International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020 (Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics) 3031051327, 9783031051326

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN SPORT AND POLITICS

International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020 Austin Duckworth

Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics

Series Editor Martin Polley, International Centre for Sports History and Culture, De Montfort University, Leicester, Leicestershire, UK

Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics aims to nurture new research, both historical and contemporary, to the complex inter-relationships between sport and politics. The books in this series will range in their focus from the local to the global, and will embody a broad approach to politics, encompassing the ways in which sport has interacted with the state, dissidence, ideology, war, human rights, diplomacy, security, policy, identities, the law, and many other forms of politics. It includes approaches from a range of disciplines, and promotes work by new and established scholars from around the world.

Austin Duckworth

International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020

Austin Duckworth Austin, TX, USA

ISSN 2365-998X ISSN 2365-9998 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics ISBN 978-3-031-05132-6 ISBN 978-3-031-05133-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Shannon Fagan/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedicated to the victims of terrorism

Acknowledgments

I always read the acknowledgments first whenever I buy a new book. I love seeing how projects received help from so many different corners and how those contributions made the final project what it was. That said, this book would not be more than an idea in my head without my incredible support network. At the University of Texas at Austin, I was lucky to be surrounded by a gracious community of scholars. None of this would have happened without my doctoral advisor Thomas Hunt. Tommy has been a friend and guide since I first started my doctorate and it is an honor to call him a mentor. Tommy sharpened my writing and encouraged me to always look at the big picture. Jan Todd showed interest in a student that she did not advise and always provided me with thought-provoking questions and entertaining stories. I’m not sure the late Terry Todd ever knew how much his storytelling ability influenced my own attempts to tell a great story. Tolga Ozyurtcu, Matt Bowers, and Kim Beckwith all challenged me to think outside of my comfort area, to look at problems from different perspectives, and to truly push myself. A Dissertation Writing Fellowship from the University of Texas’ College of Education provided me the opportunity to singularly focus on this project for six months in 2018. For that, I am grateful. Archives can be a daunting challenge for a young scholar first diving into primary source historical research. Alex Renault at the Olympic Studies Center in Lausanne, Ray Wilson and Whitney Ross at the Ronald

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Reagan Presidential Library, and the staff at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library have all been exceptional and provided hours of sage advice and assistance. Steve Silverman and Bill Rathburn were both very gracious with their time during interviews. I am particularly indebted to Bill for his perspective on the challenges for preparing security for two separate Olympic Games. While there was not a singular cohort, the contributions of Florian Hemme, Dominic Morais, Ben Pollack, George Kioussis, Sam Schelfout, Tanya Jones, Andrew Hao, Ryan Murtha, and Lauren Osmer are scattered throughout this work. In each of their unique ways, those individuals commiserated, offered ideas, or just laughed at some of the idiosyncrasies of studying sport and history. Cindy Slater, Geoff Schmalz, Ryan Blake, and Christy Toms deserve special mention, as they constitute the nucleus that keeps the Stark Center up and running. My academic career began in the fall of 2008 at the University of Alabama and over my five years at the Capstone I had the privilege of working with some fantastic scholars. I cannot overstate the influence of Dr. Barbara Fischer. Her untimely death inevitably altered my life, but her emphasis that I study in Germany one summer indirectly led to this book. Dr. Rasma Lazda, who led that 2010 adventure, stepped into the void and, through her exceptional kindness, did her best to soften the blow from the loss of her colleague. In the History Department, Dr. John Beeler displayed the benefits of humor and enthusiasm when approaching history while Dr. Howard Jones offered immense amounts of help in consolidating my athletic and academic identities. It is no exaggeration to say that I would not be where I am without the Trak Shak in Birmingham, Alabama, where I worked for a year before embarking on this goal. I won’t disclose my only interview question but thank you Jeff, Scott, Q, Val, and Tracy for your friendship and for teaching me that it was possible to work hard and have fun at the same time. This book became a reality during the 21 months I spent employed as a post-doctorate fellow at Aarhus University. There’s not enough I can say to express my appreciation to Jörg Krieger for his friendship, the opportunity to work with him, and for teaching me the value of writing and thinking at Peter Gift. My family has been my constant source of support and encouragement. John and Julie Duckworth are two incredible parents who encouraged me to always chase after my interests. All of my grandparents have played an

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important role throughout my life and I thank them for always supporting my endeavors. I have had the joy of playing the role of older brother to two sisters who taught me patience and who possess a creativity to which I can only aspire. To my aunt, Dr. Tammie Kaufman, thank you for always being there, answering my questions, and providing advice on life within academia. The sole constant in my life since I arrived in Austin, Texas, to start a Ph.D. in 2015 was a relationship maintained over thousands of miles. For the past seven years, Elizabeth Laseter listened, read various drafts, made edits, offered suggestions, and listened to frustrations vented during innumerable runs. Her unwavering belief that I could do it is the foundation of this entire project.

Contents

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Introduction

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The Growth of the Olympics as International Spectacle

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Passing the Torch, 1972–1980

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International Liaison and the 1984 Olympic Games

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“Decisive Political Ways”: The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games

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“A Most Spectacular Example of Cross-Border Collaboration”: Albertville and Barcelona

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Atlanta Attacked: The Centennial Park Bombing

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Technology and Pandemics: The Post-2000 Olympic Games

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Conclusion

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Index

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About the Author

Austin Duckworth is an independent scholar who most recently worked as a postdoctoral fellow at Aarhus University. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Texas at Austin in Physical Culture and Sports Studies. His research interests are international relations, security, and sport.

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Abbreviations

AGOC AOOC BOOC CIA COJO DOD DSS ETA FBI FEMA IOC IOOC JCAG JRA LAOOC LAPD LOOC LPOOC MOOC NFIB NOC NSA OAG OCOG OLECC OSCC

Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee Albertville Olympic Games Organizing Committee Barcelona Olympic Games Organizing Committee Central Intelligence Agency Montreal Olympic Games Organizing Committee Department of Defense Diplomatic Security Service Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Emergency Management Agency International Olympic Committee Innsbruck Olympic Games Organizing Committee Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide Japanese Red Army Los Angeles Olympic Games Organizing Committee Los Angeles Police Department Lillehammer Olympic Games Organizing Committee Lake Placid Olympic Games Organizing Committee Munich Olympic Games Organizing Committee National Foreign Intelligence Board National Olympic Committee National Security Agency Olympic Advisory Group Olympic Games Organizing Committee Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council Olympic Security Coordination Center xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

PFLP PLO RAF RCMP SOGOC SOOC

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestinian Liberation Organization Red Army Faction Royal Canadian Mounted Police Seoul Olympic Games Organizing Committee Sarajevo Olympic Games Organizing Committee

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Shortly before 4:30 AM on September 5, 1972, a group of Canadian athletes approached the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany. Comprised predominantly of members of the water polo team, the athletes were in a celebratory mood after watching the Canadian hockey team defeat the Soviet Union in the Canada-Soviet Summit Series.1 Like many of the athletes competing in Munich, rather than walking to the entrance, the group scaled the chain link fence surrounding the Olympic Village and helped several other athletes over as well. Unbeknownst to the Canadians, the other “athletes” they helped hop the fence that night were in actuality eight members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September. Soon after returning to the dormitory, one of the fence-hoppers named Dave Hart heard popping sounds he thought were firecrackers. He assumed, “someone had won a medal and was celebrating.”2 In reality, Hart 1 Following the attack, the surviving terrorists claimed American athletes helped them over the fence into the Village. In reality, they mistook the Canadians for Americans. Cathal Kelly, “Munich massacre terrorists helped unwittingly by Canadians in 1972 Olympic atrocity.” Thestar.com. April 28, 2012. Accessed August 15, 2017. https://www.thestar.com/sports/olympics/2012/04/28/kelly_munich_massacre_ terrorists_helped_unwittingly_by_canadians_in_1972_olympic_atrocity.html. 2 Cathal Kelly, “Munich massacre terrorists helped unwittingly by Canadians in 1972 Olympic atrocity.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_1

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heard gunshots. Black September entered the dormitory housing the Israeli Olympic team, shot and killed wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg and champion weightlifter Yossef Romano, and took nine other Israeli’s hostage.3 At the time of the Munich Olympic Games, the Olympic Charter clearly stated, “The aims of the Olympic Movement... [are] to bring together the athletes of the world in a great quadrennial festival of sports thereby creating international respect and goodwill and thus helping to construct a better and more peaceful world.”4 The Charter is silent on how to proceed if a group uses the Olympics as an opportunity to destroy that peaceful world. Less than forty-eight hours after the initial attack, an attempted rescue of the hostages went awry and ended with the deaths of all the Israelis and five of the Palestinians.5 The attack left the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and its president, Avery Brundage, with a new challenge to confront. Brundage famously informed the global television audience on September 7, 1972, “The Games must go on.”6 While Brundage clearly stated his belief that the Games not succumb to outside pressure, his stance created new problems for the IOC 3 Weinberg was initially shot through the cheek and forced to lead the Black September members to the other Israelis. He led them to Apartment 3, which housed the weightlifters and wrestlers. Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation “Wrath of God,” (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), 3-8. 4 “Olympic Charter,” (International Olympic Committee, 1972), https://stillmed.oly mpic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Olympic-Studies-Centre/List-ofResources/Official-Publications/Olympic-Charters/EN-1972-Olympic-Charter-OlympicRules-and-Regulations.pdf#_ga=2.246067396.1175742536.1528976047-667839264.152 8976047. Emphasis added. 5 The literature on the 1972 Munich Olympics is extensive. A brief selection includes David Clay Large, Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012); Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2005. A consideration of the impact of the Munich attack on counter-terrorism for the Olympics is found in Albert Gamarra, “Securing the Gold: Olympic Security from a Counter-Terrorist Perspective,” in A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned, ed. M.R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell (New York: Springer, 2009), 205-218. 6 Portions of Brundage’s speech can be found in Red Smith, “Again the Sandbox,” New York Times, September 8, 1972. A brief video excerpt of Brundage’s speech which includes the famous quote can be found at, “Avery Brundage: Speech after Munich massacre,” Online Footage video, 0:11, October 16, 2014, http://www.onlinefootage. tv/stock-video-footage/31073/avery-brundage-speech-after-the-munich-massacre-duringthe-olympic-games-the-games-must-go-on-president-of-the-international-olympic-commit tee-mourning-ceremony-memorial-service.

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and Olympic Games Organizing Committee (OCOG). Who possessed responsibility for providing security at an Olympic Games? What if an OCOG needed to utilize a national government’s resources to provide security? Would securing such aid not be a tacit admission that politics play an integral role in modern sport? The genesis of this book comes from my early attempts to find answers to those questions and from a personal experience in encountering what I perceived to be an incredibly large police force guarding the 2016 New York City half-marathon. This project gained momentum when additional research revealed that there had not been an archival-based study of security at the Olympics and the latest monograph focused on the security of the Olympics prior to September 11 is nearly two decades old. Visits to several archives across the globe, including the IOC’s archive in Lausanne, confirmed that there was a greater story yet to be told. Further study unveiled the deeply political nature of security at the Olympics and displayed how much of what occurs in Olympic cities today has its roots in the years after the attack in Munich. What I was also struck by in Lausanne was that the IOC had no substantive discussions on security for over one decade following the attack in Munich. There are relatively few attractive theories to explain this silence. Perhaps the most logical is that IOC members simply thought it best to leave the matters to those with military expertise.7 This theory is palatable, but I found the IOC’s response to doping as a more accurate framework to utilize. As argued by historian Thomas M. Hunt in examining the IOC’s doping policies, “the IOC leadership tended to try to shift responsibility to other organizations in the Olympic governance system.”8 The IOC adopted a similar stance in relation to security. Contrast this attitude to now where host cities for the Olympics now prepare documents for their bid to host the Olympics that contain entire sections devoted to security and sign contracts guaranteeing the safety of visitors. This book is an attempt to understand how the IOC went from ignoring security to making it something that could be contractually guaranteed.

7 Guy R. Sanan, “Olympic Security 1972-1996: Threat, Response, And International Cooperation,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Andrews University, 1997), 137. 8 Thomas M. Hunt, Drug Games: The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 1960-2008. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 25.

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A significant point to remember in the following chapters is that security for the Olympic Games became standardized over time, despite the differences resulting from geography, cultural norms, and political systems. One group of scholars argues this process results from the “exceptionality of Olympic security... [which] culminates in standardized approaches that are mapped onto the uneven terrain of diverse host cities.”9 Each OCOG sends representatives, at times government officials, to learn from previous OCOG. For example, American officials traveled to Yugoslavia in 1984 to provide advice for the Sarajevo Winter Olympics. This cooperation was not limited to previous hosts as the United States (US) again provided support for Athens 2004 and Turin in 2006.10 For the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics, the US Diplomatic Security Service worked in tandem with Brazil’s International Police Cooperation Centre.11 This transfer of knowledge also occurred through the IOC’s Delegate Security, an IOC member named Ashwini Kumar, who plays a significant role in this book. In his role, Kumar once described “a modern sophisticated telecommunication network, and all the help that modern technology [could] offer” as “fundamental requirements” for Olympic security.12 Kumar appears throughout this book as he was the first individual to truly appreciate that the IOC needed to pay more attention and play a more significant role in security for the Olympics. He was also a vocal and frequent advocate of employing technology to combat terrorist groups. In his voluminous correspondence, he repeatedly returned to the importance of using the most modern technology in every aspect of security. In one report, he wrote: 9 Pete Fussey, Jon Coaffee, Dick Hobbs, and Gary Armstrong, Securing and Sustaining

the Olympic City, (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 61. See also, Fussey and Coaffee, “Balancing Local and Global Security Leitmotifs: Counter-Terrorism and the Spectacle of Sporting Mega-Events.” 10 Duckworth and Hunt, “Protecting the Games: The International Olympic Committee and Security, 1972–1984.” US Government Accountability Office, Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance US Support to Future Olympic Games, GAO-06753 (Washington, D.C. 2006), 7, Accessed April 2, 2020. https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 240/233002.pdf 11 “2016 DSS Year in Review,” State.gov, August 31, 2017, https://www.state.gov/ 2016-dss-year-in-review-text-version/ 12 Ashwini Kumar, Security at the Olympic/World Games, Folder: Ashwini Kumar Correspondence 1986-1988, File: Correspondence 1988, IOCA.

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Fullest advantage ought to be derived of the technological advancements and the available state of art equipment pressed into service in aid of security whether it is access control, detection of intrusion, warning signals, communications, violation of allotted wireless frequencies, detection and disposal of explosives, aerial and coastal patrols, security against nuclear and biological and chemical contamination and so forth. The modern Criminals, particularly the international terrorist have the back up support of the newest technology and the organizers of the Olympic Security cannot afford to lag behind.13

While in his role at the IOC Kumar could not influence a foreign government’s policy, his work as the IOC’s primary security advisor makes his ideas on security an important piece of the puzzle to consider. The Olympic Games in recent years look vastly different than those that occurred in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union no longer exists. China not only sends teams to compete but is an active host of the Olympic Games. Over two hundred countries send athletes to represent their nations. Security, however, is one major area where decisions made in the mid-late 1970s and early 1980s continue to make their presence felt today. Over the course of this book, I trace how the use of the military, an embrace of security technology, and international cooperation are major themes within Olympic security that had roots in the aftermath of Munich and continue to influence how security at the Olympic Games operates. By tracing these developments over time, this book shows that there are some unintended consequences today on a scale that security planners in the 1970s could not have foreseen. Throughout this book, I highlight how decisions made in the Cold War era continue to impact security policymaking for the Olympic Games.

Defining Olympic Security In the sole historical treatise on Olympic security Guy Sanan wrote, “the influence of the state and the Realist conception of international relations is plainly evident in a number of broad facets of Olympic security operations; not least affecting the level of international cooperation for

13 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, May 9th, 1988, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1988, IOCA.

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the purpose of securing the Games.”14 Specifically, Sanan pointed to sharing of information between countries, or intelligence cooperation, as an example of Realism. He claimed that intelligence sharing “is illustrative not only of the influence of the host state, but also the influence of participating Olympic states, which exercise considerable restraint in sharing intelligence.”15 Sanan overstated his case. Olympic security is a cooperative effort among a wide variety of actors. From local to federal levels of law enforcement to the ability of allies (both traditional and non-traditional) to collaborate, Olympic security involves a wide-ranging, entangled web of interests. Rather than “considerable restraint,” the following chapters show that nations that hosted the Olympics shared intelligence far more frequently than Sanan suggests. While cases of intelligence sharing among non-traditional allies are not as bountiful as incidents among traditional allies, that such instances occurred speaks to the complex nature of Olympic security. Here, Sanan contended that, “intelligence cooperation amongst states which are not traditional allies, and may even be enemies... occurred for the Olympics, but there is little overt evidence of it.”16 As will be shown, however, such cooperation has occurred in the past, even if on a limited basis. Rather than a Realist approach to international relations, this book argues that the “world politics paradigm” described by political scientists Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane is best suited to analyze the development of Olympic security. While not rejecting the Realist assumption that states are the most powerful actors, Nye and Keohane note that the costs of direct confrontation lead to states and transnational organizations engaging in “new kinds of bargains, coalitions, and alliances.”17 One sees this trend in the collaborations between the IOC, Organizing Committees, and national governments ahead of the Olympics starting in the early 1980s. It is necessary to define what I mean when I use the term “security.” According to Webster’s Dictionary, security is first defined as “the quality

14 Guy R. Sanan, “Olympic Security 1972-1996: Threat, Response, And International Cooperation,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Andrews University, 1997), 364. 15 Sanan, “Olympic Security 1972-1996,” 347, 365. 16 Sanan, “Olympic Security 1972-1996,” 347. 17 Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 723.

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or state of being secure: such as[,] a: freedom from danger.”18 Admittedly, this is a fairly broad definition as one can encounter danger in various forms. Political scientist Edward A. Kolodziej further clarified the difficulty in defining security when he argued, “If a broad and inclusive understanding of security is taken as the starting point... then it would be tantamount to saying that almost every human value and interest, if perceived by the affected party to be threatened, is a security issue.”19 In order to narrow what I mean by the term “security,” I focus specifically on security threats, most frequently international terrorism, identified by Organizing Committees, national governments, and intelligence agencies as they prepared to host the Olympic Games. That said, some governments identified less “traditional” security threats, like the Soviet Union’s insistence in 1980 on preventing citizens from interacting with Western visitors. Like security, terrorism has an amorphous definition. “[T]he term ‘terrorism’ (like ‘guerrilla’) has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not necessarily political, act of violence,” argued historian of terrorism Walter Laquer.20 Narrowing this definition is particularly difficult in relation to the Olympics. Part of the issue is the IOC’s outward insistence that politics not interfere with the Olympics.21 Sociologist Pete Fussey notes that some terrorist attacks that drew the attention of Olympic security planners had no connection to the Olympic Games.22 In his study of terrorism at the Olympics, sociologist Ramón Spaaij defined terrorism as, “the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian

18 “Security.” Merriam-Webster. Accessed July 01, 2017. https://www.merriam-web ster.com/dictionary/security. 19 Edward A. Kolodziej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2. 20 Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 6. 21 Rule 50 Sect. 2 of the Olympic Charter specifically states, “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.” Quote found in “Olympic Charter,” (International Olympic Committee, September 2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 22 A. Richards, P. Fussey, and A. Silke, Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future (London: Routledge, 2010), 240-242.

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targets, in order to attain political aims.”23 Spaaij focuses the majority of his analysis on state terrorism, noting that the two worst terror attacks in the history of the Olympics resulted from state-sponsored attacks.24 I have chosen to use the definition of terrorism provided by Spaaij as a reference point as the vast majority of identified terrorist threats toward the Olympics fall within his definition. Much of the analysis on security for the Olympic Games focuses on those events that took place following the 9/11 attacks in New York City. One drawback to the focus on recent Olympic Games is a loss of historical context. For example, Greek scholar Minas Samatas argued, “the troubled example of the Athens 2004 Olympics allows us to conclude that 9/11 accelerated the transformation of the Olympics into an enormously costly security and surveillance spectacle.”25 This claim does not take into consideration the multiple renditions of the Olympic Games that occurred after Munich 1972 and before 9/11. While the events of 9/11 did represent one of the most significant changes in Olympic security, the transformation of the Olympics into a “security and surveillance spectacle” occurred in the years after Munich and before 9/11.26 At the 1976 Winter Olympics in Innsbruck, Austria, the New York Times reported, “There will be more than two policemen and soldiers for every participant, and the sight of steel-helmeted, machine-gun-carrying men... will not give this spectacle a scene of peace and calm.”27 Increased security at the Olympics came with increased costs to the Organizing Committees and host cities. If plotted on a graph, one would see a fairly consistent rise of spending on security marked by large spikes 23 Ramón Spaaij, “Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 4 (2016): 451–68. 24 Spaaij, “Terrorism and Security at the Olympics,” 452–453. Under Spaaij’s definition, the major difference in state terrorism is that it is “carried out by representatives of the state.” 25 Minas Samatas, "Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics in the Aftermath of 9/11: International Pressures and Domestic Implications" in Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events ed. C.J. Bennett and K. Haggerty (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014), 67. 26 See, Austin Duckworth and Thomas M. Hunt, “Protecting the Games: The International Olympic Committee and Security, 1972-1984,” Olympika 25 (2016): 68–87. 27 “Games Security Guards to Outnumber Athletes, 2 to 1,” New York Times, January 25, 1976.

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following major incidents that led to calls for more security.28 Spending on security at the Olympics expanded from roughly $23 million for the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics to over $895 million for the 2016 Rio Summer Games.29 This increase was, initially, in direct response to the attack on Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and slowly increased until a major jump in spending came following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City prior to the 2004 Games in Athens, Greece. Yet with the prolific literature on the relationship between security and terrorism at the Olympic Games, there is minimal literature that analyzes the historical trajectory of this trend. The work of Ramón Spaaij briefly touches upon history when he traces how scholars study the history of security at the Olympics. To date, Guy Sanan’s two-decade-old treatise on the topic is the sole manuscript length source.30 While Sanan’s work is quite thorough, his analysis suffers from a lack of archival evidence.31 Documents declassified by national governments and the IOC in the years since Sanan’s writing provide a different perspective on the IOC and security at the Olympic Games. More recently, Vida Bajc’s edited collection of essays provides a historical examination of security at the Olympics; however, one of the most influential figures in altering the IOC’s security policy, IOC security delegate Ashwini Kumar, is not mentioned in Bajc’s volume.32 This book is the first to utilize newly released archival documents to show the development of security policy at the Olympics over the course of nearly three decades. Analyzing the legacy of the Olympic Games is one thematic topic where historical studies make a contribution. In a groundbreaking work, 28 The introduction to Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser’s "Security governance and sport mega-events” provides the exact figures for security spending from the Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics ($66.2 million) to the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics ($1.5 billion). 29 Canadian scholar Dominique Clément displays that, while scholarship cites $100 million, the number started at $14.5 million and later ballooned to $23 million. “The Transformation of Security Planning for the Olympics: The 1976 Montreal Games,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 13. 30 Sanan, “Olympic Security.”. 31 Sanan’s work relies heavily

on interview material and he frequently cites “unattributable sources” in his work. See Sanan, “Olympic Security,” 311. 32 Vida Bajc, Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016).

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Clément examined the legacy and the impact of the security planning at the Montreal Olympic Games on Canada’s domestic security policy.33 The study of legacy extends to those scholars who focus their analysis on more recent renditions of the Games. In the case of the Melbourne Olympics, historical research showed how legislation passed for the Olympics continued following the Closing Ceremony.34 The most recent historical examination used three separate Olympic Games in Canada to trace the evolution of security over four decades. A trio of Canadian scholars compared the security surrounding the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics and the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics as both occurred in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. The focus was on examining these Olympics through the “politics of catastrophe.”35 This theory focuses on planning for worst-case scenarios. The Olympics, the authors contend, provide an ideal arena to utilize this concept. They note that fears over the high profile of the Olympics providing an “ideal platform for catastrophic terrorism” led to “a fixation on ‘nightmare’ and ‘worst-case scenarios’ [that drove] increasingly expensive, expansive and militarized security apparatuses designed to protect the Games from all possible risks.”36 The authors only briefly comment on the importance of collaboration among nations and the growing influence of the IOC in the organization of security since Montreal 1976.37 By analyzing the personal correspondence of American and British statesmen, the personal papers and correspondence of IOC members, the 33 Dominique Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning for the Olympics: The 1976 Montreal Games,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 1–25. 34 Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, “Surveillance and Securitization: A Forgotten Sydney Olympic Legacy,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47, no. 3 (2012): 324–37. For further discussion see Robert Cottrell, “The Legacy of Munich 1972: Terrorism, Security and the Olympic Games,” in The Legacy of the Olympic Games 19842000, ed. M. de Moragas, C Kennett, and N Puig (Lausanne, Switzerland: International Olympic Committee, n.d.), 309–13. 35 Philip Boyle, Dominique Clément, and Kevin D Haggerty, “Iterations of Olympic Security: Montreal and Vancouver,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 2 (September 15, 2014): 109–25. 36 Boyle, Clément, and Haggerty, “Iterations of Olympic Security,” 111. See also Alphus Hinds and Elina Vlachou, “Fortress Olympics: Counting the Cost of Major Event Security,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 19, no. 5 (2007): 20–26. 37 The authors describe the contemporary IOC as “an international broker of security expertise” and note the contribution of “transnational networks of policing.” Boyle, Clément, and Haggerty, “Iterations of Olympic Security,” 115.

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minutes of IOC meetings, declassified intelligence documents from the United States government, Central Intelligence Agency, and East German Security Service (Stasi) along with a wide range of newspaper articles, this book illustrates how the IOC took a more dynamic role in security. The actual implementation of security measures is more focused in earlier chapters when the IOC left policy decisions to individual Organizing Committees. Like all projects, this one has some limitations. The following argument relies on documents from the International Olympic Committee’s archives, presidential libraries within the United States, and government documents available from around the globe. As security can be in the eye of the beholder, this project would no doubt be enriched by Soviet sources, or in the case of the Seoul Olympics, the viewpoints of the North Koreans. An additional limitation is that the following discussion focuses solely on the Olympic Games. As such, there is little discussion of other international sporting bodies, like FIFA, or analysis of how other sporting organizations dealt with security during this time period.

Chapter Organization The following book discusses the Olympic Games in roughly chronological order. The early chapters cover the time period where the IOC played little role in providing security for the Olympic Games before the subsequent chapters examine the introduction of the IOC Security Delegate Ashwini Kumar and how his conception of liaison altered the IOC’s relationship to security. The final chapters cover the Centennial Park bombings, the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and considers where security at the Olympic Games is heading in the future. The focus throughout is on the previously identified themes regarding the military, security technology, and international cooperation. Before starting this analysis, the second chapter provides a brief outline of events predating the attack in Munich. This section has two purposes. The first is to show that political considerations existed from the outset of the modern Olympics in 1896. Understanding how politics played an important role from the outset of the Olympics is vital to realizing the inherently political nature of the Olympic Games and how this made the Olympics a viable target for terrorists. Secondly, this discussion displays the role of television in making the Olympic Games a spectacle that could provide terrorists a vehicle to broadcast their cause to a global audience.

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The third chapter begins with the attack in Munich and discusses the impact of Munich on the Olympics in 1976 and 1980. A focus of this chapter is the actual implementation of security at the Olympic Games as later chapters hone in on international cooperation in security preparations. This section will display that the IOC took a very laissezfaire approach to security at the Olympics even in the aftermath of the attack. A note sent by Lord Michael Morris Killanin, then IOC President, to IOC Director Monique Berlioux, best summarizes the attitude of the IOC toward security from 1972 to 1980. Killanin wrote that he discussed “various security stories” with Canadian IOC member James Worrall but believed “[Security] of course [was] completely a matter for the Canadians, but…[the IOC] should be kept fully informed.”38 The IOC’s security policy lay at the heart of this contradiction. Security was not the IOC’s problem, but they needed to be “fully informed” about preparations. The fourth chapter transitions from the heavily guarded Olympics in Montreal to Lake Placid and the American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games. Several missteps in the organization of security at Lake Placid, including the Organizing Committee’s decision to give a contract to a firm under investigation by the American government for links to international terrorism, highlighted the need for a more thorough security planning apparatus. American President Jimmy Carter defined his decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games as one of national security.39 While the United States team did not compete in Moscow, the CIA provided President Carter with a lengthy report on the Soviet Union’s preparations for the Games, including potential security arrangements.40

38 Letter from Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, 1 May 1976, COJO: correspondance janvier-mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, International Olympic Committee Library (hereafter IOCL). 39 A discussion of the technological innovations surrounding security at Lake Placid is found in Pete Fussey and Jon Coaffee, “Olympic Rings of Steel: Constructing Security for 2012 and Beyond,” ed. C.J. Bennett and K. Haggerty, Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events, (London: Routledge, 2011). One of the most thorough studies of the American boycott of the Moscow Games is Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 40 For the full report the CIA sent to Jimmy Carter, see “Memorandum for The President, The Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Assistant to the Secretary for National Security Affairs,” January 9, 1980, Central Intelligence Agency

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In the fifth chapter, the focus is the evolution of the IOC from disinterested observer to more active participant in security policy. One goal of this section is to bring to the fore the contributions of Indian IOC member Ashwini Kumar in taking a proactive role in focusing the attention of other IOC members on security. Nominated by new IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch to lead IOC security operations prior to the 1984 Olympic Games in Sarajevo and Los Angeles, Kumar advocated the IOC’s role as the liaison between national governments and Organizing Committees.41 While the leadership of Juan Antonio Samaranch as IOC President following Lord Killanin aided Kumar’s efforts, Kumar played a vital role in altering the IOC’s perceptions on security at the Olympic Games. A second aim of this section is to analyze a visit by American officials to Belgrade ahead of the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. This intelligence-sharing mission provides an example of a liaison system in action and evidence that nations shared information ahead of the Olympic Games. The 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea, provided one of the most difficult security planning tasks since Munich.42 The sixth chapter of this book shows that the cooling of the Cold War actually contributed rather than detracting from the tense political tensions surrounding the Games. As IOC lawyer Samuel Pisar wrote in May of 1988, “East and West [were] in a posture of détente; neither Washington nor Moscow want[ed] incidents that might poison the improving climate.”43 Seoul is perhaps the best example of Ashwini Kumar’s conception of liaison Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (hereafter CIA FOIA ERR), Document No. 0003387227. 41 A brief discussion on security preparations for the Los Angeles Olympics, including the rivalry between local law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is found in Christopher R. Hill, Olympic Politics (Manchester University Press, 1996), 146152. 42 The authoritative tome on the Seoul Olympics and the IOC is former IOC Vice-President Richard Pound’s Richard W Pound, Five Rings over Korea: The Secret Negotiations behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul (New York: Little, Brown, 1994). A consideration of the role of television at the Seoul Olympics is found in James F Larson and Heung-Soo Park, Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Philip ‘Agati, The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 43 “Proposal for a Further Initiative Between South and North Korea,” May 24, 1988, Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d ‘êtê de Sêoul 1988 correspondance janvier-juillet 1988, Folder: correspondance, juillet 1988, IOCL.

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between nations and the IOC at work prior to the Olympics. While a North Korean attempt to dissuade attendance at the Games by destroying a passenger airliner led to minor disagreements between the United States and Soviet Union amid nuclear arms treaty discussions, this section shows that both nations sought a peaceful Olympic Games in Seoul. The persistent fear over a provocation by the North Koreans in the midst of the Games led IOC member Willi Daume to write Samaranch, asking if it was possible for Samaranch to use his powers as IOC President to pressure the Soviets to help prevent a North Korean attack.44 The focal points for the seventh chapter are the post-Cold War Olympic Games in 1992 when the Olympic Games traveled to Albertville, France, and Barcelona, Spain. These two events attracted different types of security concerns. In light of the Chernobyl disaster, the proximity of a nuclear reactor to the Olympic site in Albertville led concerned citizens to complain to the IOC and request a change of venue. Barcelona was the first Summer Olympic Games to occur following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the newly formed Unified team made headlines, Olympic organizers focused on the threat of Basque separatist movements that may target the Games as a means to bring attention to their fight for independence. Additionally, strained relations between the city of Barcelona and the Spanish government meant security preparations moved much slower than in previous years. Following Barcelona, the Winter and Summer Games rotated every two years. The 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer were the first to not occur in the same year as the Summer Games. Security concerns arose from the animosity between two American figure skaters, Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding, as well as Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. At the Centennial Olympic Games at the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics, a lone terrorist named Eric Rudolph aimed to force the cancelation of the Olympic Games due to his anger over what he described as “abortion on demand.”45 The report written after the conclusion of 44 Letter from Willi Daume to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 25 January 1988, Politique aux Jeux Olympiques ‘êtê de Sêoul 1988 correspondance janvier-juillet 1988, Folder: correspondance, janvier-fêvrier 1988, IOCL. 45 For Rudolph’s confession to his crimes see “Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession.” NPR. April 14, 2005. Accessed July 05, 2017. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=4600480.

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the Games provides some of the more alarming aspects of security in Atlanta. Written by a “Technical Commission,” the authors commented, “Towards the latter stages of the Games some areas of security became lax and this could have created problems.”46 The authors failed to explain how security could become lax following an attack. The final chapter covers a span of nearly two decades and goes up to the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympic Games. The primary focus in this chapter is tracing how some of the book’s notable themes, including using the military for security, embracing the use of security technology, and international cooperation, worked at every rendition of the Olympic Games in the twenty-first century. Given that the archival and governmental records for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games became public record only in January 2021, covering this amount of time in the final chapter proved to be the most efficient and detailed way to convey how security continued on a path set in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The book concludes by providing a brief summary of the previously discussed trajectory and reiterates the major turning points in Olympic security. Entire books could be written focusing solely on the security process from conception to completion at a single Olympic Games. As such, I do not claim to cover every single security incident that has occurred at the Olympics nor do I delve deeply into every domestic ramification of the implementation of security at the Olympics. My primary aim is to bring some clarity to the complex geopolitical question that is security at the Olympic Games.

46 “Minutes of the 106th IOC Session,” Lausanne, September 3rd-6th, 1997, IOCL,

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CHAPTER 2

The Growth of the Olympics as International Spectacle

On September 2, 1870, Emperor Napoleon III of France surrendered to King Wilhelm I of Prussia following a heavy French defeat at Verdun. While only a child at the time of his country’s surrender, a Parisian aristocrat named Pierre de Coubertin later placed blame for his nation’s defeat on the physical health of his countrymen.1 At the age of seventeen, Coubertin enrolled at the French military academy Saint-Cyr but left prior to graduation.2 He subsequently traveled to England, which historian John J. MacAloon described as “a result of Coubertin’s inability to settle on a vocation.”3 The trip had a profound impact on Coubertin. Influenced by Thomas Hughes’ memories of his experience at Rugby School, chronicled in his book Tom Brown’s School Days, Coubertin

1 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 9. Guttmann contends the defeat “haunted” Coubertin and notes “young Frenchmen were on average less robust than their rugged counterparts on the other side of the Rhine.”. 2 According to his biographer John J. MacAloon, Coubertin sought “action and distinction, and candidates were flocking to St.-Cyr in such number that peacetime distinctions were not easily achieved,” Quote found in This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 40. 3 MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 44.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_2

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sought to emulate the English school system that combined sport and education.4 The English sport system appealed to Coubertin in part as it was the antithesis of his Prussian rivals who trained in the arts of Turnen, a form of non-competitive exercise.5 On his visit to England, Coubertin found a nation obsessed with sports.6 At some undefined point, this influence transformed into a desire within Coubertin to restart the ancient Olympic Games. According to one Coubertin biographer, “[He] never felt concerned or self-confident enough to set down a detailed record of how the [Olympic] idea was planted and grew in his own mind.”7 Crucially for the history of the Olympic movement, Coubertin’s personal motivations changed. No longer was his desire one of revenge against the Prussians. Rather, he preached the values of internationalism and the role of sport in forging peace.8

4 The inspirational figure for Coubertin was the headmaster of Rugby School, Thomas

Arnold. Guttmann argues that the actual Arnold “was far more interested in [his pupil’s] moral education than in their physical development,” The Olympics, 9. 5 On Turnen see Arnd Krüger, “Turnen und Turnunterricht zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik–Die Grundlage der heutigen Schulsportmisere.” Ursachen der Schulsportmisere in Deutschland (1979): 13–31; For Jahn, see Horst Ueberhorst, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and his Time, 1778–1852 (Munich and Baltimore: Moos, 1982); Hans Kohn, “Father Jahn and the War Against the West,” in The Mind of Germany (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960): 69–98; on the conflict between sport and Turnen, see Gertrud Pfister, “Cultural Confrontations: German Turnen, Swedish Gymnastics and English Sport–European Diversity in Physical Activities from a Historical Perspective,” Culture, Sport, Society 6, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 61–91. 6 Guttmann, The Olympics, 8. Guttmann wrote, “the English had apparently gone mad for sports.”. 7 MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 138. There were other competing attempts to restart the Olympics. In Athens, Evangelis Zappas restarted a version of the Olympics but one that only included the Greeks. The series stopped in 1889. Guttmann notes the influence of another Englishman, William Penny Brookes, on Coubertin. Brooks held an “Olympian Games” in 1849 in Much Wenlock. Coubertin discussed reviving the Olympic Games with Brookes in 1890. The key difference between prior attempts and Coubertin’s was, as Guttmann argues, Coubertin’s ability at simply “getting people’s attention,” See The Olympics, 9–11. 8 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 172. The most commonly cited rationale for Coubertin’s change of heart was his experience traveling. Guttmann writes, “Travel may not broaden everyone, but it seems to have extended Coubertin’s horizons. At any rate, his youthful fantasy of revanche against the loathsome Prussians was gradually tempered by a more humane

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Coubertin’s efforts to restart the Olympics met some initial resistance. When he announced his intentions at a contrived celebration of the anniversary of the Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques, the crowd’s general reaction was one of “puzzlement.”9 In his memoirs, Coubertin recalled the attendees “applauded, approved and wished [him] great success, but no one had understood. It was total, absolute incomprehension.”10 Most concerning, the Greek government did not match Coubertin’s enthusiasm to hold the Games in Athens and in Greece the topic soon became a political tool between different factions competing for control of Greece’s government.11 After convincing the Greek government to host the Games, Coubertin ran into a lack of interest from other nations, particularly the Germans who concentrated on Turnen. Historian Alfred Senn argues Coubertin needed the Germans as “[w]ithout them, these Olympics would have only a pale international character, but many Germans distrusted [Coubertin] and his ideas because he was, after all, French.”12 Coubertin’s aim that the Olympic Games would enhance understanding between nations dissipated following the first modern Olympiad in Athens in 1896. Despite his difficulties with the Greeks and Germans, Coubertin facilitated the arrival of fourteen nations and over two hundred athletes to Athens. A Greek athlete named Spyridon Louis won the inaugural Olympic marathon. Upon seeing Louis enter the stadium, the Crown Prince Constantine and his brother ran to the track and accompanied the peasant water-carrier to the finish line. Upon seeing this, the French political theorist Charles Maurras told Coubertin, “I see that your internationalism... does not kill national spirit—it strengthens it.”13 Far from their initial reluctance, the Greek government now demanded the

philosophy,” The Olympics, 11. MacAloon’s account of Coubertin’s travels to England evokes a similar image, This Great Symbol, 43–82. 9 Guttmann, The Olympics, 12. Guttmann recounts the story of one attendee who assumed Coubertin spoke not of the ancient athletic contests but of a contemporary theatre production. See also MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 163. 10 Quote found in MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 163. 11 Guttmann, The Olympics, 15. 12 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), 22. 13 Quote found in Guttmann, The Olympics, 19.

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Games be held eternally in Greece.14 Exactly one year following the close of the Athens Olympics, Turkey declared war on Greece. The struggle ended in humiliation for the Greeks and critics blamed the Olympics for indirectly starting the war. Coubertin wrote, “I consider it beyond a doubt that the success of the Games somewhat intoxicated opinion and gave the Hellenes a dangerous confidence as much in their own forces as in the good will of foreign nations.”15 Coubertin set in motion a movement that faced the great political quandaries of the twentieth century. From war to boycotts to the division of nations between foes, the IOC had to make difficult decisions that were, inherently, political. Simultaneously, the views of nation-states, both existent and emerging, about the value of the Olympic Games clashed with those of the IOC. “While Olympic officials have espoused the creed of universal participation for the betterment of mankind,” historian Richard Espy argued, “the nations of the world have interpreted participation in the Games as an opportunity to express national identification.”16 At times, that expression led to conflict. The following chapter traces the development of the Olympic Games from the turn of the twentieth century to 1972. Specifically, the focus is on early security considerations at the Olympics and how this impacted the events in Munich. A second theme of this chapter is the evolution of the Games to a spectacle that drew international attention and most importantly, global television broadcasts.

From Paris to Berlin The 1900 Olympic Games in Paris, held in conjunction with the Universal Paris Exposition, and the 1904 Games in St. Louis, alongside the St. Louis World Fair, saw little in the way of intense political rivalry. In Paris, attendees were unsure if they competed in the Olympic Games or in a sports-themed portion of the Exposition. Unlike more recent renditions of the Games, the Olympics in Paris and St. Louis took place over the

14 For a full account of this debate, see MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 241–255. 15 Quote found in MacAloon, This Great Symbol, 1. 16 Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games With an Epilogue, 1976–1980 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), viii.

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course of several months. St. Louis had an additional problem with participation. Of the 700 competitors, over half hailed from North America while most European nations neglected to send athletes as Russia, Japan and Great Britain fought in the conflict that became known as the Boxer Rebellion.17 While Paris and St. Louis provided a brief respite from political rivalry at the Olympics, the 1908 Games in London relit the flame of the Olympic Games as a proxy for political clashes. In an era of increasing strain in Anglo-American relations, rivalry between the nations flared in London.18 Incidents ranged from the lack of an American flag in the Olympic stadium, to an American flag bearer refusing to dip the flag for King Edward VII, to accusations of biased officiating. With the obvious tensions in Anglo-American relations an ever-present reality during the 1908 London Summer Olympic Games, this event displayed the dichotomy between the ideals espoused by the IOC and the reality in the stadiums and on the playing fields.19 As Europe emerged from World War I, the IOC selected Antwerp, Belgium, as the host of the 1920 Olympic Games. Located in a nation devastated by the war, with the former Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire not invited to join, the Antwerp Summer Olympics were overtly political.20 Former allies became foes at the 1924 Paris Olympic Games as nationalism formed a significant theme in the competitions. One memorable incident involved the final match between the American and the French rugby teams. The American team won by a score of 17–3. In the midst of the match, the French crowd continuously booed the American team. Contemporary media accounts provide a vivid description of the scene after a French player left the

17 Susan Brownell, The 1904 Anthropology Days and Olympic Games: Sport, Race, and American Imperialism, Critical Studies in the History of Anthropology (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 78. 18 Matthew Llewellyn provides a quite thorough list of the international incidents hindering the Anglo-American relationship in “The Battle of Shepherd’s Bush,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 5 (April 2011): 698–699. 19 Llewellyn, “The Battle of Shepherd’s Bush,” 703. 20 Ronald Renson, The Games Reborn: The VIIth Olympiad Antwerp 1920 (Antwerp:

Pandora, 1996), 8.

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match due to injury, “and Americans in the stands came to blows with the Frenchmen.”21 International rivalry became an afterthought in the midst of a global economic crisis. That the 1932 Olympics would even occur was unclear as, following the stock market crash in 1929, legitimate doubt existed about the ability of countries to send teams. The New York Times reported a full American contingent was “quite unlikely.”22 As a result, the atmosphere at the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games was more cordial in light of the global crisis.23 The Organizing Committee for Los Angeles arranged discounts for countries to encourage participation and, “tout[ed] the Olympics as a ‘depression buster’, an event literally powerful enough to affect the global economy.”24 Although Los Angeles did not drag the world out of economic turmoil, the Los Angeles 1932 Olympic Games left enduring legacies, including the Olympic Village.25 One lasting legacy left by Los Angeles in 1932 was how people around the globe experienced the Olympic Games. Sportswriter David Goldblatt described the role played by Los Angeles as that of creating a “mediated spectacle, a vehicle for the creation and global distribution of ideas, imagery and messages, that both distinguished the Los Angeles games from its predecessors and made its [sic] Berlin’s precursor and mentor.”26 The Los Angeles Organizing Committee established a press center that 21 “U.S. Team Is Hissed By French When It Wins Olympic Title,” New York Times, May 19, 1924. 22 Quote found in Sean Dinces, “Padres on Mount Olympus: Los Angeles and the Production of the 1932 Olympic Mega-Event,” Journal of Sport History 32, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 137. 23 Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987),

38. 24 Mark Dyreson and Matthew P. Llewellyn, “Los Angeles Is the Olympic City: Legacies of the 1932 and 1984 Olympic Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (December 2008): 1991–2018. The duo also argue, “The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 threatened the survival of the Los Angeles Olympics and made advertising southern California to the world more difficult,” 1995. 25 For more on the legacy of the Los Angeles 1932 Olympics, see ibid, 1995–1998. Dyreson and Llewllyn note, “Although Los Angeles, like the rest of the United States in the early 1930s, was fractured by ethnic and class divisions, the city boosters built an Olympic Village and organized tourist attractions that advertised Los Angeles as a land of frictionless unity,” 1995. 26 David Goldblatt, The Games: A Global History of the Olympics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2016), 152.

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far outstripped the attempts of its predecessors. Radio broadcasting of the Games had only appeared four years prior at the Winter Olympics in St. Moritz. In 1932, Los Angeles boasted space for over seven hundred correspondents and employed a “Dow, Jones” printing machine that immediately printed results of the competitions.27 The advances in Los Angeles set the stage for the next summer Olympiad in Berlin, Germany. While nationalism and politics swirled around the Olympics in the prior four decades, the Berlin Olympic Games transformed into a political pedestal for Nazi Germany. The IOC awarded Berlin the Games in 1931. The Nazi Olympics of 1936, which started a tradition that lasts to this day in the Olympic Torch relay, initially had little support.28 In 1933, Adolf Hitler rose to power as Germany’s new chancellor. Hitler disavowed organized sport, at one point describing the Olympics as “an invention of Jews and Freemasons.”29 With a significant amount of coaxing from his propaganda minster, Josef Goebbels, Hitler seized an opportunity to present Nazi Germany to the world in a different light. However, this outcome was not always guaranteed. Several nations debated a boycott out of a conviction that Nazi Germany would not live up to its pledge to allow German-Jewish athletes to compete at the Olympics.30 Historians now 27 Quote found in Los Angeles Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the Xth Olympiad Los Angeles 1932, vol. 1, part 1, 218. 28 David Clay Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 4–5. 29 Quote found in Anton Rippon, Hitler’s Olympics: The Story of the 1936 Nazi Games (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2006), 26. 30 There is a wealth of literature on the Olympic participation debate. For future IOC president Avery Brundage’s role, see Carolyn Marvin, “Avery Brundage and American Participation in the 1936 Olympic Games,” Journal of American Studies 16, no. 1 (April 1, 1982): 81–206; Bruce Kidd provides a Canadian perspective in “Canadian Opposition to the 1936 Olympics in Germany,” Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education 9, no. 2 (December 1978): 20–40. Further details on the boycott debate are found in Guttmann, The Olympics, 56–58; Allen Guttmann, “The “Nazi Olympics” and the American boycott controversy,” in Sport and International Politics, Pierre Arnaud and Jim Riordan, eds. (London: Routledge, 1998): 43–62. Berg, Kessler, and Hunt, “A Realist Perspective of Sport and International Relations: US Governmental Perceptions of Olympic Boycott Movements, 1936–2008”; Stephen R. Wenn, “A Suitable Policy of Neutrality? FDR and the Question of American Participation in the 1936 Olympics,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 8, no. 3 (December 1991): 319–35. For a more general overview of the 1936 Olympics see Bill Murray, “Berlin in 1936: Old and new work on the Nazi Olympics,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 9, no.

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recognize that Hitler and Nazi Germany were the true benefactor of the 1936 Berlin Summer Olympics that tried to present the world a “new” Germany.31 That new Germany ensured that the planned Olympics for 1940 and 1944 did not take place.

Shifting Security Ideals On July 17, 1948, the Olympic torch began a 2,000-mile trek from Olympia, Greece, to London for the first post-World War II Olympic Games. The preparations for the journey reflected the fact that Greece was in the midst of a civil war. The initial plan called for carrying the torch from Olympia to Corinth, Athens, and Delphi but guerilla resistance in the country forced a decision by Greek authorities to spend less than four hours on the Greek mainland.32 A Greek destroyer, the Hastings, was to accompany the torch from the Greek port city of Katakolon to Corfu.33 The night before the voyage, guerillas attacked a tavern hosting the staff and officers of the Hastings, to no avail. Journalist A.C. Sedgwick reported, “a guerilla radio broadcast intercepted here gave as orders that the rebels must do everything to prevent the Olympic flame from reaching London.”34 This attempted attack on the Olympic torch came following a period of uncertainty over continuing the Olympic Games. With no Olympic Games taking place since 1936, whether the Olympics could come back, and whether the public had an appetite for the event after a hiatus of

1 (1992): 29–49. Krüger and William Murray, eds. The Nazi Olympics: Sports, Politics, and Appeasement in the 1930s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); W.J. Murray, “France, Coubertin and the Nazi Olympics: The Response,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 1 (1992): 46–69; Large, Nazi Games. 31 Mandell, Nazi Olympics, 233. 32 “Guerillas Cut Olympic Torch Travel,” The Washington Post, July 9, 1948. 33 The Hastings was originally a British destroyer named HMS Catterick but sold to

the Greeks in 1946. J.J. Colledge and Ben Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 71. 34 A.C. Sedgwick, “Olympic Torch, Lighted in Greece, Starts On 2,000-Mile Trip to the Games in London,” New York Times, July 18, 1948.

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over one decade, was in question.35 Three years following V-E Day, the damage caused by German bomb and rocket attacks still lingered in London. The British IOC members who bid for the 1948 Games recognized the impact of damage to the city. In a statement made while the war continued across the globe, the men requested the IOC award London the next Olympics to give visitors the opportunity to see the pain inflicted by the war.36 The impact of World War II on the 1948 Olympics manifested in ways unrelated to the damage on the ground. With the Iron Curtain firmly in place, the question of the Soviet Union’s participation loomed large.37 The sudden arrival of Soviet officials in the midst of the London Games made organizers fear the imminent arrival of athletes wanting to compete which would “[touch] off a potential diplomatic nightmare.”38 Unbeknownst to the IOC, an anti-Western backlash within the Soviet Union, which included purges targeting athletes, delayed entry of the Soviet Union into the Olympic Games. The Soviet Union would not compete until the 1952 Summer Olympics in Helsinki.39 The addition of the Soviet Union to the Olympic family was not the IOC’s only hurdle. Since restarting the Olympics, the IOC faced a myriad of issues related to politics. The geopolitical realities of the post-World War II world raised new questions for which the IOC simply did not yet have a clear answer, nor any precedent to look toward. Mao Zedong and

35 Erin Elizabeth Redihan, The Olympics and the Cold War, 1948–1968: Sport as Battleground in the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc, 2017), 76. 36 “Three Britons Bid for the Next Olympics To Be Held in “Scarred, Battered” London,” New York Times, October 11, 1944. 37 For the original text of Churchill’s speech in Fulton, Missouri when he coined the phrase “iron curtain,” see “Winston Churchill Speech—Iron Curtain,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (hereafter CIA FOIA ERR), Document No. 5076e8f8993247d4d82b6367. 38 Erin Elizabeth Redihan, The Olympics and the Cold War, 1948–1968: Sport as Battleground in the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry, 76. 39 Jenifer Parks, The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War:

Red Sport, Red Tape (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 7–9. Jörg Krieger and Austin Duckworth. “‘Vodka and Caviar among Friends’—Lord David Burghley and the Soviet Union’s Entry into the International Association of Athletic Federations.” Sport in History 41, no. 2 (April 3, 2021): 260–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/17460263.2020. 1768887.

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the Chinese Communists forced Chinese Nationalists to flee to neighboring Taiwan. As part of the victor’s spoils, the Allies divided Germany into four separate sectors, which evolved into East and West Germany. For the IOC, China and Germany became a problem of recognition.40 Each country had two separate sporting federations clamoring for the IOC’s official recognition, which could be parlayed into a separate claim to sovereignty. A brief discussion of both of these incidents highlights the IOC’s approaches to handling political problems. Upon the collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government in China and the takeover of the Chinese mainland by Mao Zedong, the IOC had faced a rather significant conundrum. Prior to the war, a Chinese Olympic Committee existed, and Chinese athletes competed at the Olympics. Those representatives fled China and established headquarters in Taiwan.41 Simultaneously, the Communist Chinese government created an All Athletic China Federation that now claimed to represent China’s Olympic interests.42 With these competing assertions, international sport federations individually decided on which group to recognize.43 Ahead of the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki, IOC member François Pietri suggested Communist and Nationalist athletes compete in the events based on recognition by the international sport federations. Neither the Communists nor the Nationalists found this an acceptable compromise. The Nationalist Chinese decided to boycott in protest while the Communists arrived too late to compete in Helsinki.44 The question of Chinese representation at the Olympics dominated the rest of the decade. The IOC member representing the Communist Chinese delegation, Tung Shou-yi, voluntarily withdrew himself and 40 Gerald Chan describes the IOC’s approach to handling the two Chinas debate in “The “Two-Chinas” Problem and the Olympic Formula.” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 3 (1985): 473–490. For a concise explanation of the IOC’s role in these events, see Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games: with an epilogue, 1976–1980. Univ. of California Press, 1981, 32–40. 41 Espy, Politics of the Olympic Games, 36. 42 Tsu-Lin Yeh and Jörg Krieger, “Governance Reform of International Sport Feder-

ations and Its Implications for National Sport Associations: A Case Study of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the Chinese Taipei Athletics Association (CTAA),” Asian Sport Management Review, 14, (December 2019), 4–15. 43 For a focused consideration of this episode see Chan, "The" Two-Chinas" Problem,” 473–490. 44 Guttmann, The Olympics, 92.

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Communist China from the IOC after he and Brundage spent much of the late 1950s “exchang[ing] insults.”45 Even without the Chinese Communists present, the IOC demanded in 1959 that the Chinese Nationalists reapply under a different title. After rejecting the Nationalist’s request to use the name “Republic of China,” the Executive Board decided in October of 1959 that the Nationalist representation could be recognized as “Olympic Committee of the Republic of China” but had to use the name “Formosa” during the Opening Ceremonies. Meanwhile, Communist Chinese athletes did not compete at the Olympics again until 1980. The question of German representation presented the IOC a no less difficult problem to resolve. Following World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and France combined their zones of influence within Germany to form the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) while the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. The IOC now faced the dilemma of two states comprising an area previously represented by one National Olympic Committee (NOC). Unlike the situation in China, the IOC decided to recognize the previous German NOC in the FRG in 1950 but could not confirm the decision until meeting in Vienna in 1951.46 In the intermittent period, the East German NOC applied for recognition which the IOC accepted under the condition that the West German NOC include East German representatives. A compromise between the two parties did not seem likely and it was not until 1955 that the IOC accepted an East German NOC under the condition that the FRG and GDR compete under one flag. The IOC successfully navigated the issue, but by 1968, East Germany received its wish to compete separately from West Germany.47 45 Guttmann, The Olympics, 92. 46 R. Gerald Hughes and Rachel J. Owen, ““The Continuation of Politics by Other

Means”: Britain, the Two Germanys and the Olympic Games, 1949–1972,” Contemporary European History 18, no. 4 (2009): 443–74. Espy notes the IOC was initially reluctant to allow the West Germans back into the IOC prior to the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki but “considerable pressure from political sources in Europe (i.e., the Allied High Command the U.S. Embassy in Switzerland)” led the IOC to consider allowing the West Germans full recognition. Quote found in Politics of the Olympic Games, 32. 47 Guttmann, The Olympics, 94–96. This section provides the best analysis of this sequence of events. Guttmann also notes the importance of the building of the Berlin Wall. He argues, “The physical as well as ideological separation of East and West Germany intensified Potsdam’s desire for an Olympic divorce from Bonn,” 96.

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Outside of the decisions regarding China and Germany, political disputes related to sovereignty and decolonization presented the IOC with further challenges. Prior to the 1956 Summer Olympics in Melbourne, Hungary revolted against the Soviet regime and this geopolitical tension played out in the infamous “Blood in the Water” water polo match between the Hungarian and Soviet teams in Melbourne. Elsewhere, Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal displayed the ebbing of colonial power.48 In response to Soviet tanks in Budapest, the nations of Switzerland, Spain, and the Netherlands boycotted the Games. Likewise, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon refused to send athletes in response to the French, British, and Israeli intervention in the Suez Canal.49 Ahead of the Melbourne Olympic Games, the Australian newspaper Mirror briefly reported on measures taken to prepare security. The plan included detectives monitoring “all Australian seaports and major airports... [and maintaining] a vigilant watch on the arrival of thousands of visitors.”50 Local and federal police authorities from Australia worked with Scotland Yard and the English Special Security Force ahead of the Games. Australian security also had a second plan. The security forces in the country took particular care to watch for “the attempted entry into Australia of known or suspected homosexuals and international confidence men.”51 The threat posed by either group is unclear. The disputes and fears of the 1950s and early 1960s paled in comparison with the successive Olympiads in Mexico City and Munich. In the Mexican capital, a student-led protest ended in terror. Mexico City hosted the Summer Olympics in 1968, a year of protest across the globe. At the time, the gap between the promises of authorities and the goals of citizens 48 Robert E Rinehart, ““Fists Flew and Blood Flowed”: Symbolic Resistance and Inter-

national Response in Hungarian Water Polo at the Melbourne Olympics, 1956,” Journal of Sport History 23, no. 2 (1996): 120–39. 49 These boycott movements are briefly discussed in Toohey, Kristine and A.J. Veal. The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: CABI, 2007), 97. 50 “Police To Man All Sea And Airports,” Mirror, March 17, 1956, National Library of Australia. In a larger study of the life of Australian code-breaker Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Ian Pfennigwerth provides an Australian Security Intelligence Organisation report that reads, “Never before has the R.I.S. [Russian Intelligence Service] congregated so many Intelligence workers in this country at one time as during the Olympic Games.” Quote found in Ian Pfennigwerth, Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave Australian Codebreaker Extraordinaire (Kenthurst: Rosenberg, 2006), 254. 51 “Police To Man All Sea And Airports.”.

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aspiring to a more affluent lifestyle created a hostile atmosphere between the two groups. When threatened, the authorities responded by showing they were not afraid to utilize force as a means of staying in power.52 On October 2, 1968, a group of Mexican students gathered at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas. As army troops sealed exits, the white-gloved Olimpia Battalion, the security force raised ahead of the Olympics, took positions in balconies surrounding the square and opened fire on the protestors below.53

A Media Sensation The relationship between the Olympic Games and politics only partially explains why the Olympics were a viable target for Black September. While the previous sections detailed the development of the political disputes present surrounding the Olympic Games, the connection between the media, terrorism, and the Olympics was also a factor. The advent of television helped make the Olympic Games a global event. While radio and newspapers provided the bulk of the coverage for the early Olympic Games, the evolution of television after World War II dramatically impacted sport as a whole. Garry Whannel, a media cultures scholar, contends sport and television exist in a symbiotic relationship.54 Forgoing considerations of new revenue brought in by television contracts, Whannel notes television “brought immediacy and uncertainty from the public domain to the domestic sphere.”55

52 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 165–166. Details behind the student fight against the police prior to Tlatelolco are found in Kevin B. Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 109. 53 Accounts of this event are found in Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World, 104– 105; Goldblatt, The Games, 266–267. There is no mention of the Olimpia Battalion in the Final Report of the Mexico City Organizing Committee. 54 On that relationship Whannel writes, “Television transformed sport into a set of commodified global spectacles, producing huge audiences and massive new sources of income. Sport in turn provided television with an endless supply of major spectacular events and an enduring form of pleasurable and popular viewing,” Quote found in Gary Whannel, “Television and the Transformation of Sport,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 625, no. 1 (August 20, 2009): 206. 55 Whannel, “Television and the Transformation,” 206.

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At Berlin in 1936, residents and visitors to the city watched the Games on a locally broadcast station. International television broadcasts did not arrive until the 1956 Winter Olympics in Cortina, Italy. That same year in Melbourne, disputes between international broadcasters and the Melbourne Organizing Committee led to a boycott by multiple television networks.56 The IOC, sensing the potential revenue televising the Games would bring, passed Rule 49 in 1958. This statute allowed Organizing Committees to sell broadcast rights but gave the IOC the final say in how the funds would be distributed.57 Merely four years later, the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome drew over $1 million in revenue from television.58 With viewers from across the globe now able to tune into the Olympic Games within their homes, groups like the PLO had a means to broadcast their ideas to the world. A ranking member of Black September, Fuad AlShamali, bluntly stated the purpose of the attack in Munich, “Bombing El Al offices do not serve [Black September’s] cause. We have to kill their most important and famous people. Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and sportsmen.” The aim for publicity worked. Nearly 800 million people globally watched coverage of the hostage situation in Munich.59 The attack in Munich resonated to a far greater extent than previous incidents, like the massacre at Tlatelolco. Mohammed Oudeh, the man who planned the Munich operation, best expressed the legacy of his planning. In a 2006 interview with the Associated Press, he stated, “Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich... people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want?... Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.”60 Oudeh was correct. The 1972

56 Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2002), 60–69. 57 Mark Johnson, Spitting in the Soup: Inside the Dirty Game of Doping in Sports (Boulder: VeloPress, 2016) provides an account of this evolution on 155–156. 58 Espy, Politics of the Olympic Games, 73. CBS alone paid $394,000 for the rights to broadcast in the United States. See, Johnson, Spitting in the Soup, 155–156. 59 Briggite L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 49. 60 Oudeh was also known by his codename, Abu Daoud. Quote found in Aji, Albert. “Planner of Munich Olympics attack dies in Syria.” Sandiegouniontribune.com. August

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Munich Olympics marked a turning point. As IOC members preached that the Olympics taught values of harmony and peace, seventeen dead bodies showed a different reality. ∗ ∗ ∗ From the inception of the Olympic Games, international politics played a role in nearly every aspect of hosting the event. Decisions on who would host, who was allowed to send a team, and what name that team could compete under all had a political dimension. This is to say nothing of the national rivalries that appeared amidst the competitions. Black September’s attack in September 1972 added a further dimension. Now, hosts faced questions arising from the security of competitors, venues, and those spectators who traveled around the world to watch the spectacle unfold. That host nations had differing ideas on what would be allowable as a “security” measure only added to the complex political problems facing security planners.

31, 2016. Accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-plannerof-munich-olympics-attack-dies-in-syria-2010jul03-story.html.

CHAPTER 3

Passing the Torch, 1972–1980

The IOC awarded the 1972 Summer Olympic Games on April 23, 1966, in Rome, Italy. Candidate cities included Detroit, Madrid, Montreal, and Munich. At the final vote tally, Munich won the bid by a single vote.1 For the first time since Berlin in 1936, the Olympics would be going back to Germany. The significance of this moment was not lost on Germany’s political officials. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel told German embassies, “IOC statutes might state that cities rather than countries host the Games, but it is on their success or lack of it that the whole country and its population is judged.”2 The whole of Germany stood to benefit from a peaceful Munich Olympic Games. The security measures taken at Munich reflected the belief that a successful Olympics would generate a positive view of Germany and, hopefully, negate any lingering images from the Nazi Olympics in 1936 as well as World War II. The Organizing Committee feared “[b]arbed wire and machine guns” may distort the idea of a peaceful atmosphere

1 Minutes of the 64th Meeting of the International Olympic Committee, April 24th– 30th, 1966, International Olympic Committee Library (hereafter IOCL), 8. 2 Quote found in Schiller and Young, The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany, 3.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_3

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and would not provide an accurate image of the country.3 Hans Klein, who served as the Munich Olympic Organizing Committee (MOOC) press chief, echoed this sentiment following the Games, “Because of the historical background … [the organizers] tried to make security unobtrusive.”4 Various aspects of security planning reflected the insistence on keeping security light. Rather than military uniforms, members of the security force wore light blue shirts, and during the day, guards in the Olympic Village went unarmed. Even so, frustration with security procedures led some American media members to call guards clad in orange jackets, “the orange Gestapo.”5 Despite the MOOC’s best efforts, the memory of World War II lingered. While security might have been light for the Olympics in Munich, the PLO’s successful attack on Israeli athletes ensured that the Olympic Games in the years to come would take place under a heightened sense of danger. The following chapter highlights how the IOC responded to the attack in Munich and details how national governments and OCOG planned security for the Olympic Games in 1976 and 1980. Of particular focus is the disorganization of early security efforts and the inherent political questions that came with providing security at a global event.

Internal Problems After Black September took the Israeli athletes hostage, the IOC held an “Extraordinary Meeting” at ten o’clock on the night of September 5. At a meeting earlier in the evening, the IOC Executive Board maintained a very firm stance that it was not the IOC’s role to help alleviate the hostage crisis and that, “the IOC was getting involved in internal problems which did not concern it and it was [the IOC’s] opinion that the Games must

3 Munich Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad, vol. 1, part 1, 32. 4 Red Smith, “Fixing the Blame,” New York Times, September 9, 1972. 5 See Smith, “Fixing the Blame”; “Americans, Germans Exchange Complaints,” The

Washington Post, September 3, 1972. The Official Report of the Munich Organizing Committee makes several distinctions. The “surveillance personnel” wore bright colors while a “civil security service” wore light blue. The night shift in the Olympic Village was armed with pistols. Quotes found in Munich Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee of the XXth Olympiad, 32.

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continue at all costs.”6 The IOC failed to explain several areas of their assumptions. The first, how an attack by Palestinian terrorists on Israeli athletes constituted an “internal problem” for Germany, and secondly, how an attack on athletes competing at the Olympic Games was not the IOC’s concern. In the midst of the IOC Executive Board’s meeting, a report arrived of a successful rescue attempt of the hostages at Fürstenfeldbruck Airfield. According to this information, the operation led to the capture or death of all terrorists while all of the Israeli hostages survived. Present at the meeting was the MOOC President, Willi Daume. Daume, who knew of the deaths of at least two Israelis, suggested it would be appropriate to suspend the Games for a day while holding a memorial ceremony.7 Hours later, the Executive Board learned the truth of the events that transpired at Fürstenfeldbruck. All of the hostages were dead. At 8:15 on the morning of September 6, a mixture of the IOC Executive Board and the MOOC met. Only after a lengthy discussion did the group reach a decision to hold a memorial ceremony and to simplify the Closing Ceremony.8 IOC member, and soon to be IOC President, Lord Michael Morris Killanin wrote Daume less than two weeks later and his words reflected the IOC’s stance on what transpired in Munich. He encouraged Daume, observing that, “[d]espite the tragedy of the Israeli athletes there were many highlights … it was amongst the 10,000 athletes, of whom [Daume and Killanin] read little, that the real Olympic spirit existed.”9 Killanin’s attitude sheds light on how the IOC viewed its responsibility with security. The events at Munich were merely a “tragedy” that detracted from what the IOC wanted to sell: the notion of the Olympic spirit. Killanin’s opinion seemingly vacillated, as there is evidence he recognized the political morass absorbing the Olympics. He admitted to IOC

6 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st–24th, September 5th, 1972, IOCL, 58. 7 At this time, word spread that at least two Israelis were dead. See Geoffrey Miller,

“Gunplay Halts Olympics,” The Austin Statesman, September 5, 1972; Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st–24th, September 5th,1972, 58. 8 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Munich, August 21st–24th, 59. 9 Letter from Lord Michael Killanin to Willi Daume, 18th September 1972, Corre-

spondence of Michael Killanin September–October 1972, Folder: September 12th–29th, 1972, IOCL.

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Director Monique Berlioux that, “In the past, [the IOC had] rather grandly stated that [it was] above politics, but [had] always found [itself] in their midst.”10 The IOC’s choices in the immediate aftermath of the Munich attack set a precedent that lasted for nearly a decade. Matters of security were not the IOC’s problem. Responsibility for security lay with the independently run Organizing Committees. As the IOC tried to distance itself from responsibility, the attack in Munich spurred the United States government to immediate action. On September 11, 1972, President Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State, William Rogers, sent a circular detailing the problem to foreign ministers across the globe. Rogers pointed to the Munich attacks as evidence that “dramatically demonstrated once more that the nations of the world are not yet prepared to protect innocent people from the senseless and criminal activities of terrorist groups.”11 Nixon and his team were not the only people in Washington whose policy perceptions changed in the aftermath of Munich. A later publication outlining the history of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) response to terrorism highlights the importance of the Munich Olympic Games as a focusing event for the Agency. The Munich attack, “provided the impetus for getting the carriage of counterterrorism rolling throughout the US government’s foreign affairs and security establishment.”12 Nixon created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, staffed by various department heads, among them the Secretary of Defense, the directors of the CIA and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While this Committee focused on national security threats in general rather than the Olympics alone, the quick reaction by the United States government stood in sharp contrast to the IOC’s muted response to the threat of terrorism. The creation of this commission was not kept secret. The 10 Letter from Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, January 25th,1973, Correspondance of Michael Killanin (Pres) 1973, Folder: janvier 18–31, 1973, IOCL. 11 United States Department of State, Secretary of State William Rogers, Confidential Cable, “Subj: Secretary’s Letter to Foreign Minister on Consultation regarding International Measures against Terrorism” September 11, 1972, Digital National Security Archive Collection: Terrorism and U.S. Policy, 1968–2002 (available via library subscription at: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/publications/dnsa.html). 12 Anonymous, “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA: The Gradual Awakening (1972– 1980),” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1. Accessed July 8, 2016. http://nsarchive.gwu. edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_017.PDF. (The author’s name is redacted in the document.)

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Los Angeles Times announced the news with the headline “Nixon Establishes Panel to Combat Terrorism” and detailed the responsibilities of the group.13 The IOC, however, remained silent. Shortly after the Munich Olympics, Avery Brundage relinquished his control of the IOC and retired. In his place, the IOC elected Lord Killanin. Nearly three decades younger than Brundage, Killanin served as a transitional figure from amateurism’s bastion in Brundage.14 One of Killanin’s aides described him as “indecisive” and unwilling to make decisions out of a fear that these precedents may limit the options of future IOC presidents.15 Killanin’s outlook on security at the Olympics best exemplifies this mindset. In a letter to an American citizen concerned about security at the Montreal Summer Olympics, Killanin wrote, “The question of security is basically a matter for the Organising Committee and the Canadian government.”16 Under Killanin, the IOC would play no role in security at the Olympics.

Innsbruck The IOC awarded the 1976 Winter Olympic Games to Innsbruck, Austria, on February 4, 1973. Located in the Austrian state of Tyrol, Innsbruck previously hosted the 1964 Winter Olympics. Denver, Colorado, was the original host of the 1976 Winter Olympics until the citizens of the state, amid rising costs, voted in a referendum and rejected extra funding for the Games.17 Innsbruck’s most notable feature during its previous role as host was the city’s lack of snow. The New York Times reported the situation the previous decade was so dire that, “there [was a] report that the Lord Mayor of Innsbruck was admitted to a hospital. His knees were reported to have been permanently damaged from praying so 13 Robert Toth, “Nixon Establishes Cabinet Panel to Fight Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1972, sec. A1. 14 David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch (London: Pavilion Books Ltd, 1994), 11–12. 15 Miller, Olympic Revolution, 11–12. 16 Letter from Lord Killanin to Mr. J. Hamilton, October 25th, 1973, Correspondence

of Michael Killanin (President), 1973 File: August–October 1973, IOCL. 17 For more on the decision to withdraw the bid, see Laura Lee Katz Olson, “Power, Public Policy and the Environment: The Defeat of the 1976 Winter Olympics in Colorado” (PhD Dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974).

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long for snow.”18 Even with the city’s potential precipitation issue, Innsbruck’s advantage was that all of the facilities used in the 1964 Olympics still existed. As the first post-Munich Olympics, security took center stage in Innsbruck. Immediately after the IOC’s announcement, the Austrian government started planning security measures for the event. With the authorization of the Austrian federal government, authorities in Tyrol assembled an assortment of police forces from across the region. The original plan lacked enough manpower to provide adequate security for the Winter Olympics and nearly 2,000 extra police officers from around the country arrived in Innsbruck.19 Those officers who worked the previous Winter Olympics had spent most of their time in 1964 directing traffic. 1976 proved different. Among the security force’s duties were “[ensuring] the Olympic peace, [protecting] competitors at the Games, and [arranging] for extensive protection for objects and people.”20 With Innsbruck roughly 100 miles from Munich, the events four years earlier clearly influenced the thinking of the IOOC. “Considering the Munich incident and developments since then, [security] measures [at Innsbruck would] have to be particularly extensive,” the IOOC wrote, “These precautions [could] only, however, be taken for the Olympic Village.”21 It is key to note that, at this point, the security planning focused solely on protecting the Olympic Village and the competitors whereas security plans for later Olympics focused on securing entire cities. In comparison with Munich, where the attackers scaled a fence to access the Israeli housing facility, in Innsbruck an eight-foot-high electric fence surrounded the Village and armed guards protected the stairways leading to the athlete quarters.22 Outside of the fence, spectators saw one “machine-gun toting policeman” stationed every 100 feet.23 18 “Olympic Coloring Book: Color Snow Hopes Dim,” New York Times, January 16, 1964. 19 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XII Winter Olympiad Innsbruck 1976, vol. 1, part 1, 279. 20 Lake Placid Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 280. 21 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Lausanne, May 21st–23rd, 1975, IOCL, 37. 22 Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics—An Armed Camp in Scenic Austria,” The

Washington Post, February 2, 1976. 23 Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.”

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Despite these preparations, the IOOC took a similar stance to the IOC on matters of security. The IOOC played no role in security preparations for the Games writing, “[f]rom the very beginning—not least because of the events in Munich in 1972—the Organizing Committee had refused to concern itself with security tasks.”24 The IOOC offered to provide some aid but did not define in what form they would provide this support. Security would be in the hands of an amalgam of forces including local and federal police units. In the IOOC’s opinion, this decision was “wise” as it saved the Committee money and allowed them to avoid “heavy responsibilities.”25 The IOOC named some security officials to positions within the organization. As a result, the IOOC argued, they would have constant contact with security authorities if needed.26 That the IOOC actively limited its responsibility for security is surprising as two separate terror attacks in Austria occurred in the months prior to the Opening Ceremonies. A group called the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) assassinated Turkish ambassador Danis Tunalgil while famed terrorist Carlos the Jackal led a mission targeting the meeting of OPEC countries in Vienna.27 As sociologist Pete Fussey recently noted, “these threats did not appear to … generate undue alarm amongst the upper echelons of Innsbruck’s security infrastructure.”28 One piece of the security plan for Innsbruck included a team devoted to handling problems of a political nature. Vaguely named the “political crisis squad,” members of the group included officials from local, provincial, and federal levels of the Austrian government.29 No political crises serious enough to assemble this squad occurred. 24 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 279. 25 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 279. 26 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 279. 27 For the assassination, see “4,000 March in Istanbul, Blaming Greeks for Role in Envoys” Deaths,” New York Times, October 26, 1975. For more on Carlos the Jackal’s attack see Bernard Weinraub, “Libyans Arm and Train World Terrorists,” New York Times, July 16, 1976. Data on terrorist attacks found in National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). 28 Fussey et. al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City, 52. 29 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee, 279.

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Discussions between the IOOC and IOC do not reflect extensive security preparations. At one point, the IOOC updated the IOC on progress made toward hosting the Games saying that, “necessary security precautions would be taken.”30 When Lord Killanin allowed the Executive Board to ask the IOOC questions, none related to security. IOC member and future IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch and IOC Director Monique Berlioux traveled to Innsbruck to check on preparations and briefed their colleagues back in Lausanne. The duo included one short paragraph on security. There was simply not much interest in the topic. The sole debate of any substance between the IOC and the IOOC even tangentially related to security dealt with a question over athlete accommodations. The problem arose when the IOOC planned to host the athletes in Innsbruck while events like cross-country skiing and the biathlon would take place in Seefeld, some fifteen miles outside of the city. Nordic countries complained that the Olympic Village was in Innsbruck and not Seefeld.31 The IOOC planned to keep all of the athletes in the Innsbruck Olympic Village for two reasons: security and cost efficiency. The IOOC argued they could not reasonably provide two separate Olympic Villages and did not want to lodge athletes in hotels.32 The IOC decided to allow individual NOC’s to choose if they lodged their athletes in Seefeld, but the NOC would still be responsible for paying for the allotted beds in Innsbruck.33 Making sure the business stayed running outweighed security considerations. While security may have not been a topic in meetings between the IOC and IOOC, visitors and officials alike commented on the defense measures. Guards in Innsbruck doubled the number of athletes competing.34 The President of the United States Olympic Committee,

30 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, February 2nd–5th, 1973, IOCL, 25. 31 The IOOC reported “many NOCs” wanted their athletes to stay in Seefeld in order to be closer to the training facilities for their events. Agenda for the 76th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, May 21st–23rd, 1975, IOCL, 9. 32 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Vienna, October 18th–24th, 1974, IOCL, 9. 33 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Vienna, October 18th–24th, 1974, IOCL, 9;

Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, February 20th–22nd, 1975, IOCL, 88. 34 “Games Security Guards to Outnumber Athletes, 2 to 1,” New York Times, January 25, 1976.

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Philip Krumm, described the Games as “over secured” but remarked, “I think we would rather have it this than what happened at Munich.”35 In a sign of how the military was an influence in security, nearly 3,000 Austrian soldiers were on duty. The soldiers were not always a welcome sight as the New York Times reported the soldiers “with their German shepherds and machine guns, created a weird atmosphere.”36 Some precautions went beyond increasing personnel. The IOOC’s director Karl Heinz Klee noted that, “[b]orders [were] being watched and reports made on movements of suspicious groups.”37 Klee did not provide specific details on the groups that security forces monitored. As promised by the IOOC, the Olympic Village drew the most attention from security planners. Over two hundred security officials guarded the Olympic Village, including nine officers with guard dogs. Accessing the Village required signing into a reception desk prior to placing items through an X-Ray machine.38 Athletes living in the Village expressed a mixture of displeasure and unease at the arrangement. Andy Mill, a twenty-two-year-old skier from Aspen, Colorado, remarked, “I don’t like it at all … I don’t get along with people carrying guns.”39 Hank Tauber, the United States’ women’s ski coach, echoed Mill’s sentiment, “We all kind of smile about it … but these people are very uptight … You have to have a credential for everything and if you don’t, then people are very severe. They’re not very nice about it.”40 The IOOC Final Report shed further light on the intensity of the measures taken to protect Innsbruck. They were delighted that athletes in the Olympic Village were “most enthusiastic about the excellent catering service” as this “enabled the athletes to forget that from the outside the Olympic Village resembled an encampment under siege due to the

35 Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.” 36 Bernard Kirsch, “U.S. Hopes Are Dim in Olympic Winter Games Opening

Wednesday,” New York Times, February 1, 1976. 37 Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.” 38 The most detailed description of the process of entering the Olympic Village is found

in Leonard Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics—An Armed Camp in Scenic Austria.” 39 Quote found in Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.” 40 Quote found in Shapiro, “The Winter Olympics.” For Tauber’s background see

Barbara Lloyd, “Skiing; Speed Is Worth the Risk for Some,” New York Times, February 3, 1994.

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necessary security precautions.”41 In order to give an impression of the level of security at Innsbruck, the American press resorted to imagery from Nazi Germany. One Associated Press reporter praised the Austrian security forces for their professionalism as “police, fierce dogs, and electric barbed wire fences prophesied ‘Gestapo Olympics’,” however, as the reporter noted, “[that] was never the case.”42 The Games came to a close on February 15, 1976, with no significant incidents reported. In a closing statement, the Austrian Minister of the Interior noted, “the demands made of [the security forces] were unprecedented in the history of the 2nd Austrian Republic.”43 Future Olympic Games would follow this trend of security operations representing some of the largest military or security operations in a nation’s history.

Athletes Know the Weaknesses In the years leading up to the 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal, security continued to receive relatively little attention in IOC meetings outside of reports from the Organizing Committees.44 In 1973, Killanin “stressed the importance of security” to Roger Rousseau, the President of the Montreal Olympic Organizing Committee (COJO).45 Yet even when the IOC discussed security, the topics focused predominantly on the protection of IOC members rather than the athletes. For example, Willi Daume emphasized efficient seating for IOC members in the “A” stand in case several IOC members arrived simultaneously. It is unclear if Daume viewed this as a security precaution. After receiving some assurance from Howard Radford, the Secretary Treasurer of COJO, that an efficient entry into the stand was a priority but security control came

41 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Montreal, July 13th–17th, 19th, 1976, IOCL,

88. 42 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Montreal, 89. 43 Innsbruck Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee, 282. 44 At times, the word “security” appears in the IOC Meeting Minutes but not in relation to how the IOC might prepare for a potential threat to the Olympic Games. See, Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Vienna, October 18th–24th, 1974, IOCL, 8. 45 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Varna, October 5th–7th, 1973, IOCL, 24.

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first, Killanin stepped in and “stressed the importance of giving priority to security.”46 Issuing identity cards for athletes and officials attending the Olympics and how much access the press should have to athletes were both security topics the IOC considered. In October of 1974, the IOC Executive Board met in Vienna, Austria, to discuss a proposal that argued Organizing Committees should create athlete identity cards in lieu of using passports. Lord Killanin and Soviet IOC member Konstantin Andrianov objected, arguing that allowing the identity card to replace a passport “presented certain security problems and was a retrograde step.”47 The following May, the IOC passed the original proposal made by the Juridical Commission, with the language suggesting the Olympic identity card replace the passport omitted.48 Ahead of the Montreal Olympics, Monique Berlioux feared that the Village, devised as a system of zones designated either private or semi-private, would not be enough to keep the athletes away from prying journalists. She cited one previous proposal which would see the creation of press passes as a security measure.49 Michel Labrosse, the director of the press services for COJO, opposed this idea, as he feared local press staking out the Olympic Village and preventing international news agencies gaining access to the athletes. The IOC ended the discussion by asking for a “full report” on the issue.50 COJO worked with law enforcement agencies from three separate strands of government: municipal, provincial, and federal. COJO grouped security operations with departments varying from medical to catering and housekeeping under the vague title of “Services and Technology.”51 46 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Montreal, October 4th–6th, 1975, IOCL, 23. 47 Political scientist Mark B. Salter provides a useful perspective on the role of the

passport and border security in “Passports, Mobility, and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?,” International Studies Perspectives 5, no. 1 (2004): 71–91. Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Vienna, October 18th–24th, 1974, IOCL, 8. 48 Minutes of the IOC General Session, Lausanne, May 21st–23rd, 1975, IOCL, 37. 49 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, February 20th–22nd, 1975, 59. 50 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, February 20th–22nd, 1975, 59. 51 “Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIst Olympiad

Presented to the Executive Commission of the International Olympic Committee by his Excellency Roger Rousseau President and Commissioner General,” February 3, 1973, Lausanne. Box 185 Folder: Games of the XXI Olympiad 1976 Montreal, Canada—Organizing Comm, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archives, Champaign, IL (hereafter ABC), 12.

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The Montreal Urban Community Police, Sûreté du Québec, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would form a “Security Committee” for the Games. COJO’s plan was for the Committee to serve as the primary coordinator of security operations in Montreal.52 At the head of this pyramid stood Guy Toupin, whose prior position was as an assistant to the director of the Montreal Urban Community Police Force.53 In his new role, he wielded seemingly unlimited power. Not only could Toupin call for assistance from the neighboring provinces, but also “Interpol and national or international Security organizations.”54 Portions of the RCMP’s preparations for the Olympics foreshadowed the argument made by IOC member Ashwini Kumar when he contended the IOC should play a larger part in security planning: liaison between nations. A memorandum sent to Canada’s Solicitor General fully details the emphasis on liaison for the RCMP. At minimum, security planning required, “liaison with the Canadian Armed Forces; liaison with international police forces; e.g., Interpol, the F.B.I., [and] Scotland Yard.”55 The RCMP took several steps to accomplish this task and created four new programs titled Attaché Liaison, Quiet Diplomacy, Threat Assessments, and Overseas Liaison. The tasks assigned each group differed, but as sociologist Dominique Clément notes, “their common purpose was to use Canadian delegations, as well as foreign security and intelligence agencies, to collect information.”56 Lessons from Munich and the need to imagine potential threat scenarios also played a role in developing liaison. While the security planning for Munich had been an abject disaster, there were lessons that could

52 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the I.O.C. June 22nd–24th, 1973, Lausanne, IOCL, 72–73. 53 This quote is found on page 6 of magazine called “Olympress 1976” that can be found in Box 185 Folder: Games of the XXI Olympiad 1976 Montreal, Canada— Organizing Comm, ABC. 54 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the I.O.C. June 22nd–24th,

1973, Lausanne, IOCL, 73. 55 Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning for the Olympics,” 7. 56 Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning for the Olympics,” 8. For

example, attaché liaisons were assigned countries and tasked with learning all of the potential threats from these areas while “processing intelligence forwarded by foreign security personnel for that country.”

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be learned. It was the Germans who emphasized the need for the Canadian security forces to have one commander.57 One exercise imagined a potential terrorist incident where a freighter loaded with oil attempted to attack the yacht housing Queen Elizabeth II stationed in the St. Lawrence River. Given that the United States had some control over the waterway, the result was a need to establish “at the operational level … liaison with the American coastguard.”58 As early as 1976, countries shared information and worked together to improve security ahead of the Olympic Games. Government officials in the United States paid close attention to international terrorism in the weeks before the Opening Ceremonies. Robert Fearey, a member of the United States’ State Department’s interdepartmental committee for combating terrorism, wrote Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in June of 1976 and informed Kissinger that an interagency group identified several “intermediate” terrorist threats to the United States. The group included in their list: “the use of man-portable missiles to destroy commercial aircraft … use of such missiles to assassinate a visiting head of state; blowing up of a nuclear power reactor … or the sabotage of key elements of a multi-state electric power grid.”59 Fearey listed the Montreal Games along with the United States’ bicentennial celebration and the upcoming American presidential election as potential targets for an attack. Within the IOC, Lord Killanin clearly knew significant concern existed regarding an attack at Montreal. He wrote a note to Canadian IOC member James Worrall in November 1975 and attached a clipping from the Irish Times predicting a potential terrorist plot. Killanin’s sole comment on the article was that trepidation over a repeat of Munich “[was] the position at the time of writing as reported from almost every country.”60 Yet, full control of the IOC notwithstanding, he did nothing. He better explicated his position toward security at the Olympics in a letter to Monique Berlioux. Killanin noted he discussed “various security stories” with Worrall but believed “[Security] of course [was] completely 57 “Olympics Set Stage for Cooperative Policing.” Liaison, November 1976, 11–13. 58 “Olympics Set Stage for Cooperative Policing,” 11–13. 59 Memorandum from Robert Fearey to Secretary of State, June 1, 1976, CIA FOIA

ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090039-4. 60 Letter from Lord Killanin to James Worrall, 11 November 1973, James Worrall correspondance 1967–1977, Folder: Correspondance 1975–1977, IOCL.

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a matter for the Canadians, but … [the IOC] should be kept fully informed.”61 These comments contradict the idea that the less transparent presidencies of Brundage and Killanin explain the IOC’s silence on security after Munich. One of the remarkable trends in the reporting leading up to Montreal was the apprehension of some form of an attack. One article warned of an “outbreak of terrorism” as if terrorism was a contagious disease spread through contact with an infected host.62 The story Killanin forwarded to Worrall detailed a conspiracy by the PLO to attack the Games that included one suspected PLO sympathizer infiltrating COJO. According to the Irish Times, COJO’s security knew specific details about the plotters. The alleged leader was a former fighter for the Palestinian Popular Front who led “plotting sessions” but, the Irish Times noted, RCMP could not arrest the group due to a lack of sufficient evidence.63 That the Games coincided with the United States’ bicentennial only heightened the anxiety. The Washington Post claimed that there was a “modern Trojan horse,” a tanker truck redesigned so that its interior “[held] a terrorist office, dormitory, and arsenal,” aimed at disrupting the Olympics and the bicentennial.64 Some of the haphazard planning for security at Montreal should have given rise to concerns. Journalist Nancy Scannell informed the American public about some of the serious lapses in the precautions taken to prevent another Munich. She showed that those responsible knew that “very little of significance had been accomplished in the past two years to guarantee there [would] be no repeat of Munich.”65 As shown above, the IOC designated the responsibility for security to the Olympic Organizing Committees, in this case COJO. In 1973 Roger Rousseau,

61 Letter from Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, 1 May 1976, COJO: correspondance janvier–mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, IOCL. 62 “Montreal on Guard,” COJO: correspondance janvier–mai 1976, Folder: COJO correspondance janvier 1976, IOCL. 63 “Canada Fears Olympic Plot,” James Worrall Correspondence 1976–1977, Folder: Correspondence 1975–1977, IOCL. 64 Jack Anderson, “Terrorist “Fish” in a Sea of Tourists,” The Washington Post, May 16, 1976. 65 Nancy Scannell, “76 Montreal Olympics Could Be Another Munich: 1976 Olympiad Promises to Be ‘Vie in the Sky’,” The Washington Post, October 23, 1974.

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President of COJO, said security “was the responsibility of the Organizing Committee and not of the IOC.”66 Recent evidence brings the role of his organization in the planning of security into question as historian Dominique Clément convincingly argued that COJO “played no role in security planning.”67 COJO’s limited role in planning was most apparent after Soviet IOC member Vitaly Smirnov questioned COJO President Rousseau about security threats. Rousseau assured Smirnov that the potential for an attack “was being closely studied with both American and Canadian security services.”68 Rousseau’s unequivocal answer to Smirnov differed sharply with the complaints of Canada’s Security Service. Internal memorandums within the Security Service warned that the agency, “should have no illusions over COJO’s interest in security, which [was] nil.”69 Within days of his country’s main intelligence agency noting COJO’s lack of concern for security, Rousseau announced a small portion of the plans for securing the 1976 Montreal Olympics. The entire operation would constitute the largest military endeavor in Canada since the conclusion of World War II. The plan cited a force of over 16,000 soldiers.70 As a comparison, 12,500 Canadian troops fought in the Korean War. Yet even with such a large force employed, apprehension lingered. The Austin American-Statesman cautioned that, “despite the size of the force, none of the police or military officers … could offer any guarantee against a recurrence of the Munich terrorist raid.”71 Amid these concerns, the Montreal Olympic Games received a royal opening on July 17, 1976. Flanked by Lord Killanin and her husband, Prince Philip, Queen Elizabeth II declared the Games open in Montreal’s

66 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, and February 2nd–5th, 1973, IOCL, 17. 67 Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning,” 7. 68 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Innsbruck, January 30th–31st and February

5th–12th, 14th–15th, 1976, IOCL, 16. 69 Quoted in Clément, “The Transformation of Security Planning,” 7. 70 “Security force will be biggest since the war,” COJO: correspondance janvier-mai

1976, Folder: COJO correspondance fevrier–mars 1976, IOCL. 71 “Olympic Security Tight to Avert Munich Repeat,” The Austin American Statesman, March 24, 1976, sec. E1.

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new $685 million Olympic stadium.72 While the choice of the Queen to lead the Opening Ceremonies led to some controversy, the procession occurred without mishaps.73 The next day, as the Queen left a church service, a man managed to get close enough to hand the Queen a piece of paper. While he claimed that he only sought an autograph, this scene did not bode well for the supposed heightened security around the Montreal Games.74 Other security breaches at Montreal displayed how, despite the massive number of troops, planning errors hindered security procedures. One precaution involved limiting access to certain areas, like the Olympic Village, by issuing color-coded passes. In order to reduce confusion, COJO printed posters showing which pass granted entry to which restricted site. This relatively simple plan failed when, as one newspaper reported, “the color-coded pass specimens on the posters look[ed] all too much like the real thing” and could pass as authentic.75 While COJO did not record a direct security breach due to this error, one actual incident involved a friend of several Canadian track and field Olympians using their identification cards to enter and exit the Olympic Village.76 After this episode, one member of the RCMP complained, “Security measures were set up to protect the athletes … [but the] athletes know where the weaknesses are.”77 In spite of these mishaps, the Montreal Games saw no major incidents. COJO declared in the organization’s Official Report about the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics, “[COJO] would not hesitate to adopt the same security measures.”78

72 Joseph Durso, “Pageantry Dazzling Amid Controversy,” New York Times, July 18, 1976. 73 The decision to use the Queen to open the Games angered some nationalist groups in Quebec province, where French is the predominant language. As one French-Canadian official stated, “In this country of mixed cultures, it would be more appropriate to have the Canadian head of government open the games,” Robert Trumbull, “Montreal Greets Queen, But Reservations Remain,” New York Times, July 19, 1976. 74 Trumbull, “Montreal Greets Queen.” 75 “Olympics pass? Do it yourself,” 22 July 1976, Pétitions demandant que le sport

reste a politique, Folder: petitions août 1976, IOCL. 76 Gerald Redmond, “Olympic Security Is the Real Hoax,” The Ottawa Journal, July 24, 1976; “Imposter Hoax Scares Security,” The Ottawa Journal, July 23, 1976. 77 “Security Tightened,” New York Times, July 24, 1976, sec. 18. 78 “Olympic Official Report Montreal 1976 Volume One part 2,” 571.

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Not everyone in attendance thought so highly of the security at Montreal. Nikolai Kurdjukov, the Secretary General of the Soviet Union Olympic Committee, wrote a scathing letter to Lord Killanin. Among other topics, he complained about spectators in Montreal burning the Soviet flag and argued the IOC should preclude countries participating in the Olympics from taking “hostile actions.”79 From the Soviet leadership’s perspective, the Soviet team suffered from politically fueled provocations. The disappearance of a seventeen-year-old diver named Sergei Nemtsanov from the Olympic Village raised the Soviets’ ire. Reports suggested that Nemtsanov sought asylum in Canada and the Soviets demanded his return, arguing he suffered from depression and, considering his age, “the question of granting political asylum [was] absurd and illegal.”80 Star Soviet sprinter Valery Borzov received a death threat two hours prior to the 100-meter dash final. Taken together, the Soviets pointed to these events as evidence of a concerted effort to disrupt the Soviet team.81 Sports photographers presented a slightly different grievance to Lord Killanin and the IOC. In an unsigned letter sent after the Closing Ceremonies, the author described the claim of space for 120 photographers at the Olympic Pool as an “unmitigated lie.”82 The chief complaint came following a confrontation after a photographer named Thomas Metelmann sat in an empty seat around the Olympic Pool in a section designated for normal spectators. Eight policemen arrived without warning and arrested Metelmann after he was “brutally beaten.”83 The author attached

79 Letter from N. Kurdjukov to Lord Killanin, July 28, 1976. 80 Letter from Mr. S. Pavlov to the Organising Committee for the Games of the

XXIst Olympiad, July 29th, 1976, Affairs politiques: correspondance et documents 1976 Folder: Accord entre l’URSS et la US Amateru Athletic Federation 1974–1975, IOCL. Accounts of Nemstanov’s defection can be found in Neil Amdur, “U.S.S.R. Drops Threat to Withdraw,” New York Times, August 1, 1976; “2 More from Olympics Ask Canada for Asylum,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1976. 81 Borzov later stated in an interview, “an official informed me that a sniper was on the stadium and they had information that he had a plan to shoot me.” Quote found in David Owen, “A Trip Down Memory Lane with Valeriy Borzov,” insidethegames.biz. Accessed September 29, 2017. https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1016222/a-tripdown-memory-lane-with-valeriy-borzov. 82 Letter from Unknown to Lord Killanin, August 31, 1976, COJO: Correspondance janvier–mai 1976 Folder: COJO Correspondance août-septembre 1976. 83 Letter from Unknown to Lord Killanin, August 31, 1976.

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a petition to the letter with the signatures of sports photographers from Germany, Canada, London, and Japan.84 “COJO readily admits that some photographers had problems during the Montréal Games,” was how COJO described the situation.85 The Montreal Olympic Games concluded on August 1, 1976. Part of the Closing Ceremony’s spectacle was a performance by 500 women dressed in varying colors who congregated in large groups to form each of the Olympic rings. There was one final security scare in Montreal that journalist Red Smith described as “unscheduled hilarity.”86 A young man named Michel Leduc walked past the stadium’s security and stood at the edge of the infield. He proceeded to disrobe and as one witness reported, “Naked, he leaped joyfully into the air. The women continued their routine. He danced among them, running from circle to circle. The crowd roared. The police had a fit.”87 The police eventually reached Leduc and subdued the bare Canadian. Regardless of minor incidents like Leduc’s, the feared attacks never materialized in Montreal. COJO credited the presence of armed security as the main deterrence. A COJO representative wrote, “Had the fact of armed protection been any less prominent, one may only speculate!”88

Lake Placid 1980 The Opening Ceremonies for the 1980 Winter Olympics took place on February 14, 1980. Over the course of the Olympics at Lake Placid, American athletes remarked that Soviet athletes interacted with athletes from other countries differently than at previous Olympics. While it was not uncommon for athletes, even American and Soviet athletes, to exchange clothing or pins, at Lake Placid the Los Angeles Times reported that Soviet athletes “[did not] appear to be exchanging anything with 84 “The signed photographers protest,” August 1st, 1976, COJO: Correspondance janvier–mai 1976 Folder: COJO Correspondance août-septembre 1976. 85 Montreal Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXI Olympiad Montreal 1976, vol. 1, 383. 86 Red Smith, “Montreal Olympics That Opened in Strife Close on Brighter Note,” New York Times, August 2, 1976. 87 “Lid Drops on Games,” Austin American Statesman, August 2, 1976. 88 Montreal Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee, 279.

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anybody … they [kept] to themselves.”89 The predominant theory was that the aloofness of the Soviet athletes was a direct response to the threat of an American boycott of the Moscow Olympics later that year.90 Mike Eruzione, the captain of the American ice hockey team, posited a different idea. In an interview, he stated that perhaps the Soviets were “concerned about terrorism. How [could you] not be when you [saw] all the security?”91 For the athletes residing in the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, it was difficult to ignore the pervasive security. Located roughly eight miles outside of the city, the Olympic Village lay on thirty-six acres of land and originally saw use as a tuberculosis center. The idea to utilize the facility came from a New York Congressional Representative named Robert C. McEwen who noted a lack of federal youth detention centers in the Northeast and that New York State needed to find a way to use the old facility. McEwen saw an opportunity to alleviate the Lake Placid Organizing Committee’s (LPOOC) problem repurposing an Olympic Village in the remote mountain town by providing a new detention center for the region.92 The site’s design proved a hindrance, rather than an aid, to security planners as security for the Olympic Village aimed to keep infiltrators out, while the inherent design of a prison is to prevent escape. In light of this, a security contractor recommended the Lake Placid Olympic Village employ a system of early-warning communication to notify guards of any potential intrusion.93 The isolation and bleak surroundings of the Village were no accident. The LPOOC noted in their report following the Closing Ceremonies the location would make it “easy to seal off in the event of a crisis.”94 An imposing twelve-foot-high fence surrounded the Village and athletes found various uses for the fence including leaning 89 Ted Green, “Soviets Waging Modern Cold War at Lake Placid,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1980, sec. D1. 90 Green, “Soviets Waging Modern Cold War at Lake Placid.” 91 Green, “Soviets Waging Modern Cold War at Lake Placid.” 92 Letter from Robert C. McEwen to James M. Cannon, May 5, 1976. James M.

Cannon Files, Box 25, Folder: Olympic Sports, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 93 Sanford C. Curcie and Robert L. Barnard, “DoD Physical Security Technical Support at the 1980 Winter Olympics Village” (Tinton Falls, NJ: Analytics Inc, 1980), 1–7. 94 Organizing Committee of the XIIIth Winter Olympic Games, Lake Placid. (1980). The Official Report of the Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad Lake Placid, 1980, 170.

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equipment against it or using it for balance while performing exercises. A security contractor found that the repeated motions “caused significant activity of the alarm system, much to the annoyance of the troopers on duty.”95 Security at Lake Placid was a joint effort among the various levels of American bureaucracy. Planning began in 1974 when the LPOOC gathered the New York State Police, FBI, along with 11 federal and 15 state agencies, including the State Department of Environmental Conservation, to start organizing a security plan for Lake Placid.96 In a similar effort to Montreal, liaison between agencies was a tactic to monitor potential threats to the Games. For example, the United States Secret Service provided training to the New York State Police officers responsible for dignitary protection. The State Police and FBI worked together to create a unit described by the LPOOC as “comparable to a SWAT (Special Operations and Tactics) team.”97 The most notable example of liaison prior to Lake Placid came from the CIA and FBI. In November of 1979, the FBI requested the CIA provide “in-depth assessments of the threat posed to the Winter Olympic Games by foreign-based terrorist groups as well as any information acquired bearing on the security of the games.”98 John McMahon, future Deputy Director of the CIA, responded the following month. The remote location of Lake Placid factored into his analysis that the likelihood of a terrorist attack was low. He cited “unique factors” to the area that would mitigate the chances of a successful operation by “any terrorist group, no matter how eager or determined.”99 McMahon and the CIA profiled several terrorist groups around the globe and indicated the likelihood of the group’s ability to attack the Olympics. Most notable among the 95 Quote found in Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security Technical Support at the 1980 Winter Olympics Village,” 2–66; Leonard Shapiro, “Village Security Forces Try to Maintain Low Profile,” The Washington Post, February 13, 1980. 96 Organizing Committee of the XIIIth Winter Olympic Games, Lake Placid. (1980),

167. 97 Organizing Committee of the XIIIth Winter Olympic Games, Lake Placid. (1980),

168. 98 Memorandum From Robert W. Gambino Director of Security to Deputy Director for Administration, November 29, 1979, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP8400466R000100090005-8. 99 Memo from John McMahon to Stansfield Turner, December 19, 1979, General William Odom’s Files, 1977–1981, Collection: JC-NSA: Records of the office of the

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descriptions is that of Iran as three months prior to the Opening Ceremonies, Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran and took fifty-two American citizens and diplomats hostage.100 There was a belief within the United States intelligence community that even if Iran released the hostages that the tense relations between the United States and Iran would continue.101 Despite the fact that no evidence existed that Iran planned to attack Lake Placid, the poor relations between the nations made the CIA wary. The CIA rationalized their fear, “Iran might direct or influence its many adherents … to undertake some activity at the Winter Games designed to take advantage of the extensive media coverage, either to embarrass the United States or to advance Iran’s case.”102 To counter such a threat, the New York State Police Inspector Major Donald W. Ambler headed a four-person team that led security planning. Ambler was among the group who traveled to Innsbruck in 1976 to witness how the Austrians handled security. The spectacle impressed him. “Innsbruck had a handle on it … It was well publicized, with pictures of Austrian soldiers. That was a hell of a deterrent, and apparently it worked for them,” Ambler told The Washington Post.103 Ambler also met with the head security planners from Munich and Montreal to learn from their experiences, a trend for Olympic security planners that continues to the present day.104 Prior to the American team’s departure for the Montreal Olympics, Ambler led a team of 130 New York State Police officers responsible for guarding the Americans on their way to Montreal. The delegation gathered in Plattsburgh, New York, and locals took to

National Security Advisor (Carter Administration), 1977–1981, “Terrorism: Pan American Games (1979) and 1980 Winter Olympics, 5/79-1/80,” Box 53, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter JCPL). 100 For the Iranian hostage crisis, see David Patrick Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Richard Falk, “The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions,” American Journal of International Law 74, no. 2 (1980): 411–417. A consideration of the media and the crisis is found in James F. Larson, “Television and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Iran Hostage Crisis,” Journal of Communication 36, no. 4 (December 1986): 108–130. 101 Memo from John McMahon to Stansfield Turner. 102 Memo from John McMahon to Stansfield Turner. 103 Robert Fachet, “N.Y. to Test Olympic Security,” The Washington Post, May 5, 1976. 104 Organizing Committee of the XIIIth Winter Olympic Games, Lake Placid. (1980),

166.

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calling Ambler “the ‘local paranoid’.”105 In 1978, Ambler retired, and Staff Inspector Nicholas Giangualano replaced Ambler as the head of security for the Games. A year after Ambler’s retirement, security planning received a boost from the American government. On December 21, 1979, the United States Congress passed the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1980. As part of the bill, the Department of Defense (DOD) received $10 million to prepare for the upcoming Winter Olympics in Lake Placid.106 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown named the Department of the Army the “executive agent” for DOD aid to the Olympics.107 The Army subsequently contracted work to a group named Analytics, Inc. from Tinton Falls, New Jersey, whose efforts mark some of the earliest use of technology deployed for security at the Olympic Games. The range of security technology utilized at Lake Placid dwarfed that of previous Olympic Games. While Montreal did utilize a computer system to process passports and created what was termed the “Olympic Integrated Lockout System,” which had a full database of known terrorists, the full might and ability of the American military’s technology appeared in Lake Placid.108 While Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitored the entrance to the Village, unattended ground sensors surrounded the perimeter to hasten the advance of a potential intruder. These sensors had the capability to detect, “seismic, magnetic, Infra-red or acoustic stimuli … over a diverse range of ambient, terrain and climatic conditions.”109 Developed by the military to protect headquarters behind the frontlines of battle, these sensors had several components employed to detect an intruder. One of the more fascinating was termed an “Add-on Audio Unit” which when activated would record sounds in the immediate area and transmit the recording back to the central command center in the Olympic Village. This was merely the beginning. If alerted by the underground system, then guards, who had night vision goggles at their disposal if needed,

105 Robert Fachet, “N.Y. to Test Olympic Security.” 106 Joseph Addabdo, “H.R. 5359 (96th): Department of Defense Appropriation Act,

1980” (1979). 107 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 1–20. 108 “Olympics Set Stage for Cooperative Policing,” Liaison, November 1976, 11–13. 109 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 2.

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could employ a ground surveillance radar system supplied by the US Army to confirm certain aspects of the target including speed and distance. Guards would certainly know exactly what was in and around the Village. In addition, there was also a covert communication system known as “COAT-TAILS.”110 COAT-TAILS was to be used in case of a terrorist incident. Developed in response to previous attacks, the COAT-TAILS system worked by placing a small microphone under the user’s clothing which broadcast conversations in the user’s immediate vicinity.111 A separate use considered for the system was the telephone network running throughout the Olympic Village. Officials quickly found that the system turned every phone including those that remained on the hook, in the Olympic Village into a listening device and officials opted not to further pursue this route “to avoid possible charges of ‘bugging,’ invasion of privacy, etc.”112 Despite the level of technology present in Lake Placid, the systems did not always operate flawlessly. The radio station located within the Olympic Village emitted a high frequency that “leak[ed] into the sensitive ‘front ends’ of monitor sets such as … the ‘COAT-TAILS’ system.”113 Essentially, an amateur radio team could accidentally disrupt a system that had the capability to spy on every individual in the Olympic Village. Midway through Lake Placid, the alarm on the fence protecting the Olympic Village simply stopped working. After several attempts to fix this “catastrophic failure” officials at last found the problem. The system was unplugged.114 All of these security preparations notwithstanding, mistakes happened. With less than a month to go until the Opening Ceremonies, a New York State Senate Select Committee on Crime described security planning as having “significant gaps.”115 Some mistakes went far beyond a mere oversight in planning. The LPOOC contracted with a group called Communication Control Systems, Inc., to provide a variety of weapons

110 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 2–50. Emphasis in original text. 111 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security.” 112 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 2–51. 113 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 2–89. 114 Curcie and Barnard, “DoD Physical Security,” 2–66. 115 Selwyn Raab, “Security Choice for Lake Placid Called Slipshod: Albany Panel Cites

Lack of Check on Contractor,” New York Times, January 25, 1980, sec. B1.

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and technology to aid security procedures. There was only one slight problem. The United States government was in the process of investigating the company for allegedly sending weapons to suspected terrorist groups.116 To compound matters, the LPOOC did not conduct a background check of the company before awarding the contract. Ambler’s replacement Nicholas Giangualano argued, “The Olympic Committee canceled the contract with [Communication Control Systems] … no one [from Communication Control Systems] was ever involved in the security planning.”117 While a significant procedural mistake, this incident did not lead to any specific changes in security policy at the Lake Placid Games.

“A Bolshevik Under the Bed” In the four years following the Montreal Summer Olympics, the Cold War became a prominent feature of security for the Olympics. This is not to say that prior to 1980 the Cold War was not an important factor, but rather that Cold War considerations did not impact security as extensively as is evident after 1976. While the Soviet complaints in Montreal can be understood in a Cold War context, these affronts did not compare to the tensions present prior to the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and subsequent United States boycott of the Moscow Olympics, stoked the rivalry between the two nations further. Although international terrorism dominated security planning in the immediate aftermath of Munich, and continued to be an important factor, the Cold War could not be ignored. The head of the Organizing Committee for the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, Ignati Novikov, addressed the 81st Session of the IOC in Montevideo on April 6, 1979. As part of his address, Novikov cited several lofty goals for his Organizing Committee. Novikov saw Moscow 1980 not just as another sporting event, but as an opportunity. “We want the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow to make a contribution 116 Raab, “Security Choice for Lake Placid Called Slipshod.” The head of CCS, Ben Jamil, later pleaded guilty to selling equipment to Syria, Guinea, Switzerland, and Greece. The federal government dropped the charges in exchange for Jamil becoming a secret informant. Mark Hosenball, “Spy-Shop Owner Said to Lead Double Life: Jamil Called Accomplice in “Sting” to Snare Agents,” The Washington Post, September 16, 1985, sec. B1. 117 Barbara Basler, “Olympic Security Involving 1,000 U.S. and State Agents,” New York Times, January 26, 1980.

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not only to the development of the Olympic movement but also the cause of détente and the strengthening of world peace,” Novikov stated.118 Détente, a word defined as the easing of strained relations, characterized U.S.-Soviet dealings in the early 1970s.119 By New Year’s Day 1980, détente hung by a thread as Novikov’s government made his goal significantly more difficult when Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan. Rather than promoting peace, the Moscow Summer Olympics evolved into a Cold War spat between the United States and the Soviet Union. Security concerns around the Moscow Summer Olympics did not come from the specter of international terrorism, but from two foes in the midst of the Cold War.120 Less than a year from the Opening Ceremonies in Moscow, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked the end of a decade of détente and rekindled animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two weeks following the Soviet action, American President Jimmy Carter addressed American citizens on the prospect of a boycott of the Olympic Games. He reminded his constituents that the United States’ preference would be to not boycott but that the Soviet Union’s aggression would “endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.”121 Within a week of Carter’s speech, CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner distributed a memo to ranking members of Jimmy Carter’s staff on the Soviet Union’s preparations for the Olympic Games.122 Turner made clear that he opposed the idea of a boycott. 118 “Amendments to the Minutes of the 81st IOC Session,” Montevideo, April 5th– 7th, 1979, IOCL, 46. 119 For a lengthy consideration of U.S.-Soviet relations and détente, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); A briefer examination of the topic is found in Richard W. Stevenson, The Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tension in US-Soviet Relations 1953–84 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985). 120 Carol Marmor-Drews, ““To Guarantee Security and Protect Social Order” (Moscow 1980),” in Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond, Vida Bajc, ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 182. For a general history of the 1980 Games, see Barukh Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982). 121 Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” January 4, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32911. 122 Recipients included Carter, his Vice-President Walter Mondale, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Secretary of State Cyrus Roberts Vance.

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Every potential positive of a boycott Turner listed had an equally negative prospect. For example, while pro-Western elements within the Soviet Union may welcome a boycott of the Olympics, analysts within the CIA feared this would be “offset by reinforcement of wide-spread tendencies to xenophobia.”123 Nevertheless, on April 12, 1980, Colonel Don Miller, the Secretary General of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), confirmed the American boycott.124 Moscow’s security preparations differed in comparison with the postMunich Olympics in Innsbruck, Montreal, and Lake Placid. The previous three cities focused heavily on preventing a terrorist attack, but visitors to Moscow noticed a different security emphasis. Kenneth Reich of the Los Angeles Times wrote, “many felt the security here was directed not so much at preventing such an attack as at isolating ordinary Russians from foreigners.”125 Soviet leadership warned that American intelligence, including the CIA, wanted to use Moscow as an opportunity for “ideological ‘contamination’.”126 123 “USSR: Olympic Games Preparations,” December 1979, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. 0003387227; Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski strongly disagreed with this assessment. Brzezinski viewed the Soviet Union and détente with suspicion. Historian Nicholas Sarantakes notes, “[Brzezinksi] believed the Soviets were trying to use détente to spread their Communist ideology.” Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 55. Sarantakes further expands his argument later in his work. He argues Brzezinksi pointed to a newspaper article written by Robert Kaiser, who worked in Moscow as The Washington Post’ s correspondent, 85; a useful consideration of Brzezinski’s role in forming Carter’s foreign policy is found in Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 1–3. 124 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, April 21st–23rd, 1980, IOCL, 49. The United States would still hold an Olympic trial in order to decide the Olympians for 1980, in case Carter had a last-minute change of heart. Miller had a very faint hope of an American team in Moscow. He wrote Berlioux, “if the President of the United States advises the USOC on or before 20th May 1980 that international events have become compatible with the national interests and the national security is no longer threatened, the USOC will enter its athletes.” 125 Kenneth Reich, “Moscow’s Un-Spartan Olympics May Foil L.A.”s Plans for 1984 Games,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1980, sec. D1. Marmor-Drews makes a similar argument, “The Soviet authorities were clearly concentrating on the Cold War, while internal terrorist threats received less attention,” Quote found in ““To Guarantee Security and Protect Social Order” (Moscow 1980),” 190. 126 “Moscow Olympics: Not All Games,” July 21, 1980, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP90-00806R000200860039-3.

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The paranoia and security fears surrounding the Moscow Olympic Games reached every segment of Soviet society. Soviet teachers warned their young pupils against taking candy or chewing gum from Western visitors, as it would be poisonous.127 The Soviet government moved children out of the city prior to the Olympics. Sir Curtis Keeble, the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, remarked, “[t]he oppressive feeling of [Moscow was] increased by the virtual absence of children. Many parents must resent what amounts to compulsory deportation for the best part of two and a half months.”128 Jack Anderson of The Washington Post warned of Soviet prostitutes who worked for the KGB seducing American officials with access to classified information in order to blackmail them. “And in this the Russians are after as many gold medals as they can hook,” Anderson wrote.129 Both sides, it seems, were capable of spinning conspiracy theories. The Soviet desire to shield Soviet citizens from visitors was not unique to the Olympics but a part of Soviet policy since the early 1950s. Following Josef Stalin’s death in 1953, his successor Nikita Khrushchev proved more open to cultural exchanges with the West.130 Yet even with this more open policy, in 1955 nearly one-third of the country was offlimits to foreign visitors.131 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Western visitors noticed fundamental changes in Soviet society. In a 1980 article for Foreign Affairs, former Moscow correspondent Robert Kaiser argued,

127 Reports of these warnings by teachers appear in several different sources. See Dan

Fisher, “Spy Stories Fill Soviet Press as Olympics Approach,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1980; Klose, “Moscow Prepares Purge Before Summer Olympics.” 128 Telegram from Sir Curtis Keeble to FCO, undated, The National Archives (hereafter

TNA): PREM 19/376. 129 Jack Anderson, “Flesh Peddling in Moscow for the KGB,” The Washington Post, July 24, 1980. 130 Cadra Peterson McDaniel notes the American State Department viewed Khrushchev’s rise to power as a sign of future cultural exchanges between the two nations in American–Soviet Cultural Diplomacy: The Bolshoi Ballet’s American Premiere (New York: Lexington Books, 2014), 16; A brief history on the opening of the Soviet Union by Khrushchev is found in Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 14–20. 131 Victor Rosenberg, Soviet-American Relations, 1953–1960: Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange During the Eisenhower Presidency (London: McFarland & Company, 2005), 126.

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“Soviet society has been significantly infected with the foreign influences that Stalin worked so hard to obliterate.”132 This increased exposure to Western influences made hosting the Olympics a double-edged sword for the Soviet Union. While the Games provided an opportunity to play ideal host and show the world the best of life in the country, the deluge of foreign tourists and journalists accompanying their respective teams provided the Soviets with a security dilemma. British diplomat Alan Brooke Turner noted the Soviets did not take kindly to Western journalists asking non-sport-related questions during the Games. At one press conference, a Soviet press officer, after attacking a variety of Western publications, “issued barely disguised threats to expel offending journalists.”133 Security guards bombarded journalists entering and exiting a press center set up for the Games with questions. Curtis Keeble reported these increased security measures resulted from security begin taken “by the KGB as a result of high-level instructions.”134 The CIA pointed to the inherent difficulty in preventing contact between non-Soviet journalists and Soviet dissidents and correctly predicted the Soviet response, “The most troublesome dissidents [would] probably be removed from circulation before the games.”135 Some visitors to Moscow attempted to scale back the criticism of security. John Hennessy, a journalist for The Times, noted having an X-Ray check his belongings at each entry was “unnerving” but added, “advance reports had suggested something much more sinister, much more time consuming, and much more draconian than the Munich tragedy of 1972 would justify. No sign, so far, of a bug in the bedroom or a Bolshevik

132 Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Detente America and the World,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 1 (1980): 503. For a discussion on the role of culture within the context of the Cold War, see Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 133 Telegram from Alan Brooke Turner to FCO, undated, TNA: PREM 19/376. 134 Telegram from Keeble to FCO, 19/376. 135 “USSR: Olympic Games Preparations,” December 1979, CIA FOIA ERR, Docu-

ment No. 0003387227.

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under the bed.”136 Jim Railton, another journalist covering the Games, argued the Soviets did not attempt to keep normal citizens away from the Western visitors. He cited his experience traveling on Moscow’s public transportation system as an example and drew comparisons for readers in the United Kingdom.137 However, Railton’s account of what he did not see confirms the multiple depictions of security in Moscow. He noted his lack of time to write about “the treatment of Jews and dissidents” and posited, “perhaps, like the children, they were led away by the Soviet pied piper.”138 Evidence of the Soviet’s government efforts to present a positive image to the world existed on the streets of Moscow. There was the druzhina, a civil police group responsible for helping remove prostitutes and drunks from the streets of Moscow.139 In December of 1979, Soviet party officials in Moscow reportedly sent notices to local employers requesting lists of “drunkards, psychotics, disorderly persons, and Jews” as a measure to “cleanse” the city ahead of the Olympics.140 The process of forcing people to leave the city was slow and laborious. Following the Opening Ceremonies, The New York Jewish Week recounted the story of a 63-yearold Jewish woman named Hanna Elinson who, when asked by the Soviets to leave Moscow, responded with “a resounding ‘nyet’.”141 Moscow countered perceived security threats with one of the nation’s greatest resources: manpower. The Soviets had a vast area of influence to draw upon to fulfill their requirements for personnel. More than one 136 John Hennessy. “Olympic Games,” Times [London, England], July 14, 1980: 9. The Times Digital Archive. Web. November 1, 2017. 137 Jim Railton. “Have the Games Lost Their Human England], August 2, 1980: 12. The Times Digital Archive. Railton noted, Soviet citizens on the “Metro” displayed the tration of London commuters, who would whoop for joy at cheapness of Moscow’s underground.”

Touch?” Times [London, Web. November 1, 2017. “same boredom and frusthe speed, cleanliness, and

138 Railton, “Have the Games Lost Their Human Touch?” 139 Marmor-Drews also notes Soviet citizens generally volunteered for these squads

as an easy way to get out of work. In a three-month period of 1980, this group numbered nearly 30,000 people. ““To Guarantee Security and Protect Social Order” (Moscow 1980),” 193. 140 Kevin Klose, “Moscow Prepares Purge Before Summer Olympics,” The Washington Post, December 17, 1979. 141 “KGB “housecleaning” Moscow of Activists Before Olympics,” The New York Jewish Week, July 27, 1980.

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visitor to Moscow at this time noticed the sudden appearance of police officers hailing from Central Asia who arrived to aid the Olympic security effort.142 Estimates of the number of security personnel at the time varied wildly, with sources citing a range from 20,000 to 35,000 police sent to Moscow for the Olympics.143 Curtis Keeble cited a force of nearly 200,000 militiamen in Moscow. He described the capital as “increasingly taking on the air of a city about to face an onslaught.”144 It was not only the increased number of militia on patrol that caused his reaction. “Squads of KGB internal security troops have also been seen and convoys of army lorries (some decorated with the Olympic symbol) [were] a regular sight,” Keeble wrote.145 From the American perspective, fear existed that the Soviets may use the Olympics as a means to target American intelligence agents in Moscow. CIA Director Stansfield Turner reminded the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) in 1979 of the upcoming Olympics in Moscow and potential security concerns.146 Turner knew that employees from the various sectors of the American intelligence community traveling to Moscow would make a tempting target. “The potential for Soviet action against unofficial travelers in the way of provocation and harassment or attempts at compromise or recruitment remains current and real,” Turner warned.147 142 Dan Fisher, “Moscow Cops–Low Pay, No Prestige,” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1980; “Rigid Security for Moscow Olympics,” The Times of India, July 2, 1980. 143 Dan Fisher, “Security Heavy: Muscovites Rush Olympic Building,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1980. Carol Marmor-Drews offers two different numbers in regard to Moscow’s security. She notes, “Olympic objects were guarded by 21, 578 people” but also argues, “12,000–15,000 police officers were active during the Olympics.” Quote found in ““To Guarantee Security and Protect Social Order” (Moscow 1980),” 193. 144 Telegram from Sir Curtis Keeble to FCO, July 18, 1980, TNA: PREM 19/376. 145 Telegram from Sir Curtis Keeble to FCO, July 18, 1980. 146 The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) was created by Executive Order

12036 signed by Jimmy Carter on January 24, 1978. A replacement for the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the NFIB had more responsibility than the previous USIB. President Dwight Eisenhower created the USIB in 1958 to serve as a way “to coordinate a range of cooperative activities through a network of interagency committees.” Quote found in Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution” (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC: Center for Study of Intelligence, 2001), 8. 147 “Unofficial Travel to the Moscow Olympics, 1980,” April 12, 1979, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP96M01138R001200040066-1.

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Perhaps due to the Soviet government’s extensive preparations, the sole notable security incident in Moscow was one of bemusement, rather than grave danger. Nearly three-dozen Australian, Brazilian, and British athletes took to the Olympic Village disco following a day of competition. For the first time during the Games, the disco served liquor and “a lot was consumed.”148 The Soviet publication TASS claimed Western athletes demanded the disco remain open after closing hours. When this demand went unmet, the Soviet news outlet claimed the athletes “heated up by the booze consumed, went on a rampage. They overturned tables, tore curtains down, [and] started throwing food at people.”149 In a theme of the modern Olympics, politics was never far away. Alan Brooke Turner commented the incident “was reportedly enlivened by athletes shouting ‘Russians out of Afghanistan’.”150 ∗ ∗ ∗ In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games, the IOC placed the onus of security preparations on individual Organizing Committees. In addition, the extensive use of uniformed soldiers in security measures gave the Olympics following Munich a sense of a military exercise as opposed to a sporting event. At Innsbruck and Montreal, the Organizing Committees showed little interest in security and passed responsibility on further to the national governments. This diffusion of responsibility away from the Olympics’ center of power, the IOC, set the stage for the future. The Organizing Committees, and the host nations, were responsible for handling security at the Olympic Games, which limited the IOC’s attempts in the future to influence security policy. Both renditions of the Olympics in 1980 ended without an attack and while events in Munich logically sparked a fear and a response by authorities to guard against international terrorism, by the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, the Cold War took center stage in Olympic security planning. Even though no incidents marred the Olympics, several 148 Ken Denlinger and Barry Lorge, “Soviets Banish Appeals Jury,” The Washington Post, July 29, 1980. 149 Quote found in Ken Denlinger and Barry Lorge, “Soviets Dismiss Complaints as “Nonsense Boiled in Oil”,” The Washington Post, July 31, 1980. 150 Brooke Turner to FCO, TNA: 19/376.

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mishaps and oversights in planning displayed the difficulty of requesting these Organizing Committees to prepare security without assistance. The IOC lacked expertise in the field of security but the election of a new president in Juan Antonio Samaranch and the ideas of Indian IOC member Ashwini Kumar in the coming years forever altered how the IOC approached security at the Olympic Games.

CHAPTER 4

International Liaison and the 1984 Olympic Games

The IOC elected a new leader in Spaniard Juan Antonio Samaranch to replace Lord Killanin at the 83rd session of the IOC, held from July 15 to 18, 1980. At the time of his election, Samaranch already had several decades of experience in sporting governance. Appointed to the Spanish Olympic Committee at the age of 34, Samaranch joined the IOC in 1966 and became the Spanish ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1977. One biography of Samaranch described the latter appointment as the “perfect place to conduct a camouflaged campaign for election as IOC president.”1 Samaranch’s election altered the Olympic Games in multiple areas, from sponsorship deals to security. Former IOC Vice-President Richard Pound compared the changes from Brundage to Killanin to Samaranch as a move from “old-fashioned authoritarian to Merlin the Magician.”2 One of the stark differences between Samaranch and Killanin was the attention Samaranch gave to security. Initially, Samaranch charged the IOC Chief of Protocol, Cornelis Kerdel, with aiding Olympic Organizing

1 Miller, Olympic Revolution, 4. 2 Miller, Olympic Revolution, 5. For one example, see Matthew P. Llewellyn and Robert

J. Lake, ““The Old Days of Amateurism Are Over”: The Samaranch Revolution and the Return of Olympic Tennis,” Sport in History 37, no. 4 (2017): 423–447.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_4

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Committees with security preparations. As early as February of 1981, Samaranch promised the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) that Kerdel would assist the organization with security through the duration of the Games.3 Berlioux requested Kerdel make a report on security for Sarajevo and Los Angeles, a stark change from the previous administration.4 While Kerdel’s aid was a small step, the most significant moment of change for the IOC and security came two years later in the form of Indian IOC member Ashwini Kumar. Born in 1920 in the Indian city of Jullundur (present-day Jallandahar) near the India-Pakistan border, Kumar was a decorated police officer with an extensive background in Olympic governance. He served as the Deputy Chef de Mission at the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne and subsequently as the Chef de Mission at the 1960 and 1964 Games before being nominated to the IOC in 1973.5 Prior to joining the IOC, Kumar served as the Director General of India’s Border Security Force and fought in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. He received the Padma Bhushan, the third-highest civilian award in India, “for outstanding service” during the fighting.6 In April 1983, Samaranch appointed Kumar as the IOC Radio Commission’s Chairman. In accepting the position, Kumar expressed to the IOC President that he had recently given a great deal of thought about security for the Olympic Games.7 Kumar presented some of his ideas to the IOC’s Executive Board in June 1983 where he detailed global terrorist groups, their methods, and rationales for potentially attacking the Olympics.8 IOC member Prince Alexandre de Merode

3 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Los Angeles, February 23rd– 24th, 1981, IOCL, 8. 4 Letter from Monique Berlioux to Cornelis Kerdel, 11 April 1983, Sécurité aux JO: rapport et correspondance: 1981–1985: Folder: Correspondance 1983, IOCL. 5 “Ashwini Kumar,” Biography, cuttings, and writings of Ashwini Kumar, Folder: Biographie, IOCL. 6 Ibid.; Sankar Sen, ed., Reflection and Reminiscences of Police Officers (New Delhi:

Ashok Kumar Mittal Concept Publishing Company, 2006), 9. 7 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 29 April 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL. 8 The full report is attached to a letter Kumar sent to Samaranch. Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 27 May 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL.

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objected to the report. He viewed it “unnecessary” for the IOC to know of security measures, arguing this would “reduce [the security measure’s] efficiency.”9 Ignoring the critique, Samaranch proposed that Kumar replace Kerdel, which the Executive Board confirmed. Less than three months later, Samaranch created a new position for Kumar titled IOC Security Delegate. Kumar now held total responsibility for the IOC’s involvement with security at the Olympics.10 Soon after his promotion, Kumar provided a more detailed insight into his views on security for the Olympics and his viewpoint that the IOC previously failed to respond to the threat of terrorism. While Kumar agreed with the policy in place that security was the host nation’s responsibility, he argued this did not absolve the IOC from blame. He contended that the “role of the IOC was that of liaison between the host country and [nations participating in the Olympic Games].”11 In Kumar’s view, the organization had failed in that mission since the 1972 Olympics. He wrote, “[since the] Munich massacre, [and] despite the incredible growth of international terrorism, firm steps for a [sic] efficient system of security had not been taken, due to lack of liaison.”12 For Kumar, the IOC needed to extend a helping hand to OCOG. The following chapter covers the Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games and Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games in 1984 with a particular focus on the role of Ashwini Kumar in aiding security preparations. Counterterrorism continued to play a significant part of planning for security and this era saw the expansion of governments lending assistance or sharing intelligence in order to protect the Olympic Games. At the time, terrorist groups had grown in numbers and sophistication with one contemporary analysis highlighting that, while it appeared terrorism declined from 1982 to 1983, “there [was] still a great deal of terrorism going on.”13 Preventing these attacks from targeting the Olympic Games fell 9 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, May 31st–June 2nd, 1983, IOCL, 39. 10 Letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Ashwini Kumar, June 13, 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL. 11 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 1, 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983, Folder: juillet–decembre, IOCL. 12 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 1, 1983. 13 David Charters, “Terrorism and the 1984 Olympics,” Conflict Quarterly 3, no. 4

(1983): 37.

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to the Yugoslavian and American governments with the aid of the IOC’s newfound Security Delegate.

“Handle Terrorism…at the Highest Level” While bringing considerable vigor to his new post, Ashwini Kumar soon found potential roadblocks to progress. His first challenges were the Sarajevo Winter Olympics and Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games in 1984. With less than a year left until the Opening Ceremonies for both, Kumar told Samaranch that he wanted to prepare a list of “DOs and DONTs on security for various countries” but cautioned that “[a] lot of ground ha[d] to be covered.”14 Kumar initially focused his energy on the security of the IOC leadership. Within three weeks of his appointment, Kumar recommended a private security guard for the President of the IOC to “constantly travel with the President…and ensure basic security arrangements that are normally made for the VVIPs [sic].”15 The assassinations and kidnappings of major political leaders influenced Kumar’s policymaking. Six separate incidents from the previous decade targeting major political leaders facilitated by groups ranging from Black September to the Irish Republican Army influenced his thinking on the topic.16 A key component to Kumar’s ideas was the assumption that terrorists would target IOC members by virtue of the global prominence of the Olympic Games. There was no lack of public figures within the IOC. IOC members in this era included “generals, admirals, knights, lords, barons, viscounts, counts, marquises, dukes, grand dukes, princes with royal, imperial, and serene titles, sultans, and even a king.”17 If publicity

14 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, August 29, 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL. 15 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, September 12, 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL. 16 “Protection: Chairman of International Olympic Committees,” Sécurité aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. An account of the Black September assassination can be found in John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 123. Jerrold M. Post provides a brief history of the IRA during this era in The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 48–51. 17 Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 15.

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was the primary aim of terrorism, Kumar saw IOC members as potentially tempting targets. To drive his point home, Kumar reminded IOC members in November 1984 of previous threats made against over twenty of the individuals present at the meeting.18 However, some of Kumar’s concerns seem out of proportion when compared to his analysis of the potential effects. He argued that assassinations lacked value politically and that kidnappings had “seldom gained public sympathy.”19 Despite not believing in the political utility of assassinations of public figures, Kumar wanted to be prepared for any scenario. Ahead of the 1984 Winter Olympic Games, Kumar began a new precedent when he traveled to Sarajevo to serve as the security liaison between the IOC and the Sarajevo Olympic Organizing Committee (SOOC). Yugoslavian government representatives, including the Minister of Security and Secretary of the Interior, attended alongside senior officials of the SOOC. While international terrorism was a major security concern, topics ranged from broad, like “[s]ecurity of the Games in general,” to details as specific as athlete food safety.20 Bruno Mikulic, the President of the SOOC, liked the idea of assigning a “Security Manager” for each team and took the idea a step further when he argued these individuals should bring personal weapons for protection. Kumar disagreed as diplomatically as possible stating, “this would create a delicate situation amongst visiting teams.”21 Separately, Mikulic proactively sought to deter an attack through political connections. Kumar, who consistently misspelled Mikulic’s first name as “Brano,” reported to Berlioux that Mikulic “had contacted [Palestinian] Federal Authorities, who had promised to handle terrorism from the Palestinian Group by contacting [the Palestinian] leaders at the highest level.”22 This was not a hyperbolic statement. A separate CIA 18 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 30th– December 1st, 1984, IOCL, 16; “Protection: Chairman of International Olympic Committees,” Sécurité aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. 19 “Protection: Chairman of International Olympic Committees,” Sécurité aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL. 20 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, September 12, 1983. 21 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, September 12, 1983. 22 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, September 12, 1983.

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analysis on Yugoslavia’s links to terrorism confirmed Mikulic’s assurances to Kumar. According to the CIA, Yugoslavia had “sporadic relations” with Abu Nidal, who headed an international terrorist organization known variously as the Abu Nidal Organization or the Fatah Revolutionary Council with the stated aim of eliminating the state of Israel.23 More importantly, the CIA found this relationship “peaked during preparations for the Sarajevo Winter Olympics in 1984, when Belgrade apparently was trying to use its contacts to prevent terrorist threats at the games.”24 This tactic set a new precedent for assessing and handling potential threats to the Games. Even with these connections, Mikulic requested the IOC aid his efforts to track the movement of terrorists.25 Mikulic’s message to Kumar differed slightly from the American perception of the threat to Sarajevo. The CIA reasoned the SOOC had little to fear as the Yugoslavian government recognized the PLO. Simultaneously, Palestinian terrorist groups not involved with the PLO had little motivation to target the Olympics. “The absence of the Israeli team at the Winter Olympic Games … removes what would otherwise be a prime target,” reasoned one CIA analyst.26 With attempts to mitigate the Palestinian threat in place, Mikulic focused his attention on Western Europe. He worried about West German terrorists representing the Baader-Meinhof Group, known also as Red Army Faction.27 Rather 23 See “Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), aka Fatah Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims,” cfr.org. Accessed October 30, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abu-nidal-organizationano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-council-arab-revolutionary-brigades. For more on Abu-Nidal, see Yossi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu-Nidal (New York: Adama Books, 1987). 24 “European Review,” March 28, 1986, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-

RDP87T00289R000200650001-6. 25 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, September 12, 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: janvier–juin 1983, IOCL. 26 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident,” February 1, 1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP85T00287R001101290001-9. 27 “Known Terrorist Groups,” Sécurité aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, 4, IOCL. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, research revealed that the Red Army Faction received support from East Germany’s State Security, or Stasi. See John Schmeidel, “My Enemy’s Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany’s Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security,” Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 59–72.

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than Kumar’s suggestion to employ an international team of security advisors, Mikulic employed West German security specialists for the duration of the Games, likely to head off any threat posed by Baader-Meinhof.28 In continuing the use of liaison as a tactic to protect the Olympics, intelligence cooperation came from other corners of the globe as well prior to Sarajevo. Kumar wrote that security experts from, “America, Belgium, France, Nordic countries and Holland,” traveled to Sarajevo to provide assistance.29 The West Germans even consented to a joint program with the Yugoslavian government to monitor airport arrivals across Yugoslavia. Ken Hill, the White House Security Coordinator for the Los Angeles Olympics, described this arrangement as “almost unheard of.”30 Security for the Olympic Games at times stretched the boundaries of previous experience.

“The Greater the Violence” To the annoyance of his colleagues on the Executive Board in the IOC, Ashwini Kumar presented a fifty-page report on security matters in November 1983. Kumar’s report extended beyond the threat of international terrorism and for the first time considered a domestic terrorist attack in Los Angeles at the Summer Olympic Games, particularly against the Soviet team. The threat of terrorism (international and domestic) formed a theme in Kumar’s analysis as terrorism evolved in the eleven years since the Munich attacks as countries around the globe reacted to prevent attacks with new cutting-edge techniques. Kumar warned his colleagues that terrorist groups started to “protect themselves more and were thus becoming more brutal.”31 Kumar succinctly described his opinion of the state of terrorism during the 1980s:

28 “Report on the XIVth Winter Olympic Games at Sarajevo,” Folder: Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1984, File: Correspondance 1984, janvier–avril, IOCL. 29 “Security,” February 1, 1984, Folder: Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1984, File: Correspondance 1984, janvier–avril, IOCL. 30 Letter from John K. Hill to Michael Deaver, 4 January 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver memos] (11/8/1983–01/15/1984), RRPL. 31 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th–25th, 1983, IOCL,

44.

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In sum, the terrorist violence in the world has expanded to an extent whereby no country can consider itself immune from violence generated from within or without its borders as long as mal-contents of every political hue look to violence to achieve their goal. The growing link between the terrorist organizations pose serious problem for all countries. Unfortunately a belief exists that the greater the violence, the greater the mass publicity and political mileage. The Munich Massacre remains a constant reminder of the vulnerability of the Olympics which are viewed by millions of millions of people on TV in all corners of the world.32

Kumar’s assessment was correct. In the decade following the attack in Munich, terrorist attacks globally quintupled in number.33 Kumar pointed to the cooperation between terrorist groups that perpetuated successful attacks as a reason for nations to cooperate in counter-terrorism. His prime example was the Lod airport massacre where three Japanese Red Army members murdered twenty-six civilians at Lod airport outside of Tel-Aviv, Israel. Kumar argued, “In the Lod incident the JRA terrorists, trained in Japan, North Korea and Lebanon had been provided with false passports in Germany and Czech weapons in Rome, to board a French aircraft.”34 Part of Kumar’s tactics was to fight fire with fire. If terrorist groups utilized liaison to make themselves more effective, then Olympic hosts should follow a similar strategy. Despite his belief, there was one nation that Kumar did not completely trust to cooperate with other nations to prevent an incident: the Soviet Union. He wrote, “[t]heoretically the Soviets do not approve of terrorism and officially condemn it as adventurist and individualistic.”35 Yet Kumar, whose primary responsibility it should be noted was to anticipate possible threat scenarios, was not convinced. The Soviet Union, he argued, could 32 “Threat Assessment of Terrorism in the USA,” Folder Sécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL, 17. 33 The Global Terrorism Database provides a list of terrorist attacks from 1970 to the present day. The database lists 489 terrorist incidents in 1972 while in 1983 there were 2,810 attacks reported. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 34 Quote found in “Threat Assessment of Terrorism in the USA,” Folder Sécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL, 15. 35 Ashwini Kumar, “Terror Report,” Sécurité aux Jeux Olympiques: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: rapport le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL.

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be tempted. He maintained that terrorists provided the Soviets “surrogates in the cold war against the capitalist powers.”36 Kumar believed that such strategy served a dual purpose for the Soviets as “providing [terrorist] groups the training and weapons [meant] the Soviet Union could keep a certain measure of control over them and prevent them from turning their attention to action within the USSR.”37 The Soviet Union’s delegation at the IOC did not respond to his comments. Ahead of the Los Angeles Summer Olympics, there were some in the IOC who were nervous about the treatment of foreign tourists in the United States. American IOC member Julian Roosevelt asked Kumar about press reports in the United States that detailed an alleged pact between rival Los Angeles gangs. According to the rumors, rather than targeting one another, the gangs would focus on attacking foreign tourists visiting Los Angeles. Kumar assured Roosevelt that “measures had already been envisaged in [that] field.”38 Kumar continued to face resistance from some who still thought the IOC should not involve itself with security matters. Romanian IOC member Alexandru Siperco’s comments reflected an inherent contradiction at the heart of IOC security policies. Siperco noted terrorists attacked when “guaranteed maximum effect, normally in the world of politics” yet claimed that the IOC “was, of course, outside politics” and that security at Los Angeles formed a priority for the IOC.39 As shown by the attack at Munich, the notion that the IOC existed outside of politics did not matter to terrorists. Kumar realized this and best expressed this sentiment during his speech to the Executive Board when he remarked, “The Games would be an excellent platform upon which … terrorists could express their grievances.”40

The American-Yugoslavian Connection As Ashwini Kumar attempted to convince his colleagues of the benefits of an efficient liaison system, the United States and Yugoslavian governments explored sharing information ahead of the Sarajevo Winter Olympics. On January 9, 1984, a group of American government officials traveled to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Less than 200 miles away, Sarajevo prepared to

36 Ashwini Kumar, “Terror Report.” 37 Ashwini Kumar, “Terror Report.” 38 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th–25th, 1983, IOCL,

44. 39 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th–25th, 44. 40 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, November 24th–25th, 44.

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host the upcoming Winter Olympic Games. The Americans’ task was to meet with the Yugoslavian government to discuss information sharing to prevent an attack on the Games. Led by Ken Hill, agencies traveling included the FBI, CIA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and State Department.41 This trip exemplified the system of liaison preached by Kumar. Planning for the trip began in December of 1983 when Yugoslavian government officials approached the American embassy in Belgrade and requested American aid. The White House Security Coordinator for Los Angeles Kenneth Hill told Michael Deaver, Reagan’s Deputy Chief of Staff, that the contact was “unusual” in light of previously limited cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia.42 While atypical, Hill saw the utility in agreeing to this visit, as it could help to improve security ahead of the Los Angeles Olympics less than six months away. Hill previously identified a group of “Serbo-Croatian” nationalists as a potentially significant threat to Los Angeles. Over twenty acts of terrorism were attributed to Croatian nationalist groups from 1976 to 1980 and Hill argued information sharing with Yugoslavia presented “a potentially useful opportunity to enhance [the United States’] intelligence efforts” ahead of the Summer Olympics.43 The CIA’s analysis of Belgrade provided further details on terror groups who may target Sarajevo. The CIA identified Croatians, Albanians, and Serbians as potential émigré threats. The Croatians in particular worried the CIA. One estimate placed the number of Croatian émigrés who “belong[ed] to groups advocating violence” between three and 41 Another member identified as “Norman Antkol M F/T” traveled with the team. Extensive research could not locate any information on Antkol. “Security Cooperation with Yugoslavia in Connection with XIV Olympic Games,” December 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 2, Folder: Yugoslavia 1984 Winter Games, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL); Message from AMEMBASSY BELGRADE to SECSTATE WASHDC, February 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 2, Folder: Yugoslavia 1984 Winter Games, RRPL. 42 Letter from John K. Hill to Michael Deaver, January 4, 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver memos] (11/8/1983–01/15/1984), RRPL. 43 Letter from John K. Hill to Michael Deaver, January 4, 1984. Nathaniel Shep-

pard Jr., “Arrest of 9 in Terrorist Group Brings Uneasy Calm to Croatian-Americans,” New York Times, July 23, 1981. A CIA intelligence report identified several potentially threatening Croatian nationalist groups. “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident,” February 1, 1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA RDP85T00287R001101290001-9.

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five thousand.44 A recent analysis of the Sarajevo Olympics noted that, excluding Seoul in 1988, the security risk posed by ethnic tensions in the country was “perhaps … the most extreme threat facing a Modern Olympiad.”45 Sarajevo was the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region the Croatians claimed. Furthermore, intelligence analysts believed the historical meaning behind Sarajevo sparking the powder keg that ignited World War I could motivate a potential attack. The CIA observed that Croatian groups “[were] well aware of the historical significance of Sarajevo.”46 Intelligence reports within the United States justified the wariness ahead of the Winter Olympics. The FBI and Yugoslavian Embassy provided information to the CIA and State Department, respectively, regarding potential threats by Croatian émigrés. The FBI received a tip from Yugoslavian intelligence on three Croatians living in Canada potentially planning an attack on either the Winter Olympics or the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. Additionally, the Yugoslavian Embassy informed the State Department of Croatians living in the United States who were allegedly involved in the “preparation of terrorist acts” that would target the Olympics.47 Neither the CIA nor the State Department commented on the accuracy of the reports. Iranians and Armenians emerged as significant non-émigré threats to the Sarajevo Olympics. The American press reported Iran’s anger with Yugoslavia stemmed from the arrest and trial of twelve Muslims charged with distributing leaflets “calling for ‘jihad’—holy war—to defend Islamic purity.”48 One considered possibility was Iran providing personnel to support an attack. The CIA supported this theory with reports from the American Embassy in Belgrade on the impact of travel by some Yugoslavian Muslims to Iran. “[The Yugoslavian Muslims] appear[ed] to have been indoctrinated with Khomeini-style Muslim fundamentalism,”

44 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident.” 45 Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City. 46 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident.” 47 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident,” February 1,

1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP85T00287R001101290001-9. 48 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident”; Quote found in Hal Piper, “Winter Olympics Couldn’t Be Snowed Out–Could They?,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1983.

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cautioned the CIA.49 In the CIA’s view, the most likely Armenian terrorist group to target the Winter Olympics was JCAG. This organization sought to avenge the genocide of Armenians at the hands of the Turks during World War I.50 In March of 1983, JCAG terrorists murdered the Turkish ambassador to Yugoslavia. The one factor limiting a potential attack by JCAG against the Winter Olympics was the ongoing trial of the two JCAG members implicated in the assassination.51 This combination of threats from émigrés and non-émigrés motivated the Yugoslavian approach to the United States. In the Yugoslavian’s fear, the State Department saw an opportunity. One unidentified government official wrote, “The Department believes that it would be-in our mutual interests to establish a bilateral mechanism to exchange information about such threats.”52 However, the State Department insisted on maintaining absolute secrecy about the arrangement. American government officials feared that if Yugoslavian émigrés in the United States heard of cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia, it would obstruct the efforts of “investigatory agencies” in the United States.53 Yugoslavia’s role as Olympic host was not a new topic among D.C. intelligence circles. In September of 1983, a National Security Agency (NSA) representative on the CIA Director’s Security Committee (SECOM) requested that Yugoslavia be removed from a list of countries where the CIA deemed travel dangerous. The NSA official offered two rationales for removing Yugoslavia from the list: the country’s role as host of the Winter Olympics and a newly announced agreement between Yugoslavia and “U.S. forces in Europe offering economically attractive 49 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident.” The reference is to Ayatollah Khomeini who became the leader of Iran following the 1979 Revolution. 50 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident.” The latest and best account of the Armenian Genocide is Ronald G. Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide (Princeton University Press, 2015). 51 “The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospect for a Terrorist Incident.” 52 The writer of this telegram was most likely a CIA employee. According to the docu-

ment, “EUR/EEY: DPOZORSKI” drafted the telegram while “EUR/EEY: RECOMBS” finalized the draft. Similar code names are seen within CIA correspondence regarding Eastern Europe. See, “CIA Analysis of Trends in Eastern Europe,” April 14, 1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP86M00886R002300220013-2. 53 “Security Cooperation with Yugoslavia in Connection with XIV Olympic Games,” December 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 2, Folder: Yugoslavia 1984 Winter Games, RRPL.

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tour packages for U.S. military personnel.”54 SECOM’s Compartmentation Subcommittee rejected this rationale, arguing that the suggestions offered by the NSA were the precise reasons why Yugoslavia would remain on the list.55 In particular, SECOM worried over the vulnerability of agents with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). CIA Director William Casey described any travel by individuals with SCI knowledge as a “security concern” and heavily stressed agency and department heads to remind their employees of their “security obligations.”56 In response to the NSA official’s request, Casey sent a letter to the NFIB on the importance of security ahead of the Sarajevo Winter Olympics. Following the election of Ronald Reagan, Casey had replaced Stansfield Turner, who distributed a similar warning to the NFIB prior to the Moscow Olympic Games. Casey wrote visitors to the Sarajevo Olympics included “U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants, and employees of U.S. Government contractors.”57 Some of these individuals had access to classified information, which presented a potentially tempting target to Yugoslavian intelligence agents. Moreover, Casey cited a precedent of Yugoslavian agents targeting

54 Memorandum for Chairman, DCI Security Committee (SECOM), September 1, 1983, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP96M01138R001200040023-8; Memorandum for Chairman, DCI Security Committee, August 3, 1983, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP96M01138R001200040025-6. 55 Memorandum for Chairman, DCI Security Committee (SECOM), September 1, 1983. 56 The Department of Homeland Security describes SCI as “classified information concerning, or derived from, intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes requiring handling within formal access control systems established by the Director Central Intelligence (DCI).” Quote found in “Sensitive Compartmented Information Program Management,” Dhs.gov. Accessed September 6, 2017. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_11043_sensitive_ compartmented_information_program_management.pdf; A further, more in-depth description of compartmented intelligence is found in Michael A. Turner, Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence, Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 54–55. 57 Memorandum from CIA Director William Casey to National Foreign Intelligence Council, November 4, 1983, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIARDP85M00364R002404800001-6.

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American diplomatic personnel and warned that with the coming Olympic Games, “increased and more aggressive targeting [was] expected.”58 Regardless of Yugoslavian attempts to target American officials, the State Department eagerly wanted to begin this information-sharing program. The Department argued an altruistic motive for wanting to aid the SOOC, “The USG (United States Government), of course, is concerned about the safety of our Olympic team as well as that of visiting dignitaries … [going] to Sarajevo.”59 The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia was David Anderson. A Scottish-born New Yorker with over two decades of experience in Foreign Service, Anderson and his staff had very specific instructions. Embassy representatives were to approach either members of the Yugoslav government or the SOOC and propose a twofold initiative. The first was the initial request to send an “interagency security observer” to familiarize the United States with Sarajevo’s security preparations and secondly, to “establish a bilateral mechanism to exchange information about possible threats to security.”60 The American team that arrived on January 9 would work closely with the Yugoslavian Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (FSIA), or secret police. The CIA found that in response to “past security problems in the Kosovo province” FSIA had more expanded powers.61 Meetings between the two parties lasted until January 14. Ambassador Anderson messaged Robert Sayre, the Coordinator for Combating Terrorism, and Dave Fields, the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, the following month with a less than optimistic report. While no problems arose from the trip to Belgrade and Sarajevo, Anderson complained over the lack of forthcoming specific threat information. The intelligence he did receive did not provide enough detail to be of use. Anderson informed Sayre and Fields that, “The Yugoslavs … have literally pleaded 58 Memorandum from CIA Director William Casey to National Foreign Intelligence Council. 59 “Security Cooperation with Yugoslavia in Connection with XIV Olympic Games,” December 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 2, Folder: Yugoslavia 1984 Winter Games, RRPL. 60 “Security Cooperation with Yugoslavia in Connection with XIV Olympic Games.” 61 Quote found in “Yugoslavia Increases Federal Security Powers,” December 1983,

CIA FOIA ERR, Document No. CIA-RDP07S00452R000300820006-8. Further detail on the 1981 Revolt in Kosovo is found in Mark Baskin, “Crisis in Kosovo,” Problems of Communism 32, no. 2 (1983): 61–74 and Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (Pluto Press, 2000), 41–44.

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with us to provide them with as much information as possible regarding both general and specific threats to the Winter Olympic Games.”62 Anderson needed a piece of intelligence to use to placate the Yugoslavian government. He wrote that any credible information the United States provided was a demonstration of the United States’ “commitment to establishing a permanent and more expansive mechanism for the exchange of terrorist related information.”63 Anderson proposed telling the Yugoslavian government of a previous terrorist threat to the Yugoslavian President, Mika Spiljak, who visited the United States in early February 1984 to discuss nuclear arms with President Reagan.64 He argued, “Information about the recent bomb threat in New York against the JAT aircraft which transported President Spiljak … would be an excellent lead-off.”65 The State Department did not respond to Anderson’s proposal. From the American government’s perspective, the trip to Belgrade and Sarajevo served a greater public relations purpose than as a lesson in security planning. The reason lay partially in Yugoslavia’s domestic laws. Upon his return, Hill admitted to Michael Deaver that Yugoslavia’s security policies ahead of the Olympics far outstripped what Hill viewed as allowable in the United States. He provided the policy of checking cars upon entry to the Yugoslavian province of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an example. Hill wrote, “every road … will be blockaded and each car and individual entering or leaving the province will be physically searched. Imagine doing something like this in Southern California.”66 Hill previously wrote a similar problem existed in relation to the Moscow Olympics. Following a trip to Montreal to learn from their experience with security, Hill wrote Deaver, “For all practical purposes [Montreal 1976] is the most recent Olympics … (1980 in Moscow cannot be 62 Message from AMEMBASSY BELGRADE to SECSTATE WASHDC, February 1984. John Kenneth Hill Files Box 2, Folder: Yugoslavia 1984 Winter Games, RRPL. 63 Message from AMEMBASSY BELGRADE to SECSTATE WASHDC, February 1984. 64 “Yugoslav President Holds a Meeting with Reagan,” New York Times, February 2, 1984. 65 Message from AMEMBASSY BELGRADE to SECSTATE WASHDC, February 1984. 66 Letter from John K. Hill to Michael Deaver, January 4, 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: Hill to Deaver memos (1/16/1984–03/15/1984), RRPL.

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compared to anything).”67 Despite the United States’ inability to implement similar security measures, the presence of American government officials in Yugoslavia sent a message. Hill argued the group fulfilled the fundamental purpose of the visit: to show the United States’ commitment “to combat international terrorism and protect the Olympic ideals.”68 The stated goal of discussing international terrorism between the United States and the Yugoslavian government did not prove to be a straightforward task. The CIA and FBI had initial reservations on sharing information due to Yugoslavia’s tendency to allow well-known terrorist groups to travel through the country.69 Those worries aside, fundamental differences in the rights of citizens in the respective nations played a part. As shown above, Yugoslavia had ample reasons to view émigrés as a legitimate threat. When the Yugoslavian government requested the names and addresses of potential suspects living in the United States, Ken Hill and his fellow Americans cited the American Constitution as grounds for their refusal.70 Hill commented that when the Americans showed they were interested in broader security issues, “the Yugoslavs put the émigré groups into the larger context.”71 As the Americans and Yugoslavian government cautiously exchanged information, Ashwini Kumar quickly learned that the Cold War made seemingly straightforward matters more difficult. Monique Berlioux brought to Kumar’s attention the “difficulties of having a security dialogue with an ‘Iron Curtain’ country like Yugoslavia.”72 Kumar did not specify which problems Berlioux cited but the report he provided the IOC following the Closing Ceremonies in Sarajevo hints at some of the potential issues. In a separate trip to the one taken by Ken Hill, American officials responsible for security planning in Los Angeles traveled to

67 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael K. Deaver, September 29, 1983, Kenneth J. Hill Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983) Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL). 68 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to 69 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to 70 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to 71 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to

Michael K. Deaver, September 29, 1983. Michael K. Deaver, September 29, 1983. Michael K. Deaver, September 29, 1983. Michael K. Deaver, September 29, 1983.

72 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 1, 1983, Ashwini

Kumar Correspondance 1983: Folder: juillet–decembre 1983, IOCL.

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Sarajevo to observe and learn from Sarajevo’s experience.73 Kumar found himself in a difficult situation. He noticed the Yugoslavian authorities were “not keen in parting with essential knowledge particularly in regards to the strength employed and the manner in which supreme authority was to be exercised.”74 Kumar’s description of security at the Sarajevo Winter Olympics hints at the Yugoslavian government’s approach. He summarized the undertaking, “In short, the whole Games were held like a successful military operation.”75 The 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympics highlighted the precise reason that security for the Olympic Games is such a difficult endeavor. While the sports that the athletes compete in remain roughly the exact same every four years, the political ideologies of the host nations are not static. As the United States saw in its attempt to help prepare Yugoslavia to host the Winter Olympics, at times what one nation views as allowable in the name of security would be unthinkable in another. Striking that balance is one of the greatest hurdles facing security planners for the Olympic Games.

“A Byzantine Method of Coexistence” The 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles marked a turning point for the Olympic movement. These Games would be the first to be privately funded and to utilize existing facilities to help avert the massive financial losses suffered by Montreal and Moscow. Los Angeles was the only choice as Tehran, the only other bidder, withdrew its bid due to the beginning of what became the Iranian Revolution.76 In a move similar to the one that thwarted the bid for the 1976 Winter Olympics in Denver, Los Angeles residents rejected public funding for hosting the Games. This move left

73 Quote found in “Report on the XIVth Winter Olympic Games at Sarajevo”; Gates’ attendance in Sarajevo noted in Kenneth Reich, “Games Security Big Job, Gates Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 11, 1984. 74 “Report on the XIVth Winter Olympic Games at Sarajevo.” 75 “Report on the XIVth Winter Olympic Games at Sarajevo.” 76 Matthew Llewellyn, John Gleaves, and Wayne Wilson, “The Historical Legacy of the

1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 2; See also Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 45. For an analysis of Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics, see Kenneth Reich, Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics (Santa Barbara: Capra Press, 1986).

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the IOC with no real option but to allow a private organization to run the Olympic Games, the Los Angeles Olympic Games Organizing Committee (LAOOC).77 Security planning for the 1984 Olympics devolved into a bureaucratic slog. One accurate description of the security apparatus was a “byzantine method of coexistence.”78 Awarded the Games in 1978, the planning for Los Angeles’ security began in 1979 and included cooperation among local and federal law enforcement.79 A group of local officials served as the spokespeople on security for the LAOOC before the creation of the Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council (OLECC) in 1981.80 In November of 1981, OLECC created an eight-person team dedicated to security called the Security Planning Committee (SPC) which included a further sixteen subcommittees.81 Like OLECC, the SPC leadership came from a variety of local, state, and federal agencies from the California Highway Patrol to the Secret Service.82 The result of this bureaucratic setup was, as reported in Newsweek, “everyone from FBI operatives to the chief of campus police at the University of Southern California [could] voice an opinion.”83 At the heart of the security strategy for the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles in 1984 was the Security Central Operations (SCO) center. In case of an incident, the SCO would direct resources to the appropriate areas. One incident provided a prescient example of the SCO in action

77 Stephen R. Wenn, “Peter Ueberroth’s Legacy: How the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics Changed the Trajectory of the Olympic Movement,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 158. 78 “Who Will Police the Olympics?” John Kenneth Hill Files Box 7 Folder: Newsclips (2 of 8), RRPL. 79 Organizing Committee of the XXIIIrd Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles. (1984). The Official Report of the Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad Los Angeles, 1984, 600. The FBI, and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department took the early lead. 80 Those officials were LAOOC President Peter Ueberroth, Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, Long Beach City Police Chief Charles Ussery. Organizing Committee of the XXIIIrd Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles. Following his replacement of Edward Hickey, Ken Hill also served on this committee. 81 Organizing Committee of the XXIIIrd Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles. 82 Organizing Committee of the XXIIIrd Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles. 83 “Who Will Police the Olympics?”

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and takes into account increased surveillance working in tandem. A security guard noticed a car tailing a bus heading toward the Olympic Village and notified the SCO. Helicopters and officers on the ground apprehended the suspect, who had homemade bombs in the car.84 Kumar wrote, “nothing was so small that was not overseen by functionaries at this nodal site.”85 Potential privacy violations were not part of the discussion at this time. If security had been expansive in Lake Placid, it was even more so in Los Angeles. This was particularly true for technology utilized to aid security processes. Following one practice security exercise, Kumar wrote Samaranch, “[s]o much advanced technology has been employed that its like has never been used or seen in any previous Olympic Games. This is not my view only, but of many old hands at the Games since 1948.”86 Some of this was in the form of the SCO, some stemmed from the military, and other technology came private corporations. In Los Angeles, security would be coordinated from the Olympic Security Coordination Center (OSCC) where Kumar noted, “sophisticated technology [was] being used.”87 The one theme that would run through security in Los Angeles and set a precedent for future Olympic Games was this emphasis on technology to aid security. Organizers used the Illinois-based Motorola Company’s system designed in 1976 called Digital Voice Privacy (DVP). The company explained in its annual report that year that DVP, “use[d] voice scrambling techniques which [made] it virtually impossible for an unauthorized listener to intercept messages.”88 It had the added benefit of being the only system recognized by the NSA with the capability to transmit secure

84 Organizing Committee of the XXIIIrd Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles. (1984). The Official Report of the Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad Los Angeles, 1984, 608. 85 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, January 25, 1985. 86 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, June 16, 1984, Folder:

Securité aux J.O. rapports et correspondence, 1981–1985, File: Rapport sur l”exercise de securité olympique, IOCA. 87 “Olympic Security at Los Angeles, July 21, 1984,” July 21, 1984, File: Correspondance 1984, Folder: mai–décembre 1984, RRPL. 88 “Annual Report 1976,” Motorola Solutions, n.d., Accessed April 10, 2020. https://www.motorolasolutions.com/content/dam/msi/docs/en-xw/static_files/ 1976_Motorola_Annual_Report.pdf.

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communications. For the Los Angeles Olympics, DVP meant security officials in athlete buses could communicate privately with helicopters flying overhead or the central command unit.89 A different type of technology would be used in case of an attack and was called the Video Disc Mapping System (VDMS). With VDMS, authorities could “scan” a room or area like the Olympic Village and use this as a map in case of a terrorist attack or hostage situation.90 As was the case previously in Lake Placid, some of the technology was either developed for or would be later repurposed to support the military. The initial request of aid from the DOD totaled $21.9 million spread across everything from aiding with communications to air support to helping with administration. Approval for a $12.6 million communication system would help coordinate the more than 60 different agencies that would be aiding security on the ground in Los Angeles. In and of itself, that fact is neither notable nor surprising. The use of these systems following the conclusion of the Olympics in Los Angeles is notable as, “[the] equipment [would] become part of the Army inventory after the Games to be used for civil disturbance control and related purposes.”91 Taking equipment used to help with security at the Olympic Games and repurposing it for use on civilians is a trend that started in the early 1980s and continues to the present day. The American federal government took a notable interest in security at the Los Angeles Olympics. This attention stemmed partially from a feared backlash against Ronald Reagan if a terrorist attack occurred. The National Security Council’s International Affairs deputy director Richard Levine warned Reagan’s National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane about this possibility in April 1984. “[T]he stirring up of international trouble often precipitates Americans rallying around the President in office. A terrorist action within our borders, however, may provoke the opposite response from the American people,” Levine cautioned.92 89 “Annual Report 1976.” 90 Support to the Los Angeles Olympic Games: White House Meeting, 1300 hours,

29 February,” John Kenneth Hill Files Box 1 Folder [Military Support], RRPL. 91 “Support to the Los Angeles Olympic Games: White House Meeting, 1300 hours, 29 February,” John Kenneth Hill Files Box 1 Folder [Military Support], RRPL. 92 Memorandum from Richard Levine to Robert McFarlane, April 16, 1984, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Document No. GALE|CK2349662820, Accessed April 11, 2018.

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Levine offered McFarlane some options for Reagan that could head off any possibility of Reagan receiving blame if an attack occurred. There was one principle that Levine preached the most. Levine wrote that Reagan must “be seen as being ‘on top’ of a clear chain of command with regard to counter-terrorism measures.”93 Some of the American interest in counter-terrorism planning for Los Angeles must be considered as a means of protecting Reagan from criticism. In February of 1982, Samaranch visited Washington, DC, and met with Reagan. The meeting evidently went well as LAOOC President Peter Ueberroth informed an IOC Executive Board meeting the same month that Samaranch “had been received most warmly by Mr. Reagan … The American President had agreed that all efforts would be made to ensure the security of the IOC and athletes.”94 Michael Deaver informed Samaranch the following week of the United States’ nomination of a coordinator for federal law enforcement at the Los Angeles Olympics named Edward V. Hickey.95 By June of 1983, Deaver replaced Hickey with Ken Hill as Hickey continually missed meetings and had taken too lax of an approach for Deaver’s liking.96 Hickey’s dismissal came following a report by Charlie Beckwith, a former commander of an elite counter-terrorist unit called Delta Force. Beckwith played a significant, and previously unrecognized, role in security planning for the Los Angeles Olympics. In May 1983, Deaver requested Beckwith study Los Angeles’ security preparations to help the federal government decide the extent of federal aid required. The Los Angeles Times reported this decision came following the Reagan administration’s request of $69.1 million for security, $50 million of which was “for military contingencies.”97 Beckwith’s involvement caught Samaranch’s attention and he forwarded Kumar a clipping on this promotion. To Kumar, Beckwith’s participation was evidence of “how seriously 93 Memorandum from Richard Levine to Robert McFarlane, April 16, 1984. 94 Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Los Angeles, February 3rd–5th, 1982, 34,

IOCL. 95 Letter from Michael Deaver to Juan Antonio Samaranch, February 8, 1982, Sécurité aux JO: rapport et correspondance, 1981–1985, Folder: Correspondance 1982, IOCL. 96 Kenneth Reich, “U.S. Names New Olympics Security Aide,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1983. 97 Kenneth Reich, “Terrorist Expert to Write Report on Olympics,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1983.

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authorities in the US [were] tackling [the security] problem.”98 Beckwith’s involvement in analyzing security for the Los Angeles Olympic Games also highlights how the military has been a key player in Olympic security for decades. Domestically, Beckwith divided opinion. Hill told Michael Deaver that he met “stiff resistance” from local and federal authorities on Beckwith’s involvement.99 Part of the opposition to Beckwith was a perception of Beckwith as hasty, someone who approached situations without fully assessing all contingencies. Hill also noted Beckwith’s critics viewed his military experience skeptically, arguing “Beckwith’s experience is in the area of counter-guerilla operations and [his critics feel he] is no more qualified than anyone else in dealing with a security problem of such a magnitude as [would] be faced in Los Angeles.”100 Beckwith’s case was not helped as he angered some of his colleagues within the DOD by publishing a memoir he titled Delta Force which recounted the early days of the unit. Despite the skepticism of his ability, Beckwith completed the report and, following his study, sent the federal government a $200,000 proposal for the continued use of the services of his Austin, Texas-based consulting firm, Security Assistant Services of Texas, Ltd. (SAS).101 Beckwith argued that Hill, as opposed to selecting a staff that would be disbanded following the Closing Ceremonies, should utilize the services of SAS.102 Hill saw value in Beckwith’s proposal. He told Deaver in October of 1983, “Whether it is Beckwith or personnel already in the Federal Government that will assist in these areas, [he would] soon need 98 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 1 July 1983, Ashwini Kumar Correspondance 1983, Folder: juillet–decembre, IOCL. 99 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, October 17, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder [Hill to Deaver Memos] (10/1/1983–11/7/1983), RRPL. 100 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, October 17, 1983. 101 Beckwith led a failed operation to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of

1980. For reference, see Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts Volume I: A-D (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 202. According to his resume, he also aided security preparations ahead of the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics. His resume is found in “Background and Understanding of the Problem,” John Kenneth Hill Files Box 1 Folder: Beckwith, Charles Security Assistance Service 2 of 4, RRPL. 102 “Background and Understanding of the Problem.”

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such support.”103 Hill balanced the negative assessments of Beckwith with recognition of the former commander’s ability to accomplish tasks quickly. “Beckwith has a unique capacity for ‘stirring the pot’,” Hill reasoned. Eventually, the decision came through to reject Beckwith’s bid and to use resources already available to the federal government. As solace, and evidence of Beckwith’s influence on security in Los Angeles, Hill wrote, “You’ll be pleased to know that of the original recommendations you made … approximately 75% have already been addressed and implemented.”104 The VDMS technology used on the Olympic Village was just one of Beckwith’s many recommendations and influences on security at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.

“Touching All the Bases” On January 28, 1982, two members of JCAG assassinated Turkish consul general Kemal Arikan on the streets of Los Angeles. Arikan’s death was the twenty-first of a Turkish diplomat in the previous decade.105 The incident prompted Los Angeles Chief of Police Daryl Gates to contact William P. Clark, the Special Assistant to President Reagan. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) provided security for international diplomats and Gates argued the federal government should take more responsibility. He criticized the federal government for responding either “poorly” or “not at all” to his requests for aid.106 Less than two years later, Gates struck a remarkably different tone in the buildup to the 1984 Olympic Games. In July of 1983, FBI Director William H. Webster announced the creation of a counterterrorist Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) that would attend the Olympics in Los Angeles. Webster’s proclamation did not sit well with law enforcement members in Los Angeles. Journalist Kenneth Reich reported, “[Los Angeles law enforcement] fear that the FBI is intensifying efforts to gain for itself the key role in handling any terrorism that might occur at the 103 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, October 17, 1983. 104 Letter from Ken Hill to Charlie Beckwith, October 27, 1983, John Kenneth Hill

Files Box 1 Folder: Beckwith, Charles Security Assistance Service, 4 of 4, RRPL. 105 Robert Lindsey, “Turkish Diplomat Is Slain on Coast,” New York Times, January 29, 1982. 106 Letter from Daryl Gates to William P. Clark, February 5, 1982, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 6 Folder: FBI, RRPL.

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1984 Games.”107 This minor incident characterized relations between local and federal law enforcement in the buildup to the Los Angeles Olympics. The Emergency Response Subcommittee, a subcommittee of the SPC, drafted a Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and law enforcement in the Los Angeles area. This document would give the FBI the lead in handle potential terrorist incidents at the Olympics. Ken Hill described the memorandum as “extremely comprehensive” and noted the Subcommittee “discusse[d] all facets of managing [terrorist] incidents.”108 The LAPD submitted a counter-proposal to ban the FBI from conducting investigations without the LAPD’s consent.109 Once upset at the federal government’s lack of aid, Chief Darryl Gates now led the protests against giving the FBI jurisdiction.110 Because of this dispute, there was no clear delineation of responsibility in case of a terrorist attack in Los Angeles. Hill recognized the inherent political aspects of the Olympics and the type of response this required. He told Deaver, “despite what the organizers claim, this is a political and foreign affairs event.”111 As a result, Hill believed the federal government should take responsibility for potential terrorist incidents in Los Angeles. Media coverage of the standoff between the FBI and LAPD merely encouraged both sides to further entrench their positions. Hill remarked Gates suffered some pressure to not budge as, “[the] issue [was] in the newspapers [and] … [Gates’] own officers are watching to see if he will stand his ground or ‘sell-out’.”112

107 Kenneth Reich, “FBI Training Special Squad for Olympics,” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1983. 108 Letter from Ken Hill to Michael Deaver, September 16, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983), RRPL. 109 Kenneth Reich, “LAPD Balks at Deferring to FBI at Olympics,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1983. 110 Letter from Ken Hill to Michael Deaver, September 16, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983) RRPL. One of the arguments offered by the LAPD was that their Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams had equal experience to any group the FBI provided and that local law enforcement was less prone to an overreaction. Citing the “Patty Hearst affair,” Hill argued this point was “debatable.” 111 Letter from Ken Hill to Michael Deaver, August 8, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files, Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (August 1983–09/13/1983), RRPL. 112 Letter from Ken Hill to Michael Deaver, August 8, 1983.

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The fight dragged into September of 1983 when Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton, the head of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, questioned federal and local law enforcement officials on security preparations for the Olympic Games. Two weeks prior, Hill described the plans, or lack thereof, in case of a terrorist attack in Los Angeles in a memorandum to Deaver, “[w]hile planning on a law enforcement level is showing some progress in Los Angeles, the overall concept of how to prepare for, and respond to, a terrorist incident [had] not been fully developed.”113 Following the meeting with Denton, Hill reported the Senator’s primary concern was the lack of “adequate procedure in effect to have a distinct line of authority in place during a terrorist incident.”114 The disagreements lasted until March of 1984 when the two groups met in Washington, DC, and signed an agreement that Hill described as “necessarily vague.”115 In the midst of the FBI-LAPD dispute, Hill accepted an offer to visit Montreal and Ottawa to discuss how the RCMP handled security at the 1976 Games. He did not see much utility in the visit. In his opinion, “While the problems faced in 1976 will undoubtedly vary from those anticipated in 1984, for credibility’s sake and in an effort to make sure I’m ‘touching all the bases’, it seems prudent that I make this trip.”116 A week later, Hill struck a different tone. He admitted his assumption that the problems faced by Montreal and Los Angeles would be completely different was wrong. Hill found comfort in the knowledge that “[Montreal] faced many of the same jurisdictional disputes, ego problems, command and control issues, and financing approaches”

113 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael K. Deaver, September 2, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (August 1983–09/13/1983), RRPL. 114 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael K. Deaver, September 14, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983) RRPL. Hill also noted that Denton, who gained fame for blinking t-o-r-t-u-r-e in Morse Code during an interview as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, viewed the problem with a “distinct military point of view.” 115 Details of the agreement are found in Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael K Deaver, March 2, 1984, John Kenneth Hill Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (1/16/1984–03/15/1984), RRPL. 116 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael K. Deaver, September 22, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983), RRPL.

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that he now handled.117 His collaboration with the Canadians provides an example of security forces liaising and, in this case, sharing internal logistical problems rather than intelligence reports.

The IOC and the Soviet Boycott Prior to the 1984 Summer Olympics, Ashwini Kumar predicted that the probability of an attack in Los Angeles was high. He provided the IOC a list of potential threats, “[i]n addition to the time honoured international disputes.”118 He pointed to a variety of potential causes that would make the Los Angeles Olympic Games a viable target. He opined the United States’ border with Mexico and Canada could prove easy for terrorists to cross or that the Soviet Union may seek revenge for the boycott of the 1980 Olympics. Kumar’s last point, however, displayed that some threats extended beyond international terrorism. Kumar argued, “The ‘whiteblack’ tension in [the] US and particularly in L.A.” was a major security concern.119 He furthered his point later in his report. In his opinion, the end of the Vietnam War “deprived the American terrorist movements of their main spring. There [was], however, a danger that the race problems may still [have] provide[d] those organizations the necessary impetus for renewed action.”120 A nation’s internal dynamics could play as important a role in preparing security for the Olympics as the fear of external terrorist threats. The fear of race relations in the United States impacting the Games increased when Olympic Committees from third-world nations received a letter allegedly sent by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Titled, “Olympic Games For Humans, Not Apes,” the message told recipients to avoid the Olympic Games in Los Angeles and warned, “IF YOUR CURS DARE

117 Letter from Ken Hill to Michael Deaver, September 29, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (09/14/1983–09/30/1983), RRPL. 118 “Some Thoughts on the Security Arrangements at the Olympic Games,” FolderSécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL, 3. 119 “Some Thoughts on the Security Arrangements at the Olympic Games.”. 120 “Some Thoughts on the Security Arrangements at the Olympic Games,” 8. The

primary American terrorist movement Kumar mentions was a group called the Weather Underground. For more on this groups activities, see R. Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (London: Verso, 1997).

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TO COME TO THE SUMMER OLYMPICS IN AMERICA THEY WILL BE SHOT OR HANGED.”121 The KKK distanced itself from the message. The Imperial Wizard of the Klan even released a statement saying, “We condemn any sort of threats against any nation and we are against interfering with any nation’s participating in the Olympics. Obviously someone obtained some Klan stationery.”122 American government officials claimed the message was part of a disinformation attempt by the Soviet Union to lower attendance in Los Angeles. In an internal analysis of the message, the CIA argued that various errors in language and syntax meant it could not have been written by a native speaker and that “the typical Soviet active measured modus operandi is to disseminate disinformation abroad and subsequently replay it in the Soviet press.”123 The CIA pointed to the Soviet press quickly picking up the story to confirm its analysis. Aside from fears of racial issues within the United States impacting the Games, Kumar repeatedly voiced his displeasure that a private organization, the LAOOC, would handle security. At a meeting in Sarajevo with LAOOC President Peter Ueberroth, Kumar offered to provide experts on international terrorism to the LAOOC. Ueberroth declined. Kumar expressed his annoyance with Ueberroth to Monique Berlioux, “Self-sufficiency is a commendable principle, but in the matter of antisocial elements from a region other than your own country, it is always prudent to accept outside expert aid.”124 Kumar visited Los Angeles from November 9 to 11, 1983, to aid the LAOOC’s security preparations. While he noted that the preparations “impressed” him, he stressed the point that security for Los Angeles was going to be a massive endeavor.125 From housing athletes at the University of Southern California and 121 Emphasis in original. “Olympic Games for Humans, Not Apes,” Sécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: correspondance 1984, IOCL. 122 Bernard Gwertzman, “Olympic Threats Reported Abroad,” New York Times, July 11, 1984. 123 “Alleged KKK Death Threats to Third World Olympic Athletes: A Soviet Active Measure,” July 17, 1984, CIA FOIA ERR: document no. CIARDP85T00287R001400750001-6. 124 Note from Ashwini Kumar to Monique Berlioux, February 1984, Sécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: Correspondance 1984, IOCL. 125 “Paper on Security Matters at the Games in Los Angeles,” Folder Sécurité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: Rapport sur le risqué terroriste 1984, IOCL, 7.

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University of California at Los Angeles, to transporting athletes to venues around the city, security could pose an issue at innumerable points. “The fact … that the Games are being run by a private authority is not going to help matters,” Kumar argued.126 Ken Hill agreed with Kumar and provided a scathing assessment of the LAOOC. After one OLECC meeting, where Hill noted Peter Ueberroth “launched into an amazing stream of consciousness presentation,” Hill outlined a list of his complaints about Ueberroth and LAOOC.127 Deaver, who had a habit of highlighting important portions of Hill’s reports in yellow, marked several pieces of Hill’s grievances. One yellow section began, “Patience with this organization is wearing thin.”128 The crux of Hill’s annoyance with the LAOOC appeared to be a lack of appreciation for the United States government’s efforts. Another golden-colored paragraph concluded, “Everything [the United States government had] done in Los Angeles to ensure a safe environment for athletes and visitors has been in spite of the LAOOC, not because of it.”129 Hill ended his missive with his most barbed comments. With a Soviet boycott still a possibility, Hill described the LAOOC as “amateurs” who needed to be brought “back into line with reality.”130 Some of Hill’s and Kumar’s complaints with LAOOC centered around the participation, or potential boycott, of the Soviet Union. The perception within the federal government was that the LAOOC fretted over the potential impact of a Soviet boycott. Hill told White House Communications Director Michael McManus that the LAOOC had been too lenient to Soviet demands and directly blamed the threat of a boycott. “[O]ne must remain wary of the LAOOC’s motive,” Hill warned.131 In Hill’s view, the LAOOC would do whatever it took to make sure that the Soviets attended, even if that meant attempting to circumvent normal procedures, including those implemented to ensure national security.

126 “Paper on Security Matters at the Games in Los Angeles.” 127 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 17, 1984, John Kenneth

Hill Files Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (3/16/1984–05/23/1984), RRPL. 128 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 129 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 130 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 131 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael McManus,

17, 1984. 17, 1984. 17, 1984. December 16, 1983.

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The questions over whether the Soviets would attend played a significant role in security concerns ahead of the Los Angeles Olympics. While the Soviet decision to boycott is well covered in other works, it is useful to examine the perceived security threats to the Games.132 On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007) strayed into Soviet airspace. A Soviet Su-15 jet intercepted and shot down the aircraft, killing all 269 passengers and crew. In response, California Republican Senator John Doolittle and a business executive named David Balsiger formed the “Ban the Soviets Coalition” (BTSC).133 The American government paid little heed to Balsiger or his contingent. In a message to American embassies behind the Iron Curtain, Secretary of State George Schultz described the BTSC as “insignificant,” blamed the American media for inflaming the group’s message, and assured Soviet diplomat Viktor Isakov that the United States government did not support the BTSC.134 However, historian Robert Edelman shows the Soviet press took the existence and American media coverage of BTSC “as a sign of a much broader ‘anti-Communist, anti-socialist hysteria’.”135 Even if the American government did not believe in BTSC’s message, the perception existed within the Soviet Union that BTSC represented mainstream American thought. The BTSC coalition coincided with concerns, from the American and Soviet governments, over the potential defections of Soviet athletes. In early May of 1984, Hill cited the issue of Soviet defectors as one of “ominous proportions” and informed Deaver, “that [defections were] one of the most sensitive issues facing the Administration during the

132 One of the best accounts is found in Robert Simon Edelman, “The Russians Are Not Coming! The Soviet Withdrawal from the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 1 (2015): 9–36. 133 Full details of the campaign are found in ibid.: 14–16. In a letter to Michael Deaver, Balsiger argued for government support of the boycott, pointing to the support for Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election from segments of the coalition. Balsiger mentioned the KAL 007 incident several times and stated the BTSC did not want to see the Soviets “[get] away with murder by hiding behind the Olympic flag.” Deaver responded a month later, assuring Balsiger that the federal government would take the proper steps to ensure security. He made no mention of the KAL 007 incident. 134 Memorandum from SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, May 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 3 Folder: Soviet Participation in 1984 Olympics (2 of 2). 135 Edelman, “The Russians Are Not Coming!,” 16.

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Olympics.”136 While the Soviets touted security as their official rationale for potentially staying away from Los Angeles, Hill posited a different idea. The security threat to the Soviets was not international terrorism. Rather, Hill argued, the Soviets perceived an inability to prevent their athletes from defecting.137 The Soviet request to dock a ship, the Gruzia, in Los Angeles harbor for the duration of the Games represented a potential security threat to the American government. Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, warned of the possibility that the Soviet ship may “electronic[ally] eavesdrop” on the surrounding area while in port.138 Hill further outlined several security problems with the ship in a letter to Reagan’s Chief of Staff Michael McManus. Not only would the ship be difficult to secure in case of a terrorist incident, Hill noted the proposed berth was near a “sensitive U.S. Navy installation” and would give any protestors a very visible focal point for their demonstrations.139 At odds with security fears was a belief within Washington that treating the Soviets poorly would reflect badly upon the United States. Robert McFarlane expressed this idea in a memo to Reagan in January of 1984. He wrote, “Given the high profile of the Olympics throughout the world, our decisions have potential to create a major public stir if they are seen as unfairly handicapping the Soviet participation.”140 Treating the Soviets poorly would merely confirm Soviet propaganda about the United States. McFarlane recommended, “That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.”141 That the American government concerned itself with making sure that the Soviets could 136 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 3, 1984, John Kenneth

Hill Files Box 4 Folder: [Hill to Deaver Memos] (3/16/1984–05/23/1984), RRPL. 137 Memorandum from Kenneth Hill to Michael Deaver, May 3, 1984. 138 Memorandum from Robert McFarlane to the President, January 31st, 1984, John

Kenneth Hill Files Box 3 Folder: Soviet Requests: Aeroflot and Gruzia (2 of 4), RRPL. 139 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Hill to Michael McManus, December 16th, 1983, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 3 Folder: Soviet Requests: Aeroflot and Gruzia (1 of 4), RRPL. 140 Memorandum from Robert McFarlane to the President, January 31st, 1984, John Kenneth Hill Files Box 3 Folder: Soviet Requests: Aeroflot and Gruzia (2 of 4), RRPL. 141 Memorandum from Robert McFarlane to the President, January 31st, 1984.

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have no basis for complaints about their treatment if they arrived in Los Angeles highlights how planning security for the Olympic Games could become an exercise in diplomacy. While the Soviet Union would not participate in Los Angeles, the Communist Chinese government promised to participate but voiced security concerns to Samaranch and the LAOOC. The issue of Taiwan was the primary factor. The President of the Chinese Olympic Committee, Zhong Shitong, specifically targeted the wording employed by the LAOOC. He demanded the LAOOC, “ensure that the wording of ‘Republic of China’ (the abbreviation ‘ROC’ as well) or ‘Taiwan’ … not appear in any documents, bulletins or souvenirs issued by the Organizing Committee.”142 He Zhenliang, who would go on to become the Vice-President of the IOC in 1989, echoed this sentiment in a letter to Samaranch. He wrote, “As a colleague and friend of yours, I’d like to suggest that you urge the American Organizing Committee not to make any blunders on the question of security and that of Taiwan … if any blunder is made in that regard, the Chinese delegation will have to make a strong reaction.”143 During the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, rather than complaints about Taiwan, the Chinese delegation targeted security. An American journalist in Peking noted reports sent from Los Angeles to China frequently mentioned, “the Chinese [were] finding the intense security around the Games oppressive.”144 ∗ ∗ ∗ As part of their preparations, the LAOOC held three separate practice exercises to simulate potential threats to the Games. Designated Torchlight I, II, and III, these events occurred in the final year prior to the Opening Ceremonies. Following Torchlight III, Kumar wrote Samaranch with a final recommendation for future Olympic hosts, “The main lesson I have learned in this whole exercise is the fact that security should in the future not be left in the hands of private organizers but should remain a

142 Letter from Zhong Shitong to the LAOOC, June 22, 1984, Securite aux J.O. rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: correspondence 1984, IOCL. 143 Letter from He Zhenliang to Juan Antonio Samaranch, June 26, 1984, Securite aux J.O. rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: correspondence 1984, IOCL. 144 Michael Parks, “Chinese Feel Much too Secure,” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1984.

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governmental responsibility.”145 While Kumar’s ideas of nation’s liaising to protect the Olympics worked ahead of Sarajevo, the LAOOC showed him the difficulty of dealing with multiple levels of bureaucracy. There was one group that agreed with Kumar’s ideas on liaison: the CIA. Following the Games, one CIA official wrote the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics “were unique and successful experiences in multiagency liaisons with foreign intelligence and security services and with domestic law enforcement officials.”146 Despite the difficulties, some solace could be gained in that no attack disrupted the Games. The closest an attack came to succeeding was a bomb placed in a bus holding the luggage of Turkish athletes. The LAPD officer who disarmed the bomb had actually planted the bomb as an ill thought-out ploy to receive commendations from his superiors.147 In what was set to become a theme, it was not clear if the security preparations prevented an attack or if plans to target the Games even existed. One State Department official wrote in a post-Olympics analysis, “We may never know for sure whether [no attack during the Games] was fortuitous or that potential terrorists were deterred by the truly massive security apparatus committed to the Olympics.”148 That uncertainty defined the rationale supporting the massive security presence at the Olympics in Los Angeles and beyond. If nothing happened, one could never be sure where to place the credit. By the end of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the impact of Ashwini Kumar on the increasing involvement of the IOC in Olympic

145 “Olympic Security Exercise in Los Angeles June 1984,” Securite aux J.O. rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File: rapport sur l”exercise de securite olympique, IOCL. 146 Memorandum from David D. Whipple to Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, National Intelligence Council, November 28, 1984. CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: CIA-RDP86M00886R001100010007-5. 147 Millicent Kennelly and Kristine Toohey, “Terrorism and the Olympics: ‘The Games Have Gone On’,” Sporting Traditions 24, no. 1–2 (2007): 1–22; “Policeman, Hailed for Disarming a Bomb, Is Accused of Planting It,” New York Times, August 15, 1984: 18. 148 Text of the Department of State’s (DOS) final report on preparations and organization for the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games . Issues include: terrorist threat analysis; dignitary protection; immunities and privileges; a list of official guests of the U.S.; the greeting of foreign dignitaries in Los Angeles; asylum requests; entry procedure; arrangements for Soviet and Soviet Bloc participation; African participation; counter-terrorism measures. United States: Department of State, n.d. U.S. Declassified Documents Online. Accessed April 9, 2018.

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security planning was clear. His frustrations with the LAOOC and Peter Ueberroth display that Kumar and the IOC, by giving complete control of security to Organizing Committees, had little ability to influence the policy decisions made by those bodies. In a similar vein, the multiple disputes between the LAOOC and the American federal government highlight the difficulty in coordinating security for the Olympics. Kumar’s primary impact on Olympic security considerations was his conception of the IOC operating as a liaison between nations. While his experience with Bruno Mikulic in Sarajevo displayed that some governments proactively utilized connections to minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack, the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea, proved slightly different.

CHAPTER 5

“Decisive Political Ways”: The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games

On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Flight 858 (KAL 858) en route to Seoul, South Korea, exploded over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 passengers and crew on board. The South Koreans suspected North Korea perpetrated the attack with the Olympic Games in mind. The Japan Times reported South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan told a cabinet meeting, “It is a plain fact that North Korea has intensified its provocative moves to obstruct... the Seoul Olympics.”1 The bombing was North Korea’s second sport-related attack on South Korea in less than two years. Ahead of Seoul hosting the Asian Games in 1986, North Korea bombed Gimpo International Airport, killing five people and injuring dozens more. Following the attack on the airport, Park Seh-Jik, the President of the Asian Games and Seoul Olympics, messaged Samaranch with news of the bombing.2 In January 1988, South Korean Ambassador Lee

A previous version of this chapter appeared in the Journal of Sport History. 1 “Chun Suspects North Korean Sabotage,” The Japan Times, December 3, 1987. 2 Telegram from Park Seh-Jik to Juan Antonio Samaranch, September 15, 1986, Folder:

Sécurité les des Jeux Olympiques d’été de Séoul: correspondance et rapports 1984–1989, IOCL.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_5

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Sang Ock forwarded his government’s report on the Korean Air incident to Samaranch. Two North Korean subjects, a man and a woman, belonging to the Security Section of the Central Committee in North Korea received instructions from “KIM Chong Il” to plant a bomb on the plane with the stated aim of “discouraging applications for participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.”3 Hosting the Olympics in 1988 would signal a high point for South Korea after nearly four decades of strife since the end of World War II. Following decades of colonial rule by Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States (U.S.) divided Korea into occupation zones along the 38th parallel following World War II. With the Cold War in its nascent stages, this situation forced Koreans on either side of the parallel into what one scholar termed a “bipolar ideological straightjacket or Right or Left, proAmerican or pro-Soviet.”4 The tense situation on the Korean peninsula turned into conflict from 1950 to 1953 and further hardened the border between north and south. Seoul’s selection as host for the Olympics did little to ease the tension across the Korean demilitarized zone. Historian Brian Bridges writes, “[South] Koreans saw in the Olympics a way not only to symbolize their leap from ‘Third World’ to ‘First World’ in economic terms but also to propagate a new image of their country around the world.”5 Pyongyang had a stake in disrupting a peaceful Olympics if possible. Seoul’s selection almost never came to fruition. Korean President General Park Chung-hee originally supported the idea of bidding for the Olympics as a means of building “national consensus” and flashing South Korea’s newfound economic power.6 His assassination a year before the 3 “Findings of the Korean Air Flight 858 Incident,” Folder: Politics of the 1988 Seoul

Summer Olympic Games: notes, memos proposition, meetings and visit reports, declarations & speeches, reports on the political situation, investigation on the bombing of the Korean Air Flight and information on the joint security area in Panmunjom File: Rapport d’empête, declaration et article de presse sur l’attentat á la bombe du vol Korean Air 858 du 29 novembre 1987, janvier 1988, IOCL. 4 Jongsoo James Lee, The Partition of Korea after World War II: A Global History

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xix. 5 Brian Bridges, “The Seoul Olympics: Economic Miracle Meets the World,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (December 1, 2008): 1948, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09523360802438983. 6 Richard W Pound, Five Rings over Korea: The Secret Negotiations behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul (Little, Brown, 1994), 7.

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deadline to submit the bid caused considerable political concerns within South Korea. When his successor, Chun Doo-hwan, finally took power, he had a mere three months left to decide whether to bid for the Olympics. His decision to submit the bid, and the eventual victory, led the Washington Post to praise Hwan for his “deft stroke of gamesmanship” after the “chaos” following Park Chung-hee’s assassination.7 In comparison with the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, the buildup to the Seoul Olympic Games occurred in a different geopolitical climate. Relations between the United States and Soviet Union were vastly improved from four years prior. In Moscow, a former peasant named Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in March 1985. Summit meetings in 1987 and 1988 between Gorbachev and Reagan featured not only discussions over human rights, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, and the reduction of nuclear arms, but also how to protect the Summer Olympic Games.8 Samuel Pisar, described by Samaranch as the IOC’s primary adviser and “well-known international lawyer and author,” noted both nations were in a position of détente and “neither Washington nor Moscow want[ed] incidents that might poison the improving climate.”9 A key portion of the following discussion is elucidating how these improved relations impacted the security preparations for Seoul. While Calgary, Canada, hosted the 1988 Winter Olympics, the focus of the following chapter is solely on the Summer Olympics. While this is a departure from the format of previous sections, it is necessary in order to fully cover the entire security preparations and geopolitical considerations impacting the Seoul Olympics. Even in a brief overview of potential

7 Tracy Dahl, “Award of 1988 Olympics Boosts S. Korea’s Effort For Political Security,” Washington Post, 4 October 1981. Accessed November 19, 2020. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/10/04/award-of-1988-olympics-boo sts-s-koreas-effort-for-political-security/2db0f29f-29cd-4581-8771-2f08c225181f/ 8 William Taubman’s masterful biography of the Soviet leader, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (London and New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2017), does not mention the Olympic Games amid their discussions. The specific details on Olympic discussions are found in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–1989, eds. James Graham Wilson and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2016), Document 123. 9 “Proposal for a Further Initiative Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’ete Folder: correspondance, juillet 1988, the Executive Board, Lausanne, June

Between South and North Korea,” May 24, 1988, de Seoul 1988 correspondance janvier-juillet 1988, IOCL. Quote found in Minutes of the Meeting of 9–10, 1980, IOCL, 8.

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terrorist threats to Calgary, Kumar commented that he saw “newspaper reports about Japan’s Red Army planning terrorist activities during [the] Olympics in Seoul.”10 This is not to say that authorities neglected security precautions for the Winter Olympics. Rather, it is more accurate to note that geopolitics made an attack in Seoul more likely and that the emphasis on protecting the Summer Olympics from attack manifested itself in a volume of correspondence, policy recommendations, and discussions among world leaders. The Seoul Olympic Games Organizing Committee (SOGOC) recognized the potential security risk ahead of the Games. As opposed to some of the previous Organizing Committees, SOGOC promised a firm commitment to aiding security, maintaining, “The policy of the Organizing Committee was to forestall the danger of terrorism, in close cooperation with international judicial organizations.”11 The concept of liaison among nations for Olympic security, detailed in the previous chapters, came to full fruition at the 1988 Seoul Olympics. In Seoul, the aphorism that politics can make strange bedfellows rang true as the IOC, United States, Soviet Union, China, and a host of other governments worked to prevent an attack on the Games. The following chapter details these developments, how the Olympics factored into U.S.-Soviet discussions, and highlights several examples of the liaison system in action.

“Mere Child’s Play” The KAL 858 bombing merely added to the immense challenge facing the authorities responsible for security in Seoul. Former IOC Vice-President Richard Pound noted in his chronicle of the discussions between North and South Korea that the problems faced four years earlier in Los Angeles were “mere child’s play, compared with what loomed ahead for [Seoul].”12 Technically, North and South Korea were, and continue to remain, at war. Unsurprisingly, North Korea objected to Seoul as host.

10 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 30, 1987, Folder: Securité les des Jeux Olympique d’hiver de Calgary 1988: rapports et formulaire, 1985–1988, File: Rapports, 1985–1988, IOCL. 11 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 796. 12 Pound, Five Rings over Korea, 47.

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When the IOC announced the decision at its 1981 meeting in BadenBaden, North Korea’s delegate to the IOC Kim Yu Sun left and returned to North Korea.13 One proposed idea to assuage North Korean anger was to allow the country to host some of the events. While the multiple debates, meetings, proposals over a potential unified team, sharing events between the nations, and similar discussions formed a sizable part of the buildup to Seoul, the details of those discussions fall outside the scope of this work and are well covered elsewhere.14 However, Pound’s recollection of Ashwini Kumar’s 1985 visit to Pyongyang provides one important insight into how the IOC altered over the previous decade. Kumar, according to Pound, had the authority to inform the North Koreans, “the IOC itself would give all assurances on security and related matters to facilitate North Korea’s peaceful participation in the Games.”15 This power given to Kumar strongly contrasts with the IOC’s previous interpretations of its responsibility toward security. Rather than their laissez-faire approach the previous decade, the IOC took a decidedly political move by authorizing Kumar to guarantee the security of the North Koreans. It is plausible the IOC made these guarantees under the assumption the North Koreans would, under no circumstances, agree to the provisions required to co-host the Games. Pound later admitted that the discussions between the two nations “were destined from the outset never to result in an agreement... [but] The IOC had to appear to be conducting the negotiations in good faith.”16 Despite this belief the two sides would remain at an impasse, that Samaranch told Kumar to relay an IOC-backed guarantee of security to the North Koreans displays a significant shift in IOC policy. The debate on allowing North Korea to host events was not South Korea’s only major dilemma. The country faced domestic instability as student unrest simmered over the lack of promised democratic reform.17 13 Pound, Five Rings Over Korea, 58. 14 The entirety of Pound’s Five Rings over Korea is devoted to the discussions between

the two nations and the IOC. 15 Pound, Five Rings Over Korea, 77. 16 Pound, Five Rings Over Korea, 87. 17 For an analysis of the student protest in South Korea, see Park Mi, “Organizing

Dissent against Authoritarianism: The South Korean Student Movement in the 1980s,” Korea Journal 45, no. 3 (2005): 261–288.

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The months preceding the Olympics were, at best, a turbulent time for the South Korean government. That chaos was a characteristic of the nation’s multiple changes in leadership since the assassination of General Park Chung-Hee in 1979.18 On April 13, 1987, President Chun Doohwan suspended constitutional debate in the country and two months later chose his close ally Roh Tae Woo as his successor. This decision backfired. At the time, a student protest movement was in the midst of losing public support due to its proclivity for “radical and extremist tendencies.”19 On the day of Hwan’s announcement The Washington Post reported peaceful demonstrations occurred at 35 universities across the country.20 The following day, protests turned violent as students, with the aid of newfound support from middle-class citizens, outnumbered the police. Fires in the streets of Seoul, often caused by students setting ablaze equipment taken from the police, created a “towering pillar of black smoke” and did not bode well for a peaceful Olympic Games.21 Korea’s political quagmire was clearly on Samaranch’s mind. He requested Kumar visit Seoul in June of 1987 to assess the security precautions and deliver a private message to Chun Doo-hwan.22 Samaranch’s true interest, however, was the political condition of the country. Samaranch informed Kumar the trip’s purpose was “mainly to ascertain the real political situation and possible developments.”23 Kumar’s analysis a year later did not exactly inspire confidence. He wrote, “[t]he political situation remains in flux... the new system is beset with imperfections,

18 For a detailed analysis of the leadership of South Korea’s President General Park Chung-hee, from 1961 until his assassination in 1979, see Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). 19 Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,” Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (1988): 53. 20 “Chun’s Party Meets; Korea Security Tight,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1987, sec. B6. 21 Clyde Haberman, “Student Protests Gain in Intensity in Center of Seoul,” New York Times, June 19, 1987. 22 Samaranch only wrote the “head of state.” As the coup in South Korea did not take place until February of 1988, it is assumed that he intended the note for Hwan. Quote found in letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Ashwini Kumar, June 2, 1987, Folder: Sécurité les des Jeux Olympiques d’été de Séoul 1988 File: correspondance et rapports 1984–1989. 23 Juan Antonio Samaranch to Ashwini Kumar, June 2, 1987.

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discord and conflict, but [is] a functioning democracy nonetheless.”24 According to Pound, the student demonstrations caused Samaranch the most consternation. Samaranch was “hypersensitive” to reports of student protests and was “constantly badgering” the South Korean officials to halt the dissent but, as Pound notes, Samaranch occasionally acted “without full reflection concerning the political costs involved.”25 Samaranch’s concern was not the future of the South Korean political system but rather that the protests subside until the Closing Ceremonies ended. The apprehension exhibited by Kumar and Samaranch was not universal among IOC members. SOGOC updated the IOC Executive Board on preparations for the Games in October of 1986. Security formed a brief portion of the presentation. In the ensuing discussion, IOC member João Havelange expressed his opposition to SOGOC’s depictions of security. He described the planned security measures as “somewhat excessive” and urged “a more flexible security policy at the time of the Games.”26 His colleague from the Dominican Republic, Roque Napoleón Muñoz Peña, agreed with his assessment. Soviet IOC member Konstantin Andrianov countered Havelange and Peña’s argument. Andrianov stated, “it was scarcely possible to have recourse to security measures which were too strict; any kind of internal disorder or incidents led to an unfavourable [sic] climate at the Games.”27 Although neither Havelange nor Peña countered Andrianov’s statement, their initial opposition shows how security could still be a divisive topic among IOC members.

Developing Liaison Despite some opposition in its ranks, the IOC’s actions ahead of the Seoul Olympics show how the organization at least partially embraced Kumar’s ideas of liaison. IOC lawyer Samuel Pisar described by Samaranch as the IOC’s primary adviser and “well-known international lawyer and author,”

24 “1988 Seoul Olympics – Security Preview,” Folder: Securite des Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Seoul 1988: correspondance et reports, File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL. 25 Pound, Five Rings Over Korea, 312. 26 Quote found in Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12–17, 1986, Lausanne,

IOCL, 9. 27 Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12–17, 1986.

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visited American government officials in September of 1987.28 One of his contacts was Ed Derwinski, a Reagan appointee who served as the Under-Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs. According to Pisar, Derwinski promised to “put into operation a system of communication with the I.O.C. from the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva.”29 Pisar’s most productive encounter came with Gaston Sigur, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. In a recounting of the conversation with Samaranch, Pisar noted the potential of a North Korean invasion of South Korea was off the table. Pisar told Samaranch the North Koreans “[knew] that the U.S. would immediately and energetically retaliate. This was made perfectly clear via the Soviets and the Chinese.”30 The IOC’s fear was not necessarily an invasion by the North, however. Of more concern, according to Pisar, was an attack that caused enough damage to hamper the Olympics but not quite enough to garner a reaction by the United States. American Senator Ted Stevens proposed utilizing the connection between the United States and Soviet Union to aid a peaceful Olympics in Seoul. In February and March of 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze led a Soviet delegation to Washington, DC, to meet with American Secretary of State George Shultz. Stevens wrote Shultz in

28 For quote on Pisar, see “Letter from the President of the International Olympic Committee to Roh Tae-Woo with a Proposal for Further Initiative Between South and North Korea,” June 30, 1988, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, International Olympic Committee Archives (Switzerland), Seoul 88, Political Matters 1988–1989; Seoul “88/ Politique (Janvier–Juillet). Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113522; “Proposal for a Further Initiative Between South and North Korea,” 24 May 1988, Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Seoul 1988 correspondance janvier-juillet 1988, Folder: correspondance, juillet 1988, IOCL. 29 Letter from Samuel Pisar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 1, 1987, Folder: Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: chronologie, discours, coupre-rendus de reunions, memos, notes et rapports sur les visites et la situation politique File: notes, mémos, et coupre-rendus de diverses visites et réunions informelles et discussions, 1987, IOCL. Pisar also wrote that Derwinski was “responsible, among other thinks [sic] for Olympic affairs at State.” 30 Letter from Samuel Pisar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 1, 1987.

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March and urged that he “raise the issue of reaffirming both countries commitment to the Olympic movement.”31 Stevens further noted the IOC’s concern over potential incidents in Seoul and he viewed the United States and Soviet Union as able to perhaps limit this possibility. In Stevens’ opinion, the upcoming summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Moscow would be the perfect opportunity to express this mutual support of the Olympics.32 A hint also existed that Reagan may use the summit as an opportunity to discuss North Korea, terrorism, and the Olympics with Gorbachev. In a meeting with the international press prior to his departure, one journalist asked Reagan how he would broach the subject of protecting the Olympics with Gorbachev and the role of North Korea. Reagan replied, “I think what that would require are those nations that probably have a more friendly relationship with North Korea than we do... would make it plain that North Korea should not take advantage of their proximity to the games and do anything of a terrorist nature to upset those games.”33 Although Shultz did not respond to the request until the week prior to the start of the summit, he agreed with Stevens’ ideas. He viewed a potential statement by the United States and Soviet Union as a “timely endorsement of a peaceful Olympics in Seoul, something which [was] of special concern because of the recent upsurge in terrorism.”34 The Soviets had previously agreed to attend the Games and Shultz viewed this commitment as a potential avenue to utilize. He promised Stevens that he would “urge” Reagan to request Gorbachev join in a commitment to the Olympic movement.35 Shultz succeeded. A joint statement 31 Letter from Ted Stevens to George Shultz, March 25, 1988, Folder: Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: janvier-juillet 1988 File: correspondance, janvierjuillet 1988, IOCL. 32 Letter from Ted Stevens to George Shultz, March 25th, 1988. The meeting took place from May 29–June 3, 1988 and is commonly referred to as the “Moscow Summit.” See, Jack F. Matlock, Reagan And Gorbachev: How The Cold War Ended (New York: Random House Trade, 2004), 283–303 as well as Taubman, Gorbachev, 411–419. 33 Quote found in Ronald Reagan: “Interview With Foreign Television Journalists,”

May 19, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35848. 34 Letter from George Shultz to Ted Stevens, May 23, 1988, Folder: Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: janvier-juillet 1988 File: correspondance, janvier-juillet 1988, IOCL. 35 Letter from George Shultz to Ted Stevens, May 23, 1988.

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released on June 1, 1988, read, “the two leaders expressed their support for the International Olympic movement, which promotes international cooperation and understanding through athletic competition.”36 The statement did little to allay Samaranch’s fears of an attack. Stevens wrote the IOC President in July of 1988 with a sense of renewed optimism. From his vantage point, he hoped, “the reaffirmation of commitment by both superpowers to the Olympic movement [would] translate into a less strained atmosphere at the Seoul Olympics.”37 Samaranch responded in a brief missive several weeks later but struck a more despondent tone than Stevens. While he appreciated the Senator’s efforts to aid the cause of a peaceful Olympics, Samaranch did not appear to see a potential answer to the problems he faced. He concluded, “I sincerely hope that a solution can be found to this problem and we are doing our utmost in this regard, nevertheless I am not very optimistic.”38

The Soviet Influence More than just a commitment to a peaceful Olympics, the IOC, along with the United States and West Germans, sought to manipulate the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union. Relations between the two nations at the beginning of the 1980s are best described as tense, but slowly improving.39 Scholar Alexander Zhebin pointed to several factors that influenced a thawing of relations including the KAL 007 incident as well as a fear of a new anti-Soviet triad of the United States, Japan,

36 Ronald Reagan: “Joint Statement Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow,” June 1, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35902. 37 Letter from Ted Stevens to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 5, 1988, Folder: Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: janvier-juillet 1988 File: correspondance, janvier-juillet 1988, IOCL. 38 Letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Ted Stevens, July 28, 1988, Folder: Politique aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: janvier-juillet 1988 File: correspondance, janvier-juillet 1988, IOCL. 39 Several incidents contributed to this situation including a demand by Khrushcev in 1962 for payment for providing weapons to North Korea. Zhebin notes, “the Kremlin was also rather irritated by the DPRK’s position with respect to the Sino-Soviet ideological and political confrontation.” Quote found in Alexander Zhebin, “Russia and North Korea: An Emerging, Uneasy Partnership,” Asian Survey 35, no. 8 (August 1995): 727.

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and South Korea.40 There is also a suggestion that relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union were not quite as amiable as some in the West believed.41 Regardless, the fact that officials in the IOC, United States, and West Germany viewed the Soviet Union as a potential ally in preventing a North Korean attack makes their efforts worthy of examination. One of the first mentions of a potential Soviet influence on North Korea came in September of 1987. In a meeting with Samuel Pisar, Reagan’s permanent Under-Secretary John Whitehead complemented Pisar and the IOC’s efforts in dealing with North Korea and urged Pisar to continue “without, however, giving in to terrorist-like bluster and threats.”42 Furthermore, Whitehead encouraged Pisar to expand his view on the upcoming Olympics in the context of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. Pisar informed Samaranch the two discussed “ways [that would] be sought to get the Russians to use their strong leverage on North Korea and Cuba.”43 On a visit to Moscow, Gaston Sigur met with Igor Rogachev, the Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sigur later told Pisar that he “told Rogachev that Moscow should use its influence on North Korea.”44 Neither Pisar nor Sigur reported Rogachev’s response. Whitehead and Sigur were not the only ones to view the Soviets as a potential ally in dissuading the North Koreans. In early January 1988, Willi Daume turned to Samaranch in an effort to thwart potential attacks in Seoul. Daume cited information provided by an unspecified security service that North Korea planned some form of an impediment

40 Ibid, 727–728. 41 This argument is best stated in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Imperial

Decline: Russia’s Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 157. 42 Letter from Samuel Pisar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 1, 1987. 43 Due to Pisar’s style of writing, it is not clear whether he meant the IOC would try

and influence the Soviets or if he expected the U.S. Government to wield its influence. 44 Letter from Samuel Pisar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 1, 1987.

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to the Games. To compound matters, his sources depicted a weakening link between Beijing and Pyongyang.45 He continued by providing Samaranch a potential solution: I don’t know whether the IOC has possibilities to influence the Soviet government via the NOC of the USSR, so that Moscow in turn cold [sic] urge the North Korean government to refrain from that kind of criminal plans, which would set the whole world against the North Korean regime. My sources think that the political influence of the USSR on Pyonyang [sic] is – particularly for economic reasons- very strong.46

Unfortunately, Daume did not provide further information on his sources or their rationales behind this analysis. More than just forwarding information and proffering ideas, Daume posited a solution that displayed the changes in IOC policy since he helmed the Munich Olympics in 1972. He closed his letter, “Dear Juan Antonio, may I ask you to treat this information [as] strictly confidential. I suppose that you might be able to try to preserve the Seoul Games and the future of the Olympic movement from harm via decisive political ways.”47 Now, rather than stating that the IOC did not sully itself with political matters, an IOC member actively encouraged the IOC President to try and save the Olympic movement by manipulating political ties. Samaranch provided a non-committal response. He thanked Daume for the note and told him that he read the contents with “attention.”48 Protecting the Seoul Olympics from attack interspersed discussions between the Soviet Union and United States in early 1988. In February and March, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze led a Soviet delegation to Washington, DC, to meet with American Secretary of State George Shultz. That the upcoming Olympic Games in Seoul would be a topic of conversation was highly likely. In October of 1987 when John 45 Jae Ho Chung and Myung-hae Choi point to the 1970s as the first sign of strain in the Sino-North Korean relationship in “Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors? Making Sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 243–264. 46 Letter from Willi Daume to Juan Antonio Samaranch, January 25, 1988. 47 Letter from Willi Daume to Juan Antonio Samaranch, January 25, 1988. 48 Letter from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Willi Daume, February 1, 1988, Politique

aux Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988 correspondance janvier-juillet 1988, Folder: correspondance, janvier-fêvrier 1988, IOCL.

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Whitehead met with Samuel Pisar, Whitehead agreed to try and “inject the Seoul Olympics into the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and... to see how it could be put immediately on the Shultz-Shevernadze agenda.”49 Whitehead succeeded as the upcoming Olympics infiltrated the conversation between the two diplomats in several instances. At a meeting in February 1988, a point of contention between the groups was the role of North Korea in the KAL 858 bombing. In the midst of a discussion on the upcoming transfer of power in South Korea from Hwan to Roo, Shultz insisted evidence pointed to North Korean collusion behind the bombing. He argued the Soviets “had seen the evidence implicating North Korea” and believed that “[a]t a minimum, the Soviet Union ought to caution Pyongyang.”50 Shevardnadze refuted Shultz’s claims and claimed the link between the bombing and the Olympics was not clear.51 The key point of difference between the two parties was each group’s analysis of the situation. Was the attack an act of terrorism aimed at the Olympics or a North Korean attempt to provoke the South Koreans to military action? Reagan’s National Security Advisor Colin Powell argued the former point, stating, “[t]he world would see the KAL bombing as an act of terrorism, not a provocation. The motive had clearly been to demonstrate that South Korea was not a safe site for the Olympics.”52 Shevardnadze provided a succinct rebuttal and defended the North Koreans. He argued the South Koreans could conceivably view the attack as a provocation, not a specific Olympic-related threat, and would act accordingly. With this analysis as his framework, he described the North Korean leadership as “reasonable people who would not resort to such means.”53 The Americans did not directly respond to this comment. Shevardnadze returned the following month to continue talks over arms control.54 Vice-President George H.W. Bush broached the topic of security at the Games in the midst of a lunch meeting. He recounted 49 Letter from Samuel Pisar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 1, 1987. 50 FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 123. 51 FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 123. 52 FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 123. 53 FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 123. 54 The broader details of the discussions are found in David K. Shipler, “TALKS BY

SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE,” New York Times, March 23, 1988. The specific details of the conversations between the two are found in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, eds. James

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to Shevardnadze the recent visit of former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, who informed American officials of his concern for the safety of the Seoul Olympics. Shevardnadze dismissed the potential danger posed by the North Koreans. Soviet participation, he argued, bolstered his belief “that North Korea would not be the cause of security problems.”55 Shevardnadze added that Kim Il-sung would not want to damage his international image by attacking the Olympics. When Vice-President Bush pointed out security concerns stemmed from the KAL 858 incident, the same disagreements over North Korean culpability for the bombing ensued.56

North Korea and the Japanese Red Army Although concern over a potential North Korean provocation existed, there was a less-likely, though equally worrisome option, available to Pyongyang. One scenario posited by security planners was terrorism by proxy, non-North Korean terrorists acting with North Korean assistance, which could potentially absolve the nation from blame. Gaston Sigur laid out this idea in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association on July 21, 1987. He noted that “terrorism by proxy [was] considerably more likely” than an attack by a North Korean terrorist.57 Sigur balanced this analysis by stating that, to that point, North Korea had not shown an ability to recruit a foreign agent willing to carry out its orders. Events in Japan in 1987 and 1988 fueled the fear of a proxy attack by North Korea on the Seoul Olympics, particularly the actions of the Japanese Red Army (JRA).58 In 1970, nine members of the terrorist Graham Wilson and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2016), Document 138. 55 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, eds. James Graham Wilson and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2016), Document 138. 56 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 138. 57 “Speech by: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs,” July 21, 1987, Folder: Politique au JO d’Ete de Séoul 1988: chronologie, discours, coupre-rendus de reviews, mémos, notes et rapports sur les visites et la situation politique, File: Discouers du Secrétaire d’Etat assistant aux Affaires de l’Asie de l’est, NY, 21 juillet 1987, IOCL. 58 “Emergence of the Japanese Red Army,” November 1974, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: 0000105163. This document also notes that in a 5-year period following 1969

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group Red Army Faction (RAF) hijacked a Japanese Airlines flight and landed in North Korea, where they remained. The following year “vicious infighting” within the RAF led Fusako Shigenobu to create the JRA.59 She took control of the JRA and made contact with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The groups worked together to perpetrate terrorist attacks throughout the 1970s.60 Suspicion that the JRA targeted the Seoul Olympics increased in November 1987 when Tokyo police arrested Osamu Maruoka, the group’s second-in-command. Maruoka carried papers detailing a plot to attack the Olympics as well as plane tickets to South Korea.61 In July of 1988, a Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck from West German intelligence, the Bundesnachrichtdienst (BDS), telegrammed Samaranch with an analysis of potential security threats.62 Calling the North Koreans, “the greatest conceivable threat” to the Games, Wieck outlined several ways the North Koreans could make their presence known, including by conspiring with the JRA.63 A BDS report noted the JRA “repeatedly stated that, by actions against the Olympic Games, it could hit the hated axis of Tokyo—Seoul—Washington and that it wanted to support

groups that could have had a precedent with the Japanese Red Army emerged including the Japanese Red Army Faction, not to be confused with the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany also known as Red Army Faction. For the origins of Red Army Faction and it’s evolution into the Japanese Red Army, see Aileen Gallagher, The Japanese Red Army (New York: The Rosen Publishing Company, 2003), 10–13. 59 Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam, Handbook Of Terrorism In The Asia-Pacific

(London: Imperial College Press, 2016), 507–508. 60 “Emergence of the Japanese Red Army.” The most authoritative account of the rise of the Japanese Red Army is found in William R. Farrell, Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990). 61 “South Korea: Terrorist Threats to the Seoul Olympics,” May 3, 1988, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: CIA-RDP90T00100R000201120001-7. 62 There is little information readily available on anyone with that name. At the time, Hans-Georg Wieck led the BDS. The letter’s stationary confirms that it was sent from the BDS. 63 Letter from Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 6 July 1988, Folder:

Politics of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games: notes, memos proposition, meetings and visit reports, declarations & speeches, reports on the political situation, investigation on the bombing of the Korean Air Flight and information on the joint security area in Panmunjom, File: Rapports sur la situation politique en Coreé du Sud envoyé par les services de reaseignements allemands (Bundesnachrichtdienst), mars-juillet 1988, IOCL.

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the ‘struggle of the Korean people against its oppressors’.”64 Maruoka’s arrest fueled fears of a potential collaboration between the North Koreans and the JRA. The arrest of Yasuhiro Shibata, one of the perpetrators in the RAF’s 1970 hijacking, further raised anxiety over a potential plot.65 Shibata left North Korea and returned to Japan in 1986. North Korean media proposed that Shibata left due to a severe bout of homesickness.66 Wieck argued this arrest coincided with contacts between JRA supporters and North Korean agents, which “suggest[ed] covert operations by the North Korea intelligence service, possibly aimed at disrupting the Olympic Games.”67 While this was not quite as definite evidence as that found on Maruoka, who also carried a list of IOC member’s names, the possibility of North Korean collusion appeared real. One unidentified Japanese diplomat explained to the New York Times, “The fact that [RAF members had] been able to leave North Korea indicate[d] that there at least [had] to be a tacit understanding” on the part of North Korea that the JRA may attack the Games.68 Within the IOC, Kumar noticed the potential threat posed by any potential North Korean collaboration with terrorist groups. He described the threat of “military adventure” by the nation as “remote” but warned that “the chances of instigation to terrorist groups both local and foreign

64 Letter from Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 6 July 1988, Folder: Politics of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games: notes, memos proposition, meetings and visit reports, declarations & speeches, reports on the political situation, investigation on the bombing of the Korean Air Flight and information on the joint security area in Panmunjom, File: Rapports sur la situation politique en Coreé du Sud envoyé par les services de reaseignements allemands (Bundesnachrichtdienst), mars-juillet 1988, IOCL. 65 Takashi Oka, “Hijacked Airliner Returns to Tokyo With 4 Aboard,” New York Times, April 5, 1970; Susan Chira, “Arrest in Japan Raises Fears Of Terrorism at the Olympics,” New York Times, May 13, 1988. 66 “Plastic-Faced Terrorists,” The Times of India, August 7, 1988. 67 Letter from Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 6 July 1988, Folder:

Politics of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games: notes, memos proposition, meetings and visit reports, declarations & speeches, reports on the political situation, investigation on the bombing of the Korean Air Flight and information on the joint security area in Panmunjom, File: Rapports sur la situation politique en Coreé du Sud envoyé par les services de reaseignements allemands (Bundesnachrichtdienst), mars-juillet 1988, IOCL. 68 Susan Chira, “Seoul Pulls Out All the Stops to Pre-Empt Terrorism,” New York Times, July 6, 1988.

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is real.”69 Kumar truly seemed to fear a North Korean terrorist attack. He noted that North Korea had “1,120,000 soldiers” who specialized in “terrorist tactics” and that the nation had military advisers in “Iran, Angola, Madagascar... and Libya.”70 He singled out the JRA as one of the groups manifesting fear ahead of the Games. Kumar wrote the “anxiety” caused by the JRA stemmed from the groups “resurgence” and its “linkage with the Libyans, North Koreans, and the Abu Nidal group.”71 He did not provide further commentary on how he planned to limit the threat.

The Planning Far from the larger geopolitical diplomatic meetings, evidence of liaison between nations existed on the ground. South Korea’s attempts to protect the Games from an attack started from the moment visitors landed at Gimpo International Airport in Seoul. With the aid of a list of 10,000 names provided from Interpol and various security forces across the globe, the South Korean authorities aimed to prevent the entry of international terrorists into the country.72 SOGOC observed Asian countries provided additional security checks in airports. While the Japanese searched passengers by hand and X-Ray, authorities in the Philippines, “notified Korea that they had arrested a [Japanese] Red Army terrorist who had had facial plastic surgery.”73 The terrorist’s name was Hiroshi Sensui. The Times of India described the operation as “worthy of Liz Taylor or Michael Jackson.”74 Filipino authorities arrested Sensui outside of the clinic where

69 “1988 Seoul Olympics—Security Preview,” Folder: Securite des Jeux Olympiques d’été de Seoul 1988: correspondance et reports. File: Rapports du CIO, 1988. 70 “1988 Seoul Olympics—Security Preview.” 71 “1988 Seoul Olympics—Security Preview.” 72 Countries the South Koreans leaned on for aid ahead of the Olympics included

“USA, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Australia, and New Zealand.” Quote found in “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review,” Sécurité des Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: correspondance et reports File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL. Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 801. 73 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 802. 74 Quotes found in “Plastic-Faced Terrorists.”

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the operation was performed and Japanese police later reported Sensui complained “of intense pain from his new hairline.”75 This successful apprehension of a known terrorist provided proof of the utility of the liaison system. The employment of officials by SOGOC solely for the purpose of acting as security liaisons for teams is a clear example of Ashwini Kumar and the IOC’s influence on security at the Seoul Olympics. First suggested by Kumar in Lisbon, Portugal during a meeting of the IOC Executive Board, SOGOC’s Security Department finalized a plan for the liaison officials in January 1987.76 Responsibilities for the 15 volunteers selected for the post included answering security-related questions posed by the delegation’s security officials and settling problems that may arise. For example, the Israeli delegation’s security manager requested the liaison officers seal doors leading to the attic and basement of the Israeli team’s quarters in the Olympic Village.77 SOGOC commented following the Games, “[t]he operation of the security liaison officials system... greatly contributed to the successful security programs of the Seoul Olympic Games.”78 This system fell short of a plan that Kumar proposed to Samaranch following the Los Angeles Summer Olympics. He reminded Samaranch of the IOC’s role in staying informed of potential terrorist threats to the 1984 Summer Games and noted that the intelligence authorities in Seoul would embark on a similar task.79 Kumar’s fear was the ability of future hosts to effectively monitor international terrorist groups. His proposed solution was a commission based within the IOC. This group’s responsibility would be to “strive with the assistance of all member countries to keep abreast of such terrorist movements which try to exploit sports to further their cause.”80 Kumar also reflected the geopolitical reality in 75 Quotes found in “Plastic-Faced Terrorists.” 76 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, 804. 77 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, 804; “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review,” Sécurité des Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: correspondance et reports File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL. 78 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 804. 79 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, September 12, 1986, Folder: Ashwini Kumar Correspondance, 1986–1988, File: Correspondance 1986, IOCL. 80 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, September 12, 1986.

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the group’s proposed composition. The Eastern Bloc, Western Bloc, Asia, and Africa would each receive a representative with the remainder filled with members from the host country’s Organizing Committee. The lack of a response in either Kumar’s or Samaranch’s files, and without evidence to support the existence of this group, suggests that Samaranch rejected the idea. While SOGOC could utilize the aid of liaison officers to aid security, handling student protests during the Olympics would be a different matter. Organizers more than doubled the security forces for the events to be held in the gymnasiums of Seoul National and Hanyang University. SOGOC also implemented an “Olympic security self-help system” with faculty and officials at universities in case of student demonstrations.81 There is no clear explanation for how this system would work. Not all of the security planning involving students was necessarily negative. SOGOC employed 82 computer science students to aid with computer-related security matters. A further 6,440 students helped the competitions run smoothly.82 In addition to students, South Korean citizen volunteers played a significant role in security at the Games. By their estimates, SOGOC employed “112,009 security workers.”83 Not all of these personnel wore military or police attire. An analysis by the East German Secret Police (Stasi) stressed the “large numbers” of the South Korean security force dressed in “tasteful” civilian clothing.84 While it is evident the Stasi feared plainclothes police officers, the abundance of civilians was, at least in part, due to SOGOC’s insistence on employing volunteers at public access points. “By enabling civilians to take charge of access control... direct contacts by Games participants and spectators with security guards

81 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 802. 82 Ibid, 801, 827. 83 Ibid, 796. 84 Stasi-Mediathek, a German federal website dedicated to releasing Stasi documents, provides the reports sent by the Stasi back to East Germany. “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988,” stasi-mediathek.de. https://www.stasi-mediathek.de/medien/ bericht-ueber-die-taetigkeit-der-eingesetzten-operativ-gruppe-des-mfs-zur-sicherung-derddr-olympia-delegation-vom-99-bis-3101988/blatt/134/ (accessed December 4, 2017). (Author’s translation, hereafter SMD).

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were avoided, thus ensuring a good atmosphere for the access control program,” wrote SOGOC in its Final Report.85 Limiting contact between potentially fractious groups was a part of the preparations for Seoul. Kumar commented following the Closing Ceremonies, “Careful attention was paid to animosities and regional sensibilities of various delegations.”86 The IOC and SOGOC could do little to prepare if certain teams or athletes faced one another competitively but could take steps to minimize the frequency of contact between rival groups. Kumar did not provide concrete examples of how the IOC or SOGOC accomplished this goal but one comment displays that the legacy of the 1972 attack fueled this arrangement. Kumar wrote, “Korea took with full account the reality first revealed in Munich 1972 that [the] Olympic [sic] ideal only goes so far, and not all those who [came] to Seoul were driven by the pure purposes of that ideal.”87 In a similar fashion to prior Olympics, the incidents on the ground in Seoul that required police aid bordered on the bizarre. In one case, a New Zealand boxing judge named Keith Walker awarded a penalty against a South Korean boxer and was promptly assaulted by two South Korean assistant coaches and three boxing officials. As the group attacked Walker, the South Korean team manager “stood on the ring apron urging the largely Korean crowd to join the fracas.”88 Another incident saw a security guard break into the room of West German marathoner Charlotte Teske. Teske awoke when “she felt someone playing and fumbling with her feet.”89 While her attempted pursuit of the intruder yielded no results, the assistant chief of the West German delegation Heiner Henze emphasized that following the incident the security for the West German team had been “reorganized and strengthened.”90

85 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 801. 86 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review,” Sécurité des Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: correspondance et reports File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL. 87 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review.” 88 “5 Korean Boxing Officials Thrown out of Olympics,” The Japan Times, September

23, 1988. 89 “W. German Athlete’s Soles Get Seoul Guard Into Trouble,” Los Angeles Times, September 19, 1988. 90 “West German Pursues Intruder,” The Japan Times, September 22, 1988.

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While there were several reported incidents during the Games, there were an equal number of unreported threats that never came to the public’s attention. The majority of these are found in Ashwini Kumar’s review of security measures following the Games. One unverified threat specified Kurdish terrorists attacking Iraqi Olympians while “Shiite groups would bomb and attack US, British, and German aircraft transporting athletes to Seoul.”91 Another report claimed that specially trained North Korean agents would cross the border and wreak havoc in Seoul. A proNorth Korean group in Japan, Chosun Sorren, was allegedly “committed to disturb the Games.”92 These attacks never occurred. But the existence of these verbal warning’s underscored Kumar’s point that, due to the variety of threats that existed, “it made it impossible to develop a targetted defence [sic] against a most [probable] threat.”93

Stasi in Seoul While international cooperation was a key component of security at the Seoul Olympics, the presence of the Stasi in Seoul provides a compelling insight into security “on the ground.” Devised by the Stasi’s Deputy Director Rudi Mittig, the plan called for 98 inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM), unofficial Stasi informants, to attend the Games.94 The Stasi’s leaders in Seoul were Colonel Horst Gerlach and Colonel Herbert Brüggmann, who served as Gerlach’s deputy. Twelve IMs reported directly to Gerlach while another ten filed reports with Brüggmann.95 While Gerlach and Brüggmann handled the IMs, two more Stasi officials worked in support

91 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review,” Sécurité des Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: correspondance et reports File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL. 92 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review.” 93 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review.” 94 Stasi-Mediathek notes that these inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, frequently referred to as

“IM” in Stasi documents, were often called “informers” or “scouts” by East German society. See, “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988,” SMD. 95 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.”

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roles. One official’s sole responsibility was to meet daily with the South Korean security forces while another ciphered and deciphered messages.96 The sheer amount of security around Seoul factored into the Stasi’s operation. The Stasi reported back to Bonn that prior to the Games the information gained from Western media and security organizations friendly with the Stasi was “extraordinarily pointed” and that therefore the Stasi plan “required a high degree of operational consideration and discipline.”97 So worried was the Stasi leadership over the high security surrounding the Games that the IMs received instructions to only meet “when operational necessity was required.”98 The Stasi exhibited no concern over potential terrorist attacks in Seoul. From an operational standpoint, the Stasi’s rather vague definition for its role was to investigate “all kinds of treachery” committed by GDR Olympic team members.99 Preventing contacts with the West seemingly topped the list. One official despaired at the attitude exhibited by the younger members of the GDR team toward athletes from the West. He noted cyclists were the greatest offenders in exhibiting “inconsistent behavior” and that individual members received “clarifying discussions.”100 Stasi reports confirmed the presence of several national intelligence agencies in Seoul. The Stasi and KGB worked in tandem throughout the Games. Gerlach officially maintained contact with a Major General Kubyshkin from the KGB. While the Stasi and KGB reached an agreement whereby a connection between Moscow and Seoul would be “maintained continuously” during the Games, the Stasi did not establish any other connections with security services from other socialist countries.101

96 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 97 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 98 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 99 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 100 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 101 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.”

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Perhaps that was due to the positive relationship established with the KGB. A Stasi report described the connection between the two groups as “very open-minded, cooperative, and very cordial.”102 The East Germans confirmed the liaison that occurred between what the JRA described as the “Tokyo-Seoul-Washington” axis. The South Koreans openly informed the Stasi their security forces were “very closely prepared and coordinated with the CIA and the Japanese.”103 In the aftermath of the Games, the Stasi described its relationship with the security forces in Seoul as “cooperative.”104

Fire on the Streets On Thursday September 23, 1988, South Korean police arrested Oh Young Shik, the leader of the National Coalition of Student Body Organizations. The post effectively made Shik the most powerful student leader in the country.105 Shik’s fellow students responded to his arrest by taking to the streets of Seoul in protest. The world watched as the media reported on the running battle between the groups as “[w]aves of students pelted police with rocks and firebombs, setting some troopers and some demonstrators ablaze.”106 There could be no mistake for the object of the students’ ire. In the midst of their assaults on the police, the students chanted “Down with the dictators’ Olympics.”107 There was also a distinctly anti-American twinge to the protests. Some of the actions taken by American athletes fueled this sentiment. American athlete Johnny Gray was arrested after kicking a taxi cab while two others, Troy

102 “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der eingesetzten Operativ-Gruppe des MfS zur Sicherung der DDR-Olympia-Delegation vom 9.9. bis 3.10.1988.” 103 “Bericht über die Teilnahme der DDR-Mannschaft an den Spielen der XXIV. Olympiade,” SMD. 104 “Bericht über die Teilnahme der DDR-Mannschaft an den Spielen der XXIV. Olympiade, 2. 105 David R. Schweisberg, “Police Further Tightened Security at the Summer Olympics Wednesday,” UPI , September 28, 1988. Shik was arrested for allegedly breaking a national security law designed to prevent anti-government demonstrations. 106 “Students Hurl Hundreds of Firebombs at Seoul Police,” Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1988. 107 “Students Hurl Hundreds of Firebombs at Seoul Police.”

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Dalbey and Doug Gjertsen, fell afoul of South Korean officials after stealing from a hotel bar.108 The protests continued into the following week and the students soon threatened to target an Olympic event unless the South Korean authorities freed Shik. Most likely due to the timing of the protests, the students chose the men’s marathon, held on the final day of competition. The Vice-President of Korea University, Yo Taek-So, described the marathon as “the main target.”109 The 26.2-mile event was a security headache without the added threat by the students and SOGOC’s primary precaution for the marathon was to employ a force so large that it would “literally form human barriers to shut off any possible obstructive maneuver.”110 Despite the presence of some 36,000 police, the students came rather close to succeeding. While this was not covered in the media at the time, in the midst of the race students gathered at the National Cemetery with a plan to throw firebombs on the competing athletes. Kumar noted that security forces “adroitly captured” the students before they could do any damage but did not elaborate any further on the operation.111 ∗ ∗ ∗ The Seoul Olympic Games concluded on October 2, 1988, without major incident. While the student protests in Seoul never directly impacted the Games, the planned attack on the marathon shows that such a potentially catastrophic attack was never far away. Regardless of the bluster prior to the Games, North Korea never acted against the Seoul Olympics. Analysts posited several rationales for Pyongyang’s inaction. Most theories centered around the idea that there was simply no good option available to Kim Il-sung’s government. The presence of two major allies in the Soviet Union and the PRC made any attack against the Games a potential diplomatic nightmare for the beleaguered nation. The North

108 See Schweisberg, “Police Further Tightened Security.” 109 Schweisberg, “Police Further Tightened Security.“ 110 Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988, vol. 1, part 3, 801. 111 “Security at the Seoul Olympics 1988—A Review,” Sécurité des Jeux Olympiques d’êtê de Sêoul 1988: correspondacne et reports File: Rapports du CIO, 1988, IOCL.

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Korean-led boycott received a relatively weak backing.112 Simultaneously, the CIA noted, Pyongyang also faced the prospect that “a successful Olympics [would] underscore P’yongyang’s [sic] increasing isolation and undercut its bedrock resistance to international recognition of two Korean states.”113 The Seoul Olympics cemented the legacy of liaison among nations for security at the Olympics. While Seoul was not the first example of this system in action, the unique political realities in the region made preventing an incident the greatest hurdle faced since Munich. Discussions between the United States and Soviet Union showed that liaison was not always limited to countries allied with one another. Although Reagan and Gorbachev’s joint statement achieved relatively little in the actual provision of security on the ground in Seoul, such a commitment displayed that even nations at odds with one another found common ground. Sixteen years after the IOC clearly stated that security was not within its realm of responsibility, SOGOC left little doubt as to the assistance the IOC rendered for the Seoul Olympics. “The IOC’s support was instrumental in successfully overcoming international terrorist threats and domestic unrest, resulting [in] the peaceful staging of the Games,” SOGOC claimed.114 It is crucial to point out that SOGOC used the phrase “support.” It was not that the IOC took full responsibility for protecting the Games, but rather utilized its unique position in the international system to aid the South Koreans. This praise of the IOC displays the lengths to which the organization altered its role in the provision of security since the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. While Juan Antonio Samaranch could take some credit for this, the work and ideas of Ashwini Kumar played the most crucial role.

112 The six nations that boycotted the Games included, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Albania, the Seychelles, and Madagascar. Fred Hiatt, “US General Predicts Safe Olympics,” Washington Post, September 15, 1988. 113 “North Korea-South Korea: Olympic Update,” July 11, 1988, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: CIA-RDP90T00100R000201460001-0. 114 “North Korea-South Korea: Olympic Update.”

CHAPTER 6

“A Most Spectacular Example of Cross-Border Collaboration”: Albertville and Barcelona

Scarcely a year passed after the Closing Ceremonies in Seoul when the first pieces of the Berlin Wall started to crumble. The reunification of the German capital marked the beginning of the end of a nearly two-decade long period where the Cold War formed a critical piece to planning security at the Olympic Games. The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought an end of the conflict and created a new geopolitical climate to consider regarding security.1 That is not to say that the Cold War did not still find a way to make an impact. The breakup of the former Soviet republics created new nations and raised the question on how to accommodate these teams.2 1 While it does not consider the Olympics or sport, Thomas Risse-Kappen’s “Ideas

do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 185–214 provides a thought provoking analysis on the impact of transnational relations on the end of the Cold War. He provides a focus on security and transnational relations from 195–204. See also, John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 5–58; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 2 Perhaps the biggest question in this regard was Yugoslavia. The United Nation Security Council sanctioned the nation due to its role in the Balkan War, thus preventing the nation from sending teams to international competition. With the aid of the IOC,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_6

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The Olympics returned to Western Europe in 1992. Less than 500 miles separated Barcelona, Spain from Albertville, France who would, respectively, host the Summer and Winter Games. The end of the Cold War seemed to point to a relatively straightforward Olympic year. Kumar strongly believed this would be the case. He told the head of the Barcelona Olympic Organizing Committee (BOOC) Josep Abad, “the thaw in super power relations augers well for the Barcelona Olympic Games.”3 Ferran Cardenal, the Civil Governor of Barcelona, expressed a similar sentiment. He pointed to, “the end of the cold war, the end of the Iraq war and peace prospects in the Middle East and... no boycott” as positive signs for the Olympics.4 As part of the formalities, both Albertville and Barcelona signed a contract between the IOC, the host city and the host nation’s NOC. For the first time, the contracts included a specific clause related to security. The host city and NOC were responsible for “guarantee[ing] that all appropriate security measures [should] be taken by the government of their country.”5 The IOC had to uphold a duty as well, “The IOC [would] designate one of its members to ensure the liaison between the IOC, on the one hand, and the NOC and the OCOG and the government on the other.”6 For the first time, the IOC was legally bound to aid with security for the Olympic Games. The following chapter traces the security preparations for both the Summer and Winter Olympic Games in 1992. While close in proximity, the challenges facing security planners in the two cities could scarcely have been more unique. As Albertville saw an increase in the use of technology as a means of protecting Alpine-bound athletes and spectators, environmentalists protested the damage wrought by the Games. Simultaneously,

individual athletes from Yugoslavia competed at the Games. For a more detailed account, see Guttmann, The Olympics, 185 and Larry Maloney, “Barcelona 1992,” in Historical Dictionary of the Modern Olympic Movement, ed. John E. Findling and Kimberley D. Pelle (Westport, TC: Greenwood Press, 1996), 179. 3 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990. 4 Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona,” New York Times,

July 11, 1992. 5 Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12–17, 1986, Lausanne, 133, IOCL. A contract was signed by both hosts prior to the 1988 Olympics but security was not included. 6 Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12–17, 1986.

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the proximity of a major nuclear reactor to the city sparked concerned citizens to write IOC Secretary General Françoise Zweifel and request the IOC change the venue. Barcelona presented a myriad of potential issues and threats with the overwhelming majority stemming from internal Spanish politics as no less than three separate Spain-based groups threatened to attack the Games. As Ashwini Kumar grew increasingly concerned over the lack of coordination between organizers in Barcelona and the Spanish government, he paid far closer attention to Barcelona than Albertville and continuously fretted over the security preparations in Spain as the fractious relationship between the city and the Spanish government hindered security planning.

Albertville Albertville lies on France’s eastern border, snug within the French Alps and a mere three hours from the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne. With a population of roughly 15,000 at the time of the Games, the city had to prepare for the onslaught of an estimated quarter-million visitors.7 The town itself lies in a valley with no ski slopes and would be host to most of the speed skating events. At the head of the Organizing Committee stood one national hero and one politician. The former, Jean-Claude Killy, became one of the nation’s sporting idols following his triple gold medal performance at the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics. For local politician Michel Barnier, the Albertville Winter Olympics represented the culmination of nearly a decade of toil to bring the Games to the Savoy region of France.8 Kumar’s focus on security for Albertville was a fraction of that to Seoul in 1988 or Barcelona several months later. One of his reports to Samaranch prior to the Games provides evidence of this. Rather than his typical exhaustive documentation of every aspect of security for Albertville, the brief four-page report did not divulge many details. Even the threat of a terror attack received relatively short shrift. Kumar cited immigrant workers hailing from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran as well as “a school for 7 Marlise Simons, “France’s Site for the Olympics,” New York Times, September 29, 1991. 8 Rone Tempest, “Preparations Have Not Been All Fun and Games for France,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1992; Alan Riding, “Albertville Concentrates on Big Picture,” New York Times, February 2, 1992.

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Islamic Shi-ite students [that would] be an hazard in itself” as the primary threats.9 The school would be “surveilled” but Kumar did not specify by whom or what threat he sought to nullify. The design of the Olympic Village presented the greatest challenge for effective security. Rather than one central location, athletes lived in five separate residences spread across the region.10 The separate locations all required the same amount of security which Kumar noted included, “double fencing, stringent access control, and provision of foolproof fire hazard appurtenances.”11 The distance between the venues exacerbated the problem. Over 30 miles separated the main village at Brides-les-Baines from Tignes, where freestyle skiers would live for the duration of the competition. Such was the distance between event areas that journalist Michael Janofsky commented, “For those who want to see more than one event a day... bring a helicopter.”12 Poor roads connecting the region merely exacerbated the problem. Kumar lamented that, in the future, “this aspect of the Organisation of the Games should not be glossed over.”13 The seemingly nonchalant attitude toward security extended to the Albertville Olympics Organizing Committee (AOOC) as well. When the AOOC made a presentation to the IOC in February of 1988 in Calgary, Kumar noted with concern that security was not mentioned. Michel Barnier, co-president of AOOC along with Killy, attempted to assuage Kumar’s fears. Barnier assured Kumar that security in France was the 9 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991, Folder: Securite aux Jeux Olympiques d’hiver d’Albertville 1992 correspondance, rapports et dossiers d’info 1989–1992, File: correspondance et rapports de M. Ashwini déléguer CIO pour la sécurité 1989–1992, IOCL. 10 When Albertville initially made their bid, Jacques Barnier told the IOC that there

would only be one Olympic Village at Brides-les-Baines. At a June 1991 meeting of the IOC, Barnier responded to a question about athlete accommodation, “the downhill skiers would stay in Val d’Isère; the freestyle skiers would be in Tignes; the bob and luge competitors in La Plagne; the biathletes and cross country skiers in Les Saisies; the ice hockey players in La Tarda. All skaters and ski jumpers would stay at the main Olympic village in Brides-les-Bains.” Quote found in Minutes of the 97th Session of the International Olympic Committee, June 13–16, 1991, Birmingham, 29, IOCL. It is not clear when or how the AOOC decided on this policy. 11 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991. 12 Michael Janofsky, “Come to the Winter Games and See France. A Lot of It.,” New

York Times, April 28, 1991. 13 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

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state’s responsibility and “a permanent committee had been set up on the initiative of the Minister of the Interior.”14 Barnier’s claims of the French state’s involvement do not align with the AOOC’s Final Report. One section describing the role of the French state notes, “The State was not, technically speaking, involved in the organization of the Games... [but] was, however, ultimately responsible for public order.”15 While Barnier claimed that security was in the hands of the French government, the organization he and Killy ran did not consider the French government to play a role in the actual process of organizing them. While this is a relatively minor point, it is also instructive of the attitude taken toward Albertville and security. As a point of comparison, when Barcelona’s Organizing Committee faced issues with coordinating security planning with the Spanish government, Kumar was not as reticent. In Albertville, the link between the military and security was most obvious through the appointment of Christian Prouteau to lead the operation.16 Prouteau’s previous experience included forming France’s Group d’Intervention de la Genderamerie Nationale (GIGN) in response to the Palestinian attack in Munich nearly two decades prior.17 That the man who created the GIGN would lead the security operations for the Olympic Games exemplifies how the military had become a crucial tool in Olympic security. Prouteau received the job less than two years following his conviction for planting evidence on suspected Irish terrorists. That he could receive such a prestigious post highlights how past transgressions could be forgiven so long as one could ensure that the Olympics went smoothly.18 His previous conviction received scant public attention. The Chicago newspaper Daily Herald only mentioned Prouteau in 14 Minutes of the 93rd IOC Session, February 9-11, 1988, Calgary, 27, IOCL. 15 Albertville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 236. 16 . According to the AOOC, Prouteau served as the “Commanding General of the defence zone.” Quote found in Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 238. 17 For a detailed history of the work of the GIGN see, Roland Môntins, 40 ans d’actions extraordinaires (London: Pygmalion, 2013). 18 This is detailed in several sources. See, John Hoberman, “Toward A Theory of Olympic Internationalism,” Journal of Sport History 22, no. 1 (1995): 1–31; Roger Cohen, “Reporter Asserts Elysee Palace Tapped His Phone,” New York Times, March 5, 1993.

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the context of a brief article with the attention-grabbing title, “Olympic staff advised to be kind to terrorists.”19 Within France, when the news outlet Le Monde covered security for Albertville, there was no mention of Prouteau’s past.20 When comparing the numbers of guards in Seoul and Albertville, one can see that the French prepared a relatively diminutive force. While over 100,000 soldiers and citizens patrolled Seoul, Albertville offered an estimated 7,000 officers along with a few thousand volunteers.21 Two government ministries, the Interior and the Defense, provided the bulk of the manpower with 5,000 soldiers. Nearly 2,000 of this force drew from branches of the National Police including “riot squads, air and frontier police, [and] anti-terrorist squads.”22 The significant difference in staffing numbers for two separate Olympic Games only four years apart shows how security planning for the Olympics relied on a threat perception that was unique to each host. The one constant between Seoul, Albertville, and Barcelona was cooperation with national intelligence agencies and future Olympic Organizing Committees. Kumar reported the AOOC worked with officials in charge of the Barcelona Summer Olympics and established a system of liaison “at the highest level.”23 National intelligence agencies contributed to the effort to protect Albertville as officers within the British, American, and German intelligence community established liaison with the AOOC ahead of the Games.24 The primary responsibility for these agencies appeared to be aiding the AOOC in analyzing terrorist threats. Kumar noted several groups to be “studied and screened” that included terrorists from the Basque region of Spain as well as the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.).25 19 “Olympic staff advised to be kind to terrorists,” Daily Herald, February 2, 1992. 20 Examples are found in “La sécurité des prochains Jeux d’hiver Huit mille policiers,

gendarmes et militaires surveilleront l’espace olympique d’Albertville,” Le Monde April 25, 1991 and “Les Jeux Olympiques d’Albertville: Plus de neuf mille hommes assurent la sécurité des sites,” Le Monde, February 8, 1992. 21 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991. 22 Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 238. A further 2,800 Gendarmes worked to protect the public and help traffic flow. 23 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991. 24 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991. 25 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

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In addition to liaison, technology played an increasingly influential role in the security planning process. Kumar wrote that, “security of all computers and other gadgetry [had] also been catered for” in Albertville.26 The AOOC also used technology as a means to make the Games safer. One of those technologies was a risk management system called RAMSES.27 RAMSES was an artificial intelligence system designed to help security forces decide where and how to deploy their forces in case of an emergency. For the Olympics, security planners created a system of seven zones that RAMSES monitored.28 RAMSES was the first instance of utilizing artificial intelligence to protect the Olympic Games.

“A Nuclear Winter Olympics” One of Albertville’s legacies was one of environmental degradation.29 New York Times journalist John May did not mince words in his criticism, asking readers to remember the words of the President of the German Alpine Organization, Fritz März. “The Alps are being literally reconstructed because the good Lord was obviously not a skier,” März reportedly said. May added, “Raped might be a better word.”30 Other critics were not quite as crass in their analysis. Residents of the village of La Plagne, who were given gas masks to prevent accidental ammonia poisoning from the substance used to freeze the bobsled runs, may have been inclined to agree. One environmentalist in the Savoy region who 26 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991. 27 Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee, 59. 28 Eunika Mercier-Laurent, Mieczyslaw Lech Owoc, and Danielle Boulanger, eds., Artificial Intelligence for Knowledge Management: Second IFIP WG 12.6 International Workshop, AI4KM 2014, Warsaw, Poland, September 7–10, 2014, Revised Selected Papers (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 171–173. A “sub-prefect” controlled the zones while the “Central Command Post” made decisions in case “local resources” could not handle the problems. 29 This argument is most cogently made in Jean-Loup Chappelet, “Olympic Environmental Concerns as a Legacy of the Winter Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (2008): 1884–1902. Chappelet contends the Albertville Games forced the IOC to consider environmental impacts as the IOC “could not afford a repeat of Albertville environmental criticism in subsequent games,” 1892. See also, Vincent May, “Environmental Implications of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games,” Tourism Management 16, no. 4 (1995): 269–275. 30 John May, “World-Class Destruction,” New York Times, February 17, 1992.

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described Albertville as an “environmental nightmare.”31 Environmental concerns combined with potential security issues in the presence of the Superphénix, a nuclear reactor less than forty miles from Albertville. The reactor started producing energy in January 1986, roughly three months prior to the Chernobyl disaster.32 The proximity of the Superphénix nuclear reactor to Albertville received no attention from Kumar, Samaranch, or the IOC. That the Superphénix was not running at the time of the Games may explain this absence.33 Still, Kumar’s lack of reaction to the Superphénix is particularly surprising considering his focus on terrorism. In 1982, a Swiss citizen named Chaïm Nissim attacked the uncompleted Superphénix with rocketpropelled grenades.34 The German terrorist group Red Army Faction supplied the weaponry through the Belgian terrorist cell Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Communist Combatant Cells).35 Though there was only minimal damage, it is curious that this attack did not make its way into Kumar’s reports to Samaranch. The one trend Kumar displayed over his tenure as the IOC Delegate Security was an intense focus on international terrorism. As early as 1984, he worried over the “increasing coordination and collaboration between the different terrorist groups in

31 Rone Tempest, “Going for the Gold: Games Will Either Be the Salvation of Struggling Savoy or the Last Push Down Ski Slope Toward Economic Ruin,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1992. 32 Mycle Schneider, “Fast Breeder Reactors in France,” Science and Global Security 17 (2009): 43. 33 Mycle Schneider, “Fast Breeder Reactors in France.” 34 Nissim only claimed responsibility for the attack in 2003 in an interview with

the Swiss newspaper Le Temps. Sylvain Besson, “Après vingt ans de silence, un exdéupté avoue l”attaque à la roquette contre Creys-Malville,” letemps.ch. May 8, 2003. Accessed January 26, 2018. www.letemps.ch/suisse/2003/05/08/apres-vingt-ans-silenceun-ex-depute-avoue-attaque-roquette-contre-creys-malville. 35 Besson, “Après vingt ans de silence.” Initial theories blamed terrorist Carlos the Jackal for the attack but Nissim claimed responsibility in 2003. See, Gar Smith, Nuclear Roulette: The Truth about the Most Dangerous Energy Source on Earth (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2012), 114; Four years later, the RAF and the CCC merged with an aim of creating “a band of communist guerrillas in western Europe.” Quote found in Giuseppe Amadei, “Parliamentary Assembly Report on the European Response to International Terrorism,” in International Terrorism: Political and Legal Documents, ed. Yonah Alexander (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 417.

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their operations.”36 While this attack fit Kumar’s description of cooperation among terrorists, he never mentioned the Superphénix or Nissim’s strike. At least one IOC official knew of security concerns surrounding the reactor. Starting in July 1987, IOC Secretary General Françoise Zweifel, who replaced Monique Berlioux in 1985, received letters from across the globe protesting the site of the Games.37 While this was not a massive letter writing campaign, these letters demonstrate that the nuclear reactor’s proximity to Albertville did come to at least one IOC official’s attention. Fears expressed in the letters ranged from a Chernobyl-esque mistake to a recent spike of terrorist attacks in France.38 John Brotchie, a citizen of New South Wales in Australia, placed the issue in reference to the 1986 nuclear reactor explosion in Pripyat, Ukraine. He wrote, “Reflecting back on the Chernobyl disaster we are deeply concerned... The dangers are too great particularly when looking at the prospect of the reactor being targeted by terrorists.”39 Nine separate letters to Zwiefel mention a fear of terrorists targeting the Superphénix. Linda P. Martineau of Chevy Chase, Maryland claimed, “there [was] the serious possibility of a terrorist attack due to France’s recent history of terrorism from both

36 “Some thoughts on the Security arrangements at the Olympic Games,” Folder: Securité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981–1985, File- Rapport sur le risqué terrorist 1984, IOCL. 37 Guttmann writes of Berlioux’s demise, “it had been clear for several years that Berlioux was too strong willed a person to work easily with [Samaranch],” The Olympics, 166. 38 According to the GTD, from the end of the Seoul Olympics to the Opening Ceremonies in Albertville, France faced over two hundred acts of terrorism. January of 1991, almost precisely a year before the Games, was the worst month with over fifty attacks. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data File]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd. edu/gtd. As Ramón Spaaij notes, there are limitations to the GTD, including “the GTD does not include information on state terrorism.” Quote found in Spaaij, “Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas,” 465. 39 Letter from John Brotchie to Françoise Zweifel, July 23, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL.

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the left and right.”40 Regardless of the means, the authors expressed a singular sentiment. M.B. Davis of Northfield, Minnesota summarized, “a nuclear winter Olympics is not what anybody wants.”41 It is unclear if Zweifel responded to the concerned citizens though she did forward the letters to the AOOC. Gilles Tremey, an official within the AOOC, thanked her for “transmitting” letters from two of the Americans.42 Tremey played down the chances of any accident impacting the Superphénix and informed Zweifel that he had received reassurance from those responsible for the plant’s operation that “all precautions [were] taken to ensure [the plant’s] safe operation.”43 This explanation seemingly satisfied Zwiefel and the matter was dropped. In following the trend of every Games since Munich, there were no major catastrophes in Albertville. Yet, as shown previously, this did not mean that the Games were completely safe. Security breaches included “theft, breaking and entering, bomb alerts, strange phone calls or telexes, traces of explosives or drugs discovered, scuffles, landslides, power cuts, bad weather, invasion of air space, etc.”44 Some of the media members broadcasting the Games reported thefts. The IOC Radio and Television Commission blamed these occurrences on the fact that “Security at the Olympic Arena was not very good at the beginning of the Games.”45 Despite this admission, there did not seem to be any attempt to ascertain the rationale behind the poor security.

40 Letter from Linda P. Martineau to Françoise Zweifel, May 30, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL. 41 Letter from M.B. Davis to Françoise Zweifel, April 26, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL. 42 Letter from Gilles Tremey to Françoise Zweifel, August 7, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléaire de Creys-Malville, File: Lettre de Gilles Tremey (COJO) à Françoise Zweifel (CIO), IOCL. (Author’s translation). 43 Letter from Gilles Tremey to Françoise Zweifel, August 7, 1987. 44 Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing

Committee, 239. Scholars later uncovered a rarely discussed plot where a group destroyed the fiber-optic cables to the television feed during the Opening Ceremonies. See Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City, 48. The authors claim a group called “Coordination, Offensive, Use, Interruptions, and Cut” perpetrated the attack. 45 Minutes of the 99th IOC Session, July 21–23, 1992, Barcelona, 108, IOCL.

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That these incidents occurred and still did not garner a response from either Samaranch or Kumar can be interpreted several ways. One logical theory is that the incidents were so minor or handled so efficiently that neither Samaranch nor Kumar worried. A second scenario could plausibly be that, Kumar in particular, the upcoming Summer Games in Barcelona provided a distraction. In fairness to Kumar, part of his problem lay in that he seemingly worked alone and had two Olympics to prepare for in the same year. He clearly placed far more emphasis on the safety of the Summer Olympics as opposed to the Winter Games. The sole instance when Kumar worked on a somewhat even scale with both the Summer and Winter Games was 1984 but, even still, he seemed more consumed with Los Angeles. It would be difficult to underestimate the importance that Kumar and Samaranch, as a Barcelona native, placed on a safe Games in Spain. As will be seen, in comparison to Albertville, hosting the Games in Barcelona would require a careful manipulation of the relationship between the state and regional governments.

Barcelona The day prior to the Opening Ceremony of the Barcelona Summer Olympic Games, three bombs exploded simultaneously in Vilafranca, a city located approximately thirty miles from Barcelona. The First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO) perpetrated the attack against a gas pipeline that ran from Barcelona to Valencia. Samaranch confidently dismissed the significance of the incident. In his opinion, the attack was not related to the Olympic Games. He claimed, “I don’t think you can say that it is a threat because the incident took place nowhere near an Olympic site.”46 Jordi Pujol, the head of Barcelona’s regional government, argued slightly differently. In Pujol’s view, that the attack occurred relatively far from Olympic-related areas served to underscore the effectiveness of the Olympic security program.47 While Samaranch was disingenuous, Pujol’s praise of the security system scarcely reflects 46 Mike Rowbottom, “Barcelona 1992: Security threat played down.” Independent.co.uk. July 24, 1992. Accessed January 31, 2018. http://www.independent.co.uk/ sport/olympics-barcelona-1992-security-threat-played-down-1535486.html. 47 “Interior atribuye a los GRAPO el atentado contra un gasoducto en Vilafranca en vísperas de los JJ OO.” Elpais.com. July 25, 1992. Accessed February 1, 2018. https:// elpais.com/diario/1992/07/25/espana/712015216_850215.html.

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the immense difficulties faced by security planners in the years prior to 1992. Awarding the Olympics to Barcelona came with a myriad of problems related to security. Barcelona is the regional capital of the northeastern region of Spain known as Catalonia. The political history of the region is lengthy, but it is key to note that Catalonia suffered under the fascist regime of Francisco Franco, whose sports minister was Juan Antonio Samaranch.48 Catalonia’s insistence on autonomy, and at times independence, from Spain presented an issue for the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic Games and security. In the two decades since the attack in Munich, the system of securing the Olympics relied almost exclusively on state support for individual Organizing Committees. For several years, the liaison relationship between the Barcelona Olympic Organizing Committee (COOB) and the Spanish government remained unclear. The security plan devised by COOB envisioned a three-tiered hierarchical operation. The first level worked on the ground at specific locations while the second tier covered entire regions. At the pinnacle stood the Olympic Security Center that, by using advanced technology, could link with a similar body based in Madrid.49 Kumar called the system in place “satisfactory” and only truly suggested the implementation of subcommittees who could provide a narrow focus on individual topics.50 As one example, Kumar suggested an “International Security Committee” whose 48 The best analysis of the relationship between Barcelona and the Spanish State is John Hargreaves, Freedom for Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Samaranch’s legacy has been difficult for historians to grapple with. The most stringent criticism of him relates to his role with the Franco government. The harshest critique is found in Andrew Jennings and Vyv Simson, The Lords of the Rings: Power, Money and Drugs in the Modern Olympics (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992). There have also been attempts to scale back some of the criticism. While not quite a defense of Samaranch, Hill writes in Olympic Politics that Jennings and Simson “quote hardly any sources, and do not really put Samaranch into the context of Spanish politics at the time, so that it is difficult to evaluate what they say,” 74. See also Guttmann, The Olympics, 171–172. 49 The details of this system are found in Barcelona Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXV Olympiad Barcelona 1992, volume 3, part 3, 306–307. 50 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990, Folder: Ceremonies d’ouverture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989–1992, IOCL. He told Abad this system would “accelerate the rate of progress since simultaneously various committees [would] be attending to their respective jobs.”

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responsibilities would include arranging “the interception, detention, and interrogation of identified men posing danger to security.”51 Kumar was not as complementary toward other portions of the COOB’s security plans. He took particular issue with the planned number of security personnel. As of February 1990, the COOB anticipated raising a force of 40,000. Kumar was not impressed. He called the numbers “quite insufficient” and believed they “may have to be considerably augmented.”52 Kumar provided a different number to Samaranch. In a letter written the same day he called 40,000 “insufficient” he told the IOC president that the COOB mustered nearly 60,000 which he was “inclined to consider ‘grossly inadequate’.”53 While there is no obvious explanation for the disparity in numbers he cited, this example highlights the difference in focus and attention between Albertville and Barcelona. Kumar took little umbrage with Albertville protecting the Games with far less than 20,000 security staff yet fretted over nearly three times that number in Barcelona. The actual number of security staff that protected the Barcelona Games numbered roughly 28,000.54 Kumar’s prediction of a potential for security issues in Barcelona may have informed his insistence on amassing a large force. He told Samaranch in 1989, “All the difficulties in security which were noticed three years back, [were] now looming large and need[ed] immediate attention.”55 Most worrisome for Kumar was a perceived inability of the BOOC to provide security without the help of the Spanish government. He claimed that he could not see “practical implementation” of He also commented that the system would require the subcommittees to effectively coordinate with one another. 51 “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992,” March 14, 1988, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1988, IOCL. 52 “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992.” 53 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990, Folder:

Ceremonies d’ouverture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989–1992, IOCL. 54 This number is found in Stephen Essex, “Platform for Local Political Expression and Resolution (Barcelona 1992),” in Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond, ed. Vida Bajc, 228. 55 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 30, 1989, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989–1992, IOCL.

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the BOOC’s ideas amid further “[d]ifficulties stemming from different perceptions of security between the Madrid and Barcelona Administrations.”56 In Kumar’s opinion, differing political ideologies provided the simplest explanation for the inability of the city and state governments to coordinate. In Madrid, Prime Minister Felipe González led the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party while Jordi Pujol represented the Convergence and Union party, which favored independence for Catalonia. Kumar provided a somewhat understated analysis of the situation, “[i]t seems to be obvious, that there [was] tension between the regional Government and the Socialist Government in Madrid, which at the moment [did] not speak well for a co-ordinated effort to provide an efficient security system.”57 Kumar did not so much suggest a solution as comment on what caused the difficulties. For the first time in decades, the full complement of NOC’s recognized by the IOC would be in Catalonia. While a positive step, the reality was that an increase in people raised the strain on security planners. Kumar warned the number of nations competing meant more tourists in the city and, therefore, a “heavier responsibility in security aspects.”58 Yet even with this added stress, Kumar believed Spanish authorities lagged behind. He provided a bleak description of preparations to Samaranch in April of 1990 following a visit to the COOB in February. “The present rate of progress... does not satisfy me. A much greater sense of urgency is required to be put in,” he told Samaranch.59 Strained relations and a lack of liaison between Catalonia and the Spanish government in Madrid continued to bear most of the blame for the poor preparations in the early months of 1990. Kumar claimed he could not see evidence of the “involvement of the Central Government... it very much [remained] Barcelona City’s preserve.”60 The perceived lack of coordination between the two groups presented several problems. When Kumar asked the COOB about what the Spanish government may 56 “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989–1992, IOCL. 57 “Brief Report on Security on Summer Games 1992,” undated, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989–1992, IOCL. 58 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990. 59 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990. 60 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990.

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contribute, they claimed they had no idea how many state resources were at their disposal.61 The planned Olympic Village underlined the importance of the Spanish state’s resources. Built near the sea, the Village was vulnerable to a potential sea-borne attack. Kumar asked the COOB if they had discussed the provision of the Spanish navy or Coast Guard with the Spanish Admiralty. “I did not get a satisfactory reply [about] their plans so that they could be suitably dovetailed with the other security plans,” he complained to Samaranch.”62 Two months later he struggled to hide his frustrations with the COOB’s lack of progress. He wrote Abad, “I am sure you must have established liaison with the Admiralty for ensuring safety of the [Barcelona] harbour.”63 In previous meetings, Kumar suggested the COOB copy the system utilized in Seoul to protect the Pusan harbor. There is little evidence they heeded his advice, which perhaps explains some of his annoyance.64 Additionally, Kumar’s conception of liaison to protect against international terrorism required a strong relationship between Organizing Committees and national governments. “Unity has to be forged on a national basis” he contended, “for all the security agencies to weld together to fight the terrorist menace.”65 The Spanish periodical El Pais reported the Spanish government created a “commission” in 1988 to help coordinate security for the Games.66 Secretary of State for Security Rafael Vera chaired the organization and his responsibilities included, “directing, planning, preparing and implementing the security operation.”67 Despite this organizational structure, it was not until June of 1991, with barely a

61 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990. 62 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990. 63 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990. 64 “A Review of Security at Barcelona Olympics,” undated, Folder: Ceremonies d’ou-

verture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989–1992, IOCL. The system established in Pusan employed concentric rings along with submarines. 65 “Brief Report on Security on Summer Games 1992.” 66 Juan José Echevarria, “El Gobierno creará una Comisión de Segurdiad para los

Juegos Olímpicos, la Expo y Madrid Cultural,” elpais.com. October 28, 1988. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/28/espana/593996401_850215. html. 67 Barcelona Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 305.

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year left until the Games that Abad reported to the IOC, “The Spanish Government had given a firm commitment on optimum security.”68 While still a rather vague promise, this represented a step in ensuring a safe Olympic Games. Although the agreement between the BOOC and Spanish government represented a victory of sorts for Kumar’s ideas, one episode in security planning demonstrated the lack of control, Kumar had over an individual Organizing Committee’s security policy. A mountain overlooked the assigned area for VIP’s in Barcelona’s Mont Juic stadium, which would hold the Opening and Closing Ceremony. At some points, the distance between the mountain and the upper reaches of the Mont Juic was a mere 500 m. In addition to worries about a sniper having a clear line of sight, Kumar objected to the Spanish King not sitting in the highest box in the stadium.69 The COOB’s plan to counter threats was to place a bulletproof casing above the box. Kumar objected. “[I]t would be wrong from the point of view of security to have His Majesty at a lower level in the Box” he argued, “[the King] should be in the uppermost rung.”70 To Kumar’s frustration, the COOB stood firm. In a January 1992 meeting with Rafael Vera and various members of the security forces, Kumar “frankly told” the assembly of his “unhappiness over the fact that no heed had been paid to the fears that [he] had expressed in earlier meetings, about the open-ness of the Royal Box.”71 The group placated him by promising to examine the situation but no changes occurred. In addition to the Mont Juic, Barcelona’s geography presented security planners some unique challenges. The predominant issue derived from the Olympic Village and the harbor area. One plan to counter the limited availability of hotel rooms in the city was to build a floating city within the harbor. Yet the security requirements for this system would be extensive.72 Kumar called the Mediterranean Sea, “one of the world[‘s] biggest 68 Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13–16, 1991, Birmingham, 31, IOCL. 69 “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989. Kumar also noted

the massive difficulty in clearing the mountain of potential threats. 70 “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report.” 71 Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992, Folder: Security at the

1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989–1992, IOCL. 72 At a basic level Kumar listed, “perimeter of the harbour, mooring areas, access control of persons and merchandise, subaquatic checking of the ships ‘hulls, sea surveillance of the surrounding areas by spead [sic] boats, direct surveillance of spots which could be

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terrorist battle grounds,” which to him made the slow progress in security planning all the more galling.73 Kumar considered new threats that he believed could be launched against the Olympic Village. Among those he highlighted were potential threats posed by “ultralights, hang-gliders, and remote-controlled model aircraft.”74 To counter these threats, the Olympic Village had certain areas armed with equipment that would neutralize any danger presented by a flying aircraft.75 Preparing security plans for the Summer Olympic Games was an immense project both logistically, politically, and geographically. What the preparations for Barcelona showed was that if one aspect of planning is off, it had the potential to throw everything else into turmoil. Deciding on how to guard a harbor with the Navy is a difficult task if it is unclear how many ships the government is willing to provide. Kumar did his best to jump through the obstacles and cut through red-tape but he was utterly powerless to dictate anything to the Spanish government or the COOB. The seemingly very real threat of an attack in Barcelona did little to quell his worries.

The Terrorist Threat to Barcelona On May 29, 1991 a bomb ripped through the barracks housing members of Spain’s national police force, the Guardia Civil, in Vic, a city north of Barcelona that would host the roller hockey competitions the following year. Four of the nine deaths were the family and children of the guards, who also lived in the barracks. Officials quickly placed the blame on a group called Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which translates to “Basque Fatherland and Liberty.”76 Located on the French-Spanish border, the Basque region of Spain has a long history of promoting the region’s

considered vulnerable.’” Quote found in “A Review of Security at Barcelona Olympics,” undated. 73 “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989. 74 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 13, 1988, Folder:

Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1988, IOCL. 75 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 13, 1988, It is unclear what this weaponry was as Kumar described it as “appropriate equipment.” 76 “Bombing Kills 8 in Barcelona; Basque Separatists Blamed,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1991.

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autonomy.77 Formed in 1959 as a means to win independence from the Franco-controlled Spanish government, ETA claimed nearly 700 lives in terrorist attacks from 1968–1992 and fully dissolved on May 3, 2018.78 The bombing in Vic caught Samaranch’s attention and he quickly requested a more detailed description of security procedures. Abad avoided Samaranch’s request by claiming that he “was unable to explain the security measures in detail.”79 Abad attempted to assuage Samaranch’s fears. He noted that ETA had not yet claimed credit for “regrettable incidents near Barcelona” but then countered this analysis by stating, “this was not necessarily reassuring.”80 Abad sought more hope in the public’s reaction. He noted the immediate negative feedback and believed “the people of Catalonia were overwhelmingly against [the terrorists].”81 Neither Samaranch nor other IOC members pushed the issue further. Both Kumar and the COOB believed that ETA posed a serious threat to the Games. From Kumar’s vantage point, this terrorist organization represented an example of the ability of terrorist groups to effectively work in tandem. In the case of ETA, he pointed to increased contacts between the organization and terrorist groups including the PFLP and Irish Republican Army (IRA). He cited “reliable evidence” in stating that ETA members trained in Algeria and the Middle East and “that ETA

77 A detailed history of the development of Basque nationalism can be found in Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present (Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, 2003), 170–188. 78 A far more detailed history of the ETA is found in Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro, eds., ETA’s Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). Following the death of Franco, the ETA’s military arm split into two factions with differing ideas on how to achieve their goals. ETA military, ETA(m), believed in continuing the military struggle while ETA politico-military, ETA(pm), changed in the years following Franco’s death and argued that their aims could be achieved without resorting solely to violence. The vast majority of attacks carried out in the early 1990’s were the responsibility of ETA(m). For a more nuanced history of this group’s development see, John L. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency): The Fight for Euskadi 1890–1986 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 149–185. On the dissolution of ETA see, “El Desarme Definitivo de ETA,” May 3, 2018. Accessed June 10, 2018. https://elpais.com/especiales/2017/desarme-definitivo-de-eta/. 79 Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13–16, 1991, 32. 80 Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13–16, 1991, 32. 81 Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13–16, 1991, 32.

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links with IRA amount to more than fraternisation [sic].”82 The COOB’s fear likely stemmed from the fact that the bombing of the barracks in Vic was not an isolated incident. One previous study of Olympic security argued that ETA committed a “sustained bombing campaign” prior to the Opening Ceremonies.83 While ETA received the majority of the attention, several other terrorist groups threatened to potentially use the Games as a vehicle for global notoriety. The local Catalan separatist group Terra Lliure (Free Country) attacked several targets in 1988. A report from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency commented, “[the] attacks [were] aimed against the Olympic Games, and in defense of the independence and sovereignty of the Catalan People.”84 Terra Lliure disbanded two years prior to the Olympics but as the Games neared, the group showed some signs of life.85 In one instance, Terra Lliure tried bombing six banks in Barcelona. Spanish police foiled the plot by following the group, defusing the bombs, and arresting the conspirators.86 In one security breach chronicled by The Washington Post, the group infiltrated over 150 people into Olympic 82 “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992,” March 14, 1988. His claim that terrorist Iturbe Abosolo headed a France-based ETA “Executive Committee” in March of 1988 brings part of his analysis into question. Alonso died in a car crash in Algeria in March 1987, nearly a full year prior to Kumar filing his report. Abosolo’s obituary is found in, Edward Schumacher, “Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, Exiled Basque Terrorist,” March 3, 1987. 83 Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond, 48. The Summer Olympics was not the only major international target for terrorists in Spain in 1992. The Universal Exposition was set to begin in April in Seville, the capital of Spain’s Andalusian region. Spanish police arrested one ETA member preparing an attack in Seville with a “350-kg truck bomb loaded with shrapnel.” Quote found in Beth Finkelstein and Noel Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain,” The Washington Post, August 11, 1991. 84 United States. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary [Peru: Increasing Terrorist Activity in Lima; Heavily Excised],” 1988, 6. 85 Terra Iliure committed 53 attacks between the announcement of Barcelona as host and the Opening Ceremonies. See, Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond, 49. 86 Finkelstein and Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.” In Freedom for

Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games, Hargreaves notes the Guardia Civil led a “sweep” in an attempt to round up members of Terra Lliure. While most of those detained were later released, these arrests led to “suspicion among nationalists that the central state apparatus was up to its old tricks, and intended to intimidate them into desisting from campaigning around the Olympics,” 84.

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volunteer groups and, “in this manner, they were fully briefed on plans, including security procedures.”87 While there is no record of Terra Lliure utilizing this information for nefarious means, the fact that members of a terrorist group could so simply skirt the COOB’s security screens did not bode well. In following precedent, Kumar recommended liaison between the BOOC and foreign intelligence agencies to combat the threat of terrorism. In late 1989, he told Samaranch of the need to increase “intelligence effort” and that the COOB should “maintain effective liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies.”88 Spain was well equipped to liaise with other intelligence agencies. The nation joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985 and contributed as a member of a joint security group called Terrorisme Radicalisme Extremisme Violence Internationale (TREVI).89 The liaison system started gaining recognition as the New York Times reported, “Spanish officials exchanged information and experiences with security experts from a score of countries.”90 Terrorists apparently paid attention to the meetings as GRAPO bombed a gathering between police and former Olympic organizers in Barcelona.91 In early January 1992, Rafael Vera met with a wide range of the forces responsible for protecting the Games. He informed the assembly of a study underway that utilized the assistance of the Spanish government, authorities within the ECC, and members of TREVI. The goals for the study were fairly straightforward. Authorities collected and analyzed information on “terrorist groups belonging to the ETA (Basque), Arabs, elements from the Balkans, Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red army, and of the Euro-Terrorist Groups i.e. The Bader Mennhoff [sic],

87 Finkelstein and Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.” 88 “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report.” 89 TREVI was formed following the Munich Olympics in 1975 as a counter-terrorism coordination committee. See, Fernando Jiménez, “Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government’s Response,” in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993), 121. 90 Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona.” The article did not specify which countries. 91 This attack received no media attention outside of a single article, Beth Finkelstein and Noel Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.” Finkelstein and Koch mention the attack in passing and do not provide further details. There is no mention of the bomb in the BOOC records, Kumar’s files, Samaranch’s files, or the Global Terrorism Database.

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Action Diret [sic], [and] Catalunian Subversive elements.”92 One nation in particular worked to strengthen its ties with Spain. Vera informed the meeting, “better cooperation with the French authorities to combat terrorism [was] being worked out at the highest level.”93 Two months following Vera’s report, a joint French-Spanish operation against ETA displayed the benefits of liaison. With the help of a careless ETA member who left an address book in a phone booth, French authorities tracked down and arrested three of the group’s hierarchy in Bidart, France.94 The Los Angeles Times described the operation as a “most spectacular example of cross-border collaboration.”95 Yet while one French official exultantly claimed the operation “decapitated” ETA, Spanish officials cautioned against overconfidence. Jose Luis Corcuera, the Spanish Interior Minister, dampened the enthusiasm by claiming, “This is not the time for euphoria... ETA [was] still capable of causing pain and death.”96 By July 1992, Spanish authorities expressed confidence that the Games would be safe from an attack. Ferran Cardenal claimed he had “intelligence information that [ETA’s] interest in disrupting the Olympics [had] fallen.”97 The explanation for this sudden disinterest is multifaceted. The

92 Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992. Action Directe was a French terrorist group that operated from 1979–1987 and, according to one scholar, “collapsed after a mass arrest.” Quote found in Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?,” The Journal of International Policy Solutions 9 (2008): 43. 93 Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992. 94 Teresa Whitfield, Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2014). Whitfield calls the operation a “spectacular success” and that the “shock to ETA... was immediate, and real,” 74. The three men arrested were Jose Luis Alvarez, the ETA’s “ideologue,” Joseba Arregui Errostarbe, “the dean of ETA bombers,” and Francisco Mugica Garmendia, “Spain’s Public Enemy No. 1.” Quotes found in William D. Montalbano, “Basque Terror Dealt Crippling Blow by Arrests,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1992. 95 William D. Montalbano, “Address Book Leads to Basque Terror Leaders,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1992. The car bomb was one of the ETA’s trademarks and Spanish police said “it [was] impossible to protect against a car bomb.” 96 Ibid Part of the raid that captured the ETA leadership uncovered details on how the ETA’s structure operated. One official described the organization as “hydra-headed.” Quote found in William Drozdiak, “Avowed “Decapitation” of Basque Group in Doubt as Olympics Near,” The Washington Post, May 4, 1992. 97 Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona.”

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capture of the ETA leadership proved to be more damaging than originally believed while the ETA’s tactics of car bombing, which almost inevitably led to civilian casualties, alienated the popular support the group once enjoyed.98 John Hooper of The Guardian reported Spanish authorities believed that, “the [ETA] had decided an attack on either the Olympics or the Tour de France... would be counter-productive.”99 Less than two weeks prior to the Games, ETA offered the Spanish government a two-month truce in exchange for discussions in a neutral country. For the Spanish government, this presented a dilemma. The raid earlier in the year had definitely weakened ETA but also uncovered evidence that the group scouted sixteen different locations in and around Barcelona, presumably as places to attack.100 Simultaneously, a meeting with the terrorists could conceivably viewed as giving in to their demands. One theory was that ETA recognized the dilemma and gave Felipé Gonzalez’s administration a way to save public face and protect the Games. However, Spanish government policy at the time stated that the only way talks could occur was if ETA promised “unconditional cessation of hostilities.”101 In the end, the Spanish government rejected the offer, suggesting that the raid in Bidart boosted the authorities’ confidence an attack would not occur. 98 One CIA analysis in 1984 noted that the increased autonomy under Felipé Gonza-

lez’s regime had limited sentiment toward the ETA. One section notes, “ETA’s raison d’etre of perceived centralized oppression emanating from Madrid [had] lost credibility.” Quote found in “Spain: Basque Terrorism and Government Response,” November 1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: CIA-RDP85S00316R000300110004-3. Guillermo Arbeloa, an ETA member, described “an evident loss of popular support” following the car bombings. Quote found in Rogelio Alonso, “Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011): 704. 99 John Hooper, “ETA Offers to Lift Olympics Terror Threat,” The Guardian (London), July 11, 1992. However, two car bombs set off within days of the start of the Tour must have slightly diminished that belief. Elliott Almond, “Tour de France: Indurain Gets Off to Good Start,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1992. 100 John Hooper, “ETA Offers to Lift Olympics Terror Threat.” 101 Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Basques in Spain,

2004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38dec.html [accessed 12 February 2018]. According to this document, the Spanish government held firm “to its policy of demanding the unconditional cessation of hostilities as a prerequisite for talks.” A separate news article also noted that the raid uncovered documents that ETA believed that attacking the Olympics would not serve the organization’s purposes. See, “SPAIN: Basques Waver on Attacking Olympic Games,” The Ottawa Citizen, July 17, 1992.

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The Barcelona Olympic Games came to a close on August 9, 1992 without an attack. In fact, the sole major security incident came about because the system put in place by the BOOC worked. Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson attempted to enter the Olympic Village without his accreditation. When the volunteer refused to allow him in without the appropriate credentials, Johnson shoved the individual and found himself expelled from the Village.102 As the Games in Albertville and Barcelona ended, the Olympic movement had managed the transition into the post-Cold War era. ∗ ∗ ∗ There were security lessons to be learned from both Albertville and Barcelona. For the Winter Olympics in Albertville, holding events and quartering athletes in several locations showed future Olympic security planners the difficulties in both logistics and personnel that this type of event required. That Christian Prouteau played a significant role in organizing security shows how deeply enmeshed the military was in preparing security for the Olympics in the early 1990s. Despite the difficulties in negotiating the minefield that was internal Spanish politics, Ashwini Kumar and those involved in the security effort for Barcelona could be pleased that the Games went smoothly. That a cooperative relationship between French and Spanish security forces limited the threat to the Games by arresting the leadership of the ETA highlighted the utility of liaison as a tactic to keep the Olympics safe.

102 This incident occurred on the same day Johnson was scheduled to leave the Village. Christine Brennan, “An Olympic Celebration To the Finish,” The Washington Post, August 10, 1992.

CHAPTER 7

Atlanta Attacked: The Centennial Park Bombing

Barcelona set a high bar for the next host of the Summer Olympic Games: Atlanta, Georgia. The 1996 Summer Games were set to be the event’s centennial celebration and some feared the occasion would be four years too late. Mike Penner of the Los Angeles Times provided some of the most cutting critiques of Atlanta. He titled his column “Olympic Torch Passed to Cultural Abyss” and provided a list of what he believed Atlanta needed to achieve to match the previous Summer Olympics host. Among others he included “Buy a culture, Hire a King (Ted Turner ha[d] been disqualified), Age 1,000 years, And maybe lose the accent.”1 Whether anyone involved in the organization of the Atlanta Olympic Games saw the jibes is a moot point; the city and the Organizing Committee had a reputation to overcome. One avenue to enhance the visitor’s experience was to make sure the Olympics remained safe. Before the Summer Olympics convened in Atlanta, the Winter Olympics traveled to Lillehammer, Norway. Lillehammer and Atlanta provided two very distinct challenges for security planners. In Norway, the animosity between American figure skaters Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding created a perceived security risk amid death threats toward both 1 Mike Penner, “Olympic Torch Passed to Cultural Abyss,” Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1992.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_7

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athletes. While no serious security incidents hampered Lillehammer, a pipe bomb exploding in Atlanta’s Centennial Park during the Games forcefully showed that even the most detailed and expansive security effort does not guarantee safety. One aim of the following section is to highlight the extensive preparations, touted as the largest peacetime security exercise in American history, by the Atlanta Olympics Games Organizing Committee (ACOG) and the American federal government.2 In comparison with previous Olympiads, the voluminous correspondence and reports that Kumar provided to the IOC in previous years slowed to a trickle for Lillehammer and Atlanta. Re-elected to the IOC Executive Board in 1992, he took great pride in his work transforming the security process at the Olympics. “I started from scratch ten years ago and have been able to build [security] up into a well-oiled machinery [sic],” he claimed in the midst of the Barcelona Summer Olympics.3 It is clear that he did not leave his “well-oiled machinery” to run itself. In its Final Report, ACOG specifically thanked, “[t]he IOC delegate for security [who] assisted in the planning process, providing the unique insight and experience gained from security planning for numerous other Olympic Games.”4

Lillehammer 1994 In the buildup to the 1994 Winter Olympics, the Lillehammer Olympic Organizing Committee (LOOC) and the IOC rarely discussed security with only one security-related conversation taking place on record between the LOOC and the IOC prior to the Games.5 Gerhard Heiberg, the President of the LOOC, noted the utility of liaison as a security measure. According to Heiberg, the LOOC, “paid great attention to security... [and] were in contact with security organizations in other

2 For this claim see, John Kifner, “Security Levels To Set a Record At the Olympics,” New York Times, July 12, 1996. The discussion of liaison is limited as many of the records detailing the security preparations remain classified and thus make it difficult to provide a clear idea of how liaison worked ahead of the Atlanta Games. 3 “Ashwini Kumars Effective Secret,” The Times of India, July 27, 1992. 4 Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial

Olympic Games, volume 2, part 1, 367. 5 Minutes of the 102nd IOC Session, February 8th-10th, 1994, Lillehammer, IOCL,

3.

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countries and had some 4,000 police and security personnel on duty at the Games.”6 Among those working to help secure the Olympics was the FBI, which was in “direct contact” with Norwegian police.7 Relative to other security operations for the Olympic Games, Lillehammer’s was smaller, with only around three hundred military members aiding preparations.8 The increasing use of computers and technology at the Olympics aided security in Lillehammer. As a sign of how relatively new this concept was, the staff responsible for operating the computer systems amounted to a grand total of four people. The American technology firm IBM provided most of the equipment and LOOC emphasized the importance of ensuring the security of the computer systems.9 IBM provided assistance by taking part in meetings with the LOOC and Norwegian company Telecom while LOOC established a position within the Security Department solely dedicated to the security of computers.10 The LOOC heartily embraced technology to aid security, spending 60% of the budget allocated for security solely on technology.11 Authorities monitored air and water quality in Lillehammer through an Environmental Surveillance and Information System (ENSIS) that was dubbed ENSIS ‘94. Development for ENSIS ‘94 began in 1992 and Lillehammer was to be the technology’s debut.12 In the context of the Olympic Games, ENSIS’94 stored data that helped authorities guarantee that the drinking water was safe and air quality remained at acceptable levels.13 Part of the appeal of the system was that anyone from the general public to the highest official could gain access to ENSIS ‘94’s data through “INFO’94 6 Minutes of the 102nd IOC Session, February 8th-10th, 1994. 7 FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents and

Terrorist Related Activities in the United States: 1991 (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991), 15. The FBI report also shows that the agency aided security preparations in Seoul and Barcelona. 8 Lillehammer Olympic Games Organizing Committee, Official Report of the XVII Olympic Winter Games, Lillehammer, 1994, volume 2, 51. 9 Official Report of the XVII Olympic Winter Games, Lillehammer, 20. 10 Official Report of the XVII Olympic Winter Games, Lillehammer, 54. 11 Official Report of the XVII Olympic Winter Games, Lillehammer, 57. 12 Haagenrud, S. E., and B. Sivertsen, “EU 833 ENSIS’94. An environmental

surveillance system for the 1994 Winter Olympic Games,” NILU OR (1994): 1-10. 13 Haagenrud and Sivertsen, “EU 833 ENSIS’94”.

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touch screen terminals.”14 Over the course of the 1994 Winter Olympics, ENSIS ‘94 had over 100,000 requests for environmental data.15 On the ground, the rivalry between American ice skaters Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding provided one rather unique challenge in Lillehammer. Much of the focus on these two athletes concentrated on the attack on Kerrigan prior to the 1994 U.S. Figure Skating Championships.16 Both Kerrigan and Harding would compete for the U.S. Figure Skating team in Lillehammer and the duo’s presence inevitably impacted the security preparations. The ice rink’s manager quadrupled the security force in light of death threats made against both Kerrigan and Harding. One woman threatened Kerrigan while a man from Santa Barbara, California claimed, “I will have to stop Tonya Harding so she can’t take part in the competition, and if I do that, God will bless me forever.”17 Unlike the U.S. Championships, both Kerrigan and Harding left Lillehammer unscathed. In contrast to the delicate geopolitical balance required in Seoul, there was little reason to believe that Norway and Lillehammer would be the target of an international terrorist attack. Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords between the PLO and the Israeli government somewhat raised fears that Norway could be a target by parties aggrieved by the deal.18 Lillehammer also had an indirect link to the massacre in Munich. In a case of mistaken identity, the Israeli intelligence organization Mossad assassinated a Moroccan waiter named Ahmed Bouchikhi in Lillehammer

14 Haagenrud and Sivertsen, “EU 833 ENSIS’94”. 15 Haagenrud and Sivertsen, “EU 833 ENSIS’94”. 16 Excluding the recent Hollywood film I, Tonya, there is a wealth of books and articles

written on this attack. A small sample includes, Cynthia Baughman, ed., Women On Ice: Feminist Responses to the Tonya Harding/Nancy Kerrigan Spectacle (New York: Routledge, 2011); Abby Haight and J. E. Vader, Fire on Ice: The Exclusive Inside Story of Tonya Harding (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2017); Nancy Kerrigan and Steve Woodward, Nancy Kerrigan: In My Own Words (New York: Hyperion, 1996). 17 Randy Harvey, “Harding-Kerrigan Security to Be Tight,” Los Angeles Times, February 17, 1994. The media furor around the two was so great that the United States Figure Skating Association wanted to move them into separate practice groups but the International Skating Union would not allow it to prevent disrupting other athletes. 18 Doug Mellgren, “Anti-Terror Measures Increased for Norway Olympics,” Folder: Sécurité aux JO d’hiver de Lillehammer 1994: correspondance 1985-1995, File: correspondance 1985-1995, IOCL. Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond, 49.

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in 1973. He had the misfortune of bearing a “striking resemblance” to Ali Hassan Salameh, one of Black September’s top lieutenants.19 LOOC President Heiberg commented that his contacts in the Middle East, “told him that some opponents of [the Oslo Accords] might ‘want to teach Norway a lesson’.”20 No attacks occurred. As the 1994 Winter Olympics ended without incident, the Closing Ceremony paid homage to Sarajevo. A decade after Sarajevo welcomed the world for the Olympics, civil war plagued the nation of BosniaHerzegovina.21 At the time of the Closing Ceremonies, the United Nations had negotiated a seventeen-day truce between the two warring factions. Speaking to the assembled crowd in Lillehammer, Samaranch said, “Dear Sarajevo. We do not forget you. We will continue to support you.”22 As Lillehammer bade farewell, all eyes turned to the American South for the centennial celebration of the Olympic Games.

Seven Super Bowls Per Day Atlanta was the surprise victor to host the 1996 Summer Olympics. Sentiment seemed to dictate that Athens would host the Centennial celebration after its inaugural role as host in 1896. A variety of factors held back the Athens bid, including security.23 In contrast, the IOC expressed little concern for security in Atlanta in its meetings ahead of the Games.

19 Mark Ensalaco, Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Salameh was part of the Israeli “Wrath behind the massacre in Munich. Reeve, Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli

Press, 2008), 57. The attempt to assassinate of God” operation targeting the Palestinians One Day in September: The Story of the 1972 Revenge Operation “Wrath of God”.

20 Mellgren, “Anti-Terror Measures Increased for Norway Olympics”. 21 For an analysis of the causes of the war and the military campaign see, Charles R.

Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003). 22 Mike Kupper, “After Joyful Games, a Plea for Peace,” Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1994. 23 The third question posed to the Greek delegation making the bid regarded security. The bids for Toronto and Manchester had questions on security posed as well. See, Minutes of the 96th IOC Session, September 17th-20th, 1990, Tokyo, IOCL, 3135. Albert II, His Serene Highness The Prince Regent of Monaco, posed most of the questions.

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When ACOG made its initial bid presentation, no IOC member questioned how ACOG planned to protect the Games. In the ensuing period, the sole discussion of security from members of the IOC stemmed from reports from the Athlete’s Commission Working Group.24 This silence prior to Atlanta mimicked that of the time prior to Lillehammer. In meetings, where IOC members questioned other delegations on security at future Olympics, the queries directed toward ACOG avoided the issue.25 The IOC’s silence on security is even more puzzling considering the world situation in the years prior to 1996. In 1993, Ramzi Yousef bombed the World Trade Center in New York City.26 Two years later, Timothy McVeigh detonated a bomb inside a truck parked outside the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City and killed 168 people.27 That followed an attack on Tokyo commuters when a terrorist group released the nerve agent sarin into Tokyo’s subway, killing 12.28 The following year in Saudi Arabia a bomb placed outside of a complex housing American military personnel killed twenty and injured over 500, including Saudis and Bangladeshis.29 A mere two days prior to the Opening Ceremonies in Atlanta, TWA Flight 800 exploded soon after 24 See, for example, Minutes of the 101st IOC Session, September 21st-24th, 1993, Monaco, IOCL, 88. 25 See ibid, 41. The Turkish bid to host the 2000 Summer Olympics in Istanbul received several questions on security in the country. 26 For works on Yousef see, Laurie Mylroie, “The World Trade Center Bomb: Who Is Ramzi Yousef? And Why It Matters,” The National Interest 42 (Winter 1995/1996): 3–15; Simon Reeve, The New Jackals : Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press 2002). 27 The best account of McVeigh’s actions is Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). 28 For a history of the group that perpetrated the attack, Aum Shinrikyo, see, David

E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 1996). See also, Ji Hyon Kang, “1995 Tokyo Subway Attack: The Aum Shinrikyo Case,” in A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned, eds. M. R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell (New York: Springer, 2009), 219-231. Several interviews with victims of the attack can be found in Haruki Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche (New York: Vintage Books, 2000). 29 Staci Strobl and Jon R. Lindsay, “Lost in Transition: Khobar Towers and the Ambiguities of Terrorism in the 1990s,” in A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned, eds. M. R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell (New York: Springer, 2009), 283.

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takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. None of the 230 passengers or crew survived.30 While not deemed a terrorist attack, the destruction of the flight contributed to the atmosphere of insecurity created by the previous events. In this atmosphere of terrorism, Atlanta would host the centennial Olympic Games. In light of the global situation, counter-terrorism formed a significant piece of security planning for Atlanta. Describing the plans as expansive does not quite capture the magnitude of the operation. The city’s main newspaper, The Atlanta Journal Constitution even listed terrorist groups that “warrant[ed] a close watch.”31 More than one headline writer utilized the opportunity to describe counter-terrorism planning for Atlanta as an Olympic event.32 One training exercise included a scenario where a “mock terrorist group carrying deadly VX nerve gas drove a van through the city and crashed into a tanker carrying gasoline while other members of the same group held passengers hostage aboard a hijacked plane at the Atlanta airport.”33 Less extreme preparations existed, but this example serves to highlight some of the feared scenarios in Atlanta. Simultaneously, an argument existed that terrorists may not target the Olympics. A journalist at The Atlanta Journal Constitution named Ron Martz cited unspecified security analysts when he posited the notion that,

30 This crash inspired debate among conspiracy theorists over a government cover up of the cause of the explosion. The National Transportation and Safety Board ruled in 1997 that a spark in the fuel tank caused the explosion. See, “In-flight Breakup Over the Atlantic Ocean Trans World Airlines Flight 800, Boeing 747-141, N93119,” ntsb.gov Undated. Accessed February 13, 2018. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentR eports/Pages/AAR0003.aspx. 31 Ron Martz, “An Arena for Terrorism,” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, July 10, 1996. Some of these groups, the PLO, Provisional IRA, and Abu Nidal have been mentioned previously. Others, like Al-Fuqra and Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya, had not previously been identified as security concerns. Al-Fuqra was described as “a secretive, U.S.-based militant Black Muslim sect not aligned with the nation of Islam.” Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya was an Egypt based group that attacked Greek tourists in Cairo in April of 1996. Quote found in Marts, “An Arena for Terrorism”. 32 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Counter-Terrorism to Be Olympic Event,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1996; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, “Security at Summer Games Is Olympic Event,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1996. 33 Spaid, “Security at Summer Games Is Olympic Event.”; Smith, “Counter-Terrorism to Be Olympic Event.” A further example of the training police underwent can be found here: Ron Martz, “Doing battle against terrorism,” Olympic Games (26th: 1996: Atlanta, Ga.)—Security Subject file, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

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“state-sponsored terrorism at the Games [was] less likely... even those countries that fare[d] badly on the State Department’s annual report on terrorism... [were] sending teams.”34 Dr. Neil Livingstone, an expert on terrorism, provided a blunt analysis. “[W]e have a lot of loony-tunes out there,” he claimed, “but [he did not] regard [terrorists] as a serious threat to the games.”35 The differing beliefs on the likelihood of a terrorist attack in Atlanta underscores the difficulty faced by security planners. The sheer number of athletes and spectators planning to venture to Atlanta made security planning a complex task. The Atlanta Summer Olympic Games were set to be the largest in history with a planned 11,000 athletes from a record 197 countries descending upon the southeastern United States. The city braced for a further 2 million spectators in addition to over 3 million people who called Atlanta home. The extent of the preparations led one official to compare the “fundamental logistical challenge to holding seven Super Bowls per day for 17 days in a single city, at the same time that a half million people are in constant transit nearby.”36 In order to aid the operation, the number of personnel protecting the Games numbered nearly 30,000 with a significant amount provided by a private security firm called Borg-Warner.37 Technology played a crucial role in security in Atlanta. ACOG even secured a sponsor, Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, which provided

34 Martz, “An Arena for Terrorism.” Martz identified Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan as the offenders. 35 Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, “Security at Summer Games Is Olympic Event.” Livingstone had a rather long and storied history that included him allegedly attempting to aid Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi escape in exchange for payment prior to Ghaddafi’s death. See, Scott Shane and Penn Bullock, “Group in U.S. Hoped for Big Payday in Offer to Help Qaddafi,” New York Times, November 17, 2011. 36 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Counter-Terrorism to Be Olympic Event”. 37 According to ACOG’s Final Report, a relatively scant staff of 17,424 protected the

Atlanta Olympic Games. Yet there are multiple sources showing that the true number nearly doubled that provided by ACOG. For the ACOG number see, Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games, volume 2, part 1, 366. ACOG contradicts itself when discussing the number of military personnel provided. In the official tally, ACOG lists 3,525 military personnel. The report also notes, “approximately 10,000 people actually participated in staffing the positions.” See ibid, 368. Reports contradicting ACOG’s number include, Kifner, “Security Levels To Set a Record At the Olympics.” Kifner notes that security officials “privately” said that the number was about 30,000 with 14,000 soldiers. The reason for the disparity in numbers between the public records available and ACOG’s Final Report is unclear.

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roughly $25 million for security.38 Cameras, called “SpeedDomes,” placed on the fences surrounding the Village detected movement as minute as a “skittering squirrel.”39 Planning an attack on someone in the Olympic Village would require far more complexity than simply climbing a fence. One of Sensormatic’s services was the system devised to protect athletes within the Village. Access came via an accreditation card with the geometry of the user’s hand mapped into a computer chip. The individual then placed their hand inside a “hand geometry reader” which granted access if the handprint matched the information found in the accreditation card.40 One person had some reservations about the hand-geometry system, IOC President Samaranch. Even Ashwini Kumar struggled to completely pin down the rationale for Samaranch’s opposition. “I believe your concern is for not using the finger printing system for identification,” Kumar wrote, “[but the] Hand Geometry System is quite different.”41 Rather than detailing the differences, Kumar assured Samaranch the system was only in use for the Olympic Village, rather than across several Olympic sites. In mid-February 1996, Kumar further defended the system: Biometric based security systems offer the highest level of security of all access control methodologies. They are superior because they verify the identity of a person on the basis of same physiological characteristic that is non-transferable unlike cards and badges. Hand geometry is the most widely utilized and reliable biometric access control methodology. It is not

38 Ron Martz, “An Arena for Terrorism”. 39 John Kifner, “Security Levels To Set a Record At the Olympics”. 40 An entire chapter on the technology at the Atlanta Olympics, complete with intricate

detail, can be found in Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games, 442-458. Lillian Lee Kim, “Advancements Help ACOG Enhance Security of Olympic Village,” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, July 10, 1996; Peter H. Lewis, “Power Up, and Let the Games Begin; High-Technology Companies Hope to Score a 10 (at Least a 9.8) in Atlanta,” New York Times, July 8, 1996. 41 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, October 20, 1995, Sécurité aux JO aété d’Atlanta 1996 correspondance september 1995–1996, File: correspondance september–october 1995, IOCL.

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finger print of hand print system It is three dimensional picture of and individual’s hand.42

If Samaranch had further misgivings, he remained silent. Despite the technology deployed in Atlanta, one public area presented a potential target for terrorists: Atlanta’s subway system, called MARTA. One tactic employed by city officials to try and reduce the dizzying amount of traffic on Atlanta’s roads was to encourage the public to take MARTA trains.43 Yet with the recent attack on Tokyo commuters in mind, an attack on MARTA was not out of the realm of possibility. The primary challenge was that, unlike almost every other venue, the large numbers of people traveling on MARTA prevented the use of normal security measures without causing delays for spectators traveling in Atlanta to watch events.44 It was a question of maximizing efficiency without compromising security. Officials in Atlanta mimicked at least one aspect of security planning present in Barcelona. As mentioned in the previous chapter, distancing delegations with a fractious history or those in the midst of current political disputes was one avenue to prevent disturbances. Ahead of Atlanta, security officials created a similar system and utilized an “antipathy matrix” as an aid.45 Within the Olympic Village, this system would separate the Israeli’s and Palestinians or the teams from Iraq and Kuwait. The matrix aided security outside of the Olympic Village as well. If by chance India and Pakistan faced off in soccer, extra police would be available.46 The head of Atlanta’s security effort was Bill Rathburn. A veteran police officer with previous experience working at the 1984 Los Angeles 42 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, February 20th, 1996, Sécurité aux JO d’été d’Atlanta 1996 correspondance september 1995–1996, File: correspondance 1996, IOCL. 43 Christopher Weems, “A Solution For This Summer’s Olympic-Sized Traffic?” Atlanta Inquirer, February 3, 1996. This idea went awry almost immediately as MARTA trains broke down, ran late, or both. See, Eric Harrison, “If the Heat Doesn’t Get You, the Traffic Will,” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1996. 44 “Security concerns focused on park, MARTA,” July 28, 1996. Olympic Games (26th: 1996: Atlanta, Ga.)—Security Subject file, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center. 45 “Security concerns focused on park, MARTA.” It is unclear who created the matrix as it was “top-secret” and a thorough search did not uncover the document. 46 “Security concerns focused on park, MARTA”.

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Olympics, Rathburn’s perspective on security for Atlanta shows not only the influence of the Munich attack but also the different threat scenarios envisioned. His chief concern “was always a Munich type incident.”47 Yet Rathburn’s experience also highlights the difficulty in trying to predict the unthinkable. Five years prior to the September 11 attacks in New York City, Rathburn and his team feared an aerial attack. HartsfieldJackson International Airport lies roughly 10 miles south of Atlanta. While restricting airspace around the area provided one solution, even planes on a legitimate flight pattern to Hartsfield-Jackson could divert at the last second and according to Rathburn, “it would take 22 s if they diverted... and they’d be into the [Olympic] stadium.”48 As for a potential solution, Rathburn and his colleagues came to a relatively simple conclusion, “There [was] not a hell of a lot that [they could] do about it.”49 That fear was nearly realized when a small plane entered unauthorized space during the Opening Ceremonies. ACOG’s aircraft escorted the plane away from the stadium with no harm done. Rathburn recalled the occupants were merely sightseers who “did not pay attention to the flight restrictions.”50 While this did not amount to a serious threat, it underlined the potential danger of an air attack and the relative helplessness to prepare. That someone could simply ignore the restricted zone and get so close to the stadium underscored Rathburn’s point that security planners were, to some extent, unable to prepare for every eventuality.51 Logistic, financial, and personnel hurdles come with security planning at every Olympic Games. Organizers in Atlanta faced all of those, the additional pressure of hosting the centennial Olympic Games, and the fact that a record number of athletes would be in attendance. Combined 47 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. 48 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. 49 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. One problem Rathburn spoke on

was how to handle the situation if a plane was headed toward the Olympic stadium. As noted, the calculation was it would take 22s. Rathburn noted a decision had to be made within those 22s and that, if he decided to shoot down the plane, it may “inadvertently kill more people than it would otherwise... I don’t think anyone has the answer”. 50 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. 51 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. Rathburn spoke at length that

someone on the National Security Council drove the idea that Atlanta was vulnerable from the air. He summarized his feelings, “What the hell [did] they know that we [didn’t] know. I never got an answer”.

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with major terrorist attacks in the years leading up to the event, organizers had every reason to fear that something could go awry and needed help from every available source to protect the Olympics from attack.

The U.S. Government and Liaison The American federal government strongly supported the bid to bring the Olympic Games to Atlanta. Prior to the announcement, President George H.W. Bush created a task force to coordinate federal agencies involved in the bid. His successor, Bill Clinton, formed a similar committee in 1993 led by Vice-President Al Gore called the White House Task Force.52 The Task Force’s responsibilities lay more in coordinating the multitude of government efforts to host the Games rather than a security-specific task. Deputy cabinet secretary Steve Silverman remembered that the Task Force’s focus was on handling the logistical issues presented by the amount of government agencies working together on the Games.53 Gore, as head of the Task Force and Vice-President, did answer media queries on security planning. In one unfortunate instance of foreshadowing, a reporter asked Gore of the concern that existed in some quarters over the potential of “terrorist threats that would be outside of the venues for the Olympics... [the concern was] that there [was] not enough attention being paid to those areas outside of the Olympic venues.”54 Gore provided a relatively straightforward answer without providing specifics. “[W]e have spent a considerable amount of time and energy attempting to anticipate any possible threat of that sort, and we feel very comfortable with the work that has gone on,” he responded.55 Different branches of the United States government aided Gore’s Task Force. The State Department often informed the Task Force on its preparations and, prior to the Games, the Department took responsibility for

52 Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games, volume 2, part 1, 186. 53 Austin Duckworth interview with Steve Silverman, March 2, 2018. 54 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [4],” Clinton Digital

Library. Accessed February 20, 2018. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/ show/32820. 55 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [4]”.

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the protection of diplomats and led the training of local law enforcement.56 One separate State Department task force would help protect international diplomats. In order to provide sufficient protection for those diplomats coming to Atlanta, the State Department relied on liaison and “[c]oordinated international police relations and provided records and overseas background checks.”57 The United States Secret Service supported the protection of any “Heads of State” that came to Atlanta while providing training to other arms of law enforcement on how to properly protect dignitaries.58 These are mere snippets of the support that came from all corners of the United States government to help the Olympic Games run smoothly. The major example of liaison in Atlanta came in the form of the Olympic intelligence center. This operation functioned as the brain of the entire security organism, sending signals and coordinating the movements of disparate forces. In Atlanta, the FBI headed the center and “prepared daily threat assessments for dissemination to all agencies involved in Olympic security.”59 Several United States government agencies provided personnel, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). William Tidball, the Associate Director of the Response and Recovery Directorate within FEMA, outlined some of the details of the agency’s responsibilities. According to Tidball, FEMA employees operated, “in the Liaison Linkage Group Olympic Intelligence Center whose function [was] the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information related to terrorism, public disorder, and criminal activity.”60 While each host employed different means, liaison continued to play an important role in Olympic security. A separate impact of Kumar’s ideas on liaison was the inclusion of security managers for the respective Olympic delegations. Depending 56 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [1],” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed February 14, 2018. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/ show/32817. 57 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [1]”. 58 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [1]”. 59 Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial

Olympic Games, volume 2, part 1, 370. 60 Office of Speechwriting and Carolyn Curiel, “Olympics [2],” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed February 20, 2018. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/ show/32818.

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on the perspective of the delegation, the term “security” could have various meanings. Security officials with the Chinese, Cuban, and Israeli teams met with the Bill Rathburn.61 Rathburn said the Cubans wanted the athletes protected from “agents trying to sign their boxers and the baseball players.”62 This fear was not misplaced. Over the course of the Games, several Cuban athletes, predominantly boxers and baseball players, defected to the United States.63 While not a traditional “security” fear as discussed previously, the Cuban team’s experience shows that security problems were not always universal. International assistance existed at a grassroots level in Atlanta. Under a program initiated by Bill Rathburn, law enforcement officers from around the globe volunteered to work at the Games. While unpaid, ACOG offered to feed, clothe, and train those who opted to participate. Around 2,000 men and women from over 50 countries took up the offer.64 This system provided two distinct advantages for Rathburn: experience and communication. He recalled that employing international police officers limited the amount of “warm bodies just hired off the street by a private security company but rather... people who have some security perspective.”65 With spectators traveling to Atlanta from all corners of the world, multi-lingual officers provided a boon for Rathburn’s team. While a well-intentioned idea, the implementation of the program received, at best, mixed reviews. Critiques of ACOG included the housing situation at Morehouse College as well as a lack of organization. Daniele Miorelli, an Italian policeman, summarized the complains from the volunteers, “I promised to work, and I’m working... They promised many

61 Bill Rathburn, interview by Austin Duckworth, October 16, 2017. Following his tenure in Los Angeles, he accepted a position as chief of the Dallas Police Department. When contacted to head security for Atlanta, he balked. “I had aspired to be chief of police for some time... I really tried to resist leaving... [but] it got to the point where I couldn’t afford not to go,” he recalled. Rathburn later found that his friend Ashwini Kumar had been instrumental in encouraging Rathburn’s hire. 62 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. Of the 9 gold medals won by the Cuban delegation, 5 came from either boxers or the baseball team. 63 Jere Longman, “OLYMPICS; His Eye on Major Leagues, Top Cuban Pitcher Defects,” New York Times, July 11, 1996. 64 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. 65 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth.

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things and gave nothing.”66 The volunteers were not exempt from criticism, however. One confidential ACOG source, who confirmed many of the guards’ complaints, noted a seemingly incessant demand for beer from the guards. One Canadian police official dismissed this assessment and quipped, “No amount of free Budweiser can improve our morale at this point.”67 Precedents set the previous decade at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics aided security planners in other areas. Unlike the experience in Los Angeles, Atlanta’s organizers faced relatively little wrangling between local police and the FBI over jurisdiction. Rathburn credited the creation of an “inter-agency coordination mechanism” in Los Angeles, which Atlanta utilized as well.68 In other instances, problems faced by Los Angeles reappeared in Atlanta. High on that list was the bureaucratic nature of the security organization. Rathburn described the problem, “Atlanta is an allinclusive city, they want to include everybody and everything so it became unmanageable. You’d have meetings... involving too many agencies.”69 Rathburn solved the problem by meeting with the heads of the various agencies over breakfast and reviewing subcommittee recommendations. Despite the preparations, the Opening Ceremonies provided a rather embarrassing moment for Atlanta’s security planners. Hours before the scheduled start of the ceremony, a man dressed as a police officer and armed with a 45 caliber handgun entered the Olympic stadium and took a seat. The man, later identified as Ronald Atkins, was only arrested after another officer saw him, “sitting in the stands with the gun in plain sight.”70 Richard Yarbrough, a spokesman for ACOG, offered a less than reassuring analysis for the system’s failure. “He came very early, as we were setting up,” Yarbrough explained.71 Rather than malicious intent, Atkins apparently saw the ruse as a means to watch the Opening Ceremonies, as

66 Tamara Jones, “International Police Volunteers Find Their Team in Disarray,” The Washington Post, July 31, 1996. 67 Tamara Jones, “International Police Volunteers Find Their Team in Disarray”. 68 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. Rathburn did not specify how this

mechanism worked. 69 Bill Rathburn interview with Austin Duckworth. 70 Jerry Schwartz and Frank Litsky, “A Breach in Security Is Revealed by Officials,”

New York Times, July 24, 1996. 71 Schwartz and Litsky, “A Breach in Security”.

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he did not have a ticket.72 While embarrassing for ACOG, that nothing malicious occurred from this lapse in security saved the committee from answering further questions.

The Attack Shortly before midnight on July 26, 1996, crowds spilled into Atlanta’s Centennial Park to enjoy a free concert by the band Jack Mack and the Heart Attack. Many of the revelers came straight from the nearby Georgia Dome where the United States Men’s Basketball team had cruised past China, 133–70. Designed as a central gathering space for the Games, ACOG wanted Centennial Park to be an “area where local citizens and visitors, ticket holders as well as non-ticket holders, could gather to experience the friendship and celebration that [were] an integral part of any Olympic Games.”73 As the band played, a security guard with AT&T named Richard Jewell noticed a knapsack lying against a light tower in the park.74 After calling explosive experts from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Jewell and agents from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations attempted to move the crowds away from the area.75 At 1:18 AM the knapsack, filled with an improvised pipe bomb, exploded. The victims of the blast made the attack in Atlanta significantly different than that in Munich. The blast killed two and injured over one hundred. A nail pierced the skull of Alice Hawthorne, a 44-year old mother attending with her 14-year old daughter, killing her instantly. Melih Uzunyol, a Turkish cameraman, suffered a heart attack on his way to cover the explosion and passed away.76 Whereas in Munich the Palestinian terrorists specifically targeted the Israeli team to achieve a political 72 Frank Lomonte, “Olympic security force under fire,” chronicle.augusta.com. July 24, 1996. Accessed February 26, 2018. http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1996/07/24/ oly_199028.shtml#.WpSK2ZMbOYU. 73 Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games, 80. 74 William Booth and Thomas Heath, “Bomb Tip May Have Set Up Police in Atlanta

for “Ambush,”” The Washington Post, July 30, 1996. 75 The saga of Richard Jewell is not a focus of this chapter. The best account of his experience after the attack is in Marie Brenner, “American Nightmare: The Ballad of Richard Jewell,” Vanity Fair, February 1997. 76 Details of Hawthorne’s death are found in B.E. Chenault, The Traveled Road Seldom Noticed (Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Publishing Co, 2017), 91.

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end, the deaths of Hawthorne and Uzunyol came at random. Journalist Dave Anderson of the New York Times expressed the prevailing sentiment, “now, nobody [was] safe. Not even people in a party-land constructed as a crossroads for the ‘Games’ that no longer [were].”77 A breakdown in the communication system bore the majority of the blame for the attack. At 1:07 AM, a caller to the emergency number 911 claimed a bomb would explode in Centennial Park in thirty minutes. The operator attempted to enter Centennial Park into the computer system that would notify the Atlanta Police Department’s Command Center of the threat. The operator did not have the address and it took three attempts for her phone call to finally reach the Command Center. When she did, she requested the address to the park so she could relay the message. She was told, “I ain’t got no address to Centennial Park, what y’all think I am?”78 Authorities in Centennial Park never received the message. The communication system established by the police had utterly failed.79 The terrorist was a twenty-nine-year-old Florida native named Eric Robert Rudolph. He later cited a number of motivations for placing the bomb. Chief among his grievances was what he deemed was the United States government’s support for “abortion on demand.”80 In addition, he believed the Olympics promoted global socialism. As evidence, he cited ACOG choosing John Lennon’s “Imagine” as the theme song for Atlanta.81 The bomb in Centennial Park was a mere shadow of his original goal. In his confession, he wrote that when he started planning, his aim was to knock out Atlanta’s power grid. When he realized that he “could not acquire the necessary high explosives,” he dismissed the idea as “unrealistic” and opted to attack the park.82

77 Dave Anderson, “Olympics Not ‘Games’ Anymore,” New York Times, July 28, 1996. 78 Dick Pettys, “Foul-Ups Followed 911 Call in Atlanta,” The Washington Post, August

9, 1996. 79 Mark Hamm and Ramón Spaaij, The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 108. 80 “Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession”. 81 “Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession”. 82 “Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession.” He also confessed that he originally

planned to explode five bombs on consecutive days but the “chaos” that followed the attack in Centennial Park led him to destroy the other four devices.

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The bomb threat Rudolph phoned in was not the first one of the Atlanta Games. Bill Rathburn recalled receiving “a fair number” of bomb threats at the Olympic headquarters. None of them had come to fruition. Rathburn had a brief experience with bomb threats prior to the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona. ETA had a tendency to place a bomb, call the police and then, “it became a competition to see if the police could disable the bomb and avoid the booby traps.”83 One night, while Rathburn dined with the head of the Guardia Civil, the police lost and an ETA bomb killed two Guardia Civil officers.84 Prior to Rudolph’s attack, Rathburn requested the FBI research to see if any bomb threats in the United States had led to an actual bombing. To that point, none existed.85 Now, there was one.

“Stoic Defiance” As in Munich, the bombing in Centennial Park did not delay the Games. While the IOC convened to discuss continuing the Games, there is no record of the meeting.86 According to ACOG President Billy Payne, “executives from the International Olympic Committee had decided unanimously that the Games must not be interrupted or it would be seen as a capitulation to terrorism.”87 If nothing else, the attitude displayed by the IOC in 1972 and 1996 was consistent. Athletes certainly agreed with the decision. Micki King competed at the Munich Olympics and led the American diving team in Atlanta. She claimed after the bombing, “You don’t want the bad guys to win.”88 The 83 Austin Duckworth interview with Bill Rathburn. 84 Austin Duckworth interview with Bill Rathburn. The bombing he refers to is most

likely one that has gone underreported outside of the Spanish media. See, “Dos artificieros mueren en Madrid al desactivar un paquete bomba,” July 2, 1991. Accessed February 27, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/1991/07/02/portada/678405604_850215.html. 85 Austin Duckworth interview with Bill Rathburn. 86 V. Srivatsa and Ramesh Chandran, “Games to Continue despite Blast in Atlanta,”

The Times of India, July 28, 1996. The authors of the article wrote, “The IOC hastily convened a series of meetings in the middle of the night and decided that the Games [would] go on”. 87 William Drozdiak, “FBI Probes Bombing as Olympic Games Continue,” The Washington Post, July 28, 1996. 88 Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, “Blast Quiets But Can’t Silence Spirit of Olympics Series,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 29, 1996.

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famously outspoken American basketball player Charles Barkley offered a similar response to the idea of leaving the Games. “[T]o leave now would be to let them assholes win,” he said.89 The public reacted defiantly to the bombing. Isaac Tigrett, the owner of a nightclub called “The House of Blues,” expressed a rather relaxed attitude, “You’ve got to fight for your right to party, man... You can’t let something like a bombing get you down.”90 Thomas Boswell, a journalist with The Washington Post, best explained the general viewpoint present in Atlanta. He wrote, “Voice after voice here expressed similar thoughts as the Games resumed: The proper response to terrorism is courage. And if courage has no ways to express itself, then stoic defiance will have to do.”91 Before the Opening Ceremony in Atlanta, a point of debate was the planned security, or lack thereof, for Centennial Park. While some authorities, including Bill Rathburn, pushed for a secure perimeter, other members of ACOG strove to provide a public space without the tight security that characterized other venues. Spurred by his visit to Barcelona for the 1992 Summer Games, ACOG President Billy Payne saw the potential of the park as “an open area, surrounded by a fence and filled with security guards but no tickets, metal detectors or inspections.”92 While Payne achieved his vision, it came at a cost. It may seem overly simplistic to criticize Payne with the benefit of hindsight. Yet it is difficult to argue with a point made by one spectator in Atlanta, “Why, when you have 27 venues with all these careful measures in place, why in the 28th venue would you have so little on the perimeter?”.93 Unsurprisingly, security became more stringent following the attack. What is interesting is that this increase seemingly did not apply equally to all areas. The security checks at the Omni, which hosted indoor volleyball, created such delays for spectators that security staff took to leading the

89 Mike Kupper, “The Show Goes On,” Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1996. 90 William Drozdiak, “Tens of Thousands Gather as Park Makes Comeback,” The

Washington Post, July 31, 1996. 91 Thomas Boswell, “Terror Leaves Games in Somber Mood,” The Washington Post, July 28, 1996. 92 Jeff Brazil, Ralph Frammolino, and Jim Newton, “Olympic Bombing Stuns World,” Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1996. According to the authors, Payne was impressed by Barcelona’s “large public commons”. 93 Brazil, Frammolino, and Newton, “Olympic Bombing Stuns World”.

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lines of fans in sing-alongs to pass the time.94 Those who chose to watch the United States women’s soccer team defeat Norway underwent similar security checks. According to one guard, the measures included the usual measures of employing metal detectors as well as, “check[ing] suspicious persons, bulges in clothing and people who fit a profile.”95 This scene differed from the Olympic Stadium where security appeared to operate as it had before the bombing.96 The bombing in Atlanta had ramifications for the United States’ efforts to protect the nation’s Olympians in the future. While a participant in protecting American athletes since the 1976 Montreal Games, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security created a permanent Olympic Coordinator position following the bombing.97 The duties assigned to John Kaufman, the first person to hold the post, display the use of liaison as a counter-terrorism tactic at the Olympics. As the Olympic Coordinator prior to the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Australia, Kaufman’s duties included, “working with and coordinating assistance for Australian security and law enforcement agencies... [and] coordinat[ing] efforts with the Australian Federal Police, Australian intelligence, the Secret Service, [and] the FBI.”98 The system worked so efficiently for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics that the Diplomatic Security Service continued the program for future Olympics.99 94 “Security Measures Range from Lax to Tight, Depending on Site,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1996. 95 Brazil, Frammolino, and Newton, “Olympic Bombing Stuns World”. 96 Brazil, Frammolino, and Newton, “Olympic Bombing Stuns World”. 97 “History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of

State,” United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, printed October 2011, Global Publishing Solutions, First Edition. The history notes that serious considerations of security started in 1991 when Havana, Cuba hosted the Pan-American Games and several Cuban athletes defected. Several officials worried that the Cubans would “exploit and harass U.S. athletes, or even build relationships to exploit at a later date” and turned to the Diplomatic Security force for help. Quote found on p. 338. 98 “History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State,” 339. The list did not end there. Kaufman also worked with “the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, which provided explosive-sniffing dogs.” Quote found on 339. 99 The author notes, “After the success in Sydney, DS expanded its coordination and preparation for the Olympics and similar events. It initiated an exchange program for the host country’s police forces during the years preceding the next Olympics, and DS created a Security Event Training program to coordinate protective security.” Quote found

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The bombing in Centennial Park arguably had more of a dramatic effect on Olympic security in the United States than the September 11 attacks in New York City. On May 22, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 62) into law. Designed as a counter-terrorism measure, PDD 62 created a new category of events titled National Special Security Events (NSSE). Along with presidential inaugurations and State of the Union addresses, hosting the Olympics fell into this category. Designation as an NSSE brought two key components that would differ America’s preparation as Olympic host in the future. First, Clinton promised that NSSE’s would have the full backing of the federal government’s resources and second, the Secret Service would lead the planning, design, and implementation of the security plan. The latter part is of particular importance as it clarified chain of command, which had been a problem for Olympic security planning in Los Angeles.100 Despite the attack, some features of security in Atlanta set a precedent that future Games followed. The most significant of these was the Olympic intelligence center which future Organizing Committees employed in various manners. In Sydney, the Olympic intelligence center worked in tandem with Australian intelligence while the center established for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics, “shared information with over 150 countries.”101 ACOG’s Final Report noted some recommendations for future Organizing Committees with security at the Olympic Games. Interestingly, not one recommendation dealt with helping prevent another attack similar to the one in Centennial Park. The bombing received very little notice at the next meeting of the IOC Executive Board in 1997. This silence coincided with Ashwini Kumar leaving the Executive Board after he lost a bid to become IOC VicePresident to Richard Pound by two votes.102 While he continued to attend IOC meetings, he was nearly seventy-five following the Closing Ceremonies in Atlanta. It is feasible that Kumar no longer could keep

in “History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State”. 100 “Declassified Documents concerning Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD62),” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed January 5, 2022. https://clinton.presidentiallib raries.us/items/show/16200. 101 Toohey and Taylor, “Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games,” 461-463. 102 Minutes of the 105th IOC Session, July 15th-18th 1996, Atlanta, IOCL, 53-55.

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the frenetic pace that defined his early years working on security and he retired from the IOC following the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.103 As more evidence becomes available, perhaps a clearer picture will emerge of how the man most responsible for the IOC’s involvement with security viewed the latest attack on the Olympic Games. Kumar left little doubt as to how he viewed the changes wrought over the previous decade. In a summary of Atlanta’s security procedures he wrote, “It was quite obvious after the inspection that the work which the I.O.C. ha[d] put in over the years, for formulating planned security in various environs [was] now bearing fruit and [had] not been in vain.”104 ∗ ∗ ∗ The bomb in Centennial Park shattered over two decades of relative peace at the Olympics. Despite the largest peacetime security effort in the history of the United States, the plan to provide an open space for people to gather and celebrate the Olympics proved a hindrance to security. To make matters worse, despite the planning, the coordination among the local police force utterly failed. This is not an attempt to apportion blame but rather to show that simply amassing a large force is not a guarantee for security. In some ways, there was a considerable degree of luck involved in this incident. It is difficult to imagine the possibilities if Richard Jewell had not spotted the bomb and cleared the area of civilians before it exploded. For future Olympics, the attack represented a “focusing event” for security authorities. Over 500 searches for bombs occurred in the midst of the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney.105 Eric Robert Rudolph remained on the run from authorities until 2003 when a rookie police officer arrested him as he rummaged through a

103 Minutes of the 109th IOC Session, June 17th-20th, 1999, Seoul, IOCL, 36. This is the best estimation based on the evidence. He is listed as a member of the IOC in the Minutes of the 111th Session, September 11th-13th and 30th, 2000, Sydney, IOCL, 58. He is listed as an honorary member in Minutes of the 112th IOC Session, July 13th-16th, 2001, Moscow, IOCL, 59. 104 Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, January 29th, 1992, Sécurité aux JO d’été d’Atlanta 1996, Correspondance 1992-juillet 1995, File: Correspondance 1992-1994, IOCL. 105 Sydney Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the XXVII Olympic Games, volume 1, part 2, 194.

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dumpster.106 In the time since the Centennial Park bombing, he attacked a further three locations in Alabama and Georgia. As part of his confession, he wrote that he planted the bomb in Centennial Park with the specific aim of “forc[ing] the cancellation of the Games.”107 He failed. The park reopened on July 30, 1996 with a memorial ceremony attended by 40,000 guests. Andrew Young, ACOG’s co-chairman, spoke defiantly, “We’re here to proclaim a victory, to celebrate a triumph of the human spirit.”108 Nearly a quarter-century after Brundage, the message remained the same.

106 B.E. Chenault, The Traveled Road Seldom Noticed, 100. 107 “Full Text of Eric Rudolph’s Confession”. 108 Atlanta Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games, 87.

CHAPTER 8

Technology and Pandemics: The Post-2000 Olympic Games

The singular event that impacted security and the Olympic Games had nothing to do with the Olympics at all. The attacks on New York City and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, had far-reaching impacts beyond that Tuesday morning. While America’s political leaders sought to decide their next steps, the nation was due to host the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City less than six months after the attack. As a result, expenditure for security at Salt Lake was the largest portion of Salt Lake City’s budget.1 Rather than focus on one set of Summer and Winter Olympic Games, this chapter covers the last two decades of the Olympics that occurred after the turn of the millennium. There are several rationales for this choice including the simple fact that finding sensitive security information on recent Olympic Games is, at best, a difficult endeavor. Sensitive documents related to Australia’s security plans for the 2000 Summer Olympics were only released in January 2021. One United States Congressional report written after the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing lamented, “U.S. officials and private firms (even major U.S. Olympic sponsors) faced

1 US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Lessons Learned from Security at Past Olympic Games. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 4, 2004).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_8

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difficulty in getting the PRC’s plans for Olympic security.”2 Given the period covered, the primary focus in this chapter is on the several themes that have emerged as key facets of security for the Olympics. The use of the military, advanced security technology, and the pitfalls that come with that decision, as well as the continued influence of international liaison are the major themes discussed in the chapter. Preparations for upcoming Olympic Games will in part come from lessons learned from past experiences detailed in this section.

“Computers and Other Gadgetry” One major change that occurred following the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta was the relatively sudden absence of Ashwini Kumar from Olympic security planning. A feature of security planning for nearly two decades, Kumar became an honorary IOC member in 2000.3 Rather than appoint a direct replacement, the IOC turned to outside experts for aid and folded his responsibilities into the IOC’s Coordination Commission.4 The IOC’s two new security experts were Santiago de Sicard who oversaw security for the Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics while Peter Ryan led the efforts to protect the 2000 Summer Olympics in Melbourne. According to IOC member Marc Hodler, the role of the IOC’s security expert was to “check that all aspects linked to the coordination of security forces [had] been duly taken into account.”5 In the ensuing years, 2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy by Shirley A. Kan, RL 33001 (2010), 21. 3 Nick Butler, “India’s former IOC vice-president Ashwini Kumar dies aged 94,” insidethegames.biz, Accessed September 27, 2021. https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/ 1031087/indias-former-ioc-vice-president-ashwini-kumar-dies-aged-94. 4 Quote found in Minutes of the 111th IOC Session, 281. Following the bombing in Atlanta, Kumar aided the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics security preparation and advised the Coordination Commission for the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney. The Final Report from the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics states, “The Security Plan was formulated in close consultation with the IOC’s Security Delegate Ashwini Kumar,” Nagano Olympic Games Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the XVIII Olympic Games, volume 1, part 2, 284. Future IOC President Jacques Rogge thanked Kumar “for his advice on security issues” ahead of the Sydney Summer Olympics. Quote found in Minutes of the 109th IOC Session, June 17th–20th, 1999, Seoul, IOCL, 36. 5 Minutes of the 111th IOC Session, September 11th–13th, 30th, 2000, Sydney, IOCL, 145.

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the IOC relied on Ryan as an expert advisor but, more recently, the IOC changed tack and created a position solely focused on security.6 That no IOC member could replace Kumar and his work on the topic is further testament to his contribution to security and the Olympic Games. One of the impacts of Ashwini Kumar’s embrace of technology for security meant that, given the system of knowledge transfer from one Olympic Games to the next, technology became an increasingly important factor in Olympic security over time. Now, technology plays such an important role in securing modern sporting events that it is a feature, rather than an anomaly. For example, some of the slogans used within the security department for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing included, “Technological Olympics” and “Strengthening Police through Technology.”7 Since the late 1980s, the extensive use of computers to aid in several processes at the Olympics created the potential for a cyberattack. Not all observers have been convinced that cybersecurity would play a major role in the Olympics. Writing ahead of the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, one expert predicted that, “Information technology (IT) terrorism/cyberterrorism [was]... [an] unlikely contender for the wave of the future.”8 As this section displays, as computers aided security efforts, that same technology created a new security aspect for organizers to consider and target for threat actors to attack. Preventing a hacker from gaining unauthorized access to information or shutting off a power grid is a different problem, with a different solution, than preventing a 6 “Guide on the Security of Major Sporting Events: Promoting Sustainable Security and Legacies,” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, Accessed July 20, 2021. https:// www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/GUIDE-on-MSE-Security-with-Annex-Final.pdf, Nick Butler, “IOC claim in letter that Pengilly admitted physical contact in row with security guard,” insidethegames.biz, February 20, 2018. https://www.insidethegames.biz/ articles/1061709/ioc-claim-in-letter-that-pengilly-admitted-physical-contact-in-row-withsecurity-guard. 7 Ying Yu, Francisco Klauser, and Gerald Chan, “Governing Security at the 2008 Beijing Olympics,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 3 (2009): 390–405. Minas Samatas, “Security and Surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: Some Lessons from a Troubled Story,” International Criminal Justice Review 17, no. 3 (2007): 220– 38. Boyle, Philip, and Kevin D. Haggerty, “Spectacular Security: Mega-events and the Security Complex,” International Political Sociology 3, no. 3 (2009): 265. 8 Alan Thompson, “Security,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its Impact, Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes, ed. (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 1999).

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bomb from exploding. Cybersecurity will only grow in importance in the coming years as the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics alone saw 400 million attempted cyberattacks.9 In the early 2000s, a Parisian-based company called Atos started an extended run of providing information technology (IT) services for the Olympics. The company’s website describes its role in the Games as “deliver[ing] the backbone of the largest sports related IT contract in the world.”10 The company’s experience at Athens in 2004 is instructive based on the sheer number of attacks on the Olympics’ computer infrastructure. The company reported around five million attacks in 2004 in a mere 16 days of competition, an average of over 300,000 per day.11 The numbers increased in the years to come. By one estimate, the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 faced up to twelve million cyberattacks per day during the Olympics.12 Some of these cyberattacks are state sponsored while others emanate from “hacktivist” groups which aim to promote a political message through cyberattacks. Prior to the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games, a joint American and British effort found that Russia planned to disrupt the event through a cyberattack.13 Responses to cyber threats grew more uniform and became part of the structure for future games. For the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre aided cyber security measures while London 2012, “designed [cyber security] in to the technology architecture” and prevented what the Organizing

9 “Over 400 Million Cyberattacks were Attempted During Tokyo Games,” Kyodo News, October 5, 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/10/9dde30ea2997-over400-million-cyberattacks-were-attempted-during-tokyo-games.html. 10 Marta Sanfeliu, “Bringing Our Best to The Olympic Games,” Atos, January 9, 2018. https://atos.net/en/blog/bringing-best-olympic-games 11 Susannah Patton, “Security at the 2006 Winter Olympics,” CIO, February 1, 2006. https://www.cio.com/article/2447682/security-at-the-2006-winter-olympics.html 12 “Discussing Cybercrime Ahead of London’s 2012 Olympics,” Army-Technology, April 25, 2012, Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/featurecy ber-crime-security-forensics-london-olympics-2012/. 13 Patrick Wintour, Julian Borger, and Justin McCurry, “Russia Planned Cyber-Attack on Tokyo Olympics, says UK,” The Guardian, October 20, 2020, https://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2020/oct/19/russia-planned-cyber-attack-on-tokyo-olympics-says-uk.

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Committee termed seven “major” attacks.14 The 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London exemplified an extensive use of technology as well as an example of how organizers implement lessons learned from previous Games. A Technology Operations Centre, run by the IOC’s IT partner Atos, required 1,000 “network and security devices” in addition to nearly 10,000 computers to work efficiently.15 In a similar instance to what would occur six years later in PyeongChang, a nearly one-hour long attack targeted the Opening Ceremonies in London, and failed.16 The total of attempted attacks on the 2012 London Olympic Games and related organizations came to nearly 2.3 billion attempts.17 The Olympic Games came under a cyberattack during the Opening Ceremony for the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games.18 For spectators in the venue, the most noticeable sign was that the Wi-Fi suddenly stopped working. As did the security gates using radio-frequency identification. Later found to be the work of Russian intelligence, the cyberattack in PyeongChang caused no physical damage to the athletes or spectators but marked a crucial point in Olympic history where an aggressor used advanced technology to attack the Games.19 Over the last two decades, the increasing use of technology not just at the Olympics, but in the lives of humans across the globe, created new areas that attackers could exploit.

14 Robert Pitcher, Cyber Incident Handler, Public Safety Canada, “Vancouver 2010 Olympics Lessons Learned: Cyber,” Presentation at the FIRST Conference, Vienna, Austria, June 15, 2011. 15 “Technology Plays Major Role in London 2012,” Olympic.org, August 9, 2012. https://www.olympic.org/news/technology-plays-major-role-in-london-2012 16 Cynthia Dion-Schwarz et al., Olympic-Caliber Cybersecurity: Lessons for Safeguarding the 2020 Games and Other Major Events (RAND Corporation, 2018), https://doi.org/ 10.7249/RR2395. 17 “Over 400 Million Cyberattacks were Attempted During Tokyo Games,” Kyodo News. 18 Details of the Attack are Found in Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of the 2018 Olympics Cyberattack, the Most Deceptive Hack in History,” Wired, October 17, 2019, Accessed November 18, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/untold-story-2018olympics-destroyer-cyberattack/ 19 Duncan Mackay, “Russian Intelligence Officers Charged in US for PyeongChang 2018 Cyber-Attack,” insidethegames.biz, October 19, 2020, Accessed November 18, 2020. https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1099767/russia-officers-arrested-for-cyberattack

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The attack on the PyeongChang Winter Olympics ratified some of the fears related to cybersecurity. Organizers had created a seven-hundredperson strong force that operated around the clock called the “computer emergency response team” to deal with potential hackers.20 Despite these efforts a Russian hacking operation titled “Olympic Destroyer” disrupted Internet communications in addition to the host committee’s website.21 One theory posited that the hackers initially gained access through IOC partner Atos.22 It would not be hyperbole to say that creating technology to face the cybersecurity threat in the future will be a focus for Olympic security planners in the next decade. Ahead of the Tokyo Summer Olympic Games, the American think-tank RAND Corporation published an extensive analysis of the potential cyber threats facing Tokyo. Within the brief, several case studies scrutinized how previous Olympic Games security staff handled cybersecurity threats and how Tokyo’s organizers could apply some of the lessons learned. The last point, particularly given that cybersecurity has been a consideration at the Olympic Games for nearly three decades, is particularly interesting and reads, “Incorporate cybersecurity into broader security planning, training and exercises right from the start.”23 That one lesson, the incorporation of cybersecurity into security measures at the very beginning, displays just how far technology and security expanded. Over the past two decades, cybersecurity became a critical piece to the security puzzle that was a new challenge for security planners. While the number of attacks during each Olympic Games varies, that there has only been one major breach since 2000 is a sign of the importance assigned to cybersecurity at the Olympics. The Organizing Committee for the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics credited the benefits of liaison for the lack for

20 Park Soo-hyuk, “Safety Measures Announced in Advance of PyeongChang Olympics,” Hankyoreh. Modified January 30, 2018. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/eng lish_edition/e_international/830072.html 21 Greenberg, “The Untold Story.”. 22 Hilary Tuttle, “Going for the Gold: Cyberrisks at the Olympic Games,” Risk

Management 66, no. 7 (August 2019): 18–23. 23 Dion-Schwarz et al., Olympic-Caliber Cybersecurity: Lessons for Safeguarding the 2020 Games and Other Major Events, 40.

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the committee’s ability to fend off cyberattacks saying, “This is the result of information sharing and countermeasures taken by all concerned.”24

The Military and Security Ahead of the London 2012 Summer Olympic Games, the sight of antiaircraft weapons on top of apartment buildings starkly showed the public one of the most prevalent forces in preparing security for the Olympics: the military. As early as 1974, the United States federal government pledged $23 million in federal funding solely for security, which represented over 10% of the federal budget allocated to all aspects of Olympic funding.25 The United States’ Department of Defense (DOD) subsequently provided the majority of the equipment and personnel to support the efforts of the Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee. This support has grown in recent years not only in terms of the total cost but also the extensive use of technology developed for the military that sees its way into and around Olympic venues. Military support is not just limited to guns, tanks, and missiles. Troops are generally the first ones called upon when a plan goes awry. In London 2012, when the security contractor G4S was unable to provide enough guards, the British military sent over 1,000 soldiers to fill the gaps and aid in security measures.26 The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi were no different. In a display of the “ring of steel” that Vladimir Putin claimed existed around the Russian city, numerous soldiers made up the more than 70,000 guards present for the Winter Olympics.27 A further 50,000 South Korean soldiers were present at the 2018 PyeongChang

24 “Over 400 Million Cyberattacks were Attempted During Tokyo Games,” Kyodo News. 25 US Government Accountability Office, Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance US Support to Future Olympic Games, GAO-06-753 (Washington, D.C. 2006), 7, Accessed April 2, 2020. https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/233002.pdf 26 Robert Booth and Nick Hopkins, “London 2012 Olympics: G4S Failures Prompt Further Military Deployment.” The Guardian, July 24, 2012. https://www.theguardian. com/uk/2012/jul/24/london-2012-olympics-g4s-military. 27 Brian Bennett, “U.S. Feeling Shut Out of Russian Security Operation at Sochi,” Los Angeles Times, February 9, 2014. https://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/ la-fg-wn-security-olympics-sochi-russia-intelligence-20140209-story.html

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Winter Olympics.28 While the guns, tanks, and missiles play a role, the men and women in uniform continue to be a key piece of the Olympic security puzzle. Technology designed for the military to use on the battlefield is a continuing trend in Olympic security. Ahead of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, concerns stemmed from the potential of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to cause damage. Russian General Valery Gerasimov requested aid in securing American technology that could prevent the explosion of IEDs in Sochi. The system, created by the Pentagon for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, worked by disrupting radio signals sent to remote controlled IED’s. However, such a solution was not easy as the early iterations of the system did not work properly. The multiple radio signals sent by the device had the effect of canceling each other out which rendered the system useless.29 Some of the technology utilized by the military and deployed at the Olympic Games has a seemingly innocuous purpose. For the London 2012 Olympic Games, organizers procured a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD). Utilized by the United States military in Iraq for crowd control, LRAD’s primary purpose is to transmit a message over a long distance. The more nefarious side of the technology is that some versions of LRAD are capable of “producing deafening sound levels of 150 decibels at one metre.”30 Officials defended the use of LRAD by claiming that it would mostly be used as a means of communicating over long distances, not as a means of intentionally deafening people. A similar instance of an outwardly harmless battlefield technology protected the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics. An American company called Logos Technologies provided a balloon called “Simera” that provided real-time images and had the ability to access previous pictures taken by the cameras within the balloon, which could be tethered as many as

28 Amy Qin, “Protecting an Olympics Held in North Korea’s Nuclear Shadow,” New York Times, February 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/world/asia/oly mpics-north-korea-security.html 29 Thom Shanker, “US and Russia Discuss Olympic Security,” New York Times, January 21, 2014. 30 Boykoff, Jules and Pete Fussey, “London’s Shadow Legacies: Security and Activism at the 2012 Olympics.” Contemporary Social Science 9, no. 2 (2014): 253–270. Thomas, Gavin. “Sonic Device Deployed in London during Olympics.” BBC, May 12, 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-18042528.

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200 m above ground.31 Like the counter-IED technology, the creation of “Simera” came to aid American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Simera” allowed troops to note suspicious movements around a base while in Rio it allowed authorities to watch what occurred in the city. According to one report, “[t]he system is like a live city-wide Google Maps combined with TiVo” as authorities watched the city in real time as well as rewind through images the system saved.32 That citizens in Rio who had no desire to be a part of anything Olympics-related could be watched and screened without their knowledge or consent shows just how far security for the Olympics changed from Lake Placid to Rio. Utilizing the military at the Olympic Games has also been previously used as a convenient cover to pass through potentially unpopular legislation. Ahead of the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, the Australian government forced through a bill that would allow the military to be called upon to quell any domestic disturbance. The Australian government passed this legislation under the guise that “the Olympics [would] be a ‘magnet’ for terrorists.”33 After London received the rights to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games, Parliament passed the Olympics Act which contained several provisions regarding security. Most disturbingly, Sects. 19 and 22 provided authorities the ability to enter private property to destroy advertising that was in the “vicinity of London Olympic events.”34 There was no definition of what constituted the “vicinity” of an event. The military continues to play a key role in security for the Olympic Games in part due to the sheer size of the event. No city in the world can rely solely on the local police force to supply guards, provide protection for world leaders attending the event, and monitor threats emanating from around the globe. In utilizing the military as part of protecting the

31 Steven Melendez, “An All-Seeing Eye in the Sky Will Watch Over the Rio Olympics,” Fast Company, July 27, 2016, Accessed May 6, 2020. https://www.fastcompany.com/306 2179/rio-olympics-surveillance-logos-simera 32 Melendez, “An All-Seeing Eye in the Sky Will Watch Over the Rio Olympics.”. 33 Mike Head, “Australian Government Uses Sydney Olympics to Strengthen Military

Powers,” World Socialist Web Site, August 5, 2000, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/ 2000/08/olym-a05.html. 34 British Parliament, London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 (2006): http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/12/contents. Hassan, David. “Securing the Olympics: At What Price?,” Sport in Society 17, no. 5 (2014): 628–39.

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Olympic Games, some of the technology designed for use on the battlefield has made its way into cities. This far bypasses anything Baron Pierre de Coubertin could have ever imagined. Peace to de Coubertin was a key piece to his idea of “Olympism.”35 The ever-expanding presence of the military to protect the Olympic Games does little to suggest that “peace” is at the heart of the event but perhaps this was inevitable consequence following the events of September 1972. The most striking contrast will continue to be the use of technology designed for war to protect an event ostensibly rooted in promoting mutual understanding.

The Games Watching Us One of the side effects of utilizing advanced technology in security measures is the potential for privacy violations. By the mid-1980’s, the Olympic Games was well on its way to being an event that prioritized surveillance for security. It is important to note here that concerns over data protection and privacy rights played no discussion within the IOC or from IOC security delegate Ashwini Kumar at this time. Yet, as noted in a report on the security preparations for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, “any use of surveillance also involves an inevitable loss of privacy.”36 In a hearing held before the US Senate to discuss security around the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, former FBI agent David G. Maples informed US senators, “[m]ore technology, more personnel, more assets and logistics, more expense, and more need for national and international support and cooperation ha[d] been the trend in Olympic security, and necessarily so.”37 What Maples did not provide was whether officials considered whether there was a point at which this increased level of security may violate individual privacy rights. As the technology utilized for security advanced, concerns over privacy violations slowly emerged by the early 2000’s. According to Senator Mitt Romney, the US Secret Service devised a system for the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics “using the latest technology and surveillance methods” 35 Ramón Spaaij, “Olympic Rings of Peace? The Olympic Movement, Peacemaking and Intercultural Understanding,” Sport in Society 15, no. 6 (2012): 761–74. 36 Boyle and Haggerty, “Privacy Games: The Vancouver Olympics, Privacy and Surveillance.”. 37 US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Lessons Learned from Security at Past Olympic Games. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 4, 2004).

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to protect Olympic venues.38 One such example was an early attempt to employ facial recognition technology to identify potential threats. FBI agents deployed the system during the Opening Ceremony in Salt Lake City in addition to the ice hockey arena.39 This proved to be a step too early for facial recognition as officials pulled the program due to ineffectiveness. Louis Chiera, the marketing director for security sponsor Sensormatic, emphasized the extent of the technology in Salt Lake as, “one of the most extensive video surveillance installations over fibre [sic] optic networks for any sporting event ever staged worldwide.”40 The American Civil Liberties Union, for one, was not pleased with the facial recognition technology and argued that the system “outpaced [American’s] basic privacy rights.”41 A decade after the Closing Ceremonies, the Wall Street Journal reported the National Security Agency (NSA) used technology around the Salt Lake Olympic Games to monitor text messages and emails.42 What transpired in Salt Lake was merely a preview of what occurred two years later in Athens, Greece during the 2004 Summer Olympics. In 2003, an internal NSA memo noted that the agency would be present in Athens, and that the NSA’s involvement in Olympic security dated to the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. The memo ended on a rather glib note, “The world will be watching, and so will NSA!”43 That comment somewhat scratched the surface. Ten days prior to the Opening Ceremony of the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics, someone added several thousand lines of code to the telecommunications company Vodafone’s network. In turn, this code activated a software called Lawful Intercept (LI). Provided 38 US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 39 Thornburg, Robert H. “Face Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwellian

Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth Amendment,” J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 20 (2001): 321. 40 “Olympian Effort at Salt Lake City Secures Games,” IFSEC Global, May 3, 2002, Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.ifsecglobal.com/uncategorized/olympian-effort-atsalt-lake-city-secures-games/ 41 “Olympics Group Studies Super Bowl Video Surveillance,” Wall Street Journal,

February 5, 2001. 42 Siobhan Gorman and Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, “New Details Show Broader NSA Surveillance Reach,” The Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2013. 43 “SID Trains for Athens Olympics,” Snowden Archive, August 15, 2003. Accessed April 18, 2020. https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/collect/snowden1/index/ assoc/HASHd1ad.dir/doc.pdf.

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by the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson, LI is essentially a wiretap of a phone. Under normal circumstances, a law enforcement officer provides a warrant, and the company activates the wiretap. In this case, the code added to the network simply turned the system on. This act was no simple measure. As one analysis later noted, “[i]t took guile and some serious programming chops to manipulate the lawful call-intercept functions” in Vodafone’s network.44 The nature of this event was only more clearly understood after former NSA employee Edward Snowden leaked documents. The NSA led the operation, and this occurred with the full knowledge of the Greek Government. By activating the system, the NSA sent calls to “14 shadow cell phones and possibly to digital data recorders for storing and processing.”45 According to one former intelligence official, the wiretaps initially aimed to catch terrorists and the NSA deployed the system with the blessing of Greek officials to help with security for the Games.46 This is merely one example of a technology deployed to protect the Olympics that continued to operate following the Closing Ceremony. The legacy of security technology, in both host cities and other cities around the world, employed against citizens after the Olympics conclude is one of the more nefarious aspects of security and the Olympic Games. The surveillance technology purchased for Beijing 2008 had a far-reaching impact in the ensuing years outside of China’s borders. Ecuadorian government officials visited during the Beijing Olympics and, impressed by what they saw, purchased the same surveillance equipment. Spurred by their neighbor’s success, Venezuela and Bolivia followed suit.47 In Ecuador the surveillance system videos went to the nation’s domestic intelligence agency, which “ha[s] a lengthy track record of following, intimidating and attacking political opponents.”48 A system 44 Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis Spinellis, “The Athens Affair” in IEEE Spectrum, vol. 44, No. 7, Jul. 2007, 26-33. 45 Aggelos Petropoulos, “Americans and Greeks Started the 2004 Wiretaps Together,” Ekathimerini, September 29, 2015. Accessed April 15, 2020. https://www.ekathimerini. com/202026/interactive/ekathimerini/special-report/americans-and-greeks-started-the2004-wiretaps-together#webdoc. 46 Petropoulos, “Americans and Greeks Started the 2004 Wiretaps Together,”. 47 Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel, and Melissa Chan, “Made in China, Exported to the

World: The Surveillance State,” New York Times, April 24, 2019. 48 Mozur, Kessel, Chan, “Made in China.”.

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designed to protect humanity during a global celebration in the name of the Olympic Movement was retooled for domestic suppression 9,000 miles away. Ahead of London 2012, an additional 500,000 CCTV cameras with built-in facial recognition technology screened public areas in a city famous for its ubiquitous use of surveillance cameras. This number included the redeployment of nearly 300 cameras previously used to monitor an area of Birmingham with a predominantly Muslim population.49 While Lake Placid some three decades prior employed CCTV as a security measure, it was not deployed to this extent nor was the internal technology this advanced. Not only the technology, but also the scope for use had both changed.50 CCTV went a step further at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games with a technology known as VibraImage. Developed by a Russian company called Elsys, VibraImage used video feeds to measure small muscle vibrations that hinted at someone “whose agitated mental state signals an imminent threat.”51 The ability to almost see if someone was thinking about an attack represented quite a change from even Beijing in 2008 a mere six years prior. With the level and sophistication of technology increasing every year, one would expect Olympic security planners to ask themselves where to draw the line between security and personal privacy violations. With very few exceptions, this is a question that security planners have been keen to simply ignore. This decision comes at a detriment not only to the local populace, who must deal with the legacies of these plans when the Games conclude, but also the citizens of nations whose governments purchased surveillance technology after seeing it on display at the Olympic Games. The words of sociologist John Sugden writing ahead of London 2012 are prescient as he considered the line between security and privacy. Sugden wrote, “it is time we got used to the fact that rather than us watching the

49 Stephen Graham, “Olympics 2012 Security: welcome to lockdown London.” The

Guardian, March 12, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/mar/12/lon don-olympics-security-lockdown-london 50 Gold, “Biometrics Fit to Secure the London Olympics.”. 51 David M. Herszenhorn, “Heightened Security, Visible and Invisible, Blankets the

Olympics,” New York Times, February 13, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/ 14/sports/olympics/heightened-security-visible-and-invisible-blankets-the-olympics.html

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Games, for the foreseeable future, it is more a case of the Games watching us.”52 Over the course of four decades, there were several key changes regarding technology, security and privacy. One of the most important that has a lasting impact to the present day is not what this new technology secured, but who. In Lake Placid in 1980, the primary concern was the Olympic Village and protecting athletes. Today, every citizen in an Olympic city whether they are in any way interested in the Games or not, becomes part of the security screening process. Additionally, the increased security measures around the event are now lasting longer and having an impact on the lives of the citizens of the city years after the Olympics concluded. There is little evidence to show this trend will slow in the future.

Corporations One of the more pervasive developments regarding advanced technology and Olympic security is the commercialization of security at the Olympic Games. Though commercialization in all aspects of the Olympics grew over time, the transformation within security is still occurring. In some cases, private companies agreed to contracts with Olympic hosts that contradicted the company’s home nation’s foreign policy. Or, as previously described in the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a company’s technology could be later repurposed by foreign governments impressed by the technology’s display at the Olympics. At the 2000 Summer Games in Sydney, Australia, utilizing irisscanning technology as a security measure debuted. Provided by the EyeTicket Corporation, this technology was designed for airport security. Iris scanning as a technology was relatively older, with the first patent granted in 1987 to a New Jersey based company called IriScan.53 The US-based firm provided the technology to the German national team in Sydney to authenticate athletes and officials entering the German area 52 John Sugden, “Watched by the Games: Surveillance and Security at the Olympics,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47, no. 3 (2012): 414–29. Watching the Games: Politics, Power and Representation. John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson, eds. (London: Routledge, 2012). 53 Flom, Leonard and Aran Safir. Iris Recognition System. US Patent 4641349A filed February 20, 1985, and issued February 3, 1987.

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of the Olympic Village. This system displayed how globalization and technology played a role in security at the Olympic Games. By the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens and the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in New York City, companies provided technology that monitored entire cities. Even the extensive technology employed in Salt Lake for the Winter Olympics two years prior to Athens was modest, in extent and in cost, in comparison with what prevailed in the Greek capital. In tandem with the US, Greek authorities developed what has been described as a “panoptic fortress.”54 Created by Science Applications International Corporation and dubbed C4I for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, the system was an abject failure. What matters is not the inability of the C4I creation to work, but that authorities willingly authorized this system in the name of protecting the Olympic Games. Corporations have at times provided equipment to nations hosting the Olympics in contradiction of official government policy. A 2006 study commissioned by the US government noted a potentially significant issue regarding technology and security for the coming Summer Olympics in Beijing. The study’s author wrote, “technology transfer and human rights issues present new and different challenges for U.S. security support to these Games.”55 At the time, a variety of products could not be sent to China due to sanctions leveled against the Chinese. Among the items the US would not send included “defence articles/services, crime control equipment, and satellites.”56 While that ban existed for the US government, private companies were under no such obligation. Liu Shaowu, the director of security for Beijing’s Organizing Committee, specifically identified foreign providers as a critical resource for Beijing: Among the security systems and products for sale in domestic market, foreign technologies and products occupy a large share, and there are relatively few systems and products that are backed with our country’s own

54 See, Samatas, “Security and Surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: Some Lessons from a Troubled Story”; Minas Samatas, “Surveilling the 2004 Athens Olympics in the Aftermath of 9/11: International Pressures and Domestic Implications,” Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events, C.J. Bennett and K. Haggerty, ed 2014. 55 Government Accountability Office, Olympic Games: Costs to Plan, 26. 56 Government Accountability Office, Olympic Games: Costs to Plan, 26.

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intellectual properties; the security precaution industry of China does not have sufficient capabilities in independent innovation and development, system integration, market development, operation and management; most companies are only satisfied with being the sales representatives of foreign products, lack innovative technological development and wellknown brands, and are at a distance from manufacturing the superior safety precaution products that the Olympic Games need.57

Multi-national corporations, including several in the US, heeded the call as companies including General Electric (GE), Panasonic, LG, IBM, Honeywell, and Siemens, provided security technology for Beijing 2008.58 In contrast, ahead of Beijing’s role as host of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, China announced a domestic cyber security firm called Qi An Xin would serve as the official cyber security provider.59 From Beijing’s perspective, the 2008 Beijing Olympics provided a testing ground to enhance security measures that could be used after the Closing Ceremonies. According to Shaowu, “[t]he Olympic Games are a unique opportunity to showcase highly innovative products and services that undergo extreme scrutiny to prove their world class capabilities.”60 The Olympics were to be a security tradeshow for the Chinese government with global businesses serving as complicit actors, providing the goods for the Chinese government to test under the guise of protecting the Olympics. That this occurred stemmed from the early, sweeping embrace of using state-of-the-art technology to protect the Olympics. Beijing is not alone in allowing companies to utilize the Olympics as a display case for new security. As argued by journalist Stephen Graham, “[the Olympics] are the ultimate global security shop windows through 57 Liu Shaowu. “Thinking of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” Safety Environ-

ment and the Construction of Technical Defense System.” China Security Products Information 4 (2004): 26-28. 58 Dexter Roberts, “Olympics Security Is No Game,” Bloomberg Businessweek, August 6, 2008. Accessed April 14, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/200808-06/olympics-security-is-no-game; Keith Bradsher, “China Finds American Allies for Security,” The New York Times, December 28, 2007, Accessed April 14, 2020. https:// www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/business/worldbusiness/28security.html. 59 Nancy Gillen, “Software Company Qi An Xin Become Official Cyber Security Partner of Beijing 2022,” insidethegames.biz, Accessed January 2, 2022. https://www.insidethe games.biz/articles/1088940/qi-an-xin-beijing-2022-cyber-security 60 Shaowu. “Thinking of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” “Safety Environment and the Construction of Technical Defense System”.

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which states and corporations can advertise their latest high-tech wares to burgeoning global markets whilst making massive profits.”61 For the Winter Olympics in Sochi 2014, for example, private contracts reportedly totaling around $1 billion went to Austrian and Israeli companies.62 Ahead of the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics in Brazil, Logos Technologies won an $8 million contract to export its technology across the equator.63 Yet this is one of the major contradictions of security for the Olympics. As Organizing Committees spend ever-increasing budgets on security, companies see an opportunity to show off their latest gadgets, some of which may or may not work. As one security professional recently observed, “[n]ew technology is a source of both promise and anguish at major events.”64 The 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil provides several examples of high-tech security provided by corporations. The official security sponsor for Rio was a consulting firm called International Security & Defence Systems (ISDS). The company provided a rather extensive list of devices ahead of Rio. Perhaps the most unique was the EROS-B high-resolution imaging satellite. According to Brazilian Defense Minister Raul Jungmann, when launched into low orbit this satellite provided, “high-resolution images of up to 50 cm [about 1½ feet] in an area of 450 km [some 280 miles], thus enabling the identification of objects, people, cars and goods.”65 Jungmann did not clarify if the Brazilian government requested permission from citizens and Olympic visitors to take their picture. ISDS was not the sole technology provider in Rio. One consulting firm called BSW International provided some of its technology for the Games, which could access a startling amount of information. The company

61 Stephen Graham, “Olympics 2012 Security,” City 16 (August 1, 2012): 446–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2012.696900 62 US Congressional Research Service. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics: Security and Human Rights Issues (R43383; January 26, 2014), by Jim Nichol, Elaine Halchin, John W. Rollins, Alex Tiersky, and Steven Woehrel. Retrieved from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/R43383.pdf 63 Melendez, “An All-Seeing Eye In The Sky Will Watch Over The Rio Olympics.”. 64 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special

Event Security.” Homeland Security Affairs 3, Article 1 (September 2007), 15. 65 Viva Sarah Press, “Israeli Tech Set to Shine at Rio Olympics,” Israel 21C, July 24, 2016. https://www.israel21c.org/israeli-tech-set-to-shine-at-rio-olympics/

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claimed that its software not only detected how many people were in the Olympic Park at one time but also someone’s “origin, and any abnormal activity (SIM card swaps, phone reactivation, irregular movements, etc.)”66 The American technology hub Silicon Valley provided some security aid for the Olympics with a system nicknamed “Qylatron,” which aided entry to the Olympic Village by scanning bags for potentially hazardous materials. A key feature of the machine was its ability to “learn” as more objects passed through its sensors. Perhaps a hint that artificial intelligence is the next wave coming for Olympic security.

Liaison One of the lasting legacies of Ashwini Kumar’s policymaking for Olympic security was his emphasis on international cooperation and liaison. It was not that Kumar created the idea of nations cooperating to make sure the Olympics stayed safe, but he was the most vocal proponent of the idea within the IOC. Recent examples show how liaison among nations continues to serve as a crucial tool in Olympic security. Liaison has not been limited to just nations sharing intelligence. For the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, the United States promised the Australians to provide medicine in case of a chemical or biological attack.67 That same year, the Greek government formed an “Olympic Advisory Group” (OAG) for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympic Games consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Israel, Australia, France, and Spain. Among the services provided by the OAG was each nation’s expertise on how to successfully prepare and secure major sporting events.68 Russia aided the Greeks by providing equipment that would help in responding to potential biological or chemical

66 “Rio Olympic Games Security,” BSW International, Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.bl-sw.com/project/rio-olympic-games-security/ 67 Anne Davies, “Australia’s Security Fears in 2000 Focused on Hostage Taking at Sydney Olympics, Cabinet Papers Show,” The Guardian, December 31, 2020, https:// www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/jan/01/australias-security-fears-in-2000-foc used-on-hostage-taking-at-sydney-olympics-cabinet-papers-show 68 “Conference of the Olympic Advisory Group,” Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Citizen Protection, Accessed June 17, 2021. http://www.mopocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_ content&lang=EN&perform=view&id=1058&Itemid=329

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attacks.69 While sharing intelligence is a critical piece to liaison, providing needed equipment or know-how gained from previous experience is equally important. It was not just nation-states that Greece reached out to for aid ahead of the Athens Games. Greece requested aid from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a range of equipment used in case of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attack. In response, NATO sent a force of trained specialists from several nations including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the United States.70 While countries worked together for nearly two decades prior to the formation of the OAG, the Greek’s use of the OAG and NATO show how crucial liaison became to protecting the Olympic Games. Ahead of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games, the Pentagon pledged that the United States would come to Russia’s aid in case of an attack. As part of that preparation, the United States Navy sent two American naval vessels to the Black Sea and released a statement saying, “both ships [would] perform routine operations in the Black Sea to establish and enhance cooperation, mutual training and interoperability with regional partner nations and allies.”71 Given the heightened tensions between the two nations at the time, the United States’ commitment could also be read as an interest in protecting the United States citizens that would be traveling to compete and to watch the competitions in Sochi.

69 Quote found in Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece: Threat of Terrorism and Security at the Olympics.” Library of Congress Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2004, 56. See also, Toohey and Taylor, “Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games,” 463. George Floridis, a minister of public order in Greece, wrote on the OAG in “Security for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.” Mediterranean Quarterly 15, no. 2 (2004): 1-7. He wrote, “[Greece] cooperated with the best around the globe in terms of security matters and made the best use of their expertise without ever evading [Greek] national responsibility or affecting [Greek] sovereignty,” 4. 70 Tsouros, Agis D., and Panos A. Efstathiou, eds. Mass Gatherings and Public Health: The Experience of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 2007). 71 “U.S. Warships Enter Black Sea in Support of Sochi Winter Olympics,” USNI ,

February 5, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/02/05/u-s-warships-enter-black-sea-sup port-sochi-winter-olympics, “U.S. Military says Readying Plans for Olympic Security Assistance,” Reuters, January 20, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oly mpics-pentagon/u-s-military-says-readying-plans-for-olympic-security-assistance-idUSBR EA0K00N20140121

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Some liaison for the Olympic Games occurs at major sporting events not related to the Olympic Games. In the United States, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) plays a major role in preparing security for the Olympic Games. Ahead of the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games, Japanese security staff visited the United States to watch how DSS handled security at one of the nation’s largest events, the Super Bowl.72 Prior to the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the South Korean government deported 17 foreign nationals deemed to be a terrorist threat, in part relying on information relayed from intelligence shared from dozens of nations around the world.73 The concept had not changed from the time when Ashwini Kumar was first appointed to be the IOC’s voice on matters related to Olympic security. Despite all the self-aggrandizing proclamations that the IOC makes on the impact of sport and the Olympics on global unity, the real evidence comes from the liaison among nations to keep the Olympic Games safe.

COVID-19 and the Future Whether it was correct to postpone rather than cancel the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games was one of the more contested debates regarding the Olympic Games in recent memory. At the core of the debates was an issue inherently intertwined with security: public health. The debate boiled down to whether continuing the Olympic Games and importing athletes from around the globe would be a detriment to public health and the safety of Japanese citizens living in Tokyo. While the Olympic Games went on in Tokyo with the support of the Japanese government, the resignation of Japan’s prime minister soon after suggested that public opinion disagreed with the government’s decision.74

72 “Securing the Games,” State Magazine, Accessed October 25, 2021. https://sta temag.state.gov/2021/09/0921feat02/. 73 Joseph Hincks, “South Korea Has Deported 17 People Ahead of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics,” time.com. December 27th, 2017. Accessed March 13th, 2018. http:// time.com/5080001/pyeongchang-olympics-south-korea-deportations/. 74 Kietlinski, Robin. “The Trailblazing Woman on the Japanese Olympic Committee Who Called for Postponement.” In Time Out: National Perspectives on Sport and the Covid-19 Lockdown, edited by J. Krieger, A. Henning, L.P. Pieper, and P. Dimeo. (Champaign, IL: Common Ground Press Networks, 2021). Amy Gunja, “Japan’s Prime Minister

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The COVID-19 pandemic was not the first time in the previous decades that a serious illness threatened the Olympics. The Winter Olympic Games in 1998 and 2002 provide an example of how illness and disease could impact a global event. A flu outbreak in Japan infected nearly one million people during the 1998 Winter Olympic Games in Nagano.75 While some athletes and quite a few journalists fell ill, this disease directly impacted planning for the next Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. Senator Mitt Romney noted that prior to the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games he called on expertise from within the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense, and the state of Utah.76 Following the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, Romney testified before the United States Congress on some of the lessons learned from Nagano. He singled out how Nagano influenced policymaking for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake. Romney noted, “[it was] Nagano that brought home... the importance of quick identification, reaction, containment and treatment.”77 In Salt Lake, a team of researchers from the University of Utah School of Medicine completed surveillance for the flu in the Olympic Village’s medical clinic. The group tested subjects for influenza, isolated positive tests, and provide prophylactic treatment for close contacts.78 Preparations for the Summer Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 display another threat at the nexus of disease and terrorism: bioterrorism. Ahead of the Olympics, guidance on how to handle bioterrorism was relatively limited. A report commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) described the European Union’s (EU) guidance on Yoshihide Suga Is Resigning. Here’s What That Means,” Time, September 3, 2021. https://time.com/6094995/japan-prime-minister-suga-resigns/ 75 Kevin Sullivan, “The Flu Plagues Olympics,” The Washington Post, February 19, 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1998/02/19/the-flu-pla gues-olympics/2a2f2015-3951-4277-9061-381e95f56d45/?noredirect=on. 76 Romney, Mitt. (2004). “The Testimony of The Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Lessons Learned from Security at Past Olympic Games. Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, May 4, 2004. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate. p. 7. 77 Romney, pp. 6–7. 78 Gundlapalli AV, Rubin MA, Samore MH, et al. “Influenza, Winter Olympiad, 2002,”

Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2006, 12 (1): 144-146. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1201. 050645.

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how to handle bioterrorist incidents as “lacking” and, following anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001, the EU created a Task Force on Bioterrorism.79 In addition, Greek authorities sought opinions from other nations across the world. The WHO wrote that, “international cooperation at the expert level was quite productive for the planning process” for potential bioterrorist attacks at the Athens Summer Olympics.80 The Zika virus dominated headlines ahead of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Passed to humans through mosquitoes, the Zika virus threat differed slightly from the COVID-19 pandemic as the WHO publicly stated that the Olympics should not be canceled or postponed.81 Rather, due to the virus’ ability to cause encephalopathy in newborn children, the official recommendation was to practice safe sex and for women to not travel if they were pregnant. Outside of the recommendations for fans, national federations competing in Rio implemented a more varied response to protect their athletes. While South Korea ensured athletes wore long pants and shirts “infused with mosquito repellent,” the Australian team passed out condoms “coated with an antiviral lubricant” to make sure their athletes stayed safe.82 In other instances, the diseases that impacted the Olympic Games were not life-threatening but had a significant impact on security preparations. At the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea, a norovirus struck. The highly contagious virus whose symptoms include vomiting and diarrhea took aim at a particularly important piece of the

79 Tsouros and Efstathiou, Mass Gatherings and Public Health, 106. Tegnell, Anders, Philippe Bossi, Agoritsa Baka, Frank Van Loock, Jan Hendriks, Solvejg Wallyn, and Georgios Gouvras. “The European Commission’s Task Force on Bioterrorism.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 9, no. 10 (October 2003): 1330–32. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid 0910.030368. 80 Tsouros and Efstathiou, Mass Gatherings and Public Health, 106. 81 World Health Organization (2016, May 28) WHO Public Health Advice Regarding

the Olympics and Zika Virus. https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/28-05-2016-whopublic-health-advice-regarding-the-olympics-and-zika-virus 82 Knvul Shiekh, “How 4 Olympic Teams Have Prepared for Zika,” Scientific American, August 1, 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-4-olympic-teams-haveprepared-for-zika/

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security puzzle, the guards.83 Around 41 guards came down with symptoms while a further 1,200 staff went into quarantine and organizers had to hurriedly field soldiers as a temporary solution to make sure that the extensive security checks could stay in place. Protecting competing athletes, visitors, and residents of the host city from disease has been a security concern for Organizing Committee’s for several decades. The COVID-19 pandemic pushed all of the concerns and preparations to combat disease at the Olympic Games to the fore as the world shutdown and tried to grapple with a novel disease. The 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games began on July 23, 2021 and concluded on August 8, 2021. The decision to ban fans from attending should be considered as a security measure with the aim of preventing the spread of disease and protecting public health. As seen throughout this book, organizers for future Olympic Games will share lessons and find ways to make sure that a disease outbreak does not threaten the safety of athletes and the viability of hosting the Olympic Games. ∗ ∗ ∗ Since the turn of the twenty-first century, security at the Olympic Games has continued a seemingly inexorable growth. Some of this growth is by necessity. The potential threats to athletes, fans, and the citizens of host nations are unquestionably more numerous than they were in in the aftermath of the attack in Munich in 1972. It is quite simple to bemoan the increasing costs of security and question the necessity of hosting an event that requires such resources.84 That said, there are some grave questions that those with an interest in this field must seriously consider. While it is prudent business to source security equipment from companies, is it truly necessary that the Olympic Games become an arena for companies to show off brand new technology? And that the equipment utilized to

83 Anna Fifeld, “Norovirus Outbreak at PyeongChang Olympic Venues Leads to Staff Quarantine,” The Washington Post, February 6, 2018, https://www.washingto npost.com/world/norovirus-outbreak-at-pyeongchang-olympic-venues-leads-to-staff-qua rantine/2018/02/06/d702c86e-0b90-11e8-baf5-e629fc1cd21e_story.html. 84 Jennifer Rufer, “Displacement, Security Concerns Among Reasons for Olympics 2028 Opposition,” Spectrumnews.com, Accessed November 4, 2021. https://spectrumn ews1.com/ca/la-west/inside-the-issues/2019/08/09/displacement--security-concernsamong-reasons-for-olympics-2028-opposition.

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protect the Olympic Games be shown off to authoritarian governments with less than spectacular human rights records? At the heart of those questions lies one of the true intricacies that has defined security at the Olympic Games for over three decades. Host nations do not always share the same ideals whether those values regard political systems or the correct way to provide security for a global event. Each host nation over the past-twenty years would likely have a different answer that would be conditioned on any number of factors. One of the key challenges with security at the Olympic Games is finding a way to balance those interests with providing a safe environment for everyone to come and watch the world play.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

In a speech given in October 2003 at the Olympic Security Review Conference, the IOC’s security advisor Peter Ryan said of preparing security for the Olympic Games, “Wars have been planned and executed in less time and with less people.”1 Ryan’s analysis was not hyperbolic. Security is a part of the bidding process to host the Olympic Games, and the timeline from winning a bid to the Closing Ceremony takes up over half a decade. Planning how to keep this massive global event safe begins years in advance and requires careful coordination among several actors while also taking into account a dizzying amount of information and potential threat scenarios. Since 1972, the entire conception of security at the Olympic Games altered significantly. From the years after the attack in Munich where the IOC attempted to ignore that security might be a problem, security for the Olympics is now, in the IOC’s own words, “one of the largest security operations in the world.”2 The IOC does not have a military or police section to protect the organization. Therefore, it may be reasonable to ask 1 Peter Ryan, Keynote Address to the Olympic Security Review Conference, (Salt Lake City: Oquirrh Institute, 2002). 2 “Games of the XXXI Olympiad 2016 Working Group Report,” Olympic.org. Accessed 8 December 2021, https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_ 1317.pdf.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_9

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what responsibility the IOC has toward protecting the Olympic Games. It is admittedly rather difficult to provide protection when you do not have a force dedicated to the task. That is a sensible argument and likely explains, at least partially, why Lord Killanin left matters of security to the respective governments of host nations. The work of Ashwini Kumar, with the encouragement of Juan Antonio Samaranch, transformed the IOC from a passive spectator to a more active participant in protecting the Olympic Games. IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch played a crucial role in helping to make the IOC a far more active partner in security than either Brundage or Killanin. Samaranch showed this initiative early in his presidency by appointing Cornelis Kerdel to work with the Sarajevo and Los Angeles Organizing Committees until Kumar offered his services. There is no clear evidence as to why Samaranch was so proactive in this regard. The world he inherited was no more or less dangerous than the one Killanin left. Perhaps, as he showed in other areas of the Olympic Games, his vision of the IOC’s role in the world simply differed from his predecessors. Ashwini Kumar was the architect of Olympic security and received an Olympic Order of Merit in 2002. Despite this, his contributions to helping make the Olympic Games safe have gone unnoticed. His work was so vital that ahead of the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics he was named, “Policeman of the Millennium” for his contributions to Olympic security.3 Despite those accomplishments, he is rarely mentioned in discussions of security at the Olympics. Kumar’s work underlined the point that the IOC’s lack of a military or police section is not an excuse for the IOC to not provide some aid to Organizing Committees.4 Given that the IOC has no ability to protect the Olympic Games, the result has been a necessity for host nations to rely on police and military units to protect competitors and spectators from harm. In part, security for the Olympics relied on previous organizers aiding future hosts by sharing lessons learned from hosting the event. With no real precedent for protecting an event like the Olympics, the plan derived for the Innsbruck Winter Olympics in 1976 set a standard for what Olympic security should look like. In that case, it was barbed wire fences and soldiers armed

3 Butler, “India’s former IOC vice-president.”. 4 Kumar details his ideas in the following missive, Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan

Antonio Samaranch, July 1st, 1983.

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with machine guns. It is not that security planning has not changed since Innsbruck. Rather, the response in Innsbruck set the standard that future Olympic hosts have been happy to follow. Another of the trends for Olympic security seen throughout this book was an emphasis on utilizing advanced technology to assist security measures. This stemmed in part from Ashwini Kumar and his belief that using whatever means were necessary to prevent a terrorist attack was the appropriate response. Given the nature of planning for the event and how lessons were passed from event to event, once technology became dyed into the fabric of Olympic security, there was no turning back. What Kumar could not have known, nor reasonably be expected to predict, was the extent that technology used for security had changed and what that would mean for civilian populations in cities around the world. It is likely far too late to do anything substantive about how the Olympic Games become an arena for security companies to show off their latest technology. There is little, if any, public outcry about the practice and no host city would want to be seen rejecting any tool that could be deployed to keep the Olympics safe. Finding ways to ensure that new technologies do not impact or violate the privacy of civilians living within Olympic host cities should be a consideration for security planners in the future. A central issue faced by security planners over decades is that even the most technologically advanced and well-designed security plans are subject to human error. In some cases, like in Montreal with the easily forgeable color-coded passes, nothing happened. Atlanta proved that it only takes one wrong decision and one mistake for a threat to turn deadly while the failure of C4I in Athens showed how even expensive and modern technology can fail spectacularly. And recent iterations of the Olympic Games show that there are more dangers that can be posed to the Olympics that do not necessarily impact loss of life but have the ability to wreak havoc and damage a host nation’s prestige. The final trend examined throughout this book is the use of liaison between nations as a critical piece of Olympic security. In some ways, the geopolitical climate now is far different than when Ashwini Kumar first started working on security for the Olympic Games in the early 1980s. Yet in others it is remarkably similar. The resurgence of Russia under Vladimir Putin along with the rise of international terrorist groups like ISIS in 2017 and 2018 shows that many of the security challenges resemble those of decades past. Ahead of the 2018 World Cup in Russia, the head of Russia’s State Security Service Alexander Bortnikov stated, “We expect

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that our cooperation with the security services and law enforcement agencies of foreign governments will help protect this event from terrorist acts as effectively as in previous years.”5 A sign that some of the tactics to protect the Olympics extends to other major international events. The most politically driven part of Olympic security, liaison is factored on a wide range of factors, not limited to history, alliances, and the current state of geopolitics. If Olympic security is one thing, it is complicated. Citizens from around the world all descending in one place for several weeks every two years is a logistical challenge in and of itself for the host city. Adding on top of that historical animosity, current tense relations between nations, differences in perceptions of “acceptable” security measures, and a myriad of other threats from non-state actors makes Olympic security a truly unique exercise. Despite the complexity of protecting this event, there are certain aspects to protecting the Olympic Games that should be under scrutiny or reformed. Nation-states watching a security technology in use at the Olympic Games that is then purchased to dissuade domestic protest is beyond troubling. It is likely, as with many aspects of Olympic security that it is far too late to change and this pattern is ingrained into the process that is passed down every two years. Terrorism is not a phenomenon that will simply suddenly cease to exist. The spate of recent attacks directed at sporting events shows that those wishing to promote their agenda through violence still view major sporting events as viable targets. From the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 to the failed attack on the Stade de France in November 2015, counter-terrorism continues to sit at the forefront of security concerns.6 Considering the havoc wreaked globally by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 5 “Russia Expects International Cooperation on Security of World Cup,” usnews.com. 4 April 2018. Accessed 18 April 2018. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/ 2018-04-04/russia-expects-international-cooperation-on-security-of-world-cup. 6 For an analysis of the Boston bombings and counter-terrorism see, Rohan Gunaratna and Cleo Haynal, “Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 3 (2013): 44–63. Anne Speckhard analyzes the Tsarnaev brothers in “The Boston Marathon Bombers: The Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 3 (2013). Several articles detail the role of social media in spreading information and misinformation following the explosion. See, Kate Starbird, Jim Maddock, Mania Orand, Peg Achterman, Robert M. Mason, “Rumors, False Flags, and Digital Vigilantes: Misinformation on Twitter after the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing,” in iConference 2014 Proceedings (2014): 654–662.

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threat of bio-terrorism should continue to be a key consideration for security planners. In addition, how to manage naturally occurring outbreaks of disease will be a key characteristic of security planning for future events. Nations sharing intelligence and cooperating to achieve a common goal is a proven means of making these events safe and will continue to be a key piece to security planning at the Olympics. As in Munich, the Games will continue.

Index

0–9 1972 Munich Summer Olympic Games, 2, 8, 9 1976 Innsbruck Winter Olympic Games Organizing Committee of the 1976 Innsbruck Winter Olympic Games (IOOC), 38–41 1976 Montreal Summer Olympic Games Organizing Committee of the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympic Games (COJO), 12, 42–44, 46–50 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games Organizing Committee of the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games (LPOOC), 51, 52, 55, 56 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games, 12

1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games, 67, 68, 96 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games, 67 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games, 100, 113, 114 1992 Albertville Winter Olympic Games, 14 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic Games, 135, 136 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, 156 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, 15, 181, 190 2004 Athens Summer Olympic Games, 190 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, 175, 176 2012 London Summer Olympic Games, 177–181 2016 Rio Summer Olympic Games, 4, 9

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Duckworth, International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020, Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3

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204

INDEX

2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, 177 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games, 176, 192, 195

A Andrianov, Konstantin, 43, 105

B Baader-Meinhof Group, 70, 113 Barnier, Michel, 127–129 Beckwith, Charlie, 85–87 Berlioux, Monique, 12, 36, 40, 43, 45, 46, 58, 66, 68–70, 80, 91, 133 Brundage, Avery, 2, 23, 27, 37, 46, 65, 171, 198 Bundesnachrichtdienst (BDS), 113

C Casey, William, 77, 78 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 11, 12, 36, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 62, 69, 70, 74–76, 78, 80, 91, 96, 121, 123, 146

D Daume, Willi, 14, 35, 42, 109, 110 Deaver, Michael, 71, 74, 79, 80, 85–90, 92–94 de Coubertin, Pierre, 17, 182 Department of Defense (DOD), 54, 84, 86, 179, 193 Department of Justice (DOJ), 74 Digital Voice Privacy (DVP), 83, 84 Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), 4, 168, 192

E Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom), 141–147, 166 F Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 13, 36, 52, 74, 75, 80, 82, 87, 88, 151, 161, 163, 166, 182, 183 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 161, 193 G Gates, Daryl, 81, 82, 87, 88 General Park Chung-hee, 100, 101, 104 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 101, 107, 123 Gore, Al, 160 Group d’Intervention de la Genderamerie Nationale (GIGN), 129 H Hill, Kenneth, 74 Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), 87 I International Olympic Committee (IOC), 2–7, 9–14, 20, 21, 23, 25–28, 30, 31, 33–40, 42–46, 49, 56, 63–71, 73, 80, 82, 85, 90, 95–97, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108–110, 114, 116, 118, 123, 125–129, 131–134, 137, 138, 140, 142, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 166, 169, 170, 174, 175, 178, 182, 190, 192, 197, 198 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 68, 130, 142–144

INDEX

J Japanese Red Army (JRA), 72, 112–115, 121, 144 Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), 39, 76, 87 K Killanin, Lord Michael Morris, 12, 13, 35–37, 40, 42, 43, 45–47, 49, 65, 198 Killy, Jean-Claude, 127–129 Korean Air Lines (KAL) 858, 99, 102, 111, 112 Kumar, Ashwini, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 44, 64, 66–73, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 90–92, 95–97, 102–105, 114–119, 122, 123, 126–133, 135–145, 147, 150, 157, 158, 161, 162, 169, 170, 174, 175, 182, 190, 192, 198, 199 L Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 87, 88 M McFarlane, Robert, 84, 85, 94 N National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), 62, 77 National Olympic Committee (NOC), 27, 40, 110, 126, 138 National Security Agency (NSA), 76, 77, 83, 183, 184 O Olympic Advisory Group (OAG), 190, 191

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Olympic Games, 4, 5, 7–15, 18–25, 27–31, 34–37, 42, 45, 47, 50, 52, 54, 57, 59, 63–69, 71, 74, 78, 81–84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94–97, 99, 101, 104, 110, 113, 122, 125, 126, 129–131, 135, 140, 141, 143, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 159–161, 166, 170, 173–175, 177–189, 191–200 Olympic Games Organizing Committee (OCOG), 3, 4, 34, 67, 126, 150, 151, 156, 157, 160, 161, 164, 170, 171, 174 Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council (OLECC), 82, 92 Olympic Security Coordination Center (OSCC), 83 Olympic Village, 1, 22, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 63, 83, 84, 87, 116, 128, 139–141, 147, 157, 158, 186, 187, 190, 193 P Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 14, 30, 34, 46, 70, 152, 155 Pisar, Samuel, 13, 101, 105, 106, 109, 111 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 113 R Reagan, Ronald, 74, 77, 79, 84, 85, 87, 93, 94, 101, 106–109, 111, 123 Red Army Faction (RAF), 70, 113, 132 Richard “Dick” Pound, 13, 65, 102, 169

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INDEX

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 44, 46, 48, 89

Stevens, Ted, 106–108 Superphénix, 132–134

S Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 5, 13, 14, 40, 64–68, 80, 83, 85, 86, 95, 99, 101–106, 108–111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 123, 127, 128, 130–132, 135–139, 141, 142, 144, 153, 157, 158, 170, 198 Security, 3–15, 20, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33–48, 50–69, 71, 73–75, 77–87, 89–97, 100–105, 109, 111–123, 125–144, 147, 149–164, 167–170, 173–175, 177–190, 192, 194–201 Security Assistant Services of Texas, Ltd. (SAS), 86 Security Central Operations (SCO) Center, 82, 83 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), 77 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 106, 110–112 Shultz, George, 106, 107, 110, 111 Sigur, Gaston, 106, 109, 112 State Department, 45, 52, 59, 74–76, 78, 79, 96, 156, 160, 161, 168

T Terrorism, 2, 7–9, 12, 29, 36, 45, 46, 56, 57, 63, 67, 69–72, 74, 80, 85, 87, 90, 91, 94, 102, 107, 111, 112, 132, 133, 139, 144, 145, 155, 156, 161, 167–169, 175, 193, 200 Terrorisme Radicalisme Extremisme Violence Internationale (TREVI), 144 Turner, Stansfield, 52, 53, 57, 62, 77 U Ueberroth, Peter, 81, 82, 85, 91, 92, 97 V Video Disc Mapping System (VDMS), 84, 87 W Webster, William H., 87