Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa (Africa's Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries) 9819966507, 9789819966509

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AFRICA’S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM EMERGING COUNTRIES

Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa Christophe Dorigné-Thomson

Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries

Series Editor Ajay Dubey, African Studies Association of India (ASA India), Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

The 21st century has been characterized by a global rush to engage African countries. Unlike in the past, globalization has given African countries options to select and diversify their engagements. Though traditional powers are still trying to reinforce their links, African countries have generally found it more empowering to reduce their traditional dependence and develop more equitable relations with counties of the South, especially with emerging economies. Different regions and countries of the world find different opportunities and challenges in their attempts to engage the African region. Similarly, African countries, along with the African Union and other regional organizations, find different advantages in diversifying their traditional dependence. However, the new engagements have neither replaced the traditional engagement of Africa, nor are they wholly unproblematic from African perspectives. In this context, it is essential to understand and analyse emerging Africa’s global engagements. To that end, this series will cover important countries and regions, including traditional powers, that engage African countries, the African Union and African regional organisations. The book series will also address global and regional issues that exclusively affect African countries. Books in the series can be either monographs or edited works. Expected Content: The series will focus on the following aspects, among others: . In its current global engagement, is Africa still a “helpless” player? Who dictates the terms of Africa’s new engagement, and how it impacts various African countries? . In the current competition between traditional powers and emerging economies to engage Africa, is Africa’s global engagement merely undergoing a geographical shift, or is it moving toward increasingly equitable international relations? How traditional powers have restrategised themselves to retain their influence on Africa and how Africa is responding to them? How is Africa involved in the issues of global governance and how it negotiates and navigates its positions on issues of global concerns? Multidisciplinary perspectives connecting African countries with other parts of the world through culture, literature, music, and art.

Christophe Dorigné-Thomson

Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa

Christophe Dorigné-Thomson Faculty of Political and Social Sciences University of Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia

ISSN 2662-7825 ISSN 2662-7833 (electronic) Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries ISBN 978-981-99-6650-9 ISBN 978-981-99-6651-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: boommaval, shutterstock.com Cover design by eStudio Calamar This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

Prior to the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference in 2015, I began to concentrate on the topic of Indonesia and Africa. When the celebration occurred, I lived between Jakarta and Bandung and could attend the various events. I was intrigued by the symbolic power of Afro-Asia in Indonesia and the abstract presence, or absence, of Africa itself in Indonesian mindsets. Indonesia had not joined other major external powers in seriously engaging with Africa in the twenty-first century. I endeavoured several initiatives and joined the Doctoral Program in political science at Universitas Indonesia (UI) to academically study this subject. Fortunately, after I began focusing on this subject, President Jokowi decided to make Africa an Indonesian foreign policy priority; Indonesia launched the Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF) in Bali in April 2018, which I attended; General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan was appointed by Jokowi to form an ad hoc task force on Africa, progressively making him the critical engine of the effort as with various other issues during the Jokowi era, and while this book was being finalised, Jokowi travelled to Africa at the end of August 2023, a historical visit for an Indonesian president, visiting Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa for the 15th BRICS Summit. Over the years, I sometimes heard that Africa was unimportant to Indonesia and that President Jokowi was entirely focused on internal affairs and cared little for foreign policy. I always believed that judgement on a relationship of an almost 300 million people nation with a nearly 1.5

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billion people continent was wrong, notably revealing a misunderstanding of the Indonesian polity and its President. This book deals with that. Dynamic, full of opportunities, strategic, young and populated by amiable people to whom one gets quickly attached, Indonesia is an exciting place. The Bandung host thus shares many fundamental similarities with Africa. This is why I ended up staying in Indonesia for so long now, drawn by the vitality, promise, diversity and openness of the mindsets I discovered, without discounting remaining and often severe burdens. I am solely responsible for the outcome and any mistakes in this work. Overall, it has been a pleasure and an honour to study Indonesia’s engagement with Africa in an Afro-Asian context while located in Indonesia, one of the most strategically significant places on earth, and increasingly so. I first visited Indonesia in 2006 in Yogyakarta under the Sultan’s patronage. I mostly stayed in Indonesia since 2011, lived in Bandung between 2013 and 2015, and studied at UI from August 2017 to January 2022. This book is a product of all those years of experience. Any criticism of Indonesia in this book has a constructive purpose. Indonesia is full of brilliant people, and I care for the country’s progress, which is critical for the global community. However, Indonesia still struggles with innovation, education and image problems, which must be acknowledged and addressed. For the world to comprehend the true Indonesia and not some obsolete or misguided caricature, more original work is required on Indonesia from different perspectives and outside the box. On top of being surprised that nothing substantial had been produced on “Indonesia in Africa”, I was particularly struck during my research to read all these papers on Indonesia being a “middle power” while the most critical leadership of the nation considers the archipelago as aiming for great power and often considers Indonesia as already a major global player. Foremost Indonesian leaders, determining Indonesia’s future, told me this directly. Listening carefully is essential. For my research, I did not seek or receive any funding. It is, by all means, an independent effort. Politically neutral, I have no particular affiliation with any political movement or politician in Indonesia or any other location. I discuss Jokowi and General Luhut extensively in this book, given their political prominence in Jokowi’s Indonesia. Although I am inclined to disagree with them on many issues, I think it is fair to acknowledge their unique and effective power tandem in such a complex polity. This Javanese-Muslim and Bataknese-Christian duo exemplifies Indonesia’s successful diversity management. Both are self-made and have

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together brought Indonesia on a new path of possible great power and welfare. This acknowledgement does not preclude me from criticising their lack of strategic interest in education and research, notably in social sciences, which constitute the cornerstone of any sophisticated economic and political system. Hopefully, the 2024 presidential elections will bring about constructive changes supporting the nation’s progress. I first want to thank distinguished Professor Ajay Kumar Dubey, who welcomed me into this Palgrave Macmillan book series and provided precious insight, as well as the prestigious International Editorial Board. Many of its members served as references for my research, and their work helped me tremendously. I only applied to this publisher and this series. At Universitas Indonesia (UI), I would first like to thank my comrades from the class of 2017 of the Political Science Department at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP UI). I learned a lot from observing and interacting with Indonesian students. It was a fantastic experience that helped me understand Indonesia better. I would like to express my gratitude to the Professors, the faculty staff and the leadership, especially the late Burhan Magenda, Maswadi Rauf, Edy Prasetyono, Julian Aldrin Pasha, Meidi Kosandi, Fredy B. L. Tobing and Dean Semiarto Aji Purwanto. I also want to thank UI’s School of Strategic and Global Studies (SKSG UI), its leadership, particularly its director Athor Subroto and also Shobichatul Aminah, and the staff, notably Tri Astuti Handayani, who have been very hospitable throughout the years. I am grateful to all the other UI people I discussed with and all other academics, notably Professor Hikmahanto Juwana. I want to especially thank all the authors who inspired me and helped me advance in my quest. Many of them figure in the bibliography. Making this book was a permanent dialogue with all these authors’ work. I had no reference on what to write about Indonesia in Africa, so I built my work in interaction with everything I could find in the world. This intellectual dialogue has been captivating. I am especially grateful to everyone who agreed to discuss with me over the years. I apologise for not listing everyone. I have not forgotten anyone. Certain people prefer not to be named. I thank Indonesian ambassadors, notably former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda, Teuku Faizasyah, Rezlan Ishar Jenie, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Dindin Wahyudin and Sunu M. Soemarno. I thank the director for African Affairs in Indonesia’s MoFA, Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, and her colleagues for inviting me and discussing with me. I express my gratitude also to all

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other governmental figures who offered me their time, including the Indonesian Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, Sandiaga Uno. In the Indonesian military, I want to thank the late Lieutenant General TNI (Ret.) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo and Colonel Herri Hidayat among others. I thank my various sources in the Indonesian police. I wish to express my gratitude to African ambassadors in Indonesia, particularly Belmiro José Malate, Admasu Tsegaye Agidew, Hilton Fisher, and Macocha Tembele. I had conversations with many other African, Asian, American and European leaders and interlocutors in Jakarta and around the world. May they all know my gratitude. At Palgrave Macmillan (Springer Nature), I would like to thank the whole team involved. I am grateful to my family and friends for their support in whatever I do. Jakarta, Indonesia

Christophe Dorigné-Thomson

Contents

1 25 34 34 36 43 46 48

1

Introduction Problem Formulation Literature Review Indonesia–Africa, Asia–Africa Indonesian Foreign Policy Theoretical Framework Book Overview Bibliography

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Indonesian Foreign Policy’s Contemporary Evolution The Yudhoyono Contribution Ambitions An Indonesian Conceptualisation of Power Ideology and the Constitution History President Jokowi’s Impact Jokowi’s Dream of a Resurrected Maritime Power Conclusion Bibliography

67 78 81 88 90 93 97 104 106 110

3

An Afro-Asian Multilateral Deadlock Bibliography

129 166

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Knowledge Production and Indonesian Foreign Policy Bibliography

179 197 ix

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Redefinition and Principal Instigators of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa A New Approach A Dynamic Accompanied by Kemlu Policy Justification Through Academia General Luhut Jokowi’s Historical African Visit Power Consolidation and Africa Directorate for African Affairs A Brief ASEAN Trade Perspective An Ambassador’s Mission in Africa Bibliography

203 216 219 227 235 252 266 272 276 290 301

Positioning Indonesia’s African Policy among Other Major Asian Players China’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia Japan’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia India’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia South Korea’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia Conclusion Bibliography

333 335 354 368 386 399 403

7

Reinventing Indonesian Power through Africa Reevaluating the Drivers An Alternative Model? Beyond Economic Interests Africa as Indonesia’s Road to Great Power Bibliography

425 443 451 457 474 484

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Conclusion Presidential Leadership Beyond Economic Drivers Ideational Primacy Knowledge Production African Challenges NAASP Revival? Afro-Indonesian Hope Further Implications Bibliography

503 506 513 519 521 523 524 527 532 538

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Index

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4

Table 5.5

Table 5.6 Table 5.7

Trade volume and percentage of Indonesia–Africa trade of Indonesia’s 17 embassies in Africa in 2021 Indonesia’s trade with Africa, 2007–2021 (USD) Africa as a percentage of Indonesia’s total trade, 2007–2021 (USD) Indonesia’s exports towards Africa, 2007–2021 (USD) (Indonesia’s exports to Africa were above $5.5bn from 2011 to 2014 due to the boom in commodity prices at the time. Since then, they stayed below $5bn except in 2021, when they reached $7bn with another rise in commodity prices) Indonesia’s top 15 trade partners in Africa, 2021 (USD) (representing 85.5% of total Indonesian trade with Africa) (Indonesia’s trade with Africa is concentrated in a few African countries. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt represent 53.5% of Indonesia–Africa trade in 2021. In general, the African “big 6”—South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Morocco—represent a large portion of Africa’s exports, each exporting at least $25bn annually [MacLeod & Luke, 2023]) Indonesia’s cumulative trade with African countries in 2021 (%) Indonesia’s trade by Regional Economic Community in 2021

207 276 277

277

278 279 280

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Table 5.8 Table 5.9 Table 5.10 Table 5.11 Table 5.12 Table 5.13

Table 5.14

Evolution of Total ASEAN Trade with Africa 2016–2021 in billion USD Total ASEAN Trade with Africa by ASEAN country 2016–2021 in billion USD Evolution of ASEAN trade with Africa as a percentage of ASEAN total world trade 2016–2021 Evolution of ASEAN countries’ trade with Africa as a percentage of their total world trade 2016–2021 Major Asian powers’ total trade with Africa and ASEAN Trade with Africa 2016–2021 in billion USD Evolution of major Asian powers’ trade with Africa; ASEAN and ASEAN countries’ trade with Africa as a percentage of their total world trade 2016–2021 Indonesian trade with Africa as a percentage of total ASEAN and ASEAN + China, India, Japan and South Korea trade with Africa 2016–2021

282 283 284 284 285

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On 30 September 1964, Sukarno designated Ambassador Sudjono as Indonesia’s first ambassador to Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, also covering Liberia. On 6 December 1966, Sudjono was recalled to Jakarta. In 1967, the embassy closed. Both Sukarno and Nkrumah had fallen in the interim (Presiden RI, 1964, 1966, 1967).1 In 1961, Sukarno named a street in Central Jakarta after the assassinated Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba in solidarity with the Congolese people. In the 1970s, following organised protests against the Indonesian street bearing this Leftist leader’s name, the anti-communist Suharto renamed the street (Hutari, 2022). These two brief examples symbolise Indonesia’s missed contemporary relationship with Africa. Sukarno’s demise and Suharto’s ascension signalled the end of the Afro-Asian “Bandung moment ” and hampered any significant presence of Africa in Indonesia’s worldview, apart from abstractly in the Asia–Africa invocations (Lee, 2010). Indonesia has thus been late in its contemporary African engagement compared to other major Asian powers. Today, the archipelago is predicted to become the 4th largest economy in the world by 2050 or before (Hawksworth et al., 2017), yet it still often seems to be the “biggest invisible thing on earth” 1 The embassy was established in 1962. Suharto determined on May 27, 1967, that Ghana would receive coverage from Nigeria.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_1

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(Pisani, 2016). Its relationships with Africa have also been mostly “invisible” in the global narrative. This book reconciles this African absence with Indonesia’s ascent by examining Indonesia’s new emphasis on Africa under President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi. The geopolitical impact of China’s involvement in Africa represents “a major, historically unprecedented change” (Large, 2021), with ramifications yet unclear to fully evaluate. China’s political, economic and security engagement with Africa could be the most essential reality for the African continent since the fall of the Soviet Union (Lee, 2010; Taylor, 2011). However, without playing down the critical strategic significance of “China in Africa” (Alden, 2005), Afro-Asian relations have broadened beyond China-Africa only with the rise of other external powers’ engagement in Africa like India, Japan or South Korea. Academically, multiple comparisons are encouraged between the African approaches of external powers. Contrary to simply asymmetric perspectives of Africa’s ties with the rest of the world, the topic of African agency has grown to prominence, emphasising a plurality of “Africas”.2 African foreign relations are studied on all levels, not only from a unitary state perspective (Alao, 2020; Alden & Large, 2019; Hashim & Graf, 2017). African studies have developed in major Asian universities, forming their own knowledge networks (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018). No comprehensive study of Indonesia’s engagement with Africa has been published until now (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). This book aims to bridge this gap. This major Asian nation of almost 300 million people seems to have been forgotten. As usual, Indonesia continues to fly under the radar. Studying emerging Indonesia’s African foreign policy is strategic,3 recalling history and especially the Konferensi Asia Afrika (KAA) organised in Bandung in 1955,4 also because only since the election of Joko Widodo as the President of the Republic 2 With African agency as “domestic control of the governance process ” with pro-active Africans, who not only become receivers (Procopio, 2018). African agency’s intensity in international affairs is debated (Gwatiwa, 2022). 3 According to expert Marcel Merle, in a succinct definition, “Foreign policy is (...) the part of the activities of the state that is focused on the ‘outside’, meaning, contrary to domestic politics, activities which deal with issues outside the borders of the state” (Merle, 1984). 4 The Asia-Africa Conference or Konferensi Asia Afrika (KAA) took place in Bandung in April 1955, gathering 29 countries. It is often referred to as simply Bandung. Bandung hosted 2000 guests and 400 journalists (Van Reybrouck, 2022).

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in 2014 has Indonesia started to join the contemporary Asian enthusiasm for Africa, privileging the economic field following the popular and often deceptive concept of “economic diplomacy” (Himawan & Tanjung, 2017), implemented for decades already by other major Asian powers (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). The new global environment following the Cold War’s conclusion explains the sharp increase in the intensity of Afro-Asian interactions, or, as will be seen, relations between specific regions of Asia and Africa. The new global environment following the conclusion of the Cold War explains the sharp increase in the intensity of Asia–Africa interactions, or, as will be seen, relations between specific regions of Asia and Africa. Asia’s engagement with Africa evolved from a relationship centred on Cold War politics and ideology to a relationship described as bringing, some would say, mutual benefits and, others would say, unequal benefits in a context of intense globalisation and market competition; economic neoliberalism reinforcing African dependency (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018; Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). With the changing geopolitical context symbolised by the war in Ukraine and the China-US rivalry, relationships of external powers with Africa are becoming increasingly political to gain support from the coveted African bloc of nations, notably in the UN, as the evolution of Sino-African links underlines. For leaders like Jokowi or Xi Jinping, Asia–Africa matters (Xinhua, 2015). The economic serves higher political and geopolitical objectives. Hybrid technologies determining global power need Africa’s critical minerals, creating a “new geopolitics ” of mineral supply chains (Müller, 2023). Despite the KAA’s prestige and its philosophy of Afro-Asian Solidarity, Asian countries in the twenty-first century have essentially engaged independently with Africa and not through Asia as a continental bloc, even less under any kind of Pan-Asian framework. Afro-Asian interactions have been marked on the global stage by a series of forums launched by major Asian powers, such as Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, but also the KoreaAfrica Forum (KOAF) in 2006 or the India-Africa Forum Summit

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(IAFS) in 2008 (Iwata, 2012, 2020).5 After seemingly being caught up in Bandung romanticism, unaware of Africa’s new strategic importance in the twenty-first century, Indonesia, ASEAN’s giant, held its first Africa+1, the Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF), in April 2018 in Bali, with an explicit economic diplomacy paradigm and willingness to increase business with Africa (Anya, 2018; Kemlu, 2018),6 made “an Indonesian foreign policy priority”.7 Jokowi announced clearly that the aim consists of leveraging Bandung for concrete business (Himawan & Tanjung, 2017). Somewhat institutionalising Indonesia’s engagement with Africa, the IAF focuses on economic relations, including development aid as an incentive, following Jokowi’s instructions to utilise Bandung’s legacy to do concrete business with Africa. His foreign policy objectives define Indonesian core national interests as increasing economic prosperity for Indonesians. Paradigmatically, it participates in what some experts call, with a negative perception, Jokowi’s “new developmentalism” (Warburton, 2016), extended to the African continent. Trying to increase the welfare of one’s people seems a laudable goal, and “developmentalism” is nothing really new in East and Southeast Asia. This is the path all Asian developed nations took to reach their development success.8 The African strategies of Asian powers offer a panel of approaches rooted in history, partaking in a broader shared Afro-Asian past, and pursuing their own economic, political and security interests (Iwata, 2012). Although strategies have been evolving (Panda, 2017), the Asia– Africa multilateral way seemed a less straightforward path or may not have suited the strategies of countries like China, whose pragmatic and increasingly hegemonic foreign policy reflects its rise to great power status (Hodzi, 2019). While Indonesia tried to institutionalise AfroAsian intercontinental multilateralism, other Asian powers privileged

5 As a precursor in this matter, France has been organising this type of summits since 1973, initially limited to Francophone Africa or the so-called pré-carré Africain, meaning the “African backyard”. In 2021, France organised the 28th Africa-France Summit or “Sommet Afrique-France” (Glaser & Airault, 2021). 6 Country-to-continent forums between external powers and Africa, a multi-bilateral framework, are also called ‘Africa+1’ platforms (Soulé, 2020). 7 “I emphasize that Africa is one of Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities ” said President Jokowi when receiving the then President of the Republic of Niger Mahamadou Issoufou in Jakarta in October 2017 (Lumanauw & WBP, 2017). 8 And many Western nations.

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country-to-continent and bilateral means for the institutionalisation of their African ties in political-economic, socio-cultural and security terms, although the African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) emerge as unavoidable enabling partners. The lack of AU support for both the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) as complete intercontinental multilateralism and the IAF interrogates, in different manners, Indonesia’s ways, comprehension and expertise concerning Africa. On top of the Afro-Asian foreign policy discourse, China implements the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initially involving several parts of Africa, especially East Africa (Xing, 2019). Africa is now absorbed as a whole, with FOCAC being part of BRI. Securitisation trends through a security paradigm shift coupled with multilateralisation discourses can be seen in China’s approach to better protect its African interests by facilitating intervention when needed, following in the footsteps of the French or US security frameworks (Alden et al., 2018; Ghiselli, 2021). Indonesia has not thought holistically about its new African expansion’s potential impact on its foreign policy doctrine. With the possible rise of its African interests, Indonesia’s doctrine and approach could also evolve progressively. Since 2016, without results, India and Japan have proposed a strategy that appears to hedge against China, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), uniting Japanese funds and knowledge of development aid cooperation with India’s strong African networks, notably its diaspora, and technology (Yoshimatsu, 2019). Overall, finding the right multilateral or multi-bilateral approach or ways to institutionalise relations with Africa remains challenging for all external powers. Indonesia’s economic diplomacy approach to Africa appears quite fragile if security issues are not seriously considered, as the experience of many external powers reveals. Increased assets and more citizens moving to Africa call for more attention to their security and protection. Still, Indonesia’s new, more bilateral or multi-bilateral focus, in particular through the IAF, warrants study, notably Indonesia’s balance between Bandung’s multilateral ideals and bilateralism based on pragmatic national interests or an Africa+1 approach that focuses primarily on economic diplomacy, at least apparently. As Bandung’s host and organiser, Indonesia possesses in Africa both a historical advantage and a responsibility not to disappoint too much, which could harm its status.

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Simultaneously, after privileging restricted multilateralism to engage with Africa through country-to-continent approaches and bilateralism, giant countries like India and China also began to take a broader multilateral African approach, especially through the UN and the AU, but also through BRICS or IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa). With the tremendous growth of their geopolitical weight and influence, multilateralism complements their bilateral and multi-bilateral approaches, better serving national interests and prestige globally (Panda, 2017).9 Multilateralism is weaponised as a state tool beyond the rhetorical norms usually attached to the concept, advancing national interests (Acharya, 2004b; Scott, 2013). Given China’s superior economic means and projection capacities, the Sino-Japanese “asymmetrical rivalry” occurs openly in Africa (Hirono, 2019). From another perspective, the policies of Asian powers towards Africa appear complementary too, focusing on different issues with different means (Iwata, 2020). Institutionalising Afro-Asian relations has proven a tricky matter. No intercontinental platform has yet succeeded in becoming an Afrasian catalyst.10 The Asia-Africa Summit (AAS) was only held in 2005 and 2015 on the KAA’s anniversaries and was not institutionalised. The only framework for institutionalising Asia–Africa relations, created in respect of the Bandung Spirit as a sort of continuation of the Bandung memory, is the NAASP, established by Asian and African leaders during the AAS in April 2005 in Jakarta as a blueprint for enhancing future Asia–Africa cooperation. As an Afro-Asian bridging effort co-chaired by Indonesia and South Africa since its inception, the NAASP centred its cooperation on three broad pillars of partnership, the same three pillars since the KAA, namely political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation.11 Despite Indonesia’s 9 Confronted with rejection and anti-French sentiment in the Francophone sphere and the Russian challenge, France has also weaponised multilateralism to support its national objectives and interests on the continent (Charbonneau, 2016; Erforth, 2016, 2020; Henke, 2020; Recchia & Tardy, 2020). 10 “Afrasia” is a term invented by historian Arnold Toynbee (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018). Mine describes the Afrasia bloc has the potentially dominating platform in the future due notably to its dominating demographic weight (Mine, 2022). 11 The focus is on law, technology, education, international training programs to develop SMEs, and capacity building, especially to support Palestine. Given the operationalisation problems of the NAASP, Wirajuda set up a NAASP Ministerial Conference on Capacity Building for Palestine held in July 2008. “My idea. No one will dispute

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call, other Asian powers privileged their own way. Indonesia itself focused on its domestic issues since Reformasi, not making Africa a foreign policy priority as if Asia–Africa did not encompass Africa. Domestic politics being the basis of all Indonesian foreign policy, a “symbiotic embrace” (Leifer, 1983), if domestic impediments are too severe, there is no room for an expansive foreign policy (Sukma, 2003). Helped or forced by geopolitical circumstances, Indonesia is now truly positioning itself as an Indo-Pacific power on the global stage, supporting multipolarity through its own Indo-Pacific conception and ASEAN Centrality, notably aiming at supporting maritime issues, handling great power competition and preserving ASEAN Centrality. Opposing harsh geopolitical rivalries and supporting cooperation, in 2018, Jokowi launched Indonesia’s “Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept ” concentrating on maritime cooperation, connectivity for prosperity, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents & Translation, 2018). Prolonging this indigenous Indo-Pacific concept, Indonesia conceptualised and pushed for adopting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok on 23 June 2019 (Kemlu, 2019a). Previously absent from Indonesia’s geopolitical framework, East African coasts are now present in Indonesian leaders’ mindsets. The Asia–Africa platform might also have been ruled out to avoid overshadowing the Indo-Pacific geopolitical framework. We will see how Western nations have been wary of Afro-Asian relations since Bandung. Still, the Asia–Africa mandala could be considered a wider concentric circle than the Indo-Pacific mandala (Shekhar, 2018). Lacking ambition and precision given the stakes and potential in Asia–Africa relations, undermined by the Western Sahara issue,12 the NAASP was renewed in 2015 at the AAS with the same Co-Chairs. In 2013, the AU did not respond to South Africa’s request to integrate (its implementation in contrast with the NAASP ).” The aim was to train 10,000 Palestinians. Indonesia agreed to train 1000. China, Japan, Vietnam, and some African nations joined. In Indonesia, the private sector and SEOs also participated like Astra automotive, Telkom, and banks. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 12 As will be described later. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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the NAASP into the official AU agenda (African Union, 2013). Until now, the NAASP has not been formalised into an operational Afro-Asian framework (Dlamini, 2019). South Africa also prioritised other schemes, especially FOCAC and BRICS, with its accession to the BRICS in 2011 (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021).13 AU Centrality might also compete with ASEAN Centrality. Should the AU or ASEAN be the main conveyor in Afrasia? The AU is a partner of African forums hosted by Asian powers such as China, Japan, India, and South Korea. The AU headquarters in Addis Ababa were funded and built by China. Indonesia has posted a Permanent Representative to the AU since January 2012.14 Yet, both the NAASP and the IAF have not been endorsed by the AU, contributing to limiting those initiatives’ impact. Organised by Kemlu, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry,15 the IAF is placed directly under the President’s patronage, although not at the Summit or Ministerial level. It is not formally institutionalised as a regular forum that would be fixed in time, every two or three years. Africa+1 forums usually gather African leaders at the Presidential or Ministerial level, hosted by Asian countries, to improve socio-political, economic and cultural relations. Billions of dollars of investment and aid from Asian countries are usually announced, making it sometimes sound like a onesided, asymmetric relationship, not so different from the West’s relations with Africa and its forums like the Sommet France-Afrique. With the IAF, the scale of Indonesia’s involvement is more modest than other Asian powers due to Indonesia’s weaker material capacities. Jokowi himself is also known to dislike international political forums without concrete business outcomes. Probably a mistake, he never attended the UN General Assembly (UNGA) annual meeting in person in New York.16 A preliminary academic study commissioned by Kemlu recommended an economic forum at the summit level (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016). Formally, the IAF became a mere business forum, satisfying Jokowi. The IAF’s absence of recognition by the AU complicates Indonesia’s capacity and marge 13 BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 14 As Chair of the African Union Commission (AUC), Dr. Jean Ping, received the

letter of credentials from the first Permanent Observer of the Republic of Indonesia to the AU, H.E. Mr. Ramli Sa’ud (African Union, 2012). 15 Kemlu: Kementerian Luar Negeri. 16 Several diplomats told the author this contravened his constitutional mandate.

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de manoeuvre to organise such a forum at a higher level. Moreover, its lack of financial power compared to other main Asian nations forces the archipelago to preserve a low profile and keep its ambitions limited in Africa, or find the proper discourse. The Indonesian state cannot massively invest in Africa today, except through Pertamina, justified by Indonesia’s domestic oil needs. Therefore, to save face and protect its pride and dignity, Indonesia cannot boast too much about its engagement like China or India do, risking creating overexpectations in Africa. Still, through Bandung, Indonesia holds a unique position in Asia– Africa and a potential role yet to be played in the context of the drastic intensification of Asia–Africa relations, more precisely, of significant parts of Asia with major parts of Africa. Indeed, several ASEAN nations have extremely limited links with Africa and vice versa. Anyhow, Indonesia is late in engaging Africa compared to other Asian powers. Although President Jokowi is now better aware of the strategic importance of Africa for Indonesia, like the most prominent figure in his government, his main ally and backer, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment retired General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (LBP), assigned as Chair of the Indonesian Task Force for African Infrastructure, by Jokowi himself.17 LBP has been very active in seeking and trying to develop infrastructure projects and other deals in Africa, as seen through the Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID) held in August 2019 in Bali (Kemlu, 2019b).18 Progressively, increasing his power alongside Jokowi’s, Luhut also leads hilirisasi diplomacy in the Afro-Asian spirit, “hilir” meaning downstream, promoting commodity-based downstream industrialisation, particularly in Africa, through policy diffusion. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has increasingly focused on Africa for more traditional diplomatic tasks. Having suffered from colonialism and contributed to many African countries’ independence as the first Afro-Asian country to proclaim its independence, Indonesia can adopt a warm and friendly approach towards

17 According to the AfDB, Africa needs be $130–170bn billion per year for infrastructure, with a funding deficit of $68–$108bn (MacLeod & Guepie, 2023). 18 Following the tradition of other Africa+1 forums, Kemlu communicates that the IAF brought in $586.56 million in deals and the IAID $822 million (Kemlu, 2020).

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Africa (Van Reybrouck, 2022).19 In Indonesia’s modern history, Africa is clearly important, not only due to the KAA’s prestige for Indonesia and its diplomacy, but also since Africa often supports Indonesia. Egypt was the first country to recognise Indonesia’s independence. Several independent African countries supported Indonesia on the issue of West Papua, terra irredenta (Leifer, 1983), at the UN. Yet, Africa has been contemplated as an abstract notion in Indonesia and Indonesian elite mindsets until recently. It still largely is. The continent exists through the memory of Bandung or through clichés associated with it, which has not made it attractive in the archipelago. Africa has meant Asia–Africa and stayed related to the Sukarno era. Sukarno’s fall marked the end of any serious Indonesian approach towards Africa. Despite the Jokowi effort, led by Luhut, Indonesia’s engagement and dedicated means remain limited. Since the Suharto era, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been more focused on regional affairs, seeing ASEAN as its foreign policy cornerstone.20 Becoming a G20 member under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia increased its prestige, viewed as the world’s largest Muslim-populated democracy and a thriving economy despite heavy problems of corruption, legal reform and inequality. Lacking focus, SBY’s foreign policy doctrine, “a thousand friends, zero enemies ”, could not sufficiently raise Indonesia’s influence outside ASEAN. Under Jokowi, still respecting the bebas aktif doctrine,21 Indonesia appears more focused on asserting its interests and more selective in its foreign engagements for more efficiency. Africa is on Jokowi’s agenda, calling for a deeper engagement.

19 At the AU Summit in January 2015 in Ethiopia, Minister Retno L.P. Marsudi met the Chair of the AUC, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who said “Indonesia has a good reputation in Africa, and it has the Bandung Conference of 1955 to thank for that ” (Tarrósy, 2014). 20 Foreign Minister Adam Malik (1966–1977) first presented this idea of ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Leifer, 1983). Contemporary researchers still use that expression (Anwar, 2017, 2020). 21 Bebas aktif or “independent and active” is a foreign policy principle, not a mere

tactic. It does not imply a strict line. It is a path. Indonesia moves inside the path, which can be more to the left of centre or right of centre. Author’s Interview with General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former deputy chief of staff of the army (1973–1974), Roving Ambassador of the Non-Aligned Movement for Africa from 1992 to 1995. Jakarta, June 29, 2020.

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Geopolitics, all major powers’ African involvement, notably Asian powers, and Indonesia’s strategic interests have forced the archipelago to accelerate the intensity of its African interactions, often by mimicry or inspired by other external Asian powers like China. With an unsophisticated approach, Indonesia can do better given the potential big-name Indonesia carries in Africa. Nonetheless, beginning the endeavour is laudable. Friendly and brotherly, Afro-Indonesian historical ties are enshrined in the ten Bandung principles resulting from the KAA (Lee, 2010).22 Like the KAA, the IAF was symbolically organised during the month of April, marking the filiation. Significant for all the Global South, organised by the pioneer of Afro-Asian decolonisation, the KAA marks the beginning of Afro-Indonesian “close support and cooperation”, and South-South Cooperation (SSC).23 Indonesia and African countries sit together in the G-77 in the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).24 Africa stands as an important ally for Indonesia. The current geopolitical situation with the Sino-US rivalry and the war in Ukraine makes it even more so. Although imperfect like all models, Indonesia can appear as a new partner and potential model in the economic, social-cultural and political fields for African nations, with its stable democracy, dynamic economy and peaceful diversity, projecting a positive image and soft power.25 Indonesia’s socio-political profile makes it attractive for African countries to learn from, with a similar focus on stability and development. Indonesia and Africa complement each other in many ways. Naturally, we will always wonder what relations would have been if Sukarno had not been brought 22 The Ten Bandung Principles or the Dasasila. 23 On February 17, 2017 in Bonn, Germany, during the G20 meeting of the Ministers

of Foreign Affairs for Cooperation with Africa, Minister Retno LP Marsudi, stated that: “Indonesian cooperation and support for development in Africa is not something new, but has a long history since the Ten Principles of Bandung in 1955.” She pursued: “The Asia-Africa Conference was significant because not only did it begin the support and close cooperation between Indonesia and Africa, it also became the foundation of South-South cooperation” (Kemlu, 2017). 24 The latter is for the Muslim states, or largely Muslim-populated states like Indonesia. 25 Yet, Indonesia is threatened by democratic backsliding according to many researchers

(Mujani & Liddle, 2021; Power & Warburton, 2020). This matter is not the topic of this work. Moreover, we believe the situation is more complex. Indonesia is de facto engaged in an ambitious process of change.

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down following the 1965 events. The Afro-Indonesian universe would have probably been much richer today. Yet, the situation is what it is, and we must focus on that reality. A 2012 Kemlu study describes Indonesia-Africa cooperation as covering various fields such as health and family planning, forestry, agriculture and fisheries, environment, women empowerment and democracy. Economic cooperation is aimed at trade, energy, infrastructure and the maritime sector. Although limited, Indonesia provides human and institutional capacity building, financing and technical assistance (Bilateral, NAM and SSC) to African countries. Indonesian companies, both SOEs and private, are increasingly getting involved in Africa. The 2012 document also indicates that Pertamina acquired its first overseas oil field in Algeria.26 Indofood dominates the instant noodle market in Nigeria or Ghana under the Indomie brand, expanding throughout Africa. Other companies such as PT DI, PT KAI, Kalbe Farma, Wings Group, Sinar Mas, Indorama or Gajah Tunggal are growing fast on the African continent (Pramono, 2012). That document reveals the absence of a comprehensive framework of engagement with Africa. Indonesia’s interactions with and thinking about Africa remain marginal. In the Jokowi era, the tone, pragmatism and will to engage with Africa evolved. Although knowledge, expertise and allocated means remain insufficient, the highest leadership wants opportunities to be seised. Luhut embodies that Indonesian conquering spirit. In a column in 2017 titled “Indonesia and Africa: Beyond the Bandung Spirit ”, Minister Retno wrote: “The focus of our relations will be economic cooperation” (Marsudi, 2017). The question that comes to mind with Minister Retno’s statement is: Does the Bandung Spirit impede economic cooperation with Africa if there is a need to go “beyond” to increase economic ties? In its First part, Section A, the final communiqué of the KAA mentions economic cooperation, including foreign investment and technical assistance, as the first priorities of Afro-Asian relations, given “the urgency 26 The Menzel Ledjmet Nord (MLN) oil and gas field in Algeria is operated by Pertamina, through Pertamina Algeria EP as a subsidiary of PT Pertamina Internasional EP, since May 2014 with a total participating interest of 65%. The MLN field can produce up to 35,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd). The average oil production from January to May 2023 reached 14,875 bopd. On June 15, 2023, Pertamina extended its concession contract for the next 35 years (Riyandanu, 2023). With the new contract, apart from oil, Pertamina can also build an LPG factory with a 1 million metric tons per year capacity, which can be shipped to Indonesia (Uly, 2023).

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of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region” (Lee, 2009). We will see Retno returning to the Bandung discourse, and Luhut strongly leveraging it for domestic purposes. Undoubtedly, Indonesia and Africa are linked symbolically in a robust way in history. But how to fulfil historical expectations? Bandung gave birth to Afro-Asian solidarity as a concept still carrying tremendous emotional and symbolic power, although no transcontinental platform has been operationalised. Indonesia celebrates the KAA anniversaries, which gathered over 100 countries at the highest level both in 2005 and 2015, launched the unimplemented NAASP during the 2005 KAA celebration, revamping and relaunching it in 2015, and supported IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) by upgrading its main gathering to the Summit level (Anwar, 2020; Connelly, 2015).27 At least symbolically and discursively, the archipelago has committed to Afro-Asian rapprochement. Its total dedication and capacity to make specific and extensive commitments can be questioned. From 2005, the question of Indonesia’s support for Afro-Asian multilateralism, in the Bandung spirit, with the organisation of the AAS and the launch of the NAASP during the KAA’s 50th anniversary (Lee, 2010; NAASP, 2005), while other Asian powers such as Japan, China, India, or South Korea, developed their Africa+1 platforms, offers a unique angle to look into Asian approaches to Africa in the twenty-first century from an Indonesian-centric perspective and with a comparative aspect (Van der Merwe et al., 2016).28 Finding the right bilateral, multi-bilateral and multilateral frameworks emerges as a decisive quest for Indonesia and other Asian powers to

27 Indonesia was IORA Chair for 2015–2017. As an international organisation, IORA

unites countries bordering the Indian Ocean. The entity gathers several Asian and East African countries within a light institutional framework that allows thematic cooperation. The grouping was officially launched in March 1997, initially as an Afro-Asian idea from India and South Africa with the involvement of Nelson Mandela. Its main focus is to promote sustainable growth, economic cooperation and trade in areas such as infrastructure, transportation, health, education, energy and the environment. 28 We will see that this formula of country-to-continent forums placing one external power in front of the whole African continent at once is contested in Africa for its asymmetry and hierarchy detrimental to African interests and dignity and that Indonesia was conscious of that. France was the first to put this format in place with le Sommet France-Afrique in 1973.

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approach Africa effectively. This task is not straightforward nor simple, including for Western powers and emerging powers like Brazil or Türkiye. Following China’s extraordinary efforts deployed through FOCAC (Taylor, 2011), Asian powers joined the so-called “new scramble for Africa” (Carmody, 2011, 2016),29 inviting criticism, especially in the West, towards emerging powers, mostly China, based on alleged neocolonialism increasing Africa’s dependency, criticism often difficult to justify when emanating from former European colonial powers (Ayers, 2013). Asymmetrical patterns of engagement between major Asian powers and African states, with neoliberal economic paradigms carried out by Asian State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or multinational corporations (MNCs) disguised under an SSC discourse, are described as “dependency revisited”, or at least a “mixed-blessing ” in the case of “China in Africa” (Lee, 2010; Taylor, 2014). Historically, Africa has never really been marginalised, always participating in the global system, despite asymmetrical relationships or dependency, and even largely contributing to its formation (French, 2021). Bayart’s “extraversion” theory shows how contemporary African elites actively created and perpetuated their dependence on the global system for their neopatrimonial interests (Bayart, 2000; Lee, 2010). For critical thinkers, emerging powers like Indonesia emerge as additional neoliberal and (sub)hegemonic actors whose oligarchic interests want to acquire Africa’s natural resources and penetrate its markets, keeping Africa cornered in unequal trade, poverty and dependence (Taylor, 2014). Excessive, that vision must sufficiently consider African agency, now a primary topic, and capacities to shape relationships (Alao, 2020; Alden & Large, 2019; Nyabola, 2018). Indonesia is also a country rich in multiple natural resources,30 now sharing its hilirisasi policies with resource-rich African nations.31

29 The limitations of this expression will be evoked later. 30 In 2018, Shekhar cites for example steam coal, refined tin, nickel ore, gold, oil with

reserves of 3.6bn barrels, gas with reserves of 103.3 trillion cubic tons, geothermal with 40% of the world’s resource, palm oil and derivatives. Indonesia was also at the time the 2nd global LNG exporter, Indonesia having now dropped but still remaining in the top 10 (Shekhar, 2018). 31 Which questions the commitment to non-resource rich African nations and risks hurting Indonesia’s position.

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Since Bandung, interrogating “Afrasia” carries romanticism and idealism (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018; Mine, 2022). But, there is no formal institutional platform uniting both continents, apart from minimalist efforts like the NAASP, the Bandung 10-year anniversaries combined with the AAS, or more limited and functional platforms like IORA. None of these Afro-Asian multilateral initiatives can be compared to the scale of intercontinental platforms such as the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Even informal relations between ASEAN and the AU or its RECs have been minimal.32 Among other reasons, Bandung romanticism contributed to preventing Indonesia’s proper consideration of African opportunities. “Asia-Africa” did not give room to Africa, reducing it almost to a chimera in Indonesian minds, a distant and vague geographical entity carrying little importance by itself. In the Jokowi era, the desire to improve relations with Africa was clearly stated by making it a priority for Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, Indonesia’s sometimes limited material and ideational capacity and knowledge deficit, impacting its foreign policy and handling of non-traditional security issues, hindering the accomplishment of its will and the development of real power (Acharya, 2014). African countries suffer from trade imbalances with Asian powers. They mainly export commodities and import all kinds of Asian goods, such as manufactured products (Luke, 2023), thus bringing some experts and media to talk about neocolonialism (Li, 2009; Okolo, 2015; Taylor, 2014). The African rise would be a “shadow rise”. The real, qualitative development and long-term prosperity surge is taking place in China and Asia. African resources support Asia’s growth and development, while Africa’s artificial growth linked to commodity prices keeps poverty at high levels by lacking impactful economic and political strategies benefiting African populations, such as serious industrialisation (Carmody et al., 2020).

32 Internal documents and interviews with these organisations show the rarity of rela-

tions between ASEAN and the AU to date, which can also appear logical since ASEAN does not represent the whole Asian continent. Indonesia wants to develop ties between ASEAN and RECs (Regional Economic Communities) in Africa to facilitate trade notably. Smaller ASEAN countries may not see the benefits for them until now, given their low level, almost absence in some cases, of relationships with Africa as described later.

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While Western media can exaggerate, the question of racism and Africans’ inferiority in Asian eyes are acute topics, like in the so-called West (Bodomo, 2001; Olander & Staden, 2016). From this perspective, Africans who want change have their own vision for their relationship with the world based on those elements and others. With its 54 countries,33 Africa is a continent with an area of 30 million square kilometres, represents a quarter of the world’s emerged lands, 60% of the non-exploited arable land and one-third of global natural resources with 90% unexploited (Obasanjo, 2012), although natural resources often appear as a curse rather than a solution to development (Brookings, 2018; Humphreys et al., 2007). Yet, as Nigeria shows, this curse probably relates more to politics and political decisions than resources (Usman, 2022). With more than 1.4bn people, or 17% of the world’s population, with a growth rate of 2.6%, in 50 years, Africa will become a continent with a population of 2.2bn people, 25% of the world’s population (MacLeod & Luke, 2023; United Nations, 2015). At the end of the century, Africa could represent over 40% of the world’s population, on par with Asia. Afrasia would dominate the world with over 80% of its inhabitants (Mine, 2022). From 2000, economic growth in Africa was above 5% in countries, with nations like Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ghana, Mozambique and Ethiopia showing growth rates of 7 to 9%. Four of the five fastest economies in the world in 2018 were in Africa (Robertson, 2019).34 This was before Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine. Even before Covid19, Africa’s growth diminished significantly in recent years in part due to China’s new domestic political economy, which reduces resource 33 54 African nations are UN members. The AU now unites 55 members including the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic since 1976 and the Kingdom of Morocco since its formal return as a member in January 2017. Morocco left the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in 1984 after the majority of member states recognised the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Conflict over Western Sahara among African countries, especially Morocco and Algeria, can be seen as one of the reasons for the failing institutionalisation of the Asian-African platform according to Dr. Hassan Wirajuda. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). The Western Sahara issue continues to disturb the continent’s coherence and unity and complicates the approach of external powers. The problem caused the severance of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco in August 2021 and disturbed the 8th TICAD edition in Tunisia in 2022. 34 Libya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire.

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consumption. Neopatrimonialism also hinders economic growth in Africa, but this is contested to privilege reasons linked to political decisions (Alden & Jiang, 2019; Carmody et al., 2020; Usman, 2022). Still, in 2023, ten of the top 20 fastest-growing economies were predicted to be African (MacLeod & Guepie, 2023).35 Although now à la mode, Africa is not a fashion trend that goes up and down. “Penser l’Afrique” means surpassing clichés and “thinking Africa” by focusing on African people’s thoughts about their continent, not projecting external visions inconsistent with African realities.36 African agency needs to be studied and encouraged (Alao, 2020; Nyabola, 2018), without being exaggerated given African deficiencies (Gwatiwa, 2022). Yet, like most international relationships, uncovering decision-making processes in Africa and Africa’s relations with other countries, such as China, is complex (Brown, 2012; Staden et al., 2018). From the 1960s to the 1990s, cursed and the continent for pessimism, hopeless Africa was doomed due to HIV/AIDS, natural disasters, poverty, crime, war and various conflicts. Since the 2000s, optimism suddenly rose. Africa became a continent full of miracles.37 Afro-optimism replaced Afro-pessimism among commentators and media (Carmody et al., 2020). Africa was suddenly associated with growth, prosperity, innovation, and all the qualities globalisation values. Afro-pessimism seems reborn today, especially with the impact of Covid-19 and the deadly Russia-Ukraine conflict. “Anti-Africanism” is said to be “embedded in international affairs ” (Gwatiwa, 2022). Regarding China’s African presence, Sino-optimists, Sino-pessimists, and the intermediate category of Sino-pragmatists have also been described (Adem, 2014). This alternation of pessimism and optimism prevented fully describing Africa in all its complexities and dynamics. African views are lacking to enrich the global dialogue. But African civil society is empowering itself and the continent (Nyabola, 2018). The front covers of The Economist should not be confused with long-term trends and evolutions. 35 IMF estimates in April 2022. 36 “Penser l’Afrique” means “Thinking Africa” and “Thinking about Africa” (Sarr,

2016). 37 Enthusiasm could also be read in non-academic books of Indonesian diplomats in Africa (Basnur, 2020).

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Western indicators of economic prosperity do not “make” and are not made by Africa. Africa has its rhythms, dreams and goals (Mbembe, 2013). The supremacy of “the economic” is not necessarily what Africa wants, let alone based on indicators in discordance with African history, culture and reality. Social imbalances and inequalities in affluent Western societies, now often suffering from acute pauperisation, are not necessarily desirable for Africans who value consensus, collectivism and equality over individualism. This reminds us of the concept of “Asian values”, famously advocated by Mahathir, Lee Kuan Yew, or Suharto. The idea lost favour after the Asian Financial Crisis (Sim, 2021). In Indonesia, the discourse on Indonesian or Asian values remains pregnant to justify all sorts of policies, negatively perceived in the West notably. Anyhow, essentialism should be avoided. As a result of colonialism, exploitation or unequal trade, for five centuries, Africa often failed to determine its future, as desired by Africans, not the outside world. Today, Africa enjoys a bigger opportunity to make it happen, although the impact of the chaotic evolution of the geopolitical context is difficult to evaluate. The end of the Cold War and the bipolar world allowed Africa to gradually conduct its diplomacy more independently from the influence of the Western bloc and the gone Soviet Union, seeking new partners, and diversifying relations with non-traditional or non-Western partners. From the 2000s especially, Africa progressively sought to escape Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) linked to the “Washington consensus”, accused of increasing social suffering for Africans through new forms of Western imperialism and neocolonialism such as liberalisation and privatisation programmes imposed by Bretton Woods institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this context, with their increased bargaining power, African countries welcome the presence of new actors or the re-engagement of external powers with historical links to Africa (Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). After 1989, international sanctions were imposed on China, forcing it to increase its non-Western diplomacy. Africa and its substantial bloc of seats in the UNGA are attractive to countries criticised by the West, like China, Russia or Iran. The continent has also been essential for China in its diplomatic competition with Taiwan (Abidde, 2022; Large, 2008). Apart from China, other Asian countries such as Japan, India, South Korea, or Malaysia, and other developing countries such as Brazil or Türkiye; see Africa as part of their new diplomatic agenda from an SSC perspective, a new market for their products and investments, and a source

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of natural resources (Carmody, 2013; Darracq & Neville, 2014; Iwata, 2012; Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Countries like Türkiye “opened up to Africa” since the second millennium (Abdulle, 2019; Ozkan & Akgün, 2010). Russia made its African return under Yevgeny Primakov, then Vladimir Putin (Grissom et al., 2022; Ramani, 2023; Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019).38 Polemics arise around the increasing involvement of developing countries in Africa due to land or resource grabbing. A call to “reclaim Africa” is thus growing (Moyo et al., 2019). In Africa itself, the fall of Apartheid in South Africa resulted in widespread African democratisation. Between 2015 and 2020, thirtyfour peaceful transfers of power between leaders took place in Africa (Devermont, 2020). The emergence of civil society’s digitally-supported power; the creation of new or revived institutional governance mechanisms such as the AU on a continental scale and RECs on a regional scale39 and the decline in the number of conflicts also explain Africa’s emergence on the global stage as a crucial twenty-first-century actor; no longer portrayed as a burden. Africa’s demographic weight cannot be ignored. Yet, pandemics, conflicts, terrorism and climate change are hitting Africa hard. States suffer from terrorism, losing parts of their sovereignty, notably in the Sahel (Raleigh et al., 2021; Warner et al., 2021). Increasingly challenged by China and other emerging powers, Western players are forced to change their African strategies. African centrality is growing. Afrocentric approaches for studying Africa’s internationalisation are increasingly needed to understand what is happening in Africa and between Africa and the world. Many theories are irrelevant, and far from the specific African context (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2012; Murithi, 2014). From a Marxist perspective, theory can only be validated by practice. Given the new geopolitical map and the African renaissance (HunterGault, 2006), African nations have gradually become seemingly more independent from their former Western colonial sponsors. Yet, ties and 38 Yevgeny Primakov was Russia’s foreign minister (1996–1998) then Prime Minister (1998–1999). 39 African RECs like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). RECs are the building blocks to further uniting Africa in the Pan-Africanist spirit as implemented by the AU.

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dependencies sometimes remained strong for decades after decolonisation, as between France and West and Central Africa. This “special”, asymmetric Franco-African relationship is summed up in the controversial concept of la Françafrique.40 Nevertheless, given the changing geopolitics and increasing competition from new actors or returning old actors like Russia, which is specifically targeting France’s African positions, with recent examples in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso or Niger, France is losing ground, suffering from strong anti-French attacks from groups of the African public and must therefore change its foreign policy in Africa to act “Beyond Françafrique” (Sörenson, 2008), a bit like Indonesia wanting to act “Beyond the Bandung Spirit ” (Marsudi, 2017). The fundamental difference is that Françafrique has a neocolonial logic, a Bandung antinomy. France and other Western nations were indeed opposed to Bandung. Overall, Africa globalised, becoming a considerable challenge and opportunity for all major players. Does it make sense to talk about Africa as a whole? Is endorsing a continental-wide identity essentialist? Africa is indeed a very diverse continent consisting of 54 distinct, independent countries, with hundreds of languages and ethnicities. Several Africas cohabitate within Africa. However, “African countries share a similar fate, face the same historical challenges, have the same recent history”, and “the same vision for an Africa that must be again its own power and light ” (Sarr, 2016).41 PanAfricanism is not a dream and emerges as a theoretical concept that may be more powerful than Europe or Asia in the long run. African unity is an ongoing process. The AU was founded on and institutionalised PanAfricanism (Adi, 2018; Falola & Essien, 2013; Poe, 2003). Taking place within the AU Agenda 2063 action plan pushing for greater continental integration,42 probative examples of the African continental integration

40 La Françafrique is a term describing the neocolonial aspects within official and covert bilateral relations between France and its former colonies in Africa, through monetary control or militarily using complex discourses of securitisation and multilateralization (Borrel et al., 2021; Charbonneau, 2016; Erforth, 2016; Pigeaud & Sylla, 2018; Taylor, 2019). 41 Translation by the author. 42 Adopted in 2013, the AU Agenda 2063 aims for African countries to ‘speak with one

voice and act collectively to promote our common interests and positions in the international arena’ (MacLeod & Luke, 2023).

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process are the launch of the All-Africa passport at the 27th AU Summit in July 2016 in Kigali, providing visa-free access for all African nationals to all AU member states by 2021, or the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) among 54 of the 55 AU countries, signed in 2018 in Kigali.43 The “deep trade” AfCFTA gathers over 1.4bn people with a GDP above $3.4tn, around 3% of global GDP (African Union, n.d., 2018; Devermont, 2021).44 It wants to boost intra-African trade, supporting diversification and industrialisation. Trade liberalisation with harmonised Pan-African rules and behind-the-border reforms, and adequate sequencing prioritising AfCFTA implementation before other external agreements to avoid trade diversion, will benefit African manufacturing and exports (Luke, 2023).45 Yet, as of 2023, AfCFTA trade has not begun, with disrespected timelines, rules of origin (ROOs) negotiations being a major issue (MacLeod & Guepie, 2023).46 African societies and institutions clearly live and see the future from a Pan-African perspective. African borders are remnants of Western imperialism and colonialism. “Pan-Africanism can be said to have its origins in the struggles of the African people against enslavement and colonisation” (Abdul-Raheem, 1996). African historical leaders like Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah or Nelson Mandela, and legendary African writers like Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka or Bessie Head believe in Pan-Africanism (Adi, 2018). Compatible with respecting Africa’s diversity, studying Africa as a whole makes sense since it is Africa’s vision and desire for Africa. As Patrice Lumumba said: “We know that Africa is neither French, nor British, nor American, nor Russian, that it is African” (Lumumba, 1961).47 Africans are ambitious for their continent, as seen in the AfCFTA and the

43 The AfCFTA has its Secretariat in Accra. Trade was supposed to start on 1 January 2021, but it has been delayed. 44 AfCFTA is viewed as a “deep trade agreement ” because it is “extending beyond merely tariff reductions that might amount to a traditional free trade agreement. Instead, the AfCFTA includes provisions on trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers, trade in services, and behind-the-border regulatory issues such as competition policy, investment and intellectual property rights ” (MacLeod & Guepie, 2023). Eritrea is the only African country that has not signed the AfCFTA agreement (MacLeod & Luke, 2023; Vilmer, 2021). 45 Harmonising African trade rules is “the rationale of the AfCFTA” (Luke et al., 2023). 46 It is also a major subject for Indonesia-Africa trade negotiations. 47 At the opening of the All-African Conference in Leopoldville, 25 August 1960.

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AU reform process envisaged in the Kagame Report (Kagame, 2017).48 Adding to Lumumba’s thought, we may wonder if Africa is not a little Indonesian or at least Afro-Asian. Indonesia can be considered the first Afro-Asian nation to declare its independence on 17 August 1945 and hosted the KAA in 1955. These two events widely influenced Afro-Asian decolonisation and independences (Van Reybrouck, 2022). Historically, Indonesia matters in Africa and Afrasia. The dynamism and intensification of Asia–Africa relations are key topics of the twenty-first century. Asian-African interactions are not new, especially since humanity was born in Africa. Many similarities exist between Asian and African nations, cultures and ways of thinking. Both possess grand histories with ancient empires and kingdoms, and share a common history of oppression and colonisation, facilitating at least theoretically mutual understanding and creating a common Weltanschauung . The Asia–Africa relationship is thus long-lasting and deep: from the beginning of times, to the ancient maritime routes created by the Indian Ocean monsoons, anti-colonial, post-colonial and anti-Apartheid support and solidarity, SSC led by countries like Malaysia, until the recent big wave of Asian investment in Africa, and African immigration to Asia and vice versa (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018; Bandoro, 2005; Lee, 2010; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). The Afrasia transregion appears as the future dominating world space (Mine, 2022). The KAA is considered a fundamental milestone for Afro-Asian nations. A world of imagination, special paradigms and dreams of solidarity form Asia–Africa or Afrasia. Afro-Asian solidarity is immortalised in the Bandung Spirit and Solidarity concepts accompanying decolonisation and the Third World.49 Intertwined forces brought Asian and African countries closer together in the twentieth century through racial, socio-cultural, political or anti-imperialist, and non-aligned solidarities (Bandoro, 2005). Africans and Asians often share similar beliefs or traditional education systems (Bodomo, 2001). In his speech in Indonesia at the 2015 AAS, President Xi Jinping invited Asian and African countries to pursue “the Spirit of Bandung ”, showing that the Bandung memory 48 The official name of the Kagame Report being: “The Imperative to Strengthen our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union”. 49 See Acharya (2016b), Amin (2016, 2017), Assie-Lumumba (2015), Farid (2016), Lee (2010), Lumumba-Kasongo (2015), Utami (2016), and Weber and Winanti (2016).

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and narrative remain a powerful discursive reference in Asia–Africa relations (Xinhua, 2015). We will see how Luhut leverages this Afro-Asian narrative to advance in Africa. Another critical issue is the perception of Asians about Africa and Africans. Asia is also increasingly visible in Africa, a hot global topic in the media, particularly “China in Africa”. Asia, especially China, is recognised by many Africans for helping build the necessary infrastructure and investing in the economy. But criticism and tensions are also present. The number of Africans in Asia is also increasing, with over 500,000 Africans said to be living in China. While tensions exist between African immigrants and locals in China, the African diaspora in China has become a soft power recognised within the framework of FOCAC’s People-to-People relations (Bodomo, 2015). African immigrants are often associated with drug dealers or useless in the eyes of society. Academic studies underline negative perceptions and attitudes towards Africans by Asian societies. Research even shows how the concept and prestige of “Asian-African solidarity” can be a way to cover up hidden racism and Asian superiority feelings over Africans (Burton, 2016). These are controversial topics to be handled carefully. Many Africans feel emancipated in Asia, notably Indonesia. Criticism from Africans should be heard, not only for moral reasons but also because they will define their own future, especially given the continuous rise of Africa’s demographic weight. Africa criticises the uneven pattern of Afro-Asian trade: African exports of raw commodities against Asian exports of manufactured products and other more sophisticated products (Luke, 2023). The Western Africa trade pattern is similar. African societies reject what they see as neo-colonial trade patterns, asking for fairness. Africa wants better access to Asian markets and to learn more from Asia to gain benefits. From an African perspective, AfroAsian interactions have been framed too narrowly in economic terms (Amoah, 2016). Afrasia should and will be far more than that (Mine, 2022). Economic issues are necessary but not sufficient as a focus. The economy must serve politics and culture, not the other way around. China’s relationship with Africa makes that clear now. This background reveals the strong, still unrealised, potential for AfroAsian collaboration and institutionalisation. In the Asia–Africa context and given competition among Asian powers for access to African markets, resources and political support, Afro-Asian institutionalisation supported by Indonesia through the NAASP, an organisation that did not initially

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coordinate with the AU (African Union, 2013), and recognised as problematic by Indonesia itself (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010), seemingly failed. Every Asian power prioritises its national interests pursued through other strategic means. Wirajuda stated that South Africa played a decisive role in impeding the successful implementation of the NAASP.50 He cited the Western Sahara conflict opposing Algeria and Morocco.51 This Western Sahara issue could also explain, among other reasons, why Indonesia does not envisage organising the IAF in Africa. Western powers have traditionally been wary of Afro-Asianism, fearing being marginalised in the global system by Afrasia. Institutionalising relations with Africa is complex, especially given Indonesia’s lack of knowledge and capacity on Africa until now. Indonesia’s visible attachment to the Bandung Spirit did not suffice to link Asia–Africa together through a multilateral platform.52 With Jokowi, Africa has become a national priority for Indonesia. We will show that this

50 Dr. Hassan Wirajuda was the Foreign Minister of President Megawati (2001–2004) and then the Foreign Minister during President SBY’s first presidential mandate (2004– 2009). Wirajuda gained Megawati’s approval to stay on as foreign minister under SBY. She called him while he was in New York and gave the condition that he continued with “bebas aktif ”, a flexible concept. He was assigned to Egypt twice as a diplomat. First, it was from 12 November 1977 to December 1981 at an “historic juncture” during the Jerusalem peace process. “I went home one month after Sadat was assassinated (on 6 October 1981)”. He was inspired by Sadat later when handling the Bangsamoro and then Aceh peace processes. He was then Ambassador to Egypt, covering Djibouti, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya from October 1997-December 1998. Wirajuda says: “I can claim I am the only one exposed to the Middle East and Africa” in such a way in Kemlu. Wirajuda told the author that the NAASP had failed due to African politics relating to the Western Sahara and South Africa’s stance. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 51 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda

(17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). That conflict also enflamed Morocco-Tunisia relations since Tunisia, increasingly close to Algeria due to its financial weakness, invited the Polisario Front to the TICAD VIII Summit in Tunis in August 2022. Morocco boycotted the event, even though Japan does not support the Sahrawi nation. It is interesting to observe how a major Asian power gets entangled in such a conflict, which directly disturbs the organisation of its flagship Africa forum. It also highlights the obstacles faced by the NAASP. Japan pledged USD 30 billion in aid to be disbursed in three years during TICAD8 (Jechtimi, 2022; Staden, 2022). 52 For India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar: “The Bandung spirit, however, got its reality check within its first decade. Indeed, the experience of the past affirms that Asians are second to none when it comes to realpolitik” (Media Center, 2022).

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cannot be detached from Jokowi’s political and presidential consolidation domestically. General Luhut’s critical role will be described. Indonesia’s approach emulates the country-to-continent framework of other Asian powers with the IAF’s launch focusing on economic diplomacy, modestly, with a touch of development aid to make it look better and smoother, thus placing relations with Africa at the heart of Indonesia’s national interests, as defined during Jokowi’s presidency (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016; Lumanauw & WBP, 2017). Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy transforms Indonesia’s African foreign policy into a unique intermestic endeavour. Afro-Indonesian relations and dedicated means remain somewhat unassuming, but the potential should be acknowledged. Presidential changes in Indonesia could undermine the new African focus and attention to Africa, unless the continent has already become a structural interest for Indonesia.

Problem Formulation As a candidate and then as President, Jokowi launched the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), positioning Indonesia as a maritime power through a grand strategic design based on a developmental paradigm, primarily through infrastructure and industrialisation (Shekhar, 2018). The GMF aims to connect islands, support the maritime economy, and enforce maritime laws, especially against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, to improve welfare, security, and Indonesia’s global position. The maritime vision was partially developed under President SBY, blending development, infrastructure and resources to promote Indonesia as a maritime power on the global stage (Shekhar, 2018). The GMF and Indo-Pacific visions compete and share synergies with the grand strategies of other major powers like China’s BRI.53 The National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN 2005–2025),54 replacing the Outlines of the State Policy or Garis-Garis Besar Haluan

53 The GMF’s actual implementation has been doubted. A coordination problem between the GMF and Kemlu’s own strategic plan (Kemlu Renstra) exists (Irewati & Kartini, 2019). The difficulty of sectoral and bureaucratic coordination in the Indonesian polity will be seen later, which has also been a reason for Indonesia’s late African engagement. 54 Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional 2005–2025.

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Negara (GBHN) of the Suharto era, came into force in 2007.55 The RPJPN supports a maritime vision founded on national interests in five areas: maritime identity, maritime culture, maritime economy, maritime security and maritime diplomacy (Bappenas, 2005). Given Indonesia’s geography and history as an Asian civilisational power, heir to the Srivijaya and Majapahit Kingdoms (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Saha, 2016; Tan, 2007),56 the Plan mobilises nostalgia and refers to the past grandeur of those ancient Kingdoms, a civilisational and political nostalgia invoked by leaders to call for the construction of a better future (Benabdallah, 2020). Indonesian decision-makers envisioned Indonesia as a maritime power before Jokowi. However, the political momentum and leverage came from President Jokowi, who popularised it through the GMF,57 with projects such as the Sea Toll Road and ambitious port development plans (Bappenas, 2005; Elisabeth, 2016; Presiden RI, 2017; Shekhar, 2018). This process was facilitated by Jokowi’s political astuteness and popularity as a man of the people, and Luhut’s implementation capacity. The word “Africa” does not appear once in the RPJPN 2005–2025 (Bappenas, 2005), and only a few times in the National Mid-Term Development Plans (RPJMN 2015–2019 and 2020–2024).58 Three points can be noted. First, Africa is only seen as a “non-traditional export market ”, targeted through economic diplomacy. Bandung representing Indonesian diplomacy’s major milestone, limiting the engagement or minimising Africa’s importance for Indonesia is strange. Bandung already highlighted the necessity of increasing Afro-Asian economic links. Second, China’s economic and cultural expansion into Africa is mentioned in a short paragraph, highlighting how Indonesia’s African foreign policy shift was influenced by other Asian powers.59 China represents a reference for Indonesia under Jokowi, notably influencing its African policy. Asian influences are confirmed by Kemlu’s collaborative academic study on 55 Through Law No. 17 of 2007. 56 Anderson underlines that Indonesia is a new concept and not an inherited project.

Discourse or narratives on “ancestors” should be considered carefully (Anderson, 1999). 57 Indonesians use the term sosialisasi, an important Indonesian social-political concept and act, which means making a policy vastly known to the Indonesian public through specific popularising methods. 58 Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional. 59 “China has expanded its influence in Africa by marketing its products and adopting

cultural approaches such as language” (Bappenas, 2014).

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“Indonesia-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum” (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016). Academically labelled work facilitates the justification of policy choices. Third, Indonesia is presented as holding a major development role through the NAASP, including for Palestine.60 Failing to institutionalise, the NAASP tried to refocus on the Palestinian issue, with more activities on Palestine than on all other topics of cooperation together (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). Yet, the foreign policy shift towards Africa under Jokowi with the IAF’s launch, complementary with the GMF and Indo-Pacific concepts, is confirmed. Indeed, the IAF and Luhut’s efforts are not envisaged in the RPJPN or RPJPM, which praised the NAASP despite its apparent failure. The economic diplomacy framework targeting Africa as a “nontraditional ” export market had been considered beforehand, but not or not adequately operationalised. Like with the GMF, Jokowi’s leadership looks more concrete in its execution. The first mentioned priority of Jokowi’s first mandate agenda mainly focuses on foreign policy,61 repeating the bebas aktif concept, insisting on the need to serve national interests, especially economic interests, and to “strengthen (Indonesia’s) identity as a maritime nation”.62 The President announced early on that his international engagement should have a visible impact on Indonesia’s national interests as he defines or redefines them, explaining also the shift in Africa’s foreign policy. For Jokowi, international forums must be useful for the national interest (Presiden RI, 2016). A short biography of Jokowi describes his political thought as similar to when he was still a furniture exporter aiming to sell more products and find new markets (Bland, 2020). The simplicity of that image based on Jokowi’s past professional background is helpful in grasping an idea of Jokowi’s possible mindset. It also remains too simplistic to perceive 60 “Within the framework of the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP ), Indonesia’s role is very large, especially in exchanging experiences in various development fields. Through the NAASP framework, Indonesia builds solidarity and provides concrete support for capacity building for Palestinians, including for the Palestinian apparatus and police” (Bappenas, 2014). 61 The program presenting the nine priority agendas of President Jokowi and his Vice President for the 2014–2019 period was called the Nawacita. 62 “Bringing back the state to protect the entire nation and provide a sense of security to all citizens , through a free and active foreign policy, reliable national security and the development of an integrated Tri Matra national defence based on national interests and strengthening identity as a maritime nation” (Presiden RI, 2016).

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the complexity of a prominent politician’s interests in a vast polity like Indonesia. Still, the question is to study why Indonesia favoured the Asia–Africa or continent-to-continent multilateral approach for so long while other Asian powers did not, and why Indonesia now apparently follows into the “new scramble for Africa”,63 and how. Multilateralism means blending the different histories, ideologies, visions of national interests, capacities and geopolitical clout of Asian powers and beyond. Continental and sub-continental egos exist between the AU, ASEAN, Asia as an incompletely defined or uninstitutionalised whole, or the Middle East, included in Asia by Bandung. Competition among Asian powers contributes to explaining the complexity of Afrasia’s intercontinental institutionalisation. Sino-African relations have become among the most visible in the contemporary world. Although acting within the framework of SSC, a multilateral engagement, Malaysia still pragmatically promotes its own economic interests. The SSC discourse often appears as a veil hiding the pursuit of national interests (Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). However, these national pursuits placed above more collective ones do not suffice to attach the “neocolonial” term to Asian powers in Africa. They have colonised no one, and African countries are sovereign. Bandung idealism and a sense of historical responsibility for Afro-Asian relations pushed Indonesia towards pursuing the NAASP multilateral attempt privileging a historically charged but almost informal framework, with no true serious engagement, apart from ceremonial and emotional, seemingly impossible to institutionalise as an integrated intercontinental multilateral platform.64 This book has the purpose of providing a thorough study of Indonesia’s African foreign policy in the twenty-first century, especially under Jokowi, and how it is defined and implemented by the highest leadership and implemented, enabling a better understanding of the essence of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. Simply put, we focus on Jokowi and Africa, which also means LBP and Africa. No significant studies on

63 Quite a pejorative expression that we will reject. 64 The absence of serious relations between the AU and ASEAN, or the African RECS

and ASEAN to remain on the subcontinental level of analysis on both sides, confirm the complexity of the task.

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Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Africa exist.65 The African foreign policies of other Asian powers will also be compared with the Indonesian approach to comprehend better Indonesia’s late effort and position among other emerging powers. Through our in-case and comparative approaches, both causal mechanisms from in-case approaches and correlations from comparative studies will emerge to help explain the social actions constituting Indonesian foreign policy towards Africa and its contemporary evolution. This book also interrogates the concept of multilateralism as applied in the Afro-Asian context through Indonesia’s efforts to institutionalise the NAASP. Multilateralism theory needs to be confronted with Indonesia’s intercontinental multilateral efforts to develop an explanatory framework helping to better understand Afro-Indonesian and Afro-Asian relationships (Panda, 2017; Ruggie, 1993; Shaw, 2010). Asia–Africa relations face the absence of an institutional framework acting as a catalyst to enhance their quality and sustainability, serving the interests of both Asian and African nations. Afro-Asian differences, continental divisions in both Asia and Africa and Western fear of Asia–Africa closeness have all been obstacles. Given the importance of cognitive and ideational factors, expectations and perceptions of Indonesian actors in their interactions with Africa will be explored. Causal mechanisms indeed relate to physical actors. African views are also strategic. In the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy and its institutionalisation, African agency and vision of Indonesia-Africa relations will be considered. Bilateral or multilateral relations should not be based on one-sided opinions or paradigms. The West, if the concept still exists, badly listens to Africa. Asia should avoid that mistake, since the African side already complains (Moyo et al., 2019). The NAASP and the IAF have suffered from a lack of attention and consideration for the African side and its complexity. Yet, we are writing mostly from Indonesia, privileging an Indonesian perspective by necessity. In Indonesia, authoritative foreign policy actors like the President or the Foreign Minister dominate (Wirajuda, 2014). The power equilibrium between the President, his entourage, and Kemlu depends on the personality and clout of these figures, especially the President. Under Jokowi, 65 This book is an attempt to bridge the gap. The author’s dissertation also comprehensively studies Indonesia’s African foreign policy under Jokowi (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b).

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Luhut is the dominant figure. Tycoons or the “oligarchy”, intellectual or academic figures, and certain defense and security actors are also prominent (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). Given their financial means, tycoons can largely influence political parties, ministries and bureaucracies like Kemlu, especially all entities relating to economic issues. Academics can be seen as more influential when part of the President’s entourage or close to powerful businesspeople or generals. Idea or policy entrepreneurs can support the birth and development of new foreign policy concepts and communities, as studied by Parsons with the EU or Acharya with ideas spreading. For Parsons, ideas are more powerful causal mechanisms than structures or institutions, as the successful construction of the European Union (EU) shows (Acharya, 2004a, 2009, 2016a; Parsons, 2002). The EU and the EUAfrica rapprochement under the concept of “EurAfrica” were inspired by Bandung and the European fear of being marginalised by an Afro-Asian rapprochement and the birth of Afrasia (Van Reybrouck, 2022). Original ideas based on top-notch knowledge or expertise difficultly emerge in Indonesia due to academic and intellectual deficiencies. Depending on the issue, the Parliament or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) through its Komisi I (Commission I), whose scope of duties covers the fields of defense, foreign affairs, communication and informatics, and intelligence,66 and civil society, media and public opinion can now play a greater role in Indonesia. Democratisation multiplied the number of relevant foreign policy actors (Dosch, 2006; He, 2008; Jones, 2009; Nabbs-Keller, 2013; Rüland, 2009; Teguh & Wibisono, 2009; Wirajuda, 2014). However, the “Africa” topic has still weakly penetrated Indonesian civil society, media and academic circles, given a lack of actor interest, funding, knowledge production and contemporary historical links apart from Bandung. Civil society actors and media act as relays of state messages for the moment in this “African case”, mostly during official events relating to Afro-Indonesian relations. Weatherbee considers that the Indonesian public is mostly “inattentive” to foreign policymaking, except when linked to religion (Weatherbee, 2016). Major issues like the weight of China and its impact in Indonesia or mediatic issues like Palestine seem to attract more vigorous public attention. Yet, even when

66 Source: https://www.dpr.go.id/akd/index/id/Tentang-Komisi-I.

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relating to China, public opinion plays a marginal role in foreign policy that remains in the hands of the President and his closest entourage (Laksmana, 2016b). Logically, we will focus more on the state and its highest decisive actors, notably describing LBP as the decisive actor. Micro-level studies on links between African and Indonesian agencies are always interesting, but we do not feel their level of intensity is sufficient today to have a systemic impact worth prioritising over the power and influence of high-level state actors. Avoiding the study of those dominant actors and concentrating on more trivial issues can typically happen in contexts like Indonesia to not “disturb” and risk facing sanctions. The 2015 AAS was full of rhetoric about the peculiarities of Asia–Africa relations due to the KAA history, accomplishing little.67 The AAS became a celebratory ritual bringing nothing new to the Afro-Asian relationship.68 Asia–Africa clearly lacks an imagined community with a true sense of belonging and an identity (Anderson, 2006). Beyond the modesty of the NAASP compared to what is at stake and its failure to operationalise and coordinate from the start with the AU, the absence of a transregional institutional framework is a problem in Asia–Africa relations.69 Afrasia has yet to be born institutionally. This deadlock situation embodied by the NAASP may explain Jokowi’s sudden realist and mercantilist shift to economic diplomacy, following other Asian giants. The Bandung Spirit represents beautiful promises supported by history and emotion, but rhetorical promises as if Indonesia remained trapped in an Afro-Asian disincarnated dream, while other Asian powers, anchored in reality, pushed their own agenda in Africa through

67 After the AAS in April 2015, the late Indonesian thinktanker Bantarto Bandoro from CSIS wrote in The Jakarta Globe: “But we see the 60th anniversary commemorations as being full of rhetoric. The meetings didn’t produce anything concrete”. He pursued: “We couldn’t even feel their sense of belonging. It seems that delegates made an appearance only because they wanted to be seen as committed to the Asian-African solidarity” (Bandoro, 2015). 68 For Wirajuda, the KAA’s golden anniversary celebration made sense but there was no reason for the 60th anniversary celebration. “Summit fatigue” also intervenes. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 69 This is what Bandoro bluntly concluded while clearly pointing out the issue: “The problem is this Asian-African conference is just a movement without an institutional basis ” (Bandoro, 2015).

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their own summits and comprehensive African strategies. Since 1955, Afro-Asianism failed to institutionalise given the lack of homogenous ˇ 2022). principles, unlike the NAM and its non-bloc principle (Cavoški, To achieve its novel Afro-Asian dream, Indonesia must not be stuck in the past. 1955 is far away. Yet, the Bandung Spirit remains strong, at least symbolically, in Asia–Africa, as Xi Jinping mentioned in his speech during the 2005 AAS in Jakarta.70 Former Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri proposed a second KAA to address contemporary Afro-Asian problems.71 This proposition certainly highlights nostalgia coming from Sukarno’s daughter and the enduring symbolic, emotional and convening power of Bandung. For Indonesia, Bandung remains a paradox complex to manage.72 Under Jokowi-Luhut and their pragmatism, Indonesia implemented a new African engagement. The mindset problem in emerging powers’ African foreign policies, including Indonesia, is strategic to comprehend well. Asians must modify their worldview. The East-West dichotomy does not define the world anymore. Africa already has a global worldview detached from the old East–West dichotomy.73 Asia needs to hear Africa better. For Indonesia, this is a strategic issue. In Indonesia, the absence of Africa in domestic debates and media, unless there is a government forum or bad news, explains and reveals Indonesia’s weak involvement with Africa compared to other Asian powers. Given its democratic identity, Indonesia’s public opinion and civil society should theoretically play a 70 As mentioned in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2015 AAS in Jakarta (Xinhua, 2015). 71 On the 62nd anniversary of the KAA (Perwitasari, 2017). 72 Composing with contradictions, the archipelago, in the voice of its Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, thinks it has to go “beyond the Bandung Spirit” while preserving and benefiting from Bandung as leverage. 73 Ghanaian thinker Adams Bodomo offers great insight into the psychological background of the Afro-Asian relationship. “The first step towards strengthening African-Asian relations is for Asians to adopt a global, rather than an East-West dichotomous approach to world culture. Asians must accord Africa new conceptual spaces in their mindsets . (…) Asians must embrace a more global view of the world to give more conceptual spaces to non-Western parts of the world like Africa, the Caribbean islands, and South America.” He adds that: “Africans do not divide the world into a dichotomous relationship as do Asians ”. The result is that Africa seems unimportant to Asians. “The consequences of such a world-view among many Asians is that Africa and other non-Western, non-Asian countries are relegated to the background in their minds and therefore also in their daily practices ” (Bodomo, 2015).

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crucial role in directing foreign policy issues, even though foreign policymaking is still elitist and often isolated from the public eye (McRae, 2019). Nevertheless, if Africa is not in the minds of the Indonesian people and elites, Africa can difficultly become a significant concern for Indonesia’s foreign policy (Parsons, 2002). Few people are trying to place Africa on the agenda. Even for the Indonesian state, Africa is only classified officially as a “non-traditional market”, a symptom of marginality. Africa must be made to count and become more visible in the Indonesian polity. The question is which actors are interested or willing to focus on that endeavour and how. This book shows how Indonesia sees Africa, especially at the highest level of leadership, but also more generally, and what impact that vision or absence of vision has on Indonesia’s African foreign policy. Africans also have expectations towards the country where the KAA was born. Given Sukarno’s popularity in Africa, Indonesia meant something in Africa, with streets bearing his name, particularly in Egypt, the first country to acknowledge Indonesian independence. Does it still have meaning? What does it mean? Can Indonesia still leverage Bandung in the twenty-first century? Mindset change in Indonesia, and Afro-Asia more globally, will be crucial. Its ambitions and investments in Africa force Asia to understand Africa better, to better listen to the continent and its aspirations, and respect Africans more, avoiding Western mistakes. That may be the role and mission of Indonesia in Africa. Maybe that’s the new bridge that Indonesia can create (Himawan & Tanjung, 2017). The archipelago can lead the way towards Afrasia. Yet, Africans increasingly support Afrocentric approaches. Within PanAfricanism, this Continentalism replaces or complements African nationalisms, empowering African peoples and encouraging African views in foreign policy and IR. Although Africans differentiate former Western colonisers from Asian powers that often suffered from the same colonial burden, they criticise mercantilist and unequal relations with Asia. Given its history and through its hilirisasi diplomacy, Indonesia will aim to underline its Afro-Asian uniqueness. Overall, studying Indonesian foreign policy towards Africa in the twenty-first century requires an exploratory approach, given the lack of available materials compared to China-Africa research. Understanding the African foreign policy shift from an idealist-multilateral approach to a more pragmatic-mercantilist approach based on economic diplomacy

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means looking into different types of causal mechanisms,74 by focusing on the essence and available theorising of Indonesia’s foreign policy, and seeking correlations through comparisons with other Asian powers more advanced in their African policies, influencing Indonesia’s approach through knowledge circulation and mimicry. Foreign policy is seen as an effort to serve the national interest both offensively and defensively, as defined by the reigning leadership.

Literature Review Indonesia–Africa, Asia–Africa There are no thorough studies or seminal works on Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Africa. A search on Google Ngram Viewer confirms this scarcity. A short chapter on “Indonesia in Africa” in a book on Emerging Powers in Africa was published in 2016, focusing on trade and the number of Indonesian embassies in Africa (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). The IAF and the accompanying policy changes had not occurred at that time. Kemlu, in partnership with the Indonesian Eximbank, published a business guide, Road to Africa, in 2018 in conjunction with the IAF on Indonesia’s economic presence in Africa and as a tool for business expansion, limited in the depth of its analysis and non-academic (Eximbank & Kemlu, 2018; Pramono, 2012). The Indonesian case offers a new perspective on contemporary AfroAsian interactions. The contemporary literature on Asia–Africa is fairly recent. Studies appeared more frequently at the start of the twenty-first century with a primary focus on “China in Africa”.75 Since the literature was essentially Western, China was portrayed as a new predator and competitor (Zhao, 2014). Despite nuances and studies deconstructing specific unjustified accusations (Brautigam, 2009; French, 2014), the Western bias was strong from the start. Gradually, new perspectives emerged, especially with the rise of Asian research violating the Western monopoly on historical construction and storytelling. The logical and cultural foundation for Asian-African solidarity was emphasised (Bandoro, 2015; Bodomo, 2001). 74 Such as structural, institutional, ideational and psychological ones (Parsons, 2007). 75 As described in the Routledge Handbook of Africa-Asia Relations published in 2018

(Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018).

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Asian power approaches to Africa are compared with the specific aim of promoting Asian collaborations while acknowledging rivalries (Iwata, 2012, 2020). Emerging powers’ African engagements have been studied using various paradigms that can be Marxist, critical, neoliberal or more realist.76 Various drivers have been analysed, from diplomatic reasons, with China facing Taiwan and sanctions after 1989 or South Korea against North Korea, the need to secure energy and other commodities, or simply for market access to the growing African middle class (Alden, 2005; Darracq & Neville, 2014; Iwata, 2012; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Africa has been described as a “spatial fix” for transnational capital to extend its geographical presence for broader accumulation (Carmody et al., 2021; Taylor & Zajontz, 2020). From a Marxist perspective, transnational capitalists need to expand to survive and preserve their accumulative system. We will not embrace such a systemic view, preferring to seek multiple drivers and more modest explanations. But all explanations need to be considered. We also want to avoid hasty conclusions condemning foreign policies as success or failure. Mercantilism or pure power in realist terms cannot explain the complexity and diversity of reasons for Asian involvement in Africa, be it for China and India through development assistance, China in its support for the African defense sector or Indonesia with its Afro-Asian initiatives (Boutin, 2018; Ndzendze, 2018). Despite Indonesia’s rhetoric of almost exclusive prioritisation of economic diplomacy in Africa under Jokowi, we aim to show that Indonesia’s drive is multi-factorial and not as economic as it might seem, notably aimed at protecting the developmental state. If only material reasons or pure power motivated its foreign policy, Indonesia would have made a robust expansion into Africa already. Other factors prevented it. Foreign policy drivers are not that simple to detect and explain. Weighing their respective importance and interactions can represent a challenge that can only result in approximation. SSC combines the search for material acquisitions associated with more ideational human aspects in the Bandung solidarity tradition (Korkut & Civelekoglu, 2013; Ndzendze, 2018).

76 See notably Ayers (2013), Carmody et al. (2021), Corkin and Naidu (2008), Darracq and Neville (2014), Davis (2018), Hirono (2019), Iwata (2012), Kato (2017), Korkut and Civelekoglu (2013), Kornegay and Landsberg (2009), Taylor (2014, 2016, 2019), Van der Merwe et al. (2016), and Zhao (2014).

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Given their growing global interests, notably in Africa, Asian powers like China or India progressively shift their foreign policy paradigms towards more pragmatic directions to protect their citizens and investments, even if it means somewhat abandoning, or at least modifying, the non-intervention principle (Hodzi, 2019; Okolo, 2015). Questions on the type of Asian powers’ engagement with Africa seem particularly relevant given the rising importance of Afro-Asian relations. Complementing bilateralism, Chinese and Indian African strategies included increased multilateralism through the AU, BRICS and other platforms.77 Indonesia might appear as having chosen the opposite path from multilateral to bilateral. Mixing all forums of Asian and African countries into one AfroAsian or Afrasian platform has been raised.78 This blending would deliver Indonesia’s original, idealistic intercontinental vision presented at the 2005 AAS.79 The question would be who would drive such a platform with rivalries between ASEAN and AU centralities, and between great powers. Indonesian Foreign Policy Prior to Reformasi, a few Indonesian foreign policy seminal works introduced summary concepts. The archipelago’s paradox lies in the combination of “sense of vulnerability-regional entitlement” that can be traced back to the revolutionary struggle for independence and the ancient kingdoms (Leifer, 1983). Indonesia carried a permanent domestic and international struggle as a revolutionary country, and developed

77 Jagannath P. Panda from the Institute for Defence Studies in New Delhi particularly focuses on the example of South Africa (Panda, 2017). 78 For Japanese Professor Yoichi Mine, who promotes the concept of Afrasia: “these country-to-region summits may well be reorganized into a single region-to-region (AfroAsian or Afrasian) forum, thereby avoiding duplication and unnecessary competition and opening up a way of dynamic mutual learning between Asians and Africans, rather than one-way transfer of knowledge from a big Asian country to dozens of separate African nations ” (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018). 79 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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a contested identity narrative.80 These conceptual shortcuts somewhat oversimplified Indonesian foreign policy. Based on the variable of political competition intensity in the regional environment, seen as more or less hostile from elite perceptions, Indonesia seeks assistance or full autonomy from great powers, and accepts a certain degree of foreign intervention or not. Through the Javanese syncretic tradition, Indonesia can blend opposites (Anderson, 2007). Jokowi can be seen as a master in the Javanese art of blending contradictions.81 Indonesian foreign policy results from domestic power struggles, playing a political role in leadership legitimacy (Nabbs-Keller, 2013; Sukma, 2003). Foreign policy is very “political” in Indonesia (Weinstein, 1976). Overagitated domestic politics is seen as weakening the state, making it vulnerable to internal disturbance or outside interference (Leifer, 1983). Indonesia faces various internal threats related to religion, ethnicity, or separatism (Suryadinata, 1996). After monopolistic authoritarian rule, democratisation increased the Indonesian polity’s complexity and volatility, implying political change and reform (Crouch, 2010). With its associated domestic political struggles, democratisation is studied as a major variable in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Carnegie, 2009; Dosch, 2006; Gindarsah, 2012; Nabbs-Keller, 2013; Rüland, 2009; Wirajuda, 2014). With the multiplication of foreign policy actors, including the DPR, political parties, public opinion and the media,82 electoral pressure encourages political leaders to prioritise domestic politics over the national interest if there is a conflict of priorities and depending on the public pressure’s intensity (Dosch, 2006). Gaining a bigger role, parliament can theoretically suppress the government’s foreign policy choices. The President is now accountable (Rüland, 2009; Wirajuda, 2014). This capacity depends on the level of presidential power consolidated by the highest Indonesian leader, notably his control of parties in the parliament. The 80 “Classic” writers include Michael Leifer, Franklin B. Weinstein, Jon M. Reinhardt,

and Leo Suryadinata. Some of their works include Leifer (1983), Reinhardt (1971), Suryadinata (1996), and Weinstein (1976). 81 Probably more than a “Man of Contradictions ”, to use the title of an English biography about the Indonesian statesman (Bland, 2020). 82 Robert Dahl’s pluralist polyarchic paradigm indicates that interest-based contestation occurs between players (Dahl, 2006; Dosch, 2006; Homan & Lantis, 2019).

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military avoids visible foreign policy intervention (McRae, 2019). Yet, former generals like Luhut or Prabowo Subianto remain well-present in senior ministerial positions, handling strategic issues like investment or defense.83 The government uses democracy promotion to build its global image (Rüland, 2017). However, key policy areas remain secluded from democratic political upheaval, left to experts, such as Indonesia’s South China Sea policy. This claim that some areas of Indonesia’s foreign policy are isolated from competing interests is examined in our case (McRae, 2019). A new nationalism revealing great power aspirations, with economic nationalism through protectionism and alleged paranoia and obsession with maintaining national dignity, notably after the Asian financial crisis humiliation,84 accompanies democratisation (Aspinall, 2016; Fealy & White, 2016). “Democratic regression”, even an “authoritarian turn”, supposedly happened under Jokowi (McRae, 2019; Power, 2018; Power & Warburton, 2020). The concept of “Asian values” is criticised for hurting true democracy promotion (Rüland, 2017). Indonesia’s assertiveness through sinking foreign vessels due to IUU fishing, capital punishment or economic protectionism through resource nationalism, is heavily criticised in the Western world (Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015; Warburton, 2016, 2017). However, a number of protectionisms have benefited economic development.85 The Covid-19 crisis and the geopolitical upheavals in Ukraine or the Taiwan Strait reinforce the perceived need for national self-reliance. For Indonesia, developing countries have a right to prosperity through commodity-based industrialisation.

83 The seniority factor remains important in Indonesia. Senior politician and retired General Prabowo Subianto is the Minister of Defense of Jokowi’s second mandate after fighting him and losing twice for the presidency. Subianto was married to a Suharto daughter during the New Order. At the time of writing, he is a leading candidate to win the 2024 presidential election. 84 “the image of Soeharto signing a letter of intent (LoI) document under the gaze of International Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director Michel Camdessus, with arms folded on his chest, has become a coup de grace, the source of the nation’s shame. This moment is the watershed moment that reignited Sukarno’s brand of nationalism, and today we are still living under the shadow of that moment ” (Taufiqurrahman, 2023). 85 The German economist Friedrich List is often evoked. All great powers like Japan, the UK, the USA, France, and now China have used protectionism to rise (Hudson, 2010; Ince, 2016; Kitson & Solomou, 1990; Levi-Faur, 1997; Sohn, 2010; Zambakari, 2012).

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Easy accusations of authoritarianism or illiberalism fail to understand domestic and global contextual realities.86 Like in all democratic nations, a meta-security framework exists in Indonesia beyond pure political contestation, helping preserve minority rights and stability. Oligarchy researchers consider that Indonesia’s main oligarchs’ interests are not focused on “the capture of foreign markets or resources or to influence the policies of other nations ”, but on protecting their rent-seeking activities and local economic accumulation, explaining Indonesia being inward-looking (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). Indonesia’s African foreign policy denies this assessment. Indonesia’s economic interests contribute to driving the recent African focus, from the private (Indonesian MNCs) and state (Indonesian SOEs) sectors. Contradicting their seniors, a new generation of oligarchy researchers claim that the Indonesian oligarchs have expanded their interests to ASEAN to secure the Southeast Asian market (Al-Fadhat, 2019). This complete change of analysis shows the oligarchic framework’s limitations. Yet, the thesis that the change to democratic rule in 1998 was just a veil preserving the oligarchic system remains strong, although partial. Freedom exists outside oligarchy. Shekhar presents the most recent comprehensive study on Indonesian foreign policy, in the Indo-Pacific context, a new geopolitical space, a “special framing” Indonesia was given and has given to itself through its proper conceptualisation and the AOIP. He fills the gap in researching Indonesia’s emerging power status and how Indonesia’s rise is signalled to the world through the Indo-Pacific as an expanded geopolitical space, a post-ASEAN space or, more accurately, a prolongation of ASEAN through ASEAN Centrality. Indonesia fears being outcompeted by the Indo-Pacific frameworks and strategies of major powers, risking hurting

86 After seeing Jokowi as a positive leader fighting for his people’s welfare until 2020, Liddle in 2021 seemed to view Jokowi as a pure enemy of democracy responsible for democratic backsliding in Indonesia (Liddle, 2020; Mujani & Liddle, 2021), confirming a critical problem of contemporary liberal democracy and its sometimes-unimaginative promoters with a lack of consistency and long-term perspective. Indonesia cannot be fully judged through a liberal democratic framework that is too reductive. The heightened intensity of the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US and the evolution of the geopolitical context, in general, are explaining factors of the analysis or opinion of academics; and their swift shifts.

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ASEAN Centrality.87 Shekhar studies Indonesia’s status, and status dissonance, as an emerging power signalling its rise through a combination of neo-classical realism and social identity theory, allowing to examine structural factors and domestic politics together. This analytical categorisation as an emerging power brings an explanation to the narrative of Indonesia rising, in reality and discourse (Shekhar, 2018). He also looks at power projection, leadership, and the search for major power status, increasingly studied topics (Fealy & White, 2016; Laksmana, 2016a; Shekhar, 2018). As an Indo-Pacific power, Indonesia, through its maritime power strategy, the GMF, presents itself as a leading strategic Asian country at the crossroads between two major oceans, adopting a comprehensive maritime policy under Jokowi (Muhibat, 2017; Saha, 2016). As a maritime and archipelagic country, leader of ASEAN,88 Indonesia implements the GMF as a “strategic framework for foreign policy”, combining a multilateralist approach through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and more unilateral acts like the policy of sinking illegal ships trapped in Indonesian territorial waters.89 Indonesia tries to fulfil its national interests, mainly defined in domestic prosperity for its people under Jokowi, and enhancing its international status to better match its geopolitical weight (Shekhar, 2018). The imperative of preserving stability and defending Indonesia’s sovereignty as the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) remain the utmost raison d’Etat .90 Indonesia’s foreign policy has been shaped by the Javanese conception of power, privileging centralisation and hierarchy. Status recognition

87 The reality of ASEAN centrality is contested given China’s strength that strongly

influences ASEAN nations like Cambodia or Laos, undermining ASEAN capacities and relevance. Minilaterals like AUKUS or the QUAD also defy ASEAN’s regional primacy (Weatherbee, 2016). 88 At least on paper and through size and GDP, since Weatherbee indicates that Indonesia’s ASEAN leadership is contested. Indonesia cannot really pursue its interests through ASEAN, notably given the strength of major external powers like China (Weatherbee, 2016). 89 The ship-sinking policy, a policy of affirmation, was abandoned during Jokowi’s second mandate under foreign pressure and grievances. The shift was followed by the “lobster seed” polemic undermining again Indonesia’s sea fauna for material interests (Dao, 2020; Sukma, 2019). 90 The acronym NKRI stands for Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.

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and respect matter (Anderson, 2007; Shekhar, 2018). Western theoretical frameworks are unsuitable for analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy (Acharya & Buzan, 2010, 2019; Kang, 2003), as a post-colonial country (Reinhardt, 1971). A Javanese leader like Jokowi acts in manners unique to his culture and idiosyncrasy (Shofa, 2023). This needs to be well understood in the specific Indonesian context, not making the wrong interpretations and being irrelevant. Without essentialising, traditional Javanese power theory helps understand why Indonesia supposedly maintains a low international profile despite being a major G20 emerging power (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Anderson, 2007).91 Given geopolitical and domestic changes, Shekhar notes a strategic “reset” occurred in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi, which is still underway, entailing broader self-esteem and ambitions. Yet, Indonesia is not seen as desperately seeking power maximisation or ruthless power balancing, given its relatively low military capacity (Acharya, 2014; Shekhar, 2018). Its knowledge production and innovative capacities remain insufficient, so we wonder if it is not a “reset” lacking “riset”.92 Following Gilpin’s theory that leadership change leads to institutional change (Gilpin, 1981), a foreign policy paradigm shift from SBY to Jokowi occurred. Whereas SBY was inspired by globalism, multilateralism and normativism, Jokowi emerges more as a realist leader, hard-power focused, utilitarian, almost mercantilist with a maritime and developmental strategy, especially through infrastructure construction and commodity-based downstream industrialisation, often with Chinese support (Bland, 2020; Shekhar, 2018; Warburton, 2016). Indonesia’s material gains and increasing economic weight are changing its global perceptions and ambitions, and other countries’ perceptions (Fealy & White, 2016; Shekhar, 2018; Tan, 2007). Indonesia also aims to be a model for resource-rich African nations concerning commodity downstream industrialisation, a process called hilirisasi, moving up the value chain and gaining fairer trade terms. 91 The classification of Indonesia varies as a middle power, emerging power or pivot state, depending on the author and paradigm (Santikajaya, 2016). This type of classification problem for Indonesia differs from the object of this book. Nevertheless, Indonesia is not a middle power, or at least not in the same sense as Australia, Canada or South Korea. It does not conceive itself in that way. Indonesia is a major emerging power and an aspiring and ambitious great power. This study proves it. 92 Riset means research in Indonesian. “A reset lacking research” could be called “‘reset ’ kurang riset ”.

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Jokowi banned nickel exports and forced the construction of local smelters, generating substantial international investments, especially from Chinese firms,93 China being the world’s mineral hub (Müller, 2023), and resulting in export revenues from transformed nickel as steel of $20.8bn in 2021 and $33.8bn in 2022 compared to $1bn of basic nickel exports in 2020. Defying the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and opposing Western powers, especially the EU, which rejected its raw nickel export ban, Indonesia plans to quickly apply the same scheme for bauxite, copper, gold, coal or seaweed to create favourable terms of trade and become a developed nation. In 2022, $14.3bn from the $33.8bn were generated by the export of iron and steel (Karunia, 2023; Nugraheny, 2022). Luhut has also stated that gas exports could be banned to support petrochemical industrialisation (Setiawan, 2023). Led by Luhut in his commando style, hilirisasi diplomacy promotes Indonesia’s downstream industrialisation in Africa and Latin America, following the Afro-Asian Bandung Spirit, mobilising the Global South to defend Indonesia’s policy, forming a coalition of resource-rich nations, although competition among commodity-rich nations can be tough (Müller, 2023). In the environmental field, Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) formed an “OPEC of rainforests ”, a Tropical Forest Alliance, pressuring developed countries for funding (Greenfield, 2022).94 Positioning Indonesia as a new model for the developing world, Jokowi and Luhut act based on their belief that Indonesia’s “national efficacy” has strongly increased (Kennedy, 2012). According to Luhut, Global South cooperation uniting resource-rich developing countries in critical minerals, and agricultural commodities, plantations and tropical forestry, would make Indonesia “the centre and leader of developing countries ”, chosen

93 Over $14bn have already been attracted (Goodman, 2023). The leading Chinese investor in Indonesia’s nickel processing sector is the Tsingshan Group, the world’s largest producer of ferronickel and stainless-steel products. Its Indonesian partner is private, the Bintang Delapan Group (www.bintangdelapan.com). The export ban on unprocessed minerals implemented in 2014, based on Government Regulation Number 23 (2010), was decisive for China to invest. In 2013, President Xi launched the Maritime Silk Road in Jakarta (Tritto, 2023). 94 These three nations signed an agreement at Cop26 in Glasgow to stop deforestation by 2030. They are key to limiting global warming. All face threats relating to illegal enterprises and unreasonable commercial logging and mining.

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by developing countries themselves in the Afro-Asian spirit (Al Hikam, 2023).95 Geopolitical impacts like the Sino-US rivalry, the war in Ukraine, and the rise of multi-aligned India and other emerging nations create a different structural context for Indonesia. Yet, domestic politics sustain every Indonesian capacity as the main determinant for its world projection. A weak military, underdeveloped education and health systems, or lack of scientific and technological research hinder the speed and magnitude of Indonesia’s rise (Shekhar, 2018; Sukma, 2003, 2011), negatively affecting Indonesia’s African policy. Officially, Jokowi’s presidencies focused on strengthening national capacity, meaning national development as a basis for increasing regional and international engagement. Classically, following the bebas aktif principle, striving for global peace, Indonesia seeks to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, develop people’s welfare and maintain regional stability, all presented as Indonesia’s core national interests (Sukma, 2019). Indonesia must strategically position itself between China and the United States (US), or most likely refuse to consider that framing, to maintain its autonomous capacity by ensuring a regional order based on norms, institutions, and balance of power, an interesting blend of liberal-institutionalism and realism. We are observing Indonesia’s Afro-Asian mobilisation attempts from that perspective.

Theoretical Framework A complex process, foreign policy cannot be explained through an overly simplified paradigm excluding certain levels of analysis or factors, especially when dealing with the vast and complex Indonesian polity. Holistic approaches allow a better comprehension of foreign policies. Studies of foreign policies of major external powers in Africa, like China, the UK, India, France or the US, combine structural and agencylevel analysis, and both ideational and material factors (Burton, 2016; Carmody et al., 2020; Charbonneau, 2016; Copson, 2007; Duggan, 2020; Erforth, 2016; Gallagher, 2011; Porteous, 2008; Taylor, 2014); to 95 He also invited Papua New Guinea to join since Jokowi has also put Luhut in charge of strategic relations with this Eastern neighbour. Interesting synergies exist between the minerals and the agricultural sectors, notably for sustainable energy and infrastructure (Müller, 2023).

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avoid clichés seeing China’s African presence as too caricaturally positive or negative. For Seifudein, Sino-optimists view China as a long-awaited benefactor, Sino-pessimist s as a neocolonial power. Without being naïve about China’s African engagement, Sino-pragmatists remain balanced, focusing on facts and la longue durée (Adem, 2014). Fake news and exaggeration have been attached to “China in Africa”, hurting justified criticism. Sino-pragmatism complements an eclectic analysis, given the strong relationship of eclecticism with pragmatism (Brautigam, 2009; Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Explaining Chinese foreign policy in Africa only through a realist paradigm omits Chinese domestic politics and the higher hegemonic political discourse bounding the action and rationality of all Chinese actors, and transnational forces and economic neoliberalism (Duggan, 2020). Similarly, the weight of domestic factors is seen in the absence of Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with Israel (Yegar, 2006), which cannot only be analysed through a geopolitical and mercantilist lens. The 1945 State Constitution and the Pancasila ideology also bound Indonesia’s foreign policy possibilities.96 Although religious factors enter into consideration too, Islam does not determine Indonesian foreign policy. To grasp the complexity of Indonesian foreign policy, eclectic analysis offers a comprehensive and flexible framework with a holistic approach combining levels of analysis and types of factors. Eclectic analysis as defined by Sil and Katzenstein: Seeks to extricate, translate and selectively integrate analytical elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms and interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical significance. (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010)

This book uses analytic eclecticism since it responds to the three main markers distinguishing analytical eclecticism from paradigm-driven research (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). First, the study cannot be reduced to a specific paradigmatic interrogation or testing a specific theory derived from a given paradigm. The question of Indonesia’s delayed contemporary engagement with Africa and more serious recent interest transcends 96 The Indonesian Constitution is called the UUD 1945 for Undang Undang Dasar 1945.

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paradigms, calls for a diversity of explanations and appears as a concrete scholarly problem that cannot be predefined through a paradigmatic lens (Lake, 2013). Indonesia’s African foreign policy remains open to interpretation. Combining elements and concepts from different paradigms increases explanatory power. This research’s conceptualisation is problemdriven,97 starting from an interrogation of why Indonesia stuck to its multilateral approach to Africa through the NAASP and did not create its Africa+1 forum before 2018. This question broadened to Indonesia’s contemporary African approach, allowing to learn more about Indonesia’s foreign policy as a whole. Then, Indonesia’s foreign policy and African engagement require paying attention to various causal mechanisms and processes explaining the depth of the studied phenomena. Causality should be looked into more flexibly, which paradigmatic bounded research cannot always propose, to discover complex or hidden explanations or interactions.98 Research on China-Africa relations, a study of “power relations ” (Alden & Large, 2018), shows that formulating a universal theory is impossible. We presuppose the same will be valid for Indonesia. Interplay between agency and structure necessarily takes place, and a combination of material and ideational factors intervenes. Middle-range theories comprehend phenomena in a more realistic and useful way. Finally, analytic eclecticism generates impactful research and nourishes societal debate beyond academia, grounded in the real world and not caged in narrow paradigmatic views preventing openness to diverse causal mechanisms. Eclectic analysis increases pragmatism, linking causal mechanisms from various paradigms for the formulation of more holistic research outputs.99 Given the absence of significant previous studies, we remain pragmatic, open and flexible. We have also been struck by studies 97 This research is problem-driven, not method-driven (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002; Wendt, 1992). Starting from a problem can give birth to “interesting research” (Anderson, 2016). 98 A study of patronage and clientelism in Ghana’s oil revenue spending reveals the blurring of clear causality due to the co-constitution of ideas and interests through the concept of political settlements or an institutional distribution of benefits modelled on the power distribution in society (Mohan et al., 2018). 99 Bennett proposes structured pluralism as a combination of theories to go beyond the—ism problem, focusing on causal mechanisms, not paradigms. Facilitating collaborative endeavours between IR and comparative politics, the concentration on causal mechanisms, notably through process tracing, creates middle-range theories or “the ways in

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concluding too quickly on the success or failure of an external power’s foreign policy in Africa, being contradicted later. Since pluralism and flexibility are needed to interpret Indonesian foreign policy (Nguitragool, 2012), it is increasingly studied through an eclectic combination of paradigms, notably realism or neoliberalism, that share a rationalist or positivist ontology combined with constructivism, often justified to give space to both structure and agency.100 Ideational factors like perceptions or educational background of foreign policy elites and realist material factors like power and wealth distribution are also blended (Santikajaya, 2017; Shekhar, 2018). Eclectic approaches emphasise the complexity of interactions between the allocation of material capabilities such as wealth and power in a realist perspective, gains sought by utility-maximising self-interested individual and collective actors in a liberal view, and finally, ideational factors like norms, identities and ideas that create actors’ worldviews and their roles in a constructivist approach (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010).101 Studies on China’s African engagement share diverse narratives and framings of the Chinese story in Africa, with completely different interpretations depending on the paradigm used. Going “beyond paradigms” enriches the analysis (Duggan, 2020). To study Indonesia, such open approaches seem essential.

Book Overview Proposing the first comprehensive study on Indonesia’s engagement with Africa, this book proceeds as follows after the present introduction: Chapter 2 succinctly describes the evolution of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy, its main theories and principles, and its adaptability. The impact of former President Yudhoyono and, especially, President Jokowi is considered. The primary purpose consists in understanding how Africa entered, lately, Indonesia’s geopolitical perspective and leadership mindset, particularly during the Jokowi presidency. Despite the Asia–Africa discourse relating to the Bandung Conference, Africa is which combinations of mechanisms interact to produce outcomes ” (Bennett, 2013; George & Bennett, 2005). 100 Like the international system and domestic politics. 101 Gilpin called for the theoretical combination of both material and ideational factors

to understand the world (Gilpin, 2001).

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not intrinsic to Indonesia’s Weltanschauung . “Afro-Asia” existed as an abstract historical concept, an Indonesian international legacy, but Africa and African nations were not sufficiently considered for themselves. Indonesia’s current geopolitical frameworks and discourses, such as the GMF and the Indo-Pacific, are examined. Chapter 3 analyses the genesis of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), its impossible operationalisation, and Indonesia’s persistent attempts to reinvigorate and preserve the scheme given bureaucratic heaviness, and to save face, despite being ignored by other major ASEAN powers privileging their own Africa+1 forums. The reasons behind the NAASP’s failure to become a viable Afro-Asian multilateral platform are investigated. As a result, Indonesia’s African engagement lagged behind that of other major external powers. The scheme could, however, be useful in the future as an Afro-Asian bridge. Chapter 4 highlights the adverse effects of Indonesia’s knowledge production deficit on its foreign policy through the African example. Research in Indonesian universities notoriously lacks funding and quality, given an authoritarian history under Suharto, bureaucratic and political constraints and interventions, and an overall subservience to outside interests, both domestic and foreign. Overall, Jokowi’s foreign policy “reset”, undeniably bringing ambitious change, has lacked “riset ”, the Indonesian word for research, given the President’s lack of intellectualism. Chapter 5 studies the reformulation and operationalisation of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Africa under President Jokowi. The IAF and its origin, notably its academic justification, are explored. Jokowi, General Luhut, and foreign minister Retno and Kemlu’s Directorate for African Affairs are depicted as the decisive instigators responsible for operationalising the new African policy in the Jokowi era. Luhut’s commando-style Task Force, originally seeking infrastructure projects in Africa yet impeded by funding limitations, is examined. Its primary focus shifted, especially to promote Indonesia’s successful hilirisasi policy, supported by Chinese investments and know-how, through the formation of a Global South minilateral coalition of resource-rich developing nations employing an Afro-Asian solidarity discourse, aiming at facing Western challenges to its hilirisasi policy through raw mineral export bans in the WTO. Indonesia’s new Africa policy participates in consolidating Jokowi-Luhut’s power towards their prominent political patrons, notably former President Megawati and Nasdem Party Chairman Surya

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Paloh. Uncertainty surrounds continuity following the 2024 presidential elections. Chapter 6 succinctly contrasts the African foreign policies of other major Asian powers—China, Japan, South Korea and India—with Indonesia’s African foreign policy to refine the perspective on the essence and positioning of Indonesia’s African foreign policy. For analytical purposes, the various Africa+1 forums organised by Asian powers in the twenty-first century are specifically examined as the embodiment and spearhead of their broader African foreign policy. Chapter 7 re-evaluates the multiple drivers and conceptions of Indonesian foreign policy in general and towards Africa in particular, while interrogating the possibility for Indonesia of serving as a model in Africa, the necessity of holistic approaches to co-construct meaning and longterm success in Africa, and whether or not Indonesia’s road to great power leads through Africa. Chapter 8 concludes this book.

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of Indonesia. https://setkab.go.id/en/indo-pacific-cooperation-concept-foc uses-on-cooperation-not-rivalry-president-jokowi/ Okolo, A. L. (2015). China’s Foreign Policy Shift in Africa: From NonInterference to Preponderance. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies, 10(2), 32–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2015.1107976 Olander, E., & van Staden, C. (2016, June 26). Nigerian In China: Why Are People Here So Racist Towards Black People? Huffington Post. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-racist-black-people_n_576a984 0e4b065534f485002 Ozkan, M., & Akgün, B. (2010). Turkey’s Opening to Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 48(4), 525–546. Panda, J. P. (2017). Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China’s and India’s Multilateral Drives. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52(6), 853– 872. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909615622348 Parsons, C. (2002). Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union. International Organization, 56(1), 47–84. Parsons, C. (2007). How to Map Arguments in Political Science. In Choice Reviews Online. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice. 45-5806 Perwitasari, P. (2017, April 18). Megawati usulkan Konferensi Asia Afrika kedua. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/624748/megawati-usu lkan-konferensi-asia-afrika-kedua Pigeaud, F., & Sylla, N. S. (2018). L’Arme Invisible de la Françafrique. La Découverte. Pisani, E. (2016). “Biggest Invisible Thing on Earth?”—It’s Called Indonesia, and It’s Waking Up. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ 2016/nov/21/biggest-invisible-thing-on-earth-indonesia-waking-up Poe, D. Z. (2003). Kwame Nkrumah’s Contribution to Pan-Africanism: An Afrocentric Analysis. In Kwame Nkrumah’s Contribution to Pan-Africanism: An Afrocentric Analysis. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203505373 Porteous, T. (2008). Britain in Africa. Zed Books. Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), 307–338. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918 Power, T. P., & Warburton, E. (2020). Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? (T. Power & E. Warburton, Eds.). ISEAS—Yusof Ishak Institute. Pramono, S. (2012). Exploring Africa: Mainstreaming Indonesia’s Economic Diplomacy in Non-Traditional Markets. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

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Presiden RI. (1964). Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 253 Tahun 1964 tentang Pengangkatan Sudjono Duta Besar Republik Indonesia Pada Pemerintah Republik Liberia (1964-09-30). Presiden RI. (1966). Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 253 Tahun 1966 tentang Pemindahan Ke Jakarta Saudara Soedjono, Duta Besar Luar Biasa Republik Indonesia Pada Pemerintah Republik Ghana Dan Pemerintah Republik Liberia (1966-12-06). Presiden RI. (1967). Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 74 Tahun 1967 tentang Pengangkatan H.M. Sharief Padmodisastro Ma Sebagai Duta Besar Luar Biasa Dan Berkuasa Penuh Pada Pemerintah Ghana Dan Liberia (1967-05-27). Presiden RI. (2016, September 5). Visi Nawacita dalam Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia. Presidenri.Go.Id. http://www.presidenri.go.id/program-prioritas2/visi-nawacita-dalam-politik-luar-negeri-indonesia.html Presiden RI. (2017). Dokumen Nasional Kebijakan Kelautan Republik Indonesia Lampiran I Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 16 Tahun 2017 . Presiden Republik Indonesia. Procopio, M. (2018). Kenyan Agency in Kenya-Africa Relations: Contestation, Cooperation and Passivity. In C. Alden & D. Large (Eds.), New Directions in Africa-China Studies (1st ed.). Routledge. Raleigh, C., Nsaibia, H., & Dowd, C. (2021). The Sahel Crisis since 2012. African Affairs, 120(478), 123–143. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ada a022 Ramani, S. (2023). Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender? Hurst & Company. Recchia, S., & Tardy, T. (2020). French Military Operations in Africa: Reluctant Multilateralism. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(4), 473–481. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1733984 Reinhardt, J. M. (1971). Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia. Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. Riyandanu, M. F. (2023). Pertamina Jajaki Investasi Pembangunan Kilang Minyak di Kenya. Katadata.Co.Id. https://katadata.co.id/agustiyanti/ber ita/6495d309915a7/pertamina-jajaki-investasi-pembangunan-kilang-minyakdi-kenya Robertson, C. (2019, April 10). This African Nation Has the Fastest Growing Economy in the World. CNBC Africa. https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/ west-africa/2019/04/10/this-african-nation-has-the-fastest-growing-eco nomy-in-the-world/ Robison, R., & Hadiz, V. R. (2017). Indonesia: A Tale of Misplaced Expectations. Pacific Review, 30(6), 895–909. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748. 2017.1306578

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Sim, D. (2021). Explainer | What Are ‘Asian Values’ and Is the Concept Still Relevant Today? South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/explained/article/3130891/what-are-asian-values-and-concept-still-rel evant-today Sohn, Y. (2010). Japanese Industrial Governance: Protectionism and the Licensing State. Routledge-Curzon. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203417393 Sörenson, K. (2008, July). Beyond Françafrique The Foundation, Reorientation and Reorganisation of France’s Africa Politics. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency. Soulé, F. (2020). ‘Africa+1’ Summit Diplomacy and the ‘New Scramble’ Narrative: Recentering African Agency. African Affairs, May 2020, 633–646. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa015 Van Staden, C. (2022). Japan Makes $30bn Africa Aid Pledge During TICAD in Tunis (The Africa Report). https://www.theafricareport.com/236500/japanmakes-30bn-africa-aid-pledge-during-ticad-in-tunis/ Van Staden, C., Alden, C., & Wu, Y. (2018). In the Driver’s Seat? African Agency and Chinese Power at FOCAC, the AU and the BRI (Occasional Paper 286). In SAIIA (Issue September). Sukma, R. (2003). Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Domestic Weakness and the Dilemma of Dual Identity. Routledge-Curzon. https://doi.org/10.1355/ 9789814519236-008 Sukma, R. (2011). Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Indonesia Finds a New Voice. Journal of Democracy, 22(4), 110–123. https://doi.org/10. 1353/jod.2011.0057 Sukma, R. (2019, May 28). Strategic Imperatives for Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/05/28/ strategic-imperatives-for-indonesias-foreign-policy.html Suryadinata, L. (1996). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership. Times Academic Press. Tan, P. J. (2007). Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview and Foreign Policy. Asian Perspective, 31(3), 147–181. Tarrósy, I. (2014, March 26). Is the Spirit of Bandung Sweeping Across Africa? http://afkinsider.com/48375/spirit-bandung-sweeping-across-africaindonesia-africa-relations-today/ Taufiqurrahman, M. (2023). The Force of Nationalism Is Strong in Indonesia: This Year It Will Reach Fever Pitch. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakart apost.com/opinion/2023/04/06/the-force-of-nationalism-is-strong-in-ind onesia-this-year-it-will-reach-fever-pitch.html Taylor, I. (2011). The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Routledge. Taylor, I. (2014). Africa Rising? BRICS—Diversifying Dependency. James Currey.

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Taylor, I. (2016). Dependency Redux: Why Africa Is Not Rising. Review of African Political Economy, 43(147), 8–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/030 56244.2015.1084911 Taylor, I. (2019). France à Fric: The CFA Zone in Africa and Neocolonialism. Third World Quarterly, 40(4), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597. 2019.1585183 Taylor, I., & Zajontz, T. (2020). In a Fix: Africa’s Place in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Reproduction of Dependency. South African Journal of International Affairs, 27 (3), 277–295. https://doi.org/10.1080/102 20461.2020.1830165 Teguh, A., & Wibisono, M. (2009). Political Elites and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia. Tritto, A. (2023). How Indonesia Used Chinese Industrial Investments to Turn Nickel into the New Gold. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/04/11/how-indonesia-usedchinese-industrial-investments-to-turn-nickel-into-new-gold-pub-89500 Uly, Y. A. (2023). Ahok Temui Erick Thohir, Bahas Ekspansi Bisnis Pertamina ke Afrika. Kompas.Com. https://money.kompas.com/read/2023/07/18/191 540926/ahok-temui-erick-thohir-bahas-ekspansi-bisnis-pertamina-ke-afrika United Nations. (2015). World Population Prospects 2015—Data Booklet (ST/ ESA/SER.A/377). https://doi.org/ST/ESA/SER.A/377 Usman, Z. (2022). Economic Diversification in Nigeria: The Politics of Building a Post-Oil Economy. Zed Books. Utami, N. A. (2016). Revisiting the Bandung Conference: berbeda sejak dalam pikiran. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 17 (1), 140–147. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14649373.2016.1134045 Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., & Arkhangelskaya, A. (2016). Emerging Powers in Africa: A New Wave in the Relationship? In Emerging Powers in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40736-4 Van Reybrouck, D. (2022). Revolusi. L’Indonésie et la Naissance du Monde Moderne. (Traduction). Actes Sud. Vilmer, J. B. J. (2021). Peace Without Freedom in Eritrea: Causes and Consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 15(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1871556 Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the New Developmentalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 52(3), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/000 74918.2016.1249262 Warburton, E. (2017, April). Resource Nationalism in Post-Boom Indonesia: The New Normal? Lowy Institute for International Policy. https://www.low yinstitute.org/publications/resource-nationalism-post-boom-indonesia-newnormal

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Warner, J., O’Farrell, R., Nsaibia, H., & Cummings, R. (2021). The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront. Hurst & Company. Weatherbee, D. E. (2016). Understanding Jokowi’s Foreign Policy (Issue 12). https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762601 Weber, H., & Winanti, P. (2016). The ‘Bandung Spirit’ and Solidarist Internationalism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(4), 391–406. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1167834 Weinstein, F. B. (1976). Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto. Cornell University Press. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. Wirajuda, M. H. (2014). The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management. London School of Economics. Xing, L. (2019). Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative. In Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-319-92201-0_5 Xinhua. (2015, April 22). Xi Raises Three-Point Proposal on Carrying Forward Bandung Spirit. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/201504/22/content_20508769.htm Yegar, M. (2006). The Republic of Indonesia and Israel. Israel Affairs, 12(1), 136–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537120500382016 Yoshimatsu, H. (2019). Partnership Against the Rising Dragon? Japan’s Foreign Policy Towards India. Pacific Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748. 2018.1563210 Zambakari, C. (2012). Underdevelopment and Economic Theory of Growth: Case for Infant Industry Promotion. Consilience, 8(8), 171–187. Zhao, S. (2014). A Neo-Colonialist Predator or Development Partner? China’s Engagement and Rebalance in Africa. Journal of Contemporary China, 90(90), 1033–1052. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898893

CHAPTER 2

Indonesian Foreign Policy’s Contemporary Evolution

This problem-driven study was initially motivated by the question of why Indonesia kept attempting to implement the NAASP while other large Asian powers were developing their country-to-continent forums and bilateral relations with African countries, without recognising the NAASP as a strategic venue that could assist them in achieving absolute gains. Then, we pondered why suddenly, in 2018, Indonesia launched the IAF as its Africa+1 forum, although not at the Summit or Ministerial level in contrast to other Asian “Africa+1” forums. A higher-level forum would have been difficult to establish in the absence of an Indonesian partnership with the AU’s Partnerships Management and Resource Mobilisation (PMRM) Directorate(African Union, n.d.). The AU Constitutive Act mandates the institution for international cooperation through international partnerships, insisting on African agency and ownership (AU Commission, 2000; Gwatiwa, 2022). In this context, Indonesian foreign policy must be presented first, its concepts, underlying ideology and geopolitical framework interrogated before focusing more specifically on interpreting Indonesia’s contemporary African foreign policy and Africa’s new prioritisation under Jokowi,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_2

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at least in economic diplomacy.1 Indonesia’s African policy, especially expressed through the IAF and the following derivative events such as the Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue (IAMD) co-organised by Kemlu with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in October 2018, with the two main themes of maritime security and sustainable fisheries, and the IAID in August 2019, notably aiming at developing the Indonesian SOEs’ African presence in the infrastructure sector, will be studied, in the following chapters, by itself, and in dynamic parallel and direct analytical confrontation, with the African foreign policy of major Asian powers, Japan, China, India and South Korea, particularly through their Africa+1 forums mostly, but also with the approaches of multiple other external actors in Africa. Although the presidential transition from SBY to Jokowi carries clear continuities, at least a shift in style, and style matters, and mindsets occurred, akin to the contrast between the globalist Sukarno and the Southeast Asian regionalist Suharto. However, the paradox is that while Jokowi was originally seen as a new Sukarno, or more exactly, an incarnation of Sukarno’s Marhaenism theory, relating to his humble origins and PDI-P party membership (Sukarno, 2019),2 he has increasingly been portrayed as sharing Suharto’s developmentalism and repressive tendencies (Bland, 2020; Power, 2018; Power & Warburton, 2020; Warburton, 2016; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). Understanding Indonesian Presidents’ cognitive processes was never a given.3 The mood of Acharya’s book Indonesia Matters, with his praise and support for the third democracy in the world and largest Muslimpopulated country, mostly vanished in the international discourse, replaced by the democratic regression view on Indonesia (Acharya, 2014). These conclusions on Jokowi’s supposed authoritarianism seem excessive.

1 In reality, a “prosperity approach” was already a strategic framework for traditional Javanese leaders under the Majapahit Kingdom (Nguitragool, 2012). Jokowi’s cultural and entrepreneurial background and mindset help explain the economic diplomacy focus. 2 The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) can be considered the Sukarnoist legacy party. According to Anderson, Marhaenism can be regarded as a sort of Indonesian Marxism (B. R. O. Anderson, 2002). 3 Sounding a bit orientalist, Kennedy called Sukarno “an inscrutable Asian” (Simpson, 2008).

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All East Asian developmental states have been or been called authoritarian at some point, before reaching higher development levels, including Japan, China, Korea or Singapore, which might mean, if we were to be provocative, Jokowi is on the right track (Buzan & Zhang, 2014). These judgements are often based on a lack of knowledge of the subtlety of the Indonesian security system (Kurniawan, 2018), which protects minorities, and a facility to misjudge the complexity and burden that goes with leading a continental country like Indonesia. Yet, by all means, criticism must be heard and thought about seriously, without denying that Jokowi has delivered some change, notably in infrastructure and industrialisation, but also subsidised healthcare or cash transfers for the poor for example, compared to his predecessors (Davidson, 2015). At the end of his presidencies, Jokowi’s popularity remains very high (Lamb, 2023). This particular context, coupled with the unprecedented Covid-19 crisis followed by the war in Ukraine marking a new geopolitical era, place this reflection on Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy at a crossroads and in an explorative and interrogative mindset. Avoiding hasty conclusions on Indonesia in the current domestic and international contexts appears more than ever necessary. Like with Africa, over-optimism or over-pessimism in considering Indonesia can only be suspicious (Adem, 2014; Brautigam, 2009). There are many sources of optimism in Indonesia, with visible progress, but remaining reasonable in optimism while being moderately critical appears to be a better strategy to avoid either overestimating the speed of change or making the tragic mistake of rhetorically condemning a country located in the now leading region of the world. Indonesia benefits from the exceptional rise in status of countries like South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China, which have an interest in supporting at least Indonesia’s economic if not always its strategic-military rise. Lacking a long-term perspective, academic judgements may resemble hastily written news pieces. After criticism, Jokowi’s handling of the Covid-19 situation in Indonesia was praised. As usual, General Luhut was in command of operations. Despite the challenging geopolitical scenario, Jokowi was commended for Indonesia’s G20 Presidency in 2022, with a successful summit in Bali. Indonesia has been prudent regarding the war in Ukraine and Taiwan, in accordance with its non-aligned stance. During his July 2022, Jokowi suggested mediating a peace agreement between Russia and

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Ukraine, but this was mainly to ensure Indonesia’s food security (Maulia, 2022; May, 2022).4 In 2020, Wirajuda advocated abandoning multilateralism. The Covid19 crisis exposed the cracks and ineffectiveness of the current world order and the UN. For him, UN reform was unachievable given a lack of political will. Therefore, “Indonesia should be more focused on its bilateral and regional diplomacy. We have to invest more time, energy and, resources to strengthen the East Asia community-building process ” (FPCI, 2020). Although Indonesia rebounded well, these statements from Yudhoyono’s first foreign minister, recognised for his multilateral engagement, should be considered seriously given Wirajuda’s influence until today in Kemlu (Nabbs-Keller, 2013a). They symbolise the gravity of the early 2020s shock,5 and emphasise elite foreign policy debates. Covid-19 and the Ukraine conflict confirmed the global power shift towards East Asia. Indonesia’s national interests, survival and prosperity, will be heavily reliant on its ability to benefit from its dynamic participation in this region. Opposing Retno’s Indo-Pacific vision, Wirajuda compares Indonesian diplomacy to a Garuda bird flying North toward the North East Asia (NEA) centre of gravity, the tail representing Australia, the right wing the Pacific, and the left wing the Indian Ocean.Ideally, a “good balance” would occur between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Yet, since the mid1990s, Pacific cooperation and dialogue have been smoother with APEC and its offshoots. Indian Ocean exchanges are less developed, with India, focusing on its subregion, or IORA. The Indo-Pacific is complicated, including the Horn of Africa or the Gulf. Dialogue habits remain weak compared to the Pacific. Therefore, Indonesia should focus on East Asia and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in an inclusive, non-geographic manner, accepting India, Australia or New Zealand.6 4 Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto proposed a controversial peace plan to end the war in Ukraine in early June 2023 during the Shangri-La Dialogue defense meeting in Singapore. The plan was rejected by Ukraine and did not seem to have been endorsed by Jokowi and Kemlu. It was linked to Prabowo’s campaigning for the 2024 presidential elections (Kapoor, 2023). 5 In retrospect, the Covid-19 crisis has probably favoured the utterance of overstatements. We shall try to remain cautious. 6 “From the early 90s, I was supervising IORA. I never got it. No good dialogue habits in that area. India opposed the entry of Bangladesh and Pakistan in IORA”. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17

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Following ASEAN Centrality, for Wirajuda, developing the EAS, started in 2005 following the ASEAN+6 process,7 to make it a more holistic and inclusive community, focusing not only on economic collaboration, but also political-security issues, can help Indonesia boost its economic engine and development, providing an unprecedented regional platform to deploy its diplomacy in the pursuit of its goals. Indonesia, the most strategic global region, which hosts the Chinese superpower and the soon-to-be Indian superpower,8 and some of the most efficient and modern countries like South Korea or Japan, should be prioritised, especially since all these powers have vested interests in collaborating, investing in and assisting the archipelago. Indonesia needs this backing to flourish. During Covid-19, China’s vaccine diplomacy towards Indonesia was dynamic. Indonesia drew even closer to China by aiming to become the Chinese vaccine production hub in Southeast Asia (Sembiring, 2020; Taufiqurrahman, 2020).9 Luhut appreciates China’s willingness to transfer technologies (Massardi, 2022). The GMF and the BRI have been synchronised (Redaksi, 2022). China and South Korea are investing massively in Indonesia’s nickel-based industrialisation, particularly for Electric Vehicles (EVs) and batteries (Nangoy & Munthe, 2023). Wirajuda’s position entails forsaking the Indo-Pacific idea and returning to the Asia–Pacific mandala. Through the AOIP notably, largely drafted by Indonesia (Anwar, 2020), the Indo-Pacific widens Indonesia’s geopolitical canvas, giving more weight to the Indian Ocean. The classic Indonesian “Two Oceans, Two Continents ” strategy places Indonesia at the centre of the game and has been Indonesia’s foreign policy foundation

April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). India is actually collaborating well with many international partners, and its profile is increasingly rising. 7 The EAS initially united ASEAN with China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. Membership expanded in 2011 to include the US and Russia. 8 India being de facto part of South Asia but being now definitely included in any serious geopolitical consideration of East and Southeast Asia and a central nation of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical lens. 9 Indonesia itself deployed a dynamic vaccine diplomacy to secure the hundreds of millions of doses needed for its population. Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021).

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since independence with the famous “Rowing between two reefs ” statement pronounced by Muhammad Hatta in 1948 (Hatta, 1953, 1958). The Indo-Pacific is not a new concept. Created by the British Empire, it was born over two centuries ago as the greater strategic Asia. The Cold War fragmented the Indo-Pacific region into smaller sub-regions like Southeast Asia. Marking a historical return, the reemergence of China and India, and Japanese, Korean or main ASEAN country agencies, represents the resurgence of the Indo-Pacific cosmos.10 Indonesia maintains a key position in that geopolitical order. In a configuration with the Asia–Pacific mandala as the ultimate mandala and an EAS emphasis, following Wirajuda’s views, given the NEA prioritisation, Indonesia does not occupy such a strategic position geographically, although ASEAN centrality is preserved (Shekhar, 2018; Supriyanto, 2013). Essentially, it is a conceptual and legacy battle. However, Indonesia’s discomfort with extra-regional Indo-Pacific constructions is palpable. The AOIP represents an Indonesian response, intending to mitigate the issue. The Indo-Pacific enables Indonesia to stretch its wings, benefit more from crossed-opportunities with the Indian Ocean, which is crucial for its security, and places the archipelago, as a “continental” fulcrum and archipelagic power, at the geographic centre of the entire framework. Strategically, decentring the Indian Ocean from Indonesia’s main geopolitical canvas can appear mistaken. Indonesia must regain its status as an Indian Ocean power. Indonesia’s successful ascent is contingent on its capacity to engage with Africa, which will determine its attainment of great power status. The widening of the geopolitical canvas through the broader mandala of the Indo-Pacific has allowed incorporating East Africa inside Indonesia’s main foreign policy map. It is no coincidence that Indonesia inked its first Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in Africa with Mozambique and its 2500 km of Indian Ocean coastlines (Kemendag, 2019).11 Shekhar mentions an Asia–Africa mandala framing Indonesian foreign policy (Shekhar, 2018). Such an Afro-Asian strategic roadmap could 10 This is based on Pardesi, who also underlines that the Indo-Pacific is not only maritime, especially linked to the US, Australia or Japan, but also continental, given the weight of China and India (Pardesi, 2020). 11 Kemlu indicates that it deliberately changed the list of PTA negotiation targets to prioritise Mozambique as a gateway to the African part of the Indian Ocean universe (CDT with Amb. Faizasyah, 2021).

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later exist.12 Luhut is instrumentalising the Afro-Asian discourse while involving Latin America, in a Global South-targeted effort. Yet, since the mandala, or concentric circles,13 determine the nation’s geopolitical image with its Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara), and the holistic security strategy of National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional ) aiming to ensure all types of securities,14 Asia–Africa cannot today be considered as a mandala in Indonesia’s foreign policy conception given the still low level of relationships with Africa, the lack of a comprehensive approach and knowledge of Africa, despite laudable peacekeeping and peacebuilding participation, certainly contributing to a better initiation (Capie, 2016). Concerns arise concerning the Jokowi era’s African effort’s continuance, especially without Luhut. With 17 embassies in Africa, including only 12 in Sub-Saharan Africa (LIPI, 2019),15 Indonesia’s African engagement remains limited, opportunistic and more focused on economic diplomacy. Africa is not fully

12 Yet, deprived of an overwhelming unifying principle, Afro-Asianism historically lost

ˇ to the NAM and its non-bloc principle (Cavoški, 2022). 13 Mandala represent a “method of social-political governance based on centre-periphery relationships ” (Supriyanto, 2013). They are based on Javanese traditional power and Kautilyan thinking (B. R. O. Anderson, 2007). The mandala concept is described in Kautilya’s Arthashastra or “the science of polity”. The kingdom will survive in the very realist matsya-nyaya system or “law of the fish”, where “the big ones eat the little ones ”, through an adequate comprehension of its place in the mandala system of states. In this environment, the ruler applies the shadgunya or sixfold foreign policy: sandhi (peace), vigraha (war), asana (neutrality), yana (march), samshraya (alliance or shelter), and dvaidhibhava (double policy) (Zaman, 2006). 14 As Governor of the National Resilience Institute (1974–1978), General Sayidiman was active in the formulation of the concept of National Resilience. The Institute supported ASEAN unity through its cooperation with the National Security institutes of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. “National Resilience includes every aspect of life, it is an integrative effort of the Nation to preserve itself and to achieve its National Goals. It therefore includes our security capabilities as well as our diplomatic efforts ”. “The President of Indonesia is leading with all the ministers participating as members. It must achieve the best state of National Prosperity and National Security, which are the two aspects of National Resilience.” Author’s Interview with General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former deputy chief of staff of the army (1973–1974), Roving Ambassador of the Non-Aligned Movement for Africa from 1992 to 1995. Jakarta, June 29, 2020. In 1992, Soeharto became the Chairman of the Non-Alignment Movement. He installed Roving Ambassadors for NAM, active until the end of Indonesia’s Chairmanship in 1995. 15 Adding the new Indonesian embassy opening in Cameroon.

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integrated into Indonesian foreign policy elites’ geopolitical mindset,16 not to mention the general population that frequently cannot identify with ASEAN (Amindoni, 2015; Benny & Abdullah, 2011). Africa is named a “non-traditional market ” in the RPJMN, reduced to its economic aspect and potential as a market for Indonesia to grasp, highlighting its remaining lack of strategic weight in the Indonesian mindset (Bappenas, 2014, 2019). This does not undermine the Jokowi pivot, stating that Africa was now an Indonesian foreign policy priority (Lumanauw & WBP, 2017), a crucial impetus to birth an Asia– Africa mandala encompassing more broadly the Indo-Pacific mandala, or simply being complementary. The discouraging concept of nontraditional market should be abandoned. It places the concerned regions in a purely economic framework unsuitable for an aspiring great power that should consider countries and regions in their totality, not merely as markets. At least Indonesia’s African interest seems serious under Jokowi. The effort’s durability remains an open question. What type of country is Indonesia? What are the implications for its foreign policy? States are classified as great powers, middle powers, emerging powers, BRICS, non-BRICS emerging powers, or pivot states, among other analytical categories. Because of its contradictions and multiple identities,17 classifying Indonesia is not easy. The archipelago seems both weak and strong, ambitious and reticent on the world arena, inward- or outward-looking according to periods, issues and analysts (Anwar, 2010b; Leifer, 1983; Shekhar, 2018; Weinstein, 1976).18 Classified by some as a pivot state for its activism on the international stage, its pragmatism in pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy and its “pivoting behaviours ” (Santikajaya, 2016, 2017),19 while others view Indonesia as 16 Wirajuda calls to refocus on East Asia and the Asia–Pacific. China or India would not consider cutting Africa from their main geopolitical framework. For China, Asia-Africa forms the discursive basis of its foreign policy (MOFA China, 2015; Xinhua, 2015). 17 In this sense, the title of the English biography on Jokowi, “A Man of Contradictions ”, should be changed to “A Country of Contradictions”, which is probably the case for all countries and all people. Jokowi is merely composing with his countries complexities and paradoxes (Bland, 2020). 18 This is in the case Indonesia is studied as a unitary actor or as an assembled actor that is able to aggregate multiple interests, which is not always certain. 19 For Santikajaya, a Kemlu diplomat, this means acting as “(1) a soft revisionist towards the current global order, (2) a normative bridge-builder and (3) a balanced role between the regional and global stages ”.

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a middle power, a regional ASEAN power contributing to international society (Anwar, 2020). A perceptual dichotomy exists between prominent leaders like Luhut and Kemlu in discourse. Syncretically, Jokowi accommodates all. Our study demonstrates that Indonesia is not a middle power, at least in its self-perception. How can Indonesia be a middle power when Luhut, its most powerful Minister, arguably Indonesia’s most powerful man, fully representing Jokowi, declares Indonesia will become with its new Global South minilateral diplomacy “the centre and leader of developing countries ” (Al Hikam, 2023)? Another prominent Minister told the author that Indonesia is already a “global player”, certainly not a middle power.20 Jokowi himself believes Indonesia can become “one of the strongest countries in the world” (Tehusijarana, 2019). This is the reality of the mindset of Indonesia’s utmost leaders. The middle power label could prove dangerous, camouflaging Indonesia’s genuine identity. The chosen classification influences the portrayal of Indonesia’s behaviour and interests, privileging certain traits to form a specific narrative. Paradigmatic eclecticism allows for envisaging a larger spectrum of drivers. Like the Srivijaya and Majapahit kingdoms or the Revolusi, history and legacy frame Indonesia’s international role and will (Nugroho, 2015; Ricklefs, 2008; Van Reybrouck, 2022).21 The political system, the President’s personality, his entourage, and the Foreign Minister largely influence foreign policy with differences between Jokowi or Yudhoyono, or between Foreign Ministers Hassan Wirajuda, Marty Natalegawa and Retno Marsudi. Under Jokowi, foreign policy is concentrated in Jokowi’s entourage, especially General Luhut (Bland, 2020; Connelly, 2015; Weatherbee, 2017), who brings tremendous weight to foreign policy. This power concentration happened progressively during the Jokowi presidencies. After Reformasi and during the Presidencies of Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati, Indonesia was too weak to impact the international stage 20 Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy Sandiaga Uno told the author Indonesia was certainly not a middle power. It was not even an emerging power because this meant Indonesia “akan, akan, akan” (“will become, will become, will become”). For him, Indonesia was already there, a “global player”, a powerful country courted by the whole world. Meeting with the author at the Minister’s home in Jakarta, 6 June 2023. Minister Uno’s ministry is under Luhut’s Coordinating Ministry. Luhut’s influence is undoubtedly high on Uno’s perception. 21 The independence Revolusi supposedly explains until now the deep suspicions of foreign intentions that still exist in Indonesia (Cribb & Kahin, 2004; Leifer, 1983).

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(Shekhar, 2018; Weatherbee, 2017). Reformasi, the Yudhoyono and Jokowi presidencies have been qualified as critical junctures in Indonesian contemporary history. Reformasi introduced democratisation. The impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been widely studied (Dosch, 2006; Nabbs-Keller, 2013b; Rüland, 2017), less under Jokowi, often accused of illiberal tendencies. Although issues of taxonomy and democratisation are interesting, we focus more on the geopolitical framework associated with the international system, or so-called structure, and mental maps of top decision-makers, strongly affected by domestic politics, combined with the material and other ideational factors and interests of Indonesia, which determine its choice of foreign policy behaviours and actions (Henrikson, 1980).22 The Yudhoyono and Jokowi presidencies strongly impacted the nature and style of foreign policy (Shekhar, 2018). Nevertheless, President Megawati and her foreign minister Wirajuda prepared the new rise of Indonesia on the international stage, when the material predicament started to be resolved, promoting Indonesia’s new democratic normative reach and identity, strengthening projection capacities and the expertise machine (Connelly, 2015). The mandala vision was restored with the ASEAN core and Jakarta its capital,23 allowing Indonesian benevolent sub-regional leadership within the Asia–Pacific wider region (Emmers, 2014; Rattanasevee, 2014). Foreign policy was about finding and reassuring partners and investors and communicating progressive change happening domestically to the global community. Restoring the ASEAN and Asia–Pacific mandala (Shekhar, 2018), Megawati’s first foreign trips were dedicated to visiting all ASEAN nations. Indonesia was taking care of its backyard before rising again (Connelly, 2015; Soesastro et al., 2003). Wirajuda popularised “total diplomacy” in a parallel with “total football ”, supporting the Indonesian ideal of diplomacy as defined by Hatta, gotong royong (mutual assistance).24 “Everyone has a role to play

22 “Mental map means an ordered but continually adapting structure of the mind – alternatively conceivable as a process – by reference to which a person acquires, codes, recalls, reo, and applies, in thought or action, information about his or her large-scale geographical environment, in part or in its entirety” (Henrikson, 1980). 23 ASEAN headquarters are indeed in Jakarta, the main capital in the ASEAN region, as opposed to Brussels, capital of the European Union, but a minor capital in Europe. 24 Like “total football ”, the concept of “total diplomacy” recognises the diplomatic role of all elements of the nation, such as artists, thinkers, NGOs, businesspeople or

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to reach the goal ”. With Reformasi, the parliament, media, think tanks and civil society must be engaged, “reaching out of Pejambon”.25 Military modernisation took place, yet with incomplete civilian supremacy. The military has its own standing in Indonesian history, given its contribution to independence. It officially retreated from business and government. Influencing overall ASEAN policy, Defense White Papers on national defense policy were shared with the public in accordance with Indonesia’s new democratic character,26 a participative and inclusive security sector being part of democratic reform (Kurniawan, 2018; Shekhar, 2018; Sukma & Prasetyono, 2003; Widjajanto, 2007). In 2003, under Megawati, Indonesia inaugurated its strategy of signing strategic partnerships,27 the first one with Russia (Shekhar, 2018). This strategy respects the bebas aktif principle, flexibly benefiting from closer collaborations while not being caught in the heaviness of an alliance, the bebas aktif principle itself evolving with times and leaders (Sukma, 1997; Weinstein, 1971, 1976). Indonesia practised non-alignment under Sukarno, limited alignment under Suharto, and multiple alignments since Reformasi (Shekhar, 2018). The bebas aktif principle was implemented in practice after the Cold War (Anwar, 2010b), when a more “omnidirectional foreign policy” became possible (Anwar, 2020). Kemlu’s restructuration was also initiated under Megawati, who granted Wirajuda tremendous leeway (Nabbs-Keller, 2013a).28

students. Wirajuda launched “Foreign policy breakfasts” at 7 a.m. to “menyerap aspirasi” (absorb aspirations). Former Turkish Prime Minister and major foreign policy thinker Ahmet Davuto˘glu practised a similar concept. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018); (Donelli, 2021; Wirajuda, 2014). 25 Wirajuda often uses the term “Pejambon” to designate Kemlu in conversations. Kemlu is located on Pejambon Parc Street in Central Jakarta. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 26 Defense White Papers were produced in 2003, 2008 and 2015, notably emphasising

maritime security and terrorism (Shekhar, 2018). 27 For Weatherbee, a “strategic partnership is a conceptual umbrella over broad areas of functional cooperative activities and agreements designed — from the Indonesian side at least — to promote exchanges that will contribute to Indonesia’s economic and social development goals ” (Weatherbee 2016). 28 Strategic partnerships were said to be Wirajuda’s “brainchild” (Shekhar, 2018).

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The Yudhoyono Contribution Surviving economic doom, Indonesia focused on a more ambitious foreign policy during the Yudhoyono presidency (Connelly, 2015; Weatherbee, 2017). Yudhoyono enjoyed foreign affairs. Indonesia was described as behaving as an emerging middle power, promoting democracy and inter-religious dialogue. Through the contested “thousands friends, zero enemies ” slogan,29 Indonesia’s diplomacy was peaceful and friendly, encouraging a “dynamic equilibrium” between great powers involved in Southeast Asia and accepting their direct presence if non-hegemonic (Pattiradjawane, 2016), an evolution from Indonesia’s historical reluctance to great power regional activity. ASEAN centrality and hedging strategies by engaging with multiple great powers (Anwar, 2017, 2020; Gindarsah, 2016), notably through strategic partnerships, raise bargaining power to maximise external balancing effectiveness (Yani & Montratama, 2017).30 This enmeshes great powers in the ASEAN regional institutional complex (Goh, 2007).31 Indonesia’s rising economy created more manoeuvring capacity, notably through multilateral engagements.32 Indonesia proposed a “different pathway” formed by a democracy, development and stability trinity (Acharya, 2014). Among potential great powers, the Indonesian paradox stands in its relatively low military capacity, which facilitated its acceptance regionally but constitutes a long-term weakness. Beyond power, military spending generates positive linkages and externalities through technological and economic spillovers. Dual technology blurs civil-military frontiers. The increased capacity needed to secure markets and assets in continents like Africa requires a strong defense and security framework (Alden & Jiang, 2019; Alden et al., 2018; Boutin, 2018; Gidron, 2020; Lekunze, 2020).

29 An expression first used by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo (Shekhar, 2018). Jokowi dropped that philosophy considering that true friends must provide Indonesia with benefits (Weatherbee, 2016). 30 Or “nonbalancing” (Syailendra, 2017). 31 For Shambaugh, ASEAN presents a “pervasive ambivalence” towards the two great

powers, China and the US (Shambaugh, 2021). 32 Multilateralism is said to be often the preferred way for so-called middle powers (Islam, 2011).

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Geopolitical evolutions show that perceiving low military power positively seems naïve (Acharya, 2014).33 In a world full of threats,34 security concerns more than just the military. Holistic security capacity should be emphasised. As an ex-military normative leader, Yudhoyono meticulously crafted his international democratic discourse (Connelly, 2015).35 He championed multilateralism and globalism for Indonesia to elevate its status and leadership, notably through its G20 accession and the organisation of various high-level forums, including the 2005 AAS, decided under Megawati.36 The NAASP fits that multilateral mindset (Kemlu, 2019b; NAASP, 2005). Indonesia’s imagined geopolitical setting broadened through the implementation of ASEAN Centrality with the EAS prolonging the ASEAN Plus process, APEC and the Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP) for economic and trade integration in the Asia– Pacific mandala. Foreign minister Natalegawa’s Indo-Pacific vision articulated Indonesia’s historical interoceanic maritime identity and power.

33 The war in Ukraine exposed the wrong strategies of major EU nations, certainly food for thought for ASEAN nations. 34 The amount, type and level of dangerousness of threats notably depend on securitisation by authorised elites (Balzacq, 2011). 35 Yudhoyono enjoyed using plenty of pedantic English words while speaking in Indonesian, supposedly expressing dynamism and international benevolence. But those concepts were often considered as jargon challenging to operationalise. 36 Former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Roeslan Abdulgani (1956–1957) was the Secretary General of the Asia–Africa Conference in 1955. He wrote the famous book The Bandung Connection (Abdulgani, 1981). He was an advisor to President Megawati until the early 2000s (Poulgrain, 2020). Roeslan Abdulgani described the spirit of AfroAsian solidarity to be about decolonisation in the short term and socialism in the long run (McGregor & Hearman, 2017). This was an impossible long-term vision in Indonesia after 1965. Relations with Africa were also neglected after 1965, explaining the lateness of Indonesia’s engagement with the continent. To Suharto’s displeasure, Asia-Africa was associated with Sukarno. Yet, Afro-Asianism had already been supplanted by non-alignment and its non-bloc principle. Megawati decided to organise the 2005 AAS based on Wirajuda’s recommendation. Obtaining Megawati’s blessing, by phone since he was visiting New York, with the instruction to continue acting in the spirit of Sukarno’s values, Wirajuda was asked by Yudhoyono to remain foreign minister throughout his first Presidency. Author interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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ASEAN occupied a prominent place under Yudhoyono (Acharya, 2014; Anwar, 2010b, 2017; Quayle, 2018; Shekhar, 2018).37 Yudhoyono initiated several programmes prolonged and implemented by Jokowi, such as the GMF, economic diplomacy and military modernisation.38 Despite differences in style and approach, the Yudhoyono and Jokowi presidencies are complimentary.39 Both contributed to Indonesia’s rise and emerging great power narrative (Shekhar, 2018), still keeping a somewhat low profile. Yet, despite his apparent simplicity and modest background, Jokowi is more revolutionary given his humble origins, the way he reached the presidency, and his political astuteness and bravery. Unlike the stereotypical Javanese leader reigning in a topdown fashion, from the centre to the periphery (Koentjaraningrat, 1985; Moertono, 1968), Jokowi appears as a man of the people, in all his complexity as a mixture of liberalism, conservativism, nationalism and lingering patrimonialism, growing up during the New Order.40 For many citizens, his profile means hope. His political contribution’s preservation will be determined by the 2024 elections. Indonesian politics’ harshness and geopolitics could annihilate it.41 Although domestically filtered, structural constraints impact Indonesia’s foreign policy. Supported by global US liberal hegemony, Reformasi brought democratisation. The authoritarian system collapsed with the end of the Cold War, like the developmental dictatorship had gained power in 1965 due to the Cold War situation. The US had forced Indonesia into the anti-communist camp (Bevins, 2020). After September 11 and US pressure, Indonesia projected a pluralist Muslim democracy image, 37 This is symbolised by the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the work of the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group. The ASEAN Charter can be seen as a sort of ASEAN constitutional preamble. Former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas represented Indonesia in the Eminent Persons Group. 38 The military objective of constituting Minimal Essential Forces covers the 2005–2024 period. 39 We thus agree with Shekhar (Shekhar, 2018). 40 Jokowi’s story fits the traditional Javanese concept of a “just king” or ratu adil: “an

unknown commoner is entrusted with a divine power to bring peace, justice and prosperity to the realm” (Nguitragool, 2012). The Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution presents similar goals. 41 The confrontation of revived Empires of the past with the liberal order creates a geopolitical situation that tends to favour the rise of more authoritarian regimes, often preferred by superpowers to provide stability (Krasner, 2020).

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becoming an active counterterrorism expert power and Muslim partner for the West (Alles, 2016; Haripin et al., 2020; Karnavian, 2018). SBY was a pro-US general. Indonesia’s multilateralist, globalist and middle-power foreign policy under Yudhoyono reflects that era’s global geopolitics and Zeitgeist. The start of the EAS or the Indo-Pacific view relate to rising China and its rivalry with the US and other Asian powers in a post-World War II architecture slow to adapt to new geopolitical realities. Apparent democratic decline in Indonesia today, combined with a more realist foreign policy, result from systemic changes in the global configuration of powers, with a more expansive and dynamic China and the US losing pace in Asia, domestically threatened by populism and insularity, reducing pressure on emerging power elites to democratise.42

Ambitions Indonesia’s more dynamic engagement with Africa parallels the broader debate on Indonesia’s foreign policy as a rising power, how it signals its potential great power status, and what are the drivers and constraints explaining its global expansion. The mostly economic-focused targeting of the African continent reflects strategic changes appearing in the Indonesian international outlook and the strategic evaluation of required approaches and policies.43 Studying Indonesia’s foreign policy evolution cannot fit into a pure realist approach, otherwise, Africa would have long been on the agenda as a potential source of wealth, power and status. Power cannot be confined to material sources and requires attention to identity, norms, status as a marker of global importance, and the mental maps of foreign policy decision-makers, determining how they see the world and what their country should do. Civil society and public opinion should be considered. A combination of domestic factors and structural transformations in the international system form the Indo-Pacific geopolitical framework in which Indonesia places itself and is viewed, widening 42 These elites also increasingly aim to create or recreate their own intrinsic political systems and practices, based on their political culture and history; refusing to be dictated by the West and what they often perceive as liberal democratic catechism serving Western interests. 43 In the discourse of economic diplomacy, Indonesia is combining business and development cooperation (Haron & Arby, 2019).

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its geopolitical playing field. Numerous Indonesian elites and citizens feel the country should close the gap between its capacities and potential, and its achievements and recognition, expanding into Africa being part of that chosen path.44 Indonesia expresses its ambitions in various ways. As a power that focused on ASEAN, Japan and major Western powers for development and strategic reasons during the New Order, the first way entails gradually expanding, as its material power increases, its geopolitical playground to the Asia–Pacific through notably the EAS, and then the Indo-Pacific incarnated by the AOIP, prioritising ASEAN centrality. Indonesia and ASEAN keep the initiative. Indonesia preserves its collegial and subregionally amicable way of reassuring its ASEAN partners, acting inclusively for the benefit of all ASEAN (Anwar, 2020; Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Emmers, 2014). East Africa being part of the Indo-Pacific, this ideational and geographic aggrandisement pulls Africa into Indonesia’s official main geopolitical focus, facilitating expansion. ASEAN could be beneficial for this geopolitical widening (Saiman, 2019), streamlining relations with the AU, its RECs and states. For rising Indonesia, ambitions and interests now differ from when its capacity to act was more constrained, compelled to concentrate on internal consolidation after Reformasi.45 Indonesian elites have become more conscious of their power and prospective power, in accordance with Indonesia’s history as an Asian civilisational power, its size and geostrategic significance (Doyle, 2018; Rajaram, 2008). They can achieve this power potential if they expand their zone of active engagement. Although slowly, given the absence of a directly menacing enemy, Indonesia is raising its military and defense diplomacy capacities (Gindarsah, 2016; Wenas Inkiriwang, 2020), with a shift in military

44 Author’s Interview with Indonesian Ambassador Rezlan Ishar Jenie (25 November 2019, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2019); Author’s Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, 06.06.2023, Jakarta at the Minister’s home. 45 When he came to power, Suharto also focused on increasing Indonesia’s limited capacities first, building influence inside Southeast Asia before implementing a more global foreign policy after 1983, and wishing to appear as a leader of the Third World solving global problems (Suryadinata, 1996). Africa remained mostly absent from his worldview. In May 1998, Suharto was in Cairo for the G15 Summit while terrible riots were taking place in Jakarta, so that he had to come back faster. He stepped down a few days later (Nugraheny, 2023a).

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and security thinking, being more outward-looking, and aware of threats and opportunities. Military doctrine has evolved, apparently reverting to a maritime vision, at least discursively, as the largest archipelagic nation (Supriyanto, 2013). However, some consider Indonesia does not seek power maximisation as its ultimate goal in power balancing. Its main focus is internal economic development (Shekhar, 2018). Even its African policy confirms this emphasis while marking Indonesia’s global affirmation as an external actor in Africa, a status signal. Under Jokowi, democratic projection took the backseat. Self-image building concentrates on Indonesia as a capable Asian developmental power that builds infrastructure and a new capital city, owns a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and projects itself on the African continent through its SOEs, private MNCs and development aid.46 The projection as the so-called largest Muslim democracy continued with Afghanistan or Rohingya issues (MENA, 2019; Purnama et al., 2019). Decisively backed by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, to win both his presidential elections, Jokowi has encouraged NU’s religious diplomacy and Islamic soft power through international networks’ development (Fealy, 2023). But, the developmental state’s power interests, led by Jokowi and Luhut, remain the priority. Afro-Asia is also mobilised in that perspective. The Papua problem, which will be examined in relation to Africa, interrogates the “Muslim democracy” projection (B. Anderson, 2015; Day, 2015; Lawson, 2016; Viartasiwi, 2018), at odds with the Indonesian Constitution, the Pancasila state ideology and the Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika motto.47 Initially defensible, this choice now seems unsuitable. Papua and

46 Indonesian SOEs are called BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara). The Ministry of SOEs is thus called Kementerian BUMN. 47 Indonesia is not a Muslim country since it recognises six religions on equal terms. Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika means unity in diversity. It is an excerpt from a Javanese kakawin or a poem in Ancient Javanese, Kakawin Sutasoma: “Bhinnêka tunggal ika tan hana dharma mangrwa”, in Indonesian “Terpecah belahlah itu, tetapi satu jugalah itu. Tidak ada kerancuan dalam kebenaran”, and in English “It is divided, but it is also one. There is no confusion in the truth.” Source: Wikipedia on Kakawin Sutasoma and Bhinnêka tunggal ika. Leifer indicates the “apothegm” of “Unity in Diversity” might have been a strategy to attract US sympathy. He also considers the motto “a statement of aspiration rather than achievement ” (Leifer, 1983). Today, it can be said that Indonesia manages its diversity relatively well, given its stability, level of security or growing ethnic blending; with remaining issues, notably in the outer islands like Papua.

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other predominantly non-Muslim-populated Indonesian regions represent the majority of Indonesian territory.48 All Indonesians should recognise themselves in the worldwide expression of Indonesian foreign policy, without feeling excluded. It is a matter of national security and defense of territorial integrity.49 Relationships and equilibriums alter with Indonesia’s heavier weight vis-à-vis its partners, and its will to enhance its asymmetric engagements, allowing speedier experience and power accumulation. Africa is strategic from this standpoint. Being China’s foreign policy and expansionary laboratory (Brautigam, 2009; Moyo et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2016), the African lab could benefit Indonesia too. Indonesia also strives for better management of great powers by getting them engaged domestically for its transformational benefit, while restraining their potential aggressiveness in the region (Fitriani, 2018; Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015; McRae, 2019; Novotny, 2010; Sukma, 2009a; Tjhin, 2012).50 Is Indonesia really rising, and how? What are the drivers explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy and international behaviour? What structural constraints hinder Indonesia’s capacity to evolve and act? As a rising power, Indonesia’s condition is much debated. There is no conclusive viewpoint.51 Nonetheless, this book demonstrates that Indonesia’s highest leadership is determined to raise Indonesia’s geopolitical weight. Continuity and geopolitical weaknesses remain interrogations. Shekhar calls Indonesia “a conflicted power” (Shekhar, 2018).52 All large plural 48 These non-Muslim majority areas are mostly in the East of the archipelago, but also in Bali or large parts of North Sumatra and Kalimantan. 49 For Wirajuda, Indonesia is not an ethnic or religious-based state. Therefore, he does not like Indonesia’s Melanesian diplomacy. “Tidak suka diplomasi Melanesia”. He was “not proud” to see Kemlu senior diplomats next to OPM separatist leaders. For him, Indonesia should rely on Papua New Guinea. Since “Australia can be naughty”, the 2006 Lombok security treaty with Australia soothes things since Australia recognises Indonesian sovereignty and integrity, against disintegration and separatism. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 50 For example, for Sukma and others, China appears needed economically while feared

strategically. 51 In a way, this is the same as for the democratic regression debate. 52 Bland called Jokowi “A Man of Contradictions ” when he is actually describing “A

Country of Contradictions” since his main message is that Indonesia is caught in the same contradictions since independence, between economic liberalism and dirigisme, democracy and authoritarianism, political Islam and pluralism (Bland, 2020).

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nations face strong contradictions. Jokowi acts while confronting those contradictions,53 being himself a rather coherent individual.54 As President, he preserved his humble yet determined demeanour. Despite being a country of contradictions, Indonesia displays a more coherent foreign policy than the apparent mess of its domestic politics. Foreign policy matters are more insulated from open political struggle, in the hands of specific elites, contrary to the pure domestic political debate, except specific issues concerning religion or national pride. Still, competing conceptions of what Indonesia should be and accomplish globally cannot be avoided, with changes and continuities as the shift from Yudhoyono to Jokowi shows. Under SBY, the Indonesia rising narrative mirrored a middle power one, deploying a democratic discourse and positioning,55 an amicable power avoiding conflict to focus on its ascent as a newly democratic power led by a democratic former-general-turned President (Acharya, 2014; Anwar, 2010a; Rüland, 2017; Santikajaya, 2016, 2017). In contrast, Jokowi appears more utilitarian and developmental, less intellectual and more pragmatic.56 With Luhut, he can appear revisionist from a Western standpoint, although his developmental positioning is relatively classic for Asia.

53 Studying leaders of the so-called Global South like Jokowi facilitates foreign policy comprehension (Brummer, 2021). 54 Easily seeing incoherence in other cultures often indicates ethnocentrism. 55 Among other appellations, Indonesia was called a norm-setter, a peacekeeper and

a bridge-builder. In a tone reminding of the Yudhoyono years, Jokowi has also used this term of bridge-builder, notably in his first speech ever at the UN Annual Summit, virtually due to the Covid-19 crisis (Septiari, 2020). Without this Covid situation, he would probably not have travelled to New York, and thus not given a speech at all at the UN Annual Summits during his presidencies. 56 Presidents Sukarno and Suharto have been presented as mystical Javanese as opposed to a pragmatic leader like Adam Malik or reformist technocrats (Simpson, 2008). Jokowi could be seen as a blend, a mystical and pragmatic Javanese leader. Bland, among others, described his mindset as that of a furniture exporter, emerging from the lower middle class under the New Order, who needs better infrastructure to ship his products, support from the state to increase his competitiveness and better health and education to benefit from a better-performing workforce. This mindset would explain his politics (Bland, 2020).

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Indonesian foreign policy’s prioritisation of economic diplomacy during the Jokowi period (Gorbiano, 2020; Haron & Arby, 2019; Karim, 2020; Kepala Pusat P2K-OI, 2015; Setiawan, 2015), sometimes criticised,57 could be ascribed to Jokowi’s purportedly simplistic worldview. The views and interests of the most powerful leaders highly determine foreign policy (Gilpin, 1981), such as Jokowi’s well-known reluctance to participate in multilateral forums, except for dealmaking, or the post-ASEAN foreign policy approach advocated by Sukma and Luhut notably.58 Jokowi’s political genius lies in his capacity to popularise programmes towards the general public, so securing the support of national elites and facilitating implementation in the tough Indonesian polity. The difference in style, mindset and background with Yudhoyono explains Jokowi’s successful application of policies. Style creates substance, helping implementation like the relative infrastructure success Jokowi achieved compared to SBY (Davidson, 2015; Ray & Ing, 2016; Setkab, 2019). Indonesia’s capacity to develop and project itself with more impact remains challenging. Its military weight and technological and educational capacities remain insufficient. Yet, Indonesia’s stability, despite its plurality, must be acknowledged and cannot be detached from its security apparatus’ performance. Certain security concerns, notably nontraditional threats (NTTs),59 remain worrying. The country suffers from endemic and socially-embedded corruption,60 causing social calamities.61 Red tape often deters foreign and local investors. Elites fight each other intensely. They also collaborate to preserve their wealth and power 57 Economic diplomacy preeminence has been criticised for creating a foreign policy lacking strategic depth in certain foreign policy circles, including by Wirajuda and inside Kemlu. 58 Both contributed to writing Jokowi’s opening discourse at the Asia-Africa Conference’s 60th anniversary Summit in Jakarta in 2015 that criticised the liberal world order and Bretton Woods institutions (Parlina, 2015; Sukma, 2009b). Luhut’s prominent role as the chief organiser of the event, appointed by the President, would be essential in Luhut’s focus on Africa and Indonesia’s more active African foreign policy. 59 NTTs include terrorism and violent extremism, narcotics, maritime piracy, human trafficking and other criminality. 60 Corruption notably occurs in politics, business and the security apparatus (Buttle et al., 2016; Hendrawan et al., 2021; Kenny & Warburton, 2021). 61 Over-catastrophic depictions calling Indonesia the “archipelago of fear” for example are too harsh (Vltcheck, 2012).

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through the control of political parties, retarding the nation’s development (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 2017; Winters, 2011).62 Health and education systems remain deficient, hindering skill development and innovation (Rosser, 2018; WHO, 2017).63 Practically, Indonesia’s diplomatic budget and knowledge are limited. Financial means lack for academic research. University research is too driven by outside interests in the government and bureaucracy. Academic output lacks originality and transformative ability (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005; Kusman, 2019; McRae & Robet, 2020). Indonesia’s African engagement’s lateness cannot be detached from its academic deficiencies. Indonesia is unfamiliar with and understudies Africa. But, Reformasi was partly pushed through by universities and academics. Change through education can still happen. Can Indonesia become a great power without strong military might? Security and defense power will determine Indonesia’s capacity to be a significant player, notably in Africa. A peaceful regional configuration and apparent lack of enemies somewhat shield the archipelago, allowing it to focus on development (Acharya, 2014). A near-unique focus on economic power reportedly enables reaching great power status if coupled with avoiding wasteful military conflict entanglement (Schweller, 2014; Shekhar, 2018).64 With its bebas aktif principle, Indonesia refuses alliances, also explaining its relative lack of military power. Yet, the war in Ukraine caught “pacific” Europe nearly unprepared, a cautionary tale for Asian nations. Indonesia’s weak military power could impede its further rise,65 especially in an unpredictable geopolitical configuration, marked by

62 According to this oligarchic theory, oligarchs deploy their immense financial means to defend and increase their wealth. 63 After diminishing for years, poverty was said to have exploded by the tens of millions during the Covid-19 crisis (Olivia et al., 2020; Suryahadi et al., 2020). Yet, Indonesia has many social buffers, and seems to have mostly recovered and done better than expected. The upcoming presidential election in 2024 will be decisive for Indonesian stability and continued development. 64 But looking at Japan, Taiwan or South Korea, a lack of enemies can also appear as a handicap for economic growth. The US umbrella might have been the real key. It is often said that Indonesia’s hostility to Israel impedes its global rise. 65 Military innovations also drive other innovations (Owusu, 2018).

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multipolarity and the return of empires.66 Accumulating capital, Indonesia’s hilirisasi could support military and technology investments, if governance is professional.

An Indonesian Conceptualisation of Power Since the Suharto era, under the National Resilience framework, power constitutes a multi-dimensional force, both material and non-material (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Cunha, 2001; Shekhar, 2018).67 Ideology forms part of power, determining all other types of resilience, whether social-economic to ensure national cohesion and fulfilment of basic needs, or military to respond and resist collectively, in solidarity as a unitary force, external and internal threats. This Indonesian power conception seems more elaborate than the basic types of realism or neorealism, presupposing international anarchy, snubbing domestic politics and considering power and wealth in a mercantile way, as the only state goals with security, either to seek hegemony or survival (Mearsheimer, 2001).68 Projecting itself as the GMF, Indonesia seeks international recognition for its increased power (Pattiradjawane & Soebagjo, 2015; Suropati et al., 2018). Defending ASEAN Centrality challenged by minilateralism like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) or AUKUS, Indonesia is legitimate to organise regional cooperation in the Asia–Pacific, and now the Indo-Pacific, through the EAS, IORA, APEC or the RCEP (Acharya, 1997; Anwar, 2017, 2020). As a fulcrum state, Indonesia must 66 Or their possible demise due to hubris for Russia. 67 National Resilience is formed by the Astagatra (eight elements), which combines

natural aspects, Trigatra (three elements), with social aspects, Pancagatra (five elements). Trigatra unites the natural elements, or powers of geography, meaning Indonesia’s strategic location as a maritime hub, natural resources, and a young and dynamic demography. Pancagatra assembles the social powers of the democratic and stable political regime, a rising economy, a moderate, diverse and open socio-cultural democracy, a progressively adapted military power to contemporary threats and needs; all this supported by Pancasila as the state ideology providing a complete ideological foundation for the nation (Latif, 2011). Ali Moertopo added technology to Artagatra (Shekhar, 2018). Law has been added in other versions stating ten gatra (Suropati et al., 2018). Other elements could be added, like education as a main source of power. Education quality determines more than any other factor the future success of nations (Todd, 2020). 68 Facing the consequences of the war in Ukraine, Luhut called for the people to grow chillis following the Total People’s Defense concept, supporting national resilience (Amalia, 2022).

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be engaged by great powers.69 Indonesia signed strategic partnerships with all great powers, aiming to strengthen its maritime and economic capabilities. Indonesia seeks recognition as a great power in the making among other great powers; while accepting its insufficiencies (Fealy & White, 2016; Sukma, 2011). It now rejects denial of its established and upcoming strategic weight, as this book shows.70 Debates on a post-ASEAN foreign policy,71 growing militarisation, and the African expansion relate to status-seeking and international recognition. Indonesia knows its special place in world history, notably due to its Afrasian decolonising role and the KAA (Abdulgani, 1981; Acharya, 2016; Lee, 2010; Van Reybrouck, 2022). The Afrasian transcontinent could become the centre of the world. Asia is already the most strategic continent. Africa should join it soon, given its demographic profile and endowment. With its historical credentials, Indonesia should be the AfroAsian centre. China actively uses Afro-Asian Solidarity in its foreign policy discourse (MOFA China, 2015). From an ASEAN power burdened domestically, Indonesia has transformed into an Asia–Pacific and Indo-Pacific power. The trajectory is impressive and acknowledged by the outside world.72 However, international debates on Indonesia’s democratic decline or the Papua issue can jeopardise this recognition if not properly handled and without proper strategies. Indonesia manages crises well, as evidenced by the Covid-19 episode with a task force led by General Luhut, earning international accolades (Firdaus & Katriana, 2021; Pribadi & Suharto, 2021; Wardani, 2022). Leifer emphasised Indonesia’s “regional entitlement ” (Leifer, 1983). Indonesia’s projection and geopolitical canvas is broadening with the Indo-Pacific (Anwar, 2020; Shekhar, 2018). Retrieving Sukarno’s focus

69 Being a pivot state is not always comfortable, as the example of Germany between the Chinese and US giants seen from a strategic triangle perspective reveals. (Biba, 2021) Being considered a pivot state also entails a lack of military might, forcing to balance stronger powers. 70 See Jokowi and Luhut’s actions and style, and the author’s discussions with Minister Sandiaga Uno, for example. 71 The post-ASEAN debate is not new and was already taking place during the New Order (Suryadinata, 1996). 72 The rise of emerging powers can be rejected or overly contested, like Türkiye or

Iran.

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on the Indian Ocean (McGregor & Hearman, 2017), Indonesia is reverting to its original foreign policy essence as an interoceanic and intercontinental crossroads.73 Jokowi’s Javanese mandala worldview combines multiple aspects and engagements (B. R. O. Anderson, 2007; Supriyanto, 2013; Ward, 2010). The Indo-Pacific represents Indonesia’s new environment to pursue strategic interests, ensure its security, manage and hedge against major powers, and accelerate its economic rise. Given its environment and history, Indonesia aspires to become a maritime power again (Nugroho, 2015).74 Its inward-looking positioning was a historical anomaly explained by geopolitics and its weakness, the army prevailing over the navy and air force during Orde Baru. Slowly, Indonesia is building its maritime power to develop a quality navy capable of forward deployment, thwarting threats before they enter archipelagic waters (Supriyanto, 2013). A core security interest, the South China Sea tensions with China are encouraging Indonesia to militarise the Natuna islands and develop their economy, notably oil and gas (Brown, 2011; Meyer et al., 2019).75 The whole archipelago is now being defended from the outer islands; and not only the Javanese core (Darmawan, 2018).

Ideology and the Constitution Pancasila represents an ideal-type, a national soul guiding all national life, and deals with every aspect of social life in Indonesia, including being the fundamental law.76 As a meta-framework, it is practical, regulating the state administrative and bureaucratic system through its five sila (principles) and their operational interpretation. Pancasila fosters stability and peace in the world’s most plural polity. Pancasila embodies the collective goals Indonesia wants to reach as a nation, its aspirations, idiosyncrasy and collective Weltanschauung distinguishing its uniqueness from

73 As formulated by Hatta, Indonesia has a strategic crossroads position (posisi silang ) between two oceans and two continents (Hatta, 1953, 1958). 74 Sukarno envisioned Indonesia returning to its glorious past as a great maritime

nation, a “bangsa pelaut ” (seafaring nation) (JPNN, 2017). 75 The Indonesian part of the South China Sea was renamed the North Natuna Sea in 2017 (Connelly, 2017). 76 When Sukarno presented Pancasila (Five Principles) on 1 June 1945, he said it was the Staatsidee (basic ideal of the state or basic norm) or Philosophische grondslag (philosophical foundation) of the newly independent Indonesia (Bourchier, 2015).

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other nations (Latif, 2011). Indonesian foreign policy develops under the Pancasila ideology in all its expressions and activities. The KAA’s Dasasila declaration, creating the Bandung spirit of solidarity and supporting decolonisation, notably in Africa,77 was inspired by Pancasila.78 Pancasila is complemented by the state motto of Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika, given Indonesia’s territorial and ethnic diversity. Indonesian foreign policy is ideologically bounded, positively constrained by the state ideology and motto. The Indonesian Constitution, including its Preamble, also founds and structurally constrains Indonesian foreign policy. The first paragraph of the Preamble states: …independence is the right of all nations and therefore colonisation of the world must be abolished because it is not in accordance with humanity and justice.79

The fourth paragraph states that Indonesia and all Indonesian-born citizens:

77 The linkage between Bandung and the NAM is contested based on a rivalry between Afro-Asian and NAM narratives. For Vitalis, Bandung was not exactly non-aligned. Among the five Bandung founders, Sri Lanka and Pakistan were part of the Western camp (Vitalis, 2013). Lee indicates there was no consensus on what non-alignment was supposed to mean at Bandung. Only India, Burma and Indonesia seemed to be using the notion (Lee, 2009), which they linked to anti-imperialism (Singh, 2011). The NAM appeared more as a reaction to bipolarism when Bandung was still focused on a common colonial legacy, although anti-colonial pasts failed to become a basis for multilateralism with geopolitics, country idiosyncrasies and sovereignty imperatives appearing as more decisive variables (Abraham, 2008). This history helps understand the difficulties of operationalising a multilateral framework like the NAASP. 78 Pancasila was notably inspired by Sun Yat Sen and the Kuomintang’s “Three People’s Principles ” (San-Min Chu-I ) of nationalism, democracy and socialism that formed the basis of the Chinese state in 1912. Sukarno’s thinking was influenced by various foreign philosophers like Otto Bauer or Ernest Renan and concepts that he blended with local philosophies and approaches in the Javanese syncretism tradition (Bourchier, 2015). Pancasila inspired the 1954 China-India Panchsheel (Panchasheela) treaty with five principles that were adopted by the UNGA in 1957 (Van Reybrouck, 2022). Likewise, Indonesia’s African foreign policy blends influence from various other external powers. 79 “Bahwa sesungguhnya kemerdekaan itu ialah hak segala bangsa dan oleh sebab itu maka penjajahan di atas dunia harus dihapuskan karena tidak sesuai dengan perikemanusiaan dan perikeadilan” (Alinea Pertama Pembukaan UUD 1945).

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…join in carrying out world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice….80

Almost interventionist, Indonesian foreign policy is constitutionally obliged to participate in the world’s administration to create a better world order based on universal values while respecting national sovereignties.81 Wirajuda opposes Bandung and the Indonesian Constitution to the UN Charter, or Pejambon to San Francisco. Indonesia’s founding fathers created a national order, while the UN Charter emphasised an international order still supporting colonialism. Indonesian diplomacy advances the national interests and projects national values. The Preamble of the Constitution stipulates the inalienable rights of subjugated people and countries to independence, and that colonialism is against humanity and justice. This was against “international values” at the time. The UN Charter was against the colonised’s rights. For Bandung, independence was a prerequisite, against the UN Charter.82 This justifies Indonesian support for Palestine and serves as the foundation for the IAF’s creation (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016). Like Pancasila, the Indonesian Constitution justifies support for African independences and development.83 Javanese traditional power theory highlights the obligation of the Javanese king to deliver the public goods of justice, peace and prosperity to the world for order and stability to exist, and to legitimise his rule (Nguitragool, 2012). The nature of Indonesia’s Constitution 80 “...ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi, dan keadilan social…” (Alinea Keempat Pembukaan UUD 1945). All Indonesianborn citizens is expressed by “seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia”. 81 Codification and constitutional reform appear as powerful tools, as seen in the propagation of the liberal-democratic model (Cello, 2021). 82 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda

(17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 83 Anderson wrote about “the danger of arrogant provincialism, or forgetting that serious nationalism is tied to internationalism” (B. R. O. Anderson, 2016). Something Jokowionce forgot when he invited his fellow Indonesians to hate foreign products to increase the consumption of Indonesian products; quite a counter-productive statement and a mistake for a country simultaneously trying to attract more foreign investment. Supporting local productions should be done positively, not against other nations. The mistake was criticised and not reiterated (Farisa, 2021). Appointed once again by Jokowi to a strategic position, Luhut is in charge of the programme “Proudly Made in Indonesia” (Bangga Buatan Indonesia/BBI) to support local products, notably through state purchasing (Biro Komunikasi, 2023).

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and ideology define the essence of the nation’s global identity, far from supposed insularity. Indonesia’s late African expansion and low global profile were anomalies.

History Hatta established the bebas aktif principle and the “Rowing between two reefs ” doctrine to assert Indonesia’s non-negotiable sovereignty, integrity, independence and freedom against colonial and Nekolim powers,84 refusing any type of military alliance debasing the nation (Hatta, 1953, 1958; Pattiradjawane, 2016; Sukma, 1997; Wnukowski, 2015). Only non-alignment could preserve domestic stability and relative quietude to encourage economic development and concentration on national interests (Alles, 2013).85 More than a principle, bebas aktif was a strategy to avoid great power swallowing and creating tremendous domestic unrest, given the diversity of political factions and interests. The principle was tied to Indonesia’s sense of vulnerability to foreign intervention and meddling, real or imagined. For Leifer, this sense of vulnerability emerged from the “conjunction between internal dissension and external interference” (Leifer, 1983). Contemporary Indonesia appears more confident and eager to express itself globally with a diminishing feeling of inferiority.86 The bebas aktif principle has sometimes been considered a mere slogan since every leader can mould it following his vision and interpretation, according to his interests, ideology and strategic thought. The refusal of military alliances has been constant, although Indonesia signs strategic partnerships and military industry collaborations for submarines, tanks or aircraft.87 In his farewell address in 1796, George Washington 84 Nekolim (Neokolonialisme-Kolonialisme-Imperialisme) powers were seen as the enemies of the Indonesian revolution by Sukarno. 85 As exposed in the Arthashastra, non-alignment appears as a strategy of the weak to increase power while lowering risk. In a matsya-nyaya system, “any permanent compromise at the negotiating table is viewed with caution, lest this lead to irreparable loss ” (Zaman, 2006). We can here gain insight into Indonesia’s (and India’s) attitude concerning the war in Ukraine. 86 For Leifer, Indonesian foreign policy resulted from a multi-factor interplay and a “constant attempt ” to overcome subordination and inferiority (Leifer, 1983). Jokowi and Luhut have certainly been in that mindset. 87 The Bandung conference played its role in Indonesia’s continued rejection of formal alliances (Phillips & Hiariej, 2016).

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warned against any permanent alliances (Trubowitz & Harris, 2019). An analogy with today’s Indonesia and the possible future evolution of its strategic posture, with its material rise, provides food for contemplation. Indonesian independence was gained through weapons and diplomacy (Van Reybrouck, 2022; Weinstein, 1976).88 Since independence, the Indonesian grand strategy for military and non-military defense appears diverse and flexible (Balzacq et al., 2019; Suropati et al., 2018).89 During Order Baru, two main factors determined Indonesia’s defense strategy: an inward-looking orientation and constant suspicion, given a sense of vulnerability, towards the intentions and possible meddling of great powers from outside Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1983; Weinstein, 1976). General Nasution implemented the Total People’s Defense (Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta), combining guerilla warfare, as applied by Mao Zedong in China or the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria, with the strategy of territorial warfare (perang wilayah territorial ) (Cribb, 2001; Rabasa & Haseman, 2002; Shekhar, 2018).90 Lacking material capacities and military expertise, given its revolutionary army type,91 Indonesia developed a weak state and an inward-looking grand strategy, favouring the army. Still, in effect, the doctrine of territorial warfare refers to Pancasila as the foundation of an ideological war to defend the archipelago from external and internal threats, using an active defensive strategy of total and just war aimed at protecting the Constitution from enemies wanting to destroy the national social, cultural and economic ecosystem. This initial grand strategy of the weak, combined with Javanese power theories like mandala implying a layered-type of defense strategy, explains why Indonesia, compared to its size and capacities, still appears as rather inward-looking, or at least en décallage with its potential. During the 88 Struggle and diplomacy (perjuangan dan diplomasi) for Leifer (Leifer, 1983). 89 Strategi Utama or Strategi Raya in Indonesian. 90 Guerilla was a solution for Indonesia while facing Dutch weapons’ superiority (Van Reybrouck, 2022). 91 The Indonesian military or Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) was not created by government formulation. The TNI results from a levée en masse, with an uprising of Freedom Fighters to defend independence. TNI safeguarded the existence and survival of the Republic of Indonesia, “not merely as an organisation receiving orders from the civilian political establishment ”. Author’s Interview with General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former deputy chief of staff of the army (1973–1974), Roving Ambassador of the Non-Aligned Movement for Africa from 1992 to 1995. Jakarta, June 29, 2020.

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Sukarno era, Indonesia had a more globalist foreign policy with the KAA and the New Emerging Forces (Sukma, 1995), a more outward-looking external projection. Indonesia possessed in the 1960s the largest maritime force in Asia, even helping Pakistan with submarines, missile boats and torpedo boats (Supriyanto, 2013). Yet, the Pyongyang-Peking-HanoiPhnom Penh-Jakarta axis revealed Sukarno’s shrinking global vision, progressively reduced to East and Southeast Asia (B. R. O. Anderson, 2002). Indonesia’s essence is not insularity or acting with a low profile. Circumstances and capacities dictate choices and postures. Given his Nasakom domestic political stance combining nationalism, religion and communism (Bourchier, 2015; Cribb & Kahin, 2004),92 creating unity to gain independence, Sukarno could not align with any particular great power in the Cold War. Balancing was applied to manage great power interactions with the archipelago regionally, except towards his presidency’s end when he aligned more with China (Mozingo, 1970; Srinivasan et al., 2019). Territorial and socio-economic following the Pancasila framework, threats were perceived as relating to the external environment on top of the traditional domestic threats seen as harmful to national integrity.93 With Sukarno’s fall, Indonesia under Suharto quickly got closer to the US and other Western powers, especially Japan, that could finance its developmental needs, notably infrastructure and industrialisation (Suryadinata, 1996). Placing itself under the Western strategic umbrella during the Cold War, although still officially bebas aktif , and reinforcing the Java island as the Indonesian strategic core requiring protection at all costs, allowed Indonesia to attain high growth levels and rise to become a Southeast Asian tiger cub economy (Nederveen Pieterse, 2015), on the way to joining the club of the four Asian tigers of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. The 1998 “Asian financial crisis” revealed the fragility of Indonesia’s economic architecture, based on nepotism and corruption. Under Suharto, General Nasution’s Total People’s Defense became the defensive and inward-looking Total People’s Defense and Security or

92 Nationalism-Religion-Communism (Nationalisme-Agama-Komunisme). Nasakom was Sukarno’s way of uniting the three main factions fighting for independence. 93 For the balance of threats framework, socially constructed threats determine state behaviour, not pure power (Walt, 1987).

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HANKAMRATA.94 Facilitating its operationalisation, two concepts were added: the Archipelagic Outlook, a geopolitical perspective grounded in Southeast Asia and ASEAN as Indonesia’s buffer zone or the wider mandala englobing the Javanese and Nusantara core mandala, included in the GBHN in 1973 that states the non-negotiable unity of the nation and its vulnerability to threats,95 and National Resilience as a comprehensive security strategy designed to mobilise all national assets and attain all types of securities including energy and food security (Anwar, 1996; Erb et al., 2005; Raymond, 2017; Shekhar, 2018; Supriyanto, 2013).96 Indonesia is perceived as a valuable princess that many foreign powers want to kidnap for their own benefit (Haripin et al., 2021; Weinstein, 1976), a pivot state to be attracted by great powers as a major prize in the Cold War competition due to its strategic posisi silang in the IndoPacific, between two oceans and two continents, the Southern end of the Eurasian landmass and the Australian continent (Laksmana, 2011; Presiden RI, 2017; Supriyanto, 2013). Strategic straits and chokepoints traverse Indonesia, critical for energy, food and trade for major powers, and the security and sustainability of the world economy. Reformasi, bringing democratisation and demilitarisation of the civilian sphere with the progressive end of Dwifungsi,97 created a conceptual and operational deficiency in defense and security, manifested in the separatist and communal violence, especially in 1998 and 1999 (Van Klinken, 2007). Security Sector Reform (SSR) was initiated by a whole civil society 94 HANKAMRATA meaning Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta; or Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (SISHANKAMRATA) or Total People’s Defence and Security System. It is inscribed in Presidential Regulation No. 8 of 2021 relating to the General Policy of State Defense 2020–2024. 95 The maritime archipelagic doctrine allows for reconciling Indonesia’s sense of vulnerability and regional entitlement (Leifer, 1983). 96 Indonesia’s relatively sophisticated conception of security can be appreciated. For Leifer, national resilience or a sort of self-reliance was partly accommodated by ASEAN partners (Leifer, 1983). 97 Dwifungsi (“Dual function”) was a New Order doctrine justifying the social-political role of the military and its presence in the state and regional governments as regional governors, parliament, SOEs as directors and other state positions. This “assignment of TNI people to head Non-TNI organisations ” also called “kekaryaan” (work) was criticised “even in TNI circles ” according to General Sayidiman. Author’s Interview with General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former deputy chief of staff of the army (1973–1974), Roving Ambassador of the Non-Aligned Movement for Africa from 1992 to 1995. Jakarta, June 29, 2020.

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movement, including academics and activists joining with democratic thinking military officers, which brought the separation of the national police from the military or the end of the military quota in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) (Greenlees, 2011; Haripin et al., 2020; Sukma & Prasetyono, 2003).98 Military reform was conducted by the military itself under popular pressure but willingly, understanding that the national and global situation, post-Cold War and during the so-called third wave of democratisation, had evolved (Huntington, 1991). Indonesia’s profile and contemporary evolution can be a beneficial experience for authoritarian or former authoritarian regimes in Africa. Reformasi altered threat perception and the defense and security paradigm. The inward-looking orientation and sense of vulnerability towards great power intervention in Southeast Asia, pervasive in Indonesia’s defense strategy, evolved towards a more outward-looking strategy, progressively seeing Indonesia gain confidence and increase its global footing. The African expansion occurs in that context. In 2007, the “Total Defense” doctrine replaced HANKAMRATA (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013), widening the Indonesian defense and security perspective, with care for overseas security interests and transnational issues relating to NTTs like terrorism or drug trafficking, and border disputes in Ambalat or Natuna Islands, which brought Kemlu to focus on negotiating and solving border disputes with Indonesia’s neighbours. The new Archipelagic Defense Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan Nusantara) gave more room to maritime defense, based on maritime delineation, in line with the RPJPN (Bappenas, 2005; Shekhar, 2018; Supriyanto, 2013). The broader opening to the seas facilitates the penetration of Africa in Indonesian foreign policy mindsets and elites.

President Jokowi’s Impact Studying Jokowi’s worldview and foreign policy helps understand how and why Indonesia acts internationally, in continuity and contrast with the past, then how Africa fits in this Indonesian framework and why Jokowi decided to suddenly declare Africa a foreign policy priority. Yudhoyono’s globalist, multilateralist foreign policy widened Indonesia’s global reach, premises to bringing Africa more into the Indonesian picture.

98 MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

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Jokowi became President in a flash, rising from mayor of Surakarta in 2005 to Jakarta Governor in 2012 and President of the Republic in 2014 (Mietzner, 2014). Given his humble origins, his trajectory is unprecedented in a country with powerful elites preserving ferociously their turf.99 Jokowi’s profile contrasts with General Yudhoyono or Megawati, Sukarno’s daughter, two establishment figures. Jokowi has been described as utilitarian, mercantile, materialist, hard-powered, realist, developmental or neo-authoritarian, revealing Indonesian great power ambitions. His assertiveness and self-confidence are expressed in a more offensive and unilateralist policy, at least in style; symbolised by the GMF, his vast infrastructure program domestically, and the almost obsessive focus on bilateral-driven economic diplomacy to increase exports, outbound and inbound investment and other economic partnerships (Gorbiano, 2020). Jokowi’s modest origins, his political background as a PDI-P member and his sometimes rhetorically challenging tone towards the liberal world order make him seem like a new Sukarno disciple, implementing the Trisakti vision of political sovereignty, economic independence and cultural exceptionality (Farid, 2016), seeking global recognition with great power ambitions and a sometimes-defying attitude.100 The successful organisation of the 2018 Asian Games, a triumph for Jokowi, bringing great national pride, could be likened to Beijing’s 2008 organisation of the Olympic Games when China definitely consolidated its global superpower status. The 2018 Asian Games and the positive recognition it brought on Indonesia marked the avènement of Indonesia as a great and self-confident contemporary Asian power,101 uncontested leader of Southeast Asia, ready to accelerate its global and regional expansion.102 99 This is widely described in the academic literature on Indonesian oligarchy and

neopatrimonialism (Aspinall, 2013; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Hadiz, 2017; Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 2017; Winters, 2011, 2021). 100 This is underlined by executions of foreign prisoners in 2015, the IUU fishing prohibition allowing the sinking of illegal foreign ships by explosion, and the AAS 2015 discourse (Fealy & White, 2016; Setkab, 2015). 101 The increase in self-confidence of emerging powers can be accelerated by a combination of multiple factors. For India, Liebig indicates that “A new intellectual self-confidence has developed in India, along with doubts over the intellectual vitality in the West ” (Liebig, 2013). 102 Indonesia was immediately encouraged to be a candidate to organise the 2032 Olympics by the chief of the International Olympic Committee, with the backing of China. Jakarta lost the 2032 Summer Olympics bid to Brisbane but is a candidate for the

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The strong FIFA and Olympic connections of the Minister of SOEs, Erick Thohir, symbolise the growing Indonesian clout.103 Simultaneously, Jokowi has been described as inward-looking, rarely travelling abroad, avoiding multilateral forums, focusing on domestic issues apart from global investment and trade (Banyan, 2022), a Javanese leader happy to inaugurate new roads, bridges, ports and airports all over Indonesia given his developmental paradigm (Warburton, 2016). Judging a President on his travels abroad does not seem to be a valuable criterion. His ability to obtain material and ideational benefits for his country is more strategic. Global respect for Jokowi and Indonesia has been growing. He fought for that.104 This Indonesian assertiveness allows African expansion. Jokowi made his first African visit at the end of August 2023, also attending the 15th BRICS Summit in South Africa (Nugraheny, 2023b; Yanwardhana, 2023).105 Luhut acted as a super sherpa visiting Africa several times before (Kamalina, 2023).

2036 Summer Olympics (Da Costa & Widianto, 2021; Saputra, 2020; Wright, 2019). Success in international sporting events, and the reactions and enthusiasm around them from foreigners, are revealing of excitement happening around a country and of a change in international status and acknowledgement (Tomlinson & Young, 2006). 103 Erick Thohir was elected President of the Indonesian Football Federation (Persatuan Sepak Bola Seluruh Indonesia/PSSI) in February 2023 and has been a member of the International Olympic Committee since 2019. He is the former President and owner of the Inter Milan football club and still owns several sports franchises, among other businesses. He is close to FIFA President Gianni Infantino, who is himself a fan of Inter Milan. After the October 2022 stadium tragedy in Malang, killing over a hundred football fans, and the fiasco of the hosting cancellation of the FIFA U-20 World Cup, supposed to be held in Indonesia in May–June 2023, Indonesia was not sanctioned. The FIFA President is supporting Erick Thohir to raise Indonesian football quality and profile, notably by organising a game against the World Champion Argentina in Jakarta in June 2023; raising at the same time Thohir’s profile too in the Indonesian polity. The President of the Argentinian Football Association said Argentina accepted the game due to Thohir being a high-profile figure. This cannot be detached from Thohir’s ambitions to run as a Vice-Presidential candidate in Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential elections. At the end of June 2023, Indonesia was designated to host the FIFA U-17 World Cup (Afroni, 2023; Graham, 2022; Regan & Jamaluddin, 2023; Teresia & Budiman, 2023). As Minister of SOEs during Jokowi’s second mandate, Thohir is involved in the African expansion. 104 The anecdote of his insistence to sit in the middle of the table with Presidents Obama, Xi and Putin at the November 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing highlights that fighting spirit and assertiveness (Fealy & White, 2016). 105 See the description of the visit in Chapter 5.

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Structural changes in world geopolitics,106 combined with Jokowi’s agency and material focus, which makes him satisfied with China’s financial support, have pushed Indonesia towards a reaffirmed developmental model seen as more effective by an increasingly high number of developing country elites. The model’s defiance towards liberal democratic practices seems to make combining development and stability less painful. With its hilirisasi success and environmental significance, Luhut asserts Indonesia is plebiscited by the Global South, in the Afro-Asian Spirit, to become a leader of developing countries (Al Hikam, 2023). Indonesia presents itself as a new model for Africans to follow. China has not only been a developmental model for Indonesia domestically but also for its expansion and approach to Africa, the “China in Africa” narrative being commented on and observed by elites globally. We do not know to what extent Luhut’s African endeavours are linked to China. Indonesia’s hilirisasi is largely backed by Chinese interests. Other external powers also influenced Indonesia’s newly launched African focus as a rising Asian maritime power. An African policy does not take place in a vacuum. It is inspired and impacted by the policies, ideas, practices and results of others through knowledge circulation. An eternal question consists in evaluating if foreign policy drivers relate more to the international system or domestic factors (Battistella et al., 2019; Hudson & Day, 2020). Transnational drivers such as multinationals, global capital and global elites forming transnational systems of capital accumulation are often portrayed as determining state behaviour. The BRICS’ initial birth was described as a neoliberal movement of capital seeking new markets to invest in, expanding capital accumulation. Oligarchic elites ally with political leaders, using media and affiliated academic discourse, to legitimise their economic domination over the masses (Bond & Garcia, 2015; Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe & Dodd,

106 Major changes and events include China’s ascension to global leadership and, more generally, the rising supremacy of East Asia, striking during the Covid-19 crisis; the SinoUS opposition; the rise of major emerging powers like Indonesia; the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Taiwan strait; the retreat of the US under Trump; the rise of populism and new authoritarianisms; the worrying security situation in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa or the DRC. Trump’s incapacity to lead during the Covid-19 crisis as Obama did during the Ebola crisis in 2014 was telling (Fazal, 2020). The US was weakened by Trump’s ignorance, systemic racism and violence, internal divisions and its chaotic confrontation with China. Its model is far less attractive than before in places like Indonesia, which also supports expansion to new areas like Africa.

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2019; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). These neo-Marxist discourses around sub-imperialism and transnational oligarchic alliances offer frameworks for thought, but they tend to oversimplify, denying the complexity of phenomena. The so-called domination can be accepted and reproduced willingly. Human agency and freedom exist, at all levels. Yet, global elites often lack responsibility and empathy in their accumulative thirst. Some have also redistributed and helped humanity progress in the fight against disease or poverty. Despite the increasing consensus for more global assertiveness, domestic capacities constrain Indonesia’s projection. Jokowi has not travelled abroad extensively, preferring to focus internally to solidify the country.107 Expertise, knowledge and academic shortcomings, lack of funding, absence of elite consensus,108 policy instability, and diverse other socio-economic handicaps, hamper Indonesia’s international projection (Sukma, 2011). Capital accumulation from industrialisation supports Indonesia’s more expansive African foreign policy. Indonesia expresses its aspiring great power status through its membership in restricted elite groups like the G20, approved by its peers, showing recognition and acknowledgement from the international community (Kemlu, 2019a). Indonesia’s expansion to Africa, following the model of other Asian powers with its Africa forum, also corresponds to a status declaration. Indonesia envisages becoming a significant player in Africa, providing aid, expertise and investment. Whereas Yudhoyono proposed a democratic and accommodative middle power, Jokowi projects a more powerful Indonesia, more reluctant towards the Western liberal order.109 The reality of the Indonesian polity’s evolution is more nuanced as the adoption of the Indo-Pacific worldview reveals. This framework, led 107 If he had travelled too much when consolidating his power, his adversaries, or even his allies, might have quickly gotten the wrong ideas. Being a leader in Indonesia means being vigilant at all times. Positions are highly coveted, given their usually lucrative payoff. 108 Concerning China, for example, an absence of consensus on the nature of the threat and adequate responses exists among Indonesian elites (Syailendra, 2017). 109 Ikenberry believes liberal internationalism’s preservation lies precisely in its connection with domestic progressivism (Ikenberry, 2018). From that perspective, Indonesia’s regime and politics can contribute to the determination of the world’s governance by bringing more prosperity to its people. This study does not aim to assess if Indonesia is a revisionist or status quo power. Other studies have focused on that (Santikajaya, 2016, 2017; Schweller, 2014; Shekhar, 2018).

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by the West and Japan, was created to contain China, without always saying it explicitly. Indonesia adapted it through the AOIP to make it more accommodative and non-confrontational, and probably neutralise it. The idea to dilute China in a broader, decentred scheme remains aligned with other democratic powers, which feel challenged by China in their region.110 Indonesia uses ASEAN as a stepping stone for broader geopolitical ambitions. ASEAN centrality facilitates great power management, serving Indonesia’s interests in a subtle way. ASEAN was the perfect vehicle to adopt its geopolitical conception of the Indo-Pacific. As the regional leader in ASEAN, almost a benevolent hegemon, without aggressivity or blatant domination, at least that is how it likes to imagine itself (Tan, 2007), Indonesia can manoeuvre through ASEAN. This was impossible through the NAASP, given Indonesia’s weak capacity and status in that framework, compared to the greater powers. Its capacity to manoeuvre inside IORA is also weaker, given its late contemporary development, power and networks in the Indian Ocean, compared to the Indian giant or Western powers. National interests defined in an opportunistic and mercantile way determine bargaining strategies towards great powers, placed in competition to see which great power provides the most extensive benefits, like the ‘beauty contest’ for the high-speed train construction between China and Japan (Sihite & Deti Mega, 2015). Simplistically, Indonesia is said to prioritise China in the economic sector and the US as a security partner. Great power partners are engaged in a combination of multiple sectors with diverse equilibriums, according to Indonesia’s assessment of its interests and bargaining power. After Reformasi and to support its rise, Indonesia became more pragmatic and flexible in its great power engagement. Although official alliances remain impossible, Indonesia, following its strategies of dynamic equilibrium and equilateral alignment to balance and bind with great powers, signed multiple strategic partnerships with a tough bargaining stance to maximise its benefits (Yani & Montratama, 2017). Indonesia is

110 For Pardesi, the Indo-Pacific discourse favours the US, which can allocate power and status through that framework. At the same time, he claims that the reemergence of the Indo-Pacific is linked to the return to the centre stage of China and India (Pardesi, 2020). Multiple agencies animate the Indo-Pacific construction, including Indonesia’s.

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fortunate to face only benign traditional threats from the outside (Greenlees, 2011). No major power threatens Indonesia directly in a substantial way (Laksmana et al., 2020), even China, despite the Natuna sea issue. China has Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sea claims and no territorial claims over Indonesia in the South China Sea. Threat perception towards China varies among different Indonesian stakeholders (Fitriani, 2018). China has no interest in entering any major sustained confrontation with Indonesia in the near future. Conflict would be detrimental to its global standing, hard interests and the powerful Indonesian-Chinese community. Strategic partnerships allow military cooperation in military supplies to support Indonesia’s force modernisation, technology transfers and jointindustrial production. Security exchanges in expertise and knowledge help Indonesia modernise its approaches. The nation also shares its expertise in many fields like peacekeeping, counterterrorism or maritime security.111 The economic benefits of these strategic partnerships serve Indonesia’s developmental requirements with increased investments, notably in needed infrastructure. The increased international market access benefits Indonesian manufacturers and resource producers. Indonesia signed a Strategic Partnership with South Africa in 2008 when SBY visited South Africa on a State visit. The agreement has not provided complete satisfaction, notably in economic or educational relations. No significant literature or university centre exists focusing on Indonesia-South Africa issues.112 Indonesia’s major power relations hasten its power rise and knowledge acquisition, which, combined with its unique know-how, enhances its attractivity for African countries. African nations share a smaller developmental gap with Indonesia than with most other major powers. Indonesia appears as a credible, capable, and more accessible partner. It can engage in South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) with Africa by joining with a great power or other donors to develop projects in Africa (Pramono, 2012), like, on paper, Japan and India through the

111 This is more debatable concerning maritime security, given the overlapping and inter-agency coordination issues among multiple maritime security actors (Laksmana, 2016). 112 This absence is acknowledged in a book published by the Indonesian embassy in South Africa for the 25th-anniversary celebration of Indonesia–South Africa relations (Haron & Arby, 2019; SA Embassy, n.d.).

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AAGC (J. Panda, 2017; Prakash, 2018a, 2018b). Since the African continent is the playing field of all major powers, Indonesia’s expertise in great power management can benefit its Africa penetration and engagement.

Jokowi’s Dream of a Resurrected Maritime Power Apart from Africa’s economic opportunities, the growing importance of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific worldview, bringing about new thinking and doctrines about threats, places Africa in the Indonesian picture from a security perspective, notably through NTTs like piracy, drug trafficking, IUU fishing or human trafficking, which strongly concern Indonesia. These issues open collaboration, capacity-building, training and exchange possibilities with African countries and necessary knowledge and intelligence development like mapping Papua separatist activism in Africa, a major strategic and national security threat for Indonesia, still not been well comprehended (CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020). Increased economic links with Africa necessitate trade, investment and citizens’ protection from the Indonesian government, and potentially Indonesian Private Security Companies (PSCs) like China has created (Nantulya, 2020). This changing reality needs to be thought about on the Indonesian side to avoid bad experiences with citizen kidnappings, killings or asset destructions, issues that all external players face in Africa. The Sudanese civil war recently forced Indonesia to evacuate its citizens, successfully (Galiartha, 2023). Abandoning the weak state mentality and permanent sense of vulnerability, Indonesia adopts a braver, more assertive and dynamic maritime strategy to affirm itself as a rising power, protect archipelagic sea lanes, straits and hubs through which world resources and trade pass between Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Asia–Pacific, and border areas and outer islands, with enhanced maritime governance and law enforcement, defend its South China Sea interests113 ; and return to its original self as an Asian maritime civilisational power. Technology, innovation, industrial development, and new doctrines for deterrence, surveillance,

113 To defend its position in the South China Sea, China mobilises the support of African “friendly” countries, as it also does for issues relating to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang or Tibet (Large, 2021). Indonesia’s engagement with Africa can also be observed from that angle of diplomatic support and leverage.

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forward deployment, sea denial and control and maritime domain awareness, are developed and applied to face threats and vulnerabilities, as a powerful nation with a world-class navy able to project itself deeply in the world’s oceans through an assertive posture, or at least that is the final goal (Saha, 2016; Shekhar, 2018). International maritime cooperation with great powers like India and China is prioritised; and with Africa, notably through the IAMD on sustainable fisheries and maritime security. This shows how Indonesia is getting closer to Africa via the oceans, maritime potential, and threat management. The post-ASEAN debate pits those who think ASEAN remains the main cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy (Anwar, 2017, 2020), against those who still consider ASEAN important for Indonesia as a Southeast Asian nation but believe ASEAN should not impede Indonesia’s global rise and that Indonesian power must go beyond ASEAN, yet ASEAN matters if it can be used instrumentally (Sukma, 2009b).114 The AOIP’s recent adoption saw Indonesia weaponise the ASEAN multilateral vehicle and the ASEAN Centrality concept to implement its vision. With the right framework and context, multilateralism can serve its national interests (J. P. Panda, 2017). Indonesia rediscovers ASEAN’s utility to penetrate the African market, notably through trade (Saiman, 2019). Using the ASEAN platform could facilitate negotiating PTAs directly with the AU and African RECs, giving Indonesia more clout and justification to negotiate directly with the RECs and the AU and benefit from the various African free trade areas, especially the AfCFTA. A restricted NAASP and the EAS could possibly be operationalised as effective Afro-Asian multilateral frameworks (Dlamini, 2019). The frustration the archipelago felt as a new democracy in ASEAN, among more authoritarian regimes, fades with the more instrumental use Indonesia can make of the Southeast Asian grouping to support its own agenda as an ambitious emerging power, like with the AOIP (Anwar, 2020). The ASEAN framework and ASEAN centrality remain essential to manage great powers’ ambitions and engagement in the region. ASEAN centrality helps Indonesia’s hedging and balancing efforts, creating a regional architecture based on cooperation, peace and restraint. Thanks 114 Under Jokowi, a discrepancy between Kemlu and foreign minister Retno on one side; and Jokowi’s inner circle on the other, existed concerning the degree of strategic importance of ASEAN for Indonesia’s foreign policy (Weatherbee, 2016).

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to the ASEAN Plus process and the EAS, all great powers are given space in the region to express their points of view and pursue their interests. The institutional process tries to restrain their assertiveness. It is too early to know how this strategy of great power management will play out in the broader Indo-Pacific framework, which is more complicated to operationalise, especially to serve Indonesian interests. How Africa fits in and contributes to regional stability is still a work in progress.

Conclusion The contrast between the multilateralist, liberal institutionalist frameworks of the NAASP and the two AASs in 2005 and 2015; and the country-to-continent, multi-bilateral, more realist IAF and its derivatives,115 can be explained by the change in Indonesia’s geopolitical framework from the Asia–Pacific only to the Indo-Pacific, which includes Africa through the Indian Ocean. Indonesia’s worldview and foreign policy-making elite mindsets and geographical mental maps opened up to Africa and placed the continent as part of Indonesia’s main geopolitical interests, like it is for other Asian powers and all great powers, although still imperfectly and not at the same level of primacy. Indonesia abandoned its weak state, inward-looking, overdefensive posture with a strong sense of vulnerability, for a more assertive, inclusive, expansive and more outward-looking stance, providing it with the vision and attitude to widen its geopolitical view and activities beyond its traditional sphere. The shift in presidents and presidential personalities is crucial in understanding the birth of a more pragmatic, utilitarian and dynamic engagement with Africa. For Jokowi, Africa appears as a strategic new market for Indonesian economic expansion, in line with his economic diplomacy focus for Indonesian foreign policy. Successful economic development constitutes the basis of Jokowi’s political legitimacy, himself a former furniture entrepreneur. Africa can progressively be transformed in Indonesian leadership mindsets into more than just a “non-traditional market”. Jokowi’s entrepreneurial mindset seems decisive by pushing

115 The framework was described as neoliberal in its paradigmatic approach, seeking absolute advantages, in the study ordered by Kemlu preceding its formation (BPPKKemlu & UMY, 2016). Yet, the IAF was less ambitious than the study’s proposition, which placed the forum at least at the ministerial level. The absence of a partnership with the AU limits the forum’s ambitions.

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the country to be ambitious and pragmatic, by directly plunging into the African adventure, instead of trying to unite the whole of Asia– Africa in an impossible framework that Indonesia cannot lead or control, given the divergent interests inside the non-operationalised NAASP, also unrecognised by the AU (African Union, 2013; BPPK-Kemlu, 2010; CDT—Amb. Rezlan Jenie, 2019; CDT with H. Wirajuda, 2018; Dlamini, 2019; NAASP, 2005). Yet, the NAASP could be useful in the future, adequately formalised as a transcontinental multilateral platform serving Indonesia and other major powers’ interests, which will necessitate AfroAsian knowledge and community-building. Threats in Africa and NTTs emanating from Africa concern Indonesia. It represents an opportunity for Indonesia to engage with Africa and share knowledge and expertise. Africa’s securitisation, in the eyes of Indonesian elites, facilitates the rise of its importance (Kurniawan, 2018; Laksmana & Taufika, 2020).116 China’s foreign policy doctrine evolved towards interference abroad, or at least non-indifference, to protect its assets and citizens abroad largely due to African crises and NTTs (Ghiselli, 2021).117 It is likewise learning by doing for Indonesia. After its period of complaining over ASEAN being a golden cage that constrained its ambitions as a rising power, therefore necessitating a postASEAN foreign policy, Indonesia’s more instrumental engagement with ASEAN, used as a vehicle to serve its national interests, is seen in the adoption of the AOIP. Indonesia’s increased power means it can better use multilateralism, if the format is reasonable, as a tool to serve its ambitions. This has not been feasible with the NAASP until now.118 Indonesia wishes to instrumentalise ASEAN to engage with Africa and increase its leverage, notably in trade, by notably signing PTAs between ASEAN and African RECs. Indonesian elites are increasingly interested in international expansion, contradicting certain strains of oligarchic theory that stated Indonesia was unwilling to expand globally or become more influential towards other 116 The critical role of securitisation in the Indonesian polity has been observed during

the Covid-19 crisis. 117 For example. China evacuated 36,000 Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011. 118 Kemlu sources indicate that the NAASP had originally been conceived as a platform

for Indonesia to gain a “shortcut” (“jalan pintas”) to facilitate its access to African markets, a sort of multilateral leverage, given Indonesia’s weak presence in Africa (CDT with Amb. Faizasyah, 2021). Africa had probably not been so seriously considered at the time.

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nations. That oligarchic protective attitude would explain Indonesia’s inward-looking attitude.119 While it may have explanatory power, this interpretation overlooks systemic factors coming from the international structure, the agency, power and impact of Indonesian presidents,120 the will of both private and state Indonesian capital through multinationals like Indofood or Sinar Mas and SOEs like Pertamina or PT Wijaya Karya (WIKA),121 the defense and security sector that handles threats and collaborates on an increasingly wider scale internationally, and the robust model that East Asia is for Indonesia and how its successful nations influence the way Indonesia acts internationally through knowledge circulation.122 The rise of emerging powers active in Africa has been associated with neoliberal capitalism, seeking a “spatial fix”, or new markets for capital accumulation (Bond & Garcia, 2015; Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe & Dodd, 2019; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). We avoid mono-explanations and believe in political leadership’s capacity to act, and the power and impact of the human mind and knowledge. Yet, that explanation also contradicts the type of oligarchic theory evoked. A reason for this misinterpretation might be that small African nations face an asymmetric relationship with Indonesia in many ways. In a sub-imperialism framework, Indonesian elites see Africa as a way to prolong their domestic domination and capital accumulation on another continent as a sort of neo-dependency.123 The phenomenon remains more convoluted. Structurally, Africa represents a new potential way of balancing great powers

119 Oligarchic power elites, supposedly in full control of Indonesia, want to protect their domestic assets as a priority, and expansion would endanger them, notably by opening more the Indonesian market through economic reciprocity (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). 120 Especially of an ex-furniture exporter who cares about conquering foreign markets like Jokowi (Bland, 2020); or a General turned major businessman and now politician like Luhut. 121 Oligarchic theory relating to Indonesia has evolved to include the internationalisation of Indonesian capital. Oligarchs have expanded to ASEAN to protect their regional assets (Al-Fadhat, 2019). We could claim oligarchs are now expanding towards Africa, although we try to develop a more layered explanation. 122 Oligarchic theories of this type are too deterministic, and somewhat misunderstand the functioning of transnational capital and how “oligarchs” can change their operating schemes with circumstances. 123 This is often presented to be the case of elites in other emerging countries that have expanded to Africa (Van der Merwe & Dodd, 2019; Van der Merwe et al., 2016).

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for countries like Indonesia, which need new partners and solutions with the evolving geopolitical situation. The Global South coalition Luhut has set up, leveraging Afro-Asian solidarity, can be perceived in that context. Africa gradually penetrates Indonesia’s geopolitical worldview, not merely in discourse, but in reality, systemically, through the Indo-Pacific canvas especially. Changes in defense and security approaches and presidential personalities also explain the shift in approach towards Africa. Economic drivers from the state and the private sector are central, but dependent on leadership perception and knowledge to be activated. Economic development forms part of Indonesia’s comprehensive conception of security. Conquering a new continent cannot be detached from that holistic perspective. Jokowi benefits from the continuity of Indonesia’s rise ensured by previous efforts and leaders. Yet, his entrepreneurial spirit and pragmatism accelerate the search for all possible opportunities to support Indonesia’s rise, including Africa’s prioritisation in Indonesian foreign policy. The combination of material and ideational drivers on different levels of analysis helps explain Indonesia’s foreign policy evolution, notably the incorporation of Africa. Indonesia’s material power increase encourages its African interest, in finding new places to trade and invest. Indonesian multinationals preceded the state foreign policy focus on Africa, with earlier investments, and now call for higher state support.124 Mostly born under Suharto,125 Indonesian conglomerates possess their own logic and power. The broader geopolitical mental map and leadership shift in Indonesia determine full engagement with Africa with a state prioritisation and the use of state instruments and power. Given its already rising power status, history and legacy, Indonesia should have launched its Africa+1 forum at least a decade before 2018, following other main Asian powers; and not insisted for so long with the NAASP, given its incapacity to drive this multilateral construction carrying so many divergent interests. Shifts

124 Kemlu indicates that, through its embassies in Africa, it often contributes to opening the first doors for Indonesian multinationals in Africa, like in Nigeria for Indomie, now even considered a national Nigerian dish, with the blessing of then President of Nigeria Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (CDT with Amb. Faizasyah, 2021). 125 Suharto and military patronage determined business success, creating monopolies and oligopolies. The conglomerates like Salim Group or Sinar Mas progressively internationalised for diversification and asset security (Borsuk & Chng, 2014).

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in leadership and geopolitical worldview were needed to allow Africa’s real inclusion as a primary focus for Indonesia. Having shown how Africa started becoming a more serious preoccupation for Indonesia and its foreign policy under Jokowi, Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Africa per se will be examined, its shift in focus and essence, and the decisive actors responsible for creating and implementing the new Indonesian approach to the African continent.

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CHAPTER 3

An Afro-Asian Multilateral Deadlock

Prior to the reorientation of Indonesia’s African engagement, making it a more pragmatic and concrete effort, more result-oriented, at least in economic diplomacy and more in Jokowi’s image, and Africa’s structural integration in Indonesia’s geopolitical canvas through the IndoPacific Outlook, Africa was perceived quite abstractly, a discursive reality, unknown but spoken about in reference to the KAA. The continent stood as an idealised, chimerical or nightmarish entity, an abstraction not seen as a place to look for economic opportunities, being a destitute and conflicted region. Notwithstanding the Afro-Asian narrative, a posting in Africa lacked prestige for Kemlu diplomats.1 With Bandung, Indonesia contributed to the liberation of Africa from colonial powers (Darmayana, 2019; Mukthi, 2015). During the Cold War, Indonesia supported the fight against Apartheid in Southern Africa as a NAM member or the liberation of Algeria from the French.2 1 The author often heard the expression “tempat pembuangan” (landfill), mostly for diplomats ending their careers. The perception has now slightly changed, but Africa is still not considered an ideal destination for Kemlu diplomats. 2 Indonesia provided financing to the African National Congress (ANC) and Nelson Mandela (Deplu & UNDIP, 1984; Suryadinata, 1996). For Algeria and Tunisia, Indonesia imported artillery pieces from Yugoslavia and trained officers for the struggle against France. Indonesia also hosted the FLN in Jakarta, notably Lakhdar Brahimi. Author’s

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This constant Indonesian support for African nations’ freedom constitutes a tremendous political capital to engage with Africa, with the right formula.3 The end of the Cold War and the new globalisation context, the fall of the New Order and Indonesia’s foreign policy resetting through democratisation, the end of Apartheid in South Africa that encouraged South African foreign policy dynamism, notably towards Asia; the selection as Indonesian President of Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2001,4 and the post-September 11 context of the Global War on Terror (GWoT); marked the return of an interest in developing an Afro-Asian platform. Both continents share so many values and interests, but failed to form a significant transcontinental partnership formalising their unique historical ties, given the absence of a unifying principle.5 Succeeding Nelson Mandela, Indonesia’s great batik-wearing friend and Sukarno admirer (DetikNews, 2013), as South African President in 1999, Thabo Mbeki, also AU Chairperson, invited Asia to collaborate more, fostering “systematic exchange of experiences ” with Africa at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002 (Mbeki, 2002). The AU had just been launched in July, replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).6 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) had been adopted in July 2001 as the new social-development programme to bring prosperity, development, democracy and peace to Africa.7 The AU positioned NEPAD as the main framework of engagement with Africa for external powers. NEPAD represented a compromise between Western and African countries for more transparency, better governance, reforms and liberalisation in exchange for investment, market access and interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 3 The first generation liberated the colonised countries as a “call of history”. The second generation should speak about practical economic cooperation and strategic and socialcultural issues. Yet, Wirajuda wondered why it had been lacking until now for Indonesia. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 4 After President Gus Dur’s impeachment. 5 Unlike the NAM’s non-bloc principle (Cavoški, ˇ 2022). 6 The OAU was judged too weak and incapable of supporting peace, democracy, human

rights and development on the continent, notably due to its strict non-intervention policy. Tanzania’s founding father Nyerere wrote: “avoid judging each other’s internal policies ” (Nyerere, 1963). 7 NEPAD was adopted by the OAU and then ratified by the AU.

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aid (Dumont & Kanté, 2009; Gallagher, 2011; Porteous, 2008).8 Mbeki wanted to link NEPAD with ASEAN.9 After WWII, Africa was often considered as prospering better than Asia, leading in exporting resources, notably minerals and other commodities. “East Asia seemed to have very few advantages over Africa at the point of decolonisation” (Mills et al., 2020). A prominent Indonesian export, generating billions of dollars in currency nowadays, palm oil originates from West Africa. In the 1960s, Nigeria was a leading producer before being overtaken by Indonesia and Malaysia due to their better governance, agricultural policies and industrialisation (Usman, 2022).10 Indonesia overtook Nigeria’s development through betterperforming elites. Many indicators can be mentioned, such as life expectancy, poverty, UN HDI, adult literacy, per capita income, diet, health, education, infrastructure, crime, clean water access, terrorism, elections or resource management (Cunliffe-Jones, 2010). For Wirajuda, since Suharto, Indonesia is a model for Nigeria, eager to learn from the Indonesian experience, given that both nations share similar religious lines and ethnic diversity, and are both former military regimes.11 Africa declined economically compared to Asia. Lacking investment and diversification, stymied by conflicts and neopatrimonialism impeding the transformation of resource revenues into development or simply the victim of bad politics (Alao, 2020; Mohan et al., 2018; Usman, 2022),12 its production dramatically suffered. The AU and NEPAD were vehicles to mimic and catch up with Asia. Asia had taken the lead, a model for African leaders (Mills et al., 2020). The debate about the 8 The programme was notably developed by Tony Blair with Thabo Mbeki. Founded by Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, NEPAD is also presented as the merger of the Omega Plan of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and of Thabo Mbeki’s Millenium African Plan. 9 Or at least with SADC. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 10 In 1960, Nigeria produced almost half the world’s palm oil, falling to 7% in 2010

(Cunliffe-Jones, 2010). 11 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 12 Alao highlights that African conflicts are first about land and governance, and not about natural resources; with the example of diamonds that seem to create conflict in the DRC while bringing prosperity to Botswana due to good governance (Alao, 2020).

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proper development path for Africa was notably framed as an opposition between dependency and modernisation theory (Alao, 2020).13 This debate echoes Indonesia’s history with the contrast between Sukarno and Suharto presidencies, and helps understand how external powers like Indonesia can position themselves towards their African partners. A framework like NEPAD does not emerge out of a vacuum. Since Indonesia would chair ASEAN in 2003, Megawati answered Mbeki’s call by welcoming an Asian and African Sub-Regional Organisations Conference (AASROC-I) held in July 2003 in Bandung.14 South Africa organised AASROC-II in Durban in August 2004 (Alatas, 2005; Rubiolo, 2016).15 The meetings were co-hosted by the future NAASP Co-Chairs, South Africa and Indonesia (Bandoro, 2005). Wishing to create a new Afro-Asian transregional bridge through a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity, AASROCs prepared the April 2005 AAS in Jakarta (Alatas, 2005; Rubiolo, 2016).16 Potential areas for Afro-Asian transregional and intraregional economic cooperation were determined in trade, investment or industrialisation. Political-security issues concerned conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, arms proliferation, and NTTs such as terrorism. More liberal-leaning topics dealt with human rights or democratisation (Alatas, 2005). The Declaration on the NAASP with its accompanying Plan of Action were formulated during AASROCs and officially launched during the AAS 2005 as the new framework for 13 In 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for the 1980–2000 period as a Pan-African economic blueprint with common development goals and strategies for a prosperous and successful Africa, aiming to change the narrative about Africa. The plan was openly drafted in a spirit of African nationalism with a combination of “dependency theory, environmentalism and basic human needs with indigenous and longstanding African priorities ” (OAU, 1980). Focusing only on Sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to the LPA’s Pan-African perspective, the World Bank replicated in 1981 with the Berg report that advocated for economic liberalisation of the continent with the opening of Sub-African economies to international trade and investment; in a clear modernisation paradigm (Berg, 1981). 14 AASROC-I was attended by 36 countries and 22 sub-regional organisations. AASROC participants included ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 15 In between ASSROC-I and -II, a Ministerial Working Group Meeting was held in Durban in March 2004. 16 Organised in conjunction with the Golden Jubilee Commemoration of the Bandung Conference.

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Afro-Asian cooperation (Haron & Arby, 2019). After co-hosting the AASROCs and the AAS 2005, the 2005–2009 NAASP Co-Chairs were also South Africa and Indonesia, which would be prolonged since no other countries would be willing to chair the NAASP (Alatas, 2005; BPPK-Kemlu, 2010).17 106 countries participated in the 2005 AAS. Indonesia’s former foreign minister Ali Alatas, of Hadhrami descent, conceived the AAS as “a bridge over the Indian Ocean, spanning the two continents ” (Alatas, 2005). The complexity and heaviness of implementing the NAASP framework could already be imagined, especially given the animosity, rivalry, competition and divergent interests among many of those countries. Given institutionalisation problems, the NAASP defaulted to support Palestine with more activities for Palestine capacity-building than the total amount of other activities,18 limiting the possibilities of the international regime.19 This Palestine problem could have been championed through alternative frameworks. It overshadowed other NAASP issues, essential for Afro-Asian interests and Indonesian national interests, contributing to the NAASP’s appearance as a platform lacking focus, depth and commitment, and far too political to be workable. Facing blockage, Indonesia transformed the NAASP to voice its support for Palestine while attempting to raise its own status and political credibility. Like the IAF, the NAASP has not been integrated into the AU’s official multilateral partnerships scheme despite South Africa’s 2013 request (African Union, 2013).20 The AUC wields significant agency as an

17 South Africa was invited by Indonesia to be co-host and co-chair of the conferences and the NAASP. President Mbeki accepted. For Wirajuda, since it had all started from an Mbeki request, it was “only natural we invite South Africa as a co-chair”. Wirajuda told the author he “came up with the idea” of the Asia-Africa Summit anniversary. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 18 Indonesia had organised 22 partnership programmes in the NAASP framework and 24 capacity-building programs for Palestine (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). 19 Israel’s influence in strategic regions of Africa or in major Asian countries like India is significant (Gidron, 2020; Puthan Purayil, 2020). 20 The AU actually created the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) in 2013, which would then be renamed the PMRM, to try and coordinate partnerships better since different AU units and divisions could previously sign partnerships with various external partners, a sort of “strategic guidance”. Coordination is still complicated (Gwatiwa, 2022).

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international actor and a strong influence in agenda-setting, framing or strategy in Africa and concerning Africa’s external relations (Dlamini, 2019; Tieku, 2021). Therefore, Africa’s NAASP support or involvement remains limited. The NAASP followed an institutionalisation roadmap, notably with the supposed staging of a Summit every four years.21 The NAASP was composed as an intergovernmental forum bolstered by cooperation through sub-regional organisations and the development of People-to-People relations.22 In October 2009,23 almost five years after the Declaration, the NAASP designated eight “focus areas of cooperation” (Kemlu, 2019; NAASP, 2005).24 Institutionalisation never took place properly, which remains somewhat paradoxical since the NAASP aimed to develop realistic and concrete fields of cooperation (Kemlu, 2019; NAASP, 2005). The NAASP had been envisaged as an international return of Afro-Asian solidarity and cooperation. Asian-African links needed to be institutionalised through a concrete framework since earlier efforts to create Asia–Africa platforms had failed as ad hoc efforts, as expressed by Ali Alatas (Bandoro, 2005). The original aim was to create a more practical Afro-Asian platform, reinforcing Bandung. Playing collectively, Indonesians feel no other initiative proved as impactful and long-lasting as Bandung. The ideological link remains robust and meaningful.25 Despite the rise of several Asian nations, in the early 2000s, a narrative expressed in Indonesia and post-Apartheid South Africa portrayed Asia and Africa as weak and poor continents, victims of protectionism limiting access to developed markets and imposed liberal reforms by developed countries, stuck in dependency relationships, lacking a voice and decisionmaking capacity in the international system, afflicted by globalisation evils,

21 Alongside a Business Summit, Ministerial meetings every two years and regular Senior Officials, technical or sectoral meetings (Alatas, 2005). 22 Among civil society, business, media and academics. 23 During a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Jakarta. 24 Counter Terrorism; Combating Trans-national Organized Crime; Food Security; Energy Security; Small and Medium Enterprises; Tourism; Asian African Development University Network; and Gender Equality and Women Empowerment. 25 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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therefore still hit by international marginalisation (Bandoro, 2005).26 Contrasting with ambitions in certain major Asian and African societies, this storey could not correspond to the view and interests of several AfroAsian countries, or at least successful East Asian nations. It contradicts major Asian powers’ national interests and their strategic penetration of Africa, searching for resources, markets, and investments. Yet based on the weakness narrative, Asia and Africa needed more solidarity. An organisation should link both continents more concretely to support progress. This Afro-Asian weakness narrative can be paralleled with Indonesia’s historical sense of vulnerability and weakness discourse. The new intercontinental Afro-Asian bridge was supposed to enhance Afro-Asian voices and bargaining power in multilateral forums while facing developed countries. Afro-Asian political capacity and leverage would increase, bridging the gap created by the absence of any intercontinental multilateral Afro-Asian institution similar to APEC or ASEM. The NAASP’s hubris lies in the will to coordinate all existing initiatives between Asia and Africa, including TICAD and FOCAC, building upon them (Alatas, 2005).27 How could the NAASP meddle in the FOCAC process, an emanation of the sovereign Chinese state? It was unfeasible in the framework of Chinese global expansion, notably towards Africa. With China’s now growing interest in weaponising multilateralism given its hegemonic ambitions, the NAASP could find a new lease on life, or a derived, not so oecumenical, scheme. The NAASP was constructed as an innovative approach to dealing with Afro-Asian challenges in the post-Cold War world.28 A “Strategic Partnership”, its ambition was to create a workable, wide-ranging cooperation

26 As seen before, researchers like Bayart consider that Africa has never been marginalised in the international system (Bayart, 2000). 27 Both NAASP declarations mention Asian Africa+1 forums. In 2005, the NAASP declaration mentions TICAD; the Chica-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), which became FOCAC in 2006; India-Africa Cooperation, which preceded the IAFS; IndonesiaBrunei Darussalam (sponsored by the NAM Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation); the Vietnam-Africa Forum; and the Smart Partnership Initiative and the Langkawi International Dialogue. In 2015, the reinvigorated NAASP declaration mentions additional forums such as Korea-Africa Forum, Thai-Africa Initiative, Iran-Africa Forum, Arab-Africa Forum or Africa-Turkey Partnership. In 2005, the NAASP aimed at streamlining and avoiding duplicates in Africa+1 forums, which was not the case in 2015 (NAASP, 2005, 2015). 28 Especially the issues of poverty, conflict, development and instability.

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agenda between two equal continental partners fulfilling their common interest together, following the Bandung spirit. Implementation failed because it was an unrealistic construction. Kemlu reviewed the process in 2010 quite severely and honestly, but to try reviving the process as the Afro-Asian institutional “missing link”, which lacked specific benefits and buy-in from participants. National interests outweighed nebulous multilateralism (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). The NAASP’s survival remained unsure. No other nation wanted to succeed South Africa and Indonesia, the 2005–2009 Co-Chairs. The NAASP did not seem strategic and lacked funding. The AU had not been adequately associated from the outset, a crucial preliminary and strategic step for gaining its support (African Union, 2013). Internal African rivalries obstructed implementation, especially the Western Sahara problem. Following the 2005 AAS, Wirajuda experienced a “great disappointment ”. The NAASP was focusing on practical concerns, but the mess of African politics “recked the whole project ”. South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) government invited the Polisario as an observer for the September 2006 first NAASP Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Durban (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006; SPS, 2006). For Wirajuda, this was a South African “failure”. Only UN members should have been invited, not liberation movements. Wirajuda lodged a complaint with South Africa’s foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, questioning why South Africa invited Non-State Actors (NSAs). The AAS was united with only UN members, not the NAASP meeting, due to Polisario’s presence. The follow-up on the NAASP’s positive achievements could not be implemented, there was “not a single page of agreement ”. Durban was supposed to begin implementation. Wirajuda conveys this information because he refuses people to think “Indonesia always has good ideas but is not able to follow-up”. A NAASP member, Morocco, notably supported by Senegal, had an interest in opposing South Africa. Egypt attempted to rescue the endeavour by offering a practical meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, but again Polisario was presented as an observer.29

29 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). Ambassador Teuku Faizasyah, who was then posted at the Indonesian embassy in South Africa, confirmed this Polisario episode to the author in a meeting at Kemlu’s headquarters on

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Major Asian powers were developing their Africa+1 forums serving their Africa policies and national interests, more pragmatic ways of expanding their involvement with Africa than the unproductive NAASP, a noble idea but unfeasible at the time. The world had profoundly changed since 1955. Countries were all independent. Their societies craved economic development. Growing fast, Asian powers needed African resources and markets. Like in Asia, bilateralism offered greater assurance of delivering quick and substantial wins. Competition in Africa had intensified. External powers needed to plunge into the so-called “new scramble for Africa” (Carmody, 2016). Indonesian foreign policymakers were aware that the NAASP was challenging to operationalise, especially given the lack of interest of other Asian powers. Still, Indonesia did not develop its bilateral relations with Africa through an appropriate African strategy (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). The 2005 Afro-Asian weakness, poverty and solidarity discourse changed in the early 2010s. Bandoro mentioned the fundamental evolutions in “rising Africa”, now more liberal and globalised. Asian powers’ aggressivity to enhance their African market penetration was acknowledged. This situation challenged Indonesia’s NAASP preservation. Indonesian diplomacy was aware that the NAASP scheme was not becoming a functioning multilateral platform. Indonesia wanted to save face in pursuing the framework, despite not being recognised as a priority anymore, given its unbearable complexity. International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and foreign ministries can be resistant to change, stuck in the same narratives that oversimply and ignore complexity (Autesserre, 2012). Lacking financing, support from participants and clarity of purpose, the NAASP did not fulfil the success criteria of an international institution in legitimacy, participation, accountability or transparency (Cogan et al., 2016). International institutions take diplomatic decisions to organise the world against instability and inefficiency, and produce knowledge (Kott, 2021). The NAASP had little decisions to make and lacked knowledge. The matter was openly debated. Foreign policymakers were conscious that Indonesia should prioritise a dynamic bilateral African engagement, especially economically. They were cognisant of the approaches of other Asian powers and their African breakthroughs (Bandoro, 2005; BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). Without 31 May 2023 in the presence of the Director for African Affairs. Mrs. Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty.

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the embracement of a powerful figure like Luhut, Kemlu could not move forward, given Indonesia’s bureaucratic and political obstacles.30 Due to institutional heaviness and blindness, Indonesia’s commitment to the framework and lack of capacity to measure its realistic manoeuvrability, the hope for achievable coordination with the AU, NEPAD, African RECs and several leading African countries, the effort to increase buy-in and substantial stakeholder involvement, and the wishful thinking that coordination with FOCAC, TICAD or IAFS could be practically implemented, the NAASP was “relaunched” at the 2015 AAS, celebrating its 10th anniversary.31 The revamped NAASP was supposedly a more effective framework, supporting more Afro-Asian “structured, systematic and intensive” cooperation.32 As 2015–2017 IORA Chair,33 Indonesia added its maritime agenda to the NAASP with maritime connectivity and the blue economy, following the GMF geostrategic vision. In the Jokowi tradition of using multilateral events for bilateral, usually economic, objectives, Indonesian national interests and discourse were introduced, indicating the future bilateral 30 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 31 The new “Comprehensive NAASP ” was launched through the “Declaration on Reinvigorating the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership”. It should be noted that no specific digital portal exists for the NAASP. Accessing the reinvigorated NAASP declaration online, for example, is not straightforward. It can be found on the Japanese MOFA’s website, for example: Declaration on Reinvigorating the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, April 2015: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000077938.pdf. 32 As stated by Minister Retno Marsudi, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs since the election in 2014 of President Jokowi. Retno should be Jokowi’s only Foreign Minister, which is already an achievement in itself. The new NAASP was also presented as a new window, a bridge, a practical framework and an operational mechanism with selected priorities (Antara News, 2015). 33 Chairing IORA for the 2015–2017 period, Indonesia organised the first IORA Summit in March 2017 and significantly increased the importance of IORA as an international organisation, raising its level of institutionalisation and highlighting Indonesia’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean. A senior Indonesian diplomat, Salman Al Farisi, former ambassador to South Africa (2018–2021), involved in the launch of the IAF, was even chosen in November 2021 as the new Secretary General of IORA, revealing the archipelago’s serious interest in the entity and its focus. Indonesia encourages closer maritime cooperation with Africa. The Indian Ocean is the key to Indonesia’s strategic vision of becoming the global maritime fulcrum (GMF) and an ideal maritime bridge between Asia and Africa, which could mark the birth of a new era in Afro-Asian relations. The Indian Ocean’s glorious past could be revived (Kemlu, 2021).

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shift of the African approach. Classically in his 2015 AAS closing speech, Jokowi advocated for the “voice of Asian-African nations that cannot be replaced by anyone” (Parameswaran, 2015).34 Foreshadowing Luhut’s future hilirisasi diplomacy, a tinge of global order contestation manifested itself, demanding more inclusive multilateralism and the usual declaration on Palestine. The new NAASP Declaration was pretty consensual and inclusive, supporting South-South, North–South, and Triangular development cooperation, capacity-building and technical cooperation. The eight agreed-upon focus areas of cooperation were confirmed. New topics were introduced, such as democracy and human rights, governance, climate change and the environment, and infrastructure development, infrastructure being Jokowi’s favourite state capitalism tool, shaping his political legitimacy and legacy. Peacekeeping centres cooperation was evoked, a vital status marker and international pride for Indonesia. Mostly in Africa, Indonesia has deployed peacekeepers since 1957. The first time was in Egypt. Indonesia stands as a world top 10 Troop Contributing Country (TCC) with its Indonesia Garuda Contingent (IGC) (Aoi & Heng, 2014; Capie, 2016). Almost 90% of peacekeepers on the ground in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) originate from Asian-African countries (Parameswaran, 2015). The NAASP, 2015 Declaration indicates that 87% of peacekeeping personnel originate from Afro-Asian countries (NAASP, 2015).35 Contributing troops to PKOs offers numerous advantages in status, funding, development capacity and image for the armed and police forces of the TCCs (Albrecht & Cold-Ravnkilde, 2020). The initial NAASP framework was improved, strengthening its structure and making it permanent to ensure continuity between the AASs. The inaugural NAASP stipulated that the AAS would occur every four years. Since this failed, the AAS was made ten-yearly in the revised

34 The 2015 AAS theme was “Strengthening South-South Cooperation to Promote World Peace and Prosperity”. Since Bandung, the three main topics are traditionally political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation. 35 For this reason, Karlsrud describes UN PKOs as European proxies used to fight against illegal immigration or terrorism without having to send troops (Karlsrud, 2019).

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NAASP, coinciding with the KAA ten-year anniversaries. From that revivification perspective, Indonesia proposed the establishment of an AsiaAfrica Centre in Jakarta to act as the operational and institutional support entity for the NAASP’s implementation. The centre was never established, despite being announced by Jokowi himself and in the Bandung Message (Anwar, 2015; KAA, 2015), symbolising the NAASP’s structural incapacity to be operationalised in a meaningful way as a transcontinental platform (Dlamini, 2019).36 A seminar held at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in 2015,37 before the AAS, themed “Bandung Conference and Beyond 2015”, prefiguring Minister Retno’s “Beyond the Bandung Spirit” rhetoric and the more bilateral African approach (Marsudi, 2017), called for the renewed NAASP, using the now classical missing intercontinental link argument. The importance of increasing academic funding for better research and knowledge production was emphasised. Indonesia’s massive knowledge creation problem directly impacts its capacity to raise the levels of expertise and general comprehension of Africa and other strategic issues. The Asia-Africa Centre would encourage collaborative activities and scientific discussions, consolidating Afro-Asian relations. Kemlu was still focused on saving the NAASP and face, trying to add an additional layer of institutionalisation and complexity to the existing scheme (FISIPOL UGM, 2015).

36 Wirajuda was critical of that episode. For him, successful diplomacy needs a longterm strategy, not incidental projects linked to nothing, with no follow-up, bringing negative media coverage like the Asia-Africa Centre project. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 37 The powerful UGM alumni network called Kagama (Keluarga Alumni Universitas

Gadjah Mada) has become a formidable force under the UGM alumni Jokowi, with the largest number of ministers, rivalling the alumni networks of Universitas Indonesia (UI) and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). 2024 presidential candidates Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo are UGM alumni. Pranowo is even the President of Kagama. He obtained his Master of political science from Universitas Indonesia.

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In his 2015 AAS opening speech (Setkab, 2015a),38 almost retrieving Sukarno’s “bombast and belligerency” (Leifer, 1983), Jokowi adopted a revisionist tone.39 He called for “a new global economic order” with “new emerging powers” occupying their legitimate place. A “new global financial architecture” should be established against Western domination. The world needed a “collective global leadership” for more justice and responsibility. With this grandiloquent tone, Jokowi demonstrated Indonesia’s ascending power status, “a new emerging economic force”. Indonesia was ready to “play a global role as a positive force for peace and prosperity” (Setkab, 2015a), following the Javanese king’s traditional role of bringing world peace and prosperity, and constitutional requirements (Nguitragool, 2012). The NAASP would not be the vehicle to fulfil that aspiration. This Jokowi discourse appears critical in its impact and status signalling, revealing the mindset change in Indonesian foreign policy and the new President’s ambitions for his country’s success. The Afro-Asian sphere historically represented the area of Indonesia’s discursive affirmation. Jokowi astutely placed himself in Sukarno’s footsteps. Indonesia was a dependable force, confident in its strengths. Jokowi would not cling to an unrealistic framework, not delivering tangible results for Indonesia.

38 The speech was written by Jokowi’s closest entourage. In a Jakarta Post article, Cabinet Secretary at the time Andi Widjajanto described a “special team” of “experts”, including Rizal Sukma thinktanker-cum-ad hoc presidential advisor for international affairs from the CSIS, Presidential Chief of Staff at the time General Luhut Pandjaitan, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and presidential advisors Sukardi Rinakit and Teten Masduki, who would succeed Luhut as Chief of Staff and become later Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs; underlining the prominence of the presidential circle in international affairs; the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference being the jewel of Indonesia’s contemporary history and diplomacy. Not everyone was pleased with this divulgation of names (Laksmana, 2016; Parlina, 2015). Ministers Luhut and Rini Soemarno were seen as having the most weight, notably in relation to China during Jokowi’s first period. Kemlu sources claim that Minister Retno Marsudi quickly became the main figure that interacts with President Jokowi concerning foreign affairs taking prominence on ad hoc advisors and the presidential entourage. This will be examined later. Every major actor wants to be seen as the most powerful and influential. But Luhut progressively monopolised the most strategic relationships at the highest level, notably with Africa. 39 He denounced “global injustice” and “a group of established nations (that) are reluctant to recognise that the world has changed”. He criticised the major Western International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank—for their incapacity to solve global economic issues due to their obsolete paradigm (Setkab, 2015a).

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Jokowi understood the potential for business with Africa. The President’s entrepreneurial mindset intended to seize African opportunities.40 Jokowi and his inner circle understood Indonesia had potentially tremendous leverage and legitimacy in Africa.41 Other Asian powers like China were flourishing. Indonesia should follow the same path to benefit from the African Eldorado.42 Jokowi disliked heavy multilateral formats, a countryto-continent design, more bilateral, would suit him better. Kemlu would come up with the IAF with Luhut’s backing,43 himself running his own African initiatives. The discourse presaged Luhut’s future Global South coalition formation attempts to defend Indonesia’s hilirisasi policy. On the economic front, commensurate with the “Bandung Message 2015” (KAA, 2015), Jokowi’s business acumen shone through. He called for more intraregional trade and investment between Asia and Africa to reach their “true potential ” as representing three-quarters of humanity and 30% of global GDP, prefiguring the future new revamped Indonesian engagement towards Africa (Sambijantoro, 2015).44 Jokowi urged tariff cuts and non-tariff barriers suppression in intercontinental trade,45 one of the targets of Indonesia’s African effort through PTA negotiations.46 40 A simple way of thinking can be more pragmatic and impactful than disconnected intellectualism, especially when the issue is to create or restore the basics. 41 As seen previously, his GMF narrative also perfectly fitted with the Indo-Pacific outlook and thus with Africa as Eastern Africa was de facto part of the Indian Ocean and, by extension, the whole of Africa. 42 As we will see later, “China in Africa” networks also impacted Indonesian domestic politics. Controlling their extension to the Indonesian polity became necessary for presidential political consolidation. 43 Kemlu indicates this type of format had been envisaged before, but could not be implemented until then due to bureaucratic and funding constraints. As for many strategic issues during the Jokowi presidency, Luhut would make it happen, appointed by his business partner-become President, Jokowi. 44 According to 2019 IMF Nominal GDP data, Asia and Africa represent almost 40% of the global GDP. 45 This was in his opening speech at the Asia-Africa Business Summit during the AAS 2015. 46 Kemlu indicates it purposely started with an Indian Ocean country, Mozambique.

Historically the Indian Ocean constitutes the core of the Afro-Asian movement since the five organisers of the Bandung Conference were Indian Ocean Asian countries: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka; forming the Conference of SouthEast Asian Prime Ministers, or the so-called Colombo Powers. Now considered part of South Asia, at the time, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were included in the Southeast

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He underlined investment potential in manufacturing, agriculture, energy and infrastructure, all vital interests for an Indonesian expansion. Business should be more significant to achieve the Bandung hopes.47 Like in 2005, vagueness and wishful thinking were present in the declarations and working documents.48 Efforts existed for the whole event to be more concrete in topics and mechanisms (Parameswaran, 2015). Still inoperative, the NAASP was not reinvigorated, entangled in unbearable multilateralism to Jokowi’s dissatisfaction to reach his economic diplomacy objectives.49 Since its inception,50 “reinvigorated”, given Indonesia’s institutional routines hindering change, the NAASP carried prestige and legitimacy. Despite its absence of international buy-in, Indonesian elite consciousness that the programme carried fatal flaws, it was pursued for over ten years, without significant results or participation, then prolonged. Africa was not a priority for Yudhoyono, which made him feel uncomfortable (CDT with H. Wirajuda, 2018; Harymurti, 2008).51 Indonesia was likely unprepared

Asia region (Acharya, 2011). Jokowi’s historical African visit in August 2023 was also Indian Ocean-focused, with visits to Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa for the 15th BRICS Summit. Jokowi also wanted to visit the DRC, but the timing was not right. He met the DRC’s Prime Minister in Johannesburg during the BRICS Summit. See the description of the visit in Chapter 5. 47 That aspiration already existed and was presented in detail in the 1955 Bandung final communiqué (Setkab, 2015b). 48 During the Summit, the creation of an Asia-Africa Business Council was also announced, but again to no avail (Asril, 2015). 49 The progressive change in Indonesia’s effort to institutionalise the NAASP can be observed in the writings and comments of CSIS Jakarta thinktanker Bantarto Bandoro between 2005 and 2015. Enthusiastic and supportive in 2005, in 2010, he understood the difficulties of the framework and the competition from FOCAC or TICAD, associated with the national interests of the major Asian powers (Bandoro, 2005). Yet Bandoro considered Indonesia needed to ensure the sustainability of the NAASP since it was an Indonesian initiative and attempt to consolidate the scheme (BPPK-Kemlu, 2010). Finally, in 2015, after the AAS and the new Declaration on the NAASP, Bandoro criticised the absence of concrete results, the empty rhetoric, and the selfishness of major Asian powers pursuing only their national interests (Bandoro, 2015). 50 The scheme was launched during the President Yudhoyono years, although it was envisaged or conceptualised at the beginning under President Megawati. 51 His visit to Dakar, Senegal, in 2008 for the 11th Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) did not particularly enchant him, leaving a bad impression. At 9:30 a.m., thirty minutes before the given time for his speech, he stepped into an empty room and had to wait for over an hour for the event to begin, without proper information.

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and unable to envision Africa’s potential or conquering African markets.52 Africa will surpass China and India combined in 40 years (MacLeod & Luke, 2023). When Jokowi assumed power, his pragmatism and entrepreneurial mindset allowed him to cut through the multilateral rhetoric, emphasising hard facts. Indonesia shares a rich history with Africa and constitutes a legitimate partner for Africa. The continent offers excellent business opportunities suitable for Indonesian capacities and expertise. Other major Asian countries seized African opportunities. Indonesia should too.53 Given its complexity, the NAASP was too heavy for Indonesia to manage, slowing its African expansion. Indonesia did not possess the capacity and knowledge to operationalise it. A more pragmatic and straightforward strategy was needed. Luhut would implement. The NAASP framework might still be helpful in the future if adequately operationalised through ASEAN directly or through an ASEAN Centrality framework like the EAS (Dlamini, 2019). Related to Bandung, the NAASP’s birth narrative provides no clear roadmap for developing multilateralism among such a diversity of nations and interests.54 All those nations, especially the major Asian powers

President Abdulaye Wade arrived at 11 a.m., did not apologise, and made an inconsistently long speech. Wade sounded pedantic and full of rhetoric, in line with a Mugabe or Castro speech, according to Wirajuda. Yudhoyono shared his experience later with President Mbeki, telling him that Wade spoke like a professor. Mbeki replied “he thinks he’s a professor”. For Wirajuda, Mbeki was more practical like an Asian, “an economist trained in Europe, in England”. This anecdote in Senegal was confirmed by several sources. Wirajuda thought Yudhoyono was not interested in Africa for these cultural, personal and interpersonal issues. Asia was more practical and less ideological, according to him, although a figure like Mbeki was good. Yet, for example, Megawati has a bigger will, “very stong on bebas aktif ”, like her father, to engage with Africa. Author’s Interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda. Jokowi’s August 2023 visit to Africa was also full of delays in events and official meetings, often several hours late. Yet, the Indonesian President kept his composure and patience. 52 Presidents have their specific preferences and personality, which impact foreign policy (Hermann et al., 2001). They present their interpretation of the national interest and how to achieve it. 53 Simple thinking can sometimes bring impactful results and help declutter the mind. 54 The Asia-Africa Conference itself never managed to gather a second time for a Second

Bandung. The NAM also went through severe difficulties to institutionalise, although ˇ united by the non-bloc principle, which made things slightly smoother (Cavoški, 2022).

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involved, harshly compete for markets, resources and international recognition, and for actual territory like China with India and Japan. Middle Eastern countries are not united in their region.55 International organisations are primarily formed to serve national interests, not memory, romantic nostalgia or grand declarations. A functional approach, starting small and concretely, with a limited group, may facilitate multilateral cooperation like the EU.56 The transcontinental NAASP appears too large without clear operationalisable purposes that could allow institutionalisation. The Afro-Asian movement faced historically similar difficulties with the absence of political coherence. The NAM was more united, given its common non-alignment principle. How to operationalise collaboration between over one hundred nations that are so diverse, often in competition or rivalry and with very different capacities, that do not really share a strong common heritage of joint endeavours, at least one that can appear relatable in the contemporary era, apart from the Bandung discourse and colonial suffering that does not mean the same for all those nations? The lack of common interests and an accepted and capable mediator or hegemon precludes the formation of a genuine political community or integration (E. B. Haas, 1961). Elite acknowledgement from the participating countries of the importance of celebrating Bandung did not indicate an interest in effectively supporting the NAASP. The major countries privileged their own platforms against their major rivals. The smaller Afro-Asian countries saw the formation of such platforms as the preoccupation of major powers, much beyond their capabilities.57

55 The Middle East is considered part of Asia in the Bandung logic. 56 The European Union was born from a supranational process that began with the

formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, involving only six Western European countries. Restricted economic goals that progressively widened to other sectors through a spill-over effect and a transnational bureaucracy capable of implementation allowed the march of European construction rather than discourses and narratives on peace or the Greco-Roman heritage (Mitrany, 1966). 57 In an interview at the ASEAN headquarters, the Africa coordinator, originating from

Laos, stated that Africa was the interest of the large ASEAN countries, not the smaller ones. For that reason, an ASEAN focus on Africa should not be a priority. For smaller ASEAN nations, Africa is not a preoccupation. Only major ASEAN economies conduct significant trade with Africa. Interview with the ASEAN Coordinator for Africa, Phantaly Chantharathip. ASEAN Headquarters, Jakarta, 5 June 2018.

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Nations join multilateral schemes for material and ideational benefits. By cooperating, they seek to influence their partners and increase their relational power. Given the Afro-Asian movement’s diplomatic symbolism, abandoning the NAASP is delicate.58 The NAASP never gained strategic importance justifying any major country risking alienating itself from other nations through criticism. Nations showed loyalty to the Afro-Asian narrative, although major powers were focusing on their own schemes. For Indonesia, the KAA organiser, exiting the NAASP was unthinkable. Its reputation was at stake. Indonesia must appear loyal to its own cause. Indonesia voiced its wishes for change, at least inside Kemlu. Given its lack of knowledge of Africa, Indonesia was unable to comprehend the views and strategies of major Asian powers, their rivalries, and the dynamics in Africa and the AU, notably internal quarrels like the Western Sahara problem. For Wirajuda, the original continentto-continent view proposed by the NAASP remains the ideal scheme, respecting African pride.59 Indonesia’s political weight, preparation and knowledge of Asia– Africa appeared too narrow to enforce the requisite mechanisms for the NAASP’s institutionalisation. Political factors determine multilateral success. Indonesia lacks the hegemonic power to be a platform-maker on such a scale as the whole of Asia–Africa (Gilpin, 1981).60 In the international system, power remains in states themselves (Buzan, 1983). There is no real government at the international level. Trying to create “governance without government ” (Rosenau & Ernst-Otto, 1992), the NAASP could not form functioning governance.61

58 When they see that a multilateral framework lacks efficiency, nations can decide between Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, as described by Hirschmann. Exit can be chosen when the organisation cannot provide any benefit or when no change could be satisfactory. Countries can decide to voice their criticism and feedback if they can expect a positive change, providing them with benefits (Hirschman, 1970). 59 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 60 Especially with an absence of common objectives and such differences in geopolitical views inside such a vast group of states. 61 For Mearsheimer, international institutions are mere epiphenomena. Great powers just pursue their national interests. Only they can determine if such a scheme as the NAASP can move forward or not. Such schemes as the NAASP cannot affect their behaviour (Mearsheimer, 1994, 2001). Mearsheimer appears both popular and contested in the media with his offensive realist view of the Ukraine war (Smith & Dawson, 2022).

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Great powers respect the NAASP’s symbolism while pursuing their interests through their own platforms. Consequently, coordination was not a priority (Keohane, 1984). Major Asian powers did not find the opportunity or wish to instrumentalise the NAASP, not even competing inside the mostly disregarded framework.62 International institutions require internal contestation between national interests to exist (Albrecht & Cold-Ravnkilde, 2020). Institutions also need common goals (Bull, 2012). Dialogue among great powers and common interest was lacking to imagine an effective NAASP (Bull & Watson, 1984). However, the NAASP could become a valuable platform for major Asian powers in the future, notably for managing their African engagement through instrumentalised multilateralism, which they now tend to favour to limit direct exposure and possible negative repercussions.63 ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality with the EAS should facilitate Indonesia’s African engagement. African dynamics were not well understood in Indonesia. This misunderstanding is embodied in the non-involvement of the AU from the start in the NAASP. After Apartheid, South Africa supported positive change in Africa’s image and collective capacity, notably through the creation of the AU in 2002. While ASEAN and Indonesia wanted to rebuild their image after the Asian financial crisis with the NAASP, Africa, especially South Africa, wanted to attract more Asian investment.64 Although criticised (Strange, 1982), the notion of international regime can help characterise the nature of the shortcomings of the NAASP, mostly a scheme that Indonesia was not ready to implement as the leading country due to its lack of material and knowledge capabilities. Forming an international regime would require a convergence of principles, norms, 62 Perry Anderson writes that the US has always used multilateralism instrumentally to serve its interests and not as an ideal in itself (Anderson, 2015). 63 A country like France also increasingly instrumentalises multilateral approaches in Africa to secure its interests and reduce criticism of its African presence. 64 With the rise of the importance of the external dimension of regional cooperation after the Cold War, there again linked to EU ideational influence, the creation of the NAASP cannot be detached from regional rebranding attempts in ASEAN and Africa, especially South Africa (Coe, 2019). A clear research gap exists here for further study, to better understand those African dynamics and notably the role of South Africa and the perceptions and will of other African countries towards the NAASP and why the AU was not directly involved. As seen previously, major Asian powers’ interests towards Africa were not well comprehended either.

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rules and procedures for decision-making (Krasner, 1983). States can be wary of those norms that can influence their behaviour (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). This alignment did not happen, as consciously known by Indonesia itself. Until today, the AU has still not accepted the scheme. The NAASP was not internalised by participating states as a “governing arrangement ” that they would commit to (Keohane & Nye, 2001).65 Expectations among nations were different. The NAASP lacked funding and support. Structurally, the NAASP could not provide strategic information to participants and facilitate their communication to encourage cooperation through uncertainty reduction. It was not configured and thought of that way (Keohane, 1984). Indonesia was not yet participating or well-conscious of the major Asian powers’ geopolitical movement towards Africa, preventing the formation of an implementable framework. Ideationally (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993), the NAASP was not ready to be implemented. Africa’s lack of presence in Indonesian public and intellectual life is striking. The Afro-Asian identity remains to be built in Afro-Asia. Social groups with interests need to push for the NAASP’s concretisation, transforming it into an authentic cooperative scheme.66 Cooperation in foreign policy, like setting up an Asia–Africa platform, can institutionalise if both governmental and civil society elites’ interests exist and combine in the participating nations, especially in the major powers, including Indonesia as the major conveyor (Moravcsik, 1991). Debates and persuasion foster cooperation, more than logic or pure rationality (Kratochwil, 1991). To become a recognised strategic transregion, AfroAsia requires intense political-military interactions on top of economic and socio-cultural links and the perception of the actual existence of such a region by both regional members and great powers (Pardesi, 2020). No real attention towards Africa has existed among the Indonesian elite until recently. It remains minimal. Africa has been mostly absent from the public debate. The continent is not naturally part of the foreign policy debate. The progressive rise of Indonesia’s interests in Africa continues bringing change to the visibility of Africa, although not sufficiently. The role of political entrepreneurs such as Jokowi and Luhut remains essential, 65 For Ruggie, an international regime is a “set of mutual expectations, generally agreedto rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which organisational energies and financial commitments are allocated; institutionalized international behavior” (Ruggie, 1975). 66 From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective (Elman & Elman, 2003).

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and academics that might start seriously focusing on Africa. It cannot be instant. Time will tell. Perfectly aware of the criticism and shortcomings, Indonesia’s NAASP perseverance related to reputational considerations, the absence of strong political decisions and failed understanding at the highest level. The NAASP’s nonstarter is notably explained by Indonesia’s lack of insight and knowledge of Africa and the dynamics between Africa and external powers. Defecting from its own creation appeared unthinkable for Indonesia. Persistence with the NAASP seems irrational. It could become more rational in the future if the scheme can be adequately operationalised. No gain today could mean gains tomorrow. Abnegation may serve Indonesia’s interests by underlining its unwavering commitment to the Afro-Asian story.67 The NAASP might be reborn in the future, becoming an efficient institutional platform.68 Time could enhance its legitimacy and provide it with a feasibility advantage. Revamping established mechanisms can be easier. Luhut’s Afro-Asian weaponisation emphasises Indonesia retains legitimacy to mobilise Afro-Asia. Yet, results are far from guaranteed. States opposed metamorphosing the NAASP into the Afro-Asian multilateral vehicle of reference.69 Major Asian powers pursued their own agendas. Indonesia did not comprehend the African party effectively. The continent was not perceived as a priority for Jakarta. This mechanism suffers from a significant gap between discursive ambition and the reality of its actual institutionalisation.70

67 As Keohane argues: “Governments may comply with regime rules even if it is not in their myopic self-interest to do so. In a world of many issues, such apparent self-abnegation may reflect rational egoism. In view of the difficulties of constructing international regimes, it is also rational to seek to modify existing ones, where possible, rather than to abandon unsatisfactory ones and attempt to start over. Thus regimes tend to evolve rather than to die” (Keohane, 1984). 68 Especially given the primacy of world regions in international politics (Katzenstein, 2005). 69 The platform did not become a “belief ” about “how international cooperation should function” (Caporaso, 1992). The NAASP has not institutionalised to become “a process; a way of acting that involves several states (big, medium or small) working together as a matter of practice” (Scott, 2013). The “process ” and “practice” have not been established as intended. 70 Ruggie’s definition of multilateralism through “indivisibility”, “generalized principles of conduct ”, and “diffuse reciprocity” does not apply to the NAASP (Ruggie, 1992).

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Major Asian powers deploy their own African strategies on multiple levels. A highly demanding institutional form (Ruggie, 1993), multilateralism is used as a means to serve those strategies. Each emerging power develops its own perspective to serve its national interests. For Indonesia, an Afro-Asian platform like the NAASP can appear as a way to box above its weight, compensating for its lack of military power, and supporting its status and reputational goals.71 Afro-Asian transregionalism will create an idiosyncratic cooperation model.72 As Indonesia’s African interests increase, multilateralism should quickly regain a prominent place in its African engagement. Indonesia should then be able to operationalise and drive an international mechanism towards fulfilling its interests, maybe a recalibrated NAASP. The AU should be better engaged. Indonesia’s G20 Presidency invited the AU to participate. However, it was already an established practice. A tentative rapprochement could be ongoing. Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy can be perceived as Afro-Asian or Global South minilateralism, a coalition of resource-rich developing nations to face developed nations. Political constructions require forming a collective identity in addition to shared interests (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). The Asia–Africa narrative relates to the Bandung Conference, liberation leaders and anticolonialism. Path dependency exists in post-Bandung Afro-Asian institutionalisation. The story has also changed. Leaders and peoples identified with Bandung, a historical event, not with the NAASP. In Asia, bilateralism trumps multilateralism due to a problematic collective regional identity. How can an Afro-Asian multilateral institution be created when no profound and inclusive multilateralism exists in Asia? Rivalries and asymmetries stemming from historical conflicts and memories prevented the creation of a collective Asian community and belonging on the scale of the EU or the AU.73 After WWII, the US supported European and transatlantic multilateralism. In Asia, the US prioritised bilateralism, creating a hub-and-spoke system. There was no multilateral Asian alliance or security organisation but a diversity of regimes (Dibb, 2001). SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty 71 Multilateralism can help countries to box above their weight (Scott, 2013). 72 Geopolitical and historical contexts require different approaches and frameworks of

understanding (Acharya, 2012). Yet, the EU has influenced all regional institutions as an “institutional pioneer” (Lenz & Burilkov, 2017). 73 The degree and nature of that unity are another question.

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Organisation) never became an Asian NATO in profoundness. Prioritising state-centrism, non-interference and bilateralism, anti-communist ASEAN did not become as inclusive as the EU. ASEAN can accommodate divergent interests but not reconcile them (Leifer, 1983). Its ASEAN Centrality doctrine serves the preservation of Southeast Asian regional autonomy and national sovereignty, attempting to maintain its influence on engagement rules in Asia and great power management. Despite shared interests, no Pan-Asian multilateral security arrangements exist (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). Explanations are eclectic, linked to material power, efficiency, threat perceptions or identity. Rationality cannot be the dominating source of elucidation. Emotions and identity cannot be rationalised through liberal or rationalist theories. Far from liberal-institutionalist or liberal-cosmopolitan paradigms, Asian foreign policymakers display their own realist and sceptical worldview, believing in permanent hostility and the need for a Darwinian struggle for survival through the preeminence of power and security approaches (Rüland & Michael, 2019).74 With an Atlantist mental map, NATO formed a more robust cognitive construction than SEATO, with the US and Europeans developing the idea of an Atlantic community sharing similar values and a common destiny. Afro-Asia was not elaborated as a profound intellectual and institutional construction.75 Lacking a shared bonding principle, Bandung spawned no Afro-Asian institution. Multilateralism can flourish in the presence of a collective identity. Otherwise, bilateralism dominates (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). The Asia–Africa concept nourishes Indonesia’s international identity but has never been operationalised since Bandung. Africa represented an abstraction in Indonesian thinking, not really considered, classified as a “non-traditional market ” until today. Africa meant either problems or Asia–Africa in the Bandung context, where the African presence was minimal, the continent remaining mostly colonised in 1955.76 Thanks to his entrepreneurial pragmatism, Jokowi’s 74 The War in Ukraine might not prove them wrong, given the complicated defense or

energy situation of European nations facing Russia while being under the uncertain US umbrella due to the US domestic situation and China rivalry. 75 The concept of Afrasia, forming an Afro-Asian world, is getting more visible today (Mine, 2022). 76 This does not diminish Indonesia’s merit in supporting African independences. Indonesia was indeed a decolonisation pioneer.

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merit is bringing Indonesia out of this dilemma and abstraction to engage concretely with Africa. It is only a start, clearly insufficient, but it is meaningful in addressing a foreign policy problem. Afro-Asia can also be mobilised to serve Indonesia’s hilirisasi and environmental interests, a solution to confront the West. Bandung was a response to SEATO, a collective defense agreement that Indonesia rejected as great power meddling in Asia.77 For Sir John Kotelawala,78 SEATO denied Free Asia’s agency in finding solutions for Korea and Vietnam. Starting the Bandung process, the 1954 Colombo Conference exerted Asian agency, showing the world Asia could define its own destiny (Huei, 2009; Jones, 2005; Lee, 2009; Walker, 2005).79 Bandung also reacted to the Geneva Conference and an Indochina conflict attributed to great powers (Ewing, 2019). The Colombo Powers felt excluded from critical international negotiations concerning their continent (Abraham, 2008). Bandung represented a geopolitical and ideational response from the Colombo powers to global and regional dynamics (Acharya, 2011; Ewing, 2019). Western powers like the UK,80 France, the US and Australia,81 were worried about the possible creation of a permanent Afro-Asian organisation, wishing to isolate Africa from Asian influence and thus mobilising their power of influence on participants (Tarling, 1992).82 Sub-Saharan African leaders from French and UK colonies were barred from attending for both materialist reasons and racial solidarity fears (Gerits, 2016).83 Fearing the emergence of an Eastern Bloc at Bandung led by China and India (Pardesi, 2020), the

77 According to Pardesi, SEATO could be considered an Indo-Pacific organisation, which would mean that an Afro-Asian narrative opposed to an Indo-Pacific narrative already existed. (Pardesi, 2020). The Afro-Asian narrative already opposed the non-aligned ˇ narrative based on the non-bloc principle (Cavoški, 2022). 78 Third Prime Minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) between 1953 and 1956. 79 The Colombo Conference was held from 28 April to 2 May 1954. 80 The UK nicknamed the Bandung Asia-Africa conference “ah-ah!” (Tarling, 1992). 81 Countries like Australia appeared as “Nervous Outsiders ”, fearing a potentially anti-

colonial, anti-Western grouping (Walker, 2005). 82 They also feared the formation of a sort of anti-White coalition (McGregor & Hearman, 2017). This revealed the obstacles superpowers faced to form effective political-military entities serving their interests (Huei, 2009). 83 French elites feared all kinds of outside influences and interventions in the French colonies (Borrel et al., 2021).

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US supported multilateralism of the ASEAN-type, but not based on an Afro-Asian narrative (Simpson, 2008).84 The NAASP lacked Bandung’s ideational power, or emotional unity,85 and did not answer a major geopolitical contestation. The NAASP appears as an Indonesian attempt to better its image after the Asian financial crisis,86 and diversify international partners (Rubiolo, 2016). The quality of ideas and mobilised knowledge for the NAASP were insufficient to be weaponised.87 Creating a successful regime necessitates the existence of an epistemic or knowledge community whose actors will support regime definition and operationalisation (P. M. Haas, 1989). This powerful and knowledgeable Afro-Asian epistemic community does not exist, supporting a platform like the NAASP. Indonesia is still struggling with its education and knowledge production system. Becoming the regime maker for such a broad transregional community appears problematic.88 Not giving birth to a multilateral organisation either, Bandung was criticised for only producing the Dasasila declaration.89 Yet, Bandung remains a highly symbolic diplomatic achievement, part of global popular culture, promoting Afro-Asian solidarity as anti-imperialism (Shimazu, 2014).90 Bandung took place at a crucial moment for Indonesian nationbuilding, providing state credibility, domestic and international legitimacy, and coexistence facilitation among ideological factions (Al Banna 84 Archives reveal this Western fear towards the potential effects of Bandung and their

actions to control them. As a consequence, Western countries became more concerned with African development by increasing development assistance, notably in education, after 1955 (Gerits, 2016). A further study or waiting for more relevant Western diplomatic archives to be accessible would be needed to look into Western perceptions and actions towards the NAASP, which could also be seen as threatening to Western interests. 85 What Wright called “emotional nationalism” (Wright, 1956). The “Bandung

moment” had passed a long time ago (Lee, 2010). 86 On top of the classical search for status and recognition (Coe, 2019). 87 Acharya evokes ideational forces as a weapon of the weak for Bandung (Acharya,

2011). 88 But not impossible in the future. 89 This can be notably explained by the fact that the Bandung Conference can be seen

as a “fractured” event given the “Babel-like” group of participants and their opposing points of view (Huei, 2009). It was not united by the non-bloc principle like the NAM. 90 Composed of many “little stories”, Bandung remains complicated to analyse and interpret until now (Percival Wood, 2012).

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Choiruzzad, 2020), and for the national narrative, pride and security. The international served domestic goals.91 Bandung supported Indonesian unity and legitimacy, providing an international stage for Sukarno as an Afro-Asian leader.92 Precious for Indonesian domestic and international confidence,93 Bandung was perfectly timed for electoral reasons. Indonesian General Elections were also due in 1955 (Agung, 1973; Tarling, 1992).94 The rise of the Global South now places Indonesia in a potentially ideal position. 1965 ended Afro-Asianism, impeding a “Second Bandung”.95 Unlike the NAASP, Bandung was a broader moment than the Conference itself, with the transnational involvement of a diversity of CSOs (Civil Society

91 The international versus domestic dichotomy is a “Westphalian prejudice” (Ringmar, 2012). In West Java, the region of which Bandung is the capital city, the Darul Islam rebellion was still active, present in nearby mountains. The Bandung Conference, a sort of diplomatic theatre for Shimazu, justified military deployment (Shimazu, 2014). The streets of Bandung were watched by 2000 agents (Van Reybrouck, 2022). 92 Lebanese envoy Ambassador Charles Malik described Bandung as operating like “a small United Nations, a United Nations in miniature…meeting together and deliberating in matters and by ways that were almost identical with the methods and ways of the United Nations ” (Burke, 2006). 93 Boosting national esteem almost like a distraction (Percival Wood, 2012). 94 In addition to its will to enjoy better relations with China and socialise China peace-

fully in Asia, India supported Bandung also to keep Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in power after the 1955 elections (Huei, 2009). 95 In April 1964, 22 nations gathered in Jakarta for a Preparatory Meeting that decided to organise a “Second Bandung” on 10 March 1965. Against Indonesia’s will, India proposed that the meeting take place in Africa, remembering that a year after the 1955 Conference, Sukarno had proposed that a second KAA be held in China in 1956. The newly formed OAU was designated to select the host country. Algeria was chosen. Tensions between China, Indonesia, India and the Soviet Union, on the question of Malaysia, and between Africans, the coup of Colonel Houari Boumédiène in June 1965 removing Ben Bella on 19 June 1965, and the start of the Sukarno’s fall after the G30S/ PKI entailed that the “Second Bandung” was first postponed to 29 June 1965, then to 5 November 1965 and finally never organised. Afro-Asianism also lost to the NAM, ˇ more universalist and coherent (Abraham, 2008; Cavoški, 2022; Ewing, 2019; Lee, 2009; Pauker, 1965). Megawati’s contemporary wish for the organisation of a Second Bandung should be contemplated from that historical perspective. Afro-Asian solidarity and relations weakened in the 1960s with also the assassinations of political leaders Mehdi Ben Barka (Morocco), Félix Moumié (Cameroon) or Patrice Lumumba (Congo) in Africa; or the overthrow of Nkrumah in early 1966 (McGregor & Hearman, 2017). Two other Bandung founding fathers went down with the house arrest of U Nu (1907–1995) of Burma in 1962 and the death of Jawaharlal Nehru of India in 1964 (Zhou, 2019).

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Organisations).96 AAPSO (Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization) was created in Cairo after the Cairo Conference,97 supporting African independence movements and West Irian integration within Indonesia.98 Between 1958 and 1965, AAPSO conferences prolonged and expanded the range of the Bandung universe to civil society through social-cultural organisations, creating multiple networks and connections among professionals, women or youth, and holding meetings in new countries like Ghana, Guinea or Tanzania (Lee, 2009). The Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association (AAJA),99 based in Jakarta, was also created, encouraging interconnectedness and transnationalism, notably at the time of revolutionary struggles.100 A popular moment, Bandung was a movement centred on solidarity and peace gathering state and NSAs with the creation of transnational networks, notably cultural (Stolte, 2019), kickstarting an international “conferencing phenomenon” like the Cairo Conference (Percival Wood, 2012). The “NAASP moment” was simply not comparable, technocratic, devoid of profundity compared to the real Bandung, without its spirit and enthusiasm. CSOs did not get involved massively and ebulliently. The world had changed. Major Asian powers, including Indonesia, had strongly developed in the meantime. Given the amount of competitive interests to accommodate, cooperation among large numbers is less likely. “Conditional cooperation”, where one’s participation is conditioned on the participation of others, becomes less probable (Taylor, 1987). Multilateral cooperation is complex, ensnared in national interests, strategic calculations relating to threat

96 An unofficial People’’s Bandung in New Delhi eleven days before Bandung was notably organised: the Conference of Asian Countries on the Relaxation of International Tension (CRIT), which was the precursor of AAPSO (Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization) created in Cairo after the Cairo Conference. 97 From 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958. 98 Politician Ibrahim Isa represented Indonesia in AAPSO in Cairo. Politician and ulama

Sirajuddin Abbas made a speech to gather support for Indonesian West Irian at the Cairo Conference (McGregor & Hearman, 2017). 99 Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika (PWAA). 100 After the G30S/PKI, the AAJA moved to Beijing, serving the Mao regime (Zhou,

2019).

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perceptions and available means, and international contexts and crises. In Asia, historical narratives inhibit multilateral efforts.101 Against multilateral fatigue and antagonistic strategic visions, minilateralism has spread in the Indo-Pacific with the QUAD or AUKUS,102 facilitating cooperation and pacification (Pannier, 2015). Minilateralism could help operationalise an Afro-Asian multilateral platform. The NAASP impasse relates to the problematic concept of ASEAN Centrality, which, for Beeson, cannot perfectly handle great powers like China or the US, with the new QUAD or AUKUS venues bypassing ASEAN (Beeson, 2022).103 The NAASP failure until now can be perceived in the context of this ASEAN Centrality marginalisation. Luhut’s Afro-Asian mobilisation is circumventing ASEAN Centrality to mobilise the resource-rich Global South nations based on the common interest of commodity-based industrialisation. The absence of a powerful support core for the NAASP, its broadness and vagueness, explain its lack of progress. Regional groupings and institutions are assuming new forms in international politics (Acharya, 2018), with forum shopping and the rise of alternative institutions created by non-liberal powers. Global governance has moved towards “multilateralism à la carte” (Patrick, 2015), contesting traditional multilateralism. Flexibility, ad-hoc settings built around a common defined purpose, informality, well-described binding agreements accepted on a voluntary basis, multilevel and multi-stakeholder constructions, including

101 In that complicated context, Ruggie’s ideal type appears difficult to fulfill, as seen with the NAASP. 102 Minilateralism unites a restricted group on specific topics of collaboration. The group shares similar views on security with closer or more compatible strategic cultures. Different strategic cultures between two countries can also make bilateral partnerships more difficult, like between Indonesia and Australia (Beeson et al., 2021). 103 For India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar: “(ASEAN’s) centrality and relevance is therefore obvious. However, there are challenges that go beyond the remit of its institutions and platforms. These are aggravated by anachronistic multilateralism. Effectively addressing such deficits are now best done by plurilateral groups, the Quad being a notable example” (Media Center, 2022).

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CSOs,104 direct engagements with peoples without intermediation, innovation in forms and ways of collaborating, are new criteria for contemporary multilateralism.105 Facing domestic constraints and economic uncertainty, large emerging economies privilege flexibility and the primacy of their sovereignty (Kahler, 2013), multi-bilateral forums to the NAASP. Luhut’s flexible Afro-Asian ways follow the contemporary spirit and his ad hoc, commando-style preferences. Since Indonesia’s hilirisasi policy is supported by China, the question remains to what extent his Global South hilirisasi diplomacy is coordinated with China. We cannot answer. Formal multilateralism is opposed by adhocism and informality.106 States privilege flexibility to engage with other regions. The NAASP did not institutionalise because it was not institutionally exploited by major powers to serve their interests. Indonesia did not have the steering capacities. Africans did not see the NAASP as a suitable venue for forum shopping, lacking material benefits. Given institutional proliferation and overlapping, organisations compete in attractivity. National interests appear better served through more flexible frameworks than the NAASP. Any institutionalisation attempt is haphazard and improvised, based on bricolage.107 Without Pareto-optimality, the international arena necessitates creativity and trial-and-error.108 Adopting international agreements binding hundreds of countries entails strategic goal-setting instead of imposing vague and unpolitical norms (Thérien & Pouliot, 2020). The NAASP remained at the symbolic level, a vague declaration made after ceremonial summits. It lacked bricolage to become a working institution. From seeking infrastructure deals to hilirisasi diplomacy, Luhut’s evolving African effort applies bricolage. 104 Sometimes refusing the monopoly of the MOFA that can lack creativity. 105 These new formats also present defaults linked to flexibility and the possible lack of

universal inclusiveness (Patrick, 2015). 106 “Pragmatic adhocism is part of a move away from global and multilateral solutions towards voluntary engagement and exploitation of institutions ” (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020). 107 The concept of bricolage describes “the improvisatory, haphazard and combinatorial nature of global public policy making ” (Thérien & Pouliot, 2020). 108 The formulation of the United Nations SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) appears as a “compromise between the purely aspirational character of norm creation and the almost insurmountable task of formulating binding international agreements among sovereign equals ” (Thérien & Pouliot, 2020).

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Research lacks on regionalism or transregionalism outside the EU, notably Asia-Africa cooperation (Rüland, 2014).109 Studies on bilateral relations between many Asian countries and African countries do not even exist.110 Ideas regarding regionalism traverse continents like from Europe to Asia or Africa, or Bandung’s influence on European construction. The cognitive and ideational factor is crucial in institutional building. Ideas and norms are filtered through localisation, referring to a “cognitive prior” formed by local norms and values.111 The IAF follows an Indonesian-filtered multi-bilateral Africa+1 forum model developed by external powers for status signalling and material benefits. Self-esteem and dignity are likewise sought in Indonesia’s African efforts and the NAASP (Lebow, 2008). The cognitive prior in Indonesia to construct the NAASP was insufficient. Formalising a not-even-informal transregion appears complicated (Ruggie, 1993). ASEAN cooperates through intergovernmentalism.112 Apparently an EU-mimicking “isomorphic organisation” (Jetschke, 2009), the “ASEAN Way” eschews bureaucratisation, big regional institutions and profound legalisation of regional cooperation, privileging flexibility and informality for more pragmatism. Prioritising national sovereignty, deprived of supranational goals, ASEAN decisions appear non-binding.113 Successful at avoiding wars, East Asian multilateralism privileges process, not results; saving face, and building consensus (Buzan & Zhang, 2014). ASEAN defines itself, and its perception of efficacy and usefulness. Criticism exposes ASEAN’s “rhetoric-action gaps ”, the “declaratory and symbolic politics ”, and the “lack of delivery” (Rüland, 2014), providing context for the NAASP’s non-operationalisation.

109 Similarly, the lack of Indonesia-Africa studies represented a gap giving birth to this research. 110 One of the reasons is very limited relationships in economic, political and socialcultural links as seen later between the smaller ASEAN nations and Africa (Rubiolo, 2016). 111 Acharya calls it a “constitutive localization” (Acharya, 2004, 2009). 112 For Rüland, EU and ASEAN conceptions of regional integration differ. The EU

moves towards supra-nationalism or “deep institutionalization” as opposed to the lighter “ASEAN Way” or “soft institutionalisation” (Rüland, 2014). 113 Based on voluntary compliance and without constraining enforcement other than peer pressure in closed meetings.

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ASEAN creates underutilised institutions, privileging informal and hybrid network governance, seen as pragmatism, to institutionalisation (Jetschke, 2009). Process primes tangible outcomes (Dibb, 2001). Indonesia’s declarative ambitions for IORA or the NAASP, compared with its real capacities and influence within the Indian Ocean or AfroAsian contexts, and the modest outcomes, highlight the ASEAN or Indonesian Way perspective (Weatherbee, 2016). Still, Indonesia leverages ASEAN and now the Global South through an Afro-Asian narrative to assert its regional leadership and pursue its international ambitions. ASEAN’s particular idiosyncratic style of regionalism differs from Africa and the AU.114 Liberal regional integration and supranationalism clash with ASEAN’s political culture,115 rejecting advanced multilateralism and legal formalisation,116 control mechanisms or even the determination of shared common interests (Jetschke & Rüland, 2009). There is no “diffuse reciprocity” supplanting national interests (Ruggie, 1992), explaining the NAASP’s path and Indonesia’s challenge. Despite AU-ASEAN similarities (Diaz, 2017), the ASEAN Way is not shared in Africa. The AU can sanction its members and intervene inside a country facing severe democratic failure like a coup or conflict.117 In the early 2000s, the AU mandated Senegal to trial former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré (Williams, 2007). Can an ASEAN trial of Myanmar generals be imagined?118 The “intrusive” AU supports nonindifference with Responsibility to Protect (R2P).119 ASEAN favours 114 Regionalism is seen as an adequate analytical framework for Africa (Hentz, 2014). 115 From a New Regionalism Approach (NRA) perspective that supports an alternative

regionalism deprived of Eurocentrism and founded on the emancipatory force of civil society, ASEAN is disappointing due to its elitism and state-centricity that does not give place to CSOs (Rüland, 2021). 116 And “form matters ” (Ruggie, 1993). 117 A REC like ECOWAS can also intervene. For Glas and Balogun, in the norm

of people-centric governance, ECOWAS appears more integrative of civil society than ASEAN, which only does so superficially (Glas & Balogun, 2020). 118 Suharto died peacefully in his home in Central Jakarta without any trial or confiscation of the tens of billions of dollars stolen from the Indonesian state and people over 32 years. 119 A debate exists since external interventions in African domestic conflicts are paradoxically said to protect sovereignty. National sovereignty remains the main value or primary institution in the African polity, as the problematic implementation issue of AU agreements in member countries shows (Glas, 2018; Moe & Geis, 2020).

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strict regional non-interference (Haacke & Williams, 2008), supporting R2P rhetorically, not inside ASEAN.120 Can an ASEAN-instigated military intervention be imagined in Myanmar? No supranational structure stands in Asia. Despite being EU-influenced in governance and declared liberal values, ASEAN preserves bilateralism, non-negotiable sovereignty and non-interference. ASEAN apparently benefits from an EU governance style reducing conflictuality. Yet, feasibility and effectiveness remain (Henökl & Reiterer, 2015). Indeed, the NAASP followed EU-promoted transregional cooperation. Different power and regionalism conceptions between Indonesia, ASEAN and other NAASP members prevented institutionalisation.121 Successful regionalisation requires successfully functioning member states.122 In a global plurality of states and NSAs, collective political projects must unite common interests, handle hierarchical or unequal power and manage diversity in norms, values and perceptions (Hurrell, 2007). Given Afro-Asian plurality, the NAASP was doomed if intended to be operationalised and not simply a mere announcement. Overlapping, frequently ineffective or non-operational, regional organisations with similar agendas and mandates, and weak members lacking resources, overcrowd Asia (Rüland & Michael, 2019). Similar African organisational proliferation, notably in security governance, creates coordination, cohesion and reform difficulties on multiple levels of agency (Moe & Geis, 2020). Asian proliferation and overlapping relate to SinoIndian hegemonic competition to boost their spheres of influence.123 Facilitating hedging and soft balancing,124 regional institutions allow 120 The OAU, with its principles of anti-imperialism, sovereignty, consensus or nonintervention, appeared closer to ASEAN. As Williams explains, the AU has localised transnational norms like intolerance for unconstitutional changes of government or R2P; shifting from non-intervention to non-indifference in African conflicts. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 2000) stipulates in its article 4(h) the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) (Williams, 2007). 121 This is not even evoking the Middle East. 122 Hurrell calls this the “paradox of regionalism” (Hurrell, 2007). It does not seem

paradoxical in an organic perspective. 123 This Sino-Indian rivalry is largely based on cognitive factors (Pardesi, 2021). 124 Contrary to Mearsheimer, realities being more complex, institutions do not appear

as pure epiphenomena of the international arena or only playgrounds for great power games (Mearsheimer, 1994).

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China and India to implement a “hegemonic soft rule”, bringing countries into their sphere of influence, encouraging bandwagoning against material incentives and side payments while employing an altruistic narrative of selfless institutional building occulting the domination of realist objectives, similar narratives used by external powers in Africa (Rüland & Michael, 2019). Regionalism increases Sino-Indian influence, legitimacy and prestige, promotes their development models, helps ideational diffusion, forms a suitable regional identity, and facilitates access to needed natural resources (Rüland & Michael, 2019). The NAASP appears as an Indonesian “hegemonic soft rule” attempt. Yet, Indonesia was not hegemonic, and lacked material resources, knowledge and norm influence. It could not drive major powers away from pursuing their national interests, even through NAASP instrumentalisation. This Indonesian “cooperative hegemony” attempt failed by a lack of preparation, knowledge deficit, notably of African dynamics, and the incapacity to drive such a diverse and antinomic group of states.125 Given the realist, sceptical worldview of Indonesian and Asian leaders, the NAASP could only discursively become a thorough multilateral institution, not in reality. This twice repeated declaration never transformed into autonomous multilateralism, lacking rational-legal authority, expertise and knowledge, and budget and administration (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Theory differs from practice.126 Since Bandung, Afro-Asian cooperation has often been described as an Asian agenda, wondering if Africa was not exchanging the European hegemon for an Asian one. Economic success transformed Asian powers into new development models for Africa. East Asian primacy could impose Afrasia over Euro-Africa. Afro-Asian links appear similarly asymmetric,

125 “Cooperative hegemony” is a strategy used by a rising power like Indonesia to develop regional or international institutions to try and compensate for a lack of military and economic power (Pedersen, 2002). Cooperation among large numbers cannot succeed without major power buy-in and suitable institutional mechanisms (Kahler, 1993). 126 The Clausewitzian concept of friction underlines that actual war differs from war

on paper. The non-transformation of the NAASP into an international institution could also be apprehended from that perspective (von Clausewitz, 2007). Lacking Sino-Indian hegemonic power, paradoxically, Indonesia could probably more easily unite, if it possessed adequate material capacities, all the Afro-Asian nations than China and India since it has no major conflict with any of the member countries; although that is mere speculation.

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given the power gap between major Asian powers and African nations, interrogating Bandung solidarity (Bachmann, 2019).127 Still predominantly colonised in 1955, Africa’s Bandung involvement could only be minimal, especially given Western opposition to significant African participation. The five Bandung co-hosts, the Colombo powers, are all Asian Indian Ocean nations (Ewing, 2019), underlining Asian preeminence.128 Bandung involved more the Arab world than SubSaharan Africa, still vastly colonised. Six months in power, Nasser’s Egypt dispatched the largest delegation, understanding in Bandung that Egypt was the gateway to Africa (Van Reybrouck, 2022). Only Ethiopia and Liberia attended as independent Sub-Saharan nations. Sudan attended while still under Egyptian-British shared sovereignty, and would be independent the following year. The Gold Coast attended while still decolonising from the UK, without its leader Kwame Nkrumah.129 The Central African Federation was absent (Lee, 2009).130 After Bandung, outside of North Africa, links between Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia remained of low intensity, with a limited amount of Southeast Asian embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa due to restricted budgets and business relationships. Africans concentrated on their own continental problematics and organisations (Mehden, 1965). The Nigerian embassy in Indonesia, the first ever Sub-Saharan African embassy in Jakarta, only opened in 1976 (Jakpost, 2008). This inheritance is essential to understand the NAASP issue and the current state of ASEAN and Indonesia relations with Africa.

127 Asymmetries and informational distortions or lack of knowledge are causes of

cooperation failure (Kahler, 2013). 128 Krishna Menon, Nehru’s foreign minister and close ally, considered that for India, “Bandung was largely Asian”. Nehru himself aimed at uniting Asia and not Afro-Asia. He wanted a permanent Asian body (Brecher, 1968; Singh, 2011). 129 Nkrumah was forbidden to attend by the UK, which feared effects on notyet-independent Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya. The father of Pan-Africanism, W.E.B. Dubois, was also prevented from attending (Percival Wood, 2012; Van Reybrouck, 2022). According to Vitalis, many mistakes concerning which leaders attended Bandung can be found in books and research papers, highlighting the need for more serious research on this almost mythological event (Vitalis, 2013). 130 The Central African Federation comprised contemporary Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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Nehru described Africa as a continent beset by tragedy that Asia should help (Gerits, 2016). Asian expertise would develop Africa.131 Defending African agency and independence, Nkrumah was wary of Asian paternalism, seemingly antinomic with Pan-Africanism.132 He desired a united Africa with its own market, currency, army, diplomacy and constitution (Van Reybrouck, 2022). For Sub-Saharan Africans, Bandung could seem more accommodating of an Arab-African voice (Vitalis, 2013). There is a clear historical continuity between Bandung and the NAASP’s non-endorsement by the AU.133 This Bandung African resentment, not the general feeling of all Africans, given the mostly positive, often romantic and nostalgic, view on Bandung today in Africa, should nonetheless be considered, helping understand the NAASP’s non-embracement by the AU. Pan-Africanist solidarity trumps Afro-Asian solidarity (Vitalis, 2013), potentially suspect of Asian paternalism. Incorporating African agency and views will increasingly determine possible success with Africa. Although lacking institutional capacity or full territorial control, the African gatekeeper state and its elites decide who gets access to its “riches” through its security or legal apparatus (Cooper, 2002). Similarly, it decides how it engages externally, instrumentalising relationships like all international actors.134 Reinforcing their collective agency, African summits’ multiplication contributed to uniting African elites, sharing a “common socialization” (Williams, 2007). 131 Symbolically, Nehru preferred to use the term “Asia-Africa” to “Afro-Asia” since Asia was a smaller word; probably a receivable explanation, but that could seem arrogant to Africans; similar to the way contemporary Africa+1 forums usually place the external power before the African continent in their official appellation. It is also the case with the NAASP (Vitalis, 2013). Nehru’s project was about Pan-Asianism and Asian unity first. Sastroamidjojo proposed extending Bandung to Africa (Ewing, 2019). 132 Gerits explains that the Ghana perspective was that Bandung diminished solidarity with Asia. Nkrumah’s Panafricanist advisor George Padmore proposed an African Bandung where Asians would be mere observers (Gerits, 2016). 133 Bandung triggered Israel’s intensive African engagement in the late 1950s and 1960s, notably under the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Golda Meir. Israel developed diplomatic relations with 34 African countries in the 1960s before encountering difficulties in Africa due to the 1967 and 1973 wars that pushed many African countries to break diplomatic relations with Israel. In recent years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has intensified relations with Africa again (Gidron, 2020). There is also continuity between Israel not being invited to Bandung and the NAASP’s eventual focus on a majority of activities for Palestine. 134 Notably using Bayart’s extraversion model as seen previously (Bayart, 2000, 2015).

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Yet, the Africa+1 format is increasingly criticised in Africa.135 Like the “Banjul formula”, the Kagame report proposes a smaller African delegation in Africa+1 forums composed of a troika with the current, former and incoming AU chairs, the AUC and REC chairs.136 African relational influence on external powers like Indonesia appears relatively strong, Indonesia’s GDP being several times smaller than the aggregated African GDP.137 The Polisario incident underlines that African agency leverage. The NAASP’s creation occurred in a context of positive perception of regionalisation’s virtues, fostering development and a better global order. Often portraying a narrative close to EU regionalism principles,138 ASEAN and other Asian multilateral initiatives, the AU and its building

135 Kenyan President William Ruto strongly criticised the Africa+1 format and the treatment of African leaders abroad during those forums, notably in the US. Multi-bilateral asymmetry should be dropped. The AUC Chair should represent Africa in those formats (Ateba, 2023). Engaging and respecting the AU, India started its IAFS with the “Banjul formula”, which Modi cancelled for the third IAFS, inviting all African countries. Although the Banjul formula emanates from the AU, uninvited African countries complained to India for not being invited. 136 Decided at the 2006 AU summit in Banjul, Gambia, the ‘Banjul Formula’ means Africa is represented by the AU chair and previous chair; the AUC chair; five NEPAD founders (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa); and 8 RECS chairs (Kagame, 2017). The Banjul Formula, a sort of guide for African states’ collective diplomacy, tried to “align the continent ”. It has been considered “unsuccessful ”. India dropped it, for example (Gwatiwa, 2022). 137 China and Japan’s GDPs are several times the GDP of Africa. 138 This narrative is linked to liberal-institutionalism and is notably prevalent while

receiving European funding. Turianskyi states that 60%-90% of the AU projects and peace operations are funded by external players. AU funding is thus a matter of African continental sovereignty. The Kigali Financing Decision of 2016 applying a 0.2% levy on all eligible exports of AU member states should be allocated to the AU budget. The Kagame Report insists on its implementation (Kagame, 2017). Yet, the levy and the Kagame Report are opposed by the SADC or Egypt and President Al-Sisi. African countries privilege their national sovereignty (Turianskyi, 2019).

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blocks,139 follow their own logics; founded on their idiosyncrasies, histories, perceptions, objectives, norms and values. The Afrasian narrative remains vague. Contrary to partially institutionalised Asia–Europe and Africa–Europe links, involving not only states, but also CSOs envisaging a visible transregionalism, Asia–Africa links mostly focus on bilateralism. Many Afro-Asian nations have not developed significant bilateral relationships among themselves (Bachmann, 2019). Bandung solidarity discourses often appear rhetorical.140 National interests represent the true focus, like state business and Asian international recognition and status ambitions. The Asia–Africa space, in all its diversity, image levels and complexity, has not been thoroughly elucidated by political actors and elite foreign policymakers, making the formation of an Asia–Africa platform like the NAASP necessarily complicated. Asia and Africa seem to share the same values present in the Dasasila and the UN Charter, but Afrasia needs deeper foundations to become a living entity.141 Indonesia’s impossible NAASP operationalisation for over ten years was engendered by this lack of Asia–Africa conceptualisation on top of its power and knowledge deficit.142 No distinct Afro-Asian identity was formed to sustain the NAASP. Moreover, rivalries and conflicts in Asia– Africa mean the transregion regroups a multiplicity of competitive security systems impeding cooperation. An Afro-Asian identity is required since what people do and what they are is related (Wendt, 1992).143 Afro-Asian commonalities exist, probably not well highlighted in the NAASP formation process. The impossibility of a “Second Bandung” should be well comprehended before attempting to form an institution like the NAASP. 139 That is to say, the eight African RECs: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CENSAD). Like in Asia, these organisations often overlap, with nations being members of several RECs. 140 The same could be said of European or Latin American solidarity discourses. 141 Not mentioning, as seen previously, the absence of funds for the NAASP and the

non-involvement of civil society in imagining such a platform. 142 To paraphrase Wendt, institutions are what states make of them (Wendt, 1992). 143 For the English School, a common culture holds the state-system together

(Butterfield & Wight, 2019).

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Afro-Asianism lost to the NAM. Pan-Africanism differs from the principles that underpin ASEAN’s creation, formed against communism (Vitalis, 2013). ASEAN was created following the failure of earlier endeavours in permanent regionalisation like the 1947 Asian Relations Conference or the KAA, too broad and lacking flexibility (Pardesi, 2020), precisely the NAASP’s defaults.144 Africans want to coordinate themselves the different Africa Summits with external powers to maximise their benefits. Larger African nations especially, RECs and the AU, want to ensure external powers are helping African connectivity and development, following African roadmaps and needs (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021), like with the AfCFTA. A platform similar to the NAASP could emerge from Africa with an African impulse, given the difficulty to unite Asia, and that Africans want to direct the orientation and governance of their continent.145 ASEAN Centrality through the EAS could be Indonesia’s solution, potentially coupled with its new Global South mobilisation if it is successful.146

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CHAPTER 4

Knowledge Production and Indonesian Foreign Policy

This book was born from an observation made several years ago about the absence of any significant academic study on Afro-Indonesian relations (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). In Indonesia or Africa, as the author has experienced for several years now, talking about this subject often brings a puzzled reaction, although the situation has started to evolve progressively in the last few years, without being optimal yet. Until now, finding anyone with in-depth intellectual knowledge of those relations is complicated, at all levels, not to say impossible until now, which is acknowledged by both Indonesian and African officials. That observation itself had arisen from another observation, that of Indonesia’s continuous focus on promoting the NAASP despite its absence of successful institutionalisation and being ignored notably by major Asian and African powers and the AU and, in parallel, of the absence of an Indonesian Africa+1, multi-bilateral forum while all other major emerging powers had developed their own. This really means that Africa was mostly absent from Indonesia’s mental map and knowledge, relegated to a “non-traditional market ” in the official state planning documents and evoked mostly symbolically through the Asia–Africa narrative for the celebration of the Bandung Conference’s anniversaries. Afro-Asia existed discursively without Africa. All seminal books, and all the others, on Indonesian foreign policy, have

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mostly nothing to say about Africa. Organised by five Asian powers, the Asia–Africa Conference was basically not about Africa or only marginally, although it had clear consequences for Africa. Pan-Africanism remains the meta-narrative for Africa. The Afro-Asian narrative is mostly employed by major Asian powers today to justify their intensified African engagement and penetrate the continental market better. It remains a meaningful story. Indonesia tried to use it to raise its global status and reputation after the Asian financial crisis and its democratisation. It did leverage it, or did not know how, to gain benefits in Africa until recently. The archipelago even seemed to perceive it, for a while, as an obstacle with the Foreign Minister’s column on going “Beyond the Bandung Spirit ”, which indicated Bandung was almost a burden for Indonesian diplomacy, impeding broader economic links with Africa. Yet, the 1955 Bandung Communiqué explicitly called for Afro-Asian economic integration. The call for intercontinental “economic diplomacy” had already been made in 1955. Indonesia quickly came back on its feet, preserving and pragmatically leveraging the Bandung solidarity narrative, notably through Indonesia AID and Luhut’s hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy. Indonesia’s contemporary lack of African engagement and conceptualisation of the continent’s significance can be explained by knowledge production and education system deficiencies that can be traced back to critical Indonesian historical events seen as ruptures or critical junctures, such as Indonesia’s internal consolidation and developmental focus. Jokowi and his number one associate General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, an efficient and dynamic political power couple, have generated a pragmatic shift towards a concrete Indonesian African engagement, understanding Africa’s potential and its strategic importance for Indonesia on many levels. But the engagement’s apparently materialist nature and structural constraints in Indonesia in knowledge production and elite perception have still not allowed the rise of rich thinking on Africa in Indonesia and vice versa in Africa towards Indonesia. Given this scarcity of existing material, this book can only be widely explorative, trying to gain insight through interviews and comparative readings. The book places itself in the evolution from “China in Africa” to “Global African Studies”, in which, indeed, China–Africa has appeared as the “meta-organising subject”, the ultimate reference to position research like this work in the academic space (Alden & Large, 2019). In that perspective, our research has progressed through permanent analogies between Indonesia’s African approach and the engagement

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of other external powers in Africa, mainly the four main Asian powers of China, India, Japan and South Korea but also other emerging powers like Türkiye, Brazil, Singapore, Malaysia, Iran, Israel or the UAE, and the remaining four powers of the P5 of the UNSC, the US, Russia, the United Kingdom and France. Overall, China remains the main country to be compared to in our case, especially given Indonesian elites’ increasing entrenchment with Chinese and Sino-African networks. Many other nations offer exciting perspectives for analogy. These rapprochements have allowed this study to move forward by trying out ideas explored or applied elsewhere to other external powers and seeing how they might fit in the analysis of Indonesian foreign policy. Sometimes those ideas or concepts seem to be replicable in the Indonesian case. Some other times they might not. However, trying them out can only be beneficial for knowledge production and in this book’s effort to develop a greater interest in Indonesia–Africa relations and related subjects of focus. This book has a double location or vocation. First, this work belongs to the category of Afro-Asian Studies or the broader Global African Studies . More specifically, it participates in the study of external powers in Africa, and analogies between external power approaches to Africa. This effort enriches the existing body of knowledge, closing a clear gap, with an indepth study of a major emerging power like Indonesia that has not been carried out before, in this way. Then, it focuses on Indonesian foreign policy in general with a special zoom on where Africa might enter in the broader conceptualisation of Indonesian foreign policy by Indonesian elites and the wider public. Our work thus contributes to a widening of research on Indonesian foreign policy by thoroughly studying an unexplored topic, although many other studies will be needed in the future to go further. Studies on Sino-Africa in particular have been a precious guide for this research, facilitating phenomena comprehension and providing shortcuts for conceptualisation by being a constant intellectual benchmark. The evolution of China–Africa studies, which follows China’s changing approach with its rising learning curve, as described by Alden and Large (Alden & Large, 2019), allows seeing where Indonesia is situated with its African engagement, trying to employ the right tools and vision for a more adequate interpretation. As advanced nations, Japan and Korea offer precious information on development assistance and soft power notably. Yet, India provides the most inspiring engagement overall. As another example, Türkiye and the evolution of its African policy have also been

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precious to apprehend better and comprehend “Indonesia in Africa”. As a heuristic exercise, Indonesia in Africa can be positioned versus Türkiye in Africa in economic, political, discursive or religious matters, which seriously engaged Africa at least 15 years before Indonesia. The contrast between reality and discourse in external powers’ African engagements, the methodological and asymmetric problem of studying an external power, in a multi-bilateral way, in relation to the whole African continent that is usually composed of smaller countries than the external power studied, capable of extra-regional projection, the new topics brought by China’s evolving engagement with Africa due to its acquired experience, notably in security and defense, media, the environment, industrialisation and relational power through education, training and other scholarships, the fact that external powers are not unitary actors but composed of many actors on all levels with different capacities and agendas that are not perfectly coordinated, which forces, for example, to not only consider the Chinese state as a unique entity but look into all sorts of Chinese players, the way Türkiye boosts its African engagement through civil society and NSAs are all research issues that contributed to enriching this study by providing ideas, concepts and paths that could be used, experimented, reemployed or discarded for the study of Indonesia’s engagement with Africa (Alden & Large, 2019; Donelli, 2021). A better understanding of Indonesia’s role in Africa and the framing of its engagement has thus been supported by the increasingly broad selection of available studies on other external powers in Africa and the parallels made between these approaches. The role of academic research and knowledge production is essential to determine the type of foreign policy approach a country will adopt, as seen with modernisation theory with its militaristic preponderance, as defined in the US and implemented in Indonesia, bringing the rise of the New Order and then after the Cold War with democratisation as the main intellectual framework that brought Reformasi (Simpson, 2008). The tremendous geopolitical changes currently taking place with the meta-story of China–US systemic rivalry and the Russo-Ukrainian war will trigger a substantial increase in the need and role for academic knowledge (Alden & Large, 2019), which also explains the rise of China–Africa Studies and then Global African Studies and this study. Indonesia’s present type of engagement, focused on economic diplomacy with the creation of the IAF, Luhut’s task force and Indonesia AID, can be considered to be the product, through mimicry and knowledge

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circulation, of that existing academic knowledge, which has contributed to analysing and framing external approaches towards Africa. Indonesia’s approach’s modesty and lack of sophistication are also explained by a lack of academic knowledge of Africa in Indonesia that could help frame the engagement in a more ambitious and unique way and mobilise the necessary resources. When US elites realised their ignorance concerning many parts of the world they would have to engage with after WWII and funds were massively poured into Area Studies, notably in Southeast Asian studies, to understand Indonesia better (Anderson, 2016). China is doing just that to study Africa. Remarkably, the US’ African Area Studies contributed to the development of China–Africa Studies in the 1980s, notably through the support of African Studies in Chinese institutions. The Ford Foundation played a critical role in the development of African Studies in China, creating networks and sponsoring long-term collaborations between American and Chinese Africanists (Monson, 2019). There has been no significant local or international funding dedicated to African studies in Indonesia (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). As a result, the subject did not emerge in the archipelago, also explaining the low visibility of Africa in Indonesia among elites, academics and the general public. Attention towards the continent has simply not been there for decades. As a post-colonial nation, Indonesian research has also been historically more focused on nation-building or regional security studies, seen as more strategic and valuable. Guggenheim highlights the historical reasons, linked to colonisation and the New Order notably, explaining Indonesia’s domestic knowledge infrastructure weakness compared to other large emerging countries like Brazil, China, India or Mexico.1 Overly dependent on power, domestic research was held back by an absence of financial support and latent control, including through administrative means. International technical assistance impeded the development of proper domestic knowledge production capabilities (Guggenheim, 2012). Despite representing constitutionally 20% of the state budget, Indonesia’s overall education system is said to be failing, notably given politicisation and clientelism relating to teacher recruitment and poor programs (Pierskalla & Sacks, 1 Which has nothing to do, of course, with the fact that there are, like everywhere, many smart people in Indonesia. Yet, academic conditions are far from ideal to support them. The fact that Indonesia never received a Nobel Prize of any kind is a favourite example to illustrate this.

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2020). Innovation and research support are challenging to obtain inside the academic system. Playing the political game is often a necessity for funding and positions. The roots of the knowledge dilemma run deep. Even in the economic sector, Indonesian business associations like KADIN have limited research capacities (Rüland, 2014),2 another reason for Indonesia’s late economic engagement with Africa. Alumni associations from Indonesia’s main state universities are overpoliticised power tools with a strong influence in the political and social-economic scene.3 They rarely seek to support intellectual initiatives, but primarily seek projects in relation to government or foreign funding, organising commercial and entrepreneurship events with sponsors, deprived of academic value.4 The elected leaders of those alumni associations are politically affiliated, playing a significant role in political campaigns and supporting or opposing the government.5 This aspect of Indonesian power is not well studied in the literature, as is, in general, the question of locating power in Indonesia. In foreign policy, overemphasis on Kemlu masks the true reality of Indonesian power, decision-makers and their ambitions inside the polity. Diplomats act mostly as “transmitters” or visible faces. True power lies in the Palace, in powerful political figures and former generals, in tycoons and even in prominent religious figures from NU, for example. This power map is essential to understand since a topic like Africa faces this context to move forward in the polity. Jokowi–Luhut could decide Africa was important when Kemlu, for years, could not, lacking power. This problem-driven study cannot be detached from this transversal issue of the lack of a rich epistemic culture in Indonesia that would be capable of producing high-level global standard research through its knowledge system, especially its universities. Indonesia has never received a Nobel Prize of any kind, which might be symbolic or even anecdotal, but still represents an indication of its knowledge and education predicament. Indonesia’s late and low African engagement and its concomitant 2 KADIN: Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia. 3 Especially Universitas Indonesia (UI), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) or Institut

Teknologi Bandung (ITB). 4 This is not an exception in the world. 5 Their election is also sometimes questionable, with often only a limited fraction of

the alumni voting and lists of voters often remaining secret, like in Universitas Indonesia, for example.

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absence in the Global African Studies intellectual and academic debate are related to this lack of knowledge sector and university reform, preventing the production of essential knowledge and adequate policies. Since available means on the African side are also limited, Afro-Indonesian academic knowledge and relationships could not grow. There again, Jokowi does mean a “reset” in economic engagement with Africa, but not in “riset”. For Guggenheim, although Indonesia does not perform well in international comparisons, the country benefits from a vibrant civil society debate (Guggenheim, 2012). However, in this research’s case, Indonesian civil society, including academics, did not bring up the Africa topic in the Indonesian polity and academic space.6 Rüland indicates that foreign policy’s definition in Indonesia is still not really open to public debate. Decisions happen behind closed doors with no real knowledge input from civil society. Civil society can seem to participate in foreign policy implementation but in a corporatist manner, driven and orchestrated by the state (Rüland, 2021). This situation can explain also the absence of debate and lack of knowledge of Africa, and Indonesia’s African engagement deficit over time. Hadiwinata writes about the poor quality of IR research in Indonesia due to a kind of soft subjugation to power and a need to not differ from the state foreign policy orientation to obtain financing for research or consulting projects from the government. Foreign sources of funding also drive academic research. Academic work becomes project-oriented, responding to orders from international donors or Indonesian agencies

6 It is a challenging endeavour. In November 2015, after the KAA in April 2015, the author initiated a cultural initiative, supported by Indonesian politicians and African ambassadors and endorsed by Kemlu, called “The Africa Wall ” that selected three young Indonesian mural artists to paint a fresco combining African and Indonesian motifs on a 20-meters long wall in South Jakarta representing Africa through its historical leaders like Nelson Mandela. This initiative allowed the author to understand better the novelty and almost “exotism” of the African topic in Indonesia, detached from the Bandung Conference. Media coverage was honourable, notably a live on a morning news show on Kompas TV, a major Indonesian news network (Firdaus, 2015; Herliafifah, 2015). Kemlu was notably represented by Ambassador Salman Al Farisi, former Ambassador to the UAE, who was Head of Strategy of Kemlu at the time, and Al Busyra Basnur, head of Public Diplomacy. In January 2016, Ambassador Salman Al Farisi commissioned the study for the preparation of an Indonesia–Africa Forum. Ambassador Salman Al Farisi then became Ambassador to South Africa before being chosen in November 2021 as the Secretary General of IORA (Kemlu, 2021). Al Busyra Basnur became Ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union.

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and ministries (Hadiwinata, 2009). Since there was no funding originating from African countries in Indonesia or Indonesian state funding for research on Africa, the Africa topic failed to rise in the Indonesian academic field. Now that the topic has started emerging, given sudden state attention to Africa, some diplomats newly appointed to Africa suddenly appear as self-designated experts trying to drive the orientation of studies on Africa in universities. Economic diplomacy, notably studies on trade, is thus prioritised. Yet, priorities should be determined based on academic knowledge and a strong understanding of Africa. Kemlu should support academic work, but a diplomat is not an academic and vice versa. His job is different and linked to the interests he is promoting, which risks limiting meaningful knowledge creation and, ultimately diplomatic and foreign policy achievements. The process of forming knowledgeable Indonesian diplomats and academics in Africa will take time and humility. Yet, despite funding issues, Kemlu and other ministries have a growing interest in African affairs. A serious academic path should be followed, and a solid ecosystem of African Studies should be built to enrich the African engagement while avoiding mistakes that other external powers have made. Academics should be given the freedom to explore and learn, not be driven by short-term external interests that will only slow down meaningful knowledge progress in Indonesia. This autonomy is crucial to avoid creating what Hadiwinata calls “unintellectual ” scholars born from unrestrained commercialisation of research and education, and excessive state soft intervention, which only impedes Indonesia’s welfare increase (Hadiwinata, 2009). If Indonesia wants to be serious with its African engagement, it has to provide financing for independent academic research on Africa to raise its credibility in its African interactions. Being a credible development assistance partner in Africa will also mean developing credible knowledge production on Africa in Indonesia. The Indonesian government should place knowledge and education at the centre, those being the utmost drivers of long-term development (Todd, 2020). Indonesia’s foreign policy determinants’ multiplicity was highlighted, notably in its modest shift towards Africa, insisting on the role of international socialisation, mental maps’ evolution or the highest leadership’s impact thanks to its laudable pragmatism able to break policy deadlocks and force implementation. Jokowi proposes a humble and

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tangible approach as seen in this book,7 progressively made more “aggressive” with Luhut given domestic imperatives. Regrouping several existing institutions, the Indonesian government recently created the National Research Agency (BRIN),8 in charge of research coordination, to supposedly improve efficiency to support Indonesian competitiveness. Jokowi “asked that BRIN be able to detect and identify strategic research topics that are suited to the nation’s needs ” (Gorbiano, 2020). The President said that now that infrastructure development was advanced, he wanted the main focus to shift to research. The problem seems to be that research is mostly understood as applied research linked to industry or technology in a mercantile mindset. Hilirisasi fits that picture.9 Pure sciences or social sciences do not seem to get serious consideration. This stance is a significant mistake. Social sciences are notably essential to become a major power, even more when geopolitics is regaining its central position over economic or business paradigms. A long-term, meaningful engagement with Africa cannot be solely founded on economic links. The sole national research agency, BRIN, was formed as a cabinetlevel, non-ministerial government agency.10 For Mudhoffir, BRIN means

7 Jokowi’s modesty can be seen in the fact he was said, as of 2018, to have refused 21 honorary degrees (honoris causa) (Online, 2018). In Indonesia, PhD titles can be a necessity to rise in the bureaucracy or other state organisations and as a way to gain social prestige. Sometimes their academic value is not very high. There have been many cases of PhD fraud and corruption. Jokowi’s refusal of those titles is, therefore, an important gesture if it means that he wants to show symbolically that diplomas should be earned seriously, although several of his ministers have been criticised for receiving honorary PhDs, with university academics rejecting their universities giving undeserved diplomas to politicians (Fauzan, 2020; Hastanto, 2021; Pitaloka, 2023). The question of diplomas is a real question anywhere since they can tend to block genuine meritocracy by providing a title that justifies social privileges, sometimes without merit, and are often not the result of meaningful knowledge creation (Goodhart, 2020). 8 Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN). 9 Which does not mean it is negative. If it can benefit a large number of Indonesians,

hilirisasi can be seen positively since it aims to raise the country’s wealth and development level. Yet, it is simply not sufficient. Long-term prosperity relates to education. It is also true that industry capital can provide the necessary funds to support an ambitious educational rise. Hilirisasi’s benefit for the people will ultimately depend on wealth allocation. 10 Formed in 2019, it was initially attached to the Ministry of Research and Technology. In 2021, it was separated from that Ministry, which was suppressed or absorbed by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

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an increase in political control over research in Indonesia, that researchbased policy-making is not a priority, and an absence of will to create a performing research ecosystem since economic development based on extractive industries is privileged above knowledge and technology by the so-called political-economic oligarchy (Mudhoffir, 2021).11 BRIN’s steering board Chair, ex officio as steering board Chair of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP),12 is former Indonesian President and PDI-P party Chair Megawati Sukarnoputri (Bramasta, 2021), clearly linking research to ideology and political power. Political validation by ideology and Megawati took place also for the IAF. Expansion towards Africa is considered in line with Sukarno’s vision.13 Both Indonesia’s low level of research spending and results, and the instrumentalisation of research to justify extractive economic paradigms jeopardise Indonesia’s development as a whole. In this study’s case, the results of an inefficient and underfunded research ecosystem entailing wrong policies have been clear with Indonesia’s late contemporary African engagement and the absence of a knowledge foundation to support a more sophisticated approach. This does not mean Indonesia is not moving forward either. Yet, it is moving far slower, with higher risks of discontinuity and backlash, than it could with a robust knowledge engine. Jokowi’s humility and pragmatism have been positive for Indonesia, a giant country with a rising global profile. Jokowi is genuinely supported by a large majority of his people, which cannot be denied or undervalued. However, overpraising of raw and entrepreneurial pragmatism risks misunderstanding knowledge production and research’s role in raising the nation’s intellectual level. Great powers, and notably China, which has been a model for the Indonesian state’s African engagement, invest massively in knowledge and universities, including in social sciences, although under strong ideological control.14 Indonesia seriously lacks investment in knowledge creation that is not simply instrumentalised 11 Critics perceive hilirisasi from that perspective. 12 Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila (BPIP). 13 Yet, Megawati would still prefer, whenever possible, the organisation of a second Bandung, an event still postponed and unfulfilled since 1965 at least. 14 Luhut insists that in each hilirisasi project with Chinese investment, he collaborates with Chinese universities in setting up a vocational educational program relating to the investment’s field in Indonesian universities. China’s relational power is in action in Indonesia, like in Africa.

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for short terms materialist benefits. Concerning the African engagement, without a profound understanding of Africa in all aspects, Indonesia will not be considered a serious player, and risks hurting its potential reputational advantage linked to Bandung if it cannot deliver up to African elite and civil society expectations created by its narrative in Africa relating to both Bandung and its current emerging power status. Indonesian hilirisasi and infrastructure depend on Chinese investments and development models, not fully on an Indonesian development model. A more original Indonesian development proposal will be expected, without denying Indonesia’s achieved breakthroughs. As formerly colonised countries have often been under post-colonial authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes, Indonesia and many African nations share a similar plight regarding knowledge production. The politics of knowledge mainly consisted of keeping local knowledge production weak and under control. Poor funding implies those countries’ voice is highjacked from outside (Alao, 2020). For decades, multilateral institutions like the World Bank discouraged investment in local higher education, supporting foreign-educated elites (Molla & Cuthbert, 2018). Now the paradigm has slightly shifted to the concept of “knowledge economy”.15 Knowledge becomes a discursive priority but remains framed by external interests through a far too economic-centred paradigm. This serves specific transnational capitalistic interests, not necessarily meaningful and substantial local development and human emancipation (Molla & Cuthbert, 2018). The knowledge economy promoted in Indonesia or African nations often does not support welfare and emancipation, which only emerge through diverse knowledge production with many knowledge fields, sometimes disconnected from economic criteria. Developing knowledge of Africa in Indonesia seemed useless. Therefore, it was not supported, with significant consequences for Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia lacks a strategic subculture concerning Africa present in its national subconscious, like France, that links its internal security to stability in Africa, as visible with the Sahel crisis (Pannier & Schmitt, 2019). Africa is not perceived as a permanent security threat as it is for France (Guichaoua, 2020). The African urge is less intense for Indonesia and less present, even absent, in everyday public life. Developing a 15 Uniting the words knowledge and economy to become the framework to increase knowledge production in developing countries seems antinomic.

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broad interest in Africa in nations that do not have an African tradition takes time.16 In light of France’s African troubles, starting almost from scratch may be an advantage for creating a cutting-edge Afro-Indonesian twenty-first-century relationship. In Africa and Indonesia, higher education policy is not contextualised enough (Molla & Cuthbert, 2018), applying uprooted global concepts, often internationalised jargon with no real applicability locally, if not discursively.17 Alao recommends a more Afrocentric approach: “African universities should stop assuming that excellence is defined by domicile outside the continent. Indigenous erudition must be encouraged and teaching and research must be seriously revamped” (Alao, 2020). Indonesia faces the same issues. Local universities lack funding and capacity, hampering creativity. In ASEAN and Indonesia, in particular, more locally produced quality knowledge with high standards is urgently needed coming from universities and research centres (Diaz, 2017).18 Academics should be supported more and given better conditions. The lack of knowledge of Africa in Indonesia has entailed a clear negative impact on Indonesian foreign policy, as seen in this book. For such a big country, Indonesian research and knowledge production is insufficient to create substantive results for the polity, with clear disastrous consequences in development. Understanding Africa and Africans to set up the right African strategy represents a heavy task. Indonesia is no exception. All countries suffer from that perspective. Western countries like the US, France or the UK are often stuck in “development-security nexus” paradigms lacking vision. UK funding for projects in Africa often failed to deliver successful policies due to a lack of comprehension of African worldviews and “orientalism” à la Said (Porteous, 2008; Said, 1979). The French are still stuck in la Françafrique as illustrated by their Sahel presence, called France’s Afghanistan, with the expulsion of its armed forces from Mali and Burkina

16 It is also the case for Chinese foreign policy (Large, 2008). 17 Conversely, in the religious sphere, Indonesia is now trying to promote its own

narrative and conception of Islam through a process of “extroversion” of Indonesian Islam, notably using state and private Islamic higher education institutions (Allès & Seeth, 2021). 18 Singapore is the exception.

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Faso notably (Taylor, 2021) or autocrats’ systemic backing in Francophone Africa.19 Devermont denounced the US’s misunderstanding of Africa (Devermont, 2020).20 Russia also lacks information and knowledge of Africa (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). This research emphasises the cognitive obstacles faced by major Asian powers in their African engagement. Yet, major Asian countries have supported African studies for decades. Anshan reports Chairman Mao had observed that “We don’t have a clear understanding of African history, geography and the present situation”. The Institute of Asian-African Studies was established in July 1961 in Beijing, studying notably domestic African politics for a better indepth understanding of the continent (Anshan, 2005). After the Bandung Conference, China created five institutions for African Studies with diverse specialisations.21 Given China’s contemporary African engagement’s intensity, research on Africa has been a Chinese priority, especially after FOCAC III in 2006.22 This participates in a broader state-driven effort supporting area studies for both policy and soft power benefits, like the US after WWII.23 The highest Chinese leadership consults its Africanists, receiving lectures and sharing draft speeches on Africa, notably relating to FOCAC for review. Rolland indicates that Chinese

19 Like former President Idriss Déby’s son in Chad when Déby died, against the normal constitutional process (Berland & Brew, 2021; Borrel et al., 2021; Mahajan, 2021; Paquette et al., 2021). 20 Before he became the Senior Director for African Affairs in the US National Security Council during the Biden Presidency. 21 Apart from the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Peking University: the Asia-Africa History Teaching and Research Office of the History Department at Peking University (now the Centre for African Studies and the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies at Peking University), the Africa Economics and Geography Research Office at Nanjing University (now the Research Centre of Africa Studies), the African Studies Office of Xiangtan University, and the Institute of Asian-African Studies of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (now the West Asia and Africa Research Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS]) (Rolland, 2021). 22 The Centres for African Studies, respectively, at Peking University and Shanghai Normal University, were created in 1998. Leading Chinese academic Liu Hongwu’s Centre, the Africa Research Institute at Zhejiang Normal University, was started in 2007 (Rolland, 2021). FOCAC III’s grandiosity replied to the G-8 Gleneagles summit in July 2005 (Alden & Large, 2018). 23 Rolland counts 17 research centres on Africa today in China concentrating on economic issues, domestic developments in African nations and their impact on Chinese interests or strategic prevision (Rolland, 2021).

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Africanists are trying to develop a “Chinese School ”, requiring time and effort (Rolland, 2021). The leadership’s commitment is evident. During FOCAC VII in 2018, Xi Jinping declared the establishment of the China–Africa Institute housed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), focusing on economics, poverty reduction, the environment, peace and security and “mutual learning between civilisations ”.24 The academic relationship with Africa receives the Chinese President’s direct attention and engagement and is placed at the civilisational level of importance. Indonesia does not possess this deep level of knowledge and comprehension with a robust supporting knowledge architecture. Nehru created the Department of African Studies at the University of Delhi in 1954 to promote “awareness about Africa” (Africa New Delhi, 2020). The Japanese have been developing for decades a serious focus on hard science African Studies (Philips, 1997). South Korea has over four decades of “institutionalization of Korean African studies ”, with the Institute of African Studies (IAA).25 There again, Indonesia is late and has just started trying to develop African Studies in a few universities. However, the funding and quality remain poor. In general, Indonesia does not place intellectualism at the centre of its foreign policy and political process. In our Africa case, this particularly strikes the eye, contrasting with India or China. Intellectual rapprochement between academics of different countries is supposed to enable better common understanding and relations, although national interests will still dominate.26 This study also underlined the strategic importance of “relational productive power” created through social networks, exchanges, trainings and knowledge production between China and Africa, making power relations smoother, less conflictual and more efficient (Benabdallah, 2020). Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy supports Afro-Indonesian relational power, sharing Indonesia’s industrial knowledge and also representing an alternative path given Indonesia’s lack of funding capacity for infrastructure projects in Africa. SSC and Bandung Solidarity narratives require a solid knowledge background and support 24 Cf. the China-Africa Institute’s website: http://ecai.cssn.cn/au/cai/. 25 It was created in 1977 at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), first as the

Institute of African Affairs (Chang, 2020). 26 Despite a solid bilateral cognitive and academic effort supporting a rapprochement, France and Australia ended their strategic honeymoon and clashed due to Australia joining AUKUS (Soyez & Yorkshire, 2019).

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to be effective in Africa. Productive power created through network multiplication and knowledge makes Africa “possible and imaginable”, placing Africa in the picture to be considered and engaged seriously, although often in an asymmetric perspective placing Africans as the eternal recipients of external support (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). From that perspective, Indonesia still needs to work on its approach. Hilirisasi knowledge sharing seems altruistic and beneficial to Africans if they can create value through commodity-downstream industrialisation. Above all supports Indonesia’s position vis-à-vis Western WTO complaints. Indonesia’s tangible contribution to Africa in that context remains to be seen. Indonesia’s African infrastructure projects have mostly failed to materialise until now. Africans now refuse to see themselves in a hierarchic relationship with their external partners. Highlighting how Kenyan civil society expresses itself through digital, Nyabola insists on the need to develop knowledge to understand African agency and power created by Africans in their daily lives. She denounces an imagination crisis in African contemporary politics analysis. She quotes Guinean statesman Sékou Touré who called artists and intellectuals to join the “great battle for Africa”. Nyabola defines that “great battle” as “popular energy” or “the Zeitgeist —the energy that defines a society at a particular moment ”. Studying agency means looking into those new African political spaces formed by Africans for themselves and the reasons behind their creation. Kenya can thus give lessons to the world. President Ruto aims to position Kenya as the “Singapore of Africa, wealthier and with better infrastructure than its neighbours, digitally savvy and English-speaking” (Cowen, 2023). The Indonesian crowdsourcing platform that netizens used to protect the vote in the 2014 presidential election was inspired by a Kenyan digital platform (Tapsell, 2017).27 Beyond the clichés narratives of “Africa rising ” or “Africa failing ”, the stories of “Africa being ” can be discovered (Nyabola, 2018). All this applies to Indonesia, often said to be the biggest hidden thing on the planet. “Indonesia being ” has not been well described too, not to

27 Ushahidi, meaning witness in Swahili, a digital crowdsourcing channel for citizens to protect and monitor the vote in 2013. Ushahidi was created as early as 2008. In 2014, three Indonesian netizens created their own platform, Kawal Pemilu (Guard the Election), to cover the Indonesian presidential election, mobilising thousands of volunteers to report voting booth results, thus protecting the vote.

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evoke the encounter of “Africa being ” with “Indonesia being ”. “AfroIndonesian being ”, inside an “Afro-Asian being ”, proposes a whole new world in the making. External powers like Indonesia should plunge into those African stories, determining their engagement’s quality and success. An external power like France has not appropriately considered African agency, creating a gap between African publics and France as an external power.28 After the Cold War, foreign policy expertise of countries like France was partly lost, as seen with the so-called Arab Spring or the Russia–Ukraine war. The impact on France’s African policy and position, especially in francophone Africa, is appearing now. Lack of respect for local African knowledge and agency complicates collaborations with misperceptions between external actors and local societies, as observed in security sector assistance, where populations can become suspicious towards external powers’ intentions through their security assistance (Tull, 2019). France’s military forces were expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso for failure to deliver security, misunderstanding the wishes of local populations and societal dynamics. Cognitive misperceptions can create disasters.29 Bayart criticised the anti-intellectualism and militarisation driving France’s African policy, hiding the social-political origins of conflicts and seeing savagery in Africans instead of injustice (Bayart, 2011). Historically, Indonesia has suffered and denounced injustice hitting Afro-Asia and has also historically been the victim of clichés with terrible consequences. Seizing the African Zeitgeist is strategic. In many ways, Indonesia is well placed to do so, especially through its civil society. Indonesia could be imagined as a large and powerful African country, with the same young and dynamic population, and similar problems, interrogations, risks, threats and ambitions. Indonesia’s late African engagement, now prioritising economic diplomacy, has mimicked the Chinese model and is even promoting its success through hilirisasi and infrastructural diplomacy, without the same Chinese material and knowledge power, blended with idiosyncrasies and other influences and discursively wanting to be different from China, or at least this is Kemlu’s wish, since the Jokowi–Luhut pair is another story as seen. Better listening to Africans 28 As seen presently in the Sahel (Guichaoua, 2020). 29 The case of the Rwanda genocide clearly shows France badly read the situation as

exposed in the recent Rapport Duclert on the French handling of the Rwanda events (Duclert, 2021).

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and supporting serious and creative research on Africa would help sophisticate and dynamise the approach. Alao describes the rise of African epistemic communities that share common beliefs of an African destiny against negative visions of Africa that propagate an image of African permanent disorder and failure (Alao, 2020). This book shares that view. Indonesia suffers from the same plague. Engaging with Africa for the long term can only mean engaging intellectually with Africans and those epistemic communities. Given Indonesia’s powerful civil society, these links should be encouraged without overbearing political and bureaucratic instrumentalisation, which will only provide disappointing results. Africans engage with Asia to find alternative partners to the West. Ethiopia shares a long-term higher education collaboration with Asia.30 Ethiopia’s previous ambassador to Indonesia was Addis Ababa University’s former President.31 Appointing a high-level Ethiopian academic figure was obviously made to smoothen Ethiopia’s partner diversification in Asia. However, Indonesia does not necessarily read this type of move adequately, seise the related opportunities and thus risks disappointing its African partners by a lack of knowledge of African contexts and agency. Some African diplomats in Indonesia frequently do presentations to the public and private sectors in Indonesia to present investment and partnership potentials with their countries. But, their Indonesian interlocutors in the end mostly ask them to find buyers for their products to be exported instead of seriously considering the opportunities presented.32 A clear risk of creating frustration among African partners exists with a discrepancy between expectations towards Indonesia as a large and visibly ambitious Asian power and its capacity to deliver. Indonesia’s lack of funding for African projects will not help. As explained in this book, Jokowi and Luhut have a positive impact in that sense. They can deliver concrete 30 From the Japanisers in the 1920s and 1930s who saw Japan as a model of development for Africa to the contemporary support countries like South Korea or India have provided to Ethiopian universities (Thubauville et al., 2017). 31 Professor Dr. Admasu Tsegaye Agidew was in post in Jakarta until October 2021. Before chairing Addis Ababa University, he was the President of Hawassa University. The author met with the Ambassador several times in Jakarta. The Ethiopian embassy in Jakarta closed during the Covid-19 crisis, like several Ethiopian embassies around the world. It was reopening in Jakarta in mid-2023. 32 The author has also experienced this with Indonesian companies willing to export overseas but not to invest. He frequently discussed informally with African diplomats over coffee, apart from formal interviews.

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results, although certainly limited. Their weakness is still their lack of a solid knowledge capacity and refined strategy to apprehend the continent better. The approach still seems overly opportunistic, and its continuity is uncertain. Allan argues that reimagining international politics anew requires new cosmological and scientific imagination, by thinking together rather than separately to seise the meaning of the international (Allan, 2018). Resembling Plato dialectics, for Rosenberg, the concept of multiplicity defines the international as the coexistence or multiplicity of different societies whose interactions and dialectical exchanges form a new social reality. The world and any society’s development are not unilinear but interactive and diverse. This societal multiplicity has at least as much importance as states to define and explain the social world (Rosenberg, 2016). Multiscalar, societal multiplicity means existence comes preponderantly through relationships (Powel, 2020). Indonesians and Africans construct their worlds through interactions and knowledge sharing, still insufficient in the contemporary era. Multiplicity proponents present the concept as a new common ground for international theory (Kurki & Rosenberg, 2020). The notion calls to explore the co-creation of the international by multiple societies like Indonesian and African societies on all levels. Philosophy and other disciplines have long studied and theorised this type of co-creation. Interrogating the meaning of the Afro-Indonesian multiplicity in Indonesia– Africa interactions need to be pursued systematically to comprehend better and expand the relationship. Beyond dichotomies between the national and the international, Hageman states that “multiple logics are at play simultaneously, producing new forms ”, seen in the hybrid forms created by external powers’ African interventions as a combination of the defense of sovereignty and interventionist action (Hagemann, 2020). Interactive and multilinear combined development brings historical change in societies that grow together (Matin, 2020).33

33 Rosenberg, who introduced the theory or concept of multiplicity to define the goal of IR, has reinterpreted Trotsky’s Uneven and Combined Development theory (U&CD theory), describing modern world development as not unilinear but multiple and interactive (Rosenberg, 2016). This study evokes the concept to underline the importance of knowledge and sharing between Indonesians and Africans, and other actors, whatever their origins or status, in forming new Afro-Indonesian and Afro-Asian relationships and partnerships.

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Indonesia’s African awakening was born from outside interactions with all sorts of actors. Afro-Indonesian interactions will form new realities and narratives, as they already did historically. Those interplays can bring vulnerabilities due to exposure to others in relations (Kurki, 2020). External powers face risks in their exposure and interactions with African societies. Africans also often face asymmetric relationships that risk bounding their agency.34 Indonesia’s positioning and storytelling should take this multiplicity into account to be relevant in Africa and through its relations with African societies. Indonesia and Africa co-exist and co-create the international, mutually influencing themselves in their development. Academic contributions attempt to take a glimpse at those new worlds.

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CHAPTER 5

Redefinition and Principal Instigators of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa

This chapter examines Indonesia’s new approach to Africa under President Jokowi and the principal actors making the shift. Hyperboles should be avoided. The archipelago does not display an integrated and sophisticated Africa policy determined through an Africa Policy White Paper like China, although no external power seems to have a fully operative and comprehensive grand African strategy without significant challenges.1 Under Jokowi, Indonesia has primarily engaged the African continent through an economic diplomacy paradigm, according to its official economic classification of Africa as a “non-traditional market” (Bappenas, 2014, 2019). This topology underlines Africa’s long-time marginal role in the Indonesian worldview. Given Afro-Asian relationships’ ancientness, the label seems quite ironic and counterproductive, marginalising Africa in the mindset of Indonesian decision-makers and the public; and making it more challenging to prioritise. Nevertheless, Jokowi, his closest ally and critical actor in Indonesia’s African expansion and strategic foreign policy overall, General Luhut, and foreign minister Retno emphasised Africa’s upgrade to a foreign policy priority

1 As seen with China, the US, and the UK, for example Copson (2007), Duggan (2020), Porteous (2008).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_5

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(Lumanauw & WBP, 2017). The exact meaning of that African prioritisation should be interrogated; its significance in engagement intensity and prioritisation level among other priorities; the long-term continuation of this new prioritisation given leadership shifts; the exact means, notably financial but also educational, allocated; and the achieved and expected results. External powers can see their African engagement ebb and flow with leadership changes.2 A gap between a discourse on African primacy for an external power and its actual weight among its foreign policy priorities can often be perceived.3 The new dynamic started under Jokowi appears significant, given the opened potentialities for Indonesia’s future as a great power in the making. Nevertheless, Africa remains marginal in Indonesia’s trade, investment and diplomatic architecture.4 Indonesia has not developed any exceptional view or strategy towards Africa yet. Although growing, Indonesia’s engagement capacity in Africa remains limited compared to East Asian powers, fellow emerging powers like Brazil and Türkiye, or Western countries like France, Israel, Germany, the UK or the US. Given Kemlu’s modest budget, funds allocated for Jakarta’s new African expansion appear relatively minimal.5 The IAF is a relatively modest business event, not a Summit or ministerial forum attracting African heads of

2 As in Australia with the shift from Labour, notably under Kevin Rudd, to Conservatives or in Brazil with the rise, fall and rise again of President Lula (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021; Christina Stolte, 2015; Pijovi´c, 2019; Taylor, 2020). 3 For China, for example Large (2021). 4 See the trade figures in this book. 5 In 2023, Kemlu’s budget is under USD 600 million (Fauzi, 2022). The Directorate for the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Indonesian Legal Entities has been growing in size and prioritisation. The Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation has a substantial budget, for example. The Directorate for African Affairs does not benefit from a substantial budget. It has not been prioritised. Author Interview with Professor Hikmahanto Juwana, Universitas Indonesia, 18.05.2023. Clearly insufficient, the budget of the Directorate for African Affairs was normally as follows: IDR I.718 billion (USD 114,000) in 2020; IDR 1.822 billion (USD 121,000) in 2021; IDR 21.200 billion (USD 1,409,000) in 2022; IDR 3.5 billion (USD 233,000) in 2023; IDR 4.5 billion (USD 299,000) in 2024 (IDR 15,000 for $1). Since the organisation of Africa+1 forums had been scheduled for 2022, the budget was supposed to be raised to IDR 21.200 billion (USD 1,409,000) for 2022 (Kemlu, 2020a). Yet, given the Covid-19 crisis, the events were cancelled, and the budget did not rise so much. The next IAF could be organised in 2024, but nothing is certain yet given the upcoming Presidential election in February 2024.

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state. However, Indonesia’s remobilisation and weaponising of the AfroAsian discourse, mostly for domestic interests’ protection but also for developmental expansion, should be observed carefully. Indonesia has proudly participated in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa for over sixty years. Still, it lacks the defense and security engagement capacity or African expertise to influence directly or interfere in African conflicts like France, the US, Russia or China.6 Its civilian “peace capacity” has also not been well leveraged yet by the state, lacking integration with state diplomacy and uniformed peacekeepers. Opportunities have been missed to gain diplomatic and economic ground in post-conflict nations. Indonesia’s African investments are still limited. Its diplomatic presence consists of 17 embassies only,7 6 in North Africa and 11 only in Sub-Saharan Africa.8 A redeployment of Indonesia’s diplomatic network 6 Confronted with African realities, China adapted its foreign policy paradigm, forgetting about strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of African nations given the strategic weight of its African assets and the sizeable amount of its citizens on the continent needing protection (Alden & Jiang, 2019; Alden et al., 2018; Hodzi, 2019). All external actors need to better understand local conditions to implement effective peacebuilding. Unsuitable approaches and discourses prevent successful interventions (Autesserre, 2009). For Acharya, non-intervention appears as the foundational norm of Bandung; and not for domestic regime security but to prevent great power meddling (Acharya, 2014). 7 Cameroon was recently chosen to host an Indonesian embassy. Both Cameroon and Ghana were envisaged as new embassies. Yaoundé was chosen, notably given the number of foreign representations there. The Asia-Pacific-Africa DG and the Director for African Affairs went on a trip to Yaoundé on 10–14 June 2023 on Turkish Airlines to notably meet the Cameroonian Minister of Foreign Affairs and finalise an embassy location. An Indonesian embassy in Ghana existed between 1962 and 1967 before closing. The fall of Sukarno and Nkrumah was lethal. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, Kemlu, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 8 Since Wirajuda’s Kemlu reorganisation in the early 2000s, the Kemlu nomenclature places Sub-Saharan Africa with the Directorate for African Affairs, and North Africa with the Directorate for Middle East and North Africa. Sudan and, oddly, South Sudan are placed with the Directorate for Middle East and North Africa. Yet, the IAF is Pan-African in its participation. The Directorate for African Affairs covers 46 Sub-Saharan African nations with 46 diplomatic relationships since diplomatic relations with South Sudan were opened in 2022. Indonesia had recognised South Sudan’s independence in 2011. North African countries are placed under the Middle East and North Africa Directorate with the reason that they speak Arabic. But the Ministry of Trade only considers Egypt as part of the Middle East (Kemlu, 2020b). A harmonisation of nomenclatures and contemplating Africa as a whole seem necessary to ensure coherence and clear authority.

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favouring Africa is called for (CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020). Indonesia lacks strategic presence in key nations, late in its diplomatic deployment compared to China or Türkiye in Africa. For Indonesia, opening new embassies means a complicated bureaucratic process. Kemlu prioritises reinforcing its existing diplomatic architecture with staff reallocations from other less dynamic world regions.9 Southeast Asia is late in developing its African relations, limited to certain African countries. Yet, overall awareness of Africa is growing essentially for Southeast Asian economic diversification needs and for geopolitical reasons given the USChina systemic rivalry, which questions, as always, the benefit for African countries themselves (Rubiolo, 2016a, 2016b). Only the major ASEAN countries have relatively significant links with African countries. Singapore, in particular, is increasingly dynamic. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called for Singaporean firms to increase their business in Africa while being highly selective to find the right partners and focus on the right countries (Liang, 2023) (Table 5.1). With the rise of commodity prices and promotion efforts, trade with the continent has grown in 2021. The majority of Indonesia’s trade with Africa is still with South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. The 17 countries with an Indonesian embassy represent 73% of its African trade. Indonesia’s trade is progressively diffusing to more countries. Nine countries without an Indonesian embassy locked over 1% each of Indonesia’s African trade.10 Over ten thousand Chinese companies are present in Africa compared to around thirty Indonesian firms (Idris, 2018; I. Sun et al., 2017),11 limiting Indonesia’s continental capacity. Indonesian interactions mostly happen with limited parts of Africa, mainly the greater African powers, with notable exceptions in trade. Indonesia lacks a comprehensive African

9 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). Kemlu has also multiplied the number of honorary consuls in Africa to increase coverage. 10 Angola is covered through Namibia; Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea through Senegal; Gabon, Togo, Benin, Ghana and the Republic of Congo through Nigeria; and Djibouti through Ethiopia. 11 This number of thirty was stated by the then Vice President of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, during his opening speech at the IAF in 2018, invested notably in textile, pharmaceuticals and energy.

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Table 5.1 Trade volume and percentage of Indonesia–Africa trade of Indonesia’s 17 embassies in Africa in 2021* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Embassy South Africa Nigeria Egypt Kenya Algeria Tanzania Morocco Senegal Tunisia Sudan Mozambique Madagascar Zimbabwe Ethiopia Cameroon Libya Namibia Total

Trade volume $2,801,259,601 $2,511,687,637 $1,865,580,185 $551,941,202 $543,614,117 $421,503,612 $195,456,800 $159,894,926 $158,470,173 $136,841,458 $122,734,029 $100,689,833 $84,869,343 $67,998,232 $65,322,374 $27,970,602 $2,829,584 $9,818,663,708

Trade %age 20.89% 18.73% 13.91% 4.12% 4.05% 3.14% 1.46% 1.19% 1.18% 1.02% 0.92% 0.75% 0.63% 0.51% 0.49% 0.21% 0.02% 73.22%

No Embassy Angola Côte d'Ivoire Gabon Djibouti Togo Benin Ghana Equatorial Guinea Congo Total

Trade volume $633,838,109 $360,788,864 $320,688,014 $311,339,739 $265,644,418 $261,600,365 $257,340,059 $164,577,230 $157,507,575 $2,733,324,373

Trade %age 4.73% 2.69% 2.39% 2.32% 1.98% 1.95% 1.92% 1.23% 1.17% 20.38%

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database *17 embassies as of 2021 with the Indonesian embassy in Cameroon that we consider open. For countries without Indonesian embassies, countries representing over 1% of Indonesia’s African trade are mentioned

understanding and visibility. The multiple “Africas” require both a panAfrican meta-strategy and local strategies tailored to Africa’s diversity. Knowledge concerning Africa in Indonesia stands at a surprisingly low level.12 A few researchers studying Africa exist in the National Research Agency or in the African studies centre created at Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR) in Surabaya.13 Still, they usually have other specialisations and 12 As this research has confirmed with its difficulty to find any kind of complete and elaborate, even partial, in-depth or holistic study on Indonesia–Africa relations or experts on Africa in Indonesia (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). 13 The National Research Agency is called BRIN (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional) in Indonesian. BRIN has a few researchers dealing, mostly not full-time, with Africa in its Area Studies Centre. Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR) in Surabaya has created inside its Faculty of Social and Political Science (FISIP) an Africa Studies Centre (Pusat Kajian Afrika). Both seem essentially focused on economic diplomacy issues, especially trade. When created, the director of Kemlu’s BPPK, Siswo Pramono, now Ambassador in Australia, and the Asia-Pacific-Africa director general Desra Percaya, now Ambassador in the UK, were both UNAIR alumni. The current Asia–Pacific-Africa director general is

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are just starting to focus on Africa, primarily through economic topics in the economic diplomacy framework, following the governmental orientation.14 Developing Africa-related knowledge necessitates more extensive funding and a broader emphasis than economic issues, to comprehend more seriously Africa’s complexity. This lack of African knowledge and research is acknowledged.15 China invests billions of dollars in educational exchanges, think tanks and universities to increase its knowledge and ideational relationships with Africa (Benabdallah, 2020).16 Developing a sophisticated Africa policy is a long-term trial-and-error process, entailing effort and money. Even countries with long histories with Africa encounter difficulties in formulating the right African policy, facing African agency and international competition.17 Indonesia will need time to find its way in its African relationship through breakthroughs, mistakes and adjustments. After learning and experiencing more, a comprehensive African policy should be formulated. Being both optimistic in observing Indonesia’s rise and realistic concerning current Indonesian capacities in Africa, Indonesia’s new African focus represents a fundamental shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It creates new potentialities for Indonesia’s global expansion and development, absent before Jokowi’s presidency, sidelining unfeasible AfroAsian multilateralism through the NAASP and weaponising Afro-Asian discourse for domestic and foreign purposes. This abandonment may be temporary if Indonesia, depending on the capabilities rise, can instrumentalise those frameworks in the future, notably through ASEAN Centrality. The new African approach helps Indonesia join other major Asian powers in their more pragmatic, some say mercantile, although discursively described as mutually beneficial, engagement with Africa, notably through also a UNAIR alumnus. One of the main researchers in LIPI on Sub-Saharan economic issues is also from UNAIR. Funding is not easy to obtain to support research on Africa. 14 This research will later show this absence of knowledge of Africa was similar in Türkiye at the end of the twentieth century before the government started getting interested in Africa, revealing the weight of the state in academic issues and orientation. 15 By the Indonesian Embassy in South Africa, for example Haron and Arby (2019). 16 Power lies in the guanxi. Guanxi (关系) are “connections”, “relationships” or

“networks” in Chinese culture. 17 Like the UK, for example, not to mention France. The 2020 report of the UK House of Lords criticised the current approach to the continent, where African countries have seen their agency strongly increase, and thus their capacity to choose desired external partners according to the benefits offered to them (House of Lords, 2020).

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the multi-bilateral IAF. The term “neocolonialism” to describe China or other emerging countries’ presence in Africa, like Indonesia, seems inappropriate for historical reasons at least. The reality is often more nuanced than the first media or academic descriptions.18 Engagement with Africa follows a particular scenario, engagement guidelines respected by all external powers, adapted according to their intrinsic capacities. Kemlu also describes the Indonesian engagement as egalitarian and nonhierarchical with its African partners, saying it does not participate in any kind of “new scramble for Africa”.19 Indonesia’s more opportunistic and integrated style towards Africa, willing to coordinate Indonesia Inc. (Suropati et al., 2018), at least the state and its SOEs through expansive state capitalism, marks a significant critical juncture in Indonesian foreign policy.20 Indonesia created the IAF framework, including the IAMD and the IAID.21 An ad hoc special task force for infrastructure projects in Africa was formed, uniting Indonesian SOEs, especially in construction and infrastructure. With a “proven business in Africa”,22 the construction SOE WIKA spearheads the effort; securing such projects as the renovation of the Presidential Palace in Niger, the construction of the iconic and symbolic La Tour de Gorée in Dakar, Senegal, the development of a bulk liquid port terminal in Zanzibar-Tanzania or social housing in Ivory Coast and Algeria (Lingga, 2019; Ma, 2019; Qolbi, 2019). Yet, funding and political obstacles impede optimal results, blocking project implementation. Luhut’s narrative shift from building African infrastructure to hilirisasi diplomacy must be observed in that context.

18 As shown over the years, notably by Brautigam concerning China in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). 19 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 20 The existence of a coordinated China Inc. expanding in Africa has been denied (Carmody & Taylor, 2010). The tangibility of Indonesia Inc. can also be doubted, especially between the private and state sector. In peacekeeping, for example, Indonesian expert civilians criticise their lack of integration in post-conflict diplomacy and projection to propose Indonesian civilian expertise in UN missions and the welcoming state. 21 The blue economy was not a topic at the IAF. 22 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda

(17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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The special task force is headed directly by General Luhut, appointed by Jokowi (Ariyanti, 2018; Kemlu, 2019a). Kemlu insists the task force is staffed chiefly with Kemlu diplomats.23 Luhut’s team is well represented, including diplomat Jodi Mahardi, Luhut’s main deputy, assuring communication smoothness with Kemlu.24 Given LBP’s prominence under Jokowi, his appointment to head the Taskforce reveals the effort’s seriousness.25 LBP only focuses on the most strategic issues, lifting their strategic value through his involvement. Strategic for Indonesia, Luhut is enthusiastic about Africa. Mimicking China’s state-driven African approach; LBP being close to China as Jokowi’s special envoy to China and supervising the BRI investments in Indonesia (MFA China, 2020; Rakhmat, 2020); Indonesia Eximbank’s financial capacity to accompany the African expansion of SOEs was raised in a plan called “Road to Africa” (Eximbank & Kemlu, 2018; LPEI, 2019).26 SOEs are considered agents of development,27 especially under Jokowi. Their expansion to Africa denotes Indonesia’s will to contribute to change in Africa. This strategy appears as a sort of “Go out, go global” strategy similar to China’s (Shambaugh, 2013). Africa played a leading role in the internationalisation of Chinese SOEs, offering large construction and infrastructure contracts backed by China Eximbank, among other Chinese financial institutions (Golley & Song, 2011; Pehnelt & Abel, 2007). Indonesia’s financing capacity rise remains modest compared to the Chinese financing ecosystem. Starting 23 Author’s Interview with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 24 Luhut is known for surrounding himself with young, innovative Indonesians who can submit new ideas freely (Massardi, 2022). 25 Chair means authority. Luhut’s ministry covers maritime and energy, but not the SOEs like WIKA or Pupuk. Therefore, it is good to have a comprehensive Task Force, according to Wirajuda, who has good relations with Luhut. Luhut was interested in helping Pertamina to increase its operations in Algeria for oil supply. Luhut’s visit to Algeria was planned in March 2018 with a delegation and Wirajuda. He postponed due to Wirajuda’s visit to East and South Africa. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 26 Depending on the Ministry of Finance, Indonesia Eximbank is officially called Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Indonesia (LPEI). The Covid pandemic reduced LPEI’s capacities, condemning certain financing plans in Africa like La Tour de Gorée project in Senegal. 27 “agen pembangunan”.

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the process is critical, potentially announcing a promising future. Operationalising such a multidimensional, multi-sectoral effort is complicated in Indonesia. Luhut’s presence increases feasibility, given his political weight. The Covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine effects negatively affecting financing plans concerning certain construction projects in Africa, and funds were reallocated domestically. Supporting economic diplomacy combining business with aid, Indonesia’s development assistance cooperation agency, Indonesia AID,28 was created in 2019 to finance development projects, notably through SSC and SSTC schemes.29 This new institution should raise Indonesia’s status as a donor country, not simply a receiver (Kemlu, 2019b; Pinandita, 2019),30 showcasing Indonesian expertise in social housing, agriculture, health, education, governance or fisheries for example. After the South Pacific region, prioritised owing to Papua separatism (Bakhtiar & Permana, 2020; Wardhani & Dugis, 2020), Africa becomes Indonesia’s main target for development cooperation. Developmental engagement with Africa constitutes a marker of Indonesia’s increased international confidence and status, along with its peacekeeping contributions and its Africa forum. Given the global structural changes and Indonesia’s industrial and environmental affirmation, it is becoming an imperative. Indonesian AID produced a Regional Partnership Strategy on Africa as

28 The Indonesian Agency for International Development (AID), or, simply put,

Indonesia AID, is technically administered by the Ministry of Finance. Its CEO is structurally attached to the Director General of Budget, Finance and Risk Management of the Ministry. The Steering Committee of Indonesia AID comprises the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of State Secretariat and the Minister of Development Planning (Bappenas). Its official name is Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional Kementerian Keuangan (LDKPI Kemenkeu) or Ministry of Finance’s International Development Cooperation Fund Institution. Source Indonesia AID website: ldkpi.kemenkeu.go.id. The Ministry of Finance allocated around USD 500 million (IDR 8 trillion) for this “soft diplomacy” tool prioritising grants. The state budget will allocate yearly funds to increase Indonesia AID’s endowment (Siswanto, 2023). 29 SSC and SSTC are supposedly less hierarchical schemes compared to North–South aid (Mawdsley, 2012). The North–South division or South–South solidarity are used here for heuristic reasons, but in reality, these notions can be contested. With tremendous inequalities existing around the world, Jappe sees a “global apartheid” drastically separating the rich everywhere in the world from the rest of the population (Jappe, 2017). 30 Following the Constitutional mandate of contributing to world peace and order.

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part of Indonesia’s international development policy.31 Health diplomacy and cooperation are notably prioritised to act as a catalyser for Indonesian health SOEs’ and private pharma companies’ push for increased African market access (Kemlu, 2021).32 The influential Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, indicated Indonesia AID aimed at not only supporting charity and image building but concretely boosting economic relations (Siswanto, 2023). In the post-Covid-19 world, Indonesia increases its vaccine diplomacy in Africa by promoting the state-owned vaccine producer Bio Farma.33 In May 2023, Indonesia started sending 1.5 million child vaccine doses to Nigeria, which would be followed by Kenya and Zimbabwe.34 Bio Farma signed an MoU with Genrics Africa, Kenya, for cooperation in technology transfer, manufacturing contracts, registration, supply, and marketing for Bio Farma-produced vaccines (Sudrajat & Octavia, 2023). Bio Farma also proposed vaccine technology transfer to Ghana; sharing its immunisation strategies. Bio Farma can produce up to 3.2 billion doses of vaccines per year; 70% exported to 135 countries. Ghana enacted the National Vaccine Institute Bill in 2023 and founded the National Vaccine Institution on May 10, 2023. Vaccinating 33 million Ghanaians is a challenge due to parents hesitating to immunise their children. Indonesia’s capacity to vaccinate hundreds of millions in an archipelagic context presents an interesting model for Ghana (Andi Firdaus, 2023). Indonesia AID marks a fresh beginning for Indonesia in development assistance, aiming to increase its contribution and brand itself better. SSTC between 2000 and 2015 was modest, reaching $57.4 31 This was announced by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi during her 2021 annual press conference. 32 Africa imports 80% of its needs in medical and pharmaceutical products (Tan, 2021). 33 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General

of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta). 34 The donation of 1.5 million doses was worth IDR 30.3 billion, around USD 2 million. At the sending ceremony at the Jakarta airport, Minister Retno indicated Indonesia’s exports to Nigeria were the third largest in Africa after South Africa and Kenya and that 15 Indonesian companies operated in Nigeria, clearly underlining that development aid should also serve economic objectives. She also said the Pentavalent vaccine produced by Biofarma Indonesia to Nigeria was a reflection of the Bandung spirit and Global South solidarity, which seems to be a slight evolution from her previous “Beyond the Bandung spirit” rhetoric. The vaccine donation aimed at the vaccination of more than 500 thousand babies in Nigeria. Zimbabwe would also receive the Pentavalent vaccine, and Kenya a diphtheria-tetanus vaccine (Rizky, 2023).

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million in total for 783 programmes,35 mainly in Africa, notably in Tanzania, Namibia, the DRC, Algeria, and Sudan.36 US AID and JICA were regular triangular partners for financing.37 Indonesia negotiates PTAs with African countries and RECs to facilitate market access for its products, such as palm oil, agrifood or spare parts. Existing tariffs slow trade development with Africa.38 The first PTA with Mozambique was signed in 2019 (Directorate General—International Trade Negotiations, 2022; Kencana, 2020; Novika, 2020).39 Others are in negotiation with Tunisia, Angola, Kenya or Mauritius.40 ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC are significant in Indonesia’s overall

35 Annual Reports of Indonesia’s South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) 2014 and 2016: https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf and https://openji careport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf. 36 “Under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement following the 1992 NAM Summit

hosted by Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia stepped up its technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) by establishing a number of training programmes in Asia and Africa, mostly in agriculture, fisheries , and family planning . This was mainly implemented by Indonesian South-South Technical Cooperation (ISSTC) under the State Secretariat. In 1995, Indonesia established a NAM Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation (NAM CSSTC), with poverty alleviation, development of small and medium enterprises, health, agriculture, environment , and information and communication technology as its main thematic areas ”. As reported by the National Coordination Team (NCT) of South-South and Triangular Cooperation of the Government of Indonesia (UNDP, n.d.). 37 Some of the training workshop topics: textile, agriculture, farming, sustainable marine fisheries, conference organising and protocol, media and multimedia, health, family planning, science, knowledge sharing, skin tanning, governance, disaster management, elections and anti-corruption. Annual Reports of Indonesia’s South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) 2014 and 2016: https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf and https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf. 38 Entering the South African market for Indonesian F&B products has been seen as a challenge until now, with relatively high tariffs of around 0–30% (CNN, 2018; Pramudyani, n.d.). 39 The PTA was approved by the Indonesian Parliament in December 2020, ratified through a Presidential Decree (Perpres) in 2021, and came into force in June 2022. Yet, Kemlu sources indicate a Joint Committee needs to be formed to showcase its benefits and for it to produce its effects. Its implementation is not yet satisfactory. Jokowi is planning to visit Mozambique in August 2023 during his Africa tour. Author’s Meeting with Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 31.05.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 40 The Mauritius PTA negotiations covering over 400 lines of tariffs seemed the most advanced at the time of writing.

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African trade, requiring trade negotiations with those RECs.41 The pandemic and geopolitical context, and remaining bargaining points concerning the multiple tariff lines under negotiation, disturbed their swift conclusion (CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020). Moreover, Africa is prioritising the AfCFTA implementation above other trade deals to boost intraAfrican trade and industrialisation, avoiding trade diversion. Members states must inform the AU assembly before signing trade agreements with third parties (MacLeod et al., 2023). Peace and security cooperation and defense diplomacy with Africa, although in their early stages, are growing with discussions on military academy exchanges, joint-industrial development, maritime security, counterterrorism and other non-traditional security topics; and the supply of military equipment to nations like Ghana, the DRC, or Zimbabwe (Chairullah, 2022; Nugraheny, 2019). Peacekeeping showcases Indonesia’s expertise and equipment, a way “to advance its defence diplomacy goals ” (Capie, 2016). Yet, civilian capacity leveraging in Indonesian peacekeeping remains suboptimal. The Papua issue also relates to Africa. Papua separatist activism exists in Africa, notably based on “Black solidarity”, requiring broader and more effective intelligence and monitoring networks in Africa for the Indonesian state apparatus (Deplu & UNDIP, 1984; MC, 2019; Wilson, 2016). If Papua indigenous people are considered African diaspora, Indonesia is faced with a strategic dilemma (Alao, 2020; Kamei, 2010)42 ; or an opportunity if Indonesia betters the condition of Papuan citizens, making them Indonesian “ambassadors”, showcasing its inclusiveness. Since the 1960s, Papua activists placed their struggle in the spirit of Pan-Africanism (Kluge, 2019) and African decolonisation.43 The Papua situation brought African criticism in the UN, given an “ethnic affinity” (Leifer, 1983).

41 See tables in this book. PTA discussions were opened with Mauritius and Djibouti during the IAID. Since then, potential PTAs were considered with Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea and with African RECs like ECOWAS, EAC, SADC or ECCAS. PTA negotiations with countries like Tunisia or Morocco are ongoing. Priority countries change according to progress. Negotiations, conducted in several rounds, take time (CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020; Ginting, 2020). 42 The African Diaspora is officially classified as the Sixth official region of the AU and holds a strategic role in Africa’s development. 43 They called themselves “the negroids of the Pacific”, projecting a Pan-African identity existing outside Africa (Webster, 2022).

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Kemlu sees Papua separatism propaganda in Africa as a concern but is visibly not too worried. The AU upholds the uti possidetis juris principle, the basis of Indonesia’s sovereign claim on Papua. Kemlu does not consider the African personalities recently appointed by the Papua separatist movement in Africa as influential people capable of hurting Indonesia’s territorial integrity (CDT with Amb. Faizasyah, 2021; Vanguard, 2021a, 2021b). Papua is not an international problem like East Timor.44 Still, the Papua separatist movement remains alive. Africa could become its strategic playing field by weaponising Afro-solidarity and targeting African civil societies.45 There undeniably exists a structured effort, still limited but real, led at the highest level of government with Jokowi’s full support, to create an integrated approach towards Africa, through SOEs, Indonesia AID, hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy, and other governmental policies. Indonesian MNCs act autonomously, benefiting from their sophisticated transnational networks, already investing in Africa before the state’s African enthusiasm (Saiman, 2019; Saragih, 2015), and mainly lobbying the government to negotiate PTAs facilitating market access (Mudassir, 2018). Researchers have considered the role of transnational capital and emerging power oligarchic elites in developing the engagement of rising external powers in Africa as a significant driver.46 Primarily focused on the

44 When he was foreign minister, Wirajuda encountered a setback with Africa on East Timor. The 3rd NAM Summit in Lusaka had already produced a communiqué with a paragraph on East Timor. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 45 As expressed by Weatherbee, the Papua issue remains “an irritant in Indonesia’s foreign relations ”, although Weatherbee considered separatist “attacks” coming from Western activists or liberal politicians and not Africa (Weatherbee, 2016). Minister Retno herself has been seen as successful in countering Papua separatism and activism as Ambassador to the Netherlands (Redaksi, 2014a). 46 Especially those of the Marxist, neo-Marxist or dependency theory category.

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state headed by the highest leaders,47 this book chooses a less deterministic view and a combination of middle-range explanative factors; avoiding being definitive.

A New Approach Allowed by a geopolitical worldview evolution coupled with international structure changes, Indonesia’s material rise, and a new, more realist and entrepreneurial leadership, among other drivers, the IAF’s birth as Indonesia’s Africa+1 forum embodying Indonesia’s new African foreign policy involved the highest Indonesian decision-makers; the President, Foreign Minister Retno and Kemlu diplomats, and the powerhouse General Luhut as the key political enabler during Jokowi’s presidency. Indonesian foreign policy remains in the hands of a restricted elite (McRae, 2019), especially with the African topic that has not widely penetrated Indonesia’s public and academic domains. Civil society, the media and academia are presently not highly engaged with Africa.48 Africa lacks visibility in Indonesia. State action and events, and the market penetration of Indonesian conglomerates, mainly trigger any interest in the media or academia. African football players in the Indonesian football league, African drug dealers, illegal immigrants or cybercriminals, or the high penetration of Indomie instant noodles, especially in Nigeria, represent recurrent topics in the national media. Still, it seems anecdotal. People to talk to on this subject are rare in today’s Indonesia. The situation has been changing recently with more significant interest from specific stakeholders, while remaining insufficient. 47 This research does not deny the multiple types and levels of foreign and international relations agencies. Yet, this research focuses mainly on the state. Indonesia’s contemporary African effort is still fledging and depends largely on the state to progressively mobilise Indonesian society more widely; similar to what happened in Türkiye. Private interests certainly influence state action in Africa, notably to pursue trade agreements. A diplomasi Indomie said to be taking place in Africa also appears to be one of the primary motivations for Jokowi’s visit to Ukraine and Russia in July 2022 as President of the G-20; nicknamed an “Indomie mission”. Before the war at least, Ukraine was Indonesia’s largest supplier of wheat to produce the famous instant noodles owned by the Salim Group. Indonesian MNCs and corporate interests possess tremendous power in Indonesia to leverage the state in their favour (Maulia, 2022). 48 This contrasts with Türkiye, for example, where the state leveraged CSOs and other actors to boost Türkiye’s African presence through a whole-of-government approach (Ozkan & Akgün, 2010).

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Indonesia solidly embraces novelty when it has determined its terms and tempo, pushed by the right actors. Transnational forces such as MNCs and capital holders constitute a primary driver of Indonesia’s African effort. Yet those forces were already active before Jokowi reoriented Indonesia’s African diplomacy through state capitalism. This book deliberately focuses on the top state decision-makers responsible for shifting Indonesia’s African foreign policy towards a more pragmatic engagement. The President determines the direction, tone and style of the foreign policy effort. Embodied by the IAF framework, initiated by Kemlu, and Luhut’s ad hoc task force, Indonesia’s new African foreign policy corresponds to the formalisation of Jokowi’s entrepreneurial mindset and will; coupled with his developmental and state capitalism ideology, bolstered by his Chinese links. The Chinese state successfully delivered infrastructure to its people. For Jokowi and Luhut, the model seems proper for Indonesians, especially given Chinese funding supporting massive infrastructure building and hilirisasi. During the 2015 AAS, then minister of Trade stated that Indonesians suffered from a “mental block” towards Africa, explaining low trade volumes. Business agents should learn from the few Indonesian companies successfully expanding to Africa, citing the private Indonesian groups Indofood, Wings Group, Kalbe Farma, Wilmar Nabati and Kedaung Indonesia.49 He observed that “Asia must realise that Africa is much closer than we think” (Sambijantoro, 2015). The geographical mental map was evolving. The non-physical distance was diminishing with the rise of parts of the Indonesian elite’s consciousness and interest, seeing Africa as a poorly exploited opportunity (Henrikson, 2002). Jokowi clearly indicated that economic cooperation with Africa was growing too slowly. He pushed for developing new business-friendly systems, rules and regulations during the Asia-Africa Business Summit , prefiguring Indonesia’s more pragmatic African approach (Setkab, 2015). His speech was a call for action, a signal for the foreign policy community and Indonesian business that Africa meant business opportunities. Given Jokowi’s economic goals, Africa fitted perfectly as a primary target, diversifying Indonesia’s

49 Rachmat Gobel was Minister of Trade from October 2014 to August 2015. His family are the local business partner of the Matsushita Group (Panasonic). Wilmar Nabati is a subsidiary of Singaporean processing and investment holding company Wilmar International Limited.

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economic playing field (Asmara, 2019). The NAASP’s plodding progress dissatisfied Jokowi. Similarly, Jokowi downgraded the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which was President SBY’s pet project created in 2008 (Pakpahan, 2018; Rosyidin, 2020). Discussing democracy in conference rooms appears vague for a development-obsessed leader. These multilateral institutions seem too abstract for his character, pursuing tangible results and quick wins from foreign policy. Indonesian diplomacy was given ambitious targets in economic diplomacy achievements. Ambassadors have to deliver, spending most of their time on economic diplomacy. As a potential trade and investment destination, African opportunities should be tapped. Other Asian powers’ African penetration shows the way for Indonesia. This apparently basic thinking impacts Indonesia’s foreign policy, converting a blindspot in Indonesia’s mental map into a priority, at least in economic engagement initially, and reducing the existing misperceptions towards Africa (Jervis, 1976). For years, the multilateralist NAASP hindered Indonesia’s engagement with Africa. Indonesia restrained itself. The African abstraction lived only in a nostalgic version of the Afro-Asian discourse, and as a complicated place full of problems, lacking attractivity. The Bandung host felt it had a symbolic role to maintain. Jokowi respects the past while refusing to be stuck in it if it hinders his economic agenda grounded in state capitalism, the foundation of his political legitimacy. Africa was quickly reframed and rethought as an Indonesian business destination. The KAA had called for stronger AfroAsian economic ties. The Sukarnoist past indicated the Marhaen leader the path to follow.50 Implementation would be assured by a retired New Order general.

50 Although Jokowi belongs to the nationalist PDI-P, overall, he appeared more as a pro-business, pro-foreign investment leader during his presidencies despite certain nationalist policies like hilirisasi.

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A Dynamic Accompanied by Kemlu Deemed successful by Kemlu, the IAF, as the flagship of Indonesia’s new multi-bilateral African approach, aims to accelerate and streamline Indonesia’s African access, and improve Africa’s image among Indonesia’s elites and business community.51 Kemlu sources claim the idea of Indonesia’s Africa+1 forum existed before its actual 2018 launching, since the Yudhoyono years, as a recurring discussion inside Kemlu, but could not be implemented. The undertaking would necessitate a formidable bureaucratic capacity to overcome impediments. Increased confidence under Jokowi’s leadership and Indonesia’s rising material power facilitated the IAF’s formation. The momentum had arrived for “Indonesia in Africa”. Mandated by Jokowi, knowing his idiosyncrasy, Minister Retno and Kemlu could envisage this new scheme, after the NAASP relative disappointment and deadlock, as a new concrete framework reflecting the president’s entrepreneurial mindset and will, ill-at-ease with grandiloquent multilateralism lacking pragmatism and tangible deliverables.52 Luhut’s power and remarkable implementation capacity became the game changer. Given state arcana’s complexity and secrecy, tracing the exact origin of ideas relating to state initiatives cannot always be ideally conducted. Kemlu was deeply involved in conceptualising the new African engagement style and intensity, operationalising a framework suitable for Jokowi’s vision of international initiatives. Kemlu is criticised for its lack of innovation.53 Kemlu can generate ideas. The problem is political

51 The IAF was announced during the 2017 G20 Leaders’ Retreat Summit in Hamburg during a working session on “Africa, Migrations and Health” of the “Compact with Africa”, part of the G20 Africa Partnership, launched by Germany during its G20 Presidency to support private sector-driven development in Africa by promoting private investment, notably in infrastructure. This fits with Luhut’s Task Force, yet more focused on SOEs (Suhada, 2017). 52 The NAASP deadlock seems to confirm Kahler’s statements that major powers do not want to be dominated or constrained by multilateral frameworks and that the presence of too many countries blocks effective cooperation (Kahler, 1993). 53 For Weatherbee, Kemlu does not produce decisive ideas. The institution lacks influence under Jokowi compared to previous administrations due to the weight of Jokowi’s non-Kemlu entourage and the primacy Jokowi gives to domestic goals. He considers Kemlu does not produce policy but focuses on representation and technicalities (Weatherbee, 2016). As Talleyrand used to say: “All that is excessive is insignificant”.

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and bureaucratic capacity to deliver such ideas in the dynamic Indonesian political context. Senior politicians from the military or who chair political parties will be more potent than Kemlu bureaucrats. Kemlu’s initiatives need support from those kingmakers close to the President. Under all post-Suharto presidents, the foreign policy-making process remains elitist while lacking funding. Reforms mostly happened under Wirajuda, remaining insufficient and sometimes inappropriate, like the North Africa–Sub-Saharan Africa dichotomy inside Kemlu (Laksmana, 2016; Nabbs-Keller, 2013). The political game between the leading players of the Jokowi era like former President Megawati, who chairs Indonesia’s leading political party PDI-P, Nasdem (Nasional Demokrat ) party Chairman and owner of a large media conglomerate Surya Paloh, and LBP as the President’s main ally, determines major foreign policy decisions. The relative rise of the African focus in Indonesian foreign policy is linked to Jokowi’s power consolidation against his most prominent political patrons; and to networks of intermediaries originating from external powers deeply involved in Africa, especially China but also France, Israel or the US, socialising major Indonesian elites into African or Africa-related elite spheres for material gains. From a Kemlu perspective regarding process and procedure,54 imagining Indonesia’s African outlook and calibrating policy require formally consulting academic and business stakeholders, and internal research, primarily through the Agency for Policy Assessment and Development (BPPK),55 Kemlu’s inner think tank. The BPPK commissioned an academic report supporting the IAF’s birth, later studied. A legitimation act for elite decisions, the weight of these civil society consultations remains low. Both Indonesian and African diplomats consider Indonesian businesspeople as conservative and risk-averse regarding international expansion, especially in investment.56 Africa remains perceived as complicated, hazardous and remote. Kemlu established confidence-building measures 54 Kemlu’s views are conveyed here and on several occasions in this book. The author has been in continuous relationships with several Kemlu sources over the years. 55 Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan. 56 It is tough to persuade Indonesian businesspeople to consider Africa, according to

Wirajuda. They tell him: “Pak Hassan, we have a big market here”. He feels there is a sense of complacency. But things will change with the government leading. Author’s

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promoting Africa as a more exciting destination towards the business community, both the private sector and SOEs. Indonesian embassies are mobilised to support Indonesian business and open new markets as their primary diplomatic tasks,57 helping identify potential targets.58 Indonesia’s annual B2B-focused trade fair, Trade Expo Indonesia (TEI), is leveraged to attract African businesspeople to Indonesia directly to make deals, boosting Indonesian exports.59 Still, Indonesian businesspeople are difficult to mobilise to focus on Africa.60 Kemlu insists Indonesia’s approach differs from China’s, perceived as somewhat rapacious.61 Indonesia berbeda.62 Indonesia refuses participation in any “new scramble for Africa”. Indonesia considers African countries as equals (“sejajar”), avoiding hierarchical relationships. Indonesia

interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 57 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 58 Embassies in Africa took responsibility for selecting and inviting participants to the IAF according to their jurisdiction. 59 TEI has been held since 1985 and focuses not only on trade but also on tourism and investment. Backed by the Ministry of Trade through the Directorate General for National Export Development and the private sector, TEI’s explicit objective is to boost Indonesian exports and export market expansion. Seven main categories of products and services, showcasing Indonesian business capacities and depth, are proposed: F&B; Home Living; Digital & Services; Beauty & Personal Care; Chemical, Energy and Industrial Products; Medical Equipment & Healthcare; Fashion, Textile & Accessories. Investment promotion is also done towards international investors following the same categories. Since the Covid-19 crisis, the event has been hybrid with the addition of a digital trade fair. Special sessions on the African market are organised. TEI’s website: www.tradexpoi ndonesia.com. 60 Major powers like France and President Macron have difficulties pushing their businesspeople to engage with Africa, given the sometimes-specific conditions of the continent and its relatively small markets. In contrast, numerous Chinese businesspeople seem to thrive in complicated environments lacking regulation, facilities or labour skills, considering adversity as an opportunity (Glaser & Airault, 2021; Tang, 2021). 61 Chinas’s approach and impact appear more nuanced. Given its strategic rivalry with the US, China prioritises increasingly political over economic considerations on the continent. 62 Indonesia is different.

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will avoid problems like “debt-trap diplomacy” accusations.63 In Indonesia itself, the debate around Indonesia’s China debt remains vivid. Indonesia values and highlights its shared historical links with Africa, a solid Indonesian comparative asset.64 However, historical memories need to be reactivated. New generations in Africa are not well aware of Afro-Asianism. Like in Indonesia, generational changes bring unique perspectives requiring new policies and narratives.65 Kemlu’s inability to launch an Africa+1 forum fifteen years ago is not solely attributable to low national knowledge production capacity severely impacting Indonesia’s foreign policy capabilities. Indonesian bureaucratic politics’ complexity and heaviness impede Kemlu, and more entrepreneurial diplomats, from innovating. Kemlu can conceptualise a new project. Still, it needs to build alliances and find governmental partners to achieve its goals, given its relative power deficit and limited budget. Kemlu lacks a powerful infrastructure and bureaucracy to steer the whole government. For Weatherbee, Kemlu’s structure and culture are “resistant to change”; stuck in continuity, which the NAASP’s prolongation might confirm (Weatherbee, 2016).66 This appreciation appears excessive, especially given the new African policy implementation.67 Kemlu needs political weight and more money to innovate in a complex environment full of political and bureaucratic hurdles. Younger, more innovative diplomats also need more space.68

63 The risk appears low, given Indonesia’s limited capacity to concede foreign loans in amounts that could be compared to China. 64 “modal kita”: Our asset or capital. 65 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of

Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 66 He adds Kemlu is not a “dynamic policy-making environment” (Weatherbee, 2016). 67 The creation of Indonesia AID can also be seen as a bureaucratic coordination

success. As indicated later, India failed to formalise its development agency due to bureaucratic battles. 68 This is actually being done with Kemlu’s Africa team from the Directorate for African Affairs, composed of young diplomats. Yet, the team is insufficient in number.

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Kemlu diplomats consider themselves non-political professionals.69 Delivering initiatives requires political meddling at the highest level. Since independence, Kemlu was highly politicised during Parliamentary Democracy in the 1950s or bypassed by the military under Suharto (Leifer, 1983). Under SBY and Jokowi, ultimate power remains in the president’s entourage. Kemlu cannot avoid composing with that. Retno remained Foreign Minister during Jokowi’s two presidential mandates, successfully networking in the highest Indonesian power circles. Kemlu must collaborate with the most powerful political entrepreneurs, gaining their support. Retno was chosen as foreign minister thanks to her main patron, former President Megawati, and possibly since she shares the same alma mater, UGM, with President Jokowi (Hasits, 2014; Redaksi, 2014a; Weatherbee, 2016). She is the first Indonesian woman foreign minister, a factor in her appointment. Megawati herself was the only woman to become President. Her daughter Puan Maharani is the first woman to head the Indonesian parliament.70 Minister Retno supports women empowerment and leadership, notably in peacekeeping, which strongly relates to Africa (Agence France-Presse, 2014; Lubabah, 2019; Marsudi, 2019, 2020). The IAF’s creation can be observed from the perspective of Kemlu’s limited capacity, and power politics at the highest state level. The Jokowi era provided the momentum for such a forum and the more pragmatic African approach. Its successful delivery required a solid figure as its primary patron.71 A pitch was made to the most powerful figure in Indonesia, the President’s closest ally. Luhut had gained an interest in Africa, notably as the 2015 AAS’s organising committee Chairman. The General could move the entire bureaucracy and government to create and 69 “without political baggage”. Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). Ambassador Teuku Faizasyah has strived under both SBY as special staff to the President for international affairs and presidential spokesperson for international affairs, and Ambassador to Canada; and Jokowi as Kemlu’s spokesperson, Director General for Information and Public Diplomacy and Ambassador to Norway. He was previously in his career in 2007–2008, head of the Indonesian Embassy in South Africa’s political division. 70 The Indonesian parliament is called Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). 71 An “umbrella” (“payung”), a “big gun”, “orang kuat” (A strong person) are expres-

sions employed by key sources. This orang kuat was needed for the new Africa policy and the IAF to move forward.

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steer the IAF, above sectoral egos hindering policy implementation.72 Luhut criticises Indonesia’s governmental and bureaucratic coordination weakness (Massardi, 2022). Well aware of Indonesian political and bureaucratic realities, Kemlu cannot risk losing face internationally with a poorly implemented initiative shaming the country. Attracting the attention and support of a decisive figure like Luhut appears as a win–win solution. Luhut also benefits from exposure and increased political reach through foreign policy. He interacts directly with Retno and diplomats for African matters, assisted by his deputy-diplomat Jodi Mahardi. Luhut had to “secure” the Africa topic, being in political competition with other prominent figures like Megawati or Surya Paloh, also major Jokowi patrons. The authority to administer Indonesia’s foreign relations and implement the government’s foreign policy rests in presidential hands.73 The President may delegate the authority to administer Foreign Relations and the implementation of Foreign Policy to the Foreign Minister. He can appoint other state officials or non-official profiles to conduct foreign relations in specific fields, who consult and coordinate with the Foreign Minister in carrying out their duties. Jokowi’s multiple LBP appointments to handle various strategic foreign relations with China, the UAE and Africa are constitutional. Criticised initially as a lightweight lacking political bravery,74 Minister Retno survived the whole Jokowi era, proving her political astuteness. She interacts directly with Jokowi on foreign policy, gaining his trust over the years.75 Her role means translating the President’s will and style into foreign policy. Communicating with Jokowi is complex. Time is often minimal, given his domestic priorities. Retno shares the same Javanese culture with Jokowi, adopting a cultural approach towards a President not always intensely interested in foreign policy issues and who wishes to

72 “Ego sektoral” or sectoral ego is often heard in Indonesia as a reason for deadlocks and lack of progress. Some have said it could be a hyper-democratic reaction to previous authoritarianism. Sectoral ego features as a threat in the Directorate for African Affairs’ strategic plan; other threats include a long-term commitment problem, the geopolitical context and increased competition (Kemlu, 2020a). 73 Under law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. 74 Sexism can also be perceived. 75 She even gained the right to use the Javanese term “Mas” for “Mister” to address

the President, a sign of closeness and trust in the presidential kingdom.

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keep things grounded in his typical humble style. For Jokowi, Indonesian diplomacy must be down-to-earth.76 He finds an interest when the benefit he and the country can gain is clear. Foreign policy must support his domestic agenda, notably in infrastructure and investment, for him to care, as evidenced by the special relationships he has developed with China and the UAE. Africa serves his domestic policies and supports establishing his historical legacy, given the significance of Afro-Asia for Indonesia. Under Jokowi, foreign policy is mainly linked to domestic political and socio-economic goals, which weakens Kemlu’s role; or makes it less evident; and elevates functional ministries and ministers like Luhut, powerful domestically (Weatherbee, 2016). Minister Retno communicates smoothly with Jokowi to obtain his approval or position. The question remains to what extent important policy comes from Kemlu, given its relative institutional weakness. Retno has no political constituency, depending on the bon vouloir of heavy players and Kemlu’s limited power. Still, Marsudi has been successful if political success can be seen as endurance. Her image became positive, supporting women empowerment. With Luhut’s backing, she socialised the IAF to Jokowi, who endorsed the forum and the new African approach corresponding to his economic diplomacy prioritisation. When she was first nominated, ad hoc Jokowi advisors were considered the most influential concerning foreign policy, like thinktanker Rizal Sukma. With Luhut, Sukma appeared as the most prominent personality around Jokowi in foreign policy matters. Sukma’s realist IR paradigm and his post-ASEAN foreign policy wishes fit with Indonesia’s African expansion.77 76 What has been called “diplomasi membumi” or down-to-earth diplomacy. 77 In 2016, Sukma became ambassador to the UK until 2020. Weatherbee writes that

a saying in Jakarta’s foreign policy circles was “The thinker is in London, the implementer at Kemlu”, pointing to Sukma and Minister Retno. Yet, Laksmana indicates that his appointment to London diminished his influence. Jokowi even acknowledged that Sukma was decisive in his attending any international event when he said to the press while pointing at Sukma: “If he says ‘yes, you go’, I will go” (Laksmana, 2016; Weatherbee, 2016). That statement was more of a kiss of death, overexposing Sukma in the harsh Indonesian political context. Sukma’s then less visible role might also be due to Jusuf Kalla’s political retirement, given the proximity between Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and former Vice President Kalla; the prominence of the NU organisation under Jokowi whereas Sukma is from Muhammadiyah; and LBP’s increasing power and control over foreign affairs. The thinktank for which Sukma works, CSIS, is controlled by the Wanandi family, historically close to Kalla. Yet, Edward Wanandi, one

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Kemlu claims Retno made Kemlu the leading entity on foreign policy under Jokowi. Given her interpersonal skills, Javanese cultural approach and capacity to simplify and translate matters, Jokowi listens to her.78 Kemlu wants to preserve its prerogatives on foreign policy generation and implementation; and recognised influence on the President concerning foreign affairs.79 Luhut’s involvement in the new African approach was necessary to move the whole cabinet and bureaucracy towards an integrated state effort. It represents also a sensitive undertaking. Kemlu must ensure its expertise and prerogatives are respected as a state institution. The reality is that Luhut is the main force under Jokowi.80 His involvement guarantees a policy can move forward with success; Indonesia’s revamped African foreign policy included. Luhut prioritises his agenda, often corresponding to Jokowi’s. He “captured” the Africa topic as he did with other strategic foreign and domestic matters. Inside the Directorate General for Asian, Pacific and African Affairs, the Directorate for African Affairs remains a simple directorate and not a general directorate standing by itself. Altering bureaucratic structures is not a sinecure. While before Africa was not receiving the best diplomats or only senior ones ending their careers, Kemlu indicates the best young talents inside Kemlu are now joining the Directorate for African Affairs and being sent to Africa.81 The Directorate’s diplomats and Luhut’s

of the Wanandi brothers, is Luhut’s special advisor, underlining the Indonesian polity’s complexity and need for compromise. The Wanandi family has exceptional relationships all over Asia, notably in Japan and China, which are useful for Luhut. 78 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). The debate about which actor influences foreign policy most occurs in all polities. 79 The author has personally experienced the fact that high-ranking Indonesian state officials systematically ask what is the view of Kemlu when presented with a particular matter or idea relating to international affairs. This is a kind of precaution. It does not mean they would not go against Kemlu’s view though. But it does indicate its centrality. 80 In 1948, when Luhut was still a baby, President Sukarno visited Luhut’s region. He saw Luhut in the crowd and touched his head, apparently saying: “This kid will be a big man someday” (Massardi, 2022). 81 On top of regularly exchanging with the Director for African Affairs, Mrs Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, a.k.a. Bu Meidy, the author did a full session of exchange with Kemlu’s Directorate for African Affairs’ team on 6 June 2023 at Kemlu. Headed by the Director, the team of seven plus the Director, divided by geographic zone (East, West, South), is indeed staffed with young diplomats, some having been posted once in Africa before.

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African Task Force work in interaction. Kemlu communicates it is not important who chairs the Task Force since it is steered by diplomats. Kemlu’s agency cannot be denied, remaining the legitimate institution for foreign policy. But Luhut is Jokowi’s main ally, backer and implementer; a force by himself and the most special figure of the Jokowi era. Since 2016, African Affairs’ directors have been close to Luhut, personally or via his deputy.

Policy Justification Through Academia Following the 2015 AAS, Kemlu’s research arm, the BPPK commissioned a university to draft a report envisaging the establishment of an IndonesiaAfrica Economic Cooperation Forum (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016).82 This document would become an academic justification for creating the IAF.83 The BPPK conducts empirical studies on Africa internally from country-based political-economic analysis, projections or economic assessment blueprints. It organises seminars and forums with SOEs to share best practices for facilitated market access to Africa following the famous Indomie success. It communicates to the business community that “Africa matters”.84 Academic knowledge produced on Africa in Indonesia is scarce. Seminal and contemporary works on Indonesian foreign policy usually do not mention or present anything substantial on Africa-Indonesia relations. Examining Indonesia by making parallels with studies on other

Kemlu’s will and effort to modernise and increase its African engagement are undeniable. Budgetary issues remain. 82 Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) through its International Relations Study Program. The report was titled “Pembentukan Forum Kerjasama Ekonomi Indonesia-Afrika”, or Establishment of the Indonesia-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum (BPPK-Kemlu & UMY, 2016). The BPPK-UMY report aimed at proposing an operating framework to the Indonesian government, through Kemlu, to create an Indonesia-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum suitable in importance, strategy and needed steps; in the broader framework of Indonesia’s effort on economic diplomacy in Africa. 83 This choice could be further studied in religious and alma mater affiliations between members of Kemlu and the chosen university. 84 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021).

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external powers’ African approaches facilitates comprehension. Through transnational knowledge circulation (Hoffmann, 2021), China’s African engagement influenced Indonesian leaders, as observed in the operational framework Kemlu and Luhut developed. Before transforming into an hilirisasi and environmental defense lobby, the task force originally focused on contractual projects in infrastructure and construction through SOEs, supposedly supported financially by Indonesia Eximbank. Networking helps identify suitable projects, especially visible ones, to brand Indonesia as a valuable alternative player in Africa, legitimate for historical reasons but also for its capacity to deliver quality projects. The message is the Indonesian developmental state can project itself to another continent as a new model. Obstacles like knowledge of Africa and the Indonesian ability to mobilise financing remain. Another potential source of financing for Indonesia’s infrastructure projects in Africa could be the Indonesian SWF launched in 2021, the Indonesia Investment Authority (INA),85 although with no certainty since the fund focuses first on domestic projects. INA fits Jokowi’s state capitalism paradigm,86 implemented through SOEs infrastructure investment, supporting national development.87 Emirati, US, Japanese and

85 Its official name is Lembaga Pengelola Investasi (LPI) or Investment Management Institution. INA was set up with the support of the UAE, which has one of the largest SWFs in the world, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA). Middle Eastern countries and Norway allocate their oil revenues to their SWFs; Singapore its foreign exchange reserves. The Indonesian SWF model attracts foreign investors to co-invest in Indonesia, inspired by the Russian SWF Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) (R. Rahman, 2020). Singapore, with its SWFs Temasek and GIC, are also in the minds of Indonesian leaders. Part of the capital of INA will be from allocated shares of Indonesian SOEs, similar to Temasek. Singapore is the leading investor in Indonesia. Singapore has already huge interests in Africa and is increasing its investments, trade and other relations with the continent. The government agency, Enterprise Singapore, which supports Singaporean businesses’ growth, has offices in Accra, Johannesburg and Nairobi. 86 As a state vehicle. The supervisory board is chaired by the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, a personality reassuring for foreign investors (Allard et al., 2020; C. A. Putri, 2020). Initially, INA appeared as a counter-proposal to Chinese state financing in Indonesia, notably backed by Chinese rivals: the US and Japan. In July 2022, China announced a USD 3 billion investment in INA (Suroyo, 2022). 87 Another important complementary goal of INA is to deleverage construction SOEs with strong debt burdens by selling projects to foreign investors and restarting with a clean slate (K. Kim, 2022).

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Chinese government-related institutions invested in the fund.88 UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, nicknamed MBZ, developed a close relationship with Jokowi and Luhut, given the UAE’s solid strategic interest in Indonesia (Jensen, 2017),89 including religious (Fealy, 2023). MBZ is strongly focused on Africa, especially in the Horn. Indonesia– UAE cooperation in Africa could be a significant comparative advantage, notably in digital.90 Dubai is already a platform for Indonesian products to reach African markets, given the limited direct business transactions between Indonesia and Africa, often proceeding through brokers.91 Through a relationship facilitated by Jared Kushner,92 MBZ appears as another influence on Luhut, who set up Indonesia’s SWF.93 INA reflects the Jokowi era’s state capitalism and infrastructure focus for development, a vision prolonged to Africa. Indonesia inscribes Africa in this state-led development strategy. Like the IAF’s creation, Indonesia

88 ADIA, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and China’s Silk Road Fund (SRF). 89 The development of this substantial relationship with the UAE under Jokowi also marks a change, given the classification of the Middle East as a “non-traditional market” by Indonesia’s official state planning. In 1976, Adam Malik said the Middle East historically did not play a major role in Indonesian foreign policy. Saudi Arabia was important only for the Mecca pilgrimage. Middle Eastern countries gained more importance for Indonesia with the rise in oil revenues (Suryadinata, 1996). Nuance is needed, especially given the role of some Middle Eastern countries in the diplomatic recognition of Indonesia. The Indonesia–UAE association has become so tight that MBZ has named a road in Abu Dhabi with Jokowi’s name and is financing a mosque in Surakarta, Jokowi’s hometown. In return, Jokowi has named a toll road with MBZ’s name and made MBZ the head of the steering committee of Indonesia’s new capital city in Kalimantan. Among other deals, the UAE is investing USD 10 billion in INA (Anwar, 2021). 90 In 2020, the UAE launched the “Consortium for Africa”, committing $500m to

Africa’s digital economy, notably for the youth (Bhatia, 2022). 91 Shipping costs between Africa and Indonesia are also high. The role of intermediaries based in Dubai or Malaysia has slowed direct Afro-Indonesian exposure and network formation (Ubwani, 2022). 92 After China, Kushner has probably been Luhut’s most important foreign relation under Jokowi (Fachriansyah, 2020). 93 The UAE–China dynamic in Africa, both major investors on the continent, offers

food for thought. For example, in the Horn of Africa–Middle East complex, China displaced the UAE in Djibouti’s Port of Doraleh, forcing it to refocus its economic statecraft through ports in Eritrea and Somaliland (Young & Khan, 2022). Given Indonesia’s affinities with both countries under Jokowi, Indonesia’s potential choices of triangular partners in Africa should be observed closely from that perspective, notably.

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was late to engender its first SWF.94 Major international signalling tools and status markers like an SWF or an Africa+1 forum take more time to be formed in Indonesia.95 Jokowi and Luhut break the status quo to deliver. Their choices and vision are debatable; their lack of intellectualism criticised as it contradicts their stated focus on long-term development. But, their pragmatism and capacity to deliver are undeniable. Achieving material results is prioritised in a vanguardist way as the condition for proper development. Under Jokowi, infrastructure has been built and hilirisasi implemented, contrary to his predecessors in the post-New Order era. The academic report reveals the reasoning, methodology and paradigm used to conceptualise the more pragmatic IAF. The complicated relationship between Indonesian academia and government, oscillating between subordination, confrontation and harmony, is unveiled. A made-toorder academic study justifies a public policy (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005; Kusman, 2019). Luhut also mobilises his ministry’s research team, preparing studies and data. Luhut’s team supports Indonesian gastrodiplomacy in Africa by promoting Indonesian food and ingredients through the opening of Indonesian restaurants, the distribution of Indonesian spices or promotional events; inspired by the success of other Asian foods in African cities (Suwanti, 2020). The flagship program is titled Indonesia Spice Up The World (ISUTW) (Kemenparekraf/ Baparekraf RI, 2021; Widyanti, 2021),96 serving nation branding and the interests of the Indonesian F&B conglomerates. Acknowledging Indonesia’s lateness compared to other Asian powers, the report outlines Indonesia’s four strategic economic foci in Africa to enhance cooperation: trade, investment, tourism and services. A brief comparative study of the Africa+1 forums of six Asian powers was established.97 Benefiting from its historical leverage, Indonesia could seise 94 Singapore’s Temasek Holdings was created in 1974; Malaysia’s Khazanah Nasional in 1993; China’s Investment Authority (CIC) in 2007; and India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) in 2015. 95 The new capital city is also such a status marker (Clark, 2023). 96 ISUTW is based on four pillars, namely supporting spice exports, seasoning prod-

ucts and processed organising culinary tourism. Author’s Creative Economy,

food; better branding Indonesian restaurants and opening new ones; promotions, and branding Indonesian culinary destinations to boost Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and 06.06.2023, Jakarta, at the Minister’s home.

97 A SWOT analysis was drafted to determine the adequate structure and strategy for Indonesia’s own Africa forum; limited to the economic field following Jokowi’s foreign

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investment opportunities in agriculture and forestry, Indonesia’s excellence sectors. Neoliberalism was the chosen paradigm for “integrative bargaining ”, demonstrating Indonesia’s win–win, mutually beneficial approach. A consortium of Indonesian investors for Africa should be created to reassure and support business entry into Africa.98 As an investment for the future, the significance of education and cultural relations with Africa through cultural diplomacy was emphasised to become more appealing to African youth. Education, notably scholarships, was an effective way of fostering long-term friendships, increasing Indonesia’s visibility. While the report recommended a Summit every five years,99 the IAF was just a regular business forum following Jokowi’s business acumen. African governmental leaders could freely attend if they wanted. A simple business forum appeared more feasible. A Summit was too grandiloquent.

policy strategy, firmly focused on economic diplomacy as a means to serve Indonesia’s national interests. 98 This consortium was inspired by the work of the MIDA or Malaysian Investment Development Authority. Malaysia has been investing significantly in Africa for decades. To boost Malaysia–Africa links, Malaysia launched the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) in 1995, hosting a public–private debate to share developmental experiences with developing nations of Africa and the Caribbean. The government supports Malaysian entrepreneurs to invest in Africa; creating networks with African nations in the SouthSouth Cooperation perspective. Through the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) and also triangular cooperation like the MTCP-Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)-Africa (MTCP-JICA-Africa) programme, Malaysia proposes technical lessons and training to African participants (Rubiolo, 2016a). Through Third Country Training Programmes (TCTP), African countries are supported to grasp Malaysian development, industrialisation and investment promotion policies; sharing professional knowledge (Vaidyanathan, 2016). Malaysia was said to be the top Asian investor in Africa in 2011, with an FDI level of almost USD 20 billion at the time (Staff, 2013). Its investments are spread across Africa and diversified in sectors like oil & gas, palm oil and rubber plantations, agribusiness, real estate, hospitality, media and telecommunications, shipping and logistics, and finance. Malaysia exports consumer products, electronics and machinery equipment. 99 Adding to a Summit every five years, the report also called for a Ministerial Conference, a SOM, a business forum and a civil society forum with NGOs and the media, or a People-to-People initiative using public diplomacy jargon, were recommended. Until today, Kemlu is trying to find the proper format.

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Indonesia envisages a “niche” approach in Africa based on its comparative advantages.100 In Africa+1 events, the AU usually plays a role in determining African attendees; thus, the importance of AU recognition and collaboration. Its modesty and the absence of AU involvement mean the IAF is often not mentioned in lists of Africa+1 Summits (Soulé, 2021a). This is not optimal, missing the status-signalling target. Relations with Africa need to be co-constructed. Africa+1 events multiplication also favours summit fatigue. African leaders prioritise the most beneficial forums. The report advocated establishing an Indonesian development aid agency, enhancing Indonesia’s status and dispelling the notion that Indonesia was financially weak. Africans should know Indonesia had means. Aid was presented as a trade facilitator, “aid for trade”, revealing the explicit pursuit of commercial returns.101 Jokowi had already said Bandung’s political success should be leveraged economically, including in the maritime sector, following the GMF grand strategy. Bandung, the AASs and the NAASP were described as Indonesia’s political investment. The tone was business-oriented. Yet, economic development remains primarily linked to political legitimacy, stability and security in Indonesia and Asia with the primary institution of the developmental state.102 The report called for a collective, multi-stakeholder Indonesian effort in Africa to convince everyone about Africa’s importance and Indonesia’s potential benefits.103 Mobilising the Indonesian business community is not a sinecure, requiring pedagogy and patience. Investments in Africa should be profitable and visible, ensuring Indonesia’s prominence.

100 Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). 101 A specific contrast with the original NAASP discourse on the solidarity of the AfroAsian movement and the Bandung spirit. The Chinese also “prefer commercial partnerships to one-dimensional aid for the purpose of ensuring the sustainability of growth” (Tang, 2021). Infrastructure projects that had been constructed and donated by China to African countries, notably in the Mao era, often did not perform well due to management and maintenance issues. The business approach appeared as a solution. 102 Described in an English School framework (Buzan & Zhang, 2014). 103 The report was not written by Africa specialists and therefore lacks deep knowledge

of the continent.

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Following China’s strategy,104 Indonesia would be seeking “trophy investments” like WIKA’s construction attempt of La Tour de Gorée in Senegal or the Presidential Palace’s renovation in Niger (Lingga, 2019; Ma, 2019).105 The business forum should be technical and result-oriented in the Jokowi mindset. Indonesian weaknesses were listed, like the lack of adequate market information on African opportunities; Indonesian entrepreneurs’ negative perception of Africa and their inward-looking attitude; visa issues; cultural differences; distance with a lack of direct flights; or the unsupportive Indonesian financing system, Africa being risky. Knowledge about Africa in Indonesia conditions all other developments. Expertise-based comprehension of the African continent is still missing. For this reason, the report does not insist on security, a crucial issue in any African approach, at least to protect investments and citizens. All external powers have seriously considered their security approach in Africa. Geoeconomics engenders new geostrategic and security imperatives.106 Implementing Indonesia’s economic diplomacy approach will generate new threats and issues to handle. Organised in Bali in April 2018, the IAF serves as a flagship platform supporting Indonesia’s economic diplomacy effort towards Africa. Since Bandung, Indonesia organises international events professionally. Receiving African delegations in Bali supports a seduction strategy.107 Well-organised and helpful for operationalising and delivering on the economic diplomacy agenda, the IAF announced dozens of business deals

104 China’s most prestigious investment has been the financing and construction, through China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), of the AU headquarters, inaugurated in 2012. 105 While La Tour de Gorée project, as well as a social housing complex in the Ivory Coast, face funding issues to move forward, the Niger Presidential Palace renovation project was completed. The latter was paid by Niger. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, Kemlu, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 106 Through the BRI, China has faced multiple threats towards its developmental interests, assets and citizens in Africa (Li, 2020). 107 Bali is conceived to welcome these international events and possesses the accommodation capacity. Jakarta’s infamous traffic jams can complicate the picture of receiving delegates in the best conditions. For the 2015 AAS, some main Jakarta streets were closed and reserved for delegates to circulate with their diplomatic cars and dedicated buses. The author attended both the 2015 AAS in Jakarta and the IAF in Bali.

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between Indonesian and African companies.108 The amounts seem small compared to China, but it marks the beginning of Indonesia’s effort. Indonesia has limited capacities. It is also a new player in Africa, needing to learn and adjust its approach. Being able to invest, propose funding and finalise projects would contribute to Indonesian credibility, progressively raising Indonesia’s status in Africa. That equation is not resolved. The IAF is also concerned with technical and development cooperation in an SSC framework. Training and capacity-building activities were tripled; scholarships doubled at the IAF (Ginting, 2020).109 This shows the engagement is not only economic, but also for mutual progress and development, reinforcing Indonesia’s image and reputation (Tempo, 2018). During the IAF, delegations from each African country were invited and handled by corresponding Indonesian embassies in Africa, revealing how relationships were handled multi-bilaterally. African capacity to unite while facing external powers and be more assertive in negotiations immediately comes to mind. The first IAF was a traditional business forum. Sukarno lyricism and Yudhoyono multilateralism had faded. With an entrepreneurial President, Indonesia is business-thirsty, eager to go global. The IAMD and the IAID inscribe themselves in the same economic diplomacy paradigm, magnets facilitating dealmaking and networking. Through its African policy, Indonesia modestly enters the club of external players in Africa, signalling its ascent and thirst for a global role (Alden, 2019). Yet, any failures could affect its reputation.110 Jokowi was supposed to open the IAF officially. Vice President Jusuf Kalla made the opening speech. Jokowi went to Papua instead, making the cover of newspapers holding a Papuan child (Kuwado, 2018). The newspapers were distributed to all IAF delegations. Indonesia also showed it respects all humans, whatever their origins and culture. The Papua issue should not be brought to Africa by separatists based on “black solidarity”. There was no state racism in Indonesia. The message was clear. Yet, Jokowi

108 Total deals announced were worth several hundreds of millions of dollars (Ika, 2018). Publicising figures of deals or development aid is a classic of Africa+1 forums like those of France, South Korea, Brazil or China. 109 Starting from a low level, so the number of scholarships, for example, remains modest. But, there again, the first steps are important. 110 Like South Korea suffered in Madagascar in 2009.

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was also campaigning for re-election, so it was “election politics ”.111 Economic diplomacy remains the main visible focus, but strategic issues like the Papua problem deal with Indonesia’s territorial integrity, unity and stability, and thus its survival.112 Africa cannot only be seen as an economic Eldorado. After its initial learning period, Indonesia will need a more holistic strategy. Given funding issues and hilirisasi diplomacy, the African policy already evolved. Pragmatic, it still seems too opportunistic, lacking deep knowledge of Africa. As an example, stereotypes against Black people in Indonesia created a situation where Nigerians were underestimated as members of drug crime syndicates because their Black skin colour was considered equivalent to low intelligence.113 Nigerians were considered in Indonesia as “beasts ready to kill for anything ”, quoting a policeman; or as sorcerers, teaching voodoo.114 The concept of “naivety” means a misunderstanding of African diversity, given an absence of connections and African studies concerning culture or language, generating clichés and overstretching. African agency is overlooked, hurting trust (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021). This “naivety” can be visible in Indonesian actors, explaining the NAASP deadlock and the difficulty of raising knowledge and capacities about Africa in Indonesia. The risk of disappointing Africans and backlash cannot be denied.

General Luhut Retired four-star Army General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan appears as Jokowi’s guardian angel in the harsh Indonesian political sphere. LBP was Jokowi’s business partner when the President was still an entrepreneur in Surakarta.115 In 2005, he supported Jokowi to become Surakarta’s mayor, then Jakarta Governor in 2012, and President in 2014; providing 111 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 112 For the anecdote, a young Indonesian woman diplomat of Papuan origin works for the Directorate for African Affairs. She studied in Italy and worked before for the Presidential Staff’s Office. 113 As explained in a thesis from Universitas Indonesia, which contains interviews with police officers (Tathyapradipta, 2012). 114 Notably to former Indonesian politician Ki Gendeng Pamungkas (Bertrand, 2016). 115 The General supplied wood for Jokowi’s furniture business (Widhiarto & Ayun-

ingtyas, 2014).

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his vast network and social-political weight as a former military leader.116 A political phenomenon, never-elected, embodying the remaining metapower of the Indonesian security apparatus, Luhut is considered the most powerful political figure around Jokowi; the figure Jokowi trusts the most to deliver the presidential agenda, given his effectiveness and their longterm partnership. He mobilised a group of senior generals to get him elected president.117 For his firmness, military background and experience, Luhut has even been compared to the super Prime Minister of the Majapahit Kingdom, Gajah Mada, the absolute problem solver.118 A former military commander and senior figure in the Golkar party,119 he brings substantial power to Jokowi, a civilian and not a party leader. Appointed by Jokowi, Luhut was the central figure handling the Covid19 crisis (Detik, 2020). Jokowi successively appointed him as the first Chief of the Presidential staff in 2014, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs in 2015 and Coordinating Minister of Maritime

116 Luhut formed a special team of former generals to support Jokowi’s election as President, called team “Bravo 5” (Hanifah, 2019; Nugraheni, 2022). 117 Many parallels have been made between General Benny Moerdani, probably the father of the contemporary Indonesian security system and very influential in security and foreign policy under Suharto as Minister of Defence notably, and General Luhut, considered a descendent of Moerdani, given his strategic importance and profile, with probably an even greater influence, notably since Suharto was a General and Jokowi is a civilian. Respectively a Protestant and a Catholic, Luhut was close to Moerdani and regularly pays him tribute (Suryadinata, 1996; Wartakota, 2020). 118 Gajah Mada was the Mahapatih Mangkunegaran in the era of the Majapahit Kingdom, a kind of Prime Minister. Gajah Mada appears more powerful than King Hayam Wuruk because he was a senior figure, having served Queen Tribhuwana Tunggadewi, Hayam Wuruk’s mother. Experience increases power and influence. Both Luhut and Gajah Mada received strict military training. Yet, for Jokowi, like for King Hayam Wuruk, a figure like Luhut preserves his dignity and charisma, acting like a protection from the dangers of politics. There is no need to jump to deep into the political arena if the mahapatih can do the job. Given disagreements due to the Bubat War, opposing the Majapahit army to the Sundanese royal family in 1357, the relationship between Gajah Mada and Hayam Wuruk did not end well. The Jokowi–Luhut relationship has been going well until now (F46, 2020; I76, 2022). 119 The Golkar (Golongan Karya) or functional groups party was Suharto and the military’s political vehicle during the New Order. It survived democratisation by adapting to the new era. Quite resistant, it has been losing ground in recent years, especially to PDI-P, Surya Paloh’s Nasdem, and Prabowo Subianto’s Gerindra party.

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and Investment Affairs in 2016120 ; all strategic positions allowing Luhut to implement Jokowi’s developmental agenda, handling relations with international partners and investors; above all China, but also the US or the UAE; and Africa. Luhut’s power increased progressively during Jokowi’s presidencies, nurturing Jokowi’s presidential power and political consolidation.121 Luhut’s direct appointment to two strategic positions relating to Africa by Jokowi highlights Africa’s growing importance among Indonesian power circles; part of the political competition for international networks and resources. As a senior and powerful Indonesian retired general turned businessman and politician, Luhut only exerts major strategic roles. Jokowi appointed Luhut as the Chairman of the Asian-African Conference Commemoration National Committee, ensuring the 2015 AAS went smoothly (Liputan6, 2015). This position allowed Luhut to better understand Africa’s strategic primacy, other Asian powers’ activities, and how Indonesia’s engagement should evolve, leveraging its historical legitimacy (DetikNews, 2015). Secondly, Jokowi appointed Luhut to head the Infrastructure Task Force for Africa (Anwar, 2020a; Kemenkomarves, 2018).122 This second position embodied Indonesia’s African policy shift from a multilateralist, impractical and essentially discursive framework to a more flexible method seeking concrete business deals in Africa.123 The task force was appointed in 2018 after the IAF.124 Luhut’s clout extends to the whole bureaucracy. The IAF and its derivatives represent a magnet, facilitating networking and business, showing African partners Indonesia’s seriousness. Luhut would progressively place hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy at the forefront.

120 The investment portfolio was added after Jokowi’s reelection in 2019, giving even more power to Luhut. 121 In Shekhar’s 2018 book, Luhut’s presence is not strongly emphasised since his power was still not at its peak, highlighting his remarkable ascent (Shekhar, 2018). 122 The Indonesian name is Satuan Tugas Infrastruktur Indonesia untuk Afrika. The

ad hoc informal group seeking business opportunities in Africa through and for Indonesian SOEs, mainly in the construction and infrastructure fields, aligns with the “BUMN Go Global” strategy. 123 notably in the promising sectors the President had stated at the 2015 AAS, implementing the President’s prioritisation of economic diplomacy. 124 The IAF was also under Luhut’s supervision; and technically organised by Kemlu.

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Given Luhut’s special forces background, the task force operates in an ad hoc, commando mode125 ; opportunistically seeking African projects and building the Indonesian brand in Africa, an alternative partner for Africa. Indonesia’s domestic infrastructural capacities are promoted. Luhut was decisive since he switched from handling the AAS’s organisation with its reinvigorated NAASP to heading Indonesia’s bilateral economic diplomacy efforts towards Africa. He embodies the shift with his pragmatic character and capacity to deliver. As a political entrepreneur, Luhut cuts through obstacles.126 Kemlu sees this as a win–win collaboration with the most senior and powerful figure in Jokowi’s government to boost Indonesia’s African expansion without being blocked by bureaucracy. Kemlu had no choice, given Luhut’s power and closeness to Jokowi. An Indonesian business target, Africa became less abstract, not a mere discursive reality. Africa metamorphosed into more than a symbol and a word in the “Asia-Africa” expression. Africa represents a potential market with a defined penetration strategy, operationalised at the highest level of government, supervised by the most powerful senior figure with direct presidential approval; and coordinated with Kemlu. The AAS was a revelation. Thanks to Jokowi and Luhut’s entrepreneurial characters, disappointments transformed into opportunities.127 This pragmatism moves policy forward concretely against challenging bureaucracy. Broad, abstract visions like the NAASP seem attractive; making them work is complicated.

125 Luhut is a former commander in the Indonesian military Special Forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus/Kopassus). In 1981, he created the Counter-terrorism Task Force (Satuan Tugas Penanggulangan Terorisme/Satgultor 81), operating “unknown, unheard, and unseen” (“tidak diketahui, tidak terdengar, dan tidak terlihat ”) (Massardi, 2022). He has transposed his military commando methods to government, as seen with his chairing of many Task Forces, including for Africa; as he did previously when he was a businessman. 126 Based on Parsons and his “policy entrepreneur” (Parsons, 2002). More provocatively, as a former general, Luhut could be seen as an “intervention entrepreneur” advocating for military intervention with a commando approach and determining its format, notably if it should be multilateral or not, and its focus (Henke, 2020). 127 Disappointments evoked previously like the inability to deliver the Asia-Africa Center, the Asia-Africa Business Council and the lack of genuine interest in the NAASP by other great Asian powers.

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Jokowi and chief implementer Luhut permitted Indonesia’s entry into the African adventure.128 However, Indonesia’s capacity to interact effectively with Africa can still enormously increase. Knowledge of the African continent in Indonesia remains low, limiting possibilities for the moment. Understanding Jokowi’s impact, with his business mindset, means considering the complexity of policy-making and policy implementation in Indonesia; acknowledging Jokowi’s qualities and defaults as a statesman beyond ideological postures. Figures like Jokowi and Luhut allow things to happen due to their pragmatism, capacity and will to deliver. But they select their fights. LBP’s power increased all along the Jokowi presidencies as seen in his handling of strategic relationships with critical foreign partners and his multiple appointments to head special task forces by Jokowi, overseeing notably the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail, the Covid crisis, lakes, domestic production promotion, water resources, palm oil or investment in the new capital city; and the African effort (Massardi, 2022; Nugraheny, 2023b; Pratama, 2021; R. S. Putri, 2023; Redaksi, 2022; Sandi, 2022).129 Based in East Kalimantan, the new capital city,

128 Still, it might be useful to keep in mind what Jackson writes in his biography of General de Gaulle: “All biographers must guard against the temptation to impose excessive coherence on their subject ” (Jackson, 2018). 129 Luhut’s various appointments, heading multiple task forces in a military commando style, by Jokowi in more detail are the following: Chairman of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail Committee (Komite Kereta Cepat Jakarta-Bandung) in October 2021; Head of the National Team for Increasing the Use of Domestic Production (Tim Nasional Peningkatan Penggunaan Produksi Dalam Negeri or P3DN) in 2018; Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Handling Covid-19 and National Economic Recovery (Komite Penanganan Covid-19 dan Pemulihan Ekonomi Nasional or KPC-PEN) in 2020; Coordinator for the Enforcement of Community Activity Restrictions for Java-Bali (Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat (PPKM) Jawa-Bali) in 2021; Chairman of the National Lake Rescue Steering Committee (Ketua Dewan Pengarah Penyelamatan Danau Nasional) in 2021; Team Leader of the National Movement Proudly Made in Indonesia (Gerakan Nasional Bangga Buatan Indonesia) in 2021; Chairman of the National Water Resources Council in 2022. In June 2022, the President also appointed him to handle the supply crisis of cooking oil on Java and Bali islands that could have quickly become destabilising for Jokowi. In 2023, Jokowi appointed Luhut Chairman of the Task Force for Improving Governance of the Palm Oil Industry and Optimizing State Revenue or “Palm Oil Task Force” (Satuan Tugas Peningkatan Tata Kelola Industri Kelapa Sawit dan Optimalisasi Penerimaan Negara/Satuan Tugas Sawit); and Head of the National Capital Investment

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called Nusantara, is a Jokowi flagship and legacy project, envisioned by Sukarno (Clark, 2023; Lim, 2023).130 Like all major strategic projects requiring foreign investment, Luhut is in charge. Yet, the geopolitical situation and uncertainties relating to political continuity with the 2024 presidential election coming up have complicated the process, causing international investor hesitancy (Banyan, 2022). Luhut tries to give them better guarantees. Since independence, no Indonesian political leader has accumulated so many positions simultaneously, allowed by the unique “chemistry” and confidence between Jokowi and Luhut.131 In 2015, moving beyond Kemlu, Jokowi appointed twelve Ministers to attract investment from critical nations or geographic zones to accelerate Indonesia’s growth. Luhut was then in charge of Singapore only (Amindoni & Yosephine, 2015). Seven years later, the broadening of his power is evident. During Jokowi’s first period, SOEs Minister Rini Soemarno was potent in Jokowi’s entourage. Close to China, she supported increased Chinese investment in Indonesia, including the Bandung-Jakarta High-Speed Rail. She started focusing on Africa with a trip in 2019 to Madagascar and Zanzibar to expand SOEs’ presence in energy, mining, and transportation. She called for Pertamina to seek additional blocks and invest more in Africa (Arvirianty, 2019; Dirgantara, 2019; Junita, 2019). Luhut coopted both relations with China and Africa. His power concentration has been criticised in Indonesia, with doubts about his capacity alone to handle multiple responsibilities (Hardiantoro, 2022). But, Luhut has thrived politically despite his detractors, becoming one of the most powerful global leaders. For Jokowi, if not Luhut, then Acceleration Task Force (Satgas Percepatan Investasi Ibu Kota Negara) to accelerate the new National Capital’s delivery and secure foreign investment. Luhut also headed the organisation of major state events like the 2015 AAS, the IMF-World Bank 2018 gathering in Bali and the G20 Summit in Bali in 2022. 130 Sukarno had envisioned moving the capital city to Kalimantan but to the city of Palangkaraya (Andryanto, 2017). Originating in medieval Javanese literature, notably during the Majapahit Kingdom, the term Nusantara is “derived from the Old Javanese n¯ usa, “island”, and antara “outer”, nusantara means outer or other islands ”. “By Majapahit’s concept of the state, this encompassed the area outside the Javanese cultural sphere of influence, which was still obliged to pay fealty to Majapahit. This would have included the lands of present-day Indonesia including Maluku and the Sulu Archipelago, Malaysia, Singapore, southern Thailand, the Philippines , Brunei and East Timor, comprising much of maritime Southeast Asia” (Lim, 2023). 131 An expression used by Luhut. He also often uses the expression “mystery of life” to describe his successful endeavours and encounters (Massardi, 2022).

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who? Luhut and Jokowi share the same boat. Their long-term relationship means the President trusts LBP greatly, appointing him to implement his wishes safely, like during the Covid-19 crisis. Luhut successfully managed the pandemic situation. If a policy or project runs well under LBP, someone else can supervise; LBP can move to another challenge. LBP’s appointment to chair the Africa Task Force follows this pattern. For Jokowi, Luhut is the most competent figure, delivering while keeping him safe from powerful disparagers. The African effort and the chosen framework for expansion are new for Indonesia. Jokowi must ensure successful implementation. Luhut provides certainty and stability, possessing the capacity, experience, network and charisma to lead such endeavours.132 Besides, inside Kemlu, no figure was decisive regarding African relations. Luhut also benefits from his Chinese links, handy in Africa, given China’s African presence. Since 2016, both successive Directors for African Affairs have been close to Luhut and his team while respecting their official boss, Minister Retno. They help implement Luhut’s Africa strategy through Kemlu, coordinating with Luhut’s team and the presidency.133 132 Discussion with Edy Prasetyono from the IR Department of Universitas Indonesia. 133 Between 2016 and 2021, Kemlu’s Director for African Affairs was Daniel Tumpal

S. Simanjuntak, who is exceptionally close to General Luhut Pandjaitan. Tumpal also handled the Covid-19 Task Force inside Kemlu during the pandemic; thus, health diplomacy, notably the acquisition of health equipment and vaccines. This underlines his close links to Luhut, who directly supervised all these matters at the highest level with the President. Tumpal is also an Indonesian Toba Bataknese like General Luhut. In 2021, Tumpal was appointed Ambassador to Canada. There again, a critical mission supervised by LBP was given to him. The position in Canada includes being the ambassador to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) based in Montreal, Quebec. Jokowi promised to reclaim control of the Flight Information Region (FIR) over the Riau and Natula Islands managed by Singapore since 1946, a matter relating to national sovereignty that Luhut knows well as a former ambassador to Singapore and a former military figure (Adryamarthanino, 2021; Akbar, 2020; Ming, 2019; Yanwardhana, 2021). FIR realignment agreement was signed between Indonesia and Singapore in January 2022 (Kamil, 2023; Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents & Translation, 2022). The new ambassador to Canada reported directly to Luhut on this strategic mission. Africa’s health diplomacy during the Covid-19 crisis and reclaiming strategic air space control as a matter of national pride and sovereignty have thus all been handled inside Kemlu by the same Luhut protégé. Luhut’s son-in-law General Maruli Simanjuntak belongs to the same “Simanjuntak” Batak sub-clan (marga). With Luhut’s backing, General Maruli is a rising figure in the Indonesian army, having been appointed in January 2022 Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Cadangan

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Indonesia’s funding of infrastructure projects in Africa has been complicated. EximBank did not disburse promised funds. African states are debt-burdened. Apart from Pertamina, which can justify its foreign investments given Indonesia’s domestic needs for oil, Indonesian SOE directors are mostly reluctant to invest abroad for fear of being indicted for capital flight. Financing alternatives are explored with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), for example, for a laboratory in Somalia or for a Bio Farma and Institut Pasteur vaccine factory in Senegal. For political risk insurance, the Ministry of SOEs is discussing with the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC). With Japan, the right triangular scheme remains to be found for an upgraded collaboration.134 Given this financing deficiency and geopolitical evolutions, Luhut reinvented his African discourse and his task force, weaponising Afro-Asian solidarity to support domestic goals relating to the environment and commodity-based industrialisation. Representing together 52% of global primary tropical forests, Brazil, Indonesia, and the DRC formed a Tropical Forest Alliance or Forest Climate Initiative, an “OPEC of rainforests ”, a strategic alliance pledging more vigorous conservation efforts and collaboration on carbon markets and finance; willing to push developed countries to finance their conservation (Greenfield, 2022).135 Contrary to the Amazon and the Congo Basin, Indonesia’s deforestation has fallen dramatically since 2015 by 64%, aiming for excess carbon absorption by 2030 through curbing logging,

Strategis Angkatan Darat) known as Kostrad, a golden road to becoming army and/or military chief. Soeharto was the first Kostrad Commander in 1961, a position he still held when the G30S/PKI happened. As African Affairs Director, Tumpal was succeeded by the current Director, Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty (Meidy), who used to be a counsellor in the Indonesian embassy in Washington. Luhut’s main deputy in his Coordinating Ministry, previously also his spokesperson, is diplomat Jodi Mahardi, who was based in Washington with Ms Meidy. Jodi Mahardi used to be assigned to accompany Luhut when he came to the US. 134 Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 135 These three nations signed an agreement at Cop26 in Glasgow to stop deforestation by 2030. They are key to limiting global warming. All face threats relating to illegal enterprises, and unreasonable commercial logging and mining.

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fires and palm plantation land clearance.136 However, in 1900, forest covered 84% of the country, only 52% in 2010 (Van Reybrouck, 2022). This flexible and evolutive Global South cooperation, led by Luhut for Indonesia, encompasses critical minerals.137 Forming what Luhut called a cartel united in the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity and refusing to be dictated by developing countries, the three partners are inviting 12 African and 8 Latin American countries to join them in this SSC alliance around tropical forestry and critical minerals and against raw mineral exports, that should gather in Bandung in October 2023. Jokowi will also encounter several African partners during his August 2023 BRICS Summit attendance in South Africa, coupled with bilateral visits to Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique (Nugraheny, 2023a; Yanwardhana, 2023b). Developing nations should enjoy the added-value from their resources, following Indonesia’s example with nickel-based industrialisation (Darisman & Ananda, 2023; C. A. Putri, 2023). Bandung is revived for a practical purpose, defending Indonesia’s national interests while offering a new pathway for African nations. Afro-Asian states should strengthen their economies to enhance their global power. Suharto considered international power depended on “national vitality” (Leifer, 1983). Luhut weaponises Afro-Asianism to face developed countries’ domination, and bargain with them to protect hilirisasi and obtain environmental payoffs. For Luhut, the sweet Afro-Asian history relating to independence and the Bandung Spirit should be prolonged with this new concrete focus allowing better Global South welfare. Afro-Asia must unite to face developed nations’ trade imperialism in the WTO (Suryarandika, 2023). African nations have been weak when facing the WTO, given lack of funds and knowledge (Luke, 2023). A weakness in Indonesia’s approach is that it does not respect its Duty-Free Quota Free (DFQF) obligations towards African LDCs, despite agreeing to the WTO’s 2013 Bali Ministerial Decision on DFQF (Antoni, 2019). Indonesia’s nickel industrialisation strengthened the archipelago’s standing, making it able to fight for its rights.138 It is now involving other Global South nations through the Bandung spirit. Developed

136 In Ghana, for example, deforestation rose by 71% (E360 DIGEST, 2023). 137 Critics consider that the Global South “fails the test of geography, geopolitics and

economics ” (Gupta, 2023). 138 Indonesia has been described as the “Saudi Arabia of nickel” (Goodman, 2023b).

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nations have attacked Indonesia through the WTO, demanding the repeal of Indonesia’s nickel raw export ban.139 Luhut also criticised the US’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) for being discriminative against batteries containing Indonesian-sourced materials; while lauding China’s lithium battery technology, stating it was “6–7 years ahead of America”.140 Geopolitically, IRA, which supports supply chain restructuring through critical technology relocation to the US, and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, fostering secure and sustainable strategic connections in digital, energy and transport, compete against China’s BRI (Müller, 2023). Luhut formed an alliance with China in the nickel-processing sector at least, aiming to produce batteries and EVs. China processes over 80% of the needed critical minerals of the EV ecosystem (Sullivan, 2023). Korean chaebols such as Hyundai and LG are also massively investing and building factories in Indonesia for nickel-processing, batteries and EVs (Christina & Suroyo, 2022; HMG Newsroom, 2022; H.-K. Kim, 2022; Maulia, 2021). In 1955, Indonesia had leveraged Bandung for domestic issues relating to West Papua, internal rebellions or upcoming elections; in 2023, Luhut leverages the Bandung spirit to support domestic economic policies of

139 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB WTO) formed a trade dispute panel between Indonesia and the European Union in May 2023 regarding the EU’s policy of imposing compensation import duties and anti-dumping duties for Indonesian steel products. Moreover, Indonesia is appealing after losing the dispute over the ban on the export of nickel raw materials at the WTO. Yet, President Jokowi indicated several times Indonesia would continue its commodity-based industrialisation whatever happens (Suryarandika, 2023). 140 Mineral product exports, including nickel, to the US are constrained by IRA. IRA distributes subsidies worth USD 370 billion to producers who use clean energy in the US. Luhut fears batteries containing Indonesian-sourced components will not qualify for the IRA tax credit, as Indonesia does not have an FTA with the US. “The IRA makes it impossible for us to export materials because some of our production still uses Chinese technology. I just returned from China. China’s lithium battery technology is 6–7 years ahead of America” (Darisman & Ananda, 2023; C. A. Putri, 2023). Geopolitics is “complicating the move to clean energy”, according to a New York Times article on Indonesia’s nickel industrialisation. Indonesia finds itself in the middle of the US–China rivalry. Its nickel is supported by Chinese investment, which complicates its access to the US market; on top of issues of labour and environmental conditions. Indonesia has requested a trade deal with the US covering critical minerals to be labeled as a friendly country to the US. Indonesia’s nickel would then be eligible to US IRA tax credits (Goodman, 2023b). Snobbing and failing to properly engage Indonesia could turn out to be a strategic mistake with important consequences for the US.

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commodity-based industrialisation and carbon markets,141 and related conflicts with developed countries in international arenas. Luhut also leverages partnerships with multilateral institutions like UNDP with the co-creation of the Archipelagic and Island States (AIS) Forum supporting the blue economy, notably identifying seaweed-based industrialisation as strategic.142 Given his portfolio, Luhut also focuses on environmental preservation, climate change, emission reduction, particularly through mangroves and peatlands restoration, and energy transition. To implement his plans, Luhut made multiple working visits to Africa. In January 2023, he travelled to Kenya, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, notably discussing cooperation in healthcare, mining, infrastructure, energy transition or forestry. In Kenya, he met with President William Ruto. Luhut welcomed their blue economy collaboration with Kenya’s participation in the AIS Forum. Luhut sees Kenya as an important hub opening to a 300 million people market (Sudrajat & Octavia, 2023).143 The Indonesian Port Authority (Pelindo) will collaborate with the Port of Mombasa, helping it become a digital smart and green port.144 Luhut insisted on promoting sustainable energy and equitable energy transition to support green development and economic growth (Ade Irma Junida, 2023). During the visit to Indonesia of Moses Kuria in May 2023, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Investments, Trade and Industry, collaboration in palm oil was proposed to Kenya, Luhut leading the palm oil task force

141 In the environmental field, there is dualism in the government. The Ministry of Environment (Menteri KLHK) is invited to Congo Brazzaville for the Three Basins Summit in October 2023, uniting the Amazon, Borneo-Mekong and Congo Basins, and focused on SDGs and selling carbon. Website: https://thethreebasinsummit.com. Luhut’s ministry is focusing on the Tropical Forest Alliance with an interest in implementing carbon market trading. Yet, there are bureaucratic and legislative issues remaining to be handled in Indonesia. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 142 The forum was initiated by Indonesia in 2017, uniting 41 island countries to conceive solutions to maritime issues, including through blue financing and university research cooperation. Luhut noted seaweed’s many potential derivatives since it can become biofuel, fertiliser, food, an ocean cleaner, or a carbon emission catcher (Prayudhia, 2023). 143 With Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda and DRC. 144 The Mombasa port is part of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific projection, as

seen later. Jokowi’s Africa visit is focused on African countries on the Indian Ocean coast.

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also. A “deal book” was agreed spanning 18 strategic areas, including livestock exports, the blue economy, health, sustainable mining industry, EVs, infrastructure, energy transition, digitisation systems or defense. Indonesian companies would be linked with Kenyan partner companies.145 As an oil-importing country, Indonesia also offered to invest in a refinery through Pertamina. Luhut added that “there is an opportunity to bring the crude oil to Indonesia as well ” (Riyandanu, 2023). Compared to other Indonesian SOEs, Pertamina can more easily invest abroad for that reason of guaranteeing Indonesia’s oil supply, as in Algeria. Having met the DRC’s President Tshisekedi in Davos at the World Economic Forum a few days before, Luhut pursued his African tour to the DRC, meeting Prime Minister Sama Lukonde,146 discussing cooperation in climate action through their new triangular alliance with Brazil, renewable energy, sustainable mining industry, and infrastructure development. The Tropical Forest Alliance would support food resilience, eco-tourism,147 agro-forestry and environmental services, like carbon credit and carbon capture. Knowledge and experience could be shared in carbon pricing (Ade Irma Junida, 2023). In Zimbabwe, Luhut met President Emmerson Mnangagwa, evoking sustainable mining industry

145 The exact name of the “deal book” is “Implementation of Joint Business and Investment Linkages between Indonesia and Kenya”. The 18 areas listed are the “blue economy, value-added mining and Renewable Energy, especially Geothermal , Electric Vehicles, Consumable Oils, livestock and fishery industries, Infrastructure Development, Revitalization of Railway systems, Pharmaceuticals, Textiles, Oil Refineries and oil and gas industry, cooperation in the finance and banking sector including fintech, development of strategic industries such as military equipment and agricultural commodities with high economic value, especially palm oil , sugarcane and coffee, port development and human resource capacities ” (Biro Karunia, 2023c; Komunikasi, 2023b). Kemlu indicates there are discussions with Kenya concerning the formation of a “pool of funds” for African development. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 146 Luhut had met DRC’s President Tshisekedi in Davos a few days before. 147 Africa represents a reference for Indonesian tourism in ecotourism, with high quality,

high value-added programmes, and special interests tourism, like sports tourism, sports camp, safaris and religious tourism. Given the history of Sheikh Yusuf in South Africa, Indonesia shares an emotional and inner bond (“ikatan emosional, bathin”) with South Africa. South Africa is “top of mind” for Indonesia. Author’s Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, 06.06.2023, Jakarta, at the Minister’s home.

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and energy transition, healthcare cooperation, transportation infrastructure development, especially railways, forestry cooperation, and the digital economy, notably innovative funding, digital infrastructure and skills (Ade Irma Junida, 2023). Potentially supplying 20% of global lithium needs, in December 2022, Zimbabwe banned raw lithium exports and plans to produce lithium domestically and, more generally, industrialise based on its various commodities, in partnership with China (Müller, 2023). Essential for developing its battery and EV ecosystem, Indonesia wants to secure lithium from African countries since its bid for Australian lithium seems complicated (Maulia, 2023). In May 2023, Luhut brought a DRC delegation to visit Indonesia’s major nickel industrial park, showcasing Indonesia’s EV ecosystem and the benefits of hilirisasi for Indonesia, and potentially for Africa if it followed Indonesia’s example.148 Previously, in December 2019, Luhut visited Dar es Salaam; his first visit to Africa since his African Task Force’s formation. Observable is Luhut’s predominant concentration on East African nations. A PTA possibility with the EAC was evoked, and SOEs collaboration in infrastructure, energy and mining, notably involving WIKA, Indonesia Eximbank, and Indonesian mining SOE PT Timah with Tanzania’s STAMICO (State Mining Company). Since acquiring a French oil & gas company, Pertamina produces gas in Tanzania since 2017 and wishes to increase its Tanzanian operations (Hamdani, 2019).149 Tanzania’s Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, January Yusuf Makamba, 148 Indonesian Industrial Area Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) based in Morowali, Central Sulawesi. IMIP is mostly supported by Chinese investment into nickel-processing as part of the BRI in collaboration with Indonesia’s GMF (Lidiawati, 2023). Like many Jokowi projects, the actual deal for IMIP was made under SBY but could be delivered under Jokowi. In 2013, the agreement was signed between SBY and President Xi Jinping. China Development Bank loaned over $1.2bn. In a polluted atmosphere yet full of economic opportunity, IMIP gathers over 50 factories across 10,000 acres and 6000 Chinese workers (Goodman, 2023a). IMIP pollution while generating economic opportunity. Moving the pollution involved in the nickel industry away from Chinese cities. Pollution and social strife in exchange for upward mobility. IMIP The park was officially created in 2013 through an agreement announced by Indonesia’s then-president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and President Xi Jinping of China 149 The construction of a five-star hotel in Dodoma between WIKA and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) worth US$ 33 million was also agreed upon. Opening wider the doors to Africa, Pertamina acquired a majority stake in Maurel & Prom in 2017, with oil & gas production in Gabon, Angola, Tanzania, Namibia, and Nigeria notably. Website: www.maureletprom.fr.

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visited Jakarta in February 2023. Luhut insisted on sovereignty and sustainable natural resource management that all countries should enjoy. The Dasasila Bandung created an Afro-Asian shared destiny against colonialism. Indonesia and Africa can support each other as complementary partners, consolidating their collaboration internationally (Karunia, 2023a). Retno also met her Tanzanian counterpart in Jakarta in June 2023. Indonesian exports expansion in rubber tire, fertilisers, and F&B, and health cooperation, were evoked. Retno insisted on the many development cooperation programmes with Tanzania, including capacitybuilding and training on food security, trade, investment and education; willing to extend in agriculture, mining and energy. In the long run, a country-specific cooperation plan on development cooperation would be developed (Kemlu, 2023b). There again, Indonesia appears as a potential model for Tanzania in many fields, including governmental data systems.150 Visits of African leaders to Indonesia have multiplied since the Tanzanian embassy’s opening in Jakarta in 2022, encouraged by the new dynamism of Afro-Indonesian links.151 With seven embassies in Asia, Tanzania is seeking to learn lessons from Asia. The Tanzanian ambassador to Indonesia indicates Tanzania wants to learn from Indonesia’s fast industrialisation, notably “beneficiation” or hilirisasi. SOE collaborations are encouraged, notably between Indonesia’s electricity SOE PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) and Tanzania’s TANESCO (Tanzania Electric Supply Company) for capacity-building, electricity distribution and

150 Tanzania and its autonomous region Zanzibar leaders visited the Indonesian Finance Ministry’s National Single Window Agency (LNSW), studying the implementation of Indonesia’s single-window system, which allows single submission of data and information, synchronous processing, and decision-making for customs clearance and cargo release (Bhwana, 2023). Kemlu finds Tanzania very active. They want to collaborate with the National Defense College (NDC) and are “impressed with Indonesian apps ”. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 151 The Tanzanian embassy was inaugurated officially in June 2023 in the presence of the Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stergomena Tax, who greeted Jokowi at the airport in Dar es Salaam on 21 August 2023. More African embassies are opening in Jakarta. Kenya also opened in 2022. Angola, Rwanda and Eswatini are set to open in 2023. Author’s Meeting with Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 31.05.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. There are 14 African embassies in Jakarta: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

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technical training. Luhut facilitated those high-level meetings by directly calling Indonesian SOE CEOs, including PLN and Pertamina; otherwise difficult to meet for African ambassadors. Indonesian private companies like Indesso, a global leader in clove oil derivatives,152 or MedcoEnergi are also present in Tanzania. Indonesia’s vocational education system is perceived positively. The ambassador had just attended a seminar on skin tanning organised through SSTC with Germany. After Ethiopia, Tanzania holds the second livestock in Africa, which it wants to export to Indonesia. Tanzania suffers a trade deficit with Indonesia. There is room for improvement. Since Indonesia is much bigger, it remains tolerable. Tanzania exports cotton, tobacco and cashew nuts, according to the Ambassador.153 The latter are exported through Vietnam. The ambassador hopes a PTA with Indonesia would foster direct exports. Maritime security and higher education are on his agenda for the future. He suggests Indonesia should collaborate more with the AU and remember that Africa is not monolithic; African countries have different priorities.154 Through Africa, Luhut, with Kemlu, positions Indonesia as a new model in infrastructure, industrialisation, maritime issues, digital, energy, food, health or transport for African nations. Resource-rich African nations are privileged to enter into a potential coalition with Indonesia that will help defend Indonesia’s commodity-based industrialisation against developed countries’ interests fighting against Indonesia’s raw export bans of nickel and other resources. By mobilising the Afro-Asian spirit, Indonesia serves its national interests and potentially helps African nations develop their industrialisation and welfare in parallel. Deprived of solid funding and investment capacities, Luhut pragmatically reinvented Indonesia’s African discourse as a developmental, sustainability, maritime and industrialisation model in the Afro-Asian Bandung spirit; serving its domestic interests like the 1955 Conference did. The absence of discussions with civil society actors during his visits can be noted. In the future,

152 In 2021, Indesso opened a clove leaf oil field distillation unit in Pemba Island, Zanzibar, Tanzania (Indesso Media, 2021). 153 According to Tanzania Daily News, the UN Comtrade database indicates the main products exported by Tanzania to Indonesia in the past 3 years were cloves, cocoa beans and raw tobacco; imports from Indonesia were dominated by CPO (Gowela, 2023). 154 Author’s Interview with H.E. Macocha Tembele, Ambassador of Tanzania to Indonesia since September 2022. Ambassador Tembele was former President Benjamin Mkapa’s assistant until his death in 2020.

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he might be reminded, for example, that trade unions are powerful in Kenya (Procopio, 2018). In July 2023, acting like a super sherpa, Luhut visited in a week South Africa, the DRC and Kenya, with a business delegation from various sectors like cattle, palm oil, mining, and oil and gas to prepare for Jokowi’s first African visit, ensuring its success and concrete results (Junida, 2023a). Always evoking the Bandung spirit, Luhut was received by President Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa and announced Jokowi would attend the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg on 22–24 August 2023, reinforcing his Global South positioning. Luhut revealed deals for Indonesian imports of 50,000 beef cattle and 300,000 tonnes of soybean from South Africa would be signed then by Jokowi (Damiana, 2023).155 Luhut also envisaged Pertamina and PLN supplying electricity to South Africa, which suffers electricity shortages, through Indonesia’s Mozambican gas concession, revealing how Indonesia was starting to integrate African dynamics. Indonesia was sharing its mineral hilirisasi experience with South Africa, as a multiplier effect for economic growth and its competitive EV ecosystem; potentially supporting African EV projects (Africa, 2023).156 In the DRC, Luhut met President Félix Tshisekedi for the second time in 2023 and delivered Jokowi’s official proposal to establish trilateral cooperation for tropical forests protection and fighting climate change, with Brazil. The agreement would be signed on August 25, just after the BRICS Summit. Apart from industrialisation, digitalisation, decarbonisation, connectivity or education, Luhut proposed to work with Angola on oil and gas blocks, pursuing his triangular endeavours, and cooperation in copper hilirisasi, sharing technology157 ; cobalt being a copper by-product. The DRC and Zambia, both forming the Copper Belt with some of the world’s largest copper reserves, formed the Zambia-DRC

155 If disease and quarantine issues could be dealt with. 156 Other source: Luhut’s Instagram account @luhut.pandjaitan, 12 July 2023. It is

unclear which gas from Mozambique Luhut means; maybe from the gas bloc owned by Indonesian company Energi Mega Persada. South Africa has its own plans to produce and export EVs; and SADC, rich in lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel and graphite, a regional beneficiation strategy (Müller, 2023). 157 The DRC and Indonesia have, respectively, the 7th and 9th copper reserves, representing 4% and 3% of world reserves. Source statista.com For a mapping of cobalt and copper production in the DRC: https://chinaglobalsouth.com/cobalt/.

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Battery Council to produce lithium-ion batteries and EVs.158 Tshisekedi accepted Indonesia’s offer to train DRC military personnel. Indonesia would send an additional battalion to strengthen the peacekeeping force in DRC (Junida, 2023b). In Kenya, Luhut met once again President Ruto. Pertamina would invest $2.5bn in geothermal and an oil refinery, serving the Kenyan and neighbouring markets, and Indonesia. Pharmaceutical and textile collaborations were moving forward. The state-owned army weapons manufacturer Pindad was exploring cooperation opportunities with the Kenyan Ministry of Defense. Palm oil industries and the import of 20,000 cattle heads from Kenya would soon obtain permits. Sustainability was at the heart of the cooperation, according to Luhut, to reinforce the “strategic position of developing countries ” facing global challenges (Utami & Rahmatika, 2023).159 Luhut’s 2019 visit to Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa was intended to “strengthen” his Infrastructure Task Force, accompanied by SOE directors from WIKA, PT Timah, Pertamina and Indonesia Eximbank, following the 2019 IAID. Luhut insisted outbound FDI differs from capital flight, and could boost Indonesian exports. In Cape Town, Luhut met the South African Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Ebrahim Patel, explaining, among other topics, hilirisasi policy. Livestock exports were already evoked (Kemlu, 2019a). In 2023, Luhut was now received everywhere in Africa at the presidential level. Hilirisasi had now assumed the spotlight, given the Indonesian state’s need to defend the policy internationally and its difficulties to invest abroad; with exceptions like Pertamina especially, which benefits from the justification of fulfilling national energy security requirements. In total symbiosis with Jokowi, Luhut fully incarnates the President when he travels, conveying key messages and handling the most strategic issues; allowing him to negotiate and make deals with foreign partners. He can also move forward Indonesia Inc., which is not an easy task without upmost power and credibility. While Luhut was on his African tour meeting heads of state, Retno was at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting dealing with regional issues, notably Myanmar (Joint Communique of The 56th ASEAN Foreign

158 Supported notably by the African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the US state (Müller, 2023). 159 Other source: Luhut’s Instagram account @luhut.pandjaitan, 14 July 2023.

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Ministers’ Meeting, 2023). At the same event, with a softer tone, Jokowi invited “advanced economies ” to support developing nations.160 Kemlu took care of “normal ” diplomacy while Luhut managed high politics, big business, and Jokowi’s core strategic projects. Retno played the middle power part; Luhut the more revisionist, emerging great power one.161 Africa was Luhut’s turf. Even the internationally known Minister of SOEs, Erick Thohir, was not seen interfering too much in Indonesian SOEs’ African expansion.162 Jokowi was reigning as a Javanese leader, telling the ASEAN Plus meeting crowd, gathering the Chinese, US and India Foreign Ministers, to avoid zero-sum politics, using the Javanese proverb “menang tanpo ngasorake”, meaning one should win without demeaning others (Shofa, 2023).

Jokowi’s Historical African Visit Luhut having prepared the ground, Jokowi was now ready for his longawaited African tour, which would confirm and show to the world and to the Indonesian people the seriousness of his African engagement, which reinforced his legacy as an Indonesian president in the footsteps of President Sukarno. The visit would be largely ceremonial and symbolic, another signal of Indonesia’s rise and resolve to avoid geopolitical entanglements. Luhut had already attended to business matters. As the preeminent Indonesian leader, the President imparted the concluding state, and Javanese, touch through his presence in Africa. Occurring at the end of August 2023, from the 20th to the 24th of August, Jokowi’s African visit was historical, given that Indonesian presidents have mostly ignored Africa since Sukarno (BPMI Setpres, 2023q). Since Suharto faced turmoil in Indonesia while visiting Egypt, bringing his fall in May 1998, a Javanese belief or “stigma” exists concerning presidential visits to Africa. A President is doomed if he visits Africa too early.

160 “We are ASEAN countries. Developing countries that need care, wisdom, and support

from all advanced economies so [they would] leave the zero-sum approach and embrace a mutually beneficial approach” (Shofa, 2023). 161 Yet, Luhut’s main deputy and diplomat, Jodi Mahardi, was in charge of handling Luhut’s African visit, facilitating Kemlu’s approval of Luhut’s endeavours. 162 As seen previously, Wirajuda told the author Luhut was in charge of coordinating SOE internationalisation for coherence and efficiency reasons.

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He should visit at the end of his mandate to stay in power.163 Decisions concerning the presidential visit depended on Jokowi and Luhut; Kemlu being consulted, sharing its expertise and organising the diplomatic agenda.164 Preceding the President, who postponed his travel by one day and departed Indonesia from the city of Medan on the 20th, Retno left for Africa between 18 and 25 August 2023. During Retno’s eight-day absence, Jokowi appointed Tito Karnavian, the Minister of Home Affairs, as Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs. He appointed Sandiaga Uno, the Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, as Ad Interim Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment as long as General Luhut was in Africa (Nugraheny, 2023a; Ramadhan, 2023; Satrio, 2023; Yanwardhana, 2023b). Leaving from Medan, Jokowi was accompanied by General Luhut, the Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung and the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Arifin Tasrif, while Minister Retno was already in Africa (BPMI Setpres, 2023q). The Indonesian government repeatedly emphasised that Jokowi’s five-day visit to the African continent was meant to reignite the “Bandung Spirit” (Tanamal, 2023); and was “not just nostalgia”, as an editorial of The Jakarta Post highlighted (Editorial Board, 2023a). During his first visit to Africa, Jokowi stated that he was bringing with him the “Bandung Spirit” to strengthen solidarity and cooperation between Global South nations (BPMI Setpres, 2023q). Developing nations should consolidate their partnerships, and their voices should be better heard in the world (BPMI Setpres, 2023w).

163 Author’s Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, 06.06.2023, Jakarta, at the Minister’s home. For some perspective, Prime Minister then President Erdo˘gan visited himself 31 African countries on official highlevel trips, boosting Türkiye in Africa (Coffey, 2021; MOFA Türkiye, n.d.; Schipani & Pitel, 2021). 164 The author discussed the visit with various Kemlu diplomats, the Directorate for African Affairs during a special session and in several communications, and political figures. Many changes occurred. Initially willing to ensure geographical equilibrium between North, East, West, Central and Southern Africa, the visit was originally going to potentially last 7 days, visiting 6 countries. Yet, visiting 3 or 4 countries was more feasible. Early July was envisaged, then the end of July–early August, but then finally, it was decided that Jokowi would attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa at the end of August. Jokowi would visit South Africa for the BRICS Summit, and Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique. The visit to the DRC was still “on–off” until the last minute, according to governmental sources, yet did not happen. Jokowi met the DRC Prime Minister in Johannesburg. The East Africa/Indian Ocean focus of the visit is striking.

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Jokowi started his tour in the Republic of Kenya, where he met President William Ruto before moving to Tanzania to encounter President Samia Suluhu Hassan. Then, President Jokowi travelled to the Republic of Mozambique to hold a bilateral meeting with President Filipe Nyusi (BPMI Setpres, 2023q). The visit ended in South Africa, where Jokowi attended, as a guest and chair of ASEAN, the 15th BRICS Summit being held in Johannesburg, where he met President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Prime Minister of the DRC, Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde. Jokowi’s four African country itinerary had been carefully elaborated. The Deputy for Protocol, Press and Media of the Presidential Secretariat, Bey Machmudin, indicated that the selection related to Jokowi’s time constraints and the availability of African heads of state. He emphasised that all countries in the world, notably in Africa, are equal and have the same importance for Indonesia (Jingga, 2023c). Indonesia would consider and respect all African nations, whatever their size and strategic weight. This narrative might somewhat clash with Indonesia’s focus on resource-rich nations and Luhut’s minilateral hilirisasi diplomacy. For Kemlu, Jokowi’s African tour aimed to solidify Global South solidarity and cooperation in the Bandung Spirit or Bandung Spirit Reborn; and boost economic cooperation (Kemlu, 2023a). As seen in this book, Minister Retno evolved in her narrative from “Beyond the Bandung Spirit” to returning to the classical “Bandung Spirit” and now the “Bandung Spirit Reborn” launched during Jokowi’s African travels. The geopolitical situation and Indonesia’s hilirisasi policy call for a return to the Bandung fundamentals, useful to mobilise the Global South. In a “behind the scene” interview while in Nairobi, Luhut indicated the sequence leading to Jokowi’s African visit started in Davos in January 2023, where Luhut met President Tshisekedi as described previously. Luhut also had a friend, an alumnus of the Kenya National Defence University, whom he contacted to open doors in Kenya as an “entry point” for Indonesia. Therefore, the evolving approach’s opportunistic and flexible character can be underlined again. In the interview, Luhut emphasised Indonesia came to Africa as a “global player”, and a Global South and Afro-Asian leader, with the motto of “Bandung Spirit Reborn”. Hilirisasi relating to tropical forestry and critical minerals represented a long-term “mega project ” for the developing world, which Indonesia could not handle alone. Luhut revealed he asked Jokowi’s permission to explore the matter with Africa as the continent of the future. Jokowi supported the endeavour for more equality and prosperity

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by creating added-value poverty (Lubis, 2023c). Having failed due to a funding capacity deficit, the infrastructure task force effort is forgotten, and it is as if the African endeavour had started anew in 2023 with a prioritisation of hilirisasi diplomacy. It is not only the Bandung Spirit, which was reborn, but also the African foreign policy, a flexible and ad hoc approach in Luhut’s commando, special forces style. Luhut has openly said he worked closely with a “prominent Pan-African businessman”, South African Robert Gumede, owner of the Guma Group, to boost business relations between Indonesian SOEs and corporations in South Africa and other African countries where the Guma Group operates, which includes the countries Jokowi and Luhut visited. Joint projects comprise “the mining of critical minerals for electric vehicles (EV ), B2B trading, energy security, oil and gas , and climate change” (Biro Komunikasi, 2023a). Pertamina is working with him and his Guma Group, notably in Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa. Gumede is a businessman close to the South African ANC party; some say he is even a creation of the party, representing crony capitalism (Waal, 2013). This underlines the progressive integration of Indonesian and African oligarchic networks. On 20–21 August 2023, Jokowi visited Kenya. The visit was qualified as “historical ”, like the whole tour. It was the first time in over forty years an Indonesian President travelled to Kenya, the last visit taking place in 1982 (Lubis, 2023d). After an eight-hour flight on Garuda Indonesia aircraft GIA-1 from Medan, Jokowi was welcomed at the Jomo Kenyatta Nairobi International Airport by the Indonesian Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya, Mohamad Hery Saripudin,165 the Indonesian Defense Attaché in Pretoria, Col. Mar. Burhanudin, the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Mutua and the Kenyan Minister of Mines, Blue Economy and Maritime Affairs Salim Mvurya. The visit was “layered” and combined G-to-G, B-to-B and P-to-P aspects (V. El Rahman, 2023). Political symbolism and grandeur were added to the visit, which aimed to seal the breakthroughs negotiated by Luhut. The powerful political tandem was in action once again, now in Africa.

165 The Indonesian mission to Kenya was started in 1979, but bilateral affairs were covered by the Indonesian embassy in Brunei Darussalam from 1979 to 1982. The embassy was opened in Nairobi in 1982. The embassy counts 117 Indonesian citizens in Kenya, mainly professionals, international public officers working for the UN secretariat or the World Bank, and sailors in Mombasa (V. El Rahman, 2023).

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Honouring the host country, Jokowi lay a wreath on the heroes’ graves at the Jomo Kenyatta’s Mausoleum. Jokowi met President Ruto at the State House for a bilateral meeting to enhance relations. Indonesia and Kenya shared long-term and close historical ties. Speaking in reality to the whole developing world, Jokowi told Ruto, “This ‘Bandung spirit’ is what I brought to Kenya, the spirit to strengthen cooperation between the Global South countries ” (BPMI Firdaus, 2023b; Setpres, 2023a, 2023f, 2023j, 2023m, 2023n). Leveraging the presidential visit, Indonesia also requested Kenya’s support for Indonesia’s candidacy as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2029–2030, serving a multilateral objective (Kemlu, 2023a). Indeed, Nairobi is also an important UN capital for environmental and housing issues, which Indonesia cannot ignore. Sharing the Indian Ocean, Indonesia and Kenya are distant neighbours. Kenyan media were mobilised to “glorify the presidential visit ” and promote Indonesia (V. El Rahman, 2023). Jokowi’s African tour is fully focused on African nations bordering the Indian Ocean, part of Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific vision, underlining a clear strategic choice. According to Jokowi. Indonesia–Kenya relations had intensified, given Indonesia’s foreign policy prioritisation of Africa in the last nine years. As explained previously, Jokowi’s African focus did not start immediately after he became president. It was a process, described in this book, engineered by General Luhut in particular with Jokowi’s blessing. A long-term friend since Bandung and the NAM, Kenya was described as an entry point for Indonesia in Sub-Saharan Africa and Indonesia as Kenya’s ASEAN gate. Indonesia also wishes to gain access to the EAC and COMESA through Kenya (Owino, 2023). Jokowi pushed for the signature of a PTA with Kenya in the next three months to facilitate trade and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) for investments. Jokowi emphasised that “In the future, this will continue to be improved, especially for sectors that are Kenya’s priority”, highlighting Indonesia was listening to Kenya’s wishes and needs (BPMI Firdaus, 2023b; Setpres, 2023a, 2023f, 2023j, 2023m, 2023n). In total, 15 MoUs and agreements were concluded in Kenya involving the government, SOEs and private companies (Kemlu, 2023a).166 166 In detail, as presented by Kemlu: 3 MoUs from the respective Governments in energy, mining and geology and in the pharmaceutical sector; 1 Intergovernmental LoI for investment; 2 geothermal MoUs on the Indonesian side carried out by Pertamina Geothermal Energy; 1 MoU on cooperation in the upstream oil and gas sector by

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Pertamina fully supported and participated in Jokowi’s historical African visit, notably through a substantial PR campaign underlining its African expansion and deals (News Room, 2023a). Planning to invest around $2.5bn in Kenya,167 Pertamina Group’s subsidiaries, Pertamina International Exploration and Production (PIEP) and Pertamina Geothermal Energy (PGE) signed joint agreements with Kenyan counterparts for the development of the upstream to downstream and geothermal sectors; thus, Jokowi’s BIT requirement for investment protection. Pertamina’s CEO, Nicke Widyawati, indicated Pertamina Group prioritises cooperation that benefits Indonesia, serving Indonesia’s national energy security needs, in the “spirit of bringing the barrel home” (Azzahara, 2023; Kemlu, 2023a; News Room, 2023b). Geothermal is prioritised in Kenya, given its relatively small fossil energy deposits. In oil, Pertamina is considering taking over a British-owned field (V. El Rahman, 2023). Overall, Luhut indicated Indonesia could progressively handle over 300,000 barrels per day from Kenya; for Kenya, the region and Indonesia (Lubis, 2023c). In terms of trade, the importance of the Sinar Mas Group was underlined by the Indonesian ambassador. Three major products dominated Indonesian exports to Kenya and its landlocked neighbours like Uganda, Rwanda or South Sudan, transferred through Kenyan ports: CPO, paper products, and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCGs); the first two products being in majority from Sinar Mas. 80% of CPO exported to Kenya comes from Indonesia, and 60% of Indonesian exports in value to Kenya are represented by CPO (V. El Rahman, 2023). Considering that Jokowi is also very close to that group, this underlines the influence of major Indonesian conglomerates in Indonesian foreign policy. Luhut said he contacted the Wings Group to invest in Africa, a prominent Indonesian consumer goods conglomerate also involved in palm oil (Lubis, 2023c). Indonesia has been offered concessions and land surpassing 200 thousand hectares to develop palm plantations and palm-based industrialisation Pertamina; 2 MoUs for penetration of Indonesian pharmaceutical products were carried out by Biofarma and 1 other was carried out by Combiphar; 1 MoU related to support for meeting the domestic demand for meat; 1 MoU related to joint ventures for plantations, refineries and marketing of palm oil and its derivatives; 1 MoU related to joint investment for the development of the textile industry; 1 MoU related to mining exploration and development in Kenya. 1 Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) related to upstream oil and gas exploration cooperation by Pertamina (Kemlu, 2023a). 167 Luhut even said over $3bn investment (Lubis, 2023c).

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in Kenya. The Indonesian government has proposed the opportunity to Indonesian conglomerates (V. El Rahman, 2023). During Jokowi’s visit, Indonesia donated a cooking oil pumping machine and five thousand litres of palm oil to Kenya (Yanwardhana, 2023a). Suffering from bans in Europe, Indonesia aims to increase its CPO shipments towards Africa to diversify (Lidyana, 2023). Indonesia wants to support palm oil downstreaming in Africa with a 1 million tonnes production objective, according to Luhut (Lubis, 2023c). Indomie instant noodles have been produced in Mombasa since 2012, with a brand manager based in Nairobi covering the East African market. Indonesia buys agro-industry products from Kenya, like coffee, tea, avocado and fresh flowers. Indonesian garment players are also ready to invest in Kenya, such as Surakarta-based Sritex, Jokowi’s hometown (V. El Rahman, 2023). Another key theme emphasised by President Jokowi, concluding Luhut’s preparations, was health cooperation and resilience. During Luhut’s visit, a Letter of Intent (LoI) had been signed, which was followed up by an MoU during Jokowi’s visit. Indonesian vaccines and pharmaceutical products were competitive in the East African market. Cooperation between the National Agencies for Food and Drug Control was confirmed, and Jokowi wished it would be expanded. Bio Farma signed agreements with BioVax and Generics Africa Ltd.; PT Combiphar with TRAC Eco Pharma LTD also (BPMI Setpres, 2023a, 2023f, 2023j, 2023m, 2023n; Firdaus, 2023b; Kemlu, 2023a; Yanwardhana, 2023a). In development cooperation, Jokowi underlined that Indonesia AID would provide health, food security and disaster management assistance to Kenya in line with Kenyan needs and Indonesian objectives. He indicated this would be progressively increased according to Kenyan priorities. Indonesian AID would support drought relief assistance and capacitybuilding programmes in family planning and reproductive health, provide training in rice agribusiness and supply Indonesian health equipment (Imandiar, 2023). All this served Indonesia’s market strategy penetration in East Africa. Indonesia was elaborating a “Grand Design for development cooperation with Africa” in several priority sectors. The President invited Kenya to strengthen the Bandung Spirit again by promoting collaboration with the Global South countries (Kemlu, 2023a). Yet, Kenya wishes to increase its trade capacity and reduce its balance of trade deficit with Indonesia in time. It expects Indonesia to help its penetration of the ASEAN market and attract multinationals to invest

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in Kenyan industrialisation, notably in edible oil processing, which will raise its trade (Business Staff Reporter, 2023). Kenya wants to expand its export markets to better its international trade balance and gather foreign exchange. Kenya suffers trade deficits with Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, importing up to ten times more than its exports to those nations (Owino, 2023). Potential future tensions between Indonesia and Kenya can be envisaged here due to perceived unequal terms of trade, which is a classical grievance of African nations towards their major external partners. While Jokowi only stayed for a night in Nairobi, he invited President Ruto to come to Indonesia and stay for more than one or two days; jokingly telling President Ruto to remain a month (Gayati, 2023). Still, this indicated an asymmetry in the relationship; Indonesian power and attractivity being superior. The use of the term “Grand design” also seemed grandiloquent, with a risk of disappointing African partners if Indonesia fails to deliver. Major infrastructure projects Indonesia was supposed to deliver in Africa have not been built, given Indonesia’s funding deficiencies. Jokowi’s announcement cannot be detached from his wish to ensure his presidential legacy through the Afro-Asian theme. Still, Indonesia’s determination is genuine and should be taken seriously in the long run. On 21–22 August 2023, Jokowi was in Tanzania. The GIA-1 presidential aircraft arrived at Julius Nyerere International Airport, Dar Es Salaam, late afternoon. The Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stergomena Tax, greeted Jokowi with the Indonesian Ambassador to Tanzania, Tri Yogo Jatmiko and again the Indonesian Defense Attaché in Pretoria, Colonel Mar Burhanuddin. Jokowi’s visit to Tanzania was the first for an Indonesian President in over 30 years, since President Suharto visited in 1991. In the four African countries visited by Jokowi, the Defense Attaché was the same, highlighting the scarcity of Indonesian Defense Attachés in Africa. On the morning of 22 August 2023, his third day in Africa, Jokowi met with Samia Suluhu Hassan, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, at Dar Es Salaam State House. Bilateral cooperation and the signing of seven MoUs were on the agenda. To boost trade and protect investments, Jokowi encouraged the establishment of a PTA and a BIT. Like in Kenya, Jokowi called for strengthening Global South solidarity

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and collaboration in the continuity of Bandung and the NAM. Representing 85% of the global population,168 “the world should listen to the voice and interests of the Global South, including the right to take a leap in development ”, said Jokowi. The President stated that Indonesia would support Africa’s development concretely through its “grand design”, which was being finalised. Indonesia would “walk the talk to create concrete collaboration with Africa”. For Jokowi, “visiting Tanzania was like visiting close relatives ”, given a similarity of identity. “Indonesia has Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika, while in Tanzania it is Uhuru na Umoja”. These philosophies preserve unity and respect diversity, which represents “a big capital ” for strengthening the Indonesia–Tanzania partnership (BPMI Firdaus, 2023a; Jingga, 2023a; Setpres, 2023g, 2023h, 2023i, 2023p, 2023s, 2023x). Placing the relationship with African nations at the ideological level underlines Indonesia’s seriousness in making serious inroads on the continent. President Hassan stated, “We aim to strengthen our cooperation further in industries, energy, minerals, oil and gas , fishing, tourism, and the hospitality sector. This includes the exchange of knowledge and technology”. The Tanzanian President wished for knowledge exchange for palm oil production since Indonesia was the global leader. She noted, “More collaboration is envisioned in agriculture transformation, the private sector, and efficient management of state business enterprises. Indonesia is one of the bestperforming countries when it comes to running commercial enterprises such as the success of Pertamina” (Christopher, 2023). Indonesia was taken seriously and considered a potential alternative partner that could help Tanzania develop. The agricultural sector would be prioritised to support Tanzania’s development with collaborations in modern technology and the production of better seeds to support farmers. The Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Dr. Tax, recalled, “This is a continuation as in 1996 Indonesia established Farmer’s Agriculture and Rural Training Centre (FARTC) in Mkindo, Morogoro, where Indonesian agriculture experts provide training for Tanzanian farmers ”. In 2004, an MoU had been signed on the establishment of a joint commission, the Indonesia-Tanzania Joint Agriculture Cooperation Committee (JACC), which was supposed to boost agricultural sector cooperation with capacity-building through training, joint 168 Analyses differ on how many nations belong to the “Global South”, a contested concept. 78 is a number often cited (Gupta, 2023).

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research and market access facilitation (Gowela, 2023; Jingga, 2023a). There again, it is uncertain if the scale of the proposed Indonesian agricultural support justifies the use of the term “grand design”, which entails a substantial magnitude of investment and impact. The energy sector was the highest priority in reality. Jokowi indicated that “Indonesia wants to increase investment in Tanzania, including in managing the Mnazi Bay Gas Block by Pertamina and processing natural gas into chemicals and fertilisers ”. Concluding Luhut’s previous visits, MoUs were agreed on cooperation in the energy sector, electricity cooperation between PLN and TANESCO, mining between MIND ID and STAMICO, and oil and gas between Pertamina and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC). Like the CEO of Pertamina, the CEO of PLN, Darmawan Prasodjo, was also present with Jokowi.169 PLN will support the development of the electricity sector ecosystem in Tanzania, notably in clean energy. TANESCO would follow the PLN transformational example in digital transformation, business development, and human resource capacity. Africa represents a massive opportunity for PLN (BPMI Donovan, 2023; Setpres, 2023g, 2023p). Following Indonesia’s engagement pattern in Africa, Jokowi also underlined Indonesia’s commitment to increasing Tanzania’s health resilience by supplying required pharmaceutical products. An MoU on Health Cooperation was signed. In general, Minister Retno Marsudi reported that the President of Tanzania told Jokowi Tanzania wanted to learn from Indonesia, especially in infrastructure development and industrial downstreaming or hilirisasi. Tanzania was also interested in lessons and expertise from Indonesia in the palm oil industry, BUMN management, and diplomatic training. A team from Tanzania was invited to Indonesia by Jokowi in view of the development of a diplomatic school curriculum (BPMI Setpres, 2023g, 2023h, 2023i, 2023p, 2023s, 2023x). Indonesia continued to position itself as an alternative model for Africa, able to propose a vast range of cooperations. Success will be judged on concrete results and continuity. On 22–23 August 2023, Jokowi was in Mozambique. Jokowi arrived at Maputo International Airport on GIA-1 from Tanzania at around 17:00 local time on the 22nd. The Indonesian President was welcomed by 169 Prasodjo is originally a PDI-P politician close to Jokowi. He wrote an Englishlanguage biography about Jokowi (Prasodjo & Hannigan, 2021).

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Mozambique’s Minister of Mineral Resources, Carlos Joaquim Zacarias, State Secretary Maputo Manuel Vicente, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique, Manuel Jose Goncalves, the Ambassador of Mozambique to Indonesia Belmiro Jose Malate, and the Governor of Maputo Province, Iolanda Cintura. On the Indonesian side, the Indonesian Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique and Malawi, Herry Sudrajat, and, as usual, the Indonesian Defense Attaché in Pretoria, were present. After underlying ideological similarities with Tanzania, Jokowi emphasised cultural diversity resemblance with Mozambique by attending the opening ceremony of the 2023 Mozambique National Festival of Culture on August 23rd, invited by the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi. Jokowi invited the people of Mozambique to leverage cultural diversity to strengthen cooperation. Like Mozambique, the Indonesian President underlined that Indonesia is full of cultural diversity and respect for differences. For Jokowi, “Mozambique is a close friend of Indonesia and is Indonesia’s first Preferential Trade Agreement partner in Africa”. Until now, Indonesia has only signed a PTA in Africa with Mozambique. Kemlu sources indicated that the PTA was not yet producing the expected effects. A Joint Committee should be formed to showcase the benefits of the PTA. President Jokowi and President Nyusi were determined to optimise this Indonesia-Mozambique PTA for it to produce its effects. Jokowi asked Mozambique to facilitate Indonesian exports of wood and trains notably. Still, Jokowi stated that “Since the Preferential Trade Agreement between Indonesia and Mozambique was implemented in 2022, trade has increased significantly, namely 78 per cent as of June this year”. Yet, commodity prices probably explain that rise. Jokowi also called for the establishment of a BIT to secure Indonesian investments (BPMI Setpres, 2023c, 2023k, 2023l, 2023o, 2023r). President Nyusi told Jokowi, “We’d like to hear more from your experience on how to be free from dependence on raw materials trade through your country’s policy of banning nickel and bauxite exports ” (Maulia, 2023). Hilirisasi diplomacy was in continuous action. Energy took once again the centre stage. Jokowi said, “I welcome the investment plan for end-to-end gas management by Indonesian BUMNs and the expansion of investment in the power generation sector”, “As well as the production and distribution of gas sales by Indonesian private companies ”. An MoU between PIEP and Buzi Hydrocarbons Pte. Ltd (BHPL) revealed a joint commitment in the oil and gas sector, notably in upstream, midstream, downstream, gas power generation and data

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sharing. BHPL is a national private oil and gas company controlled by the Indonesian Bakrie Group, with a 75% participating interest in the Buzi field in Mozambique. Luhut is historically close to the Bakrie family. They are senior leaders of the same political party, Golkar. The PertaminaBakrie collaboration aimed to boost the Buzi block’s production and commercialisation. Like in Kenya, Pertamina also signed an MoU in the oil and gas sector with Robert Gumede’s GUMA Group. Pertamina also committed to forming a Joint Venture for LNG transportation and marine logistics (BPMI Lubis, 2023b; Setpres, 2023r). Indonesia would support Mozambique’s health resilience through the procurement of vaccines, medicines and medical devices. Jokowi requested President Nyusi’s help with the Indonesian vaccine registration process. The “grand design” for African development would assist Mozambique in the health, food and energy sectors, and other sectors of interest to Mozambique. An MoU was signed for the control of drugs and biological products. An LoI was agreed upon for bilateral cooperation in the defense sector, a preliminary step (BPMI Setpres, 2023c, 2023k, 2023l, 2023o, 2023r). Overall, the approach was fairly similar, mutatis mutandis, in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique. Time will tell what Indonesia effectively delivers. On 23–23 August 2023, Jokowi was present in South Africa for bilateral meetings and the awaited 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg. GIA-1 arrived at Johannesburg’s O.R. Tambo airport around 17:00 local time. Jokowi was welcomed by the South African Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy, the Chief Director of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Sindiswa Mququ, and, for Indonesia, the Indonesian Ambassador to South Africa, Saud Purwanto Krisnawan. The visit to South Africa served both bilateral aspects and represented the will to attend the 15th BRICS Summit at Johannesburg’s Sandton Convention Centre. Kemlu’s spokesperson, Teuku Faizasyah, indicated that Indonesia’s presence at the BRICS Summit corresponded to an invitation as a guest from South Africa, not as a potential new BRICS member (Dzulfaroh, 2023). Luhut used the term “observer” (Lubis, 2023c). Indonesia was still reviewing the possibility of joining the BRICS alliance. Jokowi insisted that Indonesia refused to rush the process. It was studying and calculating benefits for Indonesia first. The archipelago already enjoyed significant bilateral relations with individual BRICS members. Jokowi insisted that Indonesia had not sent a letter of expression of interest to

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the BRICS (Pribadi, 2023). Indonesia supposedly delayed its membership in the BRICS. It wanted to consult with other ASEAN nations. It could eventually join in the next two years (Bloomberg News, 2023). Indonesia declared that it was actually invited to the BRICS Summit as the current Chair of ASEAN. Bey Machmudin revealed that Jokowi’s presence at the BRICS Summit had thus nothing to do with an Indonesian BRICS membership (Jingga, 2023c). As seen previously, Indonesia must manage the feelings of other ASEAN nations, which might get scared of Indonesia being portrayed as joining a bloc considered anti-Western. The BRICS could be perceived as undermining ASEAN Centrality. Minister Retno emphasised Indonesia could not be against any nation or group of nations. It did not correspond to Indonesia’s national identity. Indonesia cannot belong to any geopolitical camp. Retno also revealed Indonesia has been courted by all BRICS nations to join the alliance because “Indonesia matters ” (Lubis, 2023a). For sure, joining the BRICS could reveal a headache for Jokowi and a source of domestic political attacks, given Indonesia’s bebas aktif doctrine. In Indonesian history, leaders who seemed to go against Indonesia’s bebas aktif positioning have faced serious problems. Jokowi preferred to avoid this kind of situation at the end of his presidency, and the economic benefits to be gained from a BRICS membership were unclear for Indonesia. Indonesia already applied to join the OECD (Ramli, 2023); a BRICS membership could prove disturbing to that candidacy. Joining the OECD could be more rewarding economically. While Jokowi was in Africa, his Defense Minister, Prabowo Subianto, pursued his defense diplomacy in the US, buying 24 F-15EX fighter jets from Boeing and 24 Black Hawk transport helicopters Lockheed Martin for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI); underlining Indonesia’s clear security stance (Editorial Board, 2023b). On Thursday, 24 August 2023, Jokowi participated in the BRICSAfrica Outreach and BRICS Plus Dialogue sessions. Jokowi started his intervention by saying, “Before we discuss various collaborations, there is one basic thing that we must agree on. All of us must consistently respect international law and human rights ” (Jingga, 2023b; Pribadi, 2023). In the context of the Ukraine War, and Chinese and Russian diplomatic activism among developing nations, these words have a special significance when pronounced by Jokowi. As he had affirmed throughout his African visit, Jokowi called on the Bandung Spirit, which was still very relevant and should be used to face the global crisis. Cohesiveness and solidarity among all nations, especially from the Global South, were needed. Humanity was

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threatened by war and its consequences. “War and conflict have caused a human tragedy, the food crisis has resulted in tens of millions of people falling into poverty”. Climate change was also menacing. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa also referred to the Bandung Spirit at the BRICS Summit. He likened the BRICS’ current role to the Bandung Conference in 1955. For Ramaphosa, “We must use the unity, friendship and cooperation of the Bandung Spirit ” (Erwanti, 2023). Given the unfairness of the current world economic order, with a broadening development gap and growing poverty and hunger (Jingga, 2023b), Jokowi, as an Indonesian and Global South leader, emphasised that developing countries should join forces to fight for their rights. Trade discrimination should be rejected, and hilirisasi should not be hampered (Pribadi, 2023). Jokowi wants a “win–win formula”. All discrimination against development should be eliminated. Equal and inclusive cooperation should be voiced. BRICS should take the lead in the fight for development justice and reform world governance (BPMI Jingga, 2023b; Setpres, 2023b, 2023d, 2023e, 2023u, 2023v, 2023y). Indonesia aimed at rallying the Global South against discrimination and fighting for the right to developmental justice (Aqil, 2023). In South Africa, Jokowi held a bilateral meeting on 24 August 2023 with Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde, the Prime Minister of the DRC to pursue common plans for forest management, development of carbon credits, fighting against climate change and hilirisasi. Indonesia wants to share its knowledge and experience in sustainability, notably peat and forest conservation, and downstream ecosystems. Jokowi’s Africa tour and BRICS Summit attendance supported a Global South rapprochement to face the carbon transition and move away from fossil fuels. Developed nations’ promises and pledges, especially financial, have not materialised (Maulia, 2023). With its ample supply of several transitioncritical minerals, Indonesia wants to strongly benefit from the energy transition and reach high-income status. Possessing the most extensive tropical forests and being respectively the largest and second-largest cobalt producers in the world, the Indonesia–DRC cooperation makes sense. Indonesia is also thoroughly studying the possibility of cooperating to manage oil blocks on the border with Angola. Jokowi considered the matter personally (BPMI Pramudyani, 2023; Setpres, 2023t). Luhut indicated he was invited to do a workshop in Kinshasa for the government

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about negotiation, time efficiency and other essential matters while facing external partners (Lubis, 2023c); revealing the trust and expectation Indonesia generates in Africa.170

Power Consolidation and Africa What LBP touches is or becomes strategic, strategy being the “art of creating power” (Freedman, 2013). Defending their domestic policies and presenting Indonesia as a new model for the developing world, Jokowi and Luhut challenge the WTO and Western powers based on their belief that Indonesia’s “national efficacy” has grown with its domestic industrial and infrastructural success (Kennedy, 2012). Indonesia had gained power, clout and respect among developing nations. Political adversaries interested in Africa should be neutralised. Luhut preempted the Africa topic with Jokowi’s benevolence to avoid its instrumentalisation by other prominent political figures like Megawati and Paloh, who have ideological, political or economic interests in African affairs. Despite being in Jokowi’s coalition, they are not as close to Jokowi as Luhut. The China factor is also decisive, given China’s solid contemporary African engagement, and being Jokowi’s ultimate foreign partner. For the highest Indonesian leadership, African relations participate in managing and reinforcing the China relationship and its related material benefits. As Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati places herself in her father’s footsteps, respecting his legacy. Acting like Jokowi’s boss (Weatherbee, 2016), at least in the first years of his presidency, Megawati chose foreign minister Retno, without Jokowi’s opposition, revealing the importance she attributes to foreign policy. African expansion represents a policy compatible with the KAA legacy and Pancasila; Megawati chairing the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency’s steering board (Bramasta, 2021).171 The IAF could receive Megawati’s blessing regarding state ideology, a point Jokowi cannot ignore to avoid missteps and show Megawati symbolic deference. Jokowi remained officially a loyal PDIP party member. However, having initiated the 2005 AAS, Megawati

170 Jokowi’s African visit faced constant hour-long delays in each country he visited, including at the BRICS Summit. 171 Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila/BPIP.

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seems dissatisfied with existing Afro-Asian policy. In April 2017, on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the Bandung Conference, she advocated what Sukarno never achieved: a Second Bandung, dealing with the new Afro-Asian problems (Perwitasari, 2017). Jokowi did not endorse the proposition. His closest ally LBP was already handling Africa-related matters. Jokowi’s distaste for large multilateral forums could not facilitate fulfilling Megawati’s suggestion.172 Moreover, major international partners would not necessarily be supportive, as with the NAASP. Forum fatigue exists too. Indonesia cannot impose a Second Bandung or another type of Afro-Asian event without other nations’ full support. Jokowi also knows Sukarno fell while pushing for the Second Bandung against the NAM.173 The Sukarno name carries a special meaning in Africa. Jacob Zuma, then South African President, visited Megawati’s home in Jakarta in March 2017, a strong mark of respect, to discuss “government, economy, and political party cooperation” (Fachrudin, 2017).174 Instrumentalising the Sukarno legacy, Luhut now handles those high-level African relations and opportunities himself. His direct supervision and implementation of the new African approach, mandated by Jokowi, reveals 172 For Wirajuda, “alone she cannot” do it, she is “not government”. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 173 Technically, the NAM as an organisation can be said to have been institutionalised in 1970. Before that, it was still not fully defined and organised, despite the non-aligned ˇ summits (Cavoški, 2022). 174 Puan Maharani, the daughter of Megawati and current head of the DPR, described to the author during a private dinner before Jokowi’s first presidency how her birthday had been celebrated several times by then President Abdulaziz Bouteflika in Algeria when she visited with her mother, highlighting the highly symbolic importance given to the Sukarno name. Puan also inaugurated a Sukarno monument in 2020 in Algiers (Sari, 2021). The monument was designed by the West Java Governor and former Mayor of Bandung, Ridwan Kamil, and sponsored by SOEs Pertamina and WIKA. Indonesia supported Algerian independence. The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), Algeria’s independence movement, was invited to Bandung while Algeria was fighting for its independence achieved in 1962. Senior UN diplomat and former Foreign Affairs Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi represented the FLN in Indonesia during the freedom struggle. Aged 89 now, able to speak Indonesian, he was present at the inauguration of the Sukarno monument. He likes to rest in his villa in Bali with his wife. He told the author in 2017 in Bali that he knew President SBY and Megawati well, but not Jokowi, who was indeed a newcomer both domestically and internationally, while SBY and Megawati are “blue blood” in Indonesia.

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how his involvement supports his power consolidation and Jokowi’s. The President gained autonomy from Megawati without being disrespectful. African opportunities and networks needed to be in the President’s hands through his closest ally Luhut. Ideologically, Megawati is legitimate to use the Asia-Africa discourse. The IAF and Luhut’s original effort were different; less ideological and historical, more bilateral and pragmatic. Still relatable to the Bandung discourse, the endeavour is somewhat detached, given its multibilateralism. China also uses Asia–Africa as its central foreign policy discourse, facilitating Megawati’s Chinese links. Her father was China’s friend. Indonesia’s new African foreign policy complicates Megawati’s use of the Afro-Asian discourse, explaining her call for a Second Bandung. Megawati was absent from the IAF but attended the 2015 AAS. The new, more bilateral engagement favours Luhut and Jokowi’s consolidation of their relationships with Africa; and, more importantly, with China through Sino-African networks. The new African policy bolsters their political power. They can paradoxically use the Asia–Africa discourse more effectively in that context to reinforce their ideational and material proximity with China; and now defend hilirisasi implemented with Chinese backup. The IAF was supposed to be non-ideological. Yet, with the new geopolitical context and hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy, Luhut weaponises Afro-Asianism for domestic interest protection. Another major Jokowi backer, media mogul and party Chairman Surya Paloh, developed a substantial business relationship with Africa, primarily through Chinese interests.175 At least since 2009, Paloh formed a relationship with China Sonangol International Holding Ltd., a subsidiary of the Angolan state oil company Sonangol EP in joint venture with Chinese interests, investing in an oil block (Costa, 2014).176 These Chinese interests formed a network of companies nicknamed the “Queensway Group” led by a mysterious Chinese middleman called Sam Pa, Paloh’s contact. The consortium based in Hong Kong was known for its high-level relationships with authoritarian leaders, generating billions of dollars of deals and investments in resource-rich countries, notably in Africa since the

175 A gold mine investment was made in South Africa. The profits were supposedly used to finance his Nasdem party (Yuli, 2010). 176 An investment of $200 million in 2009 through the Surya Energi company to develop an oil block located in Cepu, Central Java.

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early 2000s.177 A former Chinese spy and arms dealer, Pa proposed cash, infrastructure and security sector support in exchange for oil and mining concessions, notably all over Africa (Burgis, 2014; Kuo, 2015; Mailey, 2015; Rotberg, 2015),178 heading a transnational network (Anthony, 2018). When Jokowi became President, Angola’s then Vice President and former Chairman of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, met Jokowi in Jakarta and signed a G-to-G agreement between Pertamina and Sonangol for oil imports from Angola, supposedly at a discounted price, and to build a refinery in Indonesia (Asril, 2014; Redaksi, 2021b). The communicated goal was to eradicate the oil mafia and cut traders operating in the previous Indonesian administration (Costa, 2014). Paloh arranged the deal through Sam Pa, a close Vicente associate (Glienmourinsie, 2014).179 Accusations were made stating that the deal was a payoff for Paloh, given his support for Jokowi to become president (Redaksi, 2014b). Pa arranged other meetings between Paloh and African leaders, notably during the 2015 AAS. For example, the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Bai Koroma, visited the Nasdem Party headquarters in Central Jakarta (Yuniar, 2015). Indonesian political rivalries were at play in the Asia–Africa or, more precisely, China–Africa context. Controlling those networks was crucial for political supremacy. Pa’s arrest in China, given Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign (Burgis, 2014; Connett, 2015; Julio, 2015; Kuo, 2015; Olander, 2018; Putra, 2015; Rotberg, 2015), jeopardised the Angola–Indonesia G-toG oil deal, underlining the effect of China–Africa on the development of Indonesia–Africa and the common intensity of the Indonesian and

177 Leaders such as Angola’s President General José Eduardo Dos Santos or Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, among others. 178 Queensway started its African engagement in 2003 in Angola, before expanding in the extractive industries in more than nine African countries, notably Guinea, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Sam Pa can be seen as a middleman, opening doors for China and its Chinese SOEs and interests around the world, collaborating with local elites, starting in Africa with Angola; and also involved in more illicit activities like arms trafficking or diamond smuggling. Sam Pa was placed under US sanctions for helping regimes in Zimbabwe, Guinea and North Korea (Putra, 2015). 179 In fact, Surya Paloh had introduced Sam Pa to Jokowi when he was still the Governor of DKI Jakarta at the Governor’s Office House (Puspitasari, 2021).

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African leadership relationships with China.180 Indonesia’s new Africa policy appears as a means for Jokowi and Luhut to guarantee material benefits relating to both Africa and China go through them, the highest state leaders, and not their rivals, even though they belong to the same coalition.181 The political risk of not controlling those networks was too high. This Angola sequence called for direct state involvement to manage African and Afro-Chinese elite networks.182 Beyond Afro-Chinese networks, other foreign interests vie to accompany Indonesia’s African expansion, notably in the meta-framework of China–US systemic rivalry. Israeli intermediaries, linked to Israel’s business–security nexus in Africa backed by Mossad, sometimes combined with la Françafrique networks, are involved in Indonesia and close to certain Indonesian officials (Borrel et al., 2021; Gidron, 2020). Russian

180 China Sonangol, through its real estate arm, also formed a joint company with Paloh’s Media Group, PT China Sonangol Media Investment (CSMI), to notably build the Indonesia 1 Twin Towers, uniting the 55 floors East Tower and the 59 floors South Tower, on a prime piece of land in Central Jakarta, with a groundbreaking done by President Jokowi in May 2015. Surya Paloh’s Media Group entered a conflict with China Sonangol, which had new owners since 2016, over ownership of the project. China Sonangol only acknowledged Media Group holding held 1% of the shares, not 30% as Paloh’s group claimed. This shareholding conflict relates to the arrest of Sam Pa in October 2015 in relation to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign in China (Astutik, 2021a, 2021b; Fitriyani & Agustinus, 2021; Putra, 2015; Redaksi, 2021a; Wareza, 2020). Fortunately, in December 2021, Paloh’s group managed to acquire the shares of the 300 metres-high Indonesia 1 Twin Towers, targeted to be finished in December 2023, from CSMI. The details of the transaction are unknown (Fadli, 2022). 181 When Jokowi was elected, Luhut did not immediately become Minister. Megawati, Surya Paloh and then Vice President Jusuf Kalla refused his nomination by Jokowi, who had to wait. Retrospectively, it can be understood why they refused since he progressively overpowered them all. The 2024 Presidential election prolongs this long-term political competition. 182 The Attorney General, a member of Paloh’s Nasdem party, brought Karen Agustiawan, the CEO of Pertamina, to justice for an investment deviation linked to an acquisition made in Australia in 2009, which apparently did not respect the investment guiding principles. No feasibility study had been made, and the board has not provided its agreement. Another reason is that she had apparently contributed to blocking the Angola deal. Author discussion with a famous Indonesian legal academic and expert, Jakarta, 18.05.2023. This underlines the complexity and risk of Indonesian SOE foreign investment. It also explains the funding difficulties Indonesia faces in Africa, notably with reluctant SOE officials.

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networks are also active, notably trying to gain support for Russia’s War in Ukraine and against France in Francophone Africa.183 These examples reveal how relations with Africa happen in a framework of political and economic power-building by Indonesian elites. Jokowi’s successive appointments of Luhut to positions relating to Africa form part of Jokowi’s power consolidation and gaining of political autonomy against major patrons like Megawati and Paloh, both party chairs who supported Jokowi’s election and tried to keep maximum leverage. Jokowi and Luhut are facing them again in the 2024 elections. Jokowi’s power increase coincides with that of LBP’s, the power machine of the Jokowi era. LBP monopolised high-level state relations with Africa as with other major foreign partners. Strategic African projects and networks needed to be handled directly by Jokowi’s closest ally to ensure the President consolidated his power and no other leader could capture certain high-level state relations, notably indirectly with China. Africa participates in the political competition between Indonesian elites for international networks that can reinforce their domestic power, ensuring their political survival. The new Africa policy supports the overall effort to consolidate the Jokowi-LBP power tandem vis-à-vis other power centres. The harmonious association of a Javanese Muslim civilian President with a Bataknese Christian former General, both entrepreneurs from modest backgrounds, offers an attractive Indonesian narrative.184 Their

183 The head of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Bambang Soesatyo, also tried to benefit ideologically from the Asia–Africa narrative through the pro-Russian organisation backed by Islamic student movements, Asia-Africa Youth Government (AAYG), of which he chaired the Honorary Board. Russia has increased its interactions and support for this organisation since the Russo-Ukrainian war started on 24 February 2022, as it targets public opinion in non-Western countries. The young AAGY leadership visited Chechnya and its President Ramzan Kadyrov in June 2022, praising his leadership and inviting him to visit Indonesia. Since then, it seems to have toned down. Its positions probably displeased Kemlu notably (Nugroho, 2022). AAYG’s website: https://aayg.org/. 184 Retired General Agus Widjojo, a long-time comrade of Luhut’s and a key military reformer after Suharto’s fall, adds that Jokowi feels comfortable with Luhut, “a man of action”, since he’s not threatening for his power being neither Javanese nor Muslim (Massardi, 2022). This resembles what was said about the Suharto-Benny Moerdani relationship. As seen in a previous note, General Moerdani was a Javanese Catholic. Yet, Suharto finally felt threatened by Moerdani and fired him as Minister of Defense and head of the military forces. The Javanese factor surpasses the religious one. The Jokowi– Luhut relationship has been smooth. It should be added that Jokowi would have been much weaker without the military backup brought by Luhut.

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story as a diverse yet complementary political couple embodies Indonesia’s success in development, stability, unity and management of diversity; maybe the Indonesian dream. Together they offer complementary styles in foreign politics with Jokowi’s Javanese calm and determination, and Luhut’s assertiveness and commando execution; almost a good cop, bad cop team.

Directorate for African Affairs Kemlu describes the new African approach as the implementation of Jokowi’s vision concerning economic diplomacy, extended to the socalled “non-traditional markets”. The “Strategic Plan” for 2020–2024, elaborated by Kemlu’s Directorate for African Affairs, clearly insists on the overwhelming prioritisation of economic diplomacy for the development of relationships with Africa in the Jokowi era (Kemlu, 2020a). Kemlu’s Directorate for African Affairs describes four main focuses (Indozone, 2019). First, Kemlu tries to change the perception of Africa in Indonesia among stakeholders, insisting on Africa’s strategic significance, its opportunities and government facilitation, especially for entrepreneurs, to make Africa more alluring. Nonetheless, this role should also be that of the academic world, media and civil society with the government’s full support. The fine line between state information and propaganda is easily crossed. Credibility would be stronger if Africa’s importance in Indonesia is studied and communicated by academia.185 Universities can share their knowledge with African partners and cultivate beneficial Afro-Indonesian ecosystems. Theoretically, the internationalisation of Indonesian universities as a diplomatic tool seems a promising policy. But the Indonesian state strongly influences and determines the importance of given academic topics, through the bureaucratic control of universities and the patronage of scholars. Politicians and bureaucrats had no interest in Africa until now, so no available academic funds for the Africa topic were available. Lacking financing and submitted to political intervention, Indonesian higher education institutions remain mostly disappointing, lacking intellectual profoundness, creativity and 185 Yet, the state strongly influences and often determines the importance of given academic topics in Indonesia, notably through the bureaucratic control of universities and the patronage of scholars. In Türkiye, the state also strongly determined the rise of the importance of Africa in the academic world.

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strategic thinking; impeding internationalisation.186 Elites have captured the Indonesian education system to serve their interests,187 explaining explicit knowledge and academic research deficits negatively impacting Indonesian foreign policy, as with the example of Indonesia’s late African policy. Foreign funding serves its own interests too. This is not antinomic with Indonesia’s success in managing diversity, preserving stability and providing real space for public expression. Political choices were made, explaining outcomes. Secondly, Kemlu encourages business expansion to Africa, notably through outbound investment,188 raising Indonesia’s global player “international posturing” and increasing market access thanks to already implemented investments (Bappenas, 2019; Ginting, 2020). In 2020, Kemlu’s Directorate for African Affairs counted 43 Indonesian companies present in 54 African countries valued at around $4bn, including 34 companies in the 46 Sub-Saharan African countries worth around $2bn, with 13 companies in Nigeria, 5 in Ethiopia and 3 in Tanzania in oil & gas, mining, FMCGs, textile and pharmaceuticals (Lubis, 2019).189 F&B conglomerates like Indofood and Wings Group have investments in several African nations. Animal husbandry investments exist in Zimbabwe. A priority sector, pharmaceuticals represent a significant Indonesian investment sector in Africa, with Kalbe Farma, Sanbe, Dexa Medica, Kimia Farma, Mersi, Tempo Scan Pacific and Tunggal Idaman Abadi in Nigeria and Ghana in West Africa, and in Ethiopia and Tanzania in East Africa (Ginting, 2020). This “health” presence is supported by development assistance, notably vaccine diplomacy. Kemlu identifies relevant businesses suitable for African expansion, pitching potential opportunities to state and private actors. Indonesian MNCs possess their own capacities

186 For example, they organise academic conferences without scientific value with bureaucrats as the main guests, commercial sponsoring and door prizes (Masduki, 2022). These events become podiums to distribute prestige and fees. 187 The philosopher Olúf´emi O. Táíwò explains how the concept of elite capture . notably “helps to explain how public resources such as knowledge, attention and values become distorted and distributed by power structures ” (Táíwò, 2022). 188 Included as a general goal in the RPJMN 2020–2024. 189 This valuation is to be considered with caution since the valuation method is

unknown. It should also be reminded that the Directorate for African Affairs does not cover North Africa, although the IAF is Pan-African. Minister Retno announced 15 companies in Nigeria in May 2023 when sending vaccine donations to Nigeria.

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and networks for expansion. They often orientate diplomats in needed directions. A strong infrastructure and construction focus was chosen for SOEs. Spearheaded by WIKA, active in Africa for a long time, Dirgantara Indonesia (DI), PT Industri Kereta Api (INKA), and PT LEN Industri obtained projects in Africa.190 In Algeria, WIKA built East–West roads and social housing. A triangular project with Nigeria to build a North– South African highway was proposed to Indonesia. PT Pupuk Indonesia was aiming to produce fertilisers, combining Algeria’s gas and phosphate.191 In oil and gas, Pertamina developed a strategic relationship with Algeria, with oil assets and its first-ever oil drilling operation overseas as a field operator, signing a comprehensive multidimensional agreement with Algerian SOE Sonatrach (Asmarini, 2021; Chandra, 2015; Pertamina, 2020).192 Given Indonesia’s oil-importing status, Africa appears unavoidable (Klare & Volman, 2006). In 2021, Nigeria represented a third of Indonesia’s $6bn crude petroleum imports; Angola, $400 million, and Gabon, $270 million.193 Associated with a US company, INKA leads an Indonesian SOE consortium to build a $11bn railway “megaproject” in the DRC and a

190 Dirgantara Indonesia (DI) is an SOE in military and civilian aerospace, INKA in rolling stock manufacturing and LENin communications and electronic equipment. LEN was transformed into the SOE defense holding DEFEND ID, which also includes DI, Pindad (weapons), Dahana (explosives) and PAL Indonesia (shipbuilding). 191 The North–South African highway project was proposed by Ambassador Sofiane Mimouni, then Director General for Africa at the Algeria MOFA, during a lunch meeting in Algiers with Wirajuda and the Minister of Industry. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). While business with Algeria keeps going for Pertamina, WIKA’s social housing project has been stopped before completion; only 2 of the 4 buildings were complete. The case has entered litigation. This was indicated by Kemlu sources, but the author has not had time to dig into it at the time of writing. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 192 The agreement includes renewable energy development and joint investments abroad. 193 Source oec.world.

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solar power plant (Alawi, 2020).194 Public–private “triangular” collaboration should be observed closely, given its potential geostrategic implications. A US–Indonesia collaboration in infrastructure construction could help balance Chinese construction hegemony in Africa.195 Indonesian SOEs’ globalisation helps their diversification, learning and increased dynamism. The African laboratory is a catalyst. Supporting Indonesian MNCs’ interests, trade and PTA negotiations constitute a main Kemlu focus196 ; for Crude Palm Oil (CPO) exports and other commodities, and manufacturing, medical or agrifood products. Africa constitutes a new frontier for Indonesian trade. Between 2010 and 2017, over 65 countries increased trade with Africa (Devermont, 2020). Indonesia’s African exports rather diminished in the last ten years (Online TE Database, 2020). However, since 2021, Indonesia’s Africa trade has been boosted, given high commodity prices, especially CPO. The future will tell if it is an exception, like between 2011 and 2014 when commodity prices were also high (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b), or if government support for more African trade with Africa will pay off durably. Regarding trade, Indonesia has not seized the African market compared to the boom of China, India or Türkiye’s trade. Indonesia– Africa trade fell short of its potential. Only the PTA with Mozambique was concluded, and it is not well operationalised yet. The following graphics reveal that Indonesia’s African trade did not durably boom. Trade was higher during 2011–2014, high commodity prices years. Since 2021, Afro-Indonesian trade has grown, again given high commodity prices. Indonesia’s African trade is concentrated with a few major African nations, representing a small percentage of total Indonesian trade. 194 The US private company’s owner is well-connected with US political leaders, including former US Presidents. The other SOEs include PT Barata Indonesia (industrial machinery), LEN, PT Merpati Nusantara Airlines and DI. 195 Similar to the original intentions of the non-operationalised India–Japan AAGC. Sino-French business cooperation in Africa offers another perspective (Pairault, 2020). Another broader example was the proposed post-Covid-19 world EU–China–Africa Trilateral strategic cooperation agenda focused on health, economic development, good governance and security in Africa, seen as a way to increase the EU’s geopolitical weight (Stahl, 2021). 196 In coordination with the Ministry of Trade.

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Table 5.2 Indonesia’s trade with Africa, 2007–2021 (USD)

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Nothing shocking since Africa represented only 2.6% of world trade in 2019 (Large, 2021). Still, Indonesia’s longstanding passivity towards Africa is embodied in those trade figures (Tables 5.2, 5.3 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).

A Brief ASEAN Trade Perspective Indonesia’s African trade can be placed in an ASEAN perspective and compared with major Asian powers. ASEAN’s Africa trade seems modest in volume and percentage compared to China’s or India’s Africa trade. More intense African relations could be expected for the vast ASEAN region.197 During 2016–2020, on average, ASEAN’s Africa trade stood at around $40.7bn, on average 1.55% of ASEAN’s world trade; compared to almost $200bn for China for 4.22% of its overall trade and nearly $60bn for India for 8.23% of its overall trade. Türkiye surpasses a trading volume of $20bn with Africa, over 5% of its overall trade for 2016–2020. ASEAN’s low African trade intensity appears closer to the South Korean

197 ASEAN represents a population of 661.5 million in 2020, or around 8.5% of the global population, according to statista.com.

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Table 5.3 Africa as a percentage of Indonesia’s total trade, 2007–2021 (USD) 3.50% 3.00% 2.50% 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Table 5.4 Indonesia’s exports towards Africa, 2007–2021 (USD) (Indonesia’s exports to Africa were above $5.5bn from 2011 to 2014 due to the boom in commodity prices at the time. Since then, they stayed below $5bn except in 2021, when they reached $7bn with another rise in commodity prices) $8,000,000,000 $7,000,000,000 $6,000,000,000 $5,000,000,000 $4,000,000,000 $3,000,000,000 $2,000,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $0

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

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Table 5.5 Indonesia’s top 15 trade partners in Africa, 2021 (USD) (representing 85.5% of total Indonesian trade with Africa) (Indonesia’s trade with Africa is concentrated in a few African countries. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt represent 53.5% of Indonesia–Africa trade in 2021. In general, the African “big 6”—South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Morocco—represent a large portion of Africa’s exports, each exporting at least $25bn annually [MacLeod & Luke, 2023]) Export $3,000,000,000 $2,500,000,000 $2,000,000,000

20.9% of Indonesia’s African trade done with South Africa

Import

18.7% of Indonesia’s African trade done with Nigeria 13.9% of Indonesia’s African trade done with Egypt

$1,500,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $500,000,000

4.7%

4.1% 4%

$0

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

or Japanese situations, with respectively 1.7% and 1.2% on average of their overall trade done with Africa for 2016–2020. ASEAN–Africa trade grew from $2.8bn in 1990 to $42.5bn in 2012, a 14% annual growth rate, making Africa the fastest-growing continent for ASEAN trade after Asia (GIS-Asie, 2016). Since then, ASEAN–Africa trade reached a plateau. As both ASEAN and Africa massively export resources, trade complementarity could be an obstacle (Diaw & Tran, 2020), although major ASEAN economies are diversified. Two groups of five ASEAN countries are distinguished. The six major ASEAN economies minus the Philippines—Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam—have modest volumes of African trade, under $10bn per year on average for the 2016–2020 period, 1–2% of their total trade. These five countries represent 98% of ASEAN’s Africa trade for 2016–2020, $39.88bn on average. They are invested in Africa in energy, financial services, telecommunications, shipping, agribusiness,

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Table 5.6 Indonesia’s cumulative trade with African countries in 2021 (%) 100.0%

85.5%

91%

94.3%

96.8%

77%

80.0%

66.4% 60.0%

53.5%

40.0% 20.0%

3.2% 0.0% Top 3 African partners

Top 6

Top 10

Top 15

Top 20

Top 25

Top 30

24 remaining

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database Top 3 African trading partners: South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt Top 6: Top 3 + Angola, Kenya, Algeria Top 10: Top 6 + Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti Top 15: Top 10 + Togo, Benin, Ghana, Morocco, Equatorial Guinea Top 20: Top 15 + Senegal, Tunisia, Congo, Sudan, Mozambique Top 25: Top 20 + Madagascar, Guinea, Somalia, Zimbabwe, DRC Top 30: Top 25 + Gambia, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Cameroon, Lesotho

water sanitation and infrastructure (Diaw & Tran, 2020; Vaidyanathan, 2016).198 The four most modest ASEAN economies—Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei—plus the Philippines outlier, trade only a few hundred million dollars per year with Africa, with an average percentage of their overall trade nearing zero. ASEAN–Africa trade mostly means trade between Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam with major African countries rather than ASEAN–Africa trade per se. Singapore and Malaysia appear more experienced in doing business with Africa than

198 With an ASEAN FDI in Africa supposedly reaching USD 80 billion in 2014 (Vaidyanathan, 2016).

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Table 5.7 Indonesia’s trade by Regional Economic Community in 2021* North Africa** COMESA EAC ECCAS ECOWAS IGAD SADC

Total import $672,628,979 $645,523,283 $91,052,756 $1,100,184,341 $2,391,270,696 $73,239,995 $2,627,581,031

Total export $2,336,417,636 $3,123,403,023 $901,100,796 $331,985,061 $1,700,987,233 $1,103,123,403 $1,789,297,121

Total trade %age trade $3,009,046,615 22.44% $3,768,926,306 28.10% $992,153,552 7.40% $1,432,169,402 10.68% $4,092,257,929 30.52% $1,176,363,398 8.77% $4,416,878,152 32.94% 35.00%

$5,000,000,000 $4,500,000,000

30.00%

$4,000,000,000 $3,500,000,000

25.00%

$3,000,000,000

20.00%

$2,500,000,000 $2,000,000,000

15.00%

$1,500,000,000

10.00%

$1,000,000,000 5.00%

$500,000,000

0.00%

$0 North COMESA Africa Total import

EAC

Total export

ECCAS ECOWAS

Total trade

IGAD

SADC

%age trade

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database * Some countries are members of several RECs, so the cumulative trade percentage with all RECs exceeds 100% ** North Africa: the inactive Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) + Egypt

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Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, relatively new players.199 Around 100 Singaporean companies are present in 40 African countries (Yap & Yang, 2023). This dichotomic reality explains why ASEAN has not institutionally engaged with Africa. ASEAN–Africa diplomatic infrastructure remains limited, with few ASEAN countries’ embassies in Africa and vice versa, same for airline connections or knowledge production. ASEAN sources indicated that Africa mainly interested the major ASEAN economies (Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14). Kemlu’s economic effort is imposed by Jokowi’s economic diplomacy strategy and Indonesian conglomerates wanting to export more easily to Africa and seek investment opportunities. This almost exclusive economic diplomacy focus is intensely debated inside and outside Kemlu. Diplomacy cannot be reduced to business, especially given geopolitics’ resurgence. Yet, undeniably, Indonesia is late economically in its global expansion. Jokowi’s insistence on result-driven diplomacy has positive sides. Although not exclusively, power is strongly related to material factors. Indonesians aspire to prosper and see Indonesia rise. Jokowi perfectly represents that aspiration as a self-made man. However,

199 With a good reputation in Africa, Singapore aims to position itself as a champion of South–South investment and the gateway to ASEAN for African countries, a hub, notably for Africa’s major conglomerates. Singapore appears as a model, partner and investor in governance, customs, maritime issues, manufacturing, finance, construction, urbanisation, industrialisation, transportation & logistics, environmental services, digitalisation, energy, waste & water management, agribusiness with the giants Wilmar and Olam being active on the continent in palm oil, rubber, tea and coffee plantations, health and education. Contrary to Indonesia, Singapore’s strength is its funding capacity with a rich variety of financing tools. Singaporean companies expanding to Africa are well supported and covered (Macfarlane, 2022; Vaidyanathan, 2016). The Nanyang Technological University of Singapore (NTU), through the Nanyang Business School, in partnership with the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) and with the support of major Singaporean corporations, created the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies (CAS) in 2014 as a “practice-oriented think tank that conducts research, fosters networks , and builds capacity for doing business in Africa”. Website: www.ntu.edu.sg/cas. According to Diaw and Tran, Vietnam has seen its trade with Africa grow by over 250% between 2010 and 2018, from USD 2.52 billion to USD 6.6 billion. Yet, the Comtrade database gives us a trading volume of USD 5.5 billion in 2018. The growth remains undeniable. Like for ASEAN in general, Vietnam trade boomed, now seemingly reaching a peak. Some interesting facts are Vietnam’s use of links to Francophone Africa through the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) or the significant development of the Vietnamese SOE and military-operated telecommunications group Viettel in various African countries (Diaw & Tran, 2020). China’s African presence also pushes Vietnam to focus more on the continent.

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Table 5.8 Evolution of Total ASEAN Trade with Africa 2016–2021 in billion USD 60.00

56.9

50.00

46.81 42.60

40.73

39.39

40.00

34 30.00

20.00

10.00

0.00 2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Indonesia needs to increase its knowledge about Africa. When Brazilian President Lula took power the first time, orientating Brazil towards Africa, he chose to fund several think tanks and universities to support his effort (Christina Stolte, 2013, 2015).200 Indonesian leaders difficultly grasp the importance of knowledge funding, or they do and are unwilling to make that effort, unless it serves their interests. Thirdly, financing for Indonesian-built infrastructure projects in Africa is strategic for Kemlu, echoing the domestic infrastructural development priority. Initially, Indonesia Eximbank guaranteed funding for several Indonesian infrastructure projects in Africa.201 The funding’s availability and its ceremonial aspects increase Indonesia’s image as a capable external player in Africa, reinforcing Indonesia’s attractivity; if funding is released and projects delivered. Indonesia’s Minister of Finance (Menkeu) Sri Mulyani Indrawati explained that Indonesia Eximbank tries to solve three 200 Yet, Brazil’s Africa policy was said to have failed after Lula, according to Brazilian researchers. Lula’s return marks Brazil’s return to Africa (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021). This reinforces this study’s decision to stay away from any “paradigmatic truth”. 201 Notably during a signing ceremony at the Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue in Bali in August 2019.

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Table 5.9 Total ASEAN Trade with Africa by ASEAN country 2016–2021 in billion USD Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Country Thailand Indonesia Singapore Malaysia Vietnam Philippines Myanmar Brunei Cambodia Laos Total ASEAN

2016 $8.176 $7.700 $6.008 $6.232 $5.364 $0.393 $0.044 $0.006 $0.042 $0.033 $34.00

2017 $9.607 $9.053 $7.087 $7.626 $6.645 $0.383 $0.254 $0.005 $0.064 $0.006 $40.73

2018 $12.027 $11.286 $9.406 $7.758 $5.550 $0.479 $0.216 $0.006 $0.075 $0.006 $46.81

2019 $9.926 $8.655 $9.335 $7.686 $5.662 $0.453 $0.285 $0.483 $0.093 $0.000 $42.58

2020 $9.622 $7.159 $8.805 $7.426 $5.589 $0.398 $0.159 $0.141 $0.093 $0.004 $39.40

2021 $13.690 $13.410 $11.289 $10.987 $6.644 $0.527 $0.088 $0.153 $0.124 $0.008 $56.92

Total $63.048 $57.264 $51.930 $47.715 $35.455 $2.633 $1.046 $0.793 $0.491 $0.058 $260.434

$70.000 $60.000 $50.000 $40.000 $30.000 $20.000 $10.000 $0.000

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Total

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

problems: financing, insurance and guarantees. Financial risk determines the level of engagement in investment and trade (Eximbank & Kemlu, 2018). Indonesia and Africa are complementary markets with young populations and growing middle classes (Kemenkeu, 2018). Given the risks, investing in African countries requires a specific approach. Funding is now a problem for Indonesia, impeding the progress of several African projects and potentially hurting its credibility in Africa. Failing to deliver a symbolic project like La Tour de Gorée could prove detrimental.

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Table 5.10 Evolution of ASEAN trade with Africa as a percentage of ASEAN total world trade 2016–2021 1.75% 1.70% 1.65% 1.60% 1.55% 1.50% 1.45% 1.40% 1.35% 2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Average

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Table 5.11 Evolution of ASEAN countries’ trade with Africa as a percentage of their total world trade 2016–2021 Indonesia Thailand Philippines Malaysia Singapore Vietnam Myanmar Cambodia Laos Brunei ASEAN

2016 2.75% 2.00% 0.28% 1.74% 0.95% 1.53% 0.16% 0.19% 0.46% 0.07% 1.52%

2017 2.78% 2.10% 0.22% 1.85% 1.01% 1.55% 0.77% 0.25% 0.06% 0.05% 1.58%

2018 3.06% 2.40% 0.26% 1.67% 1.20% 1.15% 0.60% 0.25% 0.05% 0.05% 1.63%

2019 2.55% 2.20% 0.24% 1.74% 1.25% 1.09% 0.78% 0.26% 0.18% 3.98% 1.53%

2020 2.35% 2.19% 0.26% 1.75% 1.25% 1.03% 0.45% 0.25% 0.04% 1.18% 1.48%

2021 3.14% 2.56% 0.26% 2.04% 1.31% 1.00% 0.30% 0.27% 0.06% 0.78% 1.71%

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Finally, Kemlu supports outbound investment in Africa.202 The Indonesian business community appears conservative. Africa seems far and 202 Notably in collaboration with business associations like the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN).

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Table 5.12 Major Asian powers’ total trade with Africa and ASEAN Trade with Africa 2016–2021 in billion USD Vietnam Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia ASEAN Japan South Korea India China $0.000

$200.000 Total

China India South Korea Japan ASEAN Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore Vietnam Total

2016 $148.681 $48.757 $18.513 $15.008 $33.998 $7.700 $8.176 $6.232 $6.008 $5.364 $298.437

$400.000 2021

2017 $166.847 $60.142 $17.831 $15.774 $40.730 $9.053 $9.607 $7.626 $7.087 $6.645 $341.342

$600.000

2020

$800.000 $1,000.000 $1,200.000 $1,400.000

2019

2018 $203.982 $68.501 $19.203 $17.078 $46.810 $11.286 $12.027 $7.758 $9.406 $5.550 $401.601

2018

2019 $208.079 $68.359 $17.231 $17.383 $42.599 $8.655 $9.926 $7.686 $9.335 $5.662 $394.916

2017

2020 $186.725 $53.531 $13.712 $16.543 $39.397 $7.159 $9.622 $7.426 $8.805 $5.589 $348.509

2016

2021 Total $251.976 $1,166.290 $82.526 $381.816 $21.721 $108.210 $23.505 $105.291 $56.922 $260.455 $13.410 $57.264 $13.690 $63.048 $10.987 $47.715 $11.289 $51.930 $6.644 $35.455 $492.671 $2,277.476

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

complicated. Special efforts are needed to convince Indonesian businesspeople about African opportunities. Indonesian actors that know Africa best economically are Indonesian multinationals that have invested for decades, like Indofood, a market leader in instant noodles in several major

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Table 5.13 Evolution of major Asian powers’ trade with Africa; ASEAN and ASEAN countries’ trade with Africa as a percentage of their total world trade 2016–2021 9.00% 8.00% 7.00% 6.00% 5.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 1.00% 0.00%

2016

India China South Korea Japan ASEAN Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Singapore Vietnam

2017

2016 7.90% 4.03% 2.05% 1.20% 1.52% 2.75% 2.00% 1.74% 0.95% 1.53%

2018

2019

2020

2017 8.14% 4.06% 1.69% 1.15% 1.58% 2.78% 2.10% 1.85% 1.01% 1.55%

2018 8.25% 4.41% 1.68% 1.15% 1.63% 3.06% 2.40% 1.67% 1.20% 1.15%

2019 8.52% 4.56% 1.65% 1.22% 1.53% 2.55% 2.20% 1.74% 1.25% 1.09%

2021

2020 8.32% 4.02% 1.40% 1.30% 1.48% 2.35% 2.19% 1.75% 1.25% 1.03%

Average

2021 8.55% 4.17% 1.72% 1.54% 1.71% 3.14% 2.56% 2.04% 1.31% 1.00%

Average 8.28% 4.21% 1.70% 1.26% 1.57% 2.77% 2.24% 1.80% 1.16% 1.23%

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

African countries. Many Indonesian multinational owners are ChineseIndonesians, often more aware of Africa’s strategic importance through their strong links with China.203

203 Although now the awareness seems to have spread to the wider parts of the Indone-

sian business community that appear more enthusiastic about Africa than before. In a private meeting with the author in January 2020, businessman turned politician Sandiaga Uno, presently Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, expressed strong enthusiasm towards the African market and said he had been interested in Africa for two or three years already (16 January 2020, Jakarta). In an official meeting on 6 June 2023, when

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Table 5.14 Indonesian trade with Africa as a percentage of total ASEAN and ASEAN + China, India, Japan and South Korea trade with Africa 2016–2021 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 2016

2017

2018

Indonesia %age of ASEAN + 4

2016 ASEAN $33.998 India $48.757 China $148.681 South Korea $18.513 Japan $15.008 Total $264.957 Indonesia $7.700 Indonesia %age of ASEAN + 4 2.91% Indonesia %age of ASEAN 22.65%

2017 $40.730 $60.142 $166.847 $17.831 $15.774 $301.324 $9.053 3.00% 22.23%

2019

2020

2021

Average

Indonesia %age of ASEAN

2018 $46.810 $68.501 $203.982 $19.203 $17.078 $355.574 $11.286 3.17% 24.11%

2019 $42.599 $68.359 $208.079 $17.231 $17.383 $353.652 $8.655 2.45% 20.32%

2020 $39.397 $53.531 $186.725 $13.712 $16.543 $309.907 $7.159 2.31% 18.17%

2021 $56.922 $82.526 $251.976 $21.721 $23.505 $436.650 $13.410 3.07% 23.56%

Average $43.409 $63.636 $194.382 $18.035 $17.549 $337.011 $9.544 2.82% 21.84%

Source Christophe Dorigné-Thomson based on UN Comtrade Database

Kemlu tries to better its diplomatic infrastructure by pushing for the opening of new embassies in Africa. Bureaucratic and budgetary obstacles slow progress compared to other emerging powers. In 2020, the opening of an embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon, was approved.204 This new embassy improves the diplomatic coverage of Central Africa, he was now Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, Uno clearly placed Africa at the centre of Indonesia’s worldview, although his Ministry’s links with the continent were still fledging. Potential collaborations in tourism and the creative economy were numerous, particularly with Nigeria’s Nollywood or Morocco for crafts. Indonesia has not reached its potential for exports of creative products towards Africa. 204 The opening was approved in June 2020 through Presidential Regulation Number 69 (Perpres or Peraturan Presiden Nomor 69 Tahun 2020). The embassy also covers Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo and the CAR (Central African Republic); basically a large part of the Central African region (Ginting, 2020).

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existing Indonesian embassies covering too many countries. Yaoundé was preferred to Accra, despite the Ghanaian capital hosting the AfCFTA headquarters.205 Led by Luhut’s Ministry, Indonesia wants to develop its gastrodiplomacy in Africa, impacting trade, nation branding and tourism (Suwanti, 2020). Indonesia benefits from a rich and diverse cuisine and significant agro-industries. Few Indonesian restaurants exist in Africa; in Rwanda, Tanzania, Egypt or Mauritius.206 Indonesian food products like Indomie or Mie Sedap (instant noodles), Kopiko or Richeese Nabati (sweets), or soft and energy drinks sell successfully across Africa. The spice trade’s rejuvenation appears promising (Ginting, 2020). African cuisine uses spices like Indonesian cuisine. In this gastrodiplomacy ambition, other Asian countries’ influence is apparent (Djumala, 2020; USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2015).207 After Luhut’s Dar es Salaam visit in December 2019 (Hamdani, 2019), an Indonesian restaurant opened there in January 2021 (Idris, 2020).208

Cameroon will be an interesting observing post on African separatism for Indonesia with the Anglophone crisis due to cultural-linguistic tensions; and the nationalist mobilisation against it (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017). 205 Minister Retno had stated in an interview with Kompas in November 2021 that an embassy in Accra would soon be opened (Mada et al., 2021). 206 The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy told the author there were seven existing Indonesian restaurants in Africa. An Indonesian restaurant exists in Kigali, Rwanda, which also showcases Indonesian products. In Mauritius, an “Indonesian House”, which presents Indonesian crafts, furniture and food products, opened an Indonesian restaurant. In Madagascar, an Indonesian restaurant opened in Antananarivo at the Mercure Hotel owned by an Indonesian diaspora woman in August 2021. Richard Rakotonirina, Madagascar’s National Defense Minister and alumnus of Indonesian defense education, was present at the opening (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Madagascar, 2021). Minister Sandiaga Uno targets opening 4000 Indonesian restaurants around the world 1700 Indonesian restaurants exist today, according to him. Yet, no state funding is available contrary to Thailand, Vietnam or Taiwan. The government acts as an “umbrella” depending on the private sector. Minister Sandi personally attended the opening of an Indonesian restaurant in Cairo, which should help increase Indonesian coffee exports that were too low. Sandi underlined Nasser and Sukarno were close so it made sense to open there. Author’s Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, 06.06.2023, Jakarta at the Minister’s home. 207 Nations like Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam are known for their successful gastrodiplomacy. 208 The restaurant’s name is Danau Toba Restaurant, named after the famous Toba Lake, the touristic wonder at the heart of Luhut’s home region in North Sumatra, that

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Indonesia needs more achievements in multiple fields to accelerate its global rise and fulfil its people’s ambitions and expectations. Jokowi helps deliver that by rebooting Indonesia’s Africa foreign policy approach in a contemporary setting, an undeniable achievement due to the perspectives it opens. It constitutes only an essential but still insufficient beginning. Indonesia still has much to learn. African agency should be better studied in Indonesia, developing knowledge. Country-to-continent forums are criticised in Africa for being too asymmetric, denying sufficient room to African perspectives.209 Indonesia’s approach should be rethought to meet African aspirations better. As with Sino-African relations, African states contribute to framing the engagement of external powers in Africa and the development models proposed, socialising them and selecting what they want, notably through forum shopping, to maximise their gains and serve their interests, notably regime survival.210 Bayart’s extraversion and “politique du ventre” insisted on African elites’ capacity to drive relationships with external actors to their benefit (Bayart, 2000, 2006, 2015). As a master extraversion player in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is confronted with similar practices in Africa. Africans seek a new and sustainable development path through continental market integration, notably through digital connectivity. They also seek reforms in property rights, financing, bureaucracy, technology transfers, productivity rise, infant industry protection, social security, and fiscal or budgetary aspects (Frankema & Waijenburg, 2018). Critical mineral beneficiation is officially on the African agenda with the AU’s 2009 African Mining Vision (AMV) seeking sustainable mining industrialisation (Müller, 2023). Africans need partners to handle those issues on an equal footing. Given geopolitical shifts, focusing on economic relations might be insufficient. Before the Ukraine–Russia war, Devermont envisaged a reset of African external relations to recover from the Covid-19 crisis, but of the Batak people and that Luhut has been vigorously promoting, including towards Chinese investors. President Jokowi visited Toba Lake regularly during his presidencies. Danau Toba Restaurant opened in Malaki, a vibrant diplomatic quartier of Dar es Salaam, the largest city of Tanzania, on the Indian Ocean. The ambassador there at the time was also a Bataknese from the Nasdem party, Ratlan Pardede (Idris, 2020). An Indonesian restaurant named “Toba” also opened in London with the support of the ambassador there, close to Luhut. 209 For Pardesi, “asymmetric material capabilities do not automatically preclude equality in mutual relations ” (Pardesi, 2017). 210 Hodzi even asked: “Who is playing whom?” (Hodzi, 2020).

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also to address more severe issues facing Africans, such as discrimination, climate change, urbanisation and megacities, debt relief or democratic values (Devermont, 2021).211 China and other external players have their plans. Opportunities are numerous for Indonesia to position itself meaningfully, benefiting from its African engagement; proposing an Indonesian narrative co-constructed with Africans. This remains to be created, depending on Indonesia’s long-term African effort’s continuity and intensity. Knowledge production and academic research on Africa must be developed in Indonesia to maximise its African engagement, avoid tragic mistakes since dealing with Africa properly requires experience and initiation like with any region, and make more sense of all the possibilities and perspectives offered by Africa, listening more to African voices (Van Staden et al., 2018). Given Indonesia’s unique place in Afro-Asian history, developing its African understanding and engagement meaningfully can contribute to humanity’s advancement, offering new perspectives for billions of people. Continuous political will and capacity remain an interrogation.

An Ambassador’s Mission in Africa Examining the declared mission of the Indonesian ambassador to Senegal allows perceiving more concretely how Indonesia’s African foreign policy can be implemented on the ground by diplomats.212 Each Indonesian ambassador chosen by the President and Kemlu passes a fit-and-proper test organised by the Parliament’s Commission 1,213 presenting his vision and mission to the MPs. The ambassador to Senegal, based in Dakar,214

211 French describes the formation of the Lagos-Abidjan megalopolis, extending 600 miles, passing through Ghana, Togo and Benin. “By 2100, the Lagos-Abidjan stretch is projected to be the largest zone of continuous, dense habitation on earth, with something in the order of half a billion people” (French, 2022). 212 The author has known H.E. Dindin Wahyudin, the Indonesian Ambassador to

Senegal (2020–), since 2006. 213 Komisi I’s scope of duties covers the fields of defense, foreign affairs, communication and informatics; and intelligence. Source https://www.dpr.go.id/akd/index/id/TentangKomisi-I. 214 China organised the 8th FOCAC in Dakar in December 2021, clearly underlining the rising strategic importance of the region (Soulé, 2021b).

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also accredited to eight other West African countries,215 appointed at the end of 2020, H.E. Dindin Wahyudin, divided his presentation into four main categories: Politics and Security; Economy; Information and SocialCultural; Protection of Indonesian Citizens. In politics and security, the ambassador emphasised the historical ties with Africa thanks to the KAA. African nations support Indonesia’s international role, like its UN Security Council (UNSC) nonpermanent memberships. Indonesia proudly participates in UN PKOs in Mali through MINUSMA or before in Sierra Leone through UNAMSIL in the early 2000s.216 The first political mission is reinforcing African support for Indonesian national integrity and sovereignty against separatism in Indonesian West Papua and Papua provinces (CDT—Amb. Dindin Wahyudin, 2020). Benny Wenda, leader of the independence movement United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), obtained support under former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. In 2010, at Dakar’s World Festival of Black Arts, to which the Free West Papua Campaign participated, President Wade declared that “West Papua is now an issue for all Black Africans ” (Swan, 2018). Indonesian counter-measures mostly eradicated the backing. Given African civil society’s dynamism, the threat still looms. Wenda was recently declared interim President of a provisional “government-in-waiting” and appointed new ambassadors, notably in Nigeria and Ghana (Doherty, 2020; Vanguard, 2021b). Senegal has a tradition of supporting Papuan activism based on Black solidarity since President Léopold Senghor hosted an office of the Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua New Guinea (RPG) from 1975. Papuans were seen as Oceanic Africans.217 215 Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Gambia. The mission covers too many countries and not optimally since Ivory Coast, for example, a major country in West Africa, is among Indonesia’s top 8 African trading partners while Senegal, which hosts the embassy, is only between the 20th and 25th rank in 2019. 216 MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali); UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone). 217 Ben Tanggahma, the Foreign Minister of the Revolutionary Provisional Govern-

ment of West Papua New Guinea (RPG), opened the RPG coordinating office in Dakar. President Senghor strongly supported West Papua and East Timor. In the name of AfroSolidarity, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the US also supported West Papuan independence (Swan, 2018). Senghor said “the spirit of Bandung ” was nothing less than “our Renaissance” (Van Reybrouck, 2022).

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Economic diplomacy represents the Ambassador’s main task.218 Given Indonesia’s industrial capacities, market access must increase for the health sector: pharmaceutical products, medicine and medical equipment. Indonesia already exports health products and has a substantial African presence, particularly in Nigeria and South Africa. The SOEs ministry formed a health holding company gathering the relevant SOEs. The Indonesian private sector has experience in vaccine distribution and longterm investments in Africa, evidenced by Kalbe Farma’s joint venture with Orange Drugs in Nigeria since the 2000s (DetikFinance, 2007; Mahrofi, 2020; Sinaga, 2019). Solid African agency fostered Indonesian pharmaceuticals presence in Nigeria.219 Africans’ power frames and develops international relationships.220 As echoed in the Indonesian press, Indonesia can also learn from Senegal, praised for effectively handling Covid-19 (Arbar, 2020). Indonesia wants to increase market access for its commodities like CPO or textile products. Strategic industries and defense cooperation also have strong potential in West Africa. Senegal acquired three CN-235 produced by DI with a credit from a Belgium funder. In his visit to DI’s factory in Bandung in March 2020, the Minister of Planning in charge of the Plan

218 Jokowi commanded diplomasi ekonomi should occupy over 80% of the active time of Indonesian diplomats. 219 Tony Ezenna, the founder of Orange Drugs Nigeria Limited, now a Nigerian billionaire, used to come to Indonesia with suitcases full of cash to buy Indonesian drugs to sell on the Nigerian market. Progressively, he built a fruitful and trusted relationship with Kalbe Farma. He also partnered with other Indonesian pharmaceutical companies such as PT Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk, Dexa Medica and Mensa Group, becoming a sort of hub for the Indonesian health business in Nigeria. Informal discussion with a retired Kalbe Farma executive, who directly traded with Tony Ezenna. 220 Like with Orange Drugs and Indonesia, African traders in China pioneered and developed relations with the continent (Mohan & Lampert, 2012).

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Sénégal Emergent (PSE),221 Cheikh Kanté, praised Indonesia’s industrial and infrastructural development. Indonesia is an Asian success story, building planes and arms; a model for Senegal. He hoped for technology transfers (Redaksi, 2020), confirming reputation and strategic recognition’s importance to gain material benefits, and Indonesia’s positive image in Africa (Crescenzi, 2007; Crescenzi et al., 2012; Lindemann, 2010). “Services” require better market access in the West African region, meaning infrastructure, construction, mining or e-commerce, where Indonesia brings its expertise. La Tour de Gorée project, awarded to WIKA, would be a prestigious contribution, showcasing Indonesian construction capabilities. This attribution to Indonesia underlines Senegalese agency in external powers’ management. As a regional economic hub and following the PSE, Senegal goes “forum shopping” with various external partners to accelerate infrastructure construction, optimising its external relationships. Indonesia competes in a beauty contest.222 Indonesia applies similar strategies domestically, placing external powers in competition like China–Japan and China–US.223 Türkiye, South Korea

221 The PSE or Emerging Senegal Plan is a Presidential development master plan for Senegal. It is a ten-year strategy (2014–2023) with the ultimate goal of an emerging Senegal by 2035. There are three strategic axes: “the structural transformation of the economy and growth”, “human capital , social protection and sustainable development ” and “governance, institutions, peace and security”. The Priority Action Plan (PAP) accompanying the PSE breaks it down in sectorial objectives including infrastructure, energy, agriculture, water, education and health. The PAP has two phases. Phase 1 (2014–2018) brought an average annual growth of 6.6% when it was only around 2.5% during the 2008–2013 period. Phase 2 (2019–2023) pursues the effort with an aim of 9% growth and “with stronger involvement of the private sector” and also a focus on food, health and pharmaceutical sovereignty, which are all potential fields of collaboration with Indonesia (DGT—France, 2020). The Covid crisis and the increase in commodity prices related to the Ukraine–Russia war have hurt Senegalese and African growth in general. 222 Indonesia is perfectly aware of this “beauty contest” based on the author’s discussions with Indonesian leaders and diplomats. That awareness is essential to avoid a sense of entitlement or misunderstanding in Africa, which can hurt external powers in their engagement. 223 The match between China and Japan for the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail was epic. It cannot be detached from the importance of the Bandung name and the KAA. Both China and Japan were present in 1955. Afro-Asianism is a pillar of Chinese foreign policy. Constructing modern transportation infrastructure in relation to Bandung will have strong concrete and symbolic implications for China in the Global South.

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or the UAE financed and built major infrastructure in Senegal.224 La Tour de Gorée is a prestigious project, given its symbolism and the hurtful memory of slavery. Indonesia could show African partners it can deliver on strategic endeavours, learning more for African expansion. Yet, financing failed for the moment, potentially hurting Indonesia’s image. Following the countertrade “Angola model”,225 Senegal offered to compensate Indonesia with commodities like phosphate, gold, copper and lead for the $250 million multifunctional building with offices, a convention centre, a hotel, a mall and a marina. The commodities would then be sold by Indonesian SOEs on the international markets.226 Senegal’s debt level prevented it from providing a sovereign guarantee to potential lenders, especially with the Covid-19 and Russia-Ukraine conflict’s impact.227 Clearly, Indonesia’s inability to provide financial solutions for this type of project is a serious problem for Indonesia in Africa. With an unclear status today, the massive railway project in the DRC awarded to INKA planned to use diamonds countertrade.228 The US company bringing the Indonesian SOEs consortium to the DRC

224 Summa, a global construction company from Türkiye, built the International Conference Center (Centre International de Conférences Abdou Diouf—CICAD) in Dakar. Several health, agriculture and maritime projects were financed by South Korea. DP World from the UAE built the Dakar harbour container terminal. It announced in 2020 its largest investment in Africa with the construction of the new 600-hectare deepwater Ndayane port on the Atlantic Ocean for over $1 billion (Associated Deguenonvo, 2019; Press, 2020; Soulé, 2020; Summa, n.d.). 225 The countertrade “Angola model” relates to Angola receiving a $2 billion credit

line in March 2004 for its National Reconstruction Program from China Exim Bank in exchange for depositing the revenue of the sales of 10,000 oil barrels per day in an escrow account as repayment guarantee (Corkin, 2011, 2013). Although better than a commercial loan, it was not a free loan. The Libor +1.5% interest rate was over 1% lower than Angola’s average interest payments with a 17 years repayment period and a 5-year grace period (Tang, 2021). 226 The SOEs could be Pupuk Indonesia, MIND ID, Inalum and Antam, reselling the commodities through their trading divisions. 227 Indonesia Eximbank was supposed to provide substantial funding for the project. UK Export Finance and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) were possibly joining. 228 Announced officially, this project’s status is unclear.

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managed diamond mines (Anwar, 2020b).229 Risky and somewhat unpredictable if transparency is lacking, this Chinese “Angola model” was applied by the China Railway Group in the DRC in 2008 to obtain copper and cobalt mining licences in an resource-for-infrastructure framework (Hansrod, 2023; Landry, 2018; Y. Sun, 2020).230 The potential opacity of such deals presents social contestation risks, notably mining politics (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016; Carmody & Taylor, 2010; Vogel, 2022). Indonesia should thoroughly study those social dynamics to avoid backlashes. Congolese social phenomena, notably conflict, possess deep multidimensional, historical and political roots, requiring solid country and actor knowledge (Vogel, 2022). Indonesia could use this barter model with other commodity-rich countries in West Africa.231 The countertrade model was how Japan provided China with a $10bn loan against oil in 1978. China is reapplying a Japanese model in Africa.232 These resource-backed infrastructure projects helped Chinese SOEs development, serving China’s geopolitical ambitions. Yet economically, their profitability has been weak. When completed, China mostly loses control over the maintenance and operations, creating management and operational problems and potential reputational drawbacks. Consequently, African countries request more skill transfers for infrastructure management (Tang, 2021). Indonesia bartered before, notably with Algeria (P. Palia, 1992). Constrained economically, the archipelago wishes to develop countertrade to pay military purchases with its commodities (Grevatt, 2020). In Africa,

229 This discussion on countertrade is based notably on personal contacts and discussions with Indonesian SOEs and diplomats. 230 The agreement is known as the Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines) agreement. 231 Guinea requested Indonesia to build 500,000 social housing units. A social housing

project was also evoked in Ivory Coast. These projects also face obstacles relating to funding. Countertrade is a solution explored. It is also looked into with Angola (RMCO, 2020). 232 China Exim Bank called those countertrade-linked loans “huhui daikuan” (互惠 贷款) or mutual benefit loans. Natural resources guarantee loans or buyer’s credit that finance infrastructure projects mostly allocated to Chinese EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) contractors. Tang indicates that no money was directly disbursed to the Angolan government for the 2004 $2bn allocation. China Exim Bank directly pays Chinese contractors once projects are finished. Apart from Angola, billion-dollar “huhui daikuan” loan agreements were made with Congo Brazzaville, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia (Tang, 2021).

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the countertrade model and potentially large associated projects need serious evaluation. Indonesia lacks the Chinese financial capacity to back such projects abroad. China has been the main backer of Jokowi’s infrastructure development. The DRC railway project represents a triangular partnership, structured by a US private corporation.233 Fighting Africa’s Balkanisation and supporting African connectivity can help Indonesia for business, learning and SOE internationalisation; but also in soft power and recognition in Africa. Yet the “Angola model” carries potential drawbacks. A DRC change in leadership caused severe criticism and the reconsideration of infrastructure-for-minerals deals with China, notably given a deficit of Chinese investment (Hansrod, 2023).234 Geopolitical implications impact Indonesia’s African expansion, given the China–US opposition and Ukraine–Russia war, although Africa and Indonesia have a life of their own. Indonesia risks suffering from its vulnerability and limited means in Africa. It could solidify its approach as a complementary partner for major external powers in Africa.235 Luhut’s Afro-Asian minilateralism might provide a solution. Projects in Africa present multiple risks for Indonesia regarding capacity to deliver, financing, security or corruption, and thus reputation

233 Railway projects carry meaning and symbolism. China’s most famous infrastructure project, the Tanzania–Zambia Railway or Tazara or TanZam Railway built in the 1970s, also called the “Uhuru railway” or “freedom railway” in Swahili, raised China’s international status and prestige. Until today, China benefits from its appeal in Africa. Monson, who wrote the reference book on the “Freedom railway”, cites Kenneth Kaunda, who said: “Every time there is a communication network between African countries, that is a step nearer the end of our continent’s balkanization on which imperialism has fattened itself ” (Monson, 2009; Tang, 2021). 234 Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi, who replaced Joseph Kabila in 2019, said the deals with China were unfair. Tshisekedi was said to be moving away from China and closer to the US (Ross & Reid, 2021). In February 2023, an audit report by the Congolese Inspection générale des finances (IGF) revealed that only $822 million of the promised $3 billion had been spent, which was considered “unacceptable economic colonisation”. The DRC demanded reparations, contract renegotiations and more equality. Infrastructure works were said to be all conducted by Chinese companies at unfair prices. Moreover, “The minerals extracted by Sicomines are sold at half-price to Chinese companies which are also Sicomines shareholders. So, that resulted in a loss of 7 billion dollars for Gécamines, the Congolese partner of the deal ” (Hansrod, 2023). 235 Countries like Japan, South Korea, the UAE and the US, or even the UK and France, could consolidate their African presence with Indonesia as a partner; while similarly getting closer strategically with Indonesia, a priority country for all major powers. Discussions exist between Indonesia and several powers on this topic.

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and status. China has suffered many troubles.236 Yet, despite obstacles, controversies and mistakes, Chinese economic power in Africa has kept growing (Tang, 2021). Indonesia will face many problems and go through trial and error. Pragmatism, perseverance and reaction to adversity and competition will be decisive, and Indonesia’s capacity to create meaningful relationships with Africans, with the elite and the public. The Indonesian state and the private sector will need to manage reverberations in the Indonesian public space of an increased African expansion, justifying resource allocations or image and reputation damages.237 Jokowi also encourages the internationalisation of Indonesia’s digital economy, one of the world’s largest (Berita Satu, 2020). Africa is targeted for expansion. African agency will be crucial. The AU launched its digital transformation strategy in May 2020 and will contribute to driving the process (Africa Union, 2020). Several external partners prioritise the digital field in Africa.238 Indonesia lacks an integrated African digital strategy. Outbound investment is prioritised.239 West African countries are partners for SSC and potential targets for Indonesia AID. The ambassador insists these collaborations or aid aim at increased market access. Trade is central to Indonesian diplomacy. Tariff and non-tariff barriers impede Indonesia–Africa trade.240 Negotiating PTAs bilaterally, like with Mozambique, and with African RECs like ECOWAS seems a solution (CDT—Amb. Dindin Wahyudin, 2020). Nevertheless, a successful African engagement ultimately rests

236 In the early 2000s, up to thirty Chinese citizens were murdered yearly in Angola. In the DRC, Chinese businesspeople faced abuses of power from Congolese officials and bureaucrats. China’s engagement is criticised for its environmental impact, labour abuses, debt traps and low product quality. The Chinese leadership has been trying to ameliorate the BRI approach by issuing BRI Financing Guidelines and aiming at proposing higher-quality infrastructure (Liu, 2020). 237 Investing abroad is often suspicious and perceived as a scheme for capital flight in Indonesia. SOE directors will often refuse to invest abroad, fearing legal consequences and public backlash. 238 Like the US, Israel, Singapore, India, Japan, China, the UK and France. 239 Indonesia did not seem to see any significant potential for inbound investment from

that particular Western Africa area, which could be seriously discussed. 240 As they hinder intra-African trade. “While the average tariff encountered on intraAfrican exports amounts to about 6.1 per cent, the ad valorem equivalent for non-tariff barriers is much larger, at an estimated 14.3 per cent ” (MacLeod & Guepie, 2023).

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on forging genuine comprehensive partnerships with Africa and Africans based on mutual understanding. Sustainable trade results from a successful holistic engagement. Bringing better results for Brazil (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021), trade promotion can be more effective than prioritising PTAs.241 Trade barriers reflect Africa never being an Indonesian priority. African views should be kept in mind. Africans want investment and concrete realisations. Trade prioritisation generates criticism and other evils if no meaningful investments are made locally. Privileging the AfCFTA to increase intra-African trade, Africa also wants to increase its exports, that already generate foreign exchange inflows vastly surpassing ODA, FDI, and remittances combined.242 Regarding information and “social-culture”, Indonesia promotes its positive image, bounded by its inherent budgetary limitations. A peaceful majority Muslim-populated democracy, Indonesia can connect with a Muslim democratic country like Senegal through brotherhood.243 Indonesia will not play the Muslim card like Türkiye, given the Islamic factor’s limited use in its foreign policy, although some in Kemlu can be more willing to promote Indonesia’s Islamic credentials, notably in Africa.244 Instead, Indonesia highlights its contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, security and development in West Africa to

241 The US under Biden aims to move “beyond traditional trade deals ” to agree on “innovative new international economic partnerships focused on the core challenges of our time”. For Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, “trade policy needs to be about more than tariff reduction, and trade policy needs to be fully integrated into our economic strategy, at home and abroad” (Sullivan, 2023). 242 In 2019, exports brought in $421bn; ODA $31bn, FDI $40bn, and remittances $84bn (MacLeod & Luke, 2023). 243 Senegal’s democracy has been under serious tensions recently, notably with the issue of Macky Sall’s third mandate. He finally renounced, but opposition leaders have been threatened and prosecuted. Comparisons could be made with this third term issue in Indonesia pushed by Luhut. Jokowi also renounced. 244 The North Africa-Sub-Saharan Africa dichotomy in Kemlu can be seen in that perspective notably. Yet, the state, the Constitution, Pancasila and the social equilibrium of the nation prevent any open Islamic foreign policy similar to Türkiye’s. Islam plays a central role in Indonesia regarding identity, social values, norms and even political legitimation; yet sovereignty and the non-interference principle limit Islamic solidarity (Murphy, 2021). Indonesia’s support for the Palestinian cause is not officially founded on Islamic brotherhood but on the fight against remaining colonialism.

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the broadest possible audience.245 Williams’ PKOs framework applies to Indonesia, which contributes to PKOs for political, security, institutional and economic reasons (Williams, 2018).246 Under Jokowi, economic diplomacy surpasses democracy promotion as Indonesia’s first objective to gain material power.247 The current international structure does not constrain Indonesia into democratisation. Still, democracy remains on the diplomatic agenda, notably in Africa,248 although mostly symbolically. Western democracy promotion also declined in Africa.249 Yet, Indonesia’s combination of development and stability in a democratic context remains valuable material to share in

245 Obviously for reasons that are far from only economic, despite the economic diplomacy discourse. 246 According to Williams, states contribute to PKOs for political reasons linked to status, influence, existing partnerships, domestic political benefits, peer pressures or persuasion; for security reasons related to threats and threat perceptions; for institutional reasons linked to the domestic security sector that can gain financial, reputational or experience benefits; for normative reasons to appear on the global stage as a peaceful and respectable global citizen; and finally for economic reasons with financial benefits for the government, the private sector and of course the military and security apparatus. These reasons apply to the Indonesian case (Williams, 2018). 247 Used instrumentally to present Indonesia as a role model, democracy promotion was an essential feature under President SBY, especially with the BDF’s creation (Rüland, 2021). 248 A BDF Chapter was organised in Tunis in 2017, given Tunisia’s importance in the Arab Spring movement and the fact that Indonesia can appear as a democratic model for Muslim countries and other emerging countries to find a suitable way to democratise. The Indonesian ambassador to Tunisia between 2016 and 2021, Prof. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, is an intellectual and democracy promoter (CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020). The Indonesian ambassador to Ethiopia, Al Busyra Basnur, a senior diplomat previously director of public diplomacy at Kemlu, also organised meetings for democracy promotion in Addis Ababa and stated that a BDF Chapter in Ethiopia could take place in the future; to no avail until now, especially with the Tigray crisis (Basnur, 2020). Given the “authoritarian regional corporatism” of ASEAN with cooperation based on strict sovereignty or the ASEAN way, Indonesia’s democracy promotion through its foreign policy, notably in ASEAN, has been severely called an illusion (Rüland, 2021). Results would probably not be any better in Africa, especially given Indonesia’s lack of knowledge, capabilities and experience on the continent. 249 Democracy promotion or state-building ambitions’ decline from Western external powers in Africa can be seen in the shift “from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counter-terrorism”, reinforcing authoritarian governments and thus creating more unrest, terrorism and instability instead of development (Karlsrud, 2019).

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Africa.250 Following the Arab Spring, Wirajuda organised seminars with Tunisia and Egypt to share the Indonesian experience of Islam, politics, and democracy, notably for constitutional drafting.251 It may be wondered to what extent democracy promotion is compatible with the non-intervention principle and SSC. The cultural agenda includes batik promotion, gastrodiplomacy and the Indonesian language. Young with a dynamic creative economy, Indonesia lacks an offensive pop culture strategy like Japan or South Korea. Progress occurred under Jokowi. Yet, Indonesia’s diplomacy lacks integration with creators, academics and civil society. The winning formula for cultural, soft and smart diplomacy has not been found. Collaboration between universities also appears as a strong potentiality. Academic links are insufficient with Africa (CDT—Amb. Hilton Fisher, 2020; Haron & Arby, 2019). Defining academic partnerships’ content and operationalising the collaborations is critical.252 Indonesian universities should create special internationalisation task forces, linking directly with African campuses with serious long-term action plans and budgets, not only for communication purposes. University and governmental bureaucracies slow down internationalisation. The last subject evoked was Indonesian citizens’ protection.253 In the West African nations covered by the embassy, 773 Indonesian citizens were counted.254 Indonesian diplomacy also mobilises Indonesian citizens to serve Indonesian national interests (CDT—Amb. Dindin Wahyudin, 2020). The Indonesian presence in Africa remains low, even non-existent in many African locations. The number of Indonesian citizens in Africa

250 Indonesia’s current closeness with the UAE or China will not create incentives for a renewed liberal democratic promotion program. 251 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 252 The risk of signing MOUs to no avail is an all-time classic, notably in Indonesia. 253 Indonesian citizens are commonly called WNI (Warga Negara Indonesia). The

ambassador also mentioned the protection of Indonesian legal entities or BHI (Badan Hukum Indonesia) in the region. In Central Africa, in Gabon, Indonesians working in logging for Malaysian and Chinese companies are facing labour issues. Author’s Meeting with the Full Team of the Directorate for African Affairs, KEMLU, in the presence of Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 06.06.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 254 Most of which, 698 WNIs, work in the port city of Kamsar in Guinea in the bauxite industry.

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is estimated to be under 20,000.255 Indonesia’s diaspora capacities are limited. The Senegal case illustrates an Indonesian diplomat’s programme in Africa. The geographic area covered is too vast for this embassy. With minimal resources, efficient geographic coverage is challenging. The absence of embassies in the Ivory Coast and Ghana seems strange, given those countries’ importance, revealing the absence of a comprehensive African strategy, funds, and deep understanding of continental dynamics.256 Compared to external powers like Türkiye, India or China developing a Pan-African presence with much bigger means, the ambitions–capabilities gap seems significant. Indonesia could be left behind without more changes. Turkish Airlines runs eight passenger and four cargo flights to Dakar. Turkish Airlines already connects Istanbul to 60 locations in 39 African countries (Donelli, 2018; MOFA Türkiye, n.d.; Presidency, 2020). No Indonesian airline runs a direct flight to Africa. Only Ethiopian Airlines, the leading African airline, runs a direct flight to Africa, Jakarta—Addis Ababa, a professional and successful Ethiopian SOE.

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CHAPTER 6

Positioning Indonesia’s African Policy among Other Major Asian Players

To provide an Asian comparative perspective, the African foreign policies of other major Asian powers—China, Japan, India and South Korea— are scrutinised to reveal points of convergence and divergence with Indonesia.1 The goal is to strengthen explanatory power, better locating and interpreting Indonesia’s African foreign policy. For analytical reasons, the various Africa + 1 forums organised by Asian powers are privileged as spearheads of their overall African foreign policy. These forums often help coordinate the whole African policy. The IAF process and Indonesia’s overall Africa foreign policy will be contrasted with the other Asian frameworks. This study is built on those types of multiple analogies, necessary given the absence of substantial existing material on Indonesia–Africa relations. Indonesia’s contemporary African engagement’s lateness is of particular concern. The objective is not proposing an exhaustive review of Asian powers’ African policy, but highlighting essential characteristics to understand Indonesia’s approach better. While inevitably influenced by other external powers in Africa, each of the selected Asian nations implements its distinctive approach based on its developmental history, regime, geopolitical 1 This places this book in the current trend in Global African Studies towards comparative analysis among external powers in Africa (Alden & Large, 2019).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_6

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situation, capacity and development stage and its specific history and links with Africa. For an external power, an African engagement means creating an idiosyncratic narrative justifying its African expansion, notably highlighting historical affinitive relations (Alden, 2019). Asian powers offer a different framework from Western or other emerging powers. While each Asian power possesses its distinctive African story, they influence each other as members of the “Asian world”.2 An Asian power with tight relationships with the other Asian powers, especially the Northeast Asian trio, Indonesia’s African engagement was influenced and framed, consciously and unconsciously, by its interactions, knowledge and perception of China, Japan, India and South Korea; obviously not with the same intensity level; and not exclusively. Without essentialising, Asian nations consider foreign policy differently from Western nations,3 with their economic and development engagement frameworks, paradigms and institutions. Asian powers gained strong leverage in Africa, led by China as Africa’s main trading and construction partner. Hallyu is popular in Africa (Chang, 2020; Kim, 2018, 2019).4 Japan and India even joined their efforts, at least discursively, to balance China in Africa through the AAGC initiative (Yoshimatsu, 2019).5 Asian nations support Africa’s development through a vision different from Western aid, often perceived as more collaborative and respectful of African views in a relational power framework, although remaining asymmetric (Benabdallah, 2020b). Asian powers’ African engagement multiplies partnership possibilities for Africans; and thus their agency (Corkin, 2013). Yet, China, Japan, India and Korea differ in size, capacity, development stage, regime, political ideology and foreign policy objectives. Each power does not challenge the existing international order with the same intensity.6 All participate in the rising Asian supremacy, proposing alternative development models for Africans (Mills et al., 2020). The Asian dream becomes more tangible. 2 As seen previously with China towards Indonesia. 3 Japan is often considered or classified as part of the Western world while historically

being a member of the sinicised cosmos (Kang, 2010). 4 Hallyu is the famous Korean pop culture wave. 5 Although the AAGC has yet to be operationalised, the signalling is explicit. 6 Or should we say Western or Anglophone order. Japan and Korea are considered

part of the liberal or Western international order. Yet, they propose different models and values in reality, as the handling of the Covid-19 crisis revealed for example.

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After studying how Africa seriously entered Indonesia’s foreign policy mindset and how Indonesia’s highest leadership pragmatically boosted the African engagement, Indonesia’s African foreign policy positioning compared to other Asian nations must be flexibly evaluated. The aim is to locate Indonesia in Africa as the leading Southeast Asian power versus other major Asian powers, which benefit from earlier and broader contemporary African engagements. These various rapprochements allow to better grasp Indonesia’s specific engagement, its stage and level of intensity, similarities and differences, and its future potential and possible risks. The profile of Indonesia’s African approach can thus be more precise and comprehensive.

China’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia “China in Africa” tops the interest in Afro-Asian relations and literature, given the unrivalled extent of the Chinese engagement in economic terms, but also in development collaboration and various exchanges. Showing “tactical flexibility, strategic subtlety and a non-confrontational appearance” (Qobo & Pere, 2018), China creates relational power with Africa through FOCAC, the AU being a member; and the funding of training, capacity-building, academic exchanges and media; increasing guanxi (关 系) and positioning China as a dominant knowledge and norms provider that shapes its African partners towards interiorising its developmental views and interests; while being shaped in return by African perspectives, although in a weaker way (Benabdallah, 2020b).7 A geopolitical and soft power tool, education facilitates China’s national interests fulfilment, both material and ideational, supporting its power throughout the Global South. China fosters SSC and national development education, including industrialisation and rural development. China welcomes 50,000 African students per year on scholarships, trains teachers, supports human resource development in general and establishes Confucius Institutes to spread Chinese culture and language, and rural schools all over Africa (Hodzi, 2020b). Prominent in trade, China feels a structural imbalance in its African relations regarding human exchanges relating to ideology, propaganda and joint research. Strategic communications, 7 In security governance and intelligence, for example, a country like Djibouti and its President Ismail Omar Guelleh appear increasingly influenced by China regarding the state model and methods (Cobbett & Mason, 2021).

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Chinese diaspora mobilisation, people-to-people links, capacity-building by proposing vocational education and technical training to young Africans, think tank exchanges or media investments all participate in creating the “voice of China” in Africa to establish a friendlier, safer, trustful and more conducive environment for multitudinous Chinese interests. The other central structural imbalance felt by China with Africa is security.8 Despite Chinese and Russian encroachments, the US remains the dominant peace and security power in Africa. Yet, China is progressively proposing its own rival global security architecture, covering Africa.9 Indonesia has yet to reach that African engagement level. Its considerations are thus different. Still, relational power appears decisive for Indonesia to reflect on. It will determine its African success. Scholarships, training and capacity-building programmes proposed by Indonesia are undoubtedly helpful in encouraging meaningful relations. Their scale remains limited. The approach lacks ambition and strategy. Less than four thousand undergraduate students were studying in Indonesia in 2021 (Purwadi, 2022); over fifty-three thousand Indonesians were studying abroad, including twelve thousand in Egypt and only five in South Africa.10 When China gives fifty thousand scholarships to African students to study in China, Indonesia sends around the same amount of its young citizens to study abroad, financing 60% of them while only receiving a few

8 Security issues relate to a hard power deficit compared to a soft power deficit relating to human, relational aspects of the Sino-African links (Rolland, 2021). 9 Through the Global Security Initiative (GSI) notably (The Global Security Initiative. Concept Paper, 2023). 10 Almost thirty thousand of those Indonesian students abroad received a scholarship from the Indonesian state through the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education, known by its acronym LPDP (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan); an almost $10 billion (IDR 145 trillion) endowment fund as of 2023 managed by the Ministry of Finance (Aisyah, 2022; Rossa, 2022). For Egypt, the data refers to 2022. 90% of Indonesian students in Egypt were studying religion, mostly et al.-Azhar University (Maharani, 2022). Over twenty thousand Indonesian students were learning in Australia in 2023. Australia welcomed 619,371 international students in 2022, generating billions of Australian dollars in revenue for the country (International Students in Australia Statistics, 2023; Okezone, 2023). Relations between Indonesia and Al-Azhar started in the eighteenth century. The first student studying et al.-Azhar in 1850 was Abdul Manan Dipomenggolono, the founder of Tremas Islamic Boarding School in East Java (Yehia, 2023).

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thousand students in Indonesia.11 In 2021, the Indonesian government offered two hundred scholarships in total, with ten to fifteen scholarships reserved for Egyptian students.12 African students are in limited numbers in Indonesia. For budgetary reasons, Indonesia did not offer scholarships in 2022.13 Reaching a certain level of material power enables nations to establish knowledge-and-technology-based influence and networking, as China has done. A more refined and addictive power comes to predominate. Indonesia’s economic ascent is providing it with more material power, which is not necessarily well-deployed internationally. Jokowi’s economic diplomacy approach will need to be intensified and foreign policy priorities diversified to become more meaningful for Indonesia to reach a high level of influence in Africa. The management and capacities of the Indonesian education sector and universities will need to be reviewed to pursue such ambitions credibly, avoiding shallow and cosmetic collaborations. Strategic tools accompanying China’s rise, Chinese universities benefit from means far above Indonesia’s. African students in China have faced social blending issues and isolation from Chinese society due to language, social or xenophobic barriers, notably during the Covid19 crisis (Castillo & Amoah, 2020).14 Given its inherent diversity, Indonesia’s African students’ integration capacity appears firmer.15 A 11 When China received 50,000 African students in 2015, the UK and the US received 40,000 (Anshan, 2022). 12 Through its Kemitraan Negara Berkembang (Developing Countries Partnership/ KNB) programme. Twenty-three Indonesian universities participated. The 200 governmental scholarships consisted of “10 scholarships for doctoral programs, 180 scholarships for master’s programs and 10 scholarships for undergraduate programs ”. Thirty-four Egyptians studied on scholarships in Indonesia since 2017 (Fahlevi, 2021). 13 This reveals Indonesia’s still relative financial fragility and the sensitivity of international aid allocations, especially in crisis times (KNB Scholarship, 2022). 14 China has been welcoming African students since the 1960s under the Maoist policy of uniting the Third World. The 1988 Nanjing anti-African protests against better conditions provided to African students and their dating Chinese women were crucial in generating the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Although the context differs, the sensitivity of offering important scholarships to foreigners to study in Indonesia can be perceived. 15 The author has observed this for years, directly in Indonesian universities. The author has met and is in contact with several African students in Indonesian universities, including Universitas Indonesia. Their treatment seems to have been decent, including during the Covid-19 crisis. Moreover, there is no barrier for them to blend with Indonesians. Multiple

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perception of racism, human rights abuses and marginalisation towards Indonesians of Papua origin could attract African sympathy from a PanAfrican perspective (Blades, 2020; Kluge, 2019).16 Overall, Indonesia manages its diverse population well, trying hard to integrate minorities like Papuans.17 The problem for international students in Indonesia is what perspectives in research or career can an Indonesian education offer. Indonesian universities are heavy bureaucratic systems, dependent on power and highly penetrated by outside interests; especially economic ones, supporting commercial and entrepreneurial paradigms. Reliant on the mechanical accumulation of publications and politicisation, the promotion system is also deficient (Abraham et al., 2019; Irawan, 2022).18 China leads the way in African penetration, above its competitors in many fields. Its megaprojects and megadeals ensure solid visibility. Its media and Confucius institutes are spread all over Africa. Bodomo counted around two million Chinese in Africa and 500,000 Africans in China. Africans first arrived in Guangzhou in significant numbers following the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis from Southeast Asian cities hardly hit like Jakarta and Bangkok.19 China has developed its security and defense partnerships with African countries. Millions of Chinese and Africans now live intertwined. Indonesia has not yet reached that stage.

discussions with Africans in Indonesia, in general, reveal they seem pretty happy. However, further empirical studies would be needed to develop this matter. 16 Separatism or secessionism in Africa is also linked to state incapacity to ensure human and minority rights (Williams, 2007). 17 The security apparatus has been directly involved in promoting and supporting Papuans to obtain positions in the state and SOEs, which shows how seriously the matter is considered. 18 Foreigners can difficultly be employed in Indonesian state universities. Indonesian universities’ alumni associations are also not very welcoming to international graduates, or at least they do not know what to propose. Universities and their alumni associations partake in power justification and accumulation. Alumni associations have become essential vehicles for access to powerful positions and rent-seeking in the Indonesian polity. They help manage elite dynamics and cooptation, power conquering and contestation and stability. Supporting knowledge production and research is not their primary role or focus. 19 Africans were notably 100,000 in Guangzhou and 30,000 in Yiwu (Bodomo, 2015, 2020). French counted over one million Chinese citizens living in Africa, nicknamed China’s “second continent”. The Chinese state’s attempt to monitor all its citizens in Africa is not a sinecure (French, 2014).

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China has been active in Africa for a long time. Admiral Zheng He allegedly reached seven times the shores of East Africa between 1405 and 1433, under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), notably Kenya’s Mombasa port (Liu et al., 2014). The Chinese employ this narrative to legitimise their African engagement. The Bandung and Afro-Asian narratives stand at the core of Chinese foreign policy (Xinhua, 2015b), more than Indonesia, given Sukarno’s fall in 1965.20 Bandung started China’s contemporary African engagement, never stopped since, although in different ways and intensity over time. China’s first official diplomatic relations with Africa started with Egypt in 1956, just after Bandung (Sibiri, 2019), where Nasser and Zhou Enlai made trade and arms deals (Percival Wood, 2012).21 Bandung was a networking platform for China and its new partners. Indonesia’s African engagement was hurt by the New Order’s advent, with more Western and regional priorities. In the 2000s, China’s relations with Africa reached unprecedented levels in trade, investment, development, security and people-to-people ties. The relationship developed holistically, “co-constituted”, indicating Africans have a crucial voice in the Sino-African partnership (Iwata, 2020). Africa holds a strategic place in the global system, revealed notably by its glorious past (Alao, 2020; French, 2021). Indonesia needs to better understand its African partners and their legitimate agency.22 The IAF is a first step, but it appears one-sided, at the service of Indonesia itself, not co-constituted in a profound dialogue with Africans.23 The African agency topic’s rise is described as an African counter-reaction to perceived Chinese hegemony (Alden & Large, 2018).24 It probably emanates from Africans’ will to retrieve control, not only vis-à-vis China. A similar claim exists in Indonesia, carried out directly by Jokowi. Indonesians want to 20 And Indonesia’s bebas aktif positioning. 21 Nasser considered Bandung one of the two most important events of modern history

with the discovery of nuclear energy (Van Reybrouck, 2022). 22 Indonesia is pretty successful overall in accommodating different voices and gaining support, as seen in its many diplomatic gains. 23 Alao writes that Africa has become “a voice to be heard; not a problem to be solved”. Refusing the hegemony of external narratives, notably Afro-pessimism, African intellectuals challenge the vision of a structurally failed and marginal Africa to give rise to a stronger African agency. Nyabola rejects the view of Africa as a problem, pointing to the power of African agency and creativity in Kenya, notably through digital means (Alao, 2020; Nyabola, 2018). 24 If it is the case, it would probably be a counter-reaction to all external hegemonies.

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be masters in their country.25 Since the Republic’s founding, indigenous economic ownership has been an issue (Robison, 2009).26 China offers Africa an alternative development model, through FOCAC, now integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).27 Globally, BRI investments reached $104.72bn during 2014–2020, with mid-2019, 2631 projects valued at $3.7tn (Anshan, 2022). In Africa, during 2000–2020, the BRI notably provided 13,000 km of roads and railways, over 80 large-scale power facilities, over 130 medical facilities, 45 sports venues, over 170 schools, and trained over 160,000 personnel (Anshan, 2022). Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) failed in Africa (Kalu, 2018; Raposo, 2014). Western donors stopped investing in major infrastructure projects in the 1980s and 1990s, offering China an opportunity to focus on infrastructure development (Tang, 2021). Western aid conditionalities, seemingly disrespecting African sovereignty, were rejected for mutually beneficial and more equal-standing Chinese development cooperation and financing. China dominates the relationship but seems to better respect its African partners, at least before the debates on Chinese “evils” like “debt-trap” and “trade-trap” diplomacy. Yet, Zambia’s recent $6.3bn debt restructuring with Chinese support shows

25 “menjadi tuan rumah di negara sendiri”. 26 China’s position towards Indonesia’s Chinese-Indonesian community is a strategic

issue. 27 China launched the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in late 2021, said to be complimentary with the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Given geopolitical shifts, the Covid crisis and China’s strategic changes, the GDI “refocuses” on development, insisting on the promotion of the SDGs and North–South gap reduction. Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength should help solve development issues and increase the representation and voice of developing countries. The 17 goals of the UN’s 2030 Agenda are highly seen as highly compatible with the five areas of the BRI: “policy communication, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds ”. For China, “the Global Development Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative are the main drivers of global South-South cooperation” (陈超 [Chen Chao] 王义桅 [Wang Yiwei], 2023).

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China’s positive evolution.28 China’s influence is perceived as beneficial in Africa; its development model is the second favoured one after the US (Sanny & Selormey, 2021). Before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China shared Sub-Saharan Africa’s underdevelopment, thus seemingly understanding African problematics better.29 Indonesia perfectly understands issues relating to external powers’ presence. The archipelago can difficultly be accused in Africa of neocolonialism, given its history, support for African liberation movements, and development stage. Indonesia is perfectly aware of the criticism against China in Africa.30 These debates also happen in Indonesia concerning China, allowing Indonesia to adapt its African approach and discourse more efficiently. Still, Indonesia can be vulnerable to issues like discrimination against Africans, although Indonesians manage diversity well, and Africans are not numerous in Indonesia. In 2021, for example, a conflict opposed the Indonesian immigration directorate to a Nigerian diplomat allegedly attacked by immigration officers in Jakarta, causing a diplomatic row. The episode made the headlines in both Indonesia and Nigeria (AP, 2021; Ewokor, 2021; Sorongan, 2021). Launched in 2000 as the formal and flexible platform channelling China’s African engagement, FOCAC constitutes China’s institutional brand in Africa for delivering its contribution to African development and managing its diverse types of African ties (Taylor, 2011). FOCAC delivers the Chinese model in Africa as a masterplan, serving the greater BRI masterplan. The existence of a China model applied in Africa is debated. Some argue China proposes no model, only pragmatism

28 The deal was described as a “breakthrough for indebted nations”. China was Zambia’s largest official creditor, with $4.1 billion owed to the Export–Import Bank of China alone. In 2020, Zambia was the first African country to default on its sovereign debt, given the Covid-19 crisis. Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema succeeded in rescheduling the debt over more than 20 years with a three-year grace period during which only interest payments would be due (Thomas et al., 2023). 29 Tang indicates that Chinese indicators like “road density, telephone usage rate, and electricity and water supplies were similar to those of sub-Saharan Africa; some indicators were even lower” (Tang, 2021). 30 Around debt-trap and trade-trap diplomacy, Chinese workers, corruption, spying, environmental standards and other issues.

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and adaptability.31 Under Xi Jinping, China affirms and disseminates a strong Chinese way, rivalling the US (Murphy, 2022). China supports African sovereignty and self-reliance over aid to develop self-capacities, rejecting liberal democratic Eurocentrism and a colonial standard of “civilisation”.32 The IAF and especially Luhut’s Task Force have considered FOCAC as an example, considering Luhut’s closeness with China and its developmental model’s influence on him. Kemlu prefers positioning Indonesia as an alternative model to China. Afro-Asian brotherhood was born in Bandung. Still, FOCAC is an unavoidable inspiration as the most renowned multi-bilateral Africa forum.33 Indonesia’s new African approach’s pragmatism, its structuration, the development of a funding capacity through the Indonesia Eximbank or SOEs internationalisation through the African laboratory by seeking infrastructure projects, follow the FOCAC model, yet only partially. Indonesia lacks capacity compared to China, and Kemlu is unwilling to resemble China. Indonesia plays a dual part perceived with the Luhut-Kemlu African approach contrast; Afro-Asian revisionism versus a middle power narrative. Using a mutual benefit and generosity discourse while supplying global public goods, China’s infrastructure financing abroad, notably in Africa, represents a solution to its industrial and capital overcapacities (Li, 2020), unlike Indonesia. The BRI promotes the transfer of Chinese labour industries to Africa, supporting industrialisation; with the famous Huajian Group example with footwear in Ethiopia (Anshan, 2022). No country has China’s financial capacity and leverage for a state-driven international developmental effort. FOCAC contains democratic aspects, considering African views and seeking mutual benefits. African proposals and feedback matter. Nevertheless, China’s national interests always prevail.34

31 Tang indicates that in 1985 Deng Xiaoping said to Jerry Rawlings, then President of Ghana: “Please don’t copy our model …. If there is any experience on our part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s own national conditions ” (Tang, 2021). 32 Li Anshan says that civilisational standard produced more waste, more dead and

more suicide (Anshan, 2022). 33 Highlighting how the US experience inspired the creation of the Nazi regime, Whitman describes how borrowers begin with foreign models that they reframe and adapt to their specific circumstances (Whitman, 2017). 34 This is clearly expressed by Chinese Africanists and political leaders in strategic Chinese documents (Rolland, 2021). Even loan cancellations or debt restructuring under

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China’s domestic success legitimises implementing its best practices in Africa, notably in infrastructure, industrialisation and skills development. The Chinese development proposition is based on trial and error and adaptability according to African specificities. Relative domestic economic and political success, especially in infrastructure and hilirisasi, heartens Indonesia to showcase its achievements in Africa, which seems the most accessible region for the archipelago. Building infrastructure and sharing industrialisation expertise in Africa increase Jokowi’s domestic political legitimacy, embodying his achievements and Indonesia’s desirability abroad. It appears as a win–win proposition for Indonesia and Africa. FOCAC facilitates problem-solving for China’s Africa policy implementation, ensuring follow-up, evaluation and correction of problematic policies. FOCAC consults Africans, adapting its three-year action plan to African demands and feedback. African countries propose projects and request new interaction domains (Anshan et al., 2012). China dominates but softly, at least in appearance. Despite the “co-construction” discourse (Iwata, 2020), FOCAC is a tool deploying Chinese power. The powerful accommodates the weaker party, ensuring continuity and stability. Indeed, China faces critics regarding debt or trade trap diplomacy, deal opacity, corruption or environmental issues; from Africans and Westerners with neocolonialism or imperialism arguments. However, African agency should not be negated. Colonisation and decolonisation are over (Táíwò, 2022). This African agency, input and feedback, lack in the present Indonesian model, given its early development stage and knowledge production deficit concerning Africa. Indonesia does not consider organising the IAF in Africa. Indonesia should remain cognisant of African demands.35 The NAASP lesson demonstrated Africans can abruptly reject relationships, especially given Africa’s current strong attractivity, providing broader agency in strategic partnerships and collaborations. Although imperfectly, Africans frame their relationships with external powers to serve their interests, influencing the development “models” external powers promote

international pressure serves China’s political and geostrategic interests to better its image in the developing world. 35 Indonesia AID is supposedly demand-driven while aiming at facilitating Indonesian business. Handling this contradiction will be essential.

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(Hodzi, 2020a).36 The choice of creating the African Task Force was not only modelled on China, but also on the awareness of African demands for infrastructure,37 a high African priority. Indonesia’s proven infrastructure experience can benefit Africa. Hilirisasi diplomacy also corresponds to Africa’s will for industrial beneficiation of its critical minerals. FOCAC institutionalised China’s African relationships to handle highlevel networks, form better guanxi and deliver its broad cooperation agenda in resource access; trade; investment; development; peacekeeping; security and defense; diplomacy, especially given Africa’s UN weight; and rising strategic issues like the environment, science, cyber, culture, media, health or education. China’s Africa policy was described in its two Africa Policy Papers in 2006 and 2015, implemented via FOCAC (MOFA China, 2006; Mthembu & Mabera, 2021; Xinhua, 2015a).38 China’s Africa strategy now obeys the BRI strategy (Staden et al., 2018). Indonesia is a vital pillar of the Maritime Silk Road that traverses the Indo-Pacific, connecting Indonesia with Africa.39 The BRI brings Africa into the Indonesian leadership’s mindset, offering collaboration opportunities. Indonesia can position itself towards the Sino-African asymmetric relationship. Indonesia benefits from Chinese investment and knowledge domestically. To raise its status and international experience, Indonesia can imitate China’s Indonesian and African engagements, adapted to its capacities. Less developed, African countries appear more accessible. Indonesia can act proudly in Africa as a development assistance donor through its “hands on top” diplomacy, giving being better than receiving.40 From a utilitarian “aid-for-trade”

36 Indonesia also masters the framing of relationships, particularly through its art of great power management. 37 Indonesia tries to coordinate with the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of the AU that supports continental integration in Africa (African Union, n.d.-b). 38 China presented its two Africa Policy Papers during the years when FOCAC was organised at the Summit level. 2018 was also a Summit. 2000, 2003, 2009, 2012 and 2021 occurred at the ministerial level. 39 Isolated during the Cold War, the Indo-Pacific area also marks the grand geopolitical return of India, potentially China’s main rival in the future, as it was in the past for centuries (Pardesi, 2020); placing Indonesia in a pivotal position also from that perspective. 40 “Tangan di atas ” diplomacy means giving is better than receiving. Dignity or pride can appear as major diplomatic motivation for Indonesia and leaders like Jokowi and

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perspective, the Bandung discourse provides perfect leverage for Indonesian business in Africa (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy is fostering Afro-Indonesian collaboration, leveraging Bandung for Indonesia’s national interests, positioning Indonesia as “the centre and leader of developing countries ” (Hikam, 2023). China’s African penetration is more impressive in trade than in FDI. At the end of 2020, China represented 6% of FDI stock in Africa (Cilliers, 2023). In 2006, after FOCAC-3, President Mbeki warned against the risk of a “colonial relationship” between China and Africa, given the unbalanced terms of trade. Africa exported raw materials and imported Chinese manufactured products, condemning Africa to underdevelopment (BBC, 2006). The NAASP was also an African and South African attempt to diversify from China, finding new Asian partners like Indonesia and ASEAN, explaining Mbeki’s ASEAN engagement. Ultimately, South Africa would privilege African continentalism. The vivid debt-trap diplomacy debate occurs similarly in Indonesia around Chinese infrastructure loans (Akbar, 2021; Alden & Jiang, 2019). Yet, in most African countries, debt from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and private lenders far exceeds debt from China.41 With geopolitical shifts and its economic weight, China’s BRI goals have evolved. After Deng Xiaoping’s “Go Out” policy, since 2021, Xi Jinping implements a “dual circulation” strategy, reducing overseas capital outflows and boosting domestic consumption

Luhut. Indonesia AID is not only a pragmatic instrument, but also an act of dignity. African dignity should be well considered too, however. 41 Chinese public and private lenders represented 12% of Africa’s 2020 $696 billion external debt. Non-Chinese private lenders, in total, represented 35% of Africa’s total external debt, including bondholders and oil traders. During the Covid-19 crisis, China participated in the G20’s debt-suspension scheme contrary to private lenders. China’s loan average interest rate was 2.7% in 2021 and 5% for non-Chinese private lenders. The Chinese debt situation was problematic in a few countries. In 2021, Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Zambia paid over a third of their debt to Chinese lenders (Large, 2021; Savage, 2022). Nigeria’s Chinese debt represents $3.93 billion or 3.8% of the total compared to private bondholders ($15.62 billion) and the World Bank ($13.06 billion) (Olander, 2022). Still, China did loan significant amounts to Africa. Between 2000 and 2020, China made $160 billion in loans to African countries, mostly for large-scale infrastructure projects. For example, Kenya used over $9 billion for railways, ports and highways. Source: China’s Overseas Finance Development Database, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. Website: https://www.bu.edu/ gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/

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(Luke et al., 2023). China’s African engagement is thus highly political and strategic above all. Reevaluating its loans and projects with new risk policies (Nyabiage, 2023), China’s funding and investments declined 54% in 2022 to US$7.5bn. Still, China is pressured to provide debt relief or cancellation to its African debtors (Sun, 2020). Negative perceptions create trouble and instability for China’s African engagement. A solid African presence requires moderating its negative aspects in local lives and mindsets causing instability and violence. Indonesia cannot propose significant loans to African nations.42 Still, asymmetric trade or investments could cause problems. A more modest Chinese financial engagement could generate opportunities for Indonesia. Increasingly imbricated with Africa, China faces higher risks and drawbacks, particularly from African civil society with lawsuits against resource contracts or anti-Chinese sentiment instrumentalised politically.43 Indonesia would face these risks if the DRC railways project moved forward. Indonesia’s current exposure remains limited, given the still low level of its overall African engagement. Despite Bandung, Indonesia is an alternative actor in Africa, not yet identified as a major player. The archipelago is not targeted by African or Western civil society groups as a problematic actor. Indonesia can take time to learn and anticipate, although mistakes come fast and need adequate responses. Security issues facing its assets and citizens, notably BRI related, have become a central preoccupation for China, especially with Chinese public opinion’s impact on Chinese foreign policy-making (Ghiselli, 2021; Li, 2020; Wu, 2013). The Chinese government must justify African investments and aid spent to Chinese public opinion, and protect its citizens and assets in Africa (Rolland, 2021). Public opinion is not a monopoly

42 Yet, Indonesia AID does want to focus on soft and concessional loans, notably through co-financing, to support UN SDGs. 43 Civil society groups litigated in Zimbabwe over the construction of the US$3 billion

Sengwa coal plant for environmental reasons that brought Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China’s largest bank, to abandon the financing of the project; or in Kenya related to the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) contract for failing to follow procurement laws; but also in Ghana and Guinea for deals related to access to bauxite (Nantulya, 2020; Ndlovu & Sguazzin, 2021; Obadare, 2014; Taylor, 2020).

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of liberal democracies. Development assistance to Africa has been criticised in China (Chao, 2018).44 Africa seems dangerous for Chinese assets and citizens, who can feel unsafe, facing multiple threats.45 China has thus prioritised security issues in Africa, notably in recent FOCAC Action Plans.46 Non-interventionist, facing image and technical deployment issues, China partners with African security and military forces, offers funding and supply and forms PSCs to protect its assets and citizens, allowing to still respect African sovereignties (Alden et al., 2018; Benabdallah, 2020a). Still, China’s non-interference principle metamorphosed into a non-indifference principle.47 Africa impacts China’s foreign policy ideology (Hodzi, 2019). Yet, non-interference allows for avoiding precedents that could be pointed back at China concerning its domestic issues like the Uighur topic (Carmody & Taylor, 2010), similar to Indonesia with Papua. A correlation between China’s investment levels and arms sales in African countries exists, notably in Sudan (Carmody & Taylor, 2010). Indonesia’s military weight in Africa remains marginal. Learning early, even theoretically, allows better anticipation. Moreover, the Papua risk is already well present. Peacekeeping, military cooperation, counterterrorism or anti-piracy programmes are high priorities. Applying its relational power framework, China organised the first China-Africa Defence and Security Forum in 2018 (Benabdallah, 2020b; Xinhua, 2015a).48 The Asian giant supports the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in a panAfrican approach49 ; financing the African Standby Force (ASF) or the 44 Notably online. 45 Threats can include kidnappings, attacks on oil rigs, railways or ports, or risks of

revenge attacks on African soil for mistreatment of African citizens in China, as during the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis in Guangzhou (Githinji, 2020). In March 2023, nine Chinese citizens were killed at a mining site in the Central African Republic in the grip of a civil war, an attack denounced by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The second least developed country in the world, according to the UN, has faced a civil war since 2013 (Le Figaro avec AFP, 2023). 46 The latest FOCAC Action Plans were for the periods 2019–2021 and 2022–2024. Source: www.focac.org. 47 Which was seen in Sudan notably. 48 This event is in line with the 2015 Africa policy paper recommending the invitation

of African military commanders for workshops in China. 49 The five components of the APSA are: the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, the Panel of the Wise, the AU Peace Fund, the Continental Early Warning

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African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).50 Costcompetitive, China has become a large arms seller in Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, supporting its economic and security interests. China represented over 34% of Nigeria’s arms imports in 2021 (Nyabiage, 2023).51 The Nigerian navy increases collaboration with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against maritime security threats and for stability in the Gulf of Guinea; the construction of a military base being rumoured. China built and owns the Lekki deep-sea port in Lagos, supporting its deep-sea oil production (Woo, 2023). Defense supports those economic and political interests. China’s 2013 Defense White Paper requires the PLA to protect overseas interests and China’s new political economy (Camba & Hung, 2018). Indonesia can learn from China’s experience in defense and security, avoiding Chinese mistakes while reproducing its achievements. As for SOEs, Africa constitutes a laboratory for the Chinese apparatus to learn and professionalise. This peace and security laboratory does not systematically generate replicable or positive outcomes for China. China’s operations in South Sudan through conflict mediation and peacekeeping, deploying 700 combat-ready troops, entailed criticism in China for abandoning its traditional non-interventionism (Brosig, 2020). Loud criticism in Indonesia in similar circumstances can be imagined. The drivers for China’s increasing security engagement with Africa are material to protect its citizens and assets, and develop its defense industry; and ideational in development ideology, propaganda (Kovrig, 2018) and peace model since China proposes developmental peace in opposition to liberal peace (Coleman & Job, 2021). The Covid-19 crisis caused China

System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF) (Bakail, 2021). APSA is supposed to lead to a Common African Defense Security Policy (CADSP) (Gwatiwa, 2022). 50 Yet, schemes like the African Standby Force have not been operationalised and are said to be unfitting for African security threats like violent extremism and deadly transnational armed groups. “ad hoc troop coalitions have become the norm in Africa”. Coordination between the AU and RECs, and financial mean are insufficient. States also want to preserve their domestic sovereignty (Dessu & Yohannes, 2022). 51 In Sub-Saharan Africa, China’s largest infrastructure investments are in the countries

among its top 5 arms buyers. China’s sales reached US$2.04 billion in 2021, just behind Russia and three times the US. Tanzania is the largest buyer, with 19.6% of Chinese sales, followed by Nigeria at 13.5% and Sudan at 12.6%. China is also starting to sell heavier weaponry systems. The war in Ukraine could help China gain market share against Russia (Nyabiage, 2023).

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to link health cooperation with increased training for the African security apparatuses, often at the forefront of crisis handling (Soulé, 2021), like in Indonesia with the response’s securitisation, even militarisation. Since Covid-19, Indonesia also accelerated its health diplomacy in Africa. China continuously learns from its African involvement’s mistakes, adapting its approach together with its African partners. Opening FOCAC-8 held in Dakar, President Xi Jinping presented the ChinaAfrica Vision 2035 jointly designed with Africans (Anshan, 2022).52 He announced a $300bn billion non-oil imports target from Africa by 2024, “green lanes” and facilitated inspection and quarantine procedures for African agricultural exports to China, and more zero-tariff products under DFQF for LDCs (Luke et al., 2023). The Middle Kingdom gains a deeper understanding of local contexts in each African country and region to avoid disturbing stability with its presence and interventions (Kovrig, 2018). In business, China increasingly works through local actors and institutions, creating joint ventures and assimilating local norms and practices (Ado, 2022). China’s support for authoritarian regimes and promotion of its political model risk increasing instability, a mistake countries like France made for decades, willingly keeping dictators in power to protect their interests.53 Under Xi Jinping, China appears more willing to promote its governance model as opposed to its more neutral tradition since Deng Xiaoping (Large, 2021). Indonesia’s potentially broader capacity to engage with African civil society actors, given its idiosyncrasy and polity nature, seems an advantage. Since the Indonesian state applies the non-intervention principle, Indonesian civil society could play a decisive role in Africa, if it developed an interest. Knowledge and strategy will determine possibilities. These risks and security issues impact Chinese media and public opinion. China launches media campaigns, invests in media networks, deploys its media in Africa with the creation of a Chinese media hub in Nairobi and finances scholarships and training in media studies for

52 The first 3-year plan focused on the following programmes: medical and health, poverty reduction and agricultural development, trade promotion, investment promotion, capacity-building, cultural and people-to-people exchange, peace and security. 53 In the long term, France hurt its interests, incapable of sufficiently changing its approach and its underlying philosophy. Blocking the emancipation of Francophone Africans has now backlashed, placing France in a delicate situation. Reinventing itself in Africa with a change of mindset will take time and courage.

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Africans in Chinese universities (Li, 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). African academics criticised Africa’s illusionary rise in relation to China, with a forged growth, only linked to Chinese economic growth fuelled notably by African resources. China now shifted from an export to a consumption and services economy. Africa did not develop significantly. Poverty remains high.54 This echoes the “China” debate in Indonesia. Nuance is undoubtedly required. Indonesia’s hilirisasi and infrastructure building are China-backed. Indonesia’s African effort could also be perceived from that “academic, media and opinion” perspective. Africa’s academic, media and public opinion landscape should be seriously studied. Given its African engagement’s magnitude,55 China supports cultural, educational and media endeavours, helping protect its investments through more robust intellectual support. Narratives, including securitisation, condition its African presence’s stability and sustainability; diminishing reputational risk. China must also provide Africa space and support to develop its interests and presence in China and the world as a responsible and benevolent great power defending the Global South. FOCAC provides market access for African exports to China. Focused on gaining access to the African market, notably through PTAs, Indonesia does not seem to have well-considered the poorest African nations’ export access to its market, despite agreeing to DFQF. Reciprocity and solidarity, at least apparent, condition a successful African engagement. Africans need access to Indonesia in every possible way. Whereas Indonesia stands neutrally, non-aligned, willing to preserve its precious Southeast Asian autonomy, China also engages with Africa, given its hegemony battle with the US. This ideological and developmental rivalry could turn into full-scale proxy wars.56 China showcases internationally its developmental capacities in the Africa lab, seeking backup from the UN African bloc. On a different level, Indonesia is also a strategic

54 The continent did not benefit from its relationship with China, making Africa a victim of a “shadow rise” or a growth–poverty nexus (Carmody et al., 2020; Frankema & Waijenburg, 2018). 55 Seemingly seeking cultural hegemony in a Gramscian way. 56 This might already have started in places like the Sahel, Central Africa, the Congo,

the Horn of Africa or Mozambique, to name a few hot zones. Analysts differ in their opinions, depending also on definitions. Jokowi rejected ASEAN becoming a proxy (Shofa, 2023).

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place for China to showcase its model’s supremacy,57 exemplified by hilirisasi and infrastructure building. Given its great power management savoir-faire in Asia through its equilateral alignment strategy,58 Indonesia can benefit from its non-alignment in Africa to reach its objectives by nurturing great power support. Studying China’s approach underlines some essential points helping better understand Indonesia’s African approach. Indonesia, with the IAF framework and Luhut’s Task Force, modelled its African approach on a scaled-down FOCAC, limited to a few issues and bounded in scale and financial capacities. Jokowi and Luhut are implementers of a mini-Chinese developmental model, at least in infrastructure and resource industrialisation; in partnership with China. But Indonesia cannot deliver on a significant scale for the moment in funding for infrastructure projects in Africa, with the possible exception of Pertamina.59 Reinventing his approach by leveraging the Bandung Spirit, Luhut promoted hilirisasi, tropical forest and maritime diplomacy; on top of all other Indonesian assets in health, digital, governance, agriculture and more; presenting Indonesia as a useful model for Africans to follow to increase welfare, and simultaneously building a coalition to counter Western attacks on Indonesia’s raw export bans on various commodities, beginning with nickel. Continuity and capacity to generate concrete outcomes for Africans will determine success. Over 10,000 Chinese companies exist in Africa; a few tens Indonesian companies. In several African countries, only a few Indonesians are present, incomparable with the large Chinese presence all over Africa. In 2018, Chinese engineering and construction companies reaped almost US$50bn from African projects (CARI, 2020b). China–Africa trade stood at around US$200bn while Indonesia’s African trade stood below US$10bn on average for 2016–2020, increasing since 2021, given high commodity prices (Antara CARI, 2020a; News, 2018).60 China’s African trade is relatively more dispersed on the whole continent than other 57 As seen in the battle against Japan for the construction of the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train, an epic diplomatic confrontation linked to the Asia–Africa narrative that China wants to dominate. 58 Which is, in fact, a kind of non-alignment. 59 Yet, as seen previously with Angola, Africa also presents a risk for Pertamina

executives. 60 See also the charts in this book.

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external powers, notably with poorer African nations. Western nations focus more on the larger, wealthier African countries (Tang, 2021).61 In 2021, Indonesia’s trade with its three main African partners; South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt; represented 53.5% of Indonesia–Africa trade.62 Indonesia’s Africa trade is overconcentrated with its three main African partners; and with around a dozen countries out of over fifty African nations. Indonesia’s trade concentration with a few African countries relates to its still limited African trade and engagement. China, the US and the EU trade and engage more with Africa. Indonesia should intensify and broaden its African reach to increase its trade, relatively stagnant compared to China or Türkiye. China’s African presence’s transformative scale is unique and systemic. Indonesia’s approach can only be more limited. However, China’s African approach helps better locate and evaluate Indonesia’s effort. Indonesia proposes an “Indonesian model”, less vehemently ideological compared to China’s.63 Indonesia stays low profile, underlining the Indonesia– Africa historical friendship, while insisting Bandung’s political leverage should support mutual economic benefits. Indonesia can help with infrastructure and resource industrialisation. Indonesia can ship food products, CPO and other needed amenities if trade tariffs are cut. Although not

61 72% of US–Africa trade and 70% of Europe–Africa trade in 2016 was made with six African nations, whereas 72% of China–Africa trade was done with eleven countries. For US–Africa trade: South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Angola and Morocco. For EU– Africa trade: South Africa, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia. For China–Africa trade: South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Congo Brazzaville, DRC, Zambia and Tanzania (Tang, 2021). 62 See the tables in this book. Indonesia–Africa trade with its six main partners; adding Angola, Kenya and Algeria; constituted over 66.4% of its African trade. Indonesia did over 77% of its trade with Africa with ten partners, adding Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Djibouti. 63 With Chinese criticism of the so-called Washington Consensus or even the Western model of aid development with its democratic or governance conditionalities. Jokowi’s critical discourse at the 2015 AAS would be closer to a Chinese type of critical contestation of the Western governance model.

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proven yet, Indonesia can invest in some projects, having funding capabilities with, notably, Indonesia Eximbank.64 Indonesia offers scholarships and development aid while being an ideal tourism destination.65 The discourse appears almost non-ideological, despite the SSC and Bandung solidarity rhetoric. Indonesia stands as a China alternative for specific projects without all the publicity and visibility inherent to Chinese involvement. In some countries with problems linked to Chinese workers’ presence, Indonesia can be a solution. In the Jokowi style, Indonesia’s discourse and offer remain modest and pragmatic, probably an advantage to gaining trust in Africa. Delivering visible projects will raise Indonesia’s name as a partner and investor, positively reverberating in the Indonesian polity for the highest leadership’s benefit. Naturally, the tone is changing with Luhut. To defend hilirisasi, Indonesia becomes more vocal, conjuncturally. Overall, the new African policy will survive or not with the next leadership.66 Indonesia’s Africa policy remains insufficient. Incapable of rivalling China’s engagement, the archipelago should nevertheless pursue a more holistic approach, learning from China and other external powers’ mistakes. Indonesia lacks exposure, with a limited diplomatic architecture, trade, investment or citizen presence. Anticipating problems, Indonesia must develop its African knowledge and research, seeking better opportunities while preventing threats. Knowledge brings business, opening up business opportunities’ visibility thanks to a better understanding of realities. Chinese problems regarding security, public opinion, lawsuits, corruption and more must be considered more holistically by Indonesia. This is not yet adequately integrated into the economic diplomacy approach.

64 As seen, Indonesia Eximbank’s funding capacity has become less clear since the Covid-19 crisis, impacting several African projects. 65 As the delegates of the IAF witnessed in Bali for those who had never been, although the Covid-19 crisis substantially modified the tourism industry. 66 It was initially predicted Jokowi would become a lame duck before the 2024 presidential and legislative elections. In mid-2023, he appeared strong and popular, with a high popularity score and the capacity to be the kingmaker of the election. Again, Jokowi and Luhut were facing Megawati, Surya Paloh and Jusuf Kalla. If he can ensure a sort of continuity by influencing the polity on the choice of his successor, his African policy boost should be pursued by the new President, for example, Ganjar Pranowo or Prabowo Subianto. Overall, the chances of African policy continuity are high.

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Like other external powers, Indonesia could face serious problems relating to its assets and citizens in Africa without clear security solutions; threat anticipation, protection and reaction. Kidnappings of Indonesian citizens happen in Africa, like in Gabonese waters in 2020 (Kemlu, 2020). China’s strong focus on relational power around education, training and media is also missing in the Indonesian approach. Africans possess their views and ambitions. Indonesia’s capacity to understand African needs and will remain to be increased. Indonesia can benefit from its underdog profile in Africa; a peaceful power, closer in diversity and developmental gap to African idiosyncrasies. China represents a model and counter model for Indonesia for its African engagement, as it is for Indonesia domestically. Geopolitics and the highest Indonesian leadership’s mindset, ideology and goals determine to what extent Indonesia mimics China; and considers Africa.

Japan’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia Evolutive, like FOCAC, with Japan’s strength and objectives in the international system, African demands and its review process; yet now less visible than FOCAC; TICAD was the first major Asian power Africa + 1 forum launched in 1993 when Africa was not the main priority for most external powers. Eight TICADs have occurred already.67 TICAC symbolised Japanese developmental success, encouraged by the West to increase its global responsibilities through development assistance (Raposo, 2014). After helping Asian development,68 Japan would share its development expertise with Africa, providing funding and support. A game changer in ODA, inspiring other external powers, TICAD’s originality lies in being a multilateral, not multi-bilateral, forum organised by Japan in collaboration with the UN, the AUC and the World Bank to cater for Africa’s development and poverty reduction needs. As a developmental knowledge transfer platform from Asia to Africa, producing a declaration and an action plan after each summit, TICAD originally applied aid centrality and African self-help and ownership principles to encourage autonomous development, preferring loans and infrastructure development to grants 67 TICAD was thus started seven years before FOCAC. Website: https://www.mofa. go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html. 68 Japan was notably the number one donor in Indonesia, which can be seen as a success story for Japan’s development aid.

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(Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). TICAD’s foundational philosophy differs from the IAF’s economic diplomacy paradigm, almost purely business focused. Yet, TICAD evolved progressively towards a more business paradigm. TICAD represents a developed nation’s construction linking African leaders with international partners, empowering Africa through Africanowned developmental solutions and development cooperation while raising Japan’s global profile, fulfilling reputational and great power goals. TICAD serves Japanese national interests in trade, investment and security. A developed nation, not exactly Western or from the Global South, Japan displays its unique development approach. Themes linked to the liberal international order and its peace and development conception, like democracy, civil society, good governance, prevention of armed conflict or post-conflict development, pertain to TICAD’s agenda as basic development building blocks (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). In a post-Covid-19 world, the TICAD-8 in Tunisia in August 2022 increased Japan’s global health leadership focus to support affordable and quality healthcare in Africa.69 Health resilience was already a TICAD theme.70 In 2016, Abe had presented a Universal Health Coverage (UHC) model aimed at 2 million Africans at first and a Food and Nutrition Security in Africa (IFNA) in partnership with NEPAD (Abe, 2016). While the West focused more on human and social-development aid,71 Japan proposed a model based on economic, agricultural and infrastructure development, empowering the private sector through cooperation, integration and training (Iwata, 2020). Before China, Japan financed infrastructure.72 Japan offered debt relief to the poorest countries. It is now opposing debt-trap diplomacy (Kyodo, 2022). Given defense and security constitutional limitations, Japan introduced the human security concept (Hanlon & Christie, 2016; UNDP, 1994),73 underlining multiple focuses on economic growth for poverty reduction; people’s 69 The African continent has been particularly hit by the pandemic and its direct and indirect effects, appearing vulnerable yet showing resilience too. 70 TICAD 6 launched a programme against infectious disease, notably Ebola, and for reform of African healthcare systems for better overall mobilisation against pandemic outbreaks (Morreale & Jain, 2022). TICAD 6 was the first TICAD organised outside Japan, in Nairobi, Kenya. 71 Which Japan supported too. 72 China also benefited from Japan’s development support. 73 Commonly defined in the catchphrase “freedom from fear, freedom from want ”.

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personal development74 ; civic and civil society participation and multidimensional peace support (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018).75 To a certain extent, Indonesia and Japan share this UN-liberal-order aspect of peace and security, at least discursively; notably in multilateral venues, privileged by Japan to disburse its financial support for human security programmes. Coordinating with African frameworks like NEPAD, TICAD initiatives respect African ownership of issues and solutions, and African diversity and identities. Progressively, TICAD integrated industrialisation to boost African economic growth, forming supply chains bridging AfroAsia through “industrial wisdom” (Abe, 2016); and climate change and the environment. As a platform, TICAD showcases a good Japanese global citizen, supporting Japan’s global status and will to join the UNSC as a Permanent Member, an aspiration shared with Indonesia. Japan also favours Africa obtaining UNSC permanent member seats (Reuters, 2022). Given its growth problems and China’s African expansion, Japan focuses more on economic issues, supporting African growth; less on aid or humanitarian issues. Japan is not in competition with China in Africa, given its much smaller presence, although it has 37 embassies in Africa.76 In 2021, Japan traded for $23.5bn with Africa; China $252bn.77 Only 8000 Japanese citizens were in Africa; around 9000 Africans in Japan with estimated 50,000 illegals.78 Japan had only four peacekeepers left in PKOs in Africa compared to over two thousand Chinese peacekeepers in 2019 (Kato, 2019). Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) first engaged

74 In line with UN development goals. 75 The notion of “freedom to live in dignity” can be added, recognising people’s agency

and ownership in development, as seen in the insistence on African ownership in Japanese development assistance (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). Critics consider all these concepts lack concreteness and are mostly vague constructions. 76 Japan’s html.

MOFA

website:

https://www.mofa.go.jp/about/emb_cons/over/africa.

77 In 2017, Japan had a $7.8 billion investment stock in Africa against China’s $43 billion (Kato, 2019). 78 Most Africans in Japan were from Nigeria (2484) and Ghana (1877). Over 5000 are concentrated around the Kanto region (Capobianco, 2015). As an example, as of October 2017, 1505 Japanese nationals resided in South Africa. As of June 2018, 918 South African nationals resided in Japan. Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/Africa.

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in PKO in Africa in Mozambique in 1993, the year TICAD began, aiming to practically boost PKO capacities.79 Japan’s drive became more about business and private sector development. Securing critical minerals and energy sources, especially after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, represents a continuum in Japan’s African engagement. Africa possesses a large proportion of the world’s critical minerals essential for emerging greentech and digitech, like cobalt for batteries, which Indonesia is seeking for its EV ecosystem, or caesium and rubidium for mobile cellular GPS (MacLeod & Luke, 2023). The right formula for Japan in Africa, at least economically or in peacekeeping, remains more difficult to find than for China.80 Having fewer citizens and assets, Japan faces fewer security risks in Africa. Like Indonesians, Japanese entrepreneurs are not always enthusiastic about Africa, seeing Africa as a distant, risky market (Voncujovi, 2022). The African dream, 非洲梦 (F¯eizh¯ou mèng), is more alive in China. The Japanese government tries to find ways to increase its entrepreneurs’ interest. Indonesia’s geographical mental map issue towards Africa exists in Japan as opposed to China’s more robust pragmatism and straightforwardness. The international system almost forced China’s broad African expansion, finding alternative allies and resources.81 Symbolically significant although non-operationalised, Japan joined strategically with India to launch the AAGC, aiming at better competing with China and offering Africans more adapted solutions; a “partnership against the rising dragon” (Yoshimatsu, 2019). In 2007, the late Shinzo Abe already presented his Hatta-esque speech on the “confluence of the two seas ” at the Indian Parliament (Abe, 2007). The AAGC unites the Japanese policy of “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” with India’s broadened Indo-Pacific framework, expanding to the entire African continent through this partnership; a clear response to China’s BRI (Wallace, 2018). Japan’s financial capacities, high-tech, supply chain and industrial expertise combine with India’s historical 79 Shinzo Abe, in his speech opening TICAD VI, indicated that “Through the coopera-

tion of the Government of Kenya, members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are currently in the outskirts of Nairobi training military engineering personnel on how to operate earth movers ” (Abe, 2016). 80 Especially since Chinese means, presence and networks in Africa are stronger. 81 Japan is accepted as part of the Western world, benefiting from the liberal world

order.

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African networks and presence. Although the AAGC failed to materialise successfully yet (Taniguchi, 2020), Indonesia should generate these types of partnerships, accelerating impact and learning, with significant material and non-material gains. TICAD serves as a geopolitical, competition-oriented platform serving Japanese multilateral goals and national interests, positioned as a FOCAC antithesis, given its inclusivity, openness and multilateralism.82 Opening TICAD VI in Nairobi in 2016, symbolically the first TICAD on African soil and marking Japan’s shift from aid to business, Shinzo Abe emphasised Japan’s support for Afro-Asian sea lanes for Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy (Abe, 2016). Respecting ASEAN Centrality, Japan aims at expanding ASEAN’s success in connectivity with “quality infrastructure development ”, trade and investment, and human development to Africa; promoting “peace, stability and prosperity” through a “rule-based international order” founded on law, freedom of navigation and free trade in the Indo-Pacific; a region “facing various challenges such as piracy, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, natural disasters and attempts to change the status quo” (Japan MOFA, 2018). Placing ASEAN at the Indo-Pacific’s core, Japan positions itself as a catalyst of Indo-Pacific peace and prosperity through connectivity, and economic and security support. The FOIP geopolitical plan shows ASEAN at the centre of Afro-Asia. Japan supports connectivity in and between ASEAN, especially Indochina; South Asia, notably its major partner India; and East Africa, especially Kenya and Mozambique; through investment in infrastructure and economic corridors (Japan MOFA, 2018). This strategy tries to decentre Asia and the Indo-Pacific from China by creating an alternative map to the BRI, ensuring ASEAN support. African support is also strategic for the South China Sea. Yet, Indonesia is visibly not ASEAN’s core for Japan, much more focused on Indochina, particularly Vietnam, for connectivity and investments (Goh, 2007).83 While refusing ideas of containment or open confrontation with China, Japan positions itself as a provider of better-quality infrastructure and

82 The framing shares similarities with the opposition between Japanese and Chinese approaches to the South China Sea, with Japan supporting open seas while China is trying to claim 80% of the whole area as its internal waters. 83 For Shambaugh, ASEAN presents a “pervasive ambivalence” towards the two great powers, China and the US (Shambaugh, 2021).

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products, an alternative model for Africa (Abe, 2016).84 China’s industrialisation model, notably through Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as “spatial extensions in Africa” (Cowaloosur & Taylor, 2018), resourcebased industry upgrading and labour-intensive manufacturing, proposed to Africa; and Indonesia; following China’s new qualitative domestic economic strategy is rooted in Japanese development models applied in Asia like the flying geese model (Brautigam et al., 2018; Hatch, 2010; Ozawa, 2005; Ozawa & Bellak, 2010; Tang, 2018). This latter development pattern, or “economies of hierarchical concatenation”, is perceived as a successful model, notably given its positive results for ASEAN nations like Indonesia (Ifeanyi, 2019). The more than twenty China-supported SEZs throughout Africa, operating or planned, support manufacturing, which will benefit from the AfCFTA (Luke et al., 2023), fostering intra-African trade. The low-key IAF formula, a mere business forum focusing on deals and developmental assistance in an aid-for-trade perspective, reveals the will not to transform the IAF into a confrontational geopolitical platform, making Indonesia a frontal rival of other Asian powers in Africa. Indonesia’s means would not allow it. Moreover, Indonesia, at least Kemlu, wants to preserve its soft expansionist style in its ASEAN partners’ eyes. A reminder of the past, an aggressive Afro-Asian Indonesia could worry them. Strategically, Indonesia preserves its benevolent leadership from behind vis-à-vis its ASEAN partners. Indonesia’s African outreach aims not to be ideological or in response to geopolitical rivalries, unlike Japan.85 Willing to protect his legacy, Jokowi, through or with Luhut especially, is yet asserting himself more strongly; and not necessarily in Japan’s favour given hilirisasi’s Chinese backing. Nevertheless, rivalries between Asian powers should not be exaggerated; complementarity and collaboration exist (Iwata, 2020; Raposo, 2014). Benefiting from the geopolitical situation as a strategic nation to court, Indonesia is not a revisionist power, but it will defend its domestic achievements.

84 From TICAD VI, TICADs alternate between Africa and Japan and occur every three years. This alternate organisation questions Indonesia’s stance of organising IAF only in Indonesia, for now. 85 Japan defends a type of Asian liberal model against the authoritarian developmental state-driven Chinese model, itself already facing the liberal world order and Washington. Will we witness the coexistence of both the Chinese and US world orders? (Owen, 2021).

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The Japan-Indonesia developmental gap remains wide. Indonesia still benefits from high levels of Japanese developmental investments. Like African countries, Indonesia seeks increased Japanese trade and FDI more than aid (Kartasasmita, 2020). Yet, under Jokowi, China has been privileged over Japan as the main strategic investment partner.86 Japan invests much more in Vietnam (Shambaugh, 2021). Indonesia’s Chinese choice under Jokowi seems detrimental to optimising Japanese FDI. As a strong symbol of Japan’s declining economic grip in Indonesia, Japan’s control of the Indonesian automotive market is under threat from Jokowi–Luhut’s push to become central in the EV supply chain, aiming to make Indonesia a leading EV and EV batteries producer, notably based on its substantial nickel resources. As with every strategic policy, Jokowi appointed Luhut in September 2022 to monitor and accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles by all state and local government entities (Yahya, 2022). Japan’s hold on the Indonesian automotive market is at risk. Luhut notes that Indonesia did not obtain technology transfers from fifty years of Japanese domination of its automotive market (Massardi, 2022). China strongly invested in Indonesia’s EV supply chain effort with notable investments in nickel mining and batteries (Hyperdrive, 2022; Yuniar, 2022). To complete its EV value chain, Indonesia is looking to acquire lithium and graphite, notably in Africa (Setiawan, 2022).87 Indonesia is envisaging a cobalt-supplying deal with Rwanda and the DRC.88 On the Indonesian side, the whole ecosystem, overall dominated by China, is mostly private-driven.89 86 The symbolic switch from Japan to China in the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train project underlines this situation. This project is considered essential by the highest Chinese authorities, embodying the BRI and the Afro-Asian discourse placed at the core of China’s foreign policy discourse. 87 For lithium, a collaboration with Australia, home to half the world’s lithium, was favoured, which could become a full partnership for EV production (Ryan, 2023). 88 Indonesia has been trying to understand more the Rwanda-DRC situation, notably to find a proper solution for its cobalt needs to support its EV ecosystem. The DRC is nicknamed the Saudi Arabia of Cobalt for its large percentage of global cobalt reserves (Kavanagh, 2021). Yet, Rwanda seemed to be able to propose a safer solution, but all options are on the table. Indonesia is collaborating with the DRC and Brazil for the tropical forest alliance notably. Rwanda should open an embassy in Jakarta in 2023. Kemlu is also thinking of opening an embassy in Kigali. Indonesia also produces cobalt and has been raising its production. Yet, it needs more for its EV ecosystem. 89 For example, China’s Tsingshan Group’s Indonesian partner in the nickel Indonesian Industrial Area Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) is the Bintang Delapan Group. A

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Japan-Indonesian African engagement similarities seem scarce economically. Like India, Indonesia could partner with Japan on a wider scale to seek opportunities and increase its leverage in Africa, given their economic complementarities. The 2016 White Paper on international economy and trade produced by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) calls for Japanese “triangular” expansion to Africa in collaboration with India, but also with ASEAN, an opportunity to consider for Indonesia (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). An international think tank based at the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, under significant Japanese influence, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) was involved in drafting the AAGC policy (Yoshimatsu, 2019). Although complicated, a broadening of Japan–Indonesia African SSTC is seemingly supported inside Kemlu and in Japan. Indonesia AID could be linked to TICAD’s developmental approach in Africa. TICAD collaborates well with the AU and RECs, which Indonesia could learn from, notably for its trade approach. But TICAD’s multilateralist intricacy contrasts with the IAF’s multi-bilateral simplicity. Japan is a highly developed ageing nation with different economic imperatives. Indonesia’s younger demography fits better with Africa, the youngest continent. Afro-Indonesia appears idiosyncratically more compact than Afro-Japan. A visible Nippo-Indonesian development assistance and economic partnership in Africa is not neutral in global politics, especially given Indonesia’s growing closeness to China, at least economically. Indonesia could increase triangular cooperations with both Japan and China.90 Strategically, a partnership with Indonesia in Africa would appear a significant gain for any ambitious external power. Still in an opportunistic beginner’s phase, discovering the gigantic pool of opportunities, Indonesia’s African approach resembles China’s early contemporary developmental approach; probably given Jokowi–Luhut’s preferences. It appears premature for Indonesia to propose a more complex African framework, given its still limited presence and means. Japan’s research capacity produces knowledge and engagement modes with Africa that are difficult to generate in Indonesia. Indonesia must still very close Luhut associate since their military times, Lieutenant General (retired) Sintong Panjaitan sits as President-Commissioner of Bintang Delapan Group. Major General (retired) Hendardji Supandji is President-Commissioner of Bintang Delapan Investama, a subsidiary of Bintang Delapan Group (Massardi, 2022; Tribun Timur, 2018). 90 Türkiye is also considered.

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learn and develop its research capacity. Like other Asian powers, Indonesia and Japan want to increase their global recognition through their African interactions.91 In customised versions, Indonesia can apply its equilateral alignment and dynamic equilibrium paradigms in Africa towards great powers like China and Japan.92 Great power rivalries offer opportunities for Indonesia to benefit as a junior partner in Africa. Indonesia can provide human resources, operational capacity and Bandung legitimacy, smoothening African relationships. As a more neutral, alternative partner, Indonesia might reassure African nations, which might not want to take sides and offend a great power. For Japan, partnering with Indonesia in Africa constitutes a double win, in Africa and for its relationship with Indonesia overall. Yet, as the AAGC demonstrates, operationalisation is not a formality. Notwithstanding the development gap, Indonesia can benefit from Japanese capacities for its African expansion through joint projects needing technology and funding. Japan can offer a more scientific view of Africa, which could prove useful for Indonesia to gain a greater African understanding and access, differentiating itself from competitors.93 Through Indonesia’s powerful historical leverage, Japan can benefit and learn from Indonesia too; in peacekeeping for example. Indonesia and its Garuda Contingents have been active for decades in Africa (Capie, 2016). China’s PKOs and military collaborations in Africa worry Japan. In Djibouti’s extraterritorial sovereignty competition, China outpaced Japan.94 Indonesia could become a strategic knowledge and expertise partner for Japan in peacekeeping and security in Africa;

91 Hassan Wirajuda was sent to Africa in 2018 as a special envoy of President Jokowi to facilitate Indonesia’s accession to the UNSC as a Non-Permanent Member for the 2019–2020 period (CDT with H. Wirajuda, 2018). 92 But also India, South Korea, the US, Russia, the UK and France. 93 African Studies in Japan have also been historically focused more on hard science

than social sciences (Philips, 1997). 94 With already 2000 Chinese troops and potentially 10,000 as opposed to 180 Japanese

SDF personnel, ten times more investment with over $14 billion Chinese investment in a “multipurpose port (funded by China Merchant Group), a cross-border gas line and Djibouti’s international free trade zone”, China in Djibouti reveals “how political, economic and security relations can be developed in such a way as to render rival would-be investors and geostrategic partners more or less irrelevant ” (Cobbett & Mason, 2021).

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although intervention formats are evolving in Africa towards Afrocentric bilateralism with a leading intervener like Rwanda for example.95 However, Japanese public opinion is not supportive of dangerous peacekeeping endeavours, using force and damaging Japan’s perceived identity as a “peace nation” (Midford, 2006; Suzuki & Wallace, 2018).96 Japan benefited from soft power generated by its products and expertise quality, notably in productivity management, its substantial developmental aid and its people’s work ethics and capacities.97 Its human security focus also positions Japan as a humanist country, creating ideational gains (Céline Pajon, 2017). Like Indonesia, India and China, Japan benefits from its status as a Bandung participant. It tried to leverage that Afro-Asian asset in Africa (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). Nevertheless, given its history and global positioning, still seen as somewhat Western,98 Japan seems in a weaker configuration than Indonesia to call on Bandung solidarity. This also differentiates Japan in Africa from Indonesia’s more non-aligned profile. Like China or Korea, Japan also faced land-grabbing accusations, notably in Mozambique through the ProSAVANA programme developing competitive commercial agriculture in a Japan–Brazil SSTC framework, led by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Monjane & Bruna, 2020).99 JICA was accused of not protecting average Mozambican citizens in their human security needs against big business interests, especially Brazilian MNCs (Raposo, 2014).100 Similar outcomes with Indonesian MNCs or SOEs can be imagined. With experience and 95 African states are increasingly unhappy with multilateral interventions. U.N. peacekeeping missions are increasingly unpopular like in Mali or the DRC, due to perceived inefficiency and meddling in internal affairs accusations. Bilateral interventions are favoured. Preserving sovereignty, they happen fast through an agreement between the host state and the intervener. A country like Rwanda is specialising in these interventions, like, in the CAR or Mozambique (Moody, 2022). 96 Japan even withdrew its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) from South Sudan in 2017 (Placek, 2017; Suzuki, 2017). 97 Japan promotes the Japanese Kaizen business philosophy in Africa (Kato, 2017). 98 Even in intelligence, Japan is willing to join the Anglophone Five Eyes intelligence

alliance and become the sixth “eye” (Panda & Panda, 2020). 99 Brazil and Mozambique were represented by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA). 100 Yet, to be fair, the responsibility of Brazilian multinationals in the ProSAVANA scandal seems to surpass that of JICA, which is a warning of the complexity of SSTC.

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the Japan–Indonesia relations’ magnitude, the project would probably be structured more carefully. Despite rivalries, academic support for Asian collaborations in Africa exists, based on complementarity, in whatever suitable scheme.101 Until now, Indonesia was pretty absent from research on external powers in Africa (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). Comparing Indonesia with other Asian powers helps explore Indonesia’s African engagement. Through their respective African approaches, Japan and Indonesia share ambitions concerning the Indo-Pacific102 ; the UN, international status and diplomatic support; economic expansion and corporate internationalisation; or development cooperation. But Japan is an American ally and a Chinese rival, with its sophisticated developmental ideology and a strong investment capacity with a tremendous impact, especially in Asia.103 A developed country with developed country issues, Japan’s influence on Indonesia’s African approach cannot be as straightforward as China’s. It does not mean it is absent. Japanese values, ways and thinking have infused for decades in Indonesian elites’ minds, notably in development, which could support collaborations in Africa.104 Japan’s influence inside Kemlu is also strong. Still presenting itself as a global public goods provider, Japan’s African relationship evolved from donor–recipient, founded on development assistance, to focusing more on investment and trade (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018), facing other external powers’ aggressive competition. African leaders demand a more utilitarian, not humanitarian only, involvement beyond ODA in favour of FDI and Aid-for-Trade (Raposo, 2014). Contrary to Indonesia, Japan offers DFQF trade for African LDCs for qualified products with moderate ROOs, although with restrictive cumulation, which does not support African intra-trade and supply chains (MacLeod et al., 2023). In 2019, Japan’s African ODA only represents $1.5bn or 3% of its ODA, the 9th ODA provider in Africa (MacLeod et al., 2023).

101 Notably between China, Japan, India and Korea (Iwata, 2020; Raposo, 2014). 102 Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept, which can match with the

AOIP and the EAS, was launched by the late Shinzo Abe during TICAD VI in Nairobi, underlining East Africa’s integration into Japan’s main geopolitical view (Abe, 2016). 103 Including in China, since its economic opening under Deng Xiaoping. 104 As recommended by the METI itself.

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This shift echoes Jokowi and Luhut’s mindset. During TICAD VII in August 2019, the business sector’s role in African development was promoted despite Japan not being a top 10 African partner and the relative lack of interest and competitivity of Japanese business in Africa, except for investments in needed natural resources like critical minerals or from more adventurous young entrepreneurs (Kana Inagaki, 2022; Kato, 2019). Japanese companies were 796 in 2019, compared to China’s ten thousand. Japan’s African investments stock fell from $12bn in 2013 to $6bn in 2019. Its investments dropped from $590 million in 2019 to $310 million in 2021 (Voncujovi, 2022).105 Yet, notably thanks to its major conglomerates well present in Africa like Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Toyota, the latter having 22,000 employees in Africa, Japan should quickly surpass $10bn in investment stock again (AfDB, 2023). Still, Japan’s African FDI pales compared to $83bn in FDI in Africa in 2021; and the UK’s $65bn, the US’ $48bn and China’s $43bn African FDI stocks (Kana Inagaki, 2022). Unlike Indonesia, Japan has no FTA with any African country.106 Despite recent editions attracting as many as 11,000 participants (Kana Inagaki, 2022), TICAD has been considered not concrete enough, stuck in Japanese bureaucratic issues. Attracting Japanese investors to focus on Africa remains complicated. The government tries to make them more comfortable. The late Prime Minister Abe launched the Africa Business Education Initiative (ABE Initiative) in 2013, supporting AfroJapanese business links through thousands of scholarships in Japanese universities and internships in Japanese companies for African business people, government officials and academics (Voncujovi, 2022). In Nairobi in 2016, while announcing, over three years, $10bn for quality African infrastructure, 50,000 vocational trainees, an impact on 10 million Africans through healthcare, geothermal power investments or engineering education, and, combined with the private sector, a total investment of $30bn; Abe highlighted the role of young Japanese technology entrepreneurs creating startups in Africa, notably originating from the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) programme (Abe, 105 Another source list 563 Japanese companies in Africa in 2019. List of Japanese Companies Doing Business in Africa – 2019 Edition: https://abp.co.jp/PDF/ABP_List_ Japanese_Companies_Doing_Business_in_Africa_Eng_2019.pdf. 106 Japan has five International Investment Agreements (IIA) with African countries, including Egypt and Kenya, protecting its investments (Voncujovi, 2022).

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2016). JICA also created the Next Innovation with Japan (NINJA) programme supporting Kenya’s startup ecosystem.107 Still, the private sector is not fully engaging Africa. Indonesia can learn from those complaints addressed to Japan, which learned and adapted its approach progressively. Indonesia’s low profile and modest entry, without excessive claims, into the African competition seemed a suitable starting style. Leveraging hilirisasi’s success, Luhut has raised Indonesia’s tone on the global stage and in Africa, showing more ambition as an alternative model, although it seems conjunctural to defend hilirisasi domestically and since the 2024 presidential elections are coming. Although Japan lost its TICAD pioneer advantage given FOCAC’s higher visibility, preoccupied with China’s massive African presence, Japan might benefit from its niche and comparative advantages in its African approach to development assistance, business practices that create quality projects, and, in general, its Japanese uniqueness, exemplified by TICAD’s multilateralism (Kato, 2019). Historically, Japan learned effectively from abroad to “adopt and adapt” knowledge and technologies. Its developmental assistance applies the same principle, proposing its successful government-led industrialisation model. Despite scarce resources and geography, Japan became a highly developed nation. Countries like Ethiopia have implemented industrial development policies supported by JICA. JICA encourages knowledge exchanges and supports policy planning through master plans.108 Japan proposes the African approach of a highly developed international player with unique knowledge, business models for development in strategic fields109 ; and multiple development instruments.110 Indonesia would gain tremendously if it could benefit and learn how to benefit from this highly knowledgeable and experienced external partner in Africa.

107 Website: jica.ninja/. 108 Notably for urban planning in major African cities like Kinshasa, Abidjan, Nairobi

and Dakar, but also planning in agricultural development, electricity or economic zones all over Africa. In general, JICA acts as a development catalyst, promoting best practices, notably from the Global South; creating SSC and South–South, including Afro-Asian, networks; boosting capacities, technical cooperation and other activities supporting SDGs. 109 Including education, food, industry, the blue economy or sustainability. 110 Notably through JICA with concessional loans, grants and technical cooperation

and solid relationships with various actors, including multilateral agencies (Kato, 2019).

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Given the developmental gap, Indonesia seems closer to China’s African engagement model, on a smaller scale. Nevertheless, Indonesia appears complementary with Japan, an exciting partner for SSTC in Africa.111 As Indonesia experienced itself, Japan offers unique expertise of development success, less ideological than the US or China, and distinctive business models for African development. Japan gives high importance to intellectual networks in its developmental engagements. With its still weak material interests, Japan could appear as an almost neutral actor in Africa, proposing its solutions for a better Africa despite its lack of African business, thus elevating its status with the ultimate goal of joining the UNSC. It is not neutral, of course, as its Western Sahara position or its subtle alter-Chinese propositions highlight. A broad, comprehensive and strategic JICA-Indonesia AID agreement focusing on Africa would represent a breakthrough. JICA is accustomed to financing SSTC for Afro-Indonesian projects.112 Indonesia can continue learning from Japan to better its developmental approach. Their material drivers are different given their different development stages, except in their common need for certain resources. Japan proposes a sophisticated developmental approach. Indonesia apparently seeks business projects with an aid-for-trade mindset; a classic emerging power joining the alleged “new scramble for Africa”. However, Indonesia now requires Africa’s support to defend its domestic policies, so its African engagement has complexified. Nippo-Indonesian ideational and reputational drivers share similarities, both nations having UN ambitions. Like China’s guanxi building, the primacy Japan places on knowledge networks and exchanges should inspire Indonesia to increase intellectual and academic inputs to better its African engagement. Japan could form new networks by collaborating with Indonesia, which benefits from a stronger Bandung leverage and higher cost competitiveness in Africa; while reinforcing its overall partnership with Indonesia, a strategic imperative. Japan remains the first Afro-Asian nation to reach highly developed country status, thus remaining a model China and others followed and benefited from. Indonesia shares a special relationship with Japan, being 111 Similarly to the AAGC between Japan and India; keeping in mind that the AAGC has been criticised for its lack of actual execution until now (Taniguchi, 2020). 112 Annual Reports of Indonesia’s South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) 2014 and 2016: https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf and https://openji careport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12315719.pdf.

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its largest ODA recipient ever (JICA, n.d.). These ties could be prolonged in Africa in multiple ways. In 2016, Abe noted that TICAD had provided $47bn ODA to Africa since 1993 (Abe, 2016). Yet, the right formula for Japan to act as an Afro-Asian bridge prolonging ASEAN Centrality remains to be discovered. Intellectual networks should be deepened and financed to better imagine and accelerate the formation of Afrasia (Mine, 2022).

India’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia Like China or Indonesia, facing similar challenges domestically in structural reforms, economic model, demography, citizen expectations, corruption or radicalism, India needs to feed its continuous growth with new markets and resources, notably in Africa; the SSC narrative serving its material interests. Its African expansion serves its survivaldetermining political objectives. Affirming its status, India claims its seat as a UNSC permanent member and participates in global peace through peacekeeping (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018; Taylor, 2014). India has been exchanging with Africa for thousands of years across the Indian Ocean (Biswas, 2015). The diverse and well-integrated Indian diaspora in Africa, especially Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), a strategic lever now better considered by the Indian state, comprises over three million people113 ; a unique Asian power in Africa, with a long-term intimate African relationship and knowledge. Nehru advocated for the dissociation of PIOs from India and integration into their respective countries. Now the government supports association, leveraging the diaspora (Bhatia, 2022). Gujaratis represent a high percentage of PIOs and are well present in East Africa, influencing Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the former leader

113 With over half of them in South Africa, one million in Mauritius and La Réunion, and the rest mostly in East Africa, especially Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (WEF, 2015). Other sources indicate that there are “more than one million people of Indian origin” in Africa (Malone et al., 2015). Others even indicate 6 million diaspora or People of Indian Origin (PIO) in Africa (Arndt, 2014; Majumdar, 2022).

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of Gujarat (Gieg, 2023). Indians of African descent also exist in India, mostly Siddis.114 Africans in India are around 150,000.115 Like Sukarno, Indian founding fathers like Mohandas K. Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru inspired African decolonisation leaders like Kwame Nkrumah or Julius Nyerere with an alternative model of non-violent mass struggle, diplomatic messaging and non-Western democracy with a highly intellectual capacity. India was one of Bandung’s five organisers.116 Like Indonesia, India holds a special place in Afro-Asia, given its support for African national freedoms, representing valuable leverage to increase its already significant African weight. Nehru, who embraced the Indonesian national cause (Leifer, 1983), developed India’s contemporary relations with Africa, on a normative foundation (Bhatia, 2022). In Bandung, Nehru underlined Africa’s “infinite tragedy”, stating Asia should help Africa, its “sister continent(s)” (Bhatia, 2022). Indonesia and India both benefit from the Bandung solidarity discourses for their African relations. Both nations supported decolonisation and African majority rule, opposing discrimination and racism. Since launching the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme in 1964 under Nehru, extending training and capacitybuilding to developing countries, India always accompanied Africa (Biswas, 2015). Demand-driven in the SSC spirit, bilateral, ITEC, over the years, proved both effective and popular in all African countries (Bhatia, 2022); training over 40,000 alumni since 1964 (Gieg, 2023). Sukarno’s progressive eviction from power after 1965 notably explains the difference in Indo-Indonesian African engagement today.117 Both

114 Of Bantu-origin, Siddis’ ancestors came to India in the seventh and eighth centuries. They are around 50,000 (Bhatia, 2022; Hawley, 2008; Malone et al., 2015; Obeng, 2008; Vallangi, 2016). 115 African students studying in India being the most numerous (Bhatia, 2022). 116 Although he was not necessarily in favour of Bandung initially since his agenda was

more Asia-focused or Pan-Asian, Nehru is recognised for playing a decisive role in the birth of Bandung and then the NAM (Singh, 2011). 117 Tragically, ten years after Bandung, Sukarno had proclaimed 1965 as the “year of living dangerously” for Indonesia, given the continuation of its Konfrontasi against Malaysia and an intensification of a fight against imperialism everywhere. US diplomacy despised that speech, Afro-Asianism and anti-Western narratives (Simpson, 2008).

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nations now use an approach apparently less ideological and more pragmatic through economic diplomacy.118 Nonetheless, India proposes a non-Western democratic model, different from China in its essence. Like Indonesia, India lies between Beijing and Washington, fearing Beijing more and strategically increasingly closer to Washington. Indonesia is more neutral in tone, given its lesser power. Luhut’s Afro-Asian revisionist discourse is counterbalanced by Kemlu and economic ministries, recently requesting to join OECD (Ramli, 2023). Strongly re-targeting Africa in the 2000s after the Cold War like other external powers, helped by economic liberalisation started in 1991, India proposed development aid since the 1950s, focusing on African aspirations and expectations by offering capacity-building or skills development programmes, technology transfers, infrastructure, energy, scholarships, humanitarian relief and medical help. However, it mostly reduced military support for African liberation struggles during the Cold War (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). Losing its illusions, the 1962 war with China hurt India in Africa, which mostly supported China. Yet, Indira Gandhi’s anticolonial and anti-Apartheid stance, nuclear bomb acquisition, space and the Green and White Revolutions, boosting agriculture and milk production, bettered India’s image and soft power, particularly in Africa (Bhatia, 2022). Overall, India handled Africa more bilaterally (Dubey, 2011). Without the 1965 military coup, Indonesia’s African links would have been continuous like India’s. Africa would certainly be more present in Indonesian mindsets today. Developing African human resources has been a constant Indian focus, building its relational power and support for its norms and model like China. Yet, India differentiates itself from China, its “positional rival ”,119 with a more democratic and human approach, giving a noble place to capacity-building and technical assistance, as opposed to China’s perceived “harder” approach (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018).120 A major comparative advantage, India supports education and vocational training, including through digital means. Around 15,000 Nigerians are trained 118 This supposedly less or non-ideological approach is in fact probably just as ideological, as is being revealed with the changes in the US, for example, concerning international trade, protectionism, industrialisation policy for the middle-class worker. 119 “Positional rivalries are about competitions over which state will benefit from possessing greater influence in a given global or regional locale” (Ganguly et al., 2023). 120 Despite China’s increasing focus on relational power (Benabdallah, 2020b).

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in IT annually by the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT), an Indian company (Alao, 2020). In 2023, the first Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Campus outside India opened in Zanzibar, Tanzania; following the 2020 National Education Policy focusing on internationalisation and encouraging Indian universities to set up campuses abroad.121 The Indian network of IITs is perceived as having technically supporting India’s post-independence rise (Gieg, 2023). This Ugandan opening is thus symbolically powerful, transferring a secret to developmental success to Africa. Indonesia also wishes to project its digital successes and skills. In 2019, Indonesia’s digital giant Gojek invested in the Ugandan ride-hailing platform SafeBoda (Ryza, 2019).122 The plan for an IAF derivative around digital exists. Indonesia’s capacity remains far lower than India’s, lacking the Indian educational touch that makes India unique, especially in digital. Mahatma Gandhi said Indians and Africans would exchange ideas and services (Bhatia, 2022). India has developed knowledge and expertise on Africa for a long time, marked notably by the creation of the Department of African Studies at the University of Delhi in 1954 at Nehru’s personal initiative with the mandate of “promoting awareness about Africa” (Africa New Delhi, 2020).123 India’s African effort seriousness is embodied in Nehru’s academic gesture, an excellent example for Indonesia, placing academic knowledge at foreign policy’s core. A different type of knowledge, and also on Nehru’s orders, India created Ghana’s secret services during the years 1958–1961 (Paliwal, 2021), revealing a remarkable Afro-Asian relationship depth and knowledge circulation.124

121 The IIT Madras and the Indian Ministry of Education signed an MoU with the

Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) of Zanzibar–Tanzania (Media Center, 2023). 122 Gojek is now part of GoTo holding. 123 The Centre “advances knowledge and understanding of Africa through an inter-

disciplinary perspective, with a focus on African developments, Africa-India relations, the diaspora and international migration”. The University of Mumbai also has a dynamic and multi-disciplinary Centre for African Studies. The African Studies Association (ASA) of India unites Indian Africanists of all horizons, publishing the journals Africa Review and Insight on Africa (Bhatia, 2022). 124 In international intelligence relations, intelligence agencies can be conceptualised as transnational knowledge providers and intelligence as transnational knowledge circulation (Hoffmann, 2021).

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Indonesia’s African engagement lacks India’s holistic intellectual approach. India developed solid African knowledge and understanding, helped by its significant diaspora. Out of millions of Indonesians abroad,125 Indonesia’s diaspora in Africa represents less than 20,000 citizens, with around 5500 in Sub-Saharan Africa and over 10,000 in Egypt.126 Yet, Indonesian descendants in South Africa or Madagascar constitute larger numbers. India, like Indonesia, has been active in peacekeeping in Africa, sending over 200,000 troops participating in 49 out of 71 UN peacekeeping missions since 1948, with 5768 troops engaged as of May 2022; Indonesia deploying 2674 (United Nations, n.d., 2022).127 Respecting Nehruvian internationalism, India participated intellectually in framing current peacekeeping methods and paradigms, holding one of the most critical roles in global peacekeeping, especially in Africa (Choedon, 2017), with the largest national contingents in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the DRC in recent years (Arndt, 2014). Afro-Asian solidarity, soft power and ambitions to become a UNSC permanent member explain India’s peacekeeping effort in Africa.128 India collaborates with the AU to overhaul the UNSC (Dubey & Biswas, 2016). Peacekeeping is also a soft power leverage to seek energy resources and economic opportunities in trade, market access and investment (Choedon, 2017). As a major investor in Africa with around $74 billion in FDI stock, especially in Mauritius, a special case; but also notably in Mozambique, Sudan, Egypt and South Africa, India needs to protect its

125 There are officially over 4.6 million Indonesian citizens abroad, as of March 2023, or what is listed as Pekerja Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers) and, in reality, probably over 9 million. Source: Sistem Komputerisasi untuk Pelayanan dan Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia (Computerised System for the Service and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers). 126 1209 Indonesian Citizens were based in Sudan when the civil war started in 2023, mostly students, but also Indomie factory workers, for example. The evacuation was successfully carried out by the Indonesian government through Kemlu and the military (Galiartha, 2023). 127 Indian troops represent more than 13% of MONUSCO in the DRC, and 14% of UNMISS in South Sudan (Gieg, 2023). 128 In 2006, the ECOWAS Chair supported India’s bid to become a Permanent Member of the UNSC, an example of African network mobilisation for global goals and international status, similarly to Indonesia’s recent successful campaign for 2019–2020 non-permanent UNSC membership (Dubey & Biswas, 2016).

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investments (Majumdar, 2022).129 Benefiting from a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with India since the 1980s, Mauritius constitutes a hub for Indian investment in India, in the world and in Africa; and India’s most important economic partner in Africa. The “Mauritius route” represents one-third of all inward FDI in India or $132bn since 2000 and around 20% of all India’s outward FDI between 2014 and 2017. This Mauritius phenomenon complicates the evaluation of India’s real FDI stock in Africa (Gieg, 2023). The “Mauritius route” could be compared to Singapore for Indonesia, mutatis mutandis. Indonesia has just begun leveraging its political legitimacy in Africa. Yet, Indonesia is negotiating a PTA with Mauritius.130 The India–Mauritius trade agreement began in 2021, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA).131 Since 2021, China has had an FTA with liberalised Mauritius, which could form a Chinese “Mauritius route”.132 The IAFS started in 2008 in many ways as a response to China’s FOCAC; and given India’s material and non-material needs. India had to increase its dynamism and visibility in Africa, notably to secure oil to feed its economic growth; competing with China’s greater economic and political power (Verma, 2017).133 IAFS key areas have been IT & telecommunications; agriculture, agro-business and related food security; health & education, environmental and maritime issues; peace &

129 Indian companies ONGC Videsh Ltd. and Oil India Ltd. Invested $5bn for 20% in the Rovuma gas block’s Area 1 (Bhatia, 2022). 130 Concerning 400 plus lines, the negotiation was entering the 4th round. Discussions

continued on the main tax and ROOs, notably. Yet, many products are already at 0% in Mauritius. Author’s Meeting with Dewi Justicia Meidiwaty, Director for African Affairs, 31.05.2023, Kemlu Headquarters. 131 The CECPA covers 615 products from Mauritius; 310 from India (MacLeod et al., 2023). 132 The FTA promotes the use of renminbi, high-tech industries and financial services, and protecting Mauritian fisheries. The reciprocal agreement will eventually cover 96% of traded items. Mauritius is already highly liberalised in trade, with zero tariffs on most products (Luke et al., 2023). Indonesia is negotiating with Mauritius at the time of writing. 133 Importing the majority of its oil from the Middle East, Africa offers a source of diversification for India. Source: oec.world.

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security and energy. Middle East-dependent,134 oil security was prioritised in India’s African economic diplomacy, notably in North and West Africa. State-owned and strategically supporting India’s African penetration, India’s Eximbank offers substantial Letters of Credit (LoCs) to the private sector, facilitating trade and infrastructure building, and collaborates with the African Development Bank (AfDB) to build large infrastructural projects (Srivats, 2017). With funds raised on international debt markets, LoCs constitute a hybrid mechanism, between business support and development assistance, facilitating market access in line with Modi’s expansive economic spirit; 75% of a project’s purchases must come from Indian companies, boosting exports. EximBank subsidises the interest rate through equalisation.135 India’s EximBank LoCs system presents a potential path for Indonesia’s EximBank, which failed to finance Indonesia’s African projects until now. Development aid, export credit and other financial facilities are proposed to African governments. Market access facilitation supports Indian firms’ internationalisation. Many Indian companies are successful in Africa in construction, industry, banking, telecommunications or pharmaceuticals, like the Tata Group or Bharti Airtel; with an East and South Africa bias. India’s African approach is considered private sector-driven, although with government backup. Since Modi’s arrival, multi-aligned, more dominant and realist India has increased its economic and security push (Hall, 2020). Bureaucratic and ministerial infighting within the state negatively impacts African policy. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), itself “gravely understaffed”, notably fought to preserve its development assistance prerogatives, impeding the formation of India’s international development agency. Modi concentrates power, aiming at accelerating decisions and better implementation through a whole-of-government approach, addressing criticism originating notably from Africa.136 With

134 India imports a majority of its crude petroleum from Middle Eastern nations, notably Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Source: oec.world. 135 Interest-rate-equalisation is “the difference between the market interest rate and the below-market rate offered to the foreign entity” (Gieg, 2023). 136 Coordination between ministries involved in African policy is not a sinecure. Some of the ministries involved: Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas, Ministry of Coal, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of External Affairs (Gieg, 2023).

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Indonesia AID, Indonesia was more successful in centralising its development assistance efforts, facilitated by the long-time friendship between the minister of finance and Retno (Rizky, 2023). Yet, India’s aid spending is superior, with around 20% of its $1 billion aid budget spent on mainland Africa in 2017 (Gieg, 2023). In 2002, India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI), leading foreign economic policy, launched the Focus Africa Programme, India’s first significant trade facilitation initiative towards Africa to support exports, starting in seven countries, offering African countries Indian capital and technology for their projects. In West Africa, the TechnoEconomic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) targeted oil resources (Bhatia, 2022; Nagar & Mutasa, 2018).137 Reassuring and incentivising the private sector appears to be a common challenge for all external powers in Africa, at diverse degrees though. Few Indian companies invest themselves, chasing governmental financing, especially LoCs. Africa is not the most privileged investment destination (Raghuvanshi, 2023). Yet, India’s successful initiative branding with ITEC, Focus Africa or TEAM-9 can inspire Indonesia to increase its promotional capacities. Although respecting SSC values, being notably demand-driven, India’s Eximbank’s bilateral credit lines through LoCs and package deals proposed for rural electrification in Ghana or Mali, or poverty alleviation in Senegal, were criticised for lacking transparency, and for their tiedaid aspect, limiting their apparent “altruistic” motives (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). Indonesia’s tied-aid framework of aid-for-trade could entail such criticism from Africans. The archipelago’s current understanding and capacity to respond to African civil societies seems limited. To answer challenges, India benefits from its powerful knowledge infrastructure and diaspora. Yet, for India and Indonesia, foreign development assistance must be handled with care since both countries still concentrate substantial poor populations, requiring assistance. The IAFS proposes action plans through a blueprint for cooperation with follow-up mechanisms, allowing corrections, readjustments and novelties. African agency is welcomed. Nevertheless, delayed and wrong implementation issues have brought criticism to India’s African foreign policy and the IAFS. Concentrating state power, Modi promised to improve monitoring, notably with a “Joint Monitoring Mechanism 137 The first seven countries of Focus Africa: South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia.

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with the African Union” (Bhatia, 2022). The IAF framework has not been formalised to keep all options open. Yet, claimed flexibility can reflect puzzlement or lack of strategic thinking, although Indonesia is progressing. Africa’s agency and footprint are lacking in Indonesia’s framework.138 India does not focus only on bilateral ties. India engages with the AU, African RECs, international organisations, MNCs and NGOs and other civil society and transnational actors; adapting and modernising its approach, widening the IAFS progressively towards a more pan-African and multilateralist approach in close coordination with the AU to make the process smoother and ensure African input and feedback (Biswas, 2015). TICAD’s influence can probably be perceived here. Yet, reinforcing bilateralism, since IAFS-III in 2015, which attracted 41 heads of state, Modi dropped the AU’s “Banjul formula” since all African countries wanted to participate, a paradox since Africa also rejects asymmetric Africa + 1 frameworks.139 The blue economy was added for IAFSIII (Bhatia, 2022). This astute, quite sophisticated bilateral-multilateral combination brings more weight to India’s African efforts (Panda, 2017). Indonesia could follow such a model in the future through ASEAN and a reformatted NAASP (Dlamini, 2019). The EAS guided by ASEAN Centrality could be used.140 Yet, the AU’s will cannot be avoided. 138 The lead music played at the IAF in 2018 in Bali was Shakira’s Waka Waka (This Time for Africa), the official song of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. For a global event like the World Cup, the choice of a Colombian superstar singer like Shakira does the job. It may be wondered if this was the right choice for an Indonesia–Africa event. An African singer’s song could have been more relevant in that circumstance. Again, the remaining superficiality in Indonesia’s approach towards Africa could be perceived in that symbol and anecdote. Yet, another perspective could be to look at it more positively and see how Indonesia actually paid tribute to South Africa for hosting such a world-class event, which Indonesia has never hosted before. Alden describes a worse cultural mistake at the first FOCAC in 2006 in Beijing with posters of Papua New Guineans instead of Africans (Alden, 2007). This did not prevent China from progressing fast. The lack of African agency in Indonesia’s framework resides more in the programme, the format and the fact, for example, that Indonesia does not envisage holding its forum in Africa. However, Africans express their wishes, and Indonesia will evolve. 139 Decided at the 2006 AU summit in Banjul, Gambia, the “Banjul Formula” means Africa is represented by the AU chair and previous chair; the AUC chair; five NEPAD founders (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa); and 8 RECS chairs. Noninvited African countries rejected the Banjul Formula. All wanted to participate (Bhatia, 2022). 140 The opening of an AU office in Jakarta could be a start.

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The AU represents a whole continent, and ASEAN only an Asia subregion, which complicates finding the proper cooperation framework; RECs being ASEAN’s natural partner. Luhut’s Global South/Afro-Asian minilaterialism for hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy presents a new engagement format. Closing the gap with China, India has become Africa’s second trading partner, boosting its African commodities’ imports while supporting, at least discursively, African trade diversification away from hierarchical trading relationships (Schwikowski, 2019). India mainly exports refined petroleum products and pharmaceuticals; Africa mostly exports crude oil, gold, pearls, coal and various minerals (Majumdar, 2022). Manufactured goods represent 5% of Africa’s exports to India and 67% of its imports from India; while Indian pharmaceutical exports to Africa represent around $3bn per year. 88% of Nigeria’s exports to India are crude petroleum and 10% petroleum gas; 75% Angola’s 75% crude petroleum and 9.5% petroleum gas and Ghana’s 96% gold (Gieg, 2023). This trade dependency pattern remains highly criticised in Africa as being unfair and neocolonial.141 Most external powers in Africa face similar criticism, although India remains less visible and less “condemned” than China, almost in its shadow. If its trade volume increased drastically, Indonesia risks facing such accusations. Yet, its profile and still weak African trade and investment levels make it less prone to such criticism presently. Afro-Indonesian trade represents around 5% of Sino-African trade.142 As a sweetener in its trade strategy, India offers debt cancellations to the poorest indebted African countries. Announced at IAFS-I in 2008, India also proposes market access to African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with the Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme (DFTPLDC) (Biswas, 2015), facilitating African exports, especially commodities. Still, Africans are unsatisfied with India’s market openness, notably in agriculture (Gieg, 2023). Countries like India, Türkiye, Japan and Russia offer DFQF access to African LDCs with restrictions. For India, meat, dairy, vegetables, coffee, tobacco, iron, steel and copper products are excluded; for Japan, rice, sugar, fishery and leather products (MacLeod

141 South Africa raised the issue before in the BRICS framework (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). However, there is no common BRICS Africa strategy, given the lack of defined common interests (Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019). 142 See the different tables and graphics in this book.

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et al., 2023). Not applying DFQF, Indonesia has not yet properly considered what Indonesian market access it can provide Africans as a sign of reciprocity and solidarity,143 a potential weakness for Luhut’s Afro-Asian diplomacy. As a benevolent Global South power, India invests broadly in Africa in agriculture; pharmaceuticals, notably generics manufacturers offering cheap antiretrovirals to Africans living with HIV/Aids; telecommunications; infrastructure; renewables; industry; energy; commodities; education and banking. The approach appears diversified and relatively deep. Yet, India remains stronger in East and Southern Africa, including the Indian Ocean islands, than in Central and Western Africa, notably reflecting its diaspora presence. Modi focuses on that geography too, with his Indian Ocean SAGAR vision, “Security and Growth for All in the Region”, mixing military exercises and defense agreements, grants for ships and surveillance and high-level staffing of Indian officers in the Mauritian government for example (Gieg, 2023). In 2008, India was the first nation to bring a naval presence off Somalia’s coast against piracy, protecting SLOCs and Indian sailors.144 Indonesia’s engagement lacks India’s continental penetration depth. Learning from India, a hightech, educational and health power, could facilitate its choices. Indonesia should be open to collaborating in every possible way with India. Luhut’s Africa focus has been on Eastern Africa also. Under Modi, India’s African engagement became an absolute priority, especially economically, with development cooperation as a flagship. Since 2018, correcting a diplomatic weakness, India multiplies its African embassies, deciding to open 18 new ones, reaching 47, compared to Indonesia’s 17 (Chaudhury, 2019; Raghuvanshi, 2023; Times India, 2020). In 2020, 43 African embassies exist in India (Gieg, 2023), underlying India’s significance for Africa. In a speech at the Ugandan Parliament in 2018, Modi declared ten guiding principles or the “Kampala Principles” outlining India’s African engagement for economic growth, against terrorism and climate change; focusing on industry, IT, education, health, agriculture, security and financial inclusion (Majumdar, 2022;

143 Despite agreeing to the WTO’s 2013 Bali Ministerial Decision on DFQF (Antoni, 2019). 144 There are over 100,000 Indian sailors in the world (Gieg, 2023).

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Perspectives, 2018; Viswanathan & Mishara, 2019).145 Capacity-building in education, agriculture and agro-processing, rural development, health and pharmaceuticals, disaster management and human security were boosted in India’s African agenda (Raghuvanshi, 2023). Jokowi follows in Modi’s footsteps in prioritising foreign policy towards Africa, especially economic diplomacy, and more modestly in capacity-building and aid. China triggered India’s African frenzy along with its strategic needs for markets and resources, especially oil. As Asian civilisational great powers, China and India share many similarities in their African engagements. On increasingly large scales, trade, market access and investment are supported through development aid cooperation in its various forms. Yet, Sino-Indian competition still allows cooperation, including on energy resources to limit price increases, like in Sudan; or sharing a non-aligned refusal for Western conditionalities to aid, like Indonesia (Cheru & Obi, 2011). Deep Sino-Indian mistrust prevails though. Indonesia can benefit from this structural situation, in between the giants, including in Africa. India worries about China’s BRI and its concomitant African expansion, particularly its Djibouti military presence (Cabestan, 2020), given the Indian Ocean’s strategic primacy in maritime security, notably to protect gas and food coming from East Africa or oil from Nigeria and Angola. India increased its defence and security cooperation with the African Indian Ocean Rim States, on top of which Mauritius, its most formidable economic, security and commercial partnership, but also the Seychelles and Madagascar; and Eastern Africa coastal states, particularly Mozambique, monitoring the Mozambique Channel, and less so Kenya and Tanzania, which are more reticent; supporting, in parallel, its military industries (Ranjan, 2016; Vines & Oruitemeka, 2008). India prioritises investment and citizen protection.146 Revealing his mindset, as Gujarat’s Chief Minister, Modi had the Indian Navy deployed in 2008 to protect Gujarati PIOs (Gieg, 2023).

145 Indian entrepreneurs supposedly generate 65% of Uganda’s taxes revenues while representing 0.07% of the population (Gieg, 2023). 146 Like all external powers, India faces an increasing diversity of threats in Nigeria and the Sahel with Boko Haram, maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea or Aden, or state collapse like in Libya, where India had to evacuate its citizens (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018). The Indian Armed Forces, through Operation Kaveri, evacuated thousands of its citizens and foreigners from Sudan from the end of April 2023 due to the Sudan conflict.

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Reinforcing African defense and security capacities, India offers training in India, notably for Nigeria, or abroad like with South Africa; and helps build African military institutions (Arndt, 2014), like in Nigeria with the Nigerian Defence Academy and the Naval War College.147 Following Modi’s educational vision, India opened the overseas campus of its National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) in Jinja, Uganda, in 2023; a first in Africa and the first Indian government university to open a campus overseas; partnering with the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) (PTI, 2023), also gifting the UPDF with high-mobility military vehicles (Raghuvanshi, 2023). Institutes, schools, hospitals and infrastructure support Indian defense industries. Building its relational power to boost its defense exports of Tejas jets, Akash missile batteries and HAL Prachand combat helicopters, India organised its first India-Africa Army Chiefs’ Conclave in March 2023 in Pune, combined with the 2nd AfricaIndia Joint Exercise “AFINDEX”.148 The first-ever India-Africa Defence Ministers Conclave was organised before, in 2020, in Lucknow.149 Benefiting from a cost-quality advantage compared to Western and Chinese armaments, India offers a holistic approach to support Made-in-India military exports to Africa, with financing through Eximbank LoCs, training, and infrastructure development; boosting soft power (Raghuvanshi, 2023).This all-of-government approach for defense industries could enlighten Indonesia’s defense diplomacy, which seems less holistic and sophisticated. Funding and capabilities will remain issues. On paper, AAGC gathers two Asian democracies with interests in a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (Japan MOFA, 2018), countering Chinese hegemony and grand strategy narrative, and willing to increase Afro-Asian connectivity for growth and development.150 The AAGC was supposed to support projects in so-called quality infrastructure and connectivity, deliberately contrasting with so-called Chinese lower-quality works; human

147 There are 50,000 Indians in Nigeria. In 1962, contrary to most African countries, Nigeria supported India against China (Bhatia, 2022). 148 India also offers artillery guns, Pinaka rockets launchers, armoured vehicles, mobility

vehicles, drones, loitering munitions, small arms, offshore patrol vessels, interceptor crafts, communication and surveillance equipment (Raghuvanshi, 2023). 149 The Lucknow Declaration was pronounced (PIB Delhi, 2020). 150 In May 2018, Modi and Jokowi presented a shared Indo-Pacific vision for maritime

cooperation, which was the beginning of Indonesia’s use of the concept (Press Information Bureau, 2018).

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resources development; people-to-people relationships and development cooperation in general (Iwata, 2020). AAGC represents a “stillborn child”. Apparently under Chinese pressure, Japan abandoned the project and business collaborations were preferred (Bhatia, 2022). Indonesia has not yet entered into integrated schemes like the AAGC, potentially offering many benefits, but possibly at odds with the bebas aktif principle given their Chinese containment element. Japan is officially open to cooperation with ASEAN in Africa. Japan–Indonesia discussions occur for increased SSTC, without clear results yet. SSTC in Africa between them already exists on a smaller scale. Now more populated than China, India represents an alternative model in Africa, potentially proposing the whole spectrum of advantages China can offer. Through Bollywood, education, health and digital, India benefits from strong soft power. Indonesia’s approach is not as holistic as India’s.151 Imbalances in trade with Africa can hurt India’s image if African countries seem stuck in exporting only raw materials (Biswas, 2015). Like China, India faced multiple accusations and scandals in Africa, linked especially to its firms’ expansion; with cases relating to corruption, tax evasion, labour laws, land-grabbing or environmental issues (Chandran & Gardner, 2017; Mahajan, 2019; PTI, 2019; Tax Justice Network, 2013). Resource nationalism can obstruct investment in Africa (Andreasson, 2015; Economist, 2012). Attacks on African students also happen in India due to racism, hurting India’s solidarity discourse perceived as hierarchical or asymmetrical (Burton, 2016; Davis, 2018; Prabhu, 2017). In 2007, Indian peacekeeping troops in MONUC faced corruption and sexual misconduct accusations, hurting India’s soft power (Gieg, 2023). Although lacking India or China’s African exposure, these issues, detrimental to reputational capital and growth capacity in Africa, can touch Indonesia and have not yet been fully considered.152 The Papua issue, if connected to racism against Black people, can have a negative impact in Africa and be used against Indonesia and its sovereignty. India recognises its need to increase knowledge of Africa for diplomats and elites and better educate the general public to maximise opportunities and comprehension, 151 As a kind of mirror, India indicates what Indonesia could have been today in Africa if 1965 had not occurred, given status and perception similarities in Africa. 152 Despite problems like the recent viral episode of alleged aggression against a Nigerian diplomat in Jakarta cited previously.

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which is also one of Indonesia’s Africa strategy’s objectives (Dubey & Biswas, 2016; Indozone, 2019). Indonesia allocates insufficient means for such ambitions with a deficient knowledge production system, especially compared to India, whose academics and experts produce world-class research and analyses. On different scales, India and Indonesia’s African expansion drivers are quite similar in status-seeking, identity evolutions and material needs. Both Modi and Jokowi are dynamic, pragmatic leaders. India can be a model for Indonesia in its strong knowledge focus through its universities, vocational education system, technological capacity and hospitals. In the post-Covid-19 world, India possesses great assets adapted to the so-called “new normal”.153 Launched with the AU in 2009, India’s flagship African project, the Pan-African e-Network (PAEN), offers digital health and education through a pan-African initiative boosting internet connectivity and connecting major universities and hospitals in India to universities and hospitals all over Africa by satellite and fibre optic; and promotes Indian expertise and technology through modern means and for laudable reasons linked to human development (Arndt, 2014; Beri, 2011; Dubey & Biswas, 2016; Iwata, 2020), projecting a dynamic and noble image of India as a reliable country with high-level technology and knowledge.154 Despite the asymmetric relationship in trade and economic weight, India represents a chance for qualitative African development. Indonesia can learn from India’s successful policies without forgetting its mistakes. India provides impactful development and training, respecting local needs and demands in a spirit of equality and mutual support, not pure aid or charity that risks carrying arrogance. Since the early 2000s, India presents itself as a development assistance provider, not an aid-recipient anymore, to raise its status and reputation, like Indonesia’s current effort. Like India, Indonesia must manage the delicate balance between a solidarity and SSC discourse, in the Nehru-Sukarno tradition, and the pursuit of its national interests through business. India uses multilateralism to balance its different objectives and appear as an altruistic, humanist power, not a scrambler in Africa. Indonesia remains at the early stages of its learning 153 Despite its problematic management of the pandemic domestically for several months. 154 In 2017, PAEN operations were transferred to the AUC. In 2018, India announced it would form another network (Gieg, 2023).

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process in using multilateralism to serve its African interests. LBP’s AfroAsian minilateralism represents a new, flexible construction, but it largely relates to the defense of domestic hilirisasi. Multilateralism could help boost trade and market access by dealing directly with RECs and the AU, weaponising ASEAN, the RCEP and the EAS. Patience in gaining knowledge and feedback is essential for an African engagement. India’s approach is still called “messy and uncoordinated” (Nagar & Mutasa, 2018), despite its many apparent breakthroughs. Overall, the main drivers motivating India’s African engagement represent a major rising power’s interests155 : resources like oil and critical minerals, including uranium for its nuclear power; trade, investment, market access and internationalisation of its SOEs and private companies; geography and proximity that mean security issues in maritime piracy or transnational crime, pushing India to organise joint naval exercises and patrols with Africa’s coastal states, especially in East Africa; Indian citizens’ safety; the diaspora leverage facilitating business and deeper relations; the African diplomatic weight in the UN and other arenas; the structural level increasing strategic competition in Africa, notably with China; soft power and ideational reasons in general (Malone et al., 2015). Similarities with Indonesia seem clear. Studying India’s approach is crucial. India increases its capacities to reach its objectives with its diplomatic architecture development, private sector expansion and prioritisation of the role of universities and student exchanges. India benefits from a unique positioning based on a genuine capacity to think strategically and its technological prowess. As a civilisational state with a powerful indigenous political and strategic thought and uniqueness in style,156 India places knowledge at its international engagement’s core. Indonesia can learn from India’s knowledge power, becoming more effective and more readily accepted in Africa. India’s image through digital expertise linked to health, education and capacity-building programmes appears both modern and altruistic, while India remains realist in its material goals. Africans create their agency by engaging multiple partners that try to gain their favours. As a potential external partner, among many others, Indonesia will be successful in Africa if Africans open the way deliberately

155 And probable future superpower. 156 Notably perceivable in the Arthashastra and Mahabharata (Narlikar & Narlikar,

2014; Saran, 2017).

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for the long term. A qualitative proposition with noble focuses, as India can provide, facilitates positive perceptions and outcomes. Hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy could be game changers, depending on what Indonesia delivers concretely for Africans, not only discursively. Sharing priorities and drivers with other external players, India still deploys its comparative advantages. Like Indonesia, India benefits from a positive image in Africa thanks to Bandung and its anti-colonial stance. Its proximity to Africa geographically, sharing the Indian Ocean, increasingly perceived as India’s Ocean in India, facilitates connectivity infrastructure development, including new sea lines, ports and fibre optics; emphasising that India could also provide infrastructure and not only human resource development (Bhatia, 2022). Maritime security cooperation with East Africa and the African Indian Ocean Island statesincreases India’s knowledge and naval capacities, helping its rise to become a major global power.157 Cooperation also happens in facing NTTs linked to human evils and the environment. Over the decades, India has boosted its contacts in Africa thanks to peacekeeping, facilitating defense diplomacy. The Indian model of African engagement appears more private sector and civil society-driven, contrasting with the Chinese state-driven model, in perception at least.158 Indian companies and investments seem more integrated into the African economic picture, with more collaboration with local partners; compared to China’s more vertical approach with entirely Chinese business enclaves and economic zones, whole ecosystems dominated by Chinese capital with less collaboration with locals. Indonesia’s few substantial African investments are pretty well integrated into local societies, as seen with Indomie. The Indian way represents a better bargain for Africans regarding local impact or education and skills sharing. As a member of the Anglophone world, India benefits from the English language advantage, and a more integrated diaspora in Africa compared to the mostly recently arrived Chinese diaspora. Given its democratic status and well-managed pluralism, India seems a partner for positive change in Africa, helping civil society and democratic progress; a good ally in multilateral frameworks, 157 Such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Non-combatant, Evacuation Operations (NEO), Search and Rescue (SAR) and expansion of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) (Bhatia, 2022). 158 The Chinese private sector is active in Africa, and China’s complex polity and society cannot be summarised by the central state only.

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in SSTC and peace and security (Malone et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Indonesia’s African approach now carries the traits of a mini-Chinese type of engagement in its structuration, especially its deal-seeking and deal-supporting aspects implemented with the Luhut umbrella. Indonesia’s hilirisasi is also China-backed. Although originating from the Police and less visible, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, who carries parallel diplomacy, could be compared to Luhut in power, profile and proximity to the highest leader (Bhushan, 2023). More precisely, Indonesia’s effort remains an early market entry strategy that China applied over twenty years ago. Many options are open for Indonesia to join hands with India in Africa, if possibilities can be better envisioned.159 In light of China’s South China Sea offensive, India has raised its game in Southeast Asia, becoming a strategic player, enhancing defense and economic ties with Vietnam, the Philippines or Indonesia (Grossman, 2023). Like Japan intends too, India could bridge ASEAN and Africa. India’s positioning as an open, technological, pluralist and democratic actor in Africa should be studied seriously, given Indonesia’s idiosyncrasy. Complexifying and better calibrating Indonesia’s African endeavour requires considering India’s experience and knowledge. Since Modi’s Jakarta visit in 2018, Indo-Indonesian defense ties are growing through a comprehensive strategic partnership and a new defense cooperation agreement with a new naval exercise, Samudra Shakti, and anti-submarine, humanitarian and disaster relief operations. With a 500 miles sea distance, Indonesia’s Aceh province and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands are getting closer in trade, tourism and infrastructure. India supports Aceh’s port of Sabang, responding to China’s BRI (Grossman, 2023). This collaboration could be prolonged to include Eastern Africa. Collaboration with the Indian giant could accelerate Indonesia’s learning curve, growth and impact in Africa. India and Indonesia do not collaborate and act together enough. Africa could

159 After being the Indonesian Ambassador to South Africa, senior diplomat Salman Al Farisi was chosen as Secretary General of IORA, based in Mauritius, for the period 2022–2024, offering a platform for common India–Indonesia endeavours in the Indian Ocean and Africa concomitantly (Kemlu, 2021).

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provide a solution. India offers an interesting case for the Indonesian leadership, given strong similarities. India uses smart and soft power well, likely an Indian concept originally.160

South Korea’s African Engagement Vis-à-Vis Indonesia South Korea’s African foreign policy stands slightly less developed than China, Japan and India.161 South Korea’s history and geopolitical context provide convincing explanations, although insufficient. In academic literature, ROK–Africa relations are less studied and elaborate than for China especially, but also Japan and India (Kim, 2013). Comprehensive international studies on Korea’s African approach in English are scarce, mostly about economics. A recent Palgrave Macmillan book on Korea–Africa relations coordinated by the leading Korean researcher on Africa honestly highlights the still limited research on Africa in Korea, despite the dynamism of the Institute of African Studies (IAA) at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) founded in 1977 (Chang, 2020; Darracq & Neville, 2014; Nicolas, 2020).162 Academic studies focus more on Korea in East Asia and ROK–great power relations, rarely on Korea’s African engagement. Still, South Korea remains a fascinating case, especially given its increasing global attractivity and developmental success. The Korean Association of African Studies (KAAS) is also raising its game through its annual international conference notably.163

160 Well before Bourdieu or Nye, Kautilya’s thinking, developed in the Arthashastra,

proposes a comprehensive concept of soft power (Liebig, 2013). The Arthashastra highlights India’s intellectual strength based on centuries of knowledge. Often seen in an ethnocentric way as the “Indian Machiavelli”, which is strange since he lived well before, Kautilya has made a return among Indian elites recently in line with a more realist Indian diplomacy in contrast with Nehruvian India seen as a purer ethical power (Misra, 2016). On India’s soft power strategy in its contemporary foreign policy: (Kugiel, 2017). 161 South Korea or the Republic of Korea (ROK). 162 The book belongs to the same series as our book. 163 The 2023 KAAS International Conference was about “African dynamics”, organised at Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul. It was supported by the Korea-Africa Foundation and KOICA. The Presidents of the Japan Association of African Studies and the African Studies Association of India were also present.

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With its North Korean problem, the ROK is permanently caught up in Asian regional security issues, forcing high prioritisation of relationships with the leading global powers, especially the US, China, Russia and Japan (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Stuck between its bittersweet rivalry with Japan and its necessary respect for China’s superpower status,164 yet a ferocious business competitor to all, South Korea projects its middle power profile in its African engagement, looking for breakthroughs despite structural limitations. So-called middle powers like South Korea are usually defined in the literature as exercising niche diplomacy and displaying a specific behaviour based on norms, ideas and values that promote a dynamic and good global citizen image, reinforcing national identity (Easley & Park, 2018; Iwata, 2020). Indonesia is still sometimes classified as a middle power (Anwar, 2020).165 Indonesia’s African approach does not satisfy this definition. Indonesia’s policy shares similarities with South Korea’s engagement. Yet, it is not thought of with the same mindset. Indonesia is an emerging power willing to be a great power. Jokowi and Luhut are not running a middle power.166 They officially want to reach great power status. Like China, South Korea has historically engaged Africa diplomatically, facing North Korea’s proselytism. During the Korean War, over three thousand Ethiopian soldiers fought as UN troops alongside South Korea, a support for which the ROK remains grateful until today (Kim & Gray, 2016). In the 1960s, South Korea started seeking African diplomatic

164 Signs of recent South Korean rapprochement with Japan under Chinese threats linked to authoritarianism, maritime domination or Taiwan could be promising. Yet, it is China’s economic transformation from being complimentary with Japan and Korea to becoming a fierce competitor in export markets and in China that could force Japan and Korea to become closer, in the US orbit. China is hurting Japanese and Korean positions in advanced industries, notably in the automotive market, especially the EV market, including EV batteries; and competing for critical minerals access. In East Asia, economic strength relating to technological prowess determines national and international power and competition, as much as history or territorial conflicts (Bell et al., 2023). From that perspective, Indonesia is a key economic and geopolitical battleground for China, Japan and Korea, as seen with the EV ecosystem development in Indonesia around nickel resources. 165 Which might be valid if Indonesia only meant Kemlu and certain academics. 166 As indicated previously, Minister Sandiaga Uno refused the middle power appella-

tion, and even the emerging power one. Indonesia was already a “global player”, courted by all. Author’s Interview with Minister Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, 06.06.2023, Jakarta, at the Minister’s home.

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support (Park, 1978). Aid to Africa was strategic to ensure diplomatic recognition, a matter of survival and sovereignty. Indonesia is not under such pressure, although it must defend Papua. Today, South Korea needs to engage Africa more, developing its “global Korea” middle power brand (Watson, 2011),167 an active global player supporting multilateralism for international development, and peace and security. South Korea has been raising its development aid amounts and quality. Accepted as an OECDDAC member, Korea moved in record time from an aid-recipient status to a prestigious DAC donor; serving both humanist development goals and its material-ideational interests.168 Indonesia would like to start by becoming an OECD member(Ramli, 2023). Aid motivations remain a hot research topic, notably concerning emerging countries towards Africa. Are the reasons more altruistic, reputational or simply mercantile? In Korea’s case, the geopolitical context overdetermines policy. The ROK’s aid necessarily privileges geopolitical aspects first. Survival remains the ultimate state goal. Korea shares its experience between Western and developing worlds, acting as a bridgebuilder in its middle power paradigm. As usual, drivers are multiple and intertwined, material and ideational, external and domestic. Aid and national interests’ logics interact. No straightforward causal mechanism exists. Korea emulates Western mercantile success, expands its trade and investment, and raises its global status. Its policies remain tied to geopolitical realities and its successive presidents’ preferences (Bone & Kim, 2019; Kim, 2019). Some Korean MOFA bureaucrats appear more mercantile; others more humanist. Capitalists’ interests differ from statespeople’s motivations. Agency outside of capital exists (Kim & Gray, 2016). Research on Indonesia highlighting overwhelming oligarchic

167 “Global Korea” was actually Korea’s middle power foreign policy slogan under

former President Lee Myung-bak. Successive Korean Presidents focus on different foreign policy priorities and preferred partners, notably aid-recipients, according to their idiosyncrasies. Different “slogans” thus embody their foreign policies. After “Global Korea”, President Park Geun-hye’s “Eurasian strategy” took over, followed by Moon Jae-in’s “new Southern policy” and now “Global pivotal Korea” under current President Yoon Suk-yeol (Watson, 2022). Those frequent changes impact African policy consistency. 168 South Korea was accepted as a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development—Development Assistance Committee in 2010. From 1945 to the early 1990s, South Korea received $13 billion in foreign assistance. Given its story, Korea is enthusiastic about sharing its development success and experience. Source: OECD website.

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power preponderance risks denying state, bureaucratic and civil society agencies. Despite its heuristic value, not everything in the Indonesian polity falls under a so-called oligarchy’s godlike will, especially with public opinion and netizens’ power. South Korea appears legitimate to promote its developmental expertise, now soft power material, as a major development success delivered in a few decades. As an agricultural and rural governmental movement launched in the 1970s, the controversial Saemaul Undong supposedly eradicated South Korea’s rural poverty (Kim, 2019).169 The movement was promoted to around twenty African countries for job creation, revenue growth and food production increase, thanks to technology and farming knowledge transfers.170 An incredible success story, Korea’s GDP per capita is now around twenty times Ghana’s; when in the 1950s it was similar, both nations being among the poorest (Nicolas, 2020). Nonpretentious in style, South Korea represents a moderate alternative, a potential bridge between great powers, and between developed and developing nations. Given its developmental prowess, South Korea proposes development guidance and planning with targeted policies, training and capacity-building. Like other rising powers, including Indonesia, South Korea boosts its African engagement for material reasons: resource seeking, trade diversification, new investment destinations and corporate internationalisation; and for ideational reasons to raise its global status and reputation as a good global citizen. The Korean development model appears attractive for Africans, as it is for Indonesians. The “Korean miracle” rested on government-business osmosis, nurturing a powerful private sector, notably the chaebols ; Koreans’ efforts and work ethic, like the Japanese; and ODA received by the ROK. With US support, given its geopolitical allegiance, the ROK joined the wealth accumulation capitalist system (Van der Merwe et al., 2016), making the Korean model specific and not easily replicable in Africa.171 Transferring development models to other polities and civilisations is not a sinecure.

169 The framework for rural development Saemaul Undong means New Community Movement in Korean. 170 Notably in rice production through the “Korea-Africa Food and Agricultural Cooperation Initiative” (KAFACI) (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). 171 Or in Indonesia, for that matter.

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In 2006, declared ROK–Africa “year of friendship”, the ROK created its Africa + 1 forum, KOAF, at the Ministerial level mostly, institutionalising the relationship and marking a new phase in its African engagement (Darracq & Neville, 2014). Thanks to its development success, Korea now supported Africa’s development (Bone & Kim, 2019), launching the same year “Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development”. A comprehensive agenda for ROK–Africa cooperation, the initiative tripled Korea’s African ODA distributed through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA); increased training activities; and sent more Korean volunteers to Africa to share the Korean experience (Kim & Gray, 2016). First ROK President to visit Africa in over 25 years, President Roh Moo-hyun visited Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria in March 2006 to support Korea’s national interests in resources needs, market access and developmental soft power; while campaigning for Ban Ki-moon, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to become UN Secretary-General (Kim & Gray, 2016).172 Indonesian diplomats also tour African countries when the archipelago seeks to secure UN positions, notably on the UNSC. Designated Jokowi’s Special Envoy for Africa, Wirajuda successfully visited African leaders for Indonesia’s access to the UNSC for 2019–2020.173 LBP tours Africa to form minilateralist coalitions in support of hilirisasi, resource and project acquisition and environmental policy objectives. Organised with a minimal budget, the first KOAF dealt with three topics: economic cooperation, South Korea as a model of economic development for Africa and potential partnerships (Iwata, 2020). The “Seoul Declaration on the KOAF” mixes multilateralism, presenting Seoul as a responsible global citizen and mentioning poverty reduction or UN MDGs with Korea’s development efforts in agriculture, health, education and science, water, ICT or good governance; and more bilateral

172 Ban Ki-moon was UN Secretary-General between 2007 and 2016. 173 Wirajuda described this tour to the author. He notably visited Lagos, Togo, Benin,

Ghana, Abidjan in West Africa, Algeria, East Africa, including the Seychelles, and Southern Africa with South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana. He admitted that “Some countries are new for me”. He had met the then Malawian President Peter Mutharika in the US, given their similar law backgrounds. In Algeria, he was received by then President Bouteflika who gave his “blessing to everything ” asked. Indonesia and Algeria are close ideologically and since Indonesia supported the Algerian revolution. It was his second visit to Algeria after the 2003 one with President Megawati. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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interests like trade and investment. The first KOAF was organised just after the impressive 2006 FOCAC in Beijing to attract some of FOCAC’s high-level guests, revealing an opportunist precarity and Africa’s still marginal place in Korea’s interests and focus. Still, KOAF-I was considered successful, with five African Presidents attending. Indonesia’s first IAF seemed more consequential in national visibility and organisation, benefiting from Bali’s global attractivity. Yet, a mere business forum, the IAF does not seek explicitly to attract high-level African government figures. This requires recognition and cooperation with the AUC through the AU’s Partnerships Directorate (PMRM). Unlike Korea, Indonesia is not an officially recognised AU external partner, limiting possibilities.174 Starting with KOAF-II in 2009, South Korea’s MOFA co-hosted the forum with the AU. Korea kept augmenting its ODA, training and development activities in its targeted sectors; building training centres in Africa for industrial workers while adding environmental priorities linked to its Low Carbon Green Growth (LCGG) initiative, supporting green technologies for a better environment and the fight against climate change without hurting growth; notably building solar energy plants (MOFA Korea, 2009a, 2009b; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Contrary to the IAF’s absence of an action plan and institutionalisation, South Korea produces action plans for its Africa forums. The KOAF-III’s 2013–2015 action plan added peace & security to Korea’s development cooperation; relating to peacekeeping, Korea’s AU Peace Fund contribution and the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearisation as Korea’s top priority security interest (Iwata, 2020; MOFA Korea, 2012). The North Korea meta-issue places South Korea in a unique category in foreign policy and strategic issues. Diplomatically, Africa was always strategic for the ROK, given the continuous North Korean threat. KOAF-IV was supposed to be held in 2014 but was first delayed due to the Ebola crisis and then delayed again to December 2016, organised at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. The AU could not schedule KOAF before, underlining Korea’s lighter political weight compared to 174 The PMRM Directorate lists the following official AU external partnerships: Africa– League of Arab States (LAS); African Union (AU)–European Union (EU) Partnership; Africa–South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF); African Union Commission– United States of America High-Level Dialogue; China–Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC); Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD); Africa– India Partnership; Africa–Turkey Partnership; Africa–Korea. The absence of an Africa–Asia Forum is striking (African Union, n.d.-a).

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China, India or Japan; or its efforts to gain more African clout were insufficient (African Union, 2016; Iwata, 2020; MOFA Korea, 2016). In March 2016, future impeached President Park Geun-hye visited East Africa, signing in Ethiopia a Blueprint for Comprehensive Cooperation with Africa based on development cooperation and defence & security to support peace and stability. Countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Somalia maintain military ties with North Korea. The ROK’s MoUs on defense with Ethiopia and Uganda were thus seen as a breakthrough. South Korea’s African ODA was multiplied by ten between 2006 and 2016, rising from $41M to almost $400M. Around 25% of Korean ODA goes to Africa, with an objective of reaching 50% (Nicolas, 2020). South Korea possesses 24 embassies in Africa, 19 embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5 in North Africa (Van der Merwe et al., 2016), versus Indonesia’s 17. For both countries, this diplomatic coverage and operational capacity seems insufficient. Korea’s particularity is not organising only KOAF, a MOFA initiative focused on developmental issues. From the beginning in 2006, KOAFEC (Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation), organised by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), handles cooperation with the AfDB and supports the development of Korean private companies in Africa. The KOAFIC (Korea-Africa Forum for Industrial Cooperation), organised by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), unites Ministers of Trade. The MOSF also manages the Knowledge Sharing Programme, launched in 2004, which promotes the Korean developmental story, presenting knowledge, not capital, as the primary development driver, risking oversimplification or mythologisation (Kim, 2019). Narratives and their impact support an ambitious nation’s triumphant rise. Multiple forums’ coexistence might lack efficiency (Iwata, 2012, 2020; Kim & Gray, 2016; Nicolas, 2020; Van der Merwe et al., 2016). With the IAF and its IAID and IAMD derivatives, Indonesia also opts for forum variety, less for institutionalisation. Indonesia’s non-recognition as an official external partner of the AU Partnerships Directorate makes flexibility less a choice than a necessity, contrary to Korea. Convening African nations is more complicated without full AU buy-in and participation. Korea’s effort’s insistence on knowledge lacks in Indonesia’s African approach. This appears vital for bettering capacity, expertise and quality. Again, Indonesia could benefit from intelligent and well-thought triangular collaborations with a smart nation like the ROK in Africa.

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South Korea’s African engagement remains limited. Like Japan, unlike China or India, and despite its diplomatic efforts for decades to counter North Korea in Africa, the ROK has not yet discovered the right African formula corresponding to its global rank and attractivity. Japan and South Korea benefited from the US security umbrella, gaining privileged access to Western markets and investment; and then from Asia’s development, which they supported economically. Africa was less strategic until now for them than for China or India, except in multilateralism to increase their global status and reputation. Africa now stands increasingly as a priority. Both Korea and Japan are still seeking the right path. Their populations are less prone to plunge into the African adventure for prosperity, given their already high level of development and wealth per capita. In China, Africa is well-identified as a continent full of opportunities, to pursue wealth and status. This perception is absent in Indonesia, a resourcerich nation. Africa remains a marginal or inexistent consideration, despite current signs of change. Korean aid amounts dedicated to Africa are constantly rising. Yet Africa is not a main Korean partner, similar to the Japanese case. Africa represents less than 2% of Korea’s total FDI or trade, but represented 24% of its global aid in 2017 (Kim, 2019). Actually, although Korea’s aid disbursements increased 20.7% to US$2.86bn in 2021, including bilateral aid and concessional loans, the OECD-DAC indicates Korea’s ODA is under average.175 Significant partners are limited to a few African countries. Its leading economic partners in trade or FDI are different from those receiving its developmental aid, which thus seems quite decorrelated. An argumentation could be made concerning the existence of Korean altruism. Nevertheless, the same unfavourable asymmetric trade terms for Africa exist in ROK–Africa ties than with other industrialised nations (Nicolas, 2020). Similar patterns can be observed in Afro-Indonesian relations. Yet, Indonesia massively exports commodities like CPO to Africa.176

175 In 2021, OECD-DAC member states’ ODA corresponded on average to 0.33% of total gross national income (GNI), while South Korea stood at 0.16%, far from the OECD’s long-term 0.7% target (Watson, 2022). 176 The boom in Indonesian CPO exports to Africa has been spectacular in 2023, notably to Benin with an 800% increase, Kenya, Djibouti or Egypt, the latter being the biggest importer. Africa serves Indonesia’s CPO diversification from its three main Asian clients, China, India and Pakistan (CNBC Indonesia Research, 2023).

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South Korea has not dedicated enough knowledge and financial means to its African engagement; despite its substantial soft power through entertainment, digital or green technologies (Chang, 2020; Ochieng & Kim, 2019). Its material means seem more limited than China or Japan in development assistance or investment. FOCAC’s tens of billions of dollars dwarf Korea’s still modest African investments and loans. KOAF’s budget is also minimal. Korea compensates through its prosperous developmental state narrative and soft power. The ROK intends to use multilateralism or minilateralism to raise its status.177 The Park presidency hurt Korea’s African engagement with its scandals and failures. Korean companies faced cases of land-grabbing or corruption like other Asian countries (Burgis & Blas, 2009; Ndumbe Anyu & Moki, 2013). Korean ships have been involved in IUU fishing on African coasts like the Gulf of Guinea, hurting the ROK’s image and relations in Africa. Korea received a “yellow card” from the EU (Ndzendze, 2017), despite participating in the fight against maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Indonesia also suffers from IUU fishing. The IAMD dealt with maritime issues, notably maritime security. A coalition with African nations could reinforce Indonesian capacity in the maritime domain. Indonesia’s fight against IUU fishing and its maritime policy to increase maritime economic creation are seen as interesting examples to learn from in Africa (Siebels, 2020). South Korea’s African policy lacks consistency and differentiation among its overall development assistance strategy. Despite its soft power genius, the ROK failed to create a brand like FOCAC or TICAD. Its various African forums and competing mechanisms seem confusing, lacking institutional efficiency due to fragmentation and institutional tensions. Korea’s niche or strategic input in Africa still lacks clarity. The ROK lacks influence on its African partners. With the scandals evoked, African agency and instability somewhat overwhelmed Korea. The ROK 177 The MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye and Australia) informal group of so-called middle power countries, a sort of minilateralism, which tries to support global governance, has held consultations on African problematics to try and bring solutions to issues relating to the environment, development or peace & security (Jongryn, 2015; Pramono, 2018; Santikajaya, 2016). Yet, classifying Indonesia as a middle power, a country aiming to be a top 5 economy in the world, conscious of its potential, is an analytical mistake that could lead to wrong assessments. The most powerful Indonesian leadership embodied by the Jokowi–Luhut political duo and a majority of its people see Indonesia as a great power, now or especially in the future.

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can still leverage its significant soft power, as it does successfully in Indonesia. Its technology and companies, like Samsung, LG Electronics, Hyundai and SM Entertainment, are world-class. Korea benefits from a positive global image associated with innovation and youth culture. These assets are precious and “weaponisable”. Like for Japan, a well-strategised ROK association with Indonesia in Africa could represent a game changer. Although far less than China, Korea is invested in Indonesia’s hilirisasi. Korea still presents a limited African presence and bounded interests. Its African focus remains weaker compared to its rivals. ODA represents Korea’s main tool in Africa as a middle power seeking recognition and business facilitation for its conglomerates. The developmental state strongly supports Korean chaebols and corporate research. The ROK facilitates Korean companies’ African market penetration by creating Korea Business Centres (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). Korea’s private sector development promotion benefits from strong state support, forming a discourse to support Korean interests. African interests lack prioritisation from the Korean developmental state. This can also be perceived in the Indonesian state’s case.178 The ROK pursues African resources like in Madagascar, notably in nickel like in Indonesia; trade and large infrastructure projects for its construction companies. ROK companies developed direct links with the AUC to benefit from better business information, project and investment choices, notably in infrastructure and Public–Private Partnerships (PPP),179 supporting its economic expansion strategies in general, notably relating to the AfCFTA (Muchanga, 2019).180 Yet, Korea faces intense Chinese competition for infrastructure. It thus reorientates its focus; like developing integrated smart African cities through high technology (AfDB, 2019).181 The ROK’s high-tech prowess and digital 178 States serve their people first. La raison d’État stands above everything else. Accountability requires being responsible towards clearly defined constituencies. The “beyond the state” institutional form or transnational approaches might propose alternative discourses. 179 Like between Rwanda and KT Corporation, South Korea’s largest telecommuni-

cations provider, to install high-speed 4G internet service for 95% of the population in Rwanda (Ndzendze, 2017). 180 Yet, the AfCFTA will require specific strategies of engagement since the organisation has its own authority and secretariat based in Accra. The AfCFTA is late to really start operating (David, 2023). 181 Yet, China’s rise in technological capacity presents new challenges.

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attractivity provide comparative advantages unmatched by Indonesia. Still, Indonesia can be positioned as a tough competitor for Korea in mainstream infrastructure projects, given its cost advantage; or as a partner through a mutually beneficial scheme, uniting complementarities. Indonesia cannot compete in high-technology, but can act as an operational partner while nurturing its portfolio and experience. Indonesia’s financing limitations remain, hindering market access. Korea legitimately uses its developmental success to promote itself, serving its various interests. Yet, replicating its development story seems complicated in Africa. The Korean state played a unique role in this success. The configuration is mostly different in African states. Still lacking research on Africa (Kim, 2013), Korea’s knowledge and institutional capacity remain limited to engage Africa at China’s level, which has massively invested in knowledge, education and relational power (Benabdallah, 2020b). Indonesia also suffers acutely from knowledge scarcity. But international expectations towards Indonesia are different, especially regarding development assistance towards Africa. Indonesia is not considered a developed country. Former President Moon Jae-in set up the Korea-Africa Foundation in 2018 to raise knowledge of Africa, develop relations and boost private sector interest, clearly revealing Korea’s African ambitions (MOFA, 2018). Unlike impeached President Park Geun-hye’s obsession with isolating North Korea, President Moon developed a more genuine interest in Africa (Bone & Kim, 2019). North Korea’s African presence remains real, benefiting from the support of certain authoritarian African allies like Equatorial Guinea. North Korea maintains military ties and sells arms to several Sub-Saharan African countries, thus avoiding complete international ostracism (Ramani, 2016); and presenting a serious threat to South Korea. Indonesia’s African engagement is not weighed down with such direct heavy geopolitical, life-threatening concerns, explaining also its lack of engagement urgency. An intensification of Papua separatist activities in Africa could accelerate Indonesia’s security engagement. Knowledge of Africa, notably by developing African studies,182 constitutes an indispensable strategic weapon to successfully engage with Africa; 182 Studying and deeply learning about Africa can be done through multiple forms and ways, not necessarily through an Africa Centre or African studies department in universities. Hybrid, transcontinental, transregional or transnational formats allow interesting approaches, looking at Africa in the wider world.

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especially to avoid mistakes like the Korean Chaebol Daewoo’s landgrabbing in Madagascar, which created tremendous reputational damage (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). The Covid-19 crisis showed the world South Korea’s capacities to manage pandemics. The ROK represents a model in health and disease management (Kim, 2020; Kim et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2020), including in Africa, strongly increasing its global status and soft power. Since Indonesia was prioritised by South Korea in its health diplomacy during the Covid-19 crisis (Lee, 2020), new avenues of triangular health collaboration between Indonesia, the ROK and Africa could be opened. Well-employed, Indonesia’s Afro-Asianism and Global South profile constitute an advantage. South Korea could also learn from Pan-Africanism and African unification for Korean reunification (Ndzendze, 2017). The ROK aims to present a unique developmental model, contrasting with its two giant neighbours, China and Japan, uniting culture and development promoted as Korean soft power. This model can appear attractive for Africa, although South Korea developed in an authoritarian context, which should not be forgotten. The Korean model is not neutral or immediately replicable, but a product of Korea’s political context and East Asia (Kim, 2019). Similarly, an Indonesian model would be the product of a specific Indonesian political context and Southeast Asia. Africans are well aware and usually pick and choose what is of interest to them according to their national context and specificities. A combination of East Asia–Southeast Asia models would add attractivity for Africans. Indonesia’s ability to operationalise such complex strategies remains unproven for now. Luhut’s green and hilirisasi diplomacy is a test case. Given South Korea’s increasing soft power leveraging to advance its foreign policy interests, including in Africa, the Korea Aid corruption scandal presents an interesting case of problematic practices in Africa by an Asian power, hurting its status and reputation.183 As an ODA project launched in 2016 by President Park, Korea Aid consisted in distributing Korean medical staff and services (K-medics), food products (K-meals) and K-pop to rural communities using ten trucks in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; an original mix demonstrating South Korea’s soft power efforts to appear as a cultural and developmental model alternative in

183 The Korean aid scandal directly relates to the “Choi Soon-sil gate” (Shin, 2020).

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Africa (Kim, 2019).184 The ROK government promotes Hallyu globally as a soft power movement that can positively impact the value of Korean products and exports by increasing Korean attractivity. Nevertheless, Korean ODA “soft power narratives”, emphasising Korea’s successful development history, are criticised as elitist and disconnected from youth. Afro-Korean youth relationships in the creative economy should be facilitated through small initiatives, startup and SMEs support that would create more genuine Afro-Korean ecosystems and stories. This model based on PPPs could accelerate trust-building and mutual knowledge, supporting grassroots engagement, which could be leveraged for broader projects and Korea’s other agenda, like green growth and digitalisation (Watson, 2022). Experimenting and innovating appear as means to boost relations with the young African continent. Yet, education and meaningful creativity should not be abandoned for pure commercial endeavours. The Korea Aid corruption case can appear as a warning for Indonesia and Indonesia AID future African projects. Potential corruption scandals, including those relating to resource exploitation, would hurt its standing and reputation in Africa. Some African countries are better ranked than Indonesia on anti-corruption and have strong public opinions expressing themselves freely and loudly. Indonesia can also reflect on the use of soft power by looking at Korea.185 Offering platforms for Indonesian and African youths to connect directly, notably through digital, for meaningful endeavours might be more useful than grand state-backed initiatives. Finding a proper approach in Africa requires time and effort. South Korea’s developmental story undoubtedly offers meaningful lessons to be shared in Africa, but with the right adapted framework genuinely impacting African lives and development. In that perspective, although imposed by its absence of AU recognition, Indonesia’s pragmatic lowprofile approach, notably through the Luhut-led infrastructure Task Force, having evolved towards ad hoc Afro-Asian minilateral hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy, appears as a start worthy of notice and an example of diplomatic creativity. It does not promise too much or sell dreams. It offers an alternative capacity to deliver projects in Africa; eliminating unnecessary pressure on Indonesia that would be born from 184 The use of the terms K-medics and K-meals underlines the limitations of Korean soft power leveraging. Marketing can become vulgar when applied inappropriately. 185 Turkish soft power in Africa also offers an interesting example (Schipani & Pitel, 2021).

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overpromising; despite real funding issues that could backlash concerning notably La Tour de Gorée project. A tangible showcase, hilirisasi has happened already in Indonesia. Africa knows there is much to learn from Southeast Asia (Adem, 2018), and its giant nation, Indonesia. Indonesia’s effort will be evaluated in the long run and depends on its domestic situation and evolution. Africa could help Indonesia reach Korea’s development level faster. Accustomed to war conditions, the war in Ukraine’s impact on Africa might offer Korea a concrete soft power based on an ODA breakthrough with the launching of the “K-rice belt” initiative with eight African nations, providing high-yield rice varieties, agricultural machines and irrigation and sharing farming knowledge, experience and technology for crop cultivation and distribution, to support food security through the harvesting of 2000 tons of rice varieties in Africa in 2023 and over 10,000 tons starting 2027, which could feed 30 million Africans (Seok-min, 2023).186 Indonesia AID will need to verify its tangible impact is clear too, supporting millions of Africans to move forward. Its vaccine donations will immunise millions of African children. Korea’s trial-and-error journey shows that patience and resolution are necessary.

Conclusion After examining Indonesia’s geopolitical discourse and framework broadening, allowing more serious consideration of Africa as a foreign policy matter in Indonesian elites’ mindset and policies; Africa forming part of the new Indonesian Indo-Pacific strategic outlook and prolonging ASEAN Centrality outside the Asia–Pacific; Indonesia’s African foreign policy contemporary evolution and its main instigators were looked into. The shift from a multilateralist, abstract approach through the NAASP to a more realist, pragmatic approach with the IAF’s launching and the creation of Luhut’s Task Force was described. The Jokowi–Luhut duo played a decisive role in this evolution, accompanied by Kemlu, mostly perceiving Africa as a new market with many business opportunities for Indonesian companies, especially SOEs in infrastructure projects; and a prolongation of the Indonesian developmental state and a way to defend domestic hilirisasi and green policies. The African polities and markets had not been considered seriously before by Indonesia, contrary 186 The eight African nations are Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Uganda, Kenya and Guinea Bissau.

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to other main Asian powers. Africa remains classified as a “non-traditional market” in Indonesia’s bureaucratic nomenclature, which symbolises its non-strategic status until now. This “non-traditionallabel complicates serious consideration of Africa, belittling its importance for Indonesia and the exceptional Afro-Indonesian historical ties. For reasons of political consolidation at the highest level and for business, showcasing Indonesia’s developmental success, Africa’s strategic importance was increased under Jokowi, a new foreign policy priority for Indonesia. Moreover, under Luhut’s guidance, the African endeavour is transformed into more than a non-traditional market for Indonesia. Luhut makes Africa strategic for Indonesia. Luhut and Jokowi’s agency has notably been influenced by China’s African presence, in approach and perception. Under Jokowi, if Luhut is involved, the matter is essential, meaning Jokowi wants to ensure the undertaking is successful. Luhut means strategic. Latin America is also classified as a non-traditional market, meaning an official target for Indonesian business expansion. The effort is not as intensive and “highlevel” as the African one and has been mostly left to Kemlu to handle. Since Lula’s return, Indonesia is including Brazil in its green and hilirisasi diplomacy. Kemlu implements the new African engagement policy, under the Luhut umbrella, notably through the IAF framework and increased economic diplomacy, especially bilaterally, in an opportunistic approach, especially focusing on obtaining projects for SOEs. The effort remains limited, though, given Indonesia’s insufficient diplomatic presence, with only 17 embassies with weak capacities; and lacking deep African knowledge. Since 2010, external powers opened over 150 new embassies in Africa (Devermont, 2020). Türkiye already opened 44 embassies in Africa and will open one in each African country (Akoda, 2021; Dedet, 2020; Ozkan, 2012, 2013; Ozkan & Orakci, 2015; Schipani & Pitel, 2021; Ünveren, 2021).187 Ukraine announced multiple embassy openings in Africa and a Ukraine-Africa Forum to counter Russian influence (Staff, 2023). Africa is increasingly conceived as an essential region for Indonesia to step up its global role and seize strategic opportunities, starting with infrastructure and resource-industrialisation projects; a new playing field for Indonesia to rise by internationalising its SOEs as China did. Jokowi opened the door for that African effort. It is only a beginning. Continuity 187 The 43rd embassy opened in Togo in April 2021 and the 44th opened in GuineaBissau.

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will need to be confirmed with 2024 presidential change. Leadership shifts can bring new orientations. Indonesia’s seriousness in Africa remains to be proven over time, given the still limited available means and knowledge. Studying the African foreign policy drivers and essence of four major Asian powers allowed to better locate Indonesia’s specific approach, better understanding similarities and differences. Indonesia’s African foreign policy and its sudden pragmatic shift under Jokowi were not made in a vacuum, but influenced by other emerging powers, predominantly Asian powers, especially China. Engaging Africa constitutes a key marker for rising powers. External powers tend to securitise their African objectives in market access; energy; food security; diplomatic projection and soft power serving status and nationalist aspirations for global expansion; defense and security capacities to protect assets and citizens and other strategic issues depending on countries like Taiwan for China, North Korea for South Korea or Papua for Indonesia. Indonesia focuses on obtaining niche projects in Africa. Its overall project pipeline is still small. The country cannot be seen as in direct and heavy confrontation with China or India; and its capacities are far from those of South Korea or Japan. Still, competition exists with all the active actors in Africa. If they can be delivered someday, given major geopolitical upheavals that undermine Indonesian capacities and funding complications, some Indonesian projects seem substantial, like railways in the DRC or La Tour de Gorée in Senegal; and Pertamina investments, a particular case. Increasing African agency supported by available partners’ multiplication places external powers in competition for political influence and economic access (Malone et al., 2015). Indonesia will need clear differentiation. Hilirisasi diplomacy serves that goal. Indonesia’s African foreign policy represents the newest endeavour among Asian powers studied here. Compared to Japan, South Korea and China, Indonesia remains an upper-middle-income country. Its development assistance preoccupations in Africa are different and less substantial. Indonesia lacks a strong diaspora in Africa, like India or China.188 188 An Indonesia Diaspora Network (IDN) exists that has been used as a political tool by a former SBY advisor for international affairs, Ambassador Dino Patti Djalal (Soetjipto et al., 2021). Luhut’s special advisor, Edward Wanandi, from the prominent Indonesian Chinese Wanandi family, is involved in that network in the US. Wanandi has been highly involved in Luhut’s African effort, present in meetings with African leaders in Indonesia and Africa. The growing interest of the Wanandi family in African matters also underlines the importance Africa is taking in Indonesian foreign policy. Edward Wanandi’s older

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Indonesia’s academic and expertise capacity concerning Africa is limited compared to Indian, Chinese or Japanese universities or think tanks. Yet Indonesia can still leverage its Afro-Asian historical legitimacy in Africa. Bandung remains a magical name in many ways, although, as Kemlu recognises, fast generational shifts in Africa might see this memory evaporate without a smart effort. The clock is ticking for Indonesia in Africa. Revamping Afro-Asianism, hilirisasi diplomacy is risky since Indonesia will ultimately be judged on its contribution to Africa. Advantageously, the Indonesia–Africa developmental gap is not too wide as it can be with Japan or South Korea. Indonesian solutions for Africa can appear more accessible in various circumstances. Indonesia can benefit from its cost competitiveness, although facing tough competition from other external actors. The repositioning towards a more pragmatic and concrete approach facilitates on-the-ground learning, conceiving Africa as a laboratory similar to the Chinese or Indian approaches. Indonesia’s capacity to develop fundamental knowledge, expertise and material capacity in relation to Africa will determine the overall long-term success of its African penetration. The effort should be placed in investing in research and knowledge for better results from all perspectives; not a given in Indonesia. Indonesia is of great interest to the four major Asian powers studied here for similar reasons developed regarding Africa; and many more, given their proximity to Indonesia as fellow Asian polities. The dynamic equilibrium, equilateral distance and other ASEAN Centrality concepts presented previously, now implemented in the Indo-Pacific framework, could be applied in Africa itself. Indonesia can use its bargaining power and hedging strategies to pursue its strategic interests in Africa. Like at the end of the nineteenth century with the European powers’ scramble for Africa, the infamous “new scramble for Africa”, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, involves major Asian powers competing with each other and other developed and emerging powers. The “new scramble” expression is legitimately contested. No colonisation is involved as opposed to the European conquest, European powers dividing Africa

brother, Jusuf Wanandi, is the co-founder of Indonesia’s main New Order think tank CSIS Jakarta.

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between themselves at the Berlin Conference.189 However, it points to a heuristically interesting dynamic that can share similarities with the past. In any case, Indonesia can benefit from this geopolitical situation, given its positioning and strategic importance for all major players, especially from Asia. The way Indonesia and Jokowi placed China and Japan in competition for the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway could be reproduced in Africa to secure projects with support from those powers. Moreover, the US–China rivalry or the Ukraine War consequences mean Indonesia needs stronger relations with new partners to stand its ground.190 Africa cannot be avoided by any aspiring major power in the twenty-first century. Indonesia must raise the level of its game or keep failing to reach its true potential. Hilirisasi represents a milestone in Indonesia’s industrial development. Leveraging and defending this success through the Global South, weaponising Afro-Asian narratives, is astute. Concrete results, especially in Africa, will reinforce or hurt Indonesia’s credibility.

Bibliography Abe, S. (2007). “Confluence of the Two Seas” Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/spe ech-2.html Abe, S. (2016). Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD

189 African countries exercise their sovereignty in their own way, as Djibouti’s example shows with its foreign military bases and infrastructure corridors. As Cobbett and Mason reveal, Djibouti is not a victim of a “new scramble for Africa” from external powers. It plays geopolitics to its advantage; seizing new opportunities in its own way through “the art of being global ” or a “wordling strategy”. Moving beyond Westphalian ideal-types of sovereignty, Djibouti, by inviting several powers like China, the US, France or Japan to build military bases and infrastructure corridors on its territory, creates new territorialities and sovereignties. Multiple overlapping sovereignties and forms of territoriality can coexist. “Djibouti is not weak, failed, being scrambled over by Great Powers or ‘hollowed out’; rather it is a state exercising power as it negotiates the presence and overlapping sovereignties of foreign powers on its territory” (Cobbett & Mason, 2021). 190 Some criticise Indonesian diplomacy for failing to understand the implications of this decisive new US–China systemic rivalry and use multilateralism effectively (Pattiradjawane, 2021).

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UNDP. (1994). Human Development Report: New Dimension of Human Security. In United Nations Development Programme. Oxford University Press. United Nations. (n.d.). India: A Long and Deep Tradition of Contributing to UN Peacekeeping. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/gallery/541602 United Nations. (2022). Troop and Police Contributors. UN Peacekeeping. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors Ünveren, B. (2021). Turkey Seeks to Strengthen Africa Relations with “Benevolence.” Dw.Com. https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-seeks-to-strengthen-afr ica-relations-with-benevolence/a-56452857 Vallangi, N. (2016). India’s Forgotten African Tribe. Bbc.Com. http://www. bbc.com/travel/story/20160801-indias-forgotten-jungle-dwellers Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., & Arkhangelskaya, A. (2016). Emerging Powers in Africa: A New Wave in the Relationship? In Emerging Powers in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40736-4 Van Reybrouck, D. (2022). Revolusi. L’Indonésie et la Naissance du Monde Moderne. (Traduction). Actes Sud. Verma, R. (2017). India and China in Africa a Comparative Perspective of the Oil Industry. Routledge. Vines, A., & Oruitemeka, B. (2008). India’s Engagement with the African Indian Ocean Rim States. Viswanathan, H. H. S., & Mishara, A. (2019). The Ten Guiding Principles for India–Africa Engagement: Finding Coherence in India’s Africa Policy (ORF Occasional Paper No. 200 [Issue June]). Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-ten-guiding-principles-forindia-africa-engagement-finding-coherence-in-indias-africa-policy/ Voncujovi, S. (2022). Abe Shinzo’s Towering Legacy in Africa. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/abe-shinzos-towering-legacy-in-africa/ Wallace, C. (2018). Leaving (North-East) Asia? Japan’s Southern Strategy. International Affairs, 94(4), 883–904. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy027 Watson, I. (2011). Global Korea: Foreign Aid and National Interests in an Age of Globalization. Contemporary Politics, 17 (1), 53–69. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13569775.2011.552688 Watson, I. (2022). Creating a Win-Win South Korean ODA Agenda. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/07/creating-a-winwin-south-korean-oda-agenda/ WEF. (2015). 15 Facts About the Indian Diaspora in Africa. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/15-factsabout-the-indian-diaspora-in-africa/ Whitman, J. Q. (2017). Hitler’s American Model. The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law. Princeton University Press.

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Williams, P. D. (2007). From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture. African Affairs, 106(423), 253–279. Woo, R. (2023). Chinese Navy Makes Rare Foray Into West Africa with Nigeria Visit. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-navy-makesrare-foray-into-west-africa-with-nigeria-visit-2023-07-03/?s=03 Wu, Y. (2013). Global Powers and Africa Programme (Occasional Paper No. 134 “The Role of Public Sentiment and Social Media in the Evolving China – Africa Relationship”). South African Institute of International Affairs. Xinhua. (2015a). Full Text: China’s Second Africa Policy Paper. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/XiattendsParisclimateconference/ 2015-12/05/content_22632874.htm Xinhua. (2015b, April 22). Xi Raises Three-Point Proposal on Carrying Forward Bandung Spirit. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/201504/22/content_20508769.htm Yahya, A. N. (2022). Jokowi Kembali Beri Tugas Baru ke Luhut, Kini Urus Program Kendaraan Listrik. Kompas.Com. https://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2022/09/18/16181531/jokowi-kembali-beri-tugas-baru-ke-luhutkini-urus-program-kendaraan-listrik Yehia, A. (2023). INTERVIEW—Indonesia and Egypt Forge Ahead as Close Partners in Diplomacy, Trade, Culture: Ambassador. Ahram Online. https:// english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1234/504971/Egypt/Foreign-Aff airs/INTERVIEW-Indonesia-and-Egypt-forge-ahead-as-clo.aspx Yoshimatsu, H. (2019). Partnership Against the Rising Dragon? Japan’s Foreign Policy towards India. Pacific Review.https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748. 2018.1563210 Yuniar, R. W. (2022). Can Indonesia’s Electric Car, Battery Sector Have a Smooth Ride Beyond China? South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp. com/week-asia/economics/article/3192165/can-indonesias-electric-car-bat tery-sector-have-smooth-ride Zhang, X., Wasserman, H., & Mano, W. (2016). China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions. Palgrave Macmillan.https://doi.org/ 10.1080/19480881.2017.1379247 陈超 (Chen Chao) 王义桅 (Wang Yiwei). (2023). Synergies Between the Global Development Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative [全球发展倡议与 “一 带一路” 协同增效]. CSIS. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/synergiesbetween-global-development-initiative-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative/?s=03

CHAPTER 7

Reinventing Indonesian Power through Africa

International recognition, sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity, increased material benefits and improved global status, all relate to Africa for Indonesia. Like other emerging powers, Africa can appear as a promise. The first country to recognise Indonesia was Egypt, an African nation in the Arab world focusing increasingly on its African character and willing to develop its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa for economic and strategic reasons. Pan-Arabist in the past, Egypt now turns itself firmly towards Africa and its Pan-African AU. Egypt pivoted towards Africa under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, notably given the activism of its Turkish rival in the Gulf-Horn of Africa’s interlinked regional security complexes (Maziad, 2022; Pham, 2015).1 The Egyptian population’s well-being and economy are heavily linked to the Nile River and, thus, to Eastern Africa’s Great Lakes region. The White Nile and Blue Nile sources are respectively located in the Equatorial Lake Plateau (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, DRC and Uganda) and Ethiopia.2 Egypt confronts Ethiopia, which is filling its giant dam on the Blue Nile, the Grand 1 Egypt’s geopolitical allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel are also strongly focusing on developing their influence in Africa to notably counter Turkish, Qatari and Iranian expansion (Donelli, 2021; Donelli & Dentice, 2020; Gidron, 2020; Gruzd et al., 2018; Lefebvre, 2019). 2 The Nile drainage basin covers eleven African countries.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_7

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Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Abtew & Dessu, 2019; Hamada, 2017; Negm & Abdel-Fattah, 2019), a water management issue underlining the types of strategic issues Africa faces and that external powers like Indonesia should understand well.3 Just after returning from his August 2023 African tour, Jokowi indicated he realised in Africa how grateful Indonesia should be for its abundant water reserves while inaugurating a Regional Drinking Water Supply System in North Sumatra (Yanwardhana, 2023).4 The Tigray and Sudan wars affect Indonesian citizens and investments, notably in garments, instant noodles or soap. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, the three GERD conflict belligerents, participated in the KAA in 1955, forming half of the African contingent. Through Egypt, Africa thus contributed significantly to the birth of the Indonesian Republic. For Wirajuda, Cairo is a crucial centre of African politics, with almost all African countries having an embassy there.5 African contemporary dynamics will become increasingly significant for Indonesia as they do for its partners and competitors. Africa was only marginally part of Indonesia’s presence for decades. It has always been part of its past and should be a good part of its future to fulfil its ambitions. At least symbolically, the KAA remains contemporary Indonesia’s most prominent foreign policy event. A primary reason for this diplomatic event was Indonesia’s effort to gain international support for West Papua’s (Irian Barat) recognition as Indonesian territory, following international law’s uti possidetis juris principle, since West Papua, like the rest of Indonesia, had been part of the Dutch East Indies (Ewing, 2019). Indonesia gained a higher international status thanks to this conference, which helped African nations gain their independence, mainly in 3 The author was invited by the Ethiopian embassy in Jakarta to attend a Zoom webinar organised by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 November 2020 about the GERD, indicating Ethiopia’s will to share its position in Indonesia and with various stakeholders. 4 “I can feel the importance of water after four days yesterday in Africa. We often don’t feel how important water is, because we have never felt a shortage of water. We have never been short of water, so we have never felt how important water is ” (Yanwardhana, 2023). 5 Former Indonesian foreign minister and former ambassador to Cairo, Wirajuda carries until today a certain weight in Indonesian foreign policy. He told the author he spent 50 minutes with President Al-Sissi during his 2015 visit to Jakarta. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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the 1960s.6 Until today, Bandung provides prestige, recognition and gratitude to Indonesia in Africa, at least discursively.7 The 2005 and 2015 Bandung anniversaries, coupled with the AASs, allowed Indonesia to gather hundreds of heads of State and government. The Afro-Asian narrative remains powerful leverage for Indonesian projection and diplomacy. This intimate history with Africa, sometimes an idea of Africa, nourishes Indonesia’s global standing and identity. Political nostalgia can help state leaders instrumentalise the past to galvanise society, promising a better future (Benabdallah, 2020c). Jokowi leverages Indonesia’s Bandung nostalgia as a political tool to gain economic advantages in Africa and mobilise the Indonesian state and business, notably for the material benefits Africa can bring. Sukarno created the ideological framework. Jokowi–Luhut started operationalising it, placing themselves in Sukarno’s footsteps, although the gap between discourse and reality can often be highlighted. Papua separatism also relates to Africa, given the possible “Black Solidarity” promoted by some activists in Africa.8 Countering Papua separatist efforts in Africa is officially part of Indonesian ambassadors’ mission. Indonesia has been monitoring this threat for decades in Africa. From an Indonesian perspective, new approaches and a better understanding of Africa appear necessary in the digital era to properly anticipate and handle the threat.

6 The exact role of Bandung in African independences and its “Africanness” are

contested. The Conference was an Asian initiative by the Colombo Powers. This is understandable since Africa was still vastly under colonial rule, explaining the minimal presence of African states. Still, the fact that the Conference was feared by Western powers does reveal its relative significance for Africa. African independences were helped by Bandung, at least symbolically. 7 Some intellectuals like Nigerian Nobel Price Wole Soyinka, African leaders like Sene-

galese President Senghor, African civilians and Papuan activists accuse Africans and the world of having been “blinded by Bandung ”, seen as having been an Indonesian propaganda tool to take over West Papua, which they consider being populated by Oceanic Africans (Swan, 2018). This version can naturally be contested since Indonesia was colonised for hundreds of years, applies uti possidetis juris exactly like in Africa, and the racial construction concerning West Papua was largely encouraged or created by European colonisers. Moreover, Senghor was under strong French influence as the President of Senegal. France was afraid of Bandung and Afro-Asianism, given its repercussions in its African-preserved space. 8 As explained notably by the different Indonesian ambassadors to African countries interviewed for this book.

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Africa is central for Indonesia’s UN engagement. It cannot ignore Africa’s large UNGA bloc. Indonesian peacekeeping history also started in Africa, in Egypt in 1957 and in the Congo in the early 1960s. Indonesia continues sending troops to UN missions in Africa. It ranks as a top 10 Troop Contribution Country (TCC), providing international prestige and influence and supporting continuous status increase.9 Indonesia’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding participation is justified by its constitutional duty to contribute to creating a peaceful, free and socially just world order. Since Indonesia’s Constitution also requires the State to increase its people’s prosperity and make the nation smarter, and since Africa appears decisive for Indonesia’s future, notably in economic expansion that can improve the people’s well-being, an argument can be made that the Indonesian government has a constitutional mandate and obligation to increase its capabilities to expand towards Africa. The archipelago should learn more about Africa and Africans to smoothen and professionalise its approach.10 Bandung became a prestigious narrative stuck in a nostalgic past, politically non-operationalised until Jokowi. Afro-Indonesian links remain underexplored. After the Covid-19 slowdown, Indonesia’s dynamic health diplomacy, its G20 Presidency in 2022 with an AU presence supporting a better connection to the Pan-African organisation, and its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023, helped develop African relationships (Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021; Editorial, 2021). Encouraging a global health architecture, digital transformation, and energy transition as G20 President, Indonesia wished to show the world its leadership. The planet’s problems cannot be sorted out without

9 Number 8 with 2704 uniformed personnel, which includes troops, police units and experts, as of 31 March 2023, according to the UN’s peacekeeping website: www.peacek eeping.un.org. 10 As the South African ambassador in Jakarta put it, Indonesians know little about Africa today, and vice versa, Africans know little about Indonesia. Interview with H.E. Hilton Fisher, Ambassador of South Africa to Indonesia (17 November 2020, Jakarta, Online meeting, 2020).

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the African bloc, thus the G20 attendance of the AU Chair (Eguegu, 2022).11 Luhut’s Task Force and Afro-Asian minilateralism are bringing the real boost. In reality, Africa does not belong to Indonesia’s grand strategy yet, if Indonesia has one. For Brands, a state’s grand strategy is an “intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy; it is the logic that helps states navigate a complex and dangerous world” (Brands, 2014).12 Indonesia developed this “intellectual architecture” for its interests and views concerning great power management, Southeast Asia or the Asia– Pacific, with concepts like ASEAN Centrality or “dynamic equilibrium”. It is being developed for the Indo-Pacific, with the AOIP. It remains inexistent for Africa. Indonesia does not have a holistic “logic” yet for its African approach, reflected by the absence of seminal research on Africa in Indonesia (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b). Despite Africa not belonging to its core strategic interests, Indonesia now considers the continent more seriously, thanks to the Jokowi–Luhut effort with Kemlu, and Indonesian multinationals for the private sector that kicked off their engagement earlier. Hilirisasi diplomacy can appear as participating in a strategy to defend the Indonesian developmental state’s industrialisation. Continuity and results will be awaited first. Among competing external powers, Indonesia benefits from potential advantages given its history with Africa going back to ancient times through the shared Indian Ocean cosmos, a common history of suffering

11 Indonesia’s invitation to the AU follows a customary invite to participate in the G20 of the ASEAN Chair, the AU Chair and the NEPAD representative that first happened in 2010. The AU was first represented by the 2021 AU Chairperson and President of the DRC, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi. From February 2022, Macky Sall, the President of Senegal and 2022 AU Chairperson, took over. Presenting the AU as the 8th world economy, President Sall called for the organisation to become a permanent member of the G20 that would then become the G21, underlining that many problems the G20 has been dealing with concern Africa and can only be resolved with Africa like climate change, debt, pandemics and security (Marsudi, 2021; Said, 2021; Sall, 2022). The case for inviting the AU to form a G21 had been previously made, notably by Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs, 2021). India, as G20 Chair for 2023, proposed making the AU a permanent member (Staff, 2023). 12 For Art, both foreign policy and grand strategy deal with all state interests. However, grand strategy only focuses on the employment of military power to fulfill national interests, whereas foreign policy considers all the possible “instruments of statecraft ” (Art, 2009). We prefer a more overarching definition of grand strategy in this book, which is not a book on grand strategy.

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from colonialism, and the KAA. These facts, already widely used by Indonesia, can form the discursive, memorial and historical narrative for a unique Indonesian strategy towards Africa.13 This presupposes upgrading Indonesia’s intellectual capacities and “knowledge-to-policy cycle” (Guggenheim, 2012). For Alden, to frame their African approach, emerging powers employ either a restorative discourse supporting a Pan-African renaissance bringing back African dignity, or a transformative, almost revolutionary, discourse encouraging Africans to break the Western neocolonial grip for a South–South brotherhood creating mutual economic development and eradicating the unfair international system (Alden, 2019). To a certain extent, Indonesia is no exception to those discourses. Yet Indonesia’s narrative usually keeps a modest tone, mostly economically focused and non-confrontational. The archipelago prefers to appear consensual and friendly rather than overtly ambitious. Indonesia is still testing the waters in Africa through its fledging market access effort. Nonetheless, LBP’s Task Force employs a transformative and revisionist tone, protecting Indonesia’s domestic industrial policy achievements. Given its historical African ties, also religious, like in the Cape Town area in South Africa,14 Indonesia benefits from strategic recognition in Africa.15 External powers like Türkiye deploy great efforts to redefine themselves almost as African actors (Korkut & Civelekoglu, 2013). Indonesia holds a true comparative advantage with the Bandung narrative, already used or weaponised by India, China and even Japan, each in their idiosyncratic way. However, if its engagement disappoints Africans, 13 Grand strategies are various and complex, with specific goals depending on the nations formulating them (Balzacq et al., 2019). 14 Enslaved people and political detainees were sent from Batavia to Cape Town by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) starting in 1667 (Cribb & Kahin, 2004). The famous Indonesian ulema and Muslim intellectual from Makassar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Makassari, was exiled by the Dutch to South Africa in 1694. Sheikh Yusuf is considered a pioneer in the spread of Islam in South Africa and was made a national hero in both Indonesia and South Africa. Another famous figure known as “Tuan Guru” (Mister teacher), the Prince of the Indonesian Kingdom of Tidore, from his real name Abdullah bin Qadi Abdus-Salaam, was exiled to the Cape in 1780 by the Dutch. He was held on Robben Island. He transcribed two copies of the Holy Qur’an from his memory (SA Embassy, n.d.). Holland also sent around 3000 Blacks soldiers from its then West African colonies, which would today be in Ghana and Burkina Fao, to Indonesia, who were called “Black Dutch” (“Belanda hitam”) (Van Reybrouck, 2022). 15 Strategic recognition can be defined as “a good reputation (that) is essential in obtaining advantages in material resources.” (Lindemann, 2010).

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Indonesia could lose this historical advantage. Like China, the AfroIndonesian discourse evolved from history and nostalgia to win–win and from a focus on modest aid to a concentration on trade and investment, before LBP’s restoration of a more offensive Afro-Asian narrative. Following a developmental perspective, pragmatism replaced rhetoric, before being somewhat combined. Jokowi called for transforming political ties with Africa into economic benefits. Minister Retno used her “Beyond the Bandung Spirit ” rhetoric as a signal.16 Maybe it is not about going “beyond” but simply carrying out the Bandung ideals. Economic development and holistic Afro-Asian economic cooperation, including foreign investment, were central issues during the KAA. Economic development appears as the first priority, an “urgency”, of the Bandung Conference’s final communiqué that mentions trade, industrialisation, oil and nuclear energy, commodities, shipping, taxation, banking and insurance, technical assistance, exchange of know-how and expertise, research, training or equipment for the Asia–Africa transregion (Centre de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE), 2012; Lee, 2009). In 2023, Retno more directly said: “Indonesia wants to be part of African Economic Development’s success story” (Kemlu, 2023), while Luhut formed a common Global South front defending hilirisasi and defying developed nations. As a pivot state (Chase et al., 2000; Santikajaya, 2017), in a sense that all major powers have a strategic interest in Indonesia and Indonesia’s condition is considered to impact the global system, Indonesia benefits from a permissive security environment (Ripsman et al., 2016), as opposed to countries in the Middle East, South Asia or the Korean Peninsula. Its domestic politics are thus its foreign policy’s primary determinant. Although the permissiveness degree is evolving with the geopolitical context, Indonesia can prioritise other regions on top of Southeast Asia, its core region. Indonesia’s late contemporary focus on Africa can be mostly attributed to the domestic factor, notably its leaders and their mental maps, its strategic vision and its research and education system deficiencies. Once political entrepreneurs like Jokowi and Luhut 16 Although it tried to convey a legitimate idea, the “Beyond the Bandung Spirit ” expression was not necessarily adequate or well-chosen. Bandung remains a serious Indonesian plus-point. Learning by doing, Minister Retno actually changed her discourse again, as seen previously. Discourses legitimising foreign expansion tend to be flexible and evolve according to geopolitics, national interests and capabilities. “The legitimations of US expansionism had always formed a mobile complex of ideologemes, their order and emphasis shifting kaleidoscopically according to the historical conjuncture” (P. Anderson, 2015).

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understood Indonesia’s defectual African approach, they could quickly shift Indonesia’s foreign policy and direct it towards Africa, although still in a limited fashion. Classifying Africa as a “non-traditional market” limits Africa’s strategic weight for the Indonesian elites and public. Should a continent that contributed to providing the most prestigious international event of Indonesia’s modern history with the KAA, be merely classified as “nontraditional”? It seems unfitting. An African expansion serves Indonesia’s national and economic security, providing access to necessary resources and markets for increasing the welfare of Indonesians while raising Indonesia’s power and prestige as a state.17 As a Javanese leader, Jokowi is obliged to “protect the welfare of the world” (Nguitragool, 2012),18 primarily Indonesia’s welfare.19 By expanding to Africa to increase welfare and prosperity, Jokowi can transform from a vijigishu, a king desirous of conquests, into a chakravartin, a universal monarch, acknowledged by the whole world (Zaman, 2006).20 Born on a Wednesday, Jokowi reshuffles his cabinet on special Wednesdays based on the Javanese calendar (Sani, 2022). The Javanese factor cannot be ignored.21 Politically, Indonesia preserves solid remnants of a Javanese kingdom. Jokowi’s direct implication, notably by “delegating” Luhut, with Indonesia’s new African engagement, has raised Africa’s strategic weight for Indonesia. “Who Leads Matters” (Hermann et al., 2001). Powerful 17 Under Indonesian influence, increasing the welfare of the Southeast Asian people is also the basis of the ASEAN regional security concept, which should make Africa strategic for ASEAN too (Buzan, 1991; Jetschke, 2009; Lekunze, 2020). Similarly, China sees Africa as “a fulcrum for fuqiang (富强)”, meaning accession to great power and wealth (Large, 2021). 18 In Javanese: “hamemayu hayuning bawono”. 19 Kautilya’s Arthashastra places the people’s welfare and happiness at the centre to

ensure the stability and power of the state, highlighting obvious Indian civilisational influence on Indonesia (Liebig, 2013). The promotion of welfare brings prosperity to the state, which can thus expand (Zaman, 2006). 20 India aims to become the vishwaguru ou «world guru» (Hall, 2020). 21 Jawanisasi or Javanisation is the increase of the visibility of Javanese ways and culture

in the Indonesian polity. It is a strategy in Indonesia to fight radical Islamism and ensure unity and stability under the Javanese cultural umbrella and wisdom. Javanisation is not new in Indonesia since the Indonesian flag colours, Pancasila or Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika relate to the late Javanese Majapahit Empire. Yet, since the large Islamic protests in 2016 during the Jakarta Gubernatorial elections, Javanisation has increased. The author has witnessed this, notably in universities where radicalism levels had become worrying.

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leaders made a difference in reframing Indonesia’s African engagement (Byman & Pollack, 2001).22 Indonesia’s predominant power and decision source, Jokowi decided to make Africa a more critical Indonesian focus, missioning his most potent ally. All along his presidency, increasingly during his second mandate, Jokowi picked Luhut to execute the most strategic missions he wanted to ensure were delivered effectively, symbolised by the General’s various appointments as head of committees or task forces handling essential matters for the President (Pratama, 2021). As a source of wealth and now domestic wealth protection, Africa penetrated Jokowi’s mindset. Luhut became the main umbrella for Indonesia’s new African foreign policy. In military commando-style, Luhut created an ad hoc framework with his Task Force filled with his team and Kemlu diplomats and started implementing his plan with the available capacities and constraints. Facing funding constraints, the general reinvented flexibly the approach, leveraging domestic economic policy successes towards African leaders, promising to share acquired industrial knowhow while forming a defensive coalition to protect Indonesia’s hilirisasi. Indonesia lacks China’s financial means. Indonesia’s African policy continuity and its real impact will be measured in the coming years. The Brazilian example shows how Lula’s fall meant Brazil’s African engagement failure, according to Brazilian academics (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021). His return to power corresponds with the Brazil-DRC-Indonesia tropical forests alliance formation. External powers often underestimate the complexity of penetrating Africa sustainably, failing to read African realities, and making naïve mistakes. Luhut’s laudable effort still seems too opportunistic, lacking a deep knowledge foundation and a long-term implementable strategy, the main goal remaining domestic. Promoting Indonesia’s hilirisasi also means promoting Chinese technological, developmental and investment success as Indonesia’s main backer in this case. Given Jokowi’s down-to-earth diplomacy credo and what some called post-Reformasi foreign policy’s “no profile” characteristic (Irewati & Kartini, 2019),23 economic diplomacy becomes the primary visible means to engage with Africa, seemingly providing the quickest wins in Jokowi’s

22 “great men” or “statesmen”. 23 As opposed to a high-profile Sukarno foreign policy and a low-profile foreign policy

during the New Order (Irewati & Kartini, 2019).

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entrepreneurial mindset. This new call for African expansion marks the beginning of a higher-profiled Indonesia, wanting to obtain its African markets and commodities share while expressing its rising weight. A “diplomasi Indomie” is deployed to reproduce the Salim group’s instant noodle business’ success in Africa. Making Indonesians proud, Indomie constitutes a national food product (Hasan, 2016; Ramadhani & Sari, 2020), representing the success story to follow for other Indonesian private businesses to engage with Africa.24 As for the state sector, SOEs expansion is led by Luhut’s flexible Task Force, originally focused on seeking infrastructure and construction projects for SOEs like WIKA or INKA, mimicking mutatis mutandis, on a far smaller scale, the state-led “China model” in Africa25 and then broadened to all possible opportunities and used for green and hilirisasi diplomacy. Indonesia’s accelerated African economic expansion began with its MNCs, especially in agribusiness, following transnational capitalist accumulation trends, apparently detached from the Indonesian state. However, the state is supporting them through networking and by negotiating PTAs with African countries and RECs.26 SOEs are entrenched in political interests. Their orientation follows the ruling factions’ will. Under Jokowi, SOEs should expand globally, following other emerging countries’ SOE internationalisation example. The African market appears more accessible than the US or European markets for an Indonesian SOE,

24 Indomie even anecdotally became a payment method for sexual transactions in

Ghana, revealing the broadness of its presence (Sorongan, 2020). 25 Although China is said to be “a ‘model’ with no model”, given its rejection of any type of predefined development path to remain pragmatic and flexible (Tang, 2021). In China itself, no consensus seems to exist on a Chinese model in Africa, especially given African agency influencing China’s African engagement (Hodzi, 2020). For Large, the “China model” under Xi Jinping privileges politics in its foreign policy with Africa and thus proposes a political model promoting Chinese ideas on political organisation and its entailed possibilities, notably in industrialisation, investment or technology (Large, 2021). Comparing how China promotes its model in Indonesia and in Africa and its various countries would be an interesting exercise. Indonesia’s reach in Africa is insufficient yet to propose a holistic model to Africans. Yet, Indonesia is starting to lead in commoditybased downstream industrialisation under Luhut’s leadership, including in Africa and Latin America. For countries like Tanzania and Kenya, for example, Indonesia also appears as a technical model for digitalisation, notably in customs and tax. 26 Yet, Africa is now, theoretically at least, privileging the operationalisation of the AfCFTA and intra-African trade increase. FTAs with external powers risk disturbing the AfCFTA’s impact (David, 2023).

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given its comparative advantages. Capitalist and state logics cannot be separated to explain Indonesia’s expansion. Indonesian political parties are mainly financed by conglomerates under what some call an oligarchic system.27 The oligarchic lens requires nuance, particularly since Indonesia’s two most powerful politicians, Jokowi and Luhut, are self-made men. They compromised with solidly entrenched interests, in some ways, oligarchic. Still, they reached the top of the political system and carved their powerful domain, despite the “oligarchs”, or with them, depending on one’s perspective. This agency cannot be disparaged by simply placing an oligarchic etiquette. Uncomfortable with grand multilateral gatherings, Jokowi’s preference for low-key events like business forums, reminding him of the international trade fairs where he used to market his furniture as an entrepreneur, explains why the IAF was not organised at the Summit or Ministerial level, essentially focusing on business deals and trade agreement negotiations, respecting the economic diplomacy paradigm. Summitry represents a country’s way to signal its international status and profile’s rise, becoming the centre of attention for a few days while responding to domestic and foreign policy objectives, carrying both substantial and symbolic meaning (Dunn, 1996). The IAF forms part of Indonesia’s status signalling while serving its expansive aims. But Indonesia keeps a low profile, representing Javanese modesty, not to be confused with a lack of ambition. Small, modest steps are privileged to advance with certainty slowly but surely.28 Luhut’s engagement employs a louder, more Bataknese, more military and confrontational style. Yet, as for the NAASP, the main reason for the IAF’s limited grandiosity results from Indonesia’s lack of an official partnership with the AU’s Partnerships Directorate (PMRM), as opposed to Japan, China, India, South Korea or Türkiye, constraining high-level African participation (African Union, n.d.). The IAF’s relatively low-keyness relates to summit multiplication between Africa and external powers, prompting summit fatigue from Africans. Africa became more selective towards new requests from external partners, placing a moratorium on new partnerships after 2008 and pushing external powers to join

27 In a world-systems framework, Indonesia represents a semi-periphery and Africa a periphery (Wallerstein, 1979). 28 Or in Javanese, “alon-alon waton kelakon”.

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with other African institutions like the AfDB (Alden, 2019).29 Africa is dissatisfied with its asymmetric relationships with external powers embodied by multi-bilateral summitry. Africa seems passive in those frameworks, without a common position serving continental interests (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021). Kenya’s President Ruto demands change (Ateba, 2023),30 although the AU struggles to align the positions of all African nations towards external partners (Gwatiwa, 2022). Indonesia should review its chosen format, exploring new ways and means.31 Respecting African pride, Wirajuda defends a return to a continent-tocontinent format.32 The IAF’s non-formalised, flexible format combined with Luhuts’ ad hoc Task Force might be an advantage, facilitating the approach’s redesign.33 More intellectual and cultural approaches, thoroughly 29 Exceptions like Russia can be noted with the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, gathering 43 African heads of State, although RAS-2 was less successful in July 2023. 30 During discussions, African diplomats interviewed in Indonesia also agree and are confident Indonesia will listen carefully. 31 The author has discussed this on several occasions with Kemlu and with African diplomats. Indonesia is clearly open to this type of debate, respectful of various opinions. Yet, the knowledge production obstacle remains. 32 He had a discussion about the format with the President of Ghana in Accra as special envoy of President Jokowi for Africa and concluded that returning to the original continent-to-continent vision was preferable. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 33 For Wirajuda, who was “not involved” in the IAF, the IAF’s format as neither a

summit nor even a ministerial-level event is “difficult to explain to Africans ” and “not an ideal format”. The concept format would probably be if guests were somehow clearly “selected”.Yet, he felt an “enthusiasm” since “Indonesia was reaching out” to Africa. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). Leveraging its five million African diaspora and willing to assert its Africanity as a comparative advantage, France’s traditional Sommet Afrique-France gathering African heads of state, organised since 1973, was replaced in October 2021 by a forum around African civil societies in the southern city of Montpellier, whose university houses an institute of the African diaspora, and a cultural season (Glaser & Airault, 2021). This attempt to change the format aims at better connecting with African youth and civil society. It does not solve France’s serious image problems on the continent and was strongly criticised as a mere communication gig to address growing anti-French sentiment in Africa (Djereke, 2021). Yet, it offers an example to be considered when rethinking relations with Africa. Trying desperately to slow down its decline in Africa, France did not abandon the previous Summit format since the preceding May, it organised the Summit on the

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engaging African populations, allow differentiation and sophistication that can provide external powers with an edge in today’s Africa. With its young and creative population, Indonesia should become more innovative and not just appear as a late follower, showing real creative power in Africa. But, in general, Indonesia has not yet found the right equation to project its global soft power. Although change happened under Jokowi, civil society is not well mobilised to support Indonesian foreign policy, explaining Indonesia’s still low global visibility compared to its potential. Foreign policy tends to be monopolised by the state apparatus, lacking inclusivity. As a consequence, the world has difficulties perceiving the real Indonesia.34 LBP’s approach mobilising almost bureaucratically under Afro-Asian solidarity remains relevant and a smart political “weapon”, but does not really talk to new generations. The mobilisation style seems somewhat dated and dry, fully serving elite interests, while Indonesia needs creativity and soft power. Afro-Asianism must be about people, especially youth and intellectuals. Geopolitical and economic rivalries to engage Africa augment African leaders’ agency, who can better choose their partners and attend events. Indonesia can mobilise dozens of heads of state for Bandung anniversaries given its historical importance and because major powers or donors like China, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia or the UAE attend, and other countries therefore follow, but having dozens of African Presidents attend the IAF is another story, especially if there is limited financing available to offer African counterparts.35 African attendance level can signal the host power’s systemic international weight and reflects the AU relationship quality. Beyond material reasons, African participation can reinforce Indonesia’s international standing, offering an occasion for strategic public relations, notably given the Papua separatism issue. African leaders indulge in “forum shopping” through various “Africa+1” platforms to attract investments, finance infrastructure and other projects for their people, and stay in power. They want to

Financing of African Economies in Paris to address the consequences of the Covid19 crisis for Africa (Domingues dos Santos & Schlimmer, 2021; Présidence de la République-France, 2021). 34 Or mostly sees Bali, for example. 35 As seen previously, despite its partnership with the AU, South Korea faced those

kinds of difficulties in attracting foremost African leaders to Seoul for the Korea Africa Forum (KOAF), at least for the first editions.

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reduce their perceived Chinese or Western dependency, diversify and increase strategic autonomy by building more leeway towards international donors, and gain more global visibility, especially for authoritarian leaders. Actual effectiveness and benefits for African societies are unproven (Soulé, 2020). African leaders play external powers against each other to gain benefits and reinforce their power.36 Indonesia might see its African engagement oriented by African elites and their interests (Brown, 2012), using Indonesia as a new option for diversification and hedging. Indonesia’s ability to read African situations and understand the African context will determine its capacity to optimise its engagement and better serve its interests. With hilirisasi diplomacy, Indonesia positions itself as a pioneer and “expertise” leader in commodity-based industrialisation and beneficiation. It will be judged on its contribution to Africa. Economic needs for new markets, domestic business groups’ lobbying, and the will for higher status in the NAM and better international recognition explained Suharto’s restoration of ties with China in 1990 (Sukma, 1999), on top of other matters of internal politics, notably linked to Suharto’s own power position.37 The restoration of Sino-Indonesian relations was preceded by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs’ visit to Indonesia in April 1985 for the KAA’s 30th anniversary, underlining the Asia–Africa narrative’s tremendous symbolic power for both countries. The Bandung principles were presented as the foundation for Sino-Indonesian normalisation (D. T. Hill, 2020; Suryadinata, 1996). Indonesia’s African expansion cannot be detached from this Afro-Asian narrative, also reverberating in its Chinese relations until today. Suharto’s decision-making was considered utterly autonomous, filtered by perceptions and determined by economic and geopolitical calculations, culture, the leadership’s ideology and patrimonialism. Suharto embraced pro-market policies providing him with economic and political gains (Liddle, 1991). In that perspective, General Luhut acts under Jokowi’s mandate as General Moerdiono did for China under Suharto, becoming the relationship’s face on the Indonesian side, making the foreign relationships he handles matters of high strategic importance, like with China, the UAE or Africa. The role of personal relationships is paramount in 36 Following Bayart’s extraversion concept or other frameworks. 37 Foreign policy opening towards China thus participated in the highest leader’s

political consolidation, as described here mutatis mutandis for Jokowi with China and China-Africa.

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Indonesia’s often opaque elite circles (Hein, 1986). The Jokowi–Luhut relationship seems even more fusional, and Luhut’s power unprecedented for a never-elected Minister, yet far from absolute.38 Africa offers Indonesia the possibility of broader international recognition for its rising power and domestic achievements, notably in infrastructure and hilirisasi. By seeking infrastructural projects for Indonesian SOEs in Africa and promoting hilirisasi, Indonesia sends the message of its development success and readiness to help its African brothers. The infamous sense of weakness, inward-looking perspective and fear of great power games used to describe Indonesia’s foreign policy for decades give way to a sense of strength and relative advance, notably through the relationship with Africa.39 Multiple Indonesian sources stated that Indonesia is now capable and ready to “help” Africa.40 Any hubris, superiority feeling or taking Africa for granted can bring disastrous results for an external power in Africa. Indonesia seems far from those sentiments today, but overpromising in infrastructure or industrialisation could hurt its standing in Africa. Usually practised through ASEAN Centrality-related frameworks, now through the Global South and Afro-Asianism, Indonesia extends great power management to Africa, at least in relation to Sino-African networks. Hilirisasi diplomacy builds a Global South coalition to confront Europe and the US. Indonesia cannot ignore the US–China rivalry in Africa,41 which can impact its Southeast Asian backyard. China seeks support from African nations for its South China Sea positions (Murphy, 2022). Great powers are already trying to accommodate Indonesia or use its costcompetitive advantages (Anwar, 2020).42 Indonesia’s African expansion

38 At the time of writing, Luhut failed to add a third constitutional term for the President and to postpone the 2024 presidential elections (Farisa, 2022). 39 Although hilirisasi diplomacy is both offensive and defensive. 40 For Wirajuda, Asian countries can help Africa, but it is more meaningful on

a continent-to-continent, region-to-region basis, not country-to-continent, to respect Africans’ pride and dignity. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 41 Russia’s African presence is also of interest in Indonesia, as discussed with several sources, notably Russian PMCs like Wagner. 42 As can be seen in the multi-billion INKA project in the DRC under a US corporation umbrella.

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cannot be detached from geopolitical imperatives and dynamics, although it presents specific dynamics. Southeast Asia is considered a potential model for Africa to counterbalance China and other powers, notably through its strategic use of multilateralism and hedging, its pragmatism when facing great powers and Chinese, Japanese or Korean economic power use for successful economic transformation (Adem, 2018). The way Indonesia partnered with China to develop its nickel-based industrialisation, obtaining new infrastructure, technology, capital, training and employment (Tritto, 2023), is well-considered in Africa. Luhut is founding his hilirisasi diplomacy on this goodwill. Despite Myanmar, Southeast Asia has been overall more successful economically and safer than Africa in recent decades. The region offers a more accessible and relevant example for Africa than highly developed East Asia, thanks to its public spending targeted towards rural communities and the poor, pro-business environment and healthy macroeconomic management and stability (Adem, 2018; Henley, 2015).43 The Afro-Indonesian cultural gap feels more bearable than that between Africa and Korea or Japan. Indonesian people’s diversity resembles Africa’s more, compared to China’s. Although African elites are well aware of Indonesian problems with corruption and specific reforms, they understand the transformations Indonesia has achieved in the primary and secondary sectors that Africa could learn from (Mills et al., 2020). Luhut seems spot on with his hilirisasi promotion, despite Africa having its own beneficiation agenda. Indonesia achieved nickel-based beneficiation, a recognised achievement for Africans. Southeast Asia revolutionised its agricultural sector, benefiting its people, allowing industrialisation. Indonesia has powerful F&B MNCs, active in Africa. The continent failed its export-led industrialisation, leaving the rural masses in poverty. Indomie, massive Indonesian CPO exports, Indonesia’s significant agribusiness industry or nickel hilirisasi symbolise the archipelago’s achievements for Africans. Growth based on raw natural resources exports does not create sufficient jobs. Labour productivity increase is necessary for poverty reduction (Frankema & Waijenburg, 2018). Indonesia managed to increase its production of food staples massively. Food productivity allowed rapid growth in labourintensive manufacturing (Grabowski, 2016). Africa could learn more from

43 These attractive factors played a role in the initial formation of the NAASP.

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Southeast Asian agro-food industrialisation, creating Afro-Asian value chains (Diaw & Tran, 2020). Now, Indonesia is leading the way for commodity-based downstream industrialisation. Yet, environment, price, governance or conflict obstacles remain in Africa. Implementation is the key.44 Besides a frail proto-industrial foundation with low skills and technological advancement and foreign dependency, Africa faces a competitiveness problem in developing a labour export-led industrialisation following a flying geese model, which diffused production and investment hierarchically across East Asia starting from Japan. While Asia industrialised thanks to a significant cost advantage against the Western world, Africa is less cost-competitive than Asia. Ethiopia appears as an exception with its pro-industrialisation and infrastructure policies, imposed in an authoritarian-technocratic way through land grabs, given the weakness of union and civil rights (Frankema & Waijenburg, 2018), yet with real results (Oqubay, 2015).45 Despite its lack of major natural resources, Ethiopia has industrialised, with substantial manufacturing capacities as a destination for Chinese capital relocating industry production from China, allowing Ethiopia to export around the world while producing its cement and owning the SOE Ethiopian Airlines, the most successful African airline, with the highest market share in Africa (Oqubay, 2015; Tesfaye, 2017; Ziso, 2018). Ethiopian Airlines runs passenger and cargo flights between Addis Ababa and Jakarta three days per week. Ethiopian cut flowers will be increasingly exported directly to Jakarta instead of through the Netherlands. Indonesian merchandise can be sent to South America through Ethiopia (CDT—Amb. Admasu, 2020).46 Indonesia needs to consider those African problems to fine-tune its 44 Paul Kagame might resemble Luhut the most in Africa. 45 Fighting rent-seeking, the Ethiopian elite, notably through its former leader and

thinker Meles Zenawi, developed the concept of a “democratic developmental state” to inculcate developmental values in its people through a Gramscian battle for cultural hegemony, with a holistic theoretical framework joining politics, economy and security (Waal, 2015). A comparison with Indonesia’s developmentalism would be interesting. 46 Minister Luhut’s contribution to the opening of the Ethiopian Airlines flight to

Jakarta was decisive. The Ethiopian embassy had been trying to obtain the authorisation to open the liaison for three years without success. The ambassador finally met Minister Luhut, and the flights were allowed immediately (Private discussion with the Ethiopian Ambassador to Indonesia, 4 April 2021, Jakarta). This point perfectly underlines Luhut’s tremendous contribution to Indonesia’s new and concrete African engagement and the

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African approach. Africans seek solutions to their structural problems. Hilirisasi is an attempt to bring solutions, a long-time unachieved quest in Africa since independence. Southeast Asia could potentially provide as many lessons for Africa as China, which often appears more as a source of capital. ASEAN and Sub-Saharan Africa share profile similarities with their ethnic and religious diversity, social, environmental and security challenges and tradition and modernity blending (Adem, 2018). Southeast Asia has simply better managed similar problems, although the context remains different. Both ASEAN and the AU prefer regional solutions to regional issues. The famous ASAP (African Solutions for African Problems) echoes “ASEAN solutions to ASEAN problems”47 and with ASEAN great power management strategies to counter excessive external influence or Indonesia’s historical outside interference fear.48 Given Indonesia’s African expansion, its foreign policy doctrine could evolve like China’s did, needing to protect its interests in Africa, moving from non-interference to nonindifference in apparent contradiction with the Bandung Principles. Jokowi benefited from robust domestic legitimacy and popularity. A large majority of Indonesians are satisfied with his performance (Farisa, 2020). Loving and loved by the Indonesian people, Anderson states that Sukarno was the “perfect leader of the age of radio”, easily connecting with the masses (B. R. O. Anderson, 2002). Jokowi has appeared as the perfect leader of the digital age, the age of permanent proximity and the attention economy. Like Sukarno, he created a special relationship with the poor, the working classes and the youth, notably from the influential creative classes. Jokowi’s popularity allowed him to orientate state foreign policy towards new horizons like Africa without facing too much criticism from the public for allocating state resources for African development. The amounts remain restricted though.

heavy weight of the Presidential factor, given that Luhut’s legitimacy comes from his special relationship with Jokowi. 47 Thabo Mbeki supported “the need for Africa to take control of its destiny” and the notion of “African solutions for African problems ” (Bhatia, 2022). 48 In 1971, ASEAN declared Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), “free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers ” (Ball et al., 2019), for more stability (Southgate, 2021).

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Reevaluating the Drivers This book classically tries to determine Indonesia’s African foreign policy’s various determinants. Some are similar to other external powers. Some appear more specific, relating to sovereignty and national integrity or Indonesia’s particular political, historical and socio-economic configuration. Indonesian power has increased as its 2022 G20 Presidency symbolises. In August 2022, Jokowi asserted Indonesia was at the “peak of global leadership” with its G20 Presidency, followed by its 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship (Ramadhan, 2022).49 Still, for both material and ideational reasons, the country seeks expansion. Measuring or defining power is complex in the international context (Gilpin, 1981). Power cannot only be conceived as purely material. The weaker party exerts agency, as Africa–China relations reveal.50 China increases its relational power through social capital and network expansion, norm diffusion, and expertise sharing with Africa. Depending on the paradigm, Chinese relational power can even appear to surpass its material power. In the long term, China’s investment in expertise, human capital and networks and knowledge production generally makes it stronger towards Africans, particularly African elites, than its African infrastructural investments.51 Indonesia still lacks this African knowledge and relational networks, limiting its power and influence on and in Africa. Indonesia’s contemporary African expansion has just begun, trying to learn and seise opportunities. FOCAC started in 2000, almost twenty years before the IAF. As an established power, China must protect its large African investments and overall interests (Carmody & Taylor, 2010). A beginner’s strategy, like Indonesia’s, differs from that of a more veteran player like China. Green and hilirisasi diplomacy are forming increased

49 “puncak kepemimpinan global ”. 50 Given the dynamic international system and the agency that all states, even the

weakest, possess, Weber’s definition of power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” difficultly applies as such (Weber, 1947). 51 Infrastructural development can be seen as only an element of a broader Chinese

ideological framework. Positioned as a defender of the interests of developing countries and the Global South, China has notably strongly invested in party-to-party exchanges between the CPC (Communist Party of China) and African parties, thus increasing its power and influence, and defending its sovereignty and national integrity by guaranteeing African support for the One China policy (Benabdallah, 2020a; Shinn & Eisenman, 2023).

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Afro-Indonesian relational power. It is too early to evaluate to what extent. Indonesia has historically strived to ensure its regional leadership in Southeast Asia, given its sense of entitlement generated by its revolutionary birth, size and strategic location. The Southeast Asian primus inter pares also manifested a sense of vulnerability related to its great power dependence, notably to fund its development. Asia’s return as the leading continent in wealth creation benefits Indonesia, entailing renewed Indonesian great power aspirations (Fealy & White, 2016; Shekhar, 2018). Jokowi adheres to this will for great power and increased international respect, aiming for Indonesia to be a great power by 2045. Africa thus seems a natural expansion of Indonesia’s mental or power map. Following other external powers and Asian peers, Indonesia sees Africa as the most accessible region to pursue its material power needs and ideational aspirations such as international recognition, status and prestige. Consciousness has emerged. Indonesia’s thinking on Africa is still underdeveloped and strategically vague. Its capacity to focus on Africa cannot be detached from the Indonesian domestic context, its political and socio-economic condition, leadership views and capabilities and other problems linked to education, corruption, under-capacity in various domains and, more generally, geostrategic strength and readiness. Presidential elections like in 2024 also determine the African engagement’s continuity and intensity. The Archipelagic Outlook meant an inward-looking perspective focused on stability and national development to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national stability. Geopolitical realities and Indonesia’s rise required a shift of strategic outlook and context. From an ASEAN Centrality perspective, Africa comes into the picture through the AOIP, meaning Africa could logically be engaged through the EAS. Indonesia needs more markets, allies and active engagements for its geopolitical balancing, especially given the Sino-US rivalry and the Ukraine–Russia war. Practically, Africa serves to build a coalition protecting Indonesia’s hilirisasi, a domestic interest. The Indonesian leadership gains its legitimacy from its capacity to serve its people’s prosperity requirements, its contribution to raising Indonesia’s global status and respect for its dignity and protect Indonesia’s sovereignty, archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) and maritime choke points (Malacca, Sunda, Lombok,

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Makassar Straits), and West Papua (C. B. Roberts et al., 2015).52 Increasingly Africa will appear central for Indonesia to achieve all these goals. Africa has not yet been fully securitised in Indonesia like in Russia, the US, the UK, Türkiye, Israel, France or China, external players with significant African interests. Now mentioned at the elite level in Indonesia, Africa has still not entered the elite level debate like China, the South China Sea, relations with great powers in general, or even Palestine. Yet Africa could become essential to Indonesia’s strategic autonomy, international security and status, on top of being an economic diplomacy target. Luhut is weaponising it through hilirisasi diplomacy. Africa is the way to great power status for Indonesia. How Indonesia will engage the continent will be critical. The archipelago must find adequate bilateral, mini-bilateral, multi-bilateral and multilateral formulas and formats. LBP’s resource and green minilateralism is an original, flexible construction. The elite foreign policy and academic communities in Indonesia missed Africa’s strategic relevance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The country was recovering from its authoritarian period and the Asian financial crisis, busy with democratisation and consolidating its macroeconomic and social fundamentals. Even a relatively strong African engagement at some point in time does not guarantee sustainable success like post-Lula Brazil shows. Indonesia’s academic and research system also lacks creativity and focuses too much on topics that do not envisage the nation’s strategic future on a wider scale, requiring a perspective on how Indonesia can truly become a great power. The Jokowi presidency marks an essential step in tangibly placing the African continent on the Indonesian foreign policy table, although still in an incomplete and limited manner, without proper research investment. The economic diplomacy effort towards Africa reconciles Indonesia’s means and ends with an expansion concretely happening from the private and state sectors. Jokowi has walked the talk in many ways. Caring for the whole archipelago, not only Java, he built roads, bridges and ports domestically and did not just announce them53 and probably a new capital city. Hilirisasi has been 52 The three main Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes or ALKI (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia) are ALKI I, ALKI II and ALKI III. 53 At the end of 2022, Jokowi indicated $220 billion (Rp. 3309 trillion) had been spent to build infrastructure, notably 2042 km of toll roads, 5515 km of “non-toll roads”, 227,000 km of village roads, 16 airports and 38 airports repaired, 18 new ports and 128 ports repaired, 12 dams, 4500 reservoirs units, 71,000 irrigation units, bridges with a

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implemented. These achievements boost domestic and global credibility, crucial for the African effort. His predecessor failed in hilirisasi and infrastructure, given tremendous political obstacles, which Jokowi managed to overcome. “Democratic decline” occurs when leaders do not deliver positive change to their people, who then try to find leaders who will use more expeditive methods to bring tangible results. Deficient or declining infrastructure networks impact democratic performance in all countries, whatever wealth level. Industrialisation contributes to moving out of the poverty and middle-income traps. Indonesia’s boosted African approach remains fragile, linked to the current leadership’s push. Jokowi and Luhut will normally be out in 2024. Changes in leadership in Brazil or Australia saw the Africa focus enormously diminish, or the whole policy even fail despite initial hope (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021; Stolte, 2015; Pijovi´c, 2019). Foreign policy success strongly depends on its implementation. The gap between the theory and practice of a grand strategy as a geopolitical framework to reach national interests can often be high (Balzacq et al., 2019). In a political culture where form can surpass substance (Suryadinata, 1996), Jokowi wanted to stop announcements without delivery, a mindset he shares with Luhut. He usually prefers to inaugurate infrastructure or factories when completed rather than for groundbreaking when the project has not even started. Otherwise, project delivery might never happen in the end (CNN, 2019). The African approach’s apparent modesty with its “Africa+1” platform organised as a simple business forum, in contrast to other external powers who officially invite heads of state and ministers and a focus on seeking concrete deals in Africa of all sizes, jumping directly into the African pool, fits Jokowi’s humble and pragmatic mindset, as opposed to all the past announcements about the AASs and the NAASP, that did not transform into concrete endeavours and benefits. A New Order general embracing a Sukarnoist Afro-Asian discourse, Luhut implements with his military

total length of 1300 meters and 10,300 village markets. Dozens of more airports, dams and other projects will be completed by 2024. Until 2014, only 24 airports had been developed in Indonesia. Jokowi’s Indonesia-centric concept aims not only at developing the islands of Java and Sumatra but also the other islands. For example, the new capital city, Nusantara, will be built in Kalimantan (Borneo island) and major toll roads were constructed in Sulawesi and Papua (Hikam, 2023).

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commando style, summarised by the military training slogan “multilevel, gradual, and continuous ” (Massardi, 2022).54 He adds his vociferous style through hilirisasi diplomacy. The soft-hard Jokowi–Luhut approach forms one unique battleship. The resolve to change the African approach results from a decisional process, not from a unique presidential decision (Allison, 1971; Irondelle, 2011). Still, the highest decision-makers’ impact as a domestic rupture cannot be denied. Only the highest leadership could decide and implement ultimately. Jokowi’s pragmatism reconnected with historical patterns and reconciled the values, ends, ways and means for a return of an Indonesian ambition on the global stage, outside of democratic, multilateralist and globalist rhetoric that remains pure rhetoric if not combined with an actually operationalised global expansion. The pragmatic political couple formed with Luhut will remain a remarkable example of the formation of a robust political capacity for implementation in a polity full of obstacles. Among the most powerful contemporary political combinations globally, the Jokowi–Luhut political duo remains exceptional regarding diversity, pragmatism and political astuteness. Indonesia’s new African approach must be seen from that perspective. The archipelago demonstrates its state capacity and global ambition. Indonesia bisa.55 This Afro-Asian narrative cannot be detached from Jokowi–Luhut’s defense of their domestic material and political interests, given Western challenges and the 2024 presidential elections. Like in 1955, Afro-Asia became a means to rally support. Feith distinguished the solidarity-makers from the administrators in the post-WWII Indonesian polity (Feith, 2007). Sukarno was a solidaritymaker with a globalist perspective, at times revolutionary, aggressive or revisionist towards Western imperialism and its global liberal system. His successor Suharto was a developmental figure, an anti-communist ally of the Western capitalist bloc, inward-looking and limiting his foreign policy view to his region and relations with selected powers, mainly to finance domestic development. The first directly elected President,

54 “bertingkat , bertahap, dan berlanjut ”. This is a training method for soldiers in Indonesia internalised by Luhut (Massardi, 2022). 55 Indonesia can.

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SBY, was called a multilateralist and a promoter of a liberal democratic, Muslim majority, bridge-building Indonesia.56 SBY was allied with the Muslim Brotherhood Islamists through the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).57 Supportive of the Western liberal and multilateralist order, he consolidated Indonesia’s positive post-Reformasi image internationally, notably with the achievement of joining the G20. Praised internationally, he was criticised domestically for not delivering enough, particularly in infrastructure and industrialisation. Despite being often presented as a developmental President focusing on domestic issues, Jokowi follows in Sukarno’s footsteps. He represents a compromise or blend between Sukarno and Suharto, a solidaritymaker with developmental capabilities willing to raise Indonesia’s profile in a humble style, yet firmly. He is conscious of the remaining need to build up Indonesian infrastructure and industry, reforming first and attracting investment as a serious global player. For hilirisasi, which will help Indonesia become a high-income country, Indonesia should not be ashamed to ask for help and collaborate and should share its knowledge with other developing countries, notably in Africa. It should also stand its ground against Western attacks and continue its industrialisation, despite any international consequences. Suryadinata established the link between Indonesia’s capacities and its humble foreign policy (Suryadinata, 1996). Indonesia’s African expansion highlights its growing yet still limited capacities, the ascending trend being the crucial point. Leaders employ different political paradigms corresponding to their context and character. Indonesia’s bebas aktif foreign policy credo survived because of its flexibility. Each leader adapts it to their vision (Sukma, 1997; Weinstein, 1971, 1976). Bebas aktif evolves to mean the pursuit of national interests as defined by the ruling President. Success in fulfilling the chosen national interests depends on concrete asset mobilisations and tangible realisations, not rhetoric (Weatherbee, 2005). For decades, Indonesian infrastructure development was suboptimal and largely rhetorical, not under Jokowi. The African approach can evolve from an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and solidarity narrative,58 to 56 The rise of a Muslim identity in Indonesian foreign policy is linked to the post-9/ 11 context. 57 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. 58 Which is not necessarily an exhaustive interpretation of the historical Bandung

Conference talks as seen before.

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a win–win economic diplomacy framework, while still being considered to respect Indonesia’s foreign policy tradition.59 Both narratives are now combined, which generates new risks. The Indonesian people consider Jokowi a successful President, delivering well notably in infrastructure and hilirisasi. Jokowi emerged from the people to become President, something quite extraordinary given Indonesia’s said oligarchic tendencies. Still modest, Indonesia’s African expansion with a flexible operational framework represents an undeniable novelty and innovation in its foreign policy, given its supposed inwardlooking profile. Africa is perceived as a continent where Indonesia can display its capabilities, power and achievements. For an emerging country like Indonesia, Africa can be a place to gain more of the material and ideational benefits it requires. Jokowi repositioned Indonesia’s African engagement in that perspective. Luhut headed the state part of the implementation through his Task Force and the IAF framework in association with Kemlu. Jokowi has been criticised for supposedly not being interested in foreign policy and focusing almost exclusively on domestic issues, forgetting Luhut means Jokowi. For years, Suharto was also said to not be interested and involved enough in foreign policy, lacking experience (Suryadinata, 1996). The African case reveals that Jokowi greatly impacted Indonesia’s foreign policy, opening the door for serious internationalisation of its outreach and power in a new region, strategic for Indonesia’s future. No other Indonesian president achieved this since Sukarno. The US was already the largest world economy in 1885. Given its weak central government, the country had difficulties implementing an effective foreign policy and increasing its political and military power and influence abroad (Zakaria, 1998). Indonesia’s late African engagement can be seen similarly. For Sukma, Indonesia’s wish to become a beacon of democracy was constrained by its domestic situation and external obstacles (Sukma, 2011). Jokowi does not share that democratic pretension. Being optimistic about Indonesia and thinking it is doing well overall comparatively does not mean denying that Indonesia’s democracy

59 China has shown similar flexibility in its African relations and narrative (Corkin, 2011). Facing tremendous challenges and contestation in Central and West Africa especially, a country like France has also been modifying and adapting its paradigmatic approach in Africa without finding the proper formula, the French leadership’s mindset being a key obstacle.

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remains more electoral than substantial, with unresolved issues like the justice system, law enforcement or corruption. Liberal democracy is not everything. Indonesia’s historical ambition differs from that. Indonesia is more than that, in all its diversity and complexity. The theme of democratic regression is à la mode. Indonesian democracy is characterised as backsliding (Mujani & Liddle, 2021; Rüland, 2021). Militarisation is supposedly being revived through retired generals (Sambhi, 2021), but the vast majority of politicians are not generals and several recent military chiefs and former generals failed to gain the highest powers. Nuance and a long-term perspective are required. Indonesia is doing relatively well, all things considered, in stability and security, development and even human rights, with a robust civil society able to express itself and strongly weigh on the polity through social media notably. Certain papers on “democratic backsliding” in Indonesia seem too biased politically, strongly praising former President SBY (Mujani & Liddle, 2021), closer to the US and the Muslim Brotherhood Islamists than Jokowi, who appears more balanced and focused on building the nation, not on rhetoric. Labelling someone undemocratic when he does not serve one’s interests is a known stratagem. SBY was strongly criticised by his people, especially from the end of his second mandate. Jokowi stays highly popular. With Luhut, he acts as the kingmaker in his successor’s choice in 2024. A majority of Indonesians display a different appreciation of what is good for them than the most “democratic” foreign researchers using heavy words that often miss Indonesia’s complexity. Western nations’ democratic attractiveness and performance have waned. Following the Capitol’s 2020 invasion, Sukma invited the US to more humility and to reform domestically to curtail its democratic regression (Sukma, 2020). Analyses should be made in la longue durée, not following trendy research standpoints. A complex polity like Indonesia cannot be summarised by an authoritarian-democratic dichotomy. Many African countries perceive Indonesia as an interesting model for them, complementary to other external powers, if, there again, Indonesia delivers. The Covid-19 and Ukraine–Russia crises consequences were said to be complicating Jokowi’s wish to achieve more in his second term than Yudhoyono, who performed poorly during his last mandate (Fealy, 2020). Yet, infrastructure and hilirisasi continue to develop. Indonesia’s successful handling of the pandemic and its G20 and ASEAN presidencies

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mark a further positive step towards Indonesia’s global rise. Indonesia is praised by multilateral institutions as solid economically, and having well managed the pandemic. Although suffering from various crises, Africans are paying attention as they do to all partners. Indonesia interests Africa.

An Alternative Model? Indonesia and Africa share similar fragilities. Indonesia might often have better dealt with them. Africans can thus perceive Indonesia as an alternative model for specific issues. Indonesia can consider itself as a valuable partner for Africa. In internal security, Indonesia, pictured as the largest Muslim-populated nation, suffers less from radical Islamic terrorism than certain African countries.60 The archipelago now deals well with potential and former terrorists, underlining successful counterterrorism, rehabilitation and deradicalisation efforts. Since discovering large quantities of gas, a Jihadi insurgency has grown in Mozambique (Morier-Genoud, 2020). Mozambique expressed its interest in learning from Indonesia about counterterrorism and deradicalisation, a new challenging issue for Mozambique (CDT—Amb. Belmiro, 2020).61 Africa also faces large radical Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, North Africa or the Horn of Africa, becoming the most active Jihadi expansion area (Warner et al., 2021). Better comprehending local dynamics and the crime-terror nexus in those areas with the combination of weak states, terrorism, drug and weapons trafficking and migrations that creates hybridity between state and NSAs and “overlapping and competing networks of informal big man governance” constitutes a legitimate Indonesian focus given its experience (Bøås, 2015).

60 And even, to some extent, European countries, strongly hit by terrorism in recent years. 61 Energi Mega Persada, a company of the Indonesian conglomerate Bakrie Group, holds a 75% stake in the Buzi gas block in the South East of Mozambique, in Joint Venture with Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), Mozambique’s National Oil Company. The Indonesian group apparently wants to expand in Mozambique (Buzi Hydrocarbons, 2022).

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Indonesia contributes substantially to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in certain African terror hotspots.62 Indonesian anti-terrorism expertise appears useful given the merger of peacekeeping and antiterrorism (Moe & Geis, 2020). Indonesia fails to optimise its peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts through an integrated approach, notably post-mission. The framework remains dominated by uniformed personnel, especially the military. Other government entities and interests and civilian participation and capacities are not well leveraged. Indonesia Inc. or a whole-of-government approach has not been well operationalised in PKO missions. PKOs are not limited to peacekeeping by uniformed personnel but include various other dimensions. Indonesia did not use its peacekeeping participation to boost its political and economic presence in countries of intervention, mobilising business and civil society to support a penetration strategy in Africa. Indonesian civilians involved in UN missions consider Indonesia lacks this integrated strategy that could leverage their expertise and talent at the service of Indonesia’s national interests. Indonesia could learn more holistically from the area of intervention while proposing its technical, legal, security, economic or political savoir-faire to ensure an increased Indonesian presence, optimising its peacekeeping engagement for broader benefits for Indonesia and mission countries. Kemlu and the military notably organise workshops to empower civilians and discuss integrated strategies, yet the right formula has not been found yet. A more bilateral engagement would also benefit Indonesian and African parties.63 Since the US IMET (International Military Education and Training) ban fell on Indonesia’s military between 1992 and 2005 following the East Timor events, Indonesia’s security and defense apparatus diversified its partners (Inkiriwang, 2020). Following the New Order’s fall, Indonesia also increased its defense diplomacy to raise its strategic engagement and overall security, especially with major powers like the US or China, through joint exercises and other Confidence Building Measures (CBM) (Wenas Inkiriwang, 2020). Africa offers a new terrain for defense 62 Indonesian participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa as of 2019: UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), MINUSMA (Mali), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMISS (South Sudan) and UNISFA (Abyei, Sudan) (Kemlu, 2019). 63 This part is based on discussions with civilians involved in PKOs as well as diplomats and uniformed personnel.

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and security diversification, including defense SOEs,defense diplomacy, offshore balancing and hedging and partners to learn and gain experience. Increasing its African defense and security engagement, China seized opportunities in arms supply, surpassing Russia in small-arms contracts, setting up its naval military base in Djibouti supporting anti-piracy missions and a replenishment facility in the Seychelles (Boutin, 2018; Cobbett & Mason, 2021; Shen, 2019). Opportunities for Indonesia’s defense industries through technical support, joint ventures or different types of supply are numerous in Africa.64 Once again, Indonesia will be limited by its capabilities, knowledge, expertise and strategic vision. But defense and security collaboration is progressing, albeit modestly. Indonesia needs to globalise, including in the defense and security sector, not only economically. To become a player in Africa, the engagement can never be only economic (Lott, 2018). Clearly bettering its global ranking under Jokowi, Indonesia’s lack of military power and projection could slow its global rise. The Ukrainian War also highlights the vulnerability of Indonesia’s position in case of a major war in Asia. Defense and security partnerships in education and training, high-level and operational visits and exchanges, arms sales, defense industries or antiterrorism are all on the table with Africa, although still fledging like with Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, the DRC or Zimbabwe (CDT—Amb. Dindin Wahyudin, 2020; CDT—Amb. Ikrar, 2020; Cindyara & Fardah, 2020; Nugraheny, 2019). Included in the picture, Africa can allow Indonesia to prolong its dynamic equilibrium framework of great power management, offering new partners and various possible collaborations to benefit its national interests, notably by instrumentalising ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality through the EAS. African non-traditional security issues also concern and impact Indonesia’s security, like narcotics trade, climate change, pandemics, terrorism, migration, IUU fishing and human trafficking. Like China with Taiwan, Hong Kong or the Uyghurs or South Korea with North Korea, West Papua separatism stands as a matter of national security for Indonesia with

64 Only South Africa benefited from a significant defense industry in Africa, but it mainly supplied wheeled armoured fighting vehicles. Nonetheless, South Africa’s defense industry seriously declined post-Apartheid. Its survival is not even guaranteed (Matthews & Koh, 2021). The country is also hit by one of the highest criminality rates in the world (Heinecken, 2020).

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multiple African connections.65 The Papua issue risks being perceived as a state failure (B. Anderson, 2015), exploitable to weaken Indonesia by denouncing state oppression and racism against indigenous Papuans. The Papua problem impacts Indonesia’s diplomatic capacity in Africa. Indonesia risks losing its full capacity to act autonomously under the threat of non-support for its Papua rights in the UNGA. The Western Sahara case dividing Africa and creating strong tensions between Algeria and Morocco comes to mind.66 Indonesia still lacks a thorough comprehension of African dynamics and external interventions. Interventions in Africa have taken an increasingly “robust turn” (Moe & Geis, 2020), which forces Indonesia to look into its projection capabilities, but could also interrogate its non-intervention and other traditional sovereignty principles. Although Indonesia has solid experience managing great powers, Africa possesses its own ecosystem and regional security complexes requiring initiation. Increased Afro-Indonesian mutual knowledge should benefit both parties in defense and security, given similarities and complementarities, including concerning security as emancipation for African and Asian human beings (Booth, 2007).67 Ethnic and religious tensions remain in Indonesia, yet the management of social and elite diversity is relatively successful. Indonesia is stable and peaceful. General Luhut is a Christian from the Toba Batak ethnic minority. Representing around 40% of the Indonesian population, the Javanese majority shares power inclusively. All ethnic and religious groups are accommodated in the power system. For example, ethnic division in Kenya contrasts with Indonesia. Indonesia is much more diverse but better blends Indonesians into one Indonesian identity (Shilaho, 2018).68

65 As seen previously, it also impacts on the South China Sea issue with, for example, China’s diplomatic mobilisation of African countries to defend its position. 66 Appointed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Major General Imam Edy Mulyono of Indonesia was the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) from 2013 to 2015 (United Nations, 2013). 67 From a critical theory perspective, emancipation cannot be reduced to material factors (Balzacq, 2016). 68 Kenya also counted four of the ten largest refugee camps in the world in 2015, with Africa in general hosting eight out of the ten, especially in the Horn of Africa (UNHCR, 2015). Indonesia can also share experiences and knowledge of this topic, considering, for example, the Rohingya problem faced in Myanmar or other refugee management issues.

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Even the specific discrimination towards Chinese-Indonesians is diminishing in intensity.69 Under Pancasila, the Indonesian security apparatus protects Indonesian diversity through its actions and structural composition, an aspect not always well taken into account in analyses. The claim that supposed Indonesian illiberalism would be linked to sacrificing democracy for pluralism seems excessive and illogical (Rüland, 2021).70 Like everywhere, minorities defend themselves to survive, and the majority wishes to preserve its identity. For security and diversity management, Indonesia can propose attractive solutions and perspectives to Africans, alternative visions to other external powers or international bodies’ advice and support. The AfroIndonesian social-economic gap remains relatively reasonable, often nonexistent. Africans might feel closer and more comfortable with Indonesia to discuss these strategic issues. Indonesians also share the same noninterventionist paradigm in conformity with Bandung’s Dasasila. ASEAN autonomy and centrality share similarities with African frameworks. Southeast Asians understand the ASAP philosophy and respect African sovereignty. They suffer from similar contradictions with gaps between discourse and practices.71 However, all these “philosophies” have evolved, especially in Africa with R2P and other more interventionist notions. Apart from economic and security topics, potential collaboration fields are plentiful, like the environment or urbanism. Indonesia cooperates with some African countries on anti-corruption issues.72 Despite the progress Indonesia still needs to make in fighting rampant corruption, its 69 The condition of Chinese Indonesians owes a lot to Indonesia’s anti-communist history, slowing complete assimilation. Chinese Indonesians in the younger generations increasingly blend with other Indonesians. The rise of China also contributes to changing how Indonesian Chinese citizens are perceived. They cannot be treated in the same way as when China was not a superpower. 70 On the lack of research on intelligence services in the global South: (Shiraz & Aldrich, 2019). 71 Based on ASAP, “try Africa first ”, and African-ness, the AU’s security culture has been described as “a community of practice” with a fundamental contradiction between its principles and actual behaviour. Insular, exclusive and anti-imperialist in appearance, the AU remains strongly dependent on external funding, especially from the EU (Glas, 2018), and thus under strong external influence. External funding dependency hurts the AU’s agency (Gwatiwa, 2022). 72 An MOU was signed, for example, between the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) of Nigeria and the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia or KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) in March 2007 (Jakpost, 2008).

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expertise can benefit African nations and vice versa. Established relations and dialogues support broader integration and mutual comprehension beneficial for Afro-Indonesian links’ long-term progress. Willing to increase its African engagement, Indonesia faces new threats similar to those endured by other external powers, given wider exposure to African issues and challenges. The risk of perceived racism in conflicts with Africans is proven like with the Nigerian staff at the Indonesian embassy in Abuja claiming to be discriminated against (SaharaReporters, 2020), or the allegedly mistreated Nigerian diplomat by the Indonesian immigration in Jakarta, angering Nigeria (Ewokor, 2021; Nseyen, 2021). In the post-truth era (Tomsa, 2020) international conflicts relating to external power rivalries in Africa might be brought to the Indonesian public through proxy information wars. Türkiye–France, Russia–France, Russia–Ukraine, US–China or Iran–Israel, fight each other over Africa through propaganda.73 Indonesia could be brought into debates and conflicts relating to African problematics that it would rather avoid.74 The risk stands even higher concerning the China–US systemic rivalry or the Ukraine–Russia confrontation that has spillover effects in Africa and directly in Indonesia. Narratives should be elaborated and manipulated with caution. Counter-narratives must be even better prepared. Still, Indonesia remains a model of stability given its characteristics, able to manage destabilising global spills. Overall, Indonesia implements an early market access strategy in Africa, still not fully conceptualised. Its engagement narrative is not finalised, risking a gap between discourse and the realities of its African presence. Presenting itself as an alternative model could backlash if Indonesia’s engagement lacks continuity and capacity to deliver on promises, or faces

73 Türkiye published articles in Indonesian on French neocolonialism in Africa

(Pujianto, 2020). This has some truth until today. But it is also ironic since the Ottoman Empire could be described as a major coloniser. France, notably through its external secret services, the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure), is also boosting digital strategies in Indonesia, given substantial defense and security partnerships with the country, and to monitor the risk of being attacked in Indonesia concerning its African presence and policies. Russia has notably tried to mobilise certain Indonesian public figures and controversial “academics” to criticise France’s African presence, as it has done with specific African profiles. 74 Willians shows how complex African wars and their causes are. “Big ideas” about a principal cause should be forgotten to embrace complexity, a position also taken in this book (Williams, 2016).

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contestation, funding or security problems. A modest tone in Jokowi’s style and focusing on building a portfolio of fulfilled projects showcasing Indonesia’s capabilities, while building meaningful relationships and increasing knowledge production, appeared as a smart way to move forward for the moment. Claiming success in Africa might bring disappointment with a change of context and leadership in African countries, Indonesia or both. Indonesia will be a model if Africans decide it. They will cherry-pick what makes sense for them in their polity and readapt it to their needs and views, nourishing an African model. External powers do not impose their models on Africa. Africans create hybrid models specific to themselves like Indonesia throughout its history, famous for its syncretism. For sure, Indonesia’s funding constraints, impeding the delivery of major infrastructure projects in Africa, are negative, without too many consequences yet. Green and hilirisasi diplomacy will be successful for Indonesia’s African standing if it benefits Africans through tangible realisations, otherwise, it could seriously backlash.

Beyond Economic Interests The Chinese model inspired Jokowi and Luhut in many ways, including China’s African engagement, especially since their key policies were vastly Chinese-funded. Deng Xiaoping completely modified China’s grand strategy and foreign policy prioritising the formation of holistic power while keeping a low international profile as a developing country (Rolland, 2021). Chinese multi-directional foreign policy categorises relationships according to the following proverb: “Big powers are the key; China’s periphery is the priority; developing countries are the foundation; multilateral platforms are the stage” (People’s Daily, 2015).75 Africa is not a big power and is not part of China’s periphery. It is not a priori a key priority like the US, Europe, Russia, India, Japan or ASEAN and Indonesia. However, as a region of the Global South, Africa constitutes the foundation of China’s relationship with the world, appearing thus as a means rather than an end in itself, for the moment at least since priorities are evolving fast with the geopolitical context and the Ukraine– Russia war’s impact. Developing countries like African nations reinforce China to build better and stronger relationships with big powers and

75 大国是关键, 周边是首要, 发展中国家是基础, 多边是重要舞台.

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its periphery. Respecting Dasasila Bandung, a mantra for China, at least rhetorically,76 China wants to be the leading voice of developing countries (Murphy, 2022). Belonging to China’s foreign policy foundation, “Africa is a “long-term and strategic” issue, since China will always rely on Africa for support, while the “key and priority” of China’s foreign policy are “temporary” and “ephemeral” (Sun, 2020). With Xi Jinping,77 China has adopted a great power diplomacy, entering a “New Era” and fulfilling the “China Dream” of rejuvenating the great Chinese nation and creating a Sinocentric order (Large, 2021), notably by bringing Africa into its orbit.78 Given its globalised vision, China has included Africa in its grand strategy. Africa belongs to the Global South where China aims to lead as a benevolent hegemon and mobilise to serve its interests and counter the US and its allies.79 Africa is integrated into China’s grand global strategy around security, development and diplomacy and its elements like the BRI. FOCAC lies under the BRI, like Chinese infrastructural and industrial investment in Indonesia. On a second level, China develops a specific regional strategy for Africa, its RECs and its various countries. Like in Indonesia, China exports its model to Africa,80 seeking endorsement for its qualities in ideology, institutions and economic system (Rolland, 2021). Chinese substantial support for the Jokowi presidencies serves similar goals. Luhut’s Afro-Asian hilirisasi

76 For Wirajuda, China feels “more comfortable associating with developing countries ”. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 77 Leading China since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. 78 Although for Poh and Li, China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping remains a contested

topic since China remains a “conflicted great power”, in transition. Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “lying low” has not disappeared since China still needs to gain experience and faces unresolved domestic problems. Yet, using a carrot-and-stick method, Chinese diplomacy embodied by its supreme leader Xi Jinping seeks to change progressively the liberal order towards a new form of international relations with a “global network of partnerships” based on non-alignment. Both Indonesia and Africa are essential from that perspective (Poh & Li, 2017). 79 In direct line with Mao Zedong’s Theory of the Three Worlds. Mao called for a common struggle and solidarity between Asia, Africa and Latin America against the US and the Soviet blocs. Deng underlines that Africa was central to the Three Worlds’ theory, as seen in its presentation by Mao himself in February 1974 in a meeting with Kenneth Kaunda the President of Zambia (Deng, 2008). 80 If any consensus exists on its definition.

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diplomacy legitimates China’s development model for developing nations, explaining also Western attacks. China’s African relationships are managed differently from other regions, not only due to asymmetry but also given Africa’s place in China’s grand strategy, notably for counter-containing the US and its allies. Facing the US pivot to Asia, China moves increasingly to its West, notably Africa and the Middle East, to avoid direct US confrontation (Murphy, 2022). Not only a guarantee against international isolation, Africa forms part of a Chinese counter-proposition to Western IndoPacific strategies, potentially distracting the US from the Asia–Pacific.81 The possibility of Chinese proxy warfare in Africa against the US and of the opening of Chinese military bases on the African Atlantic Coast following the existing one in Djibouti, in Equatorial Guinea in particular, have been evoked (Phillips, 2021; Rolland, 2021). These developments directly concern ASEAN and Indonesia. China’s African engagement supports its positions in Asia, notably in the South China Sea. The more influence and leverage China gains on African nations, the more it can encourage the African bloc in the UNGA to back its global, regional and national policies. Again, as the leading non-Western player in Africa, China is examined in this book to contrast its actions and positioning with Indonesia, facilitating comprehension of Indonesia’s African engagement. For Indonesia, relationships with great powers, its Asian neighbours and the Pacific Islands remain the main priorities. Africa, the Middle East and Latin America are still classified as “non-traditional markets” by the Indonesian state’s long-term development planning. African relationships constitute a symbolically important part of Indonesian history and foreign policy narrative. Its strategic importance is rising, including for Indonesia to better manage its relationships with great powers, its periphery, and Chinese and Afro-Chinese networks. Africa could broaden Indonesia’s projection, credibility and capacity. African countries can also help Indonesia navigate the increasingly harsh US–China rivalry through new partnerships and collaborations. Remaining a differentiating asset, the Bandung Spirit seems far from obsolete in its geopolitical applications 81 Forcing the US to reengage with Africa, where China gained ground, can be associated with the exterior lines’ concept taken from Maoist guerrilla warfare strategy that consists in engaging the enemy on secondary battlefields far from the main one where it is more vulnerable and therefore gaining the upper hand.

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for Indonesia and its great power management, with the permanent risk of the discourse-practice gap. Economic goals served by economic diplomacy are essential. Yet, they are not the only objective of Asian powers’ African engagement, including Indonesia, despite economic diplomacy prioritisation rhetoric. Suryadinata concluded Suharto’s foreign policy gave preeminence to status and recognition (Suryadinata, 1996). Despite the rhetoric, a similar conclusion could be made about Jokowi’s foreign policy, especially given the rising US–China systemic rivalry. Given its ambitions and necessity to position itself well, Indonesia cannot afford not to understand and be a player in a major playing field like Africa, decisive in determining global geopolitics. As 2022 G20 President, during the war in Ukraine, Indonesia was drawn into African issues linked to food security, debt, fertilisers, infrastructure and energy. Indonesia shares with African nations the need to address these acute problems, making them allies by necessity to gain more political weight on the global stage and find ways out. The hilirisasi and tropical forest alliances in the Bandung Spirit serve these imperatives. Africa offers Indonesia solutions to deal with the increasingly tense global context and helps defend its domestic policies. Yun Sun shows that Chinese economic interests are conditioned by and dependent on Chinese politics. For Yun, China has four main national interests that echo the mission of Indonesian ambassadors in Africa. China’s economic interests do not reign alone above all other interests, as often simplistically portrayed (Alden & Large, 2019).82 Political and national security objectives with the defense of China’s sovereignty and national integrity through the One China policy, the multilateral agenda and ideological issues are at least as strategic, not to say more, as economic issues (Sun, 2020). For Rolland, based on the analysis of the intellectual production of high-level Chinese Africanists in direct relationship with the top Chinese leadership, including Xi Jinping, Africa is first about the strategic rivalry with the US (Rolland, 2021). Economic matters constitute tools serving China’s grand strategy. It can be noted that no such elaborate intellectual ecosystem exists in Indonesia to serve its interests abroad, especially relating to Africa. Nevertheless, LBP’s hilirisasi diplomacy is promoted in the Global South, particularly Africa, creating 82 Notably in Western media. A step should be taken back from purely events-driven analysis relating to scandals or other negative news, which can often appear more as a form of sensational journalism than academic work.

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minilateral coalitions weaponised to strengthen Indonesia’s standing against the West in the WTO notably. Sharing industrialisation expertise reinforces Indonesia’s foreign policy among resource-rich developing nations. Economically, Africa represents a small percentage of Indonesian trade and investment, around 3% of Indonesian trade in 2021, with a volume of around $13bn, about 4% for China or 8.5% for India. Africa is still a low priority for most Asian powers in pure economic weight.83 This was the same for Brazil, widely explaining the alleged failure of Brazil’s postLula Africa policy.84 Strategic importance is founded on a combination of factors. For Asian powers, Africa legitimates their political, development and ideological models. Like European colonial powers “civilising” the rest of the world, the US, which created and defends the post-WWII so-called liberal international order,85 Asian powers or other emerging powers are exporting their development models not only for material reasons but also as a justification and legitimisation for their rise as new global leaders and, firstly, for domestic audiences. When an Asian power like Indonesia talks and acts, it is under domestic constraints. Its foreign policy choices reverberate domestically. Hilirisasi diplomacy serves domestic goals before any material gains in Africa. Africa participates in domestic leadership legitimation for external powers. Each European power wanted its colonies in Africa. Now each emerging country organises its Africa+1 forum. For Indonesian leaders, perceived success in Africa reflects positively on their domestic leadership. SOEs expanded to Africa and built infrastructure there as a sign that infrastructure has been well developed in Indonesia under Jokowi, as opposed to previous Presidents. Indonesian SOEs gained the necessary scale and expertise for internationalisation. African expansion underlines domestic political achievement of the Jokowi presidency, justifying its developmental and state capitalism focus. While Indonesian infrastructure was largely state-built, state-backed hilirisasi is mainly privately owned, mostly in partnership with China.

83 Yet, the percentage is nearing 10% for India. The trade amount it represents for China, nearing $300 billion in 2022, can also not be neglected in absolute value. 84 Before Lula returned to power (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021). 85 Taking over from the British Empire as the new leading member of the Anglosphere

family (Mead, 2014).

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Likewise, sharing counterterrorism expertise with Africa or maritime security strategies helps justify domestic plans and reinforces discourses of domestic success and legitimacy.86 The Indonesian leadership can celebrate its achievements, proven by exporting its model to Africa. Despite the rhetoric of economic diplomacy preponderance in its recent African focus, Indonesia’s African interests should not be oversimplified. National integrity and sovereignty with Papua separatism and potential “Black solidarity”, status and reputation with participation in PKOs, mainly in Africa and given the African bloc’s size in the UNGA, domestic legitimacy by being able to export its development model like hilirisasi or great power and competitor management in Africa are all at least as important as economic diplomacy in Africa for Indonesia and probably more strategic when related to state survival. Notwithstanding Indonesia’s strategic energy interests in Algeria, Indonesia hesitates concerning the Western Sahara issue, officially following the UN position, despite some major politicians declaring support for Morocco and not inviting Western Sahara to the AAS (Anjaiah, 2015; Marbun, 2015).87 The potential impact on Papua is prioritised. The UK defines its raison d’État as the protection of the security of the country. This overarching raison d’État is then broken down into various national interests that are politically and intellectually contested, like freedom of trade, democratic and liberal values or international influence (D. B. Roberts, 2014). For Indonesia, economic diplomacy in Africa, presented as the main focus, serves the overarching raison d’État, the preservation of the security and sovereignty of NKRI, which necessitates prosperity served by hilirisasi. Like China, African expansion is justified on behalf of national development needs, increased access to resources for energy security and markets for Indonesian products supporting Indonesian jobs, all contributing to the state’s developmental success and political legitimacy. African expansion is political because it legitimises political power domestically in the external power, here Indonesia and the Jokowi regime but also Türkiye 86 The AU has created in Algiers an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which supports the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Bakail, 2021). Indonesia is actually also open to receiving knowledge from Egypt, for example, exploring the establishment in Indonesia of Islamic moderation centres similar to the Al Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism (Yehia, 2023). 87 Since Western Sahara is not a UN member.

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and President Erdo˘gan, Brazil and Lula or China and Xi Jinping. China’s engagement in Africa is overwhelmingly political, especially under Xi. Economic aspects serve broader geopolitical and strategic goals, domestically and globally (Large, 2021). Crucial to maintain its hilirisasi policy, Africa became strategic for Indonesia. Indonesia cannot declare any overarching, formidable ambition towards Africa, lacking means, domestic mobilisation and knowledge. Green and hilirisasi diplomacy are laudable beginnings, but it is necessary to wait and see what will be delivered concretely for Africans, the risk being mere political instrumentalisation by Indonesia for domestic purposes. Analysing this African engagement with only an economic perspective would be inexact. For contemporary Indonesia, engaging with Africa is something new outside its traditional sphere of action, explaining the clumsy qualification of “non-traditional market”. This is also why, for years, Indonesia could not find a suitable format to engage with Africa and got stuck with the NAASP as its unique alternative, not really conscious of or interested in its African potential. Jokowi’s political genius is simplification. He has been successful domestically by making things simple and feasible. With Indonesia’s African approach, he did the same, calling on Luhut’s own political genius, in military commando style, for implementation and delivery. PTAs, the IAF, SOEs seeking infrastructure projects and private businesses following the Indomie example, and hilirisasi and environmental mobilisation, represent the means to conquer the new economic Eldorado, perceived at last by Indonesian leaders. With its remaining burdens, under Jokowi, Indonesia goes global for real, transforming historical and rhetorical advantages into tangible material benefits. Jokowi’s humble style appears suitable for Africa given the risk external powers often face between a grandiloquent altruistic tone and a more selfish reality. Jokowi’s simplification abilities allied with Luhut’s militaristic pragmatism, highlight the formation of a solid political power couple creating change. Luhut’s military profile appears as an advantage in Africa to create strategic networks, given the continent’s militarisation. His Afro-Asian tone is now less consensual, increasing Indonesia’s risk-taking. The 2024 presidential elections force Jokowi–Luhut to go all out to protect their legacy and material interests. Africa plays a role, or they gave it a role. Indonesia’s African approach could be criticised as an oversimplistic strategy, lacking intellectual depth and financial means and obsessed with economic diplomacy. Hilirisasi diplomacy complexified the effort with

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multiple ramifications relating to the West, China, Africa, the Global South in general and Indonesian domestic politics. The Jokowi presidencies undeniably pioneered Indonesia’s serious start of an integrated African engagement, placing Africa concretely on the map in Indonesia, at least for certain strategic parts of the Indonesian elite. Although just a beginning, it remains a remarkable step given the previous status quo. Jokowi’s critics enjoy pointing out his lack of intellectualism or interest in foreign policy (Arif, 2021). President SBY had notably a spokesperson in charge of international affairs (Laksmana, 2016); LBP played that role under Jokowi. This type of judgement sounds snobbish and has no effect whatsoever on Jokowi’s strong popularity. Indonesians recognise and identify with Jokowi, born from their ranks. His “ordinariness” has not prevented Jokowi from impacting Indonesia’s Africa projection. The Jokowi presidency operationalised the first-ever integrated state expansion abroad, to a “new” continent, in Indonesian history, contradicting the recurrent story of Indonesia’s alleged inward-looking character. Still, Indonesia needs to increase its material, intellectual and academic capacity to better understand and engage with Africa. The Jokowi “reset” lacks “riset”. External powers engaging with Africa often face criticism, both domestically and abroad. The accusation of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa is well-documented. Yet, nuance is required. In China itself, internal criticism denounced the absence of an elaborate and comprehensive African strategy for the long term. The priority given to economic and material benefits was said to have hurt more long-term strategic goals linked to China’s rise as a great power. This explains bureaucratic tensions on aid allocation between the Chinese MOFA advocating for political choices with a long-term vision and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) handling the commercial engagement with Africa (Sun, 2020). The creation in March 2018 of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) placed under the authority of the State Council aimed to resolve this problem by taking charge of the previous responsibilities for development aid of both the MFA and the MOFCOM (Large, 2021).88 Indonesia AID’s relatively smooth creation happened just after CIDCA’s birth. These tensions could appear between different foreign policy actors in Indonesia when the African engagement becomes

88 Xi Jinping has clearly given priority to politics and geopolitics.

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heavier.89 Luhut’s involvement in the new African approach to provide muscle to Kemlu was precisely to avoid bureaucratic obstacles and solve tensions. In the domestic bureaucratic debate, domestic “politics” being the leading driver of Chinese foreign policy (Alden & Large, 2018); China’s African diplomacy has been considered too reactive, unprepared to handle crises in Africa affecting its interests, especially in security. Risk calculations were insufficient concerning crises in Sudan or Libya. China suffers from deficits in vision and understanding of Africa, capacity assessment and military projection (Sun, 2020), although China knows how to learn and evolve fast. Moreover, China’s African engagement and presence do not mean only the unitary state. A multitude of types of state and nonstate Chinese actors, with “layered interests ” (Procopio, 2018), are active that the central state cannot control directly and that impact Chinese security and foreign policy paradigms forcing doctrinal changes. This elaborate debate is not there yet in Indonesia. Indonesian presence in Africa is still minimal compared to China. Chinese provinces also directly engage African nations, playing an essential role. It is not widely practised by Indonesian provinces, especially since foreign policy is a central state prerogative. Chinese and Indian migrants in Africa create their own story, although the Chinese and Indian states under Xi and Modi “reconnect” with all their diaspora, including in Africa to support the Chinese and Indian return to great power. Outside a state-centric paradigm, often considered Eurocentric or Westphalian, many social forces interplay to form relational power between Africa and states like India, China or Indonesia. A debate to interrogate whether China acts as an imperialist neocolonial power or offers a positive development model seems insufficient to comprehend China’s African foreign policy (Ziso, 2018). Indonesia’s African relations are also formed by multiple levels and actors, yet on a far smaller scale. The Indonesian diaspora in Africa does not surpass 20,000, with a high proportion of students studying Islam in Northern Africa, especially Egypt. Interrogating Indonesia’s African engagement will be a

89 Under Jokowi, the long-term friendship between Minister Retno and Sri Mulyani, the Minister of Finance, facilitates the management of Indonesia AID. For General Agus Widjojo, Sri Mulyani is the second pillar of Jokowi’s government with Luhut. She is the financial pillar, while Luhut is the man of action to deliver on the ground (Massardi, 2022).

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long-term enterprise, accompanying Indonesia’s expansion, sustainable or not and seen as successful or not. The endeavour is still, by all means, in its infancy. Drawing definitive conclusions on Indonesia’s African engagement appears challenging. Indonesia changes fast and is announced as a top-5 global giant in the coming decades, in a dynamic political and geopolitical context. This book underlines the existence of a dual-track Indonesian foreign policy to simplify that of Kemlu, presenting Indonesia as a middle power, and that of the highest leadership controlling and/or emanating from the security apparatus reemerging on the front scene, embodied by LBP with his great power in the making narrative and ambitions. General Prabowo Subianto’s defense diplomacy could also be added. Elaborating on a satisfactory African strategy represents a challenging endeavour for all ambitious external powers. African approaches from the UK, France and the US are flawed and highly criticised domestically.90 Most great powers seem to have no comprehensive, implementable Africa strategy (Magu, 2019). This book provides various examples from major Asian, emerging or Western countries, placing Indonesia into a global context.91 China is still learning, changing its doctrine given its growing

90 Yet, some policies like the US’ AGOA have been in part positively assessed, offering non-reciprocity and uniform coverage trade for eligible African countries, and respecting “Africa’s need for a tactical sequencing of trade opening with advanced country partners ” (Luke, 2023). 91 It may also be interesting to look at smaller nations like Finland to gain insight. The competition the EU is facing in all fields from new actors in Africa, and now the war in Ukraine, are pushing European nations, like Finland, to formulate new Africa strategies, especially since Finland directly faces the weight of Russia. Russia’s activities in Africa are worrying for Scandinavian countries. Development cooperation in support of the SDGs forms the basis of Scandinavian countries’ engagement with Africa. Yet Finland insists that its relationship with African countries is, first of all, political and economic. Finland is involved in peace mediation or water and religious diplomacy. The country aims to double its trade with Africa in the 2020–2030 period setting clear indicators for its export promotion. Finland proposes a high-level offer for Africans to benefit more in domains like food security, water, waste and natural resources management, sustainable forestry, renewable energy and also artificial intelligence or the circular economy. Finland also aims to promote African investments in Finland, a smart point since many external powers, including Indonesia, tend to almost exclusively focus on outbound investment. To serve all those objectives, Finland wants to increase substantially its knowledge of and expertise on Africa and puts in place a strong ecosystem of support with education and training at the core (Finland, 2021). Finland could represent an interesting partner for Indonesia in Africa. Scandinavian nations are knowledgeable of both Indonesia and Africa.

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interests and confrontation with African realities, notably instability and conflict, and the Xi leadership. Africa was only recently included in China’s global strategy (Hartmann & Noesselt, 2020), included in the wider frameworks of the Global South and BRI. China’s first African policy paper was published in 2006. In 2015, in its second African policy paper, peace and security had gained far greater importance revealing China’s growing African experience and interests, redefining its strict nonintervention, non-interference principles (Hodzi, 2019). As the South Korean example shows, finding the right African strategy takes time and causes mistakes. Adapting to the dynamic context, changing national interests and African agency that strongly impacts the possibilities offered to external powers, cannot be avoided. China has adapted continuously. Its apparent monolithic approach through FOCAC is far more flexible and malleable than meets the eye. The strategy adapts according to the plurality of African actors and countries and to China’s paradoxically increasing vulnerability given its broader interests and engagement (Hartmann & Noesselt, 2020). Indonesia’s Africa strategy started modestly, but the Jokowi government has the merit of plunging directly into the playing field to learn and gain experience since Indonesia has been late in its engagement. Indonesia probably lost ten to fifteen years in the race to increase the level and intensity of relationships with Africa compared to other external powers. Therefore, the simple, modest and pragmatic approach, in the Jokowi style, appears as the right first step, supervised and handled directly by Jokowi’s closest and powerful ally General Luhut to make sure the engagement really increases and Africa really enters Indonesia’s strategic considerations at the highest level. Virtue can be found in a modest tone and approach compared to grandiloquence creating high expectations susceptible to backlashes. Announcing too much of a grand African strategy and formidable objectives can quickly carry tremendous disappointment in Africa, like for Brazil, whose engagement collapsed after the first Lula presidencies (Alencastro & Seabra, 2021). China itself seemingly did not define any grand strategy for Africa apart from pragmatism and adaptability to adjust its moves and positioning through mercantilism, conservative restraint and unilateralism (Holslag, 2011). Although an African strategy exists for Roland, it is simply not exposed by the Chinese state, which prefers to keep it secret to be more effective. Africa belongs to the Global South, which must be mobilised to counter-contain the US and divert it from its pivot to Asia (Rolland, 2021). For Indonesia, Africa

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officially remains a “non-traditional market”. In reality, it constitutes a new lab in-the-making, under the Jokowi–Luhut impulse. As a former special forces general, Luhut weaponises Afro-Asianism to serve Indonesia’s African penetration strategy and to mobilise a minilateral Global South coalition to protect hilirisasi in Indonesia from Western legal challenges. This tactically dynamic flexibility generates opportunities, but also high risks of backlash linked to delivery and continuity. Moreover, the question of China’s role in Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy is big.92 Breaking from the NAASP deadlock and moving from rhetoric to implementation in Indonesia’s relationship with Africa will remain a Jokowi achievement. Focusing on quick wins and immediate results can avoid disappointment towards unimplemented or unimplementable declared visions. The AAGC, developed as an Indo-Japanese synergetic partnership to optimise their African access, is criticised for its lack of impact and being “a vision without concrete achievement ”; a document without any implementation plan (Taniguchi, 2020). Revamping and patience might bring long-term results. Like other external powers, Indonesia’s approach is perfectible. It will evolve as Indonesia gains experience, makes mistakes and its interests grow in intensity. A sudden regime change, great power interference or a civil war in an African country where Indonesian interests have become substantial and Indonesia needs to defend itself and its citizens, will probably force Indonesia to reconsider its strict non-intervention principle and the respect of the Bandung Dasasila stricto sensu, not necessarily a comfortable position for the KAA host. Multilateral means could fluidify the approach like other external powers usually use. Indonesia’s bebas aktif foreign policy motto has always been flexible, adapting to the times, the international configuration, Indonesia’s interests, and the foremost leadership’s will and style, especially the President and his entourage. Given the lack of previous works on “Indonesia in Africa”, the explorative book prioritises actions emanating primarily from the state and Indonesia’s utmost leadership. Pretending other actors have an equal say and a decisive impact would be wrong. Further research could focus more on Indonesian NSAs in Africa and their interactions with African counterparts, state or non-state. However, Indonesia’s African interactions’ volume and dynamics are dwarfed by China or India, notably in NSAs,

92 Which is not the subject of this book.

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diaspora or civil society. Some African countries only count a few Indonesian citizens, likewise for African nations in Indonesia. Time is needed to look into phenomena that might affect China but not yet Indonesia in its African relationships, considering Indonesia’s contemporary African engagement’s newness and lower intensity, notably in security since the interests to protect are far more consequential in the case of China or India. In Indonesia, a substantial domestic debate on Indonesia’s African engagement has not yet emerged among the elite and in society. As a “non-traditional market ”, Africa remains a novelty not fully comprehended. Securitisation theory indicates that when Indonesia’s African interests rise and stakes get higher, political actors will describe threats in Africa faced by Indonesian interests and assets as extraordinary and necessitating a particular and increased focus (Buzan et al., 1998). The geopolitical changes occurring with the pandemic crisis, the war in Ukraine and the US–China opposition strongly impact the Indonesian elite perceptions of Africa as a new space and a partner to engage more intensely. Indonesia must create more geopolitical terrains to face evolving realities better. Indonesia is not a UNSC P5 member like China or France. Its manoeuvring capacity through multilateral means in Africa will remain bounded. Jokowi clearly placed the matter in LBP’s hands. He implemented flexibly in his style. Political entrepreneurs constitute the state’s driving force, representing and animating the state as a social construction. A limited spectrum of the Indonesian elite still drives the African effort. Thanks to their clout, Indonesian MNCs pushed the Indonesian state to engage with Africa to facilitate market access, trade and investments, helping identify opportunities. The strong state focus on SOEs is not of their choice. Yet, their influence allows them to orientate state policy. Jokowi’s visit to Ukraine and Russia during the war as G20 President in July 2022 was largely linked to the need to secure wheat and fertilisers for MNCs like Indofood, whose highest wheat supplier was

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Ukraine, another example of “Indomie diplomacy” (Maulia, 2022; May, 2022).93 If the Indonesian state was late and clumsy in its African engagement, this is less the case for major private Indonesian MNCs like the Salim Group or Sinar Mas.94 The kind and level of relational power, through workshops, education, training and exchanges, on a massive scale, created by China in Africa, allowing norm diffusion, increased recognition, and thus facilitation of the obtainment of material benefits does not exist for Indonesia today, given the modesty of those type of initiatives and their absence of systemic impact for Africans yet. Nevertheless, they do exist and are increasing, notably in the defense sector with scholarships for Zimbabwean or other African soldiers (Cindyara & Fardah, 2020) and with hilirisasi and green diplomacy. Former General Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s Minister of Defense, said after receiving DRC’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, Jean-Pierre Bemba, that Africans were impressed with Indonesian leadership and asking for Indonesia to train their special forces, receive their soldiers in Indonesian military academies and sell them weapons (Achmad, 2023; Saputra, 2023).95 Moreover, Indonesia’s witnessing of China’s African effort has influenced its approach, notably since Sino-African networks reverberate in high-level Indonesian politics through political-economic networks. An “electoral authoritarian state” under military supremacy, Zimbabwe has not properly democratised (Ndawana, 2020). As President Mnangagwa seeks new partners to diversify from China,96 Indonesia

93 As noted previously, the Indonesian Constitution requires the President to promote world peace. Specific research could focus on the subject of Indonesian MNCs in Africa and their role in Indonesia’s foreign policy, notably the degree of their influence or hold on Kemlu, the strong role of corporate diplomacy and MNCs in the contemporary globalised world having been well-revealed (Strange, 1992). 94 It can also be noted that Minister Prabowo’s brother, businessman Hashim Djojohadikusumo, obtained foodstuffs export quotas from Russia and Ukraine during the war, notably exporting wheat to Egypt and Angola. He indicated he had obtained rights to export millions of tons (Sorongan, 2022). 95 Jean-Pierre Bemba visited two domestic defense manufacturers: PT Pindad Persero, which offers the Tiger Medium Tank, and PT Dirgantara Indonesia, which proposes the CN-235 and N-219 aircrafts. 96 Partnering with the military, China has been Zimbabwe’s major partner with investments in the Marange diamond fields through Anjin Investments or the building of the National Defence College among other examples. Abiodun Alao, A New Narrative for

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could become an alternative and knowledge partner for democratisation and necessary SSR (Hove, 2017; Mutanda, 2019). While visiting the country, Luhut promoted hilirisasi, but not democracy (Ade Irma Junida, 2023).97 On another relational level, Madagascar’s current Minister of Defence, General Richard Rakotonirina, is of Indonesian descent, speaks Indonesian and went to military school in Indonesia (Akbar, 2019; Erwanti, 2023).98 His father was Indonesian, and two of his four children studied in Indonesia. A large percentage of the Malagasy population has Indonesian origins. Small groups of Indonesians crossed the Indian Ocean 1200 years ago and were the first to colonise the world’s fourth largest island and the Comoros (Butler, 2012). Srivijaya voyages generated Afro-Asian trading already from the eighth century. At the beginning of the second millennium, Banjar people of Southeast Borneo interbred with East African Swahilis in the Comoros then Madagascar. 90% of Malagasy vocabulary originates from the language of the Ma’anyan, ancestors of the Banjar people, living in remote islands of southeastern Borneo. Less than 10% of the Malagasy language comes from African languages. Malagasies of Banjar ancestry account for 37– 64% of the population, while Comorians of Banjar ancestry account for 20% in the Comoros (Brucato et al., 2016; Ricaut & Brucato, 2018). This constitutes possible means of mostly unexploited potential Indonesian soft power in Africa, starting from those Afro-Asian islands, as India leveraged its Indian-Mauritian diaspora. Given Indonesia’s preliminary focus on economic diplomacy in its new contemporary African approach, notably through SOEs infrastructure projects and hilirisasi promotion, questions about “what next?” and “so what?” come to mind. Engagement with Africa by major external powers cannot appear without meaning for Africa and Africans or too

Africa. Voice and Agency (London and New York: Routledge, 2020) (Melber & Southall, 2021). 97 Members of the delegation were negatively surprised with the condition of Harare. 98 He graduated from the Army Command School (Seskoad) Bandung in 2001, the

Command School (Sesko TNI) in Bandung in 2005, and his education at the National Defense Institute in 2011. He met Luhut in December 2022 in Bali at the Blue Innovation Solution Conference organised by the Archipelagic and Island States Forum set up by Luhut with the UNDP. At the event, Richard Rakotonirina delivered a presentation on smart solutions for island and archipelagic communities relating to climate change problems, marine resources and marine pollution.

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dry as a narrative. The hilirisasi narrative seems meaningful, but Indonesia’s concrete contribution to hilirisasi in Africa remains unclear, given its limited investment capacity, apart from Pertamina. Leading by example would require tangible industrial realisations in Africa. Moreover, influence in Africa must be constructed in several layers. Private capitalist and SOE networks that plug into global value chains and production networks, bilateral state relations, specific nurturing of relationships with African elites and civil societies, multilateral and regional organisations and forums like FOCAC or TICAD; all form a power architecture that external powers create to manage and protect their African interests. Indonesia must enrich its approach and think about it thoroughly and intellectually. Hilirisasi diplomacy is a good start though, yet as it concerns only commodity-rich African nations, other African nations could feel excluded. Indonesia needs a civilisational approach not only an economic démarche embellished by Afro-Asian discourses. China exercises both instrumental power by the clear benefits and sanctions it can provide Africans and associational, collective or relational power formed through its many educational, cultural or social initiatives often co-developed with Africans, though asymmetrically (Benabdallah, 2020a, 2020b; Ziso, 2018). Enriching its economic model based on infrastructure, SEZs and labour skills enhancement to boost productivity growth, mimicked by Jokowi and Luhut mutatis mutandis with China’s support, China prioritises, in the African lab, the dissemination of its thinking on state building and governance as a model of stable and effective government and a counter model to liberal and electoral democracy (Rolland, 2021).99 Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy de facto promotes this Chinese model, at least economically, a boon for China. Having high-level Indonesian “ambassadors” diffuse its model in Africa, with an Afro-Asian

99 For Carmody and Taylor, China applies a “flexigemony model ” or a flexible hegemony that incorporates African elites’ agency through negotiation, yet asymmetrically, similar to the British Empire’s indirect colonial rule, as opposed to a US hegemonic strategy or liberal order seen as less flexible. This Chinese type of adaptable “governance” applied across Africa supported peace like in Sudan or violence like in Zambia in the past (Carmody & Taylor, 2010). Cyberspace also appears increasingly as a place of geopolitical confrontation between major players for power, values and institutions moving towards a post-liberal order (Barrinha & Renard, 2020). Indonesia’s cyber relations with Africa could offer an interesting topic of study, including Afro-Indonesian digital interactions.

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discourse, is ideal for China. It sends the message to China with developing nations and means success for them. The Indonesian testimony represents proof. Where and how does Indonesia position itself, independently, in that context? Indonesia must think about what it can concretely offer Africans in both material and relational power. For an ambitious actor, both bear high costs. Their potential increase will necessarily enter at some point the Indonesian domestic debate with a much stronger intensity than at present, which will mean political contestation, arbitrage and polemics and the scrutiny of the international media and academic realm with its visibility and critical harshness or even unfairness in some cases. African elites use benefits and options offered by new partners for diversification and to balance Western countries or China, similar to Indonesia’s great power management and dynamic equilibrium in Southeast Asia. Indonesia can represent a new hope, or at least an alternative, to consider for Africans in their will to diversify their relationships to obtain better results.100 Indonesia will need to strongly invest in intellectual capacities to envisage its next steps in Africa, to avoid foreseeable mistakes and reinforce its approach progressively, anticipating and reacting to realities on the ground. Despite Afro-Asian narratives, its current engagement is too dry. Promoting hilirisasi is laudable, yet Indonesia is not investing massively itself and seeks to mobilise resource-rich African nations primarily to protect its domestic interests, among which stand substantial Chinese and Indonesian private interests. If its initiatives are not impactful in Africa, accusations of instrumentalisation could arise.

100 Africa can learn from how Indonesia has refused state debt burden to benefit from

the BRI, for example. Its engagement with the BRI is private sector driven, without state debt or state guarantee following the state’s development agenda. The state acts as an umbrella, a facilitator. Yet, the debt burden is taken by SOEs. Certain SOEs have faced serious debt situation. The formation of the INA SWF was notably meant to get rid of that debt. Still, the scheme is less risky for the state.

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Africa as Indonesia’s Road to Great Power In the literature, Indonesia is described as an emerging power, a potential BRICS,101 a pivot state, a middle power and rarely as a great power, although its potential to become a great power, given its systemic and strategic importance is often acknowledged. In fact, Indonesia seems more interesting imagined as a potential great power, not as a pseudomiddle power, which mainly represents a strategy to bring down or deny its importance for strategic rivalry reasons, a misappreciation of Indonesia’s intrinsic and systemic weight both in history, now and in the future and a misreading of Indonesia’s true identity and intentions. Moreover, as seen in this book, the Indonesian leadership, and current and future decision-makers managing Indonesia’s rise, do not consider Indonesia a middle power, nor do the major great powers that have always been aware of Indonesia’s uniqueness in the international system. Humbleness in style should not be confused with lack of ambition and the language of diplomats or academics with the Weltanschauung of the real powerholders and of a nation willing to rise to the top, now located at the centre of global power, in Asia. A gap exists in Indonesia between what is diplomatically expressed by Kemlu and the most potent elites’ will, which shall determine the nation’s future, as Luhut’s actions perfectly demonstrate. This dual language allows us to rise while reassuring. LBP expresses Indonesia’s true ambitions. Actors like Kemlu filter the discourse but are hierarchically lower. Indonesia is as ambitious as Türkiye or Brazil and probably more. Our modest story underlines that power gap, who can make things happen in the Indonesian polity and who cannot without serious backup. As an academic exercise, classifying Indonesia with adjectives can be stimulative. Still, the hard question is to look into how Indonesia becomes

101 As seen previously, Jokowi’s BRICS Summit attendance in August 2023 in South Africa was as an observer representing ASEAN. Indonesia “postponed” its potential membership, privileging its OECD candidacy. Indonesia could arguably be part of the BRICS based on technical criteria of size, GDP or strategic importance. Indonesia’s political profile in the international system and domestic politics might make it more complicated, but yet possible in the future. With the new geopolitical situation with USChina rivalry and the war in Ukraine, Indonesia seemed to be getting closer to becoming a BRICS member at some point. It has not happened yet. Former President Megawati considers Indonesia to have its place among the BRICS since it would be in line with the geopolitics of her father (Kristiyanto, 2022). Yet, Indonesia must also consider the sentiment of fellow ASEAN and Asian partners and bebas aktif .

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a great power and reaches its potential grounded in its strategic, material and ideational strengths, including its history. Different paradigms have brought different methods and perceptions of what makes a great power. Pardesi’s conception of great power applied to India proposes that, on top of being a leader in its home region, a great power be capable of projecting itself outside of its home region and gain economic and security interests at least in one external region, adjacent or not, with sufficient material strength to promote and defend those interests, militarily if needed(Pardesi, 2015). Great powers do not need to be hegemonic or possess global capabilities in every region of the world.102 Moreover, being a great power necessitates status recognition from other great powers active in the outside region and the states composing that outer region (Pardesi, 2015). For Pardesi, emerging powers like Brazil or South Africa still lack military power, incapable of sufficiently projecting themselves extra-regionally. Therefore, great powers and major states of outside regions cannot recognise them as great powers able to handle peace and security, not helping in their ambition to join the UNSC (C. Hill, 2016).103 Pardesi thus added this transregional economic and security capability, and transregional recognition, to existing definitions of great powers.104 This conceptualisation can be matched with other converging visions like regional security complexes or Transregionalisation in the Global South (Anthony & Ruppert, 2020; Buzan & Waever, 2003). Great power is not about global hegemony, mainly a chimera, but more about transregional capacity and leadership. With geopolitical shifts and notably Asia’s return as the global power centre, Eurocentric notions of power are also evolving (Acharya & Buzan, 2019). As a fundamental Asian nation with systemic status, Indonesia should be considered with the proper analytical framework. Indonesia is not a middle power like Canada or Australia. It is not its ambition or self-perception. Unless considering less decisive

102 Even with his offensive realism paradigm, Mearsheimer pointed out the difficulties of global hegemonic power due notably to ocean barriers (Mearsheimer, 2001). 103 Not an easy endeavour anyway, given the UNSC Permanent Committee’s conservatism in membership to preserve the exclusive status of the P5, the five permanent members. 104 Definitions can usually include the defense and security role and capacities, economic power factors and the issues of status and other elements depending on the studies (Levy, 1983; Paul et al., 2014).

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actors who are mostly transmitters, middle powership does not reflect its past, present and upcoming strategic weight. From a Javanese perspective, Java is the world’s centre and destined to be involved prominently in global issues (B. R. O. Anderson, 2007; Suryadinata, 1996), which the Indonesian Constitution also mandates. Indonesia’s lack of military power seemingly places it in the same category as Brazil and South Africa in Pardesi’s construction. Yet, beyond its acknowledged Southeast Asian primus inter pares leadership, Indonesia is already recognised as a critical Asian power by great powers. Indonesian stability grandly determines Southeast Asia’s geopolitical and geostrategic condition and thus, by extension, Asian and global stability (Dibb, 2001). Its strategic weight could be considered heavier than Brazil’s, being the Indo-Pacific’s centre.105 However, despite this international and Asian consideration, the archipelago lacks substantial economic interests and security capacity outside of Southeast Asia, complicated to acquire in East Asia, given competition intensity and the regional players’ weight, representing the historical sinicised world (Kang, 2010). In that perspective, Africa offers Indonesia the possible way to great power status. For historical reasons, Indonesia benefits from a high level of friendship and sympathy in Africa, a strong comparative advantage if leveraged well. By raising its African economic and security interests, Indonesia can probably envisage reaching great power status faster.106 Yet, implementation differs from theory. Indonesia’s road to great power is not obvious. It will take time and require astute choices and focus in a dynamic and complex national polity where short-term gains often prevail for political leaders. Attaining a great power level is contingent on domestic capacities’ improvement, a continuously growing economy, a more robust military with broader projection capabilities, better technological and scientific capacities, a smarter knowledge production system, supporting decisionmaking and a conquering mentality willing to discover new horizons. The 105 Whatever the preferred definition of that region. 106 France has constantly instrumentalised la Françafrique or its special relationship

with its former African colonies to raise its international status and clout (Lott, 2018). Indonesia has the advantage of not having France’s heavy past in Africa. Some contest the relevance of the notion of Françafriquethat now appears obsolete since France’s relationships with its former African colonies are not that strong anymore with the presence of other actors like China and the concept denies African agency (Handy & Djilo, 2021). Others contest the end of la Françafrique and call for the annihilation of this remaining French “empire” (Borrel et al., 2021).

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Jokowi government has opened the way, which will remain a commendable achievement. But Indonesia still needs to work hard on its basics and innovation capacities, notably in technology and education to gain cognitive power. The Jokowi “reset” lacks “riset”. Becoming a strong player in Africa necessitates a knowledge-backed holistic engagement to create the right path in partnership with African elites and the African public and handle the harsh competition with other external powers. Being successful in Africa today and in the future means being accepted by Africans. Pan-Africanism increasingly unites Africans (Adi, 2018). Conscious of the glorious past African civilisations, Africans conceptualise their own universe, notably through major African intellectuals (Mabanckou, 2020).107 What is Indonesia’s reasoning concerning African agency? Indonesia cannot afford to misinterpret Africans’ will for Africa. Jokowi’s economic diplomacy might have the merit of opening the road. Still, only a holistic approach supported by solid academic research will make the engagement sustainable and the gains substantial for Indonesians and Africans. As the KAA host, Indonesia’s African approach will be evaluated by African populations, politicians and intellectuals in contrast with expectations relating to Afro-Asian solidarity. A visibly too mercantile engagement, covered by contradictory Bandung rhetoric, risks being rejected in Africa in the long run.108 Like Indonesia, Africa expects external partners to provide clear benefits for its populations and development.109 Indonesia AID, through its African regional partnership strategy, should contribute concretely to African development needs.110 Moyo pointed out the “aid curse” responsible for corruption and conflict in Africa, preventing the development of free enterprise. Advocating for Africa to learn from Asia, she opposes democratisation before economic reforms (Moyo, 2009).111 107 As Lopes puts it, Africans are “not tolerating complacent narratives about the continent ” anymore and “What should count is the narrative constructed by the Africans ”. 108 Mercantile approaches in foreign policy can quickly become obsolete and require a shift to a more comprehensive strategy (Meijer, 2021). 109 Devermont described a “tension” between the priorities of African leaders, the African public and external partners (Devermont, 2021). In matters of trade, it can be seen with the WTO (David, 2023). 110 As seen previously, vaccine distribution has notably been privileged. 111 General Luhut also considers full democratisation or direct application of Western-

style liberal democracy as irresponsible in large nations like China or Indonesia, still

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This aligns with the pragmatic “Jokowi–Luhut mentality” of economic diplomacy. Although demand-driven, Indonesia AID should promote and facilitate Indonesian business. Finding the right narrative will be key. Nevertheless, for Indonesia, Pacific Islands remain the first priority, given their proximity to Indonesian Papua and the more acute threat they represent,112 also helping reinforce Indonesia’s non-alignment. Vaccine diplomacy, supporting the Indonesian health sector, including SOE internationalisation, showcases Indonesia’s capacity to create a meaningful framework serving both its national interests and African needs. Yet, Africans wish for more than vaccine diplomacy. Support for sustainable healthcare systems with health infrastructure, training and knowledge sharing is awaited. Through FOCAC, China is already proposing such a multidimensional framework (Soulé, 2021). India is a global health power supplying generics throughout Africa. Indonesia should thus propose more.113 Like China after 1989, Russia accelerated its African re-engagement after the 2014 Ukraine and Crimea crises,114 signalling its African

needing to develop, which does not mean he opposes democracy either. A strong commando is needed to deliver results (Massardi, 2022). 112 In 2019, Indonesia launched the “Pacific Elevation” concept to boost economic, political and socio-cultural ties with the Pacific Islands. In her opening speech at the Pacific Exposition in Auckland, New Zealand, on 11 July 2019, Retno Marsudi said: “We are creating a momentum to engage each other and strengthen our fraternity with fellow Pacific countries and territories… This is a new era of Pacific Partnership. A ‘Pacific elevation’.” In December 2022, Indonesia held the first meeting of the Indonesia-Pacific Forum for Development in Bali (Bernama, n.d.; Kemlu, 2022). 113 It may be wondered if Indonesia’s African foreign policy can be more principledriven when the relations of major external powers like Russia or China with Africans are pragmatic-based (Beseny˝ o, 2019). Wirajuda indicated he thought the Lippo group could envisage investing in African hospitals in the future, but it remained speculative. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018). 114 Africa often appears as a geopolitical solution for countries facing diplomatic isolation. To compensate for international sanctions, Iran increased its African engagement in trade and investment, including to obtain uranium supplies. In soft power in Africa, to raise its status, as Lob explains, Iran privileges a developmental approach with a focus on rural development, healthcare and training, less risky and more effective than military assistance and religious proselytisation. Having notably created a Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Iran’s developmental strategy is implemented for material and ideological benefits. Gaining the status of AU observer in 2010 and organising its own Africa forum in September of

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“return” as part of its “multi-vector foreign policy” and vision of multipolarity.115 Its expansion remains limited except in North Africa and countries in conflict like the CAR, Sudan or Mali, notably through Private Military Companies (PMCs) like Wagner (Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019). Adopting a summitry approach to institutionalise its African relations with its first Russia-Africa Summit (RAS) organised in Sochi in October 2019 (The Roscongress Foundation, 2019), Russia only implements a niche strategy given its limited resources and economic diversification.116 Like Indonesia, the RAS lacks an official partnership with the AUC. However, Russia attracted 43 heads of state and government from all African countries to its first summit and thousands of African leaders, generating deals worth billions of dollars (DW, 2019), placing the RAS among the heavyweight Africa+1 summits, contrasting with the IAF’s modesty. Apparently non-ideological and mobilising Russian multinationals in priority, RAS1 focused mainly on energy including nuclear, infrastructure, minerals, defense cooperation, including arms sales (Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019), education, previously an essential soft power vector under the Soviet the same year, Iran also focuses on Africa for security reasons relating to Red Sea navigation, arms sales or proxy warfare (Lob, 2016; Mari, 2017). Fighting for regime survival, its diplomatic isolation and regional security environment, notably with the rivalries with Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, make Iran and its Africa policy a special case. Despite its long-term engagement and its oil diplomacy, Iran’s economic footprint in Africa is small. Its activism, notably through proxies like Hezbollah and towards African Shi’a Muslims and against America, is criticised and fought by countries like Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan and Egypt, accusing Iran of terrorism and other criminal activities (NAPost, 2021; Saïdi, 2021; Walsh et al., 2021). Nevertheless, Iran benefits from a close historical relationship with South Africa, notably in nuclear and military cooperation (Fakude, 2016; Fitzpatrick, 2019). Iran has not been able to gain strong political support in Africa (Lefebvre, 2019). Iran shares similarities with large emerging countries like Indonesia in its quest for status and recognition, with the use of a developmental narrative. Yet Indonesia’s permissive regional security environment and friendly relations around the world allow the country to keep a low-profile attitude in political matters compared to Iran’s visible or perceived aggressiveness in Africa. 115 Russia’s “return” to Africa after the fall of the Soviet Union actually happened earlier, under Yevgeny Primakov, with the Primakov doctrine refusing a US unipolar international order. Russia imagined shifting from a focus on short-term revenue in Africa to Africa’s long-term economic potential. The head of Moscow’s Institute for African Studies, Vladimir Lopatov, thought the Russian transformation in Africa, notably through debt relief for market access and JVs (Ramani, 2023). This underlines what Indonesia is lacking in knowledge production. 116 Russia being of course one of the world’s major powers despite those limitations due to its strategic weight.

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Union and healthcare. In 2018, Afro-Russian agricultural exchanges and cooperation increased, with food exports representing US$25bn with a goal to double in the next few years, while Russian arms exports to Africa stood at US$15bn (DW, 2019).117 The Ukraine war forces changes to Russia’s African engagement, potentially hurting Russia’s global status in the long run, notably in Africa (Cilliers, 2023). Russia refocused its capacities to confront the Ukrainians and weaponises grain and fertiliser supplies, impacting Africa and Indonesia, although differently. The West– Russia enmity could make Russia more aggressive in Africa, notably through proxies, cyber means and especially towards French positions.118 Russia tries to mobilise on this subject in Indonesia, notably in academic circles or through influencers.119 While most promises made at RAS-1 failed to materialise, RAS-2 took place at the end of July 2023 with this time only 17 African heads of state (AP, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine, Russia signed more than 20 military deals with African governments and planned to develop military bases on the continent (Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019; Soulé, 2020). Russia benefits from its historical ties with Africa, needing reactivation and revamping to give them a contemporary meaning and benefit for Africans. Officially focusing on business, not ideology, Putin said that Russia would refrain from trying to exert undue political influence or interventionism, contrasting with Western or Chinese perceived dominance or hegemony in Africa (DW, 2019). Yet, Russia is increasingly involved politically in Africa, needing support for its war in Ukraine.120 In recent years, before the war, several articles in Kompas, Indonesia’s leading newspaper, dealt with Russia’s African presence, especially militarily and for 117 According to President Putin. Nevertheless, data from Statista or the UN Comtrade

Database presents figures which are not as high, with Russia–Africa trade volumes of US$20.5bn in 2018, US$16.8bn in 2019 and US$14.5bn in 2020, respectively (Elagina, 2021). 118 Perceived as vulnerable, France appears as Russia’s main target in Africa to increase its influence and material gains. 119 It is countered by Western diplomacy and intelligence. Indonesian intelligence will not let it become destabilising domestically, despising foreign interventionism of any kind. 120 Russia supported a counterrevolution in Sudan against liberal democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood, notably through an ideational partnership with the UAE (Ramani, 2020). In the CAR, Russia directly supports a Russian university alumnus, President Faustin Touadéra, placing Valery Zakharov, a former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) official, as Touadéra’s national security adviser (Ramani, 2021).

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resources, revealing an interest in Indonesian elite circles for Russia’s socalled “African comeback”, as the title of a Kompas article put it (Aulia, 2020; Bimo, 2020; Mada, 2019; Pristiandaru, 2020). Regarding the war in Ukraine, support for Russia in Indonesia in the public and elite circles is significant, notably given anti-US sentiment (Redaksi, 2022). Russia is considered a long-time Indonesian friend since the Sukarno era. The Soviet Union supported Indonesia’s independence and the restitution of Papua to the Republic (KBRI Rusia, n.d.).121 Indonesia’s first strategic partnership was signed with Russia in 2003. Presenting itself as an actor bringing security and stability to Africa, Russia does not employ a development narrative like China. Yet, it started using “humanitarian” language insisting on its openness to African brothers, notably to African entrepreneurs developing businesses and investing in Russia (Sidiropoulos & Alden, 2019). That welcoming discourse contrasts with problems relating to racism and discrimination against Black people in Russia (Petkova, 2020).122 With its war in Ukraine and opposition to the Western camp, gaining the sympathy and support of the Global South, especially Africa, becomes even more strategic for Russia to ensure it is not isolated.123 Both Indonesia, via Jokowi’s visit to Ukraine and Russia, and Africa, via the AU Chairmanship and delegations of African heads of state, have attempted to negotiate the end of the war and their practical interests relating to grain, fertilisers or energy (Jones, 2023). Avoiding any partnership with Russia in Africa, Indonesia can still learn from Russia’s niche focus and resources mobilisation in a bounded range of fields based on its limited comparative advantages, its African approach’s militarisation124 and knowledge production with Moscow’s Institute for African Studies’ essential role (Ramani, 2023). However, the 121 The Soviet Union and Russia are not the same, though. 122 An issue faced by all external powers on different scales of intensity. 123 US intelligence is sharing more intelligence in Africa to counter Russia, notably in

areas where France was evicted (Banco & Carrier, 2023). 124 A country like Israel also uses military means and its comparative advantages to support and implement civilian projects in agriculture, water resource management, health, defense and security, technology, social development and youth organisations but also for propaganda. Mossad is very active in Africa, monitoring and countering enemies like Iran, supporting entrepreneurs and various security endeavours, often in a long-term perspective like in South Sudan and the Horn of Africa in general (Gidron, 2018, 2020; Gruzd et al., 2018).

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archipelago will be more limited in its capacities and require approaches based more on soft power and intelligence. In the long term, Indonesia’s potential is stronger given its demographic weight, economic diversification and dynamism. As an aspiring global power, Indonesia cannot afford to ignore Russia’s African presence and developments that can have major implications on its own possibilities and mobilisation capacities not only in Africa but globally. Indonesia can afford even less not to be perfectly knowledgeable about the US in Africa. Facing partial or complete revisionist offensives from China and Russia globally, US material power is contested yet remains hegemonic, especially militarily. It is declining economically compared to China. Its normative power and influence are quickly decreasing (Paikin, 2020), notably in Africa and Indonesia. Reviewing the US strategy in Africa in 2020 and calling for “a new US policy framework for the African century”, Devermont criticised the narrow view and misunderstanding of Africa in the US, leading to a limited and disappointing US African engagement. He pointed out three main questions: the principles that should guide the US engagement with Africa, the partners and locations the US should privilege to serve its interests and, finally, the communication strategy the US should adopt to explain its policies to both US and African societies (Devermont, 2020). He added in another paper in 2021 that the US should follow a values-based approach in Africa (Devermont, 2021), relatable to the new Biden Presidency. President Biden appointed Devermont to the National Security Council (NSC) in October 2021 to draft a new US Africa strategy (Gramer, 2021). Presented in 2022, the “U.S. strategy toward SSA” called for reengaging Africa, particularly on digital, urbanisation, democratic values, youth and climate while listening to African voices, agency and the diaspora.125 President Trump’s former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs highlights the US’ and the State Department’s lack of capacity and readiness to face China in Africa (The China Africa Project, 2021). The Biden administration says its policy goes beyond China, engaging Africa for itself. Although Indonesia is in a different position than the US, those questions are helpful to enrich its reflection on the proper African engagement and its evolution in time with the probable rise of Indonesian interests. Finding strategic coherence, notably regarding history, memory 125 While calling to address the issue, the North Africa–SSA dichotomy is still present (National Security Council, 2022).

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and the narrative used both in Indonesia and Africa, will help avoid mistakes and misunderstandings. Unlike MOFA’s official nomenclature, Indonesia’s Pan-African approach through the IAF that does not separate North Africa from Sub-Saharan Africa and appears as the right coherent choice.126 However, should opening many new embassies in Africa be a priority for Indonesia, following the Turkish example? The ten largest African economies represent around three-quarters of African wealth production (AFD, 2020).127 Apart from Angola and Ghana,128 Indonesia has an embassy in all those nations. On the other hand, 21 poor African countries combined have a GDP inferior to Ethiopia or Morocco (AFD, 2020). In an economic diplomacy paradigm, multiplying the number of embassies does not necessarily appear as an adequate strategy. Indonesia already covers most of the “economy of Africa” with its diplomatic architecture. Bureaucratic hurdles to opening new Indonesian embassies are also significant. Reinforcing each existing embassy’s capacities to dynamise Indonesia’s overall action in the leading African markets that often act as regional hubs will create more impact. Having many embassies with low capabilities might even have negative repercussions on image or return.129 However, for political and strategic reasons, opening more embassies all over Africa might make sense, given Africa’s weight in the UNGA. The right questions should be asked with the right answers to develop an efficient and meaningful African strategy. Only robust academic knowledge will help Indonesia determine the right African strategy for each African country with the proper values, ends, means and ways, transmitted through a compelling narrative well-received by Africans. Multiple analogies with other external powers facilitate elaborating a country’s 126 Alao convincingly exposes his refusal of a North Africa —Sub-Saharan Africa dichotomy on the basis of African agency and Pan-Africanism (Alao, 2020). Fauvelle denies the historical existence of a spatial separation and describes a cultural dialogue between African societies (Louis, 2022). 127 In decreasing order: Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania (AFD, 2020). 128 Angola is covered from Namibia, and Ghana from Nigeria. Opening an embassy in both those nations seems necessary for Indonesia. The author evoked with Kemlu’s Africa team the question of embassy locations, which is a subject Kemlu looks into thoroughly. 129 China augments the ground staff in its African embassies in both economic and political sections, aware that economic engagement will always be conditional on politics (Holslag, 2011).

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positioning. The mistakes and successes of others allow learning faster, without replacing on-the-ground experience. In the current global configuration, the only truth is probably that Indonesia cannot prevent Africa from reaching great power. This does not mean its engagement will be continuous, given political factors like presidential change.

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https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/07/20/l-integration-de-lunion-africaine-au-g20-profiterait-au-monde-entier_6135500_3212.html Sambhi, N. (2021). Generals Gaining Ground: Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Indonesia. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ generals-gaining-ground-civil-military-relations-and-democracy-in-indonesia/ Sani, A. F. I. (2022). Momen-Momen Jokowi Reshuffle Kabinet di Hari Rabu. Tempo.Co. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1601986/momen-momen-jok owi-reshuffle-kabinet-di-hari-rabu Santikajaya, A. (2017). Not Just the “Other Emerging Powers”: Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey in the Transformation of Global Order. UI Press. Saputra, M. G. (2023). Prabowo: Negara-Negara Afrika Minta Tentaranya Dilatih Indonesia. Merdeka.Com. https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/pra bowo-negara-negara-afrika-minta-tentaranya-dilatih-indonesia.html Shekhar, V. (2018). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge. Shen, O. (2019). China’s Base in Djibouti: Who’s Got the Power? In J. Golley, L. Jaivin, P. J. Farrelly, & S. Strange (Eds.), Power. ANU Press. Shilaho, W. K. (2018). Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65295-5 Shinn, D. H., & Eisenman, J. (2023). China’s Relations with Africa. Columbia University Press. Shiraz, Z., & Aldrich, R. J. (2019). Secrecy, Spies and the Global South: Intelligence Studies Beyond the “Five Eyes” Alliance. International Affairs, 95(6), 1313–1329. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz200 Sidiropoulos, E., & Alden, C. (2019). Inside the Russia-Africa Matryoshka: Summitry , Geopolitics and Resources. South African Institute of International Affairs, October, 1–35. Sorongan, T. P. (2020). Jadi Alat Transaksi Seks ABG, Berapa Harga Indomie di Ghana? CNBC Indonesia. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/202 01229151139-4-212293/jadi-alat-transaksi-seks-abg-berapa-harga-indomiedi-ghana Sorongan, T. P. (2022). Tak Cuma Ukraina, Diam-diam Adik Prabowo Ekspor dari Rusia. CNBC Indonesia. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/202 20811142612-4-362989/tak-cuma-ukraina-diam-diam-adik-prabowo-eks por-dari-rusia Soulé, F. (2020). ‘Africa+1’ Summit Diplomacy and the ‘New Scramble’ Narrative: Recentering African Agency. African Affairs, May 2020, 633–646. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa015 Soulé, F. (2021). Mapping the Future of Africa–China Relations: Insights from West Africa. Occasional Paper (Issue September). Southgate, L. (2021). ASEAN: Still the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality? Political Science, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

This book explores and analyses Indonesia’s evolutive and flexible contemporary African foreign policy, mainly under President Jokowi, through multiple dimensions following the now classic type of work on external powers in Africa.1 Identifying and studying the foreign policy drivers of external powers in Africa has been the purpose of many works. This book’s first originality is being the first to thoroughly examine Indonesia’s contemporary African effort, filling a research gap on external powers in Africa, especially given Indonesia’s major Asian emerging power status and the Bandung Conference’s host. Yet, given its novelty, explorative character and lack of knowledge of Africa in Indonesia, this study only represents a beginning. The Covid-19 crisis, the US–China systemic rivalry or the Ukraine– Russia war impact Indonesia and African countries and their respective capacities in inflation, growth, supply chains, social troubles and geopolitical choices. This destabilisation is complex to evaluate at the moment of writing. The overall consequences of these upheavals on Indonesia, Africa and their relationship will take time to reveal themselves. While many African nations suffer from debt, inflation and funding shortages, 1 Led in the last fifteen to twenty years by “China in Africa”, these studies have now diversified to various other countries.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6_8

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Indonesia continues to grow and affirm itself. The Bandung Conference in 1955 was an Asian geopolitical response, made Afro-Asian, to great power games and pressures. Indonesia’s balancing and hedging might increasingly mean engaging with African nations, the AU and RECs. General Luhut’s hilirisasi and green minilateral diplomacy towards the Global South, uniting resource-rich developing nations through an Afro-Asian solidarity discourse, instrumentalises Afro-Asianism to serve Indonesia’s domestic economic interests, protecting its hilirisasi policies from Western challenges in the WTO. This first comprehensive study on Indonesia’s engagement with Africa started from a question: why did Indonesia keep focusing on the multilateral NAASP that consistently failed to operationalise while other major Asian powers prioritised their Africa+1 forums? As a pretext, this interrogation led to an interest in Indonesia’s African foreign policy in particular and Indonesian foreign policy in general, by extension, this work’s true focus. In many ways, Indonesia remains a giant nation under the radar. The contemporary knowledge production about the “continental” country is insufficient, often lacking originality. New propositions should be brought to the table. New, more diverse profiles are required, offering to travel through “the road not taken”. This book’s second originality is having moved forward by making multiple analogies of Indonesia’s African approach with the African engagements of major Asian powers—China, Japan, India and South Korea, and globalising the perspective by occasionally looking into the African policies of nations like Türkiye, Brazil, France, Israel, Russia, the UK and the US. This study places itself in the current Global African Studies academic trend of multiplying parallels between external powers in Africa. Given the absence of significant material on Indonesia in Africa (Dorigné-Thomson, 2021, 2022a, 2022b), this book would have suffered without the valuable help of all previous studies on external powers in Africa. Combined with existing literature on Indonesian foreign policy and primary data, these works accelerated comprehension and analysis, facilitating trial-and-error and providing a panoramic view while placing Indonesia’s foreign policy in a new perspective. This is rare for a study of Indonesia’s foreign policy. For such a vast country, work about Indonesia suffers from a lack of novelty and originality, with few visions capable of presenting new possible paths. The description and analysis of General Luhut’s major role and significance seem unprecedented, proposing an alternative view of Indonesian foreign policy.

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This problem-driven research on Indonesia’s foreign policy tries to explain an apparent shift towards Africa as a new region of potential contemporary expansion for Indonesia. To understand that shift, different factors on various analytical levels were identified and studied. External powers’ foreign policy towards Africa is often largely attributed to material factors, including the search for natural resources like oil and critical minerals, market access through exports and project contracts and investment, a sort of “new scramble for Africa”.2 In Indonesia’s case, at least, ideational factors clearly have a broad impact. This does not mean material factors are unimportant. They simply are not the prime and immediate drivers that started the shift. Moreover, material drivers primarily concern the defense of Indonesia’s domestic economic interests, especially hilirisasi and the green economy. Indonesia’s African engagement’s lateness reveals that the operationalisation of a quest for material benefits fails to happen when the ideational context is not ready. The expression “new scramble for Africa” indicates that emerging powers completely mobilise their nation to grab resources and markets in Africa as if it was a simple, immediate process. The Indonesian case shows it is not automatic. Schweller notices there is more literature on why nations balance or go to war than on why nations underbalance or preserve peace. Domestic constraints impede resource mobilisation serving external objectives, meaning underbalancing.3 Likewise, most literature wonders why external powers expand to Africa, not why a country like Indonesia did not for almost two decades and started to expand lately, under Jokowi. Even under Jokowi, the shift was not immediate. The destination “Africa” was not obvious. Beyond geopolitics and structure, powerful political entrepreneurs like Jokowi–Luhut elevated the topic and captured it to serve their interests. Like Schweller’s underbalancing, domestic constraints, including political leadership, elite mental maps and ideational aspects in general, political competition, financial restrictions and a deficient knowledge system, form part of the non-monolithic explanation. 2 An expression criticised in this book, but that can be useful to convey the idea of a sort of historical phenomena resurgence. 3 Domestic constraints make it challenging to mobilise resources for external goals that cannot be directly related to material benefits. Underbalancing occurs towards issues that have not entered the perceptions or mental maps of the foreign policy elite and without a successful justification of their utility (Schweller, 2004).

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Indonesia has material needs and aspirations. Indonesia wants to seek new markets and partners and internationalise its SOEs and private corporations. Indonesia needs to defend its domestic developmental policies. For all the reasons presented in this book, in the Jokowi era, Africa is an evident expansion choice for Indonesia and a useful coalition partner. It was also before when other Asian powers were already active in Africa. Yet, it is under Jokowi that Africa really comes under consideration, still imperfectly. This conclusion summarises the main reasons identified and the analysis provided in this book.

Presidential Leadership First, Jokowi can be credited for Indonesia’s shift towards considering Africa more seriously, engaging in the so-called new race into Africa. Leifer concluded his seminal book on Indonesia’s foreign policy by insisting on the gap between Indonesia’s aspirations and its actual achievements in Southeast Asia.4 Jokowi appears as an antithesis with the “Africa” example. Modestly and concretely, he opened the way for Indonesia to start a genuine African engagement and escape the pure rhetorical discourse trap. Jokowi delivers concretely. Whether or not one agrees with what Jokowi delivers as a statesman and a politician, and his way of seeing the world is another story. His domestic popularity is record-high at the end of his second mandate. Jokowi has often been underestimated during his political career. At the beginning of his first presidential mandate, many in Jakarta and abroad predicted his impeachment. This never happened. He progressively consolidated his power. This constant belittling has constituted his political strength in the Indonesian polity, to seduce the powerful and gain the public’s sympathies. A formidable political leader, Jokowi holds, for the people, a Javanese leader’s traditional qualities, notably humility, self-denial and self-control (Bertrand, 2016). He benefits from the deep intelligence of his people, who strongly support him since he embodies representation’s true meaning. Coming from the people, Jokowi represents his people well.5 A vast majority respects him for that. In their minds, he is doing his best to bring Indonesians pride, dignity

4 Nevertheless, Leifer did not describe Indonesia as a middle power (Leifer, 1983). 5 There again, this is detached from judgements on his policies.

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and welfare. Sukarno’s major goal was “national pride” (Leifer, 1983). Despite criticism, Jokowi is a unique global leader, with high popularity levels during his presidencies. His capacity to engage with Africa in a new, more pragmatic way, placing Africa more prominently on Indonesia’s elite’s map, cannot be detached from Jokowi’s domestic strength and popularity. Domestic support through the people’s trust appears essential to mobilise the necessary power needed for successful foreign policy and expansion (Trubowitz & Harris, 2019). Perceived as doing the best for the people’s welfare, Jokowi benefits from a significant marge de manoeuvre. Without appearing so, with his low-key style, Jokowi is in many ways revolutionary by his capacity to deliver and his fusion with his people. It is not overly laudatory to wonder how many world leaders benefit from such domestic support. Yet, this book also amply criticised Jokowi’s lack of intellectualism and educational breakthroughs, hurting Indonesia’s foreign policy abilities. Indonesia needs to raise its intellectual game. Given the power of vested interests, tycoons and security figures in the Indonesian polity, Jokowi’s exact political autonomy remains an interrogation. This does not diminish his political astuteness, concrete achievements and legacy. The contrast between the SBY and Jokowi eras in infrastructure building, hilirisasi and general political accomplishment is visible.6 The sensational political couple formed with General Luhut widely explains Jokowi’s success. Jokowi means Luhut, and Luhut means strategic. Striving among problems and challenges,7 Luhut secures

6 Contrary to the commoner Jokowi, SBY, a four-star General, failed to manage the political obstacles impeding infrastructure development (Davidson, 2015). Under Jokowi, the state also took over oil fields and mining assets such as the famous Freeport in Papua. Commodity downstream industrialisation, started with nickel, participates in the Jokowi legacy. 7 As explained by General Agus Widjojo: “Luhut is very political. As a man of action, he can survive until now. As a political man, Luhut is able to drive in chaos”, “When the leadership sees that no one can carry something out, he can come to Luhut . And once given an assignment, Luhut will feel challenged. President Jokowi definitely sees Luhut as a human being who gets things done, which other ministers cannot match.” (“Luhut itu sangat politis. Sebagai man of action, dia bisa survive sampai sekarang. Sebagai manusia politik, Luhut mampu driving in chaos ”, “Ketika pimpinan melihat tidak ada yang bisa melaksanakan, dia bisa datang ke Luhut . Dan begitu dikasih tugas, Luhut akan merasa tertantang. Presiden Jokowi pasti melihat Luhut sebagai manusia yang get things done, yang tidak bisa diimbangi oleh menteri lain”) (Massardi, 2022).

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delivery, shielding Jokowi from political attacks.8 Democracy activists have been worried about Luhut and the military’s presence in civilian positions.9 But, LBP is probably a unique shooting star, a senior retired general-turned-presidential backer and overwhelming minister, whose profile might not be found again after him. Luhut’s military commando style has been effective domestically and internationally, notably for the African engagement. Democratic failure comes from not being able to deliver on promises. The debate is ongoing. Through Africa, the door for internationalising Indonesia opens, a significant step for Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia raises its chances of becoming a great power.10 Given Indonesia’s frustration in ASEAN,11 Africa fits well with the concept of post-ASEAN foreign policy (Sukma, 2009; Suryadinata, 1996). Never before has Indonesia begun a coordinated state effort for expansion to another world region as initiated by Jokowi with Africa. Luhut’s hilirisasi and green minilateral diplomacy, building a Global South coalition calling on Afro-Asianism, above all to defend domestic hilirisasi, represents a breakthrough for Indonesia, marking the true rise of an emerging great power foreign policy. Given Indonesia’s traditionally ascribed inward-looking profile with heavy domestic burdens, it is no small achievement. Jokowi supports a conquering mindset, rather antinomic with Indonesia’s foreign policy’s academic description until now. After studying seriously Luhut’s 8 It may be wondered to what extent he will be able to continue doing so when Jokowi steps down in 2024. This explains why Jokowi’s children are quickly rising on the Indonesian political scene. 9 Like during the New Order, Luhut called for a return to the possibility of military officers being appointed to ministries by revising the military law (Rizqo, 2022). The military has problems with high-ranking appointments with a deficit in positions, notably for generals. This would seem like a democratic regression. Yet, unlike during the New Order, former military personnel represent a small percentage of elected or nominated officials. Moreover, several high-ranking generals, including former chiefs of staff, have failed in politics in recent years. It should also be reminded that Luhut is a retired General, not an active one. Militarisation should certainly be closely monitored, yet without making exaggerated conclusions. Paradoxically, those Luhut statements are probably his way of participating in democratic politics, leveraging his “assets”, like labour unions or conglomerates do. His military background has also helped him protect Jokowi as a popular politician who does not head a political party and whose wealth was not extraordinary. 10 As seen earlier through the application of the thinking of Pardesi (2015). 11 With the Myanmar situation notably.

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endeavours and mindset, it is difficult to classify Indonesia as a middle power, which would be an analytical mistake with potentially negative consequences for policy-making. Trade or the quest for natural resources are secondary explanations, important but secondary. Major emerging countries like Indonesia, which benefits from its large natural resources’ endowment and domestic market, have much more at stake than only adding a few billion dollars of trade to their balance, despite economic-based narratives. The African economic opportunity existed twenty years ago. China, India and Türkiye seized it. Indonesia did not at the time, demonstrating that economic factors are submitted to political and ideational factors.12 Indonesia often appears late in its foreign policy actions. Jokowi is catching up on wasted time through state capitalism and his developmental approach. Foreign policy in Indonesia, including under Jokowi, remains firstly the President’s prerogative with his closest allies and entourage.13 Major areas of Indonesia’s foreign policy appear isolated from competing interests, fully in the hands of the country’s prominent leader (McRae, 2019). Indonesia’s African shift, yet modest and fledging, shows that the President, with the right allies and strategy, can concentrate foreign policy in his hands. Competing interests still exist, although not necessarily visible. Jokowi’s pragmatism and simplicity broke Indonesia’s African deadlock, Luhut being his nuclear weapon, a powerful emanation of Indonesia’s security apparatus. A wider part of Indonesia’s elite started seeing Africa as a land of opportunity and possible expansion for Indonesian business, notably SOEs and their internationalisation. Prominent Indonesian MNCs already have substantial African operations, following their transnational strategies. Jokowi’s imposed economic diplomacy paradigm forces Indonesia to get quickly and concretely involved in Africa with a priority originally placed on infrastructure development like Jokowi’s national priority program of building roads, ports, airports, railways or power plants. Yet, funding issues for Indonesian infrastructure projects in Africa reoriented the discourse towards hilirisasi, tropical forests, health, the blue economy and other Indonesian propositions for Africa.

12 As also seen in the case of infrastructure building or Indonesia’s late launching of a SWF. 13 A “presidential affair” supported by an entourage or “a foreign policy oligarchy” outside of Kemlu (Laksmana, 2016).

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Africa legitimises Jokowi’s national politics and programs. Contributing to African development through infrastructure and hilirisasi supports global public goods, serving Indonesia’s status claims (Large, 2021). Infrastructure construction and hilirisasi and environmental diplomacy in Africa give credit to domestic choices and achievements. Indonesia’s capacity to build infrastructure and become a hilirisasi model in Africa underlines Jokowi’s domestic success. Jokowi’s state-led development and state capitalism paradigms are prolonged to Africa. Both push and pull factors thus determine the African expansion. The weakness resulting from presidential preeminence in Indonesian foreign policy could be continuity. Highest leadership change could potentially end Indonesia’s African interest, as seen in Brazil or Australia. Indonesia’s African engagement is not yet heavy enough to be considered structural. For the state, it depends on domestic politics and the highest leadership. The presidential monopoly on foreign policy reduces the overall democratic institutionalisation of entities like Kemlu, which can disturb continuity. In that leadership driver category, Jokowi’s main ally, former General turned Minister Luhut, represents the Jokowi era’s most decisive figure, including in the African shift. The Jokowi presidency is largely about the Jokowi–Luhut complementary duo. Jokowi’s presidencies would have been far less stable without the Luhut umbrella. Mandated by Jokowi, Luhut headed the Indonesian state’s African effort, given Jokowi’s trust in him as he also chaired multiple other task forces, in his military commando style, and managed relationships with major partners like China and the UAE. Given his closeness with Jokowi and his army profile, no leader other than Luhut could implement such endeavours. Heading the 2015 AAS’s organisation committee, the special task force for Indonesian infrastructure in Africa, and hilirisasi diplomacy, Luhut quickly understood the strategic importance of boosting Indonesia’s African engagement, using the Afro-Asian narrative, including to protect his domestic hilirisasi program from Western attacks. His profile as a former military General is critical, underlining how important having such a background remains to deliver in contemporary Indonesia. His pragmatic character, resembling Jokowi’s in another style, widely explains his capacity to deliver, making him an efficient political entrepreneur. Luhut has been a formidable doer, battler and guardian in the Jokowi era, for major infrastructure and industrialisation projects, and investment in general and for Indonesia’s main foreign policy evolutions like the close

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links with China, the UAE, and the US under Trump or the new African approach through SOEs seeking out infrastructure, hilirisasi and other projects in Africa, prolonging domestic developmental success abroad. Luhut’s involvement means strategic. As a senior member of Indonesia’s security apparatus representing the highest power in Indonesia, Luhut’s effort buries any middle power etiquette placed on Indonesia, leaving that discourse to Kemlu. Leaders originating from the security apparatus, especially the army, retain a higher capacity to deliver in Indonesia. Despite the democratic and electoral tumult, the security apparatus preserves the nation’s stability, managing its intrinsic diversity. Its prominent former members share unique ways and capacities to act outside conventional paths to deliver on strategic projects, cutting through red tape and other obstacles. Luhut’s ability to operationalise his African task force, in commando style, can be seen in that perspective. His ability to leverage the Afro-Asian narrative, notably to support hilirisasi, is no small thing in Indonesia. Still, this does not resolve Indonesia’s profound knowledge production deficit. Jokowi–Luhut’s prioritisation of material gains and ways through a developmental vision and state capitalism benefits Indonesia for now and seems necessary. An ambitious nation will need its highest leaders to build, fund and raise the level of universities and research institutions with the same enthusiasm and seriousness as they build infrastructure for a “reset” with more “riset ”. Kemlu needed Luhut as a powerful umbrella, enabler and implementer to kickstart the new African policy, cutting through bureaucratic and political hurdles. In structuring Indonesia’s new pragmatic African engagement and given Luhut’s proximity to China, Chinese ideational influence is evident. Yet, Kemlu sources have systematically indicated that Indonesia differs from China’s approach, often seeming destabilised by such comparisons. Jokowi and Luhut are close to China for material reasons, but also probably increasingly in their perception of order.14

14 Luhut indicates in his biography that he thinks the current system in China is the

right system. He thinks Indonesia should also not become too liberal democratic since it would not be suitable. Large nations require tough political systems. The biography shows he was not favourable to military retreat from politics during Reformasi. Yet, his family seems pretty liberal and influences him. Therefore, things are not that simple (Massardi, 2022).

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China gave them what they wanted, helping them build the country.15 Moreover, since Indonesian hilirisasi and infrastructure building are supported by China, it may be wondered to what extent hilirisasi diplomacy is too, which could also explain Western opposition. Hilirisasi diplomacy promotes de facto a Chinese development model supporting developing nations. Indonesia becomes an ambassador for that model in the Global South, particularly Africa. Like in Africa, Chinese rivals should work hard to keep pace in Indonesia with new propositions and strategies.16 The flexible, ad hoc African engagement also corresponds to Luhut’s idiosyncrasy. Indonesia’s new framework for African expansion accompanied the overall increase and consolidation of Jokowi’s power in tandem with Luhut, and his empowerment against his major political patrons, like former President Megawati and Nasdem Party Chairman Surya Paloh, who share interests relating to Africa, ideological and material.17 The IAF and Luhut’s Task Force constitute flexible tools to capture and manage African elite connections, notably Afro-Chinese networks and the related material and political benefits, making sure those high-level international networks and material opportunities do not fall into the wrong hands, representing competing interests to Jokowi’s and disturbing his presidency. Indonesia’s Chinese relationship intensity and the importance for the Presidency to monopolise the connection in all its aspects, avoiding destabilising domestic rivalry and increasing its autonomy from demanding political patrons, widely explain Jokowi’s African push led by LBP. Incidents like the Angola episode with Sam Pa and Surya Paloh at the beginning of the Jokowi presidency also demanded a more prominent state involvement to avoid such disturbing events linked to intermediaries proposing their African networks to high-level Indonesian political elites. Under the Jokowi–Luhut regime, Indonesia’s African engagement cannot be detached from “China in Africa”, without denying all the other drivers studied here. Indonesia is notably driven into Africa to compete 15 Japanese investment in Indonesia is much lower than in Vietnam, relatively and

absolutely (Shambaugh, 2021). 16 The US has been losing ground to China in terms of influence in Southeast Asia and Indonesia (Patton & Sato, 2023). 17 A similar competition, notably between Jokowi-Luhut, Megawati and Surya Paloh, is happening for the 2024 presidential elections, with Jokowi positioned as a kingmaker, given his tremendous popularity.

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or collaborate with other external powers. African networks these external powers form spread to Indonesian elites, reverberating into Indonesian domestic politics. Controlling them relates to political consolidation and survival for Jokowi. The President and Luhut could not afford to ignore the African opportunity and its benefits, potentially becoming a domestic political threat if not attended to and reinforcing political competitors. Luhut transformed the African engagement to serve his domestic political and economic interests, on top of generating international gains. All in all, the powerful Jokowi–Luhut couple of political entrepreneurs, acting somewhat freely from the public and political tumult, and an evolution of the perception of Africa’s strategic importance for Indonesia, allowed the foreign policy shift towards Africa. Jokowi is burying the seminal foreign policy affirmations associated with Indonesia, like the sense of vulnerability, the inward-looking perspective, the middle power label, or even oligarchic theory affirmations stating that Indonesia Inc. refused to expand abroad.18 The Indonesian state is now leading Indonesia’s African expansion as a natural extension of the developmental state, marking Indonesia’s true global rise through a dual foreign policy approach embodied by Luhut and Kemlu to simplify. Jokowi unites the contraries as a syncretic Javanese leader. Structural shifts in global geopolitics should increasingly support Indonesia’s African involvement. But, the effort’s immediate continuity after the Jokowi–Luhut era constitutes an interrogation, depending on the new leadership.

Beyond Economic Drivers In the hierarchy of state interests for engaging with Africa,19 economic factors do not fully dominate, rejecting “economic reductionism” and “monolithic explanations ” (Alden & Large, 2018). This is valid for Indonesia, despite the economic diplomacy narrative, a mere tool to reach vital developmental interests. Rolland presents the hierarchy of

18 Indonesian oligarchs supposedly considered that protecting their domestic interests required focusing exclusively on controlling and plundering their domestic market. The early expansion of the Salim Group abroad contradicts that perception. Expanding abroad was, on the contrary, a protection against the Suharto regime (Borsuk & Chng, 2014). Today, it might be said that if there is an oligarchic battle, it is expanding to Africa. 19 The famous “drivers” of external powers’ African foreign policy.

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China’s African interests.20 China’s most critical African interests are the “core interests”, of life and death (Poh & Li, 2017; Rolland, 2021).21 National sovereignty and unity, notably the One China policy, territorial integrity and national and systemic stability, form those absolutely non-negotiable higher interests. The so-called “important interests” relate to general development (Rolland, 2021).22 They are divided into two main categories: China’s explicit material interests in Africa, including the protection of its citizens and assets, access to resources and markets, and China’s latent immaterial interests, including defense of its national dignity, reputation and image. These “important interests” are negotiable. Economic interests are not the highest interests for China’s African engagement. Finally, China’s remaining African interests, so-called “general interests”, are comprised of all the non-core, unimportant interests, considered secondary, negotiable and concedable for the pursuit of higher purposes (Rolland, 2021).23 This categorisation helps examine the interests driving Indonesia’s African foreign policy. For Indonesia’s contemporary African engagement, economic interests are important, yet not the highest interests despite the economic diplomacy narrative. Suryadinata concluded Suharto’s foreign policy was first about status and recognition (Suryadinata, 1996). This remains the case under Jokowi. In Africa, Indonesia signals its rising status, showcases its development success to both domestic and international audiences, and seeks higher international recognition, notably through participation in peacekeeping. Luhut’s hilirisasi and green diplomacy supports domestic goals while raising Indonesia’s Global South profile, instrumentalising Afro-Asianism. Indonesia cannot ignore the sizeable African bloc at the UNGA.24 Like Indonesia’s new SWF, an Africa+1 forum is a status marker, a symbol of developmental success. Indonesia is ready to share its infrastructural and hilirisasi capabilities, belonging to the select club of unavoidable nations. International prestige

20 Based on the research of the most prominent Chinese Africanists who, for some, are in direct relationship with President Xi Jinping (Rolland, 2021). 21 Core interests—hexin liyi 核心利益—are often directly stated and promoted by President Xi Jinping himself, notably on visits to military bases around China. 22 Important interests—zhongyao liyi 重要利益. 23 General interests—yiban liyi一般利益. 24 Or that the majority of decisions at the UNSC concern Africa.

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reinforces domestic leadership. These interests are important, but not at the top of the pyramid. The Indonesian domestic polity always remains the essential matter. The Chinese notion of core interests applies to Indonesia in its African foreign policy, or the notion of raison d’État ,25 from which other national interests derive from. La raison d’État stands unnegotiable. Although economic diplomacy seems to be the main focus, Indonesia’s African presence cannot be detached from this ultimate sovereignty and security dimension, especially in the evolving geopolitical context. As the term “diplomacy” indicates, only a method or a tool, economic diplomacy serves developmental goals and thus Indonesia’s ultimate political objectives as a Southeast Asian developmental state, strongly linking sovereignty and stability to economic success. The IAF officially contributes to the National Development Priorities program (Dwifiani, 2019; Kemlu, 2015, 2020a, 2020b).26 Affecting Indonesian territorial integrity and unity, the Papua issue remains unnegotiable, above pure economic interests.27 Africa has been long present in Indonesian security services’ mindset for that Papua reason. Indonesian Papua is potentially vulnerable to separatist campaigns instrumentalised through Afro-solidarity. Suppressing these possible attacks on Indonesian integrity represents Indonesia’s highest priority to which all material benefits potentially gained in Africa would be subjected, as with the Pacific Islands. Kemlu officially considers the Papua threat coming from Africa as minimal, for good reasons since African countries officially uphold uti possidetis juris like Indonesia, and a common colonial history is shared, generating solidarity.28 Some Indonesian diplomats’ opinion appears less optimistic, as evoked previously. If a 25 That, as seen previously, the UK defines as the protection of the security of the country. 26 National Development Priorities program or ProPN (Prioritas Pembangunan Nasional ). It includes the IAF’s derivatives like the IAID and the IAMD. The link between domestic development and the African expansion is thus explicit and official. 27 Although it holds links to economic interests, notably of the military. 28 “A concern but not really a problem”, according to Kemlu’s spokesperson and director

general of Information and Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Dr. Teuku Faizasyah. Author’s Interviews with Dr. Teuku Faizasyah, Spokesperson and Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Indonesia MOFA (17 and 29 September 2021, Jakarta, Zoom Meeting, 2021). The truth is that Papua activism disturbs the government wherever it takes place, like in England (Redaksi, 2014).

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robust separatist network and campaign were set up in Africa and among the global African diaspora, a more acute sense of threat and securitisation could quickly develop, especially under domestic pressures.29 A strategic weakness, the Papua issue exposes Indonesia to potential backlashes in its African relations that must be thoroughly thought out and anticipated before the African engagement becomes too substantial. More generally, a deep understanding of Africa and powerful networks in various circles should be developed to protect any African expansion, preventing possible negative reverberations domestically. All steps should be conceptualised and calculated with the support of a robust knowledge capacity. Major universities should be leading this effort with governmental backup. The smart use of Indonesia’s comparative advantages and the minimisation of its existing and budding strategic weaknesses for a potentially successful long-term African engagement require a solid academic voice and production, often more credible and receivable by a variety of publics. Presenting external emerging powers’ engagement as a mere “scramble” for resources and markets seems mostly inadequate. The “neocolonial” adjective is mistaken, cheaply discrediting emerging powers 29 The August 2021 episode linked to the alleged mistreatment by Indonesian immigration of a Nigerian diplomat based in Jakarta, consular officer Abdulrahman Ibrahim, confirms the arguments made in this book on the necessity to increase knowledge capacity regarding Africa in Indonesia (AP, 2021; Ewokor, 2021; Sorongan, 2021). Causing the government of Nigeria to call back its ambassador, and the Indonesian government to apologise, with talks on the Nigerian side of diplomatic rupture under pressure from civil society, the event was first compared to the George Floyd tragic event since the Nigerian diplomat screamed that he could not breathe (Nseyen, 2021). This is exaggerated and not really comparable, but the episode is still significant. This type of damaging accident naturally hurts relations between Indonesia and Africa, although the problem was quickly resolved, and the ambassador returned. The accident itself appears as a warning. The newly appointed ambassadors in Africa of the Papua separatist movement made declarations on the episode calling for strict sanctions from the Nigerian government and other African countries against Indonesia, which they consider a racist state (Vanguard, 2021a). Again, the statement is too harsh and lacks nuance, yet it must be heard. These new ambassadors of Papuan separatism have political and economic connections in their countries, with links to ruling parties like the All Progressives Congress (APC) of then President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari and local business circles (Vanguard, 2021b). Kemlu is apparently not worried about those appointments and downplays the importance and networks of those new ambassadors (CDT with Amb. Faizasyah, 2021). This diplomatic crisis caused by a deplorable mistake from an Indonesian state agency underlines how vulnerable Indonesia could be in Africa due to its lack of comprehension and knowledge production concerning the continent.

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building African relationships without looking deeper into more strategic factors.30 Moreover, African nations and elites possess agency. They are sovereign. External powers, including China, cannot fully drive their African relations. African elites frame ties to serve their interests.31 Indonesia faces tough negotiations when dealing with African countries, as reflected in the difficulties and time needed to negotiate trade agreements, Africa officially privileging the AfCFTA to avoid trade diversion and support intra-African trade. Like Indonesia, African nations are courted by all major players. For Indonesia, national security and stability, international prestige, other Asian powers’ influence, domestic politics and domestic development success legitimation through the international expansion of an “Indonesian model” surpass material interests, mostly enablers, as main determinants. Indonesia’s highest leadership pushed Indonesia’s African expansion following its ideological model of state-led development and state capitalism. It was also pulled in by domestic political competition and the quest for the control of strategic African and Sino-African networks. Hilirisasi and hilirisasi diplomacy are also Chinese interests since they represent Chinese investments, technologies and the Chinese developmental model in general. This book considers Luhut’s African effort places the defense of domestic economic interests, which relate to Jokowi’s legacy, material interests and post-presidential political survival and security, above potential material gains in Africa. Africa is thus instrumentalised for domestic protection. Domestically, the stakes are too massive materially and politically to be supplanted by anything else. This does not mean African expansion efforts are not genuine. Luhut does aim for Indonesia to become “the centre and leader of developing countries ” (Hikam, 2023), so Africa cannot be ignored. Placing neocolonial labels on emerging powers’ African engagements, insisting on material factors’ primacy and the notion of a “new scramble for Africa” appears condescending to African nations as if they could not act freely. Cobbett and Mason justly wonder: “why the ‘renewed international competition in Africa’ is referred to as a ‘scramble’ and not as an outcome of a skilful foreign strategy of playing interested parties off one against the other?” (Cobbett & Mason, 2021). How

30 The book has shown how since Bandung, Western powers have feared the rise of Afro-Asian ties, perceived as a threat to their interests. 31 As classically theorised by Bayart’s theory of extraversion.

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could Indonesia, which has suffered from colonialism and oppression, be reasonably presented as a neocolonial predator? This book even highlights Indonesia privileges its domestic economic gains and partners with Africa to protect them, above any idea of African “exploitation”, a secondary priority. Fitting vocabulary should be used. Emerging powers are painted as new ravening demons, while simply expanding their horizons peacefully, not through military conquest, and forging new partnerships like Luhut’s flexible minilateralism uniting resourcerich Global South nations. Focusing heavily on material factors denies emerging powers their sovereignty and right to be complete actors with holistic global considerations.32 The world’s majority’s refusal to side with Western nations over the Russia–Ukraine war reveals the West cannot claim to represent the international community. Frameworks of thought and discourses must evolve. Lee proposes decolonising Sino-African relations still viewed through “imperial metanarratives ”, and old paradigms like the “Scramble for Africa”, Africa as a victim, or orientalism with China described as a dragon. Afro-Asianism should replace narratives like the short-termist, “presentist ” China–Africa ones (Lee, 2021). If it strengthens its intellectual game, Indonesia could legitimately contribute, proposing new visions, beyond its current minilateral attempts, which exclude non-commodity-rich African nations. China’s global weight and political economy evolution complicates simply qualifying China’s African engagement as neocolonial and predatory, obsessed with grabbing African natural wealth and markets. From the beginning, China was involved with Africa for multiple reasons, firstly for sovereignty. This research highlights that major emerging powers like Indonesia are not only thirsty for trade and resources. They do not think about ripping Africa off of its riches. They are complete sovereign nations, real powers, with domestic constraints, political games, ideologies and priorities and considerations about their status and reputation globally and towards domestic audiences. Domestic politics can pull them in or out of Africa. If Indonesia were only driven by material considerations, the IAF would have existed before 2018. Indonesia would have stopped trying to operationalise the NAASP in memoriam of the KAA. Comprehending Indonesia’s foreign policy complexity requires flexibility and openness to study. With its imperfections, this book tried to retain that 32 As if only Western powers could have multiple drivers and considerations, given their supposed moral superiority.

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mindset all along, refusing clichés and trying out various ideas through trial-and-error and analogies. The emphasis placed on Luhut underlines Indonesia’s true identity, complex and ambitious, ready to smartly defy the existing world order, judged unfair, through a dual foreign policy and discourse. Although results will be key and cannot be evaluated yet, Indonesia’s capacity to leverage Afro-Asianism is unique and could foreshadow various future global changes and events, especially if China is actually fully backing the effort. This was not the object of this book.

Ideational Primacy Keynes was “sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas ”, and: “But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil ” (Keynes, 2018). For Keynes, the world is ruled by ideas and even those who call themselves pragmatists are subject to some kind of intellectual influence, even if they ignore or refuse it. Research on external powers in Africa can sometimes seem too utilitarian, lacking a long-term perspective and using neoliberal or Marxist frameworks that lose key dimensions and prove wrong or incomplete. In this book, ideational mechanisms proved central, more than material factors, appearing as derivatives. Materiality has been, as Keynes wrote, “vastly exaggerated” in the literature on external powers in Africa as if emerging powers were mere neo-colonisers only seeking resources and export markets, forgetting they were complex states with various interests, above all survival and thus sovereignty, security and stability that economic development serves, dealing with complex African states with their agency and interests. Domestic politics and the highest leadership’s political strength determine capacity. In Indonesia’s African foreign policy, potential material interests gained in Africa are dwarfed in prioritisation by domestic ones. Africa is even instrumentalised in supporting them against the West. The NAASP did not operationalise mostly given the lack of an AfroAsian idea and an Afro-Asian epistemic community defining Afro-Asia and an Afro-Asian transcontinental platform, adding to all the institutional and political hurdles existing in Asia–Africa, notably relating to multilateralism, continentalism and regionalism. For the EU, ideas were more robust causal mechanisms than structures or institutions (Parsons, 2002). Ideas behind organisations like ASEAN and the AU differ, and therefore

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also those sustaining the various regional security complexes or regional primary institutions. Indonesia maintained a nostalgic and idealised vision of Bandung, lacking an ideational framework to operationalise the NAASP in the Afro-Asian transregional context, or about what Africa could represent for Indonesia, unlike other external powers. For Sukarno, Asia– Africa had little power, so it needed to develop moral, spiritual and ideational power (Gerits, 2016). Now that Asia is becoming the world’s centre, with Indonesian power rising concurrently, Indonesia should still follow Sukarno’s wish, creating meaningful relationships with Africa and Africans. Hilirisasi knowledge sharing is presented that way, also serving domestic purposes as Bandung did. Jokowi’s entrepreneurial ideational mindset and political prowess, coupled with Luhut’s militaristic and shared entrepreneurial mindset, allowed the foreign policy shift towards Africa through a simplified, more pragmatic and evolutive scheme. As Keynes indicates, this “pragmatism” is not born from nowhere. Linked to Jokowi and Luhut’s background, notably during the New Order, it can also be traced to Chinese ideational influence, especially in the state-led development model and capitalism applied in Indonesia and Africa.33 Both Jokowi’s terms were placed under meta-topics belonging to the “Chinese model” of economic development: the first mandate under infrastructure development, including industrial infrastructure, hilirisasi and SEZs, the second, labour skills development.34 The visibility and perceived success of “China in Africa” has influenced the operationalisation of “Indonesia in Africa”. Following China, Africa can become a laboratory for Indonesia’s internationalisation,35 although its main function at first relates to Indonesian domestic imperatives. Since Indonesia’s hilirisasi was supported by China, Indonesia’s hilirisasi diplomacy promotes a Chinese model of success for developing nations.

33 Chinese ideas and governance models are increasingly impacting the Western world also, as seen in the handling of the Covid-19 crisis. The choice of strict confinement or lockdown of populations to break the pandemic spread around Europe and the US can be directly traced to the influence of China’s own decisions that were then copied and adapted. 34 The meta-topic of the first mandate was maintained also during the second. 35 Yet the Chinese model, if it exists, can be traced back to Japanese flying geese and

other models that were also applied in Indonesia.

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Hybridisation in external powers’ African approaches occurs on all levels, revealing the complexity of attributing the true origin of political ideas and influences. Overall, the political abilities and power of the two statesmen Jokowi and Luhut permit such a foreign policy shift’s implementation. This new African orientation appears primarily significant not for material reasons but because it marks a change in Indonesian foreign policy towards real internationalisation and out of the “inwardlooking” categorisation, joining other major external powers in Africa. It is demonstrated Indonesia has solid ambitions to become a great power, industrially solid and not a modest middle power. Partnering with China for beneficiation, hilirisasi is challenging Western powers and their models, which failed to bring prosperity to developing nations, according to Jokowi–Luhut.

Knowledge Production Indonesia’s deficient quality and capacity in knowledge production and education negatively impacts its foreign policy. Indonesia’s delayed and still limited contemporary African engagement and the NAASP deadlock prove that causality. African studies have not been developed in Indonesia. No Indonesian research centre on Africa exists today. An uninteresting region for Indonesia, despite the occasional Asia–Africa narrative, no academic funding was available to study Africa. Foreign, state and business interests firmly guide Indonesian academic research. Now that Africa has started slowly penetrating Indonesian elite mindsets, possibilities to develop African studies are emerging.36 Nothing is guaranteed. Academic research should be better financed and more independent, so strategic issues could be better studied and anticipated to avoid losing opportunities against Indonesia’s national interests. Solid research and academic capacities, notably in social sciences, with resourceful and wellfunded universities, are the mark of great nations. It is not obvious in Indonesia. There are reasons why Indonesia never received any Nobel Prize. Western knowledge hegemony or Indonesia’s historical focus on research concerning nation-building and security as a post-colonial nation

36 The process will probably resemble what happened in Türkiye at the beginning of the 2000s. Research on Africa grew due to the state’s interest in the continent, serving state needs.

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can be evoked. However, the situation results from Indonesian political choices. As described earlier, the highest historical leaders in China, like Mao Zedong, or India with Nehru, created African studies centres in their nation’s universities. Nowadays, Xi Jinping supports the development of Chinese knowledge capabilities concerning Africa, staying in direct intellectual dialogue with Chinese Africanists. Jokowi, through Luhut, allowed Indonesia to finally start the process of seriously engaging with Africa. Indonesia’s knowledge capacities regarding Africa will determine the engagement’s long-term success. Competition takes place first in knowledge and ideas. Historically, Indonesia proved it can develop interesting strategies and obtain remarkable diplomatic successes if founded on strong knowledge frameworks, like the archipelagic state concept giving birth to UNCLOS in 1982.37 Foreign policy epistemic communities relating to ASEAN, the South China Sea or UNCLOS exist in Indonesia. Knowledgeable Indonesian scholars and diplomats understand those questions well. No such capacities exist today for the NAASP or Indonesia’s African foreign policy, preventing an optimal African approach. Luhut and Jokowi are formidable political entrepreneurs with a proven impact. Their lack of intellectualism represents their long-term weakness, and Indonesia’s. Indonesia needs more epistemic entrepreneurs with the means to create knowledge, notably about Africa, to reinforce political entrepreneurs’ change capacities, providing new options and capabilities to seise opportunities. A great deal more could be said about universities’ funding deficiency, “unintellectual” corporatist paradigms penetrating them, the favouring of external thinking and models potentially detrimental to Indonesia’s development or the $10bn state endowment fund largely allocated for Indonesians to study abroad, undoubtedly bringing benefits, but extra funding should support the development of local universities and research capacities. This study underlines those policies’ disastrous costs with a concrete foreign policy example. A major

37 Indonesia fought through diplomacy for its territorial sovereignty, becoming an officially-recognised archipelagic nation. For Waltz, sovereignty is a state’s capacity to “cope with its internal and external problems ” (Waltz, 1979). Indonesia’s archipelagic waters merged the internal and the external. From the Djuanda Declaration on 13 December 1957 affirming sovereignty over archipelagic waters, the Archipelagic Outlook strategic discourse in 1973 to the 1982 UNCLOS Convention, Indonesia slowly but surely affirmed its maritime nature in the contemporary world (Butcher & Elson, 2017).

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country like Indonesia must invest massively in its universities and transform them into its first diplomatic assets, recognised for their knowledge creation quality. The Bandung final communiqué called for the creation of “educational, scientific and technical institutions ” in Afro-Asia (Lee, 2009).

African Challenges Indonesia faces significant challenges in its African engagement, like all external powers. It is not necessarily prepared, notably given its lack of knowledge of Africa, as seen above, and questions concerning state capacity and leadership continuity. Developing the right African strategy and approach is complicated for all external powers, both “developed” and emerging. African approaches must flexibly evolve with changing African circumstances, adapt to African nations’ variety and always consider African agency at all levels, from elites to grassroots civil society.38 Durable relationships with African nations and societies can only be co-constructed. African nations balance their relationships with external powers, notably through forum shopping (Soulé, 2020). Indonesia’s IAF is just another venue and vehicle for African countries and their elites to increase their strategic weight, visibility and leeway on the international stage. The IAF does not stand as the most lucrative venue for African elites. They can gain more with other external partners. External powers like Indonesia are not in the capacity to dominate relationships with their African partners that will necessarily be dialectical. Beginning its contemporary African engagement, Indonesia is still evolving in the “age of innocence”. Its African ties are not yet structural, and its presence is still limited. Still in its African expansion’s early stages, Indonesia is not yet confronted with the major problems an imposing continental weight brings. With such projects as the railway construction in the DRC, its significance might quickly grow, especially if it joins with powerful partners through SSTC. Yet, Indonesia’s funding problem for its African projects constrains its engagement, risking hurting its reputation. Luhut refocused on Global South hilirisasi diplomacy through an AfroAsian narrative of Bandung solidarity, which does not require important 38 African agency has even been seen as the main concept replacing the primacy of Pan-Africanism and then African renaissance (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021).

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funding, potentially smoothens access to African resources, and supports its domestic industrialisation interests while forming relational power with the Global South, especially commodity-producing African nations. Indonesia’s African policy’s analogical description proposed in this book, with the African strategies of China, Japan, India and South Korea, and multiple references to other external powers, help identify and analyse the challenges and opportunities that Indonesia could face or not in its current and future African engagement and possible solutions and situations to avoid. China’s contemporary African approach’s evolution constitutes a precious source of knowledge for Indonesia, in ideology with questions about sovereignty and peace and security paradigms when faced with attacks on its African assets and diaspora, co-creation and relational power with academic and scientific networks built with Africans or soft power and relations to African societies and public opinions. Consciousness about Africa has risen for certain Indonesian elites, but the continent is still far from a solid priority for many. Therefore, it remains complicated for Indonesia to view Africa from a strategic perspective, optimising ways, means and ends. Elite negotiation and focus are not easy. Indonesia is full of opportunities and preoccupations for all its leaders. A constant battle for prioritisation occurs among multiple topics.39 The African subject needs more attractiveness in Indonesia’s crowded public space and media. A figure like Luhut will not always be there.

NAASP Revival? The NAASP issue originated this book’s idea on Indonesia’s African foreign policy. The multilateral attempt could not operationalise given the absence of a common Afro-Asian idea and vision, different political cultures and conceptions of sovereignty, misunderstanding of African dynamics in Indonesia notably, harsh competition between Asian powers,40 African conflicts, history and memory and simply a capacity

39 Like in India, where the Africa topics compete with subjects the elite finds more important or urgent (Bhatia, 2022). 40 Wirajuda denies any “competition”. “Africa is large enough for all” to do business. Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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and knowledge shortage, notably in Indonesia.41 Kemlu was aware of the NAASP’s impossible operationalisation and of other major Asian powers’ disinterest, yet conserved and tried to relaunch the scheme in 2015.42 Indonesia lacked the material and ideational capacities to drive a vast initiative like the NAASP, involving all Afro-Asian powers. Young insisted on leadership and its different types as the critical determinant of regionalism or regime building and for negotiating among states and their opposed interests. Adapting his model, for He and Feng, a lack of material and ideational leadership explains the absence of Indo-Pacific institutionalisation. Asia–Pacific, thanks to an influential epistemic community, institutionalised, notably with APEC (He & Feng, 2020; Young, 1991). Pragmatic and entrepreneurial, Jokowi and Luhut pushed for a more bilateral, concrete approach, notably through SOEs, with a strong ideational influence from “China in Africa”, or should it be said “China in Indonesia”, a more feasible engagement type given Indonesian capacities. Indonesia’s hilirisasi and infrastructure building also benefit from Chinese support. Under Luhut’s powerful umbrella, Kemlu supported the effort in partnership with other state entities. The NAASP was forgotten. Following the overall trend of the Jokowi era, Luhut progressively monopolised relationships at the highest level with Africa. The NAASP could prove useful in the future, especially with Indonesia’s capacities and international weight increase, and if Indonesia significantly develops its African knowledge. The NAASP originally aimed at coordinating and streamlining the various Africa+1 forums. The fusion of Africa+1 forums into an Afro-Asian mega-forum would avoid unnecessary rivalries and create more synergies, supporting an Afro-Asian community through more equalitarian and less hierarchical relationships (Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho et al., 2018). Wirajuda clearly indicated this was Indonesia’s original vision and was still valid.43 This thinking

41 And on the African side also for that matter, that feels dominated by external powers through multi-bilateral schemes and where the articulation between the AU, RECs, and African states, the latter willing to defend their sovereignty, is an ongoing issue and the subject of the Kagame Report (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021). 42 Even if they lack utility, regimes can remain in place, dysfunctionally, if they provide a “mutually recognized social value”, as seen with the African security regime complex (Brosig, 2013). The NAASP can be perceived in that perspective. 43 Author’s interview with Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda (17 April 2018, Jakarta, Pusdiklat Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2018).

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on fusion and coordination of Africa+1 summits is also taking place at the AU and RECs level to ensure Africa benefits from external powers’ engagement, reducing asymmetric relationships between Africa and its external partners through a common and coordinated African policy.44 Yet, qualifying Indonesia’s African approach as “neocolonial” would be a historical and moral mistake. Nuance is required, especially since this book shows Indonesia cares more about African support to protect its domestic interests than African riches, although it does need oil, cobalt or lithium. As the NAASP’s “vehicle for coordinating Afro-Asian South-South cooperation”, AASROC could find its utility as a mechanism to deal with Asia–Africa partnerships (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021). The AU pushes external powers to engage first with RECs, not primarily with the AU, to recalibrate asymmetric relationships developed in Africa+1 forums and formulate a common Africa policy benefiting African interests. African continentalism rests on regionalism and RECs as the AU’s building blocks. ASEAN, and therefore Indonesia, through the NAASP-AASROC process, can appear as the natural enablers on the Asian side for the operationalisation of a workable Afro-Asian platform. The AU was invited to Indonesia’s G20 Summit in 2022. Indonesia envisages engaging the AU, potentially through the EAS. With the tense geopolitical context, ASEAN Centrality could reinforce itself by widening its views towards Africa, dynamising Afro-Asian solidarity. ASEAN should also engage RECs better, the problem being smaller ASEAN nations share minuscule interests with Africa. Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy and tropical forest alliance are bringing Indonesia and Africa closer, forming Afro-Indonesian working groups to serve development goals. However, Indonesia risks ignoring non-resource-rich African nations, therefore appearing too selective and lacking altruism for Africans, notably since it does not implement its DFQF obligations. Different mechanisms can be envisaged to develop an Afro-Asian institution, like boosting knowledge partnerships to create an Afro-Asian sentiment, shared interests and even collective identities and elaborate potential Afro-Asian configurations, forming transregional financial

44 These hierarchical relationships are embodied in “the one and many” paradigm of Africa+1 forums seen by Mthembu and Mabera as neocolonial and as “Africa’s multibilateral predicament with major external powers ” (Mthembu & Mabera, 2021).

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institutions focusing notably on public goods like infrastructure, coordinating policies in health, trade, investment, industrialisation or skills or supporting cultural exchanges with concrete common realisations in media, entertainment and the arts, with Afro-Asian productions. Bali is seeing Afro-Asian initiatives of international standard develop, notably in music, dance, food and spirituality.45 It still concerns a global elite of wealthy tourists, travellers, hipsters and digital nomads. Afropop is popular in Bali and Jakarta clubs.46 Afro-Asian youth, notably young intellectuals, need to know each other better, not only through social media. These are minor indications, given the vastness of Afro-Asian potentialities. Encouraging private exchanges of all kinds, especially creative and intellectual, should be prioritised. The collective achievement of an Afrasian world should be imagined inclusively, for human progress, without excluding other continents. Its definition stands with the people and their chosen elites, especially thinkers and doers.

Afro-Indonesian Hope Indonesia remains a country full of hope and opportunities. Despite problems and challenges, there is undeniable freedom in Indonesia and a certain excitement for a potentially even brighter future. The newly started contemporary African engagement demonstrates Indonesia’s immense possibilities for progress, led by proper leaders who can deliver, like Jokowi and Luhut, with all their imperfections. Indonesia needs concreteness. Most Indonesians believe Jokowi is the right man at the 45 Some initiatives serve soft power motives of certain powers, notably in music. African food is developing its presence in Jakarta and Bali. Some African sellers, or Indonesians having lived in Africa, of simple African dishes of grilled meat served with plantain, have been doing well. Initiatives are mostly community-based and still not very visible, especially in Jakarta. Moroccan cuisine is better represented. The diversity and richness of Sub-Saharan African cuisine have still not been well demonstrated in Indonesia. 46 When studying this book’s subject, A.M. Jones’ 1964 book about Indonesia’s influence on music in Africa seemed to be the only major study published on Indonesia-Africa relations. Indonesian influence can be seen in African xylophones. The book describes Indonesia’s long periods of colonisation in Africa, like in the Niger or Congo Basins in the early Christian era, and successive migrations from several parts of Indonesia. Indonesian influence in Africa on shipping, metalwork, board games or tribal customs is described (Jones, 1964). Others, probably rather quickly, considered that, apart from piracy in the tenth century on East African coasts coming from Southeast Asia and slave transfers, Afro-Indonesian links were almost inexistent (Cribb & Kahin, 2004).

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right time. Since Jokowi’s destiny is entrenched with Luhut’s, Luhut is probably the right General at the right time.47 Simultaneously, hopefully the next batch of leaders will care more for meaningful knowledge, disinterested at times, education and societal debate concerning Indonesia’s civilisational proposition, without lacking pragmatism.48 Intellectual exchanges and co-constructions with Africa will determine the quality of Afro-Indonesia. The democratic decline etiquette placed on Indonesia does not embody the entirety and complexity of the Indonesian reality and its often-positive evolution. Like the wrongness of labelling external emerging powers in Africa as neocolonial, due to fear of competition, stigmatising a major emerging power like Indonesia with simplistic labels is also mistaken. Research long denied the African state’s historicity, as if Africans could only be guided by exogenous factors (Bayart, 2006). Indonesia determines its path and choices. Not recognising that liberal electoral democracy in its imperfections is highly problematic through the divisions, instability and lack of meritocratic leadership it brings should also be a consequential issue. The US Capitol’s invasion in 2021 calls for modesty in judgement. The irony of it was not missed in Indonesia, with academics calling for the US to restore its democratic process and credentials. Losing credibility and influence, Western democracies are suffering from the rise of mediocre leadership who accede democratically to the highest positions. The flow of post-truth stupidity and vulgarity adds to the problem. The level of crime and social conflict in the US especially, but also in several parts of Europe, is unattractive. Indonesia and Africa look at those facts carefully. In a way, Indonesia suffers from similar problems with its chaotic democracy, but since managing pluralism is existential, it has placed limits. What Indonesia sees in the West impacts its

47 Luhut and his friends often say that as a senior leader, who has achieved everything he would have dreamed of, he has “finished with himself ” (“sudah selesai dengan dirinya”) and is fully dedicated to his country’s success (Massardi, 2022). Broad acknowledgement is more complicated for Luhut as a double minority in Indonesia. Yet, Jokowi’s political success is shared with Luhut, both his political shield and implementer. 48 Luhut highly cares for education, as described in his biography. His foundation,

located in his native Lake Toba region, has developed a successful school fully financed by his businesses, especially focusing on sciences such as mathematics, IT, biotechnology and horticulture. The school has reached the podium of the best schools in the country (Massardi, 2022). Yet, this has not fully transpired in the Jokowi government, which has often seemed pragmatically non-intellectual. Education was also not in his portfolio.

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geopolitical views and foreign policy, partly explaining it’s partial “Chinese turn”.49 Africa is also looking. This brings even more acuity to studying Indonesia–Africa co-creations. Labels like “neo-developmentalism”, “illiberalism” and “neoauthoritarian” placed on Jokowi are ethnocentric, as if Indonesia should follow a given model, or it becomes a bad student. Blaming Jokowi for his developmental approach that corresponds to the nature of his state, society and the whole of East Asia and that Japan, South Korea or China have successfully applied before seems strange.50 These latter nations represent Indonesia’s preferred model, readapted to its peculiarities. China has perfectly understood the attractiveness of its achievements, promoting its model of good governance and stability through intellectual networks across the Global South, notably Indonesia and Africa, against Western liberal electoral democracy that paradoxically now seems unstable (Rolland, 2021). Luhut is even promoting the model in Africa as having been successful for Indonesia. China’s influence on Indonesia, including its African policy, should be food for thought for Western nations. Instead of being too confrontational, decency, politeness and meritocracy should be placed at the centre again. They exist in Asia. The West should remember its roots, not refuse its aggiornamento. It has a lot to learn in Indonesia and Afro-Asia. This book is not about the “West” though. Representing a world of over 1.7bn people, Afro-Indonesia exists by itself. Indonesians make and manage their country. For a time, they chose Jokowi to help them rise. Moreover, in many ways, they are doing well given remarkable challenges and complexities. Indonesia is unique in the management of its diverse population, counterterrorism, increasingly in infrastructure and industrialisation and creativity in general. Bali, a Hindu island in the largest Muslim-populated nation on earth, is the most successful touristic island globally. The archipelago can contribute to the world despite its imperfections. It knows how to manage the most diverse polity on the planet while remaining safe and stable. Why does it 49 It is partial only since we saw previously Indonesia privileged its OECD candidacy over a BRICS membership. 50 Moreover, the development state has been described as a primary institution, in the English School sense, of East Asia in general, corresponding to an East Asian idiosyncrasy. Economic development ensures political legitimacy, regime security and stability, part of a comprehensive conception of security (Buzan & Zhang, 2014).

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seem less affected by Islamic terrorism than Europe when it houses the largest Muslim population? Why does it feel safer to walk in the streets of Jakarta than in Paris at night? Why does such a diverse nation survive and not disintegrate like less plural Somalia, Sudan or Yugoslavia? African countries and many other countries, including Western ones, can learn from Indonesia, which itself still needs to learn a lot. Of course, many imperfections remain. As this book explains, Indonesia should build its knowledge and academic power. Battles occur between the vast majority of the population that wants progress and entrenched interests. By all means, President Jokowi wants the best for his people and country. The shift brought by engaging his nation with Africa in a tangible way, although still imperfect and symbolic by its modest scale, is an example of concrete change that should be well-valued, revealing Indonesia’s global ambitions. It is a pioneering endeavour not to be underestimated. Hopefully, Indonesia and its leaders will decide to develop their intellectual and academic ecosystem to keep rising.51 The country is moving forward. Jokowi is a symbol and testimony to that, so are the millions of Indonesians who freely express themselves and build their country every day. Mindsets in Indonesia are evolving fast. People are ambitious and want progress. Jokowi embodies that will, whatever the criticism. He was backed by his people to bring change. Indonesia has a genuine and strong public opinion. This book is a modest testimony about Indonesia today, a nation full of opportunities and with a bright future if its politics evolve well. The co-construction of an AfroIndonesian partnership is a fascinating perspective. Europe and the US should not be afraid like they were with Bandung but embrace this historical movement. The Covid-19 crisis, the Russia–Ukraine war, the Taiwan Strait tensions as part of the US–China meta-rivalry and other challenges like climate change remind humanity of the need to build new partnerships for change. Afro-Asian solidarity offers a path that has not been well explored in the contemporary era. Exploration and knowledge should be open to all. Indonesia’s African engagement occurs in this tense geopolitical context, notably affecting the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Like all other 51 Since the beginning of the century, Türkiye developed academic research on Africa and supported a concomitant interest and curiosity about Africa in Turkish civil society to accompany its African expansion (Donelli, 2018).

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regions, notably Southeast Asia, Africa has become a battleground for influence between China and the US, and, on a weaker scale, the UK, France, Türkiye, Russia, Israel, the GCC nations, Iran and more. Like Western powers, China aims to disseminate its conception of nationbuilding, national governance and development model in Africa, as it does in Indonesia. As Global South members, African countries are courted as counter-containment partners against the US, itself mobilising its allies in a so-called alliance of democracies, notably to counter the BRI by offering alternative solutions for building quality infrastructure for low and middle-income countries.52 China’s leading Africanist Li Anshan calls for mutual learning and civilisational coexistence with the BRI through a “sustainable development diplomacy”, China inviting the UK, France and the EU to collaborate in Africa.53 The China–US opposition supposedly becomes the meta-framework conditioning all other relationships and developments, a sort of new Cold War with a different configuration. The situation is probably not so simple with growing multipolarity.54 Still, it seriously affects Indonesia’s great power management. This study cannot systematically deal with Indonesia’s positioning in the context of China–US rivalry, but it has serious ramifications for Indonesia, including in Africa. Will Global South nations have to pick their camp like during the Cold War? Where will Indonesia be? Where will the different African nations be? Luhut’s hilirisasi diplomacy promoting a Chinese developmental success model represents an indication that Indonesia is more than that and partners with multiple powers, aiming to become a major leader of the Global South. Indonesia can apply its balancing and hedging strategies to serve its interests in Africa. Partnerships with African countries bilaterally, triangularly with other external powers or multilaterally will provide Indonesia with tremendous opportunities and ways to preserve its autonomy. 52 Such initiatives include the US’s Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), or the EU Global Gateway aiming to mobilise up to e300 billion of investments for sustainable and high-quality projects (Sullivan, 2023; The White House, 2021). Global Gateway website: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en. 53 For Li Anshan, the private sector-led B3W cannot compete with China’s infrastructure investment capacity, given Chinese state reserves (Anshan, 2022). 54 The India–China rivalry is probably as or more important in the long run (Ganguly et al., 2023).

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Afro-Asian solidarity and the Bandung Spirit remain assets that can be revived for current and future geopolitical purposes. Indonesia remains a geopolitically well-located and well-gifted country. Allied to Africans, co-constructing a shared destiny, the archipelago will be stronger and more resilient if it can also reinforce Africans. Indonesia cannot afford to lay so low anymore, almost ignoring major strategic parts of the world. Jokowi–Luhut have restored that ambition.

Further Implications This book confirms that only a combination of multiple determinants on different analysis levels can try and approximate Indonesia’s foreign policy’s causal mechanisms. The study denies realist affirmations that state behaviour is entirely caused by the international system without a role in domestic politics (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Domestic politics clearly determines how the Indonesian state decides to interact globally and its actual marge de manoeuvre.55 Jokowi’s strong parliamentary coalition provided him with bipartisanship power. Indonesia’s increased material power and confidence permit a more expansive foreign policy (Sukma, 2003). Yet, material gains in Africa do not fully drive Indonesia’s African engagement. The book even shows the African approach has been leveraged by General Luhut to protect domestic material benefits linked to nickel-based industrialisation with Chinese support. Indonesia’s African trade has not yet boomed, unlike Türkiye, India or China’s exports to Africa. Trade cannot be said to fully determine the Indonesian state’s African engagement, making it an important but secondary driver. Of course, Indonesian business elites and transnational capital play a major role in Indonesia’s expansion. Indonesian MNCs largely influence Indonesian bureaucracy, political parties and political appointments. They push the trade and foreign ministries to negotiate PTAs with Africa. Nevertheless, the developmental state, following a logic of state capitalism and state-led infrastructural development under Jokowi, and its highest elite, have their own logic.

55 US foreign policy can be similarly seen as more constrained by its domestic politics, like hyper-partisanship or the contestation of the social contract altogether than by material power competition (Trubowitz & Harris, 2019). This can also apply to China with other kinds of domestic factors.

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In the domestic politics context, presidential leadership is the primary determinant of Indonesia’s African policy shift. Wiwel and Gron underline the lack of research on “charismatic leadership in foreign policy”, or the capacity to produce meaning in a transformational and inspirational way with a sense of “we” and a perceived role in the world for a national community (Wivel & Grøn, 2021). Jokowi constitutes a “charismatic” leader in that perspective, more positive than the Weberian charismatic leader. Jokowi and Luhut’s leadership roles are clearly highlighted in this book. Jokowi does represent a “reset” in Indonesian foreign policy, but not uniquely for “the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as its geopolitical canvas ” (Shekhar, 2018). His simple and pragmatic opening up to Africa induces potentially important consequences for Indonesia and forms part of Indonesia’s road to great power conditioned by gaining great power in at least one external region.56 Related to presidential leadership change, the shift in foreign policy towards Africa appears revolutionary for Indonesian foreign policy in the perspectives opened for the first time for a country long described in seminal works as inward-looking and with an acute sense of vulnerability, supposedly scared to develop a “post-ASEAN foreign policy”57 and purportedly refusing to expand internationally due to domestic oligarchic interests. Oligarchic theorists explain that Indonesia behaves in an inwardlooking way since Indonesia’s main oligarchs are not focused on “the capture of foreign markets or resources or to influence the policies of other nations ” but on protecting their rent-seeking activities and local economic accumulation (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). This study contradicts this position. First, some of Indonesia’s main MNCs are now firmly focused on Africa, like the Salim Group and its iconic brand Indomie.58 Secondly, Jokowi has activated the Indonesian state and its SOEs to 56 Following Pardesi’s theory as explored previously (Pardesi, 2015). 57 Following Sukma’s now almost classic expression. 58 The biography of Liem Sioe Liong, the founder of the Salim Group, shows how the

Salim Group started its internationalisation decades ago precisely not to depend too much on the Indonesian market and also since Indonesian-Chinese entrepreneurs were at risk, being politically weak if not protected at the highest level. The biography also underlines how Salim group’s first major international business, and monopoly in Indonesia, was related to benefiting from a monopoly in importing cloves from Zanzibar and Madagascar, from the mid-60s until the 80s mostly, so Africa already contributed to the success of Indonesia’s major F&B group. Indonesia could buy up to 90% of these African nations’ production that employed two million small-holders, apparently of better quality than

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expand to Africa, breaking the inward-looking perspective. The Indonesian state is expanding its activities with Africa, pushing the whole country to follow. Pertamina, in particular, has solid positions already. Through state capitalism, the developmental state extends itself to Africa as a symbol of its domestic infrastructural and hilirisasi success. Domestic political competition also pulled and pushed Jokowi and Luhut to focus on Africa, notably given Chinese and Sino-African networks and associated rewards. Luhut’s Global South minilateralism in the Afro-Asian Spirit actually promotes a successful Chinese model of development support for developing countries. Indonesia de facto becomes an ambassador of that model. This opens broad research perspectives. Although the durability and seriousness of Indonesia’s new African endeavour will be assessed in the long term since the end of the Jokowi factor could mean the specific African effort’s end. Geopolitical tensions also present tremendous challenges for Indonesia and Africa. Moreover, Africa’s classification as a “non-traditional market ” indicates that Africa is not yet seen as the highest Indonesian strategic foreign policy objective. In reality, Africa has already become more than that in the mindset of part of the Indonesian elite, as indicated by the serious commitment coming directly from Jokowi and implemented by Luhut.59 The attention of those two leaders determined a foreign policy subject’s prominence in Indonesia during the Jokowi era. Still, foreign policy activation requires not only attention from the highest leaders but also a domestic political struggle, more or less intense depending on the endeavour and its rewards. Jokowi and Luhut’s entrepreneurial mindset and pragmatism, Luhut bringing the power of the security apparatus networks, allowed Africa to become a more concrete part of Indonesia’s elite considerations as a new area of expansion for Indonesia, not only for material interests but also prestige, status and domestic politics such as the legitimation of domestic developmental success towards domestic and international

Indonesian cloves. African cloves were a stepping stone for Salim’s business (Borsuk & Chng, 2014). 59 Latin America or the Middle East, the other “non-traditional markets” for Indonesia, did not receive the same personal attention from Jokowi and Luhut, apart from the UAE as the exception confirming the rule.

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audiences.60 For East Asian developmental states, economic development, including through international expansion, should reinforce state stability and comprehensive security. Foreign policy towards Africa serves domestic goals. An Indonesian engagement with Africa means promoting and sometimes defending, Indonesia’s domestic success, notably in infrastructure, hilirisasi, health, the blue and green economies or digitalisation, seen as symbols of Indonesian modernity and capacity. Its SOEs can use Africa as an internationalisation lab. Luhut’s task force for Indonesian infrastructure and then hilirisasi in Africa exports an Indonesian savoir-faire as proof of Indonesian progress. His hilirisasi diplomacy makes Indonesia an Afro-Asian changemaker and ideational leader, supporting Africa’s commodity downstream industrialisation while supporting Indonesia’s own industrialisation policies against Europeans and the WTO. An apparently economic diplomacy-focused foreign policy prolongs the sovereign state in all its dimensions, trying to defend its territorial integrity against separatism, raise its status and material power and show its people its progress. As China’s expansion towards Africa was never only about oil or critical minerals, Indonesia’s African move cannot be summarised by the quest for material interests, especially since trade with Africa was higher before Jokowi during the commodity boom, except from 2021 with another rise in commodity prices. Marxist or neoliberal explanations placing too high a premium on material factors are proven wrong in the Indonesian case. Political leaders and the state have their own interests, views and priorities. This excessive primacy given wrongly to material interests, almost denying emerging powers their complexity, resonates with Bayart’s theory of extraversion relating to Africa, contrasting with dependency paradigms. Although apparently subjugated by dependency, African countries exercise their sovereignty dynamically. They can frame relationships with superior powers to their advantage, similar to Indonesia’s great powers management in Southeast Asia. The discourse of Africa’s marginality in the world system is just “nonsense” (Bayart, 2000, 2015), especially given Africa’s crucial historical role in its formation (French, 2021). Likewise, the narrative of emerging powers’ neocolonialism in Africa does not stand empirical examination. Emerging powers face many challenges, preoccupations and constraints other than purely material, like gaining a few 60 Beyond electoral or identity-based legitimation, performance in development and stability legitimise Jokowi’s power. Luhut helps secure both.

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trade points. Domestic politics remains the main priority to survive politically. Domestic politics, like political competition between the highest leaders, can even drive Indonesia’s most powerful politicians to focus on certain policy issues like Africa to monopolise Chinese networks that could benefit political adversaries and disturb political stability. Contrary to neo-Marxist works that explain emerging powers’ African engagement mostly in material terms, evoking domestic capital overaccumulation that has to be invested in Africa in the case of China or the primary quest for natural resources (Carmody et al., 2022; Taylor, 2014; Taylor & Zajontz, 2020), this research underlined the weight of political factors relating to high leadership, sovereignty or epistemic capacities. Neoliberal or neo-Marxist paradigms insisting on material factors’ primacy in explaining external powers’ behaviour in Africa are insufficient. In the case of emerging powers, especially when using the adjective “neocolonial”, those studies can appear neocolonial themselves. Emerging states and their societies have multiple drivers, priorities and challenges like other states and societies. They are not limited to natural resources, trade or other material interests. Indonesia is a massive continental state with a vibrant civil society and major domestic constraints and preoccupations. Its African expansion could never only be for material reasons, the proof being it had to wait until Jokowi and his pragmatism when trade with Africa was lower than before his presidency to start considering a serious African approach. Like Brazil, the economic weight of Africa for Indonesia is too low to consider trade or investment as the main dominating variables. Engaging more seriously with Africa is a political choice. This book’s contribution is also to insist on the importance of being sceptical towards simplistic, purely mercantilist and deterministic explanations of emerging powers’ foreign policies, notably towards Africa. Ideas and knowledge represent the second main determinant highlighted in this book. Jokowi’s African engagement was clearly framed by his and his entourage’s existing knowledge of emerging powers in Africa, notably of “China in Africa”. Hybridisation and policy diffusion occurred through the ideational blending of external and local influences, explaining the chosen framework, which prolongs the domestic development paradigm towards Africa. The NAASP failed to operationalise due to a lack of an Afro-Asian epistemic community, and understanding of African dynamics, notably relating to the AU. Institutionalising the NAASP would require forming a transnational epistemic community thinking Asia–Africa and about Asia–Africa, influencing policymakers and

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strong leadership willing to champion the cause and able to influence or constrain other nations. China imposed the BRI thanks to its material and ideational power. The astuteness of Luhut’s Global South hilirisasi and environmental minilateral framework consists in inviting resource-rich developing nations, thereby privileging a uniting principle that facilitates coalition formation. Afro-Asianism originally failed against the NAM and ˇ 2022). The risk in Africa is its unifying non-bloc principle (Cavoški, to appear condescending towards non-resource-rich countries, creating a backlash. This lack of knowledge and ideas has had a significant impact, entailing Indonesia’s African engagement’s lateness until the Jokowi shift traced in this book. Indonesia’s education and academic insufficiencies cause significant weaknesses in its foreign policy capacities, creating mistakes in its endeavours, as perfectly revealed by its missed African engagement when other leading Asian powers were competing in Africa. Those knowledge and ideational factors and epistemic, educational and academic deficiencies and imperfections heavily determine Indonesia’s foreign policy and the spectrum of possibilities. The Jokowi leadership factor is itself constrained by Indonesian epistemic capacities. Africa is not well studied in Indonesia. Although laudable by the perspectives it opens, Indonesia’s African engagement remains limited, lacking sophistication. Indonesia’s potential efforts to increase its knowledge of Africa will determine the success and sustainability of its African engagement, which should be holistic. Indonesia’s insufficient African engagement before Jokowi relates to Indonesia’s post-Reformasi focus on internal consolidation and its power deficit. But this book shows that the role of political entrepreneurs at the highest level, the presidential leadership and its pragmatism and epistemic and ideational capacities are decisive. Indonesia persisted with the NAASP framework and did not launch its Africa+1 framework and the Luhut task force until 2018, eighteen years after China’s FOCAC.61 Against inwardlooking and pusillanimity classifications, Jokowi already left his mark by engaging Indonesia in Africa through the Indonesian state’s first integrated and conceptualised external expansion targeting an entire foreign continent. Often underestimated, supposedly not interested in foreign policy, while in reality, Luhut’s foreign policy activism means Jokowi, 61 Technically, the name FOCAC appeared in 2006, preceded by the Chica-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF).

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Jokowi leaves a historical mark on Indonesian foreign policy through this concrete expansion, opening the door to possible great power for Indonesia if it raises its capacities and expertise, especially in knowledge and research. Despite its laudable pragmatism and will to change, Indonesia’s highest political leadership remains restricted in its actions by still limited Indonesian epistemic capacities. Education remains the ultimate driver of prosperity. The Jokowi “reset” lacks “riset ”. After the pragmatic Jokowi, Indonesia needs more intellectualism, without sacrificing infrastructural and other material achievements. La longue durée will tell what Indonesia and Africa can co-constitute together, inspiring while inspired by each other and other players. New political entrepreneurs and intellectuals will determine Afro-Indonesia’s future.

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Index

A Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, 425 ABE Initiative, 365 abstraction, 218 Abuja, 456 academia, 227 academic, 8, 17, 26, 30, 34, 47, 69, 87, 98, 100, 101, 134, 140, 149, 179, 180, 182–187, 191, 192, 195, 208, 209, 216, 220, 227, 230, 270, 272, 273, 290, 300, 335, 350, 364, 367, 371, 386, 402, 445, 460, 464, 473, 474, 477, 480, 483, 504, 508, 516, 521, 524, 530, 537 Accra, 228, 288 accumulation, 84, 100, 101, 108 Aceh, 385 Achebe, Chinua, 21 actors, 203, 205, 216, 217, 235, 249, 273, 285, 289 Addis Ababa, 299, 301, 391, 441 Addis Ababa University, 195 ad hoc, 134, 141, 157

administrators, 447 Afghanistan, 83, 190 AFINDEX, 380 Afrasia, 6, 8, 15, 16, 22–24, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 89, 368 Africa, 67, 69, 70, 72–74, 78, 79, 81–84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99–101, 103, 104, 106–109 Africa+1 forum, 333, 354, 390 African affairs, 186 African agency, 2, 14, 17, 29, 67, 208, 235, 289, 292, 297, 339 African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 348 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 21, 105, 166, 214, 288, 298, 359, 395, 517 African Development Bank (AfDB), 365, 374, 392, 395 African dream, 357 African Mining Vision (AMV), 289 African National Congress (ANC), 129, 136 African ownership, 356

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 C. Dorigné-Thomson, Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa, Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6651-6

545

546

INDEX

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 347 African renaissance, 19 African Standby Force (ASF), 347, 348 African studies, 183, 186, 191, 192, 207, 235, 521 African tour, 246, 251, 252, 254, 256, 426 African Union (AU), 5–8, 10, 15, 16, 19–22, 24, 28, 31, 36, 67, 82, 105–107, 130, 131, 133, 136, 138, 146–148, 150, 159, 160, 163, 164, 166, 179, 214, 215, 232, 233, 249, 289, 297, 335, 344, 347, 348, 361, 372, 376, 382, 383, 391, 392, 398, 425, 428, 429, 435, 437, 442, 455, 462, 478, 481, 504, 519, 525, 526, 536 Africa Policy Papers, 344, 467 Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association (AAJA), 155 Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), 155 Afro-Asian Studies , 181 Afrocentric, 19, 33, 190, 363 Afro-optimism, 17 Afro-pessimism, 17 Afropop, 527 agency, 133, 152, 160, 163, 164, 187, 193–195, 197, 334, 339, 343, 356, 374–376, 383, 394, 400, 401, 434, 435, 437, 443, 455, 467, 472, 476, 477, 482, 483, 516, 517, 519, 523 Agenda 2063, 20 agriculture, 12, 143, 211, 213, 231, 248, 260, 293, 294, 351, 363, 370, 373, 377, 378, 390 aid

development aid, development assistance, ODA, 131 aircraft, 93, 255, 259 air force, 90 airline, 281, 301, 441 airport, 99, 509 Akash missile, 380 Alatas, 132–135 Algeria, 12, 16, 24, 94, 129, 131, 154, 164, 209, 210, 213, 246, 248, 267, 274, 278, 279, 295, 352, 376, 390, 454, 462, 483 All-Africa passport , 21 alliance, 87, 93, 94, 101, 102, 242–246, 263, 433, 526, 531 alternative, 228, 238, 260, 261, 334, 340, 342, 346, 353, 357–359, 362, 366, 369, 381, 389, 395, 397, 398 alumni alumnus, 184, 338, 369 alumni associations, 184 alumnus alumni, 208, 254, 288 Ambalat, 97 ambassador, 214, 218, 225, 241, 249, 257, 289–291, 297, 299, 300, 427, 460, 472, 512, 516, 534 anarchy, 88 Andaman and Nicobar, 385 Angola, 206, 213, 214, 247, 248, 250, 265, 269, 270, 274, 278, 279, 294–297, 345, 351, 352, 377, 379, 470, 483, 512 animal husbandry, 273 anniversary(ies), 13, 31, 32, 133, 138, 438 anti-corruption campaign, 269, 270 anti-piracy, 453 Anung, Pramono, 253 Apartheid, 19, 22, 129, 134, 147, 370

INDEX

Arab, 425 Arab Spring, 194, 299, 300 Archipelagic and Island States (AIS), 245 Archipelagic Defense Strategy, 97 Archipelagic Outlook, 73, 96, 444 archipelagic sea lanes, 104 archipelagic waters, 90 Area Studies, 183 armed forces, 190 arms, 269, 293, 339, 347, 348, 380, 396, 453, 479 army, 73, 90, 94, 96, 510, 511 arts, 527 ASAP, 442, 455 ASEAN, 4, 7–10, 15, 28, 36, 39, 40, 47, 71–80, 82, 86, 88, 89, 96, 102, 105, 107, 108, 130, 132, 144, 145, 147, 151, 153, 156, 158–160, 162, 164, 166, 206, 208, 225, 251, 252, 254, 256, 258, 264, 276, 278, 279, 281–287, 299, 345, 350, 358, 359, 361, 368, 376, 381, 383, 385, 399, 402, 428, 429, 432, 439, 442–444, 450, 453, 455, 457, 459, 474, 508, 519, 522, 526, 533 ASEAN Centrality, 7, 8, 39, 71, 72, 78, 79, 82, 88, 102, 105, 144, 147, 151, 156, 166, 208, 264, 358, 368, 376, 399, 402, 429, 439, 444, 453, 526 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), 7, 39, 71, 72, 82, 102, 105, 107, 429, 444 ASEAN Plus, 79, 106, 252 ASEAN Summit, 130 ASEAN Way, 158, 159 Asia, 205, 207, 213, 217, 225, 226, 232, 238, 243, 248, 268, 269, 271, 278

547

Asia-Africa Centre, 140 Asia-Africa Conference, 180 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), 5, 104, 334, 357, 361, 362, 367, 380, 468 Asia-Africa Summit (AAS), 6, 7, 13, 15, 22, 31, 32, 36, 132, 133, 136, 138–143, 217, 223, 227, 233, 237, 238, 240, 266, 268, 269, 462, 510 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 15, 135 Asian-African Conference Commemoration National Committee, 237 Asian and African Sub-Regional Organisations Conference (AASROC), 132, 526 Asian Financial Crisis, 18, 147, 153, 180, 338, 445 Asian Games, 98 Asian Relations Conference, 166 Asian values, 18, 38 Asia-Pacific, 76, 429, 459, 525 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 15, 70, 79, 88, 99, 135, 525 ASLs, 444 assets, 5, 78, 96, 107, 108, 346, 348, 351, 354, 357, 382, 395, 401, 507, 508, 514, 523, 524, 532 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 482 asymmetry, 182, 193, 197, 334, 344, 346, 376, 382, 393 “a thousand friends, zero enemies ”, 10 attention economy, 442 AU assembly, 214 AUC, 133, 164, 354, 376, 382, 391, 395, 479 AU Constitutive Act, 67 AUKUS, 88, 156

548

INDEX

AU Peace Fund, 347, 391 Australia, 70–72, 84, 152, 156, 446, 475, 510 automotive, 360, 387 autonomy, 37, 186, 350, 438, 445, 455, 507, 512, 531 avocado, 258 B B2B, 221, 255 Bakrie, 263 balance of power, 43 balance of trade, 258 balancing, 41, 78, 83, 95, 105, 108, 504, 531 Bali, 4, 9, 69, 84, 218, 233, 239, 243, 267, 282, 353, 376, 378, 391, 527, 529 Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), 218 Bandung, 1, 2, 4–7, 9–13, 15, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30–33, 35, 42, 46, 129, 132, 134, 136, 139, 140, 142–145, 150–155, 158, 161–163, 165, 179, 184, 185, 188, 189, 191, 192, 205, 212, 218, 232, 233, 239, 240, 243, 244, 248–250, 253, 254, 256, 258, 260, 264, 267, 268, 291–293, 339, 342, 345, 346, 351–353, 360, 362, 363, 367, 369, 384, 402, 403, 427, 428, 430, 431, 437, 438, 442, 448, 455, 458–460, 468, 471, 477, 503, 504, 517, 520, 523, 530, 532 Bandung Communiqué, 180 Bandung Conference, 179, 185, 191. See also KAA Bandung Spirit, 6, 12, 20, 22, 24, 31, 32, 42, 91, 140, 180, 243, 253, 254, 258, 264, 351, 431, 459, 460

Bandung Spirit Reborn, 254 bandwagoning, 161 Bangkok, 338 Banjar people, 471 Banjul formula, 164, 376 Ban Ki-moon, 390 banking, 374, 378, 431 bargaining power, 402 Batak, 241, 271, 289 batik, 130, 300 battery(ies), 71, 244, 251, 357, 360, 380, 387 bauxite, 42 bebas aktif , 10, 24, 27, 43, 77, 87, 93, 95, 339, 381, 448, 468 behaviour, 75, 84, 95, 100 behind-the-border, 21 Beijing, 98, 99, 191, 370, 376, 391 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 5, 25, 71, 210, 233, 244, 247, 297, 340–342, 344–346, 357, 358, 360, 379, 385, 458, 467, 473, 531, 537 Bemba, Jean-Pierre, 470 beneficiation, 248, 250, 289, 344, 438, 440, 521 Benin, 206, 279, 290 Berlin Conference, 403 Bharti Airtel, 374 Bhinnêka Tunggal Ika, 83, 91, 260 BHPL, 262 Biden, Joe, 482 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 256, 257, 259, 262 bilateralism, 5, 6, 36, 137, 150, 151, 160, 165 Bio Farma, 212, 242, 258 biography, 27, 37 bipartisanship, 532 blindspot, 218 blue economy, 138, 209, 245, 246, 366, 376, 509

INDEX

Blue Nile. See Nile River Boeing, 264 Borneo, 446, 471 BPIP, 188 BPPK, 207, 220, 227 Brazil, 6, 8, 14, 18, 42, 181, 183, 204, 234, 242, 246, 250, 282, 298, 360, 363, 400, 433, 445, 446, 461, 463, 467, 474–476, 504, 510, 536 Bretton Woods, 18 bricolage, 157 BRICS, 6, 8, 36, 74, 99, 100, 474 BRICS Summit, 253, 263, 264 bridge, 2, 29, 33, 47, 132, 133, 135, 138, 445 BRIN, 187 Brunei, 240, 255, 279 budget, 87, 161, 164, 204, 211, 222, 300 bureaucracy(ies), 87, 138, 142, 206, 219, 220, 222, 224, 226, 245, 272, 300, 532 Burkina Faso, 20, 191, 194 Burundi, 425 business, 204, 206, 209, 211, 217–221, 227, 229, 231–235, 237–239, 250, 252, 255, 260, 261, 268, 270, 273–275, 279, 281, 284, 286, 292, 296, 343, 345, 349, 353, 355, 357–359, 363, 365–367, 373, 381–384, 387, 389, 391, 395, 399 Buzi, 262 C Cabinet Secretary for Investments, Trade and Industry, 245 caesium, 357 Cairo, 155, 426 Cairo Conference, 155 Cambodia, 279

549

Cameroon, 205, 207, 279, 287, 288 Canada, 475 capacity-building, 6, 12, 27, 104, 133, 139, 234, 248, 258, 260, 335, 336, 369, 370, 379, 383, 389 Cape Town, 251, 430 capital, 35, 38, 76, 83, 88, 100, 108, 217, 222, 228–230, 239, 240, 242, 251, 256, 260, 288, 293, 297, 342, 345, 375, 381, 384, 388, 392, 440–443, 445, 446 capital punishment, 38 Capitol, 450, 528 CAR, 479, 480 carbon, 242, 245, 246, 265 cartel, 243 cashew, 249 catalyst, 6, 29 cattle, 250, 251 causal mechanisms, 29, 30, 34, 45, 519, 532 Central Africa, 20, 287, 300 Central African Federation, 162 Central African Republic (CAR), 20 CEO, 211, 257, 261, 270 ceremony, 212, 262, 282 chaebol, 244, 389, 395 charismatic, 533 chemicals , 261 China, 2–9, 11, 13–19, 23, 25, 26, 30, 33–36, 38–40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 81, 84, 89–91, 94, 95, 98, 100–104, 107, 135, 141, 142, 144, 145, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157, 161, 164, 180, 182, 183, 188, 191, 192, 194, 203–206, 208–210, 220–222, 224–226, 228–230, 232–234, 237, 240, 241, 244, 247, 266, 268–271, 275, 276, 281, 286, 287, 290,

550

INDEX

292–297, 300, 301, 333, 334, 336, 340–342, 344–347, 349, 350, 352, 355, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 367, 370, 377, 381, 386, 387, 392, 393, 395, 401, 403, 430, 432–435, 437–443, 445, 449, 452–462, 464–470, 472–474, 476–478, 481–483, 503, 504, 509–512, 514, 517, 518, 520–522, 524, 525, 529–532, 535–537 China-Africa, 180–183, 192 China-Africa Defence and Security Forum, 347 China-Africa Vision 2035, 349 China Dream, 458 China in Africa, 180 China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), 464 China Railway Group, 295 China’s Investment Authority, 230 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 191, 192 Chinese-Indonesians, 286, 455 Christian, 271, 454 circulation, 34 citizen(s), 5, 27, 36, 80, 82, 91, 92, 104, 107, 205, 214, 233, 255, 297, 300, 301, 336, 338, 346–348, 353, 354, 356, 357, 363, 368, 372, 379, 383, 387, 389, 390, 401, 426, 455, 468, 469, 514 civilian capacity, 214 civilisation, 26, 82, 104 civil-military, 78 civil society, 17, 19, 30, 32, 77, 96, 134, 148, 155, 159, 165, 182, 185, 189, 193, 194, 216, 220, 231, 249, 272, 291, 300, 346,

349, 355, 356, 376, 384, 389, 436, 437, 450, 452, 469 clichés, 10, 17, 44 clientelism, 183 climate change, 19, 139, 245, 250, 255, 265, 290, 356, 378, 391, 429, 453, 471 coal, 14, 42, 346, 377 coalition, 351, 394, 433, 439, 444, 468 cobalt, 250, 265, 295, 357, 360, 526 co-construction, 530 co-creation, 196 coffee, 246, 258, 281, 288, 377 cognitive power, 477 Cold War, 3, 18, 72, 77, 80, 95–97, 129, 135, 147, 182, 194, 344, 370 collective defense agreement, 152 Colombo Conference, 152 Colombo powers, 142, 152, 162 colonialism, 9, 15, 18, 21, 430, 518 colonisation, 183, 343, 402 combat-ready troops, 348 Combiphar, 257, 258 COMESA, 213, 256 commando, 42, 47, 157, 238, 239, 255, 272, 433, 447, 463, 478, 508, 510, 511 commercialisation, 186 commodity(ies), 9, 15, 38, 41, 42, 131, 206, 242, 244–247, 249, 262, 275, 277, 292–295, 351, 377, 378, 393, 431, 434, 518, 524, 535 commodity-rich, 472, 518 communication, 30, 148, 210, 213, 290, 296, 300 communiqué, 12 communism, 95, 166 Comoros, 471

INDEX

competition, 3, 7, 18, 20, 21, 23, 36, 37, 42, 133, 143, 145, 160 competitivity, 365 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), 373 confidence, 211, 219, 220, 240 Confidence Building Measures (CBM), 452 conflict, 17, 19, 131, 132, 135, 152, 159, 161, 194, 205, 245, 265, 270, 294, 295, 341, 348, 355, 379, 426, 441, 456, 467, 477, 479, 524 Confucius Institutes, 335 Congo, 428, 452 Congo Basin, 242 connectivity, 7, 138, 166, 250, 289, 296, 340, 358, 380, 382, 384 conservation, 242, 265 consolidation, 220, 237, 268, 271, 400, 512, 513, 537 Constitution, 44, 80, 83, 90–92, 94, 163, 428, 470, 476 construction, 209, 210, 228, 233, 237, 247, 274, 275, 281, 293, 294, 334, 343, 346, 348, 351, 355, 374, 383, 395 consumption, 345, 350 containment, 358, 381 contestation, 139, 147, 153 continentalism, 33, 345, 519, 526 continuity, 222, 240, 260, 261, 290, 343, 351, 353, 400, 429, 433, 444, 456, 468, 510, 513, 523 copper, 42, 250, 294, 295, 377 Copper Belt, 250 cornerstone, 105 correlations, 29, 34 corruption, 10, 86, 95, 213, 269, 270, 296, 341, 343, 353, 368,

551

381, 394, 397, 398, 440, 444, 450, 455, 477 cotton, 249 counter-containment, 531 counterterrorism, 81, 214, 347, 451, 529 countertrade, 294, 295 Covid-19, 16, 17, 38, 69–71, 85, 87, 100, 107, 204, 211, 212, 221, 236, 239, 241, 275, 289, 292, 294, 334, 337, 345, 347, 348, 353, 355, 382, 397, 428, 437, 450, 503, 520, 530 CPO palm, 352, 393, 440 creative, 437, 442 creative economy, 75, 82, 287, 300 creativity, 190 credibility, 403, 446, 459 Creecy, Barbara, 263 crime, 17, 131, 451 Crimea, 478 crisis, 69, 70, 85, 87, 95, 100, 107 critical juncture, 180, 209 critical minerals, 3, 42, 243, 244, 254, 265, 344, 357, 365, 383, 387, 505, 535 crony capitalism, 255 crop cultivation, 399 crude petroleum. See oil cultural diversity, 262 culture, 18, 23, 26, 32, 41, 208, 222, 224, 234, 235, 298, 334, 335, 344, 395, 397, 432, 438, 446, 455 cut flowers, 441 cyber, 344, 472, 480 D DAC, 388, 393 Daewoo, 397 dairy, 377

552

INDEX

Dakar, 209, 290, 291, 294, 301, 349, 366 Dar es Salaam, 247, 248, 259, 288, 289 Dasasila, 11, 91, 153, 165, 248, 455, 458, 468 Davos, 246, 254 deadlock, 31, 186, 468, 509, 521 debate, 185 debt cancellations, 377 debt relief, 290, 346, 355 debt-trap diplomacy, 222, 345, 355 decision-making, 134, 148 Declaration on the NAASP, 132, 143 decolonisation, 11, 20, 22, 79, 91, 131, 151, 343, 369 defense, 30, 38, 70, 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 94, 96, 97, 182, 196, 205, 214, 228, 246, 248, 251, 255, 259, 262–264, 271, 288, 290, 338, 344, 348, 355, 378, 380, 383–385, 401, 447, 452–454, 456, 460, 466, 470, 475, 479, 505, 514, 517 Defense Attaché, 255, 259, 262 defense diplomacy, 82, 214, 264, 380, 384, 452, 466 defense industries, 380, 453 defense policy, 77 Defense White Paper, 77, 348 deficit, 222, 249, 255, 258, 296 deforestation, 242, 243 democracy, 10–12, 38, 39, 68, 78, 80, 83, 84, 88, 91, 105, 130, 139, 218, 298, 299, 449, 455, 471, 472, 477, 480, 508, 528, 529 democracy promotion, 299 democratic decline, 81, 89, 446, 528 democratic failure, 159 democratic regression, 38, 68, 84, 450

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 42, 213, 214, 242, 245, 246, 250, 253, 254, 265, 274, 279, 294, 296, 297, 346, 352, 360, 363, 372, 401, 425, 429, 433, 439, 453, 470, 523 democratisation, 19, 37, 38, 76, 80, 96, 130, 132, 180, 182, 236, 299, 445, 471, 477 demography, 361, 368 Deng, Xiaoping, 341, 342, 345, 349, 364, 457, 458 denuclearisation, 391 Department of African Studies, 371 dependency, 3, 14, 132, 134, 150, 438, 441, 455, 535 deradicalisation, 451 deterrence, 104 development aid ODA, development assistance, 4, 5, 25, 83 developmental, 506, 509, 511, 513–515, 517, 529, 531, 532, 534 developmentalism, 4, 68 developmental peace, 348 developmental state, 228, 232, 429, 441, 535 development assistance development aid, ODA, 181, 186, 347 development cooperation, 211, 234, 248, 258 Development Finance Corporation, 229, 242 development-security nexus, 190 development story, 396 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), 30 Dexa Medica, 273, 292 dialogue, 17, 70, 88, 339 diamonds, 294

INDEX

diaspora, 5, 23, 214, 288, 301, 336, 368, 371, 372, 375, 378, 383, 384, 401, 436, 465, 469, 471, 482, 516, 524 digital, 221, 229, 244, 245, 247, 249, 261, 289, 297, 339, 351, 370, 381–383, 394, 395, 398, 427, 428, 442, 456, 472, 482, 527 digitalisation, 398, 535 dignity, 9, 13, 38, 158, 430, 439, 444, 506, 514 diplomat, 129, 184, 186, 195, 210, 216, 220, 222–224, 226, 227, 253, 274, 290, 292, 293, 295, 341, 381, 385, 390, 433, 436, 452, 474, 515, 522 diplomatic architecture, 204, 206, 353, 383, 483 diplomatic coverage, 392 diplomatic school, 261 DIRCO, 263 Directorate for African Affairs, 47, 204, 205, 222, 224, 226, 233, 235, 242, 245, 246, 248, 253, 272–274, 300, 301 Directorate-General for Asian, Pacific and African Affairs, 226 Dirgantara Indonesia (DI), 274, 275, 292 disaster management, 213, 258 disaster relief, 385 discourse, 68, 73, 75, 79, 81, 85, 86, 89, 98, 100, 102, 109, 135, 137, 138, 141, 145, 182, 204, 208, 218, 232, 242, 249, 268, 299, 341–343, 345, 352, 353, 360, 370, 381, 382, 395, 399, 427, 430, 431, 446, 455, 456, 460, 473, 474, 481, 504, 506, 509, 511, 519, 522, 535 discrimination, 265, 290, 341, 369, 455, 481

553

distance, 217, 233 diversification, 21, 195, 206, 275, 373, 377, 389, 393 diversity, 11, 21, 35, 45, 83, 91, 93, 131, 144, 150, 154, 160, 165, 207, 235, 260, 262, 272, 273, 337, 341, 354, 356, 379, 440, 442, 447, 450, 454, 455, 511, 527 Djibouti, 206, 214, 229, 279, 335, 345, 352, 362, 379, 393, 403, 453, 459 Djuanda Declaration, 522 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana, 136 doctrine, 5, 10, 83, 93, 94, 96, 97, 107 domestic politics, 76, 85, 88, 431, 464, 474, 510, 513, 517–519, 532–534, 536 donor, 185, 211 Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, 373 Doval, Ajit, 385 downstream, 9, 41, 42, 193, 257, 262, 265 down-to-earth diplomacy, 433 drivers, 216, 340, 348, 367, 382–384, 388, 401, 503, 505, 512, 513, 518, 536 drought relief, 258 dual circulation, 345 dual technology, 78 Dubai, 229 durability, 534 Durban, 132, 136 Dutch East Indies, 426, 430 Duty-Free Quota Free (DFQF), 243, 349, 350, 364, 377, 378, 526 Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme, 377 Dwifungsi, 96

554

INDEX

dynamic equilibrium, 78, 102, 362, 402, 429, 453, 473 E EAC, 214, 247, 256 EAS, 70–72, 79, 81, 82, 88, 105, 106, 144, 147, 166, 364, 376, 383, 444, 453, 526 East Africa, 5, 72, 253, 258, 273, 339, 358, 364, 368, 379, 383, 384, 390, 392 East Asia, 70, 74, 78, 100, 108, 131, 135, 142, 158, 161, 166, 361, 386, 387, 397, 440, 441, 476, 529 East Timor, 215, 240, 291 eclectic analysis, 44 analytic eclecticism, 44 economic diplomacy, 3–5, 25–27, 31, 33, 35, 68, 73, 80, 81, 86, 98, 106, 129, 143, 180, 182, 186, 194, 203, 207, 208, 211, 218, 225, 227, 231, 233–235, 237, 238, 272, 281, 292, 299, 337, 353, 355, 370, 374, 379, 400, 433, 435, 445, 449, 460, 462, 463, 471, 477, 478, 483, 509, 513–515, 535 ECOWAS, 213, 214, 297, 372 education, 6, 13, 22, 43, 85, 87, 88, 131, 153, 180, 182–184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 195, 211, 231, 248, 250, 272, 281, 288, 293, 335, 337, 338, 344, 354, 365, 366, 370, 373, 378, 381–384, 390, 396, 398, 431, 444, 453, 466, 470, 471, 477, 479, 521, 528, 537, 538 Egypt, 10, 24, 33, 131, 136, 139, 162, 164, 205, 206, 248, 252, 278–280, 288, 300, 336, 339, 352, 365, 372, 376, 390, 393,

425, 426, 428, 462, 465, 470, 479, 483 elections, 70, 80, 83, 99, 131, 154, 204, 213, 235, 236, 240, 244, 270, 271, 432, 439, 444, 447, 463 electricity, 248, 250, 261 Electric Vehicles, 71, 244, 247, 250, 255, 357, 360, 387 elite(s), 14, 33, 46, 70, 74, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 97, 98, 100, 101, 106–108, 143, 148, 165, 180, 181, 183, 189, 215–217, 219, 220, 269–271, 273, 289, 297, 432, 437–441, 443, 445, 454, 464, 469, 472–474, 477, 481, 505, 507, 509, 512, 513, 517, 521, 523, 524, 527, 532, 534 emancipation, 189 embassy(ies), 1, 73, 109, 136, 162, 205–207, 221, 234, 248, 281, 287, 288, 301, 356, 378, 392, 400, 426, 441, 456, 483 emerging powers, 14, 19, 29, 32 emission reduction, 245 energy, 12, 13, 35, 43, 70, 96, 143, 151, 206, 210, 240, 244–247, 249, 251, 255–257, 260, 261, 263, 265, 274, 278, 281, 288, 293, 339, 357, 370, 372, 374, 378, 379, 391, 401, 428, 431, 460, 462, 466, 479, 481 energy transition, 428 entertainment, 527 entitlement, 444 entourage, 29, 31, 75, 219, 223, 240, 509, 536 entrepreneur, 30, 106, 223, 231, 233, 235, 238, 271, 272, 357, 365, 379, 522, 533, 538 entry point, 254, 256

INDEX

environment, 3, 12, 13, 37, 139, 182, 192, 213, 222, 242, 336, 344, 356, 384, 391, 394, 431, 440, 441, 455, 479 environmental diplomacy, 180, 215, 237, 268, 377, 384, 398, 510 epistemic, 519, 522, 525, 536, 537 epistemic community, 153, 525, 536. See also epistemic Equatorial Guinea, 396, 459 Equatorial Lake Plateau, 425 equilateral alignment, 102, 351, 362 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 463 Eritrea, 372, 392 Ethiopia, 10, 16, 162, 185, 195, 206, 248, 249, 273, 279, 295, 299, 342, 345, 366, 372, 375, 392, 397, 425, 426, 441, 483 Ethiopian Airlines, 301, 441 ethnicity, 37 EU, 244, 275, 352, 391, 394, 519, 531 EurAfrica, 30 Eurocentric, 465, 475 Europe, 76, 87, 104, 431, 439, 457 European construction, 145, 158 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 103 Eximbank, 34, 210, 228, 242, 247, 251, 282, 294, 342, 353, 374, 375, 380 experience, 342, 344, 348, 363, 385, 388, 390, 396, 399 expertise, 5, 12, 30, 76, 94, 101, 103, 104, 107, 140, 144, 161, 163, 205, 209, 211, 214, 226, 253, 261, 293, 343, 354, 357, 362, 363, 367, 371, 382, 383, 389, 392, 402, 431, 438, 443, 452, 453, 456, 461, 462, 466 export(s), 21, 23, 42, 131, 212, 221, 230, 231, 243, 244, 246–248, 251, 257, 259, 262, 275, 277,

555

278, 287, 288, 292, 297, 298, 505, 532, 535 external powers, 181, 182, 186, 194, 196, 209, 215, 220, 228, 233, 234, 289, 293, 296, 299, 301, 426, 429, 430, 433–435, 437, 438, 443, 444, 446, 450, 455–457, 461, 463, 464, 466–468, 471, 477, 478, 481, 483, 503–505, 513, 517, 519–521, 523–526, 531, 536 extractive industries, 188 extraversion, 14, 289, 517, 535 F F&B, 213, 221, 230, 248, 273, 440 family planning, 12, 213, 258 farmers , 260 Farmer’s Agriculture and Rural Training Centre (FARTC), 260 fatigue, 156 FDI, 231, 251, 279, 298, 345, 360, 364, 365, 372, 393 feedback, 342, 343, 376, 383 fertilisers, 248, 261, 274, 460, 469, 481 fibre optics, 384 FIFA, 99 fighter jets, 264 final communiqué, 431, 523 financial services, 278 financing, 210, 213, 228, 229, 233, 242, 245, 272, 281, 282, 289, 294, 296 funding, 12 Finland, 466 fishery, 12, 211, 213, 377 flagship, 219, 230, 233, 240, 378, 382 flying geese, 441 flying geese model, 359 FMCGs, 257, 273

556

INDEX

FOCAC Action Plans, 347 Focus Africa Programme, 375 FOIP, 358, 364 follow-up mechanisms, 375 food, 434, 440, 460, 466, 480, 527, 529 Food and Drug Control, 258 Food and Nutrition Security in Africa (IFNA), 355 food production, 389 food security, 96 force modernisation, 103 Ford Foundation, 183 forest(ry), 12, 42, 231, 243, 245, 246, 254 Forum fatigue, 267 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 3, 5, 8, 14, 23, 135, 138, 143, 191, 335, 340–345, 347, 349–351, 354, 358, 366, 373, 376, 391, 394, 443, 458, 467, 472, 478, 537 forum shopping, 156, 157, 289, 293, 437 forward deployment, 90, 105 founding fathers, 92 Françafrique, 20, 190, 270 France, 4, 6, 8, 13, 20, 38, 43, 129, 147, 152, 181, 189, 190, 192, 194, 197, 204, 205, 208, 220, 221, 223, 234, 271, 293, 296, 297, 349, 362, 403, 427, 436, 445, 449, 456, 466, 469, 476, 480, 481, 504, 531 Francophone Africa, 191 Free West Papua Campaign, 291 fresh flowers, 258 Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), 94 Fukushima, 357 funding, 136, 139, 140, 142, 148, 164, 166, 183–185, 189, 190,

192, 195, 208, 209, 217, 220, 233–235, 242, 247, 249, 255, 259, 270, 273, 281, 282, 288, 294, 295, 335, 342, 346, 347, 351, 353, 354, 362, 399, 401, 433, 455, 457, 503, 509, 521–523 furniture, 27, 85, 106, 108

G G20, 10, 11, 41, 69, 79, 101, 150, 428, 429, 443, 448, 450, 460, 469, 526 G-77, 11 Gabon, 206, 247, 274, 279, 287, 300 Gajah Mada, 236 Gajah Tunggal, 12 Gambia, 279, 291 Gandhi, Indira, 370 Gandhi, Mohandas K., 369, 371 Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN), 26, 96 garment, 258, 426 Garuda, 70, 255 Garuda Contingents, 362 gas, 12, 14, 42, 90, 231, 246, 247, 250, 255, 256, 260–262, 273, 274, 451 gastrodiplomacy, 230, 288, 300 GCC, 531 GDP, 142, 164, 389, 474, 483 General Moerdiono, 438 General Nasution, 94, 95 Geneva Conference, 152 Geoeconomics, 233 geopolitics, 11, 67, 69, 71–74, 76, 79–82, 84, 87, 89–91, 96, 100, 102, 106, 109, 110, 187, 243, 281, 505, 513 geothermal, 246, 251, 256, 257, 365 Germany, 89, 204, 219, 249

INDEX

Ghana, 1, 12, 16, 45, 155, 163, 205, 206, 212, 214, 243, 273, 279, 290, 291, 301, 342, 346, 352, 356, 371, 375, 377, 389, 390, 399, 430, 434, 436, 453, 483 GIA-1, 255, 259, 261, 263 Global African Studies, 180–182, 185, 504 Global Gateway, 244 globalisation, 3, 17 global Korea, 388 Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), 25, 71, 80, 88, 98, 138, 142, 232, 247 global order, 139, 164 global player, 254, 273 Global South, 11, 42, 47, 73, 75, 85, 100, 109, 142, 150, 154, 156, 157, 159, 166, 212, 243, 250, 253, 254, 256, 258–260, 264, 265, 293, 335, 350, 355, 366, 377, 378, 397, 403, 431, 439, 443, 457, 458, 460, 464, 467, 475, 481, 504, 508, 512, 514, 518, 523, 529, 531, 534, 537 Global War on Terror (GwoT), 130 Gojek, 371 gold, 14, 42, 377 Gold Coast, 162 Golkar, 236, 263 Goncalves, Manuel Jose, 262 Google, 34 “Go Out” policy, 345 gotong royong , 76 governance, 73, 88, 101, 104, 130, 131, 139, 146, 156, 159, 160, 166, 211, 213, 265, 275, 281, 293, 335, 349, 351, 352, 355, 390, 394, 441, 451, 472, 520, 529, 531 Governor, 73, 98 grain, 480, 481

557

Grand Design, 258 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 426 grand strategy, 94, 429, 446, 457–460, 467 graphite, 360 grassroots, 398 Great Lakes, 425 great power management, 102, 104, 106, 151, 344, 351, 429, 439, 442, 453, 460, 473, 531 green diplomacy, 470, 514 green economy, 505 green growth, 398 green technologies, 391, 394 growth, 6, 13, 15–17 Guangzhou, 338, 347 guanxi, 335, 344, 367 guerilla warfare, 94 Guinea, 20, 43, 155, 206, 214, 269, 279, 287, 291, 295, 300 Gujarat, 369, 379 Gulf, 70, 425 Gulf of Aden, 394 Gulf of Guinea, 348, 379, 394 Guma Group, 255 Gumede, Robert, 255, 263 Gus Dur, 75

H Habibie, 75 Habré, Hissène, 159 Hadhrami, 133 Hallyu, 334, 398 HAL Prachand combat helicopters, 380 “hands on top” diplomacy, 344 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 386 Hanoi, 95 Hassan, Samia Suluhu, 254, 259

558

INDEX

Hatta, Muhammad, 72, 76, 90, 93, 357 Head, Bessie, 21 health, 12, 13, 43, 87, 131, 211, 213, 241, 246, 248, 249, 258, 261, 263, 273, 275, 281, 292–294, 344, 349, 351, 355, 373, 378, 381–383, 390, 397, 428, 478, 481, 509, 527, 535 healthcare, 245, 247, 355, 365, 478, 480 health diplomacy, 212, 349, 397, 428 hedging, 78, 105, 160, 402, 438, 440, 453, 504, 531 hegemony, 80, 88, 339, 350, 380, 441, 472, 475, 480, 521 helicopters, 264 hierarchy, 13, 40, 513 higher education, 249 High-Speed Rail, 239, 240, 293 high-speed railway, 403 high-speed train, 102 hilirisasi, 9, 14, 25, 33, 41, 47, 88, 100, 139, 142, 150, 152, 157, 180, 187–189, 192, 194, 209, 215, 217, 218, 228, 230, 235, 237, 243, 247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 255, 261, 265, 268, 343–345, 350, 351, 353, 359, 366, 377, 383–385, 390, 395, 397–399, 401–403, 431, 433, 434, 438–440, 443, 444, 446–450, 457, 458, 460–463, 468, 470–473, 504, 505, 507–512, 514, 517, 520, 521, 523, 525, 526, 531, 534, 535, 537 hilirisasi diplomacy, 192, 209, 235, 254, 255, 344, 345, 397, 400–402, 429, 434, 438–440, 443, 445, 447, 457, 459–461, 463, 468, 472, 510, 512, 517,

520, 523, 526, 531, 535. See hilirisasi history, 2, 4, 10, 11, 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 31, 33, 47, 75–77, 81, 82, 89–91, 109, 209, 222, 225, 228, 230, 237, 252, 255–257, 268, 291, 295, 333, 339, 341, 363, 386, 387, 398, 427–429, 431, 432, 455, 457, 459, 464, 474, 475, 482, 515, 524 holistic security, 79 Hong Kong, 95, 104, 268, 453 Horn of Africa, 425, 451, 454, 481 hospitality, 231, 260 hospitals, 380, 382 housing, 256, 295 Huajian Group, 342 human capital, 443 human development, 358, 382 human rights, 130, 132, 139, 264, 338 human security, 355, 379 human trafficking, 104, 453 hybridisation, 521, 536 hybrid(ity), 3, 159, 374, 457 Hyundai, 244, 395

I IBSA, 6 ICT, 390 idealism, 15, 28 ideas, 158, 181, 182, 210, 219, 519–522, 536, 537 identity, 20, 27, 31, 32, 37, 40, 75, 76, 79, 81, 93, 148, 150, 151, 161, 165, 363, 382, 387, 427, 448, 454, 474 ideology, 3, 44, 67, 83, 88, 91, 93, 188, 217, 266, 334, 335, 347, 348, 354, 364, 438, 458, 480, 524

INDEX

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, 25 illiberal(ism), 39, 455, 529 image, 11, 27, 38, 514 IMET, 452 immigrant, 23 impeachment, 506 imperialism, 18, 21, 343, 369, 447 independence, 9, 22, 33, 36, 72, 75, 77, 84, 91–95, 98, 155, 163, 205, 223, 240, 243, 267, 291, 426, 481 independence movements, 155 Indesso, 249 India, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 18, 24, 35, 36, 43, 48, 68, 70–72, 74, 91, 93, 98, 102, 103, 105, 133, 135, 142, 144, 145, 152, 154, 156, 161, 162, 164, 181, 183, 192, 195, 222, 230, 252, 275, 276, 287, 297, 301, 333, 334, 344, 357, 358, 361–364, 367–386, 391–393, 401, 429, 430, 432, 435, 437, 457, 461, 465, 468, 471, 475, 478, 504, 509, 522, 524, 531, 532 India-Africa Army Chiefs’ Conclave, 380 India-Africa Defence Ministers Conclave, 380 India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), 4, 135, 138, 164, 373, 375–377 Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), 371 Indian Navy, 379 Indian Ocean, 13, 22, 70–72, 90, 102, 106, 133, 138, 142, 159, 162, 245, 253, 256, 289, 368, 378, 379, 384, 385, 429, 471 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), 13, 15, 70, 88, 102, 138, 159

559

Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), 369, 375 Indofood, 12, 108, 217, 273, 285, 469 Indomie, 216, 227, 258, 288, 372, 384, 434, 440, 463, 470, 533 Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF), 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 24, 25, 27, 29, 34, 47, 67, 68, 92, 106, 133, 138, 142, 158, 182, 188, 204–206, 209, 216, 217, 219–221, 223, 225, 227, 229–231, 233, 234, 237, 266, 268, 273, 333, 339, 342, 343, 351, 353, 355, 359, 361, 371, 376, 391, 392, 399, 400, 435–437, 443, 449, 463, 479, 483, 512, 515, 518, 523 Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID), 9, 68, 209, 214, 234, 251, 392 Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue (IAMD), 68, 105, 209, 234, 392, 394 Indonesia AID, 180, 182, 211, 215, 222, 258, 297, 343, 345, 346, 361, 367, 375, 398, 399, 464, 465, 477 Indonesia Garuda Contingent (IGC), 139 Indonesia Inc., 209, 251 Indonesia Investment Authority (INA), 228, 229 Indonesian-Chinese, 103 Indonesia Spice Up The World (ISUTW), 230 Indonesia-Tanzania Joint Agriculture Cooperation Committee, 260 Indo-Pacific, 7, 25, 27, 39, 47, 70–72, 74, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 96, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 129, 142, 152, 156, 245, 256, 344, 357, 358, 364, 380, 399,

560

INDEX

402, 429, 459, 476, 525, 530, 533 Indorama, 12 Indrawati, Sri Mulyani, 212, 228, 282 industrialisation, 9, 15, 21, 25, 38, 41, 69, 71, 95, 101, 131, 132, 156, 182, 193, 214, 231, 242–245, 248–250, 257, 259, 281, 289, 335, 342, 351, 352, 356, 359, 366, 370, 400, 429, 431, 434, 438–441, 448, 461, 507, 510, 524, 527, 529, 532, 535 industry, 348, 353, 359, 366, 374, 378 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), 244 influence, 133, 134, 146–148, 151, 152, 158–160, 164 infrastructure, 9, 12, 13, 23, 25, 41, 43, 47, 68, 69, 83, 85, 86, 95, 98, 103, 131, 139, 143, 157, 183, 187, 189, 192, 193, 209, 210, 217, 219, 222, 225, 228, 229, 237, 242, 245–247, 249, 255, 259, 261, 269, 274, 275, 279, 281, 282, 287, 293, 295–297, 340, 342, 344, 345, 348, 350–352, 354, 355, 358, 365, 370, 374, 375, 378, 380, 384, 385, 395, 398–400, 403, 434, 437, 439–441, 445, 446, 448–450, 457, 460, 461, 463, 471, 472, 478, 479, 507, 509–512, 520, 525, 527, 529, 531, 535 INKA, 274, 294, 434, 439 innovation, 17, 87, 184, 219, 449, 477 instant noodles, 216, 258, 285, 288, 426, 434 Institute of African Studies (IAA), 192, 386, 479, 481

Institute of Asian-African Studies, 191 institutionalisation, 133, 134, 138, 140, 145, 146, 149, 150, 157–160, 179, 510, 525 Institut Pasteur, 242 instrumentalisation, 463, 473 insurance, 431 integration, 129, 145, 155, 158, 159 intelligence, 30, 104, 214, 235, 290 intensity, 162 International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 345 internationalisation, 210, 252, 272, 296, 297, 300, 342, 364, 371, 374, 383, 389, 434, 449, 461, 478, 509, 520, 521, 533, 535 international law, 264, 426 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 18, 38 international order, 334, 355, 358 international regime, 133, 147, 148 international society, 75 international system, 532 internet, 382, 395 intervention, 5, 36–38, 186, 349, 363 intra-African trade, 21 intra-trade, 364 investment(s), 8, 12, 21, 22, 38, 130–132, 142, 147, 188, 189, 195, 204, 217–221, 225, 228, 230–233, 237, 239, 240, 244, 247–249, 256, 257, 261, 262, 268, 270, 273, 281, 283, 284, 294, 296–298, 339, 344, 347, 349, 353, 355, 358, 360, 362, 364, 365, 372, 375, 377, 379, 381, 383, 388, 389, 391, 393–395, 426, 431, 433, 434, 437, 441, 443, 445, 448, 458, 461, 466, 469, 470, 472, 478, 505, 510, 512, 527, 531, 536

INDEX

inward-looking, 39, 90, 94, 95, 97, 99, 106, 108, 233, 439, 444, 447, 449, 464, 508, 513, 521, 533, 537 IR, 185, 196, 225, 241 Iran, 18, 181, 456, 478, 481, 531 iron, 42, 377 irrigation, 399 Islam, 430, 465 Islamic Development Bank, 242 Israel, 44, 181, 204, 220, 270, 297, 425, 445, 456, 479, 481, 504, 531 Istanbul, 301 IT, 371, 373, 378 IUU fishing, 98, 104, 394, 453 Ivory Coast, 206, 209, 214, 233, 279, 291, 295, 301 J Jakarta, 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 24, 31, 32, 36, 42, 71, 73, 75–77, 79, 82, 84, 86, 92, 94–96, 98, 99, 204, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 221–223, 225–227, 230, 232, 233, 235, 239, 240, 246, 248, 253, 267, 269, 270, 274, 286, 288, 293, 300, 301, 338, 341, 351, 360, 361, 376, 381, 385, 387, 390, 402, 403, 426, 428, 432, 436, 439, 441, 456, 458, 478, 506, 515, 516, 524, 525, 527, 530 Japan, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 18, 24, 38, 48, 68, 69, 71, 72, 82, 87, 95, 102, 103, 181, 195, 226, 228, 229, 231, 242, 245, 275, 287, 288, 293–297, 300, 333, 334, 351, 354–367, 377, 380, 385–387, 392–395, 397, 401–403, 430, 435, 437, 440, 441, 457, 504, 524, 529

561

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 213, 231, 363, 366–368 Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), 365 Java, 445, 446, 476 Javanese, 37, 40, 68, 73, 80, 83, 85, 90–92, 94, 96, 99, 141, 224, 226, 240, 252, 271, 432, 435, 454, 476, 506, 513 Jinja, 380 jobs, 440, 462 Johannesburg, 228, 250, 253, 254, 263 joint exercises, 452 joint-industrial development, 214 joint-industrial production, 103 joint naval exercises, 383 joint venture, 268 Jomo Kenyatta’s Mausoleum, 256 Jomo Kenyatta Nairobi International Airport, 255 Julius Nyerere International Airport, 259 justice system, 450 Justification, 227

K KAA Bandung Conference, 503, 504 KADIN, 184 Kagame, P., 22, 164, 166 Kalbe Farma, 12, 217, 273, 292 Kalimantan, 84, 229, 239, 240 Kalla, Jusuf, 206, 225, 234, 270 Kampala Principles, 378 Kanté, Cheikh, 293 Karnavian, Tito, 253 Kedaung Indonesia, 217 Kemlu, 4, 7–9, 11, 12, 24–26, 29, 34, 47, 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77,

562

INDEX

79, 84, 86, 92, 97, 101, 105–107, 109, 129, 133, 134, 136–138, 140–143, 146, 184–186, 194, 204–207, 209–211, 213, 215–217, 219–228, 231, 233, 237, 238, 240–242, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251–254, 256–258, 262, 263, 271–275, 281, 282, 284, 287, 290, 298–300, 342, 354, 359–361, 364, 370, 372, 373, 385, 387, 399, 400, 402, 429, 431, 433, 436, 449, 452, 465, 466, 470, 474, 478, 483, 509–511, 513, 515, 516, 525 Kenya, 193, 212–214, 243, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 253–259, 263, 279, 339, 345, 346, 352, 355, 357, 358, 365, 366, 368, 375, 379, 393, 397, 399, 425, 434, 436, 454, 483 Keynes, John Maynard, 519, 520 Khazanah Nasional, 230 kidnapping(s), 104, 354 Kimia Farma, 273 Kingdom, 26 kingmaker, 220, 450 Kinshasa, 265 knowledge, 2, 5, 12, 15, 24, 30, 34, 36, 41, 47, 69, 73, 87, 100, 101, 103, 104, 107–109, 137, 140, 144, 146, 147, 149, 153, 161, 162, 165, 208, 213, 222, 227, 231, 232, 235, 243, 260, 265, 272, 273, 281, 282, 289, 295, 299, 334, 335, 337, 338, 343, 344, 353, 354, 361, 362, 366–368, 371, 372, 375, 381–386, 389, 392, 394, 396, 398–400, 402, 430, 433, 436, 443, 448, 453, 454, 457, 462, 463, 466, 471, 476, 478, 479,

481, 483, 503–505, 511, 516, 520–526, 528, 530, 536–538 knowledge circulation, 100, 108, 183, 371 knowledge economy, 189 knowledge production, 140, 153, 504, 511, 516, 521 Knowledge Sharing Programme, 392 knowledge-to-policy cycle, 430 Kompas, 480 Konferensi Asia Afrika (KAA), 2, 3, 6, 10–13, 22, 31–33, 89, 91, 95, 129, 140, 142, 146, 154, 166, 218, 266, 291, 293, 426, 430–432, 438, 468, 477, 518 Kopiko, 288 Korea, 431, 435, 437, 440, 453, 467 Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC), 392 Korea-Africa Forum for Industrial Cooperation (KOAFIC), 392 Korea-Africa Forum (KOAF), 3, 390–392, 394 Korea-Africa Foundation, 386, 396 Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), 386, 390 Korean African studies , 192 Korean Association of African Studies, 386 Korean miracle, 389 Korean model, 389, 397 Korean Peninsula, 391, 431 Korean reunification, 397 Korean volunteers, 390 Korean War, 387 Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development, 390 Koroma, Ernest Bai, 269 Kotelawala, Sir John, 152 K-pop, 397 K-rice belt, 399 Kuria, Moses, 245

INDEX

Kushner, Jared, 229 L laboratory, 84, 242, 275, 468, 472, 520 labour productivity, 440 Lagos, 348, 390 land-grabbing, 363, 381, 394, 397 Laos, 279 lateness, 505, 537 Latin America, 42, 73, 400, 434, 458, 459 La Tour de Gorée, 209, 210, 233, 283, 293, 399, 401 law, 73, 90, 104 law enforcement, 104, 450 LDCs, 349, 364, 377 leadership, 12, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37, 40, 41, 46, 76, 79, 84, 100, 106, 108, 109, 186, 191, 204, 216, 219, 223, 266, 270, 271, 296, 297, 335, 344, 353–355, 359, 386, 394, 428, 434, 438, 443, 444, 446, 447, 449, 457, 460–462, 466–468, 470, 474–476, 505–507, 510, 513, 515, 517, 519, 523, 525, 528, 533, 536, 537 Lee, Hsien Loong, 206 legacy, 4, 47, 68, 72, 75, 91, 109, 139, 225, 240, 252, 259, 266, 267, 463, 507, 517 legitimacy, 37, 137, 139, 142, 143, 149, 153, 161, 218, 232, 237, 343, 362, 373, 402, 442, 444, 462 legitimation, 220, 298, 517, 534, 535 Lekki, 348 LEN Industri, 274 Lesotho, 279 Letter of Intent (LoI), 258 LG Electronics, 244, 395

563

liberalisation, 18, 21, 130, 132, 370 liberal peace, 348 liberation, 129, 136, 150 liberation movement, 341 Liberia, 1, 162 Libya, 465 literature, 34 lithium, 244, 247, 250, 251, 360, 526 livestock, 246, 249 LNG, 263 loans, 345, 346, 354, 366, 393, 394 Lockheed Martin, 264 LoCs, 374, 375, 380 Lombok Straits, 444 Low Carbon Green Growth (LCGG), 391 loyalty, 146 Lucknow, 380 Lukonde, Sama, 246, 254, 265 Lula, 204, 282, 433, 445, 461, 463, 467 Lumumba, Patrice, 1, 21, 22 M Ma’anyan, 471 Mada, Gajah, 236 Madagascar, 234, 240, 269, 279, 288, 372, 379, 395, 397, 471 Maharani, Puan, 223, 267 Mahardi, Jodi, 210, 224, 242, 252 Majapahit, 26, 68, 75, 236, 240 Makamba, 247 Makassar Straits, 445 Malacca Straits, 444 Malawi, 262 Malaysia, 18, 22, 28, 73, 131, 154, 181, 229–231, 240, 278, 279 Mali, 20, 190, 194, 363, 375, 452, 479 mandala, 7, 71–74, 76, 79, 90, 94, 96

564

INDEX

Mandela, Nelson, 13, 21, 129, 130 mangroves, 245 manufacturing, 21, 143, 212, 274, 275, 281, 359 Mao, Zedong, 191, 522 Maputo, 261 Maputo International Airport, 261 marginal(ity), 33 Marhaen(ism), 68, 218 marine logistics, 263 maritime, 7, 12, 22, 25–27, 40, 41, 68, 72, 77, 79, 83, 86, 88–90, 95–97, 100, 103, 104, 138, 210, 214, 232, 240, 245, 249, 281, 294, 444, 462 maritime cooperation, 105 maritime diplomacy, 26, 351 maritime domain awareness, 105 maritime economy, 25, 26 maritime identity, 26 maritime security, 68, 77, 103–105, 214 Maritime Silk Road, 344 market access, 35, 130, 212, 213, 215, 227, 261, 273, 292, 293, 297, 350, 372, 374, 377, 379, 383, 390, 396, 401, 430, 456, 469, 479 Marxism, 19, 35 Mauritius, 213, 214, 279, 288, 368, 372, 373, 375, 379, 385 Mauritius route, 373 mayor, 98 Mbeki, Thabo, 130–133, 144, 345 MDGs, 390 meat, 377 Medan, 253, 255 MedcoEnergi, 249 media, 15–17, 23, 30, 32, 37, 77, 100, 182, 209, 213, 216, 220, 231, 256, 268, 272, 335, 338,

344, 349, 350, 354, 460, 473, 524, 527 mediation, 348 megacities, 290 Megawati, 24, 32, 47, 130, 132, 143, 144, 154, 188, 220, 223, 224, 266–268, 270, 271, 512 membership, 68, 101, 264 memory, 6, 10, 22, 430, 482, 524 mental map(s), 76, 81, 106, 109, 151, 186, 217, 218, 357, 431, 505 mercantilism, 31, 33, 41, 44 meritocracy, 529 Mersi, 273 METI, 361, 364 Mexico, 183 Middle East, 373, 374, 431, 459 middle power, 74, 78, 252, 342, 387, 388, 394, 395, 466, 474, 475, 506, 509, 511, 513, 521 Mie Sedap, 288 migration, 453 militarisation, 89, 194, 349, 450, 463, 481 military, 69, 77–80, 82, 83, 86–89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 103, 109, 131, 148, 150, 152, 154, 160, 161, 214, 220, 223, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 246, 251, 271, 274, 281, 295, 299, 347, 357, 361, 362, 370, 372, 378–380, 392, 396, 403, 429, 433, 435, 446, 449, 452, 453, 459, 463, 465, 470, 475, 476, 478, 480, 481, 508, 510, 511, 514, 515, 518 military academy, 214 military base, 348 military industry, 93 military school, 471 mimicry, 11, 34, 182 MIND ID, 261, 294

INDEX

mindset, 7, 10, 27, 32, 46, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79, 85, 86, 93, 97, 106, 141, 144, 203, 217, 219, 233, 239, 335, 344, 346, 349, 354, 365, 367, 370, 379, 387, 399, 433, 434, 446, 449, 508, 515, 519, 520, 530, 534 Ming dynasty, 339 minilateral(ism), 47, 75, 88, 150, 156, 254, 296, 377, 429, 445, 504, 508, 518, 534, 537 mining, 240, 242, 245–247, 250, 255, 256, 261, 269, 273, 289, 293, 295 Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI), 374, 375 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 374 Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 68 MINUSMA, 291 missile, 95 Mitsubishi, 365 Mitsui, 365 Mnangagwa, 246, 470 Mnazi Bay Gas Block, 261 model, 11, 41, 48, 131, 150, 158, 163, 335, 340–343, 348, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 359, 366–370, 376, 381, 382, 384, 389, 390, 397, 434, 440, 441, 450, 451, 456–458, 462, 465, 472, 510, 512, 517, 520, 525, 529, 531, 534 modernisation, 132, 182 Modi, Narendra, 368 Mohammed bin Zayed, 229 Mombasa, 245, 255, 258, 339 monsoon, 22 MONUC, 381 Moon, Jae-in, 388, 396

565

Morocco, 16, 24, 136, 154, 214, 248, 278, 279, 287, 454, 462, 479, 483 Mossad, 270 MoU, 256, 257, 259, 261 Mozambique, 16, 72, 213, 243, 248, 250, 253–255, 261, 263, 275, 279, 297, 350, 357, 358, 363, 372, 379, 451 Mozambique Channel, 379 Mozambique National Festival of Culture, 262 multi-alignment, 43, 374 multi-bilateral, 4–6, 13, 179, 182 multilateral(ism), 4, 6, 13, 29, 36, 41, 70, 79, 91, 105, 107, 135, 136, 139, 143, 144, 147, 149, 150, 153, 156–159, 161, 208, 219, 234, 358, 366, 382, 388, 390, 393, 394, 403, 440 multinational corporations (MNCs), 14, 83, 215–217, 273, 275, 363, 376, 434, 440, 469, 470, 509, 532, 533 multiplicity, 186, 196, 197 multipolarity, 531 music, 527 Muslim, 68, 80, 83, 84, 271, 298, 299, 430, 448, 450, 451, 480, 529 Muslim Brotherhood, 448, 450, 480 Mutua, Alfred, 255 Mvurya, Salim, 255 Myanmar, 142, 159, 251, 279, 440, 454 N Nairobi, 228, 254–256, 258, 259, 349, 355, 357, 358, 364–366 naivety, 235 Namibia, 206, 213, 247 narcotics, 453

566

INDEX

narrative, 75, 80, 85, 100, 129, 132, 134, 142, 144, 146, 150, 152–154, 159, 161, 164, 165, 179, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197, 209, 222, 254, 271, 290, 334, 339, 342, 350, 351, 368, 380, 392, 394, 427, 428, 430, 438, 447–449, 456, 459, 466, 472, 477–479, 481, 483, 509–511, 513, 514, 518, 521, 523, 535 Nasakom, 95 Nasdem, 47, 220, 236, 268–270, 289, 512 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 162, 339 Natalegawa, Marty, 75, 79 National Defence University, 254 National Development Priorities, 515 National Education Policy, 371 national efficacy, 42, 266 National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU), 380 National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT), 371 national interests, 4–6, 24–28, 40, 43, 70, 92, 93, 105, 107, 133, 135–138, 143, 145–147, 150, 155, 157, 159, 161, 165, 231, 243, 249, 300, 335, 342, 345, 355, 358, 382, 388, 390, 429, 431, 446, 448, 452, 453, 460, 462, 467, 478 National Investment and Infrastructure Fund, 230 nationalism, 38, 80, 91, 92, 95, 381 National Research Agency, 207 National Resilience, 73, 88, 96 National Security Advisor, 385 National Security Council, 482 national vitality, 243 nation branding, 230, 288 nation-building, 153, 183, 521, 531 NATO, 151

Natuna Islands, 90, 97 natural disaster, 17, 358 Naval War College, 380 navy, 90, 105 negotiations, 213, 214, 234, 275 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 154, 162, 163, 166, 192, 368, 369, 371, 382, 522 Nekolim, 93 neocolonial(ism), 209, 341, 456, 464, 518, 526, 528, 535, 536 neoliberalism, 3, 44, 46 neopatrimonial(ism), 14, 131 Netherlands, 441 netizens, 389 networking, 337, 339 network(s), 181, 183, 192, 205, 208, 214, 215, 220, 229, 231, 236, 237, 241, 268–271, 274, 281, 296, 344, 349, 357, 358, 366, 367, 439, 443, 446, 451, 458, 459, 463, 470, 472, 512, 513, 516, 517, 524, 529, 534, 536 New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), 5–8, 13, 15, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, 45, 47, 67, 79, 91, 102, 105–107, 109, 132–141, 143–150, 153–166, 179, 208, 218, 219, 222, 232, 235, 238, 267, 343, 345, 376, 399, 435, 440, 446, 463, 468, 504, 518–522, 524–526, 536, 537 New Emerging Forces, 95 New Order, 80, 82, 85, 89, 96, 130, 182, 183, 218, 230, 236, 433, 446, 452, 508, 520 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 130–132, 138, 164, 355, 356, 376 New York, 8, 24, 79, 85

INDEX

New Zealand, 70, 71 Next Innovation with Japan (NINJA), 366 NGOs, 376 nickel, 14, 42, 71, 243, 244, 247, 249, 250, 262, 351, 360, 387, 395, 440, 507, 532 Niger, 4, 20, 209, 233 Nigeria, 1, 12, 16, 131, 162, 164, 206, 212, 216, 247, 248, 269, 273, 274, 278, 279, 287, 291, 292, 341, 345, 348, 352, 356, 375–377, 379, 380, 390, 455, 456, 479, 483 Nigerian Defence Academy, 380 Nile River, 425 Nkrumah, Kwame, 1, 21, 154, 162, 163, 369 Nobel prize, 184, 521 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 10, 11, 129, 130, 135, 144, 145, 153, 154, 166, 213, 215, 256, 260, 267, 438, 537 non-alignment, 145, 350, 363, 379 non-bloc principle, 32, 537 non-indifference, 442 non-indifference principle, 347 non-interference, 151, 160, 442, 467 non-interference principle, 347 non-intervention, 454, 467, 468 non-interventionism, 348 non-intervention principle, 36, 300 Non-State Actors (NSAs), 136, 155, 160, 182, 451, 468 non-tariff barriers, 142 non-traditional market , 74, 106, 151, 179, 203, 229, 272, 400, 432, 459, 463, 468, 469, 534 non-traditional threats (NTTs), 86, 132

567

norm(s), 6, 43, 46, 81, 147, 157, 158, 160, 165, 335, 349, 370, 387, 443, 470 North Africa, 162, 205, 220, 273, 280, 298, 451, 479, 482, 483 North Korea, 35, 387, 391–393, 396, 401, 453 North Sumatra, 84, 426 nostalgia, 26, 32, 218, 253, 427, 431 NU, 83, 184 nuclear, 339, 357, 370, 383, 431, 479, 509 Nusantara, 73, 96, 97, 240, 275 Nyerere, Julius, 21, 369 Nyusi, Filipe, 254, 262 O OECD, 264, 370, 388, 393 offshore balancing, 453 oil, 90, 210, 228, 229, 231, 239, 242, 245–247, 249–251, 255–262, 265, 268, 269, 273, 274, 294, 295, 345, 347–349, 373, 375, 377, 379, 383, 431, 479, 505, 507, 526, 535 oligarchy, 30, 39, 100, 108, 188, 215, 435, 449, 533 Olympic Games, 98 One China policy, 443, 460, 514 OPEC , 242 optimism, 17, 69 Orange Drugs, 292 order, 72, 74, 80, 92, 101 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 130 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 11 orientalism, 190, 518 O.R. Tambo airport, 263 outer islands, 83, 90, 104 outlook, 444 outward-looking, 74, 83, 95, 97, 106

568

INDEX

P P5, 181, 469, 475 Pacific, 70–72, 74, 76, 79, 82, 88–90, 102, 104, 106 Pacific Islands, 459, 478, 515 Pakistan, 70, 91, 95 Palestine, 6, 27, 30, 92, 133, 139, 163, 445 palm oil, 131, 213, 231, 239, 245, 246, 250, 257, 260, 261, 281 CPO, 249, 257, 258, 275, 292 Paloh, Surya, 48, 220, 224, 236, 266, 268–271, 512 pan-African(ism), 20, 21, 33, 162, 163, 166, 180, 205, 207, 214, 255, 273, 301, 338, 347, 376, 382, 397, 425, 430, 477, 483 pan-Asian(ism), 3, 151 Pancasila, 44, 83, 88, 90–92, 94, 95, 266, 298, 432, 455 Pancasila Ideology Development Agency, 266 pandemics, 429, 453 Pandjaitan, Luhut Binsar, 9, 69, 71, 73, 75, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 99, 100, 108, 109, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144, 148–150, 156, 157, 180, 182, 184, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195, 203, 209, 210, 216, 217, 219, 223–226, 228–230, 235–247, 249–252, 254–258, 261, 263, 265–268, 270–272, 288, 296, 298, 342, 345, 351, 353, 359–361, 365, 366, 370, 377, 378, 385, 387, 394, 397–401, 427, 429, 431–435, 438–442, 445–447, 449, 450, 454, 457, 458, 463, 465, 467, 468, 471, 472, 474, 477, 478, 504, 505, 507–514, 517–529, 531–535, 537 paper, 257

Papua, 83, 84, 89, 104, 211, 214, 215, 234, 244, 291, 338, 347, 376, 381, 388, 396, 401, 426, 427, 437, 445, 446, 453, 462, 478, 481, 507, 515, 516 West Papua, 10, 43 Park, Geun-hye, 388, 392, 396 Parliamentary Democracy, 223 partnership, 435, 437, 461, 468, 477, 479–481 Partnerships Management and Resource Mobilisation (PMRM), 67, 391, 435 party(ies), 30, 37, 68, 188, 220, 236, 255, 263, 266–268, 270, 271, 289, 435, 443, 452, 454, 516, 517, 532 Pa, Sam, 268–270, 512 Patel, Ebrahim, 251 patrimonialism, 438 patron, 220, 224, 271 PDI-P, 68, 98, 188, 218, 220, 236, 261, 266 peace, 69, 70, 73, 80, 90, 92, 105, 130, 132, 141, 145, 155, 164, 205, 211, 214, 293, 336, 348, 349, 355, 356, 358, 363, 368, 373, 385, 388, 391, 392, 394, 466, 467, 470, 472, 475, 505, 524 peacebuilding, 73, 132, 205, 298, 299, 428, 452 peacekeeping, 73, 103, 132, 139, 205, 209, 211, 214, 223, 251, 298, 344, 348, 357, 362, 363, 368, 372, 381, 384, 391, 428, 452, 514 pearls, 377 peatlands, 245 Pejambon, 77, 92 Peking, 95 Pelindo, 245

INDEX

People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), 97 people-to-people, 23, 134, 336, 339, 340, 349, 381 perception(s), 334, 338, 381, 384, 393, 400, 438, 469, 475 periphery, 435, 457, 459 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), 368, 379 Pertamina, 9, 12, 108, 210, 240, 242, 246, 247, 250, 251, 255–257, 260, 261, 263, 267, 269, 270, 274, 351, 401, 472, 534 Pertamina Geothermal Energy (PGE), 256, 257 Pertamina International Exploration and Production (PIEP), 257 pessimism, 17 petrochemical(s), 42 pharmaceutical(s), 212, 251, 256, 258, 261, 292, 293, 374, 377–379 Philippines, 73, 240, 278, 279, 385 Phnom Penh, 95, 130 phosphate, 274, 294 Pindad, 251, 274 piracy, 86, 104, 347, 358, 378, 379, 383, 394 pivot state, 74, 431, 474 pivot to Asia, 459, 467 PKOs, 139, 291, 299, 357, 452 PLA, 348 Plan of Action, 132, 166 Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE), 293 platform, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 24, 28, 36, 47, 71, 105, 107, 130, 133, 134, 137, 140, 146–150, 153, 156, 165, 166, 339, 341, 354, 356, 358, 359, 371, 385, 437, 457 Plato, 196 PLN, 248, 250, 261 pluralism, 528

569

police, 97, 139, 385 policy, 203–205, 208, 209, 212, 216–220, 222–227, 229–231, 234, 236–239, 241, 244, 251, 254–257, 262, 266, 268, 270–272, 282, 289, 290, 293, 298, 299 policy diffusion, 536 Polisario, 136, 164 political community, 145 political couple, 272, 507 political economy, 348 political entrepreneur(s), 148, 469, 505, 513, 522, 537 political power couple, 463 political tandem, 255 politique du ventre, 289 pop culture, 300 popular(ity), 442, 464, 506, 507, 512 population, 16, 425, 437, 454, 471, 477, 529, 530 port, 99, 229, 245, 257, 339, 345, 347, 348, 362, 384, 385, 445, 509 post-ASEAN foreign policy, 86, 89, 107, 508, 533 post-conflict, 205, 209 poverty, 14, 15, 17, 213, 255, 265, 350 poverty alleviation, 375 poverty reduction, 192, 349, 354, 355, 390, 440 power plant, 509 pragmatism, 12, 32, 44, 45, 144, 151, 158, 159, 186, 188, 219, 230, 238, 239, 431, 440, 447, 463, 467, 509, 520, 528, 534, 536, 537 Prasodjo, Darmawan, 261 Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), 72, 213–215, 247, 256, 259,

570

INDEX

262, 275, 297, 298, 373, 434, 463, 532 presidency(ies), 208, 216, 241, 264, 266, 267, 433, 445, 450, 458, 461, 464, 467, 507, 510, 512, 536 presidential elections, 366 Presidential Secretariat, 254 prestige, 3, 6, 10, 23, 129, 143, 161, 427, 428, 432, 444 Pretoria, 255, 259, 262 pride, 85, 98, 139, 146, 154, 506 Primakov, Yevgeny, 19 Prime Minister, 206, 236, 246, 253, 254, 265 priority, 203, 218, 256, 258, 261, 273, 282, 296, 298 Private Military Companies (PMCs), 479 private sector, 195, 355, 357, 365, 374, 375, 383, 384, 389, 395, 396 Private Security Companies (PSCs), 104, 347 problem-driven, 67, 184, 505 production, 222, 239, 244, 247, 250, 258, 260, 262, 281, 290, 436, 440, 441, 443, 457, 460, 472, 476, 479, 481, 483 projection, 427, 453, 454, 459, 464, 465, 476 proliferation, 132, 157, 160, 358 propaganda, 335, 348, 427, 456, 481 property rights, 289 ProSAVANA, 363 prosperity, 4, 7, 15, 17, 18, 38, 40 Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 448 protection, 5, 95, 104, 205, 236, 250, 257, 268, 289, 293, 300, 354, 379, 513–515, 517 protectionism, 38, 134 proxy war, 350

PT Timah, 247 public goods, 342, 364, 510, 527 public opinion, 30–32, 37, 81, 346, 349, 350, 353, 363, 389, 524 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), 395 Pune, 380 Pupuk Indonesia, 274, 294 Putin, Vladimir, 19, 480 Pyongyang, 95

Q Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), 88, 156

R R2P, 159, 160, 455 racism, 16, 23, 234, 338, 369, 381, 454, 456, 481 railway(s), 247, 340, 345–347, 401, 509, 523 raison d’Etat , 40, 462, 515 Rakotonirina, Richard, 471 Ramaphosa, Cyril, 250, 254, 265 rationality, 148 raw, 23, 42, 47 realism, 31, 35, 41, 44, 46, 88 reciprocity, 350, 378 recognition, 82, 88, 89, 98, 101, 145, 153, 165, 229, 232, 293, 296, 362, 388, 391, 392, 395, 398, 425, 426, 430, 438, 439, 444, 460, 470, 475, 479, 514 redeployment, 205 Red tape, 86 refinery, 246, 251, 269 reform, 70, 77, 92, 97, 130, 134, 185 Reformasi, 7, 36, 75, 77, 80, 82, 87, 96, 97, 102, 433, 448, 511, 537 regional autonomy, 151 regional cooperation, 147, 158

INDEX

Regional Economic Communities (RECs), 5, 15, 19, 82, 105, 107, 138, 165, 166, 213, 214, 280, 297, 348, 361, 376, 383, 434, 458, 504, 525, 526 Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP), 79 regional entitlement, 36, 89, 96 regionalism, 158–161, 164 regional security complex, 425, 454, 475, 520 relational power, 182, 188, 192, 334–336, 347, 354, 370, 380, 396, 443, 465, 470, 472, 473 religion, 30, 37, 85, 95 reproductive health, 258 reputation, 146, 180, 234, 281, 293, 296, 382, 389, 393, 397, 398, 430, 462, 514, 518, 523 research, 33, 34, 41, 43–45, 47, 87, 140, 147, 158, 162, 180–188, 190, 191, 195, 207, 208, 216, 220, 227, 230, 245, 261, 273, 281, 290, 335, 338, 353, 361, 364, 382, 386, 388, 395, 396, 402, 429, 431, 445, 450, 455, 468, 470, 477, 503, 505, 511, 514, 518, 519, 521, 522, 528, 530, 533, 534, 536, 538 reset, 41, 47, 185, 464, 477, 511, 533, 538 resilience, 246, 258, 261, 263, 355 resource management, 131 resource-rich, 14, 41, 47, 150, 156, 254, 268, 504, 518, 526, 537 resource(s), 14–16, 19, 23, 25, 39, 70, 88, 104, 131, 135, 137, 145, 160, 237, 239, 243, 249, 273, 278, 295, 301, 335, 344, 346, 350–352, 357, 359, 360, 362, 365–368, 370, 372, 375, 379, 381, 383, 384, 387, 389, 390,

571

393, 395, 398, 400, 505, 509, 514, 516, 518, 519, 524, 533, 536 restaurant, 230, 288 Retno, Marsudi, 9, 32, 70, 75, 105, 138, 140, 141, 203, 212, 215, 216, 219, 223–226, 241, 248, 251–254, 261, 264, 266, 273, 288, 375, 431, 465, 478 revisionism, 342, 430, 447, 482 Revolusi, 75 revolutionary, 36, 155, 430, 444, 447 Revolutionary Provisional Government (RPG), 291 rhetoric(al), 31, 35, 140, 143, 144, 158, 431, 447, 448, 450, 460, 462, 468, 477 rice, 258, 377, 389, 399 riset, 41, 47, 185, 464, 477, 511, 538 rivalry(ies), 3, 6, 11, 39, 43, 133, 145, 151, 160, 182, 206, 221, 244, 270, 350, 359, 362, 364, 370, 387, 403, 439, 444, 456, 459, 460, 474, 503, 512, 530, 531 roadmap, 134, 144 roads, 340, 445, 509 Road to Africa, 210 Rohingya, 83 Roh, Moo-hyun, 390 romanticism, 4, 15 RPJMN, 26, 74 RPJPN, 25–27, 97 rubidium, 357 rules of origin (ROOs), 21, 364, 373 Russia, 8, 17–20, 69, 71, 77, 88, 181, 191, 194, 205, 216, 271, 289, 293, 294, 296, 348, 362, 377, 387, 436, 439, 444, 450, 453, 456, 457, 466, 469, 470, 478–482, 503, 504, 518, 530, 531

572

INDEX

Russia-Africa Summit (RAS), 436, 479, 480 Ruto, William, 193, 245, 251, 254, 256, 259, 436 Rwanda, 16, 214, 245, 248, 257, 288, 360, 363, 395, 425

S Sabang, 385 SADC, 213, 214, 250 Saemaul Undong , 389 SafeBoda, 371 SAGAR, 378 Sahel, 19, 189, 190, 194, 451 Salim Group, 434, 470, 513, 533 Samsung, 395 Samudra Shakti, 385 Sanbe, 273 Sandton Convention Centre, 263 San Francisco, 92 Saudi Arabia, 425, 437, 479 scandal, 381, 394, 398 scholarships, 182, 231, 234, 335–337, 349, 353, 365, 370 science, 187, 188, 344, 362, 390 scramble, 14, 28, 137, 209, 221, 367, 402, 403, 505, 516, 517 sea denial, 105 SEATO, 150–152 Sea Toll Road, 26 seaweed, 42, 245 Second Bandung, 154, 267, 268 secret services, 371 sectoral egos, 224 securitisation, 5, 79, 107, 349, 350, 469 security, 2, 4, 5, 15, 25–27, 30, 39, 69–73, 77, 78, 83, 84, 86, 88, 90, 96, 97, 100, 102–104, 108, 109, 132, 150, 151, 154, 156, 160, 163, 165, 182, 183, 189,

190, 192, 194, 205, 214, 232, 233, 236, 248, 251, 255, 257, 258, 264, 269, 270, 275, 289, 291, 293, 296, 298, 299, 335, 336, 338, 339, 344, 347–349, 353–355, 357, 358, 362, 363, 373, 374, 378–380, 383–385, 387, 388, 391–394, 396, 399, 401, 425, 429, 431, 432, 441, 442, 445, 450–453, 455–458, 460, 462, 465–467, 469, 475, 476, 479–481, 507, 509, 511, 515, 517, 519–521, 524, 525, 529, 534 security apparatus, 509, 511, 534 Security Sector Reform (SSR), 96, 471 Self-Defense Forces (SDFs), 356 self-reliance, 38, 342 Senegal, 131, 136, 143, 159, 164, 206, 209, 210, 214, 233, 242, 279, 290–294, 298, 301, 375, 376, 399, 401, 427, 429, 453 Senghor, Léopold, 291 Seoul, 386, 390 Seoul Declaration on the KOAF, 390 separatism, 37, 84, 96, 104, 211, 215, 288, 291, 427, 437, 453, 462, 515, 516, 535 services, 350, 371, 373, 397 Seychelles, 379, 390, 453 Sharm El-Sheikh, 136 Shinzo, Abe, 357, 358, 364 shipping, 231, 278, 431 Siddis, 369 Sierra Leone, 16, 269, 291 signalling, 230, 232, 234, 435, 478 simplification, 463 Sinar Mas, 12, 108, 109, 257, 470 Singapore, 69, 70, 73, 95, 181, 190, 193, 206, 228, 230, 240, 241, 259, 278, 279, 281, 297, 373

INDEX

Sinocentric order, 458 Sino-optimists, 17, 44 Sino-pessimists, 17, 44 Sino-pragmatists, 17, 44 skills, 343, 370, 371, 384, 441, 472 skills development, 520 SLOCs, 378 smelter, 42 SM Entertainment, 395 SMEs, 398 soap, 426 Sochi, 479 social housing, 209, 211, 233, 274, 295 socialisation, 186 social justice, 92 social media, 450, 527 social sciences, 521 Soemarno, Rini, 240 soft balancing, 160 soft power, 11, 23, 181, 191, 296, 335, 336, 363, 370, 372, 380, 381, 383, 386, 389, 390, 394, 397–399, 401, 437, 471, 478, 479, 482, 524, 527 soldiers, 430, 447, 470 solidarity, 3, 22, 79, 88, 89, 91, 109, 134, 135, 137, 152–155, 162, 163, 165, 192, 211, 212, 214, 215, 232, 234, 242, 243, 253, 254, 259, 264, 291, 298, 350, 353, 363, 369, 372, 378, 381, 382, 437, 447, 448, 458, 462, 477, 504, 515, 523, 526, 530, 532 solidarity-makers, 447 Somalia, 242, 248, 279, 378, 392, 530 Sommet France-Afrique, 8, 13 Sonangol, 268–270 Sonatrach, 274

573

South Africa, 6–8, 13, 19, 24, 36, 130–134, 136, 138, 143, 147, 164, 206, 208, 210, 212, 223, 243, 246, 248, 250, 251, 253–255, 263, 265, 268, 278, 279, 292, 336, 345, 352, 356, 368, 372, 374–377, 380, 385, 390, 428, 430, 453, 474–476, 479, 483 South Asia, 358, 431 South China Sea, 38, 90, 103, 104, 358, 385, 439, 445, 454, 459, 522 Southeast Asia, 4, 68, 71, 72, 82, 94–98, 105, 143, 150, 162, 206, 240, 289, 385, 397, 399, 429, 431, 440, 442, 444, 473, 476, 506, 512, 527, 531, 535 Southeast Asian studies, 183 South Korea, 2, 8, 13, 18, 35, 41, 48, 68, 69, 71, 87, 95, 135, 152, 181, 192, 195, 234, 287, 288, 293, 294, 296, 300, 333, 334, 362, 386–398, 401, 402, 504, 524, 529 South Pacific, 211 South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC), 103, 211, 213, 249, 361, 363, 367, 381, 385, 523 South-South Cooperation (SSC), 11, 192, 211, 234, 243, 297, 300, 335, 353, 366, 368, 369, 375, 382 South Sudan, 205 sovereignty, 19, 40, 43, 84, 91, 93, 98, 151, 157–160, 162, 164, 196, 241, 248, 291, 293, 298, 299, 340, 342, 348, 362, 363, 381, 388, 403, 425, 443, 444, 454, 455, 460, 462, 514, 515,

574

INDEX

518, 519, 522, 524, 525, 535, 536 Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), 83, 228, 230 Soviet Union, 2, 18, 479–481 soybean, 250 Soyinka, Wole, 21 spatial fix, 35 Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 359, 520 special envoy, 210 special forces, 238, 255, 468, 470 speech, 139, 141–143, 155 spice trade, 288 spy, 269 Sritex, 258 Srivijaya, 26, 75, 471 stability, 11, 39, 40, 43, 432, 440, 442, 444, 450, 456, 476, 481, 511, 514, 515, 517, 519, 529, 535, 536 STAMICO, 247, 261 startup, 366, 398 state capacity, 523 state capitalism, 139, 209, 217, 218, 228, 229, 461, 509–511, 517, 532, 534 State Council, 464 State Department, 482 state-driven, 210 State House, 256, 259 state-led, 229, 510, 517, 520, 532 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 14, 68, 83, 96, 99, 108, 209, 210, 212, 215, 219, 221, 227, 228, 237, 240, 242, 246, 247, 252, 255, 256, 267, 269, 274, 275, 292, 294, 295, 338, 342, 348, 363, 383, 399, 400, 434, 439, 453, 461, 463, 469, 471, 473, 506, 509, 511, 525, 533, 535 state planning, 179

status, 4, 5, 39, 40, 69, 72, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89, 98, 99, 101, 102, 109, 133, 139, 141, 150, 153, 158, 165, 180, 189, 196, 211, 230, 232, 234, 265, 274, 294, 296, 297, 299, 344, 356, 358, 363, 364, 367, 368, 372, 381, 382, 384, 387–389, 393, 394, 397, 400, 401, 425, 426, 428, 435, 438, 444, 460, 462, 464, 475, 476, 478, 480, 503, 510, 514, 518, 534 status dissonance, 40 status signalling, 141, 158 steel, 42, 377 storytelling, 197 straits, 96, 104 strategic partnership, 77, 78, 89, 93, 102, 103, 132 Strategic Plan, 272 strategy, 203, 204, 207, 210, 227, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 241, 250, 258, 266, 281, 293, 297, 298, 300, 301 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), 18, 340 struggle, 36, 129, 151 style, 68, 76, 80, 86, 89, 98 Subianto, Prabowo, 38, 236, 264, 466, 470 submarine, 93, 95 Sub-Saharan Africa, 73, 132, 162, 205, 220, 256, 298, 341, 348, 372, 392, 425, 442, 483 Sudan, 162, 205, 213, 245, 248, 257, 279, 295, 347, 348, 363, 372, 379, 426, 452, 465, 472, 479–481, 530 Suharto, 1, 10, 18, 26, 38, 47, 68, 77, 79, 82, 85, 88, 89, 95, 109, 131, 132, 159, 220, 223, 236,

INDEX

243, 252, 259, 271, 438, 447, 448, 460 Sukarno, 1, 10, 11, 32, 33, 38, 68, 77, 79, 85, 89–91, 93, 95, 98, 130, 132, 141, 154, 188, 205, 226, 234, 240, 252, 266, 267, 288, 339, 369, 382, 427, 433, 442, 447–449, 481, 507, 520 Sumitomo, 365 Summit, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 13, 21, 24, 31, 67, 70, 82, 85, 86, 99, 133, 134, 138, 142, 143, 166, 204, 213, 215, 217, 219, 231, 240, 243, 245, 250, 253, 254, 263, 265, 435, 436, 474, 479 summit fatigue, 232, 435 summitry, 435, 436, 479 Sunda Straits, 444 supply chain, 3, 244, 356, 364, 503 Surabaya, 207 Surakarta, 98, 229, 235, 258 surveillance, 104, 378, 380 survival, 70, 88, 94, 136, 151 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), 10, 24, 25, 41, 70, 75, 76, 78–81, 85, 86, 97, 98, 101, 143, 144, 219, 234, 247, 448, 450, 464, 507 sustainability, 29, 232, 249, 265, 537 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 7 sustainable fisheries, 68, 105 Swahilis, 471 symbolism, 146, 147, 255, 294, 296 T Taiwan, 18, 35, 38, 69, 87, 95, 100, 104, 387, 401, 453 Taiwan Strait, 530 tandem, 512 TANESCO, 248, 261 tank, 93

575

Tanzania, 130, 143, 155, 162, 209, 213, 214, 243, 247–249, 251, 253, 254, 259–261, 263, 269, 273, 279, 288, 289, 296, 348, 352, 368, 371, 375, 379, 425, 434, 483 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), 261 tariff(s), 142, 213, 297, 349 task force, 9, 47, 182, 209, 210, 217, 219, 227, 228, 237–239, 241, 242, 245, 247, 251, 255, 300, 342, 344, 351, 398, 399, 429, 430, 433, 434, 436, 449, 510–512, 535, 537 Tasrif, Arifin, 253 Tata Group, 374 Tax, Stergomena, 248, 259 tea, 258, 281 TEAM-9, 375 technical assistance, 183, 370, 431 technology(ies), 3, 71, 187, 188, 212, 213, 244, 250, 260, 289, 293, 337, 360, 362, 365, 370, 375, 382, 389, 395, 396, 399, 517 technology transfers, 103, 212, 289, 293, 360, 370 Tejas jets, 380 telecommunications, 231, 278, 281, 373, 374, 378, 395 Temasek, 228, 230 Tempo Scan Pacific, 273, 292 terms of trade, 345 territorial integrity, 84, 215, 235, 425, 444, 514, 515, 535 territorial warfare, 94 terrorism, 19, 77, 86, 97, 103, 131, 132, 139, 358, 378, 451–453, 462, 479 textile, 206, 213, 251, 257, 273, 292 Thailand, 240, 259, 278, 279, 288 The Economist , 17

576

INDEX

The Jakarta Post , 253 think tank, 77, 336, 361, 402 Third World, 22 Thohir, Erick, 99, 252 thousands friends, zero enemies , 78 threat(s), 189, 347, 348, 353, 379, 387, 427, 454, 478 Tigray, 426 TNI, 264 Togo, 206, 279, 290 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), 3, 16, 24, 135, 138, 143, 354–359, 361, 364–366, 368, 376, 391, 394, 472 torpedo, 95 total diplomacy, 76 Total People’s Defense, 88, 94 Total People’s Defense and Security HANKAMRATA, 95 Touré, Sékou, 193 tourism, 75, 82, 221, 230, 246, 260, 287, 288, 353, 385, 527, 529 Toyota, 365 trade, 12–15, 18, 21, 23, 34, 41, 186, 204–207, 213, 216–218, 221, 228, 230, 232, 243–245, 248, 250, 251, 256–259, 262, 265, 275–288, 297, 298, 335, 339–341, 343–346, 349, 351–353, 355, 358–362, 364, 367, 370, 372–375, 377, 379, 381–383, 385, 388, 389, 391, 393, 395, 431, 434, 435, 453, 461, 462, 466, 469, 477, 478, 480, 509, 517, 518, 527, 532, 535, 536 trade diversion, 21, 214, 517 Trade Expo Indonesia (TEI), 221 trafficking, 86, 97, 104 training, 182, 213, 231, 234, 236, 248, 258, 260, 261, 335, 336,

349, 354, 355, 357, 369, 370, 380, 382, 389–391, 431, 440, 447, 453, 466, 470, 478 Transnational, 217 transnational capital, 215 transnational crime, 383 transportation, 240, 247, 263, 281, 293 Trisakti, 98 Troop Contribution Country (TCC), 139, 428 tropical forest, 242, 250, 265, 351, 360, 433, 460, 509, 526 Trump, Donald, 482, 511 Tshisekedi, Félix, 246, 250, 254, 296 Tunggal Idaman Abadi, 273 Tunisia, 213, 214, 248, 279, 299, 300, 352, 355, 453 Turkish Airlines, 205, 301 Türkiye, 14, 18, 181, 182, 204, 206, 208, 216, 253, 272, 275, 276, 293, 294, 298, 301, 352, 361, 377, 394, 400, 430, 435, 445, 456, 462, 474, 504, 509, 521, 530–532 tycoon, 30, 184 U UAE, 181, 185, 224, 225, 228, 229, 237, 294, 296, 300, 425, 437, 438, 479, 480, 510, 534 Uganda, 214, 245, 257, 368, 379, 380, 392, 397, 399, 425 Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), 380 Uhuru na Umoja, 260 Uighur, 347 Ukraine, 3, 11, 16, 17, 38, 43, 69, 70, 79, 87, 88, 93, 100, 211, 216, 264, 271, 289, 293, 294, 296, 348, 399, 400, 403, 444, 450, 456, 457, 460, 466, 469,

INDEX

470, 474, 478, 480, 481, 503, 518, 530 Ukraine war, 194, 453 UNAMSIL, 291 UN Charter, 92, 165 UN Comtrade Database, 207, 276–280, 282–287 underbalancing, 505 UNDP, 213, 245 uniformed peacekeepers, 205 uniformed personnel, 428, 452 un-intellectual, 522 Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), 40 United Kingdom (UK), 152, 162, 181, 203, 204, 207, 208, 225, 294, 296, 297, 445, 462, 466, 504, 515, 531 United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), 291 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 40, 522 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 8, 18, 428, 454, 459, 462, 483, 514 United Nations (UN), 3, 6–8, 10, 11, 16, 340, 344, 346, 347, 350, 354, 356, 364, 367, 372, 383, 387, 390, 428, 452, 462, 480 United States (US), 3, 5, 11, 39, 43, 71, 72, 78, 80, 81, 83, 87, 89, 95, 100, 102, 147, 150–152, 156, 164, 181–183, 190, 191, 203–206, 213, 220, 221, 228, 237, 242, 244, 247, 251, 252, 264, 269, 270, 274, 275, 291, 293, 294, 296–298, 336, 337, 341, 342, 346, 348, 350–352, 358, 359, 362, 365, 367, 369, 370, 387, 389, 390, 393, 401, 403, 431, 434, 439, 444, 449,

577

450, 452, 456–461, 466, 467, 469, 472, 474, 479–482, 503, 504, 511, 512, 520, 528, 530–532 Universal Health Coverage, 355 Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), 140, 223 university(ies), 2, 47, 87, 184, 186–188, 190, 192, 195, 208, 227, 245, 272, 282, 300, 337, 338, 350, 365, 371, 382, 383, 396, 402, 511, 516, 521–523 University of Delhi, 192, 371 Uno, Sandiaga, 75, 82, 89, 230, 246, 253, 286, 288 UN Security Council (UNSC), 181, 256, 291, 356, 362, 367, 368, 372, 390, 469, 475 upstream, 256, 257, 262 uranium, 383 urbanisation, 281, 290, 482 urbanism, 455 US Africa strategy, 482 US AID, 213 uti possidetis juris , 215, 426, 427, 515 Uyghurs, 453

V vaccine, 71, 212, 241, 242, 258, 263, 273, 292, 399, 477, 478 vaccine diplomacy, 212, 273 values, 130, 151, 158, 160, 165 vested interests, 507, 519 Vicente, Manuel, 262, 269 Vietnam, 135, 152, 249, 278, 279, 281, 288, 358, 360, 385 visit, 210, 213, 216, 245, 247, 250–259, 263, 264, 271, 288, 292 vocational education, 336

578

INDEX

vulnerability, 36, 93, 94, 96, 97, 104, 106, 135, 296, 444, 453, 467, 513, 533 W Wade, Abdoulaye, 291 Wagner, 439, 479 War, 3, 11, 16, 17, 43, 69, 70, 73, 79, 87, 88, 93, 94, 100, 104, 211, 216, 236, 264, 265, 271, 289, 293, 296, 347, 348, 370, 372, 399, 426, 444, 453, 456, 457, 460, 466, 468–470, 474, 480, 481, 503, 505, 518, 530 Washington, 18, 352, 359, 370 Washington, George, 93 water, 131, 239, 279, 281, 293, 294, 341, 390, 426, 466, 481 weapons, 94 welfare, 4, 25, 39, 43, 186, 189, 243, 249, 351, 432, 507 Weltanschauung , 22, 47, 474 West Africa, 131, 273, 291, 292, 295, 298, 374, 375, 390 Western Sahara, 7, 16, 24, 136, 146, 367, 452, 454, 462 Westphalian, 465 wheat, 469, 470 White Nile. See Nile RIver White Paper, 203 Widjojo, Agus, 271 Widodo, Joko (Jokowi), 2–4, 7–10, 12, 15, 24–29, 31, 32, 35, 37–43, 46, 47, 67–70, 73–76, 78, 80, 83–86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 97–101, 104–106, 108–110, 129, 138–144, 148, 151, 180, 184–188, 194, 195, 203, 204, 208, 210, 213, 215–220, 223–241, 243–245, 247, 248, 250–259, 261–272, 281, 289, 292, 296–300, 337, 339, 343,

344, 350–353, 359–362, 365, 379, 380, 382, 387, 390, 394, 399–401, 403, 426–429, 431–439, 442–450, 453, 457, 458, 460–465, 467–469, 472, 474, 477, 478, 481, 503, 505–514, 517, 520–522, 525, 527–530, 532–537 Widyawati, Nicke, 257 Wijaya Karya (WIKA), 108, 209, 210, 233, 247, 251, 267, 274, 293, 434 Wilmar, 217, 281 Wings Group, 12, 217, 257, 273 Wirajuda, M.H., 6, 7, 16, 24, 29–31, 36, 37, 70–72, 74–77, 79, 84, 86, 92, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 140, 143, 144, 146, 205, 209, 210, 215, 220, 235, 252, 267, 274, 300, 362, 390, 426, 436, 439, 458, 478 women, 155 women empowerment, 12, 223, 225 World Bank, 18, 189, 345, 354 World Economic Forum, 246 World Festival of Black Arts, 291 world order, 70, 86, 92, 98 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 243, 244, 266, 461, 477, 504, 535 worldview, 1, 32, 82, 86, 90, 97, 101, 104, 106, 109, 110, 151, 161, 203, 216, 287 World War II (WWII), 81, 131, 150, 183, 191

X Xi, Jinping, 3, 22, 32, 247, 269, 270, 342, 345, 347, 349, 434, 458, 460, 463, 464, 514, 522

INDEX

Y Yaoundé, 205, 287 youth, 155, 229, 231, 436, 437, 442, 481, 482, 527 Yugoslavia, 530

Z Zacarias, Carlos Joaquim, 262

579

Zambia, 250, 296, 340, 341, 345, 352, 390 Zambia-DRC Battery Council, 251 Zanzibar, 209, 240, 248, 249, 371 Zeitgeist, 81, 193, 194 Zheng, He, 339 Zhou, Enlai, 339 Zimbabwe, 212, 214, 245, 246, 248, 269, 273, 279, 453, 470 Zuma, Jacob, 267