International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms 1498544991, 9781498544993

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International Relations Theory

International Relations Theory Competing Empirical Paradigms

Michael Haas

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2017 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number Name: Haas, Michael, 1938- author. Title: International relations theory : competing empirical paradigms / Michael Haas. Description: Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016043064 (print) | LCCN 2016046489 (ebook) | ISBN 9781498544993 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781498545006 (Electronic) Subjects: LCSH: International relations—Philosophy. Classification: LCC JZ1305 .H33 2016 (print) | LCC JZ1305 (ebook) | DDC 327.101—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016043064 ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America iv

Contents

Tables and Figures

vii

Prefaceix PART I: HISTORY OF THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 The Beginning of the Field: An Intellectual History 2 The Great Masquerade: Waltzing to Theoretical Oblivion PART II: EXPLICATING PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1 3 19 33

3 The Need for Paradigm Development

35

4 Marxian Paradigm

51

5 Mass Society Paradigm

59

6 Community Building Paradigm

81

7 Rational Choice Paradigm

117

8 Other International Studies Paradigms 

153

PART III: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 9 Neobehavioral International Studies

197 199

References207 Index273 About the Author

307 v

List of Tables and Figures

TABLES Table 3.1 Table 6.1 Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Theories of Metaphysics Types of Social Movements Decision-Making Parameters Sociological Perspectives

45 83 155 168

FIGURES Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2 Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4 Figure 5.5 Figure 5.6 Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 6.4 Figure 6.5 Figure 6.6 Figure 6.7 Figure 6.8 Figure 6.9 Figure 7.1 Figure 7.2 Figure 7.3

The Basic Marxian Paradigm Expansion of the Marxian Paradigm Original Mass Society Paradigm Kornhauser’s Basic Mass Society Paradigm Kornhauser’s Extended Mass Society Paradigm Mass Society Social Unrest Paradigm Mass Society Development Paradigm Mass Society International Violence Paradigm Community Mobilization Paradigm Stages of Community Building Paradigm Protest Mobilization Paradigm Social Transaction Paradigm Functional Paradigm Neofunctional Paradigm Political Unification Paradigm Regime-Building Paradigm Communitarian Community Building Paradigm Classical Economics Rationality Paradigm Cost-Benefit Rationality Paradigm Social Darwinian Rationality Paradigm vii

52 54 62 64 65 67 68 73 84 85 86 92 94 96 101 106 112 119 121 124

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List of Tables and Figures

Figure 7.4 Pressure Group Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.5 Hegemonic Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.6 Balance-of-Power Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.7 Deterrence Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.8 Selectorate Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.9 Voting Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.10 Social Exchange Rationality Paradigm Figure 7.11 Resource Mobilization Rationality Paradigm

131 134 137 140 141 145 147 148

Preface

In 2015, I attended a panel “Reviving International Relations Theory” at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association. One paper, which was evidently assigned by the panel chair, discussed Social Darwinism as a possible theory but concluded that there was nothing in the ideology that could become a theory of international relations. In a discussion from the floor, I read a list of paradigms, presented herein, which included Social Darwinism. I also recited a history of the International Studies Association (ISA), which had become dominated by scholars on the East Coast who had been trying to advise Washington with their research and op-eds. The paper presenter responded that he had difficulty with the word “paradigm.” The panel chair solicited an essay from me of a certain word length, so I reviewed current textbooks and other writing on international relations theory. I was shocked that the word “theory” was equated with “ideology” and that the literature had completely lost track of empirical paradigms. Although I then prepared my essay, which was emailed to him, I never heard from him again. Subsequently, I submitted that essay, focusing on the history of ISA, demonstrating how paradigm development has been overlooked, for publication to two international studies journals. They both rejected the essay primarily because they felt that the point that “theory” was being used to describe ideology was too trivial to warrant publication. In other words, they ignored the intellectual history presented and the enumeration of paradigms in the field that had been forgotten. One reviewer even failed to see the difference between mid-level theory and paradigms, which are clusters of mid-level theories. The other read no farther than the title. I have quoted their comments in Chapter 2 along with those of a former ISA president, who reflected that there has been a decline in scholarship within the field of international studies. ix

x Preface

Subsequently, I wrote an essay on the French Fourth Republic to test a major paradigm of international studies—the Structural-Functional paradigm of Gabriel Almond (1960). I sent the essay to the editor of a political science journal, whose reaction was that the essay was unsuitable because there was no “test” in the essay, whereupon I responded that my essay was a test of a major assumption of a paradigm. Another essay, which tested two major paradigms developed in Chapter 6 herein, was refused publication because the journal editor felt that the content was empirical, making no theoretical contribution, thereby dismissing paradigm testing as untheoretical! Whether all younger scholars have lost touch with the fundamental vision of paradigm development I do not know, but I have been distressed on hearing papers presented by graduate students who believe that they are pioneering new horizons when in fact they are reinventing wheels long ago established in the empirical theoretical literature. My own discovery of paradigms testing took many years. My dissertation, for example, tested the international relations theory of Hans Speier, but none of the faculty on my dissertation committee connected that theory with the Mass Society paradigm, and Dave Singer did not see the linkage when he asked me to condense the findings into an article in his edited book (Haas 1968). Only when I tested three alternative explanations for ethnic bloc voting within an article published in 1986 did I realize that the time had come for paradigm development, and I therefore embarked on Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms (1992), which did not get much attention for reasons explained in Chapter 2 of the present volume. My essay on the history of the International Studies Association is now broken into two pieces—as Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 is a rewrite and update of the first chapter of Polity and Society, wherein I demonstrated how paradigms apply across several areas of study—development, race relations, and international community building, and international violence. Chapters 4–8 focus on how major paradigms presented in that volume have now expanded to apply across all four areas and more. I am grateful to Praeger Publications of ABC-CLIO for permission to use portions of the text therein. The final chapter explains “neobehavioralism,” making changes in the text from a similar essay in Neobehavioral Politics Science (2014c). Whereas political science has elements of neobehavioralism without a major critique, international studies has gone so far in an ideological direction that the discipline cannot be rescued until the need for a neobehavioral future is conscientiously considered. The result is a new textbook—or reference book—in international relations theory, unique among existing textbooks. The other textbooks pretend that no empirical theories exist in the field, so the aim herein is to revive not

Preface

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just theory but the field of international studies itself. The main contribution is to demonstrate that paradigms exist, await recognition, and invite research. I have also found how a multitude of existing research published during the twenty-first century within journals of the International Studies Association fits into existing paradigms, and I have credited them for their work throughout the expositions of Chapters 4–8, though the authors are thus far unaware of their relevance for broader theory and will learn that they are contributing to paradigms when they read the present volume. I have thoroughly enjoyed preparing the book. I accept responsibility for any problems that the reader may encounter. Michael Haas

Part I

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

International relations (IR) and international studies (IS) have a fascinating if checkered history. Although much history has been written about relations between empires and nations, the formal academic study of international relations began after World War I and progressed as an effort to assist policymakers. Ideological alternatives have contended ever since, but a scientific theory of international relations has been elusive. Chapter 1 explains that history, focusing on why the International Studies Association (ISA) was formed and the promise of the field to develop paradigms. Chapter 2 explains why the foundation laid by ISA has been undermined in recent years. Rather than pursuing paradigms, the discipline decided to move in a different direction. The appropriate remedy is to reconnect with the major paradigms, which are later identified in Part II, and adopt a multimethodological, neobehavioral outlook, as explained in the final chapter. The failure to pursue the original basis for ISA has had major policy repercussions. The rise of terrorism has occurred at a time when international studies scholars have been bickering about various ideologies and testing insignificant hypotheses while ignoring the need to build and advance major paradigms. Explanations for Westerners joining the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have focused on three elements—their unemployment, their alienation, and their discrimination. As a result, terrorist groups give them a sense of belonging. Yet the three explanations come from major paradigms: The unemployment explanation is Marxian. The alienation argument is from the Mass Society paradigm, which began with Émile Durkheim. The need for belonging is central to the Community Building paradigm, as developed by Karl Deutsch and others. That international studies scholars have ignored all three paradigms for decades is a commentary on how out of touch they have been with the need to learn more about the dynamics of some of the main

2

Part I

sources of current instability on the planet. Instead, if they have been interested in a paradigm at all, they have genuflected before the Rational Choice paradigm. All four major paradigms are developed in Part II of the present volume, but much more research is needed to advance knowledge for leaders of the world who seek wisdom in making informed decisions. But first international studies scholars need to reflect on the history of the discipline, the subject of Chapter 1. Major journals and scholars refuse to acknowledge the drift away from empirical paradigms, as indicated in Chapter 2. A major correction in the direction of the discipline is the imperative that prompts the words to follow.

Chapter 1

The Beginning of the Field An Intellectual History

Intellectual histories are useful reminders of paths created along productive and unproductive roads (cf. Schmidt 1997; Osiander 1998; Long and Schmidt 2005; Lawson 2006). Their utility is to see more clearly the onrush of intellectuals choosing various paths and the consequences of traveling along differing or converging highways. Writers from Plato (360bce), Augustine (426), Thucydides (431bce), and Niccolò Machiavelli (1531, 1532) for example, have provided many insights about conflicts between states. Although some may believe that Thucydides is a father of international relations theory because of his implicit “realism,” that idea had been around for millennia (Agathangelou and Ling 2004). The concept of the “just war,” of course, came from the Bishop of Hippo, Augustine, who consoled Christians after the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410. Machiavelli argued that morality did not apply to state conduct, a view that was condemned by the scholar Justus Lipsius (1589), who tried to develop a code of ethics for political leaders but confessed that leaders must often sin in order to keep public order. Empires from Egypt to the Mongols prevailed as the main units of international relations up to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, when the nation-state system was officially recognized in Europe. Some of the basic concepts of international relations, such as “balance of power” and “sovereignty,” were coined during the sixteenth century. The concept of balance of power was most clearly explicated by Benedict de Spinoza (1677), Antoine Pecquet (1757), the Baron de Montesquieu (1748), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1760), and especially Carl von Clausewitz (1832[1976]:82), though Rousseau believed that the geographic landscape of Europe was also a factor in restraining war. The development of international law by Hugo Grotius (1625), Jean Bodin 3

4

Chapter 1

(1566, 1576), Alberico Gentili (1598), and others dominated much of the discourse up to the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile, proposals for international organizations from Dante Alighieri (1313) to Immanuel Kant (1795) and Jeremy Bentham (1797) were aimed at uniting countries into a single body to facilitate negotiations rather than war. Kant had republics in mind, since monarchies were seeking imperial control; his view was shared by Montesquieu and Voltaire (1764). Bentham viewed colonialism as inherently warlike and proposed a Court of States or Congress of States to settle disputes. Other proposals for intergovernmental bodies came from Émeric Crucé (1623), William Penn (1693–1694), and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1713). Rousseau sought a federated Europe (1756). But rather than an inclusive multistate organizations, the first organization among nation-states emerged after the Napoleonic Wars: The organization, composed of five major powers, was called the Concert of Europe. The Concert attempted to suppress nationalist movements seeking to break free from empires. But as democratic norms increasingly prevailed in England and France, the Concert foundered by 1822. The field of international studies also owes its origin to mass movements during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although some decry the lack of scholarly interest in nineteenth century history (Buzan and Lawson 2013), they fail to cite the movements that provided the profound writing on the subject. One was the antislavery movement, an effort to end the transport of Africans to the New World aboard European ships that was condemned by Baron de Montesquieu (1748), John Wesley (1744), Granville Sharp (1769), Thomas Clarkson (1787), and Harriet Beecher Stowe (1852). Clarkson engaged in considerable research, while Stowe wrote a best-selling novel. Writing on human rights also focused on the subordination of women, resulting in writing by Mary Wollstonecraft (1792), Harriet Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill (1851), and the multinational suffragette movement. The rights of workers also attracted interest from such writers as Robert Owen (1813), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848), and Charles Dickens (1854). Pope Leo XIII (1891) issued an encyclical asking the state to provide “special care and foresight” to the laboring masses. The discovery that injured soldiers were left to die on battlefields without medical attention shocked Florence Nightingale and the Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna. The testament of Henri Dunant (1862), who followed their lead, resulted in a movement to stop inhumane practices in war. President Abraham Lincoln asked political scientist Francis Lieber to codify rules of warfare, and the Lieber Code (Lieber 1863) inspired Dunant to organize the first Geneva Convention in 1864. The Hague Convention followed in 1899. Aware of the principle of absolute sovereignty established by Bodin that had been questioned by The Law of Nations by Emmerich de Vattel (1758),



The Beginning of the Field

5

Lieber sought to develop international law (Lieber 1885) along the line of Henry Wheaton (1845), who began to codify customary practices into international law. John Burgess, founder of the first political science department, was skeptical due to his Social Darwinist leanings (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967:3; Schmidt 1998:441). In 1872, David Field authored Draft Outline of an International Code, in effect founding the field of international law, though the terms “international law” and “international relations” were evidently coined by Bentham (Knutsen 1992:136). The idea that the United States, a middle power, could bring law into the anarchy of international conflict so inspired President Theodore Roosevelt that he called for the second Hague Conference in 1908, asked for the adoption of a world court, and came away with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The growth of international law was popularized by the book The Principles of International Law (1910) by Thomas J. Lawrence, whose vision was supported by many other legal scholars (e.g., Westlake 1904). Whereas Bentham (1797) opposed colonialism as a weakening of national power, others viewed them as a form of inhumanity (Marx 1853; Lenin 1917b; cf. Shock 2013). Perhaps the most strident early critique came from An Address to the Irish People (1812) by radical writer Percy Bysshe Shelley. Andrew Carnegie, William James, and Mark Twain founded the AntiImperialist League, outraged over the American takeover of Hawai‛i and the Spanish territories in 1898 (Beisner 1968). Similarly, John Hobson (1902) criticized British control of South Africa. Imperialism could be viewed as the strong prevailing over the weak in line with the views of realpolitik Social Darwinists. Although Charles Darwin (1871) saw the process of natural selection at the human level as an ongoing process that needed little political intervention, there was a triumphalist Social Darwinist perspective as well: Walter Bagehot (1872), Herbert Spencer (1882), William Graham Sumner (1911), and Ernest Haeckel (1896, 2000) felt that a strong country should fight to achieve resources from weak countries and otherwise reach an equilibrium with equally powerful countries. Military historians also played a role. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) insisted that control of the seas by a hegemon was the best way to bring peace to the word. Halford Mackinder (1904) warned that control of the “heartland” of Europe was as important as maritime power. They were trying to find a short cut to achieving a balance of power in a multistate world by developing geopolitics, which still has followers (Gray 1977, 1988; Tuathail 1996; Brzezinski 1997, 2004). Aware that world trade was uniting countries around the world as never before, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1713) urged rulers to avoid war and instead gain wealth for their country with trade. Two centuries later, arguing that the industrial revolution had made war too costly and too deadly Norman

6

Chapter 1

Angell (1910:341) pointed to increasing economic interdependence based on free trade, which was making balance-of-power conceptions obsolete (Angell 1918:170–77). Agreeing with the predictions of the Abbé de SaintPierre, Angell was joined by such scholars as Leonard Woolf (1916:128) at a time when Britain was advocating free trade and the worldwide exchange of manufactured goods reached a new height. They envisioned a new world order in which international conflicts would be handled by diplomacy, since war to gain new territory or settle old scores was unprofitable, but of course they were trying to popularize a foreign policy favorable to Britain, which became a wealthy nation through trade while other countries erected tariff barriers to protect domestic industries. Similarly, free trade was one of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points; his Democratic Party had long opposed tariffs, as Southerners wanted to sell their cotton to Britain, but the Republican Party wanted to impose tariffs in order to protect “infant industry” in the Northeastern states. World War I served to challenge prescriptions about economics as the driving force in a more peaceful international politics (Delaisi 1925; Muir 1933). The conflict might have been avoided if better communication had existed among leaders of the countries, as exchanges of diplomatic notes increasingly became nasty (Zinnes, North, Koch 1961), though Heinrich von Treitschke (1916) argued that there was a failure to recognize the power perspectives of the major powers. Treitschke coined the term “realpolitik.” A major goal of international relations scholars was to end warfare as an instrument of statecraft. Many plans for a League of Nations, including Woolf’s International Government (1916), were drawn up during the war and caught the attention of Woodrow Wilson. Angell (1918:13) thought that a union of democracies would work best. Alfred Zimmern (1936:31), who later agreed, had the British Commonwealth of Nations as his exemplar. The outbreak of the war was the impetus for designing a new field of study. The pioneering of such prewar scholars as Paul Reinsch (1913) came to fruition when the subject matter of international relations was regarded as sufficiently comprehensive and distinct to merit the status of an autonomous subfield within political science or a field of its own. Many new courses were offered on diplomatic history, international law, and international organization. Separate departments of international relations, beginning with Aberystwyth University in 1919, were occasionally formed on the premise that international affairs can best be understood on a truly interdisciplinary basis. Whether within or outside political science, the new field of international relations aimed to create knowledgeable scholars in order to advise policy-makers. In an edited book, David Long and Brian Schmidt (2005) featured several international relations scholars, whose contributions rose to the level of



The Beginning of the Field

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“theory”: In addition to Lieber, Reinsch, and Zimmern, chapters feature John Hobson and Leonard Woolf. The failure of the European balance of power to prevent World War I, the conscription of mass armies, and the beginning of the practice of total war brought international events closer to the everyday activities of ordinary citizens. World War I might have been avoided if diplomats could speak to one another in a common forum rather than ad hoc Hague peace conferences, the third of which was scheduled for 1915. The old diplomacy, which was conducted largely in secret, was blamed for the outbreak of war in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and in the “Decree of Peace” of Vladimir Lenin (1917a). A new norm, though not accepted by Angell (Osiander 1998:417), was for more popular control of foreign policy (Lindsay 1917; Woolf 1928) and a new diplomacy of open covenants, a reform proposed a century earlier by Jeremy Bentham (Zhai and Quinn 2014). The sphere of politics widened to include debates over international relations beyond the late nineteenth century concern whether to have protective tariffs in order to protect industry from foreign competition and whether to build up armaments to deter aggression. When the U.S. Senate refused entry to the League of Nations (but not the Permanent Court of International Justice), American scholars passionately sought entry of their country into the League of Nations. What was later called “traditional” international relations was descriptive analysis, largely focusing on institutional analysis and normative argumentation. The works of James Bryce (1922), Quincy Wright (1922), G. Lowes Dickinson (1926), Pitman Potter (1929), and many others provided a standard for the field. Most recommended building international institutions, advancing international law, and developing public opinion to check the power of leaders to plunge into war. A major factor uniting their quest was to provide reasons why the United States should join the League of Nations and support peaceful resolutions of conflicts through diplomacy (Rosting 1923; Kruszewski 1941). When the League failed to prevent Japan’s aggression in China during 1931 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939, many writers provided the explanation that international relations research should have devoted more attention to power configurations. Most notable among the latter was E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis (1939). Torbjörn Knutsen (1992:196–205) has argued that there were four interwar “schools” of thought—idealism, communism, realism, and fascism. Although he cites Clyde Eagleton (1937) as an idealist scholar in the Wilsonian tradition, other scholars believe that the so-called idealists were more pragmatic than they have been characterized (Osiander 1998; Schmidt 1998). Scholars with communist leanings, including Rudolf Hilferding (1910), however were less influential in the development of the discipline. The realist with the most influence, according to Knutsen, was Winston Churchill (1938a,b); he also

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cited Hersch Lauterpacht (1933), though not E.H. Carr (1939). Fascism’s inspiration came from many sources but was particularly strengthened by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918). Within the field of international law, the concept of absolute sovereignty was no longer considered sacrosanct (Laski 1921; Krabbe 1922; Borchard 1924; Garner 1925; Follett 1934), thereby providing a rebuttal to skeptics that any country would allow power to an intergovernmental body. Their argument was that absolute sovereignty brought about international anarchy, which could be rescued by international law and international organizations. Two Geneva Conventions, for example, were adopted in 1929. But the League of Nations did not work as well as proponents hoped, Alfred Zimmern (1931:17) argued, because the practice of international diplomacy was not yet professionalized, and too few democracies joined (1936:31). Zimmern (1932:117) also urged the development of nongovernmental organizations. David Mitrany (1943) argued that World War II could have been avoided if more nonpolitical intergovernmental institutions had been constructed after 1919. Walter Lippmann (1922) considered mobilization of the public as a naïve idea. Friedrich Meineke (1924) stressed raison d’état. Whereas World War I began with a lack of face-to-face diplomacy following German support for Austria’s decision to punish Serbia, World War II began soon after diplomacy at Munich in 1938, when England and France ignored Russia’s promise of support for Czechoslovakia if they would stand firm against Hitler (Ignatieff 2016:60). Carr believed that the industrial revolution, rather than promoting world trade, had made nationalism stronger; autarkic development behind high tariff walls seemed the practice rather than free trade (Carr 1939:155). Lippmann and Carr felt that their analysis had been vindicated when World War II began: The League had failed, and the Geneva Conventions were massively violated during the war. Meanwhile, behavioralism in political science was launched by students of American politics, Quincy Wright (1942) was among the first to make the connection. Behavioralism was fundamentally founded on moral grounds because the aim was to provide truth grounded in scientific methods so that policy-makers could go beyond mere hunches and intuition to make effective decisions. After World War II, the field had to be transformed to deal with a world of two superpowers and nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a Hegelian shift in focus was needed. That there supposedly was an ideological debate between “idealists” and “realists” during the period between the two world wars was a retrospective rendering to serve the interests of the post-World War II era, which elevated the subfield of international politics over international law



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and international organization (cf. Schmidt 1998). Dealing with the Cold War became a priority, but endless debate on ideological and moral grounds involving George Kennan (1947, 1950), Hans Morgenthau (1948), and Reinhold Neibuhr (1950a,b) appeared to be getting nowhere when war broke out in Korea during 1950. Some scholars sought to shift the political science subfield of international relations into a separate multidisciplinary field that would enlist economists, sociologists, and others on behalf of the same agenda—world peace. Although recent histories of the field are truly fascinating, and deserve careful reading (Knutsen 1992; Katznelson 2003; Long and Schmidt 2005; Edkins and Vaughn-Williams 2009; Moore and Farrands 2010; Williams 2013), one looks in vain for any serious mention of behavioralism in their writing. Yet behavioralism was the very basis for the formation of the International Studies Association—advocacy of a Hegelian shift in perspectives. An exception is the writing of Nicolas Guilhot (2008, 2011), who portrays the rise of realism to seek dominance as an IR perspective as a reaction to nascent efforts of postwar scholars to import scientific methods into the field. His analysis focuses on the role of foundations in seeking where to provide research funding as well as East Coast and University of Chicago scholars who sought to control key positions in those foundations. The historical context at the time was the need to develop the field to be useful during the Cold War. Bitter debates for and against scientific behavioralism were taking place in departments of political science, as traditional scholarship was being questioned. No scholar wants to be characterized as “put out to pasture” for the rest of a potentially productive career by exponents of a new trend that might rise and fall. And traditional scholars did not want to re-tool themselves by learning statistics. Within international relations, the debate was less intense because the trend arrived much later than in political science, where the IR subfield was housed. But control of the foundations meant who would receive research grants, and behavioralists needed more funding because their research was more labor-intensive. Several scholars have identified the Rockefeller Foundation sponsorship of the 1954 conference on theory in international relations as a critical event in the development of the field. The outcome was general support to develop “theory,” which was never defined, but rejection of behavioralism as a cover for liberal ideology (Guilhot 2008:299). The hawkish international relations scholars, committed to something now called “realism,” tried to paint the behavioralist claim to engage in value-free scientific inquiry as subscribing to a naïve liberal ideology that had been discredited by the events leading up to World War II. But they were wrong. The Hegelian thesis and antithesis were definitely clashing during the 1950s.

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ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION The field of international studies began organizationally when Charles McClelland and several other West Coast scholars launched the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1958 (Teune 1982; Holsti 2014), when the fate of the world depended on avoiding nuclear war. McClelland did so during a period of Soviet nuclear bomb testing that deposited so much radioactivity in the San Francisco Bay Area, where he then taught, that a variety of locally grown agricultural products were almost weekly being declared unsafe, from asparagus to milk to zucchini. In response, protests to ban all nuclear weapons tests began. The “silent generation” had found a cause, protests to stop nuclear testing began, and ISA promised to address that concern scientifically by linking research with policy by inviting “practitioners” (Teune 1982:2). McClelland organized the ISA with the help of Ross Berkes, John Gange, Minos Generales, Robert North, Wesley Posvar, Fred Sondermann, and others (Holsti 2014). A second reason for forming ISA was that some international relations departments were separate from other social science departments. ISA provided a home not just for scholars in international relations departments but also those in political science specializing in comparative politics and international relations. American ISA scholars launched a truly international field, inviting membership from Canada at a time when scholars elsewhere around the world were less accessible for contact in the age before instant telephonic and Internet communications. Eventually, the scope spread as technology improved and funding for expensive travel to conferences in the United States was provided to scholars from Europe and elsewhere (Teune 1982:3–4). In the process, ISA affiliated with similar organizations in Britain, Japan, and Poland (ibid., p. 5). A third reason was dissatisfaction with the American Political Science Association (APSA), which considered international relations research one of six subfields in the discipline. APSA was too America-centric (ibid., pp. 1–2). And too dominated by East Coast scholars! Although far from the centers of power of New York and Washington, those founding ISA in California were seeking a way to prevent nuclear war by building theory with a solid empirical foundation that might be used to advise the American government and the United Nations. They sought metatheories or paradigms based on empirical research involving proposition testing (mid-level theories) that would operationalize concepts derived from macro-theories in the form of low-level hypotheses. Known as “behavioralists,” they could be found primarily at Michigan, Northwestern, and Stanford. They sought to supersede traditional international relations scholarship and provide policy guidance based on scientific research.



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The emergence of ISA must be understood in the context of the early development of the field, when Thomas Kuhn’s writing on paradigms became the subject of much fanfare within the natural and social sciences (Kuhn 1962; cf. Wolin 1980). Kuhn, of course, was developing the term “paradigm” from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953:99), who used the term as a name for something perceived in the real world, thus inherently a concept referring to isomorphisms. Kuhn’s critics then challenged his reconstruction of the logic of science (Lakatos and Musgrave 1978; Gutting 1980). Indeed, Imre Lakatos (1970) suggested that science progresses by finding new problems to solve (problem shift instead of paradigm shift), arguing that scientific progress instead emerges from “research programs” (Lakatos and Musgrave 1978). BEHAVIORALIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Even before World War II, some politicians in the United States were suspicious of the inroads of communists and fascists into American life. When the Cold War began, Congressional investigators focused on idealist academics, believing that some were Marxists or closet Communists. Congressional hearings of academics, the Hollywood film industry, and trade unions resulted in firing distinguished professors, blacklisting members of the film industry, and jail sentences for trade union leaders and others. Even political scientist Harold Lasswell was falsely accused of Communist leanings and had his security clearance revoked for a time (Farr, Hacker, Kazee 2006:582). Academics, who considered themselves objective observers, then feared that they might suffer serious consequences for making policy recommendations based on their research—or even by wearing red ties. Into the breach, international relations scholars joined behavioralist social scientists in advancing their research as scientific, not ideological. The main reason for developing behavioralism was that reliance on Morgenthauistic realism was considered dangerous and unscientific (cf. Holsti 2014). David Easton (1951) called for a general theory that would bring together empirical theories. Pendelton Herring (1953:968–72) wanted political scientists, including international relations scholars, to deepen their analyses “from the symptoms to the causes” by pursuing theory. As Harold Lasswell pointed out, political scientists could not then become employed in government positions unless they carried with them a scientific method (Lasswell 1951a:134). Endless descriptive studies did not impress the new behavioralists: Easton (1953) decried “hyperfactualism,” by which he meant that social scientists were piling up facts in study after study without integrating them theoretically. When interviewed a few years ago, he clarified that he had empirical paradigms (macro-theories) in mind when he used the word “theory.”

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Behavioralism was initially swept up in the quest for general systems theory, which sought a single explanatory paradigm for everything in the universe, including the social sciences (Bertalanffy 1968). Theorists in international relations were urged to look for isomorphisms—similar patterns in different arenas of life throughout the universe that may be explained by the same scientific law or laws. Raymond Aron (1967) cautioned that search for a single theory was naïve, and the later development of diverse behavioral inquiries proved that Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s quest was not taken seriously for very long within international studies. Ford Foundation, nevertheless, provided funding for some initial behavioral projects. Kenneth Waltz (1959) and David Singer (1961) delineated three levels of analysis—individual, societal, and international. At the individual level were those studying foreign policy decision-making, notably Richard Snyder and associates (1963). Societal-level research was rarely studied, though some research began along those lines (Haas 1965b, 1968). Among the scholars who sought to examine the international system as a whole were Morton Kaplan (1957) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979), though they were better at formulating theories than testing them. What was then called “behavioralism” professed to look for paradigms as metatheories—that is, integrated clusters of propositions that would generate hypotheses based on operationalized concepts relating to problem areas (causes of civil strife, revolution, war, etc.) which could be tested with empirical data, either through systematic comparisons or manipulation of quantitative indicators of concepts developed from paradigms (Dahl 1961a). Some behavioralists even appeared to claim that traditional research should be wastebasketed because scientific norms were not applied. International relations was the last subfield of political science other than political theory to develop in a behavioralist direction. Even political theory was thought to be obsolescing because all truth-claims of theorists could be subjected to empirical testing, according to the positivist view. Such extreme behavioralism was yet another pretext for the founding of ISA—to move away from insular political science (cf. Williams 2013:648). Unfortunately, many early behavioralist efforts in international relations were amateurish—not scientific enough or perhaps “scientistic” (Crick 1959). Systems theory was far too abstract to be of much use. (See Chapter 8 herein for some remnants.) The task of developing paradigms was left to graduate students of the initial behavioralists, who ploughed ahead by mid-level theory testing. Behavioralists eschewed deriving policy implications from promising research as unscientific. Hence, when the word “should” was uttered during an oral doctoral exam in 1961, political scientist John Bunzel, a member of the committee, repeated the word in a discouraging tone. What some



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members of the younger generation of behavioralists then had in mind was that there needed to be a coherent backlash to the anti-Communist furor—to confront rather than ignore policy problems. Soon, the terms “multimethodological” and “neotraditional” were coined to advance the notion that the discipline had room for both traditional and behavioralist types of research (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970)—for a Hegelian synthesis. The insistence that truth only emerged from hypothesis testing, according to the strictures of Rudolf Carnap (1932), was too narrow a view, according to the multimethodological and neotraditional critiques, which were articulated by behavioralists and nonbehavioralists to stop an unnecessary division of the field into warring camps. The problem with early behavioralism was that policy implications and prebehavioral research had been unfairly cast out. Hedley Bull (1966), who was delighted on hearing such a neotraditional plea presented at an ISA conference, agreed that behavioralism could never extinguish traditional international relations research. Neither the “neotraditional” nor the “multimethodological” terms became popular, however, and are now forgotten. Scholars preferred separatist debate, and departments hired according to which approach prevailed within their faculty. Among European scholars moving to the United States with a strong philosophical background, Karl Deutsch (1953, 1954) best exemplified the focus on paradigmatic thinking. His Social Transactions paradigm (see Chapter 6 below) predicted that social networks would bring peace by engaging diverse peoples in a common social system. The implication of his research was to support ideological idealism, but he was very cautious about drawing that conclusion. Ernst Haas (1958b) developed the related neofunctional paradigm to explain the development of supranational institutions developing in Western Europe, which he clearly favored, and he nonetheless conducted his research descriptively while seeking generalizations to lend credence to his theory. From academic homes at opposite ends of the country, behavioralists were united in believing that nationalism must be suppressed to avoid World War III. Their paradigms—and those of Kenneth Organski (1958), Anatol Rapoport (1960), and many others—stimulated a new generation of behavioralist scholars. BEHAVIORALIST CONCEPTUAL AND DATABASE DEVELOPMENT By the early 1960s, behavioralists were eager to develop paradigmatic concepts and quantitative databases, essential for scientific research. First of all, they sought conceptual frameworks for theory. Conceptual development was

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undertaken by Gabriel Almond (1956, 1960), who developed a typology of eight functional stages in the political process, which were also applied to the functioning of international organizations (Haas 1965a) and to international relations as a whole (Haas 1974b:ch10). Morton Kaplan (1957) characterized five international systems, going beyond the Morgenthauistic balance-ofpower system to include even the idea of a unit-veto system in which every country would have nuclear deterrents. Fred Riggs (1964) suggested new terms intermediate between dichotomous characterizations of political systems. The vocabulary of international studies was expanding to incorporate new insights, providing concepts that could be operationalized if appropriate indicators were selected. But behavioralists also needed data. A Tycho Brahe-type accumulation of UN statistical yearbooks provided massive amounts of data about countries, making quantitative and statistical international relations possible (Haas 1962, 1966). Arthur Banks and Robert Textor (1963) prepared A Cross-Polity Survey, with 57 variables across 122 countries in a volume three inches thick. A group of Yale political scientists incorporated 75 statistical measures for about as many countries into the pages of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Russett, Alker, Deutsch, Lasswell 1964), which went through two more editions (Taylor and Hudson 1972; Taylor and Jodice 1983). David Singer developed a database of wars, which expanded over the years (Singer and Small 1966, 1972) and eventually merged into a database originally developed by Ted Robert Gurr (1966) that now has evolved into the Polity database, which has gone through four iterations (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2012). McClelland (1961) tried to develop 22 types of events data, which later were absorbed into the current Militarized Interstate Disputes database (Maoz 2005). Richard Rosecrance (1963) delineated several historical international subsystems along Kaplanistic lines. None of the efforts to develop databases, however, involved operationalizations of concepts, as that task was left to theory testing. When an early developer admitted that events data had not achieved anything of note (East 1987), one obvious comment was that the database consisted neither of operationalizations of concepts developed from paradigms nor was pursued to solve a policy question (Haas 1988). Behavioralist research, in many other cases, remained largely hyperfactual, trying to find something of interest by playing with data for data’s sake. Prominent behavioralists, including David Singer, had abandoned or postponed paradigm development. Later, NSF denied a grant to Singer because he wanted to assemble yet another database without any theoretical relevance. The problem with the behavioralist data maniacs was that they manipulated variables without any concern for concepts and thus diverged from behavioralists who



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wanted to develop paradigms. The former, who now dominate quantitative studies in the field, subscribed to an imitation of positivism. The latter, who pursue concepts and paradigms are postpositivists, while the ism-ists (realism, liberalism, etc.) pretend not to know the difference (Fierke 2002). Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War (1959) opened vistas to several paradigms of international studies at three conceptual levels. But many behavioralists considered paradigms to be too speculative, preferring hypothesis testing of middle-range theory with empirical data (Eulau 1963). Most behavioralist international studies scholars preferred the word “theory” to describe the basis for their hypothesis testing. As a result, “theory” was then assumed to refer to consist of middle-range thinking about empirical propositions (related clusters of hypotheses) tested by operationalizing concepts in the form of hypotheses. James Rosenau (1966) was perhaps the most honest by describing his speculative efforts to develop a paradigm as “pre-theory.” Kuhnian paradigm development was expected to follow years later in order to organize findings when sufficient proposition testing had been completed to see a larger picture from individual studies. That vision of alternative paradigmatic explanations for basic sociopolitical phenomena guided preparation of the later Polity and Society (1992), which compared paradigms on the basis of differing ontological assumptions despite the caution of Johan Galtung not to use the term “metaphysics,” which was anathema to positivistic behavioralists. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s word “paradigm” referred to metatheory or macro-theory—to empirical or covering laws that subsume mid-level theories used to formulate micro-level hypothesis testing. The aim of paradigms is to provide a deep understanding, going beyond mid-level theory testing that only seeks conceptual explanations. That the term “paradigm” would ever be used to refer to ideologies would then have been considered heretical—as a deliberate effort to muddy precise language, contrary to the very foundation and goals of the International Studies Association. While behavioralism began to flourish, graduate students in political science were required to pass exams in several subfields of the discipline (at Stanford, four of the six subfields of political science in the early 1960s). But with the influx of baby boomers into colleges, graduate students of behavioralists were allowed to pass only one exam in their own field, a depreciation of the quality of graduate education that resulted in an end to quest for isomorphisms from one subfield to another or from other academic disciplines. The next generation, in other words, was not equipped to carry on the banner of scientific behavioralism in developing paradigms that would apply across many elements of international studies. And behavioralists had also been avoiding the proposed neotraditional synthesis. An understandable backlash then emerged to behavioralism.

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POSTBEHAVIORALISM Large-scale American military intervention into Vietnam’s civil war from 1965 changed the political landscape. Daily bodycounts on television provoked protests, some even larger than civil rights demonstrations that had been ongoing since the late 1950s. President Lyndon Johnson resigned after hearing the chant “LBJ, how many have you killed today?” ad nauseam from windows in the White House. Although President Richard Nixon promised to end the war with honor, his dishonorable bombing of Cambodia and phony peace negotiations stimulated so much public opposition that the relative tranquility of the traditional-behavioralist debate was interrupted at ISA conferences with demands for anti-war resolutions. The Dependency paradigm (see Chapter 8 below) then became prominent in a postbehavioralist era, though more on a qualitative than a quantitative basis (Tickner 2013). As a result of the incorporation of new paradigms into the field, scholars from other parts of the world felt that ISA was no longer American-centric, and membership expanded (ISA 2016:3). Election of economist Kenneth Boulding as ISA president in 1974 signaled that the organization was committed to scholars outside political science. Proposition and hypothesis testing of behavioralist international relations was questioned as irrelevant to the major questions of the day. Postbehavioralism, with a focus on policy and to the exclusion of paradigm development from testing empirical theories, became the new antithesis. Rather than appreciating the value of generating new knowledge through statistical research, behavioralism was stereotyped as “positivist” and rejected for philosophical reasons. The promising baby was thrown out with the statistical bathwater. Yet many postbehavioralists accepted the label “positivist” because they pursued “scientific realism” (e.g., Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999:39; cf. Fierke 2002:332–33). Morgenthau (1965), for example, opposed focusing American military power on Vietnam, citing realist principles. He was among the antibehavioralists. Nixon’s triumphalist view of the role of the United States as the world’s peacekeeper (through war and covert action) stimulated op-eds by political scientists in the New York Times and Washington Post. The realistidealist debate was revived, especially when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye offered a “neoliberal” alternative, culminating in Power and Interdependence (1977). Ideology prevailed, though now the dialectic was between idealists and liberals. Although few behavioralists viewed their efforts as leading to improved policy, postbehavioralists preferred to leave out macro-level and even mid-level theory so that they could analyze policy problems ideologically. That left a gulf in the discipline dividing policy-oriented research from the “simplistic” hypothesis testers, neither interested in macro-theory, which



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continues to the present (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). Forgotten were the policy and research interests of the original West Coast behavioralists. Warren Philipps (1974) then wrote an essay “Where Have All the Theories Gone?” In his essay, he identified several behavioralist paradigms, including the field theory of Kurt Lewin (1951), rank theory of Johan Galtung (1966), arms race theory of Lewis Richardson (1960a,b), and conflict-of-interest theory of Robert Axelrod (1970). His plea to return to paradigm development was ignored, however, by both positivistic behavioralists and the ideologists who now claim that isms are theories. The field developed in a different direction, as postbehavioralism became the new orthodoxy. The following chapter explains how the original goals of ISA were betrayed and why current scholars of international studies have consigned empirical paradigms to a theoretical orphanage. Today, international studies is the only field in the social sciences mired in isms, where orthodox scholars believe that empirical paradigms do not exist.

Chapter 2

The Great Masquerade Waltzing to Theoretical Oblivion

In 1979, Kenneth Waltz wrote Theory of International Politics (1979), offering a revision of realism, known later as “neorealism,” a term that he did not use at first. He thereby provided something that postbehavioralists enjoyed—debate on the norms to be applied in the analysis of international policy. But he did not advocate a scientific test of his approach. Despite an earlier interest in paradigms (Waltz 1959), he explicitly deemed the disparate works of Morton Kaplan, Richard Rosecrance, and David Singer—perhaps easy targets—as inadequate according to his criteria of the components of “good theory.” What followers of Waltz did was to promote a discourse in which ideology became upgraded to “theory” while behavioralist theory was dismissed as “positivist.” Ideological “theories” triumphed over behavioralist analysis. However, Waltz’s impact was not immediate. Writing in 1982, Henry Teune identified four “general ‘world’ views” (pp. 9–10): • The dominant view, in his opinion, was “the international system of states and the perspectives of international relations, law, organization, and the problems of conflict and cooperation or war and peace. The world system is the outcome of state action.” • The second most popular focus was on “interdependence and dependence,” including non-state and transnational actors with attention to economic and social aspects of the international or global system. • Developmental theories, Marxist and non-Marxist, as well as human rights, ranked third. • At the bottom was ideology, in particular “nationalism, great religions, and the ideological re-definition of the world society . . .” 19

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Yet many today celebrate Waltz as enabling “IR’s theory-building enterprise in the first place” (Epstein 2013:501), though he turned his back on prior efforts to operationalize concepts derived from paradigms to test empirical theory. That his incoherent ideological effort would become the Holy Grail of “IR theory” was unimaginable to those who founded ISA. While approvingly referring to philosopher Ernst Nagel (1961) as the source of his inspiration, Waltz violated the cardinal Nagelian principle that entangling morality with science commits numerous fallacies. In fact, Nagel’s ahistorical approach to science sparked the refutation by Kuhn (Ruse 1988). Waltz, in other words, carved out his own views somewhere in limbo. To pave the way for intellectual transformations, a scholar must not only have ideas but also a generation of graduate students who are willing to promote those ideas. Waltz had those at the University of California at Berkeley. The domination of any field requires captivating large graduating student populations at major universities who are eager to please their professors in order to secure employment. Accordingly, Waltz assassinated empirical paradigms without a proper burial. Waltz, thus, guillotined the behavioralist quest for paradigms by refocusing on ideology, with consequences for the discipline far beyond postbehavioralism. A new generation of scholars has read almost nothing in the field before Waltz (Kaarbo 2015), and the field of international studies has not recovered from Waltz’s reification of ideology as “theory.” Ever since, ideology has masqueraded as the only type of major theory in the field. Empirical research has been downgraded to “mid-level theory.” Ideologies now even masquerade as “paradigms.” According to the trichotomy of Auguste Comte (1830–42), ideological contention is theological, not scientific, and definitely not theoretical. Max Weber (1919[1948]:125–26) warned that social science should stand outside ideology and practice ethically responsible research (cf. Smith 2004:503–4). But Weberian social science has been backburnered by IR ideologists (Laiz and Schlitchte 2016). While a renewed debate between realists and neorealists next captured the attention of the discipline, neoliberalism emerged as a coherent alternative, though a scholar once argued that the task of the discipline was to effect a “merger of the two fundamental traditions” (Kegley 1994:8). Joining the isms in due course were constructivism and feminism, again with normative considerations in mind, though both are to a certain extent methodological insofar as they focus on concept formation (Locher and Prügl 2001). But elevating ideologies as “theory” or even as “paradigms” (Walt 1998; Geller and Vasquez 2004) has confused the discipline, as Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon (2010) have definitively pointed out. They flatter middle-range (proposition testing) theory in international studies by suggesting that researchers have tried to follow Lakatos, not Kuhn, thereby abandoning macro-level



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(paradigm development) theory. One recent thoughtful commentary has even used the oxymoron term “paradigmatic ism” (Bennett 2013:462) to refer to something that he rejects as nonproductive in the development of knowledge. Indeed, the very terms “metatheory” and “paradigm” have been redefined in current discourse to refer to an ideological contest between three “metatheories” or “three major paradigms or ‘research traditions’—realism, liberalism, and constructivism” (Reus-Smit 2013:595; cf. Chernoff 2007). But whereas the first two apply ideology to policy without the need for verifying truthclaims, the latter ism does the same whenever applied as an exposure of how elites frame concepts to beguile the masses (cf. Foucault 1975), an important element of the Mass Society paradigm (see Chapter 5 below). However, social constructive analysis (minus the ideologically framed “ism”) is an extraordinarily useful tool in constructing paradigms (e.g., Flanik 2011). Indeed, Amitav Acharya (2011) has added the term “norm subsidiarity” to the social construction lexicon, referring to a new set of norms by minority elements to counteract orthodoxies (once known as an antithesis), just as postbehavioralist followers of the god of isms sought to go beyond behavioralism. In short, postbehavioralists following Waltz kidnapped the paradigmatic vocabulary of behavioralists. Future generations subscribing to Waltz would never know that the term “paradigm” for empirical researchers meant a metatheory guiding proposition development and hypothesis testing, both qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative element would be name-called as “positivist” irrespective of the research design employed. While one scholar has asserted that realism and liberalism dominate the field (Biersteker 2012), other researchers, using the very same title as the 1974 Philipps article—“Where Have All the Theories Gone?,”—assumed that the main “theories” of international studies are realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism, and Marxism (Callaway and Matthews 2015). The latter analysis, based on a study of textbooks in the field, in which empirical paradigms are entirely absent, reinforced the view that the intellectual history of international studies is a war that was lost by the behavioralist generation due to the imperialism of those who decided to embrace the thinking of Kenneth Waltz and disavow what paradigm-seeking European scholars brought to the United States—scientific thinking that had been expelled by the Nazis (Snyder 2015). In contrast, a study of 18 textbooks for the years 2000–2003 demonstrated that at least a dozen substantive issues were featured, and even mid-level theory was a component (Grove 2003; Smith 2003). In other words, a tectonic shift in coverage among the major textbooks within the field occurred within only a decade. In the deconstructionist view of Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2015:45), American-type liberalism, though an ideology, has now become the dominant

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mode of thinking in the field because American scholars dominate international studies (cf. Griffiths 2011:14). She has implied that the dominance is maintained both unconsciously and by dismissal of all other viewpoints. She cited paradigmatic scholar Karl Deutsch, but oddly classified him as a “liberal” (p. 43). Forgetting that Deutsch’s paradigmatic ideas arose in the antiideological era of behavioralism is more evidence that isms have hijacked the profession in order to ignore empirical paradigms. What had happened is that the antipathy toward normative-based research during the behavioralist era even carried past postbehavioralism in which, according to Steve Smith (2004:503), “normative theory [is] a real no-no for the U.S. academic community because it is ‘not scientific’ . . .” He insightfully implied that researchers focusing on ideologically-based isms have been fooling themselves into believing that they are engaging in objective research. POST-COLD WAR CONFUSION During the Cold War, the major focus was on how to prevent nuclear war, crowding out other interests. When the Cold War ended, though not predicted by scholars of international studies, a variety of interests blossomed—human rights, the responsibility to protect, the role of the United Nations, the world economy, the growth of democracy, global warming, the role of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), and diplomacy (Haas 2014c:ch12). Government leaders even apologized to other countries for their past mistakes (ibid., pp. 247–48). A new focus seemed warranted. Although President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a “new world order,” he was accused of lacking a “vision” (Ajemian 2008). Visions, of course, are paradigms. International studies responded with increasingly disconnected research. Some studies were policy oriented, such as Zbigniew Brzezinksi’s The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead (1990), and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History (1992). Others continued to test hypotheses quantitatively, but were not interested in dozens of relevant paradigms. Using Lakatosian language, the “democratic peace” was christened as a “research program” (Ray 2003), as were balance-of-power theory (Vasquez 2003), and power transition theory (DiCicco and Levy 1999). Whereas “democratic peace” researchers never even defined their key concept, readers herein will find Balance-of-Power Rationality described below in Chapter 7, and power transition theory will be absorbed into the Disequilibrium paradigm in Chapter 8. By failing to pursue paradigms, mid-level theory in one area of international relations failed to



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find isomorphisms in other areas or in other social science disciplines and has remained parochial. Whereas David Lake (2013:577) has referred to “democratic peace” as an admirable mid-level research agenda that grew from a “normative insight [that] led eventually to an empirical observation,” thus admitting that the research was primarily ideological in origin, he failed to note that the world now knows that the ideological subtext of “democratic peace” was invoked by Washingtonians (e.g., Boot 2003) to justify the American effort to create democracy in Iraq (cf. Haas 2014a:ch6). In contrast, behavioralists rejected ideologically advanced nostrums, insisting on empirical proof. But the “democratic peace” remains elusive because that research agenda never considered the term as a concept with multiple meanings which defies simple operationalization. As a result, the supposed “democratic peace” empirical finding has been systematically refuted in scores of studies (ibid., ch5), even by those using the same fundamentally flawed research designs, suggesting that something had been cooked along the way. The latter has even been confessed, as the authors of one study have admitted that they rejected operationalization of “democracy” as a continuous variable because correlations and statistical significance are higher with a dichotomous (0/1) variable (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, Russett 1996)! What instead developed after the Cold War was a plethora of topics, ably described by Christine Sylvester (2013) as campfires that lost sight of flags of other campfires. The original focus of international relations on war has now been broadened by many other concerns. New ISA sections have developed: • Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies • Diplomatic Studies • English School Section • Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies • Environmental Studies • Foreign Policy Analysis • Feminist Theory and Gender Studies • Global Development Studies • Global Health Studies • Historical International Relations • Human Rights • Intelligence Studies • International Communication • International Education • International Ethics • International Law • International Organization

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• International Political Economy • International Political Sociology • International Security Studies • Peace Studies • Political Demography and Geography • Post-Communist Systems in International Relations • Religion and International Relations • Science, Technology and Art in International Relations • Scientific Study of International Processes • South Asia in World Politics • Theory. As the camps became cliques, what they produced was ignored whenever considered inconsequential in other camps, all lacking a macro-theoretical flag—or a recognizably dominant flag that was established by gatekeepers of the discipline (Brecher 1999; Tickner 2013). The problem was not diversity, which should be applauded, but a lack of cross-fertilization of ideas. Particularly annoyed by the rise of the Rational Choice paradigm (see Chapter 7 below), Alex Mintz (2007a,b) once proposed adding “Behavioral International Relations” to the list as a separate subfield as if Rational Choice research were nonbehavioral. Even though pursuing foreign policy analysis, he evidently wanted to separate from that subfield as well. Today, specialized ISA journal editors apply narrow definitions of the scope of what they will accept, and publishers have released “handbooks” with disconnected literature reviews. Meanwhile, the testing of empirical paradigms is apparently off limits (Lake 2013:580). Bringing the discipline together has become a lost cause. That a paper must be submitted only to two sections at an ISA convention gives further evidence that narrow presentations are preferred. Although there are occasional joint panels, sponsored by two sections, a proposal that every paper can only be accepted if first approved by at least two sections would be resisted by those who want the quality of international studies to be limited, lacking in paradigmatic universality. Thus, anyone seeking to elicit comments on paradigms with isomorphisms across several of the subfields would have to deliver the paper in each section for decades, given the restriction on the number of papers that one can read at an ISA convention—or might be told that the paper only is appropriate in one—or none—because the paper is not subfield-specific enough. In an effort to provide a foundation for future research beyond the confusion, Polity and Society (1992) was written to review many alternative paradigms relating to several problems, including civil strife, development,



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international cooperation, and international violence. Each paradigm was described as a set of linked causal propositions developed by several communities of scholars over time, calling for additional research. More recently (Haas 2014c:ch4), several paradigms have been added, as developed in subsequent chapters herein. Although Tony Affigne recently said that he has often consulted the contents of Polity and Society, the book was never reviewed. Reflecting on the 1970s, Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan (2013:125) recalled “a general backlash against systemic or macro-level theorizing in the name of new microlevel [‘particularistic’] rationalist consensus.” Another reason for rejection of paradigms may be a comment by Robert Keohane, which was presented at a major panel on international studies during the biennial convention of the International Political Science Association at Berlin in 1994. Without mentioning the name of an author or a book title, he succinctly said that he did not agree that the field should pursue paradigms. In response, a speaker after Keohane’s comment in Berlin indicated that sections of the field should focus on problem areas, such as civil strife, development, international cooperation, and international violence, and those present expressed strong agreement. Some ISA sections developed along those lines, and others brought together scholarly communities of various sorts, but the search for isomorphisms and empirical paradigms was lost in the shuffle. Later, Keohane urged “rationalist” research (neoliberalism and neoliberalism) rather than constructivist “reflectivism” (Keohane 1989:173) and epistemological “monism” to avoid “nihilism” (quoted in Jackson 2015:1). In his ISA presidential address, Steve Smith (2004) decried the Anglocentrism that ignored many concepts, including what Johan Galtung (1980) has called “structural violence”—the complacency of rich nations that refuse to deal with the neglect and poverty of various parts of the world where the attacks on 9/11 were celebrated. Smith then urged efforts to go beyond theoretical explanations to develop theoretical understanding. Although he did not say so, his plea was for paradigms, which provide “visions” that go beyond ideologies and mid-level theories. But his plea has been largely ignored. END OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY? As the twenty-first century has progressed, endless disputes about ideological alternatives, canonized as “theory,” have been annoying a new generation of scholars. Nowadays, some international studies researchers seem to have decided to give up on theory and just pursue whatever they want, however they will, recalling the spirit of traditionalism.

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A theoretical oblivion seems inevitable in the next generation. As that would be a major milestone in the history of international studies, panels at two ISA conferences were presented. Two journals published papers from that conference. The European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) attracted about a dozen scholars to give their views on the possible “end of international relations theory” within the pages of an entire issue in 2013 that was dedicated to Kenneth Waltz. Five papers inspired by the conferences were published in International Studies Perspectives (ISP) during 2015. About a decade earlier, the challenge of constructivism inspired a somewhat similar symposium in International Studies Review (Geller and Vasquez 2004). Many EJIR essays demonstrate considerable sophistication in regard to philosophy as a field concerned with epistemology, ethics, and ontology (metaphysics). Yet the terms “isomorphism” and “operationalization” as well as “decision-maker” and “operational code,” so important in the behavioralist era, appear nowhere in the essays. And there was not a single progenitor of empirical theory to defend the craft. The dice were loaded, in other words, to defend the status quo in which ideologies continue to masquerade as the only “theories” in town. Within ISP, the no empirical theory was cited, though terms “concepts” and “operationalizations” were used by one perceptive scholar (Jackson 2015:19). The ISP focus was instead on methodological and theoretical pluralism, but again ideologies were assumed to be the only “theories” in the discipline. Whereas the International Studies Association was launched by behavioralists to supersede the previous ideological debate between idealists and realists, the current trend is to glorify ideology, the opposite of what ISA founders originally intended. And despite the postbehavioralist insistence on policy-relevant research, the discourse on ideology has retreated into ivory tower philosophizing. It is no wonder that many seek an “end to IR theory” as currently practiced despite pleas with the ISP forum for a common discourse in which scholars will no longer talk past one another and pretend that such “pluralism” is acceptable. Accordingly, the 2013 EJIR issue can be deconstructed as an attempt to establish an ossified orthodoxy. The prevailing assumption was that normative ideologies—isms—are theories that have developed a non-ideological body of useful knowledge. The essays failed to imagine that a scholar committed to an ideology would ever go beyond such thinking by making an empirical test of basic ideological assumptions. Yet some studies have disproved a tenet of realism that military readiness deters war (Niou, Ordeshook, Rose 1989; Niou and Ordeshook 1990; cf. Vasquez 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Rathbun 2008; Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 2011). And the institutionalist tenet of (neo) liberalism also failed in a cross-test with the Deutschian paradigm (Haas



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2013:ch7). According to Samuel Barkin (2009:233), there is a fundamental contradiction between professing to describe “how states will behave, and to make arguments about how states should behave.” Ideology, after all, provides normative perspectives for action. David Lake (2011, 2013), echoing an earlier “separate tables” criticism of political science by Gabriel Almond (1990), has blasted isms as “evil,” claiming that theory, epistemology, and academic sects have been “impediments to understanding and progress.” Although some scholars thought that his critique went too far (Nau 2011; Sil and Katzenstein 2011), he was invited to include an essay in the EJIR 2013 issue. What Lake in effect revealed is that many American scholars want to apply accumulated knowledge to policy because they live in a country where they can have input to the political system. But the input has been ideologically based, not a result of empirical research. Indeed, Brian Rathbun (2012) unsurprisingly concluded from a survey that IR scholars chose their professional ideology based on their personal ideology. But he treated their professional viewpoints as “paradigms,” referring to them as “realism, liberalism idealism, constructivism, Marxist/feminism, rationalism/neoliberalism, and English school” (p. 616)! In response, Nicholas Onuf (2012) declared that he kept his values separate from his “political society” paradigm. Indeed, European scholars, including those on an “IR theory” panel at a recent convention of the European International Studies Association, believed that they lack political access and were more comfortable impressing one another by philosophizing, including comments on American ideologues. Only three EJIR essays used the term “concept.” Two argued that the discipline should have a place for behavioralist and nonbehavioralist research. But, unlike the more respectful memory of David Lake (2013), they did not use the term “behavioralism.” The first did not identify any particular paradigm, past or present (Guzzini 2015), while the second essay classified three “families” of empirically based “post-paradigmatic” theories that focus on actors and actions (Jackson and Nexon 2013). Lake extolled current midrange research agendas, presumably continuing the behavioralist tradition of seeking knowledge through empirical evidence, for being insightful and productive while he regretted that the rest of the discipline has been wasting effort by contesting ideologies. The third essay citing the word “concept” noted that some scholars in the Third World developed the Dependency paradigm only to learn that the paradigm was subjected to behavioralist analysis and then largely rejected because empirical evidence was insufficient, whereas the nonbehavioralist variant developed into forms of postcolonial discourse (Tickner 2013:640–41). Although Christian Reus-Smit (2013) primarily critiqued the “eclecticism” of Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein (2010, 2011), his analysis seemingly

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applied to Lake as well. Whereas Sil and Katzenstein recommended the incorporation of concepts found within realism, liberalism, and constructivism into their empirical research, Reus-Smit argued that any research agenda must come to terms with the philosophical assumptions that underlie and control the “truth” that emerges, and he then proceeded to deconstruct from Sil and Katzenstein a bias toward the outdated “correspondence theory of truth” (Reus-Smit 2013:604). But he endorsed a “call for a more expansive form of eclecticism” that would continue to contest truth claims as problematic because inevitably based on assumptions about epistemology and ontology. What was most shocking in many EJIR essays was that major paradigms, developed with great care over decades of behavioralist research, were forgotten. One highly revered scholar (Brown 2013), for example, attributed the term “grand theory” to C. Wright Mills. Unlike Michael Williams (2013:649), he failed to recognize Mills’s paradigm of mass society, which has been used to explain everything from civil strife, how (un)democratic foreign policy-making relates to decisions to go to war, and how the international system operates without central coordination (Haas 1992:ch6–8), as developed in Chapter 5 below. Instead, he preferred to equivalence “grand theory” with ideology and to compliment policy innovations on normative ideological rather than empirical or scientific grounds. Another scholar gave Waltz credit for providing “the first ‘picture’ of the world as a whole . . . as a system” (Epstein 2013:503,n5). But systems analysis was in fact the contribution of many scholars, notably Morton Kaplan (1957) and Richard Rosecrance (1963). Similarly, Alexander Wendt (1999) is lionized as offering the “first systemic social theory of international politics” (Epstein 2013:504), whereas that was the stellar achievement of Karl Deutsch (1953, 1954). Even David Lake (2013:576), eloquently summarizing progress within the “open economy politics” research agenda, failed to discern that such mid-level research fits well into traditional paradigms. He ignored the venerable Pressure Group paradigm dating from Arthur Bentley (1908) that was retitled the Interest Group paradigm by David Truman (1951), presumably to include groups that fail to exert pressure, and has now morphed into a variant of the Rational Choice Paradigm, which Arlene Tickner (2013:634) believed to be the dominant paradigm in the United States today (see Chapter 7 herein). Yet most international relations scholars have abandoned paradigm development—or have been too lazy intellectually to keep up with the energetic developer of one variant of the Rational Choice paradigm—Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Within International Studies Perspectives, Patrick Jackson (2015) undertook an extended comment on epistemological disagreements in international studies research as a protest against “nihilistic relativism” disguised as “tolerance” (pp. 20–21). Yet he, too, assumed that the various ideologies



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were the only paradigms in the field. For example, he took issue with apriori claims of structural realism. Within a coauthored EJIR essay, Jackson and Daniel Nexon (2013) attempted to propose three “post-paradigms”—choice-theoretic, experiencenear, and social-relational—which might go beyond ideologies claiming to be paradigms. The first is commonly known as the Rational Choice paradigm (see Chapter 7 below). The second and third are embedded within several paradigms presented below (Chapters 4–8). In sum, EJIR and ISP indulged sacred cows. Censorship is even part of the “paradigmatic war,” as gatekeeping journal editors have refused to publish tests of empirical paradigms or even the present critique, not even referring them for peer reviews. Among publishers refusing to publish the present book as a textbook on IR theory, only Lynne Rienner was honest enough to admit a fear that adoption of the present book would cut into profits from an existing IR theory book devoted to ideologies by challenging that orthodoxy. Another publisher was so eager to avoid the competition that they insisted on a retitling, explicitly signaling that the book would not be marketed as a textbook to compete with their current mainstream tomes. THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF ISMS ON THEORY BUILDING What is now happening in articles and books on various international phenomena is that a researcher, to shed light on a problem or topic, will rely on insights from one ism, might pour cold water on another, but rarely will turn to a paradigmatic-based empirical theory. In other words, theory construction has become ad hoc, piecemeal—or just absent. There are many ideas within the isms; but, because of their apriorism, they are not laid out in the form of systematized propositions for testing. Similarly, mid-level theory testing lacks theoretical cumulation across the current literature of international studies. Empirical paradigms that start from a model that can be diagrammed over time have the advantage of nesting propositions to allow an understanding of the field, not just an explanation. The same phenomenon can be studied from the perspective of several paradigms, allowing the paradigms to acquire depth. Instead, isms claims to be self-evident, do not seek the same kind of depth, but could be unpacked into testable hypotheses—but there is a refusal to do so. Paradigm development involves formulating a set of propositions that consist of posited relationships between concepts. When ideas from the isms are translated into the conceptual format of a paradigm, theory development can occur. The normative principles behind isms are still free to be applied to policies, but they should not be substitutes for empirical research.

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Demonstrating how existing studies can fit into major paradigms is not difficult. In the following pages, the narrative does just that—showing how hundreds of disconnected research approaches and findings directly relate to existing if unrecognized empirical paradigms. In other words, the current barrage of individual research efforts can be reconfigured through the advance of empirical paradigms. CONCLUSION There has been a tragic loss of paradigm development in international studies. Behavioral IR sought interdisciplinarity, with paradigms enriched by scholars of several academic disciplines. But that goal has been betrayed by the separation into separate subfields. At the present time, there is an odd disjunction between ideologically based isms and hypothesis testing derived mid-level questions, both claiming to be “theory.” Although there are many definitions of “theory,” ideology is rarely so described in science (Rapoport 1958). The normative Hegelian debate among various isms will and should continue, as argued long ago in the neotraditional and methodological pleas (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970), because they serve as alternative and complementary guides to policy, even though the current listing in introductory textbooks is incomplete, not including communitarianism (Cochran 1999; Etzioni 2004, 2008, 2012; Haas 2014c:ch12). Ideologies, eager to be marketed as apriori truths, actually bury their paradigmatic content, as will be seen later in the volume. If unpacked into testable propositions, as in a recent volume, Networks of Nations (Maoz 2011), they would lose their following as negative findings emerged, so they continue their aprioristic claims. Meanwhile, hyperfactualist hypothesis testing now resembles humpty dumpty, a mass of unrelated research agendas. Recognizing that the study of foreign policy has myriad “microtheories,” David Houghton (2007) has called for some effort to unify that area of international studies, to which William Flanik (2011) has replied that the answer is “metaphorical framing.” But the latter term is a description of the construction of metatheory and paradigms, as will be discussed below in the following chapter. What is needed in international studies is integration of lower-level theories and research findings into empirical paradigms, the task of the present volume. Some European scholars admirably look to philosophy for inspiration, (Knutsen 1992; Edkins and Vaughan-Williams 2009; Moore and Farrands 2010). But empirically minded scholars fail to extract testable paradigms from the writings of major philosophers. One of the most disappointing aspect of the field of international studies today is the failure to unpack



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ideologies and philosophies into testable empirical paradigms, a task that can easily be accomplished, as the following pages will attest. The main reason for the current malaise is a preference by many to push an ideology as if a revered gospel of truth, a practice that is unscholarly in the extreme (cf. Buzan and Little 2001; Levine 2012). International studies cannot be taken seriously if most scholarship tries to pretend that bias is selfevident knowledge. To disavow current ideological contention, there must be an empirical corrective. Although Henry Nau (2011) has claimed that there is no alternative to “isms,” there is—paradigmatic research agendas. Equations such as E = MC2 are what physics seeks—a parsimonious way to connect separate phenomena. Social science studies pose more complex questions. What is presented in Part II has been called “process tracing” (cf. Checkel 2006). Empirical paradigms assume that a full comprehension of reality requires a cross-temporal model of parts that are interlinked to form a coherent whole. Although process tracing may seem positivistic to some, determining relationships between separately identified phenomena requires either or both quantitative and qualitative analysis: Case studies can serve to validate relationships discovered quantitatively. Contrary to the very foundation of the International Studies Association, ideologies pretend to be the only types of IR theory today. Hypothesis testing exists on a parallel track, using raw data that are rarely justified as operationalizations of concepts derived from paradigms. As a result, there is little paradigmatic-based theory development of consequence today. For the discipline to develop integratively, empirical paradigms should come out of the closet to ensure that well-rounded international studies will combine both elements to produce cumulative wisdom that has policy significance, as founders of the International Studies Association intended. There is a solution at hand to unify the discipline—neobehavioralism. The animus between the behavioralist thesis and postbehavioralist antithesis can be resolved in a happy neobehavioralist synthesis. The last chapter of this volume how the field can enjoy a new life by embracing neobehavioral norms. For most scholars, empirical paradigms are locked away in a secret orphanage, forgotten in the quest for apriori certainty among contending ideologies. For the profession to generate knowledge, they must be released from obscurity. Accordingly, they are featured in Part II within the present volume.

Part II

EXPLICATING PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

International relations theories are social constructions. So are paradigms, which have been developed over the years for explaining phenomena. Anything constructed has parts, so the best way to demonstrate components of a paradigm is to draw a diagram of how the parts relate and then undertake a verbal explanation. The earliest international studies paradigms were identified in the final chapter of International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (Haas 1974c). They were extended in Polity and Society (1992) and refined in the sixth chapter of Neobehavioral Political Science (2014c). What the present section of the book does is to focus on the causal structure of paradigms (cf. Kurki 2008) while identifying isomorphisms—that is, conceptually based theories which apply in many problem areas of international studies. Part II provides empirical analyses to illustrate how competing paradigms can be cross-tested. Chapter 3 explains why paradigm development is so vital to the future of international studies. Since the idea of paradigms has been largely forgotten, the argument is revived. Paradigms satisfy the need to develop unifying theories that apply beyond particular problems and over time. But paradigms must also distinguish between the role of ideas and material realities as underlying causes. The Marxian paradigm, presented in Chapter 4, consists of the scientific claims of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marxism developed that thinking into an ideology, but the Marxian paradigm makes empirical predictions that range across the discipline, with theoretical perspectives on decision-making, economic and social development, race relations, international violence, and international cooperation. Chapter 5 features the Mass Society paradigm, which has been one of the most commonly employed efforts to replace the Marxian dialectical view of

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history with a more interactive vision of ideas and material realities. Proponents argue that forces controlling political decisions are rarely mediated by civil society. Instead, dominant economic and political forces control government outcomes. The notion of a vibrant civil society is either a sham in pseudo-democratic regimes or is banned in totalitarian regimes. Mass Society proponents present somewhat different if related visions of a social reality in which masses have little impact upon government and largely react in either asocial behaviors or submit to indoctrination by governments. In contrast with the pessimism of the Mass Society paradigm, Chapter 6 presents the Community Building paradigm, which seeks to discover the formula for breaking down barriers in order to build communities at the local, national, international, and global levels. There is a contrast between theorists who stress the role of ideas and mores, on the one hand, and the action of institutions and regimes as progenitors of community. But both dimensions reinforce each other, and the paradigm as a whole strives to discover pathways to peace. The most economistic paradigm, developed in Chapter 7, is the Rational Choice paradigm. Since the writing of Adam Smith (1776), economic decisions have been viewed as rational; otherwise, prosperity and wealth will be lost. However, the paradigm has been applied to many other areas of analysis. Rational choices are at the heart of Social Darwinism, hegemonic policies, cost-benefit studies, selectorate theory, voter deliberation, social exchange, and even resource mobilization for building communities of resistance to the existence of mass societies. Chapter 8 presents several other paradigms. What distinguishes the four paradigms of Chapters 4–7 from those outlined in Chapter 8 is that the former apply to several levels of analysis (individual, society, nation-state, international, global) and several sectors of knowledge (economics, politics, society), but those in Chapter 8 are less developed. Among those covered in Chapter 8 are the Dependency, Disequilibrium, Power Transition, and WorldSystem paradigms. Although not all paradigms are included, the coverage is more exhaustive than anywhere else in the literature of international studies. The aim of Part II is to identify component parts of paradigms, increasing awareness of theoretical progress in international studies. The narrative seeks to demonstrate that hundreds of studies, now isolated, can be brought within the framework of a small set of paradigms. The remedy for a discipline that now produces unconnected studies ad infinitum is to demonstrate that they can easily be located within ongoing communities of paradigms, thereby promoting an exciting dialog that has been missing within international studies. All social science paradigms imply ideological goals (Smith 2004:504). But their major value is to construct a vision of reality that can be tested empirically.

Chapter 3

The Need for Paradigm Development

The three most important branches of philosophy are epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. Epistemology seeks to determine how “truth” can be established, either empirically or intuitively. Ethics studies alternative ways to identify what is “good.” Metaphysics is concerned with the question “What is reality?” Ontology is a division of metaphysics that speculates on what is the basic substance of reality; another branch of metaphysics is theology. One metaphysical issue is whether parts comprise the true reality or wholes instead, the familiar dispute between nominalism and realism. Determinism and causality are additional topics of concern to students of metaphysics. More familiar in international studies is the chicken-and-egg distinction between agents (individual actors) and structures (historical processes). Any ontological knowledge about the world, as established by an epistemological principle, is a metaphysical statement to which ethical principles can be applied. Yet despite 2,500 years of philosophical speculation since First Century bce Athens, the debate continues (cf. Wight 2006; Joseph and Wight 2010; Jackson 2011). It is the thesis of the present volume that any attempt to discern truth, whether positivist or poststructuralist, postmodernist, postpositivist, or just plain naïve social science, is inherently a search for reality. The aim of truth, in the opinion of many in the field of international studies, is to liberate humanity from the adverse consequences of politically calculated forms of ignorance. THE POSITIVIST FALLACY For Immanuel Kant, “though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience” (Kant 1781[1965]:1). He 35

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went on to argue that knowledge must be encoded into categories removed from experience. David Hume (1748), of course, found that no epistemological theory could ever be validated, so he advocated what he called “scepticism.” (That’s how he spelled it.) Rudolf Carnap was more of a Humean than a Kantian. He diagnosed the ills of the social sciences in one word—metaphysics. According to Carnap, endless metaphysical speculation would not advance the social sciences because the discourse about categories contained words “devoid of meaning” (Carnap 1932[1959]:65). Although he doubtless identified a rhetorical straw person, his aim was to advance systematic observation and to keep ethics and metaphysics out of scientific inquiry. Carnap hoped that social scientists would follow the advances of behavioristic experimental psychology, where concepts were being defined in terms of observable characteristics. His advice may well have served to steer social scientists into a more data-oriented approach toward their craft, but he left ideas and other mental phenomena as “nonreality” or “epiphenomena” in an unexamined black box. Positivism was opposed to paradigm development because paradigms involve constructing conceptual metaphors, which deviate from observables (de Man 1979). While Carnap later backtracked in his thinking, empirical social scientists followed Carnap’s eschewing of ethical and metaphysical discussion. But they were unable to avoid making ideological or ontological assumptions in their theories because ideas and matter, the two concepts around which most ontological speculation revolves, play a more equal role in the social than in the natural sciences, and the choice of concepts to describe ideas and matter necessarily betrays ideological bias. Carnapian positivism covertly advocated an ontological materialism, assuming that “reality” consists entirely of material substances observable for scientific purposes, with ideas regarded as an improper object of study. Although Carnap tried to promote the fallacy that positivism had no metaphysics, his advice could not be followed because ideas do have an importance of their own. Positivism also had an agenda for epistemology. Empiricism, an epistemological theory, assumes an objective truth which can be identified by designing statements that correspond to observations. For others, the two sources of knowledge are experience and logic. Positivists objected that the logical “design” of statements, known as theory, is unobservable. Positivism’s atheoretical empiricist epistemology prescribed instead that all statements be put to the following test: Make specific predictions of observable events; if the events are consistent with the predictions, the statement is true. Since theories deal with abstract, unobservable concepts, no theory could pass Carnap’s test. Truth, thus, was considered to be a pile of facts. According to David Easton (1953:66–78), Carnapian social science was hyperfactual. Much of early behavioralism was tied to the positivistic assumption that truth can be discovered by empirical testing, with the aim of discovering



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findings that correspond to reality, even a reality constructed in conceptual terms. But positivists avoided paradigms because the imagery of nested concepts was beyond observational evidence. POSTPOSITIVISM Carnap was responding to a more popular epistemology. The epistemological belief that truth inheres in a paradigm, whose axiomatized verbal assumptions have been found consistent with evidence, is called instrumentalism, also known as pragmatism. William James (1907) and John Dewey (1920, 1925) traced the lineage of pragmatism to Kant (1781) and Hans Vaihinger (1924) (cf. White 1943). Instrumentalists insist that a paradigm must be unpacked into predictions. A paradigm either can be accepted provisionally when its predictions are consistent with experience or can be rejected when the predictions are contrary to empirical evidence. What was important to pragmatists was whether something discovered through inquiry had a positive and practical result, particularly in regards to applying knowledge. Dewey and James, thus, set the stage for postpositivism. During the twentieth century, the natural sciences began to take unobserved phenomena into account (cf. Popper 1972). Intricate paradigms have been developed about the unobservable, such as black holes. Postpositivist discourse is based on the writing of Karl Popper (1934), who believed that knowledge is inherently a conjecture and can only be achieved by falsifying conceptually generated paradigms that can be tested in the form of hypotheses with variables—herein referred to as cross-testing—until one proposition emerges that cannot be falsified. For Popper, whatever was thought to be true at one time would undoubtedly be overturned at a later time. His historical rendering suggested a view of science that would later be developed by Thomas Kuhn (1962). Efforts to transcend postpositivism continue, but they usually revert to the early pragmatists. One scholar, for example, recently found “systemic pragmatism” in the writings of Morton Kaplan (1969; Hamati-Ataya 2012). The social construction perspective, an epistemology derived from a sociology of knowledge (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966), has provided much clarity and tends to agree with the postpositivist view that concepts and paradigms are constructions, cautioning that social constructions can be naïvely equated with real-world phenomena due to researcher bias. RECONSTRUCTING THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES There are many alternative statements of how science derives truth, and there is much disagreement on how social science can best advance (Giddens

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1976). One common trend is the desire among empirically oriented social scientists to posit theories to explain phenomena and then to collect data with a view either to discarding mistaken theories or to finding theories consistent with data. Often, a particular phenomenon is the center of attention—international conflict, for example. Data are assembled to ascertain whether the central phenomenon varies over time and space. Other data are collected in an effort to account for variations in the central phenomenon. And a set of independent variables is said to predict variations in the key dependent variable. However imperfectly, the data-level findings are somehow equivalenced hermeneutically to a theory-level language, and a hypothesis is proclaimed to have been tested. As such a rough scenario is repeated many times, social scientists improve theories. When advocates of competing approaches vie for acceptance of their theories, however, they produce confusion about the state of knowledge in a particular field of study. Since each theory has its own unique vocabulary to explain the phenomena of interest, conceptual and theoretical babel is a major problem in the social sciences. Carnap hoped that such babel could be cleared away by eliminating ethical and metaphysical considerations. But even if his advice had been followed, the problem of determining the meaning of atheoretically organized facts would have remained elusive. Thomas Kuhn (1962[1970]:viii,178–79), a philosopher of science who suggested that social science’s plethora of disparate theories is explicable in macro-historical terms, provided more fascinating advice than earlier suggestions of the logical positivists. His contribution has been twofold: While some philosophers have tried to use logic to dissolve the metaphysical mind-body question (Ryle 1949), a foolish undertaking indeed (cf. Feigl 1967; Black 1970; Farrell 1983), Kuhn met the issue directly. According to Kuhn (1962 [1970]: 182–87), four components define what he called a “paradigm”: 1. 2. 3. 4.

generalizations (empirical knowledge) metaphysically shaped metaphors (models) value commitments (professional norms) concrete solutions to puzzles (exemplars).

Joseph Agasi (1964:190) characterized metaphysics as the most basic of the four in explaining the history of science, since new discoveries are ultimately new conceptions of how to constitute the world (cf. Pap 1949:ch.l6; Burtt 1952). Margaret Masterman (1970), after noting that Kuhn used the “paradigm” in 21 different ways, also concluded that the metaphysical component was the most basic. In order to produce some clarity in the thicket of social science approaches, the Kuhnian quest is to untangle the four



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elements from each competing paradigm, with special attention to the reality presupposed by each theorist, whereupon critical tests of alternative theories can be built into the design of a single research project. Kuhn noted that paradigms differ from one another in having vastly different approaches to scientific truth, known as “incommerables” (Jackson and Nexon 2010). Paradigm A, in other words, can differ from Paradigm B in having different methods, models, scientific norms, and exemplars. Inside each paradigm there is a quest to find isomorphisms—that is, metaconcepts that apply to a variety of phenomena, thereby reducing apparent complexity to theoretical parsimony. The concept of “isomorphism” requires additional explanation. As a mathematical term from the Greek, the meaning is equivalent form or shape. When Norbert Weiner (1948) developed cybernetics, he used the term “feedback” to refer to what happens, for example, when a thermometer shuts down a furnace upon reaching a certain prescribed limit. Scientists had been using unique terms to describe new phenomena, but Weiner urged them to use a more accessible vocabulary that would assist nonspecialists. “Feedback,” thus can apply to many types of communication, such as honking a horn to relay information to a motorist weaving in traffic. A second example is to say that “The ‘information’ that is ‘encoded’ in DNA gets ‘read’ by cells” (Orr 2016:20). In other words, a scientific process that could involve estoteric technical language is described in a manner that can be commonly understood because “information sciences provided biologists with loose but useful metaphors and analogies” (ibid., p. 22). In the social sciences, the term “rationality” can refer to similar phenomena in several disciplines, as when someone says that a rational decision was made by an individual and a rational decision was made by an international organization—the same generalizations should apply. Within a country, the civil society consists of pressure groups and political parties that mediate between the people and the government; international social movements, thus, should be considered the civil society of the global system. To apply different terms to similar phenomena is an unparsimonious waste that Weiner and systems theories wanted to correct. Those in international studies who celebrate “metaphors” are in fact talking about isomorphisms found in paradigms, yet they have not yet realized where their metaphor-philia is headed (Chilton 1996; Beer and Landtsheet 2004; Marks 2004; Carver and Pikalo 2008; Kornprobst, Pouliout, Shah, Zaiotti 2008). In addition, several alternative paradigms (A, B, C) may envision different exemplars that could be applied to the same phenomenon. Each paradigm will derive different propositions based on the framework of analysis in the paradigm. Although Kuhn suggested that paradigms are ditched when too many anomalous findings emerge, there is another way to weed out the

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foolish paradigms: Cross-testing of several paradigms determines which has the most predictive power. In studying ethnic group voting, for example, those who subscribe to an Assimilation paradigm will expect that the first generation will vote as a bloc, but successive generations will resemble voting patterns of the population at large. The Integration paradigm instead predicts that bloc voting of ethnics will persist until their members live in integrated suburbs. The CoalitionBuilding paradigm expects that bloc voting depends on whether the group can mathematically create a majority with another ethnic bloc; if so, the group will vote as a bloc regardless of generation or residence. A cross-test will determine whether the predictions hold for each ethnic group in a city or state (e.g., Haas 1986). For another example, the Lamarckian view that acquired characteristics can be passed on to the next generation was a paradigm differing from the Darwinian notion that only inherited characteristics are bequeathed from parents to children. Until the advent of DNA, however, there was no way to determine which paradigm was correct. What is now known is that information gets from genetic DNA into acquired protein, not the other (Lamarckian) way (Orr 2016:21). There was a second aspect of Kuhn’s contribution. Kuhn upstaged the Carnapian reconstruction of the logic of scientific inquiry with the view that the scientific community is part of an ongoing political and social process. The pursuit of truth is therefore fundamentally problematic, since politics and society pervade science. The thesis of Kuhn, that “normal science” can be distinguished from “paradigm shifts,” has attracted more attention from social scientists than the first, which calls attention to truth-claims of paradigms. Yet the discarding of one paradigm entails the abandonment of one metaphysical (ontological) theory for another. Until recently, Kuhn’s suggestion of a fourfold identification of the essence of paradigms failed to stimulate a healthy debate in many areas of social science, including international studies. As stated by political scientist William Bluhm (1969) decades ago, social science theory contains implicit metaphysical assumptions. The metaphysical glue that explains why political and social phenomena occur awaited more careful analysis which came in international studies with cognitive linguistics and constructive analysis. George Ritzer (1975) began such an effort for sociology, but he dealt with macro-theories designed for multiple research foci. Ritzer, who classified paradigms in terms of the nominalism-realism distinction, found a Social Behavior paradigm at the individual level (B.F. Skinner, George Homans). At the group level, he identified a Social Facts paradigm (Émile Durkheim,



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Talcott Parsons). Ritzer’s Social Definition paradigm (Max Weber, Robert Park) involved both levels, assuming that individuals define themselves in terms of group memberships. Later, he reviewed the potential of various theorists for unifying the three levels (Ritzer 1981). He eschewed any attempt to focus on paradigms for specific political or social issues, as undertaken herein, because he feared “thousands of paradigms” (p. 10). But political and social phenomena require problem-solving, so paradigms framed in terms of problems have more practical significance than paradigms that pretend to explain everything. A large number of competing paradigms may be inconveniently puzzling, but they can be reduced through cross-testing—tests to determine which paradigm makes the best predictions. In the present volume, alternative paradigms are identified to illuminate specific research questions, based on the view that the aim of scientific inquiry is to solve problems by achieving a broad “understanding” of reality. The text below is an effort to move one step beyond Kuhn. The aim is to explicate the nature of paradigmatic debates regarding international studies in terms of philosophical assumptions as yet dimly specified by important contemporary theorists. Such basic assumptions comprise the ontological substructure of the theories. The aim is to unpack explanatory paradigms advanced by empirical scholars studying various aspects of international relations into specific ontological components, so that the general thesis of the primacy of metaphysical thinking can become more clearly established. The procedure, nevertheless, is Derridian, using (de)construction analysis. Texts of theories are deconstructed to uncover the concepts of a paradigm; then each element is classified ontologically, while portraying the causal axioms that underpin the paradigm’s view of reality. Whereas Michel Foucault (1975) went beyond existentialism’s avoidance of essentialist renderings (the use of nonexistential labels) to urge deconstruction of texts to unmask ideology, the present volume does so primarily to find the ontological aspects of theoretically grounded truth-claims wherein ideology is embedded. Ethical and ideological presuppositions of each theory are identified, consistent with Jacques Derrida (1967), to ascertain clues about the motives of theorists and thereby help to clarify the meaning of various paradigms. The aim herein is to problematize rather than to satirize. Following Kuhn, exemplars (cases that illustrate paradigms) and generalizations are reviewed in order to increase the ability to test ontological assumptions of major paradigms. Results from theory-oriented empirical research in international studies are specified in order to explicate the meaning of important concepts and relationships. Thus, the present volume does not attempt to codify empirical findings or to praise one theory at the expense of another; instead, the aim is to identify and compare paradigms,

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which start by constructing (constituting) metaphorical concepts and then seeking isomorphisms (similarities across phenomena), a philosophical practice as old as Giambattista Vico (1725). There should be a presumption that metaphorical similarities exist in the “real world,” as conceptual and paradigmatic formulations necessarily assume similarities for the purposes of comparative analysis with the aim of “understanding and experiencing” one thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980[2003]:5; Lakoff and Johnson 1999:126). Although primary metaphors (birth, death, etc.) seem consistent cross-culturally, social science paradigms are perceived metaphors involving something imputed to a phenomenon (Grady 1999). For example, a “nefarious” leader is presumed to head a “rogue state” (Flanik 2011:Figure 1). The terms involve framing—that is, choosing words that connote while pretending only to denote. As William Flanik notes (ibid., p. 438), metaphorical thinking is inevitable; otherwise, cognition would be impossible. The most well-established metaphors are shared culturally or socially, so the fact that international studies scholars seem almost universally unfamiliar with the paradigms identified in the present volume is because those who are theory-oriented as well as those who indulge in mid-level hypothesis testing have been unaware of the behavioralist history recounted in Chapters 1 and 2 above. Flanik goes on to argue that the brain’s sensorimotor system “fires” together connections between conceptual domains, either cultural (through socialization) or experiential (direct observation). Cultural domains are stored in the brain in the form of frames and scripts, whereas experiential domains are embodied within sensorimotor perceptions. The latter, in turn, may be stored as cognitions or emotions in different parts of the brain (Damasio 1994). Frames, whether constructed from culture or experience, are then “mapped” onto target concepts (Flanik 2011:437). Paradigms, thus, are constructions involving hypothesized connections between distinguishable metaphorical representations, which may be either agents or structures—indeed, the connection between agents and structures is the essence of the paradigms, which are diagrammed in Chapters 4–7 below to illustrate those relationships. Recently, international studies scholars have been enjoying the exercise of deconstructing concepts as metaphors. Metaphors used in regard to security, from George Kennan’s “containment” to Mikhail Gorbachëv’s “common European home” have been analyzed as metaphors, though the former is individualistic in conception, while the latter has a communitarian focus (Chilton 1996:267). Metaphors from anarchy to prisons (as in the prisoner’s dilemma) have also been identified (Marks 2004:ch3). One recent volume found how metaphors of sports are often employed (Beer and Landtsheer 2004). Yet another effort showed how metaphors are applied in aviation policy, elections, and local planning (Carver and Pikalo 2008). An edited



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volume classified metaphors into three categories—mirrors (which pretend to be realistic representations), magicians (creating reality), and mutinies (deconstructing exercises)—and illustrates them with several examples in chapters of the book (Kornprobst, Pouliout, Shah, Zaiotti 2008). Yet none realize that they are actually uncovering paradigms—that is, concepts as metaphors; they ignore how a metaphor is an isomorphic concept that often fits into a paradigmatic representation of causal processes. What are the advantages of reopening metaphysical questions that Carnap was so eager to avoid and that Kuhn insisted were at the root of paradigmatic controversies in the sciences for a long, long time? Since differences between paradigms are fundamentally metaphysical, a focus on metaphysics serves at least eight objectives: • Ontological analysis will clarify the most basic structure of existing paradigms, identifying the precise meanings of the key concepts and propositions. • Theorists may learn to talk to each other about their approaches rather than when they focus on basic assumptions, instead of getting caught up in questions of ideology or methodology. • Knowing the ontological basis of a theory enables a quick separation of fundamental from marginal propositions within a particular paradigm, so critical tests of a paradigm can be given higher attention than routine proposition testing. • Ontological analysis sharpens identification of logical inconsistencies in the testing of existing paradigms, such as when proponents of one metaphysically specific theory collect data appropriate for a different ontological view. • Generalizations can be contextualized to specific metaphysical renderings of reality rather than believing naïvely that empirical tests, derived as they are from paradigms, represent reality. • Future research can be more carefully designed to go to the frontiers when underlying assumptions are in the forefront. • Information can be derived about how body acts on mind, or vice versa, by studying precisely that; metaphysical speculation can then emerge from dusty tomes into everyday discourse, thereby going beyond some 2,500 years of metaphysical speculation. • Values and goals of inquiry can be better integrated into a vision of reality on realizing that they imply ontological assumptions. The eight objectives are some of the many advantages of looking at metaphysical assumptions in theories about international relations. The most important payoff is to permit scholarly dialog. Discussions about alternative

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theories often become vitriolic when proponents retreat into ideological camps, failing to appreciate metaphysical implications of their theories. A more sober discourse is possible when researchers reveal the inner logic of theories. Ideologies may indeed be the source of metaphysical bias in theories (Connolly 1967), but theory cannot be established scientifically until its metaphysical assumptions are clear. As John Wisdom (1981:17) has noted, “All natural science has Weltanschauungen which are unprovable, irrefutable by observation.” Scientific canons require researchers to unpack metaphysical processes into concepts as well as postulated relationships into refutable empirical theories, but also to be cautious how the process is undertaken to avoid fallacies of many kinds. Accordingly, an objective of the present volume is to enable international studies scholars to confront alternative ideologies in terms of competing truth-claims. “Canons of science,” however, are also subject to a Kuhnian relativism, as standards of proof change over time. Important macro-historical questions are too complex for simple number-crunching and thus should be studied multimethodologically (see Chapter 9). If the purpose of knowledge is to improve the world, any efforts to generate new knowledge should be welcomed. METAPHYSICAL ONTOLOGY The key ontological question, classically posed, is whether the mind controls the body, the body controls the mind, or whether there is a complex formula that explains why sometimes one controls the other or appears to do so. All explanatory theories in the natural and social sciences make metaphysical assumptions; were they to fail to do so, their formulations would be empty in content: They would not refer to reality at all. For the natural sciences, the terrain of inquiry has focused mostly on material substances, presenting limited metaphysical paradoxes until physics began to deal with unobservable matter, such as black holes. For the social sciences, attitudes and ideologies are important; material factors, such as communication flows and income levels, are often considered as causes of the ideas espoused by individuals, but ideas can also forge changes in material reality. There are several ontological views in metaphysics (Table 3.1). If all reality is basically matter (i.e., material substances of one kind or another), then the body is dominant over the mind and attitudes are reducible to material substances; such a position is metaphysical materialism. If ideas and perceptions are the irreducible components of reality, then mind dominates body and material substances have no independent role to play in a causal system.



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Table 3.1  Theories of Metaphysics Name of Theory Monistic Theories Materialism Epiphenomenalist materialism Physicalism Idealism Epiphenomenalist idealism Mentalism Double aspect theory

Dualistic Theories Interactionism Parallelism Other Theories Scepticism Positivism

Role of Ideas

Role of Matter

Secondary Absent

Primary Primary

Primary Primary Same as matter

Secondary Absent Same as ideas

Primary and impact Primary and impact upon upon matter ideas Primary but no Primary but no impact impact upon matter upon ideas Role unknown Role unimportant

Role unknown Role unimportant

Source: Taylor (1963).

The second position, known as metaphysical idealism, is the belief that the world is nothing more than a mental construction of external objects, and that it is foolish to believe that a real world exists somehow independently of human conceptions of the world. Idealism and materialism are monistic. Both positions merge in metaphysical dualism, sometimes called metaphysical realism—the view that everything can be reduced to two basic elements—matter and ideas—though the two elements may be separate and distinct. A research design that includes both physical and psychological variables can pose important metaphysical questions. Monistic approaches, in contrast, do not. Such philosophers as Mario Bunge (1980) and Richard Taylor (1963) have pointed out that the putative plausibility of realism turns out to be more baffling than either idealism or materialism: How can body act on mind or vice versa? Interactionism is the dualist view that mind and body impact each other, but begs the question as to how, in what manner, and under which sets of circumstances the impact runs from body to mind or mind to body. Parallelism is a dualist theory in which body and mind have no impact upon each other but instead run on parallel tracks; thus, the naïve observer may falsely infer from correlation coefficients that one track causes the other. Nevertheless, the confusion continues within international studies, where the mindbody problem is viewed by those who employ constructive analysis (Flanik 2011) as a conundrum similar to the agent-structure problem. Lest the reader feel compelled to retreat to the simplicity of materialism and idealism, there are alternative conceptions of both positions within

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philosophy as well. Either the nonbasic element has no existential property and thus is some sort of illusion (nonphenomenon), or the nonbasic element is an epiphenomenon that appears superficially to have a separate existence but in fact is correlated perfectly with the basic phenomenon. Epiphenomenalist materialism is the view that the body acts on the mind to produce perceptual consciousness, but not vice versa: In social science terms, an individual’s income and material circumstances produce an awareness of class membership, according to some epiphenomenalist materialists. Physicalism, on the other hand, is the view that the mind is physical in the first place, so it is illogical to say that “body acts on mind,” since only body can act on body. But physicalism denies an independent role to logic and, thus, to science. Karl Marx’s attack on “economism” was against a physicalist metaphysic that leaves no room for ideas. For idealists, there is a similar epiphenomenalist idealism in which the mind tells the body what is going on, and a corresponding mentalism that points out the logical contradiction in such a statement if the universe consists solely of ideas. Often, mentalism is attacked for being a kind of solipsism— that is, a private conception of reality, a philosophical schizophrenia in which there can be no final arbiter on what is or is not real. For some epiphenomenalist idealists, exposure to the attitudes and opinions of one’s culture often provides idiosyncratic verbal labels for describing physical reality. Dualist theories reduce everything to two basic components. The monistic theories, materialism and idealism, reduce reality to one basic form. According to the double aspect metaphysic, we may transcend dualism and monism by arguing that mind and body are two metaphysically equivalent although analytically distinct aspects of the same thing. David Hume, whose epistemology is described above as scepticism, also takes the position that the question of metaphysics can never be resolved. For Hume’s metaphysical scepticism, the structure of metaphysical arguments is such that either we must observe metaphysical glue binding mind and body (which is impossible) or else our speculation is “sophistry and illusion” (Hume 1748[1977]:114). Hume posited a brute empiricism that would deny the existence of anything not established by “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence,” though clearly he relied on logic, which is not observable. He paved the way for positivism. For the positivist, the falsification theory of empiricism advances science, but metaphysical speculation is not worth the effort. Since positivists believe that scientists can never resolve metaphysical disputes, the quest for the correct metaphysic should end—or so they argue, while in practice urging a materialism rooted in particularistic observations (cf. Cheng 1975; Feigl 1950[1953]:612; Feyerabend and Maxwell 1966). In the present day, at least two schools of thought eschew both metaphysics and empiricism. Known as postmodernism or poststructuralism, the view is



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that it is impossible to discern an objective world. Instead, such philosophers as Jacques Derrida (1967) examine written texts, and then dismiss all statements that purport to describe reality or claim truth. His anti-metaphysical, anti-empiricist view resembles Winston Smith’s admonition in 1984 that “reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind and nowhere else” (Orwell 1950:189). The reader who has come this far may have a sense of bewilderment at metaphysics. How can we ever decide questions about the relationship between mind and body, attitudes and behavior, or similar rephrasing of basic ontological dichotomies about the basic substance(s) of the real world? What evidence can help us to resolve the dilemma? The more common question is how human agents can act freely within structures that determine their behavior—for example, whether historical trends are determinative or individuals can really change history. Yet a moment’s reflection demonstrates that social scientists make metaphysical assumptions all the time in their research. A survey of attitudes assigns primacy to idealist phenomena or verbalized reports of nonattitudinal phenomena. An analysis of such statistical data as per capita income, kilowatt-hour electricity production, unemployment rates, and rates of economic growth for countries around the world operates within a paradigm that gives importance to materialist phenomena. Studies that combine both attitudes and physical attributes are cast in a dualist paradigm, as when questions in a survey deal with attitudes as well as income, and when aggregate studies use national income along with multicountry survey data. An excellent example is provided by Cameron Thies (2013), who contrasts two types of explanations of the Cold War—the emphasis on material capabilities by Kenneth Waltz (1979) and the primacy of ideas in the heads of decision-makers by Alexander Wendt (1999)—and then goes on to argue that interactions occurred between the two elements are “very difficult to separate” (p. 285) without using the term “dualism” as an alternative ontological approach. However, Thies is attracted to the approach of Emmanuel Adler (1997) for “balancing materialism and individualism,” presumably adopting interactionism. Lacking a metric to score interactions between material capabilities and identity-based ideas, Thies frankly admitted that his analysis is qualitative (p. 269), while approvingly citing a more quantitative analysis that is slanted toward idealism (Nincic 1990). Poorly designed attitude studies and analyses of demographic data can be lopsided metaphysically; often, they are monist in design. Social science studies conceived in dualist terms can answer more sophisticated metaphysical questions than those using a monist design, because they admit twice as much of putative reality. Famous neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (1975) came to the same conclusion after a career of trying to solve mental problems through physical intervention: He concluded that the realm of the mental human mind

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operates in some independent manner from the realm of the physical human brain. Conditions that give rise to the onset of disease, including those who are seropositive for the HIV virus, suggest an interaction between ideas and corporeal reality (Coates, Temoshok, Mandel 1984). The social sciences have been making similar claims, but have lacked the courage to acknowledge ontology (cf. Mann 1979). Most empirical scholars of international studies rely on pragmatism as an excuse to avoid philosophical questions (Hellmann 2008). CLASSIFYING PARADIGMS Social scientists have evidence relevant to metaphysical debates. Paradigms must identify ontological alternatives, because all knowledge about reality is by definition metaphysical. Attention to how mind acts on body or vice versa can alone advance knowledge about polities, societies, international relations, and global reality. Whereas paradigms are often assumed to relate to broad-gauge theory, most ongoing debates in international studies are in the middle range of theory-building (Merton 1957). In the next five chapters, the focus is on growing “islands of theory” (Guetzkow 1950). They are not intended to cover all aspects of international studies. The metaphysical distinction between idealism, materialism, and dualism will be understood to cover primarily the relative impact of attitudinal versus economic factors as explanations for variance in development, the power of elites, voter preferences, the incidence of urban and international violence, and the growth or decline in international community. Other phenomena or other paradigms could have been chosen as well. The primary aim is to show the practical consequences of abstract theorizing, both for international studies research and for praxis. How to classify the metaphysics of a paradigm? The text of the verbal theories provides one clue to ontological assumptions—through definitions of key concepts. A second clue consists of the nature of variables used in tests of hypotheses derived from a paradigm. Sometimes there is a discrepancy between the two sources of classification, so more clarity emerges when the variables as well as the verbal statements of a theory are compared, especially in a social science so heavily influenced by Carnapian logical positivism. The task is to deconstruct texts in order to unpack various paradigms of international studies. The aim is to better understand existing paradigmatic alternatives. The algorithms for classification are simple. For each paradigm, diagrams will be constructed containing key concepts. Materialist concepts, which refer to economic and other physical phenomena, will be capitalized. Idealist



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terms, such as attitudinal and perceptual phenomena, will be in lowercase. A model with all capital letters will be considered physicalist. A model with only lowercase letters will be identified as mentalist. If a model has a mix of lower and uppercase terms, three variants will be possible. A metaphysic that is basically idealist but has a term or two referring to materialist phenomena will be called epiphenomenalist when the materialist element is merely a consequence but does not feed into the main causal path. A similar algorithm will be used to identify epiphenomenalist materialism. For example, Karl Marx was basically a materialist; although he referred to psychological consciousness of class interests, he argued that mental elements were a result of materialist conditions and thus were epiphenomenal elements in the basic sequence of causality. Among the two dualistic alternatives within an interactionist metaphysic, idealist and materialist elements impact each other during a causal sequence. In parallelism, attitudinal and physical processes run on separate tracks with no connections between them. The algorithms will become clear as the essence of each paradigm is diagrammed. Since some theorists may be surprised that they have been classified in a particular manner herein, they should be assured that the pigeonholes are for the theories alone. A particular individual may espouse two different metaphysical views in two distinct paradigms. CONCLUSION Paradigms are primarily based on intuitive understandings of reality; they are constructed from profound insight and tested later. Albert Einstein’s paradigm, for example, was an effort to account for anomalies in Newtonian physics, such as why the planet Mercury wobbles (Natarajan 2016:38), which required a reconceptualized framework before experimentation and measurement. To understand how international or global reality works is more important than achieving quantitatively precise findings. Those who claim that reality is external to the fallible human mind are epistemological empiricists. Rationalists believe that statements are true a priori—that is, made through intuition and logic without the need for systematic human observation. Although some postmodernists and poststructuralists attack positivism as the belief that a truth-claim must correspond to reality (cf. Habermas 1968:ch.2; Searle 1990:37), they are instead attacking the correspondence theory of truth that is central to empiricism. Positivism offers only one form of empiricism. Many nonpositivist empiricists are as naïve as positivists in believing that intuition plays no role in the scientific process, as Kuhn noted, but poststructuralists resolve the dialectic between experience and intuition by reifying intuition; thereby, reality seems a matter more

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of faith and dogma than of open inquiry and reason. Empiricism requires intuition to be made explicit so that insights and evidence can be compared. Paradigms should be judged by such criteria as internal consistency, coherence, parsimony, scope across issue-areas, falsifiability, and relevance to policy (cf. Chernoff 2007:Table 5.1). But the main challenge is to use them— to embrace their vision and ascertain whether they lead to new knowledge. Instrumentalist epistemology guides the present volume, allowing for correction of scientific theories with a combination of logic and human observations and thus keeps systematic inquiry open to new evidence. The present volume is fundamentally postpositivist in epistemology, since paradigms are mental constructs and thus unverifiable through positivistic procedures. Explanatory theories are socially constructed, and social constructions flow from presence somewhere in the economic, political, and social order, so the task herein is to unmask the pretense to knowledge through theory that is ontologically obscure and to depict the essence of each paradigm so that the quest for truth about international relations can proceed more clearly. Paradigms consist of clusters of related mid-level theories, which are derived from the basic structure of how concepts in the paradigm interconnect. In the following chapters some of the more arcane points made in the present chapter will become clear as examples are identified.

Chapter 4

Marxian Paradigm

For centuries, speculation about the causes of international, political, and social phenomena was left to armchair philosophical speculation. But Karl Marx, through visits to uncover information found in tomes at the British Museum, offered the first social science paradigm that purported to have empirical evidence in support. He was inspired by Georg Friedrich Hegel (1820) to think in terms of a continual progress of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as a philosophy of history. But Hegel had in mind ideas, while for Marx the process was fundamentally driven by material reality. Whereas Karl Marx was the son of a lawyer in Trier, Friedrich Engels was the son of a manufacturer in nearby Barmen. Both saw that the industrial revolution was unmercifully tearing apart the social fabric of Europe, leaving workers destitute. They inverted the idealist metaphysics of Georg Hegel, whose sanguine philosophy was preparing the way for Prussia to form a larger German state on the principle that all history involved dialectical change. The Marxian paradigm provides explanations for a wide variety of international phenomena. Below the areas covered are why economic systems change or develop; why countries engaged in colonialism; why workers revolt; and the causes of war. The propositions developed by the Marxian paradigm have in some cases been tested, but incompletely. Although Marxists believe that the Marxian paradigm is true regardless of evidence, the truth-claims need to be tested. And Marx himself distinguished the earlier utopian socialists by his claim to offer scientific socialism. DEVELOPMENT For Marx and Engels (1848), economic and associated political development are inevitable and result from an interconnection of the sectors of the 51

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economy and the polity. The universal stages of primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and eventual industrial communism reflect shifts in class dominance, struggles between rival classes in pursuit of selfinterest, and thus economic development. There is no invisible hand. Instead, there is a very visible dialectical struggle between the classes. Whereas the political rules governing the economic system respond to changes in the modes of production, the rules governing economic systems eventually emerge as contradictory, whereupon the contradictory system is succeeded by a new economic system. The Marxian paradigm can be represented by a diagram depicting cause and effect (Figure 4.1): Capitalists overthrow feudalism because feudal elites will not let them become wealthy, and workers revolt to end capitalism because they realize that they receive far less of the profits of businesses than the value of their work. The capital letters represent materialist phenomena that can be observed or measured. The lowercase letters represent attitudes. The arrows are postulated as inexorable processes, involving asymptotes that also could be measured: For example, as the extent of exploitation increases to a certain degree, action is taken by the adversely affected social class to seize power from the exploiting social class. Marx’s exemplar of the shift from feudalism to capitalism was England (Berlin 1939), a most atypical country—one that developed without outside interpenetration. Less schematically, the situation in the mid-nineteenth century was that businesses spawned by capitalism were bringing large numbers of industrial workers into factories. Wage laborers were producing goods, but surrendering ownership of their labor to managers, who in turn were deriving profits by selling goods at prices above the prevailing rate for wage labor. The masses would not allow themselves to be exploited in factories if they could stay in agriculture, so the bourgeoisie used the state to evict them from the rural areas and to force them into the cities. In other words, the class struggle centers on one dominant class trying to get another social class to be subordinate—to act in the interest of the dominant class. When workers realize that they will never share in the prosperity of the managers, that the economic gap between classes increasingly widens under capitalism because managers extract a surplus value (profit) from labor, revolution is supposed to be around the corner. The progress of history consists of economic changes, secondarily of specific decisions by the masses and by a revolutionary cadre. Accordingly, “the ultimate causes of all social changes . . . are to be sought, not in the

Figure 4.1  The Basic Marxian Paradigm.



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minds of men, . . . but in changes in the mode of production and exchange” (Engels 1878[1935]:300). The role of mental processes is to perceive economic changes, whereupon individuals will act in order to bring about the overthrow of an exploitative economic order: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” (Marx 1859[1904]:437). Louis Napoléon made history with his coup d’état in 1851, Marx conceded, but not as he pleased; he acted under the constraints of the historical process (Marx 1852[1972]:437). Mental processes, according to Marx, are inconsequential compared to macro-historical processes. Marx (1844[1972]:76) thought that psychology would never become a science. He believed that workers would easily grasp the reality of their exploitation and act accordingly: “It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole pictures at present as its goal. It is a matter of what the proletariat is in actuality and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do” (Marx, c.1845[1972]:105). Alienation, thus, was not a mental state that motivated the proletariat to revolt. Marx defined “alienation” simply as the non-ownership of property (cf. Ollman 1976). Based on his understanding of classical economics, Marx thought that wages would rise because capitalist expansion required more laborers than would be available as economic growth increased. Profits would fall due to competition between firms and increases in wages, such that some firms would be forced out of the market unless they cut wages to starvation levels, and then workers would resign and revolt. CIVIL STRIFE But Marx addressed not just economic systems but also the origin of civil strife within capitalism. When would the workers reach an apex of their consciousness of the need to end exploitation by a proletarian revolution? Johann Rodbertus (1858) argued that the tipping point would come when an economy was in freefall. Marx, however, disagreed with that proposition, arguing in Capital (1867) that in hard times both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will suffer. But workers will be more aware of the gap between rich and poor when the economy is booming, when the lion’s share of the profits are not be shared with the workers. (Marx was agreeing with Alexis de Tocqueville’s insight, as articulated in 1835, in The Old Regime and the French Revolution.) According to one of Marx’s interpreters “crises are always preceded by a period in which wages rise generally and the working classes actually get a larger share of the annual product expected for consumption”

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(Robbins 1940:33). For Marx, as capitalism develops to the fullest, internal contradictions emerge. Efforts to extract a surplus value continually run into a falling rate of profit due to competition, so workers paid proletarian wages are unable to consume what they produce. Free market capitalism would collapse because one capitalist would buy out another until the “expropriators are expropriated,” leaving monopolistic control of markets instead of competition (Marx 1867[1926]:837). In short, competition as a fundamental principle of capitalism would not work; the imperative of profit required the development of monopolies. With monopolies, workers would still be exploited, but the aim of revolutionary change was for the people to take control of governments in order to nationalize the monopolies in order to stop the exploitation. The link in the diagram between capitalist exploitation and class consciousness of workers, in other words, would expand the diagram into a larger set of propositions. For Marx, worker unrest meant psychomotor activity, including strikes and later revolutionary ferment, in pursuit of the very goal of self-interest cultivated by the capitalist ethos. When capitalism did not collapse as Marx predicted, Vladimir Lenin and others stepped forward to make important contributions to modify the Marxian paradigm (Figure 4.2). One explanation was that capitalists increased the take-home pay of workers (“bribed” them) to forestall revolutionary consciousness, so the proletariat failed to support Communist parties in the early twentieth century, and consented to fight the capitalist cause during World War I (Lenin 1914, 1917b). Lenin revised Marx by assigning a greater role to a revolutionary vanguard (1914[1935]:10) and to the need for violent action (1917c[1935]:21). The vanguard would have a greater sense of consciousness of exploitation than the workers and could thereby hasten the inevitable. Writing from one of Benito Mussolini’s prisons, Antonio Gramsci (1957) pointed out that control of the instruments of mass communication had so caught the imagination of the public that the ordinary worker could no longer perceive events as accurately as Marx assumed, though he still considered that moral and intellectual elements are “tied to the existence of objective social conditions” (p. 151). He simply added a new element to explain the zero correlation between the level of worker exploitation and the role of the vanguard in promoting class consciousness—brainwashing of the masses by capitalist media. Gramsci’s insight represents an interactionist departure, serving as a foundation for what some later called Euro-Communism.

Figure 4.2  Expansion of the Marxian Paradigm.



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Gramsci and neo-Marxist theorists tried to explain why capitalism survived during the twentieth century. For a contemporary neo-Marxist, Herbert Aptheker (1965), the riots of the 1960s in the United States were evidence that the exploited masses were participating in revolutionary acts that were more political and economic than racial in nature. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966:ch.9) likewise argued that the falling rate of profit was prompting contemporary capitalists to engage in superexploitation; the result was racism, keeping one race on top of another to hold down wages. But such propositions were tested empirically: Attitudinal data showed that reformist ideology prevailed among the rioters, many of whom were more middle class in occupation and in group memberships (G.Marx 1967; Fogelson and Hill 1968; Kaplan and Paige 1968). Indeed, perceptions of economic downturns and upturns have been demonstrated statistically to be more associated with a potential for political violence than perceptions of change in economic gratification (Muller 1980:75). In measuring levels of economic exploitation, however, Terry Boswell and William Dixon (1993) successfully predicted rebellions in times of economic crises across 61 countries in the 1970s, provided that the countries experienced economic downturns; the extent of inequality washed out as a predictor variable. COLONIALISM AND WAR The logic of capitalism and its “constant revolutionizing of production,” according to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848[1972]:338), requires capital accumulation so that investments will permit later expansion of markets and modernization of machinery. There must be profit-making to accumulate capital as well as worker exploitation in order to extract a surplus value in the form of profits. Since capitalism is unplanned, economic growth is interrupted from time to time by crises of overproduction in which warehouses are full but the market is saturated. The solution is “on the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones” (p. 340). In short, in periods of slowdown, capitalists engage either in imperialistic wars to shut down competitors in other nations or in wars that “make barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, . . . the East on the West” (p. 339). Following Marx, Lenin (1914[1935]:123) depicted World War I as an effort to “seize lands and to conquer foreign nations, to ruin competing nations, to pillage their wealth.” Lenin explained that capitalism sought to postpone its demise by dominating poor countries; superexploitation abroad could ease the falling rate of profit at home, extending Marx’s observation

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that capitalism got its start through primitive accumulation of capital accruing from “the discovery of gold and silver in America . . . and . . . the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins” (Marx 1852[1972]:823). Lenin therefore expanded a section of the Marxian paradigm by adding war as a third element between workers’ premonition of exploitation and the capitalist establishment of monopolies (Figure 4.2). When only Russia experienced a successful Communist revolution after the bourgeois Götterdammerung of World War I, Lenin (1914[1935]:130) saw World War I as an effort “to divert the attention of the laboring masses from the domestic political crises,” an insight later known as “diversionary theory” (Levy 1989; DeRouen 2000; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Foster and Palmer 2006; Tara 2006; Nicholls, Huth, Appel 2010; Davies 2012; Foster and Keller 2014; Jung 2014; Arena and Bak 2015). As the architect of successful revolution, Lenin modified Marx’s sanguine outlook on the inevitability of the rise of the proletariat by paying more attention to attitudinal factors and the role of the revolutionary vanguard, but Lenin’s theory of war was the same. While some Marxists called upon workers in Germany and other countries to refuse to fight in the war, the bourgeoisie was successful in 1914 in what Lenin (1914[1935]:125) characterized as an effort “to disunite the workers and fool them with nationalism, to annihilate their vanguards in order to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.” The reason for this confusion of the workers was that “the high monopoly profits by the capitalists . . . makes it economically possible. . . to bribe certain sections of the workers” (Lenin 1917b[1964]:152), a tactic that he believed would ultimately fail. Nevertheless, just as internal markets would be saturated, colonial exploitation would reach an asymptote. And the proletariat could never be paid enough to rise to the level of the bourgeoisie, since the imperative of the latter was to accumulate capital. Thus, Lenin did not expect capitalism to survive much longer. He clarified that there are four post-capitalist stages—a revolutionary government, a post-revolutionary government (now known as a people’s democracy), a socialist state, and eventually industrial communism. He was willing to seize power to hasten the process toward socialism in Russia (Lenin 1917c), but his legacy turned out to be a system of state capitalism, not socialism. Some readers at this point will object that Soviet communism also supported wars. Istvan Kende (1971), compiling a list of about one hundred local wars fought from 1945 to 1970, concluded that most wars have involved armed forces from Western capitalist topdog states, thereby sharing Lenin’s pessimism that capitalism might ever become more peaceful. In a later study, Kende (1978) noted a general decline in wars, a reduction in direct



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participation, and an increase in the use of arms merchants and sub-imperial proxies of the same countries. A later study by three non-Marxists, using data over recent centuries, was consistent with Lenin in finding that major power wars cluster in eras of economic upswings, whereas imperialist wars prevail in downswings (Boswell, Sweat, Brueggemann 1989:18). Clearly, a peaceful world for the Marxists comes when capitalism has rationalized the world economy—that is, when all markets have been saturated—and nationalisms have been superseded by a world culture (Marx and Engels 1848[1972]:350). Marx did not exclude the possibility that capitalism might bring world peace (Silberner 1946:253–54), and Kende (1978:237) cited data consistent with this possibility. But at the point in world history when there is a fully interdependent, rationalized global economy, Marx believed that the proletariat would triumph, distinctions between mental and physical labor would vanish, private property would disappear, and “in proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end” (Marx and Engels 1848[1972]:350–51). The function of the bourgeois state is to keep order so that the ruling classes can suppress the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, but national states were supposed to wither away after a worldwide socialist system gained ascendancy (Lenin 1917c). CONCLUSION Marxism sometimes appears along with other ideologies in textbooks on international relations theory. But the unrecognized fact is that the Marxian paradigm awaits serious testing. Masterful qualitative efforts in that regard have been presented by Benno Teschke (2003) and Alexander Anievas (2014), who utilize the concept of “uneven and combined development” from Leon Trotsky (1930:ch1; cf. Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2013) to explain factors underlying historical developments in the international system with a view to transcending accounts relying on idealism and realism. The Marxian paradigm is epiphenomenalist materialism because material realities determine ideas. For Marx, ideas play a role, but the irreversible course of history does not allow ideas to play an independent role. Antonio Gramsci (1957) placed the idealist contest between bourgeois and proletarian cultures on an equal footing with materialist changes, ending up with a more interactionist ontology. Although Marx did not define “development,” his value commitment—his Marxism—was to increase the satisfaction of all basic human needs, which would come at a time when “the antithesis between mental and physical labor

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has vanished . . . and society can inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need,” as he stated in The Critique of the Gotha Program (1875[1972]:187). Marxism, thus, is an ideology that judges economic systems by certain ethical standards, to which only socialism and later communism pass the test. Although his ethical values can be kept apart from his empirical paradigm, scholars might still determine empirically whether capitalists countries satisfy basic needs better than welfare states or socialist systems. Although Marxian reasoning continued during the twentieth century within the writing of Rudolf Hilferding (1910), Karl Kautsky (1914), Nikolai Bukharin (1915), Rosa Luxemburg (1913), and Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966), the basic assumption that state socialism provides a better life for most people was rejected by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachëv (1987), who preferred the Scandinavian welfare state model. Although Gorbachëv insisted that the “common interests of mankind” superseded the Marxian class struggle, his words did not negate the Marxian empirical paradigm. “In France and Italy,” one observer reported during the mid-1980s, “Leading non-Marxists declared Marxism dead” (Clark 1985:440). Nevertheless, the Marxian paradigm lives on, awaiting serious tests of several propositions. Thus, the Marxian paradigm was advanced to explain why economic systems change, why workers revolt, and why capitalist countries embark on colonialism and war—phenomena of great interest in international studies. Isomorphisms exist at the levels of analysis, such as families and intergovernmental organizations, but remain underdeveloped. Few paradigms have attempted to explain so many problem areas that are at the heart of international relations. The Marxian paradigm, in turn, has inspired several competing paradigms, including the Dependency paradigm (Frank 1967) and the World-System paradigm (Wallerstein 1979), which in turn have been criticized by Marxists (Fernandez and Ocampo 1974; Weaver and Berger 1984) for what they consider a phony distinction between exploitation and superexploitation, since capitalism always exploits, and the degree of exploitation is not the point. A recent compendium urges international studies to bring back historical materialism (Joseph and Wight 2010). The following chapter presents another paradigm, based on a similar epiphenomenalist materialism foundation, which seeks to supersede or turn the Marxian paradigm upside down.

Chapter 5

Mass Society Paradigm

Karl Marx and his followers have been interested in how economic factors account for political dominance. They have sought economic democracy, a sharing of resources. But after Vladimir Lenin seized power in Russia, the result was anything but political democracy. The failure of the goal of Marxism to advance political democracy, wherein the people could bring about economic democracy, has stimulated many paradigms, the most prominent of which is the Mass Society paradigm, which purports to replace or perhaps relegate the Marxian paradigm as a special case within the Mass Society paradigm. The puzzle posed by the Mass Society paradigm is how government can ever reflect the will of the people. Prior to the French Revolution, the European people were constrained economically and politically and yet erupted in riots out of desperation due to their poverty and lack of food (Berce 1974). What was unique about the American Revolution was that protests over onerous taxes in the Boston Tea Party of 1773 led to a voice intermediate between the people and the colonial government in 1774, when American-born British subjects formed the Continental Congress. When riots broke out in Paris during 1789, however, there already was a body, the Estates, which had been established to provide that intermediate voice but had failed to do so. The concept of “public opinion,” central to the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), was eloquently characterized by Germaine de Staël (1788) as the “invisible power” of the people (Fontana 2016). But when both revolutions resulted in legislative bodies, as designed by her lover Benjamin Constant in France and James Madison in the United States, they were composed of persons who considered themselves better than the masses. Political parties, already present in England during the same years, arose in both revolutions to provide an intermediate voice between legislatures and 59

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the people—though despite the wishes of the early American leaders. Even as the right to vote was extended to the masses during the nineteenth century, the problem remained that members of political parties attended to their own interests above those of the people. The gap was not filled by the media either. Walter Lippmann (1922:15), in pre-Foucaultian candor, described the role of journalists as translating government decisions into stories that the public might understand as “news” by manipulating symbols rather than diffusing ideas. After all, that’s what Lippmann did for a living. As developed originally by Émile Durkheim (1893, 1895) and later explicated by such sociologists as C. Wright Mills (1956), William Kornhauser (1959), and others, the Mass Society paradigm views social reality in terms of elites who control government, and nonelites who lack influence on government because of an absence of effective civil society institutions that can intervene between the masses and the government. Instead of interpreting worker unrest as Marxian consciousness of exploitation, they view unrest as a function of rapid social change and arrogant elite dominance. The impact of the Mass Society paradigm is broad, affecting economic and political development, civil strife, international violence, and even the globalized world. Ideologically, proponents of the Mass Society paradigm seek economic, political, and social democracy. Some seek political and social stability regardless of regime type. But they agree that “masses” differ from crowds, publics, and social movements, as masses are large groups of persons who infrequently interact because they are excessively individuated by societal changes beyond their control and can be easily manipulated by political leaders. ESTABLISHMENT OF MASS SOCIETY The son of a rabbi, Durkheim was a founder of the field of sociology along with Max Weber. During his teaching experience in Germany, he adopted an empirical view of society, thereby parting company with the reliance on logic, in particular the orthodoxy of René Descartes (1644). For Durkheim, the problem was that industrialization attracted single male workers from the rural areas to the towns, where they had no family; their feeling of anomie (alienation) came from neglect by businesses running the factories and the lack of support from family, who were at some distance back home. One result of anomie was suicide (Durkheim 1897). Durkheim’s concern was that human history entailed in­creasing specialization of social roles, such that individuals were isolated from one another, even on the factory floor, as well as from traditional institutions of social control, such as the church and the family (cf. Rule 1988:119–25). He echoed the view of



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human anarchy found in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1651). Whereas Durkheim restricted his focus by using sociological terms to explain social reality alone, other developers of the Mass Society paradigm half a century later integrated economics, politics, and society into a coherent whole. One of the most elaborate statements of the origin of mass society comes in C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite (1956). Mills was the son of a traveling insurance agent; his family moved around his home state of Texas so often that he gained few friends. His narrative traced how “the democratic society of publics is being transformed into a society of masses” (p. 300). Rather than the Durkheimian focus on the erosion of family, Mills’s concern was with the rise of mass media of communication, which he felt were turning “speakers into listeners” (p. 302): “[T]he media have not only filtered into our experience of external realities, they have also . . . provided us with new identities and new aspirations of what we should like to be” (p. 314). He articulated the Gramscian thesis. For Mills, voluntary associations had become too large to be acces­sible to the individual’s influence, thereby leaving a “gap” between elites and mass (p. 307). Politics—with its reliance on Ivy League experts whose authoritative views emerge from the media before the masses have time to reflect on events—had become “administration from above” over “atom­ized and submissive masses” (pp. 308, 309). Mills observed that political parties were in bed with corporate elites to the detriment of ordinary people in the United States. Whereas the old, propertied Republican Party upper class was fading, he noted the rise of the “ripsnorting style as well as the money of the new [Democratic Party] upper classes” (p. 33). Either the old elites would join the new or they would be displaced, Mills predicted. His concern was that there was no public debate on a wide range of important issues (pp. 335, 338), such as the unnecessary and dangerous conduct of the Cold War (Mills 1958). To Mills, the Cold War discourse placed civil rights and other issues onto a political back burner. Being a democratic socialist, his main concern was that issues of war and peace as well as macroeconomic deci­sions for the United States as a whole were being decided undemocratically, that technological advances were making the “instruments of rule quite unsurpassed” (p. 23). For his courage in openly swimming against the tide of complacent pluralism (p. 16n), he was reportedly denied admission to the graduate faculty at Columbia University, consigned to teach in the undergraduate Columbia College. Mills focused on a disturbing concentration of power, appear­ing to be a Marxist in the heyday of the Senator Joseph McCarthy’s persecution of leftists. Yet he dismissed Marx (p. 277), asserting instead that there is an interlocking triangle of power: “American government is not . . . a committee of ‘the ruling class.’ It is a network of ‘committees’ [including] . . . the

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corporate rich . . ., the pro­fessional politician . . . [and] the high military” (p. 170), which President Dwight Eisenhower (1961:1035–40) later identified as the “military industrial complex.” Yet his descrip­tion fully accepted the McCarthyite belief, quoted approvingly from Whittaker Chambers, that there was a “matted forest floor of American upper class, enlightened middle class, liberal and official life” (p. 282). Beginning with a definition of the powerful as “those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it,” based on the formulation of Max Weber (1918), Mills (1956:8,9) axiomatized that the powerful are “those who decide” and, thus, those with “access to the com­mand of major institutions” (Figure 5.1). Political scientist Harold Lasswell (1951b,c), who had defined “influence” by the acquisition of eight types of values, had argued that the attainment of a top position on any value would necessarily lead to gaining top positions on other values—the agglutinative hypothesis (cf. Haas 2014c:ch6). Mills, however, contended that “the elite are not simply those who have the most” in a political struggle. Instead, “they would not have the most were it not for their positions in the great institutions [that] are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige” (p. 9). In short, control of institutions confers the means “of exercising power, of acquiring and retaining wealth, and of cashing in the higher claims for prestige” (ibid.)—assigning primacy to three of Lasswell’s eight values. If power were dif­fused, then the powerful could not coordinate their actions. A “power elite,” thus, would identify itself by its “psychological similarity and social intermingling, . . . commanding positions and interests . . . [with] explicit coordination” (p. 19). In the tradition of Wilfredo Pareto (1916), Mills’s empirical analysis began by identifying the richest Americans. He then demonstrated that power elites go to the same schools and continue to interact in later years. The inference was that a social network of the wealthy few in the United States controls the power of the country. His methodology was positionalist: The powerful are those who have certain institutional positions, keep in touch to influence the po­litical process, and thereby secure their power and wealth. He assigned pri­macy to status and wealth, admitting that the “power elite” is “a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially

Figure 5.1  Original Mass Society Paradigm.



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and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account [because]. . . several interests could be realized more easily if they worked together, . . . and accordingly they have done so” (Mills 1956:11,20). But Mills did no interviewing. Instead, for evidence, he traced elites in various “command posts” circulating between roles in business, government, and the military establishment. Recently, journalist Thomas Frank (2016) did that interviewing, finding that the demographic composition of leaders of the two major American political parties is the same, and their outlook is a Social Darwinistic lack of concern for the working class and those who are poor. Because neither party seeks to represent the interests of the poor or working class, instead appealing to the middle class, they do not provide a civil society link between government and the less affluent members of society. Within the legislature, they often allow the executive to make decisions that they cannot (Ehrlich 2008), thereby abandoning their role because they are hopelessly deadlocked. Similarly, members of the Republican Party found out in 2016 that they had not been representing the voices of their constituents when Donald Trump surged ahead in polling and primaries to gather enough votes to be nominated for president of that party to the dismay of the established leaders. Mills conceded that pluralism in the form of group politics, with various interests bidding for a slice of the pie, operated at “middle levels of power” (p. 28), so he was willing to admit some pluralism with regard to the economic crumbs that fell into small communities of the middle classes. However, his main concern was that “[a]t the end of the road there is totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia” (p. 304). In a review of Mills’s The Power Elite, Paul Sweezy (1956:141), an avowed Marxist, argued instead that a society with poor persons and rich persons must necessarily be one in which the rich enjoy the good things in life, thereby denying the same advantage to others: Whatever the political process, the outcome obviously favors the rich. Although Mills (1956:286) stated that his interest was in the consequences of policies of the power elite, he presented no statistics of poverty in The Power Elite. Sweezy pointed out that Mills’s analysis of social networks was redun­dant. Simple statistics of income gaps, thus, would provide Sweezy with sufficient evidence of the existence of a power elite. For a Marxist, those who per­ceive otherwise have false consciousness; perceptions are epiphenomena to a Marxian materialist historical process in which capitalists need to exploit workers, prompting them to mobilize in the class struggle. Sweezy, of course, awaited a proletarian revolution. The son of a University of Chicago industrial psychologist, William Kornhauser supported the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley campus of the University of California in the 1960s, opposed the American intervention in

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Vietnam, and increasingly became radicalized over the years. He suffered a similar fate as Mills in failing to gain promotion in rank due to his leftist views. For Kornhauser, totalitarian governments created mass societies because dominant institutions and values are care­fully controlled by the elite subculture (Figure 5.2a). Other subcultures, with separate institutions and value systems, are viewed as threats to elite dominance. Elites reward those who ape their values and punish those who adhere to other value systems until the latter are “atomized” (lack access to intermediate institu­tions of civil society) and “alienated” (lack a Durkheimian sense of community identity). Kornhauser found that the same absence of civil society existed in nontotalitarian governments because of rapid industrialization, consistent with Durkheim (Figure 5.2b). Rapid social change tears the fabric of a once close-knit society as family members move away from home towns to seek employment, aban­doning traditional church affiliations and friendships in the process. Thus, there is an institutional gap between elites and masses as well as an absence of group ties between the masses, both resulting from the anti­ mony between individual identities and physical realities. Whereas Durkheim used the word “anomie,” Kornhauser preferred “the uprooted.” Because of that gap, elites are able to manipulate nonelites. Kornhauser’s The Politics of Mass Society (1959) cited various exemplars in European history, but was most interested in explaining votes for Communist Party candidates in Western Europe immediately after World War II. He linked Communist support to rapid social change, not to a desire for a larger share of the pie by workers. Since social change sometimes cannot be slowed, he noted that there are two ways out of mass society—the aristo­cratic and the democratic (p. 229). The aristocratic view, which Kornhauser attributed to

Figure 5.2  Kornhauser’s Basic Mass Society Paradigm.



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Walter Lippmann (1956), would reserve more power in the hand of elites to maintain coherence in policy. The demo­cratic view of C. Wright Mills would give more power to the masses. Kornhauser then questioned both options as being too narrow by them­selves and urged following both strategies. Clearly, Communist trade unions and political parties are examples of intermediate institutions to which workers could belong, yet Kornhauser contradicted his theory by regarding such affilia­tions as indicative of the absence of intervening groups between elites and masses. He also discounted the gratitude of many in France and Italy for the role of Communists in providing the best organized resistance to fascist rule. Communists even attracted voting support from agricultural as well as industrial workers, while members of the organized trade unions voted socialist (Rimbert 1955:197; Stoetzel 1955:116). The existence of mass society is advanced by those who decry the failure of democratic institutions to bring about true democracy—the will of the people. They blame the absence or weakness of civil society, such as the collapse of democracy in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe (Howard 2003). The most recent expositions of the paradigm were by Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000) and David Halpern’s Social Capital (2005), though they did not link their insights with the Mass Society paradigm, as they seek to revitalize a sense of community, a topic discussed in the following chapter (cf. Goldstone 2003). CIVIL STRIFE, REVOLUTION, AND WAR Kornhauser went beyond Durkheim and Mills in providing an explanation for internal and external violence by governments that operate within mass societies (Figure 5.3). According to Kornhauser, totalitarian governments repress civil strife, so elites direct the unrest of the masses concerning restrictions on

Figure 5.3  Kornhauser’s Extended Mass Society Paradigm.

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personal liberties toward internal and external scapegoats. The mass society of authoritarian Singapore confirms his analysis (Haas 2014d:ch8). Within non-totalitarian societies, newcomers to industrial towns find much difficulty in re-establishing group ties, even when they are seemingly free to do so in pluralistic societies, so they are available for mobilization by Hitlers to commit acts of violence, provided that they do not experience Durkheimian “extreme personal deviance” and become alcoholics or commit suicide (Kornhauser 1959:91). Kornhauser implied that mass behavior is the responsibility either of elites who hold too much power or of masses who “nihilistically” fail to take advan­tage of their freedom in pluralistic societies to form intermediate institu­tions for asserting political demands in legitimate institutional channels (pp. 228,237). He then explained the availability of the masses for Hitlerite movements that persecute minorities or vilify foreign countries (p. 33): Mass society is objectively the atomized society, and subjectively the alienated pop­ulation. Therefore, mass society is a system in which there is high availability of a population for mobilization by elites. People become available for mobilization by elites when they lack or lose an independent group life.

Kornhauser was relying on Talcott Parsons’s (1951:42) “fundamental dy­namic theorem of sociology”—namely, that “the stability of any social sys­tem” requires the integration of two elements: “a set of common value patterns” and “the internalized need-disposition structure” of individuals. In other words, rulers and ruled should share common values: The state must legitimate its rule so that citizens will accept the moral authority of its rulers (cf. Rule 1988:ch.5). Another Parsonian, Chalmers Johnson (1966), once argued in a similar vein that revolution occurs to the ex­tent that the state maintains order by physical force instead of through attitudinal legitimacy. He referred to the “disequilibrated social system” as the seedbed for revolution (ibid., ch.4). Similarly, Jerome Skolnick (1969) hypothesized that the less fortunate engage in violence because they lack political power. Kristine Eck (2009) indeed found that ethnic mobilization has a 92 percent higher risk of intensification leading to violence than any other types of mobilization, though she lists no citation to the sociological literature on mobilization. According to economic sociologist Neil Smelser’s Theory of Collective Behavior (1962) “hostile outbursts” and other forms of collective behavior occur when six conditions are present—structural conduciveness, strain, a generalized hostile belief, pre­cipitating factors, mobilization, and the failure of social control. Eschew­ing any disruption of the normative integration of society, he proposed that “People under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief” (p. 385). He posited each factor as a precondition to the next condition. Although he cited copious examples, he did not ana­lyze any violent event in depth.



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Although a colleague of Kornhauser at Berkeley, Smelser was far more conservative, coming from a small town in Missouri. Smelser outlined the six conditions with considerable care (Figure 5.4): • Factors that are structurally conducive to hostile outbursts are the following: social cleavages that scapegoat re­sponsibility, inadequate channels for expressing grievances, means of com­munication to spread grievances and mobilize in-groups or out-groups, accessible objects to attack, and “long hot summers” (pp. 227–41). • Even if these conditions are present, strain is needed. Smelser used “strain” as a broader term than Durkheim’s anomie to refer to conditions such as “con­flicts of interest, normative malintegration, and differences in values” that challenge existing institutions (p. 48). Regarding race riots, Smelser fin­gered the rapid influx of both races to cities—what Kornhauser identified generically as “rapid social change”—as leading to labor surpluses that resulted in competition between the races for housing, jobs, and recre­ation facilities (pp. 242–44). An example of “normative strain” is the fear of the rise of Bolshevism that led to the red scare of 1919 (p. 244). “Value strain” occurs when political movements polarize populations into being for or against political change (p. 245). • Strain alone cannot ac­count for violence, so there must be a generalized hostility of one group against another that “identifies the source of the strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate” (p. 16). • The precipitants of violence consist of an atmosphere of tension, and then a belief by one group that the other side is about to commit an irreversible outrage or already has done so (pp. 249–53), such as misconduct by police toward minorities. The precipitating factor is the catalytic event, such as when Rosa Parks refused to take a seat at the back of a Montgomery, Alabama, bus, which is believed to be the origin of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. • Nothing happens until a mobilization of the aggrieved, involving initiative from someone, drawing-in of others, and duplication of hostile acts by “deviant and destructive persons” (pp. 260–61). • Finally, there must be a failure of agencies of social control. Vio­lence can be avoided, according to Smelser, if authorities are “quick and decisive” as when a “disciplined military or police” follows their commands (pp. 262,267).

Figure 5.4  Mass Society Social Unrest Paradigm.

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Although Parsons (1955) decried McCarthyism for eroding trust in gov­ ernment as a factor prompting social unrest, Smelser stressed riot control (cf. U.S. FBI 1967). He did not sug­ gest that violent outbursts could be prevented through increased social integration or social justice, which was Kornhauser’s democratic remedy for mass society. Instead, one of Smelser’s princi­ples of riot control was to “prevent communication in general, so that be­liefs cannot be disseminated” (p. 267). Thus, Smelser’s recommendations might bring about the totalitarian mass society that Kornhauser deplored. Other Mass Society paradigmists cautioned against the aggregation of power by any single group and thus supported “social pluralism” (Kornhauser 1959:229–30). Another conservative contributor to the Mass Society paradigm was political scientist Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (1968b). Born in New York City, his father and grandfather were successful publishers. He taught at Columbia University while C. Wright Mills was kept out of the graduate program; later, Huntington joined the faculty at Harvard University. Citing statistics of various sorts to prove that coups and political instability plagued the Third World, Huntington ar­gued the need for a theory of “political decay” to complement a theory of “political development” (ch. 1). Huntington insisted that in most countries “social and economic modernization produces political instabil­ity” (p. 45) unless there is a prior “concentration of power” (p. 137). He decried simplistic efforts to promote democracy in Third World countries by the mere infusion of de­velopment capital (p. 6). And he opposed the American demand for “free and fair elections” in countries lacking stable political institutions (p. 7). He was also a critic of the American role in Vietnam’s civil war (Huntington 1968a). Huntington (1968b:275) suggested that development (or modernization) produces rapid changes in aspira­tions and capabilities of the masses, who respond aggressively when elites block both socioeconomic progress and democracy (Figure 5.5). Studies on rapid change, democratic blockage, and political violence fail to confirm these notions, however (cf. Eckstein 1980:155–57; Zimmermann 1983:96–102, 105–18). Huntington’s suspicions of democracy extended to the United States: “Political authority is . . . peculiarly weak during a period of in­tense commitment to democratic and egalitarian ideals” (Huntington 1976:37). Be­cause

Figure 5.5  Mass Society Development Paradigm.



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“political modernization in America has . . . been . . . incomplete” (1968b:98), he judged that the result was vulnerability to the “democratic distemper” (1976:37) of the 1960s—that is, urban race riots. Although Huntington traced his intellectual origins to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1789–90), his Durkheimian mentor was sociologist William Kornhauser. Huntington advanced several major propositions, focusing on the inverse “relationship of economic growth to social-eco­nomic equity, political stability, political democracy, and national auton­omy” (Huntington 1987:12). Assuming that “high levels of economic wealth are associated with high levels of equity, stability, democracy, and autonomy,” he argued that such desirable goals are much less attainable when rates of economic growth are too rapid (p. 17). Although he cited studies to sup­port the view that rapid growth entails increased income inequality (Kuznets 1955; Morawetz 1977; Fields 1980), he gave no attention to a study by Harry Oshima (1970) presenting contrary evidence for Japan. He cited a study that reviews a literature linking rapid growth to political instability (Zimmermann 1983), but he overlooked the careful analysis by Chung-Si Ahn (1981) that explicitly refuted the correlational finding by controlling for important inter­vening variables. In a later essay, Huntington (1987:15–16) restated his belief that rapid growth is incompatible with democracy, citing one cross-national analysis (Marsh 1979), yet in an essay published two years earlier he seemingly contradicted himself, saying that “prospects for the extension of de­mocracy . . . would improve significantly . . . if . . . the economic devel­opment of the Third World were to proceed at a faster rate” (Huntington 1985:276). He celebrated a study that reported “a positive relationship between depen­dency and economic growth” (Ray and Webster 1978), but had no comment on a more comprehensive analysis that reported an opposite result (Walleri 1979). Nonetheless, Huntington sought to ground generalizations in an interdisciplinary literature of systematic case studies. He specified many possible intervening variables in his hypothesized relationships, and he posed questions about rela­tionships between important facets of politics and society. Among many cited studies, Huntington reported that political participation increases as socioeconomic development proceeds; but at early stages of socioeconomic development, too much political participation is desta­bilizing (Huntington and Nelson 1976). At later stages, when more centers of power arise (the army, a rev­olutionary cadre, masses seeking land reform, a bourgeoisie interested in more domestic purchases), “political elites . . . find it in their interest to expand political participation” (p. 162). Much later, Huntington viewed the end of the Cold War as the beginning of international conflict that had been suppressed for a half century. In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), he predicted

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that China and the Islamic world would resist the West because of culture clash. His paradigm, explained in more detail within Chapter 8, gradually shifted to give more attention to culture. After the Cold War, he observed, the West was trying too hard to foster worldwide democracy in countries that were ruled in an authoritarian manner. Thus, the argument is that mass societies will emerge into which religious institutions will enter in order to provide a link between the masses and their governments, creating more likelihood of inter-civilization conflict (cf. Rinehart 2004). Consistent with Huntington, religious institutions have provided civil society institutions that mediate between government and masses alienated by liberal society within the United States (Smidt, Kellstedt, Guth 2009; Balmer 2010). The way in which religious institutions fill the void in mass society has yet to be analyzed in more depth and would have to contrast the religious basis for the American Civil Rights Movement as well as the anticlerical policies of France and other Catholic countries. Linkage between support for Israel’s policies by American fundamentalist Protestants would further complicate the Mass Society paradigm regarding international violence. Rather than a mass society approach, the interaction between civilizations could be framed as contact between different cultures (cf. Bettiza 2014). The Culture paradigm is discussed in Chapter 8 below. DEVELOPMENT Huntington was primarily trying to present a Mass Society paradigm relating to development of Third World countries. Mass society, internal conflict, and economic and political development were fused together in his thinking. The paradigm of Mass Society examined the consequences of economic development, not how to increase economic prosperity in poorer countries. Kornhauser (1959:229–30) sought to avoid a mass society by advocating “social pluralism.” But Huntington endorsed authoritarian rule at early stages of development, in order to keep the lid on political instability, until social pluralism emerged at later stages (Huntington and Nelson 1976:53). Nevertheless, some 25 years later, Sarah Michael (2005) found that the lack of a civil society actually frustrates development. Regarding development aid, Huntington criticized the view that political instability is associated with poverty instead of rapid growth (1987:13). Instead, he urged that smaller sums of aid be spent to strengthen political parties because modernization means increasing political participation. That participation has to be organized. The principal institutional means for organizing the participation



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is the political party. . . . Instead of trying to pressure . . . land reform as a substi­ tute for peasant revolution, we [the U.S. government should] . . . focus on the pro­motion of peasant organization which could then, if they wished to, put the pressure on the government. (1968a:23, 27)

To implement his proposal, which he argued would be “more discreet, less expensive, and more productive of political stability” (p. 27), Huntington asked Congress for “a new-style Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), more skilled in building governments than in subverting them [because] the vac­uum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing coun­tries . . . can be filled permanently only by political organization” (U.S. Congress 1967:121). Thus, aid to political parties would have to involve CIAtype activity. Huntington got what he wanted, and economic aid was cut back in the decade after the end of the Cold War. Twenty years after his initial contribution to the development of the Mass Society paradigm, Huntington (1987:18–21) ac­knowledged a body of literature that purported to reconcile trade-offs in development. Originally, his main exem­plars of economic and political development were Britain and the United States (Huntington 1968b:ch.2). Within brief passages in Political Order in Changing Societies he claimed that rapid economic growth precluded political and social democracy in Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Jamaica, Lesotho, Mexico, Sénégal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Later, he pointed to the successful cases of Costa Rica, Israel, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan as counter-exemplars, appearing to contradict his either/or pessimism, and suggesting that different countries follow paths based on national goals de­rived from root cultures and religions. Drawing up a ninefold classification of cultures, he stated that “Culture and its impact on development cry out for systematic and empirical comparative and longitudinal study by the scholars of development” (1987:28). In short, he blamed the failure of development on back­ward ways of thought. But then-stagnant China and prosperous Taiwan, hardly in the same economic or political league, were in the same cultural category, providing somewhat of a reductio ad absurdum to his new priority on ways of thinking over the primacy of economic change. Having abandoned the key premises of his earlier interest in the Mass Society paradigm, he had to construct a new theory, although his con­servatism remained: He ventured that some countries do not develop be­cause the image of the “developed Western society—wealthy, equitable, democratic, stable, autonomous— . . . may not constitute a meaningful model . . . for a modern Islamic, African, Confucian, or Hindu society” (p. 25). Nevertheless, noting that “a close connection exists between [the development of] political science and . . . democratization,” he urged po­litical scientists to continue to seek “political reform” (Huntington 1988:9).

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Huntington wanted to transform mass society after economic development raised countries to the level where a civil society-based democracy would be possible. Investigating the environmental movements in four countries, a team of scholars finds that the cause is more successful in open societies than those with mass society problems (Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Schlosberg, Hernes 2003). How to bring about civil society in the first place, however, was neglected until Bruce Bueno de Mesquita brought together a team of researchers interested in the transition to democracy involving respect for human rights. What they found, though cross-sectionally rather than historically, was that the constitutional framework must allow for the rise of competitive political parties in order for elections to be meaningful (Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, Smith 2005). INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE The Mass Society paradigm, as originally developed by Durkheim (1897), depicted economic change as the source of disruptions in society that lead to conflict situations. Although Durkheim did write about World War I (Durkheim and Denis 1915), more explicit suggestions on how to apply the Mass Society paradigm to the problem of war appeared in the writ­ings of Hans Speier, a sociologist who left Germany when his research institute was shut down by the Nazis in 1933. Speier (1952:276) typologized wars into absolute wars (for ideological principles), instrumental wars (for profits), and agonistic wars (for glory). He then noted that in the twentieth century international conflicts were fought primarily along ideological lines, and he speculated that the reason was because neither profit nor glory can be derived from combat in the modern age. “In the history of capitalism,” he argued, “risks and uncertainties have been unevenly distributed among the different sec­tions of the population” (p. 260). In economic downturns, some classes thus will favor any policy that promises a return to economic normalcy. “Since armament creates employment, it can be presented and popularized . . . as an effective measure against unemployment” (p. 258). Thus, he de­picted a situation in which technological unemployment marginalizes the masses, economic conditions deteriorate, scapegoats are found in other countries, and workers either accept or clamor for war to get back to work (Figure 5.6). The description clearly fits Germany leading up to World Wars I and II. The Mass Society paradigm differs from the Marxian paradigm in that capitalism per se is not the problem but, instead, a capitalism that tears apart social communities, leaving workers alienated and atomized. Speier’s remedy



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Figure 5.6  Mass Society International Violence Paradigm.

was to build new net­works of social relations among the workers, as “social homogeneity made for . . . moral restraint in the conduct of war” (p. 274). In a test that confirmed Speier’s Mass Society paradigm, one study correlated various societal mea­sures for ten countries from 1900 to 1960 (Haas 1968). As unemployment went up, so did suicide; steady increases in suicide rates, in turn, preceded eras of increasing military spending and resulting arms races, which culmi­nated in wars. Bruce Russett (1987, 1990), in studies of 23 indus­trial states since 1853, found a similar pattern in which democracies participated in interstate disputes, but then escalated into war after a short-term economic decline and increasing protest and repression. He found that nondemocratic countries, however, were more likely to enter international disputes while on economic upswings. Russett concluded that war is an alternative state policy when efforts to contain domestic protest fail. Other scholars have sought to prove that international misconduct is a diversion by elites from domestic problems (Levy 1989; James and Oneal 1991; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Tarar 2006; Nicholls, Huth, Appel 2010; Jung 2014), but they usually beg the question of which problems under what circumstances. Although evidence for a diversionary theory is rather thin (Foster and Palmer 2006; Arena and Bak 2015), that may be because regime type was not taken into account, as mature democracies and consolidating autocracies are more likely to engage in diversionary violence than consolidating democracies and mature autocracies (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). In another study, the imposition of American or UN-sponsored sanctions for human rights violations was associated with increased repression (Wood 2008). But few of the “diversionary” studies used attitudinal data. In a larger cross-sectional multivariate analysis for the years 1955 to 1960 (Haas 1974b:pt3), attitudinal variables were used but washed out. Nonetheless, the resulting causal model ex­plained 90 percent of the variance in variables depicting a two-level con­ ception of pathways to international violence: (1) Consistent with the Mass Society paradigm, developed and developing countries go to war if they are confronted by economic problems and ethnic diversity, whence they may go to war directly or else they will step up arms production and participate in armed conflicts later. (2) For the poorest

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countries, war is a simple function of high levels of military spending despite economic problems and eth­nic diversity. Findings were similar in a later twolevel (poliheuristic) study (DeRouen 2000). But again the research failed to link the concept of “diversion” within the Mass Society paradigm. Another consideration is that there also may be a gap between organized civil society and government. Bureaucrats and executives often act with no regard to interest groups and political parties, sometimes semi-tyrannically in their own interest but also in the interest of the public by executive orders to liberalize governance (Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol 1985). Some studies have examined forms of internal conflict, such as riots, as correlates of war (Geller 1985); others have focused on rising prices and governmental repression (James 1988:ch.5). Nevertheless, there is no consensus about whether internal conflict predicts external conflict; results vary depending upon the research design (Stohl 1980). Adherents of the Mass Society para­digm regard both internal and external conflict as springing from the same source—mass society. However, no relationship has been found between membership in civil society organizations and preferences for violent or nonviolent conflict resolution (Chapman 2008). If some sort of turmoil is associated with decisions for war, the explanation needs to connect the turmoil to something within the decision-making process of leaders that prompts them to go to war. One explanation is that war becomes a way of diverting the attention of the dissatisfied masses from their personal angst. In a study of the United States during the Cold War, high unemployment, strong investor confidence, an absence of wars, and an ongoing presidential election year were more likely to favor war over peace (Fordham 1998). But war can also profit the war-making industry, which in turn lobbies to use military force abroad (Camyar and Ulupinar 2015). Ignoring opposition to war from the public is another example of the mass society phenomenon, though evidence exists that civil society can act as a restraint in some cases (Levy and Mabe 2004; Maoz 2004). INTERNATIONAL MASS SOCIETY Insofar as international anarchy is the equivalent of mass society, several scholars have unknowingly expanded the Mass Society paradigm to the age of globalization, when the creation of a global civil society is difficult (Comor 2001). Lacking legitimacy, supranational institutions have evoked transnational protests (O’Neill 2004; Koppell 2010). Richard Falk (1999) decries “predatory globalization” and calls upon nation-states and transnational social movements to fight the forces of transnational corporations in the global market, yet his call for a Hegelian antithesis has been only



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tentatively answered (e.g., Margalit 2012). Anti-systemic norms have emerged in the manner identified as “norm subsidiarity”—a “process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (Acharya 2011:97). The need for global civil society is particularly urgent in regard to pandemics. If a new disease spreads in Africa (Ebola) or Asia (SARS), the matter is viewed as globally unimportant until a First World country is affected. The World Health Organization (WHO), responding to member governments, then sets a priority on controlling the disease. Yet nation-states often hide the onset of an epidemic (Sparrow 2016:27), again until spillover is detected to the First World. While the Zika virus infected slightly more than one thousand persons in late 2015, cholera continues to affect 3 million annually and kills about 100,000. WHO’s emphasis was on Zika, not cholera, clearly occurred because no transnational civil society institution set a different priority. Malaria affects and kills even more (malaria.com 2016). Third World countries are seldom accorded an equal say in globalized institutions. Those who demand democracy despite the absence of global sovereignty are called “sovereigntists” (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011). For example, the environmental, labor, and women’s movements are described by several scholars to determine whether they provide global civil society (O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, Williams 2000; Poloni-Staudinger and Orbals 2014; Hughes, Krook, Paxton 2015). One study even suggests that NGOs are engaging in direct enforcement (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014); within the World Commission on Dams, for example, non-states actors are the sole decision-makers (Dingwerth 2008). The global justice and human rights movements have also been analyzed (Clark 2001; Steger and Wilson 2012). Extended analyses also appear within chapters of at least two books (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005). An effort to have American military bases removed started as a cosmopolitan civil society movement through an international conference but thus far has been limited to national initiatives (Yeo 2009). No scholarly formulation has yet emerged to include the development of international or global civil society as a special case of the Mass Society paradigm. Daniel Cohen (2006) has argued that the poor around the world have failed to experience the prosperity enjoyed by the capitalists because they are neglected, not because of exploitation (cf. Choi, Murphy, Caro 2004; Dowlah 2004). Even more dispossessed are the indigenous peoples who lack influence while trying to preserve their cultures (Keal 2003). Global forces are much harder to influence through civil society than national power structures, so the apparent result is that inequality within countries has increased (cf. Hurrell and Wood 1999; Michael 2005; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009).

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Nevertheless, one study argues that women have gained from the globalization of the feminist movement (Richards and Gelleny 2007). Intergovernmental and nongovernmental international organizations might serve as the civil society within international anarchy, seeking to mediate between minor powers on the one hand and major or superpowers on the other hand (Jaeger 2007; Heins 2008; Omelicheva 2009). Yet the personnel who operate elite structures, who meet together at Davos and elsewhere in a manner described by C. Wright Mills, have a level of unaccountability because of their invisibility (Tsingou 2014:341) in contrast with such visible globalizers as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Woods 2006). The masses of the world have been left out. But some individuals today are described as follows: “They set agendas, they establish boundaries and limits for action, they certify, they offer salvation, they guarantee contracts, and they provide order and security” (Hall and Biersteker 2002:4–5). The “they” consists of global market forces, private market institutions, nongovernmental organizations, transnational religious movements, mafias, and mercenary armies (ibid., p. 4). Then in 2008, when the world financial crisis emerged, the invisible corporate globalizers were unmasked for their unaccountability. A network analysis of the “superclass” began in the press but stopped short of full disclosure (cf. Detomasi 2006; Slaughter 2006; Maoz 2011). Increasingly visible are the transnational activists in nongovernmental organizations (DeMars 2005; Tarrow 2005). The development of global civil society is one of the most fascinating developments in the current international environment, offering the potential to reshape global governance and stop wars (Meyer, Whittier, Robnett 2002; Doh and Teegan 2003; Kaldor 2003). Indeed, the World Bank now has a formal mechanism for private complaints when projects based on their loans commit environmental violations (Buntaine 2015). Some scholars have noted that everything is just fine in the First World, whereas the Third World is a zone of conflict because of lack of prosperity, implying that there is a global mass society. They extend the core-periphery dichotomy of Johan Galtung (1971), who seeks to explain exploitation, into a “two worlds” explanation (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Singer and Wildawsky 1996). Putting the two ideas together, First World exploitation in the Third World has become the basis for mass society pressures for war, though exponents of the “two worlds” concept had a more Darwinian idea in mind (as indicated in Chapter 7 below). Because most writing on globalization has missed the relevance of the Mass Society paradigm, a separate Globalization paradigm is identified in Chapter 8. When governments can no longer protect their people from the inroads of major powers and the invisible international superclass, one result is the rise



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of terrorist groups (Lipschutz 2008). Norms to oppose a dominant force, in other words, can choose scapegoating and violence when democratic channels are blocked (Hassner 2011). Within the United States, the abolition of slavery brought about norm subsidiarity in the form of a “state’s rights” ethos that insisted that the federal government should not intrude into the states to enforce legal equality so that they could harbor the Ku Klux Klan to impose racism. CONCLUSION The Mass Society paradigm lingers behind more research in political science and sociology than international relations. But the isomorphism between societies that have problems and strange international behavior is commonly examined. Unlike the evolving Marxian paradigm, there are several competing versions of the Mass Society paradigm, not just because they seek to explain different issues and levels of analysis. Such diversity invites cross-testing to winnow down those that predict correctly from those that are pushing ideology. Metaphysically, the Mass Society paradigm postulates interactionism— that is, how material realities impact ideas, which in turn leads to changes in material realities. Durkheim viewed industrialization as mentally and socially disruptive. Kornhauser saw alienation as a subjective phenomenon, atomization as objective. Mills depicted the rich as an interactive community monopolizing economic and political power and excluding the masses. Smelser posited that material conditions (social changes) provoke hostility between groups, whence politicization occurs leading to unrest that can get out of hand unless stopped by force; intergroup political dialog plays little role in his paradigm. Huntington’s concern was that rapid economic change and misguided promotion of democracy in the Third World produced attitudinal chaos and physical force in the form of riots and revolutions, so only authoritarian physical crackdowns could ease the transition toward prosperity and eventual pluralism. Speier felt that the vicissitudes of industrial change produced worker malaise that could be relieved by governments offering to increase employment in anticipation of war with countries abroad that elites identified as foreign enemies. Segments in the Mass Society scenarios have involved material realities leading to attitude changes, which in turn prompted governments to change material realities. Statistical and attitudinal or behavioral studies, in other words, have to be juxtaposed along with qualitative case studies to test the interactionist paradigm. An article entitled “Foreign Policy Gaps Between

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Citizens and Leaders” provided evidence supporting the Mass Society paradigm—that there are attitudinal divergences between leaders and the masses in some but not all issue-areas, but sadly the authors did not realize that they were doing so (Page and Barabas 2000), as there was not a single reference to C. Wright Mills or the other theorists mentioned in the present chapter. Paradigm development just has not been on the research agenda, and the profession continues to accumulate more isolated research gems. Within sociology, one scholar (Hamilton 2001) has argued that some of the major claims of the Mass Society paradigm have been refuted. But evidence presented by political scientists keeps piling up, though they show no evidence that they have ever heard of the paradigm. A major challenge in the world today is the unpopularity of democracy within the Middle East (Lynch 2016). The Arab Spring of 2010–11 involved young people in the region, empowered by information derived from Internet media, protesting the gap between government and the masses. Protests occurred in countries with few intervening institutions, either because they did not exist, involved too few persons aside from religious movements, or government considered their pleas as terroristic. Tunisia had intervening institutions and succeeded. There was a coup in Egypt when the political party with the most votes ignored minority views. And groups being fired upon decided to rely on outside patrons while engaging in civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Gerges 2016). Without a grasp of the Mass Society paradigm, the situation may never be properly understood. Durkheim (1912) suggested that religion can serve as a replacement for civil society. Pastors and priests provide answers in times ordinary and extraordinary. The current sense of fear and unease about terrorism, when the helplessness felt by the masses is enhanced by the view that governments are ineffective, is nothing new: Terrorism, advocated by anarchists Sergei Nechayev (1869, quoted in Confino 1973) and Mikhail Bakunin (1873) during the waning years of Tsarist Russia (Bakunin 1973) was a factor in bringing down the government’s legitimacy. The incrementalist Provisional Government of February 1917 was viewed as detached from the real needs of the people, who instead jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon of Vladimir Lenin during October. During the 2016 American presidential election campaign, the Mass Society paradigm appeared to apply to the ability of Donald Trump to mobilize support from disaffected members of the White working class despite his contradictory statements on a variety of issues because of his antagonism toward the political class (Page 2015). Bernie Sanders also provided an apocalyptic view of current American problems. They both garnered support from voters who sought to “shake things up” because they felt unrepresented by the mainstream within their respective political parties, so there should be



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no surprise that they were anti-incrementalist (Manseau 2016). When voters in England voted to sever ties with the European Union that same year, the same conclusion was advanced—that the views of a neglected majority were ignored by the dominant political parties (Jack 2016). For that matter, the operations of the International Studies Association governing council and professional journal editors act as elites, considering ordinary members as their masses, with caucuses and sections not operating as intervening institutions in the selection of candidates for top positions. Such an analysis has been found elsewhere in the social sciences, where scholars seek elite status by exclusivist claims (Bourdieu 1988). As a result, the dominance of ideologies as “theory” has been maintained to marginalize the consideration of empirical paradigms, a coup that has undermined the very founding principles of ISA. In short, the Mass Society paradigm is now haunting the world. One of the casualties may be the goal of European integration, the inspiration for the Community Building paradigm during and after World War II. Accordingly, the building of communities, at the global, transnational, intergovernmental, and national levels, is the topic of the following chapter.

Chapter 6

Community Building Paradigm

Whereas the Marxian paradigm tries to account for the overthrow of failed economic systems by mobilization of those exploited, reaching an apogee with communism, the Mass Society paradigm focuses on how rapid economic changes destroy community with adverse political and social consequences. Both paradigms treat the link between economics and political mobilization as somehow inevitable. They also deal with efforts to bring the masses together to build a new order. The Mass Society variant of Neil Smelser (1962) explicitly states that group mobilization should be expected if social strain is present, but advocates of the Community Building paradigm have developed elaborate explanations for how and why mobilization efforts can build community, an element that is isomorphic with the quest to build international communities. The term “community building” comes from sociologist Amitai Etzioni (2001), perhaps the only scholar to have done research on the group, national, and international system levels, with different exemplars. The idea gained attention during the Middle Ages, when the Cluniac Order conceived of a Christian Commonwealth that would unite those of a single faith (Krey 1922; Bozeman 1960:ch8), an idea also promoted by Dante Alighieri (1313) and Émeric Crucé (1623), both proponents of world government. Many scholars have sought to construct theories for bringing people together—to build communities with common norms that take collective political action. Depending on the type of community (Shindo 2012), there are several variants. One focuses on domestic mobilization theory, another seeks the dynamics of international integration. Because they seek the same goal in different arenas, and paradigms are valuable only if they focus on several levels of analysis, the appropriate way to bring them together is by referring to them as a paradigm of Community Building, though some refer 81

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to the mobilization of dissent about the existing order, while others mobilize consent for new projects. The quest is not just on how individuals and countries can cooperate (Axelrod 1984) but how they can construct communities to act collectively. MOBILIZATION OF DISSENT Whereas Gustave Le Bon (1896) viewed conflict as disruptive and unusual, sociologist Georg Simmel (1908) carried the Hegelian dialectic beyond Karl Marx: He regarded conflict as a normal aspect of the social process, containing integra­tive functions in which opposed parties negotiate, thereby producing progress (a new synthesis). Mobilization theorists have focused their attention on how revolutions, riots, and political changes have emerged from dissent by building movements of protest. They seek to refute the Mass Society paradigm by explaining how social movements arise among those disenchanted with the status quo—that is, disadvantaged by imbalances in power—rather than atomized by social disintegration. There is a fundamental difference between power-oriented movements that seek systemic change with little individual payoff, and participation-oriented movements, such as trade union formation, which provides tangible benefits to members. Among power-oriented movements, some are value-oriented, wanting to make fundamental social changes, while others are reformoriented with an interest in establishing new norms within an existing society (Morrison 1971). The distinctions are crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of mobilization, though most analyses blur the differences. Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961) and Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967) are perhaps the earliest to discuss a coherent theory of ethnic political mobilization—in colonial Algeria and the ghettoes of the United States, respectively. Understanding all too well how politics operates, ghettoites suspect that through the acquisition of political power they might alleviate economic disparities with non-ghetto America. Other scholars have argued the same point under such labels as the “new ghetto man” and “pro-riot ideology” (Tomlinson 1969; Caplan 1970). Relative deprivation theory is that those who lack some comfort, good, or service, especially when perceived in relation to others, are more likely to protest (Gurr 1970). But if civil strife is a reaction to socioeconomic injustice and a resistance to the brainwashing that elite elements try to im­pose upon nonelites in order to delude them into believing that they are being treated fairly by society, then clearly not all victims of depri­vation or injustice are aroused to mobilize protest (Jenkins and Perrow 1977). Only a few take the initiative; others follow.



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Table 6.1  Types of Social Movements Degree of Change Who Benefits Specific Groups Everyone

Limited Alternative social movements Reformist social movements

Radical Redemptive social movements Revolutionary social movements

Source: Aberle (1966)

Political mobilization is a strategy by which groups pursue their inter­ests. But not all groups do so until they are led by institutional communities created in civil society. The range of social movements, therefore, is considerable (Table 6.1). The first systematic presentations of the mobilization process were developed by two sociologists who wrote about Europe. In Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore (1966) analyzed how the bourgeoisie allied with the landed gentry in England, France, and the United States, whereas bureaucrats allied with landlords in Germany and Japan; the three became democracies, the two dictatorships. In a series of studies summarized in From Mobilization to Revolution (1978), Charles Tilly described how revolution­ary movements succeed by forging coalitions with a variety of organized interests, including intellectuals in the outgoing regime—a perspective reminiscent of Julien Benda (1927), Crane Brinton (1938:ch.2), and Vilfredo Pareto’s (1916) concern for a circulation of narcissistic yet clever elites in which a sure sign of successful revolution is the “alienation of intellectuals.” Thus, groups that seek change must, to be successful, find allies among the elites, such as the intellectuals. Tilly, a student of Barrington Moore, has been called the father of twentyfirst century sociology (Martin 2008). He has accommodated modifications to his theory throughout the years (cf. Rule 1988:ch.6). Tilly (1978:69) defined “mobilization” as a process of accumu­ lating and controlling resources “by which a group goes from being a pas­sive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.” While noting that recent migrants are unlikely to be involved in protest (Tilly, Tilly, Tilly 1975:269), Tilly rejected “break­down” paradigms, including the Mass Society paradigm, because they expect violence to be “a direct response to hard­ship, normlessness, or rapid change” (ibid., 252). On the contrary, Tilly (1969a:ll) traced the migration of discontented rural residents to cities in Europe, where political parties and trade unions formed while police forces emerged to control crime and dissidence. Rapid social change supposedly destroyed or precluded intermediate organiza­tions, according to the Mass Society paradigm, but for Tilly trade unions integrated migrants into the new political forms of the modern city during eras of rapid industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization. Tilly pooh-poohed the alienation thesis, arguing that trade unions provided

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Figure 6.1  Community Mobilization Paradigm.

a new sense of community for workers and a vanguard for action, evidently also accepting a semi-Leninist perspective (Figure 6.1). Tilly used examples from several countries in his more discur­sive writing, but his main exemplars were violent events of governments and challengers in France, Germany, and Italy from 1830 to 1960 (Tilly, Tilly, Tilly 1975), including an analysis of 11,616 persons arrested during an outbreak of revolutionary violence in Paris during June 1848 (Tilly and Lees 1974). When various statistical measures were correlated, collective violence was found to be more associated with organized protest over spe­cific deprivations than with generalized economic misery (Snyder and Tilly 1972), although his conclusion has been challenged (Halaby 1973). Tilly concluded that industrialization and urbanization are related to collective violence because of their impact on politics, not society, in “shaping the po­tential contenders for power, transforming the techniques of governmental control, and shifting the resources available to contenders and govern­ments” (Tilly 1973:447). The immediate determinants of collective action are “violations of established rights, the mobilization levels of different contenders for power, [and] the current costs of different forms of action,” whereas violent outcomes are a function of “the presence or absence of counterdemonstrators, the tactics of repressive forces, [and] the length of time during which opposing parties are in direct contact” (Tilly 1978:183). Large-scale violence evokes repression unless the mobilized group is ex­tremely powerful (ibid., 115). Tilly also rejected the notion that “social behavior results from individual mental events” (1984:11). Po­litical contention can lead either to peaceful acceptance of demands from challengers (usually trade-union-linked political parties) for a redistribu­tion of resources or to violence, when those in power call out the police. Nevertheless, the evidence to support his construction of the origins of collective pro­test and collective violence has been questioned by several scholars (Skocpol and Somers 1978; Zimrnermann 1983:378–83). In particular, Theda Skocpol (1979) has argued that the Chinese, French, and Russian revolutions occurred because the “dominant classes could not defend



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against peasant rebellions” or “cope with foreign pressures” (ibid., pp. 49,50), unlike the German and Japanese cases. At the heart of Tilly’s claim that social mobilization can produce societal pluralism is his concept of “resource mobilization.” To be successful, trade unions and other effective institutions of civil society must amass not just members and supporters but also funds, knowledge, media attention, build solidarity, forge legitimacy, and develop coalitions within the elite classes (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1977). The organizations have to be well managed rather than riddled by competing factions (Fuchs 2006). The resources, in other words, must be both social and material. To amass as much funding as possible, a movement must not only have group membership from those who will benefit directly but also emphasize commonalities with other groups that will not benefit but will, nevertheless agree on the goals: Beneficiary constituents, thus, will seek out conscience constituents (Paulsen and Glumm 1995). However, the Civil Rights Movement relied on the turnout at protests by those who did not contribute funds to any organization, though many were networked with the mobilizing organizations (cf. Diani and McAdam 2003). Another key element is the political opportunity concept, which refers to the receptivity or vulnerability of the political system to challenge. The concept refers to such elements as broadening political access (political pluralism), elite disunity, and ineffective repression capabilities. If an organized group makes a coalition with an elite faction, which needs political support to gain a majority, then concessions will occur through a mediation process (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001). But the concessions may not be sufficient, so protest may continue (cf. Eisenger 1973; Meyer 2004). Rather than a complicated pathway, Herbert Blumer (1969) saw a consistent pattern within social movements involving four stages—social ferment, popular excitement, formalization, and institutionalization. Later, his formulation was revised (Mauss 1975; cf. Tilly 1978) by adding a fifth stage for decline; he also changed the terminology somewhat (Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2  Stages of Community Building Paradigm.

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Figure 6.3  Protest Mobilization Paradigm.

The stages approach, similar to the analysis of revolutions by Crane Brinton (1938), requires an analysis of how to determine when each stage was reached but also which preconditions led to the five choices. The emergence phase clearly consists of a triggering event, such as the Rosa Parks exemplar cited above to move to the back of the bus in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955. Factions must then coalesce or the movement will not progress. Bureaucratization involves building the organization itself, which requires communication and funds. Building communities refers to creating something relatively permanent. In Ghetto Revolts (1973), sociologist Joe Feagin and political scientist Harlan Hahn further applied the concept of political mobilization to organized protests that morphed into riots (Figure 6.3). Citing Tilly’s earlier work (1969a,b), they started with the premise that groups pursue their own interests. They then traced the development of the political mobilization of African Americans during the 1960s with the migration of Blacks to the cities and the “concentration, for the first time, of very large numbers of Black Amer­icans in tightly bounded areas” (pp. 31–32). Segregation promoted intra-ethnic communication and “extensive social networks,” instead of the “accepted image of disorganized and atomized [B]lack migrants” (p. 32). Then, due to White discrimination and exploitation, the Black community developed both crime and political organizations. When White political elites, who were formerly divided on other matters, united to prevent Blacks from hav­ing “a share of urban power” (p. 37), Blacks tried “other methods in pro­ moting their objectives” (p. 38). When legal redress proved ineffectual, as Whites would not enforce desegregation court orders, Black protest activ­ity “began to take the form of mass marches, picketing, sit-ins, and other civil disobedience tactics” (p. 39). Modest successes served to mobilize more protests, and the result was often a bargaining process: demonstration, coercive government response coupled with some type of negotiations, on occasion, significant gains from the ne­gotiations, then demonstration again . . . to force whites into negotiations aimed at altering the distribution of power and resources, (p. 39)

Thus, violence was a tool in this struggle, used both by elites and counterelites in a Clausewitzian manner. In the Feagin-Hahn version of political mobilization, attitudes (desires for more re­sources, mobilization of support from members of groups, and



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opposition from other groups) play an important role. Downtrodden groups seek more resources to overcome mistreatment because they want a larger share of the pie; rich groups want to maintain their larger slice. The poor use protest violence to make their point, and the elites counter with repressive violence. For groups to gain more resources, they must organize and mobilize; elites use the apparatus of the state to organize and mobilize on their own behalf. The exemplars of Feagin and Hahn were the urban riots in the 1960s, with careful attention to political negotiations in the various cities af­fected. Rather than focusing on Black riots as unexpected events, they pointed out that police violence at the behest of entrenched elites occurred first (p. 43; cf. Ryan 1972[1976]:239; Rossi and Berk 1972). However, Douglas McAdam (1982) has argued that the successful outcomes, such as civil rights laws, may reflect the mobilization of the Black electorate more than skill in Black-White negotiations. In Douglas Hibbs’s Mass Political Violence (1973:ch6,9), which correlated data from 1948 to 1967 for 108 countries preparatory to a causal analysis, regime coercion figured prominently as an explanation for civil strife. Other studies have concurred (cf. Zimmermann 1983:118–28), although mere repressive capacity is not a correlate of civil strife (cf. Rule 1988:26). Sociologist William Gamson applied the concept of mobilization to civil violence in the United States in The Strategy of Social Protest (1975). He compared 53 groups that challenged the status quo from 1800 to 1945, ex­cluding race riots, lynchings, and vigilantism. He then classified the sam­ple into categories of outcomes—acceptance or rejection, new or no advantages. He found that violence occurred in only 28 percent of the cases, but “unruly” groups gained so much acceptance and new ad­vantages that he concluded that violence was a tactic used primarily when it would succeed against a weak adversary (ch. 6). Other correlates of suc­cess were bureaucratization and centralization of power, absence of fac­tionalism, single-issue objectives, goals that were pragmatic (instead of asking in-groups to concede power), and large membership. Gamson’s study has been criticized on various grounds (Graham 1989:340– 41), including the fact that 72 percent of the challengers worked out their problems nonviolently. He could hardly infer mo­tives of protest organizers from mere statistics of success and failure. According to Hugh Graham (ibid., pp. 341–47), co-editor of two editions of Violence in America (1969, 1979), the evidence appears to prove that mobilization in Europe differs from the United States, where authorities have co-opted reformist movements. He then advanced an exceptionalist thesis—namely, that political culture in the United States is uniquely consensus-oriented.

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“Exceptionalism” is the view that generalizations about human behavior apply to all but certain cultures because of their unique characteristics. Daniel Moynihan (1965), for example, argued that Blacks are different from all other groups and that War on Poverty handouts are therefore useless. As deconstructed by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967:53), White exceptionalists assumed that Black problems occur be­cause of problems in the Black community, not the White community. Graham’s exceptionalism implied that there are no serious problems in the polity of the United States; he ignored the anomaly that even Black mayors had been largely unsuccessful in redistributing economic resources to the Black com­munity (Browning, Marshall, Tabb 1984; 1990a,b) because of a cal­culated effort to cut funds to big cities, which had been relying on federal programs for more than 40 per­cent of their budgets (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978:311). The White backlash to efforts at Black political mobilization continues in the United States today. Criticisms of the mobilization approach are that groups with limited resources cannot bring about significant social change, though they can file civil rights complaints, and charismatic or fortitudinous individuals can make a difference (Saunders 2006). Two studies indicate that those who are socially isolated are less likely to participate in mass movements (Oberschall 1973; Turner and Killian 1987:300), suggesting that the Mass Society paradigm explains why some mobilizations fail while other succeed. Yet within contemporary Africa, the concept of human rights has served to mobilize opponents of autocracies into bringing about democratic change (Schmitz 2006), so the content of issues raised may be as important as the dynamics of mobilization (Saunders 2005). Riots by Muslims over blasphemous actions by non-Muslims evidently occur only in countries where civil liberties are protected yet fundamentalist groups feel that their beliefs are not respected (Hassner 2011). Different patterns based on the nature of grievances, identity issues, and cultural differences await analysis (Jenkins 1983). Nevertheless, nonviolent protest is more common than riots (Gidron, Katz, Hasenfeld 2002; Olzak 2006). INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION Building communities to combat discrimination against minorities and workers as well as environmental movements to address climate change may seem quite different from efforts to construct international communities. But the common theme is to unite peoples to seek something better, beyond a restrictive status quo. However, diplomacy has been the main method for building international community rather than mass protests and organized social movements. But the masses were clearly exploited as soldiers during



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the unnecessary World War I and rallied in support of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (Knutsen 1992:189,195), which called for a new global system of open negotiations to replace realpolitik (action to establish a balance of power). Community building at the international level can involve protests of the existing order (Wallerstein 1984), but most theorists focus on how peoples and states can be brought together to advance peace beyond the construction of alliances, which may forge power rather than community (cf. Weitsman 2004; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). The main theorists of international community building are Karl Deutsch, who stressed social communications as the basis for community building; David Mitrany and Ernst Haas, who stressed the building of international communities through functional (technical) institutions; and Amitai Etzioni, who pointed out that nothing can happen until entrepreneurial international leaders emerge. When they developed their theories in the 1950s, they were proposing alternatives to the proposal for a federal world government by Robert Hutchins and others, which resulted in publication of the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (1948). Ernst Haas, perhaps more than the others, favored “integration”—that is, supranational institutions that would abolish distinct nationstates and therefore the units most likely to go to war when conflicts arise. Rather than discussing an “integration paradigm,” the following discussion is about building community institutions that may have loose or tight membership requirements. Clearly, the requirements are more stringent for the latter because countries must surrender pieces of their sovereignty (Mattli 2000:151). Social Transactions As a German born in Prague, political scientist Karl Deutsch had many social contacts with his Czech residential neighbors. After graduating from a German-speaking high school, he completed his first college degree at Deutsche University, where he continued as a graduate student. After clashing with Nazi faculty, as members of his family were prominent Austro-Marxists (Markovits and Oliver 1981:170), he withdrew to study in England for a year, then returned when admitted to Charles University, “a signal honor for a German-ethnic Czech” (Merritt and Russett 1981:2). After completing his doctorate, he decided to visit the United States in 1938, fortuitously just before his native country fell under Hitler’s control. After World War II, Deutsch decided to develop an algorithm that might have prevented Hitler from claiming dominion over German-speaking Sudetenland based on the principle of self-determination, the pretext for Czechoslovakia’s absorption into the Third Reich in 1938. Accord­ing to Deutsch, Europe was then undergoing change of a sort that had been taking place for centuries. Patterns of social communi­cation that were once responsible for

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the formation of nations, national­ism, and nation-states were giving birth to supranational entities after World War I. Deutsch once flirted with the process of nation building (the development of integrative nationalism) among Third World countries (Deutsch and Foltz 1963; cf. Foltz 1981). However, artificial borders carved out by colonial powers left many governments saddled with multiple groups loyal to their ethnic identities yet with little sense of national identity, so the study of how to transform newly independent countries into coherent nations (nation building) did not produce successes, and scholars sought a formula for peace building within the new states (Mylonas 2012). Similarly, the process of state building, where outside powers have tried to construct a government for a country (state building) that has been a disaster in such places as contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, even if successful in postwar Germany and Japan. Deriving his paradigm from cybernetics and information theory, Deutsch directed his attention to communication among persons, cities, ethnic groups, language communities, and countries. In Nationalism and Social Communication (1953), Deutsch traced “the mass mobilization of pre-commercial, pre-industrial peasant peoples” by the industrial revolution in which nationalism was the ideology to legitimate this process (p. 164). The masses, he later noted, were thereby co-opted into the political process (1968a[1978]:282). Deutsch’s first task was to describe the rise of nationalism from patterns of social communication. Assuming that communication densities flowed from attitudinal affinities, he initially mapped the flow of com­munications to show the boundaries of a “social community,” stressing the role of quantitative factors with four exemplars—his native Bohemia with Moravia and Silesia, as well as Finland, India and Pakistan, and Scotland. He concluded that states form around peoples who engage in a high level of social communications. Thus, social patterns identify the locus of pressure to form broader political communities, and social mobilization serves as a precondition for the formation of political institutions. Conversely, when social communications break down, political unions break up. Clearly, he was closer to the nationalism of Giuseppe Mazzini (1860), implicitly arguing that Bismarckian/Hitlerite force would be futile unless a new state formed by their realpolitik rested on a firm social foundation. In Political Community at the International Level (1954), Deutsch ar­gued against premature world government and a pan-European state, since the loads placed on such a structure would exceed its capabilities until the new community became more fully interdependent, a view he later extended in an analysis of the difficulty of developing international law (Deutsch 1968b). He hypothesized as follows: the success or failure of political integration thus depends in part upon the compatibility of auton­omous responses as well as . . . on the distribution and balance



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of range of social transaction, and of the streams of experiences to which they give rise (1954:54).

Deutsch put equal stress on “large-scale and relatively impersonal data” as well as on “perceptions, beliefs, and expectations,” insisting that models of both types of phenomena “must be tested for their correspondence to re­ality” (p. 47). He then claimed that objective (transactional) and subjective (communication) methods com­bined will “predict a wider range of behavior than . . . each . . . taken by itself” (p. 48). He initially defined “integration” as “processes that create . . . unifying habits and institutions” (p. 33), though later he distinguished “integration processes” from “integration.” The latter he clarified as a re­lationship among units that “are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack” (Deutsch 1968a[1978]:198). The jointly produced properties were later called “collective goods” by Mancur Olson (1965). Deutsch’s second major project was reported in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (1957). He and several co-au­thors derived a set of preconditions for successful political unification from a nonquantitative comparative analysis of 19 exemplars, such as En­gland-Wales, England-Scotland, and the merger of the thirteen American colonies. He defined integration as the “attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (p. 5). He then noted that political communities can be of two types: Pluralistic communities exist when international institutions share common goals and harmonize their policies to achieve joint economic rewards yet maintain separate national identi­ties. Amalgamated communities establish a supranational structure, eco­nomically or politically. Deutsch felt that both types of communities were worthy of praise. Although pluralistic communities have historically been easier to attain and maintain, amalgamated states might become so powerful that they would engage in war with other states. He found that pluralistic communities form when three idealist factors are present among a set of states—mutual predictability, mutual responsiveness, and value compatibility. Amalga­mated communities, either countries built from principalities or supranational entities, require many additional conditions. In both cases the administrative, democratic, economic, and political development of a leading state or core area is the initial precondition. After a pluralistic community emerges from a core area, dense patterns of social communica­tion and transactions are critical if the community is to survive or expand. When a new generation develops a we-feeling, further in­tegration can take off, provided there is a program for shared economic and political rewards (1968a[1978]:243–51) and the rewards come before the burdens or

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loads of maintaining the new community (Deutsch et al. 1957:51). The goal of international communities of both types is to en­hance human welfare, which can only occur in the absence of war (Figure 6.4). Thus, Deutsch posited that increased economic and social transactions serve to build political community. Clearly, he pre­ferred pluralist to assimilationist methods for constructing communities. Germany, for example, arose because Otto von Bismarck forced other German states to assimilate to Berlin. The Third Reich did the same, absorbing a wider geographic area. Although a political unification of European countries was viewed in some quarters as a desirable pathway to avoid another world war, Deutsch at the end of the 1960s was less sanguine about prospects for further progress toward Western European political unification. First, looking at objective factors, he noted that Western European countries were trading extensively with countries outside Europe: The “structural in­tegration of European trade . . . reached its peak in 1948–51” (Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis, Merritt 1967:219). Second, editorials of Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from 1953 to 1963 showed that “At­lantic integrative interest has declined, and the strength of European integrative interest has remained much what it was” (p. 244), Public opinion and elite views were still favorable toward European unity in France and Germany, but national issues were increasing in importance (ch. 15–16). In other words, the pan-European “we-feeling” declined. Stanley Hoffmann (1960:45) once attacked Deutsch for placing too much emphasis on objective factors, but Hoffmann wrote before Deutsch’s attitudinal studies. Efforts of some scholars to test Deutsch’s par­adigm with economic data also departed from the interactionist character of his formulation. In International Community (1970), for example, Roger Cobb and Charles Elder relegated “attitudinal integration” varia­bles to the role of epiphenomena because they had low correlations with transactions in an analysis of aggregate data from European countries in 1952 and 1964. During the twentieth century, Deutsch later noted, more persons had become literate and urbanized, but conditions associated with the concept of mass society were also present. Rather than accepting Durkheim’s pessimistic construction of the modern world (cf. Markovits and Oliver 1981), Deutsch focused on the fact that “having become mobilized socially, having left behind many old habits and relationships, they [urbanized masses] are now available for new demands, new commitments, and new activities”

Figure 6.4  Social Transaction Paradigm.



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(1968a[1978]:282). Instead of behaving anomically, he felt that “people are learning to form organizations and to act in an organized manner to promote their interests” (p. 285). What he seemed to be saying was that nationalism was becoming passé because hu­manity, by dint of a world communication system, was forming an amalga­mated world culture in which “we may learn to seek more for human solidarity and wisdom, and less for national power and prestige, more for the community of a family or friendship group, and less for the peck order of a chicken yard” (p. 290). Clearly, he hoped that the German obsession to achieve recognition as a major power that prompted two world wars was a mindset of the past. Thus, Deutsch sug­gested that states can cooperate pluralistically without the necessity for assimilationist or supranational political unions. As the world grew more integrated economically and socially, he hoped that peace and political cooperation would increase. Supporting his view, Robert Angell’s Peace on the March (1969) showed the linkage between increased transnational communications and attempts to effect a peaceful resolution of international differences. Functional Cooperation Writing a decade before Deutsch’s paradigm appeared, Romanian-born po­litical economist David Mitrany (1943) argued that blueprints for world government were unlikely to move off the drawing boards because states will resist an open “surrender of sovereignty” (1943[1966]:30). Mitrany’s critique of the world federalist movement was that such a plan would result in “little more than a replica of the United Nations” (p. 166). Mitrany’s preference for functional institutions, according to Ernst Haas (1964:13n), may be traced to “guild socialism,” though Mitrany denied any such origin. Karl Marx, it will be recalled, branded the guild socialists “utopian socialists” because they sought to opt out of the mainstream by establishing small self-sufficient communities (Heilbroner 1953:ch5). More to the point, academic precursors of Mitrany include Pit­man Potter (1929), Paul Reinsch (1911), and Leonard Woolf (1916), who described the new internationalism of the League of Nations and its antecedents. Analyses of the failure of the League of Nations, Mitrany felt, tended to overemphasize matters of military security (1943[1966]:35). Instead of a “protected peace,” Mitrany called for a “working peace” (p. 92). Because international commerce requires cross-national cooperation with respect to a wide range of technical matters, from air traffic control to weather forecasting, an unobtrusive method for building a world community would be to establish specialized international organizations in which technocrats have the re­sponsibility of “sharing sovereignty” in tiny (thus inevitably less

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controver­sial) functional areas. From these acorns, he predicted, would grow “ever-widening circles”—a “staircase” approach. And “if the organizations are successful and their number grows, world government will gradually evolve through their performance” (p. 163). His aim was to provide a postwar path to peace so that no world war would emerge again (p. 59). Rather than relying exclusively on the United Nations for conflict resolution, Mitrany wanted to make “frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them” (p. 62). Similar to Deutsch, he felt that the nation-state was decreasingly able to solve the complex problems of modern society. Whereas Deutsch noted that governments are constrained by the social patterns of ordinary people, Mitrany believed that the cooperative impulses of ordinary people were checkmated by governments (Figure 6.5). Deutsch’s flirtation with the imagery of mass society blamed govern­ments for being out of step with the people. Mitrany agreed. Both joined classical economists in distrusting government (cf. Haas 1964:33), but they believed that a social order would emerge not from the economic hedonism of Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) but instead from the socialist view of human nature as fundamentally cooperative. (Karl Marx, of course, antici­ pated that ephemeral exploitative systems would first have to run their course.) The “way to create a community,” Mitrany argued, was to embark on “the performance of common functions” (1943[1966]:162–63). While Deutsch awaited action by citizens to demand that governments meet the needs of the people, Mitrany wanted experts (as better representatives of the people’s true interests than politicians) to apply pressure on governments. Con­sistent with Vladimir Lenin (1917c[1935]:59), Mitrany wanted “governments of men” to be replaced by a functionalist “administration of things.” Mitrany engaged in historical reflection, not systematic case analysis. His main exemplar was the success of the League of Nations in nonpolitical areas. He also cited some successful joint wartime functional bodies, such as the Anglo-American Raw Materials Board (Mitrany 1943[1966]:86–89). He focused on calculations and negotiations of individuals as central to eco­ nomic change. As attitudinal convergence would lead to concrete institu­tions, he analyzed the developmental dynamics of international institu­tions, for the most part avoiding preconditionist and transactionalist modes of analysis that Deutsch later provided within his analysis. Mitrany hoped that techni­cal experts would create a new world culture which would replace the narcis­sistic nation-state system.

Figure 6.5  Functional Paradigm.



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Although Mitrany implied that the principal cause of war was inequal­ ity between states (ibid., p. 76), and he said that “German aggression was a particularly vicious outgrowth of a bad general system,” he did not believe that existing states could tackle the problem of war creatively. States would apply political (power) criteria, not socioeconomic (people) criteria. Instead, he argued for the practicability of the functionalist incremental and technical process, in contrast with federalism or other politicized pluralistic efforts to promote integra­tion, that threaten nation-states because they are too “comprehensive” in design (ibid., 59). A web of functional organizations would take over the functions of global social welfare, and “national problems would then . . . be treated . . . as . . . local segments of general problems” (ibid., 82). A world state would eventually emerge to coordinate more than to govern, based on “interna­tional law as a gradually emerging constitution for that political cosmos” (ibid., 40). Mitrany’s functionalism thus sought to transcend the problem of national sov­ereignty. Two decades after his initial formulation, Mitrany reiterated his position but was critical of Western Europe’s exclusivist regionalism, which he felt was “drifting back onto the political track” and thus missing “the way to possible universality” (Mitrany 1975). Mitrany assumed that so­cial networks among technocrats could somehow circumvent political ten­tacles. He saw the development of international cooperation as a socializing process that would build dispositions to cooperate. His “ism” in functionalism signified a definite ideological preference, though Mitrany’s construction of the process of achieving his goals can clearly be tested empirically. Deutsch did just that: Mitrany’s functionalism was flawed because the “tasks . . . handed over by the participating governments to some common agency . . . are not very important” (Deutsch 1968a[1978]:246). Ireland, he noted, split from Britain despite complete functional integration, while Italy united without having common functional institutions beforehand. Neofunctional Cooperation Winston Churchill (cf. Dinan 2005:14–15), echoing philosopher Julien Benda (1933), identified an important goal after World War II—to achieve a United States of Europe that would never experience war again. In The Uniting of Europe (1958b), political scientist Ernst Haas argued a case for Western European political integration, using an approach known as “neofunctionalism,” which he presented as a “refine­ment” of Mitrany’s staircase functional approach (Haas 1964:ch2). Born in Frankfurt, he migrated to the United States to escape the perils of Hitlerite Germany. Haas focused on actions and perceptions of participants involved in the “continued drift toward supranationality” (p. 444). He differed sharply from Mi­trany in asserting that

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technical issues cannot be separated from politics, that humans act selfishly in politics, and that technocrats en­joy no more of a consensus than politicians. Noting that Deutsch appeared to measure integration both as “ranges of transactions as well as the presumed result of the transactions,” Haas decided to exclude transactional measures from his initial formulation (Haas 1958b:27), although he later considered them as potentially “helpful fac­ tors” after economic unions formed (Haas and Schmitter 1964). Although he toyed with equivalencing “functionalism” to Gesellschaft, “integration” to Gemeinschaft, using the familiar distinction of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887), he instead defined “in­tegration” as the process of transforming society into community (Haas 1964:26,29). Ermst Haas identified “integration” as “the process whereby po­litical actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new and larger cen­ter, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states” (1961[1966]:94). His end-state is thus a concrete political institution (Figure 6.6). Haas specified that integration is a process that takes place in a period “between the establishment of common economic rules and the possible emergence of a political entity,” and must consist attitudinally “of increasing politicization, of shifting loyalties, of adaptation by the actors to a new process of mutual accommodation” (Haas and Schmitter 1964[1966]:266). But integration occurs only when in the self-interest of those involved and aims to fulfill “every kind of group-backed de­mand” that cannot be fulfilled inside individual countries (Haas 1964:34). Haas’s initial exemplar was the European Coal and Steel Community (Haas 1958b). He found Deutsch’s analysis inappropriate to account for the rise of the Common Market in Western Europe after World War II be­cause he felt that the unique properties of the Cold War prompted quick action to develop supranational institutions (Haas 1958a). He noted that ECSC would not have emerged according to Deutsch’s transactionalist cri­teria, since the level of transactions between the six countries was not par­ticularly high in the earlier years of negotiations. He found little mutual predictability, mutual responsiveness, or value compatibility among busi­ness elites and conservative political parties even after ECSC had been formed. Politicians cooperated more readily, although trade union leaders and socialist parties initially developed regional ties to oppose European supranational developments.

Figure 6.6  Neofunctional Paradigm.



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Rather than pursuing a new way of life, proponents of ECSC were pursuing pragmatic policies to derive economic gain. In short, he could not find a single precondition to ECSC except for the self-evident truth that humans have needs and desires. In Beyond the Nation State (1964) Haas analyzed a second exemplar— the International Labor Organization (ILO). He now adhered to the basic Mitranian premise that functionally specific international organizations, once established with a firm political foundation, will develop their own norms and will deepen their scope of collaboration as they find that the ini­tial objectives cannot be accomplished adequately without an addition of new functional tasks or an expansion of scope into new issue-areas. As orig­inally developed in The Uniting of Europe (1958b:ch8), he called the deepening process “spillover,” implicitly invoking the analogy of water in a dam overflowing to a spillway; he thus re-adapted Mitrany’s concept of “ever-widening circles.” Spillover, he argued, occurs if there is a “norm-generating capacity redounding to the advantage of the organization and diminishing the powers of the member states” (1964:48). He now agreed with Mitrany that technical experts have a wider view than politicians, whose approval is needed to start functional organizations: Their vision, “if properly ex­ploited by intelligent leadership, can rescue integrative international plan­ning” from particularistic nationalism (p. 458). Haas also expected national loyalties to be transferred to organizational loyalties in proportion to “the performance of crucial functions” (p. 49). The ILO case study brought more specificity to his analysis. Haas devel­oped a set of propositions to marry Mitrany’s functionalism with the functionalism of sociologist Robert Merton (1957), stressing the need for organizational growth by expanding the number of issue-areas and tasks to be performed. Haas focused on four aspects of organizations—leadership, goals, decisions, and outputs (p. 126): 1. Regarding leadership, he noted that the ILO could be in­effective yet still promote the trend toward supranationalism, if leaders pushed to deepen the issue-areas and objectives, while avoiding trivialization in the tasks to be performed. 2. Leaders should cultivate a broad op­erating ideology that will serve to build support from diverse member countries, inspire the technical staff, and encourage issue and task expansion, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the organization; a purely defensive ideology would only breed stultification. 3. The way to upgrade common interests is to avoid decisions that merely seek a least common denominator acceptable to all states, so leaders

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should involve a diverse set of outside con­sultants in the technical committees; the consultants could legitimate new directions against the inertia of instructed delegates from member coun­tries. 4. Outputs should contribute to general goals instead of consisting of isolated tasks designed to appease specialized constituencies, lest staff work become routine. Leaders should be farsighted in planning, and then obtain consent by appealing to member countries without making extravagant promises. ILO leaders then followed these suggestions, getting into trouble only when they diverged, notably on the fourth recommendation. Ernst Haas argued that his predictions would hold only for pluralistic industrial democracies, as the benefits for other countries would be more “nebulous” (1964:452). In an attempt to compare efforts at economic union outside Europe, he hypothesized four preconditions, two conditions that should be present at the time of the formation of the union, and three developmentalist factors as predictors of moves toward political unification (Haas and Schmitter 1964). Along with his student Philippe Schmitter, he ex­amined the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which began in 1961 with the aim of establishing a full free trade area among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Perú, and Uruguay by 1973 but collapsed before that date. Some pairs of LAFTA countries had more transactions than others; not all were democracies; and there was little value compatibility. The principal reason, they argued, was that LAFTA members were not at the same level of economic and political development (1964[1966]:299). When LAFTA began, there was minimal consensus on objectives, and few powers were entrusted to an executive body. After LAFTA started, particularistic instead of collective decision-making en­sued, inter-member transactions increased only modestly, and governments did not adapt to the new LAFTA rulemaking. Haas and Schmitter predicted correctly that LAFTA would fail, as it did in 1981, when it was superseded by the inconsequential Latin American Integration Association. Following Mitrany, Haas focused primarily on the developmental process of international institutions. Although initially skeptical of Deutsch’s preconditionist form of analysis, he eventually proposed four preconditions, as noted above. He examined some transactional evidence but concluded that increased inter­ national transactions were effects, not causes, of integrative processes. Haas agreed with Mitrany that an amalgamationist world is down the road, but he felt that the toll for using that road would be to genuflect plu­ralistically to existing nation-states, whose political leaders would have to delegate real power to functional organizations. After pragmatic consider­ations brought separate states together into an integrated institution, he hoped that clever



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statecraft by leaders of those few institutions would persuade national politicians that the really important issues affecting humanity were being decided in the functional institutions, whereupon governments would agree to deepen the tasks and issues of interstate cooperation, such that a new amalgamated world polity would evolve. Joseph Nye (1971), studying Central American regional cooperation, developed a complex form of neofunctionalism that appeared to be a synthesis of the Community Building paradigms of Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas. Nye offered seven process mechanisms, four types of integration potential, three perceptual conditions, and four types of results from regional integration. The framework was perhaps too complex to be pursued by other scholars. However, the enthusiasm that Ernst Haas enjoyed in analyzing European community building evaporated later (Haas 1975, 1976). When he realized that nationalist considerations were pre-eminent in decisions about innovations, while Eurocrats were bureaucratic rather than possessing technocratic innovative abilities, he abandoned neofunctionalism later in his career. Political Unification Ernst Haas presented a developmentalist approach to international com­ munity building with a focus on how organizations grow. In Beyond the Nation State (1964), many footnotes to his chapter “Functionalism and Organizations” cited classics in the field of organization theory, a concern within both political science and sociology. One citation was to sociologist Amitai Etzioni’s A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (1961), which contrasted organizations that achieved order by appealing to coercive, normative, or utilitarian considerations. Etzioni was not his birth name. Named Werner Falk, he was born in Köln, and at the age of six his family fled Nazi Germany to Italy, then Greece, and finally to Palestine, where he changed his name to Amitai Etzioni and joined the Jewish underground seeking to oust the British and establish the Jewish state of Israel. When he arrived at the University of California in Berkley to study for his doctorate, he knew a lot about building communities to produce results. In Political Unification (1965), Etzioni sought to apply the same framework to study political unification, eclectically com­ bining “a traditional power analysis with the Parsonian theory of action and with conceptions of cybernetics and communication theory intro­duced by Karl Deutsch” (p. ix). His exemplars were the successful Euro­pean Economic Community (EEC) and the Nordic Council and two unions that failed—the Federation of the West Indies (FWI) of 1958–62 and the United Arab Republic (UAR) of 1958–61.

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After defining “unification” as a process in which political units “in­crease or strengthen the bonds among themselves,” Etzioni defined “politi­cal community” in terms of three types of “political integration,” similar to what sociologists call “cohesion” or “cohesiveness” (p. 19n11): a. it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may “delegate” some of this control to member units); b. it has a center of decisionmaking that is able to affect significantly the alloca­tion of resources and rewards throughout the community; c. it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of po­litically aware citizens, (p. 4).

Etzioni focused on the role of leadership in building international community. The word “leadership” is an En­glish translation of the Greek “hegemon,” so Etzioni was sympa­thetic to an assimilationist forging of community by a center over a periphery. Clearly, conditions (a) and (b) refer to physical factors, (c) to an attitudinal factor. Etzioni acknowledged that his definition of “integration” had a higher threshold than that of Ernst Haas, whose criteria were in turn more stringent than those of Karl Deutsch (p. 6n5). For Etzioni, “integration” is an endstate that meets the three criteria; “unification” is the process of meeting the criteria. (Haas, in contrast, called “integration” the process, with “supranationalism” the end-state resulting from the integration process. Deutsch used “integration” to refer to the end-state with “integration pro­cess” as the intervening condition.) For Etizioni, a “union” is a group of states that act together (p. 12), the equivalent of what Deutsch called a pluralistic community. The bulk of Etzioni’s analysis was on what integrative processes to pursue in order to transform a political union into political unification. Agreeing more with Haas than with Deutsch, Etzioni’s analysis of West­ern European community building was quite optimistic, although he argued that the momentum had to continue or it would regress (p. 284). How can a high level of unification be obtained? He wanted to rely on empirical evidence to show which way to go; testing 17 hypotheses, Etzioni focused on various forms of power, preconditions to unification, and strategies of leaders. Regarding forms of power applied to promote unification, Etzioni ob­served that his categorization covered both “real” (coercive and utilitarian) and “ideal” (identitive) elements. It represents the . . . Italian school of Pareto and Mosca which was especially concerned with force; the economic-Marxist school; and the Weber-Durkheim tradition which emphasized sentiments and ideas, (p. 38)

The main preconditions to unification, he reported, are geographic proximity among the member units, elite congeniality, and some previous



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Figure 6.7  Political Unification Paradigm.

economic interdependence (Figure 6.7). He agreed with Haas and differed from Deutsch in arguing that value compatibility and we-feeling need not be present before unification: “[S]hared culture is not a prerequisite for unifica­tion but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be ad­vanced” (p. 36). Whereas Deutsch felt that economic dynamism in a core area would encourage non-core countries to amalgamate, and Haas pointed to joint development of the Ruhr as the core area on which the EEC was built, Etzioni suggested that non-core dynamism spurs core countries to leadership (p. 31). He agreed with Haas that countries must be internally democratic and economi­cally developed, whereas most of Deutsch’s successful cases occurred before the democratic and industrial revolutions. Concerning the distribution of power, Etzioni found that external elites can aid in the process (Britain for the FWI, the United States for the EEC), pro­ vided they do not throw their weight to unbalance the power structure within members of a union. An elite state (which Deutsch assumed to form the core of a transaction network) must play a political leadership role in forg­ing a union; subsequently, the elite can assure a decisive unified state. Etzioni’s elite unit must make economic sacrifices, contrary to Deutsch, Haas, and Mitrany, in order to obtain a collective political bene­fit, such as enhanced prestige. For Etzioni, economics is a secondary consideration, because “high economic integration cannot be maintained without considerable political integration” (p. 284), a conclusion he shared with Deutsch but the reverse of Haas’s expectation. Etzioni then turned to factors likely to move a union of cooperating states toward the status of a fully integrated unit. He reported that progress toward unification can be attributed to economic (utilitarian) rewards and symbolic (identitive) gratification. Increasing cultural similarity does not guarantee movement toward unification, but cultural dissimilarity is a handicap. (See Chapter 8 for more on the Cultural Similarity paradigm.) Identitive support should be in positive ideological terms, not an “anti” ideology such as anticolonialism, and should be accepted by most of the politically active population (p. 307). Regarding the exercise of power, effective communications upward from member units to elites (representativeness) and downward communication from elites to members (responsiveness) facilitate unification. For egalitar­ ian unions, which lack a dominant state, he agreed with Deutsch that horizontal communications can substitute for effective upward and downward

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communications. Concern­ing coercive power, he speculated that too much force jeopardizes a union, but too little force allows it to wither, so a moderate use of the army or police is optimal. The FWI and UAR, however, collapsed through secession, not revolution. After unions form, they can grow stronger or weaker. If power internal­ izes to an elite member, the union is likely to break up. Thus, there is a tendency for an external elite to lose in authority and loyalty as a union grows in power; if internalization of power reverts to the union, not to elite members, the scope of the union will increase to cover more issue-areas or more members—a process that Etzioni called “secondary priming” (p. 54 n. 75), a term which encompasses Ernst Haas’s “spillover” as well as membership expansion. As unions grow stronger, they will move to­ward unification; weaker unions break up, whereas stable power keeps a union afloat. Etzioni counseled not to accelerate toward unification by moving too quickly into a broader scope of issue-areas or by redistributing re­sources among the unit members. Unions risk early failure if they move too quickly, either in scope of authority or redistribution of power. Rapid acceleration to broader objectives and power redistribution works best when unions get closer to unification. He contrasted four types of unions—economic (Haas’s preference), functional (Mitrany’s technical organiza­tion), identitive (Deutsch’s pluralistic community), and military. Al­though he believed that economic and military unification have greater po­tential for spillover (p. 58), whereas Deutsch hypothesized the reverse (p. 60), Etzioni’s study “cast some doubt on the ‘functional’ approach” (p. 309) as well as Deutsch’s transactional focus because he found that cooperation in neither “low spillover” (functional or identitive) nor “high spillover” (economic and mil­itary) sectors assures progress toward political unification. He could not find a “take-off sector.” Unification emerges when a union’s central institutions replace the elite unit as the superior power. Egalitarian unions, though harder to form and less decisive, have more longevity because members will transfer their sov­ ereignty to the central level more easily. The more sectors participate, the longer the union is likely to last. He thus questioned Deutsch’s bias for pluralistic over amalgamated or assimilationist community building. Later in his career, Etzioni became a communitarian (1993) and applied his approach in Political Unification Revisited (2001) to supranational institutions, as noted below. Consistent with Etzioni’s stress on the role of leaders in building communities, known as norm entrepreneurs, is that a very few persons seeking to push a political agenda can short circuit the need for an initial focus on grievances that spur mass membership. Clever norm entrepreneurs will frame or “spin” an issue as a moral rather than a monetary injustice found within the worldview of adversaries (Ryan and Gamson 2006). Subsequently, when the cause gains media attention, membership will grow (McCarthy and Zald 2002; cf. Jenkins 1983), including the rise of terrorist groups (Lipschutz 2008).



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Regime Traditional international relations researchers often took for granted that constitutions of countries and international organizations allocated power to different institutions. Amendments to basic documents have often served to clarify or reallocate power. There is no basic document in Britain, yet Walter Bagehot drew upon custom to write about The English Constitution (1867). Similar efforts to find a world constitution are found within the study of regimes and “global governance” (Weiss 2009; cf. Wendt 2003). When Ernst Haas grew disenchanted with integration, he instead embraced the concept of international regime (Haas 1975, 1983). Rather than building highly structured international organization (IGOs) or transforming states into amalgamated or pluralistic communities, the Mitranist interest in functional IGOs encouraged political scientists to focus on issue-areas of cooperation, where they found “regimes”—that is, clusters of governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in cooperation or even conflict with states regarding such matters as the world’s environment, human rights, regional security, and international trade. As defined by Stephen Krasner (1982), a “regime” is a set of explicit or implicit “principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” In the issue-area of human rights, for example, several IGOs operate along with such NGOs as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which have impacts on world developments by shaming violators if their findings receive media coverage (cf. Murdie and Davis 2012; Peksen, Petersen, Drury 2014) and can even slow investment and repression in the countries shamed (Franklin 2008; Barry, Clay, Flynn 2013). NGOs can be more effective than IGOs (Franklin 2008), though the latter do play a positive role (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). The latter study has the virtue of crosstesting a Rational Choice paradigm with a Community Building paradigm as alternative explanations; the latter paradigm fits the data. In the international trade regime, the World Trade Organization has supranational power. The term “global governance” thus emerged as the metaconcept that incorporates regimes, supranational organizations, and worldwide nongovernmental networks that provide government-like services for planetary problems in a way that no group of nation-states can handle (Weiss 2009:257; cf. Lederer and Müller 2005; Cabrera 2011). James Rosenau and Ernest Czempiel launched the concept in their Governance Without Government (1992), and the concept has gained increasing attention (Avant, Finnemore, Sell 2010; Johnson and Tallberg 2010). One task of identifying how to construct or broaden regimes has been to identify influences brought to bear by actors (states, IGOs, NGOs) in each regime and the behavior, effectiveness, and outcomes of each regime. From the standpoint of international law, regimes provide global governance,

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though their impact is disputed because of what Krasner has referred to as the five most important variables—self-interest, political power differentiation, diffusion of norms and principles, custom and usage, and expertise. Much of the early focus consisted of efforts to identify regimes. The unacknowledged analytical tool used to dissect regimes into component parts has been the input-withinput-output schema of Gabriel Almond (1960). The journal International Organization introduced the new focus in the Summer 1974 issue. Subsequently, special issues followed, with essays on oceans (Spring 1977), food (Summer 1978), security (Jervis 1982), and human rights (Moravcsik 2000). In some cases, the form of cooperation is organizational, whether regional or international, but regime analysis also involves searching for informal methods of cooperation (Young 1986). Principled norm convergence relevant to an issue-area has been identified as the key; mere articulation of principles is insufficient (Coleman and Gabler 2002; Conca, Wu, Mei 2006). However, David Detomasi (2006) applied regime analysis to show how heads of major corporations cooperate in the financial realm—cooperation that led to a collapse in 2008. A related concept is the “epistemic community”—formation of a community among knowledgeable individuals. The hypothesis is that international regimes best accomplish their objectives if they are led by epistemic communities, which consists of individuals who inform the technocrats about effective courses of action. According to Peter Haas (1992), epistemic communities have four unifying characteristics: • shared normative and principled beliefs as guides for action (in other words, ideological consensus) • shared causal beliefs derived from empirical analysis • shared notions of validity (criteria for determining when research is correctly supported) • shared set of common practices associated with a set of problems serving the goal of advancing human welfare. The concept is similar to Mitrany’s idea that experts can cooperate and achieve progress more readily than politicians. The main application has been in regard to the environmental regime (P. Haas 1990; Toke 1999; Meijerink 2005), with a focus on the European Union (Zito 2001). Within the discourse of global governance, the epistemic community consists not just of advisers but of individuals who make global decisions. Attendees at Bilderberg and Davos conferences, for example, include a “superclass” of development economists and investors who establish priorities (Sklair 2001; Huntington 2005; Rothkopf 2008; Kauppi and Madsen 2014; Tsingou 2014). Other transnational professionals include



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international civil servants (Sending 2014), international judges and lawyers (Madsen 2014), and social scientists who operate such organizations as Transparency International (Kauppi 2014). One might also include journalists and owners of global media who frame the daily output of knowledge about events. Such invisible communities, which may iron out differences behind the scenes (Pak 2013) cannot be excluded from attention. A survey of the “superclass” in the United States, however, revealed little difference in perspectives from elites not involved in globalization (Rosenau, Earnest, Ferguson, Holsti 2006). Having identified regimes, scholars have sought a theory to explain how and why some regimes are formed, while others are not supported. Oran Young, the most persistent regime analyst, has identified three ways in which regimes are formed—self-generating or spontaneous regimes, negotiated regimes, and imposed regimes—though any particular regime may have two or all three origins. The self-generated regimes result from “converging expectations” (e.g., Zawahiri, Dinar, Mitchell 2011), whereas the negotiated regimes involve a consideration of transaction cost minimization (Oye 1986). Hegemonists create imposed regimes. The same trifold distinction applies to forging alliances (Weber 2000). Young also has identified stages of regime formation—agenda formation, institutional choice, and implementation. The expectation of stability in interaction means that efforts to monitor compliance will be minimized. For example, each round of trade negotiations under World Trade Organization institutionalized procedures for the next round; therefore, procedures at the next round did not have to be reinvented, which would be costly because negotiators would have to stay at hotels some additional days and might even engage in contentious debates that would lessen prospects for successful outcomes. Regime design is crucial (Thompson and Verdier 2014). A second task in the study of regimes is to determine what makes cooperation work. Some regime scholars, known as cognitivists, stress that regimes thrive because of real problems that need attention and because considerable learning takes place on how to improve the payoffs during the diplomatic interactions of the regime negotiators (Wettestad and Adresen 1994; Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 1997; cf. Hill 1914). If positive interaction takes place within regimes, the process of developing and implementing “codes of conduct” will be enhanced. Continual interaction assures that critical information about the behavior of each participant in a regime will be transparently known to all others, so violations of conduct codes can be deterred either through sanctions or the need to receive the rewards of cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995; Dimitrov 2003). The third quest has been to identify regime effectiveness (Young 1999; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008; Bell 2011). Carrying forward the idea of

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“transaction costs,” stronger regimes, such as the trade regime centered in the World Trade Organization (WTO) but also including banks, impose sanctions to deter defection from those standards (Ritter 2010). Weaker regimes, such as ASEAN Regional Forum’s effort to create a regional security regime, have been unable to mitigate conflicts involving China or the two Koreas. The difference is explained as the differential “payoff structure” of a regime (Figure 6.8). But the payoff ultimately is assessed through domestic politics, though there is disagreement on whether the economic element is crucial (Oye 1986; Lipson 2004; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008). Those who support the Community Building paradigm expect regimes to persist even if ineffective (Keohane 1984), whereas those expecting costs to be determinative rely on the Rational Choice paradigm (Moravcsik 1999), as explicated in the following chapter. Recent studies have offered different though compatible models of effectiveness. For Edward Miles and associates (2002), the key independent variables are the malignancy of the problem, uncertainty of resolution, and problem-solving capacity; the dependent variable of effectiveness is whether goals are attained or the problem is solved. Mediating between the two variables is the level of cooperation, particularly as determined by the extent of information shared among the participants (Figure 6.8). In another investigation of compliance within international environmental regimes as a dependent variable, propositions tested involved such independent variables as power distribution of members, a settled legal framework (deep and dense), the extent to which the goals and rules are perceived as legitimate, and the expertise of participants within a well-organized regime framework (Breitmeir, Young, Zürn 2007; Breitmeir, Underdad, Young 2011). Although they did not identify intermediate variables, they are evidently the role of NGOs in rulemaking, the role of norm entrepreneurs (“pushers”) and laggards, incentives to make decisions, and information generated by programmatic innovations. Because the second group of scholars treats their quantitative study as a bivariate exercise and not a multi-stage scenario, they miss the opportunity to establish causal connections by positioning some variables between capabilities and outcomes. Usually, international studies scholars try to establish the validity of their own theories, ignoring others. But Helmut Breitmeir and associates sought to crosstest two variants, finding differences and similarities in a cross-sectional analysis, suggesting the need for a higher-order formulation that will encompass both.

Figure 6.8  Regime-Building Paradigm.



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However, paradigms depict multi-stage political and social processes of reality; bivariate exercises can only establish links between two adjacent stages (X1X2 or X2X3). There can be no correlation between stage X1 and stage X3 if they are mediated by stage X2 variables. Although the Miles study reported that both independent variables had an impact on the dependent variables, mathematically that would be impossible: To have one variable mediate between two means that the two have a zero correlation. That’s why the lost art of paradigm development must be recovered, as bivariate research is inherently trivial. Cynics of regime analysis, applying an analysis that may be relevant for all Community Building variants, argue that nothing happens within the regimes unless the major powers provide funds and enforcement capabilities (Mearsheimer 1994/95), a view supported in an analysis of the financial transparency regime (Sharman 2011). For Susan Strange (1983:342), international financial regimes are simply tools of American grand strategy. For others, regimes are dominated by Western perspectives, resulting in Third World marginalization unless the institutions take Third World perspectives into account (Halabi 2004; Dowlah 2005). An interesting application could be made to short-term regional arrangements. Peter Howard (2004) has made the case that agreements can establish a “language” for interaction. He had in mind the Agreed Framework concluded between North Korea and the United States in 1994, which provided a context for ongoing negotiations that were aimed at eventual normalization of relations between the two countries. Although that effort failed, as did the subsequent Six-Party Talks involving both countries as well as China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, a more successful exemplar is the Road Map that established the process for normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. Regardless of motivations and power configurations, regime analysis focuses on how communities can be constructed and how they can operate with benefits to members. If some members are able to engage in free riding or can violate norms with impunity, the regimes will collapse. Regime analysis has not yet developed a full explanation, which would take into account their social context, the role of political parties, and many other factors (James and Palen 2007). Moreover, there is a need to distinguish between the behavioral, cognitive, and regulatory elements before making comparisons (Stokke 2012). But the same criticisms could be applied to other alternatives within the Community Building paradigm family. Rather than grounds for rejection of the paradigm, the comments point out the need for additional concepts to be inserted into the paradigms for testing, one of which is an explanation for the nonexistence of regimes in such areas as small arms control (Dimitrov, Sprinz, DiGuisto, Kelle 2007). But the main problem is how to link the

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analysis of global governance with regimes, conceptually and theoretically (cf. Overbeek, Dingwerth, Pattberg, Compagnon 2010), a topic discussed briefly in the discussion on the Globalization paradigm in Chapter 8 below. Communitarian Cooperation Elements of the Communitarian paradigm have been around for some time, though completely ignored in current international studies textbooks. Historically, the term “communitarian” first arrived in the English language in 1841, with the establishment of the Universal Communitarian Association in England (Oxford English Dic­tionary 1971:702). The organization favored socialism in an era before Marxism became popular, and then faded away. The central premise of the short-lived movement was that the needs of society as a whole should prevail over rampant individualism. A second premise was that people who agree on cultural norms do not need government to create social harmony. The communitarian view is not the same as cosmopolitanism, which expects national identities to become irrelevant as international interactions transcend the nation-state (Beardsworth 2011). A communitarian tradition can be traced as far back as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (Phillips 1991:137–39). Molly Cochran (1999) and Chris Brown (1992:ch2) have noted that communitarian thought is the polar opposite of cosmopolitanism, the belief that all humans are part of an undifferentiated world society. Communitarian principles were the basis for such German critics of the French En­lightenment as Johann Gottfried Herder. Whereas the French Enlightenment sought to promote individual identity by pitting the individual against the state, and by having objective reason displace subjective cultural experiences, Herder believed that individuals achieve their identity through human relation­ships within a particular culture. Herder celebrated nationalism, and his ideal world was one in which all nation-states would respect one another. But Herder (1784–91[1965]:60) was rather vague about how to preserve indi­vidual autonomy. The similarity between Herder’s opposition to the Enlighten­ment project and postmodernism is not coincidental. More recently, Vincent Pouliot (2011) argued that multilateral cooperation is an end in itself, a basic tenet of communitarianism. The main thrust of the Community Building paradigm has been to suggest the intergovernmental cooperation promotes a new culture of belongingness (e.g., Krotz 2010). That military alliances are likely to bring about more war through a common culture depends on whether they are formed offensively or defensively, as the latter can develop common norms regarding peaceful conflict resolution, such as what Karl Deutsch and associated have called “security communities” (Deutsch et al. 1957; cf. Risse-Kappen 1996; Johnson and Leeds 2011).



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Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond (1982, 1984) have demonstrated that international conflicts decrease when disputants establish common norms, a point made in the paradigms already presented in the present chapter. Amitai Etzioni, who founded a journal named The Responsive Commu­nity: Rights and Responsibilities, has also given support to the need to develop a community-oriented alternative to the “me-ism” critiqued in Fred Hirsch’s The Social Limits to Growth (1976). Etzioni has applied his communitarian views to international affairs (Etzioni 1962, 1964, 1965, 2001, 2008). Whereas Etzioni initially treated communitarianism as an “ism” and not as a basis for an empirical paradigm, empirical evidence does exist. Every “ism” can presumably be unpacked into an empirical paradigm, and communitarianism is no exception. Most Community Building proponents have developed their paradigms from exemplars, primarily based on Western case studies (e.g., Krotz 2010). Whereas Mitrany believed that technocrats propel regional cooperation forward, Deutsch awaited new patterns of social communications from millions of ordinary people, and the remaining theorists expected political leaders to make the difficult decisions. But they were unaware of what was working in Asia and the Pacific, where a cultural consensus emerged from regional cooperation among democracies and nondemocracies alike. Several examples in Asia and the Pacific provide a more illuminating account of how communities can be developed. The beginning of the Nonaligned Movement in 1955, for example, was due to the effort of India and Indonesia to hold a conference at Bandung to develop a set of norms that would enable the Third World to become insulated from Western and Soviet pressures toward a bipolar division of the world. The effort was a reaction to the formation of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization that year. Amitav Acharya (2011:97) has referred to the development as “norm subsidiarity”— that is, the creation of a Third World of nonaligned countries committed to their own advancement and having sufficient voting power in the United Nations to outvote the bipolar blocs. He has demonstrated that advocates of regionalism in the drafting of the United Nations Charter were motivated by “norm subsidiarity,” and he has applied the concept in other regions. Another example came in 1959, after U. Nyun became Executive Director of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Annoyed that Western countries sought to dominate discussions during the annual forum of the organization while ignoring priorities of the countries of the region, he developed a set of principles that he christened as the “Asian Way” (Haas 1989a:4). One was to instruct Western representatives to listen as observers until Asian countries had set priorities. A third example emerged in 1965, after General Suharto came to power in Indonesia, when his foreign minister Adam Malik proposed the formation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional

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alternative to the international strife associated with the American interference in Vietnam’s civil war as an action pursuant to SEATO. About one hundred regional organizations eventually developed in the vast region of Asia and the Pacific (Haas 1989a,b; Acharya 2009a,b; Haas 2013), though largely unknown within such publications as the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Börzell and Risse 2016). Formalizing cooperative political arrangements would have been a contentious process and therefore was largely avoided. Even before the politically oriented ASEAN, economic and technical intergovernmental organizations were already thriving, consistent with Mitrany’s expectations (Schubert 1978; Haas 1989a,b, 2013). Member countries in Asia and the Pacific represent a heterogeneity of cultures, but the most consistent predictor of common membership in regional organizations of Asia and the Pacific has been similarity in economic development (Schubert 1985a); affluent Japan provided very little leadership. The success of technical organiza­tions proved that representatives of Asian and Pacific countries could get along, most notably Indonesia and Malaysia, which had been mobilized for war along their common border during the mid1960s (Haas 1989a). Ministers of ed­ucation and other less politicized officials of countries at similar levels of economic development agreed that their needs for investment and technical assistance had to be pursued jointly, instead of independently. Many new regional technical organizations were formed, pioneering innovative programs that enabled technocrats of the region to meet one another in a variety of conferences, workshops, and other opportunities for intraregional technical assistance (similar to functionalism but contrary to neofunctionalism). Technocrats then designed successful work programs, with private goods for all, in many modest technical organizations (as recommended by functionalists). Deutsch’s preconditions of mutual accommodation and mutual responsiveness took time to develop within regional technical bodies, which were formed largely by countries that had been prevented from interacting during the colonial era (Figure 6.9). Cost-sharing arrangements were carefully balanced so that no country was exploited in financing the new regional functional organizations (Kim 1985). Tasks and issues then spilled over from the original scope (Schubert 1978). The Association of South-East Asian Nations was formed next among foreign ministers, proclaiming that their aim was to form a bloc to reach a collective good—build solidarity in the economic and political arenas and forums of the world to advance economic development in the region (as neofunctionalists expect). Political leaders developed new egalitarian operational codes, similar to the “community method” of Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970). ASEAN refined the “Asian Way” into the “ASEAN Way.” A similar process gave birth to the “Pacific Way,” coined in 1965 by Ratu Sir Kamises Mara,



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whose efforts resulted in formation of the South Pacific Forum (now PIF for Pacific Islands Forum) of independent island countries during 1971. While the Nonaligned Movement continued to meet but languished, the “Asian Way” and “Pacific Way” flourished on the basis of the following principles (Haas 1989a:chl, 1989b:ch1; 2013:ch2): • consensus decision-making • informal incrementalism • equality of and respect for other cultures • primacy of politics over administration • pan-regional mutual support for economic development • noninterference in domestic affairs • uniquely regional solutions to regional problems. Later, cooperative ventures received support from economic elites and the public: Although an original motive for forming ASEAN was to bring peace to Southeast Asia, whereupon investment capital would flow to the region (Haftel 2010), only after ASEAN was formed did business elites agree to cooperate in order to identify investment projects. Frequent press stories also projected a favorable image to the public (Haas 1989a:ch7). Public opinion, which Etzioni (1965:319) thought unimportant in the Third World, rallied be­hind ASEAN, PIF, and other successful political bodies but destroyed the Asian and Pacific Council and the South-east Asia Treaty Organization, while PIF superseded the South Pacific Commission, which had originally been set up by outside powers (Haas 1989b). Thereafter, ASEAN embarked on tentative programs of regional joint ventures and tariff reductions (Haas 1989a:ch7). There was an increase in economic transactions among the peoples whose states belong to the innovating organization. Transactionalism came into play here, rather than at the beginning of the process, as neofunctionalists argue. Mutual trade between ASEAN countries quadrupled from 5 to 20 percent, while cultural exchange skyrocketed (ibid.). The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation arose in the 1980s to em­ulate ASEAN (ibid., ch.13). Aware of developments in Asia, Ernst Haas was unimpressed because economic integration was not ongoing. But more important than regional economic progress was the fact that regional cooperation brought about the main goal of the Community Building paradigm—peace among countries that might otherwise have fought over border disputes. In other words, Ernst Haas’s goal of a peaceful Europe has been accomplished in Asia without going down the path of economic integration. The spirit of regional cooperation in Asia has been infectious in mitigating bilateral conflicts. Resembling the analysis of Joseph Nye (1971) in Central America, foreign ministers developed a collective

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Figure 6.9  Communitarian Community Building Paradigm.

good—an egalitarian commitment to resolve intraregional con­flicts bilaterally or to put them into deep freeze. Border con­flicts between ASEAN countries were then either routinized through border committees or dropped (Solidum 1974; Haas 2013:ch6); disputes were rarest among frequent co-members of Asian and Pacific regional organizations (Schubert 1985b). Within Asia, the result has been a continent transformed from almost constant warfare after World War II into a zone of relative peace (Haas 2013:ch6). In short, there is an identifiable causal pattern (Figure 6.9) in which modest technical coop­eration, pursued for joint economic gain, proceeds from the development of a communitarian culture. Today, the sense of political community is so firmly rooted in cul­tural affinity that economic collaboration has expanded and spillback has become impossible. While European countries erect borders between their countries, economic cooperation across borders has increased within Asia (Haas 2013; Rüland 2014). Consensus building resulting in a common culture or identity has also been discovered as important within European regional organizations (Wendt 1994; Risse-Kappen 1996; Checkel 1999, 2007; Schimmelfennig 2003; Curley 2009; McKibben and Western 2014) and the Mercado Común de la Sur, otherwise known as Mercosur (Oeslner 2013). Rather than seeking to build a Communitarian paradigm that applies across regional organizations, the European-focused scholars have failed to cite ASEAN, where the idea was first developed (Haas 1974a). Although the tension between nationalism and regionalism and internationalism continues, all three can be viewed as arenas for communitarian principles. When economic conditions are comfortable, regional and international planning can flourish; during downturns, nationalism often prevails (Etzioni 2012; Rüland 2014). The diagram in Figure 6.9, in other words, might add a materialist precondition. CONCLUSION The Community Building paradigm can be applied to more phenomena. A recent survey of American college students by Calvert Jones (2014) finds



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that experiences derived while studying abroad have reduced perceptions of threat but heightened a sense of “enlightened nationalism” rather than building a sense of international community. Similar findings have emerged from international students in the United States who return home (Singh 1962). The explosion of organizations formed by the Internet and social media prove that the task of building communities is easily achieved at the individual level through a variety of appeals, seeking rational and often irrational objectives (Rodgers 2003). Another line of research is to study which countries can and cannot join intergovernmental organizations, as the evidence is that conflictual countries are excluded (Donno, Metzger, Russett 2015). The Marxian paradigm was nostalgic about a loss sense of community in the era before feudalism but felt that the task of recreating community required a workers’ revolution—for Lenin, a vanguard. The Mass Society paradigm blamed social ills on the disruption of rapid industrialization. But both were amateurish in regard to how to build communities. The Community Building paradigm has been constructed from exemplars to an extent not undertaken by the Marxian and Mass Society paradigms, which began as speculative formulations. Scholars advancing variants of the Community Building paradigm have identified isomorphisms across the spectrum of international cooperation, but few have been fully tested. The challenge for future scholarship is to determine which paths are successful and under what conditions. If more attention were paid to developing Community Building paradigms in international studies, then more epistemic communities of scholars could blossom. One goal of the Community Building paradigm at the international level, especially the functional variants, is that intergovernmental organizations will make technical decisions on a logical basis rather than catering to political considerations. A study has emerged to report that such autonomization has indeed occurred (Koch 2009). IGOs not only “generate, institutionalize, and maintain norms” but also “enforce or create norms that shape behavioral patterns for states” (p. 434). The paradigmatic variants of the Community Building paradigm depend upon the type of community that a scholar has in mind. The main ontological basis for most Community Building paradigms is interactionism, as there is an interplay between ideas and material realities, though Deutsch and Etzioni placed more emphasis on material factors than the other theorists. Most emphasize attitudes and the building of networks and structures, though the latter largely play a role as dependent variables. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2000) has argued that the collective identity formation “pre-theory” of Alexander Wendt (1994) is simply a variant of the functionalist and neofunctionalist traditions. Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999) emphasized the role of shared ideas and norms,

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which play a central role in the Community Building paradigm. However, Wendt diverted his focus to critiquing ideological isms, suggested a new “constructivist” vocabulary for analysis, and unfortunately missed the opportunity to contribute a paradigmatic variant. The interest in building community at the international level has always been premised on the possibility that communities will bring world peace unless, of course, they clash. But ultimately the goal appears to be the development of a sense of global or international community, something that appears to be farther off than the Marxian prediction of a world proletariat (Ellis 2009). Efforts to counter globalization, as mentioned in the previous chapter, have prompted transnational communities (O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, Williams 2000), but they have not yet been linked to the Community Building paradigm. Not all community building is peaceful. The basis to bind states together culturally can come from several sources, including religion (Warner and Walker 2011). The Crusades may be considered to have occurred because a new norm arose to justify violence against a rival power (Latham 2011), something pursued in reverse within the Middle Ages (Alkopher 2005; Hassner 2011). Protestantism was a new norm opposing the Catholic Church. Norm subsidiarity, a new way of referring to an Hegelian antithesis, does not always bring peaceful results. By focusing on international institutions from an ideological (neo)liberal rather than paradigmatic perspective, international studies scholars were unprepared for June 2016, when the British public voted to secede from the European Union. The explanation may be found within the Mass Society paradigm as well as the Community Building paradigm: Decisions impacting countries within the European Union have seldom taken concerns of the ordinary public into account, focusing instead on the interests of the most prosperous businesses. When the referendum on exiting from the European Union was held in Britain, those in favor failed to realize how regulations adversely affected small businesses and why voters opposed the prospect of thousands of refugees pouring into the country to compete for their jobs in a precarious economy (Jack 2016). As Karl Deutsch and David Mitrany had argued, and Mass Society paradigms agree, incremental change is more acceptable to the general public than disruptive developments. Ernst Haas lost faith in European integration when leaders started to cater to national self-interest. Amitai Etzioni changed his mind, in later years realizing the need for citizen support for international organizations. Regional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific has always been incremental and has gradually cultivated mass support. Nevertheless, the reader cannot help but conclude that the Community Building paradigm lacks the coherence of the Marxian paradigm. Even variants of the Mass Society paradigm have more in common. Many scholars



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reviewed in the present chapter use different terms to apply to the same phenomena and offer contradictory findings based on disparate samples of cases. The need to cross-test alternative theories is obvious. The Functionalist paradigm has been criticized from the standpoint of Marxism as well as the Rational Choice paradigm (Harsanyi 1969; Elster 1982). The earliest critique came from Stanley Hoffmann (1965), who argued that states primarily act in the national interest, so any community payoff is entirely secondary. His approach, called “intergovernmentalism,” refers to the rationality of international and supranational organizations, a segue into the following chapter, which deals with how cooperation proceeds rationally without necessarily building community (cf. Earnest 2008; Stone, Slantchev, London 2008).

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The Marxian and Community Building paradigms stress the rationality of each stage in ongoing historical processes, whereas the Mass Society paradigm finds dysfunctional explanations for instability. All three tend to give short shrift to the calculations of individual decision-makers. But the “rationality” in Weberian terms is “material”—evaluated in terms of how well ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonist, status-bases, or egalitarian criteria are satisfied (quoted in Laiz and Schlichte 2016:174). The Rational Choice paradigm (or Rational Actor paradigm) presents “formal rationality”—how means can be chosen most efficiently to achieve certain ends. The Rational Choice paradigm might be viewed as either complementary to the three paradigms, competitive with them, or instead might be viewed by promoters as superseding all other paradigms. Yet the Rational Choice paradigm also blackboxes the calculations of decision-makers. Those who want to refute the Rational Choice paradigm, therefore, must look for instances where choices by decision-makers could have gone in an irrational direction, as developed within paradigms in Chapters 5 and 8. The Rational Choice paradigm is often advanced as an ideology demanding certain courses of action rather than as an explanation of efficient decisionmaking. But the scientific import is of far more interest (Barkin 2015). The use of logic to achieve rational thinking is as old as philosophy itself. Legal analysis pretends rationality in the way that evidence, precedent, procedures, and laws are invoked. But decisions by judges might cite different precedents, vary in the weighting of evidence, and interpret statutes in a variety of ways. Deconstructing how cases are argued and decided must involve a paradigm outside the legal paradigm itself. The term “rational” is defined as behavior that is goal oriented, reflective (evaluative), and effective over time. Irrationality is random, impulsive, 117

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conditioned, or groupthinking behavior. Rationality is dependent upon perfect information, but information is not always accurate, so the paradigm is an ideal type extracted from an imperfect reality. CLASSICAL ECONOMIC (LAISSEZ-FAIRE) RATIONALISM The basic framework of the paradigm comes from classical economics. But of course not all economic behavior is rational. The main question posed by classical economics is how a state may most efficiently pursue prosperity for the people who are governed. Many economists define “development” in terms of growth of output per head of population (Lewis 1955:1; Meier and Baldwin 1957:2). Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) began the dialog by focusing on material­conceptions of development. In the tradition of natural law, they hoped to find universals. Smith, a contemporary of David Hume, was a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, whereas Ricardo was the son of a Jewish banker who migrated to England from Holland, and then be­came a stockbroker, gentleman farmer, and even a member of parliament. In 1813, food prices shot up in England after parliament increased the duty on foreign grain to stimulate production of more English wheat (Heilbroner 1953:73), demonstrating the bankruptcy of mercantilist eco­nomic thinking—the view that national wealth accrues from trade surpluses, guaranteed by protective tariffs. Both Ricardo and Smith believed that government interference in the economy—the “poor laws,” tariffs, and taxes—was irrational, resulting in overpopulation, higher prices, and a lower propensity to save. Their hypothesis was that an “invisible hand” in the competitive marketplace would serve as a better regulator of the econ­omy than government. Accordingly, removal of political obstacles would result in economic devel­opment surging forward. Both Ricardo and Smith saw their paradigm as being in the interest of all people rather than any single class (Heilbroner 1953:45; Meier and Baldwin 1957:44), although clearly they were resigned to the prosperity of the entrepreneurial class, who followed their rational prescriptions and a trickling down to Malthusian survival of the laboring class as a necessary outcome of the economic process. Ricardo was more systematic than Smith in spelling out a developmental process (Figure 7.1): Saving enables enough capital to be accumulated so that some will be invested and some will be consumed. More workers can then be hired. Technological innovations will provide for more division of labor, whereupon there will be an increase in productivity, more competition be­tween firms, and prices will fall, stimulating sales. Wages and rents will then go up, but profits (the economic surplus beyond these expenses) can be ploughed back into further investment and the hiring of more employ­ees to



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Figure 7.1  Classical Economics Rationality Paradigm.

produce more goods. Since there are more jobs for factory workers, they will have more children, providing more competition among workers as well as a larger market of consumers. Ricardo’s paradigm consisted entirely of economic concepts and thus was as materialist as the later Marxian paradigm. The premise was that following the principles laid out would keep an economy going on an even basis; failing to follow the rationality in the paradigm would result in economic disaster. However, many economists have abandoned classical—and neoclassical—economics for relying on fallible assumptions (Foley 2003; Nell and Errouaki 2011). Nevertheless, the paradigm of classical economics has provided an explanation of development success and failure that can be analyzed comparatively across developed and developing countries alike. Although clas­sical economists have provided some aggregate data to support their hypotheses, they rely on a laissez-faire paradigm of the economy that has often been rejected as inhumane and undemocratic. Those wanting to bring more humanism and democracy into the economy would be challenged to do so rationally—that is, without having an economy collapse. That challenge was accepted by Karl Marx. COST-BENEFIT (INSTRUMENTAL) RATIONALITY Macro-economic and -historical propositions about how states should behave rationally examine the impact of major decisions, such as the decision to go to war. But most decisions are micro-level phenomena in which various options are possible, information is often imperfect, and leaders must either decide to do something or postpone consideration, hoping that the problem at hand will obsolesce. However, not all decision-makers are rational all the time. Those who prove to be irrational tend to be replaced sooner than those who are rational, according to the Rational Choice paradigm. The term “actor” is used in the Rational Actor paradigm within international studies because the decisions could be made by key decision-makers of states as well as by collective actions by international organizations—or by nongovernmental bodies or transnational corporations. What is “rational”

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for the paradigm is the attempt at cost-effectiveness—achieving an outcome that is most favorable to the preferred goal or preference at least cost. The goals could be economic prosperity, national interest, personal fame, staying in office, or many other objectives. The paradigm quite simply identifies how actors go about achieving rational outcomes and explains why they do or do not achieve what they seek. Various alternatives (options) are debated, based on multiple incentives and constraints. Then the consequences and feasibility of each option are evaluated, such that options are ranked. A decision or nondecision is made with outcomes that feed back to the actor, who will learn whether the decision was rational or instead that the information about constraints and incentives was imperfect, frustrating rationality among the choice of ranked options. An options analysis based on qualitative assessments and multiple weights on such three major state goals—increasing prosperity, maintaining security, and promoting prestige to attract followers—can be conducted by a program known as Decision Pad (Haas 1991). The weights refer to how intensively a policy option is believed to fulfill one of the subgoals of the three major goals (where information may be imperfect) as well as a weighting on the relative preference for the three major goals themselves. An interesting application of the Cost-Benefit paradigm by two scholars finds that executives and legislatures calculate an opportunity cost of action and inaction in the former submitting treaties and the latter in ratifying treaties (Kelley and Pevehouse 2015). Consideration of treaties takes a lot of time in the American legislature away from more important domestic matters, and presidents are unlikely to prioritize treaty ratification over fulfillment of their election promises. As a result, the United States negotiates many treaties but ratifies few. Poliheuristic decision-making considers the decision-making process to consist of two stages (Mintz 2005; Oppermann 2014; cf. Barkin 2015). In the first stage, the decision-maker uses heuristics—simple tools of thought—to identify a matrix of acceptable options available, similar to prospect and schema approaches and other cognitive approaches (Simon 1955; Axelrod 1973; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Levi 1997; Keller and Yang 2009). The second stage is the cost-benefit or evaluation stage to maximize expected utility (Arrow 1959). The poliheuristic approach has been applied to the Iranian hostage crisis (Brulé 2005), the bombing of Serbia to create an independent Kosovo (Redd 2005), and for how particular countries respond to foreign policy challenges (James and Zhang 2005; Sandal, Zhang, James, James 2011). However, the two-stage approach is clearly insufficient (Brulé 2008). The initial stage is agenda setting or problem setting—the process by which something is perceived as requiring decision-making in the first place. William Flanik (2011:Figure 7) subscribes not only to the tri-stage approach but demonstrates how the components of mind (cognitive) and body (emotions)



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operate at all three levels. However, adding those elements to the poliheuristic approach transforms the approach to the Political Process paradigm discussed in Chapter 8 below. In Cost-Benefit rationality, also known as instrumental rationality, a reconstructive analysis of decisions tends to find rationality because none of the elements considered dig into the actual deliberation process, which is left inside a black box. Those who look for rational decisions retrospectively are likely to find what they are looking for. Ignored are such elements as continuation of previous policies and bureaucratic difficulties in implementation of the decision (Figure 7.2). The paradigm becomes more complicated when game theory is applied, putting weights on quantitative feasibility estimates and the ranking of options based on the level of information, constraints, and incentives. The more resources are committed by the decision, the more risk that a rational decision will be later viewed as irrational. The decision to commit a country to war is perhaps the riskiest. But an analyst must go into the black box if indeed there is any rationality involved in the deliberative process. Since there are risks in making any decision and limitations on the mental capacity to evaluate all the information available, the concept of “bounded rationality” has arisen. In what is called prospect theory, the costs and benefits are weighed along with the probability of possible outcomes. Risks are most likely when the costs are highly likely to exceed benefits (M.L. Haas 2001). In The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974), psychologist John Steinbruner noted that top leaders cannot spend a lot of time pondering every decision; therefore, they seek to simplify their task by considering very few factors so that the challenge or problem will quickly get off their plate. Using the term the “analytic paradigm of decision making” as an equivalent to cost-benefit rationality, the analytic decision results from a direct calculation of alternative outcomes (p. 56) with the goal of finding an optimal or acceptable solution under given constraints (p. 64). Thus, irrationality would consist of limiting inputs. Unknown factors are determined by “probabilistic inference” (p. 110). To increase the cost of war to an adversary, some theorists have advocated stockpiling a credible, devastating, invulnerable, and reliable counterforce, as discussed under Deterrence Rationality below. But such an argument can bring about perilous arms races, as in World War I, when one side decided on a preemptive strike before the cost would become too burdensome (Huntington 1958; Isard 1988).

Figure 7.2  Cost-Benefit Rationality Paradigm.

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The Rational Choice paradigm has often been applied to the study of war. For Carl von Clausewitz (1832[1968]:103), it is “a fallacy . . . to refer the war of a civilized nation entirely to an intelli­gent act.” Accordingly, political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981:27) has insisted that “nations do not gener­ally stumble into wars without adequate planning.” Estimating expected utilities derived from going to war, negotiating, or opting for peace, he found that “Almost all initiators of international conflicts appear to have had a reasonable expectation of suc­cess” (ibid., 182). Thus, expected utility explains entry into war, contrary to Balance-of-Power Rationality discussed below. While re­search by Patrick James (1988:ch3) has supported Bueno de Mesquita, Kenneth Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980:ch3) have disputed his claim. Bueno de Mesquita then admitted that he was trying to ferret out necessary but not suffic­ient conditions for war (1981:4–5), and he found that wars are avoided when the cost of waging war is too burdensome (ibid., p. 183). In a study of policy commitments of pairs of countries that were allies or non-allies, expected utility measures predicted war outcomes, but balance-ofpower and power preponderance measures did not (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990:171). However, decisions result from mental thought, whereas cost-benefit measures are derived from material calculations, so again the black box of deliberation is left out of the paradigm because of the assumption that all persons are rational most of the time. Nevertheless, the findings were confirmed in a follow-up study (Bennett and Stam 2000). When wars are already ongoing, decisions about whether to commit more resources are influenced by information from the battlefield. If one country is losing badly and expects even more losses, the calculation will be whether to seek an armistice or to surrender. But not all wars have such stark options, so commanders and politicians will bargain over whether to commit additional resources, just as opposing forces may bargain regarding possible outcomes (Wittman 1979; Gartner 1997; Wagner 2000; Smith and Stam 2004, 2006; Fey and Ramsay 2006). The decision process has been likened to a lottery. However, for James Fearon (1995) war is only rational under the following conditions: (1) The attacker has much more accurate information than the attacked, (2) commitment to the war is unflinching, and (3) the dispute is over something indivisible, which cannot be achieved any other way. If both parties are fully aware of their power capabilities, and one seeks territory from the other, the rational decision would be to bargain based on relative capabilities. There are myriad cases where one country could gain by attacking another, yet somehow peace prevails. Bueno de Mesquita has examined policy commitments of pairs of countries, estimating policy differences with an algorithm mea­suring similarity of alliance profiles (Bueno de Mesquita and



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Lalman 1986; 1990:171; 1992). His expected utility measures predicted war outcomes, whereas balance-of-power and power preponderance measures did not, serving as a cross-test of three variants of the Rational Choice paradigm. Since coun­tries enter alliances for a variety of reasons, Bueno de Mesquita blackboxed political and social processes. Although war always produces an irrational outcome from the standpoint of those whose relatives lose their lives in combat (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Werner 1996), an actor’s goal may be rationally attained through war. A familiar example is President John Kennedy’s decision in 1962 to impose a naval quarantine of Cuba while quietly informing the Soviet Union that the United States would not allow supplies to the missile launching pads and insisting on their removal. The quarantine decision was evaluated along with other options—making a demand for their removal at the UN, invading Cuba, bombing the launching pads, or negotiating a deal with Cuba—and found to be the least costly but most effective measure. The missiles did not affect the strategic balance, as the United States had missiles already installed in Turkey not far from the Soviet Union. Instead, Kennedy wanted to be re-elected, and allowing the Soviet Union to make such a strategic move would risk impeachment (Allison 1972). Promotion of citizen welfare and national interest were not the main goals sought by the president. The decision was deemed rational because the missiles were withdrawn, and Kennedy stayed in office. Implicitly, all leaders of countries have a goal of remaining in office regardless of the issue at hand, a tenet discussed more thoroughly below as Selectorate Rationality. An application to civil war has also been provided in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Internal conflicts are limited by their economic resources vis-à-vis the state. The various authors in the edited book cleverly go beyond the “greed and grievance” explanations that might emerge from a Mass Society analysis. DARWINIAN RATIONALITY The political counterpart to laissez-faire economics is known as libertarianism. Constraining governments from interfering in economic and social life is supposed to lead to rational outcomes. But, as Marx pointed out, the result of unbridled capitalism was a struggle between a class of rich capitalists and a class of exploited workers that could bring the economy to its knees through strikes and violent protests. Governments on the payroll of capitalists would necessarily have to intervene in social life to preserve the economy by cracking down on rather than appeasing workers. In so doing, they would have to abandon libertarianism for triumphalism—a view that those who are

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innovative should guide the economy. In so doing, they relied on symbolism from the theory of evolution. Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection was derived from an observation of finches in the Galápagos Islands and later generalized to all biological species. His principal biological claim was that some species survive when environmental conditions change, whereas others die out, a process known as “natural selection.” Thus, biological history records the “survival of the fittest,” not survival or the richest or of the strongest. The term “Social Darwinism” was coined by Thomas Huxley (1860) in his review of Darwin’s published scientific findings. Huxley suggested that groups of similar humans, such as ethnic groups, will die and fail to reproduce if they are too weak to survive in a social struggle for existence. When the weaker ones die off, the resulting survivors ensure the survival of a hardier human race, superior to what came before. Some of the scenario at the time was thought to refer to survival from deadly diseases that can now be prevented by immune injections or cured with antibiotics. Perhaps stimulated by Huxley, Darwin (1871) applied his scientific analysis to politics and society. The Social Darwinian paradigm analogizes the state as an organism that grows, adapts to new conditions, and occasionally dies when conditions change. Accordingly, some constitutions, countries, leaders, legal precedents, and political parties survive, while others fade away. Although he held a scientific libertarian view, Darwin inspired triumphalist Social Darwinists. The law that the fit survive, and the weak die out was developed by sociologists Herbert Spencer (1882), William Graham Sumner (1918), and political philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944) into a social principle that there is an ongoing struggle for existence, such that the strong must dominate the weak for the human race to survive. Human rights for the weak, thus, seem counter to the biological imperative. Social Darwinists also assume that some are much more intelligent and physically fit, such that those with lesser brainpower and lesser physical strength will not be clever enough to survive (Figure 7.3). Social Darwinian speculation provides some satisfaction for ruling classes, who feel that their success is organically determined, taking comfort in the belief that they are the most “fit.” But Darwin never said that surviving species were better than those that become extinct. The most controversial aspect of the Darwinian paradigm is the assumption that the poor do less well because they do not apply themselves rationally to

Figure 7.3  Social Darwinian Rationality Paradigm.



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everyday conditions, which are always changing. In addition, the view is that certain ethnic and racial groups are genetically prone to success, while other groups are doomed to failure. Sociologist William Ryan (1972) has called the Social Darwinian bias “blaming the victim.” Libertarian Social Darwinians see the struggle for existence as best achieved without intervention by government. Under classical economics, the most competitive businesses prevail over the inefficient in a free, selfcorrecting marketplace; individuals and countries focused on pursuing their economic self-interest will succeed over those who do not. Milton Friedman (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and Ayn Rand (1943) are among the most influential twentieth-century exponents of libertarianism, favoring governmental deregulation of economic and social life so that self-interest will prevail over sentimentality. They oppose government “handouts” for creating “dependency.” In many respects, they are sympathetic to the views of anarchists and isolationists. Triumphalist Social Darwinians want government to intervene so that groups with the most power and resources can establish dominance over others, such as by business subsidies and tax incentives. Writing before Darwin, Georg William Friedrich Hegel (1821[1980]:209) argued that war keeps states fit. Adolf Hitler had a similar view: He considered Germans as the superior and virtuous race, and he sought to ride roughshod over other races, particularly the Jews, to establish a “natural” hierarchy of privilege. Triumphalists would modify Figure 7.3 by adding government control by the fit, giving financial and procedural aid to the fit so that they can triumph over the unfit more quickly. After Darwin applied his theory to humans, religious authorities resisted the idea that the human race may have developed gradually from nonhuman animals rather than being created by God. But they did not discount the possibility that those going to heaven are spiritually the fittest: Among Religious Darwinians, the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim that only 144,000 will be admitted to heaven on Judgment Day. Those who obey certain religious maxims are thus more likely to enjoy a good life in heaven or, for Buddhists, reincarnation to become better persons in the next life, though they lack evidence to support their predictions based on what they claim to be a rational choice to justify their beliefs. Today, the tension between libertarianism and triumphalism is considerable (Haas 2012b:ch5). But both share the goal of enabling the human race to improve by marginalizing the inefficient and inferior. Both use Darwinian principles as a cover for elitism, justified as rational choices that lead to ideologically preferred outcomes. Although such extrapolation from Darwin’s writings is clearly pseudoscientific, Social Darwinian thinking has had strong supporters within the

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United States (cf. Hofstadter 1955). Some history of the application of the Darwinian paradigm in the United States, a country that drove Native Americans from their homelands, suppressed a democratic uprising in the Philippines, and imperialistically seized Cuba, Guam, the Hawaiian Islands, and Puerto Rico, may be instructive. Although the Republican Party began as a party determined to end or limit slavery, by the end of the nineteenth century the party was backed by big business elites. Catering to the needs of successful businesses, they gave short shrift to the poor and working classes. Republican William McKinley, subscribing to triumphal Social Darwinian ideas, did not believe in a totally free market. He achieved fame from the McKinley Tariff, which mercantilistically set high tariffs on imported goods to protect American industry from outside competition. Theodore Roosevelt, who became president in 1901 after McKinley’s assassination, was not a Social Darwinist. As president, Roosevelt backed anti-trust legislation to curb excesses of the largest companies, which were trying to establish monopolistic control of the economy by mergers and other means in order to destroy competition. Although the Republican Party preferred William Howard Taft as Roosevelt’s successor, Taft vigorously enforced anti-trust legislation. Democrat Woodrow Wilson was elected in the three-way race of 1912 (including Roosevelt as a third-party candidate) and was re-elected in 1916. Although Wilson also supported regulation of the economy, he was a segregationist, a variant of racial triumphalism. During the 1920s, the Republican Party operated as the libertarian Social Darwinian party, favoring big business. In 1929, when the Great Depression emerged, libertarian President Herbert Hoover left economic recovery to the workings of the unregulated market. The economy continued to decline, so Hoover was easily defeated in 1932 by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Contrary to the Social Darwinian paradigm, President Roosevelt intervened heavily in the economy to create jobs, protect unions, and to establish Social Security pensions for those at retirement. He adopted the economic philosophy of John Maynard Keynes (1936), who argued that government spending could rationally “prime the pump” to revive the economy. Roosevelt was re-elected three times. After his death, Harry Truman became president and continued policies for the “common man.” Republicans tried to masquerade their business bias in 1952 by picking war hero General Dwight Eisenhower to run for president. Eisenhower, however, did not unravel the Rooseveltian welfare state. When he left office in 1960, he blew the whistle on the extent to which big businesses believed that they could feed at the public trough by establishing military-related firms in nearly every Congressional district to produce goods or services supposedly relevant



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to national security, thereby ensuring passage of larger and larger defense budgets. Democrats returned in 1960 with John Kennedy as their standard bearer. After his assassination, Lyndon Johnson became president and was elected in his own right in 1964. As president, he worked for passage of landmark civil rights legislation, Medicare, and tried to end poverty through Great Society programs. To Social Darwinian Republicans, his government “giveaways” to the poor remain an anathema. But Medicare and Social Security were too popular for later Republican Party presidents to dismantle. Ronald Reagan’s successful campaign for the presidency in 1980 occurred during a recession. His economic solution was libertarian “supply-side economics,” one feature of which was a tax cut for all, including the wealthy. The rich were expected to invest surplus income, producing a trickle-down effect that would result in jobs. The less fortunate would presumably be hired as demand increased. Although Reaganomics also sought to deregulate business from government restrictions (since “government was the problem, not the solution”), Reagan insisted on maintaining the Rooseveltian social safety net. To boost the economy, Keynesian economics was utilized in the form of greatly increased military spending. Reaganomics has continued as the Republican Party’s socioeconomic paradigm. Under Democratic President Bill Clinton, deregulation continued, and he even modified the welfare program to appease Republican Darwinian thinking. Under President George W. Bush, banks fearing Darwinian insolvency foreclosed homeowners, refused to make loans to homeowners and small businesses, and were bailed out by ordinary taxpayers while taxes for the rich were cut. Barack Obama’s landslide election in 2008 was after voters realized that reckless deregulation had resulted in an unraveling of the economy—that Social Darwinian deregulatory politics resulted in economic disaster. When President Barack Obama favored a Keynesian “stimulus” bill to create jobs in infrastructure projects, Republicans then harped on Obama for instituting “job-killing” socialism. Similar to Reagan’s trickle-down solution for job creation, Republican opponents of Obama insisted on continuing tax cuts for the rich as an antidote to the sluggish economic recovery. In the postCold War global economy, many new jobs created by rich American business executives have been located overseas. In 2010, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, John Boehner, commented, For those who can compete and do well, fine. Some Americans can’t compete. I think we have a responsibility as a people to help those who can’t compete. But do we have a responsibility to help those who won’t compete? I would have serious doubts about that.

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Although Boehner has shed tears for the less fortunate, they are consigned to the fate of “natural selection.” Survival of the richest has long become the Republican Party’s official policy. Then, during a debate among Republicans vying for the presidential nomination during September 2011, Social Darwinian views toward health care came into plain view when Republican candidate Ron Paul was asked whether he would let an uninsured person die after suddenly falling into a coma. Although some in the audience cried out, “Let them die,” Paul first blamed the sick person for not taking out health insurance and then suggested that a charity would somehow learn about the case and pick up the tab (Muskal 2011). Yet neither Paul nor any of the other Republican candidates castigated those in the audience for Paul’s offhanded suggestion. And they failed to appreciate that such cases happen frequently, forcing hospitals to absorb costs and raise fees for everyone else. The rise of Donald Trump, who accused his presidential opponents in 2016 of being “weak,” is a sign of the continued popularity of Social Darwinism. According to Social Darwinians, guaranteed health insurance will enable hypochondriacs and malingerers to stay away from work, pretending they are sick. Unemployment insurance, they have said, lets bad workers enjoy a vacation on everyone else. Republicans lust to end the “nanny state” and to stop “giveaways”—except, of course, the triumphalist imperative to provide subsidies to oil companies and other profit-making businesses. Current Social Darwinian Republican triumphalists believe that economic policies of government should help those who are successful. They favor tax breaks never imagined during the Reagan era, lowering of regulatory barriers, cutting welfare, and privatizing social security. Every man (sexist term intended) for himself! According to the research of Thomas Frank (2016), leaders of the Democratic Party also hold subliminal Social Darwinian views, as they appeal to the middle class but have little interest in the working class or the poor. In short, the social Darwinian paradigm is riddled with the unresolved contradiction between libertarian and triumphalist thinking, even though the expectation in both variants is that, in a rational conception of human existence, the deserving will prevail over the undeserving. But the Darwinian paradigm also predicts that any country can fail competitively because of inadequate infrastructure and support for its middle class. When the Darwinian paradigm was applied to the rise and fall of states by Heinrich von Treitschke (1916[1963]:13) and William Graham Sumner (1911), the view was that states should arm themselves to the maximum required in order to deter military conquest, as discussed below in the section on Balance-of-Power Rationality. What will happen is that the stronger will defeat the weaker states to the point where the major powers left standing will create rules to govern a balance of power and the Darwinian survivors



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(Morgenthau 1948; Kaplan 1957; Mearsheimer 2001; Chen 2013). An alternative Darwinian logic has been applied by scholars who find that Third World countries are more likely to engage in war than First World countries because of inferior domestic and foreign policies (Singer and Wildawsky 1996), excusing the fact that the international economic order dominated by the First World creates the inequality that underlies wars within the Third World, a causal process presented in the Disequilibrium paradigm discussed in the following chapter. But the precariousness of the Darwinian balance of power has led some scholars instead to claim that empirically there are fewer wars when one country assumes hegemonic superiority in the international system, yet another form of rationality discussed below. Nevertheless, a Darwinian paradigm based on the concept of evolution may be making a comeback in international studies (Rennstich 2008; Gilady and Hoffmann 2013). PRESSURE GROUP (FIELD) RATIONALITY One of the reasons for the existence of mass society in a democracy is that the Darwinian model has been applied by political leaders to decision-making: The allocation of resources by government creates inequality because those allowed to make authoritative decisions are those with the most resources in the first place—a polyarchic (Dahl 1971) rather than a democratic process. The origin of the polyarchic concept can be traced to Arthur Bentley. Although supporting progressive aims, Bentley saw business influence in government as something inevitable. In The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (1908), Bentley’s relatively turgid prose captured the empirical essence of the political arena in Washington. However, Bentley had little immediate influence in political science. After his doctorate from Johns Hopkins, he worked as a journalist in Chicago with only a part-time teaching position at the University of Chicago. Nevertheless, his idea gained strong support within political science (e.g., Schattschneider 1935). Merle Fainsod (1940:297–98) developed Bentley’s idea of pressure groups by suggesting that a political equilibrium results from a “parallelogram of forces” impacting the political system. In other words, the Bentley’s idea of pressure groups might be similar to Boyle’s Law of gasses (P = T/V), but would instead be P = TV in which the extent of pressure of each group might be measured by multiplying the temperature of interests (salience of the issue) multiplied by the volume of interests (lobbying funds and person-hours allocated by affected interests). Alternatively, the model might be similar to Newton’s Law (F = MA)—that is, force equals mass times acceleration. One force within a parallelogram of forces, thus, would prevail when able to amass the greatest amount of pressure (in dollars or lobbying person-hours) reaching

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the largest number of key players in an accelerated pace before other pressure groups. But nobody took the “parallelogram” concept seriously as a concept to be measured quantitatively. The generals of Adolf Hitler, however, did when massive armies (the M) were dispatched by blitzkriegs (the A) at the beginning of World War II, according to the advice of Carl von Clausewitz (1832), who after all considered war the conduct of politics by other means. What Fainsod had in mind—a field of forces impinging on decisionmakers—was called field theory in social psychology, as first developed by Kurt Lewin (1951). Clearly influenced by the Einsteinian field equations of relativity theory (Natarajan 2016:39–40), Lewin’s analogy was to forces of attraction and repulsion that surround individuals like magnetic fields (cf. Guttman 1951). Several small group experiments have validated field theory over the years. Albert Pepitone and George Reichling (1955) found that cooperative groups were more productive than groups with a measure of hostility. Ronald Lippitt and Ralph White (1960) explained that experiments structured autocratically produced more aggression and in-group tension than democratically constructed experiments. Stanley Milgram (1974) was horrified that experimental subjects would push buttons to torture others in order to please those in authority. The concept of “groupthink,” in which a decision-making body tries to please the central decision-maker and discourages dissent, is yet another example (Janis 1972). Voting deliberation has often been considered as operating within a web of influences from family, friends, and community preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954:383n10), though they are more ingrained predispositions, as discussed in the following chapter, than evanescent pressures. After World War II, behavioralist case studies in the spirit of the Pressure Group paradigm were more interested in obtaining facts about group struggle than in testing Fainsod’s idea about the parallelogram of forces. David Truman (1951) documented the rise of pressure groups, renamed “interest groups,” by a thorough analysis of how the power of one group stimulated another group to mobilize and exert power on behalf of a rival set of interests in the same realm of politics. He identified the process as validating a “disturbance theory.” Such an analysis led to the conclusion that unmobilized masses, not applying pressure when major decisions are made, are shortchanged. Earl Latham (1952), similarly, studied pressures and tactics of the Cement Institute on behalf of cement corporations. Interest group studies then multiplied (Garceau 1958). Truman’s disturbance theory—that the formation of one pressure group stimulates others to form in opposition—was later challenged. Robert Salisbury (1969) proposed an alternative, entrepreneur theory—that interest groups emerge when someone, such as Ralph Nader, mobilizes resources in the manner of a business entrepreneur. Salisbury speculated that economic



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interests form lobbies in accordance with disturbance theory, whereas ideological groups develop when entrepreneurial talent is put to work on behalf of a cause. In other words, he inserted attitudes of individuals into what was otherwise a mechanical paradigm. Systematic evidence did not exist to validate Salisbury’s hypothesis until Jeffrey Berry (1978) did a cross-test. Analyzing 83 public interest groups, he concluded that Salisbury’s theory applied to most cases, though there were some outliers. However, no scholar has yet developed a larger paradigm to account for both the cases that fit Salisbury’s prediction and those that do not. Meanwhile, applying Truman’s analysis of national interest groups to study multiple sources of influence in a city, Robert Dahl (1961b) assembled information on pressures applied in three specific decisions made by the New Haven city government. He felt that he could determine the city’s power structure from the relative influence of groups in making decisions, and he was pleased that there was polyarchy—a pluralism in which different groups contest decisions relating to their specific interests (cf. Dahl 1971). Different sets of interests applied pressure in each decision, and each interest group ended up with a slice of the pie, achieving “polyarchy” (Figure 7.4). Suspicious that the information Dahl collected was a con game by the New Haven power structure, G. William Domhoff (1978) later reviewed the information, cross-checked the same sources, and found that there was very little pluralism and that instead a power elite was running the city, a cross-test won by the Mass Society paradigm. Power was not as diffused as Dahl assumed. Meanwhile in economics, Mancur Olson, Jr., (1965) refined the Pressure Group paradigm by asking how interest groups lobby to organize for collective action, while Gordon Tullock (1967) posed the question about the economic cost to businesses of rent-seeking behavior (state regulation in the public interest). In a study of economic regulation, George Stigler (1971) formalized the Pressure Group paradigm and tested propositions relating to economic regulation similar to the parallelogram concept. The question was how much money could optimally be spent by an industry for legislative lobbying or by supporting candidates for office to avoid having that industry lose an equal amount of money due to regulations. Sam Peltzman (1976) and Gary Becker (1983) then generalized Stigler’s approach. Studies along the same lines have burgeoned (Tollison 1988, 1991), but solely in the field of political

Figure 7.4  Pressure Group Rationality Paradigm.

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economy. For example, Howard Marvel (1977) explained that the British Factory Acts in the 1830s, long presumed to be in the public interest because they limited the working hours of women and children, actually favored steam-mill owners over water-mill owners because, unlike the former, the latter depended on stream flow. Although the Pressure Group paradigm was thought to be normatively neutral, there was a presupposition that equilibrium would result from a balance of forces impacting policy making. James Madison’s theory of the American Constitution was that different branches of government would inevitably be in conflict over the exercise of their power, such that the public interest would prevail over special interests. However, an alternative view is that a popular president, having a nationwide constituency, can override parochial interests of members of Congress in matters of foreign policy (Schattschneider 1935) and similarly that the Senate should be more receptive than the House of Representatives because the former has a larger constituency (Rogowski 1987). A study of roll-call votes in Congress from 1994 to 2004, however, refuted the effect of constituency size in legislative support for free trade policies (Ehrlich 2009). Fainsod’s “parallelogram,” thus, was reborn in economics but remains to be developed with quantitative precision in political science. Instead of magnetic fields of force, as in Lewin’s field theory, network analysis would be more appropriate—connecting the dots between sources of pressure (cf. Maoz 2011). The paradigm, nevertheless, remains popular (McFarland 2010). A study of ten ethnic groups seeking to influence American foreign policy concluded, similar to the Resource Mobilization paradigm discussed below, that structurally well-organized groups which mobilize their members have more influence than those which fail to do so (Rubenzer 2008). Another study points out that legislatures can successfully pressure executives on matters of human rights in democracies (Waldorf 2008). And a person who chairs an international organization can have a lot of influence on decisions (Tallberg 2010). An interesting twist to the paradigm is a study of how donors to nongovernmental organizations exert pressure on governments (Ohanyan 2009). Opposition parties can also pressure governments to embark on or refrain from war (Shea, Teo, Levy 2014). Editorials in major newspapers can also influence governments to apply economic sanctions against gross violators (Peksen, Petersen, Drury 2014). But to have influence, pressure groups must first decide to call attention to their needs—and when (Carpenter 2007). A focus on agenda setting is an important link in the Pressure Group paradigm because interests must find a way of forcing consideration before they can apply their pressure. Such a focus has been applied to foreign policy decision-making by Michael Mazaar (2007), who argues that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was a case of agenda setting



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by subordinate advisers rather than groupthink, cognitive error, or rational choice. Whereas agenda setting by the bureaucracy, the media, and presidents have been studied in domestic matters (e.g., Walker 1977), pressures to set the agenda in foreign policy often come unexpectedly from events covered by the media. But if the media do not have the resources to investigate a situation, a president can manufacture a case for action after the successful policy entrepreneurship of high-level policy advisers (Kingdon 1984). Such advice will set the agenda only if the proposed action is technically feasible, normatively acceptable, and anticipates how to overcome possible constraints (pp. 138–46). HEGEMONIC RATIONALITY The triumphal version of the Darwinian paradigm has been applied to the international system to rationalize hegemony—the belief that the world is more stable if one and only one superpower is in charge. Within the United States, such thinking is found in both major political parties, with the notable exception of libertarian Republican isolationists, due to their acceptance of the ideology of exclusivist nationalism. Members of the Democratic Party have increasingly rejected the hegemony paradigm but without promulgating a coherent alternative paradigm. The concept of hegemony as a stabilizing influence within a system, of course, was stated by Augustine (426), Bishop of Hippo, and later Thomas Hobbes (1651) as the fundamental basis for effective government: The people make a rational contract with government to provide security and stability, and government then fulfills those goals with unchecked police power. The alternative to the Hobbesian contract is supposedly a life of chaos (“war of all against all”). Although later thinkers (Locke 1688; Rousseau 1762) proposed that the social contract should limit the powers of government so that they would not intrude into personal lives, they still relied on government to maintain civil order. The international system, however, has no government or stabilizing institution. Accordingly, the Hobbesian vision is the Hegemony paradigm, celebrating unipolarity. Although several loose unipolar systems have existed without being able to assert hegemony (Wilkinson 1999), the focus is on hegemony as a rational way to bring about world stability. When there were several major powers in Europe—multipolarity—the Hegemony paradigm was applied to justify colonialism and imperialism— that some advanced countries could keep order in Asia and Africa by asserting just enough superior military force so that they could extract resources for their own benefit (Figure 7.5). Accordingly, the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 carved Africa up into areas where specific European powers would

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Figure 7.5  Hegemonic Rationality Paradigm.

be dominant. The rational choice was to provide security for the colonial regimes and their businesses by suppressing opposition from the colonized peoples, often justifying control in a Darwinian evaluation of the intrinsic worth of the colonial subjects in the scheme of social evolution (Fanon 1952, 1961). Charles Kindleberger (1973) argued that World War II occurred because there was no hegemon in the international system. The major powers, acting rationally on their own behalf, collided because there was no world leader with a dominant economy to enforce rules and ensure world stability. After World War II, the Hegemony paradigm would have applied if either the Soviet Union or the United States had triumphed militarily. During the Cold War between the two superpowers, they were dominant within their two spheres of influence, and tension between them prevailed in the system as a whole. Nevertheless, the bipolar system was relatively stable because they frightened one another, using methods of the Deterrence paradigm described below, from trying to assert global hegemony. Instead, they implicitly adopted a code of conduct to avoid nuclear confrontation and sought a way to prevent minor conflicts from escalating into major conflicts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991, American hegemony was trumpeted, since the country had economic dominance, political strength, superior military force, and a will to lead without exploiting significant other powers in the world (McCormick 1990; Brzezinski 1997, 2004; cf. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, Wohlforth 2009). There were no hostile powers bordering the United States. As Joseph Nye described the situation, Washington was Bound to Lead (1990). But would any countries follow? Or was “hegemony” a socially constructed self-delusion (Smith 2007)? For George Modelski (1987), there has been a Darwinian succession of hegemons in the world, beginning about 1500—Portugal in the sixteenth century, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century. Britain was the hegemon of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while the United States prevailed in the twentieth century. Modelski disavowed the notion that the world system was anarchic and argued that hegemonic cycles were inexorable in the international system (pp. 100,135,227). When a hegemon asserted dominance, the reason was a rational desire to reduce instability, though often wars were needed to suppress powers that would create chaos by trying to defy the world order. According to Modelski, before the



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international system was unified by explorers of Portugal, Spain, and other countries, there were regional hegemons, such as China, Genoa, and Venice. All countries need to operate in an orderly international environment, and according to Modelski only hegemons provide that stability. Buttressing the argument is the contention of Paul Kennedy (1986) that hegemons have declined due to “imperial overstretch”—that is, allocating more resources to maintain dominance than the hegemon could afford, something that Arnold Toynbee found to have occurred in every hegemonic state within his twelvevolume A Study of History (1934–61; cf. Knutsen 1999) due to a decline in resources. Hegemons can use several methods for maintaining order from the conventional tools of statecraft—economic dominance, coercive diplomacy, compellance, imperialism, military force, and what Nye (2004) later called “soft power”—enhancing a country’s prestige by charitable donations and reasonable policies. According to Robert Gilpin (1988), what is important is that the hegemon must provide “public goods,” such as funds for economic development in the Third World. (Imperialism as a paradigm related to hegemony is discussed in Chapter 8 below.) During the Cold War, coercive diplomacy was applied by the superpowers. Afterward, the United States has found difficulty applying unilateralist compellance (cf. Sperandi 2006). One reason is that there are many conceptual hurdles involved in assessing the contemporary world as “unipolar,” since the relative economic and military preponderance of the United States has been waning since the end of the Cold War, giving birth to theories of hegemonic decline (Lobell 2003; Thompson 2006; Layne 2012). As China advances economically today, some have raised the question whether the United States will no longer be the world hegemon (Zakaria 2008), but the thesis presupposes the inexorability proposition. The term “weak unipolar” possibly applies because Washington does not control as much of the world as leaders might prefer (Wilkinson 1999). Some scholars believe that global governance might provide more security than America’s apparent waning hegemony (Aydinli and Rosenau 2005; Krahmann 2005), but the problem is compliance with norms and rules, even within Europe’s supranational organizations (Tallberg 2003; Zürn and Joerges 2005). However, American hegemony may not be waning after all (Layne 2009; Nye 2012; Saull 2012; Brooks, Ikenberry, Wohlforth 2012; Wohlforth 2012b). For Robert Keohane (1984), such international institutions as the United Nations can serve as arenas for diplomatic persuasion so that the hegemon does not need to show brute force, but his view pushes the Community Building paradigm. Even when an economic or military hegemon declines in resources to enforce stability, well-crafted institutions may continue to benefit all stakeholders in the international system by providing stability (Puchala

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2005). Such a view has empirical support from Southeast Asia (Haas 1989a; 2013) but has been questioned by other analysts (Snidal 1986). BALANCE-OF-POWER RATIONALITY The concept of balance of power has been implicit in histories of international relations since the days of Thucydides (431bce[1980]:402), Machiavelli (1531, 1532), and Francesco Guicciardini (1561), all three of which drew lessons from warring city-states. For centuries, empires sought to prevent hegemonic control by other empires (Frankopan 2015). The Holy Roman Empire (952–1806) was unable to assert hegemony after the collapse of the Roman Empire in 476. Few international systems have been hegemonic since the establishment of the system of nation-states emerging from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the two treaties ending the Thirty Years War (1618–48) that were fought in part to oppose hegemonic control in Europe. Peace under a system of major, middle, and minor powers required each country to choose sides in order to balance power so that there would never be a hegemon again. As a result, countries ganged up on Napoléon’s effort to assert hegemony during the early nineteenth century. Thereafter, a system of individual, sovereign states developed balance-of-power thinking that was accepted by the time of the defeat of Napoléon (Wright 1972; Sheehan 2004) in contradistinction to the hegemony concept of Thomas Hobbes (1651). During the rest of the nineteenth century, several major powers coexisted. Otto von Bismarck, perhaps the preeminent practitioner of balance of power, used the term realpolitik to describe his strategy (Knutsen 1992:159). Today, there is one superpower but also two major powers—China and Russia. The concept of balance of power, as applied before superpower bilateral deterrence, may apply again today depending upon the context. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) had enormous influence in urging control of major sea lanes as well as Halford Mackinder (1904) in dominating land masses as a way to prevent global destabilization. Applying their geopolitical reasoning, Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (2005) today consider any stable alliance as a “pole” in a multipolar context, and a “constellation” as the relationships of nonpole powers to the major (pole) powers. Furious that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler on a silver platter in 1938, Hans Morgenthau was determined to reverse what he considered the soft policies of the period leading up to World War II. In his Politics Among Nations (1948:4), he sought a “rational theory” instead of “futile and deceptive” analysis of motives, but what he offered was more prescriptive than predictive of the main dependent variable—outbreak of meaningless wars. Although he identified two types of balance of power



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(competition and direct opposition), he suggested four methods for achieving that balance—divide and rule, compensatory actions, arming or disarming, and alliances. He cautioned that all four methods had a potential to upset the balance, but he offered exemplars of his paradigm, not tests. Kenneth Waltz (1979) critiqued Morgenthau’s analysis of the causes of international instability but did not offer a new balance-of-power theory for empirical testing any more than Morgenthau. For Waltz, the cause of instability was the anarchic lack of hegemony in the international system, whereas Morgenthau blamed irrational human nature for war. Neither provided empirical measures of their concepts to enable paradigm testing. Instead, Morton Kaplan (1957) provided “rules of the balance of power” that remain untested (Figure 7.6). Kaplan’s major assumption was that all states must treat one another as acceptable role partners in a communitarian quest to preserve the balance, thereby keeping the peace. But no such assumption holds for the one country tempted to seek hegemonic control, which will be constrained by the other major powers who are committed anti-hegemony balance-of-power believers. That multipolar international systems are the most peaceful has been fervently held (Masters 1961; Deutsch and Singer 1964; Hanrieder 1965), though evidence suggests that unipolar systems have the most stability (Haas 1970). The balance-of-power concept pushes the Darwinian paradigm at an international level. For power balancing to work, peace is expected to be preserved by countries that unilaterally maintain their strength. Empirical challenges by several scholars who have found that no state of military readiness has ever deterred war (Niou, Ordeshook, Rose 1989; Niou and Ordeshook 1990). Frank Wayman (1985), using statistical data on wars from 1815 to 1965, found that arms races are more likely to lead to war than a politics of peace through strength. Other scholars have attacked the Balance-of-Power paradigm as theoretically incoherent and incomplete as a vision of how politics operates (Wittman 1979; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Kim and Morrow 1992; Powell 1996; Vasquez 1997; Legro and Morvacsik 1999; Rathbun 2008). Kenneth Organski (1958) also has argued that countries traditionally recognized as

Figure 7.6  Balance-of-Power Rationality Paradigm.

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middle powers cannot easily be kept at bay from achieving major power status through war, especially if their economic resources are rising to the level of one or more major powers. The idea of power balancing is associated with the ideology of realism— that is, the action plan that mandates national leaders to be vigilant to preserve the balance of power so that destructive and unnecessary wars will be avoided. There is nothing inherently unscholarly about being motivated by an ideology, which after all is a type of normative theory. Ideological premises serve to advise rulers about desired policies without the bother of seeking scientific proof that the ideological assumptions lead to the goals. Similar to everyone else, scholars have values. But when ideological views are assumed to be true without empirical support, there can be no scientific progress, and the application of an untested ideology may go embarrassingly awry. Nevertheless, John Vasquez and Colin Elman (2003) celebrate new balanceof-power approaches authored by several scholars. In a balance-of-power system there are several major powers. Accordingly, the balance is maintained if at least one country can persuade at least two contending powers not to go to war. The persuasion can be by means of mediation (Leng and Regan 2003; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), as a pivotal country could take sides in the war. Timothy Crawford (2003) considers such a scenario to be one of “pivotal deterrence.” Accordingly, deterrence is discussed next, as the term “deterrence” emerged in international studies during the bipolar Cold War. DETERRENCE RATIONALITY Bipolarity has existed from time to time in the international system. During the Middle Ages the Arab and Christian powers held each other in check until the defeat of the former by General Charles Martel in 732. During the bipolar Cold War, George Kennan (1947) urged Western containment of the Soviet Union, and Thomas Schelling (1960) applied game theory to determine the best deterrence strategy when there were two superpowers and a potential for miscalculation, resulting in nuclear holocaust. Today, the deterrence concept has been adapted to any situation in which war is a potential outcome, so the theory has undergone refinement to apply more broadly than to bipolar systems (cf. Naroll 1969; Doughtery and Pfaltzgraff 1990:ch9; Lupovici 2010). Definitionally, “deterrence” is the ability of one party to dissuade an adversary from embarking on an action that the latter may prefer but the former considers unacceptable. To deter requires a credible threat, usually involving violence, which intimidates another country without infuriating the latter into taking the action as a matter of spite. A deterrent move should open the door



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to negotiation, direct or implicit, so that the latter country will be convinced of the deterrent threat and back down from contemplated action. Hoping to resolve the difficulties of the Balance-of-Power paradigm, Stephen Walt (1987) has proposed reconceptualizing the Balance-of-Power paradigm as a “balance of threats,” as if there were not already a paradigm of deterrence. A threat to use power, after all, is the essence of deterrence. Metaphysically, in other words, material realities have to be included in the Deterrence paradigm as well as mental processes (cf. Howard 2004:813n). Regarding the latter, Walt has suggested that decision-makers must consider “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions” (p. 5). Geographic considerations, of course, are now important for countries lacking nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. Alexander Wendt (1995) has pointed out that nuclear weapons of Britain are less important to the United States than those of North Korea because the role of perceived intentions is more important than capabilities, though clearly both must be considered. There are two types of deterrence (Huth 1999): Immediate deterrence involves a short-term threat. General deterrence involves preventing shortterm threats and surprise attacks arising from deep-seated rivalries. Thus, the existence of a problem of immediate deterrence means that general deterrence has either failed or was not on the radar of the country receiving the threat. Thus, general deterrence involves discouraging another country from making a short-term threat that forces the leader to make unpalatable concessions, so there is an element of balance-of-power logic within the concept of deterrence. In a nutshell, each side must agree on a price that they are willing to pay either to end a crisis situation or to go forward with escalating threats and counterthreats. Moreover, threats are only effective if one side has perfect information that the other side is relatively weak and will be expected to back down. Yet in one study, there is an incentive to deceive and lie about capabilities, using secrecy as a deterrent (Lindsey 2015). Although John Mueller (1989) suggested that a new era in human history had arrived when war between or by major powers was no longer likely, he went beyond the concept of deterrence to suggest that a new international ethic was the product of many factors, presumably including nuclear deterrence (Jervis 1978,1989; Fettweis 2006:680). Writing at the time of an ongoing proxy war between major powers in Cambodia may not have been the best time to launch the view, but his rosy scenario gained support after the end of the Cold War, when Christopher Fettweis predicted that “The West has no need to fear a growing China or recovering Russia” (ibid., p. 685). Neither foresaw that Beijing would seize islands in the South China Sea or Russia would annex Crimea, albeit without a shot. Research cases for studies on historical deterrence are plentiful, but future-oriented deterrence requires simulation (cf. Zagare and Kilgour 2003).

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As the Cold War ended, several scholars noted that what held back risky behavior was the uncertainty of the options (Powell 1990; Downs and Rocke 1990), which meant that caution (non-decisions) prevailed. As a result, proxy wars were fought, with the Soviet Union and the United States limiting the amount of support to both sides. According to James Fearon (1995), deterrence fails if all three of the following conditions exist in a crisis situation: (1) a dispute over an indivisible good, such as territory, (2) asymmetric information, such as when bluffs are called because they seem not credible, (3) the belligent side is more committed than the deterrent side. One might add that one side or the other simply does not exercise restraint (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 2006). Making a threat credible seems to be the crucial element, which Vesna Danilovic (2002) carefully develops (Figure 7.7). Reflecting on the case of Libya in 2005, Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock (2005) find that defending states must achieve several conditions to deter an adversary: First, leaders on both sides must have a minimum of domestic and international constraints; backing down in issuing or challenging a threat cannot be viewed as jeopardizing their tenure in office. Second, they must use diplomacy that involves timely proportional (limited action) and reciprocated moves (providing carrots to match the concessions by the state that makes the threat). Third, the costs of noncompliance by the country being deterred must be greater than the benefits of going ahead to carry out the threat. Fourth, the defending country must have sufficient economic and military capability and flexibility to inflict an unacceptably high level of damage on the other, both quickly (due to the impatience of a leader making threats) and over a long term. Fifth, the defending country must signal that coercive actions will be employed with a high degree of credibility (cf. Zagare and Kilgour 2000). But in the age of international terrorism, deterrence logic may not apply to asymmetric conflict. Rogue states and terrorists may gain access to nuclear weapons, a concern of many (e.g., Smith 2006). Asymmetric deterrence has been a failure in immediate deterrence when the weak challenger repeatedly makes pinpricks that are insufficient to provoke war (Langlois and Langlois 2005). The continued existence of nuclear weapons means that international

Figure 7.7  Deterrence Rationality Paradigm.



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deterrence may be insufficient to prevent global cataclysm, an issue rarely on the public agenda (Brown 2016; Perry 2016). SELECTORATE RATIONALITY Cost-benefit and other forms of rationality predict outcomes in terms of utility maximization but ignore the process, which is usually left in a black box. But Machiavelli did not do so, and Selectorate Rationality also seek to open that black box, even if just a little. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and associates have applied the Rational Choice paradigm to decisions by executives who want to stay in power. The Logic of Political Survival (2003) and The Dictator’s Handbook (2011) demonstrate the need for leaders, democratic or otherwise, to appease support coalitions (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, Smith 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow 2003). Much of the theory is similar to John Steinbrunner’s notion that survival of the decision-making unit is central to what he calls the “cognitive and cybernetic paradigm,” which seeks to eliminate complexity and uncertainty by focusing on just one paramount outcome (Steinbrunner 1974:56, 65, 66, 78). The term “selectorate” is used to identify those who support the leader. Nominal selectorates are the ones capable of supporting the leader, such as registered voters in a democracy or an army in a military dictatorship. The real selectorate, known as the “influentials,” in fact choose the leader—for example, actual voters in a democracy and the Central Committee in a country run by the Communist Party. But more important still is the term coined by William Riker (1962)—the winning coalition, which Bueno de Mesquita identifies as the “essentials,” who constitute a majority or plurality in an election or the royal council in a monarchy. Everyone in the selectorate benefits from public goods created by the government, however led, but only members of the winning coalition gain private goods as rewards for their loyalty (Figure 7.8). Because leaders continue in office as long as they please at least a minimum within their support coalitions, they have the greatest prospect of survival in office if their winning coalition is small. In an autocracy, the autocrat enjoys the advantage of drawing from the selectorate to replace those not in the winning coalition; the anticipated cost of defection from the winning coalition serves as a deterrent and maintains their loyalty. In short, selectorate

Figure 7.8  Selectorate Rationality Paradigm.

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analysis supports the main proposition of Hegemony Rationality: The regime type most likely to produce stability is autocracy—that is, until the autocrat alienates the coalition. In a monarchy, the selectorate is small, and the winning coalition even smaller. Consequently, poorer monarchs are often overthrown by those kept out of the private goods. Most members of the winning coalition will transfer their loyalty to a new monarch if they can keep their privileges. Democratic leaders, however, are the least stable. The winning coalition is large, and the selectorate is even larger. To keep the winning coalition happy, public goods are more important than private goods. The cost of private goods to every member of the winning coalition—or to attract more members into the winning coalition—is often prohibitive. Accordingly, potential democratic leaders compete in offering public goods to differing constituencies. One set of constituencies might be organized groups advancing such goals as civil rights, education, health care, and national security. Another set of constituencies might be ethnic or racial groups—or gay/lesbian and women’s groups. The leader will pick associates who are most likely to be loyal in delegating authority so that public goods handled by the executive branch officials will not become their own private goods, thereby lessening corruption. Bueno de Mesquita has supported the paradigm with cross-sectional and time-series econometric methods, but methodological questions have arisen (Green, Kim, Yoon 2001; Clarke and Stone 2008). Testing executive constraints as an indicator of democracy might better explain survival in office. However, controlling for region and year, the size of the winning coalition has been identified as the best predictor of survival in office (Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, Smith 2008). The same findings held for 31 types of public goods. But that was only one effort to survive the criticisms; many remain (Kennedy 2009; Choi 2016:ch3). Later modifications in the selectorate approach, as suggested by SeungWhan Choi (ibid., ch4), include the possibility that leftist leaders will vary the distribution of public goods over time by deficit spending to attract support from new constituency groups seeking employment at the risk of later inflation that will produce unemployment, while right-wing leaders will protect business interests by minimizing inflationary policies (ibid., 56–57). Choi also tests whether countries with high levels of civil liberties provide public goods more consistently than countries with large winning coalitions, refuting an element of the Selectorate paradigm. Another test concludes that democracies are more likely to provide a clean environment (curb air pollution as a public good) than autocracies if they have large winning coalitions, considerable state capacity, and high regime stability (Cao and Ward 2015). Selectorate rationality might be interpreted to include symbolic payoffs—to wit, showing military muscle abroad in order to regain support



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from macho-oriented hawkish voters. However, when economic sanctions interfere with the ability of personalistic dictators to continue rewarding their supporters, there is a strong likelihood that the regime will increase repression (Wood 2008) or fall (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). Sanctions work best when prescribed by international institutions (Bapat and Morgan 2009; cf. Wood 2008) or are pursued by the major trade partner(s) of a sanctioned country (McLean and Whang 2010). However, the lesson of sanctions imposed against Saddam Hussein is that compliance could have been more effective if the UN took a bargaining approach (Rose 2005). The rationality of selectorate theory inevitably leads to a situation in which competing constituencies represented by different political parties may play a zero-sum game, as when one party represents a different class or race from the other, whereupon the rational solution would be to provide public goods just widely enough to achieve a winning coalition from a group of constituencies. Those not in the winning coalition could perceive alienation—that is, they are in a mass society not unlike those created in the autocracies and monarchies. Selectorate Rationality, by shortchanging the public outside the selectorate, may lead to the need for analyses based on the Mass Society paradigm. Perhaps the most fascinating accomplishments of the Selectorate paradigm are the ability to ask questions posed by other theories, apply and test selectorate logic, and conclude that the other theories are subsets of selectorate rationality. For example, the “democratic peace” notion that democracies avoid war with other democracies has been explained in selectorate terms as caution due to the fragility of winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, Woller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow 2004). And selectorate analysis has been used to subsume voter rationality theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). VOTING RATIONALITY The selectorate approach considers how leaders can be rational vis-à-vis citizens. But what about citizen or voter rationality? Whereas scholars at Columbia University applied field theory to explain the deliberation of voters as a function of their exposure to ethnic communities, political parties, and the needs of rural versus urban life (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954), University of Michigan scholars initially operated on the assumption that rational voters give weights to three considerations—characteristics of candidates, the issues raised in an election campaign, and the political parties of officeseekers (Campbell, Gurin, Miller 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller 1960; Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes 1966; Converse, Miller, Rusk, Wolfe 1969; Miller, Miller, Raine, Brown 1976; Miller and Levitin 1977).

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But another focus is on “investment voting.” Results from many surveys suggest that voters are careless, flippant, and inattentive to the information that is available during election campaigns. Economist Kenneth Arrow (1951), for example, found election choices to be difficult when preferences vary widely. Although the same basic paradigm of Rational Deliberation between competing reasons for voter choice remained as gospel for many years, political scientists eventually became enamored of economist Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), which was based on game theory. A student of Arrow, Downs, was interested in how voters make up their minds in the absence of perfect information. The other concern was with how political parties and candidates run elections. Focusing on the former interest, Downs based his thinking in part based on Hotelling’s Law that producers make products as similar as possible so that consumers can make choices based on only a few competing differences (Hotelling 1929). Downs (1957:8n5,298n3) considered voters as far more rational than previous voting studies had assumed. Citing Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (1948), he looked at voting as an investment in which individual self-interest might lead to collective rationality. Each potential voter, first of all, advances “one’s own great­est benefit,” both in the objective “selfishness” sense and in the subjective sense, as “self-denying charity is often a great source of benefits to oneself” (ibid., p. 8). For Downs, voters must take more effort to become fully informed about ballot box choices than they have time available, so a rational (parsimonious) use of their time is not to get informed or even just slightly informed. Then political candidates will converge to the ideology preferred by the median voter with very little candidate divergence, leaving the principal appeal to political party identification for those who are loyal partisans or personality characteristics perceived as desirable (Downs 1961:195). Accordingly, most of the model leaves voter deliberation in a black box. Based on voting research, Downs (1957:298–99) suggested that rationality can be found in nine decision rules used by each voter to decide how to vote (Figure 7.9). (1) Voters acquire little in­formation before voting. (2) A citizen votes for the same party in one election as in prior elections. (3) Voters give more weight to party records than party promises. (4) Voters have little information about issues. (5) The most informed citizens, who vote most often, get the most payoff from elections. (6) Voters process information either in their role as income earn­ers or as consumers, but not both. (7) Voters with less payoff from elections defer to the judgments of others in making up their minds. (8) Voter partic­ipation varies with income because of the costs of acquiring information to reduce uncertainty. (9) Cross-pressured voters have lower rates of voting.



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Figure 7.9  Voting Rationality Paradigm.

Probing farther into the black box, Downs believed that there was an ideological continuum from conservative to liberal. Political parties and candidates choose to pitch their views somewhere on the continuum. Voters also place themselves on the continuum. Thus, voters only need to obtain information about which party or candidate is closest in “distance” to their own locus on the continuum, otherwise known as the “median voter theorem” (Black 1958; Plott 1967; Davis, Hinich, Ordeshook 1970; Page and Jones 1979; Calvert 1985). Political scientists largely ignored Downs for nearly fifteen years. Then, William Shaffer (1972) cross-tested the Downs model with the voter model applied by University of Michigan studies (Miller, Miller, Raine, Brown 1976) and found a better fit with Downs—a judgment that was later disputed (Fiorina 1976). Similarly, Samuel Popkin joined John Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey Smith (1976) in demonstrating how Downs had superseded the Michigan para­digm. Following Popkin, many scholars have used the Downsian version of the Rational Choice paradigm. But in a computer simulation, Norman Frohlich and associates (1978) found that the Downsian model was only slightly better in predicting voting preferences than the Michigan studies, which use opinion data to approximate a field of attitudinal forces, similar to the Pressure Group variant of the Rational Choice paradigm. Scholars then began to employ novel ways to analyze election data (Weisberg and Rusk 1970; Aldrich and McKelvey 1977; Rabinowitz 1978; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). For example, relative distances between voters’ positions and candidates’ positions appeared in statistical models (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979; Enelow and Hinich 1984:ch9; Erikson and Romero 1990). The mathematical representation of the probability of voting (V) involved three concepts—perceived closeness of an election (E), the value placed on citizen duty to vote (D), and the cost of voting (C). In other words, V = ED - C. Although several efforts have been undertaken to test that

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equation, only one has done so with resounding results (Sigelman and Berry 1982), proving that the perceived cost of the effort to vote is decisive. And they did so by opening the black box—asking prospective voters “how much time and effort” voting asks of them. Despite the cost, the information obtained depends on the sources consulted. Over the past many decades, the style of campaign ads has changed to increase candidate likeability and to provide more focus on issues; meanwhile, campaign news coverage has become less useful for voters (Gilens, Vavreck, Cohen 2007). The problem is that voters never have perfect information, so the use of the Rational Choice paradigm has not been fully supported by election data in recent studies (Bartels 2010). Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson’s The Macro Polity (2002), building on a series of related studies of “public mood,” presidential approval, “macropartisanship,” and dynamic representation, developed a “system model” in which officeholders’ policy choices both reflect and help to shape public opinion. Although they stressed the direct responsiveness of governmental policy to shifts in public sentiment, they found that public preferences shift chameleonlike when a Democrat replaces a Republican in the White House or vice versa (ibid., ch. 8) and thus is quite volatile (ibid., p. 272). Moreover, the polyarchic or field version of rationality, as discussed above, offers an alternative way of understanding how voters decide. And group loyalties (cultural similarity) may provide a more “realistic” explanation for political party identification (Achen and Bartels 2016). Thus, a rational model of public opinion continues to elude analysis. SOCIAL EXCHANGE RATIONALITY Sociologist George Homans (1958, 1961), relying on assumptions in behavioral psychology, believed that individuals are motivated by personal goals and driven by desires buried deeply in their psyches. Because they cannot achieve all their goals, humans must organize their goal seeking to minimize the cost required to “satisfice” their goals by calculating from alternative options. Thus, human behavior can be viewed as rational from the standpoint of individual deliberation. Homans’s social exchange approach has focused on the psychology of instrumental behavior, whereas Peter Blau (1964) developed the social exchange approach more in line with traditional economic analysis. For example, if a person invites a friend to join a nongovernmental organization, and the friend agrees, then there is a positive reward. If the friend declines, then behavior is modified, and the two persons may no longer be friends. According to Richard Emerson (1976), the success proposition is that rewarded actions tend to be repeated; unrewarded actions will be avoided.



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Figure 7.10  Social Exchange Rationality Paradigm.

The stimulus proposition is that the more a particular stimulus pleases an important individual, the more the stimulus will be repeated. The satiation proposition is that the more an individual receives a certain reward, the less likely that the person will continue to be impressed by that same reward. The basic assumptions of Social Exchange Rationality are that people involved in interaction seek to maximize goals, but the main goal is to be gratified by positive behaviors of others. Information about economic, psychological, and social aspects of human interactions is useful in considering the most profitable ways to receive positive social credit through interactions. Social credit is preferred over social indebtedness. Nevertheless, social interaction occurs within the context of cultural norms that provide boundaries for what can be said and done. The more deprived a person seeks a social goal, the more value will be assigned to means toward that goal. Individuals calculate the best possible methods for achieving their goals (Figure 7.10). Social exchange rationality may be applied to business negotiations (Lambe, Wittmann, Spekman 2001), interracial relationships (Kalmijn 1993), organizational productivity (Saks 2006; Elstad, Christophersen, Turmo 2011), and many other situations in which humans seeks to achieve goals through interaction. The application to diplomacy is obvious. The exchange of hostile diplomatic communications, for example, has been used to explain why World War I broke out (Zinnes, North, Koch 1961; cf. North 1967). RESOURCE MOBILIZATION RATIONALITY Although mobilization has been examined within the Mass Society and Community Building paradigms as a key element, the task of building an organization can be considered as one in which impact is maximized and costs are kept low. Individuals are viewed as rational actors who engage in instrumental actions that use formal organizations to secure resources and rewards (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Those who join organizations do so for rational reasons, and the leaders of the organizations are rational in seeking to advance the goals of the organization, just as countries form alliances for rational reasons, including minimizing transaction costs (Weber 2000).

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Those who join social movements do so when the benefits of membership exceeds costs, such as membership fees and time spent demonstrating with the possible risk of being arrested or harassed. The goal of a social movement is to achieve a collective good. However, those who do not join but nevertheless receive the collective good are “free riders,” so those who join must have some goal besides the benefits from the collective good. Grievances are a background factor, but not the only factor for those who join (Buechler 1993). Indeed, the role of norm entrepreneurs is to use their own social or economic capital to persuade some persons to feel the grievances so strongly that they will join and make contributions, monetary and nonmonetary. Thus, a supply-and-demand model can describe the flow of resources in and the results out. Success, in various degrees of quality of the product sought, differs depending on the extremity of the problem and solution, the means employed, and the efficiency of the organization. The role of norm entrepreneurs is to attract media attention so that more members will join and more adversaries will be shamed into agreeing on the demands. Organizations seek self-preservation even more than the product that they seek, so increasing resource flow keeps the movement alive. For Craig Jenkins (1983), there are five main propositions in resource mobilization: (1) Actions of members and participants are rational. (2) Imbalances and conflicts of interest generate grievances and desire to change the distribution of resources. (3) Centralized and formally structured organizations are more effective in mobilizing resources and achieving goals than decentralized and informal social movements. (4) Group strategy heavily influences success. (5) The political climate, notably the resources of those being confronted to make policy changes, can prevent success (Figure 7.11). Some organizations form more easily than others. Those formed by identity, such as race or sexual orientation, have an easier task than organizations seeking specific reforms for particular places and times. To persist over time, political parties have to sell their ideologies, a difficult task when vague ideas are disseminated. Becoming a member of a political party is more difficult than consistently supporting a political party because the member may have to devote resources to remain on the rolls of the organization. Communist, fascist, neofascist, and nationalist movements can originate and develop along similar lines (Johnston, Laraña, Gusfield 1997), thus giving new insight into

Figure 7.11  Resource Mobilization Rationality Paradigm.



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elements not represented within the Marxian, Mass Society, and Community Building paradigms. Nowadays, what are called “new social movements” can rely on social media, which can mobilize through communication cheaper and faster than through organizations with leaders, headquarters, and regular publications. Their resource, in other words, is the time spent in communication and the cleverness of the message—the framing of the cause (Hunt, Benford, Snow 1994). Many new social movements respond to conflicts involving democracy and individual rights and are reactions to the colonizing intrusions of markets and states into modern society (Buechler 1995). Insofar as they operate outside institutional movements, they will be less effective against structures of power. For example, they may seek to establish new lifestyles, such as the hippie movement of the 1960s or the current craze for tattoos among bodybuilders. The success of presidential candidate Donald Trump in mobilizing many types of persons during 2016 can be viewed as a new social movement to protest the political system itself, using anger and breaking social norms. A messianic message also found traction in the candidacy of Democratic Socialist Bernie Sanders, who announced that he was trying to lead another kind of social movement—a “revolution.” Political candidates share the task of mobilizing voters, though they do so under different banners. Often, the reward for joining a movement is to be a member with other members. Insofar as there is a mass society, organizational membership relieves alienation even when the cause is not strongly held by the members. Those who join for psychological or social reasons rather than political objectives can quickly pull out and join a new organization. Leaders of organizations, thus, need to learn how to cultivate commitment if their movements are to survive. However, as noted in the previous chapter, resources may not be as crucial in the success of a social movement as the cleverness of the leaders of organizations in getting their message out to the media. CONCLUSION “Rationality” has been defined in different ways within the present chapter, indicating the universality of its isomorphic scope. For classical economists, the rational course of action for businesses and countries is to accumulate capital and invest in order to increase prosperity. For individuals, maximization of utilities is the goal. The cost-calculating decision-maker is one who achieves goals quickly and thoroughly at minimum cost, human, and material. Social Darwinians define rationality as promotion of the survival of the human race. Proponents of hegemony seek stability. Leaders manage

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selectorates by appeasing supporters with rewards. Voters are rational by not devoting much time to issues that they do not understand. People satisfice rather than maximize in interpersonal relations. Organizations mobilize by framing their goals to attract members and then by trying to get media to do the job for them. Although most variants are interactionist in relations between ideal and material elements, classical economics follows Marxism in giving priority to economic (material) components and so do the Darwinian and hegemonic versions, whereas social exchange rationality is entirely a mental phenomenon. But trying to find rationality from irrational decision-makers, including voters, continues to confound researchers. The Rational Choice paradigm still inspires research into voting behavior, international relations, and in many other areas of social science. After all, who can oppose objective decision-making that maximizes goals while minimizing costs and risks unless the beneficiaries are the few? But the “rational” decision in game theory depends upon the decision rule chosen—Laplacian, maximax, maximin, or minimax—so there is no way to determine ultimate rationality unless all four are evaluated with information on how a decision-maker actually deliberated. Critics of the Rational Choice paradigm are legion. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (1994) have argued that those conducting empirical tests have used weak statistical methods which, when corrected, have disproved generalizations purporting to support the paradigm. Alex Mintz (2007b) ticks off a list of seven objections, including some featured in the following chapter, and even believes that the Rational Choice paradigm is not what he calls “behavioral IR.” But there are more fundamental theoretical criticisms. What is “rational,” after all, is culturally determined and a product of socialization (Bourdieu 2005). Neuroscience suggests that the brain does not function as the Rational Choice paradigm assumes (Connolly 2002). Altruistic decisions often defy rationality, though foreign investment is preferred in countries that respect human rights, notably in countries that provide educational opportunities, judicial safeguards, and workers’ rights (Blanton and Blanton 2012). Government leaders are inherently constrained from rational decisions by the structure of power. The Marxian paradigm offers a unified set of concepts and relationships. Under the rubrics of Mass Society, Community Building, and Rational Choice paradigms there appear to be competing frameworks, though they could be unified if empirical theorists tried to bring together the isomorphisms. The ideal-type Rational Choice paradigm promises to be the first paradigm to apply to almost any problem area of international studies. Implicitly, since deviant cases will inevitably appear in a multi-case study,



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the Rational Choice paradigm suggests consulting other paradigms to identify anomalies, such as disequilibria, dysfunctions, and irrationalities. In short, proponents of the Rational Choice paradigm and others will find themselves back to the Marxian, Mass Society, and Community Building paradigms—or those featured in the following chapter.

Chapter 8

Other International Studies Paradigms

The previous four chapters are distinctive in focusing on paradigms with universal goals—inequality (Marxian), democracy (Mass Society), cooperation (Community Building), and rationality (Rational Choice). They also highlight paradigms that have isomorphisms at several levels of analysis, using the conventional trichotomous distinction between the individual, national, and international levels (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961), though there are intermediate levels of analysis—such as dyads, ethnic groups, nongovernmental international organizations, and regional intergovernmental organization decision-making bodies (cf. Albert and Buzan 2013). Chapters on other paradigms could be written, but they would be much more concise due to lack of development by international studies scholars in finding isomorphisms across several levels and identifying universal goals. What follows are paradigmatic efforts that have been important in the past, may enjoy contemporary interest, and have relevance for the future. Rather than diagramming the additional paradigms, the narratives below concisely give a taste of what they offer. Many are ripe for development in a successor volume, as citations from the literature attest. INDIVIDUAL ACTOR DECISION-MAKING How do ordinary people and political leaders make decisions? To believe that they always do so in a rational manner, as presented in Chapter 7, is to stretch the imagination, since so many foolish decisions have been made. The underlying assumption is that there is an action-reaction or challengeresponse process whenever decisions are made in response to events, as in an arms race (Richardson 1960a; McClelland 1961; Toynbee 1934–61). The 153

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early work on decision-making, beginning with Richard Snyder and associates (Snyder, Bruck, Sapin 1963), ably summarized by Joe Hagen (2001) and Valery Hudson (2005), assumed that reality consists of perceptions; physical events and material elements existed only as perceived by humans. The idealist metaphysic, in other words, dominates decision-making paradigms presented below (cf. Kuperman 2006:527). A wide perspective has been provided by William Flanik (2011:Figure 7), who seeks to account for all the elements involved, perhaps having read an earlier formulation (Haas 1994:Table 4–1). Slightly modifying his tabulation and incorporating the five-stage formulation of Thomas Knecht and Stephen Weatherford (2006), (Table 8.1), the presentation can be viewed as ontologically complete though accounting for the interplay between affective and cognitive categories is where an interactionist paradigm would be appropriate (cf. Oppermann and Spencer 2013). Eager to revitalize behavioralism, some scholars believe that the time has now come to focus more on decision-making (James 2007; Mintz 2007a,b; Walker 2007). But besides the Rational Choice paradigm, only three prominent decision-making paradigmatic approaches have been developed over the years—the Crisis, Irrationality, and Political Process paradigms. Although Yaakov Vertzberger (1998) attempts a synthesis, which he calls the “sociocognitive” approach, his framework depends upon a separate analysis of the three main paradigms before they can be combined. Moreover, the three paradigms overlap, since irrational elements are likely to emerge within the decision-making process during crises. Irrationality Paradigm The Irrationality paradigm has been developed from an analysis of disastrous decisions. For example, World War I involved a reaction by Austria-Hungary to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists, seeking to form their own country. Vienna contemplated some form of military punishment of its Serbian province, but Russia was understood to favor Serbian independence and might respond by retaliating with its massive army. Since Austria-Hungary could not mount a defense against Russia, the Austrian emperor asked the German emperor to assure support. During the exchange of diplomatic notes between Germany and Russia, however, the tone became increasingly negative, and Berlin declared support for Vienna. But France and Russia were allies. Expecting both France and Russia to attack Germany, the German emperor decided to begin the war by launching an offensive against France, thus potentially knocking Paris out of the picture so that Germany could fight Russia in a one-front war. The key decision, thus, has been attributed to the rising hostile perceptions between Germany and Russia



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Table 8.1  Decision-Making Parameters Evaluative Phase

Cognitive Elements

Affective Elements

Agenda setting

Paradigmatic representation of the problem Determining which options might be consistent with the paradigm Favoring the option most preferred by the paradigm Translating an option into behavior

Salience of the problem

Option formulation Picking one option Implementation Policy review

Evaluating the effectiveness of an option

Somatic selection of options that feel right Somatic discarding of options that feel wrong Enduring the joy or stress of implementing an option

Pleasure or displeasure about how the option was implemented

(Zinnes, North, Koch 1961). Had cooler heads prevailed, some believe, there might have been rational decision-making and no World War I. Nevertheless, a forum on World War I in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis featured a half dozen essays, repeatedly citing “network analysis” as crucial for understanding prewar interactions (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, Scheffran 2011), yet none cited Robert North’s research or paradigmatic efforts. The Irrationality paradigm posits information processing as potentially subject to psychological or even neuropsychological elements (Mercer 2010) that preclude rationality. Since humans are not computers or robots, they must sweep away the inevitable affective (emotional) temptations before operating rationally. What is important about the paradigm is that emotional parts of the brain often react first to stimuli that seem to require a response. Several types of affective considerations come to the fore—particularly need for power. For those who analyze the human ability to construct images that may or may not reflect reality, subjectivity leads to irrationality (Solomon 2014). For Sigmund Freud, libido was the central source of motivation for irrational behavior (Freud 1921). A victim of child abuse while growing up in fin-de-siècle Vienna, Freud was trained as a physician but found medical explanations inadequate for chronic conditions of his patients. After trying hypnosis, he began to converse with his patients on personal matters. He realized that the desires of the libido are so strong that individuals must find a way to “reconcile” themselves with “reality,” using the human will. The interaction between body (id) and mind (ego), for Freud, cannot achieve victory until humans engage in greater self-realization about the struggle, through psychoanalysis in extreme cases, which can be helped by developing a superego. Writing after the cataclysm of World War I had begun (1915[1964]:288), Freud argued that war emerges when “primitive” tendencies prevail

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(1915[1964]:281–82). His remedy for avoiding war was “more truthfulness and upright dealing” between leaders and nonleaders of difference countries, as “anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between humans must operate against war” (1933[1964]:215). Freud expected that an inexorable “growth of civilization” would militate against war despite discontentedness with social change (1930). Freud’s analysis stimulated psychoanalytic analyses of Woodrow Wilson, one by William Bullitt (Freud and Bullitt 1957), another by Alexander and Juliette George (1956). The latter study concluded that his quest for self-determination of nations was an externalization of his frustration as a boy growing up with a dominating but likeable father, and his resulting personal insecurity made him too “emotionally charged” to consult with others (p. 119). The former found Wilson suffering from conflict between feminine impulses and superego expectations that a leader should be masculine (Freud and Bullitt 1967[1967]:81). The tendency for some decision-makers to prefer violent methods when they are inappropriate led to Robert North’s focus on how perceptions of hostility distorted the cognitive processes of decision-makers in World War I (North 1967). The main premise was that views of an event are shaped by the “perception and emotional feeling” rather than “objective reality” (Nomikos and North 1976:245–46). Similarly, Carl von Clausewitz (1832[1968]:103) felt that war arose from the “feeling of passion” in which “one side dictates the law to the other.” Both North and Clausewitz focused on mental causes rather than the Freudian focus on how mental and physical phenomena interact. According to Charles Hermann (1972:13), North’s approach identified perceptions of decision-makers as the “screening process” that intervenes between event stimuli and response events (decisions). Hermann’s approach was an application of the frustrationàaggression approach (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower, Sears 1939), positing intervening factors between the two concepts. A similar analysis of rising frustration leading to aggression has been applied the 1916 Irish uprising (Schafer, Robison, Aldrich 2006) and even to public diplomacy (Graham 2014). Nevertheless, in 2005 not all Islamic countries had riots following the Danish cartoon depicting Mohammed due to their political infrastructure (Hassner 2011). Only recently has the analysis of genetic and neurobiological influences on decisions has become possible. Two recent studies have explored that influence (Hatemi and McDermott 2012; McDermott 2014), the latter with particular attention to aggressiveness and anger. Leaders who enjoy cognitive complexity are more likely to act rationally, while leaders with lesser intellectual powers will resort to diversionary violence to short up lagging domestic support, a conclusion based on cases from 1953 to 2000 (Foster and Keller 2014).



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Psychologists continue to explore how irrational motivations distort decision-making. For example, a study of decisions in “high-velocity” firms discovered that executives prioritize keeping their power position by relying on persons of the same age who are located in adjacent offices (Eisenhart and Bourgeois 1988). Contrary to Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, in which different power structures form for each issue-area (Dahl 1961b), they found that executive power structure remains the same in issue after issue. The Irrationality paradigm also explains why decision-makers engage in conduct known to have no impact despite knowledge that the impact will be zero. An example is the use of economic sanctions or threats thereof despite evidence that they rarely change behavior of an adversary into a positive direction, can strengthen the influence of hardliners, and may even open replacement investment from another state (Drezner 1999; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Morgan and Bapat 2003; Drury and Li 2006; Early 2009; Whang 2011; Early and Spice 2015; cf. Davies 2012; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2014; Lektzian and Patterson 2015). The basis for such irrationality is affective and emotional satisfaction in “aliefs”—that is, affective intuitions about what should be the case (Morgan and Bapat 2003; Holmes 2015; Holmes and Traven 2015)—as a corrective to the simplistic desire + belief = action model (Fearon and Wendt 2002:59). Although such an application of diversionary theory has yielded mixed results in some studies (Foster and Palmer 2006), the reason may be that the Irrationality paradigm is applicable for some but not all decision-makers, thus calling for a unified paradigm containing both elements. Crisis Paradigm The possibility of a crisis leading to nuclear war prompted behavioralist researchers not only to found the International Studies Association but also to conduct research in order to find a metric that could be utilized in government or the United Nations to stop a conflict from escalating into a crisis. That ambitious quest failed, though several “early warning systems” has been funded and successfully utilized by the U.S. government over the past fifty years (Andriole and Young 1977; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, Rabushka 1985). Currently, the U.S. military uses an Integrated Crisis Early Warning System to predict the behavior of other states, though the prediction of the end of the Cold War is not a feather in its cap (O’Brien 2010). Efforts to construct a Crisis paradigm have historical roots. One reviewer of foreign policy analysis believes that the field “is still in its infancy; currently no coherent model or paradigm exists” (Stern 2003:183). But an incoherent paradigm is still worthy of recognition. Charles Hermann (1961, 1963), among the early researchers, was a major proponent of the view that normal decision-making differs fundamentally

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from decisions made to resolve a crisis. Presumably, irrationality is more likely to emerge in a crisis situation, but not necessarily if decision-makers are aware of that possibility. The most difficult task is to define “crisis.” When a questionnaire containing definitions of crisis was once administered to State Department personnel, the responses fell into a wide distribution (Lentner 1973). The term “crisis” can be applied to situations only if some persons do so and find agreement with others (Widmaier 2007). The Chinese translation of the term suggests that a crisis can provide an opportunity for action. For Hermann (1969), “crisis” is defined as a situation in which three elements are present—high threat, considerable surprise, and short time to react. The danger of crisis, he argued, is “the probability of an extreme response” (p. 193). Relying on a term from psychologist Leon Festinger (1957), Hermann found that “dissonance” is the quandary between “accelerated commitment to take effective action toward a specific goal and . . . decreased expectation that a policy which advances a specific goal can be formed” (Hermann 1969:151). Later, Hermann (1989:359) distinguished between systemic crises of the international decision, actor-confrontations involve dyads involving two countries in contention, and decision-making within individuals. Crisis decision-making also has interested psychologists (Sweeney 2008), who examines the mental process, and rational choice-oriented economists (Drucker 1980). According to Russian neuropsychologist A.R. Luria (1932), physiological overload may be one element, identifying when information inputs and somatic tensions exceed what a decision-maker can handle, resulting in malfunctioning of deliberations. With a shutdown in normal information processing, an individual is unable to cope with an event in a rational manner. The physical elements of human behavior, in other words, prevail over mental capacities. Crisis, in other words, produces stress, a matter long investigated by psychologists (McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman 2011). But political scientists have not been clear about the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. Luria’s physiological overload may be a cause of stress, but Charles McClelland posited mental phenomena— namely, that crisis exists when there is an increase in variety and volume of events (1961:191) or increased coercive and violent events that threaten war (1972:97). McClelland’s insight was the basis for collecting data on such events as diplomatic protests and threats on a daily basis to track possible escalations in conflict before they reach a point of no return and violence erupts, a line of research that has been very productive, though a summary suggests that the crisis perspective is as valid as the ideologically based realist doctrine when unpacked into a testable format (Leng 2004). Stephen Andriole and Robert Young (1977) have measured activity, tension, and uncertainty as elements



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of rising crisis. Richard Beal (1979) has pointed to the importance of event flow and event uncertainty. The Crisis paradigm may explain what occurs under various forms of stress without necessarily resulting in an irrational decision, as Graham Allison (1972) pointed out in his analysis of the Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962. Deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War clearly worked to avoid that outcome. There is a consensus that crisis tends to centralize the response team (‘t Hart, Rosenthal, Kouzmin 1993). Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1997) assembled case histories of all international crises from 1918 to 1994 in order to determine factors accounting for escalation of crises into war. They found that escalation was more likely over territorial issues and in protracted conflict situations. Among the most likely indicator of how a threat can become a crisis is regime type, as they found that democracy-democracy dyadic conflicts tend to be resolved short of a crisis (cf. Meernik 2005). Cross-sectional correlational findings, however, are inherently not based on an action-reaction analysis of decision-makers, whereas simulations can reveal the inside of the black box (cf. Zagare and Kilgour 2003). Case studies using poliheuristic analysis find that empathetic consideration of another country in the option selection phase of decision-making assures a more peaceful outcome to a crisis (Keller and Yang 2009). However, trade interdependence may also play a role in why crises are resolved, as Norman Angell (1910) predicted (Peterson and Venteicher 2013). Recently, a steps-to-war model has been applied to crisis decision-making (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Although apparently successful, the model is based on a polynomial, which might lend itself for diagramming as an historical process. A summary of findings in the study of crisis management has been provided in a symposium by Bruce Dayton (2004) and a book written by Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (2005). A key element is the use of public statements as threats intended to signal commitments to force an opponent into backing down (Tarar and Leventoğlu 2008). Domestic influences, such as opposition parties, may act as constraints or incentives for violent conflict resolution (Leventoğlu and Tarar 2009; Shea, Teo, Levy 2014). Richard Ned Lebow (1981) has also pointed out that many crises are manufactured to justify the choice of war. Articles reviewing the subject appear in the special edition of International Studies Review for March 2004. Crises can also result from natural disasters, such as earthquakes. Some countries collapse when they cannot handle the situation (Righarts 2008), though other countries thrive. Richard Olson and Vincent Garwonski (2010) have proposed a 5C + A framework for comparative analysis. The C’s are

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capabilities, competence, compassion, correctness, and credibility; the A stands for action taken. After analyzing several case studies, they concluded that international disaster assistance often serves to point out the inadequacies of the government where the unfortunate event occurred. A similar analysis has been made of the response to pandemics (Sparrow 2016). A study of the financial crisis of 2008/09 has revealed that failure to avoid the crisis has led to an overcautiousness that may result in a future failure (Best 2016). For that matter, International Monetary Fund bailout conditions, which deepen crises within recipient countries, seem to fall into a pattern of insanity—repeating the same policies with the same adverse effects (Stiglitz 2002:ch8; Vines and Gilbert 2004). In short, further development of the Crisis paradigm needs to include post-crisis behavior as well as crisis prevention modalities. Political Process Paradigm Leaders of states ideally can act rationally, but the second edition of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (Allison and Zelikow 1999) identified two alternative explanations, both of which deal with how the political process operates. The first he called the organizational model in which top leaders solicit opinions of various experts—a “bounded rationality” model of policy entrepreneurs. The other model, which Allison evidently prefers, is called bureaucratic—the struggle of various bureaucratic units to determine how to respond to international events, in which those with the greatest bargaining skill tends to prevail. His approach, in other words, is close to the Pressure Group paradigm involving pressures inside rather than outside the decisionmaking body. Policy entrepreneurs, such as national security advisers with strong academic credentials can have a powerful organizational influence on chief executives (e.g., Macdonald 2015). An illustration of how bureaucratic structures impact a new president is the analysis of why a troop surge was ordered in Afghanistan shortly after Barack Obama took office as president (Marsh 2014). Whereas Allison saw no way out of the parochialism of agency bargaining, Irving Janis (1972[1982]:7) noted that group “members tend to evolve informal norms to preserve friendly intragroup relations and these become part of the hidden agenda at their meetings.” The result is “groupthink,” in which everyone involved in a decision will seek to please those at the top so that they can keep their positions, a phenomenon that one scholar believes is responsible for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Badie 2010). Due to the danger of groupthink, Alexander George (1972) has urged “multiple advocacy,” which of course would slow down decision-making to ponder more options (cf. Mitchell 2005).



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A similar formulation by Robert Billings and Charles Hermann (1998:37) depicts a ten-stage process, which they have diagrammed to demonstrate the complexity of how decisions are made. What is important is when the organizational process moves from one stage to another and the feedback from each decision. Failure to consider relevant facts or to postpone consideration of an ongoing problem, thus not getting unnecessarily bogged down, is perfectly rational but may result in an irrational outcome. The role of public opinion in the process also needs to be clarified (Knecht and Weatherford 2006). Due to consideration of feedback, the cybernetic approach allows for learning from the experience of making decisions and nondecisions. The type of decision unit is stressed by several analysts (Hagen, Everts, Fukui, Stempel 2001). Margaret Hermann (2001:Figures 1–2) has further elaborated the Political Process model with particular attention to decision units and provides diagrams of her paradigm. Three decision units are identified—predominant leaders, single authoritative groups, and coalitions of agencies. Analyzing 65 cases, she and her coauthors found that predominant leaders tend to be expansionistic crusaders, single groups fall prey to groupthink, and coalitions are steered by pivotal members who can commit resources (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, Hermann 2001), but the findings await more coherent paradigmatic development (cf. Garrison 2007). Ranan Kuperman (2006) relabels the cybernetic-organizational model as the “dynamic framework.” He objects to the view that all decisions are ad hoc. The Crisis paradigm instead assumes that decisions are ad hoc because something extraordinary occurs to force a response. Kuperman suggests a second type of dynamic model—sequential decision-making: Decisionmakers operate in a stream of ongoing episodes that may or may not require decisional intervention. Studies of the foreign policy of a country over time follow the sequential model (e.g., Brecher 1975). They “disaggregate” the process, do something incrementally to attenuate a problem, and then spend time on other matters, including situations that have higher priority. They return to consider options when problems increase in priority due to changes in the problem to be addressed, reviewing previous efforts on an ad hoc basis (whereas the Crisis paradigm often assumes that decision-makers have no time to reflect on previous experience in order to respond with urgency). Sequential and dynamic decisions are usually incremental and tactical (Lindblom 1959), highly dependent on decision structure. In contrast, ad hoc Crisis decisions are mostly game changing and strategic (Kupeman 2006:542–42). An example is how the European Union has episodically dealt with the application of Turkey for membership and vice versa (Ozkecei-Taner 2006:545). The isomorphism with personal decision-making in a marriage is obvious.

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The Political Process paradigm usually accepts the flow of deliberation as an equilibrium of sorts (Lindblom 1959; Wildawsky 1975). Gary Goertz (2003), however, has imported the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” from paleontology to argue that political processes flow along incrementally until jolted by something unexpected and then recalibrate the approach taken. The stimulus event need not be a crisis. He has applied his concept to decisionmaking in the European Union, whereas the paleontologists explain why biological change proceeds in an evolutionary manner until a sudden environmental challenge provokes dramatic change (Eldredge and Gould 1972). An example of punctuated or sequential decision-making is negotiation, a process that may take hours or days or years (cf. Odell 2000). Legislative deliberation is a form of negotiation (Bailey 1950), though treaty ratification is usually one-sided (Cohen 1957; Robinson 1960). Unbiased mediators can also be used to defuse crises (Smith and Stam 2003; Touval 2003; Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn, Asal 2005; Crescenzi, Kadera, Mitchell, Thyne 2011), though rarely when military conflict is involved (Bercovitch and Jackson 1997). Conflict resolution often requires negotiations when the cost of an ongoing situation is high (cf. Ghosn 2010; Ramsay 2011). Comparative analyses of the bureaucratic and organizational components of decision-making may continue to develop the paradigm (cf. Palmer and Morgan 2006; Siniver 2008). Simulations are often a preferred method (Kuperman 2006:544). However, with the exception of the concept of groupthink, the Political Process approach provides more explication than explanation. Comment Efforts to develop a paradigm for decision-making need more development. Some advocates of decision-making paradigms encounter individual irrationality within the black box, since the outcome of crisis decision-making or organizational dynamics may be inadequate to meet various challenges. Analyses of decision-making need to take the wider context into account, as provided by the Marxian, Mass Society, and Community Building paradigms. Accordingly, paradigms at the dyadic, subnational, national, international, and global levels are described next. DYADIC LEVEL When two countries interact, they do so at the dyadic level. Much research in international studies involves relations between two countries, as in studies of the foreign policy of one country toward another. The main paradigm at the



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dyadic level has already been discussed—the Deterrence paradigm. Within the world, there are also regions of countries with considerable unity that deal as a bloc with other regions. Accordingly, there are two main types of dyadic paradigms—those dealing with similar or dissimilar pairs. Imperialism Paradigm A major paradigm dealing with economically dissimilar dyads and regions focuses on how one country attempts to control the territory of another country by asserting imperialistic primacy, a possible variant of the Hegemony paradigm discussed in the previous chapter. Before the advent of the nationstate system, a country with sufficient economic and military resources would seek to expand its territorial control in order to gain economic advantages. After the age of grand empires, the same process involved an advanced nation-state seeking to make a colony of a so-called “backward” state. Lenin’s Imperialism (1917a) was actually inspired by book of the same title written fifteen years earlier by John Hobson, a socialist critic of the Boer War who deplored the imperative of capitalist states to expand in search of markets, resulting in competition and arms races to protect external markets (1902[1938]:viii). Seeking to understand world inequality and “the resistance of this inequality to change,” sociologist Johan Galtung presented “A Structural Theory of Imperialism” (1971:81). Defining “imperialism” as “a genus of dominance and power relationship,” he identified an imperialist relationship whenever the following conditions are present: 1. there is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nation and the center in the Periphery nation, 2. there is more disharmony of interest with the Periphery nation than within the Center nation, 3. there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation (p. 83).

For Galtung, two structures produce imperialistic relationships—feudal interaction and vertical interaction. Feudal interaction exists when powerful countries force poor countries to concentrate their trade and other interactions with a single Center country and cannot trade among themselves. Vertical interaction refers to the exploitative division of labor in which upstream countries ship inexpensive raw materials to downstream countries for processing into expensive goods that the downstream country cannot afford. Later, Galtung (1980) presented a revised Leninist view of the world economy but suggested a very different solution—self-reliance within the Third

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World. Galtung was an architect of proposed New International Economic Order (cf. Rothstein 1979) and thus designed a solution beyond the dyadic level for the international system. Inequality between nations is a form of what Galtung (1980:81) has called “structural violence.” Elsewhere, he identified structural violence as a situation in which rich countries eat too much while poor countries starve (1964). The explanation for a low standard of living and a poor quality of life within many countries, in other words, is global imperialism. Some quantitative research has supported his framework (Walleri 1979) but not always (Russett 1983). The accusation that the United States engages in a unique form of imperialism, with military bases around the world and a “long history of using force to discipline states that it objects to” (Saull 2008:310), a view also stated by Andrew Bacevich (2002), provoked a symposium in International Studies Perspectives in 2008. Various definitions of “imperialism” were offered, with most American scholars eager to deny the charge. Yet none in the symposium referred to Galtung, who instead was later cited in a more balanced analysis by two English scholars (Kettell and Sutton 2013). Books on the subject will doubtless continue (cf. Bobrow 2008; Chari 2008; O’Reilly 2012). Similarly, using the term “lateral pressure,” Nazli Choucri and Robert North (1975:19; 1989) expanded the Imperialism paradigm to apply to both capitalist and socialist states: “In a country with a growing population there will be an increasing demand for basic resources” (1975:15). “When demands are unmet and existing capabilities are insufficient to satisfy them,” the result will be the “process of foreign expansion” (p. 16). For rich states, the expansion is through internal and external trade, whereas strong states acquire more economic resources by applying coercive diplomacy or foreign military expansion (p. 292). War is then explained as a zero-sum clash between two or more countries with lateral pressure (pp. 19–20). The thesis is in part a reaction to Adolf Hitler’s demand for “lebensraum” to justify German aggression in World War II, but also to the “population bomb” and “limits to growth” theses (Malthus 1798; Carson 1962; Ehrlich 1968; Meadows, Meadows, Randers, Behrens 1972; Homer-Dixon 1999; Kaplan 2000; Klare 2001). Their plea is that rich and powerful countries should stop endless growth, respect the environment, and remain relatively comfortable. But those countries refuse to take a strong dose of the appropriate medicine, whereas poorer countries are unlikely to line up for injections of no-growth vaccines (Choucri and North 1975:289). The initial exemplars were the major European powers from 1871 to 1914. North (1990:73) later added the expansion of the United States after World War II as an exemplar. The thesis resonated with the view among some anthropologists that population pressure explained inter-tribal violence (Vayda 1976:3,104). A recent study carries the



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tradition of considering population pressure as a determining element for war (Kugler and Swaminathan 2006). Cultural Similarity Paradigm If two countries are similar or believe that they are members of the same culture, their relations should be more harmonious than other dyads in the international system. “Cultural similarity” could apply if two countries are allies, share the same form or government or religion, or develop a common cultural ethos during years of close collaboration. During the Cold War, the world was divided into two economic blocs, capitalist and communist, with a Third World that traded largely with the capitalist countries. The United States maintained military bases throughout the globe, sometimes propping up dictators who promised to keep out the influence of communist insurgents. After the Cold War, Karl Marx’s prediction of a world capitalist economy was finally realized. But rather than a world proletariat emerging to overthrow the capitalist system, Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) predicted that the dialectic was a trend toward increased democracies because there would no longer be a need to prop up dictatorships, and capitalism would work best within liberal democratic rule of law. He differed from the earlier claim by philosopher Alexandre Kojève (1947) that a “universal and homogeneous” state would incorporate elements of liberal or social democracy rather than a triumph of American-style capitalism. Fukuyama’s prediction was consistent with the conclusion of Clarence Streit (1939:91) that 15 democracies from 1830 had never gone to war with one another. However, Streit was one in a long line of English-speaking theorists who wanted to bring world peace through Anglo-American hegemony, even if the method employed was imperialistic (Bell 2014). His Union Now proposed a world government that would consist only of democracies. Meanwhile, several scholars found statistically that the most peaceful dyads around the world had democratic forms of government (Babst 1964, 1972; Small and Singer 1976:67–68). Some international relations theorists then sought to trace the idea of the “democratic peace” to philosopher Immanuel Kant (1795), who hoped that republics would band together to prevent empires from endless war, though he had in mind governments with separation of executive from legislative powers (cf. Doyle 1983:209–15). Thereafter, a flurry of studies sought to validate the view that democratic pairs of countries are more peaceful than any other pairs, while other studies sought to dispute the finding (cf. Haas 2014a:ch5). The paradigmatic argument, however, was incomplete: The mechanism or process linking a form of government, which cannot breathe, was supposed to impact decisions made by leaders of other countries in the event of dispute; but both the disputes and

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the deliberation processes were black boxed. Presumably, democratic leaders shared a common cultural understanding of how to make decisions with their opposite numbers. But rather than engaging in case studies to prove those points, endless statistical manipulations arose instead. However, the “democratic peace” research designs have been seriously deficient (Haas 2014a), primarily because the multidimensional term “democracy” was never defined and was instead represented by a single number from a database as if the term were unidimensional. When anomalies were pointed out, the response was to disclaim that one of the dyads was not a true democracy, again without a definition that could apply systematically (Russett 1993:19; cf. Gat 2006:6); as a result, the overthrow of democratic Chile in 1973 with the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency was excused because election of an avowed Marxist was deemed to disqualify Chile as a democracy (Poznansky 2015:3,8). The fundamental defects in the design were well known, yet Bruce Russett, the most prolific “democratic peace” researcher even refused to publish one such critique in the Journal of Conflict Resolution despite favorable comments, so the critique appeared elsewhere at a time when the design deficiencies could have been corrected (Haas 1995, 1997). Even the back-and-forth between studies trying to prove and disprove the thesis missed the point that the supposed bivariate finding was not integrated into a paradigm, such as the Cultural Similarity paradigm. One study, however, found that pairs of dictatorships were also less likely to go to war with each other (Bennett 2006), and another found the only exceptions were personalist autocracies (Mattes and Rodríguez 2014). Two scholars reinterpreted some of the findings to consist of a paradigm of Cultural Similarity (Werner 2000; Souva 2004), but their suggestion has not been followed. Disgusted over the absurd “democratic peace” ideology, some scholars began to talk about a “capitalist peace” (Gartzke 2007). The argument that capitalist dyads are the most peaceful, another attempt to develop a Cultural Similarity paradigm, seems even more questionable, since capitalist countries have engaged in wars for centuries, but the underlying element of the “capitalist peace” is trade and the sanctity of commercial contracts, echoing the view of Norman Angell (1910) that an interdependent world will be more peaceful than one with tariff walls. An empirical test of the Cultural Similarity paradigm by Errol Henderson (1998) identified dyads from 1820 to 1989. He found that religious similarity was associated with peaceful dyads (cf. Warner and Walker 2011), whereas both ethnic and linguistic dyads had the opposite effect. However, the democratic culture in his study had the most association with peaceful relations between pairs of countries, a finding echoed by James Meernik (2005) but



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contested in dozens of studies (Haas 2014a:Table 5.2). David Cooper (2011), pointing to the success of the Proliferation Security Initiative, has argued that middle powers played an important role, whether democratic or not. If indeed democratic dyads are more peaceful than other dyads, according to empirical research, the finding begs the question of the explanation. Political similarity means very little unless there is a shared cultural foundation. But that notion has already been developed in Chapter 6 under the heading Communitarian paradigm. Clash of Civilizations Paradigm When the Cold War ended, Samuel Huntington (1993, 1998) suggested that the new basis for world conflict would be the variety of cultural norms throughout the world. The United States had been involved worldwide during the Cold War, but parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that had been integrated into the bipolar world were now free to assert their own roles in the world. In so doing, Huntington expected that they would rely on cultural and religious norms. Huntington’s cultural dissimilarity paradigm was an answer to Fukuyama’s claim that democracy inexorably would spread. Huntington expected that civilizations with differing norms would inevitably disagree on international issues and therefore clash. Out of cultural dissimilarity would emerge “core state conflicts” between the major states of different civilizations (Huntington 1998:ch9). But even when Huntington colored a map of major civilizations, he had to use ten different shades, suggesting that the clash was not just one of Western versus non-Western countries, and he even classified Papua New Guinea as “Western”! The Clash of Civilizations paradigm was a literary theory, not constructed from or designed for quantitative analysis. Many critiques have emerged (e.g., Rose 2013). In a quantitative study before 9/11, “the probability of a civilizational conflict [was judged to be] low” (Midlarsky 1998:485), a conclusion extended after 9/11 (Henderson and Tucker 2001; Fox 2004) until those in the Middle East perceived a revival of the Crusades and have been fighting back ever since. Nevertheless, the rise of China and conflicts between jihadists and Western countries needs an explanation. While the former may be a situation of a rising power seeking a larger role in the world, differences between Sunni and Shiite versions of Islam may be interpreted either as religious or in terms of realpolitik of countries with majorities accepting either version. Both Islamic sects, in turn, promote political views that “compete” with Western values (Adamson 2005). In short, Huntington’s critics could accept the challenge to disprove the validity of his paradigm, but thus far empirical research to do so is scanty.

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Table 8.2  Sociological Perspectives Perspective

Level of Analysis

Conflict Structural-Functional Symbolic Interaction

Macro Macro Micro

Focus Competition for scarce resources How parts of society interrelate

How individuals are defined and define one another

SOCIETAL LEVELS Sociologists (e.g., Mooney, Knox, Schacht 2013) agree that there are three major paradigms in their field—Conflict, Structural-Functional, and Social Interaction (Table 8.2). All three are applicable to international studies. The Conflict paradigm considers society’s inequality to be the basis for group conflict. The Marxian paradigm focuses on class and economic conflict. The Mass Society paradigm identifies power conflict. The Imperialism paradigm involves both economic and political conflict. Conflict based on culture or norms has been reviewed as the Clash of Civilizations paradigm, though the Community Building and Cultural Similarity paradigms seek to overcome conflicts based on values. Conflict based on ethnicity, gender, and race involve the third sociological focus—Symbolic Interaction. The Structural-Functional paradigm, which has enjoyed some popularity within international studies in the past, seeks to find how structures perform functions of societies in order to achieve equilibrium. Although once popular, interest has waned. The Symbolic Interaction paradigm, based on the views of George Herbert Mead (1910, 1934) and Charles Horton Cooley (1983), argues that individuals fit into society on the basis of how they are labelled and label themselves. The latter paradigm has made inroads within international studies through the useful tool of deconstruction, which some have perverted into an ideological belief. There are several variants of the Symbolic Interaction paradigm—the Socialization paradigm, the Role paradigm, the Cultural paradigm, and the Sociocultural Engineering paradigm. All but the Structural-Functional paradigm need further development. Structural-Functional Paradigm Sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1896) interpreted social unrest as an extension of psychological disorganization at the societal level. His view of social disorganization inspired scholars to trace social problems to such phenomena as alcoholism, crimes, delinquency, and suicide. Whereas Émile Durkheim (1897) viewed such deviant behavior as a function of mass society, William



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Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1918–20[1958]:1121) instead focused on “social disorganization” as deviations from “social rules of behavior.” But what are the “rules of behavior”? Social disorganization as a concept, however, did not survive as a paradigm after sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) found a way to put the term into perspective by developing the Structural-Functional paradigm. The basic Parsonian assumption is that social stability requires optimum performance of specific functions by specific structures. If some structures fail to perform functions necessary for the smooth running of social order, then the social system is considered “dysfunctional.” He identified four functions of any social system—adaptation (acquiring sufficient resources), goal attainment (setting and implementing goals), integration (coordinating subunits), and pattern maintenance (enforcing social norms). The task of Parsonian macro-analysis is to find the structures that are most appropriate for each function—police for pattern maintenance, for example. He further suggested that positive social change—and social modernization—involves continual differentiation of functions and corresponding structures to advance a more effective social order. Robert Holt and John Turner (1966) tried to apply the four functions to political systems, but they failed to find resonance in the field compared to the efforts of David Easton and Gabriel Almond. Easton (1953, 1965) identified the political process in Parsonian terms as consisting of inputs, withinputs, and outputs. Almond (1960) developed a more elaborate specification of political functions: For input functions, he identified communication, socialization, recruitment, articulation of demands (by interest groups), aggregation of demands (by political parties, adopting the demands of interest groups). The outputs of government are rule making (legislative), rule applying (executive), and rule adjudicating (courts). Almond’s implication was that Third World political systems should have the functions performed by the same structures as in the United States, his exemplar. Then, on an apriori basis, a Third World political system that did not work rationally could be explained as being dysfunctional—that is, not following the ideal-type image of First World countries. But it was absurd to argue that in a mature democracy interest groups would not directly lobby government administrators, an end run around the legislators. As a theory of political development, Almond (1973:4–7; Almond and Mundt 1973:649) later abandoned his schema, though the same categories were applied to international organizations (Haas 1965a) and to the international system itself (Haas 1974b:ch10). Images of the Structural-Functional paradigm may appear whenever a scholar uses the term “function” or “dysfunction.” Although political scientists no longer use Structural-Functionalism, sociologists still do. A recent application found fascinating connections between international organizations

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and civil society along structural-functional lines (Jaeger 2007), but international studies has focused on other paradigms to gain greater understanding. Socialization Paradigm Sociologists’ Symbolic Interaction focus deals with the identity of individuals as well as groups. But how do identities develop in the first place? The answer is socialization, but again how does socialization actually work? Irrationality may operate in noncrisis situations because some traits may be ingrained within an individual’s identity or personality. For Karl Marx, social class membership socializes individuals to make decisions to benefit their economic status. When some family members leave traditional parts of a country in order to move to cities for employment, they encounter loss of socializing influences, according to the Mass Society paradigm. The Community Building paradigm searches for how socializing influences encourage individuals to construct new communities, which in turn will serve as socializing agents. Clearly, Freudian analysis encourages investigations of the socialization process during early years of a decision-maker’s life in order to understand odd decisions made while in power (Freud 1921). The main premises of the Socialization paradigm emerge from the view that early upbringing and social influences impact individuals in a fundamental manner, creating cognitive consistency so that they can live comfortably in a particular society (Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks, Warwick 1967). Whereas field theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, believes that individuals are pressured by social influences of various kinds, the Socialization paradigm has traditionally focused on basic childhood and cultural influences that form predispositions, which in turn affect leadership styles, whereupon the leaders are sometimes able to socialize their subordinates (Clausen 1968:5; Hermann, Preston, Korany, Shaw 2001). Babies may have a “blank slate,” but they learn quickly how to adjust to social norms for purposes of survival (cf. Pinker 2002). The Socialization paradigm assumes that nurture often prevails over nature, contrary to Freud’s belief that there are innate forces within the human psyche that can be suppressed but cannot be ignored in accounting for much otherwise inexplicable human behavior. Socialization is the learning process involved in acquiring skills needed to be a positive member of a society. However, social psychologists differ on how that process occurs (Erikson 1950; Moreland and Levine 1982; Macoby and Martin 1983; Hurrelmann 1989; Gilligan 1990). Socializing institutions are the family, a person’s religion, rules of the economic and legal systems, domestic and international institutions, peer groups, and the mass media. Primary socialization occurs when children learn the actions, attitudes, culture, and values that are considered proper in



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a particular society. Secondary socialization is the process of learning how to behave within groups outside the home, such as at schools, in professions, at workplaces, or in voluntary organizations. Parents socialize their children to play gender roles. Peers perform group socialization. Of course, individuals can engage in resocialization, as when a child discards childish ways to act as an adult, an immigrant tries to acculturate to a new society, or individuals discover the urges of an unexpected sexual preference at some point in their lives. Organizations also socialize their members to play particular roles. Political socialization occurs within the same institutions and organizations with one addition—the political party (Campbell, Converse, Miller 1960). If an individual registers to vote for or supports a political party financially, the party will send messages, including endorsements by mail, telephone, or on the Internet, in an effort to influence the individual to support candidates and causes. Such influence is aimed at reinforcing the socialization that prompted party identification unlike Pressure Group Rationality. One model of voter decision-making assumed that socializing influences are predispositions more than situational field theory forces (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet 1948 [1968]), as identified in the Rational Choice paradigm. For Paul Lazarsfeld and his collaborators, “a person thinks political, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preferences” (ibid., 27). But they confused predispositional socialization with field theory when they said that people who live together under similar external conditions are likely to develop similar needs and interests. They tend to see the world through the same colored glasses. . . . But . . . many group members are not really aware of the goals of their own group. . . . They acquiesce to the political temper of their group under the steady, personal influence of their more political active fellow citizens (pp. 148–49).

Lazarsfeld and associates clarified that Catholics might tend to vote for Democrats, Protestants for Republicans, while working-class voters would support Democrats and Republicans got votes from the middle class. If a Catholic happened to be a member of the middle class, then a “cross-pressure” existed during an election campaign. Rather than having information processing of issues resolve the cross-pressure, the argument was that personal influence of a friend with more political knowledge would serve to break the cross pressure (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954:307; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1954), thus conjoining the Socialization paradigm with the field theory Pressure Group variant of the Rational Choice paradigm. Nevertheless, the Socialization paradigm is asserted whenever such variables as income level, religious affiliation, sex, national origin, and sexual

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preference are inserted into an analysis as potential explanatory factors. Because identity and material factors cannot easily change due to social pressures, the use of such variables assumes that individuals in each group will act alike. Political socialization has attracted much research in the past (Dennis 1973; Stacey 1978; Farnen 1990), but has not recently been properly recognized in many studies. International studies researchers have rarely appreciated the fact that the use of such variables puts them in a position to test the basic assumption of the Socialization paradigm—that upbringing plays a role in shaping how decision-makers perform. For example, a study investigating whether public welfare assistance socializes recipients to develop a “culture of dependence” finds no such relationship—but fails to consider the study as a test of the Socialization paradigm (Schneider and Jacoby 2003). Turning socialization upside down, what emerges is a basic concept of social psychology—social identity. The notion is that individuals look for patterns of behavior and seek to join in-groups (Brown 2000). In other words, they look for ways to economize their socialization by joining groups wherein they feel a strong affinity and easily establish an identity. But joining one group means avoiding other groups. The Group Conflict paradigm of social psychology seeks to explain why groups develop identities as in-groups that feel hostility, even racism, toward out-groups (Brewer 2001) rather than using group identity to build and expand a sense of community. The explanation that resources are unequally distributed to various groups, which has a Marxian overtone, is also found in the Disequilibrium paradigm described below. Lack of social contact between groups, leading to prejudice and stereotyping, is yet another explanation (cf. Bogardus 1926; Allport 1954). The literature of social psychology is ably summarized by Esra Cuhadar and Bruce Dayton (2011), who apply the research to Track Two international diplomacy (cf. Volkan, Julius, Montville 1990), which can enrich the Community Building paradigm. Thus far, the Socialization paradigm has been applied to the individual level of analysis. The strength of the paradigm is that isomorphisms are found at other levels. For example, one aspect of hegemony is the socialization of the dependent entities by the dominant power. However, studies on state building have come to terms with the fact that conquering and occupying another country with the aim of turning a dictatorship into a democracy involves coercive socialization, which seldom works unless there is a solid pro-democratic elite within the country, as in Germany after World War II (Fritz 2015). The nation-state system was conceived in Europe, with countries admitted to the system only if they subscribed to certain norms regarding diplomacy, international law, noninterference in internal affairs, and other matters. But



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those in the states system also had to assume roles consistent with their power potential, as prescribed in the Balance-of-Power paradigm. But what if a country rises from minor to middle or middle to major power? Maximillian Terhalle (2011) argues that the established powers must also be socialized to get along with the rising powers (cf. Epstein 2012). Failure to do so evidently brings about wars based on the Disequilibrium paradigm, as described below. The Socialization paradigm describes how attitudes are formed as coping mechanisms, something that has also been called the “cognitive paradigm” (Rosati 2000). The Socialization paradigm has also been invoked to explain how member countries of regional international organizations develop a common identity (Haas 1989a,b; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Checkel 2007) or simply agree on common policies (Johnston 2001; Cao 2009). What happens is the internalization of common norms as members get to know one another. Since many international organizations make decisions in a democratic manner, they have been found to increase democratization within their members in some studies (Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Geenhill 2010), but not always (Haas 2013). However, policy convergence does not always occur: International organizations that do so are designed for specific purposes and are composed of countries with homogeneous politics (Botcheva and Martin 2001). Role Paradigm Alexander Wendt (1999:317) refers to attitude change that affects an individual’s identity as constructive socialization. His concept of rationalist socialization involves attitude change without identity change. The latter concept is similar to that of “role,” which may be chosen for rational reasons, such as to minimize conflict in situations where an articulation of the individual’s notions of identity may provoke discord. Role playing is an adjustment of a person to a situation that may have to be tolerated so that the individual can receive rewards without losing identity. Indeed, individuals simplify their interactions with others by playing roles in the home, at school, at work, and while living in a community—that is, they have an identity, albeit sometimes they are socialized into playing a standard role, or even a deviant role that rejects socializing influences. Thus, personal identities should not be conflated with social roles. The same is the case in foreign policy decision-making. Roles are a set of norms or rules that serve as blueprints to guide behavioral choices, identify tasks to be accomplished, and performances required in particular situations. To know a person’s role is to be able to predict most attitudes and behavior of that person. Children learn roles by trial and error until they discover which roles are approved by parents and cohorts. But they

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may change their roles as they grow up, encountering new situations that may conflict with their childhood roles, thereby forcing them to conform or deviate with consequences that may be positive or negative. Accordingly, the Role paradigm predicts that attitudinal and behavioral change cannot occur without role change occurring first. The first essay on role analysis in international studies was written by Kalevi Holsti (1970), who sought to link national role conceptions with foreign policy choices. Subsequently, a few scholars have tried to apply or popularize the paradigm as a cognitive approach (e.g., Walker 1987). But results thus far have not been very productive (Thies 2010). To revive the approach, an issue of Foreign Policy Analysis in January 2012 was devoted to role theory as a paradigm for the study of foreign policy or even the field of international studies as a whole (Thies and Breuning 2012). Roles cannot be divorced from socialization, so there are three approaches— cognitive, organizational, and structural—depending upon whether the bias is toward individuals freely choosing their roles or on societal (organizational or structural) dictation of roles (Biddle 1986). Structural role theory gives less attention to norms than to social positions or statuses among those who have the same patterned behaviors (roles). Organizational role theory identifies the norms required of members who are given pre-planned assignments. Cognitive role theory focuses on how role expectations are related to behavior; the assumption is that the latter are freely chosen. Accordingly, foreign policy analysts usually examine how leaders can innovate or conform to standardized attitudes or behaviors (Hermann, Preston, Korany, Shaw 2001). Efforts to merge the three perspectives have been difficult. Deviant behavior poses a problem to be resolved within the variants of the Role paradigm. Using the structural approach, the role of major powers and superpowers is viewed as socializing middle and especially minor powers into limiting their foreign policy roles. A superpower will usually decide to play the role of hegemon (Toynbee 1934–61), and hegemons in turn can play coercive or noncoercive roles. But the question posed by Cameron Thies (2013; cf. Webner and Thies 2014) is whether the power position of a state is the best explanation of the role taken by the leaders of the state or whether a country will instead choose to identify with a role because of firmly held philosophical beliefs, an organizational conception. A rising power, according to the Disequilibrium paradigm discussed below, may seek special recognition while transitioning from middle to major power status by becoming a destabilizer. Nevertheless, the Role paradigm has been dominated by the cognitive approach—that ideas are more important than material capabilities (Wendt 1999). Several possible roles of a superpower are coalition builder or maintainer, power balancer, and regime changer—all subject to the values held



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dear by the decision-maker who may have run for office by offering a new approach to an old problem (cf. Nincic 1990; Thies 2013). But often leaders develop roles through interactions with others in the political process so that policies will be continued after they leave office (cf. Brummer and Thies 2015). The recent resurgence of interest in role analysis suggests that a more developed paradigm is down the road. Cultural Paradigm Whereas the Role paradigm assumes that socialization can produce conformist identities, the concept of cultural identity is ingrained, as the Clash of Civilizations paradigm has assumed. The practice of extracting cultural norms from observed practices is standard procedure among cultural anthropologists. For Clifford Geertz (1973), “culture” is a system of meaning that organizes perceptions as well as norms (cf. Reeves 2004; Chabal and Daloz 2006). Although there may be a view that “constructivism [is] the principal theoretical perspective on norms” (Acharya 2011:95), there is a long history on norm development in anthropology and international law. Within international studies, a prominent cultural perspective has been “operational code” analysis, which has been advanced by Nathan Leites (1951), Alexander George (1969), and Stephen Walker (1990). Applications include the operational codes of particular decision-makers (e.g., O. Holsti 1970; Schafer, Robison, Aldrich 2006; Schafer and Walker 2006). Practices of consensus making, incrementalism, and other culturally defined practices have been identified as the “Asian Way” (Haas 1989a) and the “ASEAN Way” (Acharya 2009a,b) in regard to diplomatic interaction in Asia. John Mueller (1989:11) believed that the abolition of major power wars during the Cold War was akin to the abolition of dueling and slavery as a new international norm, though he did not anticipate Russia’s recent seizure of the Ukraine and dispatch of American forces to protect allies along the border. Moreover, covert slavery remains a worldwide problem (Bahun and Rajan 2016). Unique differences between countries are sometimes explained on the basis of national culture (Gorer 1955; Morris 1956). Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux (1965) have argued that “knowledge of the varieties of human social organization may be useful to planning for types of world order in which lethal conflict will be minimized (p. 132). Talcott Parsons (1961) assumed that no collection of individuals living together in a community could be called a “society” unless they adhered to a common set of norms or a Gemeinschaft. His idea of international society assumed “normative interaction,” as in the adoption of treaties. Lewis Richardson (1960b) found that Chinese-speaking countries were the most peaceful, whereas Spanish-speaking countries were the most warlike,

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and Christian-Islamic wars occurred more often than one might expect on the basis of chance (pp. 230, 245). Although Richardson was not seeking to stereotype cultures, the cultural components of wars in some Third World countries are emphasized by such anthropologists as Paul Richards (2005) as efforts to create group identities (cultures). For that matter, arguments for the idea that democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies have been attributed to differences in political culture, a view that has been widely disputed (cf. Haas 2014a:56–60). In other words, the term “culture” is expansive. Even the past can be regarded as an abandoned culture (Jaeger 2007). But as if to rescue the paradigm from the label of “relativism,” Richard Ned Lebow (2009) recently wrote A Cultural Theory of International Relations (2009). He identified how four motives (appetite, spirit, reason, fear) have led to different methods for resolving conflict from the days of ancient Greece. Sociocultural Engineering Paradigm The existence of dissimilar ethnic and racial groups within diverse countries has often resulted in intense domestic conflict. Some of the proposed solutions are indeed imperialistic or racist, especially when one ethnic group believes itself to be superior. The history of efforts to cope with immigrant groups in the United States has spawned several paradigmatic ideas. Because there was a large territory but a small population, immigration was initially encouraged, though multiethnicity was planned in only one respect—the arrival of slaves from Africa. In the first presidential election of 1792, Black slaves could not vote, but many German Americans in Pennsylvania could, and others present were Dutch, French, Jews, Scotch-Irish, and Swedes (Wertenbaker 1938). When larger numbers of Germans and Irish arrived during the early nineteenth century, there was a backlash from descendants of the original English settlers. Later in the century, political machines arose to capture the votes of urban immigrants, sometimes even before they became American citizens (Whyte 1943; Mailey 1950; Fuchs 1956; Reichley 1959; Handlin 1961; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). When former slaves were allowed to vote after 1867, ethnic politics became racial politics. But by then Blacks lost their African cultural identities because they had been forced to conform to expectations of their masters—perhaps the most prominent example of sociocultural engineering. Social Darwinism was also the paradigm driving the suppression of the Black vote and the desire to suppress immigrants in the United States. To gain a measure of equality, immigrants cooperated with political machines, successfully seeking to outvote the Social Darwinists. Because of attacks by such public intellectuals as John Dewey (1910), overt Social Darwinism



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disappeared from the public discourse by the end of World War I (Hofstadter 1944:203). But massive immigration from Eastern Europe and Italy at the turn of the twentieth century prompted one political party to pass restrictive immigration laws during the early 1920s, carrying on Social Darwinism covertly. The next paradigm for dealing with diversity was Assimilation, which believes that problems of diversity can be cured by demanding that the newcomers give up the culture that they learned in the old country and instead adopt the cultural values of the place where they have chosen to settle. The dominant group used carrots and sticks to effect the reversal of cultural orientations of recent arrivals. Among the carrots were jobs for those who assimilated; the sticks consisted of discrimination against those who did not adapt to the culture in the new environment. Thus, ethnic politics became cutthroat. Advocates of the Assimilation paradigm believed that English culture was superior to all other cultures, so immigrants must assimilate to the dominant culture in order to achieve the better life that they wanted in immigrating to the United States. The aim was to reverse the cultural engineering that had taken place in the old country—to internalize the values of the new culture. Today, assimilationism still has followers (Huntington 2005). Indeed, a major complaint among feminists is that men demand that they assimilate to male values (Walsh 1917:290). But many immigrants did not respect the arrogance of the impersonal, phlegmatic character of English culture. Some adopted the Amalgamation paradigm, sometimes known as the doctrine of the “melting pot” (Zangwill 1914). The argument was that Anglo-conformity would not succeed, since the United States was giving birth to an “American culture” that would combine the best elements of all European cultures and discard the worst. To turn the concept into reality, there was an encouragement of intermarriage between those of European ancestry, while schools focused on American rather than European history. The idea had been promoted by FrenchAmerican farmer Michel Guillaume Jean de Crèvecœur (1782), historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1893), and novelist Henry James (1907). But that left out those of African and Asian descent as well as Spanish-speaking citizens. Nevertheless, the dominant Anglos were eager to define what constituted “Americanization” in accordance with whatever would keep them in power. The Amalgamation paradigm was simply a more palatable version of the Assimilation paradigm—sociocultural engineering to drop the old and embrace the new. But American culture changes so rapidly that what was “American” in one generation becomes “old fashioned” in a later generation. Cultural Pluralism was the main alternative paradigm to Assimilation and Amalgamation, though with many variants. According to Horace Kallen

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(1915, 1924), if Switzerland could survive with distinct French, German, and Italian cantons without the pressure to assimilate or amalgamate, why not the United States? Although he was attacked for supporting segregation and separatism, his argument was that racial harmony awaited recognition of the legitimacy of distinct ethnic groups, even when they chose to live together in enclaves. Ethnic groups should not be denied the benefits of American life, including the right to have access to political power, simply because they were perceived by the dominant Anglos as “different.” Kallen saw no need for reverse sociocultural engineering. A similar view has been held in Japan, where non-Japanese residents are kept separate, not allowed to assimilate, but nowadays are accorded equal rights (Richey 2010). Later, Beyond the Melting Pot (1963) by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan argued that ethnic groups were bicultural—accepted Americanization and also had respect for their ethnic origins. For example, such immigrant groups as Italians identified themselves as Italian Americans, a culture created in the New World that differed from the root culture. Their paradigm tried to bring the Amalgamation and Cultural Pluralism paradigms together. Michael Parenti (1967) and Michael Novak (1971) agreed that ethnic politics was alive because third generation ethnic groups continued to reject Angloconformity while rediscovering their ethnic origins (Hansen 1937). Novak argued that Catholics stress family values more than Protestants, so they see politics with different lenses (cf. Wilson and Banfield 1964). Similarly, in Black Power (1967), Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton urged African Americans to form voting blocs before trying to form coalitions with White groups. Likewise, other ethnic groups have stayed together in order to maintain cultural pride (Gans 1951; Wood 1959; cf. Penalosa and McDonagh 1966). For some observers today, bicultural pluralism describes how immigrants and their offspring both acculturate for pragmatic reasons while remaining close to cultural patterns associated with their homelands (Joppke and Morawska 2003). The Integration paradigm, however, has now eclipsed other paradigms. Based on the experience in Hawai‛i, sociologist Robert Park (1926, 1939, 1950:v–ix) argued that racial harmony could not be achieved in a segregated society of ethnic and racial enclaves. To the extent that there is more communication across ethnic lines, the social distance between groups will decline to the point that persons of different ethnic and racial backgrounds will associate on a humanistic level in schools, at work, on playgrounds, in stores, and everywhere else. Stereotypes will end as individuals get to know one another better. Park stressed social elements, whereas Gunnar Myrdal (1944) stressed economic factors. The Integration paradigm hoped for a “color-blind” society until the advent of affirmative action, which was launched to break the habit of hiring friends and acquaintance



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rather than better-qualified job applicants of diverse backgrounds (Anderson 2004). Multicultural educational innovations were intended to enhance integration by providing more information about diverse cultures to classrooms so that stereotypes can be engineered out of personal and social life (Taylor 1989). In a test of predictions of the Assimilation and Integration paradigms of voting by ethnic groups in Hawai‛i, both Assimilation and Integration paradigms predicted outcomes for some but not all ethnic groups. Evidence was also found for the alternative model, that leaders of political parties curry favor with ethnic groups to reach a minimum winning coalition, in accordance with the Voting Rationality paradigm (Haas 1986). According to the Interculturalist paradigm, racial harmony occurs when adults as well as schoolchildren experience joy in learning about, respecting, and welcoming cultures other than their own (Bennett 1998). Such a reality was present during the days of the Kingdom of Hawai‛i in the nineteenth century and exists today in the Aloha State (Haas 2016; 2017). The interculturalist attitude, which was missing in school desegregation and other structural reforms, remains the key to understanding racial harmony in the Fiftieth State. Rather than engineering cultural minorities out of their roots, the Intercultural paradigm involves appreciating, learning from, and respecting the legitimacy of perspectives found in other cultures. As soon as differing opinions are no longer perceived as disagreements but instead as opportunities to build an intercultural consensus, a more harmonious society can be achieved. Discussion among academics about different approaches often results in some seeking to assert dominance, forcing others to assimilate to their views. With the tradition of the sociology of knowledge, debates about “pluralism” in international studies can be conceptualized to include advocates of assimilation, integration, and intercultural positions (Ree 2014; cf. Bourdieu 2008). The same perspective can be applied at the international level. Reverse sociocultural engineering, after all, involves fundamental attitude change. When countries make dramatic changes in their foreign policy orientations, an unlearning process must occur in the previous outlook before a new policy can emerge full bloom. The change of American policy from deterrence in the Cold War to hegemony in a “new world order” is a prominent example (Largo 2005; Welch 2005). Sociocultural engineering is also relevant to the adoption of human rights norms through treaties. Although the ratification of human rights treaties have often been viewed as pro forma, especially by notorious violators, Beth Simmons (2009) demonstrated that real improvements have occurred after ratification, even though there is no payoff from other countries in the form of aid or praise (Nielsen and Simmons 2015), though Leonardo Baccini and

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Johannes Urpelainen (2014) have disputed such claims in two issue-areas. Several scholars have demonstrated the process of that change (Linden 2002; Cardenas 2004), in which the treaty gives substance to pressure groups demanding compliance (Avdeyeva 2007). Research on the human rights movements, even without treaties, proves that reverse cultural engineering can occur at the international level (Clark 2001). However, cultivating democratic norms within undemocratic countries by imposing military control has been more controversial. The effort to turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy in the Middle East has now been thoroughly discredited. In a study by Andrew Enterline and Michael Greig (2008), based on forty-two similar cases, success in imposing democracy was demonstrated to depend upon favorable conditions within the recipient country, especially a state that is strong enough to keep order, has few ethnoreligious conflicts, and subsequently achieves a higher level of prosperity, though their research did not deal with cultural beliefs or public opinion, thus having more relevance to the Pressure Group Rationality paradigm. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the activity of transnational pressure groups may have the effect of socializing countries to become more democratic (Freyburg 2015). The European Union, however, has tried a more subtle means of sociocultural engineering—by establishing preconditions for membership. The use of preconditions to providing foreign aid has also been tried by the European Union and the United States as the carrot for producing democratic change and human rights compliance; termination of such aid when a coup topples a democracy is the other side of the same coin. Just as sanctions for violations of human rights norms have rarely worked to achieve their objectives (Drezner 1999; Burnell 2005; Early 2011; Whang 2011), such efforts have clumsily tried to engineer better human rights without understanding how the parts of society interrelate (Collins 2009; Kurki 2011:364). On the other hand, bringing students to the United States in exchange programs, an exercise in “soft power” (cf. Nye 2004), is demonstrably more successful in disseminating democratic values (Atkinson 2010). Nevertheless, democracy usually evolves through an endogenous process unmolested by exogenous pressures. The rise of terrorism and counterterrorism is also an example of sociocultural engineering (Lipschutz 2008): Terrorists are being recruited by challenging their cultural upbringing. Anti-terrorist efforts are prompting democracies to roll back civil rights protections, thereby becoming illiberal. Then such illiberal practices as waterboarding have freed any inhibitions among terrorists to engage in beheadings. Illiberal democracies have forfeited the possibility of sociocultural engineering of terrorists to subscribe to human rights principles and have reaped an onslaught of vengeance.



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NATIONAL LEVEL Although the Cultural Similarity, Mass Society, and Sociocultural Engineering paradigms are also applicable at the national level, international studies scholars have more often focused on economic and political development. Paradigms initially constructed as models for Third World countries were indeed aimed at sociocultural engineering. But later scholarship exposed those aspirations as culture-bound or Eurocentric (cf. Apter 1987). Nevertheless, the earlier paradigms should be recalled so that their errors will not be forgotten. Stages-of-Development Paradigm Georg Friedrich Hegel (1820) argued that ideas changed throughout history as antitheses opposed orthodox theses, and the conflict gave rise to syntheses. Marx turned the paradigm upside down by identifying the means of production as the basis for stages of economic development. The inexorability assumption also informed Darwin of the continual pace of biological change. Walt Whitman Rostow (1960) identified several economic stages from traditional to modern—traditional society, attainment of preconditions for economic takeoff, takeoff (growth and investment), self-sustained drive to maturity, economic maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. His exemplars included Anglo-European countries as well as Japan. Economic advancement was possible when there is “a definitive social, political, and cultural victory of those who would modernize the economy over those who would either cling to the traditional society or seek other goals” (1960[1965):58). He also attributed the creation of preconditions for takeoff “generally in response to the intrusion of a foreign power” (p. 12), thereby supporting foreign aid and foreign investment. His approach, known as modernization theory, has been thoroughly discredited (Ish-Shalom 2006). Similar stage-of-development thinking was found in the writing of Cyril Black (1967) and A.F.K. Organski (1965), who felt that political development also went through stages. The highest level of political attainment, they felt, was democracy. In a cogent analysis by Barry Hindess (2007), the bias of Western scholarship is to imagine that the peoples of Third World countries and nondemocracies are living in the past, creating the imperative of forcing them to develop along Western lines so that they can live in the present. And Steve Smith (2004:505) has suggested that the Globalization paradigm, discussed below, is accepted because of the implication that the planet has reached a penultimate stage, needing diffusion of modern ideas to the less developed world.

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Diffusion Paradigm But if a country were to move from one stage to another, what is the impetus for change, given all the disruption to which Samuel Huntington (1968b) referred? For the Stages-of-Development paradigm, outside powers are essential to jolt movement, thereby justifying imperialism. For Daniel Lerner (1958) and Marion Levy (1966), however, traditional society develops due to the indigenous diffusion of economic practices and ideas from individuals with modern ideas living in urban centers. Change is not inexorable but instead requires a flow of learning from one geographic area to another due to modern individuals who inhabit traditional societies, overcoming resistance to change. Lerner defined “modernization” as “a high capacity for rearranging the self-system on short notice” (1958:51). He estimated that a country with 25 percent urbanization would develop sufficient literacy and media growth that industrialization would be readily accepted, and political participation would be at a high level (p. 60). Turkey was his exemplar. A recent study of the same problem—diffusion of new technology—has pointed out that corrupt governments will block “modernization” unless they receive payoffs (Bussell 2011). Why the American executive still uses outdated computer systems can be explained by another reason—lack of funding from a Congress suspicious of government. Levy was closer to Marx, arguing that modernization involved the adoption of more productive economic methods, such as role specialization and division of labor. Although he agreed with Rostow that foreign powers can be helpful in stimulating modernization, he argued that the Stages-of-Growth paradigm was refuted because “stages” can be skipped (1966:747,750). Levy’s exemplars were Japan and the United States, unlike Lerner, who did field research in Turkey. He did not specify how “new ideas” could spread; he simply felt that new technology would be adopted as soon as results were perceived as profitable. Subsequent difficulties in Turkey have, in turn, resulted from the way in which the diffusion occurred, a development that has a parallel in Thailand and perhaps other countries (Zarakol 2013). The Diffusion paradigm could be applied to more phenomena than societal economic and political development. The increase in consumer spending for particular products involves clever advertising in the media. Spreading information by word-of-mouth is highly effective, as when Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld (1954) reported that opinion leaders shape (diffuse) attitudes of voters. An international conference in which governmental representatives sign human rights treaties can be an occasion to begin diffusion. There are at least three reasons why an idea, a law, or something else is diffused among governments—the desire for a competitive edge, mimicry,



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or coercion. Economic competition breeds change. Individuals mimic innovations to appear up to date to their peers. National policies on moneylaundering have been adopted primarily through the latter route (Sherman 2008). The term “contagion” has been applied to coups, civil wars, and foreign wars (Midlarsky 1970, 1975; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Kathman 2010). The spread of democracy is also viewed as resulting from diffusion, but so is the spread of authoritarianism (Ambrosio 2010). Etel Solinen (2012) applies the paradigm in mental terms to the spread of democracy, adoption of nuclear weapons, and rise of worldwide protest movements and in physical terms to international migration, though she does not refer to the seminal writings of Lazarsfeld and Lerner. Others have studied diasporas as well as terrorist groups from a diffusion perspective (cf. Ghosh 2000; Stalker 2000; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). The worldwide emergence of women’s organizations might also be a result of norm diffusion, often by transnational networks (True and Mintrom 2001). However, Suzanne Zwingel (2012) has problematized that assumption, finding that there is a process of discourse translation of the norms, followed by impact translation; distorted translation may hold back progress. Diffusion, thus, involves a translation process that may differ from country to country. Nevertheless, the main question is what promotes diffusion most effectively. For women’s rights, the example of the major powers worked best (Fordham and Asal 2007). Conversations between individuals of different countries at international conferences can be an effective way to spread ideas: Although incorrectly described as “socialization,” the diffusion of democratic norms has been traced to contact between military personnel of different countries in multinational fora, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s spread of membership to former communist countries (Atkinson 2006). The spread of gay marriage throughout Europe has been attributed to the effect of pioneering countries conversing with other countries within European international organizations and the rise of an international gay rights movement that empowered national gay rights movements (Kollman 2007). The Assimilation and Amalgamation paradigms presuppose norm diffusion, norm unlearning, and norm relearning, but under some societal duress. Although the norms of the European Union have been learned by the newest members, which has been called “Europeanization” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003), diffusion is a process that flows from external sources to recipients, whereupon the latter either adapt, copy, or reject the innovation. Socialization, in contrast, occurs inside organizations, societies, and nation-states.

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Dependency Paradigm The origin of the Dependency paradigm may be found in Marx’s description of how Britain impoverished India (Marx 1853). Lenin (1917b) used the word “dependent” in referring to Argentina and Portugal as exemplars. Nevertheless, the Dependency paradigm has been opposed by Marxian scholars as naïve because capitalism is always exploitative (Fernandez and Ocampo 1974; Weaver and Berger 1984). The concept of dependency resonated with the experience of Africans under colonialism. Colonial dependence has been most eloquently described by Franz Fanon (1952, 1961), an African from Martinique who practiced psychiatry in Algeria. Fanon wrote not only to refute the thesis of Octave Mannoni (1950), who argued that colonial rule imparted a sense of neurotic inferiority. But Fanon also went beyond the Marxian analysis, arguing that sociopolitical development must precede economic development because those who have been colonized must overcome the sense of inferiority brainwashed upon them by the colonial powers, who justified their control because they depicted their subjects as biologically inferior (1961[1968]:37,211). He evidently was the first to use the term “neocolonialism” to apply to how the “national bourgeois will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent” (pp. 152–53). Fanon described one-party rule in former colonies as the acceptance of the colonialists’ view that “underdeveloped countries [need] a small dose of dictatorship . . . [because] men at the head of things distrust the people of the countryside” (p. 118). Besides, he argued, the colonial governments constituted one-party rule and merely transferred authority to one-party rule that favored their interests (p. 203). Earlier, the writing of W.E.B. du Bois (1903a,b) in the United States had argued that the White power structure in the United States was responsible for the dependent status of African Americans: Political development of Whites produced underdevelopment of Blacks. Du Bois became so disenchanted in the United States that he renounced his American citizenship and left for Ghana, where he died in 1963. Whether his writing inspired Fanon is unknown, but both helped to energize the Black Power movement during the 1960s, when prominent African Americans urged Black politicians to organize their communities before engaging in coalition politics with Whites (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). They pointed out that Whites believed that problems in the Black community were due to problems in that community (e.g., Moynihan 1965) rather than to the fact that they were forced to live in the Black colonies of American cities (p. 53). During World War II, the economies of Brazil and Chile boomed, according to André Gunder Frank (1967, 1969), who explained that the reason was the absence of meddling in the economy by First World countries.



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After 1945, American corporations bought out businesses in Latin America, decapitalizing the latter, thereby making the latter economically dependent on the former. His theory of dependency was endorsed by several Latin American scholar, including Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) and future Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his colleague Enzo Faletto (1969). Unlike Fanon, Frank argued that the rural sectors are poor not because of a sense of inferiority and lack of modern attitudes but because they provide “the biggest sources of capital for the world metropole” (1969[1972a]:13). He clearly rejected the Diffusion paradigm. Although unaware of the writing of Fanon and possibly du Bois, Frank’s remedy was the same—Third World withdrawal from the world economy. Fanon argued that such “collective autarky” would force “the European working class to engage in an open struggle against the capitalist regime [whereupon] the monopolies will realize that their true interests lie in giving aid to the underdeveloped countries” (1961[1968]:105). Efforts to establish a New International Economic Order during the 1970s, when oil-producing countries took pricing away from the large oil corporations, emerged as the proposed solution to the dependency problem. Nevertheless, the rise of South Korea and other cases has provided exemplars of reversal of dependency (Doran, Modelski, Clark 1983). The most devastating critique came from Guillermo O’Donnell (1978, 1986), who argued that Frank’s paradigm gained such intellectual acceptance in Latin America that the result was a series of military coups to establish relatively closed economies in which governments erected trade barriers. The Dependency paradigm was all but abandoned in later years by Frank (1974), long before the globalization following the end of the autarkic communist bloc during the 1990s. The Dependency paradigm has recently been tested by systematic analysis in a cross-national study of foreign direct investment: Although dependency theorists opposed foreign investment for creating dependence, and their opponents believed the opposite, two scholars found that investments in manufacturing were far more beneficial to Third World countries, whereas investment in agriculture created dependence, and service-sector investment had ambiguous results (Mihalache-O’keef and Li 2011). Yet countries receiving foreign aid have long found themselves at the mercy of aid consortia, which pretend to ensure that there is no duplication of effort from various sources (Laiz and Schlichte 2016). In effect, a consortium of donors, including intergovernmental organizations, runs Third World countries. Lending countries get involved because they want to extract surplus value from their aid. The paradigm may be dead, but the reality is very much alive. In short, dependence may exist in some sectors more than others.

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Human Development Paradigm During the first half of the twentieth century, colonial powers justified the failure to grant independence to their colonies by a belief that only they had the expertise to bring “civilization” and prosperity to colonized peoples. Development economics and the Stages-of-Development paradigm, which carried that myth forward after independence (Easterly 2014), have been considered failures. Trickle-down economics has produced a widening gap between rich and poor, both in developed and developing countries. Within developed countries, the welfare state was designed to cushion the adverse effects of economic fluctuations on the poorer elements of society, but today corporate elites that have decapitalized their countries want governments to cut budgets rather than pay taxes for profits retained overseas, squeezing possibilities for future human development through improved educational quality and college attendance. Within poorer countries, where there is no welfare state, there is no option left but human (bottom-up) development. Prominent among progenitors of the Human Development paradigm are Urie Bronfenbrenner and three non-Western economists—Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen, and Muhammad Yunus. They offer complementary more than conflicting approaches. Bronfenbrenner (1979) has identified four socially organized subsystems that support and guide individual human development. The microsystem consists of family, school, and other influences closest to the child. The mesosystem is the way the family relates to the school. The exosystem influences are from media, politics, and social services. The macrosystem is the culture in which an individual grows up. The goal of human development is to enable everyone to achieve the maximum possible personal development, unencumbered by external barriers. In 1973, economist—and game theorist—Mahbub ul Haq (1973) famously wrote that “22 industrial family groups had come to dominate the economic and financial life-cycle of Pakistan and that they controlled about two-thirds of industrial assets, 80% of banking and 79% of insurance assets in the industrial domain.” He could have been considered an exponent of the Mass Society paradigm if he had not for a decade advised the UN Development Program, for which he developed the Human Development Index in 1990 and then wrote Reflections on Human Development (1995) to reorient economic thinking toward the view that serious development required the development of educational and professional training. (The adjusted Human Development Index in 2011, for example, ranked Norway on top and the United States fourth, but when adjusted for inequality, Norway remained number one, and the United States fell to sixteenth [UNDP 2011].) The World Bank, which continues to fund infrastructure for the benefit of industrial corporations operating in the Third Word, adopted the human



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development paradigm under the influence of such welfare economists as Amartya Sen, author of Development as Freedom (1999). Although he is often quoted as noting that no democracy has ever had a famine, the import of Sen’s thinking has been to transform World Bank loans to support aid to increase human capabilities—what people can do and be. For Sen, human capabilities rather than income or possessions determine well-being. Sen has been said to revive the moral anthropology of Adam Smith (Walsh 2003, 2008). The presumption of the UN Millennium Development Goals has been that those in poverty need aid and that wealthier countries, private humanitarian organizations, and international organizations (which wealthy countries fund) should provide that aid. But banker-economist Muhammad Yunus had a different idea, realizing that banks were reluctant to make small loans and would charge usurious interest rates to poor people (Yunus and Weber 2007). In 1976, he made a personal loan to 42 women seeking the wherewithal to make bamboo furniture in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh. Soon, the loan was paid back. He then decided to repeat the experiment, using money from the government bank as his starting capital. The project was so successful that he set up Grameen Bank as a Bangladesh lending facility in 1983. The reason he selected women is that they have proved to be more responsible loan recipients. Today, Grameen Bank (2016) has made more than $19 billion loans to millions of borrowers, mostly women. Similar microfinancing banks have been established in at least one hundred Third World countries. Besides the economic benefits to the borrowers, microfinancing has served to empower women politically and thus fulfills many Millennium Development Goals without any public financing whatsoever (Drake and Rhyne 2002). The Human Development paradigm incorporates elements of environmental preservation, feminism, sustainable development, and welfare economics. Sustainable development, for example, stresses that human basic needs of the present should not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development can be broken up into environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and sociopolitical sustainability. The Human Development paradigm postulates that future technological developments will not resolve future problems, so the focus of development is shifting to such principles as conservation. Human security is the endpoint of the paradigm; achieving that goal is a process called “securitization.” Traditional IR research has focused on national security, an issue that sometimes emerges when one country seeks to cross the border of another in a hostile manner. But on a 24/7 basis, most people are concerned about their own personal security in regard to issues of the environment, food availability and safety, health, sanitation, and the

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ability to walk safely down a street. Consistent with the UN Millennium Goals, the UN Development Program has shifted focus from economic development to human development and human security—from economic poverty to human poverty. Income is only one measure of “poverty”; life expectancy and literacy are others. In one study, a significant allocation of government funding to the military was proved to enhance food security unless the country actually used military force (Scanlan and Jenkins 2001). The annual UNDP Human Development Report contains statistics that now institutionalize acceptance of the Human Development paradigm (cf. Williams 2003; Smith 2004:508–10). International relations scholars may be late to the paradigm (e.g., Abdollahian, Coan, Oh, Yesilada 2012), but recent work is increasingly relevant. Xiaowei Luo (2000) developed a “social development” model in discussing international technology organizations from 1856 to 1993. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Weizel (2005), for example, have argued that human development is key to democratization and economic progress. Daniel Cohen (2006) contrasts the development models of Adam Smith (1776) with those of Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1942) in arguing that the focus on Smithian economic growth by adopting a division of labor within the means of production has now been exhausted in the United States because globalization has meant that jobs can be relocated where workers are paid less. He instead argues that a Schumpeterian focus on human development to achieve innovation is inexhaustive (p. 129). In short, early paradigms of national development—Stages-of-Development, Diffusion, and Dependency—are rarely discussed today. The Human Development paradigm has achieved Kuhnian dominance. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM LEVEL Although in vain, Albert Einstein devoted the latter part of his career seeking to develop a synthesis between his general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics in order to unify all physical theories at the cosmic, macrocosmic, and microcosmic realms. Similarly, the general systems theory of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968) inspired natural and social scientists to imagine that there were universal laws across all phenomena that could be discovered, unifying all science. He attributed his conception to Nicholas of Cusa (1440) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1704). The agenda involved developing a common vocabulary from disparate esoteric jargons and finding isomorphisms across the spectrum of the natural and social worlds. In a word, Bertalanffy sought a single paradigm, the Systems paradigm. But the term “system” has been defined in many ways (cf. Hall and Fagen 1956).



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But instead of one paradigm, many paradigms arose during the 1960s to account for systemic phenomena, including the field of international studies, which then primarily focused on foreign policy analysis. Morton Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics (1957) used “system” for that reason. The first textbook on empirical international relations was called International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (Haas 1974c). But the claims of systems theory were too optimistic, the movement foundered, and a general systems theory remains elusive. Within international studies, a Systems paradigm may regenerate (cf. Helmig and Kessler 2007), as the legacy consists of several disconnected and undeveloped paradigms (Doughtery and Pfalzgraff 1990:ch4) that Bear Braumoeller (2012) now seeks to revive. The most developed variants are reviewed next. World-System Paradigm For sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, who began his research in Africa, “national development” is an oxymoron (1984:180). Instead, hegemons constrain individual countries. In a multivolume series that be­gan with The Modern World-System: Capitalistic Agriculture and the Ori­gins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (1974), Wallerstein essentially rewrote Marx’s history of capitalism with the benefit of detailed research findings of economic historian Fernand Braudel (1949, 1967–1972). He also elevated the Dependency paradigm to the systemic level. For Wallerstein, the world described by Braudel has always had cores and peripheries. Even within states there are core subregions and periphery subregions. The phenomenon of Third World dependency, thus, was a special case of a world destined to favor a few over the many. Wallerstein assumed that international conflict and war would be inevitable because the injustice of the world-system would always provoke anti-systemic movements. Despite his pessimism, Wallerstein (1974) identified four “limited possibilities of transformation”: (1) Oil-producing countries rose from Third World status by raising prices. (2) Most other successes have been by “invitation,” when core countries found that it was in their interest to promote a periphery country to core status, as in the case of South Korea. (3) Self-reliant industrialization is the third, albeit utopian, strategy. (4) Anti-systemic movements might grow. All four cases were examples of the transformation of semiperipheries—that is, countries with industrial strength but without sufficient capital to be insulated from the vicissitudes of the world economy. Rejecting communism as well as the “‘socialism’ that claims to be a ‘tem­porary’ moment of transition towards Utopia,” Wallerstein’s socialism is “a realizable historical system which one day [will] be instituted in the world” (1983:109–10). One aspect of capitalism is the “commodification of

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every­thing” (ibid.), so when there is nothing new to exploit and “political counterpressures thereby become more and more mobilized” (ibid., 91), the expected result is proletarian revolution. Yet another aspect of the crisis of capitalism is cultural. Wallerstein called upon the social sciences to develop a new “civilizational alternative” (ibid., 92), although he left the project to others, Wallerstein (1984:chl7) approvingly re­ferred to Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy of liberation (Sartre 1945), which in turn drew inspiration from Fanon, another of Wallerstein’s favorite theorists. When capitalism fails, he predicted a more humane future. But the World-System paradigm has become passé. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who became president of Brazil in 1995, advanced his country to First World status through denationalization without external “invitation” by the end of his term of office in 2002 and became a member of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), middle powers that do not easily fit into the core-semiperiphery-periphery trichotomy. Disequilibrium Paradigm Conflicts, heterogeneities, and the like are often viewed as complex problems that an individual, group, or nation-state must solve. The same applies to the international system. A variety of disciplines have used disequilibrium models. In sociology, Émile Durkheim (1897) used suicides to index breaches in the “social equilibrium.” When a chiliastic religious sect predicted that the world would end on a particular date, but no such event took place, the cognitive dissonance theory of Leon Festinger (1957; Festinger, Riecken, Schachter 1956) was advanced to account for the sect’s course of action in reconciling the failure of the prophecy. Similar theories in sociometric choice situations were elaborated by Fritz Heider (1959). Anthropologist Gregory Bateson in collaboration with psychiatrist Jurgen Ruesch presented a view of psychological problems arising from asymmetries in communication (Ruesch and Bateson 1951). Bateson (1936) also examined the origins of tribal schismogenesis. An unequal distribution of resources, whether national or international, is regarded as an asymmetrical situation that is bound to lead to “strain” in a system (Smelser 1962:385). Within comparative government, Fred Riggs (1964) argued that structural development (differentiation) is optimal when increasing capabilities of a govern­ment to regulate the political constituency are balanced with efforts to maintain an integrated, supportive populace. Too much emphasis on enlarging the ambit of governmental effectiveness can evoke revolutionary sentiments, whereas overattention to popular consultation might result in piecemeal governmental measures, rather than compre­hensive and internally consistent planning by competent persons. Samuel Huntington (1968b) then



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assembled case study evidence consistent with Riggs’s formulation, calling attention to the concept of “transitional democracies,” which he later indicated tend to undergo transformation, replacement, and transplacement (Huntington 1991). According to Halford Mackinder (1919[1962]:1), all the “great wars of history [were] . . . the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations.” Kenneth Organski (1958), seeking to explain why Germany and Japan went to war in the twentieth century, proposed the concept of “power transition” as an explanation that went beyond the Balance-of-Power paradigm. What he meant was that both developed industrial power later than North Atlantic countries, so they scrambled for colonies and the status of major powers. In the process of seeking recognition, they employed war. In other words, they scored high on some aspects of national power, but asserting their power through aggression upset the worldwide Balance-of-Power. Organski was building on the Harold Lasswell’s concept of influence, in which power was only one form of influence; the others were respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, well-being, skill, and enlightenment (Lasswell 1971b:15). In short, Germany and Japan, scoring high on the material values, used power to gain respect, but lost rectitude in the process. Arms races also create disequilibria. According to Lewis Richardson (1960a), arms races result from perceptions of fear, revenge, and rivalry (cf. Jervis 1978). Richardson developed calculus equations to study changes in military spending associated with the articulation of psychological motives. The concept of disequilibrium was developed in sociology by Elton Jackson (1962). Sociologist Johan Galtung (1964, 1966) argued that a state with a high rank on one power base but not so high in other categories will respond to “rank disequilibrium” by initiating war to rectify the asymmetric situation, and he provided a quantitative algorithm to test his theory. The major test of Organski’s paradigm variant is the War Ledger (1980), coauthored with Jacek Kugler. The paradigm was further extended in Power Transition: Strategies for the Twenty-First Century (Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Alsharabati, Efird, Organski 2000; cf. Lemke 2002), wherein the key intervening variable was identified as “dissatisfaction.” In other words, a country satisfied with the disequilibrium would not go to war until dissatisfaction mounted. Other scholars have developed the disequilibrium concept more recently (DiCicco and Levy 1999; Miller 2007), but until they integrate their work with the sociologists studying disequilibrium, they have not yet fully developed their variant of the paradigm. Globalization On rising to power, Mikhail Gorbachëv recognized that the Soviet Union was being impoverished. Although his reforms were aimed at joining the global

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economy, he was arrested in a coup, and soon the withdrawal of former Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union meant that his successor Boris Yelstin lowered the Soviet flag and joined the capitalist system. The Cold War was over. The term “international system” became an oxymoron after the end of the Cold War. The term “international” refers to relations between nationstates, whereas units other than nation-states that had earlier been playing a role now became far more significant in the global configuration. The collapse of the Soviet bloc entailed the universalization of capitalism, which occurred at a time of radical technological advances—the emergence of the Internet and other changes that have led to convergence of policies around the world (Drezner 2001). In addition, the United States was left standing as the only superpower with a global reach. And non-state actors, including regional governments inside states, began to engage in negotiations, known as “paradiplomacy,” evidence that the nation-state was being upstaged by transnational, intranational, and supranational actors (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Trends that were national or international had become global, whence the term “globalization.” Some have even written on the “global financial architecture” (Armijo 2002). Writing on the subject is so vast that a textbook has been written on the subject (Scholte 2005). But no clear paradigm has yet emerged to integrate relevant theoretical advances. However, if globalization is a paradigm, then there seems to be an identity crisis. Elements of globalization are found in the Marxian, Mass Society, Community Building, and Rational Choice paradigms. What is often described as “globalization theory” is very unclear. According to Jens Bartelson (2010), the concept of globality began with the discovery of the spherical planet in the age of exploration, but was conceptually divided by the effort to find boundaries between competing imperial claims to control the land and sea. Even before the advent of the European states system, the world was divided into insiders playing by certain rules— rules that have now become problematic in today’s globalized world, wherein the nation-state lacks the sovereignty that once was claimed to be enforced by military means and by Anglo-European-oriented international law. At least four “waves” of globalization theory have emerged (cf. Martell 2007:Table 1). The first economistically overemphasized the impact of the global spread of capitalism, as predicted by Karl Marx and heralded by Robert Reich (1991). “National economy” became an oxymoron, and corporations of any size became transnational, including the mass media in spreading information. Those delighted with globalization have been called “hyperglobalizers” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999). The idea of a “world culture” and expected decline of the nation-state sparked a second turn in the theory among those who viewed the situation



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as a continuation of a longer internationalizing trend (Krugman 1996; Opello and Rosow 1999). The development of a new global civil society has been identified in the Mass Society and Community Building chapters above. In the third “wave” a Hegelian synthesis was offered. Globalization has been characterized as “transformation” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999; Scholte 2005). Globalization has even been praised as inevitably bringing about global democracy (Archibugi, Held, Kohler 1998). David Lake (2010) has suggested that a social contract is inherently taking place. Regarding prosperity for the Third World, which requires investment, international interdependence through world trade is insufficient (Rodrik 1999). Global regulation has been favored by industrialized countries (Urpelainen 2010), raising the question about the impact on the Third World. A fourth wave has been the negative reaction, especially after riots broke out in the streets of Seattle to protest the meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 (cf. Bussmann and Schneider 2007). Some phrased their criticism in the discourse of the Mass Society paradigm, as noted in Chapter 5 above. Others have pointed out the resurgence of nationalism and increasing ideological polarization because some in the First World are losing out economically (Cohen 2006; Walter 2010). Indeed, the benefits of globalization have not been spread uniformly throughout Africa and the Middle East, thereby questioning the “clash of civilizations” concept (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Cohen 2006). The rise of China, in particular, has challenged AngloEuropean claims to universality of a global order that they are trying to control (Chan 2009; Florini 2011). The myriad confluence of a superpower, rising major powers, and efforts of international organizations (IGOs and NGOs) may have created a complex new global anarchy (Laiz and Schlichte 2016). Aside from many important studies of the international political economy (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001; Stiglitz 2002), the nature of war has changed from the classic inter-state model to one in which the hegemon seems powerless to control international terrorism as well as efforts to liberate minorities trapped inside nation-states. The “new wars” concept, though contested, has emerged as a result of the economic weakening of minor powers (Maleševič 2008): The rise of new middle powers from the Third World (cf. Cooper 2011) and microaggression from major powers China and Russia have also resulted from globalization; the latter have been able to engage in “new wars” with impunity (cf. Gartzke and Li 2003). Other developments suggest the need for a Globalization paradigm: The weakening of minor powers has brought about a reversal of the democratization trend of the 1990s (Huntington 1991, 1993, 1997). Human rights progress has been reversed as the superpower engages in torture and other war crimes, thereby providing worldwide license for other countries and movements to do likewise (Haas 2009). Meanwhile, global climate change has emerged as

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old and new industrial powers struggle for profits in the world economy, and the same economic greed has slowed efforts to arrest global warming (Dyer 2014; cf. Smouts 2003). Acute diseases have quickly spread worldwide, taxing global governance regarding disaster preparedness, especially within the weaker countries where they originate. With globalization, there are more contacts between differing value systems. Recalling his earlier flirtation with the Mass Society paradigm, Huntington (1998) expected that globalization would produce social change on a magnitude that would force secularization and other new forms of behavior to challenge traditional values, whereupon peoples would mobilize in order to maintain their identities not as the world proletariat but instead as members of a united faith across borders—as terrorists in extreme cases. Globalization would enable countries outside the West to gain increasing prosperity and therefore would be empowered to seek changes in the Western-imposed rules of international conduct. But many Third World countries have been adversely affected by globalization (Fuchs and Kratochwil 2002). Meanwhile, pro-globalization Americans who pretend that they are not seeking hegemony have been called out. According to Daniel Cohen (2006), there are 75 American transnational corporations, while Europe only has 6, and the transnational media are spreading individualistic American culture to the dismay of other peoples. He has pointed out that countries in the Middle East had the same level of prosperity before globalization but now are starkly aware that they have been left behind (p. 79). Insofar as globalization theorists construct the existence of global culture, global economy, global politics, and global society, paradigms previously applied to culture, economics, politics, and society might be more useful than a separate Globalization paradigm. Such a debate has been ongoing within sociology, including a forum organized by International Political Sociology during March 2000. Several scholars have tried to develop a coherent paradigm (Luhmann 1984; Albert 2007; Kessler 2012), and the isomorphisms have been more commonly identified than the uniquenesses. Niklas Luhmann, in fact, began his theory from the globalization approach of Talcott Parsons (1973, 1978), by extending his theory of social systems to the international realm. Meanwhile, globalization has in effect transported the Regime paradigm into the Global Governance paradigm (cf. Hurrell 2011). Global governance has three components—international regimes, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational governance. The latter consist of such entities as the International Chamber of Commerce, which provides global arbitration facilities (Dingwerth 2008). Whether any of the components operate democratically is the question handled by the Mass Society paradigm. Global governance provides something beyond coercive power, according to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), who identify three



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other forms of power: Structural power involves the relationship between the standards set by transnational corporations vis-à-vis their employees; Productive power is the ability to use media to brainwash images of reality; Institutional power is wielded by supranational institutions and the consolidation of regimes. Yet the concept of global governance—presumably the sum of hegemonic power, international organizations, regimes, supranational organizations, and powerful nongovernmental entities—is still rather vague (Finnemore 2014; Weiss and Wilkinson 2014; Murphy 2014). The need for a Globalization paradigm seems ratified by the existence of anti-global movements, which Immanuel Wallerstein (1984) called “antisystemic.” Nationalism and demands of subnational groups for recognition are other examples of consequences of unwelcome globalization, sometime resulting in civil war (Mason 2003; Helleiner and Pickel 2004; Westbrook 2004). The main substantive criticism of the globalization focus has been presented in the discussion within the Mass Society paradigm by those who believe that globalization trends have created a global mass society (Falk 1999). Thus, Globalization is yet another underdeveloped paradigm (Kornprobst, Pouliout, Shah, Zaiotti 2008; Kamola 2013), while the “superclass” involved in global governance continues to operate, and global civil society tries to catch up as noted in Chapters 5 and 6 above (cf. Kauppi and Madsen 2014). CONCLUSION If a second volume on competing paradigms appears, some of those listed in the present chapter will become chapters of their own. In any case, the listing above is incomplete. New paradigms will be developed as international studies become more paradigm conscious. Nicholas Onuf, for example, refers to a “society paradigm” (2012:626) derived from Sheldon Wolin (1980). Brian Rathbun (2011) has introduced a social psychological theory focusing on how leaders differ in the amount of trust they have toward other countries, though he does not reveal the socialization process that might lead some to trust more than others. Others are doubtless available for mention, but the most important have been described. What is notable is how the lines between lesser paradigms are often blurred. Various academic fields often use different terminology to describe the same phenomena rather than seeking isomorphisms and a common discourse. The best paradigms include isomorphisms that operate at all levels of analysis. Paradigm analysis, however, should not be an abstract exercise. Tests of the basic assumptions and propositions of paradigms are possible and necessary.

Part III

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Having demonstrated the content of many paradigms and the way in which some of them can be tested, international studies cannot continue to be mired in ideologies that are incapable of being proved correct or mid-level theories that are disconnected from one another. A new chapter in international studies must begin, albeit a continuation of an agenda established more than fifty years ago that was interrupted by a fascination with other matters. Chapter 9 provides the rationale for a new paradigmatic-based empirical approach. The term “neobehavioral,” which has been coined as the synthesis between behavioral and postbehavioral international relations, is defined in depth. The challenge is presented to the next generation of international studies scholars to bring the field into full maturity.

Chapter 9

Neobehavioral International Studies

THREE TYPES OF SCIENCE Research exists at three levels—theoretical, empirical, and clinical (applied). Paradigms and macro-theories are found at the highest level; they are often strongly held as hunches about interconnections and processes. In deductive research, paradigms contain propositions for empirical research, and the resulting research has theoretical significance, serving to correct or elaborate the paradigms. A proposition nowadays is considered a mid-level theory, connecting a subset of concepts, but unfortunately mid-level research has lost sight of paradigms and has littered the field with hyperfactual information. In multimethodological theoretical science, findings from mid-level research are integrated into paradigms, and there is competition between paradigms to provide definitive explanations. Empirical research is the second level. Whether qualitative or quantitative, the essence of empirical research is to identify elements of reality. A single proposition can be unpacked in the form of alternative hypotheses in which the concepts from the paradigms are operationalized as variables. The variables are then manipulated to determine whether any of the hypotheses are correct as predicted. Today, alternative “models” are presented as alternative statistical hypotheses, though their empirical content is often stressed rather than their theoretical significance. To be multimethodological, however, there should be parallel nonstatistical research, involving case studies. Initially, the field of international studies focused on ways to avoid war and bring about a more peaceful world, but today there are many practical policy concerns. Applied or clinical science occurs when theoretical approaches or empirical findings are deemed relevant to solve a policy problem. Whereas postbehavioralists were eager to find solutions to problems, behavioralist 199

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research eschewed premature applications of preliminary research. Ideologists often engage in policy analysis based on unstated and untested assumptions, but they are unpersuasive unless they have empirical grounding. The danger is that paradigms will become ideologies, shortcutting the empirical imperative. The tool of options analysis, as described within the Rational Choice paradigm, invites multiple perspectives in a multimethodological approach to determining which policies are most likely to achieve desired results. By coincidence perhaps, Daniel Geller and John Vasquez (2004) organized the symposium for International Studies Review in 2004 with the same triad in mind. Essays were organized into three categories—knowledge construction, knowledge accumulation, and knowledge application. However, “knowledge construction” referred to policy-oriented ideologies (realism, liberalism, etc.), rather than metatheories or paradigms. Under “knowledge accumulation,” articles were summaries of findings from empirical studies on particular topics. “Knowledge application” dealt with one ongoing and one potential war. Their triad would become neobehavioral with the substitution of paradigms as the source for knowledge construction, knowledge accumulation as the refinement of paradigms, and knowledge applications as generic and well as specific advice to policy-makers. NEOBEHAVIORALISM Today, the field of international studies remains divided between ideological pontification, hyperfactual hypothesis testing without operationalized concepts, and case studies with or without policy implications—as well as between those who write op-eds and are interviewed on television, those who engage in multiple regressions with neither paradigmatic significance nor policy relevance, and those who solely deal with important policy issues by focusing on individual cases. All three—theory, research, and policy relevance—are important, but the discipline is more deeply enriched when they are interlinked. The discipline of international relations is in real trouble when the phenomena to be studied are identified neither as policy problems, empirical puzzles to be solved, nor as theoretical challenges to be developed. Progress in advancing such goals as human rights and peace can only occur after a problem is identified, concepts are specified, and hypotheses are explored empirically, whether in a positivist or postpositivist understanding of epistemology (e.g., Haas 1994, 2014b). Today, behavioralism is so much in disgrace that some proponents even propose to wave a red flag of surrender and sneak into a corner by setting up



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a Behavioral IR section (Mintz 2007a,b; James 2007). An intuitive thinker would imagine that behavioralists have been unable to get their papers accepted within the present structure of ISA sections, as the proposal for a new section refers mostly to foreign policy research, and sections already exist for both foreign policy analysis (with a journal) and scientific study of international processes. Postbehavioralism reigns, having prioritized policy research, in the form of competing ideological isms (cf. Buzan and Little 2001; Levine 2012). The chasm between the approaches is a crisis, since the field no longer has coherence or even a mission. Stephen Walker (2007) has suggested that the problem is “arrested development,” in part a counterreaction to the success of the Rational Choice paradigm. If no new knowledge is worthy of being applied to the real world, lacking an empirical and theoretical foundation, the result will be increasingly boring conventions and papers and international calamities ad infinitum. The solution is for both behavioralists and neobehavioralists to realize that an immature discipline needs to grow up and move on to a mature stage. Among various answers to the current crisis in international studies (e.g., Hellmann 2003, 2008; Kornprobst 2009), the most obvious is neobehavioralism. The term “neobehavioral” was evidently first used by Wallace Mendelson (1963) in a comment on an early psychological analysis of judicial behavior with the aim of critiquing behavioralism itself. David Easton (1990) used the term, without providing a definition, when he expressed a hope that behavioralists would rediscover the value of broad-gauge theory and move beyond the fragmentation of the discipline that followed postbehavioralism by entering a new “neobehavioral” era. In the first part of a book on foreign policy analysis, Stephen Walker (2011) sought to establish a theoretical foundation for a neobehavioral international relations, by which he meant a framework that would combine several levels of analysis, using game theory and operational code research. The term “neobehavioral,” therefore, needs to be defined. To do so, there is a need to back up historically to define previous eras of behavioralism and postbehavioralism. In 1962, David Easton characterized the behavioralist creed in a volume on the “limits of behavioralism.” The essence of behavioralist research was eightfold: 1. a search for regularities, 2. verification of generalizations through research, 3. refinement of research techniques, 4. quantification, 5. value-free research, 6. intertwining of research with empirical theory,

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7. research as an objective guide to policymaking, 8. interdisciplinarity. Later, Easton (1991:7–8) shortened the list to six elements, leaving out (4) and (8) while revising (7) to mean that pure theory should be developed before applying theory. In other words, he seemed more timorous about using theoretical science as a guide to clinical science. Policy relevance was notably absent. Evidently unaware of Easton’s formulation and the long effort to develop paradigms, six “characteristics” of a decision-making approach were identified 16 years later as the essence of “behavioral IR” (Mintz 2007b:159–60). In 1969, only eight years after Robert Dahl (1961a) proclaimed a victory for behavioralism, David Easton codified the essence of the postbehavioralist revolution into seven points (Easton 1970:512–13): 1. Substance must precede technique. 2. Scholars should go beyond the conservatism of merely stating empirical regularities. 3. Scholars should study the real desires and needs of humanity. 4. All studies should be aware of their value premises and alternatives. 5. The role of intellectual scholarship should be to protect the humane values of civilization. 6. Knowledge must serve moral purposes. 7. Research must be relevant to the conflicts and struggles of the day.

Clearly, Easton agreed with the neobehavioral-multimethodological thesis that behavioralism had gotten off track by forgetting that the profession should be relevant to public policy concerns, but he evidently had lost enthusiasm for developing a theoretical science. Behavioralists had become out of touch, repudiating the policy science that Harold Lasswell (1951b) had been trying to promote for decades. Today, the following definition applies: “Neobehavioral international studies interconnect theory, research, and policy.” In other words, research should integrate three elements—paradigms, empirical research, and policy applications. For any research agenda to be neobehavioral, however modest, all three elements must be explicitly incorporated. Neobehavioralism goes beyond the behavioralist disdain for policy implications and the postbehavioralist rejection of hypothesis testing—and asks both traditions to pay attention to metatheory or paradigms and each other. Although he does not label himself as a neobehavioralist, Jacek Kugler (2006) stands out in making possibly the most coherent pleas for connecting theoretically oriented research with policy.



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As a discussant at conventions, presentations that leave out one or two of the three components should be encouraged to further develop their research in order to bring more scholars together. The caste system of three separate domains is unhelpful to progress in international studies by frustrating paradigm development, keeping research studies marginal, and avoiding asking important policy questions. Neobehavioralism, accordingly, involves a commitment more intense than either behavioralism or postbehavioralism: • rediscovery of the richness of empirical and normative theory found in paradigmatic philosophies that seek an understanding of important phenomena. • construction of complex theoretical processes that precede desired and undesired phenomena, based on philosophical and social science theoretical writings. • search for empirical regularities only if relevant to theory and policy. • abandonment of hypothesis testing unrelated to theory or practical matters. • cross-testing of alternative paradigms to deepen or discard theories. • use of case studies to validate generalizations. • case study research to provide depth on policy matters. • use of multiple methods of research to cross-validate findings. • researcher awareness of value premises and alternatives, guarding against leaping to erroneous conclusions. • more literature reviews in areas wherein researchers are numerous in order to detect methodological flaws and researcher bias. • substantive problems selected before the application of empirical techniques. • selection of policy problems that affect the real needs of humanity. • continuation of value-free research so that policy bias will not taint results. • application of research findings to policy making. • collective statements on public policy based on professional unanimity about carefully researched findings. • increased interdisciplinary research. • increased interaction between intradisciplinary researchers working on the same problems. Philosophers throughout the ages have sought to understand human behavior, often to prescribe how international politics can be ethical. So have social science theorists. If there is a puzzle in reality, such as international violence, the brute empirical approach has been to correlate levels of violence, from military incursions to wars, with such measures as percapita income. But such correlational exercises mean very little unless they test and correct paradigms. Empirical research should look for theoretical explanations in philosophical and social science speculation to guide data collection rather than just

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engaging in hypothesis testing. For those who have a favorite philosopher or social theorist, the components of their view of politics should be unpacked to facilitate testing. The neobehavioral recommendation to engage in applied (clinical) international studies may seem the most innovative, yet foundation funding has often been granted because of policy dilemmas (Anderson 2003). Behavioralists eschewed public policy, seeking to develop “pure science,” thereby provoking postbehavioralists to eschew proposition testing and instead engage in policy-relevant research. In a neobehavioral era, no such dichotomies are sustainable. Public intellectuals professing to have solutions to international problems are quite few despite the slanted focus on ideologies, which are basically action programs (Lawson 2008). Recommendations from the “democratic peace” tradition to impose democracy (e.g., Rummel 1983; Muravchik 1991; Russett and Oneal 2001:272; Slaughter and Ikenberry 2006; Traub 2008; McFaul 2010), which was carried out to the detriment of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, were made without consensus within the scholarly community. No single scholar, including the present author, can attempt to engage in all phases of theoretical, empirical, and clinical research. There must be a community of scholars that can fill in the gaps. CONCLUSION Advocacy of neobehavioral international studies is a threat to those locked into the present mini-discourses. Many sacred cows will resent what has been said above, and they have their protectors. Gatekeepers of the discipline have grown up in a vocabulary that has blurred distinctions that were formerly clear and a conception of the field that is incredibly narrow. For example, one comment on a draft of Chapter 2 from an American scholar was “You use the word ‘paradigm’ in a way that is more similar to the idea of a mid-range theory . . .” Obviously, the commentator did not know that Kuhnian paradigms are empirical macro-theories. And two scholars, commenting on the same draft, one American and one European, refused to abandon the view that current contending ideologies are “paradigms.” Two other American journal editors denied that a test of a paradigm was either a test or had theoretical significance. When I referred the first comment to a recent ISA president, he observed, “We, unfortunately, live in a world of declining scholarship and knowledge . . .” The field has gone so far astray that metatheoretical inquiry has in effect been reduced to a subfield rather than permeating the discipline.



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Meanwhile, “realist” scholars spend a lot of energy trying to disprove “liberal institutionalism,” and vice versa, pretending that isms based on apriori beliefs can ever be demolished through research. Rather than such wasteful efforts, scholars should instead unpack their isms, locate them within existing paradigms, as accomplished above, and expand knowledge. In short, those who insist that contending isms are the discipline’s only alternative paradigms have all but achieved the Gramscian goal of shredding the past by insisting on oxymorons in order to prevent scholars from reflecting on and advancing the true foundation of the International Studies Association in the 1950s. Ideological thinking should continue, but not christened as “theory.” Ideologies are shortcuts to guide policy, but applied science requires careful empirical analysis. Will empirical paradigms of international studies ever be revived? Fifty years ago, that was the direction of the field. Today, when the field has gone astray in many respects, “neobehavioralism” is the answer. The betrayal of the original group of scholars who formed the International Studies Association should be respected for their grand vision. Research findings should be articulated to empirical paradigms while being mindful of policy implications. Neobehavioral international studies will bring together the profession on behalf of a common enterprise that began centuries ago and has all but been forgotten or wastebasketed. Neobehavioralism combines the best elements of both behavioralism and postbehavioralism with a focus on paradigmatic yet also policy-oriented research. Through a dialog involving paradigms, the discipline can come out of various closets. The profession is long overdue for revival and transformation—by growing up, becoming a truly professional enterprise, and achieving the destiny sought from the beginning—a world at peace.

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Index

5C+A framework, 159–60 Aberystwyth University, 6 Acharya, Amitav, 21, 109 acculturation, 171 adaptation function, 169 Adler, Emmanuel, 47 An Address to the Irish People, 5 adversaries, 87, 102, 121, 138, 140, 148, 148, 157 affective process, 154, 155, 157 Affigne, Tony, 25 Afghanistan, 90, 160, 204 Africa, 56, 71, 75, 88, 133, 167, 176, 184, 189, 193 See also specific countries Africans, 4, 176, 184 age of high mass consumption, 181 “agencies of social control,” 67 agenda setting, 76, 102, 105, 120, 133, 155 agents (individual actors), 35, 42, 45, 47, 51, 170. See also structures aggregate data, 92, 119 aggregation function, 169 aggression, 7, 68, 95, 130, 156, 164, 191, 193. See also war

Agreed Framework. See North Korea Ahn, Chung-Si, 69 Albert, Mathias, 25 Algeria, 82, 184 “aliefs,” 157 alienation, 1, 64, 65, 70, 72, 73, 77, 83, 142, 149; alienation of intellectuals, 83; Durkheim’s definition, 1, 60, 64, 66; Marxian definition, 53. See also normlessness Alighieri, Dante, 4, 81 alliances, 89, 105, 108, 122, 123, 136, 137, 147, 154, 165, 175 Allison, Graham, 159, 160 Almond, Gabriel, x, 14, 27, 104, 169 altruism, 150 amalgamated community, 91, 93, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103 amalgamation paradigm, 177, 178, 183 America. See United States America-centric, 16 American culture, 11, 21–22, 177, 178, 194 American Political Science Association, 10 American Revolution, 59 Americans, 7, 10, 22, 27, 59, 60, 62, 70, 82, 112–13, 164, 176, 194, 204;

273

274 Index

African Americans, 86, 86, 87, 88, 176, 177, 178, 184; Anglo Americans, 59, 176, 177, 178; Anti-Imperialist League, 5; Asian Americans, 177; French Americans, 176, 177; German Americans, 176; ghettoites, 82; Italian Americans, 178; Jewish Americans, 176; Native Americans, 126; Scotch-Irish, 176; Spanish-speaking Americans, 177; Swedish Americans, 176 Amnesty International, 103 anarchism, 125 anarchy: domestic, 61, 78, 125; international, 5, 8, 74, 76, 134, 134, 137, 193 Andriole, Stephen, 158 Angell, Norman, 5–6, 7, 93, 159, 160 Anglo-American hegemony, 165, 193 Anglo-American Raw Materials Board, 94 Anglo-centrism, 25 Anglo-conformity, 177 Anglo-European countries, 165, 181, 192, 193. See also specific countries Anievas, Alexander, 57 anti-behavioralism, 9, 16, 19, 20, 21 antibiotics, 124 anticlerical policies, 70 anti-colonialism, 101 anti-Communism, 13 anti-empiricism, 47 anti-hegemonism, 137 Anti-Imperialist League, 5 anti-incrementalism, 79 anti-metaphysics, 47 antislavery movement, 4 anti-systemic forces, 75, 189, 195 anti-terrorism, 180 antithesis, 9, 16, 21, 31, 51, 57, 74, 194, 181

apologies, government, 22 Aptheker, Herbert, 55 Aquinas, Thomas, 108 Arabic-speaking countries, 138 Arab Spring, 78 Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 154 Argentina, 71, 98, 184 aristocracy, 64–65 Aristotle, 108 armaments, 7, 57, 72, 73, 107, 123, 129 armed forces, 7, 56, 69, 76, 102, 130, 141, 154 armistice, 122 arms control, 107 arms merchants, 57 arms races, 17, 73, 121, 137, 153, 163, 191 Aron, Raymond, 12 Arrow, Kenneth, 144 ASEAN Regional Forum, 106 ASEAN Way, 110, 175 Asia, 75, 109–12, 114, 133, 167, 175. See also specific countries Asian and Pacific Council, 111 Asian Way, 110, 111, 175 Assimilation paradigm, 40, 177, 179, 193 assimilation process: domestic, 64, 177, 178, 179; international, 92, 93, 100, 102 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 109–12 asymmetric conflict, 140, 190, 191 asymmetric information, 140, 190 asymmetric wealth distribution. See inequality Athens, 35 atomization, 60, 61, 64, 64, 65, 66, 72, 77, 82, 86 attacks on 9/11, 25, 167 Augustine, Bishop, 3, 133 Austria-Hungary, 8, 152, 154, 155 authoritarian rule, 65, 70, 77, 183 autocracy, 73, 88, 130, 141, 142, 143, 166 autonomization, 113

Index

Axelrod, Robert, 17 Baccini, Leonardo, 179 Bacevich, Andrew, 164 Bagehot, Walter, 5, 103 Bakunin, Mikhail, 78 balance of power, 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 22, 89, 122, 123, 125, 128, 132, 136–38, 139, 148, 173, 191 Balance-of-Power Rationality. See rationality, types of Bandung Conference, 109 Bangladesh, 187 banks, 106, 118, 127, 186, 187 Banks, Arthur, 14 Baran, Paul, 55, 58 bargaining, 84, 86, 122, 143, 160 Barkin, Samuel, 27 Barnett, Michael, 194 Bartelson, Jens, 192 basic human needs, 57 Bateson, Gregory, 190 battlefields, 4, 122 Beal, Richard, 159 Becker, Gary, 132 behavior, human, 34, 36, 40, 47, 66, 77, 84, 88, 107, 117–18, 140, 146, 147, 150, 155, 157, 158, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 201, 203 behavior, state, 77, 91, 103, 105, 113, 131, 157, 160, 194 behavior change, 145 behavioralism, 8, 9, 10, 11–17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 36–37, 42, 150, 154, 157, 197, 199–202, 203, 204, 205 Benda, Julien, 83, 95 Bentham, Jeremy, 4, 5, 7 Bentley, Arthur, 28, 129 Berelson, Bernard, 144 Berkes, Ross, 10 Berlin Conference, 133 Berry, Jeffrey, 131 Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, 12, 188 Beyond the Melting Pot, 178 Beyond the Nation State, 96, 99

275

big businesses, 126 Bilderberg, 104 Billings, Robert, 161 Bismarck, Otto von, 90, 92, 136 Black, Cyril, 181 “black box,” 36, 117, 121, 122, 123, 141, 144, 145, 146, 159, 162, 166 Black Power, 178 Black Power Movement, 184 Blacks. See Americans; African Americans blacklisting, 11 blaming the victim, 125 “blank slate,” 170 blasphemy, 88 Blau, Peter, 146 bluffing, 140, 140 Bluhm, William, 40 Blumer, Herbert, 85 Bodin, Jean, 3, 4 Boehner, John, 127 Boer War, 163 Bohemia, 90 Boin, Arajen, 159 Bolivia, 71 Bolshevism, 67 bomb testing, 10 bombing, 10, 16, 120, 123 Bonaparte. See Napoléon Bonaparte borders, 90, 110, 112, 134, 175, 187, 194 Boston Tea Party, 59 Boswell, Terry, 55 Boulding, Kenneth, 16 Bound to Lead, 22, 134 bounded rationality. See rationality, types of bourgeoisie. See capitalists Bowling Alone, 65 Boyle’s Law, 129 Brahe, Tycho, 14 brain, human, 42, 48, 124, 150, 155 brainwashing, 34, 54, 82, 184, 195 Braudel, Fernand, 189 Braumoeller, Bear, 189 Brazil, 98, 184, 185, 190

276 Index

“breakdown” paradigms, 83 Brecher, Michael, 159 Breitmeir, Helmut, 106 BRICS, 190 Brinton, Crane, 83, 85 Britain, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 51, 52, 59, 71, 79, 83, 89, 91, 95, 99, 101, 103, 114, 118, 134, 139, 184. See also English culture; Scotland; Wales British citizens, 59, 114, 164 British Commonwealth of Nations, 6 Bronfenbrenner, Urie, 186 Brown, Chris, 108 Brzezinksi, Zbigniew, 22 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 28, 72, 122–23, 141, 142 Bukharin, Nikolai, 58 Bull, Hedley, 13 Bullitt, William, 156 Bunge, Mario, 45 Bunzel, John, 12 burdens, 91, 92, 121, 122 Bureaucratic Paradigm, 160 bureaucratic structures, 99, 121, 133, 160, 161, 162 bureaucratization, 85, 86, 87 bureaucrats, 74, 83 Burgess, John, 5 Burke, Edmund, 68 Burma, 71 Bush, George H.W., 22 Bush, George W., 127 Buzan, Barry, 25 Cambodia, 16, 139 Canada, 10 cantons, Swiss, 178 Capital, 53 capital, investment, 68, 111, 118, 119, 149–50, 157, 181, 185, 193 capital, sources of, 52, 54, 55, 185, 187, 189 capital accumulation, 52, 55, 56, 119 capitalism, 52–58, 52, 64, 72, 123, 165, 184, 185, 189–90, 192

capitalism, free market, 54, 126 capitalism, state, 56 capitalist countries, 56, 58, 163, 164, 165, 166, 192 capitalist media, 54 “capitalist peace,” 59, 166 capitalists, 52, 52, 53, 54, 54, 55, 56, 63, 64, 69, 75, 83, 123, 184 Cardoso, Federico Enrique, 185, 190 Carmichael, Stokley, 82, 88, 178 Carnap, Rudolf, 13, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 48 Carnegie, Andrew, 5 Carr, E.H., 7, 8 case study analysis, 31, 41, 69, 77, 85, 94, 97, 98, 101, 109, 115, 130, 159, 160, 166, 191, 199, 200, 203. See also deviant case analysis Catholic Church, 114 Catholics, 171, 178 Caucasians, 78, 86, 87, 88, 178, 184 causality, 25, 33, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 51, 52, 72, 73, 87, 95, 98, 104, 106, 112, 129, 137, 156, 158 Central America, 99, 112 Central Intelligence Agency, 8 challenger, power, 78, 84, 85, 87, 120, 121, 137, 140, 153, 193 Chamberlain, Neville, 136 Chambers, Whittaker, 62 Charles University, 89 Chile, 98, 166, 184 China, 7, 70, 71, 84, 106, 107, 135, 136, 139, 167, 190, 193 Chinese language, 158, 173 Choi, Seung-Whan, 142 cholera, 75 Choucri, Nazli, 164 Christian Commonwealth, 81 Christian-Islamic wars, 114, 138, 167, 170, 176. See also Crusades Christians, 3 churches, 60, 64. See also Catholic Church Churchill, Winston, 7–8, 95

Index

cities. See urban areas civil disobedience, 86 civil society, 34, 39, 60, 63, 64, 64, 65, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 83, 85, 170. See also global civil society civil strife, 12, 24, 25, 28, 53–55, 60, 65–68, 82, 87 Clarkson, Thomas 2 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 69–70 Clash of Civilizations paradigm, 167– 68, 175, 193 classes, social. See middle class; upper class Classical Economics, (Laissez-Faire) Rationalism. See rationalism, types of Clausewitz, Carl von, 3, 86, 122, 130, 156 Clinton, Bill, 127 Cluniac Order, 81 coal industry, 96, 101 Coalition-Building paradigm, 40, 83, 85, 141, 142, 143, 161, 174, 178, 179, 184 Cobb, Roger, 92 Cochran, Molly, 108 coercive diplomacy. See diplomacy coercive government, 86, 99, 100, 102, 172, 194 cognitive dissonance, 190 cognitive elements, 40, 107, 120, 133, 154, 155, 156, 170, 174 cognitive linguistics, 40 Cognitive paradigm, 141, 145, 173, 174 Cohen, Daniel, 75, 188, 194 Cold War, 9, 11, 22, 23, 47, 61, 69, 70, 71, 74, 96, 96, 127, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 157, 159, 165, 167, 175, 179, 192 “collective autarky,” 185 collective behavior, 66, 81–83, 84, 191 collective goods, 91, 110, 148 collective rationality. See rationality, types of

277

Colombia, 98 colonialism, 4, 5, 51, 55–57, 58, 59, 82, 90, 110, 133, 134, 184, 186. See also anti-colonialism; neocolonialism; postcolonial theory “common European home,” 42 “common interests of mankind,” 58 “common man,” 126 Common Market, European, 96 communications. See mass media; social communication communism, 7, 11, 56, 58, 63, 81, 189; industrial, 52, 56; primitive, 52. See also Euro-Communism; postCommunist countries Communist countries, 165, 183, 185 Communist movements, 148, 165 Communist parties, 64, 65, 141 Communist trade unions, 65 Communitarian paradigm, 108–12, 112, 167 communitarianism, 30, 42, 102, 108–12, 137 communities. See security communities Community Building paradigm, 81–115, 84, 85, 86, 92, 94 Community Mobilization paradigm, 84 co-optation, 85, 87, 90 Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, 99 comparative analysis, 42, 71, 91, 110, 119, 159, 162 comparative politics, 10, 23, 190 compatibility, value, 90, 91, 96, 98, 101 compellance, 241 compensatory actions, 137 competition, economic, 7, 29, 53, 54, 55, 67, 118–19, 126, 144, 168, 168, 182, 183 competition, political, 72, 137, 142, 143, 163, 192 “competitive edge,” 182 compromise, 140, 187

278 Index

Comte, Auguste, 20 concept formation, 3, 10–15, 20, 29, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 130, 137, 139, 145, 162, 199, 200 Concert of Europe, 4 concessions, 84, 85, 86, 139, 140 Conflict paradigm, 168, 168. See also particular types of conflict conflict resolution, 74, 87, 88, 94, 108, 112, 137, 159, 162. See also nonviolent conflict resolution conflicts of interest, 67, 148, 148 Confucianism, 71 Congress of States, 4 consensus decision-making, 25, 74, 87, 96, 98, 104, 109, 111, 112, 175, 179, 204 Constant, Benjamin, 59 constituents: beneficiary, 63, 85; conscience, 85 constitutions, 103, 124; American, 132; English, 103; world, 89, 95, 103 constraints, economic, 59, 121, 123, 189 constraints, political, 59, 94, 120, 121, 123, 133, 137, 140, 142, 150, 159 constructivism, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 175 constructive analysis, 20, 21, 40, 45, 114, 173. See also deconstruction consumption, 53, 54, 118, 119, 119, 144, 181, 182. See also age of high mass consumption “contagion,” 183 Cooley, Charles Horton, 168 Cooper, David, 167 core areas, 91, 92, 101, 189, 190 correlational analysis, 23, 45, 46, 54, 69, 73, 74, 84, 87, 92, 107, 159, 203

correspondence theory of truth, 28, 49, 91 cosmopolitanism, 75, 95, 108 cost of transactions. See transaction costs cost of war, 5, 121, 122 cost sharing, 110, 112 costs, economic, 128, 131 costs, opportunity, 120 costs of action or inaction, 84, 105, 106, 120, 120, 121, 123, 140, 142, 145–48, 150, 162 Costa Rica, 71 Cost-Benefit (Instrumental) Rationality. See rationality, types of cost-effectiveness, 120 costs of acquiring information, 145 costs of noncompliance, 140 costs of transaction, 105, 106, 106, 147 cotton, 6 counterterrorism, 180 counterthreats, 139, 140 crackdowns. See suppression Crawford, Timothy, 138 crime, 83, 84, 86, 86, 168. See also war crimes Crimea, 140 Crisis paradigm, 157–60, 161, 162 crisis situations, 7, 76, 120, 139, 140, 159–60, 162, 190, 201 The Critique of the Gotha Program, 58 cross-fertilization of ideas, 24 A Cross-Polity Survey, 14 cross-pressures, 144, 171 cross-sectional analysis, 72, 73, 93, 106, 142, 159 cross-testing, 26, 31, 33, 37, 40, 41, 77, 103, 106, 115, 123, 131, 145, 203 Crucé, Émeric, 4, 81 Crusades, 114, 167 Cuba, 123, 126, 159 Cuhadar, Esra, 172 cultural analysis, 42, 46, 57, 64, 70, 71, 75, 88, 101, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 147, 150, 170–71, 175–76, 177–80, 186

Index

cultural dissimilarity, 101, 167 cultural norms. See norms, cultural Cultural paradigm, 42, 70, 175–76. See also Sociocultural Engineering paradigm Cultural Pluralism paradigm, 177–78 cultural preservation, 75, 178 Cultural Similarity paradigm, 101, 146, 165–67, 168, 181 A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 176 cultural victory, 181 culture, defined, 175 culture, world, 57, 93, 94, 94, 190, 192, 194 culture clash, 70, 167, 168 “culture of dependence,” 125, 172 culture, national, 175. See also national identity culture-bound reasoning, 181 Cybernetic paradigm, 141 The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 121 cybernetics, 39, 90, 99, 161 Czechoslovakia, 8, 89, 136 Czempiel, Ernest, 103 Dahl, Robert, 131, 157, 202 Darwin, Charles, 5, 181 Darwinian Rationality. See rationality, types of; Sociocultural Engineering paradigm databases for international studies, 14, 56, 156, 166, 175, 188 Davos, 76, 104 Dayton, Bruce, 159, 172 de Crèvecœur, Michel Guillaume Jean, 177 decapitalization, 185, 186 decision-making, 12, 26, 33, 47, 74, 75, 98, 100, 103, 104, 106, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117, 119, 120–23, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139, 140, 141, 150, 153–62, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 202 decision-making parameters, 155

279

The Decline of the West, 8 deconstruction, 21, 26, 28, 41, 42, 43, 48, 88, 117, 168 “Decree of Peace,” 7 deductive reasoning, 199 democracies, union of, 6, 165 democracy, types of: consolidating, 73; economic, 59, 60, 119, 144; electoral, 141; global, 193, 194; illiberal, 180; industrial, 96, 98; liberal, 165; mature, 73, 169; people’s, 56; political, 59, 60, 68, 71; polyarchic, 129, 131, 146, 157; pseudo, 34; social, 60, 71, 165; sovereign, 73; transitional, 191 democracy, unpopularity of, 78 democratic blockage, 76, 77 democratic collapse, 65, 193 democratic countries, 8, 61, 71, 73, 83, 98, 101, 109, 132, 142, 143, 165–66, 187 democratic culture, 166, 173, 176, 180, 183 “democratic distemper,” 68 democratic instability, 142, 180 democratic socialism, 61, 149 democratic suppression, 4, 126, 176, 180 democratization, 4, 22, 23, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 88, 91, 165, 167, 172, 173, 180, 181, 183, 188, 204 demography, 24, 47, 63 Dependency paradigm, 16, 19, 27, 58, 69, 184–85, 189 deprivation, 82, 84, 145, 157. See also relative deprivation theory deregulation, 125, 127 Derrida, Jacques, 41, 47

280 Index

Descartes, René, 60 determinism, 35 deterrence, defined, 138–39 deterrence, examples of, 7, 14, 20, 105, 106, 138–41, 159, 179 deterrence, types of: asymmetric, 140; general deterrence, 139; immediate, 139; pivotal, 138 Deterrence Rationality. See rationality, types of Detomasi, David, 104 Deutsch, Karl, 1, 3, 14, 22, 26, 28, 89–96, 91–102, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114 developing countries, 73, 119, 186 development, types of: autarkic, 8; economic, 19, 23, 48, 51–53, 54, 57, 60, 68–72, 68, 91, 98, 101, 110, 111, 118–19, 135, 181, 182, 186–88; global development, 193; human, 186–88; legal, 3, 5, 90; national, 189; norm development, 175; political, 8, 13, 51, 60, 68, 70–72, 75, 76, 85–86, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 169, 181, 182, 184, 193; sociocultural, 33, 69, 94, 105, 108, 165, 166, 171, 172, 173, 184, 186–88; uneven, 57, 69. See also paradigm development Development as Freedom, 187 development capital, 68 deviant behavior, 67, 168, 173, 174 deviant case analysis, 151 Dewey, John, 37, 176 dialectical change, 16, 33–34, 49, 51, 52, 82, 165 diasporas, 183 dichotomous variables, 14, 23, 47, 76, 204

Dickens, Charles, 4 dictatorships, types of: military, 141; personalistic, 143, 166 Diffusion Paradigm, 60, 104, 182–83, 185 dimensionalization, 34, 166 diplomacy, 6, 7, 8, 22, 23, 88, 105, 135, 140, 147, 154, 156, 172, 175 diplomacy, types of: coercive, 135, 140, 158, 164, 174; new diplomacy, 7; old diplomacy, 7; open, 7, 89; paradiplomacy, 192; public diplomacy, 156, 190, 191, 195, 201; Track Two diplomacy, 172 diplomatic protests, 158 discrimination, 1, 86, 86, 88, 177 disequilibrium paradigm, 22, 34, 66, 129, 151, 172, 173, 174, 190–91 disturbance theory, 130–31 diversionary theory, 56, 73, 74, 156, 157. See also war, types of diversity, 13, 24, 73, 74, 97, 176, 177, 179 divide and rule, 137 Dixon, William, 55 DNA, 39, 40 Domhoff, William, 131 Dos Santos, Theotonio, 185 double aspect theory, 45, 45, 46 Downs, Anthony, 144–45 Draft Outline of an International Code, 5 du Bois, W.E.B., 184, 185 dualism, ontological, 45, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 Dunant, Henri, 4 Durkheim, Émile, 1, 40, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 72, 77, 78, 92, 100, 168, 190 Duvall, Raymond, 194 Eagleton, Clyde, 7

Index

early warning systems, 157 Easton, David, 11, 36, 169, 201–2 Ebola virus, 75 Eck, Kristine, 66 econometric methods, 142 economic aid, 71 economic competition, 183 economic conflict, 168 economic cooperation, 81–82, 88–99, 101–2, 111 economic decline (downturn), 55, 72, 73, 73, 112, 119, 126, 135, 196. See also inequality; poverty economic dominance, 34, 52, 62, 84, 125, 134, 177. See also hegemony economic greed, 94, 125, 194 economic growth, 47, 53, 55, 57, 68, 69, 71, 73, 73, 77, 81, 94, 101, 109, 112, 118, 119, 135, 138, 164, 181, 182, 188, 191 economic imbalance, 148, 148 economic interdependence, 6, 19, 57, 90, 91, 101, 159, 166, 193 economic normality, 72 economic profits, 29, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 72, 74, 118–19, 119, 128, 147, 182, 186, 194 economic prosperity, 70, 96, 120 economic regulation, 114, 118, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 193, 196 economic rules, 96, 96 economic sacrifices, 101, 131 economic sector, role of, 6, 19, 34, 48, 50–59, 61, 71, 72, 73, 74, 81, 91, 96, 101, 103, 106, 111, 112, 118– 19, 123, 126, 127, 128, 133–332, 148, 163, 165, 170, 178, 184, 192, 194. See also exploitation, economic economic stages, 52, 113, 181 economic status, 170. See also elites economic systems, types of: capitalism, 52–58, 72, 123, 163, 165, 184, 185, 189–90, 192;

281

closed, 185; communism, 7, 11, 56, 58, 63, 81, 189; global (world), 22, 57, 74, 76, 95, 127, 129, 134, 163–65, 185, 186, 189–94; guild socialism, 93; mature, 181; mercantilist, 118, 126; national, 192; open, 28, 185; socialism, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 108, 127, 189; sustainable, 187; trickle-down (supply-side), 118, 127, 187; utopian socialism, 51, 93; welfare state, 58, 95, 126, 127, 128, 172, 186–87 (See also human welfare). See also capitalism; communism; New International Economic Order economic takeoff, 181 An Economic Theory of Democracy, 144 economic transactions. See also trade economic (utilitarian) gains and rewards, 91–92, 96, 101, 112, 164, 187 economics, political, 24, 28 economism, 46 economists, 9, 16, 34, 66, 93, 104, 118, 119, 125, 126, 131, 144, 158, 186, 187 economy, precarious, 114 Ecuador, 98 education, 23, 110, 142, 150, 179, 186 egalitarianism, 68, 101, 101, 102, 110, 112, 117 Egypt, 3, 78 Einstein, Albert, 49, 130, 188 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 62, 126 Elder, Charles, 92 elections, 42, 68, 72, 74, 78, 120, 123, 126, 127, 141, 144–46, 166, 171, 176.

282 Index

See also voting elite congeniality, 100, 101 elite disunity, 84, 85 elites, 21, 48, 60, 61, 62–63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 73, 76, 77, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 92, 96, 100, 101, 102, 105, 111, 126, 131, 172, 186 elites, types of: business, 96, 111, 126, 186; dominant, 52, 84, 124; economic, 111; entrenched, 87; external 101, 102; feudal, 52, 52; new, 61; old, 61; political, 69, 86; power elites, 61–63, 131 pro-democracy, 172 elitism, 125 Elman, Colin, 138 Emerson, Richard, 146 empires, 1, 3, 4, 136, 163, 165 empiricism, 10, 12, 15, 20, 21, 23, 27, 30, 31, 35–36, 38, 46, 49, 50, 104, 136, 137, 138, 166, 167, 189, 197, 150, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204 employment, 11, 20, 64, 72, 73, 77, 118–19, 119, 142, 170, 195 empowerment, 78, 82, 183, 187, 194 The End of History, 22 enforcement, 101 Engels, Friedrich, 4, 33, 51–52, 55 England. See Britain The English Constitution, 103 English culture, 177 English language, 100, 108 English School, 23, 27 Enterline, Andrew, 180 entrepreuneur theory, 130–31 entrepreneurs, types of: capitalist, 118, 130–31 (See also capitalists); norm, 102, 106, 148; policy, 89, 130–31, 133, 160

environment, 23, 72, 75, 76, 88, 103, 104, 106, 124, 135, 142, 162, 164, 177, 187 epidemics, 75 epiphenomena, 36, 45, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 63, 92 epistemic communities, 104, 113. See also experts epistemology, 25, 49–50 equalitarian. See egalitarianism equality, 5, 75, 77, 111, 132, 176, 178. See also inequality Erikson, Robert, 146 escalation, 73, 134, 139, 140, 157, 158, 159 Essence of Decision, 160 essentials for selectorate support, 141, 141 estates, 59 ethics, 3, 20, 23, 26, 35, 36, 38, 41, 58, 117, 139, 203 ethnic groups, 23, 49, 66, 73–74, 82, 86, 89, 90, 124, 125, 132, 142, 143, 153, 166, 168, 176, 177, 178, 179 ethnoreligious conflicts, 180 Etzioni, Amitai, 81, 89, 99–102, 109, 111, 113, 114 Eurocentrism, 181 Euro-Communism, 54 Europe, 3, 4, 5, 13, 42, 51, 64, 83, 87, 89, 92, 111, 112, 114, 133–36, 164, 172, 177, 181, 183, 189, 192, 193, 194; Eastern Europe, 65, 177, 192; Western Europe, 13, 64, 92, 95, 96, 100 European Coal and Steel Community, 96, 101 European Common Market, 96 European Economic Community, 99 European integration, 79, 90, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99–101, 104, 114 European Journal of International Relations, 26

Index

European Union, 79, 104, 114, 161, 162, 180, 183 Europeanization, 183 Europeans, 7, 10, 21, 27, 30, 59, 112, 185, 204 evaluative facet, 117, 155 “ever-widening circles,” 94, 97 evolution, 124, 129, 162 exceptionalism, 87–88 executive branch, 63, 74, 98, 120, 132, 141, 142, 160, 165, 169, 182 executives, business, 127, 157 exemplars, 6, 38, 39, 41, 52, 64, 71, 81, 84, 85, 87, 90, 91, 94, 96, 99, 107, 109, 113, 137, 164, 169, 181, 182, 184, 185 exogenous relationship, 180 exosystem, 186 experts, 61, 69, 94, 94, 97, 104, 106, 160 exploitation, economic, 52–56, 52, 54, 58, 60, 63, 75, 76, 81, 86, 88–89, 94, 97, 110, 123, 165, 184, 190. See also superexploitation expropriation, 54 factions, 85 factionalism, 85, 87 Fainsod, Merle, 129, 130, 132 Faletto, Enzo, 185 fallacy of composition, 9 family, 60, 61, 64, 89, 93, 130, 170, 178, 186 Fanon, Frantz, 82, 184, 185, 190 fascism, 7, 8, 11, 65, 148 Feagin, Joe, 85–87 Fearon, James, 122, 140 feasibility, 120, 121, 121, 133 Federation of the West Indies (FWI), 99 feedback, 39, 161 feminism, 20, 21, 23, 27, 76, 177, 187 Festinger, Leon, 158, 190 Fettweis, Christopher, 139 feudal interaction, 163 feudalism, 52, 52, 54, 113, 163 Field, David, 5

283

field research, 182 field theory, 129–33, 143, 145, 146, 170, 171 film industry, 11 Finland, 90 First World, 75, 76, 129, 169, 184–85, 190, 193 Flanik, William, 30, 42, 120, 154 Ford Foundation, 12 foreign policy analysis, 6, 7, 12, 23, 24, 28, 30, 77–78, 120, 132–33, 153– 62, 173, 174, 179, 189, 201 Foreign Policy Analysis, 155, 174 formalization, 85, 110 Foucault, Michel, 41 Fourteen Points, 6, 7, 89 frames, 21, 41, 42, 70, 102, 105 France, x, 48, 53, 58, 59, 65, 68, 70, 83, 84, 92, 108, 154 Frank, Andre Gunder, 184–85 Frank, Thomas, 63, 128 Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 92 “free and fair elections,” 68 free riders, 148 Freud, Sigmund, 155–56 Freudian analysis, 156, 170 Friedman, Milton, 125 Frohlich, Norman, 145 From Mobilization to Revolution, 83 frustration-aggression approach, 156 Fukuyama, Francis, 22, 165, 167 functional intergovernmental organizations, 89, 93–99, 94, 96, 102, 103, 110, 112 functionalist paradigm, 93–95, 94, 97, 115 functionalism, 93–97, 110 fundamentalism, 70, 88 Galápagos Islands, 124 Galtung, Johan, 15, 17, 25, 76, 163–64, 191 Gamson, William, 87 Gange, John, 10 Garwonski, Vincent, 159 Gaudet, Helen, 144

284 Index

gays and lesbians, 142 Geertz, Clifford, 175 Geller, Daniel, 200 Gemeinschaft, 96 gender studies, 23 general systems theory, 12, 188, 189 Generales, Minos, 10 Geneva Conventions, 4, 8 Genoa, 135 Gentili, Alberico, 4 geographic proximity, 100, 101, 139 geography, 24, 136, 191 geopolitics, 5, 136, 191 George, Alexander, 156, 160, 175 George, Juliette, 156 Germans, 89, 108, 125, 178 Germany, 8, 51, 56, 60, 63, 72, 83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 99, 125, 154–55, 164, 172, 191 Gesellschaft, 96, 175 Ghetto Revolts, 85 Gilpin, Robert, 135 Glazer, Nathan, 178 global civil society, 74–76, 180, 183, 193, 194, 195 global climate change. See global warming global community, 34, 79, 114 global economy. See economy, global global governance, 75, 76, 103–8, 135, 194–95 global health, 23, 75 global media, 93, 105, 194 global (international) system, 39, 60, 89, 134, 136, 141, 164, 192, 193 global warming, 22, 193–94 globalization, 74, 76, 105, 114, 185, 188, 192, 193, 194, 195 Globalization paradigm, 76, 108, 181, 191–95 goal attainment function, 169 goals, human, 34, 43, 53, 54, 59, 117, 120, 121, 123, 125, 133, 138, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150

goals, organizational, 69, 71, 79, 81, 85, 87, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98, 104, 106, 117, 120, 121, 121, 123, 133, 138, 147, 148, 150, 153, 158, 169, 171, 181, 186, 187, 188, 200, 205 Gorbachëv, Mikhail, 42, 58, 191 Gorman, John, 145 Governance Without Government, 103 government nonresponsiveness, 65 government spending, 62, 73 government strength, 137 Graham, Hugh, 87, 88 Grameen Bank, 187 Gramsci, Antonio, 54–55, 57, 61, 205 Grand Chessboard, 22 Great Depression, 126 Greece, 35, 99, 176 Green, Donald, 150 Greig, Michael, 180 grievances, 67, 84, 88, 102, 123, 148, 148 Grotius, Hugo, 3 Group Conflict paradigm, 168, 172 groupthink, 118, 130, 133, 160, 161, 162 “growth of civilization,” 156 Guam, 126 Guicciardini, Francesco, 136 guild socialism, 93 Guilhot, Nicolas, 9 Gurr, Ted Robert, 14 Haas, Ernst, 13, 89, 93, 95–98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 111, 114 Haas, Peter, 104 Haeckel, Ernest, 5 Hagen, Joe, 154 Hague Conferences, 5, 7 Hague Conventions, 4 Hahn, Harlan, 85–87 Halpern, David, 65 Hamilton, Charles, 82, 88, 178 Hawai‘i, Kingdom of, 5, 126, 179 Hayek, Friedrich, 124

Index

health, 23, 75, 128, 142, 187 hedonism, 117, 155. See also economic greed Hegel, George William Friedrich, 9, 51, 125, 181, 193 Hegemonic Rationality. See rationality, types of hegemons, 5, 34, 100, 101, 105, 129, 133–36, 134, 137, 137, 142, 149, 150, 165, 172, 174, 179, 189, 193, 194, 195 Heider, Fritz, 190 Henderson, Errol, 166 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 108 hermeneutics, 38 Herring, E. Pendleton, 11 Hibbs, Douglas, 87 Hilferding, Rudolf, 7, 58 Hindess, Barary, 181 Hindu society, 71 Hirsch, Fred, 109 Hitler, Adolf, 8, 89, 90, 95, 125, 130, 136, 164 HIV virus, 48 Hobbes, Thomas, 61, 133, 136 Hobson, John, 5, 7, 163 Hoffmann, Stanley, 62, 115 Holland. See Netherlands holocaust, nuclear, 138 Holt, Robert, 169 Holy Roman Empire, 136 Homans, George, 40, 146 Hoover, Herbert, 126 hostility, 57, 66, 67, 67, 77, 130, 147, 154, 156, 172, 187 Hotelling’s Law, 144 Howard, Peter, 107 Hudson, Valery, 154 Human Development Index, 186 Human Development Paradigm, 186–88 human race, 124, 124, 125, 149 Human Rights Watch, 103 human security. See security, types of human welfare, 92, 92, 95, 104, 123 Hume, David, 36, 46, 118

285

Huntington, Samuel, 68–72, 77, 167, 182, 190–91, 194 Hussein, Saddam, 143 Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 89 Huxley, Thomas, 124 “hyperfactualism, 11, 14, 30, 36, 199, 200 hyperglobalizers, 192 hypothesis testing, 1, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16–17, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 37, 38, 42, 48, 66, 69, 98, 100, 102, 104, 120, 122–23, 130, 131, 132, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204 id, 155 idealism, ideological, 7, 8, 13, 16, 26, 27 idealism, metaphysical, 45, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 57, 91, 154 idealistic, 11 identity, problems of, 64, 88, 108, 112, 113, 168, 170, 172, 173, 175 ideology, ix, x, 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19–23, 25–28, 30, 33, 34, 36, 41, 43, 44, 55, 57, 58, 60, 64, 72, 77, 79, 81, 82, 90, 95, 97, 101, 104, 114, 117, 125, 131, 133, 138, 144, 145, 148, 158, 166, 168, 193, 197, 200, 201, 204, 205. See also specific ideologies (isms) Imperialism, 163 imperialism, 5, 134, 135, 163–65, 176, 182 imperialism, defined, 163 Imperalism Paradigm, 163–65, 168 imperial overstretch, 135 imperialistic conflict, 4, 5, 55, 57, 126, 163–65, 168, 192 imperialist countries. See empires implementation, 155 incarceration. See prisons incentives, 106, 120, 121, 121, 125, 139, 159 incremental change, 78, 94, 95, 111, 114, 161, 162, 175

286 Index

India, 90, 109, 184, 190 individual actor decision-making, 35, 153–62, 170, 172 individual rights. See rights individualism, 42, 47, 108, 194 Indonesia, 109, 110 Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontasi, 110 industrial revolution, 5, 8, 51, 80, 101 industrialists. See capitalists industrialization, 60, 64, 64, 77, 83, 84, 113, 182, 189, 193 inequality, 52, 52, 63, 68, 82, 84, 88, 186, 190 inexorable processes, 52, 134, 135, 156, 167, 181, 182 “infant industry,” 6 influentials in the selectorate, 141, 141 influence: defined, 62, 191; group (political), 60, 61, 62, 75, 103, 123, 129–33, 148, 159, 191; personal, 7, 130, 146–47, 156, 157, 160, 170, 171, 173, 186, 187. See also power information processing, 155, 158, 171 infrastructure, 127, 128, 156, 186 Inglehart, Ronald, 188 injustices, 102, 189 inputs, 27, 104, 121, 158, 169 insight, 145 institutional analysis, 7, 8, 13, 26, 34, 62, 64, 65, 67, 70, 83, 94, 105, 113, 135, 147–49, 205 institutionalization, 85, 105, 113, 188 institutions: global, 75, 76, 103, 105; international, 7, 8, 85, 91, 93, 94, 98, 99, 114, 135, 170; political, 34, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 76, 78, 79, 85, 90, 91, 102; private business, 76; religious, 70, 76; social, 64, 67, 170–71; social control, 60; supranational, 13, 74, 85, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 103, 105, 115, 135, 192, 195

instrumental behavior, 146 Instrumental Rationality. See rationality, types of instrumentalism, 37, 50 Integrated Crisis Early Warning System, 157 integration, defined, 91, 96, 100, 169 integration, types of: amalgamated, 91; attitudinal, 92, 96; economic, 93, 96, 101, 111, 112; functional, 93–99; institutional, 98; international, 91, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96–97, 99, 100, 167; national, 90, 91, 93, 99; normative, 66, 67, 81, 82, 97, 99, 108– 13, 160, 169, 170, 172, 175, 183; pluralistic, 91; political, 91, 95, 99, 100, 190; regional, 79, 92, 95, 98, 101, 114; residential, 40; social, 68, 83, 83, 93, 178–79; structural, 92 integration paradigm, 40, 89, 179 interaction. See social communication interactionism, 45, 45, 47, 48, 49, 54, 57, 77, 92, 113, 150, 154, 155 interculturalist paradigm, 179 interdependence, 6, 16, 19, 57, 90, 91, 101, 101, 159, 160, 193 interdisciplinary studies, 6, 23, 30, 69, 202, 203 Interest Group paradigm. See Pressure Group paradigm interest groups. See pressure groups intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 4, 8, 22, 58, 75, 79, 93–99, 106, 109–13, 114, 153, 185, 193 intergovernmentalism, 115 internal contradictions, 54 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See World Bank International Community, 92 international conferences, 5, 7, 75, 104, 109, 110, 133, 183

Index

international conflict, subfield field of, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 38, 69, 72, 109, 122, 134, 167, 189. See also specific conflicts international cooperation, 7, 19, 25, 33, 73, 74, 76, 82, 89, 90, 93–99, 94, 101, 102, 103–15, 140, 148, 153, 157, 158, 159, 162, 168, 175, 176, 190, 191 international economy, subfield of, 19, 23. See also economy, types of, global International Government, 6 International Labor Organization (ILO), 96–98 international law, 3–8, 19, 23, 90, 95, 103–4, 172, 175, 192 International Monetary Fund, 76, 160 International Organization (journal), 104 international organizations. See functional intergovernmental organizations; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; supranational organizations international organization leaders, 89, 97–100, 102, 109. See also leadership International Political Science Association, 25 International Political Sociology, 24, 194 international (world) politics, subfield of, 6, 8, 19, 24, 28, 99, 113, 189, 194 international regimes, 103–8, 106, 195; defined, 103; financial, 104, 105; food, 104; human rights, 103, 104; oceans, 104; security, 104, 106, 107; trade, 103, 105, 106. See also Regime paradigm

287

international relations field, ix, x, 4, 10–17, 19–31, 44, 197, 199–205 international relations theory crisis, 22–25 international rules, 103, 106, 128, 134, 134, 135, 137, 192, 194. See also economic rules; international law international security, 24, 42, 93, 103, 104, 106, 120, 135, 142, 160, 167, 187. See also security, types of; security communities international studies, field of, x–xi, 1, 3–31, 199–205 International Studies Association, ix, x, xi, 1, 9–11, 15, 22–25, 26, 27, 30–31, 79, 157, 205 International Studies Perspectives, 26, 28, 164 International Studies Review, 26, 159, 200 international subsystems, 14 international system level, 12, 14, 19, 28, 57, 81, 95, 129, 133–38, 164, 165, 169, 188–95 International Systems: A Behavioral Approach, 33 Internet, 10, 78, 113, 171, 192 inverse relationship, 68 investment. See capital, investment investment voting, 144 “invisible hand,” 52, 118 Iraq, 1, 23, 78, 90, 132, 160, 180, 204 Irrationality Paradigm, 117, 121, 154– 57, 158, 159, 161, 162, 170 Islam sects: Shiite, 167; Sunni, 167 Islamic countries, 1, 70, 71, 156, 167, 176 isms, 7, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29–31, 114, 201, 205 isolationists, 125, 133

288 Index

isomorphism, 11, 12, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33, 39, 42, 43, 58, 77, 81, 113, 149, 150, 153, 161, 172, 188, 194, 195 Israel, 70, 71, 99 Italian city-states, 136 Italy, 58, 65, 84, 95, 99, 177. See also Genoa; Rome; Venice Jackson, Elton, 191 Jackson, Patrick, 20, 28, 29 Jamaica, 71 James, Henry, 177 James, Patrick, 122 James, William, 5, 37 Japan, 7, 10, 69, 71, 83, 85, 90, 107, 110, 178, 181, 182, 191 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 125 Jenkins, Craig, 148 Jentleson, Bruce, 140 Jews, 99, 118, 125, 176 Johnson, Chalmers, 66 Johnson, Lyndon, 16, 127 Jones, Calvert, 112–13 journal editors, x, 24, 29, 79, 204 Journal of Conflict Resolution, 166 Kallen, Horace, 177–78 Kant, Immanuel, 4, 35–36, 37, 165 Kaplan, Morton, 12, 14, 19, 28, 37, 137, 189 Katz, Elihu, 182 Katzenstein, Peter, 27, 28 Kautsky, Karl, 58 Kegley, Charles, 109 Kende, Istvan, 58 Kennan, George, 9, 42, 138 Kennedy, John, 123, 127 Kennedy, Paul, 135 Keohane, Robert, 16, 25, 135 Keynes, John Maynard, 126, 127 Kindleberger, Charles, 134 Kingdom of Hawai‛i, 179 Knecht, Thomas, 154 Knutsen, Torbjörn, 7–8 Kojève, Alexandre, 165

Korea, 9, 106. See also North Korea; South Korea Korean War, 9 Kornhauser, William, 60, 63–68, 64, 65, 70, 77 Kosovo, 120 Krasner, Stephen, 103, 104 Kugler, Jacek, 122, 191, 202 Kuhn, Thomas, 11, 15, 20–21, 37, 38–41, 43, 44, 49, 188, 204 Kuperman, Ranan, 161 laboring class, 4, 51, 52, 52, 53, 54, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 72, 73, 77, 78, 83, 84, 84, 88, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123, 126, 132, 150, 165, 171, 185, 188, 190, 194 laggards, 106 laissez-fair economics. See classical economics Lakatos, Imre, 11, 20, 22 Lake, David, 23, 27, 28, 193 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste, 40 landed gentry, 83 Lasswell, Harold, 11, 62, 191, 202 Latham, Earl, 130 Latin America, 98, 185 Latin American Free Trade Association, 98 Latin American Integration Association, 98 Lauterpacht, Hersch, 8 The Law of Nations, 4 Lawrence, Thomas, 5 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 144, 171, 182, 183 Le Bon, Gustave, 82, 168 leadership, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 109, 110, 141, 170 League of Nations, 6, 7, 8, 93, 94 Lebow, Richard Ned, 159, 176 legislatures, 59, 63, 120, 131, 132, 162, 165, 169 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 188 Leites, Nathan, 175 Lenin, Vladimir, 7, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 78, 94, 113, 163–64, 184

Index

Leo XIII, 4 Lerner, Daniel, 182, 183 Lesotho, 71 levels of analysis, 12, 34, 77, 81, 153, 195, 201 Levy, Marion, 182 Lewin, Kurt, 17, 130, 132 libertarianism, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133 libido, 155 Libya, 78, 140, 204 Lieber, Francis, 4, 5, 7 Lieber Code, 4 Lincoln, Abraham, 4 Lindberg, Leon, 110 Lippitt, Ronald, 130 Lippmann, Walter, 8, 60, 55 Lipsius, Justus, 3 lobbies, 74, 129–31, 169 logic of science, 11, 40 Long, David, 6 Luhmann, Niklas, 194 Luo, Xiaowsei, 188 Luria, Alexander, 158 Luxemburg, Rosa, 58 lynching, 87 Machiavell, Niccolò, 3, 136, 141 macho orientation, 143 Mackinder, Harold, 5, 136, 191 MacKuen, Michael, 146 The Macro Polity, 146 macro-level, 168 macrocosmic realm, 188 macroeconomics, 61, 119 “macropartisanship,” 146 macrosystem, 186 macro-theories. See paradigms Madison, James, 59, 132 mafias, 76 magician metaphor, 43 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 5, 136 mainstream, social, 29, 85, 93 major powers, 4, 6, 57, 76, 93, 107, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 173, 174, 175, 183, 191, 193.

289

See also pole (polarity) malaria, 75 malaise. See alienation Malaysia, 110 Malthus, Thomas, 118 Man, the State, and War, 15 Mannoni, Octave, 184 Mara, Ratu, 110–11 Martel, Charles, 138 Martinique, 184 Marvel, Howard, 132 Marx, Karl, 4, 33, 46, 49, 51–57, 59, 82, 93, 94, 119, 123, 165, 170, 181, 182, 184, 189, 192 Marxian paradigm, 1, 33–34, 52, 54, 51–58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 72, 77, 81, 113, 114, 117, 119, 149, 150, 151, 153, 162, 166 Marxism, 11, 19, 21, 27, 33, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 100, 108, 115. See also Neo-Marxists mass armies, 7, 130, 154 mass media, 16, 54, 54, 60, 61, 76, 105, 132, 133, 145, 146, 170, 192. See also “news” Mass Political Violence, 87 mass society: establishment of, 60–65; international, 74–77, 195 Mass Society paradigm, x, 1, 221, 28, 33–34, 59–79, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 73, 81, 82, 83, 88, 113, 114, 117, 123, 131, 143, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 162, 168, 170, 181, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195 masses, 4, 21, 34, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59–79, 64, 82–88, 130, 143, 147–49, 168 defined, 60, 66 materialism, 36, 44, 45, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 57, 58, 63, 112, 119 Mazaar, Michael, 132–33 maximization, 120, 121, 141, 147, 150 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 90 McAdam, Douglas, 87 McCarthy, Joseph, 61 McClelland, Charles, x, 1, 10, 158

290 Index

McKinley, William, 126 Mead, George Herbert, 168 Mead, Margaret, 175 media. See mass media median voter theorem, 144, 145 mediation, 76, 85, 138, 162 Meernik, James, 166 Meineke, Friedrich, 8 “melting pot,” 177 The Melting Pot, 178 Mendelson, Wallace, 201 mentalism, 45, 46, 49 Mercado Común de la Sur (Mercosur), 112 mercantilism, 118, 126 mercentary armies, 76 Mercury, 49 Merton, Robert, 97 mesosystem, 186 metaconcept, 39, 103 metaphors, 30, 36, 38, 39, 42–43 metaphysics, 10, 15, 26, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 45, 51, 77, 154. See also ontology metatheories. See paradigms Metraux, Rhoda, 175 México, 71, 98 Michael, Sarah, 70 microaggression, 193 microcosmic world, 188 microfinance, 187 microsystem, 186 micro-level, 15, 25, 119, 168 microtheory. See hypotheses mid-level theories, ix, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 50, 197, 199, 204 Middle Ages, 81, 114, 138 middle class, 55, 62, 63, 128 Middle East, 78, 167, 180, 193, 194 middle powers, 5, 136–38, 137, 167, 171, 173, 174, 190, 193 mid-level of power, domestic, 63 migration, 23, 83, 84, 176, 177, 183 Miles, Edward, 106, 107 Milgram, Stanley, 130

Militarized Interstate Disputes database, 14 military alliances, 102, 108, 110 military bases, 75, 164, 165 military coups, 185 military historians, 5 military industrial complex, 62, 63, 126 military personnel, 63, 67, 183 military security. See security, types of military spending, 73, 73, 74, 127, 188, 191 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 4 Mill, John Stuart, 4 mill owners, 132 Millennium Development Goals. See United Nations Mills, C. Wright, 28, 60–65, 68, 76, 77, 78 mimicry, 182 mind-body question, 38 minor powers, 76, 136, 173, 174, 193 minorities, 65, 65, 67, 88, 179, 193 Mintz, Alex, 24, 150 mirror metaphor, 43 Mitrany, David, 8, 89, 93–95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, 109, 110, 114 mobilization, 8, 53, 65, 65, 66, 67, 67, 78, 81–88, 84, 110, 130, 132, 147–50, 190, 194 mobilization, international, 88–112 mobilization stages, 85, 105 mobilization theories, 34, 82–88, 90, 132, 147–49 models, causal, 73 model, mathematical, 129, 145 models, statistical, 145 models, theoretical, 29, 31, 38, 39, 49, 58, 71, 91, 106, 144, 145, 146, 148, 157, 159, 160, 161, 171, 179, 181, 188, 190, 193, 199. See also specific paradigms Modelski, George, 134–35 The Modern World-System, 189 modernization, 55, 68, 70–71, 83, 92, 149, 169, 181–83, 185 Mohammed, 156

Index

monarchies, 4, 141, 142, 143, 179 Mongols, 3 monistic theories, 25, 45, 45, 46, 47 monopolies, 54, 54, 56, 126, 185 Montesquieu, Baron de, 3, 4 Moore, Barrington, 83 Moravia, 90 Morgenthau, Hans, 9, 11, 14, 16, 136–37 Mosca, Gaetano, 100 Mouritzen, Hans, 136 Moynihan, Daniel, 88, 178 Mueller, John, 139, 175 multicultural, 179 multidimensionality, 166 multiethnic, 176 multilateral, 108 multimethodology, 1, 13, 44, 199, 200, 202, 203 multinational movements, 4–5 multiple advocacy, 160 multiple regression, 200 multipolarity, 133, 134, 136, 137 multi-stage scenarios, 52, 56, 107, 120, 155, 159, 161, 181 multistate world, 4, 5, 183. See also international system multivariate analysis, 73 Muslims, 88 Mussolini, Benito, 54 mutiny metaphor, 43 mutual accommodation, 96, 96, 110 mutual predictability, 91, 92, 96 mutual responsiveness, 91, 92, 96, 110 mutual support, 111 Myanmar. See Burma Myrdal, Gunnar, 178 Nader, Ralph, 130 Nagel, Ernest, 20 Napoléon, Louis, 53 Napoléon Bonaparte, 136 Napoleonic Wars, 4 nation building, 79, 90 nation-state system, 3, 4, 19, 34, 81, 90, 94, 153, 163, 172–73, 183, 190, 192

291

nation-states, 1, 3, 4, 55, 57, 74, 75, 89, 90, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 108, 122, 136, 153, 192, 193 national autonomy, 68–69 national economies, 6, 25, 47, 118, 164, 188, 189, 190, 192 national identity, 90, 91, 93, 108, 156, 174, 175 national interest, 71, 75, 92, 95, 96, 99, 114, 115, 120, 183 national level of analysis, 172, 181–88, 192 national origin, 125, 142, 160, 171, 187 national security. See security, types of national sovereignty, 95 Nationalism and Social Communication, 90 nationalism, 4, 8, 13, 19, 23, 56, 57, 93, 96, 97, 99, 108, 112, 113, 133, 148, 154, 193, 195 nationalization, 54 nations, types of: core, 76, 189, 190; center, 163; non-core, 101; periphery, 76, 100, 163, 189, 190; semiperiphery, 189, 190 natural sciences, 36, 37, 44, 188 natural selection, 5, 124, 128 Nau, Henry, 31 naval quarantine, 123 Nazis, 21, 63, 72, 89, 99 Nechayev, Sergei, 78 negotiations, 4, 16, 82, 86, 86, 87, 89, 94, 96, 105, 106, 107, 120, 122, 123, 137, 139, 140, 147, 162, 192 Neobehavioral Political Science, x, 33 neobehavioralism, 1, 31, 197, 200–5 neocolonialism, 185 neofascism, 148 Neofunctional paradigm, 13, 95–99, 96, 110, 111, 113 neoliberalism, 16, 20, 25, 27 Neo-Marxists, 55, 58, 63, 89 neorealism, 19, 20 neotraditionalism, 13, 15, 30

292 Index

Netherlands, 118, 134 networks, social, 30, 61, 62, 63, 72–73, 76, 85, 86, 95, 101, 103, 113, 132, 155, 183, 194 Networks of Nations, 30 neuroscience, 150, 155, 156, 158 neurotic behavior, 184 neutralist foreign policy, 7 “new ghetto man,” 82 New International Economic Order, 8, 164, 185 the New World, 4, 178 “new world order,” 6, 22, 89, 93, 94, 179, 193 Newtonian physics, 49, 129 Nexon, Daniel, 20, 29 Nightingale, Florence, 4 nihilism, 25, 28, 65 Nixon, Richard, 16 nominalism, 35, 40 Nonaligned Movement, 109, 111 nondecisions, 120, 121, 140, 161 nonelites. See masses nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 8, 22, 76, 103, 106, 120, 146, 153, 198. See also civil society noninterference principle, 111, 172 non-state actors, 19, 75, 192 nonviolent conflict resolution, 74, 87, 88 nonvoting, 144, 145, 176 norm convergence, 104 norm diffusion, 104, 183 norm entrepreneurs. See entrepreneurs, types of norm internalization, 173, 175, 179 norm subsidiarity, 21, 75, 77, 109, 114 normalization, diplomatic, 107 normative analysis, 7, 20, 22, 29, 30, 66, 67, 69, 99, 104, 133, 138, 203 “normative interaction,” 175 normative malintegration, 67 normative neutrality, 132 normlessness, 83. See also alienation norms, types of:

cultural, 81, 108, 145, 147, 167, 168, 175; democratic, 4, 180, 183; human rights, 180; policy, 7, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 75, 77, 103, 104, 105, 109, 114, 135, 173, 174, 175, 179, 180; religious, 19, 167; scientific, 12, 31, 38, 39, 43. See also integration, normative normal science, 40 North, Robert, 10, 155, 156, 164 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 183 North Atlantic, 91, 183, 191 North Korea, 6, 9, 107, 139 Norway, 186 Novak, Michael, 178 nuclear weapons, 8, 10, 14, 22, 134, 128, 139, 140–41, 183 Nye, Joseph, 16, 22, 99, 111, 134, 135 Nyun, U, 109 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 185 Obama, Barack, 127, 160 oceans, 104 October Revolution, 78 The Old Regime and the French Revolution, 53 Olson, Mancur, 91, 113 Olson, Richard, 159 ontology, 5, 26, 28, 35, 36, 40–41, 43, 44–48, 45, 50, 57, 113, 154, 162. See also metaphysics Onuf, Nicholas, 27, 195 open diplomacy. See diplomacy, open “open economy politics,” 28 open societies, 72 operational codes, 26, 110, 112, 175, 201 operationalization, 10, 12, 14, 15, 23, 26, 31, 199, 200 options analysis, 119, 120, 121, 121, 123, 131, 140, 143, 145, 146, 155, 159, 160, 161, 200 organizational decline, 85 organizational model, 160, 161

Index

Organski, A.F. Kenneth, 13, 122, 137– 38, 181, 191 Oshima, Harry, 169 other, definition, 168 outcomes, 19, 34, 63, 84, 87, 103, 105, 107, 118, 120, 121, 121, 122, 123, 126, 138, 141, 150, 159, 161, 162, 179, 191 overload, psychological, 158 overpopulation, 118, 164, 165 Owen, Robert, 4 Pacific islands, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 111 Pacific Way, 110, 111 Pakistan, 90, 186 paleontology, 162 Palestine, 99 pan-European, 90, 92 Papua New Guinea, 167 paradigm, defined, 12 paradigm consciousness, ix, x, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20–25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33–50, 155, 197, 199, 200, 202–5 paradigm development, ix, x, 1, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20–21, 28, 29, 30, 33–50, 78, 107, 203 paradigms. See specific paradigms paradiplomacy. See diplomacy, paradiplomacy Paraguay, 98 parallelism, 45, 45, 49 parallelogram of forces, 129, 130, 131, 132 Parenti, Michael, 178 Pareto, Vilfredo, 62, 83, 100 Park, Robert, 41, 178 Parks, Rosa, 67, 85 Parsons, Talcott, 41, 66, 68, 169, 175, 194 participation-orientated movements, 82, 88, 148 Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, 150 pattern maintenance function, 169

293

Paul, Ron, 128 Pavlovna, Elena, 4 payoff structure, 106 payoff, economic, 106, 145, 182 payoffs, political, 82, 105, 106, 115, 143, 144, 145, 179, 182 payoffs, symbolic, 43, 142, 179 peace, goal of, 5, 6, 9, 13, 19, 34, 57, 61, 74, 84, 94, 105, 108, 111, 112, 114, 122, 135, 137, 139, 165, 166, 199, 200, 205 peace, 92: “democratic peace,” 22–23, 28, 143, 159, 165–67, 204: protected peace, 93: working peace, 93: zone of peace, 112 peace building, 7, 16, 89, 90, 93 Peace of Westphalia, 3, 136 Peace on the March, 93 peace studies, 24 peace through strength, 137 peaceful change, 91 Pecquet, Antoine, 3 Peltzman, Sam, 131 Penfield, Wilder, 47 Penn, William, 4 people’s democracy. See democracy, types of Pepitone, Albert, 130 periphery, 76, 100, 163, 189, 190 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5 Permanent Court of International Justice, 7 persecution, 61, 65, 65 Perú, 98 Philippines, 126 Philipps, Warren, 17, 21 Phillips, Charles, 145 physicalism, 45, 46 Plato, 3 pleasure. See hedonism pluralism, types of: cultural (See Cultural Pluralism paradigm);

294 Index

methodological, 26, 61, 179 (See also multimethodology); political, 63, 85, 92, 93, 95, 98, 102, 131; social/societal, 65, 68, 70, 77, 85; theoretical, 26 pluralistic communities, 91, 100, 102, 103 plurality, 141 Poland, 10 polarization, ideological, 67, 108, 193 pole (polarity), types of: bipolarity, 109, 134, 138, 167; loose polarity, 133, 135; multipolarity, 133, 134, 136, 137; unipolarity, 133, 134, 135, 137 policy change, 131, 148 policy effectiveness, 155 policy entrepreneurs. See entrepreneurs, types of policy reviewing, 155 poliheuristic decision-making, 74, 120, 121, 159 political campaigns, 78, 127, 143, 144, 145, 146, 171 political candidates, 64, 79, 126, 128, 131, 143, 144, 145, 145, 146, 149, 171 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 91 Political Community at the International Level, 90 political economy, 24, 123, 193 The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, 123 political instability, 68, 69, 70 political opportunity, 85 Political Order in Changing Societies, 68, 71 political participation, 68, 69–71, 144, 182. See also voting political parties, 39, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 69–71, 74, 78, 79, 83, 84, 96, 107, 124, 133, 143, 144, 145, 145, 146, 148, 169, 171, 177

political pluralism. See pluralism, types of Political Process paradigm, 154, 160–62 political science, x, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 25, 27, 71, 77, 99, 103, 129, 132, 144, 158, 169 political scientists, 4, 11, 12, 14, 16, 40, 62, 68, 71, 78, 85, 89, 95, 103, 122, 145, 158, 169 Political Society paradigm, 27 political sociology, 24. See also sociology political survival, 141–43 political theory, 12. See also specific theories political unification, 91, 92, 98–102 political unification, defined, 100 Political Unification, 99 Political Unification paradigm, 99–102. See also unification, political Political Unification Revisited, 102 political unions, types of: assimiliationist, 93; egalitarian, 101–2; functional, 102; identive, 102; military, 102; supranational, 93 politicians, 11, 62, 94, 96, 96, 97, 99, 104, 122, 184 politics, ethnic, 23, 176, 177, 178 politics, group, 63 politics, racial, 176, 184 politics, sector of, 7, 34, 40, 52, 61, 69, 82, 84, 88, 96, 107, 110, 113, 118, 123, 124, 129, 173, 186, 194 Politics Among Nations, 136 The Politics of Mass Society, 64 polity. See politics, sector of Polity and Society, x, 15, 24, 25, 33 polity database, 14 polyarchy. See democracy, types of poorer citizens, 53, 63, 75, 87, 124, 126, 127, 128, 145, 164, 185, 186, 187 Poor Laws, 118 Popkin, Samuel, 145

Index

Popper, Karl, 37 popular consultation, 190 “popular excitement,” 85 population, 40, 72, 91, 101, 118, 119, 164, 176 “population bomb,” 164 population pressure, 164–65 Portugal, 134, 135, 184 positionalism, 62 positivism, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 31, 35–37, 38, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 200 post-Communist countries, 24, 65, 189 postbehavioralism, 16–17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 31, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205 post-capitalist stages, 56 post-Communist countries, 65. See also specific countries postmodernism, 35, 46–47, 49, 108 postpositivism, 15, 35, 37, 50, 200 post-revolutionary government, 56 poststructuralism, 35, 46–47, 49 Posvar, Wesley, 10 Potter, Pitman, 7, 93 Pouliot, Vincent, 108 poverty, 25, 59, 63, 70, 88, 127, 187, 188 power: defined, 62; need for, 155; sources of, 62, 100, 122 power, types of: asymmetric, 91; coercive, 86, 87, 99, 100, 102, 135, 140, 164, 172, 174, 183, 194; colonial, 51, 55–56, 58, 59, 82, 90, 133–34, 184, 186; concentrated, 10, 61, 62, 68, 75, 87, 102; delegated, 68, 97, 98; diffused, 62, 65, 86, 102, 103, 131; divided, 98, 103, 132; economic power, 77, 132, 134, 135, 136, 140, 194; external, 90, 101, 148, 172, 181, 182;

295

institutional, 7, 8, 34, 62, 70, 97, 98, 113, 157, 160, 170, 195; instrumental, 191; “invisible power,” 59, 79; maritime, 5, 136; mid-level, 63 (See also middle power); military, 16, 26, 69, 74, 89, 91, 128, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 154, 162, 163, 164, 180, 188, 192, 203; national, 5, 75, 91, 93, 103, 137, 163–64, 174, 191; political, 64, 66, 77, 82, 84, 95, 104, 178; preponderant (hegemonic), 122, 123, 133–36, 163, 172, 177, 184, 195 (See also rationality, types of); productive, 195; revolutionary, 52, 56, 59, 69; rising (growing), 102, 139, 167, 173, 174, 191, 193; soft power, 135, 180; stable, 102; structural power, 195; supranational, 13, 74, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 103, 115, 135, 192, 195. See also balance of power; influence; major power; middle power; minor power Power and Interdependence, 16 power balancing. See balance of power power center, 69, 155 power elite, 3 The Power Elite, 61, 63 power sharing, 65, 86, 102 power structure, 75, 101, 131, 157, 184 Power Transition, 191 power transition theory, 22, 191 power vacuum, 155 powerlessness, 84, 193 pragmatism, 37, 48 precipitating factors. See stimuli preconditions for economic takeoff, 181

296 Index

preconditions for political unification, 100, 110 predictability, mutual, 91, 96 predictions, 6, 13, 22, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 54, 55, 61, 69–70, 74, 77, 91, 94, 96, 98, 110, 114, 122, 123, 125, 128, 131, 136, 139, 141, 142, 145, 157, 159, 165, 173, 174, 179, 190, 192, 199 predisposition, 130, 170, 171 prejudice, 172 Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, 89 preservation, types of: cultural, 75; economic, 123; environmental, 72, 75, 76, 88, 103, 104, 124, 143, 162, 164, 177, 187; expert, 94, 97, 104, 106, 160; organizational, 148, 160; political power, 75, 136–38, 141–43 press. See mass media pressure, types of: lateral, 164; political, 94, 131 (See also fpressure groups); population, 118, 164–65; social, 129, 160, 170, 172, 178 Pressure Group (Field) Rationality. See rationality, types of pressure groups, 28, 39, 65, 70–71, 74, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93, 94, 129– 33, 142, 160, 169, 180, 186; organized, 65, 70–71, 74, 83, 84, 85, 88, 93, 131, 132, 142, 186; unorganized, 85, 86, 131. See also civil society prestige, 62, 93, 101, 120, 135 prices, 52, 74, 118, 119, 189 The Principles of International Law, 5 prisoner’s dilemma, 42 prisons, 42, 54, 86 private goods, 110, 141, 141, 142 “pro-riot ideology”, 82 probabilities, 121, 145, 158, 167

The Process of Government, 129 process tracing, 31 production, 47, 53, 55, 73, 118, 144, 181, 188 productivity, 118, 119, 130, 147 profit, 29, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 72, 74, 118, 128, 182, 186, 194 proletarianization, 83, 84 proletariat. See laboring class Proliferation Security Initiative, 167 proposition testing, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 29, 30, 37, 39, 43, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 68, 97, 106, 119, 131, 135, 142, 146, 147, 148, 195, 199, 204 prospect theory, 121 prosperity, 34, 53, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77, 92, 114, 118, 120, 149, 180, 186, 193, 194 Protest Mobilization paradigm, 82–88, 86 protest movements. See movements, types of; social movements Protestants, 70, 114, 171, 176 Prussia, 51 psychiatry, psychological elements, 45, 46, 49, 62, 146, 147, 149, 155, 156, 158, 168, 170, 184 psychiatrists, 184, 190 psychiatry, 184 psychoanalysis, 155, 156 psychologists, 63, 121, 157, 158 psychology, 36, 46, 53. See also social psychology public goods, 135, 141–43, 141 public intellectuals, 176, 204 public opinion, 7, 59, 92, 111, 114, 146, 161, 180 Puerto Rico, 126 punctuated equilibrium, 162 pure science, 204 Putnam, Robert, 65 racism, 55, 77, 172, 176 raison d’état, 8

Index

Rapoport, Anatol, 13 Rapoport, Brian, 29, 155 Rational Actor paradigm. See Rational Choice paradigm Rational Choice paradigm, 2, 24, 28, 29, 34, 103, 106, 115, 117–51, 119, 121, 124, 131, 134, 137, 140, 141, 145, 147, 148, 153, 154, 158, 171, 179, 180, 192, 200, 201 rational choice research, 39, 103, 113, 115, 120, 121, 122, 130, 132, 133, 135–37, 141–45, 147, 160 rationalism, empirical (defined), 49 rationality, types of: Balance-of-Power, 22, 122, 128, 136–38, 137, 139, 173, 191; bounded, 121, 160; Classical Economics (laissez-faire), 34, 53, 94, 118–19, 119, 125, 149, 150; collective, 144; consensus, 25; Cost-Benefit (instrumental), 34, 106, 119–23, 121, 141, 149; criteria satifaction, 117; Deterrence, 138–41, 163; formal, 117; Hegemonic, 34, 129, 133–36, 134, 142, 150, 163; legal, 117; Pressure Group (Field), 28, 129–33, 131, 142, 160, 171, 180; Resource Mobilization, 34, 85, 132, 147–49, 148; Selectorate, 34, 123, 141, 141–43; Social Darwinian, 5, 34, 40, 63, 76, 123–29, 124, 133, 134, 137, 149, 150, 176–77; Social Exchange, 34, 146–47, 147, 150; socialization, 173; ultimate, 150; Voting, 34, 143–46, 145, 179 rationalization, 57, 133 Raymond, Gregory, 109

297

realism, types of: ideological, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 138, 158, 200, 205; ontological, 35, 40, 45, 45, 57 “reality,” 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49–50, 51, 91, 107, 118, 154, 155, 156, 177, 195, 199, 203 realpolitik, 5, 6, 89, 90, 136, 167 Reflections on Human Development, 186 Reflections on the Revolution in France, 68 “reflectivism,” 25 reformist ideology, 55 refugees, 114 Regime Building paradigm, 103–8, 106 regime effectiveness, 103–6, 106 regime type. See autocracy; democracy; dictatorship; empire; monarchy; totalitarian rule regimes. See international regimes regional intergovernmental organizations, 91–92, 95–99, 96, 106, 109–12, 114, 153, 173. See also specific regional intergovernmental organizations regional loyalties, 96 Reich, Robert, 192 Reichling, George, 130 reification, 49 Reinsch, Paul, 6, 7, 93 relative deprivation theory, 82 relativity theory, 130, 188 religions, 19, 24, 70, 71, 76, 78, 114, 125, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 180, 190 religious Darwinians, 125 religious institutions, 70, 125 rent seeking, 131 repression, 65, 73, 74, 84, 85, 85, 87, 103, 143. See also suppression resource mobilization, 34, 84, 85, 132, 147–49, 148

298 Index

Resource Mobilization Rationality. See rationality, types of The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, 109 responsiveness, mutual, 91, 96, 110 Reus-Smit, Christian, 27, 28 reverse relationship, 8 revolutionary cadre. See vanguards revolutionary government, 4 revolutions, 8, 12, 52, 55, 66, 82, 83, 83, 85, 149, 190; American, 59; Chinese, 84; Communist (Russian), 56, 78, 84; democratic revolutions, 101; French, 53, 59, 68, 84; peasant, 71; proletarian, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 63, 113, 190; Third World, 77. See also industrial revolution rewards, 92, 100, 105, 141, 147, 150; economic (utilitarian), 91, 101, 101; symbolic (identitive), 91, 101, 101, 145, 173 Ricardo, David, 94, 118–19 Richards, Paul, 176 Richardson, Lewis, 17, 175–76, 191 Rienner, Lynne, 29 Riggs, Fred, 14, 190, 191 rights, individual, 149; children’s rights, 132; civil rights, 16, 61, 70, 87, 88, 127, 142, 180; gay rights, 183; human rights, 4, 19, 22, 23, 72, 73, 75, 88, 103, 104, 124, 132, 150, 179, 180, 182, 193, 200; political (including voting rights), 60, 178; women’s rights, 4, 76, 132, 183; workers’ rights, 4, 84, 150 Riker, William, 141 riot control, 68 riots, 55, 59, 67, 67, 68, 74, 77, 82, 85, 87, 88, 156, 193

rising expectations, 68, 167, 173, 174, 193 Ritzer, George, 40–41 Road Map for normalization of relations, 107 Rockefeller Foundation, 9 Rodbertus, Johann, 53 rogue state, 42, 140 role analysis, 25, 60, 63, 65, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 139, 144, 148, 167, 171, 173–75, 182, 184, 192 Role paradigm, 168, 173–75 role specialization, 60, 182 Romania, 93 Rome, 3, 136. See also Italy Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 126, 127 Roosevelt, Theodore, 5, 126 Rosecrance, Richard, 14, 19, 28 Rosenau, James, 15, 103 Rostow, Walt Whitman, 181, 182 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 190 Ruesch, Jurgen, 25 Russett, Bruce, 73, 166 Russia: post-Soviet, 107, 136, 139, 154, 175, 190, 192, 193; Provisional Government (Russia), 78; Tsarist Russia, 78, 154. See also Soviet Union Ryan, William, 125 Saint-Pierre, Abbé de, 4, 5, 6 Salisbury, Robert, 130–31 sanctions, 73, 105, 106, 132, 143, 157, 180 Sanders, Bernie, 78, 149 SARS, 75 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 190 satisfice, 146, 150 saving, 118, 119 Scandinavia, 58. See also specific countries scapegoating, 65, 65, 67, 72, 73, 77 scepticism, 45, 46

Index

Scheingold, Stuart, 110 Schmitter, Philippe, 98 Schumpeter, Joseph, 188 science, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 30, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 46, 117, 124, 138, 188, 199–200 science, types of: applied (clinical), 199–200, 202, 205; empirical, 20, 199–200, 205; natural, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 150; “normal,” 40; “pure,” 204; social, 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 20, 24, 29, 31, 34–44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 79, 150, 190, 203–4; theoretical, 20, 199–200, 202, 203 scientific methods, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 37, 39, 44, 49, 50 scientific progress, 11, 36, 40, 43, 46, 138 scientific realism, 16 scientific socialism, 33, 51 Scotland, 90, 91 “secondary priming,” 102 scripts, 42 securitization, 156, 167, 187 security, types of: human, 187–88; military, 93, 103, 104, 106; national, 120, 127, 133, 135, 142, 160, 187 security communities, 108; amalgamated, 91, 102, 103; pluralistic, 91, 93, 100, 102, 103; regional, 103. See also military security; regimes, military security studies, 24, 42 segregation, 86, 86, 176, 178, 179 selectorates, 141–43, 150; nominal, 141; real, 141; support (winning coalition), 141–43 Selectorate Rationality. See rationality, types of

299

self-definition. See identity self-sustained drive to maturity, 181 semiperiphery, 189, 190 Sen, Amartya, 186, 187 Sénégal, 71 Serbia, 8, 120, 154 settlement. See conflict resolution Shapiro, Ian, 150 Sharp, Granville, 4 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 5 Sil, Rudra, 27 Silesia, 90 Simmel, Georg, 82 Simmons, Beth, 179 simulation, 140, 145, 159, 162 Singapore, 55, 71 Singer, J. David, x, 12, 14, 19 Six-Party Talks, 107 Skocpol, Theda, 84 Skolnick, Jerome, 66 Smelser, Neil, 66–68, 77, 81 Smith, Adam, 34, 94, 118, 187, 188 Smith, Jeffrey, 145 Smith, Steve, 22, 25, 181 Smith, Winston, 47 Snyder, Richard, 12, 154 Social Capital, 65 social capital, social change, 52, 60, 64, 65, 67, 77, 82, 83, 88, 156, 169, 194 social class, 152, 172. See also elites; laboring class; middle class; upper class social cleavages, 67 social communication, 89–91, 92, 101, 109, 145 social communities, 72, 90 social contract, 133, 193 social control, 60, 66, 67, 67 social credit, 145, 147 Social Darwinism, ix, 5, 34, 63, 123–29, 149, 176–77. See also rationality, types of, Darwinian social distance, 178

300 Index

social disintegration, 82, 168 Social Exchange Rationality. See rationality types of social ferment, 85 social homogeneity, 73 Social Interaction paradigm, 147, 168 The Social Limits to Growth, 109 social movements, 83, 148; alternative, 83; informal, 148; international, 4–5, 39, 60, 83–83, 85, 88; “new social movements,” 74–76, 149; organized, 88, 131, 148, 148; protest, 10, 16, 59, 73, 74, 78, 82, 83, 84, 84, 85, 86, 86, 87, 88, 89, 124, 183, 193; redemptive, 83; reformist, 69, 71, 82, 83, 87, 148, 179; revolutionary, 82, 83, 84–85, 113, 149, 190; transnational, 74, 76; unorganized, 148; value-oriented, 82. See also pressure groups; terrorism social networks, 13, 62, 63, 86, 86, 95 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 83 social pluralism, 68, 70 social psychology, 130, 172, 195 social science. See particular social sciences social sciences, logic of, 37–44 social theories, 28, 113–14. See also specific paradigms and theories Social Theory of International Politics, 113–14 Social Transactions paradigm, 13, 89–93, 92 socialism, 52, 54, 56, 58, 94, 127, 189; democratic socialism, 61, 49; guild socialism, 93;

state capitalism, 56; state socialism, 58; utopian socialism, 51, 93 socialist parties, 65, 96 socialist states, 56, 57, 164. See also specific states socialists, 51, 61, 65, 149, 163, 189 socialization, 95, 150, 169, 170–75, 183, 195; coercive, 172; constructive, 173; international, 95, 173, 174, 180; political, 172, 185; primary, 170–71; rationalist, 173; secondary, 171 Socialization Paradigm, 168, 170–73 societal level of analysis, 12, 168, 168–80 “Society paradigm,” 195 Sociocultural Engineering paradigm, 168, 176–81 socioeconomic change, 84 sociologists, 149, 163, 189 sociology, 24, 40, 60, 61, 66, 77, 78, 83, 99, 100, 168, 168, 169, 170, 179, 190, 191, 194 sociology of knowledge, 37. See also Kuhn, Thomas Solinen, Etel, 183 somatic behavior, 155 Sondermann, Fred, 10 South Africa, 5, 190 South Asia, 24 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, 111 South China Sea, 139 South Korea, 71, 107, 185, 189 South Pacific Commission, 111 South Pacific Forum, 111 Southeast Asia, 21 South-east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 109, 111 Sovereigntists, 75 sovereignty, types of:

Index

absolute, 4, 8; global, 75; national, 3, 89, 93, 95, 102, 136, 192; shared, 93–94; transferred, 89, 93, 102 Soviet Union, 8, 10, 56, 58, 59, 63, 84, 109, 123, 134, 138, 140, 159, 191, 192 Spain, 135 Speier, Hans, 72–73, 77 Spencer, Herbert, 5, 124 Spengler, Oswold, 8 spillback, 11 spillover, 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 112 “spin,” 102 Spinoza, Benedict de, 3 Sri Lanka, 71 stability, types of: domestic, 60, 66, 68, 68–69, 71, 133, 134, 142, 149, 169; international, 101, 102, 105, 133, 134, 134, 135, 136, 137, 137, 149, 150. See also instability Staël, Germaine de, 59 Stages-of-Development paradigm, 181, 182, 186, 188 state building, 90, 172 state capitalism, 56 state socialism, 58 statecraft, 6, 99, 135 statistical research, 14, 16, 23, 77, 84, 137, 145, 150, 165, 166 statistical yearbooks, 15 statistics, 9, 47, 63, 87, 150, 188, 199 steel industry, 96, 101 Steinbruner, John, 121, 141 stereotyping, 16, 172, 176, 178, 179 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, 21, 113 Stern, Eric, 159 Stigler, George, 131 Stimson, James, 141 stimuli, 13, 16, 40, 59, 66, 67, 67, 118, 130, 147, 155, 156, 162, 182 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 4

301

“strain,” 66, 67, 67, 81, 190 Strange, Susan, 107 strategic moves, 65, 83, 87, 100, 107, 123, 136, 138, 148, 148, 161, 189. See also deterrence The Strategy of Social Protest, 87 status quo, 140 Streit, Clarence, 165 stress, 155, 155, 158, 159 strikes, military, 121 strikes, worker, 54, 123 structural violence, 25, 164 Structural-Functional paradigm, 168, 168–70 structural conduciveness, 66, 67, 67 structural realism, 29 structural theory, 163 structures, 35, 42, 45, 47, 51, 170. See also agents structures, types of: economic, 163, 190; organizational, 90, 132, 148, 161, 201; political, 169, 179; power, 75, 76, 101, 131, 149, 150, 157, 184; social, 47, 168, 169, 174 Study of History, A, 135 sub-imperial proxies, 57 Sudentenland, 89 suffragette movement, 4 Suharto, General, 110 suicide, 60, 65, 73, 168, 190 Sumner, William Graham, 5, 124, 128–29 Sundelius, Bengt, 159 “superclass”, 76, 104, 105, 195 superego, 155, 156 superexploitation, 55, 58. See also exploitation, economic superpower, 8, 76, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 174, 192, 193. See also hegemons supply-and-demand, 148 supply-side economics, 118, 127, 187.

302 Index

See also economics, trickle-down suppression, 4, 13, 57, 65, 69, 77, 84, 86, 126, 134, 170, 176, 180. See also oppression supranational institutions, 13, 74, 85, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 103, 105, 115, 135, 192, 195 “surplus value,” 52, 54, 55, 185. See also profits surrender of sovereignty, 89, 93 survival, political, 124, 128–29, 141–43, 149 “survival of the fittest,” 124, 124 Sweezy, Paul, 55, 58, 63 Switzerland, 178 Sylvester, Christine, 23 symbolic (identitive) gratification, 101 Symbolic Interaction paradigm, 168, 168, 170 Syria, 1, 78 System and Process in International Politics, 189 System, definitons, 188 system level of analysis, 25, 28, 188–95 “system model,” 146 systems theory, general, 12, 39, 188, 189 systems, types of: cultural, 175; economic, 51, 52, 53, 56, 58, 81, 94, 165, 170, 192; exosystem, 186; legal, 170; macrosystem, 186; mesosystem, 186; microsystem, 186; political, 14, 27, 85, 129, 149, 169; self-system, 182; social, 13, 66, 169, 190, 194. See also anti-systemic forces; early warning systems; international system; nation-state system; unit-veto system; value systems; World-System paradigm

‘t Hart, Paul, 159 tactical moves, 56, 84, 86, 87, 130, 148, 161 Taft, William Howard, 126 tariffs, 111, 118, 126, 166 technocrats, 93, 95, 96, 99, 104, 109, 110, 112 technological change. See economic growth tenure in office, 140, 141, 141–43 Terhalle, Maximillian, 173 territorial disputes, 5, 6, 91, 122, 140, 159, 163, 176 terrorism, 1, 4, 77, 78, 102, 140, 180, 183, 193, 194 Teune, Henry, 19 Textor, Robert, 9 Thailand, 182 Theory of Collective Behavior, 66 Theory of International Politics, 19, 176 Third World, 27, 68, 69, 70, 73, 77, 107, 109, 111, 112, 119, 129, 135, 164, 165, 169, 176, 181, 185, 186, 187, 189, 193, 194 Thirty Years War, 136 threats, 64, 96, 113, 138–40, 140, 157, 158, 159 Thucydides, 3, 136 Tickner, Arlene, 28 Tilly, Charles, 83–85 tipping point, 53 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 53 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 96 totalitarian rule, 34, 63, 64, 64, 65, 65, 68 Toynbee, Arnold, 135 trade, 5, 6, 8, 92, 98, 103, 105, 106, 111, 118, 132, 143, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166, 185, 193, 196 trade unions, 11, 65, 82–85, 96 trade-offs, 5, 71 “traditional society,” 60, 64, 170, 181, 182, 194 transaction costs 105, 106, 148

Index

transnational corporations, 74, 120, 192, 194, 199 traditional international studies, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 25, 103, 187 transnational civil society. See global civil society transnational communication. See global media transnational communites, 114 transnational governance. See global governance transnational professionals, 105. See also epistemic communities transnational social movements. See social movements, transnational Transparency International, 105 treaties, 109, 111, 120, 136, 162, 173, 179, 180, 182, 183 Treischke, Heinrich von, 6, 128 trickle-down economics. See supplyside economics triumphalism, defined, 123–24 triumphalism, 5, 16, 124 125, 126, 128, 133, 134. See also Social Darwinism Trotsky, Leon, 57 Truman, David, 28, 130–31 Truman, Harry, 126 Trump, Donald, 63, 78, 128, 149 Tullock, Gordon, 131 Turkey, 71, 123, 161, 182 Turner, Frederick Jackson, 177 Turner, John, 169 Twain, Mark, 5 The Twenty Years Crisis, 7 “two worlds” explanation, 76 Ukraine, 175 ul Haq, Mahbub, 186 unemployment, 1, 47, 72–74, 73, 128, 142 unification: identitive, 102; military, 102; political, 91, 92, 98–102, 101 Union Now, 165

303

unit-veto system, 14 United Arab Republic, 99 United Nations, 10, 22, 93, 94, 109, 112, 135, 157; Charter, 109; UN Development Program (UNDP), 186, 188; UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 109; UN Millennium Development Goals, 187–88; World Health Organization, 75 United States: Alabama, 67, 85; American Revolution, 59; anti-trust laws, 126; California, 10, 15; Chicago, 129; cities, 184; citizenship, 174, 184; Civil Rights Movement, 16, 67, 70, 88; Columbia University, 61, 68, 143; Constitution, 59, 132; Continental Congress, 59; culture, 11, 177–78, 194; Democratic Party, 6, 61, 127, 128, 133, 171; desegregation, 86, 179; East Coast scholars, ix, 9, 10; economy, 71, 74, 105, 126, 127, 128, 165, 184, 185, 194; elites, 52, 54, 60, 62, 62, 64, 68, 83, 84, 101, 105, 184; foreign policy, x, 5, 7, 16, 23, 74, 91, 101, 107, 120, 123, 126, 134, 135, 159, 165, 165, 167, 180, 192; ghettos, 82; government, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 21, 22, 23, 56, 61, 63–64, 68, 68, 71, 73, 75, 91, 120, 126–27, 129, 132, 134, 135, 160, 165, 166, 175, 177, 179, 182; Great Society programs, 127; Harvard University, 68; history, 177;

304 Index

House of Representatives, 127, 132; immigration, 176–77; Ivy League, 61; Johns Hopkins University, 129; Ku Klux Klan, 77; McCarthyism, 62, 68; McKinley Tariff, 126; Medicare, 127; military bases, 75, 164, 165; Missouri, 67; New Haven, Connecticut, 131; New York, 10, 68; New York Times, 16; Northeastern states, 6; Northwestern University, 10; Pennsylvania, 176; political culture, 87; politics, 8, 11, 16, 61, 63, 70, 74, 78, 87, 88, 126–28, 129, 169, 182; presidents, 4, 5, 16, 62, 120, 123, 126, 127, 128, 132, 133, 146, 160; race relations, 77, 82, 87, 88, 184; Republican Party, 6, 61, 63, 126, 127, 128, 133, 146, 171; religions, 70; San Francisco Bay Area, 10; security clearance, 11; Senate, 4; Southern states, 6; Stanford University, 10, 15; state’s rights, 77; Supreme Court, 4; “silent generation”, 10; Texas, 61; U.S. Steel Corporation; University of California, 20, 63, 99; University of Chicago, 9, 63, 69, 99; University of Michigan, 10, 143, 145; War on Poverty, 88; Washington, DC, 10; Washington Post, 16; West Coast, 10, 17; Yale University, 14. See also Americans United States of Europe, 95

The Uniting of Europe, 95 Universal Communitarian Association, 108 University of Glasgow, 118 unrest, social, 54, 60, 64, 65, 65, 67, 68, 68, 77, 168 upper class, 61, 62 uprooted, 64, 64 upward and downward communications, 101–2 urban areas, 52, 67, 68, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 143, 170, 176, 182, 184 urbanization, 83, 84, 84, 86, 92, 182 Urpelainen, Johannes, 180 Uruguay, 98 utilitarianism, 99, 100, 101, 117 utility maximization, 141 utopia, 189. See also socialism, types of validation, 31, 36, 106, 130, 131, 165, 167 validity, defined, 104 value compatibility, 91, 92, 96, 98, 101 value systems, 64, 194 vanguards, 2, 54, 54, 56, 84, 113 Vasquez, John, 138, 200 Vattel, Emmerich de, 4 Venice, 135 vertical interaction, Yaakov, 164 Vertzberger, Yaakov, 154 Vietnam, 16, 64, 68, 107, 110 violence, precipitants of, 6 violence, types of: domestic, 54, 55, 65, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72–74, 77, 83, 84, 86, 87, 100, 123, 159; international, 25, 33, 48, 60, 65, 73, 77, 114, 138–39, 156, 158, 164, 203; police, 87; structural, 25, 164 Visigoths, 3 Voltaire, 4 voting, x, 40, 65, 114, 127, 130, 141, 143–46, 145, 149, 150, 178, 179.

Index

See also elections Voting Rationality. See rationality, types of wages, 53, 54, 55, 118, 119 Wales, 91 Walker, Stephen, 175, 201 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 12, 189–90, 195 Waltz, Kenneth, 12, 15, 19–22, 26, 28, 47, 137 war crimes, 193 War Ledger, 191 warfare, rules of, 4 “war of all against all,” 133 wars, support for, 8, 55–57, 73, 154 wars, types of: absolute, 72; agonistic, 72; civil, 9, 16, 64, 68, 78, 107, 110, 123, 163, 183, 195; colonial/imperialistic, 56–58; diversionary, 54, 56, 72–74, 156, 157; foreign (international), 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 16, 19, 23, 26, 28, 51, 55–56, 57–58, 61, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 89, 91, 92, 95, 108, 110, 112, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130, 132, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 140, 143, 155–56, 158, 159, 164, 165, 166, 173, 175–76, 189, 191, 193, 199, 200, 203; instrumental, 72; just war, 3; “new wars,” 193; nuclear, 10, 22, 134, 138, 157; proxy, 139, 140; total war, 7. See also specific wars wars, analysis of war-making industry, 74 waterboarding, 180 Weatherford, Stephen, 154 Weber, Max, 20, 41, 60, 62, 100, 117 we-feeling, 91, 92, 92, 101 wealth: national, 5, 6, 34, 55, 69, 71, 118, 187; personal, 52, 62, 127, 145, 191

305

Weizel, Christian, 188 welfare: human, 92, 104; social, 95, 123 welfare state, 58, 126, 127, 128, 172, 186 Wendt, Alexander, 28, 47, 113–14, 139, 173 Wesley, John, 4 Western bias, 109, 112, 181 Western countries, 3, 56, 64, 71, 92, 109, 167, 184, 194 Western Europe, 13, 64, 92, 95, 96, 100 wheat production, 118 Wheaton, Henry, 5 White, Ralph, 130 Whites. See Caucasians Whytock, Christopher, 140 “widening circles.” See spillover Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, 159 Williams, Michael, 28 Wilson, Woodrow, 6, 7, 89, 126, 156 winning coalition, 141–43, 179 withinputs, 104, 169 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 11 Wivel, Anders, 136 Wolin, Sheldon, 195 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 4 women, entrepreneurial, 187 women’s groups/movements, 75, 142, 183. See also feminism Woolf, Leonard, 6, 7, 93 working class. See laboring class working peace, 93 World Bank, 76, 186, 187 World Commission on Dams, 75 world constitution, 89, 103 World Court. See Permanent Court of Arbitration; Permanent Court of International Justice world culture. See culture, world world government, 81, 89, 90, 93, 94, 94, 165 World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 14

306 Index

World-System paradigm, 189–90 world trade. See trade World Trade Organization, 103, 105, 106, 121 World War I, 1, 6, 7, 55, 56, 72, 89, 90, 93, 121, 147, 154–56, 177, 191 World War II, 7, 8, 9, 11, 64, 72, 79, 89, 93, 95, 96, 112, 130, 134, 136, 164, 172, 184, 191 World War III, 13, 92, 94

World-System paradigm, 24 Wright, Quincy, 7, 8 Yemen, 78 Young, Oran, 105 Young, Robert 158 Yunus, Muhammad, 186, 187 Zika virus, 75 Zimmern, Alfred, 6, 7, 8 Znaniecki, Florian, 169

About the Author

Political scientist Michael Haas is a Nobel Peace Prize nominee for his work on behalf of human rights. The author of more than fifty books on government and politics, he holds a doctorate from Stanford University and has taught at Northwestern University, Purdue University, the University of California (Riverside), five campuses of California State University, Occidental College, and for thirty-five years was Professor of Political Science at the main campus of the University of Hawai‛i. Among his recent publications are Asian and Pacific Regional Cooperation, the textbook International Human Rights, Mr. Calm and Effective: An Evaluation of the Presidency of Barack Obama, and How to Demolish Racism. Currently retired from teaching to keep up with demands for his innovative scholarship, he is President of the Political Film Society in Los Angeles.

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