International Organization 9780754626749, 9781315251981

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International Organization

The Library of Essays in Global Governance Titles in the Series: Global Health John J. Kirton Global Law John J. Kirton with Jelena Madunic Global Trade John J. Kirton International Finance John J. Kirton International Organization John J. Kirton

International Organization

Edited by

John J. Kirton University of Toronto, Canada

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Croup

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Ox on OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © John J. Kirton 2009. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice:

Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the original printing, but these can themselves be of very variable quality. Whilst the publisher has made every effort to ensure the quality of the reprint, some variability may inevitably remain. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data International Organization. — (The library of essays in global governance) 1. International Organization I. Kirton, John J. 341.2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008924577 ISBN 9780754626749 (hbk)

Contents Acknowledgements Editor's Preface Introduction PART I

OVERVIEWS OF THE FIELD

1 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie (1986), 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', International Organization, 40, pp. 753-75. 2 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons (1998), 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', International Organization, 52, pp. 729-57'. 3 John Duffield (2007), 'What are International Institutions?', International Studies Review, 9, pp. 1-22. PART II

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3 27 57

CORE CONCEPTS AND COMPETING THEORIES

4 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1987), 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', International Organization, 41, pp. 725-53. 5 Stephen D. Krasner (1982), 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', International Organization, 36, pp. 185-205. 6 John Gerard Ruggie (1983), 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', International Organization, 36, pp. 379^ 15. 7 Robert O. Keohane (1988), 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly, 32, pp. 379-96. 8 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan (1991), 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16, pp. 114-61. 9 John J. Mearsheimer (1994-95), 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 19, pp. 5—49.

81 Ill 133 171 189 237

PART III NEW DIRECTIONS 10 Peter M. Haas (1992), 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', International Organization, 46, pp. 1-35. 11 Robert W. Cox (1992), 'Multilateralism and World Order', Review of International Studies, 18, pp. 161-80. 12 G. John Ikenberry (2003), 'Is American Multilateralism in Decline?', Perspectives on Politics, 1, pp. 533-50.

285 321 341

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13 Emanuel Adler (1997), 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 26, pp. 249-77. 14 Thomas G. Weiss (2000), 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges', Third World Quarterly, 21, pp. 795-814. 15 Chadwick Alger (2002), 'The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly', Global Governance, 8, pp. 93-117.

359 389 409

PART IV COMPLIANCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION 16 Robert D. Putnam (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games', International Organization, 42, pp. 427-60. 17 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999), 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', International Organization, 53, pp. 699-732.

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Name Index

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Acknowledgements The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material. Cambridge University Press for the essay: G. John Ikenberry (2003), 'Is American Multilateralism in Decline?', Perspectives on Politics, 1, pp. 533-50. Copyright © 2003 American Political Science Association. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. for the essay: Chadwick Alger (2002), 'The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly', Global Governance, 8, pp. 93-117. Copyright © 2002 Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Sage Publications Ltd for the essay :EmanuelAdler( 1997),'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 26, pp. 249-77. Copyright © 1997 Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Taylor & Francis for the essay: Thomas G. Weiss (2000), 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges', Third World Quarterly, 21, pp. 795-814. Copyright © 2000 Third World Quarterly. Wiley-Blackwell for the essays: John Duffield (2007), 'What are International Institutions?', International Studies Review, 9, pp. 1-22. Copyright © 2007 International Studies Association; Robert O. Keohane (1988), 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly, 32, pp. 379-96. Copyright © 1988 International Studies Association; World Peace Foundation for the essays: Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie (1986), ' International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', International Organization, 40, pp. 753-75. Copyright © 1986 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons (1998), 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', International Organization, 52, pp. 729-57. Copyright © 1998 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1987), 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', International Organization, 41, pp. 725-53. Copyright © 1987 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stephen D. Krasner (1982), 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', International Organization, 36, pp. 185-205. Copyright © 1982 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; John Gerard Ruggie (1983), 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', International Organization, 36, pp. 379^15. Copyright © 1983 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Peter M. Haas (1992), 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', International Organization, 46, pp. 1-35. Copyright © 1992 World Peace Foundation and

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert D. Putnam (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', International Organization, 42, pp. 427-60. Copyright © 1988 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999), 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', International Organization, 53, pp. 699-732. Copyright © 1999 World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.

Editor's Preface This volume on international organization is one of five works prepared for the International Library series on global governance in the major fields of international relations today. As with the other volumes, it assembles in one easily accessible collection the most important articles that have shaped scholarship in the field in the post-Second World War years. Scholarship in international organization has been importantly driven by theory, research, reviews and commentaries published in books, edited volumes, research reports, working papers from research institutions, reports from national governments and international organizations, and increasingly from pieces made available directly on the internet. However, this collection contains only those works published in scholarly journals, above all those peer-reviewed, English-language journals that stand at the centre of the disciplines that make up the field. The focal point is those essays that have defined and driven the debates, theories and research in political science, while recognizing that there is a great diversity of important scholarship within this discipline and the many subfields and approaches which now make it up. Moreover, this collection, as with the field of international organization in political science and international relations, also draws from a rich interdisciplinary inheritance, starting with works from the major social sciences disciplines of economics, sociology, management studies and law. To select the most important pieces of enduring value from this rich inheritance required a systematic review comprising several stages. The first was to compile a list of the classic essays most used in reading lists in relevant courses as I encountered them as a student in my undergraduate through graduate school years, and then as a teacher in my own courses in international relations and global governance taught over a period of thirty years at the University of Toronto, from the sophomore to the Ph.D. level. The second step was to check this list against the essays most cited and used in the major textbooks and monographs on international organization in use today. The third step was to undertake a thorough review of the major journals in the field and in the discipline and field more generally to ensure that key works were not overlooked and to see which had endured as the most referenced and referred to over many years. The fourth step was to check through several indexes of the works most cited by scholars today. The final step was to send the resulting list out to several trusted colleagues who are acknowledged leaders in the international organization field, asking them to confirm the selections or adjust them with additions or deletions they might propose. Even with these procedures, I was left with far too many attractive, indeed compelling, candidates than the 500-page limit for this book allowed. A little relief came from sending pieces that deserved inclusion here for inclusion in the parallel volumes I was producing on Global Law, International Finance, Global Trade and Global Health. Another was to set aside works whose strongest claim is from their contribution to international relations theory as a whole, rather than the field of international organization itself, while recognizing that the latter has done so much to define international relations theory and above all its liberal institutionalist approach. Finally, many strong candidates had to be excluded due to the need

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to reflect the diversity of traditions and journals in the field, rather than rely too heavily on one, no matter how central and durably distinguished that one might be. In preparing this volume, I have been assisted by several individuals whose contribution I gratefully acknowledge here. At Ashgate I am indebted to Kirstin Howgate, who first proposed this project, and to Dymphna Evans, who took it forward and waited with exceptional patience and understanding until it was done. I acknowledge the important role of Madeline Koch, Managing Editor of the G8 Research Group, in securing essays and providing editorial assistance, and of Laura Sunderland, Senior Researcher of the G8 Research Group, in scanning journals and books, obtaining candidate essays and otherwise helping me assess and select them. I owe much to my faculty colleagues in the Colloquium on International Organization held at the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto from 1977 to 1985. I acknowledge with particular pleasure the intellectual contribution of Professors Harriet Friedmann and Rima Berns-McGown, with whom I have taught a graduate seminar on 'International Governance' at the University of Toronto since 1999.1 am particularly grateful to Emanuel Adler, Steven Bernstein, Andy Knight and John Ruggie for their thoughtful responses to my collegial request for an informal refereeing of my candidate list. I have done my best to incorporate their much valued wisdom in this final version of the work. Any shortcomings in this book remain, of course, entirely my own. In conclusion, I owe more than I can express to the many exceptional students in my seminar on International Governance, who were a constant source of insight and inspiration for me to explore ever more broadly and deeply the field of international organization as it has evolved to this day. It is with great pride and pleasure that I dedicate this book to them, and to their colleagues who will join me in the course in the years to come. JOHN KIRTON University of Toronto, Canada

Introduction Since the very start of systematic inquiry into the subject of international politics, scholars have been centrally concerned with international organizations, institutions and regimes why they are created and change, how and why they operate, and the impact they have on states and the global community as a whole. From Thucydides (1954) through to Immanuel Kant (1985) to the present, there has been an ongoing interest on the part of scholars and practitioners about how international organizations and institutions work, and how they can be improved to build a better world (O'Neal and Russett, 1999). During the twentieth century, this effort first came to focus on the formal multilateral intergovernmental bodies in the new League of Nations born in 1918 (MacMillan, 2002). It proceeded to explore the successor United Nations (UN) formed in 1945 (Kennedy, 2006). And it extended to examine the many functional bodies that arose before, along with and after them to form the galaxy of organized global governance of the time (E. Haas, 1964). In more recent decades, even as the number, range and reach of formal bodies has proliferated, attention has expanded to concentrate on more informal international institutions and regimes, and, increasingly, on the broadest conception of global governance writ large. As it has done so, the field has become central to the development of the discipline of international politics as a whole. Scholarly attention and analysis has been further fuelled by the vast increase in the volume and variety of international organizations, as they have proliferated in number and character much more vibrantly than the sovereign territorial states that had long dominated a Westphalian world. The world's multilateral intergovernmental organizations expanded from under 100 in 1945 to around 200 in 1960 and well over 600 by 1980 (Keohane, 1990, p. 731). The number grew by two-thirds from 1985 to 1999 (Ikenberry, Chapter 12, p. 344, this volume). The number of global treaties increased more than threefold from 1970 to 1997. The number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with consultative status with the UN through its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) increased from a mere 41 in 1948 to 377 in 1968 to 1,350 in 1990, and over 1,400 NGOs were accredited to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio in 1992 (Alger, Chapter 15, p. 411, this volume). The arrival of civil society moved them well beyond their involvement in formal intergovernmental organizations to the creation of multi-stakeholder institutions and informal multilevel governance beyond (Scholte, 2000). The scholarly field has evolved to keep up. With the big bang in formal, multilateral intergovernmental organization-building in the 1940s, the first generation of scholars optimistically focused on the structure and new organizations of the new UN system, employing a legal-institutional approach (Goodrich, 1947). It was increasing tempered by realism and behaviouralism as the Cold War came (Fox, 1951; Hoffman, 1956; Claude, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1984; Alker and Russett, 1965; Cox and Jacobson, 1973). With the onset of the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the second generation retreated to regionalism in the economic integration in Europe, in the political community across the North Atlantic and in the co-operation unfolding in functional institutions of broader

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membership and global reach (Deutsch, 1957; E.Haas, 1964; Nye, 1971; Goldstein, 1996). As the Cold War thawed and plurilateral, summit-level bodies such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Group of Seven (G7) major market democracies arose, the third generation turned to explore global interdependence and the broader dynamics behind and within more informal international institutions and regimes (Keohane and Nye, 1972; Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Kupchan and Kupchan, Chapter 8 and 1995; Jervis, 1992; Bayne, 2005). And when the Cold War ended in 1989 with a brief belief that the UN could finally function as its founders intended, the emphasis shifted to its failures to cope with the new world of complex sovereignty, globalizations and the multi-stakeholder, multilevel global governance that was arising in response. The result is the large, vibrant, diverse field of international organization, institutions and regimes, global governance and private authorities, all at broadly multilateral, transregional and regional levels that has inspired the energies of so many leading scholars today. This collection assembles the most important essays from this rich inheritance that has formed the field of international organization, in its current identity as international institutions and regimes. It is based on a careful selection of the classic and contemporary works of enduring value that are central to the scholarship on international organization today and will be in the years ahead. The selection comprises those essays essential to the work of political scientists specializing in the discipline's subfield of international organization, institutions and global governance, although they are important to scholars and practitioners of international law, economics, security studies, human rights, environmental studies, gender studies, management studies and all seeking to understand and use the instrument of international law to advance their policy and normative concerns. This volume seeks to provide a conveniently accessible collection of those essays that constitute the core of the field, define its classic and contemporary debates, and guide scholarly research and policy debates today. It places the selected essays in the context of the evolving debates and real world developments, and highlights their distinctive contribution, while not offering an independent critique of their content. The selection has thus been guided not by any particular philosophy or approach to the field, but by a desire for comprehensiveness and balance across older and newer contributions, and from liberal institutionalist, constructivist, realist, political economy and newer theoretical traditions in political science. An emphasis has been placed on contributions dealing with the core concepts of comprehensive application, and of cumulative, continuing relevance in defining the research and debates of today, together with some issue-specific essays that have pioneered new components of the richly textured, complex and constantly evolving field of international organization. Selecting which essays and which genres of literature to include within the broad field of international organization has required truly hard choices, given the foundational character, vitality and continuing co-association and common identity of the subject with the field of international politics as a whole. The basic choice has been to focus on global or multilateral international organizations per se, classically conceived as intergovernmental organizations, and especially on the broader array of international institutions, and on international regimes which, in its many forms, continues to drive much of the research in the field to this day. The more extensive field of global governance that the international organization of old is rapidly becoming is included selectively in some of its more critical dimensions, although a full treatment of gender issues, civil society and private authorities is left for others to take

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up. Excluded from this collection in their own right are the rich fields of regional integration and the competing theories of international relations in general. Given the great vibrancy and volume of work in the field, many of the classic pieces that have pushed the scholarship forward within each generation have had to be confined to citations in this introduction, rather than being reproduced in the full glory that they occupied in their prime. Moreover, with the focus on the central essays and authors that are guiding today's teaching and research agendas, the great inheritance from the period before the Second World War, and even the first few decades following its end is also left out. Finally, the essays selected are exclusively those written in English, reflecting the character of the field as overwhelmingly an Anglo-American enterprise, with Canadian and Australian enhancements. This is the English-language literature long familiar to those in the Atlantic and Anglosphere and increasingly so to the rest of the multilingual world. Overviews of the Field Scholars of international relations exploring co-operation among states often focus their work on international regimes, commonly defined as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area of world politics (Krasner, Chapter 5, p. Ill, this volume and 1983; see also Ruggie, Chapter 6). International organizations have been central to this work. For international organization contains, codifies and constitutes the decision-making procedures, rules and even principles and norms, and helps determine whether they make a difference in adjusting the expectations and thus behaviour of their members, and states, other international organizations and citizens beyond. These elements have served as the subjects and structure of the defining debates in the field since its inception (Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Katzenstein et a/., 1998). Do international organizations work and why? Are they driven by their defining principles and norms or by the more specific rules and decision-making procedures that confine them as well as their member states? Can and do they steer or offset the structural forces of relative capability among competitors, as emphasized by realists, produce the reference points, lower transactions costs, transparency and trust highlighted by liberal institutionalists, create new interests and identities as constructivists suggest, or reinforce the power of predominant private authorities and processes, as theorists of political economy and the world system claim? How and how well do they cope with the rise of complex new problems, changes in the defining polarities and processes of world politics, and the rise of the unilateral tendencies of predominant states? And how much and how do they make a difference in constraining the behaviour of their otherwise autonomous state members in a structurally anarchic world where no single higher source of formal and effective authority prevails to this day? The answers to these questions have changed over successive generations of scholarship, as the major overviews of the state of the field suggest. The first part of this collection offers an overview of the field. In Chapter 1, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie review the development of the field of international organization from the Second World War to the mid-1980s. They argue that it has passed through four distinct phases, in a progressive and productive way, to focus on international governance and most notably on the concept

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of international regimes. But that concept has acquired some serious problems, above all the incompatibility of its intersubjective ontology based on principles and norms, and its positive epistemology in which a separated objective observer searches for material facts rather than the subjects' meanings to confirm or refute the propositions that arise. The solution is to shift to an intersubjective epistemology that can lead to a concern with transparency, legitimacy and epistemic politics. This would give a rich and robust scholarship on international organization something useful to say to practitioners of international organization, who badly need the help. In Chapter 2, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons assess the existing scholarship on international institutions, examine its evolution and identify productive areas for future research. They argue that the post-war study began with a focus on formal organizations, but since the late 1950s it has become more theoretically enriched and empirically disciplined as it has moved into the study of international institutions more generally. It first borrowed theories of American domestic politics to examine voting behaviour and coalitions in the UN and other multilateral bodies, then moved away from this domestic infusion with its functional focus in the 1980s, but now should return to be infused by this domestic base. Future research should focus on how rather than whether international institutions matter, develop a typology to trace the differing types and degrees of institutional effects, and deal with distributional impacts, unanticipated consequences and the relations between international institutions and domestic politics. John Duffield, in Chapter 3 'What Are International Institutions?', starts with the premise that comprehensive, internally coherent, well-accepted definitions are important for theoretical development and that the study of international institutions has suffered in this regard. He thus draws upon both rationalist and constructivist traditions to develop a definition of international institutions as 'relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities' (p. 58). He shows how this definition can help advance understanding of institutions' constitutive content, causes and consequences, and, by containing separate ontological and functional components, generate a taxonomy of institutional types. This will help scholars better identify the full range and variation of institutional forms, the causal mechanisms through which they exert their effects, fruitful comparisons among different institutional forms and new questions to pursue. Core Concepts and Competing Theories The great and growing debate among realist, liberal institutionalist, constructivist and political economy theorists in international politics has also flourished and often been founded in scholars working in its international organization field (Ikenberry, 1998/9, 2001). For the first few post-war decades, the great debate was between realists who felt international organizations reinforced hegemony's predominance or selected states stupid enough to trust them out of a deadly competitive international system, and pre-war idealists turned wary liberal institutionalists who argued that they could temper anarchy and turn it to order in the world (Bull, 1977). As Keohane and Nye (Chapter 4) suggest, their Power and Interdependence (1977) explicitly sought to combine realist and liberal institutionalist theories in an integrated way, using their common foundation in individual utilitarianism or rationality as the base.

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This synthesis gave rise to a new defining debate, with rationalists and reflectivists from the emerging constructivist camp first competing for the minds of students and scholars and then searching for a synthesis of shared insights that saved the best concepts from each. This effort unfolded within and fuelled the search for central concepts to describe and explain how more broadly defined international institutions worked. The first and most durable defining concept was that of international regime. Although it had long been used by scholars of international law, it was only in 1975 that John Ruggie (1975) utilized it as a concept for political scientists studying international relations. In 1977 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye showed how it could be productively applied in disciplined comparative empirical fashion to specific policy or issues areas and to individual bilateral relationships in the world. In 1982, Stephen Krasner (Chapter 5 and 1983) codified the central consensus definition among leading scholars, among the rich alternatives offered by John Ruggie and Oran Young. Shortly afterwards, Robert Keohane's After Hegemony (1984) formed the foundation of a generation of work on the relationship between relative capability and regimes, by arguing that hegemony might be necessary to create regimes, but that they could continue autonomously to exert their important effects on state behaviour long after the initial hegemony was gone. Yet the realist rejoinder remained, offering its own restricted international institutions such as major power concerts that mattered, and showing that other international institutions were still irrelevant or dangerous even as the post-Cold War era was well underway. Part II considers these core concepts and competing theories. In Chapter 4, 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye assess the contributions and failures of their pioneering 1977 work, Power and Interdependence, and its lessons for theoretical development in the field in the decade ahead. Along with summaries of their essential concepts, causal arguments and empirical conclusions, they identify both what did not catch on in a major way - notably complex interdependence - and what did - notably regimes and international processes more broadly. They conclude that the research programme they pioneered was productive and inspired further research. They cite as its successes the analysis of interdependence as a political as well as an economic process, examinations of interdependence by issue area, an emphasis on bargaining and linkage, and explorations of the evolution and impact of the rules and institutions of international regimes. For failures they list the lack of, and new need for, a theory of learning, more emphasis on the liberal components of their theoretical edifice, concern with domestic politics and its interplay with international-level processes, and above all attention to the way the conceptions actors have of their interests can change and the part that international institutions play in this regard. In Chapter 5, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', Stephen Krasner first offers his consensus definition of regimes. He then reviews the realist overall structural conception of regimes which casts them only as proximate rather than ultimate causes having a causal impact of their own, and the Grotian conception which sees regimes as pervasive, inherent parts of patterned human behaviour which both constitute and cause how it operates. He emphasizes a third, modified structural conception in which regimes, under certain conditions, serve as intervening variables that stand between and modify the impact of power and interest on the one hand on state behaviour on the other. A premium is thus placed on principles, defined as 'beliefs of facts, causation, and rectitude' and norms, defined as 'standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations' (p. 112). Alterations in principles and norms lead to changes of the regime, while alterations in

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rules and decision-making procedures lead only to changes within the regime. Regimes are developed primarily as a result of egoistic self-interest, political power and diffuse norms and principles, with usage and custom, and knowledge having a supplementary role. In Chapter 6, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', John Ruggie focuses on 'how the regimes for money and trade have reflected and affected the evolution of the international economic order since World War IF (p. 133). He explores the underlying epistemological and ontological differences among regime theorists to advance three arguments. First, political authority and thus regimes fuse power with legitimate social purposes, with power predicting the form of the international order and shared social purpose its content. Thus the post-war regime is not a return of the orthodox liberalism of an earlier era but of 'embedded liberalism' in which multilateral liberalization was predicated on domestic intervention. Second, this regime provided a permissive rather than predictive environment for the private economic flows that emerged. Third, because regime change is defined by alterations in principles and norms, and driven by independent variations in both power and social purpose, hegemonic decline need not lead to regime change if shared social purpose remains intact. Because the compromise of embedded liberalism continued through America's hegemonic decline, the destruction of the Bretton Woods monetary regime on 15 August 1971 and the rise of the new protectionism, the post-war regime remained intact, even if it acquired new institutional form through changes in rules and decision-making procedures. Robert Keohane, in Chapter 7, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', assesses the respective contributions of the rational and reflective approach in understanding how international institutions operate and change. He concludes that the hitherto dominant rationalist approach must be historically contextualized, seen as embedded in broader social practices and tested empirically. At the same time, the reflective approach pioneered by John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Hayward Alker and Richard Ashley, inspired by Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas before them, must develop testable theories, apply them to specific institutions and conduct empirical research. Through such efforts, and the constructive competition and conversation they engender, scholars can hope for an eventual synthesis that offers a better understanding of general practices and specific institutions, and the relationship between the two. In Chapter 8, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', Charles and Clifford Kupchan consider the concepts of collective security and concerts, how and why they operate, the conditions necessary for them to form and work, and whether these conditions are present in Europe as the post-Cold War era begins. They conclude that institutionalized collective security provides better balancing, more co-operative behaviour and a reduced security dilemma than balancing under anarchy. This is especially the case when the former takes the form of a concert akin to the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe that prevented a general war among the great powers for almost one hundred years. They argue that current conditions are even more ripe for an effective concert, and advise that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) should be reformed to serve as one. In Chapter 9, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', John Mearsheimer questions whether international institutions really reduce war among the great powers by assessing the claims of realism, liberal institutionalism, collective security and critical theory in this regard. He thus identifies what each theory says about what institutions are, how they cause peace,

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whether their internal logics are consistent and compelling, and how much the evidence supports their central claims. He concludes that each of the three major theories challenging realism are logically and empirically flawed, that institutions have not kept peace in the world for the last four centuries or longer and that they will not do so now in post-Cold War Europe. New Directions The end of the Cold War and the eruption of often intrastate violence in south-eastern Europe and Africa led not just to the realists' rejoinder but to a much broader reflection about the role of international organizations than the core debate about their contribution to the issue area of security in the European or Atlantic geographic region of the world. One driver to scholarly innovation was the greater force of and room for policy attention to complex, uncertain problems such as those disturbing and destroying the natural environment, from densely used oceans such as the Mediterranean to the planet's climate and biodiversity as a whole (P. Haas, 1989 and Chapter 10; Adler and Haas, 1992; Young, 1997). A second was the process of intensifying globalization in the technological, economic, social and cultural, as well as ecological realms, and the demand or hope that multilateralism in old or new forms would be revived, applied or modernized to cope (Cox, Chapter 11; Ruggie, 1992, 1993; Meyer et a/., 1997; Drezner, 2004; Biermann and Bauer, 2005). A third was the question of whether an America that seemed to emerge after victory in the Cold War with unusual power predominance as the world's sole superpower would revert to unilateralism, or be bound by multilateralism to follow and to lead in solving the problems of the new age (Cox, 1980, 1986; Cox and Sinclair, 1996). And a fourth was the prospect of more far reaching system transformation, with a security community emerging in a long war-torn and divided Europe now embracing a democratizing Russia, the ideal of domestic good governance radiating outwards to include all countries of the world, and the increasing role for an empowered civil society to be consequentially involved in the old and new governance forums (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Scholte, 2000; Kirton and Hajnal, 2006). With this move to ever more intrusive and exclusive global governance from the many old and new international institutions involved, there emerged the challenge of exploring 'regime complexes' of international institutions in the same issue area, colliding, competing and seeking to define it and dominate it in their own way. The new global governance could thus mark the return of the old realism, with the competing units now raised from the nation states of old to the international institutions of the new age (Fratianni et a/., 2005). Part III explores these new directions. In Chapter 10, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordination', Peter Haas addresses the origins of international institutions and their work in international policy co-ordination in a world where increasing technical uncertainties and complexities may leave decision-makers unaware of their state's interests. They may thus look to epistemic communities, defined as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' (p. 287). With these policymakers who can learn from epistemic communities that can help, Haas explores how the latter identify cause-effect relationships, assist in identifying state interests, frame issues, offer specific policies and select key points for negotiation. With uncertainty, interpretation

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and institutionalization serving as key causes, epistemic communities contribute in the above ways in enough important cases of contemporary world politics to conclude that power arises from control over knowledge and information, and that the diffusion of new information and ideas can affect state behaviour in ways that lead to international policy co-ordination. Robert Cox, in Chapter 11 'Multilateralism and World Order', seeks to identify the potential for change that multilateralism brings in the post-Cold War order. He thus explores the current crisis of multilateralism starting with the UN system and the way realist, liberal institutionalist and world-system structuralist theorists conceive of multilateralism. He notes the need for a historical dialectic approach that emphasizes the social processes that give meaning to, constitute and change states, the state system and world order. He argues that the globalization of finance, ecological challenges and cultural homogenization challenge a now declining American hegemony. He identifies five possible future orders as a replacement: revived American hegemony; an oligarchy or concert of great powers; a new successor hegemony; rivalry among world regions with few shared principles; and a counter-hegemonic order where many state and non-state actors agree on new principles without dominance. In Chapter 12, 'Is American Multilateralism in Decline?', John Ikenberry addresses American hegemony and multilateralism through a rationalist analysis of whether and why a newly dominant America, as the sole post-Cold War superpower, can replace its post-1945 multilateralism with a new unilateralism in the twenty-first-century world. He argues that unipolar power does indeed create incentives for unilateralism but other forces in a complex, cross-cutting array make multilateralism more attractive for the US in many places, as the evidence of its foreign policy under the early George W. Bush administration shows. Karl Deutsch's classic work on security communities is extended by Emanuel Adler in Chapter 13 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations'. Adler argues that security communities are socially constructed community regions whose inhabitants imagine that their security and well-being end at the borders where their shared understandings and common identities end. He introduces the concept of'community region', redefines Deutsch's security community as a form of cognitive region, offers a constructivist explanation for the associations between pluralistic security communities and liberal ideas, and explores the emergence and evolution of security communities. He concludes that as they become members of a security community, states may redefine their interests and the meaning of sovereignty. This process can be caused by existing international institutions, as the case of the CSCE shows. In Chapter 14, 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges', Thomas Weiss assumes that ideas and concepts do make a difference to international public policy. He explores the role of the UN-Bretton Woods system in developing and diffusing the concepts of governance, good governance and global governance. He argues that 'governance' emerged from dissatisfaction with the old statist models of economic and social development. Global governance similarly sprang from the failure of the realist and liberal institutionalist concepts that defined scholarship on international organizations during the 1970s and 1980s to deal with the proliferation of influential non-state actors and the impact of technology in a globalizing age. He concludes that the UN system has played a leading role in the influential ideational domain. It should be strengthened, along with regional international organizations, to countervail the power of a decentralized state and market system whose actors focus on their own individual gains.

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Chadwick Alger, in Chapter 15 'The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly', examines the growing, dynamic and diverse relations between the UN and civil society, and the implications for global governance. He examines in turn the changing ECOSOC procedures for UN-NGO relations, widening NGO participation at UN headquarters, the scope of NGO involvement in the overall UN system, increasing NGO participation in the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), and NGO-UN conference diplomacy. He concludes that the relationship has gone well beyond the modest recognition of civil society in Article 71 of the UN charter, due to new modes of communication, the new demands of globalization, new issues such as the environment and HIV/AIDS, and financial pressures on the UN which have led NGOs to substitute for its work. Compliance, Effectiveness and the Domestic Dimension Throughout all this theoretical innovation and application, the central question remained - do international organizations make a difference to state behaviour and if so how much, how and why? By now the basic instincts of all major theoretical offerings in international politics had developed to present a much more disciplined and detailed picture of the difference that international organizations could and did make (Finnemore, 1993; Bernauer, 1995; Chayes and Chayes, 1998; Koremonos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). For informal concerts of major powers with the leaders of the member states present, there could be a complex process of two level bargaining in a G8 system that had grown to be a centre of global governance and had seen members' compliance with its commitments rise (Ikenberry, 1988; von Furstenberg and Daniels, 1992; Kokotsis, 1999; Kirton, 2006; Kirton, Roudev and Sunderland, 2007). In a region with the supranational body of the European Union, new members could be induced to reconstruct their interests and identities on issues as central to their sovereignty as citizenship norms. There was much to suggest that international organization did indeed make a difference, but sometimes in harmful rather than desirable ways. Liberal institutionalists and constructivists could thus join some realists in declaring that international organizations did matter, but were bad for the world. Part IV of this volume thus deals with compliance, effectiveness and the domestic dimension. In Chapter 16, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', Robert Putnam theoretically develops the relationship between domestic and international politics by examining the highly successful Group of Seven (G7) Bonn Summit of 1978. Here a broad, balanced, specific agreement among the G7's major power members was negotiated and implemented almost completely. Putnam argues that G7 government accepted different policies as a result of the international summit, but also that agreements at the summit depended on key minorities within each government preferring domestically the policy G7 partners were demanding internationally. In this 'two level game', ratification depended on overlapping 'win sets' where larger win sets led to agreement. Win sets were determined by the preferences and coalitions of domestic actors, domestic political institutions and international negotiators' strategies. The analysis highlights the importance of different types of defection, issues, issue linkage, domestic-international trade-offs, targeting, the strategic use of uncertainty, reverberation and the interests of national leaders.

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In Chapter 17, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore ask if international organizations actually act the way their founders wanted and expected them to. They devise a constructivist approach based on sociological institutionalism to explain the power and the pathologies of international organizations after their creation. They argue that the rational legal authority flowing from their impersonal general rules creates social knowledge and lets international organizations define new tasks, actors and interests, and transfer models worldwide. They can thus be unresponsive to their environment, follow their rules rather than principal mission, and create poor and pathological outcomes. Theoretically, they thus do far more than help states cooperate, for they are autonomous purposive actors in their own right that can do undesirable as well as helpful things. References Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael (eds) (1998), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler, Emanuel and Haas, Peter M. (1992), 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program', International Organization, 46, pp. 367-90. Alker Jr., Hayward and Russett, Bruce (1965), World Politics in the General Assembly, New Haven: Yale University Press. Bayne, Nicholas (2005), Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century, Aldershot: Ashgate. Bernauer, Thomas (1995), 'The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More', International Organization, 49, pp. 351-77. Biermann, Frank and Bauer, Steffen (eds) (2005), A World Environment Organization: Solution or Threat, Aldershot: Ashgate. Bloomfield, Lincoln (1960), The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown. Bull, Hedley (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler (1998), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Claude, Inis (1961), 'The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations', International Organization, 15, pp. 219-35. Claude, Inis (1963), 'The Political Framework of the United Nations Financial Problems', International Organization, 17, pp. 831-59. Claude, Inis, Jr. (1966), 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', International Organization, 20, pp. 367-79. Claude, Inis L. (1984), Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Process of International Organization (4th edn), New York: McGraw-Hill. Cox, Robert (1980), 'The Crises of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s', InternationalJournal, 35, pp. 370-95. Cox, Robert (1986), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 204-54. Cox, Robert and Jacobson, Harold (eds) (1973), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Cox, Robert with Sinclair, Timothy (1996), Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deutsch, Karl et al. (1957), Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Drezner, Daniel (2004), 'The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In', Political Science Quarterly, 119, pp. 477-98. Finnemore, Martha (1993), 'International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science Policy', International Organization, 47, pp. 565-98. Fox, William T.R. (1951), 'The United Nations in the Era of Total Diplomacy', International Organization, 5, pp. 265-73. Fratianni, Michele, Kirton, John, Rugman, Alan and Savona, Paolo (2005), New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8, Aldershot: Ashgate. Goldstein, Judith (1996), 'International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws', International Organization, 50, pp. 541-64. Goodrich, Leland (1947), 'From League of Nations to United Nations', International Organization, 1, pp. 3-32. Haas, Ernst B. (1964), Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Haas, Peter (1989), 'Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control', International Organization, 43, pp. 377-403. Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth (1987), 'Theories of International Regimes', International Organization, 41, pp. 491-517. Hoffman, Stanley (1956), 'The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities', International Organization, 10, pp. 357-72. Ikenberry, John G. (1988), 'Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil Decontrol', International Organization, 42, pp. 151-78. Ikenberry, John (1998/9), 'Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar Order', International Security, 23, pp. 43-78. Ikenberry, John (2001), After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jervis, Robert (1992), 'A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert', American Historical Review, 97, pp. 716-24. Kant, Immanuel (1985), Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Katzenstein, Peter, Keohane, Robert O. and Krasner, Stephen D. (1998), 'International Organization and the Study of World Polities', International Organization, 52, pp. 645-85. Kennedy, Paul (2006), The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations, New York: Random House. Keohane, Robert (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World of Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert (1990), 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', International Journal, 45, pp. 731-64. Keohane, Robert andNye, Joseph S. Jr. (1972), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keohane, Robert andNye, Joseph S. Jr. (1977), Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little, Brown. Kirton, John (2006),' Explaining Compliance with G8 Finance Commitments: Agency, Institutionalization, and Structure', Open Economies Review, 17, no. 4, pp. 459-75.

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Kirton, John and Hajnal, Peter (2006), Sustainability, Civil Society and International Governance: Local, North American and Global Contributions, Aldershot: Ashgate. Kirton, John, Roudev, Nikolai and Sunderland, Laura (2007), 'Making Major Powers Deliver: Explaining Compliance with G8 Health Commitments, 1996-2006', Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85, no. 3, pp. 192-99. Kokotsis, Eleanore (1999), Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988-1995, New York: Garland. Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles and Snidal, Duncan (2001), 'The Rational Design of International Institutions', International Organization, 55, pp. 761-800. Krasner, Stephen (ed.) (1983), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kupchan, Charles and Kupchan, Clifford (1995), 'The Promise of Collective Security,' International Security, 20, pp. 52-61. Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stewart (eds) (1970a), Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stewart (eds) (1970b), Special Issue on Regional Integration, International Security, 16. MacMillan, Margaret (2002), Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, New York: Random House. Meyer, John W., Frank, David John, Hironaka, Ann, Schofer, Evan and Tuma, Nancy Brandon (1997), 'The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870-1990', International Organization, 51, pp. 623-51. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1971), Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, Boston: Little, Brown. O'Neal, John R. and Russett, Bruce M. (1999), 'The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992', World Politics, 52, no. 1, pp. 1-37. Putnam, Robert and Bayne, Nicholas (1987), Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits, London: Sage. Ruggie, John Gerard (1975), 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', International Organization, 29, pp. 557-83. Ruggie, John Gerard (1992), 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', International Organization, 46, pp. 561-98. Ruggie, John Gerard (1993), 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization, 47, pp. 139-74. Scholte, Jan Arte (2000), Globalization: A Critical Introduction, London: Macmillan. Thucydides (1954), The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin, von Furstenberg, George M. and Daniels, Joseph P. (1992), Economic Summit Declarations, 1975— 1989: Examining the Written Record of International Cooperation, Princeton Studies in International Finance 72, Princeton, NJ: Department of Economics, Princeton University. Young, Oran R. (1997), Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Parti Overviews of the Field

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[1]

International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie

International organization as a field of study has had its ups and downs throughout the post-World War II era and throughout this century for that matter. In the interwar period, the fate of the field reflected the fate of the world it studied: a creative burst of work on "international government" after 1919, followed by a period of more cautious reassessment approaching the 1930s, and a gradual decline into irrelevance if not obscurity thereafter. Although they sometimes intersected, the fate of theory and the fate of practice were never all that closely linked after World War II. Indeed, it is possible to argue, with only slight exaggeration, that in recent years they have become inversely related: the academic study of international organization is more interesting, vibrant, and even compelling than ever before, whereas the world of actual international organizations has deteriorated in efficacy and performance. Today, international organization as a field of study is an area where the action is; few would so characterize international organizations as a field of practice. Our purpose in this article is to try to figure out how and why the doctors can be thriving when the patient is moribund. To anticipate the answer without, we hope, unduly straining the metaphor, the reason is that the leading doctors have become biochemists and have stopped treating and in most cases even seeing patients. In the process, however, new discoveries have been made, new diagnostic techniques have been developed, and our understanding has deepened, raising the possibility of more effective treatment in the long run. What we are suggesting, to pose the issue more directly, is that students of The authors are grateful to Betty J. Starkey for bibliographical assistance, and to David Baldwin, Douglas Chalmers, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Charles Lipson, Jack Snyder, and Mark Zacher for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.

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754 International Organization international organization have shifted their focus systematically away from international institutions, toward broader forms of international institutionalized behavior. We further contend that this shift does not represent a haphazard sequence of theoretical or topical "fads" but is rooted in a "core concern" or a set of puzzles which gives coherence and identity to this field of study.1 The substantive core around which the various theoretical approaches have clustered is the problem of international governance. And the observable shifts in analytical foci can be understood as "progressive problem shifts," in the sense of Imre Lakatos's criterion for the heuristic fruitfulness of a research program.2 This evolution has brought the field to its current focus on the concept of international regimes. To fully realize its potential, the research program must now seek to resolve some serious anomalies in the regime approach and to link up the informal ordering devices of international regimes with the formal institutional mechanisms of international organizations. In the first section of this article, we present a review of the literature in order to trace its evolution. This review draws heavily on articles published in International Organization, the leading journal in the field since its first appearance in 1947, and a source that not only reflects but in considerable measure is also responsible for the evolution of the field. The second section critiques the currently prevalent epistemological practices in regime analysis and points toward lines of inquiry which might enhance the productive potential of the concept as an analytical tool. Finally, we briefly suggest a means of systematically linking up regimes and formal organizations in a manner that is already implicit in the literature. Progressive analytical shifts As a field of study, international organization has always concerned itself with the same phenomenon: in the words of a 1931 text, it is an attempt to describe and explain "how the modern Society of Nations governs itself."3 In that text, the essence of government was assumed to comprise the coordination of group activities so as to conduct the public business, and the particular feature distinguishing international government was taken to lie in the necessity that it be consistent with national sovereignty. Few contempo1. Thomas Kuhn uses the notion "sets of puzzles" in his discussion of preludes to paradigms; see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), and The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 2. The criterion of the fruitfulness of a research program, and issues connected with progressive versus degenerative problem shifts, were introduced by Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticisms and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 3. Edmund C. Mower, International Government (Boston: Heath, 1931).

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A regime critique 755 rary students of international organization would want to alter this definition substantially.4 However, there have been identifiable shifts in how the phenomenon of international governance has been conceived, especially since World War II—so much so that the field is often described as being in permanent search of its own "dependent variable." Our reading of the literature reveals four major analytical foci, which we would place in roughly the following logical—and more or less chronological—order. Formal institutions

The first is a formal institutional focus. Within it, the assumption was made or the premise was implicit that (1) international governance is whatever international organizations do; and (2) the formal attributes of international organizations, such as their charters, voting procedures, committee structures, and the like, account for what they do. To the extent that the actual operation of institutions was explored, the frame of reference was their constitutional mandate, and the purpose of the exercise was to discover how closely it was approximated.5 Institutional processes

The second analytical focus concerns the actual decision-making processes within international organizations. The assumption was gradually abandoned that the formal arrangements of international organizations explain what they do. This perspective originally emerged in the attempt to come to grips with the increasingly obvious discrepancies between constitutional designs and organizational practices. Some writers argued that the formal arrangements and objectives remained relevant and appropriate but were undermined or obstructed by such political considerations as cold war rivalry and such institutional factors as the veto in the UN Security Council, bloc voting in the UN General Assembly, and the like.6 Others contended 4. The basic terms of the definition are entirely compatible with the most recent theoretical work in the field, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). The precise meaning of the terms of course has changed significantly, as we shall see presently. 5. A distinguished contribution to this literature is Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1955). See also Klaus Knorr, "The Bretton Woods Institutions in Transition," International Organization [hereafter cited as IO] 2 (February 1948); Walter R. Sharp. "The Institutional Framework for Technical Assistance," IO 1 (August 1953); and Henri Rolin, "The International Court of Justice and Domestic Jurisdiction," IO 8 (February 1954). 6. Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto," IO 2 (June 1948); Raymond Dennett, "Politics in the Security Council," IO 3 (August 1949); M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," IO 5 (February 1951); Allan Hovey, Jr., "Obstructionism and the Rules of the General Assembly," IO 5 (August 1951); and Arlette Moldaver, "Repertoire of the Veto in the Security Council, 1946-1956," IO 11 (Spring 1957).

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756 International Organization that the original designs themselves were unrealistic and needed to be changed.7 Over time, this perspective became more generalized, to explore overall patterns of influence shaping organizational outcomes.8 The sources of influence which have been investigated include the power and prestige of individual states, the formation and functioning of the group system, organizational leadership positions, and bureaucratic politics. The outcomes that analysts have sought to explain have ranged from specific resolutions, programs, and budgets, to broader voting alignment and the general orientation of one or more international institutions. Organizational role

In this third perspective, another assumption of the formal institutionalist approach was abandoned, namely, that international governance is whatever international organizations do. Instead, the focus shifted to the actual and potential roles of international organizations in a more broadly conceived process of international governance.9 This perspective in turn subsumes three distinct clusters. In the first cluster, the emphasis was on the roles of international organizations in the resolution of substantive international problems. Preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping were two such roles in the area of peace and security,10 nuclear safeguarding by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was another.11 Facilitating decolonization received a good deal of 7. See, among others, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, "The Role of the United Nations," IO 6 (November 1952); A. Loveday, "Suggestions for the Reform of UN Economic and Social Machinery," IO 1 (August 1953); Wytze Goiter, "GATT after Six Years: An Appraisal," IO 8 (February 1954); Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Reviewing the UN Charter," IO 9 (May 1955); Robert E. Riggs, "Overselling the UN Charter—Fact or Myth," IO 14 (Spring 1960); and Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," IO 15 (Spring 1961). 8. The most comprehensive work in this genre remains Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). 9. Inis L. Claude's landmark text, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1959), both signaled and contributed to this shift. 10. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, ed., International Force—A Symposium, IO 17 (Spring 1973); James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping," IO 20 (Winter 1966); Robert O. Matthews, "The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in Peaceful Settlement," IO 21 (Winter 1967); Yashpal Tandon, "Consensus and Authority behind UN Peacekeeping Operations," IO 21 (Spring 1967); David P. Forsythe, "United Nations Intervention in Conflict Situations Revisited: A Framework for Analysis," IO 23 (Winter 1969); John Gerard Ruggie, "Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on UN Involvement in International Disputes," IO 28 (Summer 1974); and Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organization, 1945-1981," IO 37 (Spring 1983). 11. Robert E. Pendley and Lawrence Scheinman, "International Safeguarding as Institutionalized Collective Behavior," in John Gerard Ruggie and Ernst B. Haas,.eds., special issue on international responses to technology, IO 29 (Summer 1975); and Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime," in George H. Quester, ed., special issue on nuclear nonproliferation, IO 35 (Winter 1981).

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attention in the political realm,12 providing multilateral development assistance in the economic realm.13 The potential role of international organizations in restructuring North-South relations preoccupied a substantial number of scholars throughout the 1970s,14 as did the possible contributions of international organizations to managing the so-called global commons.15 Most recently, analysts have challenged the presumption that the roles of international organizations in this regard are invariably positive; indeed, they have accused international organizations of occasionally exacerbating the problems they are designed to help resolve.16 The second cluster of the organizational-role perspective shifted the focus away from the solution of substantive problems per se, toward certain longterm institutional consequences of the failure to solve substantive problems through the available institutional means. This, of course, was the integrationist focus, particularly the neofunctionalist variety.17 It was fueled by the fact that the jurisdictional scope of both the state and existing international organizations was increasingly outstripped by the functional scope of international problems. And it sought to explore the extent to which institutional adaptations to this fact might be conducive to the emergence of political forms "beyond the nation state."18 Neofunctionalists assigned a major role in this process to international organizations, not simply as passive recipients of new tasks and authority but as active agents of "task expansion" and 12. Ernst B. Haas, "The Attempt to Terminate Colonization: Acceptance of the UN Trusteeship System," IO 1 (February 1953); John Fletcher-Cooke, "Some Reflections on the International Trusteeship System," IO 13 (Summer 1959); Harold K. Jacobson, "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal," IO 16 (Winter 1962); and David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process," IO 21 (Autumn 1967). 13. Richard N. Gardner and Max F. Millikan, eds., special issue on international agencies and economic development, IO 22 (Winter 1968). 14. Among many other sources, see Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly," IO 30 (Spring 1976). 15. David A. Kay and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds., special issue on international institutions and the environmental crisis, IO 26 (Spring 1972); Ruggie and Haas, eds., special issue, IO 29 (Summer 1975); and Per Magnus Wijkman, "Managing the Global Commons," IO 36 (Summer 1982). 16. The most extreme form of this criticism recently has come from the political right in the United States; cf. Burton Yale Pines, ed., A World without the U.N.: What Would Happen If the United Nations Shut Down (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984). But the same position has long been an article of faith on the political left as well; cf. Cheryl Payer, "The Perpetuation of Dependence: The IMF and the Third World," Monthly Review 23 (September 1971), and Payer, "The World Bank and the Small Farmers," Journal of Peace Research 16, no. 2 (1979); and the special issue of Development Dialogue, no. 2 (1980). 17. Various approaches to the study of integration were summarized and assessed in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., special issue on regional integration, IO 24 (Autumn 1970). 18. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

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758 International Organization "spillover."19 Other approaches concerned themselves less with institutional changes than with attitudinal changes, whether among national elites, international delegates, or mass publics.20 The third cluster within the organizational-role perspective began with a critique of the transformational expectations of integration theory and then shifted the focus onto a more general concern with how international institutions "reflect and to some extent magnify or modify" the characteristic features of the international system.21 Here, international organizations have been viewed as potential dispensers of collective legitimacy,22 vehicles in the international politics of agenda formation,23 forums for the creation of transgovernmental coalitions as well as instruments of transgovernmental policy coordination,24 and as means through which the global dominance structure is enhanced or can possibly come to be undermined.25 The theme that unifies all works of this genre is that the process of global governance is not coterminous with the activities of international organiza19. In addition to Haas, ibid., see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functionalist Hypotheses about International Integration," IO 23 (Winter 1969); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). For a critique of the neofunctionalist model, see Roger D. Hansen "Regional Integration: Reflection on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts," World Politics 21 (January 1969). 20. Henry H. Kerr, Jr., "Changing Attitudes through International Participation: European Parliamentarians and Integration," IO 27 (Winter 1973); Peter Wolf, "International Organizations and Attitude Change: A Re-examination of the Functionalist Approach," IO 27 (Summer 1973); David A. Karns, "The Effect of Interparliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of the United States Congressmen," IO 31 (Summer 1977); and Ronald Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration," IO 24 (Autumn 1970). 21. The phrase is Stanley Hoffmann's in "International Organization and the International System," IO 24 (Summer 1970). A similar position was advanced earlier by Oran R. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," IO 22 (Autumn 1968). 22. Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," IO 20 (Summer 1966); cf. Jerome Slater, "The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis," IO 23 (Winter 1969). 23. A representative sampling would include Kay and Skolnikoff, eds., special issue, IO 26 (Spring 1972); Robert Russell, "Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960-1972," IO 27 (Autumn 1973); Thomas Weiss and Robert Jordan, "Bureaucratic Politics and the World Food Conference," World Politics 28 (April 1976); Raymond F. Hopkins, "The International Role of 'Domestic' Bureaucracy," IO 30 (Summer 1976); and John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Problem of The Global Problematique': What Roles for International Organizations?" Alternatives 5 (January 1980). 24. The major analytical piece initiating this genre was Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," World Politics 27 (October 1974); cf. their earlier edited work on transnational relations and world politics, IO 25 (Summer 1971). 25. Robert Cox's recent work has been at the forefront of exploring this aspect of international organization: "Labor and Hegemony," IO 31 (Summer 1977); "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980's," International Journal 35 (Spring 1980); and "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Summer 1983).

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A regime critique 759 tions but that these organizations do play some role in that broader process. The objective was to identify their role. International regimes

The current preoccupation in the field is with the phenomenon of international regimes. Regimes are broadly defined as governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in various issue-areas. They thus comprise a normative element, state practice, and organizational roles.26 Examples include the trade regime, the monetary regime, the oceans regime, and others. The focus on regimes was a direct response both to the intellectual odyssey that we have just traced as well as to certain developments in the world of international relations from the 1970s on. When the presumed identity between international organizations and international governance was explicitly rejected, the precise roles of organizations in international governance became a central concern. But, apart from the focus on integration, no overarching conception was developed 0/international governance itself. And the integrationists themselves soon abandoned their early notions, ending up with a formulation of integration that did little more than recapitulate the condition of interdependence which was assumed to trigger integration in the first place.27 Thus, for a time the field of international organization lacked any systematic conception of its traditional analytical core: international governance. The introduction of the concept of regimes reflected an attempt to fill this void. International regimes were thought to express both the parameters and the perimeters of international governance.28 The impact of international affairs during the 1970s and beyond came in the form of an anomaly for which no ready-made explanation was at hand. Important changes occurred in the international system, associated with the relative decline of U.S. hegemony: the achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union; the economic resurgence of Europe and Japan; the success of OPEC together with the severe international economic dislocations that followed it. Specific agreements that had been negotiated after World War II were violated, and institutional arrangements, in money and trade above all, 26. The most extensive analytical exploration of the concept may be found in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), most of which was first published as a special issue of IO in Spring 1982. Page references will be to the book. 27. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). The point is also implicit in Ernst Haas's selfcriticism, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," IO 30 (Spring 1976). 28. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," IO 29 (Summer 1975).

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760 International Organization came under enormous strain. Yet—and here is the anomaly—governments on the whole did not respond to the difficulties confronting them in beggarthy-neighbor terms. Neither systemic factors nor formal institutions alone apparently could account for this outcome. One way to resolve the anomaly was to question the extent to which U.S. hegemony in point of fact had eroded.29 Another, and by no means entirely incompatible route, was via the concept of international regimes. The argument was advanced that regimes continued in some measure to constrain and condition the behavior of states toward one another, despite systemic change and institutional erosion. In this light, international regimes were seen to enjoy a degree of relative autonomy, though of an unknown duration.30 In sum, in order to resolve both disciplinary and real-world puzzles, the process of international governance has come to be associated with the concept of international regimes, occupying an ontological space somewhere between the level of formal institutions on the one hand and systemic factors on the other. Hence, the notion that the concern with international regimes is but another academic fad from which the field has suffered throughout the postwar period itself betrays a misunderstanding of the considerable intellectual continuity that has brought the field to the present point.31 These shifts in analytical foci of course have never been complete; not everyone in the field at any one time works within the same perspective, and once introduced into the field no perspective ever disappears altogether. To provide some sense of relative orders of magnitude and of changes in them over time, a brief review of all articles ever published in IO may be of help. Figure 1 summarizes their analytical foci, defined as they are in the text, except that "international integration" as a focus has been separated out from the more general category of "organizational roles" in order to highlight a particular evolutionary pattern. Two trends are striking. First, the formal institutional focus has declined steadily from the very beginning and now accounts for fewer than 5 percent of the total. Second, the category of "general international relations" has dominated every other from the mid-1960s on and now accounts for over 60 percent of the total. A comprehensive sociology of knowledge, not only of the field but also of the journal, would be required to explain fully this latter 29. This is the tack taken by Susan Strange, "Still an Extraordinary Power: America's Role in a Global Monetary System," in Raymond E. Lombra and William E. Witte, eds., Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982); and Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" IO 39 (Spring 1985). 30. See Krasner, "Introduction," International Regimes, and Keohane, After Hegemony, for discussions of this thesis. 31. The fad-fettish is argued by Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes.

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100

i

A regime critique 761

(60.2%) General international relations

(52.2%)

50-

Formal institutions 40 CD

O I*0

30

Regimes

#

Organizational ^V roles

20

10

Institutional processes r ' International integration

0

1947-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-84

FIGURE 1. Analytical foci of contributions to International Organization. Source. International Organization, 1947-84.

trend. But in part at least it reflects the loss of an analytical core of which we spoke above, which the concept of regimes was designed to provide. As Figure 1 also shows, the focus on regimes emerged suddenly in the 1970s and now ranks in second place. In addition, there exists an interesting relationship between studies of organizational roles, international integration, and regimes. The first phase of organizational-role studies, it will be recalled, had a substantive focus, namely the contributions of international organizations to resolving the various problems confronting the international community. It was overtaken by integration studies by 1960, the concern of which was the impact of international organizations not on solving the substance but on changing the process of international governance. When integration studies declined about ten years later, they were overtaken in turn by studies that rejected the specific focus on integration as an outcome but continued to concern themselves with the role of organizations in the general process of international governance. And the decline of this latter phase of organizational-role studies clearly coincides with the emergence of regime studies, suggesting a fairly direct lineage.

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762 International Organization Conflict and cooperation

These shifts in analytical foci have been accompanied by an analytical shift of a very different sort, perhaps most clearly expressed in the premises of recent methodological approaches. Take the rational-choice approach as one instance.32 It raises the promise and offers the possibility that two strands of thinking about international relations which have been distinct if not oppositional in the past may become unified. Typically, the opposition has been expressed in the conflict/cooperation dichotomy. It has been widely assumed throughout the history of modern international relations theory that there exists one realm of international life which is intrinsically conflictual and another which is intrinsically more cooperative. Moreover, it has been inferred from this premise that these two realms of international life require (from the vantage point of conflict studies) or make possible (from the vantage point of cooperation studies) two very different modes of analysis. Realism and to a lesser extent Marxism have tended to dominate the former strand, and liberalism in its many guises—Ricardian trade theory, Wilsonian idealism, functionalism, and interdependence imperatives—the latter. What we find in the recent literature inspired by the rational-choice perspective, on the contrary, is the claim that both conflict and cooperation can be explained by a single logical apparatus.33 Moreover, the differences between the two branches now are understood to reflect situational determinants not structural determinants. In game-theoretic terms, such situational factors include how many rounds are played in a game resembling an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, how much the value of future payoffs is discounted in comparison with immediate payoffs, whether or not swift and decisive defection from cooperation is possible, and so on.34 Interestingly, developments in some neo-Marxist approaches have proceeded on precisely 32. The public-choice approach to the study of international organization began with the use of public goods theory in the early 1970s, went on to explore the theory of property rights later in the decade, and has come to focus on game theory and microeconomic theories of market failure to explain patterns of international governance. See, respectively, Bruce M. Russett and John D. Sullivan, "Collective Goods and International Organizations," IO 25 (Autumn 1971), and John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration," American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972); John A. C. Conybeare, "International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights," IO 34 (Summer 1980); and Keohane, After Hegemony. A useful review of the relevant literature may be found in Bruno S. Frey, "The Public Choice View of International Political Economy," IO 38 (Winter 1984). 33. In the context of rational-choice theory generally, the argument was first articulated by John Harsanyi, "Rational Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories," World Politics 21 (July 1969). In the international relations literature, it is implicit in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma J' World Politics 30 (January 1978), and explicit in Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review 15 (June 1981), as well as in Keohane, After Hegemony*. 34. Robert Jervis first made these points in his paper "Security Regimes," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes. For a more extended discussion see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics 37 (October 1984).

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A regime critique 763 analogous lines, insofar as the traditional opposites, unity and rivalry, have been collapsed within a single "world system" framework, or insofar as the question of unity versus rivalry has been derived from the presence or absence of "hegemony" in the Gramscian sense of the term.35 Approaches informed by hermeneutics and language philosophy are reaching much the same conclusions as well.36 And in each case, the concept of regimes is found to be a useful focal point for analysis. In summary, that branch of the study of international relations which calls itself international organization is lively and productive. It is once again focusing squarely on the phenomenon of international governance, and it is pursuing its object of study in innovative ways that are bringing it closer to the theoretical core of more general international relations work. These are no mean accomplishments. And they are not diminished by the fact that serious problems remain to be resolved. Problems in the practice of regime analysis One of the major criticisms made of the regimes concept is its "wooliness" and "imprecision."37 The point is well taken. There is no agreement in the literature even on such basic issues as boundary conditions: Where does one regime end and another begin? What is the threshold between nonregime and regime? Embedding regimes in "meta-regimes," or "nesting" one within another, typifies the problem; it does not resolve it.38 The same is true of the proposal that any set of patterned or conventionalized behavior be considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of a regime.39 The only cure for wooliness and imprecision is, of course, to make the concept of regimes less so. Definitions can still be refined, but only up to a point. Two fundamental impediments stand in the way. One is absolute: ultimately, there exists no external Archimedian point from which regimes can be viewed as they "truly" are. This is so because regimes are conceptual creations not concrete entities. As with any analytical construction in the human sciences, the concept of regimes will reflect commonsense understandings, actor preferences, and the particular purposes for which analyses 35. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974); and Cox, "Labor and Hegemony," "The Crisis of World Order," and "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations." 36. Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," IO 38 (Spring 1984), and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Errors Have Their Advantage," IO 38 (Spring 1984). 37. See Susan Strange, in Krasner, ed., International Regimes. 38. This route is taken by Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 39. Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes.

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764 International Organization are undertaken. Ultimately, therefore, the concept of regimes, like the concept of "power," or "state," or "revolution," will remain a "contestable concept."40 Well short of this absolute impediment stands another. It is not insuperable, but a great deal of work will have to be done in order to overcome it. The problem is this: the practice of regime analysis is wracked by epistemological anomalies—anomalies that more often than not go unnoticed in the literature. These anomalies debilitate any endeavor to achieve clarity and precision in the concept of regimes and to enhance its productive capacity as an analytical tool. In the paragraphs that follow, we flag three related epistemological problem areas. Without pretending that we can resolve them here, we hope merely to obtain their entry into the disciplinary discourse. Ontology versus epistemology

International regimes are commonly defined as social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas. The emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality. It follows that we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity. Now, consider the fact that the prevailing epistemological position in regime analysis is almost entirely positivistic in orientation. Before it does anything else, positivism posits a radical separation of subject and object. It then focuses on the "objective" forces that move actors in their social interactions. Finally, intersubjective meaning, where it is considered at all, is inferred from behavior. Here, then, we have the most debilitating problem of all: epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology! Small wonder that so much disagreement exists on what should be fairly straightforward empirical questions: Did Bretton Woods "collapse" in 1971-73, or was the change "norm governed"? Are recent trade restraints indicative of dangerous protectionism or not? How is it that the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 successfully passed yet another review, when so many states that voluntarily adhere to it protest its inequitable terms? And on and on. In many such puzzling instances, actor behavior has failed adequately to convey intersubjective meaning. And intersubjective meaning, in turn, seems to have had considerable influence on actor behavior. It is precisely this factor that limits the practical utility of the otherwise fascinating insights into the collaborative potential of rational egoists which are derived from 40. On "contestable concepts," see William Connally, The Terms of Political Discourse, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

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A regime critique 765 laboratory or game-theoretic situations.41 To put the problem in its simplest terms: in the simulated world, actors cannot communicate and engage in behavior; they are condemned to communicate through behavior. In the real world, the situation of course differs fundamentally. Here, the very essence of international regimes is expressed in cases such as that of France in 1968, asking for "sympathy and understanding" from its trading partners, as France invoked emergency measures against imports after the May disturbances of that year—and getting both from GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) even though no objective basis existed in fact or in GATT law for doing so. But a positivist epistemology simply cannot accommodate itself to so intersubjective an ontology. Hence, the case is treated in the literature as illustrating cynicism, complicity, and the erosion of respect for the GATT regime.42 The contradiction between ontology and epistemology has elicited surprisingly little concern in the regimes literature.43 Once it is realized just how problematical the contradiction is, however, what options exist to deal with it? One possibility would be to try to deny it somehow. Theodore Abel's classic neopositivist response to the challenge posed by Weber's concept of Verstehen might serve as a model: the concept aids in "the context discovery," Abel contended, but ultimately it is not a method relevant to "the context of validation." Hence it poses no challenge.44 This response may have been viable a generation ago, but it no longer is. Interpretive epistemologies that stress the intimate relationship between validation and the uncovering of intersubjective meanings are simply too well developed today to be easily dismissed by charges of subjectivism45—or, more likely in the arena of international relations theory, of idealism. 41. Most notable among such works is Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984), and Axelrod, "Modeling the Evolution of Norms" (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 29 August-1 September 1985). For an attempt to incorporate progressively more "reflective" logical procedures into sequential Prisoner's Dilemma situations and to expose them to more realistic data sets, see Hayward R. Alker, James Bennett, and Dwain Mefford, "Generalized Precedent Logics for Resolving Insecurity Dilemmas," International Interactions 7, no. 2 (1980), and Hayward Alker and Akihiro Tanaka, "Resolution Possibilities in 'Historical' Prisoners' Dilemmas" (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Philadelphia, 18 March 1981). 42. This case, and the more general problem of interpretation which it reflects, are discussed by John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes. 43. In the basic regime text, International Regimes, edited by Krasner, intersubjectivity is stressed by Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism," and by Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis," but no systematic epistemological discussion is undertaken in the volume. 44. Theodore F. Abel, "The Operation Called Verstehen," American Journal of Sociology 54 (November 1948). 45. For a good selection of readings that begins with Weber, includes the neopositivist response, the Wittgensteinian school, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology, and ends with hermeneutics and critical theory, see Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

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766 International Organization A second possibility would be to try to formulate a rendition of the intersubjective ontology which is compatible with positivist epistemology. In view of the influence currently enjoyed in international relations theory by analogies and metaphors drawn from microeconomics, one plausible means of executing this maneuver would be to follow the economists down the road of "revealed preferences"—that consumption behavior, for example, reveals true consumer preferences. If our epistemology does not enable us to uncover meaning, the analogous reasoning would hold, then let us look for "revealed meaning," that is, for "objective" surrogates. It should suffice to point out that this is a solution by displacement: it displaces the problem into the realm of assumption—namely that "objective" surrogates can capture "intersubjective" reality—which of course is not uncharacteristic of the manner in which economists handle difficult problems. That leaves us with the third and only viable option, of opening up the positivist epistemology to more interpretive strains, more closely attuned to the reality of regimes. Experimentation along these lines has begun. Ernst Haas has been moving steadily toward his own brand of an "evolutionary epistemology," wherein consensual knowledge about various aspects of the human condition becomes one of the forces behind the rise and decline of international regimes.46 Robert Cox has advanced an unconventional historical materialist epistemology, which gives pride of place to shifting intersubjective frameworks of human discourse and practice.47 Epistemological positions derived from the "universal pragmatics" of Jiirgen Habermas, or informed by the "interpretive analytics" of Michel Foucault, have been found fruitful.48 Other possibilities have been probed as well.49 The burden of our discussion is not to advocate any one such alternative but to urge that their consideration be delayed no longer. Norms in explanation

There is a closely related problem having to do with models of explanation. The standard positivist model works with an initial condition plus a 46. The position is signaled in Ernst B. Haas, "Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes; and elaborated in Haas, "What Is Progress in the Study of International Organization?" which has been published only in Japanese translation. 47. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," and, especially, "Postscript 1985," both in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 48. See, respectively, Friedrich Kratochwil, "Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations" (Manuscript, Columbia University, 1986); and John Gerard Ruggie, Planetary Politics: Ecology and the Organization of Global Political Space (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming). 49. For example, a nondeterministic dialectical formulation of states' conceptions of world order is sketched out by Hayward R. Alker, "Dialectical Foundations of Global Disparities," International Studies Quarterly 25 (March 1981); and of the mutual recognition among states of competencies to act in collectively prescribed ways, by Richard Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism."

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A regime critique 767 covering law, on the basis of which it hypothesizes or predicts an occurrence. Even a single counterfactual occurrence may be taken to refute the covering law.50 (A probabilistic formulation would, of course, appropriately modify the criteria for refutation, but it would not alter the basic structure of the explanation.) Now consider the fact that what distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomena—from strategic interaction, let us say—is a specifically normative element.51 Indeed, one of the four analytical components of the concept of regimes is specified to be norms—"standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." And it has become customary to maintain that change in the normative structure of regimes produces change of, as opposed merely to within, regimes.52 The positivist model of explanation is not easily applied to cases in which norms, so defined, are a significant element in the phenomena to be explained. Alas, the positivist model reigns in regime analysis. Two problems in particular need to be raised.53 First, unlike the initial conditions in positivist explanations, norms can be thought of only with great difficulty as "causing" occurrences. Norms may "guide" behavior, they may "inspire" behavior, they may "rationalize" or "justify" behavior, they may express "mutual expectations" about behavior, or they may be ignored. But they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death or an uncontrolled surge in the money supply causes price inflation. Hence, where norms are involved, the first component of the positivist model of explanation is problematical. The second is even more so. For norms are counterfactually valid. No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. Not even many such occurrences necessarily do. Does driving while under the influence of alcohol refute the law (norm) against drunk driving? Does it when half the population is implicated? To be sure, the law (norm) is violated thereby. But whether or not violations also invalidate or refute a law (norm) will depend upon a host of other factors, not the least of which is how the community assesses the violation and responds to it. What is true of drunk driving is 50. On the importance of the logical form of modus tollens in the hypothetical deductive explanation scheme, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), chaps. 3 and 4. 51. One of the distinctive characteristics of strategic interaction is that ultimately it rests upon a unilateral calculation of verbal and nonverbal cues: "A's expectation of B will include an estimation of B's expectations of A. This process of replication, it must be noted, is not an interaction between two states, but rather a process in which decision-makers in one state work out the consequences of their beliefs about the world; a world they believe to include decisionmakers in other states, also working out the consequences of their beliefs. The expectations which are so formed are the expectations of one state, but they refer to other states." Paul Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 31. 52. See Krasner, "Introduction," International Regimes. 53. Some of these and related issues are discussed more extensively in Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," IO 38 (Autumn 1984).

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768 International Organization equally true of the norms of nondiscrimination in international trade, free and stable currency exchanges, and adequate compensation for expropriated foreign property. Indeed, it is possible to go further and argue that norms need not "exist" at all in a formal sense in order to be valid. It is often said, for example, that the Bretton Woods monetary regime did not exist prior to 1958, because only then did the Europeans assume the obligation of full currency convertibility for transactions on current account. But surely the norms of the regime guided the behavior of European states toward that event for some years before it actually took place. Thus, neither the violation of norms, nor, in some special circumstances, even their "nonexistence," necessarily refutes their validity. Let it be understood that we are not advocating a coup whereby the reign of positivist explanation is replaced by explanatory anarchy. But we would insist that, just as epistemology has to match ontology, so too does the explanatory model have to be compatible with the basic nature of the particular scientific enterprise at hand. The impact of norms within international regimes is not a passive process, which can be ascertained analogously to that of Newtonian laws governing the collision of two bodies. Hence, the common practice of treating norms as "variables"—be they independent, dependent, intervening, or otherwise—should be severely curtailed. So too should be the preoccupation with the "violation" of norms as the beginning, middle, and end of the compliance story. Precisely because state behavior within regimes is interpreted by other states, the rationales and justifications for behavior which are proffered, together with pleas for understanding or admissions of guilt, as well as the responsiveness to such reasoning on the part of other states, all are absolutely critical component parts of any explanation involving the efficacy of norms. Indeed, such communicative dynamics may tell us far more about how robust a regime is than overt behavior alone. And only where noncompliance is widespread, persistent, and unexcused—that is, presumably, in limiting cases—will an explanatory model that rests on overt behavior alone suffice.54 To be sure, communicative dynamics may be influenced by such extracontextual factors as state power, but that is no warrant for ignoring them. On the contrary, it suggests a potentially important relationship to be explored.55 Similarly, the fact that verbal behavior may lend itself to manipula54. Account should also be taken of that fact that different types of norms—implicit versus explicit, constraining versus enabling, and so on—function differently in social relations. Consult Edna Ullman-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), and H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). Moreover, compliance too is a variegated and complex phenomenon, as discussed by Oran R. Young, Compliance and Public Authority (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 55. It is well established that the so-called hegemonic stability thesis, for example, leaves a good deal about regimes still to be accounted for. See the original formulation and test by

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A regime critique 769 tion suggests only that it be treated as judiciously as any other piece of scientific evidence. The hierarchy of analytical components

The concept of international regimes is said to be a composite of four analytical component parts: principles ("beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude"), norms ("standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations"), rules ("specific prescriptions and proscriptions for action"), and decision-making procedures ("prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice").56 At first blush, the four fit together neatly in the specific case that was uppermost in everyone's mind when this conception was initially hammered out: the GATT-based trade regime.57 The principle that liberalized trade is good for global welfare and international peace was readily translated by states into such norms as nondiscrimination, which in turn suggested the most-favored-nation rule, all of which led to negotiated tariff reductions based on reciprocal concessions. But matters were complicated right from the start by the fact that GATT contained not one but at least two such "scripts," and that the second stood in stark contrast to the first. The second ran from the responsibility of governments to stabilize their domestic economies on through the norm of safeguarding the balance of payments and, under certain circumstances, domestic producers, to rules defining specific GATT safeguarding provisions, and finally to establishing mechanisms of multilateral surveillance over their operations.58 Different governments of course weighted these two scripts differently, but over time they seem not to have been unduly perturbed by the need to live with the ambiguity of their juxtaposition. Ambiguity, however, is more troublesome Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in Ole Holsti et al., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview, 1980); and, most recently, Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," IO 39 (Autumn 1985). One of the few contemporary realists who take the relationship between power and norms to be at all problematical and worthy of serious examination is Stephen D. Krasner, as in his thoughtful study of these issues in Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). We can agree with much of what Krasner has to say about the efficacy of norms, principles of legitimacy, and "movements of thought"—indeed, Krasner even invokes hermeneutics. And yet, in the end, we remain perplexed at how he reconciles this position with his fervent commitment to positivist realism. 56. Krasner, "Introduction," International Regimes, p. 2. 57. These issues were discussed at length at the October 1980 UCLA conference in preparation for the regimes book edited by Krasner. 58. The interplay between these two scripts forms the basis of Ruggie's interpretation of the postwar trade and monetary regimes presented in "Embedded Liberalism."

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770 International Organization for analysts, even when it is a deliberate creation of policy makers.59 And therein lies another epistemological tale. The notion still prevails in the regimes literature that the four analytical components are related instrumentally and that the greater the coherence among them is, the stronger the regime will be.60 There is an a priori attractiveness to this notion, in the sense that our collective research program would be eased considerably were it to obtain. But reality is not so obliging. Let us take up first the instrumentalist idea. A basic epistemological problem with instrumentalism is its presumption that it is always possible to separate goals (presumably expressed in principles and norms) from means (presumably expressed in rules and procedures), and to order them in a superordinate-subordinate relationship. But this relationship need not hold. As R. S. Summers has aptly remarked: "However true this might be of constructing houses or other artifacts, it is not always so in law. In law when available means limit and in part define the goal, the means and the goal thus defined are to that extent inseparable."61 What is true of law may also be true of regimes, for, as Kenneth Waltz has argued persuasively, international collaboration is shaped primarily by the availability and acceptability of means not by the desirability of ends.62 Thus, notions such as reciprocity in the trade regime are neither its ends nor its means: in a quintessential way, they are the regime—they are the principled and shared understandings that the regime comprises. The idea that the four regime components should also be coherent, and that coherence indicates regime strength, is even more profoundly problematical. The basic epistemological problem with this notion is its presumption that, once the machinery is in place, actors merely remain programmed by it. But this is clearly not so. Actors not only reproduce normative structures, they also change them by their very practice, as underlying conditions change, as new constraints or possibilities emerge, or as new claimants make their presence felt. Lawyers call this "interstitial lawmaking,"63 and sociologists, the process of "structuration."64 Only under 59. The proclivity of international relations theorists to resolve ambiguity and contradiction in images of international order, and the schema on the basis of which they do so, are explored by John Gerard Ruggie, "Changing Frameworks of International Collective Behavior: On the Complementarity of Contradictory Tendencies," in Nazli Choucri and Thomas Robinson, eds., Forecasting in International Relations (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978). 60. Cf. Haas, "Regime Decay." 61. R. S. Summers, "Naive Instrumentalism and the Law," in P. S. Hacker and J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977). 62. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 109. 63. This is simply another name for the role of precedent in legal interpretation and development. 64. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 19: "According to the theory of structuration, all social action consists of social practices, situated in time-space, and organized in a skilled and knowl-

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A regime critique 771 extremely unusual circumstances could we imagine parallel and simultaneous changes having taken place in each of the four component parts of regimes such that they remained coherent—assuming that they were so at the outset. In any case the robustness of international regimes has little to do with how coherent they remain—how coherent is the very robust U.S. Constitution?—but depends on the extent to which evolving and even diverging practices of actors express principled reasoning and shared understandings. We have now reached the same conclusion through three different routes: the conventional epistemological approaches in regime studies do not and cannot suffice. Allow us, before ending this section, to resist the claim that we have opened up a proverbial Pandora's box. The box was opened when the discipline gravitated toward an intersubjective ontology in the study of international regimes. We have merely pointed out that this first, critical choice has consequences and implications that have not yet been adequately addressed. No discipline can resolve anomalies or reduce the wooliness of concepts when its ontological posture is contradicted by its epistemological orientation, models of explanation, and the presumed relationships among its constitutive analytical constructs. The problems we have pointed to are not insuperable, but their resolution will require the incorporation into prevailing approaches of insights and methods derived from the interpretive sciences.65 Regimes and organizations The progressive shift in the literature toward the study of international regimes has been guided by an abiding concern with the structures and processes of international governance. Despite remaining problems with this framework of analysis, the most serious of which were flagged in the previous section, a great deal has been accomplished in a relatively short span of time. Along the way, however, as Figure 1 indicated, international institutions of a formal kind have been left behind. This fact is of academic interest because of the ever-present danger of theory getting out of touch with pracedgeable fashion by human agents. But such knowledgeability is always 'bounded' by unacknowledged conditions of action on the one side, and unintended consequences of action on the other. . . . By the duality of structure I mean that the structured properties of social systems are simultaneously the medium and outcome of social acts." 65. Representative approaches may be found in Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1973); Paul Connerton, Critical Sociology (New York: Penguin, 1976); Dallmayr and McCarthy, Social Inquiry; T. K. Seung, Structuralism and Hermeneutics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Donald Polkinghorne, Methodology of the Human Sciences (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983); and Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

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712 International Organization tice. But it is also of more than academic interest. The secretary general of the United Nations, to cite but one serious practical instance, has lamented that the malfunctioning of that institution seriously inhibits interstate collaboration in the peace and security field.66 This is not the place to take up detailed institutional shortcomings in the world of international organizations. Nor would we be the ones to propose a return to the institutionalist approaches of yesteryear. Nevertheless, in order for the research program of international regimes both to contribute to ongoing policy concerns and better reflect the complex and sometimes ambiguous policy realm, it is necessary to link up regimes in some fashion with the formal mechanisms through which real-world actors operate. In point of fact, the outlines of such linkages are already implicit in the regime approach. Our purpose in this final section is no more than to underscore the specific dimensions that are highlighted by an interpretive epistemology. There has been a great deal of interest in the regimes literature recently in what can be described as the "organizational-design" approach. The key issue underlying this approach is to discern what range of international policy problems can best be handled by different kinds of institutional arrangements, such as simple norms of coordination, the reallocation of international property rights, or authoritative control through formal organizations. For example, an international fishing authority would probably be less appropriate and less able to avoid the early exhaustion of fisheries' stock than would the ascription of exclusive property rights to states. Where problems of liability enter the picture, however, as in ship-based pollution, authoritative procedures for settling disputes would become necessary. The work of Oliver Williamson and William Ouchi is very suggestive here, demonstrating the relative efficacy of the institutionalization of behavior through "hierarchies" versus through transaction-based informal means.67 Robert Keohane has pioneered this territory in his "functional" theory of international regimes, from which organizational designs can be similarly derived.68 For its part, an interpretive epistemology would emphasize three additional dimensions of the organizational-design issue. The intersubjective 66. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1982 (A/37/1). 67. Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free, 1975), and William Ouchi and Oliver Williamson, "The Markets and Hierarchies Program of Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects," in William Joyce and Andrew van de Ven, eds., Organization Design (New York: Wiley, 1981). From the legal literature, see Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral," Harvard Law Review 85 (April 1972); Philip Heyemann, "The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining with Rules," Harvard Law Review 86 (March 1973); and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights," Columbia Law Review 85 (June 1985). 68. Keohane, After Hegemony. Some policy recommendations that flow from the approach are spelled out by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," Foreign Policy 60 (Fall 1985).

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A regime critique 773 basis of international regimes suggests that transparency of actor behavior and expectations within regimes is one of their core requirements. And, as has been shown in such diverse issue-areas as international trade, investment, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights, international organizations can be particularly effective instruments by which to create such transparency.69 The appropriate design of the mechanisms by which international organizations do so, therefore, should be given every bit as much consideration as the design of the mechanisms of substantive problem solving. The second is legitimation. A regime can be perfectly rationally designed but erode because its legitimacy is undermined.70 Or a regime that is a logical nonstarter can be the object of endless negotiations because a significant constituency views its aims to be legitimate.71 If a regime enjoys both it is described as being "stable" or "hegemonic." The important point to note is that international organizations, because of their trappings of universality, are the major venue within which the global legitimation struggle over international regimes is carried out today. Work in this genre goes back at least to Inis Claude and includes important recent contributions by Robert Cox and Stephen Krasner.72 The third dimension we would describe as epistemic. Stephen Toulmin has posed the issue well: "The problem of human understanding is a twofold one. Man knows, and he is also conscious that he knows. We acquire, possess, and make use of our knowledge; but at the same time, we are aware of our own activities as knowers."73 In the international arena, neither the processes whereby knowledge becomes more extensive nor the means whereby reflection on knowledge deepens are passive or automatic. They are intensely political. And for better or for worse, international organizations have maneuvered themselves into the position of being the vehicle through which both types of knowledge enter onto the international agenda.74 As Ernst Haas has sought to show in his seminal work, in these 69. The GATT multilateral surveillance mechanisms are, of course, its chief institutional means of establishing intersubjectively acceptable interpretations of what actors are up to. For a treatment of investment which highlights this dimension, see Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); for nonproliferation, see Nye, "Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime," and for human rights, John Gerard Ruggie, "Human Rights and the Future International Community Daedalus 112 (Fall 1983). The impact of intergovernmental information systems is analyzed by Ernst B. Haas and John Gerard Ruggie, "What Message in the Medium of Information Systems?" International Studies Quarterly 26 (June 1982). 70. Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, discuss the decline of colonialism in terms that include this dimension. 71. The New International Economic Order is a prime example. 72. See Claude, "Collective Legitimization"; Cox, "Labor and Hegemony," "The Crisis of World Order," and "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations"; and Krasner, Structural Conflict. 73. Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 1. 74. Ruggie analyzes this process in "On the Problem of 'The Global Problematique.' "

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774 International Organization processes of global epistemic politics lie the seeds of the future demand for international regimes.75 In short, the institutional-design approach, complemented by a concern with transparency creation, the legitimation struggle, and epistemic politics, can push the heuristic fruitfulness of the regime research program "forward" yet another step, linking it "back" to the study of international organizations. Conclusion In this article, we set out to present a "state of the art" of the field of international organization circa 1985. Our conclusions can be restated very quickly. In the first section, we tried to dispel the notion that the field has been floundering from one "dependent variable" to another, as academic fashions have dictated. On the contrary, the analytical shifts have been progressive and cumulative and have been guided by an overriding concern with what has always preoccupied students of international organization: how the modern society of nations governs itself. In the second section we pointed out, however, that the currently ascendant regimes approach is internally inconsistent in a manner that has deleterious effects. The reason for its inconsistency is the tension between its ontological posture and its prevailing epistemological practices. In contrast to the epistemological ideal of positivism, which insists on a separation of "object" and "subject," we proposed a more interpretive approach that would open up regime analysis to the communicative rather than merely the referential functions of norms in social interactions. Thus, what constitutes a breach of an obligation undertaken within a regime is not simply an "objective description" of a fact but an inter subjective appraisal. Likewise, what constitutes reciprocity or reasonableness of behavior within regime contexts is not an issue that can be resolved simply by a monological treatment of "objective information," as is characteristic of a prepositional language. For regimes are inherently dialogical in character. To be sure, in circumstances that require little interpretation on the part of the relevant actors— because the environment is placid, because shared knowledge prevails, or because coercion determines outcomes—interpretive epistemologies will not be required. But we do not take such occurrences to be broadly representative of contemporary international regimes. For the more general universe of cases, once it was decided that the ontology of regimes consists of an intersubjective basis—and the consensus definition of regimes suggests 75. Haas, "Words Can Hurt You," and Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32 (April 1980).

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A regime critique 775 as much—then what Frank Lentricchia has called "spectator epistemology" ipso facto became insufficient.76 Finally, in our third section, we identified some linkages between the analytical construct of international regimes and the concrete entities of international organizations. Students of international organization have already assimilated from the organizational design school the lesson that the provision of routine and predictable policy frameworks is not synonymous with the construction of formal hierarchies. An interpretive epistemology would suggest further that international organizations can contribute to the effectiveness of informal ordering mechanisms, such as regimes, by their ability to enhance (or diminish) intersubjective expectations and normatively stabilized meanings, which are the very bases of regimes. International organizations do so, we pointed out, through the modalities of transparency creation, focusing the legitimation struggle, and devising future regime agendas via epistemic politics. Thus reinvigorated, the study of formal organizations may yet come to reinvigorate the practice of formal organizations. 76. Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 3.

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[2]

Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions

Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons

The role of international institutions has been central to the study of world politics at least since the conclusion of World War II. Much of this research was, and continues to be, pioneered in the pages of International Organization. In this article we take stock of past work on international institutions, trace the evolution of major themes in scholarship over time, and highlight areas for productive new research. Our central argument is that research should increasingly turn to the question of how institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics. New research efforts should emphasize observable implications of alternative theories of institutions. We advocate approaching international institutions as both the object of strategic choice and a constraint on actors' behavior, an idea that is familiar to scholars of domestic institutions but has been neglected in much of the debate between realist and institutionalist scholars of international relations. The article is organized into three major sections. The first section provides an analytical review of the development of studies of international institutions. From the beginning, the pages of IO have been filled with insightful studies of institutions, in some cases asking questions consistent with the research agenda we propose in this essay. But the lack of a disciplinary foundation in the early years meant that many good insights were simply lost, not integrated into other scholars' research. With the professionalization of the discipline since the late 1950s, scholarship on international institutions has become more theoretically informed, and empirical research has begun more often to conform to social-scientific standards of evidence, with results that provide both caution and inspiration for future research. One of the most consequential developments for our understanding of international institutions came in the early 1970s, when a new generation of scholars developed insights that opened up inquiry beyond that of formal organizations, providing intellectual bridgeheads to the study of institutions more generally. Our thanks for comments on previous versions go to Marc Busch, Peter Katzenstein, Bob Keohane, Steve Krasner, and participants in the IO fiftieth anniversary issue conference.

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International Organization 730 International Organization The second section explicitly addresses a theme that arises from the review of scholarship on institutions: whether international politics needs to be treated as sui generis, with its own theories and approaches that are distinct from other fields of political science, or whether it fruitfully can draw on theories of domestic politics. As our review shows, developments in studies of American politics, such as studies of voting and coalitional behavior, have often influenced the way that scholars approached international institutions. Most of these efforts did not pay off with major insights. The functionalist approach to institutions adopted in the 1980s owed little to theories of domestic politics, drawing more on economic models. Today, we see the pendulum swinging back, as more scholars turn to modern theories initially developed to study domestic political phenomena (see Helen Milner's article in this issue). Here, we assess whether these new attempts are likely to be any more successful than previous efforts. The third section turns to the problem of research agendas. Where does scholarship on international institutions go next? Our primary argument in this section is that attention needs to focus on how, not just whether, international institutions matter for world politics. Too often over the last decade and a half the focal point of debate has been crudely dichotomous: institutions matter, or they do not. This shaping of the agenda has obscured more productive and interesting questions about variation in the types and degree of institutional effects, variations that were in fact well documented in the less theoretical but well-researched case studies of the journal's earliest years. Of course, we do not suggest a return to idiographic institutional analysis. Rather, we suggest a number of lines of theoretically informed analysis that may lead to research that both asks better questions and is more subject to empirical testing. These paths include more serious analysis of the distributional effects of institutions, the relation between international institutions and domestic politics, the problem of unanticipated consequences, and a typology of institutional effects.

The Evolution of an Idea: Institutions in International Politics Early Studies of the Institutionalization of the Postwar World The "poles" of realism and idealism—of which much is made in graduate seminars— had little to do with the highly practical organizational analysis that dominated the pages of IO in the first decades after the war. The focus of attention was on how well these newly established institutions met the problems that they were designed to solve. On this score, few scholarly accounts were overly optimistic. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the political and economic reconstruction effort, few judged postwar organizations as up to the task. Central to this debate was a highly realistic understanding that international politics would shape and limit the effectiveness of postwar institutions; virtually no one predicted that these would triumph over poli-

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tics. The UN, 1 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 the International Monetary Fund3 —all were the subject of highly critical review. A number of important studies grappled explicitly with the impact of these institutions on the policies of the major powers and the outcomes for the central political and military competition between them. The answers, predictably, were derived from little more than informed counterfactual reasoning, but they displayed a sensitivity to the broad range of possible impacts that institutions such as the League and the UN could have on the major powers. In their examination of the ideal of collective security, Howard C. Johnson and Gerhart Niemeyer squarely inquired into the role that norms, backed by organizations such as the UN, play in affecting states' behavior. They asked whether states were "prepared to use force or the threat of force for the sake of public law and order rather than for the sake of their national advantage in relation to that of other states. . . . How has the behavior of states been affected by these standards?"4 Though ultimately more confident in the balance of power than in norms embodied in the rule of law, these scholars were correct to push for a mechanism that might explain the effects of institutions on behavior: "We cannot claim to have learned much about the League experiment until we know how it has affected the problem of harnessing and controlling the factors of force and their role in the relations of power.''5 A flurry of studies in the early 1950s suggested possible answers. Pointing to the U.S. role in decolonization and military aid for Korea, collective institutions were said to raise U.S. "consciousness of broader issues" that might affect American interests and thereby make the U.S. more responsive to world opinion.6 By subjecting policies to global scrutiny—a mechanism not unlike those of transparency and reputation central to the literature in the 1980s—the UN was viewed as having had an (admittedly marginal) effect on some of the most central issues of world politics. Though lacking the elaborate theoretical apparatus of current research, early studies of postwar organizations had many of the same insights that have informed "modern" institutionalism. Paralleling much contemporary argument on the form of cooperation,7 one study as early as 1949 argued that multilateralism was precluded in cases where there were significant bargaining advantages and discrimination advantages of proceeding bilaterally.8 Foreshadowing more theoretically sophisticated treatments of informal versus formal agreements,9 studies of GATT as early as 1954 recognized that some agreements gain strength through their informal nature, and 1. See Goodrich 1947, 18; Fox 1951; Hoffmann 1956; Claude 1963; and Malin 1947. But for the optimistic view, see Bloomfield 1960. 2. Goiter 1954. 3. See Knorr 1948; and Kindleberger 1951a. 4. Johnson and Niemeyer 1954, 27. 5. Niemeyer 1952, 558 (italics added). 6. Cohen 1951. For a parallel analysis of institutional effects on Soviet behavior, see Rudzinski 1951. 7. See Oye 1992; and Martin 1992b. 8. Little 1949. 9. Lipsonl991.

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prescient of the regimes literature viewed the value of GATT as "a focal point on which many divergent views on appropriate commercial policy converge."10 Lacking a theoretical hook on which to hang these observations, and without a professionalized critical mass of scholars to develop these insights, many important findings were only rediscovered and advanced more than two decades later. Nowhere is this more true than in the rediscovery of the relationship between international institutions and domestic politics. The idea that international institutions can influence state behavior by acting through domestic political channels was recognized by scholars writing in the mid-1950s. Referring to the example of the International Finance Corporation, B. E. Matecki wrote that international organizations could be "idea generating centers" with the ability to set in motion national forces that directly influence the making of national policy.11 Reflecting on the efforts of the Council of Europe to gain acceptance of its vision for Europe in national capitals, an early study by A. Glenn Mowers pointed out the conscious strategy of direct lobbying of national governments through national parliaments.12 And in a fascinating study of the role of the Security Council in influencing Dutch colonial policy, Whitney Perkins pointed to the crucial interaction between authoritative international decisions and democratic politics: "By defiance of the Security Council the Dutch alerted powerful monitors who allied their strength with domestic forces in requiring them to live up to principles [of decolonization]."13 "In this type of interaction between democratic governments and the UN emerge some of the essential elements of a world political process."14 Anticipating a mechanism for institutional effects that have recently resurfaced in contemporary studies, he concluded that "The role of the UN is to exert pressures designed to enable the loser in public sentiment to accept the consequences of its loss."15 This research approach reflected an effort to flesh out the mechanisms by which the policies and perspectives of international institutions could work through national politics. In short, the early postwar literature on international institutions, while highly focused on formal organizations, was far less naive and legalistic, more politically sensitive and insightful than it is often given credit for being. Early insights included the recognition that the nature of the international political system provided a context for the effectiveness of international institutions, that institutional effectiveness should be subject to empirical investigation, and that elaborate organizational structure is not always the best approach to achieving international cooperation. Moreover, the best of this early literature was concerned not merely with whether international institutions had an impact, but how one might think about a mechanism for their effects. Transparency, reputation, and legitimacy as well as domestic political pressures were suggested in various strands of thought. But there was no conceptual 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Gorter 1954, 1, 8. Matecki 1956. Mowers 1964. Perkins 1958, 40. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 42

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framework that could tie these insights together; nor was there a systematic comparative enterprise to check for their regularity. Rather, another research agenda, replete with fancy methodological tools imported from American politics, was to demote these questions in favor of an only partially fruitful examination of the internal politics of international organizations. The Influence of Behavioralism: Politics Within International Institutions If few thought international organization would liberate the world from politics, it arguably became important to understand who has power in these organizations and how that power was being exercised. Especially since the use of the veto had apparently rendered the Security Council toothless, concern began to focus on the development of rules and norms in the General Assembly. The supposed "specter" of bloc voting in that forum—increasingly of concern to American scholars and policymakers as the Cold War extended its gelid reach—became a central concern.16 This debate took what appears today to be an odd early direction. Perhaps due to new and exciting work in U.S. legislative behavior, the research program quickly became focused on how to describe patterns of voting in the General Assembly, without a systematic attempt to sort out the usefulness of the voting behavior approach. Despite warnings that the international system was fundamentally different from domestic political systems,17 this research program easily accepted that voting in the UN was a proxy for power in that institution. Certainly there were skeptics: Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, for example, cautioned that voting in an international body does not have the same function as in a democratically elected parliament; an international conference is a negotiating rather than a legislative body. Voting in such a situation, they noted, was unlikely to play a deliberative role, since such votes were no more than propaganda efforts.18 Few of these studies explicitly defended their assumption that General Assembly resolutions somehow mattered to the conduct of world politics. But the fascination with the method for analyzing voting behavior overcame fairly readily the caution that the domestic-international logic should be subject to close scrutiny. Moreover, the hope of providing an explicitly political (legislative) model inspired by American politics may have been a reaction against the overly "anarchic" systems analysis of the late 1950s.19 Much of this work can be traced directly to developments in the study of American politics. Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett's study International Politics in the Gen16. For one of the earliest studies of bloc voting, see Ball 1951. For a study focusing primarily on the behavior of the Commonwealth countries, see Carter 1950. Concern with the influence of the Commonwealth grew as former British colonies gained independence and membership in the early 1960s. See Millar 1962. 17. Hoffmann 1960, l-A. 18. Emerson and Claude 1952. See also Jebb 1952. 19. Alker and Russett 1965, 145, explicitly refer to Liska 1957 and Kaplan 1957. They argue that "[i]t is simply erroneous to think of international politics as anarchic, chaotic, and utterly unlike national politics. "Alker and Russett 1965, 147.

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eral Assembly, for example, acknowledged "that studies of the American political process by Robert Dahl, Duncan Macrae,20 and David Truman were theoretically and methodologically suggestive of ways in which roll-call data could be used to test for the existence of a pluralistic political process in a quasi-legislative international organization."21 Influenced by James March22 and Robert Dahl, this study sought to understand various influences on UN voting behavior across issue areas in which the dimensions of power and influence were likely to differ. Certainly, one factor influencing this research agenda was the priority given to reproducible and "objective" forms of social science; the focus on General Assembly voting was acknowledged to be an artifact of the availability of fairly complete voting records.23 Largely related to the ferment in American voting studies, politics within the UN dominated the research agenda for most of the decade from the mid-1960s. Central was the concern to explain why certain countries had a tendency to vote together, to vote in blocs, or to form "legislative coalitions."24 Also obviously inspired by American politics, another branch of inquiry focused on the determinants of successfully running for elective UN office.25 Much of this literature was methodologically rather than conceptually driven and highly inductive with respect to its major empirical findings.26 Little effort was made to explore the extent to which the concept of representation or the winning of elections in the domestic setting could travel meaningfully to an international institution. The research program lost steam under heavy fire from scholars who demanded a stronger justification for focusing on the General Assembly as a microcosm for world politics.27 Partially in response to the critique that the General Assembly was hardly the center of world politics, and partially influenced by another trend in American politics growing out of the study of bureaucratic politics and political systems, another research path was taken by Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson's study of eight specialized agencies within the UN.28 In their edited volume, the focus was on the structure and process of influence associated with these institutions and their outputs, rather than on their formal character. Reflecting once again a major thread in American politics, the underlying assumption was that international organizations could be fruitfully analyzed as distinct political systems in which one could trace out patterns of influence: "The legal and formal character and the content of the decision is less important than the balance of forces that it expresses and the inclination that it gives to the further direction of events."29 20. MacRae 1958. 21. Alker and Russett 1965, vii. 22. March 1955. 23. On objectivity, see Alker and Russett 1965, 2-3; on availability of data see p. 19. 24. See Riggs 1958; Hovet 1958; Keohane 1967, 1969; Weigert and Riggs 1969; Gareau 1970; Alker 1970; Volgy 1973; and Harbert 1976. 25. See Volgy and Quistgard 1974; and Singer and Sensenig 1963. 26. See, for example, Rieselbach 1960. 27. For two systematic reviews of the quantitative research on the UN and international organizations, see Riggs et al. 1970; and Alger 1970. 28. Cox and Jacobson 1973. 29. Ibid.

International Organization International Institutions 735 The work of Cox and Jacobson also encouraged the study of international organizations to consider a more transgovernmental model of their influences. Whereas other research inspired by behavioralism typically assumed a unified model of state interests and actors, this work focused on transgovernmental coalitions involving parts of governments and parts of international organizations. One of the most important insights generated was highly consonant with developments in transgovernmental relations that had come on the intellectual scene in the 1970s:30 the observation that one channel through which international organizations could affect state policies was through the potential alliances that could form between international bureaucracies and domestic pressure groups at the national level.31 Although this was an interesting insight, and case studies tended to confirm the importance of such "transnational coalitions" for policy implementation, their effect on policy formulation remains unclear.32 Meanwhile, the issues facing the international community changed drastically in the early 1970s, giving rise to a new approach to the study of international institutions, discussed in the following section. Finally, a strand of research stimulated by Ernst Haas's "neofunctional approach" to integration also left a telling mark on the study of empirical effects of international institutions in the 1970s. Neofunctionalism ascribed a dynamic role to individuals and interest groups in the process of integrating pluralist communities.33 By virtue of their participation in the policymaking process of an integrating community, interest groups and other participants were hypothesized to "learn" about the rewards of such involvement and undergo attitudinal changes inclining them favorably toward the integrative system. According to Haas, "political integration is the process whereby actors shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states."34 The implications for empirical research on such institutions were readily drawn: those who participate in international organizations should exhibit altered attitudes toward their usefulness and effectiveness. American politics provided yet another methodological instrument that dovetailed nicely with what was thought to be an empirically testable proposition of Haas's theory: survey research! From the late 1950s into the early 1980s, a plethora of studies tried to establish whether international organizations could contribute to "learning," whether cognitive or affective.35 The attitudes of civil servants,36 political appointees, and even national legislators37 were scrutinized for evidence that the length or nature of their association with various kinds of international organizations had induced attitudinal change. The impact of methods from American politics was obvi30. Keohane and Nye 1974. 31. See Cox 1969, 225; and Cox and Jacobson 1973, 214. 32. See, for example, Russell 1973; and Keohane 1978. 33. See Haas 1958; and Pentland 1973. 34. Haas 1958, 10. 35. See Kelman 1962; Alger 1965; and Jacobson 1967. See also Wolf 1974, 352-53; and Volgy and Quistgard 1975. 36. See Ernst 1978; and Peck 1979. 37. See Bonham 1970; Kerr 1973; Riggs 1977; and Karns 1977.

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ous: in some cases, indicators were used that precisely paralleled the "thermometers" used by the National Opinion Survey Research project. Three problems bedeviled this research approach for years. First, it failed to produce consensus on the effect of international institutions on attitudes.38 Second, attitudes were never reconnected with outcomes, policies, or actions.39 Third, researchers were never able to overcome the problem of recruitment bias, which itself accounted for most of the positive attitudes held by personnel associated with international institutions. As neofunctionalism as a theoretical orientation lost favor over the course of the 1970s and integrative international organizations such as the European Community and the UN seemed to stagnate in the face of growing world problems beyond their purview, this research program declined, though today a version is pursued primarily in studies that attempt to document mass attitudes toward the European Union. Politics Beyond Formal Organizations: The Rise of International Regimes As the study of international institutions progressed over the post-World War II years, the gulf between international politics and formal organization arrangements began to open in ways that were not easy to reconcile. The major international conflict for a rising generation of scholars—the Vietnam War—raged beyond the formal declarations of the UN. Two decades of predictable monetary relations under the Bretton Woods institutions were shattered by a unilateral decision by the United States in 1971 to close the gold window and later to float the dollar. The rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and their apparent power to upset previously understood arrangements with respect to oil pricing and availability took place outside the structure of traditional international organizations, as did consumers' response later in the decade. For some, the proper normative response seemed to be to strengthen international organizations to deal with rising problems of interdependence.40 Others more familiar with the public choice literature argued that a proper extension of property rights, largely underway in areas such as environmental protection, rather than a formal extension of supranational authority per se, was the answer to solving problems of collective action.41 Overall, few doubted that international life was "organized," but, increasingly, it became apparent that much of the earlier focus

38. Studies that failed to confirm expectations of attitudinal change include Siverson 1973; and Bonham 1970. A few studies even found negative impacts on attitudes due to association with international organizations: Smith 1973; and Pendergast 1976. 39. To the extent that such associations affected outcomes, the results were generally innocuous. See, for example, Mathiason 1972. 40. Brown and Fabian, for example, modestly call for "a comprehensive ocean authority, an outer space projects agency, a global weather and climate organization, and an international scientific commission on global resources and technologies." See Brown and Fabian 1975. See also Ruggie 1972, 890, 891; and Gosovic and Ruggie 1976. 41. Conybeare 1980.

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on formal structures and multilateral treaty-based agreements, especially the UN, had been overdrawn.42 The events of the early 1970s gave rise to the study of "international regimes," defined as rules, norms, principles, and procedures that focus expectations regarding international behavior. Clearly, the regimes movement represented an effort to substitute an understanding of international organization with an understanding of international governance more broadly.43 It also demoted the study of international organizations as actors: prior to the study of international regimes an inquiry into the effects of international institutions meant inquiring into how effectively a particular agency performed its job, for example, the efficiency with which the World Health Organization vaccinated the world's needy children.44 When regimes analysts looked for effects, these were understood to be outcomes influenced by a constellation of rules rather than tasks performed by a collective international agency. But just what effects regimes analysis sought to uncover has changed as the research program has unfolded.45 A first collective effort by the scholarly community to address regime effects was primarily interested in the distributive consequences of the norms of the international food regime, arguing that it is important to consider the "ways in which the global food regime affects . . . wealth, power, autonomy, community, nutritional well-being, . . . and sometimes physical survival."46 In this view, regime "effects" were to be reckoned in terms of the distributive consequences of the behavior of a myriad of producers, distributors, and consumers, and, in a minor way, by international organizations and state bureaucracies. Certainly, there was in this early volume little thought that regimes were somehow efficient or efficiencyimproving outcomes, as later theorizing would imply; rather, the food regime was characterized by "broad and endemic inadequacies," which are the result of national policies that are "internationally bargained and coordinated . . . by multilateral agreement or unilateral dictate."47 Further research on international regimes moved thinking in three important directions. First, distributive consequences soon fell from the center of consideration as research began to focus on how international regimes are created and transformed in the first place as well as the behavioral consequences of norms or rules,48 rather than the distributive consequences of behavior itself. (We argue later that attention to distributive issues ought to be restored.) Second, in one (though not dominant) strand 42. On skepticism regarding the centrality of the GATT regime, see Strange 1988. On the declining importance of "public international agencies" in general and the FAO in particular, see McLin 1979. 43. See, for example, Hopkins and Puchala 1978, especially 598. 44. Hoole 1977. The focus on international organizations as actors providing collective or redistributive goods has a long history. See Kindleberger 195la; Ascher 1952; Wood 1952; Loveday 1953; Shaip 1953; and Gregg 1966. 45. We focus here on effects of international regimes because, as argued later, we think this is the question on which future research should concentrate. For a review of theories that purport to explain international regimes, see Haggard and Simmons 1987. 46. Hopkins and Puchala 1978, 598. 47. Ibid., 615-16. 48. Krasner 1983b, introduction and conclusion.

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of research, attention to the normative aspects of international regimes led naturally to consideration of the subjective meaning of such norms and to a research paradigm that was in sympathy with developments in constructivist schools of thought.49 (See the essay by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in this issue of IO.) Third, by the mid-1980s explanations of international regimes became intertwined with explanations of international cooperation more generally. The work of Robert Keohane especially drew from functionalist approaches that emphasized the efficiency reasons for rules and agreements among regime participants.50 Based on rationality assumptions shared by a growing literature in political economy, this research sought to show that international institutions provided a way for states to overcome problems of collective action, high transaction costs, and information deficits or asymmetries. This approach has produced a number of insights, which we will discuss and extend later. But its analytical bite—derived from its focus on states as unified rational actors—was purchased at the expense of earlier insights relating to transnational coalitions and, especially, domestic politics. Furthermore, the strength of this approach has largely been its ability to explain the creation and maintenance of international institutions. It has been weaker in delineating their effects on state behavior and other significant outcomes, an issue to which we will return. This weakness opened the way for an important realist counterthrust in the late 1980s: the challenge to show that international institutions affect state behavior in any significant way. Some realists, particularly neorealists, raised logical and empirical objections to the institutionalist research agenda. On the logical side, Joseph Grieco51 and John Mearsheimer argued that relative-gains concerns prevent states from intensive cooperation. The essence of their argument was that since the benefits of cooperation could be translated into military advantages, states would be fearful that such benefits would disproportionately flow to potential adversaries and therefore would be reluctant to cooperate in substantial, sustained ways. Responses by Duncan Snidal and Robert Powell showed that, even if states did put substantial weight on such relative-gains concerns, the circumstances under which they would greatly inhibit cooperation were quite limited. Mearsheimer, in his extensive challenge to institutionalism, also argued that the empirical evidence showing that institutions changed patterns of state behavior was weak, especially in the area of security affairs. While we might dispute the extreme conclusions drawn by Mearsheimer, we take seriously his challenge to provide stronger empirical evidence. In the third section of this article we suggest lines of institutionalist analysis that should lend themselves to rigorous empirical testing, avoiding some of the inferential traps and fallacies that Mearsheimer and other realists have identified.52

49. 50. 51. 52.

See Haas 1983; and Ruggie 1972. Keohane 1984. See Grieco 1988; and Mearsheimer 1994. See Snidal 1991; and Powell 1991. See also Baldwin 1993.

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Institutions Across the Level-of-Analysis Divide: Insights from Domestic Politics Early studies of international institutions were often motivated by the attempt to apply new methods used in the study of domestic politics. As just reviewed, studies of voting behavior in the General Assembly, electoral success in the UN governing structure, and surveys regarding attitudinal change as a result of international organization experience are all prime examples. Similar studies continue today, for example, in calculations of power indexes for member states of the European Union.53 These approaches have not, however, been widely influential recently and have been subject to trenchant criticisms.54 In spite of this less-than-promising experience, scholars today are turning once again to models of domestic politics to suggest new questions and approaches to the study of international institutions. In this section, we briefly consider whether these new approaches are more likely to bear fruit. We find reasons to be relatively optimistic about today's attempts to transport models across levels of analysis, as long as such attempts are undertaken with some caution. In particular, we see substantial potential in looking at theories of domestic institutions that are rooted in noncooperative game theory. Rationalist theories of institutions that fall into the category of the "new institutionalism" have applicability at both the domestic and international levels. Virtually all the early attempts to apply techniques and research strategies from domestic politics to the international level were implicitly based on the assumption that agreements among actors are enforceable. Indeed, this was the only assumption under which it made sense to look at the politics that underlay voting and decision making in international institutions at all. Models that assume that agreements will be enforced by a neutral third party are especially inappropriate for the international setting; calculating voting power in the General Assembly in a world of unenforceable agreements may have more than a passing resemblance to arranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Thus, it is not surprising that these models have not had great influence when transported to the international level. However, recent models of domestic institutions as a rule draw, often explicitly, on noncooperative game theory. The basic assumptions of noncooperative game theory are that actors are rational, strategic, and opportunistic, and that no outside actor will step in to enforce agreements. Therefore, agreements that will make a difference must be self-enforcing. These conditions are remarkably similar to the usual characterization of international politics as a situation of anarchy and self-help.55 As long as models use the same basic assumptions about the nature of actors and their environment, the potential for learning across the level-of-analysis divide could be enormous. 53. Hosli 1993. 54. Garrett and Tsebelis 1996. 55. Waltz 1979.

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As one example, consider what international relations scholars might learn from looking at current debates on the nature of legislative institutions.56 Analogously to how realist theory portrays states with a mixture of common and conflicting interests but without supranational enforcement, these models treat legislators as selfinterested, individualistic actors in a situation where they must cooperate with one another to achieve mutual benefits.57 They ask how legislators under these conditions might construct institutions—such as committees or parties—that will allow them to reach goals such as reelection.58 Similarly, international relations scholars are interested in how states or other entities design institutional forms (organizations, procedures, informal cooperative arrangements, treaty arrangements) that assist in the realization of their objectives. The point is not, as much of the earlier literature assumed, that "legislative activity" at the international level is interesting per se. The power of the analogy rests solely on how actors choose strategies to cope with similar strategic environments. In general, we suggest that more progress can be made by drawing out the aspects of domestic politics that are characterized by attempts to cooperate by actors with mixed motives, who cannot turn easily to external enforcement, and applying them selectively to the study of international relations. The debate about legislative organization, which we argue may provide insights into international institutions more generally, has been roughly organized into a contrast between informational and distributional models. Informational models concentrate on the ways in which legislative structures allow legislators to learn about the policies they are adopting, thus avoiding inefficient outcomes.59 Researchers have argued that properly structured legislative committees can efficiently signal information about the effects of proposed policies to the floor, and that informational concerns can explain both the pattern of appointment of legislators to committees and the decision making rules under which committees operate. All of these claims have stimulated intense empirical investigation, which has been challenged by the distributional perspective discussed later. Informational models can be used to extend and clarify arguments in the international literature that stress the role of institutions in the provision of information, as Keohane has argued, and in the learning process, as Ernst and Peter Haas have emphasized. They can lead to predictions about the conditions under which international institutions can effectively provide policy-relevant information to states, about the kinds of institutions that can provide credible information, and about the effects of such information provision on patterns of state behavior. An example of an issue area where these effects might be prominent is environ56. The work on legislative institutions is just one example of the application of noncooperative game theory to domestic institutions. But since it is a particularly well-developed literature, we concentrate on it here, without wishing to imply that this is the only branch of research on domestic institutions that may have interesting analogies to international institutions. 57. Shepsle and Weingast 1995. 58. Although much of the work on legislative organization concentrates on the American context, in recent years creative efforts have been made to develop such models in non-U.S. settings. See Huber 1996b; Tsebelis and Money 1995; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; G. Cox 1987; and Shugart and Carey 1992. 59. See Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; and Krehbiel 1991.

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mental institutions, where it is highly likely that the ability of organizations to provide reliable, credible information about the effects of human activities on the environment is a key factor in explaining the success or failure of negotiations on environmental treaties. Another possible application might be the creation of international financial institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements, an original function of which was to provide credible information to markets on German creditworthiness.60 Within the European Union, the Commission's role as a relatively independent collector of policy-relevant information is a plausible explanation for its ability to exercise considerable influence over policy outcomes.61 Distributional models, on the other hand, assume that information is not all that problematic. Instead, they concentrate on the fact that legislators are heterogeneous in their tastes, caring differentially about various issues.62 Achieving mutual gains, in this framework, means cutting deals that will stick across different issues. Since exchanges of votes cannot always be simultaneous, legislators have developed structures such as committees and agenda-setting rules that allow them to put together majorities on the issues of most intense particularistic interest to them. This structure provides predictions about the distribution of benefits to individual legislators. Distributional benefits flow through appointment to powerful legislative committees. Like researchers in the informational tradition, those in the distributional tradition have used such models to explain and predict various aspects of legislative organization. For example, they argue that committees will be composed of preference outliers— those legislators who care most intensely about particular issues—and that such committees will be granted agenda-setting power, which is necessary to keep cross-issue deals from unraveling on the floor. Distributional models may be especially useful in exploring in a rigorous fashion the role of international institutions in facilitating or hampering mutually beneficial issue linkages that have been an important research agenda in international relations.63 The debate between informational and distributional models of legislative organization has been highly productive, in both theoretical and empirical terms. It has provided new insights into the types of problems confronted by legislators, the types of solutions available to them, and the role of institutions in democracies. On the empirical side, it has generated a plethora of alternative observable implications, for example, about the composition of congressional committees or the conditions under which actors gain gatekeeping or amendment power. Empirical research on both sides has led to deep insights about how the structure of institutions, such as legislative committees, influences their ability to help individuals overcome collectiveaction problems, and the conditions under which individuals will be willing to delegate substantial decision-making authority to such institutions. Both types of questions are highly relevant and essential to an understanding of the role of institutions in international politics as well. For example, the informational model suggests 60. 61. 62. 63.

Simmons 1993. See Haas 1989; and Bernauer 1995. Weingast and Marshall 1988. On issue linkage, see Stein 1980; and Martin 1992c.

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that institutions should be most influential in promoting cooperation when they are relatively independent, "expert" sources of information and when such information is scarce and valuable to states. We should expect this model to be most useful in international issue areas characterized by information asymmetries or in the development of expert knowledge (such as financial and banking regulation). The distributional model predicts that institutions will be most successful in allowing for credible cross-issue deals between states when those with the most intense interest in any particular issue dominate policymaking on that dimension and when institutional mechanisms inhibit states from reneging on cross-issue deals, even if performance on different dimensions is not simultaneous. Institutions that try to cope with environmental protection and development needs in the same package (such as UNCED and the Agenda 21 program) provide a plausible example. For our interests, another striking analogy between the international arena and the legislative literature is the degree to which the terms of the debate—information versus distribution—reflect the emerging debate about the significance of international institutions. In many essential respects the problems faced by individual legislators mirror those faced by individual states in the international system. Individual actors face situations in which they must cooperate in order to achieve benefits but also face temptations to defect from cooperative arrangements. No external authority exists to enforce cooperative agreements; they must be self-enforcing. Self-enforcement takes the form of exclusion from the benefits of cooperation, a coercive measure. Given these analogies, there is every reason to expect that some of the methods, insights, and results of these new studies of legislators could usefully inform new studies of international institutions, in spite of the fact that legislators (usually) operate in a more densely institutionalized environment.64 More generally, rationalist models of institutions that have been developed in domestic settings have the potential to be translated to the international level. As long as we are considering mixed-motive situations in which actors must cooperate in order to pursue their objectives, the incentives to construct institutions to structure and encourage cooperation are similar.

How Institutions Matter Since the 1980s, work on international institutions has been defined for the most part by the demand that scholars respond to a realist agenda: to prove that institutions have a significant effect on state behavior. While structuring the debate in this manner may have stimulated direct theoretical confrontation, it has also obscured some important and tractable research paths. Allowing realism to set the research agenda has meant that models of international institutions have rarely taken domestic poli64. One could make a similar argument about domestic theories of delegation. See Epstein and O'Halloran 1997; Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994; and Lupia and McCubbins 1994. The analogy between politicians deciding to delegate authority to bureaucrats or committees and states delegating authority to international institutions is strong.

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tics seriously, treating the state as a unit. The debate has also been reduced to a dichotomy: either institutions matter or they do not. Insufficient attention has been given to the mechanisms through which we might expect institutional effects to work. Institutionalists, in response to realism, have treated institutions largely as independent variables, while playing down earlier insights that international institutions are themselves the objects of strategic state choice. Treating institutions as dependent variables has mistakenly been understood as an implicit admission that they are epiphenomenal, with no independent effect on patterns of behavior.65 Although it has been important to go beyond merely explaining the existence of international institutions, productive new lines of research emerge if we accept that institutions are simultaneously causes and effects', that is, institutions are both the objects of state choice and consequential. In a rationalist, equilibrium framework, this statement is obvious and unexceptionable: states choose and design institutions. States do so because they face certain problems that can be resolved through institutional mechanisms. They choose institutions because of their intended effects. Once constructed, institutions will constrain and shape behavior, even as they are constantly challenged and reformed by their member states. In this section, we outline a number of lines of research that show promise to take us beyond the "do they matter or don't they" structure of research on international institutions. The following research agenda is firmly in the rationalist tradition. Although this approach allows for substantial variation in patterns of preferences over outcomes, and indeed provides predictions about outcomes based on exogenous change in such preferences, it provides relatively little explanatory leverage with respect to the sources of change in such preferences. A few words on how this agenda is related to the constructivist research program may be in order. To the degree that constructivist approaches prove powerful at making changes in actors' fundamental goals endogenous, providing refutable hypotheses about the conditions for such change, the constructivist and rationalist approaches will be complementary. Although rationalist approaches are generally powerful for explaining how policy preferences change when external constraints or information conditions change, alternative approaches, such as constructivism, are necessary for explaining more fundamental, internal changes in actors' goals. However, the rationalist research program has much to contribute even without strong theories about the reasons for change in actors'goals. One of the core insights of theories of strategic interaction is that, regardless of actors' specific preferences, they will tend to face generic types of cooperation problems over and over again. Many situations give rise to incentives to renege on deals or to behave in time-inconsistent ways that make actors happy in the short run but regretful in the long run. Likewise, many situations of strategic interaction give rise to benefits from cooperation, and conflicts over how to divide up this surplus will plague cooperative efforts. Thus, considerations of how to prevent cheating and how to resolve distributional conflict, to give two prominent examples, are central to theories of cooperation regardless of the specific goals of actors. Rationalist ap65. Mearsheimer 1994.

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preaches are powerful because they suggest observable implications about patterns of cooperation in the face of such dilemmas, even absent the kind of precise information about preferences that scholars desire. It is to such dilemmas that we now turn our attention. Collaboration Versus Coordination Problems The most productive institutionalist research agenda thus far in international relations has been the rationalist-functionalist agenda, originating with Keohane's After Hegemony and Steve Krasner's edited volume on international regimes.66 This work was informed by a fundamentally important insight, inspired by the metaphor of the Prisoners'Dilemma (PD). Individually rational action by states could impede mutually beneficial cooperation. Institutions would be effective to the degree that they allowed states to avoid short-term temptations to renege, thus realizing available mutual benefits. Some authors, recognizing that PD was only one type of collective-action problem, drew a distinction between collaboration and coordination problems.67 Collaboration problems, like PD, are characterized by individual incentives to defect and the existence of equilibria that are not Pareto optimal. Thus, the problem states face in this situation is finding ways to bind themselves and others in order to reach the Pareto frontier. In contrast, coordination games are characterized by the existence of multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria. The problem states face in this situation is not to avoid temptations to defect, but to choose among these equilibria. Such choice may be relatively simple and resolved by identification of a focal point, if the equilibria are not sharply differentiated from one another in terms of the distribution of benefits.68 But some coordination games, like the paradigmatic Battle of the Sexes, involve multiple equilibria over which the actors have strongly divergent preferences. Initially, most authors argued that institutions would have little effect on patterns of state behavior in coordination games, predicting substantial institutional effects only in collaboration situations. Interestingly, these arguments led both to expectations about institutional effects on state behavior and to state incentives to delegate authority to institutions, consistent with the kind of equilibrium analysis we find most promising for future research. As the logic of modern game theory has become more deeply integrated into international relations theory, and as authors have recognized the limitations of the collaboration-coordination distinction, we have begun to see work that integrates the efficiency concerns associated with collaboration and the distributional concerns associated with coordination. Krasner made a seminal contribution to this line of analysis.69 He argued that when states are attempting to cooperate with one another, achieving efficiency gains—reaching the Pareto frontier—is only one of the challenges they 66. 67. 68. 69.

See Keohane 1984; and Krasner 1983b. See Snidal 1985a; Stein 1983; and Martin 1992b. Garrett and Weingast 1993. Krasner 1991.

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face and often not the most difficult one. Many equilibria may exist along the Pareto frontier, and specifying one of these as the locus of cooperation, through bargaining and the exercise of state power, dominates empirical examples of international cooperation. Krasner's insight is perfectly compatible with the folk theorems of noncooperative game theory that show that repeated play of a PD-type game gives rise to many—in fact, infinite—equilibria. Thus, repetition transforms collaboration problems into coordination problems. In most circumstances, states have simultaneously to worry about reaching efficient outcomes and resolving distributional conflict. Once we recognize this fact, our approach to international institutions becomes both more complex and more closely related to traditional international relations concerns about power and bargaining. To be effective, institutions cannot merely resolve collaboration problems through monitoring and other informational functions. They must also provide a mechanism for resolving distributional conflict. For example, institutions may construct focal points, identifying one possible equilibrium as the default or "obvious" one, thus reducing state-to-state bargaining about the choice of a particular pattern of outcomes. The role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), discussed elsewhere in this article, is captured in part by this type of constructed focal-point analysis. The Basle Banking Committee's role in devising international standards for prudential banking practices similarly helped to coordinate national regulations where a number of plausible solutions were available.70 Where states fear that the benefits of cooperation are disproportionately flowing to others, institutions can provide reliable information about state behavior and the realized benefits of cooperation to allay such fears. Trade institutions perform many functions; one function that could stand more analytical scrutiny is the provision of such information about the distribution of benefits among members. Another way institutions could mitigate distributional conflict is to "keep account" of deals struck, compromises made, and gains achieved, particularly in complex multi-issue institutions. The networks created within the supranational institutions of the European Union, for example, provide the necessary scope for issue-linkage and institutional memory to perform the function of assuring that all members, over time, achieve a reasonably fair share of the benefits of cooperation.71 Unless the problem of equilibrium selection is resolved, all the third-party monitoring in the world will not allow for stable international cooperation. Thus, a promising line of research will involve bringing distributional issues back into the study of international institutions, issues that were in fact the focus of some of the early regimes literature discussed earlier. Institutions may interact with distributional conflict in a number of ways. Most simply, they reflect and solidify settlements of distributional conflict that have been established through more traditional means. These means include the exercise of state power, which Krasner emphasizes, market dominance, and alternative methods of bargaining such as making trades across issues.72 In this perspective, institutions can make a difference if they lock in a 70. Simmons 1998. 71. Pollack 1997. 72. Fearon 1994a.

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particular equilibrium, providing stability. But rather than merely reflecting power in an epiphenomenal fashion, as realists would have it, institutions in this formulation prevent potential challengers from undermining existing patterns of cooperation, explaining why powerful states may choose to institutionalize these patterns rather than relying solely on ad hoc cooperation. Institutions may also serve a less controversial signaling function, therefore minimizing bargaining costs. This would be the case if institutions construct focal points or if they primarily keep account of the pattern of benefits over time, as discussed earlier. In either case, they effectively increase path dependence. Once a particular equilibrium is chosen, institutions lock it in. Researching the ways in which institutions do this—how do they enhance path dependence, and under what conditions?— would be intriguing. Normative questions also rise to the top of the agenda once we recognize the lock-in role of institutions. If they do in fact solidify a pattern of cooperation preferred by the most powerful, we should question the ethical status of institutions, turning our attention to equity, as well as efficiency, questions. In the most traditional, state-centric terms, institutions reflect and enhance state power; in Tony Evans and Peter Wilson's words, they are "arenas for acting out power relations."73 On the other end of the spectrum, we may want to ask about situations in which institutions play a more active role in resolving distributional conflict. Perhaps institutions sometimes do more than lock in equilibria chosen through the exercise of state power, having an independent part in the selection of equilibria. Such an argument has been made most clearly in the case of the ECJ. Here, Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast find that there are a number of ways in which the European Community could have realized its goal of completing the internal market.74 The ECJ made a big difference in the course of European integration because it was able to construct a focal point by choosing one of these mechanisms, that of mutual recognition. This choice had clear distributional implications but was accepted by member states because it was a Pareto improvement over the reversion point of failing to complete the internal market. A distinct research tradition emphasizes the legitimizing role that international institutions can play in focal-point selection. Some scholars point out that institutionally and legally enshrined focal points can gain a high degree of legitimacy both internationally and domestically.75 This legitimacy, in turn, has important political consequences.76 To develop a research agenda on how institutions resolve problems of multiple equilibria and distribution, we would have to build on these insights to ask conditional questions. When are states, particularly the powerful, willing to turn the problem of equilibrium selection over to an institution? What kinds of institutions are most likely to perform this function effectively—those that are strategic or those that 73. Evans and Wilson 1992. 74. Garrett and Weingast 1993. They also argue that the multiple equilibria were not sharply distinguished from one another in terms of efficiency and do not concentrate on distributional conflict among equilibria. They have been criticized on these points. See Burley and Mattli 1993. 75. See Franck 1990; and Peck 1996, 237. 76. Claude 1966, 367.

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are naive; those that rely on political decision making or those that rely heavily on relatively independent experts and/or judicial processes; those that broadly reflect the membership of the institution or those that are dominated by the powerful? Under what conditions are constructed focal points likely to gain international recognition and acceptance? Overall, bringing the traditional international relations focus on distributional conflict back into the study of international institutions holds the potential for generating researchable questions that are both positive and normative in nature. International Institutions and Domestic Politics In allowing their agenda to be defined by responding to the realist challenge, institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics. States have been treated as rational unitary actors and assigned preferences and beliefs. This framework has been productive in allowing us to outline the broad ways in which institutions can change patterns of behavior. But in privileging the state as an actor, we have neglected the ways in which other actors in international politics might use institutions (a central insight of earlier studies of transgovernmental organization) and the ways in which the nature or interests of the state itself are potentially changed by the actions of institutions (an implication of the early neofunctionalist literature). Here we outline a few lines of analysis that should be fruitful for integrating domestic politics and international institutions in a systematic manner, rather than treating domestic politics as a residual category of explanation. Because the lines of analysis here have foundations in specific analytical frameworks with explicit assumptions, applying them to the problem of international institutions should result in productive research paths, rather than merely the proliferation of possible "explanatory variables" that has characterized many attempts to integrate domestic politics and international relations. We should note that bringing domestic politics back into the study of international institutions is an agenda that should be understood as analytically distinct from that of applying institutionalist models developed in the domestic setting to the international level, an agenda addressed elsewhere in this article. As we will argue, one of the more fundamental ways in which international institutions can change state behavior is by substituting for domestic practices. If policies formerly made by domestic institutions are now made on the international level, it is reasonable to expect substantial changes in the patterns of world politics. Three related questions are central to understanding the relations between domestic and international institutions. First, under what conditions might domestic actors be willing to substitute international for domestic institutions? Second, are particular domestic actors regularly advantaged by the ability to transfer policymaking authority to the international level? Third, to what extent can international institutional decisions and rules be enforced by domestic institutions, and what are the implications for compliance? These questions are tied together by the assumption that domestic actors intentionally delegate policymaking authority to the international level when this action furthers pursuit of their interests.

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Domestic institutions can at times be a barrier to the realization of benefits for society as a whole. Failures of domestic institutions can arise through a number of mechanisms. Perhaps most obviously, domestic institutions can be captured by preference outliers who hold policy hostage to their demands. Recent research suggests that this may be the case with respect to the settlement of territorial disputes between bordering states in some regions: repeated failure to ratify border agreements in the legislature is one of the most important domestic political conditions associated with the willingness of states to submit their disputes to international arbitration.77 More generally, this situation is likely to arise when some actors, such as those looking for particularistic benefits, find it easier to organize than do actors more concerned with the welfare of the average citizen. Such is the story often told about trade policy. Import-competing producers and others with an interest in protectionist policies may find it easier to organize than those who favor free trade, a coalition of exporters and consumers. This differential ability to organize will bias policy in favor of protection, decreasing overall welfare. Transferring the policy making process to the international level, where exporters can see that they have a stake in organization in order to gain the opening of foreign markets, can facilitate a more evenhanded representation of interests. Those actors who have the most to gain from pursuit of general welfare— such as executives elected by a national constituency—will show the most interest in turning to international institutions under such circumstances. Judith Goldstein provides an analysis along these lines when she explains the paradox of the U.S. president agreeing to bilateral dispute-resolution panels in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Act (FTA), in spite of the fact that these panels predictably decide cases in a way that tends to deny protection to U.S. producers.78 We can identify other incentives for domestic actors to transfer policymaking to the international level. One common problem with institutions that are under the control of political actors is that of time-inconsistent preferences. Although running an unexpectedly high level of inflation today may bring immediate benefits to politicians up for reelection, for example, allowing monetary policy to be made by politicians will introduce a welfare-decreasing inflationary bias to the economy. Putting additional constraints on policy, for example, by joining a system of fixed exchange rates or a common currency area, can provide a mechanism to overcome this timeinconsistency problem, as argued by proponents of a single European currency. In general, if pursuit of gains over time involves short-term sacrifices, turning to international institutions can be an attractive option for domestic policymakers. A second and related question about domestic politics is whether particular kinds of actors will regularly see an advantage in turning to the international level. At the simplest level, it seems likely that "internationalist" actors—those heavily engaged in international transactions,79 those who share the norms of international society,80 77. 78. 79. 80.

Simmons 1998. See Goldstein 1996; and Gilligan 1997. Frieden 1991. Sikkink 1993a.

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or those who have a stake in a transnational or global resource81 —will have an interest in turning to the international level. This may especially be the case when such groups or parties are consistently in a minority position in domestic politics. Drawing on these ideas, we could begin to develop hypotheses about the kinds of domestic interest groups that will most favor transferring some authority to the international level. Certain domestic institutional actors may also have a tendency to benefit from international-level policy making. One such actor, which is just beginning to enter political scientists'analysis of international institutions, is the judiciary. Increasingly, international agreements are legal in form. This means that they often are interpreted by domestic courts, and that judges can use international law as a basis on which to make judgments.82 Because international law provides this particular actor with an additional resource by which to pursue agendas, whether bureaucratic or ideological, we might expect that the judiciary in general tends to be sympathetic to international institutions. Overall, as we work toward more sophisticated specification of the causal mechanisms through which institutions can influence behavior, we will have to pay much more attention to domestic politics than studies of international institutions have thus far. The development of general theories of domestic politics provides an opening for systematic development of propositions about domestic actors. We no longer need to treat the domestic level as merely the source of state preferences, nor as a residual category to explain anomalies or patterns of variation that cannot be explained by international factors. Instead, we can move toward genuinely interactive theories of domestic politics and international institutions, specifying the conditions under which certain actors are likely to prefer that policy be made on the international level. This focus allows us to specify conditions likely to lead to the delegation of policymaking authority to the international level, some of which we have outlined here. Unanticipated Consequences In a rationalist framework, institutions are both the object of state choice and consequential. The link that ties these two aspects of institutions together, and allows the analyst to develop refutable propositions about institutions within an equilibrium framework, is the ability of actors to anticipate the consequences of particular types of institutions. For example, in the preceding discussion of domestic politics, we assumed consistently that domestic actors were able to gauge with some degree of accuracy the ways in which working within international institutions would affect their ability to pursue their material or ideational goals. The rationalist approach stands in distinction to a historical or sociological approach to institutions.83 These approaches see institutions as more deeply rooted and 81. Young 1979. 82. See Alter 1996; and Conforti 1993. 83. See Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; and Pierson 1996b. Historical institutionalism stresses the path-dependent nature of institutions, explaining why apparently inefficient institutions persist. Socio-

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draw attention to their unanticipated consequences. Although we may question whether many international institutions reach the same degree of "taken-for-grantedness" that we see in domestic politics or smaller-scale social relations, it seems undeniable that they sometimes have effects that surprise their member states. It is important to differentiate between unintended and unanticipated effects. Effects may be anticipated but unintended. For example, it is generally expected that arrangements to lower the rate of inflation will lead to somewhat higher levels of unemployment. Thus, higher unemployment is an anticipated, although unintended, consequence of stringent monetary policies. It is best understood as a price actors are sometimes willing to bear to gain the benefits of low inflation. Such unintended but anticipated consequences of institutions present little challenge to a rationalist approach, since they fit neatly into a typical cost-benefit analysis. Genuinely unanticipated effects, however, present a larger challenge. Specific examples of apparently unanticipated consequences of international institutions are not difficult to find. States that believed that human-rights accords were nothing but meaningless scraps of paper found themselves surprised by the ability of transnational actors to use these commitments to force governments to change their policies.84 In the European Community, few anticipated that the ECJ would have the widespread influence on policy that it has.85 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was apparently quite surprised at the results of agreeing to change voting rules within the European Community, such as the adoption of qualified-majority voting, which she accepted in the Single European Act.86 How might a rationalist approach deal with these events? One productive approach might be to attempt to specify the conditions under which unanticipated consequences are most likely. This specification would at least allow us to suggest when a simple rationalist model will provide substantial explanatory leverage and when it might become necessary to integrate the insights of other schools of thought. If unanticipated consequences dominate political outcomes, we would have to draw on alternatives to rationalist models in a way that goes far beyond using them as a way to specify preferences and goals. Here, we begin specifying when unanticipated consequences are most likely to confound patterns of international cooperation. Inductively, it appears that changes in secondary rules—that is, rules about rules— are the changes most likely to work in unexpected ways. Changes in voting rules within an institution, for example, can give rise to new coalitions and previously suppressed expressions of interest, leading to unpredicted policy outcomes. Changes in decision-making procedures can have even more widespread and unexpected effects if they open the policy process to input from new actors. Many examples of unanticipated consequences arise from decision-making procedures that provide access to nongovernmental and transnational actors, as, for example, Kathryn Siklogical institutionalism emphasizes the social nature of institutions, stressing their role in defining individuals' identities and the fact that many important institutions come to be taken for granted and therefore not seen as susceptible to reform. 84. Sikkink 1993a. 85. Burley and Mattli 1993. 86. Moravcsik 1991.

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kink's work has shown.87 Both as sources of new information and as strategic actors in their own right, such groups are often able to use new points of access to gain unexpected leverage over policy. Changes in decision-making rules will have widespread effects on a variety of substantive rules and are thus more likely to have unanticipated effects on outcomes than changes in substantive rules themselves. If this observation is correct, we should see more unanticipated consequences in situations that have relatively complex and permutable secondary rules, such as legalized institutions. Traditional state-to-state bargaining with a unit veto, which has little secondary rule structure, should provide less opportunity for nonstate actors or coalitions of the weak to influence outcomes unexpectedly. One question that often arises, especially in the international arena, is why governments are willing to live with unanticipated outcomes. After all, participation in international institutions is voluntary. If unpleasant and unexpected outcomes frequently occur, states as sovereign actors retain the right to pull out of institutions. Why might they choose to remain in? The trivial answer is that the benefits of remaining in are greater than the costs. But we can turn this answer into something nontrivial by thinking about the conditions when institutional membership is likely to provide the greatest benefits. Some of these have been spelled out in functionalist theory. Keohane argues that the demand for international institutions will be greatest under conditions of interdependence, when states face a dense network of relations with one another and where information is somewhat scarce.88 We could generalize that states are least likely to be willing to withdraw from an institution in the face of unanticipated consequences when they are dealing with issues that exhibit increasing returns to scale, which, in turn, create conditions of path dependence. Consider the creation of regional trading arrangements in the 1990s. These arrangements provide their members with economic benefits, and those on the outside of the arrangements find themselves losing investment and trading opportunities. We therefore see eastern European, Caribbean, and other states clamoring to become members of the relevant regional trading arrangements. This is a good example of how increasing returns to scale create a high demand for institutional membership. Under these conditions, it seems likely that these states will be willing to put up with a high level of unexpected outcomes before they would seriously consider withdrawing from an institution. However, this example begs the question of whether trade agreements are likely to have substantial unanticipated effects. They are only likely to do so in the case of rapid technological change or large international economic shocks, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s. Typology of Institutional

Effects

As we turn our attention to the problem of how, not just whether, international institutions matter, it becomes essential to understand alternative mechanisms through which institutions might exert their effects. To prod our thinking in this direction, we 87. Sikkink 1993a. 88. Keohane 1983a.

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introduce a preliminary typology of institutional effects. The reasoning behind this typology is that different institutions, or perhaps similar institutions in different settings, will have different types of effects. Specifying these effects will not only allow us to develop better insights into the causal mechanisms underlying the interaction between institutions and states or societies. It will also provide for more testable propositions about how and when we should expect institutions to exert substantial effects on behavior. The typology we suggest is analytically informed but aims first to provide a language for describing patterns of change in state behavior after creation of an international institution. Here we spell out the typology and present some illustrative examples. The next step will be to link the typology to causal processes, and we suggest some preliminary ideas along these lines. We begin by suggesting two types of institutional effects: convergence and divergence effects. Of course, the null hypothesis is that institutions have no effect. Development of a clearer analytical framework may force us to consider situations in which we combine effects: for example, perhaps some types of states are subject to convergence effects and others to divergence effects. We begin with convergence effects, since the logic of most rationalist, economistic, and functionalist theories of international institutions leads us to expect such effects. These models posit goals that states find it difficult to achieve on their own, whether for reasons of time-inconsistent preferences, collective-action problems, oldfashioned domestic political stalemate, or other failures of unilateral state action. In this functionalist logic, states turn to international institutions to resolve such problems; institutions allow them to achieve benefits unavailable through unilateral action of existing state structures. Functionalist analysis sees international institutions as important because they help states to solve problems. Many of these problems have their roots in the failures of domestic institutions, and their resolution involves turning some types of authority over to the international level. Once policy is delegated to an international institution, state behavior will converge: members will tend to adopt similar monetary, trade, or defense policies. What has been missing from functionalist accounts of institutionalization is the systematic connection between domestic political conditions and incentives to construct and comply with international institutions. But once we recognize that international institutions may make a difference because they effectively substitute for domestic practices (making policy decisions, setting policy goals, or undertaking monitoring activities), our attention turns to the domestic political conditions that make such substitution a reasonable policy alternative. If domestic institutions are the source of persistent policy failure, if they somehow prevent the realization of societal preferences, or if they interfere with the pursuit of mutual benefits with other states, turning functions over to the international level can enhance national welfare.89 Monetary policy is a prime example of this logic. Other examples might 89. Some would argue that this process is antidemocratic. See Vaubel 1986. However, such an argument rests on weak foundations. First, it assumes that domestic institutions are necessarily responsive to

International Organization International Institutions 753 include trade policy, if domestic trade policy institutions are captured by protectionists; or environmental policy, if domestic institutions encourage a short-term rather than a long-term perspective on the problem. Thinking about the logic of substitution requires much more attention to inefficient domestic politics than most functional theories have provided to date. A classic example of international institutions acting as substitutes for domestic institutions and therefore having convergence effects lies in arguments about why high-inflation states such as Italy might choose to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU).90 High inflation is a public bad, leading to lower overall welfare than low inflation. However, the short-term benefits to politicians from allowing spurts of unanticipated inflation make it difficult to achieve low rates of inflation unless institutions that set monetary policy are independent of political influence.91 Thus, transferring authority to an institution that is relatively insulated from political influence, and that itself has a preference for low inflation, can provide overall welfare benefits for the country. This is the logic that leads a state like Italy to take the unusual step (for a relatively rich, developed country) of transferring a core aspect of sovereignty— control over the currency—to a European Central Bank. Given this logic of delegation, states that become members of the EMU should see a convergence in their rates of inflation.92 Although the debate rages among economists about whether the European Monetary System has in fact worked in this manner,93 there is little doubt that one of the major motivations for monetary union is for high-inflation states to "import" low German rates of inflation, leading to similar inflation rates in all member states. If we looked at the variation in inflation rates prior to entry into monetary union (or into a monetary system more generally), and compared it to inflation rates after entry, we should see a decline in the level of variation. Although monetary union is a prominent and intriguing example of convergence effects, we can imagine a similar dynamic in other issue areas as well. Environmental institutions should lead to convergence of environmental indicators, such as carbon dioxide emissions.94 Human-rights institutions acting as substitutes should lead members to adopt increasingly similar human-rights practices. Even if full convergence does not occur, the major effect of an institution that is acting as a substitute will be to bring state practices more closely in line with one another. A convergence effect could be measured and identified by decreased variation in relevant indicators of state practices, whether inflation rates, pollution, or humannational preferences. For the kinds of reasons just discussed, such as time-inconsistent preferences, or institutional capture, this assumption is often false. Second, the argument assumes that international institutions are necessarily more difficult to monitor, constrain, and influence than domestic institutions. Although this may be a reasonable assumption for some kinds of societal actors and some states, it is not universally true. 90. For a contrasting argument on the logic of EMU, see Gruber 1996. 91. Rogoffl985. 92. Fratianni and von Hagen 1992. 93. See Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; and Weber 1991. 94. Levy 1993.

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International Organization Inflation rates prior to entry into monetary union Inflation rates after entry with a convergence effect Inflation rates after entry with a divergence effect e rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially "arenas for acting out power relationships/'33 For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process. NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about institutions. NATO is an institution, and it certainly played a role in preventing World War III and helping the

30. Lipson, 'International Cooperation/' p. 14. 31. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In/' International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107. 32. See John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), chap. 2; and J.M. Roberts, Europe, 1880-1945 (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 239-241. There was also significant cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, but that cooperation did not prevent the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after Germany and Japan were defeated. 33. Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison/' Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1992), p. 330.

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International Security 19:3 14 West win the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe.34 NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War.

Varieties of Institutionalist Theories There are three institutionalist theories, and each offers a different argument about how institutions push states away from war and help foster stability.35 Liberal institutionalism is the least ambitious of the three theories. It does not directly address the important question of how to prevent war, but focuses instead on explaining why economic and environmental cooperation among states is more likely than realists recognize. Increased cooperation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war, although liberal institutionalists do not explain how. The theory is predicated on the belief that cheating is the main inhibitor of international cooperation, and that institutions provide the key to overcoming that problem. The aim is to create rules that constrain states, but not to challenge the fundamental realist claim that states are self-interested actors. Collective security directly confronts the issue of how to prevent war. The theory starts with the assumption that force will continue to matter in world politics, and that states will have to guard against potential aggressors. However, the threat of war can be greatly reduced, according to the theory, by challenging realist thinking about state behavior, and substituting in its place three anti-realist norms. First, states should reject the idea of using force to change the status quo. Second, to deal with states that violate that norm and threaten (or start) a war, responsible states must not act on the basis of their own narrow self-interest. Rather, they must suppress the temptation to respond in whatever way would maximize their individual gains, and instead automatically join together to present the aggressor with the threat of overwhelming force. Third, states must trust each other to renounce aggression and to mean that renunciation. They must also be confident that other states will come to their rescue, should they become the target of aggression. Critical theory is the most ambitious of the theories, as its ultimate aim is to transform the fundamental nature of international politics and to create a world where there is not just increased cooperation among states, but the possibility of genuine peace. Like collective security, but unlike liberal institutionalism, critical theory directly challenges 34. See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO/' Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3^3. 35. Despite these differences among institutionalist theories, proponents of each theory occasionally make favorable reference to the other theories, and thus seem to recognize that all three theories are part of an institutionalist body of literature that takes anti-realism as its main point of reference. See, for example: Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe/7 International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114161; and Ruggie, "Multilateralism/7 pp. 561-598.

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realist thinking about the self-interested behavior of states. The theory is predicated on the assumption that ideas and discourse—how we think and talk about international politics—are the driving forces behind state behavior. It utterly rejects realism's claim that state behavior is largely a function of the given structure of the external world. For critical theorists, ideas shape the material world in important ways, and thus the way to revolutionize international politics is to change drastically the way individuals think and talk about world politics. Intellectuals, especially the critical theorists themselves, are believed to play a key role in that process. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Liberal institutionalism does not directly address the question of whether institutions cause peace, but instead focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed.36 Specifically, the theory looks at cases where states are having difficulty cooperating because they have "mixed" interests; in other words, each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooperate.37 Each side can benefit from cooperation, however, which liberal institutionalists define as "goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be.//38 The theory is of little relevance in situations where states' interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states aim to gain advantage over each other. They think in terms of winning and losing, and this invariably leads to intense security competition, and sometimes war. But liberal institutionalism does not deal directly with these situations, and thus says little about how to resolve or even ameliorate them. Therefore, the theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates instead on economic and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues.39 In fact, the theory is built on the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms—security and 36. Among the key liberal institutionalist works are: Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions/7 World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 226-254; Keohane, After Hegemony; Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches/' pp. 379-396; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, chap. 1; Charles Lipson, 'International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs/7 World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falkland Islands Conflict/7 International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178; Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies/7 World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 1-24; and Stein, Why Nations Cooperate. 37. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, chap. 2. Also see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 6-7, 12-13, 67-69. 38. Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation/7 p. 468. 39. For examples of the theory at work in the environmental realm, see Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), especially chaps. 1 and 9. Some of the most important work on institutions and the environment has been done by Oran Young. See, for example, Young, International Cooperation. The rest of my discussion concentrates on economic, not environmental issues, for conciseness, and also because the key theoretical works in the liberal institutionalist literature focus on economic rather than environmental matters.

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International Security 19:3 16 political economy—and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, but not the former. This theme is clearly articulated by Charles Lipson, who writes that "significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues/'40 Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two realms: when economic relations are at stake, "cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states/' whereas the prospects for cooperation are "more impoverished . . . in security affairs/'41 Thus, the theory's proponents pay little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and peace are of central importance. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to examine liberal institutionalism closely Liberal institutionalists sometimes assert that institutions are an important cause of international stability Moreover, one might argue that if the theory shows a strong causal connection between institutions and economic cooperation, it would be relatively easy to take the next step and link cooperation with peace.42 Some proponents of the theory maintain that institutions contribute to international stability; this suggests that they believe it is easy to connect cooperation and stability43 I doubt this claim, mainly because proponents of the theory define cooperation so narrowly as to avoid military issues. Let us assume, however, that liberal institutionalists are attempting to take a giant step toward developing a theory that explains how institutions push states away from war. CAUSAL LOGIC. Liberal institutionalists claim to accept realism's root assumptions while arguing that cooperation is nevertheless easier to achieve than realists recognize. Robert Keohane, for example, writes in After Hegemony that he is "adopting the realist model of rational egoism." He continues: "I propose to show, on the basis of their own assumptions, that the characteristic pessimism of realism does not necessarily follow. I seek to demonstrate that realist assumptions about world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements . . . which promote cooperation."44 In particular, liberal institutionalists emphasize that states "dwell in perpetual anarchy," and must therefore act as rational egoists in what is a self-help world.45 40. Lipson, "International Cooperation/7 pp. 2, 12. Also see Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy/7 pp. 232-233; and Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 39^41. 41. Lipson, "International Cooperation/7 p. 18. 42. I have suggested a possible line of argument in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War/7 International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 42^44. Also, Charles Glaser makes the connection between cooperation and peace in "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help/7 International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90. 43. Liberal institutionalists assume that cooperation is a positive goal, although they recognize it has a downside as well. See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 10-11, 247-257; and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches/7 p. 393. The virtues and vices of cooperation are not explored in any detail in the liberal institutionalist literature. 44. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 67; also see p. 29. Similarly, Arthur Stein claims that, "Despite the different conclusions that they draw about the cooperative or conflictual nature of international politics, realism and liberalism share core assumptions.77 Stein, W7ty Nations Cooperate, p. 8. 45. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy/7 p. 1.

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According to liberal institutionalists, the principal obstacle to cooperation among states with mutual interests is the threat of cheating.46 The famous "prisoners' dilemma/' which is the analytical centerpiece of most of the liberal institutionalist literature, captures the essence of the problem that states must solve to achieve cooperation.47 Each of two states can either cheat or cooperate with the other. Each side wants to maximize its own gain, but does not care about the size of the other side's gain; each side cares about the other side only so far as the other side's chosen strategy affects its own prospects for maximizing gain. The most attractive strategy for each state is to cheat and hope the other state pursues a cooperative strategy In other words, a state's ideal outcome is to "sucker" the other side into thinking it is going to cooperate, and then cheat. But both sides understand this logic, and therefore both sides will try to cheat the other. Consequently, both sides will end up worse off than if they had cooperated, since mutual cheating leads to the worst possible outcome. Even though mutual cooperation is not as attractive as suckering the other side, it is certainly better than the outcome when both sides cheat. The key to solving this dilemma is for each side to convince the other that they have a collective interest in making what appear to be short-term sacrifices (the gain that might result from successful cheating) for the sake of long-term benefits (the substantial payoff from mutual long-term cooperation). This means convincing states to accept the second-best outcome, which is mutual collaboration. The principal obstacle to reaching this cooperative outcome will be fear of getting suckered, should the other side cheat. This, in a nutshell, is the problem that institutions must solve. To deal with this problem of "political market failure," institutions must deter cheaters and protect victims.48 Three messages must be sent to potential cheaters: you will be caught, you will be punished immediately, and you will jeopardize future cooperative efforts. Potential victims, on the other hand, need early warning of cheating to avoid serious injury, and need the means to punish cheaters. Liberal institutionalists do not aim to deal with cheaters and victims by changing fundamental norms of state behavior. Nor do they suggest transforming the anarchical nature of the international system. They accept the assumption that states operate in an anarchic environment and behave in a self-interested manner.49 In this regard, their approach is less ambitious than collective security and critical theory which aim to alter 46. Cheating is basically a "breach of promise/7 Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy/7 p. 1. It usually implies unobserved non-compliance, although there can be observed cheating as well. Defection is a synonym for cheating in the institutionalist literature. 47. The centrality of the prisoners7 dilemma and cheating to the liberal institutionalist literature is clearly reflected in virtually all the works cited in footnote 36. As Helen Milner notes in her review essay on this literature: "The focus is primarily on the role of regimes [institutions] in solving the defection [cheating] problem." Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation/7 p. 475. 48. The phrase is from Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 85. 49. Kenneth Oye, for example, writes in the introduction to an issue of World Politics containing a number of liberal institutionalist essays: "Our focus is on non-altruistic cooperation among states dwelling in international anarchy.77 Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy/7 p. 2. Also see Keohane, "International Institutions: Two. Approaches/7 pp. 380-381; and Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, p. 3.

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important international norms. Liberal institutionalists instead concentrate on showing how rules can work to counter the cheating problem, even while states seek to maximize their own welfare. They argue that institutions can change a state's calculations about how to maximize gains. Specifically, rules can get states to make the short-term sacrifices needed to resolve the prisoners' dilemma and thus to realize long-term gains. Institutions, in short, can produce cooperation. Rules can ideally be employed to make four major changes in "the contractual environment/'50 First, rules can increase the number of transactions between particular states over time.51 This institutionalized iteration discourages cheating in three ways. It raises the costs of cheating by creating the prospect of future gains through cooperation, thereby invoking "the shadow of the future" to deter cheating today. A state caught cheating would jeopardize its prospects of benefiting from future cooperation, since the victim would probably retaliate. In addition, iteration gives the victim the opportunity to pay back the cheater: it allows for reciprocation, the tit-for-tat strategy, which works to punish cheaters and not allow them to get away with their transgression. Finally, it rewards states that develop a reputation for faithful adherence to agreements, and punishes states that acquire a reputation for cheating.52 Second, rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas. Issue-linkage aims to create greater interdependence between states, who will then be reluctant to cheat in one issue area for fear that the victim—and perhaps other states as well—will retaliate in another issue area. It discourages cheating in much the same way as iteration: it raises the costs of cheating and provides a way for the victim to retaliate against the cheater. Third, a structure of rules can increase the amount of information available to participants in cooperative agreements so that close monitoring is possible. Raising the level of information discourages cheating in two ways: it increases the likelihood that cheaters will be caught, and more importantly, it provides victims with early warning of cheating, thereby enabling them to take protective measures before they are badly hurt. Fourth, rules can reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements.53 When institutions perform the tasks described above, states can devote less effort to negotiating and monitoring cooperative agreements, and to hedging against possible defections. By increasing the efficiency of international cooperation, institutions make it more profitable and thus more attractive for self-interested states. Liberal institutionalism is generally thought to be of limited utility in the security realm, because fear of cheating is considered a much greater obstacle to cooperation

50. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth, p. 11. For general discussions of how rules work, which inform my subsequent discussion of the matter, see Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 5-6; Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation/7 pp. 143-178; and Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation/7 pp. 474^78. 51. See Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy/7 pp. 248-250; Lipson, "International Cooperation/' pp. 4—18. 52. Lipson, "International Cooperation/7 p. 5. 53. See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 89-92.

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when military issues are at stake.54 There is the constant threat that betrayal will result in a devastating military defeat. This threat of "swift, decisive defection" is simply not present when dealing with international economics. Given that "the costs of betrayal" are potentially much graver in the military than the economic sphere, states will be very reluctant to accept the "one step backward, two steps forward" logic which underpins the tit-for-tat strategy of conditional cooperation. One step backward in the security realm might mean destruction, in which case there will be no next step—backward or forward.55 FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. There is an important theoretical failing in the liberal institutionalist logic, even as it applies to economic issues. The theory is correct as far as it goes: cheating can be a serious barrier to cooperation. It ignores, however, the other major obstacle to cooperation: relative-gains concerns. As Joseph Grieco has shown, liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains.56 Keohane acknowledged this problem in 1993: "Grieco has made a significant contribution by focusing attention on the issue of relative gains, a subject that has been underemphasized, especially by liberal or neoliberal commentators on the world economy."57 This oversight is revealed by the assumed order of preference in the prisoners' dilemma game: each state cares about how its opponent's strategy will affect its own (absolute) gains, but not about how much one side gains relative to the other. In other words, each side simply wants to get the best deal for itself, and does not pay attention to how well the other side fares in the process.58 Nevertheless, liberal institutionalists 54. This point is clearly articulated in Lipson, "International Cooperation/' especially pp. 12-18. The subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from ibid. Also see Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy/' pp. 232-233. 55. See Roger B. Parks, "What if Tools Die7? A Comment on Axelrod/7 Letter to American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4 (December 1985), pp. 1173-1174. 56. See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation." Other works by Grieco bearing on the subject include: Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model/' The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August 1988), pp. 600-624; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Earners to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 301-338. The telling effect of Grieco's criticism is reflected in ibid., which is essentially organized around the relative gains vs. absolute gains debate, an issue given little attention before Grieco raised it in his widely cited 1988 article. The matter was briefly discussed by two other scholars before Grieco. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 172-179; and Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 118-119. 57. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 283. When liberal institutionalists developed their theory in the mid-1980s, they did not explicitly assume that states pursue absolute gains. There is actually little evidence that they thought much about the distinction between relative gains and absolute gains. However, the assumption that states pursue absolute but not relative gains is implicit in their writings. 58. Lipson writes: "The Prisoner's Dilemma, in its simplest form, involves two players. Each is assumed to be a self-interested, self-reliant maximizer of his own utility, an assumption that clearly parallels the Realist conception of sovereign states in international politics." Lipson, "International

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International Security 19:3 20 cannot ignore relative-gains considerations, because they assume that states are self-interested actors in an anarchic system, and they recognize that military power matters to states. A theory that explicitly accepts realism's core assumptions—and liberal institutionalism does that—must confront the issue of relative gains if it hopes to develop a sound explanation for why states cooperate. One might expect liberal institutionalists to offer the counterargument that relativegains logic applies only to the security realm, while absolute-gains logic applies to the economic realm. Given that they are mainly concerned with explaining economic and environmental cooperation, leaving relative-gains concerns out of the theory does not matter. There are two problems with this argument. First, if cheating were the only significant obstacle to cooperation, liberal institutionalists could argue that their theory applies to the economic, but not the military realm. In fact, they do make that argument. However, once relative-gains considerations are factored into the equation, it becomes impossible to maintain the neat dividing line between economic and military issues, mainly because military might is significantly dependent on economic might. The relative size of a state's economy has profound consequences for its standing in the international balance of military power. Therefore, relative-gains concerns must be taken into account for security reasons when looking at the economic as well as military domain. The neat dividing line that liberal institutionalists employ to specify when their theory applies has little utility when one accepts that states worry about relative gains.59 Second, there are non-realist (i.e., non-security) logics that might explain why states worry about relative gains. Strategic trade theory, for example, provides a straightforward economic logic for why states should care about relative gains.60 It argues that states should help their own firms gain comparative advantage over the firms of rival states, because that is the best way to insure national economic prosperity. There is also a psychological logic, which portrays individuals as caring about how well they do (or their state does) in a cooperative agreement, not for material reasons, but because it is human nature to compare one's progress with that of others.61 Another possible liberal institutionalist counterargument is that solving the cheating problem renders the relative-gains problem irrelevant. If states cannot cheat each other, they need not fear each other, and therefore, states would not have to worry about relative power. The problem with this argument, however, is that even if the cheating problem were solved, states would still have to worry about relative gains because gaps Cooperation/7 p. 2. Realists, however, do not accept this conception of international politics and, not surprisingly, have questioned the relevance of the prisoners' dilemma (at least in its common form) for explaining much of international relations. See Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images"; Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation"; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366. 59. My thinking on this matter has been markedly influenced by Sean Lynn-Jones, in his June 19, 1994, correspondence with me. 60. For a short discussion of strategic trade theory, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 215-221. The most commonly cited reference on the subject is Paul R. Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986). 61. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 110-113.

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in gains can be translated into military advantage that can be used for coercion or aggression. And in the international system, states sometimes have conflicting interests that lead to aggression. There is also empirical evidence that relative-gains considerations mattered during the Cold War even in economic relations among the advanced industrialized democracies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One would not expect realist logic about relative gains to be influential in this case: the United States was a superpower with little to fear militarily from the other OECD states, and those states were unlikely to use a relative-gains advantage to threaten the United States.62 Furthermore, the OECD states were important American allies during the Cold War, and thus the United States benefited strategically when they gained substantially in size and strength. Nonetheless, relative gains appear to have mattered in economic relations among the advanced industrial states. Consider three prominent studies. Stephen Krasner considered efforts at cooperation in different sectors of the international communicartions industry He found that states were remarkably unconcerned about cheating but deeply worried about relative gains, which led him to conclude that liberal institutionalism "is not relevant for global communications/7 Grieco examined American and EC efforts to implement, under the auspices of GATT, a number of agreements relating to non-tariff barriers to trade. He found that the level of success was not a function of concerns about cheating but was influenced primarily by concern about the distribution of gains. Similarly, Michael Mastanduno found that concern about relative gains, not about cheating, was an important factor in shaping American policy towards Japan in three cases: the FSX fighter aircraft, satellites, and high-definition television.63 I am not suggesting that relative-gains considerations make cooperation impossible; my point is simply that they can pose a serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be taken into account when developing a theory of cooperation among states. This point is apparently now recognized by liberal institutionalists. Keohane, for example, acknowledges that he "did make a major mistake by underemphasizing distributive issues and the complexities they create for international cooperation/'64 CAN LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM BE REPAIRED? Liberal institutionalists must address two questions if they are to repair their theory. First, can institutions facilitate 62. Grieco maintains in Cooperation among Nations that realist logic should apply here. Robert Powell, however, points out that "in the context of negotiations between the European Community and the United States . . . it is difficult to attribute any concern for relative gains to the effects that a relative loss may have on the probability of survival/7 Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory/7 American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), p. 1319, footnote 26. I agree with Powell. It is clear from Grieco's response to Powell that Grieco includes non-military logics like strategic trade theory in the realist tent, whereas Powell and I do not. See Grieco7 s contribution to 'The Relative-Gains Problem for International Relations/' American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 733-735. 63. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," pp. 336-366; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations; and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113. Also see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 83-120. 64. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," p. 292.

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International Security 19:3 22 cooperation when states seriously care about relative gains, or do institutions only matter when states can ignore relative-gains considerations and focus instead on absolute gains? I find no evidence that liberal institutionalists believe that institutions facilitate cooperation when states care deeply about relative gains. They apparently concede that their theory only applies when relative-gains considerations matter little or hardly at all.65 Thus the second question: when do states not worry about relative gains? The answer to this question would ultimately define the realm in which liberal institutionalism applies. Liberal institutionalists have not addressed this important question in a systematic fashion, so any assessment of their efforts to repair the theory must be preliminary. What exists are a lengthy response by Keohane to Grieco's original work on relative gains, and two studies responding to Grieco's writings by Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, which Keohane and other liberal institutionalists point to as exemplars of how to think about the relative-gains problem.66 Powell and Snidal offer different arguments about when relative-gains considerations are slight. Nevertheless, both are essentially realist arguments.67 Neither study discusses how institutions might facilitate cooperation, and both explanations are built around familiar realist concepts. At the root of Powell's argument is the well-known offense-defense balance made famous by Robert Jervis, George Quester, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera.68 Powell maintains that relative-gains considerations matter little, and that states act in accordance with liberal institutionalism when the threat of aggressive war is low and "the use of force is no longer at issue/'69 That situation obtains when the cost of aggression is high, which is, in turn, a function of the "constraints imposed by the underlying technology of war."70 In other words, when the prevailing military weaponry favors 65. For example, Keohane wrote after becoming aware of Grieco's argument about relative gains: "Under specified conditions—where mutual interests are low and relative gains are therefore particularly important to states—neoliberal theory expects neorealism to explain elements of state behavior/7 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 15-16. 66. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge," pp. 269-300; Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains," pp. 1303-1320; and Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. Also see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344; Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402; and Powell and Snidal's contributions to "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," pp. 735-742. 67. On this point, see Sean Lynn-Jones, "Comments on Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation: Developments in the Debate and the Prospects for Future Research7," unpublished memorandum, December 10, 1992. 68. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. 69. Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains," p. 1314; also see p. 1311. 70. Ibid., p. 1312. Powell does not use the term "offense-defense" balance in his article.

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the offense, then the cost of war is low, and relative-gains considerations will be intense. Institutions can do little to facilitate cooperation in such circumstances. However, when defensive technology dominates, the cost of initiating aggression is high and the relative-gains problem is subdued, which allows institutions to cause cooperation. Snidal maintains that relative-gains concerns might not matter much to states even if they face a serious threat of war. The root concept in his argument is the distribution of power in the international system.71 Specifically, he maintains that in a multipolar system where more than a small number of states have roughly equal power, states will not worry much about relative gains. Increasing the number of states in the system decreases concern for relative gains. "The reason is that more actors enhance the possibilities of protecting oneself through forming coalitions; and, generally, the less well united one's potential enemies, the safer one is."72 However, he concedes that "the relative gains hypothesis . . . has important consequences for two-actor situations and, where there are small numbers or important asymmetries among larger numbers, it may modify conclusions obtained from the absolute gains model/'73 I draw three conclusions from this discussion of the liberal institutionalists' efforts to deal with the relative-gains problem. First, even if one accepts Powell and Snidal's arguments about when states largely ignore relative-gains concerns, those conditions are rather uncommon in the real world. Powell would look for a world where defensive military technologies dominate. However, it is very difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, and Powell provides no help on this point.74 Nuclear weapons are an exception; they are defensive weapons in situations of mutual assured destruction.75 Still, the presence of massive numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers during the Cold War did not stop them from engaging in an intense security competition where relative-gains considerations mattered greatly. Very importantly, Powell provides no historical examples to illustrate his central argument. Snidal 71. Although Snidal's basic arguments about distribution of power fit squarely in the realist tradition (in fact, Grieco made them in abbreviated form in "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation/' p. 506), the formal model he develops rests on the non-realist assumption that "gains from cooperation are proportional to the size of the involved states and are shared equally between them/' Snidal, "Relative Gains/' p. 715. This assumption essentially eliminates the possibility of gaps in gains and thus erases the relative-gains problem. For discussion of this matter, see Grieco's contribution to "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation/' pp. 729-733. 72. Snidal, "Relative Gains/' p. 716. 73. Ibid., p. 702. 74. There is general agreement that defensive weapons make conquest difficult and costly, while offensive weapons make conquest cheap and easy. However, there is no recognized set of criteria for assigning specific weapons either offensive or defensive status. See Marion Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1941); Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219-238; John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 2527; and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 187-215. 75. See Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 45-49; Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"; and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Vol. II: National Misperception and the Origins of War, forthcoming), chap. 13.

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International Security 19:3 24 would look for a multipolar world with large numbers of roughly equal-sized great powers. However, historically we find multipolar systems with small numbers of great powers—usually five or six—and very often significant power asymmetries within them. Snidal offers no historical examples of multipolar systems in which the great powers largely ignored relative-gains considerations.76 Second, liberal institutionalism itself has little new to say about when states worry about relative gains. Proponents of the theory have instead chosen to rely on two realist explanations to answer that question: the offense-defense balance and the distribution of power in the system. Thus, liberal institutionalism can hardly be called a theoretical alternative to realism, but instead should be seen as subordinate to it.77 Third, even in circumstances where realist logic about relative gains does not apply non-military logics like strategic trade theory might cause states to think in terms of relative gains. Liberal institutionalist theory should directly confront those logics. PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. Although there is much evidence of cooperation among states, this alone does not constitute support for liberal institutionalism. What is needed is evidence of cooperation that would not have occurred in the absence of institutions because of fear of cheating, or its actual presence. But scholars have provided little evidence of cooperation of that sort, nor of cooperation failing because of cheating. Moreover, as discussed above, there is considerable evidence that states worry much about relative gains not only in security matters, but in the economic realm as well. This dearth of empirical support for liberal institutionalism is acknowledged by proponents of that theory78 The empirical record is not completely blank, however, but the few historical cases that liberal institutionalists have studied provide scant support for the theory. Consider two prominent examples.

76. Keohane actually discusses the prospects for stability in post-Cold War Europe in his response to Grieco; see Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge/' pp. 284-291. Surprisingly, his optimistic assessment pays no attention to either Powell or Snidal's arguments, although earlier in that response, he relies on their arguments to "delimit the scope of both realist and institutionalist arguments/' See ibid., p. 276. 77. Liberal institutionalists have not always been clear about the relationship between their theory and realism. For example, Keohane makes the modest claim in After Hegemony (p. 14) that his theory is a "modification of Realism. Realist theories. . . . need to be supplemented, though not replaced/' He made a somewhat bolder claim a few years later, writing that, "despite [certain] affinities with neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism should be regarded as a distinct school of thought/' Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, p. 8. In that same piece, however, he makes the very bold argument that "we must understand that neoliberal institutionalism is not simply an alternative to neorealism, but, in fact, claims to subsume it." Ibid., p. 15. 78. For example, Lisa Martin writes that "scholars working in the. realist tradition maintain a well-founded skepticism about the empirical impact of institutional factors on state behavior. This skepticism is grounded in a lack of studies that show precisely how and when institutions have constrained state decision-making." According to Oran Young, "One of the more surprising features of the emerging literature on regimes [institutions] is the relative absence of sustained discussions of the significance of ... institutions, as determinants of collective outcomes at the international level." Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation," p. 144; Young, International Cooperation, p. 206.

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Keohane looked at the performance of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974-81, a period that included the 1979 oil crisis.79 This case does not appear to lend the theory much support. First, Keohane concedes that the IEA failed outright when put to the test in 1979: "regime-oriented efforts at cooperation do not always succeed, as the fiasco of IEA actions in 1979 illustrates/'80 He claims, however, that in 1980 the IEA had a minor success "under relatively favorable conditions" in responding to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. Although he admits it is difficult to specify how much the IEA mattered in the 1980 case, he notes that "it seems clear that 'it [the IEA] leaned in the right direction'," a claim that hardly constitutes strong support for the theory81 Second, it does not appear from Keohane's analysis that either fear of cheating or actual cheating hindered cooperation in the 1979 case, as the theory would predict. Third, Keohane chose the IEA case precisely because it involved relations among advanced Western democracies with market economies, where the prospects for cooperation were excellent.82 The modest impact of institutions in this case is thus all the more damning to the theory. Lisa Martin examined the role that the European Community (EC) played during the Falklands War in helping Britain coax its reluctant allies to continue economic sanctions against Argentina after military action started.83 She concludes that the EC helped Britain win its allies' cooperation by lowering transaction costs and facilitating issue linkage. Specifically, Britain made concessions on the EC budget and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); Britain's allies agreed in return to keep sanctions on Argentina. This case, too, is less than a ringing endorsement for liberal institutionalism. First, British efforts to maintain EC sanctions against Argentina were not impeded by fears of possible cheating, which the theory identifies as the central impediment to cooperation. So this case does not present an important test of liberal institutionalism, and thus the cooperative outcome does not tell us much about the theory's explanatory power. Second, it was relatively easy for Britain and her allies to strike a deal in this case. Neither side's core interests were threatened, and neither side had to make significant sacrifices to reach an agreement. Forging an accord to continue sanctions was not a difficult undertaking. A stronger test for liberal institutionalism would require states to cooperate when doing so entailed significant costs and risks. Third, the EC was not essential to an agreement. Issues could have been linked without the EC, and although the EC may have lowered transaction costs somewhat, there is no reason to think these

79. Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 10. 80. Ibid., p. 16. 81. Ibid., p. 236. A U.S. Department of Energy review of the lEA's performance in the 1980 crisis concluded that it had "failed to fulfill its promise/' Ethan B. Kapstein, The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 198. 82. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 7. 83. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation/7 Martin looks closely at three other cases in Coercive Cooperation to determine the effect of institutions on cooperation. I have concentrated on the Falklands War case, however, because it is, by her own admission, her strongest case. See ibid., p. 96.

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costs were a serious impediment to striking a deal.84 It is noteworthy that Britain and America were able to cooperate during the Falklands War, even though the United States did not belong to the EC. There is also evidence that directly challenges liberal institutionalism in issue areas where one would expect the theory to operate successfully The studies discussed above by Grieco, Krasner, and Mastanduno test the institutionalist argument in a number of different political economy cases, and each finds the theory has little explanatory power. More empirical work is needed before a final judgment is rendered on the explanatory power of liberal institutionalism. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered so far is unpromising at best. In summary, liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for understanding international relations and promoting stability in the post-Cold War world. It makes modest claims about the impact of institutions, and steers clear of war and peace issues, focusing instead on the less ambitious task of explaining economic cooperation. Furthermore, the theory's causal logic is flawed, as proponents of the theory now admit. Having overlooked the relative-gains problem, they are now attempting to repair the theory, but their initial efforts are not promising. Finally, the available empirical evidence provides little support for the theory. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The theory of collective security deals directly with the issue of how to cause peace.85 It recognizes that military power is a central fact of life in international politics, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The key to enhancing stability in this world of armed states is the proper management of military power. As Inis Claude notes, "the problem of power is here to stay; it is, realistically, not a problem to be 84. Martin does not claim that agreement would not have been possible without the EC. Indeed, she appears to concede that even without the EC, Britain still could have fashioned "separate bilateral agreements with each EEC member in order to gain its cooperation, [although] this would have involved much higher transaction costs/7 Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation/' pp. 174— 175. However, transaction costs among the advanced industrial democracies are not very high in an era of rapid communications and permanent diplomatic establishments. 85. The works that best articulate the case for collective security are: Inis L. Claude, Ir., Power And International Relations (New York: Random House, 1966), chaps. 4-5; Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, chap. 12; and Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security." Also see Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective Security In Europe and Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), pp. 7-27; and Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War. The best critiques of collective security include: Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 293-306, 407-418; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), chap. 12. For a very useful source on collective security, see Maurice Bourquin, ed., Collective Security, A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1936).

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eliminated but a problem to be managed/'86 For advocates of collective security, institutions are the key to managing power successfully. Although the theory emphasizes the continuing importance of military force, it is explicitly anti-realist. Its proponents express a distaste for balance-of-power logic and traditional alliances, as well as a desire to create a world where those realist concepts have no role to play87 In the early twentieth century Woodrow Wilson and others developed the theory of collective security, which formed the basis for the League of Nations. Despite the well-known failings of that particular institution, the theory's popularity remains high. In fact, there has been much interest in collective security in the aftermath of the Cold War.88 Claude notes, "Whatever their failures, the Wilsonians clearly succeeded in establishing the conviction that collective security represents a brand of international morality vastly superior to that incorporated in the balance of power system/'89 Curiously, however, it is difficult to find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously expressing major reservations about the theory, and without expressing grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice. Consider the writings of Claude, who is sympathetic to collective security, and has produced some of the most important work on the subject. He wrote in Power and International Relations, "I would regard the epithet unrealistic as fairly applicable to the theory of collective security" In Swords into Plowshares, he maintained that for "men involved in ... establishing a collective security system . . . their devotion to the ideal has been more a manifestation of their yearning for peace and order as an end than as an expression of conviction that the theory of collective security provides a workable and acceptable means to that end." Finally, Claude wrote in 1992, "I reached the conclusion some thirty years ago that . . . the implementation of collective security theory is not a possibility to be taken seriously"90 86. Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 6. 87. Consider, for example, how Woodrow Wilson describes pre-World War I Europe: "The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of 'every nation take care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world'/' Quoted in Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 81. 88. Some examples of recent interest in collective security include: Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization/' World Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215-250; Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War; Gregory Flynn and David J. Sheffer, "Limited Collective Security," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1980), pp. 77-101; Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security"; Gene M. Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 173-199; Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the Sheriff's Posse," Survival Vol. 32, No. 3 (May/June 1990), pp. 196-205. 89. Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 116. Also see Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration, p. 197. 90. Claude, Power And International Relations, pp. 203-204; Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 283; and Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," p. 9. The Kupchans, who are also sympa-

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International Security 19:3 28 CAUSAL LOGIC. Collective security starts with the assumption that states behave according to the dictates of realism. The aim, however, is to move beyond the self-help world of realism where states fear each other and are motivated by balance-of-power considerations, even though the theory assumes that military power will remain a fact of life in the international system. For advocates of collective security, institutions are the key to accomplishing this ambitious task. Specifically, the goal is to convince states to base their behavior on three profoundly anti-realist norms. First, states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo. They must not launch wars of aggression, but instead must agree to settle all disputes peaceably. Collective security allows for changes in the status quo, but those changes must come via negotiation, not at the end of a rifle barrel. The theory, as Claude notes, "depends upon a positive commitment to the value of world peace by the great mass of states/'92 The theory nevertheless recognizes that some states may not accept this norm: if there were universal subscription to the norm, there would be no need for a collective security system to deal with troublemakers, since there would be none.93 However, the overwhelming majority of states must renounce wars of conquest, or else the system would collapse. It is difficult to stipulate how many aggressors a collective security system can handle at once before it comes undone. The answer depends on the particular circumstances facing the system, such as: the number of great powers, the distribution of power among them, geography, and whether the aggressors are minor or major powers. The upper limit for aggressive major powers is probably two at any one time, but even then, the system is likely to have difficulty dealing with them. Some collective security systems might even have trouble fighting two minor powers at the same time, since minor powers today are often well-armed. Fighting simultaneous wars against Iraq and North Korea, for example, would be a very demanding task, although the great powers would win them. Ideally, a collective security system would confront only one aggressor at a time, and not too often at that. Claude sums up the matter nicely: "Collective security thetic to collective security (see "Concerts and Collective Security"), apparently share Claude's doubts about the theory. After detailing the strengths (pp. 125-137) and flaws (pp. 138-140) of collective security, they abandon the theory and advocate a concert system for Europe (pp. 140161), which, as discussed below, is fundamentally different from collective security. 91. My thinking about the logic underpinning collective security has been significantly influenced by Bradley A. Thayer, "A Theory of Security Structures," unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, July 1994. 92. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 250. 93. Collective security is often criticized on the grounds that "it is feasible only when it is also unnecessary." In other words, collective security requires that "all members are willing to accept the political status quo," but if that is the case, collective security would be unnecessary since no state, by definition, would cause trouble. Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), p. 28. Also see Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," pp. 44, 46; and Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 124. This criticism is unfair, however, because the very purpose of a collective security system is to deal with aggressors. If states could be guaranteed that no other state would ever launch an aggressive war, there would be no need for collective security. The theory recognizes that such a guarantee is not possible.

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assumes the lonely aggressor; the violator of the world's peace may be allowed an accomplice or two, but in principle the evil-doer is supposed to find himself virtually isolated in confrontation with the massive forces of the international posse cdmitatus."94 Second, "responsible" states must not think in terms of narrow self-interest when they act against lonely aggressors, but must instead choose to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community Specifically, states must believe that their national interest is inextricably bound up with the national interest of other states, so that an attack on any state is considered an attack on every state.95 Thus, when a troublemaker appears in the system, all of the responsible states must automatically and collectively confront the aggressor with overwhelming military power. The aim is "to create automatic obligations of a collective character/796 States in a self-help world calculate each move on the basis of how it will affect the balance of power. This narrow sense of self-interest means that states are likely to remain on the sidelines if vital interests are not threatened.97 This kind of behavior is unacceptable in a collective security world, where there must instead be "a legally binding and codified commitment on the part of all members to respond to aggression whenever and wherever it might occur/798 A collective security system allows states little freedom of action. The practical effect of this comprehensive system of mutual assistance is that lonely aggressors are quickly confronted with a coalition of overwhelming military strength. For both deterrence and warfighting purposes, this "preponderant power77 is far superior to the "minimum winning coalitions77 that a troublemaker faces in a balance-of-power world.99 Once it becomes clear that aggression does not pay, even states reluctant to accept the first norm (the renunciation of aggression) will be more inclined to accept it. Third, states must trust each other. States must not only act in accordance with the first two norms, but they must trust that other states will do likewise. If states fear each other, as they do in a realist world, collective security cannot work. States, Claude 94. Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 196.

95. Woodrow Wilson said in 1916, "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.7/ Quoted in August Heckscher, ed., The Politics of Woodrow Wilson: Selections from His Speeches and Writings (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 258. 96. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 296. 97. A state not at risk might fail to come to the aid of a threatened state because the risks and costs of going to war are too high, or because it has an interest in letting the combatants wear each other down, thus improving its own strategic position. A state not directly at risk might even join forces with the aggressor against the threatened state, so as to gain some of the spoils of victory. 98. Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security/7 p. 119. 99. Traditional alliances have no place in a collective security system. Woodrow Wilson is particularly eloquent on this point: "I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into a competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection/' Quoted in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933)/p. 254.

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International Security 19:3 30 emphasizes, must "be willing to entrust their destinies to collective security. Confidence is the quintessential condition of the success of the system; states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and impartiality/'100 Trust is actually the most important of the three norms because it underpins the first two. Specifically, states must be very confident that almost all the other states in the system will sincerely renounce aggression, and will not change their minds at a later date. States also have to be confident that when an aggressor targets them, none of the other responsible states will get cold feet and fail to confront the troublemaker. This element of certainty is of great importance in a collective security system because if it fails to work, at least some of those states that have ignored the balance of power and eschewed alliances are going to be vulnerable to attack. This discussion of trust raises an additional point about the problems a collective security system faces when it confronts multiple aggressors. The previous discussion focused mainly on the logistical difficulties of dealing with more than one troublemaker. However, the presence of multiple aggressors also raises the question of whether most states in the system are deeply committed to peace, and therefore, whether it makes sense to trust collective security. The more troublemakers there are in the system, the more doubts responsible states are likely to have about their investment in collective security. This same logic applies to suggestions that collective security can get by without requiring that all states join the system. Some argue that one or more states can remain on the sidelines, provided the member states can still confront any troublemakers with overwhelming military force.101 Although these free-riders are assumed to be non-aggressors, there is no guarantee that they will not later turn to conquest, in which case their free ride might have allowed them to improve significantly their relative power position. This free-rider problem, like the multiple-aggressor problem, is likely to undermine the responsible states' trust in collective security and thus to cause its failure. FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. There are two major flaws in collective security theory, and both concern the all-important component of trust. Collective security is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. Realists maintain that states fear one another because they operate in an anarchic world, have offensive military capabilities, and can never be certain about other states' intentions. Collective security is largely silent about the first two realist assumptions, as the theory says little about either anarchy or offensive capability.102 However, it has something to say about intentions, 100. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 255. Also see Claude, Power And International Relations, p. 197. 101. See Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; and George W. Downs and Keisuke lida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War, pp. 17-39. 102. Advocates of collective security usually favor widespread arms reductions, but they also recognize that states must maintain a significant offensive capability so that they can challenge an aggressor. For this reason, some scholars suggest that collective security might undermine stability. See Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best," pp. 30-33.

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because the theory's first two norms call for states not to aggress, but only to defend. States, in other words, should only have benign intentions when contemplating the use of military force. However, the theory recognizes that one or more states might reject the norms that underpin collective security and behave aggressively. The very purpose of a collective security system, after all, is to deal with states that have aggressive intentions. In effect, collective security admits that no state can ever be completely certain about another state's intentions, which brings us back to a realist world where states have little choice but to fear each other. There is a second reason why states are not likely to place their trust in a collective security system: it has a set of demanding requirements—I count nine—that are likely to thwart efforts to confront an aggressor with preponderant power. Collective security, as Claude notes, "assumes the satisfaction of an extraordinarily complex network of requirements/'103 First, for collective security to work, states must be able to distinguish clearly between aggressor and victim, and then move against the aggressor. However, it is sometimes difficult in a crisis to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim.104 Debates still rage about which European great power, if any, bears responsibility for starting World War I. Similar disputes have followed most other wars. Second, the theory assumes that all aggression is wrong. But there are occasionally cases where conquest is probably warranted. For example, there are good reasons to applaud the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, since it drove the murderous Pol Pot from power. Third, some states are especially friendly for historical or ideological reasons. Should a state with close friends be labeled an aggressor in a collective security system, its friends are probably going to be reluctant to join the coalition against it. For example, it is difficult to imagine the United States using military force against Britain or Israel, even if they were branded aggressors by the international community. Fourth, historical enmity between states can also complicate collective security efforts. Consider that a European collective security system would have to depend heavily on Germany and Russia, the two most powerful states on the continent, to maintain order. However, the idea of Germany, which wrought murder and destruction across Europe in 1939-45, and Russia, which was the core of the Soviet empire, maintaining order in Europe is sure to meet significant resistance from other European states. Fifth, even if states agree to act automatically and collectively to meet aggression, there would surely be difficulty determining how to distribute the burden. States will have strong incentives to pass the buck and get other states to pay the heavy price of confronting an aggressor.105 During World War I, for example, Britain, France, and 103. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 250. 104. See Bourquin, Collective Security, pp. 295-338. 105. See Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances/7 Revieiu of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

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International Security 19:3 32 Russia each tried to get its allies to pay the blood price of defeating Germany on the battlefield.106 Rampant buck-passing might undermine efforts to produce the preponderant military power necessary to make collective security work. Sixth, it is difficult to guarantee a rapid response to aggression in a collective security system. Planning beforehand is problematic because "it is impossible to know what the alignment of states will be if there is an armed conflict/7107 There are also significant coordination problems associated with assembling a large coalition of states to fight a war. Rapid response becomes even more problematic if the responsible states must deal with more than one aggressor. It took more than six months for the United States to put together a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. As impressive as the American effort was, threatened states are not likely to have much faith in a security system that tells them help is likely to come, but will only arrive months after they have been conquered. Seventh, states are likely to be reluctant to join a collective security effort because the system effectively transforms every local conflict into an international conflict. States that see conflict around the globe will surely be tempted to cordon off the troubled area and prevent further escalation, as the West has done in the former Yugoslavia.108 Collective security, however, calls for escalation, even though it is intended for peaceful purposes. Eighth, the notion that states must automatically respond to aggression impinges in fundamental ways on state sovereignty, and will therefore be difficult to sell. States, especially democracies, are likely to guard jealously their freedom to debate whether or not to fight an aggressor. War is a deadly business, especially if great powers are involved, and few countries want to commit themselves in advance to paying a huge blood price when their own self-interests are not directly involved. Ninth, there is some contradiction concerning attitudes towards force that raises doubts about whether responsible states would actually come to the rescue of a threatened state. Collective security theory is predicated on the belief that war is a truly horrible enterprise, and therefore states should renounce aggression. At the same time, the theory mandates that states must be ready and willing to use force to thwart troublemakers. However, responsible states find war so repellent that they would renounce it; this raises doubts about their willingness to go to war to stop aggression. Indeed, most advocates of collective security prefer "creative diplomacy and economic sanctions'7 to military force when dealing with an aggressor state.109 In sum, states have abundant reasons to doubt that collective security will work as advertised when the chips are down and aggression seems likely. Should it fail, potential 106. David French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 107. G.F. Hudson, "Collective Security and Military Alliances/7 in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds.; Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 177. 108. For an example of this line of thinking, see Stephen M. Walt, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Union/7 in Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War, pp. 169-195. 109. Robert C. Johansen, "Lessons For Collective Security/' World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 562.

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victims are likely to be in deep trouble if they have ignored balance-of-power considerations and placed their faith in collective security. Recognizing this, states are not likely to place their fate in the hands of other states, but will prefer instead the realist logic of self-help. PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. The historical record provides little support for collective security, a point acknowledged by the theory's proponents. The great powers have seriously considered implementing collective security three times in this century: after both World Wars, and after the Cold War. The League of Nations, which was established after World War I, was a serious attempt to make collective security work.110 It had some minor successes during the 1920s. For example, League mediation resolved the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1920, and pressure from the League forced Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav troops out of Albania one year later. The League was much less successful in handling several other conflicts during the 1920s, however: it did not prevent or stop the Greco-Turkish War of 1920-22, or the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and France refused to allow the League to consider its occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923, going so far as to threaten withdrawal from the League if it intervened in the crisis. The League had a mixed record during the 1920s, even though that decade was relatively pacific, and no great power was then bent on aggression. The international system became increasingly unstable during the 1930s, and the League was seriously tested on six occasions: 1) the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; 2) the Chaco War of 1932-35; 3) Japan's 1937 invasion of China; 4) Italy's aggression against Ethiopia in 1935; 5) the German occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936; and 6) the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. The League failed each test, and was effectively useless by the late 1930s, when the great powers were making the critical decisions that led to World War II. The United Nations was established in the waning days of World War II to provide collective security around the globe. However, the Soviet-American competition followed on the heels of that war, and the United Nations was therefore never seriously tested as a collective security apparatus during the Cold War.111 Since the Cold War ended, there has been much talk in the West about building a collective security system.112 The success of the American-led coalition that pushed Iraq out of Kuwait led some experts to conclude that the UN might finally be ready to operate as a collective security institution. In Europe, experts have discussed the possibility of turning NATO, or possibly the CSCE, into a collective security system for the continent. It is too early for conclusive judgments as to whether any of these ideas about collective security will be realized. However, almost all the evidence to date 110. The standard history of the League is P.P. Walters, A History Of The League Of Nations, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). 111. See Ernst B. Haas, 'Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts/7 American Political Science Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1955), pp. 40-62; and Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collect!ve Security Reexamined," American Political Science Review, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 1953), pp. 753-772. 112. See the sources cited in footnote 88.

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International Security 19:3 34 points to failure. Iraq was an unusual case, and no effort is underway to reform the UN so that it can perform true collective security missions.113 Moreover, the failure of the United States and its European allies either to prevent or to stop the wars in the former Yugoslavia, coupled with NATO's January 1994 decision not to expand its membership eastward, does not bode well for establishing a collective security system in post-Cold War Europe.114 FALLBACK POSITIONS. Given the limits of collective security, some of its proponents argue that two less ambitious forms of the theory might be realizable: peacekeeping and concerts. Although they are portrayed as the "budget" version of collective security, some experts think that peacekeeping and concerts might still be a powerful force for international stability.115 Peacekeeping, as William Durch notes, "evolved as an alternative to the collective security that the UN was designed to provide but could not.//116 However, peacekeeping is not a watered-down version of collective security. It is, instead, a much less ambitious alternative strategy for promoting stability. Peacekeeping entails third party intervention in minor-power civil wars or disputes between minor powers, for the purpose of either preventing war from breaking out or stopping it once it has begun. This intervention can only be accomplished with the consent of the disputants, and third parties cannot use force to affect the behavior of the parties in dispute. Peacekeeping operations must be "expressly non-threatening and impartial."117 In essence, peacekeeping is mainly useful for helping implement cease-fires in wars involving minor powers. However, the UN's record in performing even that quite limited task is at best mixed. Peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers. Moreover, it forbids the use of coercion, which is essential to a collective security system. Its mission is a far cry from the ambitious goals of collective security. Peacekeeping by the UN or

113. See Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and International Security/7 Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-30; and Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold War," pp. 15-27. For a critical discussion of the performance of the United States and the United Nations in the Gulf War, see Johansen, "Lessons For Collective Security." 114. There is still discussion about extending NATO eastward to include Poland, Hungary, and the two Czechoslovakian remnant states. Russia is deeply opposed to such a move, however, and therefore NATO is not likely to expand eastward in any meaningful way. Regardless, even if those four states joined NATO, the remnant states of the former Soviet Union would still be excluded, and their inclusion would be necessary to transform NATO into an effective collective security system for Europe. For an argument that NATO should not be transformed into a collective security system, see Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best," pp. 26-33. 115. Regarding peacekeeping, see Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper No. 281 (London: IISS, October 1993), pp. 3-4, 75-77. Concerning concerts, see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," pp. 151-161; Richard Rosecrance, "A Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82; and Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe/7 Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 12-30. 116. William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 151. Also see Berdal, Wliither UN Peacekeeping?; and William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martins, 1993). 117. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? p. 3.

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by regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can enhance the prospects for world peace only on the margins.118 Concerts are sometimes described as an "attenuated form of collective security/' or a "reasonable hybrid version of collective security/'119 Charles and Clifford Kupchan maintain that "collective security organizations can take many different institutional forms along a continuum ranging from ideal collective security to concerts/'120 However, the claim that concerts are a less ambitious version of collective security is incorrect.121 Concerts essentially reflect the balance of power, and are thus largely consistent with realism, whereas collective security, as explained above, is a fundamentally anti-realist theory. Concerts and collective security systems, therefore, reflect different and ultimately incompatible logics. As Quincy Wright reminds us, "The fundamental assumptions of the two systems are different. A government cannot at the same time behave according to the Machiavellian assumptions of the balance of power and the Wilsonian assumptions of international organization/7122 A concert is an arrangement in which great powers that have no incentive to challenge each other militarily agree on a set of rules to coordinate their actions with each other, as well as with the minor powers in the system, often in the establishment of spheres of influence. A concert is a great power condominium that reflects the underlying balance of power among its members. The coordinated balancing that takes place inside a concert does not violate great power self-interest. In fact, when those great powers have a dispute, self-interest determines each side's policy and the concert may collapse as a result. Concerts are most likely to emerge in the wake of great power wars in which a potential hegemon has been defeated, and power is distributed roughly equally among the victors.123 Four factors account for this phenomenon. First, the great powers would not have much to gain militarily by attacking each other, given the rough balance of 118. For a discussion of the limitations of regional organizations as conflict managers, see S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security/' Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 6-37. 119. Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security/' p. 120; Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" p. 27. Also see Downs, Collective Security beyond the Cold War. 120. Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 119. 121. I cannot find evidence that Woodrow Wilson, Inis Claude, or Arnold Wolfers considered concerts to be a limited form of collective security. It appears that the first serious efforts to link collective security with concerts were made in post-Cold War writings on collective security, especially Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security." 122. Quincy Wright, A Study Of War, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 781. Charles Lipson provides an example of how institutionalists try to combine these two incompatible theories. He writes: "Thus, the [post-1815] Concert is a kind of beacon to advocates of collective security . . . not only because it succeeded but because it did so ... without transforming the self-interested behavior of states." Lipson, "Future of Collective Security," p. 119. However, a system based on the self-interested behavior of states is antithetical to collective security, and therefore, it is difficult to understand how such a system could be considered a "kind of beacon to advocates of collective security." For another example of this problem, see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts and Collective Security," p. 116. 123. See Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 58-79.

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International Security 19:3 36 power among them. Second, the victorious powers are likely to have a significant interest in maintaining the status quo, mainly because they are in control and the potential hegemon has been subdued. Third, hegemonic wars are very costly, so the great powers are likely to be war-weary and deeply interested in avoiding another costly war. Fourth, the victorious great powers worked together to win the war, so the notion of collective action is likely to appeal to them, and carry over into the early postwar years. Concerts usually last only a few years. The balance of power changes. Defeated powers rise from the ashes. Victorious powers squabble among themselves, especially about how to deal with minor powers. States become less sensitive to the costs of war as time passes. The Concert of Europe, which was established after Napoleonic France had finally been subdued, is the only case of a successful concert.124 Not surprisingly, it is sometimes held up as a model for the post-Cold War world. The Concert worked fairly well from 1815 to 1823, although the great powers did occasionally clash over their dealings with minor powers. After 1823, however, the Concert was unable to function effectively as a coordinating device for the great powers. 'The concert existed in an abortive form" until its final collapse as the Crimean War began in 1854.125 During its heyday, the Concert of Europe reflected the balance of power; states were not compelled to behave in ways that weakened their relative power position. "Maintaining a balance of power/7 as Richard Betts notes, "remained an important object of the nineteenth-century Concert regime/'126 In sum, the theory of collective security directly addresses the issue of how to push states away from war and promote peace, and it recognizes that military power plays a central role in international politics. But the theory has several important flaws. It is built on the foundational norm that states should trust each other, but it does not satisfactorily explain how this is possible in an anarchic world where states have milita'ry power and uncertain intentions. Furthermore, the historical record provides little support for the theory. The single case of an operative collective security system was the League of Nations, and it was a spectacular failure. Although peacekeeping and concerts are sometimes described as limited but promising versions of collective security, they are of marginal value in promoting peace. Moreover, both peacekeeping 124. Among the best works on the Concert of Europe are: Richard Elrod, 'The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System/7 World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 156-174; Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: Norton, 1955); Jervis, "From Balance To Concert"; Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1972); Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas Nelson, 1966); and Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh: Britain and the European Alliance, 1815-1822, 2nd ed. (London: G. Bell, 1934). 125. The phrase is from Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 22. 126. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" p. 27. The Kupchans readily accept that power politics is part of the warp and woof of daily life in a concert system. See "Concerts and Collective Security," pp. 116, 120, 141-144.

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and concerts work according to different logics than collective security. In fact, concerts, like alliances, basically reflect the balance of power, and are thus consistent with a realist view of institutions. CRITICAL THEORY

Critical theorists127 directly address the question of how to bring about peace, and they make bold claims about the prospects for changing state behavior.128 Specifically, they aim to transform the international system into a ''world society/7 where states are guided by "norms of trust and sharing/7 Their goal is to relegate security competition and war to the scrap heap of history, and create instead a genuine "peace system/'129 Critical theorists take ideas very seriously. In fact, they believe that discourse, or how we think and talk about the world, largely shapes practice. Roughly put, ideas are the 127. Critical theory is an approach to studying the human condition that is not tied to a particular discipline. In fact, critical theory was well-developed and employed widely in other disciplines before it began to penetrate the international relations field in the early 1980s. This article does not focus on critical theory per se, but examines the scholarly literature where critical theory is applied to international relations. I treat those works as a coherent whole, although there are differences, especially of emphasis, among them. For a general discussion of critical theory, see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Pauline M. Rosenau, Post-Modernism And The Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Also see Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities/7 Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-110. 128. Among the key works applying critical theory to international relations are: Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism/7 International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286; Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics/7 Alternatives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1987), pp. 403^134; Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method/7 Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-175; Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory/7 Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1981), pp. 126-155; Cox, "Towards A Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun/7 in James N. Rosenau, and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 132-159; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System/7 International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-247; Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State/7 International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775; Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis/7 World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261-285; Ruggie, "Territoriality And Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations/7 International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174; Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory/7 International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics/7 International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391^125; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State/7 American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396.1 use the label "critical theory77 to describe this body of literature; other labels are sometimes used, among them constructivism, reflectivism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism. 129. The quotations in this paragraph are from Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism/7 p. 285; and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It/7 p. 431.

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driving force of history. Furthermore, they recognize that realism has long been the dominant theory of international politics, and therefore, according to their account of reality, has had substantial influence on state behavior. But critical theorists intend to change that situation by challenging realism and undermining it. Richard Ashley graphically describes their intentions: "Let us then play havoc with neorealist concepts and claims. Let us neither admire nor ignore the orrery of errors, but let us instead fracture the orbs, crack them open, crack them and see what possibilities they have enclosed. And then, when we are done, let us not cast away the residue. Let us instead sweep it into a jar, shine up the glass, and place it high on the bookshelf with other specimens of past mistakes/7130 With realism shattered, the way would presumably be open to a more peaceful world. Critical theory is well-suited for challenging realism because critical theory is, by its very nature, concerned with criticizing "hegemonic" ideas like realism, not laying out alternative futures. The central aim is "to seek out the contradictions within the existing order, since it is from these contradictions that change could emerge/'131 It is called "critical" theory for good reason. Very significantly, however, critical theory per se has little to say about the future shape of international politics. In fact, critical theory emphasizes that, "It is impossible to predict the future."132 Robert Cox explains this point: "Critical awareness of potentiality for change must be distinguished from Utopian planning, i.e., the laying out of the design of a future society that is to be the end goal of change. Critical understanding focuses on the process of change rather than on its ends; it concentrates on the possibilities of launching a social movement rather than on what that movement might achieve."133 Nevertheless, international relations scholars who use critical theory to challenge and subvert realism certainly expect to create a more harmonious and peaceful international system. But the theory itself says little about either the desirability or feasibility of achieving that particular end. CAUSAL LOGIC. Institutions are at the core of critical theory, as its central aim is to alter the constitutive and regulative norms of the international system so that states stop thinking and acting according to realism. Specifically, critical theorists hope to create "pluralistic security communities," where states behave according to the same norms or institutions that underpin collective security.134 States would renounce the use 130. Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," p. 286. 131. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of World History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 393. 132. Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization/' p. 139. 133. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, p. 393. The young Karl Marx summed up this approach in 1844: "the advantage of the new trend [is] that we do not attempt dogmatically to prefigure the future, but want to find the new world only through criticism of the old/' Karl Marx, "For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing/' in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 13. Marx's early writings have markedly influenced critical theory. See, for example, Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism/' pp. 226-230; and Cox, "Social Forces/7 p. 133. Critical theorists, however, disparage Marx's later writings, which lay out a structural theory of politics that has much in common with realism. 134. Emanuel Adler, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security: A Thirty Year Retrospective and a New Set of Anticipations," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 11-18; Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 428, 430; and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the

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of military force, and there would instead be "a generally shared expectation of peaceful change/ Furthermore, states would 'Identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all/'136 States would not think in terms of self-help or self-interest, but would instead define their interests in terms of the international community. J In this new world, "national interests are international 107 interests. Critical theorists have a more ambitious agenda than proponents of collective security Critical theorists aim to create a world in which all states consider war an unacceptable practice, and are not likely to change their minds about the matter. There do not appear to be any troublemaker states in a pluralistic security community, as there might be in a collective security system. In fact, military power seems to be largely irrelevant in the critical theorists7 post-realist world, which has the earmarks of a true "peace system/'138 For critical theorists, the key to achieving a "postmodern international system" is to alter state identity radically, or more specifically, to transform how states think* about themselves and their relationship with other states.139 In the jargon of the theory, "intersubjective understandings and expectations" matter greatly140 In practice, this means that states must stop thinking of themselves as solitary egoists, and instead develop a powerful communitarian ethos.141 Critical theorists aim to create an international system characterized not by anarchy, but by community. States must stop thinking of themselves as separate and exclusive—i.e., sovereign—actors, and instead see themselves as mutually conditioned parts of a larger whole.142 States, or more precisely, their inhabitants and leaders, should be made to care about concepts like "rectitude," "rights," and "obligations." In short, they should have a powerful sense of responsibility to the broader international community End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism/' International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 269-277. Wendt uses the term "cooperative security system" in place of "pluralistic security community." See "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," pp. 400-401. Karl Deutsch invented the concept of a pluralistic security community See Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-9. 135. Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 430. Also see Adler, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security," p. 11. 136. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 400. 137. Ibid. 138. This outcome is fully consistent with Deutsch's definition of a pluralistic security community: "there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the entire world were integrated as a security community, wars would be automatically eliminated." Deutsch, Political Community, p. 5. 139. John G. Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 30. 140. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 397. 141. "Critical social scientific approaches," as Ashley notes, "are inherently communitarian." See Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," p. 403; also see pp. 404-407. 142. In a recent article, Alexander Wendt discusses the "emergence of 'international states/ which would constitute a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system." Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 385.

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International Security 19:3 40 A realist might argue that this goal is desirable in principle, but not realizable in practice, because the structure of the international system forces states to behave as egoists. Anarchy, offensive capabilities, and uncertain intentions combine to leave states with little choice but to compete aggressively with each other. For realists, trying to infuse states with communitarian norms is a hopeless cause. Critical theory, however, directly challenges the realist claim that structural factors are the main determinants of state behavior. In contrast to realism, critical theory assumes that ideas and discourse are the driving forces that shape the world, although it recognizes that structural factors have some, albeit minor, influence.143 How individuals think about and talk about the world matters greatly for determining how states act in the international system. Ideas matter so much, according to critical theorists, because the world is socially constructed by individual human beings whose behavior is mediated by their thoughts; these thoughts, in turn, are shared by the members of a larger culture. Individuals bear responsibility for shaping the world they inhabit. The world around them is not a given that forces itself upon them. On the contrary, critical theorists argue that ideational forces or "institutions often can change environments."144 Markus Fischer sums up this crucial point: "In essence, critical theory holds that social reality is constituted by intersubjective consciousness based on language and that human beings are free to change their world by a collective act of will."145 Robert Cox's description of the state illustrates how this process of thinking about the world determines how it is structured. "The state," he writes, "has no physical existence, like a building or a lamp-post; but it is nevertheless a real entity. It is a real entity because everyone acts as though it were."146 Alexander Wendt's discussion of anarchy provides another good example: "Structure," he writes, "has no existence or causal powers apart from process."147 States, in fact, can think about anarchy in a number of different ways. "Anarchy is what states make of it." Moreover, "self-help and power politics are institutions . . . not essential features of anarchy." This discussion of how critical theorists think about the state and anarchy points up the fact that realism and critical theory have fundamentally different epistemologies 143. It is important to emphasize that critical theorists do not make a case for pure idealism, where realist structure has little bearing on state behavior. Their argument is much more sophisticated, as they maintain that structure and discourse are inextricably linked together and constantly interact in a dialectical fashion. Structure, they emphasize, both enables and constrains individual behavior. Nevertheless, the key point for critical theorists is that structure is ultimately shaped and reshaped by discourse. In other words, structure may shape our thinking about the world, but structure is ultimately shaped by our discourse. Structure is not an independent material force that shapes how we think and talk about the world. Social reality, in the end, is ultimately a construction of our minds. 144. Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change/7 p. 226. 145. Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices/7 International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 430. 146. Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization/7 p. 133. 147. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It/7 p. 395. The subsequent quotations in this paragraph are from ibid. Also see Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-262.

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and ontologies, which are the most basic levels at which theories can be compared.148 Realists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual. Critical theorists, on the other hand, "see subject and object in the historical world as a reciprocally interrelated whole/' and they deny the possibility of objective knowledge.149 Where realists see a fixed and knowable world, critical theorists see the possibility of endless interpretations of the world before them. For critical theorists, "there are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history . . . there is only interpretation. . . . History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretation—none primary, all arbitrary/'150 Nevertheless, critical theorists readily acknowledge that realism has been the dominant interpretation of international politics for almost seven hundred years. "Realism is a name for a discourse of power and rule in modern global life."151 Still, critical theory allows for change, and there is no reason, according to the theory anyway, why a communitarian discourse of peace and harmony cannot supplant the realist discourse of security competition and war. In fact, change is always possible with critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses, and it makes no judgment about the merit or staying power of any particular one. Also, critical theory makes no judgment about whether human beings are "hard-wired" to be good or bad, but instead treats people as infinitely changeable. The key to how they think and behave is the particular "software program" that individuals carry around in their heads, and those can be changed. In essence, critical theorists hope to replace the widely used realist software package with new software that emphasizes communitarian norms. Once that switch has been made, states will cooperate with each other and world politics will be more peaceful. Most critical theorists do not see ideas and discourses forming at the grass roots and then percolating up to the elites of society Rather, theirs is a top-down theory, whereby elites play the key role in transforming language and discourse about international relations. Experts, especially scholars, determine the flow of ideas about world politics. It is especially useful, however, if this intellectual vanguard consists of individuals from different states. These transnational elites, which are sometimes referred to as "epistemic communities," are well-suited for formulating and spreading the communitarian ideals that critical theorists hope will replace realism.152 Finally, it is worth noting that critical theorists are likely to be quite intolerant of other discourses about international politics, especially realism.153 Four factors combine 148. See Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization/' pp. 132-139; Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization/7 pp. 763-775; Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era/' International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 235-254; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem/' pp. 335-370. 149. Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization," p. 135. 150. Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," pp. 408-409. 151. Ibid., p. 422. 152. See Adler, "Arms Control"; and Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, special issue of International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992). 153. For example, see Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," passim.

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International Security 19:3 42 to account for this situation. The theory is based on the belief that ideas matter greatly for shaping international politics. Also, it recognizes that particular theories triumph in the marketplace of ideas, and the result is hegemonic discourse. Moreover, although the theory itself does not distinguish between good and bad ideas, critical theorists themselves certainly make that distinction. Furthermore, critical theorists have no historical guarantee that hegemonic discourse will move toward ideas about world politics that they consider sound. Realism, for example, has been the dominant discourse in the international arena for many centuries. Therefore, it makes sense for critical theorists to try to eliminate ideas they do not like, thus maximizing the prospects that their favorite discourse will triumph. Realist thinking, in this view, is not only dangerous, but is the main obstacle critical theorists face in their effort to establish a new and more peaceful hegemonic discourse.154 FLAWS IN THE CAUSAL LOGIC. The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas RisseKappen writes, "Research on ... 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transnational networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside/'156 Not surprisingly critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist 154. Lebow, for example, writes that "Contemporary realists' . . . theories and some of the policy recommendations based on them may now stand in the way of the better world we all seek/' Lebow, "The Long Peace," p. 277. 155. My thinking on this matter has been markedly influenced by Hein Goemans. 156. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 187. Also see Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change," p. 225.

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rituals of power/' Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society/7 like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] deprived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?"157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the challenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study international politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to a c t . . . such expectations are almost never realized in practice."160 157. Ashley, "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space/7 pp. 426-427. 158. Cox, "Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization/7 p. 138. Also see Cox, "Social Forces/' pp. 138-149. For other examples, see Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation/' pp. 281-286; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation/' pp. 389-390. 159. Cox is apparently aware of this problem. After spending eleven pages outlining various objective factors that might shape a new world order, he notes, "It would, of course, be logically inadmissible, as well as imprudent, to base predictions of future world order upon the foregoing considerations." Cox, "Social Forces," p. 149, emphasis added. Nevertheless, he then emphasizes in the next few sentences how important those objective considerations are for understanding future world order prospects. He writes: "Their utility is rather in drawing attention to factors which could incline an emerging world order in one direction or another. The social forces generated by changing production processes are the starting point for thinking about possible futures. These forces may combine in different configurations, and as an exercise one could consider the hypothetical configurations most likely to lead to three different outcomes as to the future of the state system. The focus on these three outcomes is not, of course, to imply that no other outcomes or configurations of social forces are possible." In other words, Cox does rely heavily on objective factors to explain possible future world orders. 160. Cox, Production, Power, And World Order, p. 393.

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Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse. PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPIRICAL RECORD. Critical theorists have offered little empirical support for their theory.161 It is still possible to sketch the broad outlines of their account of the past. They appear to concede that realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989, and that states and other political entities behaved according to realist dictates during these seven centuries. However, some critical theorists suggest that both the discourse and practice of international politics during the preceding five centuries of the feudal era or central medieval period (800-1300) was not dominated by realism and, therefore, cannot be 1 (^D explained by it. They believe that European political units of the feudal era did not think and therefore did not act in the exclusive and selfish manner assumed by realism, but instead adopted a more communitarian discourse, which guided their actions. Power politics, so the argument goes, had little relevance in these five hundred years. Furthermore, most critical theorists see the end of the Cold War as an important watershed in world politics. A few go so far as to argue that "the revolutions of 1989 transformed the international system by changing the rules governing superpower conflict and, thereby, the norms underpinning the international system/'163 Realism, they claim, is no longer the hegemonic discourse. "The end of the Cold War . . . undermined neorealist theory/'164 Other critical theorists are more tentative in their judgment about whether the end of the Cold War has led to a fundamental transformation of international politics.165 For these more cautious critical theorists, the revolutions of 1989 have created opportunities for change, but that change has not yet been realized. Three points are in order regarding the critical theorists' interpretation of history. First, one cannot help but be struck by the sheer continuity of realist behavior in the critical theorists' own account of the past. Seven centuries of security competition and war represents an impressive span of time, especially when you consider the tremen161. Wendt, for example, acknowledges that, "Relatively little empirical research has been explicitly informed by structuration [critical] theory, which might illustrate its implications for the explanation of state action/7 Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem/7 p. 362. 162. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation/' pp. 273-279. Also see Robert W. Cox, "Postscript 1985," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 244-245. 163. Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change/7 p. 215. Also see Lebow, "The Long Peace"; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely7'; and Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev As Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner/7 International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-183. All four of these articles are published together as a symposium on "The End of the Cold War and Theories of International Relations," in the Spring 1994 International Organization. 164. Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change/7 p. 217. 165. See, for example, Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond/7 pp. 173-174; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 422; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 393.

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dous political and economic changes that have taken place across the world during that lengthy period. Realism is obviously a human software package with deep-seated appeal, although critical theorists do not explain its attraction. Second, a close look at the international politics of the feudal era reveals scant support for the claims of critical theorists: Markus Fischer has done a detailed study of that period, and he finds "that feudal discourse was indeed distinct, prescribing unity, functional cooperation, sharing, and lawfulness/'166 More importantly, however, he also finds "that while feudal actors observed these norms for the most part on the level of form, they in essence behaved like modern states/' Specifically, they "strove for exclusive territorial control, protected themselves by military means, subjugated each other, balanced against power, formed alliances and spheres of influence, and resolved their conflicts by the use and threat of force/'167 Realism, not critical theory, appears best to explain international politics in the five centuries of the feudal era. Third, there are good reasons to doubt that the demise of the Cold War means that the millennium is here. It is true that the great powers have been rather tame in their behavior towards each other over the past five years. But that is usually the case after great-power wars. Moreover, although the Cold War ended in 1989, the Cold War order that it spawned is taking much longer to collapse, which makes it difficult to determine what kind of order or disorder will replace it. For example, Russian troops remained in Germany until mid-1994, seriously impinging on German sovereignty, and the United States still maintains a substantial military presence in Germany. Five years is much too short a period to determine whether international relations has been fundamentally transformed by the end of the Cold War, especially given that the "old" order of realist discourse has been in place for at least twelve centuries. A close look at the sources of this purported revolutionary change in world politics provides further cause for skepticism. For critical theorists, "the Cold War was fundamentally a discursive, not a material, structure."168 Thus, if the United States and the Soviet Union had decided earlier in the Cold War that they were no longer enemies, it would have been over sooner.169 Mikhail Gorbachev, critical theorists argue, played the central role in ending the Cold War. He challenged traditional Soviet thinking about national security, and championed ideas about international security that sounded like they had been scripted by critical theorists.170 In fact, critical theorists argue that Gorbachev's "new thinking" was shaped by a "transnational liberal internationalist community [epistemic community] comprising the U.S. arms control community, Western European scholars and center-left policy makers, as well as Soviet institutchiks."171 These new ideas led Gorbachev to end the Soviet Union's "imperial relationship with 166. Fischer, "Feudal Europe/7 p. 428. Also see the subsequent exchange between Fischer and Rodney Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil in International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 479-500. 167. Fischer, "Feudal Europe/7 p. 428. 168. Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation/7 p. 389. 169. This sentence is a paraphrase of Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," p. 397. 170. See Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change/' p. 233. 171. Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely/7 p. 213. Also see ibid., pp. 195-214; and Stein, "Political Learning By Doing/'pp. 175-180.

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Eastern Europe/7 which led to a fundamental change in "the norms of bloc politics and thereby the rules governing superpower relations/'172 In essence, "the changed practices of one of the major actors . . . [had] system-wide repercussions/'173 Both superpowers "repudiated the notion of international relations as a self-help system and . . . transcended the consequences of anarchy as depicted by realism/'174 Gorbachev surely played the key role in ending the Cold War, but there are good reasons to doubt that his actions fundamentally transformed international politics. His decision to shut down the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe can very well be explained by realism. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was suffering an economic and political crisis at home that made the costs of empire prohibitive, especially since nuclear weapons provided the Soviets with a cheap and effective means of defense. Many empires collapsed and many states broke apart before 1989, and many of them sought to give to dire necessity the appearance of virtue. But the basic nature of international politics remained unchanged. It is not clear why the collapse of the Soviet Union is a special case. Furthermore, now that Gorbachev is out of office and has little political influence in Russia, the Russians have abandoned his "new thinking."175 In fact, they now have an offensively-oriented military doctrine that emphasizes first use of nuclear weapons. More importantly, since the end of 1992, the Russians have been acting like a traditional great power toward their neighbors. The former Soviet Union seems to be an arena for power politics, and Boris Yeltsin's Russia appears to be fully engaged in that enterprise.176 Regarding the more modest claim that the end of the Cold War presents an opportunity to move to a world where states are guided by norms of trust and sharing, perhaps this is true. But since critical theorists acknowledge that their theory cannot predict the future, why should we believe their claim, especially when it means choosing against realism, a theory that has at least 1200 years of staying power? Critical theorists have ambitious aims. However, critical theory also has important flaws, and therefore it will likely remain in realism's shadow. Specifically, critical theory is concerned with affecting fundamental change in state behavior, but it says little about 172. Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change/7 pp. 228, 239. 173. Ibid., p. 227. 174. Lebow, 'The Long Peace," p. 276. 175. See Charles Dick, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation/' in Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 1, January 1994, pp. 1-5; Michael C. Desch, "Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev and Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 467-474; and Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 19, 1993), pp. 44-50. 176. See, for example, Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand," Foreign Policy, No. 92, pp. 92-116; Steven E. Miller, "Russian National Interests," in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 77-106; Alexei K. Pushkov, "Russia and America: The Honeymoon's Over," Foreign Policy, No. 93 (Winter 1993-1994), pp. 77-90; and Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad'," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 75-90.

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how it comes about. Critical theorists do occasionally point to particular causes of change, but when they do, they make arguments that are inconsistent with the theory itself. Finally, there is little empirical evidence to support the claims of critical theorists, and much to contradict them.

Conclusion Many policymakers as well as academics believe that institutions hold great promise for promoting international peace. This optimistic assessment of institutions is not warranted, however, mainly because the three institutionalist theories which underpin it are flawed. There are serious problems with the causal logic of each theory, and little empirical evidence for any of them. What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior. We have an important paradox here: although the world does not work the way institutionalist theories say it does or should, those theories remain highly influential in both the academic and policy worlds. Given the limited impact of institutions on state behavior, one would expect considerable skepticism, even cynicism, when institutions are described as a major force for peace. Instead, they are still routinely described in promising terms by scholars and governing elites. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a detailed explanation of this paradox. Nevertheless, I would like to close with some speculative comments about this puzzle, focusing on the American context. The attraction of institutionalist theories for both policymakers and scholars is explained, I believe, not by their intrinsic value, but by their relationship to realism, and especially to core elements of American political ideology. Realism has long been and continues to be an influential theory in the United States.177 Leading realist thinkers such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, for example, occupied key policymaking positions during the Cold War. The impact of realism in the academic world is amply demonstrated in the institutionalist literature, where discussions of realism are pervasive.178 Yet despite its influence, Americans who think seriously about foreign policy issues tend to dislike realism intensely, mainly because it clashes with their basic values. The theory stands opposed to how most Americans prefer to think about themselves and the wider world.179

177. See Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), chap. 1. 178. Summing up the autobiographical essays of 34 international relations scholars, Joseph Kruzel notes that "Hans Morgenthau is more frequently cited than any other name in these memoirs/' Joseph Kruzel, "Reflections on the Journeys/7 in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Journeys through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travelers (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 505. Although "Morgenthau is often cited, many of the references in these pages are negative in tone. He seems to have inspired his critics even more than his supporters/7 Ibid. 179. See Keith L. Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism/' Review of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 281-301.

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International Security 19:3 48 There are four principal reasons why American elites, as well as the American public, tend to regard realism with hostility. First, realism is a pessimistic theory It depicts a world of stark and harsh competition, and it holds out little promise of making that world more benign. Realists, as Hans Morgenthau wrote, are resigned to the fact that "there is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does/'180 Such pessimism, of course, runs up against the deep-seated American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can solve important social problems. Americans regard progress as both desirable and possible in politics, and they are therefore uncomfortable with realism's claim that security competition and war will persist despite our best efforts to eliminate them.181 Second, realism treats war as an inevitable, and indeed sometimes necessary, form of state activity For realists, war is an extension of politics by other means. Realists are very cautious in their prescriptions about the use of force: wars should not be fought for idealistic purposes, but instead for balance-of-power reasons. Most Americans, however, tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be abolished. For the time being, however, it can only justifiably be used for lofty moral goals, like "making the world safe for democracy"; it is morally incorrect to fight wars to change or preserve the balance of power. This makes the realist conception of warfare anathema to many Americans. Third, as an analytical matter, realism does not distinguish between "good" states and "bad" states, but essentially treats them like billiard balls of varying size. In realist theory, all states are forced to seek the same goal: maximum relative power.182 A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior during that conflict. According to the theory, both sides must have been driven by concerns about the balance of power, and must have done what was necessary to try to achieve a favorable balance. Most 180. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 201. Nevertheless, Keith Shimko convincingly argues that the shift within realism, away from Morgenthau's belief that states are motivated by an unalterable will to power, and toward Waltz's view that states are motivated by the desire for security, provides "a residual, though subdued optimism, or at least a possible basis for optimism [about international politics]. The extent to which this optimism is stressed or suppressed varies, but it is there if one wants it to be/7 Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism/7 p. 297. Realists like Stephen Van Evera, for example, point out that although states operate in a dangerous world, they can take steps to dampen security competition and minimize the danger of war. See Van Evera, Causes of War. 181. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1944), especially pp. 153-190. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964). 182. It should be emphasized that many realists have strong moral preferences and are driven by deep moral convictions. Realism is not a normative theory, however, and it provides no criteria for moral judgment. Instead, realism merely seeks to explain how the world works. Virtually all realists would prefer a world without security competition and war, but they believe that goal is unrealistic given the structure of the international system. See, for example, Robert G. Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism/' in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 321.

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Americans would recoil at such a description of the Cold War, because they believe the United States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not.183 Fourth, America has a rich history of thumbing its nose at realism. For its first 140 years of existence, geography and the British navy allowed the United States to avoid serious involvement in the power politics of Europe. America had an isolationist foreign policy for most of this period, and its rhetoric explicitly emphasized the evils of entangling alliances and balancing behavior. Even as the United States finally entered its first European war in 1917, Woodrow Wilson railed against realist thinking. America has a long tradition of anti-realist rhetoric, which continues to influence us today. Given that realism is largely alien to American culture, there is a powerful demand in the United States for alternative ways of looking at the world, and especially for theories that square with basic American values. Institutionalist theories nicely meet these requirements, and that is the main source of their appeal to policymakers and scholars. Whatever else one might say about these theories, they have one undeniable advantage in the eyes of their supporters: they are not realism. Not only do institutionalist theories offer an alternative to realism, but they explicitly seek to undermine it. Moreover, institutionalists offer arguments that reflect basic American values. For example, they are optimistic about the possibility of greatly reducing, if not eliminating, security competition among states and creating a more peaceful world. They certainly do not accept the realist stricture that war is politics by other means. Institutionalists, in short, purvey a message that Americans long to hear. There is, however, a downside for policymakers who rely on institutionalist theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail. The international system strongly shapes the behavior of states, limiting the amount of damage that false faith in institutional theories can cause. The constraints of the system notwithstanding, however, states still have considerable freedom of action, and their policy choices can succeed or fail in protecting American national interests and the interests of vulnerable people around the globe. The failure of the League of Nations to address German and Japanese aggression in the 1930s is a case in point. The failure of institutions to prevent or stop the war in Bosnia offers a more recent example. These cases illustrate that institutions have mattered rather little in the past; they also suggest that the false belief that institutions matter has mattered more, and has had pernicious effects. Unfortunately, misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures in the future. 183. Realism's treatment of states as billiard balls of different sizes tends to raise the hackles of comparative politics scholars, who believe that domestic political and economic factors matter greatly for explaining foreign policy behavior.

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Part III New Directions

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[10]

Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination Peter Kt. Haas

The growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult. If decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions? What factors shape their behavior? Under conditions of uncertainty, what are the origins of international institutions? And how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge? While a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation, the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights. At its core, the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed. Among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two; whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent; and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create, defend, or expand their own wealth and power, to enhance collective material benefits, or to promote nonmaterial values.1 A related question of For their comments on earlier versions of this article, I am grateful to Pete Andrews, Peter Cowhey, Barbara Crane, George Hoberg, Raymond Hopkins, Ethan Kapstein, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, Craig Murphy, John Odell, Gail Osherenko, M. J. Peterson, Gene Rochlin, and Richard Sclove. 1. See, for example, Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-70; Margaret S. Archer, "Morphogenesis Versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action," British Journal of Sociology 33 (December 1982), pp. 455-83; David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441-73; Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-912; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of

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2 International Organization debate is the extent to which state actors fully recognize and appreciate the anarchic nature of the system and, consequently, whether rational choice, deductive-type approaches or interpretive approaches are most appropriate for the study of international cooperation.2 In focusing on the structure of international or domestic power in their explanations of policy coordination, many authors ignore the possibility that actors can learn new patterns of reasoning and may consequently begin to pursue new state interests. While others mention this possibility, few investigate the conditions that foster a change in state interests and the mechanisms through which the new interests can be realized.3 In this volume of articles, we acknowledge that systemic conditions and domestic pressures impose constraints on state behavior, but we argue that there is still a wide degree of latitude for state action. How states identify their interests and recognize the latitude of actions deemed appropriate in specific issue-areas of policymaking are functions of the manner in which the problems are understood by the policymakers or are represented by those to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty. Recognizing that human agency lies at the interstices between systemic conditions, knowledge, and national actions, we offer an approach that examines the role that networks of knowledge-based experts—epistemic communities—play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation. We argue that control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977); Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60; Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 353-90; Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin, eds., The Democratic State (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 19-57; Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State," Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984), pp. 223-46; and Howard M. Lentner, "The Concept of the State: A Response to Krasner," Comparative Politics 16 (April 1984), pp. 367-77. 2. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1988), pp. 379-96. 3. Krasner acknowledges the importance of shared beliefs in explaining the Group of 77 (G-77) cooperation and also discusses the role of shared understanding in regime creation. See the following works of Stephen D. Krasner: Structural Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 9; and "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 368. Keohane notes the possibility that states may learn to recalculate their interests, and Gilpin also acknowledges that states occasionally "learn to be more enlightened in their definitions of their interests and can learn to be more cooperative in their behavior." See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 131-32; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 227.

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the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination. An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.4 Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity— that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.5 The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is simple. The major dynamics are uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization. In international policy coordination, the forms of uncertainty that tend to stimulate demands for information are those which arise from the strong dependence of states on each other's policy choices for success in obtaining goals and those 4. The term "epistemic communities" has been defined or used in a variety of ways, most frequently to refer to scientific communities. In this volume, we stress that epistemic communities need not be made up of natural scientists or of professionals applying the same methodology that natural scientists do. Moreover, when referring to epistemic communities consisting primarily of natural scientists, we adopt a stricter definition than do, for example, Holzner and Marx, who use the term "epistemic community" in reference to a shared faith in the scientific method as a way of generating truth. This ignores that such faith can still bond together people with diverse interpretations of ambiguous data. By our definition, what bonds members of an epistemic community is their shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths. Our notion of "epistemic community" somewhat resembles Fleck's notion of a "thought collective"—a sociological group with a common style of thinking. It also somewhat resembles Kuhn's broader sociological definition of a paradigm, which is "an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community" and which governs "not a subject matter but a group of practitioners." See Burkhart Holzner and John H. Marx, Knowledge Application: The Knowledge System in Society (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1979), pp. 107-11; Ludwig Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; translated from the 1935 edition printed in German); and Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 174-210, with quotes drawn from pp. 175 and 180. Regarding scientific communities, see also Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science," Minerva, vol. 1,1962, pp. 54-73. 5. Other characteristics of epistemic communities that were mentioned or discussed during the preparation of this volume included the following: members of an epistemic community share intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge. These phrases were not incorporated in the formal definition listed here; they are simply provided to evoke additional notions that are associated with epistemic communities.

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4 International Organization which involve multiple and only partly estimable consequences of action. Examples drawn from the studies presented here include the uncertainties about strategies to avert nuclear destruction and the uncertainties about how to respond to the hypothesized threats to an invisible layer of ozone located seven to fifteen miles above the earth's surface. These forms of uncertainty give rise to demands for particular sorts of information. The information needed does not consist of guesses about others' intentions, about the probability of discrete events occurring, or about a state's own ability to pursue unilaterally attainable goals that are amenable to treatment by various political rules of thumb. Rather, it consists of depictions of social or physical processes, their interrelation with other processes, and the likely consequences of actions that require application of considerable scientific or technical expertise. The information is thus neither guesses nor "raw" data; it is the product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena. Epistemic communities are one possible provider of this sort of information and advice. As demands for such information arise, networks or communities of specialists capable of producing and providing the information emerge and proliferate. The members of a prevailing community become strong actors at the national and transnational level as decision makers solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them. A community's advice, though, is informed by its own broader worldview. To the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalize its influence and insinuate its views into broader international politics. Members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests. The decision makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other states, thereby increasing the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international policy coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic community. Similarly, epistemic communities may contribute to the creation and maintenance of social institutions that guide international behavior. As a consequence of the continued influence of these institutions, established patterns of cooperation in a given issue-area may persist even though systemic power concentrations may no longer be sufficient to compel countries to coordinate their behavior. By focusing on the various ways in which new ideas and information are diffused and taken into account by decision makers, the epistemic communities approach suggests a nonsystemic origin for state interests and identifies a dynamic for persistent cooperation independent of the distribution of international power. It assumes that state actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and wealth pursuers. It also seeks to explain the substantive nature of coordinated policy arrangements, a subject on which many structural analysts are notably silent. Yet to some extent, the approach supplements structural

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theories of international behavior: in response to new knowledge articulated by epistemic communities, a state may elect to pursue entirely new objectives, in which case outcomes may be shaped by the distribution of information as well as by the distribution of power capabilities. Table 1 presents a schematized outline of the epistemic communities approach and compares it with other approaches to the study of policy change that have been advanced by international relations scholars. Pursuing the epistemic communities approach, contributors to this volume analyze the impact of five epistemic and two epistemic-like communities on decision making in a variety of issues concerning the international political economy, international security, and the environment. In analyzing the processes leading to policy coordination in a specific issue-area, each author describes the membership and shared beliefs of an expert community, traces the community's actions, and discusses its impact. By comparing the beliefs and behavior of policymakers in one country over time and by comparing them in countries in which expert communities were active versus those in which they were not, the authors try to specify the extent to which decision-making processes were influenced by the community as opposed to the political factors and actors emphasized in other approaches to international relations. The articles by William Drake and Kalypso Nicolai'dis, Emanuel Adler, M. J. Peterson, and Peter Haas investigate the ways in which epistemic communities initially framed the issues for collective debate, thereby influencing subsequent negotiations and bringing about their preferred outcomes to the exclusion of others in the cases involving trade in services, nuclear arms control, management of whaling, and protection of stratospheric ozone. In the whaling and ozone cases, the authors also outline the role that epistemic communities played in identifying specific policies for national and collective adoption. In the study regarding the principles and practices of food aid, Raymond Hopkins traces the changes in the beliefs and understandings of the epistemic community that had a hand in the food aid regime and links these changes to regime reforms. Ethan Kapstein's analysis of banking regulators and G. John Ikenberry's analysis of economists involved in the Anglo-American postwar economic settlement both shed light on the epistemic communities approach by discussing factors that differentiate these expert groups from the epistemic communities discussed in the other case studies included here. And James Sebenius adds an additional viewpoint in his commentary on the commonalities and differences between the epistemic communities approach and negotiation analysis. While all of the case studies in this volume consider the array of political and systemic constraints within which expert communities operate, Ikenberry focuses in particular on how political factors can impede the application of the consensual views of specialists. In his analysis of postwar economic management, he thus offers a limiting case, indicating that epistemic agreement was possible only in those areas removed from the political whirl. One of the

290 T A B L E l. Approaches to the study of policy change Level of analysis and area of study

Approach

Factors that influence policy change

Mechanisms and effects of change

Primary actors

Transnational; state admin­ istrators and international institutions.

Knowledge; causal and principled beliefs.

Diffusion of information and learning; shifts in the patterns of decision mak­ ing.

Epistemic communities; individual states.

Neorealist approaches

International; states in po­ litical and economic sys­ tems.

Distribution of capabilities; distribution of costs and benefits from actions.

Technological change and war; shifts in the available power resources of states and in the nature of the game.

States.

Dependency theory-based approaches'

International; global sys­ tem.

Comparative advantage of states in the global divi­ sion of labor; control over economic resources.

Changes in production; shifts in the location of states in the global divi­ sion of labor.

States in the core, periph­ ery, and semiperiphery; multinational corpora­ tions.

Poststructuralist approaches

International; discourse and language.

Usage and meanings of words.

Discourse; the opening of new political spaces and opportunities.

Unclear.

3

c

3

For examples, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Stephen D . Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Kenneth N . Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For examples, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Dependent Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, "Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization," International Organization 43 (Spring 1989), pp. 207-38; Johan Galtung, The True Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1984); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For examples, see James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., International I Intertextual Relations (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989); and Richard K . Ashley and R. B . J. Walker, eds., "Speaking the Language of Exile Dissidence in International Studies," special issue of International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3, September 1990. a

b

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Epistemic communities approach

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conclusions that can be drawn from Ikenberry's study, as well as from earlier studies of epistemic-like communities presented elsewhere,6 is that while the form of specific policy choices is influenced by transnational knowledge-based networks, the extent to which state behavior reflects the preferences of these networks remains strongly conditioned by the distribution of power internationally. Thus, the range of impact that we might expect of epistemic and epistemic-like communities remains conditioned and bounded by international and national structural realities. The extent of that conditioning—the amount of flexibility in the international system available for reflection and understanding in the face of power and structure—is the focus of this volume. The international setting for epistemic communities The modern administrative state: expansion, professionalization, and deference to the "knowledge elite"

Many of the major dimensions of contemporary international relations can be traced to the late nineteenth century, when crafts and guilds were declining 6. A number of earlier studies focusing on the interplay between expertise, technical issues, consensual knowledge, and state power have considered the role of epistemic-like communities in the decision-making process. At the level of international organizations, such studies have been undertaken with regard to wide variety of issue-areas and have demonstrated that webs of nonstate actors provided information and were involved in the shaping of agendas and the defining of state interests. While all of these studies cannot be listed here, a few examples show the range of areas analyzed: Robert W. Russell, "Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960-1972," International Organization 27 (Autumn 1973), pp. 431-64; William Ascher, "New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: The Case of the World Bank," International Organization 37 (Summer 1983), pp. 415-39; Barbara B. Crane and Jason L. Finkle, "Population Policy and World Politics," paper presented at the Fourteenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 28 August to 1 September 1988; Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Protection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Barbara Johnson, "Technocrats and the Management of International Fisheries," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 745-70; and Warren S. Wooster, "Interactions Between Intergovernmental and Scientific Organizations in Marine Affairs," International Organization 27 (Winter 1973), pp. 103-13. For examples of studies in comparative politics that discuss the role of epistemic-like communities in the development and enforcement of common policies, see Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, pp. 107-68; Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 275 ff.; and Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions, and Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis" (in 3 parts), British Journal of Political Science 3 (July and October 1973), pp. 291-313 and 409-23. With respect to policy coordination, it is worth stressing that even if actors believe that their common understandings will contribute to enhancing the collective good, serious unanticipated consequences are possible; see Stephen Van Evera, "Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For examples of purely national studies that discuss the role of epistemic-like communities in transforming state preferences, see John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Emanuel Adler, "Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry," International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), pp. 673-705; and Dennis Hodgson, "Orthodoxy and Revisionism in American Demography," Population and Development Review 14 (December 1988), pp. 541-69.

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8 International Organization and scientific and engineering expertise were increasingly applied to commercial research, development, and governance.7 Scientific rationality began to prevail over alternative paradigms of knowledge as a model for decisionmaking science as well, although it did not reach its peak until about fifty years later, when logical positivism and the ideas of the Vienna Circle were embraced and the entry of white-coated professionals into the public policy process became more widespread. As Harvey Brooks observed in 1965, "Much of the history of social progress in the Twentieth Century can be described in terms of the transfer of wider and wider areas of public policy from politics to expertise."8 With the proliferation of government ministries and agencies to coordinate and handle many new tasks, regulation has become an increasingly important bureaucratic function,9 and the expertise required has extended to a wider range of disciplines than ever before. The domain of public governance has also grown correspondingly technical. Despite the fact that numerous ministries established for conducting War World II were decommissioned in subsequent years, the total number of ministries tripled during the period from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s. Around 1950, there were 70 independent countries with 850 ministries, or roughly 12 ministries per country. By 1975, there were 140 independent countries with 2,500 ministries, or nearly 18 ministries per country, indicating a strong shift toward more active social regulation.10 The rapid growth of government agencies was particularly evident in the United States, where two economic regulatory agencies and five major social regulatory agencies were 7. While the transfer of authority to the sphere of the secular and the rational can be traced back to the eighteenth century and the granting of Noblesse de la Robe in France, the integration of scientists and engineers into a new rationalized corporate structure really began with the second industrial revolution of the 1880s. For background information, see Franklin L. Ford, Robe and Sword (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 248-52. Regarding the acceleration of technically grounded forms of governance and decision making, see David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); JoAnne Yates, Control Through Communication (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966); Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); and A. Hunter Dupree, ed., Science and the Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1916 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963). 8. Harvey Brooks, "Scientific Concepts and Cultural Change," Daedalus 94 (Winter 1965), p. 68. 9. See Ezra N. Suleiman, ed., Bureaucrats and Policy Making: A Comparative Overview (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984); Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); James Q. Wilson, ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980); and Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Patterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 267-328. 10. See Jean Blondell, The Organization of Governments (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), pp. 195-96. For data on the professional backgrounds of ministers and individuals occupying other ministerial posts, see Jean Blondell, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982). Blondell notes that 9.5 percent of the ministers serving between 1945 and 1981 could be considered "specialists," with most of this group consisting of civil engineers, electrical engineers, and agronomists.

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created during the five-year period from 1970 to 1975, while the federal budget allocations for economic and social regulation grew by 157 percent and 193 percent, respectively.11 Governments of industrialized countries also developed a greater interest in planning and began to establish futures-oriented research bodies.12 With decolonization and the frequent emulation of the Western development models, the attitudes of these governments spread to those of the Third World as well.13 This was reflected, for example, in the fact that the governments of 118 countries established agencies responsible for environmental and natural resources between 1972 and 1982. The process of professionalization accompanied the expansion of bureaucracies in many countries. In the United States, for example, the number of scientific and technical personnel employed by the federal government grew from 123,927 in 1954 to 189,491 in 1976 to 238,041 in 1983. This mere doubling of the number over nearly three decades obscures other pertinent changes in individual expertise in U.S. government employees. From 1973 to 1983 alone, the proportion of scientists and engineers with doctoral degrees grew by 51 percent, and the proportion with masters degrees grew by 44 percent. During the same period, the government was increasing its staff of scientists, engineers, and computer specialists by 4 percent per year, while the increase for other personnel was only 2 percent per year. By 1983, scientists, engineers, and computer specialists comprised 15 percent of the government white-collar work force, in contrast to 13 percent in 1973 and in contrast to 6 percent of the nongovernment work force in 1983.14 11. See Giandomenico Majone, "Regulatory Policies in Transition," Jahrbuch fur neue politische Okonomie (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1984), p. 158. For discussions of the progressive expansion and professionalization of bureaucracies in the United States, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Maier, ed., Changing Boundaries of the Political (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Louis Galambos, ed., The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies Since World War II (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy Since World War II (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), pp. 28-35; Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and National Policy Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and George Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). 12. Yehezkel Dror, Policymaking Under Adversity (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986). 13. Jawaharlal Nehru, arguing that less developed countries must also turn toward science, offered the following rationale: "It is science alone that can solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by starving people.. . . Who indeed could afford to ignore science today? At every turn we have to seek its aid. . .. The future belongs to science and those who make friends with science." Nehru is quoted by Max F. Perutz in Is Science Necessary? (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1989), p. vii. 14. See National Science Foundation, Federal Scientific and Technical Workers: Numbers and Characteristics, 1973 and 1983 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1985), pp. 1-2. During the period from 1973 to 1978, the increase in scientists, engineers, and computer specialists occurred largely outside the Defense Department.

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10 International Organization These trends contributed to the emergence of what Dorothy Nelkin has called "the policy role of the knowledge elite."15 The proliferation of new agencies and the practice of staffing them with professionals also contributed to the erosion of centralized control over public bureaucracies, which has occurred despite widespread efforts since World War II to curb the discretion of bureaucratic administrators. As Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman found in their survey of public servants in the major Western industrialized societies, the overwhelming majority of civil servants regard themselves as technicians, policymakers, and brokers, unlike elected officials, who primarily regard themselves as advocates and partisans.16 In the case of professionals, the degree to which they are sympathetic with the missions of the agencies in which they work is influenced by a variety of factors, including the extent of their specialized training, the field in which they were trained, and their personal views.17 In other words, "where they stand" is associated with factors other than "where they sit." In international bureaucracies, such as the United Nations (UN), technical responsibilities have proliferated since the inauguration of the International Geophysical Year in 1957, yet the training of personnel within the UN system has not kept pace. Only 13 percent of the staff members have doctorates, and less than 50 percent hold more than a first university degree.18 In 1986, when the UN employed 54,000 people worldwide, about 18,000 were serving "professional" functions, 4,000 to 5,000 of which were "substantive" in nature.19 Nevertheless, the budgeting of funds in the UN indicates a shift away from the more traditional political and security considerations of the General Assembly and toward the more technical concerns of specialized agencies.20 15. See Dorothy Nelkin, "Scientific Knowledge, Public Policy, and Democracy," Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 1 (September 1979), p. 107. See also Dorothy Nelkin, "The Political Impact of Technical Expertise," Social Studies of Science 5 (February 1975), pp. 35-54. For a critical view of the role of scientists in decision making, see Joel Primack and Frank Von Hippel, Advice and Dissent (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 16. See Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. 17. See Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 357-59; William T. Gormley, Jr., "Professionalism Within Environmental Bureaucracies: The Policy Implications of Personnel Choices," La Follette Institute of Public Affairs, occasional paper no. 1, Madison, Wise., December 1986; and Thomas M. Dietz and Robert Rycroft, The Risk Professionals (New York: Russell Sage, 1987). 18. See Peter Fromuth and Ruth Raymond, "U.N. Personnel Policy Issues," in United Nations Management and Decision-Making Project (New York: United Nations, 1987), p. 13. See also Douglas Williams, The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations (London: C. Hurst, 1987), p. 254. 19. See Anthony Mango, "The Role of Secretariats of International Institutions," in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, eds., International Institutions at Work (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 40-43. Based on his survey of 75 percent of the UN's professional staff, Mango concluded that about 4,000 served key functions "in all areas of human endeavor from peace and disarmament to health, nutrition, industry, communications, and the environment." Thus, for the full 100 percent of the staff, the figure may have reached 5,000. 20. The percentage of the UN budget allocated for specialized agencies steadily rose from 45.1 percent in 1950 to 60.5 percent in 1985. With the adoption of the Kaasebaum amendment, the percentage has remained at the 1985 level. Two specialized areas involving science and

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Thus, the expansion and professionalization of bureaucracies and the growing technical nature of problems have fostered an increase in the deference paid to technical expertise and, in particular, to that of scientists. "In modern societies," Barry Barnes and David Edge have argued, "science is near to being the source of cognitive authority: anyone who would be widely believed and trusted as an interpreter of nature needs a license from the scientific community."21 As several studies have pointed out, policymakers and leaders typically expect to remain in control even when delegating authority.22 Questions arise, then, about the effects that the interaction of experts and politicians have on policy choices. Many expected that scientists, because of their common faith in the scientific method, would make policymaking more rational. Yet even in cases involving what is regarded as a technical issue, policymaking decisions generally involve the weighing of a number of complex and nontechnical issues centering around who is to get what in society and at what cost. Despite the veneer of objectivity and value neutrality achieved by pointing to the input of scientists, policy choices remain highly political in their allocative consequences.23 Especially in cases in which scientific evidence is ambiguous and the experts themselves are split into contending factions, issues have tended to be resolved less on their technical merits than on their political ones. That scientists working within the bureaucracy have a common faith in the scientific method does not guarantee their solidarity, nor does it make them immune to pressures from the institutions in which they work or from political temptation. Studies of science policy and of scientists' effects on American policy and regulation have been at best equivocal, finding only slight and transitory

technology—that of food and agriculture and that of health—have come to control over 25 percent of the resources of the UN system. See UN document nos. A/1312, A/3023, A/6122, A/7608, A/42/683, and A/10360, UN, New York, 1951, 1956, 1967, 1971, 1976, and 1986, respectively. The highest postwar rates of growth for new international scientific and professional associations (ISPAs) was also in the areas of science and technology, followed by economics and finance. See Diana Crane, "Alternative Models of ISPAs," in William M. Evan, ed., Knowledge and Power in a Global Society (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981), p. 30; and Werner Feld, "Nongovernmental Entities and the International System," Orbis 15 (Fall 1971), pp. 879-922. 21. See Barry Barnes and David Edge, "General Introduction," in Barry Barnes and David Edge, eds., Science in Context (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 2. For an argument that the influence of scientific specialists often extends to areas beyond their formal training, see Alvin M. Weinberg, "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10 (April 1972), pp. 209-22. 22. See Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science 28 (November 1984), pp. 739-77; and Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen, "Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design " American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987), pp. 873-96. 23. See Yaron Ezhrahi, "Utopian and Pragmatic Rationalism: The Political Context of Scientific Advice," Minerva 18 (Spring 1980), pp. 111-31; Robert F. Rich, "The Pursuit of Knowledge," Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 1 (September 1979), pp. 6-30; Robert H. Socolow, "Failures of Discourse," in Harold A. Feiveson, Frank W. Sinden, and Robert H. Socolow, eds., Boundaries of Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976); and Peter deLeon, Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences (New York: Russell Sage, 1988).

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International Organization 12 International Organization influence by scientists.24 Similarly, early studies of policy coordination in technical areas have demonstrated that state decision makers were no more willing to sacrifice autonomy in these areas than in issues of security; that as their governments grew cognizant of the political costs of technical coordination, they grew more unwilling to coordinate their actions; and that many foreign ministries proved resistant to any encroachment by technical functional ministries on their sphere of responsibility.25 Thus, in spite of the increasing involvement of technocrats in government institutions and contrary to the hopes of functionalists such as David Mitrany, outcomes in technical issues proved little different from those of more conventional high politics. Unlike the functionalists, who turned their attention to the development of common activities and the transfer of technocratic loyalty to a superordinate authority, the concern of the contributors to this volume is with styles of policymaking and changes in the patterns of policymakers' reasoning. As argued below, the increasing uncertainties associated with many modern responsibilities of international governance have led policymakers to turn to new and different channels of advice, often with the result that international policy coordination is enhanced. Decision-making processes: complexity, uncertainty, and the turn to epistemic communities for advice

Among the factors that have contributed to the uncertainties faced by decision makers are the increasingly complex and technical nature of the ever-widening range of issues considered on the international agenda, including monetary, macroeconomic, technological, environmental, health, and population issues; the growth in the complexity of the international political system in terms of the number of actors and the extent of interactions; and the expansion of the global economy and the modern administrative state.26 Forced 24. See Dorothy Nelkin, ed., Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979); Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979); William Kornhauser, Scientists in Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); and Peter Weingart, "The Scientific Power Elite: A Chimera," in Norbert Elias, Herminio Martins, and Richard Whitley, eds., Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel, 1982), pp. 71-88. 25. See John G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration,"American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972), pp. 874-93; Henry R. Nau, National Politics and International Technology (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); and Roger Williams, European Technology: The Politics of Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1974). 26. For discussions of these changes and the increasing social, economic, and political interdependence that accompanied them, see, for example, Todd R. La Porte, ed., Organized Social Complexity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Marion Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); Alex Inkeles, "Emerging Social Structure of the World," World Politics 27 (July 1975), pp. 467-95; Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944); Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Edward Morse, Modernization and

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to deal with a broader range of issues than they were traditionally accustomed to, decision makers have turned to specialists to ameliorate the uncertainties and help them understand the current issues and anticipate future trends.27 Complexity tests the limits of human understanding. Although knowledge may be better than it was in the past about the dynamics of any of the individual issues, the nature of the interactions between them is particularly difficult to grasp and deal with effectively in the policymaking process. For example, to the extent that economic interdependence and a globalized economy require policy coordination among countries to pursue domestic goals, the domestic agendas and international agendas have become increasingly linked, yet decision makers have often failed to comprehend the complex linkages. The result, as some analysts have complained, is that "to a far greater extent than in the past, the individuals who must make the difficult economic choices in Washington are in the dark."28 Similarly, in the case of international environmental issues, decision makers are seldom certain of the complex interplay of components of the ecosystem and are therefore unable to anticipate the long-term consequences of measures designed to address one of the many environmental issues under current consideration. Without the help of experts, they risk making choices that not only ignore the interlinkages with other issues but also highly discount the uncertain future, with the result that a policy choice made now might jeopardize future choices and threaten future generations. Conditions of uncertainty, as characterized by Alexander George, are those under which actors must make choices without "adequate information about the situation at hand" or in the face of "the inadequacy of available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976); John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," World Politics 35 (January 1983), pp. 261-85; and Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernization (New York: Free Press, 1990). For discussions of increasing ecological interdependence, see W. C. Clark and R. E. Munn, eds., Sustainable Development of the Biosphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic and Ecological Interdependence (Paris: OECD, 1982). 27. Regarding uncertainty and the turn to specialists for advice, see Dror, Policymaking Under Adversity, pp. 60-61; Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Guy Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise (San Francisco: Boyd & Fraser, 1977); William Ascher, "New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies"; J. Hirshleifer and John G. Riley, "The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information: An Expository Survey," Journal of Economic Literature 17 (December 1979), pp. 1375-1412; Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 2; Zdenek J. Slouka, "International Law Making: A View from Technology," in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, ed., Law Making in the Global Community (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), p. 149; Langdon Winner, "Complexity and the Limits of Human Understanding," in La Porte, Organized Social Complexity, pp. 40-76; and Ina Spiegel-Rosing and Derek De Solla Price, eds., Science, Technology and Society (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977). 28. C. Michael Aho and Marc Levinson, After Reagan: Confronting the Changed World Economy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), p. 8.

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A growing number of issues and problems faced by decision makers fit this description. That this is true indeed undermines the utility of many conventional approaches to international relations, which presume that a state's self-interests are clear and that the ways in which its interests may be most efficaciously pursued are equally clear.30 As several authors have warned, however, misperceptions of the nature of the international setting, as well as misperceptions of others' intentions and actions, are most likely to occur under conditions of uncertainty.31 Decision makers do not always recognize that their understanding of complex issues and linkages is limited, and it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur them to seek help from an epistemic community. In some cases, information generated by an epistemic community may in fact create a shock, as often occurs with scientific advances or reports that make their way into the news, simultaneously capturing the attention of the public and policymakers and pressuring them into action. In estimating the effect that shocks or crises have on decision makers, the contributors to this volume are influenced by two schools of thought. Those informed by organization theory presume that decision makers will seek information and defer to actors who are able to provide credible technical advice. Those applying the political literature presume that leaders will only defer to technical advice that will enable them to pursue preexisting ends and to expand political coalitions. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that leaders would defer to specialists under circumstances in which they are uncertain about what course of action is in their own political interests, nor does it exclude the possibility that their delegation of authority will persist past the initial crisis or shock. The concept of uncertainty is thus important in our analysis for two reasons. First, in the face of uncertainty, and more so in the wake of a shock or crisis, many of the conditions facilitating a focus on power are absent. It is difficult for leaders to identify their potential political allies and to be sure of what strategies are most likely to help them retain power. And, second, poorly understood conditions may create enough turbulence that established operating procedures may break down, making institutions unworkable. Neither power nor institutional cues to behavior will be available, and new patterns of action may ensue. 29. Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 26-27. 30. Armen A. Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 58,1950, pp. 211-21. 31. See Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 3; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

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Under conditions of uncertainty, then, decision makers have a variety of incentives and reasons for consulting epistemic communities,32 some of them more politically motivated than others. First, following a shock or crisis, epistemic communities can elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of various courses of action. In some cases, they can help decision makers gain a sense of who the winners and losers would be as the result of a particular action or event, as was the case in considerations about banning chlorofluorocarbon use or facing a possible environmental disaster. Decision makers seldom apply the types of decisionmaking heuristics that scientists apply under conditions of uncertainty.33 Indeed, as Jon Elster argues, decision makers generally "are unable to assign numerical probabilities to the various answers of what will happen. They can at most list the possible answers, not estimate their probabilities."34 While they may desire probability statistics and similar data for purposes of determining the gravity of a situation, they may also use the information for other purposes, such as justifying a "wait and watch" policy and deferring responsibility until the future, when other actors may be held responsible. Second, epistemic communities can shed light on the nature of the complex interlinkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy. Information is at a premium in the face of possible systemic volatility, when efforts to solve or curb a problem in one domain or issue-area may have unanticipated negative feedback effects on others. Third, epistemic communities can help define the self-interests of a state or factions within it. The process of elucidating the cause-and-effect relationships of problems can in fact lead to the redefinition of preconceived interests or to the identification of new interests. Fourth, epistemic communities can help formulate policies. Their role in this regard will depend on the reasons for which their advice is sought. In some cases, decision makers will seek advice to gain information which will justify or legitimate a policy that they wish to pursue for political ends. An epistemic community's efforts might thus be limited to working out the details of the policy, helping decision makers anticipate the conflicts of interest that would emerge with respect to particular points, and then building coalitions in support of the policy. If the policy is instituted and problems ensue, the decision makers have the option of pointing to the information given to them by 32. In Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975), Oliver Williamson argues that under conditions of uncertainty, organizations are likely to develop internal methods to generate more and better information instead of turning to external sources. 33. See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 34. See Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 185. See also John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 17-18; and Herbert Simon, "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought" American Economic Review 68 (May 1978), pp. 1-16.

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16 International Organization experts and spreading the blame.35 Again, however, it is important to stress that epistemic communities called in for political reasons may succeed in imposing their views and moving toward goals other than those initially envisioned by the decision makers. In less politically motivated cases, epistemic communities have a greater hand in the various stages of the policymaking process, including the introduction of policy alternatives, the selection of policies, and the building of national and international coalitions in support of the policies. "The definition of the alternatives," as E. E. Schattschneider noted, "is the supreme instrument of power."36 By pointing out which alternatives are not viable on the basis of their causal understanding of the problems to be addressed, the community members can limit the range of alternatives under consideration. While the actual choice of policies remains the domain of the decision makers, it can also be influenced by community members. As Herbert Simon points out, almost all organizations engage in some form of "satisficing" or procedural rationality in their consideration of policy alternatives.37 If rationality is bounded, epistemic communities may be responsible for circumscribing the boundaries and delimiting the options. Distinguishing epistemic communities from other groups As outlined earlier, members of epistemic communities not only hold in common a set of principled and causal beliefs but also have shared notions of validity and a shared policy enterprise. Their authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge in a particular domain is based on their recognized expertise within that domain. These features distinguish epistemic communities from other groups often involved in policy coordination. Epistemic communities need not be made up of natural scientists; they can consist of social scientists or individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society. Nor need an epistemic community's causal beliefs and notions of validity be based on the methodology employed in the natural sciences; they can originate from shared knowledge about the nature of social or other processes, based on analytic methods or techniques deemed appropriate to the disciplines or professions they pursue. In this volume of articles, for example, while the community involved in efforts to protect the ozone layer claimed authority 35. See Lauriston R. King and Philip H. Melanson, "Knowledge and Politics: Some Experiences from the 1960s," Public Policy 20 (Winter 1972), p. 84. For similar observations, see Martin L. Perl, "The Scientific Advisory System: Some Observations," Science 173 (September 1971), pp. 1211-15. 36. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1975), p. 66. 37. See the following works by Herbert A. Simon: Reason in Human Affairs (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983); and "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," The American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985), pp. 293-304.

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based on knowledge about atmospheric science, communities involved in other efforts had expertise related to disciplines and professions such as economics and engineering. While national epistemic communities may emerge and direct their activities largely toward a single country, as in the case of the U.S. community and the Soviet community described by Adler, they may in some cases become transnational over time as a result of the diffusion of community ideas through conferences, journals, research collaboration, and a variety of informal communications and contacts. But epistemic communities need not be transnational, nor need their members meet regularly in a formal manner. Collaboration in the absence of material interests binding together actors in different countries with common policy agendas would strongly suggest the existence of an epistemic community with transnational membership. A transnational community's ideas may take root in an international organization or in various state bodies, after which they are diffused to other states via the decision makers who have been influenced by the ideas. As a result, the community can have a systemic impact. Because of its larger diffusion network, a transnational community's influence is likely to be much more sustained and intense than that of a national community. The epistemic community members' professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area highly valued by society or elite decision makers accord them access to the political system and legitimize or authorize their activities. Similarly, their claims to knowledge, supported by tests of validity, accord them influence over policy debates and serve as their primary social power resource.38 At the same time, the professional pedigrees and validity tests set the community members apart from other social actors or groups39 and not only serve as a barrier to their entry into the community but also limit the influence that these other actors or groups might have in the 38. See Wolfgang Schluchter, "Modes of Authority and Democratic Control," in Volker Meja, Dieter Misgeld, and Nico Stehr, eds., Modern German Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 297. "It seems that in the case of functional authority," writes Schluchter, "it is the 'trust' institutionalized in the internal relations between 'experts' that communicates to outsiders faith in the value of specialized knowledge." 39. According to the definition of epistemic communities employed in this volume, community members have intersubjective, internally defined validity tests. This contrasts with Ernst Haas's usage of the concept of epistemic communities, in which he explicitly mentions that such communities "profess beliefs in extracommunity reality tests." See Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 41. Although there are other differences between his and our usage, they are fairly minor. I believe that this particular difference in emphasis on intracommunity versus extracommunity truth tests springs primarily from differing overarching historical visions. Ernst Haas seeks to demonstrate the evolution of rationality over time, possibly through the gradual intercession of epistemic communities into collective decision making. For such a normative claim to be sustained, the epistemic community must share a common basis for validation of its understanding with the broader policy community. Conversely, I am much more skeptical about such universal validity claims and am content to settle for the less ambitious internal truth tests. While in most cases members outside the epistemic community may concur that validity claims exist, it is less clear that they would be able to identify or evaluate them.

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18 International Organization Causal beliefs Unshared

Shared

Unshared

Princ pled b i fs

1

Epistemic communities

Interest groups and social movements

Disciplines and professions

Legislators, bureaucratic agencies, and bureaucratic coalitions

Knowledge base

Unshared

gj

jg

1 1

Consensual

Disputed or absent

Epistemic communities

Interest groups, social movements, and bureaucratic coalitions

Disciplines and professions

Legislators and bureaucratic agencies

FIGURE l. Distinguishing epistemic communities from other groups policy debate. In response to new information generated in their domain of expertise, epistemic community members may still engage in internal and often intense debates leading to a refinement of their ideas and the generation of a new consensus about the knowledge base. As Figure 1 indicates, it is the combination of having a shared set of causal and principled (analytic and normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a common policy enterprise (common interests) that distinguishes epistemic communities from various other groups. They differ from interest groups in that the epistemic community members have shared causal beliefs and cause-and-effect understandings. If confronted with anomalies that undermined their causal beliefs, they would withdraw from the policy debate, unlike interest groups. Peterson's case regarding the management of whaling, for example, stresses the difference between the epistemic community of cetologists, the economic interest group of whaling industry managers, and the issue-oriented lobbying coalition of environmentalists.

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Epistemic communities must also be distinguished from the broader scientific community as well as from professions and disciplines.40 Although members of a given profession or discipline may share a set of causal approaches or orientations and have a consensual knowledge base, they lack the shared normative commitments of members of an epistemic community. An epistemic community's ethical standards arise from its principled approach to the issue at hand, rather than from a professional code. Unlike members of a profession or discipline, who seldom limit themselves to work that is closely congruent with their principled values,41 members of an epistemic community tend to pursue activities that closely reflect the community's principled beliefs and tend to affiliate and identify themselves with groups that likewise reflect or seek to promote these beliefs. In practice, however, short-term alliances based on common research and concerns often exist between members of epistemic communities and professions.42 The point to be stressed here is that while economists as a whole constitute a profession, members of a particular subgroup of economists—for example, Keynesians or followers of one of the schools of development economics—may constitute an epistemic community of their own and systematically contribute to a concrete set of projects informed by their preferred views, beliefs, and ideas. The beliefs and goals of epistemic communities differ from those of bureaucratic bodies, but the approaches to analyzing epistemic communities and bureaucratic politics share a focus on administrative empowerment of specialized knowledge groups. Bureaucratic bodies operate largely to preserve their missions and budgets,43 whereas epistemic communities apply their causal knowledge to a policy enterprise subject to their normative objectives. Consequently, although members of epistemic communities may use the bureaucratic leverage they are able to acquire through obtaining key personnel 40. According to A. M. Carr-Saunders, "What we now call a profession emerges when a number of persons are found to be practicing a definite technique founded upon specialized training." Carr-Saunders's classic formulation is cited by Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills in Professionalization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 3. Subsequent sociologists have formulated a fuller definition that includes a reputation for authority, society's sanction, barriers to entry, a regulative code of conduct, and a service orientation. See Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone," American Journal of Sociology 70 (September 1964), pp. 137-58; and Schluchter, "Modes of Authority and Democratic Control." 41. See Charles Derber, William A. Schwartz, and Yale Magrass, Power in the Highest Degree (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 136. 42. This occurred in the context of efforts to control pollution in the Mediterranean, when several groups of natural scientists allied with the ecological epistemic community. While these scientists shared some of the causal beliefs and policy concerns of the epistemic community, they did not share its full array of normative and causal beliefs. See Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 386-87. 43. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy," Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-90.

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20 International Organization slots within bureaucracies, their behavior is different from that of the individuals typically analyzed in terms of their bureaucratic constraints. Such a normative component means that epistemic community members are not merely policy entrepreneurs. Because the behavior within and by an epistemic community is guided by various kinds of normative and causal beliefs as well as circumstance, it will differ from the behavior typically analyzed and predicted by rational choice theorists and principal-agent theorists. The combination of shared causal beliefs and shared principled beliefs held by epistemic community members would inform the advice they offer and would offset or outweigh the pressures for them to offer alternative advice which is more consistent with the preexisting political interests or preferences of high-level policymakers or which might further their individual careers.44 Sociologist Joseph Ben-David, writing about scientific communities with tightly shared beliefs, notes that they provide "an example of an extreme case of effective social control by a minimum of informal sanctions" and demonstrate "one of the interesting instances where a group of people is held together by a common purpose and shared norms without the need of reinforcement by familial, ecological, or political ties."45 The solidarity of epistemic community members derives not only from their shared interests, which are based on cosmopolitan beliefs of promoting collective betterment, but also from their shared aversions, which are based on their reluctance to deal with policy agendas outside their common policy enterprise or invoke policies based on explanations that they do not accept. The members' institutional ties, informal networks, and collective political practices also contribute to the persistence and solidarity of the community in several ways. They provide members with a valuable institutional structure in which to compare information and to find moral support for their sometimes socially and politically marginalized beliefs. They also strengthen the commitments of individuals and inhibit them from subsequently recanting the beliefs shared with and reinforced by their fellow community members. Cognate literature Numerous bodies of literature shed light on the three major dynamics— uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization—that are explored in the epistemic communities approach to the study of international policy coordination presented here. Insights gained from work in various disciplines appear to support our arguments that epistemic communities are not epiphenomenal; 44. See Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). 45. Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 5-6.

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that policy is not merely determined by a consistent set of deeper economic, political, or social structures that in some way generate a preconditioned set of outcomes; and that while some political and social conditions surely penetrate all technical advice and the outlooks of specialists, all specialists are not subject to the same set of conditioning forces. While international relations scholars have introduced many variables and concepts to help us understand policy outcomes and coordination (see Table 2), we argue that epistemic communities, as objects of study, are distinct from these concepts in that they may convey new patterns of reasoning to decision makers and encourage them to pursue new paths of policymaking, which may in turn lead to unpredicted or unpredictable outcomes. Reality is socially constructed. Decision makers are most likely to turn to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty. While their goal is ostensibly to obtain "knowledge" that will ameliorate the uncertainty and give them some handle on the "reality" or "truth" of the situation at hand, the specialists called upon for advice bring with them their interpretations of the knowledge, which are in turn based on their causally informed vision of reality and their notions of validity. As numerous social and cultural theorists have argued, reality is socially constructed. Epistemologically, the world and our representation of it are not isomorphic; our concept of reality is mediated by prior assumptions, expectations, and experience.46 Even knowledge "cannot mean the 'grasping' of reality itself," Burkhart Holzner and John Marx argue. "In fact," they add, "philosophical progress has produced the conclusive insight that there can be no such thing as the direct and 'true' apprehension of 'reality' itself. More strictly speaking, we are compelled to define 'knowledge' as the communicable mapping of some aspect of experienced reality by an observer in symbolic terms."47 In a similar vein, philosophers and sociologists of science have pointed to the epistemological difficulty of verifying our collective visions of the world. Radical constructivists, for example, contend that since the very language we use to describe the world is socially constructed, there is no "objective" basis for identifying material reality and all claims for objectivity are therefore suspect.48 In other words, subject and object are mutually constitutive; no 46. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967). See also Stephen Toulmin, ed., Physical Reality (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Toulmin's book includes a turn-of-the-century exchange between Max Planck and Ernst Mach regarding whether quantum mechanics occurs in the mind or in the world. 47. Holzner and Marx, Knowledge Application, p. 93. 48. See Steve Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea (London: Tavistock, 1988); and Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay, eds., Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science (London: Sage, 1983). For a balanced presentation of the radical and more moderate constructivist views, see M. Hollis and S. Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982).

360 T A B L E 2. Variables discussed in the literature on policy coordination Defining characteristics of variable Principled beliefs

Causal beliefs

Validity tests

Policy enterprise

Epistemic communities

X

X

X

X

Ideas

x

or

X

Policy coordination reflects the substance of ideas.

Belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps

x

or

X

Belief systems orient behavior and shape perceptions.

Variable

X

Policy networks

X

Transnational and transgovernmental channels and politics Institutions and organiza­ tions

Policy coordination reflects epistemic community-induced changes in state interests and patterns of decision mak­ ing.

Policy coordination reflects consensual knowledge.

X

X

Policy outcomes reflect the collusion of interested parties.

X

Information is diffused and political alli­ ances are forged via functional transna­ tional and transgovernmental channels.

X

Policy outcomes reflect historically inher­ ited preferences and styles.

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Consensual knowledge

Explanatory implications of variable

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description can exist independently of the social circumstances under which that description is made. Science, they argue, is no different from any other form of knowledge creation, and there is no basis for privileging "scientific" knowledge. Alternatively, those with a more essentialist or materialist view argue that the world is a real and separate object of inquiry that exists independently of the analyst and that although the categories in which it is identified are socially constructed, consensus about the nature of the world is possible in the long run. This limited constructivist view informs the analyses presented by most of the authors contributing to this volume. It also has implications for evaluating the validity of a given body of knowledge, pointing to the need for a consensus theory of a finite and temporally bounded notion of truth, rather than a correspondence theory.49 Although knowledge is only accepted belief, not correct belief, correct beliefs may evolve over time, as progressively more accurate characterizations of the world are consensually formulated.50 By reference to internally formulated truth tests, contending groups may collectively validate their conclusions and their beliefs may converge intersubjectively in the medium run. The epistemic communities approach focuses on this process through which consensus is reached within a given domain of expertise and through which the consensual knowledge is diffused to and carried forward by other actors. Its primary concern is the political influence that an epistemic community can have on collective policymaking, rather the correctness of the advice given. While epistemic communities provide consensual knowledge, they do not necessarily generate truth. The epistemological impossibility of confirming access to reality means that the group responsible for articulating the dimensions of reality has great social and political influence. It can identify and represent what is of public concern, particularly in cases in which the physical manifestations of a problem are themselves unclear, such as the case involving threats to the stratospheric ozone layer explored in this volume of articles. Pursuing ontological lines of inquiry, some scholars in the fields of critical theory and the sociology of science have taken a more instrumental approach to analyzing how the nature of reality is elucidated by groups. Rather than addressing questions about contending individual access to reality, they have 49. See Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Peter Munz, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). 50. See Donald T. Campbell, "Evolutionary Epistemology," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Publishing, 1974), pp. 413-63; Donald T. Campbell and Bonnie T. Paller, "Extending Evolutionary Epistemology to 'Justifying' Scientific Beliefs," in Kai Halweg and C. A. Hooker, eds., Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 231-57; Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and Larry Laudan, Science and Values (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

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These approaches lead us to ask what unspoken societal assumptions experts transmit. Is there a dominant social culture that influences the ideas developed and disseminated by scholars? Potentially, even Karl Popper's argument that theories can be evaluated according to their internal coherence rather than their correspondence to empirical reality must rest upon some social set of conditions which dictates the value of logic-deductive thought and the impossibility of "a" and "not a" being true simultaneously.56 That new conditions bring about shifts in our own beliefs would appear to be supported by the fact that what Popper refers to as the "third world" of past lore, the body of works stored in libraries, is continually reinterpreted and evokes different responses in subsequent generations of scholars. Additional questions remain. First, to what extent are specialists' theoretical edifices socially conditioned? And, second, does this conditioning reflect a systemic bias? That is, can it be found in all technical advice, or is it merely another social factor that must be considered in specific circumstances? If there is a systemic bias, then the analysis of beliefs and perceptions omits some of the other fundamental forces in international politics and focuses on epiphenomena. Specialists will not have a salutary effect on policy coordination, since they only mask deeper-seated economic forces. Yet this argument goes too far. Few would deny that technical advice reflects some prior social conditioning. I would not go so far as to argue, however, that all technical advice shares the same conditioning, that such conditioning is irrevocable over the medium to long term, or that all disciplines are equally burdened. Although the specialists' claim to privileged knowledge is certainly suspect, it is not irrevocably flawed. If the consensus theory of truth is valid, then the fundamental distortions to collective understanding may over time be reduced or at least be detectable by informed study. It is by no means clear that the same sets of constraints and censors operate in every instance of specialization and interpretation. For instance, although Jiirgen Habermas argued that social needs dictate that centralized and instrumental bodies of knowledge are deployed for policy purposes,57 the growing application of ecologically informed views is much more integrative and open in its orientation. Moreover, Michel Foucault

Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Nelkin, "Scientific Knowledge, Public Policy, and Democracy." See also Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), in which Gouldner argues that the social consequences of conferring steering authority on particular groups remain unclear. 56. See Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). See also Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrove, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196. Lakatos offers a sophisticated extension of this argument, with normative suggestions for how to do scientific research and positive suggestions for how to evaluate truth claims from contending research programs. For an alternative viewpoint, see Paul Feyeraband, Against Method (New York: Schocken, 1978). 57. See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.

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26 International Organization ultimately failed to demonstrate a consistent source of social influences that operated on the development of disciplining beliefs and practices.58 To take an example presented in this volume of articles, corporate atmospheric scientists stuck to their scientific beliefs, counter to the immediate economic needs of their company.59 That there have been pathological instances of the widespread joining of political norms and scientific means is reflected in Nazi medical science and in Lysenko's evolutionary studies in the Soviet Union. But social pressures in these cases served as a form of control and led to their halt.

Ideas inform policies.

Prevailing ideas may be an important determinant of policy choice and persistence. For instance, under the sway of economic liberalism, open trade policies emerged and remained prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries despite strong pressures toward protectionism. And in the case of the repeal of the Corn Laws, the popularity of economic liberalism helped overcome or preempt the political resistance of agricultural interest groups.60 Pointing to the persistent power of economic orthodoxy, John Maynard Keynes observed that "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of years back."61 John Ruggie offers similar arguments with respect to the power of broader visions of reality, or epistemes, that provide the assumptions from which policies follow and shape the pattern of politics over the long run. He also introduces the term "epistemic communities" in keeping with this package of dominant worldviews: Institutionalization involves not only the institutional grid of the state and the international political order, through which behavior is acted out, but also the epistemes through which political relationships are visualized. I have borrowed this term from Michel Foucault, to refer to a dominant way

58. Disciplining beliefs and practices are discussed by Michel Foucault in the following works, for example: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and The Birth of the Clinic (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973). 59. Two other examples are noteworthy. Although U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop opposed abortion on personal grounds, he did not succumb to political pressures to publicly oppose it on medical grounds. A Catholic priest trained in carbon dating techniques offered evidence against the claims that the shroud found in Turin was Christ's shroud. 60. See Charles Kindleberger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe," Journal of Economic History 35 (March 1975), pp. 20-55. See also Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and Trade Policy," International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179-217; Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy," International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), pp. 31-71; and Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy. 61. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936), p. 383.

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27

of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention. Epistemic communities may be said to consist of interrelated roles which grow up around an episteme', they delimit, for their members, the proper construction of social reality.62 Our usage of the term "epistemic community" is at a lower level of abstraction than Ruggie's usage. We use the term to refer to a concrete collection of individuals who share the same worldview (or episteme) and in particular share the four aspects of it that were outlined earlier. While members of an epistemic community by definition share an episteme with each other, they do not necessarily share it with other groups or individuals. In practice, the number of members in the communities we describe is relatively small. It is the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing institutions which lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality. The result in turn may be the creation of the proper construction of reality with respect to a particular issue-area as well as mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention. The intent of the articles in this volume is to analyze this process in numerous concrete cases and discern the extent to which the substantive content of policies was shaped by community views and the extent to which other actors and political forces played a role. While the notion that ideas inform policies is provocative, it leaves a number of questions unanswered. Are ideas themselves socially conditioned, or do social conditions merely affect which ideas gain acceptance? How are ideas disseminated? Why do some prevail over others? What is the life cycle of ideas? How do they evolve? Even if scholars resort to a natural selection model for the evolution of ideas, as Donald Campbell does,63 then they must identify the mechanisms or agents of selection. A fruitful application of ideas to policy choice, at least over time, requires a greater specification of how ideas emerge and change (or evolve and are selected for). Without compelling answers to the questions that remain in this regard, it is difficult to support the argument that ideas are independent variables and not just intervening variables. The view presented in this volume is that epistemic communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country. However, an epistemic community cannot be reduced to the ideas it embodies or purveys, since these ideas are transmitted in tandem with a set of causal and principled beliefs and reflect a particular political vision. The ideas would be sterile without carriers, who function more or less as cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers governing the entry of new ideas into institutions. The influence that an epistemic community has 62. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 569-70. 63. See Campbell, "Evolutionary Epistemology."

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28 International Organization and the ideas that it transmits may well be mutually reinforcing. In the articles presented in this volume, the precise dynamics by which epistemic communities generated new ideas and chose between alternatives in particular cases are presented, and the various social and political conditions bearing on the development and dissemination of their ideas and views are discussed in detail. Actors' understanding of the world and the formulation of alternative actions are shaped by belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps.

While we can draw on epistemological arguments about perceptions of and access to reality, we can also draw on the insights of cognitive psychologists, who stress the conditioning role that prior beliefs and established operating procedures play in determining how individuals will respond to new situations or events and choose a course of action when confronted with uncertainty. Faced with a new situation, we identify and interpret problems within existing frameworks and according to past protocols and then try to manage the problems according to operating procedures that we have applied in analogous cases. Aspects of the situation that cannot be dealt with in established ways are only incompletely perceived and processed, with the result that salient dimensions of a problem or issue at hand are often ignored.64 Investigating crises during which decisions affecting survival had to be made quickly by heads of state and high-level advisers, scholars have found that information processing was at best incremental and that decision makers tended to apply simplified images of reality which were highly resistant to modification.65 Examining noncrisis cases as well, other analysts have noted that decision makers are not always aware of the possible impact of the signals they send, since they tend to presume that the receivers of these signals have a worldview which mirrors their own.66 Similarly, decision makers' understanding of others' behavior is shaped by their own beliefs, motives, and intentions, and this sometimes leads them to misinterpret the signals they receive from others. Even the international context in which problems are to be resolved is not equally transparent to all actors.67 Factors such as these can contribute to the breakdown of cooperation. 64. See Janice Gross Stein, "International Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective," Negotiation Journal, July 1988, pp. 221-31; and Deborah Welch Larson, "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations," Negotiation Journal, July 1988, pp. 281-301. 65. See Ole Holsti, "Crisis Decision Making," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 8-84; Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and R. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980). See also Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). 66. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; and Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988), pp. 317-49. 67. See Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations.

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As Ole Holsti has argued, belief systems impose "cognitive restraints on rationality."68 More broadly, the combination of prior belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps shapes decision makers' responses not only by influencing the ways in which they interpret the world but also by erecting barriers to the types of information that they consider valuable.69 Yet policy responses to uncertainty cannot be reduced to cognitive psychology. Belief systems may be conferred by epistemic communities. As argued in an earlier section, whether decision makers turn to epistemic communities for advice depends on the level of their uncertainty about an issue-area. Failed policies, crises, and unanticipated events that call into question their understanding of an issue-area are likely to precipitate searches for new information, as are the increasing complexity and technical nature of problems. If decision makers have no strong preconceived views and beliefs about an issue-area in which regulation is to be undertaken for the first time, an epistemic community can have an even greater impact in shaping their interpretations and actions in this case and in establishing the patterns of behavior that they will follow in subsequent cases regarding the issue-area. Consensual knowledge may contribute to policy coordination and to more comprehensive policies.

Before states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively with a specific problem, they must reach some consensus about the nature and scope of the problem and also about the manner in which the problem relates to other concerns in the same and additional issue-areas. Ernst B. Haas has argued that "interrelatedness may also become interdependence in the sense that new scientific knowledge will create a consensual basis for the recognition of new cause-effect links which had not been recognized before."70 As the scientific 68. See Ole Holsti," 'The Operational Code' as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems," final report to the National Science Foundation, grant no. SOC75-15368, December 1977, p. 2. 69. See Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962), chap. 14; Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 95-124; and Robert Axelrod, ed., Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). For discussions about artificial intelligence modeling of thought patterns, see Dwain Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning and the Definition of the Situation: Back to Snyder for Concepts and Forward to Artificial Intelligence for Method," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987); and Jaime Carbonell, Subjective Understanding: Computer Models of Belief Systems (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981). 70. See Ernst B. Haas, "Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 858-59. See also Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32 (April 1980), pp. 357-405; and Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams, and Don Babai, Scientists and World Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

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30 International Organization consensus becomes the collective consensus of decision makers and as the nature of the problem is collectively redefined in broader and more interlinked terms, the need for more comprehensive patterns of policy coordination may also be recognized and pursued. Whether collective behavior becomes more comprehensive rather than merely ad hoc and incremental will in turn depend on the extent to which the scientists' and the decision makers' views coincide and the extent to which the negotiations reflect the pursuit of politically motivated linkages and the struggle for control among states. In general, governments and organizations may be said to learn through the evolution of consensual knowledge. While the role of consensual knowledge in policy coordination has been the focus of numerous studies, the process by which the views of specialists are accepted and acted upon by decision makers are poorly specified. In particular, studies have not addressed the question of how recalcitrant states can be persuaded to accept new causal understandings that point to policies which are contrary to their conceptions of self-interest. Moreover, given the many examples of different states reacting in different ways to the same consensual evidence provided by specialists,71 it is unclear how effective consensual knowledge is, as an independent variable, at explaining or predicting state behavior. The organizational structures through which consensual knowledge is diffused may be equally important. As the studies presented in this volume demonstrate, epistemic communities can insinuate their views and influence national governments and international organizations by occupying niches in advisory and regulatory bodies. This suggests that the application of consensual knowledge to policymaking depends on the ability of the groups transmitting this knowledge to gain and exercise bureaucratic power. Moreover, while governments and organizations may learn through the evolution of knowledge, the learning does not necessarily lead to policy coordination. In the case of international commodity arrangements, for example, the consensus emerging from new knowledge was that cooperation would not result in joint gains; hence, the efforts at policy coordination collapsed.72 This suggests that whether epistemic influence leads to policy coordination is a function of whether the causal beliefs of epistemic communities demonstrate the need for it.

71. See, for example, B. Gillespie, D. Eva, and R. Johnston, "Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of Aldrin/Dieldrin," Social Studies of Science 9 (August 1979), pp. 265-301; and George Hoberg, Jr., "Risk, Science and Politics: Alachlor Regulation in Canada and the United States," Canadian Journal of Political Science 23 (June 1990), pp. 257-77. For a broader discussion of additional factors influencing regulatory agencies' acceptance of consensual knowledge, see Sheila Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage, 1986). 72. See Robert L. Rothstein, "Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration," International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 733-62.

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Policy choices are often made by discrete networks of actors.

Numerous scholars have argued that domestic regulation in cases involving complex and highly technical issues is often the result of collusion among interested parties. Decision making, rather than being centralized, occurs within an amorphous set of subgovernments. Whether the parties involved are characterized as interest groups, iron triangles, advocacy coalitions, issue networks, or policy networks,73 the point is the same: small networks of policy specialists congregate to discuss specific issues, set agendas, and formulate policy alternatives outside the formal bureaucratic channels, and they also serve as brokers for admitting new ideas into decision-making circles of bureaucrats and elected officials.74 While much of the literature in this regard focuses on policymaking in the United States, similar technocratic subgovernments elsewhere have been discussed.75 Unfortunately, however, most of the literature has remained descriptive rather than analytic. It does not identify or explore the common causal beliefs that participants may carry with them, nor does it indicate the degree to which such groups actually influence policy outcomes. As with the transgovernmental literature discussed below, this literature on domestic networks supports several of the arguments pursued in the epistemic communities approach, among them the argument that a nonsystemic level of analysis is useful for considering decisions made in response to systemic stimuli and the argument that networks of specialists can become strong actors at the national level. Key locations from which members of epistemic communities could gain significant leverage over policy choices include think tanks, regulatory agencies, and the type of governmental policy research bodies that are more common outside the United States. Allied through transnational and 73. See Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 87-124; John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government," British Journal of Political Science 14 (April 1984), pp. 161-85; Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities, and Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power," in John E. Tropman, Milan J. Dluhy, and Roger M. Lind, eds., New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 75-96; Paul A. Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change," Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 8 (June 1987), pp. 649-92; and John Mark Hansen, "Creating a New Politics: The Evolution of Agricultural Policy Networks in Congress, 1919-1980," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1987. 74. See James L. Sundquist, "Research Brokerage: The Weak Link," in Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr., ed., Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1978), pp. 126-44. 75. See Suleiman, Bureaucrats and Policy Making; and Merilee S. Grindle, ed., Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).

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32 International Organization transgovernmental channels, the specialists could have an impact on international policy coordination. Coalitions are built transgovernment ally and transnationally.

International relations scholars have also identified and pointed to the significance of transgovernmental and transnational channels through which political alliances are forged and information regarding technical issues is transmitted between government officials, international secretariats, nongovernmental bodies, and nongovernmental actors, including communities of professional scientists.76 Many of these scholars have argued that management tasks at the international level have to some extent been usurped by groups of functionally equivalent nonstate actors who act relatively independently of the policies of top leaders of their governments. The members of these groups, when operating in tandem through tacit alliances, can concurrently promote their ideas and specific policy objectives within their own countries and governments. This approach describes the coordinating role of members of international secretariats and of governmental and nongovernmental bodies and the channels through which they interact, but it is unclear about what outcomes are likely to occur other than the formation of short-term policy coalitions among individuals who occupy similar positions or levels of responsibility and interact on a regular basis. Such channels could be used just as well by higher-level foreign policy officials to extend their own view of state interests. With respect to transgovernmental alliances, for example, the approach does not investigate the origin of the interests of the members involved. Do their interests stem from their common bureaucratic roles within their own governments, or are they based on preexisting beliefs and interests which they brought to their jobs and which are likely to be pursued even after they leave their current posts? In the absence of attention paid to any common causal beliefs and understandings among the members, we may well tend to conclude that such alliances will be 76. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," World Politics 21 (October 1974), pp. 39-62; Raymond F. Hopkins, "Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic Bureaucracies," International Social Science Journal 30 (June 1978), pp. 31-46; William M. Evan, ed., Knowledge and Power in a Global Society (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981); and Peter Willets, ed., Pressure Groups in the Global System (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). For more recent efforts in a similar vein, see Christer Jonsson, "Integration Theory and International Organization," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986), pp. 39-57; Christer Jonsson and Staffan Bolin, "IAEA's Role in the International Politics of Atomic Energy," in Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ed., Politics in the United Nations System (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 303-23; and Michael M. Cernea, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Local Development," World Bank discussion paper no. 40, Washington, D.C., 1988.

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short-lived.77 Indeed, while those pursuing studies of transgovernmental alliances clearly identified channels of diplomacy and interstate interaction which had been neglected previously, they were unable to demonstrate that activities emanating from these channels had any independent influence on outcomes. Moreover, they found that as issues gained in saliency, they came to assume the characteristics of high politics, with the result that the transgovernmental linkages waned.78 As Diana Crane found in her study of transnational scientific groups, however, the shared causal beliefs of the individuals in these groups proved to be more important determinants of outcomes than did the channels through which they operated: "These studies show that it is not necessarily an ISPA [international scientific and professional association] which exerts political influence but the expert committee which may or may not be affiliated with an ISPA. The invisible college which cuts across all the organizations involved, both IGOs [international governmental organizations] and INGOs [international nongovernmental organizations], plays an important role in integrating the fragmented IGO programs."79 Crane's findings lend support to our argument that epistemic communities operating through transnationally applied policy networks can prove influential in policy coordination. Organizations are not always captured.

The recent literature on the "new institutionalism" brings together many of the arguments concerning the process of decision making.80 Those pursuing the institutionalist approach emphasize the relative autonomy of political institutions, which may mediate the pressures on decision makers from international structures and domestic forces. Ultimately, they argue, institutional choices are influenced to a greater extent by historically inherited preferences and styles than by external structural factors. This means that the initial identification of interests and decision-making procedures will have a major influence on subsequent policy choices, alternatives deemed possible, and actual state behavior—as was evident, for example, in the choice of the Norwegian oil

77. See Barbara B. Crane, "Policy Coordination by Major Western Powers in Bargaining with the Third World: Debt Relief and the Common Fund," International Organization 38 (Summer 1984), p. 426. 78. See, for example, Harold K. Jacobson, "WHO: Medicine, Regionalism, and Managed Politics," in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 214. 79. Diana Crane, "Alternative Models of ISPAs," p. 39. 80. See the following works by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen: "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984), pp. 734-49; and Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1989). The actual definition of institutions in this literature appears remarkably fluid. Institutions may be anything from formal organizations to social forces (including capitalism) to culture.

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International Organization 34 International Organization ministry to apply the same safety regulations to offshore oil rigs in the 1970s as it had applied earlier to oil tankers.81 In a similar vein, studies based on organization theory indicate that institutions do not continually monitor their surroundings and reevaluate prior choices. Indeed, in the absence of crises, there will be little reconsideration of past choices, subject to what Peter Blau terms the elasticity of demand for advice.82 Yet when prior understandings lead to unexpected outcomes and uncertainty, organizations will take on the function of information seekers and solicitors of advice. As James Wilson notes in this regard, large institutions are more likely to generate new ideas but are less likely to adopt them than are smaller institutions.83 In conjunction, the bodies of literature on organization theory and the new institutionalism shed light on the circumstances under which groups with new ideas are likely to emerge, offer an explanation for their enduring influence, and point to the conclusion that, once in place, a group will persist until subsequent crises challenge its ability to provide advice. Methodology and guidance for further research The epistemic communities approach pursued in this volume is distinct from the approaches reviewed above, although it rigorously integrates and builds on the insights gained from many of them. It distinguishes epistemic communities from other groups that seek to exert influence on decision makers, and it specifies in greater detail both the factors that lead knowledge-based groups to cohere and the mechanisms by which they gain and retain influence in the policymaking process. The research techniques for demonstrating the impact of epistemic communities on the policymaking process are straightforward but painstaking. With respect to a specific community, they involve identifying community membership, determining the community members' principled and causal beliefs, tracing their activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers at various points in time, identifying alternative credible outcomes that were foreclosed as a result of their influence, and exploring alternative explanations for the actions of decision makers.84 The use of counterfactuals may be helpful in this regard. 81. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. 82. Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1967), chap. 7. See also James G. March, "Footnotes to Organizational Change," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (December 1981), pp. 563-77. 83. James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 197-218. 84. See Alexander George, "Case Study and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; and Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2, 1985, pp. 21-58.

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One of the points emphasized in the earlier section about distinguishing an epistemic community from another type of knowledge-based group (a discipline, a profession, a coalition of bureaucrats, and so forth) was that while the members of any knowledge-based group may share criteria of validity and a policy enterprise, members of an epistemic community in addition share principled (normative) and causal beliefs. Individuals in the community may be found among the respected experts whose names recur on delegation lists to intergovernmental meetings or among those responsible for drafting background reports or briefing diplomats. Identifying the beliefs of a community calls for a detailed study of materials such as the early publications of community members, testimonies before legislative bodies, speeches, biographical accounts, and interviews. The process of tracing causal beliefs is obviously easier if members' backgrounds are in disciplines that make copious use of equations and models. Operationally, epistemic community members could be distinguished from nonmembers on the basis of whether the key variables and transformation equations incorporated in their models agree. Their beliefs and spread of networks could then be depicted by causal mapping and network analysis.85 The extent to which epistemic beliefs mask social conditioning can be assessed through a judicious use of the secondary literature regarding the intellectual history of the disciplines from which the epistemic community derives its understanding of the world. A robust study of an epistemic community's influence calls for comparative studies of countries and organizations in which the community has been active and those in which it has not. Moreover, it calls for an analysis of policies and practices pursued by governments and organizations not only in the period during which a community is active but also the periods before and after in order to determine both the emergence and the persistence of influence. As the studies in this volume demonstrate, epistemic communities have exerted their influence on decision makers in a wide variety of issue-areas. Generally called upon for advice under conditions of uncertainty, they have often proved to be significant actors in shaping patterns of international policy coordination.

85. See Axelrod, Structure of Decision.

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[11]

Multilateralism and world order* R O B E R T W. COX

'World order' has become a current catchphrase of political discourse and journalism. 'Multilateralism' has become something of a growth sector in academic studies. What current events have brought into prominence, scholarship has an obligation to subject to critical analysis. This article raises some of the questions that should be probed in this analysis. The two concepts are interrelated. Multilateralism appears in one aspect as the subordinate concept. Multilateralism can only be understood within the context in which it exists, and that context is the historical structure of world order. But multilateralism is not just a passive, dependent activity. It can appear in another aspect as an active force shaping world order. The agent/structure dilemma is a chicken-and-egg proposition. To understand the potential for change that multilateralism holds, it is first necessary to place the study of multilateralism within the analysis of global power relations. I deliberately avoid using a term like 'international relations' since it embodies certain assumptions about global power relations that need to be questioned. 'International relations' implies the Westphalian state system as its basic framework, and this may no longer be an entirely adequate basis since there are forms of power other than state power that enter into global relations. 'World order' is neutral as regards the nature of the entities that constitute power; it designates an historically specific configuration of power of whatever kind. The dominant pendencies in existing world order can be examined within a global system having three principal components—a global political economy, an inter-state system, and the biosphere or global ecosystem. These three components are both autonomous in having their own inherent dynamics, and, at the same time, interdependent with each other. Contradictions are generated within each of the three spheres, and contradictions arise in the interrelationships among the three spheres. In conventional diplomatic usage, the term multilateral refers to states. It covers relationships among more than two states with respect to some specific issue or set of issues.1 Another usage of 'multilateral' has long been current in international economic relations, i.e. the notion of multilateral trade and payments. Multilateralism, in this sense was synonymous with the most favoured nation principle in * A first version of this article was prepared as a 'concept paper' for a symposium on perspectives on multilateralism as part of the United Nations University programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System (MUNS). It was also presented and discussed at the International Political Science Association Congress, Buenos Aires, July 1991.1 am especially grateful to Edward Appathurai, Stephen .Gill, Michael Schechter, and Pat Sewell for reading and commenting on the early draft, and to three anonymous readers for this Review for their helpful comments. 1 J. Kaufman. Conference Diplomacy (Leyden, 1968).

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international trade and the movement towards convertibility of currencies and freedom of capital flows.2 The first of these meanings of 'multilateral' derives from the inter-state system. It is limited to relations among states through diplomatic channels or inter-state organizations. The second refers to relations among the economic actors of civil society within a framework regulated by states and international organizations. It pertains to an historically specific form of capitalist market economy, that in which civil society is separate and distinct from the state, and the agents of civil society are presumed to act within a system of rationally deducible behavioural laws. It would have little or no meaning for the relationships among what Karl Polanyi called redistributive societies, whether ancient empires or modern centrally planned economies.3 The specific context out of which the economic concept of multilateralism emerged was negotiation essentially between the United States and Britain for the constitution of the post-World War II economic order. The United States used its economic leverage to pressure Britain to abandon the preferential trade and payments system encompassing the Commonwealth and Empire under the Ottawa Agreements of 1933, which was one of several attempts to cope with the world-wide depression of the 1930s by protectionism within an economic bloc. When these Anglo-American negotiations took place, Europe and the Soviet Union were devastated by war and what later became known as the Third World was inarticulate in international economic affairs. These countries were not effective participants in the definition of the concept or in giving substance to it. In that context, economic multilateralism meant the structure of world economy most conducive to capital expansion on a world scale; and political multilateralism meant the institutionalized arrangements made at that time and in those conditions for inter-state cooperation on common problems. There was, for some people, an implicit compatibility, even identity between economic and political aspects of multilateralism: political multilateralism had as a primary goal the security and maintenance of economic multilateralism, the underpinning of growth in the world capitalist economy. This was the vision of Cordell Hull, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of State. Others saw contradiction between economic and political aspects: political multilateralism for them existed to correct the inequities that resulted from the world economy, leading, for instance, in the 1960s, to a demand for the institutionalization of a New International Economic Order. This view came to be expressed by leaders of Third World nations. The relative simplicity of the idea of a world order consisting of a state system and a capitalist world economy may, however, be inadequate to encompass the totality of forces capable of influencing structural change at the close of the twentieth century. An enlarged conception of global society would include economic and social forces, more or less institutionalized, that cut across state boundaries—forces of international production and global finance that operate with great autonomy outside of state regulation, and other forces concerned with ecology, peace, gender, ethnicities, human rights, the defence of the dispossessed and the advancement of the advantaged that also act independently of states. Multilateralism has to be considered from the 2 3

R. M. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. The Origins and Prospects of our International Economic Order (New York, 1969). K. Polanyi, C. Arensberg, and H. W. Pearson (eds.), Trade and Market in the Earlv Empire (Chicago, 1957).

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standpoint of its ability to represent the forces at work in the world at the local level as well as at the global level. What about aspirations for autonomy and a voice in world affairs by micro-regions or fragments of existing states? How can the less powerful be represented effectively? Who will negotiate for the biosphere which humanity shares interdependently with other forms of life? To define a meaning of multilateralism for today and tomorrow, we must begin with an assessment of the present and emerging future condition of the world system, with the power relationships that will give contextual meaning to the term. In the most general statement of the problem of multilateralism, these questions are posed: • • • •

What kinds of entities are involved in multilateral relations? What kind of system connects these entities? What specific condition of the system gives the contextual meaning to the terms multilateral and multilateralism? What kind of knowledge is appropriate to understanding the phenomenon of multilateralism?

Multilateralism can be examined from two main standpoints: one, as the institutionalization and regulation of established order; the other, as the locus of interactions for the transformation of existing order. Multilateralism, in practice, is both, but these two aspects find their bases in different parts of the overall structure of multilateralism and pursue different tactics. A comprehensive enquiry into multilateralism at the present time cannot afford to focus on the one to the detriment of the other. Indeed, the question of transformation is the more compelling of the two. The 'crisis of multilateralism'

Before tackling these questions, we must consider further the circumstances leading to this revived concern with multilateralism on the threshold of the 1990s. Why is multilateralism a matter of such concern today? In a preface to a collection of articles by Dutch officials and scholars published in 1988 entitled The UN Under Attack, Sir Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, wrote: [T]he paradox—and the tragedy—of recent times is that even as the need for better management of relations between nations and for a multilateral approach to global problems has become more manifest, support for internationalism has weakened—eroded by some of the strongest nations whose position behoves them to be at its vanguard and who have in the past acknowledged that obligation of leadership. This is most true, of course, of the United States, whose recent behaviour has served actually to weaken the structures of multilateralism, including the United Nations itself.4

Ramphal then referred to some of the advances in international cooperation, particularly with reference to Third World problems, since Bretton Woods and San Francisco, and continued: They were possible because of the emergence of a global consensus which responded in some fashion to the consciousness that we were ail part of one world community—neighbours needing an ethic of partnership for living together. That enlightened consensus has become a

4

J. Harrod and N. Schnjver (eds.), The UN Under Attack (Aldershot, 1988).

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casualty in the drift towards dominance and the ascendancy of unilateralism in world affairs. . . . Recently there have been moves towards coordination of economic policy among leading industrial countries. This is, in principle, better than wholly uncoordinated national action. But cooperation within a directorate of powerful countries is hardly the answer to the world's needs, the needs of all its nations. In fact, it could well have the result of reinforcing the dominance of the few over the many.5 In this perspective, the crisis of multilateralism emerged in the 1980s in a tendency on the part of the United States and some other powerful countries to reject the United Nations as a vehicle for international action and a movement on the part of these countries towards either unilateralism or collective dominance in world economic and political matters. The context in which this shift occurred was the economic crisis of the mid-1970s which led among other things to a reduced willingness on the part of the rich countries to finance aid to the Third World, and an increased tendency on their part to insist upon free-market, deregulating, and privatizing economic policies both at home and abroad. This was accompanied by their suspicion that the United Nations system was an unfriendly political forum and a potential obstacle to economic liberalization. There thus occurred a cleavage between the old economic multilateralism, perceived as a support to a liberal economic order and institutionally located in the principal agencies of the western dominated world economy, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; and a more political multilateralism, symbolically located in the UN General Assembly, and perceived by these powerful states as harbouring an unfriendly Third World majority. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the configuration of power giving context to multilateralism changed again. The Soviet Union, beset by economic crisis at home and undergoing a major transformation of its political being, proclaimed 'new thinking' about world relationships and the United Nations system. In substance, the key factor for the Soviet Union became the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States and the corollaries of a shift of resources from military to civilian purposes, a turning inward to face political and economic crises within the union, and a withdrawal of support for Third World opposition to US international objectives. The vacancy of Soviet power as a countervailing balance to US power together with the economic and political weakening of the Third World generated a new potential for the UN Security Council, an opportunity seized by the United States. Cooperative relationships between the five permanent members of the Security Council emerged significantly with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. For Britain and France the new relationship among the permanent five was an opportunity to regain a privileged position at the centre of world power. They needed the United States but the United States also evidently needed them. For China, the new situation was a means of attenuating the relative ostracism it had suffered in the wake of the Tienamen Square incidents of 1989. The Gulf crisis of the summer of 1990 and the military action that followed delineated a new configuration of forces that US President George Bush has repeatedly referred to as the 'new world order'. From a position of reluctant member of the United Nations, expecting little support for its policies in that organization, the United States, with Soviet acquiescence, took initiative against Iraq and gained legitimacy for it from the Security Council. The reversals of attitude towards the United Nations by both the United 5 Harrod and Schrijver (eds.). The UN.

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States and the Soviet Union had previously been followed by measures to begin payment of the considerable arrears owed by both states to the UN, although repayments were stretched out over time sufficiently to constitute a continuing leverage for compliant behaviour by the organization. The US success in the Security Council posed the problem of multilateralism in a different way, contrasting with the way it was presented by Ramphal in the passage cited above. The problem was no longer how the UN could survive without the political and financial support of the United States. It became whether the UN could function as a world organization if it came to be perceived as the instrument of its most powerful member. The Security Council's action could be seen as legitimating a US initiative already decided, not as the independent source of a genuinely international policy. This question concerns particularly the Third World countries that had wielded considerable influence over United Nations decisions in the General Assembly. This apprehension is strengthened by the effect of global economic structures in weakening the capacity for resistance by poor countries to the disciplinary market eifects generated by forces of global finance and production in an economic system organized and sustained by the rich countries. If Third World countries can no longer seek even symbolic support through collective action in the United Nations, what recourse will they have to express an alternative vision of world order? The present world political-economic context raises both potentially and more and more explicitly a number of new issues for multilateralism. One concerns the process through which the Security Council majority and the military coalition for the Gulf war was put together. These were ad hoc diplomatic constructs built with countryspecific pressures and incentives. The cost to the United States in material and diplomatic concessions to secure both Security Council votes and participation in the military coalition was offset by the ability of the United States to extract funding from Japan and Germany, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Such measures could work in the Security Council with its limited membership but could hardly be expected to work in the larger General Assembly. The process hardly compares with the 'enlightened consensus' of a continuing character evoked by Ramphal with respect to the earlier period. Would it be likely to lead to a polarization within UN multilateralism between the dominant few and the relatively powerless many, eventually between the Security Council and the General Assembly? There is also the question how far a state can act militarily for the United Nations in the absence of any United Nations command and regular accountability to the Security Council or of any defined role for the Secretary-General. The Gulf case seemed to open an institutional void, creating an uncertain and potentially dangerous precedent. A further issue is the relationship between governments and domestic forces. In a number of countries in the Islamic world, sentiment in the streets favoured Iraq and fuelled resentment against US and other Western intervention forces in the heartland of Islam, despite the official positions of Arab government members of the coalition. Popular Islamism may also be read as a metaphor for a more widespread Third World resentment against the economic and political dominance of the capitalist west, more forcibly felt since the 1980s as a consequence of the Third World debt crisis among other causes: Furthermore, domestic opposition to the war was manifested in the more powerful countries as well, including initially in the United

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States. How far can the existence of widespread domestic opposition undermine the legitimating function of the United Nations? Is there any way in which multilateralism can take account of the level of popular forces as well as the level of governments? The Gulf crisis also brought into focus the issue of the environmental consequences of war. The warnings of environmental disaster from a conference of scientists in London just prior to the beginning of hostilities were quickly realised by oil spills and fires. This particular disaster underscored the problem of achieving some means of managing the relationship between the natural environment and human actions determined by politics in the interests of the biosphere which humanity shares as a part of nature. The implications of multilateralism extend beyond humanity, whether expressed at state or popular or individual behaviour levels, to include non-human forces which will affect prospects for human survival. Thus, the 'crisis of multilateralism' in its two recent phases, presents an additional set of questions: •

•

•

• •

How can national interest as perceived by the most powerful state be reconciled with multilateralism? Must there be a choice between weakening multilateralism through its rejection by the unilateralism of a powerful state, and weakening of multilateralism through its instrumental use by a powerful state? What are the conditions for global consensus as a basis for multilateralism? One form of consent may be acquiescence in the leadership of a powerful state insofar as that state is widely perceived to embody universally acceptable principles of order. Another may be through recognition of the coexistence of different value systems where the principles of each value system are brought to bear in the achievement of a solution to common problems. What is the relationship between economic multilateralism, i.e. the processes of global liberal economic structures sustained by the most powerful capitalist states; and political multilateralism or the aspiration for consensual control over global economic processes empowering less privileged countries, e.g. as was envisaged in the abortive demands for a New International Economic Order? What role could popular movements either mobilized by events or around longer-term issues (e.g. peace, social justice, environmentalism, or feminism), play in multilateralism? What role does multilateralism play in the relationship between the biosphere and human political and economic organization?

Intellectual approaches to multilateralism The current crisis of multilateralism presents the problematic of our study. This problematic can be viewed through a number of different lenses, each a different intellectual perspective. These perspectives are differentiated by epistemologies and ontologies. They express different conceptions of how knowledge in human affairs can be acquired and for what purposes; and they posit different conceptions of what constitutes the field of enquiry, what the basic entities and basic relationships are. Some of the principal perspectives can be reviewed to illustrate this point. To represent these different perspectives is, in practice, to construct them as ideal types. Here, the perspective becomes separated from the perceiver. The work of

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certain authors helps to define the logically coherent forms of ideal types; but many authors share more than one perspective. My intention is not to put people into boxes. It is rather to show how a satisfactory perspective may draw upon several of the main theoretical traditions. Realism The starting point for contemporary theorizing about global power relations is the Realist tradition. Realism puts a primary emphasis upon states and the analysis of the historical behaviour of states but, I shall argue, does not limit its vision to states. Realism, in its more sophisticated manifestations, is also concerned with the economic and social underpinnings of states and how the nature of states changes. In classical realism, the state is no absolute; the state is historicized. However, let us begin by assuming a world in which states are the only significantly powerful entities engaged in global power relations, and in which each state is constrained in its ambitions only by the threat of retaliation by other states. In such a world, multilateralism is conceivable at most as a series of transitory arrangements designed to achieve collective purposes among a group of states that find a temporary common interest. The moving forces in such a system are changes in the relative powers of the states and redefinitions of state interests. These could change the composition of groupings of states that are able to discover common or compatible purposes. International institutions and general principles of international law and behaviour are not absent from the realist conception of world order, but they have what a Marxist might call a superstructural character. That is, they are not to be taken at face value but to be seen as means of achieving ends that derive from the real conflicts of interest at the heart of the system. E. H. Carr, whose work remains a classic exposition of Realist thinking, wrote: 4Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, and denounces class war, which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers'.6 And: '[International government is, in effect, government by that state which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing'.7 In the Realist perspective, there is room for a considerable proliferation of international institutions, but little room for any cumulative acquisition of authority by these institutions. International organizations will have no real autonomy as agencies capable of articulating collective purposes and mobilizing resources to pursue these purposes. They will remain mechanisms for putting into effect, or merely for publicly endorsing, purposes that have been arrived at and are given effect by those states that dispose of the resources necessary for attaining them. International institutions are a public ritual designed to legitimate privately determined measures. 6

7

E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 (London, 1946), p. 82. Other notable authors who could be included in the Realist tradition include Hams Morgentnau, Reinhold Neibuhr, Raymond Aron and William T. R. Fox. They do, of course, differ in their relative emphasis, particularly on the role of morality in politics; but they participate in a common discourse. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 107.

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The general principles used to legitimate these measures in the enactment of ritual are suspect as rationalizations of ulterior motives. The critical Realist analyst is enjoined to strip away the cloak of public respectability so as to reveal the basic purposes at work. Argument on the ground of the principles invoked would be an irrelevant distraction from the real issue which is to reveal the basic interests at work. Only by laying bare these interests can effective counteracting forces be put together, forces which, in turn, might make use of international institutions and principles of law and morality to further their different purposes. Classical Realism is capable of recognizing its own limitations; and these limitations arise with the phenomenon of moral sentiment. The fact that the powerful appeal to moral principles in order to secure acquiescence from the less powerful suggests that moral sentiments do have a certain force in human and even inter-state affairs. Even though the state is a purely fictitious person, the fact that people ascribe moral claims to state behaviour as though the state were a person has some effect in constraining the state. Moreover, moral sentiments may enter into the formulation of state purposes. The realist will, however, beware of placing too heavy a burden of practice upon moral sentiment and will be alive to the hypocrisy with which moral sentiment cloaks egoistic intents. Classical Realism remains remarkable in the extent to which it is capable of accounting for the condition of multilateralism and in particular for the crisis of multilateralism discussed above. It provides an explanation for United States aloofness from the UN system during the 1970s phase of the crisis, in the perception that a Soviet blocking ability in the Security Council and a Third World majority in the General Assembly negated the endorsement of US goals in these bodies. Meanwhile, economic forces in which US interests remained predominant, were weakening both the Soviet bloc and the Third World. The United States could virtually ignore the United Nations as a centre of multilateral activity and allow economic forces to continue to shift power relations in its favour. Classical Realism also provides an explanation for the second phase of the crisis of multilateralism. The withdrawal of Soviet power as a counterweight to US power and the alignment of Soviet with US positions in the Security Council, coupled with continuing financial pressures on Third World countries guaranteed a docile response to US initiative in the Security Council. Most Third World countries were constrained by financial pressures of external debt to open their economies further to the penetration of the dominant forces in the world economy protected by the United States. A Third World country that sought to control its economic resources in its own interest in contradiction to external market forces posed a challenge to the global economic system that, even if not substantively threatening, might become contagious. Chile and Nicaragua were not alone to suffer the consequences. A Security Council under US dominance could authorize military action that would stand as a warning to any Third World country disposed to build a military challenge to the system. The real reasons for the US initiation of war against Iraq, in a Realist interpretation, remained obscured by the public ritual in the Security Council. The epistemological foundations of classical Realism are historicist and hermeneutic. Classical Realism is a critical theory in that it does not accept appearances at face value but seeks to penetrate to the meaning within. It takes account of historical structures as well as of events. The term historical structures designates those persisting patterns of thought and actions that define the frameworks within

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which people and states act. These structures are shaped and reshaped slowly over time—the longue duree of Fernand Braudel.8 They are the intersubjective realities of world politics. The critical analysis of classical Realism is the process of discerning the meaning of events within these historically determined frameworks for action. A critical theory is more at the service of the weak than of the strong. Machiavelli may be accorded the status of first critical theorist of European thought. (I would argue that Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century Islamic diplomat and scholar was the first critical theorist of his civilization; and I expect other instances of critical theory can be discovered in other traditions of civilization.) In form, Machiavelli's Prince appears to be addressed to the powerful, to the palazzo. In effect, his work instructs the outsiders in the mechanisms of power—it enlightens the piazza. Classical Realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power. There is a distortion of classical Realism called Neo-realism that severs Realism from its critical roots and converts it into a problem-solving device for the foreign policy makers of the most powerful states.9 This Neo-realism, which is very largely an American product of the Cold War,10 attempts to construct a technology of state power. It computes the components of power of individual states, and assesses the relative chances of moves in the game of power politics. Its epistemology is positivist and it lacks any dimension of historical structural change. The world of inter-state relations is a given world, identical in its basic structure over time. There are no changes of the system, only changes within the system.11 Liberal institutionalism From the moment of drafting of the UN Charter until the present time a different current of theories has centred attention upon multilateralism, endeavouring to discern in it the emergence of institutions that would transform world order by progressively bringing the state system within some form of authoritative regulation. This current has thrown up a whole sequence of theoretical formulations, each of which appears to have been superceded by its successor. The earliest formulation was the functionalism of David Mitrany.12 Functionalism, despairing of progress through the world federalist approach to constructing world 8

F. Braudel, Civilisation materielle, economic et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIf sleek tome 1 Les Structures du quotidien: le possible et I'impossible (Paris, 1979) and 'History and the Social Sciences: The longue duree, in Braudel, On History, trans. Sara Matthews (Chicago, 1980). 9 I have discussed the distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories in an earlier article. See R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism. 10 See, for example, K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass, 1979); cf. R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986). 1 ' I am using 'Neo-realism' to represent a perspective perhaps best expressed in the work of Kenneth Waltz (see, for example, Keohane (ed.), Neorealism). The term has also been used more broadly to include the theorizing of cooperation among interest-pursuing states in such forms as 'regimes'. See, for example, Fox, who had in mind the work of John Ruggie and Stephen Krasner. I think this is better treated as one of the modifications of liberal institutionalism (below), although it does show the influence of neo-realism upon the liberal institutionalist tradition in American scholarship of the Cold War era. (W. T. E. Fox, *E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision,' Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, Aberstwyth, E. H. Carr Memorial Lecture No. 1). 12 D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London, 1943).

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government, envisaged an alternative route through the 'low polities' of functional or technical agencies. Its principal argument was that by associating professionals and technicians who were primarily concerned with solving practical problems of everyday life—from delivering the mail on time to promoting health, education and welfare—in international agencies charged with these matters, the conflictual sphere of chigh polities' monopolized by diplomats and political leaders would be outflanked and diminished by the cooperative sphere of functionalism. World government would arrive by stealth rather than by design. Functionalism became embodied in the specialized agencies revived or established as component parts of the UN system. The thought behind it appeared to gain relevancy when the UN system, from the 1960s, expanded its technical assistance work in less developed countries. The world system was, in a sense, helping to build the state structures upon which it formally was to rest. Functionalism, however, though it distinguished 'low' from 'high' politics in order to focus upon the former with the implication that in the long run low politics was the more fundamental, offered no theory of how a more centralized world authority would come about. Neo-functionalist theory filled this gap. According to its proponents, the scope and authority of international institutions would be increased through a conscious strategy of leadership. Any major field of functional competence entrusted to an international institution was likely to impinge upon linked fields in which no international authority had been assigned. Innovative leadership could manipulate an impasse in which action was blocked at the margin of an institution's existing authority into a consensus for the expansion of authority into the bordering field that would enable action to advance. This was called 'spill over'. Neofunctionalism also expanded the range of relevant actors to include elements of civil society—trade unions, industrial associations, consumer groups and other advocacy groups, and also political parties. The orientation of these various interests towards international institutions would enhance the authority of these institutions. The broadening of scope and authority of international institutions was considered by neo-functionalists as a process of integration. Karl W. Deutsch, in a somewhat different approach, defined integration as the formation of a 'security community' within which groups of people enjoyed institutions and practices of a kind that allowed for a reasonable expectation that change would proceed by peaceful rather than violent means.13 Deutsch's approach gave more emphasis to modes of common understanding and communication without placing the condition of integration necessarily upon the creation of an authoritative central power.14 Neo-functionalism had its greatest success in studies of the process of European economic integration.15 The apparent fit with the Western European experience prompted its adaptation to non-European situations. With regard to Latin America, the importance of autonomous interest groups and political parties was replaced by an emphasis on the technocratic elites.16 Neo-functionalism was also applied, though with somewhat lesser plausibility, to the world as a whole.17 13 14 15

16 17

K. W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, 1957). K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. An Enquirv into the Foundations of Nationalitv (New York, 1953). E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford. 1958). E. B. Haas and P. Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization, 18 (1964), pp. 705-37. E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964).

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Both functionalism and neo-functionalism were challenged by events. The EastWest conflicts of the Cold War and the North-South political issues that remained after the decolonization of the 1960s (notably Southern African and the Arab-Israeli conflicts) could not be set aside by technical cooperation. These issues kept resurfacing within specialized agencies as well as in the UN General Assembly. Functionalism then appeared as an ideology of the western capitalist powers which sought to resist what they perceived as 'politicization' of technical work by Soviet and Third World diplomats. Neo-functionalism encountered its negation in the defeat of the proposed European Defence Community in 1954 when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty establishing it. It was negated again during the 1960s in the personality of General Charles de Gaulle, who stood as an obstacle to the accumulation of further authority by the Community bureaucracy in Brussels. Neofunctionalist analysts who had previously envisaged 'spill over' of authority from one functionalist sphere to another, now began to write of 'spill back'.18 What had hitherto been represented as an irreversible process now appeared to be stalled and quite possibly reversed. As functionalism and neo-functionalism lost theoretical lustre, liberal institutionalism shifted ground. It focused less on the prospect of superceding the state though some larger regional or world process of integration, in order to concentrate more upon processes through which cooperative arrangements at the international level are constructed. From the early 1970s, interest shifted to transnational relations.19 This approach magnified the emphasis neo-functionalism had placed upon civil society as a network of linkages both extending and circumscribing in some ways the autonomy of state action. The world economy was the centre of attention, in terms both of the business organizations that operated on a global scale and of the emergence of a transnational form of society among those people most directly involved. Alongside interest groups, emphasis in the liberal institutionalist tradition has been placed more recently on 'epistemic communities' or transnational networks of specialists who evolve amongst themselves a way of conceiving and defining global problems in particular spheres of concern.20 Corresponding to this prominence of transnational civil society, came a stress on the fragmentation of the state. States, following the lead given by the 'bureaucratic polities' analysis of national policy making, were perceived as systems of competing agencies, where an agency in one state might build a coalition with like agencies in other states in order to enhance its domestic influence within its own state.21 International institutions now looked more complex: they were both constrained by the transnational linkages of global civil society such as the networks of influence generated by international production and global finance; and they had become vehicles for transgovernmental coalitions constructed by bureaucratic segments within the various states. 18 19

20 21

L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Schiengold, Europe's Would-be Policy: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970). J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). P. M. Haas, 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', Millennium Journal of International Studies. 19 (1990), pp. 347-64. J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Transgovernmental Relations and World Polities', World Politics, 27, 1 (October 1974).

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This vision of 'complex interdependence',22 led to a fresh round of research into international 'regimes'.23 Without reproducing any exhaustive definition of a regime, it is sufficient to describe it as a set of norms or rules accepted by a group of states as a means of dealing with a certain sphere of common concerns. The notion goes to the heart of the question of how cooperation is achieved and sustained, without necessarily tying this to the existence of formal international organizations. Moreover, it is concerned with cooperation, not with superceding the state system as the repository of authority. Regime theory focuses upon 'rational actors' acting in conditions of 'bounded rationality', i.e. in the absence of the impossible conditions of full information and continuous calculation of self-interest, relying rather on procedures that have worked reasonably well in the past. One probable consequence of the predominance of regime theory in recent liberal institutionalism has been a shift of emphasis back more exclusively to states as the principal actors.24 A central issue in regime theory is the thesis of 'hegemonic stability' according to which regimes have been constituted under the protection of dominant powers. The question is: can regimes founded in such conditions survive the decline of such powers? Robert Keohane has constructed an argument based on rational choice argument to suggest that existing forms of cooperation may indeed survive because they continue to provide states with cost-saving, uncertainty-reducing and flexible means of achieving the results of cooperation.25 Another theoretical basis of regime theory seems to be derived from Durkheim's thesis that the growth of the division of labour bringing about increased interdependencies among the actors in society will lead to disruptive consequences—he mentioned specifically economic crises and class struggle—unless the growth of interdependence is matched by adequate regulation.26 Applied to the international level, regimes are the means of introducing such regulation—the counterpart to what Durkheim envisaged as the role for corporatism in national society. In the current world economy, some spheres of activity have been covered by regimes that are being maintained or amended more or less effectively, e.g. in trade with the GATT (at any rate pending the outcome of the Uruguay round), while other spheres of activity, e.g. finance and production, are very largely unregulated. This current approach of liberal institutionalism pursues answers to these questions: Do international institutions make a difference? Why are some spheres of activity internationally regulated while others are not? Does the density of transborder interactions in a particular area predict the formation of a regime in that area? What determines membership and non-membership in a regime?27 Liberal institutionalism through its various developmental phases has certain basic characteristics. Its epistemology has remained both positivist and rational-deductive insofar as its objects of inquiry are actors and interactions and as it attempts to account for their behaviour according to models of rational choice. It has lacked 22 23 24 25 26 27

J. Nye and R. O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence (Boston, 1977). S. Krasner (ed.), 'International Regimes', a special issue of International Organization, 36 (1982). See above, footnote 12, p. 20. R. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 1984). E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York, 1984). R. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', InternationalJournal (Autumn, 1990); O. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources (Ithaca, 1989).

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the historical structural dimension of Classical Realism which is concerned with the frameworks or structures within which actors and interactions take place and the meanings inherent in the relationship of actions to the pre-existing whole. Liberal institutionalism takes the existing order as given, as something to be made to work more smoothly, not as something to be criticized and changed. In effect, liberal institutionalism has its starting point in the coexistence of state system and world capitalist economy. The problems with which it deals are those of rendering compatible these two global structures and of ensuring stability and predictability to the world economy. Thus regime theory has much to say about economic cooperation among the G7 and other groupings of advanced capitalist countries with regard to problems common to them. It has correspondingly less to say about attempts to change the structure of world economy, e.g. in the Third World demand for a New International Economic Order. Indeed, regimes are designed to stabilize the world economy and have the effect, as Keohane has underlined in his work, of inhibiting and deterring states from initiating radical departures from economic orthodoxy, e.g: through socialism.28 The current implications of liberal institutionalism are that new regimes or international institutions may be more difficult to initiate or even to change in the absence of a dominant power able and willing to commit resources to them, but that existing regimes may survive and evolve to the extent that they provide information and facilities for dealing with matters among their members. These regimes and institutions facilitate the interaction of states and components of civil society within their spheres. This approach to multilateralism is consistent with a conservatively adaptive attitude towards the existing structures of world order. World-system structuralism World-system theories, unlike liberal institutionalist theories, have not been directed explicitly towards the study of international organizations, though they do provide an explanatory framework for multilateralism. These theories begin with a conception of the totality of the world system. This conception takes states for the constitutive units, as does Realism, but sees these units as having a structural relationship predetermined by the world economy—a relationship expressed in terms of core and periphery, with an intermediate category of semiperiphery. The concept 'state' designates the political aspect of an entity conceived primarily in economic terms. Core economies, are dominant over peripheral economies; they determine the conditions in which peripheral economies produce and they extract surplus from peripheral production for the enhancement of the core.29 Thus, the core produces underdevelopment in the periphery through the economic relations linking the two.30 Semiperiphery economies are strong enough to protect themselves from this kind of exploitation, and they struggle to attain core status. States and inter-state relations are the political structures that maintain in place the 28

29

30

Keohane, After Hegemonv, pp. 119-20, 254. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1974). A. Gunder frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York, 1969).

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exploitative core-periphery relationship of economies. Periphery states are weak in relation to core states and penetrated by them. A principal weapon in the struggle of semiperipheral countries is, accordingly, to strengthen the semiperipheral states so that it can gain autonomy in relation to the core states. Economic protectionism, economic nationalism, and national planning, whether socialist or state capitalist, are characteristic of the semiperipheral struggle for greater local control over development.31 The core-periphery structure of dominance is maintained not just by external pressures but also by support from dominant classes or elites in the periphery country who benefit from the relationship. State, military, and economic elites in the periphery country are critical factors in maintaining the relationship. They count on material and ideological support from the core. They maintain their position internally by exclusion or manipulation of the domestic social forces from political and economic power, e.g. by suppressing opposition or allowing only 'domesticated' opposition parties, suppressing or controlling trade unions, etc. Where this peripheral structure of power is overthrown, its components can count on the resources of the core (financial, intelligence, and ultimately military) to destabilize and subvert the forces that have taken power from them. This political structure of domination is coupled to a socio-economic structure that orients the peripheral economies towards the world economy shaped by the core. The core requires that the periphery economy be open to foreign investment, to imports of core goods and services, and to export of profits. Peripheral structures of labour control differ from those in the core; they ensure a supply of docile and cheap labour, since the economic function of the periphery is to supply inputs to the higher value added production of the core as well as to absorb part of the core's output. This relative subordination of periphery labour contributes to maintaining terms of trade favourable to the core while at the same time separating the interests of core labour (which benefits from the core-periphery relationship) from periphery labour. Within the periphery economy, too, a minority of labour employed in foreign-owned undertakings is integrated into the world-economy networks, while the mass of local labour remains relatively deprived. The structure perpetuates itself by dividing the potential opposition forces. Even though multilateralism has not the central position in world-system theory analysis that it has in liberal institutionalism, this theory has obvious implications for multilateralism. Multilateralism is seen, first, as an instrument for institutionalizing the core-periphery structure of domination. The role of the world-economy agencies, the IMF and the World Bank, is to enforce the practice of openness to worldeconomy forces upon peripheral economies, to maintain the outward economic orientation of periphery country economic policy as against any locally-inspired tendencies towards autocentric development.32 These international economic agencies operate under majority control by the core countries. They have become the means of collective imposition of core-oriented policies upon peripheral countries, while financial relations among core countries are 31 32

I. Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (1974), pp. 387-415. I. Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 1971); C. Payer, The Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and the Third World (New York, 1974); J. H. Mittelman, 'International Monetary Institutions and Policies of Socialism and Self-reliance: Are They Compatible? The Tarzanian Experience', Social Research, 47 (1980), pp. 141-65.

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dealt with through other mechanisms.33 In effect, a two-tier system of economic regulation in the world economy was put in place during the 1960s: a top level comprising only the advanced capitalist countries, and a bottom level through which the advanced capitalist countries collectively imposed financial conditions upon Third World countries. Moreover, technical assistance through international agencies under the influence of core countries became a means of adjusting the internal structures of the periphery countries to the exigencies of the world economy. International and bilateral aid, in the theory of the world-system structuralism, is seen as part of the total mechanism of subordination of the Third World, in which internal structures of dominance and dependency reinforce external pressures.34 Secondarily, however, multilateralism, in the world-system perspective, is seen as a terrain of struggle between core and periphery, a terrain in which the grievances of the periphery can be aggregated into collective demands upon the core for structural change in the world economy. The demand raised in the 1970s for a New International Economic Order had this aspect.35 The two phases in the crisis of multilateralism are explainable to a considerable extent within the framework of world-economy structuralism. The quasi-withdrawal of the United States from commitment to the UN system during the late 1970s and the 1980s can be seen as a response to a perception that peripheral countries were using their majority in the major assemblies and conferences in disregard of worldeconomy-oriented policy and behaviour. The United States and other core countries allowed the pressures of international finance to wreak their toll upon a debt-ridden Third World, while offering palliatives to avoid any Third-World disruption of the system. The United States also contributed to destabilizing revolutionary movements in Central America. By the threshold of the 1990s, economic discipline had very widely been restored in the Third World, where regimes favourable to policies of adjustment to the world economy were in place. The immediate threat of concerted opposition to core country goals within the major international organizations seemed abated. The longer-term problem remained one of sustaining favourable governments in Third World countries and of mounting a deterrent warning against particular instances of radical deviation. The Gulf crisis signalled that the ultimate sanction against defiance of the world-economy hierarchy is military. In these matters, world-system structuralism is close to the critical analysis of Classical Realism. In world-system structuralism, formal multilateralism, that is what goes on through international organizations, is only the institutionally visible part of a more complex total system of relationships linking First and Third worlds. The advanced capitalist countries dispose of many means of intervention (financial, intelligence, communications, and military) within Third World countries and have the support of class allies in these countries. A threat to any aspect of this complex structure of dependency would provoke retaliatory response, including response through multilateral institutions. Classical Realism also probes the less visible processes of this 33 34 35

R. Cox and H. Jacobson et al., The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven, 1974). B. Erler, L'aide qui tui (Lausanne, 1987); J. H. Mittelman, Out from Under development: Prospects for the Third World (London, 1988). R. Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on some Recent Literature', International Organization. 33 (1979), pp. 257-302: S. Krasner, Structural Conflict. The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, 1985).

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power relationship in particular cases; but world-system structuralism offers a more systematic and generalized heuristic hypothesis. Both differ from liberal institutionalism which more readily takes state actions and multilateral processes at face value. Epistemologically, world-system analysis has a structural-functionist character. It posits the existence of a structure of relationships that are coherent and selfreproducing. Within that framework, it accounts for economic practices and social forces as well as states. Thus it embraces a larger sphere of human activity that does a realism which focuses more exclusively upon states. Realism does take account of economic capabilities as the resource underpinning state power, but tends to perceive economics as segmented into national compartments whereas world-system theory stresses the transnational linkages of economies in dominant-dependent relationships. The weakness of world-system theory is the limitation of functionalism. Functionalism can account for synchronic relationships in a given system that has coherence. It cannot explain how that system came into existence; nor is it adequate to explain how it may be transformed.36 What world-system theory lacks is an ability to explain change, to explain structural transformation. For this reason, it is appropriate to describe world-system theory as a structural/sra. This structuralism can be contrasted with or complemented by a dialectical transformation of historical structures. Historical dialectic37

Historical structures, as noted above in the discussion of realism, are persistent patterns of human activity and thought that endure for relatively long periods of time. They are the result of collective responses to certain common problems— whether these relate to the satisfaction of material wants (economics), the organization of cooperation and security (politics), or the explanation of the human condition and purpose (religion and ideology)—which become congealed in practices, institutions, and intersubjective meanings for a significant group of people. These practices and meanings in turn constitute the objective world for these people. These structures are historical because they come into existence in particular historical circumstances and can be explained as responses to these circumstances. Similarly, they are transformed when material circumstances have changed or prevailing meanings and purposes have been challenged by new practices. This historical malleability of structures differentiates them from the structural/,?™ that posits fixed and immutable structures, e.g. like those of Neo-realism. The dialectical approach to the understanding of change was concisely expressed by Ralf Dahrendorf: The idea of a society which produces in its structure the antagonisms that lead to its modification appears as an appropriate model for the analysis of change in general'.38 The,method set forth here is thus both dialectical in its explanation of change, and hermeneutic insofar as it enquires into purposes and 36

37

38

W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 109-34; R. Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalism Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review, 104 (1977), pp. 25-92. I have discussed this concept more fully in earlier articles. See R. Cox, 'On Thinking about Future World Order', World Politics, 28 (1976), pp. 175-96 and 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders; Beyond International Relations Theory', in Keohane, (ed.), Neorealism. R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959), pp. 125-6.

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meanings and links subjectivity and objectivity to explain a socially constructed world order and multilateralism. This approach can be seen in one aspect as a deepening of classical Realism. Where Realism focuses upon the state and the state system, historical dialectic enquires into the social processes that create and transform forms of state and the state system itself, and into the alterations in perceptions and meanings that constitute and reconstitute the objective world order. The approach, therefore, begins with an assessment of the dominant tendencies in existing world order, and proceeds to an identification of the antagonisms generated within that order which could develop into turning points for structural transformation. Multilateralism, in this context, will be perceived as in part the institutionalization and regulation of existing order, and in part the site of struggle between conservative and transformative forces. Multilateralism's meanings and purposes, and thus the new or changed structures which multilateralism may help to create, are to be derived from its relationship to the stresses and conflicts in world order. Karl Polanyi gave a dialectical interpretation of European economic and social history in the nineteenth century in what he callled a double movement.39 The first phase of movement was the introduction of the self-regulating market—what Polanyi saw as an Utopian vision backed by the force of the state. The second phase of movement was society's unplanned and unpredicted response of self-preservation against the disintegrating and alienating consequences of market-oriented behaviour. Society set about to tame and civilize the market. The approach of historical dialectic discerns a recurrence of the double movement in the late twentieth century. A powerful globalizing economic trend thrusts toward the achievement of the market Utopia on a world scale, opening national economies and deregulating transactions. At the present moment, the protective responses of societies at the national level are being weakened by the trend, while a protective response at the level of global society has yet to take form. Yet the elements of opposition to the socially disruptive consequences of globalization are visible. The question remains open as to what form these may take, as to whether and how they may become more coherent and more powerful, so that historical thesis and antithesis may lead to a new synthesis. In this context, multilateralism will become an arena of conflict between the endeavour to buttress the freedom of movement of powerful homogenizing economic forces, and efforts to build a new structure of regulation protecting diversity and the less powerful. The global economy has become something distinct from international economic relations, i.e. from transborder economic flows assumed to be subject to state control and regulation.40 Global production and global finance now constitute distinct spheres of power relations which constrain the state system at least as much as they are influenced by it.41 They are bringing about a new social structure of production relations superseding the nation-centred labour-capital relations of the past. Decentralizing of production organizations and mass migratory movements from South to North are generating global patterns of social cleavage and bringing new sources of conflict within national borders. It is less and less pertinent to think of societies as confined within territorial limits, 39

40 41

K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1957). B. Madeuf and C.-A. Michalet, 'A New Approach to International Economies', International Social Science Journal, 30 (1978), pp. 253-83. S. Strange, States and Markets (London, 1988).

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more and more necessary to think of a stratified global society in which global elites have the impetus in shaping the social order, including the ideology in which it is grounded, and other social groups are in a position of relative powerlessness, either acquiescent or frustrated. The concepts of core and periphery, introduced by worldsystem analysis with a geographical meaning, are coming more and more to have a meaning of social differentiation within and across territorial boundaries.42 The elites of globalization merge into a common structural force, even when they compete amongst themselves for primacy in the common movement.43 The relatively powerless are fragmented by nationality, ethnicity, religion, and gender—all obstacles to greater cohesion—but their subordination is a manifestation of the formation of global society. The problem of how their concerns will be articulated is critical for the future of multilateralism. Global finance limits drastically the capacity of states to conduct autonomous economic and social policies for the protection of their populations. The state system of the late twentieth century is coming to act more as a support to the opening of the world to global finance and global production, less as a means of defence of the welfare of local populations. Indeed, where states try to act in the protective mode they face retaliation, initially financial, ultimately perhaps military, from the changed state system. The state system skews the distribution of benefits and costs of an increasingly globalized society in favour of the economically powerful within the dominant states. (In this sense, world-system analysis retains validity within the framework of historical dialectic.) The centres of financial power and military power are located in these states. These forms of power sustain the globalizing world economy, even while the processes of global society are introducing the social cleavages and latent conflicts of First and Third Worlds within these centres of world power—in a process that has been called the 'peripheralization of the core'. The biosphere suffers the impact of both the global economy and the state system. The global economy, activated by profit maximization, has not been constrained to moderate its destructive ecological effects. There is no authoritative regulator, so far only several interventions through the inter-state system to achieve agreement on avoidance of specific noxious practices. The state system itself is capable of massive ecological destruction through war. The ecosystem is no longer to be thought of as an inert, passive limit to human activity. It has to be thought of as a non-human active force capable of dramatic interventions affecting human conditions and survival. Humanity is only one contingent element in the biosphere. A valid paradigm for the investigation of global change would need to include the historical interaction of human organization with the other elements in nature. The biosphere has its own automatic enforcers, for instance in the consequences of global warming; but who will negotiate on behalf of the biosphere? That must be one of the questions overshadowing future multilateralism. The dominant economically-based globalizing tendencies are accompanied and accelerated by a process of cultural homogenization emanating from the centres that give impetus to globalization. They are spread by the world media, and sustained by a convergence in modes of thought and practices among business and political elites. Yet this homogenizing tendency is countered by the affirmation of distinct identities 42 43

R. Cox, Production, Power and World Order. Social Forces in the Making ofHistorv (New York, 1987), chapter 9. S. Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, (Cambridge, 1990); K. Van der Fiji, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London, 1984).

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and distinct cultural traditions. The changes taking place in state roles in the globalizing economy give new opportunity for self-expression by nationalities that have no state of their own, in movements for separation or autonomy; and the same tendencies encourage ethnicities and religiously-defined groups that straddle state boundaries to express their identities in global politics. Social movements like environmentalism, feminism, and the peace movement also transcend territorial boundaries. Transnational cooperation among indigenous peoples enhances their force within particular states. These various developments augur modification of the pure Westphalian concept of inter-state system into something that might be more like what Hedley Bull envisaged as a 'new medievalism', a multilevel system of political authorities with micro- and macro-regionalisms and transborder identities interacting in a more complex political process.44 The cultural challenge goes to the heart of the question of hegemony. 'Hegemony' is used here in the Gramscian meaning of a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole society, in this case a world society composed of states and non-state corporate entities.45 In a hegemonic order these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as the natural order of things. They are the intersubjective meanings that constitute the order itself. Such a structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state's dominance is not sufficient by itself to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of doing and thinking have inspired emulation or acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states. These social practices and the ideologies that explain and legitimize them constitute the foundation of the hegemonic order. Hegemony frames thought and thereby circumscribes action. Today there is an apparent disjunction between military power, in which the United States is dominant, and economic power, in which the US advantage is lessening. Neither military nor economic power alone, or even in combination, necessarily implies hegemony. In the structure of hegemony, cultural and ideological factors are decisive. Whether or not the hegemonic order of Pax Americana is in decline, is a matter of current debate.46 The very fact that it is called in question indicates a weakening of the ideological dimensions of hegemony, even if it proves nothing about the material power relations underpinning hegemony. Supposing hegemony to be in decline, several logical possibilities for the future are (a) a revival of the declining hegemony,47 (b) a revival of the universals of the declining hegemony underpinned not by one state but by an oligarchy of powerful states that would have to concert their powers;48 (c) the founding of a new hegemony by another state successfully universalizing its own principles of order;49 (d) a non44

45 46

47 48

49

H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, 1977), pp. 254-5. R. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', Millennium Journal of International Studies, 12 (1983), pp. 162-75. On this, see for example, P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1987); J. Nye, Sound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990); S. Strange, The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 551-74; and S. Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge, 1990). This would seem to be Nye's thesis in Bound to Lead. Envisaged notably in Keohane, After Hegemony. For example, speculations about a Pax Nipponica. See E. Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?', Foreign Affairs, 64 (1986), pp. 752-67, and a sceptical comment by R. Cox, vMiddlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order', InternationalJournal, 44 (1989).

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hegemonic order lacking effective universal principles of order and functioning as an interplay of rival powerful states, each with their client states, most probably based on an organization of rival world regions;50 and (e) a counterhegemonic order anchored 4n a broader diffusion of power, in which a large number of collective forces, including states, achieve some agreement upon universal principles of an alternative order without dominance. Quite obviously, the likelihood of these logical possibilities seems weighted in favour of some more than others. Equally obviously, the role and possibilities of multilateralism would be very different in each. The most unlikely prospects are (a) and (c)—the era of dominant single powers founding hegemony seems now past; there are no plausible successors, to Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. The globalizing trend of the present would, at least in the medium term, give most probability to (b), with a distinct possibility, in case of breakdown, e.g. through major financial crisis, of (d). In the much longer run, (e) will remain a possibility, and for many of the world's less powerful, an aspiration. Previous hegemonic orders have derived their universals from the dominant society, itself the product of a dominant civilization. A post-hegemonic order would have to derive its normative content in a search for common ground among constituent traditions of civilization. What might be this common ground? A first condition would be mutual recognition of distinct traditions of civilization, perhaps the most difficult step especially for those who have shared a common hegemonic perspective, and who are unprepared to forsake the security of belief in a natural order that is historically based on universalizing from one position of power in one form of civilization. The difficulty is underlined by the way political change outside the West is perceived and reported in the West—the tendency to view everything through Western concepts which can lead, as an example, to a conclusion that the 'end of history' is upon us as the apotheosis of a late Western capitalist civilization. Mutual recognition implies a readiness to try to understand others in their own terms. A second condition for a post-hegemonic order would be to move beyond the point of mutual recognition towards a kind of supra-intersubjectivity that would provide a bridge among the distinct and separate intersubjectivities of the different coexisting traditions of civilization. One can speculate that the grounds for this might be (1) recognition of the requisites for survival and sustained equilibrium in global ecology —though the specific inferences to be drawn from this may remain subjects of discord; (2) mutual acceptance of restraint in the use of violence to decide conflicts— not that this would eliminate organized political violence, though it might raise the costs of resort to violence; and (3) common agreement to explore the sources of conflict and to develop procedures for coping with conflict that would take account of distinct coexisting normative perspectives. Historical dialectic crosses the threshold of the present from past to future. Its mode of reasoning moves from an appraisal of the forces that have historically developed to interact in the present, towards an anticipation of the points of crisis and the real options for the future. It draws upon the three preceding perspectives— Realism, liberal institutionalism, and world-system analysis—while appropriating their insights within its own hermeneutic method. It approaches the problem of multilateralism as a problem in the making of a new world order. 50

For example, R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, 1987).

[12] Is American Multilateralism in Decline? By G. John Ikenberry

A

American foreign policy appears to have taken a sharp unilateral turn. A half century of U.S. leadership in constructing an international order organized around multilateral institutions, rule-based agreements, and alliance partnerships seems to be giving way to an assertive unilateralism. But how deeply rooted is this unilateral turn? Is it an inevitable feature of America's rising global power position? This article argues that the United States is not doomed to shed its multilateral orientation. Unipolar power provides new opportunities for the United States to act unilaterally, but the incentives are actually quite complex and cross-cutting; and these incentives arguably make multilateralism more rather than less desirable for Washington in many policy areas.

merican foreign policy appears to have taken a sharp unilateral turn. A half century of U.S. leadership in constructing an international order around multilateral institutions, rulebased agreements, and alliance partnerships seems to be giving way to a new assertive—even defiant—unilateralism. Over the last several years, the Bush administration has signaled a deep skepticism of multilateralism in a remarkable sequence of rejections of pending international agreements and treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Germ Weapons Convention, and the Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms. It also unilaterally withdrew from the 1970s Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which many experts regard as the cornerstone of modern arms-control agreements. More recently, spurred by its war on terrorism, the Bush administration has advanced new, provocative ideas about the American unilateral and preemptive use of force—and under this go-it-alone-if-necessary banner, it defied allies and world public opinion by launching a preventive war against Iraq. "When it comes to our security," President Bush proclaimed, "we really don't need anybody's permission."1 Unilateralism, of course, is not a new feature of American foreign policy. In every historical era, the United States has shown a willingness to reject treaties, violate rules, ignore allies, and use military force on its own.2 But many observers see today's U.S. unilateralism as something much more sweeping—not an occasional ad hoc policy decision, but a new strategic orientation. Capturing this view, one pundit calls it the "new unilateralism":

G. John Ikenberry is Peter E Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University ([email protected]). Until 2004, he is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, tie thanks Andrew Bennett, Joshua Busby, Jennifer Hochschild, Charles Kupchan, Dan Nexon, Jack Snyder, James Steinberg, Leslie Vinjamuri, William Wohlforth, participants at a Brookings Institution seminar, and three external reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. He also thanks Thomas Wright for valuable research assistance.

After eight years during which foreign policy success was largely measured by the number of treaties the president could sign and the number of summits he could attend, we now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of American national interests. Rather than contain power within a vast web of constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends.3 Indeed, Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has charged that the Bush administration threatens to make "a radical break with 55 years of a bipartisan tradition that sought international agreements and regimes of benefit to us."4 Americas "new unilateralism" has unsettled world politics. The stakes are high because in the decade since the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as an unrivaled and unprecedented global superpower. At no other time in modern history has a single state loomed so large over the rest of the world. But as American power has grown, the rest of the world is confronted with a disturbing double bind. On the one hand, the United States is becoming more crucial to other countries in the realization of their economic and security goals; it is increasingly in a position to help or hurt other countries. But on the other hand, the growth of American power makes the United States less dependent on weaker states, and so it is easier for the United States to resist or ignore these states. Does this Bush-style unilateralism truly represent a major turn away from the long postwar tradition of multilateralism in American foreign policy? It depends on whether today's American unilateralism is a product of deep structural shifts in the country's global position or if it reflects more contingent and passing circumstances. Does American unipolarity "select" for unilateralism? Do powerful states—when they get the chance—inevitably seek to disentangle themselves from international rules and institutions? Or are more complex considerations at work? The answers to these questions are relevant to determining whether the rise of American preeminence in the years since the end of the Cold War is ultimately consistent with or destined to undermine the post-1945 multilateral international order.

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Articles I Is American Multilateralism in Decline? This article makes three arguments: theoretical traditions that offer explanations for continued mulFirst, the new unilateralism is not an inevitable reaction to ris- tilateralism. To be sure, unipolarity creates opportunities for ing American power. The international system may give the unilateralist foreign-policy officials to push their agenda, particUnited States more opportunities to act unilaterally, but the ularly in the areas of arms control and the use of force, where incentives to do so are actually complex and mixed. And arguably, multilateral rules and norms have been weak even under the these incentives make a multilateral approach more—not less— most favorable circumstances. The incentives and pressures for desirable for Washington in many areas of foreign policy. multilateralism are altered but not extinguished with the rise of Second, despite key officials' deep and ideologically driven American unipolarity. skepticism about multilateralism, the Bush administration's opposition to multilateralism represents in practical terms an What Is Multilateralism? attack on specific types of multilateral agreements more than it Multilateralism involves the coordination of relations among does a fundamental assault on the "foundational" multilateralism three or more states according to a set of rules or principles. It can of the postwar system. One area is arms control, nonproliferation, be distinguished from other types of interstate relations in three and the use of force, where many in the administration do resist ways. First, because it entails the coordination of relations among the traditional multilateral, treaty-based approach. Likewise, a group of states, it can be contrasted with bilateral, "hub and some of the other new multilateral treaties that are being negoti- spoke," and imperial arrangements. Second, the terms of a given ated today represent slightly different trade-offs for the United relationship are defined by agreed-upon rules and principles— and sometimes by organizations—so multilateralism can be conStates. In the past, the United States has embraced multilateralism because it provided ways to protect American freedom of trasted with interactions based on ad hoc bargaining or straightaction: escape clauses, weighted voting, and veto rights. The "new forward power politics. Third, multilateralism entails some unilateralism" is in part a product of the "new multilateralism," reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and actions of which offers fewer opportunities for the United States to exercise the participating states are—at least to some degree—constrained political control over others and fewer ways to escape the binding by the agreed-upon rules and principles.5 Multilateralism can operate at three levels of international obligations of the agreements. Weaker states have responded to the rise of American unipo- order: system multilateralism, ordering or foundational multilatlarity by seeking to embed the United States further in binding eralism, and contract multilateralism. At the most basic level, it is manifest in the Westphalian institutional relationships (in state system, where norms of effect, to "tie Gulliver down"), Does American unipolarity "select" for unilatersovereignty, formal equality, while American officials and legal-diplomatic practice attempt to get the benefits of a alism? Do powerful states—when they get the prevail.6 This is multilateralism multilateral order without as it relates to the deep organiaccepting greater encroachchance—inevitably seek to disentangle themzation of the units and their ments on its policy autonomy. mutual recognition and interacWe are witnessing not an end to selves from international rules and institutions? tion; this notion is implicit in multilateralism but a struggle both realist and neoliberal theoover its scope and character. A Or are more complex considerations at work? ries of international order. At a "politics of institutions" is being more intermediate level, multiplayed out between the United States and the rest of the world within the United Nations, the lateralism can refer to the political-economic organization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade regional or international order. John Ruggie notes that "an 'open' and 'liberal' international economic order is multilateral in Organization (WTO), and other postwar multilateral fora. Third, the circumstances that led the United States to engage form." The overall organization of relations among the in multilateral cooperation in the past are still present and, in advanced industrial countries has this basic multilateral characsome ways, have actually increased. In particular, there are three teristic. As Robert Keohane observes, "Since the end of World major sources of multilateralism: functional demands for coop- War II, multilateralism has become increasingly important in eration (e.g., institutional contracts between states that reduce world politics, as manifest in the proliferation of multinational barriers to mutually beneficial exchange); hegemonic power conferences on a bewildering variety of themes and an increase in management, both to institutionalize power advantages and, by the number of multilateral intergovernmental organizations from fewer than 100 in 1945 to about 200 in 1960 and over 600 in reducing the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power, to 1980."8 At the surface level, multilateralism also refers to specifmake the hegemonic order more stable and legitimate; and the ic intergovernmental treaties and agreements. These can be American legal-institutional political tradition of seeing this thought of as distinct "contracts" among states. domestic rule-of-law orientation manifest in the country's Multilateralism can also be understood in terms of the binding approach to international order. I begin by looking at the logic and dimensions of multilater- character of the rules and principles that guide interstate relations. In its loosest form, multilateralism can simply entail general conalism. Next, I present and critique the structural, power-based explanation for the new unilateralism. I then look at three sultations and informal adjustments among states.9 This form of 534

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Figure 1 Types of Multilateral Relations system

sovereign state system: constitution of legal actors; principles of mutual recognition, formal equality, diplomatic practice

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basic organizing principles and features of the international order indivisibility of economic and security areas

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individual agreements/treaties among groups of states

multilateralism can be traced back to the diplomatic practices of the Concert of Europe, where the great powers observed a set of unwritten rules and norms about the balance of power on the continent. For instance, no major power would act alone in matters of diplomacy and territorial adjustments, and no great power could be isolated or humiliated.10 This loose, nonbinding type of multilateralism can be found today in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was established in the early 1990s to promote regional economic cooperation. The WTO and other multilateral economic institutions entail more formal, treatybased agreements that specify certain commitments and obligations. But the binding character of these multilateral agreements is still qualified: escape clauses, weighted voting, opt-out agreements, and veto rights are all part of the major post-1945 multilateral agreements. The most binding multilateral agreements are ones where states actually cede sovereignty in specific areas to supranational authorities. The European Union is the most important manifestation of this sovereignty-transferring, legally binding multilateralism.11 Multilateralism (as well as unilateralism) can also be understood in terms of its sources. It can emerge from the international system's structural features, including the distribution of power (i.e., the rise or decline of American dominance), the growth of complex interdependence, and the emergence of nonstate violent collective action. Incentives for multilateralism can also come from the independent influence of preexisting multilateral institutions. For example, the postwar multilateral order might in various ways put pressure on the United States to maintain or even expand its commitments. Incentives for multilateralism may also come from inside a state, manifest in national political identity and tradition or more specific factors such as fiscal and manpower costs and election cycles. Finally, multilateralism can be traced to agentic sources, such as the ideologies of government elites, the ideas pressed upon government by nongovernmental organizations, and the maneuvering of elites over treaty conditions and ratification. When deciding whether to sign a multilateral agreement, a state faces a trade-off. In choosing to abide by the rules and norms of the agreement, the state must accept a reduction in its

policy autonomy. That is, it must agree to some constraints on its freedom of action—or independence of policy making—in a particular area. But in exchange, it expects other states to do the same. The multilateral bargain will be attractive to a state if it concludes that the benefits that flow to it through the coordination of policies are greater than the costs of lost policy autonomy. In an ideal world, a state might want to operate in an international environment in which all other states are heavily rulebound while leaving itself entirely unencumbered by rules and institutional restraints.12 But because all states are inclined in this way, the question becomes one of how much autonomy each must relinquish in order to get rule-based behavior out of the others. A state's willingness to agree to a multilateral bargain will hinge on several factors that shape the ultimate cost-benefit calculation. One is whether the policy constraints imposed on other states (states b, c, and d] really matter to the first state (state a). If the "unconstrained" behavior of other states is judged to have no undesirable impact on a, then a will be unwilling to give up any policy autonomy of its own. It also matters if the participating states can credibly restrict their policy autonomy. If a is not convinced that b, c, and d can actually be constrained by multilateral rules and norms, it will not be willing to sacrifice its own policy autonomy.13 Likewise, if the agreement is to work, a will need to convince the other states that it too will be constrained. These factors are all continuous rather than dichotomous variables, so the states must make judgments about the degree of credibility and relative value of constrained policies.14 When multilateral bargains are made by states with highly unequal power, the considerations can be more complex. The more that a powerful state is capable of dominating or abandoning weaker states, the more the weaker states will care about constraints on the leading state's policy autonomy. In other words, they will be more eager to see some limits placed on the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power by the leading state. Similarly, the more that the powerful state can restrain itself in a credible fashion, the more that weaker states will be Figure 2 Sources of Multilateralism system

complex interdependence, unipolarity, the rise of nonstate violent collective action

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Articles I is American Multilateralism in Decline? interested in multilateral rules and norms that accomplish this end. When both these conditions hold—when the leading state can use its power to dominate and abandon, and when it can restrain and commit itself—the weaker states will be particularly eager for a deal. They will, of course, also care about the positive benefits that accrue from cooperation. Of course, the less important the policy behavior of weaker states—and the less certain the leading state is that weaker states can in fact constrain their policies—the less the leading state will offer to limit its own policy autonomy.

Varieties of Multilateralism

In this light, it is easy to see why the United States sought to build a post-1945 order around multilateral economic and security agreements such as the Bretton Woods agreements on monetary and trade relations and the NATO security pact. The United States ended World War II in an unprecedented power position, so the weaker European states attached a premium to taming and harnessing this newly powerful state. Britain, France, and other major states were willing to accept multilateral agreements to the extent that they also constrained and regularized U.S. economic and security actions. American agreement to operate within a multilateral economic order and make an alliance-based security commitment to Europe was worth the price: it ensured that Germany and the rest of Western Europe would be integrated into a wider, American-centered international order. At the same time, the actual restraints on U.S. policy were minimal. Convertible currencies and open trade were in the United States' basic national economic interest. The United States did make a binding security guarantee to Western Europe, and this made American power more acceptable to Europeans, who were then more eager to cooperate with the United States in other areas.15 But the United States did not forswear the right to unilaterally use force elsewhere. It supported multilateral economic and security relations with Europe, and it agreed to operate economically and militarily within multilateral institutions organized around agreed-upon rules and principles. In return, it ensured that Western Europe would be firmly anchored in an Atlantic and global political order that advanced America's long-term national interest. The United States was less determined or successful in establishing a multilateral order in East Asia. Proposals were made for an East Asian version of NATO, but security relations quickly took the shape of bilateral military pacts. Conditions did not favor Atlantic-style multilateralism. Europe had a set of roughly equal-sized states that could be brought together in a multilateral pact tied to the United States, while Japan largely stood alone.16 But another factor mattered as well: the United States was dominant in East Asia yet wanted less out of the region, so the United States found it less necessary to give up policy autonomy in exchange for institutional cooperation there. In Europe, the United States had an elaborate agenda of uniting European states, creating an institutional bulwark against communism, and supporting centrist democratic governments. These ambitious goals could not be realized simply by exercising brute power. To get what it wanted, the United States had to bargain 536

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with the Europeans, and this meant agreeing to institutionally restrain and commit its power. In East Asia, the building of order around bilateral pacts with Japan, Korea, and other states was a more desirable strategy because multilateralism would have entailed more restraints on policy autonomy. As Peter Katzenstein argues: "It was neither in the interest of the United States to create institutions that would have constrained independent decision making in Washington nor in the interest of subordinate states to enter into institutions in which they would have minimal control while forgoing opportunities for freeriding and dependence reduction. Extreme hegemony thus led to a system of bilateral relations between states rather than a multilateral system than emerged in the North Atlantic area around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community."17 Despite these regional variations, the international order that took shape after 1945 was decidedly multilateral. A core objective of American postwar strategists was to ensure that the world did not break apart into 1930s~style closed regions.18 An open system of trade and investment—enshrined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods agreement— provided one multilateral foundation to the postwar order. The alliance ties between the United States and Europe provided another. NATO was not just a narrow security pact but was seen by its founders as an extension of the collective self-defense provision of the UN Charter. The security of Europe and America are bound together; the parties thus have substantial consultative and decision-making obligations to each other. This indivisibility of economic and security relations is what has given the Westerncentered international order a deep multilateral character. The United States makes commitments to other participating states— that is, it provides security protection and access to its markets, technology, and society in the context of an open international system. In exchange, other states agree to be stable political partners with the United States and offer it economic, diplomatic, and logistical support. This is multilateralism as Ruggie has described it—as an organizational form.19 The parts of this Western order are connected by economic and security relationships that are informed by basic rules, norms, and institutions. The rules and institutions are understood by participating states to matter, reflecting loosely agreed-upon rights, obligations, and expectations about how "business" will be done within the order. It is an open system in which members exhibit "diffuse reciprocity."20 Power does not disappear from this multilateral order, but it operates in a bargaining system in which rules and institutions—and power—play an interactive role. At this foundational or ordering level, multilateralism still remains a core feature of the contemporary Western international system, despite the inroads of the "new unilateralism." On top of this foundational multilateral order, a growing number and variety of multilateral agreements have been offered up and signed by states. At a global level, between 1970 and 1997, the number of international treaties more than tripled; and from 1985 through 1999 alone, the number of international institutions increased by two-thirds.21 What this means is that an expanding number of multilateral "contracts" is being proposed

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and agreed to by states around the world. The United States has become party to more and more of these contracts. This is reflected in the fact that the number of multilateral treaties in force for the United States steadily grew during the twentieth century. There were roughly 150 multilateral treaties in force in 1950, 400 in 1980, and close to 600 in 2000. In the most recent five-year period, 1996 through 2000, the United States ratified roughly the same number of treaties as in earlier postwar periods.22 Other data, summarized in Figure 3, indicate an increase in bilateral treaties passed by the Congress and a slight decrease in the number of multilateral treaties from 1945 through 2000.23 Measured in these rough aggregate terms, the United States has not significantly backed away from what is a more and more dense web of international treaties and agreements.24 Two conclusions follow from these observations. First, in the most general of terms, there has not been a dramatic decline in the propensity of the United States to enter into multilateral treaties. In fact, the United States continues to take on multilateral commitments at a steady rate. But the sheer volume of "contracts" that are being offered around the world for agreement has steadily expanded—and while the American "yield" on proposed multilateral treaties may not be substantially lower than in earlier decades, the absolute number of rejected contracts is necessarily larger. The United States has more opportunities to look unilateral today than in the past, even though it is not more likely when confronted with a specific "contract" to be any less multilateral than in earlier years. Second, even if the United States does

act unilaterally in opposing specific multilateral treaties that come along, it is important to distinguish these rejected "contracts" from the older foundational agreements that give the basic order its multilateral form. There is no evidence of "rollback" at this deeper level of order. But it is necessary to look more closely at the specific explanations for American multilateralism and the recent unilateral turn.

Unipolar Power and Multilateralism

The simplest explanation for the new unilateralism is that the United States has grown in power during the 1990s, thereby reducing its incentives to operate within a multilateral order. As one pundit has put it: "Any nation with so much power always will be tempted to go it alone. Power breeds unilateralism. It is as simple as that."25 This is a structural-realist explanation that says, in effect, that because of the shifting distribution of power in favor of the United States, the international system is increasingly "selecting" for unilateralism in its foreign policy.26 The United States has become so powerful that it does not need to sacrifice its autonomy or freedom of action within multilateral agreements. Unipolar power gives the United States the ability to act alone and do so without serious costs. Today's international order, then, is at the early stage of a significant transformation triggered by what will be a continuous and determined effort by a unipolar America to disentangle itself from the multilateral restraints of an earlier era. It matters little who is president and what political party runs the

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Articles I Is American Multilateralism in Decline? government. The United States will exercise its power more directly—less mediated or constrained by international rules, institutions, or alliances. The result will be an international order that is more hegemonic than multilateral, more powerbased than rule-based. The rest of the world will complain, but will not be able or willing to impose sufficient costs on the United States to alter its growing unilateral orientation. This explanation for the decline of American multilateralism rests on several considerations. First, the United States has turned into a unipolar global power without historical precedent. The 1990s surprised the world. Many observers expected the end of the Cold War to usher in a multipolar order with increasingly equal centers of power in Asia, Europe, and America. Instead, the United States began the decade as the world's only superpower and proceeded to grow more powerful at the expense of the other major states. Between 1990 and 1998, the United States' gross national product grew 27 percent, Europe's 16 percent, and Japan's 7 percent. Today, the American economy is equal to the economies of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany combined. The United States' military capacity is even more in a league of its own. It spends as much on defense as the next 14 countries taken together. It has bases in 40 countries. Eighty percent of world military research and development takes place in the United States.27 What the 1990s wrought is a unipolar America that is more powerful than any other great state in history.28 Second, these massive power advantages give the United States opportunities to resist entanglements in multilateral rules and institutions. Multilateralism can be a tool or expedient in some circumstances, but states will avoid or shed entanglements in rules and institutions when they can.29 This realist vision of multilateralism is captured by Robert Kagan, who argues that multilateralism is a "weapon of the weak." He adds: "When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do."30 Put another way, power disparities make it easier for the United States to walk away from potential international agreements. Across the spectrum of economic, security, environmental, and other policy issues, the sheer size and power advantages of the United States make it easier to resist multilateral restraints. That is, the costs of nonagreement are lower for the United States than for other states—which gives it bargaining advantages but also a greater ability to forgo agreement without suffering consequences.31 According to this view, the American willingness to act multilaterally during the postwar era was an artifact of the bipolar struggle. The United States needed allies, and the construction of this "free world" coalition entailed some American willingness to agree to multilateral commitments and restraints. Yet even during the Cold War decades, realists note, multilateral economic and security commitments did not entail great compromises on American policy autonomy. Voting shares, veto power, and escape clauses have been integral to American multilateralism during this earlier era. Today, even these contingent multilateral commitments and restraints are unnecessary. 538

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Third, the shifting power differentials have also created new divergent interests between the United States and the rest of the world, a fact that further reduces possibilities for multilateral cooperation. For example, the sheer size of the American economy—and a decade of growth unmatched by Europe, Japan, or the other advanced countries—means that U.S. obligations under the Kyoto Protocol would be vastly greater than those of other states.32 The United States has global interests and security threats that no other state has. Its troops are the ones most likely to be dispatched to distant battlefields, which means that it is more exposed than other states to the legal liabilities of the ICC. The United States must worry about threats to its interests in all major regions of the world. Such unipolar power is a unique target for terrorism. It is not surprising that Europeans and Asians make different assessments of terrorist threats and rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction than American officials do. Since multilateralism entails working within agreed-upon rules and institutions about the use of force, this growing divergence will make multilateral agreements less easy to achieve—and less desirable in the view of the United States. This structural-power perspective on multilateralism generates useful insights. One such insight is that the United States—as well as other states—has walked away from international rules and agreements when they did not appear to advance American interests. This helps to explain a lot about American foreign policy over many decades. For example, when the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua was brought before the International Court of Justice on the grounds of a violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty, the court ruled in Nicaragua's favor. The U.S. response was immediately to move to rescind the court's jurisdiction over the United States. In this sense, Kenneth Waltz is surely correct when he argues that "strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them."33 But the more general claim about unipolarity and the decline of multilateralism is misleading. To begin with, at earlier moments of power preeminence, the United States did not shy away from multilateralism. As Farced Zakaria notes: America was the most powerful country in the world when it proposed the creation of an international organization, the League of Nations, to manage international relations after the First World War. It was the dominant power at the end of the Second World War, when it founded the United Nations, created the Bretton Woods system of international economic cooperation, and launched most of the world's key international organizations.34

During the 1990s, the United States again used its unrivaled position after the end of the Cold War to advance new multilateral agreements, including the WTO, NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), and APEC. There is no necessary or simple connection between a state's power position and its inclinations toward multilateralism, a tool that weak and strong alike can use.35 What is most distinctive about American policy is its mixed record on multilateralism. The United States is not rolling back its commitments to foundational multilateralism, but it is picking

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and choosing among the variety of multilateral agreements being negotiated today. Power considerations—and American unipolar power—surely are part of the explanation for both the calculations that go into American decisions and the actions of other states. The United States has actively championed the WTO but is resisting a range of arms control treaties. One has to look beyond gross power distributions and identify more specific costs and incentives that inform state policy. The chief problem with the structural-power explanation for America's new unilateralism is that it hinges on an incomplete accounting of the potential costs of unilateralism. The assumption is that the United States has become so powerful that other countries are unable to impose costs if it acts alone. On economic, environmental, and security issues, the rhetorical question that the United States can always ask when confronted with opposition to American unilateralism is this: they may not like it, but what are they going to do about it? According to this view, the United States is increasingly in the position that it was in East Asia during the early Cold War: it is so hegemonic that it has few incentives to tie itself to multilateral rules and institutions, and it can win on issues that it cares about by going it alone or bargaining individually with weaker states. This view—as we shall see below—is a very superficial reading of the situation. Unipolarity and unilateralist ideologies One source of the new unilateralism does follow—at least indirectly—from unipolar power. The United States is so powerful that the ideologies and policy views of a few key decision makers in Washington can have a huge impact on the global order, even if these views are not necessarily representative of the wider foreign policy community or of public opinion. In effect, the United States is so powerful that the structural pressures associated with anarchy—which lead to security competition and relative gains calculations—decline radically. The passing views of highly placed administration elites matter more than in other states or international structural circumstances.36 Indeed, the Bush administration does have a large group of officials who have articulated deep intellectual reservations about international treaties and multilateral organizations.37 Many of America's recent departures from multilateralism are agreements dealing with arms control and proliferation. In this area, American policy elites are deeply divided on how to advance the nation's security—a division that dates back to right-wing opposition to American arms control diplomacy with the Soviet Union during the Nixon-Kissinger era.38 The skeptical view of arms control made its appearance during the Reagan administration in the embrace by hard-liners of the Star Wars missile defense program. It reappeared in the 1990s, when conservative Republicans again championed national missile defense. WTien asked why missile defense was part of the Republican "Contract with America" campaign in 1994, Representative Newt Gingrich remarked: "It is the difference between those who would rely on lawyers to defend America and those who rely on engineers and scientists."39 The circumstances of the post-Cold War era also complicate arms control and nonproliferation agreements. The arms control of the Soviet era had a more immediate and reciprocal character.

The United States agreed to restraints on its nuclear arsenal; but in return, it got relatively tangible concessions from the Soviets, and the agreements themselves were widely seen to have a stabilizing impact on the global order—something both sides desired.40 The arms-control agenda today is more diverse and problematic. New types of agreements are being debated in a more uncertain and shifting international security environment. With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Land Mines Treaty, for example, the United States accepts restraints on its military capabilities without the same degree of confidence that they will generate desired reciprocal action. ! The realms of arms control—along with the calculations of costs and benefits, at least among some American elites—have changed. This helps explain why American unilateralism today is so heavily manifest in this policy area.42 Some observers contend that the Bush administration has embraced a more ambitious unilateralist agenda aimed at rolling back and disentangling the United States from post-1945 foundational multilateral rules and institutions. Grand strategic ideas of this sort are circulating inside and outside the administration. One version of this thinking is simply old-style nationalism that sees international institutions and agreements as a basic threat to American sovereignty. 3 Another version—increasingly influential in Washington—is advanced by the so-called neoconservative movement, which seeks to use American power to singlehandedly reshape entire countries, particularly in the Middle East, so as to make them more congenial with American interests.44 This is a neo-imperial vision of American order that requires the United States to unshackle itself from the norms and institutions of multilateral action (and from partners that reject the neo-imperial project). It is possible that this neo-imperial agenda could undermine the wider and deeper multilateral order. Given sufficient time and opportunity, a small group of determined foreign policy officials could succeed in subverting multilateral agreements and alliance partnerships—even if such steps were opposed by the wider foreign policy community and the American public. This could be done intentionally or it could happen indirectly if, by violating core multilateral rules and norms, the credibility of American commitment to the wider array of agreements and norms becomes suspect and the entire multilateral edifice crumbles. The possibility of unilateral action against self-interest does exist. Great powers have often in the past launched themselves in aggressive directions (often unilateral) that appear in retrospect to have not been in their interest. Examples include Wilhelmine Germany (1890-1918), Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union during most of its history, France and Britain in the Crimean War, ancient Athens' expedition to Syracuse, and the United States in Vietnam.45 It is extremely doubtful, however, that a neo-imperial foreign policy can be sustained at home or abroad. There is no evidence that the American people are eager for or willing to support such a transformed global role. It is not clear that the country will even be willing to bear the costs of rebuilding Iraq, let alone undertake a global neo-imperial campaign to overturn and rebuild other countries in the region. Moreover, if the neoconservative agenda www.apsanet.org

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Articles I Is American Multilateralism in Decline? is really focused on promoting democracy in the Arab and Muslim world, the unilateral use of force will be of limited and diminishing importance, while the multilateral engagement of the region will be critical. In the end, a determined, ideologically motivated policy elite can push the United States in dramatic new directions, but electoral cycles and democratic politics make it difficult for costly and self-destructive policy orientations to be sustained over the long term.46 Multilateral rule breaking and rule making Even if the United States takes advantage of its unipolar power to act unilaterally in various policy areas, the action can lead to multilateralism—no matter what the United States intended. Britain used its position as the leading naval power of the nineteenth century to suppress piracy on the high seas, which eventually led to agreements and concerted action among the major states to protect ocean shipping. 7 President Nixon unilaterally "closed the gold window" of the Bretton Woods monetary regime in the early 1970s, which upset Japan and European countries but eventually led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G-8 summit process. President Reagan pursued unilateral trade policies in some instances during the 1980s, but this led to the establishment of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Rule breaking can lead to rule making.48 Unilateralism leading to new multilateral rules is a dynamic that is particularly likely to emerge when new issues and circumstances alter the interest calculations of leading states. In the 1990s, the United States and other states showed a willingness to go beyond long-standing UN norms about sovereignty in the use of force in humanitarian crises. This experience appears to be leading to new multilateral understandings about when the UN Charter sanctions international action in defense of human rights.49 Further, the United States has recently advanced new ideas about the preemptive—and even preventative—use of force to combat terrorism. This unilateral assertion of American rights has triggered a world debate on UN principles regarding the use of force, and the result could well be a new agreement that adapts existing rules and norms to cope with the new circumstances of global terrorism.50 So it is useful to look more closely at the factors that give rise to multilateralism.

Sources of Multilateralism

The United States is not structurally destined to disentangle itself from the multilateral order and go it alone. Indeed, there continue to be deep underlying incentives for the United States to support multilateralism—incentives that in many ways are increasing. The sources of U.S. multilateralism stem from the functional demands of interdependence, the long-term calculations of power management, and American political tradition and identity. Interdependence and functional multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained, even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration, in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows, so does the need for multilateral coordination of policies. The more eco540

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nomically interconnected states become, the more dependent they are on the actions of other states for the realization of objectives. "As interdependence rises," Keohane argues, "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase, compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements."51 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. Over the postwar era, states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic, social, and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. If this remains true in the years ahead, it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements—even, and perhaps especially, by the United States—will increase. One theoretical tradition, neoliberal institutionalism, provides an explanation for the rise of multilateral institutions under these circumstances. Institutions perform a variety of functions, such as reducing uncertainty and the costs of transactions between states.52 Mutually beneficial exchanges are missed in the absence of multilateral rules and procedures, which help states overcome collective action, asymmetrical information, and the fear that other states will cheat or act opportunistically. In effect, multilateral rules and institutions provide a contractual environment within which states can more easily pursue joint gains. Likewise, as the density of interactions between states increases, so will the demand for rules and institutions that facilitate these interactions. In this sense, multilateralism is self-reinforcing. A wellfunctioning contractual environment facilitates the promulgation of additional multilateral rules and institutions. As Keohane points out, the combination of growing interdependence and successful existing institutions should lead to the expansion in the tasks and scope of multilateralism in the relevant policy area.53 This argument helps explain why a powerful state might support multilateral agreements, particularly in trade and other economic policy areas. To return to the cost-benefit logic of multilateralism discussed earlier, the leading state has a major interest in inducing smaller states to open their economies and participate in an integrated world economy. As the world s leading economy, it has an interest in establishing not just an open system but also a predictable one—that is to say, it will want rules, principles, and institutions that create a highly stable and accessible order. As the density and sophistication of these interactions grow, the leading state will have greater incentives for a stable, rule-based economic order. What the dominant state wants from other states grows along with its economic size and degree of interdependence. But to get weaker states to commit themselves to an open and increasingly elaborate rule-based regime, it must establish its own reliability. It must be willing to commit itself credibly to the same rules and institutions.54 It will be necessary for the dominant state to reduce its policy autonomy—and do so in a way that other states find credible. The American postwar commitment to a multilateral system of economic rules and institutions can be understood in this way. As the world s dominant state, the United States championed GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions as ways of locking other countries into an open world economy that would ensure massive economic gains for itself. But to get these states to organize their post-

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war domestic orders around an open world economy—and accept the political risks and vulnerabilities associated with openness— the United States had to signal that it too would play by the rules and not exploit or abandon these weaker countries. The postwar multilateral institutions facilitated this necessary step. As the world economy and trading system have expanded over the decades, this logic has continued. It is reflected in the WTO, which replaced the GATT in 1995 and embodies an expansive array of legal-institutional rules and mechanisms.55 The United States demands an expanding and ever-more complex international economic environment, but to get the support of other states, the United States must itself become more embedded in this system of rules and institutions. This perspective is particularly useful in identifying specific policy realms—such as trade—where multilateralism is an attractive tool to advance American interests. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Bush administration has succeeded in gaining "fast track" authority from Congress and led the launch of a new multilateral trade round. This view does acknowledge that American support for multilateralism will be uneven across policy realms. But it is not clear how American support for trade multilateralism may or may not spill over to other policy realms, such as the environment or the use of force. Hegemonic power and strategic restraint American support for multilateralism also stems from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. This logic is particularly evident at major historical turning points—such as 1919, 1945, and after the Cold War—when the United States has faced choices about how to use power and organize interstate relations. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states, thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states.56 The United States has pursued this strategy to varying degrees across the twentieth century—and this reflects the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order. From this perspective, multilateralism—and the search for rule-based agreements—should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. Moreover, the existing multilateral order, which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world, should rein in the Bush administration, and the administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.57 This theoretical perspective begins by looking at the choices that dominant states face when they are in a position to shape the fundamental character of the international order. A state that wins a war, or through some other turn of events finds itself in a dominant global position, faces a choice: it can use its power to bargain and coerce other states in struggles over the distribution of gains, or, knowing that its power position will someday decline and that there are costs to enforcing its way within the order, it can move toward a more rule-based, institutionalized order in exchange for the acquiescence and compliant participation of weaker states. In seeking a more rule-based order, the leading state is agreeing to engage in strategy restraint—it is acknowledging

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that there will be limits on the way in which it can exercise its power. Such an order, in effect, has "constitutional" characteristics. Limits are set on what a state within the order can do with its power advantages. Just as in constitutional polities, the implications of "winning" in politics are reduced. Weaker states realize that the implications of their inferior position are limited and perhaps temporary; operation within the order, despite their disadvantages, does not risk everything, nor will it give the dominant state a permanent advantage. Both the powerful and weak states agree to operate within the same order, regardless of radical asymmetries in the distribution of power.58 Multilateralism becomes a mechanism by which a dominant state and weaker ones can reach a bargain over the character of international order. The dominant state reduces its "enforcement costs" and succeeds in establishing an order where weaker states will participate willingly rather than resist or balance against the leading power.59 It accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power. The rules and institutions that are created serve as an "investment" in the longer-run preservation of its power advantages. Weaker states agree to the order's rules and institutions. In return, they are assured that the worst excesses of the leading state—manifest as arbitrary and indiscriminate abuses of state power—will be avoided, and they gain institutional opportunities to work and help influence the leading state.60 Arguably, this institutional bargain has been at the heart of the postwar Western order. After World War II, the United States launched history's most ambitious era of institution building. The UN, the IMF, the World Bank, GATT, NATO, and other institutions that emerged provided the most rule-based structure for political and economic relations in world history. The United States was deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states or allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet threat during the Cold War was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built that made American power farther-reaching and durable but also more predictable and restrained. As a former State Department official (now a Special Trade Representative) described this postwar bargain: "The more powerful participants in the system— especially the United States—did not forswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their strength without substantial restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interests, it sacrificed some degree of national autonomy to promote it."61 In its most extreme versions, today's new unilateralism appears to be a violation of this postwar bargain. Certainly this is the view of some Europeans and others around the world. But if the Bush administration's unilateral moves are seen as more limited—and not emerging as a basic challenge to the foundations of multilateralism—this observation might be incorrect. The problem with the argument about order built on an institutional bargain and strategic restraint is that it reflects judgments by decision makers about how much institutional restraint and commitment by the dominant state is necessary to secure how much participatory acquiescence and compliance by weaker states. The Bush administration might calculate that the order is sufficiently stable that www.apsanet.org

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Articles I Is American Multilateralism in Decline? the United States can resist an entire range of new multilateral agreements and still not trigger costly responses from its partners. It might also miscalculate in this regard and do great damage to the existing order. Yet if the thesis about the constitutional character of the postwar Western order is correct, a basic turn away from multilateralism should not occur. The institutionalized order, which facilitates intergovernmental bargaining and "voice opportunities" for Americas weaker partners, should have some impact on American policy. The multilateral processes and "pulling and hauling" within the order should, at least to some extent, lead the United States to adjust its policies so as not to endanger the basic postwar bargain. And the Bush administration should act as if they recognize the virtues of strategic restraint. The struggle between the United States and its security partners over how to deal with Iraq put American strategic restraint and multilateral security cooperation to the test. Governments around the world were extremely uncomfortable with the prospect of American unilateral use of force. Reflecting this view, a French diplomat recently noted: "France is not interested in arguing with the United States. This is a matter of principle. This is about the rules of the game in the world today. About putting the Security Council in the center of international life. And not permitting a nation, whatever nation it may be, to do what it wants, when it wants, where it wants."62 During the run-up to the Iraq war, the Bush administration insisted on its right to act without the multilateral approval of the United Nations—but its decision to take the issue of Iraq back to the United Nations in September 2002 is an indication that the administration sensed the costs of unilateralism.63 By seeking a UN Security Council resolution that demands tough new weapons inspections and warning that serious consequences will flow from an Iraqi failure to comply, the United States acted to place its anti-Saddam policy in a multilateral framework.64 In the end, the Bush administration went to war with Iraq almost alone, ignoring an uproar of international opposition, and without an explicit Security Council resolution authorizing the use offeree. Governments that opposed the war had attempted to use the Security Council as a tool to restrain the American unilateral and preemptive use offeree, while the Bush administration had attempted to use it to provide political cover for its military operations aimed at regime change in Baghdad. The episode reveals a search by the United States for a modicum of legitimacy for its provocative act, but also a willingness to incur political costs and go it alone if necessary. Still, the administration sought to wrap itself in the authority of the United Nations. In making the case for war, President Bush and UN Ambassador John Negreponte did not refer to the administration's controversial National Security Strategy, which claimed an American unilateral right to use force at any time and place in anticipation of future threats.65 Rather, they defended the intervention in terms of the continuing authority of UN resolutions and the failure of the Iraqi regime to comply with disarmament agreements. The Bush administration pulled back from the extreme unilateral brink: instead of asserting a new doctrine of preventive force, it couched its actions in terms of UN authority. 542

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The diplomatic struggle at the United Nations over the American use of force in Iraq reflects a more general debate among major states over whether there will be agreed-upon rules and principles to guide and limit the exercise of U.S. power. The Bush administration seeks to protect its freedom to act alone while giving just enough ground to preserve the legitimacy of America's global position and garner support for the practical problems of fighting terrorism. The administration is again making trade-offs between autonomy and gaining the multilateral cooperation of other states in confronting Iraq. The pressure for multilateralism in the American use of force is weaker and more diffuse than in other policy areas, such as trade and other economic realms. The incentives have less to do with the realization of specific material interests and more to do with the search for legitimacy—which brings with it the possibility of greater cooperation by other countries and a reduction of the general political "drag" on the American exercise of power. But the Iraq war episode shows how these considerations can give way when a president and his advisers are utterly determined in their policy agenda. Finally, this same basic struggle has been played out in the controversy over the ICC. European governments are moving forward to establish a world court with universal jurisdiction and strong independent judicial authority in the area of war crimes. This necessarily entails an encroachment on American sovereignty in cases where crimes by its own citizens are alleged. The U.S. position during the Clinton years, when the treaty was being negotiated, was that the UN Security Council should be able to veto cases that were brought before the ICC. The United States sought to adopt the traditional postwar approach for multilateral agreements—that is, to give the major powers special opt-out and veto rights that make the binding obligations more contingent and subject to state review.66 The proponents of contingent multilateralism calculated that escape clauses made the signing of such agreements more likely and that rules and norms promulgated by the agreements would nonetheless have a longterm impact even on powerful states. The ICC represents a newer style of multilateralism in which the scope of the agreement is universal and the binding character is law-based and anchored in international judicial authority.67 The Europeans offered compromises in the ICC treaty: the court's statutes, framed to meet American concerns about political prosecutions, provide explicit guarantees that jurisdiction lies first with national governments.68 This suggests that the gap between the "old" and "new" multilateralism is not inherently unbridgeable. Political identity and multilateralism Another source of American multilateralism emerges from the polity itself. The United States has a distinctive self-understanding of its political order, and this has implications for how it thinks about international political order. To be sure, there are multiple political traditions in the United States that reflect divergent and often competing ideas about how the United States should relate to the rest of the world.69 These traditions variously counsel isolationism and activism, realism and idealism, aloofness and engagement in the conduct of American foreign affairs. But behind these

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political-intellectual traditions are deeper aspects of the American political identity that inform the way the United States seeks to build order in the larger global system. The enlightenment origin of the American founding has given the United States a political identity of self-perceived universal significance and scope.70 The republican democratic tradition that enshrines the rule of law reflects an enduring American view that polities—domestic or international—are best organized around rules and principles of order. Americas tradition of civic nationalism also reinforces this notion that the rule of law is the source of legitimacy and political inclusion. This tradition provides a background support for a multilateral foreign policy.71 The basic distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is useful in locating this feature of the American political tradition. Civic identity is group identity composed of commitments to the nation's political creed. Race, religion, gender, language, and ethnicity are not relevant in defining a citizen's rights and inclusion within the polity. Shared beliefs in the country's principles and values embedded in the rule of law is the organizing basis for political order, and citizens are understood to be equal and rightsbearing individuals. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, maintains that individual rights and participation within the polity are inherited—based on ethnic or racial or religious ties.72 Civic national identity has several implications for the multilateral orientation of American foreign policy. First, civic identity has tended to encourage the outward projection of U.S. domestic principles of inclusive and rule-based international political organization. The American national identity is not based on ethnic or religious particularism but on a more general set of agreedupon and normatively appealing principles. Ethnic and religious identities and disputes are pushed downward into civil society and removed from the political arena. When the United States gets involved in political conflicts around the world, it tends to look for the establishment of agreed-upon political principles and rules to guide the rebuilding of order. And when the United States promotes rule-based solutions to problems, it is strengthening the normative and principled basis for the exercise of its own power— and thereby making disparities in power more acceptable. Because civic nationalism is shared with other Western states, it tends to be a source of cohesion and cooperation. Throughout the industrial democratic world, the dominant form of political identity is based on abstract and juridical rights and responsibilities that coexist with private ethnic and religious associations. Just as warring states and nationalism tend to reinforce each other, so do Western civic identity and cooperative political relations. Political order—domestic and international—is strengthened when there exists a substantial sense of community and shared identity. It matters that the leaders of today's advanced industrial states are not seeking to legitimate their power by making racial or imperialist appeals. Civic nationalism, rooted in shared commitment to democracy and the rule of law, provides a widely embraced identity across most of the American hegemonic order. At the same time, potentially divisive identity conflicts—rooted in antagonistic ethnic, religious, or class divisions—are dampened by being relegated to secondary status within civil society.73 The notion that

the United States participates in a wider Western community of shared values and like-minded states reinforces American multilateralist impulses.7 Third, the multicultural character of the American political identity also reinforces internationalist—and ultimately multilateral—foreign policy. Ruggie notes that culture wars continue in the United States between a pluralistic and multicultural identity, and between nativist and parochial alternatives, but that the core identity is still "cosmopolitan liberal"—an identity that tends to support instrumental multilateralism: "[T]he evocative significance of multilateral world order principles—a bias against exclusive bilateralist alliances, the rejection of discriminatory economic blocs, and facilitating means to bridge gaps of ethos, race, and religion—should resonate still for the American public, insofar as they continue to reflect its own sense of national identity."75 U.S. society is increasingly heterogeneous in race, ethnicity, and religion. This tends to reinforce an activist and inclusive foreign policy orientation and a bias in favor of rule-based and multilateral approaches to the conduct of American foreign policy.76 To be sure, American leaders can campaign against multilateral treaties and institutions and win votes. But this has been true across the last century, manifest most dramatically in the rejection of the League of Nations treaty in 1919, but also reflected in other defeats, such as the International Trade Organization after World War II. When President George W. Bush went to the United Nations to rally support for his hard-line approach to Iraq, he did not articulate a central role for the world body in promoting international security and peace. He told the General Assembly: "We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions." But he also made it clear that "[t]he purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced . . . or action will be unavoidable."77 In contrast, just 12 years earlier, when the elder President Bush appeared before the General Assembly to press his case for resisting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, he offered a "vision of a new partnership of nations ... a partnership based on consultations, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations, a partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment."78 It would appear that American presidents can articulate quite divergent visions of American foreign policy, each resonating in its own way with ideas and beliefs within the American polity. If this is true, American presidents do have political and intellectual space to shape policy—and they are not captives of a unilateralist-minded public. Recent public opinion findings confirm this view and actually suggest that the American public is quite willing and eager to conduct foreign policy within multilateral frameworks. In a comprehensive poll of American and European attitudes on international affairs, the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that a clear majority of Americans actually favored joining the European Union in ratifying the Kyoto accord on global warming and the treaty creating the ICC. American public attitudes reveal a general multilateral bent. When given three alternatives about the role of the United States in solving international problems, most Americans (71 percent) said that www.apsanet.org

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Articles | Is American Multilateralism in Decline? the United States should act to solve problems together with other countries, and only 17 percent said that "as the sole remaining superpower the United States should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." There is also high—and increased—support for strengthening the United Nations, participating in UN peacekeeping operations, and using diplomatic methods to combat terrorism. When asked if the United States should or should not take action alone if it does not have the support of allies in responding to international crises, 61 percent said that the United States should not act alone. Only a third of the American public indicated that the United States should act alone.79

Conclusion

The rise of unipolarity is not an adequate explanation for recent unilateralism in American foreign policy. Nor is the United States doomed to shed its multilateral orientation. The dominant power position of the United States creates opportunities to go it alone, but the pressures and incentives that shape decisions about multilateral cooperation are quite varied and crosscutting. The sources of multilateralism—which can be traced to system, institutional, and domestic structural locations—still exist and continue to shape and restrain the Bush administration, unilateral inclinations notwithstanding. Multilateralism can be manifest at the system, ordering, and contract levels of international order. The critical question is not whether the Bush administration is more inclined than previous administrations to reject specific multilateral treaties and agreements (in some instances, it is), but whether the accumulation of these refusals undermines the deeper organizational logic of multilateralism in the Western and global system. At the ordering or foundational level, multilateralism is manifest in what might be termed "indivisible" economic and security relations. The basic organization of the order is multilateral in that it is open and tied together through diffuse reciprocity and cooperative security. But there is little or no evidence that ordering multilateralism is eroding or under attack.80 The sources of unilateralism are more specific and contingent. The United States has always been ambivalent about multilateral commitments. Political judgments about the costs of reduced policy autonomy and the benefits of rule-based order are at the heart of this ambivalence. The dominant area of American unilateralism is arms control and the use of force. The Bush administration has brought into office a policy elite that represents the skeptical side of a long-standing debate within the foreign policy community about the merits and limits of arms control. The shift from Cold War arms control to the more uncertain and unwieldy world of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nonproliferation reinforces these biases. But even in the area of WMD proliferation, the United States has incentives to develop multilateral mechanisms to pursue sanctions, inspections, and the use of force. Beyond these conclusions, three questions remain in the debate over the future of multilateralism. First, what precisely are the costs of unilateralism? The unilateralists in the Bush administration act under the assumption that they are minimal. If 544

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aggrieved states are not able to take action against the United States—such action ultimately would entail the threat of some sort of counterhegemonic coalition—then the costs of unilateralism will never truly threaten the American global position. This is particularly true in the area of world politics that has been historically the most immune to binding multilateral rules and institutions—namely, arms control and the use of force. But in areas such as trade, other countries can impose tangible costs on the United States. This helps explain why the United States has been more multilaterally forthcoming in trade than in other areas. The economic gains that flow from the coordination of economic relations also reinforce multilateralism. Additionally, a less tangible cost of unilateralism is when such foreign policy actions threaten the overall legitimacy of American global position. When the United States exercises its power in ways generally seen around the world as legitimate, its "costs of enforcement" go down. But when legitimacy declines, the United States must engage in more difficult and protracted power struggles with other states. Other states cannot fundamentally challenge the United States, but they can make its life more difficult. Threats to the international legitimacy of the United States can register within the American polity as a violation of its own political identity. The United States wants to act abroad in a way that is consistent with its self-image as a law-abiding, responsible country. How, when, and to what extent the costs of unilateralism matter is an ongoing puzzle. Second, to what extent does the existing multilateral order reinforce current choices about multilateralism? I have pointed out that the United States created a web of multilateral rules and institutions over the last half century that has taken the shape of a mature political order—and the United States is now embedded in this order. A vast latticework of intergovernmental processes and institutional relationships exists across the advanced industrial democracies. This multilateral complex ultimately serves to reduce the uncertainties and worries that weaker states would otherwise have about operating in a system dominated by a singularly powerful America. But questions linger: How powerful are the effects of this multilateral complex on American foreign policy? Does the "pulling and hauling" that is set in motion by this multilateral order actually discipline American power and its unilateral temptations? Third, how significant is the challenge of the "new multilateralism" to the older-style postwar multilateralism that the United States championed? I argue in this paper that Washington's resistance to new multilateral agreements has something to do with the new type of multilateralism. The older multilateralism came with escape clauses, veto rights, and weighted voting mechanisms that allowed the United States and other major states to protect their interests and gave room for maneuvering. The new multilateralism is more legally binding in character. The ICC is perhaps the best example. But how much "new multilateralism" is really out there? Is this a clash that is primarily centered on the ICC but not on the wider range of policy areas, or is it a more basic and serious emerging divide? How wide is the gap? Some experts argue that the exceptions and protections built into the Rome Treaty of the ICC did

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move in the direction of the old multilateral safeguards. Moreover, although the WTO manifests "new multilateralism" characteristics, the United States has been one of its major champions. So it is not clear how wide the divide is between old and new multilateralism or even if the conflict over these types of multilateralism pits the United States against the rest of the world. We need to know more about the sources of the new multilateralism. Is it a result of functional adjustments to more complex socioeconomic relations—as the WTO would seem to suggest—or a result of new issues, such as human rights and norms of justice, that make escape clauses and exceptions more difficult to countenance? What is certain is that deep forces and incentives keep the United States on a multilateral path—rooted in considerations of economic interest, power management, and political tradition. To ignore these pressures and incentives would entail a revolution in American foreign policy that even the most hard-line unilateralist in Washington today does not imagine. The worst unilateral impulses coming out of the Bush administration are so harshly criticized around the world because so many countries have accepted the multilateral vision of international order that the United States has articulated over most of the twentieth century.

References

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American Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. Journal of Economic History 49:4, 803-32. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. New York: Oxford University Press. Odell, John S. 2000. Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Oppenheim, Lassa. 1912. International Law, 2d ed. London: Longmans, Green, and Company. Patrick, Stewart. 2002. Multilateralism and its discontents: The causes and consequences of U.S. ambivalence. In Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1-44. Peel, Quentin. 2002. Bush starts to look for allies. The Financial Times, 9 October, 19. Philpott, Daniel. 2001. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pollard, Robert A. 1985. Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Columbia University Press. Preston, Julia. 2002. Bush's step toward the U.N. met by warm welcome. The New York Times, 13 September, All. Purdum, Todd S. 2002. Embattled, scrutinized, Powell soldiers on. The New York Times, 25 July, Al. Reisman, W. Michael. 2000. Unilateral action and the transformation of the world constitutive process: The special problem of humanitarian intervention. European Journal of International Law 11:1, 3-18. Reus-Smit, Christian. 1997. The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions. International Organization 51:4, 555-89. Ricks, Thomas E. 2001. Empire or not? A quiet debate over U.S. role. The Washington Post, 21 August, Al. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 357-99. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution. In Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie. New York: Columbia University Press, 3-47. . 1996. Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era. New York: Columbia University Press. Schense, Jennifer, and John L. Washburn. 2001. The United States and the International Criminal Court. The International Lawyer 35 (Summer), 614-22.

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Notes

1 Quoted in Balz 2003, Al. This unilateral turn did not begin with the Bush administration. Although the Clinton administration articulated a foreign policy strategy of "assertive multilateralism," its record was more mixed. In June 1997, the Clinton administration declined to join most of the world's countries in signing the Ottawa Convention on the Banning of Land Mines. In 1999 the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ignoring warnings from experts that such a move would weaken global nonproliferation norms, and it signaled its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC. The Clinton administration did not await UN Security Council approval for its 1998 bombing of Iraq, nor did it seek such approval in the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999. For an excellent summary of recent multilateral agreements rejected by the United States, see Patrick 2002. 2 Schlesinger 2000. 3 Krauthammer 2001, A29. 4 Purdum 2002, 1. 5 This definition of multilateralism draws on Keohane 1990 and Ruggie 1993. See also Van Oudenaren 2003. 6 Bull 1977. The norm of sovereign equality is what Philpott 2001 calls the "side by side" principle. See also Reus-Smit 1997. 7 Ruggie 1993, 12. 8 Keohane 1990, 731. 9 This distinction points to what might be called informal manifestations of multilateralism. The United States has at least four routes to take action: (1) it can go it alone, without consulting others; (2) it can consult others, but then go it alone; (3) it can consult and take action with others, not on the basis of agreed-upon rules and principles that define the terms of its relationship with those others, but rather on the basis of the current situation's needs; or (4) it can take action with others, on the basis of agreed-upon rules and principles. The first route is clearly unilateral. The second and third can be coded as multilateral, even though action is not taken in accord with formal multilateral rules and institutions. In areas such as the use of force, where formal and binding multilateral rules and principles are least evident, the difference between unilateral and multilateral action will likely fall between the first route and the second and www.apsanet.org

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Articles I Is American Multilateralism in Decline? third. For a discussion of formal and informal institutions, see Koromenos et al. 2001. 10 Schroeder 1994; Elrod 1976. 11 Goldstein et al. 2001. 12 This is the story told by Crazier 1964 about politics within large-scale organizations. Each individual within a complex organizational hierarchy is continually engaged in a dual struggle: to tie his colleagues to precise rule-based behavior, thereby creating a more stable and certain environment in which to operate, and to retain as much autonomy and discretion as possible for himself. 13 Fearon 1997. 14 I sketch this logic in Ikenberry 2003. 15 On the way in which NATO multilateralism restrained American exercise of power, see Weber 1993. 16 For discussions of America's divergent postwar institutional strategies in Europe and East Asia, see Grieco 1997 and Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002. 17 Katzenstein 1997, 37. 18 This is emphasized by Leffler 1992 and Pollard 1985. 19 Ruggie 1993. 20 Keohane 1986. 21 National Intelligence Council 2000. 22 State Department data, reported in Patrick 2002. 23 The rise in bilateral treaties reflects a post-Cold War surge in tax, investment, and extradition agreements with countries that previously were part of the Soviet bloc. Multilateral treaties—which most often deal with human rights protections, international organizations, and environmental protections—tend to be more regulatory and politically contested. Treaties submitted to the Senate have increasingly been passed with reservations, understandings, and conditions. This shows that the United States has more reservations about multilateral commitments, but it provides a way for the country to join international agreements that it does not fully agree with and that it might not otherwise join. See Schocken and Caron 2001. 24 Since 1945 the U.S. executive has submitted 958 bilateral or multilateral treaties to the Senate. Of these treaties, 505 are bilateral and 453 are multilateral. These do not include executive agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and other multilateral trade agreements. There have been approximately 11,000 executive agreements signed during the postwar period. (Interestingly, the only complete record of these executive agreements is contained on green index cards at the State Department, presided over by an elderly official who appears to be the only person who knows where each is located.) 25 Boot 2002, A29. 26 The classic statement of structural realism is Waltz 1979. The legal scholar Lassa Oppenheim argued that a balance of power among states is "an indispensable condition of the very existence of international law. . . . If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no rules of law will have force, since an overwhelming State will naturally try 548

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28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

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to act according to discretion and disobey the law." Oppenheim, 1912, 193. Economic comparisons calculated from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development statistics (July 1999 Web edition). Gross national product measures are figured at 1990 prices and exchange rates. For military capacity, see International Institute for Strategic Studies 1999. The best description of American unipolarity is Wohlforth 1999. Realists differ on the uses and importance of multilateral institutions. See Schweller and Priess 1997 and Jervis 1999. Kagan 2002, 4. Odell 2000. Victor 2001. Waltz 2000, 24. Zakaria 2002, 76. Brooks and Wohlforth 2002 argue that unipolar power enables the United States to act unilaterally, but they go on to say that this does not mean that unilateralism is an optimal strategy for unipolar America. Indeed, unipolarity gives the United States the ability to think about longterm security, for which they argue a multilateral—or "benevolent"—approach is best. In this regard, there is a tension in the neorealist account of unipolarity. Those who argue that unilateralism is unavoidable because of overwhelming American power do so because in the absence of an effective countervailing coalition, there is no "restraint" on U.S. foreign policy. But neorealist mechanisms of selection and competition are premised upon the need for the state to worry about relative power. If the United States does not need to care about relative power, the structural effects of anarchy are actually quite unimportant to American behavior. This suggests that domestic, ideological, and other factors are stronger determinants of U.S. foreign policy in the current era. As one journalist reports, "The Bush administration is stocked with skeptics of international treaties and multilateral organizations." Kessler 2002, Al. This split in American strategic thinking about the efficacy of arms control as it broke into the open over the failed SALT II treaty during the Carter and Reagan years is detailed in Graham 2002. Fidler 2001, A6. On the logic of cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations, see Weber 1992. The Bush administration's rejection of the Convention on Trade in Light Arms appears to be a more straightforward deferral to the National Rifle Association. Because of America's unrivaled military power, it is also true that the costs of cheating by other states have been reduced. For this reason, the explanation of shifting costs and benefits is inadequate without an appreciation of how elite ideologies and policy ideas color such calculations.

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43 For example, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, prior to joining the administration, argued that a great struggle was unfolding between what he calls Americanists and globalists. Globalists are depicted as elite activist groups who seek to strengthen "global governance" through a widening net of agreements on environment, human rights, labor, health, and political-military affairs and whose not-so-hidden agenda is to enmesh the United States in international laws and institutions that rob the country of its sovereignty. Americanists, according to Bolton, have finally awoken and are now seizing back the country's control over its own destiny. This is a view that evinces not just a healthy skepticism of multilateral rules and agreements, but sees American resistance to the encroachment of those rules and agreements as a patriotic duty. Bolton 2000. 44 For a general characterization of this unilateral—or neoimperial—thinking, see Ikenberry 2002. Its grand strategic agenda is discussed in Baker 2003 and Ricks 2001. 45 Snyder 1991; Kennedy 1987; Kupchan 1994. 46 Snyder 2003. 47 Nye 2002. 48 For a discussion of international regime creation that distinguishes between imposed and consensual processes, see Young 1991. 49 Chinkin 2000; Reisman 2000. 50 Indeed, some commentators worry precisely that the American position will lead to a new principle about the use of force. Henry Kissinger said to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "It cannot be either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security." Quoted in Harding 2002, 10. 51 Keohane 1990, 742. 52 Keohane 1984. 53 Keohane 1990. 54 There is an expanding line of research exploring the logic of credible commitment. For an important statement of this problem, see North and Weingast 1989. 55 Vernon 1995; Jackson 1994; Winham 1998. 56 This argument is developed in Ikenberry 2001. 57 The larger literature on hegemonic stability theory argues that the presence of a single powerful state is conducive to multilateral regime creation. The hegemonic state—by virtue of its power—is able to act on its long-term interests rather than struggle over short-term distributional gains. This allows it to identify its own national interest with the openness and stability of the larger global system. The classic statement of this thesis is Gilpin 1981. In Keohane's formulation, the theory holds that "hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed." Such states have the capacity to maintain regimes that they favor through the use of coercion or

positive sanctions. The hegemonic state gains the ability to shape and dominate the international order, while providing a flow of benefits to smaller states that is sufficient to persuade them to acquiesce. See Keohane 1980, 132. 58 For a discussion of constitutional logic and international relations, see Ikenberry 1998. 59 For sophisticated arguments along these lines, see Martin 1993 and Lake 1999. 60 Ikenberry 2001, chapter 3. 61 Zoellick 1999, 5. 62 Farley and McManus 2002, Al. 63 A new investigative report by Bob Woodward shows in detail how the multilateral approach to Iraq won out in administration policy circles. See Woodward 2002. 64 Wright and McManus 2002; Preston 2002; Peel 2002. 65 National Security Council 2002. 66 Schense and Washburn 2001. 67 The ICC is treaty-based, and its jurisdiction is only over citizens/subjects of signatory parties and citizens/subjects of nonstate signatories that commit crimes on the territory of signatory parties. It aims to universalize this jurisdiction. 68 Stephens 2002. 69 See surveys in McDougall 1997 and Mead 2001. 70 Huntington 1983. 71 There are, of course, political ideas and traditions in the American experience that support unilateral and isolationist policies, which flourished from the founding well into the 1930s and still exist today. But these alternatives to multilateralism, as Legro 2000 argues, were discredited in the face of World Wars I and II and opened the way to internationalist and multilateral ideas and strategies. These multilateral ideas and strategies, in turn, are given support by the deeper American rule of law and civic national traditions. 72 This distinction is made by Smith 1986. 73 Deudney and Ikenberry 1999. 74 While Woodrow Wilson sought to justify American postwar internationalism on the basis of American exceptionalism and a duty to lead the world to democratic salvation, advocates of internationalism after World War II emphasized that the United States belonged to a community of Western democracies that implied multilateral duties and loyalties; see Stephanson 1995. For the claim that this wider Western community has reinforced American internationalism and multilateral commitments, see RisseKappen 1995 and 1996; Hampton 1996; Nau 2002. This insight about Western community has also been used to explain the rise of NATO in the Atlantic and the absence of a similar postwar multilateral security organization in East Asia; see Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002. 75 Ruggie 1996, 170. 76 On the ways in which American ethnic groups encourage foreign policy activism, see Smith 2000. 77 Bush 2001, 4. 78 Bush 1990, 3. 79 Chicago Council and German Marshall Fund 2002, 27. www.apsanet.org

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Articles | Is American Multilateralism in Decline? 80 In this sense, for the system to become less multilateral, there would need to be evidence that economic and security ties were becoming more divisible: an erosion of ties

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in the direction of separate regional spheres, a decline in mutually agreed-upon rules and principles of order, and a lessening of open economic and societal interaction.

[13] Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations Emanuel Adler

Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. 4 But which is the stone that supports the bridge?' Kubtai Khan asks. 'The bridge is not supported by one stone or another1, Marco answers, 'but by the line of the arch that they form'. Kublai Khan remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: 'Why do you speak to me of stones? It is only the arch that matters to me j . Polo answers: 'Without stones there is no arch*. 1

A renewed interest in the study of security communities calls for a careful examination of the relationship between changes in what John Ruggie labels 'social epistemes*—what people collectively know about themselves and others, or intersubjective images of reality—and the places and regions that people feel comfortable calling 'home',2 During the last few centuries, 'home'—as far as political organisation, authority, and allegiance are concerned—has come to mean the nationstate. Benedict Anderson portrays national 'homes' as 'imagined communities', because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their

1 thank Hay ward Alker, Michael Bamett, Richard Bilder, Beverly Crawford, Raymond Duvall, l:mst Haas, Arie Kacowicz, Peter Kal/enstcin, Ann-Marie Burley Slaughter, Alex Wendt, and Crawford Young for useful comments and JetT Lewis for research assistance. I also thank the Davis institute of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for financial assistance. A draft of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1-4 September, 1994. Another draft was published as Working Paper 2.28 of the Series: Political Relations and Institutions Research Group, Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley, January 1995. 1. Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, trans. W. Weaver (San Diego, CA: I lureourt Brace Jovanoviclu 1974), p, 82, 2. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities', Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 10, 1996), pp. 63-98, and John G. Ruggie, 'Territorially and Beyond: Prablemati/ing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization (Vol. 47, No. I, 1993), p. 157.

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International Organization Millennium fellow members, meet them, or or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of the communion'. 1 As has been confirmed since the end of the Cold War, national 'imagined communities' are not about to disappear as the basic reality of international life any time soon. Nevertheless, secular changes in technology, economic relations, social epistemes, and institutions are causing globalising and localising pressures that are squeezing the nation-state from both above and below/ As a consequence, people have begun to imagine new communities, or 'homes'. When it comes to their security and well-being, in some parts of the world, growing numbers of people have begun imagining that they share their destiny with people of other nations who share their values and expectations of proper behaviour in domestic and international political affairs. Forty years ago, Karl Deutsch developed the concept of 'pluralistic security communities 1 . In this article, I extend this concept by arguing that such communities are socially constructed 'cognitive regions* or 'community-regions' whose people imagine that, with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end. People who are territorially and politically organised into states, owe their allegiance to states, and act on their behalf, will also take their identity cues from the community region as these communities become more tightly integrated. Further, liberal communityregions, in particular, are more prone to turn into security communities because of shared practical knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution and a propensity to develop strong civil societies and a transnational civic culture. Nevertheless, non-liberal community-regions may also become security communities since, as this article will argue, (I) the conditions for a community to develop are socially constructed—by the individuals and, more generally, the states that eventually form the community, as well as by international organisations—and, (2) since, international institutions can diffuse 'selected1 liberal practices to non-liberal regions. Finally, 1 argue that what binds pluralistic security communities into a unit is not principally 'feeling' (subjective emotion), but intersubjective knowledge and shared identity. Accordingly, since international and transnational institutions can help diffuse and internalise norms and knowledge about how to peacefully resolve conflicts—the norms and knowledge which form the basis of security communities—they can piay a critical role in the social construction of these communities. Section 1 introduces the notions of'cognitive region' and 'community-region'. Section 2 discusses and redefines Deutsch's concept of a security community as a 3. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 15. 4. Zdravko Mlinar, 'Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation of Territorial Social Organization', in Zdravko Mlinar (ed,), Globalization and Territorial Identities (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), p. 24-25. 250

International Organization Imagined (Security) Communities special instance of a 'cognitive region'. Section 3 suggests a construct!vist explanation for the relationship between pluralistic security communities and liberal ideas. The 4th Section discusses the relationship between knowledge, power, and community, to elucidate how material and socio-cognitive factors combine to set in motion the construction of security communities. Section 5 examines the role shared identities play in the evolution of pluralistic security communities, and it purports that sovereign states, in the process of becoming representatives of a security community, may ultimately redefine their interests and the meaning of sovereignty. Subsequently, I argue that the social construction of pluralistic security communities may depend on pre-existing security community-building institutions, By way of illustration, I show that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (QSCE)/ although a creature of the Cold War, exhibits the attributes of an institution conducive to building a pluralistic security community. 1 end this article with some thoughts about the relevance of security communities for international relations theory. Cognitive Regions 'Dirt, as Mary Douglas...has noted, is matter out of place'. 6 For traditional realist and neorealist accounts of international relations, everything that is outside the realm of territorially-based states and their 'co-actions' or relations is, in the sociological sense, 4 dirt\ Hence, the conventional view in the International Relations (IR) discipline is that *a state is a fixed territorial entity...operating much the same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order'.7 This view lies at the root of the classic understanding of international relations. To begin with, the modern territorial sovereign state has rested on the principle of spatial exclusion, which entailed that * [identification of citizenship with residence in a particular territorial space became the central facet of political identity 1 —or, in Alexander Wendt's terms, of the corporate identity of the state,8 This principle meant that states became the primary vehicles for individual citizens to form societies and achieve human progress—that is, security, economic welfare, and justice. Politics, 'in the sense of the pursuit of justice and virtue, could exist only within territorial boundaries'^ 5. Until December 1994, the OSCE was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 6. David Sibley, 'Outsiders in Society and Space\ in Kay Anderson and Fay Gale (eds.j, Inventing Places: Studies in Cultural Geography (Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 1992), p. 107. 7. John Agnew, 'The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory', Review of International Political Economy (Vol. I, No. I , 1994), p. 54. For the conventional view, see Kenneth E, Waltz, Man. the State and War (New York, NY; Columbia University Press, 1959). 8. Agnew, op. cit., in note 7, p. 60-61. Alexander Wendl, 'Collective identity Formation and the International Stale', American Political Science Review (VoL 88, No. 2, 1994), pp. 384-96. 9. Agnew, op. cit., in note 7, p. 62. For counter arguments of the conventional view, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

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International Organization Millennium By taking the state as an abstract individual unitary actor, endowed only with a corporate identity, and by artificially separating the domestic and international realms, realism lost sight of the social identities of states.10 I argue instead, from a constructivist perspective, that state social identities and interests are not fixed but evolve from the diffusion and convergence of causal and normative understandings across national boundaries, high levels of communication, economic interdependence, and cooperative practices. Furthermore, not only do identities and interests evolve, they also have the potential to converge." Moreover, as several authors point out, and as John Ruggie articulates, territoriality 'has become unbundled1.1' For example, international regimes and common markets occupy a 'nonterritorial functional space1.11 Epistemic communities, social movements, and issue-networks not only inhabit this space, but are actively involved in determining its boundaries. More importantly, state authority in the realms of security, economic welfare, and human justice (human rights) is increasingly being distributed across these international functional cognitive spaces.1" Ruggie is right to say that international society is anchored in this non-territorial space, 15 and societal relations regarding global issues, such as the environment, do take place in what Ronnie Lipschutz perceives as a primitive 'global civil society V & However, what some people are tenuously starting to perceive as 'home' and 'insidenessV 7 is not the whole 'Planet Earth', but a transnational region where they

10. For an example of this, see Mans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, NY: Knopf. 1948). and I:.I! Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, NY: I larpcr and Row, 1964). Corporate identity refers to 'the intrinsic self-organi/ing qualities that constitute actor individuality. For human beings, this means die body and experience of consciousness; for organizations it means (heir constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as a "we"'. Social identity is the 'sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object,...[SJocial identities [are] at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine "who 1 am/we are" in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations 1 , Wendt, op. cit., in note 8, p. 385, In other words, tor a state, corporate identity re tiers to its constituent individuals, physical resources, and institutions which generate interests of physical security, recognition by other actors, and economic development, On the other hand, in its relations with other slates, a stale may have many social identities, such as "liberal', 'democratic1, and 'balancer1, which generate interests of preserving liberal values, democracy, and the balance of power. 11. Wendt, op. c//., in note 8. 12. Ruggie, op. cit., in note 2, p, 165. See also Agnew, op. cit., in note 7, Wendt, op. cit., in note 8; and R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also (he contributions in Ml mar (ed,), op. or, in note 4. 13. Ruggie, op. cit., in note 2, p. 165. 14. Wendt, op. cit., in note 8, p. 392. 15. Ruggie, op. cit,, in note 2, p, 165, 16. Ronnie D, Lipschutz, 'Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 21, No, 3, 1992), pp. 389-420. 17. Lee Cuba and David M. Humrnon, 'Constructing a Sense of Home: Place Affiliation and Migration Across the Life Cycle", Sociological Forum (Vol. 8, No. 4, 1993), p, 549.

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International Organization Imagined (Security) Communities imagine sharing a common destiny and identity™ People who share ethnic or national identities and organise themselves into states imagine boundaries that separate 'us' from 4 them'; as citizens occupying the space within state boundaries, they give expression to community life. When, however, for reasons referred to above, their self-identification and loyalties begin to change, their identities will be directed to (and boundaries will be imagined to run between) (a) territorial regions or locales within states, (b) newly formed territorially-based (super) states, or (c) transnational nonterritorial regions constituted by peoples' shared values, norms, and practices. It is this last kind of imagined human community that has trail-blazing potential for international and transnational relations. It suggests an evolution towards socially constructed and spatially differentiated transnational community-regions which national, transnational, and international elites and institutions, sometimes under the leadership of outstanding individuals, help to constitute. Community-regions are regional systems of meanings (an interdependent group of meanings among individuals or collectivities), and are not limited to a specific geographic place.1'' They are made up of people whose common identities and interests are constituted by shared understandings and normative principles other than territorial sovereignty and (a) who actively communicate and interact across state borders, (b) who are actively involved in the political life of an (international and transnational) region and engaged in the pursuit of regional purposes, and (c) who, as citizens of states, impel the constituent states of the community-region to act as agents of regional good, on the basis of regional systems of governance, 20 18. See, tor example, William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ruggie, op. cit., in note 2; Iver B. Neumann, 1 A RegionBuilding Approach to Northern Europe\ Review of International Studies no-agreement > B, 45 percent rank them B > no-agreement > A, and 10 percent rank them B > A > no-agreement, then both A and B are in the win-set, even though B would win in a simple Level-II-only game. On the other hand, if 90 percent rank the alternatives A > no-agreement > B, while 10 percent still rank them B > A > no-agreement, then only A is in the win-set. In this sense,

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 445 a government that is internally divided is more likely to be able to strike a deal internationally than one that is firmly committed to a single policy.47 Conversely, to impose binding ex ante instructions on the negotiators in such a case might exclude some Level I outcomes that would, in fact, be ratifiable in both nations.48 Thus far we have implicitly assumed that all eligible constituents will participate in the ratification process. In fact, however, participation rates vary across groups and across issues, and this variation often has implications for the size of the win-set. For example, when the costs and/or benefits of a proposed agreement are relatively concentrated, it is reasonable to expect that those constituents whose interests are most affected will exert special influence on the ratification process.49 One reason why Level II games are more important for trade negotiations than in monetary matters is that the "abstention rate" is higher on international monetary issues than on trade issues.50 The composition of the active Level II constituency (and hence the character of the win-set) also varies with the politicization of the issue. Politicization often activates groups who are less worried about the costs of noagreement, thus reducing the effective win-set. For example, politicization of the Panama Canal issue seems to have reduced the negotiating flexibility on both sides of the diplomatic table.51 This is one reason why most professional diplomats emphasize the value of secrecy to successful negotiations. However, Woodrow Wilson's transcontinental tour in 1919 reflected the opposite calculation, namely, that by expanding the active constituency he could ensure ratification of the Versailles Treaty, although in the end this strategy proved fruitless.52 Another important restriction of our discussion thus far has been the 47. Raiffa notes that "the more diffuse the positions are within each side, the easier it might be to achieve external agreement." (Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 12.) For the conventional view, by contrast, that domestic unity is generally a precondition for international agreement, see Michael Artis and Sylvia Ostry, International Economic Policy Coordination, Chatham House Papers: 30 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 75-76. 48. "Meaningful consultation with other nations becomes very difficult when the internal process of decision-making already has some of the characteristics of compacts between quasisovereign entities. There is an increasing reluctance to hazard a hard-won domestic consensus in an international forum." Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 266. 49. See James Q. Wilson, Political Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1975) on how the politics of an issue are affected by whether the costs and the benefits are concentrated or diffuse. 50. Another factor fostering abstention is the greater complexity and opacity of monetary issues; as Gilbert R. Winham ("Complexity in International Negotiation," in Daniel Druckman, ed., Negotiations: A Social-Psychological Perspective [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977], p. 363) observes, "complexity can strengthen the hand of a negotiator vis-a-vis the organization he represents." 51. Habeeb and Zartman, Panama Canal Negotiations. 52. Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal.

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446 International Organization assumption that the negotiations involve only one issue. Relaxing this assumption has powerful consequences for the play at both levels.53 Various groups at Level II are likely to have quite different preferences on the several issues involved in a multi-issue negotiation. As a general rule, the group with the greatest interest in a specific issue is also likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue. In the Law of the Sea negotiations, for example, the Defense Department felt most strongly about sea-lanes, the Department of the Interior about sea-bed mining rights, and so on.54 If each group is allowed to fix the Level I negotiating position for "its" issue, the resulting package is almost sure to be "non-negotiable" (that is, non-ratifiable in opposing capitals).55 Thus, the chief negotiator is faced with tradeoffs across different issues: how much to yield on mining rights in order to get sea-lane protection, how much to yield on citrus exports to get a better deal on beef, and so on. The implication of these tradeoffs for the respective win-sets can be analyzed in terms of iso-vote or "political indifference" curves. This technique is analogous to conventional indifference curve analysis, except that the operational measure is vote loss, not utility loss. Figure 2 provides an illustrative Edgeworth box analysis.56 The most-preferred outcome for A (the outcome which wins unanimous approval from both the beef industry and the citrus industry) is the upper right-hand corner (AM), and each curve concave to point AM represents the locus of all possible tradeoffs between the interests of ranchers and farmers, such that the net vote in favor of ratification at A's Level II is constant. The bold contour Ai-A2 represents the minimal vote necessary for ratification by A, and the wedge-shaped area northeast of Ai-A2 represents A's win-set. Similarly, B!-B2 represents the outcomes that are minimally ratifiable by B, and the lens-shaped area between Ai-A2 and Bi-B2 represents the set of feasible agreements. Although additional subtleties (such as the nature of the "contract curve") might be extracted from this sort of analysis, the central point is simple: the possibility of package deals opens up a rich array of strategic alternatives for negotiators in a twolevel game. One kind of issue linkage is absolutely crucial to understanding how domestic and international politics can become entangled.57 Suppose that a majority of constituents at Level II oppose a given policy (say, oil price 53. I am grateful to Ernst B. Haas and Robert O. Keohane for helpful advice on this point. 54. Ann L. Rollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), especially pp. 208-37, and James K. Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), especially pp. 74-78. 55. Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 175. 56.1 am indebted to Lisa Martin and Kenneth Shepsle for suggesting this approach, although they are not responsible for my application of it. Note that this construction assumes that each issue, taken individually, is a "homogeneous" type, not a "heterogeneous" type. Constructing iso-vote curves for heterogeneous-type issues is more complicated. 57. I am grateful to Henry Brady for clarifying this point for me.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 447

B,

A,

BM FIGURE 2. Political indifference

AM

B2

A2

curves for two-issue negotiation

decontrol), but that some members of that majority would be willing to switch their vote on that issue in return for more jobs (say, in export industries). If bargaining is limited to Level II, that tradeoff is not technically feasible, but if the chief negotiator can broker an international deal that delivers more jobs (say, via faster growth abroad), he can, in effect, overturn the initial outcome at the domestic table. Such a transnational issue linkage was a crucial element in the 1978 Bonn accord. Note that this strategy works not by changing the preferences of any domestic constituents, but rather by creating a policy option (such as faster export growth) that was previously beyond domestic control. Hence, I refer to this type of issue linkage at Level I that alters the feasible outcomes at Level II as synergistic linkage. For example, "in the Tokyo Round . . . nations used negotiation to achieve internal reform in situations where constituency pressures would otherwise prevent action without the pressure

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448 International Organization (and tradeoff benefits) that an external partner could provide."58 Economic interdependence multiplies the opportunities for altering domestic coalitions (and thus policy outcomes) by expanding the set of feasible alternatives in this way—in effect, creating political entanglements across national boundaries. Thus, we should expect synergistic linkage (which is, by definition, explicable only in terms of two-level analysis) to become more frequent as interdependence grows. 2. The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions.

Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win-set. For example, if a two-thirds vote is required for ratification, the win-set will almost certainly be smaller than if only a simple majority is required. As one experienced observer has written: "Under the Constitution, thirty-four of the one hundred senators can block ratification of any treaty. This is an unhappy and unique feature of our democracy. Because of the effective veto power of a small group, many worthy agreements have been rejected, and many treaties are never considered for ratification."59 As noted earlier, the U.S. separation of powers imposes a tighter constraint on the American win-set than is true in many other countries. This increases the bargaining power of American negotiators, but it also reduces the scope for international cooperation. It raises the odds for involuntary defection and makes potential partners warier about dealing with the Americans. The Trade Expansion Act of 1974 modified U.S. ratification procedures in an effort to reduce the likelihood of congressional tampering with the final deal and hence to reassure America's negotiating partners. After the American Selling Price fiasco, it was widely recognized that piecemeal congressional ratification of any new agreement would inhibit international negotiation. Hence, the 1974 Act guaranteed a straight up-or-down vote in Congress. However, to satisfy congressional sensitivities, an elaborate system of private-sector committees was established to improve communication between the Level I negotiators and their Level II constituents, in effect coopting the interest groups by exposing them directly to the implications of their demands.60 Precisely this tactic is described in the labor-management case by Walton and McKersie: "Instead of taking responsibility for directly persuading the principals [Level II constituents] to reduce their expectations, [the Level I negotiator] structures the situation so that they (or their more immediate representatives) will persuade themselves."61 58. Gilbert R. Winham, "The Relevance of Clausewitz to a Theory of International Negotiation," prepared for delivery at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 59. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 225. 60. Winham (see note 37); Twiggs, The Tokyo Round. 61. Walton and McKersie, Behavioral Theory of Labor Organizations, p. 321.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 449 Not all significant ratification practices are formalized; for example, the Japanese propensity for seeking the broadest possible domestic consensus before acting constricts the Japanese win-set, as contrasted with majoritarian political cultures. Other domestic political practices, too, can affect the size of the win-set. Strong discipline within the governing party, for example, increases the win-set by widening the range of agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect to receive backing. For example, in the 1986 House-Senate conference committee on tax reform, the final bill was closer to the Senate version, despite (or rather, because of) Congressman Rostenkowski's greater control of his delegation, which increased the House winset. Conversely, a weakening of party discipline across the major Western nations would, ceteris paribus, reduce the scope for international cooperation. The recent discussion of "state strength" and "state autonomy" is relevant here. The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement. For example, central bank insulation from domestic political pressures in effect increases the win-set and thus the odds for international monetary cooperation; recent proposals for an enhanced role for central bankers in international policy coordination rest on this point.62 However, two-level analysis also implies that, ceteris paribus, the stronger a state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally. For example, diplomats representing an entrenched dictatorship are less able than representatives of a democracy to claim credibly that domestic pressures preclude some disadvantageous deal.63 This is yet another facet of the disconcerting ambiguity of the notion of "state strength." For simplicity of exposition, my argument is phrased throughout in terms of only two levels. However, many institutional arrangements require several levels of ratification, thus multiplying the complexity (but perhaps also the importance) of win-set analysis. Consider, for example, negotiations between the United States and the European Community over agricultural trade. According to the Treaty of Rome, modifications of the Common Agricultural Policy require unanimous ratification by the Council of Ministers, representing each of the member states. In turn, each of those governments must, in effect, win ratification for its decision within its own national arena, and in coalition governments, that process might also require ratification within each of the parties. Similarly, on the American side, ratification would (informally, at least) necessitate support from most, if not all, of the major agricultural organizations, and within those organizations, further ratification by key interests and regions might be required. At each stage, cleavage patterns, issue linkages, ratification procedures, side-payments, negotiator 62. Artis and Ostry, International Economic Policy Coordination. Of course, whether this is desirable in terms of democratic values is quite another matter. 63. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 28.

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450 International Organization strategies, and so on would need to be considered. At some point in this analytic regress the complexity of further decomposition would outweigh the advantages, but the example illustrates the need for careful thought about the logic of multiple-level games. 3. The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators.

Each Level I negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other side's win-set, but with respect to his own win-set, his motives are mixed. The larger his win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-a-vis the other negotiator. This fact often poses a tactical dilemma. For example, one effective way to demonstrate commitment to a given position in Level I bargaining is to rally support from one's constituents (for example, holding a strike vote, talking about a "missile gap," or denouncing "unfair trading practices" abroad). On the other hand, such tactics may have irreversible effects on constituents' attitudes, hampering subsequent ratification of a compromise agreement.64 Conversely, preliminary consultations at home, aimed at "softening up" one's constituents in anticipation of a ratification struggle, can undercut a negotiator's ability to project an implacable image abroad. Nevertheless, disregarding these dilemmas for the moment and assuming that a negotiator wishes to expand his win-set in order to encourage ratification of an agreement, he may exploit both conventional side-payments and generic "good will." The use of side-payments to attract marginal supporters is, of course, quite familiar in game theory, as well as in practical politics. For example, the Carter White House offered many inducements (such as public works projects) to help persuade wavering Senators to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty.65 In a two-level game the side-payments may come from unrelated domestic sources, as in this case, or they may be received as part of the international negotiation. The role of side-payments in international negotiations is well known. However, the two-level approach emphasizes that the value of an international side-payment should be calculated in terms of its marginal contribution to the likelihood of ratification, rather than in terms of its overall value to the recipient nation. What counts at Level II is not total national costs and benefits, but their incidence, relative to existing coalitions and protocoalitions. An across-the-board trade concession (or still worse, a concession on a product of interest to a committed free-trade congressman) is less effective than a concession (even one of lesser intrinsic value) that tips the balance with a swing voter. Conversely, trade retaliation should be targeted, 64. Walton and McKersie, Behavioral Theory of Labor Organizations, p. 345. 65. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 172. See also Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 183.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 451 neither at free-traders nor at confirmed protectionists, but at the uncommitted. An experienced negotiator familiar with the respective domestic tables should be able to maximize the cost-effectiveness (to him and his constituents) of the concessions that he must make to ensure ratification abroad, as well as the cost-effectiveness of his own demands and threats, by targeting his initiatives with an eye to their Level II incidence, both at home and abroad. In this endeavor Level I negotiators are often in collusion, since each has an interest in helping the other to get the final deal ratified. In effect, they are moving jointly towards points of tangency between their respective political indifference curves. The empirical frequency of such targeting in trade negotiations and trade wars, as well as in other international negotiations, would be a crucial test of the relative merits of conventional unitary-actor analysis and the two-level approach proposed here.66 In addition to the use of specific side-payments, a chief negotiator whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of his foreign initiatives. Although generic good will cannot guarantee ratification, as Woodrow Wilson discovered, it is useful in expanding the win-set and thus fostering Level I agreement, for it constitutes a kind of "all-purpose glue" for his supporting coalition. Walton and McKersie cite members of the United Auto Workers who, speaking of their revered leader, Walter Reuther, said, "I don't understand or agree with this profit-sharing idea, but if the Red Head wants it, I will go along."67 The Yugoslav negotiator in the Trieste dispute later discounted the difficulty of persuading irredentist Slovenes to accept the agreement, since "the government [i.e., Tito] can always influence public opinion if it wants to."68 Note that each Level I negotiator has a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number, since Party A's popularity increases the size of his win-set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the relative bargaining leverage of Party B. Thus, negotiators should normally be expected to try to reinforce one another's standing with their respective constituents. 66. The strategic significance of targeting at Level II is illustrated in John Conybeare, "Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts," World Politics 38 (October 1985), p. 157: Retaliation in the Anglo-Hanse trade wars did not have the intended deterrent effect, because it was not (and perhaps could not have been) targeted at the crucial members of the opposing Level II coalition. Compare Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, p. 552: "If one faces a coercive opponent, but the opponent's majority coalition includes a few wavering members inclined to compromise, a compromise proposal that suits their views may cause their defection and the formation of a different majority coalition. Or if the opponent's strategy is accommodative, based on a tenuous soft-line coalition, one knows that care is required in implementing one's own coercive stretegy to avoid the opposite kind of shift in the other state." 67. Walton and McKersie, Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, p. 319. 68. Vladimir Velebit, in Campbell, Trieste 1954, p. 97. As noted earlier, our discussion here assumes that the Level I negotiator wishes to reach a ratifiable agreement; in cases (alluded to later) when the negotiator's own preferences are more hard-line than his constituents, his domestic popularity might allow him to resist Level I agreements.

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452 International Organization Partly for this reason and partly because of media attention, participation on the world stage normally gives a head of government a special advantage vis-a-vis his or her domestic opposition. Thus, although international policy coordination is hampered by high transaction costs, heads of government may also reap what we might term "transaction benefits." Indeed, the recent evolution of Western summitry, which has placed greater emphasis on publicity than on substance, seems designed to appropriate these "transaction benefits" without actually seeking the sort of agreements that might entail transaction costs.69 Higher status negotiators are likely to dispose of more side-payments and more "good will" at home, and hence foreigners prefer to negotiate with a head of government than with a lower official. In purely distributive terms, a nation might have a bargaining advantage if its chief negotiator were a mere clerk. Diplomats are acting rationally, not merely symbolically, when they refuse to negotiate with a counterpart of inferior rank. America's negotiating partners have reason for concern whenever the American president is domestically weakened. Uncertainty and bargaining tactics Level I negotiators are often badly misinformed about Level II politics, particularly on the opposing side. In 1978, the Bonn negotiators were usually wrong in their assessments of domestic politics abroad; for example, most American officials did not appreciate the complex domestic game that Chancellor Schmidt was playing over the issue of German reflation. Similarly, Snyder and Diesing report that "decision makers in our cases only occasionally attempted such assessments, and when they tried they did pretty miserably. . . . Governments generally do not do well in analyzing each other's internal politics in crises [and, I would add, in normal times], and indeed it is inherently difficult."70 Relaxing the assumption of perfect information to allow for uncertainty has many implications for our understanding of two-level games. Let me illustrate a few of these implications. Uncertainty about the size of a win-set can be both a bargaining device and a stumbling block in two-level negotiation. In purely distributive Level I bargaining, negotiators have an incentive to understate their own win-sets. Since each negotiator is likely to know more about his own Level II than his opponent does, the claim has some plausibility. This is akin to a tactic 69. Transaction benefits may be enhanced if a substantive agreement is reached, although sometimes leaders can benefit domestically by loudly rejecting a proffered international deal. 70. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, pp. 516, 522-23. Analogous mi$perceptions in Anglo-American diplomacy are the focus of Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 453 that Snyder and Diesing describe, when negotiators seek to exploit divisions within their own government by saying, in effect, "You'd better make a deal with me, because the alternative to me is even worse."71 On the other hand, uncertainty about the opponent's win-set increases one's concern about the risk of involuntary defection. Deals can only be struck if each negotiator is convinced that the proposed deal lies within his opposite number's win-set and thus will be ratified. Uncertainty about party A's ratification lowers the expected value of the agreement to party B, and thus party B will demand more generous side-payments from party A than would be needed under conditions of certainty. In fact, party B has an incentive to feign doubt about party A's ability to deliver, precisely in order to extract a more generous offer.72 Thus, a utility-maximizing negotiator must seek to convince his opposite number that his own win-set is "kinky," that is, that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favorable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified. For example, on the energy issue in 1978, by sending Senator Byrd on a personal mission to Bonn before the summit and then by discussing his political problems in a length tete-a-tete with the chancellor, Carter sought successfully to convince Schmidt that immediate decontrol was politically impossible, but that decontrol by 1981 was politically doable. Kinky win-sets may be more credible if they pivot on what Schelling calls a "prominent" solution, such as a 50-50 split, for such outcomes may be distinctly more "saleable" at home. Another relevant tactic is for the negotiator actually to submit a trial agreement for ratification, in order to demonstrate that it is not in his win-set. Uncertainty about the contours of the respective "political indifference curves" thus has strategic uses. On the other hand, when the negotiators are seeking novel packages that might improve both sides' positions, misrepresentation of one's win-set can be counterproductive. Creative solutions that expand the scope for joint gain and improve the odds of ratification are likely to require fairly accurate information about constituents' preferences and points of special neuralgia. The analysis of two-level games offers many illustrations of Zartman's observation that all negotiation involves "the controlled exchange of partial information."73 71. Synder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, p. 517. 72. I am grateful to Robert O. Keohane for pointing out the impact of uncertainty on the expected value of proposals. 73. I. William Zartman, The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor Books, 1976), p. 14. The present analysis assumes that constituents are myopic about the other side's Level II, an assumption that is not unrealistic empirically. However, a fully informed constituent would consider the preferences of key players on the other side, for if the current proposal lies well within the other side's win-set, then it would be rational for the constituent to vote against it, hoping for a second-round proposal that was more favorable to him and still ratifiable abroad; this might be a reasonable interpretation of Senator Lodge's position in 1919 (Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal). Consideration of such strategic voting at Level II is beyond the scope of this article.

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454 International Organization Restructuring and reverberation Formally speaking, game-theoretic analysis requires that the structure of issues and payoffs be specified in advance. In reality, however, much of what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players to restructure the game and to alter one another's perceptions of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements. Such tactics are more difficult in two-level games than in conventional negotiations, because it is harder to reach constituents on the other side with persuasive messages. Nevertheless, governments do seek to expand one another's win-sets. Much ambassadorial activity—wooing opinion leaders, establishing contact with opposition parties, offering foreign aid to a friendly, but unstable government, and so on—has precisely this function. When Japanese officials visit Capitol Hill, or British diplomats lobby Irish-American leaders, they are seeking to relax domestic constraints that might otherwise prevent the administration from cooperating with their governments. Another illuminating example of actions by a negotiator at the opposing Level II to improve the odds of ratification occurred during the 1977 negotiations between the International Monetary Fund and the Italian government. Initial IMF demands for austerity triggered strong opposition from the unions and left-wing parties. Although the IMF's bargaining position at Level I appeared strong, the Fund's negotiator sought to achieve a broader consensus within Italy in support of an agreement, in order to forestall involuntary defection. Accordingly, after direct consultations with the unions and leftist leaders, the IMF restructured its proposal to focus on long-term investment and economic recovery (incidentally, an interesting example of targeting), without backing off from its short-term demands. Ironically, the initial Communist support for this revised agreement subsequently collapsed because of conflicts between moderate and doctrinaire factions within the party, illustrating the importance of multilevel analysis.74 In some instances, perhaps even unintentionally, international pressures "reverberate" within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations. Exactly this kind of reverberation characterized the 1978 summit negotiations. Dieter Hiss, the German sherpa and one of those who believed that a stimulus program was in Germany's own interest, later wrote that summits change national policy only insofar as they mobilize and/or change public opinion and the attitude of political groups. . . . Often that is enough, if the balance of

74. John R. Hillman, "The Mutual Influence of Italian Domestic Politics and the International Monetary Fund," The Fletcher Forum 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 1-22. Luigi Spaventa, "Two Letters of Intent: External Crises and Stabilization Policy, Italy, 1973-77," in John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983), pp. 441-73, argues that the unions and the Communists actually favored the austerity measures, but found the IMF demands helpful in dealing with their own internal Level II constituents.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 455 opinion is shifted, providing a bare majority for the previously stymied actions of a strong minority. . . . No country violates its own interests, but certainly the definition of its interests can change through a summit with its possible tradeoffs and give-and-take.75

From the point of view of orthodox social-choice theory, reverberation is problematic, for it implies a certain interconnectedness among the utility functions of independent actors, albeit across different levels of the game. Two rationales may be offered to explain reverberation among utilitymaximizing egoists. First, in a complex, interdependent, but often unfriendly world, offending foreigners may be costly in the long run. "To get along, go along" may be a rational maxim. This rationale is likely to be more common the more dependent (or interdependent) a nation, and it is likely to be more persuasive to Level II actors who are more exposed internationally, such as multinational corporations and international banks. A second rationale takes into account cognitive factors and uncertainty. It would be a mistake for political scientists to mimic most economists' disregard for the suasive element in negotiations.76 Given the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds many international issues, messages from abroad can change minds, move the undecided, and hearten those in the domestic minority. As one reluctant German latecomer to the "locomotive" cause in 1978 explained his conversion, "In the end, even the Bank for International Settlements [the cautious Basle organization of central bankers] supported the idea of coordinated relation." Similarly, an enthusiastic advocate of the program welcomed the international pressure as providing a useful "tailwind" in German domestic politics. Suasive reverberation is more likely among countries with close relations and is probably more frequent in economic than in political-military negotiations. Communiques from the Western summits are often cited by participants to domestic audiences as a way of legitimizing their policies. After one such statement by Chancellor Schmidt, one of his aides privately characterized the argument as "not intellectually valid, but politically useful." Conversely, it is widely believed by summit participants that a declaration contrary to a government's current policy could be used profitably by its opponents. Recent congressional proposals to ensure greater domestic publicity for international commentary on national economic policies (including hitherto confidential IMF recommendations) turn on the idea that reverberation might increase international cooperation.77

75. Dieter Hiss, "Weltwirtschaftsgipfel: Betrachtungen eines Insiders [World Economic Summit: Observations of an Insider]," in Joachim Frohn and Reiner Staeglin, eds., Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1980), pp. 286-87. 76. On cognitive and communications explanations of international cooperation, see, for example, Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32 (April 1980), pp 357-405; Richard N. Cooper, "International Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation," Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics 44 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); and Zartman, 50% Solution, especially Part 4. 77. Henning, Macroeconomic Diplomacy in the 1980s, pp. 62-63.

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456 International Organization Reverberation as discussed thus far implies that international pressure expands the domestic win-set and facilitates agreement. However, reverberation can also be negative, in the sense that foreign pressure may create a domestic backlash. Negative reverberation is probably less common empirically than positive reverberation, simply because foreigners are likely to forgo public pressure if it is recognized to be counterproductive. Cognitive balance theory suggests that international pressure is more likely to reverberate negatively if its source is generally viewed by domestic audiences as an adversary rather than an ally. Nevertheless, predicing the precise effect of foreign pressure is admittedly difficult, although empirically, reverberation seems to occur frequently in two-level games. The phenomenon of reverberation (along with synergistic issue linkage of the sort described earlier) precludes one attractive short-cut to modeling two-level games. If national preferences were exogenous from the point of view of international relations, then the domestic political game could be molded separately, and the "outputs" from that game could be used as the "inputs" to the international game.78 The division of labor between comparative politics and international relations could continue, though a few curious observers might wish to keep track of the play on both tables. But if international pressures reverberate within domestic politics, or if issues can be linked synergistically, then domestic outcomes are not exogenous, and the two levels cannot be modeled independently. The role of the chief negotiator In the stylized model of two-level negotiations outlined here, the chief negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and Level II. Thus far, I have assumed that the chief negotiator has no independent policy views, but acts merely as an honest broker, or rather as an agent on behalf of his constituents. That assumption powerfully simplifies the analysis of two-level games. However, as principal-agent theory reminds us, this assumption is unrealistic.79 Empirically, the preferences of the chief negotiator may well diverge from those of his constituents. Two-level negotiations are costly and 78. This is the approach used to analyze the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over Hong Kong in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 79. For overviews of this literature, see Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science 28 (November 1984), pp. 739-77; John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1985); and Barry M. Mitnick, "The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis," prepared for delivery at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. This literature is only indirectly relevant to our concerns here, for it has not yet adequately addressed the problems posed by multiple principals (or constituents, in our terms). For one highly formal approach to the problem of multiple principals, see R. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston, "Common Agency," Econometrica 54 (July 1986), pp. 923-42.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 457 risky for the chief negotiator, and they often interfere with his other priorities, so it is reasonable to ask what is in it for him. The motives of the chief negotiator include: 1. Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimizing potential losses. For example, a head of government may seek the popularity that he expects to accrue to him if he concludes a successful international agreement, or he may anticipate that the results of the agreement (for example, faster growth or lower defense spending) will be politically rewarding.

2. Shifting the balance of power at Level II in favor of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons. International negotiations sometimes enable government leaders to do what they privately wish to do, but are powerless to do domestically. Beyond the now-familiar 1978 case, this pattern characterizes many stabilization programs that are (misleadingly) said to be "imposed" by the IMF. For example, in the 1974 and 1977 negotiations between Italy and the IMF, domestic conservative forces exploited IMF pressure to facilitate policy moves that were otherwise infeasible internally.80 3. To pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context. This seems the best explanation of Jimmy Carter's prodigious efforts on behalf of the Panama Canal Treaty, as well as of Woodrow Wilson's ultimately fatal commitment to the Versailles Treaty.

It is reasonable to presume, at least in the international case of two-level bargaining, that the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his domestic calculus, if a choice must be made, not least because his own incumbency often depends on his standing at Level II. Hence, he is more likely to present an international agreement for ratification, the less of his own political capital he expects to have to invest to win approval, and the greater the likely political returns from a ratified agreement. This expanded conception of the role of the chief negotiator implies that he has, in effect, a veto over possible agreements. Even if a proposed deal lies within his Level II win-set, that deal is unlikely to be struck if he opposes it.81 Since this proviso applies on both sides of the Level I table, the actual international bargaining set may be narrower—perhaps much narrower— than the overlap between the Level II win-sets. Empirically, this additional constraint is often crucial to the outcome of two-level games. One momentous example is the fate of the Versailles Treaty. The best evidence suggests, first, that perhaps 80 percent of the American public and of the Senate in 1919 favored ratification of the treaty, if certain reservations were attached, and second, that those reservations were acceptable to the other key sig80. Hillman, "Mutual Influence," and Spaventa, "Two Letters of Intent." 81. This power of the chief negotiator is analogous to what Shepsle and Weingast term the "penultimate" or "ex post veto" power of the members of a Senate-House conference committee. (Shepsle and Weingast, "Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.")

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458 International Organization natories, especially Britain and France. In effect, it was Wilson himself who vetoed this otherwise ratifiable package, telling the dismayed French Ambassador, "I shall consent to nothing."82 Yet another constraint on successful two-level negotiation derives from the leader's existing domestic coalition. Any political entrepreneur has a fixed investment in a particular pattern of policy positions and a particular supporting coalition. If a proposed international deal threatens that investment, or if ratification would require him to construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will be reluctant to endorse it, even if (judged abstractly) it could be ratified. Politicians may be willing to risk a few of their normal supporters in the cause of ratifying an international agreement, but the greater the potential loss, the greater their reluctance. In effect, the fixed costs of coalition-building thus imply this constraint on the win-set: How great a realignment of prevailing coalitions at Level II would be required to ratify a particular proposal? For example, a trade deal may expand export opportunities for Silicon Valley, but harm Aliquippa. This is fine for a chief negotiator (for example, Reagan?) who can easily add Northern California yuppies to his support coalition and who has no hope of winning Aliquippa steelworkers anyhow. But a different chief negotiator with a different support coalition (for example, Mondale?) might find it costly or even impossible to convert the gains from the same agreement into politically usable form. Similarly, in the 1978 "neutron bomb" negotiations between Bonn and Washington, "asking the United States to deploy [these weapons] in West Germany might have been possible for a Christian Democratic Government; for a Social Democratic government, it was nearly impossible."83 Under such circumstances, simple "median-voter" models of domestic influences on foreign policy may be quite misleading. Relaxing the assumption that the chief negotiator is merely an honest broker, negotiating on behalf of his constituents, opens the possibility that the constituents may be more eager for an agreement (or more worried about "no-agreement") than he is. Empirical instances are not hard to find: in early 1987, European publics were readier to accept Gorbachev's "doublezero" arms control proposal than European leaders, just as in the early 1970s the American public (or at least the politically active public) was more eager for a negotiated end to the Vietnam War than was the Nixon administration. As a rule, the negotiator retains a veto over any proposed agreement in such cases. However, if the negotiator's own domestic standing (or indeed, his incumbency) would be threatened if he were to reject an agreement that falls within his Level II win-set, and if this is known to all parties, then the other side at Level I gains considerable leverage. Domestic U.S. discontent about 82. Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal, quotation at p. 15. 83. Robert A. Strong and Marshal Zeringue, "The Neutron Bomb and the Atlantic Alliance," presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 9.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics 459 the Vietnam War clearly affected the agreement reached at the Paris talks.84 Conversely, if the constituents are (believed to be) hard-line, then a leader's domestic weakness becomes a diplomatic asset. In 1977, for example, the Americans calculated that "a delay in negotiating a treaty . . . endangered [Panamanian President Omar] Torrijos' position; and Panama without Torrijos most likely would have been an impossible negotiating partner."85 Similarly, in the 1954 Trieste negotiations, the weak Italian government claimed that "'Unless something is done in our favor in Trieste, we can lose the election.' That card was played two or three times [reported the British negotiator later], and it almost always took a trick."86 My emphasis on the special responsibility of central executives is a point of affinity between the two-level game model and the "state-centric" literature, even though the underlying logic is different. In this "Janus" model of domestic-international interactions, transnational politics are less prominent than in some theories of interdependence.87 However, to disregard "cross-table" alliances at Level II is a considerable simplification, and it is more misleading, the lower the political visibility of the issue, and the more frequent the negotiations between the governments involved.88 Empirically, for example, two-level games in the European Community are influenced by many direct ties among Level II participants, such as national agricultural spokesmen. In some cases, the same multinational actor may actually appear at more than one Level II table. In negotiations over mining concessions in some less-developed countries, for example, the same multinational corporation may be consulted privately by both the home and host governments. In subsequent work on the two-level model, the strategic implications of direct communication between Level II players should be explored. Conclusion The most portentous development in the fields of comparative politics and international relations in recent years is the dawning recognition among practitioners in each field of the need to take into account entanglements between the two. Empirical illustrations of reciprocal influence between domestic and international affairs abound. What we need now are concepts 84. I. William Zartman, "Reality, Image, and Detail: The Paris Negotiations, 1969-1973," in Zartman, 50% Solution, pp. 372-98. 85. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 136, as quoted in Habeeb and Zartman, Panama Canal Negotiations, pp. 39-40. 86. Harrison in Campbell, Trieste 1954, p. 67. 87. Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," World Politics 25 (April 1973), pp. 333-68; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Neustadt, Alliance Politics. 88. Barbara Crane, "Policy Coordination by Major Western Powers in Bargaining with the Third World: Debt Relief and the Common Fund," International Organization 38 (Summer 1984), pp. 399-428.

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460 International Organization and theories that will help us organize and extend our empirical observations. Analysis in terms of two-level games offers a promising response to this challenge. Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the "national interest" requires. Unlike the "Second Image" or the "Second Image Reversed," the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. As we have seen, statesmen in this predicament face distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas. This theoretical approach highlights several significant features of the links between diplomacy and domestic politics, including:

• the important distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection from international agreements;

• the contrast between issues on which domestic interests are homogeneous, simply pitting hawks against doves, and issues on which domestic interests are more heterogeneous, so that domestic cleavage may actually foster international cooperation;

• the possibility of synergistic issue linkage, in which strategic moves at one game-table facilitate unexpected coalitions at the second table; • the paradoxical fact that institutional arrangements which strengthen decision-makers at home may weaken their international bargaining position, and vice versa;

• the importance of targeting international threats, offers, and sidepayments with an eye towards their domestic incidence at home and abroad;

• the strategic uses of uncertainty about domestic politics, and the special utility of "kinky win-sets"; • the potential reverberation of international pressures within the domestic arena;

• the divergences of interest between a national leader and those on whose behalf he is negotiating, and in particular, the international implications of his fixed investments in domestic politics.

Two-level games seem a ubiquitous feature of social life, from Western economic summitry to diplomacy in the Balkans and from coalition politics in Sri Lanka to legislative maneuvering on Capitol Hill. Far-ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how such games are played.

[17]

The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore

Do international organizations really do what their creators intend them to do? In the past century the number of international organizations (lOs) has increased exponentially, and we have a variety of vigorous theories to explain why they have been created. Most of these theories explain IO creation as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members. Research flowing from these theories, however, has paid little attention to how lOs actually behave after they are created. Closer scrutiny would reveal that many lOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute and that many lOs exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation. Understanding how this is so requires a reconsideration of lOs and what they do. In this article we develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of lOs and their propensity for dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior. Drawing on long-standing Weberian arguments about bureaucracy and sociological institutionalist approaches to organizational behavior, we argue that the rational-legal authority that lOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like "development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugee"), create new interests for actors (like "promoting human rights"), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy.) However, the same normative valuation on impersonal, generalized rules that defines bureaucracies and makes them powerful in We are grateful to John Boli, Raymond Duvall, Ernst Haas, Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, Keith Krause, Jeffrey Legro, John Malley, Craig Murphy, M. J. Peterson, Mark Pollack, Andrew Moravcsik, Thomas Risse, Duncan Snidal, Steve Weber, Thomas Weiss, and two anonymous referees for their comments. We are especially grateful for the careful attention of the editors of International Organization. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 1997 APS A meeting, the 1997 ISA meeting, and at various fora. We also acknowledge financial assistance from the Smith Richardson Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace.

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modern life can also make them unresponsive to their environments, obsessed with their own rules at the expense of primary missions, and ultimately lead to inefficient, self-defeating behavior. We are not the first to suggest that lOs are more than the reflection of state preferences and that they can be autonomous and powerful actors in global politics.1 Nor are we the first to note that lOs, like all organizations, can be dysfunctional and inefficient.2 However, our emphasis on the way that characteristics of bureaucracy as a generic cultural form shape IO behavior provides a different and very broad basis for thinking about how lOs influence world politics.3 Developing an alternative approach to thinking about lOs is only worthwhile if it produces significant insights and new opportunities for research on major debates in the field. Our approach allows us to weigh in with new perspectives on at least three such debates. First, it offers a different view of the power of lOs and whether or how they matter in world politics. This issue has been at the core of the neoliberalinstitutionalists' debate with neorealists for years.4 We show in this article how neoliberal-institutionalists actually disadvantage themselves in their argument with realists by looking at only one facet of IO power. Global organizations do more than just facilitate cooperation by helping states to overcome market failures, collective action dilemmas, and problems associated with interdependent social choice. They also create actors, specify responsibilities and authority among them, and define the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value. Even when they lack material resources, lOs exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world.5 Second and related, our perspective provides a theoretical basis for treating lOs as autonomous actors in world politics and thus presents a challenge to the statist ontology prevailing in international relations theories. Despite all their attention to international institutions, one result of the theoretical orientation of neoliberal institutionalists and regimes theorists is that they treat lOs the way pluralists treat the state. lOs are mechanisms through which others (usually states) act; they are not purposive actors. The regimes literature is particularly clear on this point. Regimes are "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures;" they are not actors.6 Weber's insights about the normative power of the rational-legal authority that bureaucracies embody and its implications for the ways bureaucracies produce and control social knowledge provide a basis for challenging this view and treating lOs as agents, not just as structure. 1. For Gramscian approaches, see Cox 1980, 1992, and 1996; and Murphy 1995. For Society of States approaches, see Hurrell and Woods 1995. For the epistemic communities literature, see Haas 1992. For IO decision-making literature, see Cox et al. 1974; Cox and Jacobson 1977; Cox 1996; and Ness and Brechin 1988. For a rational choice perspective, see Snidal 1996. 2. Haas 1990. 3. Because the neorealist and neoliberal arguments we engage have focused on intergovernmental organizations rather than nongovernmental ones, and because Weberian arguments from which we draw deal primarily with public bureaucracy, we too focus on intergovernmental organizations in this article and use the term international organizations in that way. 4. Baldwin 1993. 5. See Finnemore 1993 and 1996b; and McNeely 1995. 6. Krasnerl983b.

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Third, our perspective offers a different vantage point from which to assess the desirability of lOs. While realists and some policymakers have taken up this issue, surprisingly few other students of lOs have been critical of their performance or desirability.7 Part of this optimism stems from central tenets of classical liberalism, which has long viewed lOs as a peaceful way to manage rapid technological change and globalization, far preferable to the obvious alternative—war.8 Also contributing to this uncritical stance is the normative judgment about lOs that is built into the theoretical assumptions of most neoliberal and regimes scholars and the economic organization theories on which they draw. lOs exist, in this view, only because they are Pareto improving and solve problems for states. Consequently, if an IO exists, it must be because it is more useful than other alternatives since, by theoretical axiom, states will pull the plug on any lO that does not perform. We find this assumption unsatisfying. IDs often produce undesirable and even self-defeating outcomes repeatedly, without punishment much less dismantlement, and we, as theorists, want to understand why. International relations scholars are familiar with principal-agent problems and the ways in which bureaucratic politics can compromise organizational effectiveness, but these approaches have rarely been applied to IDs. Further, these approaches by no means exhaust sources of dysfunction. We examine one such source that flows from the same rational-legal characteristics that make lOs authoritative and powerful. Drawing from research in sociology and anthropology, we show how the very features that make bureaucracies powerful can also be their weakness. The claims we make in this article flow from an analysis of the "social stuff" of which bureaucracy is made. We are asking a standard constructivist question about what makes the world hang together or, as Alexander Wendt puts it, "how are things in the world put together so that they have the properties they do."9 In this sense, our explanation of IO behavior is constitutive and differs from most other international relations approaches. This approach does not make our explanation "mere description," since understanding the constitution of things does essential work in explaining how those things behave and what causes outcomes. Just as understanding how the double-helix DNA molecule is constituted materially makes possible causal arguments about genetics, disease, and other biological processes, so understanding how bureaucracies are constituted socially allows us to hypothesize about the behavior of lOs and the effects this social form might have in world politics. This type of constitutive explanation does not allow us to offer law-like statements such as "if X happens, then Fmust follow." Rather, by providing a more complete understanding of what bureaucracy is, we can provide explanations of how certain kinds of bureaucratic behavior are possible, or even probable, and why.10 We begin by examining the assumptions underlying different branches of organization theory and exploring their implications for the study of lOs. We argue that assumptions drawn from economics that undergird neoliberal and neorealist treat7. See Mearsheimer 1994; and Helms 1996. 8. See Commission on Global Governance 1995; Jacobson 1979,1; and Doyle 1997. 9. See Ruggie 1998; and Wendt 1998. 10. Wendt 1998.

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ments of lOs do not always reflect the empirical situation of most lOs commonly studied by political scientists. Further, they provide research hypotheses about only some aspects of lOs (like why they are created) and not others (like what they do). We then introduce sociological arguments that help remedy these problems. In the second section we develop a constructivist approach from these sociological arguments to examine the power wielded by lOs and the sources of their influence. Liberal and realist theories only make predictions about, and consequently only look for, a very limited range of welfare-improving effects caused by lOs. Sociological theories, however, expect and explain a much broader range of impacts organizations can have and specifically highlight their role in constructing actors, interests, and social purpose. We provide illustrations from the UN system to show how lOs do, in fact, have such powerful effects in contemporary world politics. In the third section we explore the dysfunctional behavior of lOs, which we define as behavior that undermines the stated goals of the organization. International relations theorists are familiar with several types of theories that might explain such behavior. Some locate the source of dysfunction in material factors, others focus on cultural factors. Some theories locate the source of dysfunction outside the organization, others locate it inside. We construct a typology, mapping these theories according to the source of dysfunction they emphasize, and show that the same internally generated cultural forces that give lOs their power and autonomy can also be a source of dysfunctional behavior. We use the term pathologies to describe such instances when IO dysfunction can be traced to bureaucratic culture. We conclude by discussing how our perspective helps to widen the research agenda for lOs.

Theoretical Approaches to Organizations Within social science there are two broad strands of theorizing about organizations. One is economistic and rooted in assumptions of instrumental rationality and efficiency concerns; the other is sociological and focused on issues of legitimacy and power.11 The different assumptions embedded within each type of theory focus attention on different kinds of questions about organizations and provide insights on different kinds of problems. The economistic approach comes, not surprisingly, out of economics departments and business schools for whom the fundamental theoretical problem, laid out first by Ronald Coase and more recently by Oliver Williamson, is why we have business firms. Within standard microeconomic logic, it should be much more efficient to conduct all transactions through markets rather than "hierarchies" or organizations. Consequently, the fact that economic life is dominated by huge organizations (business firms) is an anomaly. The body of theory developed to explain the existence and power of firms focuses on organizations as efficient solutions to contracting problems, incomplete information, and other market imperfections.12 11. See Powell and DiMaggio 1991, chap. 1; and Grandori 1993. 12. See Williamson 1975 and 1985; and Coase 1937.

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This body of organization theory informs neoliberal and neorealist debates over international institutions. Following Kenneth Waltz, neoliberals and neorealists understand world politics to be analogous to a market filled with utility-maximizing competitors.13 Thus, like the economists, they see organizations as welfare-improving solutions to problems of incomplete information and high transaction costs.14 Neoliberals and realists disagree about the degree to which constraints of anarchy, an interest in relative versus absolute gains, and fears of cheating will scuttle international institutional arrangements or hobble their effectiveness, but both agree, implicitly or explicitly, that lOs help states further their interests where they are allowed to work.15 State power may be exercised in political battles inside IDs over where, on the Pareto frontier, political bargains fall, but the notion that lOs are instruments created to serve state interests is not much questioned by neorealist or neoliberal scholars.16 After all, why else would states set up these organizations and continue to support them if they did not serve state interests? Approaches from sociology provide one set of answers to this question. They provide reasons why, in fact, organizations that are not efficient or effective servants of member interests might exist. In so doing, they lead us to look for kinds of power and sources of autonomy in organizations that economists overlook. Different approaches within sociology treat organizations in different ways, but as a group they stand in sharp contrast to the economists' approaches in at least two important respects: they offer a different conception of the relationship between organizations and their environments, and they provide a basis for understanding organizational autonomy. lOs and their environment. The environment assumed by economic approaches to organizations is socially very thin and devoid of social rules, cultural content, or even other actors beyond those constructing the organization. Competition, exchange, and consequent pressures for efficiency are the dominant environmental characteristics driving the formation and behavior of organizations. Sociologists, by contrast, study organizations in a wider world of nonmarket situations, and, consequently, they begin with no such assumptions. Organizations are treated as "social facts" to be investigated; whether they do what they claim or do it efficiently is an empirical question, not a theoretical assumption of these approaches. Organizations respond not only to other actors pursuing material interests in the environment but also to normative and cultural forces that shape how organizations see the world and conceptualize their own missions. Environments can "select" or favor organizations for reasons other than efficient or responsive behavior. For example, organizations may be created and supported for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit rather than efficient output; they may be created not for what they do but for what they are—for what they represent symbolically and the values they embody.17 13. Waltz 1979. 14. See Vaubel 1991, 27; and Dillon, Ilgen, and Willett 1991. 15. Baldwin 1993. 16. Krasnerl991. 17. See DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1992; Meyer and Scott 1992, 1-5; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Weber 1994; and Finnemore 1996a.

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Empirically, organizational environments can take many forms. Some organizations exist in competitive environments that create strong pressures for efficient or responsive behavior, but many do not. Some organizations operate with clear criteria for "success" (like firms that have balance sheets), whereas others (like political science departments) operate with much vaguer missions, with few clear criteria for success or failure and no serious threat of elimination. Our point is simply that when we choose a theoretical framework, we should choose one whose assumptions approximate the empirical conditions of the IO we are analyzing, and that we should be aware of the biases created by those assumptions. Economistic approaches make certain assumptions about the environment in which lOs are embedded that drive researchers who use them to look for certain kinds of effects and not others. Specifying different or more varied environments for lOs would lead us to look for different and more varied effects in world politics.18 IO autonomy. Following economistic logic, regime theory and the broad range of scholars working within it generally treat lOs as creations of states designed to further state interests.19 Analysis of subsequent IO behavior focuses on processes of aggregating member state preferences through strategic interaction within the structure of the IO. lOs, then, are simply epiphenomena of state interaction; they are, to quote Waltz's definition of reductionism, "understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of [their] parts."20 These theories thus treat lOs as empty shells or impersonal policy machinery to be manipulated by other actors. Political bargains shape the machinery at its creation, states may politick hard within the machinery in pursuit of their policy goals, and the machinery's norms and rules may constrain what states can do, but the machinery itself is passive. lOs are not purposive political actors in their own right and have no ontological independence. To the extent that lOs do, in fact, take on a life of their own, they breach the "limits of realism" as well as of neoliberalism by violating the ontological structures of these theories.21 The regimes concept spawned a huge literature on interstate cooperation that is remarkably consistent in its treatment of lOs as structure rather than agents. Much of the neoliberal institutionalist literature has been devoted to exploring the ways in which regimes (and lOs) can act as intervening variables, mediating between states' pursuit of self-interest and political outcomes by changing the structure of opportunities and constraints facing states through their control over information, in particular.22 Although this line of scholarship accords lOs some causal status (since they demonstrably change outcomes), it does not grant them autonomy and purpose inde18. Researchers applying these economistic approaches have become increasingly aware of the mismatch between the assumptions of their models and the empirics of IDs. See Snidal 1996. 19. Note that empirically this is not the case; most lOs now are created by other IDs. See Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996. 20. Waltz 1979, 18. 21. Krasner 1983a, 355-68; but see Finnemore 1996b; and Rittberger 1993. 22. See Keohane 1984; and Baldwin 1993.

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pendent of the states that comprise them. Another branch of liberalism has recently divorced itself from the statist ontology and focuses instead on the preferences of social groups as the causal engine of world politics, but, again, this view simply argues for attention to a different group of agents involved in the construction of lOs and competing for access to IO mechanisms. It does not offer a fundamentally different conception of IOs.23 The relevant question to ask about this conceptualization is whether it is a reasonable approximation of the empirical condition of most IOs. Our reading of detailed empirical case studies of IO activity suggests not. Yes, IOs are constrained by states, but the notion that they are passive mechanisms with no independent agendas of their own is not borne out by any detailed empirical study of an IO that we have found. Field studies of the European Union provide evidence of independent roles for "eurocrats."24 Studies of the World Bank consistently identify an independent culture and agendas for action.25 Studies of recent UN peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts similarly document a UN agenda that frequently leads to conflict with member states.26 Accounts of the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) routinely note how its autonomy and authority has grown over the years. Not only are IOs independent actors with their own agendas, but they may embody multiple agendas and contain multiple sources of agency—a problem we take up later. Principal-agent analysis, which has been increasingly employed by students of international relations to examine organizational dynamics, could potentially provide a sophisticated approach to understanding IO autonomy.27 Building on theories of rational choice and of representation, these analysts understand IOs as "agents" of states ("principals"). The analysis is concerned with whether agents are responsible delegates of their principals, whether agents smuggle in and pursue their own preferences, and how principals can construct various mechanisms to keep their agents honest.28 This framework provides a means of treating IOs as actors in their own right with independent interests and capabilities. Autonomous action by IOs is to be expected in this perspective. It would also explain a number of the nonresponsive and pathological behaviors that concern us because we know that monitoring and shirking problems are pervasive in these principal-agent relationships and that these relationships can often get stuck at suboptimal equilibria. The problem with applying principal-agent analysis to the study of IOs is that it requires a priori theoretical specification of what IOs want. Principal-agent dynamics are fueled by the disjuncture between what agents want and what principals want. To produce any insights, those two sets of interests cannot be identical. In economics this type of analysis is usually applied to preexisting agents and principals (clients 23. Moravcsik 1997. 24. See Pollack 1997; Ross 1995; and Zabusky 1995; but see Moravcsik 1999. 25. See Ascher 1983; Ayres 1983; Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995; Wade 1996; Nelson 1995; and Finnemore 1996a. 26. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996. 27. See Pollack 1997; Lake 1996; Vaubel 1991; and Dillon, Ilgen, and Willett 1991. 28. See Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; and Kiewit and McCubbins 1991.

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hiring lawyers, patients visiting doctors) whose ongoing independent existence makes specification of independent interests relatively straightforward. The lawyer or the doctor would probably be in business even if you and I did not take our problems to them. lOs, on the other hand, are often created by the principals (states) and given mission statements written by the principals. How, then, can we impute independent preferences a priori? Scholars of American politics have made some progress in producing substantive theoretical propositions about what U.S. bureaucratic agencies want. Beginning with the pioneering work of William Niskanen, scholars theorized that bureaucracies had interests defined by the absolute or relative size of their budget and the expansion or protection of their turf. At first these interests were imputed, and later they became more closely investigated, substantiated, and in some cases modified or rejected altogether.29 Realism and liberalism, however, provide no basis for asserting independent utility functions for lOs. Ontologically, these are theories about states. They provide no basis for imputing interests to lOs beyond the goals states (that is, principals) give them. Simply adopting the rather battered Niskanen hypothesis seems less than promising given the glaring anomalies—for example, the opposition of many NATO and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) bureaucrats to those organizations' recent expansion and institutionalization. There are good reasons to assume that organizations care about their resource base and turf, but there is no reason to presume that such matters exhaust or even dominate their interests. Indeed, ethnographic studies of lOs describe a world in which organizational goals are strongly shaped by norms of the profession that dominate the bureaucracy and in which interests themselves are varied, often in flux, debated, and worked out through interactions between the staff of the bureaucracy and the world in which they are embedded.30 Various strands of sociological theory can help us investigate the goals and behavior of lOs by offering a very different analytical orientation than the one used by economists. Beginning with Weber, sociologists have explored the notion that bureaucracy is a peculiarly modern cultural form that embodies certain values and can have its own distinct agenda and behavioral dispositions. Rather than treating organizations as mere arenas or mechanisms through which other actors pursue interests, many sociological approaches explore the social content of the organization—its culture, its legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape interests, and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural environment. Rather than assuming behavior that corresponds to efficiency criteria alone, these approaches recognize that organizations also are bound up with power and social control in ways that can eclipse efficiency concerns.

29. See Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983; Weingast and Moran 1983; Moe 1984; and Sigelman 1986. 30. See Ascher 1983; Zabusky 1995; Barnett 1997b; and Wade 1996.

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The Power of lOs IDs can become autonomous sites of authority, independent from the state "principals" who may have created them, because of power flowing from at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information. The first of these is almost entirely neglected by the political science literature, and the second, we argue, has been conceived of very narrowly, leading scholars to overlook some of the most basic and consequential forms of IO influence. Taken together, these two features provide a theoretical basis for treating lOs as autonomous actors in contemporary world politics by identifying sources of support for them, independent of states, in the larger social environment. Since rational-legal authority and control over expertise are part of what defines and constitutes any bureaucracy (a bureaucracy would not be a bureaucracy without them), the autonomy that flows from them is best understood as a constitutive effect, an effect of the way bureaucracy is constituted, which, in turn, makes possible (and in that sense causes) other processes and effects in global politics. Sources of IO Autonomy and Authority To understand how lOs can become autonomous sites of authority we turn to Weber and his classic study of bureaucratization. Weber was deeply ambivalent about the increasingly bureaucratic world in which he lived and was well-attuned to the vices as well as the virtues of this new social form of authority.31 Bureaucracies are rightly considered a grand achievement, he thought. They provide a framework for social interaction that can respond to the increasingly technical demands of modern life in a stable, predictable, and nonviolent way; they exemplify rationality and are technically superior to previous forms of rule because they bring precision, knowledge, and continuity to increasingly complex social tasks.32 But such technical and rational achievements, according to Weber, come at a steep price. Bureaucracies are political creatures that can be autonomous from their creators and can come to dominate the societies they were created to serve, because of both the normative appeal of rationallegal authority in modern life and the bureaucracy's control over technical expertise and information. We consider each in turn. Bureaucracies embody a form of authority, rational-legal authority, that modernity views as particularly legitimate and good. In contrast to earlier forms of authority that were invested in a leader, legitimate modern authority is invested in legalities, procedures, and rules and thus rendered impersonal. This authority is "rational" in that it deploys socially recognized relevant knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued. The very fact that they embody rationality is what makes bureaucracies powerful and makes people willing to submit to this kind of authority.

31. See Weber 1978, 196-97; Weber 1947; Mouzelis 1967; and Beetham 1985 and 1996. 32. See Schaar 1984, 120; Weber 1978, 973; and Beetham 1985, 69.

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According to Weber, in legal authority, submission does not rest upon the belief and devotion to charismatically gifted persons. . . or upon piety toward a personal lord and master who is defined by an ordered tradition. . . . Rather submission under legal authority is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional "duty of office." The official duty—like the corresponding right to exercise authority: the "jurisdictional competency"—is fixed by rationally established norms, by enactments, decrees, and regulations in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness.33 When bureaucrats do something contrary to your interests or that you do not like, they defend themselves by saying "Sorry, those are the rules" or "just doing my job." "The rules" and "the job" are the source of great power in modern society. It is because bureaucrats in lOs are performing "duties of office" and implementing "rationally established norms" that they are powerful. A second basis of autonomy and authority, intimately connected to the first, is bureaucratic control over information and expertise. A bureaucracy's autonomy derives from specialized technical knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately available to other actors. While such knowledge might help the bureaucracy carry out the directives of politicians more efficiently, Weber stressed that it also gives bureaucracies power over politicians (and other actors). It invites and at times requires bureaucracies to shape policy, not just implement it.34 The irony in both of these features of authority is that they make bureaucracies powerful precisely by creating the appearance of depoliticization. The power of lOs, and bureaucracies generally, is that they present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral—as not exercising power but instead as serving others; the presentation and acceptance of these claims is critical to their legitimacy and authority.35 Weber, however, saw through these claims. According to him, the depoliticized character of bureaucracy that legitimates it could be a myth: "Behind the functional purposes [of bureaucracy], of course, 'ideas of culture-values' usually stand."36 Bureaucracies always serve some social purpose or set of cultural values. That purpose may be normatively "good," as Weber believed the Prussian nationalism around him was, but there was no a priori reason to assume this. In addition to embodying cultural values from the larger environment that might be desirable or not, bureaucracies also carry with them behavioral dispositions and values flowing from the rationality that legitimates them as a cultural form. Some of these, like the celebration of knowledge and expertise, Weber admired. Others concerned him greatly, and his descriptions of bureaucracy as an "iron cage" and bureaucrats as "specialists without spirit" are hardly an endorsement of the bureaucratic 33. Gerth and Mills 1978, 299 (italics in original). 34. See Gerth and Mills 1978, 233; Beetham 1985, 74-75; and Schaar 1984, 120. 35. We thank John Boli for this insight. Also see Fisher 1997; Ferguson 1990; Shore and Wright 1997; and Burley and Mattli 1993. 36. Gerth and Mills 1978,199.

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form.37 Bureaucracy can undermine personal freedom in important ways. The very impersonal, rule-bound character that empowers bureaucracy also dehumanizes it. Bureaucracies often exercise their power in repressive ways, in the name of general rules because rules are their raison d'etre. This tendency is exacerbated by the way bureaucracies select and reward narrowed professionals seeking secure careers internally—people who are "lacking in heroism, human spontaneity, and inventiveness."38 Following Weber, we investigate rather than assume the "goodness" of bureaucracy. Weber's insights provide a powerful critique of the ways in which international relations scholars have treated IDs. The legitimacy of rational-legal authority suggests that lOs may have an authority independent of the policies and interests of states that create them, a possibility obscured by the technical and apolitical treatment of lOs by both realists and neoliberals. Nor have realists and neoliberals considered how control over information hands lOs a basis of autonomy. Susan Strange, at the forefront among realists in claiming that information is power, has emphatically stated that lOs are simply the agents of states. Neoliberals have tended to treat information in a highly technocratic and depoliticized way, failing to see how information is power.39 As lOs create transparencies and level information asymmetries among states (a common policy prescription of neoliberals) they create new information asymmetries between lOs and states. Given the neoliberal assumption that lOs have no goals independent of states, such asymmetries are unimportant; but if lOs have autonomous values and behavioral predispositions, then such asymmetries may be highly consequential. Examples of the ways in which lOs have become autonomous because of their embodiment of technical rationality and control over information are not hard to find. The UN's peacekeepers derive part of their authority from the claim that they are independent, objective, neutral actors who simply implement Security Council resolutions. UN officials routinely use this language to describe their role and are explicit that they understand this to be the basis of their influence. As a consequence, UN officials spend considerable time and energy attempting to maintain the image that they are not the instrument of any great power and must be seen as representatives of "the international community" as embodied in the rules and resolutions of the UN.40 The World Bank is widely recognized to have exercised power over development policies far greater than its budget, as a percentage of North/South aid flows, would suggest because of the expertise it houses. While competing sites of expertise in development have proliferated in recent years, for decades after its founding the World Bank was a magnet for the "best and brightest" among "development experts." Its staff had and continues to have impressive credentials from the most pres37. See Weber [1930] 1978, 181-83; andClegg 1994a, 152-55. 38. Gerth and Mills 1978, 216, 50, 299. For the extreme manifestation of this bureaucratic characteristic, seeArendt 1977. 39. See Strange 1997; and Keohane 1984. 40. See David Rieff, "The Institution that Saw No Evil," The New Republic, 12 February 1996, 19-24; and Barnett 1997b.

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tigious universities and the elaborate models, reports, and research groups it has sponsored over the years were widely influential among the "development experts" in the field. This expertise, coupled with its claim to "neutrality" and its "apolitical" technocratic decision-making style, have given the World Bank an authoritative voice with which it has successfully dictated the content, direction, and scope of global development over the past fifty years.41 Similarly, official standing and long experience with relief efforts have endowed the UNHCR with "expert" status and consequent authority in refugee matters. This expertise, coupled with its role in implementing international refugee conventions and law ("the rules" regarding refugees), has allowed the UNHCR to make life and death decisions about refugees without consulting the refugees, themselves, and to compromise the authority of states in various ways in setting up refugee camps.42 Note that, as these examples show, technical knowledge and expertise need not be "scientific" in nature to create autonomy and power for lOs. The Power oflOs If lOs have autonomy and authority in the world, what do they do with it? A growing body of research in sociology and anthropology has examined ways in which lOs exercise power by virtue of their culturally constructed status as sites of authority; we distill from this research three broad types of IO power. We examine how lOs (1) classify the world, creating categories of actors and action; (2) fix meanings in the social world; and (3) articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe. All of these sources of power flow from the ability of lOs to structure knowledge.43 Classification. An elementary feature of bureaucracies is that they classify and organize information and knowledge. This classification process is bound up with power. "Bureaucracies," writes Don Handelman, "are ways of making, ordering, and knowing social worlds." They do this by "moving persons among social categories or by inventing and applying such categories."44 The ability to classify objects, to shift their very definition and identity, is one of bureaucracy's greatest sources of power. This power is frequently treated by the objects of that power as accomplished through caprice and without regard to their circumstances but is legitimated and justified by bureaucrats with reference to the rules and regulations of the bureaucracy. Consequences of this bureaucratic exercise of power may be identity defining, or even life threatening. Consider the evolving definition of "refugee." The category "refugee" is not at all straightforward and must be distinguished from other categories of individuals who 41. See Wade 1996; Ayres 1983; Ascher 1983; Finnemore 1996b; and Nelson 1995. 42. See Malkki 1996; Hartigan 1992; and Harrell-Bond 1989. 43. See Foucault 1977, 27; and Clegg 1994b, 156-59. International relations theory typically disregards the negative side of the knowledge and power equation. For an example, see Haas 1992. 44. Handelman 1995, 280. See also Starr 1992; and Wright 1994, 22.

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are "temporarily" and "involuntarily" living outside their country of origin— displaced persons, exiles, economic migrants, guest workers, diaspora communities, and those seeking political asylum. The debate over the meaning of "refugee" has been waged in and around the UNHCR. The UNHCR's legal and operational definition of the category strongly influences decisions about who is a refugee and shapes UNHCR staff decisions in the field—decisions that have a tremendous effect on the life circumstance of thousands of people.45 These categories are not only political and legal but also discursive, shaping a view among UNHCR officials that refugees must, by definition, be powerless, and that as powerless actors they do not have to be consulted in decisions such as asylum and repatriation that will directly and dramatically affect them.46 Guy Gran similarly describes how the World Bank sets up criteria to define someone as a peasant in order to distinguish them from a farmer, day laborer, and other categories. The classification matters because only certain classes of people are recognized by the World Bank's development machinery as having knowledge that is relevant in solving development problems.47 Categorization and classification are a ubiquitous feature of bureaucratization that has potentially important implications for those being classified. To classify is to engage in an act of power. The fixing of meanings. lOs exercise power by virtue of their ability to fix meanings, which is related to classification.48 Naming or labeling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action. Because actors are oriented toward objects and objectives on the basis of the meaning that they have for them, being able to invest situations with a particular meaning constitutes an important source of power.49 lOs do not act alone in this regard, but their organizational resources contribute mightily to this end. There is strong evidence of this power from development studies. Arturo Escobar explores how the institutionalization of the concept of "development" after World War II spawned a huge international apparatus and how this apparatus has now spread its tentacles in domestic and international politics through the discourse of development. The discourse of development, created and arbitrated in large part by lOs, determines not only what constitutes the activity (what development is) but also who (or what) is considered powerful and privileged, that is, who gets to do the developing (usually the state or lOs) and who is the object of development (local groups).50 Similarly, the end of the Cold War encouraged a reexamination of the definition of security.51 lOs have been at the forefront of this debate, arguing that security pertains not only to states but also to individuals and that the threats to security may be 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

See Weiss andPasic 1997; Goodwin-Gill 1996; and Anonymous 1997. See Harrell-Bond 1989; Walkup 1997; and Malkki 1996. Gran 1986. See Williams 1996; Clegg 1994b; Bourdieu 1994; Carr [1939] 1964; and Keeley 1990. Blumer 1969. See Gupta 1998; Escobar 1995; Cooper and Packard 1998; Gran 1986; Ferguson 1990; and Wade 1996. See Matthews 1989; and Krause and Williams 1996.

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economic, environmental, and political as well as military.52 In forwarding these alternative definitions of security, officials from various lOs are empowering a different set of actors and legitimating an alternative set of practices. Specifically, when security meant safety from invading national armies, it privileged state officials and invested power in military establishments. These alternative definitions of security shift attention away from states and toward the individuals who are frequently threatened by their own government, away from military practices and toward other features of social life that might represent a more immediate and daily danger to the lives of individuals. One consequence of these redefined meanings of development and security is that they legitimate, and even require, increased levels of IO intervention in the domestic affairs of states—particularly Third World states. This is fairly obvious in the realm of development. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other development institutions have established a web of interventions that affect nearly every phase of the economy and polity in many Third World states. As "rural development," "basic human needs," and "structural adjustment" became incorporated into the meaning of development, lOs were permitted, even required, to become intimately involved in the domestic workings of developing polities by posting inhouse "advisors" to run monetary policy, reorganizing the political economy of entire rural regions, regulating family and reproductive practices, and mediating between governments and their citizens in a variety of ways.53 The consequences of redefining security may be similar. Democratization, human rights, and the environment have all now become tied to international peace and security, and lOs justify their interventions in member states on these grounds, particularly in developing states. For example, during the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, human rights abuses came to be classified as security threats by the UN Security Council and provided grounds for UN involvement there. Now, that linkage between human rights and security has become a staple of the post-Cold War environment. Widespread human rights abuses anywhere are now cause for UN intervention, and, conversely, the UN cannot carry out peacekeeping missions without promoting human rights.54 Similarly, environmental disasters in Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and water rights allocations in the Middle East have also come to be discussed under the rubric of "environmental security" and are thus grounds for IO intervention. The United Nations Development Program argues that there is an important link between human security and sustainable development and implicitly argues for greater intervention in the management of environment as a means to promote human security.55 Diffusion of norms. Having established rules and norms, lOs are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as conveyor belts for the transmission of 52. 53. 54. 55.

See UN Development Program 1994; and Boutros-Ghali 1995. See Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; and Feldstein 1998. World Conference on Human Rights 1993. UN Development Program 1994.

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norms and models of "good" political behavior.56 There is nothing accidental or unintended about this role. Officials in lOs often insist that part of their mission is to spread, inculcate, and enforce global values and norms. They are the "missionaries" of our time. Armed with a notion of progress, an idea of how to create the better life, and some understanding of the conversion process, many IO elites have as their stated purpose a desire to shape state practices by establishing, articulating, and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behavior. To be sure, their success depends on more than their persuasive capacities, for their rhetoric must be supported by power, sometimes (but not always) state power. But to overlook how state power and organizational missionaries work in tandem and the ways in which IO officials channel and shape states' exercise of power is to disregard a fundamental feature of value diffusion.57 Consider decolonization as an example. The UN Charter announced an intent to universalize sovereignty as a constitutive principle of the society of states at a time when over half the globe was under some kind of colonial rule; it also established an institutional apparatus to achieve that end (most prominently the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee on Colonialism). These actions had several consequences. One was to eliminate certain categories of acceptable action for powerful states. Those states that attempted to retain their colonial privileges were increasingly viewed as illegitimate by other states. Another consequence was to empower international bureaucrats (at the Trusteeship Council) to set norms and standards for "stateness." Finally, the UN helped to ensure that throughout decolonization the sovereignty of these new states was coupled with territorial inviolability. Colonial boundaries often divided ethnic and tribal groups, and the UN was quite concerned that in the process of "self-determination," these governments containing "multiple" or "partial" selves might attempt to create a whole personality through territorial adjustment—a fear shared by many of these newly decolonized states. The UN encouraged the acceptance of the norm of sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity through resolutions, monitoring devices, commissions, and one famous peacekeeping episode in Congo in the 1960s.58 Note that, as with other IO powers, norm diffusion, too, has an expansionary dynamic. Developing states continue to be popular targets for norm diffusion by lOs, even after they are independent. The UN and the European Union are now actively involved in police training in non-Western states because they believe Western policing practices will be more conducive to democratization processes and the establishment of civil society. But having a professional police establishment assumes that there is a professional judiciary and penal system where criminals can be tried and jailed; and a professional judiciary, in turn, presupposes that there are lawyers that can come before the court. Trained lawyers presuppose a code of law. The result is a package of reforms sponsored by lOs aimed at transforming non-Western societies 56. See Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996b; and Legro 1997. 57. See Alger 1963,425; and Claude 1966, 373. 58. See McNeely 1995; and Jackson 1993.

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into Western societies.59 Again, while Western states are involved in these activities and therefore their values and interests are part of the reasons for this process, international bureaucrats involved in these activities may not see themselves as doing the bidding for these states but rather as expressing the interests and values of the bureaucracy. Other examples of this kind of norm diffusion are not hard to find. The IMF and the World Bank are explicit about their role as transmitters of norms and principles from advanced market economies to less-developed economies.60 The IMF's Articles of Agreement specifically assign it this task of incorporating less-developed economies into the world economy, which turns out to mean teaching them how to "be" market economies. The World Bank, similarly, has a major role in arbitrating the meaning of development and norms of behavior appropriate to the task of developing oneself, as was discussed earlier. The end of the Cold War has opened up a whole new set of states to this kind of norm diffusion task for lOs. According to former Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the functions of NATO expansion is to inculcate "modern" values and norms into the Eastern European countries and their militaries.61 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has, as part of its mandate, the job of spreading democracy and private enterprise. The OSCE is striving to create a community based on shared values, among these respect for democracy and human rights. This linkage is also strong at the UN as evident in The Agenda for Democratization and The Agenda for Peace.62 Once democratization and human rights are tied to international peace and security, the distinctions between international and domestic governance become effectively erased and lOs have license to intervene almost anywhere in an authoritative and legitimate manner.63 Realists and neoliberals may well look at these effects and argue that the classificatory schemes, meanings, and norms associated with lOs are mostly favored by strong states. Consequently, they would argue, the power we attribute to lOs is simply epiphenomenal of state power. This argument is certainly one theoretical possibility, but it is not the only one and must be tested against others. Our concern is that because these theories provide no ontological independence for lOs, they have no way to test for autonomy nor have they any theoretical cause or inclination to test for it since, by theoretical axiom, autonomy cannot exist. The one empirical domain in which the statist view has been explicitly challenged is the European Union, and empirical studies there have hardly produced obvious victory for the "intergovernmentalist" approach.64 Recent empirical studies in the areas of human rights, weapons taboos, and environmental practices also cast doubt on the statist approach by providing evidence about the ways in which nongovernmental and intergovernmen59. Call and Barnett forthcoming. 60. Wade 1996. 61. See Perry 1996; and Ruggie 1996. 62. Boutros-Ghali 1995 and 1996a,b. 63. Keen and Hendrie, however, suggest that nongovernmental organizations and lOs can be the longterm beneficiaries of intervention. See Keen 1994; and Hendrie 1997. 64. See Burley and Mattli 1993; Pollack 1997; and Sandholtz 1993.

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tal organizations successfully promote policies that are not (or not initially) supported by strong states.65 Certainly there are occasions when strong states do drive IO behavior, but there are also times when other forces are at work that eclipse or significantly dampen the effects of states on lOs. Which causal mechanisms produce which effects under which conditions is a set of relationships that can be understood only by intensive empirical study of how these organizations actually do their business— research that would trace the origins and evolution of IO policies, the processes by which they are implemented, discrepancies between implementation and policy, and overall effects of these policies.

The Pathologies of lOs Bureaucracies are created, propagated, and valued in modern society because of their supposed rationality and effectiveness in carrying out social tasks. These same considerations presumably also apply to lOs. Ironically, though, the folk wisdom about bureaucracies is that they are inefficient and unresponsive. Bureaucracies are infamous for creating and implementing policies that defy rational logic, for acting in ways that are at odds with their stated mission, and for refusing requests of and turning their backs on those to whom they are officially responsible.66 Scholars of U.S. bureaucracy have recognized this problem and have devoted considerable energy to understanding a wide range of undesirable and inefficient bureaucratic behaviors caused by bureaucratic capture and slack and to exploring the conditions under which "suboptimal equilibria" may arise in organizational structures. Similarly, scholars researching foreign policy decision making and, more recently, those interested in learning in foreign policy have investigated organizational dynamics that produce self-defeating and inefficient behavior in those contexts.67 lOs, too, are prone to dysfunctional behaviors, but international relations scholars have rarely investigated this, in part, we suspect, because the theoretical apparatus they use provides few grounds for expecting undesirable IO behavior.68 The statecentric utility-maximizing frameworks most international relations scholars have borrowed from economics simply assume that lOs are reasonably responsive to state interests (or, at least, more responsive than alternatives), otherwise states would withdraw from them. This assumption, however, is a necessary theoretical axiom of these frameworks; it is rarely treated as a hypothesis subject to empirical investigation.69 With little theoretical reason to expect suboptimal or self-defeating behavior in lOs, these scholars do not look for it and have had little to say about it. Policymakers, however, have been quicker to perceive and address these problems and are putting 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wapner 1996; Price 1997; and Thomas forthcoming. March and Olsen 1989, chap. 5. See Nye 1987; Haas 1990; Haas and Haas 1995; and Sagan 1993. Two exceptions are Gallaroti 1991; and Snidal 1996. Snidal 1996.

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Internal Material Cultural

External

Bureaucratic politics

Realism/ neoliberal institutionalism

Bureaucratic culture

World polity model

FIGURE 1. Theories of international organization dysfunction them on the political agenda. It is time for scholars, too, to begin to explore these issues more fully. In this section we present several bodies of theorizing that might explain dysfunctional IO behavior, which we define as behavior that undermines the lO's stated objectives. Thus our vantage point for judging dysfunction (and later pathology) is the publicly proclaimed mission of the organization. There may be occasions when overall organizational dysfunction is, in fact, functional for certain members or others involved in the lO's work, but given our analysis of the way claims of efficiency and effectiveness act to legitimate rational-legal authority in our culture, whether organizations actually do what they claim and accomplish their missions is a particularly important issue to examine. Several bodies of theory provide some basis for understanding dysfunctional behavior by IDs, each of which emphasizes a different locus of causality for such behavior. Analyzing these causes, we construct a typology of these explanations that locates them in relation to one another. Then, drawing on the work of James March and Johan Olsen, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, and other sociological institutionalists, we elaborate how the same sources of bureaucratic power, sketched earlier, can cause dysfunctional behavior. We term this particular type of dysfunction pathology.10 We identify five features of bureaucracy that might produce pathology, and using examples from the UN system we illustrate the way these might work in IDs. Extant theories about dysfunction can be categorized in two dimensions: (1) whether they locate the cause of IO dysfunction inside or outside the organization, and (2) whether they trace the causes to material or cultural forces. Mapping theories on these dimensions creates the typology shown in Figure 1. Within each cell we have identified a representative body of theory familiar to most international relations scholars. Explanations of IO dysfunction that emphasize the pursuit of material interests within an organization typically examine how competition among subunits over material resources leads the organization to make deci70. Karl Deutsch used the concept of pathology in a way similar to our usage. We thank Hay ward Alker for this point. Deutsch 1963, 170.

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sions and engage in behaviors that are inefficient or undesirable as judged against some ideal policy that would better allow the IO to achieve its stated goals. Bureaucratic politics is the best-known theory here, and though current scholars of international politics have not widely adopted this perspective to explain IO behavior, it is relatively well developed in the older IO literature.71 Graham Allison's central argument is that the "name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood as ... results of these bargaining games."72 In this view, decisions are not made after a rational decision process but rather through a competitive bargaining process over turf, budgets, and staff that may benefit parts of the organization at the expense of overall goals. Another body of literature traces IO dysfunctional behavior to the material forces located outside the organization. Realist and neoliberal theories might posit that state preferences and constraints are responsible for understanding IO dysfunctional behavior. In this view lOs are not to blame for bad outcomes, states are. lOs do not have the luxury of choosing the optimal policy but rather are frequently forced to chose between the bad and the awful because more desirable policies are denied to them by states who do not agree among themselves and/or do not wish to see the IO fulfill its mandate in some particular instance. As Robert Keohane observed, lOs often engage in policies not because they are strong and have autonomy but because they are weak and have none.73 The important point of these theories is that they trace IO dysfunctional behavior back to the environmental conditions established by, or the explicit preferences of, states. Cultural theories also have internal and external variants. We should note that many advocates of cultural theories would reject the claim that an organization can be understood apart from its environment or that culture is separable from the material world. Instead they would stress how the organization is permeated by that environment, defined in both material and cultural terms, in which it is embedded. Many are also quite sensitive to the ways in which resource constraints and the material power of important actors will shape organizational culture. That said, these arguments clearly differ from the previous two types in their emphasis on ideational and cultural factors and clearly differ among themselves in the motors of behavior emphasized. For analytical clarity we divide cultural theories according to whether they see the primary causes of the lO's dysfunctional behavior as deriving from the culture of the organization (internal) or of the environment (external). The world polity model exemplifies theories that look to external culture to understand an lO's dysfunctional behavior. There are two reasons to expect dysfunctional behavior here. First, because IO practices reflect a search for symbolic legitimacy rather than efficiency, IO behavior might be only remotely connected to the efficient implementation of its goals and more closely coupled to legitimacy criteria that come 71. See Allison 1971; Haas 1990; Cox et al. 1974; and Cox and Jacobson 1977. 72. See Allison 1971, 144; and Bendor and Hammond 1992. 73. Personal communication to the authors.

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from the cultural environment.74 For instance, many arms-export control regimes now have a multilateral character not because of any evidence that this architecture is the most efficient way to monitor and prevent arms exports but rather because multilateralism has attained a degree of legitimacy that is not empirically connected to any efficiency criteria.75 Second, the world polity is full of contradictions; for instance, a liberal world polity has several defining principles, including market economics and human equality, that might conflict at any one moment. Thus, environments are often ambiguous about missions and contain varied, often conflicting, functional, normative, and legitimacy imperatives.76 Because they are embedded in that cultural environment, IDs can mirror and reproduce those contradictions, which, in turn, can lead to contradictory and ultimately dysfunctional behavior. Finally, organizations frequently develop distinctive internal cultures that can promote dysfunctional behavior, behavior that we call "pathological." The basic logic of this argument flows directly from our previous observations about the nature of bureaucracy as a social form. Bureaucracies are established as rationalized means to accomplish collective goals and to spread particular values. To do this, bureaucracies create social knowledge and develop expertise as they act upon the world (and thus exercise power). But the way bureaucracies are constituted to accomplish these ends can, ironically, create a cultural disposition toward undesirable and ultimately selfdefeating behavior.77 Two features of the modern bureaucratic form are particularly important in this regard. The first is the simple fact that bureaucracies are organized around rules, routines, and standard operating procedures designed to trigger a standard and predictable response to environmental stimuli. These rules can be formal or informal, but in either case they tell actors which action is appropriate in response to a specific stimuli, request, or demand. This kind of routinization is, after all, precisely what bureaucracies are supposed to exhibit—it is what makes them effective and competent in performing complex social tasks. However, the presence of such rules also compromises the extent to which means-ends rationality drives organizational behavior. Rules and routines may come to obscure overall missions and larger social goals. They may create "ritualized behavior" in bureaucrats and construct a very parochial normative environment within the organization whose connection to the larger social environment is tenuous at best.78 Second, bureaucracies specialize and compartmentalize. They create a division of labor on the logic that because individuals have only so much time, knowledge, and expertise, specialization will allow the organization to emulate a rational decisionmaking process.79 Again, this is one of the virtues of bureaucracy in that it provides a way of overcoming the limitations of individual rationality and knowledge by embedding those individuals in a structure that takes advantage of their competencies with74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

See Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer and Zucker 1989; Weber 1994; and Finnemore 1996a. Lipson 1999. McNeely 1995. See Vaughan 1996; and Lipartito 1995. See March and Olsen 1989, 21-27; and Meyer and Rowan 1977. See March and Olsen 1989, 26-27; and March 1997.

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out having to rely on their weaknesses. However, it, too, has some negative consequences. Just as rules can eclipse goals, concentrated expertise and specialization can (and perhaps must) limit bureaucrats' field of vision and create subcultures within bureaucracy that are distinct from those of the larger environment. Professional training plays a particularly strong role here since this is one widespread way we disseminate specialized knowledge and credential "experts." Such training often gives experts, indeed is designed to give them, a distinctive worldview and normative commitments, which, when concentrated in a subunit of an organization, can have pronounced effects on behavior.80 Once in place, an organization's culture, understood as the rules, rituals, and beliefs that are embedded in the organization (and its subunits), has important consequences for the way individuals who inhabit that organization make sense of the world. It provides interpretive frames that individuals use to generate meaning.81 This is more than just bounded rationality; in this view, actors' rationality itself, the very means and ends that they value, are shaped by the organizational culture.82 Divisions and subunits within the organization may develop their own cognitive frameworks that are consistent with but still distinct from the larger organization, further complicating this process. All organizations have their own culture (or cultures) that shape their behavior. The effects of bureaucratic culture, however, need not be dysfunctional. Indeed, specific organizational cultures may be valued and actively promoted as a source of "good" behavior, as students of business culture know very well. Organizational culture is tied to "good" and "bad" behavior, alike, and the effects of organizational culture on behavior are an empirical question to be researched. To further such research, we draw from studies in sociology and anthropology to explore five mechanisms by which bureaucratic culture can breed pathologies in lOs: the irrationality of rationalization, universalism, normalization of deviance, organizational insulation, and cultural contestation. The first three of these mechanisms all flow from defining features of bureaucracy itself. Consequently, we expect them to be present in any bureaucracy to a limited degree. Their severity may be increased, however, by specific empirical conditions of the organization. Vague mission, weak feedback from the environment, and strong professionalism all have the potential to exacerbate these mechanisms and to create two others, organizational insulation and cultural contestation, through processes we describe later. Our claim, therefore, is that the very nature of bureaucracy—the "social stuff" of which it is made—creates behavioral predispositions that make bureaucracy prone to these kinds of behaviors.83 But the connection between these mechanisms and pathological behavior is probabilistic, not deterministic, and is consistent with our constitutive analysis. Whether, in fact, mission-defeating behavior occurs depends on empirical condi80. 81. 82. 1998, 83.

See DiMaggio and Powell 1983; and Schien 1996. See Starr 1992, 160; Douglas 1986; and Berger and Luckman 1966, chap. 1. See Campbell 1998, 378; Alvesson 1996; Burrell and Morgan 1979; Dobbin 1994; and Immergut 14-19. Wendtl998.

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tions. We identify three such conditions that are particularly important (mission, feedback, and professionals) and discuss how they intensify these inherent predispositions and activate or create additional ones. Irrationality of rationalization. Weber recognized that the "rationalization" processes at which bureaucracies excelled could be taken to extremes and ultimately become irrational if the rules and procedures that enabled bureaucracies to do their jobs became ends in themselves. Rather than designing the most appropriate and efficient rules and procedures to accomplish their missions, bureaucracies often tailor their missions to fit the existing, well-known, and comfortable rulebook.84 Thus, means (rules and procedures) may become so embedded and powerful that they determine ends and the way the organization defines its goals. One observer of the World Bank noted how, at an operational level, the bank did not decide on development goals and collect data necessary to pursue them. Rather, it continued to use existing data-collection procedures and formulated goals and development plans from those data alone.85 UN-mandated elections may be another instance where means become ends in themselves. The "end" pursued in the many troubled states where the UN has been involved in reconstruction is presumably some kind of peaceful, stable, just government. Toward that end, the UN has developed a repertoire of instruments and responses that are largely intended to promote something akin to a democratic government. Among those various repertoires, elections have become privileged as a measure of "success" and a signal of an operation's successful conclusion. Consequently, UN (and other IO) officials have conducted elections even when evidence suggests that such elections are either premature or perhaps even counterproductive (frequently acknowledged as much by state and UN officials).86 In places like Bosnia elections have ratified precisely the outcome the UN and outside powers had intervened to prevent—ethnic cleansing—and in places like Africa elections are criticized as exacerbating the very ethnic tensions they were ostensibly designed to quell. UN peacekeeping might also provide examples. As the UN began to involve itself in various "second-generation operations" that entailed the management and reconciliation of domestic conflicts it turned to the only instrument that was readily available in sufficient numbers—peacekeeping units. Peacekeepers, however, are military troops, trained to handle interstate conflict and to be interposed between two contending national armies, operating with their consent. Some UN staff, state officials, and peacekeeping scholars worried that peacekeepers might be inappropriate for the demands of handling domestic security. They feared that peacekeepers would transfer the skills and attitudes that had been honed for one environment to another without fully considering the adjustments required. According to some observers, peacekeepers did just that: they carried their interstate conflict equipment and mindset into new situations and so created a more aggressive and offensively minded posture than 84. Beetham 1985, 76. 85. See Ferguson 1990; and Nelson 1995. 86. Paris 1997.

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would otherwise have been the case. The result was operations that undermined the objectives of the mandate.87 Bureaucratic universalism. A second source of pathology in lOs derives from the fact that bureaucracies "orchestrate numerous local contexts at once."88 Bureaucrats necessarily flatten diversity because they are supposed to generate universal rules and categories that are, by design, inattentive to contextual and particularistic concerns. Part of the justification for this, of course, is the bureaucratic view that technical knowledge is transferable across circumstances. Sometimes this is a good assumption, but not always; when particular circumstances are not appropriate to the generalized knowledge being applied, the results can be disastrous.89 Many critics of the IMF's handling of the Asian financial crises have argued that the IMF inappropriately applied a standardized formula of budget cuts plus high interest rates to combat rapid currency depreciation without appreciating the unique and local causes of this depreciation. These governments were not profligate spenders, and austerity policies did little to reassure investors, yet the IMF prescribed roughly the same remedy that it had in Latin America. The result, by the IMF's later admission, was to make matters worse.90 Similarly, many of those who worked in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia were transferred to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia or Somalia on the assumption that the knowledge gained in one location would be applicable to others. Although some technical skills can be transferred across contexts, not all knowledge and organizational lessons derived from one context are appropriate elsewhere. The UN has a longstanding commitment to neutrality, which operationally translates into the view that the UN should avoid the use of force and the appearance of partiality. This knowledge was employed with some success by UN envoy Yasushi Akashi in Cambodia. After his stint in Cambodia, he became the UN Special Representative in Yugoslavia. As many critics of Akashi have argued, however, his commitment to these rules, combined with his failure to recognize that Bosnia was substantially different from Cambodia, led him to fail to use force to defend the safe havens when it was appropriate and likely to be effective.91 Normalization of deviance. We derive a third type of pathology from Diane Vaughan's study of the space shuttle Challenger disaster in which she chronicles the way exceptions to rules (deviance) over time become routinized and normal parts of procedures.92 Bureaucracies establish rules to provide a predictable response to environmental stimuli in ways that safeguard against decisions that might lead to accidents and faulty decisions. At times, however, bureaucracies make small, calculated 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

See Featherston 1995; Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbo 1995; and Hirsch and Oakley 1995, chap. 6. Heyman 1995, 262. Haas 1990, chap. 3. See Feldstein 1998; Radelet and Sachs 1999; and Kapur 1998. Rieff 1996. Vaughan 1996.

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deviations from established rules because of new environmental or institutional developments, explicitly calculating that bending the rules in this instance does not create excessive risk of policy failure. Over time, these exceptions can become the rule—they become normal, not exceptions at all: they can become institutionalized to the point where deviance is "normalized." The result of this process is that what at time t{ might be weighed seriously and debated as a potentially unacceptable risk or dangerous procedure comes to be treated as normal at time rn. Indeed, because of staff turnover, those making decisions at a later point in time might be unaware that the now-routine behavior was ever viewed as risky or dangerous. We are unaware of any studies that have examined this normalization of deviance in IO decision making, though one example of deviance normalization comes to mind. Before 1980 the UNHCR viewed repatriation as only one of three durable solutions to refugee crises (the others being third-country asylum and host-country integration). In its view, repatriation had to be both safe and voluntary because forced repatriation violates the international legal principle of nonrefoulement, which is the cornerstone of international refugee law and codified in the UNHCR's convention. Prior to 1980, UNHCR's discussions of repatriation emphasized that the principles of safety and voluntariness must be safeguarded at all costs. According to many commentators, however, the UNHCR has steadily lowered the barriers to repatriation over the years. Evidence for this can be found in international protection manuals, the UNHCR Executive Committee resolutions, and discourse that now weighs repatriation and the principle of nonrefoulement against other goals such a peace building. This was a steady and incremental development as initial deviations from organizational norms accumulated over time and led to a normalization of deviance. The result was a lowering of the barriers to repatriation and an increase in the frequency of involuntary repatriation.93 Insulation. Organizations vary greatly in the degree to which they receive and process feedback from their environment about performance. Those insulated from such feedback often develop internal cultures and worldviews that do not promote the goals and expectations of those outside the organization who created it and whom it serves. These distinctive worldviews can create the conditions for pathological behavior when parochial classification and categorization schemes come to define reality—how bureaucrats understand the world—such that they routinely ignore information that is essential to the accomplishment of their goals.94 Two causes of insulation seem particularly applicable to lOs. The first is professionalism. Professional training does more than impart technical knowledge. It actively seeks to shape the normative orientation and worldviews of those who are trained. Doctors are trained to value life above all else, soldiers are trained to sacri93. See Chimni 1993, 447; Amnesty International 1997a,b; Human Rights Watch 1997; Zieck 1997, 433, 434, 438-39; and Barbara Crossette, "The Shield for Exiles Is Lowered," The New York Times, 22 December 1996,4-1. 94. See Berger and Luckman 1967, chap. 1; Douglas 1986; Bnmer 1990; March and Olsen 1989; and Starr 1992.

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fice life for certain strategic objectives, and economists are trained to value efficiency. Bureaucracies, by their nature, concentrate professionals inside organizations, and concentrations of people with the same expertise or professional training can create an organizational worldview distinct from the larger environment. Second, organizations for whom "successful performance" is difficult to measure—that is, they are valued for what they represent rather than for what they do and do not "compete" with other organizations on the basis of output—are protected from selection and performance pressures that economistic models simply assume will operate. The absence of a competitive environment that selects out inefficient practices coupled with already existing tendencies toward institutionalization of rules and procedures insulates the organization from feedback and increases the likelihood of pathologies. lOs vary greatly in the degree to which the professionals they recruit have distinctive worldviews and the degree to which they face competitive pressures, but it is clearly the case that these factors insulate some lOs to some degree and in so doing create a tendency toward pathology. The World Bank, for example, has been dominated for much of its history by economists, which, at least in part, has contributed to many critiques of the bank's policies. In one such critique James Ferguson opens his study of the World Bank's activity in Lesotho by comparing the bank's introductory description of Lesotho in its report on that country to facts on the ground; he shows how the bank "creates" a world that has little resemblance to what historians, geographers, or demographers see on the ground in Lesotho but is uniquely suited to the bank's organizational abilities and presents precisely the problems the bank knows how to solve. This is not simply "staggeringly bad scholarship," Ferguson argues, but a way of making the world intelligible and meaningful from a particular perspective—the World Bank's.95 The problem, however, is that this different worldview translates into a record of development failures, which Ferguson explores in detail. Insulation contributes to and is caused by another well-known feature of organizations—the absence of effective feedback loops that allow the organization to evaluate its efforts and use new information to correct established routines. This is surely a "rational" procedure in any social task but is one that many organizations, including lOs, fail to perform.96 Many scholars and journalists, and even the current head of the World Bank, have noticed that the bank has accumulated a rather distinctive record of "failures" but continues to operate with the same criteria and has shown a marked lack of interest in evaluating the effectiveness of its own projects.97 The same is true of other lOs. Jarat Chopra observes that the lessons-learned conferences that were established after Somalia were structurally arranged so that no information could come out that would blemish the UN's record. Such attempts at face saving, Chopra cautions, make it more likely that these maladies will go uncorrected.98 Sometimes

95. Ferguson 1990, 25-73. 96. March and Olsen 1989, chap. 5; Haas 1990. 97. See Wade 1996, 14-17; Nelson 1995, chaps. 6, 7; and Richard Stevenson, "The Chief Banker for the Nations at the Bottom of the Heap," New York Times, 14 September 1997, sec. 3, 1, 12-14. 98. Chopra 1996.

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new evaluative criteria are hoisted in order to demonstrate that the failures were not really failures but successes. Cultural contestation. Organizational coherence is an accomplishment rather than a given. Organizational control within a putative hierarchy is always incomplete, creating pockets of autonomy and political battles within the bureaucracy." This is partly a product of the fact that bureaucracies are organized around the principle of division-of-labor, and different divisions tend to be staffed by individuals who are "experts" in their assigned tasks. These different divisions may battle over budgets or material resources and so follow the bureaucratic politics model, but they may also clash because of distinct internal cultures that grow up inside different parts of the organization. Different segments of the organization may develop different ways of making sense of the world, experience different local environments, and receive different stimuli from outside; they may also be populated by different mixes of professions or shaped by different historical experiences. All of these would contribute to the development of different local cultures within the organization and different ways of perceiving the environment and the organization's overall mission. Organizations may try to minimize complications from these divisions by arranging these demands hierarchically, but to the extent that hierarchy resolves conflict by squelching input from some subunits in favor of others, the organization loses the benefits of a division of labor that it was supposed to provide. More commonly, though, attempts to reconcile competing worldviews hierarchically are simply incomplete. Most organizations develop overlapping and contradictory sets of preferences among subgroups.100 Consequently, different constituencies representing different normative views will suggest different tasks and goals for the organization, resulting in -a clash of competing perspectives that generates pathological tendencies. The existence of cultural contestation might be particularly true of high-profile and expansive lOs like the UN that have vague missions, broad and politicized constituencies, and lots of divisions that are developed over time and in response to new environmental demands. Arguably a number of the more spectacular debacles in recent UN peacekeeping operations might be interpreted as the product of these contradictions. Consider the conflict between the UN's humanitarian missions and the value it places on impartiality and neutrality. Within the organization there are many who view impartiality as a core constitutive principle of UN action. On the one hand, the UN's moral standing, its authority, and its ability to persuade all rest on this principle. On the other hand, the principles of humanitarianism require the UN to give aid to those in need—values that are particularly strong in a number of UN relief and humanitarian agencies. These two norms of neutrality and humanitarian assistance, and the parts of the bureaucracy most devoted to them, come into direct conflict in those situations where providing humanitarian relief might jeopardize the UN's 99. See Clegg 1994a, 30; Vaughan 1996, 64; and Martin 1992. 100. Haas 1990,188.

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vaunted principle of neutrality. Bosnia is the classic case in point. On the one hand, the "all necessary means" provision of Security Council resolutions gave the UN authority to deliver humanitarian aid and protect civilians in the safe havens. On the other hand, the UN abstained from "taking sides" because of the fear that such actions would compromise its neutrality and future effectiveness. The result of these conflicts was a string of contradictory policies that failed to provide adequately for the UN's expanding humanitarian charges.101 According to Shashi Tharoor, a UN official intimately involved in these decisions, "It is extremely difficult to make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time."102 UNHCR provides another possible example of cultural contestation. Historically, the UNHCR's Protection Division has articulated a legalistic approach toward refugee matters and thus tends to view the UNHCR and itself as the refugee's lawyer and as the protector of refugee rights under international law. Those that inhabit the UNHCR's regional bureaus, however, have been characterized as taking a less "narrow" view of the organization's mission, stressing that the UNHCR must take into account the causes of refugee flows and state pressures. These cultural conflicts have been particularly evident, according to many observers, when the UNHCR contemplates a repatriation exercise in areas of political instability and conflict: protection officers demand that the refugees' rights, including the right of nonrefoulement, be safeguarded, whereas the regional bureaus are more willing to undertake a risky repatriation exercise if it might serve broader organizational goals, such as satisfying the interests of member states, and regional goals, such as facilitating a peace agreement.103 Although bureaucratic culture is not the only source of IO dysfunction, it is a potentially powerful one that creates broad patterns of behavior that should interest international relations scholars. None of the sources of pathologies sketched here is likely to appear in isolation in any empirical domain. These processes interact and feed on each other in ways that will require further theorizing and research. Moreover, while we have highlighted the organization's internal characteristics, we must always bear in mind that the external environment presses upon and shapes the internal characteristics of the organization in a host of ways. Cultural contestation within an organization frequently originates from and remains linked to normative contradictions in the larger environment. Demands from states can be extremely important determinants of IO behavior and may override internal cultural dynamics, but they can also set them in place if conflicting state demands result in the creation of organizational structures or missions that are prone to pathology. As we begin to explore dysfunctional and pathological behavior, we must bear in mind the complex relationship between different causal pathways, remaining closely attentive to both the internal organizational dynamics and the lO's environment. 101. See Barnett 1997a; David Rieff, "We Hate You," New Yorker, 4 September 1995, 41-48; David Rieff, "The Institution That Saw No Evil," The New Republic, 12 February 1996, 19-24; and Rieff 1996. 102. Quoted in Weiss 1996, 85; also see Rieff 1996, 166, 170,193. 103. See Kennedy 1986; and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1991.

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Conclusion For all the attention international relations scholars have paid to international institutions over the past several decades, we know very little about the internal workings of lOs or about the effects they have in the world. Our ignorance, we suspect, is in large part a product of the theoretical lens we have applied. From an economistic perspective, the theoretically interesting question to ask about lOs is why they are created in the first place. Economists want to know why we have firms; political scientists want to know why we have lOs. In both cases, the question flows naturally from first theoretical principles. If you think that the world looks like a microeconomic market—anarchy, firms (or states) competing to maximize their utilities— what is anomalous and therefore theoretically interesting is cooperation. Consequently, our research tends to focus on the bargains states strike to make or reshape lOs. Scholars pay very little attention to what goes on subsequently in their day-today operations or even the larger effects that they might have on the world. Viewing lOs through a constructivist or sociological lens, as we suggest here, reveals features of IO behavior that should concern international relations scholars because they bear on debates central to our field—debates about whether and how international institutions matter and debates about the adequacy of a statist ontology in an era of globalization and political change. Three implications of this alternative approach are particularly important. First, this approach provides a basis for treating lOs as purposive actors. Mainstream approaches in political science that are informed by economic theories have tended to locate agency in the states that comprise IO membership and treat lOs as mere arenas in which states pursue their policies. By exploring the normative support for bureaucratic authority in the broader international culture and the way lOs use that authority to construct the social world, we provide reasons why lOs may have autonomy from state members and why it may make sense analytically to treat them as ontologically independent. Second, by providing a basis for that autonomy we also open up the possibility that lOs are powerful actors who can have independent effects on the world. We have suggested various ways to think about how lOs are powerful actors in global politics, all of which encourage greater consideration of how lOs affect not only discrete outcomes but also the constitutive basis of global politics. Third, this approach also draws attention to normative evaluations of lOs and questions what appears to us to be rather uncritical optimism about IO behavior. Contemporary international relations scholars have been quick to recognize the positive contributions that lOs can make, and we, too, are similarly impressed. But for all their desirable qualities, bureaucracies can also be inefficient, ineffective, repressive, and unaccountable. International relations scholars, however, have shown little interest in investigating these less savory and more distressing effects. The liberal Wilsonian tradition tends to see lOs as promoters of peace, engines of progress, and agents for emancipation. Neoliberals have focused on the impressive way in which lOs help states to overcome collective action problems and achieve durable cooperation. Realists have focused on their role as stabilizing forces in world politics. Construedvists,

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too, have tended to focus on the more humane and other-regarding features of lOs, but there is nothing about social construction that necessitates "good" outcomes. We do not mean to imply that IDs are "bad"; we mean only to point out theoretical reasons why undesirable behavior may occur and suggest that normative evaluation of IO behavior should be an empirical and ethical matter, not an analytic assumption.

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Name Index Abbott, Kenneth W. 66 Abel, Theodore 15 Aberbach, Joel 294 Adler, Emanuel xvii, xviii, 289, 301, 359-87 Aggarwal, V.K. 179 Akashi, Yasushi 493 Alfonsin, Raul 450 Alger, Chadwick xi, xvi, 409-33 Alker,Hayward 31, 173, 182-3 Allison, Graham 441, 489 Alt, James E. 443 Amin, Idi 393 Anderson, Benedict 359 Annan, Kofi 391, 394, 410, 415, 428-9 Arend, Anthony Clark 66 Arrow, KJ. 180 Art, Robert 87 Arthur, W.B. 181 Ashley, Richard K. xvi, 173, 183, 270, 274, 290 Athena 185 Aust, Anthony 66 Axelrod, Robert 107-8, 173, 180, 444, 448 Baldwin, David 86, 90 Barnes, Barry 295 Barnett, Michael N. xvii, xx, 62, 365, 471-504 Barry, B. 173 Bauer, Steffen xvii Bayne, Nicolas xii Ben-David, Joseph 304 Berg, Elliot 393 Berle, Adolf 149 Bernauer, Thomas xix Berts, Richard 268 Biermann, Frank xvii Biersteker, Thomas J. 68 Bismarck, Otto von 107, 140 Black, Max 445 Blau,Peter318 Bloomfield, Arthur I. 143 B0as, Morten 389, 394-5, 399 Boekle, Henning 62, 65 Bokassa, Jean-Bedel 393 Botcheva, Liliana 73-4

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 390, 394 Braudel, Fernand 127, 329 Brooks, Harvey 292 Brown, Mark Malloch 398 Buergenthal, Thomas 382 Bull, Hedley xiv, 59-60, 112, 127, 172-3, 175 Bush, George H.W. 237, 324, 351 Bush, George W. 341, 347-53 Buzan, Barry 68, 375 Byrd, Robert 463 Campbell, Donald 311 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 290 Carr, E.H. 327 Carter, Jimmy 438, 449-50, 454, 460, 463, 467 Castlereagh, Viscount 223 Cavour, Camillo Benso di 140 Cerny, Philip 401 Chayes, Abram xix, 65 Chayes, Antonia Handler xix, 65 Checkel, Jeffrey T. 69 Childers, Erskine 429 Chinkin, C.M. 66 Chopra, Jarat 495 Christopher, Warren 237-8 Claude, Ms L. xi, 23, 31, 69, 194, 258-61, 263 Clinton, Bill 237, 350 Coase, Ronald 474 Cohen, Benjamin 112-13, 120, 122, 126, 130-31, 161, 168 Coolidge, Calvin 107 Cooper, Richard N. 149, 154 Cortell, Andrew P. 64, 73-4 Cox, Robert W. xi, xvii, xviii, 16, 23, 32-3, 182-3, 270, 272, 275, 321-40 Crane, Diana 317 Dahl, Robert 32, 90 Dahrendorf, Ralf 336 Daniels, Joseph P. xix David, P.A. 181 Davis, James W. Jr. 64, 73-4 Deng, Francis M. 392, 394 Denzau, Arthur 64

506

International Organization

Derian, James Der 290 Dessler, David 69-70 Deutsch, Karl W. xii, xvi, 119, 183, 330, 360, 365, 370, 440-41 Diehl, Paul F. 65 Diesing, Paul 445, 462-3 DiMaggio, Paul 488 Donini, Antonio 412 Dore, Ronald 181 Douglas, Mary 361 Drake, William 289 Drezner, Daniel xvii Druckman, Daniel 444 Duffield, John xiv, 57-78 Durch, William 266 Durkheim, Emile 332 Duvalier, Jean-Claude 393 Duvall, Raymond 62-3 Edge, David 295 Eichengreen, B. 180 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 84 Ellul, Jacques 308 Elrod, Richard 220 Elster, Jon 299 Emerson, Rupert 31 Ermoliev, Y.M. 181 Escobar, Arturo 483 Evans, Peter 290, 443 Evans, Tony 44 Evera, Stephen van 254 Faletto, Enzo 290 Ferguson, James 495 Field, A. J. 182 Finkelstein, Larry 403 Finlayson, J.A. 179 Finnemore, Martha xix, xx, 36, 58, 62-6, 74, 471-504 Fischer, Markus 272, 277 Ford, Gerald 439 Foucault, Michel 16, 309-10 Fowler, Alan 420-22 Fox, William T.R. xi Fratianni, Michele xvii Fukuda, Takeo 438 Fulci, Paolo 418 Funk, Walther 141-2 Galtung, Johan 290

Garrett, Geoffrey 44, 70 Gaulle, Charles de 331 George, Alexander 297 Gilpin, Robert 173, 290 Gingrich, Newt 347 Goertz, Gary 65 Goldstein, Judith xii, 46 Goodrich, Leland xi Gorbachev, Mikhail 220-21, 277-8, 393, 468 Gourevitch, Peter 95, 185, 442-3 Gramsci, Antonio 145, 397 Gran, Guy 483 Grieco, Joseph 36, 205, 251, 253-4, 258 Haas, Ernst xi, xii, xvi, 23, 33, 38, 85, 91, 106, 112, 120, 122, 129, 172, 182-3, 313, 441 Haas, Peter M. xvii, 38, 59, 285-319 Habermas, Jiirgen 16, 309 Haggard, S. xiii, 179 Hajnal, Peter xvii Hall, Rodney Bruce 68 Handelman, Don 482 Haq, Mahbub ul 396, 399 Hayek, FA. 128 Hechter, Michael 65 Held, David 401 Helleiner, Gerry 403 Heraclides, Alexis 384 Hirsch,Fredll3, 126, 169 Hirschman, Albert 84, 90, 182 Hiss, Dieter 464 Hitler, Adolf 101, 107 Hobbes, Thomas 121 Hoffmann, Stanley xi, 173, 177 Holbrooke, Richard 341 Holsti, K.J. 59-60, 64, 85, 172 Holsto, Ole 313 Holzner, Burkhart 305 Hopkins, Raymond 111, 118-19, 122, 126-8, 130, 289 Howard, Michael 232 Hughes, E.G. 174 Hull, Cordell 322 Huntington, Samuel 393 Hussein, Saddam 264, 350 Hyden, Goran 389, 393 Ibn Khaldun 329 Ikenberry, G. John xi, xiv, xviii, xix, 289, 291, 341-58

International Organization Illich, Ivan 308 Ismail, Razali 412 Jacobson, Harold xi, 32-3 Jepperson, Ronald L. 69 Jervis, Robert xii, 112-13, 118, 120, 122, 126, 131, 209, 254 Johnson, Howard C. 29 Johnston, Alastair Iain 69 Jolly, Richard 396 Kagan, Robert 346 Kamal, Ahmad 412 Kaniovski, Y.M. 181 Kant, Immanuel xi Kaplan, Morton 113 Kapstein, Ethan 289 Katzenstein, Peter J. xiii, 62, 69, 344, 441, 443 Kennan, George 279 Kennedy, Paul xi Keohane, Robert O. xi, xii, xiv, xv, xvi, 22, 36, 38, 42, 49, 58-64, 81-109, 112, 117, 120-22, 125-6, 131, 171-88, 205, 207, 215, 238, 248, 251, 253-4, 257, 332-3, 342, 348, 441, 448, 489 Keynes, JohnMaynard 141-2, 148-50, 157, 160, 310, 390, 402-3 Khan, Kublai 359 Kindleberger, Charles 124, 139-40 Kirton, John J. xi-xxii Kissinger, Henry 279, 347 Klotz,Audie 62, 65,69 Kohl, Helmut 392 Kokostsis, Elanore xix Koremenos, Barbara xix, 58, 72 Krasner, Stephen D. xiii, xv, 23, 42-3, 61-2, 111-31, 133, 175, 179, 253, 258, 290, 441 Kratochwil, Friedrich xiii, xvi, 3-25, 62, 64-5, 173, 183 Kreps, D.M. 171, 179-80 Kupchan, Charles A. xii, xvi, 189-236, 267 Kupchan, Clifford A. xii, xvi, 189-236, 267 Laitin, David 371 Lakatos, Imre 4 Lake, Anthony 237 Lauren, Paul 220 Legro, Jeffrey W. 62, 65, 72-3 Lentricchia, Frank 25

507

Levy, Marc 59 Lewis, Jeffrey 128 Lindert, RH. 180 Lipschutz, Ronnie 362 Lipson, Charles xix, 58, 66, 72, 112, 120, 122, 131, 156, 179, 248 Lukes, Steve 370-71 Lumsdaine, David Halloran 73 Lyons, Terrence 392 Lysenko, Trofim 310 Machiavelli, Niccolo 329 McKersie, Robert B. 443-4, 453-4, 458, 461 MacMillan, Margaret xi Macrae, Duncan 32 Madrid, Miguel de la 450 Mansbach, Richard W. 94 March, James 32, 176, 181, 488 Martin, Lisa L. 27-55, 59, 61, 73-4, 257 Martin, Lynn 447 Marx, John 305 Mastanduno, Michael 253, 258 Matecki, B.E. 30 Meade, James 151 Meany, George 164 Mearsheimer, John J. 36, 61, 226, 237-81 Meyer, John W. xvii Michalak, Stanley J. 81, 85 Milner, Helen 28 Mitchell, Ronald. B. 70 Mitrany, David 296, 329 Moe,T.M. 178, 180 Mondale, Walter 468 Monteiro, Antonio 418 Moravcsik, Andrew 52 Morgenthau, Hans J. 81, 177, 200, 280 Morris, William 60 Morrow, James D. 72 Morton, PJ. 180 Mowers, A. Glenn 30 Mueller, John 222 Mumford, Lewis 308 Napoleon, Louis 140 Negreponte, John 350 Nelkin, Dorothy 294 Nicolai'dis, Kalypso 289 Niemeyer, Gerhart 29 Niskanen, William 478 Nixon, Richard 347-8, 439, 449, 468

508

International Organization

North, Douglass 64, 68, 176, 178, 182 Nurkse, Ragnar 144, 146-7 Nye, Joseph S. Jr. xii, xiv, xv, 81-109, 112, 120, 441 Olson, Johan 176, 181, 488 Olson, Mancur 213 O'Neal, John R. xi Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood 64 Opp, Karl-Dieter 65 Ostrom, Elinor 58, 63, 69-70 Ouchi, William 22 Oye, Kenneth 91, 173 Pareto, Vilfredo 42-4, 117, 121-2, 471, 473, 475 Paul, James 412, 414-16 Perkins, Whitney 30 Perry, William 486 Peterson, M.J. 289, 302 Philips, Nick 133 Philpott, Daniel 68 Pol Pot 263, 393 Polanyi, Karl 139-42, 322, 337 Polo, Marco 359 Popper, Karl 309 Powell, Robert 36, 254-5 Powell, Walter 488 Price, Richard 65 Puchala, Donald 111, 118-19, 122, 126-8, 130 Putnam, Robert D. xii, xix, 184, 294, 437-70 Quester, George 254 Ramphal, Shridath 323, 325 Rawls, John 121, 172, 176-7 Raymond, Gregory A. 62, 65 Reagan, Ronald 73, 82-3, 106, 347-8, 392, 396, 449, 468 Reuther, Walter 461 Ricardo, David 153 Richard, John 57 Risse, Thomas 57, 63-4, 274 Rittberger, Volker 62, 65 Roberts, Adam 65 Robinson, Mary 399 Rochester, J. Martin 87 Rockman, Bert 294 Roosa, Robert 161 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 107, 322 Rosenau, James 390, 395, 400-401, 403-4, 440

Rostenkowski, Dan 459 Roudev, Nikolai xix Rouse, Joseph 308 Ruggie, John Gerard xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, 3-25, 62-5, 88, 96-7, 112, 114, 119, 127, 131, 133-69, 173, 175, 183, 238, 310-11, 342, 344, 351, 359, 362, 364, 377 Russett, Bruce xi, 31 Sandholtz, Wayne 59 Sato, Eisaku 449 Schacht, Hjalmar 136 Schattschneider, E.E. 300 Schauer, Frederick 68-70 Schelling, Thomas 92, 128, 450 Schmidt, Helmut 438-9, 462-3, 465 Scholte, Jan Arte xi, xvii Schroeder, Paul 367 Scott, W Richard 61-2 Searle, JohnR. 63, 69 Sebenius, James 92, 289 Sen, Amartya 404 Shapiro, Michael J. 290 Shepsle,K. 180-81 Sikkink, Kathryn 36, 48-9, 62-5, 74 Simmons, Beth A. xiii, xiv, 27-55, 59, 61, 74, 179 Simon, Herbert 173, 300 Sinclair, Timothy xvii Slaughter, Anne-Marie 53 Smith, Adam 123 Snidal, Duncan xix, 36, 58, 66, 72, 254-6 Snyder, Glenn 445, 462-3 Snyder, Jack 254 Somavia, Juan 418 Starr, Harvey 369 Stein, Arthur 59, 91-2, 112, 117, 120-22, 125, 129, 131 Steinmo, S. 68 Stiglitz, Joseph 397 Stinchcombe, Arthur 181 Strange, Susan 88, 111, 116, 131, 481 Strauss, Robert 443, 449 Stromberg, Roland 204 Summers, R.S. 20 Sunderland, Laura xix Sutton, Brent 180 Tharoor, Shashi 497 Thatcher, Margaret 48, 392, 396

International Organization Thompson, Dennis F. 378 Thucydides xi Tito, JosipBroz 461 Tollison, Robert E. 92 Tonnies, Ferdinand 375 Torrijos, Omar 450, 469 Toulmin, Stephen 23, 120 Triffin, Robert 158, 161, 163 Truman, David 32 Truman, Harry S. 106 Tsebelis, George 70 Urquhart, Brian 402, 429 Vance, Cyrus 454 Vasquez, John A. 94 Vaughan, Diane 493 Viner, Jacob 150 von Furstenberg, George M. xix Wagner, Harrison 90 Wagner, Wolfgang 62, 65 Walker, R.B.J. 290 Wallerstein, Immanuel 290 Walton, Richard E. 443-4, 453-4, 458, 461 Waltz, Kenneth 20, 84, 102-3, 113, 117, 135, 185, 243, 290, 346, 475-6

509

Weber, Cynthia 68 Weber, Max 116, 126, 472, 478-81, 492 Weber, Steven 59, 61 Weingast, Barry R. 44 Weiss, Thomas G. xviii, 389-408 Wendt, Alexander 62-4, 69, 180, 182, 272, 361, 473 White, Harry Dexter 141-2, 148 Wight, Martin xiv, 177 Wilhelm, Kaiser 107 Willett, Thomas E. 92 Williamson, Oliver 22, 178-9, 181, 474 Wilson, James 318 Wilson, Peter 44 Wilson, R. 179 Wilson, Woodrow 107, 281, 455, 461, 468 Wright, Quincy 267 Yeltsin, Boris 278 Young, Oranxv, xvii, 60-64, 69-70, 111, 118-19, 125-6, 128-30, 176, 401 Zacher, Mark W 179-80, 402 Zakaria, Fareed 346 Zartman, I. William 463 Zeus 185 Zucker,L.G. 174