Inter-Religious Understanding [5] 9789553118202

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Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne Volume V

Inter-Religious Understanding

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd: [email protected] Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne, Vol V - Inter-Religious Understanding First Print 2020 © Asanga Tilakaratne ISBN: 978-955-31-1820-2 Introduction Abraham Velez Editors Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera, Denzil Senadheera and Sheila Fernando Book and Cover Design by Bertram G. Liyanage Printed by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 601, Athurugiriya Road, Malabe Published by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 23, Ekanayaka Mawatha, Nugegoda www.sarasavi.lk and Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume V

Inter-Religious Understanding

Introduction Abraham Velez

Editors Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera Denzil Senadheera Sheila Fernando

2020

SRI LANKA ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume I - Buddhist Philosophy Volume II - Buddhist Ethics Volume III - Theravada Studies Volume IV - Buddhism and Modernity Volume V - Inter-Religious Understanding Editorial Board Prof. Raluwe Padmasiri Thera, MA. Prof. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera, MPhil. Wimal Hewamanage, PhD. D. Denzil Senadheera, PhD. Ashoka Welitota, PhD. Bertram G.Liyanage, MA. Sheila Fernando, PhD. Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇi, PhD. Sewwandi Marasinghe, MA. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa, MA.

Contents

Editorial Note ................................................................................. vii Acknowledgements .......................................................................... x Foreword......................................................................................... xii Introduction .................................................................................. xiii 01. Buddhist Christian Relations in Sri Lanka: A Buddhist Perspective............................................................... 1 02. Buddhist Reflections on Religious Diversity and Dialogue... 22 03. Religious Tolerance in Buddhism: Theory and Practice......... 35 04. Rationale for Tolerance - A Buddhist Critique and a Reconstruction......................................................................... 46 05. Buddhism and Inter-Religious Harmony ............................... 63 06. Buddhist-Christian Dual Belonging: Is it Possible?................ 72 07. The Buddhist View on Religious Conversion......................... 88 08. Aloysius Pieris s.j. on Interreligious Dialogue and the Problem of Truth in Religion................................................ 107 09. Nostra Aetate – Inter-Religious Dialogue: A Buddhist Perspective............................................................................... 124 10. Religious Conflicts and Religious Truths; Are Conflicting Truth Claims Responsible for Religious Conflicts?.............. 144 11. Buddhism from Jesuits’ Eyes.................................................. 151 12. Vain Debates: The Buddhist Christian Controversies of Nineteenth Century Ceylon.................................................. 158 Primary Sources and Abbreviations ............................................ 172

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Secondary Sources and Translations............................................ 176 Index of Subjects .......................................................................... 181 Index of Proper Names ................................................................ 188 Asanga Tilakaratne....................................................................... 192 Editorial Board.............................................................................. 194

Editorial Note

Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has followed the footprints of such eminent modern interpreters of Buddhism as KN Jayatilleke and David J Kalupahana, has played a prominent role in the field of Buddhist studies in Sri Lanka. The idea about this whole project of compiling the academic papers of Professor Tilakaratne emerged at a casual discussion among a group of us at the occasion of his retirement in 2018 from the university service as the senior chair professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo. As a tribute to his services to the field of Buddhist Studies, we decided to edit and compile his papers scattered in various journals and books. At first, we presumed that the collection would run into a few volumes only. But to the amazement of us and the author himself it far exceeded our initial calculations, now the whole series running into eight volumes altogether, three in Sinhala and five in English. The five volumes in English are Buddhist Philosophy, Buddhist Ethics, Theravada Studies, Buddhism and Modernity and Inter-Religious Understanding. Turning to the scholarship represented by Professor Tilakaratne, he rightly marks a transition from the traditional to the modern Buddhist studies, exhibiting in the course of his academic career expertise in both aspects. On the one hand, there are the traditional Buddhist studies continuing more than two millennia in this country celebrating the expertise in the Pali textual tradition, which Professor Tilakaratne mastered at Buddhashravaka Dharamapethaya, Anuradhapura. On the other hand, there is the modern Buddhist academic tradition pioneered by such eminent savants as GP Malalasekera and continued by numerous scholars such as Jayatilleke and Kalupahana who interpreted the teaching of the Buddha in the light of western analytical and empirical philosophical thought, which Professor Tilakaratne inherited first at

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University of Peradeniya and subsequently at University of Hawaii. Although Prof. Tilakaratne has his professional academic training in the Buddhist philosophy of language and philosophy of religion his wideranging interests and the needs of the Buddhist academic field in the country have made him venture into many aspects of Buddhist studies as this multi-volume collection would testify. This has indeed made the task of the editors pretty challenging. We sincerely thank, therefore, Professor Tilakaratne for trusting us to handle this task and supporting us all the way through. Our editorial function was mainly confined to three aspects of these collected articles. With the consent of the author, first, we updated some facts where they were necessary. In most cases, following our suggestions, the author himself came up with innovative ideas to revise them with new materials. Secondly, we highlighted instances that we felt needed clarifying which, again the author was kind to comply with us. Lastly, in order to fit the individual papers to a collected whole, we removed from some papers particulars unique to specific contexts (excepting book reviews). Since the articles appearing in any particular volume are not written in regular order, we did not see a point in arranging them chronologically. Since overlapping of some information is unavoidable in a collection of this nature, we have only managed to remove some such repetitions with the least possible damage to the order and the content. We must, nevertheless, confess that we opted to leave some such recurrences untouched due to the structure of the given article. At the beginning of each article, we have mentioned the original publication in a footnote, which refers only to the first version of the corresponding article. Almost all papers in these collections are revised versions of these originals. Where there is not any remark about the first publication, the paper is either a fresh one written especially for the collection or a revision of an earlier article with a good amount of new materials. A marginal note is due here on the usage of diacritical marks and the citation style. Some of the Buddhist terms such as nirvana, karma, samsara are familiar to all English readers and hence we have treated them as ordinary English words. When it comes to proper nouns, particularly personal names, the author’s preference was to leave well-known names like Ananda, Sariputta, Mahakassapa without diacritical marks, expecting that the reader would find no difficulty of pronouncing them. If the given name sounds unfamiliar to the English tongue, we have inserted the diacritics (e.g. Vaṭṭagāminī, Koṇḍañña). For the secondary sources, we followed the Chicago style in citing references. For the primary

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sources, we have developed a consistent method catering to the actual editorial requirements. Moreover, we have to concede that we ignored spelling variations, British or American, insofar as they did not interfere with the comprehension of the content. Whenever spelling variation of a word appears critical to its meaning, we have rightly corrected it. In the course of this work, we have incurred many intellectual and emotional debts paying back for which our words will never be adequate. In addition to those kind-hearted individuals mentioned in the acknowledgement note of each volume, we must acknowledge sincerely and gratefully some individuals for their guidance, support, and assistance to the overall project. Of course, first comes Professor Asanga Tillakaratne, who entrusted this task on us without any hesitation. We are grateful to all editors and publishers of all original articles. We, nevertheless, regret our inability to take permission from individual editors and publishers. Since each volume represents a specific area of Buddhist Studies, we invited five scholars to write introductory essays for the five volumes. We sincerely thank those distinguished scholars, Damien Keown, Rupert Gethin, Anne Blackburn, Abraham Velez and Ven. Soorakkulame Pemaratana, for their valuable contribution to the project. Our sincere thanks are due to Mr HD Premasiri, Chairman of Sarasavi Bookshop [Pvt] Ltd, Mr Chandu Haputhanthri, its Managing Director, and Mr Sripali Perera, its Publishing Manager, who undertook the substantial task of producing and publishing this series of volumes. In this context, we cannot fail to mention the Most Venerable Bellanwila Dhammaratana Mahāthera, the chief incumbent of Bellanwila Rajamaha Viharaya from whose magnanimity this project has gained much. A bulk of the editorial work was done at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya. We owe a great debt of appreciation to its academic and non-acadmic members, for their kind cooperation and understanding. Madihe Sugatasiri Thera of the Academic Staff of the University of Colombo deserves our thanks for his initiative to collecting and making copies of the papers to be edited. Finally, in his retirement, we wish Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has devoted more than 40 years of his academic carrier for the field of Buddhist studies, longevity, good health and happiness!

Editors  2020

Acknowledgements

We are extremely pleased that we have been able to collect and edit some of the scholarly articles written by a reputed scholar in Sri Lanka, and finally to present them for the future academic generations. Professor AsangaTilakaratne, the author of these articles, is not only an eminent Sri Lankan scholar in the field of Buddhist Studies but also a researcher in the field of Philosophy of Religion whose distinctive contribution is always appreciated locally and internationally. The present work consists of 12 resourceful articles written by him on the theme of Inter-religious Dialogue being titled ‘Inter-religious Understanding’. We regard this piece of academic work a token of appreciation of the yeoman service rendered by Professor Asanga Tilakaratne to the field of Buddhist Studies. Acknowledgement should be made of a few whose support always was inspirational. First of all, we would like to thank Professor Tilakaratne for continuous guidance throughout the project. Next, we specifically express our sincere gratitude to Fr. Aloysius Pieris s.j. who wrote a foreword for this book and Professor Abraham Velez for his valuable introduction to the symposium, carefully reviewing all the articles. We are also thankful to those editors of the Journals and monographs in which the articles selected by us were originally published, for their understanding. What is published here is the revised versions of those articles. Venerable Professor Raluwe Padmasiri Thero too deserves a word of appreciation for painstakingly coordinating the project to edit all the volumes of articles in Sinhalese and English. We also should pay our gratitude to the Venerable Professor Kotapitiye Rahula Thero, Director of the Postgraduate Institute of

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Pali and Buddhist Studies for maintaining the academic culture of the Institute where much of the editorial work was executed. Our thanks are also due to all those who participated in the discussions related to the project and helped us in various ways. We cannot fail to acknowledge Mr. Satis Kumar, who was always there to energize us with smile and tea. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Denzil Senadheera Sheila Fernando

Foreword Aloysius Pieris, s.j.

Director, Tulana Research Centre Sri Lanka

Prof. Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne is among the surviving representatives of the great new tradition of Buddhist scholarship that originated in the Peradeniya University in the middle of the last century with the movement to return to early Buddhism led by Professors such as G.P. Malalasekera, KN Jaytailake, J D Dhirasekera, N A Jayawickrama, Lilly de Silva and the rest. Prof. Tilakaratne is the most illustrious student of the last link of that chain, the late Prof. Dr. David J Kalupahana. I am happy that his students have rallied together to bring out, in his honour, his academic writings in several volumes. The Post-Graduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies had already published a volume of research papers in his honour and I, too, had the privilege of contributing to that volume and thus express my own admiration for his person and his work. Prof. Tilakaratne’s interest is not limited to Buddhist studies. He has walked into the delicate arena of inter-religious dialogue and encounter and is among the editors of the international Journal Dialogue (EISD, Colombo, 6), which brings Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and Muslims into an open forum for a constructive conversation. In this field of interest, too, he is as characteristically honest in his personal religious convictions as he is critically open to perspectives of other faiths. Such transparency has made him a much respected and sought-after partner in this new field of dialogue and collaboration between religionists. I wish that both health and time will be kind to him so as to allow him to continue his valuable work in the academe. Tulana Research Centre Gonawala, Kelaniya Sri Lnaka

Introduction Abraham Velez Associate Professor Department of Philosophy and Religion Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky

Asanga Tilakaratne is one of the few Buddhist scholars in the world who has been actively involved in interreligious dialogue and BuddhistChristian relationships. This rare commitment to the practice of dialogue between Buddhism and other religions is specifically relevant because, as Tilakaratne states with regard to the Sri Lankan context,“there are no Buddhist organizations dedicated to Buddhist-Christian relationships, academic or otherwise, but only Christian organizations” (page 5). Asanga Tilakaratne can be considered an ideal example of Buddhist openness to and respect for religious diversity. In order to properly understand his contribution to dialogue and interreligious understanding, it is necessary to clarify some of his positions. Tilakaratne opposes those who advocate the “multi-religiousness of Sri Lanka,” understood as giving equal treatment to all religions in the Sri Lankan constitution. Instead, Tilakaratne proposes treating other religions with fairness and respect, while at the same time accepting the constitutional priority given to Buddhism in Sri Lanka. For Tilakaratne, it is possible to accommodate the claims of those who speak about the multi-religiousness of Sri Lanka without having to demote the traditional position of Buddhism. Tilakaratne’s opposition to the “multi-religiousness of Sri Lanka” does not derive from an exclusivist position, according to which Buddhism is the only legitimate religion in Sri Lanka. Rather, Tilakaratne’s position derives from what the Sri Lankan philosopher Jayatilleke calls “Buddhist critical tolerance.” Buddhist critical tolerance accepts the existence of other religions and respects their contribution to ethical and spiritual development, but without abandoning Buddhist claims of soteriological superiority, as well as Buddhism’s critique of wrong views.

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Tilakaratne also justifies his critical tolerance of other religions with the Buddha’s teachings. The Buddha did not accept claims such as “this alone is true and the rest is false,” but he accepted as legitimate the claim that only his teachings could lead to liberation from mental defilements. That is, one can assert one’s own religious view without having to reject all those who are different, or being insensitive to others. The Buddha was neither a relativist for whom all religious teachings were equally valid, nor a pluralist in the sense of accepting the validity of more than one ultimate religious goal. Tilakaratne acknowledges that the way Buddhists view religious diversity determines to a great extent one’s attitude towards inter-religious dialogue. The Buddhist attitude is not enthusiastic, Tilakartne says, due to the way Buddhists understand their own system, i.e., as being the only system capable of leading its followers to liberation from suffering. Another key aspect of the Buddhist self-understanding that influences the Buddhist attitude toward other religions is the rejection of a creator God. Tilakaratne explains that the Buddha rejected the belief in a creator God because such belief was conducive to the view that all that is felt was due to the creation of God and, therefore, was conducive to inaction, i.e., to a doctrine that denies the need for human action and human responsibility. Tilakaratne rightly clarifies that this doctrine of divine creation does not correspond to the Christian belief, which holds both divine creation and human free will. Yet Tilakaratne suggests that the “uneasy marriage between divine ordination and free will” generates theological and philosophical difficulties which “cannot be easily bypassed” (page 26). Tilakaratne contends that Sri Lanka Buddhist monks tend to associate Christianity with the wrong view of a creator God and that is why they do not find Christianity religiously and intellectually stimulating, thus preventing them from being interested in the practice of interreligious dialogue with Christians. Like most Sri Lankan Buddhist monks,Tilakaratne assumes that the Buddha’s rejection of a creator God applies to Christianity and traditional forms of monotheism. However, unlike most Sri Lankan Buddhist monks, Tilakaratne has demonstrated a great interest in Buddhist-Christian dialogue, and has studied the works of several Christian theologians including Aloysius Pieris, Raimundo Panikkar, John Hick and Paul Knitter. In his academic dialogue with Christian theologians, Tilakaratne has always emphasized the importance of respecting fundamental

Introduction

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differences between Buddhism and Christianity. Tilakaratne contends that Buddhist non-theism is a key aspect of Buddhist self-understanding. Accordingly, Tilakaratne criticizes Christian attempts to reduce Buddhist non-theism to a radical form of negative theology and, therefore, to a subtle, apophatic form of theism. More specifically, Tilakaratne challenges Raimundo Panikkar’s interpretation of the Buddha in The Silence of God: The Answer of the Buddha (1989). For Tilakaratne, it is incorrect to suggest, as Panikkar does, that the Buddha was silent about the existence of God. In opposition to Panikkar’s reading of the Buddha, Tilakaratne does not think that the question of God has anything to do with the questions that the Buddha set aside without giving categorical answers to. Likewise, for Tilakaratne, there is textual evidence to suggest that the Buddha was not silent about the existence of God. Rather than being silent about the question of God because he considered God truly transcendent and ineffable, the Buddha explicitly rejected the concept of a creator God. It is precisely because of the fundamental differences between Buddhism and Christianity that Tilakaratne rejects the possibility of Buddhist-Christian dual belonging. Specifically, Tilakaratne engages Paul Knitter’s Without the Buddha I Could not be a Christian (2009), which defends the possibility of Buddhist-Christian dual belonging. Tilakaratne accuses Knitter of constructing his own version of Buddhism and Christianity. For Tilakaratne, Knitter’s construction of Buddhism and Christianity is legitimate, but methodologically problematic.The problem is that one cannot take Buddhist teachings from different traditions and historical periodsand present them as belonging to the Buddha as Knitter does. Besides this methodological problem, Tilakaratne questions four assumptions found in Knitter’s reconstruction of the Buddha and Buddhist-Christian identity: “(1) that all religions refer to one transcendental reality as their ultimate goal; (2) that the ultimate Buddhist religious experience is mystical; (3) consequently, that it is ineffable; and (4) that the Buddha neither denied nor affirmed God, but he was silent about it” (page 79).For Tilakaratne, Buddhism and Christianity are radically different religions, and dual Buddhist-Christian belonging is hard to justify because the two religions have distinct conceptions of the questions of ultimate goal and spiritual path. Tilakaratne rejects not only the possibility of Buddhist-Christian belonging but also the idea of complementarity between the two religions.

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Specifically, Tilakaratne disagrees with the main thesis of Aloysius Pieris’ Love Meets Wisdom: a Christian Experience of Buddhism (1988). For Tilakaratne, Pieris’ interpretation of Buddhism and Christianity, as representing two irreducibly distinct languages of the Spirit which complement and need each other, is problematic. Tilakaratne agrees with Pieris in understanding the religious experiences of Buddhism and Christianity as distinct and irreducible to each other. However, unlike Pieris, Tilakaratne does not assume that the religious experiences of Buddhism and Christianity express one and the same divine Spirit, or lead to one and the same salvific goal. For Tilakaratne, Buddhism and Christianity “present two qualitatively different experiences.” Unlike Pieris, Tilakaratne understands Wittgenstein’s metaphor of language game in non-essentialist terms, i.e., without assuming oneness of religious experience or ultimate goal. Despite his emphasis on the fundamental differences among the religions, Tilakaratne nevertheless believes that interreligious dialogue is something that should continue for the sake of peace, understanding, harmony and cooperation. However, Tilakaratne finds it necessary to revise some common assumptions behind the practice of inter-religious dialogue. Specifically, Tilakaratne objects to assuming that all religions are different paths leading to one and the same goal (page 15); and assuming that in order to enter into inter-religious dialogue one has to accept first a theory encompassing all religions (page 34). Instead, Tilakaratne advocates entering dialogue with an open mind to agree or to disagree (page 11). Tilakaratne believes that the time has come to abandon an encompassing theology of religions as a precondition for inter-religious dialogue. The theologies of religions that Tilakaratne criticizes are relativism and pluralism. By relativism, Tilakaratne means the idea that “all religions are true in some sense or other for truth is relative to various conditions and circumstances” (page 38). By pluralism, Tilakaratne means John Hicks’ theology of religions, which holds that all religions are different responses to one and the same ultimate religious reality. According to Tilakaratne, both relativism and pluralism view differences among the religions as ill-suited for maintaining peace and unity in society, and that is why they want to explain differences away. For Tilakaratne, however, it is highly questionable to think that differences are bad for unity in society (page 38), and we must accept that there are profound differences among the religions.

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Against relativism, Tilakaratne argues that Buddhism has a strong concept of truth. Buddhists are not ready to compromise their concept of truth because they consider it universally true, not just true for them, or true from a particular standpoint. The truths that Buddhists are not ready to compromise are the teachings of dependent origination and the four noble truths. These truths are not relative to Buddhism or just for Buddhists; they are true universally independently of the existence of Buddhism or Buddhists. Yet this commitment to a strong concept of truth does not lead Buddhists to religious intolerance and the rejection of religions which hold different concepts of truth. Quite the contrary, the existence of religious diversity does not pose a problem to Buddhism because Buddhists believe that some aspects of religions are conducive to ethical conduct and even rebirth in heaven. Buddhist critical tolerance toward other religions is rooted in the Buddha’s critical yet respectful attitude toward other teachings. The Buddha believed that his teaching was the true doctrine, but he accepted the right of others to hold different views, be they right or wrong. The Buddha had dialogues with many different masters about their teachings without ever trying to impose his own views upon them, nor did he renounce the doctrines and practices that he perceived as universally true and exclusively conducive to liberation. The Buddhist foundation for religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue is not, as relativism suggests, that all religions are true to some extent, or in some way, or for some people, or from a particular standpoint. Rather, the rationale for Buddhist tolerance and interreligious dialogue is respect for human dignity and the right of individuals to make their own decisions and hold the views they wish to hold. Similarly, Tilakaratne criticizes pluralism because it posits a transcendent reality common to all religions. For pluralism, religions offer different responses and conceptualizations of the Transcendent. The problem with this common transcendent ground as the foundation for inter-religious dialogue, Tilakaratne says, is that “dialogue at its core is essentialist and absolutist and only superficially is relativist and pluralist” (page 50). For Tilakaratne, this transcendental characterization of religion is not universally applicable because it is based on a theistic religious experience. Whereas other religious systems believe in an ineffable transcendental as their ultimate goal, “Buddhism does not subscribe in any way to the transcendental in the traditional theistic and monistic sense” (page 56). For pluralism, all religions are fundamentally

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one and the same because they all refer to the same transcendental entity. For Tilakaratne, however, the differences among the religions are fundamental and basic. The non-theistic stance of Buddhism and the theistic or monistic stances of other religions cannot be reduced to a common transcendental denominator. Pluralism and its attempt to reduce Buddhism to a transcendental common denominator is a form of absolutism and this “new form of religious absolutism is a kind of colonialism in religion” (page 67). Tilakaratne’s alternative to relativism and Hick’s pluralism is a “plural-ism based on mutual respect,” which requires true acceptance of other religions with their fundamental differences. Tilakaratne contends that the existence of fundamental differences among the religions is compatible with inter-religious cooperation and harmony. In order to promote this inter-religious cooperation and harmony, it is necessary to form a new ethics for religions, that is, “a set of ethics by which religions themselves behave toward one another.” (page 71) The ground rule for Tilakaratne’s ethics of religious diversity is to respect the right of individuals to hold their own views. All religious people have the right to follow their religion and to educate others in it. It should be noticed that Tilakaratne advocates learning not only about one’s own religion but also about other religions (page 18). Another ethical guideline that Tilakaratne proposes to foster interreligious cooperation and harmony is “to adopt a policy of non-aggressive propagation that recognizes the basic principle of ‘live and let live.’” It should be clarified that Tilakaratne’s ethics of religious diversity is not against proselytizing and conversion, but rather against certain practices to convert members of other religions. Religions may try to persuade others to accept one’s own beliefs and as a result some people may feel compelled to convert to another religion. Teaching and trying to convince others of one’s views is a natural process common to all religions. The Buddha himself taught not only to his disciples but also to followers of other traditions. As a result, many people from other schools decided to convert and become disciples of the Buddha after being persuaded by his teachings. There is nothing wrong with this type of conversion. Buddhism is not against conversion in the sense of teaching one’s religion to others who are willing to listen with the possibility of being persuaded by such teachings. Buddhism accepts and honours the right of any religion to exist anywhere and the right of followers of other religions to teach it to others. Buddhists are not opposed to conversion

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through rational consideration but rather to conversion by use of force and material allurement, that is, giving money, clothing, jobs, houses, education, health etc. Whereas conversion through education and rational analysis is perfectly ethical, conversion through means of coercion or material inducement is unethical. It is because of unethical methods of proselyting and converting others that Tilakaratne finds necessary to protect Sri Lankan Buddhism from the religious fundamentalism of some evangelical groups. Thus, Tilakaratne defends Article 9 of the Sri Lankan constitution which states that the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place, considering working toward fostering the “Buddha Sasana” a duty of the state. The term “Buddha Sasana” originally referred to the Buddha’s teachings but in contemporary Sri Lanka it refers to Buddhism as a religion including temples, seminaries, and monastic institutions. It is important to note that Article 9 also assures all religions the rights granted by other articles of the constitution. The rights of other religions are detailed by Article 10, which speaks about freedom of religion, as well as Article 14, which talks about freedom to manifest one’s own religious belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. Tilakaratne does not find it inconsistent or unfair to give priority to Buddhism while at the same time respecting the rights of other religions. Tilakaratne thinks that affirming one’s own religious belief is compatible with acceptance of, and respect for, other religions. Tilakaratne’s underlying argument seems to be that giving priority to Buddhism in the Sri Lankan constitution is compatible with respecting and acknowledging the basic rights of other religions, just as the Buddha giving soteriological priority to his teaching was compatible with respecting and acknowledging the limited value of other teachings. Thus, Tilakaratne’s ethics of religious diversity allows religions to make claims of superiority, provided that such claims are compatible with respect for the existence of other religions and the rights of their followers.

01. Buddhist Christian Relations in Sri Lanka: A Buddhist Perspective*

When a religious teaching becomes a cherished ideology, it tends to encourage a separation between adherents and non-adherents. While the presence of more than one religion has been a constant phenomenon in many places of the world, it has invariably created pangs resulting from the existence of different faiths in close proximity to one another. Although in an ideal situation one would have thought about the joys associated with being in proximity to others, it does not seem to have happened anywhere in the religious world in a noticeable manner. Sri Lanka has not been an exception to this general state of affairs. Before Christianity came to Sri Lanka as an organized religion in the 16 century, scholars like Gananatha Obeyesekera (Obeyesekera 2003) have shown that, there had been a correlation between being Sinhalese and being Buddhist and being Tamil and being Hindu. This changed with the arrival of Christianity, which converted groups from both communities. th

How adherents of Christianity gradually started to emerge from among the Sinhalese and the Tamils is a story so well known that I needn’t pen it here. My interest is more ‘phenomenological’ than historical in the sense of trying to understand what is happening at the present moment between these two religious communities. My own approach to the subject matter is that of both participant and observer. I will start this discussion by reviewing different instances of Buddhist Christian relationship – academic, religious and social. Next, I will discuss a recent effort by an international group at bringing two * Initially appeared in Buddhist Christian Relations in Asia, edited by Perry SchmidtLeukel (Ottilien), Germany, 2017.

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religious groups together to discuss some issues of common interest and what followed from it. Before concluding, the discussion, I will comment on some questions of general nature of Buddhist Christian relations in Sri Lanka.

Buddhist-Christian relationships in academic, religious and social spheres I start with the activities in the academic sphere, not necessarily because they are the most important, but because it happens to be the area in which I have more experience. That I developed an interest in Christianity, not strictly as an academic discipline but perhaps as both a religion and a teaching, which ultimately led to academic pursuits, was not something planned. Growing up in the 1960s and 70s [then] as a young Buddhist monk in Ratmalana, in the suburbs of Colombo, gave me an opportunity to read such publications as Reader’s Digest and Newsweek that covered contemporary social and political issues around the world. It was during this period that I received a notice through a friend about a meeting to be held by a Christian organization in a hotel in Colombo. I remember me participating in this meeting and not understanding much of what was said by the speaker, but getting an idea that he was saying that God has not forsaken us and that we are the ones who have forsaken God. Leaving the place, I received a copy of a monthly publication, ‘The Plain Truth” published by an American Christian organization. This monthly publication contained articles providing Christian solutions to various social and political problems prevalent in the world. What interested me most were its discussions on issues which gave a sense of what was going on in the world. Usually towards the end of the discussion, there was a quotation from the Bible indicating briefly how it provides the answer. This aspect of the discussions was not very revealing as it was almost always limited to just a quotation. Every time I read these articles, I felt that there must be better ways to address these questions and that better explanations could be provided. This is not a criticism of the Christian ideas that were presented, but merely on the rudimentary manner how these ideas were presented. Naturally, I was thinking of possible Buddhist analyses and insights. This way of thinking lead me to select a topic dealing with possible Buddhist explanations and answers to social and political problems for my final examination at Buddha Sravaka Dharma Pithaya in Anuradhapura where I was then an undergraduate. Several years later, after my dissertation had been worked into a book manuscript, I

Buddhist Christian Relations in Sri Lanka…

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was on the lookout for a publishing company. Someone in the printing field directed me to Wesley Press in Wellawatta and my manuscript was subsequently accepted for publication with them. At the time when I printed my book1 I did not know that Wesley Press was owned by a Christian church. I must say that they did a good job in printing my book, and charged a reasonable price. For some reason, perhaps for its novel approach, the book received attention. At the time, there was no questioning as to the choice of printing press in Buddhist circles (for, most probably, they were not aware of its affiliations). However, I came to know later that the press had decided not to print any more Buddhist books. The World Council of Churches (WCC) assembly in Vancouver in 1983 was an occasion for me to come to know and get more closely acquainted with Christian affairs. Once again, the opportunity for me to take part in this important event was purely accidental. The invitation was extended to Ven. Dr. K. Anuruddha, the first Vice Chancellor of the then newly established Sri Lanka Buddhist and Pali University. Unable to go himself, he asked me to take part in the meeting on his behalf, which I willingly agreed to for two reasons: on the one hand, interest to know more about this great world religion and on the other hand, a desire to see the world. I have been taking part in many interreligious dialogues, discussions and conferences, both nationally and internationally, ever since, usually presenting academic papers. I have described this autobiographical story to underscore how, even up to now, Buddhist Christian relationships can originate from the side of Buddhists without any prior planning or organization. As this is true for me, I believe that it is also true for many others who take part in encounters between the two religions.2 I like to lay emphasis on this point because Buddhism in Sri Lanka does not have an ‘official’ position on any particular matter adopted by all Buddhists or by any leader of the three Nikāyas (monastic lineages) or by any leading lay Buddhist organization. This is relevant not only for Buddhist Christian relations but also for many other similar issues. There is no any Sri Lankan Buddhist monk or a lay person who has 1 Minis getalu piḷibanda bauddha vigrahaya (Human Problems in a Buddhist Perspective), Colombo 1979. 2 Walpola Rahula (1907-1997), a leading contemporary monastic Buddhist scholar, who had close personal and academic relations with the Christian scholar Edmund Perry of North Western University, USA, is another notable example. See Perry 1980 for details.

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been specifically selected or appointed to deal with other religions including Christianity. Hence what any individual would present as the Buddhist position/attitude/view has necessarily to be understood as only one individual view. Although this may appear to lead to chaos and hence highlight a weakness in Buddhism, it is not necessarily so. At a philosophical level, this lack of authoritative3 view which is considered infallible could indicate an inherent non-absolutist position in the teaching of the Buddha. It is well known that the Buddha did not name an individual as his successor for the plain reason, I think, and that the Buddhas are neither selected nor elected, nor appointed (Walshe 2012, 231-277). This tradition has at times been misinterpreted as rejecting individual leadership within the organization. The history of the Buddhist tradition makes it clear that the Saṅgha had its leaders. Right after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, it was Mahākassapa Thera who took over the leadership of the group. The practice has been such that in different localities there have always been elders who guided a particular group. The unanimity within a group was ensured by the fact that both the elders and juniors within the group were expected to abide by the Dhamma and the Vinaya taught by the Buddha. The coherence among similar groups was also ensured on the same fact. Buddhist Christian relationships in the academic sphere have been established owing mainly to a handful of Christian individuals and organizations. I am not going to mention the nineteenth century writings on Buddhism by Christian authors or writings by Buddhist authors on Christianity. In the twentieth century, scholars such as Gunapala Dharmasiri (Dharnasiri 1998) who wrote a Buddhist critique of Christian concept of God, and Anthony Fernando (Fernando) who did comparative studies on the two religions, represent individual Buddhist and Christian scholars. Of these, Dharmasiri, incidentally a former Buddhist monk was a university teacher who does not seem to have had any religious motivations behind his academic work, whereas Fernando, a former Roman Catholic priest, seems to have been motivated by religious interests. There is only a handful of both Buddhist and Christian authors; nevertheless they cannot properly be described as participants of Buddhist Christian relations for their works basically consist of individual efforts (though the social impact of such works is not altogether denied). 3 A revealing example is the elder named Purāṇa who had a group of five hundred with him and did not wish to accept the authority of the first council convened as great elder Mahākassapa the head (Vinaya: Cullavagga XI, 1:11.).

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What is relevant in this context is Buddhist and Christian academic works done through societies and organizations for the sake of developing public awareness and knowledge. Looking from this point of view, it has to be said that there are no Buddhist organizations dedicated to Buddhist Christian relationships, academic or otherwise, but only are there Christian organizations as such. In this context, I would like to mention two such Christian institutes. One is the Tulana Research Centre (Gonawela, Kelaniya), run by Rev. Aloysius Peiris s.j. who, in addition to being a remarkable human being, is also an authority on both Buddhism and Christianity (Crusz 2004, 673-692). In contemporary Christian-Buddhist literature his works remain outstanding in both quantity and quality. His writings contain the running theme of how the two religions can complement each other through an emphasis on wisdom in Buddhism and on love in Christianity. The other notable research centre is the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue (EISD) (Havelock Road, Colombo 5) which was founded in 1953 under the leadership of the Methodist Church of Sri Lanka, and initially called the Centre for Study of Religion and Society. Its first director was Basil Jackson, a Methodist pastor from England. Jackson was succeeded by Fr. Lynn de Silva. De Silva was an acclaimed scholar in Buddhism who, in 1973, started the annual journal, Dialogue, which has evolved to become the leading academic journal for Buddhist and Christian studies in Sri Lanka. The centre was renamed EISD in 1978 and was made independent from Methodist church under the leadership of Fr. Lynn de Silva who served as its director until 1982. De Silva was succeeded by Fr. (later bishop) Kenneth Fernando who served as the institute’s Director until 1993. Leadership was then passed on to its current director, Marshal Fernando, a trained economist with academic qualifications in Buddhism whose sensitivity to social and religious issues and pragmatism has guided the institute to new heights. The institute’s journal, Dialogue, is edited by Fr. Aloysius Peiris, who has been associated with the institute since the time of Lynn de Silva. Marshal Fernando, Robert Cruz and Asanga Tilakaratne act as assistant editors, thus combining Protestant, Roman Catholic and Buddhist traditions in Sri Lanka. The journal is essentially inter-religious in its approach, and has provided a forum for many authors belonging to all the religions in the country, to discuss common issues from their own perspectives. Buddhist scholars who have been contributing to this journal include those like (the late) Ven. Dr. Dhammavihari, Prof.

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Mahinda Palihawadana, Prof. Lily de Silva, Prof. Oliver Abenayaka, Mr. Sanath Nanayakkara, (the late) Dr. Nalin Swaris and Prof. P.D. Premasiri. It is interesting to note that, despite these authors having contributed discursive academic pieces to the journal (showing clearly that they support the inter-religious understanding in different degrees), they themseles have not initiated such a work. The above list of contributors would have been a bit longer if the journal was published in Sinhalese. The fact that it is published in English says several things; Christianity, in general, and the Anglican and Methodist churches, in particular (from which the present Church of Sri Lanka has evolved and to which EISD is connected), have always used English as their main medium of communication. In addition, English has been the only medium by which scholarship about Sri Lanka has reached outside world. For this reason, scholars fluent in English have tended to prefer that language to publish their academic writings. Perhaps, the most important of all these reasons is that since those who are exposed to writings in English usually tend to have a broader outlook and wider exposure to the world, they also tend to be more open minded towards endeavours of this nature. Although this does not necessarily mean that English education invariably gives a broader outlook or that Sinhalese-only education does not give such an outlook, this remains a fact among (the Buddhist) scholars in Sri Lanka. The use of English language as the medium of expression has provided an avenue for some to adopt a double standard. It is a known fact in the Sri Lanka press that what they write to the Sinhalese reader is substantially different from what they communicate to the English reader. The Exaggerations, lies and sensationalism passed to the Sinhalese readership are not found in the same vigour in the English press. This is not only because it is held that there is a difference in the level of understanding between the two groups, but also-and perhaps more importantly- what one would say and the image one would want to project to each group can well be two different things. This duplicity can be found also among academics; they may not want to say to the local Sinhalese- reading public what they say to the international readership. Although I do not have examples for this duplicity among the Buddhist scholars who write on inter-religious matters, it is likely that some of these scholars will not come forward readily if they had to present their views in Sinhalese.

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Buddhist Christian relations at grass-root level Buddhist Christian relationships at the grass roots village level are a somewhat different experience. In the North Western coastal part of the island, in the so called “Christian belt” where Buddhists have been living with a Christian majority for several generations, the relations between two religions have been quite fluid. With many families having Christian and Buddhist members, both the swami (priest) at the church and the hamuduruvo (bhikkhu) at the monastery participate in daily affairs such as weddings, funerals and other social matters in which two religions co-exist without any noticeable troubles. It is significant to note that one does not hear about any problems of a religious nature from these areas. A similar and even more convincing example comes from my immediate neighbourhood in Pitakotte, a traditional Roman Catholic area where the Portuguese came and settled in the 16th century. Although the demography has now changed and the area is predominantly Buddhist, there is still a considerable Christian population and presence in the area. Four of the neighbouring families in the immediate vicinity are mixed Christian and Buddhist: all four women are from the area and are Roman Catholic, and all their husbands are from outside and are Buddhist. Amongst their children, most of the girls follow their mothers and are Christian and most sons follow their fathers and are Buddhist. My experience with them over the last decade is that all the women in these families go to church every Sunday morning and, at the same time, also take part in the Buddhist activities in the near-by Kotte Rajamaha Viharaya, a Buddhist monastery whose history goes back to the Kotte period (16th century). The women cook dāna for the monks, give donations to the well-known, historic Kotte Perahara (parade), and take part in the festivities. One among them even observes sil (involving spending day time or even the whole day at the monastery observing higher precepts) on important poya days such as Vesak. Interestingly, one of these women’s Buddhist husband, who was the most demonstrably Buddhist (having Buddhist flags hanging from his house all the time and broadcasting pirit- Buddhist protective chanting- to the neighbourhood every morning loudly with the help of public speaking system) all of a sudden converted to Christianity. The reason, I heard, was that he was not happy with the Kataragama god for not looking after his business as he expected him to. Life goes on and I have never heard of any religiously motivated disputes within or among these families.4This does not 4 Information included with the knowledge and consent of the relevant families.

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necessarily mean that religiously mixed marriages work perfectly. Surely there are going to be unpleasant situations if both parties are adamant and exclusivist and equally religiously active. Families with moderate religious interests or ones in which one member is more accommodating and/or less active seem to fare best. In addition to these grass-root level instances of experience, examples of organized cases of Buddhist Christian co-existence are unheard of. This does not mean that for Buddhist religious activities, for instance, such activities as meditation programs run by Buddhist institutes only Buddhists are admitted. Such programs are basically Buddhist programs, open to anyone irrespective of their religion. What I do not find, however, are Buddhist originated programs actively promoting participation from the two religions,5 though one such ChristianBuddhist experiment has been recorded; the Devasarana Development Movement was founded in 1957 at Devasarana Aramaya, a Christian monastery along indigenous lines. Initially, the centre was located in Havedivela, a village near Rambukkana in Central province. Later, in 1960, it was moved to Ibbagamuva, a village in Kurunegala, North-West province. Yohan Devananda, a Christian priest with vision and courage, was the pioneer in this project which aimed at the “living of aramaya life – the exploring of monastic discipline of both East and West, attempting to live alongside the people, and seeking a way of life based on true dharma.” 6 In this predominantly Buddhist village, Devananda initiated his experiment which, in addition to the “monastery”, included dialogue with Buddhist monks and people of the area, a people’s committee for land reform, and a collective farm. The way of life was community life, and a new Office Book was created in Sinhala for regular chanting. By 1973, a new form of liturgy, which was called “New World Liturgy” (Nava Lo Vandana) was produced “to enable full participation by people of all religions and ideologies.” 7 The idea seems to have been to develop 5 Why there are not such Buddhist originated endeavours/ movements is a question to be pondered. In the context of Christian Buddhist dual belonging, Paul Knitter has raised the same question: while there are Christian-Buddhist dual belongers, namely, Christians who adopt Buddhism simultaneously, but where are the Buddhist Christian dual belongers? (Knitter 2012). 6 Information from a report (“Devasarana Development Movement”) Yohan Devananda presented to World Student Christian Federation, Hong Kong, 1977, January. 7 Information from a report (to Devasarana Development Movement) by Yohan Devananda presented to World student Christian Federation, Hong Kong, 1977, January.

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Christianity as an indigenous religious movement which is culturally closer to the ordinary Sinhala village life. The centre continues, though it took on a lower profile after the retirement and recent passing a way (2016) of Yohan Devananda. The original goal of developing a Christian religious life along indigenous cultural lines seems, nevertheless, to have a very long way to go.

Buddhist Christian relationships and Norway In recent years there have been efforts organized by outside Buddhist groups which have had a direct bearing on Buddhist- Christian relationships in the country. The Norway Buddhist Federation (NBF), an organization representing Buddhists in Norway to the government of Norway and to the outside world, is a case in point. In 2012 “The Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or Belief”, organized a two day meeting at Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy, Pallekelle in Kandy to discuss a document titled “Missionary Activities and Human Rights: Recommended Ground Rules for Missionary Activities.”8 Egil Lothe, the chairperson of the Norway Buddhist Federation was a member and he was responsible for organizing the meeting in Sri Lanka. This document had been prepared in 2009 by a working group belonging to the same coalition which consisted of the following: Guro Almas, Sven Thore Kloster, Egil Lothe, Dag Nygard, and Ingunn Folkestein (chairperson).9 It is not my intention in this context to discuss the content of this document, though I will refer to it again later. What is interesting for the moment is what transpired over the course of the meeting in Kandy. The following had confirmed their attendance in advance: From Christian organizations/churches: National Council of Churches in Sri Lanka (3 persons), Rt. Revd. Kumara Illangasinghe (Anglican Bishop Emeritus, Kurunagala), a Catholic representative appointed by Bishop of Kandy, Laksan JS Dias (General Secretary of National Council of YMCAs of Sri Lanka). From Buddhist organizations and institutions: 8  Available online at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/091101OsloCo alitionMissionaryActivitiesHumanRightsRecommendedGroundRulesMissionaryA ctivities. 9  The group had received advice from the following persons representing various religious and civil organizations: Lars Gule (The Norwegian Humanist Association), Ernst Harbakk (Aeropagos), Thom Arne Hellersila (Human Rights Lawyer), VedbjonHorsfjord (European Council of Religious Leaders), SenaidKobilica and Lena Larson (Islamic Council of Norway) Bjorn A. Wegge (Norwegian Mission to the East) and Gerd Marie Aadna (Stavanger Missionary College).

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Prashantha Lal De Alwis, (lawyer and Buddhist activist, Colombo), Ven. Akuretiye Nanda (Vice Rector, Vidyodaya Pirivena), Prof. PD Premasiri (Emeritus professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Peradeniya), Ven. Rassagala Seevali Thera (Abbot), Dr. GA Somaratne (Rector: SIBA), Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne (Professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo), Ven. Medagama Dhammananda Thera (Project Coordinator: SUCCESS), Dr. HB Jayasinghe (Advisor: SUCCESS), Dr. L Weerasinghe (President: SUCCESS), and Dr. WAL Wickramasinghe (Vice President: SUCCESS). From secular NGOs and individuals: Tony Senewiratne (National Director, Habitat for Humanities) and Visaka Dharmadasa (Association of War Affected Women) both representing National Peace Council in Sri Lanka). From the Buddhist group, only Rev. R Sivali, Prof. PD Premasiri, Dr. GA Somaratne, Prashanta Lal de Alwis and I were present. The first day went as scheduled. When we returned to the hotel at the end of the day where we were staying, we found some pamphlets left for us at the front desk and also another in the hotel room. One was titled “Questions to Norwegian ‘Buddhists’ and their Sri Lanka Quisling Supporters”. This emphasized Norway’s alleged support for the LTTE and how Norway spent billions of Rupies for LTTE. The document concluded with the following remarks: We are asking the Norwegian “Buddhists” and their Sri Lankan supporters (“Quislings”): do not allow Norwegian money to conquer us in the manner that for 500 years, other Westerners have been trying to control us. Do not participate in this conference. If you participate we will know it and will let the people of the country also know it. We are: Unarmed Buddhists against Tiger Spies. We are successors to Variyapola Siri Sumangala Thera who at the time of our surrender burned the English flag in 1815. (emphasis original) The second was a copy of the editorial of Asian Tribune on Tuesday, 3rd January 2012, just before the meeting. Its title was: “Offering religious harmony after failing to sell peace”. It offered a much more sober analysis of Norway’s role in the peace process and the activities of various evangelical organizations aiming at conversion through humanitarian aid. It did not contain any threats. When the participants were taken to the venue next day morning, we found that police were at the entrance and the gate had been locked, so that the vehicle carrying the participants could not enter. The vehicle

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carrying the participants was surrounded by a shouting, and posterholding angry mob, including several young Buddhist monks, who threatened the participants physically. I saw Madagama Dhammanada Thera, a project coordinator of SUCCESS who had confirmed his participation but had not participated, standing beside showing his support for the protestors. One Mr. Pani Wewala, secretary of Sri Lanka Jayagrahanaya (SUCCESS), came to me personally and asked in a threatening voice, “Is this country multi-religious (sarvaagamika) or Buddhist (bauddha)?” When I said I am not obliged to answer to him, he left saying: “We know that you cannot answer this question because you have taken money from Norway.” There are some important issues arising from this whole encounter. Obviously the position of those who took part in the aggressive protest was that Buddhists in Sri Lanka should not sit with anyone having anything to do with Norway. The reason is Norway’s questionable role in LTTE organization and the general suspicion Buddhists have towards anything that is associated with inter-religious dialogue, which is understood as another form of proselytism. My own position regarding Norway’s role in the LTTE struggle and the religious aims of inter-religious dialogue is not final and of “participant observer”, giving prominence to the observer role. Here, I distinguish between academically and philosophically motivated inter-religious understanding and inter-religious dialogue as an internal aspect of the activities of the Christian religion. Coming back to the issue, when I accepted the invitation to take part in this meeting, I was motivated by the belief that it is important to sit down and discuss issues with an open mind to agree or to disagree. The position adopted by protestors seemed to be one of denial, the rejection of any interaction with Norway as denying the possibility of any good coming from that country. I was not prepared to make a blanket denial of this sort, and was instead ready to talk. The issue arising from this whole encounter is that it highlights how some powerful Buddhist groups view the whole issue of BuddhistChristian interactions. In other words, for many such people and organizations, it is an act of treachery to sit together for discussion with any group which they believe to be anti-Buddhist. This does not mean that all Buddhists think in this manner. On the other hand, “all Buddhists in general” do not play a role here for the majority of them are neither for this nor for that. The Buddhists who are of more sober views, either not interested or they do not venture to come out.

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Among the Buddhist organizations that were opposed to the meeting and threatened to reveal who took part in it, was SUCCESS. Members of this organization include middle class Sinhala business people and professionals who belong to such professions as medicine and law. Of the four members of SUCCESS who confirmed participation, three were medical doctors. The fact they had accepted the invitation and confirmed their participation indicates that they were persuaded not to take part at the last moment. At the same time, it shows the reluctance or negative ambiguity which even some of the educated Buddhists have on this issue. What happened was a good example of how moderate Buddhist voices were thwarted by some extreme elements. If the members of SUCCESS and others who changed their minds had taken part in the meeting, they would have had a good opportunity to know first-hand about the efforts to introduce an ethic for conversion. In fact, as they would have found out, the document had some serious problems, some of which the Buddhist group managed to highlight. But denying the possibility of even a trial hearing of the case, these Buddhists demonstrated several things: they showed clearly that as far as Sri Lankan Buddhists are concerned, Norway’s role was simply ignored, which is an unrealistic position, hard to maintain in a globalized world. If Norway was wrong in one endeavour, it is not reasonable to assume that it will be wrong in all its future endeavours or that it will never act correctly and be correctible. That these positions clearly go against the Buddhist philosophy is clear. Being unable to actively take part in the discussions due to the language barrier may also be a crucial factor motivating some of these Buddhists, particularly for Buddhist monks, to adhere to this type of evasive tactics. As I mentioned earlier too, this can be a general factor not specific to the present issue. Although the Oslo Coalition was not a Buddhist group, one of its members was Egil Lothe, the chairperson of the Norway Buddhist Federation. But since his official function was not mentioned along with his name, it is hard to say whether or not he was there in his capacity as the chairperson of the Norway Buddhist Federation. Those who were there representing Christianity and Islam were clearly mentioned on the list. Whatever it may be, Lothe was in the working committee and presumably he must have represented Buddhist interests. In any case, it was he who organized the meeting in Pallekelle, so it was perceived as coming from the Buddhists of Norway. The deciding factors seem to have been Norway, from where the project originated, and the issue of

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“religious harmony”, usually promoted by others, which raises eyebrows among Sri Lankan Buddhists.

The issue of “Multi-Religiousness” (sarvāgamika) A concept very often associated with religious harmony is “multireligiousness” referred to above and sarcastically treated by some Buddhist activists as evident from the question Pani Wewala shot at me, which I referred to earlier. What we need to understand at the very outset is that the statement “Sri Lanka is a multi-religious country” is not a simple statement of fact, saying that there are adherents of several religions in the country. For those who make this statement, it means something like the following: although Sri Lanka was claimed to be a Buddhist country, it is not so or it is no longer so; Buddhism is just one among the religions that exist in the country, thereby indicating that it does not deserve any special recognition. For those who advocate a totally secular state, this is only a political statement. For those belonging to other religions, this statement gives equality to all religions and brings Buddhism down to a level where it does not enjoy any specific preference. For the average Buddhist, this does serious damage to the cultural identity of the country and does historical injustice to the predominant culture of the country. For some Buddhists (certainly a minority) who believe that any religion other than Buddhism should not even exist in Sri Lanka, “multi-religious” can be the unimaginable. Pani Wewala’s question to me is to be understood in this background. Historically, there was no debate about Sri Lanka being identified as the country of the Sinhalese and as a Buddhist country. This is clear in the behaviour of the Tamil kings, who ascended the throne just before and after the Europeans invaded the country, as well as from the behaviour of Portuguese, Dutch and in particular, the English, who finally took over the whole country. How the English accepted and struggled with this historical fact and their subsequent undertakings to protect Buddhism in their agreement are so well known that they needn’t be retold here.10 Now the debate we are having up to the present belongs to the post-independent era. Article 9 of the constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka says the following: The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana while assuring to all religions the rights granted by the Article 10 and 14 (1) (e). 10 See Rahula 2003, 52-77, for a revealing discussion.

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The freedom of thought, conscience and religion is assured by the Article 10. The Article 14 (1) (e) states: Every citizen is entitled to the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. The constitution, which contains a separate article for Buddhism, is understood as giving priority to Buddhism, while ensuring, through Article 14 (1) (e), freedom and fairness to other religions. Although at times the multi-religiousness of Sri Lanka society and the constitutional priority accorded to Buddhism are taken by some as being mutually contradictory propositions, as I view it, the multi-religiousness of the contemporary Sri Lanka society and its accompanying claims can be accommodated while accepting the constitutional priority of Buddhism. Being fair and not doing injustice to other religions and giving due place to Buddhism may arguably be considered two different things. In fact, there is evidence that this was understood in exactly the same manner by the people of Sri Lanka. I remember the time (1964) when Mrs. Sirimavo Banadaranaike was prime minister, and adherents of different religions in the cabinet, would separately observe their religions at the inauguration of the government: Mrs. Bandaranaike went to a vihāra (Buddhist monastery), Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike went to church, Mr. Badiuddin Mahamud went to the mosque and Mr. C Kumarasuriar went to Hindu Kovil. This act of each, following the rites of his/her own religion, was accepted by the society as the proper way of doing things and there was no concern of any wrong doing towards the religions of others. The concept of multi-religiousness (sarvãgamika) entered into the political discourse with the open market economy introduced by JR Jayawardene, and it was particularly brought to the forefront under Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-1993), the next president. Under the new concept, all of the cabinet would go to all four religious places and follow or at least pretend to follow the religious rites of all religions. The mass appeal of this mode of behaviour is obvious; for the politicians whose sole aim was gaining power and making use of the public as a vehicle to reaching their narrow goals, sarvãgamika was clearly a useful tool. Contained within this public behaviour, however, was hypocrisy, lack of conscience and lack of seriousness on the part of those who practiced it. Going deeper into the justification of this type of attitude, one encounters in this practice two debatable claims: The one-

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ness of all religions, and that to affirm one’s own religious belief is to be disrespectful to others. I hear both these claims being espoused and defended in many gatherings related to inter-religious dialogue and discussion. I have already written on this matter and made my views clear, and do not need to repeat them here (Tilakaratne1993). I think this whole attitude and the resultant practice, not only of politicians but also of many who are engaged in inter-religious dialogue in particular, is based on a fallacy, which I call misplaced allegiance. In a world where people hold divergent views, to assert one’s own religious, political, ideological or academic view should not or need not amount to rejecting all those who are different or being insensitive to others. In the Buddhist tradition, as the Buddha has made clear in many instances, while to hold that “this alone is true and the rest is false” is not acceptable, to assert that Buddha’s path alone leads to the extinction of defilements and not any other path is acceptable. Being nice to the followers of the other religions does not require one to agree with their belief systems altogether or even partially. Some practitioners of inter-religious dialogue seem to hold such a view, and consequently put forth the thesis that all religions are different paths leading to one and the same goal, which is impossible to establish without considerable damage to some forms of religion. My criticism of sarvãgamika does not come from an exclusivist Buddhist position which holds that Buddhism is the only legitimate religion in the country. In fact, it is clear from the recorded history of the country that there was more than one religion in the country even before the advent of Arahant Mahinda. The Mahāvaṃsa (Ch. X) testifies to the existence of many religious traditions and beliefs in pre-Buddhist Sri Lanka. These religions continued even after the arrival of Buddhism. In this sense, one can say that Sri Lanka was a multi-religious country from the beginning. The point, however, is how the Sinhala culture in the island developed, having Buddhism as its fountain of civilization. This shaped the Buddhist identity of the country. Sri Lanka has remained a Buddhist country from this perspective. Although there are records of other religions trying to destroy and displace Buddhism one cannot say the same about Buddhism. Although Dutugemunu regained and reestablished the Sinhala Buddhist power, he did not destroy Hinduism that existed in the country. I consider the cultural claim of Buddhism and the freedom of other religions to be two different things. My position does not mean that a government or an individual cannot adopt

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a position of respecting all religious views and respecting the freedom of all religions to exist while having one’s own religious belief or even not having any particular religious belief.

Conversion and its means The so called “unethical conversion” has become a thorny issue in recent Buddhist Christian relations in Sri Lanka. The claim is that the various indirect methods of persuasion, including material offers such as food items, clothing, money, jobs, houses, education, health and the like, are being used to convert people belonging mainly to Buddhism and Hinduism to Christianity. Although the role of Islam also has been mentioned the charge is basically against Christian groups. This refers mainly to newly established evangelical groups which have come to the country and established their centres in different guises, not revealing their religious affiliation or underplaying it as much as they can and working to convert people, particularly in poor urban settings or in interior village settings.11 During the last two decades there have been many incidents reported in the press, some highlighting the damage caused by efforts at conversion and some others highlighting damages and destruction done to their religious places. While the news on the former was confined to the local press, the latter were internationally reported, creating a negative image of Buddhists and (to a lesser degree) Hindus who, as these reports said, violated the freedom of religious expression of the converters and freedom of religious choice and human rights of those who were to be converted. While the response of some Buddhists and Hindus was the aggression, at political level, there were several attempts to address the issue from legal and constitutional perspectives. Consequently, an act from Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU) was presented to the parliament.12The bill was originally presented to the parliament in 2004 by Venerable Omalpe Sobhita Thera, a member of JHU, as a private member’s bill, and was subsequently amended in 2009 following public discussions and suggestions made by a parliamentary committee. The act was introduced as “an act to provide measures to prevent the conversion of persons belonging to one religion to another by the use of force, by allurement and by any fraudulent means and to provide for matters 11 See Perera 1998 and Nanayakkara 2007 for detailed studies. 12 Although Hindu members of the parliament had prepared a similar act, later their concerns were incorporated into the JHU act.

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connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The key article of the act was the following: No person shall, either directly or indirectly, convert or attempt to convert any person professing one religion to another by the use of force, by allurement or by any fraudulent means. The proposed act generated much discussion among religious and social groups. The general consensus among the Buddhists, in particular among the Buddhist monks, was disapproval of conversion efforts by evangelical groups and approval and support for the act, whereas the Christian clergy in general, including the established Christian church, opposed the act. The key argument against it was that such a measure will hinder the freedom of religion, even though the act was not specifically against converting Buddhists, but rather against converting anyone from any religion by the means mentioned in the act. The act, however, was not yet been put to vote, and hence still remains to be passed.13 Conversion is a very old phenomenon in the history of religions. In Buddhism, it goes back to the Buddha, who taught in the 6th century bce in India. It is clear that the Buddha did not have “Buddhists” listening to him. Once he started teaching, it is clear from the texts how people belonging to different social strata started following him. They became “hearers” (śrāvaka/sāvaka) of the Buddha. There are discourses reporting how some people, at the end of the sermon, would take refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha, and asked the Buddha to accept them as upāsaka/upāsikā (male/female person who stays close by). This is the closest we have to denote that one was “converted” to “Buddhism” which did not exist in these early days. In fact, the Pāli language does not have a term equivalent in meaning to conversion. Taking refuge in the Triple Gem and becoming a follower of the Buddha are both voluntary acts of a person, and such acts do not mean that one was converted to something by someone. In the history of Sri Lanka Arahant Mahinda who introduced Buddha Sasana to the country is described as ‘dīpapasādaka’: one who won the hearts of the (inhabitants of) the island. Pasāda basically means the good mental disposition towards someone. Usually this refers to a characteristic of one’s mind when one develops trust (saddha) in the Triple Gem. Again, this is not identical with the act of conversion, in which the one who is being converted is more like a passive participant. Although one could say that the end result is the same in either case, the point I am trying to drive home here is that the 13  Please refer to Serasinghe 2005-6 for a discussion on the act based on the material gathered by interviewing both Buddhist and Christian clergy and lay people.

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attitude that people are there to be converted to one’s own creed is alien to the teaching of the Buddha. The historical Buddhist practice, wherever Buddhism went, should show that the tradition, even up to now, has been faithful to this basic attitude of its master. Buddhism cannot be against conversion, in the sense of teaching one’s religion to others who are willing to listen (with the possible result of one deciding to change his or her religion for another one). That is what the Buddha did and that is also what the followers of the Buddha have been doing through ages in a large part of the world. Therefore, we can easily rule out the position that conversion cannot be practiced in Sri Lanka and that only Buddhism should be allowed to teach others about its faith. Buddhism accepts and honours the “right” of any religion to exist anywhere (like everything else) and the “right” (the moral obligation) of the adherents of any religion to teach their religion to others. How, then, are we to understand the opposition of Buddhists to unethical conversion? The very term “unethical”, as it relates to conversion, offers an answer to the issue. What the Buddhists are against is not conversion per se but unethical conversion. As we found in the discussion of two parliamentary acts, the Buddhists and Hindus are not asking for a blanket ban of conversion. These proposed acts may rather be understood as demands for an ethic in conversion.14 The Oslo Coalition document, referred to above, can be understood as an effort in this direction. The section on “recommended ground rules for missionary activities” starts with articles on how to communicate belief ethically. One issue it talks about is “propagating a religion by potentially controversial means, such as door-to-door canvassing”. In fact, the list of potentially controversial means can run much longer, 14  An interesting comparison may be made between the behaviour of Buddhists now and in early 19th century Ceylon in a similar situation. According to Malalgoda: “The earliest Buddhist reaction to missionary attacks was to address petitions to the government. These petitions began to appear from the 1820s, not long after the earliest missionary tracts and pamphlets had begun to appear in print. These petitions, in general, (1) affirmed the petitioners’ deep concern for the welfare of Buddhism which had prevailed as their and their ancestors’ religion for over two thousand years; (2) referred to the pain of mind caused to the Buddhists as a result of what was being written and preached against their religion by Christian missionaries; (3) pointed out that the Buddhists themselves made no similar attacks on Christianity; and (4) urged the government to uphold religious toleration by (a) ordering the withdrawal of offensive publications which had been issued, and (b) by making a general proclamation that no religious group should issue publications which are likely or calculated to offend and injure the feelings of other religious groups.” Malalgoda 1976, 213-14.

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containing more problematic means other than door-to-door canvassing. Nevertheless, the very fact that it addresses issues related to unethical practices in conversion, as well as its effort to address both missionaries and those who are affected by missionary activities, is commendable. The problem, however, is the basic, unarticulated assumption of the document that missionary activities are intended solely for salvation. The document does not discuss the question: why missionary activities or why conversion? This question is especially important because the world the missionaries try to convert is not the same world as the world they found in 15th or 16th centuries in Asia, Africa or Latin America. The old justification, namely, the need to civilize those uncivilized, does not seem to be valid any longer. Ultimately, just as it was centuries ago, even now the purpose is to gain power over peoples, countries, regions and the world. That is why these evangelical groups compete with each other while they jointly compete with their traditional churches to convert and to re-convert. If the name of the game is power, and not salvation, then there is a serious problem with the whole activity of conversion. It is as if one says: ‘we are going to convert you from your religion to ours so that the power you have at the moment will be ours. Still then we will do so as ethically as possible, respecting the freedom you have in order to continue with your religion, not violating your human rights, using at the same time the freedom of expression and (human) rights we have, in order to propagate our religion.’ Now the interesting thing is that one who says thus is often a member of a foreign organization with substantial human and monetary resources, trained especially for the job. At the receiving end is, say, a villager in South Asia who is not worldly wise, not materially well-off and not sophisticated. It is clear that there is no parity between the subject and the object. The Oslo document recommends measures such as dialogue and mediation if unethical conversion takes place. Failing such measures, the document proposes the following as the last resort: When mediation or dialogue do not lead to satisfactory protection of the rights of community members to maintain their religion or belief, or in other situations where they feel that their rights are being violated through the missionary activities of others, the community members should appeal to legal measures in accordance with international human rights standards. Although this is theoretically beautiful, it is far cry from the reality of ordinary villagers’ ability to act accordingly in order to safeguard their freedom so that they may continue to follow their own religion.

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If religious propagation is not necessarily for salvation but for other worldly purposes, then the question is ‘why disrupt families and disturb societies by introducing a new religion?’ and ‘why should others accept it without question?’ The Oslo document discusses missionary activities, especially among children and women, because they are identified as vulnerable groups. Both these groups can be vulnerable in specific situations such as internal and external political conflicts. Under normal circumstances, they are not considered vulnerable, but rather they are cherished in traditional societies. While women have their own human rights and children in their proper age have their own rights to determine what religion they wish to follow, it is simply narrow minded to view such situations from a human rights angle alone. The document asserts that a woman may retain her traditional religion while all her family converts to a new one, and at the same time a woman is entitled to embrace a new religion even if her entire family opts to remain with the traditional religion. With very close relations with children and where divorce is considered a disaster, theoretical human rights will hardly be of help. In a different context the document addresses this issue. Discussing the conversion of asylum seekers, it says: Missionary organizations should be aware of the fact that if an asylum seeker converts to a different religion, that may create serious difficulties if the person has to return to his/her homeland, and/or to the rest of his/her family.” (emphasis added) Now this same situation can also result particularly when the woman of a household converts to a new religion. Although I do not plan to make a comprehensive study of this document, I intend to highlight some of the problems that can arise from conversion, in general, and unethical conversion, in particular. Since conversion has been a thorny issue in Buddhist- Christian relationships in Sri Lanka, some awareness of the potential sources of conflict will be of help. It is not only Buddhist and Hindus who are threatened by the evangelical groups, but also traditional Roman Catholic and Protestant churches of the country, which are not often subject to accusations of unethical conversion. Since conversion, as it is practiced by these evangelists, is beset with difficulties, and since there is no way that such conversion can be done in an unoffending way, what is acceptable/ethical in the today’s world is to adhere to the commonly available means of teaching and communicating one’s religion, namely, teaching by making use of the

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multiple manners available today for the dissemination of information. Future missionaries will be able to take an example from the manner in which Buddhist monks are operating in Western societies: while they mainly look after their own ethnic religious communities (which is applicable to evangelists only in a limited way), they conduct classes in their temples, deliver public lectures when invited, distribute publications, small and large, and try to provide living examples of Buddhist monkhood. If people come to a religion out of conviction, no one can and should stop that. It should be the only way in future for people to convert from one religion to another.

Conclusion Currently the relationship between the two communities appears to be quite positive. When Pope Francis visited Sri Lanka (8-10 January 2015), the Pope’s visit was positively viewed by the overwhelming majority, with the exception of one or two writers who talked about the past history of Christianity in the country and proposed demanding the Pope to pay for the damages caused. Without religious differences, people gathered to greet him. This can be regarded as a display of maturity in inter-religious relations nation-wide. In a country like Sri Lanka, where school education is compulsory and free, we have to place a lot of hope in our education system to provide guidance to the youth, the future citizens of the country. While the present school system gives much priority to the study of religion, it has its limitations. For example, what is compulsory at the moment is to study one’s own religion. If, however, knowledge gives understanding and understanding imparts a sense of respect, what is needed, in addition, is to enable each student to know about religions other than his or her own, though of course this may not be the only thing that we need to do in order to promote good Buddhist- Christian relationships in Sri Lanka.

02. Buddhist Reflections on Religious Diversity and Dialogue

Introductory remarks The phenomenon of religious diversity and inter-religious dialogue are closely connected. How one perceives religious diversity determines to large extent one’s attitude to inter-religious dialogue. Although dialogue has been around for a considerable time, still there are uncertainties as to what it is and why it is even among those who practice it, let alone those who do not. In this discussion, first I will review briefly the current understanding of ‘dialogue’ among its practitioners. In particular, different Roman Catholic perceptions of dialogue that shape the current practices and debates will be reviewed. Then I will look at the state of inter-religious dialogue in the local context in Sri Lanka. Thirdly I will try to develop a Buddhist response to dialogue both in theory and practice through an analysis of religious diversity. I will conclude with some observations on the future of inter-religious dialogue. Although in the Roman Catholic tradition inter-religious dialogue as a definitive concept and practice was started with Vatican II (19641966), discussions on mission have been among other Christian denominations for some time. The World Missionary Conference held in 1910 in Edinburgh is an early example from Protestant churches.1 1 Fr Pieris refers to several similar local Sri Lankan efforts: the Anglican priest (later, bishop) Lakdasa de Mel who had pioneered religio-cultural encounters with Buddhists and created indigenous liturgies and liturgical music about three decades before Vatican II; the Anglican monk-priest (later priest) Yohan Devananda who was already in the field (1959), creating an ashram-type of Christian presence in harmony with the rural Buddhist culture at ‘Devasarana’ in Ibbagamuwa; ‘The Christian workers’ fellowship started in 1958; and Rev. Lynn de Silva who pioneered an intellectual dialogue with Buddhism ever since he took over the Centre for Religion and Society which is now called ‘Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue’ (1995:p. 109).

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It appears that different denominations of Christianity have their own histories of inter-religious activities.2 In this paper, however, I will focus on Vatican II and subsequent developments in Roman Catholic tradition simply to limit my scope. My Buddhist reflections are basically coming from my Sri Lanka experience as a Theravada Buddhist. My intellectual debts in writing this essay will be clear as it unfolds, and I am, in particular, grateful to those Christian scholars who have been openminded and self-critical about a theme that is very close to their religion.

Inter-Religious dialogue and its internal discontents One cannot start a discussion on inter-religious dialogue as if one is dealing with a concept having universally agreed upon content leading to a set of unanimously accepted practices. As Fr. Aloysius Pieris has discussed in detail the new attitude to other religions and the mission proposed in Vatican II is a result of a smooth process culminating in unanimity among all participants. According to Pieris, clearly there were two schools of thought, one characterized by openness to other religions and rejection of the old practices of mission in favour of understanding and dialogue, and the other, the conservative Vatican group keen on defending the status quo. The debate was on whether the Vatican council was meant to be a reform or renewal. The distinction between the two perspectives in Pieris’ words is as follows: There is a vast difference between these two options. Reform is a controlled and graduated process of change that keeps the institutional set-up of the church intact. It comes from top to bottom, from the centre to the periphery. Such were Vatican I and Trent. Rome issued decrees and they were followed far away. But renewal is exactly the opposite process. It irrupts from below and work its way up to the top volcanically. It is initiated in the periphery where fresh and new ideas flow in more freely than in the centre of the establishment. Renewalist currents that begin to whirl in the margin of the church surge into centripetal waves that dash on the fortified ecclesiastical structures. (Pieris 2012, 125) Then Pieris goes on to describe how polarization has played a crucial role in determining the subsequent course of the inter-religious dialogue for the Roman Catholic Church. I will not reproduce that information here leaving room for interested readers to go to the original source. 2  Refer to Hettiarachchi (2012) chapters 3 and 4 for a discussion on histories, debates and disputes on dialogue in Catholic and Protestant traditions respectively.

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It seems that even at the highest level of the Catholic Church there are differences of opinion as to what dialogue means and as to what its purpose is. According to one author, the Papal Encyclical Redemptoris Missio defends the Church’s right to convert people and claims that interreligious dialogue is a “part of Church’s evangelizing mission” (Rajasheker 2012, 239). Although it is what most of the pro-dialogue Christians wish to see dialogue as not.3 While one group of Roman Catholics represented by such eminent theologians as Aloysius Peiris in Sri Lanka support dialogue whole-heartedly and think in terms of conversion as inner conversion, namely, one converting to true Christianity and to true Buddhism, or to true God from false gods such as money and power, there are others who think in terms of universal conversion. After Vatican II even those who are keen on conversion would not talk in terms of conversion or proselytization any more, and would, instead, use such terms as ‘sharing the faith’ ‘reaching out in love’ and ‘witnessing’ (Rajashekar 2012, 233) to communicate what was meant by those terms and the efforts at conversion continue unabated with questionable means and questionable results (Refer to Premawardhana 2015 and Rajashekhar 2012). The comments made by Pope John Paul II (in his Crossing the Threshold of Hope) on Buddhism, that Buddhist soteriology is negative and hence such soteriology is indifferent to the world and impedes the development of man and the world4 and the aggressive manner in which ‘new evangelization’ of the Catholic Church, a movement meant to convert the world to Christianity, launched in order to celebrate the 2000th birthday of Christ, have to be seen as powerful expressions of disagreement with Vatican II.

Dialogue and Buddhism in Sri Lanka In discussing dialogue with Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Fr. Pieris identifies three stages of its history: a period of bitterness and suspicion (1950s and 1960); a period of incipient dialogue and co-operation (1970s), and a period of bitterness and suspicion (1980s and 1990s). In this analysis Peiris discusses major historical and social factors that shaped the destiny of dialogue in Sri Lanka during these periods. The middle period discussed here is one during which Vatican II took place. According to Pieris, 3  In the persistence of this way of inside understanding, it is no wonder that many non-Christian religions perceive dialogue as the same old method of conversion in a new garb. 4  See Pieris (1955) 62-95 for a comprehensive discussion on this issue which became controversial with the Papal visit to Sri Lanka in 1994.

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Thanks to the Second Vatican Council, our local Catholic Church began to view the social reality of our country with different eyes and began to re-assess the church’s own historical role in the light of the Conciliar teachings. The Council opened up new perspectives with regard to other religions and the social reality in which the Church was to spell out its mission... The late sixties saw many groups of Sri Lanka Catholics enter a new era of dialogue and collaboration with people of other faiths. (Pieris 1995, 108) Discussing further, Pieris says that these efforts were not sufficient to remove the distrust the Buddhists had toward Christians. It is interesting to note that the efforts at dialogue that Peiris refers to were originating from Christians, and there was no reciprocity on the part of Buddhists in this Christian initiative. In addition to the fact that dialogue was a very new concept for Buddhists, the suspicion referred to above seems to have been a reason. It is understandable why at the early stages of dialogue the Buddhists were not coming forward for dialogue. But why Buddhists are not making efforts at dialogue on their own may not be explained with reference to the above-mentioned historical reasons alone. The fact that dialogue still remains a Christian affair even after fifty years of Vatican II and Nostra Aetate requires some further explanation. In Harris we read that early British missionaries complained about Buddhist monks, “indolence, indifference, overconfidence in the truth of their own system” (Harris 2006, 195). But being indifferent is not the whole story of the Buddhist monastic attitude to Christianity. There are records of monks who resisted and complained against the missionary activities from a very early period of the British rule. At the same time British missionaries had recorded themselves how they were welcomed by Buddhist monks at their monasteries and how at times the monks even allowed missionaries to have their public lectures on their religion at ‘dharma-shala’ of the monastery. According to scholars like Harris, things became unpleasant when the monks found that trust they placed on the missionaries had been betrayed by them ( Harris 2006, Ch.22 ). From the latter half of the nineteenth century the relationship between the two groups was characterized by mutual suspicion and rivalry, a situation which has continued to present.

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Buddhists’ self understanding of their own religion and its implications on dialogue As mentioned above, historical reasons as to why Buddhists are not enthusiastic about dialogue have been discussed by scholars such as Pieris. Beyond such historical reasons there must be other doctrinal and philosophical reasons to explain this phenomenon. Perhaps it could be such reasons that Spence Hardy had in his mind when he described the Buddhist monks’ attitude as ‘overconfidence in the truth of their own system’ (Harris 2006, 195). In this context it is useful to know about the self-understanding of the Buddhists of their own system which probably caused them to be unenthusiastic about dialogue. What could be the discourses of the Buddha which may have shaped the Buddhist attitude to Christianity which is a theistic religion? Although reviewing all the relevant instances is out of place here. I will refer only to two instances to establish that the Buddha rejected the concept of God as creator and savior. The first example I refer to is the Maha Titthāyatana-sutta of the Aṇguttara-nikāya (A I, 173-177) which identifies three religious views which “when questioned, interrogated, and cross-examined by the wise, and taken to their conclusion, will eventuate in non-doing” (Bodhi 2012, 266-270). They are: the view that all what is felt, whether pleasurable, unpleasurable or neutral, is due to the deeds committed in the past (sabbam-pubbekata-hetu); that all what is felt …. is due to the creation of God (issara-nimmāna-hetu); and that all what is felt … is due to no reason and no condition (ahetuappaccaya). The Buddha’s discontent with these views is that they ultimately lead to non-action denying thereby the need for human action without which moral responsibility becomes meaningless. Any voluntary act is impossible without free will which, in turn, is impossible within a creationist tradition. Although this difficulty is not fully articulated in the discourse the Buddha’s position can be regarded as a result of being aware of this philosophical difficulty. Nevertheless, Christianity holds that God has given free will to human beings. But this uneasy marriage between divine ordination and free will cause some well known philosophical and theological problems that cannot be easily bypassed. The second example is an empirical argument used by the Buddha to show how the belief in creator God does not have an experiential basis.5 In a discussion with a young and learned Brahmin called Kapathika (Bodhi 5  This does not deny the reality of the experiences claimed by believers to have been caused by God.

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1995, 775-785), the Buddha demonstrates that none of the advocates of the alleged divine tradition has personal experience of its source, none is in a position to say “I see this; I know this”. But these Brahmins are guided by mere faith which under these circumstances become “groundless” (amūlika). In his rebuttal Kapathika says that Brahmins go not only by faith but also by the tradition. Rejecting faith and tradition (and three other phenomena) as unreliable sources the Buddha says they could lead to two results, either to truth or to falsehood. What is accepted on faith or tradition could well be false whereas what is not accepted on faith or tradition may well be true. Here the Buddha’s is not a blanket denial of what is asserted on faith or tradition, but to highlight the essential unstableness of them as sources of knowledge. It is of relevance to note in this context that the Indian Brahmanic tradition during and after the Buddha did not have any hesitation in characterizing the Buddha as ‘an advocate of destruction’/nihilist (venāyika) (M I, 140) owing to his denial of atma, and in including his teaching in category of negative systems (nāstika-vāda) owing to its denial of the divine origin of the Veda. I argue that non-theism has been a key aspect of the Buddhist self-understanding. The Buddhist monks with a fair knowledge in the teaching of the Buddha should be expected to have been familiar with the Buddhist critique of the concept of creator God (issara-nimmāna-vāda=the creationist view6).Therefore it is natural if the Sri Lanka Buddhist monks did not find Christianity religiously and intellectually exiting. If this was the intellectual attitude of Buddhist monks of the nineteenth century toward Christianity, I would submit that the intellectual attitude of the present day Buddhist monks remain the same. It is perhaps this understanding that makes them satisfied with their own system and not necessitating them to learn from any other religion, although by no means this provided a justification for such an attitude. In addition, in a situation where the Christians themselves are not unanimous as to what dialogue is and for what purpose it is, it is understandable why Buddhist ( or the adherents of any other religion for that matter ) are hesitant about dialogue.

Buddhism and religious diversity Pluralism, exclusivism and inclusivism in religion, views opposites to 6  I do not venture into the debate existing among some Christian scholars to the effect that the Buddha really did not deny the existence of God. Raimudo Panikkaar (1989), who held that the Buddha was most faithful to God by refusing to speak of Him in the so-called unanswewed questions (avyakrta-prashna), is one classic example of the genre of scholars. I have discussed this matter in Tilakaratne (1993) p. 114.

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one another, all are premised on diversity of religion which is a fact about the world. If, according to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Pluralism means “the toleration or acceptance of a diversity of opinions, values theories etc.” a pluralist can be either an inclusivist or an exclusivist. But according to Oxford Concise Dictionary pluralism is “a theory of system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle” a pluralist has to be a relativist. There is much debates about the position of the Buddha. In this context it is worth discussing briefly at least Abraham Velez who has done a thorough study of a Buddha’s position on religious diversity.7 I will not make a comprehensive study of Velez’ well researched work. I will limit my comments to some key positions he holds. Velez Characterized the Buddha’s attitude to other religions as pluralistic inclusivism. He distinguished his position from what he considers ‘the prevalent Buddhist approach to religious diversity’ which is ‘sincere inclusivist attitude with an exclusivist view of liberation and the highest stage of holiness’ (Velez 2013, 1). Velez identifies three different meanings of ‘pluralism’ in relation to religion, and seems to consider the Buddha as a pluralist in the following sense: ‘an attitude that proactively engages other religions through dialogues without necessarily seeking agreement or conversion’ (Velez 2013, 167). For the pluralist reading of Buddhism supported by Velez, it is very important that the Buddha accepted the possibility of liberation outside Buddhism. Velez adduces sufficient evidence to prove that it is the case. In my understanding, however, in order for Velez’ pluralist interpretation to be true about the Buddha’s position, one has to specify as to what the Buddha meant by liberation and the path leading to it. As Velez himself has shown with reference to many discourses of the Buddha (Velez 2013, 84-85) what the Buddha meant by liberation is what one gains within the four noble truth scheme. It is the liberation that the Buddha found, and it is the same that the Buddhas of the past found and the Buddhas of the future will find. According to the Buddha, there is no liberation outside the four noble truths. What he denies is that these truths are found only in his teaching which existed in a particular space and time. Velez is quite to the point when he says that the Buddha “refuse to claim that liberation is exclusive to his teaching-and-discipline” (Velez 2013, 83) and again that “liberation is not exclusively to Buddhism” (Velez 2013, 91). But what one needs to be aware of is that what is meant by the path and liberation are not any path or any liberation but what the Buddha exactly meant by 7  Velez (2013) provides a useful reference to a variety of strands of pluralism in the context of Buddhism.

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those terms. According to the Buddhist belief, there were, there are and there will be many Buddhas in many systems of world (lokadhātu) who, however, teach the same truth. In a well-known discourse, Nagara-sutta (S II, 105-106: Bodhi 2000, 603) the Buddha has been compared to a pioneer who discovered an ancient abandoned path leading to a lost city and showed the way for others to reach the same. The implication of the smile is quite clear: the path leading to the elimination of suffering, namely, the ancient path, and the goal of elimination of suffering, namely, the ancient city, have been there all the time. What any particular Buddha does is to discover these truths by himself and to teach others. The path and the goal are there to be discovered by anyone at anytime; they are not the monopoly of the Buddha or the Buddhists. The important thing to know that the path and the city are the same whoever discover them whenever. Velez discusses the Cūḷahatthipadopama-sutta (The simile of the elephant’s footprint) of the Majjhima-nikaya (27) as a key text supporting his pluralist interpretation but one misunderstood by the tradition. In the Sutta the Buddha advises his disciples not to reach a definitive conclusion about the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha unless and until one knows for oneself that the Buddha is fully enlightened, the Dhamma is well taught by the Buddha and the Sangha is practicing the path well. In this discourse the Buddha elaborates on the simile of an elephant tracker who does not cease his search for an elephant in forest, despite much evidence such as large foot prints, until he himself sees the elephant. The Buddha says, in the like manner, disciples must continue their search until they know for themselves that the Buddha is fully enlightened, etc. Interpreting this discourse Velez says: If something can be inferred from this simile, it is that the Buddha would like his disciples to keep an open mind, at least until they attain enlightenment and see by themselves the truth about the Buddha, the Dhamma and Sangha. This openness requires the cultivation of intellectual humility and inquisitiveness, that is, it requires the abandonment of dogmatic attitudes that claim to know what they actually do not know, i.e., what can and cannot be found in other forests. That is whether other forests are devoid of big elephants (exclusivism), or whether other forests have elephants exactly like those already found in the Buddha’s forest (inclusivism). A true disciple of the world take the simile of the elephant’s footprint more seriously, would

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avoid dogmatic assumptions, and would actually explore other forests before reaching a precipitated conclusion about the kinds of elephants that can and cannot be found outside one’s own Buddhist forest. (Velez 2013, 6) Velez’ interpretation would have been different had he given due weight to the role of trust (saddhã) in the path and the gradually ascending nature of the Buddhist practice. At the stage spoken of in the discourse the disciple has already passed the stage of looking for other elephants in other forests. It is true that until one establishes ‘rational faith’ (ākāravatī-saddhā8) in the Buddha to accept him as the teacher, the would-be disciples will have to be open for other possibilities. The best example for being open, inquisitive and intellectually humble is the Buddha’s own practice as Siddhartha going from teacher to teacher and experimenting with various methods until he made up his mind to follow his own path. We may think that many people who came to listen to the Buddha were in this stage for most of them would have been followers of other religious traditions. But once they listen to the Buddha and settle down to follow him they cannot waver and be inquisitive any longer. The interesting fact about the path [and of course about any procedure] is that one has to act on it in order to see the results. At this stage one cannot do so if one does not have trust in the Buddha. Therefore it is trust that makes one proceed in the path. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Tilakaratne 1997, 593-611) without trust one cannot act and without act one cannot experience the result. The process described in the Sutta is not continuation of being open to other systems, being inquisitive or being intellectually humble. But it is a gradual progress in the path, seeing/experiencing more and more evidence with increasing strength until one reaches the very end of the journey by seeing the elephant with one’s own eyes. It is at this stage that one does not require trust any more for one has conclusive knowledge that the Buddha is fully enlightened, etc.. As K N Jayatilleka has shown (Jayatilleke 1963, 6), at this stage one’s saddhā is completely replaced by pannā (knowledge). Therefore, the whole point of the ‘elephant-simile’ is not about being inquisitive till the end but about the gradual progress of knowledge to its completion. Elaborating on openness to other traditions, Velez characterizes it as ‘critical (inquisitive), firmly rooted in one’s own tradition’ (Velez 2013, 7). If one is firmly rooted in one’s own tradition I do not see how one can at the 8  Majjhima-nikāya I p.320 (Jayatilleke 1963 p.386ff for a discussion).

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same time be open and inquisitive about other systems. These two terms appear to be mutually exclusive and contradictory. One does not need to be open or inquisitive about other religious systems if one is following one’s tradition with confidence. This however should not be construed as refusing to be open to other religious systems in the sense of having a healthy attitude toward the other systems, accepting and respecting their right not merely to exit and even to thrive, and being humble to learn from them. If one who is open for dialogue is firm on one’s own system, he cannot be inquisitive and shopping for a better system. Velez thinks that the Cula-Sīhanada-sutta [Lion’s Roar] (Majjhimanikāya. II) where the Buddha very clearly and emphatically asserts that the four stages of arahant-hood (religious perfection as conceived in the teaching of the Buddha) and those who have reached those stages are found only within the teaching of the Buddha, poses a challenge to his interpretation of Buddhism as pluralism. In this discourse the Buddha asserts: Here itself is the first sramana. Here itself is the second, the third and the fourth sramana. The systems of others are devoid of sramanas: bhikkhus, utter well the lion’s roar in this manner. (Idheva paṭhamō samaṇō, idha dutiyō samanō, idha tatiyō samanō, idha catutthō samaṇō, suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe ti evam etaṃ bhikkhave sammā sῑhanādaṃ nadatha.) In this statement the Buddha encourages his followers to utter the ‘lion’s roar’ proclaiming this fact. Velez makes a concerted effort to interpret the crucial term ‘idheva’ [meaning ‘only here’ or ‘here itself’] as not having the meaning usually attributed to it. What is stated in the Sutta need not be interpreted as contradicting the Buddha’s acceptance of the possibility of one’s attaining nirvana on one’s own in the absence of the sāsana of a Buddha. The statement should be understood as highlighting the position of his teaching vis-à-vis the other contemporary religious traditions. This is an instance of clear rejection of his contemporary systems by the Buddha, but not necessarily condemnation or criticism of them or an attack on them. Velez seems to be proposing this interpretation with the (mistaken) understanding that the Buddha did not reject other religious teachings. Had he seen the Mahā Titthāyatanasutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, discussed above, in which the Buddha rejects three current religious beliefs including the creation view (issaranimmānavāda), Velez would not have drawn this conclusion. I could not find any evidence that Velez has seen this important discourse.

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Velez examines many other discourses in the course of his study. In particular D II.151 where the Buddha address his last disciple and where the Buddha makes a claim similar to the one found in the ‘Lion’s Roar’. I do not discuss these instances for want of space.

Implications on dialogue In the previous section, I have argued for a position akin to what Velez characterizes as (to repeat) “sincere inclusivist attitude with an exclusivist view of liberation and the highest stages of holiness”. I do not have a problem in calling the Buddha a pluralist in the sense Velez seems to using the term (to repeat: ‘an attitude that proactively engages other traditions through dialogue without necessarily seeking agreements or conversion’). But can the Buddha be a pluralist in the regular sense of the term as defined by Concise Oxford Dictionary (to repeat: ‘a theory or system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle’) even disregarding its metaphysical assumptions alien to Buddhism? The foregoing discussion should have shown that the Buddha is not a pluralist in this sense, namely, accepting the validity of more than one ultimate religious goal. Within the orthodox Christianity salvation is always through Jesus and Church. Pro-dialogue people are of the view that Christianity must think of salvation as coming from God (not from Jesus) allowing more openness to other religions, a view not encouraged by the Vatican Curia. But unlike perhaps other theistic religions, even in this God-centered scheme of salvation Buddhists who deny the existence of creator God who saves but advocate a definitive ethical path leading to cessation of suffering do not seem to have much hope. It is because the four-nobletruth-scheme and savior God are mutually exclusive, each making the other redundant. For the pre-Vatican II Christians with an exclusivist view that salvation is only through Jesus there is no question of being open to other systems. Even for post-Vatican II proponents of dialogue, being open is to be open to other systems to see whether they can be accommodated within the salvific scheme of God.9 Viewed from outside, this is being magnanimous for a religion which has been exclusivist in outlook and which wields power in the arena of world religions. It is also true that those who extend this magnanimity have had to reinterpret their tradition even at the risk of being misunderstood their own integrity in 9  For this view see Amaladoss 1985 p.2 passim and 1992 p. 56 pasiim.

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the organization. But the crux of the problem is, whether one is open for dialogue or not, salvation in Christianity is always through God. Jose Kuttianimattathil, who is pro-dialogue and who wrote a voluminous dissertation on dialogue concludes his essay in the following words: In dialogue, we come to the realization that the saving action of God, the origin and Goal of all, is reaching out to all peoples in ways mysterious to us. We confess that the Word, who became flesh, enlightens all those who come into the world and is the savior of all. We affirm that Spirit is ever at work in the hearts and traditions of peoples drawing all to God. We accept the different religious traditions as God’s gift to humankind. These traditions and their saints help in the divine-human encounter of their followers. The sincere adherents of these religions are members of God’s Kingdom. As members of the Church, which is at the service of the Kingdom of God, we reach out to them in dialogue for mutual understanding, enrichment and cooperation in building the Kingdom and walking together with them towards the Infinite. ( Kuttianimattathil 1995, 635) But whether or not this means much for any other religion remains a question. One way to justify this way of thinking will be the following: If Christianity finds theological justification to include all other religions within its salvific scheme, as it has done, that is how it deals with religious diversity, and that is its internal matter. Other religious traditions too will develop their own justifications for accepting religious diversity. The end result will be peace and cooperation among the adherents of religions while themselves remaining in different conceptual universes. This is well and good. But will not be acceptable to Christians who see God as the basis for inter-religious dialogue, co-existence and peace which has in it the problematic assumption that all participants of dialogue have to be similar in some very important sense. Does this, however, mean that inter-religious dialogue is impossible in presence of difference? The widely given answer is in the positive. But the Buddhist answer to this question would be in the negative. Contrary to the widely held belief, exclusivist claims are not always results of being arrogant or being not ready or not open to learn.10 Furthermore, asserting difference is not necessarily being rude to others provided it is done with proper attitude. Being inquisitive at one stage and being certain at another 10  Since I do not have space to discuss what Buddhism can learn from the West and Western religion, let me refer to insightful presentation of Sally B King on what Buddhism has to offer and what it can learn from the West, in Roloff & Weisse (2015).

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are not mutually contradictory states in religious practice. I think, time has come to abandon the program to create a theology encompassing all religions as a precondition for inter-religious dialogue. As Dalai Lama emphatically says: ‘There are differences’ [emphasis original] (Roloff & Weisse 2015, 19). But inter-religious dialogue for peace, understanding, harmony, co-existence and co-operation has to continue.

03. Religious Tolerance in Buddhism: Theory and Practice*

Introduction The attitude of religions towards one another has become a crucial factor in peaceful co-existence of the contemporary society. It is a fact that in the recorded long history of humankind there have been religions almost from the beginning. It is also a fact that the religions have not seen eye-to-eye with their fellow religions. As a result, there has been widespread suffering in society. The situation has aggravated today for the world has been drawn closer by the revolutionary changes in the fields of communication and transport. Therefore religious tolerance has become additionally important in the contemporary society. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the theory of tolerance in Buddhism as articulated in the texts and the practice of it as revealed in the history. It is hoped that such a discussion as this will serve to enhance our religious tolerance thereby enriching a very important aspect of our behaviour towards one another.

The historical context It is widely accepted that Buddhism arose in India in the 6th century B. C. Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist literary evidence shows that, in India, there was a remarkable fermentation of religious and philosophical views by this time. In the context of Indian religion, the 6th century B. C. was the Middle Upaniṣad period when, in particular, the religion had advanced from ritualism to search for liberation through the * A version of this paper was presented at the international conference on ‘Buddhism for Twenty-first Century: An International Perspective’, Leh, Ladakh, India, August, 2004.

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understanding of one’s inner self (adhyātma). The Buddhist discourses testify to the existence of a large number of religious views based on the nature of soul and its liberation. The Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīghanikāya refers to 62 views prevalent during this period. All these views were ātma-vādas (soul theories) in the sense that, either they accepted an atma which lasts forever or an ātma which was believed to get destroyed at the death. The Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the same Nikāya records of six religious teachers who were known well during the time of the Buddha. The background story of this particular discourse is so interesting that, it records that the king, before visiting the Buddha, had visited all these religious teachers for discussions. What is revealed from the texts is that multiplicity of religious views was a fact during this time and people accepted it with any problem. This does not mean that there were no inter-religious rivalries, or even, at times, efforts to discredit rivals by unacceptable means. What is significant is that there were, among them, more similarities than differences. In the Indian religious context, during this period, there were only two main religious traditions, namely, the Brahmanism and Sramana movement. The former was the orthodox religion and it represented basically a uniform system of religion although in the Upanisads (the last section of the Veda) one may note the development of a more advanced stage of religious consciousness. The Sramaṇa movement was a society of divergent religious groups which were one in the sense that they rejected Brahmanism, in particular, its social system and theism. The six religious teachers mentioned in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta belong in the Sramana tradition. The Buddha too belonged in the same tradition. It is very interesting to see that, in addition to the instances of lively exchange of ideas between these two main religious groups, there were various such encounters among the Sramana groups themselves. But, on the other hand, as Sramanas, they shared a common life style in many respects. For example, all Sramana groups depended on people for their existence. For example, it was customary during this time for Sramanas to go for alms from house to house. It seems that ordinary people did not mind to which group they belonged as long as they were religious practitioners. This shows that the Indian religious context provided people with a healthy environment for tolerance. The presence of multiplicity of religious views during this period was not without its difficulties. The rivalry between and among different traditions was a common characteristic. Debates between religious groups were a common aspect of the ancient Indian religious life.

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The typical practice of such religious debates has been described with disapproval in the Buddhist texts. The discourses describe these debaters as ‘learned, subtle, hairsplitters who have mastered the doctrines of others and who go about shattering with their intelligence the theories put forward’ (D I, 26). Within the Buddhist tradition itself, at times, there were some people who studied the teaching of the Buddha ‘simply for the advantage of reproaching others and for the advantage of gossiping’. Such people have been described as ‘foolish’ (moghapurisa) (M I, 132). In the Suttanipāta, one of the texts belonging to the Basket of Discourses, there are several discourses which deal with unpleasant situations that can arise from religious debates motivated by the desire to win over others. For instance in the Cūḷaviyūha-sutta the following conversation occurs: (Questioner): Some who abide strictly to their own views alone, come into dispute with others, each claiming that they themselves are the only experts, declaring thus: ‘One who understands this, knows the truth; whoever rejects this is imperfect’. Having thus got into arguments, they dispute (amongst themselves). They say ‘the other person is a fool not an expert’. Since one and all are the expert talkers, which is the true statement out of these? (The Buddha): If one who does not tolerate another’s view is a fool, a dull and stupid, then all of them are fools without understanding, because all of them abide by their [own] views only. (Saddhatissa 1985, 103-104) The Buddha did not approve the debates conducted in such a hostile spirit, with the sole view of defeating the opponent. This, however, does not mean that the Buddha did not take part in religious discussions with the holders of other religious views. Understandably, the people the Buddha met for the first time were not his followers. This implies that he had to persuade them to give up their already accepted views and accept his own. The Basket of Discourses contains numerous discourses that record such encounters of the Buddha with holders of different religious views. For instance, the Ambaṭṭha-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya records a long discussion the Buddha had with the young Brahmin called Ambattha, the main issue of which is the latter’s arrogance based on his alleged superiority of caste. As revealed from this discussion, the Buddha showed with reasons to Ambattha that his views were unfounded. Finally it is recorded that the Buddha succeeded in changing Ambattha’s views. What is against

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tolerance, according to Buddhism, is not holding ones’ own views or trying to make understand others of the veracity of those views but to deny the same right for the others.

Tolerance in the teaching of the Buddha Tolerance in the field of religion seems fundamentally different from tolerance in other human interests. We have to note and fully appreciate this difference in discussing the idea of tolerance in religion. Religions usually make pronouncements about man and his destiny in the world. Such pronouncements are usually considered by adherents of each religion to be ultimate. In the case, for instance, of the theistic religions, they are taken to be revelations of God or the Almighty. This implies that the pronouncements belonging to the other religions are necessarily false. Every religion considers itself to be the exclusive owner of truth. In such a situation, it is quite understandable how conflicts can arise among different religious traditions. However, in recent times there have been a lot of discussions on this situation by people of religions themselves. The popular response has been either to accept a kind of relativism or pluralism. Religious relativism holds that all religions are true in some sense or other for truth is relative to various conditions and circumstances. Pluralism, in this particular case, holds that all religions are various responses, though expressed in different manners depending on their specific cultural and historical conditions, to one and the same ultimate religious reality. Both these responses have been motivated by the belief that differences are bad for maintaining peace and unity in society and hence they must, somehow or other, be explained away. Relativism motivated by this misguided understanding can be intellectually dishonest. Pluralism in religion is an effort to bring all religions under one category which ultimately can lead to submerge all the other religions in one powerful religion. The assumption behind this project, namely, that differences are bad for unity, is highly questionable. Moreover, in actual practice, it ultimately leads to hegemony of one religion over the others. The same thing is happening politically and economically under globalization all over the world today. What can happen under the name of religious pluralism of this sort is nothing other than this. In understanding the Buddhist attitude to tolerance it is necessary that we have a good idea of the concept of truth which is fundamental to the teaching of the Buddha. The central teaching of the Buddha is

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the four noble truths. The fact that these truths have been specified as ‘noble’ (ariya) indicates how valuable they are in the teaching of the Buddha. The four noble truths are based on the concept of suffering. It is the vision of the Buddha that human beings are suffering. The cause of this suffering is identified as ‘thirst’ or craving and other mind-defiling factors that are within human mind. The purification of mind of these defilements is the cessation of suffering and the path leading to this goal is to follow the eightfold path. When the Buddha says that human beings suffer and they suffer due to defilements these statements are meant to be universal truths which apply to all beings who are not arahants. It is believed that any person with sufficient intelligence can see these two aspects of suffering. Now the third noble truth, namely, nirvana, is what one realizes by practicing the noble eightfold path which is the fourth noble truth. They are not self-evident as the first two truths; nevertheless, it is understood that they follow logically from the first two truths. The crux of the teaching of the Buddha is continued in this fourfold analysis of human situation. Behind this analysis of human situation, there is an understanding of reality to the effect that there is no God in the universe who is responsible for the fate of human beings or who can determine their fate. And also it is understood that there is no soul, an unchanging essence which is the actual doer within the human being. Now these insights arise from the fact that all the phenomena in the world are causally conditioned, and therefore interrelated and inter-dependent. This insight is articulated in the teaching of the Buddha as ‘paṭiccasamuppāda’ or ‘conditioned co-arising’. The theory, so to say, behind the teaching of the four noble truths is this. It is important to note that the dependent nature of reality has been given, by the Buddha, as one of its universal natures. It is not a mere Buddhist view for, whether the Buddha arises or not, it exists. The Buddha discovers it and reveals it to the world. The specific Buddhist contribution to this universal theory is to show that the arising and the cessation of human suffering too takes place accordingly. Therefore, what is meant by ‘paṭiccasamuppāda’ in early Buddhist discourses is almost equivalent to the explanation of arising and cessation of suffering. But as a universal phenomenon it is applicable to all human and natural events including human suffering. In the discourses, paṭiccasamuppāda has always been described as ‘real, not-unreal and invariable’ (tatha, avitatha, anaññatha). It is because the conditionality is held to be the true nature of reality. It is

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significant to note that the four noble truths too have been described in the discourses with the same adjectives: the Buddha says thus: Monks, there are these four which are real not unreal, and invariable. ‘This is the origin of suffering’ is real, not unreal and invariable. ‘This is the origin of suffering’ is real ... ‘This is the cessation of suffering’ is real ... ‘This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’ is real, not unreal and invariable. These four are monks, real, not unreal and invariable. (S V, 430) This suggests that the Buddhist tradition treats these truths on a par with such a universal truth as paṭiccasamuppāda. Not only the four truths but also the nirvana to be realized through four stages called stream-entrant, once-returner, non-returner and arahant too has been claimed to be possible only within the Buddhist religious life. This matter has been emphatically stated by the Buddha in the following statement. The first śramaṇa (holy person) is only in here; the second śramaṇa is only in here, the third śramaṇa is only in here; the fourth Sramana is only in here; all the other teachings are empty of śramaṇas (suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe).(M I, 63-64) These instances show that the concept of truth in Buddhism is fundamental to its philosophy and practice. In the name of religious tolerance Buddhism does not want to renounce its concept of truth or to equate its ultimate goal and the path leading to it with those of any other religion. In other words, Buddhism firmly holds that the diagnosis of the human situation and the prognosis of it presented by the teaching of the four noble truths are universally true. Buddhism is not ready to compromise on this point. This does not, however, mean that Buddhism rejects all other religions in toto. For instance, although the Buddha was critical of the contemporary religions, he did not hide his appreciation of certain aspects of those religious traditions. He openly praised the ancient practices of Brahmana tradition while criticizing its soul theory and the belief in creator God and some of their rituals. He equally appreciated the religious practice of those Sramanas who accepted the efficacy of karma. For example, according to the Vinayapiṭaka (Basket of Discipline) it is clear that, in recognition of this religious affinity, the Buddha made an exception for such people by reducing to three months the usual probation period of two years, which was prescribed for the ordained members of the other religious groups who wished to enter the Sangha organization.

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Having a strong concept of truth does not preclude Buddhism from being tolerant of other religious traditions. Both in its theory and in the historical practice throughout its existence of more than twenty-five centuries Buddhism has clearly shown that it is one of the consistent advocates of religious tolerance. How does Buddhism do this? We need to understand the Buddhist rationale for religious tolerance. The rationale for religious tolerance, according to Buddhism, has to be found in the Buddhist concept of human being. Earlier we noted that Buddhism does not accept the creationist view of reality and the soul theory, two beliefs fundamental to many other religious traditions. This implies that Buddhism does not talk about universal brotherhood of people based on the idea of common father or the unity of human being as holders of soul. Buddhism holds that all human beings are born according to their own Karma, and therefore they alone are responsible for what they are. Humanity as a whole is one by being human. The Buddha, in the Vaseṭṭha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, shows that there are no characteristics that distinguish one group of human beings from another as they exist among birds, beasts and plants. In this manner, physically, all human beings belong in one group. Psychologically too human beings are one for they share a fundamentally one and the same set of characteristics. For instance, Buddhism reveals that all human beings like happiness and dislike unhappiness (sukha-kāmā dukkhapaṭikkūlā) (S IV, 172, 188; M I, 341). In the Dhammapada this insight on human nature is articulated in the following manner: Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa - Sabbe bhāyanti maccuno Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā- na haneyya na ghātaye (129) All fear punishment, all fear death. (Therefore) comparing with oneself one must not harm (others); nor must one kill (others). This psychological affinity of humanity provides us with the reason for being kind, generous and understanding towards fellow human beings. The fact that Buddhism rejects the exclusive authority of reason and persons (including God) leaves human being with the responsibility of making decisions in the field of religious life on one’s own conviction. In this regard, the Kālāma-sutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya provides us with an example which is unique in the history of religion. When the Buddha visited the Kalamas they report the following to the Buddha: Sir, certain recluses and brahmins come to Kesaputta. As to their own view, they proclaim and expound it full: but as to

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the view of others, they abuse it, revile it, depreciate and cripple it. Moreover, sir, other recluses and brahmins, on coming to Kesaputta, do likewise. When we listen to them, sir, we have doubt and wavering as to which of these worthies is speaking truth and which speaks falsehood. The Buddha’s response to the perplexed Kalamas is enlightening: Yes Kalamas, you may well doubt, you may well waver. In a doubtful matter wavering does arise. Now, look you, Kalamas. Be ye not misled by report or tradition or hearsay. Be not misled by proficiency in the collections, not by mere logic or inference, nor after considering reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor because it fits becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who holds it). (Woodward 1979, 171-2) In this well-known statement the Buddha refers to ten grounds which are not adequate for accepting an ethical claim. As scholars like KN Jayatilleke have shown, what is rejected by the Kālāma-sutta as inadequate criteria of determining what is wholesome and what is unwholesome is the authority of reasoning and the persons, religious or otherwise. Subsequently the Buddha outlines the ground on which to accept a claim: it is one’s own personal conviction. Now this is to assign a very serious responsibility to human beings. In addition to the responsibility placed on individual persons, what is exemplified in the Kālāma-sutta is the openness the Buddha had toward his own teaching. When the Buddha asked Kalamas not to accept any claim based on the personal authority of religious teacher, it was equally applicable to the Buddha himself. What this suggests is that although the Buddha believed that his teaching is the true doctrine he did not wish to impose it on others. He trusted the intellectual ability of mature human beings who are referred to in the discourses ‘viññū purisa’ (intelligent people) and he allowed the freedom for one to make one’s own decisions. There are many instances recorded in the discourses of the Buddha’s visiting the centres of other religionists and having religious philosophical discussions. These discussions were always cordial and guided by mutual respect, but not necessarily ending in agreement. The Buddha had several long discussions with the wandering religious ascetic called Vacchagotta, but it does not seem that Vacchagotta ever changed his own mode of religious life. What this, in other words, shows is that the Buddha accepted one’s right to hold different views. From the point

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of view of the Buddha this amounted to holding views which are wrong, but the Buddha believed that one had a right to hold one’s own view, right or wrong. As a religious teacher who devoted his entire life to guide people the Buddha was compelled to teach people what is wholesome; he addressed the rational sentiment of the people; but if the listener was not prepared to accept what he said, the Buddha did not resort to any kind of unwarranted means of persuasion. The best example that occurs in the Buddhist literature is the case of Upali, an adherent of Jainism who became a disciple of the Buddha. According to the Upāli-sutta (M I, 371-387), the householder Upali came to the Buddha in order to challenge him on behalf of Jaina leader, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and convert the Buddha into his views. However, at the end of the discussion, Upali was convinced of the teaching of the Buddha and offered to become his follower. At this juncture, the Buddha’s reaction was not what could be usually anticipated. He said: Householder, examine when you act; for such known people as you, it is good to examine when acting (Anuviccakāraṃ kho gahapati karohi; anuviccakāraṃ tumhādisānaṃ ñātamanussānaṃ sādhu/hoti: M I, 379). When Upali still persisted on becoming a disciple of the Buddha, the latter was humane enough to advise the former to continue with his material support to Jaina Order as he was doing. This shows that the Buddha was never motivated by narrow sectarianism or personal gain.

Tolerance in the history of Buddhism It is a well-known historical fact that religions have not been particularly kind to one another. A lot of blood has been shed in the name of religion. In this troubled history, Buddhism remains a religion for which no blood or the least amount of blood has been shed. This shows that the true character of tolerance has been practiced among the Buddhists. Whenever Buddhism found new homes it was not at the willful and malicious destruction of the indigenous religious beliefs and traditions. Wherever Buddhism went it modified the existent religion while itself getting modified. Wherever it became the more powerful religion Buddhism never tried to destroy the other religions. This historical fact has to be explained, ultimately, with reference to the solid rationale Buddhism provides for tolerance and non-dogmatism and non-violence which were a part and parcel of Buddhist religious practice. Historically, an excellent example of Buddhist kind of religious tolerance is provided by great emperor Asoka of India. In one of his rock edicts he outlines his philosophy on this matter:

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His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the kind is honouring all sects, both ascetics, and house-holders; by gifts and offerings of various kinds is he honouring them. But His Sacred Majesty does not value such gifts or honours as that how should there be the growth of the essential elements of all religious sects. The growth of this genuine matter is, however, of many kinds. But the root of it is restraint of speech, that is, that there should not be honour of one’s own sect and condemnation of others’ sects without any ground. Such slighting should be for specified grounds only. On the other hand, the sects of others should be honoured for this ground and that. Thus doing, one helps his own sect to grow, and benefits the sect of others too. Doing otherwise, one hurts his own sect and injures the sect of others. For whosoever honours his own sect and condemns the sect of others wholly from devotion to his own sect, i.e., the thought, “How I may glorify my own sect” - one acting thus injures more gravely his own sect on the contrary. Hence concord alone is commendable, in this sense that all should listen to the doctrines professed by others. (Mookerji 1972, 158-9) Asoka’s philosophy on inter-religious relationship may equally be valid in the modern world.

Conclusion Living in a world drawn physically close to each other by the phenomenal developments of technology, today we are in need of tolerance, particularly, religious tolerance, more than at any other time in history. It has become a matter of our very survival. In this very crucial aspect of our behaviour towards one another, Buddhism teaches us that we need to have a sound rationale. Having a firm and strong concept of truth is not a handicap for religious tolerance. If one has to give up one’s religiousness in the name of religious tolerance it is self-defeating. What is needed is to have people follow one’s own religious convictions without obstructing or denying the similar rights of the other people. The foundation of a sound sense of religious tolerance is the respect for human dignity and the recognition of the right of people to hold beliefs and engage in practices other than one’s own. This is precisely the essence of the message of the Buddha, and what the Buddha demonstrated from his own behaviour. The long history of Buddhism in many parts of the world bears testimony to this philosophy of religious tolerance. What we

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need today is an ability to accept the world full of diversity as it is and behave kindly and generously towards it. In its theory and practice what Buddhism teaches us is this.

04. Rationale for Tolerance - A Buddhist Critique and a Reconstruction*

Introduction Tolerance is widely accepted as a key virtue in our social behaviour. However, in spite of this broad agreement, inter-personal and social strife is quite commonplace in our daily experience. This may be indicative of the fact that the very concept of tolerance we are operating with is faulty or that the gap between the theory and the practice is still very wide. The purpose of the present paper, however, is not to explore this issue in a general manner, but to examine the nature and the rationale of one very important aspect of tolerance, namely religious tolerance. This aspect of tolerance has a particular significance for two reasons: on the one hand, sometimes, tolerance as a virtue is justified on religious grounds; on the other hand, religions themselves have been in the centre of intolerant behaviour or, in other words, religion itself has been a key cause of intolerance. The paper examines the rationale for religious tolerance and argues that the widely agreed upon rationale for religious tolerance needs revision. In addition to its specific relevance, the exercise will have implications for tolerance in general.

Tolerance in religion Tolerance in the field of religion is particularly a thorny issue for every religion is based on the basic assumption that all the other religions are wrong or false. This situation is not quite so with certain other forms of intolerance in society. For example, although an ethnic intolerance is an ubiquitous phenomenon in the world, with the kind of advanced scientific and socio-anthropological knowledge, today, one would hardly * Originally appeared in Dialogue, vol.XXIII, edited by Aloysius Peiris S.J. The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

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care to admit-certainly not publicly to possessing any characteristics of ethnic superiority. Therefore, ethnic intolerance has to find some other reasons for its justification in public. However, the case with religion is different: a religion usually starts as a reaction to the existing religion(s). If the new religion does not have anything new to offer there is no reason for its emergence. At least it has to be a better presentation of the old if not a total rejection of it. Therefore, one religion is always a negation of all other religions. The situation is made worse by the uncompromising character of the claims made by religions. The claims made by religions regarding the existence and the destiny of the human being are of such a crucial character that one cannot bargain with them. For example, a theistic religion will assert that there is one God and one God only in the universe and without believing in him salvation is impossible. Then, there aren’t too many choices. Either it is eternal salvation in paradise or eternal damnation in the fires of hell (This is precisely the point which motivated Pascal to make his well-known wager). This characteristic is quite unique to religion. Ethnic intolerance, for example, will not consign one to the fire of hell (although it could consign a victim to a man made one). Therefore both the reward and the punishment thereof are open to bargaining. It is clear that with regard to religion one cannot do this. One might wonder whether the current advancement of knowledge would not be of help to determine the truthfulness or not of one religion over the rest. In the case of ethnic intolerance, we know that there are no biological grounds for discrimination as shown by science. In the like manner, can science help determine a particular religion as the correct one? Here again a peculiarity popularly attributed to religion is that the essence of religion is wholly beyond conceptual thinking and rationalization. Two outstanding exponents of this characterization of religion are Rudolf Otto and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The former who wrote the celebrated work ‘Das Heilige’ translated into English as ‘ The Idea of Holy ‘ makes a strong case for the category of what he calls ‘non-rational’ as the key element of religion. According to Otto any effort to understand religion by means of conceptual analysis is bound to fail because the very essence of religion is not rational but emotional, and hence it cannot be encapsulated within concepts. Consequently, he suggests that a true understanding of religion has to be a non-conceptual feeling, a feeling of ‘mysterium tremendum’ (awe-inspiring mystery) of the Ultimate. Wittgenstein in his celebrated philosophical treatise Tractatus Logico Philosophicus which represents

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what is known as ‘early Wittgenstein’ distinguished between ‘what can be said’ and ‘what cannot be said’. Under the former category he included all the statements of natural sciences for he thought that what can be meaningfully talked about is only what comes within our sensory experience. All other things that are not within the limits of the senses were characterized by him as ‘non-sense’ (unsinning) and hence ‘mystical’. Now, religion falls in this second category. This theory amounts to saying that religion is outside the scope of scientific discourse. Logical Positivism, deriving its inspiration from early Wittgenstein, rejected all the ethical and religious statements as pseudo-statements. However for Wittgenstein this characterization did not mean such an outright rejection of ‘what cannot be said’ but only the belief that it belongs in a separate domain to which language is not applicable. Later however, he changed his position and developed his view by what has come to be known as the ‘language games’ theory, namely, that religious discourse, like many other discourses, is one way to ‘play’ with language or one way of using it. Nevertheless still there are many supporters of his early position according to which religion is beyond intellectual discourse. In this manner if religions made absolute claims which cannot be compromised and if the claims made by religions cannot be tested empirically there is not much choice for us other than simply accepting what is given. In such a situation, the following remains to be the crucial question: can a religion which believes that it alone is the way to salvation and all the others are false simply be tolerant of other religions which, in its view, lead the adherents of those false religions to hell-fires? The answer to this question, I believe, is very clear: No religion which has limited its soteriological options into ‘either-or’ situation can accept tolerance in the sense of agreeing with and accommodating other religions. There is another factor common to all religions that needs to be understood in the context of tolerance, namely, that no religion can remain self-cloistered. Religions have, as a key aspect of their very existence, the need to propagate and persuade the adherents of those religions which are believed to be false to accept what those propagators consider is the true religion. For example, in Christianity the ‘gospel’ or the good news becomes meaningful only when it is known by others, for news is really no news if it is not to be known by others. In Buddhism, this need to make known has been presented in the form of a mythical happening. According to the Ariyapariyesana-sutta (Discourse on Noble Quest) of the Majjhima-nikaya (26) the Buddha, when he pondered over the defilement-ridden nature of the world

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versus the ‘against the stream’ (paṭisotagāmῑ) nature of his philosophy, felt discouraged at revealing his enlightenment to the world. At the moment the great Brahma called Sahampati, reminiscent of Brahma, the creator, in Hinduism, noticed this and thought that it would be a disaster to the world if the Buddha were not to make his enlightenment known, and appeared before the Buddha and encouraged and invited him to teach what he had realized. The Buddha is then said to have acted accordingly. Another incident significant to note is that the Buddha was keen to send away the very first sixty arahants in sixty directions in order to ‘open the doors of deathlessness to those who were willing to listen (apārutā tesaṃ amatassa dvārā-ye sotavanto pamuñcantu saddham) (M I, 169). According to early Buddhist texts and traditions, this missionary activity was a great success. We must admit that those who opted to follow the Buddha had previously belonged to other religions. Thus the propagation of one’s teaching, if successful, entails the crossing-over of the disciples of the other religions to one’s own. In such a situation if one religion can still wish well of another we need to understand it properly.

Rationale for tolerance These theoretical and practical difficulties should show that tolerance in the field of religion is a special case requiring careful analysis. However, in spite of such difficulties, there has developed, particularly during the last half century, a general agreement to the effect that religions have to be tolerant to one another. The religious expression of this sentiment is described by the term ‘religious dialogue’. The call for inter-religious dialogue came in the sixties from the Catholic Church marking a clear departure from its traditional method of non-recognition of and open hostility at times, to other religions. Under the new scheme the churches of various traditionally non-Christian countries (viz. Asian, African and Latin American) made efforts to assimilate the language and the religious and cultural customs and practices of those countries. The result is a new Christianity in many local grabs. It is interesting to examine the rationale or the theoretical backdrop of this exercise. One can understand the need for powerful religions to revise their traditional methods of conversion in the light of more advanced liberal, humanist modes of thinking. Nevertheless what remains to be understood is the theoretical reasoning behind the policy. For sure, Christianity cannot initiate a dialogue while maintaining an exclusive claim to truth. If this is the case, the most probable stance would

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be to accept some form of relativism with regard to religious truth. It seems that inter-religious dialogue assumes that all religions are in some sense true. To that extent the exercise of religious dialogue is relativist and pluralist. However a deeper analysis would show that this relativism is apparent, and that what really lies underneath is still an affirmation of the transcendental character of Christian religion and attribution of the same to other religions. In this manner, religious dialogue in practice seems relativist, but in its core is absolutist. In other words, those who are engaged in religious dialogue seem to believe that all (at least, the major) religions of the world have a Transcendent as their ultimate goal and therefore they are different responses to that reality. Once this common transcendental ground is established the theoretical foundation for inter-religious dialogue is believed to have been satisfactorily laid. In this manner, the dialogue at its core is essentialist and absolutist and only superficially is relativist and pluralist. I will illustrate this by examining two recent academic expressions of this view. One is Raimundo Panikkar’s The Silence of God: The Answer of the Buddha (1989) and the other is John Hick’s well-known work: An Interpretation of Religion (1989). Panikkar’s work accepts without any question a thesis popular in the literature of inter-religious dialogue, namely, that the Buddha did not deny the existence of God. I will show shortly that this belief, although popularly entertained, is factually wrong. Having accepted it Panikkar further argues that the Buddha did not talk about God at all, and that he remained completely silent about God because he knew - even more than the very adherents of a soul and God theory - that God cannot be talked about. Panikkar says: He (the Buddha) simply refuses to let himself be drawn into dialectical discussion (which cannot but be of this world) of the genuinely transcendent. He is opposed to the notion that God can be manipulated in any way, even for the purpose of reaching God as a conclusion. (Panikkar 1989, 62) The Buddha’s silence with regard to the unanswered (avyakrta) questions mentioned in the discourses has been mistaken by Panikkar as an instance of the Buddha remaining silent about God. The problem with Panikkar’s claim is that, on the one hand, the question of God does not occur among the ten (according to the Pali tradition) or fourteen (according to the Mahayana tradition) questions that were set aside by the Buddha without giving categorical answers. On the other hand, the belief that the Buddha was silent about these questions itself is not

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correct for he has talked about them at length; therefore silence in this context has to be understood in figurative manner.1 Thus the argument is based on a false premise. According to his view, the Buddha, of all religious teachers, seems to be the most faithful to God for he alone was truly silent about the whole issue. The purpose of Panikkar’s thesis is to show that the position of Buddhism perceived as non-theistic is not actually so, but truly more theistic than any other religious system. The thesis of John Hick’s recent work An Interpretation of Religion, presented in an elaborate web of arguments, is that all religions are “varied human responses to a transcendental reality or realities-the gods, or God, or Brahman, or the Dharmakāya, or Tao, and so on” (p.1). He begins by accepting that there are two ways of understanding religious phenomena, namely, naturalistically by which he means all kinds of reductionist interpretations of religion, and religiously or from an insider’s view of religion. Based on the claim that all theistic and antitheistic arguments are inconclusive and can be interpreted differently, he further claims that neither of these interpretations is conclusively established or rejected, and therefore that both of them have to be accepted as rational. He says; ... It is rationally appropriate for those who experience their life in relation to the transcendent to trust their own experience ... It is likewise rationally proper for those who do not participate in any way in the wide field of religious experience to reject, pro tem, all belief in the transcendent. (p. 13) In holding this position Hick rejects the possibility of pure experience and accepts the view that ‘all conscious experiencing is experiencing-as’. Thus he claims that it is rational to experience reality from a religious perspective. Hick further says that the long history of religions in the world is not wholly based on an illusion but it “constitutes our variously transparent and opaque interface with a mysterious transcendent reality” (p.9). However, if religion is understood as varying responses to the transcendent there arises the problem of religious plurality. In order to resolve this difficulty Hick accepts a distinction which seems to be based on the Kantian distinction of ‘thing-in-itself’ (ding-un-sich) and appearance, namely, ‘Real in itself’ and ‘Real as humanly thought and experienced’. However, the Real un sich lies beyond human representations (pp. 2401  For a fuller discussion see Ch. vii of this author’s Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the Buddhist Theory of Reality and Language (Colombo: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, 1993).

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46). In order to explain the varying representations of the Real Hick adopts the distinction between what he calls ‘personae’ and ‘impersonae’ of the Real. What he means by ‘personae’ is the representations of the transcendental as personal God, namely, Yahweh, Krishna, and so on; ‘impersonae’ refers to impersonal characterizations of the Transcendental such as Brahman, Tathata, Nirvana and so on (see: chapters 15 & 16). Whether it is ‘personae’ or ‘impersonae’ ultimately everything is a human representation of the Real or a mode of experiencing of the Real by different human groups. In consonant with this line of thinking Hick draws the following conclusion about the ultimate Buddhist religious goal: “Nirvana is the Real experienced in an ineffable ego-lessness, unlimited and eternal...” (287). The two authors may be viewed as doing essentially the same thing. According to Panikkar, Buddhism assumes the concept of God but being extremely faithful to the transcendence of God the Buddha refrains even from referring to it. What it implies is that the ultimate religious experience is ineffable. Essentially the same conclusion has been drawn by Hick. He takes the Real un sich as a necessary presupposition of religious experience without which the multiplicity of religious experience cannot be explained. In the case of Hick, it seems that he cannot accept the multiplicity of religious experience. This inability seems to be a result of not being able to or willing to acknowledge the possibility of anything different from one’s own in the field of religion. What ultimately Hick’s project seems to be doing is to bring all religions to one common ground. Hick claims that he has been driven to this position by the pluralistic view of the modern age. However what he actually does is to directly undermine pluralism by his very act of searching for a transcendental ground of oneness. In this manner, it seems that the contemporary urge for dialogue, understanding, reconciliation and tolerance has as its back-drop the belief in a transcendental ground where all religions meet and become one. In this ideology, the differences are only appearances and not real; in the real reality all the religions are one. In other words, what is happening here is that the other is effaced and mould the way one wishes it to be, so that it loses its identity and provides a more comfortable object for tolerance. What has happened in the name of tolerance is nothing other than tolerance unto one’s own self. What I will argue in the remainder of this paper is that this ideological basis does not hold water and therefore any effort towards understanding or tolerance which is founded on such

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a basis is doomed to fail. However, as I would further show, the religious tolerance itself does not need to be doomed for it is possible to find a better rationale which assumes the pluralistic hypothesis in its true sense. The assumption that all religions have a phenomenon (in fact a noumenon) which transcends human experience as their ultimate point of reference is based on the theistic religious experience. Among the philosophers of religion there is a tradition of classifying religions into two broader categories, namely, theistic and monistic.2 They include such religions as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and some forms of Hinduism in theism and Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, Plotinian Idea of the One etc. in the monist category. The religious systems named above comfortably fit into this classification for they all believe in an ineffable transcendental as their ultimate goal.

Buddhism as non-transcendental Buddhism with its non-theism and the early form of Buddhism with its ethical ideal of nirvana in particular has been an uncomfortable point for these analysts. Earlier we saw Raimundo Panikkar’s effort to give a new twist to the non-theistic stance in Buddhism. However this effort directly contradicts the textual evidence preserved in the discourses and the historical perception of Buddhism by Buddhists themselves and by its opponents. In the Jatakas, there is clear reference to some of the classic objections to the belief in creator God. The account goes in the following manner; If God designs the life of the entire world- the glory and the misery, the good and the evil acts - man is but an instrument of his will and God (alone) is responsible (Jātaka 05, 238; Jayatilleke 1963, 411). If Brahma is lord of the whole world and creator of the multitude of beings, then why has he ordained misfortune in the world without making the whole world happy, or for what purpose has he made the world full of injustice, deceit, falsehood and conceit, or the lord of being is evil in that he ordained injustice when there could have been justice. (Jātaka 6, 208; Jayatilleke 1963: 411) One might still point out to the possibility of the Jatakas’ being somewhat later compilations and argue that the original discourses do 2  For instance, WT Stace: Mysticism and Philosophy Los Angeles, Jeremy P tarchedr, 1960/1976, J Wainright: Mysticism: A Study of Its Cognitive Value and Moral Implication, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981.

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not record any instance in which the Buddha denies the concept of God. This is contradicted by at least two references in the discourses. One is the Mahātitthāyatana-sutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (I.pp.1735) where the Buddha categorized three religious traditions from which he dissociated himself. The view that everything happens according to the will of creator (sabbaṃ issaranimmānahetu...) is one of them. The Pali term for creator God issara which is derives from Sanskrit Ishvara was used to refer to the creator during the time of the Buddha and was subsequently considered an aspect of Hindu trinity. The next reference occurs in the Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (82). According to this discourse, on being asked by the king of the region as to what made him renounce his comfortable household life in his prime youth Bhikkhu Raṭṭhapala answers that having seen four characteristics of the world (existence) that he did so. One among these characteristics is that ‘the world is without a protector and without an over-lord’ (attāno loko anabhissaro). In the face of such evidence as these one cannot say that the Buddha was silent about God or that he did not either deny or affirm the existence of God. The self-perception of the Buddhists themselves tallies well with this doctrinal position. Furthermore, the perception of the contemporaries of the Buddha has been consonant with this. They really did not seem to have trouble in recognizing the non-theistic character of Buddhism for they paired the Buddha with the materialists which represented the denial of the traditional religion (see for example M I, 140 and A IV, 182). The non-theistic stance of Buddhism is more conclusively supported by the internal evidence provided by the very structure of the religion. The fact that Buddhism is non-theistic makes it accept and operate within a set of assumptions and a world-view which are completely different from those of theistic religions. The shift from theism to non-theism cannot be understood as a shift from better to worse or worse to better within the same category. For instance, it is not similar to substituting one’s old comb with a new one. The shift from theism to non-theism may more appropriately be described as shifting from using a comb to making the comb unnecessary. The difference between the two world-views may better be described as a ‘paradigm shift’ borrowing a Kuhnian term. In a paradigm shift simply the old world-view no longer becomes valid and everything is seen in a new perspective. In Buddhist non-theism it is a shift from theism to non-theism; God to man; salvation to liberation; soul to no-soulness; and birth to no-birth. The very structure of the

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Buddhist path for liberation has as its fundamental assumption that ‘one is one’s own God’ (attā hi attano nātho) (Dh. 160). There is no God who can bring about salvation for human beings. Hence, Buddhism says that ‘purity and impurity’ depend on oneself; one cannot purify another (suddhi-asuddhi paccattaṃ-nāñño aññaṃ visodhaye) (Dh. 165). From this it should be clear that God has no function in man’s liberation. At the level of ethics, the Buddhist kamma theory which functions within the limits of causality does not require an agent to execute it. Therefore, the theistic sense of eschatology too loses its significance. Thus at no level of human existence has God a function to perform. The mancentred liberation in Buddhism in this manner has no-God-ness as one of its most fundamental assumptions. One could still argue that non-theism of Buddhism does no guarantee that Nirvana, the ultimate goal of Buddhist religion is not a transcendental state with the characteristics outlined by John Hick. I do not plan to go into details here for I have discussed this elsewhere in detail and showed that nirvana is not a transcendental and ineffable phenomenon.3 However, for the present purpose it is sufficient to show that the basic message of Buddhism, namely the four noble truths, can be understood purely on empirical terms. The four noble truths contain the most fundamental teaching of Buddhism. It contains the Buddhist analysis of the human predicament, the diagnosis and the prognosis. The noble truth of suffering characterizes human existence as full of suffering which in this context is understood in a deep philosophical sense (dukkha). The cause of this suffering which is the subject matter of the second truth is ‘thirst’ or craving for sensual pleasures, continual existence and self-annihilation (kāmataṇhā, bhavataṇhā, vibhavataṇhā). The third truth refers to the cessation of suffering by the eradication of craving (tassāyeva taṇhāya asesa virāga-nirodho ‘the complete cessation of that very same craving’). The fourth noble truth is the path that must be followed in order to realize this goal. It is the eightfold path comprising right view, right concept, right speech, right action, right profession, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. There is no metaphysical point or a metaphysical being involved at any point. This analysis should sufficiently demonstrate the fact that Buddhism does not subscribe in any way to the Transcendental in the traditional 3  See for a fuller discussion: Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the Buddhist Theory of Reality and Language. (Chapter XI), Colombo 1993.

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theistic or monistic sense. Therefore the Transcendental and ineffable ground which has been identified by a large group of scholars as the common factor of all religion is not applicable to Buddhism. In such a situation, what should be the basis for tolerance?

Rationale for religious tolerance One possibility would be to accept some kind of relativism and acknowledge the possibility of the existence of more than one truth. In fact very often the Buddhist attitude towards truth has been interpreted on these lines. The Buddhist non-dogmatic stance toward truth has been understood as not holding a clear conception truth.4 We will show that Buddhism holds a clear conception of truth in spite of its emphasis on non-attachment to truth. In the discourses the Buddha is seen as often pointing to the fact that the view that ‘this alone is true all the rest is empty’ (idaṃ eva saccaṃ moghaṃ aññaṃ: M I, 485) as leading to conflicts and turmoils. In analyzing conflicts the Buddha refers to the tenacious grasp of what one believes to be true as the main source. In the doctrine of the four noble truths, as we noticed above, Buddhism identifies tanhā or thirst for sensory objects as the cause of suffering. Among the senses Buddhism includes mind (mano). Concepts, views and ideologies etc. are taken as the objects of mind. Along with the rest of the objects of the senses, the attachment to them (dhammataṇhā) has been identified as a cause of suffering. The tenacious attachment to views and subsequent acts of defending one’s own and refuting those of others cause conflicts. Sometimes this position of Buddhism is understood as promoting some kind of relativism of truth. However, this cannot be interpreted in that manner since there are numerous textual instances in which a concept of truth has been clearly articulated. The fundamental philosophical foundation of Buddhism lies in its teaching of causality or dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda). The discourses are very clear about their claim that this teaching refers to phenomenon that is ever-present in nature. The Buddha says that dependent origination functions in nature and that it is an intrinsic character of nature irrespective of the appearance or non-appearance of the Buddhas to point it out. The dependently originating character of the nature has been described in the discourses as real (tatha), not unreal (avitatha) and not otherwise 4  For instance read: Richard P. Heyes: Dinnaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.

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(anaññathā ) (S II, 26).The fundamental teaching of Buddhism, the four noble truths are based on the central concept of suffering which is believed to be a perennial nature of (human) existence. It is revealing to see that the Buddha has referred to the four truths in the following very definitive terms: Monks, there are these four which are real, not unreal, and invariable (tathāni, avitathāni, anaññathāni). What four? Monks, ‘this is suffering’ is real, not unreal and invariable. ‘This is the origin of suffering’ is real..;. ‘This is the cessation of suffering’ is real... ‘This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’ is real’ not unreal and invariable. These four are monks, real, not unreal and invariable. (S V, 430; Kvu., 325) Given this nature of definitive identification of what is true one has to specify non-dogmatism and non-absolutism which are often taken as characteristic of the Buddhist conception of truth. If we are to understand by non-dogmatism and non-absolutism any lack of clear conception of truth or absence of definitive truths -truth not only in the sense of what is pragmatic, but, more importantly perhaps, in the sense of representing what there really is - I think we are utterly mistaken. Non-dogmatism and non-absolutism in Buddhism have to be understood not in an epistemological sense but in an ethical sense, namely, that Buddhism, while asserting that propositions correctly picture the reality, nevertheless, strongly believes that we must not tenaciously grasp them, an act which inevitably leads to turmoil and conflict. Relativism with regard to truth has never been a viable option for Buddhism. The Buddha was very definitive in asserting that the path to liberate oneself from suffering is available in his teaching alone. He articulates this position in the following words; The first samaṇa (holy person) is only in here; the second samaṇa is only in here; the third samaṇa is only in here. All the other teachings are empty of samaṇas. (Idheva paṭhamo samaṇo idha dutiyo samaṇo; idha tatiyo samaṇo; idha catuttho samaṇo suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe: M I, 63-4) However, this should not be understood as an indiscriminate rejection of all aspects of all religious systems. For example, the Buddha felt religiously akin to those other religionists who were advocates of ethical action (kammavāda) though he definitely rejected their view of soul (attavāda). In the recognition of this religious affinity the Buddha

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made an exception for such people by reducing their probation period which was usual for the ordained members of other religious groups when entering the sangha organization (Ref. Vinayapiṭaka). Although the Buddha criticized the contemporary Brahmanic religious practice he had a very high regard for the ancient Brahmins who led a simple religious life (Sn. 50-55). The Buddha cultivated friendship with other religionists obviously despite their ideological differences. Vacchgotta, a paribbājaka who frequently visited the Buddha, is a case in point. However no such factor was a reason for the Buddha to adopt some sort of relativism with regard to truth. The Buddha clearly says that ‘truth is one; there is no second’ (ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutiyaṃ atthi). (Sn. 884) When we examine the Buddha’s own practice as a religious teacher we see that he was very keen that the truth he realized must be shared with as many people as possible. He spent an itinerant life till his parinibbana going from one locality to another teaching people. He asked his disciples who had attained arahanthood to do the same. The Buddha defended his views against misrepresentations. The case of the disciple called Sāti who had the erroneous view that consciolusness runs through unchanged (viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ) ( as reported in the Mahātanhāsankhayasutta of the Majjhima-nikāya 38) is a clear case in point. In addition to defending his own views against misrepresentations, the Buddha was also very keen on distinguishing his views from other religious views that existed during his time. We earlier noticed how he rejected the theist view of religion. His criticisms of such Brahmanic religious practices as animal sacrifice, purification by water (udakena suddhi) are well-known. In his very first statement to the world (Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta) (S V, 420-4) the Buddha outlined two extreme forms of life-indulgence in sensual pleasures (kamasukhllikānuyaga) and self-torturing asceticism (attatkilamatānuyoga) which are connected to the two main ideologies of the day, namely, eternalist view (sassatavāda) and annihilationist view (uccedavāda). The materialist tradition represented by teachers like Ajita Kesakambala was annihilationist in the sense that they believed that soul is destroyed at death. All other systems of religion including Jainism and Brahmanism were eternalist for they believed in a soul which is unchanging and permanent. The Buddhist middle position represented by the doctrine of dependent origination arises from the rejection of these two extremes. In the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (1) the Buddha enumerates sixty two religious and philosophical views current during

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his time, and he distinguishes his teachings from those views. These views have been rejected on two grounds; firstly they have been rejected because they are false; secondly they have been rejected because people are entangled and caught up in the midst of such views so that they cannot disentangle themselves (Ref. to the Sutta). In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the same nikāya (2), the Buddha refers to six religious teachers who were his contemporaries, namely Purana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, Pakhudha Kaccana, Sanjaya Belatthiputta, Ajita Kesakambala and Nigantha Nathaputta. Their views are presented in the discourses and rejected but no specific critique has been made to justify the rejection. However, elsewhere the Buddha has singled out Makkhali Gosala for his fatalist standpoint which denies the efficacy of ethcal action, human action and human endeavour (natthi kammaṃ natthi kiriyaṃ natthi viriyaṃ) (A I, 286) and rejects it on the ground that the denial of the efficacy human action leads to the denial of ethical behaviour which goes counter to any form of religious behaviour. In the Mahātittāyatanasutta (referred to above) in addition to rejecting the theist view, the Buddha rejected the view that everything happens due to past kamma (sabbaṃ pubbekatahetu) and that everything happens due to no reason (ahetu appaccaya). All the three views have been rejected on the ground that acceptance of any of those views lead to the denial of the efficacy of ethical behaviours. The Buddha has defined his own position as ‘ a view of ethical action, a view of action and a view of endeavour’ (kammavādā kiriyavādā viriyavādā A I 287). In the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya 14) the Buddha comments on the futility of selftorturing asceticism practised by Jains based on the belief that doing so will lead to the cessation of suffering. As is clear from the foregoing, on the one hand, the Buddha is against the tenacious attachment to views and to true -false dichotomy. On the other hand, the Buddha makes it very clear that the four noble truths are perennial truths and that their timeless validity and applicability is established. Based on this evidence the conclusion to be drawn is that while upholding a clear conception of truth Buddhism is against the tenacious attachment to truth-an act which causes turmoil and conflicts. The delicate relationship between accepting, valuing and cherishing a truth and not being attached to it simultaneously has to be understood carefully. The best way to understand it is to examine the Buddha’s own behaviour in relation to other religions. The discourses bear ample evidence for the existence of a remarkable sense of religious tolerance during the time of the Buddha. This does not mean that

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different religionists did not argue, debate or disagree with each other, but what it means is that they did so while accepting and respecting the right to existence of those with whom they disagreed. There are numerous instances, recorded in the discourses, of the Buddha visiting the centres of other religionists and engaging in discussions. When we examine the records available in Buddhist literature and the literatures of the other religions, we can say that the movement of Buddhism was a formidable challenge to other religious organizations. A large number of people who belonged to these religions seem to have become Buddhists. The Buddha does not seem to have felt that this fact would jeopardise the spirit of religious tolerance. In other words, religious tolerance according to the Buddhist practice does not require one religion to revise its own views or accept those of another (though doing so is not in itself wrong). As a religion with a self-understanding that it has the right solution to the problem it aims at solving, Buddhism always has thought that it is its duty to convey the message to as many people as possible. However, on the other hand, as a philosophy which is centred around man, it accepts the basic human freedom and the right of each and every human being to make his own decisions, in particular, in such a crucial issue as choosing a religion to follow. Thinking that he had the right solution the Buddha spent his entire life trying to convince as many people as he could. Nevertheless, he never thought that it is his religious duty to force this view on others. This broad point of view comes into full life in the Buddha’s celebrated admonition to Kalamas who were vexed by the fact there were various religious teachers who visited them and said them that what they said alone was true and all the rest was false. The Buddha said to them: Kalamas, you may well doubt, you may well waver. In a doubtful matter wavering does arise. Now look you, Kalamas. Be ye not misled by report, or tradition or hearsay. Be not misled by proficiency in the collections, nor by mere logic or inference, nor after considering reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some theory, nor it fits becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who hold it). But Kalamas, when you know for yourselves these things are unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by the intelligent, these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sorrow, - then indeed do ye reject them (emphasis added). (Woodward 1979, 172-3)

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The understanding of truth and the conviction and urge to follow the Buddha’s path cannot be forced on anyone, but it has to come from the person himself. In the Buddhist phraseology, in order to accept and follow what the Buddha says one must have cultivated sufficient amount perfections (pāramitā) which means that one must be mature enough. (I hope this is true of any religion). Therefore even if force is used it would not serve the true purpose. Here we need to make a distinction between reaching out and making one’s views known and thinking it one’s religious duty to convert others by any means. What is abhorred in Buddhism and what the Buddha did not resort to is the latter. This recognition of and respect for basic human intellectual freedom and human dignity has been observed without any major damage throughout the history of Buddhism. What Emperor Asoka says in the 12th edict represents the true spirit of the Buddha’s attitude to other religions: His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King is honouring all sects, both ascetics, and house-holders; by gifts and offerings of various kinds is he honouring them. But His Sacred Majesty does not value such gifts or honours as that how should there be the growth of the essential elements of all religious sects. The growth of this genuine matter is however, of many kinds. But the root of it is restraint of speech, that is, that there should not be honour of one’s sect and condemnation of others’ sects without any ground. Such slighting should be for specified grounds only. On the other hand, the sects of others should be honoured for this ground and that. Thus doing, one helps his own sect to grow, and benefits the sect of others too. Doing otherwise, one hurts his own sect injures the sect of others. For whosoever honours his own sect and condemns the sects of others wholly from devotion to his own sect, i.e. the thought, “How I may glorify my own sect,”- one acting thus injures more gravely his own sect on the contrary. Hence concord alone is commendable, in this sense that all should listen to the doctrines professed by others 5 (emphasis added). The underlying principle behind this kind of religious tolerance is the recognition of the basic human dignity and respect for the right of every human to make his own decisions. 5  Translation taken from Asoka, Radha Kumud Mookerji, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi: 1972, pp.158-9 (Originally published in London 1923).

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The unsatisfactoriness of a practice of religious tolerance based on metaphysical ground which is by definition beyond one’s rational comprehension and linguistic expression is that due to its very same transcendental character it becomes unconvincing. As the foregoing should have demonstrated, the idea of transcendence is highly suspicious as a common denominator of all religions. Ultimately what seem to lie behind the project of searching for the Transcendental is nothing other than a search for an essence and an absolute which contradict the very pluralistic hypothesis which provides the basis for religious tolerance. What Buddhism teaches us is that religious tolerance is quite possible on simple and pure recognition of basic human dignity without positing a transcendental ground with which one effaces the other to suit one’s own requirements.

05. Buddhism and Inter-Religious Harmony*

Introduction The phenomenon of religious pluralism and the resultant need to be in harmony with those who do not make a part of one’s own group are problematic and challenging. The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of such problems and challenges faced, in particular, by the Buddhists living in Sri Lanka today and to highlight philosophical and historical insights that we can derive from the rich tradition of Buddhism that help foster and promote inter-religious harmony in a context of multiplicity of religion. Religious pluralism is very much a fact of our life today. In the context of Sri Lanka, we have been having four of the major religious traditions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam in this country for a long period of time. The former two having a history of more than two millennia and the last two having existed in Sri Lanka for the last five or six centuries. In the globalized context of the present-day world, as many other things, religions too have been drawn close to one another as it has never been before. This situation necessarily prompts us to think seriously of the problems of co-existence. Inter-religious harmony and co-existence has not been an easy affair for human beings. This may easily be explained through the Buddhist analysis of human nature as being guided predominantly by craving or taṇhā for money, power, prestige and the like. When each individual is motivated by this kind of wants, co-existence can be anything but smooth. * This article originally appeared in The Buddhist Way for a Better World, edited by Pradeep Nilanga Dela et el; published by Sri Dalada Maligawa, Sri Lanka

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In this context, religions are usually supposed to provide a solution and a way-out. History, however, shows that this has not been the case always. For the most part, religions have been culturing and sobering forces. But time and again we have witnessed in the history that, instead of being the solution, religions themselves have been the problem. Instead of being pacifying forces, religions have been the cause of conflicts. In this country, we have never had any religious conflicts amounting wars among adherents of religions. This is basically because Buddhism has been quite an accommodating religion. It is a well known fact that when Dutch were attacked by the Portuguese, it is Buddhists who protected them. Also, it is well known how Buddhist monks in the 19th century allowed Christian preachers to use the monastic Dharmasala as their preaching halls. It took some time for the monks to realize that this matter was much more complex. Historically, the much-discussed King Dutugamunu went to war with the Tamil king Elara not because he was a bad ruler (in fact we have the Mahāvaṃsa author, a Buddhist monk, asserting how righteous king Elara was.) but because under his rule Buddhist culture of the Country was being destroyed by his men. Buddhists not only here but also in many other traditionally Buddhist countries have been peaceful even to the extent of inviting self destruction. Discussing the Buddhist record in the world the historian Toynbee says thus: The three Judaic religions have a record of intolerance, hatred, malice, uncharitableness and persecution that is black by comparison with Buddhism’s record.1 This does not mean, as Noel Seth has pointed out2, that Buddhists have not had their own share of aggression. But what he did not notice was that Buddhists have been in conflict only with Buddhists themselves and not with other religionists. In more recent times, the Buddhists and Hindus and Muslims as well in this country have been subjected to aggressive type of conversion by some fundamentalist groups coming from abroad. This behaviour on their part is justified on the basis of freedom to follow a religion of one’s choice and freedom of expression. This has been happening not only in this country but also all over the so-called third world where majority of the people suffer from poverty. We need to see how these phenomena affect inter-religious harmony and co-existence. 1  As quoted by Noel Sheth in “ Buddhism and Communalism” in Religion and Society. vol. 1. XXXV no.4 December, 1988. p. 44. 2 Ibid

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Religious truth claims It is common among religions to claim that each one of them alone has the truth about the world and the human existence. A claim of this sort in any religion is, on the one hand, an assertion of its own position and, on the other, a criticism and a rejection of the religions that preceded it. The history of religions makes it clear that always a newly arising religion is a rejection of the other religion. For instance, in India, Buddhism arose as a way to freedom from suffering because Prince Siddhartha was not satisfied with the existing religions of the day, particularly Brahmanism and many other forms of Śrāmaṇism such as Jainsm, Ajīvikism and the like. In the like manner, Christianity came into being owing to Jesus’ dissatisfaction of Judaism. Islam came as a rejection of both Judaism and Christianity. If any of the religious leaders were satisfied with what they already had, the new religions would not have arisen. Every religion, in this manner, contains truth claims which exclude the rest. Truth claims advanced by religions usually come as very strong assertions. This is particularly so when these truths are believed to originate from sources believed to be absolutely infallible. For example, in the Judeo-Christian tradition God, the source of truth or who is believed to have revealed the truth, is characterized as omniscient, omnipotent and absolutely good and benevolent. By very definition, this God is infallible, anything that is said by such God cannot be wrong, untrue or bad. Human beings by definition are limited and imperfect, whereas God is unlimited and perfect. This makes human beings totally incapable of not merely challenging but even understanding God. The end result is unconditional surrender of one’s own self, and acceptance as final what is religiously given. In such a situation, one’s acceptance of these truths has to be understood not as an epistemological but as an emotional act. Once one accepts the possibility of such a transcendental source, it automatically follows that one accepts what is claimed to have said by him. The acceptance is an act of faith and faith alone. Faith is basically an emotion. No amount of rational arguments would dissuade one from believing in such truths.

Absolutism and relativism in religion Any form of absolutism is a breeding ground for conflict. It is particularly so when it comes to absolute truths in religion. Religion is such a serious one that one puts one’s entire existence at its disposal. Very often, it is a

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choice between an eternal hell and an everlasting paradise. One’s love for oneself is the most strong and crucial. The emotional element in it is the single most important aspect. This explains why very often people are ready to sacrifice even their life for this phenomenon. In the modern world, there are many factors such as the spread of scientific knowledge in such areas as anthropology, history and sociology, physical proximity due to modern technological advances and flow of information due to advances in information technology and the like that have forced people to rethink their old ideologies and belief systems. The religious response to this challenge posed by modernism is to embrace a form of relativism towards religious truth claims. Under this new way of thinking, it is held that all religions are true; the apparent differences in these religions to be explained with reference to regional and cultural differences. An ancient Indian saying goes: “ekaṃ hi sat – viprā bahudhā vadanti: the truth is one; sages describe it in many ways”. According to that view, the difference is only a matter of language. Perhaps Indians may have been led to concede this due to multiplicity of religious beliefs which has been an essential aspect of their existence for thousands of years. The resultant relativism looks certainly better than absolutism. It is democratic, socialist and it tends to accommodate more. It, however, poses a serious epistemological problem: how can there be more than one valid truth relevant to a given situation? In fact, if we examine closely the contemporary religious response to the challenge of co-existence we can see that the apparent relativism is not really the final stage of the process; it is only provisional. The position is, in fact, a reaffirmation of one dominant from of religion by incorporating all the existing forms of religion within it. Let me give an example for this from academic circle. In his much acclaimed work, An Interpretation of Religion (Yale University Press, New Heaven, 1989) a leading philosopher of religion, John Hick says that the ultimate goals of all religions can be classified into two, namely, personal representations and impersonal representations of the Transcendental. Such religious ultimates as Ishvara, Yahweh, Allah and the like are examples for the first category. Atman/Brahman, Nirvana, Tathatā and the like are impersonal representations. All these phenomena are ultimately representations of one and only transcendental entity which he calls ‘the Real’. Now this Real is what stands above all these religious goals. What this theory amounts to is that all the religions are ultimately one and the same for the reason that all of them refer to the

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same transcendental entity. According to this theory, all religions are true not because all religions as they stand are true (relativist position) but because all of them ultimately have the same final point. This is not really a form of relativism; it is a form of absolutism in a democratic garb. The two positions outlined so far, relativism and the new form of absolutism, both seem to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable for different reasons. The rejection of relativism could sound like also a rejection of the goals which those who accepted the relativist position wished to achieve, namely inter-religious co-existence and harmony. Therefore, the rejection of relativism needs to be supported carefully. Relativism in religion may not be acceptable by anyone who is serious about religion as a way of life leading to a fixed destination. In holding that religions can be different from one another we do not need to undermine the vast amount of common factors seen among religions. Religions do have a lot in common. Nevertheless, there seem to be certain differences which are quite fundamental and basic. The difference between two theistic religious traditions may be of such minor issues as the appropriateness of the names used to call God, the correctness of the epithets used to describe God and the like. But if we contrast a theistic religion with a non-theistic religion such as Buddhism the differences are no nominal. They involve the very fundamental beliefs of the two religions: whereas one is based on the assumption of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and all-good God who created the universe the other begins by rejecting such a possibility. This fundamental difference accounts for the other equally fundamental differences between the path and the goal accepted by each tradition. If the situation is such, relativism cannot be the right position to adopt. There cannot be a doubt about the necessity and the validity of religious harmony; but it needs to be situated on a sustainable basis. The new form of religious absolutism is a kind of ‘colonialism’ in religion. The underlying assumption of this project is the belief that, in order to be acceptable and lovable ‘the others’ need to be in conformity with ‘one’s own’ categories. So there is a necessity of reshaping and reinterpreting ‘the other’ so that it suits ‘our own’ requirements. The real solution, therefore, cannot be either relativism or absolutism however sophisticatedly or mildly. The real solution has to be plural-ism based on mutual respect. In a pluralistic religious dimension, one accepts the multiplicity of religions as a fact and acts accordingly.

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Epistemological and ethical challenge A real epistemological challenge for this position is to show that a religion can uphold its claim for truth and still practice harmony with other religions, a position usually dismissed as untenable. In other words, can religions still hold on to what they consider to be true and come up with a philosophy enabling one to live while letting others also to live? The history of religions is full of incidents of destroying the others for the propagation one’s own. This is no wonder in a situation where one accepts some belief to be true not for rational reasons but for one’s emotional attachment to it. We cannot say that things have changed drastically. Today we do not hear religious wars being fought in order to propagate one religion over the rest. Nevertheless, there are several ongoing conflicts in the world caused solely by historical religious reasons. Apart from this, there are still many efforts being made by groups of people to convert others into their own by unacceptable means. It is true that people are not being killed for this purpose today. But they are forced to accept one religion over another by improper means. Religious fundamentalism is very much a part of today’s globalized society. Religious fundamentalists are trying their level best to see that all the other religions are replaced by their own. Established forms of religion too are not without their secret agendas for conversion. Religions seem to have a kind of ‘cold-war’ going among them still. Mutual distrust and the desire to see that the other is eliminated are the key characteristics of this way of behaviour. It is ironical to see that most of the aggressive forms of religious conversions are taking place today under the guise of exercising one’s freedom of thought, freedom of choice and freedom of expression and other similar human rights and liberties. The kinds of freedom spoken here are not those of who are being converted but of those who are engaged in conversion. Majority of the people who become the victims, not only in this country but also in many other parts of the world, are those who are deprived of economic well-being and are hence powerless to resist any pressure. Ultimately the question here is: whose freedom of choice and expression do really matter here? The freedom of the converter is being used to undermine the same of the converted. Buddhism as an ethical path of freedom from suffering has never resorted to anything other than rational persuasion for proselytizing. It is one religion in history that has never resorted to power of weapons or money to propagate itself. Its very naturalist and humanist foundation

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makes it very unlikely that it is a breeding ground for fundamentalism. We in Sri Lanka today are the victims of many forms of fundamentalism. Even in rural Buddhist heartlands of this country people are not left to be in their peacefulness. The situation is not confined to this country alone. Recent incidents in Afghanistan by Taliban clearly show that the historical tradition of physical destruction of Buddhism is not a thing of the past. It is only a fact that Buddhism is the one that has suffered most in the hands of the other religious organizations. I say this neither to arouse self-pity nor to generate hatred towards others. The purpose is to show that we need to have a correct attitude toward these happenings and toward those who are responsible for such happenings. The answer for us is not a form of Buddhist fundamentalism in order to retaliate. The Buddhist track record has remained intact so far and it needs to remain in that manner for the future too. The answer for the suffering the Buddhists are undergoing today is to get organized against such actions and be strong to defend themselves without doing harm to the basic principles by which they are to abide. Adherence to the basic principles and the values of Buddhism is of paramount importance here. The ultimate protection of Buddhism has to come from that. We know that religious fundamentalists are destroying the Buddhist heritage in places like Afghanistan and South Korea. But in our own country the Buddhist cultural heritage has been systematically destroyed by those who have become slaves to thirst for wealth (taṇhā-dāsa). The end result is no different. In a way, what is happening in our own country is much worse because when an ethical path leaves its proper resting place, namely, the human behaviour, it is gone for good. Buddhism has to be equally protected from our internal evil forces, in particular from the forces of materialist outlook which are sweeping across the Buddhist life of both the householders and the monks alike. Globalization has been a mixed baggage: it has brought economically and culturally both good and bad, in particular, to countries like ours. Religiously, globalization has made possible for Buddhism to spread practically all over the world both via open space and cyber space. In one respect, in addition, globalization may prove to be of salutary effect. With the vast advances of information technology and transport the world today is much closer to one another than it was a hundred years back. What this means for religions is that they cannot ignore the existence of the others any longer; nor can they expect their public behaviour to be not known by others. In such a situation all religions have to be

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sensitive to the other religions. This situation forces religions to have a well articulated position and attitude to the rest of the religions. Furthermore, we live in a world where a secular morality, by way of UN charter for human rights and the like, is being accepted as a universal standard. It remains an open question whether the principles adopted in such charters are acceptable by all. In particular, it has been made clear that these universal documents take for granted a lot from JudeoChristian tradition. The centrality of the very concept of human rights has been questioned from the point of view of Buddhism. Despite all the limitations what is significant is the common belief that there must be a set of rules for decent behaviour, acceptable by all human beings in their capacity as human beings. In the form of the five precepts Buddhism provides such a code of conduct from its very inception. With globalization it has become imperative for religions that either they abide by these universal conditions or they come up with a broader set of principles. This, in general, means that any particular religious organization cannot overlook the implications of globalization. In accommodating other religions not acceptable by one’s own standards of truth, a religion has to accept religious pluralism. Indian religion in general and Buddhism in particular provide examples for this form of broadmindedness. The Buddha has made it very clear the path shown by him is the only path for the attainment of Nirvana which will put an end to suffering. Buddhism also makes it clear that theism or any form of determinism or substantialism (atta-vāda) cannot lead one to this goal. The Buddha talked only of suffering and its cessation. He claimed that his teaching is right and truthful as far as achievement of this goal is concerned. This implies that any religion could have truthful and acceptable features concerning other aspects of human life. Therefore, in Buddhism there is no total denial of any religious system; nor is there any exclusive claim for truthfulness. This shows that Buddhism treads a path between absolute truth claims and unconditional relativism. This enabled Buddhism to accept the existence of the other religions. But this (namely, that there can be something good and some truth in any religion) has not been given as a reason for Buddhism’s acceptance of the existence of other religions. The Buddhist standpoint derives solely from the belief that human beings have freedom to hold any view. Buddha has always thought that it is his duty to tell the people what he thought was good and to try to convince those who held wrong views (in the Buddha’s opinion) of the wrongness of their views. For this purpose,

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he held discussions with them, argued and debated with them. While it seems that he was often successful, there were instances he was not. But he kept on engaging in discussions with them. The ground rule was that one has a right to hold one’s views. A religious person has a duty to tell others what he thinks to be true, right and good. In the context of Sri Lanka today we Buddhist have to know that this is a fundamental right of those who opt to do it. Hinduism has existed in this country for well over two millennia. Christianity and Islam have been in this country for the last five or six centuries or in the case of Islam, possibly even more. They have a right to follow their religion and to educate others on it. While the Buddhists do accept this, other religions themselves have to accept the position of Buddhism in the same manner. In this type of mutual acceptance the best and most wholesome way to exist is to be open and sincere towards other religions without any hidden agenda. In a world where we are moving so closely with each other, there is a need for an ethic for religions themselves. It has to be agreed upon by all religionists. Buddhism has been most tolerant about religions and most decent in ways of proselytizing. Therefore it is fitting that Buddhism should get the same treatment from others. It is a shame in this so called cultured and civilized age the Buddhists in this country have to fight for their freedom to follow without being harassed or coerced. I think there are a lot of challenges lying before all of us who identify ourselves with religion in one way or another. Among them a very serious one will be to evolve a set of ethics by which religions themselves behave toward one another. Buddhists will have to come up with such a code of ethics in accordance with the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. In a world ridden with problems and miseries, there is no need for religions to contribute to the increase of it. Religious fundamentalism has caused a lot of suffering for humanity. It is causing suffering for the Buddhists in Sri Lanka today. We need to find solutions to these problems not by adhering to any fresh form of fundamentalism but by being vigilant and ethically strong. In the well-known statement: “sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā” (Sn 25-6) - Buddhism has a noble tradition of wishing well for all beings. All beings, we know, include all beings without any discrimination: all those who follow other religions and those who do not follow any religion at all. This perennial Buddhist wish may well be adopted by all religions as the foundation of their code of behaviour toward one another.

06. Buddhist-Christian Dual Belonging: Is it Possible?*

Introduction In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Buddhist religious goal, namely, nirvana, with a view to examine the im/possibility of Buddhist Christian dual belonging. The discussion is not a comparative study between the Buddhist concept of nirvana and the Christian concept of heavenly kingdom. Rather the approach will be to present, following the Pali Canonical discourses, which are considered to be the oldest available sources for the teaching of the Buddha, a picture of nirvana as the ultimate goal taught in Buddhism, and then, in the concluding section, to investigate in its light the possibility or otherwise of dual belonging between the two religious traditions.

Nirvana, the goal of the Buddhist path The basic meaning of the Pali term nibbāna (nirvāṇa: Sanskrit) derives from the metaphor of blowing off the light of a lamp (nir+va to blow). In this sense, nirvana refers to the extinguishment of fire. It is said that people are burning with the fires of attachment, aversion and delusion (S III, 71), and the extinguishment of these fires is called nirvana. Another sense derives from analyzing ‘nibbāna’ as nir+vṛ (to cover), extinguishing fire by covering or depriving mind of fuel, by not feeding it any further. What is noteworthy in this analysis is that they have direct reference to some obviously negative characteristics of mind, and that nirvana is defined in terms of their termination. In line with this way of understanding, nirvana is usually described as ‘the extinction of attachment, aversion and * A version of this paper appeared in the Buddhist Christian Dual Belonging: Affirmations, Objections, Explorations, ed. Garvin D’Costa and Ross Thompson, Ashgate, Surrey, 2016.

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delusion’ (rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo nibbānaṃ: S IV, 251). Two of the more important terms used in the discourses to refer to the ultimate goal of Buddhist religious life are purification (visuddhi) and liberation (vimutti). These concepts are significant for they refer to two very vital aspects of the ultimate goal, namely, its purified and free nature. The idea of purification presupposes impurities, or, in a more familiar Buddhist term, defilements (kilesa). Likewise, the concept of liberation implies bonded nature of human mind which is described in terms of being obsessed by influxes (āsava). These two concepts capture two very important aspects of the state of mind of one who is yet to realize the ultimate goal. Of the defilements that pollute human mind, attachment, aversion and delusion, mentioned above, are fundamental. Even among them, what is singled out in the four noble truth teaching as the source of discontent is attachment, characterized as ‘thirst’ (taṇhā), signifying ceaseless thirst people have for sensual gratification, continued existence and destructive sentiments. The reason for this emphasis on desire over the other two is the sheer influence that it exercises on people’s life. Both attachment and aversion are ultimately rooted on deluded nature of mind which is not the ignorance in the sense of not knowing enough facts but the lack of knowledge/understanding in the four noble truths. Defilements spoken here operate in mind at different levels. For instance, although attachment, aversion and delusion constitute the fundamental forms of defilements, what are called ‘five hindrances’ (pañca nīvaraṇa), namely, desire for pleasure, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt function at a more basic level of hindering the progress in the path. They are brought under control at higher states of concentration although those will be totally eradicated only at the level of full attainment. The practice meant to bring these hindrances under control is described in the following words; Abandoning covetousness for the world, he abides with a mind free from covetousness; he purifies his mind from covetousness. Abandoning ill-will and hatred, he abides with a mind free from illwill, compassionate for the welfare of all living beings; he purifies his mind from ill-will and hatred. Abandoning sloth and torpor, he abides free from sloth and torpor, percipient of light, mindful and fully aware; he purifies his mind from sloth and torpor. Abandoning restlessness and remorse, he abides unagitated with

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a mind inwardly peaceful; he purifies his mind from restlessness and remorse. Abandoning doubt, he abides having gone beyond doubt, unperplexed about wholesome states; he purifies his mind from doubt. (Ñaṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 274-75) This purificatory process continues through gradually ascending states of serenity and states in the path until it reaches total purification at the state of arahanthood. The freedom metaphor has its reference in influxes/taints (āsava) which flow into mind and get established in it and enslave it. They are the influxes of sense desire, becoming, and ignorance (views added at some places making them four). While these are the ultimate forms of influxes, there are influxes active in many different levels. In the wellknown ‘discourse on all the taints’ (Ñanamoli and Bodhi 1955, 91-96) the Buddha classifies taints into following types: taints that should be abandoned by seeing, by restraining, by using, by enduring, by avoiding, by removing and by developing. Once this process is complete, one’s all the taints including the four fundamental ones mentioned above are gone and one achieves total freedom from taints. The concept of freedom (from) is better highlighted by such terms as fetter (saṃyojana), bondage (bandhana), and flood (ogha) which capture the enslaving character of taints. Fetters are enumerated as ten and culminate in ignorance (avijjā). These fetters are removed gradually by the practice of the path, and are totally eradicated at the fourth and the highest stage of the path, arahanthood. It is interesting to note that the path to achieve the final goal is always characterized as the arising of knowledge or eradication of ignorance/ delusion. In the defilement analysis, delusion and in the influx analysis, ignorance, which have direct reference to knowledge were given as the focal points. Accordingly, the culmination of the path is given as a dawn of knowledge. In the ‘Discourse on the Turning of the Wheel of the Dhamma’ (S V, 420-24), considered to be the first sermon of the Buddha, he uses the following expressions, “eye is born; knowledge is born; wisdom is born; ‘science’ is born, and light is born’, all denoting knowledge. The non-mystical, clear character of this knowledge is described in the following passage: Just as if in the midst of the mountain there were a pond, clear as a polished mirror, where a man with good eyesight standing on the bank could see oyster-shells, gravel-banks,

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and shoals of fish, on the move or stationary... Just so, with mind concentrated, purified and cleansed, unblemished, free from impurities, malleable, workable, established, and having gained imperturbability, he applies and directs his mind to the knowledge of destruction of the taints. He knows as it really is: these are the taints; this is the origin of taints, this is the cessation of taints, and this is the path leading to the cessation of taints. Through this knowing and seeing his mind is freed from the taints of sense desire, from the taint of becoming, from the taint of ignorance, and knowledge arises in him: this is freedom. (Walshe 2012, 107-108) Nirvana, the ultimate goal of Buddhist religious life, is the result of the purification of mind from defilements and freedom of it from influxes. Nirvana is described as the highest happiness which an arahant experiences as a result of his inner purity and freedom. As the monks and nuns who accomplished this state of mind testify, their experience is being cool, [fires] extinguished and peaceful. Even though it would be good to conclude the discussion on nirvana at this point, it is not possible to do so for there is a lively debate among Buddhists themselves on as to what nirvana is. The discussion will not be complete without even a cursory look at this age-old debate. In spite of the testimonies of the monks and nuns who are arahants and the statements of the Buddha giving a ‘naturalist’ picture of nirvana as a state of mind and an experience, there are other statements opening possibilities for interpreting nirvana as an objective reality with its own being. The much discussed in the Udāna (Ud 80) affirms that there is ‘unborn, unbecome, unmade and unconstructed’ in the absence of which there will not be release from born, become, made and constructed. Although nirvana is not specifically mentioned in the analysis it is understood that what is being referred to is nirvana. In agreement with this way of thinking, nirvana is named ‘unconstructed element’ (asaṅkhata dhātu). Furthermore, one discourse classifies nirvana into two as the element of nirvana with the Five Aggregates remaining and the other without Five Aggregates remaining (It 38). Here too nirvana is referred to as an element (dhātu), indicating some kind of objective reality. Marking the conclusion of this way of interpreting nirvana, Buddhaghosa, the leading commentator on the Pali Canon, says that nirvana is not non-existent as a rabbit-horn and clearly affirms that nirvana exists as a supra-mundane reality. (Vsm 507)

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I do not intend, in this context, to go into details of this debate which I have treated in detail somewhere else (Tilakaratne 1993, 55-85). What is clear is that a naturalist as well as a metaphysical interpretation is possible for these debated texts. What seems to be the right position is to apply the criteria of consistency and coherence to the texts and draw a conclusion accordingly. Nirvana as the experience of total purification and freedom of mind is the result of applying the criteria of consistency and coherence to the texts of the Pali Canon.

Buddhist-Christian dual belonging With this picture of nirvana as our point of reference we may move on to examine how far, to what extent, Buddhists and Christians can adopt each other’s standpoints and ways of life. This cannot be done, however, without having an idea of its Christian counterpart, or ‘homologue’, to borrow from Fr. Aloysius Peiris (Peiris 2004, 107-121), Kingdom. But it is preposterous for me, not being an expert in Christianity, to try to say what the ultimate goal of Christian religious life is. The best I can do is, as ordinary Christians do, to accept the traditional understanding of the goal as Heaven or Kingdom where one is born to enjoy eternal life in association with God who is the creator and redeemer. This happens as a result of salvation which is “a free gift flowing from a complete self-surrender to God” (Geffre 2002, 95). The entire discourse on dual belonging arises because some are not satisfied with this plain and simple picture of God and the goal. Theologians insist that one must not take Kingdom in its literal spatial sense. Then what are the non-literal and figurative modes of understanding of such crucial concepts as Kingdom and God? To answer this question means getting into endless theological debates, ancient, modern and contemporary. Plainly I do not have competence to do so. What I would rather do is to take a representative case of dual belonging and show how it is beset with some serious difficulties. I will develop, accordingly, the remainder of my paper as a response to Paul F. Knitter, a defender of Buddhist Christian dual belonging. In Without Buddha I Could not be a Christian (2009; paperback 2013), Knitter argues and defends his case, honestly, candidly and passionately. In order to justify his position of dual belonging, Knitter develops a critique of traditional Christian understanding of such key concepts as God, Jesus, salvation and heaven. This critique is based on Buddhism, or to be more precise, what Knitter constructs as Buddhism. There are two questions to be raised on Knitter’s exercise, namely, whether or not his

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interpretation of Christianity by means of Buddhist concepts is tenable, which I leave for the Christian scholars to examine, and whether or not his representation of Buddhism is tenable, which I plan to address. Before addressing these issues, I wish to examine what Knitter considers to be Buddhism. It is well known that there are three historical Buddhist traditions current in the world. The oldest extant Buddhist tradition is Theravada which is traditionally found in the South and Southeast Asia. In historical time line, Mahayana, which is traditionally found in the East Asia, comes next. Vajrayana, the last in the line, is traditionally found in Tibet and surrounding regions. Although these traditions are not opposed to one another, are more on the positive side, and share the fundamental world view of the historical Buddha, they have substantial doctrinal differences in addition to their cultural differences. Knitter moves through these traditions freely, and constructs a Buddhism drawing from all three traditions. He takes emptiness from Nagarjuna, inter being from Thich Nhat Hanh, a contemporary Mahayana teacher, identity of samsara and nirvana from the later Mahayana, and religious practices from his Tibetan teachers. Knitter does not seem to notice a problem with this approach for he compares the distinction between Theravada and Mahayana to that of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism respectively, and sees only “smells and bells” as distinguishing characteristic of Vajrayana (pp.107-108). If we understand Knitter as reconstructing his own version of Buddhism drawing from various Buddhist traditions, I do not think anyone can oppose it so long as his reconstruction is internally consistent. But since Knitter says that it is what the Buddha said, there is a methodological issue in taking teachings, which are hotly debated, from traditions belonging to different time periods, and presenting them as belonging to the Buddha. In order to demonstrate this methodological difficulty let me discuss a few issues Knitter refers to. (1) The alleged identity between samsara and nirvana can be traced to Nagarjuna who, in Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, makes the following statement which can be considered as the source of this later claim: na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt-kiṃcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ; na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ: Following DJ Kalupahana, I translate this in the following manner: samsara does not have anything that distinguishes it from nirvana; nirvana does not have anything that distinguishes it from samsara. Taking into consideration the occurrence of ‘anything’

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(kiṃcid) and also the context of the discussion, this statement can be interpreted as affirming the absence of any ‘own-nature’ (sva-bhāva) in samsara or in nirvana. This can be understood as a hyperbolic way of saying - which Nagarjuna seems to enjoythat both samsara and nirvana are the same, from the perspective of absence of any own-nature whatsoever. To interpret this statement as affirming the identity of nirvana and samsara in an absolute sense is to misconstrue the direct meaning of this statement. If not meant as a huyperbolic device, the equation between samsara and nirvana is unimaginable for one who thinks in line with the philosophy in the Pali discourses. (2) Once the equation between samsara and nirvana is taken as established, the next step is to affirm non-duality between the two (Knitter 2013, 221). Although some Mahayanists seem to have accepted a concept of non-duality as a characteristic of the ultimate reality it is not only hard to find in Pali discourses but also it is not a characteristic of nirvana as we described in the first part of this discussion. Non-duality of Atman and Brahman is the defining characteristic of Vedanta view of liberation. In this Vedanta non-duality ultimately Brahman/Atman (subject) retained as the ultimate reality while object disappears. In the Buddhist analysis neither samsara nor nirvana remains for both are ultimately empty in the sense of not having self-nature. Nor does emptiness exist over and above all empty things. For Nagarjuna emptiness (śūnyatā) is not a super concept which remains when all other concepts are gone. It is only an aspect of the religious practice or an act of relinquishing all concepts/views (Śūnyatā sarva dṛṣṭīnaṃ proktā niśsaraṇam jinaih - yesāmtu sūnyatā dṛṣṭih taṃ asdhyan babhāsire (Kalupahana 1991, 223). Both early discourses and Nagarjuna seem to uphold this position. (3) Bodhisattva is another concept posing difficulties when used across traditions. In the Pali discourses ‘bodhisattva’ has been used to refer to the Buddha before his enlightenment. It is in the Mahayana tradition that bodhisattvahood became a distinct mode of following the path. In this new sense, bodhisattva is one who gives up his own nirvana in favour of the liberation of others. It is believed that such a bodhisattva will not attain nirvana until the last sentient being attains it. Considering the endlessness of samsara, this ‘last sentient being’ will never be

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there. This implies that the Bodhisattva himself will never attain nirvana for he will have to be there for ever. From a Theravada point of view, this appears to be a compromise between samsara and nirvana providing a moral justification for the desire for continued existence (bhava-taṇhā). Furthermore, obviously the bodhisattva path cannot have been meant for all for then there is the bizarre situation that there will not be anyone to be saved. If this is true, then it means that there are those who attain liberation without being bodhisattvas, a position not different to that of early tradition. These are some of the difficulties arising from trans-traditional construction of what Buddhism is. Apart from this initial methodological difficulty, Knitter’s position stands on several problematic premises which he adopts from the earlier writings on inter-religious dialogue. What I mean in this context are the following: (1) that all religions refer to one transcendental reality as their ultimate goal; (2) that the ultimate Buddhist religious experience is mystical; (3) consequently, that it is ineffable; and (4) that the Buddha neither denied nor affirmed God, but he was silent about it. Although Knitter takes all these premises almost as given, they are questionable. I have examined all these claims elsewhere in detail and, hence, I do not plan to repeat all I have already said. Nor am I allowed to have a long discussion due to constraints on space. Nevertheless, I need to make some analysis here. The view that all religions ultimately refer to one transcendental state has been suggested by many in the field. A representative case is John Hick according to whom all the major religions in the world are different responses to one ultimate principle which he calls ‘the Real’ or ‘the Transcendental’. Some religions present this ultimate principle, says Hick, in personal idioms (‘personae’) such as Yahweh, Allah, Krishna etc. and some other religions express it in impersonal (‘impersonae’) idioms as Nirvana Tathata, Satori, Advaya etc. Whether personal or impersonal, ultimately all these refer to one and the same transcendental reality which he calls ‘the Real’ (Hick 1989). This view seems to get support from the ancient Ṛg Vedic statement the context of which is not exactly the same: real (sat) is one; sages describe it variously (ekaṃ hi sat viprā bahudhā vadanti: Ṛg Veda 1,164.46). The claim made here is not that all religions refer to some transcendental state or being, but much different and stronger one that all religions ultimately refer to one identical transcendental reality which is understood in metaphysical

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sense. The concept of transcendence found in Pali discourses refers usually to the nature of the behaviour of the enlightened person. The following is an example: Just as a blue, red, or white lotus flower though born in the water and grown up in the water, rises above the water and stands unsoiled by the water, even so, though born in the world, and grown up in the world, I have overcome the world and dwell unsoiled by the world . (Bodhi 2012, 426) When a concept of transcendence proper - loka + uttara = transcending the world - was introduced to Theravada tradition at a somewhat later period it was still understood not in a metaphysical sense but in an experiential sense (Ñāṇamoli 1982, 347-48). As I discussed towards the end of the first part of this essay, there is a debate among Buddhist scholars whether or not nirvana is a transcendental reality. Even if we were to concede that nirvana is transcendental in this metaphysical sense, it is uncertain that such transcendence will support Hick’s transcendental interpretation of religion. The next two inter-connected claims that nirvana is a mystical experience or a state and that it is ineffable are the result of applying the popular generalization of religion, which is based on the theistic model of religion, to Buddhism. An early example of this general characterization of religion based on the theistic model is found in Rudolf Otto who identifies ‘numinous dread’ (mysterium tremendum) as the essence of religion and further describes it as ‘non-rational’ or as that cannot be conceptually defined or described or analyzed (Otto 1927, 1-6). It appears that subsequent scholars who discussed religion were led by this characterization and grouped all religions in one category as having mysticism and ineffability as defining characteristics. Now, I refer again to my analysis of nirvana in the first part of this discussion. That analysis of the ultimate religious goal of Buddhism as involving a clear state of knowledge is meant to demonstrate that nirvana is not a mystical state or experience. It is also interesting to note that there is not even a single place in the discourses where the Buddha suggests that nirvana is ineffable1, or where arahants, those who realized 1  The only remark that allows interpreting to that effect is ‘atakkāvacara’ (‘not to be realized by logic’) used by the in the Majjhima-nikāya in describing the Dhamma. Bhikhu Bodhi translates this term as “unattainable by mere reasoning’ (1955/2001 p. 260). Although logical reasoning is done by means of language what is meant seems the crucial need for practice in order to realize nirvana.

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nirvana, complain against language that they cannot describe what they had realized. It is true that ineffability has been upheld in Mahayana tradition as Knitter has pointed out. But attribution of mysticism and ineffability to nirvana as understood in the Theravada tradition suffers from the methodological issue referred to earlier. The last claim that the Buddha did not assert or deny the existence of God and that he was silent about the whole issue is a highly problematic assertion that is popular in the field of inter-religious dialogue. Raimundo Panikkar (1989) goes even further and claims that the Buddha was silent about God for he knew that God was absolutely ineffable. In Picnicker’s view, the Buddha in his silence was even more faithful to God than some believers who tried to articulate in words their experience of God. Although there is a set of ten or fourteen matters on which the Buddha did not give a definitive answers that list does not contain the concept of God. So there is a simple factual error in this assertion. When TRV Murti (1955/1960, 48-49) used the concept of silence to refer to the phenomenon of unanswered questions, he has to be understood as using ‘silence’ in a figurative sense for, although the Buddha did not give a definitive answer to those questions, he was not silent about them, but explained why he did not answer those questions in a definitive manner. In addition to some instances in the Jataka where the argument against the existence of God based on the presence of evil has been articulated there are clear sutra references to the denial of creation of God. The following statement in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: “the world is protection-less; there is no overlord (in it)” (attāno loko anabhissaro (Ñaṇamoli and Bodhi 2001, 686.) clearly articulates this denial. It is adduced by Raṭṭhapala, the wealthy young man who decided to renounce his household life to join the monastic order, as one of the reasons behind his decision. In another discourse the Buddha identifies three views “which, when questioned, interrogated and cross-examined by the wise, and taken to their conclusion, will eventuate in non-action” (A I, 173; Bodhi 2012, 266). one of which is the view that whatever one experiences is due to God’s creation (issaranimmāṇa). Discourses such as the Ambaṭṭha (D I, 87-110) and Tevijja (D I, 235-253) have substantial discussion on untenability of God. The philosophical basis for the denial of God is the Buddhist understanding of reality as causally conditioned and dependently arisen, according to which a transcendental and ‘wholly other’ god is not possible.

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In addition to these direct references to the denial of God, what I would consider to be the most fundamental argument against the existence of God is the path to nirvana taught by the Buddha. All agree that the doctrine of the four noble truths contains the essence of Buddhist religious path meant to bring about the termination of suffering. It explains human suffering, its cause, thirst for pleasures, as a characteristic of human mind, nirvana as the cessation of this suffering and the eightfold path as the path to be followed by practitioners on their own. The rationale behind this ‘soteriological’ scheme is the absence of God who saves beings from suffering. If there is God one does not need to strive in the ethical path taught by the Buddha for one will be saved by God’s grace. The Dhammapada says in no uncertain terms: Oneself, indeed, is one’s savior, for what other savior would there be? (Attā hi attano nātho - ko hi nātho paro siyā: Dhp 160; Narada 1993, 145). As Raṭṭhapala did, one has to follow the path taught by the Buddha because the world is protection-less and God-less. The very nature of the path outlined in the first part of this discussion is based on the assumption that there is no saviour God. The Buddha’s role in the path is that of the teacher and guide who embodied what he taught, not that of a saviour. Under these circumstances, it is hard to say that (any talk of) God is not relevant for the Buddhist path for it is the very absence of God that has made the Buddhist path what it is. In discussing the ultimate goal and the path to it, the Buddha seems to have been quite assertive of the uniqueness of these phenomena. A statement in the ‘Discourse on Lion’s Roar’ (M I, 63-68) is as follows: Only here [in his teaching] there is the first samaṇa [‘ascetic’/ religious practitioner]; only here is the second samaṇa; only here is the third samana and only here is the fourth samaṇa. The doctrines of others are devoid of samaṇas. What is meant by ‘samaṇa’ here are the achievers of the four stages of the path, namely, the stream winner, once-returner, non-returner and the accomplished one, the fourth and last indicating one who has completed the path and won what the Buddha describes, to a naked ascetic named Kassapa, as ‘the highest Aryan liberation’ (ariya parama vimutti). The Buddha further adds to this: Kassapa, insofar as the highest Aryan liberation is concerned, I do not see an equal. How could there be a superior? I am supreme in this regard, in super-liberation (D I, 161-177 ). These seemingly exclusionist statements and discussions of the Buddha have to be understood in their proper context. It is well known

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that the Buddha did not reject in toto the views and practices of other religions. In particular, he agreed with those who upheld the efficacy of moral actions (kammavādῑ, kiriyavādῑ). It is also known that the Buddha assimilated substantially from the religious tradition of his time. A particularly interesting case his assimilation of what are known as material and immaterial jhānas practiced by religious people during his time. Therefore, his emphasis in this context is solely on the final goal and the path. It is only on those grounds that the Buddha asserts his own authority and the uniqueness of the path and where he is not prepared to compromise. This could perhaps be an example of what Ross Drew calls ‘irresolvable differences’ among religions. So, what is dual belonging? The discussion up to this point should have shown that dual belonging between Buddhism and Christianity is impossible for the conception of Buddhism constructed by Knitter suffers from a methodological deficiency and some of the basic premises of the argument are faulty. Even if dual belonging as envisaged by Knitter is impossible one could still argue that there is room for dual belonging on a different model on different grounds. However, if my characterization of nirvana and the arguments presented are correct then they support the view that two religions are radically different from each other and that dual belonging at the level of the final goal and the path to it is hard to justify even on other grounds.

Concluding remarks Let me address a few issues by way of concluding this discussion. In the back of the discussion of dual or multiple belonging is the question: Should one be confined to one religion? Introducing the rich anthology of papers on multiple belonging, Catherine Cornille says: In a world of seemingly unlimited choice in matters of religious identity and affiliation, the idea of belonging exclusively to one religious tradition or drawing from only one set of spiritual, symbolic, or ritual resources is no longer self-evident. Why restrict oneself to the historically and culturally determined symbols and rituals of one religious tradition amid rich diversity of symbols and rituals presenting themselves to the religious imagination? (Cornille 2002, 1 ) What Cornille says goes very well with our globalized world context. And it also makes lot of sense in the present global reality of bitter rivalries among religions. If we are talking of being open to other

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religious traditions, deriving inspiration from the lives of religious teachers, learning from rich and different cultural and historical contexts and the like, I see nothing but good in this proposal. The question, however, is: can we really move from one religious tradition to another without leaving behind the former? Although externally a religion is a set of practices, rites and rituals, these are rooted in a system of beliefs which forms a consistent whole. In other words, a religion is a conceptual universe - a paradigm of its own. If we may borrow from Thomas Kuhn, movement from one to another religion is a paradigm shift. The conceptual universe of one is not relevant in the other, although this may not be exactly so in the case of monotheistic traditions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, or between Buddhism and Hinduism. Let me briefly discuss a particularly interesting case in Sri Lanka where Hinduism and Buddhism meet so frequently in rites and rituals. In particular, what I refer to in this context is the Buddhist practice of asking for help from gods most of whom are shared between the two traditions, in addition to some exclusive monopolies of two religions such as Kartikeya and Durga for Hindus and Natha and Saman for Buddhists. Buddhists believe in the existence of many gods (and other unseen beings) who occupy more powerful positions in their worldly existence and are capable of granting favours or incurring harm to human beings. It is customary for many Buddhists to visit shrines of these gods and ask for favours or punishments for enemies. The practice is to present them with some fruit etc. and some nominal cash. Decades ago these offerings were purely symbolic in that they presented these gods with a coin of low value and made their request or complaint. Today a typical offering costs much larger sum of money and other requisites depending on the riches of the participant. The interesting thing is that Buddhists do not go to the shrine of the Buddha for the worldly purposes for they know he is no more. Having paid homage to the Buddha they proceed to the god’s shrine to receive help for their day-to-day matters. Buddhists do not see this as contradicting their Buddhist practice for they make a clear distinction between the two domains, this worldly and other-worldly. As I have discussed elsewhere, the Buddhists have distributed among several gods the roles of God, such as rewarding, punishing and protecting, and attributes such as moral supremacy, to be noted specifically-minus the roles of being creator and savior. Believing in gods, getting services from them or emulating them does not pose a problem for Buddhists so long as such god is not God. This practice or similar practices in Southeast Asia are not understood as instances of dual belonging.

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Heavenly worlds, as pleasurable abodes of divine beings, are very much a part of Buddhist religiosity. Buddhist discourses usually refer to sagga and mokkha, heaven and liberation, as goals of religious, life, usually the former for the householders who aspire to be in the samsara, and the latter, usually but not exclusively, for the renounced who aspire to escape from samsara. Except for the belief that Christian heaven and hell are eternal and their Buddhist counterparts are impermanent, both Buddhists and Christians have much to agree on this point. Nevertheless, what would make any possibility of dual belonging hard is that a Buddhist, even whose religious goal does not go beyond being born in a heavenly abode after his death, still has to ground his religious life in the larger picture of samsaric existence in a God-less universe. The only way, perhaps, to belong in more than one religion will be to interpret one in line with the other or both in line with each other, which Knitter seems to do. But then the two have been made one or almost one. On the other hand, Knitter’s Buddhism is his own creation and so is his Christianity. The end result could be neither this nor that, but a new one. At either point, whether two or several traditions becoming one or whether creation of a new hybrid, dual or multiple belonging loses sense. Finally, in the latest edition of his work (paperback 2013), Knitter changing substantially from his earlier position of being a ‘Buddhist Christian’ (p.216), claims that both the Buddha and Jesus come first in his religious practice and identity. In his earlier position, he would have been more Christian and less Buddhist. But in this new position he is both Buddhist and Christian, each occupying 100% of his religious space (Knitter does not propose a name for this position). It is plain that one cannot be both 100% Buddhist and Christian unless there is total agreement between the two religious systems. Then ‘two-ness’ loses its meaning. Hick’s Transcendental position, which holds that all religions ultimately refer to ‘the One’, seems to allow one to be in all religions simultaneously provided that one sufficiently accommodate cultural differences which make different religions different according to Hick. Another possibility of 100% dual belonging is to have two systems which are complementary to each other in the sense that one fills what is not found in the other. The characterization of Christianity and Buddhism as (Christian) love vs. (Buddhist) wisdom by Fr Aloysius Peiris (Pieris 1988) may be taken as an example. According to him, these two terms are “two irreducibly distinct languages of the spirit, each

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incapable without the other of adequately mediating and expressing one’s experience of God and the world.” Although Fr. Peiris does not take this complementariness as a basis for dual belonging, one can argue that dual belonging is the logical conclusion of this way of characterization2of the two religions. The point made by Fr Aloysius Peiris on predominance of wisdom in Buddhism and love in Christianity is true particularly on practical level. In Buddhism, ultimately wisdom plays a more important a role for the ultimate goal is essentially a result of ‘knowing and seeing’. Nevertheless, as Fr. Peiris himself has noticed (Pieris 1988, 177) Buddhism refers to loving kindness (mettā) as an essential virtue to be practiced in the path. To conduct oneself with actions, words and thoughts associated with loving kindness has been described as an important part of virtuous behaviour (sīla). In a somewhat different but not totally irrelevant context of discussing ‘the balance of faculties’, Buddhaghosa mentions how ‘faith (saddhā/trust) and wisdom are to be particularly balanced: However, what is particularly recommended is balancing faith with understanding [wisdom]... for one strong in faith and weak in understanding has confidence uncritically and groundlessly. One strong in understanding and weak in faith errs on the side of cunning...(Ñanamoli 1956, 135) What Buddhism demands from a follower is not necessarily a predominance of either of these states of mind but their balance. Discussing loving kindness, Buddhaghosa highlights the importance of having this virtue in a practitioner. But his account also suggests that in the actual Buddhist practice loving kindness was taken as psychological virtue than an active involvement in social action. In this sense, Buddhist social activism has much to learn from Christianity. However, in order to learn this lesson and absorb it from Christianity one may not need to go so far as dual belonging. Perhaps the path to achieve this goal for Buddhists and Christians may be to be genuine friends (kalyāṇamitta) to each other. Let me wind up this discussion by quoting Edmund F Perry who wrote the following in 1980 when dual belonging was not much heard of: In this new era of Buddhist Christian relations, Buddhists and Christians have the opportunity to do enormous good for the whole world by becoming to each other a kalyāṇamittta, a trusted friend for mutual spiritual advancement. The starved 2 Please refer to Tilakaratne (2004) for a detailed discussion on this ‘complementariness’ position.

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and neglected religious imagination of the masses of people throughout the world today need the epic grandeur of an announced conspiracy in which Buddhists and Christians work each for the other’s eternal wellbeing and conjointly seek to transform the world with their tender care and clear thinking.

07. The Buddhist View on Religious Conversion*

I. Introduction Recent inter-religious intercourse in Sri Lanka has been marred by a wide-spread sense of uncertainty and frustration and occasional violence. The most visible reason is the efforts at conversion made by some newly-arrived fundamentalist religious groups. The practice is described as ‘unethical conversion’, a term that has gained popularity during the last decade or so. These efforts at conversion are perceived by Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims, who see themselves as main victims, as coarse and insensitive. Reactions on the part of these religions have been perceived as violent. While the ‘victims’ feel that their human rights have been violated those who are all out to convert feel that any resistance to their efforts is a threat on freedom of religion. What has sparked a lot of sentiments and debate is the proposed anti-conversion measures, in particular, two anti-conversion bills presented to the parliament of Sri Lanka. The Bill presented by JHU proposes that no religious conversion should happen outside proper procedures. They in particular mean alleged practice of conversion through inducement of material gains made available to economically deprived people. The presence of Christianity has been a fact of life for Sri Lanka society for the last five centuries and, with the exception of sporadic disturbances, the overall history of the multi-religious existence of the country may well be described as peaceful. It is against this background that the more recent incidents bear significance. It is correct to say that ‘violence’ was not against the traditional churches or their followers that * This article originally appeared in Dialogue, New Series, vols. XXXII & XXXIII, 2005-2006.

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have been there for centuries. Therefore the reason why the frustration of the people, in particular, of Buddhists, emerged has to be accounted for by the aggressive and insensitive modes followed by the newly arrived religious groups in propagating their views. Religious organizations coming from developed countries, whether East or West, are empowered by the economic and cultural dominance of those countries resulting from globalization process. In other words, what is happening in the fields of economy and culture is taking place in the field of religion too. The question is whether or not a society should succumb to this coercion. In particular, the Buddhists feel that they should be given the same treatment which they give to other religions, namely, non-coercion and looking after one’s own flock without trying to increase the number by ‘unethical’ means of conversion. What is made clear by this whole process is that the modern organized religion needs an ethic of conversion inasmuch as some participants of it have money, energy and will to convert. The purpose of this paper is not to study the current phenomenon per se but to study the theory and practice of conversion and to elicit some insights from Buddhism for the purpose of evolving such an ethics. In doing so, I will examine both, the actual statements made by the Buddha on the issue and the practice followed by him in his own life as a religious teacher. In this exercise first I will examine the Buddhist concept of religious truth and next I will study what the Buddha said about other religious systems. On this basis, finally I will discuss the Buddhist ‘theory’ and practice of conversion.

The conception of truth in Buddhism Persuading others to accept one’s own belief is an essential aspect of any religion. Except for the first-ever religion in the world (if such a thing existed at all) the rest of the religions are always engaged in this exercise. In a way, one could argue that the whole point of a religion is to get as many people as possible to accept its own view of the world. This is so because any new religion is necessarily a denial of the old. A new religion always emerges with the understanding that its predecessors are flawed in some very important respect (s). There is no reason for a new religion to arise if the already existing religions have been perceived as flawless. The Buddha would not have been there if he was satisfied with the Vedic or Brahmanic religion he inherited by birth. The same is true for Jesus and Mohammad. In fact the new religion ushering itself as a substitute for the old loses its point if it does not aim at replacing what it intends to deny.

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Conversion, in this manner, is an essential aspect of any religion. However, if all religions simultaneously think of converting others and act accordingly, there is bound to be turmoil among religions. How can religions prevent this from happening? On the one hand, religions are compelled to teach what they consider to be the ‘revealed truth’ for keeping it for oneself can be an act of unkindness and selfishness. On the other hand, one has to observe certain basic rules of civility in doing so. Therefore challenge for religions is to forge a truthful yet cultured mode of conversion. At the heart of the issue is the conception of truth in religion. Usually and traditionally religions have been quite sure about the truthfulness of their own assertions. At times these religious truths are called ‘dogmas’ in the sense that they have to be accepted without questioning as given. As a result, the English term ‘dogmatic’ has a kind of negative connotation and hence understood as referring to an undesirable characteristic. This should not, however, be understood as barring an act of holding any religious assertion as true or rejecting as false. In particular, if religious assertions are given as testable against one’s experience, holding such claims would not amount to being dogmatic. Truth value assigned to a set of assertions thus forms a significant aspect of religion. This epistemological aspect forms the foundation for any religion embarking on converting those who already do not believe in the truthfulness of the particular religion. Truth or ‘sacca’ is a is a basic concept in Buddhism. The fundamental ‘knowledge and vision’ (ñāṇa-dassana) about existence that the Buddha gained by becoming the Fully Enlightened One (sammā-sambuddha) has been described as ‘the Four Noble Truths’ (cattāri ariya saccāni). The Buddha is described as ‘sammā sambuddha’ for his realization of these four truths. The Dhamma-cakka-pavattana-sutta (Saṃyuttanikāya V p. 433), traditionally believed to be the first sermon of the Buddha, articulates these four truths. They are: the noble truth of suffering (dukkha ariya-sacca), the noble truth of arising of suffering (dukkasamudaya ariya-sacca), the noble truth of cessation of suffering (dukkanirodha ariya-sacca), and the noble truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering (dukkanirodha-gāminī- paṭipadā ariya-sacca). The knowledge of each truth involves three stages, namely, knowing that it is true (sacca-ñāṇa), that something needs to be doneabout it (kiccañāṇa), and that what is needed to be done has been done (kata- ñāṇa). For example, in case of the first truth the Buddha knew that it is true, that it has to be comprehended (pariññeyya) and that it was comprehended

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(pariññāta). In the like manner, similar three stages are applicable to what involve the second noble truth, craving, which is to be abandoned, the third noble truth, nirvana, which is to be realized and the fourth noble truth, the eightfold path, which is to be cultivated. The Buddha describes the four truths as noble (ariya). What is meant by this epithet is obviously not its racial meaning. According to the Visuddhimagga the four truths are called ‘ariya’ for the following reasons: (i) they have been realized by the noble ones such as the Buddhas (buddhādayo ariyā paṭivijjhantīti… (ii) truths that belong to the Noble (ariyassa saccāni iti ariysaccāni); (iii) the truths the realization of which makes one ariya or noble (etesaṃ abhisambuddhattā ariyabhāvasiddhato); (iv) truths that are noble (ariyāni saccāni) (Vism 495). The four truths have been described in the discourses as real (tatha), unerring (avitatha) and not otherwise (aññathā) (S V pp.431-2), terms usually employed to describe the idea of Dependent Co-origination (paṭicca-samuppāda). What is implied by these terms is that the truths are real, not unreal or untrue and not otherwise or different from what is real. Realization of truth involves a more important aspect of the Buddhist theory of truth. In calling suffering a truth what is meant is that it is really there as an essential aspect of human life. What one needs to do about it is to comprehend it. In fact the intellectual and practical aspects of this process of realization have been described as comprehension, abandonment, realization and practice (pariññā, pahāna, sacchikaraṇa and bhāvanā): the first truth has to be comprehended; the second has to be abandoned; the third has to be realized and the fourth has to be cultivated. The four noble truths discussed here involve a very important practical aspect about them. What is referred to by the first and second noble truths are there in ordinary (human) beings actually. One has to comprehend suffering that is already there in human beings and likewise one needs to abandon desire that is already there. nirvana involving the third noble truth has to be realized in the sense of making it real in oneself. The ethical path involving the fourth noble truth has to be cultivated. In this manner the first and second truths are real for they are there in all unenlightened beings. The next two are real in the sense that they can be made real by all those who have required qualities. The actions involved in the four noble truths clearly go beyond intellectual understanding of a proposition. What comes close to intellectual understanding, if

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at all, is the comprehension associated with the first truth. The rest involve different kinds of practice which make abandoning, realization and cultivation possible. All these activities and associated behaviour are intimately connected with the Buddhist concept of truth and this practical/experiential aspect of truth may be called ‘realization of truth.’ The Buddha has outlined three stages of realization of truth (Caṅkīsutta M. 95): preservation of truth (saccānurakkhaṇa), discovery of truth (saccānubodha), and the attainment of truth (saccānupatti) .The first stage is characterized by making known what one believes to be true but not drawing a definite conclusion on it. One may accept a certain state of affairs to be the case on any one of the following five grounds, namely, faith (saddhā), approval (ruci), oral tradition (anussava), reasoned cogitation (ākāra parivitakka) and reflective acceptance of a view (diṭṭhi-nijjhana-khanti). The Buddha does not reject them in toto. The discontent with these five criteria is that they could result in being either ‘empty, hollow and false’ or ‘factual, true and unmistaken’. Hence a person serious about preserving truth must not come to a definite conclusion that “Only this is true; anything else is wrong” (natveva tāva niṭṭhaṃ gacchati idameva saccaṃ moghaṃ aññaṃ iti). What one can properly do at this stage is simply to say that such and such is one’s faith etc.; one can claim nothing more. In doing so one preserves truth. The discovery of truth (saccānubodha) is a result of a series of ethicointellectual activities. It begins when a prospective follower visits a religious teacher and starts investigating him whether or not his physical, verbal and mental behaviour is characterized by greed, hatred and delusion. Once he discovers for himself that his behaviour is purified of such states as greed etc. he opts to live a religious life under that teacher. The process is described in the following manner: When he has investigated him and has seen that he is purified … he places faith in him; filled with faith he visits him and pays respect to him; having paid respect to him, he gives ear; when he gives ear, he hears the Dhamma; having heard the Dhamma he memorizes it and examines the meaning of the teachings he has memorized; when he examines their meaning, he gains reflective acceptance of those teachings; when he has gained a refl ective acceptance of those teachings, zeal springs up; when zeal has sprung up, he applies his will; having applied his will, he scrutinizes; having scrutinized he strives; resolutely striving, he realizes with the body the ultimate truth and sees

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it by penetrating it with wisdom (kāyena c’eva paramasaccaṃ sacchikaroti paññāya ca taṃ ativijjha passati). In this way … there is the discovery of truth. The third stage of arrival at truth (saccānupatti) is described as resulting from “the repetition, development, and cultivation of those same things” (tesam yeva kho dhammānaṃ āsevanā bhāvanā bahulikammā saccānupatti hoti). The three stages outlined in this discussion show that truth involves a complex cognitive, intellectual and experiential process. At the first stage one makes a statement without making any effort at justification, marking a preliminary stage of linguistic expression. The second stage represents a cognitive and intellectual activity whereas the third represents a stage characterized by realization, or experiencing the truth as real. This stage is far above the cognitive state of knowing something to be the case through one’s intellect. The final stage results from, as we saw above, from repetition of the process of practice, development and cultivation. This account of truth in early discourses gives us some idea about the concept of truth accepted in early Buddhism. When truth is spoken of as real, not unreal and not otherwise what it indicates is that truth has been understood primarily as reality or what exists in reality. The Buddha has laid stress on the idea that these truths are eternal in the sense that they are real not only for the present but they have been real in the past and they will be so in the future. In the following statement the Buddha says that the realization of the four noble truths is the eternal goal of religious life: Whatever clansmen in the past rightly went forth from the household life into homelessness, all did so in order to make the breakthrough to the four noble truths as they really are. Whatever clansmen in the future will rightly ... as they really are. Whatever clansmen at present have rightly gone forth from the household life into homelessness, all have done so in order to make the breakthrough to the four noble truths as they really are. (S V 416; Bodhi 2000, 1837) The concept of truth referred to here makes clear the following: in accepting Buddhism as one’s religion one makes a very firm commitment to intellectually accept and ethically behave in accordance with it. Seeing and accepting the four noble truths is virtually a prerequisite of conversion to Buddhism. As will be evident from the discussion below conversion is an ethico-intellectual voluntary act.

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Buddha’s comments on other religions The process of conversion presupposes a critique of other religious traditions which one plans to replace with one’s own. If a religion does not have its own critique of other religions that religion virtually does not have a reason for existence. Therefore being critical of other religious traditions is quite usual in this process. What is important, however, is the intention behind the act and the mode of operation followed. As we witness over and again in the world history of religions the philosophical critique was not the most preferred mode of conversion. Critique has very often deteriorated to verbal abuse and defamation. In this context it is important to see how the Buddha engaged in the critique of other religious traditions. In his very first sermon, the Buddha referred to indulgence in pleasures (kāmasukhallikānuyoga) and self-mortification (attakilamathānuyoga) as two extremes that should be avoided by one who has renounced the worldly life. These two categories however, have to be understood more as referring to broad generalizations on behaviour than as referring to any particular religious traditions although the latter practice happened to be the one adopted by many religious people of the day. As recorded in the Mahāsihanāda-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M 12) the Buddha himself, before the attainment of Buddha-hood followed self- mortificationary practices to a great length as his early experiments in the Path. These practices may have been followed by many religious people belonging to various traditions. In the Mahādukkhakkhandhasutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M 14) the Buddha identifies such practices with Jaina religious life and explains their futility. We may also note that this discourse is one among numerous instances when the Buddha engaged in discussions with other religious groups. It seems that the Buddha met Jain groups quite often and had discussions on matters relating to mutual differences. In the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya the Buddha describes sixty two views (diṭṭhi) prevalent during his time in India. These are broadly classified as pertaining to past and future. Although any specific religious group has not been recognized, views have been categorized on the basis of ātma view, namely, those who believed that ātma is everlasting and those who believed that it is destroyed at the death. Skeptics have been referred to in addition to these views. The context of the discussion is that the Buddha was revealing his knowledge on various views and their foundations so that the listeners may avoid getting entangled in the

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net of such views. Not any specific individual name is referred to, but views have been presented as held by “certain recluses and Brahmins”. The ethical message of the discourse, nevertheless, is clear: one must avoid getting entangled in views. In contrast to Brahmajāla-sutta, Sāmaññaphala-sutta (D I, 4786) describes six religious teachers who were the contemporaries of the Buddha. They are: Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, Ajita Kesakambali and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. In the discourse the account of the religious leaders are ascribed to King Ajātasattu who describes his encounters with them and his subsequent dissatisfaction. Naturally the accounts are not very positive but the religious teachers themselves have been described as very well respected and well-known personalities. Of the six religious teachers, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the Jain leader is the most known and the Buddhist records show that the two religious leaders from the Sākya clan itself never met each other personally. The Buddha, however, seems to have had many indirect encounters with Jain philosophy through the disciples of its leader. In the Mahā Dukkhakkhandha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 83-90) the Buddha shows the futility of the Jain followers’ practice of penance meant to burn the unwholesome karmas believed to have committed in their previous births. The Buddha has criticized the Jain theory of action according to which the physical action is more important than the other two kinds of actions. The view contrasts with that of the Buddha which says that the psychological act is more crucial in the sense that it determines the nature of the other two forms of karma. In the Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M II, 29-39) the Buddha criticizes the claim held by Jain leader that he has omniscience all the time, without any break, when he walks or stands still, when he is asleep or awake. While the Buddha did not rule out the possibility of omniscience he was not favourable to the kind of omniscience advocated by Jainism.1 In somewhat unusual manner, Makkhali Gosala, one of the abovementioned six teachers, has been singled out for criticism. The comments made are the following: Monks, I do not know of any other single person fraught with such loss to many folk, with such loss, discomfort and sorrow to 1  For further discussion on the matter see: Sandaka-sutta, 76th Disciurse of the Majjhima-nikāya and Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, KN Jayatilleke, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 1963. pp. 202-4.

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divine beings and mankind, as Makkhali, that infatuated man. Just as, monks, at a river-mouth one sets a fish-trap, to the discomfort, suffering, distress and destruction of many fish; even so Makkhali, that infatuated man, was born into the world, I think, to be a man-trap, for the discomfort, suffering, distress and destruction of many beings. (Woodward 1979, 29-30) The discourse does not make exactly clear the reasons behind this castigation. His religious stance characterized by the acceptance of strict determinism and the resultant rejection of moral responsibility may have something to do with this. Nevertheless, we have to mention that this type of person-specified criticisms are extremely rare in the Pali Canon. As we saw in the above discussion critical comments on various religious and philosophical view-points are not rare in the discourses. For instance, the Mahātitthāyatana-sutta of the (A I, 173-5) identifies three religious views which are described as “unsatisfactory”. They are: the view that all what is felt, whether pleasurable, unpleasurable or neutral, is due to the deeds committed in the past (sabbam-pubbekata-hetu),; that all what is felt ... is due to the creation of God (issara-nimmāṇa-hetu); and that all what is felt ... is due to no reason and no condition (ahetu appaccaya). The Buddha’s discontent with these views is that they deny the efficacy of human action and resultantly, the moral responsibility. The Buddha has criticized the dominant Brahmana tradition on many grounds. In particular he has articulated his rejection of Brahmanic social system and some of its long-held traditions. From a religious point of view the Buddha has found that Brahmins place their belief on a very unstable foundation. In a discussion with a young and learned Brahmin called Kapathika, the Buddha demonstrates that none of the advocates of the alleged divine tradition has personal experience of its source, none is in a position to say “I see this; I know this, but they all are guided by mere faith which under these circumstances become “groundless” (amūlikā). In his rebuttal Kapaṭhika he says that Brahmins go not only by faith but also by the tradition. Rejecting as faith and tradition and three other phenomena as unreliable sources the Buddha says the following: There are five things Bharadvāja, that may turn out in two different ways here and now. What five? Faith, approval, oral tradition, reasoned cognition, and reflective acceptance of a view. These five things may turn out in two different ways here and now. Now something may be fully accepted out of faith, yet it may be empty, hollow, and false; but something else may

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not be fully accepted out of faith, yet it may be factual, true, and unmistaken [applicable to the rest of the four phenomena too.] ( M II 164: Ñanamoli & Bodhi 2009, 780) Except the first two (faith-saddhā and approval-ruci) the rest of the three have been rejected in the well-known Kālāma-sutta (referred to above) too. What is highlighted is the unreliability of these phenomena as sure sources of knowledge, but not their total rejection. These instances show clearly that the Buddha was not hesitant to make critical comments on other religious traditions and groups if and when circumstances required him to do so. This is nothing but the natural process of convincing others of one’s own view. The Buddha himself did not make unfounded accusations of others; nor did he like others making such accusations on him.2 On many doctrinal issues the Buddha would articulate the correct position and distinguish it from the incorrect position. For instance, in a discussion on all knowing knowledge the Buddha says that those who attribute him with a form of knowledge present all the time, even during his sleep, describe him untruthfully and those who say that he has three-fold knowledge describe him truthfully. On his part, the Buddha did not misrepresent the position of others and he does not seem to have been accused of this misbehaviour by others. Asserting one’s own position is essential feature in religious discourses. It is clear that the Buddha did so in unequivocal terms. In the Cūlasīhanada-sutta (M I, 63-68) the Buddha very clearly and emphatically asserts that the four stages of arahanthood (religious perfection as conceived in the teaching of the Buddha) and those who have reached those stages are exclusive monopoly of the teaching of the Buddha . He asserts: the first śramaṇa is here only. The second, the third and the fourth is here only. The views of others are devoid of śramaṇas (Idheva paṭhamo samaṇo, idha dutiyo samano, idha tatiyo samaṇo, idha catuttho samaṇo, 2  The following incident reveals this concern for truthfulness and factuality characteristic in Buddhism: Once Jivaka, the physician, went to the Buddha and said that some people say that Gotama knowingly eats meat prepared for him from animals killed for his sake and asks: Venerable Sir, do those who speak thus say what has been said by the Blessed One, and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? Do they explain in accordance with the Dhamma in such a way that nothing which provides a ground for censure can be legitimately deduced from their assertion? The Buddha responds: Jivaka, those who speak thus do not say what has been said by me, but misrepresent me with what is untrue and contrary to fact.” (emphasis added.) (Jīvaka-sutta, Majjhima-nikāya 55.)

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suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe ti evamevaṃ bhikkhave sammā sīhanādaṃ nadatha.) In this particular instance the Buddha encourages his followers to utter the ‘lion’s roar’ proclaiming this fact. Although Buddhism accepts the possibility of one’s attaining nirvana on one’s own in the absence of the sāsana of a particular Buddha, in this particular context the Buddha makes this statement to highlight the position of his dispensation vis-a-vis other contemporary religious traditions.

Theory and practice of conversion in Buddhism As I clarified at the beginning of this discussion conversion is an essential part of any religious tradition. This seems quite the case with the Buddha too. Right after attaining the Buddha-hood and spending seven preparatory weeks in the vicinity where he attained Enlightenment the Buddha started contemplating on teaching what he had realized. It is said that the Buddha felt discouraged when he saw how clouded the minds of his possible listeners could be with such defilements as attachment, aversion and delusion (Vin I 5). This occurrence seems to have created concern at the highest level of world order: one of the highest Brahmas appears dismayed before the Buddha immediately and begs to change his mind. The story is usually understood as one devised to highlight the worth of the Buddha as an emergent religious teacher in the Brahmanic context in which Brahma was the supreme deity. Perhaps the real significance of the story is to highlight how disastrous could it be if the Buddha were to not reveal what he had realized. The Buddhist story has to be understood as underscoring the significance it gives to the act of teaching. What is highlighted in the tradition, begun in this manner, is not necessarily converting others into one’s own view but to make available the teaching for ‘those who have ears’ to listen. Although it is true that the ultimate purpose of teaching is to get the listeners to accept, what is taught the Buddhist practice does not lay stress on conversion. It may be explained in the following manner: The idea of conversion indicates a situation in which one is a passive object of being acted upon. It does not seem that the Buddha perceived his role as a teacher in such a manner. For example, after the attainment of Buddha-hood, the Buddha did not contemplate on whom to convert but on whom to teach first his newly found philosophy (“whom should I teach the Dhamma first”). Accordingly, the Buddha journeyed to Benares, where his former companion ascetics were, only to proclaim what he had discovered. The sermon ends with the following expression:

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The Buddha said this. The group of five monks were satisfied and rejoiced what was said by the Buddha. When this explanation was being uttered the Dhamma-eye, dustless and pure, arose in Konḍañña, namely, “whatever phenomenon that has the nature of arising has the nature of cessation”. This conclusion of the sermon does not indicate that the listeners were converted; it only says that all were pleased and that one among the group comprehended what the Buddha taught. In the like manner, almost universally3, the entire discourses end with the statement that the listeners rejoiced what the Buddha said (bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinanduṃ), and with an expression indicating cognition resulting from listening. In addition to these affective and cognitive aspects, one does not come across a term equivalent to conversion in these discourses. When one is convinced of the validity of what the Buddha says that person opts to follow the Buddha without any further need for persuasion. This very often amounts to listeners taking “three refuges” and becoming the followers of the Buddha. The following customary expression, occurring at the conclusion of the discourses, attributed to those listeners convinced by the Buddha, testifies to this: It is splendid Venerable Gotama! It is splendid! It is as if turning upwards something that is turned downwards! It is as if revealing what is concealed! It is as if giving road directions to one who is lost! It is as if holding a torch of light in the dark so that those who have eyes may see! The Buddha has taught the Dhamma in various manners. From today onwards, please accept me as a lay-follower taken refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha till the end of my life! (D I, 85) In this context one could argue that the end result remains the same. In fact the end result is acceptance of the Buddha as the teacher, the Dhamma as the right teaching and the Sangha as the exemplary religious body by the listener and option to follow the Buddhist way of life. This, in other words, is conversion of the listener to the teaching of the Buddha. What we have to understand is that the act of conversion has been perceived and articulated in the Buddhist tradition in a different manner. 3  There is one discourse which goes against this tradition. The Mūlapariyāya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (the Sutta # 1) concludes with the unusual expressions that the monks who listened to the sermon did not rejoice it. The Commentary says that the Buddha deliberately made his sermon too difficult for the particular group of monks to grasp so that their conceit may be tamed.

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In his entire life, the Buddha engaged in teaching his message to people of all walks of life, going from village to village and city to city stopping at one place only for the rainy season. The Buddha had his liberated disciples too done the same. It is well-known that the Buddha’s advice to the first sixty disciples who realized nirvana was that “they should go on teaching for the well-being of the many and for the happiness of the many” (caratha bhikkhave cārikaṃ bahujana-hitāya bahujana-sukhāya). The Buddha further asked these first disciples that two should not to go in one road. This suggests the urgency the Buddha felt in making known his message to the world. For the Buddha as well as his disciples engaging in ‘cārikā’ (traveling for the sake of teaching) was the cardinal function of their life. The regular journeys usually lasted for nine months and were called ‘aturita-cārikā’ or ‘non-quick travel’ whereas visiting any particular person or group was called ‘turita-cārikā’ or ‘quick travel’. In both these types of travel, the Buddha encountered many people some of whom already had their religious belief and some others who did not have. On his part we do not see any evidence that the Buddha was hesitant or reluctant in his act of teaching to those who already had their religious commitments. The Buddha knew that most of his adherents came from other religious groups. As we will see later, the Buddha was concerned about the material loss to other religious traditions that could result from his act of teaching. But that did seem to have stood on his way of teaching whoever that came to listen to him. In other words, the Buddha spent his entire life to persuade as many people as he could to accept and follow what he taught. This act, however, does not mean that the Buddha was keen merely on increasing the number of the followers. As a well-known statement: ‘This Dhamma (teaching) is for the intelligent; not for the unintelligent” (Paññavato ayaṃ dhammo nāyaṃ dhammo duppaññassa: A IV 229), says, the Dhamma is not for those who are not intellectually and temperamentally ready. This explains why the Buddha did not try to convince Cunda, the dealer in swine, who happened to live very close the monastery where the Buddha lived. This explains, on the other hand, why the Buddha traveled long distances at times in order to teach a particular person. It is clear that different people have different levels of intellectual and emotional capacity, which makes some better equipped than others, in this particular case, to comprehend the Dhamma. While the Buddha tried to teach and guide as many people as he could, his particular interest seems to have been on those who were ready. Since ‘conversion’, as we will see, is ultimately an act of intellectual conviction one naturally cannot

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expect any means of popular, covert and questionable character being followed by the Buddha or by his followers. One might object to this characterization of ‘conversion’ by pointing to the role of ‘pasāda’ or well-disposed-ness of mind (mental appreciation) toward the Buddha (the Dhamma and the Sangha) in opting to follow him. In fact, there is no denial of the fact that not all who opted to follow the Buddha were rationally motivated. Even some of the well-known disciples of the Buddha, such as Vakkali, belonged to this category. The point is not that the Buddha rejected such people but that the Buddha considered pasada born of knowledge, which is called ‘avecca-pasāda’ (M I, 37), as the most desirable pre-condition for ‘conversion’. From all internal and external and direct and indirect evidence that we come across we may judge safely that the Buddha was quite successful as a teacher. This, in other words, means that many other religious traditions lost their adherents to the Buddha. A contemporary assessment of this ability of the Buddha is evidenced in the following expression attributed to a disciple of Mahavira, the Jain religious leader: The ascetic Gotama is full of tricks; he has this attracting trick with which he attracts the followers of the other religious teachers! (M I, 375) A careful study of the methods followed by the Buddha shows that there was nothing strange or mysterious about them but that they were only rational and appealing to one’s reason and experience. The best example to illustrate this is the Discourse to Kalamas (A I, 188-193), a group of people without any committed religious beliefs. When the Buddha visited their village they said to the Buddha that they were confused as to which assertion is true for various religious teachers who visit them assert that what they say alone is true and the rest is false. The Buddha responds to them by saying that their perplexity is quite in order and reasonable and lists ten grounds on which one should not accept a religious assertion. They are: allegedly revealed religious tradition, succession, hear-say, textual tradition, fittingness to a context, respect for a teacher, logicality, methodical-ness, reflection on reasons and being convinced of a theory. Having rejected these ten reasons as unsatisfactory grounds for accepting a religious claim the Buddha delineates in the following words what he considers to be the proper approach: When, Kalamas, you know by yourselves that these phenomena are unskillful, that these phenomena are faulty, that these phenomena are despised by the intelligent and that these

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phenomena, if adhered to, are conducive for unhappiness and pain, then you reject them. Subsequently, the Buddha elaborates this criterion further by questioning the Kalamas on each of the three causes of unskillful-ness, namely, attachment, aversion and delusion and gets them to accept that they are conducive to unhappiness and pain. At the same time, absence of these unskillful states and the resultant positive states are shown to and accepted by the Kalamas as conducive for happiness. The conclusion of the explanation is that the Kalamas agree to live by what they see by themselves. The discourse ends with Kalamas both expressing their satisfaction and becoming the disciples of the Buddha. A significant feature of this particular discourse is the procedure followed by the Buddha in presenting the idea of karma and rebirth to this group who was basically skeptical on such beliefs. According to the strategy followed by the Buddha, the Kalamas who did not believe in any religion did not have difficulty in seeing and accepting the validity of the moral reasoning presented by the Buddha. What is appealed to is only the experience. The ideas of karma and rebirth, being not part of one’s immediate experience, are not forced upon the skeptical Kalamas by the Buddha. The two beliefs could well have served as the dogmas in the Buddhist tradition. In fact, although the two beliefs form an important aspect of Buddhist world-view and even discernible by developed faculties, as it occurs in the discourse, it is not even necessary for the Kalamas to believe in them in order to gain by following the Buddha. The Buddha points out four kinds of relief attainable by such a person: “If there is a world beyond and if there is result for actions well-done and ill-done there is possibility that I will be born in a good state, happy existence”; this is the first relief gained by him through this practice. “If there is no world beyond and no result for actions well-done and ill-done I will have the satisfaction that I live a peaceful life in this world itself. This is the second relief gained by him. “If evil happens to a doer of evil, how can evil happens to me who does not contemplate evil to anyone”, this is the third kind of relief gained by him. “If evil does not happen to a doer of evil then I will live a peaceful life in this very existence in both manners”, this is the fourth kind of relief gained by him. This analysis shows that one does not need necessarily to accept a set of uncompromising beliefs lying beyond one’s immediate experience as a precondition for following the Buddha. It is not only for the skeptics and the unconverted that the Buddha

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advocated free inquiry. Even for the regular monastic disciples the Buddha advocated close scrutiny and examination of himself before they are really satisfied with their teacher. The Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya (M I, 317-320) is a case in point where the Buddha admonishes his disciples to make an investigation of the Buddha himself in order to know whether or not he is fully enlightened (tathāgate samannesanā kātabbā sammāsambuddho no vā iti viññāṇāya) if they are not competent in reading others’ minds. The investigation is to make sure that the Buddha is fully enlightened; that the Dhamma leads to Nirvana and the Sangha properly follows the path. The investigation has to be conducted at two stages: first one must examine the physical and verbal behaviour of the Buddha in order to check whether or not it is characterized by attachment, aversion and delusion. When one finds no clue for such defilements one must directly question the Buddha on the existence of such defilements, which is the second stage of the investigation. It is at the completion of this investigative process that one establishes what is called ‘rational faith’ (ākāravatī-saddhā) in the Buddha. Brahmāyu-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M II, 133-146) records a case of a Brahmin youth who claims that he followed the Buddha for seven months like a “shadow that is inseparable” (chāyāva anapāyini) but could not find any defect in his behaviour. According to the Sutta, the young Brahmin is sent by his teacher who wished to know for sure that the fame the Buddha enjoyed was really justified. Having followed the Buddha closely for seven months the young Brahmin Uttara confirms to his teacher that the Buddha was a totally blameless religious teacher. It is not realistic to think that Uttara’s is the usual practice followed by everybody. It is an exceptional case, no doubt. The significance, however, is that the tradition encouraged this kind of investigation and that the tradition upheld the practice of the Buddha being subjected to scrutiny by his would be followers. The emphasis always has been to encourage having valid reasons as the prerequisite for religious conversion. As we in the discussion on the concept of truth, the discourses outline three stages of arriving at truth, and the crux of the matter is that one should not coming to the conclusion that this only is true and all else is false without having personal conviction. It is only then one should place faith on the Buddha. Miracles have been associated with religious conversion. During the time of the Buddha too miracles were very much an aspect of the atmosphere. The Buddha too has been attributed with various

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miraculous capabilities. The actual records however, seem to suggest that the Buddha did not himself use miracles to impress people and also that he strongly discouraged any of his disciples using such powers in order to win popularity. In the Buddha’s own life he is recorded to have performed miracles only at very few instances to dispel doubts entertained by some at the early stage of his Buddha-hood. For instance, it is recorded that the Buddha performed what is called the ‘dual miracle’ (yamaka pāṭihariya) to dispel doubts in the divine beings soon after his attainment of Buddhahood. Performance of miracles to convince the three Kassapa brothers is another instance belonging to the early formative period of the sāsana.4 Furthermore, he had to perform a miracle to dispel the doubts of his own kinsmen at his first visit to his native place, Kaplilavatthu. Apart from these few instances of performing miracles involving others there is no evidence to show that the Buddha resorted to miracles to convince people or attract followers.5 In fact there is evidence to show that the Buddha actively discouraged his disciples from using such powers to impress people. In a well-known incident a monastic disciple of the Buddha called Piṇḍola Bharadvaja went through air and got an alms-bowl made of Sandal-wood, kept on a very high pole in order to test the miraculous powers of religious people. The Buddha denounced the act of public display miraculous powers by his disciple comparing it to an act of display of secret parts of the body by a prostitute, and gotten the ill-gotten alms-bowl destroyed.6 This attitude is further made clear in the analysis of three kinds of miracles available in the discourses. The three miracles are: the miracle of psychic performance (iddhi pāṭihāriya), miracle of telepathy (ādesanā pāṭihāriya) and the miracle of instruction (anusāsanī pāṭihāriya). The first is the ability to perform various psychic powers such as being one becoming many, being many becoming one etc. The second is the ability to read others minds and reveal what others think. The Buddha says that both these feats can be also be performed by means other than religious practice and open to be questioned by skeptics. The third, the 4  Refer to Vinaya I pp.24-34 for a complete account. 5  We must not confuse miracles with using psychic powers (iddhividha) which one may use for one’s own convenience not involving convincing others. 6  Vinaya II. pp.110-2. Based on this event the Buddha enacted the following disciplinary rule: Monks, You must not display to house-holders psychic feats which are super-human phenomena; If one does so he is guilty of wrong-doing (“na bhikkhave gihīnam uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ dassetabbaṃ; yo dasseyya āpatti dukkaṭassa”).

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miracle of instruction is to admonish someone in the manner: “consider in this way; don’t consider in that; direct your mind this way, not that way”. According to the Buddha, the third is the only acceptable mode of miracle which is not subject to question by anyone (D II 212). This explanation suggests that, although the Buddha did not like to use psychic powers or telepathy to convince others, he did use the mode of instruction in order to convince others of his teaching. This means that the Buddha welcomed rational and intellectual means to convince his listeners of his teaching. Finally, an actual instance of conversion by the Buddha will shed light on how he practiced what he preached on conversion. Upali, the wealthy Jain follower came to the Buddha with the intention of refuting his teaching on the primacy of mental act over physical and verbal acts. At the outset of the discussion, the Buddha suggested to Upali that they should have the debate ‘on the basis of truth’ and he agreed. The conversation started and soon Upali was found contradicting himself (“Householder, pay attention how you reply! What you said before does not agree with what you said afterwards; nor does what you said afterwards agree with what you said before”). What ultimately happened was that Upali got totally convinced by the reasoning of the Buddha and begged to accept him as a follower. Without rushing to accept him the Buddha warned him: “Investigate thoroughly householder. It is good for such well-known people like you to investigate thoroughly”. At his insistence the Buddha accepted Upali as a follower of him. But he requested Upali to not discontinue his usual support for Jain religion. This incident, perhaps, may be unique in the history of religion anywhere in the world. As a religious teacher who saw guiding people to realize freedom from suffering as his duty the Buddha had to accept Upali although he was a staunch supporter of another religion. On the other hand, however, the Buddha was not oblivious to the harsh realities of material survival. Hence, his request to Upali to continue with his support to his former faith. (“Householder, your family has long supported the Nigaṇṭhas and you should consider that alms should be given to them when they come” (M I 371).

Conclusion We may summarize the results of the above discussion in the following manner: i. Buddhism has a clear concept of truth which is taken as referring

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to the objective truth anyone, irrespective of time or space, is bound to realize as the result of following the path taught by the Buddha. The criterion on which any particular religion stands or falls, according to Buddhism, is whether or not that religion provides for the realization of the truth articulated in this manner. ii. The Buddha commented on his contemporary religions, and the purpose of these comments usually was to show how faulty they are, or, in other words, how they do not lead their followers to Nirvana. iii. The Buddha wished that as many people as possible should follow him. He dedicated his entire life to teach as many people as he could and he encouraged all of his enlightened disciples to do the same. Rather than perceiving people as objects to be converted, the Buddha treated them as needing to be guided in the right path. Considering the fact that all his listeners either belonged to some other religious tradition or did not have religious beliefs of their own (as in the case of Kalamas) the Buddha did not have any hesitation in teaching them and finally accepting them as those who have taken refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. iv. Thus what matters according to the Buddha is not that religions convert but how they convert.

08. Aloysius Pieris s.j. on Interreligious Dialogue and the Problem of Truth in Religion*

Introduction Aloysius Pieris s.j. is known outside Sri Lanka, particularly in the west and in the Christian theology circles, for his ground breaking work on Asian theology. In Sri Lanka, particularly among the Buddhist academics, he is known more for his studies in Scholastic Theravada Buddhist philosophy. In addition to these two very interesting areas of study, Fr. Aloysius Pieris has done pioneering work in the field of inter-religious dialogue and he is well known among all those who are interested in different degrees in this very important aspect of our contemporary religiosity. Improving inter-religious understanding and building bridges between and among religions have been the main preoccupations of Fr Pieries’ life. By nature, Fr Pieris is a very practical man with a deep theoretical bent. Although I could have written on a theme in Buddhist philosophy to honour him on his 70th birthday, I feel that a better way to celebrate would be to dedicate to him something written on a theme very close to his heart. Although eventually I seem to be disagreeing with him I know that I do so with an utmost sense of appreciation and respect towards the man and his philosophy. In this paper, I will discuss Fr Pieris’ views on inter-religious dialogue followed by a discussion on the implications of dialogue on the theory of truth in religion. * This article originally appeared in Encounters with the Word: Essays to Honour Alloysius Pieris s.j., eds. Robert Crusz, Marshall Fernando and Asanga Tilakaratne, Colombo: Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 2004.

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Mission and dialogue Fr. Pieris is a pioneer in what has now come to be known as an Asian theology of liberation. This new theology has a critique of what is perceived to be the standard traditional western theology at both its theoretical and practical levels. It derives inspiration from the Liberation Theology development in Latin America. The Second Vatican Council, held in the early 60s (1962-5), provided the theoretical justification for these new developments. The new approach of the Vatican to other religions was marked by two characteristics: one is the adoption of dialogue instead of conversation which was the norm up till that point of time. The other is to accept the need to relocate the Church in local cultural settings. The need for this second change has been articulated in the following manner: … the church’s mission during the colonial period and afterwards was bound up with the establishment of European-style church structures, and local churches which were as similar as possible to the ‘mother’ churches in the North. The direction of mission was firmly North to South. Leaders of the churches of the South were largely European or North American. The health and education institutions they founded and maintained were usually modeled on those which the missionary educators and health professionals had experienced in the North.1 Adoption of local languages, cultural elements, architecture and similar features gradually came as a result of this change. This however, touches only the external characteristics of religion. The deeper aspect of this new change was the adoption of dialogue as a means of dealing with other religions. The declaration on the relation of the Church to Non-Christian religions (Nostra Aetate), promulgated on October 28, 1965, articulates what dialogue is in the following words: The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the precepts and doctrines which, although differing in many ways from her own teaching, nevertheless often reflects a ray of that truth which enlightens all men. Yet she proclaims and is duty bound to proclaim without fail, Christ who is the way, the truth and the life (Jn. 1:6). In him, in whom God 1 Whose Truth? A Grassroots Perspective, ed. Gillan Paterson, Grassroots, 102a, (Dunstable Road, Luton, UK.) (year not given).

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reconciled all things to himself (2 Cor. 5:18-19), men find the fullness of their religious life. The Church, therefore urges her sons to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions. Let Christians, while witnessing to their own faith and way of life, acknowledge, preserve and encourage the spiritual and moral truths found among non-Christians, also their social life and culture.2 With the adoption of dialogue as the way of relating to other religions, naturally, there arose several problematic situations that required clarification. One very important issue was whether or not Church acknowledges that other religions can equally lead their followers to salvation. In other words, this is to ask whether or not salvation is possible outside the Church. The position of the Church after Vatican II has been described in the following words: It is true that the Church does not any more hold that “no one remaining outside the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews, heretics or schismatics, can become partakers of eternal life”, or that “it is absolutely necessary for the salvation of all men that they submit to the Roman Pontiff,” as was stated by the General Council of Florence in its Decree for the Jacobites (1442) and the Papal Bull Unam Sanctam (1302) of Boniface VIII respectively. However, the Church holds that she is the “universal sacrament of salvation,” (LG 48), and that even those who do not belong to the Church are saved “by virtue of a grace which, while having a mysterious relationship to the Church, does not make them formally part of the Church … (Kuttianimattathil 1995, 116-7) According to this explanation, on the one hand, the Church has given up the traditional position that salvation is not possible outside the Church. On the other hand, however, the Church still holds that people belonging to other religions gain salvation ‘by virtue of grace … while having a mysterious relationship to the Church’ This, in other words, is it to maintain that all other religionists are essentially Christians who happen to be named differently. The position adopted by Fr. Pieris is different. I will allow him to speak on behalf of himself: 2 As quoted in Practice and Theology of Interreligious Dialogue, Jose Kuttianimattathil, (Kristu Jyoti Publications, Bangalore, 1955). p. 76.

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Let us start with that simple assertion of Marco Polo trying to speak of the Buddha to his medieval Christian contemporaries: “Had he been a Christian, he would have been a great saint of Jesus Christ,” he declared. To a Buddhist academician today this may seem a condescending way of appreciating the Buddha. On the other hand, if Marco Polo had placed the Buddha in the highest niche of his theological sanctuary, he would have ceased to be a Christian. It would no more be a specifically Christian appreciation of the Buddha but a Buddhist’s taking refuge in the Buddha-ratana! The theology of religions has not moved much further than this casual remark of a medieval Christian. From a church-centered view we have headed on to a Christ-centered theology that sees the Buddha as a precursor of Christ, or Buddhism as a quasi sacrament of salvation, or a good Buddhist as an “anonymous Christian”. But in all this, the element of condescension remains unchanged. For all amounts to saying: You none Christians are saved because and insofar as you are Christians (like us) in some mysterious way intelligible only to us. Because commitment to one’s own religion is an absolute prerequisite for any formal interfaith encounter, such condescending attitudes are, at least academically speaking, indispensable. But we must be aware that they are a subtle manifestation of evangelism – that is to say, an academically dignified way of affirming the absolute characters of one’s own religion vis-a-vis other faiths. It would be simplistic to suppose that this subtle species of evangelism is peculiar to the biblical religions, influenced as they are by belief in the fact of “chosenness.” Rather, it is characteristic of any religion that treats religious pluralism with academic seriousness. I have often heard well-meaning Buddhist refer to Jesus Christ as a bodhisattva – that is, potential Buddha. This is the greatest tribute a Buddhist could give the founder of Christianity. But Christians may not be impressed by such a concession, unless they admit that academically nothing more can be expected. (Peiris 1988 , 4) According to Fr. Pieris the proper attitude should be characterized by admitting the equality of the religion with which you get into dialogue.

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Anything less will be based on the assumption that one’s own religion is higher or better. Fr. Peiris’ position is that both Buddhism and Christianity are two equally valid ways of articulating and experiencing what is considered to be the ultimate religious goal. Let me quote from him: There are two irreducibly distinct languages of the Spirit, each incapable without the other of adequately mediating and expressing one’s experience of God and the world. Gnosis or the language of liberative knowledge is one: agape or the language of redemptive love is the other. Fr. Pieris says that Buddhism usually articulates its religious experience in a predominantly gnostic vocabulary whereas Christianity uses the language of agape. Historically, the two traditions have had both ways of understanding of religious reality although each tradition has presented itself in a one-sided manner. Fr. Pieris uses the later Wittgensteinian concept of “language game” in order to explain this phenomenon: We are dealing here with two language games, each having its own set of rules. One game should not be judged/played according to the rules of the other. Thus, the Christian mystic speaks in terms of “sin and grace”, but the gnostic vocabulary of the Buddhist arahant knows only of “ignorance and knowledge.” The gnostic process of realizing an “impersonal I” and the agapeic encounter with a “personal Thou” imply two modes of religious discourse, each having its own logic and its own grammar and syntax. (Peiris 1988, 85) The significance of the metaphor of games is that one cannot talk about validity of one game as opposed to the other. Two games stand on their own and derive validity and meaning in their own contexts. Fr. Pieris elaborates further the implications of the metaphor: Because language is not just a way of speaking about reality, but a way of seeing and experiencing it, the Buddhist challenge consists primarily in reminding the Christian that there exists another legitimate way of seeing and interpreting reality, as the following observations will illustrate. Theresa of Avila, whose God- experience is expressed in the idiom of agape, refers to the mystical grace of “suspension” (of senses and understanding) as being such an extraordinary and gratuitous gift of the divine Sprit that it would be presumptuous to make any human effort at acquiring it. But whoever meditates under the guidance of a

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Theravada master is soon made to believe that this “suspension” (norodha samāpatti or “cessation trance” as Buddhists call it) is a natural, predicable and humanly inducible, albeit rarely attained, psychic phenomenon not to be confused with nirvana, which defies human manipulation. (Pieris 1988, 85) In this quoted passage Fr. Pieris compares the experience of God in the Christian tradition With the attainment of cessation in the Theravada tradition. Although like the God-experience the Buddhist cessation is not the final goal the implication of the comparison is clear: the two religious experiences are irreducible entities valid in their own right; they are two different but equally valid and meaningful ways of experiencing ‘reality.’ The trouble with this way of articulating the difference between two religious traditions is that it is based on the assumption that both ultimately refer to the same goal, described as ‘Reality’ (or in some other names). There are two claims here: one is that the ultimate religious experience across religions refers to one and the same reality; the second, following from the first, is that all the claims made to this effect in religions are true. Let me first examine the claim that all religions ultimately refer to the same reality. Looking at the history of religion, we can see that this is not a new thesis. A very ancient Indian saying goes as “ekaṃ sat viprā bahudhā vadanti –sat or the real, is one; sages describe it in multiple manners.” The Ṛg Veda (Rv ….) makes this statement in the context of listing various gods who were seen as representatives of one ultimate reality. In the recent studies in philosophy of religion we find more examples belonging to the same genre. One early example among such works comes from Rudolf Otto. In his well known work, The Idea of Holy (Otto 1950), Otto tries to establish what he considers to be the universal characteristic of religion. He calls it “mysterium tremendum” or “numinous dread”, the feeling of awe inspired by the object of religion. In addition to this feeling being extremely intensive, Otto says, this experience is “wholly other”. The hallmark of this experience is being non-rational for it defies any rational analysis or explanation. The reality presented by religion, in this manner, is awe-inspiring, beyond human conceptualization and transcendental. Otto maintains that a religion is not worth calling by that name if it does not have this characteristic. Otto’s interpretation has been very influential in developing the Western

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concept of religion and one can see that the theistic religion has served as its model. In another similar effort, WT Stace (Stace 1976) classifies mystical experience, by which he means religious experience, into two, namely, introvertive and extrovertive. The former is described as having “the undifferentiated unity” (Stace 1976, 87) as its essence. This is experienced through ‘pure ego’ which is the “unity which holds the manifold of the stream together” (Stace 1976, 87). It is the experience that is described as ‘union with God’ in Christianity and as ‘identity with the Universal Self’ in Hinduism. The latter is characterized by experiencing unity within the multiplicity of phenomena. Stace thinks that the experience spoken of by all the major religions come under the first classification. He is faced, however, with a difficulty with Buddhism, in particular with Theravada Buddhism. He says; But it may be said that the doctrine of anatta, or no-soul, if the account given of it in the Pali Canon is accepted as being the Buddha’s view, is, at least in spirit and probably in substance, inconsistent with the experience of non- Buddhist mystics. This doctrine rejects, by means of an argument which is practically identical with the famous argument of David Hume, the whole concept of self or soul. It urges that there is nothing in the mind except its empirical contents, and from this premise concludes, as Hume did, that the “I” is nothing but the stream of conscious states. The Hinayanist also rejects, of course, the Hindu concept of the Universal Self, which is identical with Brahman or the Supreme Being. Thus it is not only sceptical of the soul, but is also atheistic. (Stace 1976, 124) In order to overcome this difficulty Stace makes use of the distinction between an experience and its interpretation. Stace maintains that: In the mystical traditions of all cultures, with the sole exception of Hinayana Buddhism, this is interpreted as being the unity of the self, the pure ego. But this, after all, is an interpretation … The fact that this is an interpretation means that it is possible to have the experience but not to interpret it in this way. (Stace 1976, 125) Stace says that the Buddhist tradition did not go so far as interpreting it in the manner the other mystics had done. The essence of Stace’s argument is that religious experience is either introvertive or extrovertive

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and in either case one experiences the same, namely, the undifferentiated unity. Whether or not one has described one’s experience in either of these manners is personal and nothing to do with the experience itself. The ultimate goal of religion is one and the same and the differences are really cultural and linguistic. John Hick, a more recent interpreter of religion who subscribes to the view that ultimately all religious experience refer to one and the same Transcendental, analyzes ultimate soteriological goals across religions and classifies them into two, namely, personae and impersonae of the Transcendental. What he means by ‘personae’ is personal representation of ultimate religious experience as God, Allah, Ishvara etc. ‘Impersonae’ means non-personal representations such as nirvana, Tathatā, Brahman, the way etc. Whether they are personal or impersonal all of them refer to one ultimate reality described in such terms as the Real or the Transcendental. The difference, according to Hick, is only a matter of perception and interpretation; at the core all religions refer to the same experience (Hick 1989). What we have discussed so far are three examples from academic attempts to solve the problem of multiplicity of religions. Ultimately, the multiplicity is accepted, and not rejected. But in the process all the religions have been reduced to one category. The differences have been explained away as not real but apparent, valid at the level of interpretation alone. Fr Pieris’ interpretation of Buddhism and Christianity as “complementary idioms that need each other to mediate the selftranscending experience called “salvation”, is not a kind of reductionism we saw in Stace and Hick. For Fr Pieris, the two ways of speech are “two irreducibly distinct languages of the Spirit” (p. 85). The idea of language game (the languages of liberative knowledge and redemptive love in Buddhism and Christianity respectively) indicates the possibility of each religion being valid in its own context. What Fr Pieris says explaining the obstacles for dialogue between the two groups is helpful in this context: Hence the first major obstacle to a core-to core dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity is not certainly the idiomatic differences just alluded to, but the failure on the part of the Buddhists and Christians to acknowledge the reciprocity of these two idioms ; their refusal to admit that gnosis and agape are both legitimate languages of the human spirit or (as the Christian partner in dialogue is concerned) that they are language that the same divine Spirit speaks alternately in each one of us.

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Now, looking from a Buddhist point of view (of a person who has realized nirvana by purifying his mind of all defilements through vipassanā meditation) the ‘spiritual language’ (whether it is human spirit or divine Spirit) spoken here poses the biggest difficulty. Although one may-follow the modern language of philosophy of religion and talk about the ‘Buddhist religious experience’ even a casual analysis of the early discourses would show that this experience, unless the person has entered a specific jhānic state, is only a undefiled manner of experiencing the day-to-day existence and nothing more than that. In other words, nirvanic experience does not mean that one experience something over and above one’s purified states of mind. Fr Pieris’ characterization of nirvana as “defying human manipulation” (p. 85), it must be mentioned, is equally problematic for the main reason that nirvana is a result of one’s own conscious effort at purification. It has been claimed (for wrong reasons as I believe) that nirvana is ineffable and it could be the only reason why it can be thought as defying human manipulation. Excepting that nirvana may well be called a human manipulation with reference to each individual human being who makes it possible. Since I have discussed these matters in greater detail elsewhere, I am not going to repeat what I have said earlier (Tilakaratne 1993). My claim, which I do not plan to argue for here, is that the two religions present two qualitatively different experiences valid in each one’s context. I would agree with Fr Peiris’ metaphor of language game if it can be divorced from the assumption of oneness of religious experience which, in fact, does not go along with the language game metaphor. Coming to Fr Pieris’ classification of gnosis (knowledge) and agape (love) as predominately emphasized in Buddhism and Christianity respectively: while accepting the explanatory use of the classification I am compelled to suggest that this is different from how the tradition itself has understood its goal. Fr. Pieris says that “the Buddhist uses only Gnostic categories to express final liberation” (p.117) and cites such terms as ‘prajnā’, ‘vipassanā’, ‘jnāṇa’,‘bodhi’, and ‘paṭivedha’ as examples. This list can be added with more terms such as ‘pariññā’, pajānana and ‘aññā’. Of the terms Fr. Pieris mentions, except ‘bodhi’ and paṭivedha’ all the others refer not to final liberation but to the path leading to it. In fact, the terms used most frequently to refer to final liberation are ‘visuddhi’ (purification in such contexts as: esa maggo visuddhiyā (Dhp 227)y: this is the path for purification), ‘vimutti’ (liberation in such contexts as ‘cetovimutti’- liberation of mind), ‘paññā-vimutti’ – liberation of wisdom), and ‘āsavakkhaya’ - exhaustion of cankers, used most frequently in The

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Theragātha and Therīgāthā containing the accounts of the nirvanic experience of male and female arahants. None of these terms can be said to belong to Gnostic categories. It is true that there is nothing very much about love in these categories. But that should not be taken as that those realized nirvana did not have kindness (karuṇā), friendliness (mettā) and concern (anukampā) for the rest of the people who had to be guided for that experience. In fact, Fr Pieris is not unaware of this for he says: Yet the constitutive dimension of this experience is gnosis: which nevertheless cannot take place without love. This is why in practically all schools of Buddhism, the complementarity between prajña and karuṇā has been affirmed as the defining essence of Buddhahood. The former is salvific knowledge implying disengagement from samsara (world is sin and sorrow); the latter stands for “redeeming love”, which engages the Buddha in a program of restructuring the psycho-social life of human society in tune with the supreme goal or nirvanic freedom. (p.177-8) The problem, I think, is not with the complementariness of karuṇā and prajñā in Buddhism but what is meant by prajñā in particular in Buddhism and gnosis in Christianity. If the content of these two concepts in the two traditions are identical or even close to each other, the comparison seems to be meaningful. When Fr. Pieris says, in the same passage quoted here, that “by gnosis the Buddha anticipates ‘the Beyond Here and Now’”, again, I think, the Buddhist prajṇā has been read in an unusual manner alluding to a transcendental reality. All these matters ultimately seem to have a bearing on the limits of dialogue and I will come to that theme toward the end of this essay.

The problem of truth With the adoption of dialogue as the proper means of interacting with other religions, in addition to the still persisting uncertainty about dialogue itself, there is a question regarding truth-claims in religion. To state the question very briefly: usually every religion has, at its heart, a belief that it, and it alone, contains the truth about what it considers to be the problem and the solution of the human predicament. It is clearly problematic for a religion if it acknowledges that any other religion is equally true, using the idea of truth in its ordinary sense of correspondence.

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If all religions do not say the same and they do not share the key characteristic the problem of truth emerges: how can all of them be true? This question has been discussed before. The late Professor KN Jayatilleke, discussing the Buddhist attitude to other religions addresses this issue. Having discussed the Buddhist attitude in detail Jayatilleke says: We note here that the relativist valuation of religion in early Buddhism does not presuppose or imply the truth of all religions or religion-surrogates. Some types of religion are clearly condemned as false and undesirable, while others are satisfactory to the extent to which they contain the essential core of beliefs and values central to religion, whatever their epistemic foundations may be. Those based on claims to omniscience on the part of the founder, revelation or tradition, metaphysical speculation or pragmatic skepticism being unsatisfactory in so far as they are based on uncertain foundations. (Jayatilleke 1986-7, 29) In the course of this discussion Jayatilleka characterizes the Buddhist attitude as one of ‘critical tolerance’. Commenting on this stand, Fr Aloysius Pieris makes the following observation: In him, too, we see a Buddhist as one ascribing an absolute character to the truth that the Buddha proclaimed, though conceding that this truth could be discovered, fully or partially, by non-Buddhist. (Pieris 1988, .4-5) Fr. Pieris’ comments originate from the position of adopting dialogue characterized by the belief that all religions ultimately lead to the same liberative experience. Commenting on his own line of thinking in this context Fr. Pieris says: Is there a way of integrating all these levels of religious manifestation, the soteriological and institutional, so that the attitude towards other religions could include the selfunderstanding of those who adhere to such religions? A humble attempt to put pluralism of religions in the context of their self understanding has been made in our lengthy article on Christian-Buddhist Dialogue … The framework we propose for such a project distinguishes the primodial liberative core of a religion from its collective memory (consisting of rites, laws, institutions and traditions) which again must be further distinguished from the level of philosophical, ideological and cultural interpretations (emphasis original). (Pieris 1986-7, 3)

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The view expressed here by Fr. Pieris is essentially not different from some of the views we have discussed so far. For instance, there is no essential difference between this and the interpretation of religion by John Hick. The “primodial liberative core” mentioned by Fr Pieris here cannot be anything more than the idea common to all religions that the present situation of human being is not satisfactory and that there must be liberation from that situation. Insofar as this basic belief is concerned we may be able to talk about a “liberative core” common to all religions. But what is meant by human predicament and what is meant by liberation can be quite diverse, at least, across theistic and nontheistic religions. What I mean is that this difference is much more than a matter of interpretation as has been suggested by scholars like Stace, Hick and Fr Pieris himself. Coming to think of this matter: The arrival of a new religion always seems to indicate the rejection of the old. For instance, Buddhism came into being because Prince Siddhartha was not satisfied with the religious systems available for him. The same is true for Jesus and Mohammed. A new religion always contains a critique of the old. Therefore it is taken for granted that religions are different from one another. The degree of difference, however, may be varied. For instance, the theological or doctrinal difference between any two theistic religions cannot be very vast insofar as the fundamental belief in God is concerned. The same cannot be said, however, about a theistic and non-theistic religion. Though the possibility of having similarities between two religions at the level of ethics and morality is not ruled out it is difficult to imagine how two totally divergent systems can have similarities at the core. The inter-religious dialogue as adopted at Vatican II specifically says that its ‘sons’ should “enter … into discussion and collaboration” with other religions “while witnessing to their own faith.” This does not specifically mention to what extent the participants may be allowed to go into other traditions. It is clear, nevertheless, that these other religions are viewed as true and good insofar as they agree with Christian religion. The position, adopted by Fr Pieris seems to be more radical. His metaphor of language game indicates that every religion is valid its own context without reference to any other. This is not only harmless but also a useful way to understand the presence of more than one religion. A Buddhist could say that any other religion is valid insofar as it diagnoses the human problem in a similar manner and provides a similar solution at the completion of a similar procedure. In the same manner,

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a Buddhist can see how any theistic religion can be valid and consistent insofar as it advocates the way to reach God (heaven or union with God). A problem is bound to arise if and when we wish to maintain that two religions are talking about the same goal in two different languages. In this particular context, I would like to maintain that Buddhism and any theistic religion are examples of two mutually irreducible languages.3 A question of truth is part and parcel with the assertion of two or more irreducible languages. Can all religious claims be equally true? In this context let me first quote from a modern commentator and advocate of inter-religious dialogue in order to demonstrate how complex the situation is: (i) While it is true that “truth is one,” it ought to be realized that, “it has many faces, and each religion is, as it were, a face of the one Truth, which manifests itself under different signs and symbols in the different historical traditions.” Hence no religion and no individual can claim to have monopoly of the Truth. We are all pilgrims of Truth. Hence one’s attitude in dialogue should be gratitude for the presence of truth in one’s own religion, humility to admit that the formulation of Truth made by one’s religion is limited and that it “can never claim full coincidence with truth itself,” and readiness to search for, accept and put oneself at the service of Truth wherever it is found, without pretending to possess it. (Kuttianimattathil 1995 , 111) (ii) Believing as we do that Jesus is the truth, and that the New Testament bears authentic witness to him, we may use the following criteria for discernment when there is a question of discerning truth from error in the different scriptures. A thing can be considered true which i) is compatible and consistent with the words and deeds of Jesus Christ; ii) is not contrary to right reason and iii) is conducive to the creation of a new humanity based on justice, peace and love. (Kuttianimattathil 1995, 473) (iii) When truth is spoken of in the context of inter-religious dialogue, one is not referring to logical truth whose classical definition is adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Truth in the context of dialogue refers rather to that which sets one free, that which leads to 3  A somewhat similar position has been held by R.C. Zeahner; see his Mysticism: Sacred and Profane (p.204) (1957).

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liberation. This truth, in the final analysis is God. And this God is an infinite mystery, whom limited human intelligence can never fully grasp. The proper attitude before Truth, God, is humility and openness. Hence it would be untrue and arrogant if one were to claim that one possesses the whole Truth. Truth is never completely grasped or possessed but ever continually revealed and striven after. Besides, as has rightly been pointed out, one cannot possess Truth, one can only be possessed by Truth. So all what one can and should try, is to be a witness to the truth by which one has been possessed, being happy and ready at the same time to listen to and learn from other witnesses. (Kuttianimattathil 1995 , 566-7) The first quotation emphasizes the view that truth is one. But by ‘Truth’ with upper case ‘t’ we can see that the author is not speaking about a propositional truth but about a metaphysical reality. In the Buddhist sense truth does not mean such an entity and the Buddhists do not usually call the Buddha the Truth. When it does, however, talk about say, four noble truths it refers to the truly existing situations in the world. In this sense Buddhism seems to take truth in the sense of correspondence with reality. The second quotation establishes the peculiar Christian way of using the term ‘truth’ to refer to Jesus. In the list of criteria produced it is interesting to see that coherence has been taken as one. The other criterion implies a pragmatic bent in the theory of truth. The third quotation again establishes the metaphysical use of the term ‘truth’ and uses the criterion to pave the way for a relativist stand. It has been shown that Buddhism accepts a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Although pragmatic value has been taken into account in teaching the doctrine it has not been considered as a criterion of truthfulness of a proposition. There is, however, evidence to show that coherence has been taken as a criterion in determining what is true or otherwise. But we need not go into this debate at this juncture.4 It suffices to say that the Buddhist concept of truth is quite different from that of Christianity which is basically metaphysical. As has been discussed in the work of KN Jayatillke, cited above, the 4  For further discussion, see Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, KN Jayatilleke, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969. Pp.351-368 in particular and History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuties, David J Kalupahana, State University of New York Press, pp. 45-52.

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Buddha emphatically says that the four paths and the associated fruits (magga and phala) are available only ‘here (in this dispensation alone) and hence all the other then existent religious traditions are devoid of (true) samaṇas5 (suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe: M I, 63). Now, in such a situation if one were to ask the Buddha which teaching to follow he would not point out to any other religious system although it is quite possible that he would not impose his own either. This, however, was never meant to be a blanket rejection of all other religious systems. Buddhism admits the possibility of religious systems which guide their adherents to heaven (sagga). But the Buddha was unhesitant to deny that other system known to him was “leading to nirvana” (niyyānika). What we see here, insofar as the truth-status of the teaching of the Buddha is concerned, is an absolutist view with a limited applicability. Like any other religious system, Buddhism too has its critique of other religious systems. But this cannot be taken as meaning a denial in toto of such systems. Since these aspects of the Buddhist position have been dealt with in detail by Jayatilleke there is no need to discuss them again here. Jayatilleke’s characterization of the Buddhist attitude to other religions as ‘critical tolerance,’ I think, characterizes it properly. While the Buddha accepted the ‘right’ for existence for other religious traditions, he was critical of them in an inoffensive manner. The discourses such as the Brahmajāla and Sāmaññaphala of the Dīgha-nikāya are among the relevant examples. As is well evident in the discourses the Buddha often visited the places of other religionists and had discussions with them. These records also show that the Buddha was always successful in convincing these other religionists of his views. All these suggest that the Buddha held a clear conception of truth although such a practice does not seem to have affected in any adverse manner his association with other religionists. It is clear that Buddhism does not subscribe to the view that to hold a religious teaching to be true is to be guilty of absolutism. Although Buddhism does not seem to believe in absolute truth claims in the abstract, it did acknowledge and advocate universal truths in concrete situations. The four noble truths, again, provide us with a good example. The teaching of the Paṭicca-samuppāda (dependent co-origination) provides us with a universal truth applicable to all phenomena including human life as well as that of animals and plants. In order to characterize 5  ‘Samaṇa’ is the common name used to refer to non-Brahmanic religious people. In this context it refers to those who have realized any one of the four stages of arahanthood.

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the position of Buddhism in this regard we need to distinguish between holding a proposition to be true (in the sense of being factual) and grasping it tenaciously and identifying oneself with the proposition and generating severe attachment or aversion (abhijjhā-domanassa) regarding one’s position. The second does not necessarily follow from the first. In other words, holding a proposition to be true does not mean that every time one holds such a position one is being dogmatic about it. What one needs to renounce is not the truth-claims themselves but the taṇhā (desire) and mamaṃ-kāra (identification with oneself) towards truth-claims.

Conclusion Finally, by way of conclusion, there is a question to be raised and answered: does the attribution of truth-values to religious propositions mean that there is no room left for inter-religious dialogue? In other words, should one renounce truth claims as a prerequisite for interreligious dialogue? It seems that a large number of practitioners of interreligious dialogue are in the opinion that their work requires them to accept a kind of relativism regarding truth claims across religions. I think, this is based on a misunderstanding. This must not, however, be taken as belittling the extent to which the contemporary Christians have gone and the tremendous courage shown in reinterpreting their own tradition to accommodate other religious traditions. Accepting a certain religious teaching as either true or false, if one is serious about it, requires one to adopt a form of life in accordance with that. Respecting someone else’s religion out of courtesy does not require one to renounce one’s own religious beliefs. Nor is it necessary for one to do so in order to work with other religionists. A piecemeal kind of adherence to more than one religion does not make one a follower of any religion. Accepting a religion requires one to accept a view of reality unique to that particular religion. Such view may be described, borrowing from Thomas Kuhn6, as representing different ‘paradigms’. Adoption of a religion is to adopt a world-view or paradigm. Changing from one religion to another will be to shift from one paradigm of reality to another. It is impossible for one to adhere to more than one paradigm simultaneously. Speaking in the particular context of Buddhism and Christianity, I do not see how one can accept 6 The Structure of Scientific Revolution (2nd edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

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simultaneously the Buddhist world-view informed by the doctrine of dependent co-origination and that of Christianity centered around the concept of almighty God. What I think in other words, is that ‘core-tocore’ dialogue as envisioned by venerable people like Fr Aloysius Pieris seems to be fraught with serious difficulties. This situation forces us to rethink the meaning of and strategy for interreligious dialogue and interreligious behavior. Any religion serious about the human predicament cannot be indifferent or inactive. It has to teach others and get others to follow what it honestly holds to be the solution. The challenge is: how could one do this in the presence of many other similar systems equally serious about the situation. I think, it is at this juncture that religions are challenged to come up with their own internal resources to cope with the situation. Looking at the behavior of the Buddha for guidance, we can see that he spent his entire life after Buddhahood to teach people and persuade them to follow his teaching. But it is also very clear that he never tried to impose his teaching on others by direct or indirect means of coercion or inducement. The method he followed was to teach by way of discussion, respecting the intellectual freedom of his listeners. Although he may have felt bad about those who did not accept what he said there is no evidence that he went beyond the limits of decent behavior to persuade them to accept what he knew to be the correct solution to the problem. Even the proverbial karuṇā of the Buddha does not seem to have prompted him to violate the intellectual freedom of his listeners. In the Kālāma-sutta (A I, 189) we find how the Buddha respected and encouraged this freedom of his ordinary listeners and in the Vimamsaka-sutta (M I, 379-382) we find how he encouraged and respected the intellectual freedom of his immediate disciples. What we see here is how the Buddha treated intellectual freedom of his listeners as an overriding factor in his interactions with actual and possible disciples. The challenge for the religion today is to come up with a set of ethics that strikes a balance between one’s urge to teach what one is convinced to be the right path to others and the respect for the freedom others have got to act without being coerced. This still remains to be done. So, it looks like that, even after fifty years of monkhood, dedicated for interreligious dialogue Fr Pieris cannot rest yet. I wish him good health, longevity and happiness!

09. Nostra Aetate – Inter-Religious Dialogue: A Buddhist Perspective*

Introduction It has been 40 years since the Catholic Church has adopted the practice of what is known today as ‘interreligious dialogue’ as its policy towards other religions. The historical document, Nostra Aetate, is a key document that outlines this new mode of practice. The content of this document shows that there have been certain fundamental changes in the attitude of Church toward other religions. On the part of the Church this no doubt is a positive change and it deserves celebrating. The theme that I have been asked to reflect on is how, as a participant of Inter-religious dialogue at organizational level, this practice has been instrumental in changing my perception of my own religion, namely, Buddhism. Personally for me, engagement in the practice of interreligious dialogue at organizational level has definitely not been 40 years. Although I grew up in a predominantly Buddhist society, Theravada Buddhist society, to be precise, overall character of this society is marked by the presence of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, three of the main religions in the world. While the Roman Catholic religion is the largest of all Christian groups, claiming about 7% of the total population of Country, Protestant groups are 1% of the population. Christianity was a very much a fact of life and in differing degrees all were compelled to have inter-religious dialogue as a part their life. My interest in religions other than Buddhism grew up as a part of my academic studies first in Sri Lanka and subsequently at University of * An initial version of this chapter was presented at the International Conference on “Nostra” Aetate Today: Reflections 40 years after Its Call for a New Era of Interreligious Dialogue. Pontifical Gregorian University, 25-28, September, 2005.

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Hawaii where I studied western philosophy and comparative philosophy for my graduate studies. For my doctoral studies, I examined the concept of ineffability of religious experience and for this purpose, I combined religious experience referred to in classical Hinduism, Christianity and Buddhism. Coming back to Sri Lanka in 90’s, I realized that interreligious concerns need to go beyond narrowly defined academic pursuits. Physical proximity of those who hold divergent views is always fraught with potential difficulties. One could be hurting the other when one does not mean bad or even when one means good. This forces us to see the other’s side more closely for the simple reason that one is sharing the same physical space with others holding incompatible world-views. My first contact with Pontifical Council of Interreligious Dialogue was when I was invited to inter-religious dialogue meeting at Ashirvanam in Bangalore, India in 1995. At this meeting, the overall theme of which was “Word and Silence in Buddhist and Christian Traditions”. I presented a paper entitled “Buddhist Enlightenment and Ineffability”. The encounter as I remember was lively and interesting. My paper highlighted how the enlightenment spoken in the Buddhist tradition was fundamentally different from that of Christian. At some point, after my presentation, I remember Cardinal Francis Arinze, the then President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, came to me praised my effort to represent my tradition as it is. This gesture of appreciation from a revered elder from the other side of the table was not only heartening but also represented well the candid spirit in which the exercise was conducted. Subsequently in 2002, I was in Tokyo, Japan, as a Buddhist participant in the Third Buddhist-Christian Colloquium, discussing “Sangha in Buddhism and Church in Christianity”. The paper presented by me was on the Sangha in Buddhism. In this discussion I highlighted, among others, two points, one on the decentralized character of the Sangha without a central ruling authority, and the other on the nature of the relation of the Buddha to his disciples marked by openness. Exercises of this nature are helpful to understand each other’s religious traditions on a comparative basis. There is no doubt that ignorance and lack of communication are two most serious impediments for peaceful co-existence. Dialogue by now has gone beyond the stage of superficial comparisons and contrasts and has reached a stage where the participants of two traditions make an genuine effort to understand each other’s traditions, to use a Buddhist term, ‘as they really are’

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(yathā-bhūta), but not as one wishes the other to be, so pernicious and wretched a straw-man most easily attacked! This broad understanding is undoubtedly great. Inter-religious dialogue has brought Buddhism and Christianity both physically and psychologically close to each other. Such knowledge and physical proximity would naturally cause one to define oneself in relation to the other. My effort in the course of this discussion is to examine what inter-religious dialogue has meant in term of my knowledge and attitudes toward not only other but toward my religious tradition.

Vatican II and Buddhist Councils (Saṅgāyanā) The Second Vatican Council marks, among many other significant changes and innovations, a shift of the attitude of the Catholic Church toward non-Christian religions. The traditional practice of conversion guided by the belief that all other religions are heresies and hence to be rejected and that the adherents of those religions are to be converted, was replaced with what came to be known as ‘inter-religious dialogue’. The historical document, Nostra Aetate, articulates this new attitude and the vision. On the part of the Catholic Church, the 2nd Vatican is a result of farsightedness of its leaders. They had to take into account the changes in the history of the modern world and respond to such changes. The history of Christianity shows that there have been many similar exercises throughout its history and 2nd Vatican was one such event and it was the latest. Turning to Buddhism: in the history of Buddhism there have been many similar events, which are usually called ‘saṅgāyanā’ (chanting together). Starting from the first which took place almost immediately after the parinirvāṇa (passing away) of the Buddha all these events, with the possible exception of the fifth and the latest, known as the ‘chaṭṭhasaṅgāyanā’ (sixth council), have been conducted with the intention of making some significant policy decisions. For example, the first council was conducted in order to determine the word of the Buddha which was perceived as the substitute for the Master once he was gone, and to make some policy decisions some of which remain valid even to-date. The second and the third Councils held in India were caused by subsequent developments that took place within the Sangha. The fourth that took place in Sri Lanka at the turn of the Christian era was of long lasting effect for it marked the completion of the Theravada canon. What is counted as the fifth took place in Burma (modern Myanmar) in the

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18th century and was very much an affair within the Myanmar Sangha. The last took place in modern Myanmar between 1952 and 1955 and has come to be known as the 6th Council. The special character of the event is that it was an international affair participated by the Sangha of all the Theravada countries. Nevertheless, still this seems to have been done mainly in order to evolve an error-free version of the word of the Buddha. In other words, the 6th Council was not necessitated by any need for making policy decisions affecting the future of the Buddha-sasana (Dispensation of the Buddha). Therefore, it cannot be compared with 2nd Vatican in the course of which decisions with far-reaching effects for the Catholic Church were made. Reviewing the recent history of Buddhism to find any exercise comparable to the 2nd Vatican Council one might think that the BuddhaJayanti celebrations took place in the Theravada world in general and in Sri Lanka, in particular, marking the completion of 25th century after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, is an exercise of that nature. In fact a closer look will show that it is not so. Although the Buddha-Jayanthi celebrations of 1956 marked a huge resurgence of the Buddhist activities throughout the Country; the event itself was not motivated by a need to address the policy matters. Events that come somewhat close to 2nd Vatican are the commissions appointed to inquire into the situation of the Buddhist society in Sri Lanka and make remedial suggestions. The first of this kind was appointed by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 1953 and a report with excellent analysis of the contemporary situation of the sāsana and remedial measure was produced. The implementation was expected from within the Buddhist organizations themselves, but nothing much seems to have happened by way of implementation. Subsequently, in 1957 a similar commission was appointed, this time, by the Government. The Commission again produced an excellent report. But subsequently nothing much has happened. The latest in this mode of action is the Presidential Commission appointed by the President in 2002 and the report produced by it is still at the discussion level. It is significant to note that none of these recent events is an ecclesiastic council comparable to the 2nd Vatican. Although the members of the Sangha participated and even played a major role in these events the events themselves were not the acts of the Sangha as such. In fact, it is true to say that such pure ecclesiastic councils were not held in the Buddhist tradition since the first three councils. Some of the decisions with the most long lasting effect made at the First Council, held three months

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after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, still hold good. For example, when Ananda, a key member of the Sangha responsible for the Council and attended to the Buddha till he passed away, informed the gathering that the Master had allowed the Sangha to make changes to minor precepts if they so wished, the participants headed by Mahakassapa, known for his strict adherence to the Vinaya, decided that they will not only not make any changes to the code of the discipline prescribed for the Sangha by the Buddha but also they will not add any new rules to it. In this manner, the Theravada Tradition with its insistence of the strict adherence to the rules, was born. The subsequent history of the Theravada tradition shows that this momentous decision made at a very early stage of the evolution of the Buddhist Sangha has not been revised at any later council and hence remains officially valid up till today. The present situation of the Sangha, however, shows that despite the decisions made at the First Council many changes have taken place gradually although no official sanction has been given to such changes by an ecclesiastic gathering. It is important to ask why the Sangha has not convened a similar meeting ever since. This is particularly important in a tradition like Buddhism the founder of which has laid much stress on the value of gathering of the Sangha together frequently and gathering so in harmony. One explanation would be that the subsequent members of the Sangha would not feel comfortable in going against the decree of its forefathers. But this does not explain why the Sangha is not in the habit of convening well represented gatherings even to discuss ordinary matters of daily relevance, not necessarily involving changes in the Vinaya rules. Coming back to Christianity, we have to admit that 2ndVacation is very good example of the entire organization in all over the world coming together to discuss its future path in matters of utmost significance. No one can say that Buddhism does not have such a need for there are many issues in which a common agreement among the Buddhists themselves is vital. One possible explanation is that the Sangha is a decentralized and independent body, each local group looking after its own activities, without a central authority to refer to. In fact, although diminished to some extent in some localities, this practice of the Sangha, who meet every fortnight to rehearse the Code of Discipline (Pātimokkha) and to discuss matters of common interest, continues up till today. In the globalized world of today, however, for the issues that affect all local bodies without discrimination, one may well argue that a cumulative approach is inevitable. Within the Theravada countries themselves, there

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are differences of approach to problems of common interest. For example, Thailand has a well organized administrative structure encompassing the entire Sangha in the Country. Such an organization does not exist in Sri Lanka. Every country seems to be looking after its own activities following its local conditions and traditions. I think it is time that the Buddhists appreciate the possible effects of globalization on their own religion and learn to adopt cumulative measures more and more. The recent history of Buddhism shows that there has not been a gathering representative of all forms of Buddhism with the aim of discussing challenges to its religion in the context of the new global developments. Until the last two centuries Buddhism was basically in contact only with the rest of the Indian religion. Islam was the only exception and whenever the two met physically, Buddhism was the loser. It is only during the last two centuries that Buddhism met with the Western religion, namely, Christianity and Judaism (and Islam). But it does not seem that there has been any major Buddhist gathering to assess the impact of these religions on Buddhism. This means that there is no official position representing the Buddhist view towards other religions universally adopted by Buddhists. But on the other hand, this does not mean that Buddhism does not have a position of its own towards other religions. Buddhism does have its own view on other religions and the practice based on it. It has been articulated by Buddha himself` and the behavioral example too been set by the Buddha. We will discuss this matter in section IV.

Catholic Church and the Buddha-Sāsana The above discussion leads us to look closely at the nature of Buddhasāsana or the Buddhist religion as an organization. As I pointed out in the above discussion Buddhism has historically evolved to be an association comprising independent communities bound by one philosophy (Dhamma) and one way of behavior (Vinaya). In this sense, it stands in sharp contrast with Christianity with a global network governed by a hierarchical system. Again, 2nd Vatican is a good example of the functioning of such a centralized system, in which leaders from all over the world gathering together to formulate policies affecting the future of the entire Church. As we saw in the above discussion such an event has not taken place in Buddhism. Should this be interpreted as a defect in the system? Before rushing into any conclusion we need to look at the philosophy behind the Buddhist Sangha organization. Since

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I have discussed this matter in detail earlier, here I will only summarize my findings. From the earliest records of the origin and evolution of sāsana, it is clear that the Buddha was a reluctant system-builder. What he seems to have expected was a religious group governed by its own spirituality and purpose. The organization of the Sangha never started with a set of rules serving as a pre-conceived constitution. Guidelines were given in the Dhamma and it was expected that when one follows the Dhamma one is automatically within the limits of proper behavior. In the Vinaya it is recorded that the Buddha did not wish to promulgate disciplinary rules until real need for them arose. It is recorded that some of the key disciples such as Sariputta and Ananda requested the Buddha to establish a disciplinary code for the members of the Sangha for they must have felt that there was a need. But the Buddha turned down those requests saying that he knew the proper time to do so. Finally when he started promulgating rules he did so because he knew that conditions for such an action were right. Furthermore, he did so not simply for its own sake but for some ten objectives (Vin III, 21), namely, (1) well-being of the Sangha, (2) convenience of the Sangha, (3) restraint of evil-minded persons, (4) ease of the well-behaved monks, (5) restrain against the defilements of this life, (6) eradication of the defilements of life after, (7) conversion of new adherents, (8) enhancement of the faith of those already converted, (9) stability and continuance of the Dhamma and (10) furtherance of the good discipline. The rules of the Vinaya gradually developed as responses to the emerging situations among the Sangha. The rules promulgated in this manner were never considered to be final or ultimate for the Buddha was not hesitant to change them responding to new situations. Certain rules had to be changed more than once. The two hundred twenty rules of the bhikkhu (male) Sangha and three hundred fourteen of the bhikkhinī (female) Sangha available in Theravada Vinaya in this manner grew over a period of time. What the Buddha expected from his followers was not the mere adherence to the letter of his rules but to their spirit. This is illustrated from an advise given by him to a disciple who complained that he cannot follow such a large number of rules as one hundred fifty (A I 230).1 The Buddha’s advice to him was to forget about all one hundred fifty but to safeguard only three, namely, his words, actions and thoughts 1  NB. By the time this episode took place, there may have been only one hundred and fifty rules.

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(verbal, physical and mental actions). This advice highlights the fact that it is the overall philosophy (Dhamma) that really matters. In other words, Vinaya was perceived as means to realize the dhamma. One cannot follow the Vinaya in a manner that defeats the meaning of the Dhamma. What emerges from this is the overall significance of the Dhamma as meaning-giver to the entire sorteriological scheme as taught by the Buddha. That the Dhamma is central is illustrated from the following episode connected to the life of the Buddha at a very early stage of his Buddha-hood. It is said that, immediately after having attained the Buddha-hood, the Buddha felt that he needed to have a teacher for himself. Pondering over this the Buddha did not find any one individual who can be so considered for he was not guided by anyone for his final realization, and decided that he would treat the Dhamma realized by him as his teacher (A II 20; Bodhi 2012, 406-407). It is clear that the story is full of meaning. It does not merely say that he alone was responsible for his realization. What the episode does highlight is the fact that the ultimate significance of the Buddhahood and the Buddha himself depended on the Dhamma he realized. In other words, the Buddha derives his significance exclusively from the Dhamma. The Buddha as a person is important only in so far as he teaches the path; only in so far as he embodies what he realized. A well-known statement of the Buddha articulates this situation by saying that “whoever sees the Dhamma sees me and whoever sees me sees the Dhamma” (S III, 130). The Buddha does not seem to have considered that he himself was the foundation of his establishment, namely, sāsana. It is the Dhamma that should be considered as the ultimate Master. When the question was raised as to who will succeed the Buddha as the head of the sāsana after his parinirvāna, the Buddha responded by saying that it is the Dhamma he had taught and the Vinaya he had established that should be treated in his absence as the Master (D II 154). This statement has many implications for the sāsana as an organization and we will examine some of them later. In the present context, the statement of the Buddha signifies how he wished to see his organization: not as one bound to any one particular individual but one bound by a philosophy and principles. In the Mahaparinibbana-sutta, which records the last days of the Buddha, it is mentioned that when Ananda, the closest associate and attendant to the Buddha, expressed his wish that the Buddha would not pass away without making some public statement about the order

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of the Sangha, the initial response of the Buddha was the reluctance. He said: If there is anyone who thinks: “I shall take charge of the order” or “the order should refer to me”, let him make some statement about the order, but the Tathāgata does not think in such terms. So, why should the Tathāgata make a statement about the order? (Walshe 1987, 245) This does not mean that he did not make some final statement to the Sangha, but it reveals the overall attitude of the Buddha, characterized by dislike for personal authority, toward the Sangha. A discussion took place after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha between Ananda and Vassakara, the chief minister of King Ajatasatthu, reveals how the Sangha adhered to this stance of being governed by the “philosophy”, not by any individual. In this discussion, which I have quoted fully earlier (in Tilakaratne: 2002), Vassakara asks the pointed question whether there is one single monk appointed by the Buddha to be his successor. To this Ananda replies in the negative. Then Vassakara questions about the secret behind the unity and concord of the Sangha in the absence of such a leader. To this Ananda responds by saying that they are not refuge-less and that they have Dhamma taught by the Buddha as their refuge. He further lays stress on the impersonal character of the rule of the Vinaya when he says: It is not the worthy ones [referring to the members of the Sangha] who deal with us; it is the Dhamma that deal with us” (Bodhi 1995, 881-2). This philosophical and historical explanation should show why there is no central personal authority within the Buddhist Sangha, which however, does mean that the Sangha did not have its own mechanism of attending to its formal, procedural organizational activities. It is the custom of the Sangha within a certain defined locality to gather under the guidance of its eldest and most capable member. The eldest and most capable always had an authority to which other members were expected to obey. But the crucial importance is that his authority derived from the Dhamma and the Vinaya and only in so far as he was guided by the Dhamma and the Vinaya. In other words, everyone was equal before the Dhamma and the Vinaya, and even seniority was under the rule of the Dhamma. It is true that the globalized society of today extends beyond narrow local confines. Even to act locally, it is said that one has to think globally. The Sangha society too is subject to this change. There are clearly issues to be discussed within a much wider context. There can be issues common to all Theravada Buddhist tradition spread in South and South-East Asian countries. There can be issues common to

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Mahayana Buddhism spread mainly in East Asian countries. Vajrayana Buddhism is in a condition of diaspora today and they have their own issues. All these three traditions have common concerns to be looked at collectively. Furthermore, all the three traditions have lately gone beyond their traditional habitats and are changing these new societies while themselves undergoing changes. All these new developments and many other similar developments need to be discussed in detail by the Buddhists themselves. In addition, there are many global problems to which Buddhists have to provide their own answers. Buddhists are not totally oblivion to the need for reviewing these new developments. Today Buddhists belonging to the all three major traditions are meeting more often among themselves. This is a development that has been taking place from the second half of the twentieth century. The tendency is to develop what may be called a Buddhist analysis or Buddhist solution meaning by ‘Buddhism’ all the three major traditions. While there can be many advantages of having such pan-Buddhist positions or stand points developed, the crucial question is: should the Buddhists move toward evolving one central authority capable of developing one official position regarding any given problem or issue? I do not think that one should do violence to the decentralized liberal character of the Sangha in the process of doing so even though we may imagine situations where such universally applicable stand points are desirable. What could be done without harming the freedom granted to the individual by the Buddha is to have developed a set of guidelines within which each group of Sangha is expected to function. Since individual freedom is not something absolute, each individual member is expected to respect and obey the traditions and standpoints adopted by the local Sangha to which he belongs. At the same time every member retains the right to challenge what he thinks to be not in accordance with the Dhamma and the Vinaya, however, much powerful may be the deciding authority. In this context we are reminded of the four great indicators (mahāpadesa) introduced by the Buddha to be used when there arises a question of authenticity of a particular statement attributed to the Buddha. In the Mahaparinibbāna-sutta the Buddha describes four situations based on which one is asked to accept that a particular statement was made by the Buddha. They are, namely, (i) one says that he heard it directly from the Buddha; (ii) one says that he heard it from a community of elders and distinguished teachers of such and such place;

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(iii) one says that he heard it from many elders who are learned, of such and such place; and (iv) one says that he heard it from a particular learned elder of such and such place. The four situations given in a descending order of weight signify the levels of authority attributed to a statement based on its alleged source. The Buddha’s advice when faced with any one of the above mentioned four situations is the following: Then monks, you should neither approve nor disapprove his words. Then, without approving or disapproving, his words and expressions should be carefully noted and compared with the discourses (Dhamma) and reviewed in the light of discipline (Vinaya). If they, on such comparison and review, are found not to conform to the Dhamma and the Vinaya, the conclusion must be: “surely this is not the word of the Buddha: it has been wrongly understood by this monk”; and the matter is to be rejected. But where on such comparison and review they are found to conform to the Dhamma and Vinaya, the conclusion must be: “surely this is the word of the Buddha; it has been rightly understood by this monk” (Walshe 1997, 255). Here again the ultimate criterion is the Dhamma and the Vinaya and not any individual. Whatever the national, regional or global organization that Buddhists are to organize it has to be subject to this basic principle. The conclusion of this section is that in today’s globalized society, the Buddhists cannot afford to not develop bodies with larger representation; they, nevertheless, cannot evolve such an institution as papacy in which ultimate authority is believed to lie2 in an individual.

Inter-religious dialogue, problem of truth in religion and conversion ‘Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions’ or Nostra Aetate, adopted on 28th October, 1965 at Vatican II clarifies 2  How Nostra Aetate was formulated is a good example of how this theoretically absolute authority functions at practical level. As Giovanni Miccoli (History of Vatican II Ed. Giuseppe Alberigo, Obris/Peeters, 2003, USA. See pp. 135-193 and 546-559) describes in detail the declaration had a very tumultuous passage through the Council. It is not at all one straight line from drafting to approval, but drafting, re-drafting so many times, endless debates over the used terms, lobbing through church leaders, so many instances of giving in and resistance have been quite common in the process. The church leaders, so many instances of giving in and resistance have been quite common in the process. The story behind the declaration is not at all one of unanimity; it was finally approved with a majority with significant number of dissent votes. This is quite against the outsider’s impression that everything follows straightly from the mouth of the Pope.

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the attitude of the Church to other major religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Judaism. What is significant in the document is that while asserting the particular world view of Christianity and the Church’s duty “to proclaim without fail, Christ who is the way, the truth and the life”, it acknowledges and accepts “what is true and holy” in the other religions. Furthermore, it “urges her sons to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions”. It also articulates quite briefly the theological rationale for this new perception and attitude to other religions in the following words. Throughout history even to the present day, there is found among different peoples a certain awareness of a hidden power, which lies behind the course of nature and the events of human life. According to this view, although not quite clearly articulated, the common feature among religions is the sense of a hidden power, which is subsequently described as the motivating factor behind religious behavior (“This awareness and recognition results in a way of life that is imbued with a deep religious sense”). The significance of the document has been widely acknowledged. Let me quote from Norman Tanner who provides us with an insider’s assessment of it: The decree is brief and cautious. Counting some 1500 words in the Latin original, it is much the shortest of the sixteen documents promulgated by the council. Its status is that of a ‘declaration’, the least authoritative of the three categories into which the conciliar decrees were divided. Its language too is much less confident and positive than what might be called its sister decree, Unitatis redintigratio, … The decree is hesitant but wisely so. The council was unready to say much, but it said something and this in a positive and respectful way. This much alone was a major change, almost a revolution, … (Robert Crusz et.al. 2004, 442) Reflecting on the interreligious dialogue that evolved from this declaration we may identify several key points, both at the levels of theory and practice, to be examined from the Buddhist point of view. To start from the last point: Buddhism in its earliest form preserved in the Pali sources is quite clear in rejecting the idea of mystery prevalent, as rightly identified in Nostra Aetate, in many religions. For the Buddha the beginning of ‘religious life’ is not the recognition of mystery associated with human life or nature but the recognition of the empirical fact that human beings are in a sorry situation in that they are born, decay and die.

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It is the recognition of this situation, which is subsequently described as the noble truth of suffering, which made Prince Siddhartha to renounce his worldly life in search of what is wholesome (kiṃ-kusala-gavesī). What he realized in his endeavor to find a solution to this problem is articulated as the four noble truths, namely, suffering, its cause (defiling factors in one’s own mind), its cessation (by the cessation of defilements) and the path leading to the cessation of suffering. In this scheme of ‘soteriology’ not only one does not find any reference to Atma or soul, which is understood as the mystery behind individual human beings, and God, which is understood as the mystery behind nature in its totality. As I have shown in detail elsewhere, “mysterium tremendum” is not a part of religious experience of Buddhism (Tilakaratne, 1993). This state of affairs ultimately can lead us to question whether or not Buddhism is a religion in this Christian sense. I do not propose to go into this debate at this juncture. But the point is that a search for a common denominator across religions is fraught with serious difficulties. The search for a common denominator becomes an impediment for “discussion and collaboration” only if one insists on an identical or similar common factor. Rejection of the idea of mystery does not necessarily mean the end of discussion and collaboration for there can be many other characteristics common to all religions. The Buddha did not believe that differences are a problem for inter-religious discussions or relations. It is clear that the Buddha accepted what is good in other religious systems and rejected what is bad. It is a remarkable thing in the life of the Buddha that he visited other religious people in their own residences and had discussions with them. These discussions were cordial and friendly. But such encounters usually focused on differences between traditions. There is no hiding of the fact that the intention of Buddha in conducting these discussions was to convince the other of futility or unsatisfactoriness of their views. What could have ideally happened was not only that the other coming to agree with the Buddha’s point of view but also to give up his own religious persuasions to become a follower of the Buddha. This process involves an intellectual aspect of assessing and judging two opposite views and an epistemological/psychological aspect of accepting a view different from one’s own and adopting a way of life congruent with such a view. This brings us directly to the issue involving truth claims in religion and the practice of conversion from one religion to another. Multiplicity of religion is a fact of life for many people in the world including the Indian sub-continent, and it has been so far a very long

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period of time. The beginning of a new religion is a context where there is a religion already has to be explained as a rejection of the earlier. If we are to examine the beginning of Buddhism and Christianity, We know that Buddhism would not have arisen if Siddhartha was satisfied with the religious he inherited from his birth. The same is true for Jesus and Christianity. Both these religious leaders felt strongly that what they presented to the world was the right way of solving what they felt to be the predicament of human being, although what they meant by their diagnosis and prognosis is not the same. When Buddhism arose in India in the 6th century B.C.E, there were many religious and philosophical traditions already. The complex religious situation has been described as “dessert of views (diṭṭhi-kantāra) (M I 8). According to the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, there were sixty two religious and philosophical views, classified into several main categories. The Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the same text reports of six religious teachers who were well established had a considerable group of followers around them. The Buddha distinguished his position from all these views and in doing so, critiqued these views and showed they are not capable of leading their followers to the goal of ending of suffering. The Buddha described some of these religious views as “wrong views” (micchā-diṭṭhi) and some others as “unsatisfactory” (anassāsika). In the Apaṇṇaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (60), the Buddha describes three views as wrong views. The first is negativism that denies the efficacy of what is given, what is religiously offered, and what is offered to deities; denying the results of what is well-done and ill-done; denying the existence of this world, the word beyond, mother, father, spontaneously born beings and the religious people who have realized the nature of reality through their own knowledge. The second wrong view is the rejection of good and bad human action; the third is the rejection of causality and believing that things happen for no reason. Of the six religious teachers referred to above, Makkhali Gosala is attributed with last view. He is said to have held the view that both purification and defilement of beings happen without reason. In one very rare instance, quite unusual to his practice, the Buddha singles out Makkhali Gosala as most dangerous and harmful for human spiritual development (A I, 33). In another instance the Buddha describes three views as “grounds of sectarian tenets”. They are, namely, the view that whatever pleasant or unpleasant one experience is due to Creator God; the view that whatever pleasant … is due to actions committed in the past; and the view whatever

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pleasant … is due to no cause or condition. Here the Buddha argues that if everything that one experience is due to any of these reasons, whether or not one behaves ethically well or ill too depends on these factors. His specific comments on the creationist view are as follows: Thus for those who fall back on the creation of a Supreme Deity as the essential reason there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. (Woodward I 1979, 158) The criticism of the Buddha of these views is that they ultimately lead to inaction, the end result of which is that ethical action will lose all its significance.3 On the other hand, the Buddha appreciated those religious teachers who held the efficacy of ethical action. He even granted special concessions for them when they came to enter the Sangha. This account shows that the Buddha was not hesitant to point out what he considered to be erroneous in the other religious systems. His critique of other religious systems was not a mere intellectual pastime but practically motivated. That means that the Buddha not only endeavored to convince his listeners of his views but also he wished that they adopt the way of life advocated by him. The records testify to the fact that the Buddha’s this wish was fulfilled to a great extent to the dismay and frustration of many who subscribed to what the Buddha identified as wrong views. It is clear that the Buddha wished to give his message to as many people as possible. He spent his entire life teaching and helping others. This theory and its practice by the Buddha shows that he identified certain religious views as good and certain others to be bad, some to be right and some others to be wrong and some to be true and some others to be false. The very emergence of a new religion anticipates a critique of the old. The very presence of more than one religion indicates mutual disagreement and conflicting truth claims. The question is: how should religions behave in communicating what each holds to be good, right and true. The guiding principle for the Buddha in this regard has been to acknowledge, accept and respect the basic dignity of human being and his freedom to think on own and act according to what he believes to be good. The criterion of accepting a religious view is nothing other than one’s own conviction. In the well-known Kālāma-sutta (Discourse to Kalamas) the Buddha articulated this criterion in the following words: Kalamas, when you know for yourself: these things are 3  Although the belief in the creation of a supreme God logically can lead to inaction, the practice of theistic religion today is well beyond this criticism.

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unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by the intelligent; these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sorrow,- then indeed you reject them. (Woodward I 1979, 172) Just before articulating this empirical criterion the Buddha advised this group not to accept any assertion either on the grounds of religious authority or on the grounds of logicality. What matters ultimately is one’s own conviction. Buddhism does not reject the necessity of faith in religious life. But mere faith is not a sufficient criterion for accepting a religion. The outcome of the faith can be either good or bad. Therefore, the faith to be placed on any religious teacher has to be what is described as ‘rational faith’ (akāravatī-saddhā) and not ‘rootless faith’ (amūlikāsaddhā).4 The faith Buddhism advocates arises in someone based on evidence. I the Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (47) the Buddha allows his would- be followers to make an investigation (samannesanā) on him to make sure whether or not the Buddha is enlightened. In the same Majjhima-nikāya (91) the Brahmāyu-sutta reports of a young Brahmin who followed the Buddha like a shadow for months in order to verify whether or not the good name spread about the Buddha is correct. The above characterization of the Buddha and his teaching has important implications for inter-religious dialogue and related issues. The first significant implication is that Buddhism does not subscribe to the view that religion is essentially a phenomenon with mystery or transcendental reality at its centre. As I briefly outlined at the beginning of this section, Buddhism rejects mystery behind religion. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Tilakaratne 1993), Buddhism is not transcendental in the theistic or metaphysical sense of the term and hence does not refer to any phenomenon, experience or a person believed to be beyond conceptual articulation (ineffable). Search for an Archimedean point in religion to which all religions are supposed to refer ultimately has been on the increase since the early part of the last century. A well known, somewhat early attempt of this kind of interpretation is Rudolf Otto. In his The Idea of Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Otto identifies sense of mystery and feeling dread (“numinous dread”) as essential aspects of any religious experience worthy of its name. More recent academic efforts are found in William Stace’s Mysticism and Religion (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. 4  Majjhima-nikāya (47) Vimamsaka-sutta.

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Tarcher Inc.,1960/1976) and John Hick’s An Interpretation of Religion (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1989).5 Stace classifies Mystical experience, by which he means religious experience, into two, namely, introvertive and extrovertive. The former is described as having “the undifferentiated unity” (p. 87) as its essence. The latter is characterized by experiencing unity within the multiplicity of phenomena. For Otto, any religious experience has to be either one or the other. Otto acknowledges the difficulty of accommodating Buddhism into this Classification. But thinks that the difficulty is only apparent for Buddhists have interpreted differently the same experience which is the same across religions. Hick maintains that although religions have opted to interpret their religious experience either as personal (“personae”), or impersonal (“impersonae”) essentially it is one and the same experience that all religions talk about. These arguments meant establish that religious experience is ultimately one and the same support the view that transcendent mystery is the core of any religion. Buddhism rejects this. The second implication is that Buddhism does not condone the relativism characteristic of post-inter-religious dialogue religion. It derives from the argument for the alleged oneness of religious experiences, as outline above. Relativism in religion claims that all forms of religious experiences are true or valid because they are different expressions of one and the same experience. Buddhism does believe that when it comes to religious systems some are clearly not true in the sense that they do not correspond to the real state of affairs. For, example, the four noble truths taught in Buddhism have been described by the terms, tatha/real, avitatha/not unreal and anaññtha/not otherwise. What it means is that suffering exists as the reality of life, that it arises due to defilements in one’s mind, and that one needs to get rid of them by following the ethical path prescribed by the Buddha. The path and the resultant experience are taken as unique aspects of the Enlightenment of the Buddha. In so far as other religious traditions do not have this vision they are not ‘leading to Nirvana’ (niyyānika). As we saw in the above discussion the Buddha rejected three views, negativism, non-actionism and rejection of causality. These have described as ‘absolute wrong views’ (niyatamicchādiṭṭhi) and have rejected without any hesitation. They are false and ethically harmful. Truth in the context of Buddhism is what corresponds to reality and it is desirable in so far as it produces results. Let me quote a statement 5  See Tilakaratne (2004) for a detailed discussion of this issue.

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that tries to articulate the concept of truth adopted in inter-religious dialogue by the Christians: When truth is spoken of in the context of interreligious dialogue, one is not referring to logical truth whose classical definition is adaequatio intelelctus ad rem. Truth in the context of dialogue refers rather to that which sets one free, that which leads to liberation. This truth, in the final analysis is God. And this God is an infinite mystery, whom limited human intelligence, can never fully grasp (emphasis added). (Kuttianimatthathil 1995, 556) Firstly, it is clear that the concept of truth in two traditions is very different. Secondly the statement makes clear that without ultimately accepting this concept of truth the interreligious dialogue is not really possible. Subsequently, based on this alleged incomprehensibility of God author goes to kind of relativism, which he seems to take as common ground without which dialogue is impossible. Let me quote again: The proper attitude before truth, God, is humility and openness. Hence it would be untrue and arrogant if one were to claim that one possesses the whole Truth. Truth is never completely grasped or possessed but ever continually revealed and striven after. Besides, … one cannot possess Truth, one can only be possessed by Truth (Kuttianimatthathil 1995, 567) Notwithstanding the sense of generosity and humility displayed, the position is intellectually wanting and religiously not fulfilling. Looking from a Buddhist point of view; we cannot say that Buddhism requires its adherents to have total knowledge of everything. In fact, Buddhism acknowledges impossibility of knowing everything and allows a kind of skepticism.6 This however does not matter, for Buddhism emphatically says that, given right attitudes, knowledge and effort, one can know what is needed for the termination of suffering and that knowledge is one that really matters. In his well known advice to the disciple called Malunkyaputta, the Buddha made clear that knowledge leading to the final liberation is what is important and knowledge on issue of speculative and metaphysical character is not relevant for the final goal and hence should not be worried over. He advised the disciple to take what he has not taught, namely, the ten issues such as the extent 6  See Jayatilleka (1963) for a detailed discussion on this issue.

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and the duration of the universe etc. as not taught and what he has taught, namely, suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation of suffering, as taught. The criterion was whether or not the particular knowledge is conducive and relevant for realizing nirvana. A man hit by an arrow, the Buddha further said, would die before he knew the answers if he were to insist that he should know all the details of his attacker before he were to be treated. This pragmatic attitude to knowledge adopted in Buddhism underscores that gaining knowledge ought to be a meaningful exercise and suggest that gaining knowledge for knowledge’s sake is a waste of time.7 The thrust of the argument is that the alleged inherent ignorance of human beings is not a ground for holding a form of religious relativism. What lies at the heart of the confusion is the misconceived belief that holding a truth claim is an impediment for dialogue. If what we mean by dialogue is what Nostra Aetate says, namely, “to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions, ... while witnessing to their own religion” holding that one’s own religion is better, truthful or more truthful is not a hindrance to dialogue. The Buddha demonstrated this through his own life. As a religious teacher who had a message to give to the society the Buddha worked hard and communicated his message forcefully. On the other hand, he never thought that he should do so any cost or do so by resorting to blameworthy means. As we saw earlier there are many instances of the Buddha visiting the place of other religious people and them visiting the Buddha. Besides, Buddhism has learnt and borrowed many things from its contemporary religions. When it came to the core issue of religion, however, there was no compromise. Every religion, including Buddhism, has its own logic of conversion. What seems to be lacking is an ethics of conversion to give vision to logics. The question is serious: on the one hand, since religions feel so strongly about the people who are not on the right path there is an acute sense of urgency to propagate one’s religion. On the other hand, however, when more than one religion make conflicting truth claims there is bound to have turmoil. It is a shame if religions have to be provided guidance by the secular law in observing an ethic of conversion. Religions will have to use their own resources and come up with an ethics to meet the situation. More than in any other time, today in this globalized society where close proximity with heterogeneous people is a fact of life 7  See Culamāunkya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya ( 63 ) for the complete text.

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religions have to develop their own system of good behavior. Perhaps the following episode from the life of the Buddha give some direction to the kind of proposed ethics (M 56 Upali-sutta). When Upali, a wealthy householder and follower and supporter of Jainism, offered to become a disciple, the Buddha warned him to think again and not to rush into a decision. When Upali reiterated his wish, the Buddha accepted him as a follower but asked him not to discontinue his support for the Jain religion. The Buddha’s behavior highlights both his commitment for what is right in religion, which he cannot compromise, and his respect for pluralism in religion.

Conclusion Theistic and non-theistic religions seem to represent two incommensurable universes, which are mutually irreducible. Each religion involves its own world view, attitudes, assumptions and histories. One cannot shift from one to the other without making substantial adjustment in one’s own world view. Difference and diversity do not need to be taken necessarily as evil. The challenge is to forge a mechanism to live with such differences and diversities. Track record of Buddhism in the field of conversion has not been blameworthy. It has not resorted to force or coercion to propagate its teaching. Although at times it has been rough on its own groups it has been peaceful with other religions. What Buddhism seems to need is to continue to follow its age-old tradition of what the late KN Jayatilleke described as “critical tolerance” ( Jayatilleke 1986-7, 29). As we saw earlier, Buddhism is a religion without a central authority and hence, as in many other cases, on interreligious dialogue too, it does not have an ‘official’ position. Nevertheless, in the globalized world of today where intensity and frequency of interaction is increasing accelerating Buddhists cannot ignore the need for evolving a more organized structure without, of course, doing violence to its liberal and non-hierarchical character. In spite of the example set by the Master, at present the Buddhists seem to be quite content within their own premises and do not seem to be going out to meet other religionists. The resultant ignorance can create a gap which leads to suspicious. Although dialogue is not without instances of lack of clarity and uncertainties it is a step in the right direction. As a result of Nostra Aetate religionists know much more about their counterparts than they did four decades ago. It is worth celebrating and worth continuing for the decades to come.

10. Religious Conflicts and Religious Truths; Are Conflicting Truth Claims Responsible for Religious Conflicts?*

Introduction It is a fundamental assumption in any religion that it alone is true and all the others are false. A second religion would not have arisen if people were totally convinced of the truthfulness of the earlier religion. Thus strong truth claims can be seen as characteristic of all religions. Although it is generally believed that being dogmatic about religious claims lead the adherents to be intolerant and aggressive to other religionists, this does not necessarily have to be in that manner. While it is generally true that dogmatism could lead to conflicts, there is no contradiction in one’s having uncompromising religious beliefs and being tolerant to religious claims held by others. Furthermore, holding a truth claim does not necessarily mean that one is dogmatic about it in a negative sense. One may well make a truth claim and adhere to it but yet may be tolerant to other possibilities. Throughout human history there have been conflicts for which religions have served as the immediate cause. This phenomenon is very much a characteristic of our lived reality today. Inter-religious dialogue and other kinds of effort at establishing harmony between and among religions are being followed in order to remedy the situation. In such efforts, very often, it is assumed that there must be some form of relativism as a necessary condition. In other words, it is believed that in order to establish inter-religious harmony religions must renounce their exclusive truth claims and be ready to accept a form of relativism of religion. * A Paper presented at International Association for the History of Religions Conference on ‘Culture and Religious Mosaic of South and Southeast Asia: Conflict and Consensus through Ages’, New Delhi, January, 2005.

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In this paper, I am going to argue that the epistemological move outlined above does not have a direct correlation to inter-religious harmony. Nor does it serve as a precondition for the same. The inter-religious harmony is desirable, no doubt. It, nevertheless, needs to be achieved without compromising the soteriological value of participant religions.

Relativism and the problem of truth in religion The debate about the truth-status of religions is not a recent phenomenon. It is recorded in the discourses of the Buddha that religionists during his period used to assert very strongly that their view alone is true and the rest is empty. People always make strong assertions regarding their religious beliefs. This is particularly so when the claims of religion are given as the truth revealed by a supernormal being. We witness that, throughout human history people have been debating over the issues of religion without ever being able to convince the others totally. In the ancient Indian context, these religious debates often deteriorated to acrimonious verbal fights coupled with attacks on person’s character. In other places these debates went so far as to take form of wars fought between and among groups and countries, in some cases, killing large numbers. This is too well known to be elaborated. Relativism in religion is a more recent trend. It is really an impact of philosophy and political theory on religion. Pluralism as a highly desired attitude and mode of behaviour is also a result of the changes of ideas in these academic fields. Cultural relativism, for example, holds that different cultural traditions are valid on their own and, consequently, it is held that values, ethical principles etc. can sharply differ from each other and still be held to be true and valid in their own contexts. There is, however, a difference in relativism in the field of religion. Relativism in religion basically holds that any given religion can be true like others. The difference, unlike in cultural relativism, is that the relativist position is backed by the belief that all religions in the world are one in some fundamental sense. In this view, the obvious multiplicity of religions is only apparent and not real. In the ancient Indian Vedic literature this idea has been expressed by the following statement: ekaṃ hi sat viprābahudhāvadanti: sat in only one; the sages describe it in many different manners’. In this analysis different religions are merely different ways of perceiving and describing the same fundamental reality. Relativism if at all is only at the level of perception and language and not at the level of reality. The distinction between appearance and

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reality is well known in philosophy. It says that the same reality may appear differently to different people. These differences are described as resulting from differences in cultural categories. More recently, some philosophers of religion have tried to use this philosophical concept of relativism in order to explain the diversity of religions. A case in point is John Hick (An Interpretation of Religion, the University of Yale Press, New Heaven, 1989). Hick notices that different religions describe reality differently and says that ‘world is religiously ambiguous’. Deriving inspiration from the philosophical position or relativism Hick thinks that we are not in a position to determine which religion is true and which is otherwise. From this it is one step further to claim that all religions are equally true (He could equally resort to a kind of negativism!). Hick, of course, does not opt for these relatively easy positions. Instead he finds a way to suggest that all religions are ultimately one. It is as follows: Hick claims that all religions invariably have a transcendental reality as their ultimate goal. It can be a personal God or deity, called by such different names as Yahweh, Allah etc., as in the case of theistic religions; or it can be an impersonal principle such as Nirvana, Tathata or Atman/Brahman as in the case of non-theistic traditions. The first category is called by him ‘personae’ of religion while the second is called ‘impersonae’. His thesis is that all the religions in the world ultimately refer to one and the same higher reality which he calls ‘the real’ or ‘the transcendental’. The sharp distinctions across religious traditions, in Hick’s view are nothing but the results of cultural difference. In other words, different cultures have historically perceived the highest reality in different manners, at times, differing from one another sharply. In this analysis, differences ultimately are valid only at the levels of perception and language, but not at the level of reality. Although Hick’s program derives from the philosophical position of relativism, it ultimately tries to locate an ‘Archimedian’ point in religion where all the differences would disappear and things would appear alike. Precisely the same mentality can be seen active in the field of religion in general and in particular to a large extent, in the process called religious Dialogue. The underlying perception seems to be that cooperation and harmony among religions is impossible so long as there are differences. This compels one to look for all the ways and the means to find similarities and explain away the differences. In addition to the more serious problem of the alleged ‘transcendental’ in religion, I see two problematic assumptions here: One is that lack of differences or presence of similarities necessarily guarantees harmony and cooperation.

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The other is that presence of differences will rule out the possibility of harmony and cooperation. Our day-to-day experience amply shows that people with divergent views, attitudes, world-views, cultures and religions find themselves in situations where they develop meaningful working relations in spite of such differences. Do religions by their very nature pose a serious threat to such a possibility? In other words, are religious differences such that they make holders of divergent faiths incapable of cooperating with one another? In answering these questions we have to be aware of the strong attachment adherents develop towards their religious traditions. Every religion has, as one of its fundamental assumptions, that all the other religions are flawed and hence wrong in some crucial sense. While this type of understanding can make one emotionally attached to one’s own religion it also could make one dislike and hate others who do not share the same. We must furthermore remember that there can be quite sincere feelings on the part of the followers of a certain religion, motivated purely by altruistic kindness, to share with others what they think to be the truth. In such a case, it is understandable that one could have a strong urge for propagating one’s religion among those who are ‘misguided’ or ‘doomed’. In this manner, adherence to a religion can be characterized by a strong sense of being right and having true belief only in itself whereas all others have false ones. This attitude makes one to consider only oneself as righteous and moral whereas all others, being wrong, unrighteous and immoral. Such a mentality makes cooperation and harmony with others almost impossible. Since, unlike politics or any similar ideological persuasion, religion pervades one’s entire life it adds to this difficulty in an acute manner. The traditional response to religious diversity has been to do one’s best to eliminate it. This was done either by converting into one’s own, by means,1 those who followed other religions or by extirpating them totally. Today the second option is getting obsolete although by no means absent. To concede that all religions are true is a more recent response. The problem with this position is that it spurs the need to establish that all religions in the ultimate sense is one and the same. This is a theoretically problematic position to hold. The ‘transcendental thesis’ as articulated by such scholars as John Hick is based on the claim that all religions have a transcendental principle at their apex and that this transcendental is one and the same. These claims cannot be established 1  Using any means to convert was deemed better than leaving the poor souls to be doomed to the eternal hell fire!

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without doing substantial damage to both theistic and non-theistic religions. I do not plan to go into details of this issue at this juncture. I have shown elsewhere, that nirvana as the Buddhist religious experience is different in kind from what is spoken of as religious experience in theistic religious traditions (Tilakaratne 1993). The underlying belief in this move, as we noticed earlier, is that harmony and cooperation is impossible in the presence of differences. But if differences do exist then it is meaningless not to acknowledge them. I think the challenge before us, the adherents of religions, is to find a way to cooperate and be in harmony with others while accepting that there are differences. Any religion, explicitly, has a critique of other religions. An essential element of this critique is that it alone is true and good and that the rest is not so. The arrival of any new religion is a result of growing dissatisfaction with the previous religions. For example, Buddhism would not be there if Siddhartha was totally satisfied with Brahmanism, the predominant religion at that time in India. In the like manner Christianity would not be there if Jesus was satisfied with the Judaic religious practice of his day. The same holds true for Islam. In this manner, the new religion is always a rejection of the old. There is an explicit truth claim contained here. To take it away from a religion means to deprive it of its very reason for existence. To say that all religions are equally true in the same sense is to be nice and courteous no doubt, but it also means to lack in sincerity and seriousness. A culture of religious tolerance built on a false foundation cannot last long. The answer to the psychological problem associated with adherence to any particular religion, I think, lies partly in renouncing the monopoly for absolute truth and goodness. For example, accepting that Christianity as a theistic religion and Buddhism as a non-theistic religion are different in a fundamental sense should not bar us from seeing the contribution of each religion for the human welfare and happiness. To this extent each religion has to be recognized as good and true in so far as each religion is internally consistent in its belief and practices. The answer, in part, also lies in our ability to accept the right of others with divergent belief systems, including those that are wrong and misguided by our own definition, to share the world with us. The inter-religious dialogue today, in most cases, is guided by the misconception that for religions to live together they must, somehow or other, be made to assume uniformity. Perhaps, some lessons from the Buddha would be helpful in this context. The Buddha held that

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the Path to attain Nirvana is nothing other than the Noble Eightfold Path taught by him. In so far as this conviction is concerned, he equally held that all the other religious systems were not leading to Nirvana (aniyyānika) and hence unsatisfactory (anassāsika) . With this conviction, the Buddha spent his entire enlightened life to convince his listeners of his teaching. The only means he followed, however, to achieve this goal was teaching, an act which is described as ‘the miracle of teaching’ (adesanā pāṭihāriya). He clearly denounced using any miraculous powers in converting people although he himself has used such abilities in extremely limited contexts. As records show, the success rate of the Buddha’s conversion was very high. Nevertheless, it is clear that there were those who were not convinced by him. Although he had his concern for them the Buddha never trespassed the limits of rational persuasion. It is a well known case that the Buddha was not able to help his neighbour, a man called Cunda, who lived by slaughtering pigs. Obviously, there were limits within which the Buddha had to operate even in such sublime efforts as bestowing the highest gift, namely, the gift of Dhamma, to people. It is clear that the Buddha respected these limits and as a result was not deluded to fancy that he could convert the entire population of the ‘middle land’ (majjhimadesa) of India where he lived. Like the Buddha, the followers of the Buddha too believe that the Path taught by the Buddha is the only Path to attain Nirvana and that nirvana alone is the true eradication of suffering. They equally believed that they must make this message available to as many people as possible. But throughout the history the Buddhists have never deviated from the path of rational persuasion in propagating the message of the Buddha. This holds true even with regard to the modern-day dharmadūtas who go to countries that are not traditionally Buddhist. What the Buddhists ask for is the same decency and understanding from others who come to traditionally Buddhist countries for propagation of their religions. Coming to the phenomenon of globalization of religion: there is an even greater danger in asserting that all religions are one. The end result of this way of thinking is that ultimately those religions with lesser organizational structures and lesser financial capacities will ultimately be submerged in the more powerful. This will be the effect of globalization on religion. We can see that this is already happening. As it was revealed at a recent meeting of the Theravada Buddhist countries held in Colombo all these countries are threatened with what is described as ‘unethical conversions’. We do not need to go outside in order to look for evidence. In Sri Lanka itself, it is happening at the moment under various covert

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mechanisms. For example, it is well known how in Sri Lank these religious organizations register themselves as companies under the companies law making use of the loophole of the legal system. It is widely believed that these organizations are funded by evangelical organizations in the United States or in allied countries. This clearly shows that globalization does not spare any aspect of human life in these societies that are at the receiving end. The culture of peace we are aiming at today needs to address this issue seriously. Globalization is not only aiming at creating an economy and a culture but also a religion that is centred around the most powerful in the world. As far as religion is concerned, once it is established that all religions are one, the theoretical part of the battle is already won. The rest is a matter of power, resources and organizational skills. As a result, all the traditional Buddhist countries in the world are forced to engage, in addition other forms of battles, also in a battle for religious survival. It is not easy to imagine an environment of friendship and cooperation in such a situation. As is evident from the statement, I quoted from President Sukarno the future envisaged by the regional leaders about five decades back was one in which all religions live while they let others live. The situation today is the total undermining of this noble aspiration. Religions need to address this issue with utmost sincerity and come up with a plan for the future based on respect for religious rights of all peoples. Acceptance of this type of plan will mean that religions will have to rethink their strategies to convert the entire humanity. This should not be misunderstood as asking religions to stop their activities of propagation. The urge to tell the ‘good news’ of one’s own religion is quite fundamental to religions and it is unrealistic to ask religions to halt this. What the religions can do however, is to adopt a policy of nonaggressive propagation that recognizes the basic principle of ‘live and let live’. Any religion that envisages a universe entirely converted to one’s own religion at some future date cannot see directly into the eyes of another religion. One cannot have overt or covert plans to convert the entire humanity and still talk about coexistence and cooperation. Time has come for religions to acknowledge, face and address this issue openly and honestly. If religions are genuinely worried about globalization I do not think that they can sidetrack this problem. In other words, if religions are worried about economic or cultural globalization they must equally be worried about religious globalization. In this manner, the answer is neither the religious fundamentalism exemplified by globalization of religion nor relativism of truth.

11. Buddhism from Jesuits’ Eyes*

The Buddha and Jesus is an anthology of scholarly papers by Jesuits engaged in Buddhist studies and interreligious dialogue. The collection contains 16 papers presented by Jesuit scholars (excepting the one by pastor Yong Un Choe) at several meetings of the Jesuit Conference of Asia Pacific between 2009 and 2014. Introducing the papers Mark Raper S.J., the president of the conference, says: They are the fruit of a group of Christian, for the most part Jesuit scholars of Buddhism, who live in various parts of Asia and who meet each year to share their experience of engaging in dialogue with Buddhists and with the way of the Buddha, as it is lived in contemporary Asia. (p.vii) Raper’s remarks capture the general flavor of the studies in the collection. They are studies done by Jesuits who live Asia where the larger majority is Buddhist. Jesuits are known and recognized for their academic pursuits. In particular, they are not novices in Buddhist studies as exemplified by the scholars of the caliber of Fr. Aloysius Pieris in Sri Lanka who is both a recognized theologian and authority in Buddhist philosophy. Although not all the papers are comparative or directly related to interreligious dialogue, they all arise in inter-religious contexts. Encounters in inter-religious contexts are not always cordial or mutually ennobling. In fact, it remains the case in many instances even today. One always tends to find fault with the other, and the result is the outright rejection of what is different from one’s own religion. The present collection is a total opposite to this general approach: it celebrates differences and * The Buddha and Jesus: An Anthology of articles by Jesuits engaged in Buddhist studies and inter-religious dialogue Ed. Cyril Veliath SJ Kelaniya, Sri Lanka: Tulana Jubilee Publications (on behalf of the Jesuit Conference of Asia Pacific) 2015.

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promotes inter-religious understanding and cooperation. Symbolizing that inter-religious understanding is very important for both Buddhism and Christianity, the book at the very beginning reproduces quotes from the Dalai Lama and Pope Francis in addition to Fr Adolfo Nicholas, Superior General of the Society of Jesus. Inter-religious dialogue, as a specific Christian religious activity, is a result of the Vatican II (1964-65) convened by Pope John XXIII. For the Roman Catholic Church, it marked the beginning of the policy of openness to other religions which up to that point was either neglected or treated with hostility. Study of other religions and dialogue with them are features that have become established by now in the Christian world. This does not mean that everything is crystal clear or that everyone is unanimous about the practice of dialogue or its modes of operation. As far as the work under review is concerned, it does not deal with these ‘meta’ issues, but is concerned with inter-religious understanding and dialogue directly, but importantly, with implications for both understanding and dialogue in a wider sense. The first paper by Jerry Cusumano, “Reflections on some psychological aspects of Zen”, is written from both personal and academic points of view. The author being a Jesuit discusses his seventeen-years practice of Zen meditation on koan on ‘mu’ (nothing). He recounts his progress with trial and error in this meditation, and concludes with some insights on psychology, psychoanalysis and therapy. Cusumano’s discussion is a representative of the genre of the studies included in the anthology, studies which involve both theory and practice illuminating mutually. The detailed list of references in English on Zen, psychotherapy and psychology is a useful guide for further research. A study that apparently goes contrary to this characterization is Paulus Agung Wijayanto’s “Nirvana as the unconditioned dharma, according to the Sarvastivada school and their controversies.” This is a thorough study of the concept of nirvana in Sarvastivada, one of the leading scholastic Buddhist schools, characterized by their robust realism, namely, the tri-temporal existence of all phenomena. The study goes deep into the Buddhist scholastic debate on the real nature of phenomena (and noumena) but does not draw any comparative conclusions which the author could have done with the ‘Unconditioned Dharma’ which has some affinities with the Christian concept of God. A similar effort is Yuichi Tsunoda’s paper, “The relation between Dharmakara Bodhisatva and Amitabha: Structure of the dharma-body

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of Buddha as a compassionate means of salvation” which discusses the relation between the particular bodhisattva and Amitabha Buddha in the Mahayana Buddhist religious practice. Again the author does not draw any comparative conclusions. But these pure academic exercises in scholastic Buddhism and the mainstream Mahayana Buddhist practice respectively, reminding of earlier pioneering studies by Fr. Etienne Lamotte, and those of Aloysius Pieris, S.J. more recently, fit well into the collection by being efforts by Christian religionists to understand deep Buddhist doctrinal concepts with important implications to interreligious understanding and dialogue. Thierry-Jean Robouam’s paper, “An introduction to the daily ritual prayers of Shingon devotees” is a study of a house-hold Shingon ritual from a Christian perspective. It is comparative in its approach and serves to inter-religious understanding directly. The author’s ‘observer-participant’ approach with much empathy adds to the value of the discussion. Noel Seth’s paper on “Contemporary Buddhist social and political activism in Asia” and S. Lawrence’s “Buddhist education and its relevance today” may also be included in the same category as Robouam’s paper. The former studies examples of such Buddhist social and political activism as that of Ambedkar (India), Ariyaratne (Sri Lanka), Sivaraksa (Thailand), Thich Naht Hanh (Vietnam) and HH Dalai Lama (Tibet), and concludes with a comparative note, showing how the Buddhist activism differs from that of Christianity. The latter is a shorter piece emphasizing particularly the value of introducing mindfulness meditation to the educational institutes which the author believes “will undoubtedly pave the way for a dawning of a new era, an era of peace and harmony” (P. 418). Joseph Ng Swee Chun’s piece on “Further along the exploring path of dialogue between Meister Eckhart and Zen Buddhism: God into the Godhead and the enlightenment toward absolute nothingness” is a comparative study between the ultimate religious goal of Meister Eckhart, a medieval Christian mystic and Zen Buddhism. In this well researched piece of work, the author finds how both Zen and Meister Eckhart resonate each other in their insistence on finally ‘getting rid of’ the attachment to the Buddha and God as the true liberation/ salvation. S Lawrence’s “The Buddha’s psycho-spirituality at the service of Ignatian spirituality” begins with an analysis of the Buddha’s views on mind, and goes on to show how the Buddhist teachings help one to develop one’s own inner strength, and concludes by discussing how

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the Buddhist practice of mindfulness can help Ignatian practitioner to engage in his/her practice more effectively. Both studies go beyond types of garden variety comparative studies which tend to get satisfied with locating superficial similarities or differences. The two studies go deep into the Christian and Buddhist traditions in order to draw their conclusions. The unapologetic and objective approach of the two papers to the subject matter provides those who wish to embark on comparative studies with text book examples of how to do such studies. There are some interesting studies on modern Buddhist movements and the people who are responsible for such movements. “The debate in China on humanistic Buddhism” by Thierry Meynard, “The dilemma of the “Supreme”: Zen meditation method in Korea and rethinking the Zen master Seungsahn” by Yong Un Choe, and “A radical orthopraxis of Theravada Buddhism” by In-gun Kang may be included in this category. Meynard’s piece is a study of the modernist stances of two Chinese Buddhist masters, Liang Shuming (1893 -1988), ‘who upheld a clear separation between Buddhism and society, thereby preserving the function of religion as a vehicle of radical criticism’ and Taixu (18901947), ‘the most important Buddhist reformer of the first half of the twentieth century in China’ and his pupil, Yinshun (1906-2005) who, following his teacher, promoted the view that Buddhism should be used to tackle social problems. The author approaches the debate between two Buddhist factions objectively, and having shown how Taixu’s reforms did not succeed, he suggests that the failure may not be ‘intrinsic’ to Buddhism, as Liang had reasoned out, but may have been triggered by ‘external causes’ such as the rise of Communism. Choe’s study of ‘Kanhwa Son’, the official meditation practice of the main order of the Korean Buddhism, Chogye order, deals with a central issue of the contemporary Korean Buddhism. Although the Korean adaptation of the Chinese Chan goes as far back as Pojo Chinul (1158-1210), the debates on it have continued to the present. The author discusses in detail the world-wide propagation activities of the contemporary master Seungsahn and the resultant popularity of Kanhwa Son around the world, and concludes with some remarks on the uncertain future of this form of meditation. In-gun Kang’s study on Buddhadasa, the Thai Buddhist master whose radical interpretations of the Dhamma has won him many admirers worldwide, is based on his doctoral dissertation on radical orthopraxis of Bhikkhu Buddhadasa and Aloysius Peiris. In this paper

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he focuses on the Buddhist aspect represented by Buddhadasa. He discusses Buddhadasa’s hermeneutical theory of two levels of language, his concept of ‘void-mind’ leading to personal transformation and dhammic socialism, Buddhadasa’s political philosophy. The author presents Buddhadasa’s thought as consistent and internally coherent, but finds some weaknesses in his political theory and activism, showing that his is a critical study of the Buddhist orthopraxis as interpreted by Buddhadasa, one of the leading contemporary Thai Buddhist masters. All three studies share one thing in common: none leave any trace that the studies have been done by one who belongs to a different religious tradition. All three studies are examples of unbiased and critical approach to religious issues. Although all papers have something to do with inter-religious understanding and dialogue, there are three pieces that directly deal with issues related to inter-religious dialogue. Christian Cochini’s paper on “Dialogue with the Buddhists in China”, Bernard Senecal’s piece on “Jesus Christ encountering Gautama Buddha: BuddhistChristian relation in South Korea” and Wajira Nampet’s piece on “ An inculturation of faith in practice: The Thai Catholic use of royal words” may be included in this category. Cochini’s study is a result of visiting 157 major monasteries out of 13,000 monasteries listed in mainland China and observing Buddhist ways of life and meeting with a large number of Buddhist monks and nuns across the country. Based on his extensive study Cochini concludes: In diffusing its stimulus around the countries of the world China’s Buddhist culture will enable the advancement of its civilization, and the nation’s rise in the global sphere too will in all likelihood promote the extension of Buddhism in several countries, since appearances suggest that China today is steadily headed towards becoming a global political and economic power. The Christian community and Jesuits in particular can in no way ignore this major alignment of Chinese culture, which, together with its essential Buddhist component, is aimed at the welfare of mankind and peace in the world at large. Dialogue with Chinese Buddhists in a spirit of mutual reverence and camaraderie, will in all likelihood prove to be one of our most stimulating enterprises in the years to come. (p.114) Senecal’s discussion of Buddhist-Christian relations in South Korea is interesting in the sense that it deals with some of the most common

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problems and issues connected to Buddhist-Christian inter-religious dialogue, not only in South Korea but anywhere in the world where dialogue is attempted. For instance, the paper refers to apparent lack of enthusiasm of Buddhists toward dialogue, and the suspicion one is most likely to be subjected to by one’s own group and by the other as well when one ventures into dialogue. The author refers to the case of the pastor Lee Ch’ansu’s who was filmed by ESB television network crew when he made bows before a Buddha statue and consequently was denied of renewal of his teaching contract at a Christian university. It is after a long trial that lasted for four years that he was finally reinstated. The author anticipates a day when Korean Christians could, along with Paul Knitter, say “Without Buddha I could not be a Christian” and likewise the Buddhists in Korea say “without Jesus I could not be a Buddhist”. The paper, however, seems to suggest that, despite the author’s optimism, there is a long way to this promised land. Nampet’s discussion of the Thai Catholic use of royal words in the context of Christian religion is an interesting study on the Thai culture and religion. The adoption of vernacular by Christians in nonChristian cultures is largely a result of Vatican II, and debated issue the practice of which is not possible without much giving and taking. In the Thai culture the issue is the use of the royal language in order to refer to God and other Christian concepts. Depending on the particular culture the language issue discussed here can take different shapes. For instance, in the Sinhala Buddhist culture in Sri Lanka, the issue is the Christian adoption of the Buddhist terms and concepts which give rise to a set of different cultural and philosophical issues. With a living tradition of monarchy the situation of the Thai Christians is unique. The author finds the practice of using royal language quite in agreement with the way of the Thai culture for “royal words are essential expression of the unique relationship the Thais have to their king (namely the relationship of a father to his children). Thus, Abba (Dad) and Phrabida (Almighty Father) for instance, convey the same filial connotation for Thai Catholics, since the father-child bond is hidden or concealed in the expression of royal words” (p.254). Jojo M. Fung’s two pieces, “Sacred time for a sacred sojourn in the mystical age” and “The great spirit in indigenous peoples’ lives and the future of pneumatology” do not seem, at the first sight, to have direct connection to Buddhist Christian dialogue, nonetheless interesting for both the new-ness of the subject matter and the anticipated wider global

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applicability of the approach. The first piece discusses Mystical Age, which is the age we are supposed to be in, and how it ‘calls for a mystagogy that employs an Ignatian pedagogy for a sacred sojourn in a Sacred Time’. The discussion is based on the author’s field experience with indigenous people for more than two decades, which, according to him necessitates shifting away from the usual neo-liberal and rationalistic anthropology and cosmology and adopting a new mystical anthropology and cosmology which ultimately will enable people to develop capacity for ‘a mystical union with the Great Spirit/Creator Spirit’. The second piece tries to draw implications of the Great Spirit in the lives of indigenous people on Christian pneumatology. The author believes that this new approach will have beneficial implications on larger global issues such as ecological crisis. The latter piece in particular is interesting for the conclusions it draws and challenging for the new approach it proposes for pneumatology which is for the Christian scholars to deal with. Both studies seem to be premised on the assumption that there are universally applicable uniform phenomena called ‘indigenous’ and Great Spirit’. Given the vastness of indigenous people and their conceptions of ‘Great Spirit’ (or lack of it), this basic assumption appears problematic. The two papers, nevertheless, widen our inter-religious understanding and in that way fits well into the scope of the anthology. To conclude, The Buddha and Jesus is a useful addition to the already existing substantial literature on inter-religious understanding and dialogue. In addition to demonstrating how wide-spread is the Jesuits’ interest in Buddhist studies, it widens our knowledge of Buddhist Christian relations in some key geographical areas of Asia. Going beyond this knowledge-aspect, the anthology provides a fine example of proper inter-religious approach characterized by a sense of respect, openness, objectivity and criticality. I think it is here that the true value and strength of the anthology lies.

12. Vain Debates: The Buddhist Christian Controversies of Nineteenth Century Ceylon*

R V Young and GPV Somaratne’s Vain Debates is the latest addition to the much discussed subject of inter-religious debates in the nineteenth century Sri Lanka, (which was then called Ceylon). According to the authors, the key feature in their treatment of the subject is that they make use of some hitherto unused or lesser used materials, in particular, Olaleaf tracts containing Buddhist responses to Christian critiques belonging to the first half of the nineteenth century, a period which marks the early phase of religious interactions during the British colonial rule. According to the authors, the inter-religious controversies during the nineteenth century have several ‘benchmarks’. The first is the publication of Christiāyani Prajñapti by Daniel Gogerly, the Wesleyan minister in 1849. The second occurred in 1862, the year when the Buddhists acquired the printing technology. They in fact established two printing presses. One in Colombo and the other in Galle. The third benchmark is the triumph of Mohottiwatte Gunananda in 1873, and the fourth was in 1883, the year when what is known as ‘the Kotahena riot’ took place. Although these benchmark events have been known to and discussed by other scholars long before Young and Somaratne, the two authors treat these events as pivotal in reconstructing the story of one of the most crucial periods of the modern Buddhist history of the country. * Book review on Vain Debates: The Buddhist Christian Controversies of Ninteenth Century Ceylon. eds. RV Young and GPV Somaratne, Vienna, 1996 pp 236. The Review was first published in The Buddha and Jesus: An Anthology of articles by Jesuits engaged in Buddhist studies and inter-religious dialogue Ed. by Cyril Veliath S.J. (Kelaniya, Sri Lanka: Tulana Jubilee Publications (on behalf of the Jesuit Conference of Asia Pacific, 2015).

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The first chapter of the book discusses the background and the methodology. The second sets out the historical setting of the debates. Starting from, the third, the discussion is on benchmark events. The treatment of the authors the first three benchmarks of their story, to a great extent, is based on literary sources: the first is centred on Gogerly’s Christiyāni Prajñapti which, according to the authors, “was an incisive work of polemical apologetics based on some of the most exacting research then being done by European scholars in the Pali Canon”.1 The third chapter is devoted to an account of Gogerly’s impact on the interreligious debates in the country. The authors make clear how Gogerly set the tone of the subsequent Buddhist-Christian debates by raising controversial doctrinal issues from the Pali Texts. The second phase of the controversies was conducted through tracts from both sides. The Christians had an advantage over the Buddhists for they owned printing presses from the beginning, and they were able to produce material in print on a mass scale whereas the Buddhists had only Ola-leaves at their disposal. Starting from 1862, the Buddhists too were able to produce printed tracts on mass scale for it is during that year that they acquired a printing press. The fourth chapter focuses on this phenomenon. The third and the culminating point of the interreligious debates is marked by the debate at Panadura. It is the subject matter of the fifth chapter. The sixth and last chapter discusses the developments subsequent to the Panadura debate: the rise of theosophy and its conflicts with Gunananda and others, the role of Dharmapala and finally, the riot at Kotahena. The account presented above does not, by any means, try to summarize the extremely rich and complex content of the book under discussion. The volume brings out many interesting and important aspects of these series of events that spanned nearly a century. It also brings out interesting pieces of information on the personal life of those figuring prominently in the events under review. However, the view of the present reviewer is that the chief merit of the book lies in the interpretative aspect which arises from the entire narration. At the very outset of the book, the authors outline the objectives in the following words: Our intention in this monograph is to map the general contours and developmental phases of a socio religious revival movement of the nineteenth century insofar as that revival was articulated in reaction to Christianity (33). 1  It is not quite sure whether the most exacting research then being done by

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Expanding on this goal the authors further say: Our goal has been modest, to clarify the historical record and contribute to a better understanding of what the symptomatic features of revivalism in the Buddhist South were. We are not theoreticians, nor was the construction of a comprehensive paradigm to the interpretation of revivalism in Ceylon or any other Theravada Buddhist society our objective. (34) However, quite contrary to these claims, the narration of the authors has been, from the very outset, based on interpretation. I do not mean by this that the nature of all narratives of historical events is an interpretation of some sort. What I mean is, Vain Debates, starting from its very title, is meant to be an interpretation of the inter-religion controversy, in particular with regard to its Buddhist aspect. The thesis of the book is that the debates conducted by Buddhists and Christians in the nineteenth century Sri Lanka are ultimately vain. They draw this conclusion on two main grounds one theoretical and one historical. The theoretical ground takes as its premises the attitude towards learning religion articulated by the Buddha in one of the discourses in the Majjhima-nikāya, namely, the Alagaddūpama-sutta (discourse on the Parable of Water-Snake). The very last paragraph of the book articulates this premiss: Their protest was symptomatically unidirectional; it recolonized no other adversary than Christianity ... The pity is that much of the best in that Dhamma was compromised in the process of voicing their protest... The ultimate vanity of the Buddhist Christian debates of the nineteenth century is, therefore, that the revivalists failed to convince even themselves that the Dhamma could be safeguarded without grasping it like a snake by the tail. In making the concluding remarks on the Panadura debate the authors cite this Buddhist criterion in more detail: The Buddha too, as Dowbeggin had, once employed a simile of a snake to describe those who, like them, had abused his teachings to gain the advantage over others in debate merely European scholars, referred to here, had become a reality by this time. According to de Jong, the Pali studies in Europe really started in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. Although the first Pali grammar by Burnouf and Chr. Lassen was published in the textural studies in the Pali Buddhist canon had not properly started in Europe (A Brief History of Buddhism in Europe and America. Varanasi Bharat-Baharati. 1976, 13-20), it is more probable that Gogerly drew inspiration from scholars like Benjamin Clough and George Turnour who were already in the country working on Pali texts.

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in debate achieve a this-worldly acclaim; a person who grasps hold of the Dhamma out of self-interest, he said, was like a person who grasps a snake by the tail; it will recoil and bite the hand that holds it. The futility of grasping the Dhamma in this way was then explained as follows in the Aalagaddūpamasutta (Discourse on the Parable of the Water-Snake) of the Majjhima-nikāya: Herein, monks, some foolish men master dhamma…. These, having mastered the dhamma, do not test the meaning of these things by intuitive wisdom; and these things whose meaning is untested by intuitive wisdom do not become clear; they master this dhamma simply for the advantage of reproaching others and for the advantage of gossiping, and they do not arrive at the goal for the sake of which they mastered the dhamma. These things, badly grasped by them conduce for a long time to their woe and sorrow. Considering that the Dhamma did indeed appear to have been grasped by extremists such as Gunananda like a snake by the tail, and that moderates such as Hikkaduwe had acquiesced in their doing so, the question is not whether, but how badly, the hand that held it would be bitten. (180)2 Based on these two quotes, the former that summarizes the argument of the entire book and the latter that clarifies the position regarding the most crucial inter- religious event in the century, it is reasonable to say that the book under review is a critique of the debates between Buddhism and Christianity from the Alagaddūpama point of view or from an early Buddhist point of view. There cannot be anything wrong, in principle, in making such a critique. However, the way the two authors have done so raises some serious problems of methodology and interpretation. In looking at a phenomenon that took place in a particular historical setting under specific religious and social circumstances from a doctrinal point of view of early Buddhism, the authors seem to give the impression that theirs is the only right way to do so. This is to take an event from its social and historical context and to place it in a purely theoretical setting. This can definitely be one way of looking at these events, but not the only way, and not at all one that can do justice to the historical nature of the series of events under review. The historical premiss on which the authors hold their claim may 2  The authors come to their favorite discourse on the parable of water-snake again at 195.

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be summarized in the following manner: The Christians who came to Sri Lanka in the early nineteenth century, wanted to understand Buddhism and for that they wanted to engage the Buddhists in debates. What they wished was a response from the Buddhists but to their utter dismay, what they received instead was a reaction. The Buddhist monks who were responsible for this reaction did so, in different degrees, by violating the spirit of the reaching of the Buddha. The debates, in this manner, did not contribute to mutual understanding between the Buddhists curd Christians. Therefore, they are vain. In this reasoning, the very first premiss, that the Christian missionaries who came to Sri Lanka challenged the Buddhists in debates in order to understand them, is historically wrong. These missionaries were quite firm in their minds that they had the right religion and that all the other religionists were pagans who were bound to hell. There was no question of mutual understanding. It was not an issue. What they wanted was to replace Buddhism (and Hinduism) with their own religion. As the authors themselves, admit the Buddhists were drawn into debates by the Christians. In doing so, they were trying to use a method they had successfully tried elsewhere. The sole purpose was the victory and elimination of Buddhism from the religious scene. The problems started when they gradually realized that this was not easily done, and that they had grossly underestimated the, strength of the indigenous religion. For example, after a very serious defeat at the Baddegama debate, George Parsons, the main Christian participant, seems to have realized the danger of antagonizing the Buddhists. The authors comment on some of Parsons’ remarks by stating that “these were many signs he saw of the futility of debates, as fuel to feed the boiler of controversy·· (146) (italics added). From the point of view of those Christians who participated in the debates they started seening the futility of challenging Buddhists because their own strategy started backfiring on them. However, for the authors the debates were futile for they did not contribute to mutual understanding. The truth of the matter is that this mutual understanding was not at all an issue. It was surely so on the part of Christians who believed that they could replace Buddhism with their own religion within a very short period of time. In addition to attributing to the missionaries a benign motive of working towards inter-religious understanding, the overall portrayal of European rulers in Sri Lanka by the authors has been overtly sympathetic.

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On the general religious policy of these powers the authors make the following observation: While it is false to say that the Christianization had been imposed on Ceylon by any of the European powers, which anyway were constrained by commercial incentives not to antagonize the indigenous population, it was certainly true that a system of inducements was put into effect that favoured baptism and the acculturation of the colonial mentality. (39) (On inducements, see also 40). What is meant to be covered by the euphemism ‘inducement’ in the history of colonial Sri Lanka, in particular, in the field of general education, is too well-known to he elaborated. The authors support their claim by saying that “the Sinhalese, not excluding even the bhikkhus among them, continued to be enamoured of the blandishments of Europeanization and Christianization” (40). It is known that the opposition of the Buddhist clergy to British rule gradually waned during the second half of the nineteenth century and that the monastic leaders such as Hikkaduwe Sri Sumanagala Thera and many others were not opposed but well-disposed to British power although they opposed Christianity vehemently. Therefore, it is not true to say that they were enamoured by both Europeanization and Christianisation. On the British religious policy, particularly up to 1850, which clearly favoured Christianity, the well-known historian KM de Silva states the following: A peculiar feature of the social policy of this period (1833-1850) was the importance attached to religion. This was partly due to evangelical influences (mainly through James Stephen) at the Colonial Office, and to men like Stewart Mackenzie (1837-41) and a host or subordinate officials in Sri Lanka who believed in the urgency or converting the ‘heathen’ to Christianity: and partly to the agitation of missionary organizations for a redefinition of the relationship between Buddhism and the colonial government in the island. During his brief tenure of office as secretary of state of the colonies in the late 1830s, Lord Glenelg had laid it down that the conversion of the people to Christianity should be a vital aspect of state policy in Sri Lanka. His successors during this period shared this belief to a greater or lesser extent. The new policy naturally implied active state support or missionary enterprise. (Silva 1981, 265)

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As de Silva explains further, although this policy became somewhat relaxed in the second half of the century the overall Christian-biased character was maintained throughout the British rule. Therefore, the characterization of the situation by the authors is far from being factual. Throughout the book not only have the debates been described as vain, but also those who participated in them have been described in quite unfriendly terms. As we saw in one of the quotes all those who participated from the Buddhist side have been portrayed as the violators of the spirit of the teaching of the Buddha. It is a known fact that such monastic leaders as Hikkaduwe Sri Sumanuala Thera were behind the public speakers such as Mohottiwatte Gunananda Thera, not only by giving them moral support but also by providing necessary doctrinal background and information. As was clear in one of the above quotes, the authors found fault with both these groups for grasping the Dhamma in the wrong manner. Their portrayal of Mohottiwatte Gunananda Thera, one who brought the entire process of hostile debates effectively to an end had been consistently negative. In the eyes of the two authors, Gunananda Thera was an ‘extremist’ (160 and many other places), or a ‘maverick, if not actually a renegade, approachable and thoroughly at home in the hurly-burly of secular life-perhaps too much so’ (223). His supporters have been described as ‘cohort of extremists’ (160 & 184). In the eyes of the authors, Gunananda Thera and his supporters, ‘maverick amarapura bhikkhus’ “were not deterred by their vows from assuming roles that might have been more appropriate for the laity” and in their behaviour they were ‘regardless of Vinaya’ (Vin I, 15). Furthermore, the authors go into details of Gunananda Thera’s personal character involving his money transactions and cast doubts on the validity of his upasampadā. The point of all this information, which could prove valuable in some other contexts, is to discredit the entire process of debate on the ground that he has been a monk of questionable morality. This ad hominem argument clearly does not have anything to do with his performance at Panadura and other debates. Furthermore, it may the true that the contemporaries of Gunananda Thera had questioned some aspects of his public behaviour; but whether he was characterized by his contemporaries as an extremist or maverick or renegade remains open to question. In the particular context of debate surely Gunananda Thera was not perceived in those terms by his contemporaries; instead he was considered a hero and a saviour. Therefore, the deprecatory

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terms referred to above betray the subjective sentiments of the authors themselves. Such condemnation is an indicator of their overall negative and subjective interpretation of the debates. The authors reaffirm their verdict on the debates on what they call intellectual ‘ground’. What follows is an example: Our approach is nonetheless one that seeks to reconstruct not only the sociological dynamics in the Buddhist-Christian controversy but also the intellectual grounds on which it was constructed, in the belief that contrastive ontologies and soteriology of Buddhism and Christianity did matter to the individuals involved, orators and spectators alike. We are, therefore, compelled to ask whether the Panadura debate was a marked improvement over the previous four in terms of the clarification-if not also the resolution-of conflicting truth-claims such that Buddhism as Buddhism could be said as it often is in Sri Lanka today to have prevailed over Christianity as Christianity. Even if measured only by the progress each party had made in moving the debate beyond the initial conceptual hurdles that the previous chapters have attempted to identify, the Panadura debate was a stunning disappointment. In this perspective Gunananda Thera’s ‘triumph” was nothing more-but certainly also nothing less-than the victory of an individual of formidable prowess in debate over other individuals who professed Christianity but with less consummate rhetorical skills. (156) In the last chapter, the authors virtually repeat the same conclusion in the following manner: Little else had been gained except the unparalleled opportunity it afforded for individuals to assert themselves and their presumptions in opposition to each other, whether in favour of Buddhism or Christianity. (217) In the first place, it is historically untrue to say that those Buddhists and Christians were worried about the conflicting truth claims of each other’s religions. The philosophical worry over conflicting truth claims and developing religious interpretations based on the resultant relativism (See An interpretation of Religion by John Hick. New Jersey. 1989 for a good example of this type of relativist articulation of religion) was not even a reality for these debaters. What the authors try to attribute to them is something that came to existence only with the so-called demise of Logical Positivism somewhere around 1950’s. Therefore, the attribution of such a post-positivist position to these debaters is simply

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unrealistic. The debaters of both sides were quite convinced on the veracity) of their own religions; what they simply wanted was to prove it in front of the public. Referring to a remark by Gunananda Thera at the Gampola debate, the authors complain that “Gunananda failed to see the commonality between Vessantara and Jephthah on any level at all’’ (150). I do not think the ignorance attributed to Gunananda Thera is the real issue here. It is simply a matter of not wanting to see any commonality, for the issue was anything but finding the truth. Nothing can be farther from the truth to say that the Panadura debate was only a personal triumph for Gunananda Thera. The authors seem to take Gunananda Thera as one isolated individual all out to prove his oratorical skills. A sense of generosity forbids me from attributing to the two authors such an unimaginably naive and simplistic view of history. Perhaps it may be the case that they simply refuse to see the implications of this crucial event in the context of the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.3 The following statement meant to summarize the aftermath of the Gunananda Thera’s debates: “The era of the imperturbable bhikkhu reticent in public affairs, eyes downcast and face screened by a fan, had come to an end’’ (115), is an exaggeration and a result of little knowledge of the monastic tradition in Sri Lanka. Subsequently, the authors compare Dhammapala apparently with Gunananda Thera: We have evidence of a reification of the once creative energies of the revivalists and a failure on their part to open up significantly new avenues of thought, expression and practice, apart from the militant defence of traditional Buddhism. Dharmapala in contrast did indeed open up authentically new pathways for the Sinhalese to be Buddhist in the modern era. (219) Here, again the authors repeat the same kind of mistake as their earlier one: Gunananda Thera and Dharmapala represent two different eras in which they had to address two different situations. Gunananda Thera was a religious leader whose immediate concern was the challenge posed to Buddhism by Christian missionaries. By the time of Dharmapala that 3  The authors do acknowledge some effect, though negative, of the Panadura debate: “one must also register dismay at the impact the Controversy has had on Sri Lanka insofar as Buddhists have become virtually unable to reflect objectively on the institutionalization of demagoguery at the expense of the very best in their own principles and tradition’’ (179-80). If this is the fate befallen on Buddhism in Sri Lanka today, though one does not know for sure whether or not it is so, it is very far fetched to hold Gunananda Thera responsible for it.

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problem was non-existent, at least, not in the same magnitude. He saw a challenge more from the Westernization than Christianization. Therefore, no one can find fault with Gunananda Thera for not doing what Dharmapala did. Furthermore, it was not the aim of Gunannda Thera to find ways for Sinhalese to be Buddhists. Although, it was for Dharmapala, Sinhaleseness was not an immediate issue for Gunananda Thera. Finally, the stand of the authors on the role of the debates in nineteenth century Sri Lanka gives rise to some problems of interpretation and methodology. What I take to be the problem of interpretation arises in this manner: According to the authors (as quoted above) by engaging in the debates in the manner they did, Gunananda Thera and others (including such sages as Hikkaduwe Sri Sumangala Thera) had taken the Dhamma in the wrong manner comparable to a person who takes a water-snake from the wrong end. Thereby all the participants have got their hands bitten in some degree or other. If not only the so-called extremists such as Gunananda Thera but also the socalled moderates had their hands bitten by the snake which suggests that, in either manner, responding to Christian challenge was something these monks should not have done. What the authors seem to maintain is that, when the Christian missionaries challenged the Buddhists to debate, they should have kept quiet, confining themselves to their kuṭis (isolated quarters for meditation).4 In support of their interpretation, as I have already shown, the authors quote Alagaddūpama-sutta repeatedly. Through this quotation and interpretation, the authors attribute a position to early Buddhism according to which the Buddha prohibited his monastic disciples to engage in anything connected with the defence of the Dhamma. In other words, the authors accuse those who engaged in debates of contradicting the teaching of the Buddha (“This was increasingly” a reified revivalism, a veritable contradiction in terms· (italics added) 184). Is this interpretation of the position of early Buddhism correct? This I would consider as a problem of understanding and interpreting the text. A broader question that arises from this kind of interpretation is what, if at all, should the Buddhist religious organization have done when another religious organization confronts it with the clear aim of elimination? First I would like to address the problem of interpretation. 4  The authors indicate that the missionaries expected a response, but they got, instead, a reaction (p.42). Again this is a misrepresentation of history. The missionaries did not need a response; they simply needed to replace Buddhism (and Hinduism). To reconstruct missionaries as needing a response is to read the present enlightened interreligious dialogue into the past where the participants had never heard of such a thing.

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Debates, inter-religious debates in particular, are not new to early Buddhism. There are many instances where the Buddha participated in such events in order to defend his teaching and, at times, to show the meaninglessness of the teachings of the others. In the discourses we find many instances when monks come to Buddha and report to him what others say about the teaching and seek the advice of the Buddha how to meet those challenging arguments. All this evidence suggests that defending one’s religious teachings in the face of criticism by others is very well recognized in early Buddhism. On the other hand, there are an equally large number of instances where the Buddha discourages debates. These are debates that are contentious and conducted with the sole aim of winning an argument for the sake of argument only. KN Jayatilleke’s explanation will be useful to clarify the seemingly incongruous situation: The Buddha’s attitude to the numerous theories which were being propagated and defended on rational grounds at this time seems to have been to ignore them. The evidence of the texts indicates that he refrained from joining issue with these dialecticians and rational metaphysicians in debates as far as possible, like some of the sceptics, though he seems to have accepted the challenge when they came to him with questions for the purpose of debate. The attitude of the Buddha is probably summed up in his own statement that ‘when a debate has arisen the sage does not enter it (vādaṃ ca jātaṃ muni no upeti: Sn 153, v. 780). In spite of this overall attitude of refraining as far as possible from debates, Jayatilleke further says that ‘the Buddha did reason with those who came to debate with him ‘ (p.408). What is clear is that the Buddha did not initiate debates but he was not hesitant to defend his teaching against criticism. The Buddhist debaters in the nineteenth century, who did not initiate debates but were forced to defend their teaching and the tradition, did not do anything different from this. In the Alagaddūpama-sutta, which the authors quote exclusively, the Buddha discourages the practice of studying the Dhamma for the sole purpose of running down others. Now when we view the circumstances relating to nineteenth century Sri Lanka, we know that Buddhists were drawn into debates by Christians who wanted to defeat Buddhism in public and thereby establish the credibility of their own religion (see 159 on how the Panadura debate originated and the authors’ own statement).5 If the Buddhists fared very well (I mean, 5  “... there can be no question but that the burden of responsibility for the

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convincingly and in a rhetorically well-articulated manner) there is no reason to find fault with them. Gunananda Thera and others cannot be accused of using the Dhamma to disparage others and thereby for self-embellishment. Therefore, the critique of the debates by the authors from the early Buddhist perspective is not applicable in this context. This totally misplaced critique results, as I have pointed out above, from a historically unrealistic view that debates were mere instances of personal glorification or failure of isolated individuals. Instead of developing a critique from an early Buddhist perspective, perhaps, the authors could have fruitfully developed a Biblical critique of the initiators of the debates and tried to articulate what Jesus would have said about this whole phenomenon. Seeing that the two authors are very serious about developing a fundamental Buddhist critique this omission seems to be a noticeable deficiency. Adding to this, have found only one instance where the authors put both sides of the debates as violating the spirit of each one’s religion: “This was all done in a spirit antagonistic to the best principles in both religions” (180). Apart from such rare exceptions, the Christian side has not been referred to in any negative manner. This overly sympathetic portrayal of the Christian missionary movement is something that pervades the entire account of Young and Somaratne. In other words, the book is openly evangelical. This becomes a problem when the supposed objective is to develop an academic and scholarly analysis. Vain Debates is a clear example of the misperceptions that can result when one’s personal religious inclinations interfere with one’s sense of objectivity. One visible deficiency in the book is that the authors do not seem to be aware of more recent research covering the same period. For instance, Elizabeth June Harris’ ‘Crisis, Competition and Conversion: The British Encounter with Buddhism in Nineteenth Century Sri Lanka’ (unpublished6 PhD thesis presented to the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya) in 1933 and some of her other published work cover, among many other things, the same material covered by the authors, but brings out a different appraisal. According to Harris, the Buddhist attitude to Christianity was initially aggravation of religious tension in Ceylon during the nineteenth century is to be attributed entirely to the aggressive evangelization of the island by Protestant Christian missionaries.” 6  By now it is published under the title: Theravada Buddhism and the British Encounter (Routeledge: Abingdon, 2006). See 191-204 for the relevant discussion in the printed version.

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marked by polite acceptance and tolerance, and subsequently by willingness to dialogue, but towards the last part of the century it had become an opposition (582). Harris’ account shows that this change on the part of Buddhists resulted from the knowledge that Christians were trying to show that Buddhism was false (588). This conclusion of Harris shows that what really happened is not what the two authors say (see footnote #4), but quite the opposite. It is really the Buddhists who faced a reaction when they in fact expected a response from the missionaries.7 The authors view their task, as we saw in one of the quoted passages, as a study of Buddhist revival in the nineteenth century insofar as it was a reaction to Christianity. If Harris is right, the very basic assumption of their project seems to be seriously flawed. A broader question that arises from the critique of Buddhism developed by the two authors is: what should the Buddhists have done in a situation where their very existence was threatened? We found that the early Buddhist critique the authors develop in this context is not applicable on account of the fact that their interpretation itself is questionable. In addition to this, we must not forget in this context that here we are dealing with the Sri Lankan Buddhist tradition which is Theravada with its own specific history. Even if how they behaved is contradictory to early Buddhism, if they behaved consistently within their own tradition following the historical role assumed by it, one cannot find fault with people like Gunananda Thera. Gunananda Thera may be taken to task if he violated the spirit of the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition. If the Theravada tradition itself was in contradiction with early Buddhism, that has to be dealt with at a different level. The point I am trying to make is that disregarding the fact that religions too have histories, taking historical events out of their context and passing judgments on them distort a clear perspective and assessment of historical events. Notwithstanding its open-to-question attempt to defend colonial religious policy and the aggressive behaviour of the Christian missionaries to Buddhists in nineteenth century Sri Lanka, Vain Debates is an interesting book to read. Its discussions on ‘protestant Buddhism’, and the division of Kammatic and Nibbanic Buddhism are worth commenting on. Concerns of space prevent me from doing so. Much of the value of the book lies in its account of the inter-religious relations during the first few decades of the nineteenth century. In particular, 7 “...Christians who sought courteous and respectful dialogue with Buddhists received courtesy in return.” (Harris 2006, 201).

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its account on early defectors from Buddhism to Christianity are interesting, and helps understand the historical roots of the suspicion the Buddhist monks have up till today about even those who have left them to become ordinary civilians. Finally, in Vain Debates, I find some interesting implications for inter-religious dialogue which has been a lively subject in the country’s religiosity for the last several decades. The book shows that interreligious controversies by no means are over. After more than a century since the Panadura debate, today, they need not be as gross as to two opposing parties vociferously confronting each other in public debates, but can be subtle and refined and appear in the form of a scholarly monograph published by a prestigious publishing house! The lesson to be learned from Vain Debates is that, old or new, subtle or gross, both inter-religious controversies and controversies over inter-religious controversies contribute little to inter-religious understanding which is worth trying.

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Vin.

Vinaya Piṭaka – The Mahāvagga – Vol. I, ed. H. Oldernberg, Pali Text Society, London, 1969. Vol. II, 1977. Vol. III, IV, and V 1964.

VinA.

Samantapāsādikā – Vol. I, eds. J. Takakusu and Nagai, M., Pali Text Society, London, 1975. Vol. II, 1969. Vol. III, 1968.

175 Vol. IV, 1966. Vol. V, 1967. Vol. VI, 1947. Vol. VIII, ed. H. Kopp, 1977. Vism.

The Visuddhi-magga of Buddhagosa, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1975.

Vvu/Pvu.

Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Yam.

The Yamaka – Vol. I and II, ed. C.R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1987.

176

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179 Perry, F. Edmond. 1980. “Can Buddhists and Christians Live Together as Kalyan-mitta?” in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, ed. Somaratne Balasooriya et al. London: Gordon Fraser. pp. 201-212. Pieris, Aloysius. 1988. Love meets Wisdom. Quezon City, Philippines: Clarentian Publications. . 1995:1. “The Christian and Buddhist Responses to the Pope’s Chapter on Buddhism” Dialogue XXII pp. 62-95. Colombo: The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue. . 1995:2. “Dialogue and Distrust Between Buddhists and Christians”. Dialogue XXII pp. 104-121. Colombo: The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue. . 2004. “Prophetic Humour in Buddhism and Christianity: Doing Inter-religious Studies in the Reverential Mood”, in Dialogue New Series vol. xxxi. Colombo: Institute for study and Dialogue. Premawardhana, Shanta. 2015. Religious Conversion: Religious Scholars Thinking Together (UK: Willey Blackwell). Rahula, Walpola. 2003. The Heritage of the Bhikkhu. 2nd impression. Colombo: Godage International Publishers Ltd. Rajashekar, J. Paul. 2012. “Discordant Notes: Proselytism in an Age of Pluralism” in Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion, vol. 3 Issue 2.14. Roloff, Carola & Wolfram Weisse. eds. Dialogue and Ethics in Buddhism and Hinduism. Munster: Waxmann. Saddhatissa, Ven, H. Tr. 1985. Suttanipāta. London: Curzon Press. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. 2008. Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions. Germany: EOS Editions of St. Ottilien. Serasinghe, Reshal. 2005-6. “Buddhist and Christian Views on the AntiConversion Bill in Sri Lanka”.Dialogue. New Series, vols. 32-33, 105131. Sheth, Noel.1988. “Buddhism and Communalism” in Religion and Society. Vol. I. xxxv. No. 04. Silva, D. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. Oxford University Press: Delhi. Stace, W. T. 1960/1976. Mysticism and Philosophy. Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tharcher Inc. Swaris, Nalin. 1999. The Buddha’s Way to Human Liberation: A Socio Historical Approach. : An Author Publication.

180 Tanner, Norman. “Ecumenical Councils and Non-Christian Religions” in Encounters with the Word: Essays to Honour Aloysius Pieris s.j. Ed. Robert Crusz, Marshall Fernando and Asanga Tilakaratne. Colombo: Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue,. Tilakaratne, Asanga. 1993. Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the Buddhist Philosophy of Reality and Language. Colombo: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies. . 1997. “Saddha: A Prerequiste of Religious Action” in Recent Researches in Buddhist Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Y. Karunadasa. edited by Kuala Lampur Dhammajoti, Asanga Tilakaratne and Kapila Abhayawansa. Colombo: Y. Karunadasa Felicitation Committee, pp. 593-611. . 2003. “Buddhist Non-theism: Theory and Application” in Approaching the Dhamma: Buddhist Texts and Practices in South and Southeast Asia ed. Ann M. Blackburn & Jefferey Samuels. Seattle: BPS Pariyatti editions. pp. 125-152. . 2003. “The Buddha and his Sangha” in pro Dialogo, Pontificium Consilium Pro Dialogue inter Religions, Citta del Vaticano. pp. 145160. . 2004. “ Aloysius Peiris on Interreligious dialogue and Problems of truth in religion: A Buddhist Perspective” in Encounters with the Word. ed. Robert Crusz, Marshal Fernando, & Asanga Tilakaratne. Colombo: Institute for Study and Dialogue. pp. 381-400.

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Index of Subjects

A abandoning 92 absolute wrong views 140 absolutism 65, 67, 121 Academic sphere 2, 4 adaequatio intelelctus ad rem 141 adesanāpātihāriya 149 adherents 18, 48 Advaita Vedanta 53 affinity 41 agape 111 aggressive 144 Alagaddūpama-sutta 160, 161, 168 Allah 66, 79, 114 almighty 38 anaññatha 39 Anglican (Church) 6 Anguttara-nikāya 26, 41, 54 annihilationist 58 Anthropology 157 anti-buddhist 11 Apannaka-sutta 137 arahanthood 58, 97 Archimedean point 139 Ariyapariyesana-sutta 48 Aryan Liberation 82 āsavakkhaya 115

atman 66, 78 avitatha 39, 140

B blameworthy 143 bodhisattva 78, 110, 153 Brahma 49, 53 Brahmajāla-sutta 36, 58,94, 95, 121, 137 brahman 52, 66, 78, 146 Brahmana tradition 96 Brahmanism 58 Brahmin/s 37,42 British Colonial rule 158 - encounter 169 Buddha sāsana 127 Buddha-hood 131 Buddha-Jayanti 127 Buddhism : early - 117,161, 168 Hinayana - 113 Mahayana - 133 Vajrayana - 133 Korean - 156 Buddhist: - Christian co - existence 8 - Christian debates 159

182 - Christian relationships 3, 7, 9, 20, 21 - and Christian academic works 5 - Christian dialogue 156 - circles 3 - clergy 163 - Councils 126 - protective chanting 7 - Schools 152 - tradition 15

C categorical answers 50 Catholic Church 49, 108, 109, 124, 126 causality 56 centralized system 129 Chinese Buddhists 155 - Buddhist Masters 154 Chogye order 154 Christian: - affairs 3 - challenge 167 - Church 17 - clergy 17 - organization 2 - preachers 64 - relationships 4 - religion11, 50 - religious life 76 - tradition 125,154, Christianity 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 21, 23, 26, 32, 48, 49, 53, 63, 65, 71, 84, 86, 114, 115, 123, 125, 129, 135, 137, 153, 161, 168 Christianization 163, 167 code of discipline 128 coherence 120 colonialism 67 consciousness 36 constitution 14

conversion 16, 18, 20, 169 unethical - 88 anti - 88 process of - 94 - in Buddhism 98 religious - 103 - of new adherents 130 Cosmology 157 covetousness 73 Creator 49 critical tolerance 143 Culadukkhakkhanda-sutta 59 Cūlahattipadopama-sutta 29 Culasīhanāda-sutta 97 Culaviyūha-sutta 37 cultural: - and historical conditions 38 - categories 146 - relativism 145

D Das Heilige 47 debates 158 defilements 73, 98 eradication of the - 130 denominator 136 Dependent co-origination 91 dependent origination 56, 58 determinism 96 Dhamma, wheel of the 74 Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta 58 dharmakāya 51 diaspora 133 Dīgha-nikāya 36, 58, 121, 137 dīpa-pasadaka 17 discrimination 47 doctrinal 26 dogmatic 144 dual-miracle 104 duel belonging 72-86 Dutch 13, 64

183

E Early Buddhism 161, 168 Ecological crisis 157 Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue 5 empirical 55 English 13 - language 6 enlightened 29 enlightenment 49 epistemological 57,68 - problem 66 -aspect 90 eschatology 55 eternal 93 - hell 66 eternalist view 58 ethics 55 euphemism 163 European scholars 159 Europeanization 163 Europeans 13 Evangelical groups 16 evangelism 110 Evangelists 21 everlasting paradise 66 exclusivism 28 exclusivist 8 extremist 164 extrovertive 140

F faith 92 fetter 74 First Council 127 five aggregates 75 four noble truths 39, 55, 93, 140 freedom 68 friendliness 116 Fully Enlightened One 90

fundamentalism 69, 153 fundamentalist 64

G generosity 141 global network 129 globalization 38, 69, 70, 89, 149, 150 globalized society 68, 134 God 38, 39, 41, 47, 50 - 55, 65 - 67, 110, 153, 156 Christian concept of - 152 creator -27, 137 denial of -82 existence of- 81 experience of - 111, 114 incomprehensibility of - 141 roles of - 84 savior - 32 scheme of - 32 untenability of - 81 union with -113 God-less 85 God’s kingdom 33 gospel 48 great indicators 133 greed 92

H harmony 144 heaven 76 heavenly kingdom 72 Hell (fires of) 47 heretics 109 Hinayanist 113 Hindu 1 Hinduism 49, 63, 71, 84, 125, 135 Hindus 20, 64 historical 38 humanist 68 Humanistic Buddhism 154 humanity 41, 71

184 humility 141

I idea of holy 47 ideal 1 ideology 1 ignorance 73 impediment 143 inclusivism 28 incommensurable 143 Indian sub-continent 136 indigenous 157 indiscriminate 57 indulgence in pleasures 94 ineffable 56, 115 ineffability 125 infallible 4, 65 influxes 73, 74 inter-religious: - controversies 171 debates 168 - dialogue 33, 107, 117, 122, 124, 125, 134, 144, 148 -harmony 145 - understanding152, 171 intolerance 46, 47 introvertive 140 irreducible languages 119 Ishvara 66, 114 Islam 12, 16, 53, 63, 84, 124, 129, 135

J Jacobites 109 Jain: - leader 95 - Philosophy 95 Jaina order 43 Jainism 43, 58, 95 Jatakas 53, 81

Jesuits 151, 155 Jews 109 jhānic state 115 Judaic religions 64 Judaism 53, 84, 135 Judeo-Christian tradition 65

K Kālama-sutta 41, 42, 97, 123, 138 kalyānamitta 86 kamma 55 kammatic 170 kammavāda 57 Kanhwa Son 154 Kantian distinction 51 karma 40, 41, 95 kiṃkusalagavesī 136 kindness 116

L language game 111 Latin America 19, 108 Latin 135 liberation 36, 55, 118 life-indulgence 58 logic 60 Logical Positivism 48, 165 loving kindness 86

M Mahātanhāsankhaya-sutta 58 Mahātittāyatana-sutta 26, 31, 54 Mahāvaṃsa 15 Mahayana Buddhist 156 Mahayana tradition 50 Mahayanists 78 Majjhima-nikāya 29,48, 54, 58, 59 materialist tradition 58 meditation 8 metaphysical 55

185 middle Land 151 missionary organizations 20 modernism 66 moghapurisa 37 monistic 53 monopoly 29 multi-religiousness 13 Muslims 64 mysterium tremendum 47, 80, 136 mystery 136 mystical age 157

N nāstikavada 27 naturalist 68, 76 negativism 140 new evangelization 24 nibbāna 72 Niganthas 105 nihilist 27 nirodhasamāpatti 112 nirvana 31, 39, 52, 66, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 91, 114, 115, 121, 140, 146, 148, 149, 152 noble eightfold path 39 noble 39 non-absolutism 57 non-actionism 140 non-Christian countries 49 non-Christian religions 108 non-conceptual 47 non-dogmatic 56 non-dogmatism 43 non-hierarchical 143 non-theism 54, 55 non-theistic 54 non-violence 43 no-soulness 54 Nostra Aetate 25, 124, 142, 143 numinous dread 112, 139

O omniscience 95, 117 once-returner 82 oneness 140

P Pali sources 135 Panadura debate 159 Papal Bull 109 paradigm shift 54 paticcasamuppāda 39, 40, 121 pātimokkha 128 patisōtagāmi 49 pativedha 115 peacefulness 69 penetrating 93 personal authority 132 Phenomenological 1 pneumatology 156, 157 philosophers of religion 53 philosophical 26 Philosophy: Buddhist-107 Western - 125 comparative - 125 pluralism 28, 38, 67, 110, 145 pluralist 50 pluralistic hypothesis 53 polarization 23 Political Philosophy 155 politics 147 Portuguese 7, 13 post positivist 165 Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies 169 Potential Buddha 110 pragmatic 57 prajña 115, 116 predicament 55 Presidential Commission 127

186 primordial liberative core 118 proselytization 24 proselytizing 68, 71 Protestant Churches 22 psychoanalysis 152 psychological problems 148 psycho-spirituality 153 Psychotherapy 152 purification 73

R rational faith 103, 139 Reader’s Digest 2 realization 91, 92 - of truth 91 relativism 57, 65, 66, 140 religion 46, 89 religionists 42, 60 Religions (History of) 68 religious 40 religious: - conflicts 144 -dialogue 49, 50 - diversity 28 - experience 52 -expression 49 - fundamentalist 68 -perspective 51 - pluralism 63 -propagation 20 -relativism 38, 50, 57 -truth 65 Renewalist 23 restraint 44 revivalism 160, 167 Rg Veda 79, 112 righteous 147 ritualism 35 Roman Catholic 7 church 24, 152 -perception 22

Roman Pontiff 109

S sacrament 110 saddhā 17, 30, 92, 97 sages 145 salvation 55 salvific knowledge 116 Sāmaññaphala-sutta 36, 95, 121, 137 samsara 85 Sarvastivada 152 sāsana 31, 131 sat 145 satori 79 schismatics 109 scientific discourse 48 Sectarianism 43 self-cloistered 48 self-mortification 94 sensory experience 48 sensual pleasures 58 sermon, first 94 Shingon devotees 153 Sinhala Buddhist Culture 156 Sinhala 8 skeptics 94, 102 skeptical 102 skepticism 141 socio religious revival 159 soteriology 24 soteriological 48 - goals 114 - value 145 soul 113 spontaneously born beings 137 sramana 36, 40 sramanism 65 substantialism 70 suffering 40, 55, 57 supreme Being 113

187 Suttanipāta 37

U

T

Udāna 75 unanswered questions 50 unconditioned Dharma 152 uniformity 148 Unitatis redintigratio 135 universal brotherhood 41 unrighteous 147 unskillful-ness 102 Upanisad 35

taints 74 Tamil 1, 13 tanhā 122 tatha 39, 140 Tathāgatha 132 tathatā 52, 66, 79, 146 Thai: - Buddhist Masters 155 -Catholic 156 - culture 156 theism 54 theistic religious traditions 67 Theologians 24 Theology: Asian - 107, 108 Christ- centered- 110 Christian - 107 Liberation - 108 Western - 108 Theosophy 159 Theravada 23, 77, 127 - Buddhism 154 - Buddhist countries 149 - Buddhist society 160 - canon 126 - countries 128 - vinaya 130 Third Council 126 Tolerance 35, 38, 43, 46, 48, 49, 52 religious - 41, 44, 59-62 Tractatus Logico Philsophicus 47 transcendental 50, 52, 56, 67, 79, 80 114, 146, 147 Triple Gem 17 Truth 90 concept of - 93 problem of - 116 monopoly of 119

V Vajrayana 77 Vatican Council ii 22, 23,25, 32, 108, 118, 126-129, 134, 152, 159 Veda 36 Vedanta (view of liberation) 78 Vīmaṃsaka-sutta 123 vimutti 115 Vinaya 4, 129-132, 134 Vinayapitaka 40 viññu-purisa 42 Vipassanā 115 virtue 86 visuddhi 115

W wholesome 43 West 107 Western Religion 129

Y Yahweh 79 yathā-bhūta 126

Z Zen: - meditation 152, 154 - Buddhism 153

Index of Proper Names

A Abenayake, Oliver 6 Afghanistan 69 Africa 19 Ajatasatthu 132 Ajita Kesakambala 58, 59, 95 All Ceylon Buddhist Congress 127 Almas, Guro 9 Ambattha 37 Ambedkar 153 Amitabha 153 Ananda 128 Anuradhapura 2 Anuruddha, Ven. K. 3 Arahant Mahinda 17 Ariyaratne, A. T. 156 Ashirvanam 125 Asia 19 Asian Tribune 10 Asoka (emperor) 44, 61

B Bandaranaike, Felix Dias 14 Bandaranaike, Mrs. Sirimavo 14 Bangalore 125 Bernard Senecal 155

Bharadvaja 104 Bodhi, Bhikkhu 27, 74, 81, 97, 131 Buddha Sravaka Dharma Pethaya 2 Buddhadasa 154, 155 Buddhaghosa 75 Burma 126

C China 155 Choe, Yong Un 154 Cochini Christian 155 Colombo 158 Cornille, Catherine 83 Crusz, Robert 5, 135 Cunda 100 Cusumano, Jerry 152

D Dalai Lama 34, 152, 153 de Alwis, Prashantha Lal 10 de Silva Lily 6 de Silva, KM 166 de Silva, Lynn 5 Devananda, Yohan 8, 9 Devasarana Aramaya 8 Dhammananda, Medagama 10,11 Dhammavihari Ven. 5

189 Dharmadasa, Visaka 10 Dharmakara 152 Dharmapala 166, 167 Dharmasiri, Gunapala 4 Dias, Laksan JS 9 Dutugemunu 15, 64

E Edinburgh 22

F Fernando, Anthony 4 Fernando, Kenneth 5 Fernando, Marshal 5 Folkestein, Ingunn 9 Fung, Jogo M 156 Galle 158 Gautama Buddha 155 Gogerly, Daniel 158, 159 Gotama (ascetic) 101 Gunananda, Mohottiwatte 158- 170

H

Jayawardhana, JR14 Jesus 76 - Christ 110, 119, 151, 155, 157 Jephthah 166 Joseph Ng Swee Chun 153

K Kalamas 42, 60, 101, 102, 106 Kalupahana, DJ 77 Kapatika 27, 96 Kataragama (god) 7 Kesaputta 42 Kloster, Sven Thore 9 Knitter, Paul F 76, 77, 79, 81, 85 Korea, South 69, 155, 156 Kotahena 158 Kotte RajamahaViharaya 7 Krishna 52, 79 Kumarasuriar, C 14 Kuttianimattatil, Jose 33, 109, 119, 120, 141

L

Hardy, Spence 26 Harris, Elizabeth June 25, 170 Hawai’i 125 Hick, John 51, 52, 55, 66, 79, 85, 114, 140, 147, 165 Hikkaduwe Sri Sumangala 163

Lamotte, Fr Etienne 153 Lawrence, S 153 Lee Ch’ansu 156 Liang Shuming 154 Lord Glenelg 163 Lothe, Egil 9 LTTE 10, 11

I

M

Illangasinghe, Kumara 9

Mackenzie, Stewart 163 Mahakassapa 4 Mahamud, Badiuddin 14 Mahinda (Arahant) 15 Makkhali Goslala 59 Meister Eckhart 153 Methodist Churches 6 Mohamad 89

J Japan 125 Jatika Hela Urumaya 16 Jayasinghe, H B.10 Jayatilleke, KN 30, 42, 53, 117, 121, 143, 168

190 Murti, TRV 81

Robouam, Thierry-Jean 153

N

S

Nagarjuna 77, 78 Nampet, Wajira 155, 156 Ñanamoli (Bhikkhu) 74, 80, 86, 97 Ñanatiloka 81 Nanayakkara, Sanath 6 Nanda, Akuratiye 10 Narada Ven. 82 Nicholas Fr Adolfo 152 NiganthaNataputta 43, 59, 95 Norway Buddhist Federation 9 Norway 9, 12 Nygard, Dag 9

Sahampati 49 Sanjaya Bellattiputta 59, 95 Sariputta 130 Sāti 58 Seevali, Rassagala 10 Senecal 155 Seneviratne, Tony 10 Seth, Noel 64, 153 Seungsahn 154 Siddhartha 65, 137, 148 Sivaraksa, Sulak 153 Sobhita, Omalpe 16 Somaratne, GPV 159 Sri Lanka 6, 9, 21, 24, 107, 162, 167, 170 Sri Lanka Buddhist and Pali University 3 Stace, WT 113 Stephen, James 163 SUCCESS 11, 12

O Obeysekere, Gananath 1 Oslo Coalition 18 Otto, Rudolf 47, 80, 112, 139

P PakudhaKaccana 59, 95 Palihawadana, Mahinda 6 Panadura 159, 164 Panikkar, Raimundo 50, 52, 53, 81 Peiris,sj Aloysius 23-25, 86, 107, 108, 111- 118, 123, 151, 153, 154 Perry, Edmond F 86 Pope Francis 152 Pope John, xxiii 152 Pojo Chinul 154 Premadasa, Ranasinghe 14 Premawardhana 24 Purana Kassapa 59, 95

R Rajshekar 24 Raṭṭhapāla 81

T Tai Xu 154 Taliban 69 Thailand 129 Theresa of Avila 111 Thich Nhat Han 77, 153 Tilakaratne, Asanga 10, 30, 115, 132, 136, 139 Tsunoda, Yuichi 152 Tulana Research Centre 5

U United States 150 University of Colombo 10 Upali (follower of Jainism) 43, 105, 143

191 Uttara 103

V Vacchagotta 42, 58 Vancouver 3 Vassakāra 132 Velez, Abraham 28, 29, 31, 32 Vessantara 166

W Walshe, Maurice 4, 75, 132, 134 Wesly Press 3 Wewala, Pani 11, 13 Wickramasinghe, WAL 10 Wijayanto, Paulus Agung 152 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 47, 48, 111 World Council of Churches 3 World Missionary Conference 22

Y Yinshun 154 Yong Un Choe 154 Young, RV 158

Asanga Tilakaratne

Born in Tissamaharamaya of Southern Sri Lanka in 1952 Asanga Tilakaratne received his primary education at Debarawewa Vidyalaya (now Debarawewa Central College), Tissamaharamaya. Subsequently, he received monastic education at Mallikaramaya, Ratmalana and Siri Vajiranana Dharmayatanaya, Maharagama. He received his first degree, Tripitakavedi, from Buddha Sravaka Dharma Pithaya (currently Sri Lanka Bhiksu University), Anuradhapura and also, he completed his Pracina Pandit examination of Oriental Studies Society, Sri Lanka. Next, he joined Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka, and received his bachelor’s degree specializing in Buddhist Philosophy and offering Pali and Sanskrit as his subsidiary subjects. Receiving East-West Center graduate fellowship he studied Western Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa for his Masters. He completed his Doctorate at the same university in Comparative Philosophy writing his dissertation on the problem of the ineffability of religious experience. From 1992 to 2007 Prof. Tilakaratne taught at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, and served as its Director from 2004 to 2007. He joined the University of Colombo as the Professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies in January, 2009 and taught there till his retirement in 2018. Meantime, he became instrumental in establishing the Department of Buddhist Studies at Colombo where he became the founder Head. During 2010-2012 he served as the President of Arts Faculty Teachers Association (AFTA) of the University. Prof. Tilakaratne received the Colombo University award for the best researcher in Faculty of Arts in 2013 and in the next year he was awarded the Best Senior Researcher Award in Humanities and Social Sciences by Council of Vice-Chancellors and Directors (CVCD). Respected

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by his students for his undergraduate and postgraduate teaching Prof. Tilakaratne has guided more than twenty-five PhDs in various aspects of Buddhist studies. Prof. Tilakaratne was the recipient of Commonwealth Senior Fellowship 1999-2000. He spent one year at Oriental Institute, Oxford University working with Professor Richard Gombrich and was affiliated to Wolfson College as a fellow. Prof. Tilakaratne has served as visiting professor at Yonsei University, Korea (2007-2008), Otago University, New Zealand (2015), Savitribai Phule Pune University, India (2017) and more recently at Sitagu International Buddhist Academy, Sagaing and Mandalay, Myanmar (2018-2019). He has published, both in Sinhala and English, more than one hundred papers on Buddhist studies. He has authored and edited more than twenty books in both Sinhala and English. Of his more recent academic works, Theravada Buddhism: The View of the Elders (2012) was published by University of Hawai’i Press in the series of ‘Dimensions of Asian Spirituality’. He co-edited with Prof. Oliver Abenayaka 2600 Years of Sambuddhatva: Global Journey of Awakening (2012), a work covering the history and the current status of global Buddhism of all three traditions, published by Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Government of Sri Lanka. In addition to his academic work, in 2002, Prof. Tilakaratne founded Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies (SLABS), an academic and professional organization of Buddhist scholars in Sri Lanka. Having served as its Joint Secretary from the beginning in 2017, he became its President. Also, in 2002, he founded, with a group of academics and professionals, Damrivi Foundation, a government registered not for profit organization for economic, social, educational and spiritual development and continues to function as its founder Chairman.

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Editorial Board Raluwe Padmasiri Thera BA (University of Peradeniya); MA (National University of Singapore); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Thought, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MPhil (University of Peradeniya); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Culture, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Wimal Hewamanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MA, MPhil (University of Kelaniya); PhD (University of Wuhan); Senior Lecturer: Dept. of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. D. Denzil Senadeera BA (University of Sri Jayewardenepura); MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Visiting Lecturer: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Ashoka Welitota BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PhD (The University of Hong Kong); Senior Lecturer and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Sources, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Bertram G. Liyanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PG Dip. (University of Pune); Deputy Editor: Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Sri Lanka. Sheila Fernando BA, MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Research Assistant: Tulana Research Centre, Sri Lanka.

Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇī MA, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Tu Nguyen Pagoda, Thach Lam street, Tan Phu District, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Sewwandi Marasinghe BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka.