the Factiva database mainly in Russian. The third group of factors is related to eventfulness. The global online information space reacts more strongly to negative events—this is a well-known fact. Among the countries that are relatively small in terms of population and economy size, which are represented in the second list in Table 2, there are states where dramatic events occurred that were covered in the press—military actions (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Donbass, Ukraine, and Syria), protests (Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan), and terrorist attacks (Iran). Of course, it must be considered that 2020 was highlighted by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which affected most countries. Let us now turn to Table 3 and clarify how the values presented in it were calculated. First, the number of texts that mentioned the country in a total of nine languages in which Factiva can conduct a sentiment analysis was revealed. Then, among these texts, the number of positively and negatively colored texts was determined, after which the percentages presented in Table 3 were calculated. In fact, each percentage value in the table is the given country’s share of positively or negatively colored materials in the total number of materials that mentioned such country. In the first list (of countries with a positive tonal balance), we again found a large number of countries, but less than in Table 2. Among them are China, Indonesia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The leaders here are three Asian countries: Vietnam, China, and Thailand. The second list in Table 3 includes the top 25 countries with the highest number of publications that mentioned them in a negative tone. In this list are 18 post-Soviet 2

Two data sources were used: population from the UN (http://data.un.org/en/index.html) and GDP from the IMF (https://svspb.net/danmark/vvp-stran.php).

24

A. Sharikov

countries, including unrecognized and partially recognized countries and territories, among 20 countries and territories (Turkmenistan was at the 45th position, and Transnistria is not identified in the Factiva database). Dubious leadership belongs to Donbass.3 The second in the list is the partially recognized post-Soviet country of South Ossetia, and the third is the unrecognized post-Soviet country of NagornoKarabakh. In addition to the post-Soviet countries, the second list includes poor countries where various kinds of conflicts were observed. Among them are Comoros, Kosovo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Montenegro, and Western Sahara. The percentages of positive and negative mentions are not correlated with the size of the GDP or the population of the countries. The Pearson coefficients for these values were 0.08 and 0.07, respectively. Sociocultural factors are more clearly visible, but they were not formalized in our study, and therefore, the Pearson coefficient for this group of factors was not calculated. It was also decided that whether there was a relationship between the percentage values that expressed tonality and the per capita GDP in US dollars would be determined. The following trends were established: • The percentage expression of positive sentiments about the country was not connected to the country’s per capita GDP. • The percentage expression of negative sentiments about the country and the country’s per capita GDP had a weak hyperbolic relationship: the higher the per capita GDP was, the lower the percentage expression of negative sentiments about the country was. The second trend is illustrated in Fig. 8. The analysis was conducted for 204 countries, including some unrecognized and partially recognized ones, about which there is information in the Factiva database as well as data on per capita GDP in US dollars for 2020 (Ranking…, 2022). Figure 8 shows that the states with the highest per capita GDP values are the small states whose economy is based on financial activity. These are Monaco, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and others. The percentage of negative-tone publications that mentioned these countries is noticeably lower than the average. Along the horizontal axis, the highest values in the diagram are those of post-Soviet states, especially of South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan (in descending order of the indicator). There is no Donbass on the diagram because the IMF does not have official data on the per capita GDP of the Donbass republics. Among the post-Soviet countries, the lowest values were observed in Russia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

3

In the Factiva database, the territories of Donetsk and Lugansk that declared independence from Ukraine are both designated as Donbass.

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

25

Number of publications that mentioned a country in a positive tone, %

18

South Ossetia 16

Nagorno-Karabakh

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Armenia Ukraine Moldova Abkhazia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Georgia Belarus Kosovo Latvia Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Russia Lithuania Estonia Netherlands USA Norway Luxembourg China Switzerland Qatar 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Liechtenstein Monaco

140

160

180

200

Per capita GDP, US dollars

Fig. 8 Relationship between the number of negative materials and the mentions of a country (Factiva system data, 2020) and its per capita GDP. Sources IMF etc.

3 Representation of Post-Soviet Countries in 2020 3.1 Frequency of Mentions In Table 1, which lists the top 30 countries in the Factiva database in terms of the number of materials that mentioned them in 25 languages in 2020, we noted that among the post-Soviet countries, only two—Russia and Ukraine—are on this list. In what positions are the remaining countries located? Figure 9 answers this question. It shows the percentage distribution of the number of publications that mentioned post-Soviet countries relative to the total number of publications in the Factiva database in 2020 in 25 languages. The vertical axis shows the countries, with their rank in brackets in the general list of all countries available on the Factiva database. Figure 9 shows that the top 50 countries, in addition to Russia and Ukraine, include Belarus (38th), Azerbaijan (41st), and Kazakhstan (44th). Eight more countries entered the top 100: Armenia (55th), Kyrgyzstan (68th), Uzbekistan (70th), NagornoKarabakh (77th), Latvia (79th), Georgia (80th), Lithuania (82nd), and Estonia (87th). The following countries and regions had even lower positions: Donbass (102nd), Tajikistan (112th), Moldova (121st), Turkmenistan (128th), Abkhazia (161st), and South Ossetia (177th). The percentages given can be interpreted as follows: Russia was mentioned only once in about every sixth publication in the Factiva database;

26 Russia (1) Ukraine (17) Belarus (38) Azerbaijan (41) Kazakhstan (44) Armenia (55) Kyrgyzstan (68) Uzbekistan (70) Nagorno-Karabakh (77) Latvia (79) Georgia (80) Lithuania (82) Estonia (87) Donbass (102) Tajikistan (112) Moldova (121) Turkmenistan (128) Abkhazia (161) South Ossetia (177)

A. Sharikov 15.933% 0.708% 0.242% 0.234% 0.217% 0.169% 0.093% 0.090% 0.080% 0.078% 0.074% 0.071% 0.059% 0.043% 0.031% 0.022% 0.019% 0.008% 0.004% Percent of publications that mentioned the country in the FACTIVa database in languages, %

Fig. 9 Percentage of publications that mentioned post-Soviet countries relative to the total number of publications in the Factiva database in 2020

Ukraine, in every 140th; Belarus, in every 410th; Azerbaijan, in every 430th; and Kazakhstan, in every 460th. These are the five most frequently mentioned postSoviet countries. At the same time, South Ossetia was mentioned only once in every 26,000 publications. Even Nagorno-Karabakh, where there was a military conflict in 2020, was mentioned in only one publication out of about 1,250. For 13 countries, the percentage of materials that mentioned them was less than 0.1% at the global level. Thus, it can be said that the world’s online media are interested in only a few post-Soviet countries. In the preceding paragraphs, we considered which variables are associated with the number of publications that mentioned countries in the global online information space and noted the long-known links with the population and GDP sizes of the country in nominal terms. In Fig. 10, we will see if this dependence will persist in the many post-Soviet countries. Figure 10 presents a scattering diagram showing a direct relationship between the population of the former USSR states (except Russia) and the number of materials with their mention in the FACTIVA database in 2020 in 25 languages. A direct connection is clearly visible. Russia is not included in this set, since both the population and the number of materials mentioning it are very out of the general range—this is an outlier that is usually excluded if we want to see a more relevant picture. Let us also pay attention to the locations of the points that represent the countries in Fig. 10 relative to the trend line. The countries with which media bursts were associated in 2020 are noticeably higher. Ukraine appeared in the materials for a number of reasons, among which we will highlight two. First, it waged a conflict with the Donbass militia. Second, it was often mentioned in the world media in connection with the events that followed the assassination of General Suleimani, when Iranian

Representation of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Online …

27

Number of publications that mentioned the country, thousand

800

Ukraine

700 600 500 400 300

Belarus

Azerbaijan Armenia Nagorno-Karabakh Kyrgyzstan 100 Latvia Georgia Lithuania Estonia Donbass Tajikistan Turkmenistan Abkhazia Moldova 0 South Ossetia 200

0

5

10

15

Kazakhstan Uzbekistan

20

25

30

35

40

45

Population size, mln

Fig. 10 Scattering diagram showing a direct relationship between the population of the post-Soviet countries (except Russia) and the number of materials that mentioned them in the Factiva database in 2020 in 25 languages. Sources UN statistics and official statistics of the unrecognized and partially recognized countries

air defenses shot down a Ukrainian civilian plane, mistaking it for a military one, which, we recall, became the strongest information storm in the world in 2020. We noted this in Fig. 5. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh caused a smaller media surge when a military conflict began in this region in September 2020. Belarus attracted the attention of the press during its presidential elections, when there were demonstrations against its current government that Western media actively covered. On the contrary, in countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Moldova, there were no bright events that were attractive to the world press. This explains their location in Fig. 10 the trend line. The correlation between the number of publications that mentioned a country and its GDP turned out to be significant but slightly less strong than the correlation with the country’s population size (Pearson coefficient R = 0.69). Thus, two well-known patterns were confirmed: • The bigger the population of a country is, the more materials that mention it are published in the world press; and • The higher the GDP of a country is, the more publications mention it at the global level. Let us now consider in which languages in 2020 materials with references to postSoviet countries were published more often. Such information is shown in Table 4.

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It shows the number of materials that mentioned countries in six languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, German, Russian, and Spanish. These languages were chosen because few materials about some countries appeared in a number of languages, and there were even languages in which there were no publications at all in 2020 from among the 100 million publications in the Factiva database. For example, there were no mentions of South Ossetia in the Factiva database in 2020 in Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Finnish, Hungarian, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Slovak, Swedish, and some other languages. Earlier, we saw how publications with references to countries are grouped on a language basis. We noted the existence of a cluster of countries that are more often mentioned in Russian than in other languages used by Factiva, with the exception of their official state languages (see Fig. 2). Let us also remember that English is absolutely the leading language on the Internet (see Fig. 1). Russian is only in second place but with a significantly lower volume. Therefore, we expected that the mention of post-Soviet countries would most often be in English. However, Table 4 shows that only for three Baltic countries—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—were the materials that mentioned them most often published in English. All other countries presented in Table 4 were more often mentioned in Russian-language materials. Thus, for the three Baltic republics, the Russian language was the second language that mentioned them most often in publications in the Factiva database in 2020. Table 4 Number of publications that mentioned post-Soviet countries in Arabic, Chinese, English, German, Russian, and Spanish in 2020 in the Factiva database Arabic Chinese English German Russian Spanish 71 40 1,273 59 7,245 48 Abkhazia 4,417 4,000 58,659 3,854 94,136 4,338 Armenia 5,978 5,010 97,382 4,279 117,544 4,704 Azerbaijan 1,901 7,347 66,823 16,080 133,850 8,099 Belarus 8,103 308 36,157 511 9 188 Donbass 32,275 2,063 22,537 825 211 876 Estonia 980 3,590 26,326 1,157 42,347 2,090 Georgia 1,104 21,012 68,377 703 135,272 890 Kazakhstan 2,336 34,555 580 59,109 475 354 Kyrgyzstan 260 520 39,188 1,375 38,658 609 Latvia 150 705 41,493 2,133 26,671 982 Lithuania 6375 779 14,402 348 241 377 Moldova 29,937 2,838 37,389 3,466 802 2,163 Nagorno-Karabakh 85,241 96,500 6,482,693 73,670 10,013,685 54,202 Russia 8 14 263 22 3,706 12 South Ossetia 718 9,039 288 22,225 109 359 Tajikistan 186 414 7,892 160 10,708 133 Turkmenistan 4,623 7,443 120,762 16,990 567,826 11,172 Ukraine 1,884 32,773 834 57,066 192 210 Uzbekistan Note For each country, the fill highlights three languages in which the largest number of materials with their mention were published

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Therefore, English and Russian were the first and second languages, respectively, that mentioned the post-Soviet countries most. What was the third language? Table 4 shows that it is Arabic, Chinese, German, or Spanish. Recall that the number of publications in a language reflects the importance of countries in a particular language environment. Table 4 shows that Abkhazia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are most in demand in the Arab world. This is probably explained by the proximity of these countries of the South Caucasus to the Middle East. In the German-speaking zone, the following 7 countries out of the 19 in the zone were more significant: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, South Ossetia, and Ukraine. These countries, except for South Ossetia, are located in the European part of the former USSR. The interest of the German-language media in these countries is also apparently explained by the geographical proximity of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to them. The case of South Ossetia is difficult to explain and requires deeper study. Seven more countries turned out to be more attractive in the Chinese-speaking zone: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This group of countries, except for Georgia, share the same borders as China or are located quite close to it. The reason for the higher interest in Georgia in the Chinese-speaking environment is also unclear. Finally, the unrecognized republics of Donbass and Nagorno-Karabakh turned out to be significant in the Spanish-speaking zone—which is difficult to explain as well.

4 Media Dynamics Let us consider the main media storms that were observed on a global scale and were associated with the states of the post-Soviet space in 2020. Let us clarify what is meant by a media storm in the present context. We have given examples of media storms—the first in the form of a media explosion, after which the second one was observed in the form of an attenuation that lasted several days (see Fig. 5). The second one was not explosive but lasted and escalated for several months (see Fig. 6). As explained, a media surge is an increase in the number of materials. Media outbursts are frequently observed. However, what exactly is the criterion for a media storm? By how many units should the number of publications increase and for what period for an event to qualify as a media storm? In 2021, we proposed that a “global media storm” be considered the dynamic effect of at least a 5% increase in the number of materials in the global online information space during the month compared to the number of materials in the previous month. We will consider a global media storm strong if the increase in the number of materials from the previous month is at least 15% (Sharikov, 2021a). We propose to apply this criterion to materials that mentioned post-Soviet countries and consider only the strongest media storms for each country under consideration. Note also that not every significant increase in the number of publications found in the FACTIVA database can be interpreted as a media storm. We saw that in 2020,

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Number of publications that mentioned Russia per month, mln

Russia 1.865 1.761

1.856

1.763

1.792 1.528

1.271

1.257

1.125 1.023 0.918 0.774

Fig. 11 Number of materials that mentioned Russia per month in 2020 in 25 languages. Source Factiva database

when the number of texts processed by the Factiva database increased but due to a planned expansion, rather than a social event (see Fig. 4). We will consider global media storms that mentioned the post-Soviet countries in 2020 as groups of countries. Let us start with Russia, which is difficult to compare with other countries because of its scale.

4.1 Russia Figure 11 shows the number of materials that mentioned Russia in the Factiva database in 25 languages in 2020. There were two strong media bursts: in March relative to February (an increase of 45%) and in July relative to August (72%). The March increase was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was actively written about by the world press and has become a global trend. However, the July increase was not related to COVID-19 but to the expansion of the Factiva database.

4.2 Baltic Countries The dynamics of publications in 2020 that mentioned the three Baltic countries— Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are shown in Fig. 12. The figure shows that on a

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31

Number of publications that mentioned the country per month, thousand

Baltic countries 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Fig. 12 Number of materials that mentioned Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

global scale, the numbers of materials that mentioned them were approximately at the same level. For all three countries, there was a strong media storm in March relative to February. The monthly increase in March was 29% in Estonia, 33% in Latvia, and 28% in Lithuania. The reason was global—the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, each of the three countries had its own media splashes. However, a strong global media storm was observed in August in materials that mentioned Lithuania (an increase of 39%). This media storm was associated with a number of events that followed one after the other: the protests of the Lithuanian population against COVID-19 restrictions, problems with migrants on the border of Lithuania and Belarus, and the mention of Lithuania in the context of the unrest in Belarus. Such problems were not observed in Estonia and Latvia.

4.3 Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Donbass The next four countries and regions—Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Donbass— are united by their geographical proximity. All of them are located in the European part of the former USSR. Two of them, Belarus and Moldova, border Ukraine. In 2020, Donbass was the unofficial name of the territory that includes two regions of Ukraine: Donetsk and Lugansk, which, in 2014, declared themselves independent

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from Ukraine. In the Factiva database, they are considered together and designated as Donbass. It is important to emphasize that the scales of the four countries and regions are very different. The large Ukraine, with a population of 44.1 million people, according to UN data for 2020 (Population…, 2022), is adjacent to the small Moldova, whose population was 2.6 million, that is, 17 times smaller (Population…, 2022). The populations of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within Ukraine as of January 1, 2021, were 4.1 and 2.1 million people, respectively (Total population…, 2022), for a total of 6.2 million people. Belarus occupies a higher position, having a population of 9.4 million people (Population…, 2022). The numbers of materials in the Factiva database that mentioned Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Donbass per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages are shown in Fig. 13. Given the aforementioned pattern, that the number of publications that mention a certain country has a strong and direct relationship to the size of the country’s population, we are dealing with a large difference in the number of materials at the global level between Ukraine and Moldova. In 2020, the difference in the Factiva database was 31 times, and between Ukraine and the combined population of the two republics of Donbass, 16.5 times. Therefore, in Fig. 13, the Moldovan and Donbass data are presented on a smaller auxiliary axis to see more clearly the media storm concerning Moldova. Figure 13 shows that strong media storms were observed twice. Both concerned the presidential election. The first was in Belarus in August 2020, which was accompanied by great unrest, dispersals of demonstrations, and attempts by the opposition

10

80

9

70

8 7

60

6

50

5 40

4

30

3

20

2

10

1

0

0

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova

Number of publications that mentioneed Moldova and Donbass per month, thousand

Number of publications that mentioned Belarus and Ukrain per month, thousand

Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Donbass 90

Donbass

Fig. 13 Number of materials that mentioned Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Donbass per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

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33

to challenge the election results, which resonated significantly with the global press and increased the number of publications in August compared to July by 4.6 times (an increase of 364%). The second media storm was related to the elections in Moldova in November 2020, which were also accompanied by protests of the population. Here, the severity of the events turned out to be less dramatic, and therefore, the increase in the number of materials in the Factiva database that mentioned Moldova in 25 languages amounted to 185%, a 2.8 times increase. Another media storm related to Moldova occurred in March when the number of publications increased by 33% from the previous month. This media storm was associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. In the dynamics of the appearance of materials related to Ukraine in 2020, there was no noticeable media storm based on the selected criterion. We see an inverse relationship between the coverage of events in Belarus and Ukraine, especially in the second half of 2020. This is explained by the fact that the journalistic corps that specialize in covering events in the post-Soviet space usually keep either the entire former USSR or groups of countries in its field of attention. Therefore, switching attention to Belarus means less attention to Ukraine. We note only a relatively small media storm recorded in March and associated with the COVID-19 pandemic (a 10% increase in the number of publications). As for Donbass, two notable media storms were observed there: in February, when there was an aggravation of the military conflict on the contact line (a 44% increase), and in July, when a truce was reached (a 46% increase). It should also be noted that the COVID-19 topics related to Belarus, Ukraine, and Donbass did not cause a strong media storm in the global dimension.

4.4 Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia This group of countries is considered in unity and closely related to each other. After the military conflict, known in the world as the “08.08.08 War” (as it began on August 8, 2008), Russia and some other countries recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the vast majority of countries in the world consider them territories of Georgia. In reality, they are deeply interconnected, and therefore, it is logical to regard them as a single cluster. Figure 14 gives an idea of the dynamics of the number of materials in the Factiva database that mentioned each of these three countries by month. Since Georgia significantly exceeds the two partially recognized republics in terms of population, the number of publications that mentioned the two partially recognized republics is noticeably lower, and in Fig. 14, these figures are given on a smaller scale, displayed on the vertical axis. For the materials that mentioned Georgia in 2020, there was a media storm associated with the parliamentary elections on October 31. On the same day and sometime after, there were active opposition rallies that demanded a review of the election results. The increase in the number of materials that mentioned Georgia in the global online information space in November compared to October was 29%.

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4.0

9

3.5

8

3.0

7 6

2.5

5

2.0

4

1.5

3

1.0

2 1

0.5

0

0.0

Georgia

Abkhazia

Number of publications that mentioned Abkhazia and South Ossetia per month, thousand

Number of publications that mentioned Georgia per month, thousand

Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia 10

South Ossetia

Fig. 14 Number of materials that mentioned Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

As for Abkhazia, there was a global media storm in January 2020. There was a 302% or fourfold increase in the number of publications in the world press from December 2019. The reason was the resignation of the president of Abkhazia, Raul Khajimba. The second notable media storm occurred in March (the monthly increase in the number of materials amounted to 171%) when new presidential elections were held in the country. A strong media storm that mentioned South Ossetia in 2020 was observed in August and was associated with a chain of events that unfolded after the assassination attempt on the country’s Interior Minister, Igor Naniev. The incident occurred on August 17 in Tskhinvali. Unknown persons fired at the minister’s official car. The minister was in the car at that moment but was not injured. Eleven days later, the society was stirred by the news that one of the detainees in this case, 30-year-old Inal Jabiyev, died in the hospital. Later, it became known that he died during an interrogation in the building of the criminal police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the body was already brought to the hospital without signs of life. Rallies were held in the capital with slogans against torture and demanding the resignation of the Interior Minister and the Prosecutor General (The main events…, 2021). The number of publications in the world that mentioned South Ossetia increased by 96% or almost twice from July to August.

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4.5 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in conflict since the collapse of the USSR, which, from time to time, had escalated into military clashes. The conflict is connected with a territorial dispute. Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the regions that was part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, where a large number of ethnic Armenians live, declared independence, which was not recognized by any state in the world, even by Armenia. Azerbaijan announced the need to liberate its region, and in September 2020, launched a military operation called the “Second Karabakh War” in the world press. A joint statement was issued by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev; the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan; and the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, on a complete ceasefire of all military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone from 00:00 Moscow time on November 10, 2020, (Statement…, 2020). The outbreak of hostilities provoked a strong media storm in the global online information space (see Fig. 15). The number of publications that mentioned Azerbaijan in the Factiva database increased 2.2 times (by 120%) in September from October, and the number of publications that mentioned Armenia rose 2.5 times (by 153%). However, the highest parameters of the media storm in relative terms were observed in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh. The number of publications in the Factiva database that mentioned it in September turned out to be about 10 times higher than in August (an increase of 939%). Another feature of this very strong media storm is that

Number of publications that mentioned the country per month

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh 60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh

Fig. 15 Number of materials that mentioned Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

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A. Sharikov

it persisted in October. Thus, the number of publications that mentioned Azerbaijan increased again 2.2 times (by 119%) in October from September; that mentioned Armenia, 2.1 times (by 112%); and that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh, 3.2 times (by 215%). Considering the peculiarity of this case, let us consider in more detail how the number of publications that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh changed day by day. Figure 16 gives an idea of this process, which shows the number of publications that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh in the Factiva database in 25 languages from September 20 to December 31, 2020. The figure shows two lines. The solid line shows the dynamics of the appearance of new publications by day, and the dashed line marks the average annual value (about 233 publications per day). Figure 16 shows that the curve literally “exploded” on September 27—in one day, the number of publications that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh in a total of 25 languages increased from 36 to 2,305, that is, 64 times (by 6,317%). The next day, the growth continued and reached a maximum of 2,728. On November 7, however, there was a decrease, with an intermediate minimum of 436. Soon, however, there was another media explosion. In one day, from November 9 to 10, 2020, the number of publications that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh increased from 1,141 to 2,549. The signing of the trilateral reconciliation document turned out to be a sensation to which the world press reacted.

The beginning of the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

2500

Signing of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia with the mediation of Russia

2000 1500 1000 500

Nagorno-Karabakh, day by day

December 29

December 25

December 21

December 17

December 9

December 13

December 5

December 1

November 27

November 23

November 19

November 15

November 7

November 11

October 30

November 3

October 26

October 22

October 18

October 14

October 6

October 10

October 2

September 28

September 24

0 September 20

Number of publications that mentioned the country per month

Nagorno-Karabakh 3000

Nagorno-Karabakh, avarage for 2020

Fig. 16 Number of materials that mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh daily, from September 20 to December 31, 2020, in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

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37

Number of publications that mentioned the country per month

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

Fig. 17 Number of materials that mentioned Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

4.6 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Publications mentioned Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two largest Central Asian countries from among the former Soviet republics, on a global scale in 2020 without such vivid media explosions as we observed in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Figure 17 shows this dynamic. In the case of Kazakhstan, a media storm related to the COVID-19 pandemic was observed in 2020—there was a 15% increase in the number of publications that mentioned Kazakhstan in the Factiva database in 25 languages in February from January. In Uzbekistan, a media storm was observed in March 2020, which was also associated with the COVID-19 epidemic (an increase of 22%).

4.7 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan Figure 18 gives an idea of the monthly dynamics of the number of publications that mentioned three other Central Asian countries—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—in 2020 on the Factiva database in a total of 25 languages. The figure shows that among the three countries; the strongest media storm was observed in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 from September 2020. The number of publications that mentioned Kyrgyzstan on a global scale increased 2.4 times (by 137%). The reasons are the parliamentary elections and the opposition protests that followed them,

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5000

18000

4500

16000

4000

14000

3500

12000

3000

10000

2500

8000

2000

6000

1500

4000

1000

2000

500

0

0

Kyrgyzstan

Tadjikistan

Number of publications that mentioned Tajikistan and Turkmenistan per month

Number of publications that mentioned Kyrgyzstan per month

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan 20000

Turkmenistan

Fig. 18 Number of materials that mentioned Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan per month in 2020 in a total of 25 languages. Source Factiva database

accompanied by strong clashes with law enforcement agencies from which more than a hundred protesters were hospitalized. Then, a state of emergency was introduced. As a result, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Sooronbai Jeenbekov, voluntarily resigned. In Turkmenistan, a media explosion was observed in September 2020. The adoption of a number of documents to change the constitution of the country became a sensation. Turkmen Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) had approved a draft constitutional law that provided for the creation of a bicameral parliament in the country. There was a 30% increase in the number of publications that mentioned Turkmenistan in the Factiva database in 25 languages in September from August 2020. Tajikistan held elections twice in 2020: parliamentary elections in April and presidential elections in October. The maximum number of publications that mentioned the country in the world press was seen in October, after an 11% increase in the number of materials in the Factiva database in a total of 25 languages in October from September—Such an increase is rather small in intensity for a monthly interval. The December increase, clearly seen in Fig. 18, is due to the fact that in November, there was a minimum of publications that mentioned Tajikistan, apparently associated with a decrease in interest in the country after its presidential elections, after which the number of publications returned to the usual zone of values without bright events.

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4.8 Typology of Media Storms Observed in Post-Soviet Countries in 2020 Let us now summarize our information on global-scale media storms in 2020 that mentioned post-Soviet countries. Table 5 shows data on the strongest media storms in each of the 19 countries under consideration. Table 5 shows the largest media bursts in the global online information space in 2020, calculated using the Factiva database in 25 languages together. This set does not include the increase in the number of publications that mentioned the country caused by the expansion of the corpus of publications (as was the case in Russia) or the recovery of the expected average values after a certain recession (as was the case in Tajikistan). Let us clarify some of the parameters shown in Table 5. The duration of the analysis was one month. For each country, a media storm was considered, observed from January to December 2020, with a maximum percentage increase in the number of publications that mentioned the country in 25 languages together in comparison with the previous month. The countries are ranked in the column Maximum monthly growth in 2020, %. The last column briefly indicates events that triggered the media storms. Table 5 clearly shows several types of events that cause global media storms. 1. Armed conflicts and agreements on their termination or suspension. The greatest increase in the number of materials was observed with the mention of the territory where the conflict occurred. In this article, these media storms were connected with Nagorno-Karabakh and Donbass. 2. National elections, both presidential and parliamentary. Media storms as reactions to these events were observed here in a number of countries, including Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan. The value of the media surge increased when the elections were accompanied by opposition protests. 3. High-profile resignations of political leaders—the president of the country, the prime minister, and others. We saw examples of these in the cases of Abkhazia and Kyrgyzstan. 4. Resonant murders. Such an event caused a media storm in South Ossetia. 5. Social protests of various kinds. Here, in addition to the protests related to the elections, we observed protests against migrants and COVID-19 restrictions in Lithuania. 6. The decision of the parliament related to constitutional changes. This caused a media storm in Turkmenistan. 7. The COVID-19 pandemic in its various aspects—medical, social, economic, and others. In 2020, this was the most common cause of powerful media storms for several months in Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. In terms of the percentage increase in the number of publications that mentioned the country, there was a large spread, from 10% (due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Ukraine) to 939% (due to the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

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Table 5 Strongest media storms in post-Soviet countries in 2020 (on a monthly basis) Month, 2020

Maximum monthly growth in 2020, %

Event

Nagorno-Karabakh

September

939

The military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Belarus

August

364

Presidential elections and opposition protests

Abkhazia

January

302

Resignation of the President of Abkhazia

Moldova

November

185

Presidential elections and opposition protests

Armenia

September

153

The military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Kyrgyzstan

October

137

Parliamentary elections, opposition protests, resignation of the President of Kyrgyzstan

Azerbaijan

September

120

Military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

South Ossetia

August

96

Assassination attempt on the Interior Minister of South Ossetia and its investigation

Donbass

July

46

Truce reached in the military confrontation with Ukraine

Russia

March

45

COVID-19 pandemic

Lithuania

August

39

Public protests against migrants and COVID-19 restrictions

Latvia

March

33

COVID-19 pandemic

Turkmenistan

September

30

Discussion of amendments to the Constitution of Turkmenistan, transition to a bicameral parliament

Estonia

March

29

COVID-19 pandemic

Georgia

November

29

Public protests against the results of the October 31 parliamentary elections

Uzbekistan

March

22

COVID-19 pandemic

Kazakhstan

February

15

COVID-19 pandemic

Tajikistan

October

11

Presidential elections

Ukraine

March

10

COVID-19 pandemic

Source Factiva database

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5 Sentiment Context of the Mention of Countries Let us now consider the sentiment context of the publications that mentioned the post-Soviet countries in 2020. The analysis was conducted on the Factiva database in nine languages, which revealed the tonality of the materials. Such information is shown in Table 6, where four tonality parameters are presented for each country, expressed as a percentage of the number of publications that mentioned the country. These four tonality parameters are the percentage of neutral, positive, and negative materials, as well as the tonality balance—the difference between the percentage of positive and negative materials that mentioned the country. Let us start with the percentage of neutral mentions. Recall that the number of neutral materials is determined as follows: The number of positive materials and the number of negative materials are subtracted from the total number of information materials. Table 6 shows that the percentage of materials with a neutral mention of countries ranged from 79.5% (Donbass) to 97.6% (Turkmenistan), with an average value of 91.7%. For a larger number of countries under consideration, the percentage of neutral materials was above average. Values below the average, in addition to those Table 6 Tonality parameters of materials that mentioned the post-Soviet countries in 2020 in the aggregate of nine leading languages of the world Abkhazia

Neutral, %

Positive, %

90.6

0.03

Negative, % 9.34

Tonality balance, % −9.31

Armenia

88.7

0.07

11.24

−11.17

Azerbaijan

91.8

0.28

7.97

−7.69

Belarus

94.0

0.25

5.76

−5.51

Donbass

79.5

0.04

20.49

−20.45

Estonia

95.7

0.69

3.61

−2.92

Georgia

93.4

0.24

6.32

−6.08

Kazakhstan

91.8

0.54

7.70

−7.16

Kyrgyzstan

95.2

0.13

4.69

−4.56

Latvia

94.3

0.38

5.31

−4.93

Lithuania

95.5

0.58

3.94

−3.36

Moldova

90.1

0.29

9.61

−9.32 −13.82

Nagorno-Karabakh

86.2

0.005

13.83

Russia

95.4

0.26

4.31

−4.05

South Ossetia

83.8

0.07

16.16

−16.09

Tajikistan

94.2

0.18

5.62

−5.44

Turkmenistan

97.6

0.47

1.97

−1.50

Ukraine

89.8

0.18

9.98

−9.80

Uzbekistan

95.0

0.41

4.55

−4.14

Source Factiva database

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A. Sharikov

of Donbass, were observed in South Ossetia (83.8%), Nagorno-Karabakh (86.2%), Armenia (88.7%), Ukraine (89.8%), Moldova (90.1%), and Abkhazia (90.6%). The percentage of positively colored materials that mentioned countries ranged from 0.005% (Nagorno-Karabakh) to 0.69% (Estonia). The average value of this parameter in the group of post-Soviet countries was 0.27%. Values below the average were observed in most of the countries presented in Table 6, including Russia (0.26%). The percentage of positive-tone materials in 2020 in nine languages together was above average with the mentions of, in addition to Estonia, Lithuania (0.58%), Kazakhstan (0.54%), Turkmenistan (0.46%), Uzbekistan (0.41%), Latvia (0.38%), Moldova (0.29%), and Azerbaijan (0.28%). The percentage of negative-tone materials varied from 1.97% (Turkmenistan) to 20.49% (Donbass), with an average value of 8.02%. For most of the countries represented, this absolute value was lower. Higher values were observed in materials that mentioned, in addition to Donbass, South Ossetia (16.2%), Nagorno-Karabakh (13.8%), Armenia (11.2%), Ukraine (10.0%), Moldova (9.6%), and Abkhazia (9.3%). The tonality balance for all the countries turned out to be negative. Its value ranged from −20.45% (Donbass) to −1.51% (Turkmenistan). The average value was − 7.75%. A more visual representation of the distribution of the countries according to the value of the tonality balance is given in Fig. 19.

Fig. 19 Tonality balance of the materials that mentioned the post-Soviet countries in a total of nine leading languages of the world in 2020. Source Factiva database

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How can the results be explained? Let us compare the three points noted above. First, for 16 of the 19 countries, most of the materials that mentioned them in 2020 were published in Russian (see Table 4). Second, a tonality balance was determined for each major language zone of the global online information space. In particular, it was shown that the Russian-speaking zone had the strongest shift to the negative tonality (see Fig. 7). Therefore, the number of publications that mention the countries predominantly in Russian are shifting to the negative, even if there are no dramatic events there. Third, the number of publications in other languages should be considered (see Table 4). If the country is actively mentioned in Chinese, then the negative impact of the Russian-speaking zone is at least partially offset by the positive tonality balance characteristic of the Chinese language as well as, although to a lesser extent, of the Spanish and English languages. Of course, eventfulness is superimposed on these basic patterns—military conflicts, protest demonstrations, the COVID-19 epidemic, and other phenomena. Summing up these factors, it becomes clear why Turkmenistan has the lowest absolute value of tonality balance. It had no negative events in 2020. Let us recall that the media storm in this country was connected to the public discussion of amendments to the Constitution of the country related to the transition from a unicameral parliament to a bicameral parliament. In addition, Turkmenistan was mentioned quite actively in the Chinese press, which led to the calmer tone of the publications that mentioned Turkmenistan and the relatively weak shift to the negative. Estonia and Lithuania differ in that they are more often mentioned in Englishlanguage sources, where the systemic tone shifted to the positive. Russian-language media mentioned them less often. In 2020, media storms in these two countries concerned the COVID-19 pandemic and the protests in Lithuania. However, the media storms in these countries were not explosive in nature and had a brightly colored negative connotation. Among the three countries with lower values (Donbass, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh), two are unrecognized (Donbass and Nagorno-Karabakh), and one is partially recognized (South Ossetia), on whose territory negative events occurred in 2020—armed conflicts and a resonant attempt against the Interior Minister.

6 Conclusions Let us summarize the results of the consideration of the representation of postSoviet countries in the global online information space in 2020. We emphasize the word global since this kind of analysis was carried out for the first time, thanks to the possibilities of working on a large corpus of texts in a rather large number of languages representing more than 90% of the informational content within the framework of the GLOPESTION model described earlier. Our main conclusions are as follows.

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1. Of the 19 considered states whose information was available in the Factiva database (among 204 countries), only Russia, the leader in the number of mentions, and Ukraine, which entered the top 20 most frequently mentioned countries, were significant at the global level. The importance of other countries was lower. This means that the world has little interest in events taking place, for example, in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan. 2. This study confirmed a long-known trend in the relationship between the number of publications about a certain country and the size of its population. This trend was manifested at a fairly high statistical level not only on a global scale, but also in many post-Soviet countries. 3. The study introduced the concepts of global media surge, global media explosion, and global media storm. Prior to these, dynamic media characteristics in academic literature was investigated either at the level of individual publications or at the level of groups of publications, but not at the global level. Global media storms were identified for each of the 19 countries, the strongest of which turned out to be related to the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in September–November 2020, with presidential and parliamentary elections and subsequent protests in a number of countries (Abkhazia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova). The world press actively covered these events. 4. The parameters of the tonality of the context in which publications that mentioned the 19 countries appeared were also considered. In absolute terms, the appearance of both positively and negatively colored materials conformed to the pattern described above—the number of publications was related to the population of the country. In relative terms, an inverse relationship was found with the size of the per capita GDP in nominal terms: negative materials appeared more often about countries with poor populations. Another interesting trend was related to the predisposition of different languages to more positive or more negative coverage. The percentage difference between positive and negative materials that mentioned the country, called tonal balance, turned out to be a convenient tool for comparative analysis on a linguistic basis. It turned out that materials in Russian and French were generally likelier to have a negative context, and materials in Chinese, Japanese, English, Spanish, and Portuguese were more often positively colored. This feature was superimposed on the assessment of eventfulness and showed that the tonal balance of all the post-Soviet countries shifted to the negative.

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Legal Regulation of the Internet Around Post-Soviet Space Svetlana Raspopova and Svetlana Simakova

1 Introduction The emergence of the Internet in the former Soviet republics coincided with the fact that they gained their state independence. National media, journalists, and ordinary citizens have been able to access cyberspace, which is freer from government control and pressure than traditional mass media. In addition, having access to various resources, any user could independently verify the information disseminated by the national media and assess the situation from different angles. In this sense, one can talk about the Internet as a factor in the formation of civil society in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, young states were faced with the need to protect their national security in the information space at the legal level, that is, they had to determine the rights and obligations of all participants in communication. The foregoing has determined the object of the present study; it was the legal policy and practice of its implementation in the former Soviet republics in the field of Internet regulation in terms of protecting the information interests of individual, social, and the state level. This will be expressed in the balance of freedom of speech and the level of protection of the technical infrastructure on the Internet. Considering the peculiarities of the legal policy in the field of the Internet in the former Soviet republics, the present study deliberately has not included Russia. It is guided by the fact that the Russian Federation is a very large country where a system of Internet law has developed, which requires separate consideration. At the same time, throughout the present study, the Russia leading part in the issue is noted as one of the vectors for the formation of legal regulators of the Internet in the post-Soviet space. S. Raspopova (B) Moscow Polytechnic University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] S. Simakova Chelyabinsk State University, Chelyabinsk, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_3

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2 From the USSR to the Post-Soviet States: Approaches to Media Regulation Initially, the term post-Soviet space is proposed by Prazauskas (1992). Researchers define the post-Soviet space according to the following features: geographical, historical, civilization, and cultural aspects. Let us take as a basis the classification of the post-Soviet space proposed by Petrov (2012). It forms five groups of states: – – – – –

Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (Central Asia). Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. Russia.

At the same time, until now, each of the former Soviet republics reel from the factor of a common past, which strengthen close and diverse bonds between the countries. Thus, according to Yegorov, “long-term existence in one “house” led to the presence in the body of states that gained sovereignty, “generic features”, despite the multi-vector nature of modern development, predetermining the commonality of their civilization destinies. Moreover, it is precisely the general features of the social economy, culture, and system of values, acquired in part not thanks to, but against their will, that are still apprehensible” (Egorov, 2011, p. 48). In addition to the geopolitical position, the post-Soviet space still possesses many parallels and factors that confirm its unity. Russian researchers agree that the postSoviet space possesses common features of the political and economic system and social and cultural proximity, called “post-Soviet identity”. Researchers also note common features in the cultural sphere, which are expressed in the weak informational immunity of immigrants from the USSR as a result of the total control of culture by its censorship authorities. It should be noted that the periodical press, radio, and television in all the union republics that were part of the Soviet Union were not regulated by special republican legislative acts, but by resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR aimed at restricting freedom of speech, which was one of the most terrible threats to the Soviet regime. In the projects of 1964 and the 1969, Soviet constitution (1977) placed emphasis on expanding the rights of the union republics. But in the mid-1970s, new proposals were formulated aimed at reducing the level of constitutional guarantees of the sovereign rights of the republics and increasing the independent role of the RSFSR in the USSR. Let us refer to Medushevsky “In the sphere of the subsequent collapse of the USSR, the central contradiction of Soviet federalism, between the construction of the “Soviet people” and the protection of national interests, is of particular importance. (Medushevsky, 2014). In this context, the inconsistency of Soviet legal norms about the unity of the USSR and at the same time about the sovereignty of the republics becomes clear. The

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cementing beginning of the multinational state was the ideology of the CPSU, therefore, in the Constitution, citizens of the USSR were guaranteed freedom of speech, press, meetings, rallies, street processions, and demonstrations, “in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system” (Article 50) (Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1977). The complete dependence of the mass media on the state was expressed in the fact that there was no registration of mass media in the USSR until 1990. The media functioned as divisions of publishing houses or government organizations, of which they were the establishment. When in 1990 the law of the USSR “On the press and other mass media” was adopted, the legal status of the mass media changed. This also affected the union republics, which were recommended to adopt their national laws on the press on the basis of union law. It should be noted that at that time there was no national legislation on the media in the union republics, with the exception of Lithuania, which was the first, in 1990, to adopt a law on the basis of a draft union law on the press. In the same 1990, laws on the press and other media appeared in the Tajik SSR and the Latvian SSR, in 1991—in the Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Georgian SSR, and Armenian SSR. To understand the peculiarities of Soviet legislation, it is important to note that the laws of the Union republics differed only in certain subtleties from the laws of the Union. The close connection between federal law and republican laws within the USSR was in full accordance with the legal tradition of socialist legislation, which was proclaimed in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Article 19. The laws of the USSR have equal force on the territory of all Union republics. Article 20. In case of a discrepancy between the law of a union republic and the law of the all-union, the all-union law shall apply.

Several decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The path of development of the post-Soviet countries has developed in different ways, since historically the former Soviet republics gain their own characteristics. For example, in Soviet times, the budget of Tajikistan used to be subsidized. Up to 60% of the republic’s income was provided by Moscow. After the breakup of the USSR, Tajikistan had to plug the budget hole itself. The civil war, that followed the breakup, lasted until 1997, and led to devastation and further impoverishment (BBC News. Russian service, 2011). However, the development pattern, for example, of Estonia after the USSR breakup turned out to be very successful. The reasons for the success are the common culture, formed, among other things, by the 700-year-old rule of the Ostsee Germans: the small size of Estonia; and, most importantly, the example and the assistance of neighboring fraternal Finland. As well as an excellent example of how not-to-do. Ülle Madise, Presidential adviser, admits that example brings the scene back to the Estonians: “We, apparently, just really wanted to build a completely different country” (BBC News Russian service, 2011). The formation of the media institution in the post-Soviet space with the adoption of relevant legislative acts was determined by the Russian law “On the Mass Media” in

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Russia (1991). In 1992, mass media laws were adopted in Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. The Law of Ukraine “On Printed Mass Media (Press)” came into force in 1992. In 1994, the law “On the Press” was adopted in the Republic of Moldova, in 1995 “On the Press and Other Mass Media” in the Republic of Belarus, in 1997 “On the Mass Media” and “On the Protection of the Professional Activities of a Journalist” in Uzbekistan. Referring to one of the developers of media legislation, Fedotov, who noted their lack of independence: “Many laws on the media that were adopted in the former Soviet republics were written off from our Union or Russian laws” (Raspopova, 2022).

3 Internet Regulatory Issues It is worth noticing that the Internet appeared in the USSR, just right before the breakup. On August 1, 1990, the first network of an allied scale, Relcom (the name is derived from RELiable COMmunications), was launched, which became the progenitor of the Runet. The democratization of public life after the Soviet Union breakup opened up wide opportunities for using the Internet in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, its further development in each former Soviet republic proceeded differently. This is largely due to the fact that the Internet or cyberspace is a very complex structure that can be considered in the unity of the social and technical aspects. The social side is that cyberspace is a set of social relations that arise in the process of appliance. Before considering the issue of approaches to regulating the Internet in the postSoviet space, let us say that the matter of legal regulation of information and communication technologies (ICT) became relevant in the early 1990s, primarily due to the rapid development of the Internet and its penetration into almost all social spheres. The Internet “actually swallowed up the commercial networks that existed before”, or, one way or another, “became the foundation for building other, more closed networks” and became the central link in information and communication technologies (Saveliev, 2014). The first researchers of the Internet believed that the virtual world of cyberspace would become more and more independent, separated from the physical one. And the main task was to protect the Internet from government interference, since the Internet community was able to independently control its activities, creating norms, primarily technical frameworks, without interference from traditional authorities. Internet researchers such as Barlow (Barlow J.), Dybell (Dibbell J.) presented the Internet as a new frontier, beyond which people would live in a world in which they would create their own norms and rules. Such conceptual approaches became widespread in the 1990s. In this regard, it is important to mention the 1996 “Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace” by Barlow; “Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is

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not where bodies live. We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity” (Barlow, 1996). In this document, the Internet is proclaimed as a territory of freedom from the state authorities and is presented as a new philosophical concept based on the principles of libertarianism. The researchers who adhered to this concept believed that the Internet is a technological resource; the regulation of which can only be carried out in terms of engineering solutions. Legal norms and rules established by the state are excluded. The thesis that “the Internet is capable of transgressing the limits of territorial law, and its appliance can lead to the fact that state regulation will lose its meaning” is supported by many Internet researchers of the late twentieth century. Today, these statements are not confirmed by practice and are regarded as invalid. The utopian view of the Internet as an absolutely free space is explained by its complex nature, which is expressed in the fact that the Internet is “a technical invention, a technology, and, a new social communicative resource” (Kasenova, 2015, p. 363), which diversifies a wide range of public relations and influencing their legal regulation. Therefore, the Internet is not only an “information service”, but an “information resource”, which is a “social phenomenon”. Foreign and domestic researchers state the dual nature of the Internet: technological and social. But in their research the scientists mainly focus on the technological regulation of the Internet as a technical resource. At the same time, the legal framework governing human rights has not been sufficiently studied. At the same time, the necessity for legal regulation of freedom of speech on the Internet is obvious and is caused by the fact that in many countries there is a very real threat of increased pressure on public opinion, the introduction of censorship, as well as falsification of facts by the state, violation of the human right to access to reliable information. One of the issues still under debatable is the one of maintaining a balance between freedom of speech on the Internet and the restrictions that states impose to maintain their information security. In this regard, it should be noted that back in 2000, the Okinawa Charter of the Global Information Society discussed the importance of introducing new information technologies into life. They were characterized as an incentive for the development of democratic values: the free exchange of information and knowledge, mutual tolerance, and respect for the characteristics of other people. “The sustainability of the global information society is based on democratic values that stimulate human development, such as the free exchange of information and knowledge, mutual tolerance and respect for the characteristics of other people” (Website of the President of Russia, 2000). In 2003, the Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet was adopted. This paper already dealt with restrictions on information, but condemned any attempt to control the content of the Internet (Law & Mass Media of Central Asia, 2003).

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Except in those cases referred to in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. https://medialaw.asia/document/-2358. Let us clarify that the ECHR is a document that is binding only for those countries whose governments have signed the Convention as members of the Council of Europe. Their membership in the ECHR imposes on them the responsibility for the observance of rights and freedoms and determines the Western approach to the definition of freedom of the media and the practice of its observance. In the context of the present study, these are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Estonia. The point is that the exercise of freedoms imposes duties and responsibilities, which may be subject to restrictions or sanctions that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security (Strovsky, 2014). In continuation of what has been said, we add that the list of legitimate goals for restricting freedom of expression in accordance with Part 2 of Art. 10 ECHR is also necessary for the purposes of “territorial integrity or public order, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (European Convention on Human Rights, 2022). Accordingly, the aforementioned declaration noted that “measures to control communications on the Internet, regardless of national borders, should remain the exception” (Law & Mass Media of Central Asia, 2003). In the very formulation of the issue of the priority of information freedom, the concept of “responsibility” of the creators of Internet messages for their distribution faded into the background. At conferences in 2004 in Amsterdam (Netherlands), in 2005 in Warsaw (Poland), in 2007 in Strasbourg, the role of the Internet as a source of terrorist threats, ideas of racism, and xenophobia was discussed, but the mechanism for this suppression was not developed. In the post-Soviet space, the formation of legislation to ensure control over information on the Internet began with the approval of the “Concept for the formation of the information space of the Commonwealth of Independent States” (1996), which included the section “Ensuring information security in the information space of the CIS” (1996). Note that this document has not been applied to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, since they are not members of the CIS. It was first applied exclusively to the operation of computer networks. It is said that one of the urgent issues of creating such a space is the need for each of the CIS states to ensure their own information security and protect their information sovereignty. To manage the issue in a timely manner, each state had to monitor “contradictions” and threats to its information sovereignty, as well as deal with the problem of ensuring national information security. According to Richter (2007), who believes that there are two reasons for this; the first is related to the need to protect national telecommunications networks and computer data banks from the latest hacking and interference systems. The second reason is due to the fear of the penetration of mass media into the borders of the new sovereign states, hostile to the regimes that are not yet strong. On a practical level, governments have shut down private providers for fear of undermining the national

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interest. A striking example is Belarus, Turkmenistan, where the authorities have deprived the licenses of providers independent of the state. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, an attempt was made in the post-Soviet space to create a new regulatory framework that would meet the challenges of the time associated with the growing role of the information sphere in society. It must be noted that the Internet as a social and communication environment in these documents is considered on a par with other communications. At the same time, the idea is traced that it is its appearance that put on the agenda the question of the formation of state policy in the field of information security. Thus, in Kazakhstan in 1998, the Decree “On the National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan” was adopted, according to this decree, it is forbidden to distribute printed materials, television, and radio broadcasts of foreign media, the content of which undermines national security, on the territory of the country. In Tajikistan, in 2003, the Concept of Information Security was adopted, and in 2004, the country’s Information Security Program was developed there, the purpose of which is to strengthen the state’s policy in this area. In Belarus, in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine in 2000–2004, not only concepts were discussed, but also laws on information security, but they were not adopted then. In Ukraine, the issue of information security was discussed in January 2001 at parliamentary hearings in the Verkhovna Rada, and an Interdepartmental Commission on Information Security and Defense of Ukraine was even created. In the context of the above, we note the Law “On Principles and Guarantees of Freedom of Information”, which entered into force in Uzbekistan (2002). This law defined the concept of “information security” in terms of protecting the interests of the individual, society, and the state. But it is interpreted extremely one-sidedly: the threat to information security came from information systems aimed at deforming national identity. The law is about the information systems of foreign countries, which are presented as a real threat to the security of Uzbekistan. Despite the outlined scope of the present study, which does not include consideration of the legal regulation of the Internet in Russia, for a complete understanding of the situation, it must be noted that in the Russian Federation in 2000 the Doctrine of Information Security is also adopted, in which among the main threats to national security threats in the information sphere were classified. A brief digression into the legislative base of the CIS countries allows to talk about the proximity at the terminological and structural levels. First, ensuring information security in the former Soviet republics is the protection of state security from foreign influence and on the flow of information that citizens received. Second, the documents discussed and adopted in the CIS countries assumed the introduction of legal and technical measures to strengthen state control over the mass media. Around the post-Soviet space, the law “On the Basics of Internet Regulation” (the “Model” act) was also adopted. It was approved by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Appendix to the Resolution of the IPA CIS dated May 16, 2011, No. 36–9. Article 8. Competence of participants in the regulation of relations related to the use of the Internet: 1. Participants of the Internet regulation process are the state, Internet service operators, and self-regulatory organizations. 2. The state represented by authorized bodies

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in the process of regulating the Internet shall be:—development, coordination, and implementation of state policy at the national, regional, and international levels;— creating favorable conditions for the development, dissemination, and widespread use of the Internet and Internet technologies;—development, coordination, and adoption of laws, other regulatory legal acts regulating relations related to the use of the Internet;—supervision of compliance with the legislation governing relations related to the use of the Internet;—promoting the dissemination of best practices in the field of regulation of relations related to the use of the Internet;—combating offenses committed using the Internet (Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, 2011). The adoption of this law demonstrated the desire of the CIS members to find a measure of legal regulation of the Internet in the post-Soviet space applying the term “soft law”. It is a model legislation in relation to the Internet. According to Istomin, “In Art. 8 of the Model Law traces the logic of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society” (Istomin, 2020).

4 The Situation with Freedom of Speech and Democracy on the Internet in the Post-Soviet Space As mentioned above, the global nature of the Internet creates significant problems in determining its jurisdiction, which country’s law enforcement authorities can consider disputes over network-related legal relations. Jurisdiction is determined by the location of the provider or the computer from which the information is distributed. According to Richter, activities in the virtual space, of course, fall under the scope of international agreements and obligations of states regarding freedom of thought and speech (Richter, 2011, p. 248). “The necessary restrictions can only be effectively implemented as a result of international cooperation, in which national authorities will be aware of the global nature of the information space and, given this circumstance, accept joint responsibility for its existence” (Richter, 2011, p. 248). According to the researchers, the best solution to the issue of regulating the Internet could be international legislation acts and documents that would congruent national laws on the Internet. The basis of the normative base of international regulation is set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948. Despite the fact that this document is advisory in nature, it fixes the main boundaries of freedom of speech and thought. Thus, Article 19 of the Declaration outlines the essence of freedom of speech, the understanding of which is very important for understanding the Internet as a global space. “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information by any means, regardless of frontiers”. But this right to freedom is not considered in the document as an absolute authority. This is pointed out in part 2 of article 29 of the Declaration, which refers to the possibility of restricting human rights “solely for the purpose of ensuring due

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recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and public welfare in a democratic society”. According to Richter, although this provision is not directly applied in the states of the UNPO, however, it is the most powerful political appeal to the whole world and is part of the very legal norms that are called international custom applicable to all states (Richter, 2011, p.18). As of today’s date, many European countries adhere to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The European Union, the World Trade Organization, and other comply with the standards of the United Nations quite effectively. Members of the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE have committed themselves to the fact that any legitimate restrictions on the right to freedom, expression, including the right to collect, transmit, and distribute information and opinions must comply with international standards. In this regard, let’s name the Decision of the Permanent Council of the OSSN “Promoting Tolerance and Freedom of the Media on the Internet”, which refers to the comprehensive respect for the right to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, which are important for democracy and are actually strengthened by the Internet. “Participating States should take steps to ensure that the Internet remains an open and public forum that ensures the freedom of opinion and expression enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council, 2004). At the same time, in recent years, in some states in the post-Soviet space, the fact of excessive application of the legal regulation of freedom of speech on the Internet has been observed. There is a strengthening of state control over the information sphere of the Internet. An indicator of the situation with freedom of speech in the countries included in the sample for our study is the rankings of countries in the world according to the Worldwide Press Freedom Index for 2012 and 2022. It is important to note here that the “freedom of the press” in the Worldwide Press Freedom Index is interpreted more than just recording violations in the media. The indexes also assess the degree of freedom of speech and self-expression that exists in a particular country. Comparing these ratings allows to say that the situation with freedom of speech in the countries considered in the study has changed over the past ten years. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia), the countries of Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus), and the countries of the Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan) have noticeably improved their positions in the ranking. There is a positive trend in the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan). Negative dynamics is registered in Tajikistan (123rd place in 2012 and 152nd place in 2022). The comparison results are presented in Table 1 (Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index 2012–2013 2013, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2022). Analyzing the studies that result in rankings on the state of Internet freedom in the countries of the world, it is important to note that their authors emphasize recognizing the existing cultural differences, national interests, and different levels of economic development of states; however, they are guided by universal criteria for freedom of

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Table 1 Comparison table of online press freedom rankings 2012–2022

No

Country

Rank, 2012–2013

Rank, 2022

1

Estonia

11

4

2

Lithuania

39

9

3

Latvia

22

33

4

Moldova

53

40

5

Ukrain

74

51

6

Armenia

106

74

7

Georgia

100

72

8

Kyrgyzstan

126

106

9

Kazakhstan

160

122

10

Azerbaijan

164

133

11

Belarus

123

152

12

Uzbekistan

157

153

13

Tajikistan

156

148

14

Turkmenistan

177

177

information, the starting point for which is Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the context of the foregoing, it is noted that countries that have noticeably improved their positions, despite the general “post-Soviet” model of education, today are characterized by membership in various international organizations. Today they are characterized by membership in various international organizations. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania are members of the European Union and NATO. Ukraine has a controversial status as a member of the CIS. Moldova is a full member of the CIS. Also, the Republic of Moldova has been an associate member of the European Union since 2014. The European Union is developing an ever closer relationship with Moldova, going beyond cooperation, toward gradual economic integration, and deepening political cooperation. Armenia is a full member of the CIS. In relations with the European Union, Armenia is guided by the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia (CEPA). It was signed on November 24, 2017, and entered into force on March 1, 2021. The document lays the foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation in various areas: strengthening democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, creating new jobs and business opportunities, adopting fair legislation, strengthening protection and security, improving the environment, improving the quality of education, and expanding opportunities for research. Georgia is a former member of the CIS. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are full members of the CIS. Turkmenistan is an associate member of the CIS.

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Speaking of Kyrgyzstan, it is important to note that despite the fact that the country is part of Central Asia, there is a turnover of power there and no president can become a real dictator. According to Dubnov: “There are many factors here, one of them is the mentality of the Kyrgyz ethnos. It is determined by the nomadic way of life, which implies freedom of choice: where it is better for the herd, the Kirghiz moves in that direction. This is the key difference between the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz from the same Uzbeks or Turkmens, whose sedentary lifestyle predetermined the desire to take the form of a vessel imposed by one or another ruler. Therefore, in Kyrgyzstan, protest traditionally arises quickly and develops rapidly, as soon as one of the leaders at the lower levels of the social hierarchy is indignant at the unfair actions of the highest authorities” (Kartsev, 2019). In the course of the present study, the place of these countries in the ranking of the level of democracy with their membership in various unions is correlated. And some features in the regulatory framework for the development of the Internet. Three countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), being members of the European Union, building their national legislation in relation to the Internet, taking into account the requirements of European organizations, have high positions in the ranking. Moldova, Armenia, as a member of the CIS and at the same time a partner of the European Union, also have positions above the average in the ranking. The status of Ukraine and Georgia has not yet been determined; these two countries actually left the CIS and are currently experiencing difficulties in harmonizing their national legislation, despite the fact that NATO countries have confirmed their decision to accept Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance. “We reaffirm the decision taken at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance with the Membership Action Plan as an integral part of this process. A similar decision is made with regard to Georgia” (Kommersant 12/06/2021). At the same time, they are ahead of the CIS countries in the ranking. It can be assumed that their desire and willingness to join the European Union challenge them to maintain a level of freedom on the Internet. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have rather low positions in the rating in terms of the level of democracy. The results of the analysis of countries by the level of democracy are presented in Table 2. (Democracy Index, 2022) and in the regulatory framework for the development of the Internet (167 countries). Thus, it is noteworthy that following international norms, which formed the basis of the national legislation of many European countries, contribute to maintaining the level of development of democracy on the Internet in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the first place, and Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia in the second.

58 Table 2 Ranking countries by level of democracy

S. Raspopova and S. Simakova No

Country

Rank

1

Estonia

27

2

Latvia

38

3

Lithuania

40

4

Moldova

69

5

Ukraine

86

6

Armenia

89

7

Georgia

8

Kyrgyzstan

115

9

Kazakhstan

128

10

Azerbaijan

141

11

Belarus

146

12

Uzbekistan

150

13

Tajikistan

157

14

Turkmenistan

161

91

5 Ensuring Information Security on the Internet in the Post-Soviet Countries As mentioned above, international documents, despite their advisory nature, set the standards for working with information for all states. These documents include the Cybercrime Convention (Council of Europe, 2001). This convention is the very first international treaty on crimes committed over the Internet and other computer networks and deals in particular with copyright infringement, computer fraud, child pornography, and network security breaches. It contains a number of powers and procedures, such as searching computer networks and intercepting. “The Budapest Convention is more than a legal document; it is a framework that allows hundreds of practitioners from Parties to share experiences and build relationships that facilitate cooperation in specific cases, including in emergencies, beyond the specific provisions of this Convention” (Council Of Europe, 2021a). The Convention also obliges to ensure that Internet service providers retain certain computer data, including traffic data, for a reasonable period of time. An important role in overcoming crime on the Internet is taken by the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime with regard to criminal acts of a racist and xenophobic nature carried out through computer systems (2003). As of December 2021, the Convention was signed and ratified by the post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine (Council of Europe, 2021b). The results of the analysis of countries by the level of democracy are presented in Table 3. In the context of the foregoing, let’s turn to the rating of countries in Global Cybersecurity Index, which provides an expert assessment of computer security in all countries of the world in five parameters: legal, technical, organizational commitment,

Legal Regulation of the Internet Around Post-Soviet Space Table 3 Ranking of countries by level of cybersecurity

59

No

Country

Index

4

Estonia

99.48

11

Lithuania

97.93

21

Latvia

97.28

30

Kazakhstan

93.15

48

Azerbaijan

89.31

63

Georgia

81.06

71

Moldova

75.78

78

Uzbekistan

71.11

86

Ukraine

65.93

97

Belarus

50.57

98

Armenia

50.47

100

Kyrgyzstan

48.64

146

Tajikistan

17.1

152

Turkmenistan

14.48

readiness for cooperation, and development of educational and research country’s potential. Consider the current version of the rating, which was released in 2020 (NoNews, 2020). https://nonews.co/directory/lists/countries/cybersecurity-index The leaders in the ranking are Estonia (4th place in the ranking with an index of 99.48), Lithuania (11th place in the ranking with an index of 97.93), and Latvia (21st place in the ranking with an index of 97.28) among the post-Soviet countries. In these states, the norms of the European Union and international law apply, the observance of which is mandatory for EU members. This circumstance determines the high positions of these states in the global cybersecurity rating. For example, in Estonia, the aims of the Public Information Act (Riigi Teataja, 2000) are to ensure that the public and all people can access information intended for public use on the basis of the principles of a democratic and social rule of law and an open society, as well as to create opportunities for exercise by the public of control over the fulfillment of public duties. The Riigikogu has passed a new version of the Electronic Communications Act in the third reading. In particular, it provides a ban on the use of equipment from the Chinese company Huawei in Estonian telecommunications networks. The adoption of the amendments is also necessary for holding a tender for the allocation of frequencies applied in the fifth generation (5G) mobile networks. Changes concerning the storage of telecommunications data are also removed from the text of the bill. The bill includes various applications applying telecommunications networks, such as Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber in the concept of telecommunications services. The rights of consumers are expanded in the form of the obligation of the telecommunications service provider to provide a leaflet with basic information before concluding

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a contract and a brief summary of the contract in order to eliminate misunderstandings between the provisions of the contract and reality. The bill also introduces the European Telecommunications Directive into Estonian legislation. The position of Kazakhstan is the 38th in the ranking, with an index of 93.15. In determining priorities in ensuring the information security of the country, Kazakhstan relies on international experience in building an information society and the provisions of the laws “On Communications”, “On Informatization”, “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, “On Mass Media”, and others. In Kazakhstan, the Rules for the provision of Internet access services is adopted in 2015. And they are still in force. The rules apply to all telecom operators that, in accordance with applicable law, provide Internet access services via fixed or mobile communications and technologically related services, as well as subscribers and (or) users of these services. The procedure for suspending (blocking) the operation of networks and (or) means of communication is provided for by the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Communications”: the use of networks and (or) means of communication for criminal purposes that damage the interests of an individual, society, and state; in case of dissemination of information that violates the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on elections, contains calls for extremist and terrorist activities, mass riots, as well as for participation in mass (public) events held in violation of the established procedure (Digital Report, 2016). Azerbaijan ranks the 48th place with an index of 89.31. This is a fairly high position in the global ranking of countries, which is due to the fact that Azerbaijan possesses achievements in the field of information security. The country has been ranked the first in the international rating of analytical centers The Global To Go Think Tank Index for several years among the countries of the post-Soviet space. For example, in 2017, only one analytical center from the post-Soviet space, the Center for Economic and Social Development in Azerbaijan (the 50th place), has got into the category “For the best use of the Internet”. The country is also recognized in the Best Use of Social Media category along with the Carnegie Moscow Center (19th place). The list of think tanks that make the best use of electronic media includes the Center for Economic and Social Development (the 48th) and the Center for Economic Research (the 56th) in Azerbaijan (Chubukova et al., 2018). Azerbaijan has developed a Cybersecurity Strategy for 2019–2022. The goal of the Strategy is to increase the level of national cybersecurity and reduce threats to information systems. On the basis of part 5 of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 708, dated September 26, 2012, the Electronic Security Center200 is established. It is a state body which main activities are: coordination of activities of information infrastructure entities in the field of cybersecurity; collection and analysis of information about cyberattacks, illegal intrusions, malware aimed at the security of information systems and networks, computers and equipment, their software, local, and corporate information systems and their resources (International Telecommunication Union, 2020). Georgia ranks the 63rd place in the ranking with an index of 81.06. In Georgia, a number of legal regulations also deal with online content and the protection of user privacy and data integrity. According to Article 20 of the Constitution of Georgia,

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“The private life of every person, his/her workplace, personal records, correspondence, negotiations by telephone or using other technical means, as well as notifications received through technical means are inviolable”. Further, Article 24 of the Constitution protects the right of every citizen “to freely receive and disseminate information, to express and disseminate their opinions orally, in writing or in any other form. The media is free. Censorship is prohibited”. Section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act protects the transmission of personal data. The rights guaranteed by articles 20 and 24 of the Constitution and article 8 of the Law on Electronic Communications may be limited by law only to the extent necessary to ensure the security and territorial integrity of the state, prevent crime, protect the rights and dignity of citizens, prevent the dissemination of information that is considered confidential, and ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (Legislative Bulletin of Georgia, 1995). Moldova has got the 71st place in the ranking with an index of 75.78. Legislative framework in Moldova is congruent with European legislation. The existing Press Law does not regulate the activities of online media, blogs, and traditional media sites, and Moldova does not possess a specific Law on Information, unlike other post-Soviet states. The legal system for combating cybercrime is based on the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which the country ratified in 2009, its performance in the rating is low. The Cybercrime Prevention and Combating Act was passed by Parliament in January 2010. According to this law, the Prosecutor General’s Office is empowered to coordinate and carry out prosecutions in the course of a criminal investigation. The goal is to improve the regulation of legal relations in the following areas: prevention and combating cybercrime, assistance to providers and users of information systems, cooperation of civil services with non-governmental organizations and other representatives of civil society, as well as international cooperation with organizations and countries with experience in such matters. Uzbekistan ranks the 78th place with an index of 71.11. In Uzbekistan, in accordance with the “Rules for the use of Internet services” (clause 4.2.a, hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”), ISPC and private operators can request the suspension of Internet services, without notifying subscribers, in cases of violation of the 2005 Telecommunications Law. The Rules also state that the provider may temporarily suspend Internet services in cases where the subscriber posts online information that possesses a negative impact on the authorities. It is important to note that Uzbekistan is far ahead of the countries of Central Asia (Tajikistan and Turkmenistan). This can be explained by the fact that the country is striving to congruent its Internet safety standards with European and international legislation. So, in 2018, Uzbekistan joins the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace memorandum, which should ensure soft regulation of the Internet. According to the memorandum, the signatories undertake to protect users from malicious activities, prevent activities that harm the availability of Internet resources, prevent foreign interference in elections and theft of intellectual property, and protect state and non-state network actors from cyberattacks (KUN.UZ, 2018).

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Ukraine has got the 86th place in the ranking, with an index of 65.98. Given the country’s current focus on Europe, these are low indicators in the security rating. Providing access to the network by operators and providers in Ukraine is not licensed and is carried out on the basis of a written agreement with the subscriber. The legislation does not provide for special rules that regulate the procedure for restricting access to certain information resources. At the same time, in January 2018, a draft law of the National Police was approved, which allows blocking websites for a period of three months to three years by a court decision. It provides for the possibility for law enforcement officers to block Internet resources without a court order if serious crimes are to be prevented. In 2021, the President of the country signed a Decree on the establishment of the Disinformation Countermeasures Center, which will unite all government agencies related to the fight against disinformation and assess media threats. In 2021, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security is established under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, the purpose of which is to increase the “society’s resilience to hybrid information influence”. “The structure is designed to document “the Russian military presence and all cases of information warfare”. On October 15, 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the “Information Security Strategy”, which provides for the possibility of closing the media, blocking information on the Web and, in general, combating “wrong” narratives” (Khetagurov, 2020). In 2021, the National Commission, which carries out state regulation in the field of communications and informatization, decided to block 426 sites in accordance with the decision of the Goloseevsky District Court of Kiev. The banned list includes: RBC (RBK), LiveJournal, GitHub—one of the world’s largest web services for hosting IT projects and their joint development, Telegram messenger statistics collection service, Tgstat.ru, portal Banki.ru, Russian and Ukrainian news portals Argumenty Nedeli (Argument Week), Vlasti.net, Zaxid Media, DneprNews, and others. In 2014, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has imposed sanctions on the Russian Internet company Yandex, as well as Mail. Ru group. In 2017, sanctions affected the social networks VKontakte (Vk.com) and Odnoklassniki. “Prohibit Internet providers from providing access services to Internet users to the resources of Mail.ru services and social resources of VKontakte” and “Odnoklassniki”, the message says (Tikhonchuk et al., 2017). The formation of the information security system of Ukraine has got a rather long history, in which, according to researchers, the inconsistency of the actions of the authorities is manifested. In particular, from 2009 to 2014, the Doctrine of Information Security is in force in the country, which is declared invalid after the Revolution of Dignity. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has published the recommendations for strengthening security in Ukraine. “According to OSCE experts, a number of provisions of the Concept could restrict freedom of speech, while others were not formulated clearly enough. Yuriy Stets, Information Policy Minister, has stated that the draft Concept will be finalized in accordance with the recommendations of the international organization” (Nesteryak et al., 2018). Belarus ranks the 87th place with an index of 50.57. This is a low cybersecurity rating. The decision to restrict access to an Internet resource is made by the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus in the following order. State bodies and

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organizations, in accordance with their competence, in case of revealing the facts of posting on the Internet information messages and (or) materials containing information whose dissemination is prohibited, send written notifications to the Ministry of Information about the need to restrict access to such information. Within three working days from the date of such a decision to restrict access to the Internet resource. Belarus is a country that needs financial support in the field of Internet development. Therefore, in the near future, Russia will provide financial support to Belarus to harmonize approaches “to ensure high-quality and holistic interaction in the transfer of information” (Alekseevsky, 2021). Armenia ranks the 98th place in the ranking with an index of 50.47. And it is the most vulnerable country, that is, with a very low level of cybersecurity. Today in Armenia, there are no special legal norms regulating the procedure for restricting access to certain information resources available to users of Internet services. Restriction (blocking) of access can be carried out on the basis of a court decision. The basis for the restriction can be either a final court decision on the illegality of the content, or an interim decision on securing a claim. Domain names are not regulated by law and are regulated by a public agreement of registrars. National domain.am is administered by the Public Organization Internet Society of Armenia, which enters into agreements with registrars and receives part of the income from registration, which is applied for administrative and technical needs related to domain administration. The administrator of domain names ccTLD.am reserves the right to cancel the registration if the user has violated the rules of use/registration, including the content of illegal information. Kyrgyzstan (the 100th place in the ranking with an index of 49.64), Tajikistan (the 146th place in the ranking with an index of 17.1), Turkmenistan (the 152nd place in the ranking with an index of 14.48). Kyrgyzstan acceded to the Model Law “On the Fundamentals of Internet Regulation” of the CIS countries, and on August 23, 2021, President Zhaparov has signed the law “On Protection from Inaccurate (False) Information”. It prescribes the deanonymization of Internet users, as well as the blocking of sites without a court decision if false information is published there. In particular, article 5 of the Law states that the Internet provider, the owner of the site or page restricts or prohibits access to false information. Also, Internet providers, owners of public access points are required to “identify their subscribers” (Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2021). According to experts from the Bishkek-based Media Policy Institute, the “fake law” “introduces censorship”. According to the Institute’s analysis, although this law is intended to protect citizens and the state from false information disseminated on the Internet, it concerns lies that stain honor, dignity and reputation, and therefore, apparently, is aimed at protecting the powerful. Experts are sure that these norms contradict the Constitution, international treaties, and restrict human rights and freedom of speech (AdIndex Asia, 2021). Tajikistan has signed amendments to the International Telecommunication Regulations aimed at strengthening state control over national segments of the global

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Internet network. The amendments are proposed by Russia and supported by likeminded states. The state information policy covers issues related to the activities of the media, elements of protecting the rights of citizens and organizations to publicly available information, as well as certain aspects of information security. According to experts, the practical application of many legal and by-laws leaves much to be desired, as there are no mechanisms for their implementation. Also, citizens are not sufficiently informed about ICT legislation. In 2020, Tajikistan has adopted amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses (Article 374(1), which prohibits the dissemination of false information). The article provides punishment for the dissemination of deliberately false information applying the mass media, the Internet or other electrical communication networks in the context of the emergence and spread of diseases dangerous to humans, or in the implementation of restrictive quarantine measures and the dissemination of untrue information about methods and methods of protection and other measures taken to ensure the safety of the population from these circumstances. ARTICLE 19 recommends that the Government of Tajikistan repeal Article 374 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences. And also notes that public authorities should not be responsible for determining what is true and what is not, since such a “dictatorship of officially approved truthfulness” can covertly lead any society to authoritarian rule (ARTICLE 19, 2020). ARTICLE 19 advocates for the development of progressive standards for freedom of expression and freedom of information at the international and regional levels, as well as for their implementation in domestic legal systems. The ARTICLE 19 Legal Department has produced a series of standard-setting publications that outline international and comparative law, as well as best practices in areas such as defamation law, access to information, and broadcast regulation (ARTICLE 19, 2020). The above example confirms that the expert work carried out by international organizations can be considered as support for the reform of legislation around the world and in the post-Soviet space in particular. The citizens of Turkmenistan have quit recently received the opportunity of free access to the Internet. It was almost impossible for a private person to get access to the network during the reign of the first president of Turkmenistan, Niyazov. The main document that regulates the Internet is the law “On legal regulation of the development of the Internet and the provision of Internet services in Turkmenistan” adopted in 2014. It establishes a restriction on children’s access to information products, which include materials that can cause a desire to use drugs, alcohol, and tobacco products, deny family values and form disrespect for parents, justify illegal behavior, contain obscene language, as well as pornographic information. The law also establishes the responsibility of users for sending information containing state secrets, as well as information whose distribution is limited or prohibited by the laws of the country, disseminating materials on the Internet containing insult or slander against the president, calls for a violent change in the constitutional order, propaganda of war, violence, racial, national and religious hatred, etc. In restricting freedoms on the Internet in the post-Soviet space, Turkmenistan has gone further than others. Most

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well-known international and Russian services are blocked in the country. Turkmenistan has a single state-owned ISP, Turkmentelekom, which does the censoring (Akobyan, 2016). According to research by Cable.co.uk, Turkmenistan is among the top ten countries with the most expensive Internet. According to the media, 1 GB of data in this country costs more than 24 US dollars on average (Cable.co.uk, 2021). The Internet in Turkmenistan is under the strict control of the state. In violation of Article 28 of the country’s constitution, the websites of independent publications covering Turkmenistan and all social networks are blocked. “VPN in Turkmenistan is prohibited by law. The government blocks not only services, but also the accounts of their users. Last year, Radio Azatlyk made a post about interrogations of citizens browsing websites banned in the country. A receipt was taken from the interrogated persons, according to which they promised not to use a VPN and not to look or search the Internet for critical information about the Turkmen government and Berdymukhammedov” (Khananova, 2021). As part of our study, we examined existing approaches to Internet regulation in the post-Soviet space in accordance with the laws adopted there and existing practice. And they revealed the limitations of the Internet, which are determined by the national policy of states. In the context of the foregoing, and according to Korshunov, who notes that, depending on the degree of regulation of the Internet, three models are considered: liberal, authoritarian, and authoritarian and totalitarian. The liberal model assumes the virtual absence of control over political content on the Internet. The authoritarian model implies control of only the political part of the Internet, in the event that certain critical materials can lead to a violation of the existing political system. The authoritarian-totalitarian model reflects the behavior of the country’s leadership, seeking to prohibit access to the Internet in general, to create its own national network (Korshunov, 2019). Although these models may not exist in their pure form in practice, they can point to some trends in Internet regulation. Thus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be attributed to the liberal group, in which the participation of the state in regulating access to information is minimized. In Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Internet regulation issues are harmonized with the liberal legislation of Europe, where there is a balance between the constitutional right of access to information and the protection of national security. Internet regulation in Ukraine is a synthesis of liberal and authoritarian models (including site blocking). In Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, Internet regulation is carried out according to an authoritarian model; to one degree or another, there is a strict state supervision over critical information addressed to the authorities. And “the laws adopted in Russia are aimed at blocking access to prohibited sites, eliminating the possibility of bypassing blocking and eliminating the anonymity of users on the Web” (Korshunov, 2019). The regulation of the Internet in Turkmenistan is carried out according to the Chinese scenario, the authoritarian-totalitarian model. The difference is the lack of necessary funding, IT specialists, and the technological backwardness of the country, which does not allow Turkmenistan to create its own national network.

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From the above, it can be concluded that the Internet is a complex system. It is difficult to keep the line between free access to information and the protection of national security, because the Internet is seen today as a political tool in the struggle for power. At the same time, the global space can function effectively only taking into account the balance of information interests of the individual, society, and the state. The balance of these interests can be maintained through the development of common international norms for regulating the Internet. Despite the fact that each country possesses its own cultural, political, economic, and technological characteristics, the Internet as a technical and social phenomenon, given its global nature, can be regulated by international norms that must be congruented with national legislation. The analysis of Internet regulation in the countries of the post-Soviet space confirmed the present study conclusion.

6 Conclusion In the post-Soviet space, several approaches to regulating the Internet have developed, which have been reviewed on the basis of national legal documents, practices for their application, as well as an analysis of international ratings. In the context of the above, it is noted that the methods of compiling ratings, of course, do not comprehensively cover the assessment of all criteria, however, they undoubtedly record the dynamics in compliance with legal norms. And so the authors of the present study focused on them (ratings for 2021 and 2022). In the course of the present study, it is compiled a classification of countries according to approaches to the legal regulation of the Internet: a balanced approach— positive dynamics (the Baltic countries), negative dynamics (Central Asian countries), and an unbalanced approach (Eastern European countries and the Caucasus countries). The legal policy in the field of the Internet in the Baltic States is based on territorial and cultural proximity. They occupy quite high places in international rankings of freedom of speech and cybersecurity. Estonia ranks the 4th in both rankings, Lithuania—the 9th and 11th, Latvia—the 40th and 21st. It is believed that this result reflects the general Internet legal policy for the Baltic States, based on the interaction of national legislation with international legislation. The legal regulation of the Internet in the countries of Central Asia is characterized by a high level of cybersecurity and lack of freedom of speech. Of all the countries in the region, only in Kyrgyzstan human rights receive legal protection. A certain pattern can be traced in the regulation of the Internet in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where the level of freedom and cybersecurity are the lowest results in the entire postSoviet space. Kyrgyzstan—the 100th place and 74th place; Kazakhstan—the 30th place and 122nd place, Uzbekistan—the 78th place and 133rd place, Tajikistan—the 146th place and 152nd place, and Turkenistan—the 157th place and 177th place. In the countries of Eastern Europe, in determining legal policy, the geographical principle cannot be considered as a classification principle. The rankings of countries

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in the sample in terms of cybersecurity and freedom of speech reveal uneven results. Each of the countries possesses its own vector in the formation of Internet law, which is largely due to their current policies. Moldova—the 71st place and 40th place; Ukraine—the 86th place and 106th place; Belarus with ratings—the 97th place and 153rd place breaks away from the general indicators for the region in terms of ensuring freedom of speech and the right to access information in the country. The countries of the Caucasus at the level of Internet regulation are also geographically little connected with each other. The results of the rankings demonstrate the diversity of their legal policies. Azerbaijan—the 48th place and 148th place, Georgia—the 63rd and 72nd place, and Armenia—the 98th and 51st place. Attention is drawn to the high levels of cybersecurity in Azerbaijan and very low levels of freedom of speech, which is evidence of non-observance of human rights and freedoms. The indicators in the rating for Armenia indicate that the country defends freedom of expression and human rights on the Internet, thereby harmonizing national Internet legislation with international documents. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that the state of the legal regulation of the Internet in the post-Soviet space only partially corresponds to the geographic classification of the book: the Baltic countries and the countries of Central Asia. The segmentation of the countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of the Caucasus in building a legal policy in the field of the Internet is based on a social and political factor. From the above, it is concluded that the greatest stability of the information space has been achieved in the Baltic countries, where attempts are being made to maintain a balance of measures to protect the information infrastructure and democratic values, such as the free exchange of information and knowledge, mutual tolerance, and respect for the characteristics of other people. The study has confirmed that, despite the fact that each of the sample countries possesses its own cultural, political, economic, and technological characteristics, the Internet as a technical and social phenomenon, has provided its global nature, can and should be regulated by international norms in their harmonization with national legislation. An analysis of Internet regulation in post-Soviet countries confirmed the present study conclusion.

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Cancel Culture and Novaya Etika in Russian Public Discourse Sergei A. Samoilenko, Alina Eremina, and Anton Gumensky

1 Introduction In October 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an authoritative international forum for cooperation between leading global experts and Russian politicians and intellectuals. In his speech, Putin underscored the importance of what he called a “healthy” (moderate, reasonable) conservatism as the foundation for Russian national ideology in the face of the multiplying risks and dangers of the global world, which was going “through a structural disruption” (President of Russia, 2021). The Russian president also addressed the perils of normative transformations in the West, specifically focusing on the impact of so-called cancel culture: Zealots of these new approaches even go so far as to want to abolish these concepts altogether. Anyone who dares mention that men and women actually exist, which is a biological fact, risk[s] being ostracized. I repeat, this is nothing new; in the 1920s, the so-called Soviet Kulturtraegers also invented some newspeak, believing they were creating a new consciousness and changing values that way. [...] Countering acts of racism is a necessary and noble cause, but the new ‘cancel culture’ has turned it into ‘reverse discrimination’—that is, reverse racism. [...] We have a different viewpoint, at least the overwhelming majority of Russian society… We believe that we must rely on our own spiritual values, our historical tradition and the culture of our multiethnic nation. [...]I S. A. Samoilenko (B) George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Eremina HSE University, Moscow, Russia A. Gumensky Moscow University of International Relations, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_4

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Speaking at the same Valdai Club meeting in 2022, Putin again attacked Western liberals for viewing any alternative opinions as “subversive propaganda and a threat to democracy” that “should be restricted if not cancelled.” Putin referred to cancel culture as “the real cancellation of culture,” attacking supposed “guardians of liberalism and progress” who are “now trying to cancel our country” and “have reached the point of banning Dostoyevsky and Tchaikovsky” (President of Russia, 2022). Why did the Russian leader call cancel culture a repressive instrument of the liberal West whose views on morality are incompatible with his country’s values? Why did Putin decide to attack cancel culture for two years in a row at the top-tier international forum that determines the official line of the Russian government? Since 2020, the terms kultura otmeny (cancel culture) and novaya etika (new ethics) have become part of Russian political discourse. Kultura otmeny is a direct translation of the term “cancel culture,” a social media practice used “to remove esteem from a person, place, or thing based on offensive behavior or transgression” (Vogels et al., 2021). Novaya etika, however, has no English-language equivalent. According to Magun (2021), the phrase novaya etika reflects the Russian view of social issues that have long been publicly debated in Western countries. These conversations include a variety of distinct social issues, including #MeToo, sexual harassment, culture wars within and with LGBT and feminist communities, #BlackLivesMatter, and race relations. In Russia, the term has become a reference point that both traditionalist patriots and liberal cosmopolitans use to make sense of debates between progressives and conservatives in the West concerning changing views of history, culture, and morality (Bogomolov, 2021; Esquire, 2021; Savina, 2020). Specifically, novaya etika has been linked to the issues of sexual harassment, power relations between genders, and same-sex relationships (Omelchenko, 2021). To date, there has been little research on cancel culture in post-Soviet countries. Using the prism of moral conflict between conservative and progressive worldviews, this chapter seeks to examine how cancel culture practices in the West have influenced Russian society. While cancel culture applies to a broad range of social issues, this essay mainly focuses on cases related to gender power relations. Specifically, it examines the effects of cancel culture inspired by the #MeToo movement across different organizational settings. The chapter argues that the Russian state’s official interpretations of cancel culture and novaya etika support its ideological vision of the world as a confrontation between two incompatible moral orders: the progressive West and conservative Russia. This simplistic view overlooks the presence of other moral struggles taking place in Russian society, including a nascent public debate concerning domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace. This study was conducted before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2021, the Russian Internet was still a shared habitat for several public spheres and political agendas, which frequently clashed, negotiated power dynamics, and organized boycotts. Similar to their Western counterparts, moral entrepreneurs, and vigilantes on both sides of the ideological divide drove outrage discourse to win

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over public opinion. This allowed conflicting parties to define issues, pass judgment, promote or resist change, mobilize supporters, and apply different cancelation strategies to put pressure on actors who occupied the field of contention. In 2022, Russian authorities blocked access to all major opposition news sites and social media platforms.

2 Cancel Culture as Moral Conflict Cancel culture emerged in a context of deep ideological conflict, political and cultural polarization, and changing moral standards (Dimock & Wike, 2020). Moral conflicts represent the most uncompromising type of social conflict, in which the conflicts’ participants belong to incommensurate moral orders (Littlejohn, 1997; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). During moral conflicts, each ideological camp simultaneously attempts to reaffirm its legitimacy while questioning the value systems of its opponents. The core of the division between progressives and conservatives is ideological incompatibility. Advocates of liberal democracy seek to advance societal gains and regulate society via interventions in the interest of social justice (Krugman, 2007). In Western societies, increased support for progressive values is associated with cultural sensitivities around social identities and public endorsement of modern forms of identity politics. The latter refers to a wide range of political activities by which various (often marginalized) social groups strive for recognition and justice (Heyes, 2020). Cancel culture is often used in conjunction with terms, such as woke, the notion of staying politically and socially aware of racial prejudice and discrimination (Romano, 2020). Additionally, liberals do not share some concerns about tradition and maintenance of social order and tradition that conservatives view as moral imperatives, including unconditional in-group loyalty, patriotism, and respect for authority (Graham et al., 2012; Janoff-Bulman, 2009). These differing worldviews inevitably result in a clash of moral values. Each sides’ interpretations and actions seem appropriate or even obligatory to its adherents, while its opponents perceive them as unwanted and dishonest. Academics and journalists have linked cancel culture to other forms of social pressure, including mob mentality, ostracism, and silencing (Breakey, 2020; Manavis, 2020; McDermott, 2019). Some view the shaming and subsequent humiliation of individuals who have committed a moral transgression in the eyes of public opinion as an effective form of social justice. Critics of cancel culture stress that, in addition to public embarrassment, publicly shamed individuals may be excluded from their professional and social circles and lose the ability to support their families (Vogels et al., 2021). The process of canceling is a rhetorical technique used by both right-wing and left-wing groups (Samoilenko & Jasper, 2023). It is often compared to the traditional

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practice of boycotting, the withdrawal from any relations with someone as a punishment or protest. Boycotts may include the refusal to vote for corrupt politicians or use certain corporate goods and services in protest against political or corporate wrongdoing. Cancel culture, however, does not merely involve ceasing to listen to a toxic person or distancing oneself from an offensive social behavior. Instead, it goes one step further, destroying its target psychologically, delegitimizing them socially, and silencing them to prevent them from responding or defending their public image in their social circles. Canceling does not always succeed, especially when targets can mobilize their own supporters to demonize the accusers in turn.

3 Canceling and Networked Activism Research has linked the process of canceling to the actions of networked activists (Bouvier & Machin, 2021; Felaco et al., 2022). In fact, Norris (2021) refers to cancel culture as “collective strategies by activists using social pressures to achieve cultural ostracism of targets (someone or something) accused of offensive words or deeds” (p. 4). Today, activists may organize Twitter hashtag campaigns to shame people “who wouldn’t otherwise be brought to justice because they are protected by their wealth, power or privilege” (Edwards, 2022, p. 12). They seek to impose social pressure on individuals for morally offensive actions and delegitimize inappropriate views, values, and conventions. Moral outrage in the form of anger, contempt, and disgust is the driving force behind cancelation campaigns (Ginther et al., 2021). Outrage discourse provokes highly emotional responses from social media followers in the form of anger, disappointment, or a sense of moral righteousness (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014). In both democratic and authoritarian societies, the imposition and regulation of moral standards is often outsourced to moral crusaders and entrepreneurs (Eder, 1985). Multiple moral vigilantes and “rule enforcers” (Becker, 1963) may take the lead in labeling a divergent behavior as a moral threat and subsequently shaming the individuals or groups associated with this behavior. Reeves and Ingraham (2020) argue that moral surveillance is not a grassroots practice so much as a political technology used to manage others’ conduct by marginalizing certain forms of behavior. Recent studies demonstrate that activists’ strategies have been successfully appropriated by corporate and state agencies, who use astroturfing to promote their business products and political agendas (Asmolov, 2018; Keller et al., 2020). In these scenarios, digital communications that elicit outrage discourse may strengthen the agendas and ideologies of governments and lobbying groups. A popular shaming method is #hashtag mobbing on Twitter or Instagram, which may feature criticism, verbal aggression, hate speech, and trolling (Lutz & Hoffmann, 2017). Cancel culture is heavily context-dependent and takes different shapes depending on the dominant cultural values in society (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In liberal societies, conservative people tend to feel pushed into a spiral

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of silence, whereas in societies with predominantly conservative social norms and moral values, individuals who hold liberal moral views are likely to feel social pressure to conform (Norris, 2021). In both contexts, dissenting minority voices mute themselves for fear of ostracism.

4 Moral Conservatism vs. Novaya Etika In February 2021, the award-winning stage and screen director Konstantin Bogomolov published a manifesto titled “The Abduction of Europe 2.0.” Calling on Russia to stop trying to emulate European values, he described Europe as a society in deep ethical crisis. Bogomolov condemned the morally decaying West, calling it “a New Ethical Reich” whose standards are being developed under the influence of “liberal totalitarianism.” According to Bogomolov, Russia needed to build a new right-wing ideology that would “strictly and irreconcilably [defend] the values of a complex world based on a complex person” (Bogomolov, 2021). Bogomolov’s manifesto was received with surprise and criticism by the Russian liberal elite (Afisha, 2021). Predictably, however, it garnered critical acclaim in Russian and international conservative circles (Ajjan, 2021; Yakovleva, 2021). Moral conservatism is perceived by some scholars as a longstanding element of Russia’s ideological manifesto of cultural distinctiveness from the rest of the world (Laruelle, 2022). Magun and Rudnev (2012) state that Russians have a high rate of “conservation,” defined as security, conformity, and tradition. With the decline of many democratic institutions in the 2010s, the emphasis on protecting and preserving traditional norms, values, and cultural practices based on morality has become pronounced. This development has been embraced by the state as a new political vision. Russia’s moral self-identification is often presented as a unique set of values and usually contrasted with the West’s decadent liberal values. State-sponsored narratives are by no means the only driver of conservative attitudes among the Russian population. Laruelle (2022) argues that research interpreting Russian conservatism exclusively as top-down disregards the existence of grassroots conservatism and far-right movements premised on different grounds than the state’s ideological narrative. One notable example of Russian conservatism is support for the traditional family structure. Homosexuality is generally perceived negatively in the context of state narratives on Russians’ demographic decline, in which natalism is a central theme (Macfarquhar, 2017). Hence, a lack of public support for gay relationships overlaps with Russia’s official political orientation as a European nation with distinctive moral values (Tyushka, 2021). Due to their low level of moderation, user-generated sites have been vulnerable to spam attacks and postings of inflammatory content by social bots. In Russia, troll farms hire teams of spammers and bloggers to confront anti-government sentiments and promote pro-Kremlin narratives (Gaufman, 2019; Gumensky, 2016). Their purpose is to influence public opinion by creating the illusion of mass support for the state’s political agenda. Trolls have significantly contaminated social networking

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sites with jingoism and patriotic groupthink, which has led to further censorship of the Russian Internet. Russia’s legal framework for protecting religious feelings, countering gay propaganda, and removing criminal penalties for domestic abuse has inspired domestic violence, radical ideologies, and far-right online extremism (Elder, 2013; Roache, 2019). The latter is best illustrated by the activities of Muzhskoe Gosudarstvo, or Male State (MG), an unofficial men’s movement which is currently banned in Russia as an extremist organization. MG specializes in the online harassment of women, people in interracial relationships, and LGBT couples. In August 2021, MG attacked the Russian sushi chain Yobidoyobi for an ad featuring a black model and promoting multiculturalism, forcing the company to take down the ad. That same month, the leader of MS urged his followers to go after the restaurant chain Tanuki for featuring a black model and the rainbow flag in its marketing materials (The Moscow Times, 2021a). In June 2021, Russian organic grocer VkusVill published an ad on social media featuring an LGBT family as part of its new marketing campaign, “Recipes for Family Happiness.” After MG reposted the ad on Telegram, a discriminatory backlash, including doxxing and death threats, forced the family to leave the country. Internet trolls and conservative followers also attacked VkusVill. The company was apparently not prepared to defend the progressive values of its minority clients in a society where conservative views prevail: Less than a week later, VkusVill pulled the controversial ad and replaced it with an apology. Andrey Krivenko, the chain’s founder, and 11 top managers apologized for hurting “the feelings of a large number of our customers, employees, partners and suppliers” (Chernova, 2021). The VkusVill controversy supports the main premise of congruence theory: namely that in societies in which public opinion on moral values remains traditional, individuals holding liberal views concerning gender and sexual identity are likely to feel pressure to conform to conservative social norms. Meanwhile, individuals whose values are in line with the dominant cultural values in their community express minimal concern about cancelation. These examples also illustrate the role of moral entrepreneurs as vigilantes who use cancelation strategies to enforce a moral code, sustain ideological conformism, and impose sanctions on dissenting voices.

5 Gender Relations as Generational Conflict Gender-based violence is a serious issue in Russia (Levada-Center, 2019b). Despite its high prevalence, Russian lawmakers voted to decriminalize certain forms of domestic violence in January 2017. Domestic abuse again came to the forefront of the Russian national conversation/public discourse during the high-profile criminal trial of the Khachaturyan sisters in 2018 and 2019. The case against the sisters, who were charged with the premeditated murder of their abusive father, provoked a strong public reaction and prompted proposals to change Russian domestic violence legislation. Others raised awareness about the problem, employing flash mobs, hashtag

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campaigns, and documentaries on domestic abuse by feminist groups, independent journalists, and human rights activists like Alena Popova (Perera, 2019). Russians generally dismiss claims that sexual harassment is a serious social problem. According to a 2020 Levada-Center survey, few Russians consider it sexual harassment for a boss to invite a subordinate on a date. Among those who had heard about the Weinstein trial, the majority of respondents believed that he had received too harsh a sentence (Levada-Center, 2020). Few Russian institutions and companies have a harassment policy, and they rarely make efforts to penalize sexual misconduct (Stogney et al., 2020). When the media outlet Doxa published an open letter describing student-faculty sexual relations at Moscow State University as common, officials refused to investigate and instead accused the students involved of libel (The Moscow Times, 2020). Despite its apparent inclination toward conservatism, Russian society is fragmented—or even polarized—in terms of its values, which makes it prone to moral debates (Levada-Center, 2019a). Compared to culturally homogenous countries like Armenia, Georgia, and Greece, Russia remains quite liberal on many social issues— including multinationality, multiconfessionality, abortion, divorce, and other topics (Haerpfer et al., 2022). There is also a generational divide in Russia on the matters of sexuality and sex-related issues. Overall, younger Russians, raised in a more individualistic culture, tend to be more tolerant of individual differences than older generations. In recent year, public opinion on the LBGT community has become more polarized than in previous years, as members of the younger generation— especially students—show more tolerance of homosexuality (Levada-Center, 2021). Sexual harassment is viewed most negatively by respondents in the 18–24 age group (Levada-Center, 2020). Moreover, a younger generation of students and professionals is becoming increasingly sensitive to moral transgressions. According to Dmitry Muratov, the editor-inchief of the liberal opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta, “there is a new generation with a different understanding of their boundaries” (Gershkovich, 2020). When he realized that the workplace atmosphere was not safe for young journalists, Muratov entrusted a group of young staffers with the development of the paper’s sexual harassment policy. Resistance to these new policies ranged from claims that sexual harassment did not exist in the newsroom to concerns—including among older female staffers—that people would now need permission to express affection. Cancel culture as a new social movement has had a strong impact on the Russian feminist community. In recent years, gender power relations and domestic violence have gained public attention largely due to the efforts of a younger generation of female activists and journalists, who publicized abuses of power and criticized the decriminalization of domestic violence (Roache, 2019; Stanglin, 2017). In 2019, Russian feminist networks offered over 300 events in at least 34 cities featuring therapy, self-actualization, and artistic workshops (Wilson Center, 2020). Rossman (2020) argues that novaya etika should be examined through the prism of a social conflict between the older generation of Russian liberals and the New Left, led by a new wave of Russian feminists (also see Procházková, 2020). Since the 1980s and 1990s, the older generation—which was exposed to hypocritical official

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narratives about sexual culture in Soviet society—has yearned for a sexual revolution like the one that took place in America in the 1960s. They have also sought to resist the conservative turn that began in the 2000s in Russia. In their struggle to make sense of this new Russian feminism, some older liberal commentators condemned novaya etika as a tool of the repressive moral police on the Russian New Left, restricting their freedoms of choice, speech, and sexual expression. Ironically, this means that the sentiments of the old liberal elite often overlap with state-sponsored anti-Western ideology and propaganda. The following case studies illustrate the attempted use of cancel culture strategies in Russia in the context of #MeToo, a social movement against sexual harassment and rape culture. The selected cases took place in three different social settings: within the Russian political establishment, in the newsroom of an online newspaper based in Latvia, and within the entertainment industry on Russian-speaking YouTube.

6 Leonid Slutsky and the Order for Merit to the Fatherland In February 2018, three female journalists openly accused Russian Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky of sexual misconduct. Several media outlets supported their colleagues and called for an open investigation. Slutsky responded to the accusations on his Facebook page in a jocular and dismissive tone, claiming to “love women like any normal man would do.” He called the accusations “a sham,” saying that the attempts to paint him as a Russian Harvey Weinstein were a shoddy provocation (Roth, 2018). On March 8, 2018, Slutsky wished all women Happy International Women’s Day on Facebook, then apologized for offending women without malicious intent. The State Duma stonewalled the issue for a week. When Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin finally commented on the allegations against Slutsky, he called them a legal matter that deserved due process and warned against assigning blame without a trial. Later, Volodin advised journalists who saw the Duma as a dangerous work environment to change jobs and find a safe place to work. He added that the third journalist to accuse Slutsky, BBC Russia Service journalist Farida Rustamova, worked for an international news agency, and that her accusations could be construed as an attempt to discredit Slutsky at the height of the parliamentary election campaign (Antonova, 2018). Some Duma members called the accusations a cheap PR stunt staged to capitalize on the Harvey Weinstein scandal in America. They dismissed the allegations against Slutsky as Western propaganda and part of an information war against Russia led by the West. Tamara Pletnyova, the head of the Duma’s committee on family affairs, supported Slutsky, saying, “We don’t live in America or in Europe, why should we copy everything they do? If a woman doesn’t want [attention], then nobody will harass her” (Roth, 2018). Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary of the presidential administration, also openly criticized Slutsky’s accusers. In his opinion, the journalists did

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not want justice under the law, but were simply following “the American craze,” an indirect reference to the #MeToo movement (Golubeva, 2018). On March 21, 2018, the State Duma Ethics Committee found no evidence that Slutsky had engaged in wrongdoing and no grounds for taking any measures against him. Several media outlets—including liberal ones like RBK and Kommersant and oppositional ones like Ekho Moskvy, Dozhd, and a few others—boycotted the Duma and withdrew their reporters from its media pool. They also refused to provide news coverage of Slutsky in his post as Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs or of the activities of the Ethics Committee. In retaliation, the Duma stripped 48 journalists of their accreditation. Nearly a month and a half after the scandal broke, the story gradually disappeared from the news agenda. By the middle of summer 2018, there were no longer reports of any developments concerning the sex scandal. Over the next two years, Slutsky was recognized for his service and promoted by the Kremlin. He was appointed President of the Department of World Politics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. He was subsequently awarded the Order for Merit to the Fatherland, 4th class, “for his great contribution to the development of parliamentarism, active lawmaking and many years of conscientious work” (Committe on International Affairs, 2021). In the fall of 2021, he joined the 8th State Duma as Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs. In 2022, after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Slutsky became a member of the Russian delegation in peace negotiations. Since Slutsky is under EU and US sanctions over his support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the allegations against him were framed as part of a larger ideological conflict between the Russian political establishment and the imaginary West. Thus, Slutsky’s colleagues and superiors shrugged off the accusations as a smear campaign. Moreover, they actively defended their conservative moral order against the harmful effects of novaya etika, which they perceived as a Western cultural import. Thus, neither critical media coverage nor condemnation by the journalistic community had a major impact on Slutksy’s professional career. Slutsky’s promotion following the scandal can be interpreted as official approval of his loyalty to the regime. This is not the first instance of a public figure being promoted after a public sex scandal in post-Soviet countries. For instance, two years after his arrest by New York police in May 2011 on charges of sexual assault, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the French economist, and former managing director of the International Monetary Fund, was invited to join the boards of several banks in Russia and Ukraine (BBC, 2016).

7 Ivan Kolpakov and the Dilemma of a Liberal Newsroom In October 2018, Ivan Kolpakov, editor-in-chief and co-founder of the oppositional, Latvia-based Russian news website Meduza, was accused of sexual harassment at a staff party by the spouse of one of his colleagues. When Kolpakov heard about the allegations, he canceled a business trip and called an emergency editorial board

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meeting. Kolpakov said he did not remember the incident but apologized directly to the woman and to her husband. The next day, he was suspended as Meduza’s chief editor. After reviewing the case and finding no evidence of prior misconduct, the newspaper’s board of directors determined that suspension and public censure were sufficient as disciplinary measures and decided to reinstate him. In protest, the husband of the victim resigned, and readers began accusing the news outlet of hypocrisy (Meduza, 2018). Meduza positions itself as a liberal Russian outlet. Before the incident with Kolpakov, it actively covered the accusations against State Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky (discussed above) and even published a how-to manual for dealing with harassment by a superior in the workplace (Meduza, 2017). Public reactions largely fell into two camps: those praising Meduza’s openness about the harassment incident and those arguing that the board of directors should have dismissed Kolpakov immediately. Many critics accused the news outlet of having a double standard, recalling that Meduza used to publish instructions on what to do “if your boss makes a pass at you” and had demanded Slutsky’s resignation following the allegations against him (see Meduza, 2017a, 2017b). Margarita Simonyan, chief editor of the Kremlinfunded RT news network, wrote on Telegram, “Meduza would not have had to fire Kolpakov if it did not demand that we fire Slutsky and did not try to introduce all of that fashionably American stuff into our quiet, patriarchal life.” Russian columnist Oleg Kashin said that the Meduza scandal was a test for Russian progressives and that by not firing Kolpakov, they were “still only imitating the West” (Gershkovich, 2018). Meduza announced that they had been unprepared for this sort of situation and planned to draft overdue anti-harassment policies and procedures. The scandal intensified when a video surfaced from Kolpakov’s time as editor of another news magazine, Salt, which depicted him lifting women’s skirts in an advertisement for the outlet. With public indignation mounting, Kolpakov decided to resign on November 9, 2018. A few months later, however, he returned to Meduza as editor-in-chief, supported by Galina Timchenko, Meduza’s co-founder and executive editor (Esquire, 2019). Meduza’s board of directors took meaningful steps to ensure transparency and accountability. Still, its handling of the situation was criticized by both the proKremlin media, and its Western colleagues, who said that Meduza “need[ed] to do a hell of a lot better” to support its projected image as a progressive media outlet (Meduza, 2018). The decision to rehire Kolpakov after his resignation was a difficult choice made in a context of increasing censorship and pressure on the newspaper by Russian state monitoring agencies. The sexual harassment cases discussed above demonstrate how reputation and moral integrity are valued differently in conservative and progressive Russian social environments. Slutsky’s colleagues generally ridiculed the harassment allegations against him and dismissed them as a fabricated defamation campaign inspired by the decadent West, while Meduza’s liberal newsroom, located in an EU country, took the allegations seriously and called for a transparent discussion and investigation of the situation. In the field of Russian politics, loyalty and allegiance to the state’s

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ideological course are esteemed higher than organizational ethics or societal norms of moral conduct. In addition, work-related sexual harassment is not considered a major social issue in Russia. Thus, political authority figures are often exempt from social judgment on such social issues altogether.

8 Regina Todorenko and Her Image Repair Handbook Regina Todorenko is best known as the host of a popular Russophone Ukrainian television travel series, Oryol i Reshka. For many young women in Russia and Ukraine, Todorenko has also been a role model: a successful businesswoman and Instagram influencer who espouses progressive values (Eckel, 2020). In 2019, she was ranked among the top 10 Russian-language Instagram influencers and voted Woman of the Year by readers of the Russian edition of Glamour magazine. In 2020, rates of domestic violence spiked after the Russian government imposed restrictive COVID-19-measures such as social distancing and quarantine. Russian media linked these cases of abuse under lockdown to a lack of adequate legislative measures (Andreeva et al., 2021). In April 2020, Todorenko and her husband participated in a video interview for PeopleTalk news outlet (FAMETIME, 2020). When the conversation turned to the topic of domestic abuse, Regina expressed puzzlement as to why women would publicly speak out about it, saying: “You need to be a psychologically sick person to say on camera: ‘My God! My husband beats me!’ But why didn’t you think about it? And what did you do to prevent him from beating you? What did you do to make him hit you?” The next day, Todorenko gave an interview to Glamour magazine in which she said that psychologists had proved that a woman is often subjected to violence when she likes being a victim. The two interviews caused an enormous scandal. Many of Regina’s followers were outraged by her misogynistic, victim-blaming views. Other celebrities criticized her position and shared personal stories about their experience with abusive partners. Oksana Pushkina, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Family, Women and Children, accused Todorenko of supporting harmful stereotypes. Soon thereafter, two brands—PepsiCo and Pampers—terminated their contracts with Todorenko, refusing to support an influencer who endorses domestic abuse. Pampers sided with victims and announced that some of the funds intended for Regina’s advertising campaign would be donated to support families in difficult situations. In addition, Glamour magazine stripped Todorenko of her status as “Woman of the Year.” Facing a difficult situation, Toderenko made a public apology, saying she was opposed to all domestic violence and simply failed to express it correctly. In a subsequent post, she admitted her mistake and indicated that she only grasped the scale of the problem after receiving “thousands of stories from women” (Todorenko, 2020). Todorenko expressed hope that her mistake, which had sparked a strong public reaction, would help women speak out. She also announced that her Instagram would become a mouthpiece for victims.

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Todorenko and her husband donated two million rubles to Net Nasiliyu, the center for victims of domestic violence—the largest donation in the history of the foundation. She also began to support other organizations helping domestic abuse survivors. She asked Glamour magazine to give her “Woman of the Year” award to Margarita Gracheva, a victim of domestic violence whose ex-husband had cut off her hands. Gracheva accepted the gift and asked her subscribers to give Todorenko a chance to redeem her good name. In addition, Todorenko soon released a documentary focusing on the problem of domestic violence and promised to direct all proceeds to charitable foundations. The title of the film “What Did I Do to Help?,” referenced her initial phrase: “What have you done to make him hit you?” The video garnered more than 4.2 million views on YouTube. Todorenko also appeared on popular journalist Katerina Gordeeva’s YouTube talk show to discuss her scandal, harassment, and decision to help to victims of domestic violence. “It had to happen to me, so that I would have a chance to be useful,” said Todorenko during her interview. Following the scandal, she gained 400,000 new Instagram followers. The public condemnation of Regina Todorenko is Russia’s first public boycott of an Internet celebrity who publicly expressed misogynistic views. It happened in the context of the abovementioned court case against the Khachaturyan sisters. Todorenko’s case demonstrates how reputation in the business context of social media depends more heavily on Western-inspired codes of ethics. Social media influencers rely heavily on advertising contracts with international brands. Hence, they are susceptible to investors’ corporate responsibility strategies and the opinions of international followers with progressive values. Finally, this case is a unique example of competent crisis management. Todorenko was able to calculate the reputational risks and respond adequately to her critics. One important strategy was her admission of responsibility and display of corrective action through her documentary and work as an ambassador for an anti-domestic violence group. The scandal also gave Todorenko’s documentary more visibility, which helped to influence the media agenda and change the course of the discussion. As a result, her fandom increased, and she has been able to get contracts with new brands.

9 Implications and Future Research The chapter examines the impact of cancel culture on Russian society. Generally, cancel culture is understood as the ideological export of a new Western moral order threatening to subvert Russian traditional values. The semantic construction novaya etika was created to make sense of the Western social trend toward a “new moral sensitivity” (Magun, 2021) to any type of injustice against minority groups. This linguistic category has been coined without a complete understanding of diverse conversations concerning race, gender, and history in other countries.

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There are two main perspectives on cancel culture in Russia. The traditionalist perspective dismisses cancel culture as an alien ideology that is harmful to the domestic system of conservative values. This perspective inevitably creates a moral conflict with Russian conservative attitudes, which are in line with the current ideological paradigm of the Russian state. The progressive perspective on cancel culture promoted by feminist communities often justifies the extreme use of canceling in the name of social justice and other noble causes, frequently overlooking the consequences of public shaming campaigns. This perspective has created another moral conflict between the older generation of Russian liberals and the Russian New Left, who differ over the meaning and outcomes of canceling as a punitive measure in gender-related matters. This second conflict between older and younger generations of Russian liberals deserves a separate comprehensive analysis. There is evidence that canceling accused abusers in support of victims was on its way to becoming a new accountability practice in professional communities in Russia and other post-socialist countries commonly considered “traditional” (Strogov, 2022). However, these nations’ sociopolitical environments, known for their pervasive state social media surveillance and general disregard for public opinion, often make it almost impossible to build up the required social pressure to cancel a powerful public figure for moral transgressions (Kiikov, 2021). Future studies should provide more empirical data on the effects of cancel culture on postSoviet societies whose prevailing values differ from Russia. These findings will allow for a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon and its impact on political and public discourse.

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Online Coping Strategies During the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Case of Izoizolyacia Flash Mob Elena Pronkina

1 Introduction The Covid-19 pandemic has become a serious global challenge and has caused various changes in people’s lives. In addition to the threat to physical health and economic challenges, it also had a negative effect on people’s well-being and mental health (Shamblaw et al., 2021). Apart from the seriousness of the threat, restrictive measures introduced by states have also become an important factor of stress and anxiety (Huang & Zhao, 2020; Medvedeva et al., 2020; Prowse et al., 2021; Shamblaw et al., 2021; Zinchenko et al., 2021). Social distancing and the quarantine regime are among the most important measures to contain the spread of Covid-19. During this period, people are forced to radically change their daily lifestyle, reducing the number of social contacts and limiting mobility. The restrictive measures can negatively affect close relationships and contribute to the escalation of interpersonal conflicts (Luetke et al., 2020). People can find it difficult to combine work and caring for children, which can also contribute to the development of anxiety and depression (Evans et al., 2020). In such a situation, it becomes important to regulate emotional state and cope with stress. During the pandemic, people actively use Internet services and social media. The restrictions on the movement in the physical space can stimulate users to pay more attention to the online activity and also cause certain changes in consumer practices when people begin to purchase more digital services (Baruah & Borborah, 2021). People use social media to obtain health information, maintain relationships, seek social support, and entertainment (Bowden-Green et al., 2021; Malik et al., 2021; Onat Kocabiyik, 2021). Similarly, they can use social media to apply coping strategies (Onat Kocabiyik, 2021; Prowse et al., 2021; Veer et al., 2016).

E. Pronkina (B) School of Communication, HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_5

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This paper focuses on a case of social media coping strategies as part of the Izoizolyacia online flash mob (#IzoIzolyaciya) in which users from the post-Soviet segment of the Internet took part. The post-Soviet space demonstrated a diverse range of responses to the health crisis from official declaration of a state of emergency to the denial of the severity of the crisis (Laruelle & Huzar, 2020). However, residents of many post-Soviet countries faced strict and often enforced restrictive measures and the need to keep distance in the early stages of the spread of the coronavirus infection. The flash mob was a reaction to the regime of social distancing and isolation, which radically changed the daily life of people.

2 Covid-19 Pandemic in the Post-Soviet Area The authorities in the countries of the post-Soviet space demonstrated a diverse range of reactions to the threat of a pandemic from timely response to denial of the problem. Marlene Laruelle and Sara Huzar singled out several strategies for responding to the emerging crisis in the early stages of the pandemic, including “early responders” (Armenia and Georgia); “late responders” (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine); “the laggards” (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan); and “the deniers” (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus) (Laruelle & Huzar, 2020). The limited responses of a number of countries to the Covid-19 could be linked to the systemic problems in the healthcare system and overall unpreparedness to provide support to citizens (Lemon & Antonov, 2021). “Early responders” and “late responders” are characterized by the relatively rapid initial responses to the spread of the coronavirus infection. Thus, the first cases of the Covid-19 in Armenia and Georgia were registered already at the end of February/beginning of March 2020 (Novayagazeta.ru, 2020). In these countries, the authorities quickly took measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus infection. On March 16, the Armenian government declared a state of emergency (Mejlumyan, 2020). The package of protective measures included the closure of educational institutions, the ban on social events with more than 20 people, and the ban on the entry of citizens from countries with an unfavorable epidemiological situation (Ria.ru, “V Armenii vveli rezhim …”, 2020). Georgia declared a state of emergency on March 21, 2020. Measures have been taken to restrict transportation, bring to justice citizens who violated the quarantine, and ban on events involving more than 10 people (Rbc.ru, 2020). The state of emergency was also declared in Kazakhstan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine (Covid-19 Civic Freedom Tracker). A “special quarantine regime” was established in Azerbaijan. It included a ban on leaving the house for people over 65 years old and restrictions related to transport and public places (Tass.ru, 2020). In Uzbekistan, the first case of coronavirus infection was registered on March 15, 2020 (Reuters.com, 2020). On April 1, 2020, a self-isolation regime was introduced in this country (Kun.uz, 2020).

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Some authorities denied the significance of the coronavirus problem or the presence of the Covid-19 cases in their countries. In Tajikistan, the initial cases of coronavirus infection were not officially confirmed for a long time. Galina Perfilyeva, the head of the World Health Organization office in Dushanbe, said that it was impossible to unequivocally state that there was no Covid-19 in Tajikistan due to “restricted capacity in diagnostics and treatment” (Rferl.org, 2020). On April 30, 2020, the authorities of Tajikistan officially recognized the presence of coronavirus in the country (Eurasianet.org, 2020). No confirmed cases were officially reported in Turkmenistan either. According to the organization “Reporters without borders”, the lack of information about the coronavirus could be explained by censorship in Turkmenistan (Rsf.org, 2020). Some media reported the ban on the dissemination of information about Covid19 in Turkmenistan (Ivanova, 2020; Rsf.org, 2020). In March 2020, the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov demanded that residential and public premises be fumigated with harmala plant smoke to tackle the coronavirus problem (Ivanova, 2020). Among other measures to counter the spread of the virus, the authorities announced the creation of quarantine zones for those entering the country and testing for infection (Hronicatm.com, 2020). In Belarus, measures to counter the spread of coronavirus infection were also rather limited. The country’s authorities did not close public spaces and educational institutions (Laruelle & Huzar, 2020). In March 2020, a ban on mass events with international participation was announced (Onliner.by, 2020). However, in May, the Victory Parade was held, which was contrary to the recommendations of the WHO (Ria.ru, “VOZ posovetovala Belorussii …”, 2020). At the same time, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko persistently downplayed the severity of the health threat in his public statements (Laruelle & Huzar, 2020). According to Laruelle and Huzar, Russia may belong to the categories of “early” and “late responders” in view of conflicting decisions (Laruelle & Huzar, 2020). On the one hand, Russian authorities introduced different security measures rather quickly. However, they did not declare a state of emergency. It was replaced by the regime of self-isolation established in March 2020. The self-isolation regime ordered the residents of Russia to stay at home until the threat of the spread of coronavirus infection would be suspended. Violation of the self-isolation regime was associated with administrative responsibility of citizens. It was forbidden to visit public places and leave the house without a vital need. Also, in various regions, additional measures were applied to restrict the movement of citizens. For example, in Moscow and the Moscow region, a pass system was introduced to regulate the movement of residents. However, the replacement of the state of emergency with a regime of self-isolation led to the uncertainty of the legal status of citizens and half-hearted measures to protect against the negative consequences of the quarantine regime (Denisenko & Trikoz, 2020; Karaseva, 2020). Many post-Soviet countries made some efforts to inform the populace about the Covid-19 and effective measures to combat the spread of the infection. The most important tasks during the pandemic were to convince people of the need to comply with protective measures and limit the spread of fake and inaccurate information

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about the infection. For example, in Kazakhstan, the official Covid-19 website had a whole section dedicated to fakes and fact-checking. Besides, journalists from a number of Kazakh media created an aggregator website for checking fakes about the coronavirus (Coronavirus, no, no, no). The site published fakes about the coronavirus around the world exposing them, as well as a list of reliable sources of information about the pandemic. In a number of post-Soviet countries, the dissemination of false information about Covid-19 was criminalized, for example, in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. However, under the auspices of the threat to public health in a number of countries, pressure was put on independent media and restrictions were imposed on access to reliable information (Lemon & Antonov, 2021). For example, in Kyrgyzstan, only the state media could move around the cities during the lockdown and the websites of independent media were blocked in Tajikistan (Lemon & Antonov, 2021). Justifying the need to restrict access to reliable information, some authorities appealed to the inexpediency and harm that its disclosure could bring. So, commenting on the disappearance of statistics from the website of the Brest Regional Hygiene Center in Belarus, Olga Aniskevich, Deputy Chief Physician of the Baranovichi Zonal Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology, said: “It is no longer interesting to anyone how much they [the number of infected]will increase. People are starting to compare which street the car (ambulance, - Ed.) came to. They don’t write names on the fences yet (sick, - Ed). Statistics is not what people need to know. They need to understand when the process will subside, what needs to be done for this, and who today can be brought to administrative responsibility” (1reg.org, 2020). Uncertainty and government-imposed restrictions became additional stressors during the pandemic.

3 Social Media as a Coping Tool During the Pandemic: Theoretical Framework Restrictions imposed by countries put pressure on citizens. The available research demonstrates that there were problems in mental health including an increase in stress, anxiety, and depression during the early periods of the pandemic (Huang & Zhao, 2020; Medvedeva et al., 2020; Prowse et al., 2021; Shamblaw et al., 2020; Zinchenko et al., 2021). The researchers also suggest that over time, people learn to cope with the negative impact of the external environment and adapt to the pandemic (Konstantinov et al., 2022; Shamblaw et al., 2020). Many factors associated with stress during the Covid-19 have been highlighted. These factors include uncertainty, seriousness of the disease, social isolation caused by the restrictive measures, threats to economic well-being, and following the Covid19 news on the ongoing basis (Banerjee & Rai, 2020; Nekliudov et al., 2020; Rajkumar, 2020; Salari et al., 2020). Under these conditions, it becomes important to control the consumption of negative news and communicate with people on various

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online platforms in order to offset the negative effect of social isolation (Banerjee, 2020; Salari et al., 2020). During the early stages of the pandemic, people began to use digital tools more often to solve everyday tasks (Polyakova et al., 2021). At the same time, social media activity also increased (Balashova & Skobelev, 2020). Uses and gratifications theory contributes to understanding the media activities during the pandemic. According to this theory, the audience is goal-oriented and chooses media based on their own needs (Katz et al., 1973). The motives for social media usage include social interaction, information seeking, pass time, entertainment, relaxation, communication facilitation, convenience utility, expression opinions, information sharing and surveillance, spiritual support, psychological support, networking, and online shopping (Dhir & Tsai, 2017; Hossain et al., 2020; Withing & Williams, 2013). Typically, media compete with other sources of needs satisfaction (Katz et al., 1973). During the initial stage of the pandemic, many alternative ways to meet these needs were not available, so social media and different online platforms often won in the competition for the attention of the audience. Social media can also be used as a tool for coping with stress (Onat Kocabiyik, 2021; Prowse et al., 2021; Schmalz et al., 2015; Veer et al., 2016). Stress and tension caused by news about Covid-19 and social isolation negatively affected people’s mental health (Loades et al., 2020; Pancani et al., 2021; Stainback et al., 2020). However, the role of social media in stress management can be controversial. In particular, under certain conditions, social media itself can be a source of stress (Beyens et al., 2016). For example, overloading with social media content about the Covid-19 can lead to mental health problems (Passavanti et al., 2021). Also, social network users may have felt overwhelmed by the monotonous and repetitive content in their news feeds (De Paulo et al., 2020). Coping can be defined as “cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). Social media coping strategies include actively seeking information that helps to reduce stress, establishing and maintaining social relations and social support seeking, community information support, consuming entertainment content, avoiding negative information on social media, and engaging in creative activities (Cauberghe et al., 2021; Ogueji et al., 2021; Xie et al., 2022). The choice of coping strategy may be dictated by available resources including social support, money, positive beliefs, and selfefficacy (Lim & Choi, 2017). It also depends on the perception of the crisis situation. Thus, active strategies are chosen when the situation is perceived as a problem, and passive strategies are applied when the situation is perceived as a threat (Lim & Choi, 2017). However, during the pandemic, people apply both active and passive strategies (Shamblaw et al., 2021). For example, people can avoid negative information about Covid-19 and actively communicate on abstract topics with social media users. Researchers also distinguish between problem-solving strategies and emotion-focused strategies (Baker & Berenbaum, 2007; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). While problem-solving strategies involve taking specific actions to solve a problem,

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emotion-focused strategies focus on regulating the emotional state, processing, and expressing one’s emotions (Baker & Berenbaum, 2007). One of the options to actively cope with stress during the pandemic is to be involved in creative activity. According to the transformative coping model, creativity can be an instrument of coping with different crises and stressful situations because such activities incorporate the use and the intensification of “the positive feelings of people about themselves” (Corry et al., 2014, 2015; Tang et al., 2021). Thus, being part of creative activities contributes to an increase in subjective well-being. Creativity allows people to change their views on a difficult situation and adapt to it (Kaufman, 2018). Social media gives users an opportunity to share with others the results of their creativity, exchange ideas, receive social support, and approval of their work. In this regard, social media transforms individual creativity into a collective action that unites people on the basis of common creative ideas and positive emotions. Perspective-affordance sociocultural theory (PAT) of creativity considers the latter as an initially multidimensional phenomenon with social, psychological, and material dimensions (Gl˘aveanu, 2020). Within this approach, individual creativity becomes possible only as a result of sociocultural relations (Gl˘aveanu, 2020). Creativity involves dialogue and establishment of relationships with other people (Gl˘aveanu, 2020). This paper focuses on a case of an individual-collective creative project, which is Izoizolyacia online flash mob (#IzoIzolyaciya) on social media. As part of the online flash mob #IzoIzolyaciya, users enter into a dialogical relationship by exchanging the reproductions of the works of art.

4 Internet Flash Mob #Izoizolyacia During the Quarantine One of the examples of the online coping strategy is flash mob #Izoizolyacia (#Izoizol ci ), which has been very popular in the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet. As part of the flash mob, social media users reproduced well-known works of art using scrap materials and household items and posted the photos with their reproductions on social networks under the hashtags #iso-isolation, #izoizolyacia, and #artisolation. In Russia, the flash mob became famous during the quarantine period. However, even after the end of the self-isolation regime, users continued to publish their photos under the appropriate hashtags and upload them to the flash mob group. The first stages of the pandemic were characterized by a fairly large number of flash mobs and challenges that were distributed on social networks using hashtags. Among them were creative and entertaining challenges (e.g., #plaqynatexno, #fliptheswitchchallenge), activities related to maintaining a healthy lifestyle in quarantine conditions (e.g., Maybelline’s #plankacpomado. ), and flash mobs related to the prevention of Covid-19 (e.g., #mo. dodypchallenge). Social media challenges were often launched by brands, celebrities, and institutions. The creative flash mob Izoizolyacia is interesting because it was launched by an ordinary user of the social network Facebook Katerina Brudnaya-Chelyadinova, who photographed

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her husband in the image of Van Gogh. She posted this photo on the social network and asked her friends to support the flash mob. Quite quickly, the flash mob gained popularity and attracted a large number of users. The flash mob was attended by both ordinary Internet users and celebrities (e.g., actor Konstantin Khabensky, actor Sergei Bezrukov, rap artist Basta, football player Alexander Kerzhakov). In an interview with Afisha.Daily, Katerina Brudnaya-Chelyadinova admitted that she had not originally conceived the flash mob as a large-scale social project and considered it as a way to escape the pandemic (Zajceva, 2020). The increase in the number of Facebook group members forced Chelyadinova to introduce pre-moderation and establish criteria filtering high-quality works from low-quality ones (Zajceva, 2020). In particular, the original publication conditions included the absence of Photoshop, the use of improvised means, and the non-use of photos that had been made before the start of the self-isolation period. The increased popularity of the flash mob attracted the attention of the media, celebrities, and organizations. Some of them also sought to create collaborations using the involved members of the movement to promote their own projects (e.g., Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts and Konstantin Khabensky Foundation). The online flash mob Izoizolyacia is not completely unique. During the pandemic, major museums around the world invited users to reproduce works of art. These museums included the Getty in Los Angeles and the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. Participants of other similar movements could also join the flash mob, such as #sfotokatypaRembrandt (about 63,000 participants in the Russian social network Vkontakte), #tussenkunstenquarantaine, and #covidclassics in the English-language segment of the Internet. Therefore, the boundaries of these movements turned out to be blurred. Some users posted the photos using more than one hashtag. The most active and engaged users apply multiple hashtags, joining different communities at once (Dedema & Fichman, 2021). Eventually, the Izoizolyacia flash mob spread beyond the Russian segment of the Internet. Residents of the post-Soviet countries and Russian-speaking users from all over the world also took part in this action. In April 2020, the members of the group were mostly from Russia (around 200,000 members), Ukraine followed in terms of the number of members (around 80,000), and also about 41,000 members were from the United States (Troianovski, 2020). Also, residents of other post-Soviet countries, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan took part in the flash mob. The creators of the group noted the wide geography of the flash mob’s participants, including “at least 100 countries”, as people from any country in the world could participate (…). However, this movement gained particular popularity in the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet. Currently, the flash mob group on Facebook has around 564.8 thousand members. The flash mob also has pages on the social networks Vkontakte and Instagram. In the spring of 2020, the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts jointly launched the #HaedinecPyxkinckim (#AlonewithPushkin) challenge, whose participants reproduced paintings and sculptures from the museum and posted them on social networks. During the pandemic, museums were forced to look for new formats of interaction with the audience. The #AlonewithPushkin (#NaedinesPushkinskim)

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project also included online exhibitions, excursions, and lectures. There were also other examples of digital interaction with the museum audience during the quarantine period. The Garage Museum created a digital platform that included exhibition tours and various thematic collections of educational and entertainment content. The Tretyakov Gallery launched the #TretyakovkaHome project, offering lectures, tours, film screenings, and streaming of individual works of art to audiences. Virtual tours during the pandemic were also offered by museums in other post-Soviet countries, for example, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Also, the flash mob participants took part in the #Izotvopitel noct (#Isocharity) charity event organized by the Konstantin Khabensky Foundation in cooperation with the Bank Otkrytie. The action was aimed at raising funds to help children suffering from severe diseases of the spinal cord and brain and forced to spend most of their lives in isolation. As part of the campaign, the most popular posts in the IzoIzolyaciya group were selected, and the total number of likes was converted into the number of rubles that the bank was supposed to transfer to the fund (#Izotvoritel’nost’, 2020). In 2020, the Izoizolyacia online flash mob (#IzoIzolyaciya) received the Runet Prize, winning the Together Against Covid-19 nomination at the Moscow Urban Forum Community Awards 2020 (MUF Community Awards: pobediteli 2020 goda, 2020). Today, people can find a specially released album with the best illustrations in bookstores. The group’s description on the Facebook page informs users that Isolation is a “flash mob against the blues in our coronavirus time” (Izoizolyacia). This slogan highlights the motivation for overcoming boredom, which could be the main driving force for encouraging social media users to participate in the online flash mob. Among the popular subjects of photographs, one can find such paintings as “Girl with Peaches” by Valentin Serov, “Girl with a Pearl Earring” by Jan Vermeer, self-portraits of Frida Kahlo, paintings by Vasya Lozhkin, “Lady with an Ermine” by Leonardo da Vinci, “Scream” by Edvard Munch, “Black Square” by Kazimir Malevich, “Son of Man” and “Lovers” by Rene Magritte, paintings by Warhol, “Alyonushka” by Vasnetsov, Van Gogh’s self-portrait, “Absinthe Drinker” and “Girl on a Ball” by Pablo Picasso. The analysis of community posts shows that users pursue two main participation strategies, including parody and reproduction. The parody strategy allows users to distort certain elements of the original work, as well as ridicule through demonstrating the inconsistency of their copies with the original. The strategy of reproduction aims to faithfully copy the original work. Such copies may be subject to criticism from members of the movement if the spirit of the original is not reproduced exactly and does not evoke the same feelings as the original source. Next, we analyze cases that represent a variety of strategies for the movement participants.

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4.1 “Girl with a Pearl Earring”: Criteria of Reproduction’s Quality “Girl with a Pearl Earring” is a famous painting by Dutch artist Jan Vermeer. The portrait depicts a girl who turns her head toward the viewer. This painting, like other portraits, is quite easy to reproduce, as it does not contain many elements. This may explain its popularity in regard of the users’ activity. However, the authors of copies of this picture did not always strive to capture themselves in the form of a beautiful girl. Instead of a girl in the photos, users captured their pets, creating a comic effect, or their children. Assessing the quality of the photograph, users often paid attention not so much to the details of the costume, but to the repetition of the gaze and the transmission of the internal state of the heroine. Therefore, a faithful reproduction of the picture was often perceived more critically than parodic interpretations involving animals. The picture was so popular that users noted the oversaturation of the group with it. Some participants in the movement saw the desire to reproduce this picture as a manifestation of disrespect for the original, as its copying can be achieved with minimal effort and fantasy. The photographs containing original interpretations were most positively evaluated by the participants. An example of this interpretation is the replacement of a young girl by an older woman. The photo’s caption reads “Temporal Perspective”, referring to the idea of the transience of life and the inseparable connection of epochs. By publishing photographs, users interact on the basis of common motives and expectations derived from participating in the online flash mob. So, these expectations were also related to the works’ quality criteria, such as novelty and meaningfulness representing the standard definition of creative activity (Gl˘aveanu et al., 2021).1

4.2 Works by Vasya Lozhkin: Positive Emotions and Humor During the Quarantine Vasya Lozhkin is a contemporary Russian artist, designer, and musician. On his website, the artist writes: “I draw mainly animals - cats, hares, and great apes. In creativity, I don’t like generalizations, and not some kind of collective image, metaphor or other crap. I have little interest in the surrounding reality. I depict a fabulous fantasy world. Sometimes it’s a world of psychosis and all sorts of borderline states, sometimes it’s scary, but still, it’s a fairy tale with a happy ending. In general, lately I try to do more of something positive, something that would evoke positive emotions” (Vasya-lozhkin.ru). Lozhkin has created paintings dedicated directly to the pandemic. Among them are “Go away, virus, accursed”, “Take care of grandmothers”, and “The world is 1

Reproductions of the painting “Girl with a Pearl Earring” can be found in the flash mob group on Facebook at the following link: https://clck.ru/xuL7Y.

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beautiful, but not safe”. For example, in the painting “Take Care of Grandmothers”, the artist depicted an elderly woman walking down the street in a respirator holding two red cats in medical masks. With his works, the artist urged people to take the health crisis seriously, but at the same time not to fall into a state of despondency (Kekova, 2020). Lozhkin also joined the flash mob and organized a competition of works based on his pictures with the support of the Russian mass media newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. Such competition can be an element of strategy of drawing attention by the artist to his work. Joining a famous flash mob and inviting Internet users to co-create can be seen as a promotion tool. This case illustrates the potential of such social media activities for brands’ promotion. Users who reproduced Lozhkin’s paintings often used the strategy of parody. When copying Lozhkin’s paintings, some participants did not avoid stories referring to the topic of the pandemic and the restrictions they faced, offering a humorous interpretation of the experience of self-isolation. Humoristic and creative interpretations of events may be a coping mechanism that allows people to maintain psychoemotional health in a stressful situation (Abel, 2002). Often, disasters become the object of jokes that can be categorized as dark humor. However, the spread of Covid-19 has become a personal threat to many people’s health and lifestyles, naturally limiting their intentions to joke about illness and death (Meder, 2021). In this case, people prefer to joke about “relatively minor suffering”, for example, social distancing, face masks, or quarantine (Meder, 2021, p. 137). With the help of humor, users continued to express everyday problems they faced during the pandemic and quarantine, as well as vent their own unstable emotional state (Lemish & Elias, 2020).2

4.3 Works by Afarin Sajedi: Discussions About Art Another interesting case is works by Afarin Sajedi, a contemporary Iranian artist who paints women in a surrealistic manner. During the pandemic, the artist posted the works of the flash mob participants on Instagram, noting that she mainly received them from Russia (Tehrantimes.com, 2020). Often the faces of women in her paintings have clear signs of suffering. Her paintings may represent “pain, violence and gender discrimination in a patriarchal society” (Dizaji, 2022). Copying her works, users usually appealed to the strategy of reproduction, although some photographs could have contained elements of irony. Some members of the Izoizolyacia group on Facebook noted that they had learned about this artist through this flash mob and wanted to make replicas of her work. The publication of these photographs sparked discussions about the purpose of art. Some users argued about the appropriateness of depicting suffering people and acceptability of the aesthetics of the ugly. Others

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Reproductions of the works by Vasya Lozhkin can be found in the flash mob group on Facebook at the following link: https://clck.ru/xuMJJ.

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talked about art’s connection to politics and different social issues, such as social pressure and violence against women.3 Social media allows users to escape from negativity (Onat Kocabiyik, 2021). Avoiding information that causes unpleasant feelings is one of the tools of the coping strategy (Xie et al., 2022). By taking part in a flash mob, users have the opportunity to abstract from information about the threat to health and restrictions, as well as any negative experiences. Instead, they may turn their attention to satisfying the need for cognition, positive emotions, and social interaction. However, as this case shows, users do not always tend to abstract from negative experiences completely choosing works that provoke an ambiguous reaction. Some participants stated that they were glad to draw public attention to the discussion about socially significant problems as part of an entertaining flash mob. This case also demonstrated the readiness of flash mob participants to face unknown and unfamiliar experiences and gain new knowledge. “Engagement with the unfamiliar” is one of the principles of creative experience (Gl˘aveanu et al., 2021). Thus, participation in the Izoizolyacia flash mob can be considered not only as an entertaining activity, but also as a creative experience.

5 Rethinking Limited Mobility and Leisure Time During the Quarantine Period The Izoizolyacia flash mob can also be seen as the result of users rethinking their leisure time and surrounding space during the pandemic. Under quarantine conditions, people’s mobility and the ability to transform their daily routine and manage their lives were limited. In this situation, the audience needed to find new ways to organize daily life, solve everyday tasks, have fun, and gain social approval. Participation in the “Izoizolyacia” flash mob was a way to break out of the quarantine routine full of restrictions and regain control over user’s everyday life. By using their own apartment as a photo studio and household items as decorations, the participants could diversify their leisure time, find ways to express themselves creatively, and gain social approval with minimal resources. At the same time, it should be noted that there are some data that show little change in people’s leisure time during the self-isolation regime. In particular, the data of the Russian research project “Koronafom” show that the leisure time of Russians during self-isolation did not differ much from the leisure time before the start of the pandemic (Kertman et al., 2021, pp. 110–111). However, users’ participation in the “Izoizolyacia” flash mob embodied different strategies of user engagement, including not only multiple participations with different photos during the period of self-isolation, and in some cases even after the quarantine, but also one-time participation in a flash mob that did not become a new hobby.

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Reproductions of the works by Afarin Sajedi can be found in the flash mob group on Facebook at the following link: https://clck.ru/xuNGG.

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Flash mob can be considered as a practice “allowing participants to explore alternate possibilities emergent in their daily lives and actions” (Walker, 2011). As part of the Izoizolyacia flash mob, users explored alternative ways of perceiving and exploring the home space and limited mobility. During the quarantine, the home space ceased to be a place that could be easily left for a long time. In this situation, it can also become a source of stress. During this period, new habits and everyday practices were formed to meet the requirements of the self-isolation regime. Participation in a flash mob allows people to rethink these habits. In particular, participating in the flash mob showed that during the self-isolation regime the home space did not only limit the people’s activity, but also presented them with certain opportunities to have fun and be creative. A place of forced restriction of freedom became means of creative self-expression. By posting photos and using special hashtags to join the flash mob, social media users demonstrated their involvement in a collective project to reimagine the experience of social isolation and limited mobility. Publicly joining a flash mob also became a way to restore the sense of solidarity and social interaction by uniting people with similar experiences. The Izoizolyacia flash mob challenged the daily quarantine routine, opposing it with a new look at the user’s living conditions during this period. Taking part in the production of creative products and exchange of positive emotions, users showed how the forced quarantine conditions failed to negatively affect them.

6 Conclusion The Izoizolyacia case demonstrated a diverse range of opportunities for using social networks to implement a coping strategy during a crisis period. By participating in the online flash mob, users could simultaneously satisfy their needs for entertainment, knowledge, communication, and social support. Since users were unable to change external circumstances and get rid of the stress factor during the pandemic and severe government restrictions, the priority strategy for using social media was emotion-focused, and coping involved managing negative emotions and positively reinterpreting negative events and experience (Baker & Berenbaum, 2007; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The available research points at the relationship between media use and emotional regulation, and also draws attention to the use of specific types of media for emotional regulation. In future research, it makes sense to pay attention to the comparison of different ways of using media as coping strategies, in particular, passive and active forms of media consumption that provide an opportunity to get involved in creative experience. The Covid-19 pandemic has shown that under quarantine regimes, social media users are interested in participating in creative projects, gaining social approval, and exchanging creative ideas. Involvement in creative experience is a coping strategy that allows people to regulate their emotional state and maintain mental health (Corry et al., 2014). The development of social media has stimulated the exchange of the

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results of creative activity. Health care organizations need to pay more attention to the potential of self-organizing online communities and creative-oriented flash mobs in minimizing the negative effects that the crisis situation and restrictive measures have on the mental health and well-being of citizens.

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Post-Soviet Countries: Special Focus

Developing an Advanced Digital Society: An Estonian Case Study Marju Himma-Kadakas and Ragne Kõuts-Klemm

1 Introduction Estonia regained independence in 1991. Like other post-Soviet countries, Estonia struggled with the economic difficulties of building up the country and its democracy. The country aimed to disconnect from Soviet heritage and transform from a socialist economy to a liberal, private sector-based market economy, i.e., to unlink the country from Soviet reality and “return to the Western world”. Estonia has been a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO since 2004 and has used the European euro as its currency since 2011. Similar processes took place in other Baltic countries such as Latvia and Lithuania (only slightly slower and modestly). After three decades of regaining independence, the country is recognized as one of the e-government Benchmark frontrunners of EU-28+ countries (European Commission, Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Capgemini, IDC, Sogeti, & Politecnico di Milano, 2020). Estonia is a country with a high level of information and communication technology (ICT) development. It ranks above countries in Central and Eastern Europe and is among the most advanced IT countries worldwide. In 2017, Estonia was ranked 17th worldwide on the ICT Development Index (ITU, 2017). Achieving these outcomes demanded several structural, infrastructural, and societal changes. Structural and institutional reforms demanded a change in policies and regulations, a reallocation of research and development funding initiatives, a transformation of the finance sector, and the establishment of cooperation between public and private sectors. Due to intense global attention to Estonia’s success in developing nationwide egovernment systems, the story of e-Estonia has been well recorded in several publications (see, e.g., Kalvet, 2007; Ströbele et al., 2017; Vassil, 2015). It has been shown that structural and cultural factors are intertwined in the technological transformation M. Himma-Kadakas (B) · R. Kõuts-Klemm University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_6

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of Estonian society into a digital society (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2020). Discussion on the starting conditions for this transformation (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2002; Runnel & Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2004) reveals that government policies played a significant role in facilitating digital developments. Led by the Estonian government in the early years, the general shift toward technological optimism and the implementation of ICT in public and private life took place (International Telecommunication Union, 2017; Kõuts-Klemm & Lauristin, 2020). However, digitalization has not driven a more equal or accessible society (Trültzsch et al., 2013). Less attention has been paid to the synthesis of different factors at the societal and individual levels. Following the morphogenetic transformation concept by Margaret Archer (2013, 2015), we intend to show how structural and cultural factors have intertwined in the transformation of Estonian society into a digital society (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2020). This chapter sheds light on the symbiotic nature of the evolution of e-Estonia, embracing the interactions between the infrastructural, policy-making and economic, cultural, and individual aspects of the development process. Methodologically, this chapter draws from an interpretative literature review, document analysis, and an examination of several national and international databases (e.g., Statistics Estonia and the Digital Economy and Society Index). For the interpretative review, the most relevant studies and reports on ICT and digital society were selected to create a holistic picture of the field. We go into detail in characterizing the processes in Estonia mainly, and in some aspects, refer to other Baltic countries as a reference to understand the scope of societal changes. This chapter starts with an overview of internet development in Estonia by browsing key events during the last three decades. This is closely related to the politics and policy aspects that accompany events (see Sect. 2). Subsequently, this chapter looks into the economic, social, cultural, and media aspects of e-Estonia. The last section of this chapter weaves divergent aspects into a conclusion in which we argue that the success story of e-Estonia has several principles that are transferrable to other countries. However, at the same time, it has been a unique combination of several factors and events that are not unanimously applicable in other sociocultural contexts or expandable to the scope of other societies.

2 Development Benchmarks and Key Events on the Path to e-Estonia There have been long discussions over the key components, decisions, or events that determined Estonia’s success in reaching the benchmarks of digital development. Estonia has implemented several innovative public services, but it cannot be determined whether they resulted from policies and strategies or were the policies and strategies an implication of these developments. The contextualization of morphogenesis—analyzing the interchanges that produce a state change—helps synthesize

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a process. We outlined key events as signposts of Estonia’s national digital development over the last three decades and synthesized the relevance of these events in the framework of morphogenetic transformation.

2.1 Personal Identification Code and Population Register At first glance, the personal identification code (PIC) and the national Population Register (PR) may seem merely instrumental aspects of significance in the development of information society and e-services. However, all infrastructural developments necessary for e-Estonia begin with these two aspects. The PR is a central database for the performance functions of state and local governments. The PR contains the personal data of citizens, data on all identity documents, and vital events certificates. The registry includes names, sex, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, residence permit, place of residence, marital status, and the PIC of all citizens and residents. The PIC—a unique number assigned to every Estonian citizen and resident—is the core element of Estonia’s identity system (Martens, 2010). Estonia’s PR was created in 1992, following the example of Nordic countries. The PR fills the purpose of state statistics (i.e., for the governability of the state) and is the interconnection of registries that all provide e-services. It functions on three principles (Aguilar Rivera & Vassil, 2015): 1. Data must be recorded and stored in the same place where they are collected. 2. Every other public registry should use the personal data contained in the PR. Access to the primary-data collection of personal data collected in the PR is forbidden to other agencies. This is a critical aspect to avoid duplication of information and maintaining consistency. 3. A representative of the following bodies exercises the administrative supervision of the PR: the Data Protection Inspectorate, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, and the chief processor (Ministry of Interior). Without systems like Estonia’s PIC and PR database, it would be improbable to develop e-services like in Estonia.

2.2 EEBone and X-Road In 1998, the network called EEBone (PeaTee in the Estonian language, meaning “the main road”) was launched. This connected all government institutions, providing both the internet and intranet. EEBone’s success encouraged the development of the program, Village Road (Külatee in the Estonian language), which was launched a year later and connected 90% of 247 local municipalities to the internet in just one

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year. These infrastructural developments create a need for novel conceptual solutions that enable coordinated data management. In 2000, the concept of the data infrastructure project, X-Road, was developed in cooperation with the government’s IT departments, key IT personnel of ministries, and scientists from Tallinn Technical University. The purpose of X-Road is to standardize national databases and enable both the public and private sectors to cross-use data in several databases. Three facts are often mentioned only remotely; we are drawing attention to them because they are essential to the focus of this current chapter. First, X-Road’s conceptual initiative was driven foremost by the fact that the Estonian state did not have enough financial resources to accommodate the requests of government institutions separately. Second, the X-Road concept was developed by six professors at Tallinn Technical University as a result of 12 meetings within three months (Ströbele et al., 2017). Third, X-Road Regulation regulates the functioning and briefly states the maintenance and usage of a data-exchange layer. This regulation has been amended only twice since its adoption in 2003. Since 2008, the use and maintenance of publicsector databases have been regulated by the Public Information Act, making the accession process complex and time-consuming for organizations that want to join Z-Road (OECD, 2015). X-Road is the backbone of all e-services in Estonia. This concept originated from the conditions of limited resources and the solution-oriented approach of a small group of specialists and scientists. The regulation of the concept, and later the XRoad software tool, stems from the practical need for and use of the concept, which may be why it has required minimal adjustment. X-Road has proven its universality and scalability. In 2021, the interoperability system, X-Road services, had 52,000 indirect users, who made nearly one billion inquiries in a year. X-Road has been implemented in Finland, Kyrgyzstan, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Japan, and others. Cooperation on X-road with Finland deserves particularly detailed insight. The cross-border and multinational cooperation on advancing a joint information society with Finland started at the turn of the century but materialized more specifically in 2004 when a report titled Finland and Estonia in the EU was issued. This report mentions cross-border cooperation in advancing an information society. Four years later, a vision report on countries’ relations by 2030 stated that in 2030, two-thirds of Finns and Estonians will use a digital signature and digital authentication, and over 80% of them will use digital signature and digital authentication when doing business with public authorities and enterprises. All base registers of Finland’s and Estonia’s public authorities will be implemented based on common principles that enable cross-border use (Blomberg et al., 2008). In 2013–2014, Finland started to implement X-Road in social and healthcare services. Also, nine municipalities were involved in the evaluation of X-Road’s feasibility in municipalities. This was done in cooperation with Finland’s Ministry of Finance and with experts from Estonia. However, Finland’s legislation and policies limit the use of X-Road. Nevertheless, cooperation was not hindered. Starting in 2016, the two countries started to deepen their cooperation by forming a joint organization to administer the development of X-Road. Also, the Nordic Institute

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for Interoperability Solutions (NIIS) was formed in 2017. NIIS plays the role of a digital bridge between Estonia and Finland. Among several other achievements in 2019, NIIS-enabled national business registers and tax boards in Estonia and Finland to move toward cooperation that allowed the agencies to exchange data more accurately and efficiently by using the X-Road Trust Federation between the countries (Sirvio, 2019). Estonian and Finnish cross-border cooperation has several promoting factors in advancing digital societies. Curry (2018) highlighted the geographical proximity, market forces, trade flows, and cultures of the borderland communities that each have contributed to collaboration. Furthermore, integration and interoperability factors contributed to multinational e-government collaboration in this case. In particular, jurisdictional, informational, technological, cost, performance, and constitutional/legal factors played a role (Curry, 2018).

2.3 Tiger’s Leap In February 1996, President of Estonia Lennart Meri, Toomas Hendrik Ilves (then the ambassador to the US), and Minister of Education Jaak Aaviksoo announced a school computerization program called Tiger’s Leap. This program was state funded and aimed to train teachers in using ICT in the teaching and learning process since the turn of the millennium. Schools were equipped with computers and the internet, but the teachers lacked the competence to integrate this into their pedagogy. In 1997 alone, about one-fourth (4,000) of the teachers in Estonia participated in introductory ICT courses, followed by thousands in the following years. They were introduced to and trained to use electronic courseware and prepare digital learning materials within two years. Tiger’s Leap was followed by Tiger’s Leap Plus, which focused on students’, teachers’, and educational staff’s ICT competencies. It boosted the creation of native-language digital learning materials, teamwork, and peer-supported experience exchange. All of this enabled the implementation of the educational portal, SchoolLife, followed by many platforms that enabled teachers to exchange teaching materials and later provided space for digital communication with students and parents. As the term information society re-emerged as an ideological and budgetary priority for state reformers (Velmet, 2020), Tiger’s Leap was turned into the symbolic embodiment—the grand narrative of ICT—of Estonia’s development toward being an information society. On the one hand, in the entire process of ICT infrastructural and legal developments, Tiger’s Leap was the sole initiative to emphasize the importance of human capital. It brought the ICT transition to a comprehensible level for an individual by showing potential personal gains. On the other hand, Tiger’s Leap was a key discourse that enabled the decision-makers and IT visioners to motivate the people to relate to the rapid changes taking place at that time. As Runnel et al. (2009, p. 33) synthesized, “the rationale behind the ICT-related change in society lay in its benefit to society: the ability of technology to increase Estonian competitiveness,

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reduce social divisions, and foster state–individual relationships. Special emphasis was placed on introducing ICTs to the education system to prepare future citizens and entrepreneurs.” However, this progress-led narrative was accompanied by the side effects of digital stratification in society. This will be discussed in the following sections on human capital. In 2013, the Tiger’s Leap program merged with the Estonian Information Technology Foundation but still lives as a metaphor in the societal and cultural discussions about Estonia’s e-development.

2.4 ID Cards, Bank IDs, and e-Identity In 1998, the Ministry of the Interior formed a committee for the development and preparation of identification cards and their technical specifications. In January 2002, the first ID cards were issued to citizens. Initially, this card was meant to be multifunctional and enable a cardholder to authenticate digitally (eID), digitally sign documents, and several other services provided by public and private partners (Sepp et al., 1998). However, these intentions did not materialize as planned. The banks in Estonia offered a bank ID, the authentication solution that used password cards, and PIN calculators, which remained the most popular authentication method for more than a decade after the introduction of ID cards (Martens, 2010). As banks also provided a federated authentication service to third parties, among which were several governmental e-services, such as e-Taxation and Citizen Portal (Parsovs, 2021), there was no actual pressure on citizens to make use of the ID card or its authentication function. Two events drove the success of ID cards and eIDs. First, the ID card was made mandatory for all citizens in 2006. Second, in 2011, banks discontinued PIN calculators and password cards as authentication measures for transactions over 200 EUR. On the one hand, internet banking, by providing authentication services for third parties, enabled people to use other public and private e-services (e.g., energy, utilities, taxes, etc.). On the other hand, it may have impacted the slow initial adoption of eIDs (Parsovs, 2021). There have been studies and discussions about the role of trust in introducing e-services (Eriksson et al., 2005). Internet banking provided authentication services, but through this, the banks leveraged the trust clients had in them for third parties to use their services (Kerem, 2003). Trusting money to a bank requires trust in digital solutions as intermediaries of the service. Although there have been claims that through internet banking services, this trust was later transferred to other public e-services (e.g., e-voting, and e-health), there are critical voices that oppose this. Runnel et al. (2009) stated that despite being ahead in internet banking, the Estonians lagged in using other means of digital participation (e.g., civic engagement initiatives). Also, modest digital participation is amplified by the Estonians’ overall lower participation in civic organizations than citizens of Western European countries (Heidmets et al., 2007). However, considering the time that statement was

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made, it must be added that by the year 2022, this has changed, and Estonia’s digital participation is equal to similar Western countries.

2.5 E-voting E-voting, sometimes called ‘remote internet voting’ or ‘i-voting,’ was first used in local government-council elections in Estonia in 2005. In 2007, Estonia was the first country in the world to use this voting method in parliamentary elections. Voters use their electronic IDs to authenticate themselves on an e-voting client application (internet voting in Estonia). To avoid the possibility of vote buying or forcing people to vote, a voter can log in and vote unlimited times during the pre-voting period or vote with a ballot on election day. Each vote cancels the previous one. The voter’s identity is removed from the ballot before it reaches the National Electoral Commission for counting, ensuring anonymity. While in 2005, e-voting among all votes was 1.9%, in the 2019 general election, the proportion of e-votes among all votes was 43.8%. The median e-voting time was 1.5 min. To tackle potential fraud and falsified results, the e-voting software solution is open source to increase trust in the e-voting system. Over the 11 elections that have used e-voting, complaints about equality, secrecy, technical uniformity, procedural soundness, and the security of e-voting have been raised (Solvak & Vassil, 2016). Thus far, all filed electoral complaints concerning e-voting have been dismissed. Nevertheless, in 2004, the Council of Europe decided that e-voting could only be a complementary voting solution, as the principles of secrecy and privacy cannot be guaranteed in remote e-voting procedures. The Supreme Court of Estonia reached the same conclusion in 2005. Springall et al. (2014) based their study on observations and interviews during local elections in 2013. They detected several procedural shortcomings and security operational weaknesses that jeopardize the integrity of elections and leave them open to the possibility of attacks, fraud, and errors. This has created favorable conditions for some parties to conclude that there are multiple ways in which insider threats, sophisticated online criminals, or nation-state attackers could successfully compromise the e-voting system (Nurse et al., 2016). The e-voting system is based on openness and transparency. The voting protocol is fully documented online, and 97% of the code is made public; the undisclosed 3% focuses on malware detection and avoidance of usage of the voter’s machine. Being open source enables anyone to test and audit the code. However, this also indicates the problem that verification of the system requires appropriate IT skills that people outside the ICT field usually do not possess. To trust e-voting, a voter should be able to understand protocols and procedures, or at least fundamental security mechanisms. Nurse et al. (2016) noted that Estonia had media campaigns when the voteverification application was released. However, there is a need for campaigns that inform the public about secure electronic voting. This may reduce distrust among people who have a strong disposition toward e-voting or among institutions that

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promote e-voting. Still, e-voting success does not eliminate the lack of resources and skills needed to use new technologies. E-voting is increasingly popular, but other aspects of digital democracy, such as civic engagement, have remained weak (Kattel & Mergel, 2019). Vassil and Weber (2011) showed that e-voting failed to perform its transformative potential by creating a ‘bottleneck’ effect in which ‘peripheral’ citizens are unlikely to use e-voting, but the few who happened to do so were exposed to solid mobilizing forces. Also, e-voting is more frequently used among the elite, which refers to digital stratification in society. However, Vassil and Weber (2011, pp. 1, 351) also concluded that “e-voting does not only increase turnout, but by bringing a small number of otherwise disengaged citizens into contact with politics, it also counteracts inequality in political participation.” Adopting e-voting in different subgroups in Estonia took at least three elections and was higher in groups with the skills and resources to use new technologies—that is, model e-voters (Vassil et al., 2016). Is Estonian e-voting adoptable in other countries? The short answer is yes but with limitations of societal specificities. Switzerland was one of the first countries to pilot e-voting in the municipality of Anières (Canton of Geneva), followed by Zurich and Neuchâte in 2005. However, the nationwide introduction of electronic voting in Switzerland has not yet been achieved, mainly due to the fragmented federal system (Ströbele et al., 2017). E-voting has been used at the municipal or regional level in Norway, Canada, and Australia. Vassil et al. (2016) concluded that with high internet penetration, broadband communications, and social media, e-voting may be adopted faster than in the three-election period that Estonia experienced. Although there have been concerns that e-voting may raise digital inequality, as digital technologies and the skills needed to use them are unequally distributed in societies, studies have concluded that Estonia’s e-voters are a heterogeneous group with diverse sociopolitical backgrounds, which ensures that, over time, different societal groups will adopt e-voting as one way of voting (Vassil & Weber, 2011; Vassil et al., 2016). Technically, however, as e-voting is based on the PIN and the PR, the e-voting solution is only applicable in societies and electorates with similar infrastructural prerequisites.

2.6 Events That Impacted e-Estonia While Tiger’s Leap, the role of internet banking, and e-voting have been discussed as events or activities that grounded the favorable conditions for several key developments of e-Estonia, some unanticipated events have directed the course. We discuss the Bronze Night, the ID-card crisis, and COVID-19 as signpost cases on the path to e-Estonia. In April 2007, Estonia relocated a Soviet-era Red Army statue called the Bronze Soldier from the center of the capital, Tallinn, to a nearby military cemetery. The monument plays a significant identity symbol for the Russian-speaking community in Estonia. In Russian media, the statue’s relocation was interpreted as a crime against

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minority rights, which provoked considerable civil unrest that came to be called the Bronze Night (Selg, 2013). This unrest was accompanied by a cyberattack against the Estonian government and banking websites and contributed to growing cold warlike tensions between Russia, NATO, the EU, and the US (Kaiser, 2012). Bronze Night has gained the title of becoming the world’s first cyberwar—the first time a country has been the target of a cyberattack (Štitilis et al., 2016). The event is significant in the context of this chapter, as it entailed several developments in how cybersecurity is conceptualized and treated in Estonia and worldwide. A year later, in 2008, Estonia adopted its first cybersecurity strategy, which had a concise and precise structure stating cyberspace threats, actions in the cybersecurity area, enhancement of cybersecurity in Estonia, and implementation of cybersecurity. It states the principles on which should be acted in the case of a cyberattack (e.g., cooperation between sectors, protection of critical infrastructure, and raising awareness). The implications of Bronze Night for the development of Estonia into a cybersecurity forefront country in the world cannot be underestimated. Estonia quickly became the leading promoter of international cybersecurity in NATO and the EU. In 2003, Estonia had already proposed the creation of a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) in Tallinn. In 2008, it received strong support from NATO and became an accredited international military organization. To defend its electronic infrastructure, in 2011, the Estonian government resorted to an innovative solution that was first proposed in 2007 and had not been utilized in any democratic country (Laasme, 2012). Several of the EU’s relevant ICT institutions were subsequently established, with headquarters located in Tallinn (e.g., in the 2012 European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the areas of freedom, security, and justice). In 2014, Tallinn Technical University established the Centre for Digital Forensics and Cybersecurity, followed by cybersecurity undergraduate and graduate programs coordinated with the University of Tartu. It can be concluded that being both the location of cyberdefense institutions and the educational and competence center of cybersecurity has made Estonia an internationally visible and attractive country for specialists in the field.

2.7 ID-Card Vulnerability The first sentence of a research paper by Chech researchers Nemec et al. (2017) is “We report on our discovery of an algorithmic flaw in the construction of primes for RSA key generation in a widely used library of a major manufacturer of cryptographic hardware” (p. 1631). These researchers found vulnerability in the Infineon RSA Library algorithm used for 750,000 Estonian ID cards. The study showed that, in theory, every user’s digital identity could be stolen as a private key could be calculated from a public one. The Information System Authority (RIA), the governmental organization responsible for the administration and development of the ID card information system,

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immediately assembled a crisis committee, including ministries, police, border guards, and experts from private IT companies. The public was immediately informed of the vulnerability and introduced the solution of remotely renewing card certificates.1 Although this vulnerability shook trust in the ID card, put the eID in jeopardy, and cost Estonia an estimated five million euros, there were also positive outcomes. First, full disclosure in crisis management enabled transparency and hindered potential information disorders that would have discredited e-services. This set the standard for solving all other cybersecurity incidents (e.g., data breaches, and attacks) in the future. Second, a transparent explanation of the vulnerability raised awareness of how the ID-card functions, and the forced renewal of certificates contributed to knowledge and skills regarding the eID. Third, the temporary paralysis of the usage of ID card-based digital signatures increased the necessity of diversifying means for authentication. For both organizational and personal use, the means for electronic authentication (e.g., mobile-ID and smart-ID) continued to provide services.

2.8 COVID-19 Digital Stress Test March 13, 2020 was a Friday. This was also the day the Estonian government declared a state emergency against the COVID-19 pandemic.2 For schools, it meant that from Monday, March 16, they had to start teaching remotely via digital platforms. This change from classroom teaching to teaching remotely via digital platforms happened over one weekend. While similar conditions were experienced in several countries, Estonia provided a stress test for the ICT learning outcomes of the Tiger’s Leap—on its 24th anniversary—and subsequent IT-centered programs. It also tested people’s digital skills and the usability of e-services, which became vitally essential in tackling the pandemic. Studies on distance learning and digital skill performance have revealed that teachers with lower technical competencies struggle with technical challenges. In Estonia, teachers with advanced skills were eager to experiment with new digital platforms and environments. These teachers felt that their digital competencies had developed significantly. However, they are often unable to support students in their ICT development (Tammets et al., 2020). At the same time, teachers found great support from schools’ IT specialists and educational technicians. Students and their parents need to adjust to educational support systems and novel learning environments. However, the data show that even though most parents had to support their children in learning activities, only 13% felt the need to have more support from a school;

1

https://cybersec.ee/2017/10/18/rsa-2048-bit-keys-in-estonian-id-cards-issued-after-october2014-are-factorizable/. 2 https://news.err.ee/1063224/estonian-government-declares-emergency-situation-against-corona virus.

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18% of parents highlighted a positive impact on their child’s digital competency (Tammets et al., 2020). Before the pandemic, schools already had teachers equipped with personal computers. Distance learning revealed that not all students had the necessary technical equipment for digital learning. Most of the schools were able to organize personal computers for students in need. Overall, Estonian public education schools, digitally ‘nurtured’ by Tiger’s Leap, endured the stress test of distance learning. However, vocational schools (VSs) are much less prepared for distance learning. VSs struggled with digital communication, as the channels for it were never negotiated or used, the teachers were unprepared for using e-learning platforms, and organizing practical tasks and internships was challenging for teachers (Loogma & Sirk, 2021). Nevertheless, again, the COVID-19 crisis revealed the stratification of digital competencies in Estonia. In particular, seniors struggled with booking vaccination appointments digitally3 and downloading vaccination certificates4 from e-health services, which demanded digital resources and competencies that seniors did not possess.5 However, the issue of seniors and digitally less-advanced people facing barriers to using e-services had already been indicated in pre-COVID-19 studies (see, e.g., Ainsaar & Soidla, 2018; Paimre, 2019). In conclusion, COVID-19 proved the success of digital advancement in general education schools and revealed the digital exclusion and division of several societal groups.

3 Political Aspects of Internet Development The legal norms that provide the institutional background for Estonian e-governance are framed in five acts or decrees (Vassil, 2015): 1. The Personal Data Act (1996) protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons upon processing personal data in (e-)government procedures. 2. The Public Information Act (2001) sets the foundation for e-democracy and obliges all public institutions to have websites and provide open and accessible online content of public interest (e.g., policy documents, and legislative acts). 3. The Population Register Act (2000) regulates the composition and usage of data and is the registry that sets the foundation for the data-exchange layer X-Road and, through that, several e-services. 4. The Digital Signatures Act (2000) enables procedures related to digital signatures. 5. The Electronic Communications Act (2004) necessitates conditions for all electronic communications.

3

https://saartehaal.postimees.ee/7199423/haigla-ootab-kaitsesusti-saama-poolt-tuhandet-eakat. https://www.err.ee/1608310094/ak-eakad-jaavad-koroonatoendi-saamisel-hatta. 5 https://e-estonia.com/think-of-the-e-elderly/. 4

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The relatively laconic and straightforward legal framework stems from a strategic approach that is similarly simple and concise. The time when Estonia regained independence was also the advent of the internet reaching the masses that led Western societies to look for options to modernize infrastructures that could not be done without reforming governmental and societal foundations regarding the internet penetration. In 1994, the first information society strategy called The Estonian Way to the Information Society was formed. This strategy was inspired by similar documents developed in the EU and the US and focused on market failures associated with infrastructure development (Kalvet, 2007). Although this document later gained less significance than the following policies, its implications are evident in actions and societal processes. Concerning this strategy, the program Tiger’s Leap indicates the paradigmatic approach Estonia took after regaining independence. The approach foresaw the renewal of ICT, starting from the most comprehensive institution— a school. As there were no legacy systems, the renewal was based on the latest technology available. In 1998, the Estonian government adopted the Principles of Information Policy which is often described as a very general document that does not provide many details on what further evidence was taken into account when creating this policy (Kalvet, 2007; Ströbele et al., 2017). The document states the values and principles of developing into an information society, starting with changes in schools. While envisaging global potential and the all-embracing integration of ICT, it sets the foundation for the development of e-democracy. Remarkably, this document was prepared by only six persons who were members of the Informatics Council; among them were government officials and academic IT experts (Estonian Information Society Yearbook, 1998, via Ströbele et al., 2017). Therefore, the document provides an example of direct cooperation between universities and the government to develop evidence-based policies that are simultaneously implemented in practice. Its successor, the Estonian Information Society Development Plan 2013, set more precise objectives that cover social, economic, and institutional dimensions that acknowledge that no other disparities or divides are to be created in developing an information society and that an information society should enable the reduction of current gaps (Kalvet, 2007). Intrinsic to the first strategy documents (also applied to the Estonian Cybersecurity Strategy of 2008 and 2014) is that the first versions were vision documents that did not contain measurable goals (Laasme, 2012; Ströbele et al., 2017). Instead, they were a form of fundamental provisions; later ones (see, e.g., Estonian Digital Agenda, 2020) had a more specific focus, such as the presentation of policies and visions (Štitilis et al., 2016). Runnel et al. (2009) concluded that ICT friendliness, represented in policy documents, is as much a cultural model as it is an economic tool. It has been challenging to conclude whether these strategies drove the practice or vice versa. They have been described “rather as ‘development-driven strategies’ than ‘strategy-driven development’” (Kalvet, 2007, p. 11). One of the success factors

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has been open legislative structures that do not overdefine technical details (Ströbele et al., 2017). Another critical factor relates to small and networked communities. Estonia’s digital transformation was led by solid political decision-making and (informally) networked governance cooperating with the small community of ICT experts in the public and private sectors (Kattel & Mergel, 2019). Therefore, Estonian e-government performance does not stem from a grand strategy for implementing e-government that could be transferred to other countries (Kitsing, 2010).

4 Economic Aspects of Internet Development Whereas e-government is like a trademark for Estonia, the same is not entirely true for e-commerce. The level and amount of electronic transactions (i.e., e-commerce), such as selling or buying goods or services by enterprises, households, individuals, or private organizations, have been under the EU average and have been unequally used for several decades. The private sector has not been the leading facilitator of ICT development in Estonia nor has it been a partner and service provider for the public sector. The Estonian economy was at the beginning of social transformations in the 1990s; thus, weak and small enterprises were rarely capable of self-investing in large-scale technological developments. Estonia has been a “subcontracting country” where firms from wealthier countries expect to get products and services at low prices (Tiits et al., 2003, p. 42). Nevertheless, economic policies created at the beginning of the 1990s favored foreign investments, and governments saw the need to boost the volume of business and trade. In policy measurements governments used the principle that the re-investment of firms’ profits was not taxed; thus, a supportive context for investments via taxation laws was created. During the three decades after regaining independence, the Estonian economy steadily grew, except for the global economic crisis in 2008. The structure of the Estonian economy has changed significantly, and increasingly, more knowledgeextensive enterprises can be found in the country. The private sector can now provide innovative solutions that attract millions of euros in investment. The ICT sector has been the Estonian economy’s forerunner and exporter in the last decade (see Table 1). It has been estimated that 7.1% of employers in the ICT sector and 6.8% of GDP come from the ICT sector, and this sector handles 12.8% of the private sector’s employment costs (Statistics Estonia, 2021). In recent years, the private sector has been catching up in developing knowledge-extensive services and products, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The largest Estonian ICT companies are developing business software (e.g., Pipedrive), mobility solutions (e.g., Bolt Technology), gaming software (e.g., Playtech), single-designed software(e.g., Nortal), business software (e.g., Helmes), web development solutions (e.g., Heathmont), identity verification services (e.g., Veriff ), or solutions for the industry such as Cybernetica and Icefire. Several of them operate worldwide.

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Table 1 Exports and imports in the ICT sector in Estonia 2014–2020 (millions of euros) Exports

2014

2016

2018

2020

514.7

612.1

916.5

1,286.6

Imports

292.1

316

469.3

585.9

Balance

222.6

296.2

447.2

700.8

Source Statistics Estonia

The COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 and slight restrictions in the following years caused a massive digitalization of services and products in formerly less digitalized sectors. One-fourth of enterprises now use IT solutions to manage different processes in the value chain. They collect, analyze, and manage client relations with software, manage resources, use digital administration solutions, and have automatized their production processes. In more prominent companies, artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming more common; one-fifth of enterprises having more than 250 employers use AI for production, marketing, sales, administrative purposes, or for IT-security reasons (Statistics Estonia, 2021). Research has shown that relatively small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are essential for innovation since they can flexibly develop cross-sectoral solutions that foster innovations in other sectors (Gerlitz & Prause, 2021). The Estonian economy is composed mainly of SMEs. During the last five years, annual growth in the start-up sector has been between 20–30%, measured in turnover, number of employees, or investments from investors. Since 2021, several innovations have been operating, creating unicorns in Estonia, such as Skype, Playtech, Wise, Bolt, Pipedrive, ID.me, and Zego (Laks, 2021). The surplus value they create is much higher than in other sectors and is increasing further. The number of unicorns per 10,000 inhabitants in Estonia is 7.9; in Latvia, it is 2.5; and in Lithuania, it is 3.7 (Estonian Centre of Excellence, 2021). ICT development is characteristic of the ICT sector, but all enterprises computerize and digitalize their processes. In 2019, 99% of enterprises had an internet connection (Statistics Estonia). Among them, ICT enterprises usually use the highest internet speed connection—at least 1 Gbit/s. Economic reporting and communication with state offices are almost unthinkable without a digital platform. All banking accounts are mainly usable online, and monthly reports to the Taxation and Customs Board can be given online only. In transactions with public bodies, only electronic bills are accepted, the employment of new employers needs to be registered in the employment register online, 88% of enterprises are satisfied with their connection speed, 81% of enterprises have a web page, and the number of webpage owners has grown in the last 10 years by more than 10% (Statistics Estonia, 2021). The turnover from e-commerce has been below the EU average and is still lower in Estonia (see Table 2). For more prominent companies, only 19% of their turnover comes from online sales. For SMEs, the number is even lower: 12–12% above the EU average. Thirty-eight percent large enterprises and 16% of SMEs are selling online, both below the EU average (2020, DESI). As is known, online sales has been changing

Developing an Advanced Digital Society: An Estonian Case Study Table 2 Total online sales by enterprises in 2005 and 2020 in the Baltic states and the EU as a percentage of total turnover (DESI)

123

2005 (%)

2020 (%)

Estonia

1.95

14.3

Latvia

0.71

9.82

Lithuania

2.34

13.9

EU average

9.76

19.8

due to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and 2021. For example, for cultural and creative industries, COVID-19 has greatly pushed digitalization. Only, enterprises that needed physical products as part of their operations were less able to digitalize, while others actively sought new production, marketing, and distribution opportunities (Pastak et al., 2021). According to surveys conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, the buying of goods and services rose in unprecedented ways. Sixty-five percent of the adult population are regular consumers, buying at least once per month from the internet (Kantar Emor, 2021). Telecommunication firms quickly improved their telecommunication networks and raised speeds in less-populated areas. Home delivery developed quickly; even in rural areas, firms created opportunities for people to order food from home. Still, there is inequality in the rate of transformation between geographical areas and social groups. The capital region of Estonia ranks first in this regard. In contrast, in less-populated areas, access to and usage of services have been relatively modest (at least until COVID-19)—this pattern being detectable, especially in Central and Eastern European countries (Eurostat Regional Yearbook, 2014). The division has also been visible at the individual level; people with the lowest income are less involved in e-commerce (Eurostat Regional Yearbook, 2014). Digitalization in the field of economy and finances can face limitations due to the small size of the domestic market, whereas global digital platforms can act as barriers to entering global markets. Especially in the cultural and creative industries, SMEs cannot develop their dissemination platforms and depend on existing platforms for sharing (Pastak et al., 2021). In their empirical work, Ibrus and Nani (2019) showed that in small countries, global social networking platforms “monopolise access to internet users – control data about those users keeping media industries at bay” (p. 210). This can have negative consequences for the development of Estonian enterprises. The economy of scale favors big actors; however, it can favor innovative solutions. It can also facilitate industries in finding new ways of cross-innovation. “Media firms enter into new kinds of cooperation relationships,” such as with the educational and cultural sectors (Ibrus & Nani, 2019, p. 211). The start-up scene in Estonia shows that Estonian enterprises can play globally; many unicorns already have a boost to operate on a global scale. Experts agree that a structural shift in the Estonian economy has taken place thanks to special attention to ICT and innovation in public policy starting in the 1990s (Kami´nska-Korolczuk & Kijewska, 2017). In its economic and public policies, the government created simple rules for creating and operating enterprises,

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which supports a rapid shift in innovation. The general atmosphere supports digital transformations (Kõuts-Klemm & Lauristin, 2020). Currently, entrepreneurs criticize the role of government—that it has stopped being a catalyst for digitalization (see the Estonian Association of Information Technology & Telecommunications, 2018). Entrepreneurs claim that the main problem in developing their businesses is a lack of talented people who possess programming and code-writing skills. Official policies enable some migration to the country for welleducated workers, but they do not seem to be enough for enterprises. Concerned voices warn that rapid digital development has stopped, especially if Estonia is compared to other Central and Eastern European countries that are now booming. The economic aspects of internet development in Estonia indicate the importance of contextual factors in facilitating change. For several decades, clear economic policies and taxation principles favoring investments and innovation have brought a cycle of growth. Openness to the world economy has enabled Estonia to surmount the limitations of the smallness of the national economy. The aforementioned cooperation with Finland and the explicit establishment of digital leadership in Europe (e.g., the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2017, and leadership in passing the Digital Single Market strategy) give a clear indication of where Estonian digital society is turning strategy-wise. While the power of global intermediaries and ICT corporations is surmounting the capabilities of small countries’ economies, Estonia is collaborating with other EU countries. Finland is emphasizing its increasing cooperation with Nordic–Baltic countries as digital forerunners in Europe.6 At the same time, the Estonian government, together with other EU member states, is urging the EU to take digital leadership to get ahead of the curve in digital transformation and to advance an open digital policy that would guarantee sufficient sovereignty (Merkel et al., 2021). Therefore, the overall objective seems to be to develop digital societies (including public services) in alignment with EU member states’ policies and to join efforts with other member states.7 Cooperation, in the long term, may turn out to be the most realistic strategy for tackling digital challenges conditioned by increasing pressure from commercial actors in developing public digital services.

5 Social and Cultural Aspects, Media The rapid growth of digital media and cultural activities characterizes the social and cultural aspects of information society development. The Estonian population has been eager to integrate new technologies into their life-worlds since the beginning of the wider availability of these technologies, starting at the end of the 1990s. ICT has been seen as the symbol of a new society, and individuals and families have invested in “get access” to advanced societies via these technologies (Lauristin, 2004). Analyses 6 7

https://vm.fi/en/international-cooperation-on-digitalisation-and-ict. https://mkm.ee/sites/default/files/eesti_digiuhiskond_2030.pdf.

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carried out in 2002 showed that even for families with fewer financial capabilities, it is essential to buy a personal computer to invest in children’s futures (Lauristin, 2004). Internet usage was accompanied by a value shift. “During the years 2002– 2008, consumerism grew in Estonia – characterized by taking people and things at their ‘market value’” (Lauristin, 2013, p. 33). For innovators, economic efficiency was important, but they aimed to create social good, transparency, and accountability while developing ICT solutions in Estonia (Männiste & Masso, 2020). In Estonia nowadays, public and private digital services are so widespread that the basic skills necessary to use the internet are the prerequisite for using these services. The Estonian population is eager to use digital devices and the internet. The number of internet users among the adult population has been growing from 28% in 2000 to 91% in 2021 (Statistics Estonia, 2021). Whereas the oldest age groups have been relatively modest internet users or even nonusers, usage is becoming evermore common in these groups. From 2020 to 2021, the growth of internet users in the 65–74 age group was 17% (Statistics Estonia, 2021). The life-worlds of citizens are highly mediatized (see, e.g., Couldry & Hepp, 2017, about the concept of mediatization). An average day for the Estonian adult population consists of eight hours and 24 min of media-related activities (Kantar Emor, 2021). Many activities overlap and take place at the same time. In particular, the smart media devices in citizens’ pockets enable parallel activities that unbound users from ‘here and now’ limitations. Younger and better-educated groups enjoy the enablements of digitalization in different ways. Studies show that a ‘media day’ is dedicated more to leisurely online activities in younger groups and that older generations prefer traditional ways of media consumption (e.g., TV, and printed material); people with higher education dedicate less time to media, and people with lower education more (see Fig. 1). People with duties for work and family have less time for media, but their internet activities are more sophisticated and bring more benefits. The most popular internet activities for the Estonian population are: reading and sending e-mails (90%), banking services (90%), searching for information (89%), and reading online news (86%). The growing trend is to participate in e-courses (34%) (see Table 3) (Statistics Estonia, 2021). Whereas the differences in usage of digital means have been explained mainly by age, there has been a digital divide of the second or even the third level8 between the Estonian- and Russian-speaking language populations too. Access to digital technology has been similar among Estonians and the Russian-speaking minority, but the qualitative use of digital means has been greatly differentiated. Russian speakers have used significantly fewer e-government opportunities to communicate with state authorities and officials (Trültzsch et al., 2013). While state officials communicate in the official language, which is Estonian, communication opportunities are lower for Russian speakers due to their lower linguistic skills. In 2011, only 28% of Russians 8

The first-level digital divide has been defined as infrastructural phenomenon, as unequal access to technologies or digital exclusion at an international as well at a local level (Cammaerts & van Audenhove, 2005), the second level digital divide refers mainly to difference in use, skills, literacy, and participation (Trültzsch et al., 2013).

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M. Himma-Kadakas and R. Kõuts-Klemm age group Average in population 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-74 0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

16.00

18.00

hours TV

Radio

60–74 50–59 40–49 30–39 20–29 15–19 Average in the population

printed press

Social media

online news portals

other internet-related activities

TV 4.41 4.13 3.25 3.09 2.52 2.01

Radio 2.47 2.32 2.15 1.30 1.24 0.42

Printed Material 0.53 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09

Social Media 0.37 1.00 1.27 2.30 3.24 3.48

Online News Portals 0.41 1.00 1.17 1.03 1.02 0.55

3.36

2.02

0.23

1.52

0.59

Other InternetRelated Activities 1.00 1.46 2.11 3.28 5.12 9.38 3.00

Fig. 1 Hours spent on media in age groups in Estonia during an average day (Kantar Emor, 2021)

reported being fluent in Estonian, and 23% said that they understood and used it moderately; the other half were unable to use the Estonian language (Lauristin, 2012). The current situation has reasons in the Soviet period when the Russians moved from all over the Soviet Union into Estonia, having no obligation to learn the Estonian language or culture; after transitions in the 1990s, they lost their status and needed to adapt to the new circumstances. The cultural and social divide is reflected in the digital one, but with every year to a lesser extent. Currently, only part of the Russian-language population with the weakest level of integration is characterized by withdrawal from the public sphere and minimal institutional participation, as the research has shown (they form about 21% of the Russian-speaking population) (Vihalemm et al., 2012).

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Table 3 The most important activities on the internet for users in Estonia (% of internet users have done this during the last three months) 2021

2011

Reading and sending e-mails

90.7

897 (2012)

Using internet banking services

89.6

89.0

Searching for information about products and services

88.5

70.9

Reading online news

86.0

88.3

Sending the official letters/forms

83.4

47.4

Searching for information from the official web pages of state and governmental institutions

75.5

63.2

Communication in social media

74.0

48.1

Participation in video conferences/video calls

69.6

49.5

Searching for information about health issues

68.1

44.1

Downloading different forms to fill out

52.0

41.7

Usage of online study materials

35.7

n.a

Participation in online study courses

34.6

7.8

Selling services/products on the internet

25.7

16.6

Searching for a job and sending job CV-s

21.8

32.6

Reading and participating in civic and political discussions

12.2

23.1

Source Statistics Estonia database

Whereas the Estonian population lives in a mediatized world, their media literacy is rather good. Estonians are among the most media literate nations, with Finnish, Danish, Swedish, and Irish inhabitants among European countries (Open Society Institute Sofia, 2021). This means that they can manage the risks and threats accompanying internet usage. A significant part of the population has well-developed digital skills. Table 4 shows that in Estonia, at least 62% of the adult population possess at least-basic digital skills—they can search and assess the quality of the information on the internet, they use online communication tools, and they can create text and content in different formats, and use the proper tools to solve the problems related to the internet and their digital needs. Internet users have their strengths, especially in the domain of information seeking (searching and evaluating information on the internet). The same applies to the problem-solving domain (identifying digital needs and resources, solving conceptual problems, creatively using technology, etc.). The less advanced are the skills in the software domain (programming, dealing with intellectual property rights and licenses, manipulating video and other content, etc.). The data show that there have been no significant changes during the last five years in digital skills. Still, people with higher incomes are more skilled than people with lower incomes. On the one hand, digital skills are related to access to technologies— e.g., slower internet connections in sparingly populated areas hinder the usage of online services and the development of digital skills. On the other hand, our research

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Table 4 Indicators of digital skills among Estonian population compared to EU average and to other Baltic States (% of the population aged 16–74) in 2019 (DESI) Estonia EU average Latvia Lithuania Individuals with at least-basic digital skills

62

56

43

56

Individuals with an above-basic level of skills

37

31

25

32

Individuals with a “low” level of skills

28

29

42

25

Individuals with an above-basic level of skills in the 80 information domain

69

68

72

Individuals with an above-basic level of skills in the 72 communication domain

65

68

65

Individuals with an above-basic level of skills in the 67 problem-solving domain

57

52

58

Individuals with an above-basic level of skills in the 42 software domain

39

29

36

has shown that skills depend on motivation—many people prefer other ways to participate and consume services, which is why they do not develop their skills further—i.e., the motivational barrier hinders skill development (see PruulmannVengerfeldt & Kalvet, 2008). Researchers relate the high level of digital skills to education, free media, and high trust among people. Cultural and societal contexts have been supportive of developing skills, and public discourse can be labeled even as coercive (Siibak & Kõuts-Klemm, 2017). The digital divide, the divide between those who have access and those who do not, is not the case in Estonia; instead, it is a multidimensional continuum in which existing social and cultural dividing lines show various gradations of digital exclusion and inclusion (Trültzsch et al., 2013). From a societal and cultural perspective, the development of an information society in Estonia was supported by the symbolic value of education and the enhancement of media literacy and digital skills. The inner resources of society have been high in moving into the digital society since education has been valued and openness to innovations has spread widely among the population. Thus, the generally high educational level of a population can be seen as a key factor in developing a digital society.

6 Conclusion Estonia provides a valuable case study that reveals the development of technologies that enable the digital transformation of information infrastructure, economy, culture,

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and society. Although there may be aspirations to copy Estonian—“e-Estonian”— practices, this chapter shows that while there are transferrable principles, the combination of political, societal, economic, and other factors provide the context in which this transition is possible. In the early years after regaining independence, Estonia reached unique conditions of nonexistent infrastructural capacity and a scarcity of financial resources. However, the basis for this was laid in cyberneticians and sociologists trained in the 1960s at the University of Tartu. Velmet (2020) argued that while politicians and entrepreneurs of the 1990s equated the novelty of the “information age” with Western hardware, the actual deployment of hardware depended on the expertise of sociologists and cyberneticians from the Soviet system. The lesson from the infrastructural development of 1990s Estonia is that this resulted from flexible and relatively informal cooperation between scientists, politicians, and entrepreneurs. Estonia was forced to restructure its economy after regaining its independence. The lack of mineral resources in the country and the small population forced the redefining of the basis for the national economy. Thus, the knowledge-intense sector was seen as a possible axis for a new economy in Estonia. The public sector mainly financed and ordered ICT services from the private sector. The strengthening of the private sector began with investment-favoring taxation policies and openness to foreign investment (Tiits et al., 2003). SMEs were mainly created. Currently, the ICT sector is the sector with the highest growth in Estonia. The number of start-ups and unicorns is the highest in Europe compared to the population numbers. Today, almost all enterprises in other sectors have an internet presence and have digitalized several processes in their value chains. This young country demanded a narrative to justify infrastructural costs when people experienced severe poverty conditioned by the economy. ICT-driven progress and an information society are well suited to unite society and give people a novel narrative in which to believe (Runnel et al., 2009; Velmet, 2020). Cultural and societal contexts fulfill the necessary preconditions for digitalization. First, the Estonian population is highly educated and possesses good digital skills and media literacy. Second, public discourse supported the adoption of ICT technologies in everyday life, mainly because of the growing availability of different public services for citizens (e.g., paying taxes, e-health, and e-schooling). The usage of services has been comfortable and time-saving. The development of digital public services has ended in other extremes; some services are available online only. Many state offices outside the capital city closed during the pandemic, thus creating disadvantages for less digi-literate or usage-motivated people. Nevertheless, digitalization would not be possible without general support for digitalization by the population and favorable public opinion. Thus, we see that cultural and institutional factors in mutual interactions contribute to the cycles of morphogenesis (Archer, 2013), appearing in Estonia as its society becomes digitalized. Several of these transformations have been a symbiosis of different factors. Therefore, e-Estonia’s digital transformation practices cannot be transferred unanimously to other sociocultural contexts. Nevertheless, the principles of open collaboration

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between sectors, creating, and nurturing a unifying narrative, and strategy-driven development are keys to successful digital transformation.

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Solvak, M., & Vassil, K. (2016). E-voting in Estonia: Technological diffusion and other developments over ten years (2005–2015). Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu and Estonian National Electoral Committee. https://skytte.ut.ee/sites/default/files/skytte/ e_voting_in_estonia_vassil_solvak_a5_web.pdf Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J., Hursti, H., MacAlpine, M., & Halderman, J. A. (2014). Security analysis of the Estonian internet voting system. Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 703–715. https://doi. org/10.1145/2660267.2660315 Statistics Estonia. (2021). E-ostlejate arv jätkas kasvu, ettevõtted teevad samme tehisintellekti suunas. Statistics Estonia. https://www.stat.ee/et/uudised/infotehnoloogia-ettevotetes-ja-leibko ndades-2021 Štitilis, D., Pakutinskas, P., & Malinauskait˙e, I. (2016). Preconditions of sustainable ecosystem: Cyber security policy and strategies. Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, 4(2), 174–182. https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2016.4.2(5) Ströbele, M., Leosk, N., & Trechsel, A. H. (2017). Two countries/two decades/two outcomes A brief comparison of e-government solutions in Estonia and Switzerland. xUpery Ltd. http://xupery.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/A-brief-comparison-of-e-government-sol utions-in-Estonia-and-Switzerland.pdf Tammets, K., Ley, T., Eisenschmidt, E., Soodla, P., Sillat, P. J., Kollom, K., Seitlinger, P., Väljataga, T., & Kori, K. (2020). Eriolukorrast tingitud distantsõppe kogemused ja mõju Eesti üldharidussüstemile (The state emergency conditined distance learning experience and impact to the Estonian general education schools) (p. 94). Tallinn University. Tigers Leap. (n.d.). How it all began? From Tiger Leap to digital society. Education Estonia. https:// www.educationestonia.org/tiger-leap/ Tiits, M., Kattel, R., Kalvet, T., & Kaarli, R. (2003). Competitiveness and future outlooks of the Estonian economy. R&D and innovation policy review. Research and Development Council. Trültzsch, S., Kõuts-Klemm, R., Aroldi, P., Carpentier, N., Schrøder, K. C., & Hallet, L. (2013). Transforming digital divides in different national contexts. In Audience transformations (pp. 191–209). Routledge. Vassil, K. (2015). Estonian e-government ecosystem (Background Paper for the World Development Report 2016, 30 pp.). Vassil, K., Solvak, M., Vinkel, P., Trechsel, A. H., & Alvarez, R. M. (2016). The diffusion of internet voting. Usage patterns of internet voting in Estonia between 2005 and 2015. Government Information Quarterly, 33(3), 453–459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2016.06.007 Vassil, K., & Weber, T. (2011). A bottleneck model of e-voting: Why technology fails to boost turnout. New Media & Society, 13(8), 1336–1354. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444811405807 Velmet, A. (2020). The blank slate e-state: Estonian information society and the politics of novelty in the 1990s. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, 6, 162. https://doi.org/10.17351/est s2020.284 Vihalemm, P., Lauristin, M., & Kõuts, R. (2012). Trends in Estonian media landscape in 2000–2012. Media Transformations, 6, 12–63. X-Road®. (n.d.). E-Estonia. Retrieved 2 September 2021, from https://e-estonia.com/solutions/int eroperability-services/x-road/

Uanet Through Socio-Political Perspectives Olena Goroshko and Nataliia Boiko

1 Introduction The Internet is a consecutive with and embedded into various social practices and spaces. Christine Hine stresses that the ethnography of the Internet involves mobility between contexts of production and use, offline and online, and reality and virtuality. It is about researching the technology itself and the social practices that take place as well as understanding the context in which those practices are realized (Hine, 2009; Roginsky, 2014). Political communication presents one of such practices. In academic, discourse political communication is rendered often as the creation and exchange of ideas and opinions between main political actors and stakeholders— citizenry, leaders of opinions, public officials, political institutions, and such related institutions, as the media. It covers the discourses throughout the political process in local, state, national, and international political systems, as well as how political information can be leveraged for political gain or to achieve political goals. Thus, political communication presents the dialogue among political organizations (e.g., political parties), political actors (e.g., elected officials), media, and citizenry. It is rendered as an interdisciplinary field that blends the social sciences, strategic communication, and media studies with politics and government (Question: What is political communication? What can you do with a degree in political communication? w.d.). Current global social transformations and processes in the information and communication technologies (ICT) area strengthen the role and importance of information and knowledge in global society. It provides prerequisites for the development of political communication on the Net. Nowadays, global society is at the stage O. Goroshko (B) Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute, National Technical University, Kharkiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] N. Boiko Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_7

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of active implementation and application of Internet technologies into the political process, both at the local and global levels (Boiko, 2020). Scholars define political internet communication as a system of actions of political information, which is reflected in a certain text, graphic, video, or audio forms, regarding its distribution on the Internet with using a set of technical means that ensure its circulation (transmission, exchange, consumption, etc.) in order to reproduce political interaction in the interests of all political actors, society, and individuals (Budanova, 2015, p. 117). The Internet becomes an integral part of the political process. The institutionalization of the Internet is characterized by the practice of its active use by both the state and civil society. However, in comparison with the state, civil society uses the possibilities of the Internet as a form of political communication more actively and effectively (Budanova, 2015). At the same time, it should be noted that in recent years the expansion of formalized dialogue with various social actors in the online format has taken place, primarily due to the development of elements of e-government, Diia software (Diia short for “State and Me” presents a mobile application, web-portal and brand of the digital state in Ukraine developed by the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. Diia was first presented in 2019 and officially launced in 2020) (Diia: Derzhavni poslugi online, 2022; Nemenushhyj, 2021), pandemics of COVID, etc., (Boiko, 2020). Due to the fact that politics has recently become more online than offline, hence political communication is also adapting to the requirements and principles of the Net. Analysis of the Internet environment as a space for political communication reveals the optimal ways of its practical application and functioning. Simultaneously, the consideration and systematization of global and local experiences on the Internet space contributes to the formation of effective dialogue between society and government through new technologies (Bronnikov, 2011; Boiko, 2014, 2015, 2020; Budanova, 2015). The intensification of ICT use initiates the emergence of a new form of politics—network politics or e-politics, which reflects the intensification of social and political ties and the coordination of political time-streams. Thanks to its specific nature e-politics changes essentially the public space of politics. Currently, one can speak about: A shift in the hierarchy towards decentralized network structures; The dynamism of the political process is growing; The uncertainty and unpredictability of the management process increases; There is a formation of “hybrid institutions”, i.e., collaboration and cooperation between managers and those managed via the Internet, between producers of information and its consumers that lead even to the term “prosumer” (Alvin Toffler) in academic discourse, between virtual and real, public and private, social and technological, etc.; Netocracy is becoming more pronounced (Bronnikov, 2011, p. 14). And these trends are repeated in ten years through the Uanet context (Boiko, 2020).

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The most important specific features of political Internet-communication are the following: Significant immensity that means the possibility of e-politics covers large heterogeneous and geographically dispersed groups of people; Global reach of the political information space that provides unlimited access to a significant volume of political information that circulates practically without restrictions on the Net and provides the foundation for the local information policy; High level of interaction based on the dialogic model of communication, which determines various forms of political Internet communication: from cooperation, collaboration, consolidation to competition; It transforms ordinary Internet users from passive participants in political processes who only receive political information, and observe political events, into political actors. Users become actively engaged into networking: disseminate information, get involved in certain political communities and other public organizations, express their opinions, take part in online discussions, look for likeminded people, interact online with various stakeholders (authorities, civil society, citizens), participate in fundraising, initiate and support volunteer activities, etc., (Bronnikov, 2011; Boiko, 2020). Thus, the general model of political communication under the influence of ICT is transformed notably, and scholars argue that these changes distribute to such areas: Both the traditional channels and methods of obtaining information by the actors of the political process are being transformed; Both traditional communication models and the specific ones (many-to-many), existing only in the virtual space, are implemented simultaneously; The growing demands of the information society development lead to the use of the Internet infrastructure by the state, and, as a consequence, to the creation of e-government; There is an opportunity to simulate political activity; There is a homogenization of the communication space and the building of horizontal connections between political actors; The Internet levels the social hierarchy of users, which in political communication provides an important factor in increasing the activity of political stakeholders; Multidimensional virtual space, combining verbal and non-verbal forms of communication, different semiotic systems (from texts to videos) allows optimizing the participation in the political process (Bronnikov, 2011). Hence within the Internet space—as a special informative and communicative environment where political information revolves and the interaction between its initiators and recipients appears, political communication acquires new possibilities for interaction, including political solidarity of online communities and gives a rise to participatory democracy that happens when individual citizens can participate in the formation of policies and laws through constant engagement. It is namely the political internet-communication that becomes an effective tool for the civil society

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consolidation and extension. It strengthens the involvement of citizens in political processes and provides real opportunities for political change through the global and Ukrainian perspectives. Current global opportunities for using ICT in the political process also impact the activation of political processes in modern Ukrainian society. To understand better the political communication on the Uanet and its impact on modern Ukrainian society the analysis of Ukrainian information society and Uanet development must be conducted. This analysis will help to understand more clearly the environment where political communication is realized and delineate tendencies for its development.

2 Information Society in Ukraine Through Indexes Dimension There are several international indexes and indicators describing the state of information society in the world: e-Gov Index, Digital Divide Index, Networked Readiness Index, Inclusive Internet Index, Digital Inclusion Index, etc. Additionally, the main rating indices of digitalization include: Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), Digital Evolution Index (DEI), Digital Adoption Index (DAI), ICT Development Index (IDI), Global Innovation Index (GII), Networked Readiness Index (NRI), Boston Consulting Group (e-Intensity), IMD World Digital Competitiveness Index (DCI). Let’s take a closer look at index indicators that enlighten the dynamics of digitalization processes in Ukraine. According to the international assessment of the United Nations, Ukraine is included in the group of world countries with a high EGDI e-government development index. In 2020, the country ranked 69 out of 193 countries in the world (United Nations E-Government Surveys, 2020). This indicator shows a significant increase in Ukraine’s rating in the e-government development segment compared to the previous year of the study. In 2018, Ukraine ranked the 82nd in the overall ranking of countries according to the EGDI index (Fig. 1). The e-Governance Development Index (EGDI) consists of three sub-indices. The OSI Online Service Index (Online Service Index) contains the following indicators: availability of an information service; availability of an extended information service; index of provision of transactional services; related service delivery index. Telecommunication Infrastructure Index TII (Telecommunication Infrastructure Index) consists of the following indicators: the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants; the number of fixed telephone lines per 100 people; number of mobile subscriptions per 100 people; the number of wireless wide connections per 100 people; number of fixed wide access subscribers per 100 people. The HCI (Human Capital Index) human capital index contains the following indicators: adult literacy rate; gross combined enrollment ratio in primary, secondary and tertiary education; expected number of years of schooling; average number of years of study. In 2020,

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Fig. 1 Dynamics of Development of E-government in Ukraine according to the EGDI Index (2014– 2020)

there was a noticeable increase in the indicators of the OSI Online Services Index, as well as the TII Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (Fig. 2). This result demonstrates the increase in available online services, the expansion of Internet access and the e-potential growth for the modern Ukrainian society democratization. According to the results of the 2020 study, Ukraine also entered the group of countries with a very high level in the EPI (E-Participation Index), ranking 46th

0.8616 0.839 0.8436 0.8591

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Fig. 2 Dynamics of EGDI Sub-indices in Ukraine (2014–2020)

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among 193 countries of the world (in 2018, the country ranked 75th in this indicator). The UN uses the e-participation index as an additional indicator that includes indicators of three levels of participation: e-information—ensuring participation by providing citizens with public information and access to information without or on demand; e-consultation—involving citizens in the introduction and discussion of issues of state policy and services; e-decision-making—empowering citizens through the collaborative development of policy options and the joint production of service components and service delivery. The 2020 study presents such content of participation levels in Ukraine: e-information (79.63%), e-consultation (80.95%), and edecision-making (90.91%) (United Nations E-Government Surveys, 2020: p. 315). The results of the international UN study demonstrate that Ukraine is approaching to the leading democratic countries of the world in terms of the index indicator of e-participation opportunities, the indicators of which reach 100% for all selected positions, and the gradual build-up of the socio-technical base for the implementation of democratic participation of citizens. The next index that describes the state of ICT and information society development is the Networked Readiness Index (NRI). It presents a complex indicator that characterizes the level of development of information and communication technologies and the network economy globally. The index is used as a tool for analysis to build comparative rankings that reflect the level of development of the information society in different countries. The yearly NRI Report maps the network-based readiness landscape on their performances in four different pillars: Technology, People, Governance, and Impact. Each of these pillars is composed of three sub-pillars that have been populated by a total of 60 variables (Network Readiness Index, 2020: p. 2). Currently, Ukraine ranks 64th out of the 134 economies included in the NRI 2020. Its main strength relates to the Governance. The greatest scope for improvement, meanwhile, concerns the Impact. As we speak about the performance at sub-pillar level, the strongest indicators are related to Content, Trust, and Businesses, among others. More could be done, though, to improve the economy’s performances in the Access, Regulation and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Contribution subpillars (see Fig. 3). NRI score concerning the Income shows the position of Ukraine in terms of both NRI score and GDP per capita (PPP). The trend line indicates the expected NRI score given an economy’s income level. Ukraine is well above the trend line, which suggests that it has a greater network readiness than would be expected from the given income level. It has been achieved due to ICT area development in general, constant increased skills in the use of computers, the Internet and software among the population, and widespread training programs in this area in the country. The main steps that Ukraine should take to increase the level of digital competence among the population include: raising citizens’ awareness of the need to implement digital competencies; availability of programs for the development of digital competence of different levels; close cooperation and purposeful actions to involve citizens in the training of various stakeholders—educational institutions, municipalities, businesses, etc., (Hotovi do cyfrovoho desyatylittya? Vdoskonalennya navychok dlya vyrishennya texnolohichnyx vyklykiv v Ukrayini, 2021; Yonan, 2021).

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Fig. 3 Ukraine Rankings by Sub-pillars (From Network Readiness Index, 2020 https://networkre adinessindex.org/)

Speaking about the strongest and weakest indicators, Ukraine performs fairly well in Adult literacy rate, e-Commerce legislation, and Income inequality. By contrast, the economy’s weakest indicators include 4G Mobile network coverage, SDGs: Affordable and clean energy, and Handset prices (Network Readiness Index, 2020). There is also the Inclusive Internet Index that “assesses the enabling environment for the adoption and beneficial use of the Net in 75 countries. It testifies that, while high levels of wealth and economic development contribute much to a strongly inclusive environment; several middle-income countries are successfully building key enablers, such as relevant content, digital literacy and policy. This proves that countries with lower levels of economic development nevertheless have levels with which to boost Internet inclusion available to them” (The Inclusive Internet Index, 2021: p. 9). One particular aim of the Index is to assist in the achievement of the UN’s SDGs, in particular—Goal 5 (gender equality), Goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure, including the goal of universal and affordable Internet access by 2020), Goal 10 (reduced inequalities), and Goal 17 (partnerships for the goals). The overall Index score is based also on the four pillars: Availability, Affordability, Relevance, and Readiness. The Availability describes the quality and breadth of available infrastructure required for access and levels of Internet usage. The Affordability indicates the cost of access relative to income and the level of competition in the Internet marketplace. The Relevance examines the existence and extent of local language content and relevant content. The Readiness reveals the capacity to access the Internet, including skills, cultural acceptance, and supporting policy. This indicator shows as well that countries with lower levels of economic development nevertheless have levels to boost Internet inclusion available to them (The Inclusive Internet, 2021: p. 3–4). Ukraine ranks 11th position among European countries and 22d overall with the score of 73.8. According to Affordability Ukraine occupies the 23rd place with 84.2 score.

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Besides the indices measuring the development of the information society in the country for understanding the process of societal internetization, such indicators as the number of Internet users in the country, the structure of the Internet audience, and what people actually do on the Net, how they use the Internet and for what purposes, taking in mind first of all the political sector are critically important also.

3 Uanet Development Researching any national segments of the Internet, the first question appears how to define this segment. Closely related to the geography of the Internet is the question of determining the boundaries of national segments of the Net. And there are many problems, because it is much more difficult to measure the boundaries of the virtual world than the real one. A number of researchers of the Network believe that on this issue there is a strong blurring of definitions and concepts. At the moment, there are several ways to define national segments of the network: linguistic, technological, and administrative (Teubener et al., 2006: p. 177). Thus, the “Ukrainian” Internet can be defined as: all Ukrainian-speaking websites; all Ukrainian-speaking communication flows (including e-mail, etc.); all URLs of the domain.ua; all users residing in Ukraine; all Ukrainian-speaking users in the world at large (Goroshko, 2010). Some of these definitions include, for example, the Ukrainian-speaking diaspora, some do not. However, a strict definition of the boundaries of Uanet, Runet, or Binet is probably impossible, but it is not required, as pointed out by Schmidt, Toibiner, and Zurawski, who in their work on the Russian diaspora on the Web, cite the opinion of one of the cult figures of Runet, the famous network literary critic Roman Leibov, who denied not only the existence of strict definitions when analyzing the Internet, but even the very need for them: “Russian is what is realized to be Russian”. We can even sketch an approximate typology on which our (whose is our?) consciousness is based when assigning one resource or another to “Russian”. But in any case, it would not explain all the quirks of this very consciousness. In general, I prefer to stay the question open, because the vagueness, the vagueness of the “Russian Internet” concept is quite consistent with the vagueness of the object (Teubener et al., 2006: p. 178). It is considered that the most appropriate for humanitarian studies of the Internet is the linguistic-centric approach to the allocation of national segments, because it is the language that presents a system-forming construal of the Internet as a social space (Teubener et al., 2006). However, if we take in mind that many Internet resources exist in several language versions, it becomes inevitable to cross and overlap the boundaries of national Internet segments, which contradicts the logic of segmentation and demarcation of the borders of geographical space. The analysis of the conceptual framework for defining the national segment of the Internet indicates that from the very beginning the Internet was and is still considered as an international “supranational” space, similar to Antarctica, outer space and the

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open sea. From these viewpoints, the topographical criterion is clearly irrelevant to the definition of the national segment at all. However, the increasing need for legal regulation of the Network constantly actualizes the need to demarcate its national segments. Therefore, in the legal sciences there is an approach in understanding the Internet as a set of national territories (network sections), where each state exercises jurisdiction over its national section, which includes the domain space of the country (.UA) and the entire network, limited to its territory, which can be taken as a basis for determining the borders of the Internet. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Internet is neither the media in its legislative sense, nor the hardware means of communication, representing a unique environment of interpersonal communication, possessing a supranational, suprastate nature. Access to network resources is a private right of citizens and cannot be restricted by the establishment of any administrative barriers by the state that prevent one way or another the free use (licensing of access, censorship of the content of Internet resources, etc.). The Internet is a fully self-regulating information environment, whose users independently determine the rules of conduct when working with it. And all these features of supranationality, freedom, and self-regulation of the network have been laid down in the concept of its development (Goroshko, 2010). The same policy of supranationality of the Web and openness of its resources is followed by the central body that coordinates the work of the entire Global Web—the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). At the same time, in recent years it is recognized more and more that the only possible and reasonable goal of regulation of relations concerning the Internet is the adaptation of existing legislation to the new Internet realities, constantly emerging in the world of global communications. Thus, when describing the national segment of the network, depending on the research objectives, it is possible to base the state segmentation on either the systemcentric principle, and then, for example, the language factor can be one of the fundamental, which is the case in most social studies of the Internet, where the Russian-speaking Internet (Runet), the Ukrainian-speaking Internet (Unet), or the English-speaking Internet (Inet) are distinguished. It is possible to put also the legal principle in the basis of allocation, and then domain names with the totality of IP-addresses of users, as well as networks passing through the territory of the country, provide a demarcation sign when describing the Internet and defining its borders. In social studies of the Web, it is possible to “start from” user-centric methods, and then the concept of the Internet audience can be used as the basis for the national segment. However, there are also a number of difficulties: at the moment, there is no clear definition of this concept in the sociology of the Internet, different researchers of the Network present this audience and describe it differently. Thus, E. A. Putilova believes that the network audience is a heterogeneous social community, united by a mediated interaction through the Internet (Putilova, 2004, p. 18). In this research, the user-centric approach is applied to. The main indicator that characterizes the level and dynamics of Internet development is the number of Internet users. This indicator is considered as an indicator of the development of the information society, so its analysis and forecasting are

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strategically important in determining the potential for further Internet growth in the country. Let’s analyze the dynamics of the Internet in Ukraine over the past 10 years, using official statistics from the State Statistics Service and the international research companies as Internetworldstats, Gemius, and data of All-Ukrainian Monitoring conducted by Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Ukrai’ns’ke suspil’stvo: monitoryng social’nyh zmin, 2020). They show an annual increase in the number of Internet users in Ukraine. In 2014, it reached 18.8 million people, which is 71% more than in 2010. Although the quantitative indicators of the Internet audience are growing, it should be noted a decrease in its growth rate: if in 2010 and 2011 the increase was 37.5% and 25.5%, respectively, in the last two years it has fallen to 7–12%. By the end of 2021, there were 40,912,381 Internet users in Ukraine, with 93.4% penetration rate (Internetworldstats, 2021). The results of almost twenty years of monitoring research of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine on the development of digitization processes in Ukraine, conducted since 2002, show a stable and positive dynamics in Internet growth: Both the number of users and the intensity of network use are increasing (Boiko, 2020). Monitoring the situation regarding the use of the Internet in Ukrainian society according to a 2021 survey, about 80% of respondents identified themselves as Internet users (see Fig. 4). The increase in Internet users is fixed in all socio-demographic groups. Today in Ukraine, both young people actively use the Internet—98.2% aged 18 to 29 years old and middle-aged people—93.2% of Ukrainians aged 30 to 55 years old. There is also a growing group of older Ukrainians who are actively exploiting the benefits of the global network—55.2% of Ukrainians aged 56 years and older. An analysis of the results of the dynamics of the age characteristics of Internet users in Ukraine indicates that the growth in the number of users in older age groups is positive, but fluctuant. It can be connected with economic factors (material state), and with the 90 76.7 78.6 77.1

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social needs of the group. For example, an increase in the need to communicate with relatives within a certain socio-political context (active hostilities in eastern Ukraine, loss of part of the country’s territory), observed in 2015, may stimulate the increase in the need to use the Internet (see Boiko, 2015 for more details). An analysis of the characteristics of Internet use to the type of settlement shows that large cities have long ceased to be the only centers for using the Internet in Ukraine. The survey testifies a steady number of Internet users in both small towns and rural areas. The increase in the number of users in different types of settlements is quite dynamic. In recent years, “Small City” and “Village” continue to actively increase the number of Internet users. At the same time, the growth in the number of Internet users in the capital and large cities of Ukraine demonstrates a certain slowdown in this process. The maximum increase in the number of Internet users, compared to the previous year, was recorded in the capital of Ukraine (Kyiv) in 2005, and in large cities in 2012. For rural residents, such a qualitative leap in the increase in users was recorded in 2014, when more than 45% of the villagers became network users, exceeding the previous year by 19% (26.9% in 2013) (Boiko, 2021). In 2021, the “village” continued to show the largest increase in the number of Internet users compared to other types of settlement. Since 2010, the number of Internet users in rural areas has been actively growing. The gap between the village and other types of settlement does not exceed 15%. More than 73% of rural residents in 2021 noted that they are Internet users (see Fig. 5). In spite of positive dynamics, in 2021, rural residents continue to be the largest group of respondents who say they “do not need and never use” the Internet. Although, it should be noted that compared to 2013, the number of such respondents in 2021 decreased almost four times to 17% (among residents of large cities—7.2%, among residents of small towns—11.9%). These changes in the Internet audiences, which are shifting from the young age to the older one, significantly expand the communicative and informational capabilities of Internet-communication. Thus, the results obtained reveal the dynamics of Internet development in Ukrainian society and the involvement of Ukrainians in the processes of digitalization. They show a steady and dynamic increase in the number of Ukrainian users of the World Wide Web and a steady decrease in the number of respondents who say that they “do not need and never use” the Internet. They are also actively using the latest information and communication technologies.

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Digital activity is also associated with the use of mobile technologies. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine at the end of 2018, the country had an average of 202.6 mobile phones per 100 households. The vast majority of the adult population of Ukraine stated that they used mobile phones. Thus, the percentage of households that own mobile phones in large cities reached 98.8%, in small towns and rural areas 97.3% and 95.9%, respectively, (Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrayiny, 2018). Modern Ukrainians demonstrate a fairly high level of computer skills and use of mobile communications. The most vulnerable group in terms of computer and digital literacy are rural residents. At the same time, the other research shows some troubling findings: 53% of Ukrainians (aged 18 to 70), according to the assessment methodology used by the European Commission, have a “below average” level of digital skills; 15.1% of Ukrainians do not have any digital skills at all. Considering the digital skills, communication and information skills are the most developed among the population of Ukraine (both above 70%), nevertheless problemsolving and software development skills require perfection. The study demonstrates a gap in digital skills among the population in age: While 66.1% of Ukrainians aged from 10 to 17 have “above basic skills” according to the EC’s methodology, this falls to just 25.5 for the population as a whole. Thus, older Ukrainians are falling behind in digital skills. According to this survey “older citizens want to become more familiar with social networks and be able to engage in self-development through the Internet. Most participants also expressed a desire to communicate with the state online” (Udovyk, 2020). Hence, one can speak about the Age Digital Divide in Ukraine. As for Gender Digital Divide during 2010–2020, the share of men who used the Internet increased, and in 2020 it reached 78% and exceeded the share of women (76.3%) (Ukrai’ns’ke suspil’stvo: monitoryng social’nyh zmin, 2020). However, the Internet audience of Ukraine in gender perspective can be considered quite balanced currently. Also the data obtained indicate that men use desk-computers more, while women prefer smart-phones. Similarly, older women spend more time on the Internet than older men and show greater interest in developing digital skills: They seek help with digital technology more frequently and communicate with it more often. The current situation of Internet development and active digitalization of Ukrainian society is the result of joint efforts of “various agents of digitalization transformations in Ukraine. These include IT specialists, online civic activists, and international donor organizations. And the state, which in recent years has intensified its activities in this direction, and today positions itself as an active agent of digital transformation in the country (in September 2019 the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine was created, the Committee on Digital Transformation of Ukraine in the Supreme Council was established, the Civil Council under the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine was founded, etc.” (Boiko, 2020, pp. 183–184). The results of the monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for 2020 demonstrate the active interest of Ukrainians in the online format of receiving socio-political information and communication online. Thus, by the end of 2020 about 60% of Ukrainians reported that they

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use various Internet resources to obtain information about political and economic events in Ukraine. And Ukrainians named “social networks (YouTube, Facebook, Telegram, etc.)” as the leading informational Internet resources for obtaining such information—41.2% (Ukrai’ns’ke suspil’stvo: monitoryng social’nyh zmin, 2020, p. 504). As for the most visited sites in Ukraine the first three leaders remain unchanged: Google, YouTube, and Facebook (Nazvano najpopuljarnishi sajty v Ukrai’ni v serpni, 2021) (see Fig. 6). The most popular news resources in August 2021 were pravda.com.ua, tsn.ua and bbc.com. In 2021, Google Ukraine also published the final rating of the most popular queries of Ukrainian users of the search service last year. According to the results of the search

Fig. 6 The Most Visited Sites in Ukraine (August, 2021) (From https://glavcom.ua/techno/telecom/ nazvano-naypopulyarnishi-sayti-v-ukrajini-v-serpni-784953.html)

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analysis, in 2021 Ukrainians were interested in “Euro 2020”, the Korean series Netflix “Squid Game”, and the entertainment show “The Bachelor 2021”. This is stated in the Google blog, published on Tuesday, December 7 (Stets, 2021). Analyzing these queries, one could argue that the most popular queries don’t possess any political content and for them Ukrainians more often visit social media platforms with their search opportunities. One can stress that the significant differentiation of living standards of the population of Ukraine remains one of the obstacles to accelerating the pace of development of the Internet and widens the gap between different segments of the population in the context of opportunities for interaction and participation in social and political processes. With the further deterioration of the socio-economic situation, the identified problem may be exacerbated in favor of further development of the information society.

4 Social Media Use in Ukraine There were 29.47 million social media users in Ukraine in January 2021. The number of social media users in Ukraine was increased by 2.0 million (+7.3%) between 2020 and 2021. The number of social media users in Ukraine was equivalent to 59% of the total population in January 2021 (Digital, 2021; Ukraine, 2021). If we analyze the popularity of social media platforms among Ukrainian users one can reveal that Facebook occupies the first place with 54% users then Pinterest follows with 13% users and Instagram holds the third place with 9% of Ukrainian social media audience (Global Stats, 2021). It is rather unexpected popularity (the second place) of the Pinterest platform in Ukraine that is even more popular than Instagram. One can specify that the data obtained in this area are rather contradictory. Thus, the research conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation for Democratic Initiatives, commissioned by the NGO Detector Media, reveals that in Ukraine, the vast majority of respondents (56%) choose Facebook to obtain information from all other social networks. In second place in popularity was Instagram (25%), and in third place— Viber (24%). Telegram is significantly inferior to the audience of Viber messenger—it is used by only 13% of respondents. At the same time, TikTok serves as an important source of information for 8.7% of Ukrainians (Barsukova, 2022). In 2020, Facebook also remained the most popular social network for accessing to the news among Ukrainians in 2020, with 47% claiming to use the service. The number of respondents using the messenger service Telegram for news on the other hand increased drastically, from 6% in 2019 to 21% in 2021. Also, among Android users in Ukraine Viber was the most popular messenger with a reach of nearly 97% in January 2021. Telegram and Facebook Messengers have the second and third highest reach, measured at near 77% and 72%, respectively, (Elagina, 2021a). The user reach of the TikTok service in Ukraine was increased to 30% in May 2021. To compare, in August 2019, only 3% of the online audience nationwide used this service (Elagina, 2021b).

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At the same time, the number of Ukrainian users of the Instagram social network was doubled in 2021—now there are 11 million of them. Most young people long ago migrated to Instagram and TikTok. Ukraine is on the 25th place by the number of TikTok influencers globally (accounts with over 1000 subscribers). 1% of TikTok influencers are from Ukraine. And 3% of influencers in Ukraine have over 100 K followers. On average, TikTok influencers in Ukraine have 176 videos uploaded into their accounts. Core TikTok audience in Ukraine are females between 13 and 24 years old (51%). The Engagement rate of TikTok influencers in Ukraine is 16% and it is almost the same as the average worldwide Engagement Rate (Baklanov, 2020).

5 Socio-Political Communication in Uanet It is the political Internet-communication that provides an opportunity for equal participation in the creation and dissemination of political information for all participants in the political process: political actors, society, and individuals. Thanks to the development of political Internet-communication, every member of society has the opportunity to get involved in political processes and become an active participant. If traditional political communication is limited and came exclusively from political actors: government officials, political elites, parties, authorities, NGOs, etc., which led to a high level of its institutionalization, then political Internet communication allows participation and production of political information by ordinary people, individuals, even those who has nothing to do with the power due to the widespread and unrestricted access to the Net and social media. The political communicative field is significantly expanded, and the subjectobject relations in political communication are transformed partially into the subjectsubject, which is a significant achievement for the development and intensification of political processes. Due to the subject-subject interaction, politics goes beyond the purely political sphere. For the analysis of political communication development on the Net, it is important to know the characteristics of Internet audience and understand its activity. The most of the local Internet audience consists of active users for whom access to the Internet becomes an attribute of their daily lives (Boiko, 2014, 2020, 2021; Budanova, 2015). This audience presents a potential stimulus for Ukrainian political sector development on the Net, providing the growth of information and communication activity in society. It procures the foundation for significant social and political changes in Ukraine as well, initiating the era of its significant societal transformations. At the same time, while analyzing political communication on the Net it is useful to analyze not only the audience activity but also the situation with the Freedom of Expression on the Net. According to this indicator Ukraine is partly free with 62 score in rating (among 100 countries), with obstacles to access—20 (from 25), limits on content—21 (from 35), and violations of users’ rights—21 (from 40) (Freedom on the Net, 2021). These indicators can be explained by the impact of hybrid informational war with Russia initiated since 2014.

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The Ukrainian government, taking in mind this situation, has been censoring the online content in Uanet, blocking numerous websites, belonging mostly to the Russian segment of the Internet: Through all these resources the manipulative impact on the Ukrainian audience is being carried out constantly. Sanctions implemented in 2017 against several Russian-owned web platforms—including VKontakte (VK), Odnoklassniki (OK), and Mail.ru—and websites deemed to contain Russian propaganda, fake, deep fake, destructive information aimed at destabilizing the political situation in Ukraine are prolonged by current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while sanctions against the Russia-affiliated companies Dr.Web, Kaspersky, and Yandex are extended for wartime in Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The actual implementation of website blocking mandated by the sanctions is inconsistent. Yandex, VK, OK, and Mail.ru are accessible on certain ISPs’ networks and due to VPN software in Ukraine. These resources are still among the top 25 websites visited by Ukrainians (Freedom on the Net, 2021). As for non-prohibited social media services like Facebook, Google, or Twitter, Facebook did not receive any content removal requests from the Ukrainian authorities, Twitter received only one request regarding 22 accounts in 2019, but the company did not act on it. The Google service received 77 requests regarding 937 items in 2019. These requests include defamation (65), threats to national security (3), copyright violations (4), hate speech (3), fraud (1), and business complaints (1). Google ultimately removed only 109 of the requested items. At the same time, some civil society organizations and groups objected to Facebook’s and other social media platforms’ habit of removing legitimate content in Ukraine (Freedom on the Net, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic also deepens fake, dis- and misinformation problems. During the “corona period” the government has blocked more than 2,700 groups with an audience of over a million and identified 393 “internet agitators” spreading “fake news” about the COVID-19 pandemic, some of whom were allegedly acting at the behest of the Russian state (Freedom on the Net, 2021). As touching the violations of users’ rights, the authorities prosecute users for spreading rumors online about coronavirus pandemic and launch additional initiatives aimed at stopping the spread of the disease, including an app that monitors individuals in mandatory isolation, that infringe upon users’ privacy rights. In 2020, there were a couple of online protesters after restrictions on massive events gatherings during COVID-19 pandemic, e.g., through the service zoom 10 000 people protest was organized against cutting of funds on cultural projects. Among other famous online flash mobs, artists, and other persons employed in the local creative industry sector organized a national campaign around the hashtag #Ctopkul’turnyjkarantyn (“Stop cultural quarantine”) to emphasize the negative corona impact on the industry in 2020. As for the free access to the net one can speak about a significant growth in rates of access, and the government laid plans for near-universal mobile Internet coverage (Nakonec kazhdyj ugolok nashej strany budet pokryt mobil’noj svjaz’ju i Internetom—Prezident o podpisanii Memoranduma mezhdu pravitel’stvom i mobil’nymi operatorami, 2019).

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Talking about freedom of speech on the Internet many media persons, bloggers, and ordinary Internet users face pressure to self-censor, especially on themes related to patriotism, separatism, terrorism, and Russia. IREX’s 2019 Media Sustainability Index claims, “self-censorship is embedded in Ukrainian media” (Media Sustainability Index, 2019). According to a study of 127 journalists, 48% practiced self-censorship, while 65% agreed that the war in eastern Ukraine had increased self-censorship (Kyryliuk, 2019). The Ukrainian social media sphere, which expanded very much after the Maidan events in 2014, has become a national online agora debating about democracy, politics, reforms, and civil society development. The VK and OK blocking in Ukraine limits substantially their potential for mobilizing on these popular platforms and consolidating communities with pro-Russian positions and views. Simultaneously, messengers become extremely popular in the online political arena, as Viber, Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp among the most popular ones (Nekrasov, 2021). Telegram channels are growing rapidly and are largely focused also on political issues. There are a lot of forms of political e-struggle in Ukraine: use of e-petitions, hashtag campaigns, zoom-meetings, etc. For consolidating political supporters, telegram-channels and messengers like Viber, Telegram, or WhatsApp are exploited. E-petitions are also quite popular among Ukrainian users of the Internet for political or social problems advocating, e.g.: “Particular attention should be paid to a number of Kyiv petitions raising issues associated with the Roma ethnic group. Some of them are formulated neutrally, however, two appeals are clearly discriminatory because they offer apply means of forced eviction against members of this nationality” (Kolesnikov, 2017: p. 17). Or a petition was registered in Kharkiv City Council demanding the introduction of a curfew hour, justifying it by the need to ensure public order. In this context, it should be noted that curfew is a means of restricting the law of persons to free movement, and in a democratic society is permissible only in conditions of emergency or martial law. However, the appeal itself can also be rendered as a call concerning the human rights violations and isn’t approved. There are also petitions calling for restrictions on human rights and freedoms appeals banning LGBT marches in Kyiv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi. In Kyiv, such a petition was directed against the officially announced KyivPride, and quickly gained the required 10,000 signatures. In honor of the Kyiv authorities, there was a petition rejected on the grounds of inconsistency with the Constitution of Ukraine and international documents in the field of human rights. However, it was rejected after collecting signatures, though, by law, such a petition should not even be allowed at all (Kolesnikov, 2017: pp. 17–18). The growing popularity of social networks in Ukraine has opened up new opportunities not only for users and bloggers, but also for politicians. Practically, all Ukrainian MPs and Government members including the president of the country use social media (especially Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram Channels) for political purposes (Goroshko & Chevordov, 2016). Experts note that social networks also played an important role in their results of the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, although relying on television

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and traditional political advertising was also rather big. For example, the Chesno movement noted that the financial statements for Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidential campaign contained almost no transactions to pay for online advertising, while social networks were a key channel of communication during his election campaign. “During the presidential election, Poroshenko’s team, for example, did not feel the rapid development of Instagram, while for Zelensky’s team video appeals to young people through this social network became one of the important elements of the election campaign” as the head of Internews-Ukraine Vitaly Moroz mentioned (Savic’kyj, 2019). In the parliamentary race, the leader in spending money on campaigning, for example, on Facebook was the party Golos (Voice), followed by European Solidarity and The Force of Law. In total, the party spent more than $1.8 million on political advertising on Facebook during the election campaign, the Opora civic network reported (Savic’kyj, 2019). Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his party Sluga Narodu (Servant of the People) do not stop using the potential of social networks even after winning the election. Since his election, the president has repeatedly called on Ukrainians to hold various flash mobs and published his video appeals on Instagram, YouTube, and Facebook. And the former head of his office, Andriy Bohdan, even stated that the new government didn’t need journalists, as it communicated with the people without intermediaries. Experts are convinced that the coming to power by Zelenskyy and his team has already radically changed the mechanisms of political communication, and the situation is unlikely to be “rolled back”. “A new type of politician, such as former US President Donald Trump, or former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, or Ukrainian President Zelenskyy will be increasingly virtual”, as political scientist Oleg Sahakyan argues. “Another thing is that with the coming to power of such candidates, the policy of states is changing. We see the diplomacy of controversial statements, and classical institutions are playing a smaller and smaller role”, he predicted (Savic’kyj, 2019). Maxym Savanevskyi—a famous internet blogger and analyst claims that New Ze-team knows the environment of its users and is well versed in their needs and sympathies. He stresses that social networks teach people that the world is very primitive and in black and white. In politics, there are many simple solutions to the most difficult questions. Savanevskyi declares that people are waiting for such simple answers, and those politicians who provide unsophisticated answers become prize-winners. He explains that in classical political office the preparation of political documents; the publication of political statements takes a long time whereas in Zelenskyy’s team everything happens rather fast. The team also uses a lot of infotainment in its activities and tells people what they want to hear (Vuiets, 2019). Social media platforms (primarily the Facebook network and Telegram channels) become the main source of news for Ukrainians (Vibrant Information Barometer, 2021: p. 3). This fact initiates the increased use of paid commentators and trolls on these platforms for political purposes. Research of activity on Facebook between May and July 2019, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s and former president Petro Poroshenko’s profiles revealed that their profiles became the target for the largest

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numbers of fake non-approved accounts (27,926 and 20,065, respectively) out of any politicians. Most comments run from these accounts were negative. However, the profile by former prime-minister of Ukraine Yuliya Tymoshenko received more positive than negative comments from the same accounts (Albrecht, 2019; Vuiets, 2019). Social networks, rather than traditional media, become more often used as a tool for conveying political messages in Ukraine. Experts argue that they are most successfully used by populist politics (Davydenko & Shkarpova, 2019). Several activist groups work to identify content manipulation. In July 2019, the NGO Internews-Ukraine launched a project, TrollessUA, to reveal suspicious accounts on Facebook and flag them for the company to inspect (Zroby svij Feisbuk chystym: Proekt TrollessUA, 2019). One can mention a web browser extension and a Telegram bot called Feykogryz (https://fgz.texty.org/) designed to identify dis- and misinformation, propaganda, and jeansa (paid information) (Feykogryz, 2021). In 2014, after the revolution of Dignity the StopFake project (https://www.stopfake. org/en/about-us/) was founded by teachers, graduates and students of the Mohyla School of Journalism. StopFake started as a volunteer project but over time it gathered a team of professionals working on disinformation and now includes over 40 people (5 Years of StopFake: The Evolution of Fighting Against Russian Propaganda in Ukraine, 2019). The main objective of StopFake is to check and refute disinformation and propaganda about events in Ukraine, disseminated by Russian social media. Besides studying the influence of propaganda on Ukraine. StopFake uses its methods of influence on other countries and regions, primarily the European Union and the countries of post-Soviet space. Currently, the Stopfake project functions on a regular basis. The Institute of Mass Information launches the INFOCRIME project to expose fake news and manipulations in the regional mass media in Ukraine. The main project goal is to expose fake news and help journalists of local mass media to check the facts and disseminate reliable information. The project starts in eight regions of Ukraine: in Odessa, Kherson, Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Rivne (IMI Infocrime Project to Detect FakeNes and Manipulations in 8 regions of Ukraine, 2021). One of the features of the political segment of Uanet is that the online platforms are actively exploited to advocate for marginalized or underrepresented groups in Ukrainian society, such as women and people with disabilities. E.g., Povaha (https:// povaha.org.ua/), an online platform launched in 2016, seeks to combat sexism in the media through advocacy campaigns and creation of a database of female experts. A flash mob using the hashtag #Jatobinedorogen’ka (“I am not Darling to you”) was launched to attract attention to sexism toward female journalists by politicians. Despite receiving popular support, the women were also harassed online. Iryna Zemlyana, a media expert at the Institute of Mass Media and a co-initiator of the #yatobinedorohenka flashmob, has been suffering from online bullying for two years. Iryna said that not only offenders but also bots were involved in online harassment (Iniciatorky proektu #jatobinedorogen’ka staly zhertvamy, 2020).

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Members of Ukraine’s LGBT + community regularly use social media tools to organize offline events such as Kyiv Pride, Kharkiv Pride, etc. However, they sometimes face resistance, also organized online, by far-right and nationalistic organizations (Country report on human lives practices, 2018). Indeed, there is a dark side in social media tools use for real-world mobilization. At the beginning of COVID-19 pandemic in Ukraine (in February 2020), residents of the village of Novi Sanzhary in Poltava region used Facebook, WhatsApp, and Viber to organize a riot after the government announced that evacuees from China—the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak at the time—would be quarantined in a local hospital. Nine police officers were wounded in the ensuing violence, and 24 people were arrested (Freedom on the Net, 2021).

6 Conclusion Current global social transformations and processes in the ICT area strengthen the role and importance of information and knowledge in global society. Currently, global society is at the stage of active implementation and application of Internet technologies in the political process locally and globally. According to the international assessment of the UN, Ukraine is included in the group of world countries with a high EGDI (e-Government Development Index). In 2020, there was a noticeable increase in the indicators of the OSI Online Services Index, as well as the TII (Telecommunications Infrastructure Index). According to the results of the 2020 study, Ukraine also entered the group of countries with a very high level in the EPI (E-Participation Index), ranking 46th among 193 countries of the world (in 2018, the country ranked 75th in this indicator). The results of the international UN study demonstrate that Ukraine is approaching to the leading democratic countries of the world in terms of the index indicator of e-participation opportunities. Speaking about the strongest and weakest indicators that Ukraine performs fairly well include Adult Literacy Rate, e-Commerce Legislation, and Income Inequality. By contrast, the economy’s weakest indicators include 4G Mobile Network Coverage, SDGs (Affordable and Clean Energy, and Handset Prices). It can be stated that the indices measuring the development of the information society in Ukraine are quite high, despite the overall rather low level of socio-economic development of the country. Simultaneously, Ukraine possesses high indicators concerning the number of Internet users, as well as indicators of online activity. The results of almost twenty years of monitoring research of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine on the development of digitization processes in Ukraine, conducted since 2002, shows a stable and positive dynamics in Internet growth: Both the number of users and the intensity of network use are increasing. Monitoring the situation regarding the use of the Internet in Ukrainian society according to a 2021 survey, about 80% of respondents identified themselves as Internet users:

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The number of Internet users shows positive dynamics in all socio-demographic groups. The number of users has increased most intensively in recent years among older age groups, as well as people living in rural areas indicating the narrowing of the Digital Divide Index. Modern Ukrainians demonstrate a fairly high level of computer skills and use of mobile communications. However, the most vulnerable group in terms of computer and digital literacy presents rural residents. At the same time 53% of Ukrainians (aged 18 to 70) have a “below average” level of digital skills, and 15.1% of Ukrainians do not have any digital skills at all. Considering the digital skills, communication, and information skills are the most developed among the population of Ukraine (both above 70%), nevertheless problem-solving and software development skills require perfection. Thus, the analysis of latest tendencies of principal indexes of information society and Internet development testifies: • • • • •

Digital transformation needs to be “system-wide”; Digital transformation may create new forms of Digital Divides; Trust and security are central to successful digital transformation; The COVID crisis is accelerating digital transformation; Education and re-skilling are critically important for successful and sustainable digital transformation of information society; • Digital transformation helps to the accelerated implementation of SDGs; • Digital transformation helps rebuild global cooperation and redefine all social practices including political communication in perspective. The results of the monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine for 2020 demonstrates the active interest of Ukrainians in the online format of receiving socio-political information and communication online. Thus, by the end of 2020 about 60% of Ukrainians reported that they use various Internet resources to obtain information about political and economic events in Ukraine. And Ukrainians named “social networks (YouTube, Facebook, Telegram, etc.)” as the leading informational Internet resource for obtaining such information—41.2%. The significant differentiation in living standards of the population of Ukraine remains one of the obstacles to accelerating the pace of development of the Internet and widens the gap between different segments of the population in the context of opportunities for interaction and participation in social and political processes. With the further deterioration of the socio-economic situation, the identified problem may be exacerbated in favor of further development of the information society. The Internet has become an integral part of the political process in Ukraine. The institutionalization of the Internet is characterized by the practice of its active use by both the state and civil society. In comparison with the state, civil society uses the possibilities of the Internet as a form of political communication more actively and effectively. At the same time, it should be noted that in recent years the expansion of formalized dialogue with various social actors in the online format has taken place, primarily due to the development of elements of e-government and e-democracy. Politics has

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recently become more online than offline, hence, political communication is adapting to the requirements and principles of the Net. The consideration and systematization of global and local experiences on the Internet space contributes to the formation of an effective dialogue between society and government through ICT. Thus, the mechanism of political communication was fundamentally changed, confirming the high efficiency of virtual political activity. At the same time, it must be stated that the most popular queries don’t possess any political content and for them Ukrainians more often visit social media platforms with their search opportunities. Namely, social media presents a certain hub for political activities of any kind from e-petition to flash mobs and political parties office functioning. There are a lot of forms of political e-struggle in Ukraine: use of e-petitions, hashtag campaigns, zoom-meetings, etc. For consolidating political supporters, telegram-channels and messengers like Viber or WhatsApp are exploited. E-petitions are quite popular among Ukrainian users of the Internet for political or social problems solutions. The growing popularity of social networks in Ukraine provides new opportunities not only for users and bloggers, but also for politicians. Practically all Ukrainian MPs and Government members including the president of the country use social media (especially Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram Channels) for political purposes. One can state that the activity of politicians in social networks played an important role in the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019. Moreover, this phenomenon was most effective for V. Zelensky’s party, which won the elections. Since his election to the Main Office, the current President of Ukraine V. Zelensky constantly has been sustaining a dynamic dialogue with users of social networks and attracts them to active socio-political interaction. One can also state a high civic online activity of Ukrainians in the issues of counteracting misinformation and manipulation online. Volunteer groups are created, which actively work to identify fake information, manipulated content in social networks. First of all, they check and refute disinformation and propaganda about the events in Ukraine. The main purpose of such work is to expose fake news and help journalists verify facts and disseminate reliable information. Also, one of the peculiarities of the social and political segment of the Uanet is that online platforms are actively exploited to advocate for marginalized or underrepresented groups in Ukrainian society, such as women and people with disabilities expanding the opportunities for e-participatory democracy generally. For the analysis of political communication development on the Net, it is important to know the characteristics of Internet audience activity. The most of the local Internet audience includes active users for whom access to the Internet becomes an attribute of their daily lives. This audience presents a potential stimulus for Ukrainian political sector development on the Net, providing the growth of information and communication activity in the society. It forms also the foundation for significant social and political changes in Ukraine as well, initiating the era of its significant societal transformations.

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The interpretation of Internet solidarity as a new form of socio-political activity, which is formed under the influence of modern information and communication technologies, has been deepened. It is proved that political internet communications become an effective means of self-realization through strengthening the potential of the Internet and the involvement of individuals in socio-political processes. The mechanism of political Internet solidarity is offered by technologies in themselves; the model and algorithm of process of political internet communication for formation of political internet solidarity of civil society is being developed currently. This allows us to better understand how the process of transforming disparate participants in the virtual environment into active participants in socio-political processes. One can argue also that social media are becoming the “telegraph” of our time, which should be seized by politicians “fighting for power”. There is the greatest societal trouble. By seizing them, they can sketch their agenda and manipulate society. And those who do not have the access to this resource lose at the start and remain on the sidelines of the political struggle in cyberspace and beyond.

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Media Generations of the Russians in the Digital Media Environment: Opportunities for Intergenerational Communication Anna Sumskaya, Greg Simons, and Valeria Solomeina

1 Introduction Disruption of intergenerational communication is one of the universal problems of society. Interpretations of Turgenev’s novel “Fathers and Sons” alone outline a wide range of philosophical and social and psychological factors that explain failures in the mutual understanding of the older and younger generations. Among these factors there are both universal, existing at all times, and specific, i.e. tied to a certain socio-historical moment. The difference in generational mental worlds has an extremely serious impact on the interpretation of historical and cultural facts. For example, “young people assess the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of communism less dramatically, as well as the significance of the constitutional event for Soviet communist ideology - the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917”, “in the collective memory of the younger generation the importance of events related to Perestroika and reforms of the post-Soviet years is also quickly erased” (Gudkov, 2020, p. 159). At the same time, as sociologist Lev Gudkov notes, it is important that “the fundamental basics of collective self-respect and national pride remain unchanged and highly significant. This allows us to say that the former structures of consciousness are reproduced in the processes of intergenerational transmission” (ibid., p. 160). Olga Makhovskaya, while exploring the problems of intergenerational transfer, concludes that “the inheritance and formation of the ideology of new generations occurs in our culture along family lines, as a father-son confrontation” (Makhovskaya, 2019, p. 108). In addition, she claims, as do Ron Eyerman and Bryan Turner (1998, p. 97), Henk Becker (2008, p. 206), Norbert Bolz (2011, p. 15) A. Sumskaya (B) · V. Solomeina Ural Federal University, Ekaterinburg, Russia e-mail: [email protected] G. Simons Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_8

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that “media, including literature, art, as well as the latest media, cinema, radio, are instruments of active generational mentality formation” (Makhovskaya, 2019, p. 109). Developing her logic, we can assume that today’s institutional media, while implementing the model of vertical transmission of experience that is traditional in Russia, act as strong “fathers” who influence their unexperienced but conscientious “sons”. Today, the most important factor in social interaction is digital communication technologies, which are used not only by institutional media (official media). Modern digital media, while forming a powerful new channel for both non-linear communication and the multiplicity of venues for its realization, are also causing serious problems in intergenerational media communication. One problem is communication based on the “historical experience of individual biographies” (Assmann, 2011, p. 18) in the digital media environment. According to Shestakova, the older generation wants “to lead their descendants, to be wiser than them”; but “until recently the younger generation turned to the older generation for information. Today, on the contrary, the younger generation more often finds information important to them with one click online. The older ones, on the other hand, mostly ask their grandchildren to help them” (Shestakova, 2017, p. 49). Indeed, today there is a powerful technological gap between the generations. As a result, according to the Australian demographer McCrindle, the younger generation (generation Alpha), less being the most digitally skilled, does not need the same power structures, hierarchies or traditional approaches to communication (McCrindle, 2020, p. 20). These reasons motivate scholars today to search for models of productive intergenerational communication and translation of intergenerational experience. At the same time, it is necessary to understand that this exchange has a bidirectional character. The “didactic” principle of transmitting cultural values, generational identity only in one direction (from the older generation to the younger one) leads to a dead end, because it only aggravates social conflict, leads to “intergenerational default” as Russian anthropologist Alexander Asmolov put it, and actually aggravates both timeless and current problems of “fathers” and “sons”. Australian researchers Mark McCrindle and Emily Wolfinger quote the Russianborn composer Igor Stravinsky, who acknowledged intergenerational differences as an eternal problem and said: “It’s one of nature’s ways that we often feel closer to distant generations than to the generation immediately preceding us” (McCrindle & Wolfinger, 2009, p. 33). At the same time, McCrindle and Wolfinger conclude that the generation gap, just like building a bridge, has to be bridged on both sides of the divide. “In their view, this can be done by sharing experiences, defining expectations, and striving to adapt to each other” (ibid., p. 31).

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2 Forming Perceptions of the Media Generation A reference to the issue of generations shows that it is an interdisciplinary phenomenon, a complex transdisciplinary polysemantic concept, which is the subject of study of many social and humanitarian sciences. A generation is a kind of “a magnetic field at the centre of which lies an experience or a series of experiences” (Wohl, 1979, p. 210), an integral life pattern that imposes its imprint on the generational chronotope (Ortega-y-Gasset, 1997, p. 262). Certainly, in this connection it is worth mentioning the work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim and his world famous treatise “The Problem of Generations”, written almost a century ago (1928). It is based on the development of a holistic concept based on the sociological approach, which treats generation as a massive phenomenon. The most important for this study are Mannheim’s ideas about formative period, generation boundaries and the selection of intergenerational subgroups. In particular, Mannheim claimed that living together the same formative experience contributes to the formation of a unique worldview or frame of reference, which can be a powerful force in people’s lives, and “the feeling for the unity of a generation is consciously developed into a basis for the formation of concrete groups” (Mannheim, 1952, p. 165), in the conditional years to 17–18 years formed “certain patterns of experience and thought” (ibid., p. 170), based on “only that “knowledge” I have personally gained in real situations. This is the only sort of knowledge, which really “sticks”, and it alone has real binding power” (ibid., p. 175). According to Mannheim: “Even if the rest of one’s life consisted of one long process of negation and destruction of the natural world view acquired in youth, the determining influence of these early impressions would still be predominant” (ibid., p. 298). H. Becker also classifies puberty and adolescence as the most important formative generational period (2008, p. 207). At the same time, the generational community, as Mannheim understood it, is not monolithic, because in spite of the fact that representatives of generations are united by identical experience and thinking patterns, they reflect it differently in practical activity depending on their social origin, thus forming intergenerational fractions, or, according to Mannheim, generational units. Following the principle of reduction, generation units have more specific characteristics than the actual generation, and their behavioural patterns, social and historical experiences, and worldview structures constitute separate generational units, modules within the same actual generation (Mannheim, 1952, p. 184). From the cultural point of view, the most significant are the ideas of Bourdieu (1993, p. 72) and his followers about the generational cultural field as a generation habitus, which is manifested in different tastes, values and behavioural patterns. Thus, Gilleard summarizes: “Concept of a generational location can be re-defined as a generational ‘field’, a field defined by the emergence of a changed relationship between past and present social spaces. Generational style or consciousness can be treated, in like fashion, as generational ‘habitus’—dispositions that generate

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and structure individual practices and which emerge and are defined by the forces operating in a particular generational field” (Gilleard, 2004, p. 114). From the position of sociocultural approach, a generation can be defined as a community, which is formed in objective sociodemographic and cultural and historical conditions, has special social and structural and cultural and symbolic features (Trotsuk, 2015, p. 23), in the basis of habitus “has typical social & psychological, ideological & moral and ethnocultural characteristics, similar spiritual values, social experience and lifestyle” (Isaeva, 2011, p. 265), connected with the solution of historically certain tasks. This community of people in the process of socialization acquires its unique sociocultural code (Sadykova, 2016, p. 35) and is recognized on the basis of “imaginary correlation with others ‘horizontally’ like ‘you’” (Dubin, 2005, p. 63) based on “we-feeling” and “we-identity” (Elias, 2010). In Bourdieu’s socio-analysis, a significant role is given to the constructed conflict over resources (both tangible and intangible). In his opinion, “each social generational field has its own specific “laws of aging”. Many generational clashes are of systems of aspirations formed in different periods” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 99). Therefore, in the context of sociocultural approach Eyerman and Turner (1998, p. 93) suggest that a generation can be seen as “cohort which has a peculiar and strategic access to collective resources and which, through rituals of exclusion, preserves not only its individual cultural identity, but excludes other generational cohorts from access to cultural capital and material resource”. The basis for the separation of generations is the results of socialization similar socio-psychological, ideological and moral characteristics, spiritual values, identical experiences and lifestyles. The totality of such characteristics is the basis of habitus of generations and is reproduced through generational patterns. The generational community is characterized by entelechy (generational solidarity) (Mannheim, 1952, p. 165), or “generational spirit” leading to similar collective and individual actions of generational cohorts. In general, it must be recognized that the concretization of generational representations allows not only to capture similar generational thinking strategies (White, 2013, p. 245), but also to understand human life in the context of historical events, to interpret the behavioural patterns of others (Foster, 2013), to capture emergent or established behavioural normative patterns (Alwin & McCammon, 2003, p. 27). Our research interest relates to the study of media generations, the discussion of which has become relevant as a result of the introduction of digital Internet technologies into the media practices of media audiences. We believe that the development of conception of media generations can be realized on the basis of a media approach related to the development of media and technology, including digital. Therefore, we are convinced that the point of reference in formulating the concept of media generations is the world famous works of the Canadian cultural scientist and philologist Marshall McLuhan on the importance of media in human life, their centripetal role in the development of communication and their influence on civilizational transformations and the formation of technogenic civilizations. According to the scholar’s position, the media or means of communication (hereinafter referred to as “the medium”) are technological extensions of the human being,

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and the form of the media is more important than the content being transmitted (The Medium is the Message). In other words, the media on which the content is placed becomes a message in itself, and this form of the medium has a decisive importance in the transformation of consciousness. According to McLuhan, the development of technology leads to the renewal, in his terminology, of the “extensions” of a human. These technological extensions become the basis of communication technologies. The process of spread and influence of communication technologies depends on the type of culture previously appropriated by society—oral (verbal) or written (visual)—and the preservation of the traditions of this culture at the present time. In particular, McLuhan repeatedly points out that the traditions of oral culture are strong in Russia due to the absence of “the pervasive influence of the patterns of written culture”, while the inhabitants of America and Europe, for example, he calls “highly developed written people of the West” (McLuhan, 2003, p. 362). The change of communication technologies is conditioned by the technological development of society and the movement from printed (mechanical) means of communication (hereinafter—SC) to electric and electronic technologies. The author of the theory proves that “a new means of communication is never an addition to the old and never leaves the old alone. It does not cease to suppress the old means of communication until it finds a new position for them and puts them into new forms” (ibid., p. 197). Digitalization, following McLuhan’s logic, has once again changed the means of communication, including the media. Until the 1980s (more precisely, until 1977), the global media industry predominantly used analogue means of communication. Electronic medium was transmitted in an analogue (waveform) way, with characteristics such as continuity, duration and strength, while limiting the quality, quantity and safety of information transmission. “Conversion of media to digital code, which has a discrete nature, allowed a multifold increase in the quantity and quality of information transmission” (Fedorov, 2015), as the result of digitalization is even greater compression and compaction of information, the possibility of its non-linear use, almost instantaneous availability of everything and always, the possibility of easy copying and distribution, etc. Kolomiets points out in this regard: “The historicism of the digital age is based on the promise of interoperability of all forms of media based on the digital code” (Kolomiets, 2014, p. 53). Therefore, in the current reality, digitalization as a result of the development and transformation of electrical and electronic has led to even greater human empowerment, which has caused a new way of life—a digital one, in which the worlds of virtual and real not only coexist, but also mutually influence the behavioural patterns of the “communicative man”. Norbert Bolz (2011, p. 15) concludes: “Which generation one belongs to today depends on which information culture one belongs to. There are no common media now. Different value systems serve different media. Different information worlds are separated from each other by demographic, political and cultural borders”. Analysis of the chronology of the emergence of media (radio, print, television, Internet media), their distribution (Vartanova, 2021), differences in the duration and specificity of audience media practices (Soldatova et al., 2017; Solomeina &

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Sumskaya, 2022), differences in audience media practices and professional and value-based practices of journalists (Bird, 2010), formed in different historical and political periods and different cultural conditions (Costa et al., 2022). Accordingly, the differences in the intentions of generations of journalists, creators of cultural meanings (Pasti, 2005, 2010), leading to cardinal consistent transformations of the individual and society, allow us to conclude that it is possible to identify the phenomenon of media generation, the essential nature of which is manifested in the priority sustainable use of certain media in a particular historical time. Thus, we take as a basis the understanding of a holistic media generation, a sociocultural phenomenon, the totality of the media audience, united by a familiar engaging information and communication technological environment, which has similar sustainable media preferences and media practices. The formation of a media generation and the formation of behavioural patterns are influenced by formative experience (a period of socialization), leading to solidarity and the common fate of a generation in a particular sociocultural reality. Generation and media generation are not equivalent concepts. There are significant similarities between the concepts: the presence of a formative period, a generational entelechy, and some others. There are also fundamental differences: the formation of media generations is based on long-term stable preferences in media use. The basis for the selection of media generations can be the familiarity with certain technical media innovations in the formative period, the preference to use certain media that can ensure communication in one cultural environment and create an affective (emotional) basis for the interaction of representatives of the generations, their daily media and ritual practices. It is important to note that we are not pioneers in this case, as the conceptualization and study of media generations has been successfully implemented in the largescale international project Global Media Generations 2000. In the course of this research project, three media generations (the “press/radio” generation, the “black and white television” generation, the Internet generation) were identified on the basis of qualitative research methods allowing for the reproduction of subjective points of view and a cross-national analysis was made in 12 countries (Volkmer, 2000). These studies have not been carried out in Russia. Project founder Ingrid Volkmer (2003) concludes that each generation perceives and constructs a “different” media world and concludes: «Media events are stored away in our brain along with all the other events happening in our lives and years later our memories of them are only selective and merged with personal life experiences. Apparently, the mass media form mutual worlds of knowledge for generations of people» (p.302). Moreover, “in the youngest generation the media shape ‘worldviews’, not only locally and globally, but also in terms of “analogue” and “digital” knowledge. Whereas the oldest generations revealed “analogue” knowledge, defined their worldviews according to national and cultural specifics, and described media-related memories in great details. The youngest generation shares a great variety of superficial media-related knowledge, when asked to describe this in-depth, they hardly know contexts and facts and use a somewhat universal code” (Volkmer, 2003, p. 16). This is probably due to the different value and meaning constants transmitted in the

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media of the “analogue” and “digital” periods, as well as to the generational characteristics of media consumption. After all, each generation has its own, so to speak, “native media”, which are the most understandable to use, have shaped the media consciousness of the media audience and evoke the greatest emotional attachment to them (Bolin, 2014, p. 111; 2016). All of these generations have the characteristics of contingent ones, since they are mostly symbolic communities of contemporaries who are united not so much by their years of birth as by significant events and trends that transform and define the nature of subjective strategies of media behaviour (Becker, 2008, p. 206).

3 Research Design 3.1 Theoretical Analysis of Generational Theories and Concepts First, on the basis of theoretical analysis we compared the most relevant for this study theories and concepts of generations. The list included the generational theory of the American historian-dramatist William Strauss and historian-demographer Neil Howe (1991), generational concepts of the Dutch sociologist Henk Becker (2008, p. 212), Australian demographer and social analyst Mark McCrindle (2009, 2020), concepts of Russian sociologists Yuri Levada (2001), Victoria Semenova (2001) and Vadim Radaev (2019). The analysis allows us to observe, at least, firstly, that the generational steps highlighted by Russian scientists are not only even roundly uneven, but can be formed in less than 10 years during the periods of turbulent development of the country (“warming” in the 1960s, perestroika in the 1990s) compared to relatively identical generational periods of Western scientists; secondly, starting from the 1950s. Many authors of generational concepts include the development of media technologies and SMC among the shaping facts, and since the 1980s in many countries of the world generational cohorts are more identified with the development of information technology than with wars, revolutions and other large-scale shocks, leading to the change of generations. In this situation, today’s excessive popularity of Howe and Strauss’s theory of generations can be explained by supposed similarity of modern younger generations all over the world because of globalization and use of identical information technologies. We believe that the use of this theory for pre-Internet era generations can and should be implemented with caution in different historical and sociocultural generational communities, and the application of the theory to generations of the digitalization era is acceptable, as it can give some insights into the trends of formation and development of these generational cohorts. McCrindle’s concept is of great importance for our study, because it is the only one analysed that singles out media technologies as differentiating generational factors. Moreover, it identifies not two

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generations associated with digital media devices, but three: Millennial («Digital integrators»), Z («Digital integrators») and Alpha («Generation Glass»), which can be taken into account when identifying Russian generations in the context of Internetization, digitalization, and the development of media technologies that affect the renewal of generations. We conclude that on the one hand we cannot fully apply the concepts of Strauss and Howe, Becker and McCrindle to Russian practice, since they are all developed on the basis of an analysis of countries with significant differences in cultural, historical and technological development compared to Russia (Zagidullina, 2019, 2020). On the other hand, we can only use the generational concepts of Russian authors as a reference point, since they do not sufficiently specify the transformative role of the media (except for Radaev). Nevertheless, the analysis of generational theories and concepts is significant for us and allowed us to formulate our own concept of media generations, the differentiating feature for the selection of media generations was the development of digital technology.

3.2 Developing the Concept of Media Generations The event that determined significant differences in media generations is the transition from analogue to digital methods of production and broadcasting, which led to the changes we are observing in Russia today: the multitude of digital media, the mediatization of modern life and the digitalization of everyday communication practices. Zagidullina convincingly argues that the evolution of the technical has led not only to their dissolution in social practices, but in the twenty-first century also in the human body itself, causing the emergence of the phenomenon of body machine (Zagidullina, 2018). The introduction of modern digital technologies coincided to some extent with the period of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The spread of the Internet and digital technologies in Russian media practice occurred gradually, regionally unevenly (Asmolov & Kolozaridi, 2021; Kolozaridi & Dovbysh, 2020). We assume that similar processes took place in other post-Soviet countries, because before the collapse of the USSR, all Soviet republics were developing in a very similar centralized media field. This had a special effect on the formation and transformation of sociocultural generational communities and communication, including the use of digital media. The data and theories analysed allowed us to form a generalized configuration of media generations in Russia, including the “analogue” and “digital” media generations, as well as the “digital borderline” media generation as a mediator between the “analogue” and the “digital”. In specifying the concept of the “digital borderline”, we are guided by the works of American sociologist Rheingold, who introduced the concept of the “electronic borderline”, meaning a transition point, in a sense, a borderline, a shift from preinternet communication to the widespread use of the Internet and digital information technology (Rheingold, 1993). In turn, we prefer to use the concept of “digital borderline” as more accurate, because in a broad sense, “digital” is an extension

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of electronic, and the opposition “analogue-digital” most reflects the essence of the transition from the wave to digital mode of information transmission. By “analogue” media generations, we mean media audience groups whose formation period coincided with the existence of only analogue media, which determined the corresponding priorities in media use and media behaviour. This is the oldest audience group. They are also called “digital immigrants” (Prensky, 2001) the natives of the pre-digital era (Shestakova, 2017), pre-digital generations (Glukhov & Stakhovskaya, 2021). Part of the media users/audience, having lived their childhood and adolescence in the so-called analogue period of their development, and adolescence and the stage of primary professional socialization in the period of the Internet development, still predominantly mastered the digital environment, so they can be identified as the “digital borderline” generation. Mannheim, for example, referred to such generations as “intermediary” generations, and Becker referred to “borderline cohorts”. Mitchell (2003), Codrington (2008, p. 7), and Fluck and Dowden (2013) call them “cuspers” because they are not only like a bridge or glue, a uniting force for neighbouring generations, but at the same time perform mediation and mentoring functions. This generation can still have some overlaps with generations of digital adaptives (McCrindle, 2014), generation X (Howe & Strauss, 1991), transitional generation (Semenova, 2001), reformed (Radaev, 2019). It is quite clear that the Russian media generation of the “digital borderline” is not equal to the above-mentioned generation, because it has distinctive features when distinguishing itself. “Digital” media generations refer to those audience groups whose formation coincided with the powerful development of modern digital technologies—digital media and social media—which, of course, affected the practices of media use and mediatization of everyday life in general. These media generations may have coincidences with the Millennial generation (McCrindle, 2014), “the network generation” (Tapscott, 2008), the Screenage generation (Becker, 1989), the “World Wide Web” generation (Popov, 2018), the computer literacy generation (post-Perestroika generation) (Semenova, 2001). It is also obvious that the presence of some common features does not put an equal sign between the Russian “digital” media generations and those listed above. The theory of generational fuzziness suggests that the generational aggregate is best defined as a combination of its year of birth and generational identity—the sociocultural field in which it feels most similar to others (Campbell et al., 2017). Using Becker’s (1992, p. 222) models of generational emergence, we first theorize differentiating characteristics of the “analogue” and “digital” media generations and the “digital borderline” media generation according to criteria: system characteristics of the generation; the most important events during the formative period; socialization characteristics which influenced the life course; value orientations and behavioural patterns; media conditions during the formative period; habitual practices, etc. These criteria represent the “connected experience” of media generations (Becker, 1992, p. 235), which most accurately reflects their features at the end of the formative period. Further on, according to the concept of “lifeway” there is a decrease in the importance of generational unity (union), life practices are individualized, the

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fates of representatives of generations are biographed (Makeev, 2012). During the period of theoretical concretization and development of practical approbation of ideas about media generations as social groups, it is important to remember that according to the results of large-scale studies, about 20% of the generation have no relevant characteristics in comparison with the most typical representatives of the cohort, the total volume of which is about 65% of the generation, and only 15% of the cohort exhibit the most representative generation patterns (Bontekoning, 2011, p. 293). Already at the level of the theoretical construction of media generations a significant intergenerational gap has been identified, which is quite convincingly described in the works of Ragnedda and his followers (Ragnedda, 2017; Ragnedda & Muschert, 2013). Thus, it is really as if for the first time in the Russian history we are observing a particular generational gap caused by different established practices of communication in mismatched media environments.

3.3 Approbation of the Concept of Media Generations in the Context of Digitalization In order to test the theoretical assumptions of the media generation concept, we conducted a study using semi-structured, focused in-depth interviews with followup questions (a sample of 100 respondents). Taking into account the differences in the digital media saturation of the Russian regions, the unevenness of the territorial development in the context of “centre-periphery”, the group of informants included the “conditional” representatives of three media generations, living both in large Russian megalopolises and in the periphery (33 respondents are the residents of provincial territories, 34 respondents lived in the province, but in the formative period moved to a megalopolis, 33 respondents are native urban residents). Respondents were selected according to the requirements of a distinctive sample, the concept of data saturation or redundancy (Strauss & Corbin, 2001, p. 158). A thorough analysis of the time of emergence, the dynamics of Soviet and Russian media development (Simons & Sumskaya, 2021) and theoretically obtained conclusions about the formative years of media generations during the “slow” changes of the analogue period of media industry development and “fast” changes of the digitalization and internetization period (Sumskaya & Solomeina, 2022) allowed to form respondent samples for the study. We followed the technology of Semenova (2003, p. 219) and on the basis of subjective indicators, i.e. mentions of significant events that most closely resonate with the idea of the generation to determine the approximate boundaries of the media generation. The sample included 30 representatives of the “analogue” media generation, 30 representatives of the “digital borderline” media generation and 40 representatives of the “digital” media generation. The gender distribution in the sample of informants corresponds to the population distribution at different age stages, since the sample consists of respondents aged 14–75. Despite the lack of principle importance of

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the level of education and sphere of employment, we considered the principle of diversification significant in the process of sampling, so the sample includes both schoolchildren, and people who received secondary and higher education. The scope of employment ranged from auto mechanics, factory workers and veterinarians to lawyers and professors. The study was conducted during the year 2021. The transcribing of the full texts of the interviews was carried out on the basis of the bottom-up principle, which made it possible to derive semantic categories from the analysis of the informants’ narratives, so we consider the results to be comparable, making it possible to discursively formulate a certain framework of characteristics of these media generations and draw conclusions based on the general logic of the respondents’ narratives. The results of the study formed the prerequisites for the development of a model of intergenerational communication. In our work, we proceeded from the assumption that new behavioural practices within one generation do not spread evenly and that age and generational differences can be superimposed on the differences in the level of development of territories/settlements.

3.4 Basis for Developing a Model of Intergenerational Communication The theoretical basis for modelling intergenerational communication was, first, the interdisciplinary level model of communication theory by Oskar Goychman, the communication model of knowledge translation by Meusburger (2017). This models reveal levels of communicative interaction. The Russian model of the digital divide is of great importance, developed by a group of researchers led by Elena Vartanova (2021). These model allows us to specify the causes and levels of digital inequality in Russia and to take them into account when modelling intergenerational communication. In addition, the theoretical basis of this work was the concept of M. Mead’s concept of the main types of cultural exchange of knowledge in the conditions of the “electronic communication network” was the theoretical basis of this work. Exploring the gap between generations, Mead developed a model of cultural transfer from one generation to another under conditions of permanent changes in society, which is extremely relevant today’s realities. They distinguished three types of transfer of generational experience: post-figurative (from older to younger), co-figurative (both older and younger learn from their peers) and pre-figurative (adults learn from children) (Mead, 1988). In addition, we used insights into the contemporary models and communicative strategies demanded in intergenerational media communication.

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4 Results and Discussion The results of the in-depth interviews revealed the following results. 4.1 The “analogue” media generation in this particular case includes respondents born in 1964 and older. 4.1.1 A significant systemic characteristic of the large cluster of “analogue” media generations is their appropriation of the ideology of the “common Soviet man” and the consequences associated with this. Three most important events in the formative period of the media generation that took part in the research are distinguished: 1. Rebuilding the country after World War II, the pivotal event of the heroic period of the country’s history. 2. The development of cosmonautics in the USSR, including the death of cosmonauts during their return from orbit. 3. The threat of nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. 4.1.2 The formative years of the media generations came in the years of the stable Soviet era with all of its advantages and disadvantages: a planned economy, ideas of socialist and communist construction, fixation within certain limits of freedoms and opportunities, including media development in all regions of the big country. The most significant media markers of television of the “analogue” era: the live report on the meeting of Yuri Gagarin after the flight, the first TV broadcast of the USSR to the whole of Europe of the parade on Red Square (1961), the Soviet cosmovision—the world’s first report from the spacecraft (1962), the world’s first report from outer space (1965). 4.1.3 The media in the formative period of the media generation were characterized by stable and consistent development in line with the principles and ideological goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Annual subscriptions to newspapers and magazines, listening to radio plays and pop concerts on the radio, watching black and white TV (with a water lens to enlarge the picture), which neighbours came to watch, family viewing and discussions of what they saw were distinctive media practices of the formative periods of the respondents who took part in the study. 4.1.4 The media-using practices of this generation nowadays are related to reading newspapers (sometimes and mostly in the digital environment), watching television as to understand state policies implemented through media and “kitchen discussions” related to this, and on the other hand watching entertaining TV programmes, mostly Soviet feature films. This is especially evident in rural areas, for residents of which, in the opinion of a team of scientists led by Kachkaeva and Novikova, the oral word has remained the predominant cultural tradition (Novikova et al., 2021). The need to master Internet technology began to be felt when the trends of digitalization took hold in professional activities, the inability to use digital media devices began to affect the performance of professional functions and, in general, the quality of life. “Analogue” media generations have considerable difficulty dealing with digital information technology. Sometimes it is similar to Internet hatred (Zagidullina, 2014). 4.1.5 The results showed that the user activity of media generations is mainly represented in Odnoklassniki, VKontakte and Facebook*. The activity of city

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dwellers differs significantly from the user practices of representatives of the media generation in rural areas: city dwellers use social media more intensively. The most popular messenger is WhatsApp. * Facebook™ is a trademark of Facebook Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, it is recognized as an extremist organization and its activity is prohibited. Banned in Russia since 04.03.2022. Thus, the basis of the habitus of the media generation consists of: a preference to use media primarily from the analogue period (radio, print, television) and from stationary devices (TVs, desktops, FM radio), possession and search in the media for support of formed values of the Soviet period, reflection of the national idea and national mentality; difficulties and reluctance in mastering advanced digital information technologies and their discrete application in everyday practices. Behavioural scenarios for the “analogue” media generation: linearity and consistency in the perception of information; a preference for large forms (movies, novels, novellas, essays, etc.) and vertical, detailed “long” communication. The territorial localization of this media audience is important, but not decisive, since the generational culture has been firmly fixed by mass media since the formative period. However, in the peripheral territories, media practices are the most traditionalist due to the preservation of value behavioural models of the late Soviet period, and new digital media technologies are used primarily not to master fundamentally new opportunities, but to improve the quality of the previous understandable generational media practices. 4.2 The media generations of the “digital borderline” in this particular case include respondents born in 1965–1982. 4.2.1 A significant systemic characteristic of the media generation of the “digital borderline” is its recognition as “perestroika” with an ambivalent Soviet and Russian identity. Two most important events in the formative period of the media generation are distinguished: 1. The collapse of the USSR, the change of economic formations and perestroika. 2. Development of the Internet and the first attempts to digitalize all spheres of life. It is important to add that the landmark events of the formative period of the “digital borderline” reflected in the media were The death of Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the Soviet state (1982), marking the end of an era; the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant (1986), the earthquake in Armenia (1988), interethnic clashes, internal ethnic conflicts (Chechnya, Tajikistan, the Baltic states, Azerbaijan, Armenia), etc. 4.2.2 The primary socialization of the media generation occurred during the years of the stable Soviet era, and the final years of the formative period (according to Mannheim) during the reform years of perestroika, which had an effect on both their value orientations and their entire life path. According to Levada, “this is the first generation of pragmatists in a century. They are mostly committed to the existing market and limited political diversity, but not because they preferred them to some other orders, but simply because they have not seen anything else” (Levada, 2001, p. 14). 4.2.3 The media in the formative period of the media generation underwent a rapid process of change following radical changes in the country’s socio-economic structure. Transformation of the Soviet model of media production, commercialization,

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audience segmentation, explosive growth in the number of newspapers and magazines, and, after some time, on the contrary, reduction of circulation as a result of hyperinflation, formation of the most powerful and nowadays media holding VGTRK, etc. The contradictory process of media development during this period was marked by new opportunities in development, a more sensible understanding of audience needs under the conditions of the emerging market economy, redistribution of the media industry infrastructure and introduction of new forms and methods of media activities, including in connection with the development of information technology and digitalization opportunities. One of the significant telemarketers of the “digital borderline”: the first telebridge “Moscow-California” (1982), telebridge “Moscow – Washington”, “Moscow - Los Angeles” (1986), dedicated to the problem of peaceful cooperation between the two countries and showed that ordinary people in different parts of the world are much more united than they are divided. 4.2.4 The media-using practices of this generation were formed when colour TV was in every home, in every family. Watching TV for this generation became familyeducational, a kind of cosy holiday of education, enlightenment and culture, a kind of admission to adulthood. Today, members of the “electronic borderline” generation prefer “background” television and radio listening, because the media have become a kind of audio-visual environment. Representatives of the “digital borderline” possess 2 generations of technology, use information from 4 media platforms (radio, television, Internet, printed magazines). 4.2.5 The results showed that the user activity of the media generation is mainly represented in VKontakte, Instagram**, Odnoklassniki and Facebook*. The activity of city dwellers differs from the user practices of representatives of the media generation in rural areas: city dwellers use social media more intensively. The greatest diversity in the development and use of social media was shown by representatives of the media generation—”migrants” from the provinces to megacities. It seems that this is the result of adaptation strategies, the need to be in demand in the new cultural and territorial environment. In addition, it was found that the activity of the media generation under study in social media is more related to professional activity than to the territory of residence. * Facebook™ is a trademark of Facebook Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, it is recognized as an extremist organization and its activity is prohibited. Banned in Russia since c 04.03.2022. ** Instagram™ is a trademark of Instagram Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, it is recognized as an extremist organization and its activity is prohibited. Banned in Russia since 14.03.2022. Thus, the media generation’s habitus is based on the consumption of both “analogue” and “digital media”, preferring stationary devices for detailed information, and mobile devices for short-term communication. We could say that the media generation has an ambivalent Soviet and Russian identity, having fixed both the collectivist values of “serving the Motherland” and the value of individual success in their worldview, so they could serve as a link between the “analogue” and “digital” value media. They have some difficulty in mastering the most advanced digital

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information technologies, but they use digital media devices on a regular basis in their everyday practices. Behavioural scenarios of the “digital borderline”: linearity and consistency in the perception of information; preference for different forms (both large/long and small/short), comprehensibility of vertical communication and ability to network horizontal communication. The territorial localization of this media audience matters. The provincial media audience has mostly fixed and preserved the values of the Soviet period and “analogue” forms of media communication, while the central-media audience group, which lives mainly in large megalopolises, is the most receptive to both the value consequences of Russian perestroika and the mastery of “digital” methods of media communication. “Digital borderline” is ready for digital diversity, for mastering ICT to perform professional tasks qualitatively, but if possible—do not seek to master more and more new technological devices, especially on an independent basis. 4.3 The “digital” media generation in this case study includes respondents born in 1983 and younger. At least, the first “digital” media generation born in 1983–1997 and the second “digital” media generation born in 1998–2006 are distinguished. 4.3.1 A significant systemic characteristic of the “digital” media generations is their maturation and vitality during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the coming of age of the Internet, the appearance of quickly outdated devices and the development of network interaction, which has little to do with the appeal to institutional media. The most significant events of the formative period reflected in the media: 1. The terrorist attack in Beslan (2004). 2. The economic crisis of 1998 (the global financial crisis of 2008). 2. Protest events (“Bolotnoe Delo,” 2011–2013, “Anti-Corruption Protests,” 2017–2018). 3. Fall of a meteorite in Chelyabinsk (2013). 4. XXII Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (2014). 3. The addition of Crimea to Russia (2014). 4.3.2. Formative periods of media generations fell in the years of Russia’s stable development, active and productive international cooperation related to the possibility of tourism, education abroad, etc. Of course, this was reflected in value orientations: freedom of choice, freedom of cross-border movement, freedom to choose one’s life and professional path. 4.3.3 During the formative period of the media generations there was an active transformation of traditional media, associated with the difficult transition from outdated analogue to digital production and broadcasting. At the same time, social networks, mobile ways of communication and content consumption were actively developing. This has caused the “digital” media generations to move away from traditional media (reading newspapers and television viewing) and to focus on Internet media and social media (both the predominant practice in the provinces and completely in the megacities). Representatives of the second “digital” media generation say they have been using information technology for as long as they can remember. It is noted by all that acquaintance with the first cell phones and computers occurred at the age of 7–11 years old and has become a steady practice. Among the milestone media events of the first “digital” media generation is the emergence of various format-based reality TV shows in the country. This allowed viewers to watch almost live the actions of the participants (The Last Hero, Behind the Glass, etc.). The iconic media events of the second “digital” media generation are

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the TV broadcasts of the XXII Winter Olympics in Sochi (2014), the preparation of protest actions in social networks with the participation of the oppositionist Navalny (declared a foreign agent by the Russian authorities in 2019). 4.3.4 Representatives of the first “digital” media generation, having witnessed the heyday of Russian TV networks and correspondingly engaging youth serial content, currently retain an interest in TV viewing, but increasingly now as background viewing. The formative period of the first “digital” media generation coincided with the time of the active spread of cellular communication in Russia (since 1993), its transition to a digital format, and the popularization of 2G generation mobile communication capabilities. The formative period of the second “digital” media generation coincided with the popularization of 3G and 4G mobile communications, the increasing importance of social networks and the emergence of the phenomenon of “online living”. The media-using practices of this generation were formed in the conditions of development of digitalization, so all respondents use the Internet almost constantly every day. All use the Internet, including for search of necessary information. All of respondents say they do shopping online from time to time, use communication services (including messengers). All respondents are registered in various social networks. Most do not distinguish the names of specific digital media in their newsfeed. They pay attention to short multimedia formats, topics of interest, concise design. 32 participants say they use various software services at work (including Adobe Premiere Pro, Photoshop, various programming platforms). Same amount of respondents say they use entertainment services such as computer games, online movie theatres. 12 respondents use educational programmes for their own self-development, most often for learning foreign languages. 4.3.5 The results showed that the user activity of representatives of media generations is mainly represented in VKontakte, Telegram, Instagram, and TikTok. The activity of city dwellers does not differ significantly from the user practices of representatives of the media generation in rural areas, unless there is a stable Internet penetration in that area. The most popular messenger is WhatsApp. The first “digital” media generation broadcasts Russian identity, but has retained the values of the Soviet period, such as superiority and tolerance, while at the same time demonstrating openness to the Western worldview as a result of using foreign technological innovations, mastering information and communication devices of foreign developers and manufacturers, and consuming network media established abroad. They have no difficulty in mastering advanced digital information technologies, and they use digital mobile devices on a regular basis in their daily media practices. Behavioural scenarios of the first “digital” media generation: the desire for non-linearity in the use of information; preference for small forms and horizontal network media communication. The territorial localization of the media generation is not crucial, because with a stable Internet and modern communication devices, the differences in media use are gradually levelled out. The habitus of the second “digital” media generation is based on: less preference for traditional media, especially in central-media territories, recognition of the advantages of non-linear consumption of digital content from mobile communication devices. The media generation broadcasts a globalized identity, demonstrating

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the adoption of a Westernized worldview as a result of active media communication in the global media space. They independently master advanced digital ICTs, and use digital mobile devices on a regular basis in their daily media practices. Behavioural scenarios of the second “digital” media generation: non-linearity in the use of information and horizontal communication; preference for small forms, including those combined in multimedia and transmedia, including storytelling style. The territorial localization of the media generation is not decisive, because in the presence of a stable Internet and media equipoise the differences in the use of media are insignificant. The result of the modelling was the development of an explanatory model of intergenerational communication in the digital media environment. When specifying the model, we used the results of previously obtained studies (Oleshko & Oleshko, 2020; Simons et al., 2021; Sumskaya et al., 2020). The model includes the interaction of three subjects of communication “analogue”, “digital” and generation “digital borderline”; three ways of transmitting experience combination post-figurative, co-figurative and pre-figurative generation interaction; three levels of translation of intergenerational experience: digital media technologies, everyday media practices and sociocultural values. The efficiency of intergenerational communication is influenced by the prevailing experience in the formative period of the media generation, the actual generational field (according to Bourdieu), which, based on the filters of generational culture, including behavioural patterns, displays the generations’ demand for the platforms on which information is presented, creative and technological tools, through which media texts are produced. The model is presented in Fig. 1. The specifics of the translation of intergenerational experience are as follows. At the level of digital technologies, the most obvious and productive is the direction of the pre-figurative model (i.e. vertical communication, from the younger generation to the older one). The “digital” media generation helps the “digital borderline” generation to master ICTs and directly teaches these technologies to the “analogue” media generation. At the level of accessible media practices, the most effective here is the cofigurative model of horizontal communication. The “analogue” media generation has significant points of overlap with the “digital borderline” generation, since the latter’s formation coincided with an era of slow social change and this generation is familiar with the practices of the “analogue” media (radio, television, print). Further, the media generation of the “electronic borderline” has some similar media habits to the “digital” generation, as it was exposed to the Internet and the first digital media practices before both the “analogue” and the “digital” generations, and these media practices became natural for it. Thus, at this level, the gap between the “analogue” and “digital” generations is bridged by the “digital bridge” that the “digital borderline” generation can provide. In the conditions of developed megacities, this situation is most typical, while in the provinces representatives of all media generations actively use the media practices of the analogue period in media development.

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Fig. 1 A model of intergenerational communication in the digital media environment

At the level of exchange and understanding of sociocultural generational values and the generational culture, a combination of post-figurative and co-figurative models of transmitting generational experience—in particular, the post-figurative model between the “analogue” generation and the “digital borderline” generation— is most in demand. The “analogue” media generation most steadily broadcasts the mentor position, which is perceived as familiar to the media generation of the “digital borderline”, because both were formed during the Soviet period, associated with the traditional (vertical) way of transmitting experience from the elder to the younger. This manipulative communication strategy, familiar to the “analogue” media generation, is not in full demand by today’s “digital” generation. At the same time, it is the “analogue” generation in our country that holds many resources (career, administrative, raw materials, etc.); and it is largely interested in “curbing influence” on the “digital” media generation. The “digital” media generation is willing to engage in dialogue, showing passionarity. It is the level of traditional sociocultural values that unites intergenerational communication in the metropolis and the provinces: the younger generation tends to turn to, so to speak, “the elderly” when solving problems that require worldly wisdom, reliance on universal values and traditions of sociocultural interaction (indicated in the diagram by solid and dotted arrows). The basis of this strategy of dialogue is trust.

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5 Conclusion Thus, the study explored the concept of generations in the context of sociohumanitarian knowledge and formulated the idea of the media generation as a phenomenon. On the basis of a comparative analysis of relevant generational theories and concepts, the model of the emergence of generations, the concept of “analogue” and “digital” media generations, and also the “digital borderline” generation in a digital media environment was formulated. The result of the empirical testing of the concept of media generations was the identification of their identification features, which are presented in the most general form in this paper. At the same time, the results have become the basis for the development of a model of intergenerational communication. The following conclusions emerged from the understanding of intergenerational communication in the digital media environment: “reverse mentoring”, involving mutual exchange of competencies depending on digital literacy, digital capital, cultural practices, communicative tasks, and co-creation in the process of “domestication” of digital technologies can reduce the acuteness of the digital intergenerational gap and ensure effective intergenerational communication, both in Russian megacities and in the province. We assume that these conclusions may also be in demand in some other post-Soviet countries. Acknowledgements The study was supported by grant No. 19-18-00264 of the Russian Science Foundation within the framework of the project Digitalization of Communicative-Cultural Memory and the Problems of its Intergenerational Transmission.

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Elite Students in Kazakhstan: Complexities of the Internet and the International Arena Ellen Mickiewicz and Galiya Ibrayeva

1 Contested Identity and the World Arena Roughly a generation after independence, a new internet-oriented, connected generation in Kazakhstan is completing higher education and will seek positions of influence. Rising elites in Kazakhstan are embedded in the world of the internet, stimulating comparisons of narratives from domestic and Russian media sources, as well as web-based international sources. It is these young elites who will in the future be sitting across the tables of international negotiation: political, economic, and cultural. To define and map how these future leaders view the world is the principal question of this study, and to that end, we conducted focus groups at the country’s most elite university. The discourse itself contributes valuable data, as is often the case in focus-group-based research generally. Rose McDermott (2011) notes that social identity creation can be effective especially among individuals “operating in a novel, uncertain environment without clear goals or rules, and purposely detached from their established social support networks…a shared sense of social identity remains the necessary prerequisite for any kind of social mobilization.” Our focus-group participants are well aware of an ongoing process involving them in the creation and mobilization of a long-suppressed, unified Kazakh identity (Spehr & Kassenova, 2012), the president’s project. An unstable constructed weak attachment toward previous Russiandominated rule through a common Soviet identity was rooted in a Russian bedrock of coercion. As David Laitin (1998) observes, though, “…when the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those of another identity held by the same person, as they do when the two identities represent antagonistic groups on the E. Mickiewicz Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA G. Ibrayeva (B) Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_9

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political state, people are compelled to give priority to one identity over another.” Official commitment to a “third way” through the narrow pass between the sources of the contested identity-space, is not sufficiently well established, and geography and economics remain unsupportive of a real third alternative. We observed focus-group discussions riven by cross-cutting values and attitudes along three axes or dimensions, each of which surfaces in discussion of attitudes toward particular countries in the international system. First among them is religion: Muslims form 70% of Kazakhstan’s population (U.S. Mission Kazakhstan, 2021). Traditionally nomadic and more tolerant of other forms of religious practice, different practices and identities deriving from the south, Uzbekistan, for example, favor change to stricter norms of behavior and dress. The withdrawal of American and allied forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and threats of terrorism pose a new challenge to the political status quo of the countries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The country continues to follow the policy of former president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who retained power and position as Elbasy of the Nation, to follow the “third path” (Kosnazarov, 2013) and at the same time, reforms of his successor. The second field of contestation is most emotionally powerful among younger Kazakhstani, especially, those who have traveled to the west. Often they are beneficiaries of the Government and President’s special assistance, so that students enter post-baccalaureate degree programs in the West in order to further the goal of modernization and entry into the interconnected world system. Persuasion research finds that such experiences may, when the traveler returns, result in a more critical and dissatisfied attitude toward the system at home. The third area of contestation is cultural identity: are the focus-group participants, in their words, Asian or Western? Years ago, in his prescient study, Karl W. Deutsch (1966) analyzed the empirical basis of culture. He noted that though “individual cultures often live in one society….they may exchange goods and services but relatively little information. They may have very few complementary channels of communication. Many of their experiences in their common society may be similar…but they are not necessarily shared.” Kazakhs under Soviet rule experienced purges of their leaders and particular cultural elements and then inclusion in a multinational state dominated by Slavic officials. Independence, the departure of many ethnic Russians, and separation from what had been jointly administered and funded mainly by Russia, occurred virtually simultaneously. For example, the first President, Nazarbayev, was to be greeted in the United States in the first-ever state visit by a Kazakhstani leader, but there was no access to formerly Soviet communications satellites, for which Russia now claimed total ownership and therefore no possibility to transmit pictures of this seminal event to the population at home. Thanks to the good will of a US news channel, satellite transponder time was donated. The largest Russian television channels of information continue to be available after the breakup of the Soviet Union and as some focus-group participants state, a continuing attachment to Russian culture still provides another sort of linkage. But what is actually shared and via what communications channels is problematic. Travel to different political and social systems involves considerable information consumption. None of it can offset profoundly asymmetric power, the multi-generational history of inclusion in the Soviet Russian state, an uncertain

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international field of competitors, and military presence, but other linkages can be activated through ambitious reforms. In 2019 Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev was elected president, continuing Nazarbayev’s policy, including educational reform, such as the transition of the Kazakh alphabet to the Latin from Cyrillic. The modernization of Kazakhstan in education policy, with the required study of the English language by children three years and older. The plan will require increases in numbers of primary-school and day-care teachers: the latter is essential to the planned expansion of pre-school education of children 3–6 years old to 100% by 2020. The ambitious goal has not yet been met; the direction has been made clear. The internet is expected to be an important tool of education at all levels, including pre-school. At issue is radical improvement in the development of children’s power of cognition that will shape their capacity for further education and Kazakhstan’s capacity for participation in the globalized, connected world. The COVID-19 pandemic has become a powerful impetus for the development of new technologies and the spread of the internet to the regions of Kazakhstan. In seeking performance at a world level, specialists from Humboldt University and Hebrew University in Israel have been invited as advisors. For advanced degrees, such as medicine, curricula will use English exclusively. Whether or when all of these changes can be implemented is quite another matter, even though pilot programs are said to have been in place for years. What is striking is the place or lack thereof for Russian. Russian-language schools will continue, as will the status of Russian as language of legal matters. But Kazakh remains the single official language. Certain subjects, such as Russian language and literature and world history, will be taught in Russian for all ethnicities. Otherwise, there is little mention of Russia and Russians, except to recognize that Russian-language schools can still be founded and used by that part of the population. Models for modern Kazakhstan are all European (and Israeli) and American. Attitudes of the elite students emerge from a series of focus groups held in Almaty at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. Because of cross-cutting values and identities drawn from contrasting interpretations of their ethnicity, religious, generational, urban/rural, gender, and clan/horde differences, we did not expect discussions to reflect consistent agreement. That the contested identities were so often riven by the first three and most important of these issues underscored the dissonance typical of states in formation, exacerbated in this case by the limited public space for diversity of viewpoints and contending attitudes. We analyze key divisions and agreements, including the presence of affect, to examine the divides of the past and the tensions surrounding divides of the present. Clans and the three “hordes” are overriding, lineage-based longstanding divisions. Historically vital to the allotment of lands for nomadic herders, their unity and power were undermined by Soviet policies, brutal removal of local elites and, particularly, collectivization. Nursultan Nazarbayev, in independent Kazakhstan, skillfully arranged coalitions, so that, as Olcott concludes, “…it is easy to offer an oversimplified view of clans as strongly deterministic of success in today’s Kazakhstan” (Olcott, 2010). But about elite mobility and power, she notes that “… it would be a mistake to conclude that clan drives any of the country’s major political rivalries” (Olcott, 2010).

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Our data are drawn from focus groups taking place at Kazakhstan’s oldest elite university: Al-Farabi National Kazakh University [KazNU], founded in 1934 in Alma Ata, then capital of Kazakhstan, and the nation’s most eminent university (Nasha Elita, 2020). Unlike institutes, which usually focus on an applied specialization, universities provide a broader spectrum of faculties and traditionally have a higher academic and social status. Of the 120 institutions of higher education in Kazakhstan only 9, including the locus of our study, are categorized as “national universities” (Nurbek, 2022).

2 Focus Groups The students participating in the focus groups were finishing their third year. The subject of the focus groups was media use, particularly, the internet. When political issues arose in the discussion, they appeared spontaneously from the participants and were discussed by the group to the extent the students wished to do so. The facilitator for the groups was Director of Qualitative Research, a specialist in empirical research using focus groups, for the Foundation for Public Opinion, one of the large Moscow-based public opinion companies. At no time was there any interference in or oversight of the project by any Kazakhstani political or university official. The single facilitator conducted all focus groups. In this way, it was possible to control for variables, such as personality or idiosyncrasies of the moderator, atmosphere and particularities of the setting. Our goal is not to study the institution itself, but rather the ideas and attitudes of these participants. Our set of six focus groups drew participants from 12 faculties (professional departments): biology and biotechnology, journalism, mechanical mathematics, oriental studies, geography and environmental sciences, history, archaeology and ethnology, international relations, philology and world languages, philosophy and political science, chemistry and chemical technology, physics and technology, and law. Focus-group sessions were held in April 2017, when lectures and seminars were still ongoing and before the stress of examinations had set in. Fifty-seven, aged 20–21, third-year students participated in the focus groups; about a third were male. When a group was in session, distractions were minimized—there were no breaks in the 2-hour discussion. Strict confidentiality was observed; all contact information was destroyed. Neither the authors nor anyone else can return to question these participants about subsequent events, but the trade-off is vitally important, because without a sense of safety about their identities, it is unlikely that they would have made many of the statements they did make. Participants were generally talkative and often impassioned.

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3 Why Focus Groups? Mass face-to-face or telephone (landline and cell) public opinion surveys have the advantage of representativeness if they are truly random and if the survey sample is properly drawn. Startling decreases in response rates, in Russia, as in the United States and elsewhere, increasingly undermine randomness and the capability to generalize to larger populations, unless statistical remedies are applied. About the United States, Mark Blumenthal has written, “Pollsters lack a ‘sample frame’ for the internet” (Blumenthal, 2009). Online experimental research offers a different path to internetbased opinion research; use of biometrics, psychometrics, sentiment analysis along with behavioral and demographic information all contribute to adding information, often from private sources, to expand the data. Megadata using all of these variables can also mislead, as Hillary Clinton’s campaign demonstrated. Another point about the traditional sample survey limits its utility for our project: its “precoded response categories obscure ambivalence and disguise the presence of schemata that produce no clear-cut position for or against. It blurs the distinction between people with nonattitudes—that is, with no working schema on an issue—and those with schemas that don’t fit comfortably in a pro or anti category” (Gamson, 1988). The focus group, in short, is useful, in William Gamson’s view, “when it comes to investigating what participants think, but they excel at uncovering why participants think as they do” (Gamson, 1992).

4 Historical Context and Media Availability Kazakhstan’s history reaches back before the Mongol invasion and stretched forward through the Russian Empire and Soviet rule. Soviet leaders destroyed the coherence of nomadic Kazakh institutions (Masanov, 1995), removed native leaders and as was the pattern with other native elites who were absorbed, replaced them with, typically, a native figurehead and a Slavic powerholder (Kozybayev, 2000). When mass media formed in the Soviet period, the same control was exercised as in other spheres of society; Moscow produced the same messages and whenever possible blocked the entry of opposing voices. Under the anti-religious control of the Soviet Union, both specifically Kazakh cultural customs, religious and secular, were destroyed at first through lethal purges of native leadership and later by the colonization of the north and massive in-migration of Slavs with sedentary agricultural production and Slavic domination at power positions. Later, diverse competitive mass media were formed in independent Kazakhstan. The pace of mass Internet connection in Kazakhstan, which began in 2000, is striking in its scale. If at the beginning there were only about 70 thousand users among Kazakhstanis, in 2005 there were already 400 thousand users. Smartphones, however, overcame lagging progress in connectivity nationwide, so by 2017, 70% of the

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total population in Kazakhstan used social networks. In 2020, the number of users increased to 81.3%. Sociologist A. Zhusupova emphasizes that the ranking data of social networks in Kazakhstan varies in 2020. The Theopenasia.net resource indicates that the most popular site in Kazakhstan is VKontakte.com, followed by Instagram (6.8 mln), Facebook (2.4 mln), Odnoklassniki.ru (2,4 mln), Telegram (2 mln), Snapchat (1.8 million users), and the professional network LinkedIn (790 thousand users). Another resource, Statcounter, shows Pinterest in first place (37.72%), Youtube (20.41%), VKontakte (14.89%), Facebook (13.54%), Twitter (11.3%), and Instagram—(4.98%) (Zhusupova, 2020). A more reliable source is “Digital 2022: Kazakhstan” (Kemp, 2022). In January 2022 there were 16.41 million Internet users in Kazakhstan. The Internet penetration rate was 85.9% of the total population (19.1 m). There were 13.80 m social media users or equivalent to 72.3% of the Kazakh population. Data published by Meta shows that Facebook had 2.3 m users in Kazakhstan. Instagram had 11.75 m users. Data published by ByteDance show that TikTok had 7.26 m users aged 18 and over in Kazakhstan. LinkedIn had 1.1 m “members” and Snapchat had 1.45 m users. Twitter figures show that the number was very low at 202.9 thousand users. According to GSMA Intelligence, in January 2022, mobile communications in Kazakhstan accounted for 127.9 percent of the total population (Social Media Stats Worldwide, 2022). In 2009, the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament) of the country (The Mazhilis of RK, 2009) and then President N.A.Nazarbayev signed “a law that all websites, blogs, chats, online stores, dating sites, mail servers in Kaznet will bear criminal and civil liability along with traditional media” (Nazarbayev, 2009). Of particular concern is the influence of new media on youth. In 2015, Kazakhstan adopted the Concept of Strengthening and Development of Kazakh Identity and Unity 2015–2025 (Concept, 2015). The document is addressed to the multinational youth of the country. Exposure is one piece of a complex interactive process of social media, but how credible the sources are judged to be on social media, and what is to be believed, is critical, especially in a crisis. When the youth of a country get much of their information from social media, it can impact how they view their country. They may interpret their situation in quite different ways from that of official Kazakh media and draw their own conclusions about the traditions and values of their culture. As in every country, internet use changes young people and it is important to understand how.

5 Participant Strategies We gave a questionnaire to the participants just before the first session; it included interest in and consumption of media. Thirty-eight participants declared that they followed the news daily; two rarely followed it. The rest sometimes did. For the general population, the “old medium” of television remains the single most used

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mass medium, that in addition to Kazakh channels carries the main state-controlled Russian channels, more popular than Kazakh-language choices. Among the focusgroup participants, the pattern is different: 84% (48) watched no television at all, and 19 gave no answer and the rest watched occasionally. Newspapers are still important: 56% (32) participants read them very frequently; the rest, from time to time, and everyone gave an answer. It is the internet that is the medium of choice, both for “important news” and specifically for news of Kazakhstan. Sources include: BBC, CNN, Vesti.ru, social media, such as VKontakte are used, Instagram, Meduza (the Latvian-based remainder of what was Lenta.ru); Eurosport, YouTube, and Kazakhstani sites, such as tengrinews, zakon.kz, nur.kz, vlast.kz, informbureau.kz. Some participants said that they turned to Instagram, Facebook, mail.ru for news of Kazakhstan, and some for news in general. Some added news sources they called “society,” “public opinion,” “family and close friends.” The picture is one of news reception primarily from a variety of internet sources and then from newspapers, and, least of all, television. In the focus groups analyzed below, they speak about sources. Research has found that audiences approach messages making use of cognitive processes that in part come from the hardwired part of the brain and in part, from cultural shaping. Studies of how audiences order or discard messages under conditions of low information isolates several components. One is the utility of the information; how much does what is talked about matter in an individual’s environment? How will a particular issue or story affect them, if at all. With limited access to a broad array of views, the salience of an issue carries weight. Citizens also develop “cues” to simplify their understanding of media stories about issues and people they care about, even under or possibly because of, scarce information. Cues, or mental shortcuts are labels for heuristics: the use of what is stored in the brain to acknowledge what is encountered as part of the general category that is stored. Using cues quickly and imperceptibly advances information into such categories (schemata), which are more or less numerous in any individual depending on experience and education. Heuristics may point to, for example, availability (an experience or event that is stored in the brain, so that it is called up rapidly), or credibility or likeability, and others. Supplementing a meager diet of information, one’s own process of cognition can help the citizen to make choices that may not follow the desired path of official communications (Ferejohn & Kuklinski, 1990). A high-information citizen appears to take a different approach to messages from, for example, political news. With prior knowledge of the circumstances and context of an issue or part of the world, these audiences carefully examine messages intended to be persuasive; arguments will be scrutinized, and the decision to be persuaded or not will be based on “thoughtful examination of issue-relevant considerations” (O’Keefe, 2016).

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6 Attitudes Toward Foreign Countries, Near and Far During the course of the focus groups, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire that listed eight countries and asked participants to indicate whether they had great interest in knowing about them, or only some interest, or virtually none at all. In addition, in the last column they were asked to put down for two of the most interesting and two of the least interesting countries two or three words that sprang to mind. The placement of countries in the list was changed for each group. In none was the United States at the top, to preclude as much as possible, an automatic or unthinking response. There was no group-specific variation in results across the groups. The choice of countries had to be manageable: participants’ attention and patience could not be strained, and consideration of each country should be thoughtful. The United States and Russia were included for obvious reasons. China, a superpower, is on the border; large numbers of Chinese sell goods in Kazakhstan and a significant number of trade agreements have been concluded, including land rentals and purchases, a very large investment in a joint Kazakhstan-China inland “dry port” to handle cargo, eventually creating a huge project and linking it to the restoration—with more investment—of the Silk Road and its trading hubs (Higgins, 2018). China’s interest in renting and buying pieces of Kazakh territory has been ongoing. An agreement in 2017 occasioned a spontaneous protest in Kazakhstan. One of the most numerous rallies took place in Atyrau on April 24, 2016 (RadioFreeEurope/Radio liberty, 2016). Three former Soviet countries have been included to explore the meaning of having been in the same national space. Ukraine is one, and two others are neighboring states professing stricter Islamic practices: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Finally, is there attraction—and for what reason—to Europe, to the UK (considered leader in world banking), and Germany (economic engine of the EU)? Are the European states and the United States irrelevant models, or a culturally appealing destination? Or, on the contrary, do these elite students consider themselves more likely to be part of the Asian, Eastern world? (Fig. 1). The numbers at the bottom of the chart refer to numbers of participants putting the country in the clearly positive or negative column. The left side of the chart shows the number of focus-group participants putting countries in the category of least interesting or significant; the right side, the most interesting and significant. There was no variation among groups concerning the top and bottom. Germany and the United Kingdom in some instances exchanged places.

7 Hard Power and Destructive Influence: The United States The difference between hard and soft power is often unclear. The unipolar post-Soviet picture of the world appeared to describe America’s capacity to use the attractiveness of “soft power” to achieve goals without resort to force (Nye, 2004). The underlying question, however, is whether it is possible to have soft power in the absence of hard,

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COUNTRIES: LEAST AND MOST SIGNIFICANCE KYRG UZB UKR GERM UK CHINA RUS US -50

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Fig. 1 Countries: Least and most significance

military-assisted power. It is true that certain states of limited war-fighting capacity, such as Canada and the Scandinavian countries, have excelled at peace-making, it is doubtful that in large-scale hostilities, limited war-fighting capacity, such as found in Canada and the Scandinavian countries, which have excelled at peace-making in smaller theaters of war, can exert significant power . ‘absent strong military underpinning it is doubtful that the soft-power specialization fully qualifies as power. Nye has refined “soft power” to solve these internal contradictions as “smart power,” and then expand well beyond the original scope of the theory to include the major modes of bringing resources to bear on successful foreign policy. In discussion about the United States, these focus-group participants in Almaty spontaneously divide their comments into categories equivalent to “hard” and “soft” power. Both elicit affect, but the first stimulates fear of attack and helplessness at home, and can be mediated by news transmissions, especially with visual elements. One participant, Nadira, referring to the news that the United States had dropped a barrel bomb [she means barometric), gives a pictorial account: “he [President Trump] was sitting with some guest drinking tea and they reported at that time that [he had ordered a barrel bomb to be used].’” When asked what impression it made on her, she responded that a “third world war could break out: Fear, to be honest. Because it’s possible that there can be some consequences for Kazakhstan.” Timur adds that Kazakhstan “will be involved.” Nadira, worries that Russia and China will show their power, “…and in Kazakhstan, is there any kind of defense?” “To stand up for itself?” adds Zharkenai. That fear and vulnerability are not necessarily shared. Skepticism regarding official media is widespread and has a long history; it is one of the divides among the participants. Referring specifically to Russian mass media, Aizada is generally skeptical of claims: “Nadira here says that Trump sat there and drank tea and who knows if he drank tea or not?” When reference was made to Channel One, the leading Russian news channel and easily available in Kazakhstan, participants called it untrustworthy. Nursultan

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links this lack of trust to the need for Channel One and other news sources to “hide something from us” at the behest, adds Aisha, of the government. The reason? Several participants join in to support Nursultan’s argument that hiding what is happening is intended to ensure that “the people won’t revolt.” Conclusions about what is not shown, can be extrapolated from how participants compare what they have seen or know about from other sources, including internet-based sources and their and their parents’ experience. They have developed heuristics allowing them to seek cues in official information that can provide a reading diverging from the intended message.

8 Soft Power Participants who see a different America, point not only to power, but also to highquality production, attention to the environment, innovation, and, for some, the particularly powerful impact of freedom and democracy. They observe power, but appear not to feel the threat others very strongly do feel. “The US influences not only us, but the whole world. Pick any country of those who influence us, they will pick USA at some level or other…imports with US. US is tied to everything. At one time it did PR for itself very well. And as a result of this they went further than we in development. They used the world situation and PR for themselves. At some moment they had a crisis and they used this crisis. When the Second World War started, it was not PR but more than that, as they were able to extract benefit from it. The US is associated, for me, with quality, food, products, cosmetics, everyday life. They are ecologically pure and act well. Chinese products appear to be chemically dangerous.” In one group, participants were thinking about graduating soon and perhaps going on to a post-baccalaureate degree. They were asked where they would like to study. It should be noted that fluency in English is not as widespread among elite students as it is in Moscow, and several said they preferred to stay home in Kazakhstan to study. Madina said “maybe America, but my level of English wouldn’t let me. But I am studying.” Among some of the participants, affect toward the United States is pronounced. In one group Fatima asserts that “all history always rests on the USA.” Raimbek continues the pace: “the whole financial system, all technological revolution…all referendums; all laws. We know their presidents by heart more than our own.” In short, says Almakhan, “everybody’s interested in America.” Another said, “I’d try America.” But this positive view of America, though strong, is still abstract, and it is other participants who add a stronger note of affect, derived from personal encounters in America, affect that reflects back (unfavorably) on their own political system. As we noted above, research on this phenomenon finds that when these young people return, they can return with a more critical and dissatisfied attitude toward the system at home. Fatima says “when I was there, I liked it. I was in Los Angeles and San Francisco. I would have stayed to live there. Honestly, there you feel freer and people are completely different and have a completely different attitude to you.” Even secondhand, the affect can be strong, as for Madina: “I wasn’t there, but people who were, have the impression: ‘I want to go there.’” Fatima continues “when

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you fly here, you already get depressed; already you don’t want to go anywhere. Sad. Already in the airport, when you land, you become completely sad.” This result is not uncommon. It has been shown that “[c]onditions in foreign countries, particularly advanced democracies, can serve as an important benchmark for what their own country can live up to for aspiring citizens in a changing society, particularly when the world is becoming increasingly interconnected” (Huang, 2015).

9 The United States vs. Russia in the World The image of America is split into a state successfully designed for war and world domination and a state achieving prosperity through the creativity of its citizens freely able to innovate and renew. Yet American power, influence, and global presence are strongly associated by most of the participants with negative intentions of aggression, domination, and the negative side of wealth. They are convinced of the global military power of the United States; its willingness to use it is a factor in arousing the emotion of fear and their search for safety in alliance with Russia. It is clear to all the students that Kazakhstan by itself is vulnerable and unable to defend itself. Long and required attachment to Russia while the Soviet Union lasted has ambiguous outcomes, and a strong one derives from a sense of weakness and fear of being set adrift in an inhospitable world by the fact of independence. There is a strong current of support for true independence, in which the Kazakh language and its particular brand of Islam arising out of a long history, sets the country apart and on its own path to development, which suggests an Asian identity, as yet blurry. The United States-Russia competition is linked to both desirable and undesirable power. American military power is great, but not unchallenged. Russia’s military power is great, and many, such as Erbolat, say that “the actions of the United States and Russia influence the whole world, the whole planet.” Kuralai adds, “in any sphere.” Discourse in the groups regarding which state or leader has more power requires inferences derived most likely from mediated images. Comparing U.S. leaders, they agree that Donald Trump is more powerful than Barak Obama: partly because of “personality,” of which they have no direct knowledge, but more importantly, because “Trump has money and he who has money has power.” In comparing Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin, there is general agreement that Putin is the more powerful, with a stronger military, the basis of his “good relations with other countries.” An evaluation of Putin’s military and the strength of his ties to other countries is based to a considerable extent on televised images from Russia: participants talk about watching military parades in Moscow, with, they notice, massive artillery and rockets on display. Equally, about the United States, it is the American president, whose pronouncements both as president and as campaigner are taken as authoritative: as Chingiz puts it, he believes Putin is more powerful, because “Trump himself admitted it.” Donald Trump directly characterized his country as having weakened military forces with substandard weaponry. Trump’s own words impressed Chingiz,

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his group, and other groups. This emphasis on the person of the United States president is, in addition to what is attributed to him, another sign of his and of America’s importance. When the focus-group participants filled out their introductory questionnaires, they addressed a few questions at the end that were of a different sort: about political knowledge. Among other questions, they were asked to name the then-Prime Minister of Russia and former President, Dmitri Medvedev. They were also asked who is president of the United States, with no prompts. Seventy-seven percent put down Donald Trump for the latter; well above the number for the Russian officeholder, Dmitri Medvedev, at 49%. About their own country, they had relatively little knowledge about formal institutions of governance. Only 1 person could correctly name the chair of the elected parliament of Kazakhstan (Mazhilis), theoretically the formal head of state. However, these patterns of knowledge were an accurate assessment of the relative power of the institutions. Kazakhstan has only a weak military; it is bounded by two great powers: Russia and China. Across the ocean America can and does project power with its capacity and will to do so whenever and wherever it chooses. These images are part of verbal discourse freighted with strong emotions of fear and vulnerability. As Nikita says, “the West has too aggressive, too arrogant a position.” America, “any country they get into—they see it, for some reason, as their duty to stick their hand into its politics.” Compared to Russia, he prefers “the actions of my country with Russia than the actions of America or some European Union.” That these images are inconsistent is not surprising: soft-power attractions of the United States are distinct from and less dominant than unpredictable lethality. Talking with a small number of their citizens returned from study or internships in the United States, it has been found that though some uncritically absorbed values and habits, while others, who had not left for study, were far more tied to the authority and values of their parents. One young man, for example, said “‘Here people listen to their parents always,…About education, marrying, buying a house—the parents make these decisions” (Blum, 2019, p. 218).

10 China In the short characterization of countries, China was called “closed politics”; “waiting out persistently”; “polluted air”; “technology”; “wars”; “communist country”; “trade”; “culture”; “raw materials”; “rapid development”… Aigerim sums it up: “The USA and China are the largest countries. At this moment they play a big role in the world.” When Zhazira suggests that in China, corruption is very efficiently investigated and eliminated, Moka simply says, “no. Corruption flourishes horribly there.” When a participant notes that Chinese are industrious, immediately another participant points to air pollution causing deaths in large numbers in the cities. Despite the large investments and an ambitious strategy to create a new city as a staging area (or substitute for a port] for trade shipments from Kazakhstan, China, the lead participant and equal investor, did not benefit in terms of image and attraction among our focus-group participants. Clearly, jobs would be created

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on a large scale, for Chinese, to be sure, but also for Kazakhs. A number of trade agreements between Kazakhstan and China relate to energy, but also to tracts of land in Kazakhstan for rent or purchase. The latter triggered a spontaneous protest in 2017. No participant wants to study in China; none declares an intention to study the language or travel there. Reference to enormous manpower for the military is met with the refutation that in future wars, the mere size of the infantry will be less defining than more modern technologies, including nuclear ones. They say Chinese are “frightening.” There is no positive affect at all about the neighboring Chinese and their country. There is concern about Chinese rental or purchase of Kazakh land and encroachment on their patrimony. The focus-group participants did not speak at length about China; they were not indifferent, but the discourse appeared unrelated to and detached from Kazakhstan. When one said, China was essentially “closed,” he expressed a sense of distance most of the others felt as well. The second President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a law on June 30, 2021, prohibiting the sale and lease of land to foreigners, Akorda reports (Tokayev, 2021). When Erbolat traveled to America, he met immigrants from the former Soviet Union: from Moldova [Romanian ethnicity] and Azerbaijan [Turkic ethnicity], he warmly recalled: “They were closer to me than Chinese.” Not only because they were fellow-countrymen for years, but also because China is regarded as alien. That there is a profound mismatch between the geopolitical importance and foreign policy of governments when compared to the images and attitudes of the focus-group participants’ affect toward their neighbor to the east and increasing close partner appears clear.

11 The European Way: The UK and Germany Europe elicits middling interest among the participants. They connect Germany with “tolerance”; “reforms”; “education”; “law” “science”; and call it a “developed country.” But it is also associated with “crisis,” and one participant sees both “cruelty” and “cleanliness.” Germany and Europe in general are noted as places to do an internship and study further. But they speak rather little of individual European countries; the obstacles are many. Education and cost of living are high; a fellowship is necessary and difficult to obtain. Great Britain is associated with “colonization” and “stability.” It takes up little space in the long discussions, except when participants refer to the concentration of banking in the country. A few participants believe that this fact makes Great Britain one of the most powerful countries in the world, but that attitude has little traction among the others. The Nordic countries are brought up repeatedly, not with concrete personal strategies or precise attributes. A generalized sense of good will and a good life, as well as absence of turbulence together with a high standard of living and care for the population characterize these countries. They are associated with power when “behind the scenes” they influence the larger powers. There are no specifics and no indication of expertise about or personal ties

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to the countries. None of the participants appears to have traveled there or have relatives living there. It is difficult not to conclude that the idealized Nordic alternative represents an unrealistic alternative to life in the shadow of great powers and the insufficient standard of living at home.

12 Ukraine Ukraine is on the list, but it is remarkably uninteresting to these elite students. Remarkably, because Russian television Channel One and online sources devote constant, high-pitched emotional space to the former Soviet state and the bias is thick. The focus-group participants are not moved; they are disinclined to expend effort to extract an objective sense of news. Unlike their “work” to expand their knowledge of the United States, they are emotionally distant from their Soviet-era fellow-citizens. The descriptors used when thinking about Ukraine are similar across all the groups: “war”; “tension”; “cunning”; “inclined to revolution”; “at one time revolution roared in the country. Finally I got bored that they cannot sort out inside their country”; “narrow-mindedness”; “change of government”; “discord”; “doesn’t especially have influence.” Participants did not indicate whether they intended the words to apply to one of the two contending sides in Ukraine or Ukraine in general. They did not elaborate; they did not go further in the total of 14 hours of discussion. Instead, participants exhibit a weariness and lack of sympathy or connectedness with Ukraine in general.

13 Russia Russia and America are two oppositional forces that influence Kazakhstan and the focus-group participants are divided on both of them. The before First President Nazarbayev, a strong advocate of continuation of ties, especially trading ties with Russia, is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, he casts himself as leader of heirs to traditions past, a rebirth of an independent First people with a heroic past. In a memoir written just after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev wrote “The roots of the imperialist tradition which has weighed down on us for several centuries, up to and including the twentieth, proved too deep. Even now, in a radically new situation they can unfortunately still be detected within victorious democracy. Both in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan it required no small effort to overcome friction in our relations with Russia…the republics were obliged to issue firm statements on their freedom and independence, on their unwillingness to continue in the humiliating role of ‘little brothers’” (Nazarbayev, 1992). For the students at KazNU Russia is the essential, indispensable power and also way of life they, as citizens of an independent country and distinct culture, will

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not reproduce. Descriptors reflect ambivalence about their protector and its political system—both negative and positive impressions, “corruption”; “war readiness”; “criminal society.” Comparisons are used: More positively, “industry”; “agreement with Kazakhstan in sphere of economics”; “close, work together”; “kinship”; “big power in world”; “great power”; “most interesting neighboring country”; “developed”; “great power, powerful country”; “great power, most influential.” When they discuss countries, the process of comparison can change the perspective. Zhazira, says “I like the US political system. They have elections. In Russia, somehow…in the US [it is] so clearly a democracy. Congressmen organize their policy and these acts. In Russia there are legislators but they are already picked out, special people.” Soviet experiences have had a formative impact on Kazakhstan that continues: the language the participants use is often emotional, stressing the ties bound by affect formed by what several call “a common culture.” As Moka says, “still we are Russian-speakers to a certain degree, and mass media, culture, art, all this acts on us and Russian culture is closer to us.” Nurzhan’s sense of “close” makes Russia “like born brothers.” History, a common language, selective memory may tend toward identification, even a generation later. On the other hand, the media, particularly television from Russia, often undermines the selectively remembered past, so that, for example, Aigerim, stimulated by what she sees on television, is appalled. “No, I wouldn’t want to be like in Russia— maybe in culture—and strive toward it….In general, in Russia, it’s the same situation with youth, with upbringing. I don’t think it’s the best way, … considering the shows, talk shows, which discuss problems of Russian adolescents and children; they’re simply scary. They develop very quickly and in the bad sense.” In this, the access to Russian mass media has an unintended effect—of exposing problems that make this viewer consider Russia a model to be avoided. Aigerim deconstructs the material: even though the major Russian channels send messages aligned with state policy, some dark sides of life in Russian society are revealed to those who deconstruct media messages and are magnified in the more traditional society of Kazakhstan. Some participants look to the past as a binding emotional tie; others see a boomerang effect, in which, as the former president’s memoir declares, post-Soviet Russia can no longer lay claim to the national characteristics and goals of an independent Kazakhstan, but it can easily exert its power. As Talent expresses his attitudes (and emotions), “Russia can put Kazakhstan on its knees…” When one participant refers to China’s massive manpower and unknown true allegiance, the participants say that the news shows how Russia’s military strength includes modern technology, the key to modern strategy. Arman agrees: in the twenty-first century everything is built on technology. “Even Russian hackers showed what they can do…” When asked by the facilitator how they feel when they know that “Russian hackers can penetrate cyber defenses,” Raul surprisingly answers “security,” because he feels defended by Russia. It is not fear of enemy penetration and methods of hidden persuasion, but a protective and proactive security Russia provides.

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14 Divisions of Identity—Comparisons, East or West, and Islam Defining identities for the participants in our focus groups is not straightforward. Each has a different mix of attitudes and aspirations. We have presented primarily how they fit in the world, which they entered as an independent state comparatively recently. We expected they would have at least residual attachments to other postSoviet republics. In fact, we found very little evidence of interest in them. Least of all do they perceive commonalities with other Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia. In fact, they regard Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as extremist in their practices and their evident moves to spread them in Kazakhstan. For focus-group participants, it is only with Russia that they find profound commonalities. They also regard Russia as their most powerful ally in the world the United States dominates. Participants indicate that given the weakness militarily and economically of their country at this stage, their dependence on Russia is both necessary and desired. They regard Russia as their most powerful ally in a world of United States domination. They are divided in their conclusions about the United States and divided within their own value systems. They speak of both fear and disapproval of what some say is an irresponsible use of power and yet they acknowledge the innovative spirit of the country and its individualism. Tied as they are to the internet, the participants, many of whom find that much of what they think about and begin to plan cannot be discussed at home. They are therefore isolated from the institution of family, which has paid such a significant role in traditional Kazakh culture. Of particular concern is the tendency among the young to copy foreign devout Muslims. Students spoke sharply against Kazakh “girls, who cover themselves totally in black …” It does not comport with “our traditions or our people,” and declared that the prohibition of this dress would proceed at what they term the legislative level. Many participants see as the greatest threat: the tide of religious extremism competing for the definition of Islam in Islamic-majority Kazakhstan. Throughout the Soviet period, key Kazakh traditions survived. One such tradition is respect for elders. Some focus-group participants seek refuge with family; some ask for consensual decision-making. On the other hand, the younger generation is also characterized by the media as “cardinally” different from past ones. New perspectives, methods of communication, travel and observation of different institutions and cultures are more available to these young elites than anything they can remember. While many accept that they are profoundly different from previous generations, they also understand that they are to some degree caught between identities.

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15 Conclusion Several valuable conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, the study of the student environment shows that the fundamental traditions of the Kazakh people are preserved in the younger generation. They understand that the national, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic values of the country are at the heart of Kazakhstani identity and unity. Second, the focus-group discussions showed that identity is an ongoing generational process. It is based on understanding the importance of the Kazakh language for strengthening the unity of the nation regardless of ethnicity and ability to speak other languages. It is also about the transfer of cultural traditions, and the importance of connecting knowledge with the future development of Kazakhstan. The awareness of this process is the main unifying principle of Kazakh identity. Third, the students showed themselves to be mature people who have developed a system of values that allows them to find social solidarity. At the same time, young people recognize the problems of society. They trust the government’s information policy but prefer the diversity of social media and online media. Kazakhstan is a country with an average age of 31. Its new elite generation is different from that of their parents and generations before. They speak two or three languages: Kazakh, Russian, and, increasingly, English. They are at home on the internet. Generational change is not uniform, of course, and our elites express a degree of tension with their families, but still preserve the traditional respect for and even dependence on them. They know that their country’s power in the world is a fraction of that of their neighbors’, China and Russia, and of the United States’. Their own newly independent country is weaker in terms of power, but it has been a hard-won independence for their multiple ethnic groups; they intend to keep it.

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Vstrecha s predstavitelami duhovnogo napravleniya musylman Kazakhstata. (2017, April 19). Akorda [Official site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan]. http://www.akorda.kz/ ru/events/akorda_news/meetings_and_receptions Zhusupova, A. (2020). Media potreblenie v Kazakhstane v 2020: Internet and cosialnye seti pobezhdaut. https://ekonomist.kz/zhussupova/mediapotreblenie-kazahstan-2020-internet/

Measuring Media Literacy Level: A Case of Central Asia Igor Zadorin, Anastasia Saponova, Valentina Reshetova, and Daria Chizhova

1 Theoretical Background Information and media literacy can be characterised as a relatively highly developed theoretical subject of study. In literature, a variety of approaches have been described to measure the individual media literacy level, as well as the level of some target groups or the population of countries (Arke & Primack, 2009; Chang et al., 2011; Christ & Potter, 1998; Davydov et al., 2020; Koc & Barut, 2016; Lee et al., 2015; Potter, 2010; Sharikov, 2018; Siddiq et al., 2016). As an academic term, “media literacy” has a long multidisciplinary history and is usually considered by scholars as an umbrella concept (Koltay, 2011). One of the first conceptualisations in the middle of 1970s was described as a set of pedagogical tools for elementary school teachers (Houk & Bogart, 1974; Potter, 2010). Since that time, it’s hard to trace the exact way of academic development of the concept. Potter claims that media literacy was considered in the variety of traditions of a study, among them: pedagogical (Houk & Bogart, 1974), cultural (Lopez, 2008), cognitive (Sinatra, 1986) and anthropological frameworks (Potter, 2010; Scribner & Cole, 1981). Despite the coexistence of multidisciplinary approaches, there are four basic principles that are accepted by the majority of the scholars: (1) the media have the potential to cause potentially negative effects on individuals; (2) the final purpose of media literacy studies is to contribute to the overall increase of media competencies; (3) media literacy is a skill that can be developed and trained; (4) media literacy is I. Zadorin (B) · A. Saponova · V. Reshetova ZIRCON Research Group, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Saponova HSE University, Moscow, Russia D. Chizhova Information and Analytical Center, Study of Socio-Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Space, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Davydov (ed.), Internet in the Post-Soviet Area, Societies and Political Orders in Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32507-6_10

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a multidimensional phenomenon (Potter, 2010). Media literacy is considered as a significant social phenomenon. The attempts of its conceptualisation went beyond the academic field—the definition of media literacy was adopted by the European Commission (European Commission, 2007) and UNESCO (UNESCO, 2013). According to the different skills-based definitions (Livingstone, 2004), media literacy may include from 3 to 11 key components (Ptaszek, 2019). Such a multidimensional nature and the constant changes in communicative practices make it difficult to develop a unified approach to measuring media competencies. Hence, there is a lack of comparative study of media literacy (hereinafter – ML) especially at country level. As a rare example of the cross-country level projects on measuring media literacy, one can notice the studies that were conducted in 27 EU member states, including the Post-Soviet countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), on the initiative of the European Commission (Celot, 2010, 2015). In the Russian research industry, there has recently been an increase in interest in measuring digital communication skills (among which ML is one of the components) and a decrease in attention to media literacy as an independent research subject. Thus, in Russia, measurements of the digital competencies level are annually carried out by various research organisations (ROCIT,1 ZIRCON,2 2018). Certain questions that relate to the critical perception of media information are regularly asked by Russian pollsters (FOM,3 WCIOM,4 Levada Centre5 ), and work is also regularly carried out to study the levels of media literacy in targeted social groups and the prospects for media education by groups of Russian researchers (Kachkayeva et al., 2017, 2020). However, the latest all-Russian data on the integrated measurement of media literacy was published back in 2015 (Malceva et al., 2017). In recent years, the emphasis in information skills research has shifted to the study of competencies for the digital economy, to the ability to use digital competencies for professional activities and financial transactions (see projects: Davydov, 2021; HSE University,6 2020; NAFI,7 2020). At the same time, in our opinion, it is obvious that the lack of information on the state of media literacy in the country (including such important “traditional” components as the criticality of information perception, the ability to 1

ROCIT is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “Regional Public Centre for Internet Technologies”. ROCIT promotes the development and dissemination of Internet technologies in the interests of Russian citizens. https://rocit.ru. 2 ZIRCON is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “Centre of Intellectual Resources and Cooperation in Social Sciences”. ZIRCON Research group is one of the oldest independent companies in Russia, specialised in sociological and marketing research. http://zircon.group/. 3 FOM is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “Fund of Public Opinion”. https://fom.ru/. 4 WCIOM is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research”, one of the leading research companies in Russia. https://www.wciom.com. 5 Levada Centre is an independent sociological research organisation in Russia. https://www.lev ada.ru/. 6 HSE University – “National Research University Higher School of Economics”, consistently ranked as one of Russia’s top universities. 7 NAFI is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “National Agency for Financial Research”. https://nafi.ru/.

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protect oneself and one’s children from excessive or harmful content, the ability to produce and broadcast information content) significantly limits the adoption of correct and effective decisions in the field of the latest digital technologies. Moreover, there is an obvious shortage of comparative information on the level of media literacy in different countries, especially neighbouring ones.

2 Methodology This chapter presents the data of an intercountry media literacy study, conducted in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 2019 and 2021 in the interest of the International non-profit organisation, Internews with the support of USAID. The methodology of the current studies is based on the ZIRCON Research group projects, which makes it possible to correctly compare data for different countries, including Russia. Mass representative polls (face-to-face interviews) were conducted in three countries by: 1) Public Opinion Institute, based in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, in July 2019. The sample size was 1000 respondents in each country, aged 14 to 65 years old. 2) M-Vector, based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 2021. The sample size was 1146 respondents in Kazakhstan, 1512 – in Tajikistan, 1512 – in Uzbekistan, aged 14 to 65 years old. The samples were multistage, stratified by region and type of settlement (city/village). The interviews were conducted in both—in national languages and in Russian (the preferable language was chosen by the respondent).

2.1 The Main Communicative Practices According to the ZIRCON methodology for measuring media literacy, the primary factor of ML is the ability to receive, consume, produce and broadcast information. In this regard, analysing the survey data in the three Central Asian countries, the authors would like to draw attention to the characteristics of media consumption, including the possession of the appropriate technical means (see Table 1). A common characteristic for all three countries is the high degree of TV and mobile phone equipment. Tajikistan is the undisputed leader in satellite TV coverage: 63% of respondents in 2021 noted the presence of a satellite dish at home, in Kazakhstan, this figure is 30%, which is more than two times lower, and in Uzbekistan it is three times lower, at 21%. At the same time, it is worth noting that in Uzbekistan this indicator has almost halved in two years: 21% in 2021 vs. 39% in 2019. We can speculate that this might be due to a digital infrastructure rollout during this time, providing cheaper and better alternatives to satellite. In the other two countries, this indicator

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Table 1 Answer to the question: “Which of the things listed on the card do you personally or those who live with you have? No matter if you use it yourself or not” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) Television

↓ 85

94

96

97

98

98

Mobile phone

↑ 84

78

↓ 74

92

89

87

Smartphone (with iOS/Android/Windows Phone/Blackberry operating system)

↑ 73

53

↑ 60

27

↑ 54

39

Computer (including laptops)

↑ 66

52

↓ 33

53

35

34

Personal, family library of ordinary (paper) books

↑ 33

21

22

13

↑ 41

34

Camera (as a standalone device, not in a phone or tablet)

↓ 13

15

↓ 10

20

↓ 10

14

Device (standalone) providing Internet access (modem, ADSL modem)

↑ 52

29

13

12

↑ 21

16

Tablet

↑ 40

30

↓ 21

32

14

16

Satellite dish

↓ 30

33

63

64

↓ 21

39

Radio (as a standalone device, not in a phone or car)

12

10

↓ 15

35

20

20

Video player (VCR, DVD or Blu-ray player, digital video player)

↑ 13

9

22

20

↓ 18

30

Stationary device for listening to audio recordings (tape recorder, music centre)

↑ 18

8

12

8

14

16

Media library (audio and ↑ video recordings in any 19 storage format: tapes, discs, recordings on a computer’s hard disk, etc.)

9

5

6

↓ 6

12

Mobile device for listening to audio recordings (CD player, MP3 player)

12

13

18

13

15

11

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) Video camera (as a standalone device, not in a phone, tablet or camera)

↑ 23

6

↓ 5

11

5

7

Game console, set-top box

↑ 15

9

6

9

3

3

E-book reader (as a standalone device)

6

3

3

3

4

3

Smart watch / electronic fitness tracker

25

–

5

–

6

–

had hardly changed. Also, Uzbekistan is the leader in the number of individual devices for receiving a radio signal (radio receivers), 20% vs. 15% (Tajikistan), 12% (Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan is significantly ahead of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in terms of the share of devices using which it is possible to consume content from third-party audio and video media. The majority of the population in Kazakhstan is equipped with the computers [66% vs. 33% (Tajikistan) and 35% (Uzbekistan)] and almost a half equipped with tablets [40% vs. 21% (Tajikistan), 14% (Uzbekistan)]. There are several reasons why Kazakhstan ranks first in the number of devices being used for the consumption of information. Firstly, among the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has the highest purchasing power (Global Median Speeds, 2022). Secondly, Kazakhstan has wide access to the high-speed Internet through a fibre-optic connection. Thus, the level of Internet coverage in Kazakhstan is 81.9% of the territory, in Uzbekistan – 55.2%, in Tajikistan – 34.9% (Global Median Speeds, 2022). Thirdly, due to the availability of broadband Internet connection, the cost is lower than in other Central Asian countries. For 2021, the cost of 1 GB of mobile Internet in Kazakhstan was 0.46 US dollars, in Tajikistan – 2.6 US dollars, in Uzbekistan – 0.6 US dollars. The cost of an Internet package with broadband fixed access in Kazakhstan is 11.5 US dollars, in Uzbekistan – 15.4 US dollars, in Tajikistan – 30.4 US dollars (Global Median Speeds, 2022). The situation of prevalence of smartphones has changed in the three countries over two years—in Tajikistan the number of smartphone users dramatically doubled from 27% in 2019 to 60% in 2021, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the increase in users is 20 p.p. and 15 p.p. [73% and 54% in 2021 respectively]. This is due to the global tendency to reduce the final cost of a smartphone, which made it more affordable. It should be noted that in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, a smartphone is a way to communicate with their relatives—labour migrants in other countries,growing in number every year. Hence, the total volume of labour migrations per year in Uzbekistan (as of the 1st of January, 2022) is 1.5 million people (4.3% of the total population), in Tajikistan this figure reaches 1.6 million people (16% of the country’s population).

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Table 2 Answer to the question: “What social networks/messengers do you use?” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) WhatsApp

90

–

41

–

21

–

YouTube

69

–

37

–

45

–

Instagram

65

63

27

31

21

20

Telegram

↑ 42

16

↑ 17

11

↑ 66

52

IMO

–

–

51

–

1

–

Facebook

23

21

↓ 19

34

12

12

VKontakte

↓ 36

50

↓ 11

17

4

2

Google +

26

–

14

–

19

–

Odnoklassniki

↓ 19

23

↓ 16

25

7

10

TikTok

28

–

7

–

14

–

Viber

3

–

23

–

1

–

My [email protected]

↓ 8

12

1

4

0.5

1

Twitter

4

5

2

3

2

0

LinkedIn

1

1

0.5

0

0.5

–

10

↓ 27

35

↓ 25

43

I do not use social networks 1 and instant messengers

Generally, the usage of different social media platforms was proliferating among the population in all three countries, the number of non-users decreased by 9 p.p. in Kazakhstan, 8 p.p. in Tajikistan and 18 p.p. in Uzbekistan (see Table 2). Each country has at least one leading platform, the main channel of personal communication among the population—WhatsApp in Kazakhstan (90%), IMO in Tajikistan (51%) and Telegram8 in Uzbekistan (66%). The only platform that demonstrates a steady growth over the years in all three countries is Telegram. We assume that, in Uzbekistan, the growing popularity of the Telegram messenger may be associated with the government policy—all departments are required to have authorised channels in this messenger, which makes this platform the most attractive for users in particular.

8

Telegram is a messenger platform, launched in 2013 by Nikolai and Pavel Durov (the founders of VKontakte). The functionality of the platform allows not only instant messaging, voice and video calling but also creates channels that are functioning as a form of one-way messaging. Channels, where admins post messages, may have an unlimited number of subscribers. In fact, this channel functions as mass media—admins are able to monetise channels by advertisement integration.

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At the same time, there is a significant decrease in the usage of Russian-speaking social media platforms (VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, My [email protected]) in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The small audience of Twitter and LinkedIn remains stable in all countries (0.5–4%).

2.2 General Characteristics of Media Literacy Level As was mentioned above, the result of the media literacy measurement is often taken as a base for designing media literacy educational programmes. Hence, the basic knowledge about the main terminology (concepts) of media literacy gives additional information about the level of media literacy skills (although the knowledge about the concepts cannot be equal to the assessment of skills). In 2021, the list of such core “media literate” terms were updated according to the current agenda—in the list were included such terms as “social media algorithms”, “disinformation”, “troll/bot”, “media literacy”, “fact-checking”. The picture below presents the level of awareness with 10 collocations, which was suggested for the estimation in 2021 (see Fig. 1). There is a vast gap in the level of familiarity with the terms across the countries. The majority of respondents in Kazakhstan are familiar with almost all terms—“internet addiction” (75%), “compromising evidence” (75%), “propaganda” (73%), “fake-news” (72%), “disinformation” (68%), “information war” (63%) and “troll/bot” (50%). In Uzbekistan, where the general awareness is significantly lower, the most familiar ones are “disinformation” (46%), “propaganda” (39%) and “internet addiction” (36%). A small number of respondents in Tajikistan have information about media literacy terms, approximately a quarter of the population are familiar with the terms “internet addiction” (27%), “fake-news” (27%) and “information war” (25%). If we look at how the level of awareness with these terms changed in two years— we can notice that these terms remain unfamiliar to the majority of the population in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (see Table 3). There is a stable shift in the general level of awareness in Kazakhstan only. The first reason is a lack of accessibility to higher education. In Kazakhstan, the higher education enrolment in 2021 was 62%. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this figure was 13 and 29%, respectively (Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021; Education in the Republic of Tajikistan Statistical Collection, 2022; Youth of Uzbekistan: Challenges and Prospects United Nations Children’s Fund, 2020). The low educational level is due to not only the insufficient number of educational institutions and the lack of demand for specialists with higher education on the national market, but also a high birth rate. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have the youngest population in the CIS9 countries (Women and men of the Republic of Tajikistan: statistical 9

CIS is an abbreviation, translated from Russian means “Commonwealth of Independent States”, a regional intergovernmental organisation in Eastern Europe and Asia that was formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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Fig. 1 Answer to the question: “Do you know such concepts as …?” (2021) Table 3 Answer to the question: “Do you know such concepts as …?” (2021 vs. 2019) Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

Yes, I know

↑ 75

56

27

28

36

33

Heard of it

9

28

11

18

10

9

No, I don’t know

16

17

62

53

54

59

↑ 63

43

25

28

27

25

Internet addiction

Information war Yes, I know Heard of it

12

29

13

19

9

9

No, I don’t know

25

27

62

53

64

66

↑ 72

37

27

16

24

28

Fake-news Yes, I know Heard of it

9

31

13

16

8

8

No, I don’t know

19

32

60

68

69

64

61

15

17

14

18

Compromising evidence Yes, I know

↑ 75

Heard of it

8

27

11

22

8

10

No, I don’t know

17

12

74

61

78

72

Measuring Media Literacy Level: A Case of Central Asia

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collection, 2020). The second reason is the lack of training programmes and materials on media literacy in national languages. There is a large number of materials and non-profit programmes on the basics of media literacy in Russian. Russian language proficiency in Kazakhstan reaches 60% of the population, while in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan it is widespread mostly in large cities (Tashkent, Dushanbe, Khujand) and tourist centres (Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, etc.). Another pivotal indicator of the media literacy level is the self-assessment of mastering basic skills of activity in the media space—ability to gather different types of information and critically perceive it. As we can see from the data presented below in Table 4, Kazakhstan remains the leader according to almost all indicators that reflect mastering basic media literacy skills. For instance, 32% of the population of Kazakhstan declare that they notice differences between information and other messages, including opinions, judgements and criticism, while in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this indicator is much lower— 14% and 8%, respectively. It is important to highlight that, in comparison with 2019, in Tajikistan, the respondents’ perception of their key media-skills has almost not changed. The share of respondents that say about the ability to recognise age restrictions of content has increased (from 10 to 28%), while the estimations of all other skills have either not changed or, conversely, decreased, especially the estimation of the ability to collect information from different sources (fact-checking). At the same time, a comparative analysis of the responses in Uzbekistan shows that the possession of the majority of skills has increased. Especially high growth was shown by the skill of revealing hidden information about additional payments— an increase of more than five times—from 4 to 27%. The most common skill in each country remains the ability to collect information and formulate search queries (Kazakhstan – 57%; Tajikistan – 37%; Uzbekistan – 43%).

2.3 Assessment of Media Trust and Criticality of Information Perception The question “How often, when watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers and magazines, do you get the feeling that they deceive you: give deliberately false, unverified information or try to impose a certain point of view on you?” can be considered as an indirect indicator of both the level of media trust and the level of critical perception of the media by respondents (Table 5). From this point, residents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where 69% and 82% of respondents, respectively, note that they rarely or almost never encounter unverified information in the media, have the greatest potential for trust in the media and, perhaps, are less critical. Since 2019, this indicator has increased slightly in Tajikistan (by 20%), while in Uzbekistan it has remained unchanged. The situation in Kazakhstan is different: both in 2019 and in 2021, a significant part of the respondents said about feeling that they were being deceived when they

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Table 4 Answer to the question: “Choose from the list on the card what you can do” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) ↑ 57

30

↓ 37

54

43

39

Formulate search queries to ↑ find the information I need 49 on the Internet

41

↑ 31

27

↑ 34

21

Recognise indications that ↑ a particular TV programme 30 is suitable for children and adolescents

8

↑ 28

10

16

20

Notice differences between ↑ information and other 32 messages, including opinions, judgements, criticism

18

14

14

↓ 8

16

Determine if information found on the Internet is correct and trustworthy

↑ 31

17

17

20

24

15

Reveal hidden information about additional payments for using services

↑ 18

5

9

4

↑ 27

4

Distinguish a bot/troll from 27 a real participant in the discussion

–

9

–

10

4

Make electronic copies of printed materials (newspaper articles, drawings, documents)

–

14

–

15

–

5

None of the above

13

19

28

30

3

0.1

Collect information from various sources to get a complete picture of the topic of my interest

Table 5 Answer to the question: “How often, when watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers and magazines, do you get the feeling that they deceive you: give deliberately false, unverified information or try to impose a certain point of view on you?” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Often and very often, quite often

40

38

↓ 7

18

15

11

Rarely and very rarely, never

↑ 52

35

↑ 86

69

82

83

27

7

13

3

6

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%)

Don’t know/Find it difficult ↓ to answer 8

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had been watching TV shows, listening to the radio and so on. However, the share of those who find it difficult to answer this question has significantly decreased in 2021, and the share of those who notice that such a feeling occurs rarely, very rarely or never has increased by 17%. Trust level in the media in Kazakhstan is related to several trends—after the coming to power of K.-Zh. Tokayev and the announcement of the “Considerate state” concept, the liberalisation of the media began in the country. This process has led to an increase in the number of online media and websites (Agency for Strategic planning and reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan Bureau of National statistics, 2022). At the same time, websites have a different socio-political orientation, which means that they represent the maximum range of opinions. Such diversity leads to an increase in trust in the Republic state and independent media. It is worth noting here that Kazakhstan is a subject to the global trend of increasing attention to entertainment content, which is apolitical and more “truthful” in the opinion of Kazakhs. In general, if a respondent has a question about the truthfulness and full-fledged accuracy of information obtained through the media, the overwhelming majority of respondents in all three countries declare the intention to try to find the necessary information for its verification (Table 6). Thus, a large proportion of respondents in all countries noted that they would search for it on the Internet (48% – Kazakhstan; 38% – Tajikistan; 40% – Uzbekistan), the second trustworthy source is the personal communication with friends, relatives, acquaintances (17%, 27% and 28% respectively), the third—other media channels (13%, 14% and 8%). At the same time, in all three countries, about a third of respondents are not going to waste time on checking and clarifying doubtful information. It is important to note that in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, this percentage has decreased since 2019, while in Tajikistan, on the contrary, it has increased. The tendency to verify the information received correlates with the increasing availability of information verification tools for citizens. There is an increase in the number of specialised information verification resources in Kazakhstan. Moreover, in addition to the increase in the number of verification tools, there is an increase in precedents of punishment for the dissemination of false information in Kazakhstan (Ministry of Information and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022). A similar situation is developing in Uzbekistan, where amendments to a number of legislative acts relating to the dissemination of so-called fake-news, rumours and slander came into force in 2020. The questions below do not directly relate to media literacy, but mainly cover the broader issue of digital literacy and digital competencies (see Table 7). Comparing Kazakhstan with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the largest gap (as in 2019) is recorded in the ability to: 1) Change personal passwords on computers and online services [28% and 28%, respectively, vs. 54% (Kazakhstan)]; 2) Delete the history of personal actions on the Internet [27% and 33%, respectively, vs. 54% (Kazakhstan)];

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Table 6 Answer to the question: “Imagine that in one of the media you heard important news for you, but the information was incomplete or caused you doubts. How will you clarify or check this information?” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) I will look for information on the Internet

↑ 48

35

38

38

↑ 40

28

I will talk to friends, relatives, acquaintances

17

18

27

25

28

20

I will look for information in 13 other media

17

↓ 14

35

↓ 8

20

5 I will send a clarifying request to the editorial office of the source of dubious or incomplete information (to the editorial office of TV, radio, newspaper, website)

3

4

4

8

1

Other

–

1

–

1

–

I will not do anything / I will ↓ not waste time on 33 clarification and verification

–

44

↑ 34

25

↓ 29

41

Don’t know/Find it difficult to answer

–

2

11

2

4

–

3) Change the settings of access to your information in social networks for different groups of users [12% and 11%, respectively, vs. 33% (Kazakhstan)]. Despite this significant gap, the number of respondents who do not possess any of these skills has decreased not only in Kazakhstan, but in Uzbekistan. In comparison with 2019, there is a noticeable increase in all skills in these two countries. In Tajikistan, the number of respondents who had none of the mentioned skills did not change—almost half of the country’s population (41%). By other parameters, respondents’ estimations of most of the listed digital competencies have not changed in two years or have even demonstrated a negative trend. A common characteristic for media consumption in the Post-Soviet Middle East is the high level of trust in the traditional media, especially TV. To varying degrees, but in all the countries surveyed, the absolute majority of respondents trust television. Moreover, since 2019, the percentage of trust has increased markedly in all three countries (see Table 8). This situation is close to the one in Russia, where, despite the steady decrease over the last decade, television remains the main reliable source of information for more than half of the population (62%) (Levada Centre, 2021). In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, trust in TV as a source of information is at an equally extremely high level—80%. The reason for this level of trust in television may be the communication isolation that is currently observed in these countries. The second place, in terms of trust in Uzbekistan, is SMS-distribution of government bodies

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Table 7 Answer to the question: “What can you do to ensure the security of your personal data?” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) 2021 (%) 2019 (%) Change passwords on my computer and online services

↑ 54

42

↑ 28

20

↑ 28

21

Delete the history of my actions on the Internet

↑ 54

41

↓ 27

35

↑ 33

22

Change the settings for accessing my information on social networks for different user groups

33

30

12

12

11

7

Backup files stored on my computer

22

18

10

12

↑ 15

7

Clear unnecessary files from ↑ my computer 40

32

18

22

↑ 26

19

Use parental controls on my ↑ computer 14

9

5

6

7

6

Scan my computer for viruses

37

32

17

18

↑ 24

15

↑ Determine the degree of confidentiality and security 21 of the transfer of personal data when using services via the Internet

11

9

9

↑ 13

4

Recognise the situation of extortion of information on the Internet

↑ 18

9

5

5

6

4

Create multiple user accounts for one computer

18

19

7

13

6

5

None of the above

↓ 14

30

41

41

↓ 36

54

No answer

2

–

7

7

3

–

(19%), the information sites in the Internet—in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (34% and 15%). It’s important to highlight that in all three countries, there is a growing trend of trust in radio and the print press, although in 2019, these sources of information revealed the least trust among respondents. The most critical audience is in Kazakhstan – about a quarter (21%) of the population say that there are no channels they trust, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan there is only 3% with such an attitude. The most critical audience is in Kazakhstan – about a quarter (21%) of the population say that there are no channels they trust, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan there is only 3% with such attitude.

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Table 8 Answer to the question: “What sources of information do you trust the most?” Answer options

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

Television

↑ 58

46

↑ 80

55

↑ 80

64

Conversations with relatives, friends, acquaintances

↑ 21

5

9

4

7

6

Information sites in the Internet

↑ 34

17

24

21

15

13

Print press (newspapers, magazines)

↑ 16

3

↑ 21

3

↑ 13

3

Forums, blogs, social networking sites, Telegram-bots

9

5

2

1

2

1

Radio

↑ 15

1

↑ 21

2

↑ 9

1

SMS-distribution of government bodies

19

–

0.04

–

19

–

There are no channels 21 of information that I trust

–

3

–

3

–

3 Media Literacy Indices: A General Review The methodology of media literacy measurement was developed by ZIRCON Research Group within the project “National monitoring of media education and media literacy”, that had been conducted with the support of the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation from 2009 till 2016. In 2014 the concept of media was revised—Information Literacy Self-Assessment Index (ILSA) was replaced by the Integral Media Literacy Index (IMLI) (see Voynilov et al., 2016; Zadorin et al., 2017; ZIRCON …, 2018). The core of the integral index is the 5-component model of media literacy that was adopted by the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation in 2014. Thus, the paper presents calculations of two variants of media literacy indices: 1) Information Literacy Self-Assessment Index (ILSA) is a short version of the Media Literacy Index, based on the self-assessments of respondents regarding their information skills (12 indicators).10 2) Integral Media Literacy Index (IMLI) is a complex Index, based on the selfassessments of respondents using a five-part competence model (57 indicators).

10

Due to the lack of data, comparison with Russia is possible only for this version of the index.

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Table 9 Indicators for the Information Literacy Self-Assessment Index №

Judgments

“Competent” answer option

1

I can easily and quickly find any information that I need

Agree

2

I usually know where (in what source) I can find the information I need

Agree

3

I often compare information from different sources in order to verify it

Agree

4

I can easily determine what information contains advertisements

Agree

5

There are media (TV channels, newspapers, magazines, radio stations, etc.) that I trust, and those that I don’t trust

Agree Agree

6

I believe the more different sources of information, the better

7

To evaluate information from newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, etc., I try Agree to find out whose interests this media represents, who is behind it

8

Media should be responsible for low-quality information in the same way as a manufacturer is responsible for low-quality goods

9

I believe what is said in the newspapers, on the television and radio

Agree Disagree

10 I often ask relatives or friends to find the information I need

Disagree

11 There were occasions when I lost time or money due to incorrect information in the media

Disagree

12 I often get tired of the large volume of information

Disagree

The self-assessment questionnaire was updated in 2021. So, some parameters were replaced with comparable equivalents. For example, respondents were asked about familiarity with the term “social media algorithms” (instead of “computer viruses” in the questionnaire of 2019). The changes were necessary to update the questionnaire in accordance with the latest changes in the digital environment, but this did not affect the structure of the index itself, so the indices of 2019 and 2021 can be fully compared.

3.1 Information Literacy Self-Assessment Indices (ILSA) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia This section provides the results of Information Literacy Self-Assessment Index (ILSA) calculation. The personal index of self-assessment of information skills was constructed based on the assessments of judgements characterising the skills of working with information.11 Table 9 presents a set of judgements that were used as empirical indicators of such skills.

11

For the index construction, survey data for September 2019 (Russia) and July 2019 (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) were used. Thus, for correct comparison, data for the periods closest to each other were taken.

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For agreeing with each of the judgements № 1–8 and for disagreeing with each of the judgements № 9–12, respondents received 1 point. For each respondent, the corresponding sum of points was calculated—the total number of “correct” answers. Thus, each respondent received a certain index value. Theoretically, the index can take a value from 0 (no matches with the “correct” answers—complete lack of information skills) to 12 (complete match with the “correct” answers—the best information skills). Due to the difference in the design of the sample population of this study, it is not possible to directly compare the indicators of the studied countries with the data on Russia. Therefore, for a comparative analysis, some modifications were made to the original data sets: – The age cohort of 14–17 years was removed from the datasets of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. – In the Russian dataset, respondents aged over 65 were removed. Thus, comparison with the data on Russia was made on a subsample of respondents in the age range of 18–65 years old. Comparing the average ILSA indices, it is noticeable that, despite the fact that the difference in the indices of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, in comparison with Russia, is 1–2 points, they are all in the middle category (see Table 10). In contrast with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the average indicator of the Russian ILSA index is formed not by means of the indices of respondents with the medium level of information literacy (from 6 to 7 points), but with a high proportion of the more “literate” segment (values of the individual ILSA index from 8 to 10 points). At the same time, the share of respondents who got the minimum number of points (0 or 1) in Russia is less than 1% (0.3 and 0.1%, respectively). Below are the distributions of respondents in the surveyed countries, according to the information literacy index. In general, the typical distribution can be characterised as normal (Fig. 2). As obvious extremes, we can note a relatively high (to other countries) percentage of respondents in Tajikistan (6%) who did not give a “correct” answer for any of the listed indicators. In Kazakhstan, this percentage is two times lower (3%), in Uzbekistan – four times lower (1.5%). Also, in the distribution of respondents in the range from 1 to 6 points scored, the highest percentage is demonstrated by Tajikistan, while Uzbekistan, on the contrary, has a higher percentage in the highly literate cohort (from 8 to 11 points). The largest percentage of respondents who got the maximum number of points is in Kazakhstan (1.5%), in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan this indicator is below one (0.8% and 0.4%). Table 10 Average indicators of Information Literacy Self-Assessment Indices in different countries with the unification of the sample structure (18–65 years) (2019) Average score (Information Literacy Self-Assessment index)

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

Russia

6.52

6.00

7.03

7.97

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Fig. 2 Distribution of respondents by the information literacy index (share in % depending on the value of the index) on comparable sub-samples (2019)

So, as shown above, there is a significant differentiation in the values of the ILSA indices in all the countries studied. Based on this, the potential basis for the growth of information literacy among the populations of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan can be the group that scored the lowest number of points (from 0 to 5), while in Russia, it is more expedient to focus on increasing the level of information literacy of the group with the medium level of the ILSA index. However, in our opinion, the usage of these indicators are not enough to adequately estimate the level of media literacy at the level of the country’s population, next we will consider a methodology that is able to more accurately capture the actual level of media competencies.

3.2 Integral Media Literacy Indices (IMLI) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Most of the media and digital literacy indices are based on the idea of “partial” types of literacy that are necessary for communication in certain areas of social life (information, computer literacy, etc.) (Boekhorst, 2013; Calvani et al., 2008). The idea of the components and internal differentiation of the subject largely determines most of the calculation methods, both in Russia and abroad (for example, DigComp 2.1., 2017). There is a certain informal convention regarding the general set of indicators that determine information, media or digital literacy. This set of indicators does not change often from one research to another.

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Integral Media Literacy Index (IMLI) is a complex level of media literacy that consists of 57 elementary indicators. These indicators were divided into five groups (sub-indices), each of them is demonstrated: 1) skills to effectively find information (7 indicators); 2) skills to protect yourself from harmful content (7 indicators); 3) skills to verify and critically assess the information with the help of the alternative sources of information (7 indicators); 4) abilities to absorb information and properly use it (18 indicators); 5) abilities to effectively and correctly spread information taking into account rules of law (18 indicators). Thus, the maximum possible value of each of the sub-indices corresponds to the number of unique indicators in the category.12 Below, in Table 11, the average values of the sub-indices built on the parameters of each group are presented, as well as the maximum possible values that these indices can take. Thus, it is noticeable that the average value of each particular index differs from the maximum value by two or more times. Comparing the indices of the studied countries, it can be noted that their highest values are recorded in Kazakhstan, with the exception of the index which determines the ability to verify and critically evaluate information: the values of the three countries are almost the same—3.5 (Uzbekistan), 3.2 (Tajikistan) and 3.1 (Kazakhstan). It is important to note that the dynamics of the integral media literacy index occurred due to the changes in almost all the sub-indices included in it, i.e. the growth or decrease in the level of media literacy occurs relatively evenly. Thus, the growth of media literacy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was due to an increase in the values of all sub-indices, the decrease of media literacy in Tajikistan was accompanied by a drop in values in 3 indices out of 5 (sub-indices 2,4,5). On the basis of the presented sub-indices, an integral (composite) index was calculated (the 4th and 5th sub-indices were normalised and adapted to a seven-point scale). Thus, the maximum possible value of the index was 35 points. Figures 3 and 4 present the share of respondents by different index values in 2019 and 2021. Further, all respondents were divided into three nominal groups, in accordance with the level of recorded media literacy: 1) low level of media literacy (0–11 points); 2) medium level of media literacy (12–23 points); 3) high level of media literacy (24–35 points). 12

In this chapter, we present a methodology to measure media literacy based on 57 indicators in order to be able to do a comparison with 2019. Colleagues from M-Vector, in their report, changed the calculation methodology in 2021 and included two more indicators (59 index indicators) in it than in 2019. Thus, the indices values in 2021 may differ slightly, but the order of values and the overall trends remain the same. Two versions of the methodology are possible, one should only take into account the details of calculation while using the indices values in one of the versions. The second version of the index calculation can be found at the link – https://newreporter.org/med iastudy2021/.

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Table 11 Average values for sub-indices of media literacy № Media literacy components

1

2

3

4

5

Year Kazakhstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Max. value

The ability to effectively search and find the necessary information

2019 3.3

3.0

2.7

2021 3.9

3.0

2.9

The ability to protect yourself from malicious and redundant content

2019 2.8

2.2

1.9

2021 3.4

1.6

2.0

The ability to verify and critically 2019 3.1 evaluate information using 2021 4.5 alternative sources of information

3.2

3.5

3.8

3.9

The ability to adequately perceive 2019 7.6 information and effectively 2021 8.3 (competently) use it

4.8

4.6

4.5

5.0

The ability to effectively and 2019 6.4 correctly disseminate 2021 7.2 information, taking into account the requirements of the legislation

4.4

3.6

3.9

4.6

7

7

7

18

18

Fig. 3 Integral Media Literacy Index – 2019

Based on this gradation, the shares of respondents were calculated for the three levels of media literacy (see Table 12). It is noticeable that respondents with a high level of media literacy remained the smallest group in two countries: 3% (2019 and 2021, Uzbekistan), 1% vs. 4% (2019 and 2021, Tajikistan). Only in Kazakhstan,

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Fig. 4 Integral Media Literacy Index – 2021

the share of highly competent respondents increased significantly over the two year period from 6 to 16% (+10 p.p.). In Tajikistan, the general level of media literacy has slightly increased—the group of respondents with a low level of competence increased by 9 p.p. (from 47 to 56%). Tajikistan is the only country where the group of respondents with a low level of media competence exceeds half of all respondents, in Uzbekistan the groups with low and average self-assessment are equal in size (49% and 48%). Also, compared with 2019, the group with medium media literacy level increased slightly from 42 and 48% (+6 p.p.) in Uzbekistan. The integral index can also be presented as the average score for each country (see Table 13). The integral value of the index summarises previously made conclusions about the dynamics of the level of media literacy. Thus, compared to 2019, the index Table 12 Respondents shares by three levels of media literacy (%) Level

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

2021 (%)

2019 (%)

low level of media literacy

15

31

56

47

49

55

medium level of media literacy

69

64

40

51

48

42

high level of media literacy

16

6

4

1

3

3

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Table 13 Average values of the Integral Media Literacy Index Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

Max. value

2019

14.6

11.9

11.3

35

2021

17.2

11.5

12.2

35

value has changed: –0.4 p.p. (Tajikistan), + 0.9 p.p. (Uzbekistan) and + 2.7 p.p. (Kazakhstan). Among all the considered countries, only the average value of the Integral Media Literacy Index–2021 of the population of Kazakhstan (17.2) can be attributed to the medium level of media literacy, while the ML values in Tajikistan (11.5) and Uzbekistan (12.2) can be characterised as low.

4 Conclusion Thus, the methodology for measuring media literacy, developed for Russia, has shown its consistency in its application in other countries, including the ability to differentiate respondents by levels of individual media literacy in Central Asian countries. Self-reported levels of information skills and media literacy indices in the three countries show comprehensible changes in media literacy among these countries. As we have shown, media consumption is directly affected by infrastructure availability. The depth of broadband Internet coverage affects the devices from which information is consumed. Changes in the sphere of media regulation directly affect media literacy. Besides, there are still not enough programmes and training materials to improve the media literacy of the population in Central Asian countries. Despite the significant cultural differences of the considered countries, some communication patterns (trust in information sources, for instance) are similar to those in Russia. The form of distribution of the population with different individual levels of media literacy is similar in all four studied countries, which suggests that the process of media education (increasing / decreasing ML) has certain patterns that are similar for the countries in the Post-Soviet Middle East and probably in the Post-Soviet Area in general.

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