Integrating Africa: Decolonization's Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union [1° ed.] 0415522013, 9780415522014

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Integrating Africa

The African Union (AU), a continental organization that comprises every African state except Morocco, is a pioneering undertaking. Its ambitious aim is to integrate all member states, with the ultimate goal of forming the United States of Africa. Despite several attempts to build a union, the AU has remained an intergovernmental organization, with one reason being a perceived unwillingness of the AU states to pool their national sovereignties. This study seeks to comprehend why Africa’s integration process has not moved toward a supranational organization, using a novel approach. It shifts the usual perspective away from the organization level and provides the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the AU from the perspective of the states themselves. It includes eight comprehensive case studies (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) to help understand their foreign policy and provide key insights into why they are (un)willing to yield sovereignty. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of African politics, international relations, and international organizations. Martin Welz is a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Konstanz, Germany. His current research interests are African politics and African integration processes in particular.

Routledge Global Institutions Series Edited by Thomas G. Weiss The CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA and Rorden Wilkinson University of Manchester, UK

About the series The Global Institutions Series has two “streams.” Those with blue covers offer comprehensive, accessible, and informative guides to the history, structure, and activities of key international organizations, and introductions to topics of key importance in contemporary global governance. Recognized experts use a similar structure to address the general purpose and rationale for specific organizations along with historical developments, membership, structure, decisionmaking procedures, key functions, and an annotated bibliography and guide to electronic sources. Those with red covers consist of research monographs and edited collections that advance knowledge about one aspect of global governance; they reflect a wide variety of intellectual orientations, theoretical persuasions, and methodological approaches. Together, the two streams provide a coherent and complementary portrait of the problems, prospects, and possibilities confronting global institutions today. The most recent related titles in the series include:

The Security Governance of Regional Organizations (2011) edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez

The Organization of American States (2011) by Monica Herz

African Economic Institutions (2010) by Kwame Akonor

Regional Security (2010) by Rodrigo Tavares

Institutions of the Global South (2009) by Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner

Institutions of the Asia-Pacific (2009) by Mark Beeson

The African Union (2008) by Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu

The European Union (2008) by Clive Archer

A Crisis of Global Institutions? (2007) by Edward Newman

Integrating Africa Decolonization’s legacies, sovereignty, and the African Union

Martin Welz

First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Martin Welz The right of Martin Welz to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Welz, Martin. Integrating Africa: decolonization’s legacies, sovereignty and the African Union / Martin Welz. p. cm. – (Routledge global institutions series; 68) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. African Union. 2. Pan-Africanism. 3. African cooperation. 4. Africa–Economic integration. 5. Africa–Politics and government–1960–6. Africa–Foreign relations–1960– I. Title. II. Series: Global institutions series; 68. JZ5334.5.A35W45 2012 341.249–dc23 2012006961 ISBN: 978-0-415-52201-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-10145-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis

Contents

Acknowledgments Foreword List of abbreviations Introduction

viii xi xiii 1

1

Case selection

16

2

Zimbabwe

27

3

Swaziland

46

4

Algeria

64

5

Ethiopia

81

6

Burkina Faso

100

7

South Africa

117

8

Uganda

137

9

Mauritius

154

10 Conclusion and outlook Notes Index

173 187 231

Acknowledgments

Writing a book like this is like embarking on a long journey. My journey to the African Union started on a summer evening in 2005 on a balcony in Berlin where I talked for hours with Anna-Margareta Peters, German Ambassador to South Africa from 2000 to 2004. We touched upon the African Union during our discussion and her guess was that little research had been conducted on this topic. Keeping this in mind, I first completed my Master’s at the London School of Economics and Political Science and then returned to the University of Konstanz to take the first steps as a PhD student. What followed were three of the most interesting years of my life which required not only perseverance but also enabled me to learn so much more about Africa, especially the African Union, and more importantly to find support from many people. As the field research was conducted in six countries over a period of almost two years, the list of people I want to thank is long and I do apologize for not being able to keep this foreword short as it is my deep desire to thank all those who contributed to the accomplishment of this study. Before moving to the people on the African continent who helped me during this study, I want to thank some people at home, namely my “Doktorvater” Wolfgang Seibel, as well as Siegmar Schmidt and Katharina Holzinger, for their advice and support in various ways over the last years. Without the financial freedom provided by the Center of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Integration” at the University of Konstanz during the three years of the field work and during the editing of the book, as well as the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, which supported the last part of my journey, I would not have arrived at the finish line. The Center of Excellence, established in the framework of the German Federal State Initiative for Excellence, also supported the final editing of this book. Benedikt Franke, Matthias Mauser, Ulrike Lorenz, and Frederik Trettin read the manuscript, commented on it, and thus made it a better piece of research. Their help was invaluable and it is very much appreciated.

Acknowledgments

ix

Similarly, Stephen Chan always assisted me whenever I sought his help, and Jan Jansen helped to make the chapter on Algeria a better part of this study. Thomas Diez also provided valuable comments in the early phase of the project. Thomas Weiss, Rorden Wilkinson, Martin Burke, Craig Fowlie, Nicola Parkin, Heather Hynd, and Megan Graieg were very supportive and I thank them for their trust in my work. Without the student assistants who helped to transcribe the interviews in particular—in total almost 1,000 pages—and assisted with some research, this study would have taken many years longer to complete. Laura Albarracin, Valentin Arfire-Schiefer, Johannes Cherbuliez, Matthias Fischer, Julius Hellermann, as well as Ben Ossamy-Dornemann are among them. Furthermore, special thanks go to Timothy Johnston and Emily Orlowski, my two student assistants, who proved themselves to be irreplaceable for my work and I know that I owe a lot to them. I also thank Angela Whale for proofreading the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. Moving on to Africa, I should first like to thank my interview partners. I appreciate that they took the time to talk to me and willingly answered all the questions that I raised. In this context, I would also like to thank the people who helped to arrange the interviews, but also the secretaries of my interview partners and the staff at the German embassies in Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, the staff of the Swiss embassy in Zimbabwe, as well as the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation with its local offices in Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda, and at the headquarters in Germany. I am grateful to Oliver Dalichau, Sabine Fandrych, and Fabian Osterwalder in particular. I would also like to thank the German and Swiss embassies for ensuring my own safety during turbulent times in some countries. There are many more who helped to arrange interview appointments, and Pia Buller, Barbara Wake Carroll, Nelson Kasfir, Reinhard Linz, Elsa Scheepers, and Caroline Stiebler should be named as the representatives of this group. I remember exactly how I felt the first time that I entered the African Union archives—everybody who has been there knows how I felt. In light of the challenges the staff of the archive are facing, I cannot say anything else other than they are doing a great job and have supported me greatly, and I am glad to call Chedza Molefa, Sika Frepeau, Stephen, and Milka from the library my friends. The staff from the other archives and libraries that I visited in Mauritius, Uganda, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe were helpful too. During my stay in Addis Ababa, the Institute for Security Studies kindly hosted and supported me, and I am indeed grateful for their assistance and insights. While in southern Africa, the University of Pretoria was

x

Acknowledgments

so kind as to host me. I thank Roland Henwood and Stephan Mühr for arranging my stay and Maxi Schoeman and Hussein Solomon for the interesting discussions. Diana Eiyo arranged my stay in Uganda and spent several days supporting me. To all those whom I have forgotten, I offer my apologies. Lastly, I would like to thank all those who supported me in my private life, who stood by my side and were there for me through the ups and downs of the journey: my parents, my brother, my grandmother, and the rest of my family, my friends and, above all, Heiko.

Foreword

Martin Welz’s book is the eighth in what we anticipate will be a growing number of research volumes in our “global institutions” series that examines crucial global problems and possible global policies and solutions. It is also the first single-authored volume. In addition to these longer research volumes, the series strives to provide readers with user-friendly and short (usually 50,000 words) but definitive guides to the most visible aspects of what we know as “global governance” as well as authoritative accounts of the issues and debates in which they are embroiled. We now have almost 70 books that act as key reference points to the most significant global institutions and the evolution of the issues that they face. Our intention has always been to provide one-stop guides for all readers—students (both undergraduate and postgraduate), interested negotiators, diplomats, practitioners from non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, and interested parties alike—seeking information about most prominent institutional aspects of global governance. The new research stream incorporates lengthier and more specialized works by knowledgeable authors as well as edited compilations. In this case, Martin Welz has broken new ground in his analysis of the African Union (AU) from the perspective of the foreign policies of eight member states: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The volume explores the legacy of the decolonization process in explaining the current attitudes of these states toward traditional sovereignty and toward integration within the AU, Africa’s largest and most prominent intergovernmental organization. We are delighted to put forward this innovative work based on extensive original field work by a promising young academic. Having completed degrees at the London School of Economics and the University of Konstanz, Martin Welz is now a post-doctoral research fellow in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of

xii

Foreword

Konstanz, and has placed this book in our series. It is unusually insightful and original for a first book, and we are hoping that other younger scholars with new things to say will also send proposals our way. Ideally, this and other volumes in the research stream will be used as complementary readings in courses in which other specific titles in this series are pertinent—in this case, we naturally point readers to a host of books on regional organizations and more especially on African institutions already published in the series, a selection of which can be found in the “About the series” section at the front of this book. Our aim is to enable topics of importance to be dealt with exhaustively by specialists as well as enabling collected works to address issues in ways that bring more than the sum of the individual parts, while at the same time maintaining the quality of the series. As always, we look forward to comments from our readers. Thomas G. Weiss, The CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA Rorden Wilkinson, University of Manchester, UK February 2012

Abbreviations

ADF-RDA AMISOM ANC APRM AU BBC BRIC CDP CEN-SAD COJ COMESA COPE COSATU DDR EAC ECOMOG ECOWAS EISA EPRDF EU FIS FLN GDP HDI ICC ICJ IGAD

Alliance for Democracy and Federation-African Democratic Rally African Union Mission in Somalia African National Congress African Peer Review Mechanism African Union British Broadcasting Corporation Brazil, Russia, India, and China Congress for Democracy and Progress Community of Sahel–Saharan States Court of Justice Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Congress of the People Congress of South African Trade Unions Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration East African Community Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front European Union Front Islamique du Salut Front de Libération Nationale Gross Domestic Product Human Development Index International Criminal Court International Court of Justice Intergovernmental Authority on Development

xiv Abbreviations JOC MDC MMM MP MSM NEPAD NRA NRM OAU POLISARIO PSC SACU SADC TPLF TRC UEMOA UMA US ZANU ZANU-PF ZAPU

Joint Operations Command Movement for Democratic Change Mouvement Militant Mauricien Member of Parliament Militant Socialist Movement New Partnership for Africa’s Development National Resistance Army National Resistance Movement Organization of African Unity Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro Peace and Security Council Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community Tigray People’s Liberation Front South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Commission de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Union du Maghreb Arabe United States (of America) Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union

Introduction

We are pioneers. Pioneers always have a problem. … But in the process we are hitting our heads against the wall and falling. But one day we will break through that wall. Khalid A. Dahab, 4 March 2009

The African Union (AU), a continental organization that comprises every African state except Morocco, is indeed a pioneering undertaking. Its ambitious aim is to integrate all member states, with the ultimate goal of forming the United States of Africa. Notwithstanding, the AU has remained an intergovernmental organization despite several attempts over the past decades to build a union of states. One reason for the persistence of the status quo is thought to be a reluctance or even unwillingness of the AU member states to pool their national sovereignties in a continental organization with effective executive, legislative, and judicial rights. In order to comprehend why Africa’s integration process has not moved toward a supranational organization, we must therefore address why AU members protect their sovereignty so fiercely. This study uses a novel approach to shed light on the process. It shifts the focus away from the organization level, and it provides the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the AU from the perspective of the AU member states. The eight case studies on Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe help to understand AU member states’ foreign policy vis-à-vis their organization and provide details about why they are (un)willing to yield sovereignty. Generally speaking, the AU has come a long way since the foundation of its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in 1963. Although the OAU was mainly a loose alliance of states that strictly adhered to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, since its formal launch in 2002, the AU has developed into a stronger, more institutionalized and diversified structure that includes a relatively strong

2

Introduction

Commission, a Pan-African Parliament with consultative functions, and several institutions to promote peace and security. In particular, it is the well advanced security architecture, comprising the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the regional Stand-by Brigades, and the Panel of the Wise as well as an observable commitment to these institutions by several states that leaves observers with the impression that some progress is being made.1 The so-called New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a program that aims to enhance the continent’s growth, development, and participation in the global economy, also became part of the AU framework. An important component of NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a monitoring process that looks inter alia into the political and socioeconomic developments of voluntarily participating states. Commentators were impressed by the progress made with the transformation of the OAU into the AU and the introduction of the NEPAD program. The South African-based Business Day, for example, praised in 2002: “The AU presents an opportunity for this continent to shrug off the interlude of denigration that some believe should be the continent’s eternal fate.”2 Enthusiasm, however, soon gave way to reality, and it became clear that not all AU member states are participating in the innovative APRM review process and not all of them are engaging in the promotion of peace and security as they continue to adhere to the doctrine of noninterference previously promoted by the OAU and guard their sovereignty. It is the goal of this study to explain why this is the case. To set the scene for this analysis, it is crucial to first provide the historical setting for Africa’s integration process.

The history of Africa’s integration in a nutshell The foundation of the OAU is often linked with a concept called PanAfricanism.3 Pan-Africanism is described as “an ideology that is difficult to define because of its amorphous character, but which involves at least an aspiration to realize or recapture the dignity, freedom, autonomy and/or unity of Africans and/or of people of African descent.”4 The Pan-African movement started in the African Diaspora toward the end of the nineteenth century5 and went through several stages, reaching its peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the first African states became independent. The quest for liberation has always been a common theme in all Pan-African activities. Moreover, “the emergence of Ghana as sovereign state provided the impetus for the reactivation of the notion of unity.”6 Kwame Nkrumah, who led Ghana into independence as

Introduction

3

Africa’s first sub-Saharan country, has insisted on several occasions that Ghana’s “independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.”7 Nkrumah spared no effort in convincing the leaders of African states that became independent in the following years to build what he called the United States of Africa.8 However, not all new states supported Nkrumah’s vision, resulting in the emergence of two groups of states: the so called Casablanca Group stood behind Nkrumah’s vision of the immediate building of the United States of Africa, whereas the members of the Monrovia Group insisted on their national sovereignty and opposed the building of the United States of Africa. A division was spreading through the continent.9 Nevertheless, the Ethiopian emperor managed to bring the rival groups together in 1963 and the OAU was ultimately founded. The organization largely reflected the demands of the Monrovia Group and was thus entirely different from Nkrumah’s envisaged framework10 as it only became a loose alliance of African states based on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs.11 It can be argued that the formation of the organization marks the de facto end of the Pan-Africanists’ vision of the United States of Africa for many years to come because the guiding principles of sovereignty and non-interference prohibited deeper integration and because Africa’s leaders formally accepted the borders as drawn by the colonial powers in 1964, thereby fixing the map of Africa.12 The unity dream was pushed to the background in the following decades, and the OAU was accused of having become a “club of dictators,” a “talking shop,” or a “toothless bulldog.”13 The changing world order caused African leaders to reconsider the OAU. The events leading to this reevaluation included the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the subsequent end of the superpowers’ rivalry on the African continent that kept many authoritarian regimes alive, the end of Apartheid in South Africa (1994), the crisis in Somalia (1992–93), and the genocide in Rwanda (1994). Those who ignited this rethinking, otherwise known as the “African Renaissance,” were primarily South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade.14 Yet, surprisingly, the then Libyan leader Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi emerged as the spearhead of the movement. In 1999, Gaddafi invited the other African leaders to Libya to discuss reforms of the OAU, but instead of discussing reforms, he tabled a proposal to establish an African Union. He drew on Nkrumah’s vision of a united Africa and promoted the establishment of the United States of Africa. Gaddafi had turned toward Africa in an attempt to end Libya’s international

4

Introduction

isolation and its pariah status as well as to return to Africa’s geopolitics.15 The Libyan leader, however, failed to establish the United States of Africa at that time, but the AU was born, and after a transition period, the new continental organization was officially launched in 2002 superseding the OAU.16 Gaddafi continued his efforts to build a union of states and called on Africa’s leadership again in 2005 when he proposed installing continental ministers for Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as Transport and Communication.17 Gaddafi’s persistence forced African heads of state and government to honor his ideas and discuss them at length, culminating in the AU Accra Summit of July 2007, which was devoted to the so called “Grand Debate” and produced the Accra Declaration in which Africa’s leadership agreed to accelerate economic and political integration and form a Union Government with the ultimate objective of creating the United States of Africa.18 The issue was further debated in the following summits until the AU summit in Addis Ababa (January–February 2009) when the AU Commission suggested that, instead of forming a Union Government, one should transform the AU Commission into an AU Authority with more power than the former.19 The debate provoked by this proposal became lodged in the question of whether the AU Constitutive Act had to be amended in order to realize the AU Authority. Gaddafi then acceded to the AU chairmanship in 2009 and pushed hard for his vision during his year in office, but again failed to overcome the deep-rooted resistance. As soon as the new chairman of the AU, the Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika, took office in 2010, the debate by and large stopped, and there were very few people in the AU and its member states who regretted the end of the debate and the temporary abandoning of the plan.20

Progress and shortcomings of the African Union Several African leaders claimed that the debate about a Union Government was untimely, as other problems such as security challenges, democratic deficits, poverty, starvation, lack of respect for human rights, rule of law, economic decline, marginalization, poor infrastructure, weak regional institutions, and the persistent weakness of African states have to be addressed before moving forward with the integration process.21 Interviewees for this study often referred to the metaphor of a house that has to have a foundation and walls before the roof can be built.22 They argue that the so called regional economic communities must be the building blocks of the AU and the United States of Africa. There are several of these regional communities on the continent, but only eight are officially recognized by the AU. These are the Community of

Introduction

5

Sahel–Saharan States, also called CEN-SAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, better known as COMESA, the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, the Southern African Development Community, better known as SADC, and lastly the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). In these regional economic communities, which were mostly established around the 1980s, states started to integrate at a regional level. Some communities are mainly driven by economic concerns, others by peace and security questions, whereas others still have a combination of objectives. Some are well advanced; others are far behind.23 There are not only challenges and shortcomings in the integration process at the regional level; the AU is also not yet a completely functional organization of integrated functioning states. Its member states’ lack of commitment is often obvious. Some member states do not actively participate in the created institutions, undermine these institutions, or do not pay their membership fees. Some time ago, Mistry noted: “Seen from an objective, impartial perspective, Africa’s commitment to integration appears to have been visceral rather than rational, more rhetorical than real.”24 Besides the lack of commitment, there is the more profound problem of political, cultural, and social heterogeneity on the African continent.25 As Uganda’s President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni warns: “Politically, one should only unite with somebody that is quite identical with one, especially culturally.”26 A diplomat from southern Africa put it plainly: “let’s be frank: what the hell do we have to do with Libya, what the hell do we have to do with West Africa, what the hell do we have to with North Africa?”27 Cultural heterogeneity is, however, only one part of the AU’s problems and shortcomings. One of the bigger—perhaps even the biggest—stumbling blocks for deeper integration and the ultimate goal of the United States of Africa is the lack of willingness of African governments to cede sovereignty vis-à-vis the AU.28 The aforementioned Accra Declaration itself makes this clear when it calls for a committee that should identify “the contents of the Union Government concept and its relations with national governments; and … [the] domains of competence and the impact of the establishment of the Union Government on the sovereignty of member states.”29 Christopher Clapham contends that “postcolonial states have, since their independence in the decades following the Second World War, emerged as the most strident defenders of Westphalian sovereignty in the international order.”30 Indeed, sovereignty not only played a prominent role during the founding period of

6

Introduction

the OAU when African leaders opted to guard their recently won sovereignty after decolonization,31 it continues to play a determining role in the current debate on political integration. Gerrit Olivier finds: “The problems that have faced European integration, particularly the sovereignty issue, are more deep-seated and much harder to overcome in Africa.”32 Analysts are, however, also right when they point out that there is an ongoing paradigm shift in terms of respect for sovereignty and with reference to the principle of non-interference.33 Contrary to the OAU, in which sovereignty and the principle of non-interference were considered as sacrosanct, the AU allows for the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.34 This therefore undermines a strict adherence to the principle of noninterference. The AU made use of these provisions and sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi (2003), Darfur (2005), Somalia (2007), and the Comoros (2008). The well advanced security architecture, comprising the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the regional Stand-by Brigades, and the Panel of the Wise, leaves observers with the impression that progress is being made.35 In addition, the AU condemns any coups d’état by automatically suspending the offending country from the AU, as was recently done with Togo (2009) and Madagascar (2009) as well as Niger (2010), and it takes a strong position on political violence. The Peace and Security Council even turned against Gaddafi, one of the AU’s main sponsors, during the 2011 uprising in Libya by condemning the political violence perpetrated.36 Although progress has undeniably been made in this policy field, it cannot obscure the incoherent approach to solving peace and security problems on the continent. The Business Day rightly asked some time ago: “while it [the AU] may involve itself in the affairs of a sovereign state in the instance of genocide and gross violations of human rights, how will it handle a country whose policies amount to incremental genocide and which have a negative effect on the economies, and indeed the political stability, of neighbouring states?”37 The AU’s ongoing refusal to engage in the Zimbabwean crisis (2000–2008), which prompted an international outcry against President Robert Mugabe and his

Introduction

7

regime, and its failure to engage in the Tunisian and Egyptian crises in early 2011 from the very beginning, are probably the most prominent examples in this regard. Taking the different levels of progress and different judgments into account, this study attempts to provide further empirical material to form a more balanced judgment. Interestingly, the aforementioned findings on progress and shortcomings are largely based on analyses conducted from the AU’s perspective. Recent scientific analysis and think tank reporting, indeed, solely concentrate on the AU perspective, but surprisingly, no scholarly work has systematically scrutinized Africa’s continental integration process from the perspective of the AU member states. This lack of literature is odd as only a few will challenge the view that the AU is intergovernmental in nature and not a supranational entity. Consequently, there is a need to unpack the AU and shift the focus toward the member states in order to obtain a better understanding of the functioning of the AU and find answers to the questions as to why the continental integration process often lacks substance as well as why the United States of Africa has not yet become reality and why AU members are reluctant to pool their sovereignty. This study will address these questions by shifting perspectives, and will thus provide a fresh look into the integration dynamics in Africa. It is the Grand Debate, in particular, that is a showpiece in terms of the reluctance to cede sovereignty vis-à-vis the AU, and which will hence serve as the political process analyzed in detail in the case studies. Despite concentrating on this period, the study nevertheless extends the analysis beyond this debate and covers more or less the whole period since the AU came into existence in 2002.

Theorizing integration The specific perspective of this study effectively means that, strictly speaking, it is not an investigation of the integration process itself but a series of foreign policy analyses. Hence, the theoretical background of the study cannot be integration theories such as Neo-Functionalism38 or New Regionalism,39 but rather a theory with a particular focus on the intra state level. When studying foreign policy behavior, it seems preferential to use a framework that draws on classic studies such as Graham Allison’s “Essence of Decision” and Robert Putnam’s “Two-Level Game” and includes more recent accounts such as Andrew Moravcsik’s study on preferences within states.40 Indeed, these liberal accounts with their central tenet that domestic political representation “determines whose

8

Introduction

social preferences are institutionally privileged”41 makes it possible to concentrate on the various actors in the domestic setting and their role in the foreign policy decision making process. Liberal theories are united in highlighting the role of human created institutions including states, international organizations, and regimes. They acknowledge that structures are not static but subject to changes42 and allow for plurality within state action; this stands in stark contrast to neorealism, for example, which considers states as unitary actors. In other words, liberals understand both the state and the international system as being subject to changes and therefore concentrate on the various actors that might shape the structure or influence the outcomes of state actions. Thereby, Moravcsik’s theory, in particular, does not neglect the influence of the systemic level as his theory is explicitly interested “in the sum total of the aggregated preferences of any relationship of two or more states and in the international system as whole.”43 Moravcsik’s “republican liberalism” maintains that “[t]he key variable in republican liberalism is the mode of domestic political representation, which determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged.”44 In his view, any foreign policy can derive from the interaction of various actors but also from an individual actor. States are assumed to be a subset of domestic society;45 that is, domestic society and its various actors define the state and its preferences. Moravcsik’s open understanding suits the analysis of authoritarian regimes and democracies alike. This differentiation is of particular importance because it is assumed that governmental variables are of greater importance in nondemocratic than in democratic states, where societal variables might play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy.46 Moravcsik includes personal benefits for national leaders, which are gained from international cooperation: “Where executives have primary access to international institutions, negotiations provide opportunities for national leaders to form ‘executive cartels,’ in which each colludes to strengthen the others’ control over their own domestic instruments and increasing the cost of domestic opposition.”47 If particularistic groups, that is to say rent seeking individuals or rent seeking groups of individuals, achieve control over political institutions and exploit them in their favor, they are systematically passing their costs and risks to others, namely weaker groups within the state, thus increasing the costs for the opposition and effectively weakening it.48 Following this line of thought, it can be found that aggressive foreign policy behavior is more likely to occur in undemocratic states as the costs of this approach can easily be passed on.49 If political influence is more equally distributed within society, states tend to act less aggressively. Aggressiveness in this context does

Introduction

9

not necessarily mean using military means. It can also refer to an exploitative foreign policy designed to benefit the rent seeking group or the rent seeking individual. Liberia’s President Charles Taylor’s involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war with the intent to benefit from blood diamonds and Gaddafi’s permanent meddling in other African states’ internal affairs to extend his influence are both examples of this. Rent seeking might include monetary benefits but could also take the shape of immaterial factors such as power and influence. Moravcsik’s republican liberalism links individual preferences with foreign policy behavior, on the one hand, and domestic consequences, on the other. It helps to scrutinize the domestic setting against the background of the various interests at play. A leader might have an interest in keeping his hold on power, oppositions might want to oust the incumbent with foreign assistance, states and their leaders might want to be acknowledged internationally, and others might search for economic cooperation or assistance. This liberal approach allows us to accommodate these various interests and preferences by concentrating on domestic and international, individual and collective actors.

Sovereignty However, the nature of states in Africa remains a problem that needs to be explored. It was implicitly mentioned above that not all African states are fully functional. Most states in Africa are weak or dysfunctional and have only limited statehood50 or are even considered “pre-modern.”51 It is difficult to define “state” in the African context and it is often difficult to speak about the legitimacy of the rulers. The problem of statehood is closely linked with the discussion about sovereignty. Stephen Krasner, in his seminal study on sovereignty in international relations, distinguishes between four types of sovereignty: first, domestic sovereignty, which refers to the organization of public authority within a state and the effective control that is exercised by those holding authority; second, interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability to control transborder movements; third, international legal sovereignty, which is the mutual recognition of states; and lastly, Westphalian sovereignty, which is concerned with the exclusion of external actors from configurations of domestic authority.52 Pierre Englebert links Krasner’s international legal sovereignty and domestic sovereignty in the African case and argues that international recognition provides state actors “with a domestic power of command.”53 He implies that the domestic dimension of sovereignty does not determine the external dimension of sovereignty but vice versa. He draws on

10

Introduction

the earlier findings of Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, who claim that African states are sovereign through the external recognition of their sovereignty claims.54 Englebert argues that “because of the exogenous nature of African sovereignty, African legal command resists the erosion of state capacity that plagues weak and failed states.”55 In other words, even though state structures are weak and domestic authority is thus not always given, external recognition translates into domestic sovereignty. As several cases in this study show, Englebert’s claim finds empirical support as there are indeed African leaders who use the AU as a platform from which to gain legitimacy for their rule, which helps them to keep their weak state structures alive and remain in office. This view is reminiscent of the “Club of Dictators,” as the OAU was labeled by its critics who assumed that the authoritarian leaders met to lend each other international legitimacy. These findings contradict the common understanding of sovereignty. Borrowing from law scholars, one finds that sovereignty is seen to comprise “a comprehensive public power, supreme as of law, exclusive territorial jurisdiction, non-intervention into domestic affairs … [and] civil strife.”56 This understanding implies a people driven authority and/or control exercised over territories and people. John Ruggie similarly claims that sovereignty is “the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains.”57 By the same token, Joseph Strayer emphasizes that sovereignty comprises “final authority over men who live within certain boundaries.”58 Moreover, Karen Liftin emphasizes legitimacy as one dimension of domestic sovereignty.59 Without any doubt, a large number of African leaders lack such legitimacy as they either acceded power through flawed elections or unconstitutional changes of government. There are also exceptions to this claim, as the cases of Ghana, Mauritius, and South Africa suggest, where the leaders gain legitimacy through free and fair elections; however, the majority of African leaders lack legitimacy from the people. Besides the problem of legitimacy, it is also true that the administrative functioning of African states and consequently the reach of state authority is limited.60 Again, there are exceptions to this, but there are a large number of states in which the administration does not extend throughout the entire territory. Thus, we should also conclude that control over territory, which is considered to be a hallmark of sovereignty in the definitions provided above, is often absent in Africa. The impact these findings have on the understanding of sovereignty herein is that we must leave aside domestic sources of sovereignty as it cannot be assumed that state sovereignty always comes from within the state. We cannot approach sovereignty as a people driven authority, as

Introduction

11

Ruggie for instance suggests.61 However, it is important to stress that sovereignty is held by state actors even though it may be provided externally rather than from within the state. We are forced to treat national governments or often the head of state alone as state actors. Although their legitimacy to represent the will of their people is often limited, they are internationally recognized as representatives of their countries. Recent works emphasize the reconfiguration of sovereignty as emerging non-state actors gain importance and create new forms of sovereignty and authority beyond state structures.62 Liberalism helps to approach this as it explicitly opens the “black box” of state and scrutinizes who makes the decisions and under which conditions, while leaving aside conceptual issues regarding the state. In fact, “nations, armed movements, regional strongmen and other non-state actors have to be considered important units of analysis in the African context.”63 In order to include them in the analysis, alongside other players such as political parties, trade unions, and business enterprises, it is crucial to understand the (domestic) dynamics at play in the foreign policy decision making process. Despite the assumed importance of other players, there are still reasons to assume that it is ultimately a country’s leadership which decides on the surrendering of sovereignty for integration.

Some conjectures It is also important to emphasize that every actor acts within a specific context. Political structures and circumstances as well as the socioeconomic situation and historic path dependencies might play an important role in determining policy decision making and hence also impact on the willingness to cede sovereignty. Thus, there is a need to include these factors in the analysis rather than solely focusing on actors. This section introduces some of these factors and links them to the questions this study seeks to address. By doing so, it sketches some of the conjectures that inform the analytical part of this study. However, it is important to stress that the analysis goes beyond these conjectures and has an open view that allows consideration of other explanatory factors. Jack Levy stresses that history is “too important to leave to the historians” and hence urges political scientists to include a historic dimension in their studies.64 When it comes to the history of sovereignty in Africa, it can be found that sovereignty and the right to self-determination were long denied to the African people. This is true for the period of the slave trade and even more so during the colonial period. There is thus a need to investigate whether path dependencies related to this history are at play, determining the reluctance of Africa’s leadership to

12

Introduction

yield sovereignty. There are some observers and politicians who indeed argue that African states jealously guard their sovereignty and selfdetermination because it has only recently been gained.65 Taking this argument further, the amount of time between decolonization and today could be an explanatory factor as younger generations have not experienced either colonization or a hard-won independence personally. Leaders might derive their individual legitimacy to govern from their personal and their party’s commitment to the independence struggle. As they appear to feel personally attached to the self-determination they fought for and gained, it can be assumed that these leaders are unwilling to undermine their personal achievements by surrendering their hard-won rights. As such, decolonization’s legacies might play a role. Other path dependencies such as long-standing traditions but also long-standing culture might play a role too. Beyond historic path dependencies, the socio-economic situation is also likely to be an explanatory variable. Looking into the history of European integration, for instance, we find that poorer and less developed states, particularly from Southern and Eastern Europe, were attracted by the European Union. At the same time, wealthy and developed states such as Norway and Switzerland have stayed away from the organization. We might assume that similar political behavior can be observed in Africa, for example in prosperous Algeria’s strong global interest but marginal regional interest in economic terms. On the contrary, Mali’s interest in a deeper integration of Western Africa stems as much from its weak economic position as does Chad’s desire to seek external assistance. In light of these thoughts, it is necessary to include the socio-economic situation in the analysis. When it comes to the political situation itself, focusing on actors again, it is important to analyze who drives the decision making process and under which political conditions. A popular view is that policy making is personalized in Africa. However, this study aims to go beyond this view and explore both the decision making process and the actors involved in greater detail. Moreover, it is important to learn more about the level of democracy in the states. In a study on the willingness of democracies to cooperate, Edward Mansfield et al. find that democratic states are more likely to cooperate economically than their non-democratic counterparts.66 Kurt Gaubatz similarly finds that alliances between democracies “tend to last longer than either the relationship between nondemocracies or the relationships that mix democracies and nondemocracies.”67 Taking Gaubatz’s claim into account, authoritarian leaders in Africa seem to be less likely to work toward a deeper integration. The analysis seeks to respond to Gaubatz’s claim in the context of the AU.

Introduction

13

Lastly, moving to the foreign policy realm, there are, as aforementioned, regional groupings beyond the continental integration attempts, and most of these regional economic communities are further advanced, have clearer goals and objectives, and are smaller in size than the AU. Björn Hettne finds that “Intra-continental organisations, such as the African Union … are usually weak paper organisations without much actor capacity … ,” whereas regional organizations are likely to have more actor capacity and are thus more important globally.68 Hence, we should include the regional economic communities and the member states’ balancing between them and the AU in the analyses. A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this study; however, we should ask whether the regional economic communities are more attractive to their members than the AU is.

The lens for the case studies Having introduced some conjectures, this section takes them further and derives the analytical framework that serves as lens through which the case studies are approached. As the discussion above made clear, the framework must comprise the state level, including foreign policy decision makers both at the individual level and in the international realm. In addition, historical and economic factors on the domestic level are included as they can also determine foreign policy. Taking all this into account, the following framework emerges with five pillars: The historical dimension: it was implicitly mentioned earlier that a state’s behavior in terms of surrendering its sovereignty might be traced back to the struggle for independence. No holistic, historical approach is required regarding this struggle, but a short overview is necessary including the most important players, the level on which it was fought, and when it took place. Was liberation achieved at the cost of many lives? Who supported the fight for liberation? Was there more than one liberation movement? Were the current political elite personally involved in the liberation struggle? When did the country become independent? Was it a latecomer? These questions are chiefly addressed in this section of the case studies. Socio-economic situation: Economic data and development status are approached in this pillar of the framework. Economy will be analyzed broadly, including natural resources and the geographical location of a state. How big is the gross domestic product (GDP)? What rank was obtained in the Human Development Index? Is the country landlocked and therefore needing other states’ assistance to sell its products in the world market or to import products? These guiding questions help to

14

Introduction

understand whether and how socio-economic variables impact on the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU and the regional economic community. The political system and its leaders: This pillar explores the political systems particularly in terms of how democratically the political system is built. It takes into account the theoretical thoughts about the importance of the individual leaders and asks which role they play. The guiding questions are: Were the last elections free and fair? Is there freedom of the press? Is there a notable opposition? Is there a term limit for the head of state? Is the state system personalized? Who effectively leads the country? And from where do the identified leaders derive their legitimacy? Foreign policy: To bring the international realm back into the analysis, the general foreign policy and the country’s interplay with other states is explored in this pillar of the framework. There are several questions to look at, focusing in particular on the country’s engagement in regional and continental integration. How much is a state involved in regional economic communities? With which states does the state conduct good relations? Is the state diplomatically dependent on another state to provide a voice on a continental and global scale? The country and the AU: This last pillar of the analytical framework is complementary to the previous on foreign policy; yet, it has a specific focus on the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU. This framework forms the lens for the case studies and is consistently applied throughout all the cases in Chapters 2–9. While it approaches the conjectures raised above, it leaves open the possibility of exploring additional explanatory variables and is thus best suited for an explorative study such as this. Before moving on to the next chapter on case selection, some notes about the methodology used are in order.

Methodology and data gathering The study was carried out in a qualitative fashion. Research for each state comprises a thorough reading and an analysis of the (sometimes limited) academic literature on the political situation of the state including its domestic and foreign policy. The field work comprises, inter alia, a newspaper analysis; however, the more important pillar of the field work is the 106 interviews with experts, decision makers, politicians, bureaucrats, academics, military staff, journalists, and others at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and the selected AU member states (Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Additionally, to ensure a thorough analysis of Algeria and Burkina Faso,

Introduction

15

several interviews were conducted with representatives of and experts from both states in Addis Ababa at the headquarters of the AU and closely related institutions in the city and elsewhere. Some of the interviewees’ names are found in the endnotes; some remain anonymous by request. To entirely ensure some interviewees’ anonymity, other interviewees’ names have also been omitted. Owing to the limited number of possible interviewees, triangulation of the information was not consistently possible. Likewise, information gained by other means, such as from newspaper or internet sources, could not always be verified. Accordingly, if a claim is not entirely verified, indications are given herein. The information provided is correct to the writer’s best knowledge. However, as Gaddafi’s death amid the Arab Spring will lead to significant changes in the AU, some of the remarks made below may have become outdated. The final chapter tries to compensate for this problem by providing an outlook for a post-Gaddafi era in the AU.

Organization of the book The remainder of this book is divided into three parts. This introduction is followed by a short chapter on the case selection. Part two, comprising Chapters 2–9, is devoted to the case studies. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze Zimbabwe’s and Swaziland’s foreign policy toward the AU. Algeria and Ethiopia are approached in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The study continues by scrutinizing the cases of Burkina Faso and South Africa in Chapters 6 and 7. Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 investigate Uganda’s and Mauritius’s AU policies, as well as the drivers in these foreign policy arenas. The concluding part, Chapter 10, summarizes the analysis of the member states’ foreign policy and links it with the question of why Africa’s continental integration is only moving forward slowly. This chapter also provides an outlook that is set in the context of the Arab Spring of 2011 including Gaddafi’s ousting and death which, in addition to the Arab revolutions, will not only have a tremendous impact on the AU but are also likely to offer the organization a unique opportunity for political change at the same time.

1

Case selection

There are 54 states in Africa including the Sahrawi Arab Republic.1 With the exception of Morocco, all these 54 countries are member states of the AU and thus form the research object of this study. It would be impossible to conduct a comprehensive qualitative study that examines all 53 countries; hence, selection is required. The case selection was carried out in two steps: first, the AU member states were grouped according to their willingness to pool sovereignty. Various variables indicating the willingness to transfer sovereignty were used to categorize the states into four groups: the Defenders, the Guardians, the Volunteers, and the Enthusiasts, plus an additional group, the Constrained, the reason for which is explained below. This categorization was done to ensure that the study depicts the whole variance of AU member states in respect to their (un)willingness to cede sovereignty, and hence, provide the most complete picture possible. In a second step, two cases were selected within each of the four groups according to a most-different-system design. Before continuing to define the grouping, some technical details for the case selection are provided: the data used for the categorization were collected in June–August 2008 and were partly updated toward the end of 2009. All data are provided in Table 1.1. The names of the relevant variables are noted in brackets in this chapter, and further details on them can be found in the notes. All variables for the first step in the case selection are dichotomous; they hold the value 1 if they indicate “yes,” and 0 if they indicate “no.”

Grouping the African Union members The study analyses four groups of states along a spectrum that ranges from states that are completely unwilling to surrender sovereignty to states that show willingness to cede sovereign rights. The first group includes states that are largely unwilling to surrender sovereignty, the Defenders.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Constrained Burundi Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Côte d’Ivoire Congo (Kinshasa) Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Madagascar Mauritania Rwanda Sahrawi Arab Rep. Sierra Leone Somalia Togo

Defenders Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Libya Seychelles Swaziland Tunisia

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

Constrained APRM

Table 1.1 Data used for the case selection

1 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

Critique Mugabe

0 1 0 1 0 1 1

1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

PSC COJ ICC

0 0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1

ICJ

1 1 1 1 1 0 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Presidential

1 0 1 0 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0.413 0.384 0.388 0.561 0.432 0.411 0.456 0.374 n/a 0.533 0.550 0.452 n/a 0.336 n/a 0.512

HDI

1975 0.736 1968 0.642 1991 0.483 1951 0.818 1976 0.843 1968 0.547 1956 0.766 (Continued on next page)

1962 1960 1960 1975 1960 1960 1958 1974 n/a 1960 1960 1962 1976 1961 1960 1960

Freedom Independence Fighter

0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

Zimbabwe

Guardians Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Cameroon Congo (Brazzaville) Djibouti Ethiopia Gambia Kenya Mozambique Namibia Niger São Tomé & Prín. Sudan

Volunteers Burkina Faso Egypt Gabon Ghana Malawi Mali

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1

0

Constrained APRM

Table 1.1 (continued)

1 0 0 1 0 0

0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

0

Critique Mugabe

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

0 1 1 0 0 1

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

0

1 0 1 1 1 1

0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0

0

PSC COJ ICC

0 1 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

0

ICJ

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

Presidential

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0

1

1960 1922 1960 1957 1964 1960

1962 1975 1960 1966 1960 1960 1977 n/a 1965 1963 1975 1990 1960 1975 1956

1980

Freedom Independence Fighter

0.370 0.708 0.677 0.553 0.437 0.380

0.733 0.446 0.437 0.654 0.532 0.548 0.516 0.406 0.502 0.521 0.384 0.650 0.374 0.654 0.526

0.513

HDI

0 0 0 0

Enthusiasts Lesotho Mauritius Nigeria Uganda

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1

1 0 0 1 1

Critique Mugabe

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1

0 1 1 1 1

PSC COJ ICC

Note: The sources for these data can be found in the notes to Chapter 1.

0 0 0 0 0

Rwanda Senegal South Africa Tanzania Zambia

Constrained APRM

Table 1.1 (continued)

1 1 1 1

0 1 0 0 0

ICJ

0 0 1 1

1 1 0 1 1

Presidential

0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0

1966 1968 1960 1962

1962 1960 1994 1961 1964

Freedom Independence Fighter

0.549 0.804 0.470 0.505

0.452 0.499 0.674 0.467 0.434

HDI

20

Case selection

The second group, the Guardians, are similar to the Defenders, yet appear slightly more willing to give up sovereignty. The Volunteers, as the third category, show an even greater willingness to cede sovereignty and are only excelled in their willingness by the Enthusiasts, who have little desire to protect their sovereignty and are the most willing to transfer it. In addition to this spectrum, a fifth category was excluded from the analysis. The Constrained group’s main characteristic is their a priori assumed inability to engage in international affairs, which results from circumstances that severely constrain state action.2 Such circumstances include either being occupied and governed by an external power or having vital domestic issues to solve such as post-conflict reconstruction, a large scale civil war covering large parts of the territory, a peacekeeping mission, or a recent coup d’état. It is assumed that such internal problems make it difficult, if not impossible, to provide resources and engage in the AU. In short, the Constraineds are too busy dealing with their internal issues and therefore do not have the capacity or the means to engage in the continental integration process. Thus, all states that are not self-governed or have had a war or experienced a coup d’état within the last five years were excluded from this study as it does not seem beneficial to explore countries that seem a priori unable to engage in the continental integration process.3 The first step in the categorization was straightforward. Each country was determined as being either constrained or not: if a country could be considered as Constrained for one of the above reasons, the country was classified as Constrained irrespective of other variables. Naturally, grouping countries into the other four categories depends on how willing a country is to cede sovereign rights. To decide this, seven variables were used. The first variable is their participation in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a mechanism that inter alia monitors and evaluates achievements in terms of democracy, good governance, and rule of law.4 “At many levels, the APRM is an exceptional undertaking. For the continent that had jealously protected its sovereignty, it is diplomatically exceptional for nations to throw themselves open to outside scrutiny.”5 Against this background, it is noteworthy that more than half of AU members have joined the APRM (28 out of 53) at the time of data gathering. Participating in this monitoring mechanism, however, does not reveal whether the country would either accept the critique received from the monitoring process or implement the proposed plan of action. Thus, the variable APRM must be accompanied by a further variable that provides information about the influence of the APRM. Such a variable would consequently be the acceptance of the APRM’s critique and

Case selection

21

the willingness to implement the plan of action. However, there are two problems attached to this: first, it is not easy to determine whether the states have implemented their plans of action; this would require an individual study for each case. Second and more important, only a few of the states that have joined the APRM have managed to complete the whole monitoring and evaluation process. This is because it takes several months—or even years—to complete the research, hold discussions, and publish the report. The variable is therefore impractical and an alternative variable is required. As such, having criticized Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe during the highly contested presidential election in 2008 offers an appropriate alternative (CritiqueMugabe).6 Criticizing Mugabe’s undemocratic behavior is clearly associated with the question of whether a state feels committed to the democratization efforts made by the APRM and, more importantly, whether this state would accept interference in its internal affairs. Therefore, this, the second variable, provides a good indication as to whether a state would accept the APRM critique. As the Zimbabwe case was debated heatedly at the AU Sharm el-Sheikh summit in July 2008 and was also on the agenda at the European Union–AU summit in Lisbon in December 2007, it is safe to assume that the Zimbabwean crisis has become a continental issue and its impact is not only restricted to southern Africa. Obviously, this variable is not the same as the acceptance of the APRM critique, yet it is an appropriate substitute. The third and the fourth variables are the states’ membership of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC)7 and the AU’s Court of Justice (COJ).8 The latter is a kind of constitutional court for the AU. Joining it supposedly means obeying the jurisdiction of that court. The PSC works in a similar way to the United Nations Security Council. Almost all AU member states have ratified the protocol establishing the PSC. It seems opportune among African states to join the council. Both variables are important and provide some insight into a state’s willingness to give up sovereignty in the AU context; however, they do not hold as high a value as the APRM variable. Participating in the APRM requires a strong commitment to the AU and its principles and, consequently, a greater willingness to surrender sovereign rights than joining the PSC or the COJ. As such, the APRM variable is double weighted. If a state is part of the APRM and has criticized Mugabe, it is even triple weighted. So far, only Africa-internal variables have been introduced. Additional global variables are required to build a more comprehensive picture. Therefore, it is asked whether a state accepts the jurisdiction of

22

Case selection

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as compulsory by ratifying the relevant treaty.9 Obeying the jurisdiction of the ICJ means sustainably surrendering sovereign rights as the adjudication of the court is then binding. Equally, ratifying the statute that establishes the International Criminal Court (ICC) means losing some of the sovereign rights of a state.10 Instead of prosecuting a war criminal in the domestic courts or tribunals, for example, preference is given to the ICC to fulfill this task. Considering the ICC’s and the ICJ’s jurisdiction as mandatory is effectively equivalent to a high level of willingness to cede sovereign rights; thus, both the ICC and the ICJ variables are double weighted. If this is translated into mathematics, the following equation can be produced: Y ¼ ð1  ConstrainedÞ½1 þ ðAPRMÞð2 þ CritiqueMugabeÞ þ PSC þ COJ þ 2ICC þ 2ICJ ð1Þ Equation 1 is set up in such a way that all states considered to be Constrained score 0. This score and threshold are intuitively right. For the other groups, the obvious rule is that the higher the score, the greater the willingness to yield sovereignty. A state should be considered a Defender if it will not give up sovereign rights other than for its own survival or because it is opportune. To set the threshold at a maximum value of 3 leaves the possibility open that a state shows a waiver of sovereignty in one or two of the above variables, but does not indicate a willingness to surrender sovereignty in other fields. For example, it has become a modus vivendi for African countries to join the PSC. At the time of writing, only 10 out of 53 states have not yet ratified the protocol. It is important to leave the PSC as a variable in the equation, yet the thresholds need to be defined in a way that takes this modus vivendi into account. A Guardian watches its sovereignty carefully; it surrenders it only partially. There are some cases where sovereignty is only given up in the African realm, but not for the ICC and ICJ. In other cases, sovereignty is only given up in the global realm while protecting it and holding up the doctrine of non-interference vis-à-vis fellow African states. All these states are Guardians, as they do not show a consistent willingness to surrender sovereignty. A state must cede sovereign rights in both the African realm and the international realm to obtain the status of a Volunteer or an Enthusiast. With a score above 7, this is the case. The threshold between Volunteers

Case selection

23

and Enthusiasts is set at 9. To obtain a score of 9 and above requires an engagement in both dimensions, to obey international jurisdiction and to leave behind the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs at a continental level. In other words, sovereign rights are ceded at a high level, indicating a consistent willingness to relinquish them. Table 1.2 shows the results of the categorization and provides the score for each state.

Selecting the case studies In the second step of the case selection, two states within each group (except from the Constrained) were selected according to a most-differentsystem design. The latter helps to uncover explanatory variables and can help to develop hypotheses by comparing each group’s most-different members with regard to the independent variable. Depicting the variance of AU members with regard to their (un)willingness to cede sovereignty and using a most-different-system design offers a good chance of uncovering patterns that explain why AU member states are (un)willing to yield sovereign rights. To select the cases according to a most-different-system design, it is necessary to have some possible explanatory variables in mind, according to which the ultimate case selection is made. The following list of variables draws on the conjectures mentioned in the introductory chapter. It is assumed at the outset that the length of time elapsed between independence and today, the way the country gained independence,11 and whether today’s political leadership were part of the liberation struggle12 might be explanatory variables for comprehending why a state is (un)willing to cede sovereignty. Additionally, the political system itself could play a role, as it can be assumed that the way the political system is designed, giving greater or less power to the head of state or government, can help explain a specific position with regard to the surrendering of sovereignty.13 Lastly, socio-economic status might play a role; poorer states might be forced to integrate as they cannot overcome their structural problems alone and hence cede sovereignty, whereas richer states see less need to integrate with their neighbors, which are often poorer and thus of little help in boosting their own economy.14 For the Defenders, Swaziland stands out as an untypical case. Contrary to the other states in this group, it does not have a presidential system; instead, it is a rare case of an African monarchy, and its current leader was not part of the liberation fight. As matter of fact, Swazis never fought for their independence by force. This was entirely different in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is unique among the Defenders as it had to fight long and hard for its independence, being a latecomer in terms of

Cape Verde (1) Equat. Guinea (2) Eritrea (1) Libya (3) Seychelles (1) Swaziland (3) Tunisia (3) Zimbabwe (2)

Burundi Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Côte d’Ivoire Congo (Kinshasa) Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Madagascar Mauritania Sahrawi Arab Rep. Sierra Leone Somalia Togo

Algeria (5) Angola (5) Benin (6) Botswana (6) Cameroon (6) Congo (Brazzaville) (6) Djibouti (6) Ethiopia (4) Gambia (6) Kenya (6) Mozambique (6) Namibia (4) Niger (5) São Tomé & Prín. (4) Sudan (5)

Guardians

Note: Numbers in brackets refer to the results in Equation 1.

Defenders

Constrained

Table 1.2 Results of the grouping of the AU member states

Burkina Faso (7) Egypt (7) Gabon (7) Ghana (7) Malawi (8) Mali (7) Rwanda (8) Senegal (8) South Africa (7) Tanzania (8) Zambia (7)

Volunteers

Lesotho (9) Mauritius (9) Nigeria (9) Uganda (9)

Enthusiasts

Case selection

25

gaining sovereignty and the right to self-determination. In addition, Zimbabwe ranks significantly lower on the Human Development Index than Swaziland. These unique features and the contrast between Zimbabwe and Swaziland, in terms of how decolonization took place, make them two interesting cases to study. To establish whether the legacies of colonization and the struggle for decolonization play a key role in explaining the (un)willingness to surrender sovereignty is one of the overall goals of this study. Within the group of the Guardians, there is a pair of states that could not be more different when it comes to this question: Ethiopia has never been colonized whereas the Algerians had to fight the most intense and strenuous war to gain independence from France. Additionally, they are mostdifferent in terms of socio-economic development as Algeria is quite a wealthy state while Ethiopia ranks amongst the poorest African states. Their politics also differ significantly, for Ethiopia legally has a parliamentary system and Algeria a presidential one. Lastly, while Algeria’s president was himself part of the liberation struggle, Ethiopia’s prime minister was not part of any decolonization process, as Ethiopia has never been colonized; however, he did play a prominent role in the fight against the previous regime. These contrasts are promising and hence Algeria and Ethiopia are selected as case studies in this group. One of the Volunteers is significantly different from the other cases, namely South Africa. Like Zimbabwe, South Africans had to fight a long struggle to overcome Apartheid and was the last African country to achieve the right to self-determination. Most of today’s key decision makers were part of the liberation struggle. Additionally, South Africa is one of the wealthiest states in the entire sample, and it is one of the rare countries in Africa that does not have a presidential system. This is entirely different in Burkina Faso, which was decolonized early without the use of force, in which the current leadership was not at all connected with the decolonization process which has a presidential system, and which is a very poor country. Lastly, the group of Enthusiasts is rather small, indicating that there are only a few states that show a higher willingness to cede sovereignty. It might come as a surprise that, even though Mauritius achieved its independence in 1968, parts of its current political leadership can be linked to an active role in the decolonization process. Furthermore, Mauritius exceeds all other AU member states (with the exception of the Seychelles) in terms of socio-economic development and is another rare African case of a parliamentary system and a functioning democracy. This is entirely different in Uganda, which belongs to the less developed countries in socio-economic terms. Uganda has a presidential

26

Case selection

system with a strong president who has no connection to the decolonization process. Following the above-mentioned set of possible explanatory variables, Uganda and Mauritius were chosen from the Enthusiasts. Critics might point out that this selection has a major flaw: some bigger states such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Libya are excluded from this study despite their importance in terms of political, economic, and military influence as well as population size. Indeed, they are dominant powers in their regions and in Africa. They belong to the so-called “Big Five” (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) that together contribute 75 percent of the AU budget. Yet for the purpose of this study, this argument is irrelevant. The variables of interest are different from those where these states show their uniqueness. It is consequently not seen as problematic that they are not included as case studies. An overall aim of this study is also to learn more about the AU members that are usually—rightly or wrongly—ignored by scholars; these states are also AU members and also deserve academic attention.

2

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is mine Robert Mugabe, 19 December 2008

Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, has been in the international media for the past 50 years. It first received global attention in 1965 when the white minority regime of Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain, a step that was followed by a bloody and intense liberation war led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Once South Rhodesia had officially become independent from Britain in 1980, Mugabe was seen as the liberation hero and was widely respected for his commitment to the liberation of his country. Within Africa, Mugabe was celebrated as the new leader of the southern African liberation movement. Holding a special place in Africa’s liberation saga,1 Mugabe has benefited from his fame as the liberation hero up until today.2 He belongs to the old guard of African leaders that the AU inherited from the OAU. This group of leaders largely saw the OAU as a platform where they met to provide each other with international legal sovereignty. At the same time, their own sovereignty was jealously defended. This trajectory reaches today’s Zimbabwe, which rejects the call for a deeper integration. Mugabe’s refusal to cede sovereignty is elaborated in detail throughout this chapter. To understand the context and to discover historical path dependencies, descriptions of Zimbabwe’s history and of the socioeconomic context are given in the first two sections. This is followed by a section on Zimbabwe’s political system, which highlights who effectively leads Zimbabwe and where foreign policy decisions are made. A section on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy follows, which also includes the country’s approach to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Before concluding the chapter, a last section provides more details on Mugabe’s political maneuvering within the AU.

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Bush war and Mugabe’s rise The Central African Federation established in 1953 by the British was broken up in 1964 when Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) became independent while South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) remained a British colony despite a strong drive for independence. Robert Mugabe was among those who demanded the right to self-determination. He had joined the liberation struggle at the age of 34 when he became a member of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which he left in 1963 to co-found the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). On the grounds of having led the military wing of ZANU, he was arrested in 1964 and sent to prison for 10 years. Shortly after Mugabe was arrested, the Rhodesian Front, a party made up of the white minority led by Ian Smith, unilaterally declared South Rhodesia independent from Britain in 1965. This move remained largely unacknowledged internationally. In the following months, a brutal guerrilla war started during which an estimated 27,000 people died.3 The rival ZANU and ZAPU (led by Joshua Nkomo) closed ranks in Mozambique and fought against Smith’s regime from their base in the neighboring country. Mugabe, who commanded the fight but did not fire a shot himself, as an interviewed comrade recalls,4 intended to overthrow the white minority regime by force rather than negotiation. Yet, Mozambique’s President Samora Machel forced Mugabe to both join a negotiation process and sign an agreement by threatening Mugabe that he would otherwise no longer allow the fighters to use their base in Mozambique. The following Lancaster House Agreement allowed for the first democratic multiparty elections in the independent Zimbabwe, which were held in 1980.5 Mugabe won this election with 63 percent of the black votes given to his party.6 He was installed as prime minister with full executive power. Canaan Banana became Zimbabwe’s first president—a position in which only ceremonial duties were vested. The world was taken by surprise when Mugabe used a reconciliatory tone in his “Swords into Ploughshares” speech to describe Zimbabwe as a country where the white minority could live in peaceful coexistence with the black majority.7 Despite Mugabe’s former anti-imperialist rhetoric, his initial reign was guided by British advice as well as structures inherited from Smith’s regime. For instance, several white ministers became part of Mugabe’s first government, the Rhodesian General Peter Walls was permitted to retain his post, and Smith’s press secretary Costas Pafitis was asked to serve Mugabe and accepted the offer.8

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Through the liberation war, Mugabe had become the star of the liberation movement and was perceived as the shining hero within Africa.9 Even beyond Africa, Mugabe had gained much respect. It was thought that Mugabe would lead Zimbabwe into a bright future. “As a British analyst put it: ‘I do not believe it is fanciful to say that Zimbabwe could become the Singapore of black Africa.’”10 Similarly, on the day of independence, Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere advised Mugabe: “You have inherited a jewel. Keep it that way.”11 Things, however, changed rapidly. “There was quite a crisis of expectation of young, indigenous, black Zimbabweans who wanted to get into posts in government,” as a former Zimbabwean senior official recalls, continuing: “So in a sense, I got the feeling that unless I was to become a member of ZANU-PF, that my future would not be all that, should we say, to the total acceptance of the people I was working for.”12 Parallel to this demand from the young liberators, Mugabe started to fight his fiercest domestic opponent by demoting Nkomo from his position as minister of home affairs to a lesser cabinet office.13 The drive toward a one-party state started to gain momentum. As early as 1982, Mugabe proclaimed “as clear as day follows night … ZANU-PF will rule Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country.”14 By the first post-independence election of 1980, “the scale of intimidation in eastern Rhodesia, according to British officials, was massive.”15 Domestic opponents were being attacked by the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade, a brigade with close links to Prime Minister Mugabe. In particular, they took control in Matabeleland, a province where Nkomo’s ZAPU had its stronghold. It is estimated that 18,000 people died as a result of state terrorism at that time.16 The armed conflict against Nkomo and his supporters became known as Gukurahundi (Shona: “the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains”). As a result of the large scale intimidation and violence that Mark Gevisser calls “ethnic genocide,”17 Nkomo was forced to step down. In 1987, Mugabe finally managed to merge Nkomo’s ZAPU with his ZANU. The “new” party was named Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). After eliminating Nkomo from the political scene, Mugabe’s power was almost guaranteed to be absolute. The positions of president and prime minister had already been merged in 1987 and Mugabe was appointed president. Zimbabwe had turned into a one-party state under Mugabe’s leadership. There are several interrelated events that changed the course of Zimbabwe’s history after 1990: first, South Africa abandoned Apartheid in 1994, dramatically changing the political landscape of Africa

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and initiating a rivalry between Mugabe and Mandela; and second, Mugabe decided to intervene in the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. However, Mugabe’s intervention in Congo had no public support,18 the country could not afford this adventure, and additionally war veterans began to demand compensation for their service in the liberation fight. Owing to the costly adventure in Congo and the demands of the war veterans, the printing presses of the Reserve Bank started to work. This in turn caused hyperinflation for years to come. Parallel to this, Mugabe decided to proceed with land reform as a second pillar to compensate the war veterans. In this context, he demanded assistance from the former colonial power Britain to help his government with the land reform. The environment in Britain, however, had also changed dramatically since the Blair administration came to power in 1997, replacing the Tories under Margaret Thatcher and later John Major with whom Mugabe had good relations. The Labour government, on the contrary, had little interest in supporting Mugabe and British assistance to Zimbabwe came to a halt. Without Britain’s assistance in a land reform program, Mugabe and his aides decided to proceed alone and started a fast-track land reform with the well-orchestrated seizure of commercial farms in 2000. Mugabe is said to have encouraged his armed supporters to seize more than 900 farms.19 Mugabe was applauded for his policy by other African leaders and by the non-white population of many African states. Even South Africa’s “ANC government recognised that it was vulnerable domestically on the land question.”20 Many acknowledged that Mugabe was once more championing the black-African cause. Yet, Mugabe’s land reform caused an outcry outside Africa. Parallel to international pressure in the aftermath of land reform, domestic pressure mounted. The trade unions served as platforms to channel the growing opposition and to create a new political party.21 The founding of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) marks the end of the one-party system despite severe pressure and intimidation from the ruling ZANU-PF to prohibit this.22 The formation of the MDC heralded a new wave of politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe that reached its peaks in the context of the 2005 and 2008 elections. Operation Murambatsvina, designed to intimidate MDC voters in the context of the 2005 election, affected at least 700,000 directly and a further 2.4 million indirectly.23 Similarly, the 2008 elections saw massive vote rigging and political violence. Some people were reported killed and many more injured before and during the elections as a result of political violence.24 Mugabe and ZANU-PF did not have a real political program to offer the voters during the election campaign in 2008. Mugabe’s “campaign

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strategy premised around the defence of the country’s sovereignty, economic empowerment and his party’s liberation war.”25 This phenomenon was not new. As an interviewee put it: “ZANU-PF has not much more to sell to the people than having liberated the country.”26 In fact, even though Zimbabwe’s independence was achieved almost 30 years ago, the liberation struggle is still omnipresent in the country. “We cannot underestimate or belittle the role of the liberation,” stressed an interviewee.27 This became apparent, for instance, when a ZANU liberation fighter was buried at the Hero’s Acre in Harare. When “national hero Brigadier-General Armstrong Paul Gunda was buried … President Mugabe urg[ed] liberation fighters to remain loyal to the values and principles of the struggle until death. He said true revolutionaries would remain loyal and committed to their country regardless of the challenges confronting it.”28 This is just one arbitrarily chosen example, which shows that a liberation narrative is used to demand loyalty and keep the people in line with the ZANU-PF leadership. It is not only ZANU-PF that derives its legitimacy to rule from the fact that it used to be a liberation movement. More importantly, Mugabe derives his personal legitimacy as the leader of Zimbabwe from the fight he commanded. One of Mugabe’s former comrades is of the view that there “is the conviction that you had to sacrifice to liberate yourself and that tendency tends to push you to a point where you feel you cannot be directed by anybody.”29 Another interviewee argues that “he [Mugabe] feels that having been a kind of Messiah and delivering this country to its people, there was no need for anybody else, or any other party or any other kind of politics to feature.”30 An article on Mugabe’s 85th birthday in the Herald, Zimbabwe’s daily newspaper linked to ZANU-PF, reminds Zimbabweans that: “It is crucial that today’s generation and future generations learn to appreciate their leaders, especially the founding fathers and mothers of our nation whose bravery and personal sacrifice made them lose so much if not all in order for us all to be free and independent.”31 In summary, the liberation war became a critical juncture in Zimbabwe’s history and became part of a political narrative designed to keep ZANU-PF and Mugabe in power. A great deal of Zimbabwe’s contemporary foreign policy can be traced to this, as shown later in this chapter.

The destroyed jewel Zimbabwe’s economic situation is utterly devastating. Reliable data from Zimbabwe are rare and at best only an estimate. Therefore, the following figures must be treated with caution, yet they give a good

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Zimbabwe

indication of how ravaged the country’s economy has become. According to the CIA World Fact Book, Zimbabwe’s GDP was US$200 per capita in 2008. There was a shrinking economy estimated at 14.4 percent in 200832 and virtually no functioning economy apart from the informal sector. In 2006, the unemployment rate was estimated at 80 percent,33 and annual inflation was estimated at 9,030,000 percent in 2008.34 One trillion Zimbabwe dollar banknotes were printed; this figure has 12 zeros. After the new government was sworn in, following a power sharing agreement between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC in 2009, US dollar, South African rand, and Botswana’s pula were also acknowledged as legal tender to halt inflation. The dollarization stopped the inflation and helped to turn around economic trends.35 With the dollarization, however, prices increased so significantly that ordinary Zimbabweans faced difficulty buying food and other essentials.36 To worsen the situation further, cholera broke out toward the end of 2008, killing up to 100,000 Zimbabweans, particularly in rural areas.37 Before cholera broke out, life expectancy was already low at 43 years. HIV/AIDS has not stopped at the borders of Zimbabwe; according to the World Bank, 15.3 percent of the population was HIV/ AIDS infected in 2007.38 These facts are worrying, particularly in light that Zimbabwe used to be the breadbasket of the region with its strong agricultural sector but has become dependent on outside assistance over the last two decades. Today, it contributes little to the regional market. Zimbabwe is mainly dependent on its southern neighbor South Africa, the economic powerhouse of the region. Mugabe’s country exports nothing apart from the few agricultural products that are still produced. A Zimbabwean interviewee seems right when he claims: “Do you know what the major export of this country is at the moment? Its population.”39 In fact, countless Zimbabweans are fleeing, particularly to South Africa. It is estimated that some three million Zimbabweans have emigrated; 149,000 alone applied for political asylum in South Africa.40 Today, it is mainly black Zimbabweans who are fleeing in large numbers as most white Zimbabweans have already left. While the whites made up 5 percent of the population in 1980, only 0.5 percent of the population was white in 2008.41 There is no doubt that the new government with Prime Minister Tsvangirai from the MDC cannot solve the severe and sustainable socioeconomic problems Zimbabwe is facing in the short term. At best, they can make the first steps toward a better future and rebuild trust so that the international community invests in Zimbabwe. A SADC market could help Zimbabwe to boost its economy. Yet, for political reasons

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that are outlined below, Zimbabwe’s interest in regional integration is limited. Zimbabwe is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which envisages a customs union. In 2000, Zimbabwe joined the free trade area of COMESA. Taking the economic figures into account, Zimbabwe’s economy seems not to have benefited from this (for more on COMESA, see the chapters on Ethiopia, Uganda, and Mauritius). In fact, Zimbabwe has so far done nothing to address its economic problems with the help of SADC, COMESA, or the AU. It does not even support the AU’s development program NEPAD and plays a negligible role in the promotion of the common markets in the COMESA and SADC regions.

Mugabe, ZANU-PF, and the MDC The 2008 elections proved that Zimbabwe is not a democracy, reflecting the Freedom House ranking of Zimbabwe as “not free.”42 It seems certain that the first round of elections in March 2008 was rigged. The MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai won the most votes but failed to win an outright majority, forcing him and Mugabe into a runoff. During the campaign for the runoff, political violence mounted and Tsvangirai pulled out, claiming that he would no longer participate in “this violent, illegitimate sham of an election process.”43 In this context, and in general, the international community focuses on Mugabe as both the problem and the key to solving the Zimbabwe crisis. This approach misses the point to a certain extent because—as will be argued in this section—Mugabe is no longer in full control of Zimbabwe. Rather, there seems to be a mutual dependency between Mugabe and the ZANU-PF ruling clique.44 This section focuses on this and asks who makes policy under the inclusive government that came to power in early 2009 following a power sharing agreement between ZANU-PF and the MDC. The constitution determines that “there shall be a President who shall be Head of State and Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The President shall take precedence over all other persons in Zimbabwe.”45 Earlier on, this reflected reality as Mugabe indeed had a strong hold on power. Mugabe eliminated those members of his own party whom he perceived to be a threat.46 Despite (or maybe because of) his strong hold on power, Mugabe began to face more and more opposition not only from the emerging MDC, but also from within ZANU-PF, particularly at the turn of the millennium. The Tsholotsho incident of 2004 is a well-known turning point in ZANU-PF’s history and shows how Mugabe was challenged from within his party. A group of high ranking ZANU-PF members were supposed to meet at a place

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Zimbabwe

called Tsholotsho to discuss a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.47 Mugabe learned about this intrigue before the dissidents could meet. He then suspended six out of the ten chairmen of the national provinces from the ZANU-PF structure as he assumed these chairmen were behind the intrigue. He lost some of ZANU-PF’s most influential figures, such as the Minister of Defense, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who, however, later re-ascended the ZANU-PF hierarchy. Although Mugabe managed to rescue the situation and survive politically, there is no doubt that Tsholotsho has had a strong impact on developments within ZANU-PF. The Joint Operations Command (JOC), comprising all heads of the state security organs and various other influential ZANU-PF members, grew stronger and is likely still to influence Zimbabwean politics despite having been officially dismantled in 2008.48 The de facto loss of the presidential election in March 2008 finally ended Mugabe’s unchallenged rule of his party. Tsvangirai won more votes than Mugabe, yet—according to official results—failed to achieve an outright majority, initiating a runoff. It seems certain that Mugabe wanted to step down at this stage.49 Mugabe did not appear in public for some days after the election. Only after a JOC meeting, during which it was decided that Mugabe must stand for a runoff election to defeat Tsvangirai and prevent him from claiming the presidency, did Mugabe appear in public again. It can be assumed that power had finally shifted: although Mugabe wanted to step down, he was forced to stand in the runoff. The reason for this move is likely to have been a mutual dependency between Mugabe and the JOC members, which is linked to the organized terror campaigns against domestic opponents of ZANU(-PF), including the ethnic cleansing of the 1980s in Matabeleland and operation Murambatsvina, in which many JOC members were allegedly involved. The JOC members know that Mugabe can support them as long as he is in power. Thus they need him. A former ZANU-PF member rightly said “he [Mugabe] is ZANU-PF.”50 Mugabe, on the other hand, needs the ruling clique: first, to secure his power as they control key policy fields in the new cabinet including state security and the Reserve Bank, and second, because Mugabe knows that they would stop at nothing to hold him responsible for past human rights violations if he were to step down and amnesty would only be granted to him.51 Even with the new government, the political circumstances remain unaltered. This government is not as dangerous for Mugabe and his cronies as it seems on the surface. The ruling clique still controls all relevant security institutions and Mugabe represents Zimbabwe internationally. The ruling clique will only grant Tsvangirai and his allies as

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much freedom as suits them. One indication of this is when Mugabe and his aides showed their strength by arresting the designated Deputy Agricultural Minister Roy Bennett in order to postpone his inauguration. Bennett is still not sworn in several months after the election. In short, it seems that the old guard still control policy making in Zimbabwe and the MDC’s influence remains rather limited. When it comes to foreign policy, it is important to note that Mugabe remains the face of Zimbabwe. The ruling clique is certainly aware of Mugabe’s prominence and international standing. As a consequence, the president can operate freely on an international scale as long as his foreign policy supports the domestic cause of the ruling clique. Mugabe uses foreign policy as an instrument to protect the status quo as well as to derive external recognition and legitimacy. If he is granted legitimacy at the international level, his system can remain and the weak state can persist. Mugabe’s foreign policy thus centers on personal survival and the survival of ZANU-PF. This in turn ensures that the legal processing of Zimbabwe’s past will not become a reality and, hence, domestic pressure and ZANU-PF internal pressure are minimized. This assumed importance of Mugabe as a foreign policy player is not new. Hasu Patel, in a dialogue with Stephen Chan, once stressed that Mugabe “is an intellectual with a keen interest in foreign policy and he has been the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.”52 Owing to this diagnosed importance of Mugabe as a political player in the international arena, it is worth trying to look behind his façade and address the personal motives that might drive his foreign policy. Mugabe is described as smart, intelligent, and eloquent. Moreover, he has charisma. He is widely seen as a liberation hero and he certainly considers himself as such. It seems that Zimbabwe’s president turns a blind eye to reality and does not see the humanitarian suffering of the ordinary Zimbabwean. In the same vein, Heidi Holland points out in her seminal study on Zimbabwe’s president that he has never been a social person and distanced himself from the world around him.53 A Zimbabwean intellectual says that Mugabe seems to believe that “there is a foreign magic hand messing up things in Zimbabwe.”54 Mugabe himself provides evidence that these claims are true when he argues that “our economy … is far better, a hundred times better, than the average African economy. Outside South Africa, what country is (as good as) Zimbabwe? … Even now, … what is lacking now are goods on the shelves. That’s all.”55 Mugabe’s charisma, eloquence, and personal background as a liberation fighter are the backbone of his strong position in Africa’s political fora, particularly in the AU. Many Africans still admire Mugabe

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for what he achieved when he overthrew Smith’s regime and brought independence to Zimbabwe and when he started the land reform. Mugabe himself undertakes any measure to keep this carefully cultivated picture alive. In addition, there are good reasons to assume that Mugabe genuinely believes that he owns Zimbabwe. He made this clear when he claimed on 19 December 2008: “Zimbabwe is mine.”56 As many insightful interviewees suggest, he derives the personal conviction that he must rule Zimbabwe from the liberation fight.57 Similarly, in a Zimbabwean newspaper, the Zimbabwean-born business man Mutumwa Maware describes how ZANU-PF’s world view is shaped, namely … by the past and by framing the current challenge as a colonially generated one it is not surprising that the best defenders of the status quo have to be the very liberation heroes that were instrumental in liberating the country. The country may have 29 years of experience but in the respect of dealing with the colonial injury, the country has not moved.58 The discussion has shown that the liberation fight and Mugabe’s personal ideals can influence Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Although it is easy to accept this, it is more difficult to pin down who rules Zimbabwe. When it comes to foreign policy, Mugabe has free reign as long as it serves the interests of the ruling clique. There is little doubt after decades of rule that Mugabe—as once expressed by himself—will “never never never surrender.”59 Zimbabwe’s willingness to cede sovereignty vis-à-vis a supra national body depends on Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s willingness to do so. The deeply undemocratic nature of Zimbabwe’s political system certainly contributes to the ruling clique’s stance against deeper integration.

“Teflon Bob’s” foreign policy Patel summarizes the five key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in the early years after independence.60 Among them are “national sovereignty and equality among nations” and the “right of all peoples to self-determination and independence.”61 Reflecting on these principles later, Patel concludes that it is true that “Zimbabwe has fiercely guarded its sovereignty, even at great costs.”62 Although Mugabe’s government engaged militarily in African conflicts (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997–98) and participated in United Nations Missions in the 1990s (Angola, Somalia, Uganda/Rwanda), it always upheld the

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principle of non-interference in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. This became particularly obvious in the aftermath of the 2005 and 2008 elections when Mugabe made clear that no fellow African leaders were invited to comment on or engage in Zimbabwe’s internal crisis.63 Mugabe’s refusal to accept any interference can be traced back to the liberation struggle and is seen as its continuation.64 This section and the next elaborate on this thought and further demonstrate that Mugabe and his cronies consider sovereignty sacrosanct and do indeed resist any interference. The refusal of the ZANU-PF regime to acknowledge any authority beyond its borders and to effectively revoke international treaties is most evident in the case of the land seizure after 2000. Mike Campbell, a white farmer, filed an application with the Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC Tribunal) in late 2007, challenging the acquisition of his farm by the Zimbabwean government. As Mugabe and his allies thought the case might interfere with the general elections of 2008, they managed to postpone the ruling.65 However, the “Tribunal grant[ed] the application pending the determination of the main case and order[ed] that the Republic of Zimbabwe shall take no steps, or permit no steps to be taken, directly or indirectly, whether by its agents or by orders, to evict from or interfere with the peaceful residence on, and beneficial use of, the farm known as Mount Carmell [owned by Mike Campbell].”66 Nevertheless, ZANU-PF thugs invaded Campbell’s farm a few days before the SADC Tribunal held the postponed hearing. Despite the violence the Campbells were faced with, they decided to continue their case.67 The SADC Tribunal ruled and declared a couple of days later that discrimination had occurred and compensation must be paid to the Campbells.68 This was a victory for the white farmers; yet their victory was still far from bearing fruit. As early as during the first major wave of land invasions in 2000, Mugabe had claimed: “the courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way,”69 and the responsible Zimbabwean minister Didymus Mutasa is quoted to have said later that the judges must be “day-dreaming” with reference to the SADC Tribunal case.70 And in fact, the SADC Tribunal ruling brought no change in the government’s position. On 21 February 2009, Mugabe said: “some farmers went to the SADC … but that’s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no-one will follow that.”71 Government officials furthermore claimed that the court had no jurisdiction to rule.72 The judges, on the contrary, found that the tribunal had jurisdiction referring to the SADC Charter. In June 2009, the SADC tribunal found that: “we note that the respondent [the Republic of Zimbabwe] has not taken part in the proceedings.”73 Yet, up until today, the issue remains unresolved. Mike Campbell died in 2011.74

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The land seizure question is closely linked to relations between Britain and Zimbabwe, a relationship that has always been special on account of the colonial past. Under the Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher and John Mayor until 1997, Mugabe had a largely free rein and relations were described as “excellent.”75 However, Britain’s political landscape changed dramatically in 1997 when “New Labour” came into office under Tony Blair and interrupted many policy doctrines, including dealings with Zimbabwe. Their policy towards Zimbabwe culminated in a letter from Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, in which she writes: I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised not colonisers.76 After having lost Britain as a partner, Mugabe attempted to establish a closer relationship with Libya. He turned to Gaddafi for assistance, asking for credit to buy petrol. Some months later, 70 percent of Zimbabwe’s petrol supply came from Libya. In July 2001, Gaddafi visited Zimbabwe and supported Mugabe’s anti-white rhetoric when he declared that all whites should leave.77 “He also promised large donations to ZANU-PF funds for the forthcoming presidential election, although, ironically, Zimbabwean law had recently been changed to prohibit foreign funding for political parties.”78 The real intention behind Gaddafi’s interest in Zimbabwe remains unknown, although there is some indication that the Libyan leader had military interests besides the officially announced economic interests.79 The relationship with Libya, however, soon calmed down. As a Zimbabwe insider knows: “Gaddafi was a champion here. Gaddafi just totally disappeared from the Zimbabwean scene because we [Zimbabwe] simply did not pay back on what he delivered.”80 In 2003, Mugabe had to fly to Libya to ask for the continuation of Gaddafi’s oil supplies, although Zimbabwe had failed to meet its payments. The Times concluded that “Mr Mugabe’s decision to risk humiliation again, seven months after being rebuffed in his last attempt to persuade Colonel Gaddafi to relent, is a measure of his desperation.”81 Calling Mugabe a “bad customer,”82 the relationship between the two statesmen came to a halt. After Britain and Libya had turned their backs on Zimbabwe, Mugabe had to search for new allies. As a last resort, he appealed to China for economic and political assistance. Chan is right when he stresses that:

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The Chinese will not ride to Zimbabwe’s economic rescue. The Chinese want to gain economic benefits from Zimbabwe. … The Chinese cannot believe how exceptionally naïve the Zimbabwean government is being. The Zimbabwean “Look East policy” is a sign of desperation, having trashed a long list of other foreign policy options.83 In fact, China proved to be of little value to Zimbabwe’s economy; yet Mugabe benefited from China in another way. China vetoes decisions against Zimbabwe in the United Nations Security Council and attempts to provide weapons for Mugabe’s regime. In April 2008, a ship carrying arms for Zimbabwe arrived at the South African port of Durban, where the weapons were to be transported overland to landlocked Zimbabwe. The dock workers in Durban refused to offload the ship. After a couple of days and after a court ruling, the ship left Durban trying to offload at other ports in southern Africa. Yet other southern African governments followed South Africa’s example and China finally ordered its ship to return home.84 Even the Angolan government, which used to be known as Mugabe’s staunch ally, refused to unload the ship, thus suggesting that Mugabe’s political stance in the region was weakened. Despite the resistance of the southern African states, there are allegations that the weapons eventually arrived in Zimbabwe. With reference to intelligence reports, sources say that the weapons were offloaded in West Africa and went through the Democratic Republic of Congo into Zimbabwe.85 Whether this is true is unknown. Contrary to Britain, China, and Libya, South Africa has a keen interest in maintaining good relations with its northern neighbor. The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe is of special note and is elaborated in detail elsewhere.86 The following is therefore only a short summary of the main points to shed some light on the often criticized “quiet diplomacy” of South Africa vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, a policy that can be traced back to the liberation struggle of the African National Congress (ANC)—the ruling party in South Africa. The ANC wants to pay back Mugabe’s earlier support. One form of compensation is the “quiet diplomacy,” another is the massive economic support ranging from petrol supplies to the offer of using the South African rand as currency in Zimbabwe. Moreover, it is in South Africa’s own interest to solve the Zimbabwean crisis peacefully in order to stem the flow of refugees from Zimbabwe. Some people in South Africa know that the post-Apartheid state is domestically vulnerable because its multiracial society is not as stable as often assumed and spillover effects from Zimbabwe’s conflict cannot be ruled out.87 The widespread xenophobic

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attacks in 2008 in many parts of South Africa, which captured international attention, showed this. A further influx of refugees might allow the situation to explode again. Despite this relatively strong position within Africa, based on his special place in the “liberation saga,” it must also be concluded that Mugabe has occasionally lost the ability to shape Zimbabwe’s foreign position as a result of the other international players’ strength which has forced Zimbabwe’s president into a defensive mode. That many states closed their ports to the Chinese arms as well as Gaddafi’s and Blair’s abandoning of him shows that it is no longer within Mugabe’s power to choose his partners, but the exact opposite. There are four reasons why Mugabe has not yet lost complete control of his international standing: first, he allowed the MDC to join the government in 2009, which brought him some credit, particularly from Western states; second, South Africa backs him for the reasons outlined above; third, there are other African dictators who will not speak out against the president of Zimbabwe; and last, Mugabe has managed to keep his liberation hero image alive. These points are important when analyzing Zimbabwe’s position in the AU in the next section.

Zimbabwe’s special relations with the African Union President Mugabe uses the AU as a platform from which to derive legitimacy for his reign. He feels comfortable in the organization as he can still largely control the AU’s positions vis-à-vis Zimbabwe. For instance, “[g]oing to the African Union summit in Banjul … [in 2006, he] already knew that he would once again escape censure by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights … for his controversial slum clearance plan that displaced more than 700,000 people.”88 Moreover, the support from Africa’s leadership before and during the AU–European Union summit in Lisbon 2007 is an indication of this. Second, he managed to silence his critics during the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2008 shortly after he was installed as Zimbabwe’s president following the disputed elections. During these events, he showed that he defends sovereignty by all means and does not accept that other states can interfere in the internal affairs of his country. The months preceding the AU–European Union summit were characterized by a heated debate between the AU and the European Union, on the one hand, and within both organizations, on the other hand. The discussion centered around the question of whether Zimbabwe’s president should be allowed to participate in the meeting of heads of states and government that was scheduled to take place in Lisbon in

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early December 2007. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown threatened not to participate if Mugabe did. Other European governments took a similar position, whereas most African states wanted all AU members to be present including Zimbabwe. In the end, the summit took place with Mugabe but without Brown. The ZANU-PF-leaning Herald triumphed: “The AU and Portugal have thrown their weight behind Zimbabwe’s participation at the EU–AU Summit … with a top Portuguese official stressing that the dispute between Zim[babwe] and Britain was merely bilateral and should under no circumstances be allowed to scupper the summit.”89 Even the German based Süddeutsche Zeitung acknowledged that it was a success for Mugabe over his rival Brown that the summit took place.90 The summit was a mere show of goodwill, producing no substantial results with regard to the general topics of the summit,91 as well as with reference to the Zimbabwean crisis which overshadowed the summit. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel voiced what many Europeans thought about Mugabe; the latter remained silent and “betrayed no emotion as Mrs Merkel spoke. A protective screen of African presidents, who admire his leadership of Zimbabwe’s struggle against white rule, were seated alongside him.”92 Mugabe obtained the backing of Africa’s leadership, particularly from South Africa’s President Mbeki who had been appointed SADC mediator in the Zimbabwean crisis. The German-based Süddeutsche Zeitung notes: Mugabe tramples human rights and ruins the economy – yet, the critique of African governments remained mild, although it has recently become louder. Now 83 years old, for many he still remains a sacrosanct hero since his liberation fight against the colonial power. Mugabe uses this anti-colonial reflex skillfully.93 Indeed, the summit may be seen as a success for Mugabe. Although heavily chastised by the Europeans, many vocal African heads of state backed him to show that they do not tolerate any interference from Europe in African affairs. The situation changed during the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, which took place six months later in June–July 2008. In the context of the 2008 runoff election, in which Mugabe was the only candidate after Tsvangirai had pulled out, he made it clear that he would not accept criticism of the Zimbabwean crisis: “No country in the world, including those in the African Union and SADC can dictate how Zimbabwe should conduct its elections,” and even went as far as to threaten that the “irresponsible and reckless statements by some SADC leaders

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could lead to the breaking up of the regional grouping.”94 After the “landslide” victory in the elections,95 Mugabe rushed to be sworn in as president, delivered a speech, and immediately headed to the AU summit taking place in Sharm el-Sheikh to manifest his position as the legitimately elected president and receive international legal sovereignty. It is noteworthy, in this context, that it took six weeks to count the votes of the first round of the presidential elections in March 2008, but the runoff votes were counted within hours so that Mugabe still managed to arrive in Sharm el-Sheikh on time. Before the AU summit, Mugabe said: “some African countries have done worse things and when I go to the AU meeting … I am going to challenge some leaders to point out when we have had worse elections.”96 Participants of the closed AU Assembly session report that Mugabe did what he had planned.97 One ambassador even recalls: “Mugabe was the superstar of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.”98 Mugabe pointed to those whose legitimacy to represent their nations as elected leaders was at best doubtful. Despite attempts, most notably by Zambia, to rebuke Mugabe, the latter ensured that in the end no statement was published that could severely threaten him. John Makumbe, professor at the University of Zimbabwe and one of Mugabe’s fiercest critics, seems right when he suggests that the AU is a mixed bag. There are people in the AU who like Mugabe and who think he is an African champion. … There are also people in Africa who see him as a demagogue, they would say he is spoiling the democratic trend in Africa. … There will be leaders in the AU who will want to rap his knuckles and he knows that and so you will find he keeps a low profile on African Union things.99 Notwithstanding the democratic trend, this new breed of leaders could not gain the upper hand during the summit and Mugabe managed to rescue the situation, resulting in a half-hearted resolution which reads: the AU decides “to encourage President Robert Mugabe and the leader of the MDC Party Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai to honour their commitments to initiate dialogue with a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and reconciliation of the Zimbabwean people.”100 In this light, the Herald rightly—although prematurely—concluded: “AU resists attempts to lambaste Zimbabwe over polls.”101 It seems that Mugabe still operates under the assumption that the AU is a “toothless talking shop,” like the OAU, where they meet and derive international legitimacy for their rule. Currently, it seems that neither ZANU-PF nor the MDC has an interest in the AU and its institutions, as highlighted by their lack of

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involvement in several AU institutions. In fact, Mugabe has shown no interest in getting involved in institutions that could potentially threaten his power base such as the APRM. There is not even a NEPAD office in Harare. An official from the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that Zimbabwe participates in the formation of the southern African regional Stand-by Brigade in principle, but fails to provide details on when they will actually contribute troops.102 Zimbabwe does not even actively participate in the Pan-African Parliament sessions regularly, as officials from the parliament confirm, although the country has signed the protocol establishing the parliament.103 John Makumbe’s analysis that “the African Union is not really a donor agency”104 is only part of the explanation as to why Mugabe has no general interest in the organization and in deeper integration in particular. Makumbe adds: Zimbabwe is Mugabe’s trump card: We are a sovereign state. … [T]he African Union as well as the United States of Africa is a direct frontal attack on national sovereignty and Mugabe doesn’t like that. He doesn’t want to turn from a national president into a provincial governor, which is what would happen if the African countries come together and constitute the United States of Africa. The current national leaders would become governors of states and Robert Mugabe finds that absolutely abhorrent.105 As a matter of fact, the United States of Africa vision is rejected in Zimbabwe and the Union Government debate is not taken seriously. The government has yet to publish a document that spells out the position of Zimbabwe in the debate. “Zimbabwe does not yet have anything that you can say is written but we are simply following the SADC decisions,” confirms an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.106 But it is not only Mugabe who shows little commitment to the idea of a continental government, Tsvangirai and his MDC allies also have little interest in the debate. A source linked to Tsvangirai summarizes: “It doesn’t add value to the situation we are in in Zimbabwe.”107 David Coltart, a MDC minister, clearly expresses his opinion on the Union Government. During the debate about the formation of the Union Government, the AU had identified some areas in which continental ministries could be established; among these is high level education.108 Having asked Coltart whether he is afraid to lose his job as minister of education, culture and sport because a continental minister of education will be installed, Coltart responded: “Well, let me say this: I think we are a long way off a continental government.”109

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Mugabe decided to pursue the position of SADC in the Grand Debate, which is to stand for “gradual incrementalism,” stated by an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.110 Indeed, the SADC region is united in the view that the United States of Africa should develop gradually with no specific time frame. Within the region, South Africa is very vocal and provides the political and intellectual leadership and arguments for the gradual position. Mugabe is thus able to hide behind his southern neighbor. Besides the Union Government debate, there are obvious reasons why Zimbabwe is not actively participating in AU institutions such as the APRM. Zimbabwe “would get zero in the points [in the APRM report], given the state of its governance, given its state of politics but also even the state of its administration, management of the affairs of the country,” as John Makumbe highlights.111 The reports of the Pan-African Parliament observer missions on the 2008 elections show that some fellow Africans are willing to criticize Mugabe and his regime. The observers concluded harshly and directly that the elections were neither free nor fair.112 To retain the APRM’s credibility, the report would have to be similarly honest and critical, and the ZANU-PF government fears this response. Moreover, as pointed out above, the APRM threatens the ruling clique’s hold on power as it would investigate the internal dynamics of Zimbabwe. In short, there is virtually no reason for Mugabe and his allies to subscribe to it.

Conclusion Zimbabwe’s interest in the AU is basically to use it as a platform to derive legitimacy for Mugabe’s regime and to obtain support for his and his regime’s survival. It seems that this is precisely the reason why he takes part in the AU meetings, although there is generally no clear commitment vis-à-vis the AU. A causal mechanism linking international legal sovereignty to the domestic realm exists. Mugabe seemingly operates under the assumption that the old paradigm about the OAU being a “toothless talking shop” is still alive in the transformed OAU. Mugabe keeps the protective belt of non-interference and sovereignty, jealously guards it, and is not willing to surrender it. Zimbabwe has not signed any international treaty that would require a substantial pooling of sovereignty and it is against the immediate establishment of the Union Government and the United States of Africa. Even in the case of SADC, where one might assume that Zimbabwe is a committed member, the evidence presented has shown that it is only lip service, as the position of Mugabe’s regime in the Campbell case suggests. Furthermore,

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it was noted in the context of Zimbabwe’s refusal to join the APRM that there seems to be a link between the authoritarian system and the perceived threat of deeper integration, on the one hand, and the refusal to join international institutions and the lack of willingness to cede sovereignty, on the other hand. Even though Mugabe cannot rule within Zimbabwe without the ZANU-PF elite who effectively control him, foreign policy in Zimbabwe is nevertheless made by him. This occurs irrespective of the power sharing agreement with the MDC, which also has little interest in the AU. The ruling clique gives Mugabe as much foreign policy leverage as suits their purposes. This, however, does not include any surrendering of sovereignty, which Mugabe would not do in any case as there are reasons to believe that he genuinely thinks he owns Zimbabwe. Drawing on this, there seems to be a link between authoritarian rule and unwillingness to surrender sovereignty. Any surrendering of sovereignty would effectively mean ceding power, which any authoritarian leader is unlikely to do. The refusal to yield sovereignty is also linked to the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Indeed, the liberation fight must be seen as a critical juncture that determines Zimbabwe’s domestic and foreign policy up to the present, as suggested by Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa, its refusal to accept the SADC Tribunal ruling, and Mugabe’s ZANUfication of Zimbabwe based on ZANU’s role in the liberation struggle. As shown, Mugabe and his aides still take advantage of the liberation struggle to justify their position. As independence was only achieved three decades ago, it is still relatively fresh in the minds of many Zimbabweans, and the younger generation is constantly reminded of the achievements of the old guard. Insofar, decolonization legacies play an important role.

3

Swaziland

Swaziland is a very different political experiment, a medieval absolute monarch trying to survive along a modern democracy The Star, 7 April 2001

Swaziland is one of Africa’s smallest countries of only 17,363 sq km, which is about the size of Kuwait. It is landlocked and surrounded by South Africa on its western, northern, and southern border and by Mozambique on its eastern flank. Swaziland is a kingdom with an absolute monarch, King Mswati III, who was crowned in 1986. All executive, legislative, and judicial power is vested in the crown. The kingdom is caught between tradition and modernity. Tradition is apparent everywhere in the country. Most notably, there are two major traditional ceremonies each year: the Incwala, a three week long annual ceremony that unites Swazis in order to gain blessings from their ancestors and to renew the kingship of the nation; and the Reed Dance, where Swazi maidens pay tribute to the queen mother and where the king occasionally chooses his wives. Some Swazis, however, live a modern life in urban areas and have turned their back on traditional village life. Nevertheless, Swazi tradition is inherently linked to Swazi politics and used as a source for the king’s legitimacy to rule. Swaziland ranks relatively high on the Human Development Index;1 nevertheless, the United Nation’s World Food Program aims to feed about 200,000 Swazis out of a population of about one million.2 The monarchy does not see deeper continental or regional integration as a useful venture for changing this situation. Swaziland is, at best, an observer rather than a participant in the AU. The kingdom focuses on its immediate region and is a strong supporter of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), a union comprising South Africa as the strongest economy as well as Botswana, Namibia, and the small kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland. It is highly beneficial for Swaziland

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to be part of this union as it obtains two-thirds of its national revenue from SACU. This chapter elaborates on the issues mentioned above in turn. It looks first at the historical dimension, providing some background information on how history and tradition impact on the country’s foreign policy. The following section is dedicated to the socio-economic context, with special reference to SACU. This is followed by a section that deals with the country’s leadership and analyzes King Mswati’s hold on power. The subsequent section scrutinizes the foreign policy of Swaziland in more detail with a particular focus on its relations with South Africa, as the latter has the ability to determine the foreign policy of the tiny kingdom. The final section explores Swaziland’s stance in the Union Government debate and its AU policy in more general terms.

The crown and Swazi tradition Swaziland’s history, particularly the decolonization phase, is in many ways unique. Whereas monarchies were abandoned in most parts of decolonized Africa, this institution survived in Swaziland.3 Swaziland’s independence was heralded in the early 1960s when negotiation talks were held with Britain, which treated Swaziland as its protectorate. However, it took some time for decolonization to become a reality as no agreement existed as to the country’s future constitution. Britain was strongly in favor of giving political freedom to the Swazis, including the right to establish political parties, whereas the Swazi king, Sobhuza II, saw this as a threat.4 Britain won this dispute initially; when Swaziland became independent in 1968, it had a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a Westminster-type constitution.5 Its independence was served on the “silver platter of a negotiated settlement.”6 At that time, there were six political parties including the royal party, which was presided over by the king and held all the seats in the legislative council following the pre-independence elections of 1964. A few years later in 1973, all the political parties were banned by a king’s decree because the king thought that parties were not suitable for Swazi political conditions. Parliament voted itself out of existence7 and became “little more than a debating platform.”8 The king’s decree destroyed the sacred doctrine of separation of powers,9 strengthened Sobhuza’s position considerably, and “by the time of Sobhuza’s diamond jubilee in 1981, the authority of the Swazi monarchy was absolute.”10 The short period of democracy was over. Sobhuza died in 1982. An interim reign was put in place until Sobhuza’s son Mwsati reached the age of 18. In 1986, he was crowned and

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named King Mwsati III. Although Sobhuza had transformed Swaziland into an absolute monarchy by decree, Mswati institutionalized the absolute monarchy with a new constitution promulgated in 2005. Under this constitution, all executive, legislative, and judicial power remains vested in the crown. The new constitution has received much harsh criticism such as that of Sabelo Gumedze: Among those Africans who have long dreamt of a just and prosperous continent governed by the rule of law are the people of Swaziland. The Swazi people are arguably still far from realising this dream. … The Swaziland Constitution is viewed as a smokescreen that is used by Swazi authorities solely to dispel the perception that not all is well in Swaziland. … Not all is well in the tiny Kingdom.11 The fact that the crown has prevailed until today results from a longstanding Swazi tradition, which dates back to the pre-colonial era. However, the British were essential in keeping the monarchy alive as they considered the king to be an important partner in ruling the country and allowed Swazi culture to be practiced and King Sobhuza to prepare for his role as head of state.12 Interestingly, Swazis seem to concentrate more on their culture and monarchy than on the colonial experience when reflecting on the past. It appears that they have collectively forgotten the colonial period as it hid behind the century-old Swazi tradition which was preserved and practiced with its ever-present symbolic figure—the king—at the forefront.13 Tradition was not only the reason why Sobhuza remained in power and the reason Mswati continues to rule today, but is also part of daily life in Swaziland. It plays a big role in social and political life, ranging from polygamy and bride prices in the private sphere to the institution of the monarchy. Writing in 1983, Booth hypothesized that “what seemed to be certain in mid-1983 was that the ensuing months, perhaps years, would witness the playing out of the tensions that had been building up for years between the forces of traditionalism and change.”14 Now, almost 30 years later, these tensions still exist. According to an interviewee, an uprising against the traditional form of government will happen; it is only “a matter of time.”15 However, it must be stressed that, so far, there are few signs that a significant change will occur, as suggested by the failure of the new constitution to bring change and little participation in protests against the current system.16 Tradition and Swazi culture are deeply rooted; they are often used to derive, legitimize, and justify policy to the extent that one interviewee called this

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“cultural blackmail.”17 As tradition is so deep-rooted in Swaziland, many citizens comply with it and remain silent on the issue, rendering an uprising rather unlikely. It is the traditional elements that superpose and strongly impact political decisions. The preliminary conclusion is therefore that the colonial period and the liberation process do not influence the conduct of foreign and domestic politics as no path dependencies can be observed. Swaziland has experienced a smooth transition between being a British protectorate and independence. Little has changed between the two periods; in fact, the monarchy has remained constant. Traditions such as the Incwala ceremony and the institutionalized monarchy are so deep-rooted in the kingdom that the current king can derive his legitimacy to rule from them. The king is personally attached to the state’s sovereignty which is vested in him. He owns nearly 60 percent of Swaziland’s territory in trust for the Swazi nation.18 Later sections continue to elaborate on this finding and suggest that the king is the key decision making unit in Swaziland. However, a brief look into the socio-economic situation will precede.

Swaziland’s socio-economic situation and SACU Swaziland is economically dependent on South Africa, to the extent that Swaziland’s currency is bound to the South African rand and the kingdom receives most of its energy from South Africa, restricting “the scope for an independent economic policy.”19 Even Swazi officials consider this dependency an undeniable “fact.”20 Ironically, the end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1990 and the end of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992 did not help Swaziland in economic terms. Although Swaziland used to be considered a relatively safe haven for foreign investment during the Apartheid era, investment now flows into South Africa and the emerging market around Mozambique’s capital Maputo, which has direct access to the sea. Insofar, Swaziland is worse off. Economic figures show that Swaziland’s economic growth is behind the average growth in the region.21 The kingdom is relatively highly ranked on the Human Development Index (medium human development with rank 141)22 and considered a middle-income country. This classification obscures the fact that a large number of Swazis live below the poverty line. Although agriculture remains the “backbone” of the country’s economy,23 it often takes place in the informal sector. It is estimated that 75 percent of the workforce are employed in subsistence agriculture.24 As a matter of fact, the World Food Program aims to feed about 200,000 Swazis out of a

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population of about one million.25 The king and the prime minister are aware of this problem as their speeches show, yet they do little to improve the situation.26 Moreover, Swaziland depends on its neighbors Mozambique and South Africa to sell its products via their ports because the kingdom is landlocked. In this light, it might appear logical that Swaziland would work toward a regional free trade area in order to have a bigger market and be able to transport its goods to the nearest port without tariffs. And indeed, Swaziland is a committed member of the SACU comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. This market and the benefits from the customs union are so large that Swaziland sees less benefit in the SADC region, which aims to establish a free trade area for the whole southern African region, including, among others, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In the financial year 2006–7, 5,321 million Emalangeni (at the time of writing about 481 million Euros) was received from SACU while Swaziland’s total revenue was 7,855 million Emalangeni (approx. 713 million Euros); that is, about 67 percent of the national revenue came from SACU.27 If a free trade area were to be established in the SADC region and the SACU consequently died, Swaziland would lose about two-thirds of its public revenue. Aware of this, Swaziland’s policy of not working toward any deeper economic integration in the region and beyond becomes understandable. However, it must be noted that the revenues from SACU fell by almost two-thirds in 2010–11 amid the global financial and economic crisis, thus posing a severe risk to Swaziland and the king.28 However, with the crisis at an end, the revenues are likely to increase again.

The king and his inferiors As shown, Sobhuza emerged as the central figure in the political arena of Swaziland. When the current King Mswati III was crowned in 1986, he was only 18 years of age and faced severe challenges in his bid to be accepted by the interim rulers who were installed after Sobhuza died in 1982. Having overcome these challenges, Mswati III also managed to become the most important political and social figure in Swaziland.29 Mswati has since continued what Sobhuza started during his reign, namely to rule Swaziland as one of the world’s last absolute monarchs. Notwithstanding, Article 80 of the current constitution reads: “the system of government for Swaziland is a democratic, participatory, Tinkhundlabased system which emphasises devolution of state power from central government to Tinkhundla areas and individuals as a basis for election or appointment to public office.”30 But is Swaziland really a democracy?

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Or is the Freedom House right when it ranks Swaziland as “not free”?31 Who effectively rules the country and makes foreign policy? This section explores these questions in greater detail by looking at the political system of the kingdom. The aim is to find out under what circumstances and by whom policy decisions are made, in order to gain a better understanding of the positioning of Swaziland toward the AU. Swaziland’s political system is unique. It has preserved its indigenous institutions despite the influx of Western principles and institutions both during colonial times and in the post-colonial era.32 One interviewee calls the political system “late-feudalistic” and “pre-revolutionary.”33 The two main features of the country’s political arena are the absolute monarch in whom the executive, legislative, and judicial power is de facto vested and the traditional chiefs assembled in the Liqoqo. The Liqoqo is an informally constituted body comprising princes and traditional leaders.34 The king and the Liqoqo are strongly intertwined and both are mentioned in the constitution.35 The constitution allows the traditional chiefs to play an advisory role (Articles 13 and 231). However, interviews have shown that, although one school of thought assumes that the traditional elements are superior to the king,36 another school of thought argues that Mswati has emerged as the sole decision making unit.37 Nevertheless, both agree that the king was initially under siege from the traditional elements in his younger years. It might come as little surprise that the king and his family see the monarch as the de facto ruler of Swaziland. The young king Mswati made it clear in 1996 that “nobody tells Mswati what to do,”38 and similarly his brother Prince Masitsela told the media years later: “there is no one, except God, who could defy the king’s order.”39 An insightful source is of the view that “it will be an understatement to say behind scenes he [the king] is not exercising his powers – he is exercising his powers. He is an ultimate voice of the country. Cabinet will report to him twice a week and I am sure anywhere else in the world where you have monarchs this is not the situation.”40 The story of Mfomfo Nkambule, a former minister in the Swazi government, who publicly criticized the king in his weekly column in a Swazi newspaper and was forced to apologize publicly, not only reveals how freedom of expression and freedom of the press are treated under Mswati III, but also indicates who effectively rules the country. The fact that an insider such as Nkambule places the king at the center of his critique illustrates the dominant role of the king. Another source does not even mention the traditional chiefs, but only ponders whether it is the cabinet or the king who is effectively ruling. In the interviewee’s view, the traditional structure “is very much confined to the rural administration.”41 There is one further reason to

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assume that the Liqoqo is indeed uninfluential. The princes and traditional leaders would have formally institutionalized their power in the recently drafted constitution if they had the power to do so. However, according to the 2005 constitution, the Liqoqo is only an advisory body and its members are linked to the king through an extensive patronage system. For this study, it is important to note that there is no indication that the princes’ and traditional leaders’ roles extend beyond Swazi borders at all or influence foreign policy making. Still, the king needs a support base and the “faceless elders”42 and their cronies benefit from this fact. A patronage system accommodates them all and ensures the survival of the traditional structure and the king.43 The “late-feudalistic” system is alive and there is no significant rebellion against it. Mswati has an interest in retaining the status quo. This becomes clear when looking at the way he oppresses any opposition in the country and silences all figures challenging his position. Mfomfo Nkambule is one example of this. Additionally, there have been incidents in the past when opposition members had to be protected by international diplomats to guarantee their safety.44 Another example of Mswati’s ruthless dictatorial style was the destruction of a slum area in 2006 to create more space for his own royal estate.45 This suggests that Mswati exercises his role as defined in the constitution which grants him absolute power, which in turns leads observers to claim that Swazis live under the king’s dictatorship.46 The king himself notes: “though in terms of the law, all executive, legislative and judicial powers are vested in the King, the King cannot be a dictator because he leads in consultation with the people.”47 There are in fact people arguing that Mswati is a benevolent monarch and others who argue against exaggerating the role of the crown.48 An official of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, has another point of view. He argues that a “benevolent leader would actually listen to the people he is leading and then lead from the front.”49 The Zimbabwean-based political science professor John Makumbe argues similarly: there is a very clear line between whether Swazis are citizens or subjects. … The people there are very hungry and very keen to get a democratic system going but none of them dares to say the king must go. No, the king is an institution but they would like to see his powers depleted and handed over to democratically elected structures.50 As a matter of fact, the monarchy based on Swazi tradition is strongly in place. The highest hurdle that needs to be overcome when transitioning

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to a democratic state is the Swazi tradition. A large number of Swazis consider the king to be the benevolent father of the nation51 and want him and the political system to remain. This is shown by humble protest actions against the regime despite loud pleas from churches, trade unions, underground political parties, and South African organizations.52 The dilemma of Swaziland’s transition seems to be that no one challenges the crown as an institution—not even the fiercest critic. It appears that most Swazis want to have a traditionally inherited head of state as a symbolic “father of the nation.” The fact that no strong social force dares to call for the end of the monarchy gives the king and the monarchy as an institution a strong position. Mswati knows this. During a state visit to Japan in 2003, he was asked about growing opposition in Swaziland. “He smiled sweetly and replied ‘You must be talking to different people than I am. The people tell me they really want a king.’”53 All the above points out that the king and his allies will undertake any measures to ensure their survival, gains, and power. These conditions are relatively easy to uphold as the population wants the monarch to remain the head of state (but not necessarily head of the executive, legislative, and judicial branch) and, second, as “the unsophisticated Swazis and some political opportunists continue to ensure the survival of the royal agenda.”54 This survival policy of the monarchy is important to stress as it has repercussions for the policy vis-à-vis the AU.

The limits of Swaziland’s foreign policy Foreign policy does not rank highly on the political agenda of Swaziland. In the opening address of the ninth parliament in 2009, King Mswati made no reference to foreign policy, focusing his speech solely on the domestic realm.55 The same was true when the prime minister presented the “Government’s Programme of Action 2008–13” on 26 March 2009. The prime minister’s speech only contained one sentence about foreign policy: “observing our international obligations and maintaining a warm and cooperative relationship with other countries will be the cornerstone of our position with the world beyond our border.”56 This is a good indication of how important foreign affairs are in the kingdom. The following elaborates on this initial finding. Swaziland is a small landlocked country dependent on outside help, especially from the United Nations World Food Program and its neighbor South Africa. There is no doubt that Swazi officials are aware of their dependency on South Africa, which is considered to be “a fact.”57 Moreover, they know about Swaziland’s uninfluential position in regional, continental, and global organizations. Swaziland is “a very

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uninfluential country. And I think they all understand that,” a Swazi politician has remarked, adding that “a lot of it depends on personality as well. There were times when there were very influential politicians in the country who were able to go out and influence and be influential in international fora but then you get times when you don’t have that … type of person who can do it.”58 King Sobhuza was respected and listened to. Mswati III, on the contrary, is less known internationally for any of his policies, but instead for his expenditure on luxury goods such as his Maybach, BMWs, and his private jet. Swaziland suffers from this image internationally; more and more embassies are pulling out of the kingdom. Although Britain argues that it withdrew its high commission from Swaziland for cost saving reasons, now serving its former protectorate from its high commission in South Africa’s capital Pretoria (a five-hour drive away), there is little doubt that the decision highlights Britain’s dissatisfaction with the monarch’s policy. Britain is certainly not pleased about the oppression of civil liberties and the king’s waste of money on luxuries while large portions of the population are starving. The Americans have also withdrawn. After the end of the Cold War and the end of the battle for supremacy on the African continent, the United States decided to relocate the United States Agency for International Development to Botswana and also withdrew their Peace Corps from Swaziland. This shows its disapproval with Swaziland’s slow pace of political reform.59 South Africa, however, maintains its presence in the neighboring kingdom. The relationship between the two states is completely asymmetric.60 As an unnamed AU official put it plainly: “Swaziland is like a small dot within South Africa.”61 Although Swaziland depends on South Africa, the latter pays only very little attention to the kingdom. Referring to the pressure South Africa can place on Swaziland, an academic from Swaziland has remarked that “They are hostages. They are just being held by South Africa. … If you don’t, then you are committing suicide.”62 The relationship with the ANC government cannot be understood without reference to the relationship between the Apartheid regime and the Swazi kings. When the kingdoms of Swaziland and Lesotho gained their independence in the 1960s, all the neighboring countries in southern Africa were still under British or Portuguese rule or were ruled by white minority regimes. There were plans that Swaziland should become a platform from which the South African ANC could launch its guerrilla fighting. Swaziland hosted many ANC fighters, among them the future Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma.63 Swaziland’s nominal support of the ANC reaches far back. King Sobhuza’s grandmother was one of the founding members of the ANC64 and Sobhuza

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himself went to school with ANC members and became a card-carrying member of the South African liberation organization. This has led a Swazi official to conclude that Sobhuza’s “relationship with the ANC was top of the world.”65 However, this only shows one side of the coin. The other side is that the Apartheid government established close relations with the monarch and agreed a mutual security pact.66 One can trace the relations between the Apartheid regime and the Swazis at least back to 1973, when advocates of the South African Apartheid government assisted with the ban on political parties.67 In the 1980s, South Africa tried to create buffer zones as, with Mozambique and Zimbabwe becoming independent, the frontline states now bordered South Africa. The South African Apartheid government pursued the so-called “Total Strategy”: incentives were offered to the countries in the region; however, if these states did not accept these incentives, they feared serious consequences, including military strikes or economic repression. King Sobhuza II followed South Africa’s demands and did what he could to prevent the ANC from infiltrating South Africa from his territory.68 The Apartheid government rewarded the Swazi king by offering parts of its territory that were formerly part of the Swazi kingdom.69 The “land deal” was attractive for both sides: Swaziland would get direct access to the sea and, for South Africa, a greater Swaziland would “act as convenient buffer against African National Congress [ANC] insurgents attempting to infiltrate into South Africa from Mozambique.”70 However, the land deal was never completed. Nevertheless, Swazi sources claim that the negotiations about the land deal are still ongoing. They claim that there are no officially recognized borders between South Africa and Swaziland.71 Independent observers, however, do not believe that the question is still being negotiated between the two countries.72 The fact that the Swazis claim, whether rightly or wrongly, that the land deal is still being negotiated shows how seriously regional and continental integration is treated. An interviewee asked in this context: “Why would they be negotiating for a land when there is supposed to be unity in SADC anyway? It’s a contradiction.”73 Sobhuza’s opposition to the ANC created tensions between him and the ANC, which still continue today. The fact that Mswati has recently appointed Frederik Willem de Klerk, Apartheid South Africa’s last president, as an advisor74 certainly does not help when it comes to easing relations with the ANC. Mbeki’s late visit to Swaziland is illustrative. He only visited the neighboring country nine years after he came into office.75 Mbeki was generally grateful to those who supported the ANC during its fight. Being a mere five-hour drive or an

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hour’s flight from his office in Pretoria, it must be seen as punishment for the royal Swaziland that Mbeki only visited after being in office for a whole nine years and missed the chance to visit Swaziland for the “40–40 celebrations”: the double jubilee of 40 years of independence and the king’s 40th birthday in 2008.76 This might also be an indication that the Mbeki administration was not satisfied with the status of civil liberties in Swaziland, yet they undertook no significant measures. It is South Africa’s trade union umbrella organization, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, better known as COSATU, which takes action against the Swazi regime, e.g., by blocking the borders so that no goods can enter from the South African side.77 Meanwhile, the Mbeki administration kept silent despite the fact that the ANC passed a resolution in 2002 urging democratic transformation in Swaziland.78 This policy continues under President Zuma. As far back as 2002, he committed himself to a non-interventionist stand: “let the people of Swaziland solve their own problems.”79 In the days before his election as South African president in April 2009, information was leaked from the Swazi side that Zuma’s office was starting to organize a state visit for the new president. Yet so far, no news has disclosed that Zuma has paid an official state visit to Swaziland or plans to do so. In any case, South Africa has always supported Swaziland behind closed doors as much as it supports other smaller and poorer states in its region. The distribution of tariffs within SACU is skewed so that the smaller states benefit disproportionally highly from the union. Effectively, there are hidden subsidies from South Africa for Swaziland and the other countries.80 Ebrahim Ebrahim, who is currently South Africa’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, explains: “why should we impose sanctions on our neighbouring countries? And who is it going to affect? It will affect the people of Swaziland. And if there is an economic meltdown there they are all going to come to South Africa. We don’t want to punish the people of Swaziland, why should we do that?”81 In other words, South Africa is well advised to keep the situation calm and not to change the status quo. The dependency on South Africa might lead to the premature conclusion that South Africa considers Swaziland to be its tenth province. A Swazi rightly remarks: “if they took us like the tenth province they would have more interest.”82 The “hostage” picture painted by Jack Halpern is therefore more precise: South Africa has the ability to fully control Swaziland and exercise significant influence.83 Yet, Swaziland is too uninteresting for South Africa to fully exercise its dominance. Therefore, they stand by and observe.

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Is Swaziland really unimportant in the region and beyond, as implied above? International news coverage might have given another impression, implying that Swaziland played an important role in the Zimbabwe power sharing negotiations in 2008. The Times of Swaziland even declared the Zimbabwean power sharing agreement as a “victory for King Mwsati III.”84 In fact, some meetings took place in Swaziland, bringing the country world-wide attention. However, the reason why Swaziland hosted these meetings was not its influential role in the region or its outstanding ability to broker political deals, but was because Swaziland held the chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security at that time.85 SADC, prompted by South Africa, Zambia, and Botswana as well as, to a certain extent, by Zimbabwe’s Tsvangirai, had to deal with the post-election situation in Zimbabwe to try to prevent a bloody civil war with possible spillover effects into neighboring countries. There was even “widespread resistance to Swaziland taking over the leadership of the SADC security organ from Angola.”86 Despite this resistance, Swaziland chaired the talks. According to officials, the Swazi position is to promote dialogue within Zimbabwe and similar cases, but stay on the sidelines and let the citizens find their own solution. An official says: “if you revisit that [SADC] statement [on Zimbabwe], it reflected solely or mainly this Swazi influence of dialogue and dialogue until the local people find a sustainable solution.”87 Although there is a certain amount of truth in this claim, it would be wrong to assume that Swaziland’s doctrine of non-interference reflects the way the Zimbabwe issue was handled. On the contrary, there was massive interference from SADC members: open critique (Zambia and Botswana) as well as hard negotiations and pressure behind the scenes (South Africa). It was Mbeki who brokered the deal under the auspices of SADC. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that SADC stayed silent and let the Zimbabweans solve their own problems. Swaziland’s passiveness in regional and international affairs is not surprising. Officials admit and stress that an unwritten doctrine of Swaziland’s foreign policy is to regard the principle of non-interference as sacrosanct. A top official remarks: Our policy is non-interference with other nations’ internal affairs. That we maintain, even our approach in SADC itself is that we should only facilitate and not interfere with what the people are doing because ultimately it is the people themselves who can resolve their own problems. People from outside can only assist and they do best in their assistance by facilitating to enable the local people to dialogue and come up with their own solutions, lasting solutions,

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Swaziland otherwise you impose a solution or you force a solution it might not be sustainable. So this is Swaziland’s approach to international affairs.88

In other words, Swaziland does not engage in the internal affairs of other states, adhering to the tradition of the OAU’s guiding principle, which was thought to have changed after the organization’s transformation into the AU. It seems to be true when an academic from Swaziland suggests that in general his country does not have its own foreign policy position. Instead, it hides behind one of the organizations of which it is a member. The source does not restrict this view to Swaziland. He states: “how many of the states in the region or in the AU act individually, unilaterally to pursue the interest of the organization? … The majority of African states don’t really want to come out as individuals; they are always hiding behind these organizations.”89 This “hiding approach” was clearly visible during the Madagascar crisis in 2009. The ousted president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, fled from his country to Swaziland on 24 March 2009 to hold talks with Mswati, who was still the chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security. Mswati scuttled to hide behind SADC and hosted a SADC meeting on 2 April 2009. Before that, he showed Ravalomanana signals of support and offered him asylum. Despite this offer, Ravalomanana quickly left for South Africa.90 Swaziland remained quiet from that moment on. As a source knows, Mswati was at first supportive of the ousted president of Madagascar but was then ordered by the South Africans to keep silent.91 Mswati obeyed and Swaziland’s position in the Madagascar crisis aligned with the SADC position. As should have become clear, Swaziland’s own foreign policy agenda is limited and often restricted by external players, most notably by South Africa. The way in which Swaziland’s restricted foreign policy agenda, dependence on South Africa, and its strict adherence to the principle of non-interference play out in the AU is elaborated in the next section.

Swaziland and the African Union Mswati’s kingdom plays a marginal role in the AU and it keeps a very low profile. Its voice is not heard and, in fact, Swazis rarely speak out. Although not to the extent of President Mugabe, King Mswati sees the AU—at best—as a debating club. Owing to Swaziland’s perceived insignificance, Mswati does not dare, unlike Mugabe, to gain legitimacy from the AU. Swaziland hardly engages in AU institutions and has not joined

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the APRM or the AU Court of Justice. Moreover, it hides behind SADC when it comes to Gaddafi’s Union Government idea. This appraisal is explored in the following part and reasons for Swaziland’s rejection of working toward deeper integration are provided. Swaziland shows that it is not committed to the AU and its institution. Its classification as a Defender in the context of this study is mainly because of its unwillingness to join AU institutions. Moreover, it shows little commitment to the NEPAD initiative. The most obvious reason for its refusal to join the APRM is its fear that grievances in Swaziland will be uncovered in the process. Many international studies92 as well as internal African election monitoring reports93 perceive challenges to democratization in Swaziland with particular reference to the last elections of 2008. Observers are united in their opinion that the true reason why Swaziland will not join the APRM is the fact that their review report would be harshly critical and threaten the current regime.94 Swaziland’s standing in the AU is not so strong that it would have the ability and resources to whitewash its APRM report as other states have. The official position is thus to wait and see how the APRM initiative develops. A high-ranking Swazi official says: “There is no rush … we are not the only ones who are not part of that. … It’s a voluntary thing. So others have volunteered we will wait and see. They are being reviewed, there is no rush.”95 Moreover, the same official claims: “we have absolutely nothing to hide, we could join tomorrow. … We are observing what is happening. … Swaziland is not averse with the idea of peer-review. We are not against it. It was just a matter of choice that we were not the first ones to jump into the court.”96 However, this person fails to provide reasons for not joining the APRM, given that already more than half of the AU members have joined the APRM and Swaziland’s “no-rush-excuse” seems not to be convincing. At the time of research in Swaziland, the APRM initiative was about eight years old and some seven countries had been fully reviewed. As far as the APRM Secretariat is concerned, there are no talks about or indications of Swaziland joining the process.97 Similar to the APRM question, Swaziland’s position toward the Union Government is characterized by a rejection of any change in the status quo. In this regard, Swaziland’s position in the Union Government is the same as SADC’s position: to integrate at the regional level first and use these blocks as building blocks for the United States of Africa some time in the future. However, what is striking about the Swazi position vis-à-vis continental integration is its ignorance. An official admits that Swaziland pursues a pragmatic policy in this regard: “We walk with the majority.”98 Another interviewee states that the Union Government is “pie in the sky.”99 It appears that Swaziland either does not consider

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the AU as a serious venture or has no capacity to deal with any foreign policy issues beyond its immediate interests in the region. A lack of capacity resulting from the country’s size is obvious. However, as the later case studies on Uganda and Mauritius, in particular, show, political priorities largely depend on the decision maker’s personal commitment. Consequently, the question emerges as to why Mswati does not pay any attention to the AU and the Union Government in particular. Swaziland has never pursued an independent policy initiative in the Union Government debate, although it has been engaged in talks on this matter since before 2006. Swazis never understood the debate to be a serious undertaking and considered the Grand Debate as “the Gaddafi-led thing.”100 When, in 2006, a commission led by Nigeria’s president Olusegun Obasanjo proposed to establish the United States of Africa by 2015, Swaziland agreed with those states that said that this time frame is unrealistic. Moreover, Swazis—at least those on the backbenches—have asked whether the current institutional framework of the AU would not serve the organization in the same way as a Union Government and in this case there is no need to create a continental government. This is another indication that Swaziland is not considering the vision of the United States of Africa, but on the contrary wants to stop the AU from developing further. In this light, it seems cynical that Swazi officials argue that their commitment to the AU is “very strong.”101 As a matter of fact, Swazi officials have not even considered the idea of a sectoral approach to the integration question, although this idea has been tabled in Addis Ababa on various occasions and even discussed during AU summits.102 Hence, there can only be one conclusion, as expressed by an interviewee: “I wouldn’t say I have identified an activity on the part of Swaziland that displays a specific commitment to the African Union.”103 The motives for Swaziland’s reluctance to get involved in the AU are certainly to do with losing its sovereignty. Officials deny that the issue of sovereignty is Swaziland’s main obstacle to the Union Government, yet they admit that it is a “major” issue.104 A former politician connects the sovereignty question with the cultural dimension: “that is the character of the Swazi culture. [We] are … independent people, an independent nation and won’t be subjected to anybody.”105 Indeed, as much as tradition is used to justify domestic politics, it also serves as a justification not to engage in building the Union Government. A source expresses that there is an “abuse of culture.”106 From the monarch’s point of view, tradition does not allow a priori any sovereign rights to be ceded. Hence, any integration efforts including any transfer of power away from the monarch are excluded by traditionalist thinking in the kingdom.

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Undeniably, the question of power plays a crucial role too.107 A trade unionist argues: “they believe they already have maximum and commanding power within their own states. And placing a government under a structure like this one [the Union Government] gives an impression that you are subordinating your sovereignty to a particular leader at a particular time.”108 The king and his cronies do not want to give the impression that they will be inferior to anybody. The constitution makes this clear in Section 11, which highlights that the king has absolute immunity and is therefore effectively above the law.109 A close observer similarly argues: “for small states like Swaziland it’s about the power to influence their own domestic issues, their own domestic politics. If we were to subject ourselves to the AU having all the policies to decide, including our domestic politics, then we may not even have the system that we have.”110 In fact, as the Swazi position vis-à-vis the APRM suggests, the king and his cronies consider the AU to be a threat. They closely follow a paradigm shift away from the doctrine of non-interference—the doctrine Swaziland is a strong adherent of—toward the doctrine of nonindifference that is taking place within Africa. The same is true for SADC as there were loud calls to intervene in the 2008 Zimbabwe crisis. If the AU decided to intervene in Zimbabwe as they had done before, for instance in Sudan or Somalia, who can guarantee the king that SADC or the AU would not intervene in his kingdom to promote democracy and human rights? Although Swaziland receives little attention and might be able to hide itself in Africa’s sea of non-democratic countries, the AU intervention in the tiny Comoros in 2008 showed that even small countries are on the AU’s radar. In fact, small states are easier operating grounds for the AU as they need fewer resources with which to handle the situation and success is more likely to occur. Swazis choose not to be vocal in the AU even though “nobody will take Swaziland seriously in a meeting” due its perceived unimportance.111 The kingdom follows a strong non-interventionist position in order to ensure that the AU undertakes no measures against it. Additionally, Swaziland must maintain good relations with neighboring South Africa. It is certain that, as long as the South African administration sees no need to engage in Swaziland’s internal affairs, there will be no interference, from either SADC or the AU. Swaziland’s plan is simple and its resources sufficient: they can concentrate on their immediate region, maintaining good relations with South Africa, but also with nondemocratic allies such as Mugabe and Gaddafi who can back them in international fora. Within the AU and SADC, Swaziland sticks to the majority and strictly adheres to the policy of non-interference. As its

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foreign policy is often the one South Africa promotes, it can hide behind its bigger and more vocal neighbor and thus protect itself. In addition to this, it must be stressed that Swaziland is one of the countries that would not benefit from deeper integration in the short and medium term. As mentioned above, about two-thirds of Swaziland’s public revenue is raised through tariff distribution within SACU. The country would lose this benefit if continental integration proceeded and if a free trade area was established in the SADC region or beyond. This would effectively and sustainably bankrupt the state as shown by the breakdown of revenues in 2010–11. Accordingly, the policy of maintaining the status quo and stopping the immediate establishment of the Union Government fits into Swaziland’s plan, which is now accompanied by the hope for increasing SACU revenue in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Conclusion The Defenders Swaziland and Zimbabwe share certain elements of their foreign policy, such as adherence to the principle of non-interference. Their policy toward the Union Government is similar as they both reject deeper integration. The key difference between the two Defenders lies in the way the policy is derived and justified. While Mugabe uses internationally provided sovereignty and the liberation war as justification for his rule, Mswati derives his right to rule from Swazi tradition. There is no path dependency and no critical juncture with regard to decolonization, but we can identify a path dependency that reaches back to pre-colonial times and is concerned with Swaziland’s tradition as the determining factor in Swaziland’s politics. The fact that the monarchy survived the colonial era puts the king into a strong position and links the crown and himself personally to his country. He believes that sovereignty is vested in him; it is not provided externally but inherited internally. Mswati does not dare to surrender any sovereign rights that are vested in him as king. Such a policy is excluded a priori. Like Zimbabwe, Swaziland is another case that shows that undemocratic states are reluctant to engage in deeper integration, thus shedding further light on the conjecture made above that there is a connection between authoritarian rule and the refusal to surrender sovereignty. The discussion above revealed fears that Swaziland’s participation vis-à-vis AU institutions such as the APRM would uncover the deeply undemocratic political system in the country, which would threaten the king and his cronies in their patronage system.

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Swaziland has no interest in integrating politically, either in the context of the AU or in the SADC region, as its membership of SACU is so beneficial for Swaziland that it does not want to give up this favorable position. The advocacy of the SACU is, however, also linked to Swaziland’s dependency on South Africa. The asymmetrical relationship with its neighbor sets the limits of Swaziland’s foreign policy and restricts the country to focus on the region. Yet at the same time, Swaziland can hide behind South Africa in questions such as the Grand Debate and thus has not to come out with its own opinion, which puts it in a comfortable position. As a matter of fact, King Mswati’s approach is to keep a low profile in order not to be conspicuous, which in turn could create foreign pressure against him and his regime. Hence, he plays a negligible role in the AU and is likely to continue playing this role.

4

Algeria

Algeria’s past and more recent history is one of building a nation in the constant struggle to affirm its identity and uphold its dignity and sovereignty. APRM Report on Algeria

Algeria is situated in the Maghreb region of northern Africa. It is the second largest African country in terms of territory and is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north. To its east lie Tunisia and Libya, to its west Morocco, the Western Sahara, and Mauritania and to its south Mali as well as Niger. The recent history of Algeria is in many ways unique,1 as it is the only country in the Maghreb region that had to engage in a long and intense war (1954–62) in order to gain independence from France. It also experienced a civil war in the 1990s. Algeria’s citizens and the political elite, including the incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, had to fight for Algeria’s freedom and the right to self-determination. Self-determination as a guiding principle became evident in the 1960s and 1970s when Algeria became a major platform for training African freedom fighters while promoting the solidarity and liberation enshrined in the OAU Charter. These guiding principles, alongside non-interference, not only shape Algeria’s policy vis-à-vis the AU but also influence its policy on the Western Sahara conflict, in which Algeria is heavily involved. However, Algeria’s foreign policy was and is not limited to the liberation struggle of the continent: it reaches beyond Africa. Post-colonial Algeria emerged as the leader of the Third World under President Houari Boumedienne and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bouteflika (1965–78). Bouteflika was able to capitalize on his previous role when assuming the presidency after the civil war in 1999, using the AU as a springboard for his diplomacy to end isolation. He served as chairman of the OAU in 1999 and spearheaded the NEPAD initiative. Despite Algeria’s

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general interest in NEPAD and the AU, the government would not take the leap to join the United States of Africa. The reasons for this are elaborated in this chapter. The analysis starts with descriptions of Algeria’s liberation war, its “golden era,” referring to the successful foreign policy under President Boumedienne and the civil war at the end of which Bouteflika came to power. The following section provides facts regarding Algeria’s economic standing. The next section explains who, effectively, is behind foreign policy making. Before concluding, two sections examine Algeria’s foreign policy in general and the country’s relation to the AU in particular.

Algeria’s rise, fall, and reemergence France began its conquest of Algeria in 1830. It was only in the 1850s that Algeria came completely under colonial rule, but not without showing opposition in various parts of the country.2 After gaining control of Algeria, it took more than 50 years until demands for self-determination increased within Algeria.3 However, they only posed a serious threat to French rule after World War II. 8 May 1945 was a turning point in Algeria’s history. The world watched the events in central Europe as Nazi Germany was finally defeated and World War II was effectively over in Europe. On the same day, largely unnoticed by the international community, riots erupted in eastern Algeria where Algerian war veterans and the rural population insisted that the war would not be over until they were granted independence and the right to self-determination.4 The ruthless crackdown on the riots cost the lives of many Algerians; reports range from 6,000 to 45,000 casualties.5 After the events of 8 May, the Algerians now realized “that French colonialism could not be beaten by peaceful way, but was required to be eliminated by force.”6 Various liberation movements emerged in the following months and years, ultimately leading to the creation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a fractioned movement, which launched the war of independence on 1 November 1954. What followed was the first large scale fight for liberation on African soil. The war lasted for more than seven years and caused between 250,000 and 300,000 casualties within the estimated 8.5 million strong Muslim population.7 The brutality carried out by the French against the Algerians did not suppress the uprising as the French had anticipated. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Nationalistic determination to gain independence grew stronger.8 At that stage, the war had also been a diplomatic war with the FLN seeking international help, especially within the United Nations.

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The FLN and its representatives acted as skillful international actors providing the basis for their later role as Third World leaders. In the early 1960s, after Charles De Gaulle had assumed power in France, colonial France realized that it stood no chance of winning the struggle and thus began negotiations. Ultimately, a provisional government was installed in March 1962, and on 1 July, a referendum was held in which 91 percent of the voters chose independence.9 On 5 July 1962, Algeria became independent with Ahmed Ben Bella as the prime minister; months later, he became president. The war of liberation undoubtedly became part of state doctrine and the national founding myth.10 The FLN was not led by a single individual, but had a collective leadership.11 Unlike in Zimbabwe and South Africa, where Mugabe and Nkomo, Mandela and Oliver Tambo, respectively, were primarily idolized, the FLN made the struggle for independence itself the symbol of worship.12 The army emerged as the unchallenged actor in Algerian politics, deriving its legitimacy to rule from its fight.13 In June 1965, the military ousted the military-installed President Ben Bella and brought Colonel Houari Boumedienne to power through a bloodless coup d’état. Boumedienne quickly gained the respect of the population, winning elections with landslide victories; however, one must not forget that he established a military dictatorship which took a hard stance against its opponents. Nevertheless, the president and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Bouteflika were internationally respected as Third World leaders.14 Since Ben Bella, Algeria has championed the African cause and supported the liberation struggles of various African countries. Later African presidents such as Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Samora Machel, and Nelson Mandela received military training in Algeria. Algerian diplomats thus proudly claim that Algiers became the “Mecca” of the liberation struggle and a center of radical anti-colonialism.15 Owing to growing oil production, Algeria enjoyed a phase of some wealth, stabilizing the political system for some years, yet with “[t]he old guard [which] had won the state in 1962 and was treating it as their personal property.”16 After riots in 1988, which erupted in the context of a bleak socio-economic situation, President Chadli Bendjedid, who succeeded Boumedienne and interim President Rabah Bitat in 1979, introduced economic adjustment measures and made the bold move to introduce a new constitution that allowed for a multiparty system. Several parties emerged, most notably the Berber party Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie and the Islamist party Front islamique du salut (FIS). The latter in particular posed the most serious challenge to the rule of the FLN which had been in power since independence.

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The following parliamentary elections were to be held in two rounds. The first round in December 1991 proved to be a success for the FIS which clearly defeated the FLN. The FIS fell short of winning an absolute majority and the threat of an Islamist state was imminent. The military wanted to prevent this and intervened. They had “to uphold its acute sense of Algerian nationalism, a nationalism that has deep roots in the struggle for independence in which the army played a central part.”17 Parliament was dissolved on 4 January 1992, and days before the second round could take place, the military cancelled the elections. President Chadli resigned and a group of former liberation fighters resumed the leadership. Algeria was moving back into authoritarian rule. What followed was a “programmed tragedy”:18 the Algerian civil war erupted. The FIS, through its military wing, and other factions fought against the military government both inside and outside Algeria, notably in France. It is estimated that at least 100,000 people lost their lives during the war in Algeria, although other sources claim 200,000.19 Amid the civil war, a new era was heralded when President Liamine Zéroual, who had come to power in 1995, announced his resignation. The following election in 1999 saw the former independence fighter and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bouteflika win. Bouteflika had lived in exile since the 1980s and was thus not connected with the “dark decade” of Algeria’s civil war.20 The new president pursued a policy of building peace and stability and working toward reconciliation. Bouteflika established contacts with rebels and pardoned thousands of imprisoned Islamist sympathizers.21 National reconciliation became one of the hallmarks of Bouteflika’s domestic policy, which was initiated when he opted for a general amnesty, including the military. This was tactically important for Bouteflika as only an appeased military would allow him to stay in power. In 2005, he put a National Charter on Peace and Reconciliation to a referendum, which was overwhelmingly endorsed.22 In 2004, Bouteflika made national reconciliation the dominant theme in his re-election campaign23 and continued to do so in his 2009 electoral campaign.24 It is interesting to note that, although the current leadership tries to sweep the civil war past under the rug,25 it simultaneously keeps the “glorious epic”26 of the independence struggle alive. In fact, the liberation war is still important for contemporary Algeria. The Preamble of the current Algerian constitution not only mentions the independence struggle, but labels it as a founding doctrine of the Algerian state.27 Article 73 of the constitution demands that, for a president to be elected, he must prove that he participated in the liberation struggle if he was born before 1942.28 The importance of the liberation

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struggle for today’s society becomes apparent in Jonathan Hill’s study on identity in Algeria (published in 2008): As preparations for Algeria’s half-centenary celebrations gather pace, its citizens are encouraged, somewhat inevitably, to reflect on their country’s past. For older generations, the war of liberation remains the most hallowed of memories. More than any other, it is a source of immense pride, as Algerians, led by the National Liberation Front, wrenched themselves free from the shackles of colonial rule. And they have been encouraged to believe this by every government since independence. To them, the war was not only the means by which the French were driven out of Algeria, it was the crucible in which the nation was forged, finally made aware of its own existence. Some of the younger generations, too, revel in this history. For as long as they can remember, they have been told the same story, a version of events that remains under the strictest supervision of the country’s political leaders. And while some of their peers might not care or are tired of being denied certain privileges because they did not participate in the war, they still largely accept its historical importance.29 There is no doubt that there is a path dependency between the liberation struggle and the president’s, the army’s, and the ruling party’s perception of ruling the country legitimately: Algerians are constantly reminded of the sacrifices made during the war of independence by the mere presence of political leaders who personally fought in the war some 50 years ago. Even though this carefully constructed picture was challenged during the civil war in the 1990s, former fighters continue to promote memories of the independence war.30 “The former veterans of the war of independence … [manage] to portray themselves as figures of timeless importance to Algeria’s national destiny.”31 Bouteflika’s regime even receives foreign help in keeping the memory alive. Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, Chairperson of the APRM Forum, highlights Algeria’s role as “[v]anguard of the fight for decolonisation of Africa”32 in his foreword to the Algerian APRM report. On account of its hard-won independence and right to self-determination, Algeria became a champion of these principles and guards its sovereignty carefully. This obviously impacts on its relations with the AU. Later sections in this chapter depart from this. The next section on the socio-economic situation of Algeria provides the grounds for the general argument of this chapter.

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Oil, gas, and the European Union Algeria is not only the second largest African country in terms of size, it is also the eighth largest country in terms of population, estimated at 35.7 million in 2010.33 Owing to its energy exports, it has the fourth largest national gross domestic product (GDP) in Africa and the ninth largest GDP per capita on the continent. It is ranked at position 104 in the Human Development Report 2009 with a “medium development,” belonging to the highest group of African states.34 The north African country has a clear orientation toward Europe. The Algerian Ministry of Finance reports that, in the first part of 2010, 57.84 percent of the country’s exports went to the European Union and 54.58 percent of its imports came from there, while 32.95 percent of Algeria’s exports were for other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and 15.11 percent of its imports came from these states. Only 1.11 percent of its imports came from the Maghreb region, that is the L’Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), which comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and only 1.37 percent of its exports went to this region. The inter-region trade is still significantly larger than Algeria’s trade with the rest of Africa: 0.15 percent of Algeria’s exports were for sub-Saharan Africa and 1.39 percent of its imports came from there.35 The interpretation of these data only allows for one conclusion: the Maghreb region and the rest of Africa are of little importance to Algeria for trade and economic purposes. In fact, regional integration within the UMA framework “remains a distant wish.”36 Independent Algeria has been a long-standing trading partner of the Europeans, dating back to the mid-1970s.37 The association agreement concluded between Algeria and the European Union in 2002, which became effective in 2005, regulates trade between the two partners.38 Today, 98 percent of Algeria’s exports to the European Union are energy related,39 indicating the importance of Algeria’s oil and gas to its economy. Algeria’s economic rise in the 1960s and 1970s was based on oil discoveries, which enabled the country’s emancipation from neo-colonial rule. In 1971, Boumedienne began the “decolonization of petroleum,”40 which culminated in the nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The hydrocarbon sector still remains government owned. Sonatrach, the state owned enterprise, prides itself on being ranked as the largest company in Africa and the 12th in the world in 2008.41 Apart from oil and gas, Algeria is starting to invest in solar technology. Alongside its neighbors, it is a member of the Desertec project, which aims to provide 15

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percent of Europe’s energy supply through regenerative sources in the near future. Although the project had a successful start in 2009, experts soon became more skeptical about the eventual size and effectiveness of the project.42

The president and the military Algeria’s political system used to be dominated by the military.43 Power only recently shifted toward the presidency. President Bouteflika is in the process of neutralizing the military, which has selected every president since independence including himself.44 This section primarily looks at how Bouteflika shifted power and by what means, eventually proving himself as the key domestic and foreign policy maker. The 1991–92 elections were supposed to mark the beginning of a democratic era; yet, the ensuing civil war triggered by the results of the first round of the election postponed the start of Algeria’s transition to democratic rule for almost a decade. Bouteflika’s victory in the 1999 elections should by no means be seen as a model of a democratic election. The campaign may have seemed free and fair, but all the other candidates withdrew from the race claiming that the vote was going to be rigged. There is no doubt that the military wanted to install Bouteflika as president.45 The former foreign minister was backed by the military because his “diplomatic experience as Algeria’s long-lasting foreign minister (1963–79), his knowledge of the system, relatively good relations with the military and negotiation skills were looked upon favourably by the armed forces, whose support he badly needed and, indeed, succeeded in securing.”46 President Bouteflika initially lacked legitimacy because of the flawed election and low turn-out. Hence, he hoped to gain legitimacy through the referendum on national reconciliation that he put to the vote in September 199947 and through his re-election in 2004 in which he secured 84.99 percent of the votes cast.48 This election was widely considered to be free and fair,49 although only 58 percent of the electorate went to the polls.50 Bouteflika raised doubts about his democratic intentions in 2009 when he allowed the constitution to be altered so that he could serve as president for a third term. The extension of the president’s term shows the limited role parliament has and the control Bouteflika exercises over the legislative arm. The parliament passed the bill, without debate, by a show of hands with 500 to 21 for an increase in the term limit.51 In fact, even though the current constitution of 1996 has given the parliament some strength, it is still the president who exerts formidable power.52 He can appoint

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one-third of the parliamentarians,53 thus making it easy for him to retain control over the legislative organ. Similarly limited is the role of the prime minister;54 Bouteflika skillfully selected his previous prime ministers, serving the interests of various groups in society in turn. There is, however, no doubt that the military plays a dominant role in Algeria’s development.55 The army reinforced its power to rule through the historical legitimacy it gained during the liberation struggle.56 Indeed, the sovereignty of the nation is inherently linked with the army’s liberation war, making the military a “political institution.”57 The army has chosen all the presidents since independence and delayed Algeria’s democratization by cancelling the 1991–92 elections. It also enabled Bouteflika to serve as president. Hence, one might conclude that it is the army that runs Algeria. Contrary to the finding of Hill that the army will remain the kingmaker and has the final say, Robert Mortimer argues that Bouteflika has sidelined the military over the past decade.58 Although there is indeed little doubt that Bouteflika has skillfully outmaneuvered the military, Hill seems to be right when he suggests that “Bouteflika knows better than anyone the immense political power wielded by the armed forces’ commanding officers.”59 To ensure that the military cannot continue to dominate the political scene to the same extent, Bouteflika pushed for significant changes in the military. He did not appoint a defense minister, instead retaining this task himself. The military are no longer allowed to have polling stations in the barracks to avoid electoral fraud.60 Furthermore, Bouteflika appeased the military by crediting the army for having saved Algeria when it closed the doors to Islamists in 1992. Moreover, he replaced the Chief of Staff General Mohamed Lamari in 2004, appointing the more moderate Salah Ahmed Gaid to the post.61 The military were pushed further into the background after the president secured almost 85 percent of the votes in the 2004 elections. Hugh Roberts finds that “getting himself re-elected has entailed a dramatic strengthening of the presidency and has accelerated the army’s retreat from the political stage.”62 With the 2009 presidential elections, in which more than 90 percent of the votes went to Bouteflika (officials report a voter turn-out of 74 percent), this trend was continued.63 Bouteflika’s position should be seen as having been consolidated after the first decade of the twenty-first century and was not challenged during the so called Arab Spring in early 2011, which also affected Algeria at the margins. Bouteflika had moved to the center of the political system in Algeria and stands firm there. He tightened his grip on the media and dominates the political system and social space through it.64 Having sidelined the military and gained control over Algeria’s political system, including the marginalization of political parties, Bouteflika’s

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regime can be seen as having an “emphatic authoritarian aspect.”65 Article 77 of the Algerian constitution grants the president supremacy over foreign policy.66 In terms of political reality, there is no doubt that Bouteflika makes Algeria’s foreign policy and is particularly active in this realm.67 This also gives him political leverage, which enables him to translate his foreign political weight into domestic power. “As a master diplomat, Bouteflika revelled in these international fora [OAU, AU, NEPAD and others], converting his prominence on the international stage into political capital at home. The foreign minister-turned-president exploited his reputation abroad to construct an aura of international prestige around his presidency.”68 Having noted that Bouteflika is the locus of foreign policy decision making, a few things need to be said about him. Referring to the time when he was foreign minister, he is retrospectively described as a “superforeign minister”69 and “dandy diplomat.”70 Born in 1937, he joined the liberation movement in 1957. He became a crucial player in negotiating Algeria’s independence from France. The young foreign minister Bouteflika gained a lot of respect when he served as prime diplomat, particularly as the leader of the Third World within the United Nations framework.71 The US diplomat W. Tapley Bennett, who served his country in the United Nations, is quoted: Then the Algerians would ram their measures through, they would tyrannize some of the milder Africans. I would say there was one year—and I don’t think this is too much of an exaggeration— when in many ways the single most influential country at the U.N. was Algeria: more than ourselves, more than the Russians, more than the British, just because they had this vehicle at their beck and call, and used it.72 Bouteflika still dominates the foreign policy realm.73 He is fully involved in the making of foreign policy and leaves only routine questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.74

Third Worldism and the foreign policy beyond Algeria’s post-colonial foreign policy can be divided into four phases. In the first phase, during the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria not only coined the concept of Third Worldism75 and became the leader of the Third World but also became one of the most influential states within both the United Nations as well as the African continent because Algiers became the Mecca of the continental liberation struggle. The second

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period runs from the end of the Boumedienne era when Algeria—under President Chadli Bendjedid—withdrew diplomatically from the international scene, while expanding economically.76 During the third period, which covers the Algerian civil war, Algeria was isolated to a notable extent. Once Bouteflika acceded to the presidency in 1999, starting a new and fourth phase of Algeria’s foreign policy, he restored Algeria’s former image and attracted foreign investors.77 Africa served as a springboard from which Bouteflika started his diplomatic offensive.78 This gained further momentum after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States when the administration of President George W. Bush discovered the Bouteflika regime as an ally in its fight against terrorism. The following looks into the phases by concentrating on the first and the last. Once Algeria had gained its hard-won independence, the returning Ben Bella made a speech in which, it is reported, he said that Algeria’s freedom was meaningless as long as Africa continued to suffer from imperialism.79 The Algerian war of independence indeed went beyond Algeria’s borders and “became the very archetype of the mid-twentiethcentury struggle to end Western colonialism.”80 After Algeria had discovered Africa as an objective of foreign policy,81 Ben Bella reminded the leaders present at the OAU founding conference of the “one million five hundred thousand martyrs [that had] fallen on the field of honour,” referring to the deaths in the Algerian liberation war.82 The new foreign policy strategy pushed Algeria to see its “duty to spread the revolt against colonialism and imperialism.”83 Based on his strong anti-colonial belief, Ben Bella pressed for the creation of the OAU Liberation Committee,84 which became a vehicle for the liberation of the continent.85 Consequently, Algeria became the Mecca of the liberation movements and attracted inter alia South Africa’s African National Congress, the Frente de Liberação de Moçambique of Mozambique, the Angolan, Chadian, Eritrean, and South Rhodesian (later Zimbabwean) liberation fighters as well as Palestinian nationalists.86 Today, Algerian officials proudly point to this when asked about Algeria’s role in Africa.87 In the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria’s foreign policy was conducted by freedom fighters who paid specific attention to the decolonization process in Africa and had a keen interest in promoting the Algerian revolution88 and spreading its radical anti-colonial policy.89 Algeria impressed many leaders of non-developed countries when it decided to turn its back on French oil companies and nationalized its oil production in the 1970s.90 Even though Africa is nowadays free from colonial rule, Algeria’s foreign policy is still guided by the idea of self-determination. The Western Sahara issue, in particular, illustrates Algeria’s commitment to this principle. The Western Sahara conflict, however, cannot be considered

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without reference to the relations between Morocco and Algeria. This topic is important for this study for two reasons: first, it impacts on the AU directly because Morocco left the OAU after the Western Sahara was accepted as a member of the organization and refused to join the AU for the same reason. Morocco is thus the only African country that is not a member state of the AU. Second, it is important because there are voices in Addis Ababa claiming that Algeria’s interest in the AU only exists as an attempt to gain support for its position with regard to Western Sahara.91 The first post-colonial conflict between Morocco and Algeria erupted in 1963, when the two countries fought each other in the “Sands War” because of a border dispute.92 This war became the first test of the OAU’s peacekeeping mechanism.93 Using an ad hoc committee filled with individual heads of state and governments—most notably Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia—the OAU assisted Morocco and Algeria in ending the dispute. The efforts of the OAU were seen as a “qualified success”94 or even as a “success,”95 as Emperor Haile Selassie’s involvement appeared particularly helpful in settling the conflict. Relations between the neighbors stabilized towards the end of the 1960s, but new disagreements ignited in 1973 when the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Polisario), Western Sahara’s liberation movement, emerged and launched its first operations against Spain, which still ruled the territory. While Morocco made claims to assert control over the Western Sahara with Mauritania, Algeria supported Western Sahara’s independence and began to support Polisario. The Spanish withdrew in 1975, and Morocco occupied the northern part of Western Sahara by claiming that the territory was part of the former Moroccan empire.96 “Isolated first, Algeria set in motion an intense diplomatic campaign. On February 27, 1976, the majority of members of the … [OAU] were ready to recognize the Polisario Front as a ‘liberation movement.’”97 Tensions within the OAU mounted on the Western Sahara issue as it was an important test of how seriously the OAU took its anti-colonial stand and its fight for the right of selfdetermination,98 because Morocco de facto treated Western Sahara as its colony. Western Sahara’s admission into the OAU consequently “led to the withdrawal of a state [Morocco] that really existed in exchange for one that only functioned on paper.”99 The conflict between Algeria and Morocco has never been resolved despite several attempts by the United Nations and other parties. Morocco itself is not interested in surrendering Western Sahara: first, the territory contains huge deposits of phosphate, and second, the issue has turned into one of national pride by helping to increase social

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control in Morocco.100 In turn, Algeria’s motives are certainly not restricted to upholding the self-determination principle, but arguably are also linked to strategic access to the Atlantic through the Western Sahara101 and the power struggle with Morocco over supremacy in the region. Although regional affairs are thus problematic, Bouteflika considers Africa an important foreign policy domain. Like other countries seeking a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, Algeria sees Africa as a key part of achieving this goal. Gaining all the African votes means securing about a quarter of all the votes in the United Nations. Even though Algerian officials point to the so called Ezulwini consensus of 2005, which deals with the African position on the United Nations reform process and highlights that Algeria has not adopted an official position by aiming for a permanent seat,102 there is no doubt that Algeria considers itself an ideal candidate particularly in the light of its previous role as leader of the Third World and in view of its support for the liberation movements in Africa and beyond. While it was unthinkable during the 1990s that Algeria would play a more prominent role in world affairs, let alone gain a seat at the United Nations Security Council, events changed dramatically both after Bouteflika assumed power in 1999 as well as after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington because the Bush administration discovered Algeria as a key ally in its fight against international terrorism.103 As early as 1999, Bouteflika pointed out the terrorist threat and pushed for a declaration to combat terrorism during the OAU summit in Algiers.104 Nowadays, Algeria is respected for its fight against terrorism and maintains close relations with the United States,105 which is traditionally closer to Morocco. Algeria was successful in emerging as a key player in the global struggle against terrorism and pursues a strategy of diversifying partners.106 Yet, it failed to achieve greater success in improving its relations with its neighbors in the context of the Maghreb integration process. Over the years, Algeria has aimed at promoting regional integration in response to European integration and has always attempted to forge ties in the Maghreb region.107 However, this question is inevitably linked with the conflict over Western Sahara. And in fact, the region is dormant;108 even though Algeria and Morocco agreed to separate the Western Sahara issue from making the UMA, the process remains deadlocked.109 UMA summits in 2002 and 2005 were cancelled on account of the Western Sahara issue.110 Yahia Zoubir maintained that: “[T]he question of the Western Sahara remains the main impediment to a rapprochement, and without such an agreement Maghreb integration is impossible.”111

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Albeit a failure of the UMA, Algeria did not become a member of the Libyan sponsored Community of Sahel–Saharan States, better known as CEN-SAD. This might be due to the lack of beneficial gain Algeria would expect from this organization, linked to the fact that Western Sahara is the second country excluded from this northern and central African organization, and the fact that Algeria’s ties with Libya are not that strong. Algeria believed the community was dominated by Gaddafi acting as hegemon.112 For Algeria, it is more important to maintain cordial relations with Europe, the United States, and other major trading partners as these relations are more beneficial to the country. These relations support Bouteflika’s attempts to increase his domestic legitimacy by being able to prove the support of democratic states. Whether or not the AU is similarly of little importance to Algeria like the UMA and CEN-SAD will be discussed in the next section.

Algeria and the African Union Algeria’s involvement in continental integration was particularly strong under President Ben Bella and President Boumedienne, at a time when Algeria’s capital “was undeniably one of the centres of anti-colonial politics in Africa.”113 In his speech at the founding conference of the OAU, Ben Bella called upon the gathered African leaders inter alia to create a “blood bank … to help these who are fighting in Angola and all over Africa.”114 He called for solidarity and a united Africa in the fight against imperialism. “We have no right to think of filling our bellies when our brothers are still dying in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.”115 President Bouteflika’s foreign policy initially picked up on Ben Bella’s engagement with the continent. Algeria’s and Bouteflika’s re-emergence on to the international scene actually began with an African security problem. In 1999, when Bouteflika assumed power, Ethiopia and Eritrea were engaged in a war against each other. An Algerian, Said Djinnit, who was later the AU peace and security commissioner, was already negotiating between the warring factions, but a peace deal was only negotiated and signed in Algiers when Bouteflika used his OAU chairmanship and his diplomatic prestige in 1999.116 Bouteflika continued his efforts for Africa when he spearheaded the NEPAD initiative, which grew out of the so called Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program, indicating an apparent interest in the socio-economic development and democratization efforts of the AU. Similar to Algeria’s influential role in NEPAD is Algeria’s stance toward the AU. Currently, Algeria holds three important positions within

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the AU framework: first, the commissioner for peace and security is Algerian; second, former President Ben Bella, in his 90s, served until his death in early 2012 as head of the Panel of the Wise, an AU institution to anticipate conflicts in Africa and to engage in preventive diplomacy;117 and lastly, at the margins of the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, Mohammed Séghir Babès became the new chair of the eminent persons, a group of African intellectuals who lead the APRM. Moreover, Algeria is one of the “Big Five” member states. Like Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa, it pays 15 percent of the AU budget and hence has an unspoken, greater influence than states that fail to even pay their smaller percentages of the AU budget. Algeria likes to keep this position. Between 2005 and 2007, it was reported that South Africa offered to pay up to 25 percent of the AU budget, a proposal that was rejected by the other four of the “Big Five.”118 According to wellinformed sources, South Africa proposed later in 2008 to increase its share of the AU budget even up to 34 percent but found no support for its proposal.119 Egypt in particular is said to have been opposed to the idea. Yet, Algeria, too, considers it to be unhealthy to allow South Africa to dominate the AU, and thus opposes the idea of increasing South Africa’s share.120 Arguably, Bouteflika has a general interest in the AU and the NEPAD initiatives, yet doubts over Algeria’s real commitment to the African continent prevail despite assertions sporadically voiced in AU circles that Algeria is indeed a committed AU member.121 As Philipp Reichmuth argues, Algeria’s foreign policy is based on two doctrines: the doctrine of independence and self-determination as well as the doctrine of Arab unity.122 Pan-Africanism is not mentioned in this context. Likewise, Akacem does not mention the (O)AU as a political arena that Algeria engages with in his analysis of Algeria’s foreign policy.123 It is also striking that, in general, analysts of Algeria’s foreign policy mention Africa, but focus their exploration on Algeria’s relations with the Maghreb, France, the European Union, the Arab World, and North America. The reason might be a Western bias; however, the reason might also be that Algeria does not consider Africa to be important. Indeed, several AU officials and other voices in Addis Ababa argue that Algeria has little interest in the AU, as can be seen in the context of the APRM, for example.124 Algeria belonged to the first group of countries that decided to take part in the APRM. Being one of the prime promoters of the NEPAD initiative, “it was only natural for it [Algeria] to implement the APRM on its own territory.”125 After joining the APRM in March 2003, it took two years to set up the National Governing Council, one of the main

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bodies to conduct the self-assessment. Once the evaluation of the review process had started, President Bouteflika ensured “that Algeria would be a glasshouse” and emphasized both “his personal commitment and that of the Algerian authorities.”126 Several institutions, including government bodies and research organizations, were involved in the self-assessment phase. This ended with the drafting of a self-assessment report in summer 2006 in preparation for the country review mission, which visited Algeria during November and December 2006. However, the final self-assessment report was only submitted during the second visit of the country review mission in March 2007,127 and the final report was only compiled and discussed during the APRM Forum meeting in July 2007. In his assessment of the Algerian APRM, Mouloud Boumghar concludes: “Its technical success is as undeniable as its substance is questionable.”128 It appears that the process was rushed and lacked transparency. The National Governing Council met for the first time at the end of March 2006 and was able to compile a first draft of the selfassessment report by August the same year. It is not easy to believe that such a complex assessment as the APRM can be completed in such a short time. Some research institutes were only given one month to conduct their surveys.129 Another problem is the lack of representation in the National Governing Council. There is no available list of council members, yet it seems that the number of representatives from the executive and the legislative bodies was high;130 hence, it is no wonder that the country review mission “felt that the information and data contained in the self-assessment report were too governmental.”131 This comes as little surprise when considering that well-informed sources claim that the National Focal Point, Bouteflika’s Minister of African Affairs, “tried to have a fair amount of control over the local process.”132 This relates to the fact that the Berber socialist party refused to meet the APRM team during its visit in November–December 2006,133 which means that one of the strongest government opponents did not participate in the process. How strong Bouteflika’s influence on the process was is still just speculation, although there are indications that he exercised some control over the evaluation process.134 Similar to the lack of commitment to the APRM, there is also a lack of commitment to the AU peace and security field. Even though Algerian diplomats argue that the African Peace and Security Architecture is the best place to approach the continent’s security problems,135 the country’s participation in AU missions remains marginal. For instance, in early 2009, Algeria pledged to send troops to Somalia to join the AU mission, but to date, these troops have never been deployed. However, Algeria supported Ugandan troops by sending airlifts to Somalia.136

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The Union Government debate might also identify a lack of commitment vis-à-vis the AU. While Ben Bella verbally favored a strong continental body in the early 1960s,137 Algeria nowadays belongs to the gradualist camp and rejects the immediate building of the United States of Africa and the Union Government. However, Algerian officials highlight that infrastructure and harmonization must first be implemented. They argue that the cement of a house must be dry before the roof is built, implying that the necessary preconditions for the Union Government have not been met.138 Algeria’s emphasis on NEPAD indicates its position that economic growth is the priority and political integration comes second. From the current perspective, suggested by the figures provided above and by Algeria’s long-standing rivalry with Morocco, it seems unlikely that economic cooperation between Algeria and its immediate region as well as between Algeria and the continent will increase significantly in the near future. Still, Algeria takes part in the Grand Debate and endorsed the Accra Declaration rather than opposing it. Nevertheless, Algeria’s position vis-à-vis the idea of the Union Government idea is clear. In an article about the idea of the Union Government published in the Algerian newspaper El Watan, the author presents a list of reasons why such a government would face severe difficulties. The article lists that, among other things, the budget problem has yet to be solved, the Union is a syndicate of the heads of state and government, the AU does not function well, and the Union does not represent the African people.139 Although the Algerian government would certainly dispute the assumption that the AU is a syndicate of the heads of state and government, it should be in agreement with most of the other arguments and hence reject the immediate building of the Union Government.

Conclusion The general theme of this chapter was that Algeria is reluctant to engage in the AU. Hence, the question arises as to why Algeria is still part of the AU, supporting and promoting the NEPAD initiative. The following will briefly mention several aspects that explain Algeria’s specific foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU and in this way will summarize and conclude the chapter. Starting with the economic aspects, it has become clear that Algeria, as one of Africa’s richest states, sees little economic benefit in regional or continental integration. Africa might be a market of the future, and Algeria is best placed geographically to link sub-Saharan Africa with Europe; yet, for the time being, Algeria is concentrating on Europe and

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North America as trading partners. This is also a necessity as Algeria’s relations with Morocco are so tense that regional integration remains a distant dream. The AU is indeed less used for economic purposes than to gain prestige and strengthen the domestic position of the president.140 The OAU summit in 1999, only a few weeks after Bouteflika’s election, was seen as a “golden opportunity”141 and was skillfully used by the new president to re-introduce himself to the international stage and translate this into domestic leverage. Participation in the APRM is a continuation of this policy. The ultimate goal is reemergence as an important global actor, preferably by gaining a seat at the United Nations Security Council. The AU is required to achieve this. Although all these political calculations play a role, the most important explanatory factors in explaining Algeria’s foreign policy are decolonization’s legacies. As became clear, Bouteflika and some individuals in his regime, who themselves fought for independence and the selfdetermination of Algeria, have a genuine interest in promoting Algeria’s and other countries’ rights to self-determination. This impacts on its policy vis-à-vis the AU in at least two ways: on the one hand, Algeria needs the AU to support its Western Sahara policy and has so far been successful; on the other hand, the Union Government or the United States of Africa are ruled out a priori. Algeria had to fight for its sovereignty and its self-determination, and it does not look likely at this stage that it would give up any of its sovereignty. Bouteflika belongs to the first generation of Algerian post-independence politicians and was himself part of the struggle against French oppression; as such, all are further attached to the sovereignty and self-determination they fought for. Without any doubt, the liberation fight and its legacies continue to determine Algeria’s foreign policy even though freedom was achieved half a century ago.

5

Ethiopia

This is perhaps the last surviving African civilization. We have our own script. We have our own calendar. We represent the greatness of Africa’s past. We also represent the worst of Africa’s present, in terms of poverty. It is the best and the worst of African reality. Meles Zenawi on Time.com, 6 September 2007

Ethiopia, the landlocked country on the Horn of Africa, surrounded by Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, is in at least two ways primus inter pares in the AU. First, the country hosts both the AU Commission as well as several other AU institutions in its national capital Addis Ababa, which is considered to be the capital of Africa, and second, Ethiopia has never been colonized and can look back on an “uninterrupted history … as a sovereign African state.”1 Ethiopia is often associated with Emperor Haile Selassie, the Mengistu regime, and with poverty and backwardness. All these issues are addressed in this chapter, which also touches upon the emperor’s role in shaping the AU’s predecessor, the OAU. However, the majority of this chapter is devoted to the current situation, namely to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, his government, and their approach to the AU. Like the preceding chapters, the analysis starts with a historic overview that sheds light on Ethiopia’s unique history and reveals how the past impacts current policy making. The following section provides the socio-economic context of contemporary Ethiopia by giving some data on the developmental status of the country. This is followed by a section on the political arena, including an analysis of several political actors and their respective roles in foreign policy making. Next, Ethiopia’s foreign policy is addressed at length. The last analytical section is specifically devoted to Ethiopia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU.

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The source of Ethiopia’s pride Ethiopia can trace its origins back to the ancient kingdom of Aksum which emerged in the sixth century BC. Some centuries later, in the fourth century AD, Christianity arrived in Ethiopia and became the religion of the majority of Ethiopians. The monarchy and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church are two important institutions that guided Ethiopia’s history at least until 1972, the year in which the communist regime assumed power.2 The country’s long history exudes pride and has resulted in the emergence of a distinctive tradition, including a separate alphabet and calendar system,3 which in turn shapes Ethiopia’s distinctive identity and forms a unique way of viewing foreign policy. The fact that the Ethiopians not only managed to defeat the Italians twice in their attempts to rule Ethiopia, but were able to resist other foreign attacks, adds to Ethiopia’s pride as an old culture. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia’s territory, which included today’s Eritrea, was under constant attack, notably from Egypt, the Sudan, and Turkey. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the increasing strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia faced a stronger power, namely Italy.4 The latter purchased an area of an Ethiopian port in 1870 for trading purposes and soon extended this territory, occupying most of today’s Eritrea. The Italians also claimed Ethiopia as its protectorate, but Emperor Menelik II refused to surrender. A war broke out and the Italians were defeated at the battle of Adwa (1896). The Ethiopian victory resulted in Europe’s recognition of Ethiopia as an independent state.5 Yet, Menelik II did not throw the Italians out of today’s Eritrea, which left many Eritreans bitter as they felt abandoned. This event became a crucial factor in Eritrea’s later battle for independence from Ethiopia.6 The battle of Adwa is seen as the beginning of Ethiopia’s foreign policy.7 In 1923, almost three decades later, Ethiopia’s foreign policy activities led to the country joining the League of Nations. Ethiopia had finally emerged as a sovereign state surrounded by colonies and protectorates of the European colonial powers. Notwithstanding Ethiopia’s recognized sovereignty, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and was only defeated in 1941 by combined Ethiopian and British forces. Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been in exile during the Italian occupation, returned to the throne. Following the Italian defeat in World War II, Britain claimed Eritrea as its protectorate while Ethiopia remained an independent country. Ethiopia became a founding member of the United Nations and, as early as 1950, the emperor won the support of the United Nations General Assembly for his plan to federate Ethiopia

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and Eritrea, which paved the way for the union of both states in 1962 when Eritrea’s parliament voted in favor of unity.8 Eritrea was, however, de facto annexed by imperial Ethiopia. Over the centuries, Ethiopia has felt a closer link to the Mediterranean and its Christian culture than to its African neighbors. It has always focused north- and eastward.9 This policy started to change in the late 1950s when Emperor Haile Selassie became active in African affairs. The emperor’s neutral position allowed him to act as a mediator in reconciling the rival Monrovia and Casablanca groups, which led to the establishment of the OAU. Subsequently, Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis Ababa, became the place where the OAU was founded and also the location of the OAU Secretariat. Ethiopia’s capital had become the capital of the continent and holds this status to the present day. The emperor used his foreign policy standing as well as his tactical skills to silence domestic opposition. However, a severe famine in 1974 led to mounting tension and triggered opposition which led to the overthrow of the imperial system.10 Following the emperor’s defeat, Ethiopia experienced two major traumas: a genuine revolution and the seizure of power by guerrilla insurgencies.11 The Derg—the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army—took power and forced the emperor into exile. After having some of his opponents within the Derg executed, Major Mengistu Haile Miriam assumed full power and remained on the Ethiopian political scene until 1991 when he fled into exile in Zimbabwe. His communist rule left Ethiopia devastated. The so called “red terror” used to eliminate the regime’s opposition cost the lives of up to 100,000 Ethiopians.12 In absentia, Mengistu was found guilty of genocide in 2005 after a 12-year trial; yet Zimbabwe’s president, a friend of Mengistu, refused to extradite the former ruler of Ethiopia. Mengistu never returned to Ethiopia. Mengistu was forcibly ousted by increasing domestic opposition in 1991, with the Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front (EPRDF) at the forefront of the fight. “The Tigrayans, whose region is the old heartland, the centre of the first Ethiopian state (the Empire of Aksum), felt historic entitlement to play a role in determining the future of the country.”13 The main element of the EPRDF was the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), led by the later prime minister Meles, who also assumed the leadership of the EPRDF. Among the EPRDF’s allies were the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, led by Eritrea’s later President Isaias Afwerki. Meles was installed as Ethiopia’s head of government, while Isaias Afwerki and his party opted for an independent Eritrea. This was initially supported by the EPRDF who enabled Afwerki to establish an interim government and thereby assume control of Eritrea. Two years

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later, in 1993, the overwhelming majority of Eritreans voted for independence in a United Nations-monitored referendum,14 and subsequently, independence was granted to Eritrea. Since 1991, Meles has served uninterruptedly as the prime minister of Ethiopia, winning elections in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Like Emperor Haile Selassie, he uses the foreign policy arena for domestic purposes and draws on Ethiopia’s distinctive history to increase the country’s international standing. Many observers agree that Ethiopia is different from the rest of Africa because of a self-conception based on its proud, long-standing history and its resistance to colonial oppression.15 Ahmed Hassen, a member of the Ethiopian parliament, states that the country’s history “definitely has its impacts because post-colonial realignment of African countries definitely gives some bearing as to how those countries that have not been colonised take a different position to the countries that have been colonised.”16 Moreover, he argues that Ethiopia always claimed an independent position, a policy approach that was briefly interrupted during Mengistu’s era but restored after Meles and his EPRDF came to power. Another interviewee links history to sovereignty by saying: “We are very jealous of it [sovereignty] and will guard it – whatever it takes. It’s our pride, our history, our culture. It defines us – people all over Ethiopia.”17 As shown later, this historical legacy has an impact on Ethiopia’s policies to the present day.

Ethiopia’s socio-economic situation Ethiopia remains behind. It is ranked at position 171 in the Human Development Index of 2009 and is hence classified as a country with “low human development.”18 About 85 percent of the population are peasants and the dominant mode of production is subsistence agriculture.19 However, the economy has grown steadily at a rate of more than 10 percent per annum since 2005.20 One of Ethiopia’s main challenges is its population growth rate which is estimated to be over 3 percent.21 Interviewees argue that the population growth nullifies economic growth and hence the latter has little or no effect on Ethiopia.22 As no active measures are being taken to combat massive population growth, it must be assumed that the largest landlocked population in the world will continue to increase. Currently, it is estimated that 88 million people live in Ethiopia.23 Another major obstacle to Ethiopia’s development is its poor infrastructure, especially the transportation network. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia does not have a port through which to access world markets. The problem is intensified as neighboring countries that have a harbor

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are either unstable or have tense relations with Ethiopia. The loss of the Eritrean harbors of Asseb and Massaw, in particular, following Eritrea’s independence has negatively impacted the Ethiopian economy.24 Government officials respond to this by arguing that they view it pragmatically: when Ethiopia had a port, the country did not perform well economically. Since the new government took office in 1991, the economy has shown consistent growth rates which lead them to the conclusion that Ethiopian economy has performed better without a port.25 It is interesting to observe that Ethiopian Airlines, the national carrier, has developed into one of Africa’s largest and most reliable airlines, and that Addis Ababa’s international Bole airport has become one of Africa’s major cargo and passenger hubs. This, to a certain extent, compensates for the lack of a harbor, but it cannot substitute for access to the sea completely. An official says that the economic imperative forces Ethiopia to integrate.26 However, as this chapter will show, there is little evidence that Ethiopia is working toward closer economic and political integration within its region and the continent. In particular, continental economic integration is seen as “a bit in the distant far” and preference is thus given to regional blocks.27 At the regional level, Ethiopia is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The latter was founded by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda in 1986, as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, in order to fight the region’s recurring droughts and famines. Eritrea joined the authority in 1993. In 1995, the organization was superseded by IGAD, which expanded its mandate to include economic cooperation and integration.28 Regional integration is currently stalled because of various challenges, such as Uganda’s and Kenya’s concentration on the East African Community, the lack of a functioning government in Somalia, Sudan’s and Kenya’s internal problems, and the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to the Minimum Integration Program of the AU, which analyzes the status quo of the regional economic communities and provides guidelines on further political action, IGAD is the least developed regional community.29 From the outset, IGAD’s vision was to promote and realize the objectives of a common market for Eastern and Southern Africa within the COMESA initiative.30 COMESA, with its 19 member states ranging from Libya in northern Africa to Swaziland in southern Africa, where 400 million people live, aims to become “a fully integrated, internationally competitive regional economic community with high standards of

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living for all its people ready to merge into an African Economic Community.”31 This huge and heterogeneous organization has been able to implement a free trade area and thus belongs to the group of further developed regional communities.32 However, COMESA is still far from achieving free movement of people33 and faces several other challenges, including the member states’ dual membership in other regional economic communities.34 An interviewee in Mauritius called COMESA a “monster” when referring to its size and inability to integrate so many heterogeneous countries.35 COMESA’s vision seems to be too far-fetched for Ethiopians. Although COMESA launched a customs union in 2009, “the truth of the matter is that COMESA is still very far from achieving a functioning one.”36 Several member states, including Ethiopia and Uganda, have not even signed the agreement on the free trade area. It appears as though Ethiopia does not favor any of the integration schemes, instead aiming to stimulate its economy from within or through bilateral agreements, such as with China, which plays a significant role in Ethiopia.

Iron fists: Haile Selassie, Mengistu, and Meles Zenawi According to Jon Abbink, there is a remarkable parallel between the different political systems of Ethiopia in recent decades, ranging from the imperial system and Mengistu’s socialist regime to the current regime under Meles: “Hierarchy, obedience and forceful authority, inherited from the old imperial system and reinforced by the Marxist-military regime until 1991, are still dominant.”37 The following looks into the contemporary political system of Ethiopia with a particular focus on the leadership of the state in order to identify who the decision maker is. Ethiopia is ranked as “partly free” in the Freedom House Index 2010,38 whereas its press is considered as “not free.”39 Furthermore, trust is a scarce commodity in Ethiopia’s political system. There are Ethiopian intellectuals who complain that they cannot speak about politics, except with people they know well or with foreigners.40 This latent fear is not restricted to intellectuals. As a matter of fact, during research, it appeared that ordinary Ethiopians tried to change the topic when a conversation about the current regime was initiated.41 Although this judgment is only based on several interactions with Ethiopians and should not be seen as representative, in combination with the facts provided above, it seems that freedom of speech is restricted in contemporary Ethiopia. The aforementioned facts are a first indication that democracy and democratic values have not been fully implemented in Ethiopia. The last elections, particularly those of 2005, are further indications of this

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claim. Although the first elections held in 1995 were generally perceived to herald a new epoch of democratic rule in Ethiopia, hopes faded after the 2000 and 2005 elections. In the context of the 2005 elections, 193 people were killed and more than 750 people injured during protests.42 Meles responded to this: “It’s very obvious now that the opposition tried to change the outcome of the election by unconstitutional means. We felt we had to clamp down. We detained them and we took them to court. … Many of our friends feel that we overreacted. We feel we did not.”43 The crackdown on protestors certainly did not help to improve the reputation of Ethiopia as a democratic country. The 2010 elections were heralded by the closure of a newspaper critical of the government Addis Neger and several other attempts to silence the opposition. Kjetil Tronvoll predicted that the prospects for a truly competitive election in 2010 were bleak and he was proven right.44 Even the current prime minister admits that democracy is not fully present in the country: “[t]he political transformation is still a work in progress. There have been quite a few bumps on the road. But in the end, the movement has been inexorably in the right direction towards permanently establishing democratic institutions, towards further consolidation of a democratic culture and towards further stabilization.”45 Politics is largely done by the prime minister and his allies. The role of the parliament is de facto limited, especially in the foreign policy realm. Only a few foreign policy issues are discussed in parliament, as interviewees state. They claim that once a year the Minister of Foreign Affairs reports to parliament, and that the parliamentarians are otherwise free to raise any foreign policy issue to be debated.46 However, as the ruling party sets the agenda of the plenary sessions, there is not much opportunity for the opposition to include foreign policy items on the agenda if they wish to. A parliamentary culture has not yet developed.47 Abbink describes the parliament as a place “where MPs show no initiative, often doze through sessions, usually follow all that the government party says, and where the opposition, which has virtually no resources— no working budget, no offices—can raise its voice but has no impact.”48 The weakness of the opposition contributes to the delayed development of a parliamentary culture. The opposition is divided and unable to provide a personal and programmatic alternative to Prime Minister Meles and his party. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has fallen behind with regard to foreign policy decision making. Officials argue that the prime minister is responsible for foreign policy, but he needs others to share the responsibility.49 Taking this into account, it seems that the ministry considers itself to be an implementation agency instead of providing impetus

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for decision making.50 With regard to the bureaucracy in general, it seems to be professional and committed to Ethiopian statehood as well as loyal to the government, despite the fact that some bureaucrats were hired by the Mengistu regime.51 Many interviewees highlighted that Ethiopia’s dominant parties, the ERPDF and the TPLF, play a crucial role in defining the country’s foreign policy.52 Minister Bereket Simon, for example, states: “the ruling party … [provides the] general direction of foreign policy, … [which] is articulated in terms of governmental policies and it’s basically the council of ministers that approves the foreign policy.”53 It is difficult to look below the surface and find out how influential the party really is. What seems certain is that the party is vocal on questions relating to the situation in the Horn of Africa. However, when it comes to more distant foreign policy issues, the higher ranking party members do seem less interested. With the reshuffling of the cabinet following the 2010 elections, the prime minister obtained a stronger hold on power than ever before. Parts of the old and influential guard of ministers, including the long serving Minister of Foreign Affairs Seyoum Mesfin and the powerful Trade Minister Girma Biru left, creating political space now filled by Meles.54 Moreover, the party has not managed to popularize a possible successor for Meles despite the current transition in the party’s leadership. Thus, it can be argued that there is a dependency on the incumbent prime minister, which places him at the center of the analysis. Meles was once asked directly about what would happen if he left and whether there would be a vacuum. He replied: “No. Politics here is not personality based. It is ideologically driven and organization based. That’s part of its strength.”55 In the initial phase of his premiership, Meles enjoyed the respect of many foreign countries. At this time, he “was regarded as one of a breed of younger African leaders who would spearhead a new beginning on the continent.”56 He is still regarded as intellectual and generally described as smart and intelligent. “His mind is sharp, his memory elephantine, and he bristles with energy and vigour.”57 “His intelligence, charm, accessibility to influential foreigners, and ability to recognise and respond to developments in the international system”58 manifested his international position and helped him to accede to the chairmanship of the APRM forum, says an insightful APRM observer.59 His reputation as a “bookworm” contributed to his appointment as APRM chairman, as such a leader was desired when the APRM was established.60 Meles is also characterized as “young, humble, forceful and not shy to criticize,” as a close observer of the political scene in Ethiopia points out,61

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making him an ideal choice to lead the APRM and give the continent a voice on the global stage, such as in the climate change debate discussed later. Yet, there is also another side to the prime minister who is also described as a “smart dictator.”62 The Economist also believes that “there is the harsher side of Mr Meles, the Marxist fighter turned political strongman with a dismal human-rights record who is intolerant of dissent.”63 Beyene Petros, a professor at Addis Ababa University and chairman of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces opposition party, argues that Meles is still trapped in a “guerrilla-mentality.”, which is explained by his fight against Mengistu.64 This mentality forces Meles to keep aloof from the public. Christopher Clapham seems to agree, asserting that there is an “exceptional level of isolation, which comes close to matching that of medieval emperors who were ritually secluded and communicated with their subjects through a curtain.”65 During the electoral campaign in 2010, the prime minister hardly appeared in public; in general, people will “very rarely see … [him] in Ethiopia, outside the party and government headquarters at Arat Kilo in Addis Ababa.”66 Meles might not necessarily be power hungry, but he seems to consider himself as indispensable, in both the domestic and the foreign policy realm. In any case, following the recent changes in the country’s leadership, he is the cornerstone of Ethiopia’s foreign policy making.

Foreign policy, wars, and interventions A good point to start analyzing Ethiopia’s foreign policy is Article 86 of the country’s constitution because Ethiopia’s external relations are defined in this article. The article reads: [The] Principles for External Relations [are] 1. To promote policies of foreign relations based on the protection of national interests and respect for the sovereignty of the country. 2. To promote mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. 3. To ensure that the foreign relation policies of the country are based on mutual interests and equality of states as well as that international agreements promote the interests of Ethiopia. 4. To observe international agreements which ensure respect for Ethiopia’s sovereignty and are not contrary to the interests of its Peoples. 5. To forge and promote ever growing economic union and fraternal relations of Peoples with Ethiopia’s neighbours and other African countries. 6. To seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes.67

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Several items in this article are clearly associated with the guiding principles of the OAU which placed sovereignty and non-interference at the center of its Charter.68 Others highlight the need for (economic) integration. This section approaches the constitutional words and scrutinizes whether Ethiopia’s incumbent government adheres to Article 86. Ethiopia is confronted with a multitude of foreign policy challenges. To understand the complexity of the country’s foreign policy, it is important to address Ethiopia’s geopolitical location on the Horn of Africa. This area is known for many ongoing conflicts, including Somalia as a failed state, the military disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Eritrea and Djibouti, the piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and Sudan with its various conflicts, and lastly Kenya, which has not entirely recovered from the political turmoil after the 2008 election. In short, Ethiopia is located in a very volatile region. Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, based on the historical reasons outlined above as well as a poorly delineated and demarcated border and different interpretations of joining the fight against Mengistu,69 culminated in the Eritrean attack on the disputed border town of Badme in 1998. The war lasted until 2000 when Ethiopia had gained the upper hand. The number of casualties varies; the United Nations estimates that 70,000 Ethiopians and Eritreans perished,70 whereas Human Rights Watch says that 100,000 people died during the war and hundreds of thousands were displaced.71 The OAU became involved as early as 1998 in trying to broker a ceasefire agreement.72 At that time, Ethiopia could be sure that the OAU would not promote any antiEthiopian policy, but preferred to side with the organization’s host country, as anonymous OAU staff assert.73 During and after the war, the Ethiopian government made sure that other African countries kept their silence on the affair. Even today, Ethiopia maintains the upper hand in the conflict, because the Ethiopian government secured hegemony over international public opinion and cultivates a picture of Eritrea’s pariah status. Although relations with Eritrea remain tense, Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan74 are not only characterized by ambivalence, but also by mutual interest; yet they are overshadowed by the Eritrean case to a certain extent. Although Sudan stands to benefit from having good relations with Ethiopia, it is reluctant to impose sanctions on Eritrea, Ethiopia’s fiercest opponent. The strength of loyalty between Muslim states is open to debate in this case. Notwithstanding, the Sudanese government needs the Ethiopian government. Meles gave the Sudanese President al-Bashir a carte blanche after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him.75 Therefore, it comes as little surprise that Sudan requested

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Ethiopia to contribute troops to the hybrid United Nations–African Union mission in Darfur. This is rather unusual, as neighboring countries do not normally contribute troops to missions next door, according to officials.76 However, the Ethiopian troops are welcomed in Sudan because Sudan’s President al-Bashir knows that the Ethiopian forces will not arrest him on ICC charges. Another focus of Ethiopia’s foreign policy is Somalia. The fragile situation in Somalia is perceived to be an acute threat for three reasons. First, as early as 1977–78, Ethiopia and Somalia fought the so called Ogaden War on the grounds that Somalia tried to incorporate Ethiopia’s eastern Ogaden region into a greater Somalia.77 This is related, secondly, to the fact that there are numerous ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden region and the Ethiopian government is aware that these people might want to leave Ethiopia.78 Third, threats from Somalia are real as Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts declared a Jihad against Ethiopia in 2006. Based on this, Ethiopia has been involved in Somalia’s internal situation for decades in order to secure its own position, and this is seen by some scholars as one of the main reasons for the decline of Somalia as a state.79 An interviewed Ethiopian official may call it “help”80 but others call it “interventionist policy”81 or “manipulation.”82 In fact, “Ethiopia has covertly manipulated Somali factions to its own advantage.”83 In 2006, Ethiopia saw no other way than to invade Somalia. The AU Peace and Security Council repeatedly addressed the deteriorating situation in Somalia in the summer of 2006, and on 31 August, they finally endorsed a deployment plan for an IGAD peacekeeping mission.84 However, when the Union of Islamic Courts seized power in Somalia in 2006 and declared Jihad on Ethiopia, the latter decided to go ahead unilaterally before the troops of IGAD could be deployed. The Ethiopian prime minister publicly declared: “Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation … We are not trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia’s internal affairs. We have only been forced by the circumstances.”85 The Ethiopian intervention began on 24 December 2006. Ethiopian officials stress that they felt threatened by the declaration of Jihad and hence had a vital interest in overthrowing the Union of Islamic Courts.86 “Ethiopia acted out of national interest, to deny Islamic extremists a base in the troubled Horn of Africa from which they could disrupt the balance in Ethiopia itself.”87 The troops of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Ethiopians were successful to an extent, but the insurgents inside Somalia were too strong, meaning an Ethiopian victory was impossible.

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Although Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles called the intervention “a tremendous success,”88 the AU started to realize that a foreign force was indeed necessary and finally deployed troops in 2007. Ethiopian officials claim that they had to go ahead unilaterally because the AU showed little rigor in establishing a peacekeeping force.89 As a matter of fact, even in 2010, after Ethiopian troops finally left Somalia, the African Union Mission to Somalia, also known as AMISOM, was still not fully operational because of a lack of troops. The Ethiopians argue that the AU and its member states were too reluctant to solve the problem of Somalia, and this contains some truth. One source claims that the former AU chairman Alpha Konaré thanked the Ethiopian prime minister for intervening in Somalia, saying that, if Ethiopia had not, nothing would have happened.90 As a matter of fact, the AU did not condemn Ethiopia’s moves. The reason might be that Africa’s leadership was pleased to see Ethiopia engaging in a conflict that many others had tried to solve before. However, it must be stressed that Ethiopia did not intervene for altruistic purposes as its main goal was to fight the Union of Islamic Courts. The Ethiopian government did not wait for the AU to restore peace and stability in Somalia. Information Minister Bereket Simon’s claim that Ethiopia has “deep trust in the AU”91 is seconded by MP Ahmed Hassen’s statement that “Ethiopia has always felt comfortable with the AU security architecture.”92 However, one might also interpret Ethiopia’s move as a lack of trust in the AU and the latter’s ability to solve crises on African soil. Tamrat Kabede of the Inter Africa Group warns: “I think, if I may say so, that would be an academic interpretation. It’s not a lack of trust. Unfortunately the world as a whole, let alone Africa, has not reached a stage where it can leave the trust of its sovereignty to a united body like the UN or the AU.”93 It is true that the official rhetoric of Ethiopia was that the sovereignty of the country was threatened.94 It is also true that Ethiopia intends to act independently. Bereket Simon says: “We have declared that whenever Ethiopia wishes to intervene and defend itself, we’ll do it publicly. … When we enter, we declare that we are entering and do whatever we want, when we withdraw, we tell the world we have withdrawn.”95 Ethiopia did not intervene in Somalia without the backing of the United States. The intervention must be seen in the context of the USled global war against terrorism in which Somalia became a prime target. The United States still capitalize on the fact that Ethiopia is the only stable country in the Horn of Africa.96 Meles’s regime “has been a favourite in Washington since 1991.”97 Clapham claims that “[i]f there is one arena within which the EPRDF regime has been unquestionably brilliant, it has been its management of the international system.”98

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The phenomenon that Ethiopia is active in the foreign policy realm is not new. As aforementioned, Ethiopia has been a player in the international system at least since Haile Selassie’s reign and its role should not be underestimated. Ethiopia was—next to South Africa and Liberia— the only African member of the League of Nations, it became a founding member and active party in the United Nations, it contributed a battalion to the United Nations force in South Korea in the 1950s following the Korean War, and it used the United Nations as a platform for its policy on Eritrea. Ethiopia is nowadays less active in the United Nations than during the emperor’s period, yet it is considered no less active in world affairs. Ethiopia’s prime minister is one of the few African leaders who is regularly invited to G8 summits. Moreover, Prime Minister Meles is part of Tony Blair’s commission for Africa, which was established to provide impetus for the continent’s development. In addition to this, Meles emerged as Africa’s spokesman at the summit on climate change in Copenhagen in late 2009, helping to “create one of conference’s few bright spots.”99 Meles indeed became the unchallenged negotiator for Africa in the question of climate change and continues to play this role even after the Copenhagen summit. During the AU summit held at the beginning of 2010, Meles was unanimously chosen to represent Africa in the upcoming consecutive global climate conferences. This means that Meles has secured a post that will attract him attention for the time being because the topic of climate change will remain on the international agenda for years to come. This post can only increase the prime minister’s international prestige. Meles’s role in the climate change talks illustrates that he conducts foreign policy skillfully and uses his international reputation and prestige to mask the dark sides of Ethiopia’s foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, it has become clear in this section that Ethiopia has emerged as a key state in its region. The next section shows how similarly skillfully Ethiopia acts within the AU using its key role in the region and on the continent.

Primus inter pares? Ethiopia and the African Union Three phases of Ethiopia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the OAU/AU can be identified, namely the reigns of the emperor, Mengistu, and Meles. The emperor played a crucial role in bringing the divergent positions on Africa’s integration together in the 1960s. Mengistu was less active in the OAU, whereas Meles is heavily involved in both the AU and related institutions including NEPAD and APRM; yet his position is weaker than the emperor’s position used to be. In order to understand

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Ethiopia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU, it is important to trace it back to the battle of Adwa and Haile Selassie’s rule, and continue the analysis with the incumbent government. Mengiste Desta, a former Ethiopian diplomat, repeats throughout his book on his country’s role in African politics that Ethiopia inspired Africa’s liberation through its defeat of the Italians at Adwa (1896) and the defeat of the Italians in 1941. He connects the victory at Adwa with the establishment of the OAU by arguing that the victory “signified a milestone in the struggle of Africans for emancipation from European colonialism, and the emergence of independent African states leading to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), later followed by the formation of the African Union.”100 Desta might be right when he argues that “[o]ne can safely say that the Italo-Ethiopian war was a turning point in the history of the African people and people of African descent in the Diaspora.”101 Yet interestingly, literature on Africa’s decolonization and liberation pays little attention to the role of Ethiopia and Haile Selassie, instead emphasizing the role of Pan-Africanists such as William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, and Nkrumah. It is noteworthy that Adi Hakim and Marika Sherwood include figures such as Du Bois, Williams, Garvey, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ben Bella, and Nelson Mandela but not Haile Selassie in their well-known and often quoted book that provides an overview of the lives of some 40 political figures from Africa and the Diaspora considered to be Pan-Africanists.102 Over the years, Ethiopia has not been perceived as an African nation by the other African states, and Ethiopia has done nothing to change this perception. Liberia’s President Tubman did not even mention Ethiopia when he made a speech about nations that could lead the continent during a summit of African leaders in May 1961. Tubman only made reference to Liberia, Ghana, and Egypt.103 Tubman had little reason to include Ethiopia in his list because Ethiopia was not known for advocating the African cause.104 In a speech made by Haile Selassie at the United Nations Assembly in New York in 1954, the emperor did not even mention the word “Africa”105 despite the fact that Africa was heading toward decolonization at that time. The emperor’s position was in many regards unique at that time. Desta highlights inter alia that Haile Selassie was the leader of the oldest independent African state and that he was an elder statesman.106 The emperor was even elected as “man of the year 1935” by Time magazine.107 Klaas van Walraven states that the emperor was a cautious leader who waited for the right time to present himself as the ideal mediator.108 This time had come when he saw his chance to unite the

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seemingly irreconcilable positions with regard to Africa’s unity. His crucial role in the establishment of the OAU cannot be challenged.109 There is, however, no hint that Haile Selassie wanted to join Nkrumah in his bid for the immediate establishment of the United States of Africa, but—if at all—preferred a loose alliance of African states. In his speech at the Addis Ababa conference of 1963, from which the OAU emerged, the emperor said: “The union which we seek can only come gradually, as the day-to-day progress, which we achieve, carries us slowly but inexorably along this course.”110 Ethiopia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the OAU at that time was by no means altruistic, but was a “shrewd, calculated move in pursuit of a meticulously worked out foreign policy.”111 Haile Selassie placed himself at the top of the emerging African diplomatic order as it suited his domestic and African interests.112 The main argument Bereket Habte Selassie provides is that the emperor wanted to divert attention from his de facto annexation of Eritrea113 and from growing domestic opposition.114 The emperor led the OAU and became intensively engaged in mediating various African conflicts, such as the one between Algeria and Morocco, leading Zdnek Cervenka to claim “the Emperor [was] … perhaps the most successful peacemaker in Africa.”115 The emperor used the OAU to increase his and Ethiopia’s influence, and at the same time, the OAU benefited from Haile Selassie’s prestige and used him to show the world that it had the power to act.116 This benefited Ethiopia, and subsequently the OAU settled in Addis Ababa. The emperor’s apparent commitment to African affairs, however, did not resonate within Ethiopia. “Ethiopians did not even regard themselves as black Africans in this period. … Haile Selassie’s conservatism was more in sympathy with European colonialism than the radicalism of the new-style African nationalists.”117 Today, there is little doubt that most Ethiopians do not define themselves as Africans. It is hard to elaborate on this finding; anyone who has been to Ethiopia and spoken to locals about their opinions on Africa will find that they do not feel as though they are part of the continent, but instead see themselves as distinctively different from the rest of Africa. Some interviewees would even go to the extent of saying that Ethiopians feel superior to the rest of Africa.118 Although this observation could be true, this claim lacks empirical substance. However, from talks with locals, it becomes clear that Ethiopians at least feel different.119 The distinctive Ethiopian identity should be traced to Ethiopia’s proud history spanning at least 2,000 years to the Axumite empire, as illustrated above. Desta argues that Ethiopia’s survival as a sovereign state while the rest of the continent was colonized can be attributed to several factors including:

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“Her proud and uncompromising nationalism … [and] the determination with which this heritage of national consciousness has been pursued.”120 This claim stands to some extent in contrast to the current leadership’s assertions that Ethiopians are committed to the African cause. The minister of information asserts that they are Africans but also Ethiopians at the same time.121 Officials remember Ethiopia’s role in the liberation of the continent, especially their defeat of the Italians, as an “exemplary heroic act.”122 Moreover, they recall the role the country played in shaping the OAU. According to another official, Ethiopia stands “second to none” in terms of liberating the African continent.123 However, there are serious doubts about this claim. Ethiopians still insist that they were crucial in liberating Africa and that they are committed to Africa and the AU today. “We have a disproportionally higher trust in the AU and its institutions than anybody else. We have a high trust, that’s what you can say. Absolute trust in the AU, absolute trust. That will be the word that you can take,” stresses an Ethiopian official.124 This rhetorical commitment to the AU, however, does not match political reality. Ethiopia, as shown above, decided to go ahead with its intervention in Somalia without waiting for AU approval, it is less committed to its APRM process (see below) than other participating countries, and it strongly opposes the immediate formation of a Union Government for Africa. With regard to the APRM, it is found that the unveiled process has been an untransparent undertaking and there are accusations that Meles is whitewashing his country’s reports.125 Ethiopia’s prime minister is also the chairperson of the APRM forum, which is the committee that discusses the APRM reports and has the final say before the reports are published. Thus, he has a certain influence on changing the wording and the focus of the report. In well-informed circles close to the APRM, it is strongly believed that the Ethiopian government is trying to water down the report and thereby ensure that Ethiopia is portrayed as a credible country. Whether this is true remains unknown. However, it is known that the government has made some efforts to ensure that the media were not included in the process. As an anonymous insider remarks, the media were taken out of the process because the issue was “very contestable.”126 Moreover, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa APRM support unit, designed to facilitate the APRM process continentally and help individual countries in completing the review exercise,127 was not allowed to assist in Ethiopia’s APRM, officially because they are located in Addis Ababa, and hence, subjective in their judgment. The reasons for Ethiopia’s participation in the review process are arguably threefold: first, the country might benefit from the APRM

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reports as donor countries will be provided with reasons to continue spending development aid in Ethiopia. Second, Meles, considered as belonging to Africa’s new leaders,128 might have a personal interest in obtaining approval for his politics from a supposedly objective authority. Last, Ethiopia after Haile Selassie likes to portray itself as a model state in terms of commitment to the African cause and African integration. To keep this image alive, it is essential for Ethiopia to participate in the review process. Although Meles secured hegemony over the APRM, his role within the AU is considerably less influential, albeit strong due to Ethiopia’s position as the host of the AU. There is no doubt that Ethiopia enjoys playing host to the AU. It brings thousands of business people and politicians (permanently and visiting) to the city, making it a beneficial venture for Ethiopia’s economy. The AU in turn attracts a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donor agencies to base themselves in Addis Ababa, increasing the economic benefits. But more importantly, they increase Ethiopia’s standing twofold: first, Addis Ababa is permanently in the press and all high-level politicians visiting AU headquarters cannot ignore the Ethiopian government. As a consequence, the Ethiopian government receives a much larger number of foreign visitors than comparable states, contends an interviewed insider.129 Second, Ethiopia capitalizes on the fact that criticism from fellow African states is silenced because it hosts the AU headquarters. This is discussed above with reference to the APRM, the war against Eritrea, and the intervention in Somalia. One might add Ethiopia’s refusal to accept a large AU observer mission to observe its national elections in 2010 to the list. Ethiopia would lose all these benefits if the AU were to be relocated. AU officials acknowledge that “Ethiopia must be very much against the relocation” and they tend to smile mysteriously when asked whether Ethiopia benefits politically from being the seat of the AU, refusing to give an answer.130 Ethiopia wants to remain Africa’s capital by all means. This has become obvious over the last decade. Since Colonel Gaddafi became active in African affairs in the late 1990s, he has constantly tried to relocate the AU headquarters.131 Gaddafi has regularly tried to achieve this goal,132 the last time through the back door during the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in July 2008 when he proposed that Sirte, his birthplace, should become the meeting place of every AU summer summit, which is currently held in different countries based on a rotating system. When Gaddafi started his attempts during the transition phase from the OAU to the AU, Meles realized that he needed strong arguments to convince Africa’s leadership to keep Addis Ababa as the AU headquarters, particularly

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as Gaddafi certainly spent a considerable amount of money on incentives for his campaign. In a famous speech, which the Ethiopian prime minister delivered during an AU summit, Meles made reference to Mengistu’s and Haile Selassie’s commitment to Africa for the first time ever. This must be seen as a remarkable event. Although there is no love lost between EPRDF and Haile Selassie and Mingistu’s [sic] Governments, circumstance compelled the Prime Minister to acknowledge historical facts when he paid tribute to Haile Selassie though “feudal” and to Mengistu though “butcher” for their commitments to the Africa freedom struggle by rendering assistance to the leaders of Africa, like Nelson Mandela and Mugabe.133 Ethiopia added some symbolism to ensure Addis Ababa’s survival as the capital of Africa. The government distributed land to African countries to build new embassies and renamed many streets in the capital city so that the names of all African states are now found in Addis Ababa— even though street names are not used to navigate in Ethiopia’s capital and no maps are available. More than 10 years into the AU, Ethiopians feel secure that Gaddafi’s attempts will not succeed.134 This security was manifested after Gaddafi resigned as chairman of the AU in January 2010, and more importantly after his death in 2011. Gaddafi’s constant challenge certainly impacts Ethiopia’s positioning in the Union Government debate. The fact that Libya supplied arms to the Eritreans in their war against Ethiopia135 adds to this. The two leaders have had an ambivalent relationship stressed a senior African diplomat: on the one hand, Meles used anti-Gaddafi rhetoric but, on the other hand, accepted Gaddafi’s support.136 Libya’s investments are obvious in Ethiopia where Oilibya is omnipresent. The acceptance of Gaddafi’s assistance, however, seems to be of an economic nature only. The current regime is strongly against Gaddafi’s Union Government vision and continues to pursue a policy oriented toward Haile Selassie’s earlier call for a gradual approach to integration. In AU circles, it is also said that Ethiopia stood against the transformation of the AU Commission into a stronger AU Authority.137 It appears that Ethiopia has an interest in maintaining the status quo and does not favor any further development of the AU. This is because the AU could feasibly do more than challenging Ethiopia’s long-standing independence and its jealously guarded sovereignty by also eroding Addis Ababa’s status as the capital of Africa and Ethiopia’s subsequent primus inter pares position in Africa. Ethiopia must have observed that AU institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament and the NEPAD

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Secretariat as well as the AU Court of Justice have been moved to other states; and it is clear that no one can guarantee that an AU Authority would be based in Addis Ababa, particularly when taking the poor and unreliable infrastructure of Ethiopia’s capital city into account. This danger is largely off the table since Gaddafi was ousted, and there is no doubt that Ethiopian officials were not sad to see him go. The status quo seems to be preserved for the time being and this helps the current regime to survive.

Conclusion This chapter has analyzed a unique African state. Many factors contribute to Ethiopia’s uniqueness, including the fact that the country has never been colonized and is Africa’s capital. Ethiopia’s proud history shapes its foreign policy as Ethiopia sees itself as an independent nation that is seemingly not exactly African but somehow different. Ethiopia has defended its sovereignty for a long time and will continue to do so, as its intervention in Somalia on the grounds of defending its territorial integrity suggests. Like the preceding case studies, Ethiopia does not even show interest in surrendering sovereignty in the context of regional integration. The very fact that Ethiopia guards its sovereignty, like Algeria which had to fight hard for its independence, shows that the colonization or decolonization of a country cannot be the only variable that explains the refusal to cede sovereignty. Like Algeria, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, Ethiopia is under an authoritarian regime which rules out the option of ceding power. Thus, evidence is growing that the refusal to surrender sovereignty might be linked to the fact that there are undemocratic systems in place. Similarly to Algeria and Zimbabwe, the AU as a foreign policy realm is used for domestic purposes. Haile Selassie had benefited from the OAU and the current government also exploits its role as primus inter pares, knowing that hardly any African state dares to criticize the host of the AU on its foreign policy or on the domestic challenges that arise in the context of the authoritarian system that is in place. Meles and his government secured an influential position within the AU framework by chairing the APRM forum; receiving African heads of state, heads of government, and diplomats; representing the AU in the climate change talks; and hosting several important AU institutions. Through his position, the prime minister can ensure that the AU will provide him with international legitimacy and will testify to his commitment to political reforms in the APRM report, which is yet to be published. His and his regime’s political survival are thus safeguarded.

6

Burkina Faso

Internationally … Upper Volta functions as the periphery of the Periphery Joel W. Gregory (1979)

Burkina Faso, formerly known as Upper Volta, is one of the poorest countries in the world, is landlocked in Western Africa, and yet is one of the most politically stable countries in a region where Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire are struggling to recover from civil wars and Togo and Niger experienced coups in 2005 and 2010 respectively. To Burkina Faso’s northern and western borders lies troubled Mali, on its east, Niger and Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo stretch along Burkina’s southern border. Burkina Faso is an active participant in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and part of the Union économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). As such, the country uses the union’s currency, the Franc de la Communauté Financière d’Afrique, as its legal tender. For a long time, Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré was accused of meddling in other African states’ internal conflicts. More recently, he has promoted himself as a benevolent leader who advocates peace and security in the region. His regional standing influences Burkina Faso’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU and determines his regime’s willingness to surrender sovereignty in favor of the continental body. As in the preceding chapters, the analysis is carried out in the following order: first, a short overview of Burkina Faso’s history is given, followed by a description of Burkina Faso’s socio-economic situation. Then, an analysis of the political system is in order to find out who makes foreign policy in the West African state. The chapter ends with an analysis of the foreign policy, which comprises a general analysis and an analysis of Burkina Faso’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU in the last section before the conclusion.

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Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré Political instability used to be a characteristic of Upper Volta’s/Burkina Faso’s post-colonial history. Only since Captain Blaise Compaoré seized power through a coup d’état in 1987 has the country become more stable, beginning to advance in terms of democratization. However, Burkina Faso is still far from being a democratic state. Before returning to this issue, a brief look at the colonial period is in order. European influence in today’s Burkina Faso reportedly began in 1886 when the first Europeans entered Ouagadougou, which would later become Burkina Faso’s capital.1 In 1895, the French signed the first treaties with the locals and eventually formed the country in 1919. In 1956, the French National Assembly passed the loi-cadre, a reform bill to transfer power from the French capital to territorial governments in French West Africa. Following this decision, the population of the French territory of Upper Volta elected a parliament in March 1957. Upper Volta became independent on 5 August 1960. Although Wilhelm Fischer reports that armed members of an ethnic group demonstrated in front of the constitutional assembly, there is no evidence that the people of Upper Volta fought for their independence.2 Instead, Upper Volta became independent in a wave of independence declarations that swept over French territories. Two unconstitutional changes of government followed before 1982 when Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo became president. Domestic opposition against his regime soon grew with Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré, both army men, in the ranks of the opponents. In 1983, Sankara and his two allies, Captain Henri Zongo and Major Jean-Baptiste Lingani, were arrested by the government. Blaise Compaoré led a revolt, in order to free his three comrades, which eventually led to another coup, after which Thomas Sankara was installed as head of state.3 Sankara, Compaoré, Lingani, and Zongo jointly ruled the country in the following four years. Although some Western governments were skeptical about the charismatic Sankara’s revolution, the Swiss sociology professor at the University of Geneva and Paris’s Sorbonne, Jean Ziegler, believed Upper Volta’s leadership was in earnest and would use their power to stop the suffering of the country’s population.4 Sankara was “undoubtedly the most charismatic figure in his country’s history.”5 Sankara, his revolution, and his leadership style were remarkable for post-colonial Africa.6 He fought the traditional “big men” image of African presidents, dispensing with the presidential limousine fleets, jealously promoting

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Burkina Faso physical fitness for the civil service, personally leading his ministers in football games and exercise sessions, dogmatically flogging corruption … and rallying the people behind his revolutionary reforms with slogans which were often belligerent.7

Sankara gained an international reputation with his speech at the United Nations Assembly, in which he emphasized his wish to free his country from neo-colonialism and make it largely self-supporting.8 Sankara’s efforts to bring about political change and socio-economic development as well as national pride in Upper Volta are symbolized by the change in the state’s name to Burkina Faso, which means “the land of upright people.” Sankara’s efforts to restructure the political landscape of Burkina Faso were based on strengthening local governance and “confrontation” with traditional authorities, including chiefs and trade unions.9 After having lost the support of his power base, the divisions between Sankara and his three fellow leaders became evident. This culminated in Sankara’s assassination by a commando unit in 1987; a unit that was loyal to Compaoré, who afterwards became head of state.10 Thus, the country experienced the fifth coup in its 27-year history. Only later in 1998, during a state visit to Uganda, did Compaoré accept responsibility for the bloody coup.11 The coup by Compaoré was widely condemned internationally, and the Burkinabe people, having been shocked by its violence, were less than supportive of the new regime.12 Compaoré’s initial domestic and foreign policy focused on justifying the murder of Sankara.13 Sankara’s revolution had been popular in Burkina Faso and beyond,14 and hence, Compaoré had to “give [the] appearance of continuing Sankara’s revolution … while finding reasons for justifying Sankara’s death.”15 This challenge was addressed with what was called the “rectified revolution.”16 “This so-called ‘rectification of the revolution’ implied the re-marginalisation of local politics of rural areas under more conventional rule.”17 In actual fact, however, Compaoré reversed Sankara’s revolution. The decentralized politics once again became centralized, efforts to achieve social equality were suspended, and the aim of achieving self-sufficiency was de facto abandoned. Compaoré remained under massive pressure to justify Sankara’s death, as the latter’s revolution “was enthusiastically welcomed by the people.”18 Sankara and his legacy remain part of the political discourse in Burkina Faso today:19 Sankara is still seen as a national hero,20 and many political parties label themselves “sankarists.”21 Given the impact caused by the beloved Sankara’s death and Compaoré’s subsequent accession to power, there is no doubt that these events are a critical juncture in the history of Burkina Faso.

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Whereas the political situation in Burkina Faso changed rapidly after 1987, with Compaoré soon consolidating power, the economic situation remained poor: “Compaoré has, for the past 20 years, publicly applauded Sankara, while actively betraying what he stood for. Under Compaoré a handful have become richer and the majority poorer.”22 During the months following Sankara’s assassination, Compaoré eliminated his former associates Lingani and Zongo, and proposed a constitution that allowed for a multiparty political system. The system was endorsed at a national referendum in June 1991 and came into effect soon thereafter. The fourth republic became official and a regime emerged that was characterized as “an iron fist in a velvet glove.”23 Compaoré stood as the sole candidate in the first presidential election after the promulgation of the new constitution, securing 74.7 percent approval of the mere 25 percent of the electorate who voted;24 the legitimacy of his rule was thus challenged. Notwithstanding, the newly elected president managed to cling on to power. Despite Compaoré’s victory in the following 1998 elections, he was put under severe domestic pressure after the death of the critical journalist Norbert Zongo, who had been murdered in December 1998 because—it is assumed—he was investigating the death of the chauffeur of Compaoré’s brother who was allegedly tortured to death by members of the presidential guard.25 Zongo’s death caused the “deepest crisis in postcolonial Burkina”26 and became another critical juncture in Burkina Faso’s history. The clashes that erupted “made the usually peaceful Ouagadougou look like a city under siege, with tear-gas, stone throwing, police violence, and burnt-out vehicles.”27 President Compaoré, knowing that most coups in the country’s history were preceded by public protests, had to react. The president needed to silence the protests and work toward reconciliation because the public discourse not only discussed impunity with regard to the Zongo case, but also impunity in the context of former President Sankara’s assassination and other politically motivated violence.28 A national day of forgiveness was held, and Compaoré asked for forgiveness for 176 unpunished crimes that had been committed by state organs since independence.29 This and other initiatives, however, triggered more political change than initially expected. Being unprecedented, they created space for political dialogue.30 The opposition was able to increase its political weight and called for changes,31 which culminated in both reform of the electoral code and amendment of the constitution, which reduced the presidential term limit to five years (previously seven years) renewable only once. This, however, does not affect President Compaoré’s reign as the constitutional amendment does not include an element of retroactivity,

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and subsequently, Compaoré could stand for election in 2005 (after his seven-year mandate from 1998 had ended) and re-election in 2010. The president took advantage of this opportunity and was elected in 2005 with 80.35 percent of the votes on a turn-out of 57.7 percent.32 In 2010, the president was again elected with an overwhelming majority of at least 80 percent, and it is not known whether or not he will retire in 2015.33 It thus comes as little surprise in this context that the Bertelsmann Country Report on Burkina Faso concludes that the “president does not demonstrate a real commitment to democratization but instead focuses on the maintenance of his own power.”34 The Zongo affair made the government realize that it had to accept criticism and establish a sense of democracy. “Some would argue that this is precisely because of President Compaoré’s need to perform as a democratic pioneer (‘washing the blood of Sankara’) without leaving the real power to anyone else.”35 This extends beyond the country itself and forced Compaoré to change his foreign policy: although he previously meddled in other states’ conflicts, he is now reinventing his image in order to be recognized internationally as a democratic leader who keeps his house in order and is working toward peace and stability in the region.36

The poorest of the poor As indicated by Joel Gregory’s (1979) quote that “Upper Volta functions as the periphery of the Periphery,”37 Upper Volta was, at that time, insignificant in political and economic terms. Adherents to the dependence theory are likely to agree that this is still the case today because the West African country is one of the poorest states in the world, and the 2009 Human Development Index ranks the landlocked country at 177 out of 182, with only Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, and Sierra Leone ranked lower.38 Burkina Faso is currently experiencing massive population growth. In 1985, about eight million people were living in Burkina Faso.39 This figure is estimated to have increased to 15.7 million people in 2008.40 The high population growth undermines economic growth, which was estimated at 5.3 percent in 2008.41 According to official data, the unemployment rate reached a peak of 3.3 percent in 2007,42 yet this figure obscures the fact that almost 70 percent of the working population work in the agricultural sector,43 a figure that certainly includes those living on the basis of subsistence agriculture. The Burkinabe population is attracted by neighboring countries. It is estimated that up to three million Burkinabe live in Côte d’Ivoire.44

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Gregory traces this development to the colonial period when Burkina Faso was part of the French West African colonial and economic system and used “as a labour reservoir for ‘development’ projects in more promising parts of the colony (Ivory Coast in particular).”45 In a more recent study, Joan Baxter and Keith Somerville confirm this view.46 Little has changed. Today, Burkina Faso remains a pool for labor forces and has not yet developed its own industrial base, let alone a diversified economy. Burkina Faso’s economic performance is negatively impacted by its geographic location: landlocked without direct access to the sea. The railway line to Côte d’Ivoire’s port of Abidjan was closed during the 2002–7 civil war, thereby further weakening the Burkinabe economy. A government spokesperson said: “Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire are like two legs of one person. … If we don’t help the sub-region, it will never develop.”47 The problem of having no direct access to the sea just adds to the aforementioned structural problems which are so deep-rooted that the Bertelsmann Country Report concludes: “[t]he country definitely cannot systematically combat poverty on its own.”48 Even Burkinabe diplomats similarly acknowledge that to “develop without regional integration, for Burkina it’s impossible.”49 Regional integration could play a key role in the country’s economic development. Burkina Faso is part of the ECOWAS and a member of the UEMOA, a monetary union for West Africa. The latter comprises only eight states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo); ECOWAS is larger in size, also including Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Cape Verde, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Of the country’s total trade, the percentage of Burkina Faso’s trade through ECOWAS is significantly larger than comparable figures from other ECOWAS members. Some 26.5 percent of Burkina Faso’s total trade takes place within the ECOWAS region, whereas the average for all ECOWAS members stands at 15.8 percent.50 Government officials do not take this to imply dependency on the ECOWAS region, but argue that ECOWAS is mutually beneficial and “the central position of Burkina Faso in West Africa is a positive factor. So being landlocked is not a major handicap.”51

Compaoré’s dominance in the political system The Burkinabe political system is highly centralized under President Compaoré. Even though democratization gained some momentum following the death of journalist Norbert Zongo, it is still true today that Burkina Faso does not qualify as a democracy. The 2002 parliamentary

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elections were an important qualitative improvement because they eliminated the dominance of the ruling party and brought about the emergence of considerable parliamentary opposition.52 The 2007 parliamentary elections were, however, affected by a revision of the electoral code following the increasing importance of the opposition in parliament. The new electoral law discriminates against smaller parties; as a result, the opposition lost ground in the 2007 election, and Compaoré’s party achieved two-thirds of the vote with a reported turn-out of 56.4 percent.53 Although there is a lively civil society54 and the press is considered “partly free,”55 democratic representation is not really given. Freedom of expression is also nominally given to parliamentarians, although they make little use of it. The vast majority of parliamentarians are loyal to the president. The parliament consists of 13 different parties, with eight parties having only one or two seats. The two biggest parties in the 111member National Assembly are the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), which obtained 77 seats in the last election and thus has a two-thirds majority, and the Alliance for Democracy and FederationAfrican Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), which has 14 seats. The dominance of the CDP is further strengthened by the fact that the ADF-RDA, the second biggest party in parliament, supports Compaoré.56 “[C]ritics jokingly say that CDP stands for Congrès pour la Distribution des Postes (‘Congress for Distributing Jobs’).”57 Owing to the centralized system and the CDP’s dominance, the authority of parliament and its involvement in decision making are ineffective and its control function is limited.58 The APRM report on Burkina Faso aptly concludes that the separation of power, as affirmed by Burkina Faso’s constitution, is ignored in practice. The presidential nature of the regime considerably reduces the full power of the parliament’s functions and parliamentary control,59 and also the role of the prime minister and the cabinet. The constitution assigns the president inter alia the right to guide state politics,60 to be the commander in chief of the armed forces,61 and to dissolve parliament after consultation with the prime minister and the president of the parliament.62 The political system is a “highly centralised presidential system, [with a] dominant executive and [a] deeprooted authoritarian legacy.”63 This is also reflected in foreign policy making, as the president is seen as “the principal source of inspiration of the foreign policy.”64 In fact, there is little reason to believe that foreign policy making is institutionalized in Burkina Faso or that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can sustainably impact the foreign policy orientation of the country. The diplomatic network of Burkina Faso comprises 27 embassies and a few consulates.65 The diplomatic staff appear to be loyal to the government,

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yet at the same time, workers in the ministry took part in a demonstration for better payment and working conditions in 2008, which forced the government to impose a sanction on them.66 However, their role is limited. As suggested by the president’s personal involvement in conflict resolution, as will be elaborated below, he regularly bypasses the diplomatic corps. The armed forces are the only potential threat to Compaoré’s reign because they have the ability to act as veto power.67 This was proven to be more than just theory in 2006 when there were violent clashes between the lower ranks of the armed forces and the elite security police. Soldiers attacked a police station after the police hindered some soldiers listening to a concert in a football stadium. There was more violence the following day, when the police headquarters came under heavy machine gun and rocket fire.68 There were reports that the “lower ranks felt alienated from their superior officer, who over the years had secured additional tasks and privileges linked, among other things, to their participation in international peacekeeping missions.”69 Compaoré and his fellows were aware of this threat and appeased the armed forces by increasing salaries and health insurance. After having already elaborated that it is President Compaoré who is very much in charge of Burkina Faso’s political scene and who is able to make foreign policy decisions without the approval of parliament and the prime minister, the following aims to build a better picture of the man in power. Characterized as a “canny chameleon” by the Economist70 and “le beau Blaise” (“handsome Blaise”),71 Compaoré has developed two sides to his personality: he portrays himself as an elder statesmen with a conciliatory tone both domestically and internationally, while at the same time ruling with an iron fist and a strong grip on power. According to the South African City Press, “Compaoré exudes a kind of calmness. His staring gaze portrays a man who is reflective, his answers are well-thought and his words carefully chosen.”72 This calmness and his ability to survive political thunderstorms, such as the murder of Norbert Zongo, are also reflected in the way he deals with the opposition: “Mr Compaoré has shown skill in deflecting or co-opting political opposition. He has built up a powerful coalition of state bureaucrats, former military officers, favoured businessmen and traditional chiefs, organized around the CDP.”73 Moreover, he is said to be driven by instincts, as Fidèle Kientega, Sankara’s former foreign policy advisor, notes.74 Others think that “Unlike his charismatic predecessor, Mr Compaoré has little public flair and is widely accused of corruption, but he has shown himself to be a wily political survivor.”75 The president is also able to charm foreign donors because he grants just

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enough democracy and exercises enough financial prudence to keep receiving funds from them.76 International observers state that President Compaoré has started to worry about his legacy in recent years.77 In an interview with the City Press in 2004, Compaoré said that he “wants to leave a legacy of a clean governance.”78 Moreover, he wants to increase his domestic and international standing. Interviewees argue that it is because of this that the president decided to join the APRM in 2003 and become a negotiator in various regional conflicts including Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Togo.79 Although accused of helping Charles Taylor and other African dictators in the past, Compaoré developed “from meddler in conflicts into a potential and effective mediator.”80 Observers assert that, because of his negotiation efforts, Burkina Faso’s president has gained considerable respect as a mediator.81 He is the longest serving head of state in the region and can use this fact to strengthen his position.82 The next section elaborates on this.

Foreign policy: meddling and appeasing The foreign policy orientation of Burkina Faso shifted dramatically after the coup of 1987 that brought Compaoré to power. Once in power, Compaoré restored relations with the West and France in particular.83 The current government is rather pragmatic in dealing with international organizations, such as the World Bank, compared with Sankara’s government, which was guided by a strong anti-imperial ideology. This becomes apparent in the Western Saharan issue, for example. Whereas Sankara recognized the Western Sahara,84 Compaoré reversed this policy and does not recognize it. Yahia Zoubir indicates that this is the result of “financial blackmail” from France, which is against Western Sahara’s independence from Morocco.85 Whether this is true remains unknown. In general terms, Burkina Faso’s post-Sankara foreign policy has a ruthless and a benevolent dimension to it. Although ruthlessness dominated in the 1990s, benevolence has come to the fore since the assassination of Norbert Zongo. Compaoré has meddled in African conflicts over the years.86 He was reportedly closely linked to Liberia’s dictator and rebel leader Charles Taylor. Compaoré refused to send troops for an ECOWAS force that was established to restore peace and security in Liberia in 1990.87 In 1995, Burkina Faso’s president changed his mind and contributed troops to the mission, yet Compaoré is alleged to have continued his ruthless policy by helping the Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone, whose conflict is intertwined with the conflict in

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Liberia. Ernest Harsch reports that there was speculation that Sierra Leone paid diamonds in exchange for military support, a claim to which a report by the United Nations adds some substance.88 Burkina Faso is also accused of being involved in the rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire.89 Compaoré said in an interview in 2003 that it was necessary for Côte d’Ivoire’s President Laurent Gbagdo to resign in order to restore peace in the neighboring country.90 This statement led to a further deterioration in the relationship between the neighboring countries and the resulting upsurge of violence forced at least 350,000 of Burkina Faso’s citizens who were living in Côte d’Ivoire to flee the country.91 Following the ups and downs in the countries’ relations, Compaoré managed to present himself as the mediator in Côte d’Ivoire’s internal conflict and brokered an agreement between the warring factions that was signed in Ouagadougou in 2007. However, when it was disclosed that he should become a member of the AU panel to solve a further crisis in Côte d’Ivoire that erupted in 2010, Compaoré was not welcomed by one of the two warring factions, which organized rallies against his inclusion.92 Nevertheless, Compaoré’s personal involvements in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis and other conflicts in the region strengthen his position: The president seems to have largely silenced external criticism over his continuing lack of democratic commitment by presenting himself as a reliable partner in African conflict resolution efforts. Successes in this area have helped President Blaise Compaoré strengthen his domestic support. His central mediation role in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, for example, became a matter of national pride, which made even his fiercest critics acknowledge his achievements.93 In other words, despite showing his benevolent side, Compaoré’s foreign policy was by no means altruistic, but designed instead to keep him in power, to recover from the Sankara and Zongo legacies, and to strengthen his international position as an elder statesman of the region and, within the AU framework, on the continent. Surprisingly, Burkina Faso’s foreign political weight is considerably more significant than its economy, its geographical location, and its capabilities generally suggest. Pierre Englebert notes that, in West Africa, age and seniority are crucial in establishing hierarchies in the relations among the states.94 As Compaoré is currently the oldest and longest serving statesman in the region, his influence is significant. Some have even argued that Compaoré has become the Doyen of the Francophone heads of state.95 Compaoré’s reconciliatory foreign policy helped him to change the mind-set of the international community toward both himself and his

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regime, leading to Burkina Faso’s election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2008–9,96 despite having been harshly criticized, e.g., by the Danish parliament and Belgian human rights groups, during state visits.97 In spite of the relative strength this brought him, government officials are aware that Burkina Faso’s political influence on the continent is limited: “when you are a poor country, your foreign policy can’t be the same … like the US, you have to have a different cause,” as an interviewee acknowledges.98 Thus, it becomes more important for Burkina Faso to attract attention through mediation efforts in order to promote the country as stable and caring. In this context, participation in the AU-attached APRM helps foreign donors justify giving aid and support to Burkina Faso; hence, Compaoré made a calculated move in joining the review mechanism. Of particular importance as a foreign policy target is ECOWAS. This regional economic community is one of Africa’s most advanced,99 and ECOWAS’s goals and objectives extend far beyond the free movement of its people and include economic integration, monetary and financial questions, and social and cultural matters.100 As the “E” in ECOWAS implies, the union is primarily an economic union and not necessarily designed to promote peace and security in the region. Indeed, peace and security are not seen as goals, but as principles, of the founding treaty.101 Notwithstanding, ECOWAS, through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), became involved in regional conflicts and deployed military missions such as those to Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea-Bissau (1999). ECOMOG is highly dependent on Nigeria which in turn—similar to South Africa’s perceived role—suffers from its hegemonic role in West Africa.102 Consequently, the peace and security architecture in West Africa has not lived up to its full potential even though the legal starting conditions are in a relatively good condition, as the principles of sovereignty and noninterference, surprisingly, do not appear in ECOWAS’s core principles, as defined in Article 4 of the treaty.103 Practitioners working with ECOWAS argue that ECOWAS is too “bureaucratic” and “ineffective.”104 Another interviewee aptly said “ECOWAS is not functioning. Let’s be frank, it’s not functioning.”105 Christiane Gans concludes that ECOWAS does not live up to its objectives and has achieved little since its foundation, although it is also true that ECOWAS has brought improvements in terms of the free movement of people and the development of infrastructure and trade.106 According to the AU Commission’s Minimum Integration Program (2009–12), ECOWAS is one of the faster communities in realizing the Abuja Treaty, which ultimately aims for a continental economic and monetary union

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to be achieved through harmonized regional economic communities.107 Owing to the relative success of ECOWAS, Burkina Faso has an interest in staying in this community and developing it further; ECOWAS is a beneficial venture for the landlocked country. Just as ECOWAS is a beneficial platform for Burkina Faso, the UEMOA, the monetary union of several West African states including Mali and Senegal, also serves Burkina Faso’s interests. Jan Cernicky asserts that the monetary union is more successful than ECOWAS because it has clearly defined goals, it is smaller in size, there is no language barrier because of the French colonial heritage, the states have similar administrative systems, and there is substantial support from France.108 The UEMOA Commission, the highest decision making body in the organization, is based in Ouagadougou. Apart from ECOWAS and the UEMOA, Burkina Faso is also a member of l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The latter is one of Gaddafi’s attempts to unite the region and the continent under his leadership. Links with Libya under Gaddafi were of special importance and will therefore be briefly addressed. Within AU circles, Burkina Faso is often accused of having been largely influenced by Gaddafi. Libya initially supported Sankara’s revolution, but relations between Sankara and Gaddafi soon deteriorated and came to a halt. Once Compaoré succeeded Sankara, Libya made some efforts to establish good relations with the new regime. State visits followed and, by early 1988, relations were even better than before Sankara was dismissed by Gaddafi.109 During the civil war in Liberia, Burkina Faso acted as an agent of Libya.110 Burkina Faso documented its close relations with Libya in 1997 when it became a founding member of CEN-SAD. Despite claims by Burkinabe officials that Libya had no influence on Burkina Faso,111 the image of Burkina Faso having acted as a Libyan tool remains. This chapter will return to Burkina Faso’s relations with Libya in the following section, which scrutinizes Compaoré’s position in the Union Government debate.

Burkina Faso and the African Union There is a noteworthy article in Burkina Faso’s constitution which effectively means that it allows the West African country to (partially) surrender sovereignty in order to join a regional or continental entity.112 Article 146 of Burkina Faso’s constitution is almost unique in Africa as just two other constitutions among the 53 AU members provide for this particular type of surrender. As shown in the previous section, vis-à-vis ECOWAS and the UEMOA, Burkina Faso has proven willing to surrender

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sovereignty. A diplomat said: “when I came new to Addis … I was surprised by some debates, some questions on the debate that was set in ECOWAS, so since more than twenty years ago.”113 However, whether Burkina Faso is really willing to yield sovereign rights toward the AU is the subject of the following analysis. Burkina Faso is at the center of a little-known, yet well-endowed AU initiative: the AU border program. Through the implementation of the program, the borders between African states shall be delineated and demarcated, that is legally defined and marked on the ground. At first, this program seems to contradict continental and regional integration: why, if there is supposed to be a union of states, must the states first define their borders? What initially sounds paradoxical appears to be a fundamental requirement. Despite the Cairo Declaration of 1964, which says that the borders between African states should remain as they were defined by the colonial masters, the exact border lines were never formally delineated and demarcated and have almost inevitably led to conflicts in the past. It is estimated that only some 25 percent of the land borders in Africa are fixed; the number is significantly lower when it comes to the maritime borders.114 To reduce conflict potential and achieve greater cooperation among neighbors, the border program aims to delineate and demarcate the borders so that governments know precisely which territory they have to administer. The border between Mali and Burkina Faso was subject to conflict in 1985, thus illustrating the potential threat that stems from ill defined borderlines—particularly if it is assumed that natural resources are to be found in the disputed territory (also see the disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as Algeria and Morocco in previous chapters). The AU border program was successfully implemented so that the borders between the two states are now fixed. The program also includes a crossborder cooperation scheme, which has been successfully implemented along the border between Burkina Faso and Mali, so that the people in the area were “able to benefit from effective conflict resolution methods bringing peace to the people on both sides of the borders.”115 Burkina Faso has volunteered for not only the AU border program, but also the APRM. It signed the APRM Memorandum of Understanding in March 2003, yet the review process did not proceed until March 2007. After the relatively long period of inaction, which can be partly explained by the elections that took place between 2004 and 2006, the review process was completed at an incredibly fast pace. “The goal was to draft a report at any cost, even to the substantial detriment of its quality.”116 Despite the clear link between the government and the research institutes responsible for the self-assessment, there are no reports

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that the Burkinabe government tried to manipulate the review process.117 However, in an assessment report of the APRM in Burkina Faso, Julien Natielse criticizes the strong involvement of political actors and the lack of popular awareness of the review process, which might raise doubts about the credibility of the undertaking. He indirectly supports the claim that it was primarily the president who initiated the process by writing: “[t]his political will was essentially manifested through the personal involvement of the president of Burkina Faso who attached the APRM governing bodies to the office of the president with a view to ensuring the leadership of the process.”118 This brings attention to the motives for participating in the APRM. These can basically be reduced to two: first, to increase the reputation of a landlocked, very poor and dependent country and, second, to strengthen the position of President Compaoré. An interviewee stresses that Compaoré chose to participate in the review process because: “he is worried by his own legitimacy internally within the country, and also to rehabilitate himself regionally.”119 Burkina Faso’s interest and involvement in the APRM and the border program could impact on its standing in the AU. Despite the country’s size and economic position, it seemingly belongs to the active group of AU members, although it is by no means as vocal as South Africa, Libya under Gaddafi, or Uganda for example. Burkina Faso is present at most of the AU summits and meetings, often at a presidential level, and has hosted AU meetings, such as the summit on employment and poverty in 2004. Earlier on, Burkina Faso served as one of the last chairs of the OAU, in 1998, before the AU was initiated in 1999. However, at the same time, the prevailing reality is that Burkina Faso plays a minor role. It contributes an almost indiscernible amount of money to the AU budget, and it has yet to be ultimately confirmed whether it pays its fees alone or with help. The fact that Burkina Faso is economically weak and thereby dependent on other states does not help to improve its position. An AU official aptly and frankly says: “forget about Burkina!”120 According to this source, Burkina Faso does not have a say in the AU. It is not a secret which states dominate the AU, and Burkina Faso is certainly not part of this club. Thus, one must conclude that Burkina Faso’s impact on AU policies is indeed marginal, despite the fact that it is an active member state. Burkina Faso’s standing within the AU suffers from the allegation that it used to be largely influenced by Gaddafi. Burkinabe diplomats insist that Libya does not influence Burkina Faso’s conduct of foreign policy;121 nevertheless, rumors persist within the AU that Compaoré’s government was guided by Gaddafi.122 However, there is no conclusive evidence for either claim. It is true that Compaoré’s government had very

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good relations with Libya and echoed some of Gaddafi’s initiatives, such as the founding of CEN-SAD. It is safe to assume that Burkina Faso was one of the few countries informed about Gaddafi’s sudden 2005 push to establish a continental minister of transport and communication, a minister of defense, and a minister of foreign affairs, all of which were to prelude Gaddafi’s later bid to establish a United States of Africa. Even before this, President Compaoré was present at a mini summit held in Tripoli in 1997, at which Gaddafi stressed the need for greater African unity. This move is seen to prelude Gaddafi’s 1999 bid to establish a United States of Africa, which resulted in the foundation of the AU.123 This shows that Burkina Faso was well-informed about Gaddafi’s plans. The position of Burkina Faso in the Gaddafi-inspired Grand Debate on the formation of a Union Government for Africa, however, remains nebulous. The country’s diplomats insist that Burkina Faso favors an incremental approach and not the immediate establishment of a Union Government.124 Yet, reports from the AU Accra summit in 2007 suggest that Burkina Faso supports Gaddafi’s push.125 At the same time, it is known that President Compaoré left the Accra Summit before the Grand Debate took place and his statement was given by his minister of foreign affairs. This implies that Burkina Faso’s president does not consider the issue to be so important that his country should be represented at the highest level during this debate. The country’s ambassador to the AU points out: “We are for example ready to surrender our sovereignty to create common bodies in areas like the environment, health, peace and security. But a Union Government includes other areas as you know.”126 The ambassador thus adds substance to beliefs that Burkina opts for an incremental approach. Contradicting this claim, Burkina Faso appears on an unofficial list of several African states that are said to be ready to join the United States of Africa immediately. The credibility of this list, originating in the Francophone milieu, is questionable; nevertheless, it adds to the uncertainty about Burkina Faso’s real position in the Union Government debate. The facts presented only allow for speculation, which are supported with some vigor by several interviewees.127 Ultimately, however, observers are left with the question of what is really true. It might be that the contradictory statements reflect an unclear position of the Burkinabe government itself. President Compaoré might not have completely decided on whether to support Gaddafi or risk serious challenges with his supporter and sponsor. This could be also the reason why Compaoré left the Accra summit in July 2007 early, in order to avoid a personal encounter. Sources also say that the relations between the two countries have recently cooled down.128 Having written this,

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Compaoré is certainly pleased that the debate came to a de facto end with Libya leaving the chair of the AU in January 2010. It is too early to judge how things will develop after Gaddafi’s ousting; yet, as it appears as though Compaoré has recently managed to emancipate himself from Gaddafi, a significant change in Burkina Faso’s foreign policy is rather unlikely. In any case, Burkina Faso is certainly not a member of the AU just to serve as Gaddafi’s mouthpiece. In fact, it has become clear that, through the APRM, Compaoré uses the AU to gain legitimacy from outside, which in turn manifests his domestic position. He needs to make sure that the legacies of Sankara’s and Zongo’s murders do not challenge his hold on power and to find a foreign policy from which he can safely gain strength; the AU and ECOWAS are such places.

Conclusion The determining features of Burkina Faso’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU are the greater importance of ECOWAS compared with the AU, the former Libyan involvement in Burkina Faso, and the domestic setting that forced Compaoré to show a greater willingness to move toward democracy. The political legacies of decolonization only play a marginal role, because Compaoré himself was not part of this process on account of its age. On the contrary, the legacy of Sankara’s and Zongo’s assassinations is also an important explanatory variable in Compaoré’s new foreign policy approach. It has been shown that the murders created demands for political reforms. Such demands can theoretically come up at any time, yet became less likely with the elections of November 2010 in which Compaoré secured at least 80 percent of the vote and consolidated power. Moreover, impunity in general is a potential threat to his reign. Thus, Compaoré needs some foreign political leverage to justify his reign. This was not an easy undertaking for him as he had been involved in various African conflicts and strengthened his position through them. Following his U-turn, he managed to build an image of a benevolent ruler who cares about the peace and security situation in the region.129 He uses his political weight as an elder statesman to gain respect from fellow African leaders, he has presented himself as a successful mediator in several regional conflicts, and he has translated these negotiation achievements into political weight in the domestic realm. To further strengthen his position, he also decided to join the APRM because he was worried about his own legacy. President Compaoré likes to present himself as a champion of democracy and thus sought outside assistance to achieve this.

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Burkina Faso managed to begin its democratization, yet it has not overcome its structural problems and the poor socio-economic situation. It sees the key to solving these problems in the ECOWAS region, and is thus a strong advocate of regional integration. In fact, Burkina Faso shows a notable willingness to yield sovereign rights in the regional setting, which is suggested by the joining of a monetary union as well as a common passport within ECOWAS. The AU can do little to boost Burkina Faso’s economy in its current shape; hence Burkina Faso prefers ECOWAS and UEMOA.

7

South Africa

I am an African Thabo Mbeki, 8 May 1996

South Africa lies at the southern tip of the continent with Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe at its northern borders, Swaziland and Mozambique at its eastern border, and Lesotho in its heart, completely surrounded by South Africa. Its 3,000-kilometer long coastline is shared by the Indian and the Atlantic Oceans, which meet at Cape Agulhas, Africa’s southernmost point. The country is divided into nine provinces, with Gauteng being the smallest province but also the economic powerhouse of the country—and actually the whole continent: 21.9 percent of the continent’s GDP stems from South Africa alone.1 The most recent census, in 2001, revealed that there were 44.8 million people living in South Africa, with around 79 percent black Africans, 9.6 percent white, 8.9 percent colored, and 2.5 percent of Asian descent. It is estimated that the population grew to 47.9 million in 2007.2 South Africa’s past is well-known and well-researched. The Apartheid system, the democratic transformation, and the post-Apartheid governments have attracted many scholars to explore South Africa from different angles.3 As a consequence, one might even go to the extent to claim that post-Apartheid South Africa is over-researched. Compared with the other case studies in this book, South Africa’s foreign policy has indeed been studied extensively.4 Even South Africa’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the AU with particular reference to Thabo Mbeki’s presidency and the NEPAD initiative is widely discussed in scholarly work.5 This chapter is, however, still more than a mere summary of previous research because it not only provides a new perspective on South Africa’s foreign policy through the analytical framework used herein, but also covers the presidency of Jacob Zuma who took office in 2009.

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The analysis starts once more with an overview of the history of South Africa by focusing on Apartheid’s legacies, then gives a synopsis of the socio-economic situation, and continues with an exploration of the political system. The final two sections look into South Africa’s foreign policy in general, the latter with a specific focus on the AU.

The legacies of Apartheid During the days of Apartheid—the country’s cruel version of race segregation—South Africa was a pariah in the international system.6 The end of this pariah status was heralded in 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, then finally ended with Mandela’s election as president in South Africa’s first multiracial, multiparty, democratic election in 1994.7 What followed was South Africa’s fast rise to a democratic, peaceful, and model-like country with a “powerful ability to influence world affairs.”8 Nevertheless, the legacies of the Apartheid system still impact domestic and foreign policy and this section will shed light on these path dependencies. The Apartheid system evolved gradually over the past century and was finally installed with the election of the National Party in 1948. The African National Congress (ANC), one of the main opposition movements, initially practiced peaceful opposition to the Apartheid system, but the situation changed dramatically in the 1960s in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, in which 69 black South Africans were killed and many more injured. The ANC began to establish an armed wing, the Umkonto we Sizwe, which engaged in guerrilla warfare against white supremacy. The Sharpeville massacre (1960) and the crushing of the Soweto uprising (1976) are the most prominent examples of the Apartheid state’s brutality. Violence was, however, not restricted to its own territory, as shown earlier in the chapter on Swaziland. Indeed, South Africa engaged in a politics of intensifying violence in Southern Africa9 and in more distant states, such as the Seychelles and Madagascar.10 It pursued the so-called “total strategy,” which included a political and military component in order to destabilize the former Portuguese territories in particular.11 This strategy, combined with South Africa’s ability to maintain closer relations with some more moderate black states and the Apartheid regime’s foreign policy in Africa, resulted in African states deeply mistrusting South Africa. Despite the regime change in the 1990s, this suspicion has not been entirely overcome and is hence a determining feature of contemporary foreign policy.12 Beyond this legacy, one can identify at least three further impacts that the Apartheid system and the liberation struggle have had, which

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are important for this study. First, the ANC’s dominance in postApartheid South Africa is not only observable in terms of election results (it has never received less than 62 percent of the votes since 1994) but also in its omnipresence in the bureaucracy and civil society. The ANC rules within the so-called Tripartite Alliance, an alliance that comprises the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The ANC exploits its struggle in order to gain domestic legitimacy to rule and to attract voters. A clear illustration of this is when a large group of disillusioned ANC members left the party in 2008 and founded a new party, which was supposed to be named Congress of the People (COPE). When the ANC learned about the proposed name, it made an urgent application to the High Court in order to prevent the new party from naming itself COPE. The reason for the ANC’s appeal is that it co-organized the Congress of the People in 1955, during which the Freedom Charter was adopted and became the ANC’s manifesto. The ANC thus sees the Congress of the People as a symbol of its struggle and “argued that COPE wanted to steal the ruling party’s ‘glitter’ by associating itself with the historical event.”13 The ANC feared that COPE would gain a competitive advantage—the advantage the ANC had been using for more than a decade—and would use the name to gain respect, legitimacy, and a “jump start.”14 The ANC rightfully considers itself as the liberation movement. Ebrahim Ebrahim, who himself was an ANC liberation fighter and participant in the Congress of the People campaign,15 argues that “it is a historical event that belongs to the ANC.”16 Yet, the judge argued that the people would not identify a party that was founded in 2008 with an event that took place in 1955 and hence ruled that COPE could use the name, leading Gevisser to claim that the ANC’s hegemony over the liberation struggle was finally over.17 Nevertheless, it is still used to gain support and attract voters.18 Second, the liberation fight was supported by many states, including neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe and Zambia, but also China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Post-Apartheid South Africa is compensating in various ways for the support it received. Vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, for instance, it practices its quiet diplomacy, whereas vis-à-vis China, it advocates a one-state solution for China and Taiwan. The support for China even resulted in refusing to allow the Dalai Lama to attend a peace conference in March 2009, which was supposed to promote the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the sport’s potential to unite people across races and nations.19 Human rights issues are often overlooked in these cases because it is seen as preferential to compensate a country for its previous support. Laurie Nathan suggests that South Africa’s foreign

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policy is rooted in three paradigms: democracy, Africanism, and antiimperialism. According to Nathan, in cases in which it is impossible to reconcile the three paradigms, it is usually the democratic paradigm that gives way.20 Lastly, the impact of the liberation struggle on individuals is tremendous, as Raymond Suttner illustrates in his seminal study on the ANC’s underground work.21 He finds that ANC fighters consider the ANC to be their new family because, in order to join the struggle, they had to break ties with their natural family, mainly for security reasons. This has obvious repercussions for individuals such as Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma who have devoted their lives to the ANC and its struggle. Mbeki’s biographer, for instance, asserts that as “son of freedom fighters, Mbeki had in fact been born into the movement, which he considered nothing less than his family.”22 [The] effects could well have continued beyond the period of insurrection and some analysts have claimed that this mindset continues to influence the current practices of ANC leaders and rank-and-file. In particular, critics of the recently defeated ANC President and current State President, Thabo Mbeki, point to the high degree of secrecy and lack of openness that are said to characterise his mode of practising politics as opposed to what is supposed to happen in a public democratic order.23 Taking these various legacies of the liberation struggle into account, we must conclude that the liberation struggle against the Apartheid regime is a critical juncture in South Africa’s history and still influences the country’s domestic and foreign policy. “There is no doubt about that,” stressed an interviewee.24 The following sections return to this finding, but first the socio-economic situation is described.

South Africa’s socio-economic situation South Africa has by any standards the biggest and most important economy on the continent. South Africa’s GDP is the 32nd largest in the world and the largest in Africa.25 Its economic dominance becomes even clearer in the southern African region, in which its national economy accounts for 62.9 percent of the GDP of the whole South African Development Community (SADC) region. South Africa’s GDP is 1.7 times higher than the sum of all the SADC countries’ GDPs together. There has been constant growth since the late 1990s, reaching its peak in 2006 when GDP grew by 5.4 percent.26

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The economy was affected by the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–10, yet it was robust enough to have sailed safely through the rough waters of the crisis and still achieve GDP growth of 2.6 percent in 2010.27 Unlike most other African states, South Africa is not dependent on the agricultural sector, which contributes 3.2 percent to the country’s GDP. The country is rich in mineral resources, particularly platinum, gold, and diamonds. The mining sector contributes 7.7 percent to GDP, the secondary sector contributes 23.6 percent, and the tertiary sector makes up a total of 65.5 percent of national GDP.28 With the FIFA World Cup in 2010, South Africa was able to show its economic strength and potential to a global audience—even though it must be noted that prosperity is unequally distributed within society.29 Having previously suffered from sanctions and economic isolation during the Apartheid era, South Africa is now becoming a large, global player. Its President Zuma is directing a power shift in the global theater and trying to increase South Africa’s influence. He therefore tried to convince the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) that South Africa must become a member of their club.30 This goal was finally achieved in December 2010 (see below). South Africa’s major trading partners for its exports (estimated for 2010) are the European Union (27.0 percent), China (13.5 percent), and North East Asia (11.9 percent), closely followed by the SADC region (11.6 percent).31 Only 4.4 percent of South Africa’s exports are to parts of Africa beyond the SADC region,32 demonstrating the importance of South Africa’s immediate region for trade. This claim is true even if it is found at the same time that the annual growth in South Africa’s exports to the SADC region in 2009–10 at 5 percent is significantly lower than the annual growth rate of its trade with other regions for the same period (for instance: European Union, 11.7 percent; China, 11.8 percent).33 In 2008, SADC launched a free trade area in the region. Currently, 12 out of 15 SADC member states participate.34 This free trade area is supposed to boost the economy of the region but will only be completely established in 2015. It remains unclear whether the free trade area will be implemented on time; however, perhaps surprisingly, the oldest customs union in the world can be found in southern Africa. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back to 1910 when the Republic of South Africa and the British High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho), and Swaziland agreed to establish this union. Today, it consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. As the chapter on Swaziland has shown, South Africa uses this union to subsidize the

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other members of the union, thus demonstrating its economic and political potential.

The president and the ANC Policy making in South Africa is institutionalized and involves a “very vocal and very active” parliament,35 the ANC, the trade unions, and several other players. However, during the Mbeki era in particular, foreign policy making was more personalized than one would expect in a democratic system. After Mbeki and interim President Kgalema Motlanthe left office and Jacob Zuma assumed power, it was widely thought that foreign policy making would become more institutionalized and the importance of the Department of Foreign Affairs—now renamed the Department of International Relations and Co-operation—would increase as the president would concentrate on the domestic realm.36 Whether this prediction became reality is analyzed here. The South African parliament plays a crucial role in foreign policy making because it has to ratify bi- and multilateral treaties, but more importantly, parliamentarians are more critical and influential compared with other countries featured in these case studies. Modeled on the German legislative system, the South African parliament has a National Assembly with directly elected members and a National Council of Provinces consisting of 10 members from each province.37 South Africa’s constitution provides for a parliamentary system, but it is the National Assembly that elects one of its members to serve as president.38 At the same time, the constitution provides the president with wide-ranging authority, which leads scholars to the conclusion that, despite the fact that the president is elected by parliament, and therefore dependent on it, the South African system is a parliamentarian system of government with a presidential component.39 However, others go even further by suggesting that the system is quasi-presidential.40 In any case, Mbeki has guaranteed his party’s loyalty by giving loyalists important ANC positions. “The South African Parliament of today [under Mbeki], elected by all of the country’s people, is an empty vessel. The majority of its members provide little or no oversight of the Executive, who in turn pay it minimal heed,” as Andrew Feinstein, a disillusioned former ANC parliamentarian, points out.41 The Economist goes even further than Feinstein in arguing that “[d]uring the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, the assembly was treated as a mere rubber stamp.”42 Once Mbeki lost the ANC presidency in late 2007, things changed rapidly. “Miraculously, the ANC caucus, which had been nothing more than a rubber stamp to the executive authority of Mbeki for years, began doing its job.”43

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The ousting of Mbeki had proven that, by using the democratic means within the party structure, ANC members are capable of setting limits for their leader. Taking this strength into account, the ANC’s role in the formulation of policies must not be ignored. The ANC is especially important in the foreign policy realm and, as has been pointed out by Ebrahim Ebrahim, the former ANC head of international affairs and current deputy minister of international relations and co-operation in Zuma’s cabinet,44 should be discussed as a player as there has been little disagreement between the presidents and the party over foreign policy. The fact that the ANC is a foreign policy actor is not new: during the liberation fight, it was a recognized player and had observer status at both the OAU and the United Nations.45 The hegemony of the ANC over South African politics might be observed anxiously, yet the risk of the “ZANU-fication” of South African politics seems unlikely. Even though the ANC had a two-thirds majority in parliament, it did not tamper with the constitution. The emergence of the COPE party included a risk of massive voter migration from the ANC to COPE. To avoid the risk of losing the 2009 elections, the ANC could have taken measures to secure its dominance and alter the constitution, as was done in other African countries. The ANC, however, did not jeopardize South Africa’s democratic consolidation. One reason for the largely undisputed democratic culture is South Africa’s very vocal civil society,46 which also has an indirect influence on the foreign policy of the country.47 Other players in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy include the Department of Trade and Industry,48 as well as the partners of the Tripartite Alliance, COSATU in particular.49 Generally speaking, about today’s policy making, COSATU’s spokesperson Patrick Craven asserts: “we have been able to exert considerable influence on the policy direction.”50 There is indeed little doubt about the influence COSATU has domestically. It has a strong stance on economic politics, having opposed Mbeki’s neo-liberal economic policy in the past. When it comes to foreign policy, things look a bit different. Even though the organization supports the Swazi opposition, for instance,51 this policy is not reflected in the country’s foreign policy. Hence COSATU’s foreign policy role must not be overestimated. Although the Department of Foreign Affairs played a peripheral role under Mandela and Mbeki,52 this appeared to change once Mbeki left office. Its renaming as the Department of International Relations and Co-operation, parallel to President Zuma’s inauguration at the beginning of May 2009, was thought to herald a new epoch for the department. The new minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, stated that the name

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change “is informed by the need to give greater clarity on the mandate of the department … The name change moves from the premise that foreign policy is based upon and is indeed an advancement of our domestic priorities at an international level.”53 A South African newspaper, the Daily News, commented in October 2009: The name change was intended to underline that the department’s mission was not “foreign,” but to pursue the government’s domestic agenda by other means. But it seems to be taking this mandate a bit far when Dico [Department of International Relations and Co-operation] announces, as it did last week, that Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane would be visiting Polokwane in Limpopo on an “outreach programme” aimed at “popularising the country’s foreign policy” and “illustrating the link between the country’s domestic priorities and the department’s international engagement and co-operation.”54 President Zuma nominated the largely unknown, yet experienced Maite Nkoana-Mashabane as the new minister. She served for 10 years until 2005 as South African High Commissioner, first in Malaysia and later in India. However, it seems that her role in foreign policy making is rather small. Her name hardly appears in international newspapers, which might be because President Zuma, contrary to predictions, “has been even more active than Mr Mbeki on the foreign front”55 and thus leaves little political space for his foreign minister. Nevertheless, the role of the actors listed above, the ANC in particular, must not be underestimated; yet, at the same time, the role of the president in foreign policy making cannot be overemphasized. Once Zuma took over, he faced a similar dilemma to Mbeki, namely to escape the shadow of his predecessor. This challenge was reinforced by the fact that Zuma was one of South Africa’s most controversial politicians. He not only played a crucial role in Mbeki’s ousting and was allegedly involved in corruption, but he also had sexual intercourse with someone who was HIV positive and later revealed in public that he took a shower to prevent infection. He was also accused of rape but found not guilty. He belongs to the left wing of the ANC and has the support of COSATU and the anti-Mbekists in the ANC. Many whites considered his presidential candidature as frightening because he belonged to an ANC camp that was not known for being interested in integrating whites.56 His biographer Jeremy Gordin argues that Zuma’s life is inseparable from South Africa’s and the ANC’s history. Like Mbeki and Mandela, Zuma was involved in the liberation struggle. Before

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joining the ANC, his activities were concentrated on COSATU’s forerunner, the South African Congress of Trade Unions.57 Like Mandela, but unlike Mbeki, he spent several years in prison on Robben Island, a prison island in Table bay. After release from prison, he continued to work for the ANC, supporting Mbeki’s underground work in Swaziland. Zuma is described as “poised, canny, polite, wily and above all, patient”58 and a “cunning politician.”59 Mbeki’s biographer argues: “[i]f Mbeki was the head of the movement, then Zuma was its heart.”60 It was Mbeki who taught Zuma “the importance of ‘diplomatic’ skill, of charm in general.”61 When the time was ripe for talks between the ANC and the Apartheid regime, toward the end of the 1980s, Mbeki and Zuma were among the ANC representatives who met the regime’s representatives in Britain and Switzerland to discuss South Africa’s future.62 Zuma is a committed party man, having served the ANC for some decades. Whereas Mbeki became aloof from the ANC’s basis in the post-Apartheid years, Zuma willingly engaged at the grassroots level of the ANC, which in the end helped him to become ANC president with the party’s support. President Zuma listens to the ANC and its partners more than Mbeki. Mbeki’s ousting as ANC president which heralded his resignation as state president has shown that the ANC is able to control its leaders and set limits. After Mbeki left office, policy making became more decentralized within the Tripartite Alliance, and the cabinet decreased the president’s role in foreign policy making. Nevertheless, as the next section will show, Zuma is considerably more active in foreign policy than was expected at the start of his presidency. Hence, the role of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation is limited; however, one should not conclude that foreign policy making is personalized, despite there being some tendency in this regard.

South Africa’s post-Apartheid foreign policy There are three main realms for South Africa’s foreign affairs: the African agenda, the south–south cooperation, and the north–south dialogue.63 Once Mbeki had assumed the presidency in 1999, South Africa started working multilaterally with a specific focus on the African cause and attempted to regionalize African problems.64 This phase ended in 2009 with Mbeki’s and the interim President Mothlante’s departures and President Zuma taking office. Zuma’s engagement in Africa’s challenges is not as pronounced as Mbeki’s often seemingly altruistic involvement because Zuma roots his foreign policy in domestic interest and is less

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ideological.65 As a consequence, since 2009, a decrease in South Africa’s continental leadership can be observed and has been noted by the AU and its member states.66 There is no doubt that South Africa’s Africa policy has its roots in the country’s and the ANC’s history. Mandela made this clear in his often quoted article in Foreign Affairs on the eve of his presidency: “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny,” he noted.67 Even though this article is more than 15 years old, it still portrays South Africa’s foreign policy well, as Mandela did not write the article in personal terms but echoed common views within the ANC.68 A commitment vis-à-vis the African continent and the (O)AU member states persists on account of historical links. Zuma does not jeopardize these historic relations with African states. For instance, he went to Uganda to open the Oliver Tambo Leadership School, which is reminiscent of Uganda’s support for the ANC’s liberation fight, and thanked Uganda for hosting and training ANC fighters.69 In the same vein, when Zuma visited Angola in August 2009, “[h]e sought to patch up damaged relations with Luanda, [and] to show appreciation for Angolan support for South Africa’s liberation struggle by visiting martyrs’ graves, … [but he also] explored business opportunities.”70 President Mbeki had followed a stricter Pan-African course. Even before he became president he committed himself to the continent, emotionally asserting in 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of the constitutional bill: I am an African. I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of our native land. … In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. Their proud dignity informs my bearing, their culture a part of my essence. The stripes they bore on their bodies from the lash of the slave-master are a reminder embossed on my consciousness of what should not be done.71 Mbeki outlined the ambitious African Renaissance project designed to renew the continent and became the chief promoter of Africa’s renewal.72 Part of Mbeki’s renewal idea was also to bring peace and stability to the continent and, as a consequence, South Africa brokered peace deals in various African countries. Mbeki was involved in solving the conflicts in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe,73 and after he left the South African presidency, he was appointed the head of a working

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group to find an AU position on the ICC arrest warrant against Sudanese President al-Bashir.74 However, policy changed under Zuma. “Gone are the days of former president Thabo Mbeki’s endless missions to small countries and insignificant regional and continental talk shops.”75 Zuma seems to be less interested in conflict resolutions such as in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. The Business Day warns: “We can only hope that there is more to SA’s [South Africa’s] behind-the-scenes diplomacy concerning Zimbabwe, or Zuma is going to go down in history as an appeaser of tyrants, just as former president Thabo Mbeki’s peculiar brand of quiet diplomacy sullied his reputation in the foreign policy arena.”76 South Africa is a hegemon in its region—perhaps in joint position with other big states such as Egypt and Nigeria even at the continental level.77 Despite assisting other African states on many different levels, fellow African states have remained suspicious vis-à-vis South Africa and there is a clear lack of trust.78 Part of the explanation for this suspicion is certainly the Apartheid government’s perfidious foreign policy described above. The ANC governments do not want South Africa to be considered a bully, arrogant, or hegemonic because such a depiction would make the country vulnerable to charges of pursuing a policy reminiscent of the Apartheid regime.79 However, this makes the situation more difficult for the ANC governments because many African governments feel annoyed that South Africa is receiving so much international attention and is considered to be an indispensable country.80 Despite the ANC’s awareness of disapproval in Africa, Mandela tried to impose sanctions against the Nigerian regime, which had sentenced some of its opponents to death in 1996. Mandela’s bullying policy was not taken well. He was accused of breaking African unity81 and was ultimately forced to give up his position in order to restore solidarity.82 South Africa never tried to “bully” again. When the Zimbabwe crisis erupted in 2001, the Johannesburg-based Mail & Guardian wrote: “South Africa when led by Nelson Mandela acted as a ‘bully’ against the military dictatorship in Nigeria, making a ‘terrible mistake’ … but the country is not going repeat that mistake with Zimbabwe.”83 The subsequent quiet diplomacy even prevailed when the Zimbabwe crisis deteriorated in 2005 and 2008. South Africa continues to suffer from deep suspicion and a counter movement to its de facto hegemony, which became apparent in the context of the discussions about the extension of the United Nations Security Council held in 2005 when its bid to become a permanent member failed. Although there had been strong opposition from various countries against the proposed extension, for instance from France

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and Italy, there had also been no support from within Africa for South Africa’s bid. The so-called Ezulwini Consensus of the AU on that matter showed that African states could not decide on its two candidates; yet they affirmed their claim for two permanent seats with a veto right and five non-permanent seats in the Security Council.84 South Africa gave up its ambitions temporarily. Ebrahim Ebrahim acknowledges that “[w]e didn’t want to create the impression that because we are a big economic power on the continent that therefore we wanted a seat.”85 South Africa’s foreign policy outlook reaches far beyond the continent. The section on South Africa’s history showed the importance of South Africa’s relations with China with reference to the one-China policy as well as the refusal to invite the Dalai Lama to visit. However, South Africa does not maintain strong links with China alone, but also with the other BRIC states, a group of emerging giants. President Zuma spared no effort to strengthen links with the BRIC states by visiting the four countries in turn; a policy that he is applauded for by one of South Africa’s leading newspapers, which regards his foreign policy vision as laudable and ambitious.86 The Zuma administration pushed hard to become a member of the BRIC club and used all its diplomatic channels to achieve this goal, such as through the United Nations, in which all four BRIC states had a seat at that time, so that South Africa could please its potential partners in this forum.87 They achieved their goal in late December 2010, when the Chinese president invited South Africa to join BRIC.88 In the annual State of the Nation address on 10 February 2011, Zuma noted “we are greatly honoured to join the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa forum. It is an important bloc of emerging economies.”89 South Africa’s foreign policy aspirations are supported by its globally recognized importance. South Africa is part of the G8+5, a forum initiated by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair when he invited the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa to the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005. During this summit, the G8 leaders negotiated a debt relief program for African states; President Mbeki played a pivotal role therein as these negotiations were linked to his NEPAD agenda. Since the institutionalization of the G8+5, South Africa has had permanent and direct access to the G8 fora. President Zuma follows Mbeki’s example and attends G8 meetings, such as in 2010 when he attended the summit in Canada’s Huntsville. South Africa also became a member of the G20, a group of states that have become more powerful during the recent global economic and financial crisis. Although South Africa’s role within the G8 framework is certainly limited, it is able to play a greater role in its immediate region. However, instead of acting collectively within the SADC framework, South Africa

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concluded a trade agreement with the European Union (EU) without involving its SADC partners. Thus, “the other SADC members are deeply suspicious of South Africa. They wonder whether South Africa is a SADC team player or is driven purely by self-interest and is therefore in league with the EU and being used as a wedge for deepening and intensifying exploitation of southern Africa.”90 In fact, during the recently negotiated economic partnership agreement between the EU and the SADC region, South Africa first had observer status and only joined the negotiations in 2006 as a full member, helping SADC to advance its position in the negotiations.91 While South Africa takes a backseat in questions concerned with the deepening of SADC’s political and economic integration, it leads SADC in the most pressing political problem the region is facing, namely the crisis in Zimbabwe. President Mbeki was appointed to mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis on behalf of SADC, and Zuma inherited this role in 2009 because Mbeki was not trusted by Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai.92 The country also plays a crucial role in solving the conflict in Madagascar that erupted in 2009.93 Although SADC appointed former Mozambique President Joachim Chissano as a mediator in Madagascar, President Zuma and his entourage are also involved in the crisis resolution, for example through hosting meetings between the ousted and the de facto president of Madagascar.94 South Africa does not engage in this crisis diplomacy for altruistic purposes, but its prime interest is to ensure peace and stability in the region to control the massive influx of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers from neighboring countries as it is believed they will create socio-economic problems.95 In fact, South Africa’s foreign policy is more pragmatic and less altruistic than sometimes thought.

South Africa in the AU: from spearhead to “backbencher” During Mandela’s time, South Africa was the newcomer in the OAU and had to find its place in the organization. During Mbeki’s era, the country was essential in transforming the OAU into the AU, as well as in spearheading the continental integration process on various levels. During Mothlante’s interregnum, South Africa continued Mbeki’s AU policy to a large extent, albeit without Mbeki’s strength. Since the arrival of Jacob Zuma, things have been changing. As the previous section showed, Africa remains on the foreign policy agenda of the Zuma administration, yet not as an unchallenged top priority as during Mbeki’s reign. The inclusion in the BRIC club is more likely to become the hallmark of Zuma’s presidency.

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With his inaugural speech on 16 June 1999, President Mbeki started to implement his African Renaissance vision. This speech ushered “a period of intense engagement with African issues. We mediated in African conflicts, boosted peacekeeping forces and helped countries find their way towards democracy. On the international stage we were Africa’s voice, managing to force Africa back onto the international agenda.”96 Mbeki was omnipresent in Africa, both bilaterally, to negotiate peace agreements, and also multilaterally at the AU level. He not only became the first chairperson of the AU, which was launched in South Africa’s Durban, but more importantly, he also became the champion of the NEPAD initiative, the blueprint of his African Renaissance project. The NEPAD Secretariat is thus located in Midrand, between Johannesburg and Pretoria. In addition, Mbeki made sure that the seat of the Pan-African Parliament would also be in South Africa. With the exception of Gaddafi, Mbeki was arguably the most vocal and active head of state at the AU level. The South African Business Day ran a story about the first AU summit, entitled “Thabo Skywalker vs Darth Gadaffi,” in which the newspaper described the “ying and the yang of the … AU summit [which] are encapsulated in two images: the controlling hand of Thabo Mbeki on the gavel and the robed and ranting Moammar Gadaffi,” who was said to be at least as influential as Mbeki.97 Mbeki’s activism was watched like a hawk by fellow African leaders: he was perceived as a bully, a head of state who stubbornly wanted to push his conceptions through.98 Gerrit Olivier notes that NEPAD epitomized Mbeki’s absolute authority: a top-down process, which was conceptualized and formalized by Mbeki and presented as a virtual fait accompli.99 Several interviewees in other African countries confirmed this view and stressed that they were not pleased with the way Mbeki tried to assert his policy, particularly as it was not entirely clear at the beginning what NEPAD meant exactly. Some African countries regarded NEPAD as a parallel structure to the AU and hence disapproved of South Africa’s push.100 These misunderstandings were only resolved once NEPAD was integrated into the AU structure as the AU’s economic component. Mbeki was a strong supporter of the APRM, which is part of his NEPAD initiative, and hence he pioneered the review process. However, he effectively undermined his own brainchild. Whereas crime, unemployment, and the ANC’s dominance, for example, were initially defined as threats to South Africa’s democracy in an earlier version of the final APRM report, the final version only sees crime and unemployment as key challenges in the second decade of freedom, yet does not refer to them as a threat to South Africa’s democracy.101 Similarly, although

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the ANC’s dominance was seen as a threat to democracy, the final report only notes: “As the dominant political party, the ANC has a specific responsibility to adopt an orientation and put in place the necessary political machinery that will nurture citizens capable of sustaining democracy and political governance through bottom-up decision-making processes.”102 The APRM Monitor, a periodical that regularly reports on the APRM process, finds that the self-assessment report had been substantially edited and that “several key issues had been downplayed or omitted.”103 Moreover, at a meeting with his peers on the margins of the Accra Summit in July 2007, Mbeki made efforts to ensure that only the heads of state and one further representative from each state were with him while they were discussing South Africa’s report. “Later AU officials rebelled against the secrecy by handing out copies to selected journalists, and saying, off the record, that Mbeki’s approach was endangering the survival of the peer review process, which is regarded as his brainchild.”104 Within South Africa, the self-assessment report was criticized for its failure to include civil society in the process. COSATU’s deputy general secretary, Bheki Ntshalintshali, found that this was not the peer review process as his organization understood it.105 Patrick Craven similarly argues: “Well they did include civil society but then what seems to have happened was they didn’t like some of the conclusions that civil society gave to the facilitators and so asked for changes to be made. And that was classic Mbeki.”106 Insiders suggest that South Africa’s political elite was too conceited about their achievements and did not realize that their economic performance over the past years was widely considered to be poor.107 The draft report hit home for Mbeki who claims to be an economic expert. Hence, Mbeki felt “belittled” by the report as a source remarks.108 It appears that Mbeki wanted to make sure that South Africa was considered as a shining example for peaceful transition and democracy and that it would not get bad marks for its apparent challenges. Moreover, Mbeki would not allow the ANC—his family—to be criticized. This phenomenon was not new. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), along with the mandate to investigate human rights violations during the Apartheid era, presented its report in 1998. This report also included a short section on the ANC’s human rights violations committed by the liberation fighters during its guerrilla war. At that time, Mbeki tried to prevent this from becoming public, and it is said that he intervened because he “did not want his party to be criticized at all, he made it [the ANC] look less tolerant and democratic than it was.”109 It was Mandela who stopped Mbeki and allowed the TRC report to be published as it was.

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Even though it failed to conduct the APRM review in a serious manner, thereby undermining the spirit of NEPAD, South Africa remains an important player in NEPAD, a claim that is also true in the post-Mbeki era, as South Africa is still the financial heavyweight within the initiative and the AU. South Africa belongs to the “Big Five” of the AU, that is to say those five states that jointly contribute 75 percent of the AU’s budget. As already mentioned in the chapter on Algeria, South Africa failed to find support for its offer to contribute more than 30 percent of the AU’s budget because Africa’s heads of state did not wish to give South Africa more power. Nevertheless, South Africa must be considered as a powerhouse and other African governments openly admit this.110 It is also true that many African states depend on South Africa’s assistance, to the extent that South Africa finances the travel expenses of other delegations to attend AU meetings. Moreover, the South African government finances an African Renaissance Fund administered by the Department of International Relations and Co-Operation to support projects in Africa. It was worth 1.6 billion rand in 2008.111 In addition, South Africa engages in conflict resolution efforts and peace building missions with its diplomatic skills and by deploying troops to conflict zones. It participates in military missions in Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan.112 In 2008, there were 4,860 troops deployed in these missions.113 Against this background of diplomatic, military, and financial support, a European diplomat called South Africa a “moral authority” on the continent.114 Although South Africa remains committed to the AU in principle, its vigor has been reduced. In the State of the Nation Address on 11 February 2010, Zuma’s approach with regard to his reconfigured foreign policy became more evident: We will intensify efforts to promote the interests of South Africa globally. We will support efforts to speed up the political and economic integration of the SADC region, and promote intra-regional trade and investment. South Africa continues to play a leading role in continental efforts to strengthen the African Union and its organs, and to work for unity. We will focus energy on revitalising the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, as a strategy for economic development on the continent. According to an African diplomat, South Africa remains committed to the African cause, particularly as the country knows how much it owes to the continent; yet at the same time, the argument goes that they will

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never pursue a policy that is not in South Africa’s national interest.115 Conversely, during Mandela’s and Mbeki’s administrations, South Africa acted partially altruistically vis-à-vis fellow African states, for instance, through engaging in conflict prevention and crisis mediation even when South Africa was not directly affected such as in Burundi. The de facto rejection of a Union Government for Africa discussed below also illustrates the reluctance to agree to deeper continental integration. Mokshanand Dowarkasing, a Pan-African Parliament member from Mauritius, asks: “How can we achieve that when we have countries playing the roles of big brothers, like Nigeria, like Kenya, like South Africa. Do you think these countries will like to lose their regional influence in favour of a United States of Africa?”116 As a matter of fact, even the Pan-Africanist Mbeki has never been an advocate of Gaddafi’s idea. During a meeting of the so-called Committee of Twelve, which was established with the Accra Declaration to find a way to establish the Union Government for Africa, Mbeki made it clear that there was a “need to respect the principle of subsidiarity and support[ed] a bottom-up approach to achieve integration … using the RECs [regional economic communities] as building blocks.”117 A close observer of the scene therefore seems to be right when he argues that he does not “classify Mbeki as a real unionist.”118 Mbeki never abandoned the idea of the United States of Africa entirely, yet he vocally rejected the idea of the Union Government’s immediate establishment and the building of the United States of Africa by 2015, as proposed originally by the so-called Obasanjo report.119 South Africa never considered this proposal to be realistic. It was thought that the AU still had its “teething problems,” as an official put it; thus, the United States of Africa appeared to be too far-fetched.120 Mbeki drove the decision making process within South Africa and sought and led an alliance with like-minded states. One interviewee even called the “gradualists” in the Grand Debate the “Mbekiists.”121 A South African official links the government’s dismissive attitude toward the immediate establishment of the Union Government with the fact that South Africa overthrew Apartheid only a few years ago and remains attached to its newly won sovereignty: “Look, let’s be realistic. I buy a car today, I drive it for fourteen days and after driving it for fourteen days somebody says come now this car must go to a car pool. Ah, I’m just giving you an example … ”122 Mbeki, however, kept promoting the noble idea of the United States of Africa and approved the Accra Declaration. The South African president and his administration worked on various committees dealing with the Union Government matter in the following months.123 Notwithstanding, he never

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considered the idea as timely and was certainly not unhappy when the United States of Africa proposal was postponed indefinitely. Alongside President Mbeki, it appears that South Africa’s political elite did not consider the Union Government proposal to be realistic. It is a telling sign that COSATU, which is formally part of the governing alliance, did not even discuss the proposal.124 If the proposal was perceived as a serious matter, COSATU would have adopted a position. COSATU’s position would certainly coincide with the ANC’s, which does not see fast track integration as desirable. Ebrahim Ebrahim states: “There has to be regional integration first, we are favoring regional integration and until then we can work towards some kind of continental integration.”125 Other officials highlight the need for other African states to first achieve internal sovereignty over their entire territory, as well as appease and stabilize their countries and their regions before moving towards deeper integration.126 In short, from the South African perspective, the Union Government is still far away. During a speech on 16 October 2009 at the University of Limpopo, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane emphasized the achievements of the AU and the need for the organization; yet at the same time, she set the limits of continental integration: “The decision on the African Union Authority will have to be implemented within the context of our understanding of the African Union as an intergovernmental organisation of sovereign member states. It is not our understanding that the African Union Authority will be a supranational entity operating over our heads.”127 As the Union Government idea is linked to Gaddafi, it is interesting to take a brief look at the relationship between Gaddafi and Zuma. In March 2011, South Africa supported United Nations Resolution 1973128 on the no-fly zone in Libya;129 this support could have effectively ended the relationship between the two statesmen. Zuma also became part of the ad hoc committee established by the AU to deal with the Libyan uprising and to bring the “immediate cessation of all hostilities.”130 However, the situation was completely different before 2011. South Africa was heard in Libya. President Zuma travelled to Libya ahead of the AU Summit in January 2010 to convince Gaddafi not to stand as AU chairman for a second term. Sources affirm that South Africa played a significant role in convincing Gaddafi to resign from his position as AU chairman.131 Thus, the relationship indeed seemed to be cordial in the past and only changed in 2011. As a matter of fact, President Zuma, accompanied by his foreign minister Nkoana-Mashabane, had visited Gaddafi in July 2010 for a second time to exchange ideas inter alia on how to speed up Africa’s integration.132 Is this an indication that President Zuma is becoming

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more interested in the AU? The final answer is left open as only time will tell. Certainly, South Africa under Zuma’s leadership will not leave the AU; they feel committed to the African continent because of their past. However, it is also certain that South Africa will not join a Union Government for Africa or agree to an AU Authority that can overrule their national government. They still consider the AU as an intergovernmental organization and not as a federation or union of states.

Conclusion Despite having a democratic order, South Africa provides little evidence that it is indeed willing to cede sovereignty vis-à-vis the AU or SADC. This comes as a surprise, considering South Africa’s classification, in this study, as a Volunteer. But indeed, the APRM, for instance, both indicates Mbeki’s attempts to avoid defaming either the ANC or the movement’s role in the history of South Africa and effectively prevents other states commenting on South Africa’s internal affairs. This is clearly connected to South Africa’s recently won self-determination after the end of Apartheid. The very fact that all of South Africa’s post-Apartheid presidents were part of the liberation movement, in exile, in the underground, or in prison, attaches them personally to the sovereignty and self-determination for which they have fought. Referring to the case against COPE, it becomes clear that the ANC sought to monopolize the anti-Apartheid struggle. The impact of the liberation struggle is also seen in South Africa’s support for fellow African states, which have previously assisted the ANC. Security in the SADC region is important for South Africa to ensure its prosperity and enable the country to develop further. Hence, South Africa helps to solve crises such as the one in Zimbabwe. SADC is more attractive than the AU in economic terms, as the trade figures mentioned above suggest. However, it is also true that one of South Africa’s post-Apartheid foreign policy paradigms is to work multilaterally. The country’s involvement in the United Nations, as well as in the AU and SADC, shows this. Yet, this interest in those organizations does not mean that South Africa would surrender sovereignty to a notable extent. Mbeki’s previously strong engagement in the African cause gave way to a more pragmatic foreign policy agenda under President Zuma. Zuma’s foreign policy should allow South Africa to emerge as a global player within the ranks of the BRIC nations. Preference is given to the G8 and the BRIC countries, whereas there seems to be less interest in economic cooperation with fellow African states.

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All in all, South Africa stands in stark contrast to Burkina Faso, the other Volunteer in this study, which is thought to have a similar willingness to surrender sovereignty according to the grouping of the AU members, but which shows a greater interest in regional and continental integration. The differences in socio-economic development might explain some of the differences with regard to their engagement in the AU and their respective regional economic communities. However, in the case of South Africa, the historic dimension adds substantially to the explanation as to why it tends to refuse to yield sovereignty. While the identified turning point in Burkina Faso’s history (the murders of Sankara and Zongo) forced President Compaoré to open the political system in order to increase his legitimacy to rule, South Africa’s turning point (the anti-Apartheid struggle) is linked with the refusal to cede sovereignty. No other state on the continent had to wait for its independence for as long as South Africa, and almost no other state on the continent has established and consolidated a democratic order so quickly and successfully. Hence, the claim made above between the level of democracy and the willingness to surrender sovereignty must be qualified in this light. It seems that the legacies of a liberation fight overshadow the status of democracy as an explanatory variable.

8

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Before colonialism we could not unite because of the chiefs and the need was not compelling. During colonialism we could not unite because we were not free. After independence, we could not unite because of the bankrupt politicians that wanted to remain big fishes in small ponds, not to mention their lack of vision. There is no reason now except ourselves. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (2007)

Uganda is a land of contrasts. Once described by Winston Churchill as the “pearl of Africa,” it experienced the most brutal dictatorship under Idi Amin in the 1970s. Up until today, the country has suffered from the devastating rules of Amin and his predecessor and successor Milton Obote. Uganda’s location in the war-torn great lake region between the ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo, crisis-prone Sudan, and recently unstable Kenya certainly does not contribute to positive development of the country. Despite these huge obstacles, Uganda has proved that it is willing to fight these challenges. In recent years, it has become a land of relative stability. Its economic performance is improving in the context of accelerating East African integration. Moreover, the country is at the forefront of the HIV/AIDS fight in Africa. Its recovery started when Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986 and “Museveni’s revolution”1 started to unfold. His “movement” strategy aimed at a broad-based government to regain trust and legitimacy after the Obote and Amin years. Museveni managed to put himself at the center of Uganda’s political arena and made himself indispensable, to the extent that the constitution was changed in 2005 to allow him to run for a third and further terms in office. He was once hailed as one of Africa’s new democratic leaders, but he lost credit when he allowed the constitution to be changed. The sky is now growing darker over Museveni, and he increasingly faces accusations of governing Uganda in an authoritarian style.

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This chapter looks at these issues. It traces Museveni’s emergence as the political center in the history section and pictures his recovery strategy. The following section picks up on these issues and analyzes the socio-economic context of Uganda, framed in a description of the East African Community (EAC) to which Uganda belongs. Museveni is pushing hard to fast track East African integration in both economic and political terms. He has managed to secure a strong and vocal position in the region, maneuvering himself toward the presidency of a potentially united East Africa, as the third section on the political system shows. Gaddafi’s grand plan of a united Africa undermined Museveni’s personal aspirations in the region and is hence strongly opposed by the latter, whose position vis-à-vis the AU and the Union Government is also shaped by it. These issues are looked into in the last two sections of this chapter.

Uganda’s history: Obote, Amin, and Museveni Uganda had to go through three major liberations. The decolonization in the early 1960s was characterized by a relatively smooth transition. On the contrary, liberation from the Obote and Amin regimes, between 1966 and 1986, included two large scale wars until Yoweri Museveni succeeded in overthrowing the regimes and developing a viable state, in which state structures enjoy a certain amount of legitimacy. Uganda became independent in 1963, toward the end of the first wave of decolonization in Africa. Apart from minor incidents, no fighting took place to free Uganda; the mode of transition was negotiation.2 Uganda’s former colonial power, Britain, first allowed the election of a Legislative Council in 1961 and, one year later, elections for a National Assembly, in which the Uganda People’s Congress, a party led by Milton Obote, won the majority of the seats.3 On 9 October 1962, the former colony became a republic with Milton Obote as prime minister and King Edward Muteesa II as head of state, albeit without executive rights. In 1966, Obote suspended the constitution, forced the king to step down, and made himself head of state. Obote implemented policies designed to make Uganda a socialist state, which brought him the support of Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere who had started his socialist project in the neighboring country. In the following years, Obote caused the socio-economic deterioration of Uganda, but this was just the prologue to what followed when Idi Amin Dada seized power in a coup in early 1971. Initially hailed domestically for his anti-socialist stance, the expulsion of the Asian community,4 and his reconciliatory move to allow a

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former Ugandan king who had died in British exile to be buried in Uganda,5 Amin’s brutality soon became obvious. Amin’s soldiers received orders to shoot anyone who was thought to oppose the regime; terror became part of everyday life. It is estimated that up to 300,000 Ugandans lost their lives during Amin’s rule.6 “[U]nder Idi Amin, Uganda represented a personalist praetorian model of despotic tyranny.”7 Amin managed to survive as a brutal dictator for eight years, inter alia, because he had the support of the young Libyan head of state, Colonel Gaddafi. The social consequences of Amin’s brutal reign were devastating. This reign finally ended after Obote, supported by Tanzanian troops and the young Museveni, was successful in overthrowing Amin and defeating his army. Ugandans suffered from collective trauma including permanent mistrust and fear of prosecution and oppression in the broadest sense and in all parts of life. Amin’s regime left generations of Ugandans without the normative structure vital for a normally functioning society. Values such as trust, patience, patriotism, unity and, most importantly democracy were effaced by institutionalized violence. Instead, the motto for the majority of Ugandans was “every man for himself and God for us all.”8 The short-term interim presidents following Amin as well as Obote, who ultimately served for another five years, failed to reconcile society. In fact, Obote continued to violate human rights, oppressed civil liberties, and murdered his enemies.9 In short, even after Amin was overthrown, there was still no light at the end of the tunnel. Since 1962, the situation had only become worse. Uganda had become “one of the poorest nations in the world and a byword for bad governance.”10 Museveni, frustrated by Obote, continued the guerrilla fight, this time against his former ally Obote. He found popular support because most Ugandans believed that Obote’s party regained power illegitimately, and Museveni used this feeling to paint his struggle as a popular rebellion.11 With the support of Gaddafi, who was now closing ranks with the guerrilla fighters, Museveni established a functioning guerrilla force, which became known as the National Resistance Army (NRA). Museveni himself headed the “movement” and engaged in the fighting.12 The war lasted until 1986 when the NRA took control of Kampala. The conflict resulted in 300,000 deaths and around 350,000 displaced people.13 Museveni had to start from scratch when he took over in 1986. His strategy was remarkable; he focused on regaining trust, implementing the professionalization of the army, and improving education from the very beginning. Museveni’s strategy was outlined in his so-called “ten

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points,” which included the restoration of democracy, consolidation of national unity, elimination of all forms of sectarianism, defense of a consolidated national independence, as well as cooperation with other African states.14 Museveni and his allies in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) tried to regain the legitimacy of and trust in the political system and their own policies. His “wonderful war,” as an interviewee close to the president called it,15 impacts on Museveni’s personality. Uganda’s president carefully depicts himself as revolutionary and makes sure that this image prevails.16 In an interview in May 2009, his domestic opponent Kizza Besigye accused Museveni of never having fired a shot during the guerrilla war. Museveni quickly responded, in a public letter published in the pro-government newspaper the Sunday Vision, that he actually fought actively during the war. In his own words: “Coming to the specific issue of whether Museveni fired his personal gun in combat, let the reader be informed that that gentleman [Museveni] had plenty of the unpleasant opportunities to do that.”17 Museveni is aware that the younger generation grew up after he had seized power and therefore have not experienced the Amin and Obote years or his fight against them.18 Thus, the NRM aims to influence public discourse by reminding the people of the liberation war. Museveni wants to keep his story in the mind of Ugandans by “usually remind[ing] us that revolutionaries do not retire.”19 These facts should lead to the conclusion that the Museveni-led guerrilla war has become a critical juncture in Uganda’s history. Later sections elaborate on this finding. First, however, we shall turn to the socio-economic situation in Uganda.

Agriculture and oil Uganda holds the rank “low human development” according to the United Nations Development Programme, ranking 156 out of 179 with a GDP of US$1,166 per capita in 2008.20 Uganda has not yet been able to industrialize and thus remains a peasant country where the cultivation of bananas, tea, and coffee play a major role. There are large plantations to provide for the global market, but the majority of Ugandans are involved in subsistence agriculture and the informal sector.21 Nevertheless, the country has experienced some socio-economic development since Museveni took over power. Uganda’s geographical situation as a landlocked state does not help the economy of the country because it has no direct access to the sea, which would enable it to trade directly with the rest of the world. However, this problem is not as acute as in the case of Ethiopia whose

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relations with its neighbors are not always cordial. Uganda’s neighbor Kenya is part of the East African Community (EAC) and so no tariffs and customs apply to goods imported or exported through the Kenyan port of Mombasa. The EAC region is indeed well advanced,22 with the primary objective of becoming an economic union that integrates the economies of its five member states. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are the longest serving members (since its foundation in 2000); Burundi and Rwanda joined the union in 2007. President Museveni tirelessly emphasizes the need for integration. In a speech delivered in Lusaka in April 2009, he said that the transformation from a subsistence economy into an industrial and service-based economy “will only happen when our countries and our regions take the bold steps of developing a large single market that can stimulate and absorb the products of robust industrialisation, spur investments and promote production and trade.”23 It can be said that Uganda’s economy is dependent to a large extent on a functioning EAC. Consequently, Uganda is interested in the integration proceedings. The infrastructure in Uganda will be positively influenced by other EAC members. Uganda will, for instance, benefit technologically from Rwanda, which plans to develop into a high-tech hub in Africa. A new glass fiber cable running from Mombasa to Rwanda’s capital Kigali will go through Kampala, providing Uganda’s capital with an even better telecommunications infrastructure than the decent one that is already in place. It is clear that the EAC is an economic success story for Uganda. Uganda’s focus on economic integration has always been on the region, not the continent. According to a senior official, the problem with the AU’s grand economic plan, the Abuja Treaty, is its long time frame.24 Because of that, it lacks seriousness from the very beginning, and African states have lost focus. In other words, the Abuja Treaty was doomed from the very beginning—at least in Uganda’s view—and there are reasons to conclude that Uganda never aimed for a continental market in the first place. Before moving on with the analyses of Uganda’s political system and its leaders, a note of caution must be added due to a large scale oil discovery in the country, which has not been included in the description of the socio-economic situation but might be important in the future. Uganda’s economic performance could change significantly if the oilfields that were discovered in western Uganda around Lake Albert are exploited in a way that benefits the population. At this stage, it is impossible to make a conclusive judgment on the economic impacts of the discovery of oil. For the time being, Uganda remains one of the

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poorest countries on the planet, although it has come a long way since Amin and Obote were forced out of the country.

The hegemony of the president President Museveni undoubtedly emerged as the political figure in Uganda after 1986. Descriptions of Museveni’s leadership style range from the benevolent father of the nation to a dictator. Before going into more detail on Museveni himself, exploring his hold on power and his carefully constructed self-image as a liberation fighter as well as his leadership style, it is worth considering some groups and institutions in order to learn more about their effectiveness in controlling the president. Among these are the army and the parliament. The parliament is de facto of little value for the political development of the country. It does not effectively control the government, as interviews with parliamentarians about their role reveal.25 It appears that it is forbidden to discuss foreign policy issues in parliament and, according to an insider, the executive “overworks” parliament,26 thereby effectively undermining the legislative arm. Even in vital issues such as military interventions, the army is deployed without the approval of the parliament. Officials justify this by saying that such decisions have to be made quickly.27 Having found that the parliament is largely unable to control the government or foreign policy decisions, it is worth looking at the role played by the press in carrying out its oversight function. Apart from the government-leaning newspaper New Vision, Uganda’s printed press is generally critical, which sometimes exposes journalists to oppressive measures. Journalists provide details about how this oppression works. If the authorities discover that journalists are researching a sensitive issue, they try to persuade them to cease work on this topic. An unnamed journalist interviewed for this study stresses that it is important to have good connections with the security apparatus of Uganda, to have a security net.28 Yet at the same time, the government allows critical voices to be published, which all in all shows a mixed picture of freedom of the press in Uganda. This is also reflected in the country’s Freedom House classification, where Uganda has a “partly free” press.29 It is true that journalists do not have an easy position in Uganda and having connections with high officials is indeed crucial. Yet, it is also true that the loudest criticism against Museveni comes from the press which, despite all restrictions, exercises its oversight to a notable extent. The army could also function as an institution that controls the government. In fact, the military still has a strong presence; 10 army members

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even have seats in parliament. According to military sources, it is good to have the army present in parliament as the 10 MPs can brief the army on what happens in parliament.30 The source refers to Article 210 of Uganda’s constitution, which states that the army is accountable to parliament. There is, however, a discrepancy between theory and reality. Aaron Mukwaya, a well-known political scientist at Makerere University, makes a point by stating “in simple terms, in short, this country is run under military rule. And you know very well that military rule does not respect the parliament, does not respect the judiciary, does not respect all those things.”31 On the contrary, John Nagenda, one of President Museveni’s senior advisors, states that the military has little influence: one of Museveni’s biggest achievements is that he emasculated the army.32 Interviewees emphasize that the MPs from the army are “significant in their silence in parliament.”33 Henry Banyenzaki, a member of the ruling NRM, thus stresses that it is not timely to keep the army in parliament. They merely guarantee 10 more votes for the ruling party, as the army is loyal to President Museveni.34 This statement from the NRM ranks is very significant. Moreover, we should look into the influence of the minister of foreign affairs and his ministry in the context of foreign policy making. Although the ministry is “supposed to give direction,” as interviewees note,35 there is little doubt that its role in foreign policy decisions, particularly with regard to the AU, is marginal. According to Banyenzaki, the staff in the ministry are just “sugar coating” their own role, if they assume they have a say.36 Even if the administration has a certain influence, for example in drafting position papers, it must be noted that it is full of political appointees who are loyal to Museveni. The cabinet is also of little importance according to the constitution which assigns several rights to the president.37 In fact, Article 98 reads: “(1) There shall be a President of Uganda who shall be the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces and the Fountain of Honour. (2) The President shall take precedence over all persons in Uganda … .” Article 99 then stipulates that “the executive authority of Uganda is vested in the President … .”38 These articles are translated into political reality, effectively limiting the role of the cabinet and placing Museveni at the center of power in Uganda. Museveni gives the impression that he tries to solve every single problem that occurs in the country personally. He solved the Boda-Boda drivers’ strike;39 he tells Muslims he can reconcile their different factions; he solved the problems of Kenyan students paying more tuition fees than Ugandans, although they are also EAC citizens; and he visits

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villages delivering promising speeches, suggesting that he is interested in even the simplest problems. It is hard to find one edition of the government-leaning newspaper New Vision in which there is no mention of what Museveni did the day before. He likes to be seen as an achiever; that seems to be his very nature.40 Museveni’s political weight becomes most obvious in the foreign policy realm. As an informed source claims: “foreign policy is made by him,” continuing: “the AU is a matter for the boss.”41 In the same vein, political scientist Aaron Mukwaya argues that Museveni sees foreign policy “as his thing.” He considers foreign policy to be largely beyond national interest, but rather that it is his personal interest and therefore he cannot encourage or allow any foreign policy issues to be discussed in parliament.42 There is no doubt that Museveni drives Uganda’s foreign policy, and he is the sole authority when deciding on any foreign policy matter. All interviewees point to this, and as there is no empirical finding suggesting otherwise, we must conclude that foreign policy making is indeed personalized.43 Having established that Museveni is the “single most important figure,”44 the remaining question is whether he should be considered an authoritarian leader. There are basically two schools of thought. One side argues that Museveni is a dictator,45 whereas the other challenges this claim by referring to his reportedly widespread support among the population and the way he has gained legitimacy since the mid-1970s.46 Not only do NRM politicians belong to the latter camp, but close observers also support this view. Museveni and his movement started to implement democratic institutions from the outset, thereby introducing democracy at the local level and building foundations to increase trust in the political system after the Amin and Obote years.47 However, the APRM report reminds us that “Uganda is in danger of slipping back into a period of neo-patrimonial rule. … Having rescued Uganda from the Amin and Obote strangleholds, the current leadership should be concerned about its own legacy.”48 These findings are related to the amendment of the constitution in 2005 in which the presidential term limit was increased. Ironically, it was Museveni who had declared, two decades earlier in 1986, that “the problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power.”49 The NRM’s decision to change the constitution caused an outcry in the republic and beyond. In particular, Western states criticized Museveni. There is no doubt that, behind closed doors, Museveni was heavily attacked by Western governments for lifting the term limit. They were deeply disappointed as they had believed Museveni to be one of Africa’s “new leaders.”

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An insider reminds us that Museveni’s most likely motive in changing the constitution was that he had not reached his aims of transforming the state, completely professionalizing the army, consolidating the economy, fighting corruption to a satisfactory extent, and moving the East African Community into a federation of states; therefore “manipulating is legitimate”50 for Museveni as he has to ensure that he can complete his work. As early as 2007, Museveni rejected the idea of being awarded for his retirement. Sudanese billionaire Mo Ibrahim awards a prize to African leaders who allow for constitutional change of power in their country. Museveni was supposedly tempted to step down in order to receive the prize. But his response was quick and clear: “President Yoweri Museveni has said he does not need the $5m award given to African leaders who retire voluntarily. Museveni … said he would retire after he had accomplished his mission.”51 Museveni ran again in the 2011 presidential elections and won some 68 percent of the votes.52

The East African Federation and the problem of al-Bashir According to an official briefing paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda’s foreign policy is based on the idea of having three concentric circles.53 First, there is the East African region with the EAC; surrounding this is the African continent with the AU; and lastly there is the “rest of the world.” Accordingly, the foci of Uganda’s foreign policy are set. The emphasis is clearly on the region and the EAC, and the distribution of embassies reflects this: all EAC member states except Burundi host a Ugandan embassy, whereas there are only 10 embassies in Africa overall. This focus on the EAC is in line with Museveni’s strong and repetitive statement about moving East Africa into a federation of states. The AU only comes second on Uganda’s foreign policy priority list. This also echoes Museveni’s stance that the regional economic communities must be the buildings blocks of the United States of Africa. Museveni does a lot to promote regional integration. In the “ten points,” written in the 1980s, he noted that African economic unity along regional lines will provide larger markets and also a greater diversity of resources.54 Museveni continues to emphasize the economic component of the EAC. There is a lot of trade within the region as Silver Ojakol, acting commissioner for external trade in the Ministry of Tourism, Industry, and Trade, has pointed out. According to Ojakol, the business community is not only very much aware of regional integration, but also interested in driving it.55 Although there is some exchange of goods within the EAC, Wolfe Braude conversely suggests that the

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leaders are the main drivers of the integration process in eastern Africa, while the private sector is left out;56 this means that a properly functioning market without political intervention has yet to emerge. The truth might lie somewhere in the middle: there is a strong dependency on political decisions and the national decision makers are the drivers of the EAC; however, the market uses the leeway provided by the leaders and the exchange of goods is increasing. At this stage, the EAC is primarily an economic grouping, yet it tries to move beyond this by aiming at a political federation.57 There is already cooperation in many policy fields such as joint army exercises. An army representative emphasizes that, as the national armies of the region are already working together, EAC members are prepared to work in the East African stand-by brigade that would be established under the African Peace and Security Architecture.58 Moreover, a common East African passport makes it easier to travel between EAC countries. This passport is politically, although not practically, real as the printing press regularly runs out of paper.59 Whether the goal of the East African Federation is more serious than the United States of Africa must be researched further. High-ranking officials from Uganda are concerned that their country is not ready to cede any rights to such a federation.60 The parallel to Uganda’s position vis-à-vis the AU is obvious. Yet, in the EAC case, reluctance is not as strong as in the case of the Union Government for Africa; under the condition that Museveni becomes president of the federation, Uganda seems to be willing to cede sovereign rights. It appears as if Museveni would like to be president of a united East Africa: a member of Uganda’s parliament remarks upon it;61 another insightful observer states that “of course he wants to be the power center [of the EAC];”62 and many other interviewees and observers echo this.63 Museveni’s project has only failed so far because of massive resistance from Tanzania and Kenya. It is important to stress that Museveni’s aspirations are not too farfetched and not entirely unrealistic, as he has gained more prestige than most of East Africa’s other leaders. Museveni’s biggest advantage is the weakness of his competitors. Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete only came to power in 2005, and Kenya has had two strongmen since the power sharing agreement that followed the turmoil of December 2007 and January 2008. Museveni is domestically unchallenged, has been vocal on many African issues, and has managed to put himself in a favorable position on the continent, for example, as one of the spokesmen for the gradualist camp in the Union Government debate and in Uganda’s temporary seat in the United Nations Security Council (2009). Moreover, Museveni chaired a joint EAC, COMESA, and SADC meeting, in which

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the member states of these regional economic communities attempted to harmonize their policies.64 Even before the AU came into being, Museveni’s Uganda proved instrumental in supporting the OAU’s main goal of liberation. Training camps for guerrillas were located in Uganda, particularly for the freedom fighters in Portuguese territories. Museveni is also globally respected despite the setback that occurred in 2005 due to his extension of the presidential term limit mentioned earlier. The Ugandan president’s decision to deploy troops under an AU mandate into war-torn Somalia certainly helped him to manifest his standing in the West. The soldiers Uganda sent to failing Somalia face a dramatic security situation and have a severely limited capacity and an ineffective mandate with which to solve the security problems of Somalia. The bombings in Kampala that killed more than 70 people watching the Soccer World Cup Final in July 2010 even brought the conflict into Uganda.65 It appears that Uganda contributes more to the AU than it gets in return. The United States of America and the European Union know that Uganda is a key state in the region. They need it to prevent the spread of fundamentalist Islam from Sudan and Somalia,66 and more generally, as a regional prop of stability in the war-torn Great Lakes region. An interviewee in Zimbabwe says in this light: “because Uganda plays a strategic role in the global war against terrorism, it appears, it is handled with kid gloves.”67 As this example shows, Museveni tries hard to find international support. Signing the protocol that established the ICC is certainly part of this strategy. Despite having signed the protocol, Museveni did not formally acknowledge the arrest warrant against Sudanese President al-Bashir initially when it was issued in 2009.68 Instead, Museveni advocated the AU policy to create an investigation team under South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki to find a common position; Museveni wanted to make his decision with the assistance of the findings of the team’s report. In the meantime, Museveni invited al-Bashir for a state visit despite the ICC charge.69 The reasons not to support al-Bashir’s arrest warrant initially could include fear: on the one hand, al-Bashir is backed by northern African states, including then powerful Libya. Supporting the ICC in the case of al-Bashir would have caused serious damage to the relationship between Libya, its allies, and Uganda. On the other hand, the internal conflict in Sudan that would stem from sentencing al-Bashir could spill over into Uganda. The concrete fear of a war in Uganda might be one reason why Museveni rejected the al-Bashir arrest warrant.70 Surprisingly, Museveni made a sudden U-turn when he refused to invite al-Bashir to the AU summit that took place in Kampala in July 2010. Uganda’s president thus accepted the international

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community’s call to isolate al-Bashir and pleased the international donor community, which was certainly glad to hear about Museveni’s decision. This strengthened the international position of Uganda’s president; however, the long-term effects of Museveni’s decision remain to be seen.

Museveni, Gaddafi, and the African Union It has been written before that Museveni is very vocal in African affairs. Accordingly, he is at the forefront of his camp, the gradualists, in the Union Government debate. Museveni adds a further argument to the position of the gradualists, who usually refer to the need to build the regional economic communities first. He argues there must be a cultural basis among states that desire unity and he does not see such a basis in Africa yet. This section looks briefly into Museveni’s argument and then moves on to the central question of how to explain Uganda’s position vis-à-vis the AU. In a speech delivered at the Accra Summit on the Grand Debate in mid-2007, Museveni pointed out: In Uganda, we are not in favour of forming a Continental Government now on account of a number of reasons. … While economically I support integration with everybody, politically we should only integrate with people who are either similar or compatible with us. The whole of Africa has got some obvious incompatibilities when it comes to political integration.71 Museveni continues “[i]nsisting on political integration at the continental level will bring together incompatible linkages that may create tension rather than cohesion.”72 Uganda’s president highlights the need to preserve one’s own identity when he stresses that he would not give up his own identity for anything.73 His recommendation for the procedure of the integration process is thus a “functions-based, rational approach.”74 He suggests certain policy fields such as environment and trade negotiations on which the AU could work collectively. If the AU concentrated on these “instead of being everywhere and nowhere, we would start moving forward.”75 From the beginning of the Grand Debate, Museveni was a speaker for the gradualists, a position he shared with South Africa’s President Mbeki. As an insightful interviewee expressed it: “Uganda feels that Gaddafi’s idea is rubbish.”76 After Mbeki left office, Museveni emerged as the strongest rival to Gaddafi’s call for the immediate establishment of the United States of Africa. Despite his rival’s opinion, “Museveni

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concluded on a conciliatory but rationalist note [towards Gaddafi in a speech when he said]: ‘I salute the enthusiasm of those who advocate for continental unity now. I, however, do not want to move from one mistake—Balkanisation—to another mistake of oversimplification of very complex situations.’”77 It seems right when political scientist Mukwaya suggests that the AU is perceived as a “routine thing”78 that Museveni does not take very seriously as Uganda does not benefit much from the AU. Still, Uganda participates in every AU institution, such as the Peace and Security Council, the African Court of Justice, and the APRM; sends members to the Pan-African Parliament; and deploys troops to AU missions. It is present and active and pays a high price for this—not only in monetary terms but also with regard to the bombings in Kampala mentioned earlier. In light of the negative impact on domestic security, why does Uganda support the AU mission to Somalia and deploy troops? The military engagement cannot be taken out of its domestic context. After having defeated a rebel group in northern Uganda, thereby ending a long rebellion, many soldiers do not have distinct tasks, and the country’s economy is not robust enough to absorb them. An army representative tries to insist that the army has other tasks now. According to him, they can undertake training, retire, or take leave.79 Yet, as works on security sector reform imply, ex-combatants can become a breeding ground for violence, particularly threatening the state, its institutions, and its leaders.80 Diplomats based in Addis Ababa joke that sending troops to peacekeeping missions is the cheapest way of conducting a so-called DDR program that aims to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate combatants after conflicts.81 At the same time, Uganda reinforces its position within the AU and in the international community. In short, the situation helps many, or as a Ugandan source put it: “practically it is a good coincidence.”82 Aaron Mukwaya takes the argument further by stating that Uganda intervened in Somalia to prolong the leadership of Museveni.83 There seems to be some truth in Mukwaya’s claim, as Museveni indeed exploits the situation for his own purpose, which is to increase his global position and in turn stabilize his domestic position, especially after having raised the presidential term limit. There is, however, also an element of loyalty toward the Pan-African cause in Museveni’s approach, which is explained by his background. Museveni studied in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam where he met Tanzania’s President Nyerere and some contemporary African leaders.84 Museveni became close friends with South Sudan’s former President John Garang and has supported the South Sudanese cause ever since.

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Maybe it is a result of the links he forged in his student years that he has developed a sense for Pan-Africanism and a desire to move regional integration forward.85 As an observer remarks, “the notion of brotherhood” has driven Museveni’s foreign policy thus far.86 Museveni became a strong believer in the African-solutions-for-African-problems paradigm, which explains why he is active in several political issues in the region and sometimes beyond. As a consequence of this approach, Uganda participated in the APRM. It completed all stages, publishing its report in January 2009. Yet, it remains questionable how serious the APRM was and is taken in Uganda. During a parliamentary discussion on a status report on the implementation of the APRM in July 2009, only one MP was present, although the deputy speaker of the parliament announced the meeting during a preceding plenary session and implored MPs to attend in large numbers.87 Silvia Angey, head of the National Planning Authority in charge of the APRM in Uganda, mentions that this was “unfortunate” but that one should not take it as an indicator that the APRM is not taken seriously in Uganda.88 A MP stresses that she is becoming more and more disappointed by the whole process.89 Political scientist Mukwaya argues that the APRM is not a priority in Uganda and the country has not been a success story in this regard.90 Henry Banyenzaki, the young Turk in the NRM mentioned above, argues that the APRM is still a “young kid.”91 According to him, it was promising at the beginning, yet he identifies that the biggest problem related to the APRM is that the executive judges its own policy. As a matter of fact, interviews with influential figures in Uganda suggest that the government of Uganda and its president did not take the APRM seriously. They thought “it won’t kill anybody … it’s a nice idea,” knowing very well that the APRM would not conduct its research in the name of the government and the latter would not really be held responsible for the report.92 Despite setbacks in the APRM process and a discovered lack of seriousness in this regard, it must be stressed that Uganda spearheaded the process and postulated a rather positive example for other African countries. Contrary to countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa, Museveni accepted the critique of the APRM and there is no report that he attempted to whitewash the report. Notwithstanding Museveni’s Pan-African attitude and his general support for AU institutions such as the APRM, he would not go to the extent of allowing the continent to integrate and form the United States of Africa. This is not only for ideological reasons, as outlined above, but also for personal reasons. Museveni “opposes Gaddafi because he [Museveni] would not be the power center,” one source remarks.93 Even

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if it remains unclear whether the Union Government for Africa would be a success, Museveni’s fundamental opposition certainly contains the fear of losing power and influence because the Union Government—no matter how it will work out in the end—“has an element of power,” one observer notes.94 Museveni’s position is also linked to his rivalry with Gaddafi, which goes back to the days when Gaddafi supported Amin’s regime and was therefore an antagonist against Museveni. The tensions eased during the early 1980s when Gaddafi supported Museveni’s guerilla army. From that time on, both leaders developed close relations. As some Ugandan interviewees proudly add, Gaddafi has visited no other African country more often than Uganda,95 and a parliamentarian alleges that Museveni’s electoral campaigns “ha[ve] been financed heavily by Libya.”96 More recently, however, the relationship between the two men has deteriorated. The rivalry between the two reached its climax when Museveni disinvited Gaddafi in January 2009. At that time, Gaddafi wanted to host a follow-up meeting of traditional leaders who had crowned him “king of the kings” in early 2009. The meeting was supposed to take place in Uganda’s capital Kampala, and its goal was to create grassroots support for Gaddafi’s call for African unity. Only days before the meeting was scheduled to take place, it was cancelled. A press statement issued by the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads: “inviting kings and chiefs who are not recognised in their respective countries to discuss political issues here would have raised controversy and could undermine security and stability in the Great Lakes.”97 This resulted in a diplomatic dispute which was not the first. Museveni and Gaddafi and their security guards also clashed in 2006 during the opening of the monumental, Gaddafi-financed “Gaddafi National Mosque” in Kampala, according to participants at this event.98 In the context of their deteriorating relationship, it comes as little surprise that Museveni became part of the ad hoc committee the AU set up to deal with the crisis in Libya in March 2011.99 Both leaders are power-hungry figures. “The two leaders apparently cannot work together because each wants to lead.”100 Gaddafi wanted to be president of Africa, a position Museveni would certainly also like to obtain. A parliamentarian said in this context that “African leaders want to live as semi-gods in the continent. So if this dream of unionizing Africa materializes, then that means a huge credit goes to president Gaddafi. And what do you expect of president Museveni? That he will be a smaller god in the African continent?”101 However, Museveni is more realistic and aims to become the president of a federated East Africa. Museveni and his African allies tried to keep Gaddafi under

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control by not allowing him to achieve further support for his Union Government idea. The cancellation of the meeting of traditional leaders was part of Museveni’s strategy. At the Tripartite Conference of COMESA, EAC, and SADC in October 2008 and in reference to Ghana’s first president and advocate of Pan-Africanism, Kwame Nkrumah, Museveni said that some African leaders believe that Kwame Nkrumah was right in his dictum, “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all the rest shall be added onto you”; and thus the clamour for the formation of an African continental government. In other words, the formation of such a government is perceived to be a panacea for fast-tracking an African Economic Community. Yet many of us within the Tripartite institutional framework [COMESA, EAC and SADC] do not share this view. Indeed, we believe that the building block strategy is best suited for the earlier realisation of the African Economic Community and even African Political Union or, at least, political integration of parts of the continent.102 Museveni secured the support of the participants of the conference, a total of 23 states. Not only did he search for support for his position, but he also undermined Gaddafi’s attempts to find support for his plan. If Gaddafi had succeeded with his vision, Museveni would have found himself in a position in which his aspirations in the EAC were threatened. This played an important role in Museveni’s strategy. With the uprisings in Libya, and the NATO-led fight against Gaddafi’s regime, and ultimately Gadaffi’s death, things changed insofar as Gaddafi will not engage in continental politics any more. Thus, the acute threat to Museveni’s aspirations disappeared.

Conclusion It has been shown that Uganda has come a long way in terms of democratic development since Amin and Obote were ousted, and that Museveni and his movement have managed to reconstruct state structures and regain legitimacy with Uganda’s citizens. This semi-democratic Uganda seems to be willing to cede sovereign rights, as shown by Museveni’s attempt to fast track the EAC, thus adding further evidence to the claim made above about the link between willingness to cede sovereignty and democratic status. Similarly, with regard to the AU, we find that Uganda cedes sovereignty, albeit not to the extent that it would join a Union Government. Uganda even joined the ICC and belongs

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to the small group of African states that seemingly support the arrest warrant against Sudan’s President al-Bashir. It is particularly in the context of the EAC that it becomes apparent that Uganda is willing to cede sovereignty in favor of an integration process. This is, however, not the case in the context of the AU, which President Museveni approaches skeptically. In short, he gives clear preference to the EAC because this integration process might help to overcome the socio-economic challenges of Uganda. Museveni pictures himself as a liberation hero and guerrilla fighter, and his victory over Obote became a critical juncture in Uganda’s history. Museveni’s claim that he will only retire once he has fulfilled his mission confirms this. Contrary to the other liberation fighters in this study, Museveni does not belong to the group of fighters who liberated their countries from colonial powers, but he freed Uganda from the dictatorships of Amin and Obote. This is different, as the one group fought for the sovereignty and self-determination of their countries and the removal of external authorities, whereas the other group fought for the removal of internal authorities and hence might have a different personal link with sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Museveni uses the image of a guerrilla fighter to derive legitimacy to rule and justify his position in the domestic realm. This is different when it comes to the foreign policy arena where his argument against the Union Government of Africa is not based on his liberation fight, but interestingly also on a cultural thought. His position for an East African Federation makes it clear that he is willing to cede sovereign rights despite his own commitment to the guerrilla fight. Besides this, research has revealed that it is impossible to approach Uganda’s position toward the AU without paying attention to the relationship between Museveni and Libya’s Gaddafi. It was argued that this increasingly tense relationship partly explains Museveni’s membership of the gradualist camp. The jealousy between the two, which characterized their relationship at least until the Arab Spring reached Libya, is linked to Gaddafi’s aspirations to lead a united Africa and Museveni’s own aspirations to lead a federated East Africa. Museveni perceived Gaddafi’s grand plan as a threat to his own aspirations and therefore opposed it.

9

Mauritius

Star and key of the region Arvin Boolell, 16 November 2009

Mauritius, the last case study, is mostly associated with a paradise picture of palm trees and white beaches surrounded by a crystal clear blue sea. The island’s tourism industry uses this image to attract foreign visitors who sometimes do not grasp that they are in an independent and sovereign country with “normal” problems ranging from traffic congestion to education and unemployment. Indeed, “[t]he fame of Mauritius as a tropical paradise may well have misled students and visitors alike into ignoring the turbulent social and political background of the island.”1 Furthermore, only a few visitors will feel as though they are visiting Africa while in Mauritius. This phenomenon is not restricted to foreigners; even Mauritians ask themselves whether they are part of Africa. The group of islands forming Mauritius lies more than 1,000 kilometers away from continental Africa, and only about 30 percent of its population, the Creoles, are of African descent, whereas almost 70 percent have ancestors from India, with which Mauritius maintains strong relations. The question as to whether Mauritius is part of Africa or of Asia informs the country’s foreign policy and results in a tightrope walk between the two regions, while Mauritius also looks toward Europe for economic purposes. At the same time, Mauritius is able to exploit its seemingly worst disadvantage, namely its geographic position. It lies between Asia and Africa in the Indian Ocean and can serve as a gateway for China and India into Africa. Thus, the AU is an interesting organization for Mauritius as it secures direct access to African states. This chapter proceeds in the established order, with a sketch of Mauritius’s history, followed by a description of the socio-economic situation. The third section continues with an elaboration of the political

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system and the various foreign policy actors. The following sections scrutinize the island’s foreign policy in general and foreign policy toward the AU in particular.

Mauritius’s post-colonial rise Mauritius was visited and/or occupied by four different European powers before it became independent in 1968. There was no indigenous population on the island when the Portuguese arrived, although the Arabs had apparently visited the island earlier. Between 1505 and 1598, Portugal used the island as a visiting base for their sailors, yet the Portuguese left the island unpopulated. This did not change when the Dutch first arrived in 1598. Only in 1638 did the Dutch start to establish a permanent settlement, but soon left the island as the Cape Colony (now Cape Town) was more suitable for their purposes as a base between Europe and Asia. France seized the island in 1710 and started to grow sugar cane, exploiting slaves that were brought from East Africa, Madagascar, and Senegal. The descendants of the slaves are today’s Creoles. After having won a large-scale sea battle against France in 1810, the British controlled Mauritius until its independence, yet France’s influence over its L’île de France remained indirectly. French prevailed as the most dominant language because the British practiced laissez-faire rule in Mauritius.2 After the British colonial masters had abolished slavery in their empire, more and more Indians arrived in Mauritius and started working on the sugar plantations. The year 1947 became one of the turning points for Mauritius’s political landscape for two reasons: first, the Indian Hindu community, which had previously remained uninvolved in politics, started to play a significant role in Mauritius’s political development, and second, democratic rule, irrespective of ethnic origin or gender, started to spread.3 The Indian community became the dominant political force in the country. Two politicians of Indian descent, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the multi-ethnic Mauritius Labour Party, and Anerood Jugnauth, serving under Ramgoolam, played a significant role in the process that led to independence. While Ramgoolam championed Mauritius’s independence, Gaëtan Duval, the leader of the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, spearheaded a movement that attempted to prevent Mauritius from gaining independence so that the islands would remain a British colony. “The difference of opinion was easily explained. The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, as party representing Creoles and the FrancoMauritian minority, was afraid of independence and of the political dominance of Indo-Mauritians which they believed would follow.”4

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The question of independence was put to a referendum in which the majority of the electorate voted for independence, which subsequently arrived on 12 March 1968.5 At this stage, the former colony of Mauritius had already been divided. While the Chagos Islands, a small group of islands more than 2,100 kilometers away from Mauritius and halfway between Mauritius and India, remained in British hands, Mauritius and the smaller island of Rodrigues jointly became part of the Commonwealth, and the British Queen Elizabeth II became the head of state of the independent country. In 1969, a coalition government between Ramgoolam’s and Duval’s party was established, with Ramgoolam as prime minister. It seems that all the controversies that the two opponents were fighting over—particularly their irreconcilable positions on the independence question— had been overcome. From today’s perspective, it can be argued that this coalition preludes the democratic development of Mauritius. The Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate acknowledged its defeat on the independence issue and considered the topic to be closed. Mauritius became independent at a time when a wave of decolonization was sweeping the African continent. Sadasivam Reddi, a former historian at the University of Mauritius, is right when he emphasizes that Mauritius went through a similar unbloody decolonization process to many other African states at that time.6 Hence, it is natural that “Mauritius has tended to stress its African connections, but never to the extent of denying its multiple origins.”7 The similarities with other African states at the time of independence were striking. Like many of the other newly independent African states, Mauritius’s destiny was at stake in the late 1960s, and Mauritius was not predestined for its unusual success over the next decades.8 The economy relied on sugar, representing 93 percent of the island’s exports and making up nearly all foreign exchange.9 Riots erupted in 1971, and the Ramgoolam government saw no other option than to postpone the elections and declare a state of emergency. It appeared that Mauritius would go down the same path as other African states during the decade.10 The existing democratic spirit seems to have been crucial in overcoming the initial political crisis. The elections of 1971, which were held after having ended five years in a state of emergency, allowed Ramgoolam to stay in power and a new political party, the Mauritius Militant Mauricien (MMM), to emerge and become the largest single party in parliament.11 Paul Bérenger who led the MMM at that time is still active in Mauritian politics and stood for election again in 2010. His fiercest opponents during the 2010 elections were the sons of the above-mentioned

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Jugnauth and Ramgoolam, Pravind Jugnauth and Navin Ramgoolam, to whom Bérenger lost. From the first post-independence political generation, only Anerood Jugnauth still serves as president in Mauritius; Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Gaëtan Duval died. Similarly to the Ramgoolam and Jugnauth families, Duval’s son, Xavier Luc Duval, is active in politics and leads the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate. These people represent the elite that has dominated the political arena until today, and so it is clear that high-level politics seems to be conducted within a small political elite consisting of just a few families who regularly contest elections. Power occasionally shifts between them. The political figures that have been introduced are still competing for popular support, thereby establishing a working and widely acknowledged democratic state with regular changes of government. In 2005, Bérenger even became the first non-Hindu prime minister of Mauritius and the only white government leader on the whole continent. Parallel to the advancing consolidation of its democracy, Mauritius made another major step by changing the constitution in 1992 to become a republic with a president replacing the British queen as head of state. This ended the constitutional link with Britain, with one notable exception: beyond the Mauritian Court of Appeal, the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council serves as last resort in Mauritius’s judicial system, providing the country with an internationally acknowledged sound legal system and a first indication that Mauritius is willing to cede sovereignty. As Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrence Carroll emphasize, the consolidation of democracy is linked to rapid economic development and a “reasonably effective accommodation of ethnic diversity. … Each of these three achievements contributed to the success in the other two realms.”12 As the incredible economic performance has played an important role and the economic needs to a large extent drive Mauritius’s foreign policy, economic development is approached in the next section.

Prosperity in the middle of the Indian Ocean With regard to its economy, Mauritius is undoubtedly a success story; its GDP of US$11,296 per capita far exceeds the average African GDP. Likewise, Mauritius ranks highly in terms of life expectancy (72.1 years), literacy rate (87.4 percent), and education.13 Mauritius has the second highest ranking of all African countries in the Human Development Index, with a rank of 81 in 2009 and 72 in 2010. The South African Business Day cheered: “Governments of other countries should not be

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surprised to see their plumpest geese go flying off to this beautiful island in the Indian Ocean to enjoy the sand, sea, golf, fishing and low taxes, where they will be gently plucked and not killed.”14 Mauritius was not predestined to see such socio-economic success. The late Nobel Prize laureate James Meade predicted in 1961 that Mauritius’s economic future was bleak because of its overpopulation and heavy dependence on sugar.15 Looking at Mauritius’s geographical position, size, and agricultural basis, this conclusion seemed logical. The island lies in the middle of the Indian Ocean some 2,300 kilometers away from mainland Africa and about 1,000 kilometers from Madagascar. It has no natural resources and the population as well as its agricultural production is under the constant threat of cyclones, which are common. Despite Meade’s dire predictions, Mauritius managed to overcome its vulnerability. Former President Karl Offmann claims that “fortunately for us, we are fighters,”16 referring to the Mauritians who fought the struggle against many imponderables faced by the island. “Poor and dependent on sugar cane exports thirty years ago, Mauritius has become a striking anomaly in Africa.”17 Today, it is a high-tech hub with a solid agricultural and industrial base, and a low unemployment rate that stood at 7.2 percent in 2008.18 Although sugar comprised 93 percent of exports at the time of independence, this figure dropped to about 18 percent in the first decade of the twenty-first century.19 Despite this massive decline, the role of sugar as the backbone of the economy cannot be overemphasized. Thomas Meisenhelder traces the economic development of Mauritius and argues that: “[t]he logic of Mauritian planning seems to have been to boost sugar production in order to accumulate both private capital and public revenue as a basis resource for a more diversified and industrialised economy.”20 Building on this fact, Richard Sandbrook describes the three phases experienced by Mauritius economically.21 First, Mauritius learned from Taiwan and created an export-oriented economy in the 1970s and 1980s based mainly on textile production. At the same time, Mauritius started to develop the tourism sector. At the time of independence in 1968, there were only 1,000 beds available and only 15,553 tourists visiting Mauritius each year;22 by 2005, 761,063 tourists used the 21,072 available beds.23 The second phase described by Sandbrook started in the 1990s when Mauritius tried to turn the island into the Singapore of southern Africa, the financial hub of its region.24 Currently, Mauritius is seeking to emulate the Bangalore experience in India, that is to say to transform Mauritius into a cyber-island.25 While Mauritius is still working to realize the third phase, a fourth phase has already been heralded: Mauritians are starting to develop a strategy to become a “green

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island,” spearheading environmental protection in times of an increasing awareness of the negative consequences of man-made climate change. Today, the four main pillars of Mauritius’s economy are textiles, sugar, tourism, and the services sector.26 Mauritius was particularly successful in making the island an attractive location for industrial production by creating Export Processing Zones free from taxation and duties.27 Mauritius positions itself as the bridge between Asia and Africa, aiming to become the “star and key of the region,” as Foreign Minister Arvin Boolell put it.28 Mauritius’s geographical location somewhere between Africa and Asia has become an advantage in spite of the fact that it generally suffers from isolation and high transportation costs.29 Mauritius’s political elite knows that, with no natural resources and a very limited market of 1.2 million inhabitants, they would do even better economically if the islands were part of a larger trading block. Hence, it is a member of both SADC and COMESA and is engaged in the economic integration of the two organizations. However, Mauritius has so far achieved its political and economic objectives by and large on its own and is likely to continue along this path. It is true that “[o]ther developing countries had similar trade opportunities and adopted similar policies but failed where Mauritius succeeded. To some considerable extent, strong domestic institutions have contributed substantially to Mauritian success and are a good candidate for underlying explanations of the Mauritian miracle.”30 The next section continues to elaborate on this thought.

The democratic model state The constitution declares various institutions to be responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, such as the prime minister, the cabinet, and Mauritius’s parliament: the National Assembly. With regard to foreign policy, the main decision making units are the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs, with their respective institutional bodies. There is wide consensus among the politicians of Mauritius about foreign policy objectives, and this consensus is epitomized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provides the country with institutional stability in the conduct of its foreign policy. Besides these official structures, another force drives foreign policy: the island’s economy. As Mauritius has a functioning democratic order31 that is well-established in the academic literature,32 leading scholars to claim that it “now appears almost irreversible,”33 this section will move on to the different players that are involved in foreign policy making and will not elaborate on the status of democracy.

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If democracy is associated with consensus and consensus-building, one might go so far as to suggest that Mauritius’s foreign policy reflects democratic principles because it is characterized by a remarkable degree of consensus. It does not matter which party is governing, because the key features of the island’s foreign policy still remain. Close observers confirm this finding, and even Pravind Jugnauth, who has been Minister of Finance since the 2010 elections, says: “It’s only in implementation that there has been differences, but otherwise there is no major difference between what the MMM says, what we say and what the Labour Party says in terms of foreign policy.”34 In fact, the new government that came into office in 2010 generally follows the path of the previous governments. Navin Ramgoolam remained the prime minister by forging an alliance with the Militant Socialist Movement under Pravind Jugnauth and the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate under Xavier Duval, once more proving how capable Mauritius’s parties are in forming new coalitions and shifting power by democratic means. This differentiates Mauritius from many of the other case studies in this book in which foreign policy making is mostly personalized and thus dependent on individuals rather than institutions and a consensus with the political elite across all parties. In fact, contrary to many other African countries, the political landscape is not dominated by one party or one political figure, but by a wide range of politicians and parties. The president’s role in the formulation of any policy is limited. He can advise the prime minister who meets the president before the weekly cabinet meetings to discuss the upcoming issues. His only constitutional power is to refuse to sign a bill. If he refuses to sign a bill, it has to go through the institutions for a second time. If it appears on the table of the president again and has not changed, the president has only two choices: sign or resign.35 This way, the constitution gives the president the possibility to influence the decision making process, yet it links this ultimately with the president’s political destiny, hence giving the president a weaker role. The situation is different when it comes to parliament. Mauritius has a one-chamber parliamentary system with a National Assembly. The latter is very vocal on many issues. Nevertheless, in terms of foreign policy, the parliament has a very small role to play, as many interviewed members of the National Assembly admit.36 Foreign policy can be discussed in parliament, and in fact it is indeed occasionally discussed in parliament; yet “the foreign policy will be the responsibility of the [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs and of course under the guidance of the policy of the government of the day,” as Françoise Labelle, member of the National Assembly and of the Pan-African Parliament, points out.37

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Pravind Jugnauth, leader of the Militant Socialist Movement party, seconds: “I must confess it is a very little role. I mean few things are debated in parliament but the main policies are determined by government, the government of the day.”38 The government comprises the prime minister and his ministers. Since independence, there has always been a coalition government so that any government position is a consensus position between at least two parties. The prime minister plays a pivotal role in the political system of the island and has the most influential position in the system. He uses his position in terms of domestic politics and he can use it in terms of foreign policy too. Although foreign policy has wide consensus and does not differ much between the main parties, the different governments have different emphases. Whereas the former Prime Minister Paul Bérenger was present at many SADC and AU meetings, Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam rarely goes to any of these meetings. He has not been present at the regular summits and only showed commitment to regional politics after a crisis in neighboring Madagascar erupted in early 2009. This does not necessarily suggest that Ramgoolam is less committed to Africa than Bérenger is, but that they have different approaches. Foreign Minister Boolell said that “the prime minister has to make sure that he uses his time in a diligent manner to be present in forums which are very relevant to the interest of the region,” when asked why the prime minister does not always attend AU meetings.39 Boolell’s answer hints at how seriously the AU is treated by the Mauritian government. It appears that the AU and other regional groupings Mauritius is part of (e.g., SADC and COMESA) are not high on the prime minister’s priority list and are thus left for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its minister. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a crucial role in serving the interests of the country, irrespective of the current leadership. As a matter of fact, “Mauritius has a senior public service which seems to be as competent, as ethical, and as committed to the goal of service to the public, as any public bureaucracy in the developed world.”40 Henry Srebrnik is of the same view: “Mauritius also has achieved a fair measure of good governance through the development of a public service bureaucracy which is recruited on the basis of merit and talent and is therefore effective and perceived as legitimate – though this is at times contested by critics.”41 The members of the diplomatic corps are generally well-educated, outspoken, and professional. The ministry provides stability and continuity for Mauritius’s foreign policy and deals effectively with questions that arise with regard to the AU and regional groupings. Foreign policy must therefore be seen as highly institutionalized, especially when compared with the other case studies.

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So far, several institutions and figures that drive the foreign policy of the island have been mentioned. Yet, the most important determinant is still missing, namely the country’s economy. There is no doubt that economic interests are the main drivers of Mauritius’s foreign policy. There is not one single source who explicitly denies this when asked about the role the economy plays in terms of foreign policy. It even appears as though Mauritius’s entire foreign policy focuses on trade and economy. “Mauritius has always been very selfish and you will find that. Very selfish in its diplomacy. We are a small country, fragile, lost in the Indian Ocean,” as a serious politician admits.42 How this plays out in its foreign policy is elaborated next.

The foreign policy of linking Asia and Africa Mauritius’s foreign policy is characterized by what seems to be an indecisiveness on which region to focus on, and a sharp divide between self-confidence that stems from the country’s achievements since independence and the knowledge that these achievements mean little on the international stage because the island is too small to be able to influence even regional affairs let alone global affairs. There is a constantly perceived threat that Mauritius is being ignored by the international community and, because of this, the islanders work hard to get the desired attention. Their work produces results and Mauritius is well-respected internationally—yet is not influential. Its foreign policy is distinctly different from the foreign policy of most other AU members. “The words ‘aid’, ‘donors’ and ‘NEPAD’ … did not crop up at all. There was no defensive tone about how the West was to blame and no reference to British and US interference in its affairs.”43 Foreign Minister Arvin Boolell romanticizes by claiming that his island is “small, beautiful [and] respected because it has forged a reputation as a haven of peace, good governance, sound macroeconomic policies and inclusive approach.” He continues by announcing that Mauritius’s foreign policy goal is to position “itself to become the star and key of the region.”44 As this statement indicates, there is pride based on the success story of the island—a pride that is omnipresent in Mauritius.45 To increase the island’s position further, the governments of Mauritius have continuously pushed to transform Mauritius into Africa’s Singapore in order to continue its economic strengthening. Yet, at the same time, awareness of the island’s vulnerability is acknowledged among Mauritians. Most interviewees repeatedly stress what will be called here the “small island syndrome.” The awareness of this vulnerability can be illustrated by Karl Offmann’s words: “Mauritius is a

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small island in the middle of the Indian Ocean. We have nothing here. We are overcrowded, we import everything. So what can we do?”46 Paul Bérenger seconds: “We are a small country, fragile, lost in the Indian Ocean.”47 Pravind Jugnauth summarizes: “there is no inferiority complex, there is a reality.”48 One possibility to increase international influence lies in what Jeanne Hey describes as one of the foreign policy characteristics of small states, namely their engagement in international organizations.49 A Mauritian official highlights the fact that a country has to align with other countries, otherwise “you die alone.”50 Mauritius is part of numerous international organizations and treaties including the United Nations, the AU, SADC, COMESA, the Indian Ocean Commission, AfricanCaribbean-Pacific countries and even co-founded the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, an organization that includes all countries located at the Indian Ocean rim, ranging from South Africa to Iran and India to Australia. Moreover, Mauritius is one of the few states that is a member of both the Commonwealth and l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie: the French counterpart to the Commonwealth. There is one specific foreign policy objective—beyond the economic realm—for which Mauritius uses international institutions to lobby and press for its position: the Chagos Islands.51 Colonial Mauritius consisted of three main island groups, namely Mauritius, Rodrigues, and the Chagos Islands including Diego Garcia.52 The Chagos Islands were transferred to the newly established British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s before independence, and Diego Garcia was given to the USA to construct a military base.53 The island’s population was forcefully resettled in the 1960s, and it was not until November 2000 that a ruling in the British High Court of Justice stated that the removal was unlawful.54 “[B]ut efforts by the Chago islanders to obtain a right of return were refused in the British courts. The US has strongly resisted any attempt to alter the status quo, as Diego Garcia is now a key base in its ‘war against terror’,”55 on account of its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is close enough to serve the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq but far enough away not to be observed.56 National Assembly member Françoise Labelle complains that “on this issue I do feel that the international community is not taking us seriously.”57 Although the Chagos issue is a special case, Pravind Jugnauth is right in saying, in another context, that: “our foreign policy is dictated, according to me, mainly by our economic interest.”58 Politicians struggle to find examples of an active promotion of democracy, good governance, and rule of law, which could indicate a more altruistic and less

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economic reasoning-based foreign policy.59 Mauritius has been largely absent from the trouble spots in Africa, such as the Great Lakes region or Somalia. Even in the case of Zimbabwe—a fellow member of COMESA and SADC—Mauritius has been silent and not actively promoted democracy and the rule of law. The well-known Mauritian journalist and close observer of the island’s political and economic scene, Jean-Marc Poché, suggests that Mauritius is a “country of traders.”60 Against this backdrop, it does not seem surprising that Mauritius maintains good trade relationships with several of the big economic hubs in the world, such as Europe, China, and India. Yet, the emerging African market is becoming increasingly interesting for Mauritians in terms of both trade as well as investment. Mauritius is predestined to interact with the different regions because of its geographic location and its population composition. Paul Bérenger adds that Mauritius must maintain good relations with Europe, Africa, and Asia for historical reasons, as these states are the origins of the population’s ancestors.61 Mauritians skillfully use their heritage to position themselves as the bridge between Asia and Africa. Many Indian and European businesses are based in Mauritius, and China is already following suit. The political and economic relations with India are excellent, leading former Prime Minister Bérenger to claim that the relations are “umbilical.”62 Mauritius has found its economic and political role. Former President Karl Offmann states: “we can be in that context what Singapore has done to Asia. And this is our ambition for the future. We want Mauritius to be able to do what Singapore has done to Asia, but we want Mauritius to do more than that. We want to bridge Asia and Africa.”63 The foreign minister’s words that Mauritius is positioning itself to become “the star and key of the region”64 leave little room to think that Offmann’s claim is not shared by the government of the day. Besides this indirect interest in Africa, Mauritius itself is directly interested in Africa in economic terms. Mauritius has become part of SADC (in 1995) and COMESA (from the organization’s beginning in 1981). As previous chapters have shown, COMESA’s political mandate is negligible, and the organization concentrates on the establishment of a common market. However, Mauritius stays “for trade purposes.”65 The pragmatic element of Mauritius’s foreign policy also comes to the fore when looking at the reasons why Mauritius joined SADC. Officials suggest that the “motivation was quite political … it has provided us with a certain political leverage, or a sense of belonging to a rather politically active region.”66 The island state even engaged in conflict resolution in Madagascar following a coup d’état on the neighboring island in early 2009. Both sides in the conflict, the newly installed

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government and the ousted president, have sought the advice of Mauritius. Mauritius is, however, not interested in conflict resolution in Madagascar for altruistic purposes. It is true that Madagascar is one of Mauritius’s closest neighbors, and therefore Mauritius might see its geographical proximity as reason to assist the island; however, the main reasons for its involvement in finding a solution to the crisis lie somewhere else. First, Mauritians have invested in Madagascar on a large scale and many businesses are at stake; second, as a result of the investment, many Mauritians live in Madagascar; and lastly, Madagascar is rich in resources. This demonstrates why Mauritius has a vital interest in solving the problems of Madagascar—again, it is economic interest that determines Mauritius’s foreign policy. Mauritius is particularly interested in maintaining good relations with the regional powerhouse South Africa. Since the Apartheid period, South Africa and Mauritius have had good relations.67 Mauritius condemned Apartheid openly in international fora but at the same time invited white South Africans to spend their holidays on the island and kept good economic relations with the Apartheid government.68 However, South Africa is not necessarily perceived well in Mauritius. Politicians voice their concerns that South Africa dominates the SADC region too much.69 Although Mauritius is closest to Africa geographically speaking, and therefore ostensibly part of it, there are major doubts in terms of population composition. It is remarkable that the first Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, himself a Hindu, decided that Mauritius should join the OAU. In the case studies of Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso, for instance, it was suggested that Mugabe and Compaoré use the AU as a platform from which to gain international legitimacy. Interestingly enough, John Addison and Kissoonsingh Hazareesingh similarly suggest that, in the mid-1970s, Ramgoolam used the OAU and other international institutions to increase his domestic support in light of upcoming elections and an economic recession.70 It would be wrong, however, to assume that Mauritian politicians still use the AU or subregional groupings as a platform from which to gain legitimacy, as might have been the case in the early years after independence when Mauritius was searching for orientation. “I would explain this by social identity. Those who are in power, they feel of course closer to India because of origins. And for them Africa is just Africa. But Africa will be used when it suits the purpose,” argues one source.71 The question emerges as to why the island in the Indian Ocean still works with Africa and what are the reasons behind it. As a source in Addis Ababa claims, there is a “schizophrenic behavior whereby I hate this neighbor

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of mine, but this neighbor is so big that I can’t also afford to ignore this huge neighbor,”72 referring to Mauritius’s relationship with the African continent. “Its turn towards Africa is perhaps better understood as a perception of opportunities rather than threats and a recognition that in Africa Mauritius is a relatively bigger fish in a relatively smaller pond than it would be in Asia.”73 This is an interesting argument, yet only shows one side of the coin as, despite being only a “small fish,” Mauritius still works more extensively with Asia. Nevertheless, more and more money flows from Mauritius into Africa, as suggested by investments in Zimbabwe and Madagascar for example. Despite economic reasons, “we have seen SADC as platform, as space for small island states.”74 In other words, aware of their small influence, Mauritius uses SADC as a vehicle to translate its political positions into the organization’s position, which has more weight internationally— particularly with South Africa in its ranks—than Mauritius’s voice would have alone. This leads back to the aforementioned characteristic of small states, which use international organizations to voice their political opinions. Mauritius is no exception in this regard. It needs international organizations: first, to increase its political weight and, second, to close ranks with strong and relatively influential states such as South Africa, India, and Australia. It is therefore hardly surprising that the initiative to found the huge Indian Ocean Rim Association, which would include the major economic powers of the Indian Ocean, was strongly promoted by Mauritius.

Mauritius’s role in the African Union Mauritius’s leadership asserts that the country is committed to the AU, yet there is little empirical evidence for this claim. Three particular points come to mind which suggest that Mauritius is not committed to the AU: first, the prime minister is not present at AU summits, leading an influential Mauritian politician to say: “the quality of representation [currently] leaves a lot to be desired.”75 If the head of government cannot spare time for AU meetings, it suggests that the AU does not rank high on the government’s priority list. Foreign Minister Arvin Boolell stresses that “one should not forget that our first priority is to address national issues and to ensure that we mitigate the impact of the contingent effect of the economic meltdown.”76 A second indication of Mauritius’s lack of commitment vis-à-vis the AU and its institutions is the way it has conducted its APRM. With regard to the APRM, a source finds that there “was a lack of commitment from everyone.”77 Insufficient funds (only US$25,000 were allocated

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for the whole process), the lack of resources, and the absence of a wellstructured coordinating body contributed to the 2005 failure to conduct the APRM. This failed attempt was perceived as a disaster for Mauritius, and hence, the country had to go through the APRM for a second time.78 In light of this non-commitment, the question arises why Mauritius initially supported the APRM at all? Masterson argues that “with a generally favourable track record of good governance, Mauritius sees the APRM as an opportunity to increase its profile in the international spotlight.”79 Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd even go a step further and suggest that there was little understanding of the spirit of the APRM. Mauritius thought they could run through the process as quickly as possible, and focused on filling in the long and complex APRM selfassessment questionnaire rather than engaging in a national dialogue on key governance issues.80 It seems that, from the very beginning, Mauritians were aware that the APRM “is only one drop of water in the ocean,” as an official put it,81 a process that they should complete because they had nothing to lose and could only benefit from by increasing the island’s standing in the world. It might be true that the government never considered the APRM as an opportunity to identify shortcomings, to use the findings to improve the system even further, and to engage in a wider dialogue about Mauritius’s status quo. The APRM exercise reflects a general unwillingness to support institution building in the AU, which in turns shows a lack of interest in continental integration. According to sources engaged with the continental APRM, Mauritius did not see a strategic interest in the APRM because of their “exceptionalism.”82 The APRM process was a disgrace for the model state of Mauritius and has certainly not increased its standing in the AU, as the country gave the impression that it feels itself to be superior to other African states and saw no need to engage in the review process in the way they were supposed to, namely by starting a dialogue across all sectors of society to identify shortcomings in the political, economic, and social system. It is also likely that states that devoted a lot of resources to their APRM do not appreciate the way in which Mauritius approached the exercise, which in turn influences their impression of Mauritius as an African state. A third and final indication of Mauritius’s general lack of interest toward the AU is that the country does not spend enough money to enable its five Pan-African Parliament members to attend the biannual parliamentary sessions, each of which last around two weeks. During the October 2009 session, for instance, the parliamentarians were only granted enough money to attend half the session. Officials justified this using the economic meltdown and subsequent financial restraints.83 Yet, there

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were similar occasions when insufficient funds were made available to send the parliamentarians to Midrand in South Africa, where the PanAfrican Parliament is located, even before the financial crisis started to spread in 2008. This is a fatal sign for many other African countries, particularly the poor ones: if not even one of the richest AU member states spends enough money, why and how should they do so? It would, however, be wrong just to concentrate on Mauritius’s lack of commitment. On the other hand, there are at least two occasions that can be identified as attempts by Mauritius to be more active in the OAU and the AU. The first dates back to 1976 when Mauritius hosted the OAU summit and Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was elected as chairperson of the OAU. At that time, some observers went to the length of suggesting that this heralded the final emergence of Mauritius as an African country.84 With the advantage of hindsight, it has become clear that Mauritius is still not seen as an African country from an AU and Mauritian perspective, and Mauritius does little to change this picture. Even during the 1976 summit, some participants raised doubts about Mauritius’s status as an African country. In 1976, in clear tribute to Mauritius’s efforts to cultivate relationships with African countries and to its success in building a multiracial society, the OAU held a summit meeting in Mauritius. The conference was an enormous success, but Mauritius’s frail ties to the African continent did not go unnoticed. At the time of the summit, Mauritius did not have a single embassy on the African continent and one Francophone African leader made the telling comment, “C’est magnifique: mais ce n’est pas l’Afrique.”85 The most obvious proof of Mauritius’s commitment to the OAU and the AU is certainly that Vijay Makhan, a Mauritian diplomat, was elected assistant secretary general of the OAU (1995–2002) and later served as interim commissioner of the AU during the transition phase from the OAU to the AU. With him, Mauritius’s AU policy gained a face but did not necessarily become a higher priority on the political agenda. The failed attempts of Mauritius to host the AU summit in June–July 2009 and to serve as the seat for the African Court of Justice might also be seen as forms of commitment vis-à-vis Africa. On closer examination, however, this perceived commitment might be challenged: Madagascar was supposed to host the mid-2009 AU summit but was suspended from the AU in early 2009 due to the coup d’état it had experienced. As it appeared to be a consensus that the summit should take place in the SADC region and no other state indicated interest, Mauritius

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made a bid to host the summit. The SADC leaders gathered in March and endorsed Mauritius’s bid.86 However, Gaddafi too wanted to host the AU summit, and it is said that Ethiopia was also apparently keen to host it, yet the latter was not openly debated and hence the choice was effectively between Mauritius and Libya. In April 2009, it still seemed as though Mauritius would host the summit and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was preparing for it. Then, out of the blue, Mauritius withdrew its application and Gaddafi hosted the summit. The reasons for Mauritius’s withdrawal are not clear. Officially, there were financial constraints resulting from the global financial and economic crisis,87 but this argument does not really explain its withdrawal—the reasons lie deeper. It is unlikely that Libya “compensated” Mauritius in this case, although it is a theoretical possibility. Yet, the relationship between Libya and Mauritius is tense. In the mid-1980s, Mauritius shut down Libya’s diplomatic mission on the island because the Libyan diplomats allegedly tried to interfere in Mauritius’s internal affairs and destabilize the country.88 The government perceived this as a threat and reacted accordingly in a forceful manner by closing the Libyan embassy and still refuses to reopen the diplomatic mission despite pressure from Libya. Gaddafi was therefore certainly not a supporter of Mauritius and the Mauritian government was aware of this hostility. An official asserts that Mauritius withdrew its bid “in exchange for [the] unity and solidarity of [the] African Union. … It could have become a divisive issue. At the end of the day it could have become a divisive issue.”89 This can be interpreted as an indication that the tensions between Mauritius and Libya are most likely the real reasons why Mauritius withdrew. There is, however, another story behind Mauritius’s withdrawal. In the past, the Mauritian government had experienced difficulty in securing the votes of AU members. With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, an African Court of Justice was established and needed a permanent location. Mauritius applied to host the court and its chances to host it initially looked good. Vijay Makhan, former OAU assistant secretary general and AU interim commissioner, even says the decision was “predetermined,”90 but in the end, Tanzania’s Arusha was accepted as the location. The reasons for this decision are manifold, ranging from a lack of adequate representation in the crucial meeting at AU level to procedural errors and Tanzania’s relative strength compared with Mauritius’s position. In addition to this, there was lobbying for Tanzania and, more importantly, against Mauritius, which relates back to closure of the Libyan representation. There is a clear connection between the two events and Mauritius’s attempts to restore “unity and solidarity” and appease Gaddafi by

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withdrawing its bid for the AU summit. However, as has become clear in the preceding sections, Mauritius does not have much interest in the AU and has consequently not pushed hard enough to host the summit and the Court of Justice. Particularly with regard to the summit, Mauritius’s chances were excellent as it had the support of the SADC region; with regard to the Court of Justice, the decision is even said to have been “predetermined.” Françoise Labelle, one of Mauritius’s members of the Pan-African Parliament, states that, at first glance, “there is a lack of commitment towards the AU,” referring to the current Mauritian government.91 Her party colleague Paul Bérenger argues: “Mauritius is not really interested in regional affairs, well the present government, in regional affairs, continental affairs, international affairs and so on. When our economic interest are into play, okay. Otherwise yes, there is a lack of commitment concerning everything. It’s like that.”92 Paul Bérenger is not alone in his opinion when it comes to economic concerns. Another politician states: “of course because all this interaction with Africa is for economic reasons. Mauritius has this policy for economic reasons, nothing more. What can we gain out of it is the reason; otherwise there is no interest in the fate of Africa I would say.”93 There is little evidence to show that Mauritius makes a foreign policy move without economic reasoning, particularly vis-à-vis Africa. Some even say that the bid to host the African Court of Justice was based on prospective economic benefits stemming from the court, its staff, and guests.94 Foreign Minister Boolell argues that one of the main objects of the AU is to create a single market for Africa.95 This is an AU policy field in which Mauritius is interested. Françoise Labelle argues that Mauritius would join the United States of Africa “if the people feel that there is economic gain, yes.”96 However, as the non-implementations of the Abuja Treaty and the Lagos Plan of Action show, the AU is still far from creating a common market. In addition to this economic reasoning, it is also true that Mauritius aims to use the AU channel to voice its political opinions and gain indirect access to the G8 meetings where AU representatives are regularly present. When it comes to the Union Government, Mauritian politicians know that it is still far off. An observer contends that Mauritius only supported the Accra Declaration “because there’s no immediate danger of it happening. And there’s really no opportunity cost in terms of supporting it at a theoretical level, while it’s still so far down the track, whereas there may be some immediate opportunity costs in … being seen to vociferously oppose it.”97 Therefore, politicians in Mauritius pay lip-service to this goal, yet at the same time, Paul Bérenger says

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“we all are in favor of eventual African unity, but going that way, rushing through that is not serious. It’s not serious and it doesn’t deserve to be taken seriously.”98 Arvin Boolell seconds: “My lips are sealed. I wish it would be a reality, but I doubt it.”99 The Militant Socialist Movement’s Pravind Jugnauth joins in by saying that he would not consider it a priority.100 Even former President Karl Offmann, who verbally commits himself to the African cause, admits that he will not see the Union Government in his lifetime.101 A Mauritian diplomat notes that Mauritius will “never” join such a government,102 and Sadasivam Reddi is of the view that Mauritius would potentially join a Union Government but will maintain its sovereignty in several issues such as the free movement of people.103

Conclusion Mauritius is a relatively inactive member of the AU, not engaging in the building of an AU with strong institutions. It has joined all the important AU institutions as it stands to lose little, but at the same time failed to initially meet the objectives of the APRM. The Union Government for Africa debate is treated in the same fashion as in most other case studies herein, namely as a noble idea that might be followed incrementally but not immediately. There is no doubt that the government considered Gaddafi’s push for the United States of Africa as unrealistic and unachievable. Although some politicians in Mauritius rhetorically promote the PanAfrican idea, there is also a large dose of pragmatism, indicating that Mauritians do not see the AU as a viable option that would serve their economic interests. SADC, in particular, is seen as a necessary venture in order to achieve the long-term goal of establishing strong ties with Asia and Africa and serving as a bridge between the two regions. Economic interest is the main driver of Mauritius’s foreign policy, and there is no exception with reference to Mauritius’s policy toward the AU. The AU is not attractive for the island state in economic terms, and even in political terms, the AU is not very helpful for Mauritius because the organization has not developed into a collective global player through which Mauritius can voice its policies. Nevertheless, Mauritius remains a member of the AU; first, in order to foster its role as interlocutor between Asia and Africa; and second, to safeguard social peace domestically as 30 percent of the population are of African descent. Lastly, the “small island syndrome” plays a role in forcing Mauritius to cooperate with any possible partner. Mauritius is significantly different from many of the other case studies in this book. First, foreign policy making is highly institutionalized

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and not bound to the head of government. This stands in stark contrast to the other Enthusiasts under scrutiny in this study because (foreign) policy making is personalized in Uganda and President Museveni effectively drives the foreign policy of the East African country alone. Second, foreign policy is not only institutionalized in Mauritius, but there is also wide consensus across all political parties and political players as well as bureaucratic actors. Third, besides South Africa, Mauritius is the only fully developed democracy in the sample. It has an excellent governmental record, underlined by its ranking in the Freedom House Index as “free,”104 and shows a notable willingness to engage in cooperation and cede sovereignty, thus shedding some light on the conjecture that the level of democracy and the willingness to cede sovereignty are linked. The above implicitly made assumption that the more democratic a state is, the more willing it is to surrender sovereignty is further proven by the analysis of Mauritius. Lastly, there is no evidence that the liberation struggle impacts on contemporary (foreign) policy making at all. The only narrative found during field work and the literature review is the strong focus on what lies ahead and the question of how Mauritius can do better.

10 Conclusion and outlook

The wheels are starting to turn in Africa. Africa is starting to wake up Trevor Giffons, 17 February 2009

This concluding chapter is divided into two main parts: the first part summarizes the findings of the study and highlights some starting points for further research. The second part takes the overall findings further and provides some thoughts on the future of the AU in light of the recent revolutionary political changes in northern Africa, better known as the Arab Spring. First, however, a short reflection on the methodology and theory is in order.

Reflection on the methodology and theory As the case studies have shown in great detail, the core suppositions of the categorization of the AU member states worked as preparatory step for case selection, with the exception of South Africa, which was classified as a Volunteer, meaning that it hypothetically shows some willingness to yield sovereignty, but protects its sovereignty in political reality. However, taking the other case studies into consideration, the categorization appeared to be generally plausible because evidence shows that Zimbabwe and Swaziland are significantly more defensive of their sovereignty than Uganda and Mauritius, both of which show a willingness to pool their sovereignty. However, if states were assumed to surrender sovereignty according to the grouping, they proved this willingness not necessarily at the AU level, but at least at the level of the regional economic communities; the states that it was assumed would not surrender sovereignty indeed showed little willingness at either level, but opposed the idea of political integration in general. A second question is concerned with the use of an adjusted liberal theory. This theory indeed turned out to be fruitful for the overall goal

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of this study. It allowed the “black box” state to be opened to determine whose preferences find their way into foreign policy making. The leaders, the domestic realm, and the political system, as well as the international domain were included in the analysis, and evidence was found that all three levels play a role. Moreover, it turned out that the motives for (un-)willingness to cede sovereignty are dependent on the specific historical, political, and socio-economic context of the respective country. We must acknowledge the political heterogeneity of the continent and treat any attempt to draw generalizations, even those made herein, with caution.1

Summary of the findings and propositions Using the analytical framework once more to structure this section, we shall start the summary with some remarks on the historical context, proceed with the socio-economic context, continue with the political system and its leaders, and then move to the foreign policy realm. The history section in the case studies aimed to identify critical junctures in the history of the countries in order to trace the level of willingness to surrender sovereignty and the enthusiasm or disinterest in the AU for each country. Two points were assumed to play a role, namely whether the current head of state or head of government was himself part of the liberation struggle and the time that has elapsed between independence and today. Taking South Africa and Zimbabwe into consideration, one might conclude that the time elapsed between decolonization and today is a good indicator of whether AU members are willing to cede sovereignty because both countries are latecomers in terms of independence. At the same time, one finds that Algeria, having achieved its independence almost five decades ago, also guards its sovereignty closely. Although the variable of time elapsed seems not entirely fruitful in explaining the phenomenon under scrutiny, it can be noted that the states that fought hard and long lasting wars to gain self-determination and sovereignty generally reject the ceding of sovereignty. In Algeria, the liberation war impacted on the country’s self-understanding as an independent state that had to fight hard to free itself from colonial rule. As the younger generation has not lived through the colonial time or the liberation war, the older generation, including the incumbent president, reminds them of the country’s past and uses this war to justify their right to rule. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, where Mugabe and his aides—having nothing else to sell—keep the past glory of Mugabe and his fight to free South Rhodesia alive and regularly exploit their previous roles to justify domestic and foreign policies. The same applies to

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South Africa where the ANC refused to accept the name of the COPE party because it wanted to manifest its monopoly over the liberation struggle. The three cases highlight how the ruling parties and their leaders use their struggle to justify their rule. This is different in Mauritius, another state where the ruling parties can be linked to the decolonization process, as there is almost no looking back into history but a strict forward-looking approach. With regard to the incumbent’s personal involvement in the liberation struggle, we might iterate the case of South Africa, for example. It was found that the country shows little willingness to surrender sovereignty in the AU and regional context—despite its ranking as a Volunteer. The former liberation movement and current ruling party, the ANC, as well as the former presidents Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe, and the incumbent President Zuma, were all part of the liberation front. Algeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe belong to the group of African countries that had to fight a bloody war to achieve independence and end white minority rule. There seems to be a link between their wars, which became critical junctures in their histories, and the refusal to surrender sovereignty. The situation is different in Mauritius where a critical juncture in history is not the liberation struggle but rather the post-colonial acknowledgment that the island is vulnerable and easy to ignore if it is not part of a group of states through which it can articulate its own interests. Consequently, Mauritius tries to use the AU as a vehicle to articulate its interests, but even more so COMESA, SADC, and other organizations that are located around the Indian Ocean. This study identified and scrutinized other critical junctures in the history sections that impact on the willingness to yield sovereignty. In several cases, it was found that a critical juncture is the way in which the incumbent leader came into power. Recalling the situation in Uganda, for instance, it was shown that President Museveni sees himself as the savior of Uganda and will not leave his post until he has finished what he considers to be his mission. Museveni’s statement goes beyond the domestic realm and reaches the AU and the Grand Debate, which Museveni considers untimely, and strongly opposes the formation of a Union Government for Africa because he wants his domestic problems to be solved first and to move regional integration forward under his leadership. In other cases, such as Ethiopia and Swaziland, it was argued that tradition plays a pivotal role—albeit in different ways—as tradition a priori rules out that the state surrenders sovereignty. Moving on to analysis of the socio-economic situation, it was suggested that socio-economic circumstances might play a role in determining a country’s willingness to cede sovereignty. It was noted, for instance,

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that poorer countries might be forced to engage in a deepening of integration, whereas richer states might see fewer benefits in engaging with poorer neighbors. The findings of the case studies, however, do not consistently support this initial thought. Zimbabwe, although considered a Defender, is as economically weak as Burkina Faso and Uganda; yet both countries show a greater willingness to cede sovereignty than Zimbabwe. Also, as in Zimbabwe, the Swazi king defends sovereignty and shows no interest in deeper integration even though about one in five of the population depends on the United Nations World Food Programme. Moreover, it was implicitly suggested, with reference to the cases of Burkina Faso and Uganda, that being landlocked is linked with a great interest in regional integration; however, taking Swaziland and Ethiopia into consideration, being landlocked does not seem to play a determining role and thus seems to have less explanatory power. Going back to the socio-economic situation itself and looking to the wealthier states, a similarly mixed picture emerges. It was noted that economically strong Mauritius unexpectedly supports the regional economic communities, which is explained by the “small island syndrome”, whereas economically strong states such as Algeria and South Africa show a notable reluctance to engage in integration processes. In particular, Algeria does not see the advantages of the African market but turns to Europe instead. Hence, taking this mixed picture into account, it appears to be difficult to establish a causal link between the socioeconomic situation and the willingness to cede sovereignty that would hold across all cases. With regard to the political system, it became clear that foreign policy making is often personalized. This does not necessarily mean that domestic politics is personalized but solely refers to the foreign policy realm, which, similar to many Western countries, is often dominated by a small elite, sometimes only by the head of state or government. The analysis has shown that Mauritius and South Africa are outliers in this regard because they have either vocal parliaments or civil societies, because the political parties play an important role, and because foreign policy making is highly institutionalized with a strong foreign service. For Mauritius, one should add that foreign policy is by and large a consensus across all political players. In general, it might be said that, in African countries with a presidential system, a variable used to select cases, the national leaders appear to be the key decision making units with regard to foreign policy. Although Ethiopia has a parliamentary system, like South Africa and Mauritius, its foreign policy is nevertheless personalized. Hence, we cannot conversely assume that a parliamentary system automatically weakens the position of the head of

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government. The picture changes if we include another variable in the calculation, namely the question whether a democratic order is given. The level of democracy by and large appears to help predict the willingness to yield sovereignty. South Africa, as one of the most consolidated democracies in this study, poses a counter example to this claim. Also, Burkina Faso and Uganda are problematic at first glance as their democracies are far from being consolidated and democratization efforts over the past decade have shown severe setbacks; yet, compared with Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Ethiopia in particular, Burkina Faso and Uganda have come a long way and implemented certain democratic standards. Taking the general finding of the personalization of foreign policy into account, we are forced to see the AU as a club where heads of state and government gather. Some heads of state and government use the AU to derive external legitimacy—or to recall Krasner’s term: international legal sovereignty—for their rule. Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe, Algeria’s President Bouteflika in his early days in office, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles, Burkina Faso’s President Compaoré, as well as Uganda’s President Museveni are examples of this. This is in line with Pierre Englebert, who hypothesizes that some African leaders translate externally provided sovereignty into the domestic realm to keep their weak states alive and themselves in power.2 We should also note that those heads of state who failed to establish democracy see any surrendering of sovereignty vis-à-vis the AU as problematic as they consider it a threat to their power base. This extends beyond the AU level and also applies at the regional level. Both Defenders and Guardians are examples in this regard. Parallel to this, we find that those states seen as Volunteers and Enthusiasts not only have a better democratic record—albeit not unchallenged—but are also generally more willing to engage in the AU or the regional economic communities with concrete actions, such as introducing a common passport or allowing free movement of people. Moving lastly to the foreign policy realm, it was noted throughout the case studies that the regional economic communities are often considered to be more important and more beneficial for African states. This became most apparent for Burkina Faso and Uganda, which champion the ECOWAS and EAC integration processes respectively. As trade figures revealed, they not only use their regional grouping for economic purposes, but also aim to intensify political integration, including free movement of people within the communities and the use of a common passport. Similarly, Mauritius shows sympathy with the SADC project and hopes that the community will develop further so that

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trade intensifies in the region, which will in turn support Mauritius’ economy. South Africa is different in this regard as it is so economically strong that it does not need the SADC or the AU. The greater part of South Africa’s trade is with Europe and China. Nevertheless, the SADC region gets more attention than the AU because, under President Zuma, foreign policy is inspired by pragmatism and is designed to support national (economic) interests. The SADC integration project is more attractive in this regard because it has an economic component on which the member states can build, whereas the AU is far behind in this regard. Algeria is also strong economically, and it is endowed with its more favorable geographic position close to the European market and with national resources. Algeria’s interest in Maghreb integration is marginal, also because of long-standing rivalry with Morocco over the Western Sahara. For Algeria, the choice between its region and the continent is irrelevant with regard to economic questions, as its economic preference is undoubtedly the European market. Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Ethiopia differ as the leadership of these states guards its sovereignty so strictly—based on different reasoning—that they consider regional integration non-essential and unhelpful, even for economic purposes. In the case of Swaziland, South Africa’s hidden subsidies through the SACU, equaling two-thirds of Swaziland’s national revenue before the global financial and economic crisis, are an additional argument for the rejection of deeper economic and political integration at the regional level because the majority of the national revenue would be at stake if a free trade area were to be established. In Zimbabwe, chronic political instability prevails and attempts by the MDC to win a share in policy making absorb too much energy. Thus, the new Zimbabwean government pays little attention to any integration process in both the continent and the region. Overall, it was found that the economic situation is not necessarily a good predictor as to whether a country is willing to surrender sovereignty. Some states with poor socio-economic status are enthusiastic about regional integration whereas other weak states reject integration. Thus, we should conclude that economic considerations might play a role in determining a country’s willingness to pool sovereignty; yet this factor is overshadowed by three other factors that appeared to be better predictors. First, the historic setting seems to be of particular importance. It was shown that critical junctures could be identified in all states that help to explain the country’s willingness to yield sovereignty. Liberation struggles, including decolonization fights as well as wars against the predecessor regime within the country, are considered to be crucial turning points that provide a deep insight into why a state is

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(un)willing to cede sovereignty and (not) engage in the AU or the regional integration processes. Likewise, long-standing traditions that exist in Ethiopia and Swaziland, for example surviving (attempted) colonization, need to be included in the explanation. Second, the level of democracy also seems to have a significant impact. More detailed and larger analyses are required; yet the aforementioned evidence from the eight case studies points in this direction. Lastly, we should note that the lack of interest in deeper continental integration is, in some cases, compensated by a greater interest in regional integration processes, which appears to be more beneficial for its member states that consequently concentrate on the regional scheme rather than spending resources on continental integration that appears to be unrealistic for many.

Outlook The historic events in northern Africa at the beginning of 2011 might have consequences for the AU in the medium and long terms. The uprising, which started in Tunisia in January 2011, swept over to Egypt, and then moved to Libya, forcing the long serving leaders Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar al-Gaddafi to resign. The effects caused through the retirement of these members of the old guard of African leaders might be tremendous and are manifold for the AU and its member states. However, elaborated here are just two closely related consequences for the AU that are connected with the political revolution in northern Africa in general, and two other consequences that are concerned with Gaddafi’s ousting and death. First, one consequence of the changing conditions in northern Africa is that the democracy and freedom rights movement might spill over into other African countries. The political conditions are different in every country, as this study has shown, and the events that occurred in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—to name only the AU member states and leave aside states such as Bahrain, Syria, or Yemen—cannot be assumed to have taken place with the same intensity and in the same fashion in other African countries. Yet, even though circumstances are significantly different, some African leaders are nevertheless becoming nervous. The most prominent reaction to the upheaval in northern Africa was that Sudan’s long serving President al-Bashir announced that he would not run for re-election.3 President Mugabe of Zimbabwe is also said to feel threatened by the revolutions north of the Sahara.4 As authoritarian leaders are at the center of the political system and face severe personal risks, they might undertake political maneuvers such as that of al-Bashir to protect themselves. Another strategy would be to “lay low and say nothing,”

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as William Gumede noted in a South African newspaper.5 However, as indicated by the chapter on Burkina Faso, where President Compaoré introduced political reforms after popular protest, the Ugandan case, where President Museveni allowed for political parties to participate in elections following public and international pressure after having banned them before, and the often cited study of Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle on the wave of democratization that swept over Africa in the 1990s (which they see strongly linked with popular protest),6 there are reasons to believe that African leaders have a tendency not to “lie low” under severe pressure, but to announce (and implement) reforms in order to rescue themselves. This was also Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s initial strategy in January and February 2011 which did not work out in the end. The threat stemming from the uprising is real and democratic reforms might spread. Second and closely related, this study implicitly noted that the “old generation” of leaders who were inherited by the AU from the OAU and strongly support the principles of non-interference and protect their sovereignty with vigor pose a challenge for the AU’s further development. Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi belonged to the group of authoritarian leaders that supported the former OAU guiding principles and secured maximum power within their states over the decades. Three of these leaders are gone now and others are also facing this risk unless they implement political reforms as hypothesized above. Either way, this might have positive effects on the AU as democratic reforms are implemented or a new generation, who might not be as strongly attached to the sovereignty as their predecessors, takes power. Both conditions are crucial for the AU to move away from the status quo as this study has highlighted by suggesting that there is a link between democracy and belonging to a liberation movement, on the one hand, and the willingness to cede sovereignty, on the other hand. Third, moving on to the specific impacts Gaddafi’s removal has had, it must first be recalled that Libya and its leader Gaddafi were important factors in AU politics.7 It was Gaddafi who spearheaded the transformation of the OAU in the late 1990s, outmaneuvering South Africa’s President Mbeki and Nigeria’s President Obasanjo in their attempts to renew Africa.8 It was Gaddafi who suggested several times the immediate building of the United States of Africa, and it was Gaddafi who tabled a proposal to establish continental ministers for defense, foreign affairs, and transport and communication.9 It was Gaddafi who spearheaded the Grand Debate on the formation of the Union Government for Africa with the ultimate goal of building the United States of Africa, which culminated in the Accra Declaration.10 It was Gaddafi

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who became the chairperson of the AU in 2009–10, continuing to push hard for his vision. And it was Gaddafi who was involved in several African states, supporting them financially, economically, militarily, or politically.11 As shown earlier, Gaddafi had been involved in Uganda’s politics, supporting first Idi Amin and then President Museveni; he also supported Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe and found allies and supporters in Burkina Faso’s Presidents Sankara and Compaoré. Libya also tried to manipulate Mauritian politics which ended in being forced to close its diplomatic mission. In addition, Gaddafi is accused of having meddled in many other African states, and there are several insiders that claim that Gaddafi paid—directly or indirectly—AU membership fees for fellow AU member states.12 Although this remains unconfirmed, Libya belongs to the “Big Five” AU member states, contributing 15 percent to the organization’s budget. After Mbeki, Gaddafi’s most powerful counterpart in the AU, left, Gaddafi won even more importance in the organization. In short, Gaddafi became the pivotal player in Africa and in the AU, and hence the fact that he is no longer involved in AU and African politics impacts on the organization and its member states. The AU itself turned away from Gaddafi when it passed a communiqué in the Peace and Security Council condemning political violence in Libya.13 This move is remarkable as it indicates a break in the relationship between the AU and Libya, even though it was hard for the AU to decide on this issue as it effectively meant condemning one of the organization’s leaders.14 This decision and Gaddafi’s death are likely to mark the ultimate end of the discussions that are considered untimely among the AU member states and within the AU bureaucracy. The organization and its member states are no longer forced to spend capacities and resources on debates, such as the discussion on the Union Government for Africa or the relocation of the AU headquarters to Libya,15 but can spend time and resources on what they consider more important issues. In other words, since Gaddafi is gone, there is a good chance that the AU can concentrate on the most pressing problems of the continent, which include the promotion of peace and security, eradication of poverty, the fight against disease, and the support for democracy and liberty rights. Gaddafi’s removal and his death both create space and allow the AU to move forward and to popularize itself within Africa and beyond. With the advantage of hindsight, one might even conclude that Gaddafi’s push for the United States of Africa had the opposite effect to that intended. First, the AU was paralyzed for years, preventing the development of several sectors where development would have been possible. Second, the call for the immediate surrendering of sovereignty

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during the Grand Debate made heads of state guard their sovereignty even more carefully as they feared losing everything at once. An incremental approach to integration, that is to say an approach through which sovereignty is transferred and pooled piece by piece over a longer period of time, might help African leaders to overcome their general opposition to ceding sovereignty and to join in the building of a strong AU. The fact that African leaders have agreed on a common position in the global climate change debate is a first step in this direction.16 The European Union’s incremental emergence can be a model for Africa and is indeed seen as such by many.17 European integration started as a politically motivated economic integration project in the postWorld War II context. Over the years, deeper economic integration proved to be beneficial for the member states and thus they intensified their cooperation and moved toward political integration, making the European Union an economically and politically strong and attractive union. Several states wanted to join, so the European integration project grew from six founding members in the 1950s to 27 members in 2007, and further states are currently applying for membership. But there is a core difference between Europe and Africa. After decolonization, African states gathered more or less all at once to form the OAU/AU rather than gradually enlarging it on a common understanding of core values. The European Union faces the problem of accommodating 27 opinions, policies, and desires; however, all the states that have joined the union are committed to the so-called Copenhagen Criteria, which spell out the core principles and values such as democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights on which the integration is based. Every state has to adhere to these criteria in order to become a member of the union.18 Nothing like this is present and adhered to in Africa. Thus, the immediate establishment of a union of states appears to be problematic as there is no common understanding of the core values that form the foundation of integration. To complicate the situation even further, there are 54 African states who all want to have a stake in the decision making process, meaning that finding a common consensus is a difficult undertaking. This problem is difficult to overcome and any solution that includes all AU member states with their individual histories and political systems is unlikely to come to fruition. Yet, the AU Constitutive Act points to one solution when it suggests focusing on the regional level instead to “coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.”19 The Accra Declaration similarly notes that the regional economic communities shall serve as the

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building blocks of the United States of Africa.20 As the findings of this study suggest, this way appears to be logical, as indeed many states— although not all—see greater benefit in regional cooperation than in continental integration. However, as shown, some communities are well advanced, whereas others lag far behind. ECOWAS and the EAC are certainly models that other regional communities have to look at; nevertheless, they too still have a long way to go. For the regional economic communities to develop further, a solution to the urgent problem of dual and triple membership has to be found.21 As noted in the case studies, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, for instance, are both members of COMESA and SADC. Uganda is a member of the EAC and COMESA, and Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and COMESA. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, is even a member of three communities that are officially recognized by the AU (Economic Community of Central African States, COMESA, and SADC). Multiple membership causes conflicts of interest, and if these are not solved, the regional communities will run into difficulties in developing further. This problem must thus be part of the coordination and harmonization efforts of the AU, for which it acquired the mandate through the Constitutive Act and the Accra Declaration. Besides this, taking into account the finding that the regional economic communities appear to be more attractive, policy makers must think about how concretely the communities can extrapolate into continentwide integration. Little has been said or written about this final step. One might assume that once the regional integration schemes are fully functional, the member states might have no interest in merging with another community as the other community might be lacking in political and economic development and integration. Therefore, researchers and policy makers must also engage with this question and investigate the relations between the regional economic communities and the AU in more detail in order to gain a better understanding of how they are linked, how strongly this link is appreciated on both sides, and whether the communities, once they are harmonized, have a theoretical chance of extrapolating to the United States of Africa. This call does not suggest concentrating on the regional level and considering the AU meaningless for the time being. On the contrary, the AU has three main tasks to fulfill which are the promotion of peace and security, support for democratic movements, and the exercising of an overseeing and coordinating function for the regional communities. The AU appears to be the best place from which to approach Africa’s security problems. It must continue and strengthen its role as the chief promoter of peace and stability on the continent. The AU gave itself

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the mandate to engage in this field particularly and is building up the necessary organs and mechanisms to fulfill this role. Progress is being made in this realm, as underscored, for instance, by the recent reaction of the AU in the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire when the organization suspended the country until a democratically elected president assumed state power.22 Furthermore, the AU’s condemnation of the political violence in Libya,23 after having failed to engage with the situations in Tunisia and Egypt,24 is a sign that the AU peace and security organs take their role and mandate seriously. If the AU continues down this path, its chances of being considered as a viable organization in Africa and beyond will improve. The promotion of peace and security might have a further effect, which is to serve as a basis for deepening continental integration. A new stream of research should provide theoretical and empirical substance to the question of whether intensified cooperation in the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture can spill over into other policy fields and serve as a springboard for strengthening the continent’s political integration. This should go hand in hand with research on the cultural foundations of Africa’s continental integration. It appears that research is stuck at this point with the use of Pan-Africanism as a cultural basis of the integration process. As indicated by President Museveni’s quote in the introductory chapter that continental integration would culturally link different states, Pan-Africanism as a normative foundation of integration is not shared by all decision makers on the continent. They see strong cultural differences across Africa and argue that these differences make it impossible to integrate the whole continent. If PanAfricanism is not necessarily the basis, then what else could it be? As Paul Williams has shown, there is an emerging peace and security culture in Africa,25 and we need to ask whether this culture might be a basis for a stronger AU or the United States of Africa. There is undeniable progress being made at the AU level; notwithstanding, this study has also shown that there is a gap between the intentions and progress made at the AU level and the intentions and policies at the member states’ level. To illustrate the point, one must simply imagine walking out of the gates of the AU headquarters in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. Once reaching Ethiopian ground, one is in a country with a government that challenges democratic norms, where the leaders undermined the AU when they decided to intervene in Somalia without AU approval, and where the APRM was conducted in a questionable way.26 At the same time, AU staff work in their enclosure in the middle of Addis Ababa to achieve the opposite. Intention and reality are only separated by a wall, yet a wall that is currently too high

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to jump over. In fact, we must not be blinded by what the AU has achieved—even though this is partly commendable—but must also look into whether its member states have implemented the policies and become committed members of the organization who support the latter’s ambitions and goals. This study has given clear indications that this is not always the case. Countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe are cases where the fundamental AU principles of democracy are undermined, the doctrine of non-interference is held high, and the national sovereignty strictly defended. Mugabe’s statement that, “[n]o country in the world, including those in the African Union and SADC can dictate how Zimbabwe should conduct its elections” shows this.27 Politicians and academics alike must address the gap between the AU and member states and find ways to bridge it. This study has indicated that there is a link between democratic status and the willingness to cede sovereignty. One possible consequence could thus be that the AU is doing more than ever before to support democratic reforms, particularly in light of the chances that appeared with the upheavals in northern Africa. The AU must make an offer to its member states. This offer must be to ultimately achieve peace, security, and stability on the continent in order to provide the ground on which political and economic development can take place. At the same time, it could support a home-grown African democratization process. Progress in the peace and security realm in particular would make the AU attractive, both on the continent and beyond, as a partner of other global players. Advancing democratization, both sustainably promoted and demanded by the AU, could not only lead to a convergence of democratic norms that would make it easier for states to cooperate but could also have further impact. As Kurt Taylor Gaubatz suggests, cooperation among democracies is stronger than among non-democracies.28 This study has indirectly confirmed this view. Edward Mansfield et al. argue similarly that democracies are more willing to cooperate economically.29 The European Union can be a model in this regard. Progress in terms of democratization would also help to overcome a structural problem of the AU, which is the weakness of the state structures in many of its member states. The examples of South Africa and Mauritius, the two fully developed democracies in this study, indicate that democracy and state building or state manifesting can go hand in hand. A strong and viable state with democratic institutions and institutionalized decision making processes where power is not personalized can, as shown, help the surrendering of sovereignty to be seen as less problematic. In such cases, sovereignty would not only be externally provided, as is currently often the case in Africa, but

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also internally given, hence lending further credibility and reliability to the states. One of the implicit goals of this study was to show that, in order to get a better picture of the AU, academics and policy makers must examine the member states and include them in their analysis and policy making. Further research must look deeper into intra state dynamics in order to understand the foreign policy of member states vis-à-vis their organization. Only then can we understand how the AU can be built more strongly. The bad news is that the inclusion of the member states’ perspectives will make research and policy making more complicated and complex; yet, as this study has shown, there is a specific need to take this perspective into consideration because otherwise our understanding of the AU will be skewed, and policy makers will run into difficulties in the medium and long terms as they are not fully aware of their environment and the dynamics of the member states whose approval is needed for any policy. In summary, the main findings of this study are that the level of democracy plays a central role and that regional economic communities often appear more beneficial for African states. In addition, it was shown that there is an urgent need to include the member states in the analysis as this perspective is pivotal to understanding ongoing dynamics with regard to continental and regional integration. In addition, it was found that the question of whether the incumbent leader and the dominant party were part of the liberation movement does play a role, as it is assumed that they feel personally attached to the sovereignty and self-determination for which they fought. Decolonization’s legacies indeed matter. With a younger generation coming to power, there is a chance that the personal attachment to power and the personalization of power itself erode. This, however, is not automatic. The AU must actively support such a policy and must ensure that democratic standards are implemented in a stable and peaceful political environment. This is the great task that the AU has to fulfill. Through this, it will make itself attractive to Africans and to the global audience in the medium and long term so that there is no other way than to include the organization in African and global political considerations. The dramatic revolutions in northern Africa and the changing political landscape provide the AU with a unique opportunity to grow stronger and achieve its immediate objectives, and that is also to serve the interests of the people of Africa.

Notes

Introduction 1 Corinne A. Packer and Donald Rukare, “The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act,” The American Journal of International Law 96, no. 2 (2002): 365–79; David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Baffour Ankomah, “African Union: From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference,” New African, no. 3 (2007): 10–15; Paul D. Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture,” African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 253–79; Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance (London: Routledge, 2008); John Akokpari, “Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa,” in The African Union and Its Institutions, ed. John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi (Auckland Park: Fanele, 2008), 85–112; Benedikt Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2009); Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Benedikt Franke, “Steady but Uneven Progress: The Operationalization of the African Standby Force,” in Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century, ed. Hany Besada (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 179–200; and Martin Welz, “From NonInterference towards Non-Indifference: An Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Africa Union?”, eds. Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (forthcoming). 2 Business Day, “AU Can Fulfil Pan Africanists’ Dream,” 16 August 2002. 3 Norman J. Padelford, “The Organization of African Unity,” International Organization 18, no. 3 (1964): 521–42; Colin Legum, “The Organisation of African Unity – Success or Failure?,” International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1975): 208–19; Klaas van Walraven, Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963–1993 (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1999); Joram Mukama Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa’s Integration and Cooperation from OAU to AU: “Old Wine in a New Bottle?” (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House Limited, 2005); Murithi Timothy, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Makinda and Okumu, The African Union; and Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa.

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4 Walraven, Dreams of Power, xvii. 5 Collin Legum, “The Roots of Pan-Africanism,” in Africa Handbook, ed. Colin Legum (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 541–55; Kwesi Kwaa Prah, “The Wish to Unite: The Historical and Political Context of the PanAfrican Movement,” in The Making of the African-Nation: Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, ed. Mammo Muchie (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2003), 13–39. 6 Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of PanAfricanism (London: Longman, 1969), 98. 7 Speech by Kwame Nkrumah on Independence Day, Accra, 5 March 1957. 8 Also see Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963). 9 Walraven, Dreams of Power, 101–42. 10 Colin Legum, The Organisation of African Unity, 209. 11 Organization of African Unity, OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963. 12 Organization of African Unity, Border Disputes Among African States, Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Cairo, 17–21 July 1964, AHG/Res. 16(I). 13 See e.g., Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa’s Integration, 46; and BBC 2002, African Union Replaces Dictators’ Club, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 2115736.stm. 14 See e.g., Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, “South Africa and the African Renaissance,” International Affairs 74, no. 2 (1998): 271–87; Pal Ahluwalia, “The Struggle for African Identity: Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance,” African and Asian Studies 1, no. 4 (2002): 265–77; Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?,” International Affairs 79, no. 4 (2003): 815–28; Elias K. Bongmba, “Reflections on Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance,” Journal of Southern African Studies 30, no. 1 (2004): 291–316; and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 249–67. 15 Also see Asteris Huliaras, “Qadhafi’s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): 5–25; Yehudit Ronen, “Libya’s Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qadhafi on the International Stage,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 13, no. 4 (2002): 60–74; Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 249–67; Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008); and Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa. 16 As the transition period is described elsewhere in detail, there is no specific attention paid herein. See instead Musifiky Mwanasali, “From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenge, ed. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 205–24; Tieku, “Explaining the Clash,” 249–67; Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa’s Integration and Cooperation from OAU to AU; Murithi, The African Union; Kassim Mohammed Khamis, Promoting the African Union (Washington: Lilian Barber Press, 2008); Makinda and Okumu, The African Union; Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa; and Klass van Walraven, “Heritage and Transformation: From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” in Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms,

Notes

17

18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33

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Institutionalizing Solutions, ed. Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 31–56. African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Transport and Communication, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.5; African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Defence, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.6; and African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.7. African Union, Accra Declaration, Accra, 1–3 July 2007, Assembly/AU/ Decl.1–2(IX). African Union, Decision on the Special Session of the Assembly on the Union Government, Addis Ababa, 1–3 February 2009, Assembly/AU/Dec.233(XII). Interviews in Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, November 2008–March 2010. Also see Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jackie Cilliers, From Durban to Maputo: A Review of 2003 Summit of the African Union, ISS Paper 76, Institute for Security Studies 2003. Murithi, The African Union; Akokpari, “Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa,” 85–112; and Makinda and Okumu, The African Union. Interviews in Ethiopia, South Africa, and Uganda, November 2008–March 2010. See African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012 (Programme of Yaounde), Addis Ababa, May 2009. Percy S. Mistry, “Africa’s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration,” African Affairs 99, no. 4 (2000): 554. Keith Gottschalk, “Things Fall Together: The Founding of the African Union,” in Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 28 2001–2002 (Teaneck: Africana Publishing Company, 2006), A 1–A 16; and Maxi Schoeman, The African Union after the Durban 2002 Summit (University of Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2003): 15. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, “Towards a Closer Co-Operation in Africa,” Brainstorming Session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/External Relations on the African Union, Addis Ababa, 8–9 May 2007. Interview, South Africa, April 2009. See Siegmar Schmidt, “Prinzipien, Ziele und Institutionen der Afrikanischen Union,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 4/2005 (2005): 25–32; Kathryn Sturman, “New Growth and Deep Roots”: Prospects for an African Union Government, ISS Paper 146 (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2007); and Makinda and Okumu, The African Union. African Union, Accra Declaration. Christopher Clapham, “Sovereignty and the Third World State,” in Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson (Malden: Blackwell, 1999), 100. Walraven, “Heritage and Transformation,” 35. Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?,” 827. Packer and Rukare, “The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act,” 365–79; Ankomah, “African Union: From Non-Interference to NonIndifference,” 10–15; Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference,” 253–79; Makinda and Okumu, The African Union; Mwanasali, “From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” 41–62; and Musifiky

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34 35

36 37 38

39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46

47

48 49 50

Notes Mwanasali, “From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa,” in The African Union and Its Institutions, ed. John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Timothy Murithi (Auckland Park: Fanele, 2009), 41–62. African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lome, 11 July 2000: Art. 4 h, amended version. See Akokpari, “Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa,” 85–112; Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference,” 253–79; Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa; Engel and Porto, Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture; and Franke, “Steady but Uneven Progress,” 179–200. African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Situation in Libya, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2011, PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI). Business Day, “AU’s Morning After,” 12 July 2002. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); and Ernst B. Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” International Organization 24, no. 4 (1970): 607–46. Björn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum, “The New Regionalism Approach,” Politeia 17, no. 3 (1999): 6–21; and Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2005): 543–71. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 1971); Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60; and Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997) 513–53. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 530. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 10. David Long, “The Harvard School of Liberal Theory: A Case for Closure,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1995), 489–505: 498. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 530. Ibid., 518. David W. Moore, “Governmental and Societal Influence on Foreign Policy in Open and Closed Nations,” Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Sage, 1974), 171–94: 190–91. Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation,” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series No. 52, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1–4 September 1994: 1–2. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 530–33. Ibid., 531. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis,” Journal of Modern

Notes

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63 64 65

66

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African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 1–31; Christopher Clapham, “Degrees of Statehood,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 143–57; Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, Big African States (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006); and Pierre Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9. Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow, 5. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24. Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow, 7. Helmut Steinberger, “Sovereignty,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law IV: Quirin, ex Parte to Zones of Peace, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt (Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier, 2000), 500–521, 501. John Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 131–57, 143. Joseph Reese Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 58. Karen T. Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” Mershon International Studies Review 41 (1997): 167–204. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” 131–57. Robert Latham, Ronald Kassimir and Thomas M. Callaghy, “Introduction: Transboundary Formations, Intervention, Order, and Authority,” in Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global–Local Networks of Power, ed. Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–20; Achille Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa,” in Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective, ed. Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 53–80; and Ulf Engel, “Die Neuordnung Afrikas – Souveränität im Wandel,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 34–35 (2009): 7–12. Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa, 18–19. Jack S. Levy, “Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations,” International Security 22, no. 1, (1997): 22–33, 33. Laurie Nathan, The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa 1992–2003, Crisis State Research Center LSE, Working Paper No. 50; Christiane Gans, Die ECOWAS: Wirtschaftsintegration in West Afrika (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006); and Admore Mupoki Kambuzi, “Portrayal of a Possible Path to a Single Government for Africa” in Towards a Union Government for Africa, ed. Timothy Murithi (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 13–28. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 477–513.

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67 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 109–39, 137. 68 Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” 556–57. 1 Case selection 1 Taking into account that it is an AU member state, Western Sahara is counted as a state. However, South Sudan is not seen as an independent state in this study. The reason for this is that, when the data for this chapter were collected in mid-2008, the referendum on South Sudan’s independence was still far away and its outcome unknown. 2 Also see Wolfgang Seibel, “Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat: UNFriedensoperationen und Dilemmata internationaler Übergangsverwaltungen,” in Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt, ed. Gunnar Folke Schuppert and Michael Zürn (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 499–530. 3 Please note that Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are not listed as Constrained. The conflicts in these countries provoked international interventions; yet, these interventions were limited to fairly small parts of the countries. For example, there is no international peacekeeping mission for the whole of Sudan, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the peacekeeping and observer mission is limited to the border region in both states. Sources: International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch. A Monthly Bulletin by Crisis Group on Current and Potential Conflicts around the World, No. 55, 1 March 2008; and Institute for Security Studies, http://www.issafrica.org. 4 The variable APRM refers to the participation in the African Peer Review Mechanism. Only states that have ratified the protocol are considered participants. Just signing the protocol that establishes the APRM is not sufficient. Source: NEPAD, Participating Countries 2008, www.nepad.org/aprm. 5 Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd, The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008), 5. 6 The variable incorporates the question of whether the government criticized Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe during the first and second round of the presidential election (including the campaign time) or in the days following the run-off election in June 2008. The basis for the coding included several international newspapers and news agencies (African, British, German, and US-American) and the databases LexisNexis, as well as Google (the latter two were fed with the name of the Head of State or the name of the state in combination with either “Mugabe” or “Zimbabwe” or both). If there was no indication of a critique directed against Mugabe, it is assumed that there was no critique. However, to verify this, the respective embassies located in Germany or neighboring countries were approached. If the officials could not verify that there was a critique, the country was coded accordingly. All countries whose embassies did not reply were also coded with 0 as it seems safe to assume that if there was a critique it would have appeared in at least one of the sources used. Sources: All Africa, Zimbabwe: Be Watchful when Hunting with Hounds, http://allafrica. com/stories/200807210679.html; All Africa, Gambia: Zimbabwe Election Valid, says President Jammeh, www.allafrica.com/stories/200807030773.html; All

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8

9

10

11

12

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Africa, Zimbabwe: Kikwete to meet with UN Boss over “Alternative Solution”, http://allafrica.com/stories/200807070587.html; Hamilton Spectator, Save Zimbabwe, http://www.thespec.com/Opinions/article/393657; Justice Africa, Zimbabwe: Only Africa can make Mugabe see Sense, http://www. justiceafrica.org/2008/07/10/zimbawe-only-africa-can-make-mugabe-see-sense/; Reuters, Bush Says Wants Peaceful End to Zimbabwe Crisis, www.alertnet. org/thenews/newsdesk/N16427300.htm; Thomas Scheen, “Krieg gegen das eigene Volk,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 July 2008; Spiegel, “Warum Afrikas Regenten plötzlich Mugabe mobben,” 23 June 2008; Njoroge Wachai, “Mugabe finds Friends in African Union,” Washington Post, 2 July 2008; and Bartholomäus Grill, “Familienbild mit Despoten,” Die Zeit, 5 July 2008. PSC stands for the AU’s Peace and Security Council. Countries that ratified the protocol are coded as participating in the council. Again, only a signatory to the protocol is not sufficient. Source: African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002. COJ is used as an abbreviation for the Court of Justice of the AU. States that have ratified the protocol are coded as participating. Source: African Union, Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003. In this study, ICJ is the abbreviation for the International Court of Justice. Those states which “at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court” are considered to be part of the ICJ. Source: International Court of Justice, Yearbook 2002–2003, no. 57 (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 2008); and International Court of Justice; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946, Art. 36 para 2. ICC stands for International Criminal Court. The value of this variable indicates whether a state has ratified the so-called Rome Statute, which establishes the ICC. Source: International Criminal Court, International Criminal Court – Assembly of State Parties, 2008, www.icc-cpi.int/region& id=3.html. This variable indicates the year of independence from the last colonial power. This study follows the general understanding that both Ethiopia and Liberia were never colonized. It is still worth pointing out that one could argue that Ethiopia was under the short rule of Mussolini and Liberia under Afro-American rule. The variable FreedomFighter denotes whether the current head of state or government played an active role in the decolonization process. Freedom fighter does not necessarily mean that he fought actively. A clear commitment to the freedom fighters’ activities, such as logistical or ideological support for the independence struggle or negotiation, is considered sufficient. The coding took place in two steps: first, the year of birth of the head of state and the year of independence of his state were compared. If he was younger than 16 years of age at the time of independence, it was ruled out that he was a freedom fighter. From the remaining heads of

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state, further biographical details were obtained. In unclear cases, the membership of a political party/movement and the party’s/movement’s year of founding were compared. If the movement was founded after independence, he was not considered a freedom fighter. If it becomes clear that he joined the movement before the country’s independence, he was attributed the status of freedom fighter. It is thought that those people who participated in the independence struggle of a country would not conceal this. Thus, if no information regarding the commitment to the liberation struggle was found, it was assumed that he was not a freedom fighter. If the positions head of government and head of state are not held by one person, the person with the greater influence according to the constitution was looked at. For Côte d’Ivoire, this was the president, for Congo (Brazzaville) and Congo (Kinshasa), it was also the president, and the same is true for Djibouti. This is different in Ethiopia where the prime minister holds executive power. For Equatorial Guinea, it was the President, yet in Lesotho the king holds an outstanding position that leaves little room for maneuver by the prime minister; in Gabon, it was again the president. Mauritius’s constitution gives the prime minister a strong position; this is different in Rwanda where the president holds the executive power. Swaziland remains an absolute monarchy and hence the king is examined. In Togo, the president holds the main power. Sources: Munzinger, Internationale Biographisches Archiv, http://www.munzinger.de/search/templates/magazin. jsp; United States Department of State, A–Z List of Country and Other Area Pages, http://www.state.gov/misc/list/index.htm; Institutional Website of Equatorial Guinea, Biography of Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, http://www. ceiba-guinea-ecuatorial.org/guineeangl/indexbienv1.htm; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central African Republic: Bozize to contest Presidency as an Independent Candidate, http://www.irinnews.org/ Report.aspx?ReportId=52396; BBC, Burundi’s Born-Again Ex-Rebel Leader, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4162504.stm; Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, Biografia do Presidente da Republica, http://www2.ebonet. net/MPLA/bio_jsantos.htm#bio; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Fischer Weltalmanach: Biographien, http://www.bpb.de/wissen/Q0SHGD,0, 0,Ravalomanana_Marc.html; République de Djibouti, Son Excellence, Monsieur Isamïl Omar Guelleh, Président de la République de Djibouti, Chef du Gouvernement, http://www.presidence.dj/biographie.htm; Statehouse Kenya, Profile of his Excellency Hon. Mwai Kibkai, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya, http:// www.statehousekenya.go.ke; Ghana Official Portal, President of the Republic of Ghana, http://www.ghana.gov.gh/the_executive; Gouvernement Tunisien, Biographie du Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, http://www.minis teres.tn/html/biographie.html; and Guy Arnold, Civil Wars in Africa (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008). 13 The variable Presidential gives information on whether the governmental system is a presidential one. Libya’s governmental system was coded as presidential. Gaddafi is usually called “brother leader,” yet he is head of state and government and rules de facto like most other African presidents. Sources: Auswärtiges Amt, Länder A–Z, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/ de/Laenderinformationen/LaenderReiseinformationenA-Z.jsp; United States Department of State, A–Z List of Country and Other Area Pages, http://

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www.state.gov/misc/list/index.htm; US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook; and Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s Electoral Regimes,” Party Politics 11, no. 4 (2005), 423–46. 14 This study used the Human Development Index 2007/2008 to determine the socio-economic situation. The index provides information on the development status of a country using various data such as education, life expectancy, and gross national income. Source: United Nations Development Program, 2007/2008 Human Development Index Rankings, http://hdr.undp. org/en/statistics/. 2 Zimbabwe 1 James Barber, “The New South African Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005), 1079–96: 1094. 2 Merle Lipton, “Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of Zimbabwe,” South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2009): 331–46, 340. 3 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Zimbabwe (1972–79),” in Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II, ed. Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2007), 829–45: 832. 4 Interview with a former comrade of Mugabe, Harare, February 2009. 5 Anthony Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe 1890–1980 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986); Mordechai Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1990); Martin Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder in Zimbabwe (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2002); and Stephen Chan, Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 6 Richard Brown and Christopher Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 2009 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 1281–88: 1281. 7 See e.g., Richard Cornwell, “Zimbabwe: The Politics of Conciliation,” Africa Insight 10, no. 3/4 (1980): 142–50. 8 Chan, Robert Mugabe, 17. 9 James Barber, Mandela’s World: The International Dimension of South Africa’s Political Revolution 1990–99 (Oxford: James Curry, 2004), 193. 10 Gregory Yanes, “Zimbabwe Economy: Continent’s Jewel,” New York Times, 30 June 1980. 11 Quoted in Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder. 12 Interview with a former senior official close to the president, Harare, February 2009. 13 Brown and Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Recent History,” 1281. 14 The Herald, 18 January 1982 quoted in William Shaw, “Towards the OneParty State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought,” Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 3 (1986): 373–94, 376. 15 Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder; also see Norma Kriger, “ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion,” African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005): 1–34. 16 See Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder; and Chan, Robert Mugabe.

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17 Mark Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009), 297. 18 Brown and Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Recent History,” 1287. 19 See e.g., Washington Post, “Violence in Zimbabwe,” 8 April 2000. 20 Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – From Reconciliation to Revival? (Oxford: University Press, 2003), 48. 21 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe,” in Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980–2000, ed. Brian Raftopoulos and Lloyd Sachikonye (Harare: Waever Press, 2001). 22 Also see Economist, “The Mess One Man makes,” 22 April 2000. 23 United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 2005. 24 Guardian, “Mugabe Opponent Beaten and Arrested,” 12 March 2007; and Byron Dziva, “Victims tell of Beatings by Mugabe’s Thugs,” The Daily Telegraph, 16 April 2008. 25 Financial Gazette, “Moment of Truth – Country Decides in Landmark Poll,” 27 March 2008. 26 Interview with a former government official, Harare, February 2009. 27 Ibid. 28 The Herald, 28 June 2007. 29 Interview, Harare, February 2009. 30 Interview, Harare, February 2009. 31 Tendai Hildegarde Manzvanzvike, “The Men, the Name, the Legacy,” The Herald, 21 February 2009. 32 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Zimbabwe,” (2009) https:// www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html. 33 Africa Confidential, “Stout Party Splits,” 20 January 2006. 34 Africa Confidential, “Death and Deals,” 4 July 2008. 35 Economist, “Can Robert Mugabe ever be persuaded to give up?,” 9 October 2010. 36 Martin Welz, “Zimbabwe’s ‘Inclusive Government’: Some Observations on its First 100 Days,” The Round Table 99, no. 411 (2010): 607–21, 606–7. 37 Also see The Daily Telegraph, “Dealing with Mugabe,” 12 February 2009. 38 World Bank, Country Profiles: Zimbabwe (2009) www.worldbank.org. 39 Interview, Harare, February 2009. 40 Economist, “Can Robert Mugabe ever be persuaded.” 41 Brown and Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Recent History,” 1285. 42 Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries (2010), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010; also see Pan-African Parliament, Report of the Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission. Presidential Run-Off Election and House of Assembly By-Elections: Republic of Zimbabwe, Harare, 27 June 2008; EISA, EISA Election Observer Mission Report Zimbabwe, http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/ zimomr08.pdf; and SADC Election Observer Mission. Preliminary Statement, http://www.sadcpf.org/SADC%20EOM%20preliminary%20statement%202 9%20June%202008.pdf. 43 Quoted in Celia W. Dugger and Barry Bearak, “Mugabe’s Rival quits Runoff, citing Attacks,” New York Times, 22 June 2008.

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44 Martin Welz and Julian Junk, “Zimbabwe still at the Crossroads? Domestic Stalemate, Regional Appeasement, and International Half-Heartedness,” Sicherheit und Frieden – Security and Peace 27, no. 3 (2009): 185–94; and Welz, “Zimbabwe’s ‘Inclusive Government’,” 607–21. 45 Republic of Zimbabwe, Constitution of Zimbabwe, http://www.parlzim.gov. zw/cms/UsefulResourses/ ZimbabweConstitution.pdf. 46 See Edgar Tekere, Edgar “2Boy Zivanai Tekere: A Lifetime for Struggle” (Harare: SAPES, 2007), 135. 47 Africa Confidential, “A Heartbeat away,” 17 December 2007. 48 Economist, “Who dunnit?,” 20 August 2011; and Welz, “Zimbabwe’s ‘Inclusive Government’.” 49 Chris McGreal, “Mugabe: I’ll quit, if I don’t face Prosecution,” Mail & Guardian online, 4 April 2008; and interviews with former senior officials, Harare, February 2009. 50 Interview with a former ZANU-PF man, Harare, February 2009. 51 Also see Constitution of Zimbabwe. 52 Stephen Chan and Hasu Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy: A Conversation,” The Round Table 95, no. 384 (2006): 175–90, 176. 53 Heidi Holland, Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a Tyrant (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2008). 54 Interview, Harare, February 2009. 55 Quoted in Heidi Holland, Dinner with Mugabe, 240. 56 BBC News online, “Mugabe insists: ‘Zimbabwe is mine’,” 19 December 2008. 57 Interviews with officials, observers, and former ZANU members, Harare, February 2009. 58 Zimbabwe Independent, “Zimbabwe: Ruling Party said facing ‘LeadershipRenewal Challenge’,” 20 February 2009. 59 Mail & Guardian online, “Mugabe: I will never surrender Zimbabwe,” 19 December 2008. 60 Hasu Patel, “No Master, No Mortgage, No Sale,” in Regional Development at the International Level, Volume II, African and Canadian Perspectives, ed. Timothy Shaw and Yash Tandon (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985). 61 The others are: “attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society,” “non-racialism at home and abroad,” and “positive non-alignment and peaceful co-existence among nations”; Chan and Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy,” 176; also see Terence M. Mashingaidze, “The Zimbabwean Entrapment: An Analysis of the Nexus between Domestic and Foreign Policies in a ‘Collapsing’ Militant State, 1990s–2006,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 5, no. 4 (2006): 57–76, 57. 62 Chan and Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy,” 176. 63 The Herald, “Mugabe Turns on African Nations,” 27 June 2008. 64 Chan and Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy,” 177. 65 Catherine Philp, “He has Nothing to pay his Thugs, his Coffers are empty. So They are told to loot What They like from the Farms,” The Times, 2 July 2008. 66 SADC Tribunal, Case No. 2–07, Windhoek, 13 December 2007, http:// www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/CASENo207.pdf. 67 For a description of the events on the farm, see Ben Freeth, “I felt no Hatred and I did not fear Death,” The Times, 22 July 2008.

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68 SADC Tribunal, Case No. 2–07. 69 Cited in New York Times, “Leader Urges Zimbabwe Blacks to Menace the White Residents,” 15 December 2000. 70 Economist, “Whose Land?,” 5 March 2009. 71 Cited on BBC News online, “Mugabe vows to seize more Farms,” 28 February 2009. 72 Mail & Guardian, “Zimbabwe Judge blasts SADC Court over White Farmers Ruling,” 13 January 2009. 73 SADC Tribunal, Case No. 2–07, 2. 74 Economist, “Mike Campbell,” 23 April 2011. 75 Interview with a former Zimbabwean diplomat to the UK, Harare, February 2009. 76 For a copy of the original letter, see http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/ images/0,9069,1015120,00.html. 77 Andrew Meldrum, “Gadafy’s Harare Roadshow brings out the Curious,” The Guardian, 13 July 2001. 78 Brown and Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Recent History,” 1288. 79 African Research Bulletin, “Libyan Intentions,” 1–30 November 2001: 14645 A-B. 80 Interview, Harare, February 2009. 81 Jan Raath, “Mugabe goes Begging for Fuel Deal from Gadhafi,” The Times, 28 June 2003. 82 Peta Basildon, “Mugabe Aiding Namibia Land Grab Drafts Mugabe Experts,” The Independent, 3 April 2004. 83 Chan and Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy,” 181. 84 Julian Borger, “China Arms Ship left with no Port of call as Britain and US apply Pressure,” Guardian, 24 April 2008; and African Research Bulletin, “Regional Anger blocks Arms Ship,” 1–30 April 2008: 17486B-C. 85 Interview at the AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 86 Dale T. McKinley, “South African Foreign Policy Towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki,” Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 100 (2004): 357–64; Alden and le Pere, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy; William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005); Andrew Feinstein, After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey inside the ANC (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2007); Soko Mills and Neil Balchin, “South Africa’s Policy Towards Zimbabwe: A Nexus Between Foreign Policy and Commercial Interests?,” South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2009): 33–48; Merle Lipton, “Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of Zimbabwe,” South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2009): 331–46; and Welz and Junk, “Zimbabwe still at the Crossroads?,” 185–94. 87 Also see Chantelle Benjamin, “Using Violence as a Voice,” Business Day, 7 July 2007. 88 Jean-Jacques Cornish and Godwin Gandu, “Mugabe Laughs Last,” Mail & Guardian, 13 July 2006. 89 The Herald, “AU, Portugal rally behind Zimbabwe,” 4 December 2007. 90 Arne Perras, “Afrikanischer Despot auf Europareise,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 December 2007. 91 Lisbon Declaration—EU Africa Summit, http://www.africa-eu-partnership. org/pdf/eas2007_lisbon_declaration_en.pdf.

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92 David Blair, “Merkel attacks Mugabe at Lisbon Summit,” Telegraph.co.uk, 9 December 2007. 93 Perras, “Afrikanischer Despot auf Europareise,” own translation. 94 The Herald, “Mugabe Turns on African Nations.” 95 The Herald, “It’s a Landslide,” 30 June 2008. 96 Ibid. 97 Interviews in Addis Ababa, November 2008 and March 2010. 98 Interview with an African ambassador, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 99 Interview with John Makumbe, Harare, 24 February 2009. 100 African Union, Resolution on Zimbabwe, Sharm El-Sheikh, 30 June–1 July 2008, Assembly/AU/Res.1 (XI). 101 The Herald, “AU resists Attempts to lambaste Zimbabwe over Polls,” 28 June 2008. 102 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, February 2009. 103 Interviews, Midrand, February and March 2009. 104 Interview with John Makumbe. 105 Ibid. 106 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, February 2009. 107 Interview with an ally of Tsvangirai, Harare, February 2009. 108 See African Union, Resolution on Zimbabwe. 109 Interview with David Coltart, Harare, 25 February 2009. 110 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, February 2009. 111 Interview with John Makumbe. 112 Pan-African Parliament, Report of the Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission. 3 Swaziland 1 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2008, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 2 United Nations World Food Program, Swaziland (2009), http://www.wfp. org/countries/swaziland. 3 Christian Potholm, Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 1; also see D. Hugh Gillis, The Kingdom of Swaziland: Studies in Political History (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999). 4 Hilda Kuper, Sobhuza II: Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland. The Story of an Hereditary Ruler and His Country (London: Duckworth, 1973), 223. 5 Joshua Bheki Mzizi, Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland (Johannesburg: EISA, 2006), 2. 6 Khabele Matlosa, “Democracy and Conflict in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Dilemmas of Social Change in Small States,” International Affairs 74, no. 2 (1998): 319–37, 320. 7 Hugh MacMillan, “Swaziland: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 2009, 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 1150–69: 1151. 8 Alan R. Booth, Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 77.

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9 Sabelo Gumedze, “Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Swaziland,” African Human Rights and Law Journal 5, no. 2 (2005): 266–86, 269. 10 MacMillan, “Swaziland: Recent History,” 1151. 11 Gumedze, “Human Rights.” 12 Also see Pieter Esterhuysen, “The Legacy of Sobhuza II,” Africa Insight 14, no. 1 (1984): 5–13; Hugh MacMillan, “Swaziland: Decolonisation and the Triumph of ‘Tradition’,” Journal of Modern African Studies 23, no. 4 (1985), 643–66. 13 Also see Esterhuysen, “The Legacy of Sobhuza II.” 14 Booth, Swaziland: Tradition and Change, 79. 15 Interview with an insider, Swaziland, April 2009. 16 Economist, “A King at Bay,” 30 July 2011. 17 Interview, Swaziland, April 2009. 18 United States State Department, Background Note: Swaziland, http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2841.htm. 19 Donald L. Sparks, “Swaziland: Economy,” in Africa South of the Sahara, 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 1156–61: 1156. 20 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 21 See e.g., Sparks, “Swaziland: Economy,” 1156. 22 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2008. 23 Speech by His Majesty King Mswati III during the Official Opening of the First Session of the Ninth Parliament, 2009. 24 International Labour Organization, Swaziland, http://www.ilo.org/public/ english/employment/ent/coop/africa/countries/southafrica/swaziland.htm. 25 United Nations World Food Program, Swaziland. 26 King Mswati III, First Session of the Ninth Parliament; and Government’s Programme of Action 2008–2013, presented by Prime Minister Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini. 27 Figures from the IMF as reprinted in Sparks, “Swaziland: Economy,” 1162. 28 Economist, “A King at Bay.” 29 Gumedze, “Human Rights.” 30 Kingdom of Swaziland, Constitution of Swaziland, http://www.gov.sz/. Tinkhundla (singular Inkhundla) are the units Swaziland is divided into politically. There are 55 Tinkhundla and each Inkhundla sends one representative to the national parliament. 31 Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries (2010), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010. 32 Ko Adinkrah, “‘We shall take our Case to the King’: Legitimacy and Tradition in the Administration of Law in Swaziland,” Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 14, no. 2 (1991): 226–39, 227. 33 Interview with a diplomat, spring 2009. 34 See Harris Protor, “Traditionalism and Parliamentary Government in Swaziland,” African Affairs 72, no. 288 (1973): 273–85, 273. 35 Also see MacMillan, “Swaziland: Decolonisation and the Triumph of ‘Tradition’,” 644; and Constitution of Swaziland, Articles 64(1), 106(a), and 140–41. 36 Interviews in South Africa and Swaziland, February–April 2009. 37 Ibid. 38 Cited in Matlosa, “Democracy and Conflict,” 333. 39 Business Day, “Royal Dictatorship,” 4 November 2002. 40 Interview, Swaziland, April 2009.

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41 Ibid. 42 An interviewee used this phrase as a synonym for traditional rulers in Swaziland. 43 Also see Louise Redvers, “Swaziland faces Fiscal Crisis: IMF,” Mail & Guardian, 28 January 2011; and interviews, Swaziland, April 2009. 44 Interview in South Africa, February 2009. 45 See Jean-Jacques Cornish, “Mswati emulates Mugabe,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 2 March 2006. 46 African Research Bulletin, “King Muzzles Critics,” 1–30 June 2001: 14443C-14444A. 47 The Times of Swaziland, 16 February 1989, quoted in Adinkrah, “We shall take our Case to the King.” 48 Anonymous interview, Swaziland, April 2009. 49 Interview with an official of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, Manzini, 14 April 2009. 50 Interview with John Makumbe, Harare, 24 February 2009. 51 Barry Bearak, “Living Royally in Destitute Swaziland,” New York Times, 6 September 2008. 52 Interviews, Pretoria and Swaziland, March–April 2009. 53 Jean-Jacques Cornish, “Not all the Swazi King’s Men,” Weekly Mail & Guardian, 30 October 2003. 54 Mzizi, Political Movements and the Challenges, 41. 55 King Mswati III, First Session of the Ninth Parliament. 56 Government’s Programme of Action 2008–2013. 57 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 58 Interview with a high-ranking Swazi politician, Mbabane, April 2009. 59 See e.g., MacMillan, “Swaziland: Recent History,” 1155; and anonymous interviews. 60 Also see Jack Halpern, South Africa’s Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); Robert I. Rotberg, “Introduction: South Africa in Its Region – Hegemony and Vulnerability,” in South Africa and Its Neighbors. Regional Security and Self-Interest, ed. Robert I Rotberg, Henry S. Bienen, Robert Legvold, Gavin G. Massdorp (Lexington Books: Lexington, 1985), 1–12. 61 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 62 Interview with a Swazi academic, Swaziland, April 2009. 63 Tor Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970–1990 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002); Jeremy Gording, Zuma: A Biography (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2007); and Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009, updated international edition). 64 Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress 1912–1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation, 637. 65 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 66 Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation, 639. 67 Bongani Masuku, “A Long-Standing Bond,” Mail & Guardian, 17 August 2006. 68 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume Two (1998): 21, 97.

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69 MacMillan, “Swaziland: Recent History,” 1155. 70 David Robbins, “The South African Land Deal,” Africa Report 1, no. 6 (1982): 18–22, 19. 71 Interview with a senior official, Swaziiland, April 2009. 72 Interview with a think tank representative, Pretoria, 2009. 73 Interview with a Swazi academic, Swaziland, April 2009. 74 Masuku, “A Long-Standing Bond.” 75 MacMillan, “Swaziland: Recent History,” 1155. 76 Pretoria News, “Mbeki skips King Mswati’s Birthday Celebration,” 8 September 2008. 77 Wilson Johwa, “Boycott will target Mugabe, Mswati,” Business Day, 13 August 2008. 78 African National Congress, 51st National Conference: Resolutions, Stellenbosch, 20 December 2002. 79 Bhekie Matsebula, “Zuma assures Swaziland that SA won’t interfere,” The Star, 22 February 2001. 80 Interview with a high-ranking politician, Mbabane, April 2009. 81 Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim, Pretoria, 24 April 2009. 82 Interview, Swaziland, April 2009. 83 Halpern, South Africa’s Hostages. 84 Musa Ndlangamandla, “Victory for King Mswati III,” The Times of Swaziland, 23 July 2008. 85 The SADC Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security is the SADC’s organ for discussing security questions. 86 Wilson Johwa, “Zimbabwe casts Shadow over SADC Summit,” Business Day, 16 August 2008. 87 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 88 Ibid. 89 Interview, Manzini, 15 April 2009. 90 The Times of Swaziland, 24–27 March 2009. 91 Interview with an insider, South Africa, April 2009. 92 See e.g., Commonwealth Secretariat, Swaziland National Elections 19 September 2008: Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team. 93 See e.g., EISA, EISA Election Observer Mission Report Swaziland: House of Assembly Election 19 September 2008 (Johannesburg: EISA, 2008). 94 Several interviews in Ethiopia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, November 2008, February–April 2009. 95 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 96 Ibid. 97 Interviews in South Africa, February–May 2009. 98 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 99 Interview, Mbabane, April 2009. 100 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 101 Ibid. 102 Interview with a Swazi diplomat, November 2008. 103 Interview in Swaziland, April 2009. 104 Interview with a senior official, Swaziland, April 2009. 105 Interview with a former high-ranking politician, Mbabane, April 2009. 106 Interview, Swaziland, April 2009. 107 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008.

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108 Interview with an official of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, Manzini, 14 April 2009. 109 Constitution of Swaziland, Section 11. 110 Interview in Swaziland, April 2009. 111 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 4 Algeria 1 William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 15. 2 Richard I. Lawless, “Algeria: History,” in The Middle East and North Africa 2009, 55th edition, ed. Lucy Dean (London: Routledge, 2009), 186–215: 186–87. 3 Lawless, “Algeria: History,” 187. 4 Also see Thomas DeGeorges, “The Shifting Sands of Revolutionary Legitimacy: The Role of Former Mu-ja-hidı-n in the Shaping of Algeria’s Collective Memory,” Journal of North African Studies 14, no. 2 (2009): 273–88, 276. 5 Mahfoud Kaddache, L’Algérie des Algériens de la Préhistoire à 1954 (Alger: EDIF 2000, 2003), 751. 6 Kahina Amal Djiar, “Symbolism and Memory in Architecture: Algerian Anti-Colonial Resistance and the Algiers Casbah,” Journal of North African Studies 14, no. 2 (2009): 185–202, 190. 7 Frank Renken, “Kleine Geschichte des Algerienkrieges,” in Trauma Algerienkrieg: Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts, ed. Christiane Kohser-Spohn and Frank Renken (Frankfurt: Campus, 2006), 25–54: 29; and Benjamin Stora, Histoire de la Guerre d’Algérie 1954–1962 (Paris: La Découverte, 2006). 8 Djiar, “Symbolism and Memory,” 197. 9 Renken, “Kleine Geschichte des Algerienkrieges,” 83. 10 Ibid., 49. 11 Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets, 19. 12 Ibid., 21. 13 Werner Ruf, “Die Erinnerung an den nationalen Befreiungskampf zwischen Staatsdoktrin und Widerspruch,” in Trauma Algerienkrieg: Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts, ed. Christiane Kohser-Spohn and Frank Renken (Frankfurt: Campus, 2006) 143–52, 152. 14 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); and DeGeorges, “The Shifting Sands of Revolutionary Legitimacy,” 273–88. 15 Interview with a senior Algerian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2010. Also see Robert Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution,” Journal of Modern African Studies 8, no. 3 (1970): 363–87, 371–72. 16 Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets, 40. 17 William B. Quandt, “Algeria’s Transition to What?,” Journal of Northern African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004): 82–92, 83. 18 Werner Herzog, Algerien: Zwischen Demokratie und Gottesstaat (München: C.H. Beck, 1995), 94. 19 Youcef Bouandel, “Algeria’s Presidential Election of April 2004: A Backward Step in the Democratisation Process or a forward Step towards Stability?,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 8 (2004), 1525–40, 1527.

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20 Bouandel, “Algeria’s Presidential Election of April 2004,” 1529. 21 Lawless, “Algeria: History,” 198. 22 Ahmed Aghrout, “Policy Reforms in Algeria: Genuine Change or Adjustments?,” in North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, ed. Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández (London: Routledge, 2008), 31–52, 36. 23 Bouandel, “Algeria’s Presidential Election of April 2004,” 1536. 24 Aghout, “The Presidential Election in Algeria, April 2009,” 179. 25 Also see Smita A. Rahman, “The Presence of the Past: Negotiating the Politics of Collective Memory,” Contemporary Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 59–76, 67. 26 James McDougall, “Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 117–31, 124. 27 People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Constitution de 1996, http:// www.elmouradia.dz/francais/symbole/textes/symbolefr.htm. 28 Ibid., Art 73. 29 Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 196. 30 DeGeorges, “The Shifting Sands of Revolutionary Legitimacy,” 272. 31 Ibid., 273. 32 APRM National Focal Point Algeria, Report on the Implementation of the National Action Programme on Governance, Algier, November 2008. 33 Office National des Statistiques, Population et Démographie, http://www. ons.dz/-Population-et-Demographie-.html. 34 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 35 The definition of Africa is not quite clear in the official figures. However, as the Maghreb region and the Arab countries are listed separately in the data, it is assumed that “Africa” refers to sub-Saharan Africa. Ministere des Finances, Statistique du Commerce exterieur de l’Algerie (Période: Premier trimestre 2010), http://www.douane.gov.dz/rappstat_fichiers/trim2010.pdf. 36 Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche and Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Maghreb: Social, Political, and Economic Developments,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 6, no. 1–3 (2007): 261–90, 261. 37 Ahmed Aghrout, From Preferential Status to Partnership: The Euro-Maghreb Relationship (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Cherif Begga and Kamel Abid, “Euro-Algerian Relationship: A Review of its Development,” in Algeria in Transition: Reforms and Development Prospects, ed. Ahmed Aghrout and Redha M. Bougherira (London: Routledge, 2004), 73–86; and Philipp Reichmuth, “Algerien,” in Die Außenpolitik der Staaten Afrikas: Ein Handbuch: Ägypten bis Zentralafrikanische Republik, ed. Wolfgang Gieler (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 42–55. 38 European Union, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, 22 April 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes& treatyTransId = 1241. 39 European Union Commission, Algeria, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creatingopportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/algeria/. 40 Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, 153.

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41 Sonatrach, Sonatrach en bref … , http://www.sonatrach-dz.com/NEW/ V_English/presentation.html. 42 See e.g., Joachim Wille, “Die Sonne geht auf; Firma für das SaharastromProjekt in München gegründet,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 31 October 2009. 43 Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets; Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002 (London: Verso, 2003); Bouandel, “Algeria’s Presidential Election of April 2004”; Mohammed Akacem, “The Role of External Actors in Algeria’s Transition,” Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004): 153–68; and Robert Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria: The ‘Bouteflika Effect’,” Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 155–71. 44 Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria,” 155–71. 45 Ibid., 158; and Quandt, “Algeria’s Transition to What?,” 84. 46 Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations, 1992 to the Present,” in Algeria in Transition: Reforms and Development Prospects, ed. Ahmed Aghrout and Redha M. Bougherira (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 151–82, 163. 47 Ibid., 165. 48 Lawless, “Algeria: History,” 202. 49 Robert P. Parks, “An Unexpected Mandate? The April 8, 2004 Algerian Presidential Elections,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 1 (2005): 98–106, 99. 50 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Algeria 2008 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), 6. 51 France 24, “Algeria: A President for Life?,” 14 November 2008. 52 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 195. 53 People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Constitution de 1996, Art 101. 54 See Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets, 128. 55 Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets; Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002; Bouandel, “Algeria’s Presidential Election of April 2004”; Akacem, “The Role of External Actors in Algeria’s Transition”; and Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria.” 56 Herzog, Algerien: Zwischen Demokratie und Gottesstaat, 118. 57 Kada Akacem, “Economic Reforms in Algeria: An Overview and Assessment,” in Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004): 115–25, 154. 58 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics; Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria,” 158; also see Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Algeria 2008; and Ahmed Aghrout, “Policy Reforms in Algeria: Genuine Change or Adjustments?,” in North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, ed. Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández (London: Routledge, 2008), 31–52. 59 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 193. 60 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Algeria 2008, 6. 61 See Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria.” 62 Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002. 63 Aidan Lewis, “Profile: Abdelaziz Bouteflika,” BBC News online, 10 April 2009. 64 Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics, 192. 65 Hugh Roberts, Written Evidence Submitted by Dr Hugh Roberts: Political Issues and Development in Algeria, United Kingdom, House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2005. 66 People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Constitution de 1996, Art 77, 3.

206 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94 95 96 97 98

Notes Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 48. Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria,” 156. Ibid., 159. Lewis, “Profile: Abdelaziz Bouteflika.” Also see Robert Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 209–10. Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations”; Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria”; Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 48; and interview with an AU official, Addis Ababa. Also see Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 48; and interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years, 209. Ibid., 209. Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations,” 169–70. Ibid., 169–70; Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Resurgence of Algeria’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of North African Studies 9, no. 2 (2004): 169–83; Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria”; and Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 48. See Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 166. Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 1. Robert Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution,” 365. Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa Conference, Statement by Ahmed Ben Bella, Addis Ababa, 24 May 1963, CIAS/GEN/INF/27. Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 228. Also see Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution,” 373–74. Also see Walraven, Dreams of Power, 238–58. Robert Mortimer, “Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: The Algerian Model,” African Studies Review 27, no. 1 (1984): 1–22, 9; Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 230–31; and Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution.” Interview with a senior Algerian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2010. Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, 159. Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 228–29; also see Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution,” 363–64. Ibid., 151. Interviews, Addis Ababa, March 2010. Stora, Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History, 135–36; Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 223. Patricia Berko Wild, “The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian– Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States,” International Organization 20, no. 1 (1966): 18–36, 25–36. Ibid., 18, 35–36. Walraven, Dreams of Power, 295. Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 223. Stora, Algeria 1830–2000, 161. Walraven, Dreams of Power, 258.

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99 Ibid., 263. 100 See Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Geopolitics of the Western Sahara Conflict,” in North Africa in Transition, State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s, ed. Yahia H. Zoubir (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 195–211, 198. 101 Also see Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy 14, no. 4 (2007): 158–77, 160. 102 Interview with an Algerian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2009. 103 Ruf, “Die Erinnerung an den nationalen Befreiungskampf,” 151. 104 Organization of African Unity, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted at Algiers, 14 July 1999. 105 Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 50. 106 Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations,” 172; and Lawless, “Algeria: History,” 202. 107 Stone, The Agony of Algeria; Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations”; and Reichmuth, “Algerien.” 108 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 109 Lawless, “Algeria: History,” 210. 110 Ibid.; and Reichmuth, “Algerien” 111 Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations,” 169. 112 See Reichmuth, “Algerien,” 52. 113 Mortimer, “Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: The Algerian Model,” 9. 114 Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa Conference, Statement by Ahmed Ben Bella. 115 Ibid.; also see APRM Country Report No. 5: Algeria (Midrand: APRM Secretariat, 2007), para 65. 116 Also see New York Times, “Eritreans and Ethiopians Sign Treaty to End Their Border War,” 13 December 2000. 117 Timothy Murithi and Charles Mwaura, “The Panel of the Wise,” in Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, ed. Ulf Engel and Joao Gomes Porto (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 77–91. 118 Mélanie Matarese, “Union africaine: Les Raisons d’un blocage,” El Watan, 1 July 2007. 119 Interviews, Addis Ababa, November 2008 and March–April 2010. 120 Interview with an Algerian official, Addis Ababa. 121 Interview with an APRM insider, South Africa, March 2009. 122 Reichmuth, “Algerien.” 123 Akacem, “Economic Reforms in Algeria: An Overview and Assessment,” 115–25. 124 Interviews, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 125 Mouloud Boumghar, The APRM in Algeria: A Critical Assessment (Johannesburg: African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, 2009), 1. 126 APRM Country Report No. 5: Algeria, para 31. 127 Ibid., para 15–40. 128 Boumghar, The APRM in Algeria, 38. 129 Ibid., 21. 130 Ibid., 10.

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131 Ibid., 20. 132 Interview with an APRM insider, South Africa, spring 2009. 133 Djamel Zerrouk, “Mission africaine pour la bonne gouvernance,” El Watan, 2 December 2006. 134 Interview with an APRM insider, South Africa, spring 2009. 135 Interview with a senior Algerian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 136 African Union Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, Addis Ababa, 18 July 2007, PSC/PR/2/LXXX. 137 Mortimer, “The Algerian Revolution,” 373–74. 138 Interview with a senior Algerian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 139 Matarese, “Union africaine.” 140 Also see Mortimer, “State and Army in Algeria.” 141 Zoubir, “The Dialectics of Algeria’s Foreign Relations,” 166. 5 Ethiopia 1 Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa (London: Heinemann: 1984), xiv. 2 Also see Christopher Clapham, Haile-Selassie’s Government (New York: Praeger, 1970), 9. 3 Ethiopia has its own calendar system with 13 months. However, this chapter uses the Gregorian calendar to make the analysis consistent with the other dates used throughout this study. 4 Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 13. 5 Ibid., 14–15. 6 Ibid., 15. 7 Conrad Ulm-Erbach, Äthiopiens Beitrag zur Gründung der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit: Eine Studie zur Rezeption des Panafrikanismus in die afrikanische Politik und Anpassung Äthiopiens an diese Entwicklung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1974), 81. 8 Wubneh and Abate, Ethiopia: Transition and Development, 21. 9 Ulm-Erbach, Äthiopiens Beitrag zur Gründung der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit, 20. 10 Also see Peter Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 11–20. 11 Christopher Clapham, “The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in African Foreign Policies, ed. Stephen Wright (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 84. 12 Jennifer Parmelee, “Ethiopia Ready to Try Officials Who Carried Out ‘Red Terror’,” Washington Post, 28 October 1994. 13 Paul B. Henze, Ethiopia in Mengistu’s Final Years: The Derg in Decline (Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2007), 34–35. 14 Terrence Lyons, “The Ethiopian–Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa,” Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 120 (2009): 167–80, 167–68. 15 Several interviews and encounters with Ethiopians and non-Ethiopians in Ethiopia. 16 Interview with Ahmed Hassen, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2010. 17 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008.

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18 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 19 Kjetil Tronvoll, “Ambiguous Elections: The Influence of Non-Electoral Politics in Ethiopian Democratisation,” Journal of Modern African Studies 47, no. 3 (2009): 449–74, 461. 20 Economist, “Investing in Ethiopia,” 12 May 2012. 21 US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Ethiopia, www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html. 22 Interviews, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 23 US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Ethiopia. 24 Belachew Gebrewold, “Ethiopian Nationalism: An Ideology to Transcend All Odds,” Africa Spectrum 44, no. 1 (2009): 79–97, 80. 25 Interview with Ethiopian government officials, Addis Ababa, February– March 2010. 26 Ibid. 27 Interview with Bereket Simon, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2010. 28 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, About Us—Our Mission and Vision, http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i d=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=1. 29 African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012 (Programme of Yaounde), Addis Ababa, May 2009, 7. 30 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, About Us—Our Mission and Vision. 31 COMESA, About COMESA: Vision and Mission, http://about.comesa.int/ lang-en/overview/vision. 32 African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012, 7, 16. 33 Ibid., 31. 34 Also see Luwam Dirar, “Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Countries: Multiplicity of Membership Issues and Choices,” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 18, no. 2 (2010): 217–32. 35 Interview with a senior politician, Mauritius, November 2009. 36 Jaindi Kisero, “Trade Disputes Between Comesa Countries and Overlapping Membership spell Double Trouble,” The East African, 18 October 2010. 37 Jon Abbink, “The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile ‘Social Contract’,” Africa Spectrum 44, no. 2 (2009): 3–28, 24. 38 Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings—Independent Countries (2010), www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010. 39 Freedom House, Map of Press Freedom: Algeria (2009), www.freedomho use.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009; and Abbink, “The Ethiopian Second Republic.” 40 Interview with an Ethiopian intellectual, Addis Ababa, February 2010; also see Abbink, “The Ethiopian Second Republic.” 41 Based on encounters with Ethiopians from all walks of life, November 2008 and February–March 2010. 42 BBC News Online, “Ethiopian Protesters ‘massacred’,” 19 October 2006; also see Tronvoll, “Ambiguous Elections,” 458. 43 Alex Perry, “Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi,” Time. com, 6 September 2007.

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44 Tronvoll, “Ambiguous Elections”; and European Union, European Union Election Observation Mission to Ethiopia 2010: House of Peoples’ Representatives and State Council Elections, www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/ english/eueom-ethiopia-fact-sheet-of-findings-08112010_en.pdf. 45 Perry, “Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister.” 46 Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 47 Interviews with Western and Ethiopian political observers, Addis Ababa, November 2008 and February–March 2010. 48 Abbink, “The Ethiopian Second Republic,” 16. 49 Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 50 Interview with an Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 51 Also see Clapham, “The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 185. 52 Interviews with Western and Ethiopian political observers and analysts, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 53 Interview with Bereket Simon. 54 Also see Fortune, “The Veterans are leaving!,” 7 March 2010. 55 Perry, “Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister.” 56 Peter Biles, “Profile: Ethiopian leader Meles Zenawi,” BBC World Service, 8 June 2005. 57 Economist, “The Two Sides of Meles Zenawi,” 15 August 2009. 58 Clapham, “The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 189. 59 Interview with an APRM insider, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 60 Interview with an unnamed Ethiopian journalist. 61 Ibid. 62 Anonymous interview. 63 Economist, “The Two Sides of Meles Zenawi.” 64 Interview with Beyene Petros, Addis Ababa, 4 March 2010. 65 Clapham, “The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 184. 66 Ibid., 184. 67 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, www.ethiopiafirst.com/Election2008/Con stitution.pdf; Art. 86. 68 Organization of African Unity, OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963, Art. 3. 69 Leenco Lata, “The Ethiopia–Eritrea War,” Review of African Political Economy 30, no. 97 (2003): 369–88, 375. 70 United Nations, Weekly Round-Up—IRINHA-132: 21-Mar-03, http://idh. cidi.org:8080/humanitarian/irin/hafrica/03a/ixl11.html. 71 Human Rights Watch, The Horn of Africa War, www.hrw.org/en/node/ 12364/section/1. 72 Thomas Ofcansky, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Cry Havoc! Background to War,” in Africa Contemporary Record, ed. Colin Legum (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 2004), A3–A15, A10; Organization of African Unity, The Dispute Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ouagadougou, 8–10, June 1998, AHG/Dec.130 (XXXIV). 73 Interview with an OAU/AU staff member, Addis Ababa. 74 As Sudan had not formally split at the time of writing, Sudan here refers to the entire country. 75 BBC World News, Hard Talk, 9 April 2009. 76 Interviews in Addis Ababa, February 2010.

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77 Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1985); Volker Matthies, “Der Ogadenkrieg zwischen Somalia und Äthiopien von 1977/78: Ursachen, Verlauf, Folgen,” Africa Spectrum 22, no. 3 (1987): 237–53; and Gebru Tareke, “The Ethiopia–Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 635–67. 78 Interview with Ethiopian government officials. 79 Ken Menkhaus, “Zum Verständnis des Staatsversagens in Somalia: interne und externe Dimensionen,” in Somalia: Alte Konflikte und neue Chancen zur Staatsbildung, ed. Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008), 32–57: 48. 80 Interview with an Ethiopian government official. 81 Ofcansky, “Ethiopia: The Last Emperor,” in Africa Contemporary Record 1998–2000, ed. Colin Legum (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 2004), B 426–B 443, B 437. 82 Interview, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 83 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2008: Ethiopia (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), 14. 84 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Situation in Libya, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2011, PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI). 85 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Ethiopia Hits Somali Targets, Declaring War,” New York Times, 25 December 2006. 86 Perry, “Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister.” 87 Rosemary Righter, “At Last, a Glimmer of Hope for Somalia,” The Times, 4 January 2007. 88 Perry, “Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister.” 89 Interviews with Ethiopian government officials, Addis Ababa, February– March 2010. 90 Interview, Addis Ababa, March 2010. This claim could not be verified. 91 Interview with Bereket Simon. 92 Interview with Ahmed Hassen. 93 Interview with Tamrat Kabede, Addis Ababa, 25 February 2010. 94 Gettleman, “Ethiopia Hits Somali Targets.” 95 Interview with Bereket Simon. 96 Interview with Beyene Petros. 97 Ofcansky, “Ethiopia: The Last Emperor,” B 437. 98 Christopher Clapham, “Post-war Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis,” Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 120 (2009): 181–92, 189. 99 David A. Fahrenthold and Kenneth W. Smith Jr., “How Nations Big and Small fared with their Goals in Copenhagen,” Washington Post, 19 December 2009; also see Martin Welz, “The African Union beyond Africa: The Limits of Africa’s Continental Organisation,” Paper presented at the KFG Workshop Regional Organisations as Global Players. Active = Influential?, Berlin, October 2011. 100 Mengiste Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History (Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2007), 36. 101 Ibid., 49. 102 Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787 (London: Routledge, 2003); also

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103 104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

134

Notes see Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness. Ethiopia and Fascist Italy 1935–1941 (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1997), 318–20. Hanspeter Frank Strauch, Panafrika: Kontinentale Weltmacht im Werden? Anfänge, Wachstum und Zukunft der afrikanischen Einigungsbestrebungen (Zürich: Atlantis-Verlag, 1964), 131. Also see Mazrui and Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa, 29–30. Ulm-Erbach, Äthiopiens Beitrag zur Gründung der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit, 97. Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History. Time Magazine, 6 January 1936. Walraven, Dreams of Power. See e.g., Ulm-Erbach, Äthiopiens Beitrag zur Gründung der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit; Berekt Habte Selassie, “The OAU and Regional Conflicts: Focus on the Eritrean War,” Africa Today 35, no. 3/4 (1988): 61–67; Walraven, Dreams of Power; and Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History. Speech printed in Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History, 155. Selassie, “The OAU and Regional Conflicts,” 64. Clapham, “The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 86. Selassie, “The OAU and Regional Conflicts,” 64. Wubneh and Abate, Ethiopia: Transition and Development, 34–35; and UlmErbach, Äthiopiens Beitrag zur Gründung der Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit. Zdenek Cervenka, The Organisation of African Unity and Its Charter (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 197. Wild, “The Organization of African Unity,” 25. Mazrui and Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa, 29. Anonymous interviews, Addis Ababa, March–April 2010. Based on various encounters with Ethiopians in Addis Ababa and other parts of Ethiopia, November 2007 and February–March 2010. Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History, 19–20. Interview with Bereket Simon. Interview with a government official, Addis Ababa, February 2010. Ibid. Ibid. Interviews in various African countries with insiders in the APRM, 2008–2010. Anonymous interview, Addis Ababa, February 2010. Economic Commission for Africa, ECA in the APRM: ECA’s Role, www. uneca.org/aprm/ECAsRole.asp. Ofcansky, “Ethiopia: The Last Emperor,” B 437. Interview in Addis Ababa, February 2010. Interview with an AU official, Addis Ababa, February 2010. Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History, 97. African Union, Explanatory Note on the Transfer of the Commission of the Africa Union, Addis Ababa, 6–8 July 2004, Assembly/AU/11(III) Add.3. Desta, Ethiopia’s Role in African History, 98. Despite attempts, the AU would not release the tape of the speech or a transcript of it. Only a small part of the speech was found at www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrrlZ-OxFhI; yet, there is no reason to doubt that Meles delivered this speech, as many different sources reported concurrently about this speech. Interview with a government official, Addis Ababa, February 2010.

Notes

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135 Ofcansky, “Ethiopia and Eritrea,” A 6. 136 Interview with a senior African diplomat, Addis Ababa. 137 Interview with AU officials, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 6 Burkina Faso 1 Wilhelm Fischer, Ober-Volta (Bonn: Kurt Schroeder, 1962), 58. 2 Ibid. 3 Joan Baxter and Keith Somerville, “Burkina Faso,” in Benin, the Congo, Burkina Faso, ed. Bogdan Szajkowski (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 237–86, 248–49. 4 Jean Ziegler, “Eine neue Macht in Afrika,” in Burkina Faso – eine Hoffnung für Afrika? Gespräch mit Thomas Sankara, ed. Jean-Philippe Rapp and Jean Ziegler (Zürich: Rotpunktverlag, 1987), 17–44, 41. 5 J. Tyler Dickovick, “Revolutionising Local Politics? Radical Experiments in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Uganda in the 1980s,” Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 122 (2009): 519–37, 520. 6 Also see Michael Wilkins, “The Death of Thomas Sankara and the Rectification of the People’s Revolution in Burkina Faso,” African Affairs 88, no. 352 (1989): 375–88, 386; and Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 56. 7 Baxter and Somerville, “Burkina Faso,” 249. 8 “Je viens en ces lieux vous apporter le salut fraternel d’un pays de 274000 km2, où sept millions d’enfants, de femmes et d’hommes, refusent désormais de mourir d’ignorance, de faim, de soif, tout en n’arrivant pas à vivre véritablement depuis un quart de siècle d’existence comme Etat souverain, siégeant à l’ONU,” Thomas Sankara, 4 October 1984. 9 Dickovick, “Revolutionising Local Politics?” 10 Englebert, Burkina Faso, 60–61. 11 Ofwono-Opondo and Odrek Rwabwogo, “Compaore Admits Role in Sankara Coup,” New Vision, 1 May 1998. 12 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007), 5. 13 Englebert, Burkina Faso, 156. 14 APRM Country Report No. 9: Burkina Faso (Midrand: APRM Secretariat, 2009), para 87. 15 Baxter and Somerville, “Burkina Faso,” 253. 16 Also see Wilkins, “The Death of Thomas Sankara,” 386–88. 17 Dickovick, “Revolutionising Local Politics?,” 529. 18 APRM Country Report No. 9: Burkina Faso, para 87. 19 Tagesschau.de, “Der Che Guevara Afrika,” www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ afrikaafrika148.html. 20 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 21. 21 Sten Hagberg, “‘Enough Is Enough’: An Ethnography of the Struggle against Impunity in Burkina Faso,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 217–46, 228. 22 Koni Benson, “Sankara, President who put People before Profits,” Cape Times, 15 October 2007. 23 Englebert, Burkina Faso, 66.

214

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24 Katharine Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 2009 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 126–31, 127. 25 Ernest Harsch, “Trop, c’est trop! Civil Insurgence in Burkina Faso, 1998–99,” Review of African Political Economy 26, no. 81 (1999): 395–406, 395–97. 26 Hagberg, “‘Enough Is Enough’,” 225. 27 Ibid., 224. 28 Ibid., 219. 29 Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 128. 30 Carlos Santiso and Augustin Loada, “Explaining the Unexpected: Electoral Reform and Democratic Governance in Burkina Faso,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 395–419, 401. 31 Bruno Jaffré, “Zongo Affair shakes Burkina Faso,” Le Monde diplomatique, August 1999. 32 Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 129. 33 Economist, “From Captain to Conciliator,” 27 November 2010. 34 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report, 5. 35 Hagberg, “‘Enough Is Enough’,” 243. 36 Economist, “From Captain to Conciliator.” 37 Joel W. Gregory, “Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Migration in Upper Volta,” in The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development, ed. Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 2009), 73–94, 75. 38 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 39 Institute National de la Statistique et de la Démographie, Annuaire Statistique 2008, 26. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., 125. 44 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso, 11. 45 Gregory, “Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Migration in Upper Volta,” 79. 46 Baxter and Somerville, “Burkina Faso,” 237–86. 47 Economist, “A Canny Chameleon,” 21 March 2009. 48 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report, 14. 49 Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 50 Jan Cernicky, Regionale Integration in Westafrika: Eine Analyse der Funktionsweise von ECOWAS und UEMOA (Bonn: Scientia Bonnensis, 2008), 88. 51 Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa. 52 Santiso and Loada, “Explaining the Unexpected,” 416. 53 Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 129. 54 Also see Sabine Luning, “Burkina Faso,” Africa Yearbook Volume 3: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2006, ed. Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 61–67: 65. 55 Freedom House, Map of Press Freedom: Burkina Faso (2009), www.freed omhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009. 56 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso, 7.

Notes 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93

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Hagberg, “‘Enough Is Enough’,” 225. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report, 7. APRM Country Report No. 9: Burkina Faso, para 3.7. Republic of Burkina Faso, Constitution, www.an.bf/textesfondamentaux/ constitution-bf.pdf, Art 36. Ibid., Art. 52. Ibid., Art. 50 Santiso and Loada, “Explaining the Unexpected,” 396. Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa, November 2008. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et de la Cooperation Regionale, Les Missions Diplomatiques et Consulaires du Burkina Faso, www.mae.gov.bf/ missions%20diplomatiques%20du%20burkina.htm. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report, 7. Ibid., 6. Luning, “Burkina Faso,” 63–64. Ibid., 64. Economist, “A Canny Chameleon.” Englebert, Burkina Faso, 62. Shalo Mbatha, “Burkina Picks up the Pieces,” City Press, 2 May 2004. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso, 9; also see Gian-Andrea Monsch, Der Klient und sein Patron – oder warum man in Burkina Faso wählen geht, CIS Working Paper 37 (Zürich: Center for Comparative and International Studies, 2008). Tita Gaehme, “Der Preis der Unbestechlichkeit – Thomas Sankara, Freiheitsmythos in Afrika,” Deutschlandfunk, 9 October 2007. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso, 9. Economist, “A Canny Chameleon.” Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. Shalo Mbatha, “Burkina Picks up the Pieces.” Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. Luning, “Burkina Faso,” 64. Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 130. Economist, “From Captain to Conciliator.” Englebert, Burkina Faso, 157, 160–62. Walraven, Dreams of Power, 262. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara,” 168. Also see Douglas Farah, “African Pillagers,” Washington Post, 23 April 2006. See Englebert, Burkina Faso, 158–60. Harsch, “Trop, c’est trop!,” United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, New York, December 2000; and Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History.” Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 130. Le Parisien, “Gbagbo finira comme Milosevic,” 21 January 2003. Murison, “Burkina Faso: Recent History,” 130. The Vanguard, “Gbagbo’s Supporters Reject Compaore’s Inclusion in AU Panel,” 3 February 2011. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Burkina Faso Country Report, 23.

216

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94 Englebert, Burkina Faso, 152–53. 95 Cernicky, Regionale Integration in West Africa, 105. 96 Also see The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2007: Burkina Faso, 11. 97 Santiso and Loada, “Explaining the Unexpected,” 403. 98 Interview, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 99 African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012 (Programme of Yaounde), Addis Ababa, May 2009, 7. 100 ECOWAS, Treaty of ECOWAS, www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php? id=treaty&lang=en, Art. 3. 101 Ibid., Art. 4 e. 102 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Christof Hartmann, “ECOWAS’ Contribution to Regional Political Order in West Africa,” Die Friedens-Warte 85, no. 1–2 (2010): 177–97. 103 ECOWAS, Treaty of ECOWAS, Art. 4. 104 Interview, Addis Ababa, February 2009. 105 Anonymous interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 106 Christiane Gans, Die ECOWAS: Wirtschaftsintegration in West Afrika (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 208. 107 African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012. 108 Cernicky, Regionale Integration in Westafrika. 109 Baxter and Somerville, “Burkina Faso,” 282. 110 Englebert, Burkina Faso, 158. 111 Interviews, Addis Ababa. 112 Republic of Burkina Faso, Constitution, Art. 146. 113 Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa, March 2010. 114 Interview with a person involved in the program, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 115 GTZ, From Barriers to Bridges: German African Border Project (GABP) Supporting the African Union Border Programme, www.auswaertiges-amt. de/cae/servlet/contentblob/340666/publicationFile/3720/GTZ-GABP-Brosch uere.pdf. 116 Julien K. Natielsé, The APRM Process in Burkina Faso (Johannesburg: African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, 2009), 20. 117 Ibid., 21. 118 Ibid., 20. 119 Interview with an African diplomat, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 120 Interview with a senior AU official, Addis Ababa. 121 Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa. 122 Interviews with AU officials and close observers. 123 Kassim Mohammed Khamis, Promoting the African Union (Washington, DC: Lilian Barber Press, 2008), 69. 124 Interview with a diplomat from Burkina Faso, Addis Ababa. 125 Hans Pienaar, “African Leaders Agree on Slow Road to USA,” Pretoria News, 5 July 2007. 126 Interview with Bruno Zidouemba, Addis Ababa, 17 November 2008. 127 Interviews, Addis Ababa, November 2008 and February–March 2010. 128 Interviews, Addis Ababa. 129 Economist, “From Captain to Conciliator.”

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7 South Africa 1 International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys: World Economic Outlook Database, 2010, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ weo/2009/ 02/weodata/index.aspx. 2 Government Communication and Information System, South African Yearbook 2007/08 (Pretoria: GCIS, 2008), 1–28. 3 Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Road to Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography (London: Harper Collins, 1999); Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); James Barber, Mandela’s World: The International Dimension of South Africa’s Political Revolution 1990–99 (Oxford: James Curry, 2004); Robert Ross, A Concise History of South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Raymond Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008). 4 See e.g., Siegmar Schmidt, “Die Republik Südafrika vor dem Ende der Ära Mandela,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 27/99 (1999): 3–12; Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan, “Partner of Hegemon? South Africa in Africa,” in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy, ed. Jim Broderick, Gary Burfurd and Gordon Freer (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 55–82; Peter J. Schraeder, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance,” The Round Table 90, no. 359 (2001): 229–43; Solomon Johannes Terreblanche, A History of Inequality in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2003); Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity?,” Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 100 (2004): 283–97; Laurie Nathan, “Consistency and Inconsistencies in South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 361–72; Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy,” in In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006), 50–63; and Paul Henri Bischoff, “Reform in Defence of Sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security Council 2007–8,” Africa Spectrum 44, no. 2 (2009): 95–110. 5 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, “South Africa and the African Renaissance,” International Affairs 74, no. 2 (1998): 271–87; Pal Ahluwalia, “The Struggle for African Identity: Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance,” African and Asian Studies 1, no. 4 (2002): 265–77; Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?,” International Affairs 79, no. 4 (2003): 815–28; Elias K. Bongmba, “Reflections on Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance,” Journal of Southern African Studies 30, no. 1 (2004): 291–316; Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 249–67; and Christopher Landsberg, “South Africa and the Making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki’s ‘Progressive African Agenda’,” in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, ed. Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Christopher Landsberg (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 195–212. 6 Schraeder, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy.”

218

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7 Ibid., 230. 8 Christopher Landsberg, “Toward a Developmental Foreign Policy? Challenges for South Africa’s Diplomacy in the Second Decade of Liberation,” Social Research 72, no. 3 (2005): 723–56, 725. 9 Thomas M. Callaghy, “Introduction: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence,” in South Africa in Southern Africa: Intensifying Vortex of Violence, ed. Thomas M. Callaghy (New York: Praeger, 1983), 1–18: 1. 10 Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation. South African Foreign Policy Making (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 118–19. 11 Ross, A Concise History of South Africa, 175–76. 12 James Hamill and Donna Lee, “A Middle Power Paradox? South African Diplomacy in the Post-Apartheid Era,” International Relations 15, no. 4 (2001): 33–59; and Alden and le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy.” 13 Xolani Mbanjwa, “COPE wins Right to Name,” Pretoria News, 13 December 2008. 14 The ANC’s Philip Ginsberg in Mail & Guardian online, “What’s in a Name? COPE confident at Court Ruling,” 10 December 2008. 15 Institute for Security Studies, Curriculum Vitae: Ebrahim Ebrahim, www. issafrica.org/AF/profiles/SouthAfrica/satpaxcdrom/files/CV%20Ebrahim.pdf. 16 Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim, Pretoria, 24 April 2009. 17 Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki, 338. 18 Economist, “Disappointment,” 14 January 2012. 19 Celia W. Dugger, “South Africa Bars Dalai Lama from a Peace Conference,” New York Times, 24 March 2009. 20 Nathan, “Consistency and Inconsistencies”; also see Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” 16 October 2010. 21 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa; also see Hans-Georg Schleicher, Südafrikas neue Elite: Die Prägung der ANC-Führung durch das Exil (Hamburg, Germany: Institute für Afrika-Kunde, 2004). 22 Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki. Govan Mbeki was Thabo Mbeki’s father. He was at the forefront of the ANC in the 1950s and 1960s before he was imprisoned together with Nelson Mandela and other leaders on Robben Island in 1964. 23 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa, 88. 24 Interview, South Africa, February–April 2009. 25 The figures are based on the GDP figures provided by the World Bank. They refer to all African states including Morocco, but excluding Somalia and Zimbabwe as there are no figures available for these two. World Bank, World Development Indicators Database: World Bank, 27 September 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 26 Johan Kane-Berman and Marco Macfarlane (eds.), South African Survey 2007/2008 (Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System, 2009), 77–78. 27 Statistics South Africa, Press Statement: Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Market Prices Increased by 2,6 per cent during the Third Quarter of 2010, www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/GDP/PressStatement1.pdf. 28 Kane-Berman and Macfarlane, South African Survey 2007/2008. 29 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Distribution of Family Income – Gini Index, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

Notes

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46

47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54

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fields/2172.html; and United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” Department of Trade and Industry, South African Trade by Regions 2010, www.dti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapregi.html. Calculated using figures provided by the Department of Trade and Industry, South African Trade by Regions 2010. Ibid. Southern African Development Community, Introduction to the SADC FTA Website, www.sadc.int/fta. Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. See Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm, Art 42, 46, and 61. Ibid., Art. 86. Schmidt, “Die Republik Südafrika vor dem Ende der Ära Mandela,” 5. Siri Gloppen, South Africa: The Battle over the Constitution (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), 216. Feinstein, After the Party, 240. Economist, “A Step Backwards,” 12 February 2011. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki, 333. Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim. Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, “The ANC’s Diplomacy and International Relations,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa. Volume 2 [1970–1980], ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 615–68; and Schraeder, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” 236. Also see Julie Hearn, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 815–30; and Howard P. Lehman, “The Emergence of Civil Society Organizations in South Africa,” Journal of Public Affairs 8, no. 1/2 (2008): 115–27. Also see Martha Bridgman, “Parliament, Foreign Policy and Civil Society in South Africa,” South African Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2002): 69–74. Schraeder, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy”; and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, “Foreign Policy-Making in South Africa: Context, Actors, and Process,” in In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006), 37–49. Schraeder, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy.” Interview with Patrick Craven, Johannesburg, 17 April 2009. Cape Times, “Mbeki’s Absence from Swazi Celebrations seen by Many as a Deliberate Snub,” 8 September 2008. Nieuwkerk, “Foreign Policy-Making in South Africa”; and Alden and le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy,” 286. Statement by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane on the name change to Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DICO), 14 May 2009, www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/mash0514.html. Peter Fabricius, “New Name, Same Policy: Minister needs more than Outreach Programme to align its Foreign Policy with Human Rights,” Daily News, 20 October 2009.

220 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77

78

Notes Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” Gording, Zuma: A Biography, 295. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 301. Brendan Boyle, “Treat Bob as Vorster did Smith,” Sunday Times, 3 January 2010. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred, 322. Gording, Zuma: A Biography, 29. Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 122–32. See Department of International Relations and Co-operation, Annual Report 2008–2009, www.dfa.gov.za/department/report_2002–3/p2_32–79.pdf. Bischoff, “Reform in Defence of Sovereignty.” Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” Interviews with AU officials in Addis Ababa and government officials in other African countries. Nelson Mandela, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (1993): 86–97, 89. James Barber, “The New South African Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005): 1079–96, 1079. Anne Mugisa, “Zuma opens Tambo Leadership School,” New Vision, 26 March 2010. Africa News, “Is Zuma’s Foreign Policy a Change of Style or Substance?,” 29 December 2009. Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, on behalf of the African National Congress, on the Occasion of the Adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of “The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill 1996,” Cape Town, 8 May 1996, www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/960819_23196.htm. See Landsberg, “Toward a Developmental Foreign Policy?,” 723. Barber, “The New South African Foreign Policy,” 1089. Also see Martin Welz, “The African Union beyond Africa.” Business Day, “Zuma goes for the Jugular Abroad,” 26 August 2010. Kevin O’Grady, “Zuma in Britain,” Business Day, 3 March 2010. Hamill and Lee, “A Middle Power Paradox?”; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, “Partner of Hegemon?”; Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, “South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, ed. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 171–204; and Chris Alden and Soko Mills, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 3 (2005): 367–92. Collin Legum, “Balance of Power in Southern Africa,” in The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa, ed. York Bradshaw and Stephen N. Ndegwa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Alden and Soko, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa”; Judi Hudson, “South Africa’s Economic Expansion into Africa: Neo-Colonialism or Development,” in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, ed. Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Christopher Landsberg (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 128–49; Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner or ‘Just Another Kid on the Bloc’?,” in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, ed. Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Christopher Landsberg (Scottsville: University of

Notes

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

221

KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 92–104; and Björn Möller, Africa’s Sub-Regional Organisations: Seamless Web or Patchwork, Crisis State Research Centre: Working Paper No. 56 – Regional and Global Axes of Conflict (2009). Interview with a senior official, South Africa, February–May 2009. Landsberg, “Toward a Developmental Foreign Policy?,” 733. Barber, “The New South African Foreign Policy,” 1084. Maxi van Aardt, “A Foreign Policy to Die for: South Africa’s Response to the Nigerian Crisis,” Africa Insight 26, (1996): 108–19, 114. Jaspreet Kindra, “We Won’t Make the Same Mistake With Zimbabwe,” Mail & Guardian, 2 March 2001. African Union Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus,” Addis Ababa, 7–8 March 2005, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII). Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim. Business Day, “Zuma goes for the Jugular Abroad,” 26 August 2010. Economist, “Human Rights? What’s that?” New York Times, “South Africa invited to Join Emerging Nations Group,” 25 December 2010. State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G. Zuma, President of the Republic of South Africa, at the Joint Sitting of Parliament, 10 February 2011, www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid= 16154&tid=27985. Mwesiga Baregu, “Economic and Military Security,” in From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenge, ed. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 19–30, 21. Southern African Development Community, SADC–EC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), www.sadc.int/tifi/browse/page/316. Celia W. Dugger, “South Africa: President Zuma will Serve as Zimbabwe’s Mediator,” New York Times, 26 November 2009. International Crisis Group, Madagascar: Crisis Heating Up?, Africa Report No. 166, 18 November 2010: 16–17. Department of International Relations and Co-operation, President Zuma to host Madagascar Political Talks, 27 April 2010, www.info.gov.za/speech es/2010/10042810051002.htm. Also see Chantelle Benjamin, “Using Violence as a Voice,” Business Day, 7 July 2007. Mondli Makhanya, “Shred the Peer Review and You will trample Africa’s Best Hope,” Sunday Times, 20 May 2007. Jean-Jacques Cornish, “Thabo Skywalker vs Darth Gadaffi,” Business Day, 18 July 2002. Interviews in various African countries, November 2008–February 2010. This opinion was particularly loudly voiced in Mauritius. Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?,” 825. Interviews in various African countries, November 2008–February 2010. Also see Brendan Boyle, “Africa tells SA to fight Crime,” Sunday Times, 3 December 2006. APRM Country Report No. 4: South Africa (Midrand: APRM Secretariat, 2007), 3.23. APRM Monitor, APRM in South Africa: What Will the Final Report Say?, No. 2, September 2006: 3.

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104 Hans Pienaar, “Mbeki ‘endangering’ Africa’s Peer Review,” The Star, 7 July 2007. 105 Tumi Makgetla, “Which Peers will Mbeki listen to?,” Mail & Guardian, 1 February 2007. 106 Interview with Patrick Craven. 107 Interviews with APRM insiders, South Africa, February–April 2009. 108 Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 109 Robert Guest, The Shackled Continent: Africa’s Past, Present and Future (London: MacMillan, 2004), 228. 110 Interviews in various African countries, November 2008–March 2010. 111 Interview with an unnamed South African government official, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 112 Government Communication and Information System, South African Yearbook 2008/09 (Pretoria: GCIS, 2009), 244. 113 Ibid., 246. 114 Interview with a European diplomat, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 115 Interview with an African diplomat, Addis Ababa, February 2010. 116 Interview with Mokshanand Dowarkasing, Curepipe, 16 November 2009. 117 African Union, Summary of Discussion, First Meeting of the Committee of the Twelve Heads of State and Government on the Union Government, Arusha, 22–23 May 2008. 118 Interview, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 119 African Union, Study on an African Union Government towards the United States of Africa (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2005). 120 Interview with a South African diplomat, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 121 Interview with Michelo Hansungule, Pretoria, 20 April 2009. 122 Interview with a South African official, Addis Ababa, November 2008. 123 African Union, Summary of Discussion. 124 Interview with Patrick Craven. 125 Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim. 126 Interviews, Addis Ababa, November 2008, and Pretoria, March–April 2009. 127 Public lecture by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane at the University of Limpopo, 16 October 2009, www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/mash1016. html. 128 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011. 129 The Guardian online, “Libya Resolution: UN Security Council Air Strike Vote – as it happened,” 18 March 2011. 130 African Union, Press Release: The African Union Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya Meets in Nouakchott on 19 March 2011, Addis Ababa, 17 March 2011. 131 Interview, Addis Ababa, February–March 2010. 132 Loyiso Langeni, “Zuma in Libya to discuss how to speed up African Integration,” Business Day, 20 July 2010. 8 Uganda 1 Joshua Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 62. 2 Thomas Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 33–38.

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3 Michael Jennings, “Uganda: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 2009, 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 1227–33, 1227. 4 David B. Ottaway, “Amin Exits as Villain, Hero to the Last; Amin’s Political Demise Leaves Confusing Legacy,” Washington Post, 16 April 1979. 5 Uganda Argus, Kampala, 5 April 1971. 6 Lauri Kubuitsile, Uganda (Philadelphia: Mason Crest, 2005), 26. 7 Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica, 45. 8 Ibid., 50. 9 Also see Kubuitsile, Uganda, 28. 10 APRM Country Report No. 7, Uganda (Midrand: APRM Secretariat, 2009), xxxv. 11 Nelson Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 2 (2005): 271–96, 278. 12 Ondoga Ori Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerilla to Statesman (Kampala: Fountain Publisher, 1998); and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda (London: Macmillan, 1997). 13 Michael Barutciski, “Uganda: 1986–Present,” in Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II, Volume II, ed. Karl Derouen and Uk Heo (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2007), 791–808, 793. 14 Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 217. 15 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 16 Also see Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 46–173. 17 Sunday Vision, “I Fired Gun, Museveni Answers Besigye,” 17 May 2009. 18 Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 202. 19 The Weekly Observer, “Is Museveni a Revolutionary or Mercenary?,” 15 April 2009. 20 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2008, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 21 APRM Country Report No. 7, Uganda: xxvii. 22 See East African, “Integration Tracker,” 22 June 2009; and African Union Commission, Minimum Integration Programme 2009–2012 (Programme of Yaounde), Addis Ababa, May 2009. 23 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President’s Statements: Regional Integration will Liberate Africa from Poverty, Lusaka, 6–7 April 2009, www.mediacen tre.go.ug/details.php?catId=6&item=372. 24 Interview with an Ugandan senior official, Kampala, July 2009. 25 Interviews with members of the parliament of Uganda, Kampala, July 2009. 26 Interview with an European diplomat, Kampala, July 2009. 27 Interview with a senior government official, Kampala, July 2009. 28 Interview with a journalist, Kampala, July 2009. 29 Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries (2009), www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009. 30 Interview with an army representative, Kampala, July 2009. 31 Interview with Aaron Mukwaya, Kampala, 10 July 2009. 32 Interview with John Nagenda, Kampala, 15 July 2009. 33 Interviews, Kampala, July 2009. 34 Interview with Henry Banyenzaki, Kampala, 8 July 2009.

224

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35 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 36 Interview with Henry Banyenzaki. 37 Republic of Uganda, Constitution, www.parliament.go.ug/images/constitut ion_1995.pdf, Art. 98, 99, 111, 117. 38 Ibid. 39 Boda-Bodas are motorbikes used in Uganda for public transport. 40 Various interviews in Kampala, July 2009; also see Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 182. 41 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 42 Interview with Aaron Mukwaya. 43 Based on interviews in Kampala and Addis Ababa, November 2008– March 2009. 44 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 45 See Wafula Okumu, “The Travails and Antics of Africa’s ‘Big Men’ – How Power has corrupted African Leaders,” The Perspective, 11 April 2002. 46 Interviews in Kampala with Ugandan and European officials. 47 Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda. 48 APRM Country Report No. 7, Uganda, xxix 49 Quoted in Roger Tangri, “Politics and Presidential Term Limits in Uganda,” in Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics, ed. Roger Southhall (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2006), 175–96, 175. 50 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 51 New Vision, “I don’t need $5m to Quit – Museveni,” 30 October 2007. 52 Tabu Butagira, “2011 Elections: Museveni wins with 68,38%,” Daily Monitor, 21 February 2011. 53 Briefing paper of the Foreign Ministry, unpublished, received in July 2009. 54 Ten Points, reprinted in: Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerilla to Statesman, 245. 55 Interview with Silver Ojakol, Kampala, 6 July 2009. 56 Wolfe Braude, Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008), 81–88. 57 East African Community, Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (as amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007), Arusha, 30 November 1997. 58 Interview with an army representative, Kampala, July 2009. 59 Interview with an Ugandan official, Kampala, July 2009. 60 Interview with a senior Ugandan official, Kampala, July 2009. 61 Interview with an Ugandan parliamentarian, Kampala, 7 July 2009. 62 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 63 Ibid.; and Braude, Regional Integration in Africa. 64 COMESA–EAC–SADC, Final Communique of the Joint COMESA– EAC–SADC Heads of State and Government Tripartite Summit, Kampala, 20 October 2008. 65 See e.g., Josh Kron, “Uganda: Suspect In Bombings Says He Wanted To Kill Americans,” New York Times, 13 August 2010. 66 Also see Tangri, “Politics and Presidential Term Limits in Uganda,” 191. 67 Interview in Harare, February 2009.

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68 Also see New Vision, “‘AU to yet clear Bashir’ – Museveni,” 20 June 2009. 69 Angelo Izama, “Museveni Invites Bashir to Kampala Despite ICC Charge,” Daily Monitor, 8 July 2009. 70 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 71 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Speech delivered at the 9th Ordinary Session of the African Union Summit, Accra, 2 July 2007. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Interview with a senior official, Kampala, July 2009. 77 African Research Bulletin, African Union Summit: No Unity Agreement, 1–30 June 2007: 17145 C. 78 Interview with Aaron Mukwaya. 79 Interview with an army representative. 80 Also see Paul Collier, “Demobilisation and Insecurity in Ethiopia and Uganda: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace,” in Dismissed: Demobilisation of Former Combatants in Africa, ed. Jakkie Cilliers (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1995). 81 Interview with an European diplomat in Addis Ababa. 82 Interview with an Ugandan senior official, Kampala, July 2009. 83 Interview with Aaron Mukwaya. 84 Also see Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 27, 49. 85 Ibid. 86 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 87 Henry Mukasa, “MPs shun Africa Peer Review Meeting,” New Vision, 8 July 2009. 88 Interview with Silvia Angey Ufoyuru, Kampala, 9 July 2009. 89 Interview with a parliamentarian, Kampala, July 2009. 90 Interview with Aaron Mukwaya. 91 Interview with Henry Banyenzaki. 92 Interview with a senior official, Kampala, July 2009. 93 Interview with an unnamed member of the parliament of Uganda, July 2009. 94 Interview, Kampala, July 2009. 95 Ibid. 96 Interview with an unnamed member of the parliament of Uganda, July 2009. 97 Cyprian Musoke, “Country halts Gadaffi Meeting with Kings,” New Vision, 12 January 2009. 98 Anonymous interview, Kampala, July 2009. 99 African Union, Press Release: The African Union Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya Meets in Nouakchott on 19 March 2011, Addis Ababa, 17 March 2011. 100 East African, 16 January 2009 101 Interview with a parliamentarian, Kampala, July 2009; further interviews in Kampala, July 2009, and Addis Ababa, November 2008 and February– March 2010. 102 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Regional Integration will Liberate Africa from Poverty, www.mediacentre.go.ug/details.php?catId=6&item=372.

226

Notes

9 Mauritius 1 Auguste Toussaint, History of Mauritius (London: Macmillan Education, 1977), 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Katharine Murison, “Mauritius: Recent History,” in Africa South of the Sahara 2009, 38th edition, ed. Iain Frame (London: Routledge, 2009), 770–74, 770. 4 John Addison and Kissoonsingh Hazareesingh, A New History of Mauritius (Rose Hill: Edition de l’Ocean Indien, 1999), 94. 5 Toussaint, History of Mauritius, 89–91. 6 Interview with Sadasivam Reddi, Port Louis, 13 November 2009. 7 Toussaint, History of Mauritius, 2. 8 Richard Sandbrook, “Origins of the Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 39, no. 3 (2005): 549–81, 553. 9 Larry W. Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 104. 10 Also see Edward Meade, Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1968); and Richard Morris Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Tony Lynes, Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius: Report to the Governor of Mauritius (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1968). 11 Murison, “Mauritius: Recent History,” 770. 12 Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrence Carroll, “Trouble in Paradise: Ethnic Conflicts in Mauritius,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 38, no. 2 (2000): 25–50, 28. 13 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2008, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 14 Eustuce Davie, “The ‘Mauritian Miracle’ appears far from Over,” Business Day, 4 June 2007. 15 Meade, Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius. 16 Interview with Karl Offmann, Beau Bassin, 12 November 2009. 17 Deborah Bräutigam, “Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in Mauritius,” Comparative Politics 30, no. 1 (1997): 45–62, 48. 18 Jean-Yves Chavrimootoo, “Chômage – légère fluctuation en 2009 avec un taux estimé à 7,7% contre 7,2% en 2008,” L’Express, 28 December 2009. 19 Mauritius Central Statistics Office, Mauritius in Figures 2008, www.gov. mu/portal/goc/cso/mif08/trade.pdf. 20 Thomas Meisenhelder, “The Developmental State in Mauritius,” Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 279–97, 283. 21 Sandbrook, “Origins of the Democratic Developmental State.” 22 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development, 134–35. 23 Mauritius Central Statistics Office, Mauritius in Figures 2008. 24 Sandbrook, “Origins of the Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius,” 566. 25 Ibid., 567. 26 Annaleigh Vallie, “Alluring Mauritius fast becoming an Economic Hub,” Business Day, 30 October 2007. 27 Arvind Subramanian and Devesh Roy, “Who can Explain the Mauritian Miracle? Meade, Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?,” in In Search for Prosperity:

Notes

28 29 30 31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

227

Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 205–43, 227. Interview with Arvin Boolell, Port Louis, 16 November 2009. See Meisenhelder, “The Developmental State in Mauritius,” 293. Subramanian and Roy, “Who can Explain the Mauritian Miracle?,” 239. Freedom House, Map of Press Freedom: Mauritius (2009), www.freedomh ouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009; Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries (2009), www.freedomhouse.org/ template.cfm?page=363&year=2009. Bräutigam, “Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in Mauritius”; Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrence Carroll, “The Consolidation of Democracy in Mauritius,” Democratization 6, no. 1 (1999): 179–97; Wake Carroll and Carroll, “Trouble in Paradise”; Ismael Khoodabux, The Anatomy of Mauritius (2000); Henry Srebrnik, “Can an Ethnically-based Civil Society Succeed? The Case of Mauritius,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 18, no. 1 (2000): 7–20; Subramanian and Roy, “Who can Explain the Mauritian Miracle?”; Amédée Darga, “Mauritius Electoral Reform Process” (Johannesburg: EISA Occasional Paper No. 24, September 2004); Gavin Cawthra, “Mauritius: An Exemplar of Democracy, Development and Peace for the Southern African Development Community?,” Africa Insight 35, no. 1 (2005): 14–19; and Sandbrook, “Origins of the Democratic Developmental State.” Wake Carroll and Carroll, “Trouble in Paradise,” 34. Interview with Pravind Kumar Jugnauth, Port Louis, 17 November 2009. Republic of Mauritius, Constitution of Mauritius, www.gov.mu/portal/site/ AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/, Art. 30(2) and 46(2). Interviews with members of the National Assembly, Mauritius, November 2009. Interview with Françoise Labelle, Rose Hill, 11 November 2009. Interview with Pravind Kumar Jugnauth. Interview with Arvin Boolell. Wake Carroll and Carroll, “Trouble in Paradise,” 188. Srebrnik, “Can an Ethnically-based Civil Society Succeed?,” 16. Interview with a senior politician, Mauritius, November 2009. Diana Games, “Tiny Island’s Attitude holds big Lessons for Africa,” Business Day, 30 January 2006. Interview with Arvin Boolell. Also see Wake Carroll and Carroll, “Trouble in Paradise,” 195. Interview with Karl Offmann. Interview with Paul Bérenger. Interview with Pravind Kumar Jugnauth. Mauritian diplomats confirm this view. Jeanne Hey, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). Anonymous interview, Mauritius, November 2009. African Union Assembly, Resolution on Mauritius, Addis Ababa, 30–31 January 2011, Assembly/AU/Res.1(XVI); and Navin Ramgoolam, Statement at the 66 Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2011.

228

Notes

52 See Toussaint, History of Mauritius; Addison and Hazareesingh, A New History of Mauritius. 53 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development, 157–59. 54 Terence Neilan, “World Briefing: Britain: Victory for Diego Garcia,” New York Times, 4 November 2000. 55 Cawthra, “Mauritius: An Exemplar of Democracy,” 17. 56 Also see Victor T. Le Vine, Island of Shame. The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 57 Interview with Françoise Labelle. 58 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 59 Interviews with Mauritian politicians and officials, Mauritius, November 2009. 60 Interview with Jean-Marc Poché, Port Louis, 9 November 2009. 61 Interview with Paul Bérenger. 62 Ibid. 63 Interview with Karl Offmann. 64 Interview with Arvin Boolell. 65 Interview with a Mauritian politician, Mauritius, November 2009. 66 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 67 See Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States, 59–60. 68 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development. 69 Interviews with Mauritian officials, Mauritius, November 2009. 70 Addison and Hazareesingh, A New History of Mauritius, 112. 71 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 72 Interview in Addis Ababa. 73 Cawthra, “Mauritius: An Exemplar of Democracy,” 18. 74 Interview with a Mauritian official, Mauritius, November 2009. 75 Interview, Mauritius, 17 November 2009. 76 Interview with Arvin Boolell. 77 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009; also see Sheila Bunwaree, The African Peer Review Mechanism in Mauritius: Lessons from Phase 1 (Johannesburg: Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, 2007), 14–15. 78 See Grant Edward Thomas Masterson, Governance Quality and Government Commitment to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (Johannesburg: EISA, 2006); Bunwaree, The African Peer Review Mechanism in Mauritius; and Herbert and Gruzd, The African Peer Review Mechanism. 79 Grant Masterson, An Analysis of the Implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism in Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius, EISA Occasional Paper No. 29, February 2005: 13; and Herbert and Gruzd, The African Peer Review Mechanism. 80 Herbert and Gruzd, The African Peer Review Mechanism, 244. 81 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 82 Interview with a close observer of the APRM outside Mauritius. 83 Interviews, Mauritius, November 2009. 84 Ram Seegobin and Lindsay Collen, “Mauritius: Class Forces and Political Power,” Review of African Political Economy 4, no. 8 (1977): 109–18, 109. 85 Bowman, Mauritius: Democracy and Development, 151. 86 Le Mauricien, “La SADC soutient la candidature de Maurice,” 31 March 2009. 87 Interview with a Mauritian official, Mauritius, November 2009.

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88 Washington Post, “Mauritius Orders Libyan Diplomats to Leave,” 15 January 1984. 89 Interview with a senior politician, Mauritius, November 2009. 90 Interview with Vijay Makhan, Moka, 17 November 2009. 91 Interview with Françoise Labelle. 92 Interview with Paul Bérenger. 93 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 94 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 95 Interview with Arvin Boolell. 96 Interview with Françoise Labelle. 97 Interview, Mauritius, November 2009. 98 Interview with Paul Bérenger. 99 Interview with Arvin Boolell. 100 Interview with Pravind Kumar Jugnauth. 101 Interview with Karl Offmann. 102 Interview with a Mauritian diplomat. 103 Interview with Sadasivam Reddi. 104 Freedom House, Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries (2009). 10 Conclusion and outlook 1 Also see Maxi Schoeman, The African Union After the Durban 2002 Summit (University of Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2003). 2 Pierre Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 3 Economist, “Wee But Worrisome,” 26 February 2011. 4 Caiphas Chimhete, “Mugabe Moves to Pre-empt Egypt-Style Uprising,” The Standard, 26 February 2011. 5 Sipho McDermott and Aphiwe Deklerk, “Leaders Tiptoe Around Libya,” Mail & Guardian, 28 February 2011. 6 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 7 Asteris Huliaras, “Qadhafi’s Comeback,” African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): 5–25; Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 249–67; and Kassim Mohammed Khamis, Promoting the African Union (Washington DC: Lilian Barber Press, 2008). 8 Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests.” 9 African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Transport and Communication, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.5; African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Defence, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.6; and African Union Executive Council, Establishment of a Post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 24–28 January 2005, EX.Cl/165 (VI) Add.7. 10 African Union, Accra Declaration, Accra, 1–3 July 2007, Assembly/AU/ Decl.1–2(IX). 11 Asteris Huliaras, “Qadhafi’s Comeback”: 5–25; and Yehudit Ronen, “Libya’s Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qadhafi on the International Stage,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 13, no. 4 (2002): 60–74.

230

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12 Interviews in Ethiopia and various other African countries, November 2008–March 2010. 13 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Situation in Libya, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2011, PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI). 14 McDermott and Deklerk, “Leaders Tiptoe Around Libya.” 15 African Union, Explanatory Note on the Transfer of the Commission of the Africa Union, Addis Ababa, 6–8 July 2004, Assembly/AU/11(III) Add.3. 16 Martin Welz, “The African Union beyond Africa: The Limits of Africa’s Continental Organisation,” Paper presented at the KFG Workshop Regional Organisations as Global Players. Active = Influential?, Berlin, October 2011. 17 Interviews in Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, November 2008–March 2010. 18 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21–22 June 1993: para 111. 19 African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lome, 11 July 2000. 20 African Union, Accra Declaration, Accra, 1–3 July 2007, Assembly/AU/ Decl.1–2(IX). 21 Also see Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa, 256–58. 22 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 252nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, 9 December 2010, PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLII). 23 African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 261st Meeting. 24 Also see African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 260th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, 16 February 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCLX). 25 Paul D. Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture,” African Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007). 26 Anonymous interviews in South Africa, March–April 2009. 27 The Herald, “Mugabe Turns on African Nations,” 27 June 2008. 28 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 109–39. 29 Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 477–513.

Index

Abuja Treaty 110–11, 141, 170 Accra Declaration 4, 5, 133, 148, 180, 182–83; 2007 Accra Summit 4, 114; Gaddafi, Muammar 180; Mauritius 170; Union Government debate 4, 7, 79, 180; United States of Africa 4; see also AU Africa 16, 182, 204; African borders 3, 112; African liberation 66, 72, 73, 75, 76, 94, 96, 98; “African Renaissance” 3, 126, 130; Maghreb region 64, 69, 75; sub-Saharan Africa 69, 80 Algeria 25, 64–80; Algerian Constitution 66, 67, 70, 72; civil war 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73; decolonization 25, 69, 80, 99; history 64, 65–68; path dependency 68; self-determination 64, 65, 68, 73, 77, 80; socioeconomic situation 12, 25, 65, 66, 68, 69–70, 73, 79–80, 176, 178; El Watan 79; see also following Algeria entries Algeria/AU relations 64–65, 68, 76–80; APRM 68, 77–78, 80; “Big Five” 26, 77, 132; Guardian 25, 99, 174; NEPAD 64–65, 76, 77, 79; OAU 64, 73, 76, 77; Panel of the Wise 77; Peace and Security Architecture 76, 77, 78–79; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 68, 80, 174; Union Government debate 79; United States of Africa 65, 79; see also other Algeria entries

Algeria, foreign policy 65, 66, 72–76, 77, 79–80; African liberation 66, 72, 73, 75, 76; Boumedienne, Houari 65, 76; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78; CEN-SAD 76; domestic/ international legitimacy relationship 72, 76, 80, 99, 177; EU 69–70, 76, 79, 176, 178; integration 69, 75, 76, 79–80, 176; non-interference 64; president supremacy 72; terrorism 73, 75; Third Worldism 66, 72, 75; UMA 5, 69, 75–76; United Nations 65, 72, 74, 75, 80; United States 73, 75, 76; Western Sahara conflict 64, 73–75, 80, 112, 178; see also other Algeria entries Algeria, political system 25, 66, 70–72; authoritarianism 72; coup d’état 66; Ben Bella, Ahmed 66, 73, 77, 79, 94; Bendjedid, Chadli 66, 73; Boumedienne, Houari 64, 65, 66, 69, 73, 76; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 3, 64–65, 67, 68, 70–72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 177; elections 67, 70, 71, 80; FIS 66–67, 71; FLN 65–66, 67, 68; FreedomFighter variable 25, 64, 66, 67–68, 72, 80, 174; independence 25, 64, 65–66, 67–68, 73, 80, 174, 175; legitimacy 66, 70, 71; military dictatorship 66, 67, 70–72; non-democratic state 70, 71; opposition 66, 78; parliament 70–71; see also other Algeria entries

232

Index

Allison, Graham 7 APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism) 2, 20–21, 192; acceptance of the APRM’s critique 20–21, 44 (CritiqueMugabe 21); aims 2, 20; Algeria 68, 77–78, 80; Burkina Faso 108, 110, 112–13, 115; Ethiopia 68, 88–89, 93, 96–97, 99, 184 (Meles Zenawi 68, 88–89, 96–97, 99); Mauritius 166–67, 171; South Africa 130–32, 135; Swaziland 58–59, 61, 62; Uganda 144; Zimbabwe 43, 44, 45; see also NEPAD Arab Spring 15, 71, 153, 173, 184–86; Gaddafi, Muammar 6, 15, 151, 179–81 AU (African Union) 1, 179–86; Africa’s integration, history 2–4; aims/tasks 1, 183, 186; Arab Spring 6, 15, 151, 179–81, 184–86; AU border program 112, 113; AU Constitutive Act 4, 182, 183; AU/ regional economic community relation 183; “Big Five” 26, 77, 132, 181; debating club 58, 113, 177; democracy 61, 177, 183, 185, 186; foundation 3–4, 114, 180; inclusion of member states’ perspectives 186; intergovernmental organization 1, 7, 134; membership 192; Morocco 1, 16, 74; non-interference principle 6; post-Gaddafi era 15, 181; progress, security issues 6, 184, 185; shortcomings 4–7; sovereignty 6; supranational entity 7, 134; see also following Accra Declaration; AU entries; OAU; integration; United States of Africa AU/case studies relation 14; Algeria/ AU relations 64–65, 68, 76–80; Burkina Faso/AU relations 100, 109, 111–15, 116; Ethiopia/AU relations 81, 83, 92, 93–99; Mauritius/AU relations 161, 166–71; South Africa/AU relations 129–35; Swaziland/AU

relations 46, 58–63; Uganda/AU relations 138, 148–52, 153; Zimbabwe/AU relations 27, 33, 40–44; see also other AU entries; AU relations under specific case studies; foreign policy AU Court of Justice 21, 59, 99, 149, 193; Mauritius 168, 169, 170; see also other AU entries AU, security 2, 4, 5, 183–84, 185; AMISOM 92; AU progress 6, 184, 185; Continental Early Warning System 2, 6; Panel of the Wise 2, 6, 77; Peace and Security Architecture 2, 6, 22, 78–79, 110, 146, 184; Peace and Security Council 2, 6, 21, 22, 91, 149, 181, 193 (Commissioner 76, 77); political violence 6, 181, 184; sovereignty 6; Stand-by Brigades 2, 6, 43, 146; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 6; see also other AU entries; security AU, structure/organization 1–2; AU Authority 4, 98, 99, 134, 135; AU chairmanship (Gaddafi, Muammar 4, 98, 115, 134, 181; Konaré, Alpha 92; Mbeki, Thabo 130; Mutharika, Bingu wa 4); AU Commission 2, 4, 81, 98; AU headquarters 81, 83, 95, 97–99, 184; Pan-African Parliament 2, 43–44, 98, 130, 133, 149 (Mauritius 160, 167–68, 170); see also other AU entries; NEPAD AU summits 60, 130; 2006 Banjul Summit 40; 2007 Accra Summit 4, 114, 131, 148; 2007 EU–AU Summit 21, 40–41; 2008 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit 21, 40, 41–42, 97; 2009 Addis Ababa Summit 4; 2009 Summit, Mauritius’ withdrawal 168–70; 2010 Kampala Summit 77, 147; see also other AU entries AU, Union Government debate 4, 5, 7; Accra Declaration 4, 7, 79, 180; Algeria 79; Burkina Faso 114; continental ministers 4, 43, 114, 180; Ethiopia 98; Gaddafi,

Index Muammar 59, 60, 133, 134, 152, 153, 180, 181–82; gradualists 79, 133, 146, 148, 153; Mauritius 170–71; SADC 44; South Africa 44, 63, 133–34, 135, 148; sovereignty 5, 7, 181–82; Swaziland 59–61, 62, 63; Uganda 138, 146, 148–49, 150, 152, 175; Zimbabwe 43–44, 62; see also other AU entries; integration; United States of Africa authoritarianism 3, 8, 10, 179–80; Algeria 72, 99; Ethiopia 99, 184; integration 12; Swaziland 99; Uganda 137, 139, 143, 144; unwillingness to cede sovereignty 45, 62, 177; Zimbabwe 45, 99; see also coup d’état; democracy; dictatorship; Zimbabwe Big Five 26, 77, 132, 181 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 3, 64–65, 67, 68, 70–73, 75–78, 80, 177, see also Algeria entries BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 121, 128, 129, 135 Britain: Blair, Tony 30, 38, 128; Brown, Gordon 41; G8+5 128; Mauritius 155, 156, 157; Swaziland 47, 54; Thatcher, Margaret 30, 38; Zimbabwe 27, 28, 30, 38, 39, 41 Burkina Faso 25, 100–116; Burkinabe Constitution 103–4, 106, 111; decolonization 25, 115; Economist 107; history 100, 101–4; migration 104–5, 109; socio-economic situation 25, 100, 103, 104–5, 113, 116, 176; see also following Burkina Faso entries Burkina Faso/AU relations 100, 109, 111–15, 116; APRM 108, 110, 112–13, 115; AU border program 112, 113; Gaddafi, Muammar 111, 113–15; OAU 113; sovereignty, willingness to cede 100, 111–12, 114, 116, 136, 176; Union Government debate 114; United States of Africa 114; Volunteer 25, 136, 176; see also other Burkina Faso entries

233

Burkina Faso, foreign policy 106–7, 108–11, 177; CEN-SAD 111, 114; Compaoré, Blaise 100, 104, 106–7, 108–11, 136; Côte d’Ivoire 108, 109; domestic/international legitimacy relationship 109, 113, 115, 136, 165, 177; ECOWAS 100, 105, 110–11, 112, 115, 116, 177; integration 105, 116, 176, 177; Liberia 108–9; Libya 111, 113–15; L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 111; Sierra Leone 108–9; UEMOA 100, 105, 111, 116; United Nations 102, 110; see also other Burkina Faso entries Burkina Faso, political system 100, 105–8, 177; CDP 106, 107; coup d’état 100, 101, 102, 103, 108; elections 103–4, 105–6, 115; freedom of speech 106; non-democratic state 101, 104, 105–6; opposition 103, 106, 107; parliament 105–6, 107; political violence 102, 103; presidential system 25, 105–6; Sankara, Thomas 101–2, 108, 111, 115, 136; Zongo, Norbert 103, 104, 108, 115, 136; see also other Burkina Faso entries; Compaoré, Blaise Burundi 6, 126, 132, 133, 141, 145 case studies 13–14, 16–26; selecting case studies 23–26 (flaw 26; most-different-system design 23; variables 23–26, 193–95); study framework 13–14 (AU/case studies relation 14; foreign policy 7–9, 14; historical context 11–12, 13; political system and leaders 14, 23, 193; socio-economic situation 13–14, 23, 195); see also Algeria; Burkina Faso; case studies and sovereignty; Ethiopia; Mauritius; methodology/data; South Africa; Swaziland; Uganda; Zimbabwe case studies and sovereignty: grouping AU member states 16–24, 173–74; Constrained 16,

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Index

17, 20, 24, 192; Defender 16, 17–18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 177 (Swaziland 23, 59, 62, 173; Zimbabwe 23, 62, 173, 176); Enthusiast 16, 19, 20, 22–23, 24, 177 (Mauritius 25, 172, 173; Uganda 25–26, 172, 173, 176); Guardian 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 177 (Algeria 25, 99, 174; Ethiopia 25, 99); variables 16, 20–23, 192–93; Volunteer 16, 18–19, 20, 22–23, 24, 177 (Burkina Faso 25, 136, 176; South Africa 25, 135–36, 173, 175) CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel–Saharan States) 5, 76, 111, 114; Burkina Faso 111, 114; Gaddafi, Muammar 76, 111, 114; see also regional economic community China: South Africa 119, 121, 128, 178; Zimbabwe 38–40; Ethiopia 86; Mauritius 154, 164, 178 Clapham, Christopher 5, 89, 92 climate change 89, 93, 99, 182 colonialism 3, 5, 11, 112; see also decolonization; independence/ liberation COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) 5, 85–86, 164; Ethiopia 85, 86, 183; Mauritius 159, 164, 183; Tripartite Conference 152; Uganda 86, 183; Zimbabwe 33, 183; see also regional economic community Comoros 6, 61, 126, 132 Compaoré, Blaise 102–4, 105–8, 180; APRM 113, 115; coup d’état 102, 108; foreign policy 100, 104, 106–7, 108–11, 136; peace and security 100, 104, 108, 115; presidential dominance 106–7; see also Burkina Faso COPE (Congress of the People) 119, 123, 135, 175 Côte d’Ivoire 100, 104, 105, 126, 132, 184, 194; Burkina Faso 108, 109 coup d’état 6, 20, 66, 138, 164, 168; Burkina Faso 100, 101, 102, 103, 108

DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) 149 decolonization 94, 174, 178, 182, 186; Algeria 25, 69, 80, 99; Burkina Faso 25, 115; Mauritius 25, 156; Swaziland 47, 49, 62; Uganda 138; unwillingness to cede sovereignty 5–6, 12, 25, 45, 99, 178–79; Zimbabwe 25, 36, 45, 174 democracy 8, 177, 179–80; AU 61, 177, 183, 185, 186; cooperation 12, 185; Mauritius 25, 155, 156, 157, 159, 172, 185; Mo Ibrahim Prize 145; South Africa 120, 123, 130–31, 136, 172, 177, 185; Uganda 140, 152, 177; willingness to cede sovereignty 12, 136, 152, 172, 177, 180, 185; see also authoritarianism; coup d’état; elections; non-democratic state Democratic Republic of Congo 30, 36, 39, 183 dictatorship: Algeria 66, 67, 70–72; Amin, Idi 137; Ethiopia 89, 184; Meles Zenawi 89; OAU, “Club of Dictators” 10; Swaziland 52; Taylor, Charles 9, 108; Zimbabwe 40; see also authoritarianism; coup d’état; Zimbabwe EAC (East African Community) 5, 141, 145–46, 183; Tripartite Conference 152; Uganda 138, 141, 145, 146–47, 151, 152, 153, 183; see also regional economic community ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) 110 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 5; 105, 110, 183; Burkina Faso 100, 105, 110–11, 112, 115, 116, 177; see also regional economic community Egypt 26, 77, 179, 180 elections 14; Algeria 67, 70, 71, 80; Ethiopia 86–87, 88, 89, 97; flawed

Index elections 10 (Algeria 70; Burkina Faso 103–4, 105–6, 115; Ethiopia 86–87; Uganda 151; Zimbabwe 21, 33, 41–42, 44, 57, 192); Mauritius 156, 157; Mo Ibrahim Prize 145; South Africa 118, 119; Zimbabwe 21, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41–42, 44, 57, 61, 185, 192; see also democracy; nondemocratic state; political system Englebert, Pierre 9–10, 109, 177 Eritrea 192; Ethiopia 76, 82–84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 112 Ethiopia 25, 81–99, 192, 208; Addis Neger 87; historical legacy 81, 82–84, 95, 99, 179; never colonized 25, 81, 82, 95–96, 99, 193; socio-economic situation 81, 83, 84–86, 140–41, 176; see also following Ethiopia entries Ethiopia/AU relations 81, 83, 92, 93–99; APRM 68, 88–89, 93, 96–97, 99, 184; Guardian 25, 99; host to AU 81, 83, 95, 97–99, 184; NEPAD 93; OAU 81, 83, 90, 93, 94–96, 99; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 98, 99, 175, 176, 178; Union Government debate 98; United States of Africa 95; see also other Ethiopia entries Ethiopia, foreign policy 81, 83, 84, 87–88, 89–93; COMESA 85, 86, 183; domestic/international legitimacy relationship 93, 99, 177; Eritrea 76, 82–84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 112; Ethiopian Constitution 89–90; IGAD 85, 91, 183; integration 84, 86, 90, 97, 98; Italy 82, 94, 96; League of Nations 82, 93; Meles Zenawi 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 99; non-interference principle 90; personalized foreign policy 176; Somalia 90, 91–92, 96, 97, 99, 184; Sudan 90–91, 210; United Nations 82, 90–91, 93, 94; United States 92; see also other Ethiopia entries; Meles Zenawi Ethiopia, political system 81, 86–89; authoritarianism/dictatorship 89, 99, 184; the Derg 83; elections

235

86–87, 88, 89, 97; EPRDF 83, 84, 88, 92, 98; freedom of the press 86, 87; freedom of speech 86; Haile Selassie, Emperor 74, 81–84, 94–95, 98–99; Mengistu Haile Miriam 81, 83, 84, 88; nondemocratic state 86–88, 99, 184; opposition 87, 89; parliamentary system 25, 81, 84, 87–88, 176; TPLF 83, 88; see also other Ethiopia entries; Meles Zenawi EU (European Union) 182, 185; 2007 EU–AU Summit 21, 41; Algeria 69–70, 76, 79, 176, 178; Copenhagen Criteria 182; European integration 6, 12, 75, 182 foreign policy 7–9, 14, 177–78, 186; foreign policy behavior 7–8, 9; “hiding approach” 58; institutionalized foreign policy 122, 161, 171–72, 176; nondemocratic state 8, 45; personalized foreign policy 12, 122, 125, 144, 160, 172, 176; preferences within states 8–9; rent seeking 8, 9; study framework 7–9, 14; see also foreign policy under specific case studies; non-interference principle; political system; regional economic community; sovereignty freedom of the press 14; Ethiopia 86, 87; Swaziland 51; Uganda 142; Zongo, Norbert 103; see also newspaper freedom of speech 86, 106 FreedomFighter 23, 180, 186, 193–94; Algeria 25, 64, 66, 67–68, 72, 80, 174; Ethiopia 25, 83; Mauritius 25, 175; South Africa 25, 119, 124, 135, 175; Uganda 140, 142, 153; Zimbabwe 27, 29, 35–36, 40, 41, 62, 66, 174 G8 93, 128, 135, 170, G8+5 128 Gaddafi, Muammar 130, 179, 180–81; 2009 AU summit, Mauritius’ withdrawal 168–70, 181;

236

Index

Arab Spring 6, 15, 151, 179–81, 184; AU chairmanship 4, 98, 115, 134, 181; AU foundation 3–4, 114, 180; AU headquarters 97–98; Burkina Faso 111, 113–15, 181; CEN-SAD 76, 111; continental ministers 4, 114, 180; Gaddafi/ Amin relationship 139, 151, 181; Gaddafi/Mugabe relationship 181; Gaddafi/Museveni relationship 139, 151–52, 153, 181; Gaddafi/ Zuma relationship 134; post-Gaddafi era in AU 15; Presidential variable 194; rent seeking 9; Union Government 59, 60, 133, 134, 152, 153, 180, 181–82; United States of Africa 3–4, 114, 133, 180, 181, 183; see also Libya Gaubatz, Kurt 12, 185 Gevisser, Mark 29, 119, 120, 125 Ghana 2, 10, 94, 100, 105, 152; Nkrumah, Kwame 2–3, 94, 95, 152 good governance 20; Mauritius 161, 162, 167 government see leader/head of state; political system; state Grand Debate see AU, Union Government Debate guerrilla 28, 54, 83, 118, 131, 139, 140, 153 Haile Selassie, Emperor 3, 74, 81–84, 93–95, 99 Hettne, Björn 13 historical context 11–12, 13, 174–75, 178–79; Algeria 64, 65–68; Burkina Faso 100, 101–4; Ethiopia 81, 82–84, 95, 99, 179; Mauritius 155–57; South Africa, Apartheid 3, 25, 29–30, 49, 54, 55, 118–20, 135, 136, 165; Swaziland 47–49; Uganda 138–40; Zimbabwe 28–31; see also FreedomFighter variable; independence/liberation; path dependency Holland, Heidi 35 human rights: Meles Zenawi 89, 90; Mengistu Haile Miriam 83;

Mugabe, Robert 34, 40, 41; South Africa 131; Uganda 139 ICC (International Criminal Court) 22, 193; al-Bashir, Omar Hassan 90–91, 147–48, 152–53 ICJ (International Court of Justice) 22 IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) 5, 85, 91, 183; see also regional economic community independence/liberation 13, 23, 174, 178, 186, 193; Africa 66, 72, 73, 75, 76, 94, 96, 98; Algeria 25, 64, 65–66, 67–68, 73, 80, 174, 175; Burkina Faso 101; Mauritius 25, 155–56; Pan-Africanism 2; South Africa 25, 39, 119, 135, 136, 175; Swaziland 23, 47, 49, 54; Uganda 138, 140, 152; unwillingness to cede sovereignty 45, 175, 178–79; Zimbabwe 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 45, 175; see also decolonization; FreedomFighter variable integration 7–9, 179, 182; Africa’s integration, history 2–4; Algeria 69, 75, 76, 79–80, 176; Burkina Faso 105, 116, 176, 177; continental integration 7, 15, 55, 59, 76, 79, 112, 129, 136, 179, 184, 186; Ethiopia 84, 86, 90, 97, 98; inclusion of member states’ perspectives 186; non-democratic state 45, 62; Mauritius 159, 166–67, 176–78; South Africa 55, 126, 129, 132–33, 134, 176; Swaziland 46, 50, 55, 59, 60, 62–63, 178; Uganda 137, 138, 140, 141, 145, 148, 175, 176, 177; Zimbabwe 33, 36, 45, 62, 176, 178; see also regional integration intervention 61, 91–92, 97, 99, 192; non-intervention principle 61; see also non-interference principle Jackson, Robert 10 Kenya 85, 90, 133, 137, 141, 146 Krasner, Stephen 9, 177

Index leader/head of state 174–75, 186; authoritarianism 12; Compaoré, Blaise, presidential dominance 106–7; legitimacy 9, 10, 11, 14; Museveni, Yoweri: presidential hegemony 25–26, 137, 142–45; personalized foreign policy 12, 72, 122, 125, 144, 160, 172, 176; Presidential variable/system 23, 176, 194; study framework 11, 13, 14, 23; term limit 14 (Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 70; Compaoré, Blaise 103–4; Museveni, Yoweri 137, 143, 144–45, 147, 149); see also Algeria, presidential system; FreedomFighter variable; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz; Meles Zenawi; Mugabe, Robert; Mswati III; Museveni, Yoweri; Zuma, Jacob; political system; Swaziland, absolute monarchy League of Nations 82, 93 legitimacy: Algeria 66, 70, 71; domestic/international legitimacy relationship 9–10, 11, 177 (Algeria 72, 76, 80, 99, 177; Burkina Faso 109, 113, 115, 136, 165, 177; Ethiopia 93, 99, 177; Zimbabwe 35, 42, 44, 62, 99, 165, 177); leader/head of state 9, 10, 11, 14; Museveni, Yoweri 138, 153, 177; Swaziland, tradition as source of legitimacy 46, 48–49, 52–53, 60, 62, 175; see also sovereignty Lesotho 46, 50, 54, 121, 194 Levy, Jack 11 liberalism 8, 173–74; Moravcsik, Andrew 8; state 7–8, 11, 174 Liberia 94; Burkina Faso 108–9; never colonized 193; Taylor, Charles 9, 108 Libya 179; “Big Five” 26, 77, 181; Eritrea 98; Mauritius 168–70, 181; South Africa 134; Zimbabwe 38, 181; see also al-Gaddafi, Muammar Madagascar 6, 58, 118, 127, 129, 164–65 Makumbe, John 42, 43, 44, 52

237

Malawi 28; Mutharika, Bingu wa 4 Mali 12, 104, 105, 111, 112 Mandela, Nelson 66, 94, 98, 118, 120, 125–27, 129, 131 Mansfield, Edward 12, 185 Mauritius 10, 133, 154–72; Britain 155, 156, 157; decolonization 25, 156, 175; history 155–57; Mauritian Constitution 157, 159, 160; Poché, Jean-Marc 164; socio-economic situation 25, 156, 157–59, 176; see also following Mauritius entries Mauritius/AU relations 161, 166–71, 175; 2009 AU summit, Mauritius’ withdrawal 168–70, 181; access to African states 154; APRM 166–67, 171; AU Court of Justice 168, 169, 170; AU meetings 161, 166; Enthusiast 25, 172, 173; lack of commitment towards the AU 166, 168, 170, 171; Makhan, Vijay 168, 169; OAU 165, 168; Pan-African Parliament 160, 167–68, 170; sovereignty, willingness to cede 172, 173, 175; Union Government debate 170–71; United States of Africa 133, 170, 171; see also other Mauritius entries Mauritius, foreign policy 159, 162–66, 177–78; between Africa and Asia 154, 159, 164, 165–66, 171; Chagos Islands 163; COMESA 159, 164, 183; consensus 160, 172, 176; economic interests 162, 163–64, 165, 166, 170, 171, 177–78; government 161; Indian Ocean Rim Association 163, 166; institutionalized foreign policy 161, 171–72, 176; integration 159; international organizations 163, 166; Libya 168–70, 181; Madagascar 164–65; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 161, 176; parliament 160; SADC 159, 164, 166, 171, 177, 183; “small island syndrome” 162–63, 171, 175, 176; South Africa 165; see also other Mauritius entries Mauritius, political system 60, 159–62, 176; Bérenger, Paul

238

Index

156–57, 161, 163, 164, 170–71; Boolell, Arvin 154, 159, 161, 162, 166, 170, 171; democracy 25, 155, 156, 157, 159, 172, 185; Duval, Gaëtan 155, 156, 157, 160; Duval, Xavier 157, 160; elections 156, 157; FreedomFighter variable 25, 175; independence 25, 155–56; Jugnauth, Anerood 155, 157; Jugnauth, Pravind 157, 160, 163, 171; MMM 156, 160; Offmann, Karl 158, 162–63, 168, 171; parliament/National Assembly 25, 159, 160, 176; president 160; Ramgoolam, Navin 157, 160, 161; Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur 155, 156, 157, 165, 168; see also other Mauritius entries Mbeki, Thabo 3, 41, 120, 125; “African Renaissance” 3, 126, 130; APRM 130–31, 135; AU 117, 129, 130–32, 133–34, 135, 148, 180, 181; criticism 120, 122, 130–31; foreign policy 122, 124, 125, 126–27, 128, 129; NEPAD 117, 128, 130; Pan-Africanism 126, 133; Swaziland 54, 55–56; see also South Africa Meade, James 158 Meles Zenawi 68, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88–89, 93, 97–98, 212; APRM 68, 88–89, 96–97, 99; climate change 89, 93, 99; foreign policy 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 99; FreedomFighter variable 25, 83; human rights 89, 90; smart dictator 89; see also Ethiopia methodology/data 14–15, 16–19, 173–74; see also case studies; case studies and sovereignty migration: Burkina Faso 104–5, 109; South Africa 129; Zimbabwe 32, 39–40 Moravcsik, Andrew 7, 8, 9 Morocco: outside the AU 1, 16, 74; Western Sahara conflict 64, 73–75, 80, 108, 112 Mozambique 28, 49, 50, 55, 73, 76, 129 Mugabe, Robert 6, 27, 28–31, 33–45, 98, 179, 185; CritiqueMugabe

variable 21, 28, 192; foreign policy 35, 36–44, 45, 58; FreedomFighter variable 27, 29, 35–36, 40, 41, 62, 66, 174; Gaddafi/Mugabe relationship 181; human rights 34, 40, 41; legitimacy 31, 35–36, 40, 42, 44, 58, 62, 177; OAU 27, 44; see also Zimbabwe Mukwaya, Aaron 143, 144, 149 Museveni, Yoweri 5, 26, 60, 137–38, 139–40, 152, 175, 180; AU 144, 146, 148–49, 150, 151–52, 153, 172; authoritarianism 144; Constitutional change/term limit 137, 143, 144–45, 147, 149; criticism 147; foreign policy 144; FreedomFighter variable 140, 142, 153; legitimacy 138, 153, 177; Museveni/Gaddafi relationship 139, 151–52, 153, 181; Pan-Africanism 149–50; presidential hegemony 25–26, 137, 142–45; “ten points” 139–40, 145; see also Uganda Mswati III 46, 47–48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 58, 63, see also Swaziland entries NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) 2, 98–99; Algeria 64–65, 76, 77, 79 (Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 64, 76); Ethiopia 93; Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program 76; South Africa 117, 128, 130, 132; Swaziland 59; Zimbabwe 33, 43; see also APRM newspaper, media 14, 15, 27, 71; Addis Neger 87; Business Day 2, 6, 127, 130, 157–58; City Press 107, 108; CritiqueMugabe 192; Daily News 124; Economist 107, 122; Herald 31, 41, 42; Mail & Guardian 127; New Vision 142, 144; Poché, Jean-Marc 164; Süddeutsche Zeitung 41; The Times 38; The Times of Swaziland 57; El Watan 79; see also freedom of the press Niger 6, 100, 104, 105, 108 Nigeria 133; “Big Five” 26, 77; ECOMOG 110; Obasanjo,

Index Olusegun 3, 60, 133, 180; South Africa 127 Nkrumah, Kwame 2–3, 94, 95, 152 non-democratic state 177; Algeria 70, 71; Burkina Faso 101, 104, 105–6; Ethiopia 86–88, 99, 184; foreign policy 8, 45; integration 45, 62; Swaziland 47, 50, 52, 62, 185; unwillingness to cede sovereignty 45, 62, 99, 177, 179; Zimbabwe 33, 36, 42, 185; see also authoritarianism; coup d’état; dictatorship non-interference principle: Algeria 64; AU 6; Ethiopia 90; non-interference/non-indifference shift 61; non-intervention principle 61; OAU 1, 2, 3, 6, 58, 90, 180; Swaziland 57–58, 61, 62, 185; Zimbabwe 37, 40, 41–42, 44, 62, 185; see also foreign policy; sovereignty OAU (Organization of African Unity) 1, 3; Algeria 64, 73, 76, 77 (Ben Bella, Ahmed 73, 76; Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 64, 76); Burkina Faso 113; “Club of Dictators” 10; criticism 3, 10; Ethiopia 81, 83, 90, 93, 94–96, 99 (Haile Selassie, Emperor 3, 81, 83, 95, 99); Mauritius 165, 168 (Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur 168); Mugabe, Robert 27, 44; non-interference principle 1, 2, 3, 6, 58, 90, 180; OAU Liberation Committee 73; Pan-Africanism 2; “Sands War” 74; South Africa 123, 126, 129; sovereignty 1, 2, 3, 6, 27, 90, 180; Uganda 147 Olivier, Gerrit 6, 130 opposition 8, 14; Algeria 66, 78; Burkina Faso 103, 106, 107; Ethiopia 87, 89; political violence against 30, 33, 34, 37; Swaziland 51, 52, 53; Uganda 139, 142; Zimbabwe 29, 30, 33, 34, 37; see also political system L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 111, 163

239

Pan-Africanism 2, 77, 94, 149–50, 152, 184; African Diaspora 2, 94; independence/liberation 2; Haile Selassie 94; Mbeki, Thabo 126, 133; Museveni, Yoweri 149–50 Pan-African Parliament 2, 43–44, 98, 130, 133, 149, 160, 167–68, 170 path dependency 11–12; Algeria 68; long-standing tradition/culture 12; South Africa 118, 119–20, 127, 133, 135, 136; Swaziland, tradition 46, 48–49, 52–53, 60, 62, 175; unwillingness to cede sovereignty 11–12, 135, 136; Zimbabwe 27 political system 11, 12, 14, 23, 176–77; see also authoritarianism; democracy; dictatorship; elections; freedom of the press; leader/head of state; opposition; political system under specific case studies; Swaziland, absolute monarchy political violence 6, 181, 184; Burkina Faso 102, 103; Zimbabwe 29, 30, 33, 34, 37 Putnam, Robert 7 regional economic community 4–5, 13, 14, 133, 148, 173, 177, 186; AU/regional economic community relation 183; building blocks of United States of Africa 4, 59, 133, 182–83; multiple membership 183; see also CEN-SAD; COMESA; EAC; ECOWAS; IGAD; integration; regional integration; SADC; UMA regional integration 13, 112, 178, 179, 183, 186; Algeria 75, 79; Burkina Faso 105, 116, 176; South Africa 134, 136; Uganda 145, 150, 175, 176; Swaziland 55; see also integration; regional economic community Rosberg, Carl 10 Ruggie, John 10–11 rule of law 4, 20, 48, 163, 164, 182 Rwanda 3, 36, 126, 141, 194 SACU (Southern African Customs Union) 46, 50, 121; South Africa

240

Index

121–22; Swaziland 46–47, 50, 56, 178 SADC (Southern African Development Community) 5; Mauritius 159, 164, 166, 171, 177, 183; South Africa 121, 128–29, 132, 135, 165, 178; Swaziland 50, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63; Tripartite Conference 152; Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security 57, 58, 202; Zimbabwe 27, 32, 33, 37, 41–42, 43–44, 57, 183; see also regional economic community security 4; Compaoré, Blaise 100, 104, 108, 115; SADC Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security 57, 58, 202; see also AU, security; political violence self-determination 11, 12, 174, 186; Algeria 64, 65, 68, 73, 77, 80; South Africa 25, 135; Zimbabwe 25, 28; see also sovereignty Senegal 105, 111, 155; Wade, Abdoulaye 3 Sierra Leone 9, 100, 108–9, 110 slavery 11, 155 small island syndrom 162, 171, 175–76 socio-economic situation 11, 12, 13–14, 175–76, 178, 195; Algeria 12, 25, 65, 66, 68, 69–70, 73, 79–80, 176, 178; Burkina Faso 25, 100, 103, 104–5, 113, 116, 176; Ethiopia 81, 83, 84–86, 140–41, 176; Human Development Index 25, 46, 49, 69, 84, 104, 157, 195; Mauritius 25, 156, 157–59, 176; South Africa 25, 117, 120–22, 176, 178; Swaziland 46, 47, 49–50, 176; Uganda 25, 137, 138, 139, 140–42, 176; Zimbabwe 25, 27, 30, 31–33, 176; see also NEPAD Somalia 3, 6; Algeria 78–79; AMISOM 92; Ethiopia 90, 91–92, 96, 97, 99, 184; Uganda 78–79, 147, 149 South Africa 10, 25, 117–36; Apartheid 3, 25, 29–30, 49, 54, 55, 118–20, 135, 136, 165; Business Day 2, 6, 127, 130, 157–58; City

Press 107, 108; Daily News 124; Economist 122; human rights 131; Mail & Guardian 127; path dependency 118, 119–20, 127, 133, 135, 136; self-determination 25, 135; socio-economic situation 25, 117, 120–22, 176, 178; Tambo, Oliver 66, 126; TRC 131; see also following South Africa entries; Mandela, Nelson; Mbeki, Thabo; Zuma, Jacob South Africa, ANC 30, 39, 118–19, 122–23, 125, 130–31, 175; foreign policy 123, 124, 127, 134; hegemony 123; OAU 123; Swaziland 54–56; United Nations 123; see also other South Africa entries South Africa/AU relations 129–35; APRM 130–32, 135; “Big Five” 26, 77, 132; Mbeki, Thabo 117, 129, 130–32, 133–34, 135, 148, 180, 181; NEPAD 117, 128, 130, 132; OAU 123, 126, 129; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 133, 135–36, 175; Union Government debate 44, 63, 133–34, 135, 148; United States of Africa 133–34; Volunteer 25, 135–36, 173, 175; Zuma, Jacob 125–26, 129, 132, 134–35; see also other South Africa entries South Africa, foreign policy 117, 119–20, 125–29, 135, 178; ANC 123, 124, 127, 134; BRICs 121, 128, 129, 135; China 119, 121, 128, 178; COSATU 123, 131, 134; Department of International Relations and Co-operation 122, 123–24, 125; G8+5 128; hegemony 127; immigration 129; institutionalized foreign policy 122, 176; integration 55, 126, 129, 132–33, 134, 176; Libya 134; Madagascar 118, 127, 129; Mandela, Nelson 126, 127; Mauritius 165; Mbeki, Thabo 122, 124, 125, 126–27, 128, 129; Nigeria 127; parliament 122; personalized foreign policy 122, 125; “quiet diplomacy” 39, 119,

Index 127; SACU 121–22; SADC 121, 128–29, 132, 135, 165, 178; Swaziland 47, 49, 53, 54–56, 58, 61–62, 63, 125, 178; “Total Strategy” 55, 118; United Nations 123, 127–28; Zimbabwe 30, 39, 40, 41, 127, 129, 135; Zuma, Jacob 122, 124, 125–26, 127, 128, 129, 132, 135; see also other South Africa entries South Africa, political system 25, 122–25, 176; COPE 119, 123, 135, 175; COSATU 56, 119, 123; democracy 120, 123, 130–31, 136, 172, 177, 185; Ebrahim Ebrahim 56, 119, 123, 128, 134; elections 118, 119; FreedomFighter variable 25, 119, 124, 135, 175; independence 25, 39, 119, 135, 136, 175; Mandela, Nelson 66, 94, 98, 118, 120, 125–27, 129, 131; parliament 122, 176; see also other South Africa entries; Mbeki, Thabo; Zuma, Jacob South Sudan 149, 192 sovereignty 9–11, 186; definition 10; colonialism 11; domestic/ international sovereignty relationship 9–10, 11, 177 (Algeria 72, 76, 80, 99, 177; Burkina Faso 109, 113, 115, 136, 165, 177; Ethiopia 93, 99, 177; Zimbabwe 35, 42, 44, 62, 99, 165, 177); history of 11; international legal sovereignty 9–10, 27, 42; Monrovia Group 3; OAU 1, 2, 3, 6, 27, 90, 180; Union Government debate 5, 7, 181–82; types of 9; Westphalian sovereignty 5, 9; see also case studies and sovereignty; non-interference principle; self-determination; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede; sovereignty, willingness to cede sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 1, 5, 11–12, 173–74; Algeria 68, 80, 174; authoritarianism 45, 62, 177; decolonization 5–6, 12, 25, 45, 99, 178–79; Ethiopia 98, 99, 175, 176, 178; independence/liberation

241

struggle 45, 175, 178–79; non-democratic state 45, 62, 99, 177, 179; path dependency 11–12, 135, 136; political system 11, 12; socio-economic situation 11, 12; South Africa 133, 135–36, 175; Swaziland 60–61, 62, 173, 175, 176, 178, 185; Zimbabwe 27, 36–37, 40, 43, 44–45, 173, 176, 178, 185; see also sovereignty sovereignty, willingness to cede 11, 173–74, 180; Burkina Faso 100, 111–12, 114, 116, 136, 176; democracy 12, 136, 152, 172, 177, 180, 185; Mauritius 172, 173, 175; Uganda 152–53, 173, 176; see also sovereignty state 185–86; failed state 10, 90; functional/dysfunctional state 5, 9; legitimacy 9; liberalism 7–8, 174; neorealism 8; statehood 9; see also foreign policy; leader/head of state; non-interference principle; political system; sovereignty Sudan 6, 91, 192; al-Bashir, Omar Hassan 179 (ICC charges 90–91, 127, 147–48, 152–53); Ethiopia 90–91, 210 Suttner, Raymond 120 Swaziland 46–63; decolonization 47, 49, 62; historical legacy 47–49; independence 23, 47, 49, 54; socio-economic situation 46, 47, 49–50, 176 (UN World Food Program 46, 49–50, 53, 176); Swaziland Constitution 48, 50, 51, 52, 61, 200; The Times of Swaziland 57; see also following Swaziland entries Swaziland, absolute monarchy 23, 46, 47–53, 62, 194; authoritarianism/ dictatorship 52, 99; freedom of the press 51; Mswati III 46, 47–48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 58, 63; non-democratic state 47, 50, 52, 62, 185; opposition 51, 52, 53; parliamentary system 46, 53, 200; patronage system 52, 62; Sobhuza II 47, 48, 50, 55; sovereignty 49, 62; tradition as source of

242

Index

legitimacy 46, 48–49, 52–53, 60, 62, 175; see also other Swaziland entries Swaziland/AU relations 46, 58–63; APRM 58–59, 61, 62; Defender 23, 59, 62, 173; NEPAD 59; observer status 46; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 60–61, 62, 173, 175, 176, 178, 185; Union Government debate 59–61, 62, 63; United States of Africa 59, 60; see also other Swaziland entries Swaziland, foreign policy 47, 52, 53–58, 60, 61–63; Britain 47, 54; integration 46, 50, 55, 59, 60, 62–63, 178; non-interference principle 57–58, 61, 62, 185; non-intervention principle 61; SACU 46–47, 50, 56, 178; SADC 50, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63 (SADC Troika on Politics, Defense, and Security 57, 58, 202); South Africa 47, 49, 53, 54–56, 58, 61–62, 63, 125, 178; United States 54; Zimbabwe 57, 61; see also Swaziland Tanzania 139, 141, 146, 169; Nyerere, Julius 29, 138, 149 terrorism 73, 75, 92, 147, 163 Togo 6, 100, 105, 108, 194 Tunisia 69, 179, 180, 184 UEMOA (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) 100, 105, 111, 116 Uganda 137–53; decolonization 138; history 138–40; human rights 139; independency/liberation 138, 140, 152; New Vision 142, 144; socio-economic situation 25, 137, 138, 139, 140–42, 176; Ugandan Constitution 137, 138, 143, 144–45; see also following Uganda entries; Museveni, Yoweri Uganda/AU relations 138, 148–52, 153; APRM 144; Enthusiast 25–26, 172, 173, 176; Museveni, Yoweri 144, 146, 148–49, 150, 151–52, 153, 172; Museveni/

Gaddafi rivalry 150–52, 153; OAU 147; sovereignty, willingness to cede 152–53, 173, 176; Union Government debate 138, 146, 148–49, 150, 152, 175; United States of Africa 152; see also other Uganda entries Uganda, foreign policy 145–48, 177; ANC 126; al-Bashir, ICC charges 147–48, 152–53; COMESA 86, 183; EAC 138, 141, 145, 146–47, 151, 152, 153, 177, 183; integration 137, 138, 140, 141, 145, 148, 175, 176, 177; Libya 151; Museveni, Yoweri 144; personalized foreign policy 144, 172; terrorism 147; Somalia 78–79, 147, 149; see also other Uganda entries Uganda, political system 138, 180; Amin, Idi 137, 138–39, 151, 181; authoritarianism 137, 139, 143, 144; coup d’état 138; democracy 140, 152, 177; dictatorship 137; elections 151; freedom of the press 142; the military 142–43, 149; NRA 139; NRM 140, 143, 144, 150; Obote, Milton 137–39; opposition 139, 142; parliament 142, 143; see also other Uganda entries; Museveni, Yoweri UMA (L’Union du Maghreb Arabe) 5, 69, 75–76; see also regional economic community Union Government Debate, see AU, Union Government Debate and United States of Africa United Nations: Algeria 65, 72, 74, 75, 80; Burkina Faso 102, 110; Ethiopia 82, 90–91, 93, 94; South Africa 123, 127–28; UN World Food Program 46, 49–50, 53, 176; United Nations Security Council 21, 39, 75, 80, 110, 127, 146 United States: Algeria 73, 75, 76; Bush, George W. 73, 75; Ethiopia 92; Swaziland 54; terrorism 73, 75, 92, 163 United States of Africa 1, 3, 4, 5, 133, 184; Accra Declaration 4;

Index Algeria 65, 79; Burkina Faso 114; Casablanca Group 3; Ethiopia 95; al-Gaddafi, Muammar 3–4, 114, 133, 180, 181, 183; Mauritius 133, 170, 171; Monrovia Group 3; Nkrumah, Kwame 3, 95, 152; Obasanjo, Olusegun 60, 133; regional economic community 4, 59, 133, 182–83; South Africa 133–34; Swaziland 59, 60; Uganda 152; Zimbabwe 43, 44; see also Accra Declaration Western Sahara 16, 108, 178, 192; POLISARIO 74; Western Sahara conflict 64, 73–75, 80, 108, 112, 178; see also Algeria Zambia 28, 42, 50, 57, 119 Zimbabwe 27–45; Bush war 28–31; decolonization 25, 36, 45, 174; Herald 31, 41, 42; land reform/ seizure 30, 36, 37–38; migration 32, 39–40; path dependency 27; self-determination 25, 28; Smith, Ian 27, 28, 36; socio-economic situation 25, 27, 30, 31–33, 176; see also following Zimbabwe entries Zimbabwe/AU relations 27, 33, 40–44, 58; APRM 43, 44, 45; Defender 23, 62, 173, 176; NEPAD 33, 43; Pan-African Parliament 43, 44; sovereignty, unwillingness to cede 27, 36–37, 40, 43, 44–45, 173, 176, 178, 185; Stand-by Brigades 43; Union Government debate 43–44, 62; United States of Africa 43, 44; see also other Zimbabwe entries

243

Zimbabwe, foreign policy 27, 31, 32–33, 35, 36–40, 45, 62, 178, 197; Britain 27, 28, 30, 38, 39, 41; China 38–39; COMESA 33, 183; domestic/international legitimacy relationship 35, 42, 44, 62, 99, 165, 177; integration 33, 36, 45, 62, 176, 178; Libya 38, 181; Mugabe, Robert 35, 36–44, 45, 58; non-interference principle 37, 40, 41–42, 44, 62, 185; SADC 27, 32, 33, 37, 41–42, 43–44, 57, 183; South Africa 30, 39, 40, 41, 127, 129, 135; Swaziland 57, 61; see also other Zimbabwe entries Zimbabwe, political system 27, 28, 29, 33, 36, 45; authoritarianism 45; elections 21, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41–42, 44, 57, 61, 185, 192; independence 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 45, 175; JOC 34; MDC 30, 32, 33–36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 178; Nkomo, Joshua 27, 28, 29, 66; non-democratic state 33, 36, 42, 185; opposition 29, 30, 33, 34, 37; political violence 29, 30, 33, 34, 37; Tsholotsho incident 33–34; Tsvangirai, Morgan 32, 33, 34, 41, 43, 57, 129; ZANU 28; ZANU-PF 29, 30–31, 32, 33–36, 38, 42, 45; see also other Zimbabwe entries; Mugabe, Robert Zuma, Jacob 117, 120, 124–25; AU 125–26, 129, 132, 134–35; BRICs 121, 128, 129, 135; foreign policy 122, 124, 125–26, 127, 128, 129, 132, 135, 178; Gaddafi/Zuma relationship 134; Swaziland 54, 56; see also South Africa

Routledge Global Institutions Series

68 Integrating Africa (2013) Decolonization’s legacies, sovereignty, and the African Union by Martin Welz (University of Konstanz)

67 Trade, Poverty, Development (2012) Getting beyond the WTO’s Doha deadlock edited by Rorden Wilkinson (University of Manchester) and James Scott (University of Manchester)

66 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2012) Industrial solutions for a sustainable future by Stephen Browne (FUNDS Project)

65 The Millennium Development Goals and Beyond (2012) Global development after 2015 edited by Rorden Wilkinson (University of Manchester) and David Hulme (University of Manchester)

64 International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors (2012) A framework for analysis edited by Joel E. Oestreich (Drexel University)

63 Maritime Piracy (2012) by Robert Haywood (One Earth Future) and Roberta Spivak (One Earth Future)

62 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2nd edition, 2012) by Gil Loescher (University of Oxford), Alexander Betts (University of Oxford), and James Milner (University of Toronto)

61 International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance (2012) by Charlotte Ku (University of Illinois)

60 Global Health Governance (2012) by Sophie Harman (City University, London)

59 The Council of Europe (2012) by Martyn Bond (University of London)

58 The Security Governance of Regional Organizations (2011) edited by Emil J. Kirchner (University of Essex) and Roberto Domínguez (Suffolk University)

57 The United Nations Development Programme and System (2011) by Stephen Browne (FUNDS Project)

56 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (2011) An emerging collaboration architecture by Lawrence Sáez (University of London)

55 The UN Human Rights Council (2011) by Bertrand G. Ramcharan (Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies)

54 The Responsibility to Protect (2011) Cultural perspectives in the Global South edited by Rama Mani (University of Oxford) and Thomas G. Weiss (The CUNY Graduate Center)

53 The International Trade Centre (2011) Promoting exports for development by Stephen Browne (FUNDS Project) and Sam Laird (University of Nottingham)

52 The Idea of World Government (2011) From ancient times to the twenty-first century by James A. Yunker (Western Illinois University)

51 Humanitarianism Contested (2011) Where angels fear to tread by Michael Barnett (George Washington University) and Thomas G. Weiss (The CUNY Graduate Center)

50 The Organization of American States (2011) Global governance away from the media by Monica Herz (Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro)

49 Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics (2011) The construction of global governance by Peter Willetts (City University, London)

48 The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (2011) by Ian Taylor (University of St. Andrews)

47 Global Think Tanks (2011) Policy networks and governance by James G. McGann (University of Pennsylvania) with Richard Sabatini

46 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2011) Creating norms for a complex world by J. P. Singh (Georgetown University)

45 The International Labour Organization (2011) Coming in from the cold by Steve Hughes (Newcastle University) and Nigel Haworth (University of Auckland)

44 Global Poverty (2010) How global governance is failing the poor by David Hulme (University of Manchester)

43 Global Governance, Poverty, and Inequality (2010) edited by Jennifer Clapp (University of Waterloo) and Rorden Wilkinson (University of Manchester)

42 Multilateral Counter-Terrorism (2010) The global politics of cooperation and contestation by Peter Romaniuk (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY)

41 Governing Climate Change (2010) by Peter Newell (University of East Anglia) and Harriet A. Bulkeley (Durham University)

40 The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat (2nd edition, 2010) by Leon Gordenker (Princeton University)

39 Preventive Human Rights Strategies (2010) by Bertrand G. Ramcharan (Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies)

38 African Economic Institutions (2010) by Kwame Akonor (Seton Hall University)

37 Global Institutions and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic (2010) Responding to an international crisis by Franklyn Lisk (University of Warwick)

36 Regional Security (2010) The capacity of international organizations by Rodrigo Tavares (United Nations University)

35 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009) by Richard Woodward (University of Hull)

34 Transnational Organized Crime (2009) by Frank Madsen (University of Cambridge)

33 The United Nations and Human Rights (2nd edition, 2009) A guide for a new era by Julie A. Mertus (American University)

32 The International Organization for Standardization (2009) Global governance through voluntary consensus by Craig N. Murphy (Wellesley College) and JoAnne Yates (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

31 Shaping the Humanitarian World (2009) by Peter Walker (Tufts University) and Daniel G. Maxwell (Tufts University)

30 Global Food and Agricultural Institutions (2009) by John Shaw

29 Institutions of the Global South (2009) by Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (City College of New York, CUNY)

28 International Judicial Institutions (2009) The architecture of international justice at home and abroad by Richard J. Goldstone (Retired Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa) and Adam M. Smith (Harvard University)

27 The International Olympic Committee (2009) The governance of the Olympic system by Jean-Loup Chappelet (IDHEAP Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration) and Brenda Kübler-Mabbott

26 The World Health Organization (2009) by Kelley Lee (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)

25 Internet Governance (2009) The new frontier of global institutions by John Mathiason (Syracuse University)

24 Institutions of the Asia-Pacific (2009) ASEAN, APEC, and beyond by Mark Beeson (University of Birmingham)

23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2008) The politics and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first century by Gil Loescher (University of Oxford), Alexander Betts (University of Oxford), and James Milner (University of Toronto)

22 Contemporary Human Rights Ideas (2008) by Bertrand G. Ramcharan (Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies)

21 The World Bank (2008) From reconstruction to development to equity by Katherine Marshall (Georgetown University)

20 The European Union (2008) by Clive Archer (Manchester Metropolitan University)

19 The African Union (2008) Challenges of globalization, security, and governance by Samuel M. Makinda (Murdoch University) and F. Wafula Okumu (McMaster University)

18 Commonwealth (2008) Inter- and non-state contributions to global governance by Timothy M. Shaw (Royal Roads University)

17 The World Trade Organization (2007) Law, economics, and politics by Bernard M. Hoekman (World Bank) and Petros C. Mavroidis (Columbia University)

16 A Crisis of Global Institutions? (2007) Multilateralism and international security by Edward Newman (University of Birmingham)

15 UN Conference on Trade and Development (2007) by Ian Taylor (University of St. Andrews) and Karen Smith (University of Stellenbosch)

14 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2007) by David J. Galbreath (University of Aberdeen)

13 The International Committee of the Red Cross (2007) A neutral humanitarian actor by David P. Forsythe (University of Nebraska) and Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan (Central Washington University)

12 The World Economic Forum (2007) A multi-stakeholder approach to global governance by Geoffrey Allen Pigman (Bennington College)

11 The Group of 7/8 (2007) by Hugo Dobson (University of Sheffield)

10 The International Monetary Fund (2007) Politics of conditional lending by James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University)

9 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007) The enduring alliance by Julian Lindley-French (Center for Applied Policy, University of Munich)

8 The World Intellectual Property Organization (2006) Resurgence and the development agenda by Chris May (University of the West of England)

7 The UN Security Council (2006) Practice and promise by Edward C. Luck (Columbia University)

6 Global Environmental Institutions (2006) by Elizabeth R. DeSombre (Wellesley College)

5 Internal Displacement (2006) Conceptualization and its consequences by Thomas G. Weiss (The CUNY Graduate Center) and David A. Korn

4 The UN General Assembly (2005) by M. J. Peterson (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

3 United Nations Global Conferences (2005) by Michael G. Schechter (Michigan State University)

2 The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat (2005) by Leon Gordenker (Princeton University)

1 The United Nations and Human Rights (2005) A guide for a new era by Julie A. Mertus (American University) Books currently under contract include:

The Regional Development Banks Lending with a regional flavor by Jonathan R. Strand (University of Nevada)

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) For a people-centered development agenda? by Sakiko Fukada-Parr (The New School)

Peacebuilding From concept to commission by Robert Jenkins (The CUNY Graduate Center)

UNICEF by Richard Jolly (University of Sussex)

The Bank for International Settlements The politics of global financial supervision in the age of high finance by Kevin Ozgercin (SUNY College at Old Westbury)

International Migration by Khalid Koser (Geneva Centre for Security Policy)

Human Development by Richard Ponzio

Religious Institutions and Global Politics by Katherine Marshall (Georgetown University)

The Group of Twenty (G20) by Andrew F. Cooper (Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario) and Ramesh Thakur (Balsillie School of International Affairs, Ontario)

The International Monetary Fund (2nd edition) Politics of conditional lending by James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University)

The UN Global Compact by Catia Gregoratti (Lund University)

Institutions for Women’s Rights by Charlotte Patton (York College, CUNY) and Carolyn Stephenson (University of Hawaii)

International Aid by Paul Mosley (University of Sheffield)

Global Consumer Policy by Karsten Ronit (University of Copenhagen)

The Changing Political Map of Global Governance by Anthony Payne (University of Sheffield) and Stephen Robert Buzdugan (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Coping with Nuclear Weapons by W. Pal Sidhu

Global Sustainability by Tapio Kanninen

Private Foundations and Development Partnerships by Michael Moran (Swinburne University of Technology)

Feminist Strategies in International Governance edited by Gülay Caglar (Humboldt University of Berlin), Elisabeth Prügl (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva), Susanne Zwingel (SUNY Potsdam)

The International Politics of Human Rights edited by Monica Serrano (Colegio de Mexico) and Thomas G. Weiss (The CUNY Graduate Center)

For further information regarding the series, please contact: Craig Fowlie, Publisher, Politics & International Studies Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon Oxford OX14 4RN, UK +44 (0)207 842 2057 Tel +44 (0)207 842 2302 Fax [email protected] www.routledge.com