Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century 3030340031, 9783030340032

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Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century Edited by Tom Røseth · John Michael Weaver

Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century

Tom Røseth  •  John Michael Weaver Editors

Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century

Editors Tom Røseth Norwegian Defence University College Oslo, Norway

John Michael Weaver York College of Pennsylvania York, PA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-34003-2    ISBN 978-3-030-34004-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020, corrected publication 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch / shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 The Need for Intelligence Relations during a Time of Uncertainty  1 Tom Røseth and John Michael Weaver 2 The Nature of Intelligence Requirements, Internal Roles and Relations in the Twenty-­First Century 13 Ingeborg Guldvik Grongstad and Kenneth L. Lasoen 3 How to Classify Intelligence Relations: Partnership Types in the Intelligence Community 41 Tom Røseth 4 Countering Hybrid Threats Through Signals Intelligence and Big Data Analysis? 69 Njord Wegge and Thorsten Wetzling 5 Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship 89 John Michael Weaver

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6 Commanding America’s Military Spies123 Matthew A. Rose 7 Relations, the Field of Intelligence, and the Way Ahead157 Tom Røseth and John Michael Weaver  Correction to: The Nature of Intelligence Requirements, Internal Roles and Relations in the Twenty-First CenturyC1 Ingeborg Guldvik Grongstad and Kenneth L. Lasoen Index165

Notes on Contributors

Ingeborg  Guldvik  Grongstad is a graduate of the Intelligence and Security Studies master’s program at Brunel University London, and holds a Master of Technology Management from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). She has previously worked as head of branch and as a senior security policy advisor in the Norwegian Armed Forces. She spent her time at Brunel studying conceptual issues relating to the field of intelligence, in particular organizational issues and the relationship of intelligence to policy. Kenneth  L.  Lasoen  is an associate researcher at Ghent University and teaches Intelligence at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. Educated at the universities of Ghent and Leuven in History, and at Brunel University London and Pembroke College Cambridge in Intelligence and Security Studies, he specializes in the history of the Belgian intelligence services, in addition to studying security and defense matters in general. Matthew  A.  Rose  is a Department of Defense Civilian. He joined the Department of Defense in 2012, and he also serves as a Reserve Army officer. His portfolio includes strategy, policy and plan formulation. His past tours include positions at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, United States Africa Command, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the Joint Staff and the Multi-National Force in Iraq. Prior to joining the Defense Department, he served with the Department of Homeland Security and Transportation Security Administration where he focused on surface transportation threats and statutory reports to Congress. His notable past projects vii

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include counterterrorism/counterweapon of mass destruction (WMD) planning and operations, Humanitarian and Ebola response planning, strategy, policy and contingency plan development, and strategic analysis. Rose holds a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from National Intelligence University, a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from U.S.  Army War College and a Bachelor of Science from University of Cincinnati. Tom  Røseth is an associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College. Røseth has held this position since 2016, mainly doing research and teaching in intelligence studies combined with the coordination of an intelligence course at the graduate level. From 2012 to 2016 Røseth was a fellow at the Asian Centre for Security Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). At IFS he researched on Russia’s relations to China concerning the military, energy and Arctic domains. Røseth has for more than 15 years held several positions within the Norwegian Armed Forces as a civilian, working primarily with security policy relative to state actors. He defended his PhD on Russia–China relations at the University of Oslo in 2017, and holds one master in Military Studies from 2012 (Norwegian Defence University College) and another in Comparative Politics from 2001 (University of Bergen). John  Michael  Weaver  is Associate Professor of Intelligence Analysis at York College of Pennsylvania, U.S., a retired Defense Department (DOD) civilian from the U.S. Intelligence Community and has served as an officer in the U.S. Army (retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel). Since entering active duty, he has lived and worked on 4 continents and in 19 countries, spending nearly 8 years overseas (working on behalf of the U.S. government). His experience includes multiple combat deployments, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and disaster assistance support in both conventional and unconventional/nontraditional units. In recent years, Weaver has trained and certified multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reconnaissance teams based in the Netherlands, Germany and Spain for worldwide deployment to support full-spectrum missions. He has also personally led several reconnaissance missions throughout Europe, the Middle East and Asia (including multiple missions in Afghanistan). Weaver earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Management from Towson University in 1990, graduated from Central Michigan University with a Master of Science in Administration in 1995, earned a Master of Operational Arts and Science from the Air

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University in 2004, and graduated from the University of Baltimore with a Doctorate in Public Administration in 2013. Njord  Wegge is an associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College/Military Academy. He has previously been a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Wegge’s research focus is directed toward issues of security and defense, including questions pertaining to ‘hybrid warfare,’ intelligence methods and national security. Wegge has also published extensively on issues pertaining to international relations, geopolitics and security in the Arctic, and he has previously held a position as an adjunct associate professor at the University of Tromsø–The Arctic University of Norway. Wegge has been a visiting scholar to the University of California, Berkeley, U.S. He has worked as a senior social science advisor to the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS-committee), and he has been a senior researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI). Thorsten Wetzling  works at the Berlin-based think tank Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, where he heads the research on digital rights, surveillance and democracy. He directs the European Intelligence Oversight Network (EION) and is a principal investigator in the collaborative research project GUARDINT. Since 2019, Wetzling helped design and implement aboutintel.eu—a new multi-stakeholder platform for a European conversation on intelligence. Wetzling testified before the European Parliament and the German Bundestag on recent intelligence legislation, and his analyses on contemporary intelligence appeared in various media outlets. Recently, he became a member of the expert advisory board on Europe/Transatlantic of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Berlin. Wetzling holds a doctorate degree in political science from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6

Types of intelligence partnerships Selected U.S. foreign intelligence relations Examples of U.S. intelligence partnerships. Source: Map created by the author at mapchart.net under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model (Weaver, with Pomeroy, 2018). Credit: Nova Science Publishers, Inc The York Intelligence Red Team Model-Modified Tensions with commanding HUMINT framework Area of Operations (AORs) for geographic combatant commanders. (NGA 2005) Levels of warfare Risk tolerance framework for HUMINT Risk tolerance fluctuations model Declassified OSS planning process for military operations (OSS 1944, 33–34)

47 58 62 93 94 131 134 138 142 144 145

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Types of intelligence partnerships Organizational lean for HUMINT based on authorities Levels of intelligence and consumers (DoD 2017, 114)

57 137 139

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CHAPTER 1

The Need for Intelligence Relations during a Time of Uncertainty Tom Røseth and John Michael Weaver

1.1   Background Information The overarching theme of the volume is the importance of intelligence relations and the sharing of information between states, be it allies or reluctant partners, or between functions in an intelligence organization during a time of uncertainty. Walsh (2009) underscores relations and even goes as far as to say that the sharing of intelligence is paramount for the establishment of stability and security. Still, Sims (2006) states that when establishing a framework for analysis, those considering whether to share intelligence weigh the costs and benefits in terms of what they themselves might stand to lose or gain in the process. The editors of the book are in part inspired by Svendsen (2012a) who looked at relationships and sharing of information with intelligence liaisons to help guide the research.  The challenge in  portraying and assessing  intelligence relations, often labeled as intelligence liaisons, is that their

T. Røseth (*) Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] J. M. Weaver York College of Pennsylvania, York, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_1

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partially autonomous system is often regarded even by diplomats as a fencedoff mystery (Herman 1996). Intelligence relations have become a multinational activity that determines the relative strength and power of an intelligence service, often reflecting or enhancing the state’s foreign policy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent end of the Cold War, and for nearly 25 years, the world was becoming more globalized. With a more globalized world, the intelligence services had to adjust their focus toward transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and cyberattacks. Policymakers may talk of “new” threats related to globalization, information technology  or hybrid operations, but their newness label convey more an excuse to ignore lessons from the not-sodistant history (Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark 2020). Rather, it is the post– Cold War period in the 1990s that was the exception seen from Western powers, with the near absence of threats from state actors under a US hegemonic world order. The turbulent conditions in the beginning of the twenty-first century manifest the intelligence organization’s role to secure the state and its population, so that normal life can continue (Omand 2010). In addition to globalization, the world has seen other challenges such as the global power shifts, regime transformation, and movement toward populism. The rise of China has led to an increased challenge to Western liberal values as a successful model for economic prosperity. We have seen tendencies toward more authoritarian rule or personalized cults in states such as Russia and China, while Turkey appears to be politically drifting from  the West. Additionally, many  democratic and transitional states are increasingly witnessing a move toward nationalism and populism. Such changes in the economic and political landscape lead to changes in intelligence relations, both when it comes to content and preferred partners. The political and intelligence professional levels operate separately but are influenced and reinforced by each other “despite practitioners’ occasional misconceptions that their professional relationships are insulated” (Herman 1996, 215). Intelligence is therefore not to be considered as isolated from foreign policy. A trend since 2016 shows that nations are moving toward greater nationalism and are willing to challenge long-standing partnerships, for example, the US and its approach to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the UK efforts to pull out of the European Union, China’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea, and Russia’s bellicose stance toward most Western nations. We live in a globalized world some claim contains security challenges that are neglected by the intelligence

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agencies (Shiraz and Aldrich 2015). Add nationalism and populism as a challenge to liberal democracy, and the playing field for intelligence agencies becomes even more troublesome and complex. Accordingly, there are implications for intelligence professionals who need to adjust in order to optimize their support to national decision-makers. More pointedly, the book should be seen in light of three main issues: traditional intelligence studies and how these adapt to contemporary changes, international security and how the move to a more nationalistic approach is changing global security, and, finally, what nationalism means to traditional intelligence-­ sharing relationships. The book focuses on open sources deemed academically acceptable. Mercado (2019) writes of the value of open source data, especially in the Internet age and the value of products that use it for both practitioners and academics alike. It looks to weave together an anthology of ideas in what the field of intelligence refers to as an “intricate mosaic” (Smith 1989). Intelligence relations are traditionally a secretive topic in which research entails several challenges (Svendsen 2012b, 49–54). The book therefore appreciates, like the intelligence services, the value of open source information that is critical to provide intelligence for strategic consumers (Gannon 2001). Relationships matter and play a vital role for intelligence success or failure accordingly. The past two decades have seen an increased focus on terrorism and cyber-threats and have reconfigured or pushed forward new relations in the intelligence world, both domestically and internationally. These relationships are often convenient in nature, seeking to mitigate common risk. However, intelligence services are not themselves changing quickly to changing threats, and these transnational challenges do not always lead to effective cooperation. Aldrich (2009, 892) argues that intelligence services are creatures of the nation-state and strongly connected to sovereignty. Only if the services attain a certain degree of bureaucratic autonomy will these be able to muster stronger international cooperation (Deflem 2002, 32). The challenge in international cooperation lies therefore in the nature of intelligence organizations within the sovereign state, mixed with the lack of seeing the many challenges connected to globalization among policymakers and intelligence chiefs. This volume brings out implications for those either working in or interested in learning more about the field of intelligence. Moreover, the work affords consideration to the importance of relations in optimizing intelligence integration, challenges of intelligence oversight, and the com-

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plexity in the understanding of intelligence relationships among ­nation-­states. These include the likes of an understanding about or sharing of intelligence with such actors as the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the interrelations among the 29 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. There are a vast number of intelligence partnerships and intelligence clubs, including periodic liaison between adversaries, all here seen as important for handling various situations in uncertain times. That said, nations are still apprehensive about fully disclosing sources and methods that could result in them getting burned by the other party (Aldrich 2009). Due to globalization and the inextricable linkage among a majority of the nations of this world, most countries cannot afford to pursue a pure isolationist position. An interdependence between states has developed and no nation can fully understand everything that is occurring everywhere at all times. Gaps may be due to a lack of expertise, shortfalls in cultural or linguistic understanding, a lack of human intelligence sources, and/or limitations in intelligence technical collection platform abilities. Information sharing between states is both extremely relevant and of paramount concern for advancing a country’s agenda, even while, at times, those nations can simultaneously be seen as foes or in opposition to the country on other issues. This book provides perspectives on these important issues. There are advantages and disadvantages to almost all aspects in establishing intelligence relations. Provided that the partnership brings to fruition mutual benefit to all concerned, then information and intelligence sharing will likely continue and develop. Conversely, if a country with possession of critical information exposes a key collection advantage (in terms of sources and methods) to others, then the country providing the knowledge might not be as forthcoming with further sharing of intelligence. Such risk to exposure is particularly sensitive between states that are adversaries, where there is insufficient trust in how provided intelligence is used. Positive examples include when the US warned Russia in late 2017 of an imminent terror plot in Saint Petersburg (Kremlin 2017) and the US sharing on Russian election meddling tactics, techniques, and procedures to European allies ahead of the 2017 election cycle. This book looks at when sharing intelligence is more likely to occur, its necessity within the intelligence processes, types of intelligence partnerships, and under what circumstances sharing will not happen.

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1.2   Intelligence and Power During Uncertain Times On intelligence relations and intelligence sharing relative to a state’s executive power, several themes resonate. For one, presently, we find ourselves living in uncertain times (Steinberg 2014; George and Wirtz 2014). It is increasingly necessary to have an open mind in the field on what nations need in terms of the basics required to acquire, dissect, synthesize, and produce intelligence products under fast changing conditions. In essence, intelligence is about stealing and keeping secrets according to Gill (2009), underlining that ethics should not be simply traded in for a promise of greater security. Ideally, intelligence can have a stabilizing function, providing realistic assessments on the opponent’s capabilities and intentions, leading to improved decision-making. Intelligence thus mitigates risk, and it contributes to the understanding and narrowing of uncertainty (Phythian 2012). To know more of what you do not know, the “known unknowns” that intelligence services provide, can in some instances frustrate the decision-maker and lead to preemptive action that may create other threats (Gill 2012, 203). The fear of underplaying intelligence warnings and be held responsible for not preventing a major terrorist attack can push decision-makers into counterproductive decisions. In order to ensure ethics, some functional form of transparency, and accountability with proper democratic oversight must be in place in order to secure trust and legitimacy of political bodies and their electorate, an issue increasingly relevant with big data collection. Why do relational intelligence issues apply to power and rule? Oftentimes, issues arise between intelligence professionals and those who are seen as consumers on the policy side (Steinberg 2014). According to Richard Betts (1978), the best-known cases of intelligence failure are seldom done by the intelligence collectors, sometimes by the intelligence analysts, but most often by decision-makers who consume the intelligence products. Such failures are underscored by the complexity in the relationship between the analysts and the policymakers who ultimately are seen as customers of the intelligence community (Davis 2019). Faulty intelligence to decision-makers often emanate from such things as unrealistic expectations, situations where intelligence professionals historically have been seen as cautioners and naysayers, and that those who work in the field of intelligence do not fully appreciate the political realities of those for whom intelligence serves (Steinberg 2014). Transparency, accountability  and

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consciousness on the different roles between intelligence officials and decision-makers are efficient tools for lowering the risk for politization of intelligence. Additionally, there is an increased call for strengthening the oversight of international data exchange between intelligence and security services, seen in Europe with the initial cooperation of exchanging methods and best practices  between five  national oversight bodies  (Joint Statement 2018). These institutions  seek to fill the oversight gap, as national oversight does not cover relations and cooperation with partners. This limitation is in place in order to protect partner information from being exposed through another state’s domestic policies, and to ensure and secure the development of intelligence cooperation. Underscoring the foreign transmission of classified material is found in the US Intelligence Community Directive (ICD 201 2006). It states that the US has a responsibility to provide national leaders with warning in advance of events, foreign developments, and/or conditions that could not just adversely affect the targeted country but could result in damage to the US as well (Nelson 2014). One can see that in a world inextricably linked economically through globalization, this could universally apply to other countries throughout the planet. Another ICD encourages those who work in the intelligence community to think outside the box and seek support and input outside its community (ICD 205 2008). The purpose is to improve, support, and enrich analysis. Though many sources are identified (think tanks, academia, US government labs and industry as well as state and local government sources), it does not expressly prohibit reaching out to foreign governments and their agencies. This book presents mainly a state or state agency view on intelligence; in doing so, the editors do not deny that there is a broader  security intelligence network through for example of powerful corporate actors and civil society as demonstrated by Gill and Phythian (2012) or Nelson (2014). State actors are the most prominent in the intelligence world, which reflects the dominant position of a functioning state to provide security and foreign policy. Relationships matter. Relationships are important, especially in the field of intelligence in order to provide decision-makers with tools to ensure not only the state’s security but also its population. That said, there are still numerous issues that intelligence services and countries will have to overcome. There will still be problems in sharing information with adversaries, intelligence sharing  in NATO and not least sectoral  stovepiping within or between  services. There is a need for  a  proactive stance on

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i­ntelligence relations to manage the broad list of threats,  whether they stem from  global power shifts,  cyber  actors,  transnational  terrorism  or hybrid actions from capable states.

1.3   Chapter Introductions The second and third chapters expand on individual countries’ pursuit of intelligence initiatives. Underscored in this section is the notion of living in uncertain times and challenges to conventional ways of looking at intelligence processes. Chapter 2 affords consideration to an essential phase of intelligence, namely the requirements generation process and how getting this right is imperative. Grongstad demonstrates the difference between tactical, operational and strategic intelligence and how these levels  address and process requirements depending on the decision-makers. From an ­analysis-driven point of view and in order to better predict future developments, the author argues that strategic intelligence has moved from being static and data/collection oriented during the Cold War to a dynamic requirement process where the analyst should take the center stage in a more theory-driven approach, the consequence being that the Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Management (IRM&CM) process (JP 2-00 2011) should be more analytically driven and influenced by expert analysts. Thereafter, Grongstad articulates the strong need to move from bureaucratic silos to more agile cooperation where collection and analysis are more aligned, according to Treverton et al.’s (2006) recommendations—hence, underpinning  the importance of intelligence relations to improve intelligence processes. Further, revisiting the nature of  requirements, one can present new avenues to improve concepts, as well as training, and education of intelligence professionals. The main question addressed here is: based on the nature of requirements, how could the process and roles of IRM&CM differ in strategic intelligence production compared to tactical and operational intelligence production? Chapter 3 provides emphasis on how to classify intelligence relationships by looking at pragmatic (zero-sum game), strategic (win-win), and normative (shared values) partnerships (Røseth 2014, 2017, 2018). Relations can move between these often as a response to general relations between states. Tuzuner (2010) writes that security cooperation gravitates around some form of intelligence sharing that often grows as relationships strengthen. Like in other power relations, ones focused on intelligence are

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more often asymmetrical, in that one of the partners is more dependent on the relationship, and the depth of relationships vary. Røseth posits that there is a strong correlation between relationships and trust through the exposure of intelligence vulnerabilities—in terms of sources and methods and whether or not the recipient will protect them. To demonstrate this, the chapter underscores a modified version of a partnership typology by Smith (2006). The author provides enumeration on under what circumstances one is likely to see the emergence of a particular partnership and looks at varied partnership types. The classification of intelligence relations can be generally employed on interagency and state levels, although the author illustrates this through US foreign intelligence relations. The subsequent chapters focus on challenges concerning just how complicated the state of affairs is in the current world. Specifically, they use case studies to substantiate the analysis. These include the topic of intelligence oversight, and the United Nations through the permanent members of its Security Council to show challenges in understanding the geopolitical landscape as intelligence professionals work to assess threats during uncertain times. Chapter 4 studies the topic of hybrid warfare and the common understanding of what it is, looking at a consortium of threat assessments and problems that ensue from its use, and more pointedly, Wegge and Wetzling look at hybrid threats through the signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection discipline and the bulk collection of information derived from its use. They discuss the intrusive character of bulk data collection in democracies and the dilemma between being able to detect hybrid threats versus privacy law and principles. Further, their chapter presents the evolution of hybrid warfare,  its “newness” and the relevancy to NATO and the European Union, and what nation-states are doing to leverage hybrid warfare (most notably from China and Russia). Wegge and Wetzling take into consideration the legal framework for SIGINT collection and possible dangers in abusing bulk collection in the context of hybrid warfare, and propose some solutions in how proper oversight might look like. Chapter 5 looks at the complexity of the United Nations. More pointedly, Weaver applies two models to help analyze what is taking place regarding the four other non-US permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The first is a variation of the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM), which has been used extensively in other research (Weaver and Pomeroy 2016). The YIRTM-M (modified) is closely linked to NATO’s PMESII model covered in an earlier chapter. Through the YIRTM-M, the author explores four instruments of power

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(diplomacy, information, military, and economic) in order to see how and why China, France, Russia, and the UK are engaged in affairs to advance their positions and when they will and when they won’t work with the US to achieve their ends. Likewise, to ensure a balanced approach, this chapter made use of a second model, the Federal Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model to vary data sources (Weaver 2016). It finishes with implications of intelligence sharing for one’s convenience through the lens of the United Nations Security Council. Chapter 6 undertakes studying the complexity of managing spies with a focus on the US military. Under the military, a dichotomy exists between human intelligence and the profession of arms where tension levels (command, authority, level, and risk) are at play at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war impacting the performance of spies. Rose argues that these tensions need to be identified and acknowledged to improve effective management and attain better intelligence relations.  Rose  uses several models to explore the uncertainty associated with risk by looking at several contemporary military operations, and identifies a definition gap between what is considered strategic and not. Further, Rose argues that it is important to build a strategic HUMINT force both in peacetime and during conflict, and that it is prepared to operate under a more technologically advanced environment. Combined, this book takes a look at the broad spectrum of intelligence dilemmas, moving from a generalized view of interstate intelligence relations to specific methods that seek to improve the intelligence process and oversight of such processes. It aspires to contribute to the intelligence and security research in the context of political changes in the worldwide political landscape. This work discusses  these contemporary challenges and how traditional paradigms are changing in the context of hybrid warfare, long-standing intelligence-sharing relationships, and power shifts among states. The volume closes with concluding remarks on the importance of intelligence relations in uncertain times.

References Aldrich, Richard J. 2009. Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to and Old Problem. Intelligence and National Security 24 (1): 26–56. Andrew, Christopher, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark. 2020. Preface. In Secret Intelligence: A Reader, ed. Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, 2nd ed., xvii–xxxi. Oxon: Routledge.

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Baudet, F., E. Braat, and J.V. Woensel. 2017. Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali: Between Learning and Law. T.M.C. Aser Press. Betts, Richard K. 1978. Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable. World Politics 31 (1): 61–89. Davis, Jack. 2019. Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies. 5th ed. Oxford University Press. Deflem, Mathieu. 2002. Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gannon, John. 2001. The Strategic Use of Open-Source Information. Studies in Intelligence 45 (3): 67. George, Roger Z., and James J. Wirtz. 2014. Warning in an Age of Uncertainty. In Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Gill, Peter. 2009. Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the ‘Heart of Darkness’? Intelligence and National Security 24 (1): 78–102. Gill, Peter. 2012. Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight. Intelligence and National Security 27 (2): 206–222. Gill, Peter, and Mark Phythian. 2012. Intelligence in an Unsecure World. 2nd ed. Polity Press. Herman, Michael. 1996. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge University Press. ICD 201. 2006. Intelligence Community Directive Number 201, National Foreign Intelligence Warning System. https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-201. pdf. Accessed 6 June 2018. ICD 205. 2008. Intelligence Community Directive Number 205, Analytical Outreach. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_205.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2018. Joint Statement. 2018. Strengthening Oversight of International Data Exchange Between Intelligence and Security Services. https://eos-utvalget.no/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/joint_statement_for_publication_20181114_final_ endelig-2.pdf. JP 2-00. 2011. Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 3rd ed. Kremlin. 2017. Telephone Conversation with US President Donald Trump. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56398. Mercado, Stephen C. 2019. Open Source Intelligence in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies. 5th ed. Oxford University Press. Nelson, Susan H. 2014. Analytical Outreach: Pathway to Expertise Building and Professionalization. In Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. Georgetown University Press. Omand, David. 2010. Securing the State. New York: Oxford University Press. Phythian, Mark. 2012. Policing Uncertainty: Intelligence, Security and Risk. Intelligence and National Security 38 (2): 187–205.

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Røseth, Tom. 2014. Russia’s China Policy in the Arctic. Strategic Analysis 38 (6). https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952942. Røseth, Tom. 2017. Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold? Eurasian Geography and Economics 58 (1): 23–55. Røseth, Tom. 2018. Moscow’s Response to a Rising China. Problems of Post-­ Communism 66 (4): 268–286. Sims, Jennifer E. 2006. Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19 (2): 195–217. Shiraz, Zakia, and Richard J.  Aldrich. 2015. Globalisation and Borders. In Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, ed. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand, 363. New York: Routledge. Smith, Russell J. 1989. The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency. Washington, DC: Pergamon Brassey’s. Smith, Martin A. 2006. Russian and NATO Since 1991: From Cold War Through Cold Peace to Partnership? London: Routledge. Steinberg, James B. 2014. The Policy Maker’s Perspective: Transparency and Partnership. In Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. Georgetown University Press. Svendsen, Adam D.M. 2010. Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11. Abingdon: Routledge. Svendsen, Adam D.M. 2012a. Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Svendsen, Adam D.M. 2012b. The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method Out of Mayhem. Palgrave Macmillan. Treverton, Gregory F., Seth G.  Jones, Steven Boraz, and Phillip Lipscy. 2006. Toward a Theory of Intelligence. Workshop Report. RAND. https://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2006/RAND_CF219.pdf. Tuzuner, Musa. 2010. Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing. IOS Press. Walsh, James I. 2009. The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. New York: Columbia University Press. Weaver, John M. 2016. Variables of Transformation: The Relationship of DOD and DHS in a Domestic Disaster Environment. In Crisis Management: A Leadership Perspective. Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M., and Jennifer Pomeroy, eds. 2016. Intelligence Analysis: Unclassified Area and Point Estimates (and Other Intelligence Related Topics). Nova Science Publishers.

CHAPTER 2

The Nature of Intelligence Requirements, Internal Roles and Relations in the  Twenty-­First Century Ingeborg Guldvik Grongstad and Kenneth L. Lasoen

2.1   Strategic Intelligence: Numerous, Shifting and Interconnected Requirements Demand Updated Concepts, Agile Practice and a Cooperative Culture 2.1.1  Background Although there is an abundance of writing and research on intelligence, its definition is debated. There is still, to this date, no universally accepted theory of intelligence (Warner 2008). As several scholars have pointed out, this complicates the debate, as well as the practice and development of this part This chapter is the result of a paper first presented at the 2018 International Studies Association (ISA) conference in San Francisco at the Intelligence Studies Section Panels. The author is thankful for the comments and feedback from peer reviewers and participants. The original version of this chapter was revised. The correction to this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_8 I. G. Grongstad (*) Oslo, Norway © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_2

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of statesmanship (Kleinsmith 2020; Davies 2020; Phythian 2013). However, this is perhaps even more problematic for a field that is experiencing changing circumstances and developments that are challenging the established intelligence concepts, systems and processes. When in the words of Gregory Treverton (2001, 176) “intelligence strives to adapt to a changed world” it does so without a clear and shared understanding of all aspects of what intelligence really is, and should be, and how factors of change are influencing the practice (Honig 2007, 700). And yet current developments call for changes in the concepts of intelligence and its conduct. Intelligence systems are still based on the conditions of when the theory and study of intelligence was first being developed, in the immediate aftermath of World War II and during the rise of the Cold War. Intelligence practice was strongly influenced by military heritage and doctrine and developed to maturity in the course of the Cold War but adjusted to the security challenges of that era (Richards 2010; Greenberg 2007; Hulnick 2006; Treverton et al. 2006, 21). Not long after the end of the Cold War it was quickly recognized that a new security reality was emerging for which these models were no longer adequate. The security perspective had to move from a “two-dimensional, regional stand-off to a partially connected series of global, asymmetric actions and threats affecting many countries in different ways” (Rolington 2013, 9). The taken-for-granted ideas from old and outdated concepts are still influencing systems, processes and procedures, so much so that practitioners lament how the intelligence paradigm is “woefully out of date” (Moore 2011, 5). The dominating intelligence concept of the Cold War and the military operations are particularly observed to influence debates and practice. The challenge lies in identifying how the conceptualization remains under the influence of the old paradigm. It is necessary therefore to test the specific prerequisites and tasks of these dominating concepts to current and strategic conditions. Only with an awareness of which factors of change are influencing concepts and how, can concepts be updated, and intelligence efficiently adapt, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Although the post–Cold War and peaceful 1990s seemingly decreased the demand for intelligence (Warner 2014, 258–270; Dearlove 2010, 34; Herman 1996, 346–352), current circumstances show no signs of intelligence services going out of business. But, outdated or ineffective concepts, or misconceptions, could cause intelligence failure or the K. L. Lasoen Political Science Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium History Department, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

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failure to meet demands, missed opportunities and ineffective use of valuable resources. Additionally, changing developments and debates of reform increase the need for developing and defending the role of intelligence, its means and legislative frameworks. The focus of this chapter is the change of conditions, mainly in regard to the intelligence process, in particular the relationship between the core functions and, consequently, internal roles and relations. As the chapter sets out to develop the understanding of the process, the definition of intelligence is a theme throughout this part of the book. The main argument is that this understanding needs to be adjusted for intelligence to adapt to the developments of more dynamic missions. The previously stated static missions and targets allowed for more rigid bureaucratic processes, roles and relations. With changing circumstances, there is a need for agile cooperation and organizational alignment, especially that of analysis and collection. Internal and external roles and relations are a decisive condition for performance (Marchio 2016, 11). Many have argued for intelligence transformation and reform (Agrell 2014; Rolington 2013; Medina 2008; Betts 2007, 1–2). There are even those that call for a revolution (Moore 2011; Treverton et al. 2006, 21). Gregory Treverton is well known for his Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Treverton 2001). In it, Treverton argues for the reshaping of intelligence based on current developments such as more targets, more information and more customers compared to at the time of the Cold War (Treverton 2001). After the Cold War, the end of the superpower rivalry devaluated traditional intelligence work because it could be argued that developments removed the need for acquiring secrets from other countries (Betts 2007, 4). Technological developments increased the amount of openly available information (Degaut 2016; Medina 2008, 240). However, although strategic intelligence is now more about utilizing information that is openly available, the focus on information ­explosion risks making challenges about scale and capacity, while the real challenge is more about dynamics and complexity (Gressang 2007; Mercado 2004). As Richard Betts points out, the volume and complexity of openly available information increase the need for assimilating and integrating both open and secret information so that policymakers can gain knowledge from it (Betts 2007, 5). Developments have made intelligence requirements wider in scope, including multiple geographical areas, actors and themes (Kleinsmith 2020, 75–83, 188–191; Lowenthal and Clark 2016, 212–215; Herman 1996, 348). This makes the challenges more about flexible systems and cooperation to align resources in order to meet shifting and interconnected requirements (Clark 2010, 263–268).

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Richard Dearlove expressed how relatively simple intelligence work seemed in the Cold War compared to the complex security situation that followed it: “what we need to do was estimable and achievable, what we needed to know had boundaries” (Dearlove 2010, 33). While Western intelligence collectors of the Cold War could tattoo the intelligence requirements on their arm while working on the main target, the Soviet Union, later developments have spurred intelligence requirements and made them more dynamic (Treverton 2001, 22). The requirements are no longer focused on a few narrowly defined targets, like the Soviet Union and its allies, but have a global scope and more dynamic targets. More importantly, requirements are increasingly interconnected (Lowenthal 2017, 172; Treverton 2009, 144). These developments influence the process of intelligence. The transition from one static target to multiple and changing requirements is still underway as the current culture and perspectives are still rooted in old conditions. Cold War era requirements could be approached with an emphasis on clandestine collection, which focused on a few clearly defined and static information requirements that could be met with limited data and concrete information (Medina 2008, 240; Hedley 2007, 215). If these requirements, like the secrets of the Soviet Union, were met, there was also less need for analysis as there was—sometimes too much so—widespread consensus and understanding of the context and situation (Marchio 2016, 7). The nature of today’s requirements, on the other hand, must be approached with an emphasis on expert analysis, integration and cooperation (Wirtz 2010, 60–65). This makes analysis and expert knowledge more central to the process than previously, as analysts’ expertise is often required in order to define and operationalize the needs of policymakers. More importantly, with a wider span and an increase in missions, expert analysts are vital in order to focus the process so as to cover ground and make the best use of collection capabilities and partners and relations as force multipliers (Lowenthal and Clark 2016; Clark 2010). They are central when it comes to identifying information requirements, some of which are best addressed by clandestine collectors. The process is more analytically driven than data or informationally driven. Still, this is not fully acknowledged, as the process is still presented and conceptualized as the latter in doctrines and other acknowledged literature. Even Michael Herman describes the process as moving from collection to analysis in the traditional intelligence cycle (Herman 1996, 39). Recently, the intelligence cycle concept has met with increasing criticism as an inadequate model of the day-to-day reality of intelligence work (Omand 2010; Richards 2010, 15; Agrell 2009, 107–108). The nature of intelli-

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gence requirements affects the analytical approach and therefore the process and, especially, the roles and relations between the core functions (Kleinsmith 2020; Svendsen 2017, 5–7; Agrell 2014, 142–145; Rolington 2013, 36–41). Arguably, little controversy ought to be connected to the main argument of this chapter. Debates on intelligence reform have emphasized that intelligence should be organized around “issues or problems, not sources or the provenance of information” (Treverton et  al. 2006, 1; see also Svendsen 2017; Moore 2011; Rolington 2013). However, to get beyond generalization, this chapter will focus on how the specific conditions and the nature of intelligence requirements affect the analytical approach and, consequently, the intelligence process. To properly examine these connections, two terms should be specified in this context. First, theory is used throughout this chapter as it is used in the scientific community: that is, the building of models that explain causal relationships and the relationship between different variables. Theory is a type of generalization that is based on data from observation or research and several hypotheses that are consistent with theory. Theories could be more or less valid or reliable, which could be a problem for intelligence. Theory is, however, used here broadly, to distinguish between the process of gaining insight from data versus the testing of hypotheses and theory. Second, varying intelligence problems require different analytical approaches. Treverton and Gabbard explain puzzles as problems with certain answers, while mysteries are those questions with answers that are future-oriented and contingent upon several factors (Treverton and Gabbard 2008). Puzzles could be solved definitively with the right ­information while no information could be used to answer questions such as those of framing mysteries (Treverton and Gabbard 2008, 143). While intelligence copes with both questions that require solving puzzles and framing mysteries, at the time of the Cold War, the focus could be observed to be on finding missing pieces of the puzzle. Puzzles have answers and can be solved, but mysteries cannot be answered; they can only be framed by identifying factors and drivers. 2.1.2  Dominating Concepts The field of intelligence is under the strong influence of intelligence concepts that developed under different conditions than those that most intelligence services currently face (Agrell 2009, 110–114). A better understanding of how these different conditions influence various intelligence concepts could establish a baseline for efficiently improving the pro-

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cess and practice of intelligence, enabling a better adaption to current circumstances, and bringing theorization forward with a better grasp of what the more general intelligence concept is. This will enable change and transition for better and more efficient concepts, efficiently adapting current concepts to new conditions with a focus on the right adjustments. 2.1.2.1 The Influence of Military Heritage, Data-Driven Military intelligence, which includes both operational and tactical intelligence, has strongly influenced how intelligence is conceptualized (Treverton et al. 2006, 11; Showalter 1991). Some even claim that the current view, in the US, is that intelligence merely exists to support warfighting in a tactical and operational context (Treverton et al. 2006, 14). However, the requirements addressed at these levels are different from strategic intelligence for political decision-makers. Moreover, while operational and tactical requirements are more specific to time and place, strategic intelligence is concerned with broad and forward-looking questions on topics with relevant knowledge and theories. This affects the analytical approach and the roles and relations of the core functions (Kleinsmith 2020; Lowenthal 2017, 2; Clark 2016; Richards 2010, 23). The demarcation between strategic and tactical intelligence is often simply explained by whom it serves and for what purpose. Simply put, strategic intelligence serves political decision-makers and supports policy and national strategy. Conversely, operational and tactical intelligence serves uniformed leaders for military operations at the operational and tactical command level (Clark 2016, 51; JDP 2-00 2011, 2–7). The development of distinct levels could be traced to the expansion of the battlefield that came to fruition through the industrial revolution, leading to the problem of coordinating and directing combat efforts so that tactical engagements remained connected to strategic objectives. The solution was a framework for coordinating the efforts, grouping tactical actions in a specified time and place, into operations, and operations into campaigns (Kleinsmith 2020, 30–36; Kelly and Brennan 2010, 110–111; Dandeker 2006). In most Western doctrines, this framework is managed by a clear hierarchy of responsibilities with distinct levels of war, served by its own levels of command (Kelly and Brennan 2010, 114). However, within the last century, the boundaries between the strategic, operational and tactical levels have blurred, increasing the need for cooperation and sharing of information and intelligence among these levels. Based on these developments, some have claimed that the boundaries between the national strategic level and the operational and tactical levels have less relevance when related to intelligence (JDP 2-00 2011, 1–15).

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However, although the different levels seem to blur or even appear obsolete, there are clear differences between producing finished intelligence1 for customers at the strategic level compared to the tactical and operational levels (Clark 2016, 51; Hedley 2007, 213–214). In reality, the specific intelligence requirements addressed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are, for the most part, still significantly different as they serve distinctly different customers with varying roles and responsibilities. The requirements for tactical intelligence address specific and local conditions, while strategic requirements have a wide scope and are more open and future-oriented. Open questions and requirements are what Treverton has referred to as mysteries as they cannot be definitely answered and require thought and understanding (Treverton 2001). Requirements at the tactical and operational levels are more limited in time and space as they aim to make sense of the physical operating environment. Although Western operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have been lengthy, the specific physical operating environments and targets are subject to frequent change, making operational and tactical requirements more dynamic (Evans 2009, 35). Strategic intelligence requirements could be more static as they are tied to policy, and key conditions for policy are often more fixed. However, later developments have made strategic requirements also more dynamic. Strategic intelligence is also concerned with what Treverton has referred to as ‘tactical puzzles’ (Treverton 2001). However, these requirements and variables are not tactical finished intelligence; they are secrets, more specific questions or sub-­questions where adversaries are observed to implement denial and deception. Tactical intelligence is better suited for customers who are more concerned with specific issues, usually limited in time and space. More specific topics seem to be increasingly labeled as tactical, though they might well be strategic. The increased focus on intelligence, as well as strategic sensors directly contributing their support to military operations, could lead to an increased focus on operational and tactical intelligence, contributing to a blurring of the difference between the practice of tactical and operational versus strategic finished intelligence production (Treverton 2001, 18–19). Because requirements at the operational and tactical level address specific and local conditions, they could be met by collecting and processing data and information (Clark 2010). It is a data- and information-focused concept. This is emphasized by later developments in military affairs. After the 1991 Gulf War, traditional concepts of war were replaced by a new consensus that the struggle for information supremacy would be more 1

 All-source/multidiscipline intelligence.

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decisive (Biddle 1996, 144). Military developments have focused on technological advances, especially sensors and surveillance capacities. Some have even claimed that this focus has led to a belief that all can be collected, and that with increased collection, all answers can be found (Treverton et al. 2006, 14). Persistent surveillance could be possible in a small and defined tactical environment, but it is not possible for strategic intelligence (Lasoen 2019, 960; Treverton et al. 2006, 14; Dandeker 2006). All-source analysis and integration of information and data are still important at the operational and tactical level, but it is more about the timely processing of data and information, connecting the dots and identifying change in developments, activity and patterns. The requirements and conditions with available data and information make for an analytical approach that is more data- and information-driven. With a number of available collectors and sensors, these could be aimed at the physical operating environment and the objects and actors within this interest area. Analysts will process the information and turn it into finished intelligence. Evidentially, doctrines present this step as the processing step of the intelligence process, which includes collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation (JDP 2-00 2011, 3–3; Dandeker 2006; Ferris 2004). Intelligence concepts for supporting military operations are concerned with uniformed customers and their requirements. Requirements are dynamic and specific, as they focus on a defined tactical environment. Technological developments make military operations collection and sensor focused. The concept does allow for a process where direction is followed by massive collection and processing to identify patterns or changes in patterns, integrating all the data or information. Tactical intelligence production is likely to be dependent on gaining insight from all the data. This makes for a different analytic approach and does not only influence the knowledge and skills required, but the concepts, systems and institutions, particularly the roles and the relationship between the core functions, and how the intelligence process is managed. This concept is about all-source analysis, but is data-driven. Accordingly, it is in line with a broad definition of intelligence, a product resulting from both collection and the processing, integration and analysis of information from multiple sources and disciplines (Kleinsmith 2020, 3; Treverton et al. 2006, 7). 2.1.2.2 T  he Influence of the Formative Years During the Cold War: Collection-Centric, Finding the Few Secret Pieces of the Puzzle Another concept that still influences current intelligence concepts and systems is the one that emerged in the course of the Cold War, the formative years for most modern Western intelligence services (Agrell 2009, 102, 104;

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Herman 1996, 21, 341). Without oversimplifying the challenges that intelligence professionals faced when working against the threats of the Cold War, which were still many and difficult (Andrew 2018, 677–700; Warner 2014, 161–165, 228, 237–256; Herman 2001, 191–196; Lockhart 1987, 39), it has been recognized that the bipolar era created a relatively stable environment in terms of requirements and conceptualization, compared to the complexity and diffuse character of the security reality that followed the end of the USSR (Baudet et al. 2017, 8–9). Requirements were for the most part clearly defined, more static and focused on one target, the Soviet Union or its acolytes. The target was also more static in that key prerequisites for policy remained unchanged. However, information about intentions and capabilities was scarce and depended on clandestine collection capabilities to gain access to information that the Soviet Union tried to keep secret. Western intelligence services under these conditions were required to solve questions that could be defined as puzzles. Because the questions that intelligence addressed during the Cold War were mostly puzzles, collection was the mainstay of intelligence concepts. The intelligence machinery was focused on collecting secret pieces of the puzzle. In the US, this is illustrated by organization; intelligence was organized around sources or disciplines, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT), and analysis around agencies (Lowenthal and Clark 2016; Treverton 2005, viii). Also, because the intelligence requirements focused on questions that could be defined as puzzles and could be solved definitively with the right information, these requirements did not require much all-source analysis in order to be met. The information requirements, if met, could aid decision-makers without much analysis. Of course, the information, sources and context had to be critically examined and evaluated. The analysts had to be cautious in case denial and deception or bias could influence the understanding of targets and context. The analysis of competing hypotheses was introduced by Richards J. Heuer Jr. in the 1970s to aid against the analytical fallacy of denial and deception (Heuer 1999). However, because requirements focused on concrete pieces of scarce information and common situational awareness was more easily maintained, analysis was less central to the concept. At the time of the Cold War, consumers were fewer in number and possessed a more in-depth knowledge and understanding of the issues and problems as they focused on one highly prioritized target. The intelligence was sensitive, and distribution was limited. All in all, the Cold War intelligence machinery was a model for less complex and dynamic missions than the conditions of today. Requirements were more static and focused on one target, the questions were more about solving puzzles rather than

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mysteries, and analysis was therefore of less importance. Altogether, intelligence organizations could be organized around finding secrets to solve puzzles. In this concept, the entire machinery was focused on finite number of static requirements. The situation and context were well understood or believed to be understood by those involved, and the understanding or perception was to a great degree shared, and there was less information that had the potential to alter perceptions (Maddrell 2015). Intelligence was conducted in a more static context with less need to adapt to frequent changes in the form of new or altered requirements, or new information. The concept of the Cold War started with collection because it is clear to all involved what the important questions are, “the missing pieces of the puzzle.” The puzzle is solved by a collection-centric concept where ­analysis is less needed. This concept is mainly about secrets, and as such it is in line with a narrow definition of intelligence, emphasizing that intelligence is a specific sort of information: “someone else’s secrets” (Davies 2004, 501). This underlines the standard model of Cold War intelligence (Moore 2011, 16). However, conditions change and, consequently, concepts and theories need to be updated. 2.1.3  Changed Conditions: The Nature of Requirements, the Analytical Approach and the Intelligence Process in a New Security Reality The standard model as it developed during the Cold War quickly came under pressure. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there emerged a more turbulent world where all manners of new threats, concerns and contingencies roamed free (Warner 2014, 335; Gressang 2007, 123; Herman 2001, 72). Suddenly, a whole range of diverse transnational targets and issues clamored for attention, but the standard model was not suited to prioritize among them or cope with their interconnected and dynamic nature. Globalization meant that even small states had global interests, and the information revolution created a whole new security domain that came with its own specific challenges for intelligence (Inglis 2018, 30–33; Degaut 2016, 514; Gressang 2007, 124). “Formed as they were during the Cold War, it should be no surprise that Western intelligence services have struggled to adapt to the new security environment” (Lonsdale 2012, 439). Arguably, strategic intelligence requirements are more dynamic now. More importantly, requirements are increasingly interconnected (Lowenthal 2017, 172; Clark 2016). The number of cus-

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tomers has also increased (Fingar 2011a, 7; Treverton 2009, 147–148). Strategic intelligence, dealing with key questions facing foreign policy, had to deal with mysteries, although collecting secrets was still vital to foreign policy (Treverton 2001, 11). Mysteries are underpinned by grand and complicated questions with the availability of a plethora of openly available information and address the complexities of the real world (Treverton 2009, 149). Strategic requirements have to address these complexities. Therefore different concepts are called for as well as fundamental changes in the conduct of intelligence (Rolington 2013; NRC 2011, 33; Moore 2011, 5; Treverton et al. 2006, 21). Strategic analysis is not simply about processing collected data, as doctrines and publications on operational and tactical concepts seem to emphasize (JDP 2-00 2011); it is a deductive process and theory-based analysis. Although there are incidents where strategic intelligence will address problems that have not been previously considered, more often, strategic intelligence deals with questions about which some foreknowledge exist and general theories are applicable. To specify, while theory is used here in the context of the scientific community, strategic intelligence does not always have the privilege of drawing on sound and scientifically tested theory. However, for the most part, foreknowledge, mid-level theories or models will be able to explain causal relationships or aid in attaining inferences. Strategic intelligence is more deductive as it is concerned with the testing of theory or a hypothesis against specific data and information (Rolington 2013; Marrin 2003, 25). To address complexities, analysts need to develop an understanding of the world and carefully select information to test hypotheses. As Stephen Marrin points out, intelligence analysis is not an exercise in connecting the dots, but it is an approximation of social science methodology (Marrin 2011, 21). Because strategic intelligence benefits from utilizing relevant theory or adapting and developing mid-level theories, the analysts should have relevant expertise. To be able to create a hypothesis from relevant academic theory such as economics and political science, among others, analysts would benefit from the varieties of expertise that Marrin, in particular, has referred to as regional (such as a specialty in a geographical area as the Middle East) or disciplinary expertise (such as economics) (Marrin 2009). Of course, there are nuances to this claim. For example, there will be incidents where intelligence organizations tasked with producing strategic intelligence products will, need to rely on just data. For example, cases termed Black Swans have been much debated (Taleb 2007). These are highly improbable and extremely unpredictable events (Taleb 2007).

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Neither theory nor data could aid in foreseeing such events, but data could be useful in retrospect. Operational and tactical intelligence will also sometimes rely on theory or methods. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) model is a methodical framework that defines and grounds analysis at the state level. The taxonomy predefines variables that should be assessed as they could be influenced directly or indirectly by political, military or economic means (Svendsen 2017, 66). Such concepts and frameworks for addressing variables and measuring developments are more likely to be established later in an operation, and because recent campaigns and operations have been lengthy, such as the operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, this may increasingly be possible. Current intelligence is also, even at the strategic level, more subject to be data-driven because time might not be available for establishing frameworks. Another factor that could determine if a certain intelligence concept is more reliant on data or theory is whether the requirement is new or has been addressed over a certain period of time. Most strategic requirements will still be able to draw on theory more extensively because the issue is not genuinely new, as it is likely to have been already addressed outside of the intelligence community in some form or another. Supporting a military operation in the Middle East and meeting the requirement of increased situational awareness in a limited time and space are very different from trying to answer a question addressing future regional developments in the next 1–5 years. However, these two assessments could certainly enrich each other. Much of the same information will be relevant, but the latter will benefit to a larger degree from drawing on theoretical models to identify causal factors already addressed in academia. The expert analyst will implement relevant theories and knowledge of the Middle East and try to test theories using available data, while the tactical-level analyst will want to look at all the data to gain insight. To sum up, in the twenty-first century, strategic intelligence will consistently rely more heavily on theory and, therefore, benefit from analysts who are subject-matter experts, while tactical intelligence will be more reliant on data and analysts with more general knowledge, but skilled in structured analytical techniques and methods for organizing data. The intelligence process for producing strategic intelligence is more theory-based and analysis-driven, since it is concerned with addressing broad and forward-looking questions with relevant knowledge and theories. It seeks insight: “a strategic intelligence assessment is a justified set of judgments about the course of events, informed by having reached the best pos-

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sible explanation of the underlying motives and circumstances of the individuals and organizations being observed, informed by a real understanding of their past behaviour” (Omand 2010, 196). Therefore, in reality, most expert analysts test theories or hypotheses. This is conceptually very different from the traditional understanding of intelligence as simply collection and processing information. While processing data and information could give insights into issues and developments that analysts are not aware of, researching topics of expertise is done by looking at specific data and information in the context of theories, models and ­hypotheses. In this scenario, the analysts are not concerned about all the data and information on a topic, but specific data and information and make sense of. Mainly the developments mentioned have differentiated the process and concept of producing strategic intelligence from producing operational and tactical intelligence. While requirements at the lower levels are more limited in time and space, strategic intelligence is mainly concerned with mysteries, spawning broad and forward-focused requirements and theorization. The concept is more analysis-centric, but with the increasingly dynamic requirements, there is now more need for management and alignment (Clark 2010, 266). For given these broader, more interconnected, complex and dynamic issues, intelligence requirements are seldom clearly defined by policymakers. This is exacerbated by the influx of intelligence consumers. The consumers vary especially when it comes to their level of expertise or knowledge and experience of the issues and problems, as well as their expectations of what intelligence can do for them. Thanks to the information revolution they also have a great deal more information disposable at their fingertips and might come to feel that intelligence offers them little added value (Degaut 2016, 510). Senior policymakers are also impermanent, as Mark M. Lowenthal points out, often holding but short-term positions (Lowenthal 2017, 3; see also Gardiner 2020 and Fingar 2011b). New issues gaining interest as fast as they lose it by changing developments handicaps the development of a shared understanding of theories and models, between policymakers and analysts. Intelligence analysts often hold specific knowledge and expertise, as there is more continuity in the intelligence services and recruitment is based on specialized knowledge (Lowenthal 2017, 3–4; Fingar 2011b, 13; NRC 2011, 50–56). Because analysts have a high-level understanding of their responsible topic area, they are central in order to operationalize and define the intelligence requirements. The direction stage of the intelligence process, which is often described as essential to satisfy intelligence requirements as needed by decision-makers, is therefore both a more formal process of tasking but

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also largely a result of analysis of issues in the frame of current and potential policy goals and dialogue between producers and consumers. The analysts have become central to the direction stage of the intelligence process (Lowenthal and Clark 2016, 59–60, 100–104, 138–140, 215; Fingar 2011a, 7, 18; Omand 2010, 182–196). The framing of mysteries, which is the context and knowledge of causal relationships and interference, focuses the process to operationalize requirements and make the best use of collectors. The expert analysts are key and central to all of the core functions; however, overall roles and relations are increasingly important. First, direction is a result of analysts’ ability to frame the issues and problems that are presented by the consumers. Efficient direction comes from dialogue between producers and consumers. Analysts identify the main research questions, and the sub-questions, some of which may be suited for collectors. Lastly, in connection to dissemination, products could be disseminated without the involvement of analysts, but dialogue and feedback with consumers are required to understand the value and further need of analysis and production. Joseph W. Wippl, a previous practitioner and current academic in the field, also confirms that analysts in the CIA have tasked collectors (Wippl 2019). Overall, the increasingly dynamic requirements make cooperation and efficient roles and relations decisive. 2.1.4  From Bureaucratic Silos to Agile Cooperation These developments have several implications and call for different concepts and conduct (Treverton et al. 2006, 21). The previous more static missions and targets of intelligence led to the creation of rigid bureaucratic processes. Twenty-first century intelligence requires a change from previous models of collection-centric bureaucratic hierarchies to agile cooperation and arrangements that could continuously adapt and leverage resources to dynamic requirements and missions (Medina 2008, 242; Gressang 2007). Intelligence concepts need to efficiently align information, technology, operators and analysts to respond to the dynamic requirements and missions. Innovation and capacity for continuously improving and adapting concepts are required. Lasting transformation is about updating concepts and understandings. While bureaucracies are well suited for simple and repetitive tasks, which demand a high degree of precision and are conducted in a stable environment, changing environments call for flexible organizational forms that easily respond and adapt to the environment (Morgan 1997). Flexible organizational models include project and matrix structures (Morgan

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1997). Philip H.J. Davies has advanced the understanding of intelligence by organizational analysis of intelligence institutions. He has argued that there are both circumstantial and structural pressures toward collegiality in the UK and US intelligence communities (Davies 2004, 497–498; see also ISCP 2018, 53–59; NRC 2011, 61–68). Such pressures are evident elsewhere too, as the terror attacks of the 2010s have exposed similar ­dysfunctions related to bureaucratic stovepiping that contributed to previous intelligence failures (Lasoen 2018). However, the degree to and effectiveness of collegial institutional arrangements have varied. The collegial body of the British system is structured around the Joint Intelligence Committee (Goodman 2014). Collegiality is far more noticeable in the British intelligence system than the American system (Davies 2004, 497). In the latter, the formal and hierarchical model of independent agencies has been observed to prevent efficient alignment of intelligence resources to focus on issues and problems (Treverton 2005, viii). New legislation after the September 11 attacks of 2001 allowed for the creation of intelligence centers under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). This organization would, in theory, enable more flexibility, as resources from the agencies could be fused to address issues and missions (Fingar 2011b; Treverton 2005, 9–12). However, several have argued that it is not enough to move the boxes in the organizational chart: substantial cultural changes are needed to transform the rigid governmental bureaucracy into what is now being called the “national security enterprise” (Rishikof and George 2011, 331–337). Circumstances call for updating concepts and consequently institutional arrangements. However, to change these systems, there is also a need to transform the culture and internal roles and relations. Management functions are key to change organizational culture and improve roles and relations. The main theme of James Clapper’s tenure as US Director of National Intelligence from 2010 to 2016 was enhanced integration of analysis and collection (Lowenthal 2017, 172). To increase coordination and integration of collection and analysis on specific geographical and functional issues, Clapper established the positions of National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) (Lowenthal 2017, 104). These new management positions, as well as other management and coordinating functions on the lower levels, are key when it comes to fusing the right resources and facilitating cooperation and dialogue. Although many have criticized the US intelligence’s institutional arrangements, Joseph W.  Wippl and Donna D’Andrea have presented a much more positive picture of cooperation between Collection Management Officers and Case Officers in the CIA.  The Collection Management Officers are

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described as having an important function connected to internal direction: aligning collection and analysis with identifying the questions that analysts are concerned about and giving input to tasking and dialogue with the collection side (Wippl and D’Andrea 2010). These management functions should be key to enable close and efficient dialogue and cooperation (Rishikof and George 2011, 342; Wippl and D’Andrea 2010; Clark 2010). However, because intelligence systems and institutions rely on specialized expert knowledge, they are made up of communities and subcommunities with very different cultures, which can hamper good cooperation and relations. Underscoring this is the culture between all-source analysts and collectors (Wippl 2019). The need for agile cooperation with different entities increases the required competences and understanding of the concept and process and makes standardized training with a focus on common language and understanding more important than in static arrangements. Both analysts and collectors need to understand the entire process and their role therein, as well as understanding more of the other roles and responsibilities. In particular, there is a need for analysts to understand the different collection disciplines and their limits and potential. Better understanding of concepts would also aid relations with a common language and school of thought across disciplines and their distinct culture. The intelligence profession has been a challenging one from the start, whether on the management, collection or analysis side. However, the increased dynamic of later developments have not made these different roles easier. The need for a transformation that stems from new requirements means that professionals need to remain specialists in their field, but at the same time to orient themselves to understand more of the concepts, environments and circumstances in which their tasks are conducted. Smaller intelligence communities could be better able to do this, sometimes even out of necessity. The Belgian domestic intelligence service (VSSE—Veiligheid van de Staat/Sûreté de l’Etat), for example, has for the past decade been forced by manpower shortages to shift its analysts away from their expertise and assigned domain in order to cope with the increasing workload of countering other threats, such as terrorism (Lasoen 2018). The positive outcome of such trade-offs is that Belgian analysts developed much wider scopes beyond their area of specialized knowledge, which makes them polyvalent and transferable. As part of remedying the failure to prevent the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and in Brussels on 22 March 2016, the Belgian security services are working toward transcending organizational barriers to exchange experts when and where they are needed (Lasoen 2020). New developments increase the need for cooperation and efficient roles and relations across core functions, production units and disciplines.

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Management functions and theoretical frameworks that increase t­ ransparency and aid in aligning resources—especially analysis and collection—are needed as well. Theoretical frameworks need to be institutionalized, so that they can be critiqued and challenged, and to facilitate efficient internal direction. The external direction from decision-makers is only one of two types of direction (JDP 2-00 2011, 3–3). And there is the internal direction. The main internal activities of this process are often termed Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Management (IRM&CM) (Clark 2010, 275). Although Geraint Evans has pointed out that concepts for developing requirements and collection management are left unexplored in some militaries (Evans 2009, 36), most writings on IRM&CM stem from tactical and operational intelligence concepts, such as the British Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (JDP 2-00 2011) and NATO publications and doctrines (Grebe 2007). The exceptions are Wippl’s and D’Andrea’s presentation of collection management in the CIA (Wippl and D’Andrea 2010, 2014) and Robert Clark’s handbooks on intelligence collection (Lowenthal and Clark 2016; Clark 2010, 261–289). Because the process of IRM&CM is meant to facilitate efficient direction by connecting the efforts of collection and analysis, the analytical approach has a great impact on how the IRM&CM process is conducted. 2.1.4.1 T  he Function of Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Management Because of these shifting and interconnected requirements, the process and roles of IRM&CM should be increasingly important for strategic intelligence. Therefore, IRM&CM is a more complex process that facilitates more efficient roles and relationships across the core functions, especially those of collection and analysis. The requirements are the proper place to start examining this process, as they should drive everything else (Lowenthal 2017, 44; Clark 2010, 266–267). The external part of the direction stage focuses on the intelligence requirements as received from intelligence customers. The process for setting overall priorities is often a more formal and centralized process. For example, the priorities for US intelligence are set by the National Security Council (NSC) and summarized in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) (Lowenthal 2017, 75–76). Because the formal direction could easily become too static, it is important that both customers of intelligence and the intelligence community, particularly the analytical community, are given the opportunity to suggest changes to the overall requirements, based on either developments, ongoing events, or new issues of concern (Lowenthal 2017, 75–76).

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The internal process is based on the external process and is analytically driven, as it aims to operationalize requirements and dedicate and prioritize resources for effective analysis and collection. Expert analysts are especially central to the internal process of operationalization. Because the operationalization of strategic requirements benefits from expert knowledge and the implementation of theory, clearly defined questions, which are effectively measurable and understandable, are a result of an analytically driven process. To connect the external- and issue-driven process to the internal and analysis-driven process, continuous dialogue is required. A disconnection between these processes can result in intelligence that is less relevant to decision-makers as the problem sets are not framed to assist policy, or a less ideally operationalized research framework for addressing issues, not efficiently utilizing existing knowledge of the issues and problems (Kleinsmith 2020, 185–187; Moore 2011, 51–62). This process of operationalization needs to be institutionalized to frame the effort of intelligence production to ensure unity of purpose and effort across functions. This is perhaps similar to conventional research work in academia, with a research design making the hypothesis explicit, developing an intelligence collection plan (ICP)2 and finalizing an intelligence production plan. Unfortunately, the degree to which concepts and theories are made explicit and organic to the intelligence agencies will vary. As Richard Betts highlights: “intelligence bureaucracies are not naturally inclined to deal with theories in a conscious, rigorous, or sustained manner” (Betts 2007, 53). The lack of such frameworks and concepts will not only increase the risk of intelligence failure, but this lack of transparency will also make alignment of analysis and collection challenging, increasing the risk for costly efforts at the collection side that have less value to analysis. Without institutionalizing these methodologies, the application of theory will also be more dependent on the background of the individual analyst or manager and not open to evaluation and criticism. The internal process should result in a research framework in which requirements are operationalized to be effectively measured and to ­understand developments. The prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs)3 are framed research questions. When a research question, such as the PIR is formulated, a potential hypothesis will be generated. Because strategic intel2  Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) lists Prioritized Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Specific Information Requirements (SIRs) and Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) and indicates which collection capabilities best suited to satisfy the intelligence requirements. 3  Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)/Intelligence Requirement (IR) should be precise and ideally formulated as a question.

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ligence often addresses questions that are tied to future developments and decision points, these strategic questions are often open and forward-­ looking. Thus, the hypotheses will necessarily be forward-looking scenarios. Identified variables/factors or drivers influence the development. Therefore, indicators could be used to falsify hypotheses, ideally for the benefit of mutually excluding hypotheses. The gap between the information that is available and the information that is needed could be validated and prioritized for suitable collection capabilities. Framing and identifying questions need to be an iterative process, especially when the issues and problems are dynamic. Continuous dialogue and cooperation between consumers, such as policymakers, all-source analysts and collectors, is therefore essential. More importantly, this is a continuously analytical process of identifying and adjusting assessments and questions. The mainstay of the process is analysis, and the process of IRM&CM should, therefore, be more analytically driven and influenced by expert analysts. At the end, the effort should also be regularly evaluated (Kleinsmith 2020, 191–198). Evaluation is not easy but could be done qualitatively by collecting feedback from consumers; quantitative evaluation should be executed with care. Specifically, personnel dedicated to IRM&CM facilitate the relations between the analytical community and the dedicated collection capabilities and are the link between and key to integration of analysis and collection. This includes identifying, validating and prioritizing intelligence requirements, identifying existing products and information, advice on future production and identifying information requirements, some of which could be eligible for collection, and communicating these to appropriate collection capabilities (Medina 2008, 242–243). If requirements could not be met by national capabilities, bilateral and multilateral partners or other national sources could be explored (Walsh 2010, 140–146). Information requirements management and collection management are also more specific parts of this process. Information requirement management is the function of communicating information requirements to appropriate collection agencies, while collection management is the actual management and tasking of collection capabilities. IRM&CM is a ­ complex management function, involving a number of discreet activities that can be organized in varying ways depending on the specific intelligence concept. More importantly, personnel dedicated to IRM&CM are the bridge between the core functions and facilitate and build efficient internal roles and relations. Commanders and policymakers will seldom formulate questions or even sufficiently frame issues and concerns that they need addressed. At the strategic level, analysts are central in formulating the PIRs. Good questions

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stem from an analytical process. Decision-makers seldom have time for such a process of analysis, which aims to operationalize and frame issues. This does not mean, however, that there should not be a centralized process of direction. Because national strategic requirements are broad questions and mysteries, they benefit from theory and expert knowledge, making the qualified analysts central to the process (Treverton 2001, 140). The process should be analysis-driven, but that does not mean that analysts should dictate information requirements and collection; rather, they are central in providing input to tasking and prioritization (Lowenthal 2017, 82; Medina 2008, 242). However, there needs to be a system to validate requirements because an analyst working on a specific topic will want the best resources at any given time. Another challenge is that analysts have limited knowledge of collection; specific personnel dedicated to IRM&CM are, therefore, central in giving advice on the use of collection capabilities. Collection resources are always scarce and take time to develop and should be used wisely. Managers within the scope of IRM&CM provide a balance between the priorities and requirements of the customers, and the priorities and requirements that emanate as a result of the analytically driven process. Personnel involved in the IRM&CM process ensure efficient use of collection capabilities. To validate and identify information requirements that are really in need of and suited for collection, information requirements should be discussed with collection units. Collection capabilities should be included in the process in order to ensure that prioritized information requirements will contribute to overall requirements and that the collection resources can gather information in order for the specific requirements to be met. Requirements that cannot be met because of a lack of resources or capabilities could be addressed with partners or other national agencies or liaisons. Within the intelligence organization, the suggested intelligence and main information requirements should be centrally approved to ensure priorities with proper overview. As mentioned earlier, defining and formulating the questions is the result of an analytical process; thus, the analytical community should be able to suggest questions, but the final approval must be retained at the central level. This is to facilitate efficient cross-­ prioritization of requirements. Revision of requirements should be made routinely, on request of managers or analysts based on noted development, or initiated by the central unit, customers or collection. If the overall intelligence requirements or new information requirements change or are subsequently adjusted, the information requirement manager is particularly important, together with collection assets, in mapping out available possibilities and avenues and limitations connected to established

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capabilities and evaluating potential new possibilities for exploitation. Because collection at the strategic level is costly and time-­consuming, existing possibilities should always be utilized first. The information requirement manager and collection manager could avoid the duplication of efforts and validate the need for new access or capabilities. The manager should be able to suggest resource allocations to new or changed information requirements and contribute to discussions of cost versus benefit. Because the process of strategic analysis relies more heavily on theory, the process of IRM&CM at the strategic level should be more analysis-­driven. Analysts are not concerned with all the data on a certain topic but are interested in specific data or information. Collected data are systematically analyzed to test and ideally disprove the hypothesis. Conceptually, this means that collection cannot come before analysis but that the intelligence process should start with directions, followed by analysis for the operationalization of requirements and, then, potentially, collection. The traditional presentation of the intelligence cycle will make more sense for data-driven tactical intelligence production where information is first collected and processed to gain insight from it. This makes for completely different approaches, where the concepts, and particularly the analysts’ influence on the direction step, are conceptually very different. Developments put the intelligence analyst at the heart of the process. The function of IRM&CM is key to integrate and align analysis and collection. Therefore, it is also probable that the function of IRM&CM is more central to concepts where the requirements, issues and problems are more dynamic and subject to change. The context and conditions are central to what intelligence is and should be. Identifying conditions and their influence should therefore be central to the debate. The degree to which these conditions are identified and acknowledged should directly correlate to how efficiently the intelligence concepts are improved and adapted to current conditions. Additionally, because outdated concepts still shape perspectives, acknowledging how influential conditions impact understandings and perspectives, from broad to narrow, could bring different perspectives to a confluence and aid in establishing the needed consensus to reshape intelligence. Acknowledging the significance of data versus theory in tactical and strategic intelligence could contribute to developing best practices and optimizing concepts. Instead of prescribing the same cure for what is suggested here to be potentially different problems, challenges could be met with more tailored solutions. As these different analytical approaches also require a multitude of knowledge and skills, this perspective could also enrich the debate on the training and education of intelligence analysts.

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The lack of awareness of the significance of theory and data in different intelligence concepts could be part of the reason for the ongoing debate and the two general and contrasting views when it comes to education. One camp presents the view that the practice of intelligence is a craft that can be taught. The other, that best practice is as much a result of academic training and that topical expertise makes the best analysts (Marrin 2009, 133; Greenberg 2007, 175). As Marrin argues in his article about training and educating US intelligence analysts, there are two types of analysts: generalists and specialists (Marrin 2009). Generalists are more skilled at current intelligence production, sorting through large amounts of data to gain insight, while specialists build knowledge (Marrin 2009, 136); thus, the latter are better suited for implementing relevant theory to test data.

2.2   Conclusion Any attempt to describe the character and area of responsibility of intelligence, either in general or specific, is intelligence theory. This is a broad definition. Many attempts to define intelligence offer a valuable insight into what intelligence is and should be. However, there should be no attempt made to pick one and abandon the rest as this would be to adopt a simple understanding of a very complex and varied business. Theories also need to be continuously developed and updated (Agrell 2014; Honig 2007). To develop the intelligence practice and organizations, there is a need to examine what intelligence is, both in general and in different ­conditions and within the different components. We need theory to give valid answers to what intelligence is and should be in different contexts. The factors of change which are influencing concepts need to be examined. Only then could concepts be properly adapted. In addition, by explicitly looking at and comparing the change in conditions from the concepts of the Cold War and now, intelligence theorization could perhaps also be advanced, weeding out outdated and invalid perspectives and understandings by getting closer to “the heart of the matter” (Warner 2008). The debate on intelligence is continuously blurring the practice of intelligence under different conditions (Agrell 2009, 111–113). By looking at dominating intelligence concepts, this chapter has attempted to shine light on the devils that are in the details (Lowenthal 2017, 47). Requirements are the most important condition for finished intelligence production. Developments have made intelligence requirements numerous, shifting and interconnected compared to the time of the Cold War. This is similar to operational and tactical intelligence where

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requirements are more dynamic. However, strategic intelligence still addresses broader requirements and should benefit from theory as it aims to simplify the complexities of the real world (Marrin 2007, 201–205). This makes strategic intelligence more analytically driven and influenced by the expert analysts. Although management and coordinator functions such as the functions as IRM&CM are increasingly required, these functions should be different at the tactical level. While these functions are less complex and have substantial authority at the tactical level, at the strategic level these should be facilitators for relations and dialogue. At the strategic level, analysts even give input to collection requests, illustrating their importance and centrality in the process (Wippl 2019). This chapter also presented a view that supports those critical of the linear understanding of the intelligence cycle, arguing that the function of analysis is more central to both the direction step and the activity of collecting information. The intelligence process is based and relies on analysis in several aspects, and collectors should act in response to analytical needs (Lowenthal 2017, 163; Rolington 2013, 158). The challenge of strategic intelligence systems is to increase flexibility and the ability to build efficient roles and relations to align resources based on changing developments and interdisciplinary issues (NRC 2011). Strategic and tactical intelligence address different requirements, as they serve different customers. These requirements require different analytical approaches and, therefore, different concepts and skills. Strategic intelligence addresses requirements that allow for an analytical approach that can be based on the testing of theory. This approach also makes the expert analyst, who tests theory by searching for and requesting specific data and information, more central to the direction process. Tactical-­finished intelligence production is more data-driven, gaining insight from all relevant data and information, as general theories are harder to implement when addressing local and specific questions at this level. Strategic intelligence needs to utilize theory and knowledge developed outside the intelligence community. Expert analysts are more central to the process of producing strategic analysis and, especially, to the process of IRM&CM, which aims to integrate the effort of analysis and collection (Gressang 2007, 137–138). This chapter focused on and took the perspective that it is the change in issues and problems, the missions, that is the main driver of change for the practice of intelligence, not the increase in openly available information. This is, however, perhaps just a different way of seeing the same developments because the increase in information could be seen to be driving the changes in missions and requirements. However, the implications of this nuance are not trivial because it does not make information

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the mainstay of intelligence, but analysis. The change in the nature of requirements influences the analytical approach and the relationship between the other core functions of the process. Overall, current issues and problems result in requirements that emphasize the point that analysis and analysts are vital to the concept of intelligence. To efficiently manage intelligence and develop streamlined roles and strengthen relations between the core functions, these developments and their effect on the analytical approach need to be understood.

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CHAPTER 3

How to Classify Intelligence Relations: Partnership Types in the Intelligence Community Tom Røseth

3.1   Introduction This chapter focuses on partnerships in intelligence cooperation.1 The aim is to develop a classification of intelligence relationships and introduce three distinct types based on established partnership literature. The partnership concept is taken from international relations (IR) but has its origin in organizational science (Wilkins 2008). Like market-oriented business, the foundation of intelligence cooperation has a transactional nature based on barter, with the essential ingredient realizing benefits for both parties. Over time, and under special circumstances, the transactional relationship can develop into a stronger, transformative and more trustworthy relationship. According to Musa Tuzuner (2010), information grows as it is shared and intelligence collaboration sparks further knowledge. The value 1  The author uses intelligence relations interchangeably with intelligence cooperation, both similar to the terms intelligence liaison, intelligence sharing and intelligence exchange.

T. Røseth (*) Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_3

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of trustworthy intelligence exchanges should not be underscored and will ultimately lead to increased security for the state and its population (Omand 2010). After the Cold War, in the 1990s until 2001, many intelligence organizations lost momentum and struggled in adjusting their focus to new threats. International military operations and terror gained increased attention up to 2001 and especially in the following years. An intelligence organization focused effort is on its adversaries, but it also needs to nurture friends in order to support national decision-makers. As a result, vigorous new partnerships complemented the old ones as counterterrorism cooperation expanded (Byman 2017, 147). However, increased resources allocated to intelligence go beyond the recent surge of terrorism and are a result of increased globalization with its many security implications affecting intelligence services. The resurgence of the Russian military and its endeavors, power shift toward Asia and the emerging power of China in particular, with geopolitical competition on the South China Sea and a U.S. trade conflict with China forces Western  intelligence organizations to adapt. Changes in international relations due to globalization relate to the evolving realities of the intelligence services in handling an increased number of transnational threats, involving international crime and cyber threats, among others. According to Richard Aldrich (2009), states were too focused on terrorism to handle all the other ills with globalization that government asks them to handle. Later, focus has increased on global power competition and state actors as well. In responding to a globalized world and multiple threats, intelligence services increasingly cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally both nationally and internationally.2 What should one make of these partnerships and how do they differ? Some intelligence relations develop into close relations, moving from ad hoc or limited collaboration focusing on a passing threat to broad and deep relations founded basically on common interest, and sometimes also on common values. The suggestion here is to employ and adjust the interstate relations partnership concept onto the specific sphere of intelligence cooperation. The problem statement simply put is: How can we classify different types of intelligence cooperation? In answering this question, the author includes the notion of vulnerability and willingness of exposure to risk—which implies  This chapter focuses on international intelligence relations relative to external threats (foreign intelligence) and not domestic security cooperation, which encompasses interstate policing and security cooperation through organizations such as Interpol or the Club of Berne. 2

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degrees of trust toward the other. By classifying intelligence cooperation, this study contributes to identifying and clarifying intelligence relations. In doing so, this chapter draws parallels to three main IR theories, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. The author sees these as complementary expressed in the partnership concept, as intelligence relations can evolve from threat-based practical cooperation familiar to realists, to broad and deep collaboration based on common interest with similarities to liberalism, and in some instances reach the level where one agrees of behavioral norms and standards on intelligence similar to constructivism. This author will employ examples from U.S. interstate intelligence relations, while being aware of the disadvantages of a simplified unitary state perspective.3 Michael Herman (1996, 210) is well founded when he argues that the distinctive feature of interstate intelligence interaction is agency to agency or single discipline focused multilateral intelligence clubs. Collaboration is not based on a coordinated national intelligence community toward another one. Rather, it is based on interagency cooperation, for example, between National Security Agency and Government Communications Headquarters or multilaterally within the Five Eyes signals collection club. However, due to the secrecy of such interagency cooperation and in order to present a more coherent argument on classification, examples here will be on the state level. Much of the analysis and discussion is on the interagency level, in order to ground the IR concepts to the interagency level. The classification is modeled in such a way that it can be employed on several levels. Furthermore, the examples of U.S. aggregated interstate intelligence cooperation provide an initial valuable overall assessment to the importance of intelligence in its foreign relations. Intelligence cooperation can vary greatly between the different national intelligence organizations. The state mainly provides a policy framework in which intelligence organizations operate. For example, the political authority may instruct an intelligence organization with whom it may or may not cooperate—or even order it to improve or end cooperation. Within this framework and guidelines, intelligence relations gain its own dynamic depending on  Examples in the last part of the chapter are on the aggregated state level, for example between the U.S. and the U.K. Being aware of the significant difference of state level cooperation and foreign interagency interaction, the author’s assessment on the partnership is a qualitative judgment based on open sources. 3

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necessity, common threats, culture, institutional traits, personal relations and not least—the willingness to share. In the intelligence literature, many describe the changing nature of intelligence relations, but there is a need for a coherent classification of the multitude of relationships. This chapter aims to initiate a discussion on intelligence classification by utilizing IR tools. Indeed, some form of differentiation is already in place already by the intelligence practitioners. As in other organizational settings and in business, one often employs “strategic” on the most important partners without having contemplated much about what it should entail and how to clearly differentiate from other types of relations. The aim of this chapter is to more clearly differentiate between types of intelligence partnerships. Intelligence cooperation has a long history through allies sharing information during war, while peacetime exchanges first took place after the institutionalization of intelligence organizations prior to World War I (Herman 1996). Intelligence has become a form of international diplomacy in its own right. Intelligence relations are still undeveloped compared to diplomacy, but Michael Herman (1996, 203) argued two decades ago that structures of alliances and agreements have formed with varying degrees of formality. He saw a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral arrangements of all kinds and degrees of intimacy. The global intelligence system is dominated by the U.S. with its many partners, a hegemony that reflects the unipolar state system that has dominated the post–Cold War period. Having in mind the contemporary power shift toward Asia, the U.S. is increasingly challenged by competent and capable Chinese intelligence services. Russia is another capable actor with strong intelligence capabilities that in Soviet times matched the ones of the U.S. Russia and China lack the extensive international partner system that the U.S. enjoys, notwithstanding some selective states, and must depend more on national intelligence resources. The increased alignment between Moscow and Beijing politically and militarily (Røseth 2018) leads incrementally to increased intelligence sharing, but their partnership lacks the intelligence standardization and trust found in U.S. alliances. The U.S. advantage provides global access to local opportunities that can provide unique intelligence on several topics, be it terrorism or nuclear proliferation. The evolving threat of terrorism is the most emphasized factor for increased intelligence cooperation in the intelligence studies literature, affecting all types of intelligence and security actors domestically, bilaterally and multilaterally (Lefebvre 2003). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, intelligence agencies are strongly connected to the nation

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state and may lack the autonomy to muster effective international cooperation, leading to slow reaction to threats connected to globalization (Aldrich 2009; Deflem 2002; Svendsen 2008). Cooperation with different countries on terrorism is challenging, as different types of governments have intelligence services that may be reluctant to cooperate on targeting specific groups or sensitive issues/areas, because intelligence is politicized, corrupted or lack democratic legitimacy (Byman 2017). Scholars often study the formal sides of intelligence cooperation through policy instructions or formal interstate or institutional agreements or take on the practitioner side with the actual challenges in intelligence cooperation. James Walsh (2009) uses social-economic theory to address the intelligence bargaining of information in what he sees as an anarchic intelligence system. Walsh is among many that views intelligence as a commodity. States share out of mutual interest and he argues that the secret nature of intelligence gives rise to two key problems. The “sellers” of intelligence cannot be sure that “buyers” will adequately protect what they receive, and “buyers” cannot be sure of the veracity of the intelligence they get from “sellers.” These represent risks that intelligence organizations fear in their relations to others and are in this study factors that in part determine the type of intelligence partnership states have. Studies by Jelle van Buuren (2014) and Jason Dittmer (2015) view intelligence cooperation as assembles, in which bottom-up cooperation through a diversity of entities form a new order or reality and view intelligence cooperation as a complex network system with its own dynamic. Instead of evaluating such a wide complex of intelligence relations, this author’s aim is to classify intelligence cooperation into a simple typology. In this process, whenever possible, the employed classification refers to practices rather than formal policy ambitions. The author also includes not only bilateral but also multilateral intelligence cooperation that has gained increased importance. On the other hand, he contends that most intelligence organizations’ preferred modus operandi remains bilateral, not multilateral. Bilateral relations are favored in order to secure information and the methods behind intelligence, and not least due to the transactional nature of intelligence cooperation. If a service provides valuable information multilaterally in organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it loses value for bilateral gain, and one risk is to provide information to free riders that may not be returned. Multilateral intelligence and security cooperation has come quite far in Europe, with the Club of Berne and the Counterterrorist Group, but often intelligence

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sharing is more about sharing assessments, rather than creating new common intelligence agencies or sharing collection resources (Aldrich 2009, 739). Adam Svendsen (2009, 701) concurs and states that multilateral intelligence cooperation has increased, but that its expansion has been cautious. There are exceptions, such as the Five Eyes collaboration among the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Here intelligence collaboration on signals intelligence is broad and deep with raw collected data sharing, forming a formidable pool of resources with complementary geographical and thematic issues. Intelligence cooperation, especially bilateral ones, can move beyond the cynical transactional interaction, a point the author will return to later. Further, work from scholars such as Richard Betts (2009) leans more toward organizational theory as a useful theoretical base for explaining intelligence. Mark Phythian (2009) sees structural realism as the theoretical basis to handle intelligence failures, although with clear limits. Finally, the work of Adam Svendsen (2009) should here be emphasized in his effort to confine intelligence studies relative to traditional IR theories. Svendsen sees intelligence studies, and especially intelligence liaison, as remarkably disconnected from IR theory and other theories. Much theoretical or conceptual effort has been put into works concerning the intelligence process through simplified models of the intelligence cycle or elements within it. The intelligence cycle has its deficits, and for one does not consider intelligence relations. In conclusion, Svendsen sees IR theories as too simplistic to be employed individually on intelligence relations because they fail to capture complexity. He therefore argues for a collective use to capture dynamics more fully, which should consider realism and liberalism and constructivism among other theories. In sum, there is a relative low influx of IR theories into intelligence studies sphere. Theories of intelligence cooperation are lacking, and this subject defies an easy categorization (Svendsen 2009). This chapter seeks to make a classification or typology of intelligence relations, with references to IR theory. Conceptually and theoretically, intelligence relations are a global phenomenon not limited to the employed example of U.S. international intelligence relations. In this chapter, the author will now present the partnership concept with its three types and draw brief parallels to their respective traditional IR orientations—realism, liberalism and constructivism. Thereafter, the author will employ the concept to the intelligence sphere, and through U.S. intelligence relations exemplify the three types. The author will ­conclude on the applicability of the partnership concepts on intelligence relations.

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3.2   The Partnership Concept The author argues that the presented partnership concept is an appropriate analytical tool to analyze and classify intelligence relations. He presents three levels by applying a modified version of Smith’s partnership types on intelligence relations. These include the concept of vulnerability that builds on Keohane and Nye’s (2012) definition, which in the intelligence world would be the unavoidable cost one or both of the partners take through cooperation if their methods, sources, operations or information provided were to be exposed. Considerations on vulnerability are the calculated risk an intelligence service takes in order to obtain gains. By adjusting the partnership concept and adapting it to the intelligence sphere, it enables a classification between types of partnerships and thus an employable typology. 3.2.1  Partnership Types A partnership, and especially a strategic partnership, is a commonly used description of relations in which relations are good or there is an ambition of such. This does not mean that it qualifies as a strategic partnership per se. Hence, an intelligence service may claim to have several strategic partnerships with services in other countries, but these are very different from one another. For this reason, it is essential to assess the substance of a relationship rather than acquiescing to a mere statement of political aim (Grevi 2010, 3). In order to avoid such fallacies, this author seeks to improve the means of distinguishing a strategic intelligence partnership from pragmatic and normative ones. Figure 3.1 displays the types of intelligence partnerships in a continuum from adversary liaison or more hostile intelligence relations. Relations can over time move from one to another. Adversary liaisons are relations between strong competitors or foes. Such intelligence relations are not the aim of this chapter, as it here only serves as a contrast to more constructive relations. Examples of such relations can be found between the great powers, for example, within the UN Security Council covered later in Chap. 5.

Fig. 3.1  Types of intelligence partnerships

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The pragmatic partnership type represents a rather simple arrangement. It qualifies as the label partnership because the intelligence organizations cooperate “with” and not opposes “against” the other. The pragmatic partnership thus represents the start of the partnership continuum, with the alternative being adversarial or more hostile relations. The second type is the strategic partnership where one agrees on how to handle common risks and interests and is a broad type of cooperation. Third, it is the normative partnership—reachable only under common conditions of values and norms, which often take time to establish. The author will describe these types more in detail below. In order to use the partnership concept on intelligence relations it needs to be clarified and adjusted for the purpose. First, there is no common definition of what constitutes a strategic partnership among scholars and the strategic level often uses the term based on political ambitions rather than actual content (Wilkins 2012; Grevi 2010). Second, there may also be different objectives between the leadership of an intelligence service that seeks friendly improved relations versus the operative level which have a more realist view of potential gain and costs and where trust over time develops (Svendsen 2009, 715). A wide interpretation would include most relationships as strategic ones, undermining the concept’s purpose and meaning. Of equal importance, the definitional criteria of a strategic partnership should not be too strict to open for a meaningful generalization. The author uses a modified version of Martin Smith’s (2006) identification of the partnership types. In addition, to allow for both realist assumptions and elements of a more cooperative or common value-­oriented nature, the partnership concept considers developments at a multitude of levels—be it the specific subject issue or collection method arenas or the systemic interstate level. The dynamic within the concept falls in line with Svendsen’s (2009, 709) description that IR theories employed alone “fail to capture the full complexity of the more specifically concerned intelligence liaison phenomenon.” In other words, different IR theories can explain varying aspects of intelligence relations. As mentioned, a developed interpretation of Smith’s, partnership concept enables elements from realism, interdependency theory and constructivism on intelligence. These theories complement each other and in combination are better able to capture dynamics inherent in the different types of intelligence relations. An intelligence partnership can develop beyond basic threat-based needs, into a relationship built on enough trust to allow for exposure to risk and acceptance of vulnerability. Connecting these theories to the concept is here done with limited room to go into theoretical discussions.

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An intelligence partnership can imply strong relations based primarily on sharing analysis or collected data, but it can also include privileged economic incentives. Intelligence relations can inherit parallel mixes of partnership types, depending on the issue area or intelligence branch, and these are consequently not mutually exclusive. The point here being that the author’s examples give a simplified aggregated picture on intelligence relations, as the aim is to classify relations and not to deeply explore different attributes. For example, there may be close counterterrorism cooperation between two national states’ services and no other collaboration or exchanges only within a single collection domain. With the many intelligence services in the U.S., these organizations cooperate differently from service to service toward another nation state. Such examples, combined with secrecy inherent in foreign interagency collaboration, mean that qualitative judgments are challenging. Further research is needed on the interagency level to classify these. Here the aim is to simplify on the aggregated level, despite the mentioned caveats. 3.2.2  The Pragmatic Partnership Type The first partnership type identified is the pragmatic relationship, based mainly upon expedient and tactical calculations and confined to perceived common interests (Smith 2006, 111–112). While seeking mutually advantageous agreements on common issues, the parties will remain concerned about the capabilities of the other. A zero-sum game plan will tend to predominate, moreover, where a win for one is considered a loss for the other. It is an approach familiar to realists as relations are based on high threat perceptions, protection of national interests and strong security concerns vis-à-vis the other state. The pragmatic partnership type represents low interstate or interagency intelligence ambitions, and barely qualifies as a partnership. The pragmatic relationship deserves still to be called a partnership, according to Smith (2006, 112), because the partners cooperate on “mechanisms to prevent a deterioration in the security situation.” There is a constant risk of the partnership being misused or compromised, with low willingness to expose vulnerability toward the other. The pragmatic partnership includes cooperation where the parties may collect intelligence on each other, somewhat overlapping with what Sims (2020, 179) calls “adversarial liaison.” In such intelligence relations, information is exchanged despite the nonexistence of general common interests between the services and their states.

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If the parties resort to overt hostile confrontations or liquidations between the services, or one directs massive collection toward the other, then it is clearly not a partnership per se. Pragmatic intelligence relations should not be overly destructive but instead focus on coordination and common tactical interests in a transactional relationship. If overly destructive, intelligence relations cease, the partnership concept becomes irrelevant as relations move toward hostility. A pragmatic partnership may be a temporary or a permanent arrangement with one or both parties finding it in their interest to maintain limited constructive intelligence relations. Often, cooperation is on a narrow subject, such as counterterrorism or another common threat that has caused two or more reluctant states to seek together to gain on security. Or it could be a cynical barter forced out of necessity by one or both. Collaboration may be absent or very limited on other issues and normally lack raw intelligence collection. Jennifer Sims (2020) employs the term simple intelligence liaison, which involves limited cooperation on intelligence material on a specific security concern or target. Her description fits well with the pragmatic partnership type described above, where it is easy to keep track of the costs and benefits of limited intelligence cooperation. In order to argue for the utility of the partnership concept, a short mentioning of vulnerability and realism is necessary here in the pragmatic partnership theme. This chapter introduces vulnerability as an additional factor to better distinguish pragmatic from strategic partnership policies. Vulnerability implies risk, to allow or accept exposure. According to Keohane and Nye (2012, 12), vulnerability translates into costs on one or both of the parties should the relationship turn hostile: Vulnerability entails that exposure to or dependency on the other cannot easily be altered by one party only revising its policies (ibid.). In a pragmatic partnership, intelligence services avoid vulnerability through withholding sensitive information and methods, as well as by limiting the cooperation to specific fields (e.g. counterterrorism). A distinct feature of a pragmatic partnership is that it is threat-driven. This is a familiar tenet of the realist school where states worry about each other’s relative power, in a situation where a common threat influences the relationship toward necessary coordination with intelligence organizations attempting to avoid leaving themselves vulnerable and exposed toward the other. Shared intelligence can often be selected or be biased in order to influence the other, and suspicion of such would be omnipresent in various degrees. Such manipulative intelligence limits the potential of shared intelligence and it becomes hard to agree on strategic intelligence and analysis.

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Threat-driven pragmatic partnership policies accommodate to the realist school and Kenneth Waltz’s (1979, 107) view that states do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence, nor provide assets that might increase the relative power of the other. In a self-help system, considerations of security are subordinated to other interests. Providing intelligence that increases the relative power of the more resourceful state is considered too risky—a probable reason why Russian security services are reluctant to share with Chinese services. Pragmatic partnership relations thus are compatible with balance of power theory. The (neo)realist concepts of balancing and bandwagoning (Waltz 1979), derived from alliance theory, are relevant to pragmatic partnership policies—insofar as to explain interstate relations by the state system and other state actors such as intelligence services. While alliance choices may be predicted (Walt 1987, 19), most such theories do not seek to depict foreign policy, as one could claim intelligence cooperation is a part of or similar to. Nonetheless, the system-level’s main aim is not primarily to explain foreign policy (Waltz 1979). An abstract system-level analysis is therefore not ideal for a study such as this investigates intelligence choices. This author’s other reluctance to use solely realist concepts is mainly due to the limited leeway they provide for examining changing intelligence relations. Without a more dynamic concept, it is hard to account for developments outside of pragmatic partnership policies—that is—if one consents with the argument that intelligence relations can move beyond the mere threat-based ones. Generally speaking, realist concepts do not shed enough light on why intelligence services accept heightened risk and vulnerability through collaboration. Therefore, the aforementioned complementary approach advocated by Svendsen (2009, 715) is here supported by including the three main IR theories to represent and show the dynamic nature of intelligence relations at different levels. Next, a partnership may change into another type of relationship, first a strategic one that is more goal-driven due to an alignment of common interests. The transformation process is usually gradual. 3.2.3  The Strategic Partnership Type The second type is the strategic partnership. A broad, long-term relationship based on trust is one that allows the parties to compromise to obtain benefits. For Smith (2006, 112), a partnership is only strategic when agreements exist on the overall nature of international issues, on sources of potential and

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actual security threats and on the most appropriate means of responding to them. Under a strategic partnership, win-win attitudes predominately show on most issues. Such a partnership is underpinned by a strategic calculus promoting stability, long-term resilience and commitment. It is not entirely secure or immune to shifts in national or agency interests and (mis-)perceptions about the other, insofar as strategic partnerships do not rule out concerns about each other (Smith 2006, 112). A strategic partnership encompasses what Jennifer Sims (2020, 176) labels a complex intelligence liaison: “The bartering of intelligence collection assets for some mix of political, intelligence, economic, military, or operational goods provided through intelligence channels.” Thus, cooperation is broad and across a variety of intelligence channels that makes keeping score of barter and services hard, and involves weighing multiple factors also outside the intelligence domain. For example, the partner provides intelligence in exchange for hardware investments, infrastructure or support for a regime’s security. Indeed, mutual suspicion is a constant factor in intelligence relationships, especially where there are cultural and national policy differences. A strategic partnership, according to Smith (2006, 112), tolerates such anxieties as long as there is a common platform to work out security concerns and a framework for broad cooperation. This does not mean that the partner refrains to influence or manipulate the other’s intelligence and their decision-makers, but it is more limited and often openly discussed and handled. As mentioned, this author suggests that Keohane and Nye’s concept of vulnerability is included to distinguish between pragmatic and strategic partnership policies—that is, whether one allows for risk toward the other in order to obtain a common good. According to Giovanni Grevi (2010) who looks at partnerships within the European Union (EU), those in a strategic partnership are the ones that could inflict most harm if relations were to change, something Brexit could be an example of. A reliant partner turned sour can be a costly affair, as much is vested into the partnership and much activity depends on it. Indeed, increased security and economic cooperation produce interdependencies. This interdependency is more often asymmetrical according to Keohane and Nye (2012), where one party is less dependent than the other. With alternative partners or relocation of own resources parallel intelligence sources can be established, and one can reduce or eliminate the exposure, while the other has no alternatives or these are too costly. An intelligence agency is vulnerable when it, through policies, cannot alter this dependency. Often, this refers to intelligence services in smaller states with limited resources and fewer partners. This vulnerability will again in practice vary on the subject issue or collection method while the overall picture lies with the

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leadership and liaison coordinators in the services. If there is a strong deficit on vital national interest, the dependency is aggravated. An asymmetry can influence the partnership to be rather unequal and often increase the weaker party’s willingness to share. The fortunate position by the resourceful partner is then sensitive (able to alter dependency) and not vulnerable (unable or too costly to alter dependency) in an asymmetric interdependency. Implied risk is inherent as junior partners are exposed to potential manipulation and control by the dominant partner (O’Neil 2017). Nonetheless, in a strategic partnership, relations run across a broad set of issues and an asymmetric situation should not be overly exploited and the resourceful partner would not see the necessity to alter its sensitivity toward the other—as it is satisfied with the information provided. A strategic partnership can tolerate setbacks due to limited collection toward the other, often handled through redundancy of trust with multiple channels of communication between the partners. Liberalism holds that complex interdependence is a condition under which cooperation prevails and military power becomes less important (Keohane and Nye 2012). In this view, multiple channels connect societies and domestic actors play a role, blurring the line between domestic and foreign policy. Such channels include intelligence relations and intelligence actors, demonstrating that there is a multitude of interstate relations that underpin the liberalist view that the state as a unitary actor is a simplification. Both Smith (2006, 21) and Wilkins (2012, 67) emphasize the relative sharing of risk and worrying less about the other’s power in a developed stage of interstate relations. Sharing risks and worrying less about the other are important if the parties are to tolerate vulnerability. With increased mutual trust, one intelligence service may help the other increase its power. It will reciprocally benefit and does not see its contribution leading to a threat to its interests assessing that involved exposure represents a manageable risk. The main difference between pragmatic and ­strategic partnerships policies is that strategic ones tolerate such vulnerability, while pragmatic ones do not. Lo’s (2008, 41) list of criteria for defining a partnership as strategic comply largely with those of Smith (2006) and Wilkins (2008). According to Lo, a strategic partnership is a long-term commitment, resilient enough to overcome occasional tactical opportunism and setbacks. The focus on the partnership as a tool to leverage third parties should not be disproportionate, as a change in relations with or within the third party would alter the partnership’s foundation. Intelligence agencies should share a vision of the world and agree on their roles within it. There is also a strong need for substance that the cooperation must contain actual information sharing

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that is valuable and meaningful underpinning national decision-making. The partnership process may generate a new common organizational culture over the longer term, influencing the behavior of the states involved and others that happen to interact with them. One of the dynamics inherent in this and other types of alignment is the incentive to deepen the relationship further. Examples of such cooperation in the intelligence community are seen within the EU. The territorial defense is the response of the member states, but the union streamlined its foreign and security policy with the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The EU’s prime node for foreign intelligence is its Intelligence Analysis Centre, and through the imagery collection by the EU Satellite Centre (Fägersten 2014).  According to Artur Gruszczak (2016), the collection, processing and sharing of available information enhance internal security and stimulate various forms of cooperation between the intelligence and security services in the union. The state with its services is the predominant factor in the intelligence process, where it facilitates cooperation and sharing of information in order to improve the internal security within the organization. Considering external threats, the member states of the EU have a military intelligence hub and intelligence supports early warning and crisis prevention, thus show a developed intelligence cooperation with some similarities to the NATO-system. In sum, the strategic partnership type entails broad cooperation that entails interdependency and fits well with the main elements from liberalism. 3.2.4  The Normative Partnership Type The third type, the normative partnership, is based on a common set of standards where the partners consider themselves in a community of shared values (Smith 2006, 112). Furthermore, relations are shaped on a common set of behavioral norms, values and standards. Common values in liberal democracies are individual freedom, political democracy and, for instance, democratic control of the intelligence services. Between nondemocratic, transitional and authoritarian states, the common values may be more connected to cultural identity, authoritarian tradition, state security, and norms derived from other common interests established over time. For example, Russia and Belarus can be said to be in a strong bilateral relationship and even an alliance  based on their so-called establishment of a  Union State. Their relations are based on common history, culture, military cooperation and a shared former ideology. Both have developed authoritarian tendencies within a formal democratic framework, but relations are still challenging and closer integration has not materialized (Moscow Times 2019). More often,

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nondemocratic regimes and their institutions have their main motivation in opposing the U.S., liberal democratic values or what they perceive as the West’s interests. As long as such a third-party factor dominates relations between Russia and China, it cannot aspire to become a normative partnership in their intelligence relations. Their strategic partnership is mainly based on a negation in addition to lacking common values and norms. Normative relations between intelligence services are more often found within alliances, but an alliance is neither a necessity nor enough for the normative partnership type to materialize. In such a collaboration, the partners may also both claim and accept the responsibility to scrutinize the other’s observance of the core norms and standards of behavior—being it in their interstate affairs or regarding their intelligence operations. A normative partnership implies acceptance to a high degree of vulnerability toward the other, where strong trust opens for sharing raw signals intelligence, sensitive human intelligence reporting or to perform joint intelligence operations and thereby disclosing own methods. The partnership is established over time and is considered resilient with a solid foundation that can withstand occasional setbacks. A setback could be that the partner collects intelligence on the other, for example to gain economic benefit (Sanger 1995). Great anger can come from spying on an ally, for instance when collection on the partner takes place and is disclosed, such as with the U.S. and Germany case (Spiegel Online 2014). A normative partnership should not have severe setbacks after the dust has settled, as seen with U.S. intelligence relations with Japan and Germany after Washington was caught red-handed. That is not to say that relations cannot become long-term damaged or are unaffected, because  some wrong deeds are simply hard to forget. Ideally, normative partners do not collect extensively on the other. Despite asymmetry in the partnership, in a normative partnership the junior partner is not forced to accept outcomes antithetical to their interests (O’Neil 2017, 529). The normative partnership type occurs more rarely in the intelligence community, because there often is a lack of sufficient trust or that cultural differences make common norms and values difficult to establish. The normative partnership and its weighting on common norms and values have parallels with constructivism. A main proponent of constructivism, Alexander Wendt (1992) clearly criticizes the static assumptions of anarchy in traditional IR theory in his article titled “Anarchy is What States Make of It”. Intelligence relations are often seen as merely transactional in nature, keeping track of the “intelligence capital” or barter vis-a-­ vis partners in a balance sheet of offer or demand. However, intelligence

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relationships can develop into something more—where the common benefit holds higher than keeping score, as seen within the Five Eyes cooperation. A normative intelligence partnership entails an extensive intelligence liaison where cooperation naturally flows inside and outside of the intelligence sphere in order to promote intelligence collection and security. There is a more holistic approach across economic, political, diplomatic and security spheres, often observed within alliances. Wendt (1992) holds that ideas are more important than material resources, such as military capabilities or economic power, in influencing relations between people and states. Therefore, the structure and interaction between nations (and intelligence services) are socially, rather than materially determined. In the international context, Wendt argues that ideas form actors’ interests that in turn articulate into state actions. Common beliefs or political ideologies can therefore be a powerful resource, such as universal Western values in competition with nondemocratic authoritarian states. A central point is the willingness to enhance each other’s capabilities for mutual benefit. Common ideas and norms with pooling of resources can therefore be an enabling factor for deep and broad intelligence collaboration. 3.2.5  Concluding the Three Partnership Types Table 3.1 depicts the main elements in the partnership types, that is, the indicators for classifying a partnership. As mentioned, a partnership can contain differences within types depending on the subject issue or sector at hand. The overall assessment should therefore be judged by conducting a qualitative assessment on the agency level or aggregated to the state level. The process moving from one to the other is gradual and can differ dependent on the intelligence agency, branches or subject issues. The three partnerships are to be viewed as ideal types. Changes occur most often between the pragmatic and strategic partnership, as relations improve or worsen. The normative partnership is harder to obtain due to the threshold of common values and norms, establishing trust that takes time to develop. Worsening of interstate relations could degrade the intelligence partnership, or it could be due to compromising or misuse of the partner’s intelligence. In such instances, it can take years to repair the same level of relations. This author views the partnership concept through Smith’s lenses with elements from Wilkins (2008) and Lo (2008), and through eclectically theoretical additions of Waltz (1979), Keohane and Nye (2012) and Wendt

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Table 3.1  Types of intelligence partnerships Pragmatic partnership

Strategic partnership

Normative partnership

• Threat-driven coordination with zero-sum considerations • Avoid exposure of vulnerability • Simple intelligence liaison • Tactical nature, transactional • Differences are a constant risk • Cooperation limited and selective, manipulative • Share selected analytical products or processed collected material • Collect on each other

• Goal-driven cooperation with win-win considerations • Accept exposure of vulnerability • Complex intelligence liaison • Strategic common calculus • Differences are manageable • Broad cooperation, long-term intention • Share both collected material and analytical products • Some collection on the partner

• Collaboration based on common norms, standards and values • Allow for high vulnerability • Extensive intelligence liaison • Resilient and solid foundation • Room for scrutinizing the other • Broad and deep cooperation, long-­term • Share sensitive intelligence, raw data, HUMINT or run joint operations • Minor collection on the partner

(1992). The result is a partnership concept making it easier to unravel changes and assess shifts from one type of partnership policy to another. The partnership concept thus incorporates factors related to neorealism, but also builds on other approaches such as liberalism and constructivism to explain strategic partnership policies. By bringing in the vulnerability factor into the partnership concept, he argues to more easily differentiate between the partnership types. The pragmatic type of partnership has considerable resonance with the realist school, in that states lower risk by carefully seeking to avoid vulnerability. The sharing of ­information is selective based primarily on the necessity in facing a common threat. The strategic type of partnership, on the other hand, includes a tolerance of vulnerability, be it symmetric or asymmetric. Such states find more to gain from cooperation where the partners take the risk of exposure believing that the other will not take advantage of it. There is willingness to share along a broad specter of information, assessed as a common good believed to benefit both over time. Lastly, the normative type of partnership allows for a high degree of vulnerability and trust in the other. Common values and norms, combined with broad and deep cooperation, make intelligence sharing natural—and instead is seen as lowering risk as collaboration increases the security and improves decision-making processes in both states.

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3.3   Partnerships Employed The author has above accounted for the classification and description of the three types of intelligence partnerships, and now moves to employ these on intelligence relations. The scope is limited to the U.S. on the mentioned aggregated level with a selection of its foreign intelligence relations. Figure  3.2 displays the different partnerships the U.S. has with a selection of countries. Keeping in mind limitations in employing a simplified qualitative assessment on interstate intelligence relations, these should be considered as general examples rather than a thorough description of interagency cooperation. The pragmatic partnership type can be found within U.S. intelligence relations with often weak democratic, transitional or authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Ad hoc or long-term interacting with intelligence services in countries, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Indonesia and Tajikistan, are mainly focused on fighting terrorism or supporting the stability of a current regime. Essentially pragmatic endeavors where there is limited degree of trust, with an uncertainty in how the other secures and utilizes the information. It is primarily a common threat that is the motivation behind such a zero-sum collaboration—meaning that the partner is reluctant to provide information that empowers the other vis-a-vis oneself, or other actors one sympathizes with or supports. Typical intelligence interaction of the pragmatic type does not include sporadic U.S. intelligence coordination with Russia, China and Syria. In  general,  such relations are at times strongly oppositional or hostile and not considered as a partnership despite the occasional sharing on terror—here listed as adversary liaison in Fig. 3.2 to show the contrast of these with pragmatic part-

Fig. 3.2  Selected U.S. foreign intelligence relations

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nerships. Adversary liaison is selective and sector-dependent on specific common threats often in a short-term perspective, where conditions for cooperation may change fast toward hostilities between services due to hostile engagement on other issues or sudden political changes (see more in Weaver’s Chap. 5). In a pragmatic partnership, the partners seek to avoid vulnerability, by providing carefully selected material in order to minimize the exposure of methods, and at the same time perform risk assessment on how the information may be handled and utilized. Therefore, the information provided is often analytical reports or processed material in order to secure the methods and sources. Shared intelligence is selective, and the partner will often make efforts to manipulate the other or influence policies through intelligence. Under a pragmatic type of intelligence partnership, the partner may again cooperate simultaneously with a U.S. adversary, such as Russia or China, in order to balance, supplant or decrease U.S. influence. Such relations marginally qualify as pragmatic intelligence relations because they can be easily assessed as hostile or nonconstructive relations. In addition, intelligence coordination with nondemocratic states or states in a transition toward democracy have often services that are tightly connected to the executive power with an inward focus on regime security and enforcement services of the ruling party (Aldrich 2015, 394). Interaction with such services, combined with covert action, may challenge the norm, rules or ethics of U.S. or Western services. Pragmatic partnerships can therefore turn out to be problematic concerning democratic oversight at home, among human rights activists or investigative journalists. Relations within most NATO allies and some partner countries are of the strategic partnership type, including medium and smaller newer members to the alliance that have limited intelligence capabilities—relations where the relationship with the U.S. agencies are more asymmetrical than with larger NATO states. Smaller states are eager to cooperate as a U.S. partner can provide lacking capabilities, operational knowledge, technology and financial resources. While basic trust develops and common interest exist, there may still be security issues connected to the relatively short time the state has functioned as a liberal democracy and as part of the alliance, as the state may have elements of historical Russian influence that represent higher security risk (Dettmer 2019a, b). In a strategic partnership, the parties agree broadly on the overall nature of international issues, the sources of potential and actual threats, and how to respond to them (Waltz 1979). There are also win-win considerations on most issues where the intelligence agencies cooperate, be it terrorism, a common security

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threat and providing improved decision-making foundation on international issues or incidents. In a strategic partnership, vulnerability is accepted, and partners share information that is sensitive and may include collection reports, such as signals intelligence reports or more digested analytical reports. There are formal agreements of sharing intelligence through Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and frequent meetings between high-level intelligence officials and subject issue experts from both the collection and analyst branches. The U.S. has, for example, strategic intelligence partnerships with countries, such as the Baltic States, Romania, Finland, Georgia, India and Malaysia (U.S.  State Dep. 2019; Sprenger 2019; Kaura 2019; Ott 2018; Kutelia et al. 2017; Colibasanu et al. 2017). Strategic partnerships also include other broad and long-term partnerships that provide vital intelligence and resources in regions where the U.S. has more challenges to operate due to language and cultural differences, for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Thailand (Byman 2017). Some relationships may be sensitive about the capability and intention of the other. On this note, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence cooperation probably consider what information to provide to the other given the consequences it may have for developments in Afghanistan and border areas in Pakistan, where their interests and views at times differ. The U.S. can trade superior resources and technology for on-the-ground intelligence on terrorist networks and actors, receiving local knowledge hard to obtain through other means. Frederick Hitz (2015) argues that lessons from intelligence cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan show that the junior partner can put the U.S. in a vulnerable position. The U.S. needs to rely on the partner and incrementally becomes exposed to influence, as the U.S. itself does not control the information chain that it acts upon—which culminate in military operations or political decision-­ making with potential fatal outcomes. On the other hand, such partners have enabled effective counterterrorist operations and brought in exclusive local knowledge and specific expertise. Finally, on normative intelligence partnerships of the U.S. one finds countries with long security collaboration and alliance traditions, in which agencies bring significant information to Washington and vice versa. The partners have established a common set of values, norms and standards in how they perform and cooperate on intelligence operations. Cooperation is broad and includes the sharing of signals intelligence data and other sensitive intelligence as there is a high degree of trust. The partners allow for vulnerability beyond the strategic partnership, where exposure to risk does not raise any significant con-

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cern. Examples here are the Five Eyes (UKUSA Agreement) that includes the U.K., the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in which intelligence cooperation surpasses that of NATO (O’Neil 2017). Five Eyes is a good example of a normative intelligence partnership; there are even suggestions that it should expand to include Germany, France, South Korea and Japan (Pfluke 2019; Fishlock 2019). U.S. partnerships with key NATO allies contain somewhat less of the same features, such as with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. Still, these relations qualify as normative partnerships as the cooperation is extensive, although there is clear potential for improvements in NATO itself (Michael et al. 2017). Bilateral intelligence relations are far more developed than intelligence collaboration and processes within NATO itself, which is in strong need of new information-­ sharing structures (Hanna et al. 2017).  An objection could be that major NATO countries also are economic competitors and sometimes disagree on geopolitics, and thus do not qualify to be at the normative level. This shows that there are several dimensions and states have a mix of relations depending on the subject issue that complicates the defined partnership type. Here focus is on foreign intelligence cooperation where cooperation admittedly can vary greatly. Further, normative partnerships include U.S. intelligence relations with non-NATO states, such as  the broad and deep  collaboration with Switzerland, Sweden, Israel, Japan and South Korea (Fishlock 2019; Pfluke 2019; Nilsson 2016; Lapid 2016). Despite varying degrees of cultural differences between the U.S. and some of these states, all are solid democracies where established ­ security commitment and collaboration over time has established common intelligence standards. Compatible norms are based on shared democratic values and long inter intelligence relations due to the many common global security issues and concerns—be it in the Middle East and the Asia-­Pacific region. Thus, the normative partnership cannot develop between partners that do not overlap on basic values and norms, despite good intelligence relations that is destined to limit within the strategic partnership type. In Fig. 3.3 below, selective partners of the U.S. are shown on colors according to the type of partnership level.  In addition, it is important to note that the foreign policy and intelligence policy between two states can differ, although one often assumes that intelligence relations reflect political ones. Intelligence cooperation may be vital and intimate independent of varying official political policies that follows leadership change. But as Michael Herman (1996, 215) states, foreign policy intervenes in intelligence both in specific and general ways. The policy level can create rules or encourage forums for enhancing

Fig. 3.3  Examples of U.S. intelligence partnerships. Source: Map created by the author at mapchart.net under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license

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cooperation across states in intelligence clubs or bilaterally (Tuzuner 2010). Indeed, intelligence can in turn influence foreign policy through the intelligence process to support decisions. Changes in interstate political relations can influence intelligence collaboration, but intelligence relations often surpasses temporary political turmoil (Kojm 2019). Pragmatic intelligence relations are more subject to political changes than strategic and normative partnerships, which are more resilient. Relations can therefore move from pragmatic to strategic or from pragmatic to hostile intelligence relations. Within NATO, relations between Turkey and its NATO allies are politically challenging after the attempted coup in July 2016 and subsequent state of emergency with the development toward a strong presidential system. Ankara has also improved relations with Russia, by deploying the noncompatible Russian surface-to-air missile system S-400 and talks of buying new multipurpose fighter jets from Moscow (Brennan 2019). Such political shifts influence intelligence relations because it shakes the common interests, trust and standards vested in the NATO alliance. If developments continue with the increased suspicion in the relationship and strong negative political shift in bilateral relations, Turkey can fall from its strategic partnership with the U.S. down to a pragmatic one.

3.4   Conclusion The initial problem statement was how to classify different types of intelligence cooperation. In intelligence relations, costs and risks are constantly assessed. Some partners are more valuable and appreciated than others and the sharing of sensitive intelligence is a delicate matter based on trust over time. The author has developed a classification containing three types of partnerships. The pragmatic partnership is based on the necessity of sharing intelligence due to a partial overlap of security challenges. In such a partnership, there is little trust between the partners. They seek to avoid vulnerability toward the other through securing their collection methods, selective sharing and suspicion on how the information is utilized, essentially a limited transactional relationship bordering on hostility. The strategic partnership, on the other hand, contains broad cooperation based on common interests and a shared perception on the nature of the security situation and the role  of intelligence. Both partners accept vulnerability toward the other and share sensitive intelligence—based on a basic trust in how the other handles the intelligence. The normative partnership is observed only in a selection of U.S. partners, where over time there has

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been a broad and deep collaboration. In addition, there is a sharing of information between the signals intelligence branches of the agencies, often on raw collected material. Although the transactional nature of intelligence still matters, the normative type harbors focus on joint solutions for common security, although resources and exchange of information can be asymmetrical. Cooperation involves deep trust in the other were the partners take considerable risk and allow for exposing a high degree of vulnerability through exchange of sensitive intelligence or data. The three ideal types represent each a distinct intelligence relationship, with the possibility of moving from one level to the other—each with parallel connotations to a basic tradition from IR theory. A threat-based pragmatic partnership reflects the realist view of the world as an anarchic self-help system where intelligence cooperation lacks trust. The strategic partnership type resembles liberalism where the partners through a developed interdependency make compromises and allow for exposure toward the other for the common good—a goal-based and broad intelligence cooperation. The normative partnership relates to constructivism, as agreement on common values and norms brings intelligence cooperation to a higher level, aggregated over time by common interests, political system and values. The three types of intelligence relations—pragmatic, s­ trategic and normative—are the proposed classification underpinned by indicators that assist in determining the type of partnership in intelligence relations. The multiple forms of intelligence relationships have created a need to assess and classify, in order to understand better their significance and meaning. This chapter provides a classification of intelligence relations through three types of intelligence partnerships. The partnership concept is a flexible tool able to capture the dynamic and changing nature of intelligence relations, considering both bilateral and multilateral perspectives.

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CHAPTER 4

Countering Hybrid Threats Through Signals Intelligence and Big Data Analysis? Njord Wegge and Thorsten Wetzling

4.1   Introduction Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea in 2014 came as a surprise to the West. The annexation was followed up by prolonged state-sponsored covert, and overt, operations in Eastern Ukraine, giving crucial support to pro-­ Kremlin separatist movements. While the Kremlin’s future plans and long-­ term political goals in Ukraine might remain unclear, the operations on the ground demonstrated a highly sophisticated state actor able to execute complex strategies to reach revisionist goals, de facto changing borders illegally in Europe. The Russian undertaking paralyzed several aspects of the Ukrainian society through what stood out as tailor-made and synchro-

The authors are equally responsible for the chapter. Thorsten Wetzling’s work is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—Project number 396819157.

N. Wegge (*) Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway T. Wetzling Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, Berlin, Germany © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_4

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nized operations. The operations broke international law and effectively separated Crimea from the rest of Ukraine with relatively modest use of force, as the Ukrainian armed forces stood out as incapacitated. The successful Russian operations would soon put Western intelligence relations and services under tough scrutiny, particularly with respect to their apparent lack of capacity to warn about these types of operations (Cullen and Wegge 2019). The blunt statement from the US Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman, Dianne Feinstein, is illustrative: “We have to better deploy our resources … it should not be possible for Russia to walk in and take over the Crimea and it’s a done deal by the time we know about it” (Politico 2014). The events in Crimea also served as an impetus to further developing traditional intelligence relationships in the West, for example, in going beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including states like Finland or Ukraine in a new way, as these states seemed to be exposed targets for the hybrid threats originating from the Kremlin. The Russian operation in Ukraine is often referred to as “hybrid warfare” and has to a large degree become a new standard reference of the notion, even though the term is still contested (Renz 2016). Other scholars prefer the somewhat less dramatic term hybrid “threats” instead of warfare, while again others prefer to talk about hybrid “influence” or “interference” (Wigell 2019). In parallel to this plurality in the use of the term among scholars, one can also observe differences in the preferences of which terms to use among public agencies. In this context, ministries of justice might, in general, prefer “threats” or other terms different from “warfare,” while ministries of defense in many Western states might be comfortable to label the phenomena “warfare,” as in the largely Ministry of Defense (MoD)-funded Multinational Capability Development Campaign’s (MCDC) research project “Counter Hybrid Warfare” (Monaghan et al. 2019). The Crimea crisis in 2014 made Western states worry if the Kremlin would continue to execute ambiguous hybrid operations and exploit the blurred, “gray zone” between peace and war seen also in other places. Following this, as hybrid threats tend to refer to complex operations across the society that is hard to attribute to a specific threat actor and that do not cross the line of open use of coercive force, Western liberal democracies have found themselves more vulnerable than what was earlier assumed. This “new found vulnerability” is partly based on what seems to be a lack of detection capacities but does also refer to an absence of knowledge

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about the threat as well as clear policies and doctrinal development pertaining to how to deal with such ambiguous, complex threats (Cullen and Wegge 2019). Yet, as intelligence services continuously are improving their ability to intercept, store and analyze very large amounts of data, bulk collection of communication data and other digital signals stand out as a very powerful tool to detect, and potentially even deter, attacks of a hybrid nature. At the same time, as bulk collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) has a high potential for illegal and unethical interference in ordinary peoples’ private lives, these methods carry with them substantial ethical and legal problems. This chapter investigates the dilemma, seeking to identify and discuss the new challenges for states, posed by hybrid threats, while also discussing how or if liberal Western states can or should utilize bulk collection of digital information when countering hybrid threats, making sure that the methods applied remain within the law even when faced by issues of crucial importance to national security. This chapter starts out by discussing the concept and definition of hybrid threats and why such malign operations are difficult for intelligence services to detect. It then elaborates on how bulk collection of digital signals could be applied as a method to detect and counter hybrid threats and why this method creates legal and ethical problems for liberal democracies. Finally, the chapter introduces good practice to ensure the rule of law and basic civil rights in democracies, while countering hybrid threats through the method of bulk collection of digital signals.

4.2   Hybrid Warfare: Definition, Threat Assessments and Problems Hybrid warfare, threats or influence is notoriously difficult to define, and no agreed-upon definition exists (Renz 2016, 285). Symptomatically, at almost all conferences or in academic texts assessing hybrid warfare or threats, a debate about the very term itself will arise. In this context, perhaps the most common objection leading to controversies is the view that hybrid warfare is nothing new in the history of warfare (Van Puyvelde 2015). In this context, the Clausewitzian understanding of war—viewing war as the continuation of politics with other means, regardless of what specific means that are actually applied—fits well (Mälksoo 2018, 377). This approach is also emphasized by Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, stating:

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Of course, hybrid warfare is nothing new. It is as old as the Trojan horse. What is different is that the scale is bigger; the speed and intensity is higher; and that it takes place right at our borders. Russia has used proxy soldiers, unmarked Special Forces, intimidation and propaganda, all to lay a thick fog of confusion; to obscure its true purpose in Ukraine; and to attempt deniability. (2015)

At the same time, NATO has, indeed, made certain efforts to meet these new threats. The continuation of Stoltenberg’s aforementioned statement is in this context of great interest: “To be prepared, we must be able to see and analyze correctly what is happening; to see the patterns behind events which appear isolated and random; and quickly identify who is behind and why.” Recognizing a lack of capacity for certain types of warning intelligence today, Stoltenberg adds: “…we need to sharpen our early warning and improve our situation awareness. This is about intelligence, expert knowledge and analytical capacity. So we know when an attack is an attack” (Stoltenberg 2015). For a warning intelligence analyst, a key approach to this problem is to collect and analyze more data, from all sectors of society, not only what has traditionally been of interest pertaining to the security and defense sectors (Cullen and Wegge 2019). When investigating the evolution of the term “hybrid warfare,” Frank Hoffman, writing from the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., in the 2000s, is often addressed. Building on the National Defense Strategy of 2005, Hoffman noted that US defense planning tended to think of and prepared to meet many of the evolving security challenges separately. These threats could stem from both traditional and irregular warfare—exemplified by insurgents, terrorists’ attacks or even sophisticated operations conducted by criminal networks. Arguing that “these may no longer be separate threats or modes of war,” Hoffman put forward the view that such mixed security challenges should be analyzed in a holistic manner. Moreover, with the new mixed threats, he noted that the distinction between war and peace and combatants and noncombatants were increasingly blurred (Hoffman 2007, 7). Hoffmann’s work was heavily influenced by observing the way Hezbollah had represented a complex and long-term threat to Israel for years, pointing out how this substantial non-state actor was able to challenge this nation-state through a mix of irregular and conventional tools of power. In addition, through observing how the West despite its technological and numerical domination had struggled to successfully fight various asymmetrical and irregular threat

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actors in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hoffmann was convinced of the need to rethink the Western concepts of warfare and the security challenges of the future (Renz 2016, 285). Based on observations of the techniques used by the aforementioned actors, Hoffmann came to define Hybrid War as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives” (Hoffman 2010, 443). Hoffman’s definition captured a central aspect of what has come to be the crucial component of hybrid warfare, namely the “hybridness”—fusing different ways of waging war in one concept, most prominently by mixing what can be referred to as conventional and non-conventional ways of warfare (Renz 2016, 285). However, the definition was soon to be criticized for being too focused on non-state actors, and in emphasizing the material, and kinetic aspects of power too much, at the cost of the cognitive dimension where issues such as the creation of certain narratives could be center stage (Cullen and Wegge 2019). With the well-prepared and swiftly executed Russian operations in Crimea in 2014, the academic discourse on hybrid warfare grew (Shea 2018, 40–41; Racz 2015; Wither 2016; Thiele 2015; Chivvis 2017; Renz and Smith 2015). The Crimea operation stood out as well executed, conducted with a mixture of tools and means of power, and stretching from the application of special forces to take physical control over key points of infrastructure to cyberattacks, penetrating intelligence networks and putting the civil society out of normal function, while hardly resorting to the use of lethal force. In addition, a well-crafted media campaign was conducted, establishing a pro-Kremlin narrative of the events both in Russia and in Crimea itself (Shea 2018, 40–41; Biersack and O’Lear 2014). Adding to this, the low-key and partly covertly executed campaign prevented obvious retribution of the actions and managed to create sufficient instant confusion abroad, hindering a resolute response from the international society. The Russian operations in Crimea are often portrayed as a textbook example of hybrid warfare, even though historic, ethnic and other particularities of Crimea might have made the peninsula particularly vulnerable to the annexation (Shea 2018, 40–41). New references pointing to Crimea include the foreign meddling in the US presidential election, the UK Brexit referendum as well as in elections in the Western Balkans (Jopling 2018). In addition, the largely nonviolent, incremental expansion of China’s foothold in the South China Sea are frequently mentioned as yet

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another empirical example of the phenomena (Burgers and Romaniuk 2017). In seeking to deepen the understanding of hybrid warfare as a more general phenomenon, the MCDC’s Counter Hybrid Warfare project can be put forward as one important attempt. In this project, academics, military professionals and civil servants from Western and Central Europe and North America met for years to discuss the problem and suggest solutions to governments. The project agreed on a generic definition of hybrid warfare, describing it as “[T]he synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects,” also arguing that the “relative novelty of hybrid warfare lays in the ability of an actor to […] exploit creativity, ambiguity, non-linearity and the cognitive elements of warfare,” while remaining “below obvious detection and response thresholds” (NUPI 2018, Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017, 3). The MCDC projects understanding of hybrid warfare has been important as it has been adopted by participating states in their work to improve their ability to counter these types of threats (FFI 2018). NATO defined hybrid threats as early as 2011 to be “those [threats] posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives” (NATO 2011). While it seems like NATO after the Crimea crisis in 2014 increasingly has replaced the term hybrid “threats” with hybrid “warfare,” there is still a lack of clarity with respect to NATO’s exact understanding. The statement from the last NATO summit with heads of state in Brussel 2018 provides an illustration: Our nations have come under increasing challenge from both state and non-­ state actors who use hybrid activities that aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between peace, crisis, and conflict. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of armed attack. (Brussels Summit Declaration 2018, paragraph 21)

Also, the European Union (EU) has in recent years worked to address the threats from hybrid warfare. In a food-for-thought paper from 2015, the EU’s external action service specified the following understanding of the phenomena: “…[hybrid warfare is] a centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, enacted by military and/or non-­

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military means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic pressure to the use of conventional forces.” Moreover, in adding that such attacks usually seeks “to undermine and destabilize an opponent by applying both coercive and subversive methods,” for example, through “various forms of sabotage, disruption of communications and other services including energy supplies … [where] … massive disinformation campaigns designed to control the narrative are an important element of a hybrid campaign,” the EU document underscores that hybrid warfare usually is conducted “with the objective of achieving political influence, even dominance over a country in support of an overall strategy in their attempt” (EEAS 2015). The food-for-thought paper was important as it came to represent an agreed understanding in the EU of the problem, something that was later revisited in the “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats” communicated to the European Parliament, April 6, 2016 (EU Commission 2016). Illustrating the serious way hybrid threats were understood by Western states, “The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats” (Hybrid CoE) was established in Helsinki in 2017.1 Using “threats” and not “warfare,” the intergovernmental center of excellence defines hybrid threats as, “[A]n action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm the target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronized and deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ vulnerabilities,” where, “[a]ctivities can take place […] in the political, economic, military, civil or information domains. They are conducted using a wide range of means and designed to remain below the threshold of detection and attribution” (Hybrid CoE 2018). When seeking to extract the essence of the threats presented in the aforementioned statement to the understandings or definitions of the problem, the cross-sectorial nature of hybrid threats stands out. The unusual complexity of this type of threat or warfare is hence its broadness in scope, whereby, for example, cyber operations and other nonkinetic levers of power could be at the core but also combined with 1  Currently, the Participants of the Hybrid CoE are Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Participation in the Centre is open to EU member states and NATO Allies. The EU and NATO are actively participating in activities of the Centre (see: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/ what-is-hybridcoe/).

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operations in many other domains potentially also involving the use of one’s armed forces. The broadness of the threat takes advantage of signals intelligence and the use of non-targeted bulk collection appears to be a well-suited tool for states seeking to counter the new challenge. Moreover, as collection in bulk is conducted in order “to collect everything,” modern SIGINT capacities stand out as a very potent countermeasure for states being concerned about detecting hybrid operations. Naturally, SIGINT data does not stand alone; it may also be triangulated with other information collected through human intelligence, to name but one example. One could also argue that bulk collection of “all data” in and of itself might have a deterring role on a potential adversary, as malign actors not only risk being detected but also attribute the action and potentially publicly “blame and shame.” The well-argued and unclassified documents presenting evidence of Russian-sponsored interference in the 2016 US presidential election campaign, presented by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, represent a well-known example (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2018). However, while potentially representing a potent countermeasure to hybrid threats, signals intelligence collection in bulk also represents severe challenges to liberal democratic standards as mentioned earlier. In contemporary Europe, it is also subject to pending litigation at the European and national court level.

4.3   Bulk Collection of Signals as an Intelligence Method Bulk collection refers to the interception, data management, storing and analysis of enormous troves of communication data and transmitted via different telecommunications networks (fixed telephone lines, mobile networks, the Internet and satellite networks). The data are intercepted as an electronic signal, comprising various types of metadata as well as content. Bulk collection provides intelligence services “mass access […] to data from a population not itself suspected of threat-related activity.” These non-targeted SIGINT capabilities are often considered as the “crown jewels” of a national intelligence community and its intelligence relations. It is a technically sophisticated and highly complex intelligence-gathering discipline that involves intense international cooperation in addition to national capabilities. The method has grown in the shadows of many

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democracies for quite some time. The National Security Agency (NSA) famously proclaimed that due to the shift toward digitized means of communication, we now live in “the golden age of SIGINT.” With respect to the threat from malign hybrid operations, potentially targeting all spheres of society, collection, storing and analysis of potentially “all” digital communications might therefore give intelligence services and their analysts a method to reveal potential threats, either when it is going on or after the fact. When adding the potential assistance of machine learning or artificial intelligence, applying methods such as pattern recognition and anomaly detection, bulk collection of digital signals possibly represents one of the most promising methods for countering and detecting hybrid threats. Yet, as argued later, just because bulk collection may be a promising method to counter hybrid threats, it does not automatically follow that all applications of this method would be legitimate, let alone legal for democracies to adopt. More specifically, this needs to be discussed in relations to the right to private communication, the inviolability of private homes, the right to informational self-determination and the freedom of speech— which are rights granted in the United Nations’ universal declaration of human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. These instruments also impose positive obligations on the states, which ensure the social fabric and public trust in democracies. An extension of bulk collection practices to counter hybrid threats does not bode well with other principles, for example, the one formulated in the US Presidential Policy Directive 28, which posits that “signals intelligence shall be as tailored as feasible.” What is more, many democracies allow for different data protection standards in their surveillance laws depending on a target’s presumed nationality (Wetzling 2017; Swire et al. 2019). Due to this, countries such as Germany or the United States would then need to demonstrate how such different protection standards would still be honored in practice when using bulk collection to counter hybrid threats. In spite of the fact that bulk collection is not directed at particular individuals, David Anderson, the former UK Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, cautioned that bulk collection “may have serious adverse human rights implications.” According to Anderson, such capabilities “involve potential access by the state to the data of large numbers of people whom there is not the slightest reason to suspect of threatening national security or engaging in serious crime […] any abuse of those powers could thus have particularly wide ranging effects on the innocent […] even the perception

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of that abuse is possible, and that it could go undetected, can generate corrosive mistrust” (Anderson 2016). Bulk collection of foreign and international communication has been a standard intelligence practice for decades by many intelligence services worldwide. Greater public interest in the wake of the Snowden revelations and the fact that many countries lacked a robust legal framework for it, let alone effective oversight thereof (Wetzling 2016), has caused many parliaments to adopt new laws or to amend existing legislation since then (Vieth and Wetzling 2019). Legal reforms in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France have specified and broadened the powers of intelligence agencies to engage in bulk collection. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, have also adopted new provisions for government hacking (“equipment interference”) and the acquisition of large data sets from the private sector. Currently, Norway, France and Germany are also in the midst of further intelligence reforms to accommodate the security services’ demand for better collection tools and greater access to data. In Germany, for example, the Home Affairs ministry has now proposed a bill that, in direct contrast to Germany’s long-standing policy to protect encrypted communication, would compel private messenger to “hand over end-to-end encrypted conversations in plain text on demand” (Nichols 2019).

4.4   Bulk Collection of Signals and Its Problems for Liberal Democracies Electronic collection of communication data is difficult to reconcile with the fundamental human rights and civil liberties such as the right to privacy and the rights to freedom of opinion, of expression, of association and of assembly. It might also be problematic with respect to basic principles of democratic governance such as rule of law, transparency and accountability of governmental agencies. In order to ensure public trust and the legitimacy of intelligence governance, democracies need to place all intelligence activities on a solid legal footing and subject them to rigorous and effective oversight. To ensure accountability with respect to the day-to-day business of intelligence agencies and their activities, already represent a formidable challenge, something that is likely to become an even more daunting task should the use of bulk collection of all types of digital signals to counter hybrid threats ever become a bona fide legal practice.

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The legitimacy of intelligence work must constantly be earned—even in the presence of severe security threats. Effective governance and democratic control of intelligence services is the result of a complex multifaceted effort that should not be left to a small group of technocrats (Leigh and Wegge 2019). Next to audits within the services, it requires rigorous executive control and parliamentary oversight. It also needs strong, independent and tech-savvy judicial mechanisms to either authorize or approve and review individual intelligence measures (Wegge and Wetzling 2019). In addition, there ought to be independent public scrutiny of the process of intelligence legislation and the oversight practice. Together, these various layers of oversight and accountability mechanisms can provide legitimacy to the government’s steering and tasking of the intelligence services as well as the work of the intelligence services. What is more, they also ensure that the output of intelligence policies and decisions is informed and effective (output legitimacy). The jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union set limitations for the member states’ access to bulk surveillance. Bulk surveillance is only permissible when considered necessary in a democratic society. More specifically, the European Court of Human Rights stated in Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary: A measure of secret surveillance can be found in compliance with the Convention only if it is strictly necessary, as a general consideration, for the (sic) safeguarding the democratic institutions and, moreover, if it is strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation. (Szabo and Vissy v Hungary, para 73) ECtHR, Szabo and Vissy v Hungary, App. No 37138/14, 12 January 2016

Hence, should intelligence services of signatory countries of the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights wish to satisfy this condition, they are advised to only engage in bulk collection techniques in relation to clearly confined categories of serious threats to a democratic society (Murray and Fussey 2019, 56). These categories ought to be more clearly defined and should go beyond a general understanding as to what constitutes a serious threat (Murray et al. 2018, 3). What are the relevant aspects that one needs to consider when it comes to creating a legal basis for and the democratic control of bulk surveillance? According to what standards and criteria can one elaborate on the quality of either a legal provision or an oversight practice?

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A clear and specific legal mandate is the precondition for transparency and accountability of foreign intelligence gathering. The mandate should describe specific legal grounds against which the permissibility and proportionality of a particular measure can be assessed. It should also stipulate what data sources or types of communications may and may not be included in SIGINT collection. (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 21)

Whether the intelligence services of those countries that allow for different data protection standards based on nationality in their surveillance laws have actually mastered the data minimization challenges that the practice of bulk collection of international communications data entails remains an open and contested question (Wetzling and Vieth 2018). Apart from the technological challenge to prevent data that benefits from higher protection standards from being wrongfully subjected to further treatment, longer storage and foreign intelligence sharing, it is worthwhile to underline the essence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence regarding UK SIGINT practices and the former UK surveillance law: Basically, the court had “two principal areas of concern; first, the lack of oversight of the entire selection process […]; and secondly, the absence of any real safeguards applicable to the selection of related communications data for examination” (ECtHR 2018, para 387). Thus, broad approaches to detecting hostile interference demand careful analysis of potential unintended costs. For lawmakers and civil society alike, the interest by the security services in all aspects of society certainly bears numerous risks to important fundamental rights and long-earned freedoms. Also, there might be other or additional strategies to counter hybrid threats that are less rights-infringing, stretching from better defensive cyber-capabilities to protect against aggression to more robust fact-­ checking and open ranking of news sites according to their adherence to journalistic standards (Baker 2019).

4.5   Can There Be Necessary and Proportionate Bulk Collection Against Hybrid Threats? While Presidential Policy Directive 28 stipulates that “Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as feasible,” the Dutch intelligence law (Art. 29 of the Act on the Intelligence and Security Services 2017) also states that special powers have to be applied in an as targeted manner as possible. Placing such a requirement into the actual intelligence law, and not just

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into an executive decree, adds an accountability dimension and reinforces the need to deploy bulk collection methods only when less intrusive means are not able to achieve a given objective. With a warrant, the intelligence service (or, as the case may be, the ministry performing executive control over a particular intelligence service) applies for an authorization to collect data. Warrants describe and delimit surveillance measures based on specific criteria. They are a core element of accountability in intelligence governance provided they request detail and particularity. If they do, they constitute an effective safeguard against overly broad surveillance authorities (Donohue 2016). A range of countries in Europe only apply the concept of warrants to criminal investigations and not to bulk collection. In this conventional understanding, “bulk powers are irreconcilable with the requirements of classic warrants. There is no specificity. By definition, bulk powers are not targeted; they are indiscriminate” (Forcese 2018). Under the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act, on the other hand, the term warrant is used for different types of applications for bulk interception or acquisition of data. This, then, implies a class-based warrant system, in which large categories of data can be collected. Warrants can, however, be a powerful tool to specify the minimization rules, the authorization requirements and the purpose limitations of a measure. The more specificity a bulk warrant can provide, the better its protective function. Warrants may also be used to exclude certain data categories from collection and limit the use of the data collected. The major advantage of warrants, though, is the active involvement of an independent authorization body before the collection begins, which allows for case-by-case controls. Ideally, a clear legal mandate is combined with obligatory independent ex ante controls of all applications for bulk data collection. Likewise, warrants also often define the duration of an operation for a specific collection method. This, in turn, triggers a mandatory reassessment of the measure and potentially the subsequent reapplication and reauthorization. Setting an expiration date is, hence, an accountability mechanism as well as a regular efficacy test that helps to ensure efficient allocation of resources by the agencies. Such accountability mechanisms could, however, be difficult to reconcile with a mere broad authorization that presumably would be required to use bulk powers against vaguely defined hybrid threats. According to the French foreign intelligence law, only the services named in the warrant are allowed to process the collected data. Furthermore, the provision determines that the purpose stated in the warrant may not be

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changed, and the data may not be used for other purposes (Art. L. 854-6 of the French Law No. 2015-1556). This rule limits the unforeseen sharing of unprocessed data from one intelligence service to another. Other agencies that may develop an interest in the collected data are prevented from performing unwarranted “searches on top of searches” (Renan 2016, 1068) with such a requirement. As argued, there are legal, technical and political challenges to use bulk powers to counter hybrid threats. Should parliaments decide to write such powers into their national intelligence laws, then they should consider mandatory warrants for them. And if they do that, then it is important to focus on the factors that determine whether or not a warrant should be approved. Here, it is of interest that the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) recently published advice and information to public authorities and to the public writ large as to the general approach that Judicial Commissioners will adopt under the Investigatory Powers Act (IP Act) when deciding whether to approve decisions to issue warrants. IPCO also enriches these abstract principles with the help of a public consultation process to identify the broad range of factors that the Judicial Commissioners have to bear in mind when evaluating the proportionality of bulk warrants. Beyond the authorization and judicial review of bulk collection practices, it is also critical to define who is in charge of extracting the data and where and how the extraction devices may be installed. Is the collection administered by the intelligence service or do private entities (e.g. Internet service providers) do this on behalf of the intelligence services? This distinction is relevant as provider intermediation can be an important safeguard against over-collection. In the French intelligence community, most data collection from third parties such as Internet service providers or communication service providers such as Google or Facebook is handled by a body called “Groupement interministériel de contrôle” (GIC). This body is technically not part of the intelligence community. Rather, it serves as a centralized hub that manages all data interception/acquisition under the purview of the prime minister. If an intermediary body such as the GIC is responsible for the first data minimization process, then this arrangement could be preferable as fewer individuals will have access to the collected data. The centralization of managing data access on behalf of the agencies can also serve to facilitate holistic oversight of all data collected. The GIC only grants analysts access to data that they need for a given assignment. This gatekeeping function may help to maintain secrecy. That said, centralizing data storage also entails the risk of creating a single point of failure for data security (e.g. hacking attacks, etc.).

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A number of European countries have installed interfaces, allowing oversight bodies direct access to collected data (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 51–52). Such direct access could be an important innovation for oversight but also entails risks that have to be addressed. The advantage of direct access to databases is that the oversight body can conduct random checks, unannounced inspections and potentially also automated controls on the data handling by the intelligence agencies. This has the potential to level the playing field between the controller and the controlled. Traditionally, oversight bodies depend, to a large extent, on the information provided by the intelligence services. If overseers gain direct access, the incentive to comply increases because intelligence officials cannot know whether an incident will be reviewed or not. Technical interfaces might also empower review bodies to monitor statistical anomalies in the databases. This opens a new field of (automated) oversight applications that will support overseers in effectively diverting their limited resources for in-depth compliance auditing. Such an approach—using analytical techniques to identify potential non-compliance—amounts to “predictive oversight” and is already being practiced by institutions entrusted with financial audits in the banking sector. Granting direct, unfettered access for oversight bodies to the intelligence databases may, however, turn them into attractive targets for foreign espionage and hacking attacks. It is important, therefore, to only grant such access to properly trained and certified oversight personnel and to provide oversight bodies with the most secure facilities (Wegge 2017). Making sense of raw intelligence data and log files is hard. It is not enough for oversight bodies to merely have access. The information advantage that direct access may bring comes from data analytics. In other words, oversight bodies need to engage with the data to which they now have access to. In order to learn how much more rigorous their c­ ontrolling could become, overseers may want to learn from financial audit bodies and will need to get special training. They may also want to commission the design and implementation of control algorithms to become a more credible actor in modern intelligence relations (Wegge and Wetzling 2019). Proper deletion of bulk data is an enormous challenge. Technically, it is not as easy as one may think to securely “get rid” of data. This is because “deleting” a file typically only marks the space it occupies as usable. Until the disk space is overwritten, the data are still there and can be retrieved. To ensure that the deleted data cannot be retrieved any longer, the physical records on a storage medium must be overwritten with other data several times (minimum of seven times as per the US federal government’s guidelines). But simple overwriting storage space on physical medium

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with new data does not necessarily guarantee that none of the old data are gone for good (Dorion 2008). Notice that it is also “more costly to delete data, than retain it” (OECD 2013). Due to this, legislators have found it difficult to insert proper legal definitions or public standards for what “deletion” or “destruction” of data means into the intelligence laws. By extension to the issue addressed in this chapter, the verification of accurate data deletion remains a veritable oversight challenge that would only get bigger if bulk collection also would be applied to counter hybrid threats. This is because review bodies need accurate audit trails to be able to check services’ compliance with data deletion requirements. This may include automated destruction of data after legal retention periods have lapsed or if the relevant authorization for collecting data has ended. The Dutch law requires data from bulk collection to be destroyed as soon as it has been determined to be irrelevant for an intelligence investigation. Swedish overseers are running statistical pattern analysis on the amount of deleted material to independently verify whether or not the rules concerning obligations to delete data are applied. For them, “a starting point for the review is statistical monitoring of the amount of destroyed material in order to respond to deviations” (SIUN 2018). Finally, in the United Kingdom, “there are computerized systems for checking and searching for potentially non-compliant uses of Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ’s) systems and premises. For example, when an authorized person selects a particular communication for examination, this person must demonstrate that the selection is necessary and proportionate; this process is subject to internal audit” (EU Fundamental Rights Agency 2017, 59; UK Home Office 2017). Arguably, the necessary and proportionate criteria pose the biggest challenge to the adoption of bulk collection techniques to counter hybrid threats.

4.6   Conclusion As threats on the international stage are evolving, so are also intelligence relationships and the services’ methods and tradecraft. This chapter has demonstrated that the development of hybrid threats, potentially targeting all aspects of society, while usually not breaching the threshold of war and rarely using kinetic force and hence trigger a military response, has led states, their intelligence services and partnerships searching for new detection methods. In this context, bulk collection of enormous amounts of data from all sectors of society appears well suited to detect anomalies potentially originating from a hostile hybrid threat actor. However, this chapter

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has highlighted a wide range of challenges, following the collection of data in bulk. Democracies bestow upon the state the protection and the promotion of fundamental rights, such as the right to private communication. This requires concerted efforts to establish effective safeguards against undue rights infringements that this type of non-targeted collection could produce. This must also be taken into consideration when reflecting on the potential use of bulk collection to counter hybrid threats. Finally, the introduction of bulk collection of communication of a whole population entails serious challenges to liberal democracies from a legal perspective. The method and scale produce challenges for the state to honor the core values of freedom and liberty that are at the very core of modern liberal democracies and open societies at large. These are important values that should not be taken lightly when introducing new ways of countering hybrid threats.

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Murray, Daragh, and Pete Fussey. 2019. Bulk Surveillance in the Digital Age: Rethinking Human Rights Law Approach to Bulk Monitoring of Communications Data. Israel Law Review 52 (1): 31–60. Murray, Daragh, Pete Fussey, and Maurice Sunkin. 2018. Response to Invitation for Submission on Issues Relevant to the Proportionality of Bulk Powers. https://ipco.org.uk/docs/Essex%20HRBDT%20Submission%20to%20 IPCO%20Re%20Proportionality%20Consultation.pdf. NATO. 2011. NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat. https://www.act.nato.int/ nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat. Nichols, Shaun. 2019. Germany Mulls Giving End-to-end Chat App Encryption Das Boot: Law Requiring Decrypted Plain-text Is in the Works. May 28. https:// www.theregister.co.uk/2019/05/28/german_government_encryption/. NUPI. 2018. Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2015-­18, Countering Hybrid Warfare. https://www.nupi.no/en/About-NUPI/Projectscentres-and-programmes/Multinational-Capability-Development-Campaign2015-18-Countering-Hybrid-Warfare. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2013. The OECD Privacy Framework. https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_ framework.pdf. Politico. 2014. Why Didn’t the U.S. Know Sooner? May 3. https://www.politico. com/story/2014/03/united-states-barack-obama-ukraine-crimea-russiavladimir-putin-104264. Racz, Andras. 2015. Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine. Report nr. 43, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Renan, Daphne. 2016. The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/ 68_Renan_-_68_Stan._L._Rev._1039.pdf. Renz, Bettina. 2016. Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’. Contemporary Politics 22 (3): 283–300. Renz, Bettina, and Hanna Smith. 2015. Russia and Hybrid Warfare  – Going Beyond the Label. Papers Aleksanteri, University of Helsinki. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2018. Intel Committee Releases Unclassified Summary of Initial Findings on 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSCI%20ICA%20 ASSESSMENT_FINALJULY3.pdf. Shea, Jamie. 2018. NATO’s Role in Baltic Sea Security. In Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region, ed. Ann-Sofie Dahl. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. SIUN  – Swedish State Inspection for Defense Intelligence Operations. 2018. Årsredovisning för 2017. February 22. http://www.siun.se/dokument/ Arsredovisning_2017.pdf. Stoltenberg, Jens. 2015. Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Opening of the NATO Transformation Seminar 25 March.

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm?selected Locale=en. Swire, Peter, Jesse Woo, and Deven R.  Desai. 2019. The Important, Justifiable, and Constrained Role of Nationality in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance. Aegis Series Paper No. 1901. https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/ research/docs/swire-woo-desai_the-important-justifiable-constrained-role-ofnationality-in-foreign-intelligence-surveillance1.pdf. Thiele Ralph D. 2015. Crisis in Ukraine  – The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare. ISPSW Strategies Series no. 347, Berlin. UK Home Office. 2017. Interception of Communications. Pursuant to Schedule 7 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Draft Code of Practice. December 2017. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/593748/IP_Act_-_Draft_Interception_ code_of_practice_Feb2017_FINAL_WEB.pdf. Van Puyvelde, Dameien. 2015. Hybrid War – Does It Even Exist? NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/hybrid-modernfuture-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/index.htm. Vieth, Kilian, and Thorsten Wetzling. 2019. Data-Driven Intelligence Oversight: Recommendations for a System Update. (Stiftung Neue Verantwortung: Berlin) Policy Paper. https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/data_ driven_oversight.pdf. Wegge, Njord. 2017. Intelligence Oversight and the Security of the State. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 30 (4): 687–700. Wegge, Njord, and Thorsten Wetzling. 2019. Contemporary and Future Challenges to Effective Intelligence Oversight. In Intelligence Oversight in the Twenty-First Century. Accountability in a Changing World, ed. Ian Leigh and Njord Wegge. Abingdon: Routledge. Wetzling, Thorsten. 2016. The Key to Intelligence Reform in Germany: Strengthening the G 10-Commission‘s Role to Authorise Strategic Surveillance. (Stiftung Neue Verantwortung: Berlin) Policy Brief. https://www.stiftung-nv. de/sites/default/files/snv_g10.pdf. Wetzling, Thorsten. 2017. New Rules for SIGINT Collection in Germany: A Look at the Recent Reform. Lawfare Blow, June 23. https://www.lawfareblog. com/new-rules-sigint-collection-germany-look-recent-reform. Wetzling, Thorsten and Kilian Vieth. 2018. Upping the Ante on Bulk Surveillance: An International Compendium of Good Legal Safeguards and Oversight Innovation. Vol. 50, Publication Series on Democracy. Heinrich Boell Foundation. https:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/2019_HRC_Annex5_ CompendiumBulkSurveillance.pdf. Wigell, Mikael. 2019. Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy. International Affairs 95 (2): 255–275. Wither, James K. 2016. Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare. Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15 (2): 73–87.

CHAPTER 5

Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship John Michael Weaver

5.1   Background Information Weakened border security emerged after the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, globalization has fostered ease of movement for nefarious types engaged in the human trafficking and drug businesses, the transit of counterfeit goods, cross-border illegal arms sales, and the movement of terrorists and their organizations. Those involved in national intelligence should see the concern and push for greater situational awareness with what is taking place in the world (Weaver 2016). What should occur are improvements in policymakers and intelligence professionals enhancing relationships with one another to overcome barriers to communication (Jervis 2010, 203). This is particularly true when considering countries as a primary unit of analysis in the context of international relations (Lamy et al. 2015). More to the point, intelligence professionals will have to foster communication allowing for the proliferation of their products to consumers to help them make informed decisions (Lamy et al. 2015).

J. M. Weaver (*) York College of Pennsylvania, York, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_5

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Consider the United Nations (UN); discussions among the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) permanent members can be complicated because each actor might have wants and needs that the other members might oppose (Weaver 2016). That stated, the UN has undergone extensive changes over the years (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-196 1999). A recent success was the Iranian nuclear program and what occurred in the early summer of 2015. The Security Council’s permanent five (P5) members were in agreement as they pursued a single path approach in their attempt to sway Iran away from its effort to develop a nuclear weapon (Obama 2015). All five wanted to see the cessation of the country’s uranium enrichment program. The five also had a desire to reward Iran through the walking back of sanctions for irrefutable actions leading to the stoppage of its nuclear weapons development program though there still is a concern that Iran could go back to its enrichment program (which remains a concern today especially for the United States). Nevertheless, what appears as an integrated effort on the part of the P5 in one region does not necessarily apply to others (Weaver 2016). The security crisis in Ukraine underscores this. Since 2014, intelligence analysts have seen the escalation which has resulted in Russia annexing Crimea; it also provides Russian backed rebels with materiel support necessary to wreak havoc in Ukraine, with most of Europe, and other US allies throughout the world opposing what is taking place (DOD Press Briefing 2015). Though the United States and other permanent security members required wholehearted support on the Iranian nuclear deal, here the non-Russian Western members of the UN Security Council regard Russia as a potential adversary. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in general (and more specifically the United Kingdom, and France with the United States) have implemented the Very High Joint Readiness Task Force (VJTF) to deal with among other issues, the potential response to Russia’s aggression and therefore expanding on initiatives previously developed under the NATO Response Force (NRF) concept implemented in the early 2000s (Weaver 2016). China is another significant actor in today’s world. Many countries and their intelligence professionals see this country’s cyber activity as a potential world security challenge (Weaver 2016). Likewise, China’s investment in cyber serves as a potential threat not just to governments but allegedly this country is even pursuing the acquisition of proprietary information for its own economic and military benefit (ISAB 2015). China’s military activity has increased in the South China Sea recently. Specifically, intelligence professionals have seen this country escalate its

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presence over the last several years in this body of water. Moreover, it has retrofitted a Russian aircraft carrier to suit its purposes and actively pursued land reclamation projects to build up manmade islands with airstrips and other military structures throughout the Spratly Islands (Lamy et al. 2015). It has been using its military as a way to control access to and through the South China Sea. Another concern pertains to China’s Belt and Road initiative. Beijing is looking to recreate a modern version of the Silk Road with the intent to move raw materials back to China and products to many markets throughout Asia, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and Europe. Yet the United States, Russia, and other countries in Northeast Asia require Chinese support to apply pressure on North Korea. They still need China’s leverage emanating from its close relationship as a staunch supporter to Kim Jong-un’s regime in order to move it away from the testing of long-range ballistic missile technology (now capable of reaching parts of the United States), nuclear weapons’ development, and the proliferation and exportation of said materiel and knowledge to other questionable nations like Syria and Iran (Lamy et al. 2015). Combined, this is worrisome to intelligence professionals. The United Nations met in New York on September 19, 2017. It was during the General Session that President Trump addressed world leaders (Trump 2017a). During his speech, the US president made reference to intelligence challenges confronting world order to include the likes of terrorism, rogue regimes, weapons of mass destruction, extremism, and more. To address these issues, he called on prominent leaders to work together to promote greater security, peace, and prosperity for the world; in particular he called on the UN to serve as the impetus for this through resolve and of the independent nations that make up this body (Trump 2017a). At present, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States will have challenges in the foreseeable future to deal with many security issues. The complexity transcends geopolitical considerations and will be a problem for intelligence professionals as they try to ascertain who will gain and lose from bilateral and multilateral arrangements with members of the P5 consortium.

5.2   Research Questions This chapter explores three research questions. Specifically, the author looks to answer “how,” “why,” and “what” questions regarding world occurrences in relation to the four other permanent members of the

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Security Council of the United Nations (the United States excluded) and what this means to the United States and intelligence analysts. Q1: How are the other P5 members (excluding the United States) of the Security Council of the United Nations using the instruments of national power to shape outcomes favorable to them? Q2: Why are the other P5 members (excluding the United States) of the Security Council of the United Nations using the instruments of national power to shape outcomes favorable to them? Q3: What impacts will these have on the United States?

5.3   Methodology Methodological use is important to intelligence professionals in order to conduct analysis and, by extension, research. Remler and Van Ryzin (2010, 180) positively write about the value of secondary data research. Secondary data types cost less when compared to primary data acquisition and often are quite accessible; both practitioners and researchers in the policy and social science fields have turned to these sources to leverage these data for the purpose of conducting research (Remler and Van Ryzin 2010, 180). Intelligence professionals have used secondary data as well when turning to open sources (OSINT) to help analyze situations. This chapter used data that came solely from secondary unclassified open sources. More pointedly, this author used qualitative techniques and a specific model to triangulate on results (Remler and Van Ryzin 2010). Creswell (2008) also provides an understanding of the strength in using qualitative research techniques in the exploration of relationships among multiple variables in answering research questions (Creswell 2008). Intelligence professionals should strive to include multiple sources when conducting assessments; the more balanced, the more likely it is that one will be able to arrive at strong judgments and conclusions. This author utilized a model previously covered in other research to help balance the problem dissection process when looking at open source data. This model is the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model found in Fig. 5.1 (Weaver 2015b). This is a Venn model comprising three primary components. The first includes plans and systems (and the subsequent assessment of those). The model also dedicates attention to multiple written works. These look to legislation, government documents, peer-reviewed publications,

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Plans and Systems

Assessments Case Study Triangulation Scholarly & Government Reports

Documents, Legislation & Policy

Key Public Leaders

Press Releases, Testimony, Interviews, Biographies

Fig. 5.1  Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model (Weaver, with Pomeroy, 2018). Credit: Nova Science Publishers, Inc

and others; those in this circle are often seen as the most credible through the lens of a majority of researchers. The final component looks to mostly oral accounts; it turns to testimony, press statements coming from speeches, official government agencies, information covered by key leaders, and interviews. The author narrowed the focus by only considering the four instruments of national power. He made use of a modification to the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM) shown in Fig. 5.2 (Weaver and Pomeroy 2016). The YIRTM is predicated on the four instruments of national power and includes diplomacy, information, military, and economic means (Weaver 2016). The modified model (YIRTM-M) was used due to changing circumstances since not all nations want to seek a weakened United States (especially France and the United Kingdom) but rather focus on enhancing one’s own position and influence in the world. Accordingly, model modification is often applicable when tailoring to a specific study and is acceptable according to Glassick (2000).

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Focused Diplomacy

+

Targeted Information

+ Strategic Direction

+ +

+ + +

Military Capabilities

Shaped Outcome

+

Status Quo or Enhanced Position

+

Economic Pressure

Fig. 5.2  The York Intelligence Red Team Model-Modified

It visually represents the applied use of the instruments of power on behalf of a government to better shape outcomes favorable to a particular country and this represents the intervening relationships. Directionality in conjunction with temporal precedence often lends greater credibility to the relevance of this logic model (Weaver and Pomeroy 2016). Particularly, the ordering of elements is helpful, but these specific variables are not the only factors one considers for helping to fully establish a perfect understanding of the relationships of these instruments to shape outcomes. This specific model includes all of the components except for the weakened US position since this work operates under the assumption that the United Kingdom and France would like to see a strong United States. Strategic direction of the country sets in motion how it will subsequently use the instruments of power to serve its purpose. This strategic direction focuses on the national security establishment of the particular country to move toward understanding what will need to occur to achieve its stated ends. These instruments of power are useful in order for the country to pursue their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) supportive of its cause. Diplomacy is the first of these (Weaver and Pomeroy 2016, 2018, 2019; Weaver 2019). More specifically, it involves government leaders that engage others to create conditions favorable to what the country hopes to achieve regarding their particular country. It ascribes consideration not only to one specific country but should look more holistically by

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considering outcomes regionally and even globally that decisions will have in the immediate areas and beyond. Information is critical to power. The selected use of it could thereby more aptly influence activities throughout the planet. Message targeting oftentimes has merit to influence public opinion to better promote one’s cause; this is frequently done in simultaneity to delegitimizing the message being articulated by another country or non-state actor. Likewise, nefarious actors and adversaries use information through social media platforms as a way to inexpensively draw others to causes aligned to their national interests to garner support as a country looks to expand its position. This instrument is inextricably linked to the use of cyber. Many times, this is seen as the least expensive of the instruments of power; it is available to all parties—countries and non-state actors alike (Weaver 2016, 2019; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018, 2019). The military instrument is the most notable of the four and one known throughout the world (Weaver 2016, 2019; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018, 2019). Thus, this author looks to military capabilities of the four permanent members of the UN Security Council and their vulnerabilities and competencies. Money is a precursor resource necessary to implement all governmental actions (Weaver and Pomeroy 2016, 2018, 2019; Weaver 2019). Most activities are underpinned by money and it has frequently been associated with power. Nations can exert influence economically, by using the power derived from monetary resources to cajole others to change behavior. Likewise, state actors can often look for opportunities to weaken another’s economy by exposing their vulnerabilities and in the case of this study, at how to weaken others in opposition to its goals and objectives. Scholarly research must focus on the topic of having validity (Creswell 2008). Likewise, this chapter addresses this topic; it considers two aspects. First, variable checks were performed. Variable checks included efforts to help make sure that selected variables measured what they were supposed to measure. Face validity was the second technique to better ensure that variables and models intuitively made sense (Creswell 2008). The author also looked at the topic of reliability. Creswell (2008, 118) writes that to achieve consistency in research approaches one should consider similar projects to better obtain reliability (Creswell 2008, 190). Facilitation was further realized by the use of the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model and the YIRTM-M to perform data analysis.

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5.4   Research Limitations Research using secondary data is limited in such areas as the variables used and the temporal period considered. Generally, this work’s scope was limited to a five-year period moving from 2015 and ending in 2019 (though some instances dating before 2015 were included). Greater weight was assigned to data in more recent years due to the relevance and more so as it pertains to the future. Though this author selected the variables in the YIRTM-M, other influencers exist that could impact each.

5.5   Analysis and Findings This section looks at the application of the two models mentioned earlier. More attention focuses on the P5 members, with specific emphasis placed on the four non-US member nations. To begin, consider the United States. In mid-December of 2017 President Trump issued his National Security Strategy (NSS). It is the government’s capstone document that provides direction and guidance for key government leaders to lead them through the execution of core functions at federal agencies and departments in the years to come. It contains only 55 pages; it outlines major issues that the president and by extension, his National Security Council see as of primary concern for the United States. More broadly, President Trump looks to the following: (1) promote US prosperity, (2) protect the homeland, (3) leverage the country’s strength to preserve peace, and (4) advance US influence in the world (NSS 2017, 4). 5.5.1  China China has developed as a major global contender on the world stage in recent years. It is the largest in terms of population in the world with an estimated count of 1.3  billion people according to the United Nations (Weaver 2019). When turning to its gross domestic product (GDP), it ranks second only to the United States according to the International Monetary Fund with a GDP value at around $11.2 trillion (IMF 2017). The latest edition of the United States’ 2018 National Defense Strategy states that China is a strategic competitor of the United States bent on using its position to intimidate with regard to other nations in Asia, while simultaneously it is militarizing the South China Sea (NDS 2018, 1).

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Diplomatically, China has conveyed to the world a message that it has benign intentions both regionally and globally (Crosston 2016, 120). It is apparent that what China has done underscores its intention to emphasize sovereignty and to ostensibly coming across as disarming through its present cultural leanings and philosophy (Crosston 2016, 120). This country has been using its power through sticks and carrots though to shape outcomes favorable to it (Swaine 2017). China has been a strong ally of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but it does see the nuclearization of the peninsula as an issue of concern and a major destabilizing factor in the region. Accordingly, China has therefore supported most of the sanctions requested by the United States in response to the DPRK’s September 2017 nuclear tests, thereby supporting UN Security Council resolution 2375 exerting greater pressure on North Korea (UN2375 2017). China is adept at information and cyber warfare engagement at a global level (Rogers 2017). A Worldwide Threat Assessment at the behest of the Director of National Intelligence for the United States sees China as an actor quite proficient at using this TTP and believes that it will most likely continue to do so to target governments of the United States and its allies, as well as US businesses (WTA 2017, 1). Admiral Rogers (the most recent former head of the National Security Agency or NSA), in a speech to The New America Foundation in February 2017, made a statement that China was a frequent culprit in stealing secrets by way of cyber means (through both government and private entities) from the United States. Moreover, China’s investments in the capabilities to foster computer network operations (CNO) have increased. Under CNO, measures and efforts include the likes of computer network exploitation (CNE), and computer network attacks (CNA). CNE and CNA efforts are frequently used to expose vulnerabilities in developed nations that are dependent on information technology (Weaver 2017a, 10). It has most likely also aimed efforts at other governments, the United Nations, corporations, and more for the purposes of hedging against advantages both economically and militarily possessed by others (Rudner 2013, 454). Conversely, China is greatly concerned about its own cyber network defense (CND) and is investing in efforts to protect itself from CNE and CNA efforts by others. China’s intelligence organizations are focused mainly on internal operations yet it is also becoming increasingly concerned with regional and global issues that have an impact on its own national security (Crosston 2016, 118). China is doing this to help ensure its self-survival (Crosston 2016, 119).

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In the middle of May 2017, the US Defense Department released an unclassified annual report on China and its military. The report intoned that China’s leaders are seemingly obsessed with military modernization and its importance relative to the pursuit of President Xi’s “China Dream” which Xi hopes will bring about rejuvenation for his nation (OSD 2017, i). In the year leading up to this May 2017 report, China’s military budget burgeoned by 8.5% with China’s intent to further develop capabilities to defeat adversaries and to counter intervention efforts by third parties (to include the United States) (OSD 2017, ii). To bring this to fruition, it intends to pursue advanced technologies and weapon systems (OSD 2017, 17). More to the point, it has pursued research plans to improve such things as information technologies, aeronautics, and nanotechnology (OSD 2017, 70). Likewise, China has robust military capabilities and is now acquiring out-of-area operational systems to clearly send a message to the world regarding its rising strength (Weaver 2017b). Moreover, evidence from secondary data points to China as being particularly adept at using cyber espionage in order to infiltrate into government and private sector networks throughout the United States (Weaver 2017b). An assessment of China’s People’s Liberation Army capability also shows that it is committed to the acquisition of systems and capabilities that can be used for cyber-attacks (Regional Focus 2015). There are military tensions growing in the South China Sea (SCS) (GAO 17-369 2017, 1). This has been fostered by China exerting its influence in the region in recent years. According to a Department of Defense (DOD) press release in December 2016, a US unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) was intercepted by China in the SCS while an oceanographic survey ship operated by the US Navy was in the process of recovering it (P.R. 448-16 2016). The United States saw this as a direct infringement on its right to conduct research in this sea as it saw itself operating in international waters at the time of the incident. This has all come to fruition as China has increased its focus modernizing and building its military (Crosston 2016, 119). It is clearly leveraging this instrument to shape activities in its region (NDS 2018, 2). Likewise, it has done so to improve its own border security while also exerting stronger maritime influences in this region (Crosston 2016, 119). To add more context, President Xi Jinping met privately with the US president at the G20 conference in July 2017. During this meeting, both leaders expressed a desire to enhance their economic positions regarding

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trade and market access (White House Press Release 2017a). Yet as of 2019, relations between the two countries have deteriorated and each nation has implemented tariffs on the other’s goods even as lower tiered negotiators for each country are working to repair relations while renegotiating a trade agreement. Yang Jiechi, China’s State Councilor, and Fang Fenghui, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of Joint Staff, met with the US Secretaries of State and Defense at the time, Rex Tillerson and Jim Mattis, respectively, in June 2017 (Joint Press Release 2017). Tillerson and Mattis spoke of the next 40  years with Tillerson expressing concerns about anything that would tip the balance regarding the status quo in the Asia Pacific region during a press conference (Joint Press Release 2017). During this conference, Mattis expanded on this statement by acknowledging that competition between the two nations was inevitable and stressed the importance for both sides to avoid conflict particularly in the SCS region. The most reassuring notion to keep tensions from rising is the inextricable linkage of the economies of both China and the United States at least for the foreseeable future (WEF 2018, 36). Underscoring this importance is that over $3.4 trillion in trade moves through this region (CFR 2017). China has been engaged in cyber espionage to compress the research and development timeline economically to enhance its position in the world while it also seeks to improve its military capabilities at the same time (Weaver 2017b). Moreover, China will likely turn to sustainability development and internal consumption over dependency on other nation-­states (Crosston 2016, 121). China also has an interest in enhancing the country’s information technology sector as a way to grow its portion of the world’s market share in this specific industry (WTA 2017, 4). China is expanding influence over land as well. It is looking to grow its influence throughout Asia and is expanding westward toward Europe. The China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was initiated in 2013. The China BRI effort encompasses 60 countries which also includes the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Pakistan Economic Corridor (WEF 2018, 40). As it looks to expand ground lines of communication and trade, this could help China improve its economy especially with regard to newer markets.

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5.5.2  France The United Nations reflects that France ranks 21st overall in the world in terms of population and it comes in 4th in relative size to the other three nations by population (estimated at 67 million people) (Weaver 2019) and ranks in 4th place economically relative to the other permanent Security Council members (IMF 2017). France rolled out the diplomatic red carpet to endear itself to the United States in July 2017. President Trump was President Macron’s Bastille Day guest of honor at the ceremonies on July 14 (White House Press Release 2017b). The French president used this visit as an opportunity to address issues of cooperation in cyber defense, joint security, and countering propaganda from terror organizations. Likewise, France supported President Trump’s call for greater sanctions regarding nuclear and ballistic missile tests by the DPRK (UN2375 2017). France, though, has reduced restrictions regarding the application of intelligence resources and is allowed to gather information on its citizenry in recent years similar to what the United States did in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The government’s political leadership has allowed for this due to the emerging threat of terrorists operating within France’s borders (Hammond 2015). Among other issues, this country has extended the breadth from which it can conduct its intelligence operations and by extension France’s ability to implement mass surveillance on electronic communications (Hammond 2015). It has also made use of relationships linked with countries where it once had colonial ties (Honig, Or, and Zimskind 2017, 432). Surprisingly though, it may put less emphasis on  such intelligence from other nations. The Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), for example, in retrospect  failed to seriously consider information received from Arab countries that could have provided insight into efforts leading up to the November 2015 Paris attacks (Honig, Or, and Zimskind 2017, 440). Prior to the recent French elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the other members of the US intelligence community assessed that in the aftermath of the US election, Russia would try to use information operations to influence other democratic elections (ODNI 2017, iii). Russia did exactly this in France. France’s electoral system calls for the president to be elected to a five-year term directly by the citizens (Election Code 2017). Though the country still conducts its elections using a paper ballot system, its social media convey-

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ances were vulnerable to hacking and foreign sponsored influence. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, and in direct response to Senator Richard Burr’s question on France’s preemptive actions during its May 2017 election, the Assistant Director for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Counterintelligence Division, Bill Priestap, referenced that the French did take action but wouldn’t elaborate (CSPAN 2017). More specifically, the tech security firm Trend Micro, in a report, showed that Emanuel Macron’s campaign successfully took preemptive steps to thwart hacking attempts by a group called Pawn Storm; this group has been linked to Russia and was bent on affecting the outcome of the French elections (Trend Micro 2017). With regard to the information instrument, France sees the viability in sharing information especially as it relates directly to transnational terrorism. Evidence of this is found in the finalizing of information-sharing relationships bilaterally with the United States and even multilaterally through improvements to information sharing within the European Union (EU) (DOS2 2017). Militarily, France has leaned on its armed forces and by extension the military relationship that it has with other allies more so in recent years. It now ranks ninth in relation to all other NATO members in terms of military expenditures as measured as a percentage of GDP (NATO 2018, 23). A former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, noted in recent years that France was glad to be back in the NATO military structure and stated that his country had no intention of leaving it again; this is particularly relevant in times of fiscal challenge when one can possibly achieve synergy through pulling of multinational resources (Lasconjarias 2014). France has seen the importance of leveraging capabilities possessed by other countries and the benefits in alliance strengths when looking to confront major threats abroad. Even so, France has experienced great pressure exerted by terrorists in recent years. Moreover, although France has tremendous military capabilities, it still remains vulnerable to acts of terror targeting softer targets. In July 2016, a 19-ton cargo truck driven by a Tunisian resident killed 86 and injured hundreds more at a seaside resort on Bastille Day (DOS2 2017). France has taken its fight against terror organizations abroad and has been a central actor on the African continent. It has been involved in a counterterrorism operation called Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region working with the UN Multinational Integrated Mission in Mali (DOS2 2017). Likewise, it has also been instrumental in working with the UN to

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help train and develop counterterrorism forces in Niger (DOS2 2017). It has and presently supports counterterrorism efforts in Libya (DOS2 2017). France’s counterterrorism efforts transcend these and move beyond the African continent as it conducts operations in the Middle East. France has been one of the primary air operations contributors engaged in countering the Islamic State’s efforts in both Iraq and Syria (DOS2 2017). 5.5.3  Russia Russia’s population ranks in the top ten worldwide and comes in the middle of the P5 Security Council members (Weaver 2019). According to the IMF, Russia’s GDP value places it ninth in the world with a value of 1.2  trillion; it finishes last in relation to the other permanent Security Council members (IMF 2017). The 2018 edition of the National Defense Strategy of the United States underscores Russian border violations and this country using its veto power in the UNSC to counter diplomatic, military, and economic decisions on its neighboring countries (NDS 2018, 1). Diplomatically (and militarily), Russia has exerted greater influence in the Central Asian States, and in the Middle East recently (Russian Federation 2018). This is all being done while it is also tightening security around its borders (FSB 2018). Evidence of this is shown in its forays into Syria, and through the military equipment sales to Iran and other activities in the region. Though Russia often disagrees with the United States and did not support the full measures requested by the United States with regard to recent nuclear tests by the DPRK, it did affirm support to UNSC resolution 2375, tightening pressure on the DPRK (UN2375 2017). Russia has significantly invested in efforts to protect itself from actors looking to acquire information (and by extension, intelligence) on its intentions. It has invested extensively in capabilities to limit collection attempts by others through its Counterintelligence Service and its Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (Crosston 2016, 123). Russia has also been developing asymmetric TTPs and has proven quite effective at using cyber as a tool leveraging information (and its technology) to its advantage. An intelligence community unclassified assessment underscored this when turning to the most recent US federal election (ODNI 2017). In an unclassified key judgment section on the US election, the intelligence assessment stated that Vladimir Putin ordered a campaign to undermine liberal democratic order while also pushing efforts to

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reduce the faith of US citizens on the voting process (ODNI 2017, ii). The Russian government was able to achieve this by using a mixture of covert and overt information with the intention of discrediting the democratic presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton (ODNI 2017, ii). During an open intelligence hearing where testimony took place, Senator Mark Warner stated that Russia had successfully flooded social media, spread fake news, hacked political emails and leaked them selectively, and all without firing a shot with very little cost (CSPAN 2017). Bill Priestap also underscored that the Russian military spy agency, the GRU, was directly involved in this effort (CSPAN 2017). Russia’s information and cyber influences move beyond the scope of elections and frequently include hacking attempts on US public and private sector organizations in discussion that occurred with the former director of the NSA (Rogers 2017). The intelligence community further assesses Russia as a major cyber player in the world (WTA 2017, 1). As was the case with China, Russia has invested in CNA and CNE capabilities in order to steal secrets away from other countries to gain advantages (Weaver 2017a, 10). Likewise, it is concerned greatly about its own cybersecurity (CND) to protect itself from exploitation (Crosston 2016, 124). It is shoring up its computer network defenses while it is engaged in cyber espionage; this was covered in a released Russian cyber defense plan dating back to December 2016 (Russia Plan 2016). It is most likely doing so to advance its position diplomatically. An interview with the former head of the NSA revealed that what ensued had been a loss of billions of dollars and even state secrets (Rogers 2017). Bill Priestap testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee stating that Russia fully understands that it cannot confront the United States directly with its military and as a result is investing in cyber as a way to weaken this nation and allies to the United States (CSPAN 2017). Turning to a member of NATO, Denmark’s Defense Minister Hjort Frederiksen stated, “This is part of a continuing war from the Russian side in this field, where we are seeing a very aggressive Russia” in response to Russia’s attack on its military networks (MacFarquhar 2017). Although no classified data was accessed by Russia, the actions were still disheartening. The US IC assessed that Russia will continue to use cyber TTPs to conduct information operations in order to affect diplomatic initiatives and military operations throughout the planet (WTA 2017, 1). Historically, Russia has shown itself to be quite capable of recruiting foreign agents. However, two scholars have recently written that this has

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not been the case though diplomats have been implicated in the recruitment of recent college students in New York (Honig, Or, and Zimskind 2017, 453). Although its recruiting efforts have fallen short, it has seen the viability of using information and by extension propaganda to endear others to its causes (Fitzgerald and Brantly 2017, 230). Likewise, Russia has been quite effective at countering NATO’s information campaigns that have attempted to dispel Russian inaccuracies in Ukraine (Fitzgerald and Brantly 2017, 230). The latest National Defense Strategy of the United States stated that Russian intent behind this was to create fissures within this alliance (NDS 2018, 2). This has been brought to fruition through Russia’s courting of Turkey, a longtime US ally, and Turkey’s relationship with Russia has created a divide within the NATO alliance. Moreover, Russia has intentions to demonstrate its global power (Crosston 2016, 123). Militarily, it has asserted its aggressive behavior on the European continent (GAO 17-369 2017, 2). To mitigate the effectiveness of allied counter aggression, Russia has been bolstering the defenses of its own allies and partners. In a statement in mid-December of 2016, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the Kremlin stands ready to boost Serbia’s defensive capabilities in response to what his Serbian counterpart alleges is a threat from Croatia, a newer NATO member (Stojanovic 2016). Russia has other allies in its sphere of influence as well and include Belarus and Armenia, but what is not certain is how much support these countries would provide to one another militarily if called to do so. In response, the United States has applied its own pressure on European allies to contribute more in defense spending to the alliance but in doing so, this might hinder economic growth in the region (GAO 17-369 2017, 2). While remaining focused on the military instrument, Russia (as with China) has extensive military capabilities and is even pursuing out-of-area operations to demonstrate its strength globally (Weaver 2017b). It has been instrumental, for example, in fighting terrorists in Syria. It has used its military to rebrand itself as a formidable actor in today’s world (WEF 2018, 38). In Syria, it has tipped its hand in support of Bashar al-Asad’s regime and even broadened its campaign targeting moderate fighters backed by the United States. Russia has also weaponized its cyber ­capabilities. Evidence segueing from secondary sources point to Russia’s competence in using cyber espionage to infiltrate US government and private sector networks (Weaver 2017b).

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Economically, Russia has been using cyber as an espionage tool to complement its asymmetric military capabilities while also looking for vulnerabilities in US military systems (Weaver 2017b). Likewise, Russia can generate hard currency for its efforts through weapons’ sales to improve its position economically and to use hard currency to develop new weapon systems. In the end, Russia’s economic and military power is more regional than global, but it has global nuclear deterrence capabilities and asymmetric tools such as cyber to compensate in part for this deficit.  5.5.4  United Kingdom In terms of numbers of people, the United Kingdom ranks 22 overall in the world (just behind France) and is the smallest nation in relation to population to the other four permanent members of the Security Council (Weaver 2019). The United Kingdom comes in fifth place with a GDP value at 2.5 trillion, and this puts the United Kingdom in the middle nominally when looking at the P5 UNSC members. While attending the G20 conference in 2017, President Trump met privately with Prime Minister Theresa May. While meeting, these two leaders conversed on the importance of a variety of issues that included counterterrorism, trade, and foreign policy (White House Press Release 2017c). During a recent UNSC meeting, the United Kingdom supported President Trump’s push for more sanctions regarding recent DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile tests showing resolve and support for US initiatives. Prime Minister May stressed the importance of the enhancement of foreign relations with the United States at a later meeting with President Trump in September 2017 (May 2017). Like France, the United Kingdom’s electoral system makes use of paper ballots (Electoral Commission 2017). It, like France, is concerned about foreign influence in future elections and believes that this mode of voting is more secure than digital voting. The United Kingdom has an extensive intelligence and information gathering structure. It has used ties to its colonial past effectively (similar to France) to leverage information and intelligence for its personal benefit in contemporary times (Honig, or, and Zimskind 2017, 432). As one has seen in other nations, information and technology can be useful to improve a country’s position. Conversely, overreliance on technology especially presents a case for exposing the United Kingdom to vulnerabilities (Clark 2017, 31). What’s more is that its infrastructure is

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susceptible to adversarial exploitation of network weaknesses with a particular focus on its national infrastructure (Clark 2017, 31). Cyber threats are a prime concern (Weaver 2019). To mitigate effects from CNO, and by extension CNE and CNA, the United Kingdom has implemented its National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 to 2021 (Clark 2017, 22). It has the intent to emerge as one of the most secure places for the conduct of business over the Internet in the world. It has remained committed to a public-private partnership to improve its cyber resiliency (Cyber 2017, 1). While remaining focused on the information component of power, the United Kingdom has engaged the United States bilaterally on topics related to cybersecurity (DOS 2016, 10). This is to strengthen alliances among like-minded countries in relation to civil groups, government activities, and private sector entities. The United Kingdom, militarily, is looking to its national interests over those of its allies (McCormack 2015). It ranks fourth overall in relation to all NATO member countries when looking at military expenditures in relation to its GDP (NATO 2018, 23). The United Kingdom has made traction as it pursues its security and preservation over traditional Cold War venues though McCormack (2015) intones that it could be detrimental to the country. Yet the United Kingdom has succumbed to increasing acts of terror on its soil like the bombing in London in September 2017 (Trump 2017b). Both the United Kingdom and the United States stressed the need for maintaining strong security and defense relations recently (May 2017). The United Kingdom fully acknowledges that acts of terror and the instability and extremism that ensue from attacks is a primary concern for its security (Clark 2017, 21). That stated, it has a plethora of experience in dealing with acts of terrorism and in the implementation of anti-terrorism legislation (Alati 2015, 97). Attacks have increased in complexity, diversity, and scale. To help reduce the threat coming from transnational terrorism, the United Kingdom has implemented CONTEST, a counterterrorism strategy aimed at reducing the risk associated with these types of attacks (Clark 2017, 22). Four principles under CONTEST include prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare. This nation sees the viability of the UNSC to help it achieve its ends. More specifically, it has engaged in bilateral discussion on the topic of extremism and terror with Russian and Chinese leaders as well as the United States more generally (DOS2 2017). The United Kingdom clearly acknowledges that terrorism is a key contemporary problem. In a time of constricting budgets and fiscal challenges, it had increased resource allocation to counter terror operations

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in 2016 (DOS2 2017). Likewise, its efforts have seen its operations expand to the Middle East to conduct counter Islamic State operations in both Iraq and Syria, to Africa to fight the Islamic State in Libya, and even through improved information sharing throughout the European Union; it has even stepped up its game to counter terror financing. Likewise, it is also conducting counter Daesh operations in Afghanistan (MOD 2017, 11). Economics is central to the United Kingdom’s security interests (Cormack 2014). Cormack (2014) continues by writing on the linkages of traditional concepts gravitating around military and political security and national interests and the interlinking of intelligence and security. Theresa May confirmed the United Kingdom’s interests in expanding trade during a bilateral meeting with President Trump during the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly (May 2017). That stated, May stepped down as Prime Minister in June 2019 as a result of the quagmire associated with the United Kingdom’s inability to come to terms with a viable plan to withdraw from the EU. Early in the National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review, Greg Clark (2017, 2), from the United Kingdom’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy sees the inextricable linkage of economic interests to national security. Moreover, Clark (2017) understands the clarity, consistency and proportionally of the United States and the United Kingdom as being codependent in the pursuit of prosperity and viability. This report goes on to demonstrate that shared economic interests with other nations are an opportunity for the United Kingdom to expand and enhance its security interests. Another vulnerability is the foreign ownership of its companies (Clark 2017, 21). These threats have increased significantly since the country’s last assessment dating back to 2010. As the United Kingdom moves into the next decade, it is concerned with a triad of concerns. These include the exertion of global influence, protection of its people, and promotion of prosperity (Clark 2017, 21). 5.5.5  Answers Particularly, the United States should be concerned about what is occurring and realistically, what it should do to remain the dominant world power for the foreseeable future. The IC in the United States will work toward this. It will have challenges though in the context of this nation’s

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deficit spending and its debt. The deficit has grown to $587  billion in 2017; this is up by 33% from just the year before (GAO 17-579T 2017). Moreover, the debt of the United States as a share of the GDP also increased by 3% (to 77%) from fiscal year 2015 to 2016 (GAO-17 579T 2017). The US debt as of early 2018 is well over $20 trillion and is getting much worse. Threats to stability and peace remain throughout the world and show no sign of improving (Weaver 2015). Tied linkage among the world’s nations and by extension through globalization will have an impact on the stability of the world economy. More to the point, over time, it will become increasingly important to grow and nurture relationships with other international allies with particular attention given to those in the intelligence profession to help foster improved peace and security around the planet; this should be done while simultaneously striving to make the world less dangerous. A utilitarian approach pursued by intelligence leaders must look beyond areas of expertise and focus on the future to what outcomes their decisions will have holistically to ensure that they are not inflicting greater damage while pushing for short-term gains within one’s narrow purview. Q1: How are the other P5 members (excluding the United States) of the United Nations using the instruments of national power to shape outcomes favorable to them? Nations will pursue diplomatic measures to help improve their prominence in the world. Likewise, countries will likely continue to foster relations with countries that have cultural similarities with regard to their own and will strengthen relations in order to do so. Intelligence professionals should be aware that diplomatic efforts are intertwined in all that a country does. Information is a key instrument to help garner support. Russia most likely will use its influences and adeptness in social media information campaigns to help elect candidates with leanings likely to support its security interests (WTA 2019). Both China and Russia most likely will make use of cyber TTPs to continue to steal proprietary information, trade secrets, and military blueprints to help reduce costs associated with research and development while also undercutting technical superiority possessed through systems owned and used by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (WTA 2019). All countries are moving in a path that will tighten

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CND to mitigate the effects from other countries using information operations and social medial to affect outcomes in future election cycles. Intelligence professionals should look to see not just what other nations are doing in terms of cyber espionage but also how quickly they are able to act on information to implement technological innovations that they have acquired. Militarily, both China and Russia will most likely increase expenditures relative to their gross domestic product to achieve greater influence. Russia’s will be limited regionally and China’s will expand more globally. Russia will continue to invest in weapons of mass destruction and other strategic and nonstrategic systems where China will modernize its nuclear weapons’ sea-based systems and road-mobile weapons (WTA 2019, 9). Conversely, France and the United Kingdom will either maintain or only make modest increases due to the impact of the most recent recession and the subsequent economic hardships experienced by both countries despite for calls by the United States for NATO nations to increase spending on defense. That stated, the strength of the combined power possessed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States can be further complemented by the continuation of their participation in NATO. Intelligence professionals should look to see if the strength in these NATO allies grows or contracts in future years while also looking to see the pursuits of both China and Russia in terms of where one will find their military formations (whether regionally or globally). One thing is seemingly certain: all nations are rallying against the Islamic State. Evidence of this is demonstrated through the approval of UN Security Resolution 2379 on September 21, 2017 (UN2379 2017). Here once again, the P5 are in concurrence that terrorism is bad and don’t see anything favorable coming out of the burgeoning of this terror organization. China, finally, will more than likely move to fill the vacuum left by the United States pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The purpose will not only enhance its economic standing but will serve as a way to invest in its military buildup. Russia, likewise, can use weapons sales in order to provide it with currency and it can leverage petroleum shipments (oil and natural gas) to many of the Eastern European countries to hedge against NATO influence in the region though this is not as dire for recipient nations since there are other sources for petroleum products (e.g. like Norway). Economically, Europe will have to deliberately and properly prepare for the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union so

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that this severance from the EU does not adversely move the continent back to recession. Intelligence professionals from the United States should monitor the EU to see how the extrication of the United Kingdom from the union will impact both the EU and the United Kingdom. When looking at China, intelligence personnel should monitor indicators of economic growth, trading alliances, leadership to fill the TPP vacuum, and where it is establishing economic ties. Likewise, they should look to see where it is investing capital in pursuit of advanced weapon systems. Russia will present a unique challenge to the intelligence community. Much of its economic viability will be contingent more generally on the commodities’ market and more specifically on the price of oil and gas. Likewise, those that work in the field of intelligence should monitor the weapons’ exports (and the specific consumers of these products) to gain insight into those nations that might be drawn into a stronger relationship with this country. Also, analysts and researchers should watch to see if Russia is looking to expand influence in the Middle East. Q2: Why are the other P5 members (excluding the United States) of the Security Council of the United Nations using the instruments of national power to shape outcomes favorable to them? The P5 members of the UNSC at times will see utility in sharing information with one or more members for the advancement of their own security interests. Diplomatically, these efforts can help maintain alliances or coalitions. No nation wants to atrophy and all countries would like to either maintain or rise in terms of power and influence and therefore will attempt to use their diplomatic efforts broadly to do so. More specifically they will make use of their position as UNSC members (and the threat of veto) to shore up positions favorable to them. Intelligence personnel should be aware of this. The UNSC Permanent Members will likewise use information to help shape perceptions to help promote their country’s image (and by extension their influence). Likewise, they will most likely invest in efforts to protect against propaganda campaigns and other adverse influences exerted by state and non-state actor CNE and CNA efforts to prevent them from succumbing to exploitation. Those that work in the field of intelligence should monitor efforts to see if they are effective at countering

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the nefarious intentions of those purveying cyber as a way to conduct information operations, for example influencing elections. Investment will continue in their militaries with likely increases in those of China and Russia and maintenance of capabilities in France and the United Kingdom. China and Russia will do so to exert greater influence and power with the latter two focusing on synergizing capabilities from alliances like NATO. Strength is often seen as a precursor to power which underscores the relevancy of the military instrument to the four permanent Security Council members. Intelligence professionals can gain great insight into the direction of a country by looking at the types of weapons systems being purchased (offensive vs. defensive), and the global stationing of a country’s military personnel and capabilities. China will likely use its position as the second largest economy in the world to grow and to fill vacuums left by the United States withdrawing its economic influence especially in Asia. Russia’s desire is to grow its economy and most notably can do so through the export of petroleum (oil and gas) and weapons, provided that it sees an easing of sanctions levied against it. Moreover, China and Russia are more closely aligned now than at any point since the mid-1950s (WTA 2019). France, as a result of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, would like to assume a more assertive leadership role alongside Germany; conversely, the United Kingdom through divorcing itself of its perceived financial burdens linked to the EU wants to grow its economy through bilateral agreements. Economically, those who work in intelligence should study the financial pursuits of a country, the implementation of trade agreements, and the relative growth (or contraction) of its GDP longitudinally and more. This will give indications as to whether a country is gaining prominence from a monetary perspective. Q3: What impacts will these have on the United States? The information instrument as used by the non-US UNSC Permanent Members is the most immediate concern for the United States. Information as an instrument of national power will have implications among the other permanent members of the UNSC. Most notably, China and Russia will remain major players in the cyber world and will use this instrument to weaken the United States, are not likely to foster intelligence relations with the United States and by extension its two main allies (i.e. France and

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the United Kingdom); France and the United Kingdom will likely maintain intelligence relations with the United States. This was recently underscored by an economic report showcasing an increase of state-on-state cyber-attacks in recent years (WEF 2018, 33). Accordingly, these CNOs have burgeoned exponentially in recent years. Russia and China seemingly have been engaged in cyber espionage activities the world over according to the secondary sources (Weaver 2017b). Cyberspace and the systems that use it continue to be a major vulnerability for the United States. Those that are seen as potential adversaries to this country will see a rise in the use of cyber capabilities and will work to block intelligence relations (WTA 2019, 5). Therefore, the United States must invest in enhanced security measures and defense in depth to achieve greater cybersecurity (especially at the federal government level) and to have more robust and effective TTPs to mitigate its exposure to these vulnerabilities (GAO 17-533 2017). France and the United Kingdom should also protect networks from vulnerabilities, as well as other developed nations reliant on information technology that are allied with the United States. This is further amplified by the notion that cyber threats are likely to grow in sophistication and number in the next few years; intelligence professionals should monitor this. Most notably, the United States can and should expect more of the same from both China and Russia (GAO 17-533 2017; WTA 2019, 5). Moreover, the implementation of improved TTPs is what is necessary to detect, respond to, and mitigate from cyber threats (GAO 17-440T 2017). It is also necessary to invest in strengthening the cybersecurity of the critical infrastructure of the nation as a whole (GAO 17-440T 2017). China and Russia, as the most potent actors, will likely remain major purveyors of cyber as a way to weaken France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (WTA 2019, 5). The three latter must build redundancies to protect their interests while knowing that the two former will most likely use these to advance their positions and stature in the world and keep open channels to foster intelligence relations. The United States has prided itself as being in a strong technological position in the world, but a recent Government Accountability Office document underscored the challenges confronting the United States in the cyber domain. This is particularly the case with a need to mitigate cyberspace threats and the necessity to enhance these capabilities (GAO 17-369 2017).

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The world is a more complex place as a result of globalization and the interdependency of nations on resources and goods from other countries (Weaver 2016, 2019); those in the intelligence profession know this. Nation-states might see themselves aligned with a country on one matter and yet they could be diametrically opposed to the same country or countries on other issues. What this means is that members of the United States’ IC (military and civilian) and those of its long-term allies, must come to terms with this new reality and could make use of the “DIME” (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) approach to help gain clarity regarding the situation as they look at potential impacts of decisions they might make on relationships among the countries with whom interaction occurs (especially when looking at globalization among the UNSC P5 members and the fostering of intelligence relations). Likewise, it would be beneficial for the IC to develop a clearer understanding of what is going on within the targeted country that moves beyond their specific country or region if their organizations are geographically aligned.

5.6   Conclusion The YIRTM-M was useful in conducting the analysis in this chapter. Each of the instruments of national power was considered in the context of the four other permanent members of the UNSC. China and the United States are major trading partners and the former is a nation whose economy continues to burgeon at a much faster pace than the latter. It sees its growth in economic terms as being directly linked to its national security and has made use of information technology as a way to reduce the technological edge the United States holds. At present, it also realizes that it can’t confront the United States in a direct military operation and achieve victory and therefore has also invested in cyber offensive capabilities looking for vulnerabilities in the United States’ infrastructure and defense sectors. That stated, China has continued to invest extensively in the modernization of its armed forces especially in capabilities that provide reach beyond the confines of Asia. Diplomatic efforts have been linked to economic initiatives to help expand China’s position. China has used its position as a member of UNSC P5 to serve as a counterbalance to the United States thereby weakening the latter’s influence. France is a staunch ally of the United States and a powerful member of NATO. Accordingly, it uses the information instrument of power in order

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to protect against cyber threats, to foster network defense and to use information and intelligence sharing (both as a contributor and recipient) to thwart would-be attackers. Economic pursuits have been used to enhance diplomatic and military efforts. Likewise, France has implemented diplomatic initiatives and military power to expand its influence, strengthen alliances, and pursue terrorism also outside of the European continent. Since the fall of communism in the early 1990s, Russia has fallen in and out of favor multiple times with the United States. Though it has seemingly become more aggressive in recent years, it still trails behind the other three permanent members covered in this chapter in terms of economic position; it has, however, invested heavily in its military capabilities (NATO 2018). That stated, Russia (like China) realizes that it cannot match the US and NATO allies in a direct conventional military exchange and accordingly has invested in cyber (information) as an asymmetric TTP (NATO 2018). When shifting to the military instrument of national power, Russia has expended time and effort and demonstrates willingness to conduct operations in both Europe and the Middle East (NATO 2018, 18). Diplomatic efforts are used in conjunction with an information campaign as a way to try to convince the world of its legitimacy. Diplomatically, Russia has also used its position as a P5 member of the UNSC to exert influence over the United States and will most likely not be forthcoming with information and not be candid in the pursuit of intelligence relations with the United States. The United Kingdom, similar to France, has been a staunch supporter of the United States and remains a significant member of the NATO alliance; it will most likely desire a strong and healthy intelligence relationship with the United States. The United Kingdom is particularly focused on diplomatic initiatives and military efforts as a way to hold onto power. Following these two instruments of power, the United Kingdom has looked to apply information as a way to promote its messaging while pursuing investments in cyber defense to guard against vulnerability exploitation at the behest of nefarious types. Economic means were also used but at a lesser extent than the other three. The United Nations remains quite relevant. Those who work in the field of intelligence would be remiss to think otherwise. As was the case leading to Iran’s cessation of its uranium enrichment program, indications

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show that the P5 members are in step with countering the DPRK from pursuing a nuclear ballistic missile program, to also keep nuclear weapons out of Northeast Asia to hopefully bring about greater regional stability in Northeast Asia. Although both these cases may in the end prove unsuccessful, they still demonstrate that the UNSC can work on selective issues and bring forward constructive cooperation between the great powers and agree on significant issues of global interest. A study on the United Kingdom and other members of the European community provides amplification on the challenges arising from acts of terrorism (Maftei 2015). Europe in recent years has experienced a significant increase in terror incidents; France and the United Kingdom are major targets. Accordingly, these two countries are particularly interested in fomenting relations through diplomacy and military means to hopefully prevent future acts of terror or extremism, and militarily will contribute where possible to continue to help weaken the Islamic State in places like Iraq and Syria. The Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model was useful to orient the researcher toward credible data sources. Most of the evidence of data from this chapter came from the bottom left of this model (mostly written sources which included government document, books, and journals). These sources provided the strongest insight into what is taking place with each of the four nations. Oral accounts from the bottom right also contributed significantly to but to a lesser level than the documents component. Press releases, key leader statements, and testimony further complemented what the written sources provided. Plans and systems were marginally useful in triangulation to help understand what was taking place. The YIRTM-M model helped narrow the chapter’s focus to the four instruments of power (diplomacy, information, military, and economic). Other research might look to complement with primary data to confirm or refute what this study found by interviewing key defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence professionals. When turning back to the intelligence community, things are not often as they appear; one does not live in a black and white world. Those who conduct assessments and judgments for their national intelligence organizations need to understand the complexity in the relationships among different state actors especially in the context of the UNSC P5 members. Though it is not likely that assessments and judgments will be clear with straightforward conclusions, intelligence professionals should strive to

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make sure things are as clear as possible (Jervis 2010, 203). It is through this understanding that intelligence professionals  might be able to provide  decision makers with deeper and more meaningful assessments on foreign policy—when looking to see just who their country’s friends or foes really are.

References Alati, Daniel. 2015. Current National Security and Human Rights Issues in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Hong Kong. ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 22 (1): 91. Boyer, E. L. 1990. Scholarship reconsidered: Priorities of teh Professoriate. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. CFR. 2017. Council on Foreign Relations. China in Africa. https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/china-africa. Accessed 15 Dec 2018. Clark, Greg. 2017. National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. https://www.gov.uk/ government/consultations/national-security-and-infrastructure-investmentreview. Accessed 17 Oct 2017. Cormack, Rory. 2014. Secret Intelligence and Economic Security: The Exploitation of a Critical Asset. Intelligence and National Security 29 (1): 99–121. Creswell, J.W. 2008. Research Design; Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Crosston, Matthew. 2016. Bringing Non-Western Cultures and Conditions into Comparative Intelligence Perspectives: India, Russia, and China. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 29 (1): 110–131. CSPAN. 2017. Russian Interference in U.S. Elections. https://www.c-span.org/ video/?430128-1/senate-intel-panel-told-21-states-targeted-russia2016-election. Accessed 23 July 2017. Cyber. 2017. Defence Cyber Protection Partnership. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defence-cyber-protection-partnership. Accessed 18 Oct 2017. DOD Press Briefing. 2015. DOD Press Briefing on April 16, 2015, with Secretary of Defense Carter and GEN Dempsey. http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/ Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5619. Accessed 28 Apr 2015. DOS. 2016. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy Public Law 114–113. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defence-cyber-protectionpartnership. Accessed 17 Oct 2017. DOS2. 2017. Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. Department of State. https:// www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/index.htm. Accessed 17 Oct 2017.

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Election Code. 2017. Legifrance. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006353155&cidTexte=LEGIT EXT000006070239. Accessed 23 July 2017. Electoral Commission. 2017. The Electoral Commission. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/roles-and-responsibilities/our-role-in-elections-and-referendums. Accessed 23 July 2017. Fitzgerald, Chad W., and Aaron F. Brantly. 2017. Subverting Reality: The Role of Propaganda in 21st Century Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3 (2): 215–240. FSB (ФСБ). 2018. RUSSIA: I servizi segreti mettono al sicuro i confini di stato. Prevenire è meglio che curare, January 17. http://www.eastjournal.net/ archives/88014. Accessed 5 Dec 2018. GAO 02-174. 2001. European Security U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-174/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-174.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2017. GAO 17-369. 2017. Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges. http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-369. Accessed 23 July 2017. GAO 17-440T. 2017. Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Strengthen U.S. Capabilities. http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682756.pdf. Accessed 23 July 2017. GAO 17-533. 2017. Cybersecurity: Federal Efforts Are Under Way That May Address Workforce Challenges. http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683923.pdf. Accessed 23 July 2017. GAO 17-579T. 2017. The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Actions Needed to Address the Federal Government’s Fiscal Future. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO17-579T. Accessed 23 July 2017. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-196. 1999. United Nations Observations on Reform Initiatives. http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/107972.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2017. Glassick, Charles E. 2000. Boyer’s Expanded Definitions of Scholarship, the Standards for Assessing Scholarship, and the Elusiveness of the Scholarship of Teaching. Academic Medicine 75 (9): 877–880. Hammond, Brian. 2015. French National Assembly Clears Bill to Expand Government. Cybersecurity Policy Report. Aspen Publishers, Inc. Honig, Or, and Sarah Zimskind. 2017. The Spy Machine and the Ballot Box: Examining Democracy’s Intelligence Advantage. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3 (3): 431–463. IMF. 2017. International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=32&pr.y=19&sy=2015&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&s ort=country. Accessed 18 July 2017.

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ISAB. 2015. International Security Advisory Board Report on a Framework for International Cyber Stability. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/229023. htm. Accessed 28 Apr 2015. Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash. Political Science Quarterly 125 (2): 185–204. Joint Press Release. 2017. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis at Joint Press Availability June 21, 2017. https://www.state.gov/ secretary/remarks/2017/06/272103.htm. Accessed 18 July 2017. Lamy, Steve L., John S.  Masker, John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. 2015. Introduction to Global Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Lasconjarias, Guillaume. 2014. ‘Rentrée dans le rang?’ France, NATO and the EU, from the Védrine Report to the 2013 French White Paper on National Security and Defence. Journal of Transatlantic Studies 12 (4): 418–431. MacFarquhar, Neil. 2017. Denmark Says ‘Key Elements’ of Russian Government Hacked Defense Ministry. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/world/ europe/russia-denmark-hacking-cyberattack-defense-ministry.html. Accessed 27 July 2017. Maftei, Danut. 2015. The Way Several European Countries Use to Achieve Their Strategic and Security Objectives by Involving the National Experts Seconded to International Organizations: Case Study: United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Journal of Criminal Investigations 1 (8): 62–72. May, Theresa. 2017. Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom Before Bilateral Meeting. https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/09/20/remarks-president-trump-and-prime-ministermay-united-kingdom-bilateral. Accessed 26 Sep 2017. McCormack, Tara. 2015. The British National Security Strategy: Security After Representation. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (17): 494–511. MOD. 2017. Finance & Economic Annual Bulletin Departmental Resources Statistics 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/580469/Commentar y_relating_to_Finance___ Economics_Annual_Statistical_Bulletin___Departmental_Resources___ January_2017.pdf. Accessed 17 Oct 2017. NATO. 2018. 2018 Annual Presidential Report. https://www.nato-pa.int/documents. Accessed 9 Mar 2019. NDS. 2018. National Defense Strategy. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed 20 Jan 2018. NSS. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. http:// nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf. Accessed 23 Dec 2017.

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Obama, Barak H. 2015. Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon on April 2. https://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/statement-president-framework-preventiran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon. Accessed 28 Apr 2015. ODNI. 2017. Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution. https:// www.documentcloud.org/documents/3254239-Russia-Hacking-report.html. Accessed 20 July 2017. OSD. 2017. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017. https://www.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF. Accessed 18 July 2017. P.R. 448-16. 2016. Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Incident in South China Sea. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/NewsRelease-View/Article/1032611/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretarypeter-cook-on-incident-in-south-china-sea/source/GovDelivery/. Accessed 27 July 2017. Regional Focus. 2015. Regional Focus Asia Pacific. http://www.janes.com/article/39339/regional-focus-asia-pacific-es14e2. Accessed 18 Feb 2016, 17 June 2014. Remler, D.K., and G.G. Van Ryzin. 2010. Research Methods in Practice: Strategies for Description and Causation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Rogers, Michael. 2017. Admiral Michael S.  Rogers (USN), Director, National Security Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Delivers Remarks at The New America Foundation Conference on CYBERSECURITY. https:// www.nsa.gov/news-features/speeches-testimonies/speeches/022315-newamerica-foundation.shtml. Accessed 20 July 2017. Rudner, M. 2013. Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 36 (3): 453–481. Russian Federation. (2015). The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy [PDF file]. (Russia, Russian Federation, Office of the President). Moscow: Russian Federation. Retrieved from http://ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/ OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-SecurityStrategy31Dec2015.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 2019. Russian Plan. 2016. The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy [PDF file]. (Russia, Russian Federation, Office of the President). Moscow: Russian Federation. Retrieved from http://ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/ OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-SecurityStrategy31Dec2015.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 2019. Russia Plan. 2017. Plan 05.12.2016 r. No 646. http://kremlin.ru/acts/ bank/41460. Accessed 27 July 2017.

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CHAPTER 6

Commanding America’s Military Spies Matthew A. Rose

6.1   Introduction History is littered with character of war changes due to innovation and technology advancements (Carr 2000, 264–265, 445–446). But is this true for all tools in war? Weapon systems, their projectiles and logistics support trains continue to advance, but the spy remains an outlier. Human intelligence or HUMINT, colloquially referred to as spying or espionage, is a unique intelligence discipline. Unlike intricate instruments in space that collect images or antennas that capture transmissions, HUMINT allows for the collection of information inaccessible through other means. Yet, HUMINT is not without shortcomings. Commanding military spies is paradoxical. Since the earliest days of military organizations, how to A shorter version of this book chapter was published in Orbis: Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Journal of World Affairs, 2 March 2019. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.orbis.2019.02.006. Matthew Rose works in the US Department of Defense and is a 2018 graduate of the US Army War College where he received The Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research. The opinions in the chapter are the author’s own and do not represent those of the US government. M. A. Rose (*) Department of Defense Civilian, Washington, DC, USA © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_6

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command and control military spies has presented a unique challenge to those who study history and those who lead military organizations. Under the military, a dichotomy exists between human intelligence and the profession of arms where tension levels (command, authority, level and risk) are at play at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war impacting the performance of spies. This is especially true for those who do not offer immediate value to a theater or tactical commander. Spies who seek strategic intelligence over operational or tactical intelligence are especially difficult to command, direct and integrate into military operations. Often, military commanders find themselves attempting to control a seemingly immutable, and in some cases confusing, set of opposing forces. This begs the question—how should the US Department of Defense (DoD) manage the tensions associated with commanding its strategic HUMINT capabilities? Examining this space involves understanding tensions. Tension, a physics term, describes the act of being stretched by opposing forces. The term can also refer to mental or emotional strain on an individual. Ironically, both descriptions fit. For military commanders and intelligence practitioners alike, navigating these tensions and reducing friction are essential for operational success. “One spy in the right place is worth 20,000 men in the field,” an idea attributed to Napoleon, summarizes the utility of a well-placed spy if the tensions are adequately reconciled (Folsom 2012). If not, an allied commander may find themselves tipping their strategy to the opposing side or, in Napoleon’s case, a subordinate’s fair lady introduced by the British Secret Service (Grant 1915, 301–312). Historical examples provide insights and underscore the impacts of such perennial struggles between commanders and HUMINT capabilities. The foundational tension between the military and spies lies within the disparities in the profession. From this foundation, subsequent tensions in command, authority, level and risk tolerance are apparent. Friction within these tensions occurs when influencing actors emplace incompatible or restricting management frameworks between the opposing sides. One size does not fit all. This concept of tension and friction is instinctive for Americans and most Western democracies. Their fundamental system of government is designed to operate with balanced tensions and friction. Removing tensions and friction generally create more efficient and streamlined systems. However, removing the tensions should not be the goal; they are integral to the design. The US system of government is built upon the idea of

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three equal parties that serve as a check and balance to one another. Friction and tension were built as designed. This general principle is ­critically important to think about commanding spies. Understanding and identifying reoccurrences will assist with managing and resolving current problems and therefore potentially minimizing future ones. Through this, the DoD may implement a system where natural tensions are expressed but managed properly by governance, thus leading to desired outcomes.

6.2   Tension of Profession The first tension with commanding spies is the most basic. It bridges two distinct professions—HUMINT and the profession of arms. Subconsciously, one accepts that spies are not men and women at arms. It is true that military HUMINT collectors are routinely cross-trained in arms, but their primary job is not to perform mundane military duties. This relationship among professions is not novel but yet prevalent to the military. Doctors, lawyers, pilots and engineers are other professional fields that have a similar relationship with the profession of arms. However, HUMINT appears different from other vocations based on two questions. One, is HUMINT a profession? Two, is it compatible with the profession of arms? On compatibility, consider the US Peace Corps, an organization that expressly states applicants associated with intelligence need not apply (Peace Corps 2018). This is to protect the Peace Corps’ employees. This is a similar standard held by other professions against HUMINT practitioners. Spies are expected to tread lightly around journalists and religious personnel. Professions are the creations of humans and fit in a specific societal role. The study of professions is “ecological.” They arise when society creates the preconditions for them to be (DiMaggio 1989, 534–535). A profession provides autonomy of practice for its members and may exclude nonmembers (U.S.  Army War College 2017, 25). As one profession grows and determines its “jurisdiction” of practice, others interact to determine their corresponding places in society (DiMaggio 1989, 534–535). This idea describes a competition or tension among professions for jurisdiction. John Burk, a prominent American military sociologist, espouses this definition, “a relatively ‘high status’ occupation whose members apply abstract

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knowledge to solve problems in a particular field or endeavor” (Burk 2005, 41). He further explains that the military is a profession despite the field of sociology historically taking this for granted (Burk 2005, 44–47). While nations rely on their military professionals to defend their borders, respond to disasters and provide security, their primary purpose is to wage war. To accomplish this charge, the profession of arms routinely engages in sanctioned violence. Accordingly, the profession of arms serves a specific purpose in the international system. A military’s purpose is generally the same in all three main categories of international relations—realism, liberalism and constructivism. Humans recognize this profession’s practice and include the sanctioned termination of human life. This sets arms apart from other professions. On this point, societies hold militaries to a higher standard (Mattox 2005, 390–392). Very few professions are held to this elevated standard. It is true doctors, pilots and police are given the discretion over life; only arms have this responsibility at a much larger scale. Can the same be said for spies? A spy, colloquially, is “someone who is employed by one nation to secretly convey classified information of strategic importance to another nation.” The act of “spying” or using spies is synonymous with espionage. There is little distinction between the military intelligence collector, support staff, the source and sub-sources. All are considered “criminals,” if caught by the opposition. Spying is almost universally a crime in all nations; each has its own definition of what constitutes a spy (International Committee of the Red Cross 2018). Conversely, almost all nations employ them for their own benefit. Even the holiest of holy nations, the Vatican, has an extensive record of employing spies in peace and during global conflict (Alvarez 2002). Societies clearly have use for purveying espionage. While there is not one standard definition of a spy, international norms were established to combat the idea—one man’s soldier is another man’s spy. The international community remains firm on distinguishing between spies and the armed forces. Spies in the military are an enigma. They are valuable but erode the purity of the law of war. In the arena of life or death, spying is a dirty business. The Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, two bedrock international law standards, recognize spies as different from lawful combatants. Therefore, combatants and spies can and have been treated differently (Radsan 2007, 599–607). President Abraham Lincoln shared this view on the dishonest practice despite the Union Army’s employment of

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spies. He issued General Order 100—known as the Lieber Code—which stated a “spy is someone who secretly seeks information for the enemy and should be hung by the neck regardless of their success in the endeavor” (Yale Law School 2018). Lincoln and the Union’s harsh but standard tone toward spying did not preclude their use for the Union. Elizabeth Van Lew, a Richmond postmaster by day and spymaster by night, managed a clandestine interracial spy network commonly known as the Richmond underground (Varon 2018). Her insights provided General Ulysses Grant with much-needed Confederate logistical intelligence regarding troop movements and supplies east of the Shenandoah Mountains. Today, there is general international law consensus that spies are not afforded the same privileges provided to their military counterparts when captured by the enemy (ICRC 2018).

6.3   Biblical Examples Knowing that spies and soldiers are different—despite sharing similar jurisdictions—does not de facto recognize military HUMINT as a profession. For this point, John Cardwell, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, presented a unique case study for the management of intelligence collectors. Cardwell contended the Holy Bible could offer lessons on HUMINT management for “One Nation, under God” (Cardwell 1978). In the Old Testament, there are two examples of the use of military spies by Israelite leaders. As recorded in the Book of Numbers, Moses chose 12 prominent tribesmen to collect intelligence on Canaan. These amateurs were sent to live among the Canaanites for 40  days with the charge of determining whether Canaan was their “Promised Land.” Moses tasked them with collecting intelligence and providing a general assessment of the geography and people. When the prominent tribesmen reported back, they disagreed with each other and lost their faith in God. Dissatisfied with what they saw, they verbally spoke against God. This intelligence operation concluded poorly for 10 of the 12—who were subsequently stoned to death. Only Joshua and Caleb, the tribesman who remained loyal to God, survived. Adding to the intelligence failure, the bible references that God severely punished the Israelites for losing their faith. The account shows how the intelligence failure and amateurs who lacked the adequate tradecraft cost the Israelites; the Israelites were punished with 40 years of wandering in the wilderness.

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The second example involved one of the surviving tribesmen—Joshua, who became the Israelites’ leader. He chose his spies more carefully. In preparation for entering the “Promised Land,” he selected two professionals to enter Jericho. Joshua requested intelligence on the inhabitant’s attitudes in preparation for a military operation. The story alludes to these intelligence collectors using tradecraft to mask their movements and sent secret messages back to Joshua. The two spies discretely recruited assets under Joshua’s authority. Unlike Moses’ management style, Joshua kept the details and tasking of his spies hidden from prominent leaders and soldiers. The Holy Bible makes several other references to this ancient profession. English interpretations and translations list “spying” in Genesis. King David made use of spies to report on Saul’s movements. In the New Testament, there are several accounts of spies sent to report on Jesus Christ. It is clear this profession has a long lineage. The historical accounts and veracity of details can be challenged; nevertheless, the lessons they reveal are important. Cardwell succinctly underscores this when he writes: If there is a lesson to be learned, it would appear that a strong case is made for the conduct of spying activities in secret by professionals, unencumbered by other political or military responsibilities, and that these professionals should report in secret to higher authority who would make policy decisions without debate. Spies should definitely not participate in the policy-­decision-­ making process, nor should they take their cases to the public. When that occurs, although stoning is passé, the people are likely to throw figurative rocks at the wrong people for the wrong reasons. (Cardwell 1978)

6.4   Fast Forward to Modern Times Spying is an act best undertaken by a community of professionals who are separate and distinct from general military duties. While stoning, as in the tribesman example, might be hyperbole, it provides a useful frame of reference to amateur consequences. Within the US Intelligence Community (IC) and DoD the term “spy” is generally not used to describe its workforce. The intelligence discipline that primarily uses people to collect information from other humans is HUMINT (CIA 2013a). Other military intelligence elements or special operating forces can also be regarded as “spies,” under international definitions embraced by

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adversaries. But “HUMINT practitioners” are most analogous to spies. The DoD’s HUMINT field of practice consists of clandestine, overt and interrogation elements (Wahlquist 2008). The primary task of all within this field is to collect intelligence. Endeavors that go beyond gathering sensitive information are more akin to those conducted by special operating forces or other elements, and thus not seen as “spying.” But the underlying question remains: is military HUMINT a profession? One could argue HUMINT is not a “high status” occupation but would be hard pressed to convince others that HUMINT practitioners do not apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in the endeavor of collecting intelligence (Burk 2005, 41). Thus, human intelligence is clearly a profession using most accepted definitions of the term, although the compatibility between the military and HUMINT remains a contention. The profession of arms and HUMINT are dissimilar despite both being vocations of war. In the US military, the profession of arms is “a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat” (Army 2010, 4). The profession is built through a shared combination of knowledge, attributes, skills and behaviors. The attributes of the profession of arms are starkly different from those in the human intelligence discipline. The ethical behaviors and norms acceptable for HUMINT collectors are generally unacceptable in military circles. A clash of ethical norms and behaviors is evident. Consider the common flow of information between service members. Within military circles, subordinates do not impede the flow of information to their commanders or staff. Withholding pertinent information from superiors could be labeled insubordination. On the other hand, HUMINT collectors must operate with secrecy and discretion. Withholding sources and methods and other information is normal practice, even between supervisors and their direct subordinates. Internationally, the military is expected to remain in clear sight for all to see, hence the uniforms. HUMINT professionals, on the other hand, do not (OUSD(I) 2018). The interaction and subsequent friction between members of opposing professions cannot be solely attributed to differences in process, jurisdiction or organizational structures. Rather, it is the strong undercurrents of distinctly different values and norms, which influence those members. John P. Langan studied the moral damage associated with the profession of intelligence collectors noting, “In intelligence agencies there is a general recognition that the acquisition of intelligence from human sources requires

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deception and manipulation” (Langan 2006, 106). Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, an adept military intelligence officer with experience in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), explained, “Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude towards intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don’t, they regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral” (Imler 2006, 230). Members of professions customarily place limits on what is acceptable and not acceptable. These limits are routinely based on their corresponding codes of ethics. The Hippocratic Oath taken by physicians is a manifestation of this idea. In intelligence, and HUMINT, in particular, the limits of practice are this: don’t get caught (Pfaff 2006, 75). A former DoD legal advisor highlighted this clash: “Intelligence operatives live in a dark and shadowy world, while military forces are the proverbial knights on white horses. Advocates of military transparency want to ensure the reputation of America’s men and women in uniform remains untarnished by association with the shadowy world of espionage” (Wall 2011, 87). Both professions are controlled by stringent laws and rules, but society views one as dishonest and the other as honorable. These examples show military HUMINT members are influenced by a different set of norms, ethics and required skills than their general military counterparts. The anecdotal differences are the friction points within the tension of profession. Understanding there is a difference is useful when considering other sub-tensions. Yet the acknowledgment of the differences is not the same as concluding the profession of arms and HUMINT should not be intermingled. The DoD must meld several professions into its overall organizational structure to achieve success. Integrating professions into the military is a valid pursuit. However, the differences between HUMINT and the profession of arms are the bedrock from which misunderstandings, opposition and other tensions arise.

6.5   Sub-tensions Like a house’s foundation, the tension of professions is the foundation from which other sub-tensions branch. On the one side, a tension is HUMINT and, on the other, the profession of arms. As mentioned earlier, there are sub-tensions of command, authority, level and risk tolerance. Likewise, they are apparent through historical and contemporary examples. The historical ones show several tensions and their frictions at play, but for simplicity, each was examined separately. Commonly, the friction

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Fig. 6.1  Tensions with commanding HUMINT framework

occurring in the tensions are the events or influencers that attempt to pull actors to an opposing side. There are other unexplored tensions, but they too also segued from the tension of professions. Figure 6.11 provides an illustration and serves as the point of departure. 6.5.1  Tension of Command The first sub-tension resides in military doctrine. The opposing sides in this tension are command concepts adopted in doctrine, and the HUMINT practitioner’s preferred modus operandi. Military command is hierarchical 1  This framework is an original creation of the author. It shows the foundational tension between military and human intelligence (HUMINT) professions. Sub-tensions stem from these differences. The identified sub-tensions are described in this study. Other tensions exist, but they were not described in this work.

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so their organizations and management structures generally follow suit. On the other side, strategic HUMINT collectors prefer flexibility and the ability to use discretion due to the inherent uncertainties within their field of practice. To examine this tension, one must understand military command concepts, their purpose, and how these concepts can clash with HUMINT’s modus operandi. Military command and control (C2) refers to exercising authority and direction of forces to complete a task (DoD 2017, 41). C2 is innate for all US military members; it permeates throughout all levels of military culture, doctrine and policy (JCS 2017, V-1). There are slight definition differences among the military services, but the idea applies to all. Joint Doctrine bridges the differences. This dogma applies to all military services; therefore, it provides the widest applicability for this examination. The Marine Corps and Army doctrine also provide useful insights into this topic, undoubtedly because the business of spying and land combat both occur where people live. The modern view is C2 and unity of command are inseparable. Unity of command is a concept that traces back to General John J. Pershing during World War I.  General Pershing found it difficult to apply combat power in a multinational command structure where different commanders were equal (Perry 2011, 134). Command unity describes how no military force has two or more commanders who exercise the same type of relationship over them. To achieve this unity, a force should have only one commander empowered with the requisite authority. This concept is fundamental and necessary for optimal combat operations, according to military doctrine and experts (JCS 2017, V-1, xix; USMC 1996, 77). Unity of command is a military principle that complements others such as mass, offense and maneuver (JCS 2017, V-1). Today, command authority from a higher to a lower commander is delegated through command and support relationships. The transfer of command authority and forces is sometimes restricted. For example, as codified in law through the United States Code (USC) Title 10, Section 164, prohibits the delegation or transfer of Combatant Command authority, except by the President or Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) (JCS 2017, V-2). While restrictions remain, the overall framework for command and support relationships ensure unity of command can be achieved. When unity of command is not possible—usually because of inadequate authorities—unity of effort is described as the next best option. Unity of effort is defined as, “forces under different commands coordinating and

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cooperating to achieve a common objective” (JCS 2017, V-1). Unity of effort describes how commanders at an equal level, or non-military ­interagency partners, support one another in the pursuit of an objective, goal or mission. Recent doctrine suggests that unity of effort is only guaranteed through unity of command. The “if this then that” statement is communicated in doctrine, “attaining unity of effort through unity of command … may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal,” and “unity of command is central to unity of effort” (JCS 2017, V-1, xix). This premise is important for understanding the difficulty with commanding HUMINT.  The premise leads to the following argument: human intelligence forces can best support a theater commander if they are under the same chain of command. A thought experiment can show how this notion creates a tension of command and subsequent friction. HUMINT practitioners are generally expected to operate as singletons or in small groups. Militaries are generally most effective when massed into a unified force. Military commanders are normally allocated areas of responsibility. At the highest command level below the Secretary of Defense or SECDEF is the Geographic Combatant Command. Geographic Combatant Commanders are given missions and physical boundaries (refer to Fig.  6.2) to conduct operations. Strategic HUMINT’s ability to gather intelligence is not limited by the commander’s priorities or geographic area where the collectors operate. Those working in the field of Collection are safer and operations are more permissive in areas where adversarial control is limited. For example, an American collector operating against the military in North Korea is a risky endeavor. It is often the case, particularly in strategic collection, that the opportunity to collect against the primary target occurs somewhere in the world. This is why interrogating suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay offers a more permissive environment. In both cases, the commanders in the permissive environments have higher theater priorities than North Korea or outside terrorist groups. Using the doctrinal command and support relationships, HUMINT elements prefer to be in general or direct support to local commanders. This provides the element of increased flexibility necessary to operate. Although commanders are advised to seek unity of command, they pursue command relationships like Operational Control (OPCON). This relationship restricts the element’s ability to operate within the commander’s area of responsibility (AOR).

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Fig. 6.2  Area of Operations (AORs) for geographic combatant commanders. (NGA 2005)

The tension of command is a military doctrinal creation. C2, unity of command and associated frameworks serve a purpose for managing military forces. However, select activities suffer from a broad-brush ­ approach. Strategic HUMINT elements and their operations suffer when command relationships restrict an element’s flexibility and movement. Joint Doctrine does not prohibit the SECDEF, defense agencies or Geographic Combatant Commanders from figuring out how to achieve command across AORs. US adversaries do not limit their operations based on US AOR boundaries; therefore, it makes little sense that one should engage in such self-limiting behavior when pursuing intelligence against these very same adversaries. The idea that strategic HUMINT is akin to general land forces, who can be neatly organized and positioned within the sight of a commander, is itself the tension.

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6.5.2  Tension Authority The second sub-tension involves the authorization behind HUMINT and military operations. A former special forces legal expert succinctly framed this tension when he wrote, “the law permits while Congress attempts to restrict” (Wall 2011, 92). The authority to conduct all military operations stems from executive branch powers and law. The framers of law influence executive power and the authority to conduct operations by adding restrictions. The merits of each legal restriction are irrelevant. Understanding that legislatures influence how military and HUMINT operations can be conducted, and by whom, is germane. Looking back, it appears that the first US Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington, understood this tension. He was commissioned as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army in June 1775 (Journal of Continental Congress 1775). For the management of war, the Continental Congress provided General Washington with the authority and power to act as necessary for the good and welfare of the service. He clearly wielded power and authority over the armed forces, and like many prominent generals before him, he understood the utility of spies (Kaplan 1990, 115–138; Roberts 2002; Goulden 2013). The British military Chief of Intelligence in the colonies, Major George Beckwith, noted after the war, “Washington did not really outfight the British, he simply outspied us” (DIA 2014a). General Washington conceived a human-centric intelligence system and left the management to skillful officers like Benjamin Tallmadge (White 2018). Washington not only created his own network of strategic spies, he understood the risks associated with intelligence operations supporting the military. Washington’s authority to conduct the war did not fully extend into all areas like strategic diplomacy and espionage. The Second Continental Congress created Secret Committees, “for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world” (DIA 2014b). The Continental Congress Intelligence Committee corresponded with General Washington to synchronize the military’s efforts with those areas retained by Congress (Washington 1777; Dick 2018). Quite a lot has changed since 1775, but not Congress’ view on spying and their control of funding. As noted, the overall authority used by the military nests with the powers of the President of the United States. Authority is the underlying foundation of command; it provides legitimacy and characteristically follows a hierarchical structure (DoD 2017,

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41). Thus, a military commander’s authority is not limitless. The executive branch also does not have unrestricted authority, due to congressional oversight and dynamic changes in law. US Code (USC) Title 10 provides the SECDEF with the direction, authority, and control over the DoD. All DoD military and intelligence operations stem from USC Title 10 or other delegated authorities (NDAA 2003). Unpacking the authority, congressional restrictions on organizational roles, funding and oversight become readily apparent. Legal code additions and restrictions add ambiguity; nevertheless, the three pertinent statutes for Defense HUMINT are USC Title 10 Armed Forces, USC Title 50 War and National Defense, and Executive Order (EO) 12333, as amended. USC Title 50 and Executive Order 12333 provide the SECDEF with a redundant authority stream, funding and oversight outside of Title 10. Under this supplementary stream, the SECDEF and select defense agencies are provided the authority to conduct intelligence activities within the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP includes IC members and excludes the activities conducted by military departments or Combatant Commands for planning and executing tactical military operations. Operations conducted within the NIP fall under the oversight of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees (Wall 2011, 87–90). The same statutes also provide guidance to focus the activities of DoD HUMINT collection elements. EO 12333 states military services shall collect intelligence for departmental requirements and national requirements as appropriate. EO 12333 also states that the DIA is charged with “collecting information to support national and departmental missions with the tasking of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and other components and agencies” (Executive Order 12333 as amended 2008). These statutes created leanings for DoD organizations and their HUMINT elements (refer to Table  6.1). Despite the law stating the SECDEF can use any DoD element to accomplish his tasks, Geographic Combatant Commands are generally precluded from expending NIP monies because they are not IC members. IC membership is defined in USC Title 50 and EO 12333. On the other hand, the DIA and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are not limited by this restriction. Title 10 and 50 authorities’ arguments routinely gloss over the fact that the SECDEF maintains control and direction of all DoD HUMINT. This power can only be limited by the President (Wall 2011, 99). The compartmentalization, organizational leanings and subsequent funding authoriza-

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Table 6.1  Organizational lean for HUMINT based on authorities Organization

Title 10

Military services Defense intelligence agency Geographic combatant commands Joint task forces within combatant commands US special operations command

Title 50

X X X X X

X

tions with oversight are congressional limitations on executive powers. It is not the authorities that produce the tension, but rather the age-old separation of powers among the legislative and executive branches of government. 6.5.3  Tension Levels The third sub-tension occurs between the levels of war and intelligence. To begin to understand this, one should put themselves in the shoes of a World War II soldier. This soldier, dug in on the forward line of troops, does not necessarily care about the enemy’s strategic stocks or manufacturing capability. This soldier is worried about what is over the next hill.2 This illustration describes how intelligence requirements vary in different levels of war (Bateman 2015). While the levels of war and intelligence are extensively defined in doctrine, the levels of HUMINT operations and the elements who conduct them are not. This lack of fidelity in understanding and the difficulty with defining HUMINT operations and elements as strategic, operational or tactical causes friction between collectors and commanders. An illustration of these levels is reflected in Fig. 6.3. Sherman Kent, often referred to as the father of US strategic intelligence analysis, described the differences in intelligence levels, noting in 1949, “the words ‘high-level’ are there to exclude what is called ‘operational’ intelligence, tactical intelligence, and the intelligence of small military formations in battle known as combat intelligence” (Kent 1966, 3). Kent postulated there were levels of intelligence in both war and peacetime. Today, military and intelligence professionals understand this idea 2  Discussions between Dr. Troy Sacquety and author were conducted regarding the focus and utility of special intelligence provided by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. Troy J. Sacquety, e-mail message to author, 1 February 2018.

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Fig. 6.3  Levels of warfare

when they discuss the three levels of intelligence: strategic, operational and tactical (refer to Table 6.2). The levels of intelligence share the same names as the levels of warfare. By definition, the intelligence levels are differentiated by the finished product and intended consumer. Strategic intelligence aligns with the strategic level of war. What is missing is pivotal. The intelligence operations and associated elements are absent in the definitions. The DoD neither defines “strategic intelligence operations” nor explains “strategic HUMINT elements.” A partial reason for this is the nonstandardized intelligence collection process. Strategic intelligence is not solely collected in strategic operations or by strategic elements. A tactical collector could gather intelligence that fulfills a knowledge gap for a policymaker, albeit this example is the exception rather than the rule. It is generally understood that certain elements and operations yield different values of intelligence. Counterpoints to this idea rely on anecdotes to show the uncertain nature associated with ­collection. But collection is not a trivial pursuit; collectors generally understand the type of intelligence that may result from their operations. They also have the discretion on the type of sources they approach. Consider military attachés. They are regarded as an overt collection element among international military circles (Murphy 1982; CIA 1995;

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Table 6.2  Levels of intelligence and consumers (DoD 2017, 114) Level of intelligence

Definition

Likely consumers

Tactical intelligence Operational intelligence

Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels

Tactical commanders, units and elements Joint task forces, combatant commanders and campaign planners

Strategic intelligence

President, SECDEF, congress, military service secretaries, policymakers and combatant commanders

Richelson 1996). The type of information these attachés are expected to collect leans toward the strategic side, but this does not preclude them from collecting tactical or operational information (CIA 1995, 2008). Attachés must maintain a set of highly specialized cultural, language and tradecraft skills to successfully serve in their posts. They also operate under a unique chain of command. In the US military system, attachés are not beholden to subordinate commanders, rather to the Chief of Mission from within an embassy or consulate under the Department of State (USMC 2018; DIA 2017). Their specialization, unique chain of command and focus on strategic intelligence infer they are a “strategic element.” This is not the case for all military HUMINT elements. While the title of some DoD HUMINT elements denotes that they are part of a “strategic element”—strategic debriefer, for example—they routinely support operational or tactical intelligence requirements (US Army HTJCOE 2010). The separation of strategic assets is not novel. Outside of intelligence, the DoD determined the nuclear weapons triad, which remains a strategic military capability. The triad’s C2, operations and capabilities are unique compared to other operational and tactical elements. The triad still serves a critical role in the DoD despite their separation from regular military elements. Another military idea useful for understanding this tension is reconnaissance push and pull. This concept is found in Marine Corps doctrine. Push is used when a commander knows his foe and requires intelligence to support operations. Pull is used when knowledge of the enemy or terrain is lacking, and a commander has not yet committed to a plan (GlobalSecurity 2018). This idea may appear to be useful for operational to tactical levels

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of war, but the Romans offer another historical lesson. Julius Caesar cataloged his use of spies during his time as a supreme military commander. These accounts survive today in his Bellum Gallicum texts, wherein, Caesar personally questioned merchants, prisoners of war and his legates for intelligence purposes. He also managed his own network of professional spies to supplement overt means. These professionals were prominent Romans such as Volsenus and a cadre of clandestine operatives called the Speculatores. This array of human sensors provided Caesar with an understanding of foreign people, terrain and political-military dynamics for his own military purposes (Crawford 2012, 71–73). Analysis of Bellum Gallicum suggests human-derived intelligence was pivotal to Caesar’s campaigns. The importance of this type of intelligence cannot be overstated. A.C. Bertrand astutely noted, “Caesar adjusted his military goals to the amount of intelligence available rather than gathering the intelligence relevant to his military objectives.” This idea rivals common understanding of the use of intelligence as an ancillary tool for commanders (Bertrand 1997, 113–114). When Caesar allowed his HUMINT capabilities to operate in a pull mode, he surrendered partial control and the ability to direct these assets. This mode enabled these strategic HUMINT forces to operate more freely than others. This freedom was not required or given to all of his forces. Only those who required this maneuver space to be successful, and had the requisite skills, were afforded this luxury. The DoD does not define a strategic equivalent to Caesar’s Volsenus. Instead, all HUMINT elements are considered the same because they are defined as such. The military intelligence and HUMINT communities may differentiate select operations as more sensitive than others, but this falls short of defining operations and elements as “strategic.” Definitional gaps leave the analysis and judgment to a case-by-case basis, thus causing friction among actors. Because differentiation between strategic and other HUMINT elements is not explicitly stated, military commanders tend to view all capabilities as potential available forces. At best, military commanders seek more capable units to support their operations. At worst, military commanders limit HUMINT collector’s freedom of movement who are operating in their AORs and possibly against targets above their respective levels of war (Interview—Confidential Source 2018).

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6.5.4  Tension of Risk Tolerance The final sub-tension with commanding spies is risk tolerance. Intelligence gathering is a risky business. When military intelligence operations are compromised, the impacts can be calamitous. Risk is seemingly well understood in military circles. A joint staff officer stated, “risk is the most important dialogue there is [in the DoD]. Either you can [achieve objectives] or you can’t” (Freier et al. 2017, 19). But, this risk assessment is incomplete and does not adequately fit HUMINT.  Compromises and attribution are generally not factored into military risk assessments in the way they are for HUMINT.  Despite recent expansions, joint doctrine’s risk discussions still gather around the probability of not reaching an objective (JCS 2017, I12–I15). The risks associated with an operation going awry and subsequent implications are often misunderstood. Risk tolerance, usually an investment term, refers to one’s “ability to tolerate something” or “the limit of enduring a force” (Merriam-Webster 2018). Both definitions are useful for this tension. Thus, it explores how commanders tolerate risks, except the implications of a compromise shift, and exceed their own or even their higher commander’s risk limits. For the DoD, risk is visualized as the force between an organization’s strategy and its objectives. Plainly put, risk is uncertainty; assigning ownership to it is a tricky endeavor. Past DoD risk studies concluded ownership as ambiguous and often misunderstood. Operational commanders are expected to describe, identify, assess and communicate their risk to higher-­level commanders. Thusly indicating, risk ownership flows upward along the chain of command. The overall risk owner for military operations is the Commanderin-Chief. The Office of the President may statutorily own all military risk, but it is the citizens who elect the President, partially by assessing and inferring the candidate’s risk tolerance (Freier et al. 2017, 103–104). Tolerance and ownership are two altogether different things. One commander’s personal tolerance varies from the next. A commander’s tolerance is also influenced by environmental factors. One’s acceptance of something could be higher when their forces are in war versus a peacetime environment. Peacetime commanders are presumably less risk tolerant. Risk tolerance in the HUMINT discipline is no different. However, what is unique to HUMINT is the shifting ownership and ability to forecast compromising effects. When a HUMINT operation ensues, there might be a knowable and manageable amount of risk. Regardless of the operation type, overt or clandestine, personal and operational risk changes over time. Likewise,

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Fig. 6.4  Risk tolerance framework for HUMINT

HUMINT operations generally take time to develop. Interrogations or development of clandestine sources can be prolonged. Unique to HUMINT is when a seemingly tactical operation could fail and thrust parties into a conflict or could contribute immensely to the failure of a battle. When military risk exceeds a commander’s tolerance and ownership limits, the higher commander must approve. In HUMINT, an expected operational failure could be the compromise of a source and/or loss of a collector. The commander may still approve the HUMINT operation. However, an event that could cause national embarrassment or lead to congressional inquiry might have precluded the operation from occurring. This describes a tolerance mismatch and tension. Understanding the dynamic continuum of risk to event could be useful. Figure  6.4 underscores the challenges graphically for a commander charged with making decisions. A recent illustration of this is the congressional investigations on DoD and CIA detainment and interrogation abuses (Hersh 2007; Dianne Feinstein 2014). Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified before both Armed Services Committees regarding the infractions in Abu Ghraib prison. Later, the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded its investigation on the CIA’s interrogation program. Upon full declassification, the

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allegations, details and findings were intolerable for the US population. Subsequent restrictions were emplaced on the DoD. Congress then levied the requirement to videotape DoD “strategic intelligence interrogations” in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 2010 Conference Report 2009). The DoD and IC members were required to conform to the law and changed their policies to respond accordingly (Schmidt 2014; Shane 2009). In this case, when the detainment and interrogations began, the risk tolerance was within assessed limits. The American public generally had a positive view of coalition operations based on media portrayals and service member accounts. The risk mismatch was initially realized once the detainment abuses were published throughout international media outlets. Congress responded. The US population’s tolerance was further reduced once the details were released in declassified reports. The DoD, Congress, US population and host nation are just a few groups that had a lower tolerance post event than they did prior. Those savvy within the Washington Beltway commonly refer to this phenomenon as the “Washington Post Test” (Agreen 2012). The test explains how the tolerance of groups is constricted in compromises. Other examples of compromises, failures and embarrassments are littered in the media and fall outside of classified channels. Visually showing risk tolerance fluctuation underscores the complexity of intelligence relations. More pointedly, when one considers what is displayed in Fig.  6.5,3 an understanding of the challenges of the relations among the consortium of actors is realized (the intelligence community, DoD, Congress, the public, allies and more). Few HUMINT operations are ever compromised. When compromises do occur, not all will have strategic impact. Some do, however. The select operations that carry high strategic risk and are conducted and managed by lower echelons are often mismatched. Additionally, when select commanders experience past HUMINT failures, this can create a lower personal tolerance for accepting HUMINT-related risk. Intelligence, and HUMINT, in particular, is a risky proposition. Collectors pursuing intelligence for national purposes will indubitably share spaces where tacticaland operational-level operations occur. Not allowing HUMINT elements 3  This model is the creation of the author. It represents how organizational risk tolerance is altered after an operational compromise. The contraction of tolerance is based on both international and external factors. Not represented but also included in this are influences between the organizations.

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Fig. 6.5  Risk tolerance fluctuations model

to operate because of risk indubitably restricts the operations and blunts the capability’s effectiveness. EO 12333 lays out a framework for the IC— supported by all federal departments and agencies—to provide intelligence for “the protection of the United States’ national interests from foreign security threats” (Executive Order 12333 2008, 1.1).

6.6   A Look Back The tensions of profession, command, authority, levels and risk are apparent in historical examples. A useful example for viewing all the tensions involves the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Colonel William Donovan, the presidentially designated “Coordinator of Information (COI)” who was disinclined to serve as an intelligence officer, addressed a convincing letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) on the importance of the Philippines. His letter to the ­Commander-­in-­Chief urged US military action in the Philippines and requested, “… that I be permitted to serve with this force in any combat capacity” (Donovan 1942). The Chief of Staff for the War Department, General George C.  Marshall, responded, “Your request for service in a combat capacity is typical of you [William Donovan], I will watch for a suitable assignment in that area, and will call call [sic] on you as soon as it

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develops” (Marshall 1942). That was not to be; instead, he soon found himself rise to become the director of the nation’s first centralized intelligence agency. FDR, in part, based on the advice of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, found a suitable assignment for Director Donovan, leading a dedicated agency focused on intelligence and clandestine and covert operations (Beams 1983, 63; CIA 2008; US Army Special Operations Command 2018). Formed from hand-me-down units disregarded by the military services, one of the OSS’ inherited missions was espionage (CIA 2008). The OSS, a nascent intelligence organization, was still technically a military one. Despite his formal military rank, Donovan was considered by fellow officers to be a civilian (Roberts 2011). The tension of control over the organization was widespread. The COI answered operationally to FDR, but the OSS was administratively placed under the Joint Staff. Outside of Washington, DC, the Secret Intelligence (SI) elements—the espionage arm of OSS—were controlled by OSS officers with the oversight by the chiefs of diplomatic missions or the theater military commander. These SI elements were focused on collecting what would in modern terms be referred to as national HUMINT, instead of military HUMINT.  A declassified OSS field manual shows this bifurcated command and control and focus (also refer to Fig. 6.6). It is essential that SI cooperate closely with the armed forces both in Washington and in theaters of operations. In Washington, liaison is maintained between the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and SI on a recip-

Fig. 6.6  Declassified OSS planning process for military operations (OSS 1944, 33–34)

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rocal basis in order to insure a free and rapid interchange of appropriate intelligence. Similar arrangements exist with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Air Intelligence (A-2). In theaters of operation, the coordination of SI activities with the armed forces is still more complete, since all OSS operations come under the direct control of the theater commander. Although combat intelligence does not normally come within the province of SI, SI organizations in theaters of operations may at times be called upon to assist in the collection of this type of intelligence. However, SI should not engage in the collection of combat intelligence unless specifically requested to do so by the theater commander. (Director of Strategic Services 1944; Office of Strategic Services 1944, 33–34)

The tension over who controlled and directed SI collection was fierce. FDR and senior military commanders understood the necessity of strategic intelligence. On command relationships, G.C. Marshall and Eisenhower recommended to FDR the COI/OSS be under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Once there, the Army did not approve of its officers conducting espionage and covert actions. To assuage this concern, Eisenhower thought these operations should “be conducted by individuals occupying a civilian rather than a military status” (Ambrose 1981, 64). Once under the JCS and until the OSS was disestablished, the tension between collecting strategic and military combat intelligence was evident. Firsthand accounts from OSS officers who served in Northern Africa, Sicily, Italy and Burma describe this tension (Peers 1959, 1960; Corvo 2005, 65–85). In Operations Torch and Husky, OSS officers admitted, “[the OSS agent’s] appalling ignorance of military matters,” and “the traditional intelligence services such as G-2, Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), and the office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) often displayed open hostility toward the OSS because they did not understand its work and its true objectives” (Beam 1983, 64–65; Corvo 2005, 73). The new organization had to prove its value to the JCS and war effort. Instead of focusing on the strategic intelligence—the area they were arguably better fit to gather—the OSS focused on collecting military intelligence to support the amphibious landing in Africa (Walker 1987, 22, 688). Looking back, the OSS’ efforts supporting this operation were faulty. The collection and analysis did not represent the ground truth, and the allied landings were contested. That stated, the allied landing operation was a success, but the intelligence collected and assessments provided by OSS did not reflect the armed opposition actually experienced. Historians note Marshal Pétain

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and the French Vichy waged a fierce resistance against the allied landing forces, causing unnecessary fratricide on both sides (Walker 1987, 671; Moorhead 2018, 12). Despite this initial failure, the OSS was able to provide valuable strategic intelligence to FDR, the British and General Eisenhower in an environment of conflicting personality issues (Beam 1983, 66–67; Corvo 2005, 182–183, 222–225; Moorhead 2018, 4–11). While military intelligence was not necessarily their forte, examples like Detachment 101 in Burma explicitly demonstrated how intended strategic intelligence units did provide valuable intelligence to theater and operational commanders (Sacquety 2008, 81–132, 244, 261). This significant historical example clearly embodies the tensions inherent in commanding spies. The places, names and dates are different today, but the same arguments continue in national security circles in both Washington and theaters around the world.

6.7   Looking Forward As noted throughout this chapter, identifying and understanding the tensions with commanding spies are the first step to effective management; to do so could lead to better intelligence relations. But just as great powers clashed during World War II, the same may occur in the future (Garamone 2018). To prepare for what might occur, understanding the tensions and implementing policies to restrict friction are imperative. Failing to do so could be akin to the military choosing to enter a conflict with one arm tied behind its back. Further studies of the tensions and friction points are required. This examination briefly surveyed select areas where the military and HUMINT are strained. Tensions of support, communication, benefits for members and talent management are other notable areas, as are the strains of those looking to develop relations with intelligence professionals. Developing a more in-depth understanding on the tensions for similar fields like counterintelligence and special operations is also a noble pursuit. Understanding the tensions and friction supports productive intelligence relations with outside parties like Congress, the IC and legal circles. In addition, defining strategic HUMINT operations and elements is imperative. National HUMINT was codified by the Director of National Intelligence in policy. The DoD is an important member of the “national

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HUMINT capability” and already provides highly capable collectors to de facto national elements (DNI 2009). An example of this is the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). According to DoD HIG policy, the group is responsible for the interrogation of high-value persons in DoD custody, who are presumably of national interest (DoD 2017). The HIG, military attachés and other DoD HUMINT elements are examples of “strategic HUMINT elements.” There remains a definition gap at the DoD-wide level. This definitional gap and the compounding effect of the disestablishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Intelligence Center (DCHC) are causing strains from within the military services, IC members and combatant command intelligence staff (Vickers 2013). A definition could be coordinated across the DoD HUMINT enterprise and then incorporate it into policy. Not taking action opens risk for outside elements like the IC and Congress that is already creating definitions in policies and law respectively. Congress created the term “strategic intelligence interrogation,” in the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2010. Yet, there are definition threshold gaps in what is strategic and what is not (NDAA 2010, 111–184). Technological cyber-advancements in the operating environment and risks of inaction predicate a need for this change. Also, building a strategic HUMINT force is necessary to operate in both peacetime and conflict environments. The HUMINT discipline is different from other nonhuman capabilities. Yet, HUMINT collectors are sensors and expected to operate as designed and directed. Strategic and operational HUMINT elements will certainly require more advanced training and skills than their tactical counterparts. Unfortunately, the DoD routinely builds its HUMINT forces using a personnel readiness model versus an acquisition model for things like aircraft carriers or other weapon systems. The acquisition process for material capabilities is stringent but ensures requirements are paired with deliverable capabilities. Military attachés, HIG members and clandestine case officers are just a few examples where filling two-thirds of the necessary requirements could seriously hinder operations. The necessary skills in a technologically advancing and more dangerous operating environment are expected to broaden. Ensuring strategic and operational HUMINT elements are funded, built and their talent managed appropriately is more crucial now than ever.

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Central Intelligence Agency, June 27. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/ CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_ and_Interrogation_Program.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb 2018. Central Intelligence Agency. 2013b. News and Information, Intelligence: Human Intelligence. Last modified April 30. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/ featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-humanintelligence.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Corvo, Max. 2005. O.S.S. in Italy 1942–1945, xix–xxi, 65–85. New  York: Enigma Books. Crawford, Jane. 2012. Spies and Spying in Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum. The Classical Outlook 89 (5): 71–73. Defense Intelligence Agency. 2014a. George Washington: More than a General and a President. http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/ Article/566965/george-washington-more-than-a-general-and-a-president/. Accessed 20 Mar 2018. Defense Intelligence Agency. 2014b. Secret Committees, May 11. http://www. dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566976/secret-committees/. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Defense Intelligence Agency. 2017. Joint Military Attaché School, September. http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/Training/JMAS/JMAS_ Student_Info_SEPT-2017.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Dianne Feinstein. 2014. (TS//NF) Senate Intelligence Committee Study on CIA Detention and Interrogation Program (Declassified to Unclassified by United States Senate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 3). https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/senate-intelligencecommittee-study-on-cia-detention-and-interrogation-program; https://www. feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A6D9FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb 2018. Dick, Jimmy. The Committee of Secret Correspondence. Journal of the American Revolution. https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/08/the-committee-of-secretcorrespondence/. Accessed 5 Feb 2018. DiMaggio, Paul. 1989. Review of The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor by Andrew Abbott. American Journal of Sociology 95 (2): 534–535. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/229319. Director of National Intelligence. 2009. Intelligence Community Directive Number 304, Human Intelligence, July 9. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20304.pdf. Accessed 25 Mar 2018. Director of Strategic Services. 1944. (TS) Secret Intelligence Field Manual— Strategic Services (Declassified by NDD 974345 on December 3, 2013), Field Manual No. 5. Washington, DC: Office of Strategic Services, 33–34, March 22. http://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/secret-intelligence-fm.pdf. Accessed 20 Sep 2018.

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Kaplan, Roger. 1990. The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution. The William and Mary Quarterly 47 (1): 115–138. Kent, Sherman. 1966. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 3. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/ book/43068. Accessed 29 May 2018. Langan, John. 2006. Morale Damage and Justification of Intelligence Collection from Human Sources. In Ethics of Spying. A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, 106. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press Inc. Library of Congress. 1775. U.S. Continental Congress. Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789. Entry Thursday, June 15. Last modified March 10, 2018. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-in/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@ lit(jc00238)). Mattox, John Mark. 2005. The Moral Foundations of Army Officership. In The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J.  Matthews, 2nd ed., 390–392. New York: McGraw-Hill. Merriam Webster. 2018. Definition. https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/risk. Accessed 9 Jan 2020. Moorhead, Eleony. The OSS and Operation TORCH: The Beginning of the Beginning. Tempus: The Harvard College History Review X (1): 12. http:// www.hcs.harvard.edu/tempus/archives_files/x2_02.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2018. Murphy, Caryle. 1982. Soldier, Diplomat, Gossip, Spy in Capital. Washington Post, November 3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1982/11/03/ soldier-diplomat-gossip-spy-in-capital/f6340339-e2f5-4d96-8b41ac6742512ac7/?utm_term=.241476fd60c9. Accessed 15 Mar 2018. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. 2003. Public Law 107–314, 107th Cong., (Dec. 2, 2002), 116 STAT. 2619. https://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ314/pdf/PLAW-107publ314.pdf. Accessed 5 Feb 2018. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 2009. Conference Report, Report 111–288, 111th Cong., 1st sess. October 7. H.R. 2647 Sec. 1080. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt288/CRPT-111hrpt288.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 2005. The World with Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility. St. Louis, MO: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/2005633566/. Office of Strategic Services. 1944. (S) Operational Group Command, Office of Strategic Services (Declassified by NDD 843099 on December 3, 2013), Operational Group Command. Washington, DC: Office of Strategic Services, 33–34, December. http://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/operational-groupsoverview.pdf. Accessed 20 Sep 2018.

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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 2018. Human Intelligence Division and Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Operations, Interview by Author, February 12, On Location. Peace Corps. 2018. Eligibility. https://www.peacecorps.gov/about/agencyjobs/eligibility/. Accessed 23 Mar 2018. Peers, William R. 1959. Retrieved from William Donovan Papers Archive at U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, on September 14, 2017. Letter, October 8. Peers, William R. 1960. Retrieved from William Donovan papers archive at U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, on September 14, 2016. Letter, September 23. Perry, John. 2011. Pershing: Commander of the Great War. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 134. https://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA1 34&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots =z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&v ed=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q =unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=false. Accessed 11 Feb 2018. See here for full text excerpt: Unity of Command. The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command results in unity of effort by coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. Coordination may be achieved by direction or by cooperation. It is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority. U.S.  Department of the Army, 1954, Field Service Regulations–Operations, Field Manual 100-5 Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 25–27. Pfaff, Tony. 2006. Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age. In Ethics of Spying. A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, 75. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press Inc. Radsan, John A. 2007. The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law. Michigan Journal of International Law 28 (3): 595, 599–607. https:// repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss3/5/. Richelson, Jeffery. 1996. A Century of Spies. Washington Post. https://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/a_centur.htm. Accessed 5 Feb 2018. Roberts, Sam. 2002. War of Secrets; Spy History 101: America’s Intelligence Quotient. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/weekinreview/war-of-secrets-spy-history-101-america-s-intelligence-quotient.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2018. Roberts, Andrew. 2011. The Spymaster’s Spymaster. The Wall Street Journal Online, February 12. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870 4709304576124663638197624. Accessed 20 Mar 2018. Sacquety, Troy James. 2008. The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945. Office of Graduate Studies, Texas A&M University,

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May, 81, 107, 131–132, 157, 244, 261. http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bits t r e a m / h a n d l e / 1 9 6 9 . 1 / E T D - TA M U - 3 2 8 0 / S A C Q U E T YDISSERTATION.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Schmidt, Michael S. 2014. In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require Recording of Interrogations. New York Times, May 22. https://www.nytimes. com/2014/05/23/us/politics/justice-dept-to-reverse-ban-on-recordinginterrogations.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Shane, Scott. 2009. Congress Moves to Require Taped Detainee Sessions. New York Times, October 8. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/us/ politics/09interrogate.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Statement by U.S.  Ambassador to Russia on the Expulsion of Russian Intelligence Officers. YouTube, video file. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_8a5KaR6hF4. Accessed 27 Mar 2018. U.S.  Army Special Operations Command. Office of Strategic Service. http:// www.soc.mil/OSS/the-beginning.html. Accessed 19 Mar 2018. U.S.  Army War College. 2017. Academic Year 2018 Carlisle Scholars Program Strategic Leadership Directive, 25. Pennsylvania: Carlisle. U.S.  Department of Defense. 2010a. Nuclear Posture Review Report, ix, xii. Washington, DC: Pentagon, April 6. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. U.S.  Department of Defense. 2010b. DoD Support the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) (Directive Number 3115.13). Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 9. Incorporating Change 2, August 30, 2017. U.S.  Department of Defense. 2017. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 41. Washington, DC: Pentagon. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. U.S. Department of Defense. 2018a. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2018. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1. https://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf. Accessed 10 Mar 2018. U.S.  Department of Defense. 2018b. Unified Command Plan. https://www. de fe ns e . g ov /A b o u t / M i l i t a r y -D e p a r t m en ts/ Uni f i e d-Comba ta ntCommands/. Accessed 15 Mar 2018. U.S. Department of the Army. 2010. The Profession of Arms, 4. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. http://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/whitepapers/profession-of-arms-white-paper.pdf. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. Marine Corps Command and Control (MCDP 6), 77. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. http://www.marines.mil/ Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control. pdf. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

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U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Support to the Defense Attaché Service (DAS). http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Intel-OPS-PERS/DefenseAttache-Program/. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers. 2013. Action Memo, Disestablishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center. Washington, DC: Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 25. Varon, Elizabeth R. 2018. Elizabeth L.  Van Lew (1818–1900). Dictionary of Virginia Biography. Library of Virginia (1998–). Published 2018. https:// www.lva.virginia.gov/public/dvb/bio.asp?b=Van%20Lew_Elizabeth. Accessed 4 July 2019. Wahlquist, John A. 2008. Interrogation, World War II, Vietnam and Iraq, 7. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College. http://ni-u.edu/ ni_press/pdf/Interrogation_WWII.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb 2018. Walker, David. 1987. OSS and Operation Torch. Journal of Contemporary History 22: 688. https://www.scribd.com/document/63441549/OSS-and-OperationTorch-Journal-of-Contemporary-History-1987. Accessed 1 Mar 2018. Wall, Andru. 2011. Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate, Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities and Covert Action. Harvard Law School, National Security Journal: 87–92. http://harvardnsj.org/2011/12/ demystifying-the-title-10-title-50-debate-distinguishing-military-operationsintelligence-activities-covert-action/. Accessed 15 Mar 2018. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Letter to Colonel Donovan. 1942. Retrieved from William Donovan Papers Archive at U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, on September 14, 2016, February 27. Washington, George. 1777. George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: Continental Congress Intelligence Committee to George Washington, September 2, 1777. Manuscript/Mixed Material, Retrieved from the Library of Congress, September 2. https://www.loc.gov/item/ mgw448198/. Accessed 5 Feb 2018. Washington, George. 2008. Historical Letters 1789–1797. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/washington.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2018. White, Kathryn. 2018. Benjamin Tallmadge. George Washington’s Mount Vernon. http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/benjamin-tallmadge/. Accessed 20 Mar 2018. Yale Law School. 2018. General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#art88. Accessed 16 Feb 2018.

CHAPTER 7

Relations, the Field of Intelligence, and the Way Ahead Tom Røseth and John Michael Weaver

7.1   Back to the Beginning As the editors of this book wrap up the work, it is important to understand that the field of intelligence is a complicated one. Nation-states have a need to self-perpetuate their survival and, in order to do so, turn to intelligence professionals to help them acquire information and analysis on adversaries, while also understanding the interests and actions of partners and friends. More specifically, leaders of countries turn to their intelligence profession to provide them with advice, variegated assessments derived from multiple modes of collection, and the subsequent processing and exploitation of data, all in order to arrive at best possible  judgments with the time and resources available. Accordingly, sources and methods must be protected to allow for the intelligence apparatus to repli-

T. Røseth (*) Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] J. M. Weaver York College of Pennsylvania, York, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_7

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cate success in gaining insights to prevent an adversary from closing the door to their access to sensitive information. That said, countries and nation-states share information with others. They do this to ensure their own survival and position, and in order to strengthen relations with partners that they believe over time will help them advance their own interests. Herman (1996) described in the 1990s a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral arrangements of all kinds and all degrees of intimacy. Such relationships have only multiplied with an increased focus on terrorism from 2001 and the effects from globalization and technology developments. Sims (2006) writes that nations pontificating on whether or not to share intelligence weigh the costs and benefits when considering sharing processed information. Walsh (2009), who sees intelligence sharing between countries as important for how nations maintain stability and security, underscores this. Svendsen (2012) calls for increased professionalism and theory inclusion on  intelligence cooperation to better conceptualize its function and how to understand its role in supporting decision-making. This book seeks to contribute with discussions on intelligence processes, how to understand intelligence relations and contribute on relevant concepts and classifications.

7.2   Intelligence Relations Relationships in contemporary times in a globalized setting matter and play a vital role for intelligence success or failure accordingly. No nation has all of what it needs whether it is intelligence-gathering equipment (satellites, manned and unmanned vehicles, sensors, signals gathering systems, etc.) or humans (case officers, interrogators, analysts, and others) to have everything they need at all times. As mentioned at the outset of this book, the world has seen an increased focus on terrorism and cyber-threats especially over the past 20 years and countries don’t have all that is needed to prevent these types of attacks, let alone those that could emanate from state actors. When turning back to Chaps. 2 and 3, Ingeborg Grongstad and Tom Røseth looked at intelligence relations and processes through initiatives made in the backdrop of uncertain times where challenges should lead to improved processes and conceptualization. Grongstad, in Chap. 2, looked at intelligence relations in the first phase of the intelligence process, namely the requirements generation; the interlinking of intelligence through collection, analysis, and dissemination; and how each builds on one another. Her chapter considered the three levels of intelligence—tactical, operational, and strategic—and how the lines among these levels have become

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blurred. Through best practices leading to the integration of intelligence, she looked at how strategic intelligence benefit more from theory to simplify a complex world, and that the strategic level of intelligence processes should be analytically driven rather than data or collection driven. Røseth demonstrated how to classify intelligence relationships by adopting the international relations concept of partnerships onto intelligence relations. He operationalized three types: the pragmatic (zero-sum game), strategic (win-win), and normative (shared values) partnerships in Chap. 3 (Røseth 2014, 2017, 2018). Relations can move between any two of these often as a response to general relations between states. As was introduced in Chap. 1 and more extensively covered in Chap. 3, power relations that gravitate around the field of intelligence are often asymmetrical, in that one of the partners is more dependent on the relationship. Thus, Røseth shows that trust through the exposure of intelligence vulnerabilities in terms of sources and methods determines the level of partnership. Obviously, the partnership depends on what is brought to the table, and if the relationship over time is rewarding for those involved. Once again, as was posited early in this book, Røseth provided enumeration under what circumstances one is likely to see the emergence of a particular partnership and presented examples through varied US partnerships. The subsequent chapters served as case studies to show the challenges as they pertained to just how complicated the global affairs were in contemporary times. Chapter 4 brings insights into the common understanding of hybrid warfare and what it constitutes. Wegge and Wetzling looked at the threat assessments that exist today and problems that ensue from its use specifically through the signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection discipline through bulk data. The authors presented hybrid warfare’s evolution, the relevancy to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, and practices that nation-states are implementing to leverage actors using hybrid warfare such as China and Russia. Moreover, the authors looked at the legal framework for SIGINT collection and with focus on the susceptibility to abuse in bulk collection in the context of hybrid warfare, and important challenges with oversight. In Chap. 5, Weaver looked at intelligence relations among the four other non-US permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. He applied two models. The first was a variation of the York Intelligence Red Team Model that explored four instruments of power (diplomacy, information, military, and economic) to see how and why China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom engage in affairs to

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advance their positions and when they will and won’t work with the United States to achieve their ends. Likewise, to ensure a balanced approach, this chapter made use of a second model, the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model to vary data sources (Weaver 2016). Weaver finds that the UNSC is relevant and finds areas to cooperate, such as on Iran and North Korea, and that intelligence professionals need to understand the complex relationships within the five permanent members. In  Chap. 6 Rose  looked at the complexity of managing spies with a focus on the US military. As in Grongstad’s chapter, Rose looked at the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Under the US military, a dichotomy exists between human intelligence (HUMINT) and the profession of arms where tension levels (command, authority, level, and risk) are at play at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war impacting the performance of spies. Accordingly, Rose used several models to explore the uncertainty associated with risk by looking at contemporary military operations. Rose finds that areas between HUMINT and the military are strained, and agents with strategic intelligence focus are especially difficult to command, direct and integrate into military operations. Rose sees it as imperative to define strategic HUMINT operations in order to address the identified tension and friction, and to build a strategic HUMINT force for both peacetime and conflict.

7.3   The Way Ahead What is important to know is that intelligence relationships are tricky and services often fall into comfort zones finding themselves inclined to internally focus steadfastly on their own nation-state and sovereignty at the expense of other nations (Aldrich 2009). As was illustrated throughout this book, though the services often will be compelled to attain varying degrees of bureaucratic autonomy, they should be able to pursue international cooperation by asking themselves who else should know in the interest of the state’s own self-preservation. This is underpinned by the notion that cooperation on the international stage is obfuscated by the sovereign state nature of intelligence organizations, compounded with the lack of prescience in seeing the interlinking to globalization among policymakers and intelligence chiefs. As a result of looking at the amalgam, regardless of whether intelligence is tactical, operational, or strategic, nations will only share information if the arrangement is mutually beneficial over time and if it believes that it will likely end up in an equal or better position than if it decided not to

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release information to the shared partner nation. An example would be NATO nations that continue to be more forthcoming with sharing information because they see the collective good, leveraging the resources of the other 28 countries (to reduce their overall costs associated with collection and analysis). However, some allies are more important than others and intelligence relations differ greatly within the NATO alliance. Each state has their unique security concerns that overlap in varying degrees with the others due to their geographical position, history, and strategic interests. While common interest is a necessity for good intelligence relations, it is not enough. The partner needs to bring, over time, relevant and value-adding intelligence to the partner, although not necessarily on equal terms. Often, intelligence relations are asymmetric with larger powers cooperating with smaller ones, but the latter can provide unique valuable local knowledge and assessment. Likewise, many nations share concerns about China’s and Russia’s actions and intentions, and conversely, China and Russia see benefits associated with a greater bilateral relationship in order to hedge or balance against the US hegemony. Many nations fear a resurgence of Russian military might and the burgeoning economic power of China as two countries, separately or coordinated, that can infringe on a nation’s power and influence. Russia and China have an arrangement where Moscow provides high-end military equipment, operational training, and expertise to China, and Beijing has the economic might to level the importance of their strategic partnership (Røseth 2018). With improved relations, they will probably progress on their intelligence relations to achieve synergistic effects. The universal issue where most states will likely share information deals with the threat of transnational terrorism. Even though states don’t historically see eye to eye, they realize that the growth of those that use terror tactics, techniques, and procedures serve no purpose but to create disorder in the world, and if attacks were to occur, could often affect others beyond the physical boundaries of the directly affected nation. There are advantages and disadvantages to almost all aspects in establishing intelligence relations. Provided that the partnership brings to fruition mutual benefit over time to all concerned, then information and intelligence sharing will likely continue. On the other hand, if a country with possession of critical information will expose a key collection advantage (in terms of sources and methods) to others, then the country with the knowledge might not be as forthcoming with the sharing of intelligence. Positive examples include when the United States warned Russia in early 2018 of an imminent terror plot in Saint Petersburg and the United

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States sharing election meddling tactics, techniques, and procedures to European allies ahead of the 2017 election cycle. Another important matter is the increased demand for oversight in Western democracies with the digital exhaust that follows all citizens, with pleas for more accountability and transparency on foreign intelligence cooperation than what one sees today. This book looked at intelligence relations, intelligence partnerships, and when sharing intelligence is more likely to occur and under what circumstances where sharing will not happen.

7.4   Concluding Remarks The book focused on academically acceptable open sources. The authors have shown the value of open source data, especially in the Internet age, and have relevance for both practitioners and academics alike. Indeed, the value of open source information was, and still is, critical, especially for strategic consumers of intelligence (Gannon 2001). The book weaved together an anthology of ideas in what the field of intelligence refers to as an “intricate mosaic” (Smith 1989). The chapter contributors showed many models and issues at play and the intricacies of trying to understand if, and under what circumstances will, intelligence relations exist between and among state actors. The world is complex and seems to become more challenging with each day. It is a dangerous world and no single country that wants to exert influence and ensure its own security has the resources or the intelligence assets to do all that it will need. State actors will have to reach out beyond one’s borders in order to foster relationships underpinned by sharing intelligence. Combined, this book looked at a broad spectrum of intelligence dilemmas, moving from classification of interstate intelligence relations to specific methods to improve the intelligence process in the context of intelligence relations. It aspired to contribute to the intelligence and security research fields in the context of political changes in the worldwide political landscape. This work looked at these contemporary challenges and how traditional paradigms are changing in the context of hybrid ­warfare, long-standing intelligence-sharing relationships, and power shifts among the wealthiest and most powerful nations in the world. This volume brought out implications for those either working in or interested in learning more about the field of intelligence. Moreover, the work afforded consideration to the importance of relations in optimizing intelligence integration, challenges of intelligence oversight, and the complexity in the understanding of intelligence relationships among nation-­

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states. Be it their understanding about or sharing of intelligence with such actors as the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the interrelations among the 29 NATO countries, and more, relationships during uncertain times remain important. That said, nations are apprehensive about fully disclosing sources and methods that could result in them being burned by the other party (Aldrich 2009). There will be challenges moving forward. Most countries see terrorism as a tie that binds on security. It is more likely to share over the common threat of terrorism as it moves beyond borders. Organized terrorism, state sponsored or not, often grows in failed or weak states with connections to actors that reside in other states, or terrorist ideas flow within a network of international sympathizers. Terrorism is global and pushes intelligence relations even between adversarial countries for the purpose of terror mitigation. In addition there are the more classical adversary that NATO encounters that motivates and binds intelligence sharing. This picture of continuity and change makes intelligence relations now of the first importance (Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark 2020, xix). Cyber-threats (and intelligence relations for understanding these) are not as simple. Nations that have common values, norms, and economic ties will likely share information with one another, since this could help ensure the survival of the nations that have this alignment, the advancement of one’s ideas, interests, and economy. Conversely, if a nation views another affected by cyber-threats as a competitor, it might not be as forthcoming with information and therefore not foster intelligence relations in order to advance their own position at the expense of the other. Cooperation between states on security and intelligence comes down to trust proven over time. Common values and norms such as those found between democracies incrementally strengthen intelligence relations. Vital technology and military procurements are seldom bought from potential adversaries, as it can undermine one’s own security and relations to allies. The same goes for intelligence; states are cautious about sharing and receiving intelligence from adversaries. Relationships matter. Relationships are important, especially in the field of intelligence, on all levels. There are numerous issues that countries will have to overcome as we exist in uncertain times. There will still be problems with the ability to share intelligence in a timely manner to those who need it, be it allies or actors that could be partners against a common security threat. While threats can appear with short or no warning notice, combined with technological advances, Big Data, and cyber-threats, states hardly have the resources to ensure security for the state and its population by domestic resources. Many states have therefore established deep and broad intelli-

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gence partnerships in order to increase intelligence capabilities, burden sharing, and exchange of analysis, learn methods, share ideas, and perform joint operations. While there are sound arguments and strong motivation for sharing, there are also arguments for caution, most notably risk to sources and methods. Lastly, although intelligence practitioners may think intelligence relations are insulated from foreign policy, it is not. Foreign policy can intervene and determines the framework. Interstate agency relations do create their own momentum and have leeway to set the level of cooperation. Intelligence relationships can be trustworthy with broad and deep intelligence sharing for a common good if the partners prioritize and nurture them. The  many  common  threats intelligence  agencies  face makes such relationships essential for making the world more secure.

References Aldrich, Richard J. 2009. Global Intelligence Co-operation Versus Accountability: New Facets to and Old Problem. Intelligence and National Security 24 (1): 26–56. Andrew, Christopher, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark. 2020. Preface. In Secret Intelligence: A Reader, ed. Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, 2nd ed., xvii–xxxi. Oxon: Routledge. Gannon, John. 2001. The Strategic Use of Open-Source Information. Studies in Intelligence 45 (3): 67. Røseth, Tom. 2014. Russia’s China Policy in the Arctic. Strategic Analysis 38 (6): 841–859. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161 .2014.952942. Røseth, Tom. 2017. Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold? Eurasian Geography and Economics 58 (1): 23–55. https://doi.org /10.1080/15387216.2017.1304229. Røseth, Tom. 2018. Moscow’s Response to a Rising China. Problems of Post-­ Communism 66 (4): 268–286. Sims, Jennifer E. 2006. Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19 (2): 195–217. Smith, Russell J. 1989. The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency. Washington, DC: Pergamon Brassey’s. Svendsen, Adam D.M. 2012. The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashoning Method out of Mayhem. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Walsh, James I. 2009. The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. New York: Columbia University Press. Weaver, John M. 2016. Introduction to the Prevailing National Security Issues Confronting the United States (Chapter). In Intelligence Analysis: Unclassified Area and Point Estimates (and Other Intelligence Related Topics). Nova Science Publishers.

Correction to: The Nature of Intelligence Requirements, Internal Roles and Relations in the Twenty-First Century Ingeborg Guldvik Grongstad and Kenneth L. Lasoen

Correction to: T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_2 It was confirmed that the chapter needed major edits. The substance within needed re-work and the references needed to be more solid along with in-text citations. The linkages between the concepts were required to make sure that it was communicated most effectively. The abstract had The updated version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_2

I. G. Grongstad (*) Oslo, Norway K. L. Lasoen Political Science Department, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium History Department, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium © The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9_8

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CORRECTION TO: THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS…

been revised for better understanding. A co-author was also included to this chapter. Kenneth is a scholar in this field; he was involved in revising and analyzing the Manuscript. All of the above mentioned corrections have been updated in this revised version.

Index

A Abu Ghraib prison, 142 Accountability, 78 Afghanistan, 60, 73 Alignment, 54 Alliance, 55 All-source, 19 Analyze, 71 Anomaly detection, 77 Armed Services Committees, 142 Asymmetry, 55 Audit trails, 84 Australia, 61 Authority, 124 Authorization, 81 Automated destruction of data, 84 B Balancing, 51 Baltic States, 60 Bandwagoning, 51 Bartering, 52 Beijing, 44 Big data, 69–85

C Canada, 61 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 127 China, 42, 73, 96–99 Clausewitzian, 71 Combatant Command, 132 Command, 124 Command and control (C2), 132 Communication data, 76, 78 Computer network attacks (CNA), 97 Computer network exploitation (CNE), 97 Computer network operations (CNO), 97 Constructivism, 43 Control algorithms, 83 Conventional forces, 75 Costs, 63 Counter Hybrid Warfare, 74 Counterterrorism, 42 Court of Justice of the European Union, 79 Covert, 74

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Røseth, J. M. Weaver (eds.), Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34004-9

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INDEX

Crimea, 69 Cross-sectorial, 75 Cyber, 75, 106 D Data minimization, 80 Data storage, 82 Defense HUMINT, 136 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 130 Deletion, 83 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 97 Denmark, 61 Department of Defense (DoD), 124 Dependency, 50 Detainment, 143 Detection, 70 Digital information, 71 Diplomacy, 135 Direct access, 83 Disinformation, 75 Dutch, 84 E Effective oversight, 78 Egypt, 60 Electronic collection, 78 Ethical, 71 “The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats,” 75 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 79, 80 European Union (EU), 52, 101 Executive control, 79 F Finland, 60 Five Eyes, 61 France, 78, 100–102 Fundamental rights, 85

G Geographic Combatant Commanders, 133 Georgia, 60 Germany, 55, 78 Globalization, 42 Golden age, 77 Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ’s), 84 Gross domestic product (GDP), 96 Groupement interministériel de contrôle (GIC), 82 G20, 98 Gulf War, 19 H Helsinki, 75 Hezbollah, 72 Hoffman, Frank, 72 Human intelligence, 123 HUMINT, 21 Hybrid CoE, 75 Hybrid threats, 69–85 Hybrid warfare, 70 I India, 60 Intelligence, 76–78, 89–116 agencies, 78 cycle, 46 governance, 78 relations, 70 Intelligence Community (IC), 128 Interagency cooperation, 43 Intercept, 71 Interception, 76 International cooperation, 76 International relations (IR), 41 Interrogation, 142 Investigatory Powers Act, 81

 INDEX 

Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), 82 Iraq, 73 Israel, 61 Italy, 61 J Japan, 55 Junior partner, 55 K Kent, Sherman, 137 L Legal, 71 Legitimacy, 79 Level, 124 Liberal, 71 Liberalism, 43 Log files, 83

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National security, 71 National Security Agency (NSA), 77 National Security Council (NSC), 30 NATO Response Force (NRF), 90 The Netherlands, 61, 78 New Zealand, 61 Normative partnership, 48 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 70, 90 Norway, 61, 78 O Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 144 Operational, 124 Operational Control (OPCON), 133 OSINT, 92 Overt, 74

M Malaysia, 60 Media, 73 Military attachés, 138 Military capabilities, 56 Military intelligence, 17 Moscow, 44 Multilateral intelligence, 43 Multinational Capability Development Campaign’s (MCDC), 70

P Pakistan, 60 Parliamentary oversight, 79 P5, 92 Policy, 45 Political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) model, 24 Pragmatic partnership, 48 Predictive oversight, 83 Professions, 125 Pro-Kremlin, 73 Public trust, 78

N Narratives, 73 National Defense Strategy, 72 National Defense University, 72 National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), 30

R Realism, 43 Revisionist, 69 Risks, 63, 124 Romania, 60 Russia, 44, 102–105

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INDEX

S Safeguards, 85 Saudi Arabia, 60 Secondary data, 96 Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), 132 Signals intelligence (SIGINT), 21, 69–85 SIUN, 84 South China Sea, 73 South Korea, 61 Soviet Union, 15 Spain, 61 Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 136 Spy, 126 Store, 71 Strategic, 124 debriefer, 139 partnership, 47 Subversive, 75 Surveillance, 81 Sweden, 61 Swedish, 84 Switzerland, 61

Turkey, 63 Typology, 46

T Tactical, 124 Tactical intelligence, 137 Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), 94 Technical interfaces, 83 Tension, 125 Terrorism, 44 Thailand, 60 Threat-driven, 50 Tradecraft, 84

V Very High Joint Readiness Task Force (VJTF), 90 Vulnerabilities, 75

U UK Brexit, 73 Ukraine, 70 UKUSA Agreement, 61 Unclassified, 76 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 136 Unitary state, 43 United Kingdom (UK), 61, 78, 105–107 United Nations (UN), 90 United Nations’ universal declaration of human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, 77 United States (US), 61, 96 Unity of command, 132 Unity of effort, 133 US federal government, 83 US Senate Select Committee on intelligence, 76

W War Department, 144 Warfare, 73 Warrant, 81 Western Balkans, 73