Indian Ocean: The New Frontier 9780367354695, 9780429331640

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INDIAN OCEAN The significance and salience of the Indian Ocean for Asian and global affairs has been on steady rise. The widespread acceptance of the concept of Indo-Pacific is reflective of this reality. Anticipating this trend before most others, Osmania University Centre for International Programmes (formerly ASRC) has been at the forefront undertaking study, research and investigations into all facets of the Indian Ocean Region. The volume will be of immense interest to students and researchers interested in Indian Ocean affairs. Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia Former Ambassador/High Commissioner to Kenya, Myanmar, Mexico and South Africa The present volume curates papers presented at an international conference organized at OUCIP to engage with the oceanic turn in different fields of knowledge embracing Social Sciences, Humanities and, Physical Sciences to project the Indian Ocean as the new frontier of research across various disciplines. That this event coincided with a series of programmes launched in different Indian cities under the aegis of Project Mausam of Government of India was indeed fortuitous. The papers are divided into four sections: The Oceanic Reach has papers reflecting on the received knowledge regarding the historical role and reach of the Indian Ocean and providing new insights in the evolving dynamics of the region. The section Literature and Culture has essays reflecting the different trajectories within Humanities and Cultural Studies through which Indian Ocean has stimulated the imagination of scholars, intellectuals, diasporic writers, and culture historians. The section on Roots and Routes includes accounts of the historical, cultural, religious, trade and diasporic linkages across oceanic communities inhabiting the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean. The final section The Power Games includes papers that deal with the increasing interests of various international powers in the Indian Ocean region particularly in the context of the shift from the Asian land mass to the enormous presence of the Indian Ocean, and the economic, political and strategic significance that it has for the entire region. Taken together these contributions offer both an opportunity and a challenge for interested scholars to engage with Indian Ocean as a new frontier of knowledge with enormous potential for research and exploration. Kousar J. Azam, Professor Emeritus, and former Head Department of Political Science at Osmania University, Hyderabad, has held many academic and administrative positions including the Chairmanship of the Southern Regional Centre of the ICSSR. She has authored/edited nine books and has been the Advisor, Programmes and Development at Osmania University Centre for International Programmes (OUCIP) until recently.

INDIAN OCEAN The New Frontier

Edited by

KOUSAR J. AZAM

MANOHAR 2019

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Kousar J. Azam; individual chapters, the contributors; and Manohar Publishers & Distributors The right of Kousar J. Azam to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-35469-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-33164-0 (ebk) Typeset in Minion Pro 11/13 by Ravi Shanker, Delhi 110 095

Contents

Foreword a. karunaker

9

Acknowledgements

11

Introduction kousar j. azam

13

I. THE OCEANIC REACH 1. Inaugural Address rajiv k. bhatia

25

2. Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean in the Past and the Future susantha goonatilake

31

3. Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War: Emerging Dimensions of a Fascinating Region mohammed khalid

39

4. The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being mohan guruswamy

55

5. India and the Indian Ocean: Old Concerns, New Perspectives lakshmi subramanian

65

II. LITERATURE AND CULTURE 6. From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific: Missionary Summer Resorts in Asia rui kohiyama

85

6  Contents 7. The Different Destinies of the Indian Diaspora in the Mascarene Islands soocramanien vithilingem

105

8. Epic Writing in Diasporic Mauritian Literature in English with a Focus on Tsang Man Kin’s The Hakka Epic and Lampotang’s The Coral Heart sooshilla gopaul

117

9. Amitav Ghosh, Indian Ocean and the New Thalassology r.s. sharma

131

1 0. The Hyperreal Waters of Sea of Poppies: New Perspectives in Reading Ghosh’s Fiction alice samson

141

1 1. The Emergence of Cricket as an Indian Ocean Game joe christopher

155

III. OF ROOTS AND ROUTES 1 2. The Muziris: An Ancient City of Global Village sanitha beevi

169

1 3. Islamicate World System and South Indian Muslim Trading Networks in the Medieval Indian Ocean History anas s.

175

1 4. Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States of Western Indian Ocean:  Sources of India’s Soft Power in its Foreign Policy aparajita biswas

183

1 5. Linguistic Communities and New Historiography: Constructing a Maritime Tradition in Colonial Odisha sachidananda mohanty

195

1 6. Bangladesh: Striving towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region syed muntasir mamun

205

Contents  7

IV. THE POWER GAMES 1 7. The Renewed Geostrategic Significance of the Indian Ocean Small Islands christian bouchard and william crumplin

253

1 8. India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean: A Strategic Triangle to Counter Piracy? sriparna pathak raimedhi

285

1 9. The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region: India-China-US: Conflict or Cooperation? sreeparna dasgupta

295

2 0. India’s Stature in the Indian Ocean: Emerging ‘Power’ with a Human Face mohor chakraborty

305

2 1. Collective Diplomacy: India’s Role in Indian Ocean Power Dynamics sukalpa chakrabarti

319

2 2. Indian Ocean Warming: Its Extent and Impact on the Monsoon and Marine Productivity m.k. roxy

333

List of Contributors 337 Index

339

Foreword

I am happy to write this foreword for yet another publication of OUCIP in Social Sciences in keeping with its declared mission to encourage interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary events addressing contemporary issues. OUCIP had organized an international conference ‘New Directions in Indian Ocean Studies’ in February 2015. Aimed at drawing the attention of scholars and policy makers to the ever widening relevance of Indian Ocean in India’s external relations this event materialized in the wake of fresh initiatives announced by the prime minister and the foreign minister of India and focused on the changing dimensions of Indian Ocean studies within the academia and beyond. I congratulate Prof. Azam who convened the conference and edited this volume for publication. The OUCIP also thanks the Indian Council of World Affairs for a partial funding of the conference and Ambassador R.K. Bhatia for delivering the inaugural address. As an institution with a reputation for research and publications, the OUCIP looks forward to many more such events bringing disciplines and practitioners together to enrich our understanding of issues of our times. 15 November 2016

A. Karunaker Professor of English, Director, OUCIP Osmania University, Hyderabad

Acknowledgements

The Osmania University Centre for International Programmes thanks the following individuals and institutions who made it possible for us not only to organize the international conference ‘New Directions in Indian Ocean Studies’ but also to bring out an edited collection of papers presented at the conference: Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, the then Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, for evincing a keen interest in the conference and for delivering the Inaugural address. The Indian Council of World Affairs for partially sponsoring the conference through a grant. Prof. Himanshu Prabha Ray for her encouragement and interest in the event and for her contribution of books to the OUCIP Library. Dean, Development and UGC Affairs, Osmania University, for a minor grant. The chairpersons, the keynote speakers and the participants from India and abroad who contributed to the event by sharing their expertise, for enriching the discussions and for sending their papers. Prof. A. Karunaker, Director, OUCIP for his support. The staff of OUCIP for their dedication, inputs and support in the organization of this conference. Sameera Khundmiri, Librarian, OUCIP for extending technical and organizational support. Prof. R.S. Sharma for his inputs, guidance and support. Finally, the OUCIP wishes to register its most sincere thanks to Ramesh Jain, Siddharth Chowdhury and their entire team at Manohar Publishers for undertaking the publication of this work

12  Acknowledgements and especially for their patience while we overcame the many hurdles in completing this work.

The editor, the publisher and the staff at OUCIP are not responsible for the opinions expressed by individual authors in this volume. Kousar J. Azam

Introduction KOUSAR J. AZ AM

The Osmania University Centre for International Programmes (OUCIP) was established to promote innovative knowledge and discourses and to create a community of scholars committed to that goal. To that purpose it was felt that OUCIP should be moving into focusing on newer perspectives, of existing discourses, and look at their interpretations beyond the routine formats and paradigms that have tended to impose disciplinary boundaries. The objective has been to bring together scholars in a given field from areas as diverse as science and philosophy, economics and faith, policy and traditions, archaeology and history, trade and culture and to renew our understanding of how the enmeshing of multiple discourses enables us to widen our own perspectives of a given topic. It was to achieve this in the understanding of the importance of the Indian Ocean that OUCIP organized an international conference entitled ‘New Directions in Indian Ocean Studies’ in February 2015. The recent upsurge in Indian Ocean Studies is part of this phenomenon. It is obvious that Indian Ocean studies have moved beyond its traditional ‘marginal’ status to a global discourse involving social sciences, sciences and humanities. A growing body of multi-disciplinary studies has expanded its traditional scope and has brought within its fold fascinating new aspects of lives and societies within the Indian Ocean region. This new

14  Kousar J. Azam knowledge is going to influence both policy and practice in the entire region in the years ahead. With increasing concerns for environment, climate change, natural calamities and biodiversity, historical sites and archaeological finds, scholars across disciplines are moving towards oceanic studies. The oceanic turn in sciences and Humanities suggest how critical this turn is going to be in shaping a new world order in the twenty-first century. While this surge continues unabated in specific disciplines, we at OUCIP felt that it would be a singular teaching/learning experience if we could bring the practitioners of the policies, and scholars and researchers from the diverse fields that draw from the Indian Ocean at an academic event to converse, converge and communicate with each other from their respective sites and to move towards forging linkages across their respective disciplines. The purpose was to coalesce and integrate their knowledge for the benefits of the larger community of scholars in and outside the academia. The OUCIP conference was therefore an exciting experience to listen to and to interact with people dedicated to the pursuit of Indian Ocean studies. These included scholars from the fields of archeology, history, international relations, strategic studies, literature and culture, economics, environmental studies and science and technology. However, it has not been possible for us to include all the presentations made at the conference in this collection for reasons beyond the control of the organizers. Nevertheless we have tried our best to retain a thematic coherence clubbing the papers available under specific sections. As we were able to procure only one paper from the session on science and technology we have incorporated it as the concluding chapter of this collection. This, however, does not reduce its importance and relevance to the theme of this conference. Divided into four parts, the essays in this collection represent the reach and range of the Indian Ocean converting the disciplinary boundaries into permeable borders towards a holistic understanding of the Indian Ocean. Part one ‘The Oceanic Reach’ begins with the inaugural address

Introduction  15

by Ambassador Rajiv K. Bhatia, the then Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi who set the tone and the tenor of the three days’ proceedings. In his paper ‘New Directions in Indian Ocean Studies’ Rajiv Bhatia mentions the three significant events that the ICWA hosted relating to the Indian Ocean studies. These being the March 2013 conference on ‘Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region: Asian Perspectives’, the September 2013 initiative on Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean, and the third being in the first meeting of the Indian Ocean Dialogue initiated by the MEA in which the ICWA participated. He points out that the Indian Ocean has been at the centre of some of the oldest civilizations and indeed of recorded history. The power shifts from the west to east have added to the increased salience of the Indian Ocean. Elaborating further he highlights three important developments: collaboration-cum-competition defining the role of India, China and the US in Indian Ocean, India’s response to the new initiatives, and India’s efforts in recent times to connect with the Indian Ocean neighbours. He speculates whether the deliberation at the conference would probe the strategic dimensions of the project Mausam—essentially a soft power project. The next paper ‘Cultural Dynamics of the Indian Ocean in Past, Present and Future’ is by the eminent scholar from Sri Lanka, Susantha Goonatilake, who traces the onset of globalization in Indian Ocean to first century ce when it connected East Asia, South Asia and the West in a web of trade and ideas. He feels that the projection of Greece and the Mediterranean as the centre of global civilization and knowledge was an imperial construct and remained so till the receding of the European hegemony. With the rise of Asia once again the Indian Ocean now becomes a platform for new thoughts. He wonders if this new thought would be just an extrapolation of recent European thought or it would be a combination of both European and Asian civilizational thought. He feels that as Asia rises in confidence it ‘has the possibility and indeed the necessity of combining both’. He points out that this has already drawn the attention of writers who have pointed out that the Industrial and Scientific Revolutions were a joint European and

16  Kousar J. Azam Asian production including Islamic elements (Hobson 2004, Arun Bala 2006, Goonatilake 1998). In this paper he explores the areas, including the search for historical and geographical knowledge around Indian Ocean laying to rest the fiction of European voyages and the achievements claimed therein. This is followed by Mohammed Khalid making a survey of the power play in the Indian Ocean from ancient times to the contemporary environment of globalization. In his analysis he elaborates on how the European colonial powers vied with each other to establish trade and commerce in the littoral states and how in the process they dismantled the incumbent Arab-dominated trade networks shutting them out of the economic leverages. He goes on to explain the reduction of Indian Ocean to the status of a ‘British Lake’ during the British colonial rule in South Asia. With the Indian independence coinciding with the outbreak of the Cold War the Indian Ocean became a region of superpower rivalry. In conclusion he touches upon the emerging concerns in the Indian Ocean regions like diaspora, disaster, communications, piracy, and the role of more recent international organizations to contend with these. Mohan Guruswamy writing about ‘The Centrality of IOR to India’s Being’ traces the different kinds of activities in the Indian Ocean Region beginning from ancient to modern times. He elaborates upon the different uses of Indian Ocean for Trade in goods, to trade in human beings when slavery was prevalent, to migration and in more recent times for the trade in petroleum. He dwells on the use of Indian Ocean Region by littorals for both import and exports of oil and underlines how this establishes the centrality of Indian Ocean to the trade, economics and security of the littoral countries. More recently as the the Indian Ocean Region is becoming a region of conflict he projects how the Indian Ocean is crucial to the very being of India. In the next paper Lakshmi Subramanian elaborates upon the old concerns and the new perspectives in the Indian Ocean. Making a plea for a more inter-disciplinary approach she underscores the need to refigure the more familiar notions of empire, nation and diaspora. She attempts a genealogy of the Indian Ocean

Introduction  17

historiography tracking some of its more visible elements and locating them within a political context. In the process she interrogates Eurocentricism in the wake of nationalist recovery of Asian enterprise followed by a more rigorous appreciation of commodity culture. The next part ‘Literature and Culture’ reflects the different trajectories within the realm of humanities and cultural studies, through which Indian Ocean has engulfed the imagination of scholars, intellectuals, diasporic writers and sports historians, to name just a few. The papers in this section vary from analyses of missionary summer resorts in the littorals of Indian and Pacific Oceans, to diasporic articulations in the literatures and the destinies of the Indian diaspora in the Indian Ocean islands and the analysis of Amitav Ghosh works. The first paper in this section is by Rui Kohiyama who makes an attempt to compare the culture of missionary summer resorts in the littorals of Indian and Pacific Ocean by elaborating upon such resorts in India and Japan. She maintains that though not much has been said about the missionary connections about India and Japan within the context of the Indian Ocean, yet long before the current globalization, the two countries India and Japan or the two regions Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean shared contemporaneity. People, goods and information were conveyed to and fro over the Indian and the Pacific Ocean for a long period of time. In the modern period Western missionaries as well as colonists and adventurers were important agents who made such connections. The next two papers come from Mauritius and project the political and literary dimensions of the reach of Indian Ocean in her islands. The first paper entitled ‘The Different destinies of the Indian Diaspora in the Islands of Indian Ocean with particular attention to the Mascarenes’ is by Soocramanian Vithilingam. A response to Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s suggestion that there should be more research on the Indian diaspora in the Indian Ocean islands, Vithilingam elaborates on the difference destinies of the Indian Diaspora in Mascarenes, Seychelles, and Reunion. He focuses on the Islands of Mascarenes in particular where the

18  Kousar J. Azam Indian diaspora enjoys a place of pride due to historical reasons. Evolving from humble roots as labourers, artisans and craftsmen, the Indian Diaspora has grown into a vibrant community with anchorage in agriculture, industry, education, law and above all politics where they hold important positions. He suggests that the Indian Ocean Commission in the Indian Ocean Rim should be roped into collaborative research projects to further expand the horizons of knowledge and to strengthen healthier bonds between India and the diasporic communities in these islands. Sooshilla Gopaul, focuses on the epic writing in diasporic Mauritian literature in English. In particular, she analyses Tsang Man Kin’s The Hakka Epic and Peggy Lampotang’s the Coral Heart. She asserts that, epic writing can contribute towards building up and maintaining a sound multicultural society though modernity does not favour epic sensibility. R.S. Sharma in his paper ‘Amitav Ghosh, Indian Ocean and the New Thassology’ asserts that Amitav Ghosh not only extended the boundaries of Indian Writing in English but he has also anticipated much that is now seen as the new Thassology—a turn towards humanities in Indian Ocean studies. What distinguishes Ghosh most is his creative engagement with the human drama played in and around Indian Ocean, the interplay between its past and its present, and the role language and history play in the lives of people who are struggling to come to terms with what they have inherited from the Ocean and what they hope to find as they look into the future. His analysis is primarily focused on Amitav Ghosh’s The Slave of MS H6. Continuing the discussion on Amitav Ghosh’s contribution to the literature of Indian Ocean, Alice Samson focuses on the reading of Sea of Poppies. She reminds readers that since Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, humanities scholars have been contending with the constellation of identity formations transcending ethnicities and nationalities in the traditional sense. Going beyond and even contesting the gains of cultural studies or conventional postcolonial scholarship, scholars of the oceanic studies including Amitav Ghosh—particularly with the two volumes of his Ibis

Introduction  19

Trilogy, have contributed in drawing attention to the force the Indian Ocean has exerted in configuring post-national identities and communities. She proceeds to examine the function of the sea and the ocean in Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies in the light of the ‘Oceanic Turn’ in humanities. She argues that through his disjuncture narrative, experimental language and imaginative take on history Ghosh presents a deterritorialized and hyper real image of the post-colonial world which stands in contrast to—until now taken for granted—nation- or territory-based notions of identity. The last paper in this section ‘Cricket in the India Ocean World’ by Joe Christopher is an interesting account of how the game of cricket despite its Anglo-Saxon origins, has been rapidly ‘localized’ in the last fifty years. The regional powers in the Indian Ocean namely India, Australia, and South Africa have emerged as the global giants of this game. These three countries while using the idea of a nation state—through the use of cricket as the primary sport—have also been instrumental in using cricket to contain racism and civil strife across the world. He examines the politics of decolonization particularly in sports in the Indian Ocean. The next part entitled ‘Of Roots and Routes’ includes papers that project the historical, cultural, religious, trade, and diasporic linkages across the oceanic communities inhabiting the vast expanse of Indian Ocean. Sanitha Beevi writes about the Muziris, an ancient coastal city which in itself merited to be known as the global village in view of the interactions that facilitated across the world. Anas S. in his paper ‘Islamic World System and South Indian Muslim Trading networks in the Medieval Indian Ocean History’ touches upon the very crucial encounter between the Islamicate World System and the south Indians Muslim trading networks. In the processes he shares very interesting information about the place names, the people and practices that knitted together the Muslim trading network in the medieval Indian Ocean history. In her paper ‘Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States of Western Indian Ocean: Sources of India’s Soft Power in its Foreign Policy’ Aparajita Biswas traces the trajectory of the movements of Indians into these states. She comes to the

20  Kousar J. Azam conclusion that these diasporic communities in modern times can enhance the soft power projection of India and at the same time act as the instruments and as actors in such a projection. Sachidananda Mohanty in his paper ‘Linguistic Communities and New Historography: Constructing a Maritime Tradition to Colonial Odisha’ comments on the different versions of ‘histories’ and ‘historiography’ including the maritime ones. In the process he chronicles the efforts of a new breed of contributors to journals like Utkal Sahitya that attempted to construct its own brand of historiography that relied on myths, legends folklore and literary sources rather than an empirically verifiable methods of European historiography, current then and now, although it may have, evolved over a period of time. Muntasir Mamoon’s paper is titled ‘Connecting Roots with Routes: Towards a new Paradigm of Inclusive Prosperity across Bangladesh, India and China’. He explores the possibility of raising a virtuous triangle of industry, ecology, and inclusive prosperity across Bangladesh, India and China, which would commence with the ancient port of Chittagong and percolating through several and essentially multi-model transit route through Agartala, Guwahati, and stops in Arunachal to open up in Rima—a dormant township in Chinese south-west. He also deals with the possibility of projecting Chittagong as a multimodal transport and transshipment hub—supported by air, sea and inland waters, Roads and railway routes, leading to the formation of a concentric industrial, manufacturing and urban corridor across four primary axes address between Bangladesh and India. Essentially the paper proposes an academic take on a framework which would reverse the economic impacts of 1947 Partition and take the region (rather, subregion when Nepal and Bhutan on the north and Myanmar on the south and join in) into its logical point of evolution. From a long scholarly document by Mamoon, for the purpose of relevance and brevity we have included in this collection his analysis of the more contemporary events beginning with formation of the state of Bangaladesh and the projection of possible and newer trajectories of collaboration between India Bangladesh and China.

Introduction  21

The last part entitled ‘The Power Games’ begins with a joint paper entitled ‘Renewed Geostrategic Significance of the Indian Ocean Small Islands’ by Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin. Giving a detailed analysis of the several small islands across the Indian Ocean the authors bring to the fore the strategic importance of these islands for the big powers. They maintain that historically small islands have played a very significant geostrategic role in Indian Ocean from ancient times up to the expanding hegemony of European colonial powers. These small islands have been viewed with interest and need by both regional and foreign powers for military purposes. In an interesting analysis they point out how even in contemporary times the importance of these islands has been greatly enhanced due to globalization. In the process they elaborate how the US, India, France and Australia are securing and even developing their position in the Indian Ocean islands while China and others are seeking to establish new facilities in the region. Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi, surveys in her paper ‘India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Triangle to Counter Piracy?’ the rise of non-traditional threats to security and how the major powers of the ‘Asian Century’ India, US and China would need an interdependent relationship to effectively counter the challenges of threats like piracy. Sreeparna Dasgupta, in her paper ‘The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region: India-China-US: Conflict or Cooperation’, carries forward the discussion of the role of India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean. Dasgupta analyses the emerging geostrategic environment of the Indian Ocean Region. While doing so, she underscores the importance of choke points of the Indian Ocean and states that any power that can throttle these choke points could paralyse the maritime ambitions of the rest. She elaborates upon the different policy options launched by these powers to secure sea lines of communications. The next paper by Mohor Chakraborty ‘India’s Stature in the Indian Ocean: Emerging “Power” with a Human Face’. Is an exposition of India’s Geo-Political situation that adds to its strategic salience in the Indian Ocean Rim. She analysis India’s

22  Kousar J. Azam burgeoning and projected ascendance as an Indian Ocean power to be reckoned with, against the backdrop of both traditional and nontraditional security compulsions. The last paper in this part is by Sukalpa Chakraborti who suggests in her paper ‘Collective Diplomacy: India’s Role in Indian Ocean Power Dynamics’ the many dimensions of collective diplomacy by all the major powers to address their respective strategic, energy and security concerns. She does this by first providing a background narrative of the Indian Ocean Region and the shifting power landscape. Then she moves on to examine the regional hegemony and region building exercises in the Indian Ocean Region and finally dwells upon the Indian efforts to establish her power in the region. Roxy Mathew Koll in his paper, ‘Indian Ocean Warming: Its Extent and Impact on the Monsoon and Marine Productivity’ looks at the Indian Ocean as a scientist researching in the field of Tropical Meteorology. He feels that only in recent times studies have become available that look into the causes and consequences of the warming of this ocean. Recent studies have revealed that the Ocean has been warming for more than a century at a rate and magnitude larger than what was thought before. He holds that this intense monotonous warming turns out to be the largest contributor in-phase with the global ocean surface warming with a firm grip on the global climate. He examines the consequences of this excessive warming for the physical and biological dynamics over the South Asian domain and eventually on the socio-economic livelihood of the surrounding countries. He stresses the need for being vigilant about the Indian Ocean warming while assessing the long-term changes in the monsoon, the marine productivity and the global climate. While projecting the reach and relevance of the Indian Ocean studies into several realms of knowledge pursued and practised in and outside the academia, the present volume is an attempt to stress the need for looking at Indian Ocean studies as an independent discipline by itself, that would absorb the diverse disciplinary quests.

I. The Oceanic Reach

CHAPTER 1

Inaugural Address R A J I V K . B HAT IA

It is a privilege to participate in this important International Conference on a theme that is growing in its scope, impact and relevance day by day. The well-designed intellectual event is the fruit of collaboration between Osmania University Centre for International Programmes (OUCIP) and Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) as well as representatives of other institutions and eminent scholars who are assembled here today. I am grateful to have been asked to deliver the Inaugural Address. What I propose to do at this early stage of our conference, is to present an Indian perspective, from the IR point of view, on the changing power dynamics in the Indian Ocean. I would argue that institutions and scholars need to devote more, not less, time, effort and resources to the study of issues pertaining to the Indian Ocean.

OUCIP’s Approach Let me first congratulate OUCIP for conceptualizing this conference and translating an interesting idea into a tangible reality. Even a casual glance at the elaborate programme will make it clear that a thoroughly multi-disciplinary approach has been devised in order to reflect on the chosen theme from multiple angles. Consequently, we shall have expert presentations and dialogues on an array of subjects covering the cultural dynamics; history and archaeology; science and technology; environment and climate

26  Rajiv K. Bhatia change; coastal communities; indigenous peoples and small islands; security concerns, changing power relationships and emerging geopolitics; diasproic communities; literature, culture and recreation; and an informed peep into the future with a focus on how to connect the ‘roots with routes’. No single person or institution can hope to acquire complete knowledge of this multi-faceted subject. Therefore, this collective endeavour, anchored in a genuine desire to share and to give and take, promises to be beneficial to all of us in our different ventures.

ICWA’s Initiatives ICWA, the front-ranking and oldest foreign policy think-tank in this country, has been actively engaged in both research and outreach, with the aim to unveil and showcase the rising importance of Indian Ocean in India’s scheme of things. Of a myriad of our activities, three deserve a brief mention here. First, in March 2013, we hosted an international conference on ‘Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region: Asian Perspectives’, which helped experts to examine how the new construct itself was reflective of the changing mindsets. The second initiative was to organize in September 2013 a Track-1.5 Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean (TDIO), involving India, Australia and Indonesia which were then the present and future chairs of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC), later known as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Two rounds hosted by ICWA and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) have already taken place and the third session, to be hosted by Indonesia, will follow in due course. The essential take-away from TDIO has been that resident powers need to assume a leadership role in the Indian Ocean through enhanced dialogue, understanding and cooperation among themselves before these features could be consolidated at the pan-regional level. As to the third initiative, it was, in fact, taken by the Ministry of External Affairs and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) with which we were closely associated. This resulted in the first meeting of the Indian Ocean

Inaugural Address  27

Dialogue in Kochi in September 2014, a highly innovative event. Its outcome document, known as the ‘Kochi Consensus’, remains relevant to our deliberations here today.

Indian Perspective Indian Ocean is the only ocean in the world, named after a country. Barring a minority, most informed Indians do not regard the Indian Ocean as ‘India’s ocean’ or ‘India’s lake’. But they do want to see it as a region of peace and security that promotes every nation’s development and prosperity through increased partnership and collaboration. In the quest for achieving these goals, India visualizes a special role for itself as a bridge, a natural leader, a premier security provider and a nation instinctively opposed to domination of the region by non-littoral states. The Indian Ocean region has been at the centre of some of the oldest civilizations and indeed recorded human history. In the twenty-first century, looking at the emerging geopolitics and geoeconomics of the world, the Indian Ocean has assumed greater salience as power shifts from the west and to the east, as the dependence of Asia’s majors – China, India, Japan – on trade and energy supplies from the heart of the Indian Ocean increases, as power conflicts and competition sharpen, and as non-traditional challenges to security ranging from piracy, terrorism and violent extremism to natural disasters, climate change and calls for ‘blue economy’ rise. Maritime disputes among nations, freedom of navigation, safety of sea lines of communications and the broad domain of maritime security all have engaged the attention of policy makers in an unprecedented manner. This certainly is the case with India. Hence, happily, no one talks about ‘sea-blindness’ afflicting the Indian establishment any more. On the contrary, we seem to be guided by the notion that whatever happens in the Indian Ocean impacts India directly and deeply. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to monitor and mould developments in the region to the possible extent.

28  Rajiv K. Bhatia In this context, I wish to highlight three important developments concerning the geopolitical facets. First, collaboration-cum-competition that defines the role of US, India, and China in the Indian Ocean region needs to be studied with due care. The announcement of ‘Joint Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’ at the end of President Obama’s recent visit to India is of immense importance. It portrays the US-India partnership as ‘indispensable’ and refers to several specific areas of cooperation that may be further developed in future. Second, India’s response to the new initiatives by China such as BCIM-Economic Corridor and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) should be analysed closely. On the first proposal, India is already engaged positively, though somewhat cautiously, whereas on the second proposal, New Delhi is yet to take a clear stand. Whether this position evolves further during Prime Minister Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, would be worth watching. Third, India is taking its own initiatives concerning the Indian Ocean. The visit of Prime Minister Modi to Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles have been a unique endeavour to interact with four of our most important Indian Ocean neighbours. It is expected that increased political attention, backed by a higher level of economic, cultural and defence cooperation with these four countries, will be of considerable benefit to them as well as India. In this regard media has drawn attention to the Project Mausam. This is essentially a soft power project, designed to strengthen cultural and commercial links and increase awareness among littoral states of the Indian Ocean, with a focus on India’s pivotal role through history. Whether it may have a strategic dimension added to it should be discussed at this conference.

Conclusion Experts on IOR-ARC/ IORA share the view that this institution has not become a strong and vibrant one due to the absence a spirit of solidarity and identity among littoral nations of the Indian Ocean. A sense of community needs to be nurtured. This is why the ‘Kochi

Inaugural Address  29

Consensus’, to which I made a reference earlier, recommended: ‘They (i.e. participants) affirmed that the strategic and foreign policy communities as well as civil society groups must actively contribute to the emergence of a vibrant Indian Ocean community engaged in open-ended regionalism.’ I am confident that this international conference, examining developments in the Indian Ocean from the prism of past, present and future and outlining new directions in IO studies, will contribute handsomely to increasing the awareness of an Indian Ocean community.

CHAPTER 2

Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean in the Past and the Future* S U S A N T HA G O O NAT I L A K E

The Indian Ocean region is experiencing a tectonic shift as the world’s centre of gravity in economics, politics and the social returns to Asia (perhaps its historical default setting) after a period of nearly 200 to 300 years of European hegemony. This will have repercussions also in the cultural and knowledge realm including in science and technology. These repercussions should not necessarily be extrapolations of Eurocentric culture and knowledge, but with Asia at the realm, it should ideally incorporate cultural and civilizational elements from the Asian region. Before discussing the future directions of such possibilities, we should, a predominantly English-speaking audience subject to Macaulay imprinting, disabuse ourselves of the given trajectories of knowledge, say presumably from that of Greeks (supposed to have invented intellectual explorations), through the Renaissance (which broke through the 1,000 year reign of the Christian Dark Ages), through the Enlightenment from which arose the bulk of our Eurocentric cultural systems including science and technology. Macaulay writing in 1835 made his infamous ‘observation’ that ‘a single shelf of a good European library was worth the * Keynote address, ‘Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean in the Past and the Future’, Osmania University, Hyderabad, International Conference ‘New Directions in Indian Ocean Studies’, 26-8 February 2015.

32  Susantha Goonatilake whole native literature of India and Arabia’.1 When he said this of South and West Asia, he would have had in mind also East Asia which had a cultural overlay of Buddhism (‘The Light of Asia’ in Arnold’s evocative poem). When Macauley made this statement, the classical literature of these regions namely in Arabic, Sanskrit and Pali (for Buddhism) were not well known, and in fact in the case of the Indic languages, the Asiatic Society established in 1784 was just making its preliminary forays in translation. The statement was therefore made in ignorance although the Asiatic Society in the form of advocates like Prinsep was pushing for local knowledge. The mindset of Macauley was made during the initial Industrial Revolution in Britain and with the presumed primacy of an intellectual trajectory starting from the Greeks and now passed on to Western Europeans. The social context of this trajectory’s beginnings was deconstructed by Martin Bernal in his Black Athena (1987)2 where he showed that the primacy of Greece was invented as a background to the Imperial project which missed out others’ contributions. Since then much historical research has indicated that this Eurocentric trajectory was not unique and had been fed by extraEuropean, in our case Indian Ocean elements. I have documented in detail elsewhere,3 transfers of knowledge elements from the South Asian region to the European one beginning from circa the fifth century bce to the late twentieth century. In summary these are: the theory of five elements,4 atomic theory,5 theories of flux,6 the doctrine of the mean, and core medical concepts are some examples of parallels between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ from the ancient Greek era. Examples from the late Middle Ages and after (when there were Arab intermediaries) are the place system of notation in arithmetic, the concept of zero, algebra7 (some of these Asian discoveries being not known until the eighteenth century in Europe), trigonometry and large segments of the standard European medical text of the Middle Ages; and during the Renaissance, the beginnings of chemistry with the new element, salt in the work of Paracelsus,8 and the Impetus Theory. Later influences and parallels may be found in surgery during the eighteenth century,9

Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean  33

in linguistics10 and philosophy in the nineteenth century and psychology in the twentieth century.11 Post-Scientific Revolution in Western philosophy, one should note has been shown to have their parallels. Thus, Descartes’ cogito has parallels with Nagarjuna, Hume’s work with Buddhist ideas12 while Schopenhauer, Kant and Hegel13 are a few nineteenth-century philosophers whose works find echoes in the South Asian tradition. The example of Einstein’s relativity influenced by the philosophy of Ernst Mach and Hume (with its echoes in Buddhism) and Schrödinger’s quantum physics (with its influence from Vedanta) are only two examples from the twentieth century.14 In addition, one could mention the inflow of psychological thought and practice, most notably Mindfulness Cognitive Based therapy as more recent inflows. Much of the existing research is of inflows through the northern part of the subcontinent later through the Arabs, but there was Indian Ocean traffic connecting say Rome and China from at least the dawn of the Christian era. Some of this went through southern India where excavations have revealed links to Rome, and some went through Sri Lanka. Because of the then LTTE threats, excavations in the key ports of Sri Lanka were suspended for nearly 30 years, but there is extensive evidence now coming of early coins and other artefacts from Rome and China and in between. For example, the Roman historian Pliny the Elder records a delegation from Sri Lanka to the Roman court in the first century and he is informed that the father of the leader of the delegation travels to China.15 The parallel to this father and son travel to the major centres of global power then, occurs only 1,000 years later when Marco Polo and his father travel to China. But the Sri Lankan Chronicle the Mahavamsa which incidentally gave the early history of India after the British found Mauryan remains (Chap. XXIX) records that a monk from ‘the Greek city of Alexandria’ travelled to Sri Lanka in the consecration of a stupa in the second century bc. And in Andhra Pradesh, there is the third century inscription of the Sinhala Vihara which says that it was donated to monks from Sri Lanka who converted (pasadakanam) Kashmir, Gandhara, China, Chilata, Tosali,

34  Susantha Goonatilake Avamta, Vanga, Vanavasi, Yavana, Damila, Palura and the island of Tambapanni (Sri Lanka).16 Reflecting the importance of Sri Lanka in early globalization, the world’s first global map of Ptolemy shows Sri Lanka’s size much exaggerated. Cosmas Indicopleustes of Alexandria writing in the sixth century calls Sri Lanka as having large ships and the ‘mediatrix’—that is midway between East and West in the global traffic of the time.17 The large ships are mentioned also in Chinese sources, connections with China beginning from the early Christian centuries.18 Sinhalese texts from the thirteenth and fourteenth century list about 60 countries with which the country had relations.19 Illustrating the effect of these relations, current genetic research indicates the ‘Sinhalese’ have the largest genetic diversity in the country, while the Tamils many of them brought during the Dutch occupation of Jaffna for tobacco plantations and during the British for tea plantations have far less diversity.20 Although much of transmission from Sri Lanka has not been adequately explored, one could mention the ‘no self ’ ideas of David Hume who influenced the Enlightenment and later even Albert Einstein got his material from Thailand which was exported earlier from Sri Lanka.21 Similarly, mindfulness therapy although came via Southeast Asia was also likewise a Sri Lankan export earlier. For mathematics from South Asia, we have the well-known documentation of transmission of computation on arithmetic through the Arabs to the Western world as well as that of trigonometry. In addition, we have the transmission of geometry from the Mediterranean world to us. As for technology, Dharmapal and Alvares had documented South Asian technologies that were ahead of eighteenth-century Europe. And we know from Juleff ’s excavations, the mass production of ‘Damascus’ steel in Sri Lanka for export.22 For more recent science and technology and its global relations, we have had the works of Arun Bala23 and Hobson24 which show that the Scientific Revolution and the Industrial Revolution of the West were a joint production with Asia.

Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean  35

The Shift to the Indian Ocean to Asia If the above were indicative of transfers of knowledge from the Indian Ocean region to Europe as it ascended, what should be the Asian effort? Let me recall. The economic shift towards Asia is taking place with a redivision of global work. In the initial stages, it was the relocation of cheap manual work to the Asian region, but now there is a relocation of brainpower. In addition, in the West, a significant number of Asian origin personnel man the research institutes and Silicon Valley. And just like electronic and computer hardware got relocated in East Asia and Southeast Asia, software is getting relocated in South Asia. But indicative of the way forward is in other less measurable cultural realms. Thus, some of the best novelists in English, a prime carrier of globalization are from South Asia. Fashion designers from East Asia and Southeast Asia are beginning to breach the eurocentric hegemony partly because the new markets are also in Asia. At a foundational scientific level, tectonic changes like which happened in relativity and quantum physics required a reorientation in epistemology. This as was noted earlier, resonated with or was inspired by South Asian philosophical realms.25 Varying epistemological and even ontological realms exist in the varieties of Indic philosophical systems. These include the six varieties of ‘Hindu’ philosophy and varieties of Buddhist and Jain positions which could provide elements for turning points when new crises in science occur. One should note that these epistemological positions should be distinguished from popular mythologies that have no factual basis such as gods and presumed flying machines during ancient times. Some of this material, as in some writers on Vedic mathematics, as opposed to factual Indic mathematics26 is imaginative fantasies. Again at the level of theory, noting that theories are often created by transferring metaphors from other disciplines, the Asian region has a large variety of metaphors that could be explored when new theories are required.

36  Susantha Goonatilake The new technologies that transform what we mean to be human in both the physical and mental sense include current developments in biotechnology, information technology including Artificial Intelligence and nanotechnology. These promise to dramatically transform the physical body as well as of how we perceive and process the world around us. The ethical issues around these are covered by the broad subject of bioethics which is still largely Eurocentric, discussed also through their broad belief systems including varieties of Christianity. But the nature of life and of mental processes has been the subject of much philosophical and observational discussion in different positions in the Indic realm. Unfortunately, the positions of the Indic realm have been noticeably absent in this discussions, and it is here that we could make significant contributions. The realm of bioethics, govern the broad directions that these disciplines should develop. Some of these directions go into entirely different realms such as ‘Transhumanism’ (which embrace the position that the human condition is changing dramatically into a post-human one) and discussions on a ‘Singularity’ (which posits that the human condition would be soon transcended). Although there is intense discussion in the West on these issues through their own implied philosophical bases, we have not done so although I have attempted to bring together several groups including one in New Delhi but gave rise to no significant outcome. It is in these new technologies that the Indic and the Indian Ocean imprint can be easily made. One should also remember that the social sciences as taught in our universities arose primarily in the West as it industrialized and went through significant transformations in their societies. These theories whether it be of Marx or Max Weber for example were essentially addressing problems within a particularistic frame of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. But they are clearly inadequate at a time when Asia is overtaking the West. Thus, Marx’s Asiatic Mode of Production which was supposed to be Asia’s default position relegated to stagnation was not only false but in the face of our rapid development is patently not applicable. Similarly, Weber writing around a century ago posited that the engine of industrial growth was in Protestant countries

Cultural Dynamics in the Indian Ocean  37

and that the cultural systems of Asia would not allow for industrial development. This was again not only historically wrong but considering that Asian countries are today growing more rapidly than the West should evoke laughter, but unfortunately does not. If arising Europe could fashion its own social theories given the changed social and civilizational circumstances, we should have the courage to do so. The possibilities of fresh thinking from the Indian Ocean realm as Asia advances are immense and urgently required. I have only given a few indicative examples (which I had sketched out in earlier publications) but the possible tapestry is huge. And we must, rise to the occasion and paint this tapestry with our own brushes.

Notes 1. Text to be found in H. Sharp (ed.), Selections from Educational Records, Part I (1781–1839), Calcutta: Superintendent, Govt. Printing, 1920. 2. Martin Bernal, 1987, Black Athena: Afro Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, vol. I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785-1985, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 3. Susantha Goonatilake, Toward a Global Science: Mining Civilizational Knowledge, Indiana University Press, 1999; Delhi: Sage India, 2000. 4. D.M. Bose, S.N. Sen and B.V. Subbarayappa, A Concise History of Science in India, New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy, 1971, p. 573. 5. A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, New York: Grove Press Inc., 1953, p. 497. 6. Bose et al., p. 467. 7. Donald F. Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 399. 8. Bose et al., 1971, pp. 334-8. 9. C.A. Alvares, Homo Faber: Technology and Culture in India, China and the West 1500-1972, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1979, p. 63. 10. Philip P. Wiener, (ed.), Dictionary of the History of Ideas, New York: Charles Scribiner’s Sons, 1973, p. 67. 11. A.H. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, New York: Van Nostrand, 1968. 12. N.P. Jacobson, ‘The Philosophy of Oriental Influence in Hume’s Philosophy’, Philosophy East and West, vol. XIX, no. 1, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, January 1969, p. 17.

38  Susantha Goonatilake 13. Yoel Hoffman, ‘The Possibility of Knowledge: Kant and Nagarjuna’, in Ben-Ami Scharfstein et al. (eds.), Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic and European Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, p. 27. 14. Susantha Goonatilake, ‘Modern Physics Bears the Imprint of Western and Asian Philosophies’, Millennium Essay’, Nature, 25 May 2000, vol. 405, Issue no. 6785. 15. Ananda W.P. Guruge, ‘From Tamraparni to Taprobane and from Ceylon to Sri Lanka’, in UNESCO, The Cultural Triangle of Sri Lanka, Paris: UNESCO, 1993, pp. 12-13. 16. Hanumantha B.S.L. Rao, Ramachandra N.S. Murthy and B. Subrmanyam, E. Sivanagi Reddy, Buddhist Inscriptions of Andhradesa, Secunderabad: Buddha Vihara Trust, 1998, p. 153. See also Himanshu Prabha Ray, The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 141. 17. Guruge, 1993: 13. 18. S.G.M. Weerasinghe, A History of the Cultural Relations Between Sri Lanka and China: An Aspect of the Silk Route, Colombo: The Central Cultural Fund, 1995, p. 35. 19. Ibid., pp. 9-12. 20. Ruwan Illeperuma, ‘Genetic Genealogy of Sri Lankan Populations’, in the special conference on ‘The Genetic Heritage of Sri Lanka’, Colombo: Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka, 2010. 21. Alison Gopnik, 2009, ‘Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism? Charles Francois Dolu, the Royal College of La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network’, Hume Studies, vol. 35, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 5-28. 22. Gill Juleff, ‘An Ancient Wind-powered Iron Smelting Technology in Sri Lanka’, Nature, vol. 379, 4 January 1996, pp. 60-3. 23. Arun Bala, The Dialogue of Civilizations in the Birth of Modern Science, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 24. John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 25. Goonatilake, op. cit., 2000. 26. Ashok Jhunjhunwala, Indian Mathematics: An Introduction, Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited, Delhi, 1993.

CHAPTER 3

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War: Emerging Dimensions of a Fascinating Region MOHAMMED KHALID

Known in antiquity as Erythrean Sea, the Indian Ocean got its present name from the Arabs who called it Bahr-al-Hind. In 2000 bce, the Egyptian and the Persian empires extended their influence seawards in the west, and traversed on its waters. Later the Romans and Arabs followed suit. The Arabs mastered the directions of the winds between the tropics which helped their ships sail from the west to the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean and back. Their long voyages on its waters helped them establish in the remote corners of the ocean littoral. In the east from about the commencement of the Christian era, it was the Indians, Malays and the Chinese who travelled the sea. Indian Ocean was the scene of extensive commercial activity, for its littoral lands produced raw materials, especially the spices that were in great demand in European markets. The Indonesians crossed the Ocean to reach eastern Africa and Madagascar. Arab and Persian navies became predominant by the ninth century ad followed by the Chinese with enormous fleets between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.1 History has witnessed the emergence of important civilizations and cultures on the shores of the Indian Ocean: East Africa, the Middle East, the South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Malay world, etc., have constituted an important chain of human activity which

40  Mohammed Khalid pulsated along the littoral of the Ocean. These included ‘the Astronesians, and Malays who settled in Madagascar, the IndoAryans and Dravidians who occupied Sri Lanka and Maldives, the aboriginals who occupied the Andamans, Nicobars and Australia . . .’ .2 The Indian Ocean littoral lands had great centres of different faiths: Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and also Christianity. These centres radiated waves of influence and impulses. The movements of Parsis (Zoroastrains) from Iran to Gujarat (India), Buddhism from India to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, Hinduism to Mauritius, Seychelles and other parts of the Ocean and Islam from Arabian Peninsula to almost all the lands of its littoral. The frequent travelers were the Muslims who had to go to perform Hajj every year from all parts of the Indian Ocean lands to Mecca (Saudi Arabia). The Hajj also fostered a great trade network.3 This unity, however, started disintegrating as European imperial conquest led to the founding of empires as part of their imperial extension in various parts of the Indian Ocean littoral. The cut-throat competition, rivalries and manifold activities of the European powers followed the Portuguese vanguard into the Indian Ocean. As a consequence, the native cultures, languages, economic systems, religious orientations underwent a transformation and change forever. The history of Indian Ocean up to the end of the Second World War has traditionally been divided into two broad periods; ‘pre-Gaman’ and ‘post-Gaman’, with Vasco da Gama rounding the southern tip of South Africa in November-December 1497 and his arrival at the port of Calicut in India on 20 May 1498 serving the cutting point between the two periods.4 The pre-Gaman period denotes the explorations by the ancient people of the Indian Ocean region which had a thriving network of trade and people to people links. The post-Gaman epoch is replete with advancing European navies and other ships which gradually unravelled the largely self-sustained and tightly interwoven economic, political and cultural world of the Indian Ocean. The post-Gaman epoch denotes the 450 years from 1498 till the British withdrawal from India in 1947 and withdrawal of European Navies from China in 1949. Geographically, an important aspect of the Indian Ocean studies

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  41

has been to term the Indian Ocean as a ‘region’. Geologically, the Indian Ocean basin forms a contiguous mass since the Palaeozoic era, which on the map is depicted in the physical unity and symmetry of its area that contrasts with the ‘shapeless vastness of the Pacific and the corridor-like form of Atlantic’. Indian Ocean since antiquity has constituted a geopolitical region. Constituting a distinct geographical unity. Indian Ocean is by no means entirely homogeneous. It encompasses many a diverse areas and the people of its littoral range from primitive to the most sophisticated. The vital aspect of climatic factor in the form of monsoon winds which link many parts of its littoral very closely – giving it a popular description of ‘Monsoon Ocean’. These winds have been blowing quite predictably from south-west to north-east and back in an annual cycle. These winds bring rain to feed the agriculture and economy in South and Southeast Asia. The Ocean has a unique geology, relief and climate and is fairly safe for navigation throughout the year.5 It may be said that while the Atlantic and Pacific have existed as the earth’s features since the planet congealed perhaps, the Indian Ocean is one which has a formidably rich history, unique geology and geography. This aspect of the Indian Ocean thus has attracted a number of scholars to investigate as how far it makes a geopolitical or geostrategic region. The Ocean includes Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Flores Sea, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Java Sea, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Savu Sea, Strait of Malacca, Timor Sea, and other tributary water bodies. These sub-water areas within the Indian Ocean have attracted a number of scholars to investigate them independently as well as in relation to the wider Ocean realm and their correlation. Its monsoon cycle and tropical cyclones have been studied in their impact on agriculture and economies of the littoral states. Counterclockwise gyre (broad, circular system of currents) in the southern Indian Ocean, unique reversal of surface currents in the northern Indian Ocean and its floor dominated by the MidIndian Ocean Ridge and its subdivisions are of great attraction for geologists and oceanographers.6 Indian Ocean on its littoral has 29 states and six island

42  Mohammed Khalid republics in its waters.7 It has the largest and perhaps the most heterogeneous combination of countries with states as large as India and Australia and as small as Seychelles, has large and growing economies like India and Australia and small economies like Maldives and Comoros, has income per capita levels ranging from very high like that of Singapore, Australia or United Arab Emirates (UAE) and low like Mozambique, Tanzania, Somalia and Bangladesh. Even though these states display tremendous socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and religious heterogeneity, the Ocean has bound them together through the ages while affecting their historical developments in a decisive fashion. Diversity and variations in the geography, social organization, culture, economy, historical experiences, political development and structure of their people and places notwithstanding, all its littoral and island states are dependent on the Ocean, making the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) a fascinating world for study and investigation. Before the Second World War, the Indian Ocean – then considered a British ‘lake’ – was encircled by important British held possessions and its navy kept a strict vigil on the strategic supplies such as Persian oil, Malayan rubber, Indian tea, Australian and New Zealand foodstuffs, etc., needed in peace and war which had to pass across. British supremacy in the Indian Ocean ended after the Second World War and gradually Britain gave up most of its possessions in the region. Finally, the British forces withdrew from the east of Suez in 1971.8 Indian Ocean was not considered to be of any political and strategic significance until the late 1960s and had largely escaped the attention of academics and scholars, political and military strategists. In the 1960s, the Superpowers of the time, United States and Soviet Union, emerged on the horizons of the Indian Ocean. They justified their presence to fill the so-called ‘power vacuum’, which had resulted after Britain’s exit and to articulate their political, economic and strategic interests. Their continued and expanding naval presence turned into a rivalry aimed for political and economic advantage and quest for markets for the vast quantities of military and consumer goods. Their increased presence converted it into an area of turbulence and tension, a focal

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  43

point for crises of all description and an area of crucial geostrategic importance. Indian Ocean became a hot bed of oceanic designs of superpowers and their competing strategic and commercial interests led to rapid arms buildup both conventional and nuclear. Concerned with this growing rivalry, the States of the Indian Ocean region came together to oppose the superpower naval build up. In 1971, on a Sri Lankan proposal, the UN General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and took practical measures by establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to consult the Great Powers to persuade them to abstain from further military expansion in the Indian Ocean.9 With the military buildup and local response Indian Ocean gradually became an important area of study and investigation. Indian Ocean studies attracted scholars not merely because of its long history, they also applied interdisciplinary and comparative approaches to social, economic, political, and cultural interactions within and its linkages beyond the Indian Ocean in the past and present. These studies have made significant contributions to the understanding of the nature and dynamics of regional and pan-regional issues. Scholars from anthropology, archeology, economics, geography, history, marine sciences, political science, and sociology have made innovative studies on topics such as human migration, cultural and religious diversity, trade and commerce, imperialism and colonialism, globalization and about the abundant resources on the Indian Ocean bed and their exploration. In the recent decades and more pertinently after the end of the Cold War many new dimensions of Indian Ocean study and research have emerged. Living resources are the most significant assets of the Indian Ocean. About 14.6 per cent of the world’s fish catch comes from its waters. It also represents a large share of farming fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals. Coveted fish species like shrimp, croakers, snappers, skates, and grunts are caught by fishermen of littoral countries, while pelagic fish of higher value – including species of tuna and tuna like species such as billfish that are found in tropical and subtropical waters – are taken mostly by the world’s major fishing nations such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia.10

44  Mohammed Khalid Indian Ocean has oil and gas fields, sand and gravel aggregates and deposits of manganese and poly-metallic nodules beneath its waters. India has been pursuing research in seabed exploration since early 1980s. In 1987 India was accorded on 17 August 1987 the ‘pioneer investor’s’ status by the International Seabed Authority (ISBA) giving it exclusive rights for exploring polymetallic nodules for mineral resources like copper, cobalt and manganese among others in the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB). As the competition in the field grew, in 2011, China also obtained approval from ISBA to explore a 10,000 sq. km area for poly-metallic sulphide-ore deposits in the international seabed region of the south-west Indian Ocean. Subsequently, China has made attempts to explore for hydrothermal sulfide, a seabed deposit containing copper, zinc and precious metals such as gold and silver. This approval is an important Chinese inroad in the Indian Ocean.11 There is a galaxy of scholars who are devoting considerable space to study the quantum and nature of Ocean bed resources, possibility of their commercial exploitation and its ecological cost. Maritime security and security-related issues in the Indian Ocean, both at sea and in the littoral states is another field of study and research. Robert D. Kaplan described it as the ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century’ and that the importance of Indian Ocean, which had long been neglected in the study of international politics, was growing.12 He also explained the civilizational and political connections of disparate Asian, African and Middle Eastern players in the Indian Ocean. Kaplan also examined the Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean and US interests in the region. With the end of the Cold War and ongoing crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, active offensives of al-Qaeda terrorist activities and exacerbating activities of ISIS have boosted the importance of the Indian Ocean as a theatre of conflict. Its strategic importance has further increased with the growth of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including oil requirements from the Middle East, to provide for their economic growth. The strategic chokepoints in the Ocean – the Straits of Hormuz, the

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  45

Bab‐el‐Mandeb, and the Malacca Straits, etc. – have become a matter of great importance for all trading nations within and outside the region. Conflict in Yemen and piracy near Bab‐el‐ Mandeb emanating from the failed state of Somalia are issues of great concern. Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and the undersea cables traversing the Indian Ocean providing broadband communication connections between Asia, Europe, and the United States has become of utmost importance for the future of all the Asian powers.13 Environmental degradation and challenges faced by the fragile and sensitive eco-system of the Indian Ocean is another important area of study and research. Apart from the overall impacts of global warming the myriad human pressures increasingly threaten to degrade essential ecosystem resources in and around the Indian Ocean, coastal development for aquaculture, roads, buildings, and urban infrastructure is damaging or demolishing mangroves, coral reefs, wetlands, and other habitats. Ever increasing flow of domestic sewage, and industrial effluents into the sea are causing toxic substances in coastal waters killing marine life. It is estimated that Indian Ocean Asian coastlines alone lost 1.9-million ha of mangroves from 1980-2005, while Africa lost another half million. Pollution, destructive fishing practices (such as the use of dynamite and poisons), coral mining for construction materials, and coral bleaching have already destroyed or critically endangered the Indian Ocean ecosystem.14 Consequent rise in the sea levels could force migrations and shifting of populations in coastal areas. For instance one meter rise of sea level could potentially reduce Qatar’s land area by 2.6 per cent, submerge 13.95 per cent of Bahrain, and inundate 5,763 sq. km. of India’s coast. Indonesia could lose 2,000 islands to the rising waters.15 This aspect is emerging as a focus of research for many scholars. Throughout its history, people living around the Indian Ocean have migrated to distant lands on its littoral and islands. The Malays, Africans, the Arabs and the Indians have settled all around making a hybrid ethnic and cultural mix at many places. The oldest civilization on its littoral, India is a cultural hub and home to diversity. For more than a thousand years, Indians have been

46  Mohammed Khalid migrating to different parts of the Indian Ocean littoral. Through these migrations India has exerted considerable cultural influence on the littoral lands. The Indian Diaspora today constitutes an important, and in some respects, a unique force. Their presence in the coastal towns and ports of many of the African countries dates back to more than a thousand years. They went as indentured labourers imported by the British to Kenya, Mauritius etc., in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indians were brought to fight on behalf of the British Empire in the Boer Wars (1880-1 and 1899-1902) in South Africa; they went as labourers in the Gulf countries; and in recent decades, went as professionals in almost every field in many countries of the Indian Ocean. On the African littoral of the Indian Ocean, there is significant presence of the Peoples of Indian Origin (PIO) in south and southeast Africa and presence in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Egypt. Indians are not only notable investors but also decision makers in their respective countries. They also hold important positions in the government and in key non-government sectors. They have set up Indian associations and organizations at local, regional and national levels in the host countries. Some of these organizations have been established on the basis of many Indian regions, religions and castes creating ‘mini-Indias’ on the African continent and Arabian Peninsula. In fact, they act as true cultural diplomats and messengers of India. Respective Indian governments are aware of the importance of Indian Diaspora in the Indian Ocean because of their remittances, help in spreading Indian culture and tourism potential, etc.16 A host of Indian scholars have made serious attempts at Diaspora studies and it has emerged as a fascinating area of Indian Ocean studies.

Regional Cooperation and Conflicts To promote multi-dimensional regional cooperation, the countries of the Indian Ocean formed the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative and Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) in 1997. Renamed as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), it is a regional forum of coastal states bordering the Indian

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  47

Ocean. The Association brings together the representatives of government, Business and Academia, for promoting cooperation and closer interaction among them. It also aims at strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.17 Similarly, to promote the sustainable utilization of the living marine resources of the Southwest Indian Ocean, Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC) was set up in 2004 by a Resolution of Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). It was set up with a purpose of proper management and development of the living marine resources, and to address common problems of fisheries management and development faced by the members of SWIOFC, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal states.18 The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) comprising Comoros, Reunion, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles was created in 1982 in Port Louis to strengthen the ties of friendship between the member countries. The declared objectives of IOC include political, diplomatic, economic and commercial cooperation; sustainable development and strengthening of the regional cultural identity. Similarly, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), involving the countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, etc.) was created in 1997 to increase cooperation in trade, transport and communication, energy, tourism, technology, fisheries, etc. Regional cooperation among the countries of the Indian Ocean is another important dimension of Indian Ocean Studies. The Indian Ocean region suffers from a high level of internal conflicts. It is said to be the locus of some 70 per cent of the world’s natural disasters. Countries on its littoral have unsettled boundaries many of which were left behind by their former colonial masters. It has given birth to violent conflicts, insurgencies and wars in the region. Wars between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israel conflict, Iran-Iraq war, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait are such examples of internal conflicts. Many of the islands in the Indian Ocean remain disputed between the neighbouring states and island republics.

48  Mohammed Khalid The unsettled dispute of British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) and continued US naval base in Diego Garcia is a cause of concern for the littoral states. Conflicts among the neighbours have led to arms race siphoning off a substantial amount of scarce funds which could otherwise be used for highly-required economic development. This is another dimension of Indian Ocean Studies.

Emergence of Piracy and its Implications Due to the chaos and violence in Somalia after 1991, rising economic deprivation and an uncertain future, many coastal people of Somalia were pushed into the realm of piracy in order to feed themselves and their families. These pirates became predators as they had no mission other than acquiring money. Piracy off the Somali coast gradually began to threaten international shipping after the early 1990s. International Maritime Organization, the World Food Programme and many trading countries in the Indian Ocean felt concerned over the rise in piracy. It contributed to enhance shipping costs and shipping insurance premiums, and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. In August 2008, a multinational coalition task force called as Combined Task Force 150 was formed to take the role of fighting Somalian piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden. United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1838 calling on nations with vessels in the area to use military force to repress the acts of piracy. At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India called for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force under a unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia. On 2 December 2008, UN Security Council deplored all acts of piracy and urged the states and regional organizations to fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and enter its territorial waters to repress acts of piracy.19 To give a coordinated effort against piracy, Security Council adopted Resolution 1851 on 16 December 2008 and called upon the ‘States, regional and international organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia’.

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  49

The pirates have kept on expanding their area of operation into the Indian Ocean in some cases more than 1,850 km off the coast of Somalia and attacked ships close to Seychelles. Rising piracy has threatened the reduction in world trade through the Suez Canal by about a third. It also has grave economic implications as some shipping companies have already decided to re-route vulnerable vessels around the Cape of Good Hope.20 To tackle this problem, more than 20 nations contributed to maintain an international naval force in the Gulf of Aden. On any given day it keeps about 17 naval ships on patrol in the Gulf of Aden. They have created an internationally recognized transit corridor that provides security to about 30,000 cargo ships that transit that corridor every year. Several multinational initiatives have been launched to chalk out anti-piracy strategies. A multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created in January 2009 and in the same month, under the leadership of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Rising piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean has attracted many a scholars to study the nature of piracy and its political and financial impact on the nations using these waterways.

String of Pearls After the end of the Cold War, China has increased its presence in the Indian Ocean Region and has established its ‘nodes of influence’. Called the ‘string of pearls’, under which China has strengthened economic and strategic ties with Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These ties include joint port construction or enlargement deals, such as building of Chittagong port in Bangladesh, building close relations with Maldives with a possible future development of Marao Island in Maldives, establishing its surveillance systems in the Coco Islands off Myanmar, developing Hambantota port in Sri Lanka as a tanker farm, and getting on lease the Gwadar port of Pakistan near the all important Gulf of Hormuz. To feed its industry, China is becoming increasingly dependent on Middle East for oil, and needs markets to sell its goods. These are readily available on the Asian and African littoral

50  Mohammed Khalid of the Indian Ocean. To secure the supply lines China needs to protect the SLOCs and is compelled to venture into the waters of the Indian Ocean. China currently has no naval bases in the Indian Ocean, but stories regularly surface in the press ranging from the supposed presence of Chinese submarines at Marao in the Maldives and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.21 Such presence poses a serious challenge to Indian Navy and has the potential to collect intelligence about Indian submarines operating in the Indian Ocean and monitor India’s activities at sea. The String of Pearls has become one of the most widely debated subjects in contemporary strategic studies of the Indian Ocean Region. The littoral countries of the Indian Ocean continue to export raw materials and import manufactured goods produced elsewhere, with a few exceptions like Australia, India, and South Africa. Petroleum dominates commerce, as crude oil is exported from the region to Europe, North America, and East Asia. Iron ore from Western Australia and from India and South Africa is shipped to Japan, while coal is exported to the United Kingdom from Australia via the Indian Ocean. Processed seafood has emerged as a major export item from the littoral states. As the economic competition grows, two major players, India and China face each other to expand their trade and commerce with the other countries of the Indian Ocean Region. Competition to capture the markets of African continent, and development of intra-regional trade is an important area of Indian Ocean Studies. Bilateral trade and multilateral trade between and among the countries of its littoral is an area which has enormously developed after the end of the Cold War.

India and the Indian Ocean Embedded, and terrestrially moored to the surrounding ocean, India is a gift of the Indian Ocean. By virtue of its location, India has close neighbourhood not only with Indonesia, Malaysia Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, but it is also central to the entire Indian Ocean. The African continent and Arabian Peninsula to its west and south-west, and

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  51

Southeast Asia to its east, impart a unique centrality to India in the Indian Ocean. Until the advent of Europeans in the sixteenth century, the life and history of India was entirely north-bound. The Europeans brought about a qualitative change in the life of the Indian subcontinent. The ramifications and resonance of the change defined and determined the extent and intensity of the Ocean’s linkages with contemporary India. The experience and the legacy of colonialism–imperialism have notably contributed to the country’s consciousness of Indian Ocean. The Second World War changed Indian perspective of the Indian Ocean drastically. The importance of the Indian Ocean was realized in the wake of Japanese penetration of South Asia, following the fall of Singapore in 1942. Noted historian K.M. Pannikar emphasized that India should set up its bases at Singapore, Mauritius, Aden and Socotra as outposts of the country’s defence, so that Indian Ocean must remain truly Indian.22

Conclusion Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American Navy admiral, geostrategist, and historian, once said, ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters’. Indian Ocean is the emerging theatre of ‘Great Power’ politics of the twenty-first century as its waters carry the most strategically significant maritime trade for global economy. Owing to its geo-strategic disposition, Indian Ocean will continue to enjoy eminence in global calculations. Driven by the hunger for key resources and markets, the jostling among regional and extra-regional maritime powers for influence in the region will continue. It is interesting but true that the change in world politics has always had an impact on the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean – be it the earlier trade networks and migrations among the littoral states, the Chinese forays into its waters, European expeditions into its littoral eventually converting it into a ‘British Lake’, superpower rivalry and their naval presence during the Cold War. The region was largely ignored by the scholars for meaningful

52  Mohammed Khalid academic discourse for quite some time but now has attracted focus of research that is transforming our understanding of this oceanic world’s past and present and its place in global geopolitics. Scholars from anthropology, archaeology, economics, geography, history, political science, and sociology are exploring different dimensions of Indian Ocean. Innovative studies on topics such as human migration, cultural and religious diversity, trade and commerce, changing complexion of security threats and necessity for cooperation among the countries of the Indian Ocean have grown. As India emerges a formidable power in the Indian Ocean, Indian scholars need to assume an added responsibility to dig out other hitherto unexplored dimensions of this fascinating region.

Notes 1. For details of this discussion see, K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Power in Indian History, Bombay: Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp. 32-6; idem, Asia and the Western Dominance: A Survey of Vasco da Gama Approach of Asian History 1998-1995, London: George Allen and Vanita, 1953, pp. 24-67; Auguste Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, pp. 74-86. 2. See Kenneth McPherson, ‘Cultural Exchanges in the Indian Ocean Region: An Historical Perspective’, International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies II, Perth, Australia, 1984, p. 4; J. de V. Allen, ‘A Proposal for Indian Ocean Studies’, in Historical Relations Across The Indian Ocean: Report and Papers of the Meeting of Experts Organized by UNESCO, Port Louis, Mauritius: UNESCO, 1980, pp. 138-42. 3. Devender Kaushik, The Indian Ocean: A Strategic Dimension, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p. 1; Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Indian Ocean: A Whirlpool of Unrest, Delhi: Paribus Publishers, 1984, pp. 9-10. 4. Henry the Navigator, the Prince of Portugal, initiated the first great enterprise of the Age of Discovery – The search for a sea route east by south. These expeditions were further encouraged by King John II. After many sacrifices and unsuccessful attempts, finally captain Vasco da Gama under the instructions to the reach Calicut on India’s west coast, led a magnificent voyage around the Cape of Storms (which he renamed as Cape of Good Hope) helped by an Arabian pilot and reached Calicut. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 7, 1974, pp. 1039-41; the New Encyclopaedia

Indian Ocean after the End of the Cold War  53 Britannica, vol. 21, 2002, pp. 182-3; Lexicon Universal Encyclopedia, vol. 9, 1987, p. 24. 5. N. Balakrishnan Nair, ‘Indian Ocean, A New Frontier for Food and Wealth’, ICIOS II, Perth, December 1984, vol. A, p. 7. 6. For Indian Ocean trenches, mid-oceanic ridge, continental shelf and ocean floor, see, Viktor Filipovich Kanayev, ‘Indian Ocean’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, online, at, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/285876/Indian-Ocean. 7. The littoral countries of the Indian Ocean include South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia. The island states include: Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives and Sri Lanka. 8. Ashley Jackson, ‘Britain in the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol. 7, no. 2, 2011, pp. 145-60. 9. See, ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Indian Ocean Adopts Report to General Assembly’, Press Release United Nations (meetings coverage and press releases), 25 July 2005. 10. Philomene A. Verlaan, ‘Indian Ocean: Biological Resources’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit. 11. Saibal Dasgupta, ‘China gets First-ever Chance to Enter Indian Ocean for Exploration’, The Times of India, 2 August 2011; ‘China Speeds up Indian Ocean Exploration for Minerals’, The Economic Times, 26 February 2014. 12. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2, March/April 2009. 13. David Brewster, ‘Looking Beyond the String of Pearls: Indian Ocean is Where India holds a Clear Advantage over China’, India Today, 16 May 2013. 14. Kanchana Wickramasinghe, ‘Environmental Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region Half of the World’s Trade Travels through it, but are we Protecting it?’, Sunday Island online, 9 January 2011. 15. Mohamed El Raey, ‘Coastal Areas’, in Mostafa K. Tolba and Najib W. Saab (eds.), Arab Environment: Climate Change – Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries, Beirut, Report of Arab Forum for Environment and Development, 2009; Rex Victor Cruz et al., ‘Asia,’ in M.L. Parry et al., Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 484; Asian Development Bank, The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review, Manila: ADB, 2009, p. 32. 16. Mohammed Khalid, ‘Indian Diaspora and Culture in the Indian Ocean:

54  Mohammed Khalid A Basis of Cultural Diplomacy in the Region’, Indian Ocean Digest, Issue 54, vol. 33, no.1, January-June 2014, pp. 1-34 17. For details visit official website of Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at http://www.iora.net/ 18. For details visit official website Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/swiofc/en 19. See, Colum Lynch, ‘U.N. Authorizes Land, Air Attacks on Somali Pirates: International Effort to Secure Sea Route May Stumble Amid Political Disarray in East African Nation’, Washington Post, 17 December 2008; also see, Security Council, SC/9514, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, 2 December 2008. 20. Mohammed Khalid, ‘Somalia and its Lawless Coast: India’s Growing Security Responsibility in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, April 2010, pp. 67-80. 21. Christopher J. Pehrson, ‘String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral’, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, July 2006. Retrieved on 10 January 2015. 22. See, Mohammed Khalid, ‘India in the Changing Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean’, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, April 2007, pp. 61-78.

CHAPTER 4

The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being M O H A N G U R U S WA M Y

The Indian Ocean has been at the centre of world history ever since we know. Man originated in Africa, probably somewhere in the Olduvai Gorge in present-day Tanzania – where Homo erectus lived 1.2 million years ago and where the first traces of Homo sapiens, our more recent ancestors having evolved only about 200,000 years ago. First phonetic languages evolved around 100,000 years ago. The migration of mankind out of Africa began almost 60,000 years ago. But we don’t call the Indian Ocean the African Ocean because the first recorded activity over it began only about 3,000 years ago. Three great early recorded activities of this period come to mind. The first is the Indus Valley Civilization. It was a Bronze Age civilization (3300-1300 bce; mature period 2600-1900 bce) in the north-western region of the Indian subcontinent. Along with Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia it was one of three early civilizations of the Old World, and of the three the most widespread. The Indus civilization’s economy appears to have depended significantly on trade, which was facilitated by major advances in transport technology. It may have been the first civilization to use wheeled transport. These advances may have included bullock carts that are identical to those seen throughout South Asia today, as well as boats. Most of these boats were probably small, flatbottomed craft, perhaps driven by sail, similar to those one can see on the Indus River today; however, there is secondary evidence of sea-going crafts.

56  Mohan Guruswamy Archaeologists have discovered a massive, dredged canal and what they regard as a docking facility at the coastal city of Lothal now in Gujarat. Judging from the dispersal of Indus Civilization artefacts, the trade networks, economically, integrated a huge area, including portions of Afghanistan, the coastal regions of Persia, northern and western India, and Mesopotamia. There is some evidence that trade contacts extended to Crete and possibly to Egypt. There was an extensive maritime trade network operating between the Harappan and Mesopotamian civilizations as early as the middle Harappan Phase, with much commerce being handled by ‘middlemen merchants from Dilmun’ (modern Bahrain and Failaka located in the Persian Gulf). Such long-distance sea trade became feasible with the innovative development of plank-built watercraft, equipped with a single central mast supporting a sail of woven rushes or cloth. The second great economic activity was Slavery. Slavery can be traced back to the earliest records, such as the Code of Hammurabi (c.1760 bc), which refers to it as an established institution. Slavery is rare among hunter-gatherer populations, as it is developed as a system of social stratification. Slavery typically also requires a shortage of labour and a surplus of land to be viable. Bits and pieces from history indicate that Arabs enslaved over 150 million African people and at least 50 million from other parts of the world. Later they also converted Africans into Islam, causing a complete social and financial collapse of the entire African continent apart from wealth attributed to a few regional African kings who became wealthy on the trade and encouraged it. The third great economic activity was seafaring, evidenced by migration. The island of Madagascar, the largest in the Indian Ocean, lies some 250 miles (400 km) from Africa and 4,000 miles (6,400 km) from Indonesia. New findings, published in the American Journal of Human Genetics, show that the human inhabitants of Madagascar are unique – amazingly, half of their genetic lineages derive from settlers from the region of Borneo, with the other half from East Africa. It is believed that the migration from the Sunda Islands began around 200 bc. Linguists have established that the origins of the language

The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being  57

spoken in Madagascar, Malagasy, suggested Indonesian connections, because its closest relative is the Maanyan language, spoken in southern Borneo. The gods were also kind and gave the IOR the weather conditions that helped in evolving seaborne trade and intercourse. The sea surface current and prevailing wind structure in and over the Indian Ocean favoured seafarers in their endeavour and sailings in the Indian Ocean from the southern tip of Africa (Cape of Good Hope) during the month of May. After the entry into the Indian Ocean, the seafarers continued to sail in the northerly direction along the coastline of Africa (aided by the strong Somali Current and the East Arabian Current) towards the Arabian Sea. The physical environmental conditions over the sea and the external prevailing weather helped the seafarers reach places up to the west coast of India. As this sea surface current extend towards the east coast of India, the sailors were greatly assisted by the surface current as they sailed along. During November, when the East Indian winter wind reverses its direction and begins to blow from the north-east, the sailors prepare for their return journey. The winds that generate the waves contributes to reduction in the otherwise required travel time for the sailings between any given two points of departure and arrival. The natural and external forces help the sailors making their journey/expedition more economical and energy efficient. Clearly the region was a hub of all kinds of economic activity. Then came the Petroleum Age. And things changed as never before. The Spice Trade, the Silk Trade, the China Trade all paled into insignificance. The use of coal as a ship fuel enlarged distances and volumes of cargo. Oil made even longer journeys and greater volumes possible. Petroleum is the lifeblood of modern society. Its a relatively new activity, but its advent has transformed our world as few things have. Petroleum, in one form or another, has been used since ancient times. According to Herodotus more than 4,000 years ago, asphalt was used in the construction of the walls and towers of Babylon; there were oil pits near Babylon, and a pitch spring on Zacynthus.

58  Mohan Guruswamy Great quantities of it were found on the banks of river Issus, one of the tributaries of the Euphrates. Ancient Persian tablets indicate the medicinal and lighting uses of petroleum in the upper levels of their society. By ad 347, oil was produced from bamboo-drilled wells in China. Early British explorers to Myanmar documented a flourishing oil extraction industry based in Yenangyaung, that in 1795 had hundreds of hand-dug wells under production. Oil is now the single most important driver of world economics, politics and technology. Its rise in importance was due to the invention of the internal combustion engine, the rise in commercial aviation, and the importance of petroleum to industrial organic chemistry, particularly the synthesis of plastics, fertilizers, solvents, adhesives and pesticides. Oil is now the basis of about half the world GDP of over $85 trillion. In 1847, the process to distill kerosene from petroleum was invented by James Young. He noticed natural petroleum seepage in the Riddings colliery at Alfreton, Derbyshire from which he distilled a light thin oil suitable for use as lamp oil, at the same time obtaining a thicker oil suitable for lubricating machinery. In 1848 Young set up a small business refining the crude oil. Today the world’s biggest stand-alone refinery is the Reliance Refinery at Jamnagar with a refining capacity of about 1.5 million barrels a day. The Essar Refinery at Jamnagar refines a further 0.5 million barrels a day. Together they make Jamnagar one of the world’s largest refining centres. India’s number one export item is petroleum products, mostly petrol and diesel. It now exports the equivalent of about 300,000 barrels a day. In 2014 $60.3 billion dollars or a fifth of our total exports of $306 billion. This sector accounts for almost a third of India’s total international trade. All of it is by sea. India imports $160 billion worth of crude oil now and exactly three-quarters of this comes from countries in the IOR. Saudi Arabia’s share is 18 per cent, Iran 16 per cent, Kuwait 10 per cent, Iraq 9 per cent, and UAE 8 per cent. The IOR is India’s lifeline and lifeblood. If this line gets chocked we will suffer hugely. India just cannot afford anything to go wrong here. The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered among the

The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being  59

most strategically important in the world– according to the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points, with 40 per cent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 per cent through the Bab elMandab Strait. But it’s not just about sea-routes and trade. More than half the world’s armed conflicts are presently located in the Indian Ocean region, while the waters are also home to continually evolving strategic developments including the competing rises of China and India, potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamist terrorism, growing incidence of piracy in and around the Horn of Africa, and management of diminishing fishery resources. As a result of all this, almost all the world’s major powers have deployed substantial military forces in the Indian Ocean region. For example, in addition to maintaining expeditionary forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, and uses the island of Diego Garcia as a major airnaval base and logistics hub for its Indian Ocean operations. In addition, the United States has deployed several major naval task forces there, including Combined Task Force 152, which is aimed at safeguarding the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, and Combined Task Force 150, which is tasked with countering piracy from the Gulf of Oman to Kenya. France, meanwhile, is perhaps the last of the major European powers to maintain a significant presence in the north and south-west Indian Ocean quadrants, with naval bases in Djibouti, Reunion, and Abu Dhabi. And, of course, China and India both also have genuine aspirations of developing blue water naval capabilities through the development and acquisition of aircraft carriers and an aggressive modernization and expansion programme. China’s aggressive soft power diplomacy has widely been seen as arguably the most important element in shaping the Indian Ocean strategic environment, transforming the entire region’s dynamics. By providing large loans on generous repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, dams,

60  Mohan Guruswamy ports, power plants, and railways, and offering military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through its veto powers, China has secured considerable goodwill and influence among countries in the Indian Ocean region. And the list of countries that are coming within China’s strategic orbit appears to be growing. Sri Lanka, which has seen China replace Japan as its largest donor, is a case in point – China was no doubt instrumental in ensuring that Sri Lanka was granted dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To the west, Kenya offers another example of how China has been bolstering its influence in the Indian Ocean. The shift was underscored in a leaked US diplomatic cable from February 2010 that was recently published by WikiLeaks. In it, US Ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger highlighted the decline of US influence in East Africa’s economic hub, saying: We expect China’s engagement in Kenya to continue growing given Kenya’s strategic location. . . . If oil or gas is found in Kenya, this engagement will likely grow even faster. Kenya’s leadership may be tempted to move close to China in an effort to shield itself from Western, and principally US pressure to reform.

The rise of China as the world’s greatest exporter, its largest manufacturing nation status and its great economic appetite poses a new set of challenges. At a meeting of Southeast Asian nations in 2010, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi, facing a barrage of complaints about his country’s behaviour in the region, blurted out the sort of thing polite leaders usually prefer to leave unsaid. ‘China is a big country’, he pointed out, ‘and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact’. Indeed it is, and China is big not merely in terms of territory and population, but also military might. Its Communist Party is presiding over the world’s largest military build-up. And that is just a fact, too – one that the rest of the world has to come to terms with. China’s defence budget has almost certainly experienced a doubledigit growth for two decades. According to SIPRI, a research institute, annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2000 to

The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being  61

almost $120 billion in 2010. SIPRI usually adds about 50 per cent to the official figure that China gives for its defence spending, because even basic military items such as research and development are kept off budget. Including those items would imply total military spending in 2012, based on the latest announcement from Beijing, would be around $160 billion. By 2015 this budget will be around $240 billion. This is not a sum India can match and the last thing we need to get caught in is a numbers game. A one-party dictatorship will always be able to outspend us, even if our GDPs get closer. But history tells us again and again that victory is not assured by superiority in numbers and even technology. If that were so, Alexander should have been defeated at Gaugamela, Babur at Panipat, Wellington at Waterloo, Russia at Leningrad, Britain in the Falklands, and above all Vietnam who defeated three of the world’s leading powers – France, USA and China – in succession. One does not have to spell out that victory is more a result of strategy and tactics. Numbers do matter, but are not all. Technology does matter, but technology alone cannot assure one of victory. Its always mind over matter. That said, the threat from China should not be exaggerated. There are three limiting factors. First, unlike the former Soviet Union, China has a vital national interest in the stability of the global economic system. Its military leaders constantly stress that the development of what is still only a middle-income country with a lot of very poor people takes precedence over military ambition. The increase in its military spending reflects the growth of the economy, rather than an expanding share of national income. For many years China has spent the same proportion of GDP on defence (slightly over 2 per cent, whereas America spends about 4.7 per cent). The real test of China’s willingness to keep military spending constant will come when China’s headlong economic growth starts to slow down further. But on past form, China’s leaders will continue to worry more about internal threats to their control than external ones. More recently spending on internal security outstripped military spending for the first time. With a rapidly

62  Mohan Guruswamy ageing population, it is also a good bet that meeting the demand for better health care will become a higher priority than maintaining military spending. Like all other great powers, China faces a choice of guns and butter or more appropriately, walking sticks. But till then it is: Nervi belli pecunia infinita or unlimited money is the muscle of war. India on the other hand will keep growing long after China has stopped growing. Its youthful population and present growth trends indicate the accumulation of the world’s largest middle class in India. This growth is projected to begin in 2015 and continue well past 2050. In fact, it is predicted that so big will this become that India during this period will increasingly power world economic growth, and not China. In 2050 India is projected to have a population of 1.6 billion and of this 1.3 billion will belong to the middle and upper classes. The poor is predicted will be constant at around 300 million, as it is now. India already has the world’s third largest GDP. Many economists predict that in 2050 it will be India that will be the world’s largest economy and not China. In per capita terms we might still be poorer, but in GDP terms we will be bigger. According to a study by US banking group Citi, India will be the world’s largest economy within thirty-nine years. Indian GDP in 2050, measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), will be $85.97 trillion. China, in second place, will have a GDP of $ 80.02 trillion and the US $ 39.07 trillion. Now comes the dilemma for India. Robert Kaplan writes: ‘As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geo-politics in Eurasia in the 21st century. India, in other words, looms at the ultimate pivot state.’ At another time Mahan noted that India, located in the centre of the Indian Ocean littoral, is critical for the seaward penetration of both the Middle-east and China. If one were an Indian planner, he or she would be looking at the China-Pakistan axis with askance. India has had conflicts and still perceives threats from both, jointly and severally. The Tibetan desert, once intended to be India’s buffer against the north now

The Centrality of the IOR to India’s Being  63

has become China’s buffer against India. The planner will not be looking at all if he or she were not looking at the Indian Ocean as a theater. After all it is also China’s lifeline and its lifeblood flows here. Now if one were a Chinese planner, he or she would be looking with concern over India’s growth and increasing ability to project power in the IOR. He will also note with concern what experts are saying about India’s growth trajectory – that it will be growing long after China gets walking sticks – that it is the ultimate pivot state in the grand struggle for primacy between the West led by the USA and Japan, and China. What will this planner be thinking, particularly given the huge economic and military asymmetry between China and India now? Tacitus tells it most pithily. That peace can come through strength or Si vis pacem para bellum. While China has ratcheted up its show of assertiveness in recent years, India has been quietly preparing for a parity to prevent war. Often parity does not have to be equality in numbers. The fear of pain disproportionate to the possible gains, and the ability of a country with a smaller number of weapons to aspire for parity in itself confers parity. There is a certain equilibrium in Sino-Indian affairs that make recourse to force extremely improbable. Both modern states are inheritors of age-old traditions and the wisdom of the ages. Both now read their semaphores well and know how much of the sword must be unsheathed to send a message. This ability will ensure the swords remain recessed and for the plowshares to be out at work. Finally, it would be remiss to not say something about the centrality of the Indian Navy to our future. Nothing says it better than what Theodore Roosevelt said a century ago: ‘A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guarantee of peace!’

CHAPTER 5

India and the Indian Ocean: Old Concerns, New Perspectives LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN

Many here will be familiar with at least the first part of the title of my presentation. The title of this paper has an obvious reference to an important volume that Ashin Dasgupta along with his colleague M.N. Pearson put together in the 1980s.1 Significantly, this choice is determined by how influential Dasgupta’s work has been in having charted not only an important sub-field of Indian economic history but also in speaking to the historiography of global history, world history and even that of trans-nationalism. The conversation admittedly, has largely been framed in the context of deliberations on the modern European world system but it is nonetheless worthy of consideration that recent scholarship is engaging more fruitfully and frontally with the idea of an Indian Ocean history and what Marcus Vink refers to as the new Indian Ocean ‘thalassology’.2 In the genealogy of Indian Ocean Studies from its humble beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s, in its crossfertilization between the Annales school and world systems in the 1980s to its institutionalization today, Dasgupta’s work assumes a particular centrality for it went beyond the story of commodities and commerce and instead raised possibilities of investigating the social history of circulation, of merchant actors and the state, all of which have come to be explored in new and innovative ways and within newly emerging conceptual frames. This paper is an attempt to identify some of the concerns that have dominated

66  Lakshmi Subramanian Indian Ocean Studies in the past and how these are being revisited by new perspectives that also adopt a more interdisciplinary approach and in the process, refigure the more familiar notions of empire, nation and diaspora. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship was so implicated in the politics of imperialism that it tended to posit European hegemony against Indian stasis especially in the domain of maritime activity. The writings of historians like W.H. Moreland tended to stress the obvious preponderance of European trading companies in the Indian Ocean, their evident superiority at sea that set them apart and in contrast to the less developed Asian nations. His counterparts in Southeast Asia on the other hand, like J.C. Van Leur and Boeke put forward the idea of a sharply divided and dichotomous domain between the enclave economies fuelled by European capital in the Indian Ocean and the hinterland economies of local subsistence. This idea was almost entirely internalized by several Indian historians, among whom K.M. Panikkar was perhaps the most eloquent.3 He identified the advent of the Portuguese as a major break in the history of India’s transformation, thereby betraying the age-old belief of European military supremacy and Indian subjugation nearly two hundred and fifty years before the fateful guns had been fired in Plassey in 1757. It took nearly two decades of sustained revisionism for laying the ghost of Eurocentrism to rest; predictably, the compulsion to reclaim the autonomy and agency of the Asian trader coincided with the search for new archival material that went beyond the received wisdom of the European official archive and with the anxieties of new nation states in South and Southeast Asia. Consequently, the emphasis shifted to skeins of private trade and partnership, to the collaboration between Asian trade and European investment in the Indian Ocean, wherein the latter integrated with the existing networks of exchange in what was an identifiable and self-sustaining world system. This provided the much needed balance between European hegemonic discourse and Indian jingoism. For earlier, diehard Indian nationalists like R.K. Mukherjee had made an elaborate case for the hegemony of Indian trade and shipping in maritime Asia

India and the Indian Ocean  67

while historians like R.C. Majumdar eulogized the expansionist enterprise of Hindus in Southeast Asia, ‘Greater India’, where Hindu colonization was a direct consequence of trade and benign moral influence mediated by religion and political ideals of an idealized kingship. These narratives of Indian greatness came under greater scrutiny as the principles and procedures of history writing undertook the challenge of excavating the elusive Indian merchant from the European archive. Sifting the official material and reading against the grain, scholars like Holden Furber, C.R. Boxer and Meilink Roelofz, N.K. Sinha among others excavated the interconnectedness of Euro-Asian enterprise and situated more centrally the complexity of indigenous trading contacts that constituted the Indian Ocean trading system, the rules of which the European entrant4 adopted and expanded. Much of the researches unravelled the depth of commercial exchanges that were based on commodities, remittance facilities and the working of pre-modern and early modern markets.

Contesting Eurocentrism: Understanding Networks in the Indian Ocean Thus the compulsions of Eurocentrism were effectively set aside in the 1970s and 1980s largely by the painstaking researches of scholars like Dasgupta and Pearson, who worked with European documentation but attempted to look at private records to retrieve a closer analysis of indigenous mercantile activity and the larger context in which it operated. The idea was not simply to contest the assumptions of European dominance in the trading world of the Indian Ocean but also thereby, to qualify the notion of an indifferent, even aggressive and grasping state system that terrorized the merchants and deprived them of any possible support structures. The researches clearly established the fact that the volume of trade between Europe and Asia through the newly discovered Cape route was, at no time, larger than that carried within Asia, and even Europeans, who traded in their private capacity were quick to settle down to well established and entrenched practices and strategies. Consequently, the Europeans until the early eighteenth

68  Lakshmi Subramanian century became an integral part of the trading world of the Ocean working alongside indigenous networks and strengthening what van Leur called the warp and woof of Asian trade. Detailed studies of Indian participation in the trade of the Indian Ocean, on Indian merchant communities undertaken by Ashin Dasgupta, Anthony Disney, Michael Pearson, R.B. Seargent and Sinappah Arasaratnam, Om Prakash among others, imaginatively expanded the received wisdom and put forward an alternative framework to understand the dynamics of trade, society and politics in the Indian Ocean.5 All these scholars even while working within the lens of the European trading companies and utilizing their archives, attempted to reclaim the space of the Asian merchant and his operations and thereby make a strong case for the autonomy of the Indian Ocean trading world even as it interfaced with the Atlantic seaboard. The new researches challenged the stereotypical attributes of Asian trade, particularly its so-called luxury dimension and demonstrated the internationality of Asian trade. India’s location in this maritime network was central as Indian merchants driven by rational considerations, conducted a vigorous trade in a range of goods that had a regular and sustained demand. Textiles, coarse and fine, constituted the single largest item in the intra Asian trade that, M.N. Pearson demonstrated was by far larger than the one transacted between India and Europe. Indian calicoes were exchanged for spices in Southeast Asia and were transported to west Asia and Africa as well.6 Food items like grain and sugar were important exports, and as Kenneth McPherson pointed out, the differentiation between luxuries and necessities in pre-capitalist cargoes across the Indian Ocean became increasingly blurred over time.7 The dependence of most of the West and Southeast Asian economies on Indian textiles necessarily invested Asian trade with a certain cadence notwithstanding the seasonality of the commerce in the age of sail. Studies of the Indian Ocean at this important stage, when Indian and Asian enterprise was being recuperated, remained concerned primarily with items and movements of trade and commercial organization, the location of merchants in the larger political systems of Maritime Asia and their responses to the

India and the Indian Ocean  69

advent and politics of the European trading companies. The emphasis on South Asia as the principle, even if not exclusive unit of study was partly informed by the centrality of the region in the global system of the Indian Ocean and partly by the training of scholars as historians of India. Each of them worked out a segment of Maritime India and reconstructed the story of the Indian Ocean by stressing the linkages between political structures and international trade, the movement of men, money and materials following the stream of religion and conversion and the interdependence of markets reflected in credit networks, interest rates and price movements. A distinguishing feature of these new works stressed the interconnectedness of the Indian Ocean trading system, where a cross-cultural and commercial circuit worked as a unit and developed strategies of risk sharing and crisis resolution. Another was to locate the working of large regional trading networks within a concrete political context and to stress the linkages between politics and trade both in a local sense as well as in a larger milieu. The implications of these findings were especially significant in reassessing the nature and potentialities of the pre-colonial state and its political economy in India as well as in establishing and reinforcing the centrality of India as a nodal centre in the trading system of the Indian Ocean. The close connection between politics and trade constituted an important thread that ran through Ashin Dasgupta’s exposition of the trading history of the Indian Ocean. The phenomenal expansion of India’s maritime trade in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was firmly grounded in Mughal political expansion and consolidation, which in fact provided the much needed material scaffolding for external trade. The Mughal state though indisputably despotic, did not unduly interfere with overseas trade. Monopolies, extortion and other despotic acts were phenomena of a later period when the writ of Mughal authority no longer stretched over the realm. The seventeenth century constituted a kind of golden age for Indian maritime activity when the dense circuit of exchanges that emanated from India and connected it with other subregions in the Ocean gave the trading world of the Indian Ocean a distinct

70  Lakshmi Subramanian character enabling the cohering of mercantile and even cultural networks. Increasing levels of commercial activity pumped silver into the economy and held out prospects for improvement even if these were neutralized in part by the levels of revenue demand and extraction. Notwithstanding the evident bias in isolating maritime India as a central component in the system, there was also an attempt to treat the region and its networks as a socio-economic system, holistic and integrated in its production and distribution networks and as a civilizational entity. K.N. Chaudhuri sketched an impressive history of the ocean as a complex network8 with multiple nodes and centres all of which responded to certain schedules of production and distribution and intersected with one another. Kenneth McPherson identified both deep structures and elements of continuity and overlapping cultural zones to form an interlocked human world joined by the common way of the Ocean. Whether such a system was comparable to the Mediterranean world and its unity is not really the moot issue – what is important is to consider the unit as potentially capable of being a heuristic unit of analysis. I would suggest it is and that looking at it as an interlocking system of working networks enables us to move away from the stranglehold of political states and empires as overdetermining agencies of change. Two points may be made in this connection – one that networks especially of merchants treated the system as one large circuit where they circulated information, goods and credit. Second, that there were connected histories being made in the Indian Ocean. The vitality and cohesiveness of the Indian Ocean trading system came under severe pressure in course of the eighteenth century, when the simultaneous decline of the Mughals in India, the Ottomans in Turkey and the Safavids in Persia coincided with the aggressive expansion of European private trade and undermined both the systemic unity of the Indian Ocean trading unit, rendering it vulnerable to the hegemonic pressures of the European capitalist thrust. The conditions in which the Indian Ocean trading network had emerged and expanded gave way to a new situation when the system came under the influence of extraneous pressures that

India and the Indian Ocean  71

displaced existing networks and transformed the older template of transactions between merchants and rulers, networks and states. Historians quibble over whether the process of incorporation happened in the second half of the eighteenth century or in its last quarter or even in the first decade of the nineteenth century but the debate as far as I am concerned, is neither important nor substantive. I think one can legitimately argue that by the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the material context of the older and existing Indian Ocean system had substantially changed and a changing set of pressures external to the system, set the stage for a new seascape. This is not to suggest that the Indian Ocean became overnight, a British lake, but to remind ourselves that the new configurations of trade and exchange, movement and migration were mediated through the emergence and workings of a New Empire. The road to empire was of course paved with obscure intentions that made the history of transition a fluid and complex one, the nuances of which have been captured in two kinds of writings related to the Indian Ocean. One is the world system debate initiated by Immanuel Wallerstein and the other a social history of networks approach that opened up the issue of mobility and practice and gestured to an alternative understanding of the history of the Indian Ocean from the lens of the moving merchant. Sebouh Arsalan’s work on Armenians and Enseng Ho’s work on the Hadrami diaspora among others stand out in this regard and to which we shall return in a moment.

The Indian Ocean Bypassed: The European World System Thesis The delineation of the trading structure in the Indian Ocean and the centrality South Asia enjoyed in it assumed a perceptible edge in the aftermath of the World systems model put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein.9 In one sense, Wallerstein was reinvoking the reality of European hegemony in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the context of modern capitalism and its triumph and how in the process Asia and the Indian Ocean area

72  Lakshmi Subramanian became peripheral and subordinate to the world system. In the triumphal march of capitalism, European overseas expansion was a key factor in the articulation of the modern world system, but it did not in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alter the basic externality of Asia, a feature that derived, according to him from the fact that trade between Asia and Europe was in luxuries. Even in the seventeenth century, when there was a substantial expansion of trade in textiles and pepper under the stewardship of the Dutch East India Company, the area remained external for the Dutch were content to continue the luxury trade even while they administered it to deal with the problems of oversupply inherent in a luxury trade. Only after 1750, with the political subjugation of India by the English East India Company did the process of peripheralization commence and goods traded became basics and necessities and peripheral areas like the Indian Ocean became part of the capitalist world system which was predicated upon the differences between the core and the periphery and the surplus transferred from the periphery to the core. The core was distinguished by strong states, skilled labour, tenancy or self-employment and high wages while the periphery was characterized by the right opposite – weak states or colonies, unskilled labour, low wages and forms of coerced labour or slavery. According to Wallerstein, prior to the articulation of the capitalist world system, there were world empires like those in China and India and which were primarily re-distributive mechanisms of tribute collection and were by nature inefficient and expensive and did not have the potential for capitalist transformation. These were doomed either to decay or to convert into an empire/s. World systems on the other hand, were uniquely efficient and could expand and appropriate surpluses from the periphery and perpetuate the differences to keep the core intact, where, as mentioned before, there was a happy convergence of strong and efficient states, free skilled labour, tenancy and high wages. Wallerstein’s formulations generated a number of somewhat impassioned responses, which served to bring back to the Indian Ocean as a unitary trading system into the ambit of discussion

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relating to the possibilities of capitalism outside Europe. Critics of the world system theory like Andre Gunder Frank, Janet Abu Lughod and M.N. Pearson pointed to some basic flaws in the analysis, that the process of incorporation was preceded by the workings of an Afro-Eurasian ecumene that was a single network of commodity flows and interlocking merchant networks. Pearson referred to the sheer volume of transactions that covered the Indian Ocean and that was the distinction between luxury and necessities had been vastly exaggerated. Further, it was much more important to investigate the proportion of Asian trade in terms of total European trade: was the trade with Asia crucial to European core economies or was it too small to matter? More important what was the impact of this traffic on Asian economies? What was the role of foreign trade in total economic activity? Did it affect production techniques and was there over time a move to new forms of labour control? South Asia and World Capitalism10 edited by Sugata Bose in 1990 was in part an attempt to locate South Asia and the Indian Ocean within broader regional and theoretical contexts and more specifically within the world systems analysis, although Immanuel Wallerstein himself in his work on the world system had little to say about the Indian Ocean. Essentially for Wallerstein, the Indian Ocean world economy assumed the role of a semi-periphery after 1757 and its earlier history fitted in more with his model of redistributive enterprises that were not quite capitalist in its orientation. But he argued that it did not make much sense to wonder whether India would have developed an indigenous capitalism if Europe had not conquered South Asia and maintained that models like the world system that accommodated processes of integration and adaptation were useful explanatory devices. Critics on the other hand maintained that there were several routes to the modern world system and that the century of transition in India actually saw important tendencies come to the fore and that regionalism, decentralization, emergence of magnate power and capital accumulation, regional migrations were important pre-conditions that also served to bring Empire into being. For the earlier period, K.N. Chaudhuri emphatically

74  Lakshmi Subramanian stated that comparative researches of China, the Middle East and South Asia have conclusively demonstrated that dominant class relations were as prevalent in Asian societies as they were in the West; also that the division of economic interests between the state and the ruling classes was an essential feature in the history of the Indian Ocean. However, structural contradictions between subsistence and market production made it impossible for a predictable telos of capitalist development. Other contributors to the volume like David Washbrook and Chris Bayly pointed out that the MWS analysis failed to capture the uniqueness of the Indian Ocean region, where the semi-peripheral region of South Asia was entirely capable of generating right through the eighteenth century, agencies of intermediation that were able to function within the new dispensation and also to put to use in a reassembled circuit of global flows. Reading both critic and apologist for the world system, I would argue that any extrapolation from either the vantage point of the early modern past or the colonial past or indeed the post colonial present is not particularly useful in grappling with the question of the potentialities of capitalism in Late Mughal India or indeed of the dynamism of the Indian Ocean as a unitary system. Rather my emphasis would be to try and locate elements of structural unity that the Indian Ocean accommodated in terms of its consumption and distribution patterns, of its networks and its civilizational orientation and whether these continued to give it a distinct character in the same way that distinguished Mediterranean culture. Merchant networks, patterns of consumption and the political frame that supported both local and regional economies and integrated them within a larger system were definitely important elements that were not easily expropriated by external agencies like the European trading companies. Islam both as a vehicle of faith as well as the faith of political states in the Indian Ocean world gave a definite shape to the social world of trade and exchange enabling merchants to navigate local societies with relative ease. On the other hand, the system encompassed foreign networks as well that devised innovative strategies and practices to negotiate diverse political systems and to thereby integrate more

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effectively into local societies. This was especially evident in the case of Hadrami-Chulias and Armenians, not to speak of other groups whose relationship with state power was in a very real sense trans-national. In fact, it is in the understanding of mobile merchant networks that some of the more recent works have thrown up very new ways of understanding and analysing social practices of trade and business and thereby to understand the Indian Ocean system on its own terms not by denying its political subordination but to investigate within the interstices of the new political system patterns of change, continuity and growth and that threw up its own histories. The study of maritime merchants has predictably figured at the centre of most micro histories of the Indian Ocean and has tended to be aligned to issues of capital accumulation and enterprise on the one hand and to that of political power of states – both precolonial and colonial on the other. While Dasgupta’s researches looked at the functioning of merchants within the political set up as well within the larger context of markets in the ocean as well of the competing operations of the European companies, more recent works emphasize the operations of merchant networks within a sociological context.11 These tend to stress on business practices, political decisions and on their investment in certain social strategies that one may identify as typical to an Indian Ocean culture. These strategies included language skills, penmanship, marital connections in some case, religion and investment in political diplomacy cases which produced over time as in the case of the Chulias, conglomerate communities and an endorsement of merchant diaspora in littoral societies of the Ocean.

Merchant Networks, Local and Global Flows I would like to mention two important works in this connection.12 One is Sebouh Arsalan’s work on the Armenian network of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and the other Engseng Ho’s work on the Hadrami diaspora. The two networks provide interesting comparisons and contrasts – both tended to maintain close linkages with the local political set up and yet remained

76  Lakshmi Subramanian grounded within the notion of a natal or nodal centre. Both networks participated in what may be called a culture of correspondence – in the case of the Armenians, the investment in letter writing as the most important vehicle of information was very pronounced and as Sebouh Arsalan has argued, it served to keep the community well informed and to instill in its members a heightened sense of responsibility about circulating correct business information not to speak of maintaining high standards of reciprocal trust. With the Hadramis whose diaspora Engseng Ho has likened to the British unitary one, the emphasis seems to have been on maintaining certain notions of public responsibility that demanded at one level, very close linkages with local society in the form of marriages and language adoption and at another a wider espousal of religion as part of a wider public culture and civilizational feature. Both networks it would appear invested very substantially in writing and in the case of the hadramis, in local language networks. Recall for instance the life story of Munshi Abdulla, munshi of Sir Stamford Raffles in Singapore, whose grandfather was renowned in Malaya as an expert Tamil speaker and as a petition writer who knew how to draw contracts and write petitions. The family was held in respect as they performed vital religious functions of familiarizing the locals with the scriptures – Abdullah mentions in the Hikayat, a valuable and insightful account of his family and early life, that his grandmother organized classes for young children in the study of the Koran. Their skills as scribes held them in good stead as merchants flocked to their chambers to arrange for documentation. Abdullah in fact mentions that good scribes were not easy to come by. In Malacca of those days, it was very hard to find people who could do letter writing. There were four or five who altogether practiced it as a profession. There was first Khoja Muhammed, the son of a Malacca Tamil who became the Company’s tolk, second Jamal Muhammed bin Nur Muhammed of Surat, third my father Abdul Kadir bin Muhammed Ibrahim, fourth Mahidin Ahmed Labbai.13

Ho’s work illustrates how Labbais or Marakkayars in southern India developed as a sub-section of the Hadramis who invested

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in local society and in the larger Islamic represented by Hanafi legal traditions, investment in learning and scriptural education and who also integrated themselves into the political structures of local society effectively. Commercial skills, literacy and linguistic proficiency, networks of sociability and religious sentiment combined to give Labbais a special niché in the trading world of the Indian Ocean right until the middle decades of the nineteenth century. What is worth reflecting on is how information and values circulated in the Indian Ocean and how central information was in cementing both global commercial flows but also in creating a cohesive sense of a diaspora community. Although unravelling the languages of the Indian Ocean as a subject of study is only slowly developing, it is now fairly clear that regimes of circulation were able to create very distinct subjectivities as well as very sharp and reinforced sentiments of local affinity that were in contrast to the experiences of circulating labour that produced in many ways more creative and hybridized self-expressions. In fact, it is this aspect of oceanic interactions that engage the attention of more recent directions of research around the Indian Ocean – one that falls more widely under the rubric of trans-national public spheres and cosmopolitanism. But before we touch on this, a few preliminary observations on the more recent histories of the Indian Ocean, especially by Sugata Bose and Thomas Metcalf who look at a different period and make a case thus for reading the Empire differently.

Imperial Flows and the Indian Ocean Bose (2006) and Metcalf (2007) examine in different ways the circuits of interconnectedness in the Indian Ocean by studying the complex movements of capital, labour, service and administration between the various nodes of Empire in the Indian Ocean.14 A common underlying assumption, often stated so, in both the works is to reclaim the Ocean as a site of connected histories that do not conform to older impressions of the region being converted into a British lake in the nineteenth century. For Metcalf, the

78  Lakshmi Subramanian Indian Ocean was one of opportunity for both the colonizer and the colonized and one that subsequently provided new ways of imagining identity as subjects and citizens. The principal concern of his work Imperial Connections is to locate the nucleus of the Empire in India and not in metropolitan Britain and to see how Indians ran the Empire across the Ocean. For Bose, the important issue is to see the immense mobility that the Ocean continued to offer and how through interactions multiple modernities were effectively articulated. That the spatial dimensions of the imperial order over the ocean provided the basis for articulating new systems of administration, economic activities and consequently facilitating movements is brought out effectively by both scholars. The spread of legal institutions enabled Indian lawyers to operate the legal codes in Africa – the development of plantation economies by British capital enabled both labour and Indian intermediate capital to flow through new conduits thereby producing new colonies and new vantage points for looking at the new possibilities travel afforded and at the natal base they left behind. Notwithstanding the resilience of indigenous trading enterprise that at times deflected the force of colonial enterprise, the nineteenth century saw major ruptures in the older circuit of linkages and inter-connections. For example, the appreciable decline in the distribution of Indian cloth in the Indian Ocean and its replacement by British cloth, the changing technology of shipping and communications that inaugurated an entirely new order of capitalist enterprise and finally the introduction of plantation economies based on indentured imported labour brought major changes that displaced old subjects and produced new ones. The latter had their own histories and it is in this context that the two works speak of the need to look at histories in the Indian Ocean rather than re-work a history of the Indian Ocean. But in doing this, they are not advocating a history of ruptures and discrete units – rather look at possibilities of connected histories that can interpolate a simple and straightforward history of empire or of Nationalism. Until the 1920s, the sub-imperial system worked before it showed signs of decay. The diminution of Indian military presence, the ending of

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indentured labour recruitment, all these were emblematic of a shift in the imperial predilections. On the other hand, the space that the Imperial Ocean had provided for a refiguring of identities among soldiers and sailors were important in constituting a new diasporic nationalism that Bose speaks of. This, he argues is important in pushing our understanding of patriotism among expatriates without resurrecting the monolith of nationalism. Regional patriotisms contributed creatively to a politics of anti-colonialism that was based on a creative accommodation of differences and that was articulated through new channels of expression that made up a dynamic public sphere in the Indian Ocean. Among the many intellectual tendencies that the new public sphere reflected and accommodated was that of trans-nationalism and a different universalism, like the one advocated by Rabindranath Tagore.

The Indian Ocean Public Sphere: New Universalism, New Histories and New Geographies of Law This brings me to what I consider have been the most important themes to have emerged in recent years around the Indian Ocean, namely that of a public sphere organized around the medium of print journalism and of law and space within the empire. By the twentieth century, as ports around the Indian Ocean assumed multiple roles as simultaneous bastions of European capital and enterprise and of indigenous, local modernizing experiments, a vibrant cosmopolitan culture gave expression to the development of a vibrant press culture that was replicated in centres such as Rangoon, Singapore, Durban, Dar-e-Salam, Zanzibar, Jakarata where locally run publications both in English and in local languages provided an outlet to the debates on policies and practices. It is around the newly constituted Indian Ocean public sphere that some of the most interesting work capable of theorizing issues of circulation, cosmopolitanism and trans-nationalism is emerging. The new work on the public sphere covers a range of issues from editorial practices and public debates on caste, community, religion and the nation as well as the dynamics of print and publishing networks in littoral cities and the construction of new models of selfhood

80  Lakshmi Subramanian and citizenship. How the models were constituted and how they broke down are issues that enable a more nuanced understanding of diasporic experience. Education and the articulation of a civic religion were evidently central to the new model of subjecthood; these were seen as essential pre-conditions to adaptation to a new environment. As Lala Har Dayal, an influential commentator and writer for the South African journal The Hindi is supposed to have observed that the adoption of a high standard of life was the key to success and self-definition. What informed this idea was one the need to shake off the objectionable appellation of India as ‘coolieland’ and the other was to directly intervene in a debate with the colonial authorities about what was permissible for the emigrant and what was not. So while he wrote that ‘the Indian emigrants should adopt a high standard of living and eschew their old habits of primitive simplicity and contentment’, he was equally forceful in denouncing the double speak of the colonial masters who had initially treated the Indians with contempt as those who could live off the smell of an oily rag and subsequently resisted them avenues for expansion when they found Indians to be serious competitors. Hence his exhortation ‘Earn money but also spend it well; work hard but also enjoy life and make the best of it. Love and cultivate art and science and show the world we are a civilized people’.15 If the diaspora was indeed a layered experience, so was the empire. This is an important formulation that recent studies on law and geography have sought to establish. Benton’s work is especially significant in this direction forcing us to reconsider the Empire not as a well organized grid but as a lumpy geography whose control especially of ocean spaces was jagged and shared. It is here that I believe some of the most interesting arguments are being made in relation to both law and policy in the India Ocean. Are we then moving towards a new social history of Indian Ocean networks? A history that looks at not so much about prices and commodities and distribution channels as that of identity formations, civic issues of subjecthood and citizenship, and cultural questions of self-construction and consumption. The answer seems to suggest in the affirmative as historians and anthropologists come together to address notions of a space,

India and the Indian Ocean  81

identity and occupation, of deconstructing discourses on citizenship and entitlement outside the frame of the nation state as well as of the area studies perspective. While one may exaggerate the importance of the cultural studies perspective on Indian Ocean studies where the emphasis is on the relic, the artefact, memory and the fragment, there seems to be a clear and real advantage in speaking across disciplines to grapple with the more subtle aspects of communication and dialogue. The work of scholars like Edward Simpson and Kai Kresse who use inter-disciplinary methods to look at the dynamics of social life on ports and social exchanges at sea to untangle practices, narratives and visions offers us a more convenient way out to understand what we mean by categories like cosmopolitanism used so often and so randomly in relation to histories of the Indian Ocean.16

Notes 1. Ashin Dasgupta and M.N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean 1500-1800, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. 2. Marcus P.M. Vink, ‘Indian Ocean Studies and the New “Thallasalogy” ’, Journal of Global History (1), 2007. 3. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea power on Indian History, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1945. 4. R.K. Mookerji, Indian Shipping: A History of the Sea Borne Trade and the Maritime Activity of the Indians from the Earliest Times, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912. Also see Dasgupta and Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean, pp. 2, 4. 5. For a comprehensive bibliography see Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-colonial India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 6. M.N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1976. 7. K. McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A History of the People and the Sea, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 81. 8. K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge: Cambridge Universty Press, 1985. 9. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, New York: The Academic Press, 1974. Also see his The Capitalist World Economy: Essays

82  Lakshmi Subramanian by Emmanuel Wallerstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; and M.N. Pearson, Before Colonialism.Theories on Asian European Relations 1500-1700, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988. 10. Sugata Bose, South Asia and World Capitalism, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. 11. See for instance Himanshu Prabha Ray and Edward A. Alpers (eds.), Cross Currents and Community Networks: The History of the Indian Ocean World, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007. 12. Sebouh Aslanan, ‘The Salt in a Merchant’s Letter: The Culture of Correspondence in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean’, Journal of World History, 19(2), 2008. Also see Engseng Ho, ‘Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 46(2), Issue No. 2, 2004. 13. The Hikayat Abdulla, an annotated translation by A.H. Hill, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Singapore: Malayan Publishing House, vol. 28, no. 171, pt. 3, June 1955. ‘It happened that at that time in Malacca,’ Abdulla writes, ‘my grandmother on my mother’s side became a great teacher at Kampong Pali. Some two hundred children learnt the Koran.’ 14. Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Enterprise, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006; and Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections India in the Indian Ocean Arena 1860-1920, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007. 15. See for details, Edward Simpson and Kai Kresse (eds.), Struggling with History: Islam and Cosmopolitanism in the Western Indian Ocean, London: Hurst and Co., 2007.

II. Literature and Culture

CHAPTER 6

From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific: Missionary Summer Resorts in Asia R U I K O H I YA M A

In a hot and humid Asia, Western colonialists usually took refuge in the highlands during the hottest months in the year. Missionaries in Asia also actively participated in this practice in order to survive and even created several summer resort communities which they administered according to their satisfaction. Colonial summer resorts in highlands seem to have begun in India under the British rule and then spread over the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia, East Asia and further to the Far East, Japan. In this paper, I would like first to show the geographical distribution of the highland summer resorts in Asia, pick up several examples of missionary summer resort communities in India and China and explain some of their characteristics compared to more secular ones like Shimla and Ootacamund. Then I will examine a major missionary high land resort in Japan, Karuizawa by illuminating its history, particularly its missionary and Christian origin and connections. Further, I will explore how the missionary origin has contributed to forming the distinctive character of Karuizawa. In so doing, the paper will point out that under missionary influence, Karuizawa became a special space for the Japanese to try out Western courtship/marriage and coopted later for modern consumer culture. The main body of the paper deals with the Japanese summer resort. However, by showing the practice and development in

86  Rui Kohiyama Karuizawa, I would like to excavate the invisible connection between India and Japan and suggest a future field of research that might illuminate a distinctive feature of the region around the Indian Ocean.

Hill Stations in Asia There are many hill stations all over Asia, for instance, Shimla, Mussoorie, Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Ootacamund and Kodaikanal in India; Muree in Pakistan; Nuwara Eliya in Sri Lanka; Maymyo in Burma; Maxwell’s Hill, Cameron Highlands and Fraser’s Hill in Malaya; Bogor (Buitenzorg), Buckttinggi (Fort de Kock) in Indonesia; Dalat in Vietnam; Baguio in the Philippine Islands; Peitaiho, Kunming, Kuling (Lushan) in China; Nikko (Lake Chuzenji), Unzen, Karuizawain Japan.1 Among these, the ones indicated by bold letters were predominantly missionary in their founding, development and character: Kodaikanai in India, Kuling or Lushan in China and Karuizawa in Japan. See map in J.E. Spencer and W.L. Thomas, ‘Hill Stations and Summer Resorts of the Orient’, Geographical Review, 38 (4) (October 1948), p. 643 http://www.jstor.org/stable/211450 accessed through the Tokyo Woman’s Christian University Library on 15 June 2014.) There is an excellent book on the hill stations of India by Dane Kennedy called The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British Raj (University of California Press, 1996). In the British time, white men and women went to the hills in the hottest months to evade various diseases and fatigue. Especially, they disliked mosquitoes. The hill stations first served as places where soldiers could recuperate. Later they began to cater to the whites’ needs more generally. Some of them like Shimla became the summer capital of the presidency and governors and government functionaries moved entirely to the hills during the season. In the centre of a hill station, you could almost always find Anglican church, a post office and a mall (the main street). In case of a summer capital, the governor’s residence was added to this list. A clubhouse might have been another addition.

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Residents of the hill stations enjoyed all kinds of outdoor sports and indoor amusements just like people visiting Bath or Brighton in Britain do. The residents recreated an English landscape by building English style cottages and planting English plants while some of them even introduced new plantations for tea, coffee, cinchona, etc. Although White colonialists in India were predominantly male, comparatively more women could be seen in the hill stations as wives and children were sent there while husbands worked in the plains. With more women and single officers or soldiers recuperating, the hill stations became theatre for romance and scandals. At the same time, many good schools were established to take care of White children whose parents could not afford to send them to England for education. There were different ranks and prestige even among the hill stations. In general, the higher above the sea, the better; a civil station was better than a military one. Missionaries went to civil but smaller stations of lower heights such as Kodaikanal, Dharmkot, Yercaud and Coonoor. These belonged to the second tier of the stations for people with moderate income of Rs. 500-600 per month in 1870. Going up to Shimla, one had to have a monthly income of nearly Rs. 1,500.2 As such, Kodaikanal was founded by the missionaries of the American Madurai Mission (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1834) in the 1840s and the Interdenominational Church Under the Hill, instead of the Anglican Church which was established a little later. Also, the Kodaikanal Missionary Union, instead of a fashionable club, was the centre of the Kodaikanal society. During the missionary season, missionaries made the rules of the community, prohibiting Sunday activities and drinking. According to Nora Mitchell in her 1972 volume titled The Indian Hill-Station: Kodaikanal, American missionaries were ‘less sensitive to the innate rights and privileges of the British upper class’3 and so the community tended to be egalitarian, allowing ‘easy social mix of Indians, other Asians, Americans and Europeans’.4

88  Rui Kohiyama

Summer for Missionaries in Japan The first group of Protestant missionaries arrived in Japan in 1859 as soon as Kanagawa (Yokohama) and Nagasaki ports were opened to Americans according to the Japan-US Friendship and Trade Treaty in 1858. Since then till about 1870, missionaries in Kanagawa seem to have stayed in the concession during summer. Margaret Ballagh in a letter in 1862 wrote, As autumn came on, I supposed we should have some relief from our persecutors the mosquitoes, but what is my consternation to find them coming thicker and larger and more venomous in their bite! Dr. H. gives me the hope that at the end of this month they will disappear. It seems to me I get nothing done these hot months but wash and dress baby and keep her as comfortable as I can.’5

Occasionally, the missionaries went out to the sea like Mr. and Mrs. Hepburn in 1868 who were invited by a Captain Phelps. According Kanagawa, Yokohama missionaries’ official and private letters, some of them began to spend summer in ‘mountains’ such as Hakone, Tomioka, Hakodate in Hokkaido and Nikko after 1870.6 In those days, foreigners excepting those who had got a special permission had to reside in the concession and their free travel was limited within the area about 39 km from the concession. Only ministers and consulates were given the right to travel out of this limit. In 1874, the government issued the rules for domestic travels for foreigners, which loosened the original regulations. More foreigners now could get a special permission for travel for reasons such as health. Those in Yokohama were permitted to stay in Hakone, Atami, Fuji, Nikko and Ikaho. But missionary letters tell us that they travelled to mountains out of the 39 km limits even before 1874 and I can say that the 1874 rule was meant to confirm what had already been practiced as Hiroshi Maruiyama points out in his article.7 The first missionary that I have so far found who climbed Mt. Asama and therefore possibly passed at least through the Karuizawa area was Edward Rothesay Miller of the Dutch Reformed Church, USA in 1876.8 In 1881, Ernest Mason Satow (a British diplomat)

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and A.G.S. Haws published A Handbook for Travellers in Central and Northern Japan in which they wrote, Karuizawa may be said to be only two days’ journey from Yedo, now that the new road over the Usui Pass is completed, as the whole distance may be done in a wheeled vehicle. The lofty situation, 3,270 ft. above the level of the sea, renders the climate very cool during the summer months and the absence of mosquitoes is another recommendation in its favour as a place of retreat from the unhealthy heat of the plains. There are plenty of decent houses in the village where good accommodation can be had, and the surrounding country affords an innumerable variety of walks and mountain climbing. As uncultivated moor, covered with wild flowers in July and August, extends for miles in a southerly direction, while on the east it terminates in a range of grassy hills. On one of these, one ri (about four km) from Karuizawa, is a curious rock called Kamado-iwa. . . . Another striking object in the neighbourhood is an isolated hill called Atago yama. It has a little chapel and some curious perpendicular rocks, half way up from its base. Close by also, is the easily ascended Hanare Yama, beyond which rises the active volcano of Asama yama.9

In 1886, Alexander Croft Shaw (1846-1902) of SPG and James Martin Dixon stayed in Karuizawa for a month and the former acquired an abandoned Japanese inn for his summer residence. Since then, missionaries quickly began occupying Karuizawa.10 According to the land register, in 1905, 54 per cent of the property owners in the old village/town were missionaries.11 According to The Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Handbook, in 1930, among the 186 foreigners who owned property in Karuizawa, 147 (about 80 per cent) were missionaries.12 Foreigners’ summer houses concentrated on the southtern slope of Atagoyama, Asamagakure and Sakura no Sawa (Happy Valley), the core of Karuizawa. The Japanese cottages surrounded the core for 1930.13 Several reasons for proliferation of missionaries in Karuizawa can be considered. During the Edo period, Kauizawa prospered as a post town on the major road from Yedo to Kusatsu where the road merged with Tokaido. The town began to decline after the Meiji Restoration and particularly after 1884 when a new route bypassing Karuizawa was opened in 1884. Without hot springs and major shrines/temples, Karuizawa was not a hot spot of tourism to

90  Rui Kohiyama the Japanese, nor was it suitable for farming as the soil is poor. So, the land around Karuizawa was cheap and the inhabitants there found means for survival by selling land. Shaw had acquired 2,623.5 sq. m. of land in 1886 and 1888 for just 31.80 yen.14 One can clearly see how cheap land was there compared to the Oku Nikko (Lake Chuzenji) area where foreign diplomats created a summer residents’ community as Karuizawa emerged as a missionary community. There, in 1887, William M.H. Kirkwood, an English law advisor for the Japanese government, built a summer house by renting a piece of land for 250 yen/year.15 The annual income of most of the Protestant missionaries in Japan was not very high although they were paid far more than the Japanese. For example, in 1890, the US Presbyterian Japan Mission paid 2,500 yen to a married male missionary while the same mission was planning to increase the annual income of Kajinoske Ibuka, Japanese president of Meiji Gakuin, a mission school for boys that Presbyterians ran in Tokyo, from 720 to 920 yen.16 For comparison, roughly between 1865 and 1890, the average annual income of Americans employed by the Japanese government was about 2,470,000 yen.17 Land in Karuizawa was cheap enough in early days for missionaries to buy. Carrie Alexander, a single woman Presbyterian missionary who received two-thirds of the annual income of a male married missionary demanded ‘home allowance’ for furlough because her financial condition was very tight in the US. However, according to a Japanese documentation, on returning to Japan in 1889, she acquired land in Karuizawa.18 Further, the travelling cost to Karuizawa was not so expensive, as it is close to Tokyo and its height is moderate compared to Lake Chuzenji.19 The local Japanese populace in Karuizawa welcomed foreigners as they had an experience of providing accommodations for strangers as they had lived in a post village on the major road for a long time. In 1891, the villagers decided to refrain geishas, dancing and music during summers in the inns along the main street to meet the missionary standards, although there were many geishas and prostitutes working in the vicinity of Karuizawa for the

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workers for railroad construction.20 Some of the villagers were also quick in providing hotels and providing food to suit Westerners’ palate.21 The villagers also welcomed major shops in Tokyo to open their summer branches on the mall (main street) of Karuizawa and by 1900s, Karuizawa became a hotspot for missionaries from the countryside to enjoy shopping.22 They even invented Karuizawa-bori (a kind of wood engraving) to decorate furniture for summer houses by inviting from Nikko wood engravers who made engravings for Toshogu (the Shrine for Ieyasu Tokugawa, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate).23 In short, Karuizawa was affordable for missionaries who were committed to a life-long residence in Japan and were in need of a summer retreat for health. As missionaries gathered in Karuizawa and determined the tone of the village according to their religious and middle-class habits and taste which will be explained below, more missionaries came to stay to enjoy exchanges among the ilk while other foreigners who did not share missionaries’ culture went to elsewhere like Lake Chuzenji, the spot for summer residence for upper tier foreigners.

The Peculiarities of Karuizawa as a Community Constructed by Missionaries Karuizawa shared some of its feature with general hill stations in Asia. The old village/town had an Anglican Church, a mall (the main street) and a post office located in its centre. The place had a restorative climates as the fact that a military sanatorium as well as a GHQ rest centre was once placed in the vicinity of the town/village. The village/town was vibrant with various outdoor activities and social gatherings. Also, more women than men stayed there, on which subject I will come to detail below. Of course, the village/town had a lot in common with American missionary hill stations in Asia such as Kodaikanal. First of all, North American missionaries were dominant in Kaurizawa. This is not surprising since a majority of the Protestant missionaries in Japan, just as in the case of Korea, were from North America.

92  Rui Kohiyama In 1930, for example, out of 186 summer residents listed in the Handbook, at least 105 (56 per cent) can be identified as North Americans.24 Among North Americans, Canadians loomed large in Karuizawa. Alexander Shaw, the so-called father of Karuizawa, was a Canadian although sent by SPG, and Daniel Norman, the so-called village mayor of Karuizawa was a Canadian sent by the Canadian Methodist Church. For Norman, Karuizawa was not only the place for summer rest but also the field for evangelism as the Canadian Methodist Mission in Japan had stations in Shizuoka, Yamanashi and Nagano prefectures as well as Tokyo, and Norman was in charge of Nagano to which Karuizawa belonged.25 The innocent and inexpensive recreations that missionaries introduced to Karuizawa were by and large similar to those popular in Kodaikanal and other hill stations in India. In Karuizawa, tennis seems to have become almost the symbol of the village/town; the public tennis courts that the Summer Residents’ Association maintained was the place for social exchange as described by Kate L. Hansen: Have I told you about the courts? These four together in a hollow; and just above them on the hill is a sort of covered grandstand which is the special center of Karuizawa for everybody goes there to talk, drink tea and incidentally once in a while, take a look at the games. In the afternoon, everybody puts on her (the men folks wear all sorts of athletic rigs) best bib and tucker, and the stand is a regular reception. I’ve met all sorts of interesting people. . . . 26

In so doing, the missionaries repudiated drinking, geisha girls and prostitution and replaced these traditional entertainments with new ones, speaking from the Japanese context. Some of the Japanese found nothing entertaining in Karuizawa like novelist Hakucho Masamune who visited there in 1912: ‘There was no hot spring nor could I find a comfortable and convenient inn and so, I thought I should return to Ikaho right away. . . .’27 Christianity was an active functionary in the village/town. Shaw’s chapel (1895), The Union Church (informally begun in 1897 and formally in 1906) and the Japanese Church (1904; its chapel by William Vories in 1912) were in the centre of the old village/

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town. Sabbath observation was enforced. Drinking, geishas and prostitution were prohibited. Missionary conferences and bible classes were routine during the summer and missionaries held meetings for the villagers.28 In the first half of twentieth century, most of the Japanese children native to Karuizawa went to Sunday school and mixed with foreign and Japanese children staying in the summer houses.29 The Christianity practised in Karuizawa was definitely ecumenical and liberal. Missionaries sent by different denominations worshipped together in the Union Church; the Japanese Church was established also on the union basis although its care was delegated to Methodists; the leaders among the missionaries in Karuizawa such as Daniel Norman and A.K. Reischauer belonged to the liberal wing in the increasingly hot debate between liberals and conservatives in the missionary circle in the US.30 Differing from the practices in the hill stations in India, missionaries in Karuizawa did not build English cottages or Swiss chalets to create an English/European landscape. Rather, many of them adopted the Japanese architectural technology such as the Japanese cypress bark thatching and often used a bungalow style with a terrace on the front. In contrast, many wealthy Japanese who built summer houses surrounding the missionary core adopted a Western style: typically, Genjiro Nozawa tided up with Amerikaya Construction Co. who imported two-by-four prefabricated houses from Seattle and put up about fifty of them on the lots he began to sell in 1915.31 Missionaries participated in the civil governance of the village/ town quite aggressively. From early days, they took initiative in such projects as road construction, collecting donations and opposing taxes.32 In 1913, they established Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Association, which maintained the public tennis courts, established a summer clinic, planned various entertainments, etc. Such self-governing efforts can be interpreted as an attempt to create a public sphere in the private sector in a sense of Jurgen Habermas and must have been an eye-opening event for many Japanese. Looking over The Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Association

94  Rui Kohiyama Hand Book in 1922 as well as in 1930 that I have obtained,33 the most striking feature is that all the residents in the particular year are listed under each house number and its owner(s)’ name(s). The map folded in the Hand Book shows the location of all the numbered houses. In 1922, a person who paid 2 yen would be a member of the Association and was eligible to enjoy all the privileges that the Association would offer. The Hand Book was sold at 0.5 yen to anyone.34 This means that everyone had an easy access to the summer residents’ community once s/he reached Karuizawa. Such openness and assumed equality among summer residents and visitors made a strong contrast to the exclusiveness in most of the hill stations in India, where no names were given to lanes ‘since inhabitants were presumed to possess the same cozy familiarity with their surroundings’.35 A missionary in Japan testified to the democratic atmosphere of Karuizawa writing: No one but a missionary, and one who had lived in an isolated interior station at that, could fully appreciate Karuizawa. But anyone could enjoy the busy, friendly, Westernized little community, which someone called ‘A Little America’, and another a ‘Sample of the Kingdom of Heaven’. Here tired and worn our workers of all races met and lived in a fraternity far more democratic than a Soviet and more conglomerate than a Republic. To be sure, after the missionaries discovered and developed the place, Japanese nobility and even occasional royalty summered there; but these, too, became democratic and friendly with the hairy barbarians that still outnumbered them in this unique city of their own land.36

Obviously, if one could not manipulate English at all, you could not get in the community and might have felt estranged. Only a tiny majority of the Japanese who had studied abroad was good at English in those days. The woman missionary quoted above might have been acquainted only with this tiny majority. Of course, many Japanese worked for the summer residents as house servants or inn/hotel keepers. I cannot assume a perfect equality in their relationship with the summer residents. Moreover, even the early Japanese summer residents in Karuizawa, the exceptional elites in the Japanese society, seem to have felt a certain distance to the foreigners: One of the Japanese kids who stayed in Karuizawa in

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1910s later said, ‘I did not mingle with foreign kids. I should say that we did not get along with each other well’ because foreigners had new and smart bicycles while the Japanese only had awkward ones, and he added, ‘they despised us’.37 Probably, there was a racial and cultural segregation or distance about which the missionary quoted above was ignorant. Women were a definite majority among the summer residents in Karuizawa. I conducted a simple sample test using the Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Association Hand Book 1930. I picked up p. 51 arbitrarily which lists residents in houses from #610 to #642. In a total of 56 residents on the page, I found 33 were women (60 per cent); Women owned three of the eight houses privately owned by foreigners. This is a simple reflection of the tendency in the entire Protestant missionary forces in Japan where women shared as much as two thirds of the personnel at a time38; feminization might seem more conspicuous in Karuizawa than that of most of the hill stations in India. These women missionaries must have tried to replicate the ‘Christian Home’ in their summer houses. The ‘Christian Home’ was an ideological backbone of the nineteenth-century feminized evangelical Christianity in the US which radiated Christian and moral influences; it purified men tainted with secular dirt and religiously inspired children. Like the ‘Christian Home’ in the US, the summer houses in Karuizawa had no hedges or walls to mark the border between private and public space. In other words, there was no barrier between home and the community as if the former’s influence were filtering through the latter, thus creating a public sphere. Dominated by women, Karuizawa became a theatre of love romance and courtship, because in the Victorian middle-class culture with which most of the missionaries were identified, women controlled courtship. They provided occasions for young people to meet each other and watched over the steps toward marriage. In a fictional rendering of Karuizawa by Emma Lippard, young male and female missionaries meet in Karuizawa and get married.39 Finally, I must briefly add here that there was no boarding

96  Rui Kohiyama school for missionaries’ children in Karuizawa like in Kodaikanal. Only a kindergarten established there was open to missionary children during summers. This was probably because the number of missionary children was not as large as to open a school, as roughly half of women missionaries were single and the total missionary population in Japan was far less than those in India or China.

Ramifications among the Japanese As missionaries established their own community in Karuizawa, the Japanese quickly came to surround the missionary core. Over time, the Japanese expanded Karuizawa beyond the old village/ town. Here is a list of major large-scale developers engaged in the expansion in a chronological order. • A few individual Japanese who initially built summer houses had stayed in England or the US: Yujiro Hatta, Kanesumi Suematsu, Saburousuke Mitsui, Zennosuke Kosaka, Tamao Fujishima. • In 1893, Iwazo Kajima acquired 500,000 sq. m. for 150 yen and built his own cottage as well as 4 additional cottages for lease. • In 1910, Senpachi Goto and Motojiro Sato, local developers, acquired the southern slope of Atago-yama of which land use rights were mostly sold to foreigners. • In 1914, Kasuke Hoshino opened the Hoshino hot spring. • In 1915, Genichiro Nozawa acquired land and began to sell the Nozawahara summer cottages tying up with the Amerika-ya Construction Co. • In 1916, Tomoemon Kondo acquired land and began to sell lots in the area from Old Karuizawa to the Usui Pass (220,000 sq. m.). • In 1918, Yasujiro Tsutsumi acquired land and began to develop the Sengataki Area for summer cottages. • In 1920, Yasujiro Tsushumi acquired Oni no Oshidashi from the government and about 4,200,000 sq. m of land in South Karuizawa for 63,200 yen.

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The last one on the list, Yasujiro Tsutsumi, became a representative capitalist resort developer and the company he established now runs a major hotels, skiing slopes and a huge outlet mall mainly in the southern side of the Karuizawa railway station.40 The missionaries in Karuizawa succeeded in creating a small Japanese Christian community who gathered in the Japanese Church mentioned above. Some of the hotel/inn keepers were Christian as in the case of Kunisaburo Sato of the Manpei Hotel. Further, probably for the fame of Karuizawa among missionaries, some Japanese Christians began to come and spend summers in the vicinity of Karuizawa. For example, Kanzo Uchimura, one of the most famous Christians in Japan, stayed at Kasuke Hoshino’s place in 1920s and lectured for ‘the summer school for free education and arts’.41 Hoshino sympathized with Uchimura and now a chapel stands on the lot of the Hoshino Resort Hotel to commemorate Uchimura. The Japanese Christians thus reinforced Christian connotation of Karuizawa further. The Japanese seem to have embraced the new, innocent amusements wholeheartedly. Today, outdoor sports and home-based entertainments that missionaries enjoyed in Karuizawa are popular among the Japanese, not only in Karuizawa but also in general, as one of the most liked pastimes in Japan. Although the traditional amusements such as drinking, hot springs, shrine/temple visits and theatre are still popular, geisha is now on the verge of extinction and prostitution is illegal. The Japanese also created their own educational spaces in Karuizawa emulating missionary Bible classes and conferences. Beginning from the summer dormitory of Japan Women’s College in 1906, many university or school facilities have been put up in the vicinity of Karuizawa. Also, under the leadership of Shinpei Goto and Inazo Nitobe, another representative Japanese Christian, Karuizawa Summer University was opened in 1918, following the examples of the university extension movement in the UK and the US and the Chatauqua movement in the US. These movements were intended for democratic dissemination of knowledge and the US missionary enterprise was deeply involved in the latter, providing textbooks on missionary activities overseas as well as on

98  Rui Kohiyama foreign countries in which they worked. One of the texts used in Karuizawa Summer University in 1930, which I have found in the library of my university, was titled Some Selections from EighteenthCentury English Literature, and the lecture was given by Norman Blanch, Professor of English, Tokyo Higher Normal School.42 The Japanese also tried to establish their own fraternal selfgoverning resort community in the vicinity of Karuizawa and elsewhere: Housei University Village in 1920,43 Sakuzo Yoshino’s Nirayama Resort Community in 1920s, Seiyu Village in 1933 and Friends’ Village in 1933. The Japanese who took leadership in establishing these villages invited their friends of the same profession or of similar social standing to buy a lot and join the resort community just like missionaries had done in the old village/town in Karuizawa. I am not sure if they have succeeded in building the public sphere in their communities at the moment and would like to investigate into the matter in the future. Finally, but not the least, the Japanese have constructed Karuizawa as their own space for romantic love that would ripen into marriage, following missionary examples as described by Lippard above. Novelist Renzaburo Shibata once remarked, ‘Karuizawa is a town for legal wives’. Ichiro Inumaru, a long time summer resident of Karuizawa elaborated on this point writing, ‘In Karuizawa, everyone buys land through friends and acquaintances and builds a cottage. Residents have close ties with each other on a family basis. While shopping or eating out, you meet people you know very well. Yes, in Karuizawa, you can walk only with your legal wife.’44Although an old custom of keeping a mistress was still widely accepted in Japan before Second World War, it would not pass for legitimacy in Karuizawa. Building upon the Christian atmosphere that missionaries as well as Japanese Christians created, Karuizawa for the Japanese in general became a resort where heterosexual romantic love with a life-long commitment was welcomed and encouraged. You can find plenty of literary constructions of romance set on the theater of Karuizawa in the former half of twentieth century: Novelist and one-time ardent Christian Takeo Arishima

From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific  99

committed double suicide with Akiko Hadano, a married missionschool graduate working for a publisher. Arishima wanted to die at the height of their immoral love romance partly to evade disappointments that would follow the zenith.45 In Tatsuo Hori’s novels such as The Beautiful Village and When Wind Blows, Karuizawa was the place where a young male protagonist fell in love or tried to keep mutual love with a young woman. Such construction had reached its climax when the beginning of romance between Crown Prince Akihito and Michiko Shoda was marked in the tournament on the public tennis court in Karuizawa. A formal marriage of Crown Prince with a commoner’s daughter was the first thing in history and the so-called ‘love romance on the tennis court’ in Karuizawa became the symbol of democratic Japan after Second World War as well as the major turning point where marriage based on the couple’s mutual love romance began to replace the custom of arranged marriage primarily based on the class and background.46 In 1980s, church wedding in Karuizawa was in the vogue as more Japanese chose a Christian ceremony for wedding. By then, for many Japanese, the space of Karuizawa looked promising, a happy-ever-after for a loving couple at least on the wedding day, however illusory that promise might be.

Conclusion The missionaries sent from North America to Japan in the pre Second World War period belonged to the middle class. Their amusements and recreations during summer in Karuizawa were simple, modest and moderate in cost. In short, they were ready for mass consumption. Although Karuizawa began as a little, devout, tranquil and, to some extent, elitist community of missionaries and their friends, it quickly accommodated the middle class desire and absorbed capitalist greed, growing to be a secular, tumultuous and popular resort resilient in the mass consumption society in Japan. The evangelical missionaries had come to stay in Japan for a life-long commitment and hoped to lead the Japanese to a mass

100  Rui Kohiyama conversion to Christianity. While their hope failed, the seeds of mass consumption that they sowed have long been in full bloom by now.

Notes 1. J.E. Spencer and W.L. Thomas, ‘The Hill Stations and Summer Resorts of the Orient,’ Geographical Review, 38 (4 ) (October 1948): 643. 2. Dane Kennedy, The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations of the British Raj, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 114. 3. Quoted in Barbara Crossette, The Great Hill Stations of Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, p. 93. 4. Ibid. 5. Margaret Tate Kinnear Ballagh, ‘Temple of Mosquitoes’ on 7 September 1862 in Glimpses of Old Japan, 1861-1866, Tokyo: Methodist Publishing House, 1908, p. 81. 6 In 1870, Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn stayed in the Mountain area. In 1871, Rev. and Mrs. S.R. Brown and Mary E. Kidder stayed in Hakone. In 1872, the two daughters of S.R. Brown and Mary E. Kidder stayed in Tomioka, seashore near Yokohama. In 1875, Mary Pruyn and her students stayed in Katase near Enoshima. In 1875, Rev. and Mrs. Edward Rothesay Miller travelled to mountains for a month. In 1876, Rev. and Mrs. Miller spent a summer in hills probably including Karuizawa area. In 1878, Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn and Rev. and Mrs. Miller went to Hakodate in Hokkaido. In 1887, Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn went to Nikko and rented a little Japanese house for three months for the health of his wife. At this time, twelve missionaries attended a monthly meeting held at Hepburn’s place. According to Nikko Kanaya Hotel, Dr. Hepburn visited Nikko in 1871 and stayed in a room of Kanaya family and told him to open a Western style inn for foreigners, whose advice Mr. Kanaya followed in 1873. But this story cannot be confirmed in the remaining Hepburn letters. To get the above information, I have checked missionary letters in the following books: Michio Takaya, ed. and tr., Hebon Shokan Shu [Letters of Samuel Hepburn], Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1988; Michio Takaya, ed. and tr., Hebon no Tegami [Letters of Hepburn], Yurin-do, Yokohama, 1978; Michio Takaya, ed. and tr., S.R. Brown Shokan Shu [Letters of S.R. Brown], Nihon Kirisutokyodan Shuppankyoku, Tokyo, 1980; Michio Takaya, ed. and tr., Furubekki Shokan Shu [Letters of Guido Verbeck], Shinkyo Shuppan-sha, Tokyo, 1978; Ferris Jogakuin, ed. and tr., Kida Shokan Shu [Letters of Mary Kidder], Kyobunkan, Tokyo, 1976.

From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific  101 7. Hiroshi Maruyama, ‘Kindai Tourism no Reimei’ [Dawn of Modern Tourism], in 19-seiki Nihon no Joho to Shakai Hendo [Information and Social Change in Nineteenth Century Japan], Kyotodaigaku Jinbunkagaku Kenkyujo, Kyoto, 1985, pp. 90-4. 8. Ferris Jogakuin, pp. 78, 125. 9. Ernest Mason Satow and A.G.S. Haws, A Handbook for Travellers in Central and Northern Japan, 2nd edn., London: Murray, 1884, p. 229. The quoted lines are the same in the first edition published in 1881. 10. Yasuharu Miyabara, Karuizawa Monogatari [The Karuizawa Story]. Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 1991, pp. 61-5. 11. Calculated from the table in Daisuke Satoand Isao Sato, ‘Meiji Taishoki no Karuizawa niokeru Kogen Hishochi no Keisei to Besso Shoyusha no Hensen’ [Hill Station Formation and Changes in Ownership in Karuizawa], in Rekishi Chiri-gaku [Historical Geology], 46(3) (June 2004), p. 6 12 Calculated from the table in Toshihiro Hanazato, ‘Senzenki no Karuizawa no Bessochi niokeru Gaikokujin no Shoyu, Taizai to Taijinteki Kankyo no Yotai’ [The Status of the Ownership and the Occuapncy by Foreigners and the Inter-Personal Environment at the Summer Retreat Areas in Pre-War Karuizawa], in Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Keikaku-kei Ronbunshu [Japanese Architecture Planning], 77 (672) (February 2012), p. 251. 13. From the two maps in 1911 and 1930 in ibid., p. 253. 14. Miyahara, p. 65. This means that Shaw paid 0.04 yen for 3.3 sq. m. In 1890, the price of 10 kg rice was about 0.5 yen. 15. Kazumi Fukuda, Nikko Masuzuri Shinshi Monogatari [Stories of Trout-Fishing Gentlemen in Nikko], Yoma to Keikoku-sha, Tokyo, 1999, p. 61. 16. Letter by T.M. MacNair dated 28 December 1891 in Japan Letters, Records of US Presbyterian Missions in Yokohama Archives of History. 17. Shoji Uemura, ‘Meiji Zenki Oyatoi Gaikokujin no Kyuyo’ [Salaries of Oyatoi (Japan’s Foreign Employees) in Early Meiji], Ryutsu Kagaku Daigaku Ronshu, 21 (1) (2008), pp. 1-24. 18. Letter by Carrie Alexander dated 26 January 1889 in Japan Letters, Records of US Presbyterian Missions; Sato and Saito, pp. 4, 6. 19. The railroad from Tokyo to Yokokawa was opened in 1885 and a horsecarriage railway from Yokokawa to Karuizawa in 1887; Karuizawa is located 934 m while Oku Nikko (Lake Chuzenji) was 1,269 m above the sea level; the railroad from Ueno (Tokyo) to Utsunomiya was opened in 1885 and from Utsunomiya to Nikko in 1890; the railway for electric vehicles from Nikko to Umagaeshi in 1913 and a new road from Umagaeshi to Chuzenji in 1925.

102  Rui Kohiyama 20. Miyahara, pp. 95-5. 21. Manpei Sato who opened Manpei Hotel in 1895 was one of such quick Japanese who responded to Westerners’ demand. 22 Miyagi Jogakuin Shiryoshitsu, ‘Hansen-sensei, Rinze-sensei to Karuizawa Sanso’ [Kate I. Hansen and Lydia A. Lyndsay and the Mountain Villa in Karuizawa] in Shin, Kibo, Ai, 1 (January 1995), p. 103. 23. Karuizawa Kanko Kyokai, ‘Dento Kogei Karuizawa-bori’ [Traditional Craft Karuizawa-bori], http://stock.karuizawa-kankokyokai.jp/home/ tokusyu/tokusyu12/ accessed on 14 July 2014. 24. Calculated from the table in Hanasato, p. 251. 25. Canadians were often identified as English in Japan because Canada, though a self-governing body, was part of the British Empire till 1931. But as far as the missionary enterprise in Japan is concerned, the USCanada alliance was stronger: for example, the Canada Methodist Mission in Japan cooperated with the five missions of the US origin to establish the Tokyo Woman’s Christian College (to which I belong) in 1918. 26. Post card dated 7 August 1908 by Kate I. Hansen (missionary of the German Reformed Church, USA in Miyagigakuin Shiyroshitsu, p. 102. 27. Hakucho Masamune, ‘Karuizawa to Watashi’ [Karuizawa and I], Gunzo (October 1957) as quoted in Kiyoshi Shimazaki, ed., Karuizawa Hyakunen no Ayumi [One Hundred Years of Karuizawa], privately published by the author, Karuizawa, 1985, p. 41. Translation is mine. 28. In 1889, about 100 villagers come to one of such meetings according to G.P. Pierson. See Rev. and Mrs. Pierson, Tenshi ha Futari de Tatsu [Forty Happy Years in Japan], Nihon Kirisutokyokai Kitami Kyokai Pierson Bunko, Kitami, 1985, p. 53. 29. Miyahara, p. 194. 30. See also Pierson, pp. 54-5 in which the author appreciated exchanges with those who had a different theological viewpoint. 31. Shimazaki, pp. 43-4. 32. Miyahara, p. 205. 33. I thank Mr. Hiroaki Kinoshita of Karuizawa National Trust for generously lending me the Hand Book of 1922. The Hand Book of 1930 is reprinted in Shoko Komatsu, Karuizawa to Hisho [Karuizawa and Summering], Yumani Shobo, Tokyo, 2009. 34. Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Association Hand Book 1922, Kobe: The Far Eastern Advertising Agency, 1922, cover and p. 6. 35. Kennedy, p. 101. 36. Emma Gerberding Lippard, Second Hand, Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1934, p. 149. 37. Quoted in Miyahara, pp. 207-8.

From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific  103 38. Rui Kohiyama, American Women Missionaries, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992. 39. Lippard, Chapter 26. 40. As the Japanese developed and commercialized Karuizawa, some missionaries attempted an exodus to Lake Nojiri beginning from 1921 (Shimazaki, p. 51). 41. ‘Uchimura Kanzo’, http://www.stonechurch.jp/profile/uchimura.html accessed on 15 August 2017. 42. Norman Blanch, Some Selections from Eighteenth-Century English Literature for use during a course of lectures to be delivered at Karuizawa Summer University, Tokyo: Kenkyu-sha, 1930. 43. For Housei University Village, see Kita Karuizawa Daigaku Mura [The University Village in North Karuizawa], 1938 in Komatsu. 44. Ichiro Inumaru, Karuizawa Densetsu [A Legend of Karuizawa], Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 2011, p. 50. 45. As for Arishima’s double suicide, see Shigenobu Satoya, Hyoden Arisima Takeo [Takeo Arishim: A Critical Biography], Tokyo: Kenkyu-sha, 1978, Chapter 29. 46. In fact, the number of marriage based on love began to catch up with that of arranged marriage in 1960s right after the royal wedding in 1959 and the former exceeded the latter at the end of 1960s. Kokuritsu Shakai Hosho, Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo, ‘Dai 13 Kai Shushou Doukou Kihon Chosa’ [The Thirteenth Basic Research on Birth Trends] http://www. ipss.go.jp/ps-doukou/j/doukou13/chapter1.html accessed on 14 July 2014.

CHAPTER 7

The Different Destinies of the Indian Diaspora in the Mascarene Islands SOOCRAMANIEN VITHILINGEM

Introduction Smt. Sushma Swaraj, the Minister of External Affairs of India, whilst on an official visit to Mauritius [1-3 November 2014] stated that there was a dearth of studies on the Indian diaspora in the Indian Ocean. She wished there were more. She was the chief guest at the celebrations of the 180th anniversary of the arrival of indentured labourers from India to Mauritius. This paper is in response to her suggestion. My purpose is to delve briefly into the origins and the future of the diaspora in the Mascarenes, that is Mauritius, including the island of Rodrigues and Reunion Island, an overseas French department. I wish to add my voice to others in the region to demonstrate to the Government of India that it is in line with its own geopolitical and economic interests in the region to pay more attention to these people of Indian origin. With devices such as PIO, OCI, NRI and the periodic meetings of the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, India has held out the hope of a gradual integration of the diaspora in its fast economic development. The Indian Ocean Rim for Economic Cooperation is a fertile ground for India’s attempt at establishing itself as a major player in the region. Moreover, the diaspora in these countries can lobby with the diaspora elsewhere in support of India’s claim for permanent membership of the Security Council. I intend to use this brief

106  Soocramanien Vithilingem paper as a stepping stone to my doctoral research in the diaspora in Australia, Canada, the UK and Australia.

Spread of the Indian Diaspora Migrants from the poorer parts of India as well as some of the highly educated ones have penetrated most of the countries of the world leading to the Calcutta-based paper, The Statesman to state in its issue of 5 August 1980: Indians are ubiquitous. In fact, there exists hardly any country in the world which does not have its own sprinkling of Indian communities with its Little India, complete with curry shops selling tandoori chicken, tikha massala, idli and dosa; video outlets; temples and mosques; and community organisations celebrating such festivals as Diwali, Id, and Dussehra. . . . (Lal 2006: 263-72)

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the colonial powers, in an era of nascent capitalism would have failed to capitalize on the abundance of cheap labour in India. Since Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1497 en route to India, the Indian Ocean had gradually become an area of intense activity with ships engaged in trade and piracy traversing the ocean on a regular basis (North-Coombes 1971). The English and the French were vying with one another for the use of the strategically located islands of the Indian Ocean for multiple uses, chief among which as a source of fresh food and water supply for the rest of their journeys. After America was appropriated by the Portuguese and the Spaniards at the beginning of the sixteenth century, other mercantile nations on the Atlantic seaboard tried to occupy other parts of the globe for economic and military reasons. The three countries in the Mascarenes were born in the Franco-British power game. Subsequently, they integrated the new world economy whereby colonies specialized in the production of cash crops such as coffee, cotton, rice and, in the case of Mauritius and Reunion, sugar that grew well in the tropics and fetched a good price on the metropolitan markets. In view of the different times of migration, the different ports from which they embarked, their social status, religion, language, ethnic group, class, religion and caste, the diaspora in all these islands is not homogeneous. An indication of the

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size of the diaspora in the different countries of the Mascarenes will show the importance of this study: Mauritius [including Rodrigues] 882,220 Reunion 275,200 [Source: Map created by Chlorophyll on 2 December 2013] The Indian diasporas in the Mascarenes have known almost the same fate, except that in Reunion Island where the French policy of integration and assimilation destroyed almost all traces of Indian culture and religion just as in the Seychelles. Even personal records were destroyed. The Hindu revival that we have witnessed of late is quite amazing (Ghasarian 1997). Starting from almost nothing, they have worked wonders with the help of priests from Mauritius and Pondicherry. The Muslims, equally, have caught up as is evident from the mosques that are visible in the main towns. The Indian diaspora in the Mascarenes have collaborated among themselves as well as with the international diaspora. Three conferences held in Mauritius are examples of this continuing interaction. The first, the World Tamil Conference 1-8 December 1989 organized by the Ministry of Education, Arts & Culture was attended by delegates from the Mascarenes. There were also delegates from Malaysia, Sri Lanka and even the USA. The second was the Regional Conference on Tamil Diaspora organized by the Tamil League on the occasion of its 70th anniversary. The third was the First International Conference on the Tamil Diaspora [INTAD] held in the auditorium of the Mahatma Gandhi Institute, from 23-7 July 2014 organized by the INTAD [Mauritius] and the Institute of Asian Studies of Chennai [website www.tamil-diaspora. org]. These were golden opportunities for the delegates from the Hindu and Muslim associations of the region and elsewhere to interact for their mutual benefit.

The Diaspora in Mauritius: Origins and Present Status 2 November is an important date in the history of the diaspora in Mauritius for it was on that date that the first group of indentured labourers set foot on Mauritian soil in the year 1848.

108  Soocramanien Vithilingem Since then there have been various waves of Indian immigration characterized by a rich diversity. In 2001 the report of the Indian Government’s High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora mentioned that the degree to which these differences have been maintained and at times intensified or left to decay has depended upon the political, social, cultural and economic environment in which they have evolved. In Mauritius, for example, there are strong Hindu and Muslim communities. The Indo-Mauritians have progressed from indenture, through farming, land ownership and a strong foothold in agriculture to the liberal professions and political leadership. Their sons had acquired a solid education in Indian and European universities. This has enabled them to hold the levers of political power. In 1876, for example, there were only 47,286 Indian migrants. After a century, by dint of hard work, a strong bourgeoisie had risen from their ranks supported by a hardworking middle class and a strong base of small planters, traders and labourers.

Uniqueness of the Mauritian Case The report of the Indian Government’s High Level Committee mentioned: It would not be an exaggeration to say that among all the countries in which the Indian Diaspora is located, Mauritius must be regarded for more than one reason as unique and distinctive. There are three specific things which make the Mauritian experience unique and distinctive in the history of the Indian Diaspora in the world: the Apravasi Ghat, Grand Bassin or Ganga Talao and the Indian Immigration archives at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute. The Aapravasi Ghat is the only place in the world where there is a monument marking the arrival of Indian immigrants in a foreign land. Secondly, there is no other place outside of India where the descendants of Indian immigrants were able to create an important place of pilgrimage such as Grand Bassin or the Ganga Talao where every year thousands of Indo-Mauritians assemble to worship Lord Shiva. Thirdly, the Indian immigration archives at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute in Moka contain the biographical data of more than 450,000 Indian immigrants who came to Mauritius between 1834 and 1924. In addition, more than 200,000 thousand passport-sized photographs of mostly Indian immigrants which were taken

The Different Destinies of the Indian Diaspora  109 at the Aapravasi Ghat between 1868 and 1890 are also kept at the Indian Immigration Archives. (Peerthum Sateeanand and Satyendra, 2004)

The first people to tread Mauritian soil may have been the Phoenicians or even the Chinese. But the Arabs must have trodden Mauritian soil or sighted it as is evidenced by the Italian Alberto Cantina’s map of 1502, where the island is named Dina Arobi. Alfred North Coombe attributes the discovery of Mauritius in July 1500 to the Portuguese navigator Diego Dias (North-Coombe undated). At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch tried unsuccessfully to colonize the island. They, however, exploited the fauna and flora. Before they left, the Dodo, a bird for which Mauritius is well known, became a thing of the past and our ebony forest was decimated and the rare wood transported to Holland. Soon after the French took possession of the island in 1721 and called it the Isle de France, free artisans, slaves and soldiers were brought from the French comptoirs (trading posts) in India. Indian immigration would dominate the whole of the eighteenth century and part of the nineteenth. A number of them were sold or conscripted into the economic and military service of the French East India Company. It is noteworthy that some Indians were awarded land grants and became employers of slaves and respected members of the coloured elite. Apart from a few isolated attempts, it was only in the second half of 1834 and after that greater numbers of immigrants arrived. Furthermore, the British abolished slavery in the colony in February, 1835. As a result, the local planters began to import Indian labourers to supplement and eventually replace the freed slaves on the sugar plantations and in their homes as domestic servants. Some were assigned to road constructions and other public works. Between 1834 and 1839 about 26,000 Indian labourers were brought to the island. After a short suspension, the British government in the UK and in the colony regulated Indian immigration and appointed a Protector of Immigrants. In all between 1834 and 1924 around 450,000 Indians were brought to Mauritius. But conditions must have been difficult as only 200,000 remained while 160,000 left mostly for home or to other British colonies in South Africa, Fiji, British Guyana and Trinidad.

110  Soocramanien Vithilingem

The Great Morcellement: A Turning Point in the History of the Indo-Mauritian Community During the 1840s and after, the old immigrants and those who had remained after serving their term had made some savings. They started moving away from the estates and settled on their own small marginal parcels which they had bought or squatted in the rural areas. Family life gradually developed as some married exslave women. Between the 1840s and 1860s a small rural peasantry emerged as they acquired from the French planters more small patches of marginal land and set up as cultivators and farmers. Others became small traders and hawkers. It was only really between the 1870s and 1920s that a sizeable class of rural IndoMauritian landowners began to emerge in Mauritius. In the last 30 years of the nineteenth century the sugar industry went through bad times, many of the white sugar producers sold out their marginal lands to thousands of old Indian immigrants and a few Indian merchants and traders. This development was referred to as the Great Morcellement Movement (Allen 1999). The acquisition of land would facilitate the rise of the Indo-Mauritians into the higher spheres of national and local politics and the economic, social and cultural fields. At the end of the nineteenth century, Mahatma Gandhi, still fresh from his struggle against apartheid in South Africa, treaded the Mauritian soil and aroused the consciousness of the Indian labourers about their plight and the vision of a better future He sent his representative, Manilall Doctor, a barrister like him, to assist Mauritian labourers fight for better work conditions. Manilall Doctor was instrumental in obtaining many improvements in the lives of the Indo-Mauritians. A memorial has been erected in his honour in the town of Vacoas.

The Rise of an Indo-Mauritian Intelligentsia Thanks to the hard labour of the indentured Indian labourers, their habit of thrift and their savings which they multiplied through loans at low interests among themselves, they were able to send their sons to schools and later to universities in the UK and

The Different Destinies of the Indian Diaspora  111

India. Some twenty years before Independence, the investment on education started bearing fruit: Young professionals – doctors, lawyers, teachers who had been exposed to the latest revolutionary ideas – Fabianism, Socialism and Gandhism – emerged. They were prepared to struggle for the rights and freedoms of the descendants of indentured labour and slaves against the English ruler. Inspired by the missionary work of the Mahatma in South Africa and Mauritius and his friend Manilall Doctor, they claimed greater representation in the government of the island. The most formidable among them, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, managed together with Renganaden Seeneevassen, a lawyer and a few others of mixed origin to bring down the British citadel. Independence came in 1968 after a number of constitutional arrangements involving gradual devolution of political power and protracted constitutional talks with British ministers in London. The moderate Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, a doctor who was favoured by the British, fought a general election held as a referendum to decide the issue of independence vs. association to the UK and became the first prime minister of Mauritius. The mix of descendants of Africans, Franco-Mauritians and the SinoMauritians voted massively against Independence. A few names of illustrious Indo-Mauritians who helped to carry through the change should be mentioned here. Professor Basdeo Bissoondoyal who led the Jan Andolan to raise the level of consciousness of the Indo-Mauritian masses, his brother, Sookdeo Bissoondoyal, a fearless politician who was under constant watch by the English doing the constitutional talks, Jay Narain Roy, educationist and prolific writer who led the battle against the Franco-Mauritians as a columnist of the pro-labour daily Advance, Rampersad Neerunjun, the first native Chief Justice, K. Hazareesing, close adviser to Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the Burrenchobay brothers, Sir Dayendranath who was the highest civil servant advising the prime minister and his brother, affectionately nicknamed ‘Baron’ one of our first luminaries at the University of Mauritius, Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo and Sir Satcam Boolell, barristers, who later became ministers in the post-Independence labour government. However, in the early 1970s in spite of the

112  Soocramanien Vithilingem Sugar Bonanza, many Mauritians were finding it difficult to make both ends meet, the IMF had imposed two devaluations of the Mauritian Rupee and popular opposition swept Ramgoolam off his feet and he finally lost to a new charismatic Franco-Mauritian who had rallied around him Mauritians of all denominations on Marxist-Leninist values against the White and Indian bourgeoisie. Sir Anerood Jugnauth became prime minister and remained so until 1995 when he was brought down by a coalition of his former allies and the Labour Party led by Navin Ramgoolam, a British trained doctor and lawyer and son of the first prime minister of Mauritius. The latter remained in power until the second week of December 2014 when Sir Anerood Jugnauth made a brilliant comeback as prime minister from the post of president at the head of an alliance of three parties. The Indo-Mauritians continue to dominate in the political field.

Rodrigues: The Fluctuating Diaspora Rodrigues was first discovered by the Arabs but was named after the Portuguese navigator Diego Rodrigues. The Dutch took over in 1691 but lost the island to the British in 1809. On the accession of Mauritius to Independence in 1968, Rodrigues was made the tenth district of Mauritius. In 2001, the Rodrigues Regional Assembly Act was passed by the parliament of Mauritius and Rodrigues was granted the fullest measure of autonomy. The population on 24 December 2014 stood at 39,242, a fair percentage of which spent most of their time working in Mauritius. Unlike Mauritius more than 90 per cent are Creole Christians whose ancestors were brought over as labourers from Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius. A fair number, clustered in a region known as Baie aux Huitres, are of fair complexion revealing their intimate contacts with the Whites. Rodrigues, except for these differences could well be subsumed under Mauritius. There is very little information on how a handful of people of Indian origin landed in Rodrigues. It is believed that a few petty merchants from Mauritius, including Muslims, exploited the Creole peasants for their small surpluses of

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vegetables, chicken and dried fish. Some of them settled there in the small trades selling imported textiles products and food to the local people. Mauritius is 560 km away and Rodriguans could not satisfy their every need from subsistence farming (Lal 2006). From my long stay in Rodrigues I know things are different now; there are two ships that carry cargo and passengers between the two islands once or twice a month. Although Air Mauritius makes regular flights to Rodrigues, transporting cargo by air is expensive. Some 200 people of Indian origin are found on the island, almost all engaged in business. Golah Mackoojee, seventy years old, still manages the family clothing and fabric store in the capital. His younger relatives are also in business next door. The Fateymamodes own one of the only two bakeries on the island and some retail shops and guesthouses. One of them heads the finance section in administration. One Valimamode was a senior executive. Another, a former Chief Nursing Officer, is a Commissioner in the local assembly. Other temporary Hindus teach in the secondary schools but this practice is being phased out as a number of Rodriguan graduates are now available. However, almost all the secondary schools are headed by Indo-Mauritians from the mainland. It is noteworthy that the Chairperson of the Regional Assembly is a Hindu whose children also serve in administration or in the private sector. The clerk of the Assembly is also a Hindu on loan from the National Assembly. The author was the first clerk of the Assembly from 2002 to 2007 and later, served as legal adviser in 2013.The judicial personnel, all Hindus, are on a tour of service from mainland Mauritius. The Hindus celebrate their cultural and religious festivals in the only Shivala on the island. There are special spots for the Cavadee, Mahashivaratree and Ganga Shanan rituals and devotees of Sai Baba.

The Indian Diaspora in Reunion Island Discovered by the Arabs and later visited by the Portuguese who named it Santa Apolonia, it was finally occupied precariously by the French in the middle of the seventeenth century and administered

114  Soocramanien Vithilingem from Mauritius. It was known as l’Ile Bourbon but renamed Reunion in 1793. The French recruited workers from their colonies in Pondicherry and Karaikal. Between 1810 and 1815 it was held by the British before being returned to France. Since 1946, it has become an Overseas Department of France. This has enhanced the prestige of the 270,000 strong Indian diaspora and given them political clout. Tamils such as Jean Paul Virapoulay and Saminadin Alex Kitchener have been the mayors of the two important towns of Saint Paul and Saint Andre where a sizeable number of Reunionais of Indian origin live. A couple of them, including Jean Paul, have even represented their department in the House of Deputies in Paris. Jean Paul also holds the prestigious position of the first vicepresident of the General Council of Reunion while Saminadin and Mrs. Nadia Ramassamy are his second and the third vice-president respectively. Mrs. Denise Nilameyom is Deputy Mayor of Tampon. France Canaguy, president of GOPIO [Reunion] recently stated: ‘I want to tell all members of the diaspora, I am not different from you. Consider us as brothers and sisters. I am a “Malbar” just like you. I also wish to thank GOPIO Mauritius for introducing us to the GOPIO family’. Paul Canaguy, honorary president of GOPIO Reunion has stated: ‘Our nationality is French, but spiritually and culturally we are Indians’ (Dutta 2012). The Indian Reunionais can, therefore, juggle with multiple identities. The Francophone diaspora has struggled hard to build up strong ties with India. They have been highly appreciative of visits from Indian ministers as was the case of Shri Valayar Ravi to Guadeloupe and Reunion in 2011. These visits have helped to revive the Indo-Reunionais’ interest in their ancestral culture (Nayagam 2014). In January 2013 in Kerala, the President of the Republic of India bestowed the Pravasi Bharatiya [Samman] Divas Award, the highest honour that the president can confer on people of Indian origin, on Gilbert Canabady, a wellknown citizen for his significant contribution to the welfare of the Indian diaspora in the island. Honourable Rajeswar Puriag, the President of Mauritius, was equally honoured. Mahen Utchanah, the Mauritian president of the Francophone Gopio International

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attended the function. The Minister of Indian Overseas Affairs as well as the Mauritian Minister of Arts and Culture was also present [Source: Le Defimedia Group, 10 January 2014]. Moreover, the Reunionais diaspora have pursued their struggle for recognition as PIOs. Members have made known their desire to see a more supportive attitude on the part of the ‘mother country’. They have claimed centres similar to the Indian Cultural Centre and the Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre of Mauritius (Gopal 2010; Bhattacharjee 2008).

Conclusion The Indian diaspora in the Mascarenes has maintained its religious and cultural values in spite of the invasive European environment and without any real support from India. This is because they cherish their links with mother India. An Indian walking in the streets of Mauritius, Rodrigues or Reunion would feel as if he were in his own natural milieu. There is an earnest desire in the region to play an active part in bridging the gap between India and Africa for trade, cultural and economic reasons. The announcement at the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas held in Cochin in the year 2014 of the merger of the PIO and OCI by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a step in the right direction. It brings solace to the diaspora who felt that their links to their motherland were not given due importance. After the recent visit of Smt. Sushma Swaraj, the news that PM Modi will be the Chief Guest of the Mauritian government on 12 March 2015 at the 47th anniversary celebrations of Independence has been perceived as God’s blessings to the new government. His recent declaration in January last at the PVD in Gujarat [Week-End, 18 January] that India has fused the PIO and ICO cards comes as New Year’s gift to the descendants of Indians scattered over the five continents. The Mauritian Indian diaspora have also been comforted by Modi when he added comments about the Ganga Talao and the celebrations of Mahashivaratree at the lake.

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References Alberto Cantina’s map, 1502, showing Mauritius under the Arab name of Dina Arobi. Available on Google. Source: www.historytoday.com/ interactive/alberto—cantinos-world map. Allen, Richard B., Slaves, Freemen, and Indentured Labourers in Colonial Mauritius, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Bhattacharjee, Ankita, ‘Why the Indian Diaspora in Francophone Africa is Ignored?’, paper presented at JNU Symposium on ‘Indian Diaspora in Francophone and Lusophone Africa’, 27 September 2011. Dutta, Nandita, ‘An Indian Reunion’, Littleindia.com. Retrieved on 9 February 2005. Ghasarian, Christine, Indentured Immigration and Social Accommodation in La Reunion, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Gopal, Sunil, ‘PIOs Living in French Overseas Departments: Awaiting Full Integration with the Indian Diaspora, Le Deft-Medias Group, 10 December 2010. Lal, Brij. V (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora, Paris: Editions Didier-Millet, 2006. North-Coombes, Alfred, La dé couverte des Mascareignes par les Arabes et les Portugai: rétrospective et mise au point: contribution a l’histoire de l’Océan Indien au XVIe siècle, Port Louis, Service Bureau, 1979. Nayagam, Christine, Diaspora: Indians in the Reunion – Rediscovering Cultural Pride: India & You (editor of an online journal entitled India Views. Source: https://indiaviewblogs.wordpress.com/a-propos/. Peerthum, Sateeanand and Satyendra Peerthum, ‘The Significance of the Indian Diaspora in Mauritius’, L’Express, Mauritius, 2 November 2004. Week-End, Mauritius, 18 February 2015.

CHAPTER 8

Epic Writing in Diasporic Mauritian Literature in English with Focus on Tsang Man Kin’s The Hakka Epic and Lampotang’s The Coral Heart S O O S H I L L A G O PAU L

Experience is a process, negotiated socially, which can lead to better insight. john h. zammito, 2000

Though perpetual celebration of the past can be a subtle form of manipulation and indicating the route to the roots can be an indirect way of creating glass ceilings, careful crafting in epic writing and sensitive reading can be most valuable in creating new directions for future diasporic generations. In various cultures, epics have been regarded as major collective cultural points of reference in epistemology. Towards the end of the twentieth century some writers in former British colonies attempted to deconstruct the universality of Western epics and create their own ones; some have done so in verse, others in prose. The constitutive features of the epic form, namely narrating the past, the establishment of distance and the building up of national tradition are all also most resonant in diasporic writing. In 1990, Derek Walcott from Saint Lucia, wrote a seven ‘book’ epic in verse, Omeros, in which he retells the story of Iliad and Odyssey through Caribbean characters fighting their individual conflicts. From the 1960s Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul, born in

118  Sooshilla Gopaul Trinidad, portrayed the struggle of Indian immigrants settled in the Caribbean Islands in a series of novels, among which A House for Mr Biswas stands foremost. Both writers were awarded the Nobel Prize. This trend in the writing is understandable as the writers of new nations feel the need to create a cultural hinterland. Besides, diasporic writers being Janus-faced, naturally turn towards the past which holds an ever open storehouse of materials. In this paper, I shall analyse two Mauritian texts: Joseph Tsang Mang Kin’s The Hakka Epic (2011), a fifty-stanza long poem, and Peggy Lampotang’s The Coral Heart (2014), a novel covering the progress of three generations of a Chinese family in Mauritius. I emphasize that though modernity does not favour epic sensibility, epic writing can contribute towards building up and maintaining a sound multicultural society. I use Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan’s point regarding the changing nature of ethnicity in an age of diaspora and highlight the way mutability of identity can lead towards peaceful adaptation. Here I argue that adaptation need not glide into integration. Second, in my examination of the epic writings I have drawn from Satya P. Mohanty’s post-positivist realist view of experience and identity to point out the epistemic value of the two texts.

Mauritius Today Mauritius is an island (720 sq. miles with a population of 1.30 million) that has been populated through French and later British expansionist and imperialistic attempts. In the process they, by turn, brought over slaves from Madagascar and the coasts of Africa and artisans and labourers from India and China. The descendants of the slaves, artisans and the labourers, along with those of the French and British sugar plantation owners, today form the population of Mauritius. It is thus a multicultural, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic society. The island won its independence in 1968 and ever since, efforts have been made to build up unity within diversity. The concept of ‘one people one nation in peace, justice and liberty’ – words found in the Mauritian National Anthem,

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has been the guiding motto of policy makers and administrators. However socio-cultural groups have simultaneously exercised pressure to make each ethnic group aware of its own origin, culture, religion and ancestral languages and mother tongues and to guard its particular identity. Racial discrimination exists; each community evolves in its own cocoon; cases of ‘miscegenation’ are rare; ‘peace is maintained because Mauritians are taught, since childhood, to maintain a safe distance from the other against whom denigrating words or terms of abuse must never be used, at least in public. Besides, general elections reveal that mistrust of the other is strong for we do hear slogans such as “vote for the person, not for the party”. ’

Commemorative Celebrations in Mauritius In Mauritius often parades and floats commemorating the abolition of slavery or arrival of indentured labourers are held as part of the official celebrations of the independence of Mauritius, abolition of slavery and arrival of indentured labourers. Parades and floats re-enacting treatment of slaves and indentured labourers are held. Among these the Chinese community often participate by presenting the Chinese Dragon Dance. I believe that such commemorative celebrations are controversial as they reaffirm the attitude of white sugar planters held towards workers. Ceremonies held to commemorate freedom can be seen as disrespectful towards the memory of ancestors. They are put in place for maintaining boundaries (Brubaker 2005) and I add that the reason is to rule better. So in Mauritius commemorative celebrations can become a site of ambiguity, conflict and revival of trauma. They can be close to manipulation and indoctrination. By reminding present-day Mauritians about the capture of slaves, by exhibiting the instruments of torture or by repeating that Indian workers were lured, or showing the Chinese dragon as greedy or one which can be pacified only with money gifts, there is the danger of creating a self-fulfilling expectation of low ability and that of placing a glass ceiling above oneself. Concerning the Holocaust,

120  Sooshilla Gopaul Hanns-Fred Rathenow says: ‘There is a great danger that excessive amount of shared suffering might lead to internal repression and impotence’ (Hans Fred Rathenow 2000: 73). The idea that present-day Mauritians should constantly be made aware of their past and in particular about the hardships faced by their ancestors – their struggle against the oppression of sugar cane plantation owners, strict control of their movements within the island, the low wages paid to them and also coping with the sense of loss and sorrow that comes with displacement—does not always hold. Today’s youth look upon these facts in a detached manner. For them it is past history and not linked with them. Yet to look upon the past simply as history is not enough. The important fact is that the past is about us about human beings to whom we can trace back our genes and DNAs, about exploitation of human labour and most importantly about human courage and determination to adapt, to adopt and survive so that their future generations will flourish. So the aim of using commemorative celebrations mainly through tableaux, parades and floats, to build up individual identity is failing. Besides commemorative parades are costly; they deplete the sources of the participating institutions. However, according to Mitchell Kachun, commemorative ceremonies and parades ‘Might help in mobilizing masses and can make powerful political statements from a people claiming their rights and their place in the national family’. Yet emphazing on the importance of transmitting the past, he adds that ‘only through such an awareness in the coming generation could the larger projects of universal race identification and subsequent emancipation be accomplished’ (Kachun 2003: 49-50). So the past is necessary but forms other than parades and floats. It can be used for nation building and in-depth collaborative living for future development.

The Epic Form and Its Advantages An epic is a long narrative told on a grand scale; it includes a central figure of superhuman calibre, perilous journeys, various

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adventures of warriors and heroes; digressions, vivid descriptions; it has a polygonal structure incorporating myths, legends, folk tales and history. Writers just as those involved in the media, have the responsibility of educating their audiences. The epic is an elevated form and by presenting elevated forms we appeal to the highest responses. We also place the new text on a high level. First, epic texts in prose or poetry have unlimited scope; they can depict life in its entirety. Second, in an epic the narration predominates and experiences become important. The writer relates what has taken place at an earlier time, so temporal distance is maintained and objectivity is attained. However, the narrator acts as a witness and as an interpreter; he transmits his perception and his point of view. Third, in an epic the events occupy a central part and through mimesis, the staging parts and diegesis, the narrative and descriptive parts, the writer creates a whole world. The epic form does not accept any strategy to narrow down an idea, it goes on widening its scope. Hence the epic form gives much room to experiences; this step gives the work maximum authenticity. Fourth, the fact that the epic form is all-inclusive makes it a fit form for nation building and development.

Mauritian Literature in English Mauritian literature in English is poor compared to Mauritian literature in French and Hindi, because those writing in English are mostly government servants. So they have to be very cautious and have little freedom of expression. It happens that often those writing in English are foreign women married to Mauritians; they can use the plea of ignorance and be excused. Though when one of them wrote a novel entitled Rape of Sita, the book was banned.

Importance of Tsang Mang Kin’s The Hakka Epic (HE) and Lampotang’s The Coral Heart (CH) These two texts are of great value to the Mauritian society. These writers, these ‘unacknowledged legislators’ are lighting up paths that can build better intercultural relationship in Mauritius and in

122  Sooshilla Gopaul the rest of the Indian Ocean region. I am not including the world on purpose because we do have writers such as Amy Tan, presently based in America, who has opened the doors of their community to readers and has revealed the Chinese way of life and has initiated better understanding between cultures.

Tsang Man Kin’s The Hakka Epic (2011) Tsang Man Kin’s poem is made up of 49 sections in which we listen to the voice of a poet and the choir in an irregular manner. It starts with the poet celebrating the return of the Hakka people on their own to Moy Yen. The choir then takes up the narration of the tribulations of the Hakka who were chased by the first emperor from the north twenty centuries ago to the south. From the south they dispersed again, some going to Bengal (section VIII), and some to Tahiti (Section XV). By the time we reach Section XX, the poet is once more celebrating his return among the family of his ancestors, to a particular Uncle Lien. After that the poet describes the reminiscences of his voyage into the land of his ancestors, his visits to the graves and we hear his hymn to the ‘Great Mother Ancestress’ the, eldest of the twenty-fourth generation On the Tsang clan tree in the company of all the others (Section XXXIV)

The poem ends with songs of praise to the Hakka people, starting with homage to Hakka women who were ‘the first to castoff the fashion of foot-binding’ and with a vote of thanks to the roots of the Hakka people.

Lampotang’s The Coral Heart: A Shopkeeper’s Journey The narrative starts in 1906 when a four-year old boy realizes that he is hungry. Later his father who had been working in Mauritius joins the family and takes them back to the island. As he grows up he helps his father and the family business thrives. He helps his siblings and the focus is on multiplying the family wealth. He falls in love with a Muslim girl whom he meets secretly and who gives

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him a coral heart. This girl is soon married off and from then on it is only work for this young man. He becomes the head of the family and he decides on the ways to adopt in order to make the family business prosper. A chain of shops are opened. When his first wife dies he realizes that he has not given her the attention she deserved. After his second marriage, he realizes that his siblings might have designs of their own. In fact, while he is on a trip to Hong Kong his brothers meet and discuss their own future prospects. On his return he learns about the plans of his siblings he is shocked but also thinks that he has done his duty for by that time the foundations of an empire have been laid down: the Lam Po Tang business empire. It was achieved through prodigious on hard work night and day by all the members of the family and through perpetual lookout for what the customers would need: it could be vegetable pickles that the labourers like to have in their loaf of bread or an aluminium lunch box with compartments so that the labourers’ roti and dal and vegetable curry would not get mixed up. This is the gist of the novel but my point is that it is more than a story of survival; the daily experiences, the minor emotional and financial victories over the successive hurdles and the realization that a new identity is being built is what makes this novel a modern epic. Besides, according to Bakhtin, the form of the novel ‘is the only genre that was born and nourished in a new era of world history and therefore it is deeply akin to that era’ (Bakhtin 1996: 47).

The Chinese Community’s Absence on Mauritian Social Canvas In Mauritius, people of Chinese origin came mostly as traders. They are mostly Hakka people. Tsang Mang Kin believes that their ‘forebears settled’ in the ‘heartland of the Hakkas’: after two millennia of migration and wanderings of flights and forced marches. (The Hakka Epic 2011: 8)

124  Sooshilla Gopaul The choir later adds: We left the North For the central plains. We left the Centre For the Southern heights (The Hakka Epic, 2011: 47)

Mauritius is a multiracial country but it is also a place where each community has evolved within itself; there is little inter-communal activity. Mixed marriages are still rare. Yet most Mauritians know about the life led by the descendants of Africans, Europeans and Indians but not about the descendants of the people of Chinese origin. They have kept to themselves, working or studying night and day. They know English, French, Creole, some of them even know Bhojpuri and can easily follow Hindi films but most other Mauritians do not know the Hakka language. The Chinese people on the other hand know everything about the other communities because they supply them with all their requirements but others do not know about the Chinese community. The people belonging to the Chinese community have shown that they are not willing to readily mix with the people from other communities. They guard their privacy highly and also the secret of their economic and intellectual success. Most of them came only with their courage for hard work, with the determination to work night and day and not waste time at all. They would work in shops belonging to Chinese and open their own as soon as they could, even if they had not saved enough for they would be helped by the other Chinese community. This is clearly shown, at several instances in The Coral Heart. They have been taught to hide their emotions (CH, p. 73). So they have kept away from the descendants of the African slaves who often break into a dance and make merry and the descendants of Indians who work and save but also relax and spend time in social and religious gatherings – too much one may say. Formerly, most of Chinese would break from work only on the Chinese New Year. In case of a birth or a death one could hear some fire crackers but it would be business as usual. Their highly organized work-oriented

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family life is clearly described by Regis Fanchette, a Mauritian poet, in his poem entitled ‘Lin Piao’s Backshop’ (Fanchette 1996: 83-4). Today the Chinese community is among the richest on the island, as rich as the descendants of French and is in fact buying them off. Many of them are among the top professionals not only in Mauritius but also in England, Australia, America and Canada. As a result other communities look upon the Chinese community with suspicion; they even make up ‘stories’ about the dishonest means that the Chinese community could have used for the educational success of Chinese scholars; their funeral customs are turned into jokes; they are accused of double dealing because of their habit of using Christian names as first names; their custom of giving money as gift is criticized and their calm disposition is taken for surreptitious behaviour. The narrator in The Coral Heart says: ‘We Chinese keep our emotions and don’t say whatever comes to our head. It’s not good to let others see our weaknesses. They can use them against us.’ This attitude has been clearly displayed in American films portraying Chinese characters: suspects in court rooms become accused because neither their facial expressions nor their body language reveal their feelings, unlike say South African Olympic runner Oscar Leonard Pistorius suspected of killing his girlfriend. These situations can change now through these two texts which can be taken as modern forms of epic. Through the two texts mentioned here, we see that their identity is changing. They are no longer living in seclusion and have started to reveal their innermost fears and joys.

New Directions that These Two Texts of Epic Writing can Give I started this paper by saying that according to me parades, floats and other forms of concrete visuals recall of the past can hamper progress of a community, especially one which had had a difficult past. I advance that epic writing, with all the included account of experiences, can be most positive in building a better future.

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1. The two texts show that mutability in identity is positive and can be intentional According to Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan: Diaspora has created rich opportunities of understanding different histories. And these histories have taught us that identities, selves, traditions, and natures do change with travel (and there is nothing decadent or deplorable about mutability) and that we can achieve such changes in identity intentionally. (Radhakrishnan 2008: 126)

The Coral Heart reveals a Chinese community that has transformed itself and has developed a metamorphic identity. Lampotang shows clearly how the Chinese men discard their Chinese clothes to adopt Western suits and have their long hair tied in ‘pigtail’ cut off (CH, p. 4) . Radhakrishnan argues that ethnicity is always in a state of flux. He is joined by Stuart Hall for whom identity is ‘not a fixed essence at all’, that is, it is unstable and ‘has its histories’, and that is, it is metamorphic (Hall 2008: 237). Lampotang’s hero first changes his ways of dressing up and at the end of the novel he learns to abide by the Mauritian laws of inheritance. Radhakrishnan’s key to peaceful adaptation seems to be a willingness to change.

2. The two texts can foster better understanding In Mauritius we are all diasporics. It is true that the Chinese community’s attempt at self-exclusion has no serious effect but it is quite visible that they do not fully form part of our rainbow nation – except that they pay lip service to performances during special celebrations. The Chinese community is the same everywhere else and this is why the Chinese film festival has been so acclaimed as it gives the other communities in America an opportunity to understand the Chinese people. These two texts of epic writing will definitely make the other communities look upon them with empathy. In Mauritius these two texts will do what the films on the Chinese community made in America have succeeded in doing; they have given a voice to the Chinese characters.

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3. Epic writing can show that ‘personal experiences’ have epistemic value We start with the premise that ‘personal experiences’ need not be direct; they can be transmitted. Satya P. Mohanty, adopting a post-positivist realist stand believes that the relation between experience and identity is a theoretical issue. He claims that ‘personal experience’ is ‘socially and ‘theoretically constructed, and it is precisely in this mediated way that it yields knowledge’ (Mohanty 2010: 33). He draws from the philosopher Naomi Scheman who shows that our emotions can be misleading for in spite of being our ‘inner’ ones they are often constructed by society and ‘the political framework is explicit’ (Scheman 1980: 186). But we may note that Mohanty focuses on the fact that because experience is ‘mediated’, ‘it yields knowledge’. He also brings in historian Joan Scott who believes that experience ‘is not a word we can do without’ and that experience ‘serves as a way of talking about what happened, of establishing difference and similarity, of claiming knowledge’ (ibid.). The positivist approach of mid-twentieth century considered only the empiricism – (observation and measurement were basis for a scientific study). So emotions that could not be measured were not considered as reliable factors of knowledge. But the philosophy of critical realism leads us to believe that there can be a reality which is beyond our knowledge, that observations could be faulty and theories can be revisited. When we include greater number of experiences we realize that the positivist approach was a subjective one; greater numbers of accounts can help in making the study objective. Comparing similarities and differences of experiences will help in increasing the reliability of knowledge through triangulation (Trochim 2006: 1-3). Thus studies involving experiences can move from being subjective to being objective and becoming knowledge. So experiences gain in epistemic value. Mohanty suggests that once ‘the cognitive status of experience’ is acquired, ‘We can conceive of legitimate ways of reproducing and transmitting knowledge said to be arrived at through experience’. So following Mohanty we may say that the experiences included

128  Sooshilla Gopaul in the two texts can help in understanding the Chinese community; the texts have epistemic value that can contribute to better relationship among people.

4. Epic writing can show that nostalgia can become a source of joy as well as strength Nostalgia once associated with romanticism was considered a sickly disposition, was ridiculed and looked upon with derision by modernists. Later in diasporic studies nostalgia becomes an essential part which has to be dealt with in order to move ahead. Today Tim Adams draws our attention to a research carried out by Contatine Sedikides and Dr Tim Wildschut, in ‘18 countries on five continents’. They find that nostalgia, through ‘measurable effects’ ‘is shown to be both a driver of empathy and social connectedness’ (Guardian Weekly).

5. The two texts provides a much needed balance A close reading of both texts reveal great deal of similarities between the history of Indo-Mauritians and that of the SinoMauritians. Hindus predominate among the Mauritian population and there are frequent references to the epics in their scriptures in the media. Diwali is celebrated on a national level. The Hakka Epic with its wide sweeps and enchanting verses and The Coral Heart with its detailed descriptions of daily struggles can come as a balancing factor.

6. Epic writing can lead from diaspora to transnationalism These two texts have shown that the characters do not claim back material possession left behind in the homeland. They might have lost many things but they have guarded their cultural identity. Both writers have drawn deep from memory, as mentioned earlier. As Michel Bruneau rightly points out memory ‘preserves part of territoriality’. He adds that diasporic people break from

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the homeland but in transnationalism there is no break. There is mobility (Brubeau 2010). This mobility can become a source of anxiety but it also calls for celebration as it can wipe out the trauma associated with diaspora.

Conclusion The Hakka Epic is an extremely short epic poem but is most effective in putting the poet’s point across. Readers of the twenty-first century highly appreciate brevity. Tsang Mang kin’s verse is simple yet its rhythm has a magic, that of creating in readers a desire to go back again and again to his verse. His poem celebrates a return to homeland to home; feelings of joy, gratitude and reverence are transmitted and these are similar to those felt by many IndoMauritians who visit their home districts in India. Lampotang’s The Coral Heart is a novel that spreads out the slow and daily struggle to build up an empire with only hard work as the initial investment. These two texts must be taken in tandem; they complement each other; the first one operates on a macro-thinking level while the second one works on the micro-thinking level. The first one traces the history, their tribulations and joys of return of the Hakka people in broad lines while the second text gives us a detailed account of the Hakka people’s arrival in Mauritius and their ascents to fortune. Using a post-positivist realist approach I confirm that it is the experience included in epic writings, narrated through synoptic or extended that time are most valuable. They have the capacity of laying the foundations for a peaceful multiracial Mauritian society built on active understanding and can lead from diaspora to transnationalism.

References Bakhtin, Mikhail, ‘Epic and Novel’, in Michael J. Hoffman and Patrick D. Murphy (eds.), Essentials of the Theory of Fiction, London: Leicester University Press, 1996, p. 47.

130  Sooshilla Gopaul Brubaker, Roger, ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’, Ethnic and Radical Studies, vol. 28(1), January 2005, 1-19. Bruneau, Michel, ‘Diasporas,Transnational Spaces and Communities’, in Rainer Baubock and Thomas Faist (eds.), Diaspora and Transnationlism, Concepts, Theories and Methods, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, pp. 48-9. Fanchette, Regis, A Private Journey, Port Louis: Edition de l’Ocean Indien, 1996. Hall, Stuart, ‘Cultural identity and Diaspora’, in Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur (eds.), Theorising Diaspora, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 235. Kachun, Mitch, Festivals of Freedom: Memory and Meaning in African American Emancipation Celebrations 1805-1915, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003. Lampotang, Peggy, The Coral Heart: A Shopkeeper’s Journey, Atelier d’ecriture, La Pelouse Troud,eau douce, Port Louis: Atelier d’ecriture, 2014. Radhakrishnan, R., ‘Ethnicity in an Age of Diaspora’, in Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur (eds.), Theorising Diaspora, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 120. Saker, Richard, ‘Look Back in Joy: Power of the Past’, The Guardian Weekly, no. 28, 27 November 2014. Scheman, Naomi, ‘Anger and the Politics in Women and Language’, in Ally McConnell-Giner, Ruth Borker and Nelly Furman (eds.), Literature and Society, New York: Praeger, 1980, p. 186. Trochim, William, Positivism & Post-Positivism, 2006. Accessed from http:// www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positivsm.php on 24 January 2015. Tsang, Mang Kin, The Hakka Epic, President’s Fund for Creative Writing in English, Mauritius: Port Louis, 2011. Zammito, John H., ‘Reading Experience’, in Paula M.L Moya and Michael R. Hames-Garcia (eds), Reclaiming Identity, Hyderabad, Orient BlackSwan, 2010, 295. http://www.cafilmfestival.com/index.php?option =com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=34&lang=en (seen on 15 January 2015).

CHAPTER 9

Amitav Ghosh, Indian Ocean and the New Thalassology R.S. SHARMA

Moving away from the Indian Ocean historiography that emerged in the 1980s, historians are now navigating the Indian Ocean as a site for rethinking on traditional scholarship focused on trade routes, monsoon, ports, littoral societies, seafarers and colonial settlements. The new thalassology consists of the many strands of contemporary discourses that have gone into the unraveling and interpretation of existing knowledge about the Indian Ocean.1 These include colonialism and post-colonialism, old globalism and current globalization, the diasporas of the past and the new diasporic identities, the territorial nation state and the new transnational entities, the Indian Ocean past as it impacts the Indian Ocean now. The most important aspect of this new development has been the attempt to write Indian Ocean history from a humanistic perspective with emphasis on words and language, on art, literature, music and culture with a new methodology that reconstitutes the inter-regional Indian Ocean space to interpret the experience and consciousness of the Indian Ocean community. The new thalassology is remarkably visible in recent scholarship on Indian Ocean Studies. With increasing interest in human networks converging on the study of race, ethnicities, identities and transnational human formations, Indian Ocean writers and intellectuals are acquiring greater visibility. Indian Ocean is no more a ‘Forgotten Sea’ as it was perceived a few years ago.2 A new corpus

132  R.S. Sharma of texts, as Mardewun Adejunmobi puts it, ‘associated with mainly coastal and island communities sharing in common similar experiences of slavery, indentured labour, colonialism and other deprivations of political and economic rights is part of the new thalassology’.3 The trend to see Indian Ocean as a global space has encouraged critics and intellectuals to resist traditional notions of Indian Ocean identity and has opened up new venues of critical interpretation. Thus, Edward A. Alpers in his recent book The Indian Ocean in World History, has emphasized how ‘music, song, and dance, religion and healing, language and folkways’4 are important constituents in the life of Indian Ocean communities. Isabel Hofmeyr, arguing for the universalization of the Indian Ocean finds it ‘as a historically deep archive of competing universalism’5 that offers ‘a privileged vantage point from which to track a changing world order’.6 As a site of critical investigation it ‘complicates boundaries, moving us away from the simplicities of the resistant global and the dominating global’.7 The historic turn in Indian Ocean Studies has yielded new interpretations of Indian Ocean world. For instance, drawing upon the ‘routes and roots’ construct of Martinican philosopher Eduward Glissant, Catherine A. Reinhardts interprets Indian Ocean life world in terms of rhizome memories, which are ‘testimonies of the past spread widely and are continuously exposed to the transformative influence of other testimonies’.8 They ‘expose the connections, making it possible to analyse how the multiple voices of the past mould the historical process’.9 Kaman Brathwaite from Barbados interprets the experience of transoceanic voyages through the metaphor of ‘tideletics’, the movement of water backwards and forwards as a kind of cyclic motion rather than linear. These movements of water ‘mimic’ historical trajectories of migrancy and dispersal and highlight the waves of various immigrants handfalls. Elazabeth M. DeLoughrey elaborates ‘tidelectics’ as a ‘Methodological tool that foregrounds how a dynamic model of geography can elucidate island history and cultures, production,

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providing the framework for exploring the compiles and shifting entanglement between sea and land, diaspora and indignity and routes and roots’.10 Khal Torabully, the Mauritian critic, has advanced the notion ‘coolitude’ to interpret the experience of immigrants in Mauritius. It employs the metaphor of coral to define ‘coolitude’. Coral, he suggests, ‘can be both soft and hard’ traversed by currents continuously changing . . . [it] establishes links between coolies and their descendents with other ethnic groups within the island nation of Mauritius. Memory of the homeland is the key factor in his construct, because it enables the coolie to liberate himself into newer forces of life, new imaginaries. ‘Imaginary’ is a set of values, institutions, laws and symbols common to a particular social group and the corresponding society through which people imagine their social whole. In recent scholarship the Indian Ocean appears, as stated earlier, as ‘a historically deep archive of competing universalisms’. Nowhere is this more visible than in the writings of authors like Amitav Ghosh, Abdul Razak Gunrah, Barlene Pyamootoo and others. Writers and intellectuals in the field of Indian Ocean Studies are increasingly delving deep into colonial archives to arrive at a new understanding of the many forms of human existence in the Indian Ocean region. As a consequence, Indian Ocean appears as a productive site, ‘for rethinking global histories’. Thus in his A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, Sugata Bose pleads for a methodological shift ‘from the ones prevailing which lead to a high degree of abstractions’ and in which ‘real human beings and their agency vanish from the view’. He ponders over the ‘magical spell’ that Indian Ocean casts on the minds of poets.13 Citing, for example, the poetry of Jibananda Das, the Bengali poet and asserts: ‘The reality of Indian Ocean comes through most strongly in the imagination of native thinkers and artists’.14 Bose in his highly perceptive study emphasizes ‘the continuing relevance of the Indian Ocean as an inter-regional space in a time of intense global connections’.15 For him, ‘The human history of the Indian Ocean is stung together at a higher level of intensity

134  R.S. Sharma in interregional arena while contributing to and being affected by structures, processes, and events of global significance.’15 To quote him again, ‘there is no question that the history of Indian Ocean world is enmeshed with its poetry and in some ways propelled by it’.16 This methodological shift in Indian Ocean Studies towards the humanities is already manifest in recent studies of art, literature and culture of the inter-regional space of the Indian Ocean. The writer who is most intensely sensitive to this new thalassology is Amitav Ghosh. Both in his fiction and in his non-fiction writing, he has demonstrated a highly creative engagement with the many universals competing for critical space in the inter-regional Indian Ocean Studies. It will be interesting to trace here Ghosh’s navigations into Indian Ocean Studies to understand the depth of his engagement. Delving deep into colonial archives, he has tried to interpret colonial history from a humanistic perspective by refiguring it in fictions at once real and surreal. For him, the archive is the source of stories yet to be told. His narratives enlarge the domain of Indian writing in English to render it a global character. Ghosh is perhaps the most original of contemporary Indian writers, for his inclusive writing intertwines all the threads of present-day discourses ranging from colonialism to post-colonialism, nationalism to trans-nationalisms, globalism to globalization, rootless cosmopolitanism to vernacular universalism – in fact, the many universalism that are the substance of modern theory and criticism. No wonder the net and the weave are his favourite metaphors. The Indian Ocean voyage of Amitav Ghosh started when in August 2007, he presented a keynote at a conference ‘Eyes across the water, Navigating the Indian Ocean’ at the University of South Africa’s India Research Trust, Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He published a revised version of the same in the Economic and Political Weekly as ‘Of Fanas and of Forecastles: The Indian Ocean and Some Lost Languages of the Age of Sail’.17 This perhaps was the beginning of a new course of narrative writing emanating from his deep engagement with archival research as a scholar in sociology

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at Oxford University, It was followed by a unique narrative, The Slave of Ms H6 which he later turned into his masterpiece In An Antique Land.18 Since then, Ghosh has produced a series of fictional narratives centred on the Indian Ocean, its littoral states and communities, recapturing history in its oceanic variety. Taken together these texts are at the heart of Ghosh’s fictional world. In ‘Fanas and Forecastles’ Ghosh reveals his extensive knowledge of the literature of seafaring, his familiarity with sea fiction or nautical fiction and its major practioners such as Joseph Conrad and Herman Melville and the many nuances of lives as they were lived on the ship.19 While ruminating on the lives of Lascars and their language Lascari, Ghosh perceives a deep connection between language, community and history. In words and language, he comes to see the interconnectedness of people, rootless, but united by routes, the many aspects of seafaring which makes them a people who have ‘nothing in common except the Indian Ocean’.20 The Lascar and his language become a trope for the Indian Ocean community; the Lascars are prototypes of the present-day immigrants. They are of interest because they are ‘probably the first Asians and Africans to participate freely and in substantial numbers in a globalized work place’.21 Reflecting on the lives of the Lascars, he becomes aware of the many unexplored histories of the subaltern, hidden behind what he calls the ‘curtains of silence’. As he puts it, ‘theirs is not the least of the many curtains of silence which we seek to pierce when we inquire into their lives’ (p. 88).22 After musing on the etymology of the word, Ghosh perceives the emergence of an Indian Ocean community in the lives of the Lascars. Words often have their own reality: ‘it is easy to imagine that living in the crampled bowels of sailing ships, coping with conditions of extreme danger and difficulty, men from every edge of the Indian Ocean came to share in an experience which though similar to that of sailors everywhere was also different in that it was salted with a particular kind of brine.’23

136  R.S. Sharma With a fascinating insight Ghosh saw the sail ship ‘precisely a vast floating lexicon, with thousands of named parts’ (p. 58).24 While sailing, seafaring and sailors occupy Ghosh’s creative imagination, he feels, sailing and its many complex ramifications in history and community could not be possible without ‘the unseen network of words’ which help us ‘pierce the many curtains of silence’ when we seek to probe the lives of seafarers like the Lascar. Ghosh, thus, sees a deep connection between words, language and history. In order to understand the Indian Ocean experience historically, we must go to the lexicon, to the archaeology of languages encrusted in the lexicons. In his narrative on lost languages of the Indian Ocean, Ghosh delves extensively into the processes which have gone into the making of a ‘shipload of lexicographers from the 16th century onwards’. Ghosh proposes a new approach to the Indian Ocean experience through this archaeology of language and words. As one of his characters Neel in Sea of Poppies says, ‘words, no less than people, are endowed with lives and destinies of their own’. The writer in the act of writing, like Neel, becomes a ‘linkster’ who helps translate one language into another. Ghosh enjoys playing with words and draws extensively from the language of seafaring in the Indian Ocean and tries to capture in vivid detail ‘the texture of life’ as lived on the sea or the shore. On his website, Ghosh has provided a 35-page vocabulary entitled ‘The Ibis chrestomathy’ to enable us to get into the world of his Ibis trilogy, something like what T.S. Eliot had done in his The Wasteland. Ghosh, thus, becomes a ‘linkster’ trying to establish a link between language and history, chrestomathy meaning a selection of passages to understand a language, language being a record of the many passages that the seafarers have gone through. It is history as lived in words, something that cannot be negated and cannot be falsified. For as Revathy Krishnaswamy has pointed out: ‘The hermeneut who could not trust the history constructed with words could trust the history in words, for although it is possible to create false historical narratives, language itself could not lie about history since its very being is historical’.25 The fusion of many strands, historical, linguistic, sociological

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and political and the use of romance of unknown place names, navigational tools, the strange names of ships and a language evoking the images of the sea lend his narratives a meditative, philosophical strain, inviting us to look deeper into the mystery and the magic of the life, individual and collective, lived on the sea. His two early narratives move us to look into the lexicon and the archaeology of words therein, so that we can hear the voices yet unheard and pierce ‘the curtains of silence’ which inhibit our articulation of joys and pains of living in a world constantly floating, like that of Lascaras. They are documents which provide methodology for the new thalassology, like the documents he had struggled hard to discover and put together while telling the story of the slave of MS.H.6. In his own words: Each of these documents has a story of its own: of travel from Aden and Egypt, to Malabar and Sicily and then back again to Cairo – medieval histories that somersault into a further chronicle of travel and dispersal in modern times. Their history has the baffling exclusiveness of lights seen in parallel mirrors, they are both the stuff of history and history itself, as real as a battle or a temple, they are each a living history and a commentary on the writing of history, a mocking aside on how histories are stolen bought and traded in the market place. The story of the slave of Ms. H.6 is one tiny spark within the lights of this looking glass chamber, faint, elusive and often jeering.26

In these lines we have history, philosophy of history and interpretation of history. Truly, Amitav Ghosh’s Indian Ocean is both magical and mysterious. Soon we may find scholars navigating deep into lexicons like Hobson Jobson, that inexhaustive source of lost knowledges of Indian Ocean.

Notes 1. See Markus P.M. Vink, ‘Indian Ocean Studies and the ‘New Thalassology,’ Journal of Global Studies, 2: 1, May 2007, pp. 41-62. I enlarge Vink’s concept to include scholarship that has emerged since 2007. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1017s1740022807002033. 2. Ibid., p. 42. 3. Maradewun Adejunmobi, ‘Claiming the Field: Africa and the Space of Indian Ocean Literature’, Callaloo, 32: 4, fall 2009, pp. 1247-61. DOI: 10.1353/cal.0.0548.

138  R.S. Sharma 4. Edward A. Alpers, ‘Recollecting Africa: Diasporic Memory in the Indian Ocean World’, African Studies Review; 43(1): 83-99, especially p. 91. See also Edward A. Alpers, The Indian Ocean in World History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 5. Isabel Hofmeyer, ‘Universalizing the Indian Ocean’, P.M.L.A. 125: 3, May 2010, pp. 721-9, especially p. 722. 6. Ibid., p. 721. 7. Ibid., p. 722; Elizabeth M. Deloughrey, ‘Tidaclectics: Chartering the Space/Time of Caribbean Waters’, in Span: Journal of South Pacific Association, vol. 47, October 1998, p. 18. 8. Catherine A. Reinhardt, Claims of Memory: Beyond Slavery and Emancipation in the French Caribbean, New York: Berghahan Press, 2006, p. 14. 9. Ibid. 10. Elizabeth M. Deloughary, Routes and Roots: Navigating Carribbean and Pacific Island Literatures, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007, p. 2. 11. See on this and other related aspects, Binita Mehta, ‘Memories in/of Diaspora: Barlen Piyamootoo’s Benares 1999’, L’Esprit Createur: The International Quarterly Journal of French and Francophone Studies, vol. 50, no. 2, Summer 2010, pp. 46-62, The John Hopkins University Press, DOI: 10.1353/esp.0.0224. Part of Project Muse. 12. Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006, p. 23. 13. Ibid., p. 276. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., p. 3. 16. Ibid., p. 5. 17. Amitav Ghosh, ‘Of Fanas and Forecastles: The Indian Ocean and Some Lost Languages in the Age of Sail’, Economic & Political Weekly, 43: 25, June 2008, pp. 56-62. 18. Amitav Ghosh, ‘The Slave of Ms. H.6’, in Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey (eds.), Sublatern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. 19. For a historical survey of nautical writing, see Smith Myron Jr. and Robert C. Weller, Sea Fiction Guide, Metuchen; N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1976. 20. Ghosh, ‘Of Fanas and Forecastles’, pp. 12-13. 21. Ibid., p. 58. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 57.

Amitav Ghosh, Indian Ocean and the New Thalassology  139 24. Ibid., p. 58. 25. Revathi Krishnaswamy, ‘History in Language, Language in History’, Clio: A Journal of History and the Philosophy of History, 34: 1-2 (2005) pp. 1-18, especially p. 3. See also Shao-pin Luo, ‘The Way of Words: Vernacular Cosmopolitanism in Amitav Ghosh’s ‘Sea of Poppies’, Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 48(3) (September 2013), pp. 377-92. 26. Ghosh, ‘The Slave of Ms. H6’, op. cit., p. 167.

CHAPTER 10

The Hyperreal Waters of Sea of Poppies: New Perspectives in Reading Ghosh’s Fiction ALICE SAMSON

Introduction Amitav Ghosh’s 2008 novel Sea of Poppies begins with the description of a vision that Deeti, the protagonist of the novel, has. The vision of ‘an immense ship with two tall masts . . . not materially present in front of her’, the Ibis, is likened to an apparition and terrified Deeti. Ghosh’s intricate narrative about Deeti’s inaccessibility to any meaningful life: her crippled husband, the anxiety of her poverty-stricken life, the lack of support from her lecherous brother-in-law set the background for Deeti’s vision. By contrasting Deeti’s vision in the water with her lived reality, Ghosh introduces the ocean as an unknown and uncanny presence in Deeti’s life. It is something she is removed from in every way: physically; the sea was ‘as distant as the netherworld’ from her village in northern Bihar, and cognitively, she had never known anything outside her inland Bhojpuri culture. Yet, her vision of a jahaj had a material counterpart in the steel and metal Ibis that had made contact with the sacred waters of the Ganga at the same moment that Deeti stood half-immersed worshipping it. At the opening juncture of the novel, the distance between Deeti and the ocean is seemingly unsurmountable yet the narrative seems to forebear the special connection between the two. What

142  Alice Samson an undiscerning reader engrossed in Deeti’s plight might miss out is that along with Deeti, Ghosh places at the centre of the narrative the powerful and creative force of the Kala-Pani. The Indian Ocean has perhaps never had as important a role in any story as it has in Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies. Deeti draws her vision in a silhouette for her shrine wall and the accurateness of her description is explained in the following manner: In time among the legions who came to regard the ibis as their ancestor, it was accepted that it was the river itself that had granted Deeti the vision: that the image of the Ibis had been transported upstream, like an electric current, the moment the vessel made contact with the sacred waters. (p. 10)

Attempting to expand the already abundant scholarship on Ghosh’s fiction, this paper seeks to explore the role the Indian Ocean has in his novel Sea of Poppies. It further attempts to explore meaningful theoretical paradigms that can help understand the Indian Ocean in literary and cultural representations in contemporary post-colonial fiction. In other words, what is the cultural representation of the ocean and what models are available to theorize its character and role. While political scientists and economists have recognized the role of trade routes, migration patterns, colonialism and imperialism, in studying the Indian Ocean’s role in the modern world, cultural and literary dimensions of the ocean have received relatively less attention. Ghosh’s approach to the ocean however is unique even in this minority group as it proposes a space for the ocean that is beyond a revisionist post-colonial resistance to the colonial legacy.

Approaches to Understanding the Indian Ocean The Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Bergen conducted a four-year long study1 of the societies and cultures around the Indian Ocean, specifically its south-western area. The main focus of the project was the examination of inter-

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civilizational encounters between different countries at the rim of the Indian Ocean. In particular the focus was the emergence of regional identities and the spread of Islamic learning. Other studies at the centre focused on the link between diaspora spawned by migration and homeland communities, formation of ‘neo-sufi brotherhoods’ through the networks of Islamic teachers and the impact on language through loanwords. The AFRASO2 project seeks to examine transformations in East African imaginaries of the Indian Ocean both in oral literature and contemporary fiction. These projects seek to understand the Indian Ocean as a transregional contact zone through time. The authors of Eyes Across the Water: Navigating the Indian Ocean describe the product of their inquiry into the Indian Ocean as something that ‘captures the complexities of . . . emerging Indian Ocean realities . . . [and] asks what the Indian Ocean means now. What are the links, circuits and exchanges that both unite and divide different regions? Is there an idea of the Indian Ocean?’3 Sugata Bose’s insightful work A Hundred Horizons the Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire seeks to understand ‘the role of human agency, imagination, and action, while being a little more humble in respecting the power of the sea’ (2006: 4) Ghosh uses the metaphor of the tsunami to indicate the influence the Indian Ocean region has on global trends. Like the changes in sea levels caused by the disturbances of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, Ghosh points out the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean in its impact on global changes. His self declared aim is to further ‘our understanding of this vast interregional arena by reintegrating the modern history of culture, politics, and economy of the Indian Ocean rim’ (2006: 35). He offers his unique contribution to the area of Indian Ocean Studies as the exploration of the Indian Ocean as an ‘interregional space’. Ghosh explains: Just as waves in one ocean produce fluctuations in sea levels in others, the human history of the Indian Ocean is strung together at a higher level of intensity in the interregional arena while contributing to and being affected by structures, processes, and events of global significance. A radically new perspective on the history of globalization can, therefore, be offered by

144  Alice Samson focusing on the historical space that intermediates between the levels of nation and globe. Such a focus may enable us to tease out both the power and the limits of globalization as a historical phenomenon.

Ghosh’s project seeks to disturb stereotypes of colonial history by rendering ‘permeable the rigid boundaries’ drawn by it and to facilitate investigation of the complex interregional cultural and economic ties that flourished in the Indian Ocean region before European domination. Ghosh uses stories and narratives along with lives of particular sailors, merchants and colonial officials to see how key commodities in Indian Ocean trade have ‘engendered vibrant stories’ about the networks of capital and labour in the ‘interregional’ area of the Indian Ocean area. Of special interest to literary scholars is Ghosh’s documentation of the role poets like Tagore have played in imagining the ‘interregional identity’: a universal element to Indian identity, ‘a greater India’ across the Bay of Bengal or the notion of a brotherhood of Sufi poets along the Arabian Sea. These projects and historians have, even while paying attention to literary and cultural representations of the Indian Ocean, remained confined to links between the different important actors of the region. Amitav Ghosh on the other hand, while participating in the rewriting of subaltern histories through engagement with particularities of commodities, trade, language and social structures, ventured further into the ocean by foregrounding a new aesthetic of identity and emphasis on the process of identity formation. Through his novel Sea of Poppies Ghosh proposes an aesthetic commentary on contemporary information led ‘unsettling’ of the concepts of identity, self and community. His primary metaphor is the ocean and through his narrative rendering, Ghosh points out the antiquity of what is only now recognized by post-modern understandings of identity. In this respect Ghosh’s novel both participates in the post-colonial reclaiming of identity denied by colonial historiography and questions the very notion of that identity in its post-modern aesthetic of dissolving and untidy conceptualizations of characters in the novel.

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Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies and the Indian Ocean Sea of Poppies Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies is the first volume of the Ibis trilogy. Deeti, a simple hardworking housewife is married to Hukam Singh. With her crippled husband’s meagre earning at Ghazipur Opium Factory, the family is pushed further and further into debt. On her wedding night Deeti was drugged by her mother-in-law and raped by her brother-in-law. When Hukum Singh dies, Deeti is rescued from becoming a sati on her husband’s funeral pyre by Kalua, the untouchable ox man. Deeti’s marriage to Kalua makes them outcastes and fugitives until they find refuge as indentured servants on a ship named Ibis. Zachary Reid, an American sailor of mixed birth set sail with the Ibis from the beginning of its journey and sees it as a mother to him because it has supported him in his dark hours and celebrated his happiness. Serang Ali, is head of the lascar company and second in command of the ship. The Ibis is commissioned to carry indentured labour to the island of Mareech or Mauritius. Neel Rattan Halder, a wealthy raja is tricked by the merchant Burnham into debt and sentenced to indentured labour. Ah Fatt, a half-Chinese, half-Parsi opium addict from Canton, becomes Neel’s companion on the ship and in his escape in the end. Other characters are Paulette, a French orphan, raised in India after her mother dies in childbirth. She is the victim of sexual abuse at the hand of her guardian. Her friendship with Jodu and Zachary Reid helps her overcome loneliness and a dire fate. She is at great ease with Indian manners, food, and clothing. Other characters Munia, Heeru, etc., bring their own stories to the ship. The novel ends with Ah Fatt, Neel, Kalua and Serang Ali throwing themselves into the water to escape another hopeless life. In Ghosh’s novel, the Indian Ocean is a fictional entity, a geographical place, a space for dissolution and displacement of identities and an aesthetic paradigm. Ghosh’s narrative rendition of the ocean as a singular vital force takes representation of the Indian Ocean beyond existing literary

146  Alice Samson attention to the ocean, its connections to costal inhabitants or their diasporic cultures. It is this new representation of the ocean that I seek to parse out of the stories: Deeti’s, Zachary Reid’s, Kalua’s, etc., and discourses: of Imperialism, of caste in the colonies, of gender that Ghosh sets into it. It is clear that Ghosh sees the ocean like noone else and expands the limits of post-colonial fiction by bringing in a new engagement with the materiality of geographies in post-colonial imaginations. Yet, to me Ghosh’s engagement with materiality takes an even further unprecendented leap by paralleling notions of identity found in post-modern cybernetic theories, digital literary works or literary readings informed by information technology. Ghosh shares all of the main concerns and characteristics of post-colonial writing and theory. He engages with stories set during and after imperial rule for e.g., Sea of Poppies is set in early nineteenth century in the backdrop of the colonial opium trade. Comparing the functions of Ghosh’s fiction to the criteria for postcolonial writing listed by Bill Ashcroft and others in their book The Empire Writes Back, we find appropriately post-colonial characters who connect deeply with their land, take pride in indigenous language and culture and participate in making history. His inclusion of corrupted names Zikri for Zachary, mimickry of colonial mannerisms like the transformation of Zachary into a gentleman and inclusion of oral literary traditions like Bhojpuri song lyrics, ensure that Ghosh pushes forward the agenda of post-colonial fiction like his contemporaries Arundhati Roy and Salman Rushdie. Yet when we examine Sea of Poppies more closely we never fail to find yet another strand of indige or transformation that cannot be easily accommodated within the overly polemical emphasis of a post-colonial reading of texts, for example the tensions between the lascars and others, the complexity of pre-colonial Indian caste and societal systems, and even the nature of transformation of the characters in the novel. Zachary Reid to Malum Zikri, Kalua to Maddow Clover, Paulette to Putli and so on. The constant transformation of the central character Deeti perhaps offers the largest amount of material for proposing a new

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paradigm of identity formation as seen in the novel. At the opening of the novel Deeti is firmly entrenched in the disadvantaged caste and gender relations of her village. Her escape with Kalua and fugitive run from this oppressive structure leads her to the banks of the river for refuge. As Deeti becomes conscious of her escape from death at her husband Hukum Singh’s pyre she is described as being overcome with ‘a curious feeling, of joy mixed with resignation, crept into her heart, for it was as if she really died and had been delivered betimes in rebirth, to her next life; she had shed the body of the old Deeti . . . and was free to create her a new destiny as she willed . . . until another death . . .’ (p. 178). The river provides the lovers retreat and nourishment while they establish their new relationship. As Deeti runs from her old self she lets go of her daughter symbolically destroying the central part of her old self; her relation with her daughter. Washed away into the Ganges is the pain and suffocation that marked her daily life and a new Deeti found Kalua sheltering and comforting. The first part of the novel titled ‘Land’ depicts the unsettling of rigidities imposed by given social norms and at the end of the section the reader sighs with relief as Deeti and Kalua are protected by the river. The second part of the novel ‘River’ is the mediator between absolute rigidity on ‘Land’ and the fluid interplay at ‘Sea’. As Kalua stuggles to find work the reader sees situations where Kalua and Deeti’s inherited caste hierarchies are completely levelled, for example when Kalua discovers that the girmitiyas who worked on the ships ferrying opium were from all castes: ‘Brahmins, Ahirs, Chamars, Teli’. Deeti and Kalua can’t board the ship due to kotwals looking out for them but they manage to wade into the water to reach the boat going to the ship. The dislodging of Deeti’s old identity is complete on the ship when she refuses to answer the question about her child, tells the woman on the ship that her name is Aditi and her husband Madhu and they are Chamars. Munia calls her sister-in-law and believes they share a deeper relation than everyone else because they are from the same caste group. This ironic special bond based on false identity serves to highlight the new role Deeti takes up. It is as if she has erased her old self with a

148  Alice Samson completely new identity; name, caste, caste relation, marital status, fraternal bonds of sisterhood, and social status as the matronly figure ‘Bhauji’ for the unmarried women, on board. This process is repeated in the story of Neel; when he is repulsed by the sight of Ah Fatt in his cell he is told by the guard that there was to be no escape and Fatt was his new caste brother, family, everything. Paulette describes the complexity of her new identity on the Ibis when she calls Zachary a soul twinned to her and matching her in the multiplicity of her selves’. The ship is the new mother and ‘their rebirth in the ship’s womb had made them into a single family’. What of the relation between these identities in flux? Deeti found Paulette’s solution ‘complete, satisfactory and thrilling in all its possibilities’ when she compared their predicament to a boat of pilgrims who are all the same and no one can lose caste. ‘From now on, and forever afterwards, we will all be ship siblings’ – jahazbhais and jahaz-bahens – to each other. There will be no difference between us (2008: 356). The parallel of this conceptualization to Sugata Ghosh’s trope of poets as pilgrims in search of deeper bonds amongst diverse regional identities exemplified in the figure of Tagore serves to situate Ghosh’s fiction in the discourse of postcolonial inquiries once again. Yet the novel is sprinkled with intimations of a new valence for the ocean unlike any before. The first sight of the Kala Pani is said to stupefy anyone who sees it. Deeti and others found it ‘impossible to think of this as water at all’ because it had no boundary, nothing to hold it in shape. It was ‘an abyss’, ‘a firmament like the night sky, holding the vessel aloft as if it were a planet or a star.’ The dissolution of rigidities characteristic of social structures back home in Jambudvipa or Hindoostan was accompanied by ‘an atmosphere of truculence and uncertainity’. Fights which would have been mediated by kinsmen or elders in the village escalated at a bewildering pace and men turned against each other, ‘friend against friend and caste against caste’. Deeti is confronted with the question Could the Black Water really drown the past? Why did she feel murmurings of disapproval and impending everlasting doom for her action of running away with Kalua and faced with

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taking tough decisions for her jahaj-sister Heeru, Deeti asks ‘Who was Heeru to her after all? Neither aunt nor cousin nor neice.’ In a few pages the exhilaration of new found freedom is replaced with anxiety and a scramble for support but a new equilibrium is quickly established in the realization that they needed to only follow their own desires casting aside all need to seek sanction from elders or kinsmen in order to choose configurations of the identity; marriage, names, relationships, etc., that most suited them.

Hypertext Aesthetic The ‘multiplicity of selves’ characterizing the members on board the Ibis result in them being what Jaishree Odin has theorized as ‘border subjects’ in her seminal essay ‘The Performative and Processual: A Study of Hypertext/Postcolonial Aesthetic’. Odin defines this challenge to the unitary idea of subjectivity as unified and singular saying The border subject then is the processual subject who must at each moment negotiate difference and whose essence lies in the act of becoming rather than being. The resulting subject is improvisational, always in the process of becoming, always ‘in the making’. It is in the possibility of the performance of the same with difference that the challenges to naturalized dominant social and cultural norms lie.

Given that Deeti, Kalua and others become such border subjects only in the ocean onboard the Ibis, the ocean becomes a space for revelation and ceases to be just a place in the story. Citing scholars like Donna Haraway and Gloria Anzaldua, Odin says this ‘radically new’ subjectivity is characterized by a ‘tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainity’, is in between certainities and made up of partial identities and contradictions. Haraway’s Cyborg is an example of this subjectivity. Echoing what is happening aboard the Ibis, Odin’s examination of post-modern culture reveals that just as in networked computers diverse, sometimes contradictory information, can exist simultaneously in hypertext format, so it is in

150  Alice Samson culturally diverse societies with different, sometime contradictory narratives. The person’s location based on race, class, and gender determines what perspective will be taken. Odin argues that the constant negotiations of identity require a new aesthetic to grasp the contours of the space it creates. Odin terms this the ‘hypertext/postcolonial aesthetic’. Odin describes it as something that represents the need to switch from the linear, univocal, closed, authoritative aesthetic involving passive encounters characterizing the performance of the same to that of non-linear, multivocal, open, non-hierarchical aesthetic involving active encounters that are marked by repetition of the same with and in difference. An excellent example of this is Deeti’s shrine that reappers periodically through the Ibis trilogy albeit each time having some of the same qualities: deeply personal, hidden from public eye, consisting of emblematic sketches, yet with a difference, the figures represented changed from time to time. Unlike her shrine at home, Deeti’s shrine on the Ibis had a figure representing her daughter. The intertextual and interactive hypertext aesthetic, Odin says, is most suited for representing post-colonial cultural experience because it embodies our changed conception of language, space, and time. On the Ibis, the lascars brought together by their common need for work from diverse parts of the globe are an excellent example of language determined by the contingencies of the situation. Language and place, Odin reminds us are no longer seen as existing in abstract space and time, but involve a dynamic interaction of history, politics, and culture. As the Ibis prepared to sail away from India, the migrants remembered not only the homeland they had intimately experienced; cooking fires, raindrenched Holi the colour of poppy or the tales of elders, but also the homeland they had visited time and again, ‘through epics, Puranas, myths, song and legend’. In order to escape the homogenizing and universalizing tendency of linear time, time in both post-colonial and hypertextual experience is represented as discontinuous and spatialized. The

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narratives of Pauelette, Neel, Deeti cutting through one another foregrounds this feature of the aesthetic rendered by Ghosh in the novel. The narrative and characters of Ghosh’s novel like the aesthetic Odin describes is ‘composed of cracks, in-between spaces, gaps where linearity and homogeneity are rejected in favour of heterogeneity and discontinuity.’ Odin references the work of artist Trinh Mihn Ha to explain the nature of the hypertext aesthetic as constantly dissolving and re-forming, revealing a place that is ‘always emerging’ and ‘always in the making’ (Mihn-ha) does not want to identify with any one definition of the borderlands, instead she wants ‘to play with it, or to play it like a musical score,’ so that identity is ‘not an end point in struggle’, it is rather ‘a point of departure’ (1992: 140). Trinh notes the strategic importance of the identity claim, and the importance of all three – the political, historical and cultural – in any self-understanding. Strategies of reversal she posits are ineffective without strategies of displacement. Recognition of the shifting nature of cultural identity makes the notion of cultural displacement very important in post-colonial discourse. Displacement creates a dynamic where ‘[each] itinerary taken, each reading constructed is at the same time active in its uniqueness and reflective in its collectivity’ (1991: 23). Therefore, ‘the notion of displacement is also a place of identity: there is no real me to return to, no whole self that synthesizes the woman, the woman of color and the writer; there are only diverse recognition of self through difference, and unfinished, contingent, arbitrary closures that make possible both politics and identity’ (1992: 157). As the Ibis prepared to sail away to Mareech, Deeti and others on the ship sing the song of separation sung for the bride as she leaves home. The pain of those leaving never to return home was the pain of perennial exile of the child married off. Their journey away from those memories of children and past lives was incomprehensible except as a ‘lapse from sanity’. In a searing description of her plight Deeti recognizes the loss of her ‘whole’ self, in the impossibility of return to her child Kabutri. Identity thus is a processual and performative as can be seen in the many roles the members of the ship take on. Odin explains

152  Alice Samson theorizing the hypertext environment in terms of the performative and the processual as that which denies supremacy to any cultural text or singular abstraction and highlights the relevance of the lived experience of the text. This understanding of identity contests the ideas reinforced by Western colonialism, nationalism, and the scientific materialism of earlier eras. Identity in the hypertext aesthetic is Odin tells us what Benjamin called ‘that slow piling one on top of the other of thin, transparent layers which constitutes the most appropriate picture of the way in which the perfect narrative is revealed through the layers of a variety of retellings’. In Ghosh’s novel the ocean enacts the unsettling and displacement of singular ideas of self and identity that occurs in a hypertext art work or text. Deeti’s shrine at her village home, on the ship and in the next novel in the series at a cave in Mareech serve as points of stabilization in her identity but as is discernable from the differences in her pantheon at each place, Deeti’s identity is constantly in flux and in each situation the Ocean has a substantial influence in shaping her making it a significant force. Ghosh’s Ibis trilogy thus not only participates in existing Indian Ocean study paradigms but offers as new position within the text for rethinking its role and nature in shaping new identities.

Notes 1. Indian Ocean Project: http://org.uib.no/smi/research/projects02.htm

2. Africa’s Asia Option: http://www.afraso.org/en/content/s4-indianocean-imaginaries-east-african-literature-and-oral-culture 3. http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=23 532&P_XSLFile=unisa/lms.xsl

References Africa’s Asia Option: http://www.afraso.org/en/content/s4-indian-oceanimaginaries-east-african-literature-and-oral-culture Bose, Sugata, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

The Hyperreal Waters of Sea of Poppies   153 Gupta, Pamila, Isabel Hofmeyr and Michael Pearson (eds), ‘Eyes Across the Water – Navigating the Indian Ocean’, Indian Ocean Series: Africa in the Indian Ocean: Cultural and Literary Perspectives, Pretoria: Unisa Press & Penguin India, 2010. Indian Ocean Project: http://org.uib.no/smi/research/projects02.htm Odin, Jaishree, ‘The Performative and Processual: A Study of Hypertext/ Postcolonial Aesthetic’. Postcolonial Web, accessed on 27 February 2016. 

CHAPTER 11

The Emergence of Cricket as an Indian Ocean Game JOE CHRISTOPHER

It is often said that cricket is a global game. This statement can be contested at several levels. For instance, not more than ten countries play test cricket, which is the highest or the most valued form of cricket. Major cricket tournaments when compared with the Football World Cup or European Premier League are may smaller. Be it the number of teams contesting in the tournament, the audience watching these events or the prize money at stake, the numbers are smaller when compared to global football, basketball or tennis events. Even the International Cricket Council (ICC) organized quadrennial limited overs World Cup does not see more than 16 countries participating for the grand prize. Apart from England and Australia, cricket does not enjoy the status of the official national game anywhere else. Besides the South Asian countries, where cricket, over the last three decades, has emerged as the de facto national game;1 cricket is not the primary game even in most of the postcolonial societies. Despite the above-mentioned facts, since the beginning of the 1990s, cricket gradually emerged as one of the most followed competitive team sport in the world. Besides the cricket playing nations, competitive cricket is watched by millions in North America, and several thousands in Europe. The game makes billions of dollars through television revenues alone. On one plane cricket is played seriously only in a handful of

156  Joe Christopher countries. In several of these countries the game has come to occupy a political space. Cricket in these countries, exists more than just as a game. It is the carrier of several political ideologies. In these countries (particularly in the Global South2), discourses on sub-nationalism, nationalism, identity and consumerism are constructed through cricket. While the Ashes or a series played between India and Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand continue to invoke nationalist feelings, given the rivalry between these countries; several cricketing contests between various national sides fail to attract the required audience. Tournaments featuring natioinal sides do not appeal to the contemporary fans of cricket as much as they did in the 1990s.3 Yet, the game enjoys a global audience as vindicated by the eyeballs tournaments such as the World Cup, the Ashes series, Twenty-Twenty leagues (T20 cricket) such as the Indian Premier League, Caribbean League and the Big Bash League attract. During the last five years Celebrity Cricket League (CCL) teams representing India’s numerous regional film industries (comprising film actors, cameramen, producers, screen play writers, and directors) compete for grand prize and have emerged as one of the most watched spectacles on television. These teams representing provincial film industries also advocate sub-nationalism in many cases.4 In almost every test-playing nation, club-based, local T20 leagues are as popular (in some cases such as West Indies and Bangladesh more popular) as international cricket. In other words contemporary cricket exists on several planes – one the club level cricket which operates on the sub-national plane and has an audience outside the boundaries of the nation state; and second national level cricket which, given its nature commands a global following. Over the last two decades there has been a steady decline in West Indies cricket.5 Given that power houses of international cricket, apart from England are located around the Indian Ocean, one can argue that cricket has ceased existing as the ‘game of the Empire’. It has now morphed into what one may call an ‘Indian Ocean game’. Second, the sudden acquisition and appropriation of global spectatorship by the numerous region based club leagues, in many ways signifies the end of cricket as a game of the British

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Commonwealth. This paper demonstrates how cricket’s current phase was shaped by a series of socio-economic changes that took place towards the end of the nineteenth century. The paper also argues that cricket, as we know it, survives only because several nations in the Indian Ocean find it an excellent tool to transact transnational exchange of ideas, cultures, and capital.

The Genealogy of Cricket as an Indian Ocean Game The Beginning of the ICC At the turn of the twentieth century, the age often described as the high-noon of British colonialism, many cricket enthusiasts among the British imperial officers deemed that cricket was the connecting link between the Mother Country and its colonies. While cricket was played in the colonies since the beginning of British imperialism6 several officers, missionaries, soldiers, cricket’s deep roots in the colonies, notwithstanding, individually felt the need to formalize the colonies’ relation to the British Crown vis-à-vis cricket. In 1907 Abe Bailey, the President of South Africa Cricket Association in a letter written to the secretary of the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) sought the creation of an ‘Imperial Cricket Board’. He stated that the board could create rules and govern international matches between England, Australia and South Africa. He also proposed the inauguration of a triangular tournament involving the three countries. Incidentally, while both Australia and England were inclined towards the creation of an International Cricket Board, Australia rejected the idea of a triangular cricket tournament. In 1909 on 15 June the representatives of the three countries met at the MCC. Within a month the representatives met again for the second time, on this occasion the meeting was chaired by Lord Harris.7 The cricket boards of the three countries formed Cricket Board that was called the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC). The Conference decided to organize a triangular contest involving Australia, England and South Africa in 1912. The triangular test tournament which was organized in the summer of 1912 in England ended as a disaster. The weather was inclement and the

158  Joe Christopher playing conditions were horrible. Australia could not send its first playing eleven. The next meeting of the ICC took place in 1921 while the third meeting of the ICC was arranged in 1926. It was an exciting year for cricket, as the ICC met again for a second time. Delegates from India, West Indies and New Zealand attended the second ICC meeting in 1926. In that meeting, it was decided that the membership to the ICC was to be restricted to those ‘governing bodies of cricket in countries within the Empire to which cricket teams are sent, or which send teams to England’. Thus while New Zealand, India and West Indies could become a part of the ICC, the rule restricted the United States from becoming a member in the ICC. England, Australia and South Africa were termed the founding members of the ICC. They also had the powers to veto any decision within the ICC. The other members were termed full members. It is interesting to note that formation of the ICC and its growth as an international sport regulatory body mirrored the decline of the British Empire. It is also interesting to note that by 1909 cricket successfully accomplished its functions, as a cultural tool, both in the mother country and the colonies. Before we go on to look at the aspects of the letter and the socio-economic conditions which led to the creation of the ICC, let us briefly examine the cultural role that cricket played in the nineteenth century.

Cricket at Home and in Colonies in the Nineteenth Century Cricket, like most of the modern, competitive, outdoor games including tennis, football, hockey and badminton, originated in rural England. Till the advent of the eighteenth century, cricket was one among the several popular art forms which were patronized by the English poor and frowned upon by the Church and most of the gentry. Thanks to a complex nexus, which involved the bookies, petty aristocracy, rural elite and several pub owners; by nineteenthcentury cricket morphed into a social institution which was owned and supported by the gentry. The socio-economic changes

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in nineteenth century (which led to the migration of the poor to the cities, the emergence of factory towns, and the establishment of enclosures in rural England) led to the disappearance of several art forms. England needed to construct a new public culture to replace the vanishing art forms. The elements constituting English public culture included popular sports such as cricket and literary genres such as the novel. Cricket had to be continuously legitimized through nebulous notions such as the ahistoric ‘Merry England’. Neville Cardus, writing in the Guardian said ‘if everything else in this nation of ours were lost but cricket – her Constitution and the laws of England of Lord Halsbury – it would be possible to reconstruct from the theory and practice of cricket all the eternal Englishness which has gone to the establishment of that Constitution and the laws aforesaid.’ Cricket in many ways played the role which was also performed by the Tory novel which, as Simon During (2008) demonstrated, advocated patriotism, and sought to attribute everything desirable about contemporary England to the ‘ancient’, benign English monarchs. The Tory novels (the works of John Buchan, Angela Thirkell, Dorothy L. Sayers and Evelyn Waugh, to name a few) repeatedly pointed out that rights of Englishmen were not guaranteed by the British parliament, but were granted by the magna carta which superseded the birth of parliamentary democracy. Bolstered by several myths cricket was considered an ancient game. In the nineteenth century, cricket’s nexus with literature as demonstrated by Anthony Bateman (2011), led to its emergence as the most formidable sport. From Lord Byron to P.G. Wodehouse, prominent litterateurs of the Romantic, Victorian and Edwardian ages wrote about cricket. They were its patrons, administrators and advocates and ensured that cricket was at the centre of England’s realpolitik. Cricket was the site at which several political ideologies including the ‘Muscular Christianity’, the idea of Englishness and thereby English nation were constructed. These three ideologies were central to sustenance and justification of nineteenth century imperialism and were the immediate precursors of the ‘White Man’s Burden’. Cricket in short created the idea of England within England.

160  Joe Christopher Across the seas in several English colonies cricket was used as a pedagogic tool (Ashis Nandy 1986). Till the middle of the nineteenth century, in the colonies, as Manthia Diawara pointed out, the ability to play cricket was viewed as means of Englishness8 or as ‘Whiteness’. ‘Englishness’ and ‘Whiteness’ were used by the colonial administration as a means through which they could differentiate themselves from the colonized population. By the middle of the nineteenth century, in various parts of the Indian Ocean world (where the English empire either took care to marginalize or erase the local population completely as in the case of Australia or New Zealand or ensured that the English stayed away from sexually aligning with the local population as in the case of South Asia) cricket, along with literature, was used as an epistemic tool and a marker of Englishness. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, where the relations between various races were complex, given the presence of significant Afrikaner population, cricket was used to differentiate the English from the rest of the European populations as well. By the turn of the twentieth century post the Boer war, cricket emerged as the primary marker of English culture in Australia, New Zealand, South Asia, South Africa, and even smaller colonies such as Rhodesia, Kenya, Botswana and in several islands of the Caribbean region.9 Given that cricket was recognized as an epistemic tool by the colonized populations it did not emerge as a successful vehicle of nationalism and anticolonialism in the nineteenth century. Till the end of the nineteenth century, cricket in the Indian Ocean world, was played in the port cities. These include cities such as Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Kandy, Sydney, Melbourne, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and Perth. By the turn of the twentieth century cricket took roots in the mainland of several colonies in the Indian Ocean. Apart from very few individuals, most cricketers and their patrons were loyal to the British Crown. As the game made roots into the hinterlands in these colonies, it also began to work with other master categories such as caste and class (Ramachandra Guha).

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The Making of the ICC Thus it is very interesting to learn that despite everything appearing hunky-dory, several colonial subjects felt the need to formalize cricketing relations through the constitution of a global board. Let us now get back to the letter written by Abe to the secretary of the MCC. Of all the English games introduced into the colonies during colonialism, even though sports such as hockey and football were also popular, cricket emerged as the game of the Empire. Unlike other British sports such as hockey, football and tennis, cricket was not popular in European countries. Since several of the European countries were involved in these games by the turn of the twentieth century an international body was in place to frame rules for games such as football, fencing, athletics, boxing, and hockey. The International Association of Foot Ball (IFAB), not to be confused with the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) which was formed in 1904, was based out of London and was the MCC version of football. Likewise there was an association each for lawn tennis, fencing, hockey and athletics, besides one for the Olympics. Now let us get back to the letter of Sir Abraham Bailey. Born to a Scottish mother and an English father, Bailey was a businessman based out of South Africa. He thought of himself as the political successor of Cecil Rhodes. His letter addressed to the MCC stated that ‘Inter-rivalry within the Empire cannot fail to draw together in closer friendly interest all those many thousands of our kinsmen who regard cricket as our national sport, while secondly it would probably give a direct stimulus to amateurism’. The need felt by Sir Abraham was probably felt by many other Englishmen housed in the several colonies. Unfortunately, the creation of the ICC did very little to foster the spirit of amateurism. Given Sir Abraham’s varied business interests, he found cricket as a way to advance his personal cause. Since the ICC was funded by South African businessmen, Sir Abraham and his friends were eager to make a business out of Australian cricket tours to England and vice-versa. They thought that it was only natural that South Africa would

162  Joe Christopher become a frequent test playing nation. However, the ICC did not progress the way he had envisaged. For men like Sir Abraham, ICC was supposed to exist as a white men’s club. Colonies such as India had no place among the founder-members of the Anglo-Saxon nations. The constitution of the Imperial Cricket Board, which was carefully worded, as to not offend the British Crown, had several ramifications on the growth of cricket in the Indian Ocean. In many ways, the Imperial Cricket Conference ensured that cricket, apart from a few colonies in the West Indies, was largely limited to the Eastern hemisphere. However, the biggest fallout was that the rules of the ICC kept the United States out of the ICC. Until the beginning of the twentieth-century cricket was a major sport in Canada and the United States. In fact the first recognized international cricket match was played between Canada and the United States in 1844. The decision to keep away the US and Canada effectively killed the game in North America. Between 1900 and 1920 the US, probably influenced by the isolationists who advocated ‘international non interventionism’ did not attempt to become a major player in international sports bodies. It rather focussed on creating a robust framework for games such as baseball, boxing, and basketball which were perceived as American games. Thus the ICC largely restricted itself to countries around the Indian Ocean region. The decision of the ICC to organize periodic test matches between various colonies marked the beginning of cricket’s decline as a game of the Empire. The decision led to several acrimonious tours including the ‘Bodyline Series’ (played between England and Australia) in 1932 which effectively destabilized the Empire. With ICC organizing test matches, cricket became the carrier of nationalism and anti-colonialism ideologies in several colonies. Post-1947, the Imperial Cricket Conference was forced to rename itself as the International Cricket Conference. With South Africa, the founding member and the chief financier of the ICC, forfeiting its membership at the ICC over the question of apartheid the power equations within the ICC began to gradually change. In 1989, ICC was renamed the International Cricket Council.

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The veto powers of England and Australia were dropped. Since several countries around the world vied for test status, countries such as India and Pakistan created strategic alliances with various countries in the Global South and leveraged their strength to create more clout within the ICC. With the readmission of South Africa (the board largely consisting of coloured officials) in 1991, the balance of power shifted towards the Indian Ocean. Over the last decade, a new triumvirate consisting of India, South Africa and Australia emerged within the ICC. With these countries emerging as the new power bloc within the ICC, the decolonization of cricket seems complete. The new power bloc ensured that the latest and the most watched form of cricket – the T20 was recognized and legitimized by the ICC. Thus the new power bloc was in a position to successfully market domestic or club cricket across the globe. Australia houses significant number of immigrants from South Africa and India; and a large percentage of both Indian and South African diaspora reside in Europe and North America. The diasporic populations in Australia, Europe and North America, ensure that domestic cricket and T20 matches played in Australia, India and South Africa are consumed across the world. The efforts of these countries have brought in new, young and diverse audience to cricket. South Africa and Australia have a major role in the Indian Premier League. Thus the coming together of these three nations lent respectability to T20 form of cricket. T20 played in these countries, finance elite cricketers around the world. England, the former mother nation and once the Lord of the ICC, is now relegated to the status of a minor power. With England and test cricket being pushed towards the periphery of the ICC, major cricket nations within the Indian Ocean World call the shots. India, South Africa and Australia are situated on the northern, western and the eastern boundaries of the Indian Ocean. Besides a shared history of colonialism, English language and cricket unifies them. The coming together of these three countries to form a new triumvirate within the ICC was not accidental. The top political class, and the business houses, within each of these countries pushed them toward working with each other within

164  Joe Christopher the ICC (Joe Christopher 2015). Within the Indian Ocean World, cricket diplomacy seems to have worked across several spheres. These countries, until the end of the twentieth century, did not vigorously pursue bilateral relations among themselves. But having worked together to make cricket an ‘Indian Ocean Game’, today, these countries are working together in many fields. While South Africa and India are an integral part of the BRICS, Australia and India work together in areas of nuclear energy and defence. It is very hard to say, if Australia, India and South Africa will leverage cricket diplomacy to cooperate with one another to form a vibrant triumvirate outside the cricket pitch. However, given the security and trade concerns that these countries share including the rise of China, global warming, piracy and climate change; the Indian Ocean World will be a safer and prosperous region if the three major powers within the region work together in the ‘spirit of cricket’.

Notes 1. Cricket is not the official national game in any of the South Asian countries. It has emerged as the most popular and the most followed sport in these countries. While cricket is still popular in various island-nations in the Caribbean region, it has ceded its space to basketball and athletics in those nations. 2. I use the term Global South to denote those nations whose populations were ruled by European Imperial powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of these nations are located in Africa and Asia. 3. Unless test or limited over matches feature teams such as Australia, South Africa, England or India; cricketing matches featuring other sides are not watched. Most of the matches that don’t feature these teams do not attract television audience. For instance the Board of Control for Cricket in India has never invited Bangladesh to play a test match in India. The BBCI argues that matches featuring Bangladesh will not interest cricket fans in India. Hence, often Australia, India, England and South Africa play among themselves. 4. The Celebrity Cricket League is a complex cultural phenomenon. At least the teams representing southern film industries (Telugu, Tamil, Kannada and Malayalam) or the Bhojpuri film industry have emerged as spokespersons of their respective linguistic groups. They have spoken

The Emergence of Cricket as an Indian Ocean Game  165 on serious political issues such as river water agreements, intellectual property rights, realignment of states, and corruption. 5. Even as I am writing this piece, both men and women’s teams from the West Indies have won the ICC organized Twenty-twenty World Cup. The West Indies cricket is known for producing exciting, cricketers who are renowned for their powerful batting and fast bowling exploits. Yet, the game for a myriad of reasons has become financially unviable in the Caribbean world. 6. One of the earliest recorded instances of cricket being played outside of England was in 1721 when a few soldiers of the East India Company pegged stumps at the Gulf of Cambay to play cricket. By 1770 there were several cricket clubs in India. 7. Lord Harris along with Lord Gilligan, towards the concluding years of the nineteenth century, played a stellar role in shaping the future of cricket in Indian subcontinent. One of Mumbai’s premier local tournament is called the Harris Shield. 8. For Manthia Diawara, Englishness is an extension of whiteness and vice versa. These were social markers. The essential feature in the construction of ‘Englishness’, is the ability to play cricket. Even as these markers played a crucial role necessary in the colonies of the empire, in those locations where a significant populations of mulattos existed alongside the white and the black populations (such as in South Africa and West Indies) in the popular psyche, a cricket player was assumed to be closer to the Europeans. 9. In the West Indies, where the local population was exterminated and was replaced by African population and indentured Asian labourers, cricket played a slightly different role. I will not discuss the role which cricket played in West Indies in this paper.

References Bateman, Anthony, Cricket, Literature and Culture: Symbolizing the Nation. Destablising Empire, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009. , Cambridge Companion to Cricket, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Cardus, Neville, Cardus on Cricket, Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2008. Christopher, Joe, Reading Cricket: The Culture of Popular Sport in India, Berlin: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012. , ‘Cricket and its Discontents: The Genealogy of 2015 BCCI’s Current Relevance in World Cricket’, in Kousar J. Azam (ed.), India in World Affairs, Delhi: Manohar, 2015.

166  Joe Christopher Diawara, Manthia, ‘Englishness as Blackness: Cricket as Discourse on Colonialism’, Callaloo 13, 1990. During, Simon, ‘Literature – Nationalism’s Other? The Case of Revision’, in Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, London: Routledge, 1990. Guha, Ramachandra, A Corner of a Foreign Field, London: Picador, 2002. Nandy, Ashis, Tao of Cricket, New York: Viking, 1989.

III. Of Roots and Routes

CHAPTER 12

The Muziris: An Ancient City of Global Village SANITHA BEEVI

Muziris (in Greco-Roman sources, Muciri in Tamil and Muyirikkottu in Malayalam) was an ancient seaport and urban centre in south-western India (in Kerala) that dates from at least the first century bc, if not before it. Muziris has found mention in the bardic Sangam literature and a number of classical European historical sources.1 The port was a key to the trade between southern India and the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Roman Empire. The important known commodities exported from Muziris were spices (such as black pepper and malabathron), semi-precious stones (such as beryl), pearls, diamonds, sapphires, ivory, Chinese silk, Gangetic spikenard and tortoise shells. The Romans brought money (in gold coins), peridots, thin clothing, figured linens, multicoloured textiles, sulfide of antimony, copper, tin, lead, coral, raw glass, wine, realgar and orpiment. Location of coin hoards unearthed suggest an inland trade link from Muziris via the Palghat gap and along the Kaveri Valley to the east coast of India. Though the Roman trade declined from the fifth century ad, the former Muziris attracted the attention of other nationalities, particularly the Chinese and the Arabs, presumably till the devastating floods of Periyar in the fourteenth century.2 The exact location of Muziris is still not known to historians and archaeologists. It is generally speculated to be situated around

170  Sanitha Beevi present-day Kodungallur, a town situated 18 miles north of Cochin. Kodungallur in central Kerala figures prominently in the ancient history of southern India as a vibrant urban hub of the Chera rulers. A series of excavations were conducted at the village of Pattanam (near Kodungallur) by the autonomous institution Kerala Council for Historical Research (outsourced by Kerala State Department of Archaeology) in 2006-7 and it was immediately announced that the lost port of Muziris was found. The rapid conclusion invited criticism from historians and archaeologists and started a healthy debate among scholars of south India.3 A major archaeological discovery has been made by archaeologists Dr. K.P. Shajan who is conducting research in England, Dr Cheriyan, Director of Kerala Archaeological Department and Dr V. Selvakumar. An ancient city named Muziris has been excavated from the small town of Pattanam in central Kerala, India. Earlier it was assumed that Muziris was in Tamil Nadu, another southern state in India. A rough map named Tabula Peutingeriana served as a proof for this claim till date.4 Pliny in his natural history says that if a sailor follows the wind Hippalus (south-west monsoon) he will reach Muziris in forty days. He also mentioned that the port was not a seaport but a river port. Romans later confirmed this through another mentioning that the port was 500 stadia from the shore. Pliny also mentioned Muziris as a port prone to piracy. The gemstones which were available in Muziris were from Arikamedu region (situated garnets and quartz), gulf of mannar (pearls), Kodumanal (lapis lazuli beads). In fact, there was a lull in the trade between India and West because of the Roman invasion of the Greece. Afterwards Egypt also came under Rome. But in ad 51 the finding of Hippalus wind helped the sailors, it increased the speed of the ships and shortened the time between India and Egypt. So the trade flourished. This continued till sixth century and suddenly the port of Muziris disappeared from the history. But from the later developments in Muziris mining it is obvious that more systematic ways of merchandize business existed even before Christ in Kerala rather than Tamil Nadu. In Muziris archaeologists found the remains of precious stones, many sizes of nails in different metals, lanterns, bricks, etc. This throws

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lights on the civilized human factories that must have existed in these regions. The black soil found in the fourth layer of sand confirms that there was a factory that existed using fire, most probably a metal factory. The soil is being tested in the lab for exact data. Discoveries around the world confirm the importance of this small town in Kerala.5 It is believed that around ad 600 a chera king named Cheraman Perumal who ruled most parts of Kerala from Kodungallur (Muziris) left for Makkah, embraced Islam, and accepted the name Thajudeen. He marrried the sister of king of Jeddah and came back in a ship with many Islamic leaders to spread the faith. But unfortunately he died enroute. But he had already written a letter to the reigning king of Muziris to treat the guests with favour. Thus the reigning king made all the arrangements for the Muslim team and let them build their religion in Kerala. He gave them the Hindu Arathali temple to be converted into a mosque. We can still see the Hindu temple architecture design in the mosque.6 The well and structures were found on the land owned by Rajappan of Krishna Nivas at Pattanam. The project undertaken as part of Kerala government’s ‘Muziris Heritage Project’ also had collaborative support from the Archaeological Survey of India, State Archaeology, Tourism and Revenue Departments. The excavations have given clear indications that the site was first occupied by the indigenous megalithic (Iron Age) people.7

The Ancient Trade While digging in Muziris archaeologists found a jetty with a boat loaded with pepper, mango, gooseberry, frankincense, and dry shells of coconut. The cargo was perfectly mummified in mud. Wood of the boat is carbon dated to 2,500 years by scientists from Bhubaneswar Institute of Physics. The wood was identified as Artocarpus hirsutus lamk (wild jack or ‘anjily’) and Tectona grandis (teak) by the Kerala Forest Research Institute, Thrissur. The 14C date range of the canoe sample is 1300 bc to 100 bc (i.e. 700 plus or minus 600 bc with 95 per cent probability). For the two bollard samples, the 14C date range is 800 bc to 200 bc (500 plus or minus

172  Sanitha Beevi 300 bc, with 95 per cent probability) and 1100 bc to ad 1300, (ad 100 plus or minus 1200 with 95 per cent probability), respectively.8 The steps near the boat and large wood pieces mounted vertically (bollards) indicate the remains of a port. Amphora (a clay vessel for wine), roolited ware, torpedo jars, Central Asian, Persian pottery and Chinese pottery are also found in this area. The most valuable item they got has the ‘Camio Blank’ which was a medal issued by the Roman government for Excellency. The geography of this area changed a lot after a massive flood in 1341. An ancient map of Muziris about 1,500 years old is kept in the British Library. From second to fourth century, Roman Arabian merchants business flourished in this small port. The number of Christians and Muslims in this area stands as a proof. Experts says that with the fall of the Roman Empire this small port in the other end of the world also disappeared mysteriously. This ancient port is also mentioned in the epics Ramayana (Kishkindha, vol. 4, chapter 41), Mahabharata (Bhima-Parva, Karna-Parva), and the Tamil epic Chilappathikaram (Mathurai Kanda, Vanchi Kanda), and another Tamil ancient poem Akananooru vol. 7, poem no. 149. The Mazhuanchery and Padamadthil families contributed greatly to the survey by allowing their property for digging. This was a great help to the archaeology team. The team members also included Dr Stephen Sidebottom, Dr K. Rajan, Dinish Krishnan, Sujatha Stephen, Rachel Varghese, K.S. Janusha, C.S. Ambili, P.K. Vijimol and K. Vasudevan.

Amphoras Found in Muziris Today this place is known as Kodungallur, situated 40 km to the south-west of Trichur, Kerala, lies in 10°100' North latitude and 76°10' East longitude. This is where St. Thomas, one of the twelve apostles arrived on 21 November 52 ad. One of the seven churches built by St. Thomas is in Kodungallur. This place is therefore known as cradle of Indian Christianity. According to some, the powerful invasion by Tipu Sultan destroyed Muziris. The port of Kochi started emerging after the arrival of British and Muziris was nowhere to be found by then.

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A new project called Muziris Heritage Project (MHP), a heritage preservation-cum-tourism project is under preparation and was expected to fully functional by December 2009, it is still an ongoing project. The main objective of this project will be preserving the historical buildings and cultural and traditional heritage at the Muziris site. Kottappuram Fort in Methala Panchayat and Paliam Palace and Paliam Nalukettu of Chendamangalam panchayat will be opened for public in the first phase of this project. In the second stage the visitors will be privileged by special village boat cruise through the well connected waterways. This will be ready by 2010. Though these projects has been already announced, the state of Kerala is renowned for many only on paper projects and uncompleted projects. Public-Private participation in this project will rejuvenate the local economy. It will cover seven panchayats (local areas for governance, like a province) (Chennamangalam, Chittattukara, Vadakkekara, Pallippuram, Azhikode, Methala and Mathilakam) and two municipalities (North Paravur and Kodungalloor) in Ernakulam and Thrissur districts. This one billion rupees project will have a holistic approach towards sustainable development. Project director Benny Kuriakose described this project as a ‘walk through 2,000 years of Kerala history and a cultural pilgrimage’. The present archaeological research undertaken by Kerala Council for Historical Research (KCHR) would be extended offshore and to other nearby backwaters. The under-water explorations would be carried out with the support of the Southern Naval Command, Kochi. The first phase of excavation was carried out by KCHR from 18 February to 8 April 2007 in collaboration with the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the State Department of Archaeology and the Tourism and Revenue Department.9 The site at Pattanam is a round 1.5 sq. km and the core area measures about 600 × 400 m. The north-eastern part of the site was chosen for excavation based on the surface exploration done before. Four trenches (PT 07 I, PT 07 II, PT 07 III, PT 07 IV) and one trial trench (PTT 07 I) covering an area of 125 sq. m was excavated. The ‘locus methodology’ adopted for this excavation distinguished each layer/feature/pit/structure/activity area on the basis of colour,

174  Sanitha Beevi texture and composition. The excavations suggest that the site was first occupied by the indigenous ‘Megalithic’ (Iron Age) people, followed by the Roman contact in the Early Historic Period. Most of the Muziris remains are buried, unexplored and untouched. The excavation team is filling back the excavation sites with earth and thus conserving the site. The museum which is coming up will showcase the entire archaeological findings in Muziris.10

Beads Found in the Muziris Site The old people in Muziris remember how they used to find colourful beads floating around in the rainy season and had no clue about their origins. They never knew they were laying hands on thousands of years of history.11

Notes 1. Steven E. Sidebotham, Berenike and the Ancient Maritime Spice Route, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011, p. 191. 2. George Gherverghese Joseph, A Passage to Infinity: Medieval Indian Mathematics from Kerala and its Impact, Delhi: Sage, 2009, p. 13. 3. Romila Thapar, The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to ad 1300, Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, p. 46. 4. P. Krishnakumar, ‘Muziris, At Last?’, www.frontline.in Frontline, 1023 April 2010. Web. 5. K.P.M. Basheer, ‘Pattanam Finds Throw More Light on Trade’, The Hindu [Madras], 12 June 2011. Web. 6. Ajayan Smitha, ‘Traces of Controversies’, Deccan Chronicle, 20 February 2013. Web. 7. ‘Historian Cautions on Pattanam Excavations’, The Hindu [Madras], 6 February 2012. Web. 8. ‘Archaeologist Calls for Excavations at Kodungalloor’, The Hindu [Madras], 5 August 2011. Web. 9. ‘KCHR Asked to Hand Over Pattanam Excavation’, ibnlive.in.com, CNN-IBN, 16 November 2011. Web. 10. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India, New Delhi: Routledge, 2004. 11. Peter Francis, Asia’s Maritime Bead Trade: 300 bc to the Present, Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p. 120.

CHAPTER 13

Islamicate World System and South Indian Muslim Trading Networks in the Medieval Indian Ocean History

ANAS S.

The Malabar and Coromandel were the two significant coasts in the south Indian region which was popularized by the broader connection of trade networks to Asia, Africa and Europe. During the Medieval period Malabar was the geographic centre of maritime routes that connected the South China Sea and Eastern Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea with its links to Persia, Arabia, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. In the eastern side of south India, the Coromandel coast had received a big volume of traders from the diverse centres of the world. With the global trade relation with the Orient in the medieval period, mainly before the colonial expansion, Muslims were the major trading community in the region. There were mainly two types of trading communities, the first was formed by interaction with the international traders and the second was formed by the local traders from the inland and coastal region. This substantial level of trade networks escalated the nature of this region as the global hub of business and culture. In the case of Muslims and Jews in the Medieval period, they have never tried to capture the power of the region and also they had developed the system of relationship through the process of trade and faith. Therefore, this global relationship has to be looked beyond

176  Anas S. the traditional interpretations of the world system based on the European or Western experiences. While analysing the history of Indian Ocean trade during the pre-colonial epoch, it could be identified with the existence of alternative world systems especially by the traders and people of Orient. The main feature of this broader connectivity of the Asian region was that this Islamic or Muslim trading was the reason of new systemic analysis of the Islamic or Islamicate world system. Academically it should be divided into two realms as the Modern world system of Immanual Wallerstein and Oriental world system of Abu-Lughod, M.N. Pearson and Andre Gunder Frank, etc. The Islamic world system is not a new coinage. Different scholars around the world got engaged with the debate on the systemic character of Islam and its historical context. According to Richard M. Eaton, In the post-thirteenth-century period, Muslims also constructed a world system, but one radically different from that modelled on Homo economicus. It was, rather, a world system linking men and women through informal networks of scholars and saints, built on shared understandings of how to see the world and structure one’s relationship to it. Above all, it was a world system constructed around a book ‘the Qur’an’.1

To quote Samir Amin ‘Arab Islamic world was part of a larger regional system which I call Mediterranean system’.2 From this clarification, he puts forward the importance of systemic character of Arab Islamic entity. In another sense Andre Gunder Frank called this Islamic system as a ‘trading world-system’ that existed till 1500 ce.3 On a similar note Janet L. Abu-Lughod observed that it was ‘a long standing, globally integrated “world-system”, to which Europe had finally attached itself.’4 Richard M. Eaton joins this debate by saying that the historians of Islam are beginning to realize that in the post-thirteenth-century period, Muslims also constructed a world system. John Obert Voll views ‘the pre-modern entity of the Islamic world as a world-system’5 in which he argues ‘Islam as a special World System’. These views are basically concerned with the expansion of economic and social connectivity especially by the Muslim trade and faith

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networks, which historically have cut across political boundaries in efforts to incorporate people with the uniform structure. This homogenization of Asian trade did change the history of the region like south India into a new phase which can call an Islamic trading system or Islamicate system that existed without the over emphasis of religion and power domination. Moreover, it was a kind of trade and cultural reciprocal phenomenon of medieval world. As a historical region Malabar has been predominantly sited by the international travellers and local texts since the Ancient and Medieval period. The word ‘Malabar’ is not an indigenous one but was first applied to the coast by Arab or Persian traders. The part of the name Malabar is derived from the Dravidian word for hill (mala) which was used by the indigenous inhabitants synonymously to the term keralam (after the ancient Chera kingdom that had ruled this part of south India). The designator mala (or male, malai, maliah, etc.) appears in the early post-classical notices of India and was applied to the region in an eleventh-century inscription at Thanjavur. The affix appears to be derived either from Arabic barr (land) or the Persian bar (country or coast), giving the word Malabar a hybrid etymology. The first recorded usage of the name Malabar dates only from the mid-twelfth century, when it was mentioned in al-Idrisi’s Kitab-e-Rujar. But the earliest Arabic geographical texts had referred to the Malabar coast by the name as ‘the land of pepper’ (bilad al-filfil) or with reference to a specific port. The name Malabar was subsequently adopted by other outsiders such as the Chinese (the ‘Ma-lipat’ of ChauJu-Kua), European travellers (Marco Polo’s ‘Melibar’), and the Portuguese (‘Malavar’). In the Medieval era, Malabar had a continuous relationship with Cairo, Egypt with the support of independent Muslim trading group like the Al-Karimis, they had also maintained the relationship with Hadramis from Yemen and Aden, with Arabs of Oman and the Persian Muslim traders. The central element of this trade was black pepper and also they exported cardamom, ginger, metals (copper, iron and steel), and ‘sundries’ (Ar.tafariq). In the same period, the ports or coasts of Coromandel areas were busy with huge number of foreign traders especially with Arab and Persian region. This east coast of south India was known to

178  Anas S. the Arab geographers, travellers and traders as Mabar. Mabar is an Arabic word meaning a ferry or a crossing place; the word ‘Mabar’ was used first by Yakut, the Arab geographer (1179-1229), in his Geographical Dictionary to denote the east coast of the Peninsular India. It is not possible from the accounts of Yakut and other Arab geographers to locate the boundaries and the area it comprises. Abul Fida, another Arab geographer says that, ‘the first locality of Mabar from the side of Malabar is Cape Comerine’. Diminisquo, yet another geographer says, ‘after Quilon comes the country of Sulyans (Chola) the Mabar’. The chief exports were rice, paddy, cereals, silk, cotton products, jaggery, coconut, dry fish condiments and chank. This port was famous for the Arab horse trade from thirteenth century. Marakkayar or Marakkar Muslim community was the major local group of people in the Coromandel coasts and they connect the region with global Muslim traders.

Connection Points of the System: The Major Ports of the Region In the Medieval period, there were a number of significant coasts and ports in the Malabar and Coromandel region. The discussion here includes the major ports and centres of the region to analyse the historic significance of the Islamicate system. The Jewish, Christian and Muslim maritime community set their monopoly at Kodungallur, a major port town of Malabar. The Genizah (a storage area in a Jewish synagogue) records the evidence of Jewish trade with Malabar, including the involvement of Muslims. Some time Muslims from Cairo like the Al-Karimis – an independent trading community, were the major mediator among the Jewish traders and families in Kerala. Now the early evidence of international relationship with Kodungallur or Muziris has been retrieved by the Patanam excavation which has channellized the ancient relationship of Malabar coast with Europe, Africa and Asia. Kollam was another significant port of Malabar and the main circuit of Arab trade to China. In the 1290s, Marco Polo saw at Kollam many merchants from southern China (‘Manzi’) who as he wrote ‘make great profits by what they import and by what they

Islamicate World System and Muslim Trading Networks  179

export’. Fifty years later, Ibn Battuta called Kollam one of the finest ports in Malabar and the one most frequented by Chinese traders. During the eleventh century in global trade via Indian Ocean, Kollam played a crucial role to connect people from different regions and religions of the world. Mangalore (Ar. Manjarur), in South Kanara is another Malabar port. There was a strong Jewish merchant relationship which has been retrieved from the letters of Jewish trader Abraham Ben Yiju during the mid-twelfth century. By the fourteenth century, its trade was dominated by Muslims and it is scripted in the record of Ibn Battuta where he mentioned that there were almost four thousand Muslims settled and engaged in trade. There was a strong number of local Muslim trading groups called Navayats like the Mapplilas in the other ports of Malabar. The special significance of ports such as Barkur and Mangalore was their role in the horse trade. Mount Eli (Malayal. Ezhimala) was the landmark of seafarers and its identification known to the Arabs as Hili, has posed a number of problems but can now be confidently said to be near Madayi. It is one of the most frequently mentioned Malabari ports in the Arabic sources, and its mosque is the oldest extant Muslim monument on the Malabar coast, dating back to 1124. Madayi did not have a proper harbour and there was a constant risk of ships being driven against the rocks of Mount Eli. This danger, Marco Polo writes, was of lesser consequence to Chinese ships with their ‘huge wooden anchors which hold in all weather’. Ibn Battuta confirms the presence of Chinese junks at Madayi, adding that it was one of only three ports on the Malabar coast visited by them. Valapattanam (formerly Baliapatam, Ar. Budfattan) was another port with a Muslim trading community. Significantly, there are old Arabic inscriptions on the Malabar coast in the form of a tombstone dated 1078/9. Valapattanam had been a capital of the Cheras and was also known as an important Brahmin centre. Ibn Battuta also described it as a fine port but notes that the Muslims dwell outside the town, as there was a history of conflict between Muslims and Brahmans in this locality. After about 20 km of these three ports one reaches another bay. Here, the port of Dharmadam (Ar. Dahfattan) was located on a small island formed at the con-

180  Anas S. fluence of the Tellicherry and Anjarakandi rivers. Dharmadam had a Muslim community since at least the thirteenth century and figures prominently in the traditions of Malabar’s Muslims. Another principal centre of the system was Calicut. During the 1330s Wang Dayuan described it as the main port of all the foreigners in the western ocean. A decade later, Ibn Battuta described Calicut in similar terms as one of the largest ports in the world, visited by merchants from China, Java, Ceylon, the Maldives, Yemen, and Persia. The nearest ports of Calicut Chaliyam (Ar. Shaliyat), were situated to the immediate south of Calicut on an island formed by the Beypore and Kadalundi rivers. It was an important site of Muslim trade, which according to Barbosa was dominated by native Muslims. Further south, Ponnani is not known as a port of trade in the pre-Portuguese period, but emerged in the sixteenth century as the main arsenal of Calicut. As a port, Ponnani was handicapped by shoals and sandbanks and the annual floods of the Ponnani River that created dangerous currents. It is also strongly associated with the Makhdums, a family of Muslim scholars and writers who produced some of the most significant indigenous sources for the sixteenth century. It was perhaps in this period that Ponnani emerged as an important centre of Islamic learning. Pantalayini-Kollam (Ar. Fandarina), was historically one of the most significant ports on the Malabar coast. It is situated to the north of Calicut, close to the Kotta River. Pantalayini-Kollam is mentioned by all the medieval Arab geographers and features prominently in local traditions about the introduction of Islam. Cochin was the third prominent dynasty on the Malabar coast in the post-Chera period. The Coromandel ports also were powerful centres in the south Indian region to develop this systemic nature. Kilakaria is a coastal town of Ramnad district in modern Tamil Nadu. It was a famous port town in the Coromandel coast. Kilakarai is called by various names from the period of Sangam age.6 The Kilakaria region was divided into three areas, Melakarai, Kilakarai and Kenikarai.7 According to Krisnaswamy Iyengar, these names resemble the famous ports of Wassaf, Mali Fittan, Fittan and Kabil (Kayal).8 And that he says ‘Wassaf ’s Fittan, Mali Fittan and Kabil must be held

Islamicate World System and Muslim Trading Networks  181

to stand for Pattanam, Malipattanam and Kayalpattanam. From reading Wassaf with Ibn Battuta we have to take that the Fittan or Fattan was a port of Madura.9 Kilakarai was popular in the Arabic name of Maabar. The name Maabar was popularized from the end of the sixth century by the Arab travellers. The Arabic word Maabar means passage, a channel or a bridge. In Arab travelogues and records they generally used Maabar for explaining the entire region of Tamilagam/Coromandel coast. Another nearby port Kilakkarai was Kayal in ancient history. ‘Kayal’ is a Tamil word, meaning ‘sea shore’. It was a famous port on the Coromandel coast, and it was mentioned by the famous travellers and historians like Abdullah Wasaf, Rasheeduddin, Ibn Battuta, Marco Polo, etc. Marco Polo first came to Kayal in ad 1288. He mentioned that leaving the island of Zeilan (Ceylon) and sailing in a westerly direction for 60 miles he reached the great province of Maabar which is not an island but a part of the continent of the greater India. According to Marco Polo, Kayal was the premier port, where all merchants used to come from the east as well as the west and from all over India for the purpose of trade. The early Islamic settlement in Kayal included Arabs and Persians originating from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, as well as local converts. For example, some of the tombstones record the origin of the deceased as al-Qahiri, indicating that the personage or his ancestors were from Egypt. A tomb near the Sirupalli belonging to Maulana Abd al-Sadiq records his name as Mausili and the name of his grandfather as Muhammad al-Iraqi, and another at the graveyard of the Marakkayar Palli record the name of the deceased as Shaikh Nuh b. Shaikh Sayyid Ahmad b. Allama Nuh al-Bakkari. Many other people who must have been of local origin are recorded on their tombs as al-Malabari. Hence, the Indian Ocean Islamicate system was a trilateral relationship of international Muslim traders, local coastal Muslim traders, and inland Muslim traders. The above-mentioned Malabar and Coromandel ports were the major connecting points of these three groups where they sustained relationship of trade and faith. The system ensured blended culture in the region and which amalgamated the global religious and local customs. The system

182  Anas S. composed the new code of communication and language in which that Mappilas followed Arabic Malayalam and Tamils adopted Arabic Tamil. All kinds of global and local unifications were the supplementing factors of trade that Islamicate system maintained in the Medieval world through these centres.

Notes 1. Richard M. Eaton, ‘Islamic History as a Global History,’ in Michael Adas (ed.) Islamic & European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993, p. 31. 2. Samir Amin, ‘The Ancient World-Systems Versus the Modern Capitalist World-System’, in Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gill (eds.), The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, Routledge: London, 1993, p. 253. 3. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? Routledge: London, 1993, p. 209. 4. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System ad 1250-1350, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; ‘Restructuring the Pre-modern World System’, Review, 13 (1990): 275-6. 5. John Obert Voll, ‘Islam as a Special World-System,’ Journal of World History, 5(2) (1994): 219. 6. The local old Tamil song sarkurukkanni by Syed Asiya Umma mentioned seven names for Kilakaria. These are Korakai, Kael (Kayal), Bavithiramanickapattanam, Ninaithaimudithanpattinam, Anthubar, Fattan and Kilakkarai. ‘Ko-ru-kai’ is a Tamil name of a grass plant namely reed. Ibn Battuta also had described the jungle (Arhatu(ie) Attukadu near Kilakarai) where he was received by the Madurai sultan’s officer as ‘The country we had to traverse was an impenetrable jungle of trees and reeds’, in Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, tr. H.A.R. Gibb, vol. IV, 1929, pp. 262-3. 7. Ka.Mu. Shareef, Vallal Seethakathi Varalaru (Tamil), Chennai: Sharmila Publishers, 1981, pp. 46-7. 8. S. Krisnaswamy Iyengar, South India and her Muhammadan Invaders, New Delhi and Madras: Asian Educational Service, 1991, p. 63. 9. Ibid., p. 192.

CHAPTER 14

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States of Western Indian Ocean: Sources of India’s Soft Power in its Foreign Policy A P A R A J I T A B I S WA S

The Indian diaspora in Sub-Saharan Africa represents a significant population in size, spread and depth. Within this subregion of the African continent, the Indian diaspora has penetrated the deepest in East Africa, and African littoral states of Western Indian Ocean, where both People of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident Indians (NRI) have occupied significant positions in their respective national political and economic institutions. India’s diaspora is an asset in so far it is a huge source of soft power. There are millions of Indians spread across in the Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone countries in Africa. Francophone Africa houses around 1 million PIOs. Majority of them are in the Western Indian Ocean States like Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles. A small number of them are in Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Chad, Senegal, Mali Djibouti and Algeria. Many of them were taken as indentured labour recruited by the French government after the abolition of slavery. There is a small percentage of ‘passenger Indians’ or merchant and trading communities. For instance, the Indian Diaspora in Réunion accounts for 25 per cent of the population. The majority of them are from south India, notably from French settlements in Tamil Nadu

184  Aparajita Biswas (Pondicherry and Karikal). The Island is an Overseas Region of France in the Indian Ocean, situated in the southern hemisphere, about 200 km south-west of Mauritius. Mauritius is the only country where the PIOs are in majority (68 per cent of the total population). In Seychelles, the Indian diaspora constitutes only 6 per cent of the total population. It is equally distributed among the PIOs and the NRIs. Although Eastern African countries and African littoral states of western Indian Ocean boast of a strong, industrious and successful overseas Indian community, yet it is argued that their economic, social and cultural engagements with India are yet to reach their full potential. This paper focuses on the Indian diaspora in African littoral states of western Indian Ocean, being those that not only have the substantial presence of overseas Indians, but are also of significant strategic importance to India. This area is extremely important for India for several reasons. These littoral states of western Indian Ocean dominate the sea lanes of communications not only between India and Southern Africa but between Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Under the terms of UNCLOS-111, these island territories have vast sea area under their EEZ and continental shelf. Taken together it covers almost the entire sea area of south-west Indian Ocean. Like Mauritius and all other Indian Ocean littoral states, India is affected by emerging problems in the region, ranging from piracy, illegal trafficking, and territorial disputes in the regional seas to global environmental pressures on coastal and marine resources. Seychelles is also important for India’s south-west Indian Ocean strategy. But its relations with India are quite different from that of Mauritius. The tiny island state with a population of 86,000 achieved independence from British in 1976 and since then it has been courted by many powers wanting to set up military bases. Its location between Madagascar and Persian Gulf 1,600 km east of Kenya makes it an excellent base from which to project power throughout the entire Indian Ocean. The country has for decades successfully balanced the interests of many powers like USA, France, South Africa, North Korea and now China. Since the 1980s India has security cooperation with Seychelles. It provides training

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States  185

to security personnel. Since 2010 India increased its security role focusing on the assistance it could provide in combating piracy. A number of extra-regional states maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In this context, cooperation among Indian Ocean states in the field of maritime security becomes essential. India and Mauritius have had a long-standing, comprehensive partnership in this regard, with joint patrolling and surveillance of the Exclusive Economic Zone, search and rescue operations; anti-piracy efforts, and sharing of hydrographic data as critical components of this cooperation. This article discusses how Indian diaspora in western African littoral states can play an influential role in enhancing cooperation between their home countries and their country of origin. It argues that the Indian diaspora in African littoral states of western Indian Ocean have contributed to the economies of the host countries inmmensely and now are in a position to play a part in cooperation efforts between India and these countries.

Soft Power and Indian Foreign Policy The importance of soft power as an instrument of foreign policy has increased in a globalized world where the use of military power for achieving foreign policy objectives is looked down upon by the international community. The attempt to understand the effects of diaspora on a country’s foreign policies poses several conceptual problems. Are the diaspora independent actors or simply instrument deployed by other actors? Under what conditions are they mobilized, and if so, by whom? What characteristics of the diaspora, the country of origin, and the country of settlement matter? Under what conditions diasporas act as a mechanism of the country’s soft power? To the extent that diasporas are autonomous actors that engage in long distance nationalism, as with all nationalisms, this role can be a mixed blessing – for both source and destination country. However, the trans-border movement of people may well be an important lever of ‘soft power’ – for the source country and/or the destination country. In fact, travellers and sojourners of various types – pilgrims, explorers, diplomats, merchants,

186  Aparajita Biswas students, and exiles – have long been agents in the transmission of ideas. The idea of soft power has had considerable appeal in policy circles especially in India. This is one of the areas in which India can claim to stand out among players in international arena. From Business gurus to religion gurus, Buddism to yoga, Bollywood to Bhangra rap, classical music to cuisine, there seems to be a cornucopia of Indian soft power. Bollywood has done more for Indian influence abroad than the bureaucratic efforts of the government. For example, former Union Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor, has argued that past classifications of major powers, numbering 29 were becoming archaic and that India had now become a great power mainly by the ‘power of example’ or in other words because of its ‘soft power’.1 From classical and popular music to its cuisine, from the growing impact of its writers and intellectuals, India now has begun to acquire many levers of soft power. The biggest instrument of Indian soft power is the Indian diaspora apart from music, films, sports, yoga and Ayurveda.2 People of Indian origin are extremely important sources of support for the Indian government in the execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command in the countries in which they live. Indian diaspora has helped India raise its standing abroad and has spread Indian influence. The more probable mechanism of India’s soft power is arguably less the exports of its culture and more the exports of its people. Raja Mohan argued that the biggest instrument of our soft power is the Indian diaspora.3 India’s former External Affairs Minister similarly pointed out people of Indian origin are extremely important sources of support for the Indian government in the execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command in the countries in which they live.4 But this recognition of the Indian diaspora as a strategic assets among Indian foreign policy elite is very recent. During the pre-Independence period, though the focus of foreign policy was British centric, the then Indian government took the initiative to address the various concerns of the Indian

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States  187

expatriates as they were ‘British subjects’ living elsewhere in the British Empire. The Indian political elite had shown solidarity with and shared their concerns with the Indian expatriates through deputations by the Congress delegates.5 In fact, the plight of Indians abroad was a major issue for the independence movement led by Indian National Congress. Mahatma Gandhi visited Mauritius in 1902 on his return from South Africa to India. He met the community leaders of the People of Indian Origin and advised them to educate their children and to take active part in politics. The plight of Indian indentured labour in Africa and Mauritius preoccupied his mind during his Mauritius visit. In 1906, he sent Manilall Doctor to inquire into the lives of the indentured labourers.6 The nationalist movement made very significant efforts to forge bonds with the diaspora. Inspired by Gandhi’s efforts on behalf of the Indian community in South Africa, the leadership of the Indian National Congress took up the cause of overseas Indians as an extension of the anti-apartheid struggle in other parts of the Empire and even set up an Overseas Department under Jawaharlal Nehru in 1929. Mauritius was the first country where Nehru, under his interim prime ministership appointed the first ever High Commissioner in 1946. However, this position was short lived, as the shockwaves of Partition overwhelmed the perception of sovereignty and citizenship. Post-Independence India as Kapur noted adopted a civic, territorial nationalism and a secular inclusive state. In this vision, emigrants were no longer considered nationals and there was no need to maintain official ties with them. Jawaharlal Nehru categorically announced that ethnic Indians who chose to remain abroad would consider themselves as citizens or nationals of their respective host lands.7 In fact, they were encouraged to integrate with the host country culture and fight for the liberation of their adopted lands. Nehru’s views were influenced by circumstantial necessities. First, the sovereignty issues of newly independent India prohibited him from taking a stand on protecting the rights of Indian diaspora who were citizens of other countries. Supporting the rights of Indians settled in other countries, could

188  Aparajita Biswas have weakened India’s relations with these countries. Second, it also risked India’s ambition to play the leadership role of the NonAligned movement. This view of the Indian government towards its diaspora existed and remained dominant until 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi came to power. He made substantial changes in India’s policy perspectives on a wide range of issues including its diaspora policy as well. In the 1986 Fiji crisis, when the Indian diaspora in Fiji were ousted from government in the aftermath of a coup, Indian government’s stand was that India would stand by their citizen abroad if there was any affront to their rights and dignity. For the first time in history, Indian government battled an action by a foreign government against the people of Indian origin by imposing sanctions against Fiji, by getting it expelled from the Commonwealth and by raising the issue at the United Nations. This change in the diaspora policy put in place by Rajiv Gandhi following the military coup in Fiji and his decision to stand by them, was the one defining moment in India’s dealings with its overseas family. This policy of government of India was in total contrast from its earlier policy of lack of response to the 1972 Uganda crisis, in which all people of Indian origin were expelled from that country following a coup that brought Idi Amin to power.
 While India has emphasized its cultural and civilizational links with African countries for decades, its soft power diplomacy has received a boost with the new initiative to rope in its diaspora in strengthening relations with African countries. Since early 1990s, there has been a proactive interest of Indian government in the overseas Indians. The Indian policy changed significantly with regard to this segment during 1990s. The submission of the L.M. Singhvi Committee Report on PIOs and NRIs on 8 January 2002 may be looked at as the most important embodiment of this change in outlook and approach. The Vajpayee government at that time accepted the recommendation of the Committee and had undertaken initiatives like celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas and the creation of a Ministry for Overseas Indians. The Indian government now stands for active and overt

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States  189

association of the PIOs for foreign policy objectives of India. India wants to promote its economic interests and it has become paramount in Indian foreign policy. It was mainly in the early 1990s that the Indian government reached out to NRIs and Indian settlers abroad, to attract FDI into their economy, as a major step towards globalization. NRIs enjoyed special concessions for investing in Indian industry or to place foreign currency deposits in their Indian bank accounts. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) went so far as to maintain close contacts with the overseas Hindu population, as a means to creating a strong support base. It played an active part in organizing the first ever Conference of Parliamentarians of Indian origin, and also introduced the PIO Card wherein a one-time fee of $1,000 enabled overseas Indians to get multiple entry visas for twenty years, besides all commercial rights, except purchase of agricultural land. In fact, the PIO Card is a strong symbol of recognition of the Indian diaspora by the Government of India. Subsequently, long- and short-term comprehensive policy measures were unveiled to engage the diaspora during the NDA regime. These included the appointment of a high level committee on Indian diaspora, the launching of PIO Card scheme, organizing annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas on 9 January every year, giving out Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards, offering dual citizenship (OCI) and so on. The subsequent UPA government established a separate Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs which has taken several initiatives for engaging the diaspora. A High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora noted that ‘while there may be different perceptions of the foreign direct investment in certain sectors, there is a general consensus in the country that investment by the Non-Resident Indians and persons of Indian origin are desirable, as they are our own kith and kin’. The committee observed that overseas Indians can also create markets for India’s entertainment industry, thanks to the growing popularity of Indian films and TV serials among the Indian diasporic community in Europe, Africa, Middle East and USA. This author has seen in many African countries, Indian

190  Aparajita Biswas films being dubbed or shown with local language subtitles. The commercial success of Indian films abroad also indirectly helps promote Indian fashion products. In accordance with the Committee report, India has over the last five years attempted to make better use of its soft power assets. It has also incorporated cultural elements into its foreign policy. ICCR has set up cultural centres in many parts of the world, including West African Ocean littoral states and organized book fairs, fashion shows, art exhibitions, etc. The Indian government, on its part, has helped Indian diaspora set up Indian schools in their host countries. 


Indian Diaspora in West Indian Ocean Littoral States India’s diaspora in West Indian Ocean littoral states like Mauritius, Seychelles and Reunion are also considered to be a major assets to Indian diplomacy. Widespread Indian migration and permanent settlement took place in these countries when French established themselves in India between 1666 and 1700. Between 1735 and 1754, under French governors, Benoit Dumas and Joseph Dupleix, the French influence in south India and Bengal expanded and became powerful. During this period Indians were taken to Francophone African countries to work as indentured labourers, domestic servants and sailors. No records of these departures are available except for a few words now and then. It may be noted that as the Act of Emancipation of 1834 abolished slavery, tropical colonies with sugar and cocoa plantations had sought other forms of cheap labour. The British and French colonial authorities arranged a system of indentured Indian immigration established in Calcutta and Madras. Labour was recruited in the hinterlands who signed contracts for at least five years, which guaranteed them basic pay, accommodation, food, ration, medical facilities and partly paid return passage. With the developing trading opportunities in the African hinterland and the government’s policy to encourage large-scale immigration from India, the pull from Africa drew hundreds of people from India.

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States  191

Another big reason for this immigration was the impoverishment of people in British India. There was a lack of job opportunities, repeated famines and excessive pressure of population on land and other resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the nineteenth-century India had provided a ready market for cheap labour for several British and French possessions. In 1834, East India Company allowed planters in Mauritius to recruit labourers from India. Thousands of Indians reached Mauritius from Calcutta and Pondicherry. In the beginning labourers were recruited on an individual basis but later entire families or labourers from the same village and districts were recruited. The heavy influx of Indians immigrant labourers brought a sharp change in the population composition of Mauritius. In Seychelles also British took Indian labourers to work in plantations. France followed the same policy. It signed an agreement with the British government to import Indian indentured labourer to work in sugar plantations in Reunion. Several groups came as indentured labour between 1829 and 1848 mainly from Pondicherry and Tamil Nadu. Later, voluntary immigration gathered momentum in all these countries, with new immigrants coming in as traders and artisans. Towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Gujarati traders arrived in Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles to sell food and textiles. They play an important role in the economy of Reunion.8 It is estimated that people of Indian origin constitute over onethird of the inhabitants of the Reunion Island and according to some associations, they number upto 280,000 majority of whom are from Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. Indian origin people have, by and large, done very well for themselves as they emphasized on education and are active in all spheres of life including senior positions in the civil services, teaching, medical profession, business, etc. Some of them have been elected to the General Council and Regional Council of Reunion, Mayors of municipalities and some of them were also elected to the parliament in Paris. In Madagascar, Indian community mainly comprises Bohra and Gujarati traders who are prosperous and are contributing substantially to the economy.

192  Aparajita Biswas By the early twentieth century there were around 700,000 PIO population in Mauritius and 81,000 in Seychelles. All of them have contributed tremendously in the economies of these countries. They are mostly in government services, farmers and agricultural workers. Indian diaspora constitutes an overwhelming majority – nearly 70 per cent of the total population and they were among first permanent settlers in the island. They are playing a vital role in the political process of the country and holding important elected posts and in the current parliament of Mauritius there are 36 members of Indian origin. There are associations and organizations associated with their culture/ language. Every township of Mauritius is graced with a temple, gurdwara, mosque and various community halls. Famous Ganga Talav is said to be purified by water of holy river Ganga and being considered as pilgrimage for Hindus in Mauritius. Due to cultural resemblance Mauritius is often regarded as a Little India away from the geographical territory of India. On the bilateral trade and investment front, India continues to be the largest trading partner of Mauritius. However, both sides are keenly aware that there is much potential for further diversifying our trade basket and exploring untapped markets. A three-year agreement between the Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL) and the State Trading Corporation of Mauritius for supply of all petroleum requirements of Mauritius has been renewed. Mauritius was the single largest source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India during the financial year 2012-13, with FDI equity inflows of US $9.497 billion. Indian public and private sector companies have continued to contribute to the Mauritian economy, both by their performance and engagement in various Corporate Social Responsibility activities. Apart from trade and investment Indo-Mauritians have had an impact on Mauritian culture dominating the economic and political faces of the island. Mauritian politics have been historically dominated by the Indo-Mauritian community due to their majority as a whole on the electoral platform. All presidents except Karl Offmann and all prime ministers except for Paul Berenger have been members of the community. Most Hindu celebrations are public holidays.

Indian Diaspora in the Francophone African Littoral States  193

Indian influence is felt in all spheres of life, be it religion, cuisine or the arts. The relations between India and the island states of Mauritius and Seychelles got a tremendous boost when the Indian Prime Minister Modi visited these islands in 2015. India has signed an agreement to build infrastructural facilities in Agalega Island in Mauritius and Assumption Island in Seychelles. Agalega, located 1,100 km north of Mauritius, is spread over 70 sq. km and is closer to India’s southern coast. This pact provides for ‘setting up and upgradation of infrastructure for improving sea and air connectivity at the Outer Island of Mauritius which will go a long way in ameliorating the condition of the inhabitants of this remote Island’.9 Ultimately the survival and functioning of democracy in India is its biggest asset as a soft power. Where many other developing countries have fallen on military rule or authoritarian regimes, India thrives on its democratic traditions. Indeed, the world appreciates the prevalence of democracy in India and its use in solving many problems since Independence. Another major aspect of India’s soft power is its thriving and free press, where all shades of opinion can be expressed freely. India’s civil society too remains strong and faces every social challenge and social ills with courage. From efforts to eradicate poverty to ensuring a greener environment to challenging government decisions through a court of law, freedom remains a high flying flag. Added to this is an independent judiciary that plays an activist’s role on many public interest issues that are ignored by the government. The reason why Indians continue to have faith in the country’s judicial system. India has recently demonstrated the intention to exploit its soft power resources in a systematic manner to achieve its objectives, notably by creating a public diplomacy division in India’s Ministry of External Affairs in 2006. The objective of this new institution has been to intensify dialogue on foreign policy issues with all segments of society at home and abroad. However, it is a fairly small department and its ability to formulate and execute the policies remain to be seen.

194  Aparajita Biswas As a result, India has over the last five years attempted to begin to make better use of its soft power assets. It has also incorporated cultural elements into its foreign policy. ICCR has set up cultural centres in many parts of the world including East African countries. The Indian government helps Indian diaspora to set up Indian school. ICCR has organized book fairs, fashion shows, and art exhibitions in Africa and East African countries as well. In East Africa, the prosperous and confident overseas Indians have the potential to become a powerful lobby that can create a strong support base for India in foreign countries. Industrialists, academics, scientists of Indian origin in East African countries have tremendous goodwill in their host countries because of their significant contribution in the economies of those countries. They can emerge as strong strategic assets. Thus, the Government of India may take into consideration these new developments in formulating its Africa policy and its policy towards overseas Indians in East Africa.

Notes 1. See Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century, Delhi: Penguin India, 2012. 2. Ibid. 3. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Indian Diaspora and “Soft Power” ’, The Hindu, 6 January 2013. 4. See Tharoor, Pax Indica, op. cit. 5. Devesh Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. 6. ‘The Influence of Mauritius on Mahatma Gandhi’, by S. Peerthum, http:// www.mkgandhi-sarvodaya.org/articles/mauritius&mg.htm 7. Kapur, 2010, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy, op. cit. 8. See Ajay Dubey, Indian Diaspora in Africa: A Comparative Perspective, Delhi: MD Publications, n.d. 9. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-seychellessign-four-pacts-to-boost-security-cooperation/#sthash.sotm13e6.dpuf

CHAPTER 15

Linguistic Communities and New Historiography: Constructing a Maritime Tradition in Colonial Odisha SACHIDANANDA MOHANT Y

Mid to late nineteenth century witnessed the attempts of a new literati in colonial Odisha to fashion out different versions of ‘histories’ and ‘historiography’ including the maritime ones. The European settler colonies dotting the Coromandel coast, including undivided Bengal, generated native interest in the maritime traditions, especially in the fabled Kalinga region that subsumes the present territorial limits of modern Odisha. This paper will chronicle the efforts of a new breed of contributors to journals like Utkal Sahitya that attempted to construct its own brand of historiography that relied largely on myths, legends, folklore and literary sources rather than on empirically verifiable methods of European historiography, current then and now, although it may have evolved over a period in time. While the Kalinga maritime tradition in the Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Malacca, the Indonesian Archipelago, and the Indian Ocean Region were ‘facts’ of maritime life from the Christian era, no systematic accounts in ‘historical terms’ are available in the region as part of an archive. In the absence of this, efforts of writers like Birupaksha Kar and others appear to be part of a new imaginary in colonial Odisha for legitimating a demand for a linguistic state.

196  Sachidananda Mohanty

The Context The British arrived in Odisha officially in 1803 nearly a hundred years after they annexed Bengal for political and economic gain. It must be noted that the British rule in Odisha was an indirect one. For the most part, especially in the feudatory states and kingdoms the so-called ‘Gadjat’ states, they ruled through political agents. In the coastal belt of Puri, Cuttack, Balasore and Ganjam, called ‘Mogalbandi’ there was the zamindari system, much of which was controlled by Bengali owners, distantly located in Bengal and politically overseen by the local gumasta [agent] and the British officials posted at Cuttack, responsible for land revenue and the maintenance of law and order. The economy was in shambles, as may be noticed from the writings of a sympathetic British official G. Toynbee. The taxes that the British levied in colonial India varied from place to place but the following extract may give a representative account of the situation prevailing in most parts of the country: The taxes levied in different places varied with the idiosyncrasies of the Government or of the individual tax collector: but among them it may be noticed that people were mulcted for having houses to live in, or, if they had no houses, for their temporary sheds or huts. If they ate grain, their food was taxed at every stage in progress through the country; if they ate meat, they paid duty on it through their butchers. When they married, they paid for beating drums or putting up marquees. If they rejoiced at the set of Hindu festivals, they paid again; at the ‘holi’, for instance, on the red powder which they threw at each other; at the ‘pala’, on the ornaments which they tied to the horns of the cattle. Drinkers were mulcted by an exercise and smokers by a tobacco duty. Weavers, oil-pressers, fishermen, and such low-caste industrials, had as a matter of course to bear a special burden. No house or slaves or cattle could be sold, no cloth could be stamped, no money could be changed – even prayers for rain could not be offered, without payment on each operation of its special and peculiar tax. In short, a poor man could not shelter himself, or clothe himself, or earn his bread, or eat it, or marry, or rejoice, or even ask his gods for better weather, without contributing separately on each individual act to the necessities of the State! These were the regular taxes merely, and it certainly does not seem likely that any money could have slipped by owing to their want of comprehensiveness; but the revenue accounts of the times show

Linguistic Communities and New Historiography  197 that supplementary measures were occasionally found necessary to reach men who would otherwise have escaped.1

To what extent would the state of the economy have a bearing on the nature of the colonial modernity practised by the colonial State? The genesis of the first full-fledged journal in the region owes its existence to a mid-century economic crisis: Utkal Dipika arose, as a direct answer to the great famine of Odisha dated 1866.

Colonial Modernity: Contested Space Just as the Periodical Press has become axiomatic for reading social and cultural history today, perhaps the same could be said regarding its link with colonial modernity. One must begin the exercise by admitting that there cannot be a uniform and consistent alignment between the vernacular press and the colonial modernity in India; the vast complexity in the historical situation does not permit such a unilinear approach. This modernity arguably came in a complex, contestatory and ambivalent manner, and left lasting impressions on the political formations and the language communities. The modernity propelled by the colonial State and its appendages rested upon the ‘High Modernism’ of the European Enlightenment with its belief in the primacy of the West and the rhetoric of progress. In the subject nations and regions such as colonial Odisha, it produced various forms of resistance and acquiescence. One will therefore have to deal necessarily with the fractured relationships and the complex negotiations between the two. Again, resistance to colonialism came in the form of homegrown vernacular or alternative modernity among the emerging gentry. What was the nature of such modernity and how did they evolve over time? Critics like Satya P. Mohanty2 and others in recent times have underlined some of these developments in the domain of the nineteenth-century cultural history in India. Next, one will have to unveil the theoretical underpinning while outlining the historical change recorded in the pages of the journals. And finally, we need to contextualize the periodical press and colonial modernity in nationalist and regional frames adopted by cultural historians.

198  Sachidananda Mohanty English education comes Janus-faced to the native gentry. The best of the response, as we shall see later, went beyond mere acquiescence to questioning the dominant paradigms and programmatic action by the colonial state and administration. Where the subjugated could not respond on equal terms, they deployed the mode of irony and sarcasm as weapons. This is best expressed by Fakir Mohan Senapati through prose and poetry in Utkal Sahitya. Here is Fakir Mohan’s narrator in Six Acres and a Third (Chha Mana Atha Guntha) mimicking the style and claims of the British historian James Todd: There was only one pond in Gobindapur, and everyone in the village was used to it. It was fairly large, covering ten to twelve batis, with banks ten to twelve arms-lengths high, and was known as Asura Pond. In the middle once stood sixteen stone pillars, on which lamps were lighted. We are unable to recount the true story of who had it dug, or when. It is said that demons, the Asura, dug it themselves. That could well be true. Could humans like us dig such an immense pond? Here is a brief history of Asura pond by Ekadusia, the ninety-five-year-old weaver. The demon Banasura ordered that the pond be dug, but did not pick up shovels and baskets to dig it himself. On his orders, a host of demons came one night and did the work. But when day broke, it had not yet been completed: there was a gap of twelve to fourteen arms-lengths in the south bank, which had not been filled in. By now it was morning, and the villagers were already up and about. Where could the demons go? They dug a tunnel connecting the pond to the banks of the river Ganga, escaped through it, bathed in the holy river, and then disappeared. During the Baruni festival on the Ganga, the holy waters of the river used to gush through the tunnel into the pond. But, as the villagers became sinful, the rivers no longer did this. English educated babus, do not be too critical of our local historian, Ekadusia Chandra. If you are, half of what Marshman and Todd have written will not survive the light of scrutiny.3

The point is simple: if one were to accept unquestioningly the ‘historical truths’ peddled by James Todd without the need for verification of ‘facts’ of the empirical kind just because he as an Englishman enjoyed a celebrity status, then why should the ninety-five year old, local historian Ekadusia’s claim be discarded and treated as outlandish? In any case, it is now well known that a

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great deal that Todd wrote about the kingdoms of Rajasthan was garnered by fancy. Fakir Mohan, as the narrator, however, is not primarily interested in the truth value of the [Western] historical claims. By parrottalking the sanctified ‘historical’ method, mechanically, listing items and building an inventory such as the following: ‘covering ten to twelve batis, with banks, ten to twelve arms-lengths high’, ‘gap of twelve to fourteen arms-lengths in the south bank’, etc., and casually slipping in the remark, as part of contrapuntal reading: ‘we are unable to recount the true story of who had it dug’, he punctures the Western pretension to knowledge and unveils the possibility of an alternative epistemology.

New Historiography/Oral History/Local Tradition The parody and the satire here are not just against the empirical claims of the English historians Marshman and Todd, but more crucially the ‘English educated Babus’ who must constantly imitate a derivative discourse. Fakir Mohan’s local historian is deliberately modelled after a humble Ekadusia Chandra [the ‘name’ in Odia is meant to provoke laughter]. The critique is against historiography based on rationally verified accounts of ‘Truth’ to be seen against the claims of local/oral history tradition which would gain acceptance much later in the West. In so doing, Fakir Mohan seems to pose challenge to the dominant modernity project and offer an alternative modernity/ epistemology. The menace of the Western modernity finds recurrent mention in Chha Mana Atha Guntha which was serialized in Utkal Sahitya and had an enormous mass appeal.4 Talking about the Asura Pond before the women appeared, Fakir Mohan’s narrator declares in a tongue in cheek manner: There is another equally irrefutable proof to support this contention that [there are fish in the pond]. Look over there! Four Kaduakhumpi birds are hopping about like Gotipuas, like traditional dancing boys. The birds are happy and excited because they are able to spear and eat the little fish that live in the mud. Some might remark that these birds are so cruel, so wicked that they get pleasure from spearing and eating creatures smaller than themselves!

200  Sachidananda Mohanty What can we say? You may describe the Kaduakhumpi birds as cruel, wicked, Satanic or whatever else you like; the birds will never file a defamation suit against you. But don’t you know that among your fellow human beings, the bravery, honour, respectability, indeed, the attractiveness of an individual all depend upon the number of necks he can wring? Some sixteen to twenty cranes, white and brown, churn the mud like lowly farmhands, from morning till night. This is the third proof that there are fish in the pond. A pair of kingfishers suddenly arrives out of nowhere, dive into water a couple of times, stuff themselves with food, and swiftly fly away. Sitting on the bank, a lone kingfisher suns itself, wings spread like the gown of a memsahib. Oh, stupid Hindu cranes look at these English kingfishers, who arrive out of nowhere with empty pockets, fill themselves with all manner of fish from the pond, and then fly away. You nest in the banyan tree near the pond, but after churning the mud and water all day long, all you get are a few miserable small fish. You are living in critical times now; more and more kingfishers will swoop down on the pond and carry off the best fish. You have no hope, no future, unless you go abroad and learn to swim in the ocean.5

Here is Fakir Mohan at his best parodying English logic and legalese used in abundance to get even with the native populace. Suitable warning is held out by the narrator to be watchful lest one is stripped at any time of one’s rightful claims. That the whole discourse comes in the guise of humour and sarcasm does not minimize the seriousness of the situation. The image of the pond and its denizens on the lookout for life and liberty stands as an objective correlative to the British Rule.

Modernity and New Historiography If the flipside of the modernity project has been shown by Chandrasekhar Mishra, then the idea of modern historiography gains ground in many essays in Utkal Sahitya. It must be noted here that although Odisha had a rich tradition of voyages abroad to faraway lands like Lanka, Java and Bali, there are very few accounts available, based on historical documentation. Most narratives have been in the realm of legends, folklore and the oral tradition. This has been largely true of other regions in India as well. In fact, Western historiography based on a set of empirically verifiable facts,

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has not been as pervasive in India as in Europe. An astute editor, Biswanath Kar, conscious of his role as a ‘modernizer’ spearheaded efforts to fill this gap. Consequently we find in the pages of Utkal Sahitya, a number of essays that deal with Odisha’s historical past. The article ‘Prachina Utkalare Jalajatra’ (‘Sea Voyages in Ancient Utkal’) combines history, myths, legends and folklores6 in order to trace the traditions of seafaring activities in Odisha, but there is little here that can bear scrutiny in empirical terms. Birupaksha Kar begins the essay by alluding to the rich seafaring tradition of Athens, England and America. There is glory in association, but can such association take us far? He asks a pointed question rhetorically: ‘Three parts of India are surrounded by water. Consequently, Indians must be adept in sea voyages. Was India ever a maritime nation? That is not the main objective of this essay. A small part of India, namely Odisha or ancient Kalinga’s maritime tradition is the subject of this essay.’7 Kar outlines the history of Odisha from the earlier period when it stretched from Ganga to Godavari. The objective that he sets before himself is to prove ‘the excellence of Odiyas in the seafaring activities’. He alludes to the Buddhist period and the annals of the Buddhist pilgrim Bigyandujtta. Referring to Chanakya’s Arthashastra in fourth century ad, he speculates that the voyages referred here must surely refer to Kalinga, [emphasis mine]. The shift from Chanakya to Kalinga occurs through qualifiers such as ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’. Assertions are made with the help of speculations and surmises. He links the verses from Chanakya to the practices in the Odia villages during the month of Kartika, when women paint their houses and draw the picture of the native ships and worship them. He then refers to the history of colonization by the Odias during the first century ad. According to him, in ad 75, Odias established a colony in Java. Known as ‘Klings’, these tribes continue to live in Malaysia and Singapore as well. In his support, he alludes to the accounts of Ptolemy and suggests that the ports mentioned by the Roman historian such as Pakoura, Nanigaina, Katidarmana,

202  Sachidananda Mohanty Kosamba, Tyndis, Dosaram and Adamas refer actually to places and rivers like Pakura (near Ganjam), Puri, Cuttack, Kosamba (Balasore), Brahmani and so on in Odisha. Similarly, he invokes the traditions of art, sculpture, temple architecture, costumes, as well as the journey of travellers who came to Odisha from Arabia and Persia. Poetry of Dinakrishna and that of Chaitanya Dev too comes handy to support Kar’s claims. At the end of this survey, largely based on myth, hear-say and speculations, Birupaksha Kar turns to the present with a sense of sadness. He reflects pensively: ‘Today, the name of Odisha is not uttered in lands and nations that have excelled in maritime activities. The Odias seem fearful of the sea; they are socially ostracized when they travel abroad by sea. Afraid of swimming in the ocean, most Odiyas today amuse themselves by throwing coins into the sea and watch the antics of fishermen’. It would be seen that Birupaksha Kar’s essay on the sea-faring tradition of Odisha, while claiming to be ‘historical’ is based, for the most part, on legends, folklore, iconography and poetry. He makes speculative claims and uses expressions such as ‘It must have been so’, ‘Perhaps it was so’ and so on. The attempt at producing historiography of the western kind signals the yearning for rationality, objectivity and empiricism, all parts of colonial modernity. Ultimately this desire fails because of an inability to provide a recorded history. The claim to a glorious and golden past remains a recurrent feature, however. It is a past that is idealized, given the existing crisis of identity.

Anthropocentrism The conflicting approach to writing history continues to be manifest in the pages of Utkal Sahitya. For instance, the same issue of the journal carries an essay called ‘The Problem of World Religions’, written as part of a serial by Kulamani Dash. The essay is a thinly veiled account of anthropocentrism. It attempts to prove that practically everything outside India can be traced back to Indian sources! This includes Indian religions, culture, and

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philosophy and even geographical land masses. For instance, Dash claims fact that the ‘Harayu’ River of Persia is the ‘Sarayu’ of India, the name ‘Euphrates’ is similarly drawn from the term ‘Bharat’. The name ‘Bharat’ is turned into ‘Pharat’ and subsequently becomes ‘Euphrates’ in Persia. He surmises that ‘Babylon’, the capital city of Persia, on the bank of ‘Pharat’, is associated with ‘Bhupalan’, and possibly comes from ‘Bhupal’ (‘Bhopal’) of India. Likewise, the ‘Kousi’ community that lives on the bank of the river ‘Tigavu’ of Persia arguably went from ‘Kasi’ or ‘Varanasi’ or ‘Benares’ in India. Quoting several European thinkers like Max Müller and Sir William Jones, Kulamani Dash concludes triumphantly: In our earlier essays we have tried to prove that belief in God and the Almighty went from the Vedas to Zenda Avasta, and subsequently to the Bible in a distorted and degraded form. Those who advocate the theory of evolution, what arguments can they show to counteract against this view? The proof and the evidence that we have furnished earlier, do they not defeat the claims of evolution?

Dash concludes his argument of the Vedas as the source of all religions in the following words: We have travelled along the banks of the river of Dharma (Religion) and travelled to the source of the river. Koran and Bible have taken us to Zenda Avasta, and Zenda Avasta to the Vedas. We have not been able to travel further. Once there, we notice that the stream of Religion that flows from heaven is lost amidst a mound of ice. Are we therefore not correct in our belief that the Vedas are a source of all Religions?

While one can legitimately have respect for one’s own religion and cultural traditions, clearly Kulamani Dash seems to go overboard in his sweeping claims and assertions. To believe in a comparative study of religions is one thing, but to argue that world religions have only one source namely the Vedas, and that the rivers and places in Persia are invariably named after Indian names, is clearly far-fetched. The fact that this article was part of a series in Utkal Sahitya seems to enjoy an editorial approval unless the editor himself was trying to cater to different sides without endorsing any particular view point or argument.

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Conclusion It would thus be seen that the new historiography that was attempted in the public domain by the authors and the reading public in Odisha during the Raj, was largely marshaled for the sake of ethnic self-esteem and community building exercises. Historiography of the Western kind was at times mimicked, as in the hands of Fakir Mohan, for resisting the cultural hegemony of the colonial state. Others such as Birupaksha Kar, enormously popular in his own time, used the new ‘historiography’ for constructing a maritime tradition for the sake of a new linguistic community.

Notes 1. See G. Toynbee, A sketch of the History of Orissa: From 1803 to 1828, Jagatsinghpur: Prafulla, 2005. 2. Satya P. Mohanty, Colonialism, Modernity, Literature: A View from India, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 3. Quoted in Six Acres and a Third (Chha Mana Atha Guntha), tr. Rabi Shankar Mishra, Satya P. Mohanty, Jatindra K. Nayak, and Paul St-Pierre, Delhi: Penguin Books, India, 2006, first published by the University of California Press, 2005. 4. A crowd reportedly gathered in the court premises at Cuttack believing that the evil-doer Ramachandra Mangaraj would be tried for his crimes which was reported in the novel in the serialized form in Utkal Sahitya. 5. Chha Mana Atha Guntha, op. cit., pp. 21-2. 6. See Bishnu Mohapatra, ‘Ways of Belonging: The Kanchi Kaveri Legend and the Construction of Oriya Identity,’ Studies in History, vol. 12, no. 2, 1996. 7. Utkal Sahitya, Kartika, 1328 Sala, no. 7.

CHAPTER 16

Bangladesh Striving towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region S Y E D M U N TA S I R M A M U N

This paper is part of a long scholarly document that traces the evolution of Bangladesh as a geo-political entity since ancient times to the war of liberation that led to the emergence of Soverign Bangladesh. Here the author traces the developments since 1971 to show how the new policy is striving towards the creation of a zone of peace and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region. [editor]

The idea of the paper is to look at history and connections from the angle of an alien trying to make sense of what is, what was and what all could be. The lenses utilized are that of a human adventurer. The future prescribed is that of an industrial society – marked by empathy rather than apathy. The objective of the paper is to one day build a zone of unprecedented peace, prosperity and happiness between the 80 and 100° East and the 20 and 30° North.

The Grand Vision Grand visions grow out of facts of the past, appreciation of the present and ideas of the future. In our very lifetime we have seen profound changes. The changes that we are experiencing as countries and as communities are nothing less than transforma-

206  Syed Muntasir Mamun tive. These changes are affecting the way we live and work, and in general, visualize our countries and us. In a nutshell, we live in exciting times. The last one hundred years have seen two world wars, six wars of extraordinary magnitude, even a Cold War, end of essentially European colonization, formation of the United Nations, and many other regional and strategic groups, oil spikes and energy troughs, and thirty years later property shocks and dot-combubbles, internet and networkcentric configurations in business, administration and knowledge. But these are to name only a few. There are so many more and the time is so short that we would be obliged to refer to all of them in a set and call them our new existential paradigm. We would characterize these changes as evolution – as metamorphosis – in our being as humans, as conscious creatures cognizant of his time, context and place in the history of civilization itself. What fascinate us are the ideas that we are toying with for the future. What would the future hold? Que sera, sera. The theme of this paper is ‘Shared Opportunity, Shared Prosperity’s. The paper aims at moving towards ‘prosperity’ by forming ‘regional partnerships’ both east and west across the vast socio-economic landscape of the three countries, Bangladesh, India and China, and connect the historic roots of the interplay of the two dominant civilizations over at least one thousand and five hundred years to form new routes of transmission of wealth, power, energy and people-to-people connectivity. We must remember that these are strong words and very articulate directions. Strong constructs, nuanced with diplomatic undertones, which have a host of complex concepts and variables associated with them. Connected by history, geography, heritage and synchretic faith systems – which transcend and permeate through the boundaries of republics, religions, and colours – the conceptual frameworks which determine the nature and functioning of the three countries focused – flow through the boundaries of the south, the east and the south-east. Nations in this region have a very generic and common set of goals and challenges in the sphere of economy and society. Although located at different levels of human development, one

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way or the other these young countries and ancient nations share very similar dreams, prosperity, development, food, democracy, just to name a few again. To us in Bangladesh, prosperity is not only economic in nature. Rather, economic prosperity is only a mere sub-set of the paradigm of human, societal and ecological well-being that we understand. Prosperity, to us, is inclusive. Prosperity to us is not only in building tall sky-scrapers and fleets of ocean-going vessels and large multiplex theatres but also the capability of the community or the society to sustain the human life form in all its magnificent glory. Prosperity to us is the ability of the state system to enable the individual to live with pride and dignity. Access to nutrition, shelter, health, education, and an otherwise decent living is all part of the prosperity that we understand. This forms the core vision of the Father of the Nation of Bangladesh, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and this is also situated at the heart of the vision of the Government of Bangladesh led by his able daughter, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Given such a backdrop, this is where we see the pan-BangladeshIndia-China partnerships coming into play. We believe that Bangladesh is the missing link between the two great civilizations, which have suffered, endured and triumphed over the test of time. For millennia, we have lived, loved and prospered together. What suddenly makes us different from one another? We don’t see a reason. And therefore, we endorse to take the idea of reconnecting the ancient value-based chains and networks of service, production, trade, commerce and communication into its pristine natural configurations. Since days have changed and times have passed, a host of value-added services and productions possibilities have been added to the paradigm of our interconnectedness. Telecommunications, power, energy, university and skill-building centres, hospitals and hospitality services have been added to the regional and subregional architecture of cooperation. We believe in synergy and leverages. And we see a great possibility of synergy in the way that we could connect, reconnect and network in meaningful subsistence. We must remember that the aspiration of our peoples in all our countries has significantly

208  Syed Muntasir Mamun changed. Our boys and girls now dream of conquering not only the Mars and the Moon, but also, the outreaches of the universe. This is serious matter. Our peoples have finally started to dream and that too, dream big! We must do all that we can to ensure that their dreams can be fulfilled and that we as countries and peoples can live, and grow with them and their dreams. Let’s energize these dreams! Governments cannot do anything alone. It has to be a partnership between the private and the public sectors to achieve the maximum and optimize the sets of resources and possibilities available at our disposal. It is thus imperative that we do not only make the policies and rules, but that we effectively implement all those to boost both South Asian trade and trading with their Southeast and East Asian brethren. Better connectivity in the value-networks and instilling a component of trust amongst the nations party to such a Grand Design is crucial in this regard. The leadership of the region must demonstrate determined and forward-looking ‘political will’ to bring peace and prosperity to the region which, in spite of its glorious past, remains least integrated in the world of the day. Our firm conviction is that with proper and visionary integration of the socio-economic processes, countries in this definitional paradigm could come together in meaningful ways and bring about revolutionary changes in the way people all over the world look at us. There was a saying of the ‘Ibu People’, which went like this, ‘You are, therefore, I am; and since I am, therefore, you are’. The best network is not a cartel of petrochemicals and weapons rather, the best network is the network of the intelligent mind. Today, we are looking at this question with great expectations. We see intelligent minds coming together on a single platform – where they turn the baggage of history and heritage into a playground of wealth and prosperity. Our anchors are connecting two geospatial topographies of the Indian subcontinent and the Chinese Middle Kingdom into a seamless flux of production, trade and investment concentric to the Bay of Bengal and extending the

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zone into the trading ecosystem of the world in general – which can transmute value generated into tangible gains for humanity. The defining parameters, which we would expect to characterize the nature of involvement, thus are, Economy, Ecology and Security. The following sections will detail a politico-economic history of Bengal to reconstruct a clear idea of how this part of the world has played the role of a connector between the two great civilizations and between the both with the rest of the world through the ages and in the process has shined bright with prosperity.

South-East Asia from Ptolemy’s Geography. Source: The British Library Harley MS 7182 (Ref: The 11th Map of Asia (Descriptio Undecimae Tabulae Asiae) from Ptolemy’s Geography, Depicting India beyond the Ganges (India extra Gangem) and the Land of the Sinae in South-East Asia. British Library Harley MS 7182, 15th century.)

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Shifting Boundaries: Staunch Allegiances Both India and China play host to a plethora of languages, peoples, lifestyles, and imaginations. For more than five thousand years of virtually recorded history, and at any given point in time, there was more than one contending King of India claiming for dominance as the King-Emperor India. Not surprisingly, all kings were Kings of India. Map references changed, boundaries melted and reconstructed themselves, but the fact remained that the subcontinent never chose to shut itself off to the outside world. A closer look at the evolution of the map of Bengal can clearly identify the stakes, which have moved and evolved over the course of a thousand years. The politico-economic boundaries and attempts to redraw them from time to time have affected the natural flow of production, service, trade and investment and also the formulations in the combination of productive capabilities. It has also affected the way the associated civilizations components have evolved. Because the history of Bengal is so critically important in understanding the psyche which goes into the making of the modern Bangladesh and the national constituents associated with it. Without a proper understanding of how the region has evolved so far it might be difficult to understand how it would evolve in the future. India and Pakistan emerged as two independent dominions as per the India Independence Act passed by the British parliament on 18 July 1947. By the same stroke the province of Bengal was divided into East Bengal and West Bengal. East Bengal became a part of Pakistan and West Bengal that of India. The province of ‘East Bengal’ was born on 14 August 1947 and its nomenclature was changed to ‘East Pakistan’ on 8 September 1955. The bureaucrats were at the centre of all administrative power since the emergence of Pakistan. The representation of East Pakistan in the bureaucracy was very nominal. Out of 42,000 officers in the central government of Pakistan in 1956, the number of people from East Pakistan was a mere 2,900. As Islamabad the capital of the country, the West Pakistanis got a monopoly of jobs in government offices and courts. Due to the geographic distance, it was not possible for the people of East Pakistan to appear at

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interviews to get those jobs. Besides, it was not easy for the Bengali students to achieve success in different competitive examinations before Bangla was recognized as a state language in 1956. In this situation, the disparity between East and West Pakistan in administration widened day by day. The proportion of East Pakistanis in the foreign service in 1962 was 20.8 per cent; the proportion of East and West Pakistanis among the officers of defence services was 10:90. It was observed in the field of education that whereas West Pakistan was allocated a sum of Rs. 1,530 crore during 1948-55, East Pakistan was sanctioned a mere Rs. 240 crore (13.5 per cent) during that period. During the period 1947-55, only 10 per cent of total expenditure of the central government were spent in East Pakistan. Whereas Rs. 1496.2 million were spent in the development sector in West Pakistan during the period, the amount spent in East Pakistan was only Rs. 514.7 million. Three capital cities were built in West Pakistan (Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad) in phases during the Pakistan era. An amount of Rs. 5,700 million was spent till 1956 for Karachi alone in order to build it up as the capital city. This was 56.4 per cent of the total expenditure for East Pakistan, its share in the total expenditure during the period being only 5.10 per cent. Whereas Rs. 3,000 million were spent for the development of Islamabad until 1967, the amount spent for development of Dhaka was a meagre Rs. 250 million. Due to the location of the capital and the head offices of different civil and military departments in West Pakistan, the West Pakistanis got sweeping benefit in the fields of employment, outlays for construction of buildings, furniture, residences for staff, etc., and the employment opportunities generated from construction and supplies. The demand for autonomy of East Pakistan became stronger due to discriminations it endured in different fields; failure to get desired results from elections and the inadequate defence status of the province.

The Emergence of Bangladesh On 10 April 1971, the leaders of Awami League (AL) formed the government-in-exile headed by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur

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The Emergence of Bangladesh (1971) Source: Political Maps of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office Library (http://lib. pmo.gov.bd/maps/)

Rahman as the president. Syed Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmed took the charge of vice-president and prime minister respectively. In the absence of the president (who was in jail in Pakistan), the vice-president took up the responsibilities of the state. On 17 April 1971 the government-in-exile (also known as Mujibnagar Sarkar) took oath at Baidyanathtala under Meherpur district. With the surrender of the Pakistani army at the Dhaka Racecourse Maidan on 16 December 1971 ended the war of liberation. Fast forward forty-three years and we are in the midst of an evolution – a paradigm shift that has claimed a thorough introspection for today – to reconnect the boundaries into the greater paradigm of the world.

It’s the Bangladesh Economy, Fool! East Bengal, the eastern segment of Bengal, has been historically an important centre of trade and commerce since at least the first millennium bce. The Ganges Delta provided advantages of a mild, almost tropical climate, fertile soil, ample water, and an abundance

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of fish, wildlife, and fruit. The standard of living is believed to have been higher compared with other parts of South Asia. As early as the thirteenth century, the region was developing as an agrarian economy. The region was a junction on the south-west Silk Route, and commercial centres emerged at several ancient and historical cities across the region. Under Mughal rule, the region flourished as the centre of the worldwide muslin trade. The British, however, on their arrival in the late eighteenth century, chose to develop Calcutta, now the capital city of West Bengal, as their commercial and administrative centre in South Asia. The development of East Bengal was thereafter limited to agriculture. The administrative infrastructure of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reinforced East Bengal’s function as the primary agricultural producer – chiefly of rice, tea, teak, cotton, sugar cane and jute – for processors and traders from around Asia and beyond. According to the International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh was ranked as the 48th largest economy in the world in 2009, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $256 billion. The economy has grown at a constant average of 6-7 per cent per annum over the past few years. However, there really is no secret to the self-sufficiency of Bangladesh from Foreign Aid. Foreign Aid dependence, primarily, was a result of economic setbacks suffered by the nation due to a series of both man-made disasters and the recurrence of natural calamities of rather immeasurable magnitude for much of the nineteenth century.

Economic Reforms in the Country Bangladesh has undergone a host of economic reforms since its independence. But to understand what drove the policy planners in Bangladesh towards adoption of different means towards the economic emancipation of its people, we have to look at the history behind. A SOCIALISTIC STREAK

Bangladesh, erstwhile East Bengal – the eastern segment of Bengal – was a prosperous region of Asia until modern times. It had the advantages of a mild, almost tropical climate, fertile soil, ample

214  Syed Muntasir Mamun sweet water resources, and an abundance of fish, wildlife, and fruit. As early as the thirteenth century, the region was developing as an agrarian economy. Trading centres interspersed the countryside too, and Dhaka in particular grew into an important entrepôt during the Mughal Empire. The Partition of British India and the emergence of India and Pakistan in 1947 severely disrupted the former colonial economic system that had preserved East Bengal (now Bangladesh) as a producer of jute, rice and other agro commodities for the rest of British India. East Pakistan – as an independent and segregated country – had to build a new industrial base and modernize agriculture in the midst of a rapidly expanding population. Pakistan’s five-year plans opted for a development strategy based on industrialization, but the major share of the development budget went to West Pakistan, that is, contemporary Pakistan. The sudden disruption in the flow of natural resources and natural economic hinterlands caused by the Partition meant that East Pakistan was heavily dependent on imports, creating a balance of payments problem. As early as the 1960s, without support from the central government to either the undertaking of a substantial industrialization programme or towards adequate agrarian expansion, the economy of East Pakistan started to decline. After the devastating War of Liberation in 1971, Bangladesh worked hard to regain its economic composure. The first Government of Bangladesh, under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, undertook a policy of industrialization with an egalitarian welfare focus. It started off with a socialist streak by nationalizing the industrial installations left marooned by the West Pakistani regime. Though a series of privatization followed as soon as the government could establish some form of order in the war-ravaged country, for much of the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was rather a policy of balancing the current accounts of the government (i.e. the revenue budget) with the assistance of foreign aid (primarily food/staples aid). A large and growing population had to be fed. And much needed social and administrative infrastructure had to be either rebuilt or built from scratch. The sources of government revenue from direct taxation, like customs,

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excise, and income taxes, were low due to the stagnant economic growth of the overall economy – with much credit to the successive military regimes, which installed themselves after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975.

Winds of Change In the mid-1980s though, there were encouraging signs of progress. Economic policies aimed at (i) encouraging private enterprise and investment, (ii) privatizing public industries, (iii) reinstating budgetary discipline, and (iv) liberalizing the import regime were accelerated. The major objectives of this planned development initiative was geared towards (i) increased national income, (ii) rural development, (iii) self-sufficiency in food, and (iv) increased industrial production. However, progress in achieving development goals was slow. Political turmoil and untamed natural hazards of cyclone and flooding have combined with external economic shocks to persistently derail economic plans. Bangladesh’s First Five Year Plan (1973-8) aimed to increase economic growth by 5.5 per cent annually, but actual growth averaged only 4 per cent per year. A special two-year plan (1978-80), stressing rural development, also fell short of its projected growth target, as did the Second Five Year Plan (1980-5), which targeted 7.2 per cent annual growth. The Third Five Year Plan (1985-90) had a 5.4 per cent annual growth target though only 3.8 per cent was actually achieved.

Economic Liberalization of the 1990s In 1991, with the reinstitution of elected government, a new economic programme was initiated that included financial sector reform (FSR) and liberalization measures to encourage (i) higher levels of investment in productive capabilities, (ii) enhanced revenue efforts (realized largely through implementation of a value-added-tax), and (iii) tight monetary policy. Income transfer measures, Food-for-Work, and other programmes were also implemented to help protect the poorest segments of the

216  Syed Muntasir Mamun population from the transitional effects of structural reform. From 1991 to 1993, the government successfully followed an enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but failed to follow through on reforms in large part because of preoccupation with the government’s domestic political troubles. In the late 1990s the government’s economic policies became more entrenched, and some of the early gains were lost, which was highlighted by a precipitous drop in foreign direct investment in 2000 and 2001. Unfortunately, a renewed political turmoil from 1994 to 1996 reduced the final average annual growth rate under the Fourth Five Year Plan (19905) to 4.15 per cent (short of the 5 per cent target), albeit the best performance so far under an economic plan in an independent Bangladesh. The 1996 elections brought renewed economic stability. Exports grew 14 per cent over 1996, and GDP growth for 19967 rose to 5.5 per cent as the economy rebounded. Devastating floods during 1998 and 1999 caused some economic slowdown but this was balanced by unprecedented growth in production of natural gas and electricity production sectors. Average annual GDP growth under the Fourth Five Year Plan rose to 5.3 per cent. Many new jobs – mostly for women – were created by the country’s dynamic private ready-made garment industry, which grew at double-digit rates through most of the 1990s. By the late 1990s, about 1.5 million people, mostly women, were employed in the garment sector as well as leather products specially footwear (shoe manufacturing unit). During 2001-2, export earnings from readymade garments reached $3,125 million, representing 52 per cent of Bangladesh’s total exports.

Trade not Aid As a brief backgrounder, external assistance has played a vital role in the economic development of Bangladesh, assisting in bridging the internal gap (savings-investment gap) and the external gap (export-import gap). The costs, risks and maturity structure related to external debt management analysis are important.

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The cost of external debt is low as the most of the foreign loans received are through the concessional window of IDA, ADB and the Government of Japan.1 The structure of maturity of the external debt of Bangladesh is composed of medium and long-term debts with an average grace period of ten years and a repayment period of twenty years. With the shrinkage of share of grant aid in the external aid package in recent years, the volume of external borrowings is increasing which has resulted in a progressive increase of per capita debt obligation, which stood at US $139.9 in 2006. From 1972 to 30 June 2006, a total of about US $53.93 billion of foreign assistance was committed of which about US $44.83 billion of aid was disbursed. 44.74 per cent of the disbursed aid was grants and 55.26 per cent was loans. In 2007, Bangladesh received $1631 million as foreign economic assistance of which $1040 was loan while the amount of grant was $590, almost half of the amount received as loan. Aid is received from both multilateral and bilateral sources. The multilateral sources include World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) and other UN organizations. The bilateral donors include individual countries.2 Interestingly, with the passage of time, there has been a significant change in the composition of aid to Bangladesh over the years. The key features demonstrate the fact that the share of grants has been decreasing steadily over the past few decades. The share of grants which was 89 per cent in 1971/3 has reduced to only 31.9 per cent in 2006. The declining volume of grants resulted in a larger share of loans in the total aid package. Bilateral aid has shown a declining trend whereas multilateral aid has increased positively over the years. Bilateral aid that was 75.4 per cent of total aid in 1973/8 has declined to about 43.8 per cent in 2005. Multilateral aid, on the other hand, has grown from 24.6 per cent to about 56.2 per cent in 2005. The flow of food aid and commodity aid has shown a declining trend while project aid has increased sharply from 1.3 per cent of total aid in 1971-2 to 93.8 per cent in 2006. The shrinking contribution of foreign aid in the economic well-being of the country stemmed from three principle sources:

218  Syed Muntasir Mamun (i) strengthening of the internal revenue management system of the country by means of widening the tax-net (both direct and indirect; in different proportions), (ii) balancing the external payments mechanism with trade and remittances, and (iii) with the changing policy paradigm of the development partners with regards to the conditionalities attached to the aid disbursed. With the installation of a democratic form of governance in the early 1990s, the economic well-being of the country took an upswing. Since the establishment of a civilian government in 1991, the economic impetus of Bangladesh has been: (i) to diversify its economy – by adding new means of income generation, (ii) to reform its agricultural sector – coupled with land reforms, (iii) to expand its industrial sector, (iv) to liberalize the trade regime, and (v) to institute a social safety net based on employment generation through the private and informal sector.

Internal Factors In the early 1990s, while Bangladesh was struggling to solve its economic difficulties and eliminate poverty, it achieved impressive growth in many of the constituent areas, including manufacturing and agriculture. With much difficulty, the government tried to implement recommendations for conducting structural adjustments, which included (i) relinquishing its socialist orientation and state control over the economy, (ii) decentralization of economic management, and (iii) privatization (of the economy). With structural adjustments and enhancement of the tax-net – especially after introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT), the government’s potential for revenue generation from internal sources was greatly augmented. Early 1990s was the time since when Bangladesh started to develop a fresh impetus to draw its strengths from internal resources – rather than depending on the stringent constituency of foreign aid. The situation alleviated to a great extent with the take-off by the RMG sector as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and the influx of remittance from expatriate Bangladesh nationals.

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External Factors Added, the political economy of foreign aid, its focus, magnitude, composition and operational modalities has also undergone important changes over the last decades. Over the last two decades, especially. The range of policy conditionalities imposed is now being extended to areas far beyond the traditional structural adjustment policies derived from the so-called Washington Consensus. Studies suggest that among the new areas of interest to donors, as either preconditions for or as corollaries to aid, are the growing emphasis: (i) on dealing with the non-government sector, (ii) on upholding human rights, promoting democracy, and (iii) on emphasizing good governance. This reconstruction of the aid agenda was incorporated into the design of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by the Government, where aid recipients were expected to assume ownership over this conduit between the Washington Consensus with the newer aid priorities of the Development Partners. From a different viewpoint, it is also true that while the flow of foreign aid is on the wane in Bangladesh, the absorptive capacity of foreign aid is also a serious concern for the country. A low aid absorption capacity often leads to a vicious cycle of ‘low absorptionlow development-low aid’. While it has been suggested time and again that the government should not look at aid as a source for overcoming weaknesses in fiscal management, and rather it should be seen as a source for enhancing investments, it remains true that (i) multiple controls, (ii) ad hoc procedures, (iii) divergence between development and revenue budgets, and (iv) undefined ministerial jurisdiction are the major factors contributing to the weak implementation of aid financed development programmes inside the country.

The Future We must bear in mind that the role of aid is primarily twofold: (i) meeting immediate needs for poverty alleviation, and (ii) capacity building for self-sufficiency in localized administrative paradigms.

220  Syed Muntasir Mamun It has been argued that Bangladesh is now evolving from an aid- to a trade-dependent economy. The fact of growing regional export concentration during the 1990s in the markets of the EU and the USA, with a single product, namely readymade garments (RMG), is now playing a more important role in defining Bangladesh’s foreign policy than its need for aid. While in the 1980s Bangladesh’s foreign policy was targeted to ensure an uninterrupted flow of foreign aid, today, Bangladesh’s aid dependence is focused on the international and regional financial institutions. Only a few bilateral development partners, such as Japan, are largely delinked from Bangladesh’s trade relations whilst remaining an important source of FDI. In contrast, the EU, which is Bangladesh’s principal trading partner, lets its individual members develop their own bilateral aid relation with Bangladesh, whilst their role as an individual aid donor is much less significant. Experts and administrators alike have underscored low levels of association between aid flow and poverty. Based on a disaggregated analysis of aid flows during the two previous decades, one can trace the dynamics of the aid and foreign exchange gap in Bangladesh, and the diminishing but critical role of aid in government finances. While food aid is not an important element of the aid flow, it is still critically important towards improving human development indicators as part of the global commitment of Bangladesh to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). An Intersectoral Analysis by the Center for Policy Dialogue shows that over the past decade there is continuing erosion in the importance of aid for public investment in Bangladesh – but it has remained important for the MDG-related sectors (e.g. health and education) as well as for rural income and employment supportive sectors (e.g. transport and communications).

Expansionary Policies in the New Millennium The economic story of Bangladesh after the year 2000 – should we take 2000 as a milestone – is that of parallel regimes. From the public sector, fiscal 2000 was marked by a sharp increase in

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monetary expansion due to unprecedented borrowing from the banking sector (though the sale of treasury bills) to cover budget shortfalls due. Domestic borrowing increased primarily due to the reduced availability of external concessional financing. What Bangladesh used to receive in foreign aid disbursements equivalent to about 6 per cent of GDP, declined to a level of 34 per cent of the GDP. Moreover, according to the IMF, much of the domestic borrowing was being used to cover recurrent expenses such as wage and salary increases. The revenue to GDP ratio rose in 2001 from 8.5 to 9.4 per cent, but this improvement was more than offset by expenditure to GDP ratios of 14.4 and 14.1 per cent, creating budget deficits amounting to 5.9 and 5 per cent, in 2000 and 2001 respectively. The drain on foreign reserves from domestic borrowing contributed to reducing the foreign exchange cover for imports to imprudent levels of two months in 2000 and one-and a-half months in 2001. However, at the same time, the private sector managed to cope successfully with the ‘crowding out’ effect of the government’s expansionary policies. Bangladesh’s textile industry, which includes knitwear and readymade garments along with specialized textile products, accounted for 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s exports of $15.56 billion in 2009. The industry employs nearly 3.5 million workers. Current exports doubled since 2004. Bangladesh overtook India in apparel exports in 2009, its exports stood at $2.66 billion US dollar, ahead of India’s $2.27 billion. Despite apprehensions that Bangladesh might lose out to exporters from China and India following the phase-out of the MFA quotas, its share in global apparel and textile exports has remained stable and export volumes have continued their robust growth. The country’s main markets are the EU and the US and its imports are dominated in general by machinery and textiles, with China and India being the most important sources of imports. Bangladesh also has substantial unrecorded trade with its neighbour India. Labour exports are also important, with remittance inflows at about 9 per cent of GDP.

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Trade Liberalization Bangladesh launched a deep and wide-ranging trade reform strategy in the early 1990s.3 This included (i) substantial reduction and rationalization of tariffs, (ii) removal of quantitative restrictions, (iii) move from multiple to a unified exchange rate system, (iv) instituting convertible current accounts, and (v) an overall outward orientation of trade policy regime. As a result, the country’s trade integration, measured by the trade-GDP ratio, rose from 18 per cent in 1990 to 43 per cent in 2008. The role of private sector driven export growth and diversification has been emphasized in Bangladesh’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, making export-led growth a key thrust of its poverty reduction and growth strategies. Historically, like many other developing countries Bangladesh relied on tariffs and quantitative restrictions to protect domestic activities and raise revenue. Roughly 40 per cent of its total tax revenue still comes from import taxes. Average protective tariffs are currently at 20.1 per cent, with average agricultural tariff at 28.8 per cent and non-agricultural tariff at 18.5 per cent. A noteworthy feature of the present tariff structure is the significant application of paratariff called supplementary duties, which account for about 31 per cent of the average protection. The average customs duty, which registers a decrease over time, is currently 13.8 per cent with four non-zero duty slabs of 3, 7, 12 and 25 per cent. Food stuff, fertilizer, seed, plastic trays used in poultry and dairy, medicines and raw cottons are not subject to any custom duty. Some consumer goods, mainly the non-food luxury items, have high protective rates even up to 463 per cent – well beyond the top custom duty rate. Despite the trade liberalization reforms initiated in 1990s, Bangladesh is still high on restrictions on the trade policy regimes. Although half of the country’s GDP comes from the service sector, liberalization of this sector leading to export of services is not satisfactory yet. Bangladesh faces a more favourable market access in developed markets because of its LDC status, but is yet to fully exploit this opportunity. Cumbersome customs and border

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procedures and an inefficient duty drawback system, in addition to the high import duties, contributed to this outcome. The remaining trade barriers work against the emergence of new export activities and expansion of the export activities to nonenclave areas. It is no surprise then that the export base is heavily concentrated in garments, the sector facing the most liberal import regime largely because of its access to bonded warehouse facility. RMG exports account for about 75 per cent of merchandise exports. The extension of the bonded warehouse facility in 2008 to all 100 per cent export-oriented sectors should help promote greater export diversification. Recent measures to liberalize the banking and telecommunication sectors are also welcome. Future trade liberalization programme needs to focus on (i) reduction in the dispersion and average level of protection, (ii) promotion of services export, (iii) reduction of the reliance on limited number of goods through diversification of exports, (iv) promotion of more efficient handling of custom and border procedures, and (v) a more efficient duty drawback system.

Growth Outlook for the Year 2011 Government of Bangladesh has initiated budget reforms under Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF). MTBF will assist in improving the overall quality of planning and budgetary process and also enhancing the quality and effectiveness of public expenditure. Multi-year budget horizon provides ministries the space and flexibility they need to formulate, plan and implement policies that focus on public service delivery or ‘outputs’. MTBF reforms were successfully pilot implemented in Ministry of Health and Ministry of Population Welfare from FY 2005-6. These are now being rolled out to other line ministries in a phased manner. From FY 2006-7 MTBF reforms have been extended to Ministry of Education, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and Ministry of Women Development. Ministry of Finance, being the central ministry has also initiated implementation of MTBF reforms which are in advanced stages of completion. In order to

224  Syed Muntasir Mamun provide solid foundation and sustainability to MTBF reforms, each ministry under MTBF will be undergoing a three year implementation framework. The objective is to build on the experience, develop capacity and demonstrate real results in spending outcomes. The Ministry of Finance has developed a ‘Strategy Paper’ for rolling out budget reforms under MTBF which has been approved at the highest levels of government. The ‘Strategy Paper’ articulates Government of Bangladesh’s approach towards introduction of comprehensive budget reforms under MTBF. It also addresses a number of other reform issues facing the public expenditure management systems in Bangladesh. The World Bank Group’s GDP growth forecast is projected to be 6.1-6.3 per cent in FY 2011. This estimate is largely based on proposed higher public and private investment. However, the group has projected several downside risks too. A weak global recovery (from the financial meltdown) could dampen the recovery in exports and further slow down remittances. But the key issue is domestic – energy shortages, which pose the biggest threat to an increase in growth rates. In the year 2010, growth came mainly from the services and industrial sectors driven by growth in consumption, which contributed 4.2 percentage points. Key reasons include: (i) strong remittance inflows, (ii) rebound in construction activities, and (iii) growth in rural non-farm activities. All these and more supported the growth in consumption. Problems remained with a stagnant investment paradigm (which remained at 24.4 per cent of GDP). Some experts suggest that weaknesses in the investment climate, rather than financing of investment, continue to constrain growth. The ongoing and prospective changes in tax policy and administration remain critical for Bangladesh’s growth prospects. The government is also progressing fast on reducing structural constraints to investment. There has been some improvement in the institutional framework for facilitating public and private investments such as Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, PublicPrivate Partnership (PPP) guidelines, Bangladesh Infrastructure Finance Fund (BIFF).

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As far as the external trade is concerned, exports and the terms of trade appear to have deteriorated. Bangladesh’s exports achieved a growth rate of 4.1 per cent for the year after declining for much of FY 2010 (year-to-year). The positive trend continued in the first two months of FY 2011 with a growth rate of 28.8 per cent. Exports of readymade garments have grown at 1.2 per cent in FY 2010, which is the slowest growth since FY 2002, while the volume of manufactured goods increased by a rate of 5.2 per cent. The global recession caused a drop in retail sales in Bangladesh’s main export destinations. During the period May-July of FY 2010, exports of readymade garments to the US and Germany – the two largest export markets – declined by 4.1 and 7.9 per cent respectively. Total remittance inflows to Bangladesh grew strongly for most of FY 2010, but the monthly pace slowed down and turned negative at the end of the fiscal year. In FY 2010, remittances reached $ 11 billion, a 13.4 per cent increase compared to last year. However, between January-June 2010 the growth rate was only 5.2 per cent, from 22.8 per cent during July-December 2009. Preliminary data for July-August 2010 show a continuation of the downward trend, with remittance inflows declining by 0.8 per cent. Foreign exchange reserves are rising. The external current account surplus rose to US $3.7 billion in FY 2010, over 50 per cent higher than previous year. Recognizing the importance of reliable power for industrial growth, the government is contracting domestic and foreign private power producers on an emergency basis. While providing such power would help sustain growth, it also imposes additional fiscal costs. The additional fiscal cost of the new power agreements is estimated to be between Tk 52.4 billion and 55.8 billion, which is equivalent to 0.67-0.72 per cent of GDP. Considering the loss of production that would result from inadequate electricity, such power agreements may be unavoidable at the moment. But the government is seriously considering this as an expensive and short-term solution – while implementing long-term strategies for improving power supply remains on the table. The government formed by the Grand Alliance has mentioned in its Election Manifesto that they believe in long term perspective

226  Syed Muntasir Mamun planning and medium term strategic planning. Government would like to set future goal and to achieve that, it has mentioned about Vision for 2021. Now the government has started to concretize that Vision. The time span for perspective planning should have been more spread out. But considering golden jubilee of Bangladesh’s Independence, government has decided to limit its Charter for Change to 2021. But it can be hoped that at the last year of this government’s term, it will leave a draft perspective planning for 2035/40. The government has already started drafting the five year plan (2011‐15). The government has built on the initiative taken by the caretaker government. The five-year plan will provide strategic direction to the grand alliance government for the next 4 years. A detailed update report on the government’s success in attaining the Vision 2021 can be found in the following link: http:// www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/me/mes_en_july_sep_10.pdf ? phpMyAdmin=GqNisTr562C5oxdV%2CEruqlWwoM5&phpMy Admin=XRGktGpDJ7v31TJLuZ5xtAQmRx9

Foreign Investment and Economic Growth Development economists generally concur that the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) can play a vital role in the growth dynamics of developing economies. It is generally accepted that the inflow of FDI in developing countries can help fill at least three ‘development gaps’ – first, the ‘investment gap’ by providing capital for domestic investment; second, the ‘foreign exchange gap’ by providing foreign currency through initial investments and subsequent export earnings made possible by the initial investments; and finally, the ‘tax revenue gap’ by generating tax revenues through additional economic activities.4 The stock market capitalization of the Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh crossed $ 10 billion in November 2007 and the $30 billion mark in 2009, and US $50 billion in August 2010. Bangladesh had one of the best performing stock markets in the world during the recent global recession, due to relatively low correlations with developed country stock markets. FDI has played

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Foreign Investment and Economic Growth (figure projected by the author from his personal research)

a key role in the modernization of the Bangladesh economy for the last fifteen years. There was an inflow of $666 million foreign direct investment in 2007, which raised significantly in 2008 to $1086 million. As of June 2009, inflows of FDI recorded to $358 million. In the year 2009-10 (February), there were 89 new foreign and joint venture investment projects registered to BOI which amount to $590 million. The projects were invested to mainly in the service, engineering, clothing and agricultural sectors.

Major Institutional Framework in Motion The division of the Indian subcontinent was arbitrary, to say the least. The flaws from the economic standpoints were understood from the very initial years of the divison. But the road back to normalcy was hacked to a circuitious nature due to the entrenched coteries, which had taken hold of the state mechanism of various nation states after the partition. An obvious response was through the multilateral route. Several intitiatives are underway to reconnect the older value chains at the Track I. Most prominent amongst them being the

228  Syed Muntasir Mamun South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)5 and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).6 Slightly newer yet probably more effective formations include the SAGQ: South Asian Growth Quadrangle7 and the BCIM-EC: Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.8 From the Chinese side, there is serious effort to reconnect the value chains as well. The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ are initiatives first introduced by President Xi in the fall of 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively. They are expected to feature prominently in China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which will run from 2016 to 2020 and guide national investment strategy throughout that period. Often referred to jointly as the ‘One Belt, One Road’, details released so far by China’s official media outlets show the ‘Belt’ as a planned network of overland road and rail routes, oil and natural gas pipelines, and other infrastructure projects that will stretch from Xi’an in central China, through Central Asia, and ultimately reach as far as Moscow, Rotterdam, and Venice. The ‘Road’ is its maritime equivalent: a network of planned port and other coastal infrastructure projects that dot the map from South and Southeast Asia to East Africa and the northern Mediterranean Sea. The new Belt and Road plan, jointly released by the NDRC and the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, highlights that the scope of the initiative will extend well beyond infrastructure construction. The programme will also include efforts to promote greater financial integration and use of the Renminbi by foreign countries, create an ‘Information Silk Road’ linking regional information and communications technology networks, and lower barriers to cross-border trade and investment in the region, among other initiatives. New regional institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Silk Road Fund (NSRF), are also designed in part to complement and support the Belt and Road’s development. The plan is also notable for its mixing of traditional Chinese diplomatic language (e.g., emphasizing sovereignty and nonintervention) alongside a newer rhetorical focus on adherence

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to high standards and international norms and the ‘decisive’ role of the market and industry in driving the initiative. This echoes the pledge made by China’s leadership at the November 2013 Third Plenum to ‘give the market a decisive role in resource allocation’, but it remains to be seen whether or not market forces and commercial considerations will in fact play a critical role in driving the new Silk Road forward. There are important economic and geopolitical drivers of the initiative, though Beijing is likely more focused on the former at present given its domestic economic challenges. Specifically, the Chinese leadership is making an attempt to manage a complex transition to a ‘new normal’ of relatively slower and yet more sustainable economic growth. The infrastructure projects proposed as part of the Belt and Road – many of which would run through some of China’s poorest and least developed regions – could provide stimulus to help cushion the effects of this deepening slowdown. Beijing is also hoping that, by improving connectivity between its underdeveloped southern and western provinces, its more affluent coast, and the countries along its periphery, the Belt and Road will improve China’s internal economic integration and competitiveness and spur more regionally balanced growth. Moreover, the construction is intended to help make use of China’s enormous industrial overcapacity and ease the entry of Chinese goods into regional markets. At a time when many large stateowned enterprises are struggling to stay afloat and banks are stuck in a cycle of rolling over ever-growing and progressively less viable loan portfolios, the projects that make up the Belt and Road could provide vital life support and serve as a useful patronage tool for compensating vested interests threatened by efforts to implement market-oriented reforms. On the foreign policy front, the Belt and Road reflects many of the priorities President Xi Jinping identified at a major Chinese Communist Party gathering on foreign affairs held in November 2014. These included a heightened focus on improving diplomacy with neighbouring states and more strategic use of economics as part of China’s overall diplomatic toolkit. Against the backdrop of a regional ‘infrastructure gap’ estimated in the trillions of

230  Syed Muntasir Mamun dollars, the initiative highlights China’s enormous and growing resources and will provide a major financial carrot to incentivize governments in Asia to pursue greater cooperation with Beijing. Over the medium- to long-term, successful implementation of the initiative could help deepen regional economic integration, boost cross-border trade and financial flows between Eurasian countries and the outside world, and further entrench Sino-centric patterns of trade, investment, and infrastructure. This would strengthen China’s importance as an economic partner for its neighbours and, potentially, enhance Beijing’s diplomatic leverage in the region. Increased investment in energy and mineral resources, particularly in Central Asia, could also help reduce China’s reliance on commodities imported from overseas, including oil transiting the Strait of Malacca. From a slightly different angle, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ has been referred to as China’s version of the Marshall Plan, a comparison Beijing has sought to downplay as being freighted with geopolitical undertones that it claims are absent in its initiative. Motivations aside, the initiative is a powerful illustration of China’s growing capacity and economic clout – and the Xi administration’s intent to deploy them abroad. Properly implemented, the projects that comprise the Belt and Road could help enhance regional economic growth, development, and integration. According to the Asian Development Bank, there is an annual ‘gap’ between the supply and demand for infrastructure spending in Asia on the order of $800 billion. Given that infrastructure is at the heart of the Belt and Road, there is room for the initiative to play a constructive role in regional economic architecture. In addition, if this leads to more sustainable and inclusive growth, it could help strengthen the political institutions in the region and reduce the incentives and opportunities for terrorist movements. Although the initiative does not result directly into a regional free trade area, and it involves no binding state-to-state agreement, it is at its heart a pledge by China to use its economic resources and diplomatic skills to promote infrastructure investment and economic development that more closely links China to the rest of Asia and onward to Europe. In this regard, it reflects China’s

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preference to avoid if possible formal treaties with measurable compliance requirements in favour of less formal arrangements that give it flexibility and allow it to maximize its economic and political skills.

Multi-Sector Multi-Country Corridors Experience over the decades has clearly identified the bottlenecks to greater integration across both the South and East Asian sectors. For the purity of purpose we shall not go into assigning responsibility to countries for the failures each suffered or contributed towards. Rather, we shall briefly outline ideas, which could be given a try for greater, faster and stronger cooperation – restoring the pristine natural configurations, which used to exist between and amongst the countries in the region. Agriculture, production, manufacturing and construction, power, energy, transit and trans-shipment across several countrywide formations such as: Bangladesh-India, India-China, Bangladesh-China, and Bangladesh-India-China – complemented and supplemented as and when required with Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar would be what we would be looking at. The first obvious would be power. An interesting article appeared in The Hindu on 2 June 2012.9 The report identifies Arunachal Pradesh as a potential powerhouse for India and highlights the Union Government’s push for 157 hydro-power schemes with an installed capacity of 57,672 MW in the north-east, including Sikkim, for meeting the shortfall in the country’s power generation. The north-east has always been hailed as a potential power source for India. Power sector development and public utility supply in India itself had its beginnings in 1897 with a small hydropower plant near Darjeeling (West Bengal), close to the North-Eastern Region. An excellent report – available in the public sector domain since September 2006 by V. V. K. Rao – in the National Water Portal of India – identifies some of the finer details along with illustrated inter-state and inter-region power transfer plans for the north-east (and especially in Arunachal Pradesh with development in the Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Dibang, and Lohit

Source: V.V.K. Rao, Hydropower in the North East: Potential and Harnessing Analysis: A Critique, India Water Portal (www.indiawater portal.org/articles/hydropower-northeastpotential and harnessing analysis/critique

Schematic map of the Brahamaputra showing annual flows

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(the place where Yarlung Tsangpo turns retrograde and takes up the name Brahmaputra – upon entering India from China) basin. The major river systems of the North-Eastern Region are the Brahmaputra and the Barak (joining the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh). V.V.K. Rao’s estimates, which I find rather comprehensive that this river system drains a catchment area of 238,473 sq. km, which is 7.25 per cent of the geographic area of India. The surface water potential of the Brahmaputra and Barak River system accounts for 31.35 per cent (586 out of 1,869 billion cubic metres) of the total average annual surface water of the country. The hydropower potential of this river system constitutes 41.55 per cent (34,920 out of 84,044 MW) of the total hydropower potential of India. The hydropower potential of other river systems of the north-east, for example the Kolodyne and Manipur (in Mizoram and Manipur) draining into Myanmar, and the south-flowing rivers (of Meghalaya and Tripura) draining into Bangladesh, is included in the potential for the Brahmaputra. The region has a total groundwater potential of 855 million cubic metres (excluding Sikkim). The Central Groundwater Board has assessed the replenishable groundwater potential as 265.5 million cubic metres. These figures are important for Bangladesh since much of the north-south seepage takes place from the Brahmaputra and its estuaries before the main river enters Bangladesh through Kurigram. The first comprehensive study on the hydro-electric power generation potential of the north-east was carried out by India during 1953-9 by the then Central Water and Power Commission’s Power Wing (reconstituted as the Central Electricity Authority), which estimated the economically exploitable hydro potential of the Brahmaputra basin at 13,400 MW at 60 per cent load factor, which constituted about 32 per cent of India’s hydropower potential of 42,100 MW at 60 per cent load factor. Reassessment studies were carried out by the Central Electricity Authority during 1978-87 taking into account further detailed topographic and hydrological data, advances in design and construction technology, and emerging trends in energy costs. This study placed the hydropower potential of the country at

234  Syed Muntasir Mamun 84,040 MW at 60 per cent load factor from a total of 845 projects, which would yield energy of 442 billion kW-hours per year. With seasonal energy, the total energy potential was assessed to be 600 billion kW-hours per year. Subsequent assessments suggested that the total hydro-power generation capability from different basins were shown in the following table.10 About 75 per cent of the power potential of India comes from the Himalayan river systems (the Indus, Ganga, and Brahmaputra) and is located in the north eastern (39.4 per cent) and northern (35.9 per cent) power regions. The hydropower potential of the north-eastern power region, including Sikkim, is 33,100 MWs at 60 per cent load factor, almost all of which excluding Sikkim is from the Brahmaputra basin. According to some estimates, the installed capacity captures only 18.91 per cent of the estimated hydro-electric potential of the north-east and 81.09 per cent is still available for development. The annexed report from The Hindu suggests yet another upward revision in the power potential estimate for the north-east region. The Indian government, within its own territory, has been using a stakeholder analysis based on recognizing rights and assessing risks, and also enabling vulnerable and disadvantaged stakeholder groups to participate in an informed manner. The centre, in its deliberation – since long, has been using a distribution analysis of POTENTIAL MWS AT 60 PER CENT LOAD FACTOR Basin

First survey (1953-9)

Reassessment study (1978-87)

No. of identified schemes

Indus

6,583

19,988

180

Ganga

4,817

10,715

226

Central India

4,300

2,740

142

West-flowing

4,350

6,149

63

East-flowing

8,633

9,532

84

Brahmaputra

13,417

34,920

140

Total

42,100

84,044

845

Source: India Water Portal (www.indiawaterportal.org)

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the allocation of costs and benefits of the projects and developing mitigation and resettlement measures to promote development opportunities and benefit sharing for displaced and adversely affected people. One of the cornerstones of the development in India’s power structure is avoiding, through modified design, any severe and irreversible ecosystem impacts and providing for an environmental flow requirement, and mitigate or compensate any unavoidable ecosystem impacts; and design and implement recourse and compliance mechanisms. Theoretically, at present, there is no problem in the availability of transmission systems beyond the north-eastern power region for distribution of power as the five power regions of India are in the process of greater integration within a national grid. The interregional transmission capacity is supposed to reach 37,150 MWs by the end of the 11th Plan (March 2012). However, transmission and distribution losses in the north-eastern power region and Sikkim were 38.64 per cent, highest among the regions and

River Basin Map of Arunachal Pradesh with Hydro Potential Source: Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh, Office of the Chief Engineer, Dept. of Hydropower Development, Itanagar, 2008. For further information see http// expert-eyes.org/power/hydro.html

236  Syed Muntasir Mamun above the national average of 32.53 per cent. In six of the eight states the losses were in the range 45-65 per cent. In Assam and Meghalaya the losses were 39.3 and 16.3 per cent. Also using solely the hilly (and elevated) Siliguri Corridor for power transfer is a matter of serious concern (both in technical and financial terms and also for strategic reasons) for the GOI. Although not suggested anywhere in the published official papers of GOI, power transmission through Bangladesh and a straightforward grid transfer into West Bengal is the only available (and obvious) course of action that the GOI should contemplate for a more efficient value addition from hydro-power generation in the north-east. For all countries in the region, other than a share of the huge electricity cache, this opportunity could also be coupled with (i) river training, (ii) flood management, and (iii) ground water protection. But obviously, because of the stakes and partnerships involved, cooperation of all three countries, Bangladesh, India and China would be required. It is perhaps high time that a greater scheme of plans among all three to harness the power potential of the north-east and share it meaningfully between the three countries be proposed where each share the stakes investment-wise and then share the benefits according to the utility derived. Seamless connectivity across the full spectrum of the Inland Water Transit in all of the three major river basins could be the second avenue for cooperation and integration amongst the three countries. A closer look at the river systems reveal mighty transit corridors, which connect major growth centres across the whole range of the Indian subcontinent. The major river Ganges cannot flow freely to its footfall at the Bay of Bengal due to the dysfunctional barrage of Farakka which has caused siltation and river strangulation on the Indian side and has generated antiIndia feelings in Bangladesh. It is perhaps a good time to rework a modern cooperative paradigm. Rail connectivity is what comes next. Rails should complement the riverine network of transport. A look at the East Indian Railways even in 1909 can depict what we have lost as a region after

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  237

Master Plan for Hydro Electric Projects in Arunachal Pradesh Source: CISMHE (Centre for Inter-disciplinary Studies of Mountain and Hill Environment) University of Delhi, Draft Final Report, June 2012. Part of Environmental Impact Assessment and Management Plan of HEO Hydroelectric Project, Arunachal Pradesh.

the Partition and particularly after the 1965 war. Reconnecting the rails of the East Indian system with Bangladesh and through Bangladesh to China and Myanmar in the East could be yet another option which we could think of. Road connectivity comes next in line to complement the rail connections. Taking the routes of Field Marshal Viscount Slim during the Burma Campaign of the Second World War is an option. But there is also another option. Three famous travellers undertook this option hitherto unexplored.

Power Map of India-Bangladesh Source: Central Electric Authority, Ministry of Power, Govt. of India, New Delhi.

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  239

The first was Ikhtiaruddin Muhammad Bakhtiar Khalji (under orders from Qutubuddin Aibek – the First Sultan of Delhi: 1206), the second one being Mir Jumla (under orders from Aurangzeb) and the third one filmmaker Mrinal Talukdar (entered through the Lohit Valley; where the Great Tsangpo becomes the Great Brahmaputra). This is basically a narrow stretch of land, which connects Tinsukia in Assam with Rima in China. Someone coming from Delhi could take the Rajdhani Express from Guwahati to Tinsukia and then take a 30-minute ride to reach Dirak Gate on the Assam-Arunachal border. Permits are needed for any onward journey. The NH 52 then takes him to Namsai, Chowkham, Parashuram Kund, Hailyung, Walong and Kibithu, the brigade HQ of the Indian Army. Civilian movement beyond Kibithu is restricted though. The route could connect all three countries in a direct land connection – leading to the waters of Bay of Bengal in a downhill run through Sylhet – Chittagong corridor. Activating all the major airports and airstrips in Bangladesh to complement the regional connectivity needs on the rail and road

Map of Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin Source: J. Bandyopadhyay and N. Ghosh, 2016, ‘Hydro-Political Dynamics and Environmental Security in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin’, Social Sciences, 24, pp. 1-25.

240  Syed Muntasir Mamun networks in a hub-n-spock formation could be the next-in-line option for energizing the connectivity – which would complete itself with the coastal shipping arrangement across the Indian East and Bangladesh coast lines. Several corollaries abound the discussions at this part. These include, Confidence Building Measures across the BangladeshIndia, Bangladesh-China, China-India, and China-India-Bangladesh configurations. The situation becomes sweetly complex when Nepal and Bhutan and then Myanmar joins the game. Creating a network of solid economic corridors where sovereignty comes only as an issue of creating price premiums might still be the best solution for an anti-conflict situation for economic engagement is much superior as an alternative to military engagement. With urban-centric administration slowly coming to

Indian Railways, 1909 Source: Map scanned and reproduced from personal copy of Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. 25 (Atlas), Oxford University Press, 1909. John Bartholomew et al., Edinburgh Geographical Institute.

Ledo Road (North Route): Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway routes through Myanmar-India-China (https://drkokogyi.wordpress.com/2011/07/02/ asian-highway-and-trans-asian-railway-routes-through-myanmar-india-china/ Source: Strengthening Regional Transport Connectivity among BCIM Countries by M. Rahmatullah, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka.

South Route: Kunnig-Mandalay-Meiktila-Magway-Chittagong (Bangladesh) Source: Strengthening Regional Transport Connectivity among BCIM Countries by M. Rahmatullah, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka.

242  Syed Muntasir Mamun Kibithu • It is the Eastern most part of the North East India • It is geographically located 3 degree East of Port Blair which is supposed to be the Eastern most part of India. • It is East of two National Capitals: 1. Dhaka – Bangladesh 2. Yangoon – Myanmar

Border Areas Source: Curated by the author.

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  243

The possible economic corridors between Bangladesh and India Source: Curated by the author.

reality, this is a must for de-escalating tension in the region and creating potential for growth-centre connectivity point-to-point and people-to-people as opposed to capital-to-capital only. It’s time that old ghosts are laid to rest.

Notes 1. Since Independence, Bangladesh has received highest amount of bilateral aid from Japan in terms of cumulative disbursement followed by USA. International Development Association (IDA) is the largest amongst the multilateral development institutions followed by the Asian Development Bank. IDA contributed 26.68 per cent of the total aid disbursed between 2001-7 – closely followed by ADB. 2. Common agendas of International Financial Institutions (IFI) are: • Dismantling public institutions and public enterprises that deprives people but give immense authority to big business. • Removing all supports and protection for local industries and agriculture by liberalizing imports. • Supporting export oriented activities to meet the needs of western market by supplying cheap product at the expense of economy and environment.

244  Syed Muntasir Mamun • Withdrawing state’s responsibility of providing basic services such as health care and education for the people. • Raising prices of fuel, gas, electricity, raising education fee and cost to create good business opportunities of the global companies. 3. From: http://go.worldbank.org/HEAGSVFC00Trade Paradigm of Bangladesh Policy Criteria

Status

Exchange Rate

Unified

Exchange Rate determination

Free Float

Payment convertibility Current account Capital account

Yes No

Import restrictions Import licensing QRs on imports State monopolies

No No No

Tariff structure Top Rate, 2009 Average Protective Rate 2009 Tariff slabs (customs duty) Para-tariffs

25 20.1 3, 7, 12, 25 Supplementary Duties

Existence of high level of NTBs

No

Trade Openness (trade-GDP ratio)

43

4. Bangladesh offers some of the world’s most competitive fiscal non-fiscal incentives. In summary and in most cases, these amount to the following: I. Remittance of royalty, technical know-how and technical assistance fees. II. Repatriation facilities of dividend and capital at exit. III. Permanent resident permits on investing US $75,000 and citizenship on investing US $500,000. IV. Tax holidays a. In the Dhaka & Chittagong Divisions: 100 per cent in first two years: 50 per cent in the year three and four: and 25 per cent in the year five. b. In the Rajshahi, Khulna, Sylhet, Barisal Divisions and three Chittagong Hilly Districts: 100 per cent for first three years, 50 per cent for next three years, 25 per cent for year seven. V. Depreciation allowances a. Accelerated depreciation for new industries is available at the

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  245 rate of 50, 30 and 20 per cent for the first, second and third years respectively, on the cost of plant and machinery. VI. Cash and added incentives to exporting industries a. Businesses exporting 80 per cent or more of goods or services qualify for duty free import of machinery and spares, bonded warehousing. b. 90 per cent loans against letters of credit and funds for export promotion. c. Export credit guarantee scheme. d. Domestic market sales of up to 20 per cent is allowed to export oriented business located outside an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) on payment of relevant duties. Cash incentives and export subsidies are granted on the FOB-value of selected exports ranging from 5 to 20 per cent on selected products. 5. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a regional intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union in South Asia. Its member states include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SAARC comprises 3 per cent of the world’s area, 21 per cent of the world’s population and 9.12 per cent of the global economy, as of 2015. SAARC was founded in Dhaka in 1985. Its secretariat is based in Kathmandu. The organization promotes development of economical and regional integration. It launched the South Asian Free Trade Area in 2006. SAARC maintains permanent diplomatic relations at the United Nation as an observer and has developed links with multilateral entities, including the European Union. 6. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional organization comprising seven Member States lying in the littoral and adjacent areas of the Bay of Bengal constituting a contiguous regional unity. This subregional organization came into being on 6 June 1997 through the Bangkok Declaration. It constitutes seven Member States: five deriving from South Asia, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and two from Southeast Asia, including Myanmar and Thailand. Initially, the economic bloc was formed with four Member States with the acronym ‘BIST-EC’ (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation). Following the inclusion of Myanmar on 22 December 1997 during a special Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, the Group was renamed ‘BIMST-EC’ (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation). With the admission of Nepal and Bhutan at the 6th Ministerial Meeting (February 2004, Thailand), the name of the grouping was changed to ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC).

246  Syed Muntasir Mamun The regional group constitutes a bridge between South and South-east Asia and represents a reinforcement of relations among these countries. BIMSTEC has also established a platform for intra-regional cooperation between SAARC and ASEAN members. The BIMSTEC region is home to around 1.5 billion people which constitute around 22 per cent of the global population with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of 2.7 trillion economy. In the last five years, BIMSTEC Member States have been able to sustain an average 6.5 per cent economic growth trajectory despite global financial meltdown. The objective of building such an alliance was to harness shared and accelerated growth through mutual cooperation in different areas of common interests by mitigating the onslaught of globalization and by utilizing regional resources and geographical advantages. Unlike many other regional groupings, BIMSTEC is a sector-driven cooperative organization. Starting with six sectors – including trade, technology, energy, transport, tourism and fisheries – for sectoral cooperation in the late 1997, it expanded to embrace nine more sectors – including agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counter-terrorism, environment, culture, people to people contact and climate change – in 2008. 7. In 1996, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal, a subset of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), formed the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) aimed at boosting cooperation in environment, energy and power, trade and investment, transport, and tourism. SAARC endorsed SAGQ in 1997. The initial four member countries then requested ADB assistance to promote economic cooperation in the subregion, leading to the creation of the SASEC Program in 2001. Maldives and Sri Lanka were welcomed as new member countries in May 2014. In 2005, the SASEC countries agreed on priority sectors for investment and coordinated action: transport, trade facilitation, and energy. SASEC also supports regional initiatives in ICT. Transport – SASEC aims to put in place the critical multi-modal transport networks that will enhance intraregional trade and investment in the subregion and, in turn, boost economic growth. SASEC works to strengthen road, rail, and air links, as well as developing port infrastructure to match the needs of the region’s growing economies, and to support the SAARC transport corridor network. Trade Facilitation – SASEC is helping speed up the time and reduce the costs of trading across borders throughout the subregion. Regional SASEC trade facilitation initiatives are creating modern customs administrations that are compliant with the terms and provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention, streamlined and transparent cross-border trade regulations

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  247 and procedures, and improved information and services for the private sector. Energy – SASEC is working to improve energy access and security in the region by developing essential infrastructure, and promoting intraregional power trade to reduce costs and import dependence. SASEC energy initiatives focus on renewable energy. SASEC investment since 2001 amounts to more than $6.75 billion, mostly in the transport sector. ADB has provided $4.28 billion in loans and grants to the SASEC countries for regional programming initiatives with member countries providing the balance of $2.47 billion. Projects include hard and soft infrastructure priorities, identified by the SASEC governments. SASEC follows a flexible, multi-track approach to project implementation, where member countries work together to ensure that projects implemented at the national level are coordinated across borders to deliver positive results at a wider regional level. Sector Transport (road, rail, air, sea) Energy Trade Facilitation ICT Total

Number of Projects

Total Project Cost (US$ mln)

25

5,410

10 1 1 37

1,281 48 18 6,757

ADB also supports the goals of the SASEC Program through the provision of national and regional technical assistance funding. Since 2001, it has implemented more than $64.45 million worth of technical assistance projects to create regional institutions and boost technical and other skills. To ensure international best practice and technical knowledge is made available to the SASEC governments, ADB often collaborates with other partners such as the  World Customs Organization, the  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 8. BCIM EC connects a contiguous landmass spreading from the eastern Chinese province of Yunnan (Kunming – provincial capital), cutting across north-east India, northern Myanmar, Bangladesh and ending at Kolkata (India). Aside point-to-point connectivity, BCIM-EC would establish long-awaited, seamless physical connectivity between Chinese mainland and India, through Myanmar and Bangladesh. The landmass under BCIM-EC corresponds to the ancient ‘Southern Silk Route’ that flourished under the Ming and Tan dynasties of China. Thus, BCIM EC

248  Syed Muntasir Mamun initiative is an attempt to re-connect thriving economic region many centuries later. Covering around 2.12 million sq. km, BCIM account for 40 per cent of global population and 68 per cent of global working population. The region also accounts for 10 per cent of global GDP, i.e. approx. US $5.7 trillion. In 2011, Intra-BCIM trade was US $90.2 billion. Welfare gain-wise, as earlier previous studies show, the proposed corridor would bring to Bangladesh the second highest welfare gain in this region in case of full, moderate and partial liberalization, while India being the first and China as the third. The idea of creating BCIM Economic Corridor was announced during the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India (May 2013). The Joint Communiqué, issued by the two Premiers, expressed their willingness to conduct ‘a joint study’, to be conducted by experts of the four countries, on the BCIM EC; and also agreed to pursue the matter with the other countries (Bangladesh, Myanmar) to join the initiative. Subsequently, the same was reiterated through the Communiqué issued by India and China during Indian prime minister’s visit to China (October 2013). These declarations marked the step towards bringing the agenda of the BCIM EC to Track I. Shortly thereafter, Bangladesh and Myanmar responded positively to the initiative. BCIM EC got its first formal shape at the first meeting of the BCIM Joint Working Group (Kunming, 18-19 December 2013). Bangladesh Foreign Secretary led an 11-members delegation to the Meeting and co-chaired the Joint Coordination Committee, particularly negotiation on its Minutes. A significant accomplishment of the Kunming Meeting was the agreement reached among the four countries on the principles of engagement, i.e. mutual trust and respect, mutual interest, equitable sharing of mutual benefits, pragmatism, effectiveness, consensus-building and securing win-win outcomes. All sides agreed that the cooperative project-oriented, specific undertakings under BCIM would be aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trust and further unlocking of vast economic potential as also securing lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the people in the region. The other key agreement was to take into account earlier research outcomes/experience within and beyond the region in respect of mechanism-building. The summary of the outcome of the JSG meeting is as follows: 1. The convening of the first JSG meeting of BCIM-EC marked the official launch of the intergovernmental process of BCIM-EC; 2. The four delegations jointly initiated the development of the BCIMEC which will, inter alia, advance multi-modal connectivity, harness

Bangladesh Striving Towards a Zone of Peace and Prosperity  249 the economic complementarities, promote investment and trade and facilitate people-people-contacts. 3. Identified the areas of cooperation of BCIM-EC as follows: (i) Physical connectivity, (ii) Trade in goods, services and investment including finance, (iii) Environmentally sustainable development; (iv) People-to-people contacts; 4. The four delegations agreed to establish, at a senior level, a Joint Working Group (JWG) to actively explore the possibility of improving the working mechanisms; 5. The four delegations witnessed the signing of the minutes of the meeting and the annexed Joint Study Program. The second meeting of the JSG was held in Cox’s Bazaar on 17-18 December 2014. Each of the report, agreed on a negotiated detailed outline, spread over eleven common chapters, was discussed at the second Meeting and would be synthesized thereafter. The final synthesized report is expected to be adopted at the third meeting of the JSG (India) and then will be submitted to the governments. Based on the outcome and conclusions reached at the third meeting, the countries would proceed towards finalization and signing of the ‘inter-governmental cooperation framework’, possibly during the 4th JSG meeting in Myanmar. 9. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3480635.ece 10. Further information: http://expert-eyes.org/power/hydro.html

IV. The Power Games

CHAPTER 17

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance of the Indian Ocean Small Islands C H R I S TA I N B O U C HA R D WILLIAM CRUMPLIN

Introduction Historically, small islands have played a very significant geostrategic role in the Indian Ocean. From the ancient Persians’ and Arabs’ links with Pemba and Zanzibar on the Eastern African coasts to the more recent American military presence on Diego Garcia, several small islands have been viewed with interest and used by regional and foreign powers for military purposes. Their location at sea and isolation from the continental landmasses can provide a very advantageous position to armed forces for a wide range of activities, such as defence, surveillance, support and power projection from sea to land. Far from fading away, the military forces’ interests in these islands have been greatly renewed since the beginning of the twenty-first century, in conjunction with the Indian Ocean Region’s growing importance in global geopolitics and world economy. This is certainly true for the United States about Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory), as well as for India and its island territories (Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep), and for France and its Indian Ocean islands (Réunion, Mayotte, etc.). Nevertheless, many other small islands are already in use for ongoing military operations or are

Figure 1: The Indian Ocean Region and the Studied Small Islands

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  255

now integrated into strategic planning, such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives, Oman’s Masirah Island, Yemen’s Socotra Island, Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and perhaps Burma’s Coco Islands. This study examines how the United States, India, France and Australia are securing and even developing their positions in the Indian Ocean small islands, while China and perhaps others, may be seeking to establish new facilities in some islands. This research focuses on the following small island states and territories located in the core body of the Indian Ocean (thus excluding the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait), namely: - Ashmore and Cartier Islands (External Territory of Australia) - Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Union Territory of India) - British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT, United Kingdom), including Diego Garcia - Christmas Island (External Territory of Australia) - Coco Islands (Myanmar), especially Great Coco Island - Cocos (Keeling) Islands (External Territory of Australia) - Comoros (Union of the Comoros) - Crozet Islands (District of the FSAL,1 France) - Heard Island and McDonald Islands (External Territory of Australia) - Kerguelen Islands (District of the FSAL, France) - Lakshadweep (Union Territory of India) - Maldives (Republic of the Maldives) - Masirah Island (Province, Ash Sharqiyah Region, Oman) - Mauritius (Republic of Mauritius) - Mayotte (Overseas Department and Region of France) - Perim (Mayyun) Island (Republic of Yemen) - Prince Edward Islands (South Africa) - Réunion Island (Overseas Department and Region of France) - Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean2 (District of the FSAL, France) - Seychelles (Republic of Seychelles) - Socotra (part of the Hadhramaut Governorate, Yemen)

256  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin - St. Paul and Amsterdam Islands (District of the FSAL, France) and - Zanzibar Archipelago (United Republic of Tanzania), including the main islands of Unguja (Zanzibar) and Pemba.

Military Uses of Small Islands and ‘Military Forward Presence’ in the Indian Ocean Good location and isolation from the continental landmasses can provide a very advantageous position to armed forces for a wide range of activities, including, but not limited to, defence, surveillance, support and power projection from sea to land. This has been the case many times in the past, such as during the European Colonial period (especially for the United Kingdom in the era when the Indian Ocean was regarded as a British Lake), the Second World War for Britain and its allies, and the Cold War era with its two superpowers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, under colonial time, ‘of the various bases available for projecting power into the Indian Ocean region, the Europeans favored island strongholds. These facilities, which could also serve as supply stations, allowed the desired control of trade routes yet did not have large populations to be governed or hinterlands from which rebellions could be launched’ (Ladwig III et al., 2014, p. 137). In addition to the archetype of these islands serving as the ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, such as Diego Garcia, and to their traditional support role for naval and aerial activities (bases, replenishment services, communication facilities, etc.), we now see the rising use of small islands for surveillance and reconnaissance activities, including the operation of radar systems and drones, as well as quickly growing military cooperation be-tween local armed forces and large military powers involved in the Indian Ocean (training, joint exercise, equipment provision, intelligence sharing, etc.). As reminded by Rogers and Simon (2009, p. 6), ‘whereas a powerful fleet is a must-have asset in [the] quest for maritime dominance, naval strength is but one element underpinning

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  257

a maritime presence, which in turn is a sub-set of the broader concept of “forward presence”.’ In our case, we define the ‘military forward presence’ of a country as its military deployment and operations taking place outside its national territory (terrestrial, airspace and territorial sea), its extraterritorial maritime zones (exclusive economic zone and continental shelf), as well as its nearby aerial and maritime approaches in international areas. Therefore, the ‘military forward presence’ consists of the military deployment and operations taking place far away from the national mainland, and consequently includes permanent and temporary military installations in other countries or overseas territories. In regard to the ‘military foreign presence’ in the Indian Ocean, we find several different situations including: 1. Military bases or facilities operated by non-Indian Ocean countries in an Indian Ocean country, such as the bases of the United States (Djibouti, Oman, Bahrain, etc.), France (Djibouti, UAE), Japan (Djibouti) and the United Kingdom (Bahrain); 2. A military base operated by a non-Indian Ocean country in an Indian Ocean overseas territory, which is the US Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia located in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT); 3. Some military activities by other non-Indian Ocean countries without a permanent base or formal facility of their own in the region, as for examples several European nations (Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, etc.), China, South Korea, New Zealand and Canada (with the exception of China, most of these activities are related to multinational operations such as the Combined Task Force 150 [CTF-150], the Combined Task Force 151 [CTF-151], the European Union Naval Force [EU NAVFOR] Somalia – Operation Atalanta, and the NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield); 4. Sovereign forces of an European country stationed in its own Indian Ocean overseas territories, which are the French Army Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone (FAZSOI),3 based in Réunion and Mayotte, but also operating in the French

258  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin Southern and Antarctic Lands (FSAL) four island districts (the United Kingdom have no permanent military forces stationed in the BIOT); 5. military forces and installations of an Indian Ocean country permanently operating in other Indian Ocean countries with, and in addition to, some installations in its own island territories; for instance, the Indian armed forces who are especially involved in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Mauritius, as well as those operating from Andaman & Nicobar and the Lakshadweep Islands, and the South African forces that have maintained naval anti-piracy patrols off Mozambique and Tanzania since early 2011 (under Operation Copper)4 with support by elements of the SA Air Force, notably a 35 Squadron C-47TP based at Pemba in Mozambique (Martin, 2014); and 6. Military forces of an Indian Ocean country deployed far away from their homeland with some minor installations in one of its distant and remote island territories; which are the Australian armed forces who contribute to international operations in the Indian Ocean and do have some facilities on Cocos (Keeling) Islands.

Overall, the ‘military forward presence’ is quite impressive in the Indian Ocean and it certainly has been on the rise in the recent years, especially in the wake of the radical Islamism terrorist outbreak (early 2000s) and the Somali maritime piracy crisis (end of the 2000s). Linked to these challenges and other important maritime security issues (such as arms and drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing, etc.), is the desire of outside great powers to secure their vital Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean (including the USA, EU, China, Japan and South Korea) and of the regional powers to secure their maritime approaches (including India and Australia), if not to achieve an Indian Ocean-wide naval dominance (India). It is in this large and complex geo-political strategic context that the situation of the small Indian Ocean island states and territories has to be considered.

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  259

The United States Crucial for the United States’ armed forces in the Indian Ocean is the Navy Support Facility (NSF) at Diego Garcia, which provides logistical support to operational forces forward deployed to the Indian Ocean (Pacific Command) and the Persian Gulf (Central Command) areas of responsibility in support of American national policy objectives. In addition to several communication and intelligence facilities, ‘the US military uses Diego Garcia for long-range bomber operations, special forces staging, the replenishment of naval surface combatants and guided-missile nuclear-powered submarines (SSGN) capable of carrying out strike and special

Figure 2. Atoll of Diego Garcia (BIOT). The United States gained access to the island through a 50-year agreement reached with Britain in 1966, followed by a 20-year optional extension (to 2036). Britain maintains a limited presence on the island, but maintains no permanently deployed military units. Great location, remoteness, good weather conditions and no local population (following the Chagossians’ displacement) combine to provide an ideal site for a large-scale military base. Source: Google images.

260  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin operations, and the prepositioning of Army and Marine Corps brigade sets’ (Ladwig III et al., 2014, p. 131). The importance and tremendous strategic value of this position in the middle of the Indian Ocean has been publicly known since its role in the Gulf War (1990-1), as well as in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-14) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-11). In recent years, the US forces increased their presence and activities in other small islands of the North-west Indian Ocean. For instance, maritime patrol aircraft and drone surveillance operations were conducted from the Seychelles International Airport.5 As well, several navy port visits were made to Victoria (Mahé Island, capital of the Seychelles). This activity is linked to the fight against the Somali-based maritime piracy and to operations related to jihadist activities in Somalia. Seychelles has also provided some very enjoyable and safe leisure opportunities to the navy personell operating in the region while on port visit or permission. Regarding the drone operations that ran from 2009 to 2012, the Washington Post has revealed that a small fleet of ‘hunterkiller’ Reaper MQ-9 drones6 resumed operations from Seychelles in September 2011 ‘after an experimental mission demonstrated that the unmanned aircraft could effectively patrol Somalia from there’7 (Whitlock and Miller, 2011). Reacting to the news, JeanPaul Adam, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Seychelles, ‘denied claims the US is flying armed drones from the islands in the Indian Ocean to Somalia and Yemen, in order to target suspected terrorists’ and ‘insisted that the unmanned Reaper aircraft based in the Seychelles are used solely for ‘intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes in the fight against piracy’ (Channel 4 News, 2011). Following the crash of two drones is less than a year at the Seychelles International Airport, the US drone programme from Seychelles was halted in 2012. According to some reports, US Forces are also developing their military presence in Socotra (Yemen), which could be a strategic priority for Washington in the wake of a regional competition with Russia, and perhaps China, for facilities in the area (Chossudovsky,

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  261

2010). In Yemen as well, there were also reports of a possible US installation on Perim (Mayyun) Island at the entry of the Badel-Manded. However, independent credible sources and official acknowledgments remain lacking on these two issues (Socotra and Perim). Nevertheless, from an American perspective and in the broader geopolitical context of the Middle East and the Northwest Indian Ocean, Yemen is very strategically located and has to be duly taken into account in strategic planning. In addition, US military activities on the small Omani island of Masirah continue and could very well be expanded in the very near future, as other US Air Forces could move from Oman continental locations to the island (Katzman, 2013). The US has also been negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Maldivian government, a process and agreement that raised many questions about the real American intentions in the archipelago, even if the US embassy in Colombo has maintained that ‘there are no plans for a permanent military base in Maldives’ (Bhadrakumar, 2013). However, the newly elected Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen has decided not to sign the SOFA as proposed by the US, and ‘told reporters in Sri Lanka that a SOFA would have given the United States a foothold in his archipelago located across the main east-west sea route’ (Zee News, 2014). Finally, the US military is, as well, eyeing Cocos Islands (Australia) for the establishment of a joint US-Australia air base that would support surveillance operations over the Eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. In 2011, the Australian defence minister ‘hinted that US ships and aircraft would use the Cocos Islands eventually’ (Coorey et al. 2012).

India In accordance with the ‘Indian Maritime Doctrine’ published in 2004, the 2007 India’s Maritime Military Strategy calls for ‘reach’ multiplied by ‘sustainability’ for the ‘presence’ of Indian forces in the Indian Ocean’ (Indian Navy, 2007). In this important document (p. 81),

262  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin the term ‘forward presence’ is used to express a resolve to deploy forces for presence into or close to areas of interest or concern. In the Indian Naval context, forward presence is intended to: • • • •

demonstrate India’s commitment to regional stability; gain familiarity with overseas operational environments; keep the area of interest under surveillance; and promote interoperability among the forces of friendly nations.’

This doctrine leads to the strengthening of India’s infrastructure presence, the growth of its naval capabilities, and increased deployments of these naval assets around the Indian Ocean. On the one hand, India is now considering to take the full geostrategic advantage of its own island territories (Das, 2011; Kukreja, 2013; Upadhyay, 2013a and 2013b; Subbu, 2014; Kaul, 2015). Recent steps toward this direction have included the commissioning in April 2012 of a comprehensive naval base (INS Dweeprakshak) on Kavaratti Island in the Lakshadweep Islands, as well as several upgrades of its naval and air force assets in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands (Port Blair, Car Nicobar), including a new Naval Air Station (INS Baaz) on Great Nicobar Island that was commissioned in August 2012. As pointed out by Subbu (2014, p. 63), India needs to exploit the geo-strategic advantages of its offshore territories to enable her to play an increasingly pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific strategic setting. India can ill afford to ignore the lessons of history or contemporary strategic imperatives because doing so would severely limit its political, diplomatic and military options in the IOR. A well-orchestrated use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands […] would further India’s foreign and strategic objectives and enable India to start rediscovering its great maritime and political influence in the region.

Overall, the Andaman and Nicobar installations are of much greater geostrategic significance as they have the potential to allow India to project large naval and aerial power through Southeast Asia and control the Andaman Sea, the Six Degree Channel8 and the northern entrance of the Malacca Strait.

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  263 The islands occupied a marginal position in India’s strategic consciousness until October 2001, when Delhi established a new Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in the local capital, Port Blair. Today the command serves as the focal point for Indian engagement with regional navies in Southeast Asia. This includes biannual coordinated patrols with the navies of Thailand and Indonesia, the annual SIMBEX maritime exercises with Singapore, and the biennial Milan multilateral naval exercises. (Smith 2014)

Overall, Andaman & Nicobar Islands are instrumental in pursuing the security dimension of the Look East Policy initiated in 1991. The Lakshadweep installations are, however, much more modest and their role is limited to a first line of defence for the homeland and maritime security in its surrounding waters. Nevertheless, this area is of vital importance for maritime transportation as it is crossed by the Nine Degree Channel9 and projects India’s maritime domain westward into the Southern Arabian Sea. But the islands also pose important local and national security issues that need to be better addressed. Subbu (2014)

Figure 3. Campbell Bay, Great Nicobar Island. Very strategically located on the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, this Indian Naval Air Station (INS Baaz) may sooner than later be upgraded to a prime base with a 10,000 foot-long runway that would allow fighter operations. (Photo: 2012) Source: Google images.

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lists the main threats as being rivalry for natural resources, religious and sub-national fanaticism, terrorism, piracy and other illegal activities. In the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, ‘non-conventional threats such as poaching of marine and forest resources, illegal migration, arms smuggling and natural disasters have been posing serious challenges to the internal security of the island chain’ (Das, 2011). All commentators on this matter raise the need for both a more efficient security infrastructure and more robust socioeconomic development on the islands, including the potential of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands as an international tourist destination (Kaul, 2015). The same issues are reported in Lakshadweep, with several maritime pirate attacks recorded in its surrounding waters in the past couple of years as well as reports of political extremist groups trying to establish bases on these islands (Upadhyay, 2013a). A further development is the establishment of Indian facilities and permanent military activities outside the Indian national territory, more specifically in some small Indian Ocean island states. Following the Indian Operation Cactus in the Maldivian Archipelago in 1988, the security relationship between India and the Maldives has been very significant. In addition, and as noted by a PIB press release (2014), the Indian Navy has been instrumental in supporting Maldives whether in disaster relief (tsunami of December 2004), responding to various contingencies (water crisis of December 2014) or in meeting their maritime security needs (surveillance of the maritime domain). Since 2009, India has brought ‘Maldives into its security nets’ (Puddy, 2009). It has stationed aircrafts, helicopters and naval vessels in the island nation, built a maritime surveillance system across the entire archipelago,10 and is now operating reconnaissance and surveillance aircrafts from Gan (Dutta, 2009; Chandramohan, 2009; DeSilvaRanasinghe, 2011). The Indian Navy is also operating in the Mauritius and Seychelles EEZs, and India has shown interest in developing a presence in the Agalega Islands (Mauritius).11 In this latter case, it was presumably to develop economic opportunities (tourism, fisheries, and perhaps offshore petroleum), but Osman

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(2013, p. 111) does not hesitate to talk about the possibility of a future Indian military base in this strategic area of the Indian Ocean. Regarding Mauritius, Brewster (2014a, p. 74) highlights the fact that, India now has a comprehensive role in the security of Mauritius. New Delhi supplies a RAW officer to act as national security advisor to the Mauritian prime minister, an arrangement that seems to elicit little comment in Port Louis. India also supplies the commander of the Mauritian Coast Guard and equips and trains the Coast Guard and Police Helicopter Squadron. Since 2003 the Indian Navy has also provided maritime security through periodic patrols of the Mauritius EEZ; since 2009 this includes hydrographic surveys and anti-piracy patrols. India has also installed a radar coastal surveillance system throughout the Mauritian island chain, including five stations on the islands of Mauritius, and one each on Rodrigues, Saint Brandon and the Agalega islands.

As well, India’s armed forces have been very involved in Sri Lanka since the 1980s, but this island nation is not considered in this paper as it does not qualify as a small island state. To complete the Indian ‘military forward presence’ in the Indian Ocean islands, we also note that in July 2007 India activated its first listening post on foreign soil in northern Madagascar. This key monitoring station comprises radar installations and surveillance gear to intercept maritime communication.12

France French armed forces have a permanent and important presence in the South-west and Southern Indian Ocean that ensues from France’s territorial possessions in the region (Bouchard and Crumplin, 2011 and 2013). These forces operate under the joint command of the French army forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone (COMSUP FAZSOI13). They are mostly stationed in Réunion Island, but some are also located in Mayotte, and operate as well in the four island districts of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands: Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands, Scattered Islands, and

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Figure 4. French Naval Base Port des Galets, Réunion Island. This base and its naval assets are instrumental for reach and sustainability in the region for the French Army Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone (FAZSOI). The FAZSOI AOR covers some 22 million sq km. Réunion Island also hosts the 2nd Regiment of Marine Infantry Parachutists and an Air Force base (Air Detachment 181 Lieutenant Roland Garros). (Photo: 2002) Source: Google images

St. Paul & Amsterdam Island. Additionally, these forces primarily focus on fighting maritime piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing and human trafficking in the Western Indian Ocean. They are also important players in regional security and military cooperation, especially with the small island states of Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros. The FAZSOI forces clearly play two different roles: first, as ‘sovereignty forces’14 for the defence of the French national territory and the control of France’s economic exclusive zone (some 2.7 million sq. km), and second, as a military forward presence operating in the Western and Southern Indian Ocean. The FAZSOI official area of operation is defined as the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone,15 an area of 22 million sq. km extending from the Equator to the 60° latitude South (Fig. 5). However, the FAZSOI can also contribute to other French military operations in the Indian Ocean, as has been the case in the recent

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  267

Figure 5. French territories and the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone. (Figure first published in Bouchard and Crumplin, 2013)

year with the contribution of several ships to the European Union Naval Force [EU NAVFOR] Somalia–Operation Atalanta. It is noteworthy to remember that, in the Indian Ocean Region, France also maintains permanent forces at bases located in Djibouti and Abu Dhabi, as well as a naval deployment operation under the ALINDIEN Command (for the Indian Ocean Maritime Zone). Altogether, ‘the French bases in La Réunion, Mayotte, Djibouti

268  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin and the United Arab Emirates have led to a “quadrilatère français” in the Indian Ocean region. This “French quadrilateral” covers the areas of the region that are most significant to France’s interests’ (de Paiva, 2011, p. 2). Following some administrative status changes for Mayotte (that became a French overseas department and region on 31 March 2011) and the Scattered Islands (that became a district of the FSAL on 21 February 2007), as well as the publication of The Southern Indian Ocean Blue Book in 2011,16 France is now strongly reaffirming its territorial presence in the Indian Ocean, and looks forward to a better political and economic regional integration of its islands, as well as further developing its maritime ambitions in the region. Clearly, the FAZSOI forces are one important leg of France asserting its presence in the region, defending its own vested national interests and involving itself in regional cooperation. Another dimension of this French territorial and military presence in the South-west Indian Ocean is likely to emerge in the future as the European Union defines its common maritime security strategy. This strategy ‘would provide a strategic framework for the Union’s security-related activities regarding the sea that encompass maritime power projection, as well as maritime security and safety’ (Germond, 2011, p. 565). Even if this strategy should especially consider the importance of its maritime margins (Wider Mediterranean, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Arctic Ocean), which clearly constitute potential theatres of E.U. maritime operations, it should also be cast inside the larger framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This implies a need for the EU to develop its common global forward presence. On this issue, overseas small island territories of EU members could play a significant role in either basing or supporting an integrated EU forward presence. According to Rogers, J. and Simón (2009, p. 23), ‘the Member States of the EU would benefit from placing their overseas military installations and maritime power at the crux of the European Security and Defence Policy. Indeed, it is a serious possibility that our failure to do so could lead to a severe challenge to the vital interests of the EU and all of its Member States in the years ahead’.

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This, in the context of the Indian Ocean small islands, highlights once more the tremendous geostrategic significance of both the BIOT and its Diego Garcia installations in the centre of the Indian Ocean, and Réunion Island, the French military cornerstone in the South-west Indian Ocean.

Australia Australia is another important regional power in the IO Region with significant involvement and presence in the eastern, northwest and southern17 parts of the Indian Ocean. Unlike India, it does not have permanent military infrastructure in other IOR countries, but maintains continuous military activities under several operations such as Accordion (supporting Middle East operations), Manitou (RAN operation in the Middle East Region), Okra (RAF operation in Iraq), Resolute (protection of Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests), Highroad (Afghanistan, continuation of Operation Slipper), and Aslan (RAF operation in South Sudan, continuation of Operation Azure). In regards to Indian Ocean small islands, Australia exercises sovereignty over four external territories in the IO Region, namely the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, the Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands (HIMI), the Territory of Christmas Island and the Territory of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Overall, the islands and their surrounding waters raise national security issues, especially as targets for smugglers transporting asylum seekers to Australia as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. In terms of historical military activities, the islands are known for the naval Battle of the Cocos (WW I), the operation of the Cocos cable station (WW II), as well as the Battle of Christmas Island and its Japanese occupation (WW II). Today, the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island represents the two Australian strategically valuable island territories in the Indian Ocean; the HIMI being too remote in the southern waters and Ashmore and Cartier being non habitable and almost impossible to develop as a valuable military station. In 2011, the confirmation of talks between US and Australia

270  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin about the possible deployment of American drone aircraft on the Cocos Islands has publicly highlighted the almost untapped strategic potential of both Cocos Islands and Christmas Islands. The renewed Australian interest for the islands was confirmed in the 2012 Australian Defence Force Posture Review (Hawke and Smith, 2012, p. 26) which stipulates that: (1) ‘the Cocos (Keeling) Islands have significant military strategic value as a staging location for maritime air patrol and surveillance activities, given their position in the Indian Ocean and close to Southeast Asia’; and (2) ‘Christmas Island remains a valuable location for supporting border protection operations by refuelling Navy vessels and staging aircraft’; and recommended that: ‘defence should upgrade the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield facilities to support unrestricted P-8 and UAV operations (and KC-30 operations with some restrictions, if cost-effective noting the larger footprint needed by this aircraft)’.

From the Australian perspective, this might be enough in the short run, but the islands are now fully integrated in the large-scale Indo-Pacific strategic thinking of both Australia and the United States. As Christmas Island is too close to the Indonesian islands18 (and only 260 nautical miles from Jakarta), it should therefore not be the first choice for the development of a future possible fullblown multiservice base. Despite their much smaller size and less favourable geology (low-lying atoll), the Cocos Islands would be the preferred location. However, as noted by Kopp (2012, p. 20), this base could not be developed as a logistical Main Operating Base (MOB) such as Diego Garcia, since the Cocos Islands are too small (limited land area), the central lagoon is unusable (too shallow), and they are located quite close to the Indonesian islands19 (within 600 nautical miles of Sumatra and Java). Nevertheless, the position of the Cocos Islands as prime real estate in the Indo-Pacific strategic game of position, offers Australia the ability ‘to maximize opportunities […] to capitalize on its potential to project power and secure Australian influence in the vital region’ (McHugh 2011), and allows the US to close the gap between its major bases in Guam and Diego Garcia (Kopp,

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Figure 6. South Keeling Islands. One of the two flat, low-lying coral atolls forming the Australian External Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands. It is already being used by Australia to support aerial surveillance and it hosts a signals intelligence station, but it could certainly be used to support American military activities as well, and may eventually host a joint US-Australia large military base. Cocos Islands is an excellent geographical location for any operations intended to cover the chokepoints of the Malacca and Sunda Straits, and the major sea lanes skirting southern India. Source: Google images.

2012, p. 20). No doubt, a joint US-Australia large military base in the Cocos Islands is a very credible possibility to consider in the ‘long run’; but according to the Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith in an interview in November 2011, ‘that’s well down the track. Indeed, there would be a requirement for substantial infrastructure changes to be made for further air or naval engagement through the Cocos Islands’ (Whitlock, 2012).

China China is fast emerging as an economic superpower and a serious maritime stakeholder in the Indian Ocean. It is slowly beginning

272  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin to move in naval assets to safeguard its vital national interests in the area and contribute to maritime security. Major Chinese investments in port infrastructures as well as the development of commercial, political and military relationships with several Indian Ocean states have been described as parts of a ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, that usually refers to the small islands of Maldives, Great Coco Island (Myanmar), and perhaps Seychelles, as well as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar. But according to Yung (2015), ‘the “String of Pearls” model has long outlived its usefulness as a strategic concept’, a conclusion that most of the Indian Ocean strategists and analysts agree on. A recent Chinese proposal for the development of a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ between China and Europe, crossing the Indian Ocean, could have great economic and strategic implications for those that will link to the project, but this still needs to be seen. China’s first steps in projecting naval power into the Indian Ocean region have been in response to the piracy crisis in the Gulf of Aden. In December 2008, following the hijacking of two Chinese registered ships, China deployed three warships to waters off Somalia to conduct antipiracy operations, only the third deployment of Chinese naval ships into the Indian Ocean in more than six centuries. The PLAN has since made successive deployments, with vessels receiving logistical support primarily out of Salalah in Oman and Aden in Yemen. (Brewster, 2014b, p. 137)

A second step seems to have been taken in 2013-14 with the deployment of at least two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean. On the first occasion, a nuclear powered attack submarine (Shang class SSN) made its first declared operational patrol in the Indian Ocean waters (December 2013 to February 2014). Even if it was officially tasked to perform anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden, ‘intelligence reports say the Chinese deployment aims to “demonstrate its ability to protect its interests in Africa and West Asia as well as Sea Lanes of Communications” and “to send a message of persuasion to Indian Ocean Rim States”’ (Unnithan, 2014). On the second occasion, it seems that in early September 2014 ‘a Chinese Type

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039 diesel-electric Song-class submarine along with Changxing Dao, a submarine support ship from the North Sea Fleet was sighted berthed alongside at the Colombo International Container Terminal’ (Sakhuja, 2014). Sakhuja notes that ‘if the presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean is true, it is fair to suggest that Chinese forays have graduated from diplomatic port calls, training cruises, anti-piracy operations, search and rescue missions, to underwater operations. Further, the choice of platforms deployed in the Indian Ocean has qualitatively advanced from multipurpose frigates to destroyers, amphibious landing ships and now to submarines.’ In any case, the Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean is set to grow in the future, which will consequently bring the need for real and various military infrastructure in the region. This is a very recent and significant development in the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the Indian Ocean, and more broadly in the emerging Indo-Pacific grand theatre of competition between the United States and China, with India as a third major party. But as of now, ‘limited logistical support remains a key obstacle preventing the PLA Navy from operating more extensively beyond East Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean. China desires to expand its access to logistics in the Indian Ocean and will likely establish several access points in this area in the next ten years. These arrangements will likely take the form of agreements for refueling, replenishment, crew rest, and low-level maintenance’ (DOD 2014, p. 38). According to a report from Yung et al. (2014), ‘China is likely to establish at least one “dual-use” civilian/military base to provide logistics support for increased PLA Navy operations in the Indian Ocean’, and ‘the so-called “string of pearls” model of covert access to commercial ports built with Chinese investment is unable to support a robust, combat-oriented Chinese naval presence in the India Ocean’. With regard China’s ‘military forward presence’ and the small islands in the Indian Ocean, there seem to be a small number of possible geographic options. The Maldives, the Seychelles and Great Coco Island in Myanmar are those that have been identified and discussed in both news coverage and defence/security literature.

274  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin The Maldives option is very improbable, even impossible in the present context as it would seriously impact the island nation’s relations with India, its primary security partner.20 As pointed out by Kostecka (2010, p. 9), ‘one of the more sensationalistic claims regarding China’s military ambitions in the Indian Ocean revolves around reports that China has developed a submarine base in the Maldives Islands’. More specifically, this base was said to be built on the island of Marao (40 km north of Malé), an island that does not even exist. Regarding the Seychelles, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 2 December 2011 that the government has invited China to establish a naval base for anti-piracy operations (Chau 2011, defenceWeb 2011). However, ‘China’s Foreign Ministry was quick to clarify that China is not contemplating a military base in Seychelles and that it would “not violate” its age old policy of not stationing troops abroad’ (Singh 2011). At present, no official deal has been announced for any formal Chinese military port facilities in the Seychelles. If such a thing is realized, it would likely take the form of a simple support facility, perhaps a ‘dual-use’ civilian/ military facility as proposed by Yung et al. (2014), and not that of a full-blown naval base. Concerning the Coco Islands21 in Myanmar, China was long suspected by the Indians to have provided assistance in the early 1990s in constructing a signals intelligence facility on Great Coco Island, from where it could ‘spy on India’s naval base at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, monitor commercial traffic through the Malacca Strait and/or monitor Indian missile tests’ (Brewster, 2014b, p. 139). But this was proven to be false when the Indian Navy visited the islands in 2005 and ‘conceded that there was no Chinese intelligence facility on Great Coco Island and nor were there any Chinese naval bases anywhere in Myanmar’ (Brewster, 2014b, p. 139, citing Asian Defence Journal 2005). However, there have been recent new speculations about Chinese military activities on the Coco Islands, with rumors that the Chinese were expanding the Greater Coco island’s airstrip into a modern air base, but there is definitively no solid and credible evidence that this is happening. Thus, at the moment, the Chinese military footprint is still quite

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minimal in the Indian Ocean small islands if compared to those of India, the US, and even France.

Other Players Several other non-Indian Ocean nations have some ongoing military operations in the Indian Ocean Region, some of which are permanent while others are on a temporary basis. These activities are mainly related to the different multinational naval task forces operating in the North-west Indian Ocean and to other international operations, such as the actual US-led war against the Islamic State (ISIS) and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. Apart from the United Kingdom and Japan that have a permanent presence and military bases of their own in the region, respectively in Bahrain and Djibouti, the other nations use different facilities for support (refueling, replenishment, crew rest, etc.), including civil airports and ports as well as the infrastructure of military allies/friends. In terms of naval forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, these other nations principally include several European states (Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, etc.), South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, and Turkey. The last significant nation to consider here is Russia which, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, remained almost totally out of the Indian Ocean theatre for some two decades (1990s and 2000s). But Russia is slowly moving back into the Indian Ocean and its military presence is very likely to increase in the coming years. ‘Since July 2012, there has been speculation about new Russian overseas naval bases, the first since the collapse of the Soviet Union. One suggestion is that a base will be located in the Seychelles, in the western Indian Ocean’ (Mendiolaza and Saxon, 2013, p. 3). Other speculations have been made about basing on Socotra Island (Yemen), where the USSR is said to have previously maintained some limited facilities. As of now, it seems that India will welcome the Russian ships at its Vishakhapatnam Naval Base. It seems, therefore, that several economically and politically significant non-Indian Ocean countries are considering or are in the process of establishing or extending their ‘military forward

276  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin presence’. This will mostly result in the expansion and/or development of infrastructure to support increased navy presence. This has been the case in recent years with new bases in the Indian Ocean Region for the United States (Djibouti), the United Kingdom (Bahrain) and Japan (Djibouti). Considering their actual and increasing level of engagement in the Indian Ocean, it is therefore not a surprise that China and Russia are seeking more formal infrastructure to support their ongoing activities. Other significant nations (i.e. various European states) or supranational organizations, such as the EU, may follow the same path. For example, the argument has already been made for Germany to establish its own base to support its continuing ‘military forward presence’ in the Indian Ocean (Seidler, 2013). The problem with establishing such presence in the small islands in the present geopolitcal context is simply that the options are becoming seriously limited.

Figure 7. Port visit to Victoria, Seychelles. Guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy and guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge are moored together during a port visit to Seychelles (17 September 2007). (US Navy photo by V.J. Street, ID 070917-N-5459S-002)

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Conclusion Our survey of the ‘military forward presence’ in the small islands of the Indian Ocean clearly illustrates a recent increase in foreign military activities, infrastructure development, and collaboration with local forces. No doubt, many small islands are of great and often growing geostrategic significance, especially in a time when the Indian Ocean is becoming a more contested maritime space. In addition to their traditional roles of ‘support facilities’ (refueling, replenishment, crew rest and low-level maintenance) and ‘military stronghold’ (autonomous fire power, port and airport infrastructure, ammunition storage, prepositioned forces and material, communication and intelligence facilities), we note fast and significant developments in these islands’ roles of serving ‘sentinel’ (maritime surveillance, man and unmanned aerial patrols, radar stations and other intelligence facilities) and ‘policing’ functions (especially fighting maritime piracy, smuggling, illegal human migrations and illegal fishing). Overall, many small island states and territories are centrepieces in the competition between great powers for geostrategic locations in the Indian Ocean. This is particularly the case for Diego Garcia (BIOT), Maldives, Seychelles, and Andaman & Nicobar (India), to which we can add Mauritius and Réunion (France) in the Southwest Indian Ocean. In addition, other islands are also of geostrategic importance and have recently attracted some attention, such as Lakshadweep (India) and Masirah (Oman), where Indians and Americans are increasing their military footprints, as well as the Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Australia) that some strategists and analysts already see becoming another military stronghold in the future. But questions remain regarding the possibility of an American presence on Socotra (Yemen) and of a Chinese presence on the Coco Islands (Myanmar); the ‘mirage’, however, of a Chinese base on the imaginary Marao Island (Maldives) has vanished. Obviously, the competition between the great powers’ interests and ambitions in the region is set to induce another phase of militarization in the Indian Ocean, a process that can have some serious geopolitical implications for the small islands. It will be

278  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin interesting to see how each island can manage its relationships with the great powers, and how this militarization will-impact their economies, societies, local politics, and natural resources and environments.

Notes 1. French Southern and Antarctic Lands or FSAL (in French: Terres australes et antarctiques françaises or TAAF). 2. Short form: Scattered Islands. In French: Îles Éparses de l’océan Indien (short form: Îles Éparses), which consist of the atoll of Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island and Tromelin Island. 3. In French: Forces Armées dans la Zone Sud de l’Océan Indien (FAZSOI). 4. ‘Operation Copper, the mission to provide maritime security and prevent piracy in the Mozambique Channel, is now a bilateral operation between South Africa and Mozambique after Tanzania withdrew’ (Martin, 2014). 5. As part of its Air Force Satellite Control network (AFSCN), the US operated the Indian Ocean Tracking Station (IOS) on the island of Mahé, the main island of the Seychelles archipelago, from 1963 to 1996. Its location was ideal for communicating with geosynchronous satellites over the Indian Ocean. IOS has been supplanted by Diego Garcia RTS. 6. The Reaper MQ-9 drones have the capacity to carry laser-guided bombs, air-to-ground and heat-seeking missiles. The aircraft can stay in the air for 14 hours, even when fully loaded with weapons, and has an operational range of 3,600 miles. 7. Somalia is located about 800 miles (1,287 km) to the north-west of the Seychelles. 8. The Six Degree Channel is ‘a 200-km wide passage leading from the Indian Ocean into the Strait of Malacca, located between the southernmost point of the Nicobar Island group and Aceh on the Indonesian island of Sumatra, and arguably one of the most important shipping lanes in the world’ (Subbu, 2014, p. 58). 9. The Nine Degree Channel is ‘a 200-km wide passage straddled by the Lakshadweep Islands chain, [similarly] being the most direct route for ships sailing between the Persian Gulf or Red Sea and East Asia’ (Subbu, 2014, p. 58). 10. ‘The coastal radar chain in Maldives will be networked with the Indian coastal radar system. India has already undertaken a project to install radars along its entire coastline. The radar chains of the two countries

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  279 will be interlinked and a central control room in India’s Coastal Command will get a seamless radar picture’ (Puddy 2009). 11. However, ‘any Indian use of North Agalega is [also] likely to occur only gradually, perhaps beginning with Indian investment in the airstrip and other [tourist] infrastructure on the islands’ (Brewster, 2014a, p. 76). According to Brewster (2014a, p. 82), the Indian Space Research Organisation also operates a satellite tracking station. 12. Stands for ‘Commandant supérieur (COMSUP) des forces armées dans la zone sud de l’océan Indien (FASZOI)’. 13. Sovereignty forces refer to military installations and forces located in overseas departments and territories, whereas presence forces refer to military installations and forces stationed in allied countries. 14. In French: Zone maritime sud de l’océan Indien. 15. France (2011), Livre bleu sud océan Indien, Paris: MEDDTL (Ministère de l’écologie, du développement durable, des transports et de du logement) and MIOMCTI (Ministère de l’intérieur, de l’outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l’immigration), 99 p. [A simplified English version of this document exists and can be found online under the title of The Southern Indian Ocean Blue Book, 79 p., http://www.reunion.pref.gouv. fr, accessed on 22 March 2013]. 16. In the Southern Indian Ocean (Southern Ocean for the Australians), the Southern Ocean Maritime Patrol and Response (SOMPR) programme provides a dedicated vessel, the ACV Ocean Protector (a Customs and Border Protection multi-role ship), which is able to conduct yearround patrols in sub-Antarctic weather conditions. Operations in this remote and hostile oceanic area are conducted in collaboration by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection), the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the Australian Defence Force. 17. The territory is made of four low-lying tropical islands in two separate reefs, and the 12 nautical mile territorial sea generated by the islands. A permanent military installation would require the building of an artificial island as the Chinese built on several reefs in the South China Sea. 18. A base there would be difficult to defend and operate efficiently in the case of a war with capable armed forces (jet fighters, missiles, etc.) operating from Java. 19. ‘And thus within easy reach of large tactical fighters, or air/sea launched cruise missiles, necessitating significant base hardening and concrete shelters if a base is to be viable for use in wartime.’ (Kopp 2012, p. 20) 20. ‘In 2009 the Maldives under the leadership of the new pro-Indian President Mohamed Nasheed approached India about becoming integ-

280  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin rated into India’s security grid in order to enhance existing security cooperation agreements and out of growing fears that a Maldivian island resort could be taken over by terrorists (The Hindu, 22 October 2009). According to the Indian press, as a result of this request the Indian Navy and Coast Guard will each base one helicopter in the Maldives, India will install coastal radars on Maldivian atolls, where there are currently only two such devices as well as integrate them with India’s maritime surveillance network, and Indian patrol aircraft now conduct flights over the islands (Indian Express.com, August 13, 2009) (Kostecka 2010, p. 10). 21. ‘Sitting 300 kilometers off the Burmese mainland in the Indian Ocean, the Coco Islands were once known as “Burma’s Devils Island”, infamous as a detention centre for political prisoners. After the penal colony was closed in 1971, the tiny islands – which form the northern link in the Andaman Islands chain – were handed over to the Burmese navy. […] Panmawaddy Naval Base took over from the disused prison and remains there to this day. […] Even though evidence has surfaced regarding China’s assistance in upgrading the Burmese naval base on the islands, there is still a lack of solid evidence about China’s military involvement.

References Bhadrakumar, M.K., 2013, ‘US Seeks Military Presence in Maldives’, Russia and India Report (part of Russia Beyond the Headlines, RBTH): http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2013/04/26/us_seeks_military_presence_in_ maldives_24183.html (last visited on 25 January 2015). Bouchard, C. and W. Crumplin, 2011, ‘Two faces of France: France of the Indian Ocean/France in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 7: 2, pp. 161-82, DOI: 10.1080/19480881.2011.637423. , 2013, ‘The Marine Nationale in the Southwest and Southern Indian Ocean’, in A. Forbes (ed.), The Naval Contribution to National Security and Prosperity; Proceedings of the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, 2012, Canberra: Sea Power Center, pp. 141-60. Brewster, D., 2014a, India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership, London and New York: Routledge, Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series 26, p. 228. , 2014b ‘Beyond the String of Pearls: Is there Really a Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, published online: 17 June 2014, DOI: 10.1080/19480881.2014.922350. Chandramohan, B., 2009, ‘India, Maldives and the Indian Ocean’, Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA Comment, 13 October

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  281 2009, http://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/IndiaMaldivesandthe IndianOcean_BChandramohan_131 009 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Channel 4 News, 2011, ‘US Reaper drones in Seychelles “unarmed” says minister’, The Washington Post, 26 September 2011, http://www. channel4.com/news/us-reaper-drones-in-seychelles-unarmed-saysminister (last visited on 25 January 2015). Chau, W., 2011, ‘Seychelles invites China to set up naval base’, New Pacific Institute: Asia Security Watch, http://asw.newpacificinstitute.org/? p=9185 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Chossudovsky, M., 2010, ‘Yemen and The Militarization of Strategic Waterways: Securing US Control over Socotra Island and the Gulf of Aden’. Centre for Research on Globalization, Global Research, http:// www.globalresearch.ca/yemen-and-the-militarization-of-strategicwaterways/17460 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Cooray, Phillip et al., 2012, ‘US military eyes Cocos Islands as a future Indian Ocean spy base’, Sydney: The Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh. com.au/frontpage/2012/03/28/frontpage.pdf (last visited on 30 January 2015). Das, P., 2011, ‘Securing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 465-78, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.559988. de Paiva, B., 2011, France: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region, West Perth: Future Directions International, Strategic Analysis Paper, p. 6. defenceWeb, 2011, ‘China Invited to Set up Anti-piracy Base in Seychelles’, Johannesburg: defenceWeb, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=21843:china-invited-to-setup-anti-piracy-base-in-seychelles&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Department of Defence, 2014, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, Washington (DC): Office of the Secretary of Defence, Annual Report to Congress, p. 87. DeSilva-Ranasinghe, S., 2011, ‘China-India Rivalry in the Maldives’, Jakarta, The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2011/06/17/china-india-rivalry-maldives.html (last visited on 31 January 2015). Dutta, S., 2009, ‘Navy Eyes Maldives – Counter to China’s “String of Pearls” Plan’, Calcutta: The Telegraph, 20 August 2009, http://www. telegraphindia.com/1090820/jsp/frontpage/story_11385890.jsp# (last visited on 30 January 2015).

282  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin Germond, B., 2011, ‘The EU’s Security and the Sea: Defining a Maritime Security Strategy’, European Security, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 563-84, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2011.635648. Hawke, A. and R. Smith, 2012, Australian Defence Force Posture Review. Canberra: Australian Government. Holmes, J., 2014, ‘Coming to the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy: How Should India Respond?’, Washington (DC): The National Interest, 7 October 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-the-indianocean-the-chinese-navy-how-should-india-11415 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Indian Navy, 2007, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence (Navy), Integrated Headquarters. ‘Interview with Admiral Arun Prakash, Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy’, Asian Defence Journal, October 2005, p. 22. Katzman, K., 2013, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington (DC): Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress. Kaul, S., 2015, Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Untapped Strategic Assets, Delhi: Pentagon Press in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Kukreja, D., 2014, ‘Andaman and Nicobar Islands: A Security Challenge for India’, Indian Defence Review, vol. 28 (January-March 2013). Khalid, M., 2012, ‘French Islands in the Indian Ocean: A Geostrategic Presence and Antarctic Dimension’, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 406-17. Kopp, C., 2012, ‘Strategic Potential of the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island’, Defence Today, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 18-21. Kostecka, D., 2010, ‘Hambantota, Chittagong, and the Maldives: Unlikely Pearls for the Chinese Navy’, China Brief, vol. 10, no. 23, pp. 8-11. Ladwig III, W.C., A.S. Erickson and J.D. Mikolay, 2014, ‘Diego Garcia and American Security in the Indian Ocean’, in C. Lord and A.S. Erickson (eds.), Rebalancing U.S. Forces, Basing and Forward Presence in the AsiaPacific, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, pp. 131-79. Martin, G., 2014, ‘Operation Copper Now Only with SA and Mozambique’, Johannesburg: defenceWeb, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34071:operati on-coppernow-only-with-sa-and-mozambique&catid=108:maritime-security (last visited on 25 January 2015). McHugh, L., 2011, ‘History Repeating: Australian Military Power in the Cocos Islands’, London: The Conversation, 1 December 2011, http:// theconversation.com/history-repeating-australian-military-power-inthe-cocos-islands-4484 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Mendiolaza, G. and Z. Saxon, 2013, Russia: National Involvement in the

The Renewed Geostrategic Significance  283 Indian Ocean Region, West Perth: Future Directions International, Strategic Analysis Paper. Osman, Shafick, 2013, ‘La géopolitique de la République de Maurice’, Paris: Université Paris-Sorbonne, École doctorale de géographie de Paris, PhD thesis. O’Rourke, R., 2014, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress, Washington (DC): Congressional Research Service, CRS Report. PIB, 2014, ‘Indian Navy the First to Respond in Maldivian Crisis’, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, 7 December 2014, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid= 112783 (last visited on 25 January 2015). Puddy, M., ‘India bringing Maldives into its Security Net’, Delhi: The Indian Express, 13 August 2009, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/indiabringing-maldives-into-its-security-net/501583/ (last visited on 31 January 2015). Rogers, J. and L. Simón, 2009, The Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of the European Union and their Potential Role for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate‐General for External Policies of the Union, Briefing Paper. Sakhuja, V., 2014, ‘Chinese Submarines Taste Indian Ocean’, The Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 October 2014, http:// cimsec.org/chinese-submarines-taste-indian-ocean/13257 (last visited on 30 January 2015). Seidler, F.F., 2013, ‘Germany Needs a Permanent Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean’, Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik (Blog), http://www.seidlerssicherheitspolitik.net/2013/11/germany-needs-permanent-navalpresence.html (last visited on 30 January 2015). Scott, D., 2013, ‘India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Securing the Waves?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 484511. Singh, M., 2011, ‘The Proposed PLA Naval Base in Seychelles and India’s Options’, Delhi: The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA Comment, 15 December 2011, http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ TheProposedPLANavalBaseinSeychellesandIndiasOptions_msin gh_151211 (last visited on 30 January 2015). Smith, J.M., 2014, ‘Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Strategic Outpost’, Tokyo: The Diplomat, 18 March 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/ andaman-and-nicobar-islands-indias-strategic-outpost/ (last visited on 25 January 2015). Subbu, B.R., 2014, ‘The Geostrategic Importance of India’s Island Territories

284  Christain Bouchard and William Crumplin and Implications for National Security’, Australian Defence Forces Journal, no. 193, pp. 56-65. Unnithan, S., 2014, ‘Exclusive: Indian Navy Headless as Chinese Nuclear Sub Prowls Indian Ocean’, Noida (India), India Today, http:// indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-indianocean/1/350498.html (last visited on 31 January 2015). Upadhyay, A., 2013a, ‘Geo-Strategic Importance of India’s Island Territories and Implications for National Security’, Security-risks.com: http:// www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/indian-ocean/geostrategic-importance-of-india%27s-island-territories-1807.html (last visited on 25 January 2015). , 2013b, ‘India’s Island Territories: Strategic Significance in Securing IOR’, Security-risks.com: http://www.security-risks.com/securitytrends-south-asia/indian-ocean/indias-island-territories-strategicsignificance-in-securing-ior-1867.html (last visited on 25 January 2015). Whitlock, C. and G. Miller, 2011, ‘U.S. Building Secret Drone Bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Officials Say’, The Washington Post, 20 September 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/usbuilding-secret-drone-bases-in-africa-arabian-peninsula-officialssay/2011/09/20/gIQAJ8rOjK_story.html (last visited on 25 January 2015). Whitlock, C., 2012, ‘US and Australia Discuss Drone Flights over Indian Ocean’, Canberra (ACT): Canberra Times, 27 March 2012, http://www. canberratimes.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/us-and-australiadiscuss-drone-flights-over-indian-ocean-20120327-1vw10.html (last visited on 25 January 2015). Yung, C.D., R. Rustici, S. Devary and J. Lin, 2014, Not An Idea We Have to Shun: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the Twenty First Century, Washington (DC): National Defense University Press, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives No. 7. Yung, C.D., 2015, ‘Burying China’s “String of Pearls”’, Tokyo: The Diplomat, 22 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/burying-chinasstring-of-pearls/ (last visited on 30 January 2015). Zee News, 2014, ‘US Rules Out Permanent Military Presence in Maldives’, ZeeNews.com, 25 January 2014, http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/ us-rules-out-permanent-military-presence-in-maldives_906738.html (last visited on 25 January 2015).

CHAPTER 18

India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean: A Strategic Triangle to Counter Piracy? S R I PA R N A PAT H A K R A I M E D H I

The Indian Ocean is an important global trading area, an important resource centre and a diverse geopolitical entity. As global politics witnesses the shift of power from the West to the East, along with energy politics gaining increasing importance coupled with the rise of more serious non-traditional threats, the Indian Ocean region is also witnessing several transformations. These transformations have been occurring in the last several centuries and are gaining in momentum as international politics increasingly begins being labelled as the ‘Asian century’ with India and China playing greater roles in the global arena. Beyond the role the United States has played as the leading military power, countries such as India and China have also stepped up to address issues which are nontraditional security threats, but are important security threats nevertheless – piracy being one such threat to cite as an example. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), roughly about 4,000 × 4,000 miles is the habitat of one-third of the world’s population; one quarter of United Nations (UN) members, most of which are Third World countries. On an average 20 per cent of the global shipping in transit takes place in this region. Oil resources of the Persian Gulf for example, or the distribution routes of the region are indicative of the importance of the region for the Western world. According to Admiral Zumwalt, ‘The Indian Ocean has

286  Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi become the area with the potential to produce majority shifts in the global power balance over the next decade’ (Mugomba, 1976: 18). Similarly, Cohen states that the Indian Ocean is an eventual third geostrategic region with a globe influencing character (Cohen, 1973: 58). Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is a great deal of not just cultural but also political divergence in the states which exist in the IOR. It was only in 1971, when a threat to peace and security emerged in the region due to intrusion and activities of naval forces from the superpowers and the first UN-sponsored Zone of Peace Proposal emerged on behalf of the littoral states, that a sense of collective Indian Ocean identity emerged under external threat. In 1979, in the meeting of the 44 littoral and hinterland states the collective identity developed further, which continued right up to 1982 in the reiteration of the UN Zone of Peace Proposals (House, 1984: 10). However, the fact remains that dissention and diversity have never been really set aside, and they continue to exist even in the twenty-first century. A cut to the twenty-first century reveals that not much has changed. While the erstwhile Cold War order characterized by tight bipolarity between the US and the erstwhile USSR have now been replaced by a more multi-polar world order, mutual suspicions run high among countries which have high stakes in the region – an example is the Chinese mistrust of increasing IndoAmerican bonhomie in the region. Nevertheless, there remains much more to gain through cooperation than through mutual suspicion and competition in the region. An arena wherein cooperation of states such as China, India and the US – all three of which have stakes in the region – can be imagined is that of countering piracy. Nevertheless, before delving into the issue of piracy it is first pertinent to discuss what stakes the three countries have in this particular region.

India and the Indian Ocean India’s location along the Indian Ocean inevitably leads it to perceive the IOR as being of vital importance. India relies on the region for

India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean  287

a significant volume of its sea-based trade, and the importance of the region is seen even in India’s foreign policy formulations. As has been witnessed in several policy formulations in the recent past, India argues for a unified Indian Ocean region with India being at the centre. Former Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, for instance, asserted that ‘India and the Indian Ocean are inseparable. In the midst of the third largest ocean in the world, India’s location is in many ways her destiny. That is not just a statement regarding a fact of geography but of deeper civilizational, historical, cultural, economic and political linkages that have been forged between India and the Ocean that bears its name. Apart from the Monsoon, the India-link, in its broadest sense, is the single common thread that is visible in the Indian Ocean region’ (Rao, 2011: 5). As the former Chief of Naval Staff (2004-6) and subsequent Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation (2008-12) Arun Prakash put it, India has the opportunity and challenge ‘to leverage her geographical advantage’ through appropriate strategies. These geopolitical advantages for India are partly of length of coastline; 7,516.6 km, made up of the mainland (5,422.6 km), the 27 Lakshadweep Islands (132 km), and the 572 Andaman & Nicobar Islands (1,962 km). They are partly of location; India being situated in the middle of the northern Indian Ocean, looking both westwards across the Arabian Sea and eastwards across the Bay of Bengal. They are partly of extension, with a long Indian peninsula jutting over 2,000 km further southwards into the Indian Ocean reaches (Scott, 2013: 485). For India’s continuous economic rise, it is essential that the Sea Lanes of Communication remain open in order to maintain trade flows. India’s rise in the global order is driven by its economic growth and rise; for which it needs ever increasing imports of energy. Therefore, it is essential that disruption of the flow of trade and energy along the sea lanes as a result of piracy is kept in check. Such disruptions through piracy are generally faced in the Strait of Malacca and in the Gulf of Aden, which has now also spread back into the Arabian Sea and waters off the Seychelles and Maldives in the Western Indian Ocean. Another concern that emanates for India in this region is terrorist infiltration, which has increased

288  Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi since the Mumbai terror attacks of 26/11, when the terrorists entered Mumbai from across the sea. In the words of David Scott (2013), ‘potential infiltration of India’s island territories, especially the Lakshadweep Islands, is also coupled with concerns on Islamist destabilization of the Maldives and the Seychelles (ibid.). India imports about 70 per cent of its oil through the IOR to its various ports. It is precisely because of this that India has been enhancing its strategic influence by majorly investing in regional mining, gas, oil and infrastructure projects. Additionally, India has increased its naval presence and has included the establishment of listening posts in Madagascar, the Seychelles and Mauritius. All these are indicative of the immense importance the region has for India.

The US and the Indian Ocean Strategic interests of the US in the IOR date back to the era of the Cold War, wherein the American decision to register its presence in the Indian Ocean was prompted by a desire to assert the international character of the Malacca Straits, which control the eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean. American naval presence in the Indian Ocean was and is seen as necessary to protect the economic arteries of the ‘free world’ from any threat to raw material supplies and trade inflows from the particular area. While deliberating on the most important points of American strategy in the Indian Ocean, it becomes pertinent to point out that for the US the Indian Ocean is a secure highway for international commerce. As stated by Dr Saturo Nagao of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, it is important for the US that freedom of navigation through strategic chokepoints of the Indian Ocean highway – the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea – around Africa and the Mozambique Channel is maintained. Another concern for US strategic interests in the region is that the region could become an arena for great power strategic competition between India and China (Saturo 2012). In short, the three US geostrategic interests at stake in the region are ‘maintaining a secure highway’, ‘sanitizing great power rivalry in

India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean  289

Asia’, and ‘defending chokepoints’. The maintenance of a secure highway includes the protection of SLOC, which also is a priority for India and China. Additionally, a security concern for the US is the prevention of nuclear proliferation of failed states, while the threat of Islamic terrorism looms large (Brewster, 2012).

China and the Indian Ocean Region As stated earlier, for both India and China, continued economic growth is of vital interests and a lot of China’s oil demands are met through the IOR, especially through the Straits of Malacca. 80 per cent of China’s oil demands are met through this region. As such, China has begun building alternative ports to create alternative transport routes for its oil imports – so as to reduce the dependence on the Straits of Malacca and to provide China with resource security. Additionally there are Chinese fears that the US is trying to contain Beijing by roping in Indian Ocean littoral states within an Indo-Pacific framework, and as a result of this, various Chinese efforts have been witnessed in wooing these littoral states through economic means in particular. Its drive to build infrastructure in the IOR littoral states as part of its ‘going global strategy’ is already setting the trend in this regard (Rajan 2013). Just the way it is pertinent for India and the US to protect the SLOCs, it is pertinent for China as well to protect the SLOCs which are vital for the country’s energy imports. In November 2014, in a ‘blue book’ on the IOR, Beijing attempted to spell out its plans and strategies to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean. The blue book puts forth that it is essential for Beijing to deepen its economic engagements with the littoral states in the region, and adds that Beijing’s interests will be driven more by commercial interests and not military per se. The ‘blue book’ states that Beijing has fallen behind New Delhi and Washington in securing its interests in the IOR, and adds that China so far has no Indian Ocean strategy, while India has its own Look East Policy and the US has its pivot in Asia. It goes on further to state that a clear development strategy in the IOR for China is not just a sign of confidence but also a crystal clear demonstration of Beijing’s strategic interests in the IOR. The

290  Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi publication of this book in itself is an indication of the fact that the IOR is of extreme strategic importance for China. As has been seen in the preceding three sections on India and the Indian Ocean, the US and the Indian Ocean and China and the Indian Ocean respectively, the IOR is of vital strategic importance for all the three powers. However, the possibilities of confrontation also remain high. Nevertheless, the common threat for all these three remains in the form of disruption of smooth traffic flows of oil and resources through the region as a result of piracy. The following section delves deeper into the issue of piracy in the region and then tries to find a common arena for collaboration between the three countries of India, the US and China.

Piracy in the Indian Ocean Region The seriousness of the issue of piracy in the IOR is reflected in the fact that more than US $330 million was paid in ransoms between 2009 and 2012 to pirates (European Union Naval Force, 2013). In another report by the World Bank in 2013, maritime piracy by Somalian pirates costs US $18 billion a year, and over the years as piracy continues to evolve, the weapons used by pirates are becoming more sophisticated and dangerous. Out of a total of 264 piracy cases reported in 2013, as stated by the International Maritime Bureau, 189 incidents took place in the IOR. If one were to analyse the most vulnerable regions for piracy in the IOR, then it is seen that these are along the Horn of Africa, off the Somalia coast, the Gulf of Aden and the region near Indonesia in Southeast Asia. While a decrease has been witnessed in the region on the east coast of Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, wherein 117 cases were reported in 2009, which fell to just six in 2013; and in Somalia, wherein from 80 cases in 2009, only seven were reported in 2013. Reasons behind the decline are attributable to the increased active military action against suspected pirates, and to more armed guards on ships sailing the region. However, an increase in such incidents has been witnessed near Indonesia, wherein the number of such cases was merely 15 in 2009, and it rose to 106 in 2013. Similarly, the Indian subcontinent

India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean  291

has also witnessed an increase in piracy incidents, wherein only five cases were reported in 2010, and this rose to 14 in 2014. Between 2010 and 2013, 38 Indians were held as hostages by Somali pirates (ibid.). Singapore is the country that is most affected by maritime piracy in the IOR. 39 of its ships were attacked in 2013. Malaysia and Hong Kong have also been adversely affected by maritime piracy, and the number of Malaysian ships attacked by pirates stood at 20, while the number of ships from Hong Kong that were attacked stood at 10 in 2013. In 2013, 304 crew members were taken hostage, out of which 54 were from Malaysia and 34 from Indonesia. It is observed that most of the ships attacked are chemical tankers, oil tankers and bulk carriers. This is indicative of the fact that maritime piracy is a global threat for trade and commerce. According to Wayne Bowen (2014), Somalia is not alone in its inability to prevent its coasts from hosting pirates. Other failed states such as Yemen, Pakistan, Burma and Tanzania have been unable or unwilling to ‘prevent pirates from launching from their territory’ (ibid.). In order to deal with the issue of maritime piracy, the US and its allies operate through the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150); which is a coalition of 25 nations, based in Bahrain, and which primarily fights piracy in the western Indian Ocean. China and India are not a part of the CTF-150. However, Russian, Chinese and Indian anti piracy operations do exist in the IOR. However, the constraint faced lies primarily in the vastness of the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion In the introductory part of this paper, the commonality between the strategic interests of India, the US and China was traced. It is seen that for all three, SLOCs are extremely important. The passage of oil tankers becomes even more pertinent for the two developing countries of India and China which are highly dependent on oil imports to sustain their economic growth. In terms of tackling the issue of maritime policy, the US has taken a lead over both India

292  Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi and China in the form of a CTF-150. Nevertheless it is pertinent to note that Indian and Chinese efforts are also aimed at tackling the issue. While a number of scholarly works look at the evolving ‘competition’ between these three countries in the IOR, what is largely absent is the attempt to find a common ground wherein these three countries could cooperate and could find win-win solutions for all. Clearly, piracy is a threat to global trade and commerce, and it is essential that oil supplies along with supplies of other essential resources do not get thwarted by piracy. There are seven choke points that have been identified on the SLOCs in the IOR, which are strategically important in terms of maritime security. These choke points are in Bab el Mandeb, the Mozambique Channel, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait. It is pertinent that patrolling activities at these choke points in particular are increased. Also, joint studies and date sharing to identify the most vulnerable areas in the region should be carried out between the patrolling countries. It is premncisely because of increased patrolling that a slight decrease in piracy has been witnessed in the IOR. However, as stated earlier, the levels of sophistication of the tools used in planning piracy is increasing, and concerted efforts and vigil is needed to prevent a future increase of such activities. In the absence of concerted efforts, there will be a resurgence of piracy in the region. The twenty-first century is characterized no longer by traditional security threats, but more so by non-traditional security threats such as those of terrorism and piracy, and it is essential that the seriousness of the issue is realised and concerted efforts are made.

References Bowen, Wayne, 2014, Opinion: Piracy in the Indian Ocean: Perils on the High Seas, 26 August, Southeast Missourian, viewed on 1 January 2015 (http://www.semissourian.com/story/2103360.html). Brewster, David, 2012, US Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean, 26 June, The Interpreter, viewed on 26 December (http://www.lowyinterpreter. org/post/2012/06/26/US-strategic-thinking-about-the-Indian-Ocean. aspx?COLLCC=2799197459&).

India, China and the US in the Indian Ocean  293 Cohen, Saul Bernard, 1974, Geography and Politics in a World Divided,  London: Oxford University Press. European Union Naval Force, 2013, ‘As Pirates Attack a Super Tanker in the Indian Ocean, Naval Forces Warn Yachts to Avoid the High Risk Area’, 18 October, European Union External Action, Viewed on 26 December (http://eunavfor.eu/as-pirates-attack-a-super-tanker-in-the-indianocean-naval-forces-warn-yachts-to-avoid-the-high-risk-area/). House, John, 1984, ‘War, Peace and Conflict Resolution: Towards an Indian Ocean Model’, Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers, Durham, 12 January 1984. Mugomba, A.T., 1976, ‘NATO, the Southern Oceans and Southern Africa’, African Review, 6: 15-33. Piracy and Security News, 2013, ‘The Indian Ocean’s $18-Billion Piracy Stakes’, 20 October, Hellenic Shipping News, viewed on 1 January 2015 (http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/the-indian-oceans-18-billionpiracy-stakes/). Rajan, D.S., 2013, ‘China in the Indian Ocean: Competing Priorities in IPCS SPECIAL FOCUS, The Maritime Great Game India, China, US & The Indian Ocean,’ 15 October, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, viewed on 26 December, (http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR150IPCSSpecialFocus-MaritimeGreatGame.pdf). Rao, Nirupama, 2011, ‘India as a Consensual Stakeholder in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 7(1): 1-31. Saturo, Nagao, 2012, Review of ‘Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy’, 10 April, From the Oceans, viewed on 26 December ( http://oceans.oprf-info.org/ analysis_en/c1204-1.html#1_US_Interests) Scott, David, 2013, ‘India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Securing the Waves?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(4): 484-511.

CHAPTER 19

The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region: India-China-US: Conflict or Cooperation? S R E E PA R N A D A S G U P TA

The paper attempts to analyse the emerging geo-strategic environment of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with reference to the complex interactions between the three key players in the region: India, China and the United States (US). The Indian Ocean, stretching from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian Plateau, the Indian subcontinent and beyond the Indonesian Archipelago, seems poised to charter the course of the twenty-first century just as Europe steered the course of the last century.1 The IOR, interestingly and perhaps aptly referred to as a ‘post-American’2 world by Fareed Zakaria (2008), is being projected by analysts and scholars alike as the region where much of the manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvring for restructuring the Asian balance of power will be played out in the foreseeable future. Further, what cannot be discounted is the argument that the Indian Ocean is the most nuclearized of the seven seas and thus, is in urgent need of strategic stability.3 Just as China dominates Eurasia physically, India bisects the Indian Ocean. India’s geo-strategic location allows it to dominate the IOR. It was Sardar K.M. Pannikar who, way back in 1945, was one of the first Indian analysts to highlight the geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for India. Pannikar writes:

296  Sreeparna Dasgupta The peninsular character of the country with its extensive and open coast line, and with a littoral that is extremely fertile and rich in resources, makes India entirely dependent on the Indian Ocean over which her vast trade, has for the most part, found its way to the marts of the world all through history.4

Pannikar had also cautioned India against a resurgent China trying to establish its dominance in the Indian Ocean and against the US, which guided by its long term economic and strategic concerns would inevitably attempt to enter these waters as a major naval power in the future.5 In fact, much of Pannikar’s dire predictions regarding the geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean vis-à-vis the key stake-holders in the region (India, China and the US) seem to be translating into reality in the present century.

Geo-Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean The Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly crucial for both China and India from the perspective of energy security. The Indian Ocean rim land from the Middle East to the Pacific accounts for 70 per cent of the traffic of petroleum products for the entire world.6 As such any power that controls the ‘choke points’ of the Indian Ocean: Bab el Mandeb (Gulf of Aden), Strait of Hormuz (Gulf of Oman) and Strait of Malacca (Indian Ocean–South China Sea) could throttle the commercial and strategic lifeline of other nations in the region. The political establishment in India has in recent years reiterated that achieving energy security is India’s primary national objective.7 Similarly, China, in order to achieve its core national interest, i.e. economic development, requires increasing access to oil and other raw materials. The world’s energy needs will rise by 50 per cent by 2030 and almost half of that demand will be generated by India and China.8 It has been predicted that before 2025 India will overtake Japan as the world’s third largest net importer of oil after the US and China.9 Further, it has also been predicted that by 2020 China will import 7.3 million barrels of crude oil daily and 85 per cent of that oil will pass through the Strait of Malacca.10 China with its lack of direct access to the Indian Ocean

The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region  297

has responded by setting up ports in friendly countries around the Indian Ocean, the so called ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. China is building a large naval base at Gwadar in Pakistan which will allow it to monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, another port at Pasni, Pakistan, 75 miles east of Gwadar. China has set up a fuelling station at Hambantota, on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, another naval facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh. It has also set up naval bases in Myanmar. In response India has set up staging and listening posts in Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. India has also developed a port in Karwar, south of Goa to counter the Chinese port at Gwadar.11 China’s perception of its vulnerability in securing uninterrupted flow of oil through the Malacca Strait in the presence of US and Indian Navies has been termed as ‘Malacca Dilemma’12 by President Hu Jintao. Similarly, India’s dependence on imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz with Chinese base of Gwadar in Pakistan across Hormuz has been called India’s ‘Hormuz Dilemma.’13 However, what needs to be understood are China’s long-term strategic needs that underpin the elaborate port projects in the region, that is, China’s need to gain access to deep water ports in friendly countries along the IOR. This will not only enable China to guard the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC), but in doing so, also allow the Chinese bureaucracy to make a convincing pitch to the Chinese political-military leadership for a blue water naval force. Thus the stage is set for intense rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

China’s Indian Ocean Strategy and India’s Response It cannot be denied that China’s strategic focus till now continues to be the Pacific and not the IOR. It would, however, be a strategic folly to ignore the gradual changes in China’s perceptions regarding IOR’s strategic importance. As for now, Beijing’s principal interest seems to lie in protecting the SLOCs along the Indian Ocean, vital for the country’s energy imports.14 However, signals that maritime security interests have come to dominate China’s thinking on the IOR become evident from a number of factors:

298  Sreeparna Dasgupta 1. China’s ongoing naval modernization efforts which confirm Beijing’s intentions to expand the country’s naval capabilities so as to operate in waters far beyond its borders.15 2. China’s actions in deploying attack submarines in the Indian Ocean. 3. Official statement (Galle, Sri Lanka, 13 December 2012) made by Vice-Admiral Su Zhiqian, Commander of the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy, laying stress on the ‘freedom and safety of navigation in the Indian Ocean’. 4. The Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) released in June 2013, which can be perceived as a policy indicator. The Blue Book observes, ‘In the past, China’s Indian Ocean strategy was based on “moderation” and “maintaining the status quo”, but the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates China play a more proactive role in affairs of the region’. 5. China’s massive infrastructure building drive in the Indian Ocean littorals as part of its Silk Road plan. China has also proposed to revive the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), with the promise that it will invest heavily in the industrial and infrastructure development of those countries that participate in the MSR initiative.16 However, China has defended its naval policy in the IOR as one geared towards establishing a ‘harmonious sea’17 (through capacity building and international cooperation) and its infrastructure drive in the Indian Ocean littorals is projected as part of its economyoriented ‘Going Global’ strategy.18 While China attempts to expand its influence vertically by moving south-ward to reach the Indian Ocean, India is trying to expand its influence horizontally, that is, parallel to the Indian Ocean.19 Indian response to China’s Indian Ocean strategy has found manifestation in increased efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals. For instance, India’s long-term economic interests demand that India establishes trade links with Iran and a recovering Iraq. In 2005 India signed a multibilliondollar energy deal with Iran; there is also talk of building an energy

The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region  299

pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan.20 This, apart from connecting the Middle East to South Asia, would also go a long way in placing India-Pakistan relations on an even keel. India is also helping Iran in developing the Chah Bahar port on the Arabian Sea.21 Given India’s economic and strategic integration with Iran, it would be untenable for India to side with the US on Iran. As far as India’s naval capability is concerned, though India’s 155 ship navy is one of the world’s largest navy, its dominance of the IOR is not absolute.22 It cannot therefore impose ‘Rossenian’ peace in the region, i.e. balance between a continental power and a maritime power. The Indian navy also cannot use its presence in the Indian Ocean as a leverage to persuade China to settle the border dispute. Therefore, for India prudence, restraint and capacity building will continue to remain vital. As far as South-east Asia is concerned, India is focussing on strengthening its economic and strategic ties with not only the ASEAN but the larger East Asia region such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. In 2008, Tokyo signed a security pact with New Delhi.23 In fact, if Prime Minister Modi’s first bilateral visit within the neighbourhood was to Nepal and Bhutan then his first bilateral visit outside the neighbourhood was to Japan. This establishes the fact that India is very serious about increasing its footprints in South-East Asia and the larger East Asia region. Significant is New Delhi’s participation in multilateral fora like the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Indian Ocean Naval symposium. Such attempts by India can be perceived as essentially a ‘soft balancing’24 of China and the latter also sees it in this way.25

India-China-US: A Complex Matrix The US’s interest in the IOR centres around three imperatives: Securing Indian Ocean for international commerce; avoiding regional conflict on issues of strategic choke points in the IOR – Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca strait, and dealing with SinoIndian competition in the IOR. The US Navy’s new maritime strategy, unveiled in October 2007 at the Naval War College in

300  Sreeparna Dasgupta Newport, Rhode Island, clearly states that the navy will henceforth seek a sustained and forward presence in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific but less so in the Atlantic.26 Further, the US Marine Corps ‘Vision and Strategy’ statement of June 2008, covering years till 2025, also reiterates the importance and centrality of the Indian Ocean for the US’s future economic and strategic interests.27 This strategic vision of the US finds reflection in the US administration’s ‘Asia Pivot’ doctrine which envisages a more prominent and assertive role for the US in the Asia-Pacific region.28 The US, in keeping with its ‘Asia pivot’ policy is currently promoting the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept as part of its approach towards the IOR to achieve the freedom of navigation and to reassure its allies and partners. China perceives this as US’s attempt to contain it by encircling it both economically and militarily. China fears that the US is trying to contain China by roping in the Indian Ocean littorals under the ‘Indo-Pacific’ framework. In fact, China’s drive to build infrastructure in the Indian Ocean littorals is an attempt to keep the littorals away from US’s influence. Further, in order to balance the US in the region, China seems to have found a willing strategic partner in Russia. In the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference at Beijing (10-11 November 2014), China and Russia signed the preliminary papers on a massive energy agreement that has the capacity to outstrip Europe as a consumer of Russian gas.29 The Sino-Russian alliance, at a far more important level, must be understood as China’s continuous attempt to find safer, alternative in-land routes (via roads and pipelines) for the transfer of its energy imports. The Sino-Russian alliance also opens a new phase in the geo-strategic rivalry among the key players in the IOR, particularly India, China, Japan, US and Russia. This alliance also establishes beyond a doubt that the IOR is indeed multi-polar. Further, Russia, an old ally of India, seems to be moving closer to Pakistan as is evident from the Military Cooperation Agreement signed by the two countries in November 2014.30 This indeed is a milestone and a turning point in the bilateral relations of Russia and Pakistan, which historically have always been turbulent. This does not bode well for India’s long-term security and strategic

The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region  301

concerns and New Delhi needs to closely monitor this evolving relationship; it also brings to the forefront the fact that India has failed to capitalize on old friendships and alliances and this amounts to a huge diplomatic and strategic failure on India’s part. China is wary that US wants to push India to integrate into its system to contain China and encourages India to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs under the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept. However there is a dominant perception within Chinese scholarship that India will maintain its strategic autonomy in the IOR, a view that find reflection within Indian scholarship as well. This view, in the immediate context, draws sustenance from a number of facts, ranging from the joint naval exercises by Indian and Chinese navies near the southern Chinese city of Kunming31 to India’s participation as a founder member in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2014.32 The US had been lobbying in various Asian capitals against the bank. The AIIB aims to reduce the dependence of member countries on the West-dominated international finance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and thereby give far greater financial autonomy to China and its partners than before. Those who stayed away from the AIIB were the staunch US allies – South Korea, Japan and Australia. The AIIB is in essence, China’s riposte to the US’s attempted economic and military encirclement of China in accordance with its ‘Asia Pivot doctrine’.33 However India’s involvement in the China-led AIIB initiative proves the fact that India would certainly not like to ride piggy-back on the US nor be part of a US led coalition to contain (‘hedge’ against)34 China – as long as China’s rise remains peaceful and it does not de-stabilize the regional balance.

Conclusion As stated earlier, the Indian Ocean is multi-polar: it is multi-polar in the sense that no single power dominates the waters (despite US’s continuing naval hegemony), but rather dominance seems to be shared by the key powers in the region.35 This is primarily because the Indian Ocean does not represent an undulating continuum,

302  Sreeparna Dasgupta but is characterized by multiple focal points such as the Bay of Bengal, the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, etc.36 These focal points have their own issues and conflicts which are mostly localized and are also characterized by diverse permutations and combinations of regional players at each point. This makes the IOR a strategic system which is home to some of the fastest growing economies of Asia and is defined by growing military capabilities, expanding strategic alliances and deepening economic interdependences. In this fluid and complex strategic environment, US’s superior maritime capability, India’s geo-strategic advantage in the IOR and India and China’s dependence on the same SLOCs may compel China to persist with its ‘harmonious sea’ approach and shun a military approach thereby pushing for ‘constructive engagement’ in the IOR between the three key powers in the region – the US, China and India. The geo-strategic and the geo-political conditions in the IOR are still evolving. At present, as far as India and China in the IOR are concerned the situation is one of hesitant and tentative cooperation on certain key strategic and economic issues against a backdrop of intense competition over resources with the US attempting to reassess its priorities and accordingly seeking to reposition itself in the Indian Ocean. Hence, there is no doubt, as Kaplan has stated that the Indian Ocean will be where the twentyfirst century’s global power dynamics will be revealed.37

Notes 1. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, New York: Random House Trade, 2011, p. xii. 2. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: Norton, 2008, pp. 36-7. 3. According to defense analyst Thomas P.M. Barnett, the nuclear powers whose navies ply the Indian Ocean are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. Thomas P.M. Barnett, ‘India’s 12 Steps to a World-Class Navy,’ Proceedings, Annapolis, MD, 2001, July, as quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon, op. cit., p. 8. 4. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945, p. 82.

The Evolving Power Dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region  303 5. Ibid., pp. 86-7. 6. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 7. 7. India imports 65 per cent of its oil needs. India’s oil demand in 2025 is expected to be around 370 million tonnes. See Ray, Dadwal and Sinha, ‘Equity Oil and India’s Energy Security’, Strategic Analysis, JulySeptember 2005, p. 521. 8. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 7. 9. Ibid., p. 8. 10. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, ‘Beijing’s Energy Security Strategy: The Significance of a Chinese State-Owned Tanker Fleet’, Orbis, Fall, 2007, pp. 665-84. 11. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Play in the India Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, pp. 21-2. 12. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, ‘China’s Global Hunt for Oil’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, viewed on 10 February 2015 (http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/61017/david-zweig-and-bi-jianhai/chinasglobal-hunt-for-energy). 13. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century’, op. cit., p. 21. 14. D.S. Rajan, ‘The Unfolding China’s Indian Ocean Strategy’, Indian Strategic Studies, 12 February 2014, viewed on 5 February 2015 (http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/search/label/China?updatedmax=2014-02-12T18:27:00-08:00&max-results=20&start=267&bydate=false). 15. China is expanding its navy at breakneck speed fuelled by its concern for economic survival. Sometime in the next decade China’s navy will have more warships than USA. China is also acquiring submarines five times as fast as the United States. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, ‘China’s Global Hunt for Energy’, op. cit. 16. Atul Aneja, ‘Towards Multipolarity’, Frontline, 12 December 2014, pp. 68-71. 17. Chunhao Lou, ‘Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don’t Exaggerate the ChinaThreat’, East Asia Forum, 24 October 2013, viewed on 5 February 2015 (http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-theindian-ocean-dont-exaggerate-the-china-threat/). 18. Ibid. 19. Kaplan, Monsoon, op. cit., p. 10. 20. Ibid., p. 12. 21. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century’, op. cit., p. 28. 22. Although India is expanding its navy and is soon to be the third largest navy after those of US and China, India will lack the capability to secure its own interest in the Indian Ocean region in the foreseeable future. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, ‘China’s Global Hunt for Energy’, op. cit.

304  Sreeparna Dasgupta 23. Jae Ho Chang, ‘East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Pattern and Variation’, Pacific Affairs, Winter 2009/10, p. 663. 24. ‘Soft balancing’ has been defined as restraining the power and threatening behaviour of the hegemon with strategies other than military build up and alliances. See Stephen G. Brook and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 60. 25. Mohan Malik, ‘India and China: As China Rises, India Stirs’, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, New Delhi: Routledge, p. 169. 26. Kaplan, Monsoon, op. cit., p. 9. 27. Ibid. 28. See Douglas Paal, ‘The United States and Asia in 2011: Obama Determined to bring America ‘Back’’ to Asia’, Asian Survey, 2012, p. 13. 29. Aneja, ‘Towards Multipolarity’, op. cit., pp. 68-71. 30. The Economic Times, 20 November 2014, viewed on 25 January 2015 (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-20/news/ 56304004_1_russian-defence-minister-defence-ties-defence-ministry). 31. Kaplan, Monsoon, op. cit., p. 15. Also see Malik, ‘India and China: As China Rises, India Stirs’, op. cit., p. 173. 32. Aneja, ‘Towards Multipolarity’, op. cit., pp. 68-71. 33. Ibid. 34. ‘hedging’ is defined as wishing not to be dominated by China nor to antagonize it for fear of losing hefty economic gains. See Jae Ho Chang, ‘East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Pattern and Variation’, Pacific Affairs, Winter 2009/10, pp. 668-9. 35. Kaplan, Monsoon, op. cit., p. 16. 36. Ibid., p. 15. 37. Ibid., p. 13.

CHAPTER 20

India’s Stature in the Indian Ocean: Emerging ‘Power’ with a Human Face MOHOR CHAKRAB ORT Y

The ascending stature of India as an Indian Ocean power is by no means a recent acknowledgement. India’s geographical location, jutting out for a thousand miles into the Indian Ocean, and being walled off on three sides by land, has endowed it with a strategic ‘security sphere’ over the entire Indian Ocean Region. This geostrategic salience of India’s situation, acting as a security umbrella over the countries of Southeast Asia and the greater AsiaPacific, vindicates Lord Curzon’s posturing, since he envisaged a predominant role for India, bearing the seeds of an Indo-centric vision of the region. The imperative of India safeguarding the Indian Ocean Region emerges from its extensive coastline of over 7,516 km, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 2.172 million sq. km and a continental shelf of more than 1 million sq. km beyond the EEZ. Given these considerations, the modern vision of the country’s responsible power profile in the Indian Ocean has been outlined by the Indian Naval Doctrine (inaugurated in 2004 and modified subsequently in 2009), which constitutes an important edifice of India’s ‘Look East’ policy, precursor of the present ‘Act East’. Given this premise, the paper proposes to analyse India’s role as a responsible Indian Ocean power, in the sphere of both traditional and non-traditional security computations, as well as take stock of its stature as a ‘balancer’ to China’s graduating military and strategic assertiveness in the region.

306  Mohor Chakraborty

India in the Indian Ocean: Geostrategic Significance The Indian Ocean has remained a strategically significant locus since the colonial and pre-colonial era. The Indian Ocean, which covers at least one-fifth of the world’s total ocean area, provides critical sea trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia with the broader Asian continent to the east and Europe to the west. The strategic salience of the Indian Ocean is magnified by the presence of a number of important choke points, including the Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca, through which 32.2 millions of barrels of crude oil and petroleum are transported daily, accounting for more than 50 per cent of the world’s maritime oil trade. Besides, the Indian Ocean Region is believed to have rich deposits of energy and nearly 40 per cent of global offshore petroleum is produced here, while the coastal beach sands and offshore waters are loaded with heavy mineral deposits.1 Furthermore, since the Indian Ocean is flanked on three sides by land, it is often called ‘half ocean’ or ‘land-locked ocean’, providing geographical contiguity to its surrounding lands. Such a unique geopolitical seascape has been likened to a ‘bowl whose rim is formed by the bordering lands. . . . This rim has both protected and isolated the region and major invasions have come through the break in it or across the ocean highways.’2 Given this strategic import of the Indian Ocean and India’s location, the stature of India as a responsible oceanic power has been underscored by several eminent maritime historians, among whom, K.M. Pannikar argued that the country has prospered at those times when it used the seas extensively and stagnated when it did not.3 Pannikar also highlighted that during the colonial period and even the Second World War, the burden of Southeast Asian defence had to be borne by India, which acted as the base for supplying the resources and manpower to the European colonizers for containing their expansionist regional ambitions. In fact, he has portrayed the geographical reach of India as jutting out for a thousand miles into the Indian Ocean, thus constituting an area ‘walled off ’ on three sides by land, with the southern side of Asia forming a canopy over it, in a manner in which, whatever angle

India’s Stature in the Indian Ocean  307

may be used to view India, the concept of an ‘Indian security sphere’ covering the entire Indian Ocean Region was evident. The salience of India’s geopolitical situation, acting as a security umbrella over the countries of Southeast Asia, was a vindication of Lord Curzon’s strategic posturing of India as a ‘fortress’ who acknowledged that, ‘If rival and unfriendly influences move up to it and lodge themselves under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would grow up that one day might menace our security. That is the secret of our whole position in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and as far eastwards as Siam. He would be a shortsighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look beyond.’4 Lord Curzon, while underscoring India’s centrality in the Indian Ocean Region, had clearly asserted in his essay, ‘The Place of India in the Empire’ (1909) that, ‘It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India, must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added . . . on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and it is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam. On the high seas, it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas.’5 Although Lord Curzon had envisaged a role for India within the scaffold of the British imperial interests, his ideas bore the seeds of an Indo-centric vision of Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean Region and the greater Asia-Pacific. His strategic philosophy could be extended to propose that, even when India would not dominate the region as Great Britain had done during the colonial era, it had the potential of emerging as a regional nucleus of power by harnessing its geopolitical situation. A modern extension of such an argument may be derived from Alfred Mahan’s doctrine that it is through control of the seas that great powers derive their status. A more recent variant on this line of argument has sought to justify the presence of India’s large and sophisticated navy, by virtue of its role as the ‘protector’ of the Indian Ocean, seeking actively to project itself as the only ‘status quo’ regional power capable of maintaining the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) and International Shipping Lanes (ISL).

308  Mohor Chakraborty

Indian Ocean Region: Cockpit of Sino-India Rivalry The geo-strategic significance of the Indian Ocean has been the principal factor responsible for transforming it into an arena of rivalry and one-upmanship between India and China. Beijing’s attempts at expanding its footprints in the region have been borne out by the increasing frequency of anti-piracy deployments, naval exercises and the growing investments in maritime infrastructure projects. Of late, reports pointing to the docking of two Chinese naval vessels at Colombo South Container Terminal (CSCT), a deep-water facility built, controlled and run by a Chinese company, the China Merchants Holdings (International), succeeded by the docking of a Chinese submarine at Colombo, have strengthened Indian concerns that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) assets are being allowed privileged access to Sri Lankan ports funded by Chinese investments. The issue has received greater attention since November 2014, when reports about China’s plans for constructing eighteen ‘Overseas Strategic Support Bases’ in the Indian Ocean Region, stretching from the Seychelles through Pakistan to Djibouti, with facilities for fueling and material supply bases for peacetime use; relatively fixed supply bases for warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and the naval staff ashore rest; and fully functional centres for replenishment, rest and large warship weapons maintenance made their rounds. Given this backdrop, the rationale behind China’s Maritime Silk Route, an umbrella term referring to maritime infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region may be viewed as a supplement of the ‘string of pearls’ strategy aimed at encircling India and challenging the Indian Navy’s role and stature in the region.6 In addition to these hard power calculations, both India and China are dependent on energy resources transported through the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, with these waterways accounting for approximately 80 and 84 per cent of their energy (mostly oil) imports respectively. This maritime traffic transiting the Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits and the South China Sea – the water routes constituting the connecting cords between India/South Asia and Southeast Asia– is set to spiral with the rapid economic growth in

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the region and the increased dependence of the regional countries on Persian Gulf oil resources. Axiomatically, over the period of twenty years starting 2000, the number of oil tankers navigating these waterways is projected to increase threefold.7 Summarily then, the Indian Ocean Region has gained currency in the context of Sino-India rivalry, primarily over energy resources, strategic port facilities and the competitive degree of naval deployment, as both countries have embarked on their ‘blue water’ naval status. India has been working hard to evolve from ‘brown water’ to a ‘blue water’ naval power, seeking increasingly to safeguard its coastlines and simultaneously enhance its maritime domain of interests and outreach, for the purpose of which, the forging of pragmatic naval cooperation linkages with the regional maritime neighbours is a priority. Such a vision of India’s emergence of ‘a core state’ whose role would be crucial for long-term peace, stable balance of power, economic growth, and security in the Indian Ocean, has been envisaged in the Indian Naval Doctrine (2004 and 2009 editions). In April 2004, the Indian Navy enunciated a maritime doctrine for the first time, stressing the need for a submarine-based credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence (MND) capability, that is ‘inexorably linked’ to India pursuing an independent foreign policy posture and ‘if India is to exude the quiet confidence of a nation that seeks to be neither deferential nor belligerent’. Through this doctrine, the Indian Navy tried to establish its naval power and multiply it through sustainability across ‘its legitimate areas of interest stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits’.8 Besides, in 2007, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (IMMS-2007) provided an overarching strategy for the effective exercise of maritime power and employment of its primary instruments, especially the Navy and Coast Guard, by emphasising the growing importance of the maritime environment, and the centrality of maritime security for national development. It provided an insight and rationale for the resurgence of Indian naval power and postulated a strategy underpinned on ‘freedom to use the seas for our national purposes, under all circumstances’, with a central role for the Navy. The strategy brought out the various ways in which the Indian

310  Mohor Chakraborty Navy could serve as a catalyst for peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean Region.9 Furthermore, the revised version of the Maritime Doctrine (in 2009) spelt out that the ‘Indian Navy has a key role to play in meeting the maritime components of the challenges, which have been increasing in both scale and scope in recent years.’10 An important edifice of these doctrines is the ‘Look East’ policy (precursor to the present ‘Act East’ policy) highlighting the imperative of building cooperative maritime security linkages with the littoral countries of Southeast Asia, with regard to common aspirations and challenges, including the safeguard of trade and energy flows and threats emanating from terrorism, piracy, and transnational crimes, manifested through expanding bilateral and multilateral interactions through joint exercises, patrolling, anti-terror operations and dialogue.11 Resultantly, the maritime outlook of collaboration provided a holistic stress on the development of its naval policy as well, in a bid to form alliances and conduct joint exercises with the littoral navies not only of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states, but also with the countries of East Asia and beyond, particularly Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Finally, while it is indubitable that India and China will continue enhancing their strategic posturing in the Indian Ocean Region, it would be judicious for both countries to emphasize cooperation, particularly in facing the scourge of non-traditional challenges to security, in a more coordinated manner and consciously act towards transforming the region to a zone of peace and cooperation from a zone of conflict and rivalry.

Non-traditional Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region: Indian Navy’s Response The imperative of executing holistic security in the Indian Ocean Region, both in the traditional and non-traditional sense, has emanated from a host of serious challenges brought forth by maritime terrorism and piracy which disrupt the free and safe movement of international trade and energy traffic through the SLOCs; transnational crimes involving arms trafficking, narcotics

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and movement of Weapons of Mass Destruction through marine channels; poaching; illegal migration; natural disasters like cyclones and Tsunami; environmental hazards which endanger marine flora and fauna, etc. The menace of terrorism – whether terrestrial or maritime – both from within and across borders, as faced by India and the countries of the Asia-Pacific has been identified as a common agenda requiring joint monitoring and coordination. In fact, the Indian Naval Doctrine has been successful in upholding the Indian Navy’s benign and humanitarian face to the countries of this region, evoked in the wake of its whole-hearted response to the ruinous Tsunami (December 2004) and sporadic cyclonic and environmental disasters in Southeast Asia (particularly in Myanmar, Indonesia, the Philippines and Laos), as well as in its sincere efforts to ward off the menace of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and neighbouring SLOCs. Besides, India’s ‘Look East’ and its successor, ‘Act East’ policies have played a primary role in forging collaborative links with the Southeast Asian neighbours in addressing the wide array of non-traditional challenges to security. For instance, in view of keeping the diabolism of piracy and maritime terrorism at bay, the navies of India and a majority of the littoral ASEAN nations, like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam initiated the process of conducting joint exercises, aptly called ‘MILAN’ (‘coming together’) since 1991. Although MILAN had taken off as a multilateral naval forum for India, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Sri Lanka, it has presently been extended to embrace Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles as new members. In addition to the multilateral exercises, India has also undertaken bilateral naval war games with individual ASEAN countries.12 The bilateral exercises conducted on a regular basis include: Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercises (SIMBEX), India– Indonesia Coordinated Patrolling (IND INDOCORPAT), IndiaThailand Coordinated Joint Patrol (CORPAT) and the like. Among the regional navies, the Indian Navy has offered to assist the littoral states in the implementation of the Eyes in the Sky programme for patrolling the pirate-infested Straits of Malacca.

312  Mohor Chakraborty Therefore, the dimension of maritime collaboration has evoked a greater strategic significance, within the framework of which, the Indian Navy has sent warships, tankers and submarines to Japan, South Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam for joint exercises and raised the goodwill quotient, through regional confidence-building and cooperative mechanisms like regular participation in institutions of regional governance like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting + 8 (ADMM + 8), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) meetings and signing of agreements like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Furthermore, India’s significant naval build-up in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the establishment of a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC), based in these islands has manifested a more strategicallypragmatic and vision-oriented ‘Look East’ policy.13 This endeavour has been bolstered with the more recent commissioning of the Indian Naval ship, Baaz at the Great Nicobar’s Campbell Bay in August 2012,14 allowing India to assert itself more forcefully and keep a hawk-like eye on the strategically important Malacca Straits. India’s willingness to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia and its endorsement of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) have gone a long way in assuring the region of India’s peaceful intent. Subsequently, the ASEAN has viewed India’s security needs more as a factor emanating from the compulsions of its geopolitical position, rather than a derivative of any hegemonic designs.15 Furthermore, in the two decades of India’s collaboration with its Southeast Asian brethren, India has been profoundly engaged in providing training, personnel and professional support to their defence forces and holding defence policy dialogues. The most noteworthy instances to this end have been the assistance provided by the Indian Defence Forces to Thai pilots (for flying Sea Harriers); Vietnamese pilots and naval officers (for upgrading Mig-21 aircraft); Malaysian pilots (for training pilots and securing spare parts for Mig-29 aircraft); Singaporean Air Force personnel (for joint training of F-16 combat aircraft), etc. This defence

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diplomacy has undoubtedly brought the countries of Southeast, East Asia and beyond on a common strategic pedestal, in addition to raising their consciousness about the potential of New Delhi as a balancer vis-à-vis China’s rising regional stance.

Enhancing Indian Navy’s Footprints in the Indian Ocean Region: The Way Ahead Within the evolving framework of the Indian Navy’s initiatives for expanding its sphere of influence and operations in the Indian Ocean Region, the most recent operational blueprint in the form of a maritime guidance document, has been christened Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS-2015). In keeping with the principles and concepts of national security and maritime power, enunciated in the Joint Doctrine (Indian Armed Forces) and the Indian Maritime Doctrine, it builds upon the Indian Navy’s Vision Statement and Guiding Principles, formulated in 2014, which highlight the strategic ‘way points’ for the next decade. It reviews the key maritime strategic imperatives and influences, articulates the national maritime interests, and defines the related maritime security objectives, in addition to deriving corresponding strategies for attainment of these objectives. On the one hand, while acknowledging the hybrid nature of maritime challenges, exacerbated by the almost overlapping nature of traditional and non-traditional threats, the document harps on the imperative of envisaging a seamless and holistic approach, advocating greater coordination between and among different maritime agencies. On the other hand, it justifies the significance of the Indian Navy as the primary instrument to secure the oceanic neighbourhood for economic purposes, given India’s centrality in the Indian Ocean Region. Towards this end, the IMSS-2015 has recommended a four-pronged approach for the Indian Navy under the present and emerging circumstances: first, it has advocated steady increase in the Indian Navy’s operational footprints across India’s areas of maritime interest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a ‘net security provider’ in the neighbourhood, including deployments for anti-piracy, maritime

314  Mohor Chakraborty security, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations; second, an expansion in maritime operational engagements, with increased number and complexity of exercises with foreign navies, coordinated mechanisms for maritime security operations, and enhanced training, technical and hydrographic cooperation with friendly maritime forces; third, continued development of regional cooperative approaches for enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region, including operational interactions such as ‘MILAN’, evolution of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and emergence of maritime security cooperation as a priority area for the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA); and fourth, the growth and development of the Indian Navy’s force levels and maritime capabilities, with steady focus on indigenization.16 While the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 26 November 2008 may be interpreted as among the major stimuli for India to review its maritime-military strategy, IMSS-2015 clearly indicates that proxy war through terrorism has not prevented India from adopting an outward-looking approach to maritime security. In fact, the new strategy dilates the geographical scope of India’s maritime focus, expanding the two areas of interest southwards and westwards by bringing in the South-West Indian Ocean and Red Sea within its ‘primary area’ and the western Coast of Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and ‘other areas of national interest based on considerations of Indian Diaspora, overseas investments and political reasons’ within its ‘secondary area’ of interest. This acknowledgement clearly transcends the Indo-Pacific region, with the 2004 and 2009 editions of the Maritime Doctrine expounding the northern Indian Ocean Region as the ‘primary area’ of interest. IMSS-2015 even goes beyond IMMS-2007 to include two additional chokepoints: the Mozambique Channel and Ombai-Wetar Straits, which are strategically located at the far end of the south-western and southeastern Indian Ocean respectively, thereby formally recognizing these choke-points and reiterating the Indian Ocean’s geo-strategic ‘exclusivity’ for India.17 Besides, the Navy’s expanding footprints in recent years through the overseas deployments indicate that the maritime force is developing the capabilities to implement the

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intent. Strikingly enough, the fact that the IMSS-2015 focuses on India’s strategy for deterrence and response against traditional/conventional military threats and corresponding capability development, has a bearing on the ambitions of the PLA-Navy, laying it threadbare that the concept of maritime security would be operational across the entire array of conflicting interests and belligerent forays by regional or extra-regional navies. The renewed emphasis of the Indian Navy in securing the Indian Ocean, while acknowledging the Navy’s central role as a ‘net security provider’ may be viewed in the backdrop of the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s visit to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka in March 2015, within the purview of which, he demonstrated the region’s niche at the ‘top of New Delhi’s policy priorities’. While endorsing the ‘vision for Indian Ocean Region’, rooted in advancing regional cooperation as well as using ‘our capabilities for the benefit of all in our common maritime home’, Modi highlighted the following: first, the deepening of regional economic and security cooperation, particularly with the maritime neighbours and island states; second, undertaking collective action and cooperation to best advance peace and security in the maritime region for ensuring better preparedness to respond to emergencies and challenges, ranging from piracy, terrorism, natural disasters, etc. Towards, this end, he acknowledged India’s existing maritime security cooperation with the Maldives and Sri Lanka (Trilateral Initiative) and hoped that Mauritius, the Seychelles and other littoral nations would join the initiative; and finally, the need to promote a more integrated and cooperative future in the region that enhances the prospects for sustainable development, facilitating greater collaboration in trade, tourism and investment; infrastructure development; marine science and technology; sustainable fisheries; protection of marine environment; and, overall development of the blue economy.18 The urgent need of implementing this vision emerges from the burgeoning dependence on the seas for national and regional development, particularly since maritime economic activities continue to expand, and the conduct of seaborne trade, shipping and fishing calling for securing and maintaining freedom of navigation of

316  Mohor Chakraborty the SLOCs and ISL. The Indian prime minister’s enunciation of not only securing the Indian Ocean maritime domain against traditional and non-traditional challenges, but also of enhancing means of ensuring sustainable and balanced development, establishing and maintaining a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms; sensitivity to each other’s interests; and peaceful resolution of maritime issues will be realized in a mutually supportive and cooperative manner, for the culmination of which, the regional stake-holders must play a responsible role as well. Furthermore, in addition to boosting bilateral engagement between India and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region, it is contingent on the multilateral institutions and mechanisms like the Indian Ocean Rim Association, IONS, ARF, etc. to forge focused collaborative endeavours for carving a secure, sustainable and prosperous future of the region, in keeping with the letter and spirit of ‘SAGAR’ – Security and Growth for All in the Region.

Notes 1. Eleanor Albert, ‘Competition in the Indian Ocean’, CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 November 2015, http://www.cfr.org/ regional-security/competition-indian-ocean/p37201 (accessed on 18 February 2016). 2. ‘Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area: A Report by the Indian Council of World Affairs’, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1957, p. 26. 3. Sandy Gordon, India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995, p. 320. 4. K.M. Pannikar, The Future of Southeast Asia, New York: Macmillan & Co., 1943, p. 70. 5. Ibid., pp. 204-5. 6. Abhijit Singh, ‘A “PLA-N” for Chinese Maritime Bases in the Indian Ocean’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 26 January 2015, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-7-pla-n-chinesemaritime-bases-indian-ocean (accessed on 18 February 2016). 7. Robert Manning, ‘The Asian Energy Predicament’, Survival, vol. 42, no. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 24.

India’s Stature in the Indian Ocean  317 8. For details, see Indian Naval Doctrine: 2004, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Government of India, Compiled by the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC), Mumbai, 2004. 9. Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, 2007, pp. 9-10. 10. Indian Naval Doctrine: 2009, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Government of India, Compiled by the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC), Mumbai, 2009, pp. v-vi. 11. Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, pp. 117-18. 12. Tridib Chakraborti, ‘India’s Conviviality with Southeast Asia: Traversing the Saga of “Look East” Achievements-Hindrances Dichotomy’, in Ganganath Jha and Vibhanshu Shekhar (eds.), Rising India in the Changing Asia-Pacific: Strategies and Challenges, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012, p. 127. 13. Tridib Chakraborti, ‘India’s Look East Policy: Time for Stock-Taking’, World Focus, vol. 30, Annual Number, New Delhi, November-December 2009, p. 466. 14. Sudha Ramachandran, ‘India Extends Malacca Strait Reach’, Asia Times, 8 August 2012. 15. Shankari Sundararaman, ‘India and ASEAN’, The Hindu, 19 November 2003. 16. Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, October 2015, pp. 11-12, http://indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_ Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf (accessed on 24 February 2016). 17. Gurpreet S. Khurana, ‘Net Security Provider’ Defined: An Analysis of India’s New Maritime Strategy-2015,’ National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, 23 November 2015, http://www.maritimeindia.org/ View%20Profile/635838396645834619.pdf (accessed on 24 February 2016). 18. Prime Minister of India’s Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Barracuda in Mauritius, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 12 March 2015, http://www. mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?24912/Prime+Ministers+Remark s+at+the+Commissioning+of+Offshore+Patrol+Vessel+OPV+Barracu da+in+Mauritius+March+12+2015 (accessed on 24 February 2016).

CHAPTER 21

Collective Diplomacy: India’s Role in Indian Ocean Power Dynamics S U K A L PA C H A K R A B A R T I

Introduction: Geostrategic Significance of the Indian Ocean Region The current world order is witness to an east bound movement of power and influence. The rapid rise of the Asian economies, renewed interest in Africa and the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan have put the spotlight on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) pitching it to be the main theatre for twenty-first century global politics. The IOR has come to assume a pivotal place in the contemporary geo-politics, conspicuous by the rivalry and naval-military buildup of the major powers. The Indian Ocean also links the Middle East with Asia, thereby harboring yet another critical economic and geopolitical space. Alfred Mahan describes the strategic importance of Indian Ocean in the following words: ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world would be decided on its waters.’1 Geographically, the Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest ocean and it has an area of 26,469,900 sq. miles (68,566,000 sq. km). It spans the coasts of India, Pakistan, Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Australia, certain islands of Indonesia, the Malay Peninsula and Antarctica. The region contains 25 per cent of the world’s landmass, 40 per cent of the world’s oil and gas reserves

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Map of Indian Ocean. Source: http://www.yourchildrenlearns.commapofindianoceanatgoogle.com

and handles 30 per cent of the world’s trade.2 It constitutes between a quarter and a third of the world’s population (close to 2 billion) which makes it a massive market. It is rich in strategic and precious minerals and metals and other natural resources, valuable marine resources ranging from food fisheries to raw material and energy for industries. It has abundant agricultural wealth in terms of the variety and mass of arable land and has significant human resources and technological capabilities. Many countries of the Rim are becoming globally competitive and are developing new capacities, which can be jointly harnessed through regional co-operation efforts.3 The ridges running through the ocean have carved out many strategic islandic locations, viz., St. Paul, Rodriguez, Chagos Islands group, Seychelles-Mauritius, Reunion, Prince Edward Islands, Kerguelen islands. Andaman, Cocos, Christmas islands and so on. It is also the locus of important international Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). Also significant is the location of the maritime chokes points in this ocean; these include the Suez

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Canal, Bab-el-Mandab and Strait of Hormuz in the north-west, Mozambique Channel in the south-west; and Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait in the south-east of the ocean. These choke points typically have the potential of controlling the entry and exit of the flow of maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean.

The Shifting Power Landscape This explains the heightened competition between the regional and extra-regional powers for gaining dominance over the Indian Ocean region. The rapid rise of the Asian economies, renewed interest in Africa and the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan have put the spotlight on the IOR pitching it to be the main theatre for twenty-first century global politics. IOR is also a region wherein instability and conflict can be quick to spark off over border disputes, internal conflicts, resource security, piracy, terrorism, environmental security issues, economic exploitation of the oceanic resources and conflicting national interests. Because of Indian Ocean’s growing importance to global trade and energy flows, extra-regional powers too have sought to build maritime security by forging strategic partnerships with key littoral states in the Indian Ocean Rim. Emergence of both China as a major maritime and economic power has posed a challenge to USA’s traditional hegemony. In 2009, noted American journalist and writer, Robert D. Kaplan saw energy security and geopolitics converging in the Indian Ocean.4 Other than the United States, the countries commanding most of Kaplan’s attention were India and China. Given their size and growing dependence on the sea lanes for energy supplies and trade, Kaplan saw an inevitable geopolitical ‘great game’ rivalry emerging in the Indian Ocean. The policy of the major powers in the Indian Ocean is based on the objective to secure their economic, political and military interest. As observed by Vali,5 the nature of US interests in the Indian Ocean, reveal that they are neither offensive nor defensive nor expansionist, but are rather aimed at maintaining the status quo. As has been observed by researchers, the major US interest in the Indian Ocean is the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern

322  Sukalpa Chakrabarti oil, the protection of its investment in the same area and the safety of sea routes for supply of strategic raw material to the developed countries. The conflict in the Horn of Africa, the Iran-Iraq war, tensions in the Gulf and Middle East, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the presence of an anti-US government in Iran, have all forced the US to re-evaluate their policy in the Indian Ocean. Parallely, the emergence of China as both a major maritime and economic power has posed a challenge to USA’s traditional hegemony. In response, USA is also enhancing its naval presence in the region. The US strategy has been to leverage the naval power of its closest allies – India in the Indian Ocean and Japan in the western Pacific – to set limits on China’s expansion; as is evinced through the ‘Asia pivot’ strategic shift. The 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review talked of India’s positive role as a ‘net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond’. India’s ‘Look East-Act East’ policy, which envisions high-level engagement with nations in Asia that are traditionally perceived to be China-wary, is in perfect sync with the US policy. The Russian intervention in Afghanistan is analysed by Western strategists as an evidence of its expansion southwards. It is alleged that the long-term interest of Russia lies in allying with the oil producing areas of the Gulf, in a bid to control the important choke points of the Indian Ocean and also preparing for future exploration and exploitation of the riches of the ocean. Russia also seeks to contain China by establishing its footprint in the IOR and thereby posing a threat to its southern border. Let us now examine the US-Russia relations in the region. With the renewed intensification of Russian-American rivalry, it is but natural that Russia also wants to establish its dominant presence in the region. As a part of this strategy, the Russian government has signed friendship treaties with India. The ‘Protocol for Consultations Between the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for the period of 2013-2014’ states that both countries will seek to ‘further strengthen the special and privileged strategic partnership and to enhance the cooperation between the countries both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral format, including in the

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framework of international and regional organizations. . . .’ In fact, India has signed more treaties with Russia than with any other country, indicating that the process of engagement between the two countries continues to remain high.6 Both USA and Russia justify their naval-military presence in the Indian Ocean by declaring that it is a source of regional stability. Actually, neither the US nor Russia would like to vacate the area out of the sheer fear that a rival would take advantage of the situation.7 The same is true of the emerging Asian powers. The small and medium-sized states of Indian Ocean nurse the fear that India or China would try to fill the vacuum in the absence of the extra regional powers and dominate over them. China views the American presence in the region as an effort to ensure the stability of friendly regimes and primarily a control over oil prices. It harbours the suspicion that USA is trying to contain People’s Republic of China by roping in Indian Ocean littorals within an Indo Pacific littoral. The January 2014 naval drill by China on Lombok Strait near Indonesia is seen as a signal that maritime security interests have come to dominate Chinese thinking on IOR. Chinese President, Xi Jinping has been open in proposing a new maritime silk road (MSR) similar to ancient Chinese trading route to accelerate economies of the region, and has even proposed setting up of a China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund. This strategy helps China dispel the notion of ‘string of pearls’8 theory, legitimizing its involvement in the maritime infrastructure projects along the maritime silk route. It extends from its naval base in Hainan Island (South China Sea) to Bagamayo in Tanzania, Africa, with several of the ports encircling mainland India. Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Marao Atoll (Maldives) are the ports being built by China as per the initiative. The larger Chinese interest in the region is that it needs ASEAN resources and its markets. The tricky territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea that vexes China in its relations with Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, also connected with energy security issue, needs a peaceful solution. Any act of assertiveness by China can push these countries closer to extra regional powers like Japan

324  Sukalpa Chakrabarti or USA. Possibly therefore, China is trying to cement peaceful relations by taking the initiative to share its development dividend; the maritime silk route being one such technique. The Chinese government is also envisaging a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, to link the Indian Ocean to China’s Pacific coast – a project that could further tilt Asia’s balance of power in China’s favour by giving China’s flourishing navy and commercial maritime fleet easy access to a vast oceanic continuum stretching all the way from East Africa to Japan and the Korean Peninsula.9 Parallely, China is also cultivating its relations with the countries of the region through aid, trade and defence agreements. While China’s maritime objectives in shipbuilding and port construction around the Indian Ocean are primarily driven by commercial interests, the possibility that the large investments could later evolve or be adapted for military purposes cannot be ruled out altogether. Also China is seeking to reposition itself in the Middle East and Africa. On Iran, China has been willing to reduce its energy trade with Iran, but does not want to accommodate the western demands to cause economic pressure to isolate and punish Iran for its non-compliance on nuclear issues, as that could lead to instability in the country. In Egypt also China is keen that they avoid the ‘Turkey model’ premised on democracy, the free market and close ties to the West. Such an alternative course for Egypt would be a potent sign of reduced American influence in the Arab country of greatest consequence for the United States.10 The other emerging power of the Indian Ocean with control of the most critical Strait of Hormuz is Iran. The Hormuz transit route is responsible for the supply of oil to most of the world. It is an effective tool in the hands of Iran to bargain with USA and its allies over the thorny nuclear issues. This has been clearly indicated in the Iranian response to the European Union’s oil embargo with a defiant show of military strength and renewed threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Parallely, preserving the security in the Strait of Hormuz is a priority of Iran’s defensive deterrence strategy in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Europe too has robust economic and security interests in the Indian Ocean. The UK and France hold territories and military bases in the Indian Ocean and provide support to

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counterterrorism and counter piracy operations through NATO, the EU and Combined Maritime Forces. European countries are working to obtain rights to mine the seabed of the Indian Ocean for valuable metals, with some foreseeing a rush in deep-sea exploration in the coming years. Japan and South Korea are highly dependent on imported oil and gas that transit the Indian Ocean. Both nations have companies that are undertaking exploration activities in the Bay of Bengal and western Indian Ocean, while their navies have conducted escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. Japan also built a counter piracy base in Djibouti in 2011. Also as the other Asian economies grow and their energy requirements increase, their interest in IOR is going to get intensified. Thus the Indian Ocean, which links Europe and the Middle East with Asia, as the new global centre of trade and energy flows has become critical in determining the eclectic geopolitics, maritime order, and balance of power in Asia and beyond.

Indian Efforts to Establish Imprint on the IOR With China rapidly increasing its naval and strategic might in the Indian Ocean, India is also looking for ways to counter the threats in what she considers to be her backyard. India has forged close defence ties with almost all important countries in the region such as Mauritius, Maldives, Singapore, Seychelles, Srilanka, Vietnam, Malaysia and Oman. Wariness about China’s rising influence has led India to encourage USA and Japan’s involvement in the IOR. This marks a major shift in India’s foreign policy directive which was previously aimed at keeping extra regional powers out. Among the Indian Ocean littorals, it is a fact that the Indian navy is the most powerful and with the new government, the rhetoric about maritime security, interests and influence in the Indian Ocean region has significantly changed. It is a historical fact that all major powers have also been great sea powers. This was reiterated by India’s first Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru in the following lines ‘to be secure on land we must be supreme at sea’. The Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine also argues that, ‘Control of the choke points could be useful as a bargaining chip

326  Sukalpa Chakrabarti in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.’ A rising share of India’s growing military budget is being passed to the Indian navy, amounting to $6.2 billion,11 or nearly a fifth of total military spending. India is also the founding member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium as well as Contact Group on Piracy, as well as a signatory to the tripartite maritime security pact with Sri Lanka and Maldives emphasizing on joint cooperation on exclusive economic zone surveillance and anti-piracy efforts. India has also engaged with USA in the maritime drills, popularly known as the Malabar exercises. At the same time India is anxious to preempt any suspicion of maritime power projection. The Ministry of Defence’s annual reports seek to project Indian navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean as a catalyst for peace, tranquility and stability. The Indian government’s response to China’s MSR has been to launch ‘Project Mausam’ for countering Beijing’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region. This transnational programme is aimed at restoring India’s ancient maritime routes and cultural links with republics in the region. The project proposes to determine the Indian Ocean ‘world’ – expanding from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asian archipelago. Therefore the IOR, comprising 56 littoral and hinterland states, is where India is looking, to take on the high stake power play. India is seeking to enhance its involvement in the region, in a bid to expand her sphere of influence from the Plateau of Iran to the Gulf of Thailand. India is also set to become the world’s fourth-largest energy consumer, after the USA, China, and Japan. In this, she is dependent on oil for roughly 33 per cent of the energy needs, 65 per cent of which is imported; and 90 per cent of the oil imports could soon come from the Persian Gulf. Another reason is India’s ‘Hormuz dilemma’ – her dependence on imports passing through the strait, close to the shores of Pakistan’s Makran coast, where the Chinese are helping the Pakistanis develop deepwater ports. In response, India is enlarging its navy to establish strategic autonomy in the IOR. Thus we see that, both China and India continue to vie for similar strategic space in the IOR. While China’s commercial influence in the region has increased, India

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meanwhile has called for a common maritime security regime in the IOR. This move is seen as a calculated regional cooperative approach to maritime security, in a bid to counter China’s overtures. All these developments seem to reinforce, Robert D. Kaplan’s observation that ‘The Indian Ocean area will be the true nexus of world powers and conflict in the coming years. It is here that the fight for democracy, energy independence and religious freedom will be lost or won.’ Kaplan12 hypothesized the scenario of a maritime Great Game in the Indian Ocean between India and China. A summary of his views reads: ‘Already the world’s preeminent energy and trade interstate seaway, the Indian Ocean will matter even more as India and China enter into a dynamic great‐power rivalry in these waters.’

Conclusion Finally, the conclusion considers potential for Indian leadership to collective diplomacy approaches, and suggests some directions for future research. Despite maritime bonding, the IOR has unfortunately not seen the emergence of a vibrant trans-oceanic community. India’s geo strategic location and power can serve to organize the states of the Indian Ocean littoral. In the words of Admiral Suresh Mehta, former Chief of Naval Staff, India – ‘we need to project power and show presence; catalyse partnerships through our maritime capability; build trust and create interoperability through joint operations and international maritime assistance’.13 While presently, no Asian power is pressing for an IOR union along the lines of the European Union but all seem to agree on the need to go beyond what is currently in existence to promote regional security and deal with collective problems of globalization and natural disasters. There also seems to be no disagreement that this should be pursued under a regional forum (IORA/IOC/ BIMSTEC etc.). However, there is obviously ground for political contest over the depth, breadth, form and purpose of future regional governance and the shape of institutional arrangements. India can take lead by focusing on cementing multilateral relationship through the four Cs of Collective

328  Sukalpa Chakrabarti diplomacy, Commerce, Communication and Culture. By leading collective diplomacy efforts, what is suggested is that India takes initiative in promoting ‘pooled regional governance’14 in the IOR. By collective diplomacy the paper signifies any collective action aimed at arbitrating, tempering or diffusing regional tensions and maximizing the benefits from positive collective foreign policy influences. Such exercises in collective diplomacy are useful in building consensus and trust among the participants which then needs to be followed by institutional developments. Given the enhanced interest of regional and extra regional powers in the IOR, India would have to proactively work towards developing strategic security architecture so that her status as a predominant power in the region is recognized. This would call for a policy of cooperative engagement to – (a) create and maintain regional balance (b) continue improving maritime governance and transport (c) enhance security architecture through information sharing and surveillance and (d) emphasize on policies to promote people to people connect. In short, good governance through sustained interstate cooperation and collaboration should be the goal. First, we need to adopt a strategic cross sectorial approach to security encompassing all partners in the context of law enforcement, border control, customs and environmental vigilance, fisheries and mining control, research and development and so on. Therefore we must promote a synergetic and coordinated approach to maritime trade and security. Second, rule-based good governance at sea, in line with the existing treaties and legislations (UNCLOS – United Nation’s Convention on Law of the Sea) must be enforced. Third, instead of seeking to create a new structure, programme or legislation, we need to build upon and strengthen existing achievements, be it joint contingency planning, risk management, conflict prevention or crisis response and management. Fourth, in order to establish stronghold in the IOR, India needs to chalk out comprehensive development plan for the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a security and trade zone. It is only through sustained engagement with the IOR states and translating the proposals into actions for collective good, that India

Collective Diplomacy  329

can successfully position herself as a credible, reliable and effective partner in the maritime domain, ready and able to take on her international responsibility. While looking through the traditional security analysis lens, one may naturally conclude great-power rivalry in the IOR, but there is a greater likelihood that the Indian Ocean may become the theatre where great powers can end up acting together to address transnational security challenges in the spirit of harmony and collaboration. The new directions of study for the IOR, from the perspective of international relations should therefore cover: (a) Collective diplomacy to respond to traditional and nontraditional threats to security in the IOR (b) Island dynamics in international power play in the IOR (c) Migration and rehabilitation issues in the IOR (d) People to people connect and cross border public diplomacy in the IOR (e) Role of civil society in addressing the issues of IOR (f) Technology and resource sharing for natural disaster mitigation the IOR (g) Regional economic cooperation and peace building in the IOR (h) R&D for resource utilization – the role of private and public corporations These are however only indicative of some of the broad areas of research and cooperation likely to take precedence in the region and not an exhaustive list.

Notes 1. Bezboruah Monarajan, US Strategy in the Indian Ocean, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 3. 2. R.C. Wijegunarathne, Rear Admiral, ‘Maritime Security Concerns in the Indian Ocean’. www.galledialogue.com/assets/pdf/rear_admiral_rc_ wijegu 3. http://www.iora.net/about-us/background.aspx 4. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the 21st Century: Power plays in the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2009 (http://www.foreign

330  Sukalpa Chakrabarti affairs.com/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/center-stage-for-the-21stcentury). 5. F.A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, New York, The Free Press, 1976, p. 28. 6. Rakesh Krishnan Simha, ‘High up on India’s Treaty Meter’, 9 August 2014 http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/08/09/high_up_on_indias_treaty_ meter_37303.html 7. Abbas Amirie (ed.), ‘The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics’, Tehran, Institute for International, Political and Economic Studies, 1975, p. 4. 8. The ‘String of Pearls’ describes the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf. Each ‘pearl’ in the ‘String of Pearls’ is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with upgraded military facilities, is a ‘pearl.’ An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a ‘pearl.’ A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a ‘pearl.’ Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a ‘pearl,’ as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s ‘String of Pearls.’ The ‘pearls’ extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East. 9. http://orientalreview.org/2013/04/19/evolving-strategic-competitionin-the-indian-ocean/ 10. ‘New Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Region?’, Opinion by Ellen Laipson on 27 June 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/new-geopoliticsindian-ocean-region-1326305 11. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21617000-india-eyes-strategicopportunity-bay-bengal-outpost-springboard 12. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/centerstage-for-the-21st-century 13. Admiral Suresh Mehta, Chief of Naval Staff, at the Indian National Defence College, November 2005. 14. Australian Prime Minister Howard first promoted the notion of ‘pooled regional governance’ in July 2003 in the context of announcing his

Collective Diplomacy  331 government’s intention to lead a regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands.

References Africa‐Asia Confidential, ‘The Battle for the Indian Ocean’, May 2009. http:// www.africa‐asia‐confidential.com/article‐preview/id/234/The-battle‐ for-the-Indian-Ocean (accessed on September 2014). Barber, N., K. Coe, V. Steffes and J. Winter, ‘China in the Indian Ocean: Impacts, Prospects, Opportunities’, Robert M. Lafollette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Spring 2011. Chunhao, Lou, ‘US-India-China Relations in the Indian Ocean: A Chinese Perspective’, IDSA, vol. 36, no. 4, July 2012; http://www.idsa.in/ strategicanalysis/36_4/USIndiaChinaRelationsintheIndianOcean_ LouChunhao.html (accessed on August 2014). Harrison, Selig S. (ed.), 1989, Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, Robert D., ‘Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64832/ robert-d-kaplan/center-stage-for-the-21st-century (accessed on 5 April 2013). , ‘China’s Unfolding Indian Ocean Strategy – Analysis’, 11 February 2014 http://www.cnas.org/content/china%E2%80%99s-unfoldingindian-ocean-strategy-%E2%80%93-analysis#.VLZqT9KUf84 (accessed on August 2014) Michel, David and Russell Sticklor, eds., Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, July 2012, Stimson; http://www.stimson. org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Book_IOR_2.pdf (accessed on August 2014) Quadrennial Defence Review Report, February 2010, Department of Defence: Washington DC. www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_ 12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed on August 2014). Rajan, D.S., ‘China in the Indian Ocean: Competing Priorities’, http:// www.ipcs.org/article/india/china-in-the-indian-ocean-competingpriorities-4302.html (accessed on September 2014). Ryou, J.H., ‘South China Sea and the Indian Ocean’, http://orfonline.org/ cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/South%20 China%20Sea_1249644687106.pdf (accessed on September 2014) www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IORARC.pdf (accessed on August 2014).

CHAPTER 22

Indian Ocean Warming: Its Extent and Impact on the Monsoon and Marine Productivity M.K. ROXY

Among the major oceans, Indian Ocean is the smallest, but also the warmest. Being the warmest among the major oceans, the Indian Ocean plays a critical role in regulating the mean climate and variability of the Asian monsoon, as well as the dynamics over the tropics. The Fifth Assessment Report from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that 90 per cent of the heat due to anthropogenic warming during the past several decades is stored in the oceans. A recent study (Roxy et al. 2014) using observed datasets and climate models demonstrate that a large share of this heat has accumulated in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean has been warming for more than a century, at a rate and magnitude larger than what was thought before. While the global mean summer sea surface temperatures have risen up to 0.6 °C, the tropical Indian Ocean surface temperatures have gone beyond these values. In some regions, like the western Indian Ocean, the increase in the summer sea surface temperatures is up to 1.2 °C. This intense, monotonous warming turns out to be the largest contributor in-phase with the global ocean surface warming, with a firm grip on the global climate.

334  M.K. Roxy

The Cause: Increasing El Niño Events, likely due to Anthropogenic Emissions What has caused this intense warming of the Indian Ocean? Roxy et al. (2014) points out to an increase in the frequency and magnitude of El Niño events during the recent decades. El Niño is a quasi-periodic phenomenon (i.e. they occur on average every three to five years), associated with warmer than usual temperatures in the east Pacific. Earlier studies (e.g. Du et al., 2009) have shown that when there is an El Niño event,the changes in the atmospheric circulation induces warming over the western Indian Ocean. The number and intensity of these El Niño events have significantly increased during the latter half of twentieth century, in comparison with the former half. That is, while there were only 7 events during 1901-50 with surface temperatures 1.0 oC above normal, there were about 12 El Niño events during 1951-2000 with surface temperatures 2.0 oC greater than normal. Once these El Niño events dump the heat on the Indian Ocean, the local ocean-atmospheric interaction behave in such a way that the heat persists in the basin for a long time. In the first impression, the role of El Niño events in warming the Indian Ocean seems to imply that there is no anthropogenic role on it. There is a twist here though. It is highly likely that this increase in El Niño events are in turn due to the increase in greenhouse gases (anthropogenic emissions), though at the moment we do not have concrete evidence to prove it.

Potential Implications on Monsoon Rainfall and Marine Productivity Consequences of the rapid warming of Indian Ocean are large, especially on the physical and biological dynamics over the South Asian domain, and eventually on the socio-economic livelihood of the Indian Ocean rim countries. An essential control of the monsoon is the thermal contrast between land and sea. During summer, the land will be warmer than the sea-driving the monsoon circulation towards the land. Recent analysis (Roxy

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et al., 2015a) shows that since the Indian Ocean has been consistently warming, the strength of the land-sea thermal contrast has reduced considerably. This has weakened the monsoon circulation, and in turn reduced the rainfall over central South Asia, extending from Pakistan through central India to Bangladesh. The reduction in rainfall is significant especially over the central-eastern parts of India (about 10-20 per cent), where agriculture is still mostly rain-fed. Another implication of the intense warming in the Indian Ocean is its potential role in affecting the marine biological productivity. The warming is most intense over the western Indian Ocean – one of the most biologically productive regions among the tropical oceans. Warmer ocean temperatures, along with its direct effect and heat stress on the marine organisms, have indirect effects too. Warmer surface waters are less dense, making it difficult to mix with the subsurface waters. The subsurface waters are usually nutrient rich, ideal for enhanced production of phytoplankton. Marine phytoplankton are the microscopic plant-like organism in the ocean, which forms the base of the food pyramid. The phytoplankton is consumed by the zooplankton, which is in turn consumed by fish and other marine organisms. Hence warmer surface waters can mean less nutrient mixing, leading to a possible reduction in marine phytoplankton and ultimately the fish production. Analysis using observations and climate model simulations (Roxy et al., 2015b) shows that the warm, less dense water in the surface has suppressed the upwelling of nutrients from the subsurface waters, and have resulted in a reduction of up to 20 per cent in the marine phytoplankton production in the recent decades. India is not only a major consumer, but also one of the major suppliers to the global fish market. Statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) show that the Indian Ocean, despite being the smallest of the tropical oceans, supports the second largest share of the most economically viable big-eye tuna catch. Overfishing since the 1950s have resulted in a marked reduction of annual catch rates of tuna from the Indian Ocean. Combined with the industrial fishing pressure, the reduced phytoplankton due to

336  M.K. Roxy warmer temperatures has the potential to drive this productive region to an ecological desert, depleting the fishery resources. Future climate model simulations suggest that Indian Ocean will continue to warm, as human activities are providing increasingly strong climate forcing. This might potentially lead to further desertification of the Indian subcontinent in terms of the rainfall, and the Indian Ocean in terms of the biological resources. The Indian Ocean may thus need to be monitored more closely to see if it is acting as an early indicator of physical-biological interactions in a warming world.

References Du, Y., S-P Xie, G. Huang and K. Hu, 2009, ‘Role of Air-Sea Interaction in the Long Persistence of El Niño-induced North Indian Ocean Warming’, Journal of Climate, 22: 2023-38. Roxy, M.K., K. Ritika, P. Terray and S. Masson, 2014, ‘The Curious Case of Indian Ocean Warming’, Journal of Climate, 8501-9. Roxy, M.K., K. Ritika, P. Terray, R. Murutugudde, K. Ashok and B.N. Goswami, 2015a, ‘Warm Ocean, Weak monsoon’, Nature Communications, http:// www.nature.com, revised. Roxy, M.K., A. Modi, R. Murutugudde, V. Valsala, S. Panickal, S. Prasanna Kumar and M. Ravichandran, 2015b, ‘A Reduction in Marine Primary Productivity Driven by Rapid Warming over the Tropical Indian Ocean’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, revised.

Contributors

ALICE SAMSON, Assistant Professor in English, National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad. ANAS S. Ph.D. Scholar, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. APARAJITA BISWAS, Professor, Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai, Mumbai. CHRISTIAN BOUCHARD, Professor, School of Environment, Science Engineering and Architecture, Laurentian University, Ontario, Canada. JOE CHIRSTOPHER, Independent Researcher, Hyderabad. LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN, Professor of History, Centre for Studies in Social Science, Kolkata. MOHAMMED KHALID, Professor of Political Science, Department of Evening Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. MOHAN GURUSWAMY, Chairman and Founder, Centre for Policy Alternatives, New Delhi. MOHOR CHAKRABORTY, Assistant Professor in Political Science, South Calcutta Girls College (under Calcutta University), Kolkata. MUNTASIR MAMUN, (Former) First Secretary Bangladesh High Commission, New Delhi. RAJIV K. BHATIA, (Former) Director General, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

338  Contributors ROXY MATHEW KOLL, Climate Scientist, Indian Institute of Tropical Metrology, and an Adjunct Professor, University of Pune, Pune. R.S. SHARMA, Professor of English (retd.) and former Dean, Faculty of Arts, Osmania University, Hyderabad. RUI KOHIYAMA, Professor of American and Gender Studies, Tokyo Women’s Christian University, Tokyo. SACHIDANAND MOHANTY, Professor, Department of English, University of Hyderabad. SANITHA BEEVI, Assistant Professor, Iqbal College, Peringammalla, Trivandrum. SOOCRAMANIEN VITHILINGAM, Ph.D. Scholar, Open University of Mauritius, Mauritius. SOOSHILLA GOPAUL, Professor, Open University of Mauritius, Mauritius. SREEPARNA DASGUPTA, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Loreto College, Kolkata. SRIPARNA PATHAK RAIMEDHI, Doctoral Candidate, Chinese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi  SUSANTHA GOONATILAKE, President, Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Sri Lanka. SUKALPA CHAKRABARTI, Deputy Director, Associate Professor (IR & Public Policy), Symbiosis School of Economics, Pune. WILLIAM CRUMPLIN, Associate Professor, School of the Environment, Science Engineering and Architecture, Laurentian University, Ontario, Canada.

Index

Aapravasi Ghat 108-9 Act East policies 305, 310, 311 Adejunmobi, Mardewun 131-2 al-Idrisi’s Kitab-e-Rujar 177 Alpers, Edward A. 132 Amphora 172 Anthropocentrism 202-3; Utkal Sahitya, conflicting approach to writing history 202 Arab Islamic world 176 Australian Strategic Policy Institute 26 Bahr-al-Hind 39 Bangladesh, Awami League 211-12 Bangladesh, economic reforms 21315; 1980s, economic policies 215; 1990s, economic liberalization 215-16; 1990s, trade reform strategy 222; 2011, growth outlook 223-6; BCIM-EC: Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar Economic Corridor 228; Belt and Road, China’s internal economic integration 229; China’s growing capacity and economic clout 230; China’s internal economic integration and competitiveness 229; conducting structural adjustments 218; Dhaka Stock Exchange, stock market capitalization of 226; economic well-being, shrinking contribution of foreign aid 217-18; enhanced structural adjustment facility 216; evolving from an aid to a trade-dependent economy 220; external assistance, multilateral and

bilateral sources 216-18; external debt, cost of 217; external factors 219; external gap (export-import gap) 216; financial sector reform 215; foreign direct investment 226-7; global recession 225; Information Silk Road 228; infrastructure projects 229; internal factors 218; internal gap (savings-investment gap) 216; liberalization measures 215-16; major institutional frameworks 227-31; MDGrelated sectors 220; Medium Term Budgetary Framework reforms 223-4; Millennium Development Goals 220; multi-sector multicountry corridors 231-43; multi-year budget horizon 223; new Belt and Road plan 228-9; new millennium, expansionary policies in 220-1; One Belt, One Road 230; partition of British India disrupted economy 214; policy of balancing the current accounts of the Government 214-15; Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 219; private sector driven export growth and diversification 222; RMG exports 223; SAGQ: South Asian Growth Quadrangle 228; tax policy and administration, ongoing and prospective changes in 224; total remittance inflows 225; trade barriers to new export activities and expansion 223; trade liberalization reforms 222-3; Value Added Tax,

340  Index introduction of 218; War of Liberation in 1971 214 Bangladesh, economy 212-13: East Bengal, development of 213 Bangladesh, emergence of 211-12 Bangladesh, government-in-exile / Mujibnagar Sarkar 212 Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 47 Brathwaite, Kaman 132; experience of transoceanic voyages through the metaphor of ‘tideletics’ 132 Bronze Age civilization 55 Bruneau, Michel 128-9 Cardus, Neville 159 Celebrity Cricket League teams 156 Chha Mana Atha Guntha: Western modernity, menace of 199-200 China: aggressive soft power diplomacy 59-60; Belt and Road 229-30; defence budget 60-1; overall diplomatic toolkit 229-30; rise as the world’s greatest exporter 60 China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 301 Chinese film festivals 126 Code of Hammurabi 56 Combined Task Force 150 48 Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 49 Coolitude 133 Coromandel coast, connection of trade networks 175 cricket at home and in colonies, nineteenth century 158-60; cricket’s nexus with literature 159; cricket in the Indian Ocean world 160; Englishness or Whiteness 159-60; socio-economic changes 158-59; White Man’s Burden 159 cricket tournaments 155 Das, Jibananda 133 Dayal, Lala Har 80

DeLoughrey, Elazabeth M. 132-3 Diawara, Manthia 160 Eaton, Richard M. 176 epic form and its advantages 120-1; epic texts in prose or poetry 121; writers 121 epic writing: building up and maintaining a sound multicultural society 118; critical realism 127; diaspora to transnationalism 128-9; empiricism, positivist approach of mid-twentieth century 127; nostalgia as a source of joy as well as strength 128; reliability of knowledge through triangulation 127; shows ‘personal experiences’ have epistemic value 127-8 epics 117; constitutive features of 117 Essar Refinery at Jamnagar 58 Eurocentrism: Understanding networks in the Indian Ocean 67-71; Asian trade, internationality of 68; dynamics of trade, society and politics 68; India’s location in maritime network 68; Indian Ocean trading system, vitality and cohesiveness of 70; Indian Ocean trading network, emergence of 70-1; India’s maritime trade, late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 69-70; Indian Ocean trading system, interconnectedness of 69; luxuries and necessities in pre-capitalist cargoes, differentiation between 68; politics and trade, close connection between 69; political structures and international trade, linkages between 69; stereotypical attributes of Asian trade 68; volume of trade between Europe and Asia 67; working networks, interlocking system of 70 European World System Thesis 71-5; Afro-Eurasian ecumene 73; capitalist development, predictable telos of 74; delineation of the trading structure

Index  341 in the Indian Ocean 71-5; dominant class relations were as prevalent in Asian societies 74; English East India Company, peripheralization process 72; European overseas expansion 72; Indian Ocean as a unitary system, dynamism of 74; Indian Ocean as a unitary trading system 72-3; Indian Ocean as a unitary trading system 72-3; Indian Ocean world economy 73; maritime merchants, study of 75; mobile merchant networks, understanding of 75; tribute collection, re-distributive mechanisms of 72 Fifth Assessment Report from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 333 Francophone Africa, Indian diaspora in 183-94: 1986 Fiji crisis 188; Act of Emancipation of 1834 190; active and overt association of the PIOs for foreign policy objectives 188-9; anti-apartheid struggle, role of Indian National Congress 187; bilateral trade and investment 192; foreign policy in pre-Independence period 186-7; High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora 189-90; in Réunion 183-4; indentured Indian immigration in Calcutta and Madras 190-1; India and the island states of Mauritius and Seychelles, relations between 193; India, security cooperation with Seychelles 184-5; Indian government, view towards its diaspora 188; Indian political elite 187; Indian soft power diplomacy 186-8; Indians worked as indentured labourers 190; L.M. Singhvi Committee Report on PIOs and NRIs 188; labourers recruited from India 191; longand short-term comprehensive policy, diaspora during the NDA

regime 189; Mauritian politics 192; Mauritius, influx of Indians immigrant labourers 191; Mauritius, PIOs and NRIs 184; nationalist movement 187; NDA, close contacts with the overseas Hindu population 189; Nehru’s views, influenced by circumstantial Necessities 187-8; newly independent India, sovereignty issues of 187-8; PIO card scheme 189; post-Independence India, ethnic Indians 187; Seychelles 184; soft power and Indian foreign policy 185-90; trans-border movement of people 185-6; UNC LOS-111, 184; vital role in the political process 192; voluntary immigration 191; West Indian Ocean Littoral States, Indian Diaspora in 190-4 Ghosh, Amitav 134; archaeology of language and words, new approach to the Indian Ocean experience 136; Fanas and Forecastles 135; Indian Ocean community in the lives of the Lascars 135; Indian Ocean voyage 134; sailing and its complex ramifications in history and community 136 Glissant, Eduward 132 Great Morcellement Movement, IndoMauritian Community, history of 110; family life 110 Hill Stations in Asia 86-7 Hofmeyr, Isabel 132; Indian Ocean, universalization of 132 ICCR 190; cultural centres in many parts of the world 194 Ichiro, Inumaru 98 ICWA’s initiatives 26-7; ‘Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region: Asian Perspectives, international conference on 26; Track-1.5

342  Index Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean 26 Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC), making of 161-4; decision to organize periodic test matches 162; decolonization of cricket 163; new triumvirate within the ICC 163-4; renamed International Cricket Conference 162; Sir Abraham Bailey 161-2 India Ocean: ‘Great Power’ politics of the twenty-first century 51; regional and extra-regional maritime powers 51 India, power potential: Himalayan river systems 234 India, world’s third largest GDP 62 India’s soft power project 15, 20, 28, 183-94; public diplomacy division in India’s Ministry of External Affairs 193; thriving and free press 193 India–Indonesia Coordinated Patrolling 311 Indian Council of World Affairs 25 Indian diaspora in Reunion Island 113-15; GOPIO Mauritius 114; named l’Ile Bourbon 114; named Santa Apolonia by the Portugese 113; renamed Reunion in 1793 114; Reunionais diaspora, struggle for recognition as PIOs 115 Indian diaspora in Sub-Saharan Africa 183-94; Non-Resident Indians 183; People of Indian Origin 183 Indian Diaspora in the Mascarenes, origins and present status 107-8; Indo-Mauritians 108; Indian Government’s High Level Committee’s report 108-9; Mauritius, strong Hindu and Muslim communities 108 Indian Diaspora in the Mascarenes, spread of 106-7; integration and assimilation, French policy of 107 Indian Navy’s footprints in the IOR 313-16; central role as a ‘net security

provider 315; evolution of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 314; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations 314; Indian Ocean Regional Association 314; MILAN’ 314; Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 314; PLANavy, ambitions of 315 Indian Ocean Commission 47; declared objectives of 47 Indian Ocean communities 132; Lascar and his language 135 Indian Ocean: as an inter-regional space in a time of intense global connections 133-4 Indian Ocean historiography 131 Indian Ocean history 131 Indian Ocean Islamicate system, Medieval Indian Ocean History 17582; Asian trade, homogenization of 177; Calicut 180; connection points of the system 178-82; Coromandel ports 180; Islamic world, premodern entity of 176; Genizah, Jewish trade with Malabar 178; Kaya 181; Kilakaria 180-1; Kollam 178-9; Malabar 177; Mangalore (Ar. Manjarur), in South Kanara 179; Marakkayar or Marakkar Muslim community 178; Valapattanam (formerly Baliapatam, Ar. Budfattan) 179-80 Indian Ocean life: rhizome memories 132 Indian Ocean Naval symposium 299 Indian Ocean public sphere: New universalism, new histories and new geographies of law 79-81; education and the articulation of a civic religion 80; Indian Ocean Studies, cultural studies perspective on 81; objectionable appellation of India as ‘coolieland’ 80 Indian Ocean region 27-8; BCIMEconomic Corridor and Maritime Silk Route 28; British Indian Ocean

Index  343 Territory, unsettled dispute of 48; blue book 289; Buddhism (‘The Light of Asia’ in Arnold’s evocative poem), cultural overlay of 32; centrality to India’s being 55-63; collaboration-cum-competition in 28; continued US naval base in Diego Garcia 48; Cultural Dynamics, past and future 31-7; Descartes’ cogito 33; Eurocentric cultural systems 31; Eurocentric culture 31; high level of internal conflicts 48; Joint Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region 28; political divergence in the states 286; Project Mausam 28; sea-blindness 27; UNsponsored Zone of Peace Proposal 286; Western philosophy, postscientific revolution 33 Indian Ocean region, centrality to India’s being 55-63; China and India, aspirations of developing blue water naval capabilities 59; China’s aggressive soft power diplomacy 59-60; more than half the world’s armed conflicts 59; oil, history of 58; Petroleum Age 57-8; physical environmental conditions over the sea 57; sea lanes 58-9; Sino-Indian affairs, equilibrium in 63; substantial military forces, deployed by world’s major powers 59; threat from China 61 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 26, 46-7, 299 Indian Ocean Rim for Economic Cooperation 105 Indian Ocean Rim Initiative 46 Indian Ocean studies 13, 40-1, 43, 46-8, 50, 66-81, 131-4, 143; contiguous mass since the Palaeozoic era 41; coveted fish species 43; enclave economies fuelled by European capital 66; Euro-Asian enterprise, interconnectedness of 67; European hegemonic discourse and Indian

jingoism, balance between 66; European trading companies, preponderance of 66; expansionist enterprise of Hindus in Southeast Asia 67; genealogy of 65; late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury scholarship 66; living resources 43; methodological shift in 134; Portuguese advent, history of India’s transformation 66; private trade and partnership 66; regionaland pan-regional issues 43; sustained revisionism laid Eurocentrism to rest 66; writers and intellectuals, delving deep into colonial archives 133 Indian Ocean surface temperatures 333 Indian Ocean to Asia, shift to 35-7; economic shift 35; epistemological positions 35; eurocentric 36; Indic philosophical systems 35 Indian Ocean to the Pacific: Missionary summer resorts in Asia 85-100; Missionaries in Asia 85 Indian Ocean trade, history of 176 Indian Ocean Warming 333-6; affecting the marine biological productivity, potential role in 335; El Niño events, frequency and magnitude of 334; monsoon rainfall and marine productivity, potential implications on 334-6; most intense over western Indian Ocean 335; subsurface waters 335 Indian Ocean, after the end of the Cold War 39-52; African littoral of 46; as a theatre of conflict 44; as a zone of peace 43; Asian economies, growth of, strategic importance 44; bilateral trade and multilateral trade in 50; Central Indian Ocean Basin and 44; civilizations and cultures on the shores 39; environmental degradation and challenges faced 45; Gulf of Aden, international naval force in 49; India and 50-1; Indian Diaspora today 46; Indian Ocean

344  Index Asian coastlines 45; International Seabed Authority 44; littoral lands 40; maritime security and securityrelated issues 44; mini-Indias on the African continent and Arabian Peninsula 46; oil and gas fields 44; Peoples of Indian Origin 46; piracy, emergence of, and its implications 48-9; post-Gaman epoch 40; pre-Gaman period 40; regional cooperation and conflicts 46-8; Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), protection of 45; securing supply lines, China needs to protect the SLOCs 50; Somali coast, piracy off at 48; strategic chokepoints 44-5; strategic importance 44; String of Pearls 49-50; United Nations Peacekeeping Force 48; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1838 48 Indian Ocean, and imperial flows 77-9; appreciable decline in the distribution of Indian cloth, replacement by British cloth 78; circuits of interconnectedness 77; opportunity for both the colonizer and the colonized 78; regional patriotisms 79; ruptures and discrete units, history of 78; spatial dimensions of the imperial order over the ocean 78 Indian Ocean, India’s stature in 305-16: Colombo South Container Terminal 308; Exclusive Economic Zone 305; geostrategic significance 306-7; ‘half ocean’ or ‘land-locked ocean’ 306; India and China, energy resources transported through the Indian Ocean sea-lanes 308; India’s ‘Look East’ policy 305; India’s geopolitical situation, salience of 307; Indian naval power, insight and rationale for the resurgence of 309; Indian security sphere 306-7; IOR, cockpit of Sino-India rivalry 308-10; Look

East policy, building cooperative maritime security linkages 310; non-traditional challenges in the IOR, Indian Navy’s response 310-13; Overseas Strategic Support Bases 308; People’s Liberation Army-Navy 308 Indian Ocean, small island states and territories 255-6; military deployment and operations 257; military foreign presence, different situations 257-8; military uses and ‘Military Forward Presence’ in 2568; Sea Lines of Communications 258; United States’ armed forces in 259-61 Indian Ocean small islands, Australia 269-71; Cocos Islands as prime real estate in the Indo-Pacific strategic game of position 270; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities 269; military activities 269; sovereignty over four external territories in the IOR 269 Indian Ocean small islands, China 271-5; 039 diesel-electric Songclass submarine 272-3; China’s ‘military forward presence’, possible geographic options 273-4; Chinese military presence 273; Coco Islands in Myanmar, Chinese military activities 274-5; nuclear powered attack submarine (Shang class SSN ) 272; People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines 272; String of Pearls’ strategy 272 Indian Ocean small islands, France 265-9; European Union Naval Force [EU NA VFOR] Somalia– Operation Atalanta 267; FAZSOI forces 266, 268; FAZSOI official area of operation 266; joint command of the French army forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone 265-6; ‘quadrilatère français’ 268; territorial possessions 265

Index  345 Indian Ocean small islands, India’s maritime military strategy 261-5; Andaman and Nicobar Islands, non-conventional threats 264; Andaman and Nicobar installations, geostrategic significance 262-3; Indian facilities and permanent military activities outside the Indian national territory 264; Indian Maritime Doctrine 2612; Indian Navy in Mauritius and Seychelles EEZs 264-5; Lakshadweep installations 263; Naval Air Station (INS Baaz) on Great Nicobar Island 262; naval base (INS Dweeprakshak) on Kavaratti Island in the Lakshadweep Islands 262 Indian Ocean small islands, Russia’s military presence 275 Indian Ocean small islands, United States’ armed forces: Army and Marine Corps brigade sets 260; drone operations from 2009 to 2012 260; guided-missile nuclear-powered submarines 259; maritime patrol aircraft and drone surveillance operations 260; Navy Support Facility at Diego Garcia 259; Persian Gulf (Central Command) 259; Reaper MQ-9 drones 260; Status of Forces Agreement with the Maldivian government 261; US military activities on the small Omani island of Masirah 261 Indian Premier League (IPL) 163; T-20 form of cricket 163 India-Thailand Coordinated Joint Patrol 311 Indo-Mauritian Intelligentsia, rise of 110-12: Basdeo Bissoondoyal 111; Seewoosagur Ramgoolam 111; Jay Narain Roy 111; Renganaden Seenevassen 111 Indus Valley Civilization 55; artefacts, dispersal of 56; economy 55 International Association of Foot Ball 161

International Cricket Council 155 International Federation of Association Football 161 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 48, 49 IOR, Bangladesh striving towards a zone of peace and prosperity 205-49: Bengal, politico-economic boundaries 210; better connectivity in the value-networks 208; East and West Pakistan, disparity between 210-11; pan-Bangladesh-IndiaChina partnerships 207; politicoeconomic history of Bengal 209; synergy and leverages 207-8 IOR, China’s position 289-90: AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference 300; blue water naval force, Chinese politicalmilitary leadership for 297; building alternative ports to create alternative transport routes for its oil imports 289; China’s Indian Ocean Strategy and India’s Response 297-9; China-led AIIB initiative 301; India’s ‘Hormuz Dilemma 297; India’s geo-strategic location 295-6; India-China-US: A Complex Matrix 299-301; Indian Ocean, geo-strategic importance of 296-7; Indo-Pacific’ concept 300; military cooperation agreement between Russia and Pakistan 300-1; K.M. Pannikar, views on India’s geo-strategic location 2956; Sea Lanes of Communications, China to guard 297; Sino-Russian alliance 300; String of Pearls’ strategy 297; US administration’s ‘Asia Pivot’ doctrine 300; US Marine Corps ‘Vision and Strategy’ statement 300; US, Asia Pivot policy 300; US’s interest in the IOR centres, imperatives of 299 IOR, geostrategic significance of 31929; China’s commercial influence 326-7; China’s maritime objectives in

346  Index shipbuilding and port construction 324; European countries 325; India, initiative in promoting ‘pooled regional governance’ 328; India, policy of cooperative engagement 328; India’s ‘Hormuz dilemma’ 326; India’s ‘Project Mausam’ 326; Indian efforts 325-7; Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine 325-6; Iran, Hormuz transit route 324; maritime chokes points, location of 320-1; new directions of study 329; regional and extra-regional powers, competition between 321; Russian intervention in Afghanistan 322; Sino-US relations 323; United Nation’s Convention on Law of the Sea 328; US-Russia relations in the region 322-3 IOR, Piracy in 290-1; chemical tankers, oil tankers and bulk carriers are attacked 291; Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), issue of maritime piracy 291; disruption of the flow of trade and energy along the sea lanes 287; imports about 70 per cent of its oil through the IOR 288; India’s location 286-7; IndoAmerican bonhomie 286; Sea Lanes of Communication 287; Singapore, most affected by maritime piracy 291; vulnerable regions 290 IOR, United States’ position 288-9; American naval presence 288; geostrategic interests at stake 288-9; strategic interests 288 Islamic world system 176 Island of Madagascar 56; Malagasy 57; Maanyan language 57 Isle de France 109 Kanzo, Uchimura 97 Kar, Birupaksha 202 Karuizawa as a community constructed by missionaries, peculiarities of 91-6; as a theatre of love romance and courtship 95; Christianity as an

active functionary 92-9; Christianity practiced 93; democratic dissemination of knowledge 97; innocent and inexpensive recreations 92; Japanese Christian community 97; Japanese, own educational spaces 97-8; literary constructions of romance 98-9; major large-scale developers engaged 96; missionary conferences and Bible classes 93; missionaries, participation in the civil governance 93; ramifications among the Japanese 96-9; Alexander Shaw 92; self-governing resort community in the vicinity 98; Summer Residents’ Association 92; The ‘Christian Home’ 95; women as a definite majority 95; women missionaries 95 Karuizawa Summer Residents’ Association 93 Karuizawa Summer University 98 Kerala Council for Historical Research 173 Kochi Consensus 27, 28-9 Kodaikanal 87 Kresse, Kai 81 Lampotang’s The Coral Heart (CH) 121, 122-3, 125; Mauritian laws of inheritance 126; mutability in identity 126 long-distance sea trade 56 Look East Policy 263, 289, 305, 310, 311, 312, 322 Macaulay 31-2 Majumdar, R.C. 67 Malabar coast, connection of trade networks 175 Mangalore (Ar. Manjarur), in South Kanara: Mount Eli (Malayal. Ezhimala) 179; Navayats 179 Maritime Security Patrol Area, within the Gulf of Aden 48 Maritime trade network: operating

Index  347 between the Harappan and Mesopotamian civilizations 56 Maritime tradition in Colonial Odisha, linguistic communities and new historiography 195-204; Anthropocentrism 202-3; colonial modernity 197-9; European enlightenment, high modernism of 197; historiography based on rationally verified accounts of ‘truth’ 199; Kalinga maritime tradition 195; Gadjat states, Biritsh ruled through political agents 196; Mogalbandi zamindari system, controlled by Bengali owners 196; modernity propelled by the colonial State and its appendages 197; native gentry, Janus-faced English education 198; Utkal Dipika 197; Utkal Sahitya 195 Marx’s Asiatic Mode of Production 36 Mascarene Islands, Indian Diaspora in 105-15 Mauritian literature in English 121 Mauritian social canvas, Chinese community’s absence on 123-5; Chinese traders came as traders 123; Lin Piao’s Backshop, and Regis Fanchette 125 Mauritian society 121 Mauritius today 118-19; guiding motto of policy makers and administrators 119; mistrust of the other 119; one people one nation in peace, justice and liberty 118-19; racial discrimination 119 Mauritius, commemorative celebrations in 119-20; aim to build up individual identity 120; importance of transmitting the past 120; parades and floats commemorating the abolition of slavery or arrival of indentured labourers 119-20 Medieval Indian Ocean History 175-82; Coromandel areas, ports or coasts of 177; Indian Ocean Islamicate system 178

merchant networks, local and global flows 75-7; Armenian network, Sebouh Arsalan’s work on 75-6; diaspora community, cohesive sense of 77; Hadrami diaspora, Engseng Ho’s work on 75-6; Indian Ocean, information and values circulated in 77; Labbais or Marakkayars in southern India 76-7; rubric of trans-national public spheres and cosmopolitanism 77 MILAN (coming together) 263, 311, 314 Ministry of External Affairs and Observer Research Foundation 26 missionaries in Karuizawa, Japan, spending summer 88-91; foreigners’ summer houses 89; protestant missionaries 90; proliferation of, reasons for 89 Mohanty, Satya P. 127 Moreland, W.H. 66 Mukherjee, R.K. 66-7 Muslims: major trading community in Malabar and Coromandel 175 Muziris 169: Amphoras found in 172-4; Ancient trade 171-2; archaeological discovery 170; Artocarpus hirsutus lamk (wild jack or ‘anjily’) 171; beads found in 174; Cheraman Perumal 171; indigenous ‘Megalithic’ (Iron Age) people 174; Kerala government’s ‘Muziris Heritage Project’ 171; Kodungallur 172; locus methodology 173-4; Tectona grandis (teak) 171 Muziris Heritage Project 173 National Water Portal of India 231 New Thalassology 131 1986 Fiji crisis: Indian government’s stand 188 1972 Uganda crisis: Indian government’s policy 188 non-traditional challenges in the IOR, Indian Navy’s response 310-13; Eyes in the Sky programme, assistance in

348  Index 311; Far Eastern Naval Command 312; Indian Naval Doctrine 311; Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 312; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 312 North-Eastern Region: hydro-electric power generation potential 233; Inland Water Transit, Seamless connectivity 236; major river systems 233; rail connectivity 236-7; road connectivity 237; solid economic corridors, network of 240 Oceanic studies 14, 18 offering dual citizenship 189 Omeros 117-18; Derek Walcott from Saint Lucia 117 Osmania University Centre for International Programmes 13, 25; approach 25-6; conference 14 Panikkar, K.M. 66 Reinhardts, Catherine A. 132 Reliance Refinery at Jamnagar 58 Rodrigues, Regional Assembly Act 112 Rodrigues, the fluctuating diaspora 11213; Creole Christians 112; people of Indian origin 113; secondary schools, headed by Indo-Mauritians 113 Rossenian’ peace 299 Scheman, Naomi 127 Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) 21, 27, 45, 50, 258, 289, 291, 292, 297, 302, 307, 310, 311, 316, 320 Sea of Poppies 136, 141-52; AFRASO project 143-4; and the Indian Ocean 145-52; ‘border subjects’, Jaishree Odin 149-50; constant negotiations of identity 150; dissolution of rigidities characteristic of social structures 148-9; homogenizing and universalizing tendency of linear

time 150-1; Hypertext Aesthetic 14952; hypertext aesthetic as constantly dissolving and re-forming 151; Indian Ocean in literary and cultural representations 142; Indian Ocean, approaches to understanding 142-4; intertextual and interactive hypertext aesthetic 150; language and place, involve dynamic interaction of history, politics, and culture 150; powerful and creative force of the Kala-Pani 142; narrative rendition of the ocean as a singular vital force 145-6; unitary idea of subjectivity as unified and singular 149 Shimla 86-7 Simpson, Edward 81 Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercises 311 Slavery 16, 56, 72, 109, 132, 183, 190; in Mauritius 119 small islands 253 Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission 47 Sri Lanka, early globalization 34 Swaraj, Sushma 105 Torabully, Khal 133; Memory of the homeland 133 trading world-system 176 transhumanism 36 Tsang Mang Kin’s The Hakka Epic (HE) 121, 122, 129: Mauritian laws of inheritance 126; mutability in identity 126 Utkal Sahitya 198; Birupaksha Kar’s essay on the sea-faring tradition of Odisha 202; Buddhist period and the annals of the Buddhist pilgrim Bigyandujtta 201; colonization by the Odias during the first century ad, history of 201-2; modern historiography, idea of 200; Prachina Utkalare Jalajatra’ (‘Sea Voyages in

Index  349 Ancient Utkal’) 201; The Problem of World Religions’ 202-3; Western modernity, menace of 199 Valapattanam (formerly Baliapatam, Ar. Budfattan) 179-80 Van Leur, J.C. 66

Voll, John Obert 176 Wallerstein, Immanuel 71 West Indian Ocean Littoral States, Indian Diaspora in 190-4 Yasujiro, Tsutsumi 97