Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth [1 ed.] 0691028982, 9780691028989

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•

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Bell

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Cu

Claude S. Fischer, Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann Swidler. .

andKi

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Inequality by Design

Inequality by Design CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH

Claude

S.

Fischer,

Michael Hout,

Martin Sanchez Jankowski,

Samuel

Ann

R. Lucas,

Swidler,

and Kim Voss Department of Sociology University of California, Berkeley

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright

©

1996 by Princeton University Press

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,

New Jersey 08540 Kingdom: Princeton University Chichester, West Sussex

Princeton, In the United

Press,

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Inequality by design bell

curve myth

/

Claude p.

cracking the

:

S.

Fischer

.

.

.

[et al.].

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

—

ISBN 0-691-02899-0 (cl alk. paper). ISBN 0-691-02898-2 (pb alk. paper) :

:

1

3.

.

Intellect.

2.

Nature and nurture.

4. Intelligence levels

United States. 6.

—United —Social aspects

Intelligence levels

5.

States.

Educational psychology.

Herrnstein, Richard I.

Fischer,

Claude

J.

S.,

Bell curve.

1948-

BF431.I513 1996 96-2171 305.9'082—dc20 This book has been composed in Times

CIP

Roman

Princeton University Press books are printed

on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines

permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity

for

of the Council on Library Resources Printed in the United States of America

3579 7

9

8642

10 10

(Pbk.)

8

TO OUR CHILDREN

We

have been quick

failures in

to seek explanations of our

what we are instead of what we do.

to the belief that our situation is a

problems and

We

seem wedded

consequence of our nature

rather than of our historical acts

.

.

.

—Kenneth Bock, Human Nature Mythology

* Contents *

Figures and Tables

ix

Preface

xi

Chapter

Why

1

Inequality?

Chapter

3

2

22

Understanding "Intelligence"

Chapter But

Is It

3

55

Intelligence?

Chapter 4

Who

Wins?

Chapter

Who

70

Loses?

5

The Rewards of the Game: Systems of

Inequality

102

Chapter 6

How

Unequal? America's Invisible Policy Choices

Chapter

7

Enriching Intelligence:

Chapter

129

More

Policy Choices

158

8

Race, Ethnicity, and Intelligence

171

Chapter 9 Confronting Inequality

in

America: The Power of Public

204

Investment

Appendix

Summary

1

of The Bell Curve

21

Appendix 2 Statistical

Analysis for Chapter 4

225

Notes

241

References

277

Index

303

Figures and Tables *

Figures 1.1

Changes

1.2

Explained Variance in Household Income Accounted for by

in

Household Incomes, 1959-1989, by Income Class

5

Intelligence 2.

15

Distribution of Original Scores on the

AFQT

and Distribution

of Scores as Transformed by Herrnstein and Murray

32

2.2

Different Interpretations of Predictive Validity

36

2.3

Interpreting Criterion Validity

38

4.1

Herrnstein and Murray's

Model of the Causes of Inequality

and Social Problems

73

4.2

Our Model of the Causes of

4.3

Probability That an

AFQT Score 4.4

in

1990 by

was Poor

in

1990 by

NLSY Respondent Was Poor in

1990 by

8

NLSY Respondent

85

Social Environment, and Formal Education

Probability That an

AFQT Score 4.7

Poor

Score and Social Background

Probability That an

AFQT Score, 4.6

NLSY Respondent Was

NLSY Respondent Was Poor in

87

1990 by

and Gender

89

Explained Variance in Household Income Accounted for by (a) Intelligence

Alone versus

(b) Social

Environment and

Gender Alone

100

Today

5.1

Estimates of Inequality from

5.2

Percentage of All Household Income Received by Highest-

1

800

to

107

Income 5 Percent and Lowest-Income 40 Percent of Households, 1930-1994

Who

Earned Enough

110

5.3

Percentage of Full-Time Workers

5.4

Keep a Family of Four Out of Poverty, 1964-1994 Income Changes Over a Decade for Men in Their Thirties and Forties,

to

1950-1993

Age Group, 1966-1994

Rates of Poverty by

5.6

Ratios of Earnings for High-, Median-, and Low-Earners in

Six Nations

1

19

122

Ratios of Incomes for High-, Median-, and

Households

112

114

5.5

5.7

74

and Family Background

Probability That an

AFQT 4.5

Inequality and Social Problems

in

Eight Nations

Low-Income 124

ix

FIGURES AND TABLES 6.

1

Percentage of Children

Who

Government Action,

Eight Nations

in

7.1

An

7.2

Probability that Students

8.1

A Model

Are Poor, Before and After 134

S-shaped Learning Curve

Were

161 in

College Track by Math Test

Score and Social Class of

How Low

164 Ethnic Position Causes

Low

Test

Scores 8.2

174

Index of Black Residential Isolation, Eighteen Northern Cities,

1890-1990

184

Tables Women,

the Unmarried, and Parents

4.1

Poverty Rates for

6.1

147

8.1

Change in Family Income, 1977 to 1990 Group Differences Around the World

A2.1

Descriptive Statistics of All Variables by Race

230

A2.2

Description of Variable Coding

231

A2.3

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a Person Being in

A2.4

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a Person Being in

A2.5

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a

A2.6

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a

192

Poverty in 1990 (Whites Only)

233

234

Poverty in 1990 (African Americans Only)

Interviewed in

Interviewed in

A2.7

Jail after

Jail after

AFQT

A2.8

Being

236

(Whites Only)

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a

AFQT

Man

Being

Americans Only)

Woman

AFQT (African

Woman

237

Having an

(Whites Only)

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of a Illegitimate Child after

Man

AFQT (African

Illegitimate First Child after

90

238

Having an

Americans Only)

239

* Preface *

w

were

impelled to write

book by

this

the publication in late 1994 of

The Bell Curve. That immensely well publicized book was then the

latest

statement of a philosophy that gained extensive credence in the 1990s: The

widening inequalities among Americans century are inevitable. Because of

the market, because of the nature of

more and more by

sarily divide

that

human

modern

social class

ophy. Besides being morally complacent, foundation. Research has

shown

developed

in the last quarter-

nature, because of the nature of

it

society,

and is

Americans

race.

will neces-

We reject that philos-

a doctrine without scientific

that "nature" determines neither the level

of inequality in America nor which Americans in particular will be privileged or disprivileged; social conditions and national policies do. Inequalsense designed. Similarly, the market does not require us to

ity is in that

accept great inequalities for the sake of growth. Quite the reverse seems

do better the more equal

true; nations ties

can be

less

And modern socieothers are now and ours

their citizens are.

unequal than America

is in

1996;

has been in the past. The Bell Curve, in particular, as an emphatic statement

of this mistaken philosophy,

is

intelligence explain inequality.

wrong to claim that differences in native The social science evidence is clear. We

see our task as bringing such evidence to the attention of the wider public.

—came

we

—

members of Berkeley's Department of Sociolphenomenon and soon response from sociologists was in order. Some colleagues

In late 1994,

ogy

all

together to discuss The Bell Curve

agreed that a

suggested that The Bell Curve would fade from public consciousness. After all, its

arguments about the significance of intelligence had already been

dealt with.

(Almost a quarter-century ago, Christopher Jencks and his col-

leagues showed, in Inequality, that individuals' intelligence at best only

modestly affects their fortunes.) But the ideology The Bell Curve represents

is

too pervasive; the book's shock waves are too great to ignore.

social scientists, sity teachers,

we

we

feel responsible for correcting the record.

are painfully

aware

that

As citizens, we must participate much of our ongoing work to write

As

The Bell Curve has unsettled our

students.

in the national debate.

aside

this

Inequality by Design

is

As

univer-

So we

set

book.

a true collaboration. While particular individ-

uals took the lead in drafting specific chapters, everyone joined in outlin-

ing the basic argument, contributing ideas, and revising drafts. Fischer had

xi

PREFACE and giving the book

responsibility, in addition, for coordinating the project

a single authorial voice.

We benefited from the collaboration as well of several Berkeley graduate students. Richard

Arum was

so critical to our reanalysis of The Bell Curve

data that he shares authorship of chapters 3 and 4. Elizabeth Armstrong, Leslie Bell, Charlotte Chiu, Tally Katz,

helped us find some of the scientific

Amy

literature.

uted include Judy Haier and Maureen Fesler. tion" of several scholars

both.

We thank Robert

Christopher Jencks,

who gave

Schalet, and

Berkeley

We

for

contrib-

Adam

Hochschild,

Rob Macoun, Douglas Massey, Lee

Rainwater, Paul

We

especially thank

commenting us.

who

us either suggestions or comments, or

Bellah, Fred Block, Joe Harder,

on an early

closely

draft.

Troy Duster, Robert Hauser, and Chris Winship shared manuscripts with

Sean Stryker

had the "collabora-

also

Romer, Saul Rubin, David Vogel, and Alan Wolfe.

David Levine

staff

William Dickens,

their prepublication

Audiences who heard early versions of the work

at the

University of Arizona, University of Virginia, Princeton University, the University of California, Berkeley, and the

May

national Sociological Association's Research

1995 meeting of the

Committee on

Inter-

Stratification

and Mobility helped hone our arguments.

No

large grants funded this work, but Berkeley's

Department of Sociol-

ogy and Survey Research Center provided meeting rooms and occasional secretarial assistance. In addition, the stitute

Survey Research Center and the

of Industrial Relations supported a few of the graduate students

In-

who

helped us.

We

also very

much

appreciate the

commitment and energy

Dougherty, publisher of Social Science and Public Affairs University Press, gave this book.

McKenna and editor.

We

We

that Peter

Princeton

also thank, at the Press, Michelle

Jane Low. Anita O'Brien was our amazingly efficient copy

Chris Brest drew the figures.

hope

that this

book

will help redirect the public discussion

from the mistaken, helpless view equality are very

much

tion that, as great as

whom we

within citizens' control.

it is

away

that inequality is fated or necessary

toward the more accurate, empowering understanding

to

at

We

that opportunity

look forward to a na-

today, will be a yet fairer one

when our

dedicate this work, shoulder the burdens of

xn

and

and

its

children,

citizenship.

Inequality by Design

CHAPTER

*

Why

A, we .s

1

*

Inequality?

write, Americans are engaged

in a great

debate about the in-

equalities that increasingly divide us. For over twenty years, the

gaps have widened. As the American Catholic Bishops stated

economic

in late 1995,

economy sometimes seems to be leading to three nations living by side, one growing more prosperous and powerful, one squeezed by

"the U.S. side

stagnant incomes and rising economic pressures and one

behind

left

increasing poverty, dependency and hopelessness." Being prosperous 1

mean owning

in

may

a vacation home, purchasing private security services, and

having whatever medical care one wants; being squeezed

may mean 1 when

ing one modest but heavily mortgaged house, depending on 91

hav-

dan-

ger lurks, and delaying medical care because of the expense of copayments;

and being

left

rent, relying

may mean

behind

barely scraping together each month's

on oneself for physical

safety,

and awaiting emergency aid

Most Americans

an overcrowded public

clinic.

fragile their position

One missed mortgage payment

is.

jury might be enough to push

Few deny

thing can be done about

Some

them

that inequality has it,

middle

in the

know how

or one chronic in-

into the class that has

widened. 2 The debate

at

been

left

behind.

over whether any-

is

over whether anything should be done about

it.

voices call for an activist government to sustain the middle class and

uplift the poor.

Other voices, the ones that hold sway as

government ought

to

do

less,

They argue

not more.

we write,

argue that

for balanced budgets,

lower taxes, fewer domestic programs, minimal welfare, and less regulation.

These moves, they contend, would energize the economy and

way

help the middle class.

They would

in that

also help the poor, economically

and otherwise. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich

in

1995 said of people

on welfare: "The government took away something more important than .

.

.

money. They took away

their initiative,

morality, their drive, their pride.

I

want

.

to help

.

.

their

freedom,

them get

.

.

that back."

.

3

their

As

to

some advocates of circumscribed cannot be changed, because inequality is natural; some

the increasing inequality of our time,

government say say

it

it

ought not be changed, because inequality drives our economy. At a

deeper

level, then, the

explains

its

the debate.

origin,

debate

is

about

what explains

its

how

to understand inequality

growth. That

is

where we

shall

— what engage

CHAPTER The arguments over

1

policy emerged from almost a quarter century of

economic turmoil and disappointment. Middle-class Americans saw the era of seemingly

ever-expanding affluence for themselves and ever-

expanding opportunities for

The

their children

come

to

an abrupt end in 1973.

cars inching forward in the gasoline lines of the mid-1970s foreshad-

owed

the next twenty years of middle-class experience.

prices rose, husbands to stay at

seemed tracted.

home

felt

worked longer hours, and even wives who preferred

pressed to find jobs. The horizons for their children

upward economic mobility conWhat was going on? What could be done about it?

In the early 1980s,

solution

was

one explanation dominated public discussion and

The cause of the middle-class less

crisis

government

was government, and

—had wrecked

the

—indeed,

by rewarding the sluggards and penalizing the

swer was

to get

talented.

stunting

The

an-

government "off the backs" of those who generate eco-

nomic growth. "Unleash the market" and the lift all

the very size of

economy by wasting money and

initiative,

that will

its

government. Regulations, taxes, programs for the poor,

preferences for minorities, spending on schools

result

would be a

"rising tide

boats, yachts and rowboats alike."

won enough

This explanation for the economic doldrums

public support

be enacted. Less regulation, less domestic spending, and more tax cuts

for the wealthy followed.

class

had not eased;

it

By

the 1990s, however, the crisis of the middle

had just become more complicated. Figure

the trends in family incomes, adjusted for changes in prices,

1989 to

stagnated,

to shrink as the opportunities for 4

public policy:

to

Wages

(the trends continued into the 1990s).

new

The

1.1

shows

from 1959

richest families

to

had soared

heights of income, the poorest families had sunk after 1970, and the

middle-income families had gained terly misleading.

The middle

class

slightly.

But

managed

this slight

to sustain

gain was

bit-

modest income

growth only by mothers taking jobs and fathers working longer hours. Also, the slight gain could not

make up

for

and parents' anxiety that key elements of the education, a stable job, and an affordable

grasp of their children.

began

to

And

growing economic insecurity

"American Dream"

home

—were

slipping

—

college

beyond the

so the phrase "the disappearing middle class"

be heard.

Another puzzle now called for explanation: The 1980s had been a boom decade; overall wealth had grown. But average Americans were working harder to stay even.

Why had the gaps between the rich and the middle and How do we understand such

between the middle and the poor widened? inequality?

WHY INEQUALITY

9

Between 1959 and 1969, income per person grew for all households. Since 1970, income per person has continued to grow rapidly for the richest households, grown at a declining rate among middle-income households, and fallen slightly among poor house-holds. The result is significantly

more

inequality.

$60,000 M «J

Top 20%

O T3 ON on ON

.A $50,000

1—1

C CO

$40,000

^A"

CLh

4-» C/5

3 $10,000

Bottom 20%

T3

< $0

1959

1979

1969

1989

Year

1.1.

Changes

in

Household Incomes, 1959-1989, by Income Class (Note:

Household incomes are adjusted by dividing income per family member by the square root of the household

size.

"Demographic Change, Rising Earnings

An answer emerged the

same voices

that

in the public debate,

had offered the

Source: Karoly and Burtless,

Inequality," table 2)

forwarded for the most part by

earlier explanation: Inequality is a

"natural," almost inevitable, result of an unfettered market.

sary by-product of unleashing talent. sink. Eventually,

free market.

however,

all

The reason such wider

the market has not

The

will gain

skilled soar

It is

the neces-

and the unskilled

from the greater efficiency of the

benefits have yet to be delivered

been freed up enough; we need

still

less

is

that

government and

CHAPTER

1

then the wealth will flow to middle- and lower-income Americans. Sharp inequality

among

trade-off for

The

strongest recent statement that inequality

market came

free

the classes, these voices suggested,

American were

is

the natural result of a

The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure

in

in

published in 1994. Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray

Life,

argued that intelligence largely determined rich

the necessary

is

economic growth.

rich mostly because they

how

well people did in

life.

The

were smart, the poor were poor mostly

because they were dumb, and middle Americans were middling mostly because they were of middling intelligence. This had long been so but was

becoming even more so

as

new and

inescapable economic forces such as

made

global trade and technological development

by

more impor-

more open economy, people rose or sank

tant than ever before. In a

levels largely fixed

intelligence

their intelligence.

essentially innate, this expanding inequality cannot be stopped.

It

damaging the national economy. Inequality

is

is

might be

slowed by government meddling, but only by also doing injustice talented and

to the

Moreover, because intelligence

to the

in these

ways

"natural," inevitable, and probably desirable.

The Bell Curve also provided an explanation for another troubling aspect of inequality in America

—

its

strong connection to race and ethnicity.

Black families, for example, are half as likely

to

be wealthy and twice as

be poor as white families. The questions of

likely to

racial disparities

Now,

decades.

is

—and

why

to

how

to understand

do about them have anguished the nation

was a new answer

there

newed): Blacks whites; that

and what

Latinos, too

(actually, a very old

—were by

answer

for re-

nature not as intelligent as

they did less well economically, and that

is

why

little

can or should be done about racial inequality. Yet decades of social science research, and further research sent here, refute the claim that inequality

equality

is fated.

it

have such disparate standards of is this: First,

will pre-

explain

why

who

people in different classes

living. Instead,

individuals' social milieux

what

—

better explains in-

family, neighborhood,

—

community provide or withhold the means for attaining higher positions in American society, in part by providing people with mar-

school, class

we

natural and increasing in-

Individual intelligence does not satisfactorily explain

ends up in which class; nor does

equality

is

ketable

skills.

by social

Much

policy.

of what those milieux have to offer

For example, the quality of health care

is,

in turn,

shaped

that families pro-

vide and the quality of education that schools impart are strongly affected

by government

action. Second, social policy significantly influences the

rewards individuals receive for having attained their positions in society.

WHY INEQUALITY? Circumstances earn,

— such

how much

sidized

—determine

living. In turn, these

government.

We

how much money

as

professional or manual workers

tax they pay, whether their child care or housing

sub-

is

manual workers' standards of

professionals' versus

circumstances are completely or partly determined by

do not have

such inequalities to sustain or ex-

to suffer 5

pand our national standard of living. Thus, inequality

is

not the natural and

inevitable consequence of intelligence operating in a free market; in substantial

measure

it

is

and

will

always be the socially constructed and

changeable consequence of Americans' political choices.

Our contribution

to the debate over

and why inequality arises and

to clarify

how

our argument by

first

growing inequality

persists.

We

initiate

is

challenging the explanation in The Bell Curve, the idea that inequality

we go on

natural and fated. Then,

to

show how

social

is

environment and

conscious policy mold inequality in America. If the

growing inequality

in

America

is

not the inevitable result of free

markets operating on natural intelligence, but the aftermath of circumstances that can be altered, then different policy implications follow from

those outlined in The Bell Curve. equalities

mount; we do not have

growth; and

we do

We

do not have

to accept

them

to fatalistically let in-

as the Faustian trade for

not have to accept heartlessness as the companion of

social analysis. Instead,

we can

anticipate greater equality of opportunity

and equality of outcome and also greater economic growth.

Explaining Inequality

Why

do some Americans have a

human

follows inevitably from

talent than others; the first tion. is

Many

people accept

lot

more than others? Perhaps,

nature.

Some people

succeed while the others

this explanation, but

it

inequality

are born with

fail in life's

more

competi-

will not suffice. Inequality

not fated by nature, nor even by the "invisible hand" of the market;

it

is

a social construction, a result of our historical acts. Americans have created

and type of inequality we have, and Americans maintain it. To answer the question of what explains inequality in America, we must

the extent

divide

it

who falls behind in the competiSecond, what determines how much people get for being

in two. First,

tion for success?

who

gets ahead and

ahead or behind? To see more clearly

that the

two questions

are different,

think of a ladder that represents the ranking of affluence in a society. Question

one asks why

this

person rather than that person ended up on a higher

or lower rung. Question

two asks why some

societies have

tall

and narrow-

CHAPTER ing ladders

—ladders

people

—while other

have huge distances between top and bottom

that

rungs and that taper off

1

top so that there

at the

room

is

distance between top and bottom and with lots of

little

people

all

way

the

One

the footrace:

is

room

for

many

who wins and who and rewards of the race. Some

question

is

loses; another question is

what are the

rules

races are winner-take-all;

some award

prizes to only the

others award prizes to

The answer

few

—ladders with

to the top.

(Another metaphor

we need

stand the race,

for only a

have short and broad ladders

societies

many

finishers,

even

to understand the rules

to the question

of

who

first

few

to all participants.

finishers;

To under-

and rewards.)

ends up where

that people's social

is

environments largely influence what rung of the ladder they end up on. 6

The advantages and disadvantages

that people inherit

from

their parents,

the resources that their friends can share with them, the quantity and quality

of their schooling, and even the historical era into which they are born

boost some up and hold others down. The children of professors, our children, have substantial

head

starts

over children

Young men who graduated from high school

who

greater opportunities than the ones

of, say, factory

in the

own

workers.

booming 1950s had

graduated during the Depression.

Context matters tremendously.

The answer to is more

why

the question of

rewards

political.

societies vary in their structure of

In significant measure, societies choose the

height and breadth of their "ladders."

them, by providing services to

By

loosening markets or regulating

citizens or rationing

all

them according

to

income, by subsidizing some groups more than others, societies, through their politics, build their ladders.

To be

straints

deny

remains

(see, especially, chapters 5

full

freedom of

Americans have

the inequality

result of policy choices

tives

—have made.

tinctively unequal.

sure, historical

action, but a substantial

and

—

or, at least,

In the United States, the result

Our ladder

is,

To

see

—and becoming more

how

—

means

that

measure, the historical

Americans' representais

a society that is dis-

history, unusually

extended

so.

policies shape the structure of rewards

outcomes), consider these examples:

marketplace

this

by the standards of affluent democracies

and even by the standards of recent American and narrow

democracy,

in significant

is,

Americans

6). In a

and external con-

freedom of action

Laws

(i.e.,

the equality of

provide the ground rules for the

rules covering incorporation, patents, wages,

ditions, unionization, security transactions, taxes,

working con-

and so on.

Some laws

income and earnings among people in the market; others narrow differences. Also, many government programs affect inwiden differences

equality

more

in

directly through, for example, tax deductions, food stamps,

8

WHY INEQUALITY? and corporate subsidies. Later

social security, Medicare,

in this

book,

we

Americans have taken, or chosen

will look closely at the various initiatives

not to take, that shape inequality.

To

see

how

and which

policies also affect

the

fall to

which particular individuals get

bottom of our ladder

to the top

the equality of opportunity),

(i.e.,

consider these examples: The amount of schooling young Americans receive heavily determines the jobs they get and the income they make. In turn, educational policies

— what

school resources are distributed (usually according to the

which children strongly affect

live),

way community in

sorts of schools are provided, the

teaching methods such as tracking, and so on

how much

schooling children receive. Similarly, local em-

ployment opportunities constrain how well people can do economically.

Whether and where governments promote jobs or influence

who

Claiming equalities

tell

do so

who

that other policies could

in-

change those inequalities

a novel idea in the current ideological climate.

us that inequality

will, in turn,

is not.

have significantly constructed the

that intentional policies

we have and

may seem

fail to

poised for well-paid employment and

is

So many voices

the result of individuals' "natural" talents in a

is

"natural" market. Nature defeats any sentimental efforts by society to re-

duce inequality, they say; such

efforts should therefore

Bock wrote

be dropped as

futile

common

and comforting. As Kenneth

in his study of social philosophy,

"We have been quick to seek what we are instead of what

and wasteful. Appeals to nature are

explanations of our problems and failures in

we do. We seem wedded

to the belief that

is

a consequence of

this case,

appeals to nature

our situation

our nature rather than of our historical acts." 7 In are shortsighted.

Arguments from nature

are useless for answering the question of

what

determines the structure of rewards because that question concerns differences in equality us

why

among societies. Theories of natural

inequality cannot

tell

countries with such similar genetic stocks (and economic markets)

as the United States, Canada, England, and

Sweden can vary

so

much

degree of economic inequality their citizens experience. The answer

in the lies in

deliberate policies.

Appeals tion:

Why

genetic

cannot satisfactorily answer even the

to nature also

do some individuals get ahead and some

endowment

and white helps

helps.

Being

tall,

makes them matter

and these

traits

More important

milieux in which people grow up and

ques-

traits are totally

or partly

matter to the degree that society

—determining how much,

white skin are rewarded.

first

behind? Certainly,

slender, good-looking, healthy, male,

in the race for success,

determined genetically. But these

fall

for example,

good looks or

yet than these traits are the social

live.

CHAPTER

1

much

Realizing that intentional policies account for

of our expanding

more accurate than theories of natural inequality; it is also more optimistic. We are today more unequal than we have been in seventy years. We are more unequal than any other affluent Western nainequality

is

not only

tion. Intentional policies

could change those conditions, could reduce and

reverse our rush to a polarized society, could bring us closer to the average inequality in the West, could expand both equality of opportunity and

equality of result. Still,

the "natural inequality" viewpoint

is

a popular one. Unequal out-

comes, the best-selling Bell Curve argues, are the returns from a cess that sorts people out according to

how

Bell Curve's explanation of inequality

is

assuming

human

that

intelligent they are.

inadequate.

fair pro-

But The

The authors

err in

can be reduced to a single, fixed, and essen-

talents

they label intelligence. They err in asserting that this

tially innate skill

largely determines

how

people end up in

life.

And

trait

they err in imagining

that individual competition explains the structure of inequality in society.

In this book,

we

use The Bell Curve as a starting point for really under-

standing inequality in America.

evidence, fated

we can

see what

is

By

exploring that book's argument and

wrong with

by nature and see instead how

the viewpoint that inequality

social milieux

its

is

and social policy create

inequality.

Generations of social scientists have studied inequality. Hundreds of

books and

articles

many factors that including among of research.

have appeared

affect

in the last

decade alone examining the

who gets ahead and who falls behind in our society,

those factors intelligence. We will draw on this treasury We will also show, using the very same survey used in The Bell

Curve, that social environment

is

more important

which American becomes poor than

is

in

helping determine

"native intelligence" most gener-

we will turn to the more profound question, the why the United States has the system of inequality it

ously estimated. Then,

second question, of does.

We

will

show

that although

much

results

from purposeful, and

of

it

some

inequality results from market

—and even many aspects of market

forces,

inequality itself

alterable, policy.

The Bell Curve Controversy In late

1994 a publishing sensation burst upon America. The covers of

newsmagazines heralded a new study articles inside

and whites

in

suggested

—of

America. The

—perhaps

the definitive study, the

the differences in intelligence

between blacks

New Republic blared "Race & IQ" in enormous 10

WHY INEQUALITY? letters

—and

sold out

rack copies in Harvard Square. Newsweek's cover

all

man and

featured facial profiles of a black

back with the superimposed words "IQ.

New Book

Controversial

&

on Race, Class

Those who went beyond the

man

a white

Is It

standing back-to-

A

Hard Look

at a

book claiming

that

Destiny?

Success."

front covers read of a

blacks are not as smart as whites, most likely because the two groups'

genes

More

differ.

broadly, they read that intelligence

by nature unequally inequalities

inequality

best

among Americans. The

is

natural, then

wrongheaded and

at

political implications

in the first case; the

for National Public

as

was

it

publicized. Both The

New

it

is at

New

Repub-

York Times Magazine published a coverthat

he

is

a boor; an interviewer

Radio delivered almost every question

with a clear note of skepticism; the editorials against the

clear: If

their reports with critical sidebars, over a

one of the authors implying

story profile of

were

worst destructive.

and Newsweek bracketed

dozen

a gift distributed

governmental intervention to moderate

The book was attacked even lic

is

conception and that this distribution explains the

at

New

book; and so on.

to that author at least

two

book withstood

the

York Times published

And

yet the

attacks and sold hundreds of thousands of hardcover copies (perhaps a sales record for a

book with dozens of pages of

The Bell Curve, by Richard

ogy professor

at

statistical tables).

Herrnstein (who had long been a psychol-

J.

Harvard University

at his

untimely death shortly before

the book's publication) and Charles

Murray

well-known conservative

and resident

more

tanks), is

stance its

is

is

essayist,

substantial than

due not merely

to its

imposing array of graphs, a philosophy ages old:

demption; inequality talents,

is

Ph.D.

in political science,

at

conservative think

media representations suggest.

its

Its

sub-

mass, about 850 pages cover-to-cover, nor to tables, footnotes,

Human

fated;

(a

misery

is

and people

and references. At

its

base

and beyond human

natural

re-

deserve, by virtue of their native

the positions they have in society.

From

that ideological base,

Herrnstein and Murray build a case that critics cannot simply dismiss out

of hand. Herrnstein and Murray argue

—

relying on their

own

national survey, supplemented by an array of citations

analysis of a large

—

that individuals'

intelligence largely decides their life outcomes. Intelligence

unequally a

among

few people

distributed

people, in a distribution shaped like a "bell curve" with

at the

people clumped

is

lower end, a few people

in the

middle.

A

at the

upper end, and most

person's position in that distribution

heavily influences his or her position in the other distributions of

life

—

the

distributions of jobs, income, marriage, criminality, and the like.

The centerpiece of Herrnstein and Murray's evidence 11

is

the National

CHAPTER (NLS Y),

Longitudinal Survey of Youth

1

a massive survey of over ten thou-

sand young Americans involving repeated interviews over more than a de-

The

cade.

NLSY administered

Armed

the

to its subjects in 1980. Herrnstein

who

scored high on that

poorly. This

is

(AFQT)

NLSY

subjects

which the authors

test,

usually doing well ten years

Forces Qualifying Test

and Murray show

and those

later,

that

treat as

an "IQ"

who had low

test,

proof, they argue, that intelligence largely determines life

outcomes. Herrnstein and Murray also contend that intelligence tially fixed,

unchangeable

in

therefore also unchangeable. forts to alter this naturally

any significant fashion. People's

And

who have

not read

The Bell Curve

is

so must be social inequality

is

essen-

fates are

Ef-

itself.

unequal order waste money and undermine

efficiency and justice. (Appendix

those

were

scores ended up

summarizes The Bell Curve

1

its

in detail for

it.)

an inadequate explanation of where individual Ameri-

cans end up in the system of inequality.

some people end up higher than

others

Its

answer

to the question of

why

on the ladder of success vastly over-

estimates the relative importance of aptitude tests and underestimates the

importance of the social environment. Despite Herrnstein and Murray's self-congratulations that, in examining intelligence, they have dared to go

where no

social scientist has

that scores

on IQ and IQ-like

gone before, scholars long ago established tests

were only of modest importance com-

pared with social context in explaining individual attainment.

We reinforce

and expand that familiar conclusion by redoing Herrnstein and Murray's analysis of the

NLSY

the

AFQT is

largely a

We show that they made major errors that AFQT relative to social factors. For example,

survey.

exaggerated the role of the

measure of

Newsweek cover could

instruction, not native intelligence.

just as well read "Grades.

NLSY

Moreover, a correct analysis of the score

is

only one factor

among

these factors, the social ones are

More

how

more important than

AFQT

well people do; of

the test score.

fundamentally, The Bell Curve also provides an inadequate under-

standing of systems of inequality. the

Are They Destiny?")

survey reveals that the

several that predict

(The

American ladder

is

so

tall

Its

implied answer to the question of why

and narrow

natural market. This interpretation

is

is

that natural talent prevails in a

wrong,

in part

because

it

is histori-

cally naive. For example, during most of this century Americans became

substantially

more equal economically, but

since 1973 they have

become

substantially less equal. Understanding such fluctuations in inequality re-

quires a broader historical and international perspective than The Bell

Curve provides.

Why

We

try to provide

do we pay so much

such a broader perspective.

attention to

12

The Bell Curve? Some colleagues

WHY INEQUALITY^ The Bell Curve

told us that

is

so patently wrongheaded that

would be

it

quickly dismissed; that genetic explanations of inequality are old news,

having gained notoriety and disrepute

and

we would

earlier; that

we

so forth. But

go away.

The Bell Curve

felt that

seventy years ago,

thirty years ago,

only further publicize The Bell Curve; and not easily ignored.

is

It

will not

ideas and data, at least as transmitted by the media and by poli-

Its

many

provide a touchstone in policy debates for

ticians, will

Our

years.

Berkeley colleague Troy Duster notes that within weeks of The Bell Curve's publication, Charles Murray had been invited to address the newly elected Republicans in the

House of Representatives and

that an article in

The Chronicle of Philanthropy had speculated that charity for "people of 8 Shortly afterward, the president of lesser ability" might be a waste. Rutgers University faced an uproar when he apparently alluded to The Bell

Curve

in explaining

problems of black students.

Also, The Bell Curve's perspective on society, which reduces a complex

more than

reality to little

a footrace

among unequally

offends us as social scientists. Social reality set

—

swift individuals,

for example,

up the "race" and how they reward the runners

how

societies

—cannot be understood

through such reductionist thinking.

Nor were we

satisfied with the critical appraisals that

we undertook this

Some

project in late 1994.

had appeared when

reviewers, even as they casti-

gated The Bell Curve, accepted, or were perhaps intimidated by, tific

presentation.

Some

its

attacked the authors, the authors' funders, or the

authors' intellectual friends. Deserved or not, such attacks

Herrnstein and Murray's claims.

do not invalidate

Some commentators seemed

to be grasp-

ing at straws, picking one or two contrary studies reported in the

without noting that the authors had piled on

And some just admonished The

arguments. plications.

We

scien-

many

book

others to support their

Bell Curve for

its

political

im-

believed that the book deserved neither the deference nor

the unfair attacks.

It

could be challenged on scientific grounds. Also,

in

responding, critics generally accepted Herrnstein and Murray's framing of

why some people finish first and others last. 9 We do not. As academics, we have the impulse to contest every claim and statistic the 850 pages of The Bell Curve. There are certainly many errors and

the question:

in

10

contradictions in the details. dress:

What

is

ronment play set as

it

is?

intelligence? in

What

shaping

However, there are more basic issues

What

life

role

outcomes?

difference does policy

issues, the particular statistics usually history.

We

will

do individual

show

that

Why

to ad-

and social envi-

the structure of

outcomes

make? For resolving many of these

do not matter

The Bell Curve 13

is

talent

is

wrong

as

much

as logic and

statistically, that

it

is

CHAPTER

1

even more profoundly wrong logically and

historically,

and

that its impli-

cations are destructive.

One

statistic is

worth noting right away because

it

shows

The Bell Curve than some intimidated reviewers have

less to

that there is

realized: "ex-

plained variance." Near the end of their text, Herrnstein and Murray capsulize their

argument by asserting

on how people do that

AFQT scores,

their

powerful bearing

that "intelligence has a

in life" (p. 527).

However, 410 pages

measure of IQ, explain "usually

cent and often less than five percent" of the variance in

admit

earlier they

less than ten per-

how

people do in

What does "explained variance" mean? It refers to the amount variation in some outcome, like income, from zero to 100 percent,

life (p. 117).

of the that

can be explained by a particular cause or

set

of causes. To state that

intelligence explains 10 percent of the variance in, say, people's earnings is to

say that intelligence accounts for 10 percent of the differences

people in earnings, leaving 90 percent of the differences

unaccounted

for.

By

among

own statistical estimate, outcomes among respondents

Herrnstein and Murray's

5 to 10 percent of the differences in

life

odds that they became poor, criminal, unwed mothers, and so on accounted for by differences among them way,

90

if

to

we

95 percent of the inequality

The

1

we

see today.

What

F-axis represents the proportion of

shows

that virtually

2 percent

is,

we would

that

still

in the

United

in

to $150,000.

in 1993;

—had incomes of $25,000, about .01(1

shape of inequality

hardly changed. Because

line displays the actual distribu-

household income. The dashed if

line dis-

every adult in the

AFQT score accounts for, at best, only

of the variation in earnings, 11

it

solid

about

percent) had

United States had had identical intelligence as measured by the

for.

see

shown

American households. The

plays what that distribution would have looked like

counted

the

is

means

income

no households had zero income

incomes of $75,000; and so on. The solid tion or the

— —can be

scores. Put another

bottom are the incomes from zero

line

that

only

.2.

The

—

AFQT

figure displays the distribution of household

States in 1993. Across the

.02

in

could magically give everyone identical IQs,

graphically in figure

among earners

AFQT:

10 percent

leaves 90 percent of the variation unac-

In sum, intelligence, at least as

measured by the AFQT,

is

of

such minor importance that American income inequality would hardly

change even

if

everyone had the same

AFQT score.

(In a response to simi-

Murray backed away from explained variance as a criterion judging the importance of intelligence, but The Bell Curve argument

lar criticisms,

for

depends on

that criterion.)

12

As some economists have noted for policy

is

in

reviewing The Bell Curve,

neither total explained variance nor even whether

14

13,

the issue

it is

intelli-

WHY INEQUALITY

If all adults had the same test scores (but different family origins and environments), inequality of household

incomes would decrease by about 10 percent.

% of households with income close to average remains about the same

t

a

4 Household income,

V

U.S., 1993

*

All adults have the same AFQT

A

4

*P

o §\000 $25,000

$50,000

$125,000

$100,000

$75,000

$150,000

Household Income Level

1.2.

Explained Variance

gence (Note: See

in

Household Income Accounted

for

by

Intelli-

and notes for method of calculation)

text

gence or the social environment that explains more of the variation vidual outcomes.

It is

contribution to outcomes. In asserting that cognitive ability

determining individuals' fortunes but

Murray argue

that

in indi-

whether a given intervention can make a positive net

is

no intervention can pay

is critical

to

unchangeable, Herrnstein and off.

We

will see,

however,

that

cognitive abilities are malleable (chapters 2 and 7). In asserting that socio-

economic background

is

of

ual outcomes, Herrnstein and

importance

trivial

Murray

conditions cannot be effective.

We

influencing individ-

in

are claiming that

will see,

working on social

however, that socioeconomic

conditions matter a great deal, so that policy there can be effective in in-

creasing opportunity (see chapter 4).

Murray do not consider

the deeper

More important ways

yet, Herrnstein

that social policy

and

shapes both

individual competition and the structure of inequality (see chapters 5 and 6).

There

is

great leverage for policy there, as well.

15

CHAPTER The claim

1

is

the central

argument of The Bell Curve. But many

discussions in The Bell Curve wander from that argument. distraction

the discussion of ethnicity and IQ.

is

the argument over intelligence and inequality

is

The major such

a distraction because

It is

unchanged whether or not

Murray has

there are inherent racial differences in intelligence. Charles

admitted

end, whether genes or environment explain racial dif-

that, in the

IQ scores "doesn't much matter"

ferences in

on the

that intelligence accounts for individuals' locations

ladder of inequality

(italics in original).

We

14

agree (although the genes versus environment debate matters a great deal if

we want

topic of race

issue (see chapter 8).

and IQ so

we must

centrally,

But otherwise we intend

we

discussion. Finally,

some ways Herrnstein and Murray policy suggestions.) For example,

become

address the

on the main

to stay

line of

agree with Herrnstein and Murray on some matters.

(Secondhand readers of The Bell Curve may be surprised

since 1970

Because the

to explain racial differences in life circumstances).

media featured the

to learn that in

are not always conservative in their

we

agree with them that Americans have

increasingly polarized between rich and poor, and

we

agree with them that a guaranteed annual income ought to be considered as a possible national policy.

We raise

15

several arguments against The Bell Curve, any one of which

sufficient to dismiss

it.

If intelligence is not single, unitary,

intelligence can be altered; if test scores

gence

is

mismeasure

not the major cause of people's fortunes;

reward intelligence;

if

we respond

in detail to

intelligence; if intelli-

markets do not

ment and of

its

—

if

it

affords us

we

see in

stresses the importance of social environ-

policies that construct the social environment. That under-

standing, in turn, begins a realistic discussion of

and

fairly

fails.

The Bell Curve because

an opportunity to explain what does account for the inequality

America today. That explanation

is

fixed; if

patterns of inequality are socially constructed

any of these arguments holds, The Bell Curve case In the end,

if

and

harmful

how

to

reduce inequality

effects.

Overview of the Argument If

one asks why some people get ahead and some people

fall

behind, an-

swers concerning natural differences in ability are woefully inadequate.

We can

see that by looking closely at "intelligence."

in intelligence is a abilities are

One

poor explanation of class inequality

much more complex,

is

reason inequality that individuals'

variable, and changeable than

16

is

sug-

WHY INEQUALITY

1

gested by the old-fashioned notions of intelligence upon which The Bell

Cur;e

rests.

Concretely, the basic measure of intelligence that Herrnstein

and Murray use, the quick-wittedness.

AFQT,

It is

instead a test of what people have been taught, es-

pecially in high school, of

they

make

in the test.

actually not a test of genetic capacity or of

is

how much

they recall, and of

Another reason

how much

explanation of individual success or failure

effort

an adequate

that intelligence is not

as social scientists

is that,

have

known for decades, intelligence as measured by such tests is only one among many factors that affect individuals' success or failure. In the NLSY, respondents' AFQT scores in 1980 do not explain well how they ended up at the end of the 1980s. We show that, instead, aspects of respondents' social environments explain the If

outcomes more

fully.

one asks the more basic question of what determines the pattern of

inequality,

answers concerning individual intelligence are largely

vant. Societies

and

historical

epochs vary greatly

in the nature

irrele-

and degree

much more than any variations in intelligence, or the market, can account for. Some of that variability lies in technological, economic, and cultural changes. But much of it lies in specific of their inequality; they differ

policies concerning matters such as schooling, jobs, and taxes.

we can change

In the end,

American

inequality.

have reduced inequality

policies

We in

improving the economic fortunes of the elderly equality in others

—

of the already advantaged.

shows

that there is

do

to

much more

for

in-

that

And

the experience of other nations

can be done

to

reduce inequality

if

we

so.

Policies also affect ity.

example, spheres — —and have expanded

for example, with tax expenditures that advantage

many

choose

have changed inequality.

many

where individuals end up on the ladder of inequal-

Policies help construct social environments. Policies even alter cog-

nitive skills, particularly in the

age here

lies

ways we

structure schooling.

The

lever-

not with the episodic compensatory programs over which

there has been

much

debate, but with the everyday structure of schools in

America. Finally,

what about race? Arguments

Americans have done poorly intelligent than whites are

in

Americans and Latino

United States because they are less

completely backward. The experiences of low-

caste groups around the world

worse

in the

that African

show

that subordinate ethnic minorities

do

schools and on school tests than do dominant groups, whatever

the genetic differences or similarities

European Jews

in

1910

New

between them. Whether

York, the Irish in

or Afrikaaners in South Africa, being of lower caste or status

17

it

is

England, Koreans

Eastern

in Japan,

makes people

CHAPTER seem "dumb." The States

fits

status;

1

particular history of blacks and

the general pattern. It

is

Mexicans

in the

United

not that low intelligence leads to inferior

that inferior status leads to low intelligence test scores.

it is

The Plan of This Book Chapter 2 examines

Murray draw

how

the psychometricians

for their psychology

have sought

upon

is

is

themselves:

tests

Intelli-

the statistical core (labeled "g") of those tests. In other words,

intelligence nition

The

to study "intelligence."

psychometric concept arises largely from the IQ

gence

whom Herrnstein and

what IQ

is

by showing

tests

We show how problematic that defiAFQT largely measures how much math and

measure.

that the

English curricula teenagers have learned and display. But there are other, better

ways

to think about intelligence.

We discuss

formation-processing" perspective, one which

is

as an

more

example the

Chapter 3 examines The Bell Curve's specific evidence about

AFQT. Scores on

gence: scores on the

"in-

realistic. intelli-

school achievement tests are, of

course, important in a society that rewards people according to

how

well

they do in school, but they are not what most people would consider as

We

"intelligence" per se.

"massage" the ity

and

utility

ways Herrnstein and Murray arguments. They overstate the valid-

also explore the

AFQT data to fit their AFQT scores. Yet

of the

degree that such

to the

measure how well we educate our children,

outcomes

testifies to

how

educational policy

critical

test scores

their ability to predict life is

for

American

in-

equality.

Chapter 4 addresses the analyses purporting to

fattest section

show

that

NLSY

of The Bell Curve, respondents'

— and presumably, respondents' mines — what becomes of them. We review

predict

the

so,

its statistical

AFQT

intelligence

scores best

most

deter-

critical errors Herrnstein and

Murray made

come

—

in their analysis;

we

as other scholars have, also

ronment

is

more, not

less,

reanalyze the identical data; and

—

we

to opposite conclusions: Social envi-

important than

test

scores in explaining poverty,

likelihood of incarceration, and likelihood of having a child out of wedlock.

For economic outcomes, gender, a

nored, matters most of

conditions

—

specific data, tists.

We

all.

trait

Other social factors

Herrnstein and Murray ig-

—education and community

are at least as important as test scores. Stepping back

we

point out that these findings are not

have long understood

that a person's

news

economic fortunes are hos-

tage to his or her gender, parents' assets, schooling, marital status,

18

from the

to social scien-

commu-

WHY INEQUALITY? nity's

economy, stage

one item on such a

and so on; intelligence

in the business cycle,

list.

This chapter

settles the issue

of

why some

is

what

get ahead of others in the race for success; the next chapter looks at the racers

win or

lose.

Chapter 5 turns attention

not whether individuals are

how how

will see

particularly

how extreme nations.

The

systems of inequality, showing

to

they vary across history and

We

just

people

among

nations.

more or

less equal, but

American

widened since the 1970s. And we

inequalities

greatly

whether societies

the degree of inequality fluctuated in

5

is

are.

history,

will see

compared with other advanced industrial America today is not "natural" but in great mea-

the United States

inequality in

how

The question of chapter

is

sure the result of policies that tolerate wide inequalities. Ironically, those policies are, despite assertions

by interested

parties, not necessary for eco-

nomic growth; indeed, inequality may well retard economic growth. Chapter 6 turns to several explicit national policies that structure equality in America.

Some

policies

social security, Medicare, food stamps, etc. rate subsidies, the

so on. little

—while some widen —corpoit

mortgage deduction, laws concerning unionization, and

Compared with America's economic

to equalize people's

economic fortunes

competitors,

a result of the policies

Americans have

Chapter 7 turns to policies that shape individual

economic inequality

—

relatively

or even their economic op-

at least tacitly

intelligence. Individuals' cognitive skills

we do

—

portunities. This explains our charge that the inequality

that determine

in-

and programs narrow inequality

Americans have

is

chosen.

abilities, specifically,

—those supposedly

fixed talents

are indeed changeable.

We

show,

using the examples of the school year, tracking in schools, and the structure

of jobs, that learning environments alter

how and how

Policies help construct those learning environments.

well people think.

Even

the inequality of

ability is subject to social shaping.

Chapter 8 turns to race and ethnicity tion, albeit

—

a topic

we

on standardized

was

a distrac-

Why

do blacks and La-

tests? This turns out to

be not a biological

an incendiary one, in The Bell Curve.

tinos score lower

believe

question but a social one. Around the world,

members of disadvantaged

groups usually score lower than members of advantaged groups, whatever their racial identities. In

many

cases, both the higher- and lower-status

groups are of the same race. Also hard to reconcile with the point

is

the

way

ethnic groups seemingly

become smarter

racialist

view-

after they have

succeeded. For example, in Japan Koreans are "dull," while in the United States

Koreans are "bright"; Jews

years ago but are

among

in

America were "dull" seventy-five

the "cognitive elite" today.

19

We

describe three

CHAPTER ways

1

that ethnic subordination in a caste or castelike

school and

test

system leads to poor

performance: One, subordination means material depriva-

which

tion for students,

in turn impairs their achievement; two, subordi-

nation usually involves group segregation and concentration, which, by

multiplying disadvantage and drawing

all

group members into

difficult

learning situations, undercuts academic achievement; and three, subordination produces a stigmatized identity of inferiority,

which

in turn breeds

resignation or rebellion, both of which limit academic achievement. histories of African

rent conditions,

Americans and Latino Americans,

more than

suffice to explain

lower than whites on

to score

race for success.

tests

why

fits

members

their

and also why they do

The American case

The

as well as their cur-

tend

less well in the

the global pattern;

it

is

not

genes but caste positions that explain the apparent differences in cognitive performance.

Chapter 9 concludes with a consideration of what the intellectual and the practical implications are of understanding inequality in these historical

and sociological ways.

Concluding Comments by Way of Introduction

A comment

on the "burden of proof:

to contradictory studies about

may

how

Many

by now accustomed

readers,

certain foods

do or do not cause heart

among dueling Ph.D.s' claims many specific issues of evidence in The Bell Curve. But more important is how the basic questions are framed and the historical breadth of evidence examined. From such a fundamental perspective, we find that intelligence, broadly understood, does affect Americans' fates but is just one factor among many. It is not the key disease or cancer,

about inequality. In

feel

this

unable to decide

American inequality nor

to

ences

among

we

book,

to

contest

American

social problems; indeed, differ-

individuals altogether are not the key.

together as citizens, choose to structure our society.

The key

We

do

is

how we,

not, of course,

have unlimited freedom of action; we are constrained by material circumstances, social traditions, and political institutions. But

freedom

book

will show, than admitted

a lot

more

by those who coun-

acceptance of the growing inequalities in our society. The challenge

sel

to

to act, this will

we have

make

In thinking about those choices,

This nation draws tions.

is

those choices.

The

its

it

may

help to go back to

moral precepts from

its

biblical

first

principles.

and republican

tradi-

Bible repeatedly enjoins us to help the needy; the Declaration of

20

WHY INEQUALITY? Independence announces that

dowed by

should presume that ises.

"all

men

are created equal, that they are en-

their Creator with certain inalienable Rights." 16

The burden

is

have us sorted out proof is on those

its

people

on those

come

who would

at birth into the

Such

a nation

fulfill

those prom-

contend otherwise,

who would

equally equipped to

worthy and the unworthy. The burden of

who would contend that some

of us are hopeless and fated

only for piteous charity. Absent conclusive proof of that claim, Americans

should assume an equality of worth and can's horizon.

21

move

to

expanding every Ameri-

CHAPTER

*

*

2

Understanding "Intelligence" "When tone, "it

/ use a

means

word," Humpty Dumpty

just

what

I

choose

it

to

said, in a rather scornful

mean

—

more nor

neither

less."

"The question

mean

so

many

different things."

"The question ter

—

"whether you can make words

is," said Alice,

is," said

Humpty Dumpty, "which

—Lewis he word here

Carroll,

mas-

Through the Looking Glass

"intelligence." For those

is

who

believe that inequality

of talent explains inequality of fortunes, intelligence talent of

to be

is

that's all."

them

all.

For those

who

the immutability of intelligence

believe that talent

dooms any

comes. But arguments that intelligence

way of understanding

most important

the

largely fixed at birth,

effort to alter inequality of out-

immutable

rest

on a particular

approach called psychometrics (the

intelligence, an

measurement of mental

is

is

is

we will show that this outhow complex and flexible people's cogniunderestimates how much such skills can be

traits).

In this chapter,

dated approach underestimates tive skills are

and thereby

improved. Other,

newer schools of psychology

offer better approaches to under-

standing intelligence and also offer sensible hope for improving Americans' abilities.

They show us

cating people,

young and

more more

acutely, to

make more of

intelligent population

did generations ago.

We

we can beneficially invest more in eduwe can train people to use their minds their abilities; and that we can produce a

that

old; that

—just as the establishment of mass education one example of such alternatives

will take, as

psychometrics, the information-processing perspective.

It

psychometrics but extends our knowledge of intelligence Contrasting psychological schools

differences are akin to the difference between seeing the

orb in the sky and seeing lieve that the

always aim

moon

at the

is

it

fixed,

wrong

as an orbiting

companion of

you could never land on

place. If

you

encompasses

much

further.

not a mere academic exercise.

is

realize that

it

it is

to

moon

The

as a fixed

Earth. If

you be-

because you would

in

motion, the

moon

can become the point of departure for exploration of the cosmos. So with

22

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" understandings of intelligence:

we can

target our efforts

When we

understand

on expanding and enriching

how it.

malleable

To

is,

it

the degree that

people's cognitive skills affect their chances of success, then understanding

how

malleable those skills are underlines

how much

equality of oppor-

tunity can be changed.

The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray imply

In

no

that

self-respect-

ing psychologist questions the psychometric perspective. But not only do

many

established psychologists question

come from

into intelligence

it,

most of the important insights

perspectives that directly contradict funda-

mental claims of psychometricians.

1

we

In this chapter,

ferences between the schools, showing

how

describe the dif-

limited psychometrics

is

for

understanding the role of intelligence in inequality.

Psychometrics,

how

we

will show, has not

people think or solve problems.

It

been centrally concerned with

has been concerned instead with

developing tools to rank, to differentiate, people by

how

successfully they

solve academic problems. Psychometricians have spent decades refining

minutely graded

tests so that they yield scores for individuals that are reli-

able and that correlate with success on other tasks, such as progress in

school and in the job market. The specific problems that comprise a less

important to psychometricians than that the

ple.

Among

the difficulties with this approach

test is

"works"

test are

to rank peo-

that the test items psy-

chometricians typically use deal with school subjects or are school-like,

such as math questions. They thereby confound intelligence with schooling.

(We

will see this in detail below.)

Another profound

difficulty is that

the psychometric effort to rank people requires that the tests produce fine distinctions, differences in scores that correspond

among people problem

is

in

how

the psychometricians' insistence

rather than their observations of people intelligence.

—

driven by their techniques

a singular and basic

Other approaches to intelligence avoid these and similar

and they do so by studying thinking

complex

be easily absorbed into psychometric

Before fleshing out these points,

made

Yet another

life.

—

that there is

difficulties,

to

to differences

little

they use intelligence in everyday

in science.

we need

itself,

typically in

ways too

tests.

to understand

how

Otherwise, the psychometric school and

its

progress

alternatives

will simply appear to be equally valid points of view. Therefore,

discuss

is

we

first

how one research framework in science gives way to another and we examine psychometrics and demonstrate its fundamental

why. Second, circularity:

Psychometricians have discovered a single, fixed "intelligence"

because they have developed a methodology that works, and ology works because

it

implicitly

assumes 23

that

method-

that there is a single intelli-

CHAPTER gence, essentially fixed native

at birth

ways of understanding

2

or early in

we

Third,

life.

point to alter-

intelligence, looking in particular at the in-

formation-processing framework, which understands intelligence to be changeable.

The Importance of "Paradigms" The

stereotype of the scientist as a lonely inquisitive soul

is false.

communication among scholars, each one would be forced scratch,

Without

to start

from

and accumulating knowledge would be impossible. To communi-

cate, researchers

common

use a

"language" of concepts

any language, paradigms impose

a paradigm. Like

limitations. Crucially,

Some

the questions that researchers can ask.

paradigm and others make no sense

to a

2

in that

the Flat-Earth paradigm, questions about

paradigms limit

research questions are critical

paradigm. For example, in

what happens

if

you

sail

off the

edge of the Earth make sense, while questions about the velocity needed

to

reach orbit are nonsense. In the Spherical-Earth paradigm, the reverse

is

Because the

true.

digms

to delimit

answers

of

list

all

our inquiries. Paradigms also

to those questions

One way paradigms cepts; another is

possible questions

should look

by suggesting how

alert researchers to

para-

what the

like.

and answers

limit questions

we need

is infinite,

to observe, or

is

by defining key con-

measure, those concepts.

Like the questions, empirical observations typically make sense only within a paradigm. For example, precise measurements of

bumps on peo-

heads made sense for the nineteenth-century "science" of phrenology make no sense to twentieth-century psychologists. It is a paradigm that

ple's

but

gives any particular observation

have

scientific

its

meaning.

meaning only within

We will see that IQ test scores

the perspective, or paradigm, of psy-

chometrics. (They have, of course, considerable practical meaning as well.)

New digm

paradigms

loses steam

scholars find

it

when

arise is

old paradigms lose steam.

boring and "tired." Another

way

is

is

that

new

later.)

—

paradigm that

it

the

When in

phenomenal

rise

(We in IQ

will discuss

an ad hoc way. Eventually, so to

third route to

an example

in

psycho-

scores over the twentieth century

apparent anomalies arise, scholars

no longer seems

A

new

research findings appear that cannot be as-

similated by the old paradigm.

metrics

a para-

that scholars raise

questions that cannot be addressed in the old paradigm.

paradigm change

One way

by running out of stimulating questions; younger

first try

many ad hoc

to patch

up the old

patches are applied

be an elegant blueprint for research but instead

24

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" seems

to

be a hodgepodge of poorly understood findings. This

what happened

to the astronomical

motion

that the

perhaps fanciful story

may

Suppose

commonly

hair,

Among

at flat

is

a critical concept.

of a standing

human

question people ask tall

will

because answers to

when planning

you be?"

it tell

It is

at

"How Some

persist in asking the old question,

now

very confusing.

total

with

their

tall

question, as they

know

a small

plaza, she

way

will

to the plaza,

many

you be?" The answers,

not what to report given the chair in

The old concept no longer

Some

Others argue that the concept Still

row of the

people cling to the old concept

fits

the

alter the

the vertical distance that a person takes

it.

this society

height of their body and accoutrements. Others stare

Eventually, arguments ensue.

ing.

A

her reduced "height." Others soon see the gain in sitting,

and eventually chairs abound. Upon making

their hands.

wearing.

young woman fashions

amazes many

and report the

They come

to attend a concert, speech, or

to the gathering, and, sitting in the front

at the

at

people where they should stand.

day, an enterprising (and tired)

however, are

is

an important question in

bench to bring

mean

human

being, plus what-

headgear, high heels, or other footwear the person

"How

blankly

to

community of people who

outdoor plazas, the performers are

these people, "height"

critical

One

suggest, in such a state.

power paradigms have

and the members of the audience stand throughout each per-

play

is

we

deals with the concept of

It

to define height as the vertical length

ever

roughly

Sun and

attend public events such as concerts, plays, and speeches.

level,

formance.

is,

that there exists an isolated

These performances are given ground

based

is

illustrate the

shape questions and observations. height.

is

that the

it

metrics upon which The Bell Curve

A

assumed

that

became so complicated trying to account paradigm fell apart. The version of psycho-

planets revolved around Earth; for planetary

paradigm

is

new

reality.

concept of

up whether

human

height to

sitting or stand-

useless and call for society to dispense

others try to resurrect the concept by correlating the old mea-

sures of height to the vertical distance of people sitting at the plaza. Finding a high correlation

between these two measures, the

call

goes forth to hold

ways of thinking. As we leave this community to its problem, we may draw a few (1) The concept (height) arose from important problems in that

on

to the old

(2) reality (i.e., the

society;

dimensions of space) limited the definitions of the con-

cept that could be devised, but (3) the old

lessons:

it

did not determine a unique definition;

concept became problematic because

it

no longer answered the

questions that society needed answered; and (4) the old concept could be

under a new framework but would likely not have been central to that

25

fit

new

CHAPTER framework. The basic point prior assumptions;

2

that understandings of "height" rested

is

on the

could have different meanings and different measure-

it

ments. So, too, with intelligence.

We will focus on two paradigms for thinking about intelligence: psychometrics and information processing. We will see how each defines "intelhow

ligence,"

only a

fatalistic

intelligence,

and what

toward intelligence. Because

framed perspective on

a narrowly

measure

practitioners try to

definition implies about policy

it is

their

trapped in

intelligence, psychometrics can provide

view of the opportunities for change.

It

should become

apparent that newer approaches, such as information processing, allow us to break out of the dated confines of psychometrics, allowing us to see

we can

raise intelligence

how

and modify inequality.

Intelligence in the Psychometric School The psychometric paradigm assumes critical to

human

functioning

is

to determination, self-discipline,

myriad of human

abilities that

that the

"intelligence."

empathy,

we

fundamental

skill

or talent

gives no or

little

attention

It

creativity,

charm, energy, or a

recognize in people during our daily

Occasionally, a psychometrician suggests (as Herrnstein and Murray

lives.

traits result from intelligence. Famed psychometriEdward Thorndike once wrote that "the abler persons in the world the more clean, decent, just, and kind." 3 But for the most part the talent

do) that other admirable cian are

.

of interest

is

.

.

intelligence.

Psychometricians' descriptions of intelligence arose from their efforts to sort

and rank people.

of psychometrics

is

Assumptions such as chometrics

the foundational, paradigmatic assumptions

this

must rank

in a "bell curve."

one severely limit the approach, rendering psy-

at best irrelevant

inequality. Let us see

In

Among

the premise that people

why

and

at

worst a hindrance to understanding

this is so.

The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray assume

that there is "a general

capacity for inferring and applying relationships drawn from experience,"

which (p. 4;

is

synonymous with

a "person's capacity for

complex mental work"

emphasis added). This basic, singular capacity

cians label g, or general intelligence. Herrnstein and

what psychometriMurray contend that

is

psychometricians have accepted the reality of g, but even a cursory scan of the psychometric literature reveals contentious disagreement

among them

about the existence or importance of g. Psychometric positions range from the idea of a unitary g, through

Raymond 26

Cattell's distinction

between

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" The History of Testing and the Limits of That History Critics of psychometrics often stress the political history of

the United States and the ideological

They

tricians.*

testing in

commitments of many psychome-

IQ

highlight the use of

IQ

mid-twentieth

tests in the early to

century to promote eugenics, restrict immigration, and defend segregation. (Several prominent psychometricians explicitly allied themselves with

coarse racists and Nazi sympathizers.) Based on this history,

many

dismiss

testing.

We do

not take this approach, for

chometric testing in other countries decisions people tests

made about how

two reasons. shows

that

First, the history

it is

to use the tests. In the

United States, IQ

were used for discriminatory purposes, but elsewhere,

Britain, liberal reformers

children and provide

used similar

tests to find

of psy-

really a history of the

Great

like

promising lower-class

them with opportunities.** Second, IQ and similar

widely used by educators and employers as gatekeeping mecha-

tests are

who will or will

nisms to determine

not obtain scarce positions.

It is

highly

unlikely that such tests will be discarded simply because people used

badly in the past. Therefore, ligence testing and * See, for

its

we need

instead to

examine the

them

logic of intel-

limitations.

example, Huston, Testing Testing; Kamin, "The Pioneers of IQ Testing";

and Politics of Racial Research. ** See Wooldridge, "Bell Curve Liberals."

Tucker, The Science

crystallized

and

120 components of intelligence.

No

less

Arthur Jensen, educational psychologist be boiled as

many

down

to

one

entity;

as four independent

We review

way

fluid intelligence, all the

to

Joy Guilford's notion of

prominent a psychometrician than at

Berkeley, disagrees that g can

he suggests that psychometric g

components.

may

reflect

4

the chain of reasoning that leads to the psychometric notion

of intelligence.

We

will see that, in practice, the definition of intelligence

as "a general capacity for inferring and applying relationships" does

not match the procedures psychometricians actually use. fore, are not

The

tests, there-

good measures of what most people would consider

to

be

"intelligence."

We gence

begin with Arthur Jensen's definition: "intelligence tests

5

measure" (emphasis added). This 27

is

is

what

intelli-

an honest and telling state-

CHAPTER

2

ment. In practice, psychometricians have defined intelligence after the fact: after constructing intelligence tests, obtaining the results,

what those

results

mean. 6 So, what then

Measuring Intelligence

is

an intelligence

and interpreting test?

Psychometric Tradition

in the

For psychometricians, virtually any task can be an intelligence intelligence presumably determines success tests are better erties. ability.

first

should have. Specificity

example,

because

test

virtually all tasks.

But some

than others, and the best intelligence tests have certain prop-

These properties

The

on

It is

two

are: (1) specificity; (2) stability;

are properties that any

the third one, differentiability, that

means

we want to

good

that a test

test will test

that also reflected their agility.

7

To be well

(3) differenti-

is

problematic.

only one kind of

we would

people's strength,

and

good measure of anything skill. If,

for

not want to use a test

constructed, therefore, an intel-

ligence test must reflect intelligence only, and

it

must not capture other

potentially important determinants of task success, such as motivation, creativity,

and anxiety. (This will turn out

The Bell Curve.)

means

Stability

to

that if

be a problem for the

we

test

administer the same

used in

test twice,

We

would be puzzled if a football player lifted 500 pounds one day and was unable to do so five days later. We know that the measuring instrument, the 500-pound barbell, has not changed, which is another way of saying that lifting the barbell is a stable test. Simithe measure should not change.

larly,

repeated applications of an intelligence test should yield a consistent

score for each test taker unless that test taker's intelligence changes in the interim. (In reality, scores as the college Scholastic

on many

bution of randomness. That for example, sixty points definitive.)

8

common

tests

Assessment Test [SAT], is

of cognitive

skills,

such

reflect a notable contri-

why modest differences in such test scores

on the verbal

Specificity and stability are

SAT

— should not be considered

good properties

for all

measuring

instruments, including yardsticks, thermometers, altimeters, and more.

The

psychometric

third property of a well-constructed

test, differenti-

good property of a measuring instrument. For example, we would not throw away a tape measure because it cannot help

ability, is not necessarily a

us discern tiny differences in height

Each player has a

specific

if we we must throw away measures

ences are not relevant. Yet, degree, then

among

prospective football players.

and discernible height, but quarter-inch

differ-

require that a test differentiate to the finest that

do not do

measure, and search for more precise ones. Psychometric

28

so, like

our tape

tests drafted to

UNDERSTANDING 'INTELLIGENCE Driving Tests and Psychometric Tests

Many

designed to certify sufficient competence rather than to

tests are

differentiate the population. Driving tests are an important example. certify sufficient

we could

ers to use the highways. Alternatively,

cense

We

competence, which has allowed the vast majority of driv-

test to differentiate the

require the driver's

population of would-be drivers

in the

li-

same

way that psychometric tests differentiate the population by intelligence. If we did so, such important skills as making a left turn in heavy traffic,

— com—would be deemphasized or eventually removed

correctly interpreting street signs, and parallel parking

pose most driving

from the

tests

because they

test

lation. Instead, ability to

way

speeds, to

fail to

make

sharp distinctions

maintain control of the car

make Grand

at

to that quarter-inch

and magnify

practical implications (see

may

damaging

it

take a difference that

—even

the pylons

Differentiating to a fine degree

to

make

is

comparable

such fine distinctions have no

if

box above). is

not a need of testing.

matic commitment of the psychometric

need

the popu-

the driving test.

differentiate the population finely

tricians

among

Indianapolis Speed-

Prix hairpin turns effectively, and to navigate

a slalom course within a given time limit without

would form

skills that

test designers.

fine distinctions in their tests

that fine distinctions in intelligence are real

and

It is

That

is,

a paradig-

psychome-

because they presume

that they matter.

To understand that paradigmatic commitment, let us start with the very name "psychometrics." In scientific disciplines, such as biology and sociology, the suffix "-logy" fers to

their efforts to the

task

may seem

how

it

is

— how much

distributed

son's place on that

from

measurement of

of."

The "-metrics"

suffix re-

this direction?

Why

They

intelligence

among people

assumed

approach

to this

say, in effect, let us

assume

intelligence. Their

quite alien to the outsider.

the fundamentals

and

means "the science

measurement. Since the 1930s most psychometricians have devoted

is

out there in the population

—and

distribution.

Why

set

about finding each per-

do they approach the task

do they not measure intelligence

searchers measure, say, educational attainment or income? the units of measurement. Educational attainment and

29

directly as re-

The answer

income have

is in

clear

CHAPTER and measurable units intelligence are or

—years and

how

2

But nobody knows what units of We do not have "ounces" or "watts"

dollars.

to count them.

of intelligence.

Psychometricians have "solved" the problems caused by the lack of a unit of intelligence rectly) that

by assuming those problems away. They note

/fwe assume

(cor-

(1) that intelligence in the population is distributed

normally, like a "bell curve," and (2) that people can be ranked from the

lowest to the highest on a

test,

then

we can give each

person an intelligence

score by simply converting his or her rank into a score. If the previous two

assumptions are correct, then the units of measurement turn out to be relevant;

we do

intelligence.

not actually need to see or weigh an

Those

are

some big

There

ifs.

amp

or decibel of

a basic circularity here.

is

ir-

The

scores people receive on intelligence tests derive from the measuring tools rather than

What cians

is

from observations of intelligence

at

work.

the distribution of intelligence in the population? Psychometri-

do not know. They assume

that

it is

The

a bell curve.

bell curve is

characterized by the large bulge in the middle representing the preponder-

ance of scores near the average and by long, sloping edges indicating that large departures

from average are infrequent. And the

fectly symmetrical.

But

this distribution is not a

dence about human intelligence. The

first

bell curve is per-

discovery based on evi-

psychometricians chose the bell

curve to represent the distribution of intelligence as a matter of faith that just about everything is distributed this way,

nience. 9 For technical reasons,

it is

and as a

statistical

conve-

easier to convert test scores into

IQ

scores using a "normal," bell-curve distribution than using any other statistical distribution.

If a last

10

psychometrician assumes a bell curve and ranks people from

on a

test,

assigning scores

is

routine

And

are tied at the top or at the bottom.

comes

crucial.

A bell

as long as not too

here

is

where

first

to

many people

differentiation be-

curve, by definition, has very few people at the top

and the bottom. Therefore, a "good" test

—

must produce scores

in a bell

getting top scores and very

test

must also have

this property.

The

curve distribution, with very few people

few people getting bottom

scores. Psychometri-

cians routinely include questions in their tests to produce this very result. If

they are building a vocabulary test (a typical part of intelligence

tests),

make sure to include some words that only one person out of 100 will know and some words that only one person in 100 will know. Whether

they not

—

—

knowing these rare words say, "snood" or "entremets" has anything to do with intelligence as "a capacity for inferring or applying relationships 30

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" drawn from experience"

in effect, irrelevant.

is,

Those very common and

those very rare words define the ends of the scale.

Psychometricians then end up with scores for each

test taker.

But be-

cause the units of measurement are arbitrary, the numbers are not fixed like inches on a carpenter's steel rule.

They

rubber band that can be stretched to

more

are

like pencil

between any two

fit

Give psy-

points.

known

chometricians a word to define (or another problem)

marks on a

to

99 percent

of the population to nail one end of the rubber band to and a word to

only

percent of the population to nail the other end of the band

1

they will be able to

fill

in the rest

In sum, psychometricians

tributed

among people

assume a

single intelligence and that

and so they build

no substantive reason

is

to,

and

it is

dis-

of the distribution, the bell curve.

like a bell curve,

yield a bell curve. There

known

to start

their

method

from these

to

as-

sumptions.

The Bell Curve

By

looking

the

commitment

at

The Bell Curve

to differentiate

call that the basic

Armed in the

itself,

in

The

Bell

we can

see

Curve

how

from

distortions arise

and the commitment

Re-

to the bell curve.

evidence Herrnstein and Murray draw upon

is

a

test,

the

Forces Qualifying Test, given in 1980 to over 12,000 young people

National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The

AFQT

is

composed of

four sets of questions for a total of 105 test items. (These sets are inter-

spersed

Armed

among

228 questions,

six others, totaling another

Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.) For the

to

form the

moment, we

will

accept Herrnstein and Murray's claim that the 105 questions measure intelligence. Later in the chapter,

measure.

If

we

will look at

many people answered

that

number of questions

shaded shape labeled "Original" in figure to the right,

what those questions actually

one graphs the number of questions answered correctly by

2.

shows how many of the white

1

.

correctly,

how

one obtains the

That shape, leaning heavily

test takers

answered

that

many

questions correctly. (To be consistent with Herrnstein and Murray's analysis

we

of intelligence and class inequality,

in the

NLSY

largely analyze only the whites

sample.) For example, 45 young adults answered 104 or 105

correctly and 126 answered fewer than

represent "smoothed out" data; that

is,

30

right.

slight

and

(Both lines

in the figure

erratic variations in

num-

bers are averaged out for legibility.)

Oops! Despite the best psychometric assumptions, tion is not a bell curve!

this original distribu-

Most white respondents scored near 31

the top end of

CHAPTER

2

Originally, the distribution of test takers by the number of correct answers was bunched upward; it took considerable effort to transform it into a bell curve.

300

Original

10

20

40

30

50

60

70

80

90

100

Number of Questions Answered Correctly

2.

1

.

Distribution of Original Scores on the

AFQT

and Distribution of

Scores as Transformed by Herrnstein and Murray (Source: Authors' anal-

NLSYdata)

ysis of the

the

test.

About 20 percent of the

of the questions correctly. This

key measure

in

test takers is

answered more than 90 percent

the real distribution of scores

from the

The Bell Curve. There are simple reasons why the

did not yield a bell curve. 11

Our concern

here, however,

is

AFQT

with the psy-

chometric insistence that there must be a bell curve. The other line

in fig-

ure 2.1, labeled "Transformed," shows the distribution of test takers after

Herrnstein and Murray recalculated the scores. is

also the source of the

title

It is

roughly bell-shaped;

and the jacket design for The Bell Curve.

it

How

did Herrnstein and Murray get a bell curve from the lopsided distribution

of original scores?

By

a

good deal of

mashing and

statistical

Because they presumed, as psychometricians do,

that intelligence

distributed in a bell curve, they justified transforming the

must be

number of ques-

produced the

bell curve

what Herrnstein and Murray did was give "extra

credit" for

tions each test taker correctly in the figure.

stretching.

answered

until they

12

(Practically,

32

UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE" being

at the

higher or lower ends. For example, a difference of three correct

answers for those

upper end, 105 versus 102, yielded differences

at the

what Herrnstein and Murray labeled "zAFQT" scores of one "standard deviation," from 2 to

3.

full step,

But for respondents near the middle,

— 28 more

in

or it

took far more correct answers to

move one

from -1

took 16 more correct answers to go from

-3

to 0.

to -2.

among If

The

effect of this

exaggerate, to stretch out, slight differences

is to

high and low ends

test takers at the

among people

is

forced into these kinds of contortions.

it

matters It

is

in

order to form a bell curve.)

that an

like height

unseen

matter?

that this transformation creates a bell curve

scheme exaggerates

and lowest ends. And

They "knew from

that is

one

One reason

where there was

paradigm. Another

is

the importance of being at the high-

what Herrnstein and Murray wanted

collateral data that

at the tails" (p. 573).

in a

entity, intelli-

in a bell curve,

is,

Why does this

shows how researchers can be trapped

that this rescoring

occurs

move

it

one builds a science around the axiom

none.

correct to

Near the bottom,

gence, must be distributed

est

step

much

to do.

of the important role of IQ

So they did not use simple

alternatives to that

transformation, like centile score (99th percentile, 98th percentile, etc.) or

raw score (number of questions correctly answered), but instead constructed the bell curve.

expectations that the stein

By

stretching out the

tails are critical.

and Murray because

do so much

they helped affirm their

tails,

the tails are critical to Herrn-

their entire focus is

5 percent (the "cognitive elite") (the "very dull")

And

on demonstrating

better

that the top

and the bottom 5 percent

do so much worse than everyone

else.

they ignore the middle 90 percent of Americans. This

For the most

part,

not good science

is

13 but self-fulfilling prophecy.

In this way, the psychometric testing intelligence. If "intelligence

problem

is

how

to

measure

constructed intelligence

By whether must be

it

is

test.

paradigm prefigures the meaning of

what intelligence

intelligence.

How

tests

measure," then the

The answer

do we know a

test is

is

to use a well-

well-constructed?

sharply differentiates the population. Hence, intelligence

finely distributed (preferably in a bell curve). Herrnstein

ray's analyses of the "cognitive elite" and the "very dull"

impossible without the presumption that intelligence that there are distinctive top

and bottom 5 percents.

is

and Mur-

would

all

be

so finely graded

And

makes sense

it

only within the psychometric paradigm.

Psychometricians' methodological need to differentiate dovetails with other reasons to differentiate. Administrators, employers, and other con-

sumers of psychometric

tests

use them to allocate,

stratify,

and label

dents and employees. Sorting people out into precise ranks

33

may

stu-

not be

CHAPTER

2

necessary for education or for work, but admit, hire, promote, and so forth.

own

it

(It is

is

who

useful for deciding

we allowed

as if

to

only the top

Then we would design driving tests to differentiate so finely. But that seems silly. When more precise distinctions are necessary, say for licensing heavy equipment drivers, then more 5 percent of drivers to

sports cars.

precise tests are used.)

Tests constructed with differentiating as a goal also legitimate the strati-

imposed, make

fication that is

it

seem just. Tests

good devices of

are

legit-

imation because they appear to be objective. The record on the use of intelligence tests to justify ethnic differences

is

a long one.

14

We

will explore

that role of tests in chapter 8.

Sharp differentiations make psychometric

most other

life tasks, like

fundamentally unlike

tests

driving and doing one's job.

A good

test

be like a good task, and neither needs to differentiate in order to about the talent of the person being tested. However, ability

been used primarily

formance, needed for

statistical analysis

enough:

things.

The

desire to

compare

per-

and organizational work, requires

no matter how

that tests discern difference,

scheme of become ingrained in

have not

to tell us about the talent of the person being

tested in relation to the talent of other persons.

the larger

us

tell

to tell us about the talent of the person being tested;

have been used

instead, they

tests

should

trivial that difference

may be

Because we argue against a position

the very idea of testing,

we

cannot

state

it

in

that has

strongly

possible to construct evaluations that point to the talents and

It is

weaknesses of people but

that

do not discover, magnify, and therefore

lidify originally trivial differences.

Such

so-

might incorporate evalua-

tests

tions of diverse skills in general ways.

Most ing, for

skills are useful

example,

ability test that

is

no

even

if

good test

every good

will

everyone succeeds

behave

many

at

them. Walk-

because everyone learns to walk.

most people can pass equally well

to psychometricians or to

have as

if virtually

less useful

is,

however, of

little

An use

users of tests. Therefore, test makers be-

We

test

must

differentiate.

like a

good

task, revealing

argue, however, that a

whatever differences there

are but not magnifying differences for the sake of differentiating people.

The Psychometric Circle In these ways, psychometrics rests Its

on

statistics as

very definition of intelligence, g, derives from

takers' scores

on various kinds of

much

on psychology.

statistical finding that test

ability tests correlate

34

as

with one another;

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" people

who do 15

gence, or

measure a common, underlying property: general

There

g.

The explanation

well on one tend to do well on another.

that the tests all

is

intelli-

nothing wrong with beginning a research program

is

trying to explain a statistical regularity such as the intercorrelation of tests,

nor with making

concerns while one

statistical

what

is

wrong

is

work

limiting the

To demonstrate used

how

it

is

validity has

ways

we need

this circularity

supposed

to only these concerns.

becomes irremediably

to introduce

been evaluated for intelligence

tests.

to establish validity, or three types of validity.

way and

One

type

is

lying

trait

we

measures exactly is

clear in

There are three main

Sometimes

a measure

invalid in others.

A

predictive validity.

can predict an outcome that

closing off

one more concept

it

measure. The psychometric circularity

to

appears valid in one

By

However,

circular.

A test has validity when

to evaluate tests: validity.

what

the middle of this process.

is in

other issues, the reasoning

all

nor with setting aside non-

statistical regularity a goal,

measure has predictive

we assume ought be

validity if

it

predicted by the under-

we assume that intelliwe show that people who do well grades, we can then say that the SAT

are trying to measure. For example, if

gent people get better college grades and

SAT

on the

also get better college

appears to have predictive validity as a measure of intelligence, given that the

outcome of interest

is

college grades. If we were to say that the

what

predictive validity without stipulating

is

SAT has

being predicted, then our

statement would be incomplete. To evaluate a claim of predictive validity,

we need

to

know what

is

being predicted (grades) as well as what

underlying concept being measured

is

the

(intelligence).

Figure 2.2(a) illustrates these assumptions graphically. The double-

headed arrow between grades and covers, that the

two

correlation between lation

are correlated.

score shows what the research un-

(A double-headed arrow

two measures; a single-headed arrow

and an assumption about

the empirical information that

how

SAT

the direction of causality.) This exhausts all

is

available. Figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(c)

analysts invoke additional assumptions to

what the

SAT really

show

draw conclusions about

measures.

Figure 2.2(b) illustrates

how one may

validity as a test of intelligence

assumes

indicates a

indicates a corre-

infer that the

when used

that intelligence determines

SAT

has predictive

to predict college grades.

performance on the

SAT

It

and that

intelligence causes better college grades, so that the observed correlation

between the observed

SAT and

college grades in figure 2.2(a)

entity, intelligence.

35

is

the result of the un-

CHAPTER

2

Predictive validity can imply different causes.

(a)

Correlation

College Grades

v SAT

Scores

(b) Intelligence Interpretation

College Grades

Intelligence

SAT Scores

(c)

Social Class Interpretation

College Grades

v

Parents' Socioeconomic Status

SAT

2.2.

Scores

Different Interpretations of Predictive Validity

36

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" The inference depends crucially on the two assumed causal relationships. They may be accurate, but we have no way of knowing for sure. To know for sure, we would have to have another, better measure of intelligence. Yet,

if

we had such

a better measure,

gate the predictive validity of the the intelligence interpretation

SAT

as a

SAT as

a

not need to investi-

measure of intelligence! In sum,

just that, an interpretation of a finding, not

makes

a finding itself. Figure 2.2(c) pret the

is

we would

that point

more

clearly. Here,

measure of parents' socioeconomic

we

inter-

status, believing that

higher parental socioeconomic status determines both higher grades and

higher scores on the SAT. Juxtapose figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(c) and you realize

why

predictive validity

show

they

that

is

any concept

a very

that

weak form of validity. Taken

observed factors can be said to be captured by the validate.

It

cal music,

is

test really

edly, Herrnstein at

is

a logically

how

and Murray and

their allies

validity.

defend the

tests

16

Repeat-

by saying:

however, exaggerated.) 17 The problem

is,

is

valid test if

we

we

that simpler tests save schools

The

that

is

outcomes;

A test has criterion

already believe

already had one?

newer one may be cheaper, quicker

on the people who take the

that is predicting

criterion validity.

correlates with another test that

would we seek a Note

on predictive

well these tests predict grades, or economic success, or job

A second kind of validity

the

in classi-

weak form of validity. Leaning on more research that would iden-

we do not know whether it is intelligence only know that the tests predict them. it

seeking to

measures. But research psychometricians, after gen-

performance. (That claim

ity if

is

often a substitute for

erations of work, continue to rely heavily

Look

one

what have you.

Thus, predictive validity

what a

test

could have been height, body mass, hair color, interest

predictive validity tify

together,

can be assumed to be related to both of the

valid-

is valid.

typical reply

we

Why that

is

to administer, or otherwise simpler.

and agencies money, but the cost

falls

The correlation between an expensive and more expensive test may be worth it to the person denied a position because the test that was used was second best. The set of assumptions needed to establish criterion validity are shown in figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) Figure 2.3(a) shows a statistical correlation a cheap test

is

tests.

not perfect. Thus, a

between an expensive indicator and a cheap

indicator, say ten hours of

personal portfolio evaluation and a three-hour SAT. Figure 2.3(b) shows that, just as in the predictive validity case, there are

two assumptions

for

every observed correlation. The assumptions are that both the expensive indicator and the cheap indicator are caused by

37

some unobserved

third

CHAPTER

Criterion validity also

(a)

makes

2

a causal assumption.

Criterion Correlation

10-hour Portfolio (expensive)

A V SAT (cheap) (b) Intelligence Interpretation

10-hour Portfolio

S

(expensive)

Intelligence

SAT (cheap)

2.3.

entity,

here intelligence.

Interpreting Criterion Validity

We might instead assume that the entity that deter-

mines both the expensive and the cheap indicator

nomic

is

parents' socioeco-

status or almost anything.

Under most circumstances,

criterion validity

the same. 18 In both, assumptions

and predictive validity are

outnumber information two

cause assumptions outnumber information two to one, there

way of

for

faith.

someone But

to

be confident of their validity

faith is not the

to one. is

only one

—one must make

measures the concept

test

maker must specify

simply with

statistics,

a leap

only answer to the validity dilemma; there

third kind of validity: construct validity. Construct validity exists test

it is

supposed

that content

to

measure. To establish

Be-

is

a

when

a

that, the

ahead of time. This can be assessed not

but by substantive analysis.

38

The

inability to evaluate

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" construct validity by statistics has rendered that validity invisible to

many

psychometricians.

commonly argue

Psychometricians, however, relation that is

umn

is

no necessary

being measured. For example, Jensen contends that the falling col-

of mercury in a barometer does not remotely resemble the phenome-

non

that

test

look anything like

is

that there

between the manifest content of a measure and the phenomenon

We need not therefore expect that an intelligence real-world intelligence. We agree that resemblance

predicts, rain.

it

19

not necessary; but connection

between a

tion

barometer

necessary. For example, the connec-

is

column of mercury and

falling

reflects falling local air pressure,

A

rain is physical.

falling

which, given the higher

air

pressure in surrounding locations, creates a wind pattern that leads to a lifting

of

air.

As

the surface air rises

ture, leads to rain.

cools and,

it

if

looks like rain but because there

is

air patterns.

on a

the measure, questions

test,

Hence,

a connection between

it

is

measures

is

it

is

not suffi-

If the

only

the case for the con-

paradigm, however,

really does not address

(Below and

intelligence.

it

predictive validity, then

By attending to construct validity, can be made explicitly. The psychometric weak.

does not attend to construct validity;

what

it

is

and the construct, intelligence.

evidence that something real has been measured is

enough mois-

20

cient for the researcher simply to assert that there

the claim

is

a well-understood causal connection

between the barometer and on-going

nection

there

Thus, the barometer does not predict rain because

we do

in chapter 3

whether

address that

issue.)

A related problem is

the inattention psychometricians have given to the

"population" of intelligence-demanding tasks.

survey research

must be able

statistics is that,

A

fundamental notion

in

before one draws a sample of people, one

to specify the population

from which the sample

is

drawn.

Otherwise, one cannot be sure what the sample represents, and then every inference one

makes from

the sample

analog in psychological testing tasks to be tested before test questions. Testers

metricians

still

is

that

is,

one constructs the

have known

in principle, indefensible.

test, that is,

this for a

draws a sample of

long time, but

many psycho-

contend that one need not specify the population of

before making an intelligence

test.

The

one should specify the population of

Their argument

is

skills

akin to saying one

need not identify the nation under study before conducting an electoral poll.

Many

below,

psychologists

now

reject

many have moved beyond

such faulty reasoning. As

the limits

we

shall see

imposed by psychometric

as-

sumptions explicitly to study "everyday" tasks as measures of intelligence.

39

CHAPTER

When

the psychometric

was probably

construct validity

about

how

paradigm

to define,

2

first

began

to take shape, neglecting

wise. Researchers were very confused

of psychometricians to say more than "intelligence

measure" suggests

tests

now

measure, or shape intelligence. But

that construct validity is

is

still

the inability

what intelligence

not relevant to the

mainstream of psychometric work. In the psychometric paradigm, gence is

a black box, visible only in test results.

is

in that

21

what

it is

intelli-

one can specify what

box (although some psychometricians provide

pretations of out").

No

after-the-fact inter-

measure, such as an ability to "figure

that their tests

Therefore, no one can say what policies the research implies.

cannot embrace the successes of psychometrics that predict well

— without accepting

ignorance about whether and

how

—

One

the construction of tests

the limitations of psychometrics

well the tests really measure "intelli-

gence." In terms of social policy, the limitations are key: Without knowing

what the

tests

measure, policymakers are flying blind. Herrnstein and Mur-

ray try to have

both ways. They assert that the tests measure g as people's

it

capacity for inferring relationships. But there

is

no consensus among psy-

chometricians on the content of g 22 The only way to be true to the psychometric approach is to remain agnostic on what the tests measure. American institutions continue to use such tests, but reliance

sure

is

on them

is

wise.

It is

much more

it is

unclear whether heavy

unclear whether what they mea-

intelligence.

What Does the Test Measure? The problem of is

letting intelligence

demonstrated by The Bell Curve

the

AFQT — the

lent

be whatever intelligence itself.

test that is the basis

of their

measure of intelligence. Indeed, "the

test,"

they write, "but

[as]

group of psychometricians

measure

tests

Herrnstein and Murray claim that statistical

work

AFQT qualifies

—

is

an excel-

not just as an

who defended The

all

measure the same intelligence," implying

that purpose, too.

24

achievement

than an intelligence

test

But we

shall see that the

takers learned and displayed their

measure as well of in taking tests.

By

that the

AFQT is much

test. It is

a measure of

AFQT

their interest, cooperativeness, anxiety,

a school

how

well test

—and

a

and experience

extension, then, other such psychometric tests are

40

tests,

serves

more

knowledge of school subjects

the same.

A

Bell Curve in the Wall Street

Journal wrote that "while there are different types of intelligence they

IQ

one of the better ones psychometrically." 23

much

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE"

AFQT

Readers will find no examples of actual Curve, but

we

will provide a

few

here.

amounting

to 105 questions.

(As

we

The

noted

questions in The Bell

test consists

of four subsections,

105 questions Herrn-

earlier, the

stein

and Murray used were part of a longer, 333-question, three-and-a-half

hour

battery.)

1

The four

Section

2,

arithmetic skills 2.

11

Section

AFQT sections

are:

Arithmetic Reasoning, composed of word problems using

— 30 questions with

3,

a 36-minute time limit

Word Knowledge, composed

of 35 vocabulary words

3.

Section 4, Paragraph Comprehension,

ring to short paragraphs 4.

Section

8,

—

Four examples

composed of questions

refer-

15 items in 13 minutes

Mathematics Knowledge, composed of questions testing

algebra and higher mathematical skills illustrate

—25 items

the questions.

in

24 minutes

(These are simulated versions

of what remain confidential questions.) Each of these examples at

in

minutes

about average

difficulty.

Recall that the target population

is

rated

is

high

schoolers. 25

1.

Arithmetic Reasoning: If a cubic foot of water weighs 55

much weight

75 /2-cubic-foot tank

will a

]

trailer

lbs.,

how

be carrying when fully

loaded with water? (a) 1,373 lbs

(b)

3,855 lbs

(c)

4,152.5 lbs

(d) 2,231.5 lbs

2.

Word Knowledge: (a)

"Solitary" most nearly

means

sunny

(b)

being alone

(c)

playing games

(d) soulful

3.

Paragraph Comprehension: People

moting land

remember

in

in resort areas for as little as

the

maxim: You

get

danger of falling for ads pro-

$3,000 or $4,000 per acre should

what you pay

for.

the ultimate purpose in buying resort property. If

sake,

it

was

a

good buy. But

might someday be worth

Land investment

is

far

if it

Pure pleasure should be it

is

was purchased only

more,

it

is

enjoyed for in the

hope

its

own

that land

foolishness.

being touted as an alternative to the stock market.

Real estate dealers around the country report that rich clients are putting

41

CHAPTER money

their

in land instead

2

of stocks. Even the less wealthy are showing

an interest in real estate. But dealers caution that sition

be just so

to

much expensive

a "hit or miss" propo-

desert wilderness.

The author of this passage can (a)

it's

with no guaranteed appreciation. The big investment could turn out

best be described as

convinced

(b) dedicated (c) skeptical

(d) believing

Math Knowledge:

4.

(a)

JK is

In the drawing below,

zoid. All of the following are true

the

median of the

trape-

EXCEPT

LJ = JN

(b)a = b (c)

JL =

(d)

a*c

KM

On

face value, these questions do not measure test takers' intelligence, " 26 their "deeper capability ... for 'catching on.' Mostly, they measure test takers'

exposure to curricula in demanding math and English classes. They

remind us of pop quizzes Elsie

in high school.

Two

scholars, Darrel

Moore, who wrote the authoritative book on

AFQT,

Bock and

this administration

of the

describe the section on paragraph comprehension as "lean[ing]

rather heavily

on general knowledge.

A

well-informed person has a good

chance of answering many of the items correctly without reading the paragraph. This

means

educated

that the better

reading the passages and already knowing

them, should have found

knowledge nal

this test

for scoring well

army "alpha"

tests

on IQ

.

.

.

,

having both the benefit of

many of

the facts contained in

very easy." (The importance of general tests

used in World

goes back a long time. In the origi-

War

I,

10 percent of the questions

required familiarity with national advertising campaigns, as

in: "

'There's

27

Bock and a reason' is an 'ad' for a: drink, revolver, flour, or cleaner?") Moore say of the section on math knowledge that the answers would be "known only to persons who had some exposure to high school algebra and geometry, or far cry

who had

28

This seems a

"ability to learn

from experi-

studied textbooks on these subjects."

from measuring intelligence as the

ence." 29 After looking at similar items, political scientist

Andrew Hacker

concluded, "At best, The Bell Curve authors have identified not a genetic

42

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" meritocracy, but what might be called a testocracy: individuals possessed

of a specialized

skill

which, on further examination, has

little

or no rele-

vance to most human endeavors." 30 not necessary to use school curricula questions for measuring "intel-

It is

ligence." For example, social psychologists

Schooler have measured what they

"Suppose you wanted

like:

locations available.

What

to

Melvin Kohn and Carmi

call "intellectual flexibility"

with items

open a hamburger stand and there were two

questions would you consider in deciding which

of two locations offers a better business opportunity?" 31 Other scholars

have also realized

that the kinds of questions

used in the

AFQT and in most

other similar aptitude tests totally miss what they call "everyday" or "practical" intelligence, the kinds

after

of ability that mature people develop, long

high school, as they deal with the complexities of real

life.

These

ways of testing people's abilities to 32 figure out solutions to problems, ways not wedded to school curricula. Such tests may be less finely differentiating, more qualitative, and more

researchers have also formulated other

labor-intensive than psychometric tests such as the sults are different

—but they

would seem

also

to

AFQT— and

their re-

be more valid measures of

intelligence broadly understood.

Researchers have also found that such paper-and-pencil

tests as the

AFQT are limited in predicting how people apply their knowledge in pracContext matters. Children, for example, given an abstract

tical situations.

logical

video

problem

have great trouble; embed

to solve

game and

that

same problem

in a

they often do brilliantly. In another example, child street

vendors in Brazil have trouble solving abstract math problems, but they do fine

when

those

same problems

are presented as

commercial transactions.

Middle-class Brazilian children react in the opposite way; they do better with the task phrased as a school

test.

Perhaps most discouraging to us as

university faculty are findings that students

who do

well in classes on re-

when presented with analogous logical probclassroom. The point is that there is not much transfer

search design do not do well

lems outside the

between academic intelligence and everyday

Given the

limits of psychometrics,

why

intelligence.

33

did Herrnstein and Murray not

choose another perspective on intelligence? The psychometric paradigm not only scientifically limited, the resources It is

needed

possible, as

we

to

make

it is

also limiting because

shall see in the next section, to identify policy prescrip-

adopted an alternative perspective

—

that

probably

Had

—information

Herrnstein and Murray processing, for

does allow one to speak about action, the

much

does not provide

policy prescriptions to improve intelligence.

tions using other approaches to intelligence.

ple

it

is

else in

it

would have changed. 43

title

exam-

of their book and

CHAPTER

2

Psychometric reasoning has become both circular and self-reinforcing. Psychometricians found that different hypothesized that they tests,

making

all

reflected a

tests intercorrelated

common

component,

this statistical

and sharply differentiating in the

tests.

g,

and from that

They refined the more and more distinct, stable, factor, g.

Educational institutions and em-

ployers increasingly used highly "g-loaded" tests for admission and place-

ment

decisions. Precisely for that reason, the predictive validity of such

has probably increased over the years. (Yet

tests

SAT

scores, for example,

do not predict college grades any better than high school grades do.) 34 The

more

institutions sort people

by

test scores, the better the test scores predict

sorting. This predictive validity is then taken as a sign that the tests

measuring intelligence and legitimates further refinements is,

making

the tests even

ing. All this occurs,

actually

more narrow, more

stable,

must be

in the tests, that

and more differentiat-

however, without any clear evidence that the

measure what they purport

to

refined to magnify differences, there

ferences are as large as they

measure.

is little

now seem to

And because

evidence that the original

be. Finally,

even

all

that the tests are designed to

mountainous

if

make minute

dif-

of this would

not be of such concern were psychometrics put into perspective.

would care

tests

the tests are

Who

differences appear

the discussion and use of the tests kept their limits firmly in

the foreground?

Most college ity

applicants and administrators probably ignore the ambigu-

of the tests and the mountains-out-of-molehills strategy of test construc-

tion as they

open

their mail

from Educational Testing Service. But

construction in the psychometric paradigm magnifies differences

people and so impedes our understanding of inequality.

psychometric tradition the reasoning stable,

and highly differentiating

measuring something

one

real.

No

to believe in the fatedness

may

From

outcomes, so they must be

wonder, then, that psychometrics

anyone might lose sight of other

inside the

appear impeccable: Specific,

tests predict

of

test

among

may

lead

Trapped

in that circle of reasoning,

possibilities

and become convinced of

life.

the hopelessness of ever ameliorating inequality. Fortunately, there are

other ways,

changing

ways

that identify intelligence

and are more hopeful about

it.

The Political Arithmetic of Testing Tests appeal to decision makers and the public alike because they appear to

be objective. The

SAT is

a prime

example

in

many

respects.

It is

said to be

35 and appears to be heavily "g-loaded," predicts college grades modestly,

44

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE" neutral.

can be useful when applied properly, but too often the

It

test is

An important case in point is the recurring controversy about the relative SAT scores of whites and members of minority groups at some universities. Many people who care about college admissions point out that minority freshmen have average SAT scores far below those of white freshabused.

men. The gaps

that they point to are often quite large.

36

The

minorities,

Herrnstein and Murray argue, must have gotten an edge in the admissions

how

process. Otherwise, they ask,

could freshmen with scores so far below

those of the average white student get into this university? But there statistical fallacy here. It is ity

impossible to

tell

how much

is

a

of an edge minor-

students have been given simply by looking at the difference in average

test scores.

This

preference

so even

is

The groups

sion.

scores were the only criterion for admis-

if test

among freshmen,

will differ in scores

absent any racial

because minority applicants score lower on average than

at all,

do whites. (Why minority applicants have lower average scores

is

the sub-

ject of chapter 8.)

As

a simple example, imagine a very small college that will admit ten

freshmen. The college receives twenty applications from eighteen white

high school graduates and two black ones (roughly the proportions nationwide).

The twenty

students have the following

scores:

1300

1225

1200

1175

1150

1125

1100

1075

1050*

1025

1000

975

950

925

900

875

850

825

800*

750

The two black students twenty

SAT

scores

is

students

is

925.

1014

we

sidering that If the

1018; the average for the two black

is

difference

(These twenty

are

SAT

at this little

admit students, then the ten students

are admitted.

The

process,

if

students were given no edge. Yet

man's score

mean is

— leaving

sion process simply passed

a small

number of "observations.")

college uses nothing but test scores

row

in the top

a

would

like

it

when we examine

for the nine white

1050

22 points smaller than the na-

will

be the ones

who

followed, would be completely race-neutral,

just as the critics of current practices

see that the

is

scores are surprisingly realistic con-

working with such

dean of admissions

these

14 above the national norm). 37 The aver-

(just

The 93-point

tional difference.

The average of

are identified with asterisks.

age for the eighteen white students

to

SAT

freshmen

gap of 103

is

1

points.

to be.

The two black

the entering class,

we

153, and the black fresh-

The

race-neutral admis-

on the preexisting difference

in test scores

from

Any race-neutral process will. much larger and more realistic num-

the applicant pool to the freshman class.

We have bers.

38

repeated the exercise with

The conclusion

is

the same. Race-neutral admission practices that

45

CHAPTER rely solely

SAT

on

scores

would

2

yield an entering class that

shows a

dis-

parity in scores. Race-neutral selection processes pass disparities in the

applicant pool through to the freshman class. Therefore,

gap

in test scores as if

some

to

it

reflected an

edge

that the

students at the expense of others. In part,

tages that suppress the measured achievement of

blacks and Latinos.

It

might also

reflect the

cannot read a

it

reflects the disadvan-

some groups,

Suppose the system does give some edge an affirmative-action system?

Is that

urally occurring" difference that 39

Although the

to minority applicants

we just saw

race-neutral admissions pass

SAT gap between SAT

under race-neutral admissions, the

blacks and whites in the

would be

to black students' scores.

American descent

is

higher than that

flects the distribution

among freshmen of Asian

among white

that universities are discriminating against

may

it

gap would not increase by the

Similarly, the fact that the average test score

process

through

edge simply added on top of the "nat-

freshman class would be larger under affirmative action than

amount added

especially

tendency of minority applicants

on other criteria of admission, such as grades and class rank.

to score higher

through? No.

we

admission process gives

students does not prove

Asian Americans.

It,

too, re-

of test scores in the applicant pool. The admission

simply reflect the higher average scores that Asian American

applicants bring to the freshman class. In short,

we

cannot actually

tell

much

about the race-sensitivity of the

admission process from the racial disparity of the outcome.

A race-neutral

admission process does not result in equal means for students from groups, even

use other criteria as well). The only conclusion that holds in general the profile of

SAT

all

scores are the only criteria for admission (most schools

if test

is

scores in the freshman class reflects the profile of

that

SAT

scores in the applicant pool.

We draw testing.

The

two lessons from first is

this exploration

of the political arithmetic of

the substantive point that the discussion of racial and

ethnic preferences in college admission

is

based on a

statistical fallacy.

The

average score of freshmen from one group might be lower than the average for

freshman from some other group for a variety of reasons;

it

does not

imply that applicants from the lower-scoring group were given preferential

Our second lesson is that the apparent objectivity of tests invites The claim that affirmative action is reverse discrimination would be much harder to make if those who make it could not cite group differences in test scores. Ironically, affirmative action's critics make themselves seem authoritative and objective in the act of committing a fundatreatment.

their abuse.

mental

error. In fact they are neither authoritative

of the numbers

is

nor objective. Their use

selective and calculated to persuade, not inform.

46

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE"

The Information-Processing View of Intelligence Despite the inclination of Herrnstein and Murray and

make psychometrics appear to be it

is not.

the only perspective

much of the media to on human cognition,

There are several alternative approaches, ones

that posit multiple

intelligences or that stress the relativism of intelligence, for example.

we

illustrate the alternatives,

look closely

at

To

one: information processing.

In contrast to the psychometric school, scholars within the information-

A

processing tradition begin with a definition of intelligence.

ment of

this

suggest

some of

paradigm

is

beyond our scope, but a

ways

the

in

full treat-

brief discussion should

which the information-processing school

breaks through the psychometric circle. The psychometric and information-processing traditions have very different implications for think about inequality and what

An

we might do

about

how we

it.

Information-Processing Definition of Intelligence

One noted information-processing

adherent, Robert Sternberg, defines in-

telligence as "purposive adaptation to and selection and shaping of real-

world environments relevant

management." 40 Note testing.

Depending upon the

tests

may

to an

environment. The

tell

sterile one.

ing about

to one's life. Stated simply,

that this definition

test takers' familiarity

us something about

Even

how

how

test itself is

at best,

with

tests, intelligence

however, standard psychometric

tests tell us noth-

proficient test takers are at shaping or selecting their envi-

environment

(i.e.,

who shapes differently) or who re-

us that the test taker

tell

interprets the questions

a failure. Thus, a psychometric test

tell

self-

proficient test takers are at adapting

fuses to spend any time on the questions is

mental

an environment, although a particularly

ronments. At worst, intelligence tests the test

it is

does not dismiss psychometric

(i.e.,

may

selects another environment)

tell

us

some

things but cannot

us other important things about the test taker's intelligence.

If intelligence is

defined as mental self-management, then intelligence

can be taught. The very existence of business schools

dence that management

skills

attests to

can be taught. To teach intelligence,

searchers must discover what mental processes are invoked

solve problems. sources.

As

They must

learn

how

test

re-

when people

people manage their mental re-

these processes and strategies

can devise ways to

our confi-

become understood,

researchers

people's use of them and to teach people to use

An example will suggest what may be learned from such research and how that learning can influence intelligence testing and training.

them

better.

47

CHAPTER Many

psychometric intelligence

tests

2

contain analogies.

On

their face,

these types of questions should directly test what Herrnstein and

Murray

have defined as intelligence, the "general capacity for inferring and applying relationships" the inference

may have used ear syllogism;

(p. 4).

Sternberg argues, however, that

also important;

is

two people who

how people

arrive at the

reach

same answer

different processes to get there. Consider the following lin-

simpler than an analogy, but

it is

still

requires that the test

taker grasp a relationship:

Mark

Who

than

is taller

Adam

is taller

is

Adam.

than Jerry.

shortest?

One can use

either a verbal strategy or a spatial strategy to

answer

this

question. In the verbal strategy, the test taker attends to the literal relation-

ship between the objects. In the spatial strategy, the test taker might visualize or

draw a map of

appear on a logic

test

the relationships.

might appear on a

(which answer, a to Part

1

But

this

question

is

unlikely to

of spatial intelligence. However, a question with a similar

| 1

Part 3

spatial test.

Consider the following spatial analogy

belongs in part 4?):

d,

Part 2

I--

Part 4

7

(a)0 (b)

0-0

-

(c)« (d)

•

The question

requires one to infer

part 2 to the relationship

problem presented spatial terms, but

An

from the relationship between

between part 3 and part

in spatial terms.

some

translate

it

Many

This

is

part

1

and

an analogy

answer the question

in

problem and then solve

it.

test takers

into a verbal

4.

information-processing analyst would point out that three distinguish-

able skills are being tested in these examples: (1) the ability to recognize relationships; (2) the ability to apply such relationships to another domain;

and

(3) the ability to translate a given

problem

into the terms that are per-

sonally easier to solve.

Two

key inferences may be drawn from the analogy examples:

First,

intelligence can be taught. Success in such tests depends in part

on recog-

And something can be

has been

nizing relationships.

seen before

Sternberg

—

lists

that

is, if

recognized only

if

it

one has been educated about such relationships.

thirteen different kinds of relationships that can be

48

found on

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE"

common

one

test,

the Miller Analogies Test. If these relationships can be

so identified, then students can certainly be taught them.

set

of signs, the twenty-six

difficult

it

would be

letters

had one been exposed

chance of answering correctly, one must know one's

Some may

find

it

regularly

how

to only half of

maximizes one's

own

strengths and

helpful to translate a problem into another

Good mental self-management can

format before proceeding.

a small

of the English language. (Imagine

to read or write

the letters.) Second, in order to select a strategy that

weaknesses.

We

among

teach small children to recognize thousands of relationships

identify

one's strengths and weaknesses. Also, weaknesses can be strengthened, just as strengths

can atrophy, so that training can shape success on such

intellectual tasks.

In sum, intelligence in the information-processing

framework

is

mental

self-management, and mental self-management involves selecting, adapting

to,

and shaping real-world environments. These intelligence

skills

can

be taught and trained; they are neither fixed nor singular as the psychometric

view assumes. The implication for the entire debate on inequality

clear:

To

the extent that intelligence does affect

who

is

gets ahead, so does

teaching.

Measuring Intelligence Critics often

complain

earlier discussion

psychometric intelligence

that

should suggest

why

that criticism

metricians: the tests are supposed to be narrow. But

ligence must take into account the

many

tests are

narrow.

Our

does not faze psycho-

good measures of intel-

aspects of intelligence that are

neglected, deemphasized, or even negatively evaluated in psychometric tests (e.g., creativity).

We

can see the multiplicity of intelligence

existence of "idiots savants"

who

are mentally deficient in others. that points to

many

in

An example

psychometrics but

critical to

a problem. For example, defining a intelligence. In

normal

explicit questions tion,

one of which

ability to define a

Good

it

in

some ways and

in recent brain research

life, it is

of a dimension of intelligence uninformation processing

problem

the rare

is

is

defining

probably a task that requires

problem

that arrives neatly, with

and "the" four alternatives placed just below each quesis

surely correct.

A good intelligence test should test the

problem.

tests in the

tual process.

also see

different centers for information processing rather than

a single central processor.

explored

can perform brilliantly

We can

in the

information-processing tradition also

Not content

test the intellec-

to leave intelligence as a black box, information-

49

CHAPTER

2

how people process information. One line of research that may reveal much about how people process information, as well as shed light on how to improve human performance, is the comparaprocessing researchers study

of experts and novices.

tive study

Experts

know more

facts about a subject than novices do, but that dis-

tinction does not fully explain the differences in

perts and novices.

performance between ex-

The two apparently process information and

think about

a problem in qualitatively different ways. Yet because every expert

once a novice, somehow novices must learn ences in

how

was

to think like experts. Differ-

novices and experts process information could therefore be

taught, as a part of mental self-management.

In one well-designed study, Jan

Maarten Schraagen investigated how

novices and experts differ in their use of problem-solving strategies. 41

Schraagen studied four groups: beginners, intermediates, "design experts," and "domain experts." The specific research question.

was to design an experiment to answer a The domain experts were experts in the specific test

research topics; the design experts were expert in

how

to design experi-

ments. (Thus, Schraagen was able to determine whether knowledge of content alone explains the difference

between novice and expert.) Schraagen

found that both kinds of experts brought to bear problem-solving strategies that beginners

more

and intermediates did

proficient than design experts,

not.

Although domain experts were

owing

knowledge

to their vast store of

about the domain, design experts resembled the domain experts in

how

they reasoned. In short, there were qualitative differences in the structure of

reasoning between experts and nonexperts.

For example, experts tended linking information so that

to use a

procedure

known

remembering one element

as chunking

in a

chunk

forth the full

chunk of information. The opposite of chunking

member each

piece of information as an isolated element.

is

—

calls

to re-

By chunking

information, experts not only sped up retrieval but also assured that re-

any one item

trieval of

in a

chunk would

call forth other

needed items.

Another example comes from chess: A. D. de Groot compared how quickly master players and amateurs could recall the locations of chess pieces on a board.

The masters performed much

the pieces

domly on

were placed not

the board, there

better than the amateurs.

in a recognizable

chess-game pattern but ran-

was no difference between

Masters did better than amateurs not because

But when

the

two groups.

their brains

Why?

were inherently

superior but because they had learned expectable patterns that emerge in a

game

(e.g.,

the positions of a

which kind of defense

is

few key pieces

will trigger the

being used). Remembering

50

memory

of

one piece of the pat-

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE"

When

tern stimulates recall of the entire pattern.

placed, learning matters

As

much

less.

the pieces are

randomly

42

these and other expert tactics are studied further, researchers are

learning

how

For example, Jon-

to teach cognitive strategies explicitly.

athan Baron found that children labeled as retarded could perform

most as well as "normal" children on memory tasks trained to use the

al-

after they

had been

same kinds of memorizing and monitoring

strategies

other children use. Lest one think these strategies can only aid students

lower range, explicitly teaching monitoring strategies

at the

(i.e.,

mental

self-management) also increases the success of college-level math dents.

43

We

teach such strategies whenever

we

teach novices to

stu-

become

experts.

There are many more aspects

to the information-processing perspective

on intelligence testing than we can tified

show how

ric tests

treat here.

44

The elements we have

iden-

aspects of intelligence are beyond the scope of psychomet-

but flow easily from the information-processing tradition. Psycho-

metric tests are limited because they tap only a small part of intelligence

and then magnify small differences. Moreover, the information-processing

paradigm does not discard the findings of the psychometricians but puts

them

into perspective

and then adds additional

insights. This is the familiar

process by which one paradigm supplants another.

Implications Particular policy prescriptions that psychometricians might dismiss

a lot of sense from an information-processing tradition,

among

make

other alter-

Murray dismiss educational intervention a waste because they believe that how intelligent people become is

native paradigms. Herrnstein and as

largely fixed at birth or shortly thereafter. Thus,

serious educational proposal

is

to invest

"dull" ones. But because research learned,

money

is

it

—

can be taught and

—

time, talent, attention, and

We can

improve Americans' cogni-

even more than we already have (see next box).

intellectual

self-management

even long

We

in school, tailoring instruction to

The information-processing

tradition, recognizes that lives,

The Bell Curve's only

in "gifted" students, not

that intelligence

sensible to invest resources

into educating all our people.

tive skills

dent.

shows

more

tradition, in contrast to the

can teach

each

stu-

psychometric

people can grow intellectually throughout their

after their formal education has ended. In chapter 7,

review several specific, concrete ways

Americans' intelligence. 51

in

which our

we

social policies shape

CHAPTER

2

The Brilliance of Americans Today: A Puzzle Psychometricians have discovered a dramatic and encouraging but, for them, embarrassing finding: According to their

world are

far smarter

now

people around the

tests,

than were their parents and grandparents. Little

psychometricians' genetic paradigm allows them comfortably to

in the

explain this change.

The "Flynn the evidence,

named

Effect,"

shows a

after

rise in

James Flynn who brought together

Western countries of roughly

fifteen

all

IQ

points in one generation. Another scholar estimates that Americans of the

1970s were twenty-two points smarter than Americans of the 1890s. This is

an amazing change, implying that the average American of about

would be considered "dull"

in

1

895

1975 and that a large proportion of Ameri-

cans today would have been near-geniuses in their great-grandparents' day.

Psychometricians

who

hold that intelligence

have great trouble accepting

this

is

genetically determined

happy conclusion, however. Genetic

change cannot account for such a rapid increase, no matter how optimal breeding patterns

on claim

may be. (Most of the

sources Herrnstein and Murray rely

have been driving intelligence

that breeding patterns actually

downward. But

the historical data are clear and imply that intelligence has

been sharply elevated by changing social environments.) Psychometricians have taken different routes to escape tal

contradiction. Flynn argues that the

IQ

this

fundamen-

tests are faulty; they

do not

measure intelligence but something loosely related

to intelligence,

"abstract problem-solving ability." Herrnstein and

Murray

tentatively sug-

gest that the change

and partly the

really

is

people having learned

change

is

real

partly real (but temporary)

how

to take

and concludes

wrong: Lamarckism

is

IQ

tests.

result of

Miles Storfer accepts that the

that evolutionary theory

must therefore be

possible and people can pass on learned skills bio-

logically!* If "intelligence is

what intelligence

tests

measure," but the results seem

implausible, what can a psychometrician do? These are the sorts of contradictions that unsettle and eventually break * Flynn,

down

a paradigm.

"Massive IQ Gains"; Herrnstein and Murray, The Bell Curve, pp. 307-9,

passim; and Storfer, Intelligence and Giftedness, chaps. that social classes are

converging

and Murray (Weakliem

et al.,

in intelligence

"Toward Meritocracy?").

52

5, 18.

There

is

—another contradiction

also evidence to Herrnstein

UNDERSTANDING "INTELLIGENCE

Concluding Reflections Herrnstein and Murray discuss information processing and other alterna-

psychometrics

tives to

by the end of

in their introductory chapter, but

it

they claim to have good reason for using only the psychometric tradition.

They argue

on the "relationship of human

that their focus is

abilities to

public policy" (p. 19). In doing so, they deny an interest in the development

of

human

abilities.

Indeed, Herrnstein and Murray admit that, had they an

interest in cognitive

development, they would have spent more time using

So we agree with them on this The information-processing approach is far more applicable than is psychometrics when cognitive development is the issue. To the extent that Herrnstein and Murray address the (im)mutability of intelligence, howthe information-processing tradition (p. 20). point:

development

ever, cognitive

tradition

With grams

is

precisely the issue and the psychometric

not appropriate.

is

the exception of criticizing affirmative action and supporting pro-

for the "gifted,"

The Bell Curve gives

little

attention to

educational system might be altered to improve cognitive intelligence

is

skills.

how

the

A study of

remiss in neglecting the inner workings of the only institu-

tion in this country

whose very raison

to solve intellectual

and

life

d'etre

is

improving people's

abilities

problems. The only justification for ignoring

schooling appears to be that Herrnstein and Murray believe intelligence to

be immutable. Yet they use a theory of intelligence that they themselves

admit

We,

is

of limited value in assessing mutability.

the authors of this book, are in a bind.

intelligence

is

analyzed in The Bell Curve

single, essentially

the rest of

the

immutable

entity.

is

We

have argued

wrong. Intelligence

"most benign interpretation" of

is

way

not a

That should be sufficient to dismiss

The Bell Curve. For some psychologists, all

authors were simply operating with

that the

it

is.

the errors in that

One wrote

book

that

"is that the

outmoded psychological notions

.

.

.

an old-fashioned psychometrics and almost equally outdated behavior genetics."

45

But

respond fully to Herrnstein and Murray's arguments,

to

will in the next

two chapters

psychometric stance.

We

set aside these reservations

will look closely at exactly

we

and accept their

how

they applied

psychometrics to the topic of inequality.

When Americans cial policy,

they need not be bound by the limits of the outdated psycho-

metric paradigm.

accompany

discuss the connection between intelligence and so-

They can transcend

the fear-laden politics that

the zero-sum result of psychometric reasoning.

53

seem

Newer

to

under-

CHAPTER

2

standings of human psychology offer better

the psy-

chological factors that advantage

race for

success.

They

ways of understanding some people over others in the

also offer a realistic

hope of building a smarter and

society.

54

better

CHAPTER But

3

+

Is It Intelligence?

M.

any American parents have had the experience of trying to help a teenager with his or her homework and discovering that they have forgotten how to calculate the volume of a sphere or could not recall "lowest

common to

them,

factors." at

Even

age forty or

grammar seem embarrassingly vague teenager often whizzes through the same

subjects like

Yet the

so.

problems. According to psychometric Bell Curve, the teenager

same teenager who

how

is

more

always

tests,

including the one used in The

intelligent than the parents. This

without being driven,

socially

is

ward, and cannot remember to turn out the lights in his or her

How can the

tests that

doing well on other

forms the evidence

The proposition

measure learning

life tasks. It is this

at the

in school

own room.

and

that

do not measure

limited notion of intelligence that

that natural inequality in intelligence explains

among people

"intelligence." If

is

economic

based on the assumption, which the previous

one nevertheless proceeds on

is

a single, fixed trait of

that assumption, the re-

searcher must then find an instrument that accurately measures such in order to test the proposition. In this chapter,

instrument used in The Bell Curve, the

AFQT is cial

a

we

AFQT. We

will

will

poor measure of innate intelligence and instead

environment

that

environment matters most

further implication

is

intelli-

examine the

show

that the

reflects the so-

shapes people's academic performance, largely their

schooling. Because schooling helps people get ahead, this that the social

mance on

awk-

foundation of The Bell Curve.

chapter demonstrated to be dubious, that there

gence

the

teenager be more intelligent? Only by defining intelligence as

doing well on

inequality

is

cannot figure out

late getting off to school,

A to point B

from point

to get

is

that

we

is

confirmation

in explaining inequality.

And

the

can, through training, raise people's perfor-

the sorts of tests that are admission tickets to

upward mobility

in

our society.

The reader

will recall that the central evidence in

The Bell Curve comes

from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth's repeated interviews with over 12,000 young respondents. In 1980,

were between the ages of

Richard

Arum

coauthored

fifteen

when

these respondents

and twenty-three, they took the AFQT.

this chapter.

55

CHAPTER

3

Herrnstein and Murray use scores on this test as their measure

operational definition

—of

The Bell Curve they argue

low

on the AFQT, determined which

came

poor,

became

as their

Through a few hundred pages of by low scores

intelligence. that

—

intelligence, as indicated

NLSY

youth dropped out of school, be-

criminals, and otherwise had problematic

young

adult-

hoods.

The AFQT, however, was not designed to measure intelligence or cognitive ability. It was designed to predict how well high school graduates would do in the armed forces. It was written to measure school achievement more precisely, to measure how well teenagers attained high school-level math and reading skills. (As many critics have noted, the

—

1

original Binet tests

were designed

school and specifically not as a chologists turned

it

into a

test

problems

to identify children with

in

of inherent intelligence. American psy-

measure of "IQ.") Furthermore, the

AFQT

problematic even as a gauge of a person's school learning, because

is

test

takers' scores reflect other factors as well, such as the instruction they re-

ceived outside of school, their social backgrounds, and their motivations.

The Content of the AFQT In chapter 2,

we

discussed

how

the psychometric tradition that Herrnstein

and Murray follow works from the

test

backward

to the concept of intelli-

gence. Psychometricians did not identify g, the general factor for

gence, by observing people behaving intelligently; they derived statistical

analyses of test questions, from the tendency of people

swer one question accurately built

from the

later forget

it:

test

to

answer others accurately.

It is

upward. (Herrnstein and Murray admit

"The evidence

on

statistical analysis rather

an-

a concept

was perva-

than direct ob-

servation. Its reality therefore was, and remains, arguable"

does the

from

who

this point but

for a general factor in intelligence

sive but circumstantial, based

intelliit

[p. 3].)

What

AFQT measure?

In chapter 2,

we

looked

at a

clearly tested an examinee's

few questions from the

command

AFQT

itself.

They

of school curricula. Here are a few

more examples: 2

Two

X and Y, agree to divide their profits in the ratio of their If X invested $3,000 and Y invested $8,000, what will be Y's

partners,

investments.

share of a $22,000 profit?

56

BUT

INTELLIGENCE?

IS IT

$8,250

(a)

(b)

$16,000

(c)

$6,000

(d)

$5,864

Reveal most nearly means cover again

(a)

(b) turn over (c) take

open

(d)

The

away to

greatest

view

common

factor of

1

6, 24,

and 96

is

(a) 8

(b)2 16

(c)

(d) 12

If j

and k are positive whole numbers andy + k =

12,

what

is

the greatest

possible value of jkl (a)

6

(b)36 (c)32 (d) 11

As

before,

we

see that the

AFQT questions

are manifestly about school

tasks. Still,

intelligence as

most people generally understand

probably learn more in school and so

pay attention, and care more. At this rationale for the

AFQT

test better

least

test

cal arts,

—and thus

—

as

do youths who

better

sit still,

as a test of intelligence. First, school subjects

ignores those other realms

and so on

probably con-

two problems, however, cloud even

comprise but one of many realms of life This

it

on the AFQT. Youths who process information

tributes to doing well

is, at

—

in

which intelligence might

social relations, business,

best, a partial test.

matter.

mechani-

Second, for youths to

display intelligence on this test requires having been at least exposed to the

school subject matter. material

—and

it

If intelligent

youths have not been instructed

schools, lousy homes, lousy attitudes, or simply being too

taken these subjects yet ple, the case

in the

matters not whether the deficiency arises because of lousy

—then they

young

to

will not score well. (See, for

have

exam-

of the Founding Fathers on page 58.) Moreover, of the four

subtests in the

AFQT — arithmetic

reasoning,

57

word knowledge, paragraph

CHAPTER

3

Were the founding Fathers "Dull"? In the course of our history, Americans'

bers and numerical operations

—has

Revolution, most Americans had calculations.

"numeracy"

—command of numAt the time of the

greatly increased.

familiarity with, or interest in, exact

little

The few who formally learned

arithmetic struggled with un-

sophisticated teachers and crude textbooks that focused on rules for converting currencies If the

mnemonic

and measures.*

AFQT had been administered to Revolutionary-era

Americans, to

Founding Fathers perhaps, most probably would have scored

the

lower range. Would

we then conclude

that they

today's high school students? Probably not.

today's students

know more mathematics

were

We

would conclude

that

than did George Washington and

his fellows because today's students are taught

were the Founding Fathers. And

in the

less "intelligent" than

that is just

more mathematics than

what the

AFQT

measures:

what students have been taught. *

A

Cohen,

Calculating People.

comprehension, and mathematics knowledge

—

the

the greatest difference in the final scores. 3

make

two math components

These are subjects

that

probably most require having enrolled in the right classes, having had good teachers, and having paid attention.

The

AFQT

questions themselves testify that what

is

being assessed

is,

foremost, environmental, not "natural." Vocabulary words, profits and ratios, greatest

common

usually in school. the sense that

it

The

factors

AFQT

— is

these are topics that children are taught, also a test of environmental influences in

has a very specific substance, curricula taught in

twentieth-century American high schools. Similarly,

and concepts specific

lary

to middle-class

it

late-

also taps vocabu-

American homes

in the late

4

twentieth century. In another place or time, an armed forces screening test

might consist

of, for

example, reading signs of an animal

how

to find water, staying

rests

on questioning the AFQT's content

upwind

of g by simply reading the the

AFQT

is

a better

test.

of prey,

There

trail,

knowing

and so on. 5 Our critique here

validity (see chapter 2) as a test is

other evidence, as well, that

measure of social background than of "native"

intelligence.

58

BUT

INTELLIGENCE?

IS IT

Schooling, Age, and the Statistical

evidence supports reading the

AFQT

AFQT as essentially a test of maswe

tering school curricula. Following Herrnstein and Murray,

the

NLSY survey,

focus on white respondents only, and use the

they calculated from the 105 scores

"zAFQT,"

bell curve.

6

AFQT questions.

They

call those

referring to standardized scores designed to

how

(See chapter 2 for

reanalyze test

scores

transformed

conform

to a

Herrnstein and Murray constructed a

bell-curve distribution from original test scores that were not distributed in a bell curve.)

Cognitive

people grow test

ability, if

it is

like other

developmental

(at least until the debilitation

traits,

should grow as

of advanced age).

When

doctors

children on, say, hand-eye coordination, they take into account the

children's ages.. Similarly, psychometricians

dren of different ages on raw IQ

do not simply compare

test scores,

because they presume that

children score higher as they age. Psychometricians "standardize"

scores for age.

cause the

Age needs

NLSY

gave the

be taken into account

to

test to

in the

AFQT,

most

a roundabout fashion. In their statistical analyses

test

too, be-

part, dealt

showing

with age in

that the

AFQT

outcomes such as poverty, they introduced the respondent's age

the time he or she took the test as a "statistical control variable." point, all that

sumed

IQ

youths ranging from fifteen to twenty-

three years old. Herrnstein and Murray, for the

predicts

chil-

means

for us

that test takers'

they wanted to hold

it

that Herrnstein

is

AFQT is

at

this

in effect, as-

scores increase as the test takers age, and so

constant.

perspective: Intelligence

and Murray,

At

7

This makes sense from the psychometric

inborn or nearly so and matures in a develop-

mental manner, just as eye-hand coordination does.

But

if it is

instruction in curricula rather than biological

that is critical, then a different attribute

takers' ages, but

taught

when

how much math and

they took the

crude measures of the

test.

The

NLSY

test

provides researchers with only

of instruction: the number of

years of school the test takers had completed in

— not

vocabulary they had already been

test takers' histories

whether or not they had been

development

needs to be controlled

at the

an academic track

time of the in school.

test

and

These are

crude measures, in part because they do not reflect the quality of instruction the test takers

had received. Graduates of Andover, the Bronx High School

of Science, a

weak

troubled children

inner-city high school, or a remedial high school for

all

score "12" for years of schooling completed. These

59

CHAPTER

3

measures are crude also because they do not informal instruction

Children

who

at

reflect students'

home, during the summer,

home

are read to at

exposure to

and so on.

in travels,

whose parents encourage them

or

to

pay

the bill in a store will be ahead of the curve in vocabulary and math. Yet

turns out that even these

it

two crude measures of

instruction

—

schooling and having been in an academic track closely with test takers'

AFQT scores

correlate

—years of

much more

than do their ages.

(Readers will recall that a positive correlation coefficient, between 1

,

means

that people

A negative

who

correlation,

are high

on one

to -1, means that people high on one trait The higher the absolute value of the correlation,

from

tend to be low on the other.

which are

the stronger the connection. Practically speaking, correlations,

symbolized as that there is a

above

r,

r

=

.20 to .30

how

or below r

= -.20

to

how

— suggest

-.30

people scored on

they scored on another.)

The table below shows how ages,

—

noteworthy correspondence between

one measure and

test takers'

AFQT scores correlate with their

on the one hand, and with two indicators of instruction, on the

Clearly,

one can predict how high someone scored on the

by knowing how

had been

in;

and

tend to be high on the other.

trait

far the

other.

AFQT pretty well

person had gone in school and what track he or she

one can hardly predict

AFQT

score at

all

by knowing the

test

taker's age.

Correlations of test taker's

age

at the

AFQT

time the

test

score with.

years of education completed at time test

whether the

test taker

had been

in

.

.

.

was taken

.16

was taken

.54

an academic track

.45

AFQT strongly

Scores on the

correlate with how many years of schoolwhen they took the test (.54). Another way to see who were among the highest and the lowest scorers. The

ing test takers had had that is to look at

high scorers, the top 5 percent (Herrnstein and Murray's "cognitive

were those who answered 101 or more of the 105 questions

elite"),

correctly.

Over

two-thirds of these high scorers had had at least one year of education

beyond high school when they took

the test.

Of

those

who

scored in the

bottom 5 percent (the "very dull"), almost half had already dropped out of high school before taking the

test.

Age, on the other hand, weakly correlates with fact,

age correlates negatively with

constant.

8

That

is to say,

AFQT

if

AFQT

score (.16). In

one holds years of education

among NLSY respondents

with grossly similar

exposure to instruction, the older ones scored below the younger ones. So, for example, older respondents with twelve years of schooling scored

60

BUT

INTELLIGENCE?

IS IT

below younger respondents with twelve years of schooling. The explanation for this result

logical

had been out of

that the older respondents

is

school longer and had had more time to forget what they had learned there. 9 It

makes sense because

to accept Herrnstein

the

intelligence, these results

hood buy

AFQT measures

and Murray's premise

would imply

that as

young adulthood they became

into

instruction. If

we were

instead

AFQT measures

that the

native

people aged from teenage-

Only teenagers might

stupider.

that explanation.

Herrnstein and Murray are not

much concerned

because they assume that intelligence

and purposes even before age

AFQT

were 15

to

with

immutable

—

test takers'

fixed for

ages

intents

all

Herrnstein and Murray wrote, "The

fifteen.

NLSY

test scores for the

is

sample were obtained when the subjects

23 years of age, and the IQ scores were already as deeply rooted

them

a fact about

as their height" (p. 130). That

is

a bold but untenable

statement.

Think about the heights of teenagers. Take a group of

them up from

three-year-olds and line

fifteen to

shortest to tallest. Gather

twenty-

them

to-

gether again in eight years and line them up again. In general, the order of

people from shortest to

tallest will

heights will have changed a fifteenstill

lot.

We

have changed some, but

cannot validly compare the heights of

and twenty-three-year-olds on any one day. The fifteen-year-olds

have growing

have reached

to do, but nearly all of the twenty-three-year-olds will

their full height.

Now think

about the

AFQT scores

of fifteen- to twenty-three-year-olds.

These comparisons are even more problematic

mere .16 shows. score.

their actual

The

It

implies that there

correlation

is

is little

—

as the correlation of a

connection between age and

weak because youths

differ greatly in

how much

education they get between age fifteen and age twenty-three. People leave school

all

along the

by maturation

would be

AFQT

—

way during

as height

is

AFQT score was determined correlation between age and AFQT

those years. If

—then

the

as high or higher than the correlation

score.

It is

far lower,

however. Those

who

between education and receive

more or

better

schooling between age fifteen and age twenty-three pass ahead of those

who

receive less or worse schooling. Consider two

young women

in the

sample, one fifteen and the other twenty-three, and suppose that the fifteenyear-old has exactly the gotten

if

AFQT score the twenty-three-year-old would have

she had been tested at fifteen. Suppose also that the fifteen-year-

old will ultimately attend the identical schools for exactly as long as the

twenty-three-year-old already has done. to obtain the

same

Can we expect

these

two women

AFQT score on the same day? (If intelligence were 61

fixed

CHAPTER by age

fifteen

would be

and

yes.)

if

the

3

AFQT measured this

The answer

is,

intelligence, then the

answer

of course, no. The twenty-three-year-old has

already finished high school and gone on to college; the fifteen-year-old in the ninth or tenth grade.

still

of the instruction she received since age

test all

old

still

this

lem

in

—

but the fifteen-year-

between teenager and parents with

the comparison

chapter opened

AFQT to be The

fifteen,

is

to the

has that instruction ahead of her. The apparent paradox about aging

and intelligence

which

The twenty-three-year-old can bring

—underlines

the fallacy of taking tests like the

measures of intelligence broadly understood.

issue of aging and testing does not merely reveal a technical prob-

The Bell Curve's use of the AFQT.

we mean by

It

speaks to the essence of what

what we can do about

"intelligence" and to

Until the 1960s

it.

and 1970s, psychometricians had convinced most specialists of aging

from about age twenty onward, people became

less

and

that

less intelligent,

because researchers had found that older people scored considerably worse

on the psychometric

AFQT,

tests

than younger people did. But those

largely tapped school

tests, like the

and school-like learning. In recent years, psy-

chologists have realized that such academic tests measure only one special

kind of cognitive ability; the tests ignore other psychological capacities,

such as practical

and wisdom.

skills, social acuity,

New research

uses tests

measure a wider variety of "everyday" problem solving, for example,

that

how

would advise a friend who had a financial or medical probThe research shows that people sustain or even expand their mental 10 The inability of the psychometric paradigm capacities well into old age. to handle this most elementary point, that in many ways mature adults are a person

lem.

"smarter" than teenagers, casts doubt on that entire enterprise.

The age

of schooling.

been

in

AFQT is really a test So does the high correlation between AFQT score and having

pattern in the

NLSY data

an academic track

Classes in academic tracks teach more

(.45).

about the topics covered in the

shows how the

AFQT

than do classes in general or voca-

tional tracks. This should not matter if the

formance the

is

some kind of raw

main determinant of

The In

latter is

main determinant of AFQT

intelligence.

AFQT

score

is

It

per-

should matter a great deal

instruction in academic

if

material.

what the evidence shows.

some ways,

the

AFQT might be a good measure of instruction, but not

one of native intelligence. What

it

people encountered and absorbed.

captures best

It

is

how much

instruction

does that better than does the conven-

tional "years of education" measure,

because the

AFQT

seems

to assess

educational quality and informal instruction as well as simply time in school.

It

taps the difference

between those who spent time 62

in classes with

BUT

IS IT

INTELLIGENCE?

rich curricula, energetic teachers, motivated students,

sources and those the difference

and those

who

who

and plentiful

spent time in classes without those qualities.

It

re-

taps

between those who are "instructed" outside the classroom are not. (See, for example, the discussion of

tions in chapter 7.)

summer

vaca-

These differences favor rich children over poor ones. Of

AFQT also taps the difference between those who concentrated

course, the

who did not. Yet even these we saw in the discussion of infor-

and remember what they were taught and those cognitive skills can be and are taught, as

mation processing

One response

in chapter 2.

to

ally

do measure

is

that

we have

mere technical debate;

we

instruction

a test of instruction,

AFQT

scores re-

intelligence; and, as proxies for intelligence, they cause,

and smart kids go further

test

is

the order reversed:

rather than are caused by, schooling. That

on the

AFQT

our argument that the

especially schooling,

it

is

to say, smart kids score high

in school.

This controversy

is

not a

has profound policy implications. Whether the

give children molds their intelligence or their intelligence

molds the instruction they receive says a

lot

about whether and

how

to

invest in schooling.

To support

their

claim that the amount of schooling youths complete

only reflects the intelligence they brought to school, the authors of The Bell

Curve conducted a complex

NLSY researchers

statistical analysis.

IQ

cess to scores from earlier school-administered

tests for

had ac-

about one-fifth

of the respondents. Herrnstein and Murray report that the higher respondents had scored on the earlier

How many all

IQ

There ercise.

are,

tests

to

little

know was

by education

to the ability to predict

—

measures

however, several problems with Herrnstein and Murray's ex-

errors, which,

when

to

measure the

corrected, double their

intelligence.

12

A

more than

made

own

more sophisticated

same data by two economists showed

AFQT score

AFQT

supposedly measure, intelligence (pp. 589-92).

For one, using years of education

on

AFQT

1980 were caused almost solely by

and, therefore, the

ignores quality of education. 11 For another, they

effects

on the AFQT.

the earlier test score. Herrnstein and

AFQT scores in

that

scores, not

what other IQ

contributed

tests

one needed

Murray concluded earlier

the higher they scored

test,

years of school the respondents had completed in the period

between the two score;

IQ

three times as

effect of schooling

a couple of technical

estimate of education's

statistical analysis

much

as Herrnstein and

mated. 13 Furthermore, Herrnstein and Murray

fail to

Murray

63

esti-

report an important

piece of evidence about the predictive validity (see chapter 2) of the Test takers' scores correlated with the

of the

that years of schooling affected

AFQT.

number of years of school they had

CHAPTER

3

finished at the time they took the test at r

=

.54. Test takers' scores corre-

number of years of school they completed after taking the = .33. The AFQT score better "predicted" past schooling than

lated with the test at it

only r

did future schooling. That

is,

AFQT

the

measured what

test takers

had

already learned, not their ability for future learning.

A

more fundamental problem with Herrnstein and Murray's effort to separate the AFQT score from schooling is that other IQ tests also reflect instruction. Take, for

example, the

children of the respondents. the

NLSY

test

used by the

the late 1980s,

many

NLSY

to assess the

of the young

women

had been tracking since 1978 had themselves borne children.

Interviewers gave these the

By

women's

Peabody Picture Vocabulary

three- to six-year-old sons and daughters

Test. In this test,

an adult reads a word and

then asks the child to pick out from four choices the correctly corresponding picture. This most surely tests substantive learning of vocabulary learning that

may come from

talking with parents, listening to parents read

books, watching educational television, and the

like.

14

Typical IQ tests

share the property of measuring school-like learning. Finally,

we must

not forget that schools often use such tests to track

students. This, too, will create correlations

exposure to curricula, and scores on dents

who

later tests,

scores on early

IQ

tests,

because schools place

stu-

score well in the early tests into enriched classes and place low

scorers into remedial classes.

much

among

The

classes students are placed in affect

instruction they receive and, subsequently,

how

how

well they do on fu-

ture tests. (See chapter 7.)

That instruction in curricula

is

the cause, not the consequence, of test

scores can be illustrated with another sports analogy. Suppose to

measure people's

people to

Some

lift

"lifting quotient"

—

call

it

"LQ."

We

we wished

ask a sample of

weights and use their performance to measure their LQs.

of these people have been working out in

ened themselves and received instruction

gyms where

they strength-

in weight-lifting techniques;

others have barely exercised since their physical education classes in high

how much time people had spent in a gym would correhow much poundage they lifted in the test. Maybe high LQ causes more gym time (perhaps people who are strong choose to work out more), but it is much likelier that the causality runs largely the other way: More gym time causes high LQ scores. Similarly, more instructional school. Obviously,

late highly

time

—

in

with

and out of class

—causes high IQ

scores.

The

AFQT is a measure

15 of instruction received, absorbed, and displayed. And, as such,

the environment

—

it

reflects

schools mostly, but also families and communities

the test takers.

64

—of

BUT

IS IT

INTELLIGENCE?

This understanding of the connection between education and is

not only

more accurate than Herrnstein and Murray's.

we can

us to believe that

raise test

scores

test

also encourages

It

performance through more and better

teaching.

What AFQT

is

gence," but

it

The

a better is

AFQT Measure?

Else Does the

measure of instruction than

it is

of "natural

intelli-

not a perfect measure of the former either. Scoring well or

poorly depends on other factors as well, most notably, on

test takers'

moti-

vation to display that learning.

To see

this, let

us look closely at the

and lowest-scoring

the highest-

of the bell curve distribution,

tails

We

test takers.

showed

in chapter 2 that

Herrnstein and Murray squeezed a bell curve out of what was not bell-shaped distribution of original scores.

They did

that

convinced not only that intelligence had to be distributed but also that the dramatic differences in the extremes.

most

ute the

It is

in a bell curve,

outcomes are found between

life

the highest 5 percent, the "cognitive elite,"

to society

at all a

because they were

and the bottom 5 percent, the "very

who

dull,"

contrib-

who

are

responsible for most social problems.

Who

were

in the

upper end, the 5 percent "cognitive elite"? As noted

they were overwhelmingly people

earlier,

beyond high school before taking the disproportionately

men

math than have American

is

girls. In addition, the

— lucky because had they

empha-

further in

top 5 percent were also

answered just one or two more

down

to being

merely "bright."

a result of standard

psychometric insistence on differentiating, de-

When

small differences are exaggerated, chance be-

scribed in chapter

comes

the test

American boys have gone

questions wrong, they would have dropped (This

who had had some schooling 16 And the high scorers were

—68 percent—probably because

sized mathematics. Traditionally,

lucky people

test.

all

the

2.

more important.)

Who were in the bottom, the disreputable 5

percent?

We pointed out

that

they were uneducated. In fact, 27 percent of the "very dull" had dropped out of high school at least three years before taking the

some of

the

test.

17

Furthermore,

bottom 5 percent had mental problems. Interviewers

in later

years rated forty-two of the white respondents as "mentally handicapped,"

and those respondents were cent. If

we

believe that the

likelier than others to

AFQT

is

an IQ

test,

be in the lowest 5 per-

then

all

of the bottom 5

percent were mentally "retarded" by the conventional standard that IQ

65

CHAPTER scores below 75 one-fifth of the

mark

the retarded.

18

If

3

we

use a line of 70, then about

bottom 5 percent were retarded. (Unfortunately, the two

—

ways of assessing mental handicaps interviewer rating and AFQT score hardly agree, casting more doubt on the AFQT as an intelligence measure.) 19 Including these two groups in the analysis distorts the picture

—

of how intelligence operates in the general population, the huge majority of

which

We

neither mentally retarded nor handicapped.

is

many

also suspect that

of these low scorers were neither mentally

disabled nor unintelligent but were instead discouraged test takers

gave up or were, to use the colloquial, "screw-ups" jected the

test,

fooled around, or just did not take

who

—respondents who

it

seriously.

Why

re-

do we

think that? Consider that sixty-nine of the whites (1.5 percent of them)

scored below chance. Test takers

who

simply answered the questions ran-

domly would have, on average, gotten twenty-six correct. 20 How do we interpret someone scoring below chance? Many of the questions were designed to be answered correctly by virtually everyone. Yet these did worse than throwing darts at the answer boxes.

who

of the respondents

because

it

was hard

test seriously, either

We

test takers

suspect that

many

scored below chance simply lost interest, perhaps

them or

for

for other reasons; others did not take the

answering randomly or not answering many questions

at all.

We

believe that

many

many who

of the lowest 5 percent, including

scored below chance, were "screw-ups" for three major reasons.

First,

some of these low scorers had scored at or even above average in previous, school-given IQ tests. 21 Second, the below-chance scoring is greatest in the last section

test

of the

test:

form (sections

Three of the

2, 3,

and

4).

AFQT

From

subtests appeared early in the

1.5 to nearly 5 percent

of whites

scored below chance on those. In the last subtest Herrnstein and Murray used, section 8 (which appeared after respondents had already faced 264

multiple-choice questions), 10 percent scored below chance tion to us that, as the test

went on, more

test takers

"dropped out."

sections 4 and 8, five respondents actually scored zero sible result

on a lengthy multiple-choice

test,

—

is

This pattern of taking

The seems

setting in to

our tests

which the

own

were tested

roughly ten in hotels,

On

both

suggesting that they did not

many test among youth.

that

observations of test-taking

has wider implications.

NLSY respondents took the AFQT during

have been optimal for valid

(6 percent)

indica-

a virtually impos-

even attempt the questions. The third reason we believe takers dropped out

—an

individually.

testing.

The

rest

About 700 of were tested

libraries, or similar locations.

66

Two

1980

the subjects

in

groups of

interviewers ad-

BUT

IS IT

INTELLIGENCE'

ministered and proctored each group administration. Respondents were

show

paid $50 (worth over $90 in 1995 currency) to

on the

test

how

they scored

did not matter. Respondents were also enticed to participate by

being offered the

were

up;

test results

mature as

relatively

and vocational information. The

test takers

go

and had already demonstrated their commitment to the interviewed a couple of years

earlier.

test takers

(fifteen to twenty-three years old)

NLSY

by being

22

Contrast this situation to the typical setting for standardized tests in schools: restless, tries to

A

teacher hands out booklets to a class of twenty to thirty-five

perhaps resentful, adolescents or preadolescents. The teacher then

maintain order during the long

at least as

test. It is

reasonable to assume that

high a proportion, but probably a higher one, of students become

distracted or discouraged or just

NLSY. Even one-on-one

"blow off

testing in schools

that test as did the is

problematic. School psychol-

do so many evaluations

ogists in inner-city schools, at least, are pressed to that their testing tends to

Students likely to

who

AFQT in the

be rushed and superficial. 23

ignore or resist teachers' instructions for taking a test are

do poorly

in school,

and they are likely to do poorly outside of

school as well. Employers do not appreciate such rebellious attitudes any more than teachers do. Consequently, low scorers will often become low achievers. Perhaps this outcome is due, in part, to poor intelligence. But it is

probably due to poor attitudes

even

if

—one reason

that

such

tests predict well

they do not measure intelligence well.

Rebelliousness, apathy, and other attitudes reduce test scores. So do

emotional conditions such as anxiety. 24 Where do such attitudes and

feel-

come from? Perhaps they are to some degree "natural," inborn temperaments. But many studies of youths point to social conditions such as

ings

—

poor schooling, disorganized neighborhoods, stressed parents, high unemployment, and being in a stigmatized minority tudes.

Once

—

that stimulate

such

atti-

again, then, the evidence points to the environment as the basic

explanation for

test scores.

We

will revisit these points

explaining racial differences in test scores in chapter

when we

turn to

8.

Conclusion

We have made

several important critiques of using the

AFQT as a measure

of "natural intelligence." To these, Herrnstein and Murray can provide one rebuttal:

The

AFQT

has predictive validity. That

correlated with other, later outcomes that

67

we

is,

scores on the test are

care about.

High scorers

are

CHAPTER likelier to

go on

do well

to college, to

so on; low scorers are likelier to

how

(although

weak

strong or

whether a

in the military, to get

same

the

fail in

the connection

we

will see in the next chapter). But, as

validity tells us

3

is

good jobs, and

We

tasks.

grant

pointed out in chapter

test correlates

all this

with such outcomes

we

2, predictive

with outcomes, but not

why

it

does. Cognitive skills are surely part of the explanation for the correlation

between

tests

numbers

who

skills are

read faster,

who can juggle more who think more

recognize more words, or

on the AFQT. These

clearly will generally score higher

them well

who

and outcomes. Youths

in their heads,

One

in school and, to a lesser degree, in life.

learned in a variety of settings,

to successful learning than others.

some of which

The other point is

skills will serve

point

are

is

that such

more conducive

that the

AFQT in large

degree reflects other characteristics besides some basic intelligence.

were just "noise," just random influences on

If those other characteristics

the

AFQT

would not undermine The Bell Curve argu-

scores, then they

— such how — not mere

ment. But those other characteristics school and self-defeating attitudes

how

people end up in

life.

attribute all the effect they

as

The problem

is

have found of

native intelligence; they should attribute

that

AFQT

much,

if

recently people were in

They influence Herrnstein and Murray

are

noise.

scores on outcomes to

not most, of the effect of

AFQT to these other characteristics, such as instruction and motivation. Another way to understand what we have shown is that test takers' AFQT the

scores are

good summaries of

a host of prior experiences (mostly instruc-

someone do well in adult life. The error is to attribute of the AFQT to some unseen native intelligence. 25

tion) that enable

significance

the

The AFQT basically measures how much formal and informal instrucsomeone has received and absorbed. It is no surprise that youths who

tion

do well

in school will usually

continue to do well in school, in addition to

doing well on the standardized

tests.

(Doing well on early

tests also

opens

up more opportunities for advanced schooling, for example, by moving into a higher track.) to

do well

in life.

society today

is

And it is no surprise that doing well in

As every

parent of an adolescent

is

structured so that the college diploma

imagine success. But

this points to the direct

school helps one

acutely aware, our

is

necessary even to

consequences of schooling

(And cognition, unlike genes, can be see in chapter 7.) The AFQT also reflects

rather than of cognitive ability.

changed by mental

how

policy, as

we

shall

disabilities, motivation,

well

someone does

and

attitude.

in postschool

deavors requiring school-like

skills

And these traits,

endeavors

too, influence

—

especially those en-

and school-like discipline. For such

reasons, the tests do predict outcomes well.

68

BUT

As predictive

devices, then, the

a general way, although they

it

AFQT and

similar tests work, at least in

do not predict very well the performance of

AFQT

any given individual. But the

whether

INTELLIGENCE?

IS IT

predicts

outcomes irrespective of

reflects intelligence or, instead, reflects other characteristics.

practical purposes

— such

as admission to college

—

predictive validity

be sufficient. But for understanding, predictive validity

must be concerned with content sure, with

why

gauge an

ability

formed early

then where people end up in

and inequality

is

predetermined.

If,

life

not enough.

AFQT

and similar

in life, stable thereafter

The evidence strongly

The Bell Curve, the AFQT,

is

really a

and

largely reflects natural differences

however, these

tests largely assess in-

struction and other environmental conditions, then inequality

natural nor fixed.

We

with what the tests actually mea-

the tests correlate with outcomes. If the

tests essentially

fateful,

validity,

is

For

may

is

neither

measure

indicates that this key

measure of instruction and

in

attitude,

of things that are changeable, not of innate intelligence.

The policy implications of tion

this analysis are straightforward:

—both formal and informal —

matters.

So do

Educa-

efforts to affect youths'

motivations and attitudes. Instead of shrugging our shoulders and dismissing efforts to raise academic achievement,

cognitive training (see chapter If the analysis

of this chapter

fails at this point. If the

tion

is

correct, then

AFQT heavily

and social environment

we can

successfully invest in

7).

The Bell Curve argument of instruc-

reflects the contribution

to individual

achievement, then Herrnstein

and Murray have not shown the dominance of native intelligence over environment, but the opposite. In the next chapter, however,

We

we will assume how well the

AFQT does measure intelligence. AFQT predicts outcomes compared with measures of the social environment. We will see that, even were we to scrap this chapter and grant all that

that the

will evaluate

Herrnstein and Murray claim about the validity of the text

still

better accounts for

who gets ahead and who

for success.

69

AFQT,

falls

social con-

behind

in the race

CHAPTER

*

+

4

Who Wins? Who Loses? I

n the old blues refrain, Albert King asks, "If you're so smart, how come you're not rich?" Herrnstein and Murray issue the academic equivalent of that challenge. Their evidence shows, they claim, that being intelli-

gent leads people to be successful in school, wealthy, and stable in marriage; being unintelligent leads people to

even prone

to injury. Herrnstein

be poor, divorced, criminal, and

and Murray also claim

that differences in

people's social backgrounds are of minor importance in determining their lives turn out. This is the crux of

The Bell Curve's empirical

more strongly shapes

tions, that intelligence

environment. The challenge to the book's 1995,

the

is

"way IQ dominates

in explaining life

outcomes than does

critics,

this thing

we

outcomes. The contrary 1

we showed

In chapter 2 as

life

call

'socioeconomic status'"

is true.

that intelligence is not single, unitary,

measured by the AFQT. In

very same evidence used in The Bell Curve,

were a good measure of

intelligence, the

We

—

specifically,

who becomes

With

errors.

statistics

we demonstrate

this chapter,

and fixed if

it

were,

using the

we show that even if the AFQT more strongly determine

life

poor.

reflects intelligence. at

poverty and

is

a

way

step, to correct their technical

no more complex than

that social contexts

theirs

and conceptual

—just more accurate

shape individual outcomes more than

we grant them the dubious assumption that AFQT Later in the chapter, we step back to take a broader

does intelligence, even

Curve

even

follow Herrnstein and Murray's data analysis as closely as possible

and then go on, step by

look

that,

socioeconomic status of people's

parents and their broader social environment

outcomes

asser-

social

wrote Charles Murray in

The Bell Curve assumes. In chapter 3 we showed

intelligence is not well

how

if

its

causes.

to see the real

Redoing the survey analysis

dynamics

that sort out

in

The Bell

winners and losers in

America. Other scholars have also reexamined the NLSY, using somewhat different procedures than

we

did,

Herrnstein and Murray are wrong.

and have come

to the

same conclusion:

2

Herrnstein and Murray exaggerated the importance of intelligence, not

only by using a measure that largely reflects instruction, but also by defin-

Richard

Arum

coauthored

this chapter.

70

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? ing social environment narrowly and incorrectly. For them, the educational attainment, income, and occupation of people's parents comprise the total-

of their family environment. We, however, recognize and demonstrate

ity

that the schools, live also

communities, regions, and social circles

shape their

which people

in

lives.

Herrnstein and Murray also exaggerated the relative importance of intel-

making several technical

ligence by

most

of these. Ironically,

tistically the

them

one of

importance of the

AFQT score.

bulk of our

By

statistical

work

intelligence

the years.

we accomplish

that people's ultimate fortunes

—

Which

that social context is

NLSY

predicts

Poor?

we

not

We show

their social envi-

more important than

tested

in the social sciences

An Overview

over

of the Analysis

respondents became poor in 1990? Herrnstein and Murray

who was poor

in 1990: the respondents'

and Murray claim that the

the rate of poverty for people

scored low on the

poverty between those

which one most strongly

attributes to see

the respondents' parents' socioeconomic status

this

have sim-

a larger end:

depend on

—has been repeatedly demonstrated

up a contest between two

who

We

2.

3

Who Becomes

stein

of their errors led

analyses will be found in appendix

ronments. This finding

set

to underestimate starest

taking these steps to reanalyze The Bell Curve's evidence,

many ways

correct

for presentation in this chapter.)

only refute Herrnstein and Murray, the

them

But the

We

importance of social environment. (The

to underestimate greatly the

plified the

errors in their analysis.

their errors led

who

AFQT who

AFQT

is

wins

AFQT

scores in 1980 or

(SES) around 1980. Herrn-

this

match. The difference

scored high on the

AFQT

in

versus those

greater than the difference in the rate of

scored high versus low on parental SES.

evidence they conclude that "natural intelligence"

is

the

On

key determi-

nant of inequality. This result, the contrast between the strong association

of

AFQT with

erty,

has

poverty and the

become

weak

association of parental

the central claim in Murray's defense of

How could sociologists

SES

with pov-

The Bell Curve. 4

and economists have been so blind

to the

impor-

tance of intelligence? Perhaps they have not been blind but have been too

scared to reveal this "truth." to

it

nor scared of

devoted

itself to

it.

The answer

Since the

late

is:

They have been

explaining economic outcomes.

by Christopher Jencks and

neither blind

1950s an entire school of research has

his associates is a

71

The 1972 book

Inequality

well-known example of such

CHAPTER

have incorporated intelligence

studies. Social scientists

AFQT— in

cluding specifically the

typically found that conventional

AFQT,

test scores

—

in-

work. 5 These researchers have

measures of intelligence, including the

large; intelligence as

measured

in

such

does not have an overriding influence on economic outcomes; and

scores are but one factor sive

their

are correlated with important outcomes, especially with education

and earnings. But the effects are not tests

4

among many

and well-known research

that

literature

test

shape inequality. 6 This exten-

made

us very skeptical of the

claims that were emanating from press coverage of The Bell Curve. Years of accumulated research, not ideology, nity's chilly reception of itself,

lies

behind the academic

commu-

On close examination of the book

The Bell Curve.

our skepticism turned out to be well founded.

We

redo the

analysis of the

statistical

NLSY

data in the following

sequence: •

We

review a few of the

explain •

how we

critical errors

Herrnstein and Murray

We replicate Herrnstein and Murray's basic finding — that differences in AFQT scores matter more than differences in parental SES in predicting the chances that NLSY respondents were poor in 1990 — and then show what the finding looks

like

once a few technical errors are corrected: The

structure of respondents' families of origin

•

made and

corrected them.

is

then about as important as

AFQT score in predicting poverty. We expand the notion of social background

to include aspects of the

communities respondents lived

show

in at the

time of the testing and then

that these factors affected poverty, too.

Together with

home

envi-

ronment they are equally important as AFQT. •

We

add into the explanation the formal educational experiences of the

respondents, and

becomes

at this

significantly

point social environment broadly understood

AFQT

more important than

as a predictor of

poverty. •

We

•

We close the reanalysis by

include two attributes of the respondents' communities in 1990 to

show

the importance of local conditions.

showing the

critical

of three factors that Herrnstein and Murray

importance to being poor

essentially ignored: being

female, being unmarried, and being a parent. In the end,

become one of

AFQT

scores

the less important explanations of respondents' poverty.

In defining social background, Herrnstein and

Murray overlooked some

aspects of families, such as their size, and completely ignored other ele-

ments of the environment outside the family ples' life chances,

that nonetheless shape peo-

such as the kind of schools they attended and local job

72

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES Parental

SES

Parents' educations Parents' occupational status Parents' income

Inequality Poverty

Unemployment

Social Problems Out-of-wedlock births Incarceration

Welfare dependence Divorce Injury "Idleness"

Herrnstein and Murray's

4.1.

Problems {Note: Solid

Model of

the

Causes of Inequality and Social

lines indicate strong effects;

or insignificant effects. Herrnstein and

reasons but do not examine

its

Murray

dashed

lines indicate

weak

also control for age for technical

effects. Source:

Authors' interpretation of The

Bell Curve)

opportunities.

Even our

analysis does not capture nearly

environment, because data are unavailable for of the environment

—

for example,

many

all

of the social

important dimensions

on people's social contacts

what you know, but who you know").

("it's

not

7

The authors of The Bell Curve seem blind to this broader meaning of the 8 They, and some of their critics, too, seemingly cannot raise their sights beyond the household to see obvious social influences on individuals. When, for example, a region enters a recession, many workers social.

plunge into poverty

—

individual and family have

little to

do with

it.

For

another example, residential segregation by race and class increase the risk of poverty for those

who

are isolated.

9

Yet Herrnstein and Murray's mea-

sures of social origin take none of such realities into account.

show below, their

the kinds of

communities people

chances regardless of their individual

traits.

We

As we

abilities

or other personal

10

can display the differences between the "natural inequality" expla-

nation of individual outcomes and the environmental one the following graphs. Figure 4.1

we propose

by the AFQT, strongly determines their inequality.

It

with

shows what Herrnstein and Murray claim

happens. People's genetically given intelligence, as measured in the

mines

will

live in substantially alter

their

economic outcomes and thus

also determines the chances that they

NLSY deter-

become

involved in problematic behavior. Herrnstein and Murray acknowledge

73

CHAPTER Parental

4

Home

Environment Parents' educations Parents' occupational status

Schooling

income Two-parent family Parents'

•

Years of school

•

Academic

track

Number of siblings Farm

Social Problems

Adolescent Community

Environment • •

Out-of-wedlock births

Cognitive skills

School composition Region of the country

•

Incarceration

AFQT

Welfare dependence Divorce Injury

Race Most

"Idleness"

relationships

vary in strength from

group

group

to

Inequality

Gender

• •

Our Model of

4.2.

have drawn parental

in

Poverty

Unemployment

the Causes of Inequality and Social Problems (Note:

only the strong effects to simplify the diagram.

We

assume

We that

home environment and adolescent community are correlated and adwe do not specifically analyze that correlation)

just for that in our analysis, but

that people's family origins, specifically their parents'

SES, has some

ef-

but those, they say, are weak.

fects,

Figure 4.2 displays our alternative. figure 4.

1

because the reality

is

It is

considerably more complex than

considerably more complex. Original con-

ditions include aspects of individuals' families (labeled here "Parental

Home

Environment") but also include aspects of the wider social milieux,

such as the region people grew up

in.

and gender because these are genetic

(We do

Origins also include people's race

traits that

take on social significance.

Herrnstein and Murray's procedure of examining inequality only.

Chapter 8

is

devoted to the subject of race and

the record in figure 4.2 that racial identity influences ple's

we among

not in this chapter examine racial differences because

home and community

origins affect the

ethnicity.

follow

whites

We note

amount and kind of schooling

they receive and, together with schooling, affect their cognitive skills

which we use the Figure 4.2 individuals'

is

AFQT as

for

most processes.) Peo-

—

for

a measure.

simplified for easier legibility by not displaying aspects of

contemporary

situations: their adult

community environment,

including where they live and the local unemployment rate; and their con-

temporary family situations, including whether they are married and have

74

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES children.

These conditions also

affect the

We

do include them

become model. They would appear

odds

poor, independent of the other factors in the

roughly in the center of figure 4.2,

at the risk

1

that people will

of considerable visual

clutter.

in the analyses that follow.

Adolescent environments, schooling, and contemporary environments shape people's economic circumstances. Finally, those circum-

in turn

stances affect the odds that people will encounter social problems.

ognize that figure 4.2

is still

current environment,

it

NLSY. For

rec-

a simplification. Aside from not displaying the

leaves out other social factors such as people's peer

groups. Also, elements listed in each box are limited by what in the

We

instance,

we have no

direct

is

available

measure of school

quality.

Figure 4.2 also simplifies the complex causality. For example, getting injured or divorced often leads people to to contrast

become

poor.

Still,

the figure serves

our perspective with the vastly oversimplified and mistaken one

presented in The Bell Curve.

It

also provides a road

map

to the analysis that

follows.

Fixing the Errors

we

NLSY

we needed to correct several errors in Herrnstein and Murray's analysis. One technical error actually led Herrnstein and Murray to wrc^restimate how much AFQT score affected the risks of being poor. We corrected it in Before

could use the

to explore the sources of inequality,

our analysis. 11 Yet the bulk of their errors led them to exaggerate the relative

importance of

AFQT

score by greatly underestimating the impor-

tance of social environment. erred in

how

importantly, Herrnstein and

Murray

they constructed the measure they call "parental SES," the

measure they use as the key uals' social

Most

environments.

—

essentially the only

—

indicator of individ-

We quickly review four kinds of errors that they

made. MISSING INFORMATION

Key information was missing 17 percent did not

no information on

list

for

many

of the respondents. For example,

their father's occupation.

their parents'

income

And

21 percent provided

for either 1978 or 1979, about

two-thirds of those because they were not living with their parents then,

so they were not even asked their parents' income. 12 Herrnstein and Murray

still

used those respondents

in their analysis, in effect

assigning each

of them the average parental income reported by the other respondents. M

But these respondents with missing information were not average respcn75

CHAPTER dents.

14

By

4

assigning them the average income, Herrnstein and Murray

rendered their measure of parental income less accurate and thus less likely

show up

to

this error

as an important influence

on becoming poor. 15

by using a more appropriate procedure

We

corrected

for handling the cases with

missing information. 16 RELIABILITY

The term

"reliability" refers, roughly, to

surement

is.

A metal

time after time;

it is

how

ing measures of the

same

and trustworthy a mea-

same measurement of an object

ruler will give us the

reliable.

stable

A ruler made of soft rubber will give us vary-

object;

it

is

not reliable. In this research, the

AFQT is more reliable than the measure of social environment. Whatever AFQT measures —intelligence, years of school, motivation, and so

the

on

—

same score

same person time after time. That is because many years of psychometric work have gone into making it reliable (see chapter 2). The components of the parental

SES

it

does so

reliably.

It

gives roughly the

For example, youth are only approxi-

scale tend to be less reliable.

mately accurate in estimating their parents' income. 17

The implication of

this difference in reliability

components of parental SES

is

this:

because

will

its

have a higher

between the

When two

equally associated with a third, the one of the

measured

And only 4 questions

measure SES, compared with the 105 for the AFQT.

are used to

the

for the

first

two

statistical correlation

measurement contains

Herrnstein and Murray set up, the

less

random

AFQT

and

attributes are both that is

more

reliably

than the other. That

is

error. So, in the face-off

AFQT has the critical advantage of much

greater reliability over parental SES. University of Minnesota public policy

professor Sanders

Korenman and Harvard

sociologist Christopher

Winship

repeated Herrnstein and Murray's analysis, using a statistical adjustment to correct for unreliability in the

AFQT and the parental SES

index.

By doing

number of Herrnstein and Murray's conclusions: Corunreliability, parental SES was often more important than the

so they reversed a rected for

AFQT. 18 This

is

one correction we did not do

others had done

it,

however, our

our analysis, partly because

partly because not all scholars agree

ness, and partly because so,

in

own

we have more

its

substantive concerns.

appropriate-

Had we done

reversal of Herrnstein and Murray's conclusions

would have been even stronger than sion, as well as others,

on

we

are

the

one we present below. In

more cautious

justifiably be.

76

in

our critique than

this deci-

we might

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? WEIGHTING THE COMPONENTS OF PARENTAL SES Herrnstein and Murray discussed in detail their construction of the parental

SES

index, proudly announcing that they bent over

good measure of social

class

background

to

They added together mother's education,

did not.

backward

to build a

AFQT. But

run against the

they

father's education, the

head of household's occupation, and parental income, averaged for 1978 and 1979,

to create

an index. In principle, each of these four counted

equally in building the scale. In practice, they

made

errors that

let

the

two

education measures count for more than occupation and income. 19 But their real error

Here

is

was

to

even

try to construct

why: In creating

their

such an index.

four-component index of parental SES,

Herrnstein and Murray were in effect insisting that each component deter-

mined outcomes with equal weight. For example, having poor education, they

tacitly

poverty as having parents with a low income. But what is

wrong? What

if

having a father or a mother with

assumption

education does not

little

income substantially increases those chances? Lumping sures together in a scale

would wash out

precisely what happened. In the

parents earned

but

if this

chances of becoming poor, but having parents with a low

alter people's

is

mother with a

a

assumed, should be as much of a risk factor for

how much

the different

the effect of parental income. This

NLSY, how much money

makes a big difference

mea-

in his or

a respondent's

her chances of being poor,

education their parents had makes no difference. Herrnstein

SES index leads them to underestimate home environment, specifically income, for

and Murray's parental

the impor-

tance of parental

the risk of

poverty.

We our

corrected this error by simply using each component separately in

statistics.

rately.

There

is

no

statistical necessity for

combining measures

and there are often good reasons for looking

indices,

That

plaining

is

how we

who becomes

learned that parental income poor.

at the is

so important in ex-

(Even here our reanalysis leans

and Murray's favor. Income earned over two years, even ported, to

look

is

at

into

measures sepa-

if

in

Herrnstein

accurately re-

an unreliable measure of a family's affluence. Economists prefer

measures such as accumulated wealth or income received over

several years.)

OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS

The fearsome

label "omitted variable bias" refers to leaving important

causal factors out of an explanation. Such omissions

77

mean

that

one both

CHAPTER

4

misses the whole story and distorts the analysis of the causes that are in the

The bulk of our corrections to The Bell Curve analysis conproblem: Herrnstein and Murray left out many important features

explanation.

cern this

who

of the social environment that affect

them back

is at

risk of being poor.

We added

in.

For example, in trying to estimate the social class background of each respondent, Herrnstein and Murray included income (sort of; see above),

but they did not include the studies

show

that the

effective wealth

who grow up

more

number of siblings each respondent

had.

Many

siblings people have, the lower their families'

and the lower

own

their

chances of getting ahead. People

with no or one sibling get more space, resources, and atten-

tion than those with several siblings.

20

We included the

number of siblings

We

each respondent had had in 1979 in our reanalysis.

also included

whether or not the respondent had been reared on a farm, because calculations of

income and needs

farm families (see next box), and

differ for

whether the respondent had grown up

in a two-parent family,

because that

strongly affects a family's long-term wealth.

The Bell Curve also ignored the community context within which people

were raised and within which they currently tion

the

live.

from which people come, the communities

communities

for example,

in

which they currently

live also

by providing schools of varying

Whatever the home

in

situa-

which they grow up and

shape their

quality,

fates, the first,

and the second, for

example, by providing jobs of varying quality. Herrnstein and Murray nored these sorts of environmental conditions;

made

we

ig-

included them, and they

a difference.

Researchers do

make

errors; in

any project as large as The Bell Curve,

they are bound to happen. Unfortunately, the great bulk of the errors Herrnstein and Murray cial

made

led

them

to underestimate

how much

the so-

environment changes the odds that someone will become poor. And

made a low AFQT score seem more important who becomes poor. We corrected these (and other) errors in our reanalysis; consequently we came to more accurate conclusions. Compounding the problems of measuring parental home environment and adolescent community environment are the problems of how to interpret the AFQT scores. As we argued in chapter 3, the AFQT captures a broad array that underestimate, in turn, in

determining

of instructional experiences that are related closely to both periods of youths' environments. In other words,

outcomes

are indirect via their effects

that is true, Herrnstein

the

some of

the social influences on

on the AFQT. To the extent

to

which

and Murray also overstate the role of intelligence

AFQT effects. 78

in

WHO WINS WHO LOSES Defining Poverty Deciding

who

government

should be counted as poor

ties the definition

were understood

complex

a

is

task.

The

federal

of poverty to "nutritional needs" as they

in the late 1960s. In

1968 a group headed by Dr. Mollie

Orshansky of the U.S. Social Security Administration took the Depart-

ment of Agriculture's calculations of how much tional

it

number

for other combinations of adults

and children and also took into

account that farm families could contribute their surveys

comes

cost to meet the nutri-

needs of a family of two adults and two children. They adjusted that

for food, Orshansky's

estimate families' total needs. erty lines" for

own

produce. Because

time showed that poor people used one-third of their

at the

group multiplied the cost of food by 3

The

result

was

farm and nonfarm families of varying

sizes.

Census Bureau has adjusted each of these poverty

account.

Since 1968 the

lines for

ratio

of

in nutrition, tastes, or other eating patterns

Nor has

total

changes

in

Nor

been taken into

there been any attempt to check the assumption that the

needs to nutritional needs

is 3.

Most researchers

the poverty line understates national rates of poverty; sify families

to

a table that defined the "pov-

overall prices, but not for changes in the prices of the specific foods.

have changes

in-

with incomes 25 percent over the

original poverty line for a

some

realize that

prefer to clas-

official line as

"poor."*

nonfarm family with two adults and two

The chil-

dren was an annual income of $3,477 (in 1968 currency); adjusting for inflation yields an official poverty line for a similar family in

1994 of

$15,029. * See, e.g., Jencks, "Is the

American Underclass Growing?"

Poverty, Test Scores,

and Parental Home Environment

how AFQT NLSY respondent was

Herrnstein and Murray's key statistical analysis compares scores and parental

poor

in 1990.

We

Murray got from

zAFQT

SES

influenced the odds that an

have already shown the

number of

score of intelligence.

in a

siblings,

two-parent family

at

chapter 2)

And we have

with their measures of parental SES.

ronment include

(in

how

correct answers on the

Herrnstein and

AFQT

just discussed the

Our measures of

parental

to their

problems

home

envi-

farm residence, and whether the respondent lived age fourteen. These together assess family back-

79

CHAPTER

4

ground more accurately and more powerfully than does Herrnstein and

shows how much more complex peothan Herrnstein and Murray acknowledge.

Murray's flawed index. This ple's family situations are

(Korenman and Winship,

home

including

attributes

set also

in their reanalysis,

went

farther than

we

do,

such as whether the respondent's mother

worked, what age she was when the respondent was born, and whether the family regularly received newspapers. The reader can with think of several other features of lives but

home environments

were not even asked about

work schedules, family wealth,

in the

that

NLSY—for

effort

little

shape children's

example, parents'

parents' physical and mental health, and

21 the involvement of other relatives.)

We begin our reanalysis by reproducing Herrnstein and Murray's results NLSY respondent was poor in 1990 (see

concerning the chances that an details in

appendix

Then we

2).

contrast that pattern with what

the corrected measures of parental stein

as a

home

environment.

and Murray's practice of graphing the results of the

We

we get using

follow Herrn-

statistical analysis

method of making comparisons.

Part (a) of figure 4.3 reproduces The Bell Curve's key finding (p. 134) as closely as possible.

22

Here

the probability that an

is

how to read the

graph:

The

NLSY respondent was poor in

axis displays variation in any particular causal variable,

deviations" below the

shows The horizontal from -2 "standard

vertical axis

1990.

mean (which is about where the bottom 5 percent of mean to +2 standard deviations above the mean

people are) through the

(where one finds the top 5 percent or

The

so).

solid, higher line in figure 4.3(a)

AFQT

respondents'

shows the association between

scores in 1980 and the probability of being poor in

1990, for respondents with average parental

measured

who

it

SES

as Herrnstein

and average ages (within the range of 25

scored -2 standard deviations below the

to 34).

mean on

the

and Murray

Respondents

AFQT

estimated probability of being poor of about 28 percent. That dents of average parental

On

SES and

average age

is,

respon-

scored that low on the

opposite page:

4.3.

Probability That an

Family Background:

(a)

NLSY

Respondent Was Poor

AFQT

score

—

solid line

number of siblings, farm

in

1990 by

AFQT

Score and

Herrnstein and Murray's Calculations; and (b) After correc-

tions {Note: All variables except either parental

to

who

had an

— were

set at their

home environment

mean

—dashed

line

—

or

values. Correction involves adding

residence, and two-parent household to the parental

SES

index

form the parental home environment index, and also replacing uniform weights for

index items with "effect proportional" weights. Source: Authors' analysis of data)

80

NLSY

WHO

WI NS

'

WHO LOSES

effects of AFQT scores and parental home environment on the probability that young white adults are poor: Herrnstein and Murray's original results show AFQT scores to be much more important, but corrections show that

The comparative

they are not.

(a)

Herrnstein and Murray's Calculations

30% o o As

£

AFQT score goes

from low

to

high

20%

o>

o

«

10%

As parental SES goes from low

0%

I

-2

to

high

I

-1

1

Standard Deviations from

(b)

Mean

Corrected Measures of the Effects

30% o As

So

AFQT score goes

from low

to

high

20%

o

~§

10% h

o

As parental home environment goes from low to high

0% -1

1

Standard Deviations from

81

Mean

CHAPTER

AFQT had a

.28 chance, better than

one

4

in four, of being poor.

respondents with average

AFQT

scores and then drops to about 2 percent,

a one-in-fifty chance, for very high scorers the

AFQT

parental

AFQT

mean. The lower, dashed

SES

—how

line

+2 standard

for

the risk of being poor varied for persons with average

who had

score and age. Respondents

parents of very low

who had

SES had very high

parents had about a 5 percent chance of being poor. Note the contrast

in the lines:

SES low

deviations above

shows the same information

a 14 percent chance of being poor in 1990, while those

SES

That proba-

drops sharply to between 7 and 8 percent, about one in thirteen, for

bility

line.

The

There

solid is

to very high

to very

AFQT line

steeper than the dashed parental

a twenty-one-point drop in the risk of poverty from very

AFQT score

versus only a nine-point drop from very low

high parental SES. This

intelligence "dominates"

(These

much

is

statistics are

SES

the basis of the trumpeted claim that

is

as an explanation of poverty.

derived from "logistic regression analysis." For a

brief overview of regression analysis, see appendix 2.)

But now

let's

tions. Part (b)

making

see what happens after

few elementary correc-

a

of figure 4.3 shows the consequence of correcting the mea-

sure of parental SES and also expanding it to be a fuller measure of parental home environment. Separating the SES components into the two parents'

education, occupation, and income;

and adding

data;

siblings,

ents in the respondents'

much

23

correcting the treatment of missing

farm residence, and whether there were two par-

homes

—

substantially increase our estimate of

family origin influenced the chances of becoming poor.

the risks of poverty about as

much

AFQT

as

we

how

influenced

scores did. In quantitative

terms, the corrected estimate of the family effect the corrected

It

AFQT effect (the AFQT effect also

is

86 percent as large as

increased a

because

little

corrected a technical error Herrnstein and Murray made). Comparing

extremes,

we see that,

all

else constant,

1

8 percent of people

from the poor-

est families grew up to be poor while only 4 percent of people from the

most advantaged families became poor. For technical reasons, even this home environment compared

correction underestimates the importance of

with

AFQT score. 24

Murray challenged ion, parental

critics

SES can be

of The Bell Curve to show how, in any fash-

as important as

that simple corrections of errors suffice to ited

measure of home environment

the

AFQT

measure

is.

is

AFQT meet

score.

25

We

have shown

that challenge.

Even

a lim-

as important a predictor of poverty as

Korenman and Winship

reanalysis of the data: "Estimates based on a variety of methods

82

from

also conclude, .

.

.

their

suggest

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? that parental family

background

more important than [AFQT

is at least

as important,

and may be much

score] in determining social and

success in adulthood" (see also work by Dickens et

al.).

economic

26

Poverty and Communities People's social environments involve more than simply the financial, educational,

and demographic assets of their own families. 27 The

nity matters, too.

getting married at

commu-

local

Research shows, for example, that women's chances of

depend on the number of men

in the area

good wages. 28 The immediate neighborhood

who are employed

also affects people's

ways

life, whatever the family's own resources. This simple fact is one reason why Americans try so hard to find and afford "good neighborhoods." 29 It is one thing to come from a low-income family but live in a pleasant suburb

of

with parks, low crime, and quality schools, and another thing altogether to live in

an inner-city neighborhood that lacks those supports. The child

in a

well-endowed community gets the benefits of the locale regardless of his or her family's particular situation, just as the inner-city child bears the bur-

dens of a low-income community even

if his

or her family might have a

moderate income. Social scientists have increasingly taken

and have found compelling evidence

community context

seriously

that residential segregation

and the

concentration of the disadvantaged exacerbates the consequences of poverty,

family break up, crime, and deterioration. 30 (In chapter

the role of residential segregation

8,

we

will see

on minority achievement.) The concencommunities and particular

tration of the disadvantaged in particular

schools undermines the fortunes of otherwise able youth. Schools in low-

income and minority neighborhoods tend

to lack resources

struction; the concentration of children with

learning; and separation

and quality

in-

problems can distract from

by social class cuts poor children off from friend-

ships with advantaged ones. In the local neighborhoods, similar effects occur.

Low-income

areas have fewer jobs, fewer resources, and poorer-

quality services than

do

affluent ones. Local culture can clash with high

aspirations, public disorder creates insecurity, leave. 31

Other youth with similar personal

taged families but benefit

who

find

from the obverse of

From

the

NLSY,

themselves all

and similar disadvan-

good schools and neighborhoods

32 these conditions.

unfortunately,

the respondents' adolescent

in

and remaining opportunities

liabilities

we could

extract only

two measures of

community environments. One, 83

their region of

CHAPTER residence in the

some

first

differences in

specific.

year of the survey (1979),

economic and

is

quite global but captures

cultural conditions.

The other

is

quite

an index of school composition for the high school the

It is

spondent

4

re-

The index is composed of three indicators: the perbody that was nonwhite, the percent that was economi-

last attended.

cent of the student

cally disadvantaged (that qualified for free lunches),

and the dropout

rate.

33

(Direct measures of instructional resources and quality were unavailable.)

This measure

tells

us about the immediate context in which the respondents

spent their days as teenagers and, because schooling tells

us something about the local

score

—

is

locally organized,

as well.

The higher

the

the fewer dropouts, the fewer poor students, and the fewer black

students in.

community

—

the

(We do

more advantaged

mean

not

the

communities the respondents grew up

to suggest that

per se drags on achievement.

The

low-income and black students are

fact is that in the

United States schools

and neighborhoods where poor and minority youths are concentrated tend to lack all sorts of "social capital."

34

lems they bring from home, and

that contributes to a social climate that

may

Also, poor students tend to have prob-

interfere with attainment.)

These two

partial

measures of adolescent environments make a

statisti-

cally important difference in the respondents' probabilities of being poor.

Since uals

we have

—notably

"controlled" or "held constant" attributes of the individ-

their

AFQT

scores

—

these results

show

that the

wider com-

munity, as well as the specific family, shape individuals' economic fortunes.

The combined,

community 105 -question AFQT score. As

distinct effects of family of origin plus

of origin equal the distinct effect of the

figure 4.4 shows, the poverty rates predicted

cent community environments, on the other, are similar.

The

effect of

by parental home and adoles-

the one hand, and

by

AFQT

scores,

on

35

communities

is

even greater than appears

in figure 4.4,

because local conditions can temper or aggravate the consequences of getting low scores or

average

AFQT

poverty rate

if

coming from poor

families.

scores and average parental

For respondents with

home environments,

they had attended disadvantaged schools was

over ten points higher than for identical respondents

the

14 percent,

who had come from

advantaged schools, 4 percent. 36 But the contrast by school composition is

even greater for those

who had low

scores or poor parents, about

teen to twenty points difference in the chances of ing on whether the school

fif-

becoming poor depend-

was above or below average

in

composition. 37

Disadvantaged communities put even relatively advantaged individuals at risk;

advantaged communities help even the unfortunate. Disadvan-

84

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES

Adding adolescent community environment - school composition and region - to home environment shows social

the probability that

that

AFQT scores have equal effects on

environment and

young white adults

are poor.

30%

O o

As

M 20%

to

social environment - home and community - goes from low

g

high

(P

=

-.679)

/

M-H

o

%

10%

/

•§

As AFQT score goes from low to high ((3 =

0%

-.668)

-2-10

1

Standard Deviations from

Probability That an

4.4.

NLSY Respondent Was

Mean

Poor

in

1990 by

AFQT

Score and Social Background (Note: Social background includes parental

home environment and ing the plot, or

AFQT

adolescent community environment. For comput-

variables except either social background

all

—

score

thors' analysis of

solid line

NLSY

— were

set at their

mean

activity

line

Au-

data)

taged communities have schools where learning

economic

—dashed

values. Source:

is

hindered, they lack the

necessary to provide jobs, and they even limit the

chances of marrying out of poverty. Advantaged schools help residents in these

and other ways. 38 These calculations make the fundamentally

sociological point that individuals' fates are not theirs alone. Their

chances depend on their social surroundings

own

much

as

on

life

their

intelligence.

We sis,

at least as

could stop right here because, by repeating The Bell Curve's analy-

we have shown

that social

environment during childhood matters more

as a risk factor for poverty than Herrnstein and

85

Murray

report and that

it

CHAPTER matters statistically at least as

measure

much as do the test scores that purportedly we have been conservative in our re-

intelligence. (Recall that

analysis.) its

The key

finding of The Bell Curve turns out to be an artifact of

method. Although we could

go on, because our

will

4

rest

our case against The Bell Curve,

larger purpose

is

we

to explore the social sources of

inequality.

and Education

Poverty, Test Scores, In chapter 3

we showed

that the

AFQT

largely

motivation), but for the purposes of this chapter stein

and Murray's assumption that the

what

is

measured schooling (and

we have adopted

Herrn-

AFQT measures intelligence.

If so,

the role of schooling itself in determining the chances of being

poor? Social scientists have long established that people's educational

at-

tainments are the strongest immediate determinants of their economic fortunes. tion is

39

The

works

to say,

further

in part

you go

in school, the

by "transmitting" the

how much

more money you make. Educa-

effects of earlier experiences.

education people obtain

affluence and education of their parents. But attain is not the result only of

and what happens in them

and so on

—

—

also determine

itself

depends

how much

That

on the

in part

education students

such personal factors. Schools themselves

the instruction, the teachers, fellow students,

how much

students learn and

how

far they

go

(see chapter 7). Independent of talents or personal background, then,

schooling

is

We now

part of the social environment.

add formal schooling into our analysis. In estimating the

of education on poverty

we

distinguish between

the years of school respondents had completed before taking the the years completed after taking the

effect

two phases of education

AFQT. We

AFQT and

also distinguish between

an academic high school education and a general or vocational one.

how

Figure 4.5 shows

including education further accounts for the

chances that someone became poor. At

this stage in

our reanalysis, formal

schooling and childhood environment are each more important than score in predicting the risks of poverty. If one takes the

AFQT

AFQT as a measure

of intelligence, then figure 4.5 shows that intelligence does affect the odds of being poor. But

it

also

shows

that formal schooling

and childhood envi-

ronment matter more.

As we discussed in chapter 3, Herrnstein and Murray contend that how much formal education people obtain largely reflects their intelligence. One should, therefore, assign the effects of formal schooling in figure 4.5 86

^ WHO WINS? WHO LOSES

Adding education to the analysis gives a more complete description of what determines the probability that young white adults are poor: education and environment more than AFQT. ^U7o

Years of education and track (P = -.634)

Home and community

o

environment

£ m>

20%

AFQT (P

s

•9

X

s

\^ s^

O

^ 2

N

VV

=

-.628)

-.423)

v

^\^ -v

10%

^****'«««,.^^.

^"^.^V

no/

"^

~—

1 1

-2

1

-1

1

Standard Deviations from

4.5.

=

V

pa M-|

3a £o

(p

V

Probability That an

NLSY

Mean

Respondent Was Poor

in

1990 by

AFQT

Score, Social Environment, and Formal Education (Note: Social envi-

ronment here includes only parental home and adolescent community environments, not the contemporary environment; education includes years of schooling completed before taking the

and whether the respondent had been the plot, for,

each

all

in

AFQT,

years completed

variables in the equation were set at their

in separate estimates: social

after,

an academic track. For computing

mean

values, except

environment (dashed

line),

AFQT

score (black line), and education (gray line). Source: Authors' analysis of

NLSY

data)

to intelligence.

But we showed

likely that the opposite

premise

that, for a

is true,

not the cause, of formal education. the

AFQT

few reasons,

it

is

that test scores are the

We

much more

consequence,

should then interpret the effect of

in figure 4.5 as largely representing the effects

of schooling not captured by years or track

—

for

of those aspects

example, the quality of

teaching, the content of courses, and extracurricular instruction. servatively,

we could claim

instead that the

87

AFQT line

More con-

in figure 4.5

shows

CHAPTER

4

the effects of variation in respondents' verbal and

Whatever

able to their formal schooling. less important than

fecting the risk of

math

skills

not attribut-

the interpretation, such skills are

formal schooling and childhood environments in

becoming

af-

poor.

Adult Community Environment

To

this point,

we have

largely looked at

ronment in adolescence influences

their

how young

people's social envi-

chances of becoming poor in adult-

hood. But the contemporary community context surely matters, too. Most important, perhaps,

is

the local

economic

situation.

poor are higher for residents of communities

The only

measure we have of

direct

indicator of the

unemployment

The chances of being

in the

that in the

economic doldrums.

NLSY

is

an approximate

rate in the respondents' labor markets.

40

We

also can distinguish whether respondents lived in inner cities, suburbs, or rural areas. Together, these

plain

who became poor

in

two

rough as they

indicators,

are, further ex-

1990 (data not shown; see appendix

2).

41

Finer

geographical distinctions, by neighborhood perhaps, and further descriptions of

contemporary communities would no doubt have shown yet

stronger effects. But the key point for us tions

—

far

comes poor and who does alike, become poor.

not. If jobs depart,

Poverty, Gender,

that local

is

any recognition

economic condi-

—help determine who be-

more people, smart and dumb

and Adult Family Environment

Perhaps the most surprising omission of of poverty

is

beyond the control of any individual

that

women

all in

The Bell Curve's discussion

are far likelier to be

men. Figure 4.6 shows how great the gap was

in the

poor than are

NLSY.

It

compares

AFQT scores, holding constant age, education, and social environments. A young woman would have had to score fortyone points higher on the AFQT than a young man of the same age, formal men and women by

their

schooling, and background in order for her risk of being poor to have been as

low as

his.

Put another way, just being a

woman

raised a respondent's

AFQT points (the difference similar point can be made "bright"). A being being "dull" and between concerning parental income. Holding the AFQT and the other factors conrisk of poverty

stant, a

by the equivalent of forty-one

woman's

parents

would have had 88

to

have earned $63,000 more than

WHO WINS? WHO LOSES

7

A white woman needs to score 41 AFQT points higher than man from the same environment and with the same education in order to reduce her probability of being poor to his lower level. a white

30%

o o bp

20%

.S

Women

c

l-H

£

Jo

.

1 1

1

1800

1850

1

1900

1

2000

1950

Year

5.1.

Estimates of Inequality from

1

800

to

Today (Note: Lines

are authors'

estimates of trends described in sources listed in note 6)

mum-wage

legislation,

ing subsidies, and

expansion of public universities, the GI

many

growth and middle-class

Bill,

hous-

other programs that effectively brought economic life to

more Americans.

Inequality since the 1970s During the 1980s

politically

American middle

class

into rich ing,

and poor.

engaged academics argued over whether the was "disappearing" and the nation was splitting Defenders of freer markets denied that this was happen-

blaming misinterpreted data or the business cycle. 16 But the answer

clear now.

The

trend toward a

more equal

is

society that developed in the

twentieth century stopped in the early 1970s. Income divisions widened

and continued expanding through the 1980s. 107

CHAPTER

A Case of

5

Historical Amnesia: Caring for the Needy

While The Bell Curve's treatment of American history lematic, one of

America

its

greatest historical errors

dealt with the unfortunate.*

when neighbors provided

a time

is

generally prob-

the discussion of

is

The authors of The

how

a past

Bell Curve recall

the "safety net" that the poor needed.

all

But such memories are notoriously unreliable. There really was no such time

in

America.

If the

unfortunate were long-

time residents of the town, victims of bad luck, and considered morally upright, then neighbors might pass the hat, allot funds treasury, or

was

typically small

especially

(One aided

if

from the municipal

board the destitute with a local family. Even

and grudging.

If the

so, the

support

needy did not pass these

historian wrote of a colonial Puritan village that "poor persons if

tests,

they were newcomers, then usually nothing was forthcoming.

they were

members of

were

a townsman's family, otherwise they were

no matter how hungry they might be.")** From colonial

sent packing

when towns "warned out" newcomers whom residents feared might become public dependents, to the Great Depression, communities' major response was to move the needy out. days,

(We have

forgotten

cans used to be

how many Americans were on

much more mobile

than they are now.

off or losing a farm, hundreds of thousands

while and then

move

again.

the

moved on

move. Ameri-

Upon

to find

These people do not appear

in

being laid

work

for a

our

Andy

Hardy-like memories of small-town America, because, being poor and transient, they

But

were anonymous residents on the wrong side of the

their stories belie the nostalgic

image of the small town

that

tracks.

succored

the needy.)

The

local structure for helping the needy,

most American voters well enough sion destroyed that structure. residents also

came

became

Many

destitute.

pinched as

for generations.

it

was, satisfied

But the Great Depres-

long-time, middle-class, and "worthy"

Would-be charity-givers themselves be-

needy. Local philanthropies, even where supplemented by town and

county government contributions, could not keep up. In response,

New

Deal programs funnelled massive amounts of money into local communities directly

actually

and through work projects. Whether or not these programs

ended the Depression, federal intervention certainly supported

* See, especially, pp.

** Lockridge,

536-40.

A New England Town,

p. 15.

108

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME many of the needy through

the hard times.***

sustaining the poor, sick, and elderly has

By now,

become

the federal role in

even for

essential,

pri-

vate charities.****

Some have proposed

that

America today deal with

the destitute by re-

turning to private philanthropies and local communities the responsibility to

do

so, returning to

an earlier "safety net." Advocates of such policies

can appeal to nostalgia but they cannot appeal to

community shows

local

that

its

"safety net"

history.

The

history of the

was composed mostly of

holes.

*** For general overviews, see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poor House; Trattner,

From Poor Law the

to Welfare State; Keyssar,

Unemployed. For the history of the

Out of Work; and

New

of Reform; and Brock. Welfare, Democracy, and the ies

Sautter, Three

Cheers for

Deal's role, see also Chambers. Seedtime

New

Deal. For monographic stud-

of the needy in earlier eras, see, for example, Althschuler and Saltzgaber, "The

Limits of Responsibility": Vandal, "The Nineteenth-Century Municipal Responses to the

Problem of Poverty"; and Monkkonen (ed.). Walking to Work. **** Estimates are that replacing a proposed $400 billion cutback

grams

for the

in private

giving to charity (Steinfels,

"As Government Aid

In the first roughly twenty-five years after ilies

of

all

in federal

classes shared in

Evaporates*').

World War

II,

American fam-

economic growth; since 1970 only the

families have seen a significant rise in their standard of living. figure 1.1 the trend since 1959. In the ten years

incomes

pro-

needy by the year 2002 would require immense and improbable increases

for the richest

$36,000 per person

We

richest

saw

20 percent of households grew from $29,000

(in real

in

between 1959 and 1969, to

spending power); incomes for the middle 60

percent of households grew from $1 1,500 to $16,000 per person; incomes for the poorest

20 percent grew from $2,900

to

$5,400 per person. The

percentage increase for the poorest households was larger,

at 6.5

percent

growth, than the others. In the twenty years after 1969, the incomes of the top 20 percent have risen an additional $28,000 per person, the incomes of the middle

60 percent have gone up by a modest $4,600 per person, and the

incomes of the poorest 20 percent of households have actually

$200 per person. For several reasons discussed below, played

in figure 1.1

may

fallen

by

the pattern dis-

underestimate the declining conditions of the mid-

dle group.

These converging and then diverging fortunes are further indicated the data

on the shares of the nation's 109

total

income

that

went

in

to different

i

CHAPTER

5

From 1930 to 1970, the lowest-income 40% of American households began receiving almost as much of American income as the highest-income 5%, but that trend reversed after 1970.

30%

a,

25%

£ o u C »—

Share received by top

5%

-d

o 20% QJ en

O

X %

—*

15%

- --.

**

Share received by lowest 40%

C

'+—*:

aj

u jjj

10%

5%

0% 1940

1930

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

Year

5.2.

Percentage of All Household Income Received by Highest-Income 5

Percent and Lowest-Income 40 Percent of Households, (Sources:

U.S.

Ryscavage,

Bureau of the Census, Historical

"A Surge

in

Growing Income

p.

301;

Inequality?"; U.S. Bureau of the

Census, "Income and Poverty: 1994, Highlights")

110

1930-1994

Statistics,

—

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME income groups. Figure 5.2 shows

1930, the highest-income 5 per-

that, in

cent of American households

income

that the

combined received over twice the total bottom 40 percent of American households combined re-

The highest-income 5 of every 100 families received about oneof all the income received by American households that year, while third the lowest-income 40 households out of 100 received one-eighth of naceived.

tional

income. By 1968 equalization had developed to the point that the

bottom two-fifths

finally

brought

home almost

as

much

as the top one-

twentieth (15.3 percent versus 16.6 percent). Households between the 40th

and 5th percentiles had increased their share from 58

68 percent (not

to

shown). After the 1960s, however, the income share of the top 5 percent rose sharply and that of the lower

40 percent of families dropped

reversing the earlier trend toward equality.

tinued into the 1990s.

The unequalizing

sharply,

trend has con-

17

Economists and sociologists, working from different perspectives, have analyzed and reanalyzed the available data and have Inequality in

income expanded greatly

made more money and people the chances of

in the

after

come

to a consensus.

about 1970. People

bottom half made

low-income Americans moving

less. In

into the

at the

18

top

recent years,

middle class have

dropped and the chances of middle-class Americans moving into poverty have grown. 19

The growing

inequality in annual

income displayed

understates the magnitude of the change.

One

reason

in the figure actually

is

that

income accumulate as some families invest and others

gaps

in

pile

up debts.

annual

Wealth has become even more unequal than has annual income. From about 1975 to 1992, the wealthiest tional

1

percent of families' share of the na-

household wealth rose from about 22 percent to about 42 percent;

in

the 1980s the wealth held

by the poorest 40 percent of families actually

dropped

The middle

in absolute value.

class has also felt the strain. In the

1960s the middle one-third of Americans saved about 5 percent of their annual income; in the 1980s they saved virtually nothing. 20

Another reason the annual income changes shown state the

change

is

that the increase in inequality has

in figure 5.2 under-

been most acute

in the

younger generations. The proportion of young men earning a "family

wage"

—

that

is,

enough income

to

keep a family of four out of poverty

has fallen sharply since the 1970s. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of time, year-round least a

family

employed men, divided

wage from 1964

to 1994.

into a

We

full-

few types, who earned

at

can see that the proportion that

earned enough went up substantially from 1964 to 1974. But then the proportion declined.

It

declined dramatically for high school dropouts and for

111

CHAPTER

5

The proportion of full-time employed men whose earnings could keep a family out of poverty rose until 1974 and then dropped.

100%

Age

25- -34 "---.

""•

/ /

—

'

^

^

/

/

90%

N

m

-^^^^^

// /All men

• if

80% -

^^^

\High school dropout

„.•_

^^^. »»

-^ \

•

*'

\

/

V_

x /

A

\

/

/Age 18-24

\

/

\ / \ /

70% _

\

/ /

\

/ /

60%

i

i

1964

1969

1974

1

1

1979

1984

1

1

1989

1994

Year

5.3.

Percentage of Full-Time Workers

Who

Earned Enough

to

Keep

Family of Four Out of Poverty, 1964-1994 (Note: The measure

is

a

the

percentage of full-time workers whose annual earnings exceed the poverty line for a family

with

Low

of four. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Workers

Earnings"; and Jack McNeil, U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpub-

lished tables,

November 1995)

112

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME 18-to-24-year olds, but larly,

men

even declined for workers aged 25

it

to 34.

21

Simi-

turning 30 around 1990 were notably less likely to have already

attained a middle-class

income than were men who had turned 30 around

1980. 22 These figures underestimate the sinking fortunes of workers be-

cause they count only fully employed men;

been

employed.

fully

ladder,

in recent years,

fewer

men have

Less able to save, less able to move up a career

younger men are seeing differences

widening yet in

23

further. All these

earnings and wealth

in lifetime

compounding changes mean

economic security and independence has accelerated

portion of Americans, aside from the elderly,

who

that inequality

The pro-

sharply.

are poor has increased.

Unlike the leveling that accompanied the economic growth of the 1950s, the

economic growth of the

late

1980s failed to stop or seriously slow

this

unequalizing trend.

Although young workers have been the most vulnerable

to the

economic

dislocations since 1973, older male workers have also been affected. This

can be seen most clearly in figure annual income (cost-adjusted) of

5.4.

It

men

shows what has happened

as they

grew

to the

older, contrasting the

1950s and 1960s with the 1970s and 1980s. The gray arrows show what

happened

income they with,

started

started the

decade with and the income they ended the decade

now aged

started

each decade aged between 25 and 35

the

men who

35-45. The black arrows show that pattern for

each decade aged between 35 and 45. In the period before 1973,

men could

expect to earn more, on average,

they did at the beginning. For example, in

—

men who

to

1950 made about $12,000

at the

end of the decade than

men who were between 25 and

in constant dollars,

35

and by 1960 they averaged

men who had started the men who had had stagnant incomes. And

about $17,000. However, from 1973 to 1983,

decade aged

35^5

(black arrow) saw drops in income;

started the

decade aged 25-35 (gray arrow)

from 1983

to 1993,

men

in the

35^5

cohort had

25-35 cohort had growing incomes, but

flat

incomes.

that cohort of 30-ish

Men men

in the

started

down that even the gains they had made by 1993 left them behind men who had been the same age in 1973. The assumption that men will move up the salary ladder as they mature now seems untenable. M.I.T. economist Frank Levy, who developed the original version of figure 5.4, offers the image of "yesterday's $25,000 steelworker who now so far

clerks in a

K-Mart

at

24 $4.25 an hour." But

declining industries like steel had to sectors of the

economy were

move on

displaced.

pared job mobility

in the late

found that workers

in the

it

A

is

to

not only that workers in

new

jobs.

Men

1980s to mobility

in the early

1990s were more likely to lose jobs. 113

in

many

1995 Census Bureau report com1990s and

And

full-

CHAPTER

5

Before the 1970s, 30- and 40-year-old men made major gains in income over a decade, but that has not been true since 1970.

$30

5.4. ties,

r

Income Changes Over

a

Decade

for

25-35

35-40 years old

35-45

45-50 years old

Men

in

Their Thirties and For-

1950-1993 (Note: Modeled on Levy, Dollars and Dreams,

p. 81.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, various series;

and

Statistical Abstract

1994)

114

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME

who

time workers

saw

a

jobs more frequently ended up as part-time

lost their

workers; even those

who found

20 percent drop

in their

a full-time job after a period of joblessness

average weekly earnings. 25

There has been some controversy about the claim of growing inequality that

we

made. Few observers deny

just

have gotten much

that the rich

richer faster than everyone else in the United States. But the dissenting

voices claim that the economic situations of average and poor Americans

have also improved

decade or

in the last

so, if not as rapidly as those

of the

wealthy. If that were true, one might be able to claim that the fortunes of the

down

wealthy have trickled

Some

to the rest of

argue, for example, that the

Americans.

way

the

Bureau of Labor

Statistics

calculates the cost of living exaggerates the year-to-year cost increases,

much

perhaps by as

as 1.5 points. All the

numbers we have used

here,

of living, would therefore underpower and overestimate the growth in poverty. Instead of concluding that the median earnings of fully employed men dropped 12 percent in buying power from 1979 to 1994, we would

which adjust incomes for increases

in cost

estimate the growth in real earning

conclude that they rose 14 percent. Recalculating the price index would not

change our conclusion

that the

gap between

classes has increased, "but

instead of the usual story of the rich getting richer and the poor getting

new

poorer, the

exactly

how

basket" and

would be that the rich got a The debate over this claim can

story

held their own." 26

weigh apples and oranges

to

same

products.

Is,

seem

clear,

however: One

only to those

who

visit to

for example, a 1995

Is

a visit to an

a private practitioner?

that the debate over earning

is

are earning.

incomes today than before. 27

consumers' "market

as a 1975 television set but has stereo

sound and a cable socket a "cheaper" television set? doctor the same "value" as a

while the poor

get arcane, dealing with

in the typical

how to account for changes in

television set that costs the

lot richer

As noted

A second

is

earlier,

fewer

A

HMO

few points

power applies

men

are earning

that the "big-ticket" items of the

home and college education for the chilmuch more rapidly than the little items that

middle-class life-style, such as a dren, have risen in "real" cost fill

up the

market basket. Americans have had

statisticians'

to

harder and go into more debt to attain those pieces of the

Dream." 28

A third

with children thirds of

at

them 29

point

home

—a

is

that

between 1975 and 1993 many more wives

started working,

great

many because

from fewer than half

much

to over

two-

they believed, rightly or wrongly,

that maintaining a middle-class life-style required

ing jobs,

work a lot "American

it.

As mothers took pay-

of the free labor they had contributed to the household in 115

CHAPTER

5

cleaning, cooking, child care, and the like had to be purchased or done

without. If one takes these points into account, the decline in living stan-

dards has probably been greater, not

Another

among

than the crude numbers indicate.

less,

line of defense charges that the apparent increase in poverty

the nonelderly

is

Some commentators

also a statistical anomaly.

point out that often government aid to the poor such as food stamps

is

not

counted as income. But add into the calculations government assistance

and the trends are

still

the same. (Recall that the

much a problem of the poor,

not so

although

it is

problem of inequality

that, too, as

it is

a

is

problem

of most American families falling behind the wealthy, as well as behind their

own

expectations.) Others have argued that the increase in poverty

the product of family

women

change

—

the increase in divorce and in the

bearing children out of wedlock. This argument implies that the

structural situation is fine, the

problem

chosen to be poor by making poor

is

that

many women

decisions. This

life

divorce and single-parenthood are often

First,

is

number of

economic

of a

strain, typically the inability

Therefore,

much

of the family dislocation

fails.

not usually) the results of

(if

man

have, in effect,

argument also

to help support his family.

itself is the

consequence, not the

we found in chapter 4 that having been poor was the key determinant of whether a woman would later have a child out of wedlock.) Second, even if we were to assume that every cause, of economic dislocation. (Recall that

divorce and out-of-wedlock birth were not the result of economic distress,

such family changes account for only about one-third of the rise in inequality.

And,

at the

same time, other family changes have

the inequality trend.

More lower-income women

and they are having fewer children. trend toward greater inequality the

growing inequality

The

is real, it is

post- 1970 increase in

are

not for these

substantial,

and

it

down

working than before, last

two changes,

would have been more severe

of the rich outpacing an advancing the rest have been retreating.

If

actually slowed

is

still.

the

In sum,

not simply a matter

have been advancing and

field; the rich

30

income inequality

largely arose

from increas-

ing inequality in workers' earnings. (Increasing wealth inequality was, in great measure, the result of the escalation in the value of financial instru-

ments

relative to

owner-occupied homes during

especially those of younger men, have ticular,

this period.)

31

Earnings,

become much more unequal.

earning differences by education have widened. During

In par-

the 1980s

had graduated college but declined 8 percent for

men who men who had dropped out

men who had

only graduated from high

the hourly

wage

(adjusted for inflation) went up 13 percent for

of college, dropped 13 percent for school, and

plummeted 18 percent

for

116

male high school dropouts. 32

In-

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME equality in earnings has also expanded cation,

and workers

in all sorts

why wages have

explaining

among workers of comparable

diverged

more

is

difficult.

University of Massachusetts economist Barry Bluestone

why

ent theories for explaining tion

and

skill

more than

used

it

edu-

of industries have been affected. In turn,

the market

to.

33

One

seems

lists

ten differ-

rewarding educa-

to be

part of the explanation appears to

be technological change, especially computerization, which would make

more highly educated workers more valuable points to this as a factor, although

it

is still

Some evidence controversial claim. 34 Many

to

a

employers.

making them more complex

technological changes simplify jobs instead of

and therefore encourage employers to hire less-skilled rather than moreskilled workers.

turing jobs

35

move

"Deindustrialization"

the process

by which manufac-

—

America explains what happened in terms of reduced dework of the less-educated. Generally, competition from other workers has depressed middle Americans' wages. When, for ex-

service jobs in

mand

—

overseas or are automated, leaving more poorly paid

for the

nations'

ample, software programming can be done in India cost here,

it is

pressure seems not, however, to have depressed earlier.

at a fraction

of the

hard for American workers to demand higher pay. 36 (This

CEO

salaries, as

we saw

Indeed, Disney executive Michael Eisner banked a record $203

million the year his

company

suffered a 63 percent drop in profits.)

37

Also

contributing to the free-fall in less-skilled workers' wages are the weakening of unions, the stagnation in the

education (see chapter It is

minimum wage, and

cutbacks in higher

6).

important to understand that this widening inequality in earnings has

occurred, not only in the United States, but in most affluent Western nations during recent years. that

However, as we

compares the American experience

inequality has been greater and

anywhere

its

shall see in the section

to that

below

of other nations, expanding

consequences more severe here than

else (except perhaps for the United

Kingdom). 38

Analysts often treat inequality in earnings as simply the result of "market" operations and separate those effects from the effects of governments'

after-market interventions too.

But we

misleading.

By

its

first

—

taxes and transfer payments.

will

do

that,

note that the distinction between market and policy

The market

taxes and by

is

permeated with policy. 39 (See box,

its

"transfers"

—

income created by

—government can blunt

inequalities in earnings

American government today does reduce largely for older people.

117

is

p. 118.)

social security, Medicare, food

stamps, unemployment insurance, and the like equalities in

We

in-

from the market.

inequalities of income, but

CHAPTER

How the What people

5

"Free" Market Rests on Government Policy

earn in the labor market cannot be separated from policies

that structure the market.

We

discuss such policies in detail in the next

chapter, but pause here to consider just a

few examples of how government

policies shape difference in earnings:

—Licensing practice a

The

laws:

Governments

stipulate the requirements necessary to

wide range of professions, from hair-cutting

Imagine what would happen

their earnings.

earning 5 percent of Americans fessorate essarily

if

to neurosurgery.

fewer the practitioners, and the higher

tighter those requirements, the

to the

incomes of the top-

entry into medicine, or law, or the pro-

were made considerably easier? (As professors, we are not nec-

recommending

—Direct and urban

this

move.)

subsidies: Direct subsidies, such as agricultural

transit construction, divert

American economic development pended heavily on federal

gifts

farm supports

income from some people

to others.

in the early nineteenth century de-

of land to the states and on state borrowing

Democrats largely opposed

for infrastructure. (Jeffersonian-Jacksonian

such spending, and Hamiltonian Federalists, predecessors of today's

"Wall Street" Republicans, supported

it.)

Later, sizable subsidies to rail-

road companies spurred the interconnection of American towns.

—Laws governing property and

finance:

Fundamental

to the

economic

system are the laws that govern property. In the early nineteenth century,

American courts provided

critical rulings that

ited-liability corporations

and that protected businesses from paying for

the incidental

damages they caused. Different

different earnings. Later, the

Amendment's

enabled the creation of lim-

rulings

Supreme Court ruled

would have meant

that the Fourteenth

protections for people extended as well to corporations, fur-

ther aiding the expansion of the large corporate sector.

Other examples of rules, tax deductions,

even these few

income

is

far

policy shapes the market, such as unionization

and regulations,

illustrations

from a

show us

pristinely

will

be discussed

that the

way

in chapter 6.

But

the "market" apportions

economic process.

many of which may be

of policies, to

how

It is

embedded

so longstanding that

in a set

we assume them

be "natural." Nevertheless, they are policy choices. "There

is

no such

thing as a free lunch," the laissez-faire economists remind us. True, and there

is

also

no such thing as a "free" market.

118

THE REWARDS OE THE GAME

Since 1966, the poverty rate among the elderly has dropped it has increased among other Americans.

by half;

30%

r-

-

V

65+ years old ""^

£ 20%

o

/

^ /

/ Under 18

"' -'"

*«.-

"*^

\'~ c QJ

u 10%

18-64

.

PL.

0%

i i

1966

1970

i

1974

l

i

1978

1982

i

i

1986

1994

1990

Year

5.5.

Rates of Poverty by

Age Group, 1966-1994

(Sources: U.S. Bureau of

the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-60, no. 178, and series

P-23. no. 188; and "Income and Poverty: 1994, Highlights")

Not so long ago, older people were poorer than

the rest of Americans,

and their poverty was a social problem of wide concern. But, as

among By 1994 under 12

we

first

pointed out in chapter 4, poverty

older people has dropped dramati-

cally (see figure 5.5).

percent of older people were poor,

compared with 15 percent of

the nonelderly.

this reversal is social security.

For decades,

retire early.

In

1940, 42 percent of older

17 percent did. Then, in

more recent

The

it

single major reason for

has allowed older people to

men worked;

in

1994, only

years, cost-of-living adjustments ac-

celerated the increase in social security payments. In the 1980s, while the

median income of

all

American households increased

just 5 percent, the

median income of older households increased 20 percent. 40 By 1993 the wealth of the typical older household

age.

41

was over twice

the national aver-

America's social policy has successfully fought the "war on

poverty"

— but mostly on behalf of older people. 119

CHAPTER

5

Inequality has widened since 1970 not just in money, but also in the quality of life

money can

buy.

something Americans value

homeownership fell

We

see

it,

for example, in

homeownership,

Between 1983 and 1994 rates of for every age group under 60 while rising for every age greatly.

group over 60. For example, the percentage of heads of household 40-44 but the

who owned

homes dropped from 73 percent to 68 percent, percentage of those aged 70-74 who owned their homes grew from

years old

their

75 percent to 80 percent. 42 People's sense of security

relies in part

on hav-

ing health insurance, to take another example, but the proportion of Ameri-

cans covered by any health insurance (increasingly caid) for an entire year has fallen recently,

1993 and

to 85 percent in

is still

this

falling (though not

among

covered as they are by Medicare). 43 More dramatically of men

has meant Medi-

from about 87 percent

in

1987

older people,

about one-third

yet,

who changed jobs recently found that they had lost health insurance

in the process.

a widening

44

gap

denned broadly

Also paralleling the widening income and wealth gaps

and mortality among social

in health

in

such ways

classes.

45

is

Inequality

also growing.

is

Conclusion

What have we history?

We

learned about inequality from this quick look at American

see that systems of inequality are changeable. In

little

more

than a generation, Americans became notably more equal and then notably

more unequal. These changes cannot be explained by changes in individuals' "natural" talents, be it IQ or other inherent traits. (Changes in Americans' acquired traits probably played a role. Far more Americans were college graduates in the 1980s than in the 1940s.) Even if, as some testing data suggest, Americans

became "smarter" during

(see chapter 2), inequality

the changes

was

changed

just too great.

the twentieth century

in different directions,

and the scale of

Market forces also cannot explain these

variations in inequality. Certainly, technological developments and global

trade have helped shape inequality in the United States, but

under the control of policy

and policy that corrects

when we compare

—

how

policy that structures

how

much

has been

the market

works

the market works. This point emerges again

the United States with other nations.

Inequality Here and There

A glance

behind us to American history shows that our pattern of inequal-

ity is far

from fixed or naturally determined. 120

A

glance sideways to other

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME wealthy nations makes the same point. The United States has the greatest degree of economic inequality of any developed country. inequality that

nomic conditions but

we

will

and

capitalist

compare

have ways

to

is

is

are our competitors in the global market

this chapter,

CEOs

numbers

The

best and latest evidence on

comes from

—and

yet they

noted

how much wider

the

in the is

the

gap

United States than

in it

greater even than these

indicate. In general, our high earners earn relatively

more and our low earners earn

is

we

and average workers

elsewhere. America's distinctive inequality

illustrative

The nations with which

the result of policy choices.

reduce inequality and remain competitive.

between

is

a level of

the United States are also modern, affluent, democratic,

—they

At the beginning of earnings

It is

not fated by Americans' talents nor necessitated by eco-

is

do workers elsewhere.

relatively less than

how

nations

compare

Luxembourg Income Study

(so

in levels

of inequality

named because

the project

headquartered in Luxembourg). Social scientists affiliated with the study

have collected detailed, comparable data on earnings and income from over a dozen nations.

Our

first

use of their research appears in figure 5.6, which

speaks to the question of inequality in earnings, specifically earnings of

men, aged 25-54, who worked

full-time, all year during the

mid-

to late

1980s. (Comparable data on earnings were available for only five nations.

We

are looking just at

labor force

was

in

men

here, because the situation of

such flux and varied so

vertical line in the figure serves as

each nation.

It

men

at the

median

90th percentile in earnings

—

line display the ratio

to the earnings of

men

median worker earned. The bars stretching

same comparison between

the

The

at inequality in

The

of the earnings

near, but not at the top of, the earnings ladder received

1.8

—those

median. In

at the

1986 the 90th percentile American male worker earned the

nations.)

in the 46

represents the earnings of the average (median) worker.

horizontal bars to the left of the that

much among

an anchor for looking

women

times what

to the right represent the

median earner and a low-paid worker, one at median worker

the 10th percentile of earnings. In the United States, the

brought

home

2.8 times the

amount

the 10th percentile

left-hand bars, therefore, display inequality of earnings

worker

did.

The

between the high-

earners and the average; the right-hand bars display inequality between the

average and the low-earners. Together, they display

total inequality. In the

United States, the 90th percentile worker earned five times that of the 10th percentile worker.

These numbers are highest

in the

United States. That

ings between the rich and the average worker

where, as

is

the

is

is,

the

gap

in earn-

greater here than else-

gap between the average and the low-paid worker. The

contrast between the United States and Europe sharpens further

121

when non-

CHAPTER

5

The gap between the highest- and the average-earning men was widest in the United States — as was the gap between the average- and the lowest-earning men. Gap between high-earner and average:

ratio of 90

percentile to

low-earner: ratio of median th to 10 percentile

median

Median

9Qth

United States

Gap between average and

th

jQth

\Z

1

Canada

I

Australia

Vest

1

Germany

Netherlands

Sweden I

i

i

l

l

i

i

Ratio

5.6.

Ratios of Earnings for High-, Median-, and Low-Earners in Six Na-

tions (Source:

Adapted from Gottschalk and Smeeding, "Crossnational

Comparisons," table

1)

monetary compensation

is

added

to the picture. In

national law requires that virtually

all

most European

nations,

workers have the kinds of benefits

such as strong job security and four-week vacations that in the United States only workers with seniority in major firms have.

These national differences expanded

in the 1980s,

47

when

inequality in-

creased globally. International economic forces widened the gaps be-

tween what the

better-

ized nations, but this

and the worse-educated earned

in

most

industrial-

chasm opened up farthest and fastest in the United Kingdom. (These were the years of Thatcherite

States and the United

reforms that reduced the role of government in the United Kingdom.) Elsewhere, the gap in earnings between the better- and worse-educated

widened

less,

barely at

all,

or even narrowed. There seems no clear con-

nection between these differences and other economic trends such as

122

— THE REWARDS OF THE GAME growth

The reasons

rates.

power of unions and ern countries.

lie in

government

policies, notably the relative

the expansions of higher education in the other West-

48

The biggest

income inequality between

contrast in

the United States

of the developed world, however, appears after taking into

and the

rest

account

how government

means

deals with the results of the market. That

accounting for taxes, tax deductions, transfer payments, housing subsidies,

and the

like.

we

(Again,

note that this before- and after-government distinc-

tion underestimates the role of government.

ments require employers

Where,

for

example, govern-

more market

to provide certain benefits, there is

equality.)

to

To look at international differences in household income, we turn again the Luxembourg Income Study. Peter Gottschalk and Timothy Smeed-

ing compiled comparable data on households' disposable

income

after taxes

seventeen nations.

in

incomes

and government support, adjusted for household 49

we

In Figure 5.7,

size

use just the figures for nations

with over ten million residents in 1980; our conclusions about the United States

As

would be

same

virtually the

if

in figure 5.6, the bars to the left

household's income

(at the

we showed

the smaller nations, too.

50

of the median display the ratio of a rich

90th percentile) to an average one's income,

while the right-hand bars show the ratio of an average household's income to that of a

in the

poor one

( 1

United States,

0th percentile). 5

unequal nations (4.0 for

Italy,

The rich-to-average

average-to-poor

2.1, as is the

rich-to-poor ratio, 5.9 (not shown)

1

is

much

and so the

higher than that of the next most

Canada, and Australia). 52 In

States has the greatest degree of

ratio is greatest

ratio, 2.9,

income inequality

in the

short, the

United

West whether one

focuses on the gap between the poor and the middle or the gap between the

middle and the

rich.

Even

tiveness, because they

these

numbers underestimate America's

do not count the

and lower-income families receive

in

distinc-

sorts of "in-kind" help that middle-

most other nations, such

as free

health care, child care, and subsidized housing and transportation. also underestimate inequality in tion of

income

at the

America by not displaying

very top of the income ladder.

Western nations generally take two routes discuss in chapter 6,

They

the concentra-

some

to

reducing inequality.

As we

intervene in the market to ensure relatively equal

distributions of earnings by, for example, brokering nationwide

wage

agreements, assisting unions, or providing free child care. Others use taxes

and government benefits

few do both

to

reduce inequality of income after the market.

seriously, such as the Scandinavian countries.

States does the least of either. If one sets aside older people,

123

A

The United

who

benefit a

CHAPTER

5

The income gap between the richest and the average household and the gap between the average household and the poorest are both wider in the United States than elsewhere.

Gap between ratio of 90

th

rich

and average: median

percentile to

90 th

Gap between average and poor: ratio of

median

to 10

th

percentile

Median

10 tb

United States \Z

i

Canada

i

Australia

U.

i

Kingdom Italv

France

i

i

1

[

i

W. Germany

i

Netherlands i

i

i

i

i

i

i

Ratio

Ratios of Incomes for High-, Median-, and

5.7. in

Low-Income Households

Eight Nations (Source: Adapted from Gottschalk and Smeeding,

"Crossnational Comparisons," table 3)

great deal

from government action

taxes and transfers here

changed from the way

it

is

in the

to leave the

United States, the net effect of

degree of inequality virtually un-

was determined by market

earnings.

53

(See also

chapter 6.)

When

everything

income inequality

is

is

accounted

for, the

Western nation with the most

the United States. But the United States

is

also ex-

ceptionally unequal in terms of wealth. At the end of the 1980s, the richest 1

percent of families

owned about 40 124

percent of household wealth here,

THE REWARDS OF THE GAME more than

in

any other advanced nation; the richest

1

percent

owned only

25 percent of the wealth in Canada and 18 percent of the wealth Britain, for

example. 54

Add

in

Great

the less tangible features of "wealth," such as

vacations and security of medical care, and the conclusion

reinforced that

is

Americans are remarkably unequal.

(Some critics of crossnational comparisons contend

one ought not

to

contrast the United States to other nations, because the United States

is

distinct in certain ple.

ways.

We have so many single-parent families,

But even looking only

unusually unequal.

55

that

at

for

exam-

two-parent families, the United States

is still

America

also

seems exceptionally diverse

racially

and ethnically. But other Western nations also have ethnic diversity, the racial caste still

system we do.

exceeds that

And

among white

poverty

among American

if

not

whites only

or majority populations elsewhere. 56 Such

reservations do not challenge the conclusion that the United States

is

un-

usually unequal.)

America's level of inequality

is

by the distribution of its people's

by design.

talents,

It is

not given by nature, nor

nor by the demands of a "natural"

market. Other Western nations face the same global competition that

and are about as affluent as

we

are and yet

have managed

terns of inequality less divisive than ours. Ironically, that

Americans were proud of comparing

to the class-riven, hierarchical,

it

to

we do

develop pat-

was not so long ago

their relatively egalitarian society

decadent societies of Europe. In the

last

couple of decades, America has become the more class-riven and hierarchical society.

57

The United

States

is

unusually unequal and Americans are unusually

show that Americans back moves toward expanding opportunity but oppose moves toward equalizing outcomes. They endorse wage differences among jobs that are pretty similar to the wage differences that they believe exist today (although the real differsupportive of this inequality. Surveys

ences are greater than Americans imagine), and they do not approve of

government programs six nations,

to

narrow those differences.

In a survey of people in

only 28 percent of Americans agreed that government should

reduce income differences. The next lowest percentage was 42 percent (Australians), while in the other countries majorities supported reducing

income differences. 58 Whether we have as much opportunity as Americans want

is

debatable (see chapters 4 and

8),

between the desired and the perceived

may be because Americans

but

we seem to have

level of

outcome

a rough

think that considerable inequality

stimulating productivity and a high standard of living.

125

match

inequality. That

Is it?

is

needed

for

CHAPTER

Is

Inequality the Price of Growth?

Some commentators equality.

A

5

straightforwardly defend our current level of in-

congressional report in 1995 conceded that the recent trends

toward inequality were real but argued, "All societies have unequal wealth

and income dispersion, and there degree of market determined

is

[sic]

no positive basis for inequality."

59

criticizing

Disparities in

any

income

and wealth, some analysts argue, encourage hard work and saving. The rich, in particular,

jobs for

all.

60

can invest their capital in production and thus create

This was the argument of "supply-side" economics in the

1980s, that rewarding the wealthy

—

for example,

taxes on returns from their investments benefit of

The 1980s did not work out

all.

the theory

is

still

We

influential.

these analysts say, but doing so

by reducing income

—would stimulate growth that way, as

we have

to the

seen, but

could force more equal outcomes,

would reduce

living standards for all

Americans.

Must we have

so

much

nomic research concludes

inequality for overall growth? not,

it

even suggests

economic growth. In a detailed

statistical analysis,

Persson and Guido Tabellini reported finding

had more inequality of earnings tended

that

to

The

that inequality

latest eco-

may

retard

economists Torsten

that, historically, societies

have lower, not higher, sub-

sequent economic growth. Replications by other scholars substantiated the finding: eties.

61

More unequal That

fits

nations grew less quickly than did

more casual observations

as well:

We

more equal socisaw that, in the

United States, our era of greatest recent growth was also an era of greater equalization. ica's

62

economic

give us

stiff

And we rivals

saw, at the beginning of this chapter, that

do not need

to

pay

their

CEOs

Amer-

exorbitant salaries to

competition. In fact, during the 1970s and 1980s, America's

national wealth did not

pean nations.

grow

as fast as that of the

more

egalitarian Euro-

63

Close examination of detailed policies also suggests that greater equality helps, or at least does not harm, productivity. Researchers affiliated with

the National

economic

Bureau of Economic Research closely examined the

flexibility (that is, the ability to shift resources to

tive uses) of several redistributive policies

effects

on

more produc-

used by Western nations

—job

homeowner subsidies, health plans, public child care, and so They found that such programs did not inhibit the functioning of those

security laws,

on.

economies. 64 Indeed, a study of over one hundred U.S. businesses found

126

— THE REWARDS OF THE GAME that the smaller the

wage gap between managers and workers,

the business's product quality.

how

This recent research has not demonstrated precisely helps economic growth,

66

we can

but

the higher

65

greater equality

consider a few possibilities. Increas-

ing resources for those of lower income might, by raising health, educational attainment,

and hope, increase people's

abilities to

Reducing the income of those

entrepreneurial.

at the

be productive and

top might reduce un-

productive and speculative spending. Take, as a concrete example, the

American corporations ones.

are run

The American companies

whose main

responsibility

prices to shareholders and to

by largely autonomous managers

are run

is to

way

compared with German and Japanese return short-term profits and high stock

—because they

are often paid in stock options

themselves as well. Japanese and German managers are more

like top

employees whose goals largely focus on keeping the company a thriving enterprise.

The

latter is

more conducive

to reinvesting profits

long-term growth, 67 Whatever the mechanisms to

may

undermine growth. Americans certainly need not

accept the high levels of inequality

we

and thus to

be, inequality appears feel that they

must

currently endure in order to have a

robust economy.

A related concern for Americans is whether "leveling" stifles the drive to get ahead.

Americans prefer

encourage Horatio Alger striving and to

to

provide opportunities for everyone. Lincoln once said "that

shows

rich

that others

may become

believe that inequality if so,

how much

is

needed

inequality

is

to

rich."

68

Many,

if

some would be

not most, Americans

encourage people to work hard. 69 But,

needed?

For decades, sociologists have been comparing the patterns of social mobility across societies, asking: In which countries are people most likely to

overcome

lar,

the disadvantages of birth and

move up

the ladder? In particu-

does more or less equality encourage such an "open" society? The an-

swer

is

that

Western societies vary

little in

economic successes are constrained by

the degree to their

which children's

parents' class positions.

America, the most unequal Western society, has somewhat more intergenerational mobility than

most equal Western in this

In

society.

70

do other

There

is

nations, but so does

no case for encouraging inequality

evidence, either.

sum, the assumption that considerable inequality

even encourages, economic growth appears to

fluid

Sweden, the

make

equality;

a morally wrenching choice

we can have

both.

But even

if

127

to

be

false.

is

needed

We

for,

or

do not need

between more affluence and more such a choice were necessary, both

CHAPTER sides of the debate, the "altruists"

and the supposed "realists"

who

who resist

5

favor intervention for equalizing it,

agree that inequality can be

shaped by policy decisions: wittingly or unwittingly,

we choose our

level

of inequality.

Conclusion Either

we Americans have come to desire the inequality we live with or the we live with reflects our desires (or both). Certainly, there are

inequality

values and beliefs

—individualism,

more unequal

creating a

society.

capitalism,

freedom

—

that

can justify

But many Americans also believe

that

such levels of inequality are inevitable, the result of inequality in natural ability or

come

of the market or both. This belief has no basis in evidence. In-

and,

more

generally, wealth, standard of living, and quality of life

have been more equal in other times and are more equal

in other places,

without any evidence that talents were more equal earlier or are more equal elsewhere, or that market pressures are different there.

Perhaps today's trend toward inequality will reverse; fore in

American

But the keys equality

we

history, as

economic and

with

is

nomic conditions strongly influence the shape of its

changed.

The degree of

not a "natural" result of either inherent

talents or a "free" market. Certainly, people's skills

acting through

has reversed be-

political conditions

to understanding inequality will remain.

live

it

and

in-

human

societies' eco-

inequality.

But a people,

government, can contract or expand that inequality.

The

policy changes enacted by the 1995-96 Congress will, certainly in the short

run and most probably in the long run, widen inequality. choices

we have

in

more

detail in the next chapter.

128

We

explore the

CHAPTER

*

How

*

6

Unequal?

America's Invisible Policy Choices

A,.mericans

can significantly

them. In chapter

much

it

varies

5,

we showed how

from nation

how much

inequality

to nation.

from changes and variations specific

alter

Such

that

chapter

more

measure

focus on several

as welfare spending, are not the

even the most important ones,

"invisible" practices are

we

is

shape inequality.

Obvious redistributive programs, such only policies, or

fluidity results in large

in policy. In this

American policy choices

among changes over time and how inequality there

that affect inequality.

Many

For example, American housing

significant.

and road-building programs have largely subsidized the expansion of suburban homeownership for the middle class. Other largely unnoticed policies set the ball,

ground rules for the competition

batters

have the advantage (see box,

regulations favor last

to get ahead. Just as in base-

where the height of the pitcher's mound p. 130),

affects

whether pitchers or

so in the marketplace laws and

some competitors and disadvantage

We saw in the

others.

chapter that the United States has the greatest inequality in earnings

among full-time workers and that that inequality has increased since 1970. Some policies narrow inequality and some widen it. Again and again we will see that the basic dimensions of social inequality how rich the rich are a are and how poor the poor are, and even who becomes rich or poor

—

result

of our social and political choices.

directly,

and hence

invisibly.

Many

The programs

—

of our policies operate

that help the

in-

poor are glaringly

obvious, but those that aid the rich and middle class tend to be invisible.

Obscured even more are the policies

we

labor market. In this chapter,

game" for the many ways that

that set the rules of "the

will reveal

some of

the

social policy shapes inequality.

We icy,

will begin

which

is

by looking

at

to provide, with

one general pattern of American social pol-

one hand, limited direct help

to

some of

the

poor and indirectly to subsidize, with another, the middle class and the wealthy. Next,

we

will

uncover one of the most hidden arenas of social

policy, the regulation of the labor market,

and show

how

the

ground

rules

shape inequality. Finally, through an examination of higher education, we 129

CHAPTER Baseball: and

In sports, talent

determine ceed.

We

who

How

6

Rules Help Pick the Winners

effort should

who

determine

wins. But the rules also

has the advantage and even the kinds of players

who

suc-

see that in the history of baseball. In 1893 the team owners

lengthened the pitching distance to sixty feet and pitchers

lost

an edge;

game the next year. Then, game plummeted (to seven

runs soared to an average of fifteen per

number of runs per

early 1900s, the

National League) because

counted the

first

two

partly determined

new

rules created a wider

foul balls as strikes.

who became

home

in the in the

plate

These new regulations,

and

in turn,

successful players. Baseball historian Ben-

jamin Rader writes:

With the lengthening of the pitching distance

in

mound"), the sheer

pounds tall,

the

5' 11")

size of pitchers

were

the pitchers

same height

and stood

By

as the hitters.

averaged an inch and a half

average of 9 pounds heavier (180

taller

of

dirt ("the

1894

to increase sharply. In

relatively small; they averaged

lighter than the hitters)

pitchers of 1908

began

1893 and the grow-

mound

ing practice of placing the pitching slab on a

at five feet

168 pounds (4

and ten inches

1908, however, pitchers

(at

than the hitters and were an

lbs. vs.

171

lbs.).

Notice that the

weighed a whopping 12 pounds more than the aver-

age of their counterparts in 1894.

Following another hitting drought

in the

mid-1960s, baseball owners

again attempted to right the balance by lowering the pitching fifteen to ten inches, ordering

home

fences closer to

plate,

umpires to tighten the

and

in the

ignated hitter" to bat for the pitcher.*

changing rules

molds

why is

some of

American League allowing a "des-

As we

write,

owners once again are

is

114-16, 169.

the diverse

inequality. In the end,

inequality

moving

in the pitcher's favor.

* Rader, Baseball, pp. 87, 89,

will look at

mound from

strike zone,

we

ways

in

which public investment also

will better understand the

historically so inconstant

so high.

130

major reasons

and why inequality

in

America

HOW UNEQUAL

1

Reducing Poverty through Redistribution

Visible Policy:

Over

American government has done much

the last century,

to help those

poor by the market. Public health programs, school lunches, food

left

stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits

have reduced the inequality

Americans have chosen not

to pursue

left

(AFDC), and

survivors'

by earnings differences. Yet

such programs as far as citizens

in

other affluent nations have (and the programs are being sharply cut back as

we

Most

write).

ilies

industrial societies provide "family allowances" to all

fam-

with children and some form of universal health care or health insur-

ance to

residents. In such ways, the

all

numbers and problems of the very

poor are sharply reduced by government policies that are directed toward

everyone and that do not single out the poor. Most American welfare pro-

—

who

can

prove that they are poor and that they are otherwise deserving. These

tar-

grams, in contrast, are "means-tested"

available only to those

geted programs consequently lack wide political support and are vulnerable to budget-cutting.

Only

social security

and Medicare, nearly universal

entitlements for the elderly, have largely survived cutbacks in recent years.

Most other

nations, unlike the United States, also substantially subsidize

housing for

many moderate-income

who make

it

into higher education,

citizens, provide stipends for students

and support the long-term unemployed.

Recent American antipoverty programs have had some success, but mostly in reducing poverty rity

and Medicare, and

among

the elderly, largely through social secu-

in taking the

edge off misery (see figure

can see the emphasis on the elderly by looking cans

who

are pulled

above the poverty

line

at the

by

all

government

programs (taxation, unemployment support, welfare, social put together. In 1992, 22 percent of Americans

below the poverty

line if all that

families' earnings.

Government taxes and

cent, a

drop of ten points

elderly, taxes

5.5).

We

percentage of Amerifinancial

security, etc.)

would have had incomes

had been available

them were

to

their

transfers reduced that to 12 per-

in the proportion

of poor Americans. For the

and transfers reduced the proportion by forty points, from the

50 percent who would have been poor based on nongovernmental income alone to the 10 percent

come and was

to

taxes.

who were poor

after including

governmental

For children, however, the net effect of taxes and transfers

reduce poverty rates by only seven points, from 24 percent to

percent. For

in-

young

adults, the

drop was merely 131

five points,

1

from 21 percent

CHAPTER to 16 percent.

1

6

This generational imbalance

is, in part, the outcome of polweakened the equalizing effects of taxes we have no data on the effects of the 1993 Clin-

icy changes during the 1980s that

and transfers. 2 (As of

yet,

ton tax changes that raised the earned income tax credit for low-income families and raised the

income tax

rates for the very wealthiest households.

Presumably, these laws shifted net incomes toward equality a

changes enacted by the Republican Congress elected

incomes away from If

we

income trition etc.

But the shift

equality.)

the programs that helped nonelderly

list all

little.

1994 will

in

— food stamps, AFDC, Women,

Americans with low

Infants and Children

(WIC

—

a nu-

program), Medicaid, SSI

—they sound

like a lot.

disability, the earned income tax credit, Adding together these programs and adding in

as well a variety of federal, state, and local spending directed not just at the

poor but also

many people who

at

are

above the poverty

line,

such as col-

lege loans, job retraining, and energy assistance, the total expenditures for

"persons with limited income" in 1992 amounted to almost $290 billion.

As

sizable as that figure

ment expenditures

is, it

represents less than 12 percent of

all

govern-

comes to about $5,900 per lowincome person. Almost half of this total, $134 billion, was for medical care, largely Medicaid. Nonmedical spending came to about $3,200 per limitedincome person, of which about $2,100 was in the form of cash or food stamps. That $2,100 is roughly what the typical American family spent on eating out in 1992; it is within a few hundred dollars of what typical homeowners saved on their federal income taxes by being able to deduct mortgage interest. Even after this government spending which is probably a high-end estimate of what America spent to aid low-income people in 1992 over 14 percent of Americans, 21 percent of American children, at all levels that year. It

—

—

remained poor. 3

We

can best evaluate the effort to redress poverty comparatively. Low-

income American children

are

worse off than low-income children

in

any other industrial nation. In the 1980s, for example, about 20 percent of American children lived in poverty, while 9 percent of Canadian children and of Australian children were poor, 7 percent of children in the

United Kingdom, and even fewer respectively.

Why

in France,

West Germany, and Sweden,

4

are so

many American

children poor? Charles

Murray claimed

in

an earlier book that American children are poor because welfare policies

encourage poor

women to have more children. He is wrong.

by demographers demonstrate minimal bearing. Rather,

young parents

are

effects, if any,

more 132

of

Careful studies

AFDC

on

child-

susceptible to poverty, and their

HOW UNEQUAL? poverty makes their children poor. 5 American children are more often poor, first,

because American adults are more unequal

in

both wealth and income

than people in any other industrial society. Second, children suffer especially

because the incomes of young

mid-1970s. More young of poverty, and

many

men

men have

fallen so sharply since the

cannot earn enough to keep their children out

then refuse to take on the responsibilities of marriage,

young mothers and children even poorer. We can see how American government compares with others in dealing with poverty by turning again to the Luxembourg Income Study. Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding calculated, for eighteen nations, the percentleaving

age of children

who were

poor. (To be able to

compare across countries,

"poor" was defined as being in a household with real purchasing power less than half that of the median in the nation. Half the median the poverty line in the United States calculated.)

6

was

in the

roughly what

is

1960s when

Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of children

it

was

first

who were poor

before and then after including taxes and government transfer payments in the calculations. Again,

we

look only

at the

populous nations. Before gov-

ernment intervention, a relatively high percentage of American children

were poor, but not as high as

in

France and the United Kingdom. After

counting taxes and government payments, however, the poverty rate for

American children was

substantially higher than that elsewhere (including

shown

Even those countries with higher before-government child poverty than the United States managed to reduce their poverty levels to far below the level here. Two objections might be raised to the evidence that America leaves so nine other nations not

many of its

children in poverty.

poor because so

many

in the figure).

One

is

that so

many American

live in single-parent families.

Rainwater and Smeeding also looked separately and

in single-parent families. In

figure 6.

1

:

action.

7

The

other objection

being below 50 percent of the median,

how much

real

is

is in

being poor elsewhere. Unfortunately, that ing calculated

American children near

more

real

However,

children in two-parent

likely to

that being

be

left

poor

is

in

after

America,

not so. Rainwater and

purchasing power children

the top and

in

poor

material terms not as terrible as

at the

Smeed-

at the 10th, 50th,

and 90th percentiles of the income distribution had available try.

children are

is true.

each case, the same pattern appears as

American children were exceedingly

government

at

That

in

each coun-

middle did, indeed, have

income than did children near the top and

at the

middle else-

where. But American children near the bottom had less real income than children in the other nations, 25 percent less than poor Canadian children

and 40 percent less than poor West German children. 133

And

again, the

CHAPTER

6

Government in the United States does the least to reduce the proportion of children who are poor: percent of children poor before and after government action.

United States

Australia

Canada

'//////A

United Kingdom

IT Italy

V/////A

West Germany

France

in the 1980s.

They

participate

similar technologies, and have similar types

of industries and occupations. Yet these other countries experienced neither the

same

wage

large increases in

inequality nor the drops in the real

earnings of the less skilled. In Canada, Japan, and

grew, but

much more modestly

and

inequality changed hardly at

Italy,

than

it

Sweden wage

inequality

did in the United States. In France all.

52

(Only

in

Great Britain did the

gap between professionals and blue-collar workers increase as much as did in the United States, and there only because of gains for people with

low wages rose

in

at the top; the

it

pay

Great Britain, just not as quickly.) Low-

wage workers in the United States now earn only about halt as much relaAmerican high-wage workers as low-wage workers in Europe earn

tive to

relative to

Why

high-wage ones

there.

did other advanced industrial countries experience less

wage

in-

equality in the 1980s than the United States did? Because, in large part,

they

made

different policy choices. In particular, other

advanced countries

have different rules about unionization and have different wage-setting institutions.

53

Union Rules Economists Richard Freeman of Harvard and David Card of Princeton mate

that the sharp decline in the percentage of unionized

1980s explains

male workers

at least one-fifth

in the

of the growth

United States.

54

This

is

in

wage

inequality.

differentials

In the

were simply too few union members

Between 1970 and 1990

esti-

in the

among

because unions reduce the pay

gap between higher- and lower-ranking workers. 55 the 1980s, there

workers

United States

to offset

in

growing

the proportion of the labor force that

was unionized dropped more than 45 percent

to only

1 1

percent of the

private sector, virtually the lowest unionization rate in the industrialized

world.

Unionization, in turn, has declined so precipitously in the United States largely because of the unusually hostile political and legal environment here. Especially instructive

is

the

comparison with Canada, because Can-

ada and the United States share similar cultures, economic institutions, and standards of living. In the 1940s Canadians revised their labor laws to re-

semble the United States' 1935 Wagner Act, which established

legal proce-

dures for labor organization and collective bargaining here. Since then.

however, Canadian labor laws have become more favorable while American labor laws have

become 149

less favorable.

56

to

unions

Under current

CHAPTER Canadian law, a union

is

indicating their support.

6

established once a majority of workers sign a card

Under current American

workers have signed such cards, unions must tion

still

go through a long

elec-

campaign, often facing management consultants hired by employers

convince workers that they do not want a union in

law, after a majority of

Canada

ble to

for

do so

employers

in the

many Americans March

1995.

after

all.

57

Also,

to replace strikers permanently, but

it is

it is

permissi-

United States. This was brought to the consciousness of during the baseball strike that ran from August 1994, to

The Canadian government forbade

foreign replacement

workers, and Ontario provincial law prohibited hiring any replacements all.

to

illegal

The Toronto Blue Jays were forced

to schedule their possible

at

1995

"replacement baseball" season in Florida.

when

In the 1950s and 1960s,

labor laws and practices were most similar

two countries, unionization

in the

rates

were also

similar, but since then

unionization rates have risen in Canada and dropped sharply in the United States.

By

the early 1990s the percentage unionized in the private sector in

Canada was almost

three times larger than in the United States. 58 Partly

because of these differences

much

Canada than

less in

in unionization rates,

in the

wage

inequality

grew

United States in the 1980s. 59

Unions and Plant Relocation In the 1980s

some major American companies busted

their unions in cele-

brated cases (after President Reagan had defeated the air traffic controllers' union).

More

often,

however, employers escaped union pressure by mov-

ing from one state to another or out of the United States altogether. scale of

movement during

the decade of the 1980s alone

is

The

staggering.

University of North Carolina sociologist John Kasarda estimated that the

northern and midwestern states lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs and

$40

billion in

in southern lost to

pay between 1980 and 1990. 60 One-third of the jobs ended up

and western

states;

some of the

rest

moved overseas; some were

automation; and some were simply lost as firms stopped producing

goods.

The competition among

localities for

struggle to land sports franchises

among

cities

and

is

jobs-on-the-move

a vivid illustration.)

states for firms usually turns

commitments, and promises the victors are significant.

intense.

on tax concessions,

to regulate union activity.

They do not

is

61

(The

The competition capital

But the costs

to

necessarily increase their tax bases,

because the bidding frequently requires giving away tax revenues;

also,

local taxpayers often contribute to firms' relocation costs. National policy

150

HOW UNEQUAL' allows states to differ greatly in laws protecting labor and thus to compete

on the basis of who has the weakest ones, thus encouraging to

weakly unionized

— and lower-paying — Wage

employee with ployer. In

his or her

many jobs,

the

or no negotiation

tem, and one result to

Setting

United States, workers' wages are negotiated either by an individual

In the

little

the shift of jobs

states.

is

is

employer or by a

local union with a specific

employer simply

offers the job at a preset

involved. This

is

an extremely decentralized

that differences in the

be high. The variation

gender, and occupation

in

wages

much

is

for

s> s-

wages of similar workers tend

workers of the same age, education,

greater in the United States than

more centralized wage-setting systems.

countries with

em-

wage;

62

it

is

in

That means

greater earnings inequality here. In countries like

Norway and

made up of employers of

Austria, national employer associations,

in different industries, bargain

the national unions to determine

all

sector of the

wage

economy. Local employers and unions

increase (but not decrease)

wages above

with representatives

levels for workers in each

are then allowed to

the national level

if

they agree

to.

France and Germany, bargaining goes on between unions

In countries like

and employers' associations

in

each industry or region; the government

then routinely extends these collective agreements to nonunion workers

and firms

in the relevant industry or region.

These kinds of centralized

arrangements diminish the amount of wage inequality. They do so by ting a

wage

floor for those at the

for those at the top of the

Centralized

wage

wage

worker makes

American top

is

CEO

so

scale, particularly executives.

setting practices are

tween what a typical European

much

set-

bottom of the pay scale and a wage ceiling

CEO

one reason why the disparity be-

makes and what an average European

less than the difference

between what

a typical

reaps and what an average American worker earns. While

American managers might claim

that their

enormous compensation

packages are justified by their productivity, researchers have found only a 63 between executive compensation and productivity. And, as we mentioned in the last chapter, Western Europe's economic growth out-

weak

relation

paced ours between 1970 and 1990. 64

One way in the face

to think about the policy choices different countries

have made

of economic pressures during recent years

The Euro-

is this:

peans have generally chosen to keep workers' real wages up, even

means

a slightly higher level of

if that

unemployment (because employers 151

will

CHAPTER hire

fewer workers

at

6

those wages). Part of that decision

to sustain the basic living standards of the long-term

government transfers and fault

—

to allow real

services.

wages

The United

is a commitment unemployed through

States has decided

to drop, so that slightly

more people

—by de-

are

working

but in lower-paying, less-secure, and often benefit-shorn jobs. Since no

made to assist the workers in these poorer jobs, income has widened more in the United States.

provision has been inequality

Both unionization rules and wage-setting practices are the

result of pol-

And these policy choices have profound effects on the amount of inequality we see in American society today. Recent statistics show that icy choices.

before 1974 American workers' increases in productivity were rewarded

by increased wages. Since 1974, in

this

has no longer been true. Productivity

both manufacturing and services increased by over 50 percent since then,

but wages in both sectors have been essentially

flat.

The

last

twenty years'

gain in productivity instead fueled gains in executive compensation and in stock prices. American workers received no greater slice of the growing pie

because they had no place

at the table.

65

Public Investments: The Case of Higher Education Public investment decisions also shape inequality.

Some

investments, like

clean water or public parks, improve everyone's quality of

down

income

the

others.

Roads

that

ladder.

life

up and

Other investments benefit some of us more than

go from suburbs

to

downtown business

areas of our large

example, tend to advantage middle- and upper-class commuters

cities, for

more than they do

central-city residents.

investments that affects

all

One of the most

of us, but in different ways,

important public is

public higher

education. In a crucial but not too visible manner,

a choice that

moved

Americans a generation ago made

the United States toward greater equality.

From

the

1950s to the 1970s, America invested enormously in higher education. In

1945 there were enough five

slots in

Americans aged eighteen

grown

to

about four for every

sive because

years.

it

postsecondary education for only one of

to

twenty-two.

five.

66

is

the

to serve

number had

especially impres-

happened while baby-boomers were entering

Higher education expanded enough

tion of a

By 1992

The expansion

their college

an ever greater propor-

growing population of young people. 67

Expansion was achieved through a generous commitment of public 152

re-

HOW UNEQL

\l

'

sources. Indeed, private college and university enrollments

grew only

slightly faster than the eligible population, while enrollments in public col-

New

leges and universities soared. States like California and

York

built

elaborate systems of higher education: junior colleges, state colleges, and university

campuses

New

University of size

—

the University of

Michigan from 20,000

15,000 in 1955 to 62,000 state

and local

levels,

tunity, the aspirations

sion,

in

Ohio

to 45,000;

1975. These political choices,

from

State

made

expressed Americans' optimism and belief

largely in

at

oppor-

of states and cities for prestige and economic expan-

and parents' desires to assure

Those who believed sion of opportunity

and campus after campus of the State

in California,

York. Other public universities increased greatly in

in the link

were

right.

their children's futures.

between higher education and the expan-

For those fortunate enough to earn one. a

four-year-college degree levels out family advantages and disadvantages in a

way

that increases equal access to

good

jobs.

no connection between the occupational

there

is

their

own. Children of the working

Among

college graduates,

status of their parents

jobs as are children of the middle class once they have a diploma.

when higher education expanded from 1960 father's place

on the economic ladder determined what

place would be

to the rise in the

was

cut

by

68

So

to 1980, the intergenerational

inheritance of socioeconomic status dropped dramatically.

ter's

and

class are as likely to land prestigious

half, nearly all

of

How much

his son's or

a

daugh-

this decline attributable

69 proportion of the workforce with college degrees. (The

weakening of the connection between parents' and children's rectly contradicts Herrnstein

based intelligence

is

and Murray's argument

becoming more important

in the

statuses di-

that a genetically

modern economy.

If

they were right, the correlation between parents' and children's statuses

should have grown stronger during those years. There are signs, however, that,

with increasing tuitions and stagnating investments

tion, the pattern

of expanding opportunity

is

in

higher educa-

beginning to reverse.

" I

Expansion of higher education increased equality of opportunity b\

weakening the connection between parental and child

status.

But overall

income depends on whether expansion of higher education keeps pace with the economy's demand for educated workers. The great

equality of

development of colleges

in the

1950s and 1960s increased the supply of

educated workers, reducing each graduate's claim on high wages. The

number of managerial and professional jobs

available

from 2.2

fell

71

college diploma-holder in 1952 to 1.6 in the mid-1970s."

workers could

still

ladder, but overall

bump

income

153

each

Better-educated

less-educated workers from jobs farther equality increased.

for

down

the

CHAPTER

Whom

6

Will Colleges Reject?

The expansion of public higher education from 1952 modest expansion of private colleges equality of opportunity in America.

in the

1969 (and a more

to

1970s and 1980s) increased

Young people who lacked wealthy

or

well-educated parents were increasingly able to compete on equal terms

with students from more advantaged backgrounds as seats in colleges creased. However, the picture will be sharply different in the

cade.

Between 1991 and 2001

the

number of 18-to-23-year-olds

increased by 40 percent, as the generation of the "baby

reaches college age. But in the 1990s there fiscal

Thus have

is

in-

coming dewill

have

boom echo"

neither the public will nor the

resources to finance another round of expansion of higher education. the proportion of

young people going on

to higher education will

to fall.*

One of

us,

Michael Hout, has examined

handled similar enrollment squeezes. The

how

Irish

modern

other

societies

between 1970 and 1984

allocated university positions solely on the basis of achievement test scores.

With the

eligible population

growing substantially

faster than uni-

versity places, this policy disadvantaged high-scoring poor

dents equally.

Italy, in

and rich

stu-

a similar squeeze, kept admitting students without

adding faculty or resources, so that students admitted to university increasingly found that they could not get into lectures.

It

took students longer to

graduate, and those from better-off families were likelier to finish. Russia

faced an admissions bottleneck

when

schools without expanding university

it

expanded academic secondary

facilities.

The shortage of places

exacerbated historic inequalities, so that students from poorer back-

grounds became even

The United

likelier than before to

be rejected.

States does not provide the kind of free university education

Ireland offers, so

it is

unlikely that the privileged and the disadvantaged

will bear the brunt of the enrollment

States will probably

mix

crunch equally. Instead, the United

the Italian and Russian patterns. Students

who

qualify for relatively low-cost public institutions will have a harder and

harder time simply finding the classes that allow them to earn degrees. The

more privileged on

to those ity

will

until graduation.

who have

be better able

And access

to

manipulate the system and to hang

to private institutions will increasingly

greater ability to pay.

of opportunity. *

Hout, "The Politics of Mobility."

154

The

result will

go

be reduced equal-

HOW UNEQUAL? After the mid-1970s, however, the supply of educated workers that col-

more slowly than the demand for them. Thus, as we first pointed out in chapter 5, the wages of college graduates rose relative to those of nongraduates. And inequality of income between those who had leges provided rose

who had

and those

who do

not graduated college increased again. 72 Today, those

not graduate from college

high school education or less

—

lege graduates are rising at a time

ratio

1.65.

The earnings of

the earnings of high school gradu-

Between 1979 and 1989

in high-tech

like increased the

the

manufacturing, health services, legal services,

demand

demand

Meanwhile the commerce reduced

for college graduates.

decline of traditional manufacturing, bookkeeping, and for workers with a high school education.

kinds of jobs available in the United States all

a

col-

did not go to college (the "B.A. premium") rose from 1.45 to

Growth

and the

the

who have

so, those

of earnings for college graduates to earnings for high school gradu-

who

ates

when

did not attend college are falling. 73

who

ates

—and even more

face bleak prospects.

These

economy do

shifts in the

not account for

of the increase in earnings inequality in the 1980s, but they do account

for the increased

B.A. premium. 74

It is

we emphasize, market demand

that reversed

a trend,

an earlier one and that reflects not just the

for workers,

but also the supply provided by our decisions about investing in higher

education.

American policy regarding postsecondary education is disMost of our trading partners provide students who do not go to college with more vocational training than we do. Successful systems link In addition,

tinctive.

schools and firms. Firms can explain their labor needs to schools, and schools can draw on firms for technology and job placement. States has given

little

75

The United

systematic attention to vocational education,

al-

though recent research shows that vocational programs tailored to the labor

market notably increase workers' earnings. 76 Overall, then, America's investment decisions about education have had

important

—

if

complicated

education after World

youngsters

who were

War

—

effects

II

on

inequality.

The expansion of higher it gave more

reduced inequality, both because

less affluent the opportunity to attain

high-paying

jobs and because the growth of the supply of educated workers tended to

reduce the B.A. premium. Retreats since those days have increased equality.

At the same time, the

failure of the

generously in vocational training (or

in

in-

United States to invest as

primary and secondary education;

see the next chapter) has increased inequality here relative to other ad-

vanced countries where public investment been greater. 155

in these

kinds of education has

CHAPTER

6

Conclusion: The "Free" Market and Social Policy Influential

commentator George

Will, responding to headlines about

ing inequality in America, voiced what ity is

not bad

A society

if

it

results

from a

many Americans

and

free

fair

market.

that values individualism, enterprise

neither surprised nor scandalized

when

grow-

believe: Inequal-

and a market economy

is

the unequal distribution of market-

able skills produces large disparities in the distribution of wealth. This

does not mean that social justice must be defined as whatever distribution of wealth the market produces. But

does mean that there

it

is

a presump-

tion in favor of respecting the market's version of distributive justice. Certainly there

is

today no prima facie case against the moral acceptability of

increasingly large disparities of wealth. 77

However, "the market's version of a natural market but

Some

from complex

policies determine

distributive justice" results not

political choices,

how unequal

many

the starting points are of those

enter the market's competition; other policies determine selects winners

and

losers.

how

For example, African Americans

were prevented by private discrimination and

from purchasing homes and thereby

from

of them hidden.

lost out

explicit

who

the market

in the

1950s

government policy

on subsidized loans and mort-

gage deductions. They were also unable to leave substantial assets

to their

As another example, think of the businesses in industries subsidies. The market is not a neutral game that distributes

children.

that

receive

just

rewards to the worthy; in biases.

it is

a politically constructed institution with built-

78

As we have shown rising equality of

government

here and in chapter

post-World War

policies,

some

II

5, the

enormous prosperity and

America resulted

legacies of the

New Deal,

in part

from many

policies that provided

old-age security, encouraged homeownership, gave labor increased bargaining power, built massive physical infrastructure, and financed an enor-

mous expansion of public

education. Since the late 1970s, however, public

investment of these sorts has slowed and sometimes actually reversed. At the

same time,

inequality has dramatically increased.

The kinds of inequalities we ral

see reemerging in

America

are neither natu-

nor inevitable, nor do they reflect the distribution of individual

Through our

politics,

Americans have chosen

talents.

to increase equality of op-

portunity (expanding higher education, for example) or equality of result

156

HOW UNEQUAL' (subsidies for to

do so

chosen. the

homeownership, Medicaid, and Medicare,

to a far

We

1

more

for instance), bui

limited extent than citizens in other nations have

extend support to fewer of our citizens, largely the elderly and

middle class; and

we

extend less support. For example,

we

provide

medical insurance for some residents; most nations provide medical care for

all.

We

provide a tax deduction for children of taxpayers; most nations

provide family allowances. Americans have also

made choices

that in-

creased inequality, such as the tax changes of the 1980s and the rules on unionization

we have

the well-off

more than

We have

many programs

to help

the less well-off, such as the subsidies for

home-

accepted.

structured

ownership and medical insurance.

What in great

all this

implies

measure a

is

that the inequality

result of policy decisions

chosen not to make. Generally, life

do

America

to

We

do

is

—

or

far less to equalize

have chosen to reduce

between the middle class and the upper class somewhat, but

far less to

cans — with

see today in

Americans have made

we have chosen

conditions than have other Western people.

the inequality to

we

reduce the gap between the lower class and other Ameri-

the notable exception of older people.

decades, our choices have these choices; others, like

moved

And

in the last

us farther from equality.

George

Will,

may applaud

Americans constructed the inequality we have.

157

couple of

Some

criticize

them. Either way,

*

CHAPTER

7

*

Enriching Intelligence:

More

Policy Choices

i F we have done our job well, readers of

this

book should by now appre-

ciate that the explanation for inequality lies in the design of society, not in

the

minds or genes of

individuals.

The rewards

that contestants gain in the

race for success are determined by the rules of the race, not the personal traits

of the racers. Even

who wins

or loses the race

is

determined more by

the "nutrition" and "training" they receive than by their "natural speed." In

the last

few chapters, we have directed

social systems

and shown

attention

that inequality

and

its

away from

individuals to

reduction are to be found

of competition and distribution. The leverage for expanding

in structures

opportunity and moderating inequality

lies in policies that

deal with those

structures.

In this chapter, tive skills

—

we

or, for

argue that social policy can also improve the cogni-

shorthand, the intelligence

—of

individuals. This

is

a

worthwhile goal, because a more cognitively skilled population would be a

more productive one,

tunity,

and cognitive

a wider distribution of skills

skills are

valuable in their

own

would expand opporright.

Those who be-

lieve that intelligence is genetically determined or fixed in infancy claim that nothing

That

is

can be done to increase such

skills; intelligence is

immutable.

why, they argue, intervention programs are a waste of taxpayer

money. However, the pessimists are wrong. Evidence shows gence can be changed. Indeed,

it

is

that intelli-

shaped every day by institutions

all

we define intelligence in its broadest sense, as it should be. But even if we define it narrowly, as school skills (see chapter 2), it is still changeable. To improve skills, we need to improve the social around

us.

This

is

true if

environment.

The debate about

the mutability of intelligence has been misfocused;

it

has lost the forest for the trees. Both the pessimists and the optimists have

argued about whether special interventions, such as Head Start and remedial instruction,

episodic events;

can raise it is,

test scores.

But the

real leverage lies not in

instead, in the continual, systematic, everyday

society forms intelligence.

We

such

ways

will therefore forgo debating those inter-

vention programs, only noting for the record that

158

many

scholars have per-

ENRICHING INTELLIGENCE suasively defended their effectiveness (see, e.g., Dickens, et

we

Instead,

will look at four

cognitive skills: schools,

chap.

al.,

3).

examples of how society pervasively shapes

summer

vacations, classroom tracking, and the

structure of jobs.

Do Schools Matter? In

1964 Congress mandated a major study of educational inequality

America, asking whether disparities ferences in students' test scores.

would arouse

findings

in

in

school resources accounted for dif-

Some members

of Congress hoped the

the nation to battle ignorance by equalizing educa-

tional resources across schools. Alas, the best-laid plans often fail. After

painstaking analysis and reanalysis, the late University of Chicago sociologist

James

S.

Coleman was unable

to find that school resources

had much

of an effect on student achievement. Neither the number of books library,

in the

nor the number of credentials on the teachers' resumes, nor the size

of students' classes, nor the length of the school day seemed to affect

achievement scores. Coleman concluded that family environments, rather than schools, determine learning.

The

report set off a firestorm.

parents

move

to

How

could schools be irrelevant, when

expensive suburbs just to enroll their children

in

highly

regarded schools? Did the Coleman Report really lay the blame for students' failures at the feet of the parents?

policy

if

finally,

what good

is

public

resources in schools do not matter?

Sociologists today understand

much

And,

how

schools shape inequality in learning

some commentators ignore the insights gained in the nearly thirty years since the original Coleman report. For example, Herrnstein and Murray cite the 1966 Coleman Report as better than they did in the 1960s. Yet

demonstrating the

futility

of attempting to raise intelligence. But they

ig-

many studies critical of the original 1966 report, including Coleown subsequent work. The primary value of the 1966 Coleman today is as a historical demonstration of how a mis-asked question

nore the

man's report

1

can lead to a mistaken answer. Correcting limitations of the original study and applying better methods, researchers have found that variations

key limitation of the 1966 report

among

that

is

it

schools are important.

assumed

that

every student

One in a

given school has access to the same resources, the same books, and the

same

teachers.

in the library

But we cannot make

this

assumption. Having

many books

can increase the achievement only of those students exposed 159

CHAPTER to the

7

books; quality teachers help only those students

Coleman's approach did not take

classes.

who

enroll in their

into account individual students'

exposure to the resources of the school when looking

at their

achievement

scores, and thus he underestimated the effects of those resources.

Researchers have devised better understandings of

achievement

how

educational

produced inside schools. They have also developed better

is

understandings of

how

children learn, which has led

them

to ask sharper

research questions, such as what affects students' rates of learning. researchers

have expanded

their

that schools

And

beyond simply comparing

how much

students learn during school

are out of school.

These kinds of studies show

schools, looking, for example, at

compared with when they

analysis

and school resources do matter.

Understanding

How People Learn

One important post-Coleman advance was

a deeper understanding of

people learn. Consider learning to ride a bike.

When

one

first

how

begins, one

knows nothing. Learning at the beginning is likely to proceed very slowly. As one begins to feel comfortable with the task, the rate of learning speeds up. Learning does not, however, increase forever; eventually plateau.

There

is

skilled, but after

always more

to learn,

some plateau

is

it

reaches a

and some bikers become extremely

reached additional learning usually pro-

ceeds slowly. Figure 7.1 demonstrates the classic "learning curve."

The slope of

the curve indicates the speed of learning: the steeper the

slope, the faster the learner learns. Different people

curves. is

have different learning

When we say that someone is "bright," we often mean that he or she we can measure people's skills frewe can measure each one's learning curve. We can then curves to see what circumstances accelerate or slow down

a fast learner in just this sense. If

quently enough,

compare those

individual learning.

Speed of knowledge growth is the very issue in which if one is interested in intelligence. For example,

one should be interested

Herrnstein and Murray claim that intelligence makes

some people more

accurate, rapid, and efficient in solving problems and attaining success. If so, then the

speed with which a person's knowledge grows could be de-

fined as their intelligence or, at the very least, as a

good proxy

for their

intelligence. Researchers studying learning curves find powerful evidence

primary determinants of speed of learning. This turns the old Coleman findings upside down. Anthony Bryk and Stephan Raudenbush, of the University of Chicago that schools are the

and Michigan State University, respectively, studied the learning curves of 160

E N R

I

C H

I

NG

INTELLIGhNCI-

Time An S-shaped

7.1.

618 students grade.

86 different schools as they moved from

in

They investigated

reading. This distinction explicitly taught birth

Learning Curve

math

first

is

important because the only place students are

is in

school, while language skills are taught from

and through most social interactions children have.

searchers found that variation the variation in students' skills,

grade to third

students' learning curves in mathematics and in

among

When

earlier re-

schools did not account for

math scores but mattered more

much

of

for language

they concluded that schools could not be important because

if

they

were, schools should matter especially for math. 2

Bryk and Raudenbush found what Coleman found when they asked

same question Coleman asked: reading achievement that

is

due

How much

the

variation in mathematics and

to the schools the children attend?

They found

only 14 percent of the variation in mathematics achievement and 31

percent of the variation in reading achievement

was

attributable to differ-

ences between schools. Unlike Coleman, however, Bryk and Raudenbush

had data that allowed them to investigate learning curves. They came to a startling conclusion.

Over 82 percent of the

ing curves occurred between schools; that

how

variation in mathematics learn-

is,

82 percent of the variation

in

quickly students learned math was attributable to school differences.

Nearly 44 percent of the variation curred between schools. matter: schools are

Thus, average

finding

more important

at its core, the

test

The

in learning

what one would expect

is

for

math than

if

scores

backgrounds, then ship, resources

it

—do

seem

to

A and

in

if

schools

for language skills.

answer of the Coleman report was

scores for students in school

the same, and

curves for reading also oc-

school

B

incorrect. If the

are pretty

much

be accounted for by the students' famih

appears that schools not matter. Yet. 161

—

their funding, structure, leader-

more complete analyses show

that

CHAPTER

7

schools matter very much. Schools matter because differences within schools in

how

(We

students are taught affect learning.

And

instance, tracking, below.)

will look at

one

schools matter because they influence rates

of learning.

may seem

That schools matter

many American

an unexceptional conclusion; after

But the conventional academic wisdom for years was

was not academic. Cognitive

those struggles

only by family background cians, social

—

background for

wisdom

larly for the less

skills

that the payoff for

seemed

genetic background for

to

be affected

many psychometri-

sociologists. (Perhaps the payoff lay in the

social or "networking" advantages of political

all,

parents struggle to put their children into "good" schools.

in recent years

good

schools.)

The conventional

has been that investing in schools, particu-

advantaged, was wasteful. The Bell Curve seems to certify

these views, but here again

it

misleads

Schools appear to be the primary

us.

determinant of children's intellectual advancement.

Summer Vacations Other researchers also interested

in the question of

whether and how

schools affect learning and test scores have taken advantage of a routine

American life, the summer vacation. It is the major reason most American children receive only 180 days of instruction per year. Researchers compared how much test scores change during the school year with feature of

how much they change during in school has

The affect in

on cognitive

logic of

summer in

order to see what effect being

learning research

is this:

We

can see

how

schools

development by comparing how much children learn when they are

school with

that,

summer

the

skills.

how much

they learn

when

they are out of school. To do

researchers compare changes in test scores that occur during the

school year, from

fall to

spring, to changes in test scores that occur during

summer vacation, from spring surprise except to those

to fall.

who doubt

that intelligence is

dren increase their intellectual performance school than during a month of

pens to children's

skills

—and mutable —

Researchers have found

much more

it

is

no

that chil-

during a month in

summer vacation. Furthermore, what hapsummer depends a lot on their summer

during the

environments. Children from disadvantaged circumstances tend to stagnate or even

fall

back

circumstances

intellectually during the

make some

summer, while those

gains during the vacation.

It

in better-off

looks as

if

class parents provide their children with experiences, such as travel or lessons, that

add

to cognitive

162

middle-

camp

or

growth and higher scores, while

ENRICHING INTELLIGENCE summer

poorer parents do not. Just like going to school, having

activities

increases test scores. In studies separated

by some

fifteen years, at different stages

leged destruction of standards in schools, Barbara Heyns, then versity of California, Berkeley,

of the

al-

Uni-

at the

and Doris Entwistle and Karl Alexander

at

The Johns Hopkins University found that all students learn at a faster rate during the school year than they do during the summer. Some students' rates of learning are so

peers. Poverty

is

slow during the summer

the important determinant of

that they fall

behind their

which students tend

to fall

behind during the summer. The researchers also found that the disadvantages of poverty are compensated for during the school year; that

children begin to catch up to middle-class students while school sion. In

summer

reviewing the literature on

entire black-white

gap

is

poor ses-

Heyns found

learning,

reading achievement

in

is,

is in

due

that the

to differences that

emerge during summer vacations. These findings imply

that schools are

very effective because they overcome the disadvantaged backgrounds of students. skills

But schools cannot sustain

their effectiveness in

improving the

of the disadvantaged because schools are in session only nine months

of the year, whereas family disadvantages operate during winter, spring,

summer, and

fall.

Many weaker come

3

students might gain academically

if

schools were to be-

year-round. Herrnstein and Murray concede in passing that year-

round schooling might reduce inequality but then dismiss the point by guing that

it

is

likely die hard.

politically inviable.

However,

it is

4

The

tradition of

summer

a matter of policy; there

ative for school buildings to close during June, July,

is

ar-

vacation will

no natural imper-

and August, nor for

children to take a three-month vacation from formal schooling.

(It is

a left-

when children were needed to help on the farm.) Resummer vacation tradition is also to choose lower levels of

over from the days specting the

intellectual skills ities in

and a higher level of inequality.

cognitive skills

if

we chose

We could

reduce dispar-

to.

Tracking In the to

wake of the Coleman

report,

many

researchers turned their attention

what might be called "schools within schools,"

process of assigning

some

students to

to tracking. This

is

the

more rigorous college preparatory

courses and other students to less rigorous preparation for immediate work careers. Essentially,

it

creates different learning environments within one

school.

163

CHAPTER

7

Higher-scoring students end up in college tracks, but at each level of test score, students have a better chance the higher their class background.

607c

10

20

15

25

30

35

Math Test Score Probability that Students

7.2.

Were

in

College Track by Math Test Score

and Social Class (Source: Adapted from Gamoran and Mare, "Secondary School Tracking")

Researchers have focused on two questions: (1) Are track assignments

Do

fair? (2)

mean

that

track assignments matter?

equally

achievement

By

fairness, researchers typically

well-prepared students

—of whatever

—

as

measured by previous

ethnicity, gender, or class

have an equal chance

of being assigned to the college-preparatory track. The vast majority of analyses

show

that parents' social class strongly influences

5 to the college track. This

ity,

is

who

is

assigned

one way parental background sustains inequal-

by shaping children's academic development.

Figure 7.2 shows the estimated probability of entering the college track for white

boys of varying mathematics achievement. The horizontal axis

shows tenth-grade students' scores on a math screening cal axis

shows

the chances that a student

was

test,

and the

in a college track.

verti-

The heavy

middle line indicates the probability that a student from a family of average 164

ENRICHING INTELLIGENCE social class

would be

above and below off

that

in a college track,

homes and from worse-off homes,

track.

6

At each

given his math score. The lines

one represent the chances

that students

respectively,

would be

from

better-

in a college

from better-off families had

level of test score, students

a

greater chance of being placed in a college track than did students of poorer class backgrounds.

At the highest

level of

measured mathematics achieve-

ment, economically disadvantaged students suffered a fifteen-point penalty

chances of being

in the

lowest lines

achieved

in the college track.

at the far right

at the

(Compare

the highest and

of the graph.) The lower-class student

who

highest possible level had about a 42 percent chance of

being in a college track, while the higher-class student with the identical score had about a 57 percent chance. Put another way, students

one-quarter of the mathematics questions but

who

miss

come from advantaged back-

much chance of being in the college track as the impoverwho answered every question correctly. (These comparisons

grounds had as ished student

are fairly pure because the possibly

confounding effects of the schools'

structure and composition, as well the effects of individual achievement in

other subjects, have been statistically held constant.)

The

class bias in track placement, large as

would not matter

it is,

if

being

tracked did not affect achievement and college entry. But students in college tracks not only learn

more

and learn different

facts

develop a different relationship to knowledge (see box,

Many

studies

show

hoff of land,

p. 166).

7

One example

will

more than do show how tracking

performance. In an especially well-executed study, Alan Kerck-

Duke University used

data on

Northern Ireland, and Wales

compare students placed in

they also

that students in the college track learn

students in the noncollege track. alters test

facts,

in

all

in the

children born in England, Scot-

week of March

3-9, 1958, to

high tracks, students in low tracks, and students

untracked schools. This design allowed Kerckhoff to control for

the factors

we

already

know might be

many

of

related to achievement, such as stu-

dents' social class, aspirations, and prior educational experience. Kerck-

hoff had information on the students at age seven, age eleven, and age sixteen.

He found

that high-track students

gained more academically than

students in the untracked schools, and that low-track students gained less

than students in the untracked schools. This pattern widened preexisting differences. Thus, after students

were assigned

to different tracks, their

achievement levels diverged; tracking exacerbated inequality.

An

obvious rejoinder to the Kerckhoff study

to high tracks

were more

is

that the students assigned

intelligent at the outset.

high-track students to learn so

Thus, one would expect

much more over time

that the

gap be-

tween them and low-track students would grow. But Kerckhoff compared 165

CHAPTER

7

Same Book, Different Lesson Researchers have shown that in

many

school practices undermine instruction

lower tracks. For example, high-track students are often given demand-

ing material, reading Shakespeare, Faulkner, and Walker, while their peers in

low-track classes read "young adult fiction." But even

students are given the

same books,

when low-track

the uses to which the material

result in vastly different learning experiences.

A

put

is

high-track class might

write and produce a play that captures the essence of The Color Purple, or,

using Julius Caesar as a point of departure, argue over whether and

one can justify murder. Students

how

lower tracks are more likely to

in the

fill

out worksheets that have a rote structure of question and response, and

where

all

of the "correct" responses are to be found in the book. The high-

track students are learning to treat

can even produce for one's

knowledge

are taught to see their

*

own

knowledge

as

something one uses and

ends; in contrast, the low-track students

as something outside of themselves,

beyond

power, that stands over and against them.*

Cookson and

Persell,

Preparing for Power, Anyon, "Social Class and School

Knowledge"; Bernstein, Class, Codes, and Control.

who had

students

same

the

signed to different tracks.

initial

achievement level and yet had been

He found that

as-

students assigned to the high track

gained more than otherwise similar students assigned to lower tracks. Thus,

if,

as

many

claim, these tests reflect intelligence, Kerckhoff's study

shows how tracking

selectively nurtures or neglects existing intelligence.

Those whose intelligence nored

is

nurtured gain; those whose intelligence

is ig-

lose.

Kerckhoff studied Great Britain; the same kind of finding appears

in the

United States. 8 The data show that tracking has powerful effects on cognitive

growth and

less than they

offset

that students

excluded from demanding instruction learn

would have otherwise. Because gains

by losses for others, the average

dents in tracked schools

Tracking exists school.

in

Even though

is

level of

for

some

students are

achievement of

not increased. Yet inequality

is

all

the stu-

increased.

elementary and junior high as well as secondary the systems of tracking are far

more varied

lower schools, analysts find the same pattern for younger students

in the

we have

discussed in the case of older students: powerful effects of social class on student placement, and powerful effects of track location on students' suc-

166

ENRICHING INTELLIGENCE 9 cess that exacerbate preexisting cognitive differences. There

broader

common

in other

in the

Western nations

United States

— means

sum, studies of tracking suggest

demic intelligence to

do just

ing;

it

that.

seems

the time.

all

The

that

and even

10

we do change

children's aca-

entire process of tracking

Most Americans may have good reasons

to

— much more than

that entire schools

school districts are, in essence, on different tracks. In

also a

is

which American schools are tracked. The great decentral-

and local control of schools

ization is

sense in

designed

is

for adopting track-

advantage middle- and upper-class students. Less well-off

students, however, are shunted disproportionately to lowei tracks. Inequality in learning,

although not the average level of learning,

through tracking.

By

is

increased

these practices schools demonstrate the pliability of

cognitive skills as well as the powerful effect social factors have on the

success of individuals. Policies alter intelligence.

Adult Development and Jobs So

far

we have looked

at

how

schools affect children's intellectual

That makes sense, because schools are the major institution signed precisely to expand people's cognitive

velopment does not stop with school nor end

abilities.

But

abilities.

we have

de-

intellectual de-

in people's childhoods.

Older

notions of intelligence led psychologists to assume that, after about age twenty, people stopped growing mentally and probably got dumber. Intelli-

gence

is,

by

this view, fixed early in life.

cognitive skills deteriorated after

cussed in chapters 2 and

what people learn of

that.

in

3, their

is

that they

now

abilities,

do tend

to

forties, stay level for ten or

Even

intelli-

twenty more

then, however, not all

Moreover, gerontologists have found that even the

weaken can be

much

including practical problem-solving.

years, and then tend to decline after sixty.

that

dis-

their notions of intelli-

believe that cognitive skills and practical

gence typically increase into the

skills deteriorate.

we

measures of intelligence are measures of

But modern psychologists have expanded

result

as

school and, of course, as people age they forget

gence to include a variety of

The

Psychometricians believed that

young adulthood because,

skills

restored with training. Just five hours of

training can, for example, substantially

improve older people's inductive

reasoning. 11

Not everyone grows does everyone decline

intellectually as they in old age.

What

some

stifle

167

age, nor

some environments stimulate Getting more education, staying

ple face and the experiences that they have;

cognitive development and

move toward middle

matters are the situations that peo-

it.

CHAPTER

even being married for a long time

culturally active,

spouse

—

One

slow their deterioration. 12

crucial experience that affects adults' mental their jobs. Social psychologists

is

working out of the National

Institute

of Mental Health, have conducted

how

it is,

studied

And

The more complex the job, the less rousupervision it entails, the more self-directed the job

and the

is

less

the consequences of self-direction

what they

Kohn and Schooler have

call "intellectual flexibility"

—

in effect, intelligence.

they have found that "job conditions that promote occupational self-

direction increase

.

.

.

whereas jobs

intellectual flexibility,

pational self-direction decrease

A quick and obvious

.

.

.

that is

13

what explains the correlation between

having a demanding job and having good cognitive

much

that limit occu-

intellectual flexibility."

objection might be that intelligent people seek out

and get self-directing jobs;

skills.

That

is true,

and

of the causal connection between job and psychology runs that way.

But, using various techniques and data sets,

show

able to

tioning,

Kohn and Schooler have been

that the causal effects run both

that is intellectually

whatever

Upon reflection so.

different kinds of

self-direction jobs require.

Among

is.

in these

Kohn and Schooler have measured how

jobs affect people psychologically.

tine

development

Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler,

decades-long research across three continents on

much

to an intelligent

these are the kinds of activities that spur the growth of cognitive

abilities or at least

ways

7

demanding

ways. Having a complex job

itself increases

people's cognitive func-

their prior intelligence.

—and upon other research—

Spending eight hours a day,

five

it

is

clear

days a week,

fifty

why

that

weeks

would be

a year in a

position that forces one to analyze problems, to calculate, to strategize,

often to persuade others, and to do these tasks independently exercises the

mind, just as a rigorous calisthenics regime exercises the body. Spending those the

same two thousand hours

same routine actions and

a year in a job that only asks one to repeat

to follow orders is to the

hours each day as a "couch potato"

is to

mind what spending

the body.

The psychological consequences of job

structure,

turns out,

it

go beyond

the jobholders themselves to their children. Social scientists have long

known

that middle-class parents tend to teach their children

independence

and self-direction, while working-class parents are more likely size conformity

and being obedient. Melvin Kohn showed

for this difference

is

that middle-class adults usually

that

to

empha-

one reason

have had more sec-

ondary and higher education, a training that stresses independent thinking.

Kohn

also

experience.

showed

"Men

that another reason for the class difference is the

of higher class position,

168

who have

job

the opportunity to be

ENRICHING INTELLIGENCE self-directed in their work,

come

want

to think self-direction possible.

Men

come

to regard

matter of necessity to conform to authority, both on and off the job.

man

—

it

who do

of lower class position,

not have the opportunity for self-direction in work,

does mold the

and

to be self-directed off the job, too,

it

a

The job

can either enlarge his horizons or narrow them." 14

These different orientations then carry over into how adults parent

when and how they discipline their children, workers are more likely to expect their children

for example. Blue-collar to

do what the parent says

because the parent says so; white-collar workers are more likely to expect their children to

be able to explain why the parent says what he or she says.

This training, for obedience or for independence, differently for their

own work

The conformist values and ents, with their

in turn

prepares children

lives.

orientation of lower- and working-class par-

emphases on externals and consequences, often

are inap-

propriate for training children to deal with the problems of middle-class

and professional

life.

ations, solving

new problems

.

.

.

[C]onformity

—

in

is

new

inadequate for meeting

short,

[T]he self-directed orientation of the middle and upper classes ...

new and

adapted to meeting the

situ-

for dealing with change.

the problematic.

At

its

best,

it

is

.

.

.

well

teaches

children to develop their analytic and empathic abilities. These are the essentials for handling responsibility, initiating

Without such

reacting to

it.

The job

one setting

is

skills,

that,

change rather than merely

horizons are severely restricted. 15

well into adulthood, shapes intelligence and

other psychological dispositions that, in turn, affect people's

While most jobs would seem policies,

to

outcomes.

life

be outside the purview of governmental

most are under the control of large private organizations. Evi-

dence shows

mands of

that,

within limits, employers

the jobs they provide also

who

enrich the intellectual de-

improve the cognitive

skills

of their

workers.

The broader point

is

that cognitive skills

keep changing over the

life

course and are changed by experience. Policy can intervene here by, for

example,

increasing

older

people's

opportunities

for

intellectual

stimulation.

Conclusion: The Only Constant

Is

Change

Despite the rhetoric of the intelligence-never-changes school, not be surprised to learn that cognitive skills

169

do change over the

we should life

course.

CHAPTER known are weak

7

change so much

Indeed, researchers have long

that those skills

early intelligence scores

predictors of later intelligence test

scores.

seven

The

correlation between

is .86,

and age

measured intelligence

at

that

age six and age

but the correlation between measured intelligence at age six

only

fifteen is

.69.

Were

the correlation to be close to

1

,

intelligence immutable,

we would

or at least

we would

not to decline as the gap in ages increases. But children's ranks on

change so much

that their scores at

expect

expect the correlation

IQ

tests

age six account for less than half of the

variation in those scores at age fifteen. 16

Why

should such change in IQ occur? Because, as

we have

noted, chil-

dren experience different school environments, and those environments play an important role in

how

fast they

leam. Children, locked out of

school in the summer, cope variously well or poorly with the absence of

formal cognitive training. Children are assigned to different tracks, and

some of those to

tracks lead to heightened self-efficacy and greater exposure

knowledge and

analysis, while other tracks lead to lowered self-efficacy

and reduced exposure. But children are not alone and challenging environment faster

when

which

in

cognitive abilities.)

A common

grow; even adults lose their edge

which they work and

the environments in

capabilities. (Other

to

in requiring a nurturing

theme here

is

that challenges

demanding jobs, grow

to

at birth or at least fixed

narrow, academic intelligence

—

When their skills

when

not, those skills

who

is

rently shape skills,

in

like decisions

like decisions

intelligence.

To

is

de-

—even

about tracking

about vacations and job

the extent that academic intelli-

gence, as measured by grades, SATs, and the

advancement

ability

quite changeable.

American policy choices, whether obvious

for

claim that intelligence

by adolescence, cognitive

and school funding or more subtle

American

demanding schools or

meet those challenges.

tend to atrophy. Contrary to the fatalists

structure, shape

test their

and mental exercise expand

are tested, people usually strengthen those skills;

termined

do not

17

intellectual abilities. People, be they children in

adults in

live

such as television-watching, also shape

activities, too,

like, is

used to sort out people

school and the economy, then these same policies cur-

American

we can reshape

inequality.

Because we already shape cognitive

inequality.

170

CHAPTER

*

8

*

Race, Ethnicity, and Intelligence

N

lo

chapter

in

The Bell Curve received more attention than the one

claiming that African Americans and Latino Americans are inherently less intelligent than white

Americans look ing,

sex,

Americans. This attention

and even sports

Murray raised

every issue

at virtually

—through

this sensitive topic

not surprising, because

is

—crime,

poverty, politics, hous-

the prism of race. Herrnstein and

even though

their essential

argument,

that individual differences in intelligence explain social inequality, nei-

ther stands nor falls

on the question of group differences

Although the issue of race

is

irrelevant to their

main argument

there to justify a critique of affirmative action), their

American obsession with

race.

We, however, needed

ferences in this book, because race has been and

We

our society.

still is

cannot understand inequality

in

in intelligence.

book added

(it

is

to the

to treat racial dif-

the great

chasm

in

America without ad-

dressing the roots of racial inequality and the controversy over

intelli-

gence.

who may have turned first race, we reiterate the basic

For readers it

deals with

The Bell Curve

is

ray use, and

most

tion people

have had, not

much about

social

test

findings of our earlier chapters:

of intelligence Herrnstein and Mur-

measure how much academic instruc-

others, too, really

measure differences very

The

mistaken.

their inherent abilities.

Even

if

in native intelligence, those differences

among

inequality

because

to this chapter precisely

such

tests

did

do not explain

individuals in America; individuals'

environments explain more. More significantly, the distribution of

individual intelligence has

little

to

society; patterns of inequality are

structures of the nation and era.

do with the extent of inequality

in a

produced by the economic and social

Both the conditions

that help or

impede

individuals' race to succeed and the system of inequality within

which

those individuals compete are heavily governed by specific social policies.

Thus, policy choices have shaped the kind of class inequality Policy choices, over the long course of

kind of racial inequality

we

American

have, as well.

171

history,

we

have.

have shaped the

CHAPTER

8

The Argument about Race and Intelligence:

A Preview African Americans and Latino Americans in the United States tend to be

economically worse off and to suffer from more social problems than do whites. Blacks and Latinos

standardized

tests.

1

For those

also tend to score lower than

do whites on

who

"natural," the

second pattern clearly explains the

believe that inequality first:

Ethnic groups are socially unequal

because they are intellectually unequal. But for those societies construct the inequalities they have, as has this

book, the reverse

is

true:

is

who

understand that

been demonstrated

Groups score unequally on

tests

in

because they

are unequal in society.

Consider

this situation:

Members

of a minority,

brought to the country as slave labor, are

They do the siders them

dirty

deadly

bottom of the social

work, when they have work. The

rest

ladder.

of the society con-

violent and stupid and discriminates against them.

years, tension in

at the

many of whom were

Over

the

between minority and majority has occasionally broken out

riots. In the past,

minority children were compelled to go to

segregated schools and did poorly academically. Even now, minority chil-

dren drop out of school relatively early and often get into trouble with the law. Schools with

many

minority children are seen as problem-ridden, so

majority parents sometimes

move

out of the school district or send their

children to private schools. And, as might be expected, the minority chil-

dren do worse on standardized

tests

than majority children do.

What

is this

who

in the

minority?

Koreans

in Japan.

Koreans,

who

are of the

same

"racial" stock as Japanese and

United States do about as well academically as Americans of Japanese origin (that

is,

above average), are distinctively "dumb"

in Japan.

planation cannot be racial, nor even cultural in any simple way. nation

is

that Koreans,

half-century,

whose nation was a colony of Japan

have formed a lower-caste group

in Japan.

The

ex-

The explafor about a

2

Consider another case: Immigrants flood into the United States to take

They are "swarthier" and more "primitive" than most Americans; they seem unwilling or unable to assimilate; they are suspected low-wage

jobs.

of criminal behavior; and they threaten native workers' jobs. Together with other newcomers, these immigrants provoke a backlash against easy immigration into the country. Objective test data

172

show

that the

immigrants are

RACE. ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENCE low on intelligence; and

their children

do poorly

in school.

Who

does

this

describe? 3 Polish Jews in the 1900s and 1910s.

These same Polish Jews, whose descendants now do well both economically

and on

were scorned when they came. Many scholars of the day

tests,

believed that the Jews, along with Italians and other "dark" types, were dim-witted.

4

Can

race or genes explain what happened in the intervening

As

seventy or so years? No, but social location can.

a peripheral and sub-

servient group in the early twentieth century, Polish

even

As

in school.

they

came

to

be accepted

in

Jews were

American

failures,

society, their

position and their "intelligence" rose.

Our argument, which we or ethnic group's position rather than vice versa.

will flesh out later in the chapter, is that in society

Some

determines

its

measured

ethnic groups find themselves in inferior posi-

Maori

tions through conquest or capture (e.g., the Irish in Great Britain,

New Zealand,

most

origin

Jews

in Israel,

Turks

closer to equality faster.

mance

in three

and lasting effects of subordina-

grow up

5

(e.g., Italians in the

in

Germany). These groups typically move

In either case, subordination leads to

members of

in suffer

like

a familiar one and the subject of that

reduce

much

test

that this first process

—

is

Low

income,

ill

health,

performance. This process

research.

When

Herrnstein and

socioeconomic differences between individual blacks and

whites do not explain the black-white gap in

ditions

low perfor-

the subordinate groups and the families

socioeconomic deprivation.

poor parental education, and the

Murray say

United States, Eastern-

ways.

First, individual

is

drastic

Other minority groups enter a society through immigration, often

made under economic duress

they

in

Africans, Mexicans, and Indians in the United States). These

are the groups that suffer the tion.

a racial

intelligence

—

test scores,

they are asserting

deprivation based on differences in economic con-

insufficient to account for the race differences. This

process they examine.

The second

is

the only

process, however, cannot be understood

individualistically.

Subordinate groups typically experience segregation. Ethnic ghettoes concentrate disadvantages and accentuate them. (The term "ghetto" originally described Jewish quarters in

grants to

European

cities. Ironically, the

America from those ghettoes were viewed

immi-

in a similar light

gen-

erations ago as today's ghetto residents are viewed.) Segregation also

exposes children

who would

otherwise do well to the problems and the

culture of the disadvantaged.

173

CHAPTER

How inferior ethnic caste position leads to low test scores.

Socioeconomic Deprivation

4

^^

Low Ethnic Status

^\

U Gr ° U

Caste or

r

Position^

> cSegregation ?

I

Low

>

Test

Scofes

v

Stigma of Inferiority

8.1.

The

A Model

of

How Low

Ethnic Position Causes

third process is cultural

Low

Test Scores

and psychological: Young members of sub-

ordinate groups understand that they carry a stigma of inferiority based on

The young people respond in variSome become anxious, fatalistic, and resigned;

the wider society's perception of them.

ous ways to that

identity.

others reject the wider culture's expectations and standards, adopting an

oppositional stance. Either of these reactions to stigmatizing images resignation

or rebellion

—brings

down

average school and

test

per-

formance. Youth from advantaged ethnic groups have mirror-image experiences of

all these.

They

typically benefit

from more

circumstances, from having friends and neighbors

affluent family

who do

well and

who

can help them to do well, and from the confidence that they are destined to succeed. Figure 8.1 outlines the argument.

We

do not claim

groups

that this explanation applies equally well to all ethnic

in all societies;

histories matter.

it is

important to understand that groups' particular

But we do claim

that

it

applies to most cases and that

it

applies particularly to groups that have been severely suppressed, such as

American Indians, Mexican Americans, and African Americans. Understood

this

way, groups'

test

scores are not the beginning of an

explanation for inequality but the end of one. The beginning

That

is

system

why

is history.

the next section reviews the history that created a racial caste

in the

United States. In the subsequent section,

174

we

describe the

RACE, ETHNICITY.

AND INTELLIGENCE

continuing legacy of this caste system in our time. In the explain

why

academic

skills.

We show that these

lower scores

American

fit

a

worldwide pattern of

do with

ethnic group differences that has nothing to Instead, the

we

final section,

blacks and Latinos tend to score below whites on tests of

racial intelligence.

case, like others around the globe,

is

explained by

the three consequences of caste: deprivation, segregation, and stigma. norities score

Mi-

lower because they are lower caste.

Ethnic History and Ethnic Inequality many

Herrnstein and Murray, like

seem

others,

in

America

to believe that the history

of slavery, segregation, and discrimination in America, a history they ac-

knowledge but then

forget,

ended sometime

in the 1960s.

6

The

slate

was

Any group

inequalities in

outcomes since the 1960s, therefore, can only be explained

as the result of

wiped clean; everyone then group inequalities

started out even.

in natural talent.

crimination had ended in the 1960s tion)

—

the weight of history

is

But

not so simple. Even

life is

—and

it

if dis-

certainly did not (see next sec-

oppressively heavy. Three decades of

mod-

erate reform

have narrowed some of the gaps, but Americans were naive

think that

would quickly erase

it

A caste system

ranks groups economically, politically, and socially. The

by law and

privileges of those ranks are usually enforced

belong to the ranked groups by virtue of their sense ethnic or racial.

The system

is

justified

by a

policy.

groups are

birth; the set

People in that

of beliefs, often

shared by the lower-ranked as well as higher-ranked groups, about the tellectual is

to

three centuries of a rigid caste system.

in-

7

and moral superiority of the higher-ranked one. The term "caste"

drawn from

India, but

it

describes perfectly the American race system

until the 1960s.

Although most non-English people who came ination and exploitation, the experiences of a

What

to

America faced discrim-

few were

distinctly different.

separates the historical experience of Africans from that of other

groups

is

that they did not

come

to the

United States to find work but were

instead impressed into labor. They, like

Berkeley anthropologist John

Ogbu

American

Indians,

and are distinct from voluntary immigrant groups such as the and Chinese. 8 The African case

is

form what

has labeled an "involuntary minority" Irish,

Jews,

well-known: Europeans purchased cap-

and sold them in America as slaves. The Mexican American case is more complex; it

tive Africans

175

fits

neither

Ogbu

cate-

CHAPTER gory neatly. (We focus

Mexican experience distinct

from

that of

in particular

on Mexican Americans because the

United States

in the

8

is

closer to that of blacks;

most other Latino groups, such

it

is

Americans

as Central

and Cubans; and Mexicans are the largest Latino population. The case of Puerto Ricans, one-sixth the population of Mexican Americans, however, bears

many

Mexican Americans and African Ameri-

similarities to that of

cans.) After the

Mexican- American War of 1848, when the United States

conquered Texas, California, and the Southwest, many Mexicans were caught under the control of the enemy they had just fought. The Americans treated the

Mexicans both

as beaten foes

and as exploitable

labor.

9

Later

immigrants to the United States, although voluntary, were absorbed into a

conquered group. Moreover, those immigrants were treated by Anglos, as

we

members of a racial

shall see later, as

different in origin but similar in

caste.

outcome

Thus, the Mexican case was

to that of involuntary migrants,

such as Africans.

Although educated Americans ought not history of slavery, a

few

salient points are

slavery was, historically, one of the

more

to

need reminding of our cruel

worth noting.

First,

American

rigid versions of slavery in the

world. Africans were not only taken thousands of miles from their homelands but were also shorn of

much

of their culture. Americans built an

especially high wall between the status of slave and that of freeman and built

it

higher over time. In most states any drop of "black blood" con-

demned one and one's descendants forever to slavery, unless formally emancipated. The race-and-slavery borderline was ferociously guarded with respect to sexuality.

was

A

second distinct feature of American slavery

the elaborate ideology southerners developed to reconcile slavery with

a democratic society.

They began with

religious justifications, that blacks

were descendants of Noah's dark son Ham, whose transgressions con-

demned

his descendants forever to

be servants. They ended with "scientific

racism," scholarly arguments that Africans' biological "nature" fit

made them

only to be servants. Third, American slavery ended later than did slavery

elsewhere in the advanced world.

These distinctive features of American slavery contributed

mous weight of disadvantage passed on

formidable edifice of slavery was, of course, not natural;

Americans decided over

fifty

in

more years

1789

to allow slave importation until

after that

to the enor-

to the descendants of slaves. it

was

The

policy.

1808 and for

decided to permit slavery to expand.

We

continue to live with the consequences of those choices.

Mexicans were not as distinct

slaves, but in the

Southwest they formed a caste

from Anglos as blacks were from whites. Anglo Americans 176

AND INTELLIGENCE

RACE. ETHNICITY.

Intelligence as Rationalization

When

groups find themselves

intelligence

used

this

is

a perfect

of inequality, the dominant one

in situations

generally develops a justification for

its

advantages.

A

theory of innate

example of such a justifying ideology. Americans

theory to explain

why

Africans and Mexicans

such as the Irish and American Indians*

—were

—and

others, too,

subordinate. Although

both Africans and Mexicans had established complex societies

Anglo Americans believed them

native lands,

Thomas

Jefferson provides an example of such an interpretation:

Comparing nation, in

in their

to be intellectually inferior.

[blacks]

by

their faculties of

appears to me, that

it

much

reason

inferior, as

memory

in I

memory, reason, and imagithey are equal to the whites;

think one could scarcely be found ca-

pable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid;

and

imagination they are

that in

dull, tasteless,

Most of them indeed have been confined homes, and

own

their

society: yet

and anomalous.

to tillage, to their

many have been

to the handicraft arts,

.

.

own

so situated, they

might have availed themselves of the conversation of

many have been brought up

.

their masters;

and from

that cir-

cumstance have always been associated with the whites. Some have been

liberally educated,

and

have lived

all

in countries

where the

arts

and sciences are cultivated to a considerable degree, and have had before their eyes samples of the best works from abroad. ... But

never yet could

I

find that a black

level of plain narration; never see

had uttered a thought above the

even an elementary

trait

of painting

or sculpture.**

Jefferson struggled with the contradiction between his egalitarian principles

and

slavery

his slave practice.

was

Although Jefferson thought the

institution of

tyrannical, he understood certain practical considerations.

Slavery provided the labor needed to sustain the plantation economy.

Abolishing

it

would

create

potential political chaos.

economic hardship

A theory

for the general citizenry and

of innate intellectual inferiority helped

reduce the dissonance. Logic could be sacrificed for

*

in this effort

by implying,

example, that by working near his master a slave might absorb a

On

the Irish, see Roediger,

The Wages of Whiteness.

American Indians, see Rogin. Fathers and Children,

p.

On

bit

of

such arguments regarding

34.

** Jordan. White over Black. Jordan draws his quotation from Jefferson's Notes on Virginia.

.

177

CHAPTER

8

Euclid. Jefferson also dealt with the dissonance by suggesting that the

question of innate inferiority be

left to

future scientific observation, a solu-

tion remarkably similar to that disingenuously

advanced by Herrnstein and

Murray.*** ***

Ibid., pp.

438-39; Herrnstein and Murray, The Bell Curve,

innumerable references

in

p.

317. There are

The Bell Curve concerning the need for future

scientific re-

search to determine the real impact of genetics on the cognitive abilities of different races. Thus, like Jefferson, they

hedge on the

ability to

genetic differences in cognitive ability and leave

it

account scientifically for real

for future scientific inquiry.

considered Mexicans both ethnically different and former enemies but also

saw

them

in

peon system

a source of badly needed labor.

Anglos adopted the patron-

to use that labor. In this system, the

on a landowning patron

to provide

him with

peon ranchworker

a job,

home, security

relied

for his

family and his old age, and even religious instruction of his children (through godparenthood). For these favors, the peon reciprocated with total loyalty throughout his lifetime.

10

This quasi-feudal structure, which oper-

ated not unlike slave plantations in the South, provided a social order useful for

economic development. Anglos did not need

during the early years because the

to segregate

patron-peon system was

Mexicans

sufficient to

maintain caste lines and guarantee Anglo control. Anglos did not impose the

most malignant forms of

adopted the same sort of Jim

racial ideology until the

Crow system

1920s when they

that African

Americans then

11

faced.

Nineteenth-century claims about differences in intelligence provided a rationalization that

was comforting

to whites but a

poor explanation for the

12 disadvantaged positions of African Americans and Mexican Americans.

Physical intimidation, legal codes, and social custom are sufficient to ac-

count for the

latter's

lower caste position. Apologists invoked intelligence

to justify the caste order only after whites

blacks and Mexicans.

The

had physically subordinated

13

slave and feudal systems that had been in place gave

way

at the

end

of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries to a rigid and

malevolent caste system based on tenant farming and segregation. Understanding this system

cause

it

is critical

persisted until recently.

for understanding race relations today, be-

Many

white Americans dismiss the oppres-

sion of blacks by saying that slavery ended over a century ago. True, but

178

RACE, ETHNICITY,

AND INTELLIGENCE

serfdom lasted much longer. This serfdom was only yesterday for

virtual

blacks and Mexican Americans.

White southerners established the Jim Crow system over the quartercentury following Reconstruction's end in 1877,

when

federal authority

withdrew from the former Confederacy. Jim Crow laws and vigilante pression such as

Ku Klux Klan

embarrassment nor euphemism

lynchings were designed

—

to sustain white

— with

supremacy

re-

neither

after the

Emancipation Proclamation. Those laws established segregation, eliminated civil liberties, withdrew the right to vote, denied educational and

employment tions.

lords

opportunities, and severely constrained intergroup social rela-

The Jim Crow economic system tied black farmers to white landin debt peonage that was only one step above slavery. For Mexicans

in the 1920s, the

in cattle

new economic system

replaced the patron-peon relations

ranching with those more appropriate to tenant farming and agri-

business.

14

These

rebuilt caste systems

ended brief eras of

relatively

open

opportunity for blacks during Reconstruction and Mexican Americans before the 1920s, ushering in generations of denied rights and repression.

The

history of black education in the South

Immediately

after

the

Civil

schools in the South for freed slave children. the opportunity, so

slaves

much

compared well

is

particularly instructive.

War, northern Reconstructionists opened

The

children quickly grabbed

among the former among white children. With the

so that school attendance

to school attendance

advent of Jim Crow, most of that progress was reversed. Sociologist Stanley Lieberson has

shown

that, starting

about 1880, spending on black

plummeted from rough parity with spending on white schools to about one-third of the amount spent on white children. School terms for black students became shorter; teacher schools in the South, where most blacks lived,

per student ratios in black schools lower; and black teachers' standards

weakened. Outside of a few major

cities,

high school education was, for

all

practical purposes, unavailable to black youth in the early years of the

twentieth century. In 1911, for example, Atlanta had no high school for

black students; in 1930 about one-third of counties in the South had no four-year high schools for blacks.

The dismantling of black education was

especially devastating in those regions with the greatest concentrations of blacks.

went

15

Black teenagers today, for the most

part,

have grandparents

who

to those blatantly inferior southern schools.

Starting at the end of Reconstruction, 1877, for African

Americans and

including Mexican Americans by the 1920s, segregation, sometimes legal

and sometimes informal, became the primary means through which access to schooling, housing, and jobs

was

179

controlled.

16

(One

justification

CHAPTER authorities offered for segregation

was

8

that

mixing of the races would com-

promise the superior culture and apartheid

17

intellect of white Europeans.) American began with schooling. "Separate but [supposedly] Equal" was

many

the law in

states.

No

matter where they lived, African American and

Mexican American children had

to attend separate schools, schools invari-

ably inferior to whites' schools. This profoundly undermined the education as well as the self-esteem of those

surprising that black and in school

who were

forced to attend.

It

not

is

Mexican American children lagged behind whites

achievement. (Note, however, that in the early part of the twenti-

most white immi-

eth century northern blacks did better in school than did

grant groups.) 18 Authorities then used lower academic achievement, a result

of educational segregation, to further justify segregation.

Barred by segregation from good education and from well-paying jobs, as well, blacks and

Mexican Americans had

to live in ghetto housing.

consequences of multiple segregation were profound.

It

The

reduced living

standards and housing quality and reinforced the segregation of the schools.

It

concentrated disadvantage into tight quarters. Not the

segregation told

all

least,

black and Mexican American children that they were

not as good as whites, and this

left

would have enormously negative

a psychological scar of inferiority that

effects for decades to

come. 19

Racial stratification remained governed by legal segregation until after

World War

II

when

the Civil Rights

movement

steadily challenged the

system's constitutional basis. This challenge culminated in the successful case of Brown

v.

The Board of Education ofTopeka, Kansas. The Supreme

Court reasoned in

its

decision that "separate but equal" schooling

herently unequal, that

when

was

in-

a society legally separates people by race,

it

sends a message that they are not equal.

down of Jim Crow, and the passing of subsequent civil rights legislation, many Americans thought that both blacks and Mexican Americans would now have the opportunities they had After the

Brown

ruling, the tearing

been denied for so long, lished. Progress

that a level playing field

was made.

New

had

finally

been estab-

policies such as equal opportunity en-

forcement made a difference. In 1940 employed blacks earned 43 percent as

much

as did whites;

by 1980

that proportion

had risen

economic progress leveled off after the mid-1970s.

20

In

to

73 percent. But

some

areas, includ-

ing education and occupational advancement, moderate advances have reversed. This

new

trend troubles Herrnstein and Murray.

They

point to the

growing number of blacks (and others) who are very poor, have been that way for a considerable time, and have little hope of improvement the

—

so-called underclass.

As we noted

in earlier chapters, Herrnstein

180

and Mur-

RACE, ETHNICITY. ray

AND INTELLIGENCE

combine an economic explanation,

that low-skill jobs are disappearing,

with an explanation based on intelligence, that minorities are insufficiently intelligent to ties in

make

it

in the

new marketplace,

economic fortunes. (Of course,

to explain the

group dispari-

few blacks and Latinos

relatively

were succeeding when "suitable" jobs were available.) This over.

It

is

an explanation that ignores history except to claim that history

assumes

and psychological oppression

amount

economic,

that three centuries of steady physical,

—

to nothing, disappear,

no one contests

a record that virtually

evaporate in thirty years.

and sociologically naive! Parents' advantages

—

is

social,

How

historically

property, learning, per-

sonal contacts, practical crafts, social skills, cultural tools, and so on

—

are

passed on to their children and are also passed from older members of a

community to younger ones. Disadvantages are passed on, too. Jim Crow was banished only one generation ago; its legacy will last much longer.

Ethnic Inequality Today To many,

it

might appear that the

1960s created a level playing

lems with that impression.

civil rights legislation

field for all,

but there are

of the 1950s and at least

two prob-

century or more, African American

First, for a

and Mexican American families faced severe discrimination

in education,

housing, jobs, and other economic opportunities. Such disadvantages cu-

mulate and burden future generations.

It

was naive

Mexican Americans could immediately compete

to think that blacks

and

effectively with whites in

the labor market. Second, the conditions creating deprivation never fully

changed (see box,

p. 182).

Although de jure segregation has been

officially

terminated, de facto segregation and discrimination clearly continue. Critics of

government action on

The Bell Curve, argue to

that discrimination against blacks

occur but does no longer.

groups

still

racial matters, including the authors

If

discrimination

lag behind economically, that

ability or will to succeed. But, despite

discrimination illegal, the refusal of a

it

persists.

News

Denny's restaurant

is

policies

and laws

the

make

such as

to serve black Secret Service officers,

Field "experiments" have demonstrated that there in,

that

stories of discrimination,

repeatedly point this out. But systematic research points

nation

and Latinos used

gone and these minority

must be because they lack

new

of

is

it

out, too.

extensive discrimi-

for instance, the housing market. In the typical study, black

and white researchers, posing as homeseekers with identical credentials,

approach

realtors, agents, lenders, or landlords.

181

At

least half

of the time

CHAPTER

8

Martin Luther King on the Conditions for Equality Martin Luther King,

Jr.,

warn both whites and blacks

tried to

that they

should not think that three hundred years of servitude could be overcome with the changing of laws alone.

were

ties

to

be given a

If

African Americans and other minori-

chance

real

compete, something other than

to

merely allowing them to compete would be needed.

Whenever for the

is

raised;

Negro should be granted

On

nothing more. realistic.

For

it is

wrote:

of compensatory or preferential treatment

this issue

Negro

He

some of our

friends recoil in horror.

The

equality, they agree; but he should ask for

the surface, this appears reasonable, but

obvious that

if

a

man

it

is

not

entering the starting line in

is

a race three hundred years after another man, the

first

perform some impossible

up with

feat in order to catch

would have

to

his fellow

runner.*

*

King,

Why We

Can't Wait,

p. 134.

discrimination occurs. For example, the black applicants are not

shown

properties the whites are; they are told that there are no apartments rent while the white applicants are

shown those same apartments; and

blacks are "steered" to black neighborhoods.

where so much depends on where we

live

21

—

the

left to

the

In a society such as ours,

the quality of our schools,

police protection, access to jobs, tax assessments, etc.

—being turned away

from some neighborhoods and being pushed toward others has profound rippling effects. 22

Other studies show similar discrimination except

when under

are the same.

In

when

qualifications for the job

one study, businessmen admitted as much. Sociologists

Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn the

job hiring. Employers,

strong affirmative action pressure, prefer white to black

or Latino job applicants three to one, even 23

in

Neckerman interviewed employers

Chicago area and found many who said

in

that they preferred not to hire

black men. 24 Even managers of fast-food places in Harlem, according to another study, prefer to hire nonblacks. 25 In interviews with the

New

York

Times, foremen admitted to hiring whites over blacks for construction jobs.

One foreman explained, 'They Employment discrimination open competition,

sports.

[whites] are the people

I

know

best."

26

also appears in that realm of supposedly

The days of 182

explicit segregation are gone, but

RACE, ETHNICITY, black athletes sionally.

still

There

have

to

than white ones to play profes-

bit better

some evidence

also

is

be just a

AND INTELLIGENCE

because of fan preferences,

that,

black players' salaries are lower than they would otherwise be. 27

And

then there are the everyday harassments and slights that identifiable

minorities suffer in America: being ignored by storekeepers, watching

people cross the street to avoid you, subtle rejection, being questioned by

Survey research shows

police.

that white

Americans are

definitely less

28 prejudiced than they used to be. But blacks do not need to be constantly

victimized, as they were under Jim Crow, for discrimination to

The occasional encounter with discrimination and

lives.

of disparagement, even

show

that whites tend,

if

now

even

if

oblique,

is

would

still

their

a pervasive sense

enough. Experimental studies

unconsciously, to ignore blacks in need or to

convey negative impressions of them. 29 (Were only one bigoted, that

warp

in eight

whites

leave one hostile white for each black in America.

Numbers like these would leave whites with the reasonable impression that bigotry was rare and yet leave blacks with frequent experiences of bigotry one way that racial groups can experience the same reality so differ-

—

ently.)

While each discriminatory incident may be

trivial,

a lifetime of such incidents

mounts up

rare

and perhaps even

to a constant experience of

mistreatment. 30

We

might wish that history's heavy weight were the only burden

minorities carried today, but they

where

is this

more

we just described discourage blacks and

finding housing in white areas.

that minority renters

same housing Americans

—

Crow One

stock.

to face the

same

Latinos from

they have found housing in white flight.

Housing segregation means

situation that they faced during the era of

Jim

of the striking changes in American cities during the twentieth cen-

been the increasing residential segregation of blacks. The number "black residential isolation index."

that blacks tend to live

blacks tend to live only

every black lived solely northern

cities.

among

(There are three line segments

northern

to

cities.

that

among other blacks. A perfect 100 would mean that among other blacks. The data cover eighteen large, in the figure

on somewhat

tions of "neighborhood," but the overall trend

from 1890

Low numbers

High numbers mean

whites.

calculations in different eras had to be based

in

dis-

and home purchasers pay more than whites for the More critically, it forces many blacks and Mexican

in figure 8.2 is called the

that

The

segregation.

tury has

mean

When

has typically precipitated white

it

that

confront active discrimination. No-

blatantly visible than in the housing market.

criminatory practices

areas,

still

is

clear.)

because the

different defini-

The

figure

shows

1970 blacks became increasingly segregated from whites 31

Since 1970, black isolation has leveled off

183

at a

high

CHAPTER

Over the twentieth century, blacks became segregated from whites in northern cities.

1930

much more

1950

1970

1990

Year

8.2.

Index of Black Residential Isolation, Eighteen Northern Cities,

1890-1990 (Source: Calculated from Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, pp. 24, 28, and 64; and from Harrison and Weinberg, "Racial

and Ethnic Segregation")

rate. In the early years,

and lived

in

blacks were a small percentage of the population

pockets scattered around the

southern blacks

moved

in

and whites

cities.

As

fled to other

years passed,

more

neighborhoods while

preventing blacks from following them. The result was the division of northern cities into large, virtually all-black inner neighborhoods and virtually all-white outer

neighborhoods. During the same decades that white

immigrant groups became

less segregated

from native-born whites and

from one another, blacks became more segregated. 32 Through the 1980s, poor blacks

in particular

ety as middle-income in

became increasingly

Americans

isolated

fled the inner cities.

from the wider

America have become increasingly all-minority 33 The schools that black and Mexican American children attend 184

soci-

Poor neighborhoods are segre-

RACE. ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENCE gated again. This time

it

is

de facto segregation attributable to a segregated

housing market, but the result

the same. Indeed, de facto segregation

is

may

more detrimental psychologically, because African American and Mexican American children can no longer rationalize their separation well be even

as the result of legal oppression but see

instead as personal rejection.

it

Although middle-income blacks have been leaving the ghettoes of the poor, they usually end up living in or near rarely

low-income black ghettoes,

by choice. Their children are often drawn into the world of low-

income youth. 34 This experience sends a clear message youth that their

life

surety

it

will bring a

neighborhoods

Even

if

is

chances are going

What does

white counterparts'.

nonwhite

be significantly less than their

to

good education mean when

good job? What does

a

there

is little

good job mean when choice of

restricted?

blacks and Latinos went to schools that were equal in quality to

those that whites went

Unfortunately, that

a

to all

to,

it

would be

we cannot even

most of the minority students go

gated inner-city schools

is

difficult for teachers to inspire

to are not equal.

a difficult task.

Many

them.

because the schools

test that possibility,

Learning

in segre-

of the physical structures

are in poor condition, educational supplies are inadequate, teachers are

overwhelmed with disciplinary problems, and, more

generally, the climate

of pessimism weighs on the talented students as well. 35 mobility

filter

back from the world of work

couragement and resentment. ents, teachers,

It

Rumors of blocked

to the schools, fostering dis-

then becomes increasingly difficult for par-

and school administrators

keep minority students com-

to

mitted and focused on their studies. In this climate, high dropout rates

among Latino and African American high school

students persist.

Recall anthropologist John Ogbu's distinction between voluntary immigrants and involuntary minorities. 36 Voluntary immigrants, such as Italians,

Japanese, and West Indians, chose to

nities.

They

come

feel hopeful. If things

do not work

out, they

America

for

its

opportu-

homeland and

can go home, as millions of

immigrants have before them. Their optimism to

to

contrast their conditions here with those in the

in turn

commitment

sparks

schoolwork. Involuntary minorities, such as blacks and American Indi-

more complex way, were forced to be minorities in the white man's land. They contrast their conditions here with those of their fellow citizens and despair; certainly for American Indians ans,

and Mexican Americans

and blacks there

is

no

in a

realistic

homeland

to

compare with or

to return to.

(Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell put the distinction this

way:

"My

black ancestors

may have been dragged

chains, but they were not dragged to the United States. That ent emotional and psychological beginning than that of

185

to is

Jamaica

in

a far differ-

American blacks.

CHAPTER Delivering in the Barrio

and Dangerous Minds The popular movie Stand and Deliver

in

is

the Ghetto

instructive about student aspi-

rations in ghetto schools. In this true story, teacher Jaime Escalante takes

a group of Mexican

American students

Angeles and develops

their

in

one of the poorest schools

mathematical

score well on national exams.

An

skills to

in

Los

such a level that they

inspiring story, Stand

and Deliver

still

contains several dispiriting elements. For one, few teachers are as gifted

and dedicated as Jaime Escalante was. He put ings, evenings,

more important, even

a heart attack. Perhaps selves

worked so

hard, their success

regulators charged

portunity to have

how

in extra

hours

in the

morn-

and weekends with his students, overworking himself into after his students

was so unexpected

that

them with cheating. Mr. Escalante fought

them take

the test again.

had them-

examination

They scored high

for the op-

again. Yet

often can students' sincere efforts be sustained in the face of such

cynicism and suspicion? The stigma that young nonwhites face

is

a further

deterrent to striving in the classroom or on achievement tests.

Dangerous Minds

is

another truth-based, popular movie about

how

a

dedicated teacher successfully taught minority students. In the story,

LouAnne Johnson reached and helped youth in a crime-ridden black ghetto. Ironically, Ms. Johnson, in her own book, did not credit herself for the students' success.

She credited a federal grant

that paid for smaller

classes and for time to provide students with individual instruction.*

*

Mosle, "Dissed."

whose ancestors were brought here

in chains.")

untary minorities sparks resistance to

37

The pessimism of

invol-

schoolwork. These minority youth

might even be described as "rationally" pessimistic. Numerous studies

show

that the

economic advantages of staying

great for blacks and Latinos as for whites.

The oppressive weight of history and ination together easily explain

Americans remain behind

in the

why

in school are not nearly as

38

the pressure of continuing discrim-

African Americans and Mexican

American race

for success. Racial stratifi-

cation in the United States cannot be understood by looking at individual traits

such as intelligence; ethnic inequality did not emerge from individual

competition. Blacks were captured in Africa, Mexicans lost a war; neither

186

—

RACE, ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENT!-.

Smarts on the Street The debate about race and

intelligence has focused on intelligence as ex-

As we pointed

pressed in classroom tasks.

out in earlier chapters, these

formal vocabulary and mathematics, form but a small

skills, essentially

aspect of people's mental abilities. Paper-and-pencil tests capture poorly,

what

if at all,

it

means

to

be "smart"

in life outside the

Here

is

in

sense of their wider intelligence.

where anthropologists and sociologists have a great advantage

over psychometricians.

everyday

Many

of the former have studied people

in their

settings.

and anthropologists have studied the kind of

In particular, sociologists

people

full

—

Only by observing

business, in personal relations, in politics, and so on.

people in their real lives can one get a

classroom

whom

Herrnstein and Murray dismiss as constitutionally "dull"

black and brown residents of low-income neighborhoods,

many of them

high school dropouts, and some even criminals. Although researchers

have described bleak "dull" residents.

Latinos

who

have described

the ethnographers have found poor blacks and

are foolish and shortsighted, but they have also found poor

blacks and Latinos

More

lives in these settings, they rarely

Of course,

who

are wise and discerning, just as with any group.

striking in the research, however,

is

how

quick-wittedly and

shrewdly residents of these communities navigate through the perilous waters of ghetto

life.

Their "street smarts" often entail the same kinds of

sophisticated calculation required of professionals and executives.

members who operate

as black-market entrepreneurs,

"hustle" a living, single mothers

who

Gang

young men who

balance limited funds and demand-

—

men who juggle multiple low-paying jobs these are the kinds of people who perform poorly on the paper-and-pencil tests of the classroom but who nevertheless perform shrewdly on the survival ing children, working

tests

*

of the "mean streets."*

One

vast literature that speaks to these points consists of ethnographic studies

in

low-income communities, ranging from older ones

to

more recent ones such

as Stack, All

Our

like

ski.

done

specifically of

Islands in the Street; Padilla. The

Cocaine Kids; and Wacquant, "Life

Gang

in the

Street

Up

done

Corner Society.

Kin; Hannerz, Soulside; Anderson.

on the Corner; and Williams and Kornblum, Growing literature includes studies

Whyte.

A Place

Poor. Another applicable

gangs and delinquents, such as Jankow-

as an American Enterprise; Williams. The

Zone."

87

CHAPTER

8

group ended up on the bottom because they

on a

test.

The

caste system had

origins in colonization

its

Americans' need for cheap labor and rationalize their control. tify the existing racial

The

lost a fair race or

their

power

to get

role of intelligence has

order rather than to create

it,

scored poorly

—

to

in

European

keep

it,

been primarily

and

to

to jus-

it.

The conditions faced by blacks and Latinos have not changed as much in we might imagine. 39 Most of the young people

the last several decades as

groups face an educational environment and an occupational future

in these

And

that is simply not equal to that of whites. in the black

and Latino communities appear

conditions for the very poor

to

be getting worse. 40

Given the harsh past and the daunting present we have described, what is

perhaps more remarkable than the persisting gap between the academic is that the gap in test scores is narrowMurray admit grudgingly but must admit

performance of blacks and whites ing.

It is

a point Herrnstein and

nevertheless.

Over

the last twenty years or so, the white advantage over

blacks in various standardized tests has narrowed by the equivalent of several

IQ

points.

41

That alone should cast doubt on the idea that the group

differences are inherent and unchangeable. But

let

us look further.

Ethnicity, Race, and Test Scores The is,

current economic inferiority of ethnic minorities in the United States

we have shown,

sufficiently explained

by

their centuries-long suppres-

sion in a caste system. Purported differences in intelligence are not the

cause of their greater poverty, only a post hoc rationalization for theless,

we

return

now

to the question of

why

average, below whites on standardized school achievement is

what much of the controversy

gence"

tests,

it

is

more accurate

is

it.

Never-

blacks and Latinos score, on tests,

since that

about. (Although often labeled "intelli-

to say that the

exams

assess

how much

instruction students have received; see chapters 2 and 3.) Herrnstein and

Murray arise

pull

up

just short of claiming that the

from group differences

group differences

in genes, but others

in scores

have drawn the conclu-

sions The Bell Curve authors merely implied.

Many

critics

have attacked The Bell Curve both for

its

claim that there

are racial differences in intelligence and for the implication that those dif-

ferences are inherently racial. Critics usually engage the debate within the

psychometric tradition (see chapter box,

p.

2),

attacking the quality of the tests (see

189) or the quality of the statistical controls designed to simulate

an all-else-being-equal comparison of the groups. For the record,

we

will

mention some of these and other criticisms. But our particular claim 188

is

RACE, ETHNICITY, AND INTELLIGENCE

Cultural Bias One common argument made

Tests

in

against racial differences in intelligence

that the intelligence tests are "culturally biased."

knowing words and information more ple than to blacks

World War

is

made

test for

I,

Scoring well depends on

familiar to white, middle-class peo-

and Latino Americans. There

The problem of cultural content goes back in

is

is

some

to the early

which included questions such

as:

truth to this claim.

"Alpha"

tests

used

"The Pierce-Arrow car

Buffalo, Detroit, Toledo, or Flint?"* Similarly, a contemporary

in:

small children requires that they be familiar with a flag pole and

that they

know

the etiquette called for

ing to another person.**

To be

upon having broken an item belong-

in a subordinate minority

is,

in part, to

be

and socially isolated from the majority, thereby reduc-

culturally distinct

ing the chances of answering such questions "correctly."

Herrnstein and Murray respond to these criticisms by echoing Berkeley

psychometrician Arthur Jensen's claim that blacks score below whites on "abstract" test items, too. Thus, the gap cannot be due to cultural content,

What

they argue.

is

"abstract," however,

ing and reciting digits in reverse order

and Murray

stress

—

on such

not at

all clear.

Even memoriz-

"intelligence test" Herrnstein

requires familiarity and comfort with numbers.***

Also, as conservative economist cisely

is

—one

Thomas Sowell

sorts of "abstract" items that

has noted,

it

was

pre-

European immigrants, such as

Jews, demonstrated their supposed dim-wittedness in the early twentieth

century.****

Clarence

S.

Yoakum, Army Mental

Tests (1919), pp. 260-61, quoted by Lears,

Fables of Abundance, p. 220. ** Questions quoted in Science for the People, "IQ."

*** See Stephen

J.

Ceci,

On

Intelligence, esp. chap. 9,

gence?" Herrnstein and Murray also

show black Abilities of

Damned

Mankind,"

Abstract

Is Intelli-

Those studies have, however, been persuasively undermined.

inferiority.

See Kamin, "Lies,

"How

like to cite reaction-time studies that purportedly

p.

Lies,

and

Statistics," pp.

87-89; Irvine and Berry, "The

51; and Nisbett, "Race, IQ, and Scientism," p. 44.

**** Sowell, "Ethnicity and IQ."

broader than ity,

that:

Scores on achievement tests are the products of inequal-

here and elsewhere

We

return

grammed to score

now

in the

world.

explicitly to the explanation

in figure 8.

1

.

we

outlined earlier and dia-

Ethnic groups in lower caste or status positions tend

poorly because their position leads to socioeconomic deprivation,

189

CHAPTER group segregation, and a stigmatized

8

each of which undermines

identity,

performance on psychometric measures of intelligence. As foundation for

we

these claims, is

first

show

that this pattern of ethnic differences in scores

not special to blacks or Latino Americans today;

groups earlier

American

in

it

existed for other

history and exists for other groups around the

world.

Many immigrants faced prejudice and discrimination in coming to America (although not slavery or peonage). As early as the colonial era, Benjamin Franklin objected to allowing Germans "Palatine boors," he

—

called

them

—

into Pennsylvania.

often considered those

Around 1900 immigrants

—

who came

By

earlier to these shores

immoral, subversive, and

dull.

new

later as

time they were

at the

— were

cheaper transportation available least

Those who came

the president of M.I.T., an economist, stated that the

eastern European groups

were the

42

Italians,

Russian Jews, Poles, and other

inferior to earlier immigrants. at the

turn of the century, the

of their kind, were failures, and lacked

fit

Because of

new

talent.

arrivals

43

the 1920s the nativists could point to scientific evidence for such

charges:

New immigrants

on standardized

and

their children did

worse

than did "old-stock" Americans.

tests

in school

and worse

As Thomas

Sowell,

writing in the conservative magazine American Spectator, points out, the

conclusion that European immigrant groups were of below-average

gence "was based on hard data, as hard as any data

in

The Bell Curve. These

groups repeatedly tested below average on the mental

War

I

era,

both in the army and in civilian

poorly on the "abstract"

low

that Carl

test questions.

44

life."

The

test

intelli-

tests

of the World

They scored

especially

scores of Jews were so

Brigham, an early scholar whose work was often drawn upon

in policy debates

during the 1920s, wrote that the results "would rather

disprove the popular belief that the

Jew

Karl Pearson, a founder of modern

statistics, also

is

highly intelligent." (In Britain,

discovered that Jewish

children scored below gentile children on mental ability.) Generally, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were assessed as significantly inferior to the

scores of the

"Nordic race." 45 Yet a couple of generations

new

later,

the test

groups had risen dramatically, matching or exceeding

those of earlier-arriving white Americans. Sowell explains that low scores reflect groups' positions "outside the cultural

Western society

.

.

.

whatever

their race

European immigrant groups arrived

mainstream of contemporary

might be." Southern and eastern

as cultural outsiders but

became

insid-

ers during the course of the twentieth century.

Sowell's argument

is

not unlike our own. (Sowell's argument and evi-

dence were presumably known

to Herrnstein

190

and Murray, because he

first

RACE. ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENCE published them a quarter-century ago.) Today, blacks and Latinos are cultural

than

— and economic and

was

social

—

outsiders in

far

8.

lists

1

is

We

where

are rising.

a sample of studies from around the world that have

ined group differences in test scores.

The information

—and they

still

more profound

true for the Europeans. Today, black test scores are about

those immigrants' scores were in the 1920s

Table

ways

exam-

note the limitations of this table:

not complete; the tests and procedures varied consider-

is no simple way to compare the size of some cases, a few studies have yielded more mixed findings than those shown here, although virtually none found group contrasts opposite to those shown here; and a narrowing of differences appears to be happening in some nations not unlike the narrowing in the United

ably from study to study, so there

group differences; in

between blacks and whites. All

States

this said, the table still captures the

general pattern.

The

John Ogbu has argued,

table shows, as

inferior in status

ligence"

tests.

that ethnic

groups that are

and caste position score worse on achievement and

Ogbu

also noted a tendency, in cases

"intel-

where the subordinate

group differs racially from the dominant one, for members of the superior group

to explain those differences as genetic.

46

Yet genetic or racial expla-

nations cannot explain the pattern of group differences.

A reading cally,

of the table shows that ethnicity or race, understood biologi-

cannot be the cause of the test-score differences. Particularly striking

are the substantial gaps in test scores

between groups of the same ethnicity

or race in countries like Israel, Japan, and South Africa. In Israel, Ashkenazi (Western-origin)

Jews have

(Eastern-origin) Jews.

47

origin

Jews have had

historically scored higher than Mizrachi

Since the founding of Israel in 1948, Eastern-

less wealth,

power, and status than Western-origin

ones; the latter have often considered and treated the former as culturally "primitive." Although the differences have been narrowing and intermarriage has been growing, Eastern-origin children

origin children in

many

still

score below Western-

aptitude tests, with differences as large as two-

thirds of a standard deviation.

(The black-white gap

in

one standard deviation.) Moreover, researchers continue

America

is

about

to find ethnic dif-

ferences in scores after controlling for ethnic differences in social class. In Japan, residents of

Korean ancestry are so

racially indistinguishable

from "pure" Japanese that many Korean youth "pass" their ancestry

to pass is

in

school by hiding

and taking Japanese names; some continue passing

ward by cutting family

ties

and fabricating new

48

identities.

after-

The motivation

strong because the Japanese have historically discriminated

against Koreans and consider the Koreans to be a problem group

191

—

dull,

"

CHAPTER Table

8

8.1

Group Differences Around

the

World

Status or Caste Position

Low

High

Country United States a

_

Test Scores, School Success

Low

High

Whites

Blacks

Whites

Blacks

Whites

Latinos

Whites

Latinos

Whites

American Indians

Whites

American Indians

English

Irish, Scottish

English

Irish, Scottish

Protestants

Catholics

Protestants

Catholics

d

Whites

Aborigines

Whites

Aborigines

Zealand e

Whites

Maoris

Whites

Maoris

South Africa f

English

Afrikaaners

English

Afrikaaners

Belgium g

French

Flemish

French

Flemish

Jews

Arabs

Jews

Arabs

Western Jews

Eastern Jews

Western Jews

Eastern Jews

Nontribals

Tribal people

Nontribals

Tribal people

Brahmin

Harijan

Brahmin

Harijan

High caste

Low

High caste

Low

Slovaks

Gypsies

Slovaks

Gypsies

Non-Burakumin

Burakumin

Non-Burakumin

Burakumin

Japanese Origin

Korean Origin

Japanese Origin

Korean Origin

Great Britain

15

Northern Ireland' Australia

New

Israel

11

India'

Czechoslovakia*

Japan k

a.

The white-black and Anglo-Latino

American Indians:

see, for

differences are reported in The Bell Curve and

Research by Richard Lynn discussed

c.

Lynn

scored higher on tions based

on

"Home Background,"

in

for aspects of parental

other places.

On

Benson, "Ireland's 'Low' IQ."

presents evidence that

among young men

an intelligence test than did Catholics. (There

their table

many

caste

example, Church, "Academic Achievement."

b.

et al.,

caste

4 show

that the religious difference in

socioeconomic

status.

in

Northern Ireland, Protestants

was no difference among young women.)

IQ among males

A few newspaper stories on

Catholics scored one standard deviation below Protestants in IQ, but

persists

even

The Bell Curve reported

we have been

Calcula-

after controlling that, in Belfast,

unable to find the source

for

that claim. d. Klich,

"Aboriginal Cognition and Psychological Science"; Clark and Halford, "Does Cognitive Style Ac-

count for Cultural Differences?" e. f.

Ogbu, Minority Education and Caste;

St.

George, "Cognitive Ability Assessment

in

New

Zealand."

Verster and Prinsloo, "The Diminishing Test Performance Gap."

g.

Raven, "The Raven Progressive Matrices," esp.

h.

On Jews

versus Arabs: Kugelmass et

al.,

fig. 2.

"Patterns of Intellectual Ability";

Jewish high school students passed matriculation exam versus ary 12, 1995;

cf.

Lieblich et

al.,

15%

news item

that, in

1992,

26%

of

of Arab students—Jerusalem Reports, Janu-

"Patterns of Intellectual Ability."

On Western

versus Eastern Jews: Gross,

"Cultural Concomitants of Preschoolers' Preparation for Learning"; Dar and Resh, "Socioeconomic and Ethnic

Gaps." i.

on

For an overview on Indian caste differences, see Das and Khurana, "Caste and Cognitive Processes." Also,

tribal groups, see

Concentration of

'g'

Gupta and Jahan, "Differences

in

Cognitive Capacity"; on Brahmins, Shyam, "Variations

in

Level Abilities"; and on caste: Das, "Level-I Abilities of Socially Disadvantaged Children,"

192

RACE, ETHNICITY, AND INTELLIGENCE ill-mannered, often criminal.

Even

the

word "Korean"

is

considered a

slur.

Children of Korean ancestry have historically done relatively worse in school and on aptitude

tests.

Another low-status group

49

Japan also racially indistinguishable from

in

the majority consistently also scores lower than the majority tests.

on aptitude

These are the Burakumin, descendants of people who formed a

sort

of "untouchable" caste in feudal Japan. (They, like India's untouchables, dealt with "filth," such as burials

and carcasses.) Burakumin

who

try to

"pass" can be unmasked only by careful genealogical analysis, often con-

ducted preparatory to marriage. to

Still,

them

the majority Japanese consider

be inferior and often discriminate against them. The Burakumin, like the

Koreans their

in Japan, are

prone to economic failure and social problems.

children have systematically done worse on aptitude

Burakumin children

in the

same

schools.

tests

And

than non-

50

In South Africa during the 1950s, children of English origin scored

higher on aptitude and intelligence tests than did Afrikaaner (Dutch-origin) children.

The gaps between

wide as a half

these

two northern European groups ran

to a full standard deviation. In the

as

1960s the English- Afri-

kaaner differences narrowed, and by the 1970s they seemed to have dis-

The convergence of Afrikaaner and English scores coincides with the rise of Afrikaaners to power in South Africa after generations of subordination to the English (and before conceding power to the native appeared.

black Africans in the 1990s). 51

gap has

In all three of these cases, evidence suggests that the test-score

narrowed over recent generations as subordinated groups began slowly toward political and social parity.

A similar trend is

Still,

move

noticeable over

the twentieth century for African Americans, despite continuing

and geographical

to

economic

isolation.

the basic differences in the table persist.

inferior test scores of eastern

These

results, just like the

and southern European immigrants

to the

United States seventy-five years ago, cannot be reasonably explained by

and Das and Padhee, "Level

II

Abilities of Socially Disadvantaged Children."

Some

studies of

advanced school students do not show caste differences. Rangari, "Caste Affiliation," showed nonsignificant differences in a small sample. Sandhu,

"A Study

of Caste Differences," also found

no differences, but the sample sizes of "backward" and "scheduled" castes

in that

study were also

quite small. j.

k.

Adamovic,

"Intellectual

On Burakumin:

Development and Level of Knowledge

in

Gypsy

Pupils."

Shimahara, "Social Mobility and Education"; on Koreans: Lee, "Koreans

Japan and the United States"; DeVos and Wetherall, Japans Minorities.

193

in

CHAPTER The most

inherent genetic differences.

8

logical explanation

Where

is this:

ethnic groups exist in castelike or near-caste relationships, youths in the

subordinate groups do poorly on so-called intelligence tests and similar

academic assessments. They do so because tural

of the

fewer material and cul-

resources their families have, because of segregation, and because

they understand the limitations placed on their aspirations in those societies.

Black and Latino American youth

like other

more

youth

in the

the United States are simply

in

world with subordinate caste

status.

52

Let us look

closely at this process in the United States.

Socioeconomic Deprivation

Most

critics

of The Bell Curve concede

youth score lower on achievement

that the difference can be entirely

backgrounds of the two groups

—

vation of minority individuals.

On

lower income, much less wealth,

that,

tests than

on average, black and Latino whites ones do, but they assert

accounted for by the differing family

that

is,

by the material and cultural depri-

average, minority children

grow up with

less nutritious diets, unhealthier environ-

ments, worse medical care, and so on than do white children. These conditions impair learning. Black and Latino children also

from poor home environments value education

5^

in

which learning

Their families

but cannot create the physical conditions for

lack the kind of social skills to support

help with

more often come

is difficult.

homework

or

how

it

and often

how

example, knowing

(for

to find the best teachers).

minority students are generally less interested

it

in

The

result

is

to

that

academics, have difficulty

focusing on their studies, and are more physically active. Such conditions require the ghetto schools to do

more than they would have

to

do

in

middle-

class neighborhoods, and yet the ghetto schools usually have fewer re-

sources with which to do

it.

If

blacks and Latinos were, on average, equal

to whites in social conditions, critics of racial explanations say, the perfor-

mance gap would

disappear, showing us that race and ethnicity are irrele-

vant to intelligence.

The

typical

way

that researchers evaluate this

adjust individuals' test scores for differences

economic circumstances, simulating

argument

is

among them

a situation in

statistically to in social

and

which minorities and

whites laced equal disadvantages. (See appendix 2 for an introduction to multiple regression analysis.) Herrnstein and Murray version of this procedure

when

seminated by the media, that

(p.

2X8) perform a

they show, in a graph that was widely disat

every level of "parental socioeconomic

194

RACE, ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENCE status,"

from lowest decile

Armed

the

social

to highest decile, blacks scored

Forces Qualifying Test.

From

background cannot account for the race gap

One problem with

work, as

that

we

below whites on concluded

that exercise, they

that

in test scores.

pointed out

in

chapter 4,

Herrnstein and Murray's statistical treatment of parental status

is

is

faulty

that

and

so provides an inadequate test of the argument that differences in deprivation explain differences in scores.

Another problem

is

that there are

many

more conditions besides parental education, income, and occupation disadvantage the minority children and that also affect learning. condition

is

in wealth.

income accumulate over the

two-earner, black couple brings

kin,

and because even small annual gaps

is

median young,

years. So, for example, the

home

8

1

percent as

median young, two-earner, white couple. But

worth

This failure arises,

because annual incomes fluctuate widely, because income figures

in part,

do not capture financial help from

the

One such

wealth. Annual income differences between whites and blacks

do not capture the true scale of the differences

in

that

much annual income

as

the black couple's net

only 18 percent as great as the white's. 54 Other differences be-

tween the races not captured

in the typical analysis

range from rates of

breastfeeding, to exposure to lead poisoning, to parents' clout in the school

system. 55 In a recent study of the that Herrnstein

young children of

the

same survey respondents

and Murray analyzed, Jonathan Crane found

that the black-

white gap in math and reading scores could be totally accounted for by the

following differences between black and white children: family income, size of household, proportion of students in the school the

tended

who were

poor, the age the child

and, most important,

how much

mother had

was weaned, whether the

home was

child

at-

was

read

to,

tive

and cognitively stimulating. Black and white children similar to one

the

another in these conditions performed similarly on the

Crane concludes

emotionally suppor-

tests.

Consequently,

that genetics is irrelevant to explaining the test-score

gap. 56

Such studies are controversial, however. The basic charge against them by

racial theorists is that simulating equal social

cal controls is misleading.

circumstances by

statisti-

These circumstances are themselves, psycho-

metricians such as Arthur Jensen contend, the product of low intelligence.

home

environ-

ments for children; those parents are disproportionately black.

Statisti-

For example, parents with low intelligence provide poor

cally eliminating the effect of the

home environment masks

the fact that

poor intelligence breeds poor intelligence genetically; the poor 195

home

envi-

CHAPTER ronment

is

just a by-product of

turn, researchers

who

8

low parental

intelligence, they argue. In

claim that the racial gap can be explained by the

individuals' personal environments have rejoinders to this charge. 57

debate will continue. Certainly,

is fair

it

The

conclude that some, perhaps

to

most, of the minority-white difference in scores arises from impairing social conditions,

such as the poverty that black and Latino children more

often face for longer periods than white children do. But these disadvantages of family class position are not the only ethnic caste impairs test performance and

may

ways

that being in a lower

not be sufficient to explain

the test-score gap.

Segregation and Isolation

As we have shown, African Americans Americans; Latino segregation regation

is

is less

are severely segregated

from white

58

Social seg-

severe but

also great. Friendships usually

black-white intermarriage

is rare.

still

sizable.

do not cross

racial lines,

Schools, especially in the larger

and

cities,

are also highly segregated.

Residential, social, and school segregation blacks, that

children

But

cussed

some minority more education or

have. Sociologists have found that the better

this is not so for

income does not major reason

so profound, especially for

often overrides middle-class advantages that

it

may

income whites have, the live.

is

is

earlier.

59

and safer the neighborhoods

in

which they

black Americans; for them, more education or

translate as well into better or safer neighborhoods.

The

we

dis-

the subtle and not-so-subtle housing discrimination

Therefore, middle-class blacks often have to live in or near

low-income communities, something middle-class whites need not do. Similarly, poor black families are concentrated together

poor white families ents strive to help

who

are.

60

much more

them academically must

still

live

and learn with children

lack such social support. Again, equally poor white children are

less likely to

have

than

This means that poor black children whose par-

to deal with

much

poor neighbors and disadvantaged fellow

students.

Segregation impairs school and revealed by analyses of individual

test

performance

traits.

in

ways

For one, schools

that are not

in segregated

black neighborhoods tend to be poor schools, and differences schools do affect learning and test scores (see chapter that minority students,

7).

among

Research shows

even with the same amount of schooling as compa-

rable white students and even in nominally academic tracks, are less likely

196

AND INTELLIGENCE

RACE. ETHNICITY.

61 than whites to have had classes in advanced mathematics or science.

Minority children score low on standardized for this reason,

tests

such as the

AFQT in

part

because the schools they must attend do not expose them

to

important curricula. Furthermore, most blacks and Latinos must attend schools with higher classroom size and fewer and older teachers

who

facilities.

Many

are creative leave inner-city schools because they tire of the

daily battles, leaving the ghetto with an oversupply of teachers

burnt out or

62

who

are inexperienced.

Such differences

who

are

affect students' abili-

score high on standardized tests. In addition, persistent de facto seg-

ties to

regation creates conditions that lower youths' self-esteem and ultimately

lower their

test scores.

Blacks and Latinos have to

live

among

increasingly

impoverished and marginalized members of their groups; they must cope with the disaffection and disruption of poorer students. Comparable white youth, in contrast, do not face such barriers to learning, because they are not barred from communities of their choice.

And

Much

then "concentration effects" accentuate the problems.

search has

shown

that

re-

people are influenced by the social climate around

them, influenced, for example, to vote in ways one would not expect given their individual characteristics. Similarly, research

ple are strongly influenced

about the crowd with

by

shows

whom their children hang out).

In

Simply

put,

would be expected given

their individual

even "good" kids can turn "bad"

if

more youth

cally

who might

the setting they are in is

is

negative.

be otherwise destined to do well academi-

do not do well because they are

trated problems, that lead

get

backgrounds. 63

heavily comprised of troubled youth and the social climate

Minority children

who worry

neighborhoods and

schools with high concentrations of delinquent youngsters, into trouble than

young peo-

that

their peers (no surprise to parents

them

in

segregated settings, with concen-

to learn less.

Together, the deprivation and the segregation of blacks and Latinos go a long

way

to

account for the persistent difference

ing to appeal to genetics. But

That

final bit

reality

—by

tinos, or

The

we

of difference cannot be erased

raising the

statistically

without need-

— nor probably

in

economic conditions of individual blacks and La-

perhaps even by moving them into desegregated communities.

residual difference

emerges from the fundamental

group, African American or Latino American.

being black or Latino in America

is

to

be

in a

handicap youth

in test

taking and in

197

identity of the

The profound

reality

of

lower caste position. That

identity creates specific expectations, anxieties, turn,

in scores,

suspect that a residual difference remains.

and reactions. These,

more important

tasks as well.

in

CHAPTER

8

Stigmatized Identity

Youths

who

see themselves as fated to a lower caste position

them

cept the description of in self-destructive

whatever their

ment

ways. Or they do both. Thus,

ability or learning, score poorly

many come

meate and

to ac-

on intelligence and achieve-

tests.

Nonwhite youth have heard fail;

come

Or they rebel against it many nonwhite youth,

the majority provides.

their

that they are unintelligent

to fear that this is true. After

all,

low-income neighborhoods. The fear

When

their preparation.

and fated

examples of

to

failure per-

affects their confidence

tested, then, they find that the results con-

firm what others, and sometimes they themselves, believe. Experiments led

by psychologist Claude Steele show assistants

this

He and

his

drawn from

the

process in operation.

gave black Stanford University students a

test

Graduate Record Exam. The researchers raised the specter of feriority for a

measured

random

set

racial in-

of the black students by telling them that the

test

reminded

their personal abilities; alternatively, the researchers

them of race by asking them to check off their ethnicity on a questionnaire. They told another set of black students, also randomly chosen, that the study was simply psychological research. The first group of students performed notably worse than the second group did. Steele explains that when black students are explicitly confronted with the stereotype of black lectual inferiority, the resulting anxiety

inferiority?" If this

—

happens

interferes with to black

youth

can imagine that the process

— "Am

I

intel-

going to reveal blacks'

performance and so they do perform worse.

who have made it all the way to Stanford, one is yet stronger among other black youth. (Re-

inforcing Steele's theory of "stereotype vulnerability" are studies that

showed

that the

same process occurred among women and among white

men taking math tests. When told in advance that women usually do worse than men on the test, female undergraduates scored poorly; but when told that women did equally well, the female undergraduates scored as highly as male ones did. Similarly, white men performed worse when they were contrasted to Asians.)

Here

is

64

one way The Bell Curve and similar books help create

they claim to explain, the lower performance of minorities

apprehension.

As

university teachers of teenagers,

the popularization of

we

that

—by

which

instilling

are concerned that

The Bell Curve has demoralized our minority

dents, reinforced nagging self-doubts, and

worsened the problem.

also falsely inflate the self-images of white students.

198

It

stu-

may

RACE, ETHNICITY,

AND INTELLIGENCE

Black and Latino youth respond to the caste system with fatalism, with anxiety,

and sometimes also with

experience suggests

that,

hostility.

Their parents' and neighbors'

whatever abstract value they place on education,

schooling will probably not pay off for them.

If the

"program" seems

promise humiliation and dead-end jobs, many decide not

to

to

go along with

They view cooperation with white institutions, such as capitulating to the enemy. They develop an oppositional cul-

the program.

schools, as ture,

one

in

which, for example, performing well

"white" or "doing the Anglo thing." Prestige life,

in

is

school

found

is

such as sports. Even good students face peer pressure

standards.

seen as acting

in other

to

realms of

defy white

65

low self-esteem and

In this climate of collective

resistance, school

suffers. Similarly, in testing situations, students might, in a

of disdain, haphazardly answer

test questions.

complete show

(When one of

Martin Sanchez Jankowski, taught junior high school

work

the authors.

in Detroit,

he en-

among Gypsy children. They questions randomly; some deliberately

countered a consistent test-taking pattern

would answer

the standardized test

answered them incorrectly. They said they did not care about school, the only reason they attended

was

trouble with the law.) There

evidence of such attitudes toward the

among

the minority

Korean youth

in

is

to

NLSY respondents who

Japan

—but not

in

that

avoid having their families get into

took

America

AFQT

66 it.

— seem

to

show

similar pat-

terns: low academic expectations and a history of disruptiveness in the

schools.

Some Korean

Japanese children see sports as the only arena for

success in school. Their parents are also often skeptical that they can suc-

ceed through academics.

hope [my son]

is

One

father told a visiting anthropologist, "I just

physically tough and strong."

67

British sociologist Paul

among white workingclass youth in England. (In England, class differences take on some of the quality of caste differences.) Believing that they are doomed to lousy jobs Willis has described such an oppositional culture

or no jobs at

all

and that the society demeans them, they denigrate school-

work and honor delinquency. 68 Similar reactions have been observed where, for example,

among

Eastern-origin Jews in Israel.

have described are not unique to lower-caste

In a caste it

to

69

The

else-

patterns

we

American blacks or Latinos, but common

groups around the world.

system where race

is

a master

trait

defining people's identities,

should be no surprise that race matters. America has for centuries treated

people according to their race and

Young people understand

it still

does, albeit not as severely now.

their positions in the racial caste system, irre-

199

CHAPTER

and Math: A Parallel Story

Boys, Girls,

The idea

that

males and females

differ in their "natural" talent for

many Americans. Women

matics seems intuitively plausible to likely to take fields.

Not

math-heavy subjects

gap

in

in

matheare un-

school or to pursue careers in such

American media

surprisingly, the

fundamental differences

8

in brain structure or

are full of speculations that

chemistry explain the gender

math.

Recent research by David Baker and Deborah Perkin Jones reveals

wrong

that intuition

is.

Using math

how

given in 1982 to 77,000 eighth

tests

graders around the world, they found that, on average, boys and girls score

about the same. But there countries, boys

do

is

considerable variation

do

better; in others, girls

among

better;

and

nations. In

in

about equally well. Girls tend to perform better relative to boys countries where

modern

mance

more women go

industries. Also, girls in the relative to

boys since

speed with which a nation's

girls'

1982

in those

women

hold jobs in

had improved

their perfor-

and more

test

were conducted

earlier tests

girls

which women's participation sum,

to college

some

some, they do

in

1964.

The

closed the gap varied with the degree to

in their country's

math performance responded

to

workforce had grown. In

women's

career opportunities

in their nations.

These and other

results support

Baker and Jones's interpretation of the

stereotypical gender gap: If

male students are afforded the possibility of future educational and

occupational opportunities as a function of their performance in

mathematics, then they

may

try harder, teachers

more, and parents and friends a

may

domain of performance they should take

hand, female students,

mathematics as

less

number of ways by nity structures

who

may encourage them

help them see that mathematics seriously.

On

are faced with less opportunity,

is

the other

may

see

important for their future and are told so in a

teachers, parents, and friends. In short, opportu-

can shape numerous socialization processes that shape

performance.* Substitute "white" for "male," "minority" for "female," and "academic" for "mathematics" in this quotation. *

The

logic

Baker and Jones, "Creating Gender Equality,"

"Cross-Cultural Gender Differences

in

is

p. 92.

the same.

For similar

Mathematics Education."

200

results, see

Hanna.

RACE, ETHNICITY, AND INTELLIGENCE spective of their families' education or wealth.

some

stance expected of them,

rebel against

One result is the same mance on tests in school. What about Asian Americans? They

Some

all

it,

adopt the resigned

probably worry about

it.

whatever the reaction: poorer than expected perfor-

on standardized the data

Does

tests.

that point to a racial explanation?

on the Asian advantage

ferences are tiny.

70

more highly than whites do

score

in intelligence is

mixed;

No.

First,

at best, the dif-

Second, the great bulk of Asian American youth today

are the children of, or are themselves, "voluntary immigrants," quite dif-

ferent

from the experience of the "involuntary minorities," blacks and

Most have arrived since the 1965 liberalization of the immigralaws, many coming with middle-class backgrounds. Third, early in

Latinos. tion

the century, Asians, like Jews, scored

States

on

position.

An

tests; their

improvement

below native whites

is a result of the

change

in the

United

in their social

71

additional feature of the Asian case does have wider implications for

understanding race and academic performance. The success of Asian and of Asian American children

how much more

in

school can be satisfactorily accounted for by

time, attention, ambition, and effort Asian children and

their families put into education. Ironically,

white Americans' disadvan-

tage relative to Asians seems to rest, in part, on the ural" talent.

American idea of

White mothers, children, and teachers are much more

attribute success in school to innate intelligence than are Asians;

instead typically attribute success

Ogbu

reports that the Chinese

viewed believe to

prove that

sivity; the

much more

it is

so.

Asians

to hard work. Indeed,

American high school students he

that they are better than white students

The American

"nat-

likely to

John inter-

and so work harder

belief in "natural" talent leads to pas-

Asian belief that talents are learned leads to more hard work and

better performance.

assimilate into

72

(It

will

American

be interesting to see what happens as Asians

culture.)

For African American and Mexican American youth, even equalizing family backgrounds and community settings probably cannot completely close the test-score gap, because the problem tized caste.

rooted in being in a stigma-

But the gap can be closed further. As European immigrant

groups were accepted

some of

is

in

America,

their test scores rose dramatically. In

the societies listed in table 8.1, recent research

seems

show

to

smaller test-score differences than earlier studies did. Those changes Eastern-origin Jews in Israel, Maori in Africa, even

Burakumin

in

Japan

New

Zealand, Afrikaaners

—appear

to

match

the

in

—

for

South

weakening of

ethnic caste and status barriers in those societies. For example, intermar-

201

CHAPTER

8

A Thought Experiment One can

appreciate the importance of race as a social reality in

America

with a thought experiment once suggested by an economist.

We

readers to imagine that a scientist developed a potion that

would

ask white turn a

white person black. Everything else about the person would be exactly the

now

same, except that he or she would

much would

look African, permanently.

the experimenter have to pay

you

in

potion? The answer might be one estimate of what

America even when everything

who

feel that blacks are

How

order for you to take the it

else about the person

costs to be black in the same. (Those

is

advantaged these days should, of course, be will-

ing to pay the experimenter for the privilege of

becoming

black.)

riage, the greatest breach of the caste lines, has increased in these cases. In

between black and

the United States, however, the caste lines, especially

white, remain firm.

Conclusion The Bell Curve treatment of tory and destructive.

It is

racial differences in intelligence is

score below whites on standardized ral" difference,

inflamma-

also wrong. Yes, blacks and Latinos consistently tests.

But notions

that this is a "natu-

one resulting from genetics, are inadequate. Individual

blacks and Latinos confront these tests of school- and school-like knowl-

edge burdened by centuries of disadvantages: family histories rooted servitude, poverty, and cultural isolation.

They

in

also carry heavy disadvan-

tages rooted in conditions today: continuing discrimination, low income,

concentration in problem neighborhoods, and inferior schools, to

name

a

few. Like other lower-caste groups around the world, their poorer perfor-

mance

in school

and school-like situations can be understood as the

result

of socioeconomic deprivation, segregation, and a stigmatized lower-caste identity.

African Americans and Latino Americans score below whites be-

cause to be black or Latino in the United States

But the gap tion, as

it

is

closing,

is

to be

below whites.

by the equivalent of several IQ points a generamoved from the periphery of Ameri-

closed for other groups that

can society toward

its

center. If

we choose 202

to

exaggerate the remaining

RACE, ETHNICITY. AND INTELLIGENCE ethnic differences, to treat

down

the convergence. If

inequality generally,

more

quickly.

Our

is

them

we

as natural and inevitable,

we

will slow

see, instead, that this inequality, like social

under our control,

we can choose

fate as a multiracial nation

is

gap

not in our stars, to para-

phrase Shakespeare, nor in our genes, but in our hands.

203

to close the

CHAPTER

!

*

9

Confronting Inequality

in

America:

The Power of Public Investment

w

have shown

e

that

American inequality cannot be explained

terms of people's "natural" intelligence or other supposedly genetic

why

Understanding inequality requires explaining

individuals end up

where they do on the "ladder" of success and explaining why the

is built

way

ity is the result

desserts"

it is.

For each

who

task, those

of inequality in natural talent

—have

—

in

traits.

that ladder

argue that social inequalthat

people get their "just

vastly underestimated the importance of the social en-

vironment.

—

While genetically assisted advantages looks

—

portant.

affect

how

One reason environment

individual

example,

traits,

in

matters so

more

being male,

is

that

it

is

more im-

determines

how

also matters because

it

would have been a major

trivial.

it is

egalitarian societies,

is it

In societies with severe

a heavy burden on individual

is less so.

Social environment

directly structures the opportunities individuals

have. Family circumstances tural advantages,

much

societies, near-sightedness

on women, being born female

attainment; in

health,

even genetic ones, translate into material advantages. For

most

handicap; in a society with eyeglasses, restrictions

height,

high individuals climb, social environment

— number of

siblings, parental

income, cul-

and so on; the quality and quantity of schooling; neigh-

borhood conditions; job opportunities; and other features of the text significantly boost or hold

back the individual, whatever

social conhis or her

talent (see, especially, chapter 4).

As

for the structure of inequality, individuals' native abilities are largely

irrelevant. Investments in

improving

skills,

such as the expansion of higher

education in the 1950s and 1960s, and major disinvestments, such as

ducing health care for infants, can

But these,

alter the

too, refer to societal policies

re-

shape of inequality in a society.

and structures, not distributions of

"natural" talent. Nations and historical eras differ in the degree of inequality

they have because their economic, cultural, and political circumstances

differ.

For example, the gap between well-off and worse-off Americans'

standards of living widened substantially in the last twenty-five years, even

while American intelligence stayed constant or increased (see, especially,

204

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY chapter

5).

To understand systems of

AMERICA

IN

inequality,

we have

to think

beyond

individuals to social structure.

Moreover, both operations of the social environment tures the ladder of inequality

and the way

it

—

way

the

it

provides advantages for

struc-

some

individuals and disadvantages for others as they clamber up that ladder are themselves shaped, in part,

through

ters 5

7).

by

political choices (see, especially,

Those choices concern

way we provide schooling and job tions, subsidies,

chap-

the rules of the marketplace, the

opportunities, government interven-

and taxes. In these ways, we, as citizens, decide the

equality, both of opportunity

and of

result, that

in-

our nation will have.

The Myth of "Just Desserts" These conclusions are not novel. In ago, in response to an

IQ controversy

Bane, a noted scholar Health and

Human

many have been commonplace

in

and public discourse for decades. Over twenty years

the social sciences

gist

fact,

who

later

stirred

up

became an

in the early 1970s,

Mary Jo

Department of

official in the

Services, and Christopher Jencks, an eminent sociolo-

and policy analyst, summarized the

known

facts

then in an article

about IQ "myths":

IQ

tests

measure only one rather limited variety of intelligence, namely the

kind that schools (and psychologists [more precisely, psychometricians]) value. Scores on such tests

mance

in

The poor

most adult are

show remarkably

little

relationship to perfor-

roles.

seldom poor because they have low IQ scores.

.

.

.

They

are

poor because they either cannot work, cannot find adequately paying jobs, or cannot keep such jobs. This has very

little

to

do with

their test

scores.

Socioeconomic background has about the same influence as IQ on how

much schooling a person gets, on how much money he makes.

the kind of occupation he enters, and

1

Since those words, research has,

ronment

if

anything, indicated that the social envi-

—encompassing family background,

schools, and

community

—

is

even more important than Bane and Jencks thought.

Why, myths

after all this well-established scholarship

persist?

Why

do Americans

—

at least,

debate such issues in magazines and newspapers

205

debunking them, do the

those "opinion leaders"

— seem so receptive

who

to the

CHAPTER

9

idea that inequality simply reflects individuals getting their just rewards for their "natural" abilities?

A simple

There are several possible answers.

one

people to believe in the justice of current inequality

books

like

The Bell Cur\>e who are

suggested

that, "like the divine right

it

society.

Bane and Jencks

economic inequality "help[s] legitimate the

Certainly,

the interest

it

is in

— material and

we

ideological

—of

the "haves" to

myth

are

that.

may be

particu-

when inequality widens, becomes blatant, and cries out The 1920s, for example, was such an era. The economic

high in eras

for explanation.

boom much

of the decade benefited the affluent, especially stock speculators, so that inequality

flourished and

now

2

predetermined and unchangeable. But

is

Receptiveness to messages like that of The Bell Curve larly

in-

status quo."

believe that the bases for belief in the "natural inequality"

deeper and more genuine than

many

of kings," the myth that genetic

equality explains

endorse the theory that inequality

serves

especially readers of

and Murray repeatedly

(as Herrnstein

members of

note) overwhelmingly advantaged

that

is

—

in a similar era.

also be high

in that

decade eugenics

liorate inequality

We

Receptiveness to notions of natural inequality

now because

are

may

of the widespread impression that efforts to me-

—antipoverty —have

tory education, etc.

were even

widened considerably. And

was applied against "darker" European immigrants.

programs, affirmative action, compensa-

"failed."

Whether they

really tried, is a matter of intense

really

have

failed, or

and serious dispute. 3 But

it is

the opinion of the journalists, politicians, policy intellectuals, and talk-

show have

hosts that seemingly matters here. If social intervention appears to

opinion leaders are more likely to also believe that

failed, then

equality

is

in-

fated and immutable.

Yet another part of the answer

that this social theory is consistent with

is

4 longstanding American beliefs about inequality. Those beliefs generally

hold

— although —

fications

the

there are, as in any belief system, contradictions and quali-

that inequality of result

outcome of a

opportunity.

fair contest in

What

is

perfectly acceptable, so long as

which

citizens of the

all

—

after all, the leaders of the

World inequality was

"unfair."

is

contenders have had equality of

new American

nation in the nineteenth

century resented about the Old World was not so

wealth

it

much

its

Revolution were wealthy

Both the privileges

that

inequality of

—

as that

Old

decadent aristocrats

received by luck of birth and the interference of autocratic governments in the

economy robbed hard workers of

free-market the

way and

spirit, let

Americans wanted

the "fruits of their labor."

—

the race be run.

206

still

want

—everyone

5

In true

to get out of

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY If this is

that this is

how

people want their society to be,

how, for most

part, their society

and can say

ically consistent

in

AMERICA

IN

a simple step to believe

is

it

(Most people are not ideolog-

is.

one conversation

that there is equality

of

opportunity in America but then say in another conversation something like,

"Rich kids get

The context of The

the breaks."

all

and the social position of those

who

read about

Bell Curve debate

will favor the first re-

it

sponse, that America offers equal opportunity. Then, inequality must be

To answer

the result of natural talent.)

American

Left critics of the

status

quo, Herrnstein and Murray and their ideological allies offer a robust state-

ment

that

American equality of opportunity

equality of result

Linked

is

each person's "natural"

people can win or lose a

all,

what

fair race

from

the "inner person" standing apart

A

gifts.

American ideology

parents gave them. But

munity.

and thus American

fair race, then,

This

now

see that

treats the "real" individual as

social context,

gave them. This

American

from family or com-

its

makes

virtues,

it

structure (the "ladder of success"

even

we have

6

it

is

because of

who

icans tend not to explain

in

and

talent are

This individual-

referred to) because

that person is or of

outcomes

can only

to discuss matters of social

usually interpret events as the result of individual will. If or poor,

not for

traits.

beliefs about inequality

difficult

traits,

truly unique person

rooted yet more deeply in American individualism. ism, despite

fair

because of the training their

rewards people for their unique

their parents or friends

can

in-

not logically neces-

is

be the "natural" person, the person composed of in-born

We

what a

to these beliefs about inequality is the notion that

contest reveals sary; after

exists

is fair.

Americans

someone

what he or she

did.

is

rich

Amer-

terms of the circumstances people

face.

One

effort

we have made

does matter, individual

in this

traits

book

is

to explain

notwithstanding.

Move

how

social structure

a child

from a chaotic

and impoverished school to an ordered and affluent one, and more often

become "smarter." Move a job-seeker from a region with a 10 percent unemployment rate to one with a 3 percent rate and more often than not that same job-seeker will than not that

same

child will learn more; he or she will

land a better-paying position.

Move

a family headed by

working but poor

parents from a society with minimal family support to one with family

allowances, universal medical care, and other assistance, and more often than not the children in that school, and contribute nizes the differences

more

among

same family

will be healthier,

as adults. In the big picture,

historical eras

do

one

that recog-

and societies, the greatest

ences are from context to context, rather than person to person.

207

better in

differ-

CHAPTER

An American These points can be icans.

was born

in a steel mill.

laid off, so

1915 in Trenton,

in

The next

he returned

a job in a foundry

New

Jersey. His father his

— not

year, with the onset of the Depression, he

to school.

John graduated

any job

1936 John married;

projects. In

and John,

was

Sr.,

in

1934 and found

would seem

the kind of job a high school diploma in the

Depression was a good one.

John's cohort were lucky to land jobs in

in

Amer-

stories are true, repre-

mother had worked as a laundress before

to deserve in those days, but

Some

But the

1929, at age fourteen, John dropped out of school and started

birth. In

was

Sr.,

a truck driver and his

working

are fictional.

and instructive. 7

John Smith,

was

Story: The Smiths

illustrated with the story of three generations of

The names and kinship

sentative,

9

laid off

in

New

Deal public works

1938 his oldest son, John,

Jr.,

was born

from the foundry. Times were no doubt hard and

much help could be expected from John's parents, with their low income and need to hoard for their later years. After twenty-one months of not

unemployment and

as the

a job in a steel mill.

European war unfolded

Work was

in late 1939,

John found

steady through and beyond World

War

II.

(John was too old for military service and was a father.) With growing prosperity,

John was able

to

buy a home. In 1985 John

worked on-and-off

have two more children

after the

war and

to

His and his wife's pensions (she had

retired.

for state government) and their social security checks

provided an annual income of $15,000 in 1990 (about twice the poverty line for a couple).

John,

Jr.,

born in 1938, also grew up

in Trenton.

Unlike his dad, he

continued his education straight through and attended Rutgers University for

two

from 1956

years,

to 1958. His parents paid the tuition of

$500

a

year and he worked for his living expenses. After his sophomore year John,

Jr.,

took a management-trainee job with a firm in Chicago. The next

year he married. In the 1960s the Smiths

where John

III

ployed, John,

moved

to

Richmond,

Jr.,

moved up the ladder through three firms last move to Atlanta in 1990. In that

agement, making his

owned a new in

1995

Virginia,

("Johnny") was born in 1966. Having never been unemto

upper man-

year, John,

Jr.,

house in the suburbs and earned $48,000 a year (over $56,000

dollars).

His wife earned an additional $17,000 as a secretary.

Despite widespread corporate downsizing, John, two, he had a good future in his

new

Jr., felt

that, at

age

fifty-

company. And, given that his elderly

parents were financially secure, he could look forward to helping out his children.

208

—

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY Johnny, born in 1966, grew up

Duke

Although

his father

computer

out to be five

Richmond suburbs and attended

in the

University, earning a bachelor's degree in political science in 1988.

had paid for $32,000 of

graduated owing an additional $32,000 a

AMERICA

IN

firm, trading

still

Carolina, with a

hobby

He landed

computers

in

a

had been married

had been well on

He was

only a sales rep.

his

way

hobby

that turned

for four years and,

to corporate success

living in central Charlotte,

young woman. They had been

were unmarried,

—

a sales job with

his college major. In 1991, at age twenty-

his father already

less education,

Johnny was

years,

his

more valuable than

—an age when

even with

on

Johnny

his college education,

in loans.

North

living together for a

few

and had no expectation of buying a house

childless,

anytime soon. Johnny earned about $36,000 a year and his companion,

working as a substitute teacher, made only $4,000

that year.

Johnny was promotion

not optimistic about his financial future, putting his prospects of at

50:50.

These three men their genetic ferent,

reers

—grandfather,

endowments. Even

greatly.

They

— varied hardly

at all in

their educational credentials, although dif-

were roughly representative of

—humble achievement,

and son

father,

their generations. Yet their three ca-

solid success,

and anxious toehold

differed because the times, the social contexts, in

—

differed

which they

lived differed.

Consider

how even more

dissimilar the stories

would be had we focused

on three generations ol women. As sharply as conditions have changed for men, they have changed much more for women. The typical 1920s stopped working to marry and raise a large family; the 1990s

more often delays marriage

in

woman of the the woman of

order to pursue a career.

The

first

might have hoped for a temporary job as a teacher or nurse; the second

The woman of seventy years ago could

aspires to a well-paid profession. feel financially

secure supported by a "breadwinner" husband; the

woman

of today must consider the real possibility of divorce and single parenting.

Once an average woman might expect

to

woman

on the aid of her children; today's

spend her widowhood depending can look forward to a financially

secure retirement. These have been radical shifts in

life,

not because of

genetic changes, but because of changing contexts.

The differences

in

contexts are not accidental nor totally a result of

forces outside our society.

To be

sure, such forces

world competition, war, for example

much

is

munity. John,

—do

— technological change,

partly determine contexts. But

subject to our control, to our political choices as a national

We

Sr.'s,

can see illustrations adulthood and John,

in the three-generation story.

Jr.'s,

adulthood,

governmental institutions had been created

209

to

all sorts

com-

Between

of financial and

reduce the ferocity of the

CHAPTER

9

business cycle, so that the younger John did need not to pass through a depression. Also, programs were established that relieved John,

weight that had burdened John,

Sr.'s,

Jr.,

of a

generation, dependent parents. Social

security and Medicare directly helped the older generation but also pro-

vided material and psychological freedom for the younger generation.

Other programs

—expansion of higher —aided

homeownership, and so on the

same

education, the

place, others in national priorities,

some

to

why

which they

Implications:

the

Different scientific paradigms

comprehensible (see chapter

is

is

why some

make

Policy Questions

We

Ask?

different questions relevant or even

So, too, with theoretical or ideological

2).

It

assumes

that the critical trait, intel-

—then people can be ranked on one dimension;

—then we can

schools and jobs; that

it

is

—then one can explain family it

is

have pointed

out, for

fails,

it

continuity,

unchangeable

then existing inequality must be accepted and efforts to change

of these elements

that

efficiently sort people into their appropriate

genetic

legitimate inheritance, and predict talent; and that

If any

people get

consider the implications of the "natural inequality" para-

singular

measurable

generation.

gap between the two may be wide or

What

digm, exemplified by The Bell Curve. ligence,

Ill's

live.

Should

First,

generation. At

world market-

be found inside individuals but instead outside of them,

in the society within

paradigms.

Jr.'s,

have frustrated John

In short, the truly powerful forces in determining

ahead and others do not and

Bill, assistance for

in the

the ascent of John,

time, contractions of various kinds,

narrow are not

GI

so do the policy implications.

it

—

are futile.

As many

critics

example, even singular, measurable, and genetic

traits

(such as hair color, myopia, height, and weight) are changeable and are

changed If

all

the time; only unchangeable traits can justify nonintervention.

one believes

that inequality

is

determined by an innate

trait

a "free" market, then the following sorts of policy questions

How

operating in

make

sense:

we best assign children to their appropriate slots? What tests should we use? At what age? How can we reconcile untalented children and young adults to their fates? What can we do to keep their aspirations in line with their limits, so that they are content? Does too much education lead them to frustration? How do we reorganize democracy to take natural inequality into account? Should voting be restricted to those who test well or succeed in life? can

210

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY

How

do we reduce the

birth rates of the

ducement enough, or For the dull

who

will

are born,

it

IN

poor

—

AMERICA that

is,

the "dull"? Is in-

be necessary to compel them?

what do we do

them

to sustain

in a

humane

fashion?

Are moral If so,

same way?

qualities as well as cognitive ones "natural" in the

how do we deal

with people born lacking moral instincts? (Several

early psychometricians claimed or speculated, for example, that

Jews

inherited a genetic tendency for dishonesty.)

This agenda

is

not fanciful.

tricians, educators,

and

was

It

statisticians

explicitly taken

up by the psychome-

whose work forms

the foundation of

The Bell Curve. For example, Harvard psychologist William McDougall 1925 proposed a be

in class

A and have

educated would be

in

system of citizenship: Intelligent people would

stratified

full rights;

in class

C

people

who

were poorly

tested poorly or

and have no vote; and class

B would

be

largely a temporary status for children before they are selected into class

or C.

8

Colgate University president George Barton wrote

hoped intelligence India," but

testing

would produce

in

A

1922 that he

a "caste system as rigid as that of

one based on the "rational" system of psychology. 9

Herrnstein and Murray's ideas are distant from these draconian extensions of the "natural inequality" perspective, but they are rooted in the

—

same paradigm.

Parts of a similar agenda are hinted at in

for instance, the

concern with differential breeding, with helping everyone

The Bell Curve

find the place in society "appropriate" to his or her intelligence, with recon-

ciling people to their limitations,

10

and the suggestion of a guaranteed an-

nual income for the "dull" losers. This agenda need not be undemocratic, racist,

or inhumane. But

it

follows logically from the "natural inequality"

paradigm.

The

"natural inequality" paradigm, whatever

does not stand up to the evidence, as to

this

its

political implications,

book has demonstrated. Turning

our "social construction" paradigm, which does

fit

the evidence, a differ-

ent set of policy questions arise:

How much equality of opportunity do we want? We, as a nation, have set up and can revise the rules for the "race" to success. To what extent do we want those rules

to provide every child with

an equal

start,

so that where

they end up reflects only their varied talents and not the advantages or

disadvantages of their social backgrounds?

The hasty answer might be "as much as possible," but stop to consider what that would really mean: In a society with full equality of opportunity, each child would have the same material advantages, the same challenging school curricula, the same quality neighborhoods, and so forth. That goal

211

CHAPTER

9

American

directly contradicts another important

value: that parents

work

hard, scrimp, and save precisely in order to give their children an advan-

tage

—

to provide

attend, the

them with

homes

the nicest

to live in, the best schools to

most supportive neighborhoods, extras

so on. This value

is

oppose the idea of big inheritance your children a head

is

to give

is

being unable to do

so.

So

a real one:

the question

is

family value and the value

How much

like

we

taxes.

start;

One of the just rewards

What

we want between

trade-off do

do we want? Once

should the rewards be for the winners and losers? As is

is

counted.

exists,

Is that

because

the race

from market earnings

acceptable?

this level

this

Many

believe

of inequality

is

it is,

to

what

run,

is

we have documented,

extreme among the industrial nations

inequality once everything,

of success

conversely, one of the costs of failure

place on equality of opportunity?

equality of result

the United States

summer camp, and

one reason Americans, even those with low incomes,

in its

degree of

government programs,

as long as a "safety net"

equitable and because perhaps

it

stimulates greater productive energy. Others find American inequality of

and unnecessary. Certainly, evidence shows

result intolerably high

communities and societies with high degrees of inequality tend bled and torn ones. 11 Critics of inequality also argue that

and depresses

initiative,

thereby reducing productivity.

it

to

that

be trou-

stunts ability

Some

in this

camp

argue that more equality would actually increase the whole "pie" for every-

one by bonding people

at the

bottom

into the

wider society, reducing

ill

health and destructive behavior and widening the pool of talent. There

evidence that equality Realistically,

may

well spur economic growth (see chapter

more equality of

result

would require rewriting

competition and restructuring the system of rewards. that?

—and here "we" includes

book,

we who come from

the authors and

is

5).

the rules of

Do we want

to

most of the readers of

do

this

the comfortable classes in America.

These are the most general questions

that derive

sented in this book (they are questions that

from the paradigm pre-

make no sense in the older come onto the agenda. For

paradigm). But other, more specific issues also

example:

Which it?

talents should

Human

skills,

we

nurture

and how much should we spend doing

whatever genetic component they have, are developed.

Even children born with

serious neurological impediments can today, with

timely help, develop into successful adults. So can children born with seri-

ous social impediments. invest in

—

It is

a matter of identifying the skills

analytical logic, creativity,

and deciding

how and how much

to invest.

212

we wish

empathy, leadership, and so on

to

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY

IN

AMI RICA

History shows us that public investment, far from undercutting tive,

frastructure

—

—

roads, technology, agricultural development, and the like

much of

undergirded ple

initia-

has unleashed and stimulated American energies. Investments in in-

the

American economic boom. Investments

in

peo-

quality schools, public health, higher education, enriched jobs, and

the like

—have not only enriched

American community have not

horizons. These joint endeavors of the

sapped individual

How bedded.

sparked and sustained

vitality but

human

us materially but also expanded

it.

The market

is "socially emwe From standardized weights and measures, to the limited corpowork regulations, to tax deductions, governmentally established

ration, to

the market?

regulate

shall " I2

rules shape the market. So,

which ones do we change //we want

to alter the

Some answer "none" and contend minimum wages, health and safety (with little evidence) that certain rules already equalize too much and intercodes, required benefits, and so on inequality that arises in the market?

—

Others answer "a

fere with efficient production.

for

—

lot."

The

example, increasing the bargaining power of labor

raising the

minimum wage,

In

Expanding higher education,

sum, the paradigm

equality

is

paradigm ever

way

is

How

is

to structure the

would

market?

from our

"historical

agenda of policy issues for Americans. Because

may answer

re-

presented, one that recognizes that in-

socially constructed

factually accurate, that

readers

for example,

in turn

home mortgage deduction would

do we want

we have

not "natural" but

acts," leads to a critical

wages, or

shape the market, which

will

duce earnings inequality; capping the reduce wealth inequality.

might urge,

or limiting executive income, or making taxes

more progressive. Whatever we decide will shape inequality.

latter

in setting

agenda

is

the questions

a real and urgent one.

on

this

this

Which-

agenda, they must rec-

ognize that Americans are designing inequality; even to avoid a decision to

is

decide for the status quo. Either way, Americans must accept responsi-

bility for the

design of inequality instead of blaming nature.

Equality and Opportunity

When

posed as alternatives, Americans endorse equality of opportunity

and reject equality of

result.

called full opportunity, that ideal. Jennifer

13

But there

more

is

a third option, which might be

closely captures the

American moral

Hochschild of Princeton University has identified four com-

plementary tenets of the American Dream: Everyone can participate;

everyone has a reasonable chance for success

213

if

he or she plays by the rules;

CHAPTER success and failure

9

under one's control; and success implies

is

we have

equality on the scale

denies

ity truly to participate,

many

a reasonable chance to succeed, and

handicaps people according to accidents of clearly a

badge of

birth, so that

virtue. Greater opportunity

closer to fulfilling the

virtue. In-

today robs some people of the opportun-

success

would bring

American dream. Securing

this

is

not so

country

this

kind of opportunity

depends, in turn, on our social choices. Policies that simply

provide

promote equal opportunity may not be

One can imagine

opportunity.

full

sufficient to

a science fiction society of im-

poverished people where a few are chosen by lottery to

live in luxury.

This

equality of opportunity neither rewards nor encourages development of talent.

The kind of opportunity Americans want for themselves and their would require not only equalizing access to resources such as

children

schools, but also public investments to

make

sure that the schools were

excellent ones.

We

do not have a society of equal opportunity. The evidence

certainly

shows how

background (especially parents' income)

inequalities in family

and of the broader social context (including the quality of schools) despite the difficulty of measuring such contextual factors fully and accurately

— shape outcomes, so opportunities

are not equally distributed. But

we could equalize 1960s when we expanded higher

research also shows that

opportunity more, as America

did in the

education. In a stagnant econ-

omy, however, or

in an

economy with growing inequalities in outcomes, may mean insecurity or decline for the vast

simple equality of opportunity

majority. In such a case, the difference

between an unfair race

children of the privileged are advantaged versus a fair one that

much

of a difference

if

in

may

which the not

make

neither the children of the privileged nor of the

unprivileged can find secure and rewarding positions. Policies that

would promote

full

opportunity require extensive public

investment. First and most clearly, a society that promoted opportunity

would invest

in

most

fully,

primary and higher education, job — —whatever would help people develop

people

ing, school lunches

in health,

so that more, not fewer, people could participate in a

economy. Second, a commitment in

to full opportunity

programs

home

skills. It

loans for

ple of all social

mean

would mean

that built the

modern

would mean investing

job development, so that there would be rewards for people

proved their

train-

their talents

who

im-

extending, not contracting, the kinds of

broad American middle class

— such

as low-interest

young families and low-tuition public universities for peobackgrounds to go to college. And it would almost certainly

a different

way of providing

health care, in a system that encouraged

214

CONFRONTING INEQUALITY employers

to hire

AMERICA

IN

more, rather than fewer, workers, and that increased the

chances that both rich and poor children had a good

most central

start in life.

Third, and

our argument here, more opportunity necessarily requires a

to

the one we have now. If we have a social order in people cannot make an adequate living even when working many which

society

more equal than

hard or cannot find jobs that provide security or cannot find work then they have

reward for their

efforts.

opportunity, too, since off in

at all,

incentive to develop their abilities and no reasonable

little

Such

a social order inevitably decreases equality of

burdens children as they

strains marriages,

it

start

and disrupts the communities upon which children depend. So,

life,

greater inequality of

outcomes necessarily decreases both opportunity and

equality of opportunity.

Americans

resist

what

is

called "equality of result" because the idea of

giving everyone equal benefits no matter what their contributions violates

many

our sense of fairness. But

energy and tion,

initiative. If

egalitarian policies stimulate and reward

American law encouraged higher

more jobs would pay

a decent wage. If

rates of unioniza-

American government once

again regulated corporate wheeling and dealing, more jobs might be pre-

we provided more

served. If

social infrastructure, such as affordable child

care and longer school years,

same

skills at the

time.

Even

care for poor children or

we would

support work and raise childrens'

policies of direct redistribution, like health

income supplements

give children from poor backgrounds a

"Equality of result," in an absolute sense,

man.

No one

is

for poor

working families,

more equal chance is

in life.

thus something of a straw

advocating, nor could one realistically imagine, a society in

which people benefit equally regardless of thriving, wealthy,

modern

their contributions.

But other

societies stimulate initiative and reward ability

with systems of inequality more generous than our own. The real concerns

ought to be

do

how much

inequality

to exacerbate that inequality.

reasonable and what our social policies

is

At what point does inequality become a

powerful drag on our people, giving the poor no real hope of improving their lot,

keeping the middle striving ever more frenziedly just

place, and rewarding the rich ever

more

lavishly,

sometimes

to stay in

just for hold-

ing assets favored by the tax code?

Naysayers

will

warn

that

such moves would undermine our nation's

we pay

Such As we pointed out in chapter 1, they are arguments Americans heard more and more as the antigovernment economic policies of the 1980s failed to help the middle class. They were meant to assuage listeners' anxieties about

economic

health; that inequality

arguments are

in

is

the price

for our wealth.

tune with the claims that inequality

215

is

"natural."

CHAPTER growing

9

But these warnings are

inequality.

We

false.

need not

The contrary seems

gross inequality in order to have growth.

tolerate

true;

such

inequality probably slows our growth (see chapter 5).

We

have emphasized repeatedly

Americans who

that

national politics design the inequality with which

determine inequality

in the

ways we

we

participate in our

live.

For example, we

distribute tax burdens, subsidize

homeownership, regulate business and labor unions, and finance health care. But the inequality we have does not just affect the overall well-being of our citizens.

by whether it

it

also shapes

It

how much

opportunity our society provides,

encourages individuals to develop their

rewards them

abilities

and whether

fairly for their efforts.

Invocation In closing,

we

note that any debate over inequality can rest only in part on

the weight of the social science evidence.

commitments. The

explicit

over two hundred years

—

It

must also

rest

on our moral

moral commitments Americans have made for

them

despite our frequent failures to live up to

include a political dedication to equality. Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in

1937 that the

"test of

our progress

abundance of those who have much; those

who have

too

junctions to charity.

little."

And

God tells

is

not whether

it is

we add more

to the

whether we provide enough for

our commitments include the biblical in-

the Israelites, "If there be

man, one of thy brethren, within any of thy gates

.

.

.

among you

a needy

thou shalt not harden

thy heart, nor shut thy hand from thy needy brother" (Deut. 15:7).

was hungry and you gave me food, I was was a stranger and you welcomed me.

Jesus spoke: "For

gave

me

drink,

I

thirsty

I

.

you, as you did to one of the least of these (Matt. 25:35, 40).

216

my

brethren,

.

.

Truly,

you did

And

and you

it

I

say to to

me"

* APPENDIX

Summary

*

1

of The Bell Curve

H,

.errnstein and Murray begin,

in the preface,

by raising a concern

that

Americans are becoming increasingly and more widely divided between a highly educated and well-paid elite at one extreme and an impoverished

and problem-beset underclass

How

at the other.

In the introduction, Herrnstein

can

we

understand that?

and Murray define "intelligence" concepand applying relationships drawn

tually as "a general capacity for inferring

from experience" and "a person's capacity for complex mental work" but operationally as a person's score on a statistically determined set

(p. 4),

of

test questions, the

testing against

IQ

tests accurately

how

colloquially

famed "IQ"

many

its

critics.

and

test

Most

its

surrogates.

measure variations

Part

I

agree that

"smart" they are; that people's IQ scores are stable over

80 percent "heritable" is

now

in people's "cognitive ability"

their lifetimes; that these tests are not biased culturally;

people in IQ

They defend IQ

scholars, they claim,

due

—

that

that

is,

to variation

40

to

and

that

American

draws high-IQ people into

II,

40

to

in their genes.

outlines the threat of an emerging "cognitive elite."

economic echelons. Since World War

is

80 percent of the variation among

among them

ciety today with increasing efficiency

IQ

its

so-

top

colleges have accepted and gradu-

more young Americans and have done so more on achievement test scores than of family connections. The elite ated vastly

the basis of

colleges, in

have increasingly "creamed" the smartest students. Similarly,

particular,

occupations that recruit high-IQ people have expanded and perhaps (the case here dates.

is

more

On the job,

speculative)

become more

workers' IQ scores predict

selective of high-IQ candi-

how

well they perform and do

so better than do seemingly job-specific tests or workers' other characteristics.

The market, of

course, rewards this superior performance by the

brightest with the highest incomes.

sun"

(p. 92): stratification

The

result

is

"something new under the

of society by cognitive

the formation of a high-IQ elite.

The

ability,

and

in particular,

stratification process is accelerating

because the emerging economic system rewards intelligence above

The economic separation of

the smartest

constantly reassure readers that they are the rest)

is

augmented by

from the

among

rest

of us (the authors

among More and and smart men and

the smartest, not

their increasing physical separation.

more, the smartest work and

live apart

217

from the

rest,

all.

APPENDIX

women

smart

are increasingly marrying

assumption that IQ

is

largely genetic

we

smart babies. In the end,

turally distinct elite "taking

Part

1

one another, which

—makes

the

are seeing the formation of a smart, rich, cul-

on some characteristics of a caste"

of The Bell Curve lays the foundation for most of

II

—given

even more distinctively

for

its

(p. 113).

substantive

arguments. In over 230 pages of text, notes, and appendices, the authors try to

make

they

.

some of lems"

people

become problematic

likely to

"barely

how

the statistical case that individuals' intelligence determines

live. In particular,

.

.

who

score low on

citizens.

By

looking

IQ

at

tests are especially

IQ's effects, until

the mystery that has surrounded the nation's

(p.

now

considered" by social scientists, they will be "clearing away

118).

To make

massive survey and a

their case, Herrnstein

most serious prob-

and Murray introduce a

statistical tool.

The survey Herrnstein and Murray analyzed is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Researchers began in 1979 with a sample of over 12,500 youths aged fourteen to twenty-two and have followed them since, asking

them

a

took a battery of

wide variety of questions. In 1980 most of the sample

tests,

including the

(AFQT). Herrnstein and Murray use Curve includes analyses of the

the

Armed

AFQT

Forces Qualifying Test as their

NLSY respondents

IQ

test.

The Bell

through the 1990

inter-

views. (In this part of the book, the authors look only at white, non-Latino respondents.)

The

statistical tool is "logistic multivariate regression analysis."

quick introduction to regression analysis, see appendix

Murray use

it

how much

for estimating

2.)

(For a

Herrnstein and

the variation in white

NLSY

re-

AFQT scores) "explains" variations How much, they ask, does AFQT score an NLSY respondent in the next decade

spondents' IQs (as measured by their

among them in

in certain

outcomes.

1980 explain the chances

became

that

poor, a high school dropout, unemployed, unmarried, an

unwed

mother, on welfare, a neglectful mother, or a criminal? To underline the

importance of the ation in an

AFQT

outcome

it

score, they regularly

explains with

how much

compare how much

variation

is

vari-

explained by the

socioeconomic status of the respondents' parents. Crudely, parents' class represents "nurture" and the

deem

it

AFQT score represents "nature." (Where they AFQT score, they add other

appropriate to testing the effects of the

variables to the analysis.)

From

chapter 5 through chapter 12, Herrnstein and Murray present the

results of statistical

AFQT

analyses claiming that white

scores better identify which of them ended up

tions than does their parents'

socioeconomic

218

NLSY

respondents'

in problematic situa-

status. In particular,

it is

the

SUMMARY OF THE BELL CURVE respondents

label "very dull"

By

extreme low end of the

at the

AFQT bell curve who are at great

For example, 30 percent of the whites

risk.

—

the

whom

bottom 5 percent on the

were poor. Using

logistic multiple regression analy-

appendix 2 for a review of regression analysis) to look

sis (see

and parents' class

at the

same time suggests

position

poor

in

parents of average

and about 10 percent for children of the very lowest class

class position

who had

—and

AFQT

average

AFQT better

sion: the

who had

AFQT

at the

that the risk of being

1989 was about 25 percent for the "very dull"

position

1989.

24 percent of the lowest 5 percent on the scale measuring

contrast,

parents' class position

work

Herrnstein and Murray

AFQT— were poor in

scores. Herrnstein and Murray's conclu-

accounts for adult poverty than does parents' social

problem

similarly with the other

disability,

being divorced, and being

such as having a

statuses,

in jail.

Herrnstein and Murray wrap this section of The Bell Curve by giving

each respondent to the

NLSY

scored as "middle class" in the labor force

a

"Middle Class Values"

first

A man

score.

he had graduated from high school, had been

throughout 1989, was never interviewed

married to his

still

if

in jail,

and was

who met

wife. ("Never-married people

all

the

other conditions except the marital one were excluded from the analysis" 263]. In other words, unmarried people with a problem were kept in the

[p.

analysis; those with

no problems were ignored.)

A woman

needed

to

have

graduated from high school, have never had a baby out of wedlock, have never been interviewed

AFQT, class

in jail,

and be

still

married to her

by

this

support the claim.

cant independent role for

in

who had

IQ remains"

probability of "middle classness"

graduated high school, "a in

AFQT